


JL
V1-56m N35
N35.117
69170

THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. CXVII

JANUARY—JUNE 1935

LONDON
CONSTABLE & COMPANY LIMITED 10 & 12 ORANGE STREET
LEICESTER SQUARE W.C. 2

JL
VI-56m N35
N35. 117



CONTENTS OF VOL. CXVII

AUTHOR		PAGE
BARDOUX, Jacques . . .	What France Needs	172
BOND, Professor R. Warwick . . .	In Praise of Pindar	112
BONE, Professor William A. . . .	Gas or Electricity for Domestic Heating? . . .	712
BOSSOM, Alfred C.	Housing and Common Sense	257
BROWN, Ashley	Why not a National Transport Board? . . .	330
BROWN, Harrison	Drang nach Osten	291
BURDETT, Osbert	The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins . . .	234
CROTCH, W. Walter	Whither Austria?	409
DAVIES, Right Hon. Lord	'Round Table' or World Commonwealth? . .	47
DAVISON, Ronald C.	Unemployment Assistance: the Crisis and the Way Out	431
DENT, H. C.	'And All the People Rejoiced'	513
DE WATTEVILLE, Lieut.-Colonel H. . .	Germany Rearms	385
DUFFERIN AND AVA, Most Hon. the Marquess of.	National Government at the Cross-Roads . .	400
EASTERBROOK, L. F.	Is the Small Farmer Doomed?	340
ELLIS, Sir Geoffrey	The Planning of Industry	56
FINDLAY, Ranald M.	Has Protection Paid?	69
FITZ-GERALD, W. G. (<i>Ignatius Phayre</i>)	The Rape of Abyssinia?	646
FLEMING, Sir Ambrose	Television	351
FULLER, Major-General J. F. C. . . .	Imperial Defence	129
GARRATT, G. T.	What India Really Thinks	268
GEROTHWOHL, Professor Maurice . . .	Stresa, Geneva, and After	672
GODSALL, Dr. John	The Problem of Cancer	79
HALL, Sir Daniel	The Flight from the Fields	533
HARRIS, Sir Charles	Problems of the Voluntary Hospitals . . .	546
HEADLAM, Maurice	The Charm of Fly-Fishing	492
HEARNshaw, Dr. F. J. C.	Force and Fraud as Instruments of Policy . .	686
HOPKINSON, Austin	The Great Opportunity	524
HUDSON, Geoffrey	Mongolia and Manchukuo	162
HUGH-JONES, E. M.	Labour under the New Deal	319
HUTTON, D. Graham	Europe Breathes Again	24
KENNEDY, Captain M. D.	Japan and the Pacific: a Reply	421
KIPLING, Rudyard	An Undefended Island	641
LENNARD, Reginald	The Forestry Commission and the Lake District	470
LEVY, Dr. Hermann	'Planning' and Industrial Organisation . . .	184
LOWRIE, Dr. Donald A.	Masaryk of Czechoslovakia	597
MACCOLL, Dr. D. S.	Art and the Machine	367
	Super- and Sub-Realism: Mr. Stanley Spencer and the Academy	703
MACDONAGH, Michael	Unparliamentary Language	359
MACHRAY, Robert	The Baltic Pact, Vilna and Memel	585
MAINE, Basil	Controlling Broadcast Music	482
MIDDLETON, W. L.	A French Colonial Conference	605
MONKSWELL, Right Hon. Lord	Railway Speeds	210

AUTHOR		PAGE
NEWBOLT, Sir Francis	Parting Lovers	760
NEWMAN, Major E. W. Polson	Europe and the World	561
NORWOOD, Dr. Cyril	Sons of the Poor and Schools of the Rich	693
O'DWYER, Sir Michael	The India Report: A Plea for the Masses	1
O'SULLIVAN, Professor M. D.	Anglo-Irish Relations	141
PEMBERTON, W. Baring	William Cobbett: 1763-1835	735
PERCY, Right Hon. Lord Eustace	The India Report: A Conservative Defence	14
PETRIE, Sir Charles	The Rome Agreement	152
	The Historical Film	613
PHILBY, H. St. J. B.	Britain and Arabia	574
REYNOLDS, Major B. T.	A Sidelight on Unemployment	198
SCHILLER, Professor F. C. S.	Antmen or Supermen?	89
SHERRINGTON, C. E. R.	Britain's Position in the North Atlantic	440
SIMON, Right Hon. Sir John	Quelques Réflexions sur le Régime parlementaire en Grande Bretagne	502
SOLOVEYCHIK, George	The London Agreement	280
STRABOLCI, Right Hon. Lord	Japan and the Pacific	306
STRUVE, Gleb	Literature in Soviet Russia	221
STUART-WILLIAMS, Sir Charles	Why not a National Transport Board?	330
STUTTERHEIM, Baron K. von	Anglo-German Relations: A German View	36
TUDOR-CRAIG, James	Art, Industry, and Burlington House	102
WATSON, Francis	Poets and Politics	242
WELLARD, J. Howard	Some Observations on American Speech	374
WEST, Rev. Arthur G. B.	The Fairbridge Model	452
	Depression in the 'Eighties	459
WILSON, Sir Arnold	Walks and Talks	624, 748
	Germany in May	659
WILSON, Stuart	The Future of the B.B.C.	729

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCV—JANUARY 1935

THE INDIA REPORT

I. A PLEA FOR THE MASSES

THE King's Speech at the opening of Parliament struck the right note in expressing the hope that the Indian problem will be approached 'with the single aim of furthering the well-being of my Empire.' Everyone will admit that the proposals of the Joint Committee, or rather of the majority (for there are separate Reports from the Conservative and Socialist minorities), must be judged by that test. The Committee (par. 12) have cleared the ground by stating that 'in the Preamble to the Act of 1919, Parliament has set out finally and definitely the ultimate aims of British rule in India,' and they brush away all discussion of other pledges in saying that 'subsequent statements of policy have added nothing to the substance of this declaration.' The declaration contains two main principles:

(a) 'The gradual development of self-governing institutions by successive stages with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire.'

VOL. CXVII—No. 695

(b) 'The time and manner of each advance can be determined only by Parliament, upon whom responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples.'

Clearly the intention of Parliament was that the steps taken to develop self-government were not to imperil the good government which since Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 we are pledged to give to *all* our fellow-subjects in India. The natural ambitions of the politically-minded *intelligentsia* were not to have priority over the interests of the masses; administration was not to be subordinated to politics. But that is exactly what the Committee have done. Their Report deals almost exclusively with the problem of satisfying the aspirations of what they describe as 'a small fraction of the vast population of India' (almost exclusively urban, whose interests are often opposed to those of the rural masses), but—and in this it copies the White Paper—it has hardly a sentence to show, nor have its advocates a word to explain, how its proposals will affect, much less promote, the welfare of the rest of the vast population.

That grievous omission doubtless arises from two facts—(1) the Committee of thirty-two contained only a single member with a thorough first-hand knowledge of Indian administration, and from its composition was predisposed to adhere to the White Paper, which is purely a document framed by politicians for politicians; and (2) the Committee had associated with themselves, as their 'opposite numbers,' twenty Indian delegates, whose object was to avoid the dangerous subject of administration and concentrate on the political side, in which both they and the Committee were more at home.

The writer of this article and other witnesses before the Committee thought, rightly or wrongly, that in trying to show how the Indian masses would be affected they became suspect of hostility to Indian aspirations. The majority proposals go to confirm their view. For, while there are many salutary amendments of the White Paper in minor details and many well-meaning attempts to strengthen the safeguards, the Report accepts all its fundamental proposals. The result is:

- (1) The control of the Crown and Parliament over the whole civil administration of British India, exercised through the Secretary of State and the agency of the Governor-General, Governors of Provinces and the Services, British and Indian, disappears.
- (2) For the Crown and Parliament is substituted an All-India Federation, still in the air, to be composed of *elected* representatives of the eleven British Provinces and *nominees* of the several hundred Indian States, or of such of them as may be found willing to join the Federation.

- (3) The Governor-General, as head of the Federation, must follow the advice of his Indian Ministers, who under the authority of a Federal Legislature, almost exclusively Indian, will control the whole of the all-India civil administration—Finance, Tariffs, Customs, Railways, Commerce and Industry, Posts and Telegraphs, etc., and the connected Services.
- (4) Similarly, the whole field of Provincial administration—Courts and Police, Land Revenue, Irrigation, Public Works, Public Health, Forests, Agriculture, Education, etc.—is transferred to Indian Ministers responsible to Provincial Legislatures, almost exclusively Indian. The Governor is ordinarily to act on the advice of those Ministers.
- (5) But the Governor-General and Governors are given discretion to overrule the Ministers where they consider that necessary in the discharge of their 'special responsibilities' for maintenance of public tranquillity, protection of minorities, of the Services and of the interests of the Indian States, prevention of fiscal discrimination and (in the case of the Governor-General) the maintenance of Indian financial stability and credit.
- (6) The present substantial British element in the Superior Executive and the nominated members (official and non-official, British and Indian) in the Legislatures disappear, as being inconsistent with democratic ideals.
- (7) Similarly, British recruitment ceases at once, where it has not already been stopped, for all the British-Indian Services, except the I.C.S. and the Police, which are given a respite of at least five years—namely, Irrigation, Public Works, Forests, Agriculture and Veterinary, Education, etc.
- (8) The Governor-General, as Viceroy, retains control of the Army, foreign relations, and the small ecclesiastic establishments. Great Britain remains responsible for naval defence and its cost.

The only vestiges of British authority left, in what is still described as a 'Partnership,' are the Governor-General and the Governors of Provinces; their discretionary powers are wide—on paper—but in practice, even if they have the will to exercise them (which assumes a strength of character not always forthcoming and support from the Government of the day at home), they will not usually have the means; for all the machinery that could give effect to their decisions (apart from the Army) will have been transferred to the control of the very Ministers whose ill-advised policy is *ex hypothesi* compelling the Governor to intervene.

Sir William Marris, who played a prominent part in drafting the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and had ten years' experience of their working in two Provinces, has put it on record¹ that the Government of India has, in its unwillingness to oppose the elected Assembly, often failed to exercise its emergency powers and allowed itself to be driven into positions which its better judgment would never have accepted. Two of the three ex-Viceroy's on the Committee could have borne eloquent testimony to the truth of that statement. If that has been the case hitherto, how unlikely is it that in the altered conditions a Governor-General or Governor will be able or willing to exercise his emergency powers? Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in the course of the Irish Home Rule debate of November 1912, accurately summed up the value of safeguards. He said:

I am one of those who do not believe that safeguards of any certain efficiency can ever be embodied in an Act of Parliament.

That has been proved by Mr. de Valera's repudiation of every safeguard in the Irish Treaty within the last few years; and even the 'Moderate' Indian politicians have repeatedly declared that their first task will be to render the safeguards a nullity.

The fact is that the Report ignores one of the two guiding principles laid down in the Act of 1919, and accepts and gives effect to the declaration of Mr. MacDonald as head of the Socialist Government at the first Round Table Conference in January 1931, 'That responsibility for the Government of India should be placed on Indian Legislatures, Central and Provincial,' with suitable safeguards 'during a period of transition.' In the course of 1931 the Socialist Government was driven from office and their general policy was repudiated. But Mr. MacDonald remained on as Prime Minister of the new National Government and, by methods which are still obscure, secured the adherence of his Conservative colleagues in the Cabinet—but not of the party—to his Indian policy. Mr. Baldwin, at the Queen's Hall, quoted Sir John Simon in support of the argument that by the adhesion of a 'powerful Prince' a new situation had arisen. How that adroit manoeuvre was effected is described by Mr. Glorney Bolton in an article called 'The Indian View' which appeared in the December issue of the *Fortnightly Review*. Anyone reading it will agree with the writer that 'the Conservatives were dragooned [in 1931]. They have been dragooned ever since.'

Mr. Baldwin, indeed, needed no conversion, for he had on his own responsibility in October 1929 agreed to Lord Irwin's disastrous pronouncement inspired by the Socialist Government in regard to Dominion Status; and though, after consultation

with leading Conservatives, he had to withdraw that approval, it is clear from all that has since passed that he not only accepted the Socialist policy but has used his great influence to bring a powerful section of his party to adopt it. At the Queen's Hall on December 4 the Council of the party, mainly as the result of Mr. Baldwin's powers of persuasion backed up by the Central Office, accepted the Majority Report as a basis for legislation by a majority of three to one. Both Houses have since endorsed that view, though not without serious misgivings, and the Bill to give effect to that decision is now before Parliament.

To such lengths has the Conservative majority gone to meet the political aspirations of 'a small fraction of the vast population.' Have they succeeded? The answer from every section of Indian political opinion is an emphatic 'No!' At the recent elections to the All-India Assembly the Congress Party and allied organisations have won a majority of the elective seats—57 out of 106. They have decided to refuse even to discuss the proposals; their programme is:

complete independence, including unfettered control over the Army, external affairs, internal policy, fiscal and commercial matters, and the right to choose between voluntary partnership with the British and complete separation.

If Lord Willingdon had to form a Government to-morrow on the lines proposed by the Committee—which eliminates the present forty nominated and official members—he would have to call in a Congress Chief Minister pledged to the above programme!

It is often urged that in the future Federal Assembly the nominated representatives of the Princes—one-third of the whole—will provide a loyal and stable element to oppose the Congress. The calm assumption by Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare that the Princes are eager to join the All-India Federation is quite unwarranted. In March 1933 the then Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes (the late Jam Sahib of Nawanagar), at a meeting presided over by the Viceroy, denounced the White Paper scheme, which the Joint Committee have adhered to in essentials, 'as injurious alike to the interests of the States and the British connexion.' The present Chancellor (H.H. the Maharaja of Patiala, a State which has a most distinguished record of service to the Crown in every crisis) accepted the ideal of Federation, at the first Round Table Conference, when 'a powerful Prince,' the Maharaja of Bikanir, gave the lead to the six Princes (out of a total of some hundreds) then present. But since realising the implications of the scheme he has shown an increasing hostility towards it. In a letter of October 28 published in the London Press of December 6 His Highness and four

¹ *Modern India*, 1932.

other Princes, forming a majority of the Standing Committee of the Princes' Chamber, state that 'the White Paper proposals were received by us with grave concern,' and 'that the acceptance of the principle of Federation itself depends entirely on the fact whether the Report of the Joint Select Committee incorporates the conditions' demanded by the Princes. The Princes' final decision is held over till the special meeting of their Chamber on January 21, but the pressure that is steadily being exercised on them has been exposed in the recent debate—notably by Major Courtauld.

Meantime they have not been slow to see that the British Government, which is under treaty obligations to maintain their integrity and internal sovereignty against any attack, is voluntarily renouncing the authority which would enable it to fulfil that obligation, and is even asking them to assume the rôle *vis-à-vis* British India which it is abdicating. H.H. the Maharaj Rana of Jhalawar states in the London Press of November 27 :

With the vast majority of the Princes there has been a growing apprehension that the Federal scheme would ultimately rob us of our present strength, prestige and status with which we can fulfil our obligations as friends of the Empire in India. Consequently those who wish to use the Princes as a convenience, in their attempts to placate the demands of aggressive democracy in British India, will be taking a great risk. It should now become apparent why we Princes view the Federal scheme with grave and growing disquiet.

That was said *after* the Joint Committee's Report had been made public.

The Princes fear, and with reason, that the Congress having brought the British Government to its knees, will then proceed to 'liquidate' the Princes, as the Congress left wing has threatened, by fomenting agitation in their States. In opening the new Constitution in 1921 the Duke of Connaught expressed the King-Emperor's 'determination ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes of India. The Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable.' It will not remain inviolate if we force the Princes into the Federation.

But just as the Princes object to being the scapegoats of a British Government unwilling to face its own enemies and theirs in British India, the now dominant Congress Party equally repudiates any federal association with the Princes. Mr. Rajendra Prasad, president of the recent Congress at Bombay, denounced the Federation in scathing language. He said :

And what is this Federation ? It is a kind of Federation which has no parallel in history. In it the rulers of one-third of India will be called in to counteract, through their *nominees*, the progressive *elected* elements of

the remaining two-thirds. There is no mutuality in any respect. 'The Princes' nominees will have the right to interfere in the administration of British India, without British India having the least voice in the administration of the States, which will continue their autocratic rule.

It is sought to replace the block of officials and non-officials nominated by Government by nominees of Indian States. The nominated officials and non-officials of British India cannot be said to be amenable to popular opinion, but they have certainly a wider outlook and are more in contact with public opinion than any nominee of a State could be. They also feel a sense of responsibility even though it is to the British Government.

There is much truth in these criticisms. Clearly, neither the Congress nor the States, the two most powerful forces in political India, desire an ill-assorted union between such discordant elements—one bent on revolutionary change, the other proud of its loyalty—which both regard as the cowardly device of a Government running away from its responsibilities.

All other political sections are opposed to the scheme on one ground or another. The able and plausible 'Liberals' or 'Moderates,' on whom the Viceroy and Secretary of State relied to work the new Constitution, and who bulked so large before the Joint Committee, are proved by the elections to have no following ; but even they denounce the safeguards, and some of them echo the Congress in saying they would prefer things to remain as they are. The minorities, whether Hindu, Muslim, Christian or Sikh, in the various Provinces are appalled at the prospect of coming under the rule of a permanent communal majority—Hindu in most provinces, Muslim in a few, and predominantly Hindu in the Central Government. The Muslim majority in the Punjab, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Province alone show some desire to accept it, as giving them local control of the gates of India. But they resent the inevitable Hindu control of the Centre, and if they find it irksome would break away. Could Hindu India prevent them ? The valiant Sikhs of the Punjab, who, with the Mahrattas of Bombay, alone retain the traditions of rule and the spirit of nationality, are already organising for resistance to the Muslim majority. The Indian Christians, over 6,000,000, who, amiable Church dignitaries here assured us, were under no anxiety as to their future, have complained recently in the All-India Legislature that, though 'their fundamental rights are seriously threatened' by the White Paper, they were not given a hearing before the Joint Committee.

The non-official Europeans are alarmed about security and commercial discrimination ; the Anglo-Indians as to their future chances of employment when the policy is fixed by an Indian Minister ; while the Services, British and Indian, in so far as they were allowed to express any opinion, told the Joint Committee that many of them viewed their transfer to the control of Indian

Ministers with the 'gravest apprehension.' That was just after Mr. Baldwin had publicly declared that the Services were almost unanimous in support of the scheme! One wonders, if the scheme goes through, where the Government is to look for the political support necessary to work it.

And now let us turn to the other aspect of the proposals. How far do they fulfil Parliament's responsibility for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, particularly of the 97 per cent.—90 per cent. living in the villages—who have no votes at present, no aptitude for or interest in politics, and who are concerned, not with the *forms* of government, but with its everyday administration? The overworked *cliché* that good government is no substitute for self-government has no appeal in India outside the small westernised *intelligentsia* of the towns—perhaps 2 per cent. of the population. The Indian peoples are so deeply divided by race, religion, and caste that they have no tradition of national unity or common citizenship, except in so far as British rule, which now becomes a shadow, has created it. India has never been able to defend itself. For the last 900 years British India has been under the rule of successive invaders by sea or land who rarely met with any resistance and whose rule was accepted by the various peoples without question unless and until they interfered with religion or usages founded on religion, as the later Moghuls did and paid the penalty. Great Britain is no more an 'alien' to them than any preceding ruler.

What the Indian masses look for is not self-government—for they never had it—but reasonably good government. Now, the essentials of good government in every country are four—security, external and internal; impartial justice; clean and progressive administration; light taxation. All these have in the past been secured to India under British rule to a degree unprecedented in her long and chequered history: every one of them will be jeopardised by the present proposals. The Army remains under the Viceroy, but the finance required for its maintenance and the communications, posts and telegraphs necessary for its mobility will be under the control of Indian Ministers, who, if hostile—and the present Congress majority admittedly is—could hinder or hamper its use in any serious emergency. The Police is the main arm for internal security; it is the eyes and ears of the Army. Hitherto—and here the writer can speak with personal experience of many a serious crisis—security has been ensured because the Army and Police were under the same authority and worked in close co-operation; in future the Police will be under the control of Indian Ministers who may or may not be willing to work with the military authorities. The Joint Committee make suggestions to keep the Police free from political

interference; but once you have surrendered the keys of the fortress these paper safeguards are of little value.

Justice and efficient administration will admittedly suffer from the disappearance of the small British element in the administration—a *corps d'élite* of less than 3000 for 350,000,000 people. It is they who have established the great services that have built up and maintain the prosperity of India (Irrigation, Forests, Public Works, Agriculture, Veterinary, Education, Public Health), have trained their Indian colleagues and subordinates, and have set the standards of integrity and efficiency that have won for our Indian administration the world's admiration. In all these services British recruitment is to be closed down. In some it has been closed down already with disastrous results, as shown in the official reports put before the Simon Commission, and revealed more fully in the admirable pamphlets of the Duchess of Atholl. Can anyone, British or Indian, argue that the disappearance of these few thousand British officials is demanded by or in the interests of the Indian masses, who, whatever Mr. Baldwin may say to the contrary, invariably turn to them for justice and protection? Not even the most bitter extremist has dared to do so. But the Indian politicians desire their removal and the Joint Committee bow to them.

Two examples may be cited. The Simon Commission, which got down to Indian realities, made a strong representation that British recruitment to the great Irrigation service (on whose efficiency one-fourth of India's agricultural production depends) and the Forests (on whose efficient conservancy the supplies for irrigation depend) should be maintained; that, in their words, 'administrative efficiency' should not be sacrificed to 'political expediency.' Their plea has been disregarded. What does it matter how millions of peasants suffer as long as a few thousand ambitious politicians are placated?

Similarly as regards the High Courts in the Provinces. There is a salutary statutory provision at present that one-third of the judges should be recruited from civil servants of long executive and judicial experience in India; one-third from men, British and Indian, who have been called to the Bar here; one-third from Indian lawyers. The system has admittedly worked admirably: the High Courts have the confidence of the Indian masses. But here again, in deference to the Indian politicians whose stronghold is in the bar-rooms of India, that wise provision is to disappear from the Statute-book. The Committee express the pious hope that appointments from the Civil Service and the Bar here will continue to be made. If that is desirable, why alter the existing law? Here again the interests of the people are to be sacrificed to political expediency when politicians call to politicians across the deep!

Finally, there is the problem of taxation. The Committee have clearly got into a morass in their attempt to handle this all-important question. Their vague estimates as to the extra cost of the scheme carry little conviction, even to themselves. Official experts have put it at amounts varying from £7,000,000 to £20,000,000—in any case, a serious addition to a Central budget of £60,000,000, and a heavy burden on a poor population hard pressed by the slump in agricultural prices. The Committee admit that taxation has already been raised to the limit and expenditure cut down to the bone to balance the budget, but they airily dismiss the additional burden proposed as not 'formidable'. Have they heard the proverb of the last straw?

Admittedly several of the Provinces are now in permanent deficit. Sir Samuel Hoare, giving evidence before the Committee, said (questions 8254 and 8270):

It is clear that there are financial difficulties to be overcome before the new autonomous provinces can be started. Speaking generally, I should expect the Provinces to be on an even keel—that is to say, with no permanent deficit round their necks.

But Sir John Thompson, chairman of the Union of Britain and India, was quite prepared to take a leap in the dark. In reply to Lord Salisbury's question whether he thought India could bear the extra taxation, he said: 'I think the important thing is to go ahead with the scheme and then decide.' Lord Salisbury: 'Whether you can pay for it or not?' Answer: 'Yes.' Lord Salisbury's pertinent comment was: 'Generally speaking, prudent people go the other way to work.' But apparently the Committee have decided to go ahead like Sir John Thompson.

It is significant that at the Queen's Hall and in the Commons' debate the Government speakers scarcely touched on this and other matters bearing on 'the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples.' Those of us who have given the best years of our lives to that service are shocked by the callous disregard of their interests by politicians here and in India and by the indifference of most of the Press. It is some satisfaction to find that not only the Conservative but also the Socialist minority gave some thought to the masses. Major Attlee, M.P., admits that it is necessary to satisfy national aspirations, but

at the same time to see that as far as possible the poorer sections of the community should not be handed over to be exploited by the landlord and the capitalist.

His remedy is 'to give the workers and peasants the potentiality of using the vote'—though he recognises 'that it will be long before they learn to do so.' That is not very helpful. Even the present limited electorate (7,000,000 out of 270,000,000 in British

India) is for the greater part admittedly incompetent to handle even its present limited responsibilities. The Government of the United Provinces—which may be taken as fairly representative of India generally—have recently put it on record that the great majority of the voters 'are not only illiterate, but also ignorant of and without interest in the affairs of the Province as a whole.'

It is proposed at once to increase the electorate from 7,000,000 to 35,000,000. Is this deeper plunge into the strata of illiteracy and ignorance likely to bring up a more responsible electorate, capable of knowing what it wants and of obtaining what it wants? Its capacity must be actual, not the mere 'potentiality' Major Attlee refers to. He is right in thinking that 'it will be long before they learn to make their voices heard and their influence felt.' But meantime they will be 'fodder' for every unscrupulous demagogue or dangerous revolutionary—and there are many such in India—who may trade on their ignorance and appeal to their cupidity or their racial and religious passions. Surely the remedy is, while the masses remain minors politically, to retain Parliament's trusteeship on their behalf, for it is the British spirit in the administration and the British element in the Services—both of which the Committee would abolish—that have always stood up for the masses and prevented, as far as they can, their exploitation by the grasping landlord, the greedy moneylender, and the unscrupulous manufacturer. It is noteworthy that Mr. Shiva Rao, the Indian Labour delegate to the recent T.U.C. Conference at Weymouth, said:

Why we in India want your help is because next year the Government will put through a scheme for political reform in India, which will place the Indian workers in a much worse position than they are at present.

The late Mr. C. R. Das, perhaps the ablest extremist politician of his time, as President of the Congress in 1922 said:

If to-day the British Government grant Provincial Autonomy with Central Responsibility, I for one will protest against it, for it will lead to the concentration of power in the hands of the middle class [the urban politicians]. I do not believe the middle class will then part with their power.

The representatives of the orthodox Hindus have recently endorsed those views.

The scheme fails to satisfy the Indian politicians; it does nothing for the Indian masses except to increase their burdens and to place the town workers 'in a much worse position.' Mr. Churchill, in the Queen's Hall debate, went to the root of the matter.

[He asked] whether this plan would work, whether it would last? Would it give Indians more food? Would they have less taxes to pay? Would there be more peace in their streets, greater justice in the courts

and higher security against the oppression of class and race? Would it give what the Indian politicians themselves asked for? Was there any finality about it? Any hope of tranquillity even for a breathing space?

To each of these questions the answer is 'No!' One wonders why the Government persists in a scheme which no one in India wants, which no one in this country has ever yet tried to defend on the merits (the welfare of the Indian peoples), and which will inevitably break up the main bulwark in this country against predatory Socialism.

The only explanation the writer can offer is *fear*. Fear of the Congress and of the veiled threats of Sir T. B. Saprú and his colleagues inspired successively the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1930, the repudiation of the Simon Commission's Report in 1931, the summoning of the various Round Table Conferences, in which there was no administrator of wide Indian experience to stand up for the Indian masses, the White Paper of 1933, the Majority Report of the Joint Committee just issued, and the Bill now before Parliament. Fear stands behind each successive surrender of our Imperial responsibilities and our obligations to the Indian Princes and peoples. Fear is proverbially the worst counsellor—above all where, as in this case, it is baseless. Surely it was *fear* that prompted Mr. Baldwin's final appeal to the Queen's Hall audience:

If you refuse India this opportunity you will infallibly lose India, whatever you do, before two generations are passed. That, to my mind, is the choice.

The argument prevailed; though it could easily be refuted. In the Commons' debate Mr. Churchill aptly retorted with Mr. Bonar Law's epigram: 'You cannot argue with a prophet, but you can disbelieve him.' But has a British statesman ever before used such an appeal to a British audience? What hope is there for the British Empire in India or elsewhere while that defeatist spirit prevails? In a similar crisis Demosthenes said to the Athenians: 'Providence alone protects our Empire. We on our part are doing all we can to destroy it.' The Majority Report and Mr. Baldwin's eloquence are providing the engines of destruction. But the British public can be trusted, as in 1931, to do the right thing when they know the facts, and as the facts become known so will their repudiation of this craven policy gain strength and they will turn to the sane and reasonable proposals for *gradual* development by successive stages put forward by Lord Salisbury and his colleagues in accordance with the preamble of the Act of 1919.

It may be asked, What is the alternative? There is one, based on an admirable principle laid down by the two chief authors of the present scheme—Lord Halifax and Sir Samuel Hoare. The

Government of India (including three Indian members) proposed in their Despatch of September 20, 1930, that 'Parliament's control should be of such a nature as to establish *partnership* in place of *subordination*'; they went on to define, and very reasonably, the limits within which Parliament should continue to exercise its direct control. They also made it clear that the partnership involved the retention of a British element (nominated and elected) in the Legislatures as well as in the Executive and the Services. That, of course, follows from a partnership. Sir Samuel Hoare gave this principle an enthusiastic welcome on December 24, 1932, when he said:

We have been confronted with the problem of reconciling the claims of three partners—Great Britain, British India, and Indian India. The old articles of association were getting out of date; a new bond of union had to be found; the new bond must be the bond of an All-India Federation, with the rights of each of the three partners effectively safeguarded.

This offers a sound basis for a stable Federation—at least, after the Provincial units have been established on an autonomous footing. But the Federation now proposed departs from the fundamental principle of partnership; it excludes from nearly all the business of the joint firm the British partner, hitherto the predominant partner, relegating him to the menial post of watchman; it does not satisfy the Princes, who, as shown above, fear the loss of their States and independence; while it is repudiated by the most powerful political party in British India as well as the minorities. Surely these facts have given us an opportunity and a justification to review the situation and recast the proposals. Can any reasonable Indian politician dispute the principle and application of genuine Partnership? The writer believes the Princes and the Indian masses would welcome it.

The outlines of such a scheme were submitted to the Joint Committee, who have completely ignored it; indeed, one of their number, Sir J. Woodland Milne, stated in the Indian debate on December 10 that no alternative had been put forward. Here again the majority were doubtless influenced by *fear* of the Indian politician. Parliament has still to decide. Surely it will not repudiate the principle of an effective partnership enabling Great Britain to carry on its great work in combination and close co-operation with British India, and with the Indian States if and when they decide to come in.

M. F. O'DWYER.

THE INDIA REPORT

II. A CONSERVATIVE DEFENCE

To write about a report for which one is personally responsible as a member of the committee which drew it up, is painfully like crying one's own wares. But no member of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform is likely to succumb to the temptations of self-advertisement. Writing a fortnight after the publication of the Report, one's mood is rather one of abashed humility before the mysterious processes of public opinion. After working for eighteen months intensively over old ground, already covered by years of previous inquiry, the Committee has produced a document full of compromises with things as they are, of acquiescences in expedients which are difficult to justify on grounds of principle—full, in short, of all those imperfections which seem to be inherent in the art of government. One has, indeed, refused to be the mere slave of circumstance; one has taken bold decisions and has made some original contributions to the science of constitution-building; and one has sought at least to present a complete picture of a new Constitution, both in principle and in detail. But, admitting all this, one had no right to expect that the Report would be regarded as more than the decent workmanlike performance of an allotted task, or that one's reward would be more than the penny granted by grace to the eleventh-hour worker in the vineyard. Yet this document seems to have crystallised in its favour a mass of public opinion which had been little affected, one way or the other, by previous controversies and could never have been convinced by years of debating argument. One realises afresh that, in government, the only creative act is to make up one's own mind. That is, perhaps, the secret of the British political genius: the ordinary Englishman in the street recognises instinctively that conviction is a more significant fact than the reasoning which has led up to it, or the arguments that can be advanced in favour of it. The reasoning of the Joint Select Committee's Report may be close and its arguments strong, but they do not account for the way in which the Report has been received.

This, no doubt, is the main answer to the question whether these last four years of Round Table Conferences and intensive parliamentary inquiry have not been largely a waste of time. The Joint Committee's Report is, after all, little but a completion of the Report of Sir John Simon's Statutory Commission. When the Statutory Commission was appointed, it was always contemplated by the Conservative Government of that day that any Bill based upon its findings should only be passed after it had been considered in its main outlines by some joint body of English parliamentarians and representatives of Indian political opinion. The procedure contemplated was very much like that actually followed by the Joint Select Committee between May and December 1933. The injection of the new issue of All-India Federation shortly after the publication of the Statutory Commission's Report probably necessitated some additional measure of preliminary consultation, but, even if one Round Table Conference was necessary for the purpose of crystallising this new issue, were three successive Conferences really justified? It would, in fact, almost certainly have been better to have dispensed with the third Round Table Conference and to have advanced the appointment of the Joint Select Committee by six months. But, on the whole, the delay has, perhaps, been justified from the point of view of public opinion—at least, in this country. Conviction, if it is to impress public opinion, must have a certain air of maturity. The Report of the Joint Select Committee is not a better, and it is certainly a far less original, document than the Simon Report; but, while the Simon Report formed public opinion, the Report of the Joint Select Committee seems to have brought public opinion to life. Probably that final touch could not have been given at any much earlier stage. But, of course, the battle is not won. The Report has not carried anything like universal conviction, and, ineffective as mere argument must always be, it may be worth while to consider some of the objections which have been urged against what is new in the Report.

What is new is mainly its completion of the recommendations of the Simon Commission in the matter of the Central Government. The Central Constitution proposed by the Simon Commission was admittedly a transitional form of government. No approximately final solution of that problem could be envisaged apart from an All-India Federation. The Joint Select Committee was given the opportunity, which had been withheld from the Simon Commission, of propounding a solution on the basis of such a Federation. If the Report deserves any of the kind things that have been said about it, it deserves them because it set out to examine the Federal solution on the basis, and in the spirit, of the Simon Report. It applied to that problem the same principles

solemnly has been promised to Germany, and upon which no German Government can go back?

On the reply to this question much depends for Germany's future relations with England as well as with the League. Again and again Herr Hitler has offered friendship to France, nor has he ever questioned England's right to provide herself with the means of defence which she considers indispensable for her national security. It is this very right, and nothing more, which Germany claims for herself, acting herein on the principle laid down by *The Times* of February 16, 1934: 'In any case, it must surely be regarded as the inalienable right of every sovereign State to possess the means of self-defence.' It is one of the paradoxes of our age that, at a time when England has hardly one good word left for Germany, in the vital question of disarmament the two countries stand very nearly on the same platform. Twice within a few years Germany's claim for equality was first contested by Great Britain and later on accepted. It was so in 1932 and also a year later, when the spirit which England adopted in January 1934 might have prevented the breakdown of the previous October. Is that not a proof that Germany's demands, at first declared to be exorbitant, were on second thoughts found to be quite reasonable? Is it too much to hope that the spirit of second thoughts might still prevail?

If so, and if, as some people believe, France too is moving towards a more realistic position, the gain for Europe would be tremendous. Disarmament, it is true, seems to be postponed for many years to come. But the next best thing—limitation—should still remain within the possibilities of diplomatic skill and with it the stopping of competitive building, nearly always the forerunner of war. If once the 'arms' question were out of the way, the war-hysteria, too, would die down, for which the nervous tension of our days is the very breeding-ground. While there has been no war hysteria in Germany, the country is preoccupied with its security, and the more so as, with Russia again in the field, Germany's old *cauchemar* of encirclement is lingering in the back of her mind. That her anxieties are not mere phantasy was proved by an indiscreet Frenchman who, not long ago, spoke about the Red army and the Red air fleet as at the disposal of France. How would England have reacted if a Japanese politician were to declare that Japan could rely on the United States if trouble should start in the Far East? To understand Germany one must put oneself in her position, geographically as well as mentally and economically, always treating her as an equal partner. This is the shortest way towards an improvement of the relations between Germany and Great Britain.

K. VON STUTTERHEIM.

'ROUND TABLE' OR WORLD COMMONWEALTH?

AN influential group in Great Britain and the Dominions, the 'Round Table,' has for many years been concerned to consolidate the British Empire and, on the basis of an 'Anglo-Saxon' *entente*, to bring it into closer relationship with the United States. Solicitude for the future of the British Commonwealth and the desire for a continuance of its friendship with America are not, however, the monopoly of any group. Many of us are equally concerned to develop the potential unity of the Empire and its co-operation with the great Republic. But we believe that this development can best be served, not by rigidly insisting upon a cut-and-dried imperial Anglo-Saxon policy, not by leaving Europe to stew in its own juice, but by adapting the policies of each unit in the English-speaking community, so as to secure the existence and well-being of the whole and enable it to play its appropriate part in the wider arena of the world. Consequently, we are convinced that in the long run it is unwise to urge a uniform and stereotyped policy of defence upon all the members of the British Empire which may be harmful, and indeed dangerous, to the interests of one or more of its members. It is impossible and impracticable to put the Empire into a strait-jacket. This is especially true of the vital question of security.

The security of the Empire as a whole is obviously a matter of paramount importance, but it does not follow that the same methods of achieving security apply equally to all its component parts. For instance, Great Britain, strategically and geographically, is still part of Europe, whilst its Dominions are separated from this continent by thousands of miles. The latter are vitally concerned with the safety of Great Britain, and if this can be assured only by participating in a European collective system of defence, they would be foolish to try and prevent the Mother Country from co-operating with her European neighbours, even though they decided that at the moment their own interests did not warrant their participation in setting up this system. Such an attitude would not imply any disloyalty on the part of the Dominions. It would simply mean that they recognised the necessity imposed upon Great Britain to col-

Report itself. It is admitted that an All-India Federation will involve 'an obvious anomaly: a Federation composed of disparate constituent units in which the powers and authority of the Central Government will differ as between one constituent unit and another.'

The short answer to these objections is that they are objections to an All-India Federation at any time and under any conditions. If there is one thing which the Englishman feels in his bones about India, it is that the personal government of the more enlightened Indian States is probably better adapted to the conditions of Indian life and the character of the Indian people than the forms of government which have been gradually evolved in the British Indian Provinces out of English parliamentary ideas and an anglicised system of education. And this instinct is probably sound. Personal government in the States will be, and is being, gradually modified; but the idea that Federation should wait until the sovereignty of the Princes has been whittled down to the proportions of an autonomous Provincial Government, and until the representatives of each State in a Federal Legislature can be elected by a State Parliament instead of being nominated by a State Ruler, can only be entertained by men who are wholly out of touch with realities and who cannot discern the trend of their own arguments.

It is easy to say that Federation, when it comes in the future, may be 'a different kind of Federation'; but, unless we are to be mere Micawbers, waiting for something new to turn up which we cannot invent ourselves, we must face the fact that a different kind of Federation can only mean a looser form of Federation, looser (by the very essence of this line of argument) both for the British Indian Provinces and for the Indian States. And that, of course, is precisely the danger. Any attempt to assimilate both States and Provinces to an exactly equal status for the purposes of Federation can only mean the erection of the Provinces into at least semi-sovereign and semi-independent units. If the essential unity of British India is to be reconciled with the essential semi-independence of the Indian States—if, in technical terms, the sovereignty of the Crown in British India is to be reconciled with the paramountcy of the Crown in the Indian States—then any All-India Federation at any time must be a union for certain purposes of 'disparate constituent units in which the powers and authority of the Central Government will differ as between one constituent unit and another.'

The critics seem often to be chiefly worried by one particular anomaly: that the States are not prepared to give the Central Government power to levy income tax on their residents. This is certainly an anomaly, for the States' representatives in the

Central Legislature cannot be correspondingly limited in their right to vote on any part of the Federal budget. No 'in-and-out' provisions, as we well know, can be imposed on the members of any parliament. The answer to this objection is partly that the exemption of the States from income tax is not in itself unjust. The States might fairly claim a division of the existing Public Debt of British India into remunerative and non-remunerative liabilities, the service of the latter to be exclusively charged on British Indian revenue. Such a division would be inconvenient, involving the creation of a separate Central budget distinct from the Federal budget, and the States have consequently not pressed their claim in this form; but the substance of the claim remains. There are other claims arising out of the existing relations between the States and the Crown which can also be urged against an exact assimilation of States to Provinces in the matter of liability to Federal taxation. A further answer is that British India will gain infinitely more in taxation by acquiring the power to levy excise duties over the whole sub-continent than it will forego by not having the power to levy income tax. Moreover, the States have accepted a liability to make special contributions to the revenues of the Central Government, if income tax in British India rises above a certain level. And, if the States are thus not being unfairly privileged, the point about their voting rights in the Federal Legislature loses its substance. It is surely overwhelmingly in the interests of sound financial policy in India that the vote of the States in all matters of taxation should be free and unfettered, even at the cost of a superficial anomaly.

The second class of objections begins with Lord Salisbury's dilemma, that direct election to the Central Legislature is 'impossible' and that indirect election is 'unworkable.' This is obviously no very good argument in favour of retaining an existing Legislature, the majority of whose members are directly elected. But the claim that indirect election based upon the Provincial Legislatures is unworkable is usually based on the contention that, if the Lower House of the Federal Legislature is dissolved, at least a large proportion of the British Indian members will be re-elected by precisely the same constituent bodies, while all the States' representatives might well be reappointed by their Rulers. There is much force in this contention. It is true that a Governor-General will probably only be able usefully to dissolve the Lower House when intervening general elections in two or three Provinces have indicated the possibility of strengthening a group or party in the Federal Legislature on which he relies for support. But, as the Joint Select Committee point out, dissolution under a system of communal electorates is always likely to be comparatively ineffective. It will be ineffective in the directly

elected Provincial Legislatures, and it will be ineffective in the Central Legislature under any conceivable system of election, so long as election, direct or indirect, is based on the system of voting by communities. It is on that ground, very largely, that the Joint Select Committee justify their reservation to the Governors and the Governor-General of such large autocratic powers. In short, the arguments of these critics are meaningless unless they lead to the conclusion that there should be no Central Legislature at all. This objection is often associated with the statement that communal electorates are the negation of parliamentary government. Here again, the argument seems to lead to no conclusion, for the existing Central Legislature is, in fact, based on communal electorates. And, after all, recent events in India suggest that, if communal electorates are bad in principle, they at least have some advantages in the direction of stable government. Even what appears to have been a sweeping Congress victory seems to have given Congress, combined with the Nationalist Party, only a bare majority in the Central Assembly.

As I have just referred to the powers reserved by the Joint Select Committee's recommendations to the Governor-General and the Governors, it may be worth while at this point to refer to the argument embodied in Lord Salisbury's phrase, that government with such 'safeguards' cannot be called self-government—that it is government in a strait-jacket, but a strait-jacket made only of paper. Whether the Committee's scheme can be labelled a scheme of self-government is a question of words which need hardly detain us; but, if it is government in a strait-jacket, the strait-jacket is certainly not made of paper. The truth is that, as between the Governor or the Governor-General on the one hand and his Ministers on the other, it is the Governor and the Governor-General who possess all lawful authority and power; it is the Ministers who have to rely for their power on a mere scrap of paper, on the Governors' and the Governor-General's Instrument of Instructions, alterable or revocable with the consent of the Imperial Parliament at any time. Of course, if law itself is regarded as mere paper, if the right to issue lawful orders enforceable by the courts adds nothing to the power of an officer of government, then all statutes, let alone all constitutions, are worthless. But, if there is any distinction between influence and government, between delegated functions and sovereign authority, then it is the Ministers who are restricted to mere influence and to delegated functions; it is the Governor and the Governor-General who hold the government and exercise sovereign authority.

And this is the answer to the final, and far the weightiest, objection to the Central Constitution proposed by the Joint

Select Committee: the objection that, while responsible Federal Ministers will only be entitled to advise the Governor-General on certain matters, they will, in fact, influence him by pressure in other matters. The right to control the Provincial Governors in all matters relating to their special powers and responsibilities is vested in the Governor-General personally. So is all Army administration, including the whole Army budget, and all questions of foreign affairs. The questions on which Ministers will be entitled to advise him will be mainly matters of economic policy and taxation. Yet it is urged that Ministers will be able to make a certain line of action by the Governor-General in Army matters, or in his relations with the Provincial Governors, a condition of accepting or retaining office. If he resists such pressure, he will not be able to retain a Ministry commanding a majority in the Federal Legislature, and he will be driven back on the exercise of his autocratic 'breakdown' powers.

The real answer to this lies in the very fact that the course which it is thus assumed that Ministers might take *will* drive the Governor back on the exercise of autocratic powers. In other words, the law puts all the trump cards in the Governor-General's hands. As a matter of fact, he will have at least an ace or two before he needs to lead his trumps at all. The combination of votes which Congress Ministers would have to build up in order to confront the Governor-General with a majority opposition in the Federal Legislature would be an exceedingly difficult and insecure one, consisting of at least a large proportion of the States' representatives and of the Muslim members. That sort of *bloc* can be built up, but it can seldom be maintained for long. The Governor-General will have much more power than George III. had in 1783-84 to maintain a minority Prime Minister in office for the period necessary to allow such a combination to disintegrate. And is it really argued that such a *bloc* can more easily be built up in an Assembly where every member is eligible for the office of responsible Minister of Finance or Commerce than in an Assembly where no member has anything to gain from supporting the Government, so long as he remains an elected legislator? Is it easier for the leader of a Congress Party to say to a leading Muslim legislator, 'I will resign if you will promise not to replace me in the honours and the sweets of office,' or for him to say, as he can say now, 'Will you join me to fight the Governor-General until the Imperial Parliament consents to open the doors of office both to you and to me?' No, the Governor-General's Ministers can apply no pressure to him; all they can apply to him is influence, that sort of influence which the opponents of Indian self-government are so quick to deride when it is exercised by the Governor-General of a self-governing Dominion, like the Irish Free State,

on Ministers in whom the lawful authority of government has been vested by a Dominion Constitution.

One may note, in passing, that the five Conservative members who disagreed with the Report of the Joint Select Committee did, in fact, suggest in their amendments a much more dangerous course—the admission of members of the Legislature into the existing Governor-General's Executive Council at the discretion of the Governor-General. The Governor-General-in-Council in India to-day is, like the Governor-General-in-Council in a Dominion, the repository of the powers of the Crown. To admit members of the Legislature into so powerful a corporation would, indeed, place in their hands, as against the Governor-General, certain legal powers which would be a real means of pressure. But this suggestion was, perhaps, made by inadvertence, and it would be unfair to lay too much stress upon it.

Nevertheless, such a suggestion does indicate the great danger of indecision. The advice to go slow, to take one step at a time, is always immensely attractive to any Englishman. But the advice to go slow at the Centre while going fast in the Provinces, to take bold decisions in the one case and to postpone all decision in the other, is the straight road to the disruption of Indian unity. The Joint Select Committee was surely not wrong in referring to unity 'as perhaps the greatest gift which British rule has conferred on India.' In the Government of India at Delhi are knotted all the threads of government throughout British India. We are proposing, by almost universal consent, to untie those knots, to lengthen those threads, and to give enormously added weight to the Provincial Governments which are attached to their extremities. To go slow at the Centre means, or may mean, that we delay and fumble with the reknitting of those threads. New knots must be made, and the Central Government must be strengthened to withstand the pull-away of the added weight of eleven great Provincial Governments. To shirk that duty is, not to take one step at a time, but to pause with one foot in the air.

But—and this must be the final question—does the scheme propounded by the Joint Select Committee tie these knots securely? Does it sufficiently strengthen the Central Government? It is not for any author of the Report to answer that question, but it is important to point out that its answer depends upon an examination of two distinct sets of proposals. Under the new Constitution the unity of British India will be maintained, as it were, along a double line of communications: first, the Governor-General's control over the Provincial Governors in the sphere of his and their special powers and responsibilities; and, secondly, the interaction of responsible Ministries in the

Provinces and at the Centre, based on the inter-connection between the Provincial Legislatures and the Central Legislature. Of these two, the second is of vital importance in the financial and economic sphere, but it is, broadly speaking, limited to that sphere. At present, and for many years to come, the first line of communications will be of predominant importance, for it taps, or can tap, whenever necessary, every strategic centre in the whole field of government.

It is really from this point of view, rather than from the point of view of mere Provincial administration, that the Joint Committee's reinforcement of 'safeguards,' especially in the sphere of law and order, becomes so significant. It is too little realised that, wherever we define the Provincial Governors' personal powers, we consolidate British Indian unity. Stated thus baldly, this truth might well shock that great body of sentiment in India which attaches far more importance to Provincial autonomy than to any reform at the Centre, and is keenly suspicious of any proposal which might detract from such autonomy. The answer to such suspicions is, of course, that our two main lines of communication are interchangeable. As the Provincial Governor finds himself able to rely more and more fully on the advice of his Ministers, even in matters where he has a special responsibility, the traffic will, so to speak, be shifted from one line to the other, always provided that the Governor-General finds himself able to place an equal reliance on his Ministers in matters for which they are responsible. But it remains true that one of the main tests by which the definition of the Provincial Governors' special powers and responsibilities must be judged is the extent to which that definition covers those spheres of government in which it is essential to maintain unity of policy and common standards of administration.

And it is also true that the line of communications can only be shifted as the Provincial Ministries become increasingly conscious of their underlying responsibility, not merely for the good government of their Province, but for its development as an integral member of a united Indian polity. For a responsible Minister is not only responsible to his parliament; he is responsible also to the sovereign whose temporary adviser he is. Every Provincial Minister in India will be as much 'His Majesty's servant' as an English Secretary of State. By the extent to which the Report of the Joint Select Committee has made that responsibility a reality its recommendations must ultimately be judged.

EUSTACE PERCY.

EUROPE BREATHES AGAIN

THE history of Europe has been little short of sensational in 1934—even more sensational in a way than it was in 1914. For all the sensation of that earlier year was crowded into the second half of it; and all hinged on one fateful event and its aftermath. In 1934, on the other hand, right from the outset a sequence of startling events was unfolded before a jumpy, fear-ridden Continent, any one of which, by itself, might have produced war had it occurred in the pre-1914 setting. The very breath-taking rapidity with which each such surprise succeeded its predecessor did much to prevent a catastrophe. For European politics in 1934 were in a flux: disarmament, the fate of Austria, the outcome of the negotiations for the 1935 Saar plebiscite, the attitude of the League and of France to Russia, developments of German Nazidom and Germany's relations with the League Powers, the final policy of Italy—not one of these questions admitted a clear and speedy answer. In such a state of affairs exploded one political bombshell after another.

At the very beginning of the year France, Italy, and Great Britain were led, by Nazi aggression against Austria, to reaffirm their intentions to make the integrity of Austria a cardinal feature of their policies. At the same time the four Balkan Powers—Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey—concluded a Pact which provided for maintenance of the Balkan *status quo* by mutual defensive agreements. Next, Bulgaria, the inveterate opponent of Yugoslavia, permitted herself the luxury of a semi-Fascist *coup d'état*, in consequence of which the new Bulgarian army Government proceeded to round up, exile, or exterminate the Mihailov Macedonian terrorist organisation which had poisoned Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations ever since the war. There followed the miraculous reconciliation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Then trouble in Austria began again; Herr Hitler flew to Venice to confer with Signor Mussolini, and the trouble died down. Next, there came the news of the Nazi leader's 'purge of blood' in Germany on June 30. Within a month of that news, Dr. Dollfuss had been brutally murdered by Nazis in Vienna, and a Nazi revolt broke out in Austria which was only quelled after

long guerilla warfare and the movement of Italian troops up to the Austrian frontier. This latter action greatly exacerbated Italo-Yugoslav relations, which had never been quiet since the war.

By this time the League of Nations was gravely deliberating the measures for the Saar plebiscite, due on January 13, 1935; and Nazi intimidation in the Saar itself was evoking French threats of armed intervention. A small but ominous dispute between Hungary and Yugoslavia over frontier abuses and differences had embittered their relations in June. Suddenly, as if to fill the cup of political crime and terrorism brim full and overflowing, a crime occurred which, in itself, was far graver than that at Serajevo in 1914. On October 9 King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, were assassinated in Marseilles by an agent of Croat and Macedonian terrorist organisations within ten minutes of the King's landing in France upon an official visit. Many more than the officials in the Chancelleries of Europe asked themselves if the lamps were going out in Europe for a second time within a generation. Little Entente Ministers held hurried consultations with the French authorities; the Yugoslav Press, with one voice, cried 'Some enemy hath done this,' and adduced the Yugoslav complaints last May against Hungary for harbouring Croat terrorists as evidence of Hungarian complicity. The Hungarian Premier hastened to Vienna, Warsaw, and Rome. The Italian Press maintained a singular, but commendable, restraint. On November 22 the Yugoslav Government presented a Note to the League at Geneva, requesting its immediate consideration of the alleged responsibility of Hungary in connexion with the Marseilles assassinations. And at that moment the League Council and special Assembly happened to be meeting in an attempt to solve two other international problems—the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay and the future of the Saar after the forthcoming plebiscite! Here was matter enough for the gravest misgiving in the mind of the most optimistic observer. As November drew to an end the European tension seemed to become intensified. One hardly needed to be an alarmist to feel that it might not be a matter of weeks before 'the guns went off by themselves.'

But they did not go off. Before December 11 dawned three great achievements were announced which went very far to retrieve the *damnosa heritas* of the year 1934 and turn it to positive international advantage. First, on December 3 in Rome the representatives of France and Germany were brought by the skilful handling of the League Committee of Three, under Baron Aloisi, to agree on the measures and conditions of the Saar plebiscite in January. Secondly, what was much more striking,

Mr. Eden announced at Geneva on December 5—exactly one month after Sir John Simon had announced in the Commons that there had never been any question of the use of British troops in maintaining order in the Saar during the plebiscite, and that 'nothing of the sort on our part is contemplated'—that His Majesty's Government were prepared to send a contingent of British troops to help maintain order in the Saar during the plebiscite, provided other States members of the League, excluding France and Germany, also agreed to send contingents for that purpose. Italy, Sweden, Holland, and Russia at once offered to send contingents; and France, in accordance with her ill-concealed expressions of dislike at having to police the Saar in the event of trouble with the Nazis during the plebiscite, agreed not to send any troops at all. The third achievement, which also took place at Geneva and was more obviously a success for League procedure in international disputes, was the firm, rapid, and universally satisfactory reconciliation effected, under Mr. Eden's initiative, between Hungary and Yugoslavia, after a veritable barrage of accusations and counter-accusations and after a hotly contentious debate in which Italy and Hungary found themselves ranged against a solid phalanx comprising the accuser, Yugoslavia, together with France, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Turkey in the background. Thus, within the short space of two months, the most ominous international conflagration of 1934 had broken out and had been safely damped down before it reached destructive proportions, and another slowly smouldering danger, that of the Saar, had been securely isolated. What lay behind such surprising sequences? How were such achievements—especially that of British intervention to safeguard the peace of Western Europe—made possible? And what new vistas do they open before a distraught Continent?

Take first the Saar agreement. Active preparations for the Saar plebiscite began in January 1934, when the League Council appointed a Committee of Three to study the question. This Committee, composed of Baron Aloisi (Italy) as chairman and of Señores Lopez Olivan (Spain) and Cantilo (Argentina), adopted a preliminary report on May 14, advocating that the League Council should relieve the Saar Governing Commission of all duties directly connected with the plebiscite, that a special 'neutral' Plebiscite Commission should be formed to prepare and supervise the plebiscite, and that a tribunal should be created to take the actual votes and to adjudicate on electoral disputes. On June 4 the Committee of Three presented a final report, together with a collateral Franco-German agreement. The report provided that the plebiscite was to take place on January 13, 1935, and contained provisions for the Plebiscite Commission's

functioning as from July 1, for a Supreme Plebiscite Tribunal and a divisional tribunal for each of the eight voting districts, for the Governing Commission's power to recruit extra 'neutral' German-speaking police, and for the equal sharing of the plebiscite expenses between Germany and France. The Franco-German agreement bound both countries 'to abstain from pressure of any kind, whether direct or indirect, likely to affect the freedom or trustworthiness of the voting.' The League Council adopted the report of the Committee of Three on the day of its presentation; and the Plebiscite Commission, composed of one representative each from Sweden, Holland, and Switzerland, began to function at Saarbrücken on July 2.

But in the meantime the Saar Governing Commission under Mr. Knox were engaged in continuous dispute with the German Nazi authorities, owing to measures taken by the latter to 'invite' Saar-German workers into Germany for 'voluntary' short spells of Nazi 'Labour Front' training, and then to return them, suitably indoctrinated, to the Saar territory and the Nazi *Deutsche Front* organisation in that territory. Mr. Knox impounded documents and forwarded them to the League; the documents showed the extraordinary difficulty of ensuring a plebiscite free from any 'direct or indirect' pressure, for Mr. Knox's own butler was found to have been carrying secret information to Nazi quarters, Saar workers were shown to have been victimised by the *Deutsche Front*, and the Saar officials and police were found not to be altogether immune from Nazi intimidation, sufficient to paralyse their efficacy in many cases. On August 14 Mr. Knox had informed the League that he could not guarantee the maintenance of law and order and the correct conduct of the plebiscite unless at least 2000 neutral extra police were recruited. On August 20 the Governing Commission took measures to control the voluntary Labour Service of the *Deutsche Front*, and on September 3 feeling was running so high over Nazi intimidation that the French (Doumergue) Cabinet thought fit to lay down the conditions under which France would accept the result of the plebiscite. These included 'every possible precaution . . . to ensure the genuineness of the vote'; provisions for security of the mines adjudged to French ownership under the Peace Treaty; and provisions for the repayment to France, if the Saar returned to Germany, of some £15,000,000 worth of French francs now circulating in the Saar. Moreover, two new elements in the problem now emerged. First, at the end of October the French Government recalled that in 1926, when Franco-German relations over the Saar were strained, the French Government at that time had, in answer to an appeal for assistance to the League by the Saar Governing Commission, offered to maintain the League's

(i.e., Saar Governing Commission's) authority in the Saar in the event of a violent disturbance, either from within or from without the territory, and that the Council had implicitly agreed to this French offer by 'noting' it. This reminder issued by M. Doumergue's Cabinet was given an up-to-date twist by a new French offer, indicating that if the Saar Governing Commission should really need military support in keeping order, they could count on the assistance of certain contingents of French troops, which had been specially moved up to the Saar frontier. It was reported in Paris on October 31 that the French Ambassador in London had informed Sir John Simon of these measures. The German Press gave evidences of alarm, and declared that Germany would denounce the Treaty of Versailles, lodge an appeal at the Hague Court, and move the *Reichswehr* into the demilitarised Rhineland zone as soon as one French soldier crossed into the Saar.

The second disturbing element was the growing realisation that the plebiscite might result (a) in some of the eight electoral districts voting for maintenance of the *status quo*, and (b) in the whole territory returning to Germany, but Germany finding herself unable to discharge immediately the price, 'in gold,' of the mines owned by the French, as provided by the Versailles Treaty. This second factor had already, on August 31, led the French Government to send a Memorandum to the League, in which they reminded the Council of its obligations in the event of a *status quo* decision, of the need to prepare for Germany's discharge of her indebtedness if she secured the Saar, and of the equity inherent in the French francs circulating in the Saar if Germany secured the territory and proceeded to 'block' them without attempting to pay out French property-owners in the Saar. The French Government also put on record their willingness to allow the Saar to remain under the League and to vote for return to Germany later.

At the beginning of November, therefore, when the Doumergue Government fell, the Germans were objecting strongly to the employment of French troops, in whatever emergency might arise; the recruitment of German-speaking extra police for the Saar Governing Commission was proceeding all too slowly for the Commission's needs; the British Government, in the person of the Foreign Secretary, had categorically declined to send British troops, and the new French Government and the German Government were seeking a *via media*. The Nazi Plenipotentiary for the Saar, Herr Bürckel, prohibited the S.S. and S.A. men from wearing uniforms within 40 kilometres of the Saar frontier between January 10 and February 10, 1935; and on November 20 another order provided for a cordon of S.A. men round the zone, to obviate any hot-headed adventure. On December 1 M. Laval, the

French Foreign Minister, in the French Chamber, reiterated his Government's desire only to act within the sphere of international procedure, and he invited other countries 'to join with us in undertaking police duties for the maintenance of order, should such prove necessary.'

At this point the scene of the Saar discussions changes to Rome, where Baron Aloisi and his two colleagues had been in session with the French and German representatives in an attempt to reach an agreement over the political and economic problems necessarily involved if the Saar returned to Germany. This task had been entrusted to the League's Committee of Three in view of the French Memorandum of August 31, referred to above. On December 3 an agreement was concluded and signed, which provided, *inter alia*, that if the Saar returned to Germany, France would accept 900,000,000 francs in total payment for the French-owned mines and all other French State credits in the Saar; Germany would guarantee to extend to non-voting Saar inhabitants the same safeguard of rights as she had guaranteed to the voting population under the agreement of June 1 (referred to above); and Germany would also guarantee that for a specified limited period, thought to be one year, she would take no action against any Saar inhabitant on account of his or her religion, language, or race. The stage was therefore aptly set at Geneva for a *dénouement* of the Saar drama. This occurred at the special session of the League Council on December 5. Mr. Eden, who had been back to London since the special Assembly meeting on the Chaco war, suddenly made the following announcement:

If the Council of the League decides, as a result of the information which has been laid before it, that it is desirable for an international force to be stationed in the Saar for the purpose of maintaining order in connection with the forthcoming plebiscite, and if the United Kingdom were invited to co-operate in this matter, then, provided other countries which are conveniently situated for this purpose were prepared to make a contribution, and on the condition that both France and Germany assented to this arrangement, we should also be prepared to supply a suitable proportion of such an international force.

The effect of this declaration, coming so hard upon the heels of Sir John Simon's reply to the French overtures in London, was electric. M. Laval at once declared that France would not seek to participate in the execution of the Council's duty in the Saar, if Germany also did not participate. The representatives of Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Italy forthwith associated their Governments with Mr. Eden's proposal. M. Benesh, as President of the Council, announced that any State member would be eligible to participate in the international force. Mr. Knox, on behalf of the Governing Commission, affirmed that the Com-

mission could not be sure of maintaining order without such a force. And in the evening of December 5 the news was received that the German Government agreed in principle to Mr. Eden's proposal. Later on, the Governments of Holland and Sweden agreed to participate in the constitution of the force, together with Britain and Italy; a British general, General Brind, was placed in supreme command of the international force, and by December 14 the advance guards of the contingents were discussing in Saarbrücken details of the organisation necessary to enable the contingents to arrive before Christmas.

This sharp intervention of the British Government was due, so the special correspondent of *The Times* at Geneva assured his readers on December 8, to a decision of the British Government at a regular Cabinet meeting

some time before the present meeting of the [League] Council. The new move was therefore entirely British in origin, and Mr. Eden came to Geneva with the plan in his pocket and with authority to propose it to the other Governments concerned if he found that the situation in the Saar made this necessary. A few hours at Geneva—and especially an interview with Mr. Knox—were enough to convince him of the urgent necessity for the public adoption of the plan, and the final sanction of the British Government followed in due course.

If this be so, Mr. Eden must have impressed upon his colleagues at the Cabinet Council of November 28 the urgency of the Saar problem, for he returned to London from Geneva for that meeting after representing Britain at the special Assembly meeting on the Chaco war; and on December 4 he was back in Geneva for the special Council meeting on the Saar, when he saw Mr. Knox, preparatory to making his announcement on December 5. It would seem, therefore, that while the Committee of Three was proceeding to a satisfactory agreement at Rome with the French and German representatives, Mr. Eden must have remarked the great opportunity for British initiative offered by the unwillingness of M. Laval rigidly to carry out the late M. Barthou's inflexible policy towards Germany over the Saar problem.

The outcome of the unexpected British initiative was itself unexpected. By a singular coincidence, while Mr. Eden was in Geneva for the special Assembly on the Chaco war and for the renewed disarmament discussions, a second crisis had arisen. On November 22 the Yugoslav Government presented a Note to the League requesting that the subject of King Alexander's assassination should be placed on the agenda for the (normal) January Council meeting, under par. 2, Article XI., of the Covenant, as a matter likely to disturb the relations existing between Hungary and Yugoslavia 'as well as the general conditions upon which peace in Central Europe depends.' The Note stated that Hungary

was the base from which the plot had been executed and that 'this was with the complicity of Hungarian authorities, on whose responsibility a 'disquieting light' had been thrown. Czechoslovakia and Rumania associated themselves with Yugoslavia and with the Yugoslav request that Hungarian responsibility for permitting the continuation of a training-ground for international terrorists, long after Yugoslavia had protested on that very score to Hungary, should be established or refuted by 'the highest organ of the international community.'

An uproar arose at once. The Hungarian delegate at Geneva protested 'against this tendentious action,' which he denounced as 'an act of international terrorism.' The Hungarian Press stated that Hungary was being made a scapegoat for evils which arose solely from Yugoslav internal dissensions. On November 24 an official Italian statement ranged Italy solidly behind Hungary, and strongly supported the Hungarian Government's request for immediate discussion of the Yugoslav accusations by a special meeting of the Council following its meeting on the Saar problem. At a particularly unfortunate juncture, the very next day the Court of Appeal at Turin decided against extraditing two notorious exiled Croat agitators to the French police on suspicion of their implication in the Marseilles assassinations. This refusal to extradite was based on the Franco-Italian Extradition Treaty of 1870, which explicitly excluded *political* crimes from the list of extraditable offences. But opinion in France and Yugoslavia took the decision badly; it was asserted that the Marseilles assassinations were more akin to the ordinary, extraditable crime of murder than to 'political offences.' On November 28 the Yugoslav Government presented a detailed Memorandum and *dossier* of evidence to the League in support of its accusations against Hungary, in which appeared striking evidence that it was

solely due to the tolerance and assistance lent by certain Hungarian authorities that it has been possible to form a body of assassins and trained terrorists in what in reality was a school of crime founded on Hungarian territory. It is to this nursery of terrorists that the organisers of the outrage . . . came to seek the perpetrator of their abominable crime. . . . This crime cannot be regarded as an isolated and individual manifestation of criminal anarchism . . . it is the natural culminating point of a conspiracy against Yugoslavia which had long been organised and nourished abroad.

The concluding sentence of this citation provoked instantaneous reactions of a grave political order. Rumours had long been current that Italy would be compelled to support Hungary, even to the extent of resisting a League inquiry *in situ* in Hungary, owing to the implication of certain Italian authorities with Hungarians in the organisation of Croat exiles in their propaganda

work against the Yugoslav Government. News was received in Geneva that Gustav Persec, the organiser of the criminal *farm* at Yanka Pusztá, in Hungary, had been released from police detention in Vienna by the direct intervention of the Italian authorities. The goings to and fro in Central Europe of notable personages, and the apparent breakdown of the recently constructed diplomatic 'bridge' between France and Italy, boded ill for the special Council meeting called for December 7. The Little Entente and France were solid in seeing the Marseilles outrage as an outcome of irredentism and revisionist propaganda and methods on the part of Hungary and Italy. Italy, Hungary, and Austria, bound by the Protocols of last March in political unity, were equally solid in maintaining their attitude against the Little Entente. Meanwhile Yugoslav authorities began to expel hundreds of peaceable Hungarian peasants, resident in Yugoslavia since the Peace.

On December 7 M. Yevtitch opened the Yugoslav case for the prosecution of Hungary at the bar of the League Council, on the lines of the Yugoslav memoranda. There had been some hope that the Hungarian delegate, M. de Eckhardt, would open a loophole by accepting the Yugoslav accusation only in so far as it impugned 'certain Hungarian authorities'—i.e., local authorities excited by an *excès de zèle*. He did nothing of the kind, however. He preferred a vigorous repudiation of all the charges; laid the cause of the assassinations at the Yugoslav Government's doors, on account of its internal administration; and then proceeded, to the manifest discouragement of the British, Italian, and French delegates, to range over the whole ground of Hungary's international grievances since the Treaty of Trianon. This was altogether too much for the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, who thus found themselves in the dock as accessories before the fact, instead of in the rôle of witnesses for the prosecution! M. Benesh and M. Titulescu launched their own attacks on Hungary for her post-war irredentism, her revisionist propaganda, and her opportunist readiness to harass the Little Entente States. The case had been lifted from the judicial to the political plane with a vengeance. On December 8 M. Laval opened his speech in the Council with the words: 'In this grave debate, France is on the side of Yugoslavia.' The Italian delegate made his Government's sympathy with Hungary equally plain. M. Litvinov hinted that responsibility for the outrage could be sought elsewhere than in Hungary. Mr. Eden tried to please both political sides with a judicial speech, and failed. The *impasse* seemed complete. The League Council appeared little more than a collection of contestants.

But the tribunal constituted under the League permitted, if

not the parties in the dispute themselves, at least their counsel, to put their heads together; and before the war that was generally impossible. It was significant that Yugoslavia and Hungary both urged their cases at the Council table—in itself a remarkable enough contrast with so recent an international dispute as the Balkan wars of 1912-13.

M. Laval and Baron Aloisi, the one supporting the Little Entente and the other supporting Hungary, met in conclave on December 8 and 9. Perhaps Mr. Eden's new-found authority, after Britain's initiative in forming the international force for the Saar, enabled him to urge M. Laval to call his friends to order, at the same time as it enabled him to urge Baron Aloisi to recall the Hungarian delegate to a sense of the consequences to which intransigence might lead both Hungary and Italy. On December 8 the Italian Government's decree taking measures to commandeer the assets abroad of all Italian-domiciled persons, individual and corporate, had made Italy's economic problems manifest. Neither dared Hungary envisage war, or that more acute isolation in Central Europe which would be her lot if she followed Germany out of the League. Moreover, on December 8 the Yugoslav Government stopped the deportation of Hungarians. On the evening of December 9 Mr. Eden dined with M. Laval, and saw M. de Kánya, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, and Baron Aloisi. And on the evening of December 10 it was announced in Geneva that a resolution had been agreed by both parties and approved by the League Council.

This resolution of the Council condemned the encouragement or toleration by any State upon its territory of any terrorist activity with a political purpose; set forth the Council's opinion that 'certain Hungarian authorities may have assumed, at any rate through negligence, certain responsibilities relative to acts having a connexion with the preparation of the crime of Marseilles'; called upon the Hungarian Government alone to take 'appropriate punitive action in the case of any of its authorities whose culpability may be established'; asked that Government to communicate to the Council the results of its inquiry and the action taken; and announced the Council's decision to set up a committee of experts charged with the preparation of a draft International Convention against terrorist organisations, over which Mr. Eden was invited to preside. The resolution was hailed as satisfactory by both Hungary and Yugoslavia; and Mr. Eden paid M. Yevtitch a warm tribute for the restraint and patience with which he had presented the Yugoslav case. Moreover, the settlement appeared to hold out hope of organised international action to prevent the activities of terrorist bands on the territories of States signing the proposed Convention.

The sudden, precise, and comprehensive nature of the settlement took Europe by surprise—the second surprise within a week. All the delegates at Geneva were unanimous in their praise of Mr. Eden's handling of an extremely delicate and ominous dispute. As France was so patently committed by M. Laval's first words in the Council to one side, and Italy, in the words of Baron Aloisi, to the other, the rôle of mediator naturally devolved upon Mr. Eden. But the significant, undeniable fact is that, had Mr. Eden not built and buttressed the decisive position of Great Britain on the Council by his announcement on December 5 of his Government's willingness to police the Saar with British troops, the rôle of an effective mediator could never have been sustained by him on December 8 and 9, nor could the British Government have exercised, as it did, so great an influence on the Governments at Budapest and Belgrade from London. It was, in fact, a triumph for British statesmanship, quite in the best tradition of 'an honest broker'; but such a triumph would have been impossible without the previous success of the Saar declaration. Twice within a week had a British Government, of which the Continental statesmen had despaired and the counsels of which they had rejected in favour of dubious and dangerous expedients, dramatically taken a leading rôle and carried it off in quiet perfection. The effect on the Continent—in Paris, Berlin, Rome, Central Europe—was profound. The 'tired lion' was not dead, then. He was not even dozing. Britain had proved her concern, not over peace in the abstract or in the world at large, but over peace in the Saar: peace between France and Germany on the terrain of Locarno, peace between Hungary and the Little Entente, and over the need for good and constructive relations between France and Italy.

The moral is self-evident. Peace in Europe is a condition precedent of Britain's own tranquillity, in the long run. The spectre of war had been raised by the Saar dispute, by the introduction of 'revisionism' into the Hungarian-Yugoslav dispute, by the danger that Italy and France might separate after their recent *rapprochement* over the integrity of Austria. But the sudden and bold initiative of the British Government at Geneva had changed all that. It had accomplished two notable achievements. It had dissipated the fear of war, by reconciling national disputants as an honest broker, on two occasions. Most important, it had only done so by acting within the framework of, and as a member of, the League of Nations. Without such action through the League any efficacious intervention of the British Government would have been, and would have been immediately interpreted abroad as, equivalent to a declaration of partisanship or alliance in two international disputes.

Thus the year 1934 closed with the stocks of the League and the British Government standing at higher levels in the political market than for years past. These evidences of recovery in international affairs are, in all probability, the most reliable indices of the continuance of such a recovery in 1935. The 'new diplomacy' was abundantly vindicated—justified by works! If the British Government goes on in diplomacy as boldly as it has begun, it will not only be rendering immeasurable service to an apprehensive Continent, but will also be rallying to its support all those who in this country desire to see Britain playing that rôle in international affairs for which she is most fitted, and which, in these crucial days, she alone can play.

D. GRAHAM HUTTON.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

A GERMAN VIEW

It is easy nowadays to criticise the Treaty of Versailles. The whole world has realised its mistakes. But graver even was the omission to revise the Treaty—of course, not at once, but, say, about the middle of the century's third decade. The German people knew perfectly well that the war hatred had to die down before a revision could be talked of. It was prepared to wait. But when after Locarno (advertised as the stepping-stone to a new relation between the enemies of the Great War) nothing fundamental happened, the moral revolution started whose political outcome was January 1933.

It was an English poet, Mr. D. H. Lawrence, who was among the first to sense what was happening. Writing from Germany, if I remember rightly, in 1926, he expressed his amazement that that country was turning away from the orbit of Western civilisation. The poet's vision proved to be correct. After the *débâcle* of the monarchic military system, Germany had turned towards Western civilisation with an *élan* which, if properly nursed, could have easily transferred the frontier between East and West from the Rhine to the Vistula. It was one of the really great occasions which so rarely occur in history. Democracy, parliamentarism, the precedence of trade and business before the soldier and the civil servant, would have taken root in Germany if they had had the chance to do so. Wilson would have triumphed over William II. That the President and all for which he stood failed in this task was not only the fault of Germany's ex-enemies. A great blame fell on the too hastily drawn up Weimar Constitution, which too blindly followed the great examples of the West. '*L'art c'est la nature vue à travers d'un tempérament.*' It was the fatal mistake of the Weimar Constitution that it did not see democracy through the temperament of the people which it was to serve. Besides, with the zeal of the convert, Weimar overstepped democracy, inserting, it is true, a safeguard in the form of the emergency article 48, but providing the country with an electoral system which proved to be utterly unworkable.

If these were the mistakes of Germany herself, the West again was to blame that the two great statesmen which democratic Germany produced, Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Brüning, had no time to take the revision of Germany's parliamentary and electoral system and the consolidation of democracy in hand. Instead, they spent their strength, and, as far as Dr. Stresemann is concerned, their life-blood, running from one international conference to another, whose political and economical results were not enough to check the rising tide of Germany's anti-democracy. The latter, too, could point at only too many Staviskys who helped to bring down German democracy, as they nearly did in France. The *régime* got discredited, and the more so as financial corruption was equalled by financial mismanagement, private and public. The first shocks of the world crisis smashed to pieces the illusionary fabric of German prosperity, and with it the faith in Western capitalism, so closely interwoven with democracy.

Three times after the downfall of the Hohenzollern the German people has looked across its frontiers searching for an inspiration upon which to build up its own order of things. From these spiritual expeditions the most promising one to Western democracy had returned empty-handed. A better fate befell the gazing towards Soviet Russia, which country succeeded in mesmerising an ever-increasing number of German workmen and intellectuals. But it was Germany's third look towards Italy which provided the decision. One may think about Herr Hitler as one likes, but one must admit that, on this occasion, he showed greater genius than Germany's Democrats and Communists, who thought they could pack democracy and Communism in a trunk in London and Moscow and unpack them in Berlin. Hitler instead fitted the Fascist cloak to the German body. He took over the soldierly outlook, the State supremacy and autocracy of Fascism, knowing how much they were akin to Germany's heart, but he added to it that touch of mysticism and romanticism without which Germany cannot live. Even his most disputed race theory is based on the 'mystery of the blood.' Doubtlessly, with these additions, Hitler made things infinitely more difficult and problematic for himself than the hot-and-cold realist Mussolini. But is not even this passion for difficulties very German? Probably the world would have accepted German Fascism if it had been run on Italian lines; the question is, would Germany have accepted it?

I have dwelt on this prelude to impress the English reader that what took place in January 1933 was not a change of government, but a revolution. England's judgment about the happenings of the last two years might have been different if this had been realised from the beginning. Every revolution has its

Huguenots and its rough work. It throws out new ideas and makes experiments of which only a certain percentage will stand the test of reality. No revolution can live without its dreams and visionary ecstasies, and it was one of the foremost faults of Germany's democracy that it confounded government with a kind of board meeting. But how did the spectators, lined up on the sheltered shore of Western civilisation, react to the birth-pangs of Hitler's Germany? There is no need to give a reply. The unfortunate fact is that the flood of accusations, the whipping up of hatred in which the bulk of England's Press indulged at the mere mention of Nazism, undermined the tremendous moral influence which post-war England had exercised upon German public opinion. If it has been said in England that Hitler destroyed the work of Brüning and Stresemann, the English Press destroyed the work of Lord d'Abernon, to whom once the whole of Germany listened as to a trusted friend. To-day, if an English statesman addresses Germany, the man in the street will ask, 'Is that the advice of a friend or an enemy?' Just as Germany has lost in England, so has England in Germany.

This does not mean that Germany expects England to applaud everything she does or to withhold criticism. National Socialism realises perfectly well that the whole fabric of its state is foreign to English temperament and tradition. It has never made one gesture of propaganda for the sake of England's Blackshirts. But just as Germany respects England's peculiar forms of government, economics and social life, so she claims the right to build up her country corresponding to her own ideas. After all, Germany has tried to work on English lines and has failed; and surely nobody in England complains that the part of the German population which looked for an inspiration towards Moscow did not get the chance to realise its dream. To put it shortly, what Germany resents is that England takes a far greater interest in the accidents of her revolution than in its final aims; that it judges the Third Reich after its shortcomings, overlooking or minimising its constructive work; that in things German the English Press, or at least a great part of it, has fallen back to the old recipe—vice is news, virtue is not; and finally, that, in running down Nazism, England never considers the alternative, as if Communism would be a lesser evil than the rule of Herr Hitler.

Take a practical example. The conflict of the Churches has roused a tremendous interest in England, where again and again Bishop Müller was accused of overplaying his hand. But when finally the Chancellor stepped in, withdrew his support and took the most reasonable line to let the Churches work out their own salvation, did he get equal credit for what he had done in comparison to previous blame? Was it ever put to the English

public that, during the Democratic Republic, Protestantism was dead and Catholicism had degenerated into a political organisation, and that when in fourteen terrible years the German people tottered from one spiritual and material crisis to the other neither Church was able to give the people the much-needed support? That religion is once more a power in Germany, as it has not been since the days of Martin Luther, is due to National Socialism, which not only cut the ground under the atheistic propaganda, but dealt the crude materialism of post-war Germany a fatal blow. True, there are men among the Nazis who question some of Christianity's ethical values, who prefer the heroic outlook on life to the Christian virtue of love and forgiveness, so brilliantly displayed in Versailles. But religions have never died through controversies, but through the very indifference which spread like wild fire in democratic Germany.

I think a great step forward could be made in Anglo-German relations, if England would try to see both sides of the problems which have risen with National Socialism. Many distorted views could be put right with a minimum of impartiality, and by keeping in mind that revolutions have their own laws, that they make many steps at once and take risks such as would be impossible in well-balanced communities. It is not what a revolution does but what will survive from its doings which decides its historical importance; not the bombs of the Suffragettes will remain immortal, but the position gained for Englishwomen through these hysterical fighters. Many, of course, of the Nazis' aims will remain unpalatable to the English mouth; first of all the racial creed. Likewise, unless things should change radically, England will never accept the restriction of personal freedom such as demanded by Herr Hitler. Fundamental as these differences are, there remains a wide range of affairs where, given a certain amount of good-will, England will be able to understand what is going on in that 'dark continent' Germany. Is it really a crime that Hitler tries to make Germany as German as England is English or France is French? Highbrows might scoff at what they call the 'flight to the nursery,' where a great nation gone astray tries to make a new beginning. For, let it not be forgotten, German culture, too, had broken down long before Hitler came. A healthy nation could not have produced that sequence of morbid plays and perverted novels so characteristic of post-war Berlin. In England a harmless affair like the *Well of Loneliness* was banned. In post-war Germany there was hardly a literary production which did not start with a boy seducing his mother or a girl trying to revive grandpapa's extinct sexuality. If Hitler has not succeeded in producing new masterpieces, at least he has brushed away much that was diseased and unclean—Hitler, and,

be it understood, not the Churches, whose feeble protests remained unheard in democratic Germany. But he never got a word of appreciation, not even from Anglo-Saxon Puritanism.

The same applies to the schools. Not that they were unmoral; but the spectacled, pale-faced German schoolboy of pre-revolutionary days bore witness to a practice of over-cramming and stuffing young minds with knowledge which no English headmaster would have allowed. In giving sport its proper place in the young man's upbringing, National Socialism paid the public schools of England the greatest compliment—that of imitation. The labour camps which a German boy joins once he leaves school add to physical games the training in physical work. In a country suffering from an ever-increasing intellectual proletariat, this was surely one of the wisest measures of the new *régime*, unless one thinks that the unemployed youth hanging about on street corners is a glory of twentieth-century Europe. But hardly were the labour camps opened when they were accused of militarising aims, whereas, in reality, they are a school for German youth to learn physical work and to unlearn class war.

When Herr Hitler came to power he found 6,000,000 unemployed. To-day that figure is hardly over 2,000,000. That this was achieved in face of shrinking exports makes the miracle even greater. It is not my task to judge how far the gigantic public works, the restrictions on dismissing workers and all the measures to reduce unemployment conform to the rules of orthodox economics. Morally, they will stand the test of time as a symptom of social conscience with which Herr Hitler, who personally has experienced hunger and need, has imbued the German nation. To be or to act unsocially is a delict in modern Germany, as a well-off banker found to his cost when he evicted an unemployed man for non-payment of rent. That Germany's economic situation is strained is unavoidable after the country had been bled white by reparations and the inflation, to be followed by over-borrowing. But if here the German business man and many municipalities are to blame, so are the foreign lenders who, after the miracle of the *Reichsmark*, swarmed through the country throwing money at anybody who wanted it. So when the Nazis came to power, not only did they find an impoverished, but also an over-indebted country. To pay her debts Germany was the more unable, as the spreading of economical nationalism all over the world, the currency devaluations and the boycott ravaged Germany's foreign markets, whereas at home the time-honoured problem arose how to combine industry with the salvation of agriculture. It was a grim inheritance which fell to Herr Hitler with nobody to help him. For the world has not yet taken in hand the reform of international

indebtedness, without which no ultimate settlement of the world crisis seems possible.

But in the meantime Germany had to act. She did so, not by repudiating her obligations, but, as every honest business man does in similar circumstances, by the application of strict economy. No goods are to be bought which cannot be paid for. This 'organised economy in using foreign goods' has, in Dr. Schacht's own words, the double aim of balancing Germany's expenditure abroad against her receipts of foreign currency and of building up an active trade balance, without which Germany cannot pay her foreign debts. Hard as these measures were for an impoverished country and an industry in need of raw materials, they are not to be understood as an act of deliberate self-isolation, as some foreign critics of Germany pretend. On the contrary, by making foreign payments, debts and otherwise, dependent on foreign trade, the 'New Plan' fosters the latter, which, the age of wild speculations being on the wane, can only be done on the basis of rigorous honesty. There is an old German joke about a milliner girl who divides her customers into two classes: the poor woman who buys one hat and pays, and the rich woman who buys five hats without bothering about the bill. This joke characterises exactly the difference between Germany's pre- and post-revolutionary economics. England, who knows that confidence lies at the root of all things, economical as well as political, will not be at a loss to choose. Even if temporarily at a low ebb, in the long run trade can only gain if run on these lines. But trade is not only a profit-making institution. It is still the foremost peacemaker of the world, especially between such big industrial nations as Germany and Great Britain. It is, therefore, the fostering of trade which offers one of the best chances to improve the relations between these two countries.

Commercial confidence is much; but it is not all. To yield the expected results it must be paralleled by political confidence and co-operation. That Germany has been accused of self-isolation has been mentioned above. But just as this was wrong in the field of economics, so it was in politics. In spite of the fact that self-concentration is the rule of every revolution (unless it aims at a world revolution), Germany was always prepared to throw in her lot with the rest of the world. Never has anything like England's talk of splendid isolation been heard in Germany, who realises that neither she nor Europe could flourish if the country lying at the latter's heart were surrounded by a Chinese wall. The only price which Germany asked for her co-operation was to be treated as an equal partner. The fateful word *Gleichberechtigung* (equality) was written across the sky of Europe.

For many years Germany had striven for this equality. She

never got it. Even Germany's entry into the League of Nations resembled less a great act of reconciliation than a readmission of an outcast into good society. In spite of all Geneva oratory, the German people was never allowed to forget the sting of defeat. The accusation of Germany's sole responsibility for the war was never withdrawn, whereas war-time phantasies like the 'corpse factory' were only very half-heartedly admitted to be false. Grave as this moral discrimination was, it was Germany's one-sided disarmament which brought the equality question to its climax. Here German diplomacy stood on a very firm ground. For did not the very Treaty of Versailles state that 'in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow'? In the same spirit Article VIII. of the Covenant put it down that 'the members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety.' Here, again, it was not a question of disarmament in a hurry, but of disarmament in the long run. Year after year Germany waited patiently for the diplomatic negotiations, the preparatory Disarmament Conference (which, by the way, sat for five years), and finally for the Disarmament Conference itself to succeed in getting the disarmament cheque honoured. But neither Germany's forced nor Great Britain's voluntary disarmament was followed by the country which in this question held the key position—namely, France.

France's political master-minds were clever enough not to contest the claim of disarmament. Instead, they changed the laws of physics. One had only to shout the word 'disarmament' at the mountain of munitions, tanks and guns heaped up in France, when the echo came back, '*Sécurité*.' This was done so persistently that in the end disarmament and security became the heavenly twins of European policy. One could not move without the other. If Germany was disappointed in the disarmament question, France pretended that she never got the security promised to her at Versailles, where, let it be remembered, she demanded the left bank of the Rhine in the name of security. Finally, as an '*Ersatz*' for this supreme form of security, France accepted the promise of America and Great Britain to come to her help if attacked by Germany. The United States soon dropped out as insurance company for France's Eastern frontiers, dragging with them Great Britain. Since then, whenever Great Britain asked France to disarm, the latter refused, unless given adequate security—no longer by America, but by England.

England has striven manfully to give France her pound of security. True, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 was cancelled, but

in Locarno Great Britain tied up herself with the Rhine frontier to an extent which amazed the world. It was an ominous sign that neither Locarno nor the Kellogg Pact of 1928 brought disarmament any nearer. Can it be wondered that the belief spread in Germany that France would never disarm, however great the security which England and all international agreements might offer her? The suspicion arose that France in reality used security as a pretext to keep her army in such a state of superiority that Germany for ever would remain a second-class Power. Ten years after the war, and more, this was a position which no self-respecting country of 65,000,000 inhabitants could accept. Besides, a new generation arose which did not understand why she still had to pay this humiliating price of defeat. To explain her unwillingness to disarm, France pointed out that twice in living memory she had seen the enemy on her sacred soil. To this the Germans replied that they, too, had had a foreign army in their country, and even in peace-time, when, in opposition to the public opinion of the world, M. Poincaré invaded the Ruhr. Surely, if France had a right to security, so had Germany. Already, from a financial point of view, Germany would infinitely have preferred security *via* disarmament. It was only when the hopes of a general disarmament faded away that Germany drew the attention of the world to her own means of defence.

The desire for security and equality grew so strong that already in 1932 Germany found herself compelled to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference. She came back immediately once her right to equality 'in a *régime* of security' had solemnly been recognised in the historical agreement of December 11, 1932. Unhesitatingly, too, Germany had joined the 'no-force' declaration made by Sir John Simon on November 10 of the same year in which the Foreign Secretary reaffirmed the principle underlying the Kellogg Pact. Four months later Mr. MacDonald put the British Draft Convention on the table of the Disarmament Conference. Germany adhered, and, to do her utmost to foster an agreement, she contributed the sacrifice of exchanging her long-term army for a short-term militia. Again Germany had said 'yes,' when, for the sake of French security, the British Government combined its Draft Convention, not only with the old 'no-force' declaration, but also with a Consultative Agreement. Herr Hitler, who by now was responsible for the German policy, could rightfully claim that, whatever proposition came from Great Britain, he had played the game, even if it meant a heavy sacrifice, as in the case of the militia.

The Draft Convention was accepted as a basis for a future Convention, and once more hope dared to raise her head. The first shadow fell over a respiring world when, after certain

pourparlers during the summer, Sir John Simon in September 1933 went to Paris to conclude there what the French Press called '*l'accord de Paris*.' The cat was let out of the bag when in Geneva Germany found herself faced with a probation period of four years, to be followed by an inquiry, if by then international control had worked well enough to allow Germany the arms forbidden to her in the Treaty of Versailles. This was a completely new situation, which, in German eyes, not only undid the equality agreement, but the very Draft Convention. Things were not improved by calling the probation period a transitional period and by suggesting that it should be shortened. In either case Germany saw the fulfilment of equality postponed, in spite of the fact that she did not claim quantitative but only qualitative equality. If there ever was a discrimination, it was here. Preferring the odium of the world to putting her signature under such an agreement, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League.

I happened to be in Geneva during those fateful days, when in circles near to the British delegation one could hear that English public opinion would never swallow a disarmament convention whose outstanding fact would be the 'rearmament' of Germany: hence the delegations' intransigent position. I was greatly surprised when, coming to England, I found British public opinion far more in favour of a convention than horrified at a reasonable amount of German armament. Even in face of a growing hostility towards the Hitler régime, the British Press could not help writing that Germany in Geneva had not had a very fair deal. Whitehall did not fail to understand the *vox populi*, which, as on a different occasion, *The Times* of December 7, 1934, was to write later on, 'may even be ahead of official opinion.' The outcome was the famous Memorandum of January 29, 1934, in which the British Government recognised the 'practical application of the principle of equality,' and declared itself prepared to allow Germany tanks up to six tons and guns up to 155 mm. Besides, His Majesty's Government

frankly recognised that Germany and other States not at present entitled to military aircraft could not be asked to postpone for long their claim. . . . If the permanent disarmament commission has not decided on abolition at the end of two years, all countries shall be entitled to possess military aircraft. Countries would reduce or increase by stages, as the case might be, in the following eight years. . . . Germany would acquire parity with the principal air Powers by these stages.

Once more, as in the previous equality declaration, Great Britain had made a bold step forward, and once more it was Germany who to a very large extent agreed, as Mr. Eden was to find out

when visiting Herr Hitler in Berlin. True, Germany was not prepared to wait for two years for appropriate means of aerial defence. But Herr Hitler agreed to wait ten years to attain full equality with the principal air Powers, contenting himself during five years with 30 per cent. of the combined air forces of Germany's neighbours or 50 per cent. of France's military aircraft, 'which-ever figure was the less.' On the basis of reciprocity Germany further accepted the supervision of the S.S. and S.A. to insure their unmilitary character. She finally agreed to France's non-disarmament till the fifth year of the Convention.

The echo which these aims (published in the famous Memorandum of April 16) found in England proved beyond doubt that the English people considered this to be a fair arrangement. Praise was loud for the conciliatory spirit shown by the German Chancellor. Not so in France, who during these negotiations had found herself in one of the greatest bewilderments of her post-war history. The dilemma reached its climax when Great Britain, to do her utmost in the way of security, had offered to guarantee the execution of the Disarmament Convention, which very nearly meant a second Locarno. If Locarno guaranteed the frontiers, the British offer guaranteed the armies. What more could France ask for? If ever anybody suspected that in no circumstances was France going to disarm, he found the proofs in the way in which France rejected the British proposals. The dragging in of the German defence budget, which, by the way, was known before, was only a 'save face.'

Unfortunately, political events like June 30 and the death of Dr. Dollfuss increased England's hostility towards Germany to such an extent that it nearly became forgotten that not Germany, but France, had ruined the chances of the Disarmament Conference, which in April seemed so bright. So when England had to look after her own armaments it was Germany who was picked out as the potential enemy. No wonder that Germany, after having backed England whenever she made a move towards the Disarmament Convention, resented this kind of propaganda. X was the thief, but Y was hanged. Great praise is due to Mr. Baldwin when on November 28, in the House of Commons, he stopped the speculation about thousands and tens of thousands of German aeroplanes. The appeasement produced by this speech was followed by the arrangements about the Saar, which between them suddenly created a better atmosphere all over Europe. While gladly recognising this improvement, Germany has been warned by past experiences not to be over-optimistic. Too often Germany has witnessed how Great Britain made a step in the right direction only to stop when a cold wind blew from Paris. Are we now on the way towards the practical equality which so

solemnly has been promised to Germany, and upon which no German Government can go back?

On the reply to this question much depends for Germany's future relations with England as well as with the League. Again and again Herr Hitler has offered friendship to France, nor has he ever questioned England's right to provide herself with the means of defence which she considers indispensable for her national security. It is this very right, and nothing more, which Germany claims for herself, acting herein on the principle laid down by *The Times* of February 16, 1934: 'In any case, it must surely be regarded as the inalienable right of every sovereign State to possess the means of self-defence.' It is one of the paradoxes of our age that, at a time when England has hardly one good word left for Germany, in the vital question of disarmament the two countries stand very nearly on the same platform. Twice within a few years Germany's claim for equality was first contested by Great Britain and later on accepted. It was so in 1932 and also a year later, when the spirit which England adopted in January 1934 might have prevented the breakdown of the previous October. Is that not a proof that Germany's demands, at first declared to be exorbitant, were on second thoughts found to be quite reasonable? Is it too much to hope that the spirit of second thoughts might still prevail?

If so, and if, as some people believe, France too is moving towards a more realistic position, the gain for Europe would be tremendous. Disarmament, it is true, seems to be postponed for many years to come. But the next best thing—limitation—should still remain within the possibilities of diplomatic skill and with it the stopping of competitive building, nearly always the forerunner of war. If once the 'arms' question were out of the way, the war-hysteria, too, would die down, for which the nervous tension of our days is the very breeding-ground. While there has been no war hysteria in Germany, the country is preoccupied with its security, and the more so as, with Russia again in the field, Germany's old *cauchemar* of encirclement is lingering in the back of her mind. That her anxieties are not mere phantasy was proved by an indiscreet Frenchman who, not long ago, spoke about the Red army and the Red air fleet as at the disposal of France. How would England have reacted if a Japanese politician were to declare that Japan could rely on the United States if trouble should start in the Far East? To understand Germany one must put oneself in her position, geographically as well as mentally and economically, always treating her as an equal partner. This is the shortest way towards an improvement of the relations between Germany and Great Britain.

K. VON STUTTERHEIM.

'ROUND TABLE' OR WORLD COMMONWEALTH?

AN influential group in Great Britain and the Dominions, the 'Round Table,' has for many years been concerned to consolidate the British Empire and, on the basis of an 'Anglo-Saxon' *entente*, to bring it into closer relationship with the United States. Solicitude for the future of the British Commonwealth and the desire for a continuance of its friendship with America are not, however, the monopoly of any group. Many of us are equally concerned to develop the potential unity of the Empire and its co-operation with the great Republic. But we believe that this development can best be served, not by rigidly insisting upon a cut-and-dried imperial Anglo-Saxon policy, not by leaving Europe to stew in its own juice, but by adapting the policies of each unit in the English-speaking community, so as to secure the existence and well-being of the whole and enable it to play its appropriate part in the wider arena of the world. Consequently, we are convinced that in the long run it is unwise to urge a uniform and stereotyped policy of defence upon all the members of the British Empire which may be harmful, and indeed dangerous, to the interests of one or more of its members. It is impossible and impracticable to put the Empire into a strait-jacket. This is especially true of the vital question of security.

The security of the Empire as a whole is obviously a matter of paramount importance, but it does not follow that the same methods of achieving security apply equally to all its component parts. For instance, Great Britain, strategically and geographically, is still part of Europe, whilst its Dominions are separated from this continent by thousands of miles. The latter are vitally concerned with the safety of Great Britain, and if this can be assured only by participating in a European collective system of defence, they would be foolish to try and prevent the Mother Country from co-operating with her European neighbours, even though they decided that at the moment their own interests did not warrant their participation in setting up this system. Such an attitude would not imply any disloyalty on the part of the Dominions. It would simply mean that they recognised the necessity imposed upon Great Britain to col-

laborate with her neighbours in establishing the reign of law in Europe. On the other hand, should they elect, as States Members of the League of Nations, to become associated with her in this enterprise, they would have contributed, not only to the safety of the Mother Country, but also to their own security. Obviously, however, it is for each to decide for itself as to how far and to what extent it will participate in establishing the new system, and nothing will be gained by insisting upon any rigid plan to which all must conform.

It is for this reason, amongst others, that some of us condemn the policy adumbrated by the *Round Table* group. They are oblivious to change. They still think of the next war in terms of the last. Obviously this attitude of mind is fatal because it ignores reality and the march of events. It fails to co-ordinate scientific facts with political necessity and seeks to impose a doctrine which the discoveries and inventions of a modern age have completely invalidated. What is this doctrine? Briefly it is this—that the policy of Great Britain in the matter of security must be determined by the attitude of other countries, especially by our Dominions and the United States; that a collective system based upon the League is useless unless it is universal and comprises at least all the Great Powers.¹ This means, in effect, that the reign of law cannot be inaugurated, even in Europe, until the United States, and even Japan, decide to join the League in establishing it throughout the world. Unless there is unanimous and simultaneous agreement, no advance is possible. Clearly this is either crying for the moon or deliberate sabotage. Even at the conclusion of the bloodiest war in history, it was impossible to persuade all nations to enter the League. How, therefore, is it possible now to induce them simultaneously to become partners in a system of mutual defence against aggression? The suggestion is ludicrous. It implies that the fate of Great Britain and the destiny of Europe must depend upon the actions and policies of nations thousands of miles away who are only remotely concerned with the fate of Europe and are immersed in their own particular problems.

There are three facts concerning the British Empire which are apt to be overlooked or ignored by the editors of the *Round Table*. The first is that the Empire consists of two distinct parts—its self-governing communities and its dependencies. The former, mainly of European origin, have been accorded a status of equality with the Mother Country, whilst the latter, notably India, are inhabited by subject peoples who are governed by the British Parliament. All are included in the Empire, although the

¹ See article 'The Empire, the League and Security' in the *Round Table*, March 1934.

first is a loose confederacy, whilst the second is an *imperium* resting for its ultimate sanction upon the forces of the Crown. It is clear that, so far as security is concerned, the needs of the component parts of this heterogeneous Empire may be entirely different.

Secondly, when Great Britain and the Dominions signed the Treaty of Versailles they became, severally and individually, members of the League of Nations. When each of the self-governing Dominions appended its signature to the Covenant it was admitted to the status of nationhood. They became units of a larger and wider commonwealth into which the British Commonwealth was absorbed, not as a single entity speaking with one voice and casting one vote, but as a number of units each having the right to speak and vote for itself—a commonwealth within a commonwealth. The case of India was anomalous because she was and still is a dependency. Great Britain occupies the position of a trustee. She is responsible for the welfare and development of the Indian peoples. Therefore, in effect, India is a mandated territory, and until she enjoys Dominion status she cannot claim equality with other States Members of the League. The signing of the Covenant marked a new phase in the history of the British Empire which, through a process of adaptation, has survived when so many other empires have gone into the melting-pot. It also has a bearing upon the problem of security.

Thirdly, the march of science has flung new weapons—super-weapons, devastating weapons—into the world. The aeroplane, poison gas, and submarine have profoundly modified, if indeed they have not revolutionised, our ideas about Imperial defence and security. In pre-war days sea-power was the dominant factor. To-day it has been superseded by air-power. Any nation which secures the mastery of the air in Europe will have taken the first step in the conquest of the British Empire. In any case, the Empire will no longer exist, because its connecting link, sea-power, will have vanished at the same moment. Therefore, the problem of Empire security has to be considered from an entirely new angle. Great Britain is still the heart of the Empire, and if the heart ceases to beat, the whole body collapses. Highly industrialised and densely populated, this island affords a more admirable and attractive target than any other country in the world. It follows that, under the new conditions which have supervened since the war, the urgent problem is the protection and defence of Great Britain. How best can this be achieved? Through a system of collective security based upon the League? or by reliance upon our own strong right arm reinforced by the military, naval, and air resources of an Empire scattered all over the globe? That, in essence, is the supreme problem which

confronts us. It is forced upon us by necessity which no amount of sentiment, no number of treaties, pacts or resolutions can overcome. The paramount question is what practical measures can we take now to prevent, as far as it is humanly possible, London and our great cities, our ports and nerve centres—in short, our country—from being utterly destroyed?

The *Round Table* replies: An Imperial defence scheme; an understanding with America; a universal collective system; negative disarmament; isolation; no entanglements in Europe; a new balance of power, 'equilibrium'—a bundle of Utopias as unreal as they are impracticable. Some of us maintain, on the other hand, that security is bound up in the reign of law, that in order to secure a durable peace it must be based upon justice, that justice is unattainable without at least an international tribunal and police force, and that these two institutions should form part of the permanent machinery of the League. They are complementary, because it is clear that a court cannot be effective without a policeman, whilst the policeman cannot function without a court. Therefore, so far as Europe is concerned—i.e., the European States Members of the League—no time must be lost in establishing a tribunal in equity to settle political issues, including the revision of treaties.

In the present state of international development there is no other way of securing the pacific settlement of disputes, and, as matters now stand, when negotiation and conciliation break down, there is nothing left but a resort to war. The Council and Assembly of the League are, as at present constituted, totally unfitted to discharge the duties of a final court of appeal when all other expedients have failed to bring about a settlement. The delegates represent the interests and policies of their respective Governments. They are not qualified, nor are they expected, to pronounce decisions on grounds of equity and good conscience. Moreover, their proceedings are governed by the rule of unanimity. Consequently, the time has not yet arrived, and world consciousness has not sufficiently developed, to allow 'the Parliament of Man,' 'the Federation of the World,' to be ushered on the scene. Therefore, the only practical alternative is to put the legislative function into commission through the establishment of the tribunal system. This is the only effective substitute for war, because through its instrumentality it will be possible to revise treaties by an appeal to reason instead of to the sword. It also means that any nation which, in defiance of this system, resorts to war is the enemy of all, and by its own act discloses itself to be the aggressor.

But the tribunal will be useless unless behind it stands a collective system of security, expressed not merely in terms of

treaties or pious resolutions but in a living institution—a police force charged with the two-fold duty of protecting all the States Members of the International Authority against aggression, both from within and without, and of providing a guarantee that the decisions of the tribunal will not be flouted. Such a system is essential to the existence and welfare of the peoples of Europe, whatever may be the attitude of nations outside. In this matter the immediate interests and safety of Great Britain, and in the long run those of the Empire, are bound up with the internal security of Europe. Why? Because the nations of this continent, living in close and dangerous proximity to each other, are now in a position to exterminate one another in a few hours. This, of course, is unpleasant, but it is a new and potent fact which cannot be overlooked or thrust aside. Proximity and the range of the bomber are the deciding factors. It is a matter of life and death.

Mr. Winston Churchill in his broadcast a few weeks ago said:

Now, there would be much to be said for this plan [isolation] if only we could unfasten the British islands from their rock foundations, and could tow them 3000 miles across the Atlantic Ocean and anchor them safely upon the smiling coasts of Canada. I have not yet heard of any way in which this could be done. No engineer has come forward with any scheme. Even our best scientists are dumb. It would certainly take a long time. Have we got a long time? At present we lie within a few minutes' striking distance of the French, Dutch and Belgian coasts, and within a few hours of the great aerodromes of Central Europe. We are even within cannon-shot of the Continent.

Mr. Baldwin has told us that our frontier is the Rhine. Mr. Eden, announcing the willingness of the Government to despatch troops to the Saar, said 'prevention is better than cure.' This can only mean co-operation with the nations of Europe before, not after, the crisis is upon us. We cannot rely upon our strong right arm alone, for Mr. Churchill goes on to say:

I look to the League of Nations as being an instrument which, properly sustained and guided, may preserve the threatened peace of the world. I know it is fashionable in some quarters to mock at the League of Nations; but where is there any other equal hope? The League of Nations . . . should call upon its members to volunteer as special constables for the preservation of peace against a particular danger.

Will the Dominions and the United States volunteer as special constables? And if they refuse, does it mean that Great Britain is precluded from doing so? The reply of the *Round Table* is 'yes,' and the most recent exposition of its policy is contained in the speech delivered by General Smuts at the dinner given in his honour by the Royal Institute of International Affairs on November 13. In his admirable survey of international relation-

ships he told us that Europe should put its house in order. He did not, however, explain whether Great Britain is geographically and strategically part of Europe, and should therefore co-operate in establishing order in this turbulent household, or whether she should merely play the part of observer and adviser. General Smuts is all things to all men. The League, he tells us, is to become the instrument of peace as the 'round table of the nations,' but 'the future policy and association of our great British Commonwealth lie more with the United States than with any other group in the world.' Incidentally, the United States has rejected the League. We must banish 'the fear complex.' Does this mean that, ostrich-like, we must bury our heads in the sand, although 'we dare not bequeath to the coming generation a legacy of chronic disorder which may prove more than they can bear.' 'With perhaps one exception,' he tells us, 'not a single nation is to-day prepared for war,' but everyone knows that all are feverishly preparing for the next war. The armament firms are doing good business.

What is the General's remedy for this anarchic state of affairs? Cultivate feelings of friendship and 'good humour'! Excellent. Be good boys! Produce a round table! Sit round it and, by free and frank discussion, settle all your disputes! Diplomacy by conference—very simple! But suppose it does not work, what then? Has the last word been said? If the good boys, with swords dangling at their sides and pistols bulging in their pockets, refuse to agree, are they to be allowed to fight and annihilate each other? This system has been in operation during the last sixteen years: has it sufficed to banish the spectre of war in Europe? There is not a word in the General's speech which suggests a practical alternative to the ancient practice of trial by battle. When negotiation and conciliation have broken down, he has no remedy to offer. The idea of natural justice finds no place in his speech, and the reign of law is entirely ignored. It never seems to have occurred to him that before friendship and 'sweet reasonableness' can assert themselves there must at least be toleration, and that toleration can only be achieved when each nation is prepared to admit and respect the rights of others, and is willing, in a conflict of rights, to refer the decision to a third party whose impartial and disinterested services have been secured. Here is a confusion of thought which can be very simply illustrated.

The General affirms that Germany is entitled to 'complete equality of status with her fellows.' Every fair-minded person will agree with this proposition. It follows, however, that if Germany is no longer to be regarded as a 'second-rate nation,' she is just as much entitled to claim a mandate for the South

African mandated territory as any other Great Power. If 'the continuance of her Versailles status is becoming an offence to the conscience of Europe and a danger to future peace,' may I ask the General whether this remark also applies to South Africa? Is Germany's demand for the return of her colonies to be settled by the good boys at the round table? If so, why has no attempt been made to come to grips with this problem during the last sixteen years, and thus to remove 'the workings of the inferiority complex'? And, in default of an amicable settlement at the round table, is the Government of South Africa prepared to submit this dispute to the adjudication of a tribunal in equity empowered to deal with it from the standpoint of natural justice—justice as between the disputants, and consideration for the general interests of 'humanity as a whole'? If the answer is 'no,' then the assumption underlying the whole of General Smuts' speech is invalid. If conciliation and negotiation will not suffice, we are back again in the vicious circle of competitive national armaments as the final arbiter: that, sooner or later, means war.

Why should the General ask Great Britain to refuse to co-operate with other law-abiding nations to establish the reign of law in Europe? Why should we risk a war with Germany because a member of the British Commonwealth may prefer to remain in a state of lawlessness? It would be equally stupid and short-sighted if we insisted that the Dominions should participate in this development of the collective system. They refused to endorse the Locarno Agreement, but their decision has not resulted in the disintegration of the Empire. Surely each member of the British Commonwealth should be free to decide for itself whether it will join in a system of collective security, which ultimately can only find its embodiment in a tribunal and police force.

General Smuts also tells us that if Europe proceeds thus to 'set her house in order' the United States will never become a member of the League. He must have forgotten that in 1910 Congress demanded the establishment of an international navy. We may yet live to see the great Republic championing the cause of international sanctions, and the fact that Europe will have set an example by putting its own house in order will assist, rather than delay, America's entry into the League. In any case, the European situation, as General Smuts insists, brooks of no delay whatever the United States chooses to do. After all distance is the deciding factor. America cannot blot out Europe or Europe America; but the nations of Europe can entirely annihilate each other in a few weeks or even days.

General Smuts lives 8000 miles away. His country for the moment is outside the range of the bomber. He may scoff at the fears of Europe, but the realisation of danger prompts intelligent

anticipation, which is the forerunner of courageous action. If we realise the menace overhanging our country and our children, we may develop a moral courage which will enable us to take the only course consonant with our national welfare and security, and consistent with our covenanted obligations and honour.

Lastly, General Smuts stated: 'I say quite definitely that the very idea of a League of force was negatived there' (at Versailles). Anyone who reads Mr. David Hunter Miller's *The Drafting of the Covenant* will find that this statement is untrue. In the last resort, the founders of the League intended it to be an international authority, not merely a round table debating society. The Report of the Phillimore Committee, which was the basis of the Covenant, makes this perfectly clear. The Covenant-breaking State 'will become *ipso facto* at war with all the other Allied States,' and the latter agree to take 'jointly and severally all such measures—military, naval, financial and economic—as will best avail for restraining the breach of covenant.' It was supported by the Cecil plan, the Italian and German plans, and the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace in America, all of which provided for military sanctions. M. Léon Bourgeois, representing the French Government, pressed for the creation of a police force, and the appointment of a general staff under the direct control of the League, but these proposals were rejected.

President Wilson, in his speech introducing the Covenant at the Plenary Conference, made it abundantly clear, when he said armed force is in the background in this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war.

This statement is endorsed in the provisions of the Covenant. Article VIII. lays down 'the enforcement by common action of international obligations,' whilst Article XVI. is even more explicit and prescribes the methods for the employment of force.

General Smuts was also at that time a protagonist of military sanctions, for in a brochure entitled *The League of Nations, A Practical Suggestion*, we find the following:

My view, however, is that they—financial, economic and military weapons—will not be enough if unsupported by military and naval action. A powerful military State may think that a sudden military blow will achieve its object in spite of boycotts, provided that no greater military reaction from the rest of the League need be feared. This fear may under certain circumstances be a more effective deterrent than even the boycott; and I do not think the League is likely to prove a success unless in the last resort the maintenance of the moratorium is guaranteed by force. The obligation of the members of the League to use force for this purpose should therefore be absolute, but the amount of the force, and the contribution from the members, should be left to the recommendation of the

Council to the respective Governments in each case. . . . In order to secure world peace I would pile up the dangers and risks in front of an intending breaker of the moratorium. . . . And the question requires careful consideration whether such a State should be accorded the status of legalised war, and whether it should not be outlawed and treated as the common criminal that it is.

Of course, General Smuts is entitled, like anyone else, to change his opinion. But he is not entitled to present a false and misleading version of historical facts or to suggest that the framers of the Covenant intended the League to become a 'toothless' institution incapable of restraining the aggressor or of coercing the law-breaker. The basic principle is clear and unmistakable. Force is to become the servant of Justice and its employment must be limited to the police function—that is to say, protection against armed attack, compelling appearance before a court or tribunal, and upholding its decisions. Need we remind the General that a police force is not a punitive or a land-grabbing institution; and once the policing principle has been agreed to, it is only a question of method as to how force—financial, economic and military—shall be organised so that it may be utilised in the most effective but least destructive manner.

If we want to create a sense of security, if we desire disarmament, clearly force should be centralised under the League, because centralised force tends to eliminate all force, including itself. General Smuts says: 'I cannot visualise the League as a military machine.' Nor can anyone else. I suggest there is all the difference in the world between a military and a policing machine. Some of us can visualise a policing instrument under the control of an international authority which has no axe to grind, and whose sole purpose is to prevent breaches of the peace, to ensure the peaceful revision of treaties and the just settlement of *all* international disputes. Obviously the machine itself will not prevent war, but, as an adjunct of the tribunal system, it will enable the League to combine moral and physical force, so as to produce the maximum deterrent effect upon the would-be disturber of the peace.

General Smuts talked about the 'Beelzebub of militarism.' The problem of casting out devils remains, and General Smuts has not solved it. At the moment a host of Beelzebubs, ministered to by sovereign States, war offices and armament firms, foster fear and the inferiority complex. Clearly, in order to restrain their Satanic activities, it is necessary to enthrone the Prince of Justice. In the words of Pascal: 'We must therefore put together Justice and Force; and therefore so dispose things that whatsoever is just is mighty, and whatsoever is mighty is just.'

DAVIES.

THE PLANNING OF INDUSTRY

THROUGH all the welter of industrial reconstruction proposals the word 'planning' now persistently emerges. What exactly do those who use it mean? Has it any relation to amalgamation, rationalisation, merger, reconstruction, and other similar loose terms? Few will doubt the necessity for looking ahead in these machine days of glutted production and unsatisfied consumption, yet not all will accept restriction of production as the only medicine for our economic ills. There are still people who regard present difficulties as a passing phase which must be suffered in order that the final good unfettered competition can bring may at length prevail. Others embrace whole-heartedly the doctrine of national self-sufficiency, and forget that this, if carried to its logical conclusion, would seal the doom of international commerce and leave them with a vastly lowered standard of life. Least of all can Great Britain advocate self-sufficiency and survive as a great nation. The main economic trouble of to-day is that all the nations wish to collect from their debtors in full and pay their creditors under heavy discount. Small wonder that the world of industry and commerce is disorganised. It will remain so until the nations accept that inescapable scaling-down which is the only certain prelude to recovery and the new trading era.

Every nation is planning its future, but, unfortunately, none has the courage—or perhaps the rashness—to work only in an economic medium. Just so fast as plans are made for economic recovery, fruition is prevented by the fear of war. The consequent expenditure on armaments takes from industry what might well have mitigated its sickness. So perhaps it is as a last resort that the nations have turned unwillingly to economic self-sufficiency. They will find no satisfaction in the paradox of restricting production and import in order to increase trade. Yet one nation (Russia) is quite honest and firmly deliberate in seeking national self-sufficiency as a desirable end in itself. The Government is in complete control of production, distribution, and finance. Industry is classified into twenty-five main groups. A few groups only work on export production, and these are solely designed to produce credits with which to buy the

machinery, goods, and services Russia and Russians cannot produce. This planning may succeed, but, if so, the final shape will scarcely be on its present political basis. Some account must be taken of the temperamental inability of the average Russian to handle machinery with even moderate efficiency, and the impossibility of complete central control over so vast a field. The plan in its aim, as in its end, is complete Socialism. No moral, material, or political difficulty will be allowed to interfere with the dictatorship without which no Socialist State can function. As a 'planning' example Russia offers us nothing tangible for copy in our own industrial field.

Italy came late into the field of State planning, and only within the last two years has some apparent finality been reached. The State has worked through the principle of giving control to industrial corporations, and is content to allow wide power to groups which can show a 70 per cent. majority for any reasonable scheme produced. There is also power to control the erection of new and the extension of existing plant. Finance, Exchange, and Foreign Investments are controlled. The corporations may regulate economic relations, and can, in effect, control production, allotting to their units quotas of output and fixing prices in certain classes of production. While there is in theory a generous measure of self-government, central political control is always in the offing, and if necessary is rigidly applied. The Duce's avowed object is political, and he intends to replace the Chamber of Deputies by a representative council drawn from his twenty-two corporations.

Germany seems to have hesitated somewhat between the complete political planning of Russia and the modified corporative control of Italy, and in the end to have compromised on departmental interference, which, in its Prussian rigidity of thought and action, may well smash German industry before there is time to reshape it. There is now a Ministry of Economic Affairs with wide powers of industrial control responsible only to the Chancellor. So far these powers have been exercised to restrict output and to make the country as self-sufficient as possible. The latest practical effort of the Ministry is a scheme to produce oil from coal which is designed to make Germany independent of oil imports in three years. Apparently every unit in the industry, and indeed any allied producer, can be forced into the one great combine, and must find the necessary finance to erect the new plant required. A commissioner (dictator) is to be appointed by the Minister to act as a kind of super-managing director with complete authority. So far the German plans are sporadic, devised empirically and intended to be worked through industrial groups. Jews are excluded from any share in the groups. There

does not seem to be any considered general basis linking up production with the export as well as with the home market. The rise in food prices, following on scarcity exacerbated by import restriction and growing unemployment through attrition in the old export industries, has frightened the Government. They have now appointed a price-fixing official with rigid and autocratic powers. Maximum prices have never yet restored prosperity. In Germany, as in Russia, the Government is planning essentially on a political basis to which the economic life of the nation is to be fitted. Again British industry can find few models in such a plan.

What exactly is happening in Japanese industry is difficult to follow. The State, apparently, has done little planning by direct legislation. Industry has rather been encouraged and shepherded in certain directions to suit the Japanese political plans of the future. In varied fashion the State has controlled finance and nursed industry. There are several very large industrial groups, but these appear to operate by internal agreement rather than through codes sanctioned by law. On the whole, industry has taken such shape that big business rules, but is checked politically when the Elder Statesmen think it wise to ring the bell. What some of our industrialists might learn from Japan is the value of energy and inventive power, and the ruthless elimination of unnecessary units in marketing.

It is impossible to gather much of practical value from the great experiment now rending the vitals of industry in the United States. There are few principles, but many codes. In some cases where a code has been whole-heartedly accepted the industry seems to have benefited—notably coal mining; but the planning of industrial groups has been so intermixed with long overdue reforms in matters of hours, wages, conditions and labour union recognition that, so far, expenses only have increased while profits seem nearly to have disappeared. Evidently the proper relation between the need for political and social reforms and the resulting financial charges on industry has been neither worked out nor properly appreciated.

In Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan economics are strictly subordinated to politics. The object in each country is to erect a glorified State on a new political basis into which industry shall be made to fit itself on socialist or corporative principles. There is in the rulers of these States a deliberate intention to dissolve the individual in the national mass. In these countries the effort may succeed, since in not one have the people that long heritage of self-government and racial solidarity which makes the minds of our people so instinct with freedom and so hateful of dictatorship. Their whole conception of government is definitely alien

to our political thought. Nor can we learn much from the United States, since in their banking and conditions of labour they are a generation behind the times. Body and soul they have handed themselves over to their President to do what he will with their economic future. Surely this is a frank recognition that their political system has failed to meet the economic needs of the day.

British production, and therefore industrial planning in Great Britain, must always be conditioned by our need to export in order to pay for the bulk of the food and raw materials needed by an excessive population. As we are, on the standard of life demanded by our people, we cannot be economically self-sufficient. If the Dominions had a population ten times their existing numbers, then we might be able in the future to replace our foreign customers by new Dominion buyers, but time and their willingness to admit our manufactures on a more open basis of competition with their own than now exists are strict conditions precedent to the change. In the meantime we have to reconquer foreign markets. To some extent—happily increasing—we have recovered some freedom of trade by our system of bilateral treaties. We may reasonably hope for an extension of this class of treaty and with it a slow broadening of international commerce, although the French and the Americans seem to remain as stubborn protectionists as once we were free importers.

We, probably with the rest of the world, will have to face at least during a generation some definite contraction from the old basis in international trade. The pre-war financial method of lending freely to undeveloped countries in order to have returned some portion only of the loan in the goods we sold no longer seems sound. Lenders will expect borrowers to be credit-worthy. The restriction of credit abroad will mean more available capital at home. It is the use of this extra capital at home which will need careful regulation; and planning for the purpose must be the work of the Government as well as of industry.

The task of planning within four walls which no external competitor can breach is comparatively easy. To plan with satisfaction to your home market, producer and consumer alike, and still to obtain a profit from a willing buyer of your exports, are other and much more difficult problems. Some of our English planning, however, has been completed, and in a measure may be considered successful. The Metropolitan Water Board and the Port of London Authority, while not exactly productive units, are complementary necessities without which industry could not function. They cover ground formally pegged with scattered units and perform their work with expedition and efficiency. Both are well alive to modern organisation demands

and keep in touch with inventive progress. The charges of both are important factors in the costs of productive industry, and, while both are in a sense monopolies, overcharges of the Water Board are to some extent checked by the ability of large users to seek private supplies; and any slackness or excessive charges at the London docks would tend to drive shipping away to the other great ports municipally or railway owned. There is the opportunity and the need for amalgamation of adjacent port authorities all over the country.

In water supply throughout the kingdom there is crying need for reorganisation by amalgamation. Certain authorities have come together to form joint boards. Several are large and important, and function efficiently. The tendency is to encourage such boards; but local jealousies and municipal vanities are very difficult to assuage, still keeping apart many units which should flow naturally into union. For many years small authorities have wasted thousands of pounds in legal and parliamentary charges while seeking for exclusive catchment areas. Small units of water supply are always expensive and generally inefficient. There is here ample opportunity for dividing the country into large water areas with representative boards of efficient practical members. Taken out of the ambit of local politics these boards could work easily on an efficiency basis, introduce uniform charges, gradually purchase their catchment areas, and establish a modern system of water conservation and supply. Conditions and wages for their workpeople would be made uniform, and prospects of service, promotion and pension much improved. At present the only bar to this very necessary progress is local jealousy, certain hidden municipal over-capitalisation, and the vested interests of a mass of small officialdom.

Later examples of unification are the Central Electricity Board and the London Passenger Transport Board. This particular planning is still on trial. The Electricity Board produces no current, but buys it from selected stations, and resells it to them and to other distributors. The current is distributed through a nation-wide grid of transmission lines, the complete linking-up of which is of doubtful technical value and might be fatal in a time of war. The Board is an arbitrary body, in practice slightly controlled by the Electricity Commissioners, but legally entitled to recover the whole of its expenses by a levy on all producing companies and corporations—with the inevitable repercussion on consumers. So far many millions have been spent, a good deal of friction created, and little uniformity of charge to the consumer established. Future planning, if uniformity be the object, must have in view the grouping of all production and granting to companies and corporations the permanent

franchise of distribution under price control. Efficiency would be secured by allowing each distributing unit to measure its profits by the skill of its management, the sale of current by the Board being on an equitable basis. The London Passenger Transport Board has yet to prove itself and to justify its complicated finance. It was born of urgent necessity. It has a practical monopoly of transport in the metropolitan area, and, in effect, will charge what it can get. Over the four authorities discussed Parliament has retained no effective control. In some measure, either by way of a special department under one of the Ministries, advisory committees or public audit, with days for discussion in the Commons, closer control, in the general interest of the public, ought to be established.

Nothing needs planning for the future so much as our transport system. The railways are buying up road services, and the only check imposed is the occasional oversight of the Traffic Commissioners. Much of the road transport is unremunerative and therefore economically wasteful. Proper relation between road, rail, and canal traffic charges and labour conditions is still in the air. Although competition between the railways is not now the insensate fight that it has been in the past, there is still redundancy both in routes and staff. Many of the labour union leaders refuse to admit that wages and conditions of work need bear any relation to what users of the system can afford to pay, but look forward in nationalisation for an 'old man of the sea' who will be for ever fixed on the neck of the taxpayer. Railway costs are inflated by expensive systems of rolling-stock manufacture, most of which ought to be standardised and might be more cheaply dealt with in general engineering shops. It is at least open to question whether supplies and reparations for all the systems could not be more efficiently and much more cheaply arranged from three or four joint centres. There seems ample opportunity and real need for still further fusion in the existing organisations. The complete planning of our transport system is logically a condition precedent to any industrial planning, since the costs of industrial production are vitally and directly affected by transport charges.

So much has been planned for agriculture that it is suggested that the new schemes, notwithstanding all their complexities of control and price-fixing, might conveniently serve as a model for industrial planning. The comparison is faulty, since the whole basis of the agricultural schemes is the raising of prices. To insure this end it has been necessary for the Government to establish quotas, to control imports, and even to grant subsidies, without which their agricultural planning would be useless. Hereafter by a quota on imports prices in the home market will be

conditioned mainly by home production, and, whatever may be the world price, local restriction of production or the effects of bad harvests might well result in prices out of all proportion to those obtaining outside the guarded home market. The Government is working on the belief that the people at large desire to see a prosperous agricultural population. This it is proposed to achieve by restoring the economic balance between town and countryside. That balance might equally well have been restored by the imposition of a moderate tariff on food products with preference in favour of the Dominions, possibly graduated in proportion to the reality of the preferences they accord to British manufactured goods, in relation to their own as well as to foreign production. Any purely interior scarcity could not then result in higher prices, because an import flow would at once set in to compensate for the temporary shortage. These agricultural systems are still being worked out, and until some finality is reached it is useless to prophesy and a little previous to criticise in detail. Self-government, however, is given to the industry, although the working of the control rather raises the doubt whether the efficient units, being checked in their right to expansion, may not take to marking time, and so bring about an atmosphere inimical to progress. That is the danger of all regimentation, and particularly in those systems where price fixation by a restriction of production is the essence of the scheme. We arrive, then, at the position that the examples of planning already discussed are limited in scope, and therefore offer little real example for a productive industry which has the foreign as well as the home market to consider. The problem, therefore, narrows down to the inquiry—what can the units of industry do better by working in close co-operation rather than independently?

The first operation is to check by agreement an over-production that cannot be marketed at a profit. Such deliberate restriction of output is charged with difficulties and needs most careful consideration, since if Parliament agrees to stabilise production in any self-governing industry, price fixation in and by the industry must necessarily follow. Once the industry has achieved self-government, its possible degeneration into a monopoly must be prevented. It is likely that the State will already have accorded some measure of tariff protection, and if the continuance of this protection be conditioned by proof of continued efficiency the industry will be compelled to watch its development with studious care. Success or failure to a large extent must always depend on the measure of internal competition which is allowed to subsist between the units composing the industry. The proof of this may be gathered from the history of combines which have ended in virtual monopolies. After the

temporary elimination of competition the combine steadily raises its prices and at once becomes open to attack. The attack comes from new undertakings run by men of inventiveness, energy, and close personal application. Just as under the coal industry schemes a developing local pit is entitled to apply for an increase in its output quota, so must any suitable newcomer properly provided with capital be permitted to apply for entry as a unit into the self-governing industry. Should he be refused, there must exist some right of appeal outside the authority of the industry. Within the industry problems of output quota for each unit will inevitably lead to difficulties, and therefore before any industry is given self-government a large majority of those applying for compulsory powers must be agreed on the details of their scheme. Parliament also, or its appropriate Minister, should be satisfied that the recommended scheme is sound in essence and sufficiently elastic to expand when demand increases; and possibly, following the theory of the Australian tariff system, an undertaking be given that profits due to increased output should in some measure be reflected in lower prices.

One of the outstanding difficulties in all self-governing schemes is the problem of killing the weaklings. To-day this is achieved by an unchecked competition which leaves only the most efficient units in existence, albeit often bearing some of the scars of the financial battle. Should open competition be checked by agreement, then what are the criteria which will justify any industrial group in destroying, for their and the public benefit, those undertakings which, through bad management, lack of capital, laziness or incompetence of staff or workpeople, no longer pull their weight? Are they to be bought off by compensation or just disregarded and left to die? If the latter, they will retain a diseased and infecting life far longer than they would have done in the days of open competition.

It has been suggested by one 'planner' that the test should be, under strict accounting, ability to make a profit, which, if in abeyance for two years, ought to compel liquidation without compensation for a presumably non-existent goodwill. Such a course may be held too drastic; but it is clear that the weaklings, unless dealt with, may well become an intolerable drag on the industry (as well as an increased cost to the consumer) if they have to be kept alive. These considerations are very present in a recent cotton scheme for the cutting out of redundant spindleage. In the coal industry some hold that inefficient pits should be able to sell their quotas and so expire in comfort, but others object that this is money for nothing, and that speedy execution is the proper economic end. There is some precedent for compensation in our system of liquor licensing law. Here an annual levy

produces a fund which is drawn on whenever a redundant house is closed, but the amount of compensation bears a definite relation to the trade the house was doing. In this respect it is well worth examining the compulsory merger scheme just recommended by the Mines Department to the Board of Trade. The scheme relates to sixty collieries in the West Yorkshire area, and includes closing of pits with compensation to owners and general co-ordination of marketing. The object is to obtain concentration of output in fewer pits, greater efficiency and economy of working, with consequent reduction of production costs. Even if the Board of Trade approve, any dissenting owner may find sufficient flaws to encourage an appeal to the law courts on the ground that the scheme is *ultra vires* and contrary to public policy.

The next consideration is, having established a firm skeleton for the industry, what is to be done for those who clothe it with profits? Obviously there must be arranged equality of wages and conditions of labour throughout the units of production with some relation to varying local costs of living. There is little difficulty in making such an arrangement general, because already in well-managed industries such principles are fully applied. There may, however, be serious difficulties if the extreme side of Labour insists on central political control of craft questions. It is only just that the workpeople should be represented by thoroughly competent spokesmen, and it is true that the requisite mental qualities are not always to be found in every factory or workshop. Many workpeople as well as most employers feel that, whenever possible, Labour should be represented on a craft basis by those who really understand the craft, and who are working among their fellows without thought of using them as stepping-stones for a Labour political career in a wider sphere. Taking any industry as a whole, there should be no difficulty in finding men employed somewhere therein of the right calibre to represent their fellows.

It will be objected, and rightly, that the difficulties of industry are not over even when you have in existence productive units of the highest efficiency and grouped together in complete self-government. There is still the question of marketing, both wholesale and retail, and of consumers. It is easy to talk of the wide price margin between consumer and producer; but the increasing costs of transport and urban amenities, which distributors and retailers have to bear, are forgotten. On the other hand, it is true that many systems of 'agencing' and 'wholesaling' are out of date or redundant. Public utility consumers, large users of material, and the multiple store distributors are accustomed to buy direct, since they have discovered big savings by eliminating useless intermediaries. Middlemen must prove their

economic value and earn what they ask. It is a queer turn in the wheel of fortune which has made of many a factory the tied house of the retailer.

The coal industry has suffered too many middlemen for generations, and, whatever may have been necessary or useful in bygone days, the present trend as far as possible is in the direction of placing wholesale marketing in the hands of the producers. Probably in the end this will be the only way in which the latest planned coal industry scheme can be made to work. The cotton trade is so charged with middlemen—and many of them have helped to past success—that they will refuse to be eliminated without a stiff fight. But in the cotton industry, like any other, even self-government will fail if it begin with the handicap of an excessive 'overhead.'

The final problem is how Parliament may best achieve in the way of permissive planning what many industrialists are now demanding. Those who wish to 'plan' may be wrong, but every politician is exhorting industry to put its house in order, to establish large co-operative units capable of dealing with similar groups of foreign industrialists, and with its own Government when industry needs to approach the political power, or politics are considered to be interfering unduly with industry.

'Planning' industrialists demand that they be permitted to establish definite groups of self-governing producing units working on a co-operative basis. They ask for the right to come to the Government with a considered scheme framed by those engaged in a particular industry, and, if the scheme be approved, that it become a working code of the industry concerned. They suggest that the Government pass a General Enabling Bill laying down the conditions in which schemes shall be prepared, how the views and interests of those concerned shall be heard and protected, and what majority in numbers and capital in favour of a scheme shall be required to justify its grant. They ask that they shall have powers both to limit or to extend production, to quota their units, to bargain with their staff and workpeople as to hours and conditions of labour, skill and education, and to compel, under severe penalties, every unit to observe the rules. The powers asked are very wide; but the answer is, 'At least give us power to make our planning effective; otherwise, what is the use of it?'

It would be necessary to allot to some Government department—probably the Board of Trade—the duty of examining and reporting on all schemes brought forward. Schemes might be considerably modified from the original plan introduced before final agreement, and it is certain that every interest concerned must have the opportunity of presenting its case. Once an

agreement has been reached, it is suggested that the Minister reports the scheme to Parliament as a scheme under the General Enabling Bill for final sanction. It also suggested that an authority constituted on the basis of the Import Duties Advisory Committee might undertake these preliminary examinations. With the help of a panel of trade advisers little that was material would be missed, and, if members of the Committee also worked in panels, schemes should suffer no undue delay during the examination period.

The next step will certainly disclose differences of opinion. There are those who think that the approved scheme should lie on the table of the House of Commons and be accepted automatically if not disapproved of within a certain period. For a multitude of rules and orders that practice now obtains. Others consider that the scheme ought first to be debated in Parliament or sent to a special Select Committee, which might, if it thought fit, demand more evidence, or even amend the scheme without evidence after debate, and leave the final ratification to Parliament. There is a good deal to be said for both views; but whichever may be adopted, it is necessary to remember that if ever any amendment of a code be required, the procedure to amend would necessarily follow the same course, although working more quickly, as did the original code.

The opponents of this form of practical planning—and without doubt they are many who are experienced in industry—point out the impossibility of rigid codes for industries which are not sharply defined. At any moment, as the market demands, one form of production may be discarded and another taken up. The classic case quoted is engineering. Many firms do general as well as special work. Others are specialists who never touch heavy work. Conditions of labour vary vastly, and in a shop which relies on high skill alone the rules of a union dominated by unskilled labour would never be considered. The objectors also instance trades, such as motors, radios and scientific apparatus, established or expanded as the result of individual invention and initiative within the memory of the present generation. How would these have fared under a planning scheme that would have made no provision for them, and might well have looked askance at demands for what were long regarded as scientific fads?

Further, it may be argued, for instance, that while you may 'rationalise' cement production, planning would be useless for brickmaking, because the conditions governing local kilns with a local market could never be subject to the same rules as mass production in the Peterborough area. Other building material production, such as light castings, slates or tiles, might work under codes, but actual building to a large extent must inevitably

be governed by local considerations. What of material producing contractors and builders?

To all these objections the 'planners' reply—and with justice—what we propose is voluntary. Any scheme must obtain the consent of an overwhelming majority of producers, and will be, searchingly riddled. No group need plan if its units are unwilling; and incompatible units cannot be forced into rigid classification without close inquiry and the right to appeal. Moreover, since, until recent times, it has been the British custom to apply rigidly the rule of law, the question will be asked, 'Where do you propose redress shall be available if a 'planned' industry unlawfully coerces its units or acts *ultra vires* of its constitution?' The point is of substance, and must be met. Appeal for any breach of the law is normally to the ordinary courts, or in special instances to special tribunals. Although the Commercial section of the High Court might take these industrial cases with the usual following rights of appeal, probably it would be better to set up a special tribunal with simple procedure, consisting of a chairman with the status of a judge aided by industrial assessors taken from a pre-arranged panel. If such a tribunal be established, from it there should be no appeal. Should injustice be done, Parliament is available for redress, and in the shaping of such new economic work would never refuse any reasonable alteration of the law.

Lastly, inevitably but rightly, up jumps the consumer. 'Where,' says he, 'do I come in when these planned industries sell me their products? What is to stop one of these corporations establishing a monopoly and fixing what price it pleases? What is to prevent agreement with a foreign cartel to divide territory, and even to sell cheaper abroad than at home? Such things are happening now. What of the future?'

The 'planners' reply is that any code ought to be recallable for good reasons shown. Where monopolies develop, new entrants may be allowed to compete or the tariff wall lowered to permit foreign competition to redress the balance. It must be admitted that the latter remedy might prove difficult to apply. Once an industry has been established on a planned basis, the protection given it cannot be lightly recalled, since continuity of fiscal policy might well be the only safeguard for all the money raised to develop and extend the industry. Vested interests are very strong, and their whole political weight would be applied. But the difficulty is not born of 'planning' alone; it is one implicit in any protectionist régime, and will have to be met whether we have industrial planning or none.

But surely the last word is still with the 'planners': 'You are always urging us to plan the future; give us a reasonable chance to do so.'

Recent happenings compel a postscript. The Commissioners appointed to inquire into the distressed areas have now made their reports, that of Captain Wallace, on the most difficult North-Eastern Area, being outstandingly courageous and practical. The Government has taken action by legislation empowering the appointment of two Executive Commissioners, and making an initial grant of £2,000,000. The Commissioners have no power to override existing authorities, and their value would appear to be in the direction of co-ordination and persuasion rather than in the origination of new schemes. The troubles of these distressed areas are plainly exacerbated symptoms of a general malaise, and the remedies proposed are obviously only of local application. What stands out clearly is that the Government must get on with courageous national planning, since without that prerequisite industrial planning is useless. Problems of local government unification, unemployed training, public works of a needed type, control of labour migration, choice of sites for new enterprises, research and extension of guarantees for approved capital issues spring to the mind at once. Little as our preconceptions may have prepared our minds for the change, we have to face a period in which complementary planning has become essential if we are to recover. The one hope is that the urgent need to plan, both nationally and industrially, may still leave us time for clear thinking.

GEOFFREY ELLIS.

HAS PROTECTION PAID?

IN attempting to assess the benefits of Protection in this country, and its cost, one is faced with the difficulty of making adequate allowance for the host of extraneous factors which have entered into the situation since the summer of 1931. The 'balance of trade' issue—which played such a vital part in the election campaign and was largely instrumental in securing such a large majority for the Government—has been confused by the chaotic condition of the exchanges. The revenue issue has been complicated by debt defaults and conversion operations. The unemployment figures, to which so much importance is attached in framing a judgment, have been materially affected by administrative changes. But the task of assessment has to be tackled and the findings placed before the public.

On the 'balance of trade' question expert opinion differs widely. We do not know to what extent the official figures are reliable: we do know that they seldom coincide with the estimates of other accredited authorities, and that no two estimates are in complete agreement. Nor can we accurately measure the effect of our departure from the gold standard: we can only say that it has had the broad effect, as anticipated, of discouraging imports and favouring exports. This latter effect has not been pronounced, owing to the exchange policies adopted by other countries. Free Traders are entitled to the opinion which they hold that our Protectionist policy, in so far as it has provoked retaliation at the expense of our exports and handicapped our shipping and other international services, has interfered with the natural balancing process.

In spite of the midsummer recession, upholders of the Government's Protectionist policy can point to an improvement in the unemployment figures as compared with 1931. By the end of October the total showed a reduction of 608,000 as compared with the last month under Free Trade. What has not been so generally noticed is that there has been an increase of almost 400,000 in the numbers in receipt of Poor Law relief. A very considerable number of our unemployed have been transferred from the charge of the State to the care of local authorities. Even after allowing

for the large numbers who have been removed from the official unemployment roll without actually finding work, we are left with a smaller total of unemployed than existed in 1931, but this can only be acclaimed as a Protectionist achievement by ignoring the many other factors at play. The reduced unemployment in 1933 and the first half of 1934 must be attributed partly to the short-term effects of the reaction from the economy campaign of 1931-32, partly to the activity inspired by the belief that prices were going to rise, partly to the cheap credit policy to which the banks resorted, and partly to the tendency to spread the work over a larger number of hands. It is impossible to estimate precisely the effect of these favourable influences on the unemployment total, but clearly their combined effect must have been considerable and leaves little, if any, that can truthfully be placed to the credit of the protective policy; and, as Mr. J. A. Dale has pointed out in an address to the Royal Statistical Society, the numbers of those permanently unemployed have grown greater and continue to increase.

When we pass from the study of the unemployment returns as a whole to a consideration of individual industries, we are bound to recognise that many industries have benefited from Protection. How could it be otherwise? The obstacles placed in the way of foreign competition have enabled many producers of industrial goods to capture a greater share of the home market. Yet the great staple industries of the country have enjoyed few of these benefits, since they are dependent largely upon overseas markets. The textile trades, badly hit by the decline in purchasing power throughout the world since 1929, have not found recovery easier under tariffs. To some extent they were assisted by the depreciation of the exchange value of the pound, but the restrictions placed upon foreign imports have helped, and can help, them little. What small part of the home market they have captured from the foreigner makes little difference to their business, and increased Protection can carry them only a short distance further. Lancashire cannot look to Protection for salvation. The Ottawa Agreements, from which something substantial was expected, have proved barren and disillusioning. The coal industry has fared no better, in spite of the attention which Mr. Runciman has given it in his trade negotiations. It has enjoyed a slightly improved demand, but it is still in a state of acute depression, and nothing but a complete revival in our staple industries, the removal of the wholesale restrictions abroad, and a return to terms of equality in competition with oil can restore prosperity in our coal-mining areas. Protection cannot do it, and the coal industry rests under no delusions on the question.

To pass from coal to shipping is perhaps to stress the obvious. Yet we should not forget that some shippers placed their faith in a policy of industrial Protection, and that even now some of them are calling for Protection for their own industry in the shape of further subsidy aid or flag discrimination against the foreigner. Shipping has been severely hit by increased restrictions abroad, direct and indirect, during the past three years. The French embargo against British shipping in the carrying of coal to the French ports alone caused 180 ships to be laid up and 2500 hands to be dismissed. No benefits have come from Ottawa. The mercantile work in hand is little more than one-tenth of the work requiring to be done if the industry is to prosper. The number of ships on our register has declined by over 300 in three years. The Chamber of Shipping Freight Index in 1933 showed a decline from 85 to 75.38, while the number of merchant ships launched last year was the smallest on record. Whatever reason there may be for tariffs, declared Lord Essendon, chairman of Messrs. Furness, Withy & Co., in July 1932, 'their effect is most harmful to shipping.' Events have proved it.

We come to iron and steel. Here we meet the Protectionist on his chosen ground, for no claim of improvement is complete without reference to the benefits that have accrued to iron and steel. Production has increased and unemployment has been reduced. The claims in this case must be conceded, although the improvement has not carried far enough to justify complacency or undue optimism. But two considerations demand notice:

- (1) To what extent has the partial recovery been achieved at the expense of subsidiary industries?
- (2) Has the prime condition of the granting of Protection to the industry been observed?

I may recall that in April 1932 the Iron and Steel Tinsplate and Metal Merchants' Section of the London Chamber of Commerce strongly opposed Protection on the ground that the using trades would be penalised. 'An increase in the price of raw material and semi-raw material,' they declared, 'may mean all the difference between obtaining an order and losing it. There are peculiar circumstances in special trades—for example, the tube trade. Welded tubes in many cases are made from imported strip.'

We did not have to wait long to see the fears of the users justified. A short time afterwards a manufacturer of tubes, in a letter to a customer, explained that he could accept no further orders at the old price because 'the import duty on our material makes business on the present basis quite unprofitable.' In March 1933 Mr. J. H. Weager, of the Metal Trades Association, revealed that the price of steel sheets, another important raw

material, had risen from £5 a ton to £8, and that the tax on steel bars had been responsible for the loss of the Spanish market for tinplates to the Italians, who were able to secure their raw materials duty free. Other instances of the damage done to the using trades have come to hand. The Advisory Committee showed that they were not oblivious to these adverse reactions when, in June 1933, they stated: 'We are fully alive to the danger of adverse reactions on some sections of the iron and steel trades from a marked increase in the price of pig iron. . . . We propose to watch the situation.' The reactions continued, however, and nothing was done to safeguard the interests of the users. It is not easy to balance the effects of the iron and steel tariff on the producers on the one hand and the users on the others, but the users have found the duties a definite handicap.

It was a condition of Protection that the producers would set their house in order. Only if this were done could the tariff be justified. In May 1932 Sir Herbert Austin, himself a prominent Protectionist, warned the public that the danger lay in using the tariff merely as an umbrella to keep the wind off torn and tattered industries; and a month later Sir George May, chairman of the Advisory Committee, reminded the iron and steel industry that the using trades could only maintain their business if they could be assured of getting 'the requisite material of the right quality at the lowest possible price.' Protection, he said, was being granted to enable the producers to reorganise and meet the needs of the users. If they did not do so, the Protection would not be continued.

The history of the past two years must have been disillusioning to those who believed that the granting of Protection would have this desired effect. Six months after his earlier pronouncement Sir George May issued a stern reminder to the iron and steel interests. If the industry would not put its own house in order, he declared, somebody else would have to do it for them. The industry forthwith produced a plan. It was not a reorganisation plan. As Mr. Neville Chamberlain explained, it was 'a scheme for establishing the machinery whereby reorganisation might be achieved, rather than the scheme itself.' As such, however, it was accepted by the Advisory Committee. But closely following its announcement came the revelation that the scheme was not sponsored by the industry as a whole. It excluded from representation the three chief users of iron and steel. A sharp controversy arose, which culminated in the postponement of the scheme. By June 1933 it had died a natural death, and the head of one of the foremost iron and steel firms in the country declared that until more Protection was provided the industry should refuse to proceed with reorganisation. The tariff was due to be

withdrawn in October last, if reorganisation had not been reasonably far advanced, but, following Mr. Runciman's rash assurance that the Government had no intention of depriving the industry of Protection, the Advisory Committee was forced to capitulate. Reorganisation has not taken place, yet Protection has been indefinitely extended—and increased. *The Times*, which approved the decision, acknowledged that the producers had failed to carry out their part of the bargain. The industry had used the tariff merely as an umbrella to shelter it from the wind of competition and the pressure of the using trades for the supplies they require at the price they are able to pay. 'The appointment of Sir Andrew Duncan, the chairman of the Central Electricity Board, to be chairman of the reconstituted Iron and Steel Federation, will, it may be hoped, prove a better omen.'

I have devoted a good deal of space to iron and steel because it represents the most important case of industrial Protection in this country, and also because its short history illustrates how a danger which was feared by all responsible Free Traders, not least among them Mr. Walter Runciman, has materialised. In a greater or less degree, other industries enjoying Protection and profiting from it are using the tariff as an umbrella—as a purely defensive weapon, not as the powerful weapon of construction which Protectionists claimed it would be. We were told that the tariff would, by shutting out foreign competition, enable our industries to increase their production and, by cutting down overhead expenses, sell their goods at the duty-free price. It has not had this general effect. It has introduced a host of new, small productive units in industries already working much below capacity. The establishment of many small factories has done nothing to lower unit costs of production. It has attracted capital to new industries, already over-capitalised, at the expense of consuming power.

The Protection which is being granted to agriculture in piecemeal fashion is a complicated and frankly experimental procedure. It makes no attempt at solving the allied problems of maldistribution and under-consumption. It is based on the old idea of restriction of supplies. By quota control it aims at forcing up the prices to be paid to the farmer, with the ultimate object of replacing foreign supplies by home supplies. The machinery devised by Mr. Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture, controls and restricts internal trade as well as import trade. The reactions have been alarming. They have alarmed the farmer as well as the consumer. The consumer pays through the nose—he paid £27,000,000 in food taxes last year, but the farmer does not get the benefit. No less than £176,000,000 worth of food products have been brought under the new 'control.' The

cost to the consumer increases as the Protection becomes more effective.

The bacon quota scheme is typical of the economics of Elliotism. It has proved a very expensive experiment. Following an early over-production of pigs, it was found necessary to make a loan to the curers to enable them to pay the high price dictated by the Government. Under the influence of this loan the home market has been kept alive; but the wholesale price of bacon rose from 53s. per cwt. to a peak figure of 102s., and consumption naturally declined. One large firm of suppliers reported a loss of £150,000 in twelve months owing to the operation of the quota. In the shops bacon which formerly sold at from 8d. to 1s. per lb. sold at prices ranging from 1s. 4d. to 2s. In Scotland the price actually rose to 2s. 6d. The head of one of the biggest firms in the country reported that the British price was double the world price, and that the extra cost to British consumers amounted to £10,000,000 a year. We have cut down our foreign supplies, but we are paying more for them. In the first nine months of 1933 we paid £22,900,000 for 7,025,000 cwt. of imported bacon. In the same period of 1934 we paid £23,009,000 for only 5,801,000 cwt. Yet, while the Dane is getting 15s. more per cwt. at the expense of the British consumer, he would gladly return to the pre-quota position. As a result of the decline in production of all but the best-quality cuts, the price of pig meat in the Danish market has risen from 90 ore per kilo to 170 ore per kilo, and receipts of hogs in the Copenhagen market have fallen to little more than half their former figure. The standard of living has been lowered in Denmark, and this must ultimately result in a decline in purchasing power for British goods abroad.

Before proceeding to review the general effects of our Protectionist policy abroad, we should notice two other important consequences of our changed policy which affect the internal situation. First, a very considerable amount of clogging matter has been introduced into our trading system. Our tariff has not proved to be the 'scientific' tariff of Protectionist dreams. It embodies a host of anomalies. It involves customs delay and interference with the everyday business of the merchant. If this has not received the publicity it deserves, it is because fear plays a part. It is almost customary when one receives information reflecting upon the decisions of the Board of Trade or the Customs authorities to be enjoined not to reveal the source. 'Don't mention our name' is an injunction which we have come to expect. In many cases the operation of the tariff system penalises users without protecting producers. For example, although pit timber figures on the Free List, the strips of wood which are imported for the purpose of being cut into pit props are

taxed. Again, although the Government makes grants for the advancement of research work in our laboratories and medical schools, up-to-date scientific and medical apparatus is dutiable.

In the second place, log-rolling has entered the system and is being practised with increasing diligence and skill by the protected interests and by members of Parliament. There have been blatant examples. Industries intent upon securing higher duties have made themselves vocal and enlisted a volume of support among members of Parliament altogether out of keeping with their importance in the general scheme of things. One industry, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as one of the major industries of the country, succeeded in having the decision of the Advisory Committee overruled and the Protection they demanded granted through the intercession of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They succeeded after 'a very strenuous campaign inside the House of Commons,' to quote the words of one of the claimants. I do not wish to exaggerate this charge of log-rolling, but the practice has reached such a pitch that Sir David Milne-Watson, president of the Bribery and Secret Commissions Protection League, has been moved to state:

We are face to face with a new danger in British politics. The country has gone over to Protection, and one has already seen what a tremendous amount of wire-pulling is going on. Anyone with a little imagination can see that here we have a new power which is likely to become an undesirable feature of our business life.

While it is not easy to estimate with any precision the effect of Protection internally without a careful balancing of advantage against disadvantage, a process which is complicated by the presence of diverse new influences, the effect on the international situation can be more readily appraised. It is unquestionable, I think, that our tariffs and quotas have had a harmful effect in this sphere. They have failed as instruments of bargaining. They have provoked wholesale retaliation. They have depressed world purchasing power and strained international and Imperial relations. They have given a fresh impetus to the spirit of economic nationalism.

Retaliation has been both direct and indirect. It has taken many strange shapes. For example, Poland adopted the means of increasing her rail charges by 250 per cent., which was equivalent to the exorbitant charge of £1 a ton on the price of British coal entering her ports for inland consumption. The tariff war with France, which took the shape of retaliation and counter-retaliation, and lasted for two and a half years, involved both countries in a heavy loss of trade, and the ultimate settlement barely restored the 'pre-war' conditions. The method of quota restriction as a means of retaliation was freely adopted and was

generally directed against our coal export trade. Within a year of our adoption of Protection over a score of nations had retaliated directly by fresh tariff, surtax, quota and exchange restrictions. Even Holland, virtually a free-trade country, decreed an all-round increase in her low tariff rates.

Woollen manufacturers, seeking to retain old custom, found that the increased restrictions in Continental countries had severely injured their markets. Sir Kenneth Lee has told us that when he went to Belgium and found that the duties on certain of his firm's products had been almost doubled, he was told that the duties had been raised following our adoption of tariffs—in order to give Belgium something to bargain with! This was the general reaction of the foreigner to our bargaining tariff. Holland put a quota on our textile goods after we put a tariff on Dutch imports. She cut down her imports of British coal when we cut down our imports of Dutch iron. Norwegians who suffered from our increased duties on wrapping-paper transferred their orders for coal to Poland. A single case of which I received particulars resulted in the unemployment of 8300 British miners for a week.

It is too early, as Sir George Schuster emphasises in the Empire Trade Supplement which the *Economist* issued on November 3, to make any final assessment of the effects of the Ottawa Agreements. The recent trend of inter-Imperial trade has been affected by several favourable factors, such as the formation of the Imperial sterling group, which bear no relation to the Ottawa Agreements. But, in spite of these favourable influences, there has so far been no improvement in the Dominion markets for British goods to compare with the steady improvement of the British market for Empire goods. Our exports to the Dominions last year were only slightly higher than in the slump year of 1931, when the Indian boycott was operative: they were far below the figures for 1929 and 1930, and were less than half of the average figure for 1924-29.

The very plausible argument in favour of stimulating complementary trade within the Empire is sound only if the gain from such fostering is calculated to outweigh the loss of trade with foreign countries. Admittedly, the possibility of an expansion of complementary trading within the Empire is considerable; but the best way to encourage it is to free Imperial trade from the barriers in its way. The Ottawa Agreements have not so far achieved any notable lowering of these barriers, and there is little sign of any change of heart on the part of the Dominion Governments. Moreover, Sir George Schuster's stipulation that the Empire group should be willing to encourage others to come within its orbit not only remains unfulfilled, but is further from fulfilment now than it was before the Ottawa Conference. If the

present trend of Empire restrictions, including such measures as the depreciation of the exchange rates, is not reversed, the Ottawa Agreements will come to be regarded, not by Free Traders alone, as a fraud and a delusion and a tragic consequence of our adoption of Protection. The Ottawa Conference will prove to be 'a grand wrong turn' (to use Mr. Churchill's phrase) in our Imperial history.

Our foreign bargaining has held out little hope for the future removal of the obstacles that hamper international trade. Mr. Runciman has made thirteen trading agreements with foreign countries, and, although it is too early to form any accurate estimate of their value, we can, I think, get a fair idea of the measure of his achievement by comparing the figures of our trade with these countries in the first half of the current year with those for the first half of 1931, before we went off the gold standard and adopted our tariff policy. The comparison reveals that our exports this year, under the new agreements, rose above the figures for 1932 and 1933, but were below the figure for 1931. I have left France out of my calculation, because the arrangement with her was reached only last May. If we also omit Germany, where the exchange difficulties have probably more than discounted the advantage to our exporters of being 'off gold,' we find that exports under the trading agreements have merely returned to, but have not risen above, the pre-tariff level of 1931.

I am not sure that we should omit Germany from the calculation, in spite of the considerations mentioned. Our tariff policy has proved detrimental to our export trade with Germany. We raised our tariff against German goods, and Germany retaliated with increased restrictions against British goods—notably coal. Mr. Runciman, in return for a relaxation of these new restrictions on coal, agreed to lower certain of our bargaining tariffs, and the document was signed. Germany was to take up to a minimum of 180,000 tons of our coal per month, which was an improvement on the quota in force previously and was acclaimed as a success for our bargaining policy. But in 1931, before our adoption of the policy, Germany was taking over 300,000 tons a month, and the amount had been reduced after we had adopted tariffs. It would, therefore, be not unfair to include Germany in the calculation and point to a smaller export total than existed in 1931, before bargaining began. Protectionists naturally prefer to draw attention to the slight improvement since 1932-33.

But Free Trade criticism of the agreements is not based mainly on such figures as these. Our exports to the thirteen countries might rise above the 1931 level, and still the Free Trade objection to bilateral bargaining would remain. Such an increase in exports would be secured at the expense of other countries. These

countries, robbed of some of their market, could maintain their power of consumption only by successfully attacking other markets, some of which we at present hold. Should they fail in this, their demand for imported goods would decline and would react unfavourably on our export trade. Whatever happened, whether the other countries cut us out of neutral markets or, failing in that, lost the trade and cut down their imports, Britain's export trade would suffer. It cannot be far wrong to say that it must lose in this way whatever it may gain by any such artificial redirection of trade as Mr. Runciman's bilateral agreements involve.

It would be easy to argue that our policy spelt the doom of the Tariff Truce—did we not proceed with the imposition of new tariffs after the truce had been signed?—and that, to a great extent, our policy undermined the efforts of the assembled statesmen at the World Economic Conference to bring about an all-round reduction. Be that as it may, it is an ironical commentary on Mr. Runciman's administration at the Board of Trade that restrictions against British goods abroad, and restrictions to trade generally throughout the world, have increased, both in number and severity, since we adopted Protection.

RANALD M. FINDLAY.

THE PROBLEM OF CANCER

THE history of almost every great scientific discovery consists largely of small and apparently unimportant yet consecutive and sustained advances against a dimly comprehended but not clearly delineated goal. For centuries after the discovery of the microscope, men appeared to lack the essential insight—belonging only, perhaps, to what we call genius—which years later enabled one man, Pasteur (and he a chemist, not a microscopist or a biologist), to seize upon a series of known facts in such a way that a means of adding to the series became apparent, and the existence in Nature of bacterial organisms capable of causing the majority of known plant and animal diseases was demonstrated swiftly and conclusively to a half-incredulous world. To-day the causes of almost every disease are known. Within less than a century since the work of Koch, Pasteur and Metchnikoff gave the initial stimulus, workers in all parts of the world have succeeded in isolating and cultivating outside the body the causative germs of almost every human, and indeed animal, disease, and in testing the potency of their cultures by animal inoculation. Yet, amidst discovery upon discovery, the citadel which encloses the secret of the cause, and cure, of cancer remains impregnable and perhaps unbesieged.

It is almost a century since the general application of microscopic and staining methods of tissue examination enabled the tumours which appear to have grown upon the bodies of all vertebrates since the dawn of their creation to be classified, according to structure, as it was seen stained under the microscope, and to be placed in one or other of the two great divisions—innocent (*i.e.*, non-infiltrating) and malignant (or infiltrating and destructive). That such a classification was based upon an examination of tissue killed unavoidably during fixation and staining limited but did not destroy its value, and when clinical observation of the sites of tumours, and their manner of appearing in more parts of the body than one, added information invaluable in diagnosis and prognosis, even then the central problem of how tumours were caused remained a complete enigma.

For the last ten years the British Empire Cancer Campaign, for example, has been co-ordinating and correlating all British

researches into the problems presented by cancer, and though such a period, as judged by the appropriate standards, is short, nevertheless the removal of much error and false speculation, and the initiation of much valuable experimental work, has been accomplished, and already it appears not improbable that, even with the data now, or about to become, available, only the essential insight of genius is lacking to supply the clue and crowning hypothesis which would place all the facts in order and solve the central problem itself.

An almost alarming feature of the whole position, however, is the fact that it appears to be possible to produce 'cancer' at will in so great a variety of ways. Mechanico-chemical agents such as aniline, arsenic, cobalt, ultra-violet light, a whole series of hydrocarbons (derived from tar and paraffin), radium and X-radiation, even recurrent extremes of heat and cold, applied, under experimental conditions, to the same type of tissue in the same species of animal, produce tumours of the same kind. Given the appropriate time, space, and financial resources, such agents are not difficult to apply in a laboratory, and the fact that the tumours so produced are found to differ in no observable way from those seen to occur 'naturally' in both human beings and animals seems not only to render the problem of the ætiology of cancer particularly difficult to solve, but also to make it appear possible, nay probable, that the disease itself, when elucidated and fully described, will be found unique among known diseases. Animal experiments have also proved convincingly that the type of tumour produced by the injection of carcinogenic bodies corresponds so closely with the type of tissue into which they are injected (*i.e.*, the same agent will produce *carcinoma* in skin and *sarcoma* in connective tissue), that the hypothesis that any tissue in the body is potentially cancerous and that the type of tumour developed depends fundamentally, not upon the agent which produces it, but upon the type of cell which begets it, received the strongest confirmation—though the problem presented by the production of a similar end-result by a variety of disturbing agents remains.

Do the variety of known cancer-producing agents possess a common cancer-producing factor? Are there a number of such factors, or do such agents in their varied ways do little more than cause an apparently similar disorder in essentially the same machine? Recent work, the complete significance of which cannot yet be estimated, has made it appear highly probable that all known carcinogenic hydrocarbons possess a common molecular structure—the phenanthrene ring; and the fact that the same structure is found to be present also in the molecule of bodies of such known physiological activity as the sterols,

vitamin D, some alkaloids, and the ovarian hormone 'œstrin' has suggested the hypothesis that the production of cancer by a variety of agents may be due to the fact that each of them either contains, or causes to occur, *in situ* a specific chemical body capable of stimulating enormously, and finally deranging permanently, the whole machinery of cell reproduction. Cook and Dodd, who have shown that 1-2 Benzpyrene prepared either from coal-tar or synthetically is the most potent carcinogenic agent available, have shown, also, that of its many derivatives those are certainly *most* carcinogenic in which the alkyl groups or new rings are attached at the 1-2, 5-6, and 6-7 positions; while of fifteen other derivatives where substitution groups were attached at other parts of the molecule, not one was found to possess the property of producing tumour growth when injected or inoculated. A cell product of a molecular structure capable of stimulating other cells to an abnormal and possibly unlimited proliferation is by no means inconceivable, and when Boycott and Murphy (the chief British protagonists of this theory) adduce the fact that the living cell and its descendants are known even now to be capable of elaborating chemical bodies of very great complexity over prolonged periods of time, it is seen that the production—in response to varied stimuli, intrinsic and extrinsic—of a 'transmissible mutagen' capable, wherever present, of causing abnormal (*i.e.*, tumour) growth, is not an unreasonable hypothesis. The dehydrogenation of ring systems—a process which will transform deoxycholic acid and cholesterol, both of them common inhabitants of the bile—into methyl-cholanthrene and œstrin respectively (the former an active cancer producer, and the latter the hormone responsible for the enormous cell proliferation of pregnancy) has recently been proved to occur normally in living people, and, though no such mutagen has ever been demonstrated, the possibility that such bodies may be present at some stage of the cancer process cannot be excluded. The transmissible mutagen theory has recently obtained a fair measure of support. A final deduction from the whole search for a *bio*-chemical originator of cancer, however, is that it appears highly improbable that any *single* body can be specifically the originator of the condition; and equally improbable, too, that whatever new bodies may be produced in tissue by the above-named cancer-producing agents are, or will ever be demonstrated to be, the primary cause of the disease. So many chemical bodies have in recent years been proved to be capable of producing tumour growth, and so many other bodies (also containing structures in their molecule similar to those contained in known cancer producers) are found capable of producing œstrus, enlargement of the prostate and other glands, disordered metabolism, etc., that the possibility that any single

specific chemical body will be found to be the primary cause of cancer—in the way that the diphtheria germ is the cause of diphtheria—is made to appear even more remote.

The great variety and diversity of tumours, however, is a fact which even now cannot be adequately explained. Recent remarkable advances in our knowledge of the 'ultra-microscopic' viruses (*i.e.*, the organisms no longer 'ultra-microscopic'—for they can now be seen by the most powerful microscopes—whose multiplication within the body produces small-pox, shingles, poliomyelitis, canine distemper, and other diseases) has shown such creatures to be so minute in structure, and to possess so close an affinity for the interior and inner mechanism of the living cell, that the virus theory of cancer—an hypothesis which was first advanced some three decades ago and then received very limited support—is now in the ascendant. The production of a virus disease which could be produced *artificially* by means of heat or X-radiation would be a remarkable phenomenon, however; and though many distinguished workers adhere to the virus hypothesis, the acceptance of the latter, though a *prima facie* case can be made for it, presents considerable difficulties. Upon the theory, however, that minute and unknown viruses bathe perpetually our tissues, Carpenter and Warren, for example, have claimed that raising the body temperature of normal human beings will produce in 50 per cent. of them an eruption of *herpes simplex*, and have explained this by the fact that minute and unknown viruses, some of which cause *herpes*, perpetually bathe our tissues and, if given the opportunity, will produce their appropriate disease. It is suggested, similarly, that the production of cancer by a variety of physico-chemical agents is also explicable by their success in 'opening the door' to a pre-existing and possibly omnipresent virus by lowering tissue resistance against it. Though there are many difficulties inherent in the acceptance of such a theory—not least is the fact that cancer cells have been grown artificially outside the body through so many generations that the persistence through them of a continuously active virus is almost inconceivable—the possibility that at least one of the causative factors in cancer is a *minute intra-cellular, and possibly intra-nuclear, virus* is one to which some of the best research opinion is becoming increasingly inclined. All known virus disorders, however, are highly infectious or contagious. They possess a distinct incubation period, and confer a high degree of immunity, whereas in each of these respects the 'disorder' of cancer behaves in just the opposite way. It appears quite non-infectious and, apparently, non-contagious. It can appear almost anywhere and grow at a great variety of rates, and though there is now very definite evidence that cancer confers varying

degrees of immunity, there are grounds, too, for expecting that the cancer virus—if or when it is discovered—will be found to differ in many important respects from any organism now known.¹

The fact that recovery from known virus disorders—and their artificial production in an attenuated form—is followed by a high degree of immunity is evidence that the discovery of a cancer virus (which could be inoculated like the small-pox virus in such a way as to produce an immunity) would effect a revolution in preventive medicine. Even if the virus hypothesis itself be proved false, recent London researches into the phenomena of tumour immunity have afforded convincing evidence that, in addition to its known defensive mechanisms, the animal body possesses a means of defending itself against the cancer-producing—or cancerous—invaders, whatever their cause. The facts that some members of the same litter of rats and mice are more resistant to artificially produced or implanted tumours than others, and that in certain individuals an implanted tumour, after appearing to 'take,' will afterwards disappear, so that the further production of another cancer by the same methods in the same body elsewhere becomes impossible, have led to the very pertinent suggestion that if there exists—as there appears to—a mechanism whereby the cancer-producing invader can be met in such cases and, as appears, overwhelmed, then the discovery of some means of activating this mechanism would be an event of the first importance.

As long ago as 1928 Nakamura, of Japan, injected an emulsion of rat sarcoma cells into rats grafted successfully with growing rat sarcoma, and, in noting a distinct regression of all tumours, claimed that his emulsion had contained an antigen and had produced an immunity destructive to tumour growth. Similarly in 1929 Lumsden injected 1 per cent. formalin into rat sarcoma *in situ*, and, noting a regression, found also that rats so treated developed a high degree of immunity against further malignant

¹ The recent claim of Dr. von Brehmer to have isolated from many tumours a specific and hitherto unknown organism—the *Siphonospira polymorpha*—does not appear to have been accompanied by convincing evidence that this organism, even if present in many tumours, is the specific cause of all of them. Contamination by parasites, possibly of a kind yet undemonstrated, is probably frequent in most tumours, human and animal, and though the confirmation by Dr. Schilling of Dr. von Brehmer's claim to have discovered a hitherto unknown organism has been accepted by so established an authority as Professor Kolle, nevertheless much careful experimental work will be necessary before von Brehmer's further and much wider claim that his organism is present in all cases of tumour and is the actual causal factor can be discredited or confirmed. From the history of similar claims made in the past, however, it seems probable that the von Brehmer organism—though possibly a 'new' one—is an accompaniment, not a cause, of cancer.

transplants. Upon the hypothesis that the serum of animals immune against artificial cancer would be found to contain bodies lethal to the cells of such-growths and that such serum, whether derived from 'naturally' immune or artificially immunised animals, would be demonstrably lethal both *in vitro* and *in vivo* upon growing cancer cells, Lumsden, by injecting weekly for three months finely divided mouse cancer into the peritoneum of a rat or rabbit, has produced a serum which appears to kill the cells of mouse cancer in three minutes but to be harmless to the normal cells of such animals, and harmless also to those of 'non-malignant' mice. Similarly, rabbits injected with rat sarcoma cells have been shown to develop a serum which, injected into similar tumours in living rats, and concentrated there by occlusion of the venous and lymphatic drainage, will cause the disappearance of a high percentage of such tumours and the development of an immunity such that other tumours growing elsewhere on the same animal will retrogress and that further production of artificial cancer will become virtually impossible.

Against these successes, however, must be mentioned the fact that evidence of a *specific* reaction is far from being conclusive. Bashford and others, for example, claim that they have produced a similar immunity in mice by injections not only of 'malignant' cells but also of those derived from *normal* mouse embryo, and even of *normal* mouse blood. Borrel and Bridré have not only repeated Bashford's experiments, but claim, too, that they have produced precisely the same effect with *normal* liver cells. Lumsden, too, found 'anti-cancer bodies' in the serum of animals into which only normal testis and kidney cells had been injected. Similarly, the French Cancer Institute affirms that animals inoculated with cancer cells can be shown to develop an immunity not only against the cells of cancer but against normal tissue as well—facts which have led to the suggestion that 'tumour immunity' is nothing more than a non-specific resistance against cells from a foreign source not necessarily 'malignant.' The claim of Lumsden, however, that the serum of a rat found or made to be immune to rat sarcoma will kill the actively multiplying cells of that growth within half an hour and *leave normal cells undamaged* would seem to invalidate such conclusions.²

Recent London work, indeed, appears to indicate convincingly that if finely divided mouse carcinoma be injected into the peritoneal cavity of a rat or rabbit once a week for three months,

² The same worker claims, further, that in accordance with the best scientific tradition he has demonstrated not only the *presence* of anti-cancer bodies in the serum (a) of rats immune to rat sarcoma, and (b) of other rats in which a tumour is *retrogressive*, but also their *absence* in rats susceptible to cancer or becoming progressively cancerous.

the serum of the latter animal applied *in vitro* to mouse carcinoma cells will kill them within three minutes, whereas the same serum applied under the same conditions to the cells of normal mouse tissue will produce no harmful effect. Similar mouse carcinoma cells, treated similarly with such sera, are incapable, upon injection, of producing a tumour growth. In other words, the cancerous, as opposed to the normal, cell contains, almost certainly, in intimate association with its protoplasm, *chemical bodies* whose presence is peculiar to the cancerous state and whose presence, too, appears to stimulate the production, either locally or in other parts of the infected animal, of *anti-bodies* whose effect, apparently, is to neutralise the cancer bodies, whatever these may be, and, in addition, or coincidentally, to kill the cancer cell. Since a virus, a bacterial body, a chemical mutagen, or a genetically mutated cell may, any one of them, be conceived as capable of exerting such effects, the discovery of the more intimate details of the mechanism of tumour immunity, though of very great importance to the science of Preventive Medicine, cannot be considered to throw any direct light at present upon the central problem of cancer—*i.e.*, the nature of its cause.

Upon the hypothesis, then, that cancer cells may possess, or cause to appear in the serum, chemical bodies of a characteristic kind, many workers have attempted to determine whether the presence of 'cancer' *locally* in a living organism causes *general* changes to occur. Though Abderhaldeus, Botelha, Thomas, Binetti and others have described various bio-chemical changes which they found to occur in the serum when tumour growth was present, and to be absent after its removal, the fact that minor chemical changes occur continuously in our bodies and are as yet incompletely charted reduces the possibility of tests based upon present knowledge of more minute changes in blood chemistry ever being really reliable. Recent attempts to demonstrate in the serum of cancer patients chemical changes consequent *invariably* upon cancer and characteristic of it have been uniformly unsuccessful. Bendien, of Holland, for example, claimed to demonstrate in the serum of cancer patients a characteristic capacity to precipitate the salts of vanadium, but reliable British work undertaken both coincidentally and subsequently failed completely to substantiate the more important of his claims.

Is cancer inherited? In spite of earlier scepticism on the subject, recent researches have proved almost conclusively that there is a definite hereditary factor in the incidence of malignant disease. Though human family histories of sufficient length and breadth are practically unobtainable, it has been found possible in short-lived mice and rats to breed parallel strains with a demonstrable tendency to develop (or not to develop) apparently spon-

taneous tumours. Miss Slye, of Chicago, for example, after performing 16,000 autopsies upon selected strains, has concluded that cancer susceptibility and insusceptibility in mice are unit Mendelian characters, and are transmitted and inherited as such. Loeb, Lathrop and Simpson, in the same city, have bred strains of mice in which 90 per cent. of the females develop mammary cancer upon reaching a certain age. Bashford and Murray, in England, claim to have bred strains in which tumour transplants 'take' more frequently and multiply more rapidly than they do in less specialised strains; and in an ambitious series of experiments Loeb and Bittner, in the United States, claim that they have produced pure strains of mice in which 100 per cent. are susceptible to cancer transplants as compared with other strains bred from the same species in which no tumour growth can be produced at all. Further remarkable evidence of the existence of an hereditary factor in cancer has been found also in a series of uniovular human twins collected recently by Power, Machlin and McFarland. Whether such selective breeding renders the cells of some strains more likely to develop spontaneously a disordered manner of reproduction, or whether it merely isolates one or more strains in which an immunity against an unknown and possible widespread carcinogenic factor affecting the whole species is absent, cannot be decided yet. Upon the facts as known, however, a further hypothesis has been built.

One special and almost insuperable difficulty in the way of the general application of the virus or chemical factor theory to cancer exists in the fact that cancer tissue grown *in vitro* is seen to maintain its specific cellular character over prolonged periods of time. There exist in London, for example, mouse tumour strains which have remained alive for twenty-three years, or seven times the normal lifetime of a mouse; and the fact that they are found to retain unaltered their characteristic features and functions has made it doubtful whether any virus or chemical body which entered the parent cells 'in the beginning' could have multiplied itself and been transmitted through successive generations and be still present in the cells. Upon the more probable hypothesis that the causative agent of cancer, whatever it be, has produced some remarkable change in the original somatic cells, such that their inherited constitution and functions have been altered characteristically and permanently—almost in such a way as one might imagine a change in the genetic cells of an entire people transforming a race of white or yellow men into one of negroes or albinos—the somatic mutation theory has been given to the world.

It is known that visible changes in the chromosome complex of germ cells are followed by the appearance of new transmissible characters in the offspring, and the suggestion that a similar

change, however produced, in somatic cells might transmit a disordered method of reproduction—such as would cause 'a tumour'—is not easily dismissed. In 1914 Boveri, in Germany, after memorable researches into the fertilisation and development of *Echinoderm*, suggested that the acquisition of a defective chromosome complex might be followed by a variety of offspring in which the normal capacity to react consistently to the inhibitory influences of the environment might be suspended or permanently lost. As almost any type of cell cultivated appropriately *in vitro* is found capable of proliferating indefinitely, the hypothesis that some means must exist in the body whereby such tendencies are limited and symmetrical growth produced must, of necessity, be made. Would the permanent derangement of such a mechanism, if it is present, as it probably is, produce a race of cancer cells? Now the nuclei of the cancer cells themselves are not demonstrably abnormal, and contain no chromosome complex which is demonstrably and consistently abnormal in size, shape or number; nevertheless, the suggestion that the growth rate of somatic cells is controlled by certain genes within their nuclei, and that a mutation of such genes by either an 'inherited tendency,' an extrinsic stimulus, or both, would cause mitosis to occur more frequently than normally and invariably produce a tumour, has recently been made.

Apart from animal experiments (mentioned above) which make it apparent that 'spontaneous' tumours develop far more frequently in some strains than in others, the available and recently collected evidence concerning human uniovular twins—in whom, presumably, hereditary traits are present in greater concentration than in other members of the race—appears to indicate a remarkable tendency for the same type of tumour to develop in both members of the twinship at approximately the same time. Recent experiments upon bacteria also have indicated that in *paratyphosus*, for example, each of the several strains has its own inherent growth-rate, and the rate at which families of such minute 'cells' divide appears to be transmitted from individual to progeny along with other characteristics. But is the cancer cell simply a normal cell, multiplying at an abnormal rate, or is it 'plus a little something which the others' (*i.e.*, the normal ones) 'haven't got'?

Of the many arguments used against the somatic mutation theory not least is the fact that considerable difference exists between a 'simple' and a 'malignant' tumour. Numerous simple growths—cysts, pigmented moles, adenomas of skin, of bowel, etc.—have certainly an hereditary incidence, and it is not difficult to conceive some change in the gene controlling the local rate of cell reproduction, causing an increased number of cells, and

of necessity a simple tumour. But what occurs when such tumours *begin suddenly to infiltrate* neighbouring tissues, to destroy their blood vessels and lymphatics, and to be carried to other parts of the body with the final lethal result? Available microscopic evidence—notably that of Dukes—suggests that the transformation to a malignant condition occurs when one or a few cells *at one part* of the innocent tumour begin to grow outside the basement membrane and to invade connective tissue. But when apparently 'simple'—*i.e.*, non-malignant—growths become, after long years, *in several places*, and *to a varying degree*, 'malignant,' the suggestion that an *infective* as well as an inherited factor is operating is not easily discountenanced.

Everything has a cause—'spontaneous' action of any kind is inconceivable; and when all things are considered, it appears not improbable that a convincing demonstration of the series of events which precedes the development of cancer must be postponed at least until our knowledge of cell physiology *as seen in living cells in situ* is more complete than it is to-day. Only then may some genius or devotee of the future present us with a method of observing, with accuracy and in a complete series, the changes, now only dimly comprehended, which occur in a group of living cells when, with a change as remarkable as it appears to be irrevocable, forsaking 'the noiseless tenor of their way,' they become suddenly 'malignant.'

JOHN GODSALL.

ANTMEN OR SUPERMEN?

HARDLY any one nowadays is likely to deny that man's 'nature'—that is, his spontaneous tendencies to feel and act—is profoundly *social*. The disputes about man's destiny and prospects begin only after this obvious fact has been admitted, and when the question is raised *to what sort of society* his social nature can, or should, give rise. Moreover, a little reflection will show that the sides men take in these disputes are largely determined by the ways in which their convictions about man's social nature have been reached. Those who have taken the high *a priori* road and argued from metaphysical essences and necessities of thought will naturally find themselves a little wearied by their arduous journey and disposed to view man's social nature as a resting-place and end, after reaching which they are disposed to think all will be well and nothing more need be said or done. In consequence, their contributions to the problem of man's future are apt to be nugatory. Those, on the other hand, who have followed the empirical way of biological science will easily apprehend that the need for society rests on the simple fact of individual mortality: they will also realise that the problem of the relations of the individual to society is capable of an indefinite number of solutions, among which it is incumbent on us to choose the *best*. Accordingly man's social nature will appear to them, not as a *terminal*, but as a *starting-point*, from which there radiate many alternative policies and programmes for the future development of man.

It will not, however, seem feasible to discuss the future without reference also to the past. For it should never be forgotten that man's present nature is the resultant of a long historical development, which has knit together his nature in all its details. Nor can one overstress the fact that he is not merely a social being in the abstract, as might be inferred from the disquisitions of most philosophers: he has acquired *a specific sort of sociality* by leading a special sort of life in the specific history of the race. Hence it means little, and explains nothing, merely to proclaim him a social being; but it is highly relevant to know *how* he acquired his present habits and organised his existing institutions. His

laws, his customs, his manners, his religions, his morals, his failings, his temptations, his crimes, nay even his diet, all have a bearing on his social nature, and have gone to mould it; they must all be studied historically in order to understand what he has become.

For example, it would be possible, as the late Professor Carveth Read has shown,¹ to write the whole social history of man in terms of the successive revolutions in human food supply. To begin with, man (or rather his ape-like ancestor) must have been (as the structure of his teeth still testifies) a good vegetarian, who lived, like the gorilla, on the fruits and shoots of a tropical forest, necessarily in small bands or families that ranged over large areas for their sustenance. Then the climate deteriorated in their forest home and winters grew up in which vegetable food grew scarce. This change confronted the ape-men with a choice between extinction and the adoption of another diet. They preferred the latter alternative, and became carnivores. They decided, further, to prey on the big beasts of the forest and the prairie rather than on the smaller fry. After that they *had* to change, not only their physique by coming off their forest perches (again like the Kivu gorillas) and becoming agile on the ground, but also their social habits. They had to organise themselves into packs of hunting wolf-apes—i.e., of apes who had adopted the methods and acquired the mentality of wolves—to gain their livelihood. Carveth Read very acutely pointed out that this inferential history explained a number of oddities about man's social nature. It explained why human mentality is that of the pack, in all its atrocity, rather than that of the herd. It explained why socially men are able to combine to attain a common aim, but are very apt to quarrel immediately afterwards over the division of their booty. It explained, lastly, why the once vital instincts of the hunter and the fisher had been reduced to 'sports' and continued to be indulged in at great cost, even though they had ceased to be necessary or even profitable, under modern conditions.

After they had thus lived precariously as hunters for ages, an original idea occurred to men—as to ants. Why not intervene in the course of Nature so as to domesticate and secure their food supply? Thus the livelihood of the hunter was eked out, and finally superseded, by the domestication of animals and plants; and with that arose two new ways of life: the tending of tame animals, the pastoral; and the tilling of the soil, the agricultural. So the herdsman and the agriculturist rendered the hunter obsolete. The consequent addition of milk, butter, eggs, grains and vegetables to human diet not only turned man back again

¹ In the *Origin of Man and his Superstitions*, chap. v.

into a vegetarian (in the main), but had far-reaching effects upon human politics. It enormously increased the numbers of mankind and the density of population a given area could support, and it divided the tribes of men into nomads, who drove their herds from pasture to pasture according to the season and lived a varied life with a good deal of incident and leisure for reflection, and the plodding agriculturists doomed to unceasing toil, who were practically *ascripti glebæ* and tied to the soil they tilled.

So a contrast and a conflict soon arise between Cain and Abel; but (contrary to Scripture) it was Abel who usually proved himself the better man and became top-dog. 'For the nomads' mode of life was intellectually more stimulating and more conducive to the growth of leadership. Also the nomads were better and more mobile fighters who carried their food supply with them on their raids and could therefore gather in greater numbers to overwhelm the little strongholds of the agriculturists. So the leaders of the nomads overran the settled districts and founded nobilities and dynasties, which fostered civilisations and grew into empires. These they could administer with the aid of priestly castes that had from the earliest epochs cultivated knowledge, real or imaginary, as the avenue to power. It is pretty plain that the earliest science was conceived as an aid to agriculture, being astronomical in order to determine the length of the year, and geometrical in order to measure out fields annually inundated by the fertilising floods of rivers like the Nile and the Euphrates, the Ganges and the Yangtse-kiang. It would seem, also, that the earliest art, the paintings which adorned Mousterian caves, was essentially food magic and the work of men who had devised this way of sharing in the spoils of the chase without incurring its dangers. In some such ways, we can aver with growing confidence, was human nature moulded and did human civilisation grow.

But can we detect in this history any law of progress? If we could, we might, by observing it and conforming to the requisite conditions, secure the indefinite continuance of progressive change. But as yet the achievement of progress (in the sense of *change for the better*) seems so rare, so haphazard, so 'contingent,' that we cannot formulate any 'law' for it that will guarantee it inevitably and apart from our efforts. We cannot even assign to the possibility of 'progress' any very deep roots in the nature of things. We have to content ourselves with observing under what conditions the progress we recognise seems to have occurred.

It would then appear that one main condition of progress is a proper balance between the forces of conservation and of change. An excess of either is ruinous. Too much conservation

means failure of adaptation to new conditions, fossilisation and destruction. On the other hand, too rapid and revolutionary a change also means destruction, by social disintegration and the deliquescence of social habits.

We may inquire further by *what means* a society can equip itself with sufficient amounts of conservation and of change. As to the former there is no great difficulty: the force of habit alone can be trusted to conserve an established order. Moreover, quite a moderate amount of fairly low-grade intelligence, such as the bureaucratic expertness of an experienced official, will suffice to carry on affairs in an established *routine*. But to change with safety and advantage involves a creation of the new and its adaptation to the old: whence is the new to come and how is it to be adapted to the old? Both originality and skill are needed, and the former is the rarest of human qualities.

It is a quality which occurs only in a few individuals. Every novelty that has enriched and improved the world has originated in an individual mind, and started its career in a minority of one. In consequence, its hold on existence is very precarious at first, and it is the rule rather than the exception for it to be strangled at birth. There is then nothing for it but to wait until it re-incarnates in another individual mind, more potent or more favourably situated to make itself heard. In the most favourable event, a novelty can survive only if it takes birth in a society which contains a number of other minds who, though not capable of originating it themselves, are well disposed towards novelties and willing to try them. These form the natural raw material for Liberal parties everywhere and in all subjects. Contrariwise, it is from lack of a favourable social environment that so many discoveries have to be made over and over again, and do not win recognition until the obstructive conservatism that suppressed them begins to feel that after all they have become familiar and no longer offend too glaringly against the principle that there is nothing new under the sun!

But no society has yet recognised how vital it is to its prosperity and continuance that it should refrain from suppressing innovations on general principles, and should organise itself so as to give them a fair trial. Nor has any society adequately recognised the debt it owes to the individuals who have saved its existence by adapting it to new conditions or by inventions that improved its adjustment to old conditions. Historians also have greatly underrated the rôle of invention in determining the course of events. It has been generally assumed that the supply of salutary innovations would never fail.

Nor, strange to say, has it failed so far. Thanks to some strange luck, fatality, or providential guidance, the necessary

innovations have always been forthcoming. All through history human originality has made discoveries and initiated progress. Some of the earliest of these were the most difficult and most important. Thus in all mythologies the discoverer of the art of making fire has ranked high among the gods or heroes. The inventor of the wheel is not so famous, but he must be credited with the only human mechanism to which Nature had provided no obvious clue.

Thus the problem of *judicious innovation* is the real crux of human progress; conservatism and stability must be supplemented by an intelligent *liberalism*. If now we analyse the idea of Liberalism as a social ideal, we shall find that it comprises two aims. The first is to maximise *freedom* and to develop *individuality* to the utmost, meaning by freedom the permission to do as one pleases, minimising social coercion and resting government on the free consent of the governed. Secondly, Liberalism stands for the policy of reaching social agreement by reasonable discussion or debate rather than by authority and force.

Both these ideas of Liberalism go back to the Greeks, and especially to Athens, and in both respects the nineteenth century appears to represent the high-water mark of Liberalism. Since then it has been ebbing, at a growing and alarming rate, for reasons we shall presently consider. But the vicissitudes of its popularity cannot affect the psychological fact that Liberalism is as natural and as deeply rooted in human nature as conservatism and trust in *routine*.

The Conservatives and the Liberals, then, are the two great parties into which human society is naturally divided; in spite of their contentions both are necessary to human progress. Indeed, so much is this the case that in a well-ordered polity it will often seem that each party is driven to play the other's game, and practically joins it in directing the smooth course of progress. For example, in England, before the war, the balance of the forces of conservatism and of progress was normally so perfect that it seemed as though neither party could realise its programme except with the aid of the other and through the agency of a Government belonging to the opposite party, because only then would the normal inhibitions to it be withdrawn. It used to be said that only a Conservative Government could pass a radical reform, and only a Liberal Government could plunge the country into a great war. Hence it was that feminine suffrage and Irish Home Rule were conceded by Parliaments which contained large Conservative majorities, while it was the Liberal Government of Asquith and Grey which got entangled in the foreign policies that ended in the catastrophe of 1914.

This catastrophe seems to have pretty well proved fatal to

Liberalism all the world over. War is naturally adverse to Liberalism, because it substitutes violence for reason as the method of settling international differences; but still even the Great War need not have proved the death of Liberalism. Its demise looks more like a case of murder than of natural death. For it was chiefly due to the actions of three eminent statesmen who controlled the destinies of the world after the war. All three professed Liberalism, and all contributed to its destruction, when by adopting another attitude they might easily have brought about a triumph of Liberalism and launched the world on a career of unprecedented progress.

But, unfortunately for mankind, President Wilson was more of a pedant than of a philosopher, while M. Clemenceau was more of a nationalist than of a Liberal, and a hater of his enemies rather than a lover of mankind. As for Mr. Lloyd George, he was essentially an opportunist, who discovered too late that Liberal catchwords suited his style of eloquence far better than those of Conservatism or of Communism, and that his amendment to Abraham Lincoln's *dictum* that one cannot fool all the people all the time—namely, that if one is clever enough one *can* fool all that matter—did not in the long run apply to a party leader who had split his party to gain his position and delivered himself into the hands of his enemies, in order to escape from the vengeance of his former friends.

So it first of all became too difficult for Liberalism to withstand the tide of nationalism. Everywhere a narrow and bigoted conception of nationality broke up not only the political but also the economic aggregates that were essential to human civilisation and prosperity, and forced mankind back into barbarisms, follies and superstitions that it had seemed to have outgrown long ago. It was a signal example of the bitter irony of history that a war which had been ostensibly fought to render the world safe for democracy should lead not only to a widespread abandonment of democratic institutions, but also to a state of affairs in which there was no safety for life, property, or justice, and to a recrudescence of personal rule in its most ruthless and tyrannical forms.

As this ebbing of Liberalism seems likely to continue, and Liberal sentiment seems to be merely stunned by the course of events and unable to understand and resist its causes, it may be well to carry our analysis a little further.

Deadly as had been the betrayal of Liberalism by its leaders in the Peace Treaties, it might have recovered from the blow if strong leadership had been forthcoming in the triumphant democracy. But parliamentary politics seemed to be overtaken everywhere by a sort of paralysis. Innumerable conferences and

endless talk led to nothing or worse than nothing, and yet nothing seemed to shake the complacency of democratic politicians and their conviction that all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. They appeared to be quite blind to the loss of public interest in their proceedings and of public confidence in their methods. They could see nothing beyond the futilities of party politics, and did not understand what was meant by the successive revolts against the debating society theory of government. They continued to imagine that the voters would continue to be satisfied by periodical elections, and did not observe their growing impatience with constitutional forms that had been debased into shams powerless to relieve either the discontents or the distresses of the people.

So revolutions alike in the theory and in the practice of government became the order of the day. Dictatorships took the place of parliaments in one country after another. They were easy to establish wherever a picturesque personality was available.

Bolshevised Russia led the way. Its dictatorship was called that of the proletariat, and was actually that of the Bolshevist leaders, Lenin and Stalin, who organised their party despotically, and suppressed all others. They organised also an elaborate propaganda aimed especially at enthusing and enthralling the young and ignorant, and turned their Communism into a sort of religion. But they took care not to change the actual mechanism of government, the system established in Russia by Ivan the Terrible, and they ruled by open force and secret police, like the Tsars. They disavowed the private profit motive as the inducement to industry, but the necessities of their situation are forcing them to revert to compulsion and to reintroduce a still earlier device—namely, forced labour, serfdom, or slavery.

Italy, in Mussolini, has produced the most capable of dictators, as Spain the feeblest, in Primo de Rivera. Mussolini showed remarkable skill in appealing to the dramatic sense of the Italian people, and Fascism may be said to have evolved a political theory of sorts.

Germany in Hitler's National Socialism has apparently the maddest of all the dictatorships, based on the pseudo-science of fantastic race theories and the barbarism of anti-Semitic *Judenhetzen*, which before the war were confined to Russia, but have since been steadily coming further west, and the hooliganism of perpetual brawling and an unofficial civil war.

Nevertheless, it is not safe to argue from the initial antics of dictators at the beginning of their careers to the final character and effect of their rule. They have to rise to power by adapting their programmes to popular follies and frenzies and rendering it

palatable to the meanest intelligence. Like democracy, but far more directly and forcibly, they rest on an appeal, not to the *intelligentsia*, but to what may be called the *unintelligentsia*. But when they have consolidated their rule, they no longer need the crudities of castor oil and the manganello (though they must still provide *panem et circenses*). So even Hitlerism may outgrow its anti-Semitic barbarism and its 'Aryan' racialism, and find itself compelled to return to its allegiance to *la haute finance*, and to make its peace with Jewry. Even now it must be credited with a firm (and much needed) stand against sexual laxity and degeneracy in Germany and with setting a truly scientific example by recognition of the social need of eugenics. This in the long run may turn out to be the most important and beneficial feature in its programme.

The political justification of the modern European dictatorships is everywhere the same. It is to be found in the social chaos to which excessive war, frantic nationalism, the upsetting of stabilising habits and customs, the defiance of economics and oblivion of morals have reduced the unhappy populations of that continent. This chaos the traditional methods of parliamentary 'democracy,' corrupted as they everywhere are by political trickery, are manifestly unable to abate. Hence in their desperation men are more and more attracted by devices which promise them relief in a more rational and *planned* order, which can be established speedily by main force, without the tedious delays and constant frustrations interposed by parliamentary oppositions, party intrigues and long debates. The dictator is the ideal man who can remould the world nearer to the heart's desire of multitudes, even though he has to shatter much of it to bits in the process.

But those who feel thus fail to realise that our chaotic social conditions are largely a reflection of the chaos existing in the individual soul. One great truth underlying our distresses is that we are not fit at present for any less chaotic social order than our own. It is idle to talk of Planning, of Socialism, or of Communism, while the extant human mentality is an unescapable presupposition of all attempts at reform. We do not possess at present the men who can plan successfully, as President Roosevelt's well-meant efforts have amply shown, nor the men who are willing to work Socialism and to work under it, nor the men who are willing to live communally. All these sorts of men have to be *grown*. But it will not be easy to grow them, and as yet far too little thought has been given to the problem of growing them.

Dictatorship, however, is not only an ideal. Like democracy, it is also a form of government, and the aims of dictatorships may differ. While they all agree that a strong and authoritarian

government is demanded by the emergency which enables them to arise, and while they may seem to agree in the doctrine of a 'totalitarian' State, they may yet differ widely in their conceptions of the nature of the life they desire to produce and of the men they desire to populate their State.

Actually these differences are already quite marked. They are all proclaiming the need of unlimited sacrifice from the individual citizen, but the kind of man wanted in a Communist dictatorship like Russia is plainly very different from the kind of man wanted in Fascist Italy or Hitlerian Germany, and neither sort of dictatorship would be content with the merely servile masses submissive to financial exploitation such as would satisfy the requirements of South American dictators.

In each of these cases the citizen is required to be relative to the constitution under which he lives, and to be adjusted to it. But the root of all political troubles and discontents is that in point of fact he is not. The average man of to-day is not such as to fit into any of the revolutionary schemes; he does not make a good citizen either in Russia or Italy or Germany. He is not even willing to submit any longer to exploitation by the despotic dictator or tyrant, though for ages he has been more nearly adapted to this ideal of dictatorship than to any other. As for the man who would come up to the Communist ideal or that of Mussolini or Hitler, it is safe to say that at present he does not exist on earth. Hence every dictatorship intelligent and convinced enough to wish to perpetuate itself is confronted by the problem of remoulding human nature. It must *breed*, or somehow mould, the sort of man it wants, the man who would be fit for its purposes, would believe in its ideals, could enjoy life in it, or could at least endure it. At present such men hardly exist—at any rate, in sufficient quantities. But it is conceivable that they may be grown, and it will be instructive to consider how the various dictatorships would set about the task of growing them.

Let us take first the communistic man, adapted to a Communist State. He is easy to delineate, not so much because he may already be coming into existence in Russia, but because the problem he presents to his makers has already been solved, in all essentials, by the social insects. From the communities of the ants, bees, and termites we can gather what must be the qualities of communistic man, whom we may henceforth call the *Antman*. He must be infinitely laborious, self-sacrificing, and submissive to his social order. Moreover, all these social qualities must be so ingrained in him that they have become unquestionable and instinctive, and that he performs his social functions willingly, easily, and without demur or friction, and approximates to the ideal of an efficient and trustworthy social automaton. If he can

attain to this degree of adaptation he will not need either of the motives which have hitherto driven men to labour, either the lure of personal wealth or the lash of the slave-driver. He will be impelled to work by his own nature, without any *arrière-pensée* of any sort, without hope of private gain and without fear of the whip. Similarly he will sacrifice himself for the ends of the State, without question, hesitation or regret, feeling that his function is not to reason why but merely to do and die. And he will be incapable of thinking of anything better than the established order which has made and moulded him. Evidently it will take many generations and the severest and most unrelenting discipline to evolve him; but when he is evolved, he will be in many respects a very formidable beast.

But he will be lacking in intelligence, and this deficiency may prove his undoing, if he has to contend against a different type of man. Intelligence is essentially adaptability, the capacity to vary response and to modify habitual action under novel conditions, and thereby to improve adjustment. Of such intelligence the antman will become as incapable as the ant, for, like the latter, his intelligence will have become a matter of habit and instinct. For dealing with novelties he will not be equipped, and so his unintelligence will make him unprogressive; yet the need for progress may be forced upon him. If new conditions arise, if new adjustments are required, his instinctive intelligence will be too stereotyped to make them. He will go under, therefore, if he has to compete with plastic and more flexible types of intelligence.

This is a prediction which may safely be based on the history of the social insects. They, too, are essentially unprogressive. They have existed, apparently for æons, in their present state. They had discovered the value of social combination ages before the ancestors of man, and had elaborated highly complex and ingenious forms of social life. They, too, have domesticated animals and plants, and in the complete subjugation of the individual and the frictionless working of their institutions their social order appears to be greatly superior to ours. They have also devised more perfect methods of birth-control and of regulating population than any we have reached.

But they have never advanced towards a domination of the earth. For they had doomed themselves to stagnation by sterilising the individual and arresting the natural selection of superior types. The worker ant, and bee, and termite, has been unsexed in order that nothing may detract from his (or rather her) devotion to the commonweal, and leaves no descendants to learn by her experience; while the males and functional females have been reduced to mere instruments of propagation.

An essentially similar policy is bound to be pursued in human

communisms, if they survive. The taming of the individual and the extirpation of his individualism will demand the reduction of the human worker to the level of the insect worker. The process will presumably be painful, long and difficult; but it has already begun. The Bolsheviks began it by exterminating or expelling their *intelligentsia*. They are now continuing it by periodically decimating their technicians for the crimes of sabotage and counter-revolutionary activities. They seem to think that men will work best with the sword of Damocles hanging over them. They are also sending to Siberia and similar resorts (where, if they survive, they may grow into a nucleus for a successful revolt against the whole system!), as 'kulaks,' all the more intelligent and energetic of their peasants. But even the somewhat crudely selective method of shooting their 'planners' when their plans break down does not seem very likely to conduce to better planning, if there was any truth in the assumption that the best reputed planners had been selected to do the planning! And by constant selection of the submissive and elimination of the recalcitrant, what are they likely to achieve but a progressive lowering of the level of the collective intelligence? In short, the antmen seem to have a poor prospect of surviving in a world which harbours also other sorts of men.

Will the world ever harbour more efficient sorts of men—more efficient, that is, than our present men are, or than Communists can ever hope to be? There is at least a chance of this. For what may be termed a Superman is scientifically conceivable, and can be brought into existence by sustained and intelligent efforts, hardly more difficult than those needed to produce the Antman. Already one of the new dictatorships, the German, has declared in favour of eugenics, alike in its negative or sanitary form, which aims at purifying the stock, and, in its positive and more ambitious form, which aims at creating a real aristocracy and a better type of man. No doubt many centuries may elapse between this declaration and the realisation of its programme, but it is none the less significant that the ideal of eugenics should now have been officially adopted and proclaimed in a great modern State. If moreover, as we may hope, the methods adopted are intelligent and adequate, and really able to purify and invigorate the human stocks subjected to them, and actually raise the level of human intelligence, the example of Germany must prove infectious and will be imitated everywhere. Thus the human race may be enabled to resume the progressive evolution which has been so deplorably arrested by the unforeseen mischiefs of a biologically dysgenic civilisation. Civilisation hitherto has been dysgenic in its effects, because it has so softened the conditions of life that weaklings in depressed social strata have

been able to survive and to propagate abundantly, while in the upper strata there have been such temptations, so much fighting, so much prudence, that their numbers have always dwindled. A truly and inherently progressive civilisation, on the other hand, would be so ordered as to recruit itself from its *best* stocks and to eliminate, slowly but surely, its defective material. By so doing it will progressively ameliorate social conditions by increasing the efficiency and capacity of the individual citizens.


It is plain, however, that any programme of eugenics, or what the Germans call 'race-hygiene,' manifestly looks ahead to a distant future and demands faith, determination and perseverance. It is no programme for the immediate future, and holds out no hopes of instant commercial returns. Hence at first stern discipline will be needed to enforce it, and to steer the ship of State straight for so distant a goal. Probably eugenics will have to be elevated into a sort of biological religion and equipped with appropriate ritual and myths. But this should not prove more difficult than was the creation of the early astronomical religions, with their assiduous worship of the heavenly bodies, as a means of determining the length of the year. Nor would there be anything in the eugenical programme and the social discipline it entailed to debase the superman and to lower his intelligence to that of the antman. For he would always be encouraged to develop his faculties and to excel. Hitlerism is already committed to the policy of developing *leadership*, a quality which the democracies are more and more failing to produce, and it would surely be the height of folly to breed leaders only to dispose of them after the fashion of last June! Society would not attempt, therefore, as in the Communist State, to abolish competition, to extinguish initiative, and to make all equal by levelling down and eradicating individuality. It would realise that by such attempts it was hamstringing progress, and that in individual variation alone could be found the stimulus and source of salutary innovation. Instead of suppressing individuality, therefore, it would be content to socialise it by education.

Hence it is possible that a Fascist dictatorship, even though it might not initially appear to be any more favourable to human freedom and development than a dictatorship for the alleged benefit of the proletariat, would develop very differently. Originally both are essentially socialistic; they agree in demanding the subjection of the individual to social purposes. But after that their paths may diverge. Communism sets out from a postulate of human equality and proceeds to grind down individuals to the uniform degradation of the antman. But Fascism, unhampered by any such dogma, can afford to develop all suitable individuals and to utilise all talents in building up its social

synthesis. If it desires to progress, it can adopt the eugenical programme of human development, and aim at the ideal, not of an antman, but of a superman. It will then have to utilise the progressive possibilities latent in human individuality and to cherish the individuals from whom it will derive the impetus to progress. Moreover, as it will not be able to determine altogether *a priori* what will turn out to be the value of various variations in behaviour and endowment, it will have to adopt an open-minded experimental attitude, and to practise a good deal of toleration. And on this scientific basis there may once again grow up a considerable degree of Liberalism and a certain amount of rational discussion. This new Liberalism will differ from the moribund Liberalism of to-day in being based, not on abstract dogmas about the equality and rationality of men, but on science and experience. We may hope, also, that the grievous collapse of nineteenth-century Liberalism will serve it as a salutary warning to be ever on its guard against the danger of atavistic relapses into brutality and savagery.

But these solitudes concern the future. For the moment our most urgent task and immediate endeavour must be to extricate ourselves from our present mess and the imminent danger of a rapid reversion into barbarism. If we can prevent our feelings from sacrificing our civilisation to our nationalisms, and our dictatorships from growing into tyrannies, we may find leisure to give some careful thought to the momentous choice between the alternative social developments now confronting us. Shall we aim at the antman or at the superman? If we do not choose speedily and rightly, the avenging Furies of our past misdeeds may turn us back again into the beasts we were.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.



ART, INDUSTRY, AND BURLINGTON HOUSE

MARRIAGE, to be successful, depends, essentially, upon harmony ; for where there is no harmony there must, in spirit if not in practice, be divorce. When, therefore, it is attempted to marry art with industry there must be a definite distinction between what is antithetical in the intended partnership and what is not, between what is pure art and what is applied art. The intellectual and emotional reactions of the artist which find expression in the abstract forms of pure art have clearly no concern with industry, and machine production cannot be related to anything which evolves as a result of the expressive power of the human mind acting directly upon matter. It is only when that power is detached from actual material contact and applied to the formulation of design for products to be made by machinery that art and industry may be successfully wedded. Yet in the practice of the applied arts there must be something of the same spirit as that which is essential to pure art—there must be the initial desire and impulse to create.

It has been the failure to perceive the problem of transmitting this spirit through the medium of the machine that has caused the disharmony and consequent divorce between industry and art, and the assumption that what the craftsman did the machine could do, and do better, was the fundamental error. Ornament when reproduced by the machine is denuded of the only reason for its being and at once loses the very qualities that gave it power to please. It becomes a mere pattern, with no purpose and no meaning, and it marks the complete divergence between the work of the hand and the product of the machine. While the realisation of this divergence is the initial necessity, the acceptance of the fact that machine-made goods demand their own technique of design provides the first principle of art in industry.

There is to-day a fairly general acknowledgment of this principle by manufacturers, and, although in some cases an effort has been made to carry it out, the means to its adoption are not so simple as might appear, for the question arises of who is able and available to execute the design required. The manufacturer, seeking the designer, has turned to the artist. It is not at present

a happy combination, for the two are out of sympathy and do not understand each other ; but the fact that the manufacturer has recognised his need of the artist is important, and one aspect of this recognition has been to show that the artist, however eminent, may wholly fail in designing for machine products. Indeed, it is apparent that there are but few artists who succeed in doing so, while in the field of architecture, which would have seemed likely to promise a number of gifted designers, a similar situation exists. It follows that the manufacturer, however eager or willing he may be to improve the designs of his products, is often prevented from doing so by his inability to find a capable designer.

Yet this is only the first phase of the problem of art in industry, for, granting the good design and the subsequent manufacture, the product has to be sold, and it is notorious that the taste and discrimination of trade buyers are not of a high standard. The buyers, not unnaturally, are conservative, and they, too, are essentially concerned in selling what they buy. What has sold well before will do so again, but something fresh presents an element of uncertainty and risk, and it may be, also, of a design which they do not begin to understand and so cannot appreciate. They tend, moreover, to share with the public the association of ideas which induces a fixed habit of mind. That a toilet jug and basin should be plain thus seems extraordinary, even, perhaps, a little indecent, for it should, of course, be covered with rose buds. It may be difficult, therefore, for some fresh but good design to find a market, with the usual result that the manufacturer, finding it will not sell, ceases to produce it.

The public is not always to blame, and the saying that the public will buy anything—the truth of which was largely evident in the prosperity of the Victorian manufacturer—has no longer the same general application, though it has still foundation in that shoddy and ornamented goods continue to command large sales. In certain sections, however, the standard of taste has definitely risen, while Continental designers have shown that proportion and harmony are not inconsistent with modern work and materials. There is, indeed, a recognition of the urgency for improvement in æsthetic standards, and there is, also, the desire to give it effect. So much so that last January the Government set up under the Board of Trade a Council for Art and Industry with terms of reference which were widely drawn and with a membership which sought to include all the relevant interests. But it is another side of the problem that the present period is one of flux. There are no static conditions which may contribute a simple basis for a 'style' or 'manner,' but rather an impatient instability in which there seem no finite forms ; and there is, in

consequence, a seeking in the arts for something new, something that will properly express the contemporary state.

Broadly, the relation of art to industry is determined by the manufacturer, the distributor, and the public; and since demand is the ultimate arbiter of supply, the greatest potential influence that can be brought to bear upon that relationship is the public taste. If the quality of the demand can be raised, that of the supply should, in time, follow; for the effect of such a process should be to encourage artists to turn to the applied arts, to urge upon the manufacturer the need for their proper employment as designers, and to bring about a better informed and more intelligent outlook on the part of trade buyers. Of the ways in which this end may be accomplished experience provides the precedent of exhibitions—although it must be admitted that their success, judged by their impress upon public taste, has, at the least, been dubious.

The chief difficulties inherent in exhibitions are those of finance and selection. An exhibition must be made to pay for itself, and, since the public attendance is normally an unreliable factor and the price of admission must necessarily be kept low, the exhibitors are required to pay for the space which their goods occupy. Manufacturers in this country have little liking for exhibitions, and it is on sufferance that they are induced to exhibit. They feel they are 'jockeyed' into a situation which they would rather avoid, and in their resulting sense of protest it is not surprising that any real effort to provide original goods for display should be lacking. Nor, in such circumstances, can selection be of the sane and impartial kind that, most essentially, is required. For cajolery goes ill with dictation, and the manufacturer does not pay for the privilege of being told what he can or cannot exhibit. Moreover, selection itself is never an easy matter, and the composition of the selective body even less so. A committee of selectors can rarely, if ever, combine the practical experience and general art knowledge with, at the same time, the wise catholicity of taste so necessary to impartial judgment. More often than not, the goods selected accord with the personal tastes and prejudices of a few individuals.

The Royal Academy Exhibition of British Art in Industry, which is to open at Burlington House this month, is thus of unusual interest and promise, for exhibitors do not have to pay for space and the method of selecting exhibits is directed to eliminate the element of personal preference. Each group of manufactures has been allotted an 'advisory committee' which has the first say upon the exhibits of that group. The committees consist of the manufacturers themselves, of practical designers, and of one or more members of the Royal Academy. The final

selection is reserved to the executive committee—composed equally of members of the Royal Academy and the Royal Society of Arts—which may, and no doubt will, invite advice upon technical or other points. It must be noted, also, that a consulting architect is attached to the advisory committees, and that of the twelve members of the executive committee three are architects. In theory, therefore, this structure for selection has much to commend it, and although in practice it may not work so well as it would promise, it yet offers perhaps as good a basis as any for intelligent and impartial choice.

The Exhibition therefore assumes an importance quite apart from its distinguished auspices and semi-official character; for it not only offers a real stimulus to the manufacturer, but aims at providing a selection of articles which will be properly representative of his reaction. There will, in other words, be a range of exhibits which should show how far British industry is at present capable of producing articles of good design; and in so far as the design succeeds or fails many object-lessons must follow. This is a factor of considerable value. Especially so since one of the avowed purposes of the Exhibition is 'to enable British manufacturers to study the full extent to which British artists are capable of supplying original, attractive and technically suitable designs for the production of articles by mechanical means, and to turn the attention of British artists to design in relation to industry.' The exhibits should supply a promising basis for such study and a focal point for the attention and interests of artists.

Emphasis is laid upon this both directly, by the stipulation that the designer's name must be shown on each article, and indirectly, by the organisation for display—itself a ready means of educating public taste to the necessity for order and harmony in and between objects and their setting. To this end each gallery at Burlington House will, as far as possible, be devoted to the products of a particular industry, while the galleries themselves have been designed by various leading architects with the special purpose of relating setting to products and of effecting conditions suited to their display. The main furniture gallery, for example, will contain a variety of rooms which will be completely furnished, from electric fittings to carpets, each being under the direct supervision of an architect; while there is a presiding architect in control of the scheme and lay-out of the gallery as a whole. The same or similar procedure is in force in the other galleries, and a definite impression of harmony and coherence should result. Only the central hall will be left in its pristine state—that Sir William Llewellyn might gain reassurance from some remnant of familiarity when receiving his guests is

certainly thoughtful, though the carpet which is to cover the floor and those which are to hang on the walls may unduly temper familiarity with strangeness.

The distribution of the exhibits will be made as follows:-

- | | | |
|---------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| Gallery | 1. | Ceramics. |
| " | 2. | Glassware. |
| " | 3. | Furniture |
| " | 4. | Furniture } and Domestic Equipment. |
| " | 5. | Furniture } |
| " | 6. | Window Display. |
| " | 7. | Plastic Mouldings. |
| " | 8. | Dress Materials. |
| " | 9. | Dress Materials. |
| " | 10. | Book Production. |
| " | 11. | Furniture. |
| " | C. | Furnishing Fabrics. |
| " | D. | Commercial Printing and Posters. |
| " | E. | Leather Goods and Gold and Silver. |
| " | F. | Jewellery. |

Vestibule: Posters.

Central Hall: Carpets and Rugs.

The value of the Exhibition does not, however, lie only in the propriety of choice of exhibits and the manner and conditions of their display, nor is it confined to the measure of outward success that may attend it. A more fundamental value lies in the work of preparation, in the contacts which that work effects between the manufacturer, the designer, the technician, the artist, and the layman in the person of the Exhibition authorities; in the consequent expression and discussion of ideas and the fresh angles of thought suggested by different and often opposing points of view. It becomes possible to apprehend the roots of the problem of art in industry and to perceive, if not the solution, at least the possible methods of approach towards it. It can be realised with greater clarity that an exhibition does not of itself strike forcefully enough at those roots, that it serves rather to advertise that the problem exists, and to show, by the quality of the exhibits, the gravity and extent of its symptoms. The approach is directed at the last phase of the problem, the education of the consumer, and, although it may supply an impetus towards progress in the first phase of design and manufacture, such an impetus cannot be sustained by an exhibition alone.

While there seems little doubt that the Burlington House Exhibition will supply an impetus of this sort, it should, at the same time, establish a framework for the organisation of subsequent and equally important exhibitions and invest it with that intangible but potent quality—good-will. Were subsequent

exhibitions held at regular intervals, the impetus towards the marriage of art and industry would gain steadiness and momentum; and if the experience thus to be gained upon the problem of their relationship were properly applied, the present disharmony should be of comparatively short duration.

The obvious direction for the application of that experience lies in art education, not only in the specialised medium of art schools, but among all those generally concerned in art and industry. There should, of course, be fresh methods of teaching and training in art schools, so that the interest and energy of art students is turned to the examination and practice of the applied arts; but there must be, also, a corresponding ability on the part of industrialists and those in responsible positions in commerce to appreciate the principles of design. It is of little use that art schools should produce students with the knowledge and ability to design for the machine if their industrial employers cannot appreciate their designs, nor distinguish between the merits or demerits of one as against another. Art teaching, therefore, must not be confined to art schools, but extended throughout the educational system as a whole. Elementary, secondary, and public schools should devote a portion of their syllabus to grounding their pupils in the principles of design, to training the eye and the mind to a sense of proportion and colour, to the perception of form, and to the synthesis of fitness and function. There might then be a sure foundation upon which to foster art in industry, and upon which to secure the correlative improvement in public taste.

With this foundation the atmosphere of mutual suspicion which is prevalent between the manufacturer and the artist, and which gives rise to distrust and intolerance of outlook and method, would be dissipated. It would become possible for each to meet the other on common ground, and in such circumstances the creative impulse might once again find inspiration and delight in the applied arts. 'Dead patterns' could be burnt and from their ashes rise the spirit of expressive design. The production of beauty, the urge and intention of the craftsman, might indeed become the hope and purpose of the machine. A public conscience could, in fact, develop which, perceiving the value of order and harmony, would render such evils as slums—for there are the slums of to-morrow as well as those of to-day—and incoherent town and country planning impossible of practice.

It is not difficult to visualise the social and economic benefits to which that common outlook would give rise; and if the vision may represent an ideal which belongs to the future, it is none the less worth the attempt to hasten its realisation. There is, indeed, urgent need for the attempt from the point of view of commerce

itself, for the British manufacturer is suffering from the attention which his Continental competitors give to design and the resulting progress of their applied arts. As selling points the factors of design are becoming of importance, and although our manufacturers are not unconscious that this is so, they have yet to learn of what design consists. The statement that 'to the commercial producer the actual wares are nothing; their advantages in the market are everything' no longer holds, for market advantages are beginning to be related to the æsthetic worth of the actual wares, and our producers must be concerned with making the two synonymous.

In point of time the auguries for the Burlington House Exhibition are thus distinctly propitious, for there is a readiness to exhibit on the part of the exhibitor and an eagerness to see on the part of the public, while the desire to learn whatever lessons the Exhibition may give is shared by designer, manufacturer, distributor, and consumer alike. It seems a pity, therefore, that the exhibits are restricted to manufactured goods. The essential purpose of the Exhibition is to foster design, and a selection of actual designs would have been of service. To have shown designs would have given evidence of their present standard, of the kind of ideas behind the manufactured article and of the relation of those ideas to machine production. One of the elements of the problem of art in industry is to discover what are the original concepts of which the product is the result, and how far such concepts agree or conflict with the methods of manufacture. Properly to interpret this element of the problem must entail the critical examination of initial design, for it is only by analysis that the means to a solution may be determined; and while it may be that the public would, for the most part, not understand a series of drawings, it must not be forgotten that the Exhibition is not for the public alone.

It has already been said that the Exhibition is not of itself sufficient to sustain the purposes at which it is aimed, and must be supported, not merely by subsequent exhibitions, but by art education in schools. Yet neither of these methods can effectively reach the mass of population now adult which constitutes the bulk of the present demand for cheap manufactured goods and which stands to gain the most benefit, mental as well as material, from the proper functioning of art in industry. Consideration of this aspect of the problem suggests that the link between manufacturer and consumer offers the most influential means of contact. If salesmen and wholesale buyers could be so educated to the principles of design that they were able to appreciate the difference between what was good and what was bad, and if salesmen could be taught to 'put across' that appreciation upon the retailer in

terms of salesmanship, much would be accomplished in the ultimate task of raising the standard of taste among the mass of the population. For the retailer would stock well-designed goods and the consumer would be persuaded to buy them.

The influence of this upon individual sensibility could, moreover, be supplemented by other means of contact. It should not, for example, be beyond the powers even of British film producers to devise films which pointed the essentials of good design and its benefit to the consumer. Their showing might be made compulsory in every cinema throughout the country, and it should be possible for distribution to be made to industry itself, from factories to retail stores, and to social organisations, rotary clubs and the like, with facilities for obtaining the necessary projectors. But films of this nature must be interesting and ably produced, for failure to be either would do more harm than good. Yet there can be no doubt of the possibilities of educational films, nor, if they be well done, of the value and extent of their influence.

Concentration upon the consumer end should have the required effect of hastening the realisation of what is bad design, and it seems likely that it would supply an incentive to the artist to look to commercial work apart from any demand for his services by the manufacturer. If the artist sees that progress in the applied arts is no longer being stultified by ignorance and prejudice, that it is possible for good design to find welcome and adoption, he will be inclined seriously to consider the applied arts and to turn his energies to designing for the machine. When this reorientation of attitude is accompanied by the manufacturer's demand for his ideas—for it is ideas, not draughtsmanship, that the artist gives—there is reason to hope that the desire may evolve for mutual co-operation. And if that hope were fulfilled the basis for a common ground of sympathy, which fresh methods of art education should make possible, would be more firmly and more easily established.

The Exhibition forms a rallying ground for æsthetic forces and a base from which they may operate. For it will bring together a wide variety of articles which should be representative of the existing relation of art to industry, and by them define that relationship in terms of æsthetic quality and mechanical technique. The exhibits will indicate to what extent technical limitations and expressive design are in conflict, how far design is in harmony with function, and what in practice is thought to constitute design at all. If these factors can be gauged and the measure of their interaction determined, the initial difficulty of getting art into industry will be simplified. While, therefore, it is to be hoped that all the exhibits shall be of merit, there is no

need for undue disappointment if they are not, since the essential importance of the exhibits is the fact that they will imply certain standards from which conclusions may be drawn and the most effective means to their improvement considered.

It seems likely, however, that the articles displayed will suggest that the divergence between utility and non-utility articles is being realised by industry. Once this is definitely accepted, machine production may be directed into the channels to which it belongs, for the difference between expressive practical design and abstract beauty will be understood. The chief *raison d'être* of the machine is its power of infinite repetition, and therefore of its complete dissociation from ornament. The essence of true machine products is simplicity, the balance of fitness with function and the harmony between shape, proportion, and line. When this balance and harmony are realised in the practice of the applied arts, the world of appearance, in so far as it is manufactured, will be profoundly changed. It is probable that the human need for æsthetic satisfaction would be so far satisfied that there would be much less need for pure art, and that the creative impulse of the artist would be drawn to the applied arts. In that event the artist would earn a living which left him free for abstract expression, and pure art, divorced from the mediocrity enforced by the necessity to produce it as a means of livelihood, should benefit.

There can be no doubting the effect of such conditions upon the general community, and in conjunction with it must be marked the trend of mechanisation in industry. Machines are increasing, not only in numbers but in ingenuity, and the necessity for labour and for skilled labour must accordingly grow less. Work, while it may be less exacting, will grow more monotonous and the hours worked, if employment is to be maintained, must become fewer. There will be a difference in the daily life of the worker—his time for leisure will be longer and his working time shorter. The occupation of that leisure therefore becomes a matter of serious consequence, and the need to foster the power of individual self-expression of considerable urgency. The presence of the machine does, in fact, make possible the ideal of human freedom, the organisation for leisure; but for the industrial worker to have leisure without the ability to use it is for him to exchange from one monotony to another. Yet it is out of leisure that art grows.

If the social significance of the relation of art with industry is perhaps incalculable, the elements of the problem of their unity are not. It is thus of primary importance that not only should these elements have the widest study, but that they should be given the greatest possible publicity; for it is the general

apprehension of what is wrong that impels the effort to put it right. The Burlington House Exhibition is an effort at such publicity, and the greater the numbers of those who attend it the greater will be the stimulus to effect those purposes at which it is aimed.

JAMES TUDOR-CRAIG.

IN PRAISE OF PINDAR

It is not improbable that the position accorded to Pindar among the Greeks themselves was second only to that of Homer; but, if so, he must have owed that pride of place, as well as the preservation almost complete of his *Epinikia*, mainly to his steady cultivation of a subject of common interest to all the widely-sundered Hellenes—to wit the great national games. Perhaps the supremacy of Homer himself might sometime have been questioned, had the Catalogue been less comprehensive; and even our fastidious Milton confessed, in his choice of subject, the same desirability of wide appeal as seems to govern the thousand scribblers of to-day. Of Pindar no more than of these latter can it be said that he has paid no penalty for his choice; for many moderns are apt to tire of perpetual athletics, and, with some exceptions, can hardly force an interest in the various victors and their blameless relatives and ancestors, by eulogy of whom the enterprising poet hoped to commend himself to his employers and enhance his fees. For Pindar, as he himself quite admits,¹ has a keen eye to the main chance—the bird, if not a cormorant, is pretty ravenous.

But the charge of monotony might be brought, perhaps with equal justice, against the poets of the New Comedy, especially as seen in their Latin imitators; and brought, too, against famous craftsmen of far later times. If Petrarch and his French and Elizabethan followers have successfully defied the bonds of the single subject and the sonnet form—if *In Memoriam* be still praised, as it can be, for 'variety of woe'—we need not despair of similar relief in Pindar; and perhaps, before approaching our main subject, a few words may be allowed on the way in which he may have enlarged our first conception of Greece and Greek matters.

The early studies of most of us were concentrated, no doubt, on Greece's repulse of the Persian attack in 490 and 480, and then on the grand opposition of Athens and Sparta which culminated in the long Peloponnesian War. In the former we paid scant attention to the Greeks on the east of the Ægean, and took small

¹ *Isth.* ii. 13-14.

account of the battle of Mykale—that was not in Greece! And when the struggle with Sparta was transferred at its crucial point to Sicily, it almost seemed as if the Athenians were wantonly adventuring against a foreign country. Now through Pindar more than anybody do we realise the vast extension of the Greek name and power at the beginning of the fifth century; and how, while Athens is yet a comparatively insignificant State, Greece as a whole, however loosely organised, is in no way limited to Greece proper, but is in fact the dominant power in the Mediterranean basin, against which the Phœnicians still maintain a dwindling struggle through their settlements at Carthage and its neighbourhood. Herodotus, if we study him, has no doubt much to enlarge our notion of Greece; but it is through the eyes of Pindar, as his competitors come flocking to the games from many parts of the Greek world, that we best realise her as occupying not merely the south-east corner of Europe, but the Ægean islands, the coasts of Asia Minor, Thrace and Cyrene, nearly all Sicily, southern Italy, and even places further west—for has not Hercules long ago pushed beyond the Pillars, exploring the cliffs and shoals and making the whole Mediterranean ferry safe?²

Here in Pindar we have, not only those astonishing Argonauts sailing to the far end of the Black Sea and in their return 'seeing Jerusalem and Madagascar,' or at any rate 'the Ocean and the Red Sea,' visiting Lake Tritonis, near the Syrtis, and receiving there the promise of Thera as their island whence in later days they shall found Cyrene and set up a race of Greek kings³; but also Tlepolemus of Argos colonising Rhodes,⁴ Athens colonising Teos and then Teos colonising Abdera in Thrace and struggling hard for awhile with the native Pæonians under Mount Melamphyllon.⁵ If the Argonauts and Hercules are legendary, the Greeks are clearly aware of the Phasis; and a contemporary instance is offered in *Isth.* ii. 41-2, where the genial Xenocrates of Akragas in Sicily 'voyages to Phasis in the summer and the banks of Nile in winter'; nor can we quite see why Donaldson should hold this merely a metaphor for his hospitality, or why Xenocrates should not, once at least, have made either voyage—regular Greek settlements at Bubastis and Naukratis in the Delta had been permitted, the one by Psammetichus in the seventh, the other by Amasis in the sixth century.⁶ Best of all, seventeen of Pindar's forty-five odes are for Sicilians, and we

² *Nem.* iii. 22-6, *Isth.* iv. 55-7.

³ *Pyth.* iv. and v.

⁴ *Ol.* vii.

⁵ *Pæan* ii. 70; and, for a vivid glimpse of Xerxes or Mardonius at Athens, *ll.* 28-30: *ματρός | δὲ ματέρ' ἐμῆς | ἐπιδὼν ἔμπεαν | πολέμῳ πυρὶ πλαγίσαν.*

⁶ Grote, *iii.* 144-5, 152.

learn with some surprise that 'tyrants,' in the absence of Labour-Socialists, may be quite amiable people. Hiero, who succeeded his brother Gelon at Gela (485-78) and at Syracuse (478-66), was able by a mission of his brother-in-law Chromius to deter Anaxilas of Rhegium, a much less favourable specimen, from a meditated aggression on Locri Epizephyrii (on the east of the toe of Italy); and Pindar tells Hiero in 475 'the Locrian maiden of the West invokes thy name before her doors.'⁷ In 476 Hiero had founded the city of Ætna near the mountain, and sent Chromius to govern it for his son Deinomenes. In that year Chromius won the chariot race at Nemea, and from our poet's congratulatory ode we see he has previously enjoyed, and now expects, a hearty welcome in his house.⁸ From there later he must have witnessed the eruption of 475; and his ode to Hiero of 470 gives from memory what seems to be the earliest extant description of such an event.⁹ There,

in dreadful Tartarus, lies Typho of the hundred heads, who opposed the gods. . . . Sicily lies heavy upon his shaggy breast, and the soaring pillar of snowy Ætna keeps him down, she who nurses sharp frost the whole year through, she from whose recesses are disgorged absolute fountains of unapproachable fire: and in the daytime rivers roll forward their dark-red torrent of smoke, while in the gloom of night a rush of scarlet flame carries the rocks with a roar into the level deep. Ay, that reptile shoots aloft most terrible spouts of fire, a portent wondrous to the eye and a marvel to the ear of whoso witnesseth it—such a being is there bound in the dark-leaved crests of Ætna and in the plain, and the couch strewn for him lacerates and scores his whole length of back reclined upon it. (*Pyth.* i. 15-28.)

Another ode for Chromius (*Nem.* ix. 34-44: 474 B.C.) recalls his fame won by land and sea, in fight for Hippocrates of Gela (father of Gelon and Hiero) against the Syracusans at the battle of the river Helorus, B.C. 492, and quite recently (474) by Hiero's side in the sea fight off Cyme (Cumæ) on the bay of Naples, to defend that oldest of all Greek colonies (before 735¹⁰) against a combined attack of Carthaginians and Etruscans:

What crushing defeat did they suffer at the hands of the lord of Syracuse, when he flung the flower of their youth into the deep from

⁷ *Pyth.* ii. 18-9.

⁸ *Nem.* i. 19-24.

⁹ Homer seems on the verge of such in *Il.* ii. 780-3: 'the Greeks marched as if the whole ground were consuming with fire; and earth groaned as under the wrath of Zeus whose joy is in the thunderbolt, what time he scourges the ground about Typhoeus among the Arimoi, where they say Typhoeus hath his couch'; and in Hesiod's *Theogony*, 837-68, which Pindar, his countryman, must have known, we have this same giant's overthrow by Zeus, a vigorous passage with marked volcanic symptoms, as Paley felt, though the personal myth is maintained throughout.

¹⁰ Grote, iii. 169.

the swift-moving ships and snatched Hellas from a grievous slavery. (*Pyth.* i. 73-5.)

The same first Pythian, 79-80, glances at an earlier victory in which Hiero and his three brothers had played a part, though the person chiefly concerned was Theron of Akragas. Marching north across the western half of the island, he had in 482 expelled Terillus, tyrant of Himera, who appealed for aid to the Carthaginians. Shut up in Himera by Hamilcar's great army of mercenaries from many parts in the west Mediterranean, Theron besought help from his connexions in Syracuse; with the result that Gelon, Hiero, and two other brothers in a most bloody battle of 480 defeated the vastly more numerous Carthaginian force, of whom scarce any returned to tell the tale, while Hamilcar was never found afterwards. Such is Herodotus' report¹¹ of a victory which is said to have been won on the very day of Salamis, and must at least have established an undisputed Greek mastery in the west of the Mediterranean, as Salamis and Mykale did in the east. To Theron we have *Ol.* ii. and iii., both celebrating the same chariot victory of 476, besides a fragment (119) which assigns to his ancestors the colonising of Rhodes. Pindar roundly avers that 'for a hundred years past no city has produced a man of more kindly heart or liberal hand'¹²; and he may well have been a better man than Hiero, with whom the poet's relation was closer, but who was hampered by a serious internal complaint. We hear much more of Theron's brother, Xenocrates; though both the odes, nominally for him,¹³ are actually addressed to his son Thrasybulus, who drove his chariot in the first case (490), and at the time of the second (472) has lost his father some few years before, while his uncle Theron also has just died. This is perhaps the reason why he is bidden not to be deterred from sounding his father's praises by the 'envious hopes' of others¹⁴: the poet adds that he does not write odes merely to have them suppressed. It does not appear that Thrasybulus had any claims to succeed; but Theron's son, Thrasydæus, may have already assumed the arrogant attitude which brought him into collision with Hiero and quickly led to his overthrow. A third and very friendly composition addressed to Thrasybulus sends him a drinking song.¹⁵

Furthermore, if in our intense admiration of Athenian literature, philosophy and art we have been inclined to ignore anything of the kind in their great opponents, our intensely Dorian Pindar¹⁶

¹¹ Bk. vii. 165-7.

¹² *Ol.* ii. 93-4.

¹³ *Pyth.* vi. and *Isth.* ii.

¹⁴ *Φθονεῖν ἐλπιδες* l. 43.

¹⁵ Fragment 124.

¹⁶ Gray stressed the Æolic character in Pindar's poetry, citing 'Ἄιολος μοῶπις'

may serve to remind us that the choral ode or dance-song in which his *Epinikia*, processional songs, *Partheneia* and other sections of his work have their *raison d'être*, is a distinctively Spartan institution, to which Athenian drama in great part owes its existence; that the greatest cities of Sicily—Akragas, Gela, Camarina, Syracuse, Megara—were all Dorian colonies; and that Pindar, staying in Sicily for the great part of 476–5, could not fail to meet at Hiero's court the flourishing poet Epicharmus, native of Dorian Cos, near Rhodes, and a pupil of Pythagoras, who produced in Sicily before his death (c. 450) a large number—some say fifty-two—of comedies, now all lost, which dealt with the old myths, generally in a comic spirit. Jevons (*Hist. of Gk. Lit.* pp. 239–40) gleaned some details of his burlesque *The Muses*, which described Hebe's wedding to Hercules, showing his marvellous appetite, the Dioscuri dancing together, and Athene playing the flute. Hercules and the Dioscuri, as Dorian favourites, are constant in Pindar: in fragment 168 the hero roasts and devours two whole oxen, his marriage to Hebe appears (*Nem.* i. 70–2, x. 18, and *Isth.* iv. 59), while the Dioscuri are handled with warm sympathy, especially in *Nem.* x. 49–90. But the remarkable parallel is that of Athene playing on the flute, an accomplishment with which I do not know that she is elsewhere credited, save in Pindar, *Pyth.* xii. 6–8, 18–24, where she appears as *inventing* the instrument and its varied music to imitate the cries of the dying snakes on Medusa's head. It is something of a coincidence that this ode celebrates a Sicilian, Midas of Acragas, for flute-playing; but it is perhaps his least pleasing, almost serio-comic in tone, and one of his earliest (490 B.C.); so that the imitation is probably rather by Epicharmus. Aristotle, writing of Athenian comedy, 'does not know who bestowed on it masks, or prologues, or a number of actors, and the like; but it was Epicharmus and Phormis who gave us the making of plots—that came originally from Sicily.'¹⁷ We cannot definitely associate Pindar with those

(*Ol.* i. 102), 'Αιολίδες χορδαί (*Pyth.* ii. 69), and 'Αιολίδαν προσαὶ ἀδλῶν (*Nem.* iii. 79); but the first two have been explained—e.g., by Sandys (*Loeb Classics*, *Introd.* pp. xxxiv.–v.)—in a metrical sense as referring to the Æolian *logædic* rhythm (dactyls combined with trochees and tribrachs 000) as opposed to the Doric *dactylo-epitritic* rhythm (dactyls with the epitrite – 0 –), while the third passage seems a matter of the musical instrument.—The question whether Pindar himself was of Æolic rather than Doric descent seems quite obscured by our uncertainties about earliest Greece and the internal movements of her population; but it seems pertinent to observe that the comparatively few Æolic forms he uses are probably derived from the mixed Epic language that Homer and his followers had made familiar, that the whole policy of Thebes seems to align her usually with the Peloponnese, and that Pindar's own sympathies are predominantly and intensely Dorian, though he can be very polite to Ionian Athens, and is of course well aware of Æolic claims in poetry.

¹⁷ *Poetics*, v. 3. τὸ δὲ μῦθος ποιῆν (ἀπεδωκεν) Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φορμῖς τὸ μὲν εἰς

developments of drama from the Doric choral dithyramb assigned to Arion, Thespiis, Phrynichus and Pratinas, nor even point to any mention by him of his great contemporary Æschylus, who visited Hiero's court in 468–7 and died at Gela in 456: yet his own dithyramb for the Thebans¹⁸ shows a personifying power which may owe something to Sicilian influence. Enough has been said to show that the Dorians of Sicily, under kinder conditions of soil and climate, were much less austere in taste than those of Sparta; though, where so much has been swept away in that battleground of the nations, the sole Dorian product now left flowering for us, the sweeter for its loneliness, may be the belated *Idylls* of Theocritus and of his successors Bion and Moschus.

Of the four pan-Hellenic festivals the Olympic, far the oldest with definite chronology from 776, came in August of every fourth year; and the Pythian, originally octennial but made quadrennial in 582, fell also in August in the third year of each Olympiad. The Isthmian and Nemean games were both biennial—the Isthmian falling always in the April preceding an Olympic or a Pythian, and the Nemean always in July of the second and fourth years of each Olympiad. Thus, while there was never a year without one of the four, the first and third years would always have two, while the solitary Nemean consoled the second and fourth. The four- or two-years periods were called *πενταετηρίς* or *τριετηρίς*, five (or three) years being actually involved if both ends are counted—much as the Romans dated January 30 as a.d. *iii* Kal. Feb., or as Christ was said to have risen 'on the third day.'

But, beside these four attended by the Greeks in general, there were very numerous local ones all over the Greek world, whether regular or occasional. Pindar mentions such, in Greece proper, at Thebes, Eubœa, Athens, Marathon, Eleusis, Megara, Ægina, Sicyon, Argos, Epidaurus, Stymphalus, Cleitor, Tegea, Parrhasia (the Lycæan Mount), and Pellana (in Laconia); also at Camarina and Ætna in Sicily, at Cyrene, and in Rhodes. And while the fame attending pan-Hellenic contests was soon sufficient to limit the victor's reward to a wreath of wild olive at Olympia, of laurel at Pytho, of wild celery at the Isthmus and Nemea, the prizes at the local festivals were of considerable value—e.g., silver winebowls at Sicyon, silver cups at Marathon, a shield of bronze at Argos and bronze articles at other places of Achaia and Argolis,¹⁹ soft woollen garments at Pellana, richly painted oil-jars or else

ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν. Cf. C. J. Gysar, *De Doriensium Comædiæ*, Cologne, 1828, p. 77; Müller's *Dorians*, bk. IV. c. vii. sec. 2.

¹⁸ Fragments 79 a, b, and 208.

¹⁹ *Nem.* x. 48–9.

cups at Athens.²⁰ The pot-hunter's is recognised as among the most glorious of careers; and Pindar, like Lord Verulam in a graver field, seems quite to regard these winnings as a suitable method of house furnishing.²¹

Olympia in Pindar's time lasted five days, and, along with many contests found at a modern athletic meeting, included others that we now relegate to the prize-ring, race-course, or parade-ground. There were the stadium (foot race, some 200 yards), the double stadium (δίαιλος, nearly our quarter-mile), the long race, the *pentathlon* (five events—foot race, long-jump, discus (iron quoit), javelin, wrestling), wrestling (separate), boxing, the *pancratium* (combining wrestling and boxing), boys' events, race in full armour, chariot race (sometimes with mules), and horse race. One misses throwing the hammer, putting the weight, pole-jump, high-jump and archery contest, though both the weight and archery had borne a part in the Greek games of *Iliad* xxiii. But in Pindar's time at least the bow was an Asiatic rather than a Greek weapon: had it been of prominence in military training it would have been included along with the javelin and the race in armour. That the jumping was long, not high, is clear from Pindar's metaphor in *Nem.* v. 19–20, where, disclaiming a particular subject, he suggests others he will willingly treat—'let a man dig me long leaping-places from these points'—such digging up of hard ground being then, as now, required by the speed at which the spring is launched, to avoid dislocation of the ankles on landing.

The games in Pindar's time observed in general a distinction between athletics and art. Olympia provided no contest in music (vocal or instrumental) or in poetry; though at Pytho, the very centre of Apolline worship, they could hardly be excluded—indeed, the original octennial festival was confined to competition in the harp and pæan, and only enlarged after the first Sacred War (595 B.C.), probably in 582, when it became pan-Hellenic.²² Pindar himself, then, cannot be considered as a competitor in the games (unless at Pytho), nor yet for any prizes at local festivals. What he earned was a private matter between him and his patrons. Indirect competition between himself and rival poets there no doubt was, to secure commissions for odes; and the dependence of these on victories actually won must have demanded the personal presence of poets, especially new ones, at the games. For there a short revel-song might be given at the

²⁰ *Nem.* x. 35 and fragment 124, l. 3 (Thrasylbulus).

²¹ *ἐν τ' ἀέθλοισιν θίγον πλείστον ἀγώνων,
καὶ τριπλάσσειν ἐκδόμησαν δόμον*

καὶ λεβήτεσσιν φιδλαῖσι τε χρυσῶν.—*Isth.* i. 18–20

²² The single musical victory celebrated is in *Pyth.* xii.; for the flute, 490

concluding banquet, and the order for a more elaborate composition secured, to be produced if possible in time for the victor's return to his native place, as lately illustrated by Mr. H. F. Hose in the first number of *Greece and Rome*. Pindar must have been at Olympia in 476, where he sees Hiero's horse Pherenikos 'rush by alongside the Alpheus without spur' and Hagesidamus win the boys' boxing match²³; also at Epharmostus' wrestling in 468, and perhaps at Phrikias' victory, whether boy or horse.²⁴ His detail of the respective position of the tombs of the cænist of Cyrene and of later monarchs argues a personal acquaintance with the city in 462²⁵; and similarly in *Ol.* vii. 52 his mention of the statues that line the streets, and his preservation of the legend of the island's birth and locating Athene's there, show him speaking literally when he says he has 'come to land with Diagoras to Rhodes,' in 464; while in *Pyth.* viii. 58–9 he leaves Alcmaeon to take care of his goods when he 'goes to the world's centre of song,' Delphi, in 446.

It is perhaps singular that only one ode shows the least attempt to describe an actual contest; but Pindar had scant room for close detail, and, besides, the thing had been done once for all in the spacious ground of the epic (*Il.* xxiii.) and perhaps overdone in Cyclic imitations. Only of the chariot race won at Delphi in 462 for Arcesilas of Cyrene by Carrhotus, his queen's brother, are we told cursorily that he came through the twelve circuits of the hippodrome (nine miles, says Sir John Sandys²⁶) with car uninjured where forty other competitors were wrecked, and after the race dedicated it at Apollo's temple, where it was possibly seen by Pausanias some six hundred years later.²⁷ The closer description of such a race was left to Sophocles (*Electra*, 680–763), perhaps a score of years after Pindar's death; and the full imitation and variation from Homer's "Ἀθλα to a poet of a far-distant age and another land and language, who substituted a boat race for the chariots, while closely copying some details of Homer's shooting match. But Pindar's language is at least often coloured by his theme. Besides the long-jump, he often talks of the 'darts in his quiver,' fears to 'hurl his javelin outside the lists' (*Pyth.* i. 44–5), and in praise of a wrestling-master would 'lock his words close and strain unconquerably in expression' (*Nem.* iv. 94); while in fragment 111, which must be describing Hercules' contest with the giant Antæus, we have the final hoisting of him into the air and crushing the life out of him there where no contact

²³ *Ol.* i. 18–20; x. 100.

²⁴ *Ol.* ix. 93; *P.* x. 15–16.

²⁵ *Pyth.* v. 93, 96–8.

²⁶ He is speaking, however, of Olympia (Loeb Classics, Intr. p. xxvi.).

²⁷ *Pyth.* v. 26–39, 49–53; Pausanias, x. 13.

with the earth could renew his vigour.²⁸ Refraining from description, he exempts himself from vauntings before or sufferings after the contest; though in *Nem.* iii. 17-18 victory is spoken of as 'a healing remedy for wearisome blows' of the cestus, and we are given an admirable glimpse of the feeling of lads defeated in wrestling, where the victor

has fallen with fell intent on four bodies from above, to whom no like happy return was adjudged in Pythia, nor when they come to their mother does her sweet laughter kindle pleasure in their heart, but they slink along byways, shunning their foes and stung by their ill-luck.²⁹

In regard to the origin of the Olympic games, where Pausanias, writing about 175 A.D., proffers a long list of successive founders derived from 'those of the Eleans who remember the most ancient things,'³⁰ Pindar boldly plumps for Hercules of Thebes asserting it in ode after ode; and we much prefer his account, though equally mythical. The third Olympian relates his bringing the olive 'from the shady springs of Ister' among the Hyperboreans to supply shade for his newly-founded race-course on the Alpheus in the hot August days of the festival: he had noticed the trees in the north during a previous year's quest for the gold-horned doe, ultimately killed in Arcadia.³¹ The tenth Olympian relates his actual foundation of the festival after dealing faithfully with Augeas, King of Elis, who had refused to pay his stipulated reward. Hercules' first force from Tiryns had been ambushed in Elis by Augeas' nephews, Cteatus and Eurytus; but later himself ensnared these near Cleonæ, and then returning to Elis sacked Augeas' city and founded his games. It was he who gave a name to the 'hill of Kronos' on the north, set up six altars of stone to the twelve gods 'near the ancient tomb of Pelops,' marked off a grove sacred to Zeus, fenced round the Altis (or arena, now identified and measured as 750 by 570 feet³²), and

appointed ground around it as a resting-place for the banquet . . . while the lovely light of the fair-faced moon shone upon that evening, and all the precinct was one song of happy merriment in right revel-fashion.³³

The judges or *hellenodikæ* at Olympic contests were, in

²⁸ Cf. also *Isth.* iv. 52-5. I cannot believe that Pindar identified this murderous pest with the roughly humorous Antæus of Irasa, to whom suitors for his daughter repair in *Pyth.* ix. 105-25. Irasa is said to have been in the territory of Cyrene: Lucan's vigorous account of the struggle with Hercules (*Phars.* iv. 589-655) seems to locate it not far from the river Bagradas, near Utica.

²⁹ *Pyth.* viii. 81-7 (446), developed from *Ol.* viii. 68-9 (460).

³⁰ V. vii.

³¹ The poet's fondness for trees is noticeable: e.g., *Ol.* ix. 20: ἀγλαόδενδρον of Locri, *Pæan* iv. 52, the oak of Ceos, prized by contented Euxantius, and *Pyth.* iv. 264-9, its sterling value.

³² Sandys, *Loeb Classics*, p. xxvi.

³³ *Ol.* x. 45-7, 73-7.

Pindar's time, only two (much more numerous later), and both Eleans, the term 'Αἰτωλὸς ἀνὴρ (*Ol.* iii. 12) being merely reminiscent of a traditional invasion of Elis from Ætolia by Oxylyus, who became king. They are distinct from the heralds (κήρυκες),³⁴ whose function was, not the decision, but the loud announcing of such to the assembled crowds. A passage in Pausanias asserts that women who attempt to compete, or even to cross the Alpheus (immediately south of the arena) on days forbidden them,³⁵ are hurled from the Typæum, a precipitous rock in the neighbourhood; but only one case has occurred, that of Kallipateira, a widow, who disguised herself as an athlete in order to witness her son's performance, but was spared in recognition of victories won by her family. Occasionally (vi. 20) a particular priestess has been allowed to look on from a stone pedestal opposite the judges, 'for they do not prevent maidens from seeing the games.' There seems some inconsistency here; but in any case, while competition with men might reasonably be forbidden, it would seem foolish to deny women the spectacle, unless at Athens, where a certain prudery fettered the lives of young women. It seems contradicted by the legendary instances of Atalanta, the Lemnian women—e.g., Hypsipyle in *Ol.* iv. 19-28—the Amazons, and Artemis herself; by the girls' processional Partheneia, of which a pleasing instance by Pindar is preserved³⁶; by the acknowledged Spartan discipline of Lycurgus, under which girls ran, wrestled and boxed together just as the men did, in very light attire and without restriction on male spectators³⁷; and lastly by the poet's assurance of Telesicrates that the women of Cyrene, witnessing his victories there, pray that they may have such an one for their husband or son.³⁸

The addition of horse or chariot races made at Olympia in 680 B.C. was, as Grote remarks,³⁹ important as introducing wealthy competitors who alone could support the great expense those contests involved. It gave the rulers of the Greek world an additional link with their subjects; but it is not surprising that, in celebrating such men, those who actually rode the horse or drove the chariot should be ignored, save Thrasybulus, who drove for his father Xenocrates in 490, Nicomachus, who drove for him in 472, and Carrhotus of Cyrene mentioned above, while Herodotus of Thebes is specially praised as driving for himself.⁴⁰ These

³⁴ *Ol.* xiii. 99-100, *Pyth.* i. 32, *I.* ii. 23.

³⁵ ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐλθεῖν . . . ἢ καὶ βλῶς ἐν ταῖς ἀπειρημέναις σφίσιν ἡμέραις διαβᾶσαι τὸν Ἀλφειὸν, V. 7.

³⁶ *On Aeoladas II.*, fragment 104d.

³⁷ Grote, ii. 301-2.

³⁸ *Pyth.* ix. 97-100.

³⁹ Vol. iii. 282.

⁴⁰ *Isth.* i. 14.

potentates could hardly be pleased to find their jockeys, unless near relatives, admitted to share compliments addressed to themselves; and the ode in which Nicomachus is praised is written some five years after the race, when his master is already dead. Similarly, only three professional trainers in boxing or wrestling are mentioned: of these Orseas, who trains Melissus of Thebes, is probably known to Pindar; the other two, Menander and Melesias, are both Athenians, and their cordial mention by Pindar is a witness to his sense of fairness, for the four boys they have trained are all Æginetans, and the relations of Ægina (a prime favourite of the poet) with Athens are never friendly. Melesias, however, has won victories himself, as man and boy.

But, *pace* Greek opinion, it is not by his athletic aspect that Pindar wins from Gray his title of 'the Theban eagle.' It may be suggested in part by his frequent mention of the bird, with which he seems at times to identify himself, especially in contemptuous allusion to unnamed rivals as chattering jackdaws or crows.⁴¹ His lofty attitude reminds us of Tamora's

The eagle suffers little birds to sing
And is not careful what they mean thereby

(*Titus Andronicus*, iv. 4, 83).

though he somewhat abates this indifference in writing to Hiero about such.⁴² A touch of self-consciousness may even lurk in the fine vignette of the sovereign fowl lulled by the influence of music:

Sleeps on Jove's sceptre the eagle, prince of birds, drooping his swift pinions on either side, while over head and beak is shed a veil of darkness, sweetly closing his eyelids, and the supple back heaves in his slumber, subdued by the lyre's pulsations. (*Pyth.* i. 6-10.)

But neither to Pindar's pride does Gray pay homage, nor can such be fairly predicated of him, but rather a loftiness of mind that disdains all littleness. Nothing is more frequent than his deprecation of *ἔβρις*, whether in a victorious athlete, the idol of the moment, or in a tyrant whose power might seem to exempt him from human restrictions. There is much good advice to Hiero in the first Pythian: let him regard the fit season, remember that his lightest word carries weight, catch at no underhand gains, but be open-handed as Cræsus, and forget not the infamy that rests on cruel Phalaris. Jealousy is the subject of not a few telling remarks, and the sad fate of its victim, noble Ajax, son of Telamon, his favourite instance.

⁴¹ *Isth.* iii. 81-2; *Ol.* ii. 87, where the dual is thought to indicate Simonides and his nephew Bacchylides; also *Nem.* v. 20-1, and perhaps *Nem.* vii. 66, *δύματα δέρομαι λαμπρόν*.

⁴² *Pyth.* ii. 76-85.

Tales are a dainty to those who nurse envy, which ever fastens on the noble and lets the base go unmolested. . . . Malicious perversion is quite an ancient practice; she is a familiar of whispered stories, of guileful device, a shameful ill-doer, that assails what is illustrious and rears up a rotten répute for the obscure. (*Nem.* viii. 21-2, 32-4.)

He quotes with approval a precept of Nereus not to stint the praise of good and patriotic achievement, even though it be your enemy's (*Pyth.* ix. 93-6). *Apropos* of Clytæmnestra, we are warned that sin is not hid: citizens are prone to repeat ill tales, high fortune carries no exemption from envy, and the merest groundling clamours out the secret (*Pyth.* xi. 28-34). On Arcesilas IV. of Cyrene, who has recently had political trouble and whose dynasty comes to an end within a decade or so of *Pyth.* iv. and v. (462), he discreetly presses the restoration of the exiled Daimophilus—'it is easier to shake a city than to set it firm on its feet again' (*Pyth.* iv. 273-4); and Aristagoras, elected president of the Council of Tenedos, is reminded amid his blushing honours that the limbs he is robing are but mortal, and earth the last garment of us all (*Nem.* xi. 15-6). But it would be endless to distil all the lofty morality and practical prudence that are in Pindar. If himself makes high charges for his work, he has fairly won his great répute: he expressly disclaims hoarding, and rather regrets the days when poets wrote for nothing⁴³ (we might have made him quite comfortable to-day):

He who broods on wealth hidden at home, and finds a pleasure in bringing others down, considers not that he is framing his soul to a dishonoured grave.⁴⁴

For his own part he

loves not to keep a mass of money secretly in his house, but to have good use of what there is and be called a benefactor of his friends.⁴⁵

This is the temper that would appeal to Gray, however shut off by shyness and reserve from Pindar's *bonhomie*; while his own *Progress of Poetry* shows him well able to assimilate his rich and vivid diction.

Our estimate of Pindar as pure poet is necessarily hampered by the loss of the greater portion of his work. The considerable body of other fragments surviving might well suggest that the *Epinikia* was hardly the sphere in which he could do himself full justice. But these odes assure us in several passages of his confidence in the inborn faculty above all that study or practice can bestow; and one might almost say that he falls into the snare which at first beset Wordsworth, the belief that a strong poetic

⁴³ *Isth.* ii. 6-11.

⁴⁴ *Isth.* i. 67-8.

⁴⁵ *Nem.* i. 31-2.

faculty enabled him to make any subject poetic, which is very far from being the case—the poet must assert himself in his choice as well as in his treatment. 'The poet,' Pindar says, 'is one who knows much by nature: but mere learning with its profusion of words babbles idly like crows against the divine bird of Zeus' (*Ol.* ii. 86–8). 'It is by an inborn truth of instinct that a man carries weight; but the commonplace fellow, crammed with knowledge, can never be consistent or tread with sure foot, but essays a thousand skills with a purpose that brings naught to full fruition' (*Nem.* iii. 40–2; and *cf.* *Ol.* ix. 100–4). In his performance the average of his diction is vigorous and poetic, and one cannot travel far without coming on a beautiful passage. No one would question the poetry of the following opening:

As when a man, taking in his hand a bowl, the crown of his possessions, now foaming with the dew of the grape, bestows it on his youthful son-in-law, wishing him joy in the home to which he goes from the home he leaves, honouring his new relative in the eyes of the feasting company, and thereby making him the envy of those present because of so concordant a union—even so do I send my stream of nectar, the Muses' gift, to men who bear away the prizes of struggle. (*Ol.* vii. 1–8.)

nor of his contention (at that date) that poetry alone can confer immortality on great deeds, a sentiment he often repeats⁴⁶:

But even as his youngest son by a lawful wife is the darling of a sire already nearing the opposite goal, and warms his very heart with fondness—for wealth that must fall to the shepherding of a hireling stranger is a source of loathing to one face to face with death; so, Hagesidamus, when a man nears the hall of Hades with his fair achievement unsung, he feels his breath of life has been an emptiness and his toil has brought him scant pleasure. (*Ol.* x. 86–93.)

Nor less poetic is the sense of mortal vicissitude that now and again o'ercasts his happy cheer like a cloud saddening over a sunny landscape:

But we must needs submit to what the blessed gods send, and the winds that blow from heaven are very variable; nor is human happiness long-enduring when it comes with overpowering weight. (*Pyth.* iii. 44–6.)

Mortal joy grows up swiftly; swiftly, too, it falls to ground. . . . Creatures of a day! What is any one? . . . man is a dream of shadow. (*Pyth.* viii. 92–5; *cf.*, too, *Pyth.* xii. 28–32.)

But neither doth the dark ploughland yield its fruit in continuity, nor do the trees consent to bear their scented bloom in equal wealth in all the circling years, but in alternation: even so is the tribe of mortals under destiny's leading, and no sure sign from Zeus is at men's service. (*Nem.* xi. 39–44.)

⁴⁶ μελιγάρες ὕμνοι | ὑστέρων ἀρχὰ λόγων (*Ol.* xi. 4–5); ταὶ μεγάλα γὰρ ἀλλὰ | σκότον πολὺν ὕμνων ἔχοντι δέσμεναι κ.τ.λ. (*Nem.* vii. 12–16; also *Nem.* iv. 68).

And yet one cannot but marvel that this poet, who usually thinks in picture, should leave imbedded in his varied and glittering odes so many lines as dull and homely as Theognis; and again that so much space should be occupied by mere recitation of previous successes won by a victor or his highly respectable relatives. But this is just what he is paid for; and we may find the same thing in poets of the Renaissance—in Ariosto, for instance, or in Drayton. Obviously the circumstances compelled him to check rather than indulge his poetic impulse. The impression left is that of one writing under some constraint. He does his duty by the games; he makes all possible effort for his employers, but here cannot wholly escape the air of perfunctoriness. The material to which he turned for relief was the abundance of the national myths; but that material, sometimes introduced with an abruptness that betrays its alien character, was too rich and full for his limits, and we find him breaking off with apologies. Even in the famous fourth Pythian, about three times the length of any of the others, he is obliged at l. 246 to move the closure on the fascinating tale of Jason, and return by 'a short cut' to the business of Cyrene. The ode is further marred by his commencing with a later part of the tale, in Medea's long speech at Thera (ll. 9–56) about their meeting in Africa with Triton, who presents Euphemus with a clod of earth in earnest of the future foundation of Cyrene—this merely to connect the myth with that place, and enable him to introduce Jason later on. Indeed, Euphemus and Triton might be Pindar's own addition to the myth, for Homer is silent of the Argonauts, and Hesiod's eleven lines⁴⁷ speak only of the hero reaching Iolcos and marrying Medea. But since in *Pyth.* v. 81–7 we hear of Trojan Antenor visiting Cyrene with Helen after the sack of Troy—an excursion that must be due to some Cyclic poet—Euphemus, Triton and Medea's prophecy may confess a like source; though, besides the dislocation, the episode is open to the objection that Medea's fellow-travellers are perfectly familiar with the facts already, whence perhaps their rather chilling reception of her effort.⁴⁸

So, too, in *Pyth.* iii., the destruction of Apollo's love, the fair-robed Coronis, by Artemis' arrows is stated at the outset, ll. 8–12, and then her sad story is told more amply. An unfortunate propensity to long for what she has not—a common complaint, says the poet—resulted in her infidelity to the god and consequent destruction by his sister; though Apollo, relenting towards his unborn child, snatched it from her body while burning on the pyre and entrusted it to the rearing of the good centaur, Cheiron,

⁴⁷ *Theog.* 992–1002.

⁴⁸ *Pyth.* iv. 100–101.

whose instruction gave the world the great healer Asclepios; but the impression of an interesting tale is rather marred by the piecemeal fashion of its narration. Perhaps the same might be urged against his very similar but far pleasanter narrative, in *Pyth.* ix. of the same year 474, of another adventure of Apollo with the nymph Cyrene, daughter of Hypseus, king of the Lapithæ. Here, again, we are first briefly informed of his abduction of her from Pelion and her gracious reception at Cyrene in Africa by Aphrodite, who 'lays her hand lightly upon the car' and 'sheds a charming coyness over their sweet union'; but in this case all objection is overborne by the full subsequent narrative of what occurred in Pelion, given with a grace and delicacy that makes it for me the most delightful thing in all Pindar's work. Perhaps the initial statement (ll. 5-8) is all he derived from the myth, and Aphrodite's reception and all the rest his own brilliant development. As with Coronis, he begins with a slight description of the girl's nature. In this case I give it in Sir John Sandys' translation, rather than risk any forfeiture of its charm by my own.

Cyrene cared not for pacing to and fro before the loom, nor for merry banquets with stay-at-home maidens of her own age; but, contending with brazen darts and with the falchion, she would slay the fierce beasts of prey, thus in very deed assuring deep and perfect rest for her father's kine, while she spent on her eyelids but a scanty store of that slumber which is so sweet a bed-fellow when dawn draweth near. Once did Apollo, the far-darting god of the wide quiver, find her without spears, wrestling alone with a monstrous lion; and forthwith he called Cheiron from out his halls and spake to him in this wise:—

'Son of Philyra, leave thy hallowed cave and look with wonder at a woman's spirit and mighty power. See what a contest she is waging with undaunted head,—this maiden with a heart which no toil can subdue, and a mind that no fear can overwhelm. From what mortal was she born? From what race hath she been reft, that she should be dwelling in the hollows of the shadowy mountains? And she is putting to the test a strength that is inexhaustible. Is it right to lay an ennobling hand upon her? ay, and, by consorting with her, to cull the honey-sweet flower of love?'

Then did the inspired Centaur, softly smiling with kindly brow, at once unfold his counsel in reply:—

'Secret, O Phœbus! are the keys of wise Persuasion, that unlock the shrine of love; and, among gods and men alike, do they shun to enter for the first time the sweet bridal-bed in the light of day. For thou, who canst not lawfully breathe a lie, hast been tempted by the pleasant mood to dissemble in thy words. Dost thou ask, O King, of thy maiden's birth? thou who knowest the end supreme of all things, and all thy ways that lead thereto, the number of the leaves that the earth putteth forth in spring, the number of sands that, in the sea and the rivers, are driven before the waves and the rushing winds, and that which is to be, and whence it is to

come,⁴⁰—all this thou clearly seest. But if I must measure myself against one that is wise, I needs must speak. Thou camest to this glade to be her wedded lord, and thou shalt bear her over the sea to the choicest garden of Zeus, where thou shalt make her queen of a city, when thou hast gathered the island-folk around the plain-encircled hill; and soon shall queen Libya amid her broad meadows give in golden palaces a kindly welcome to thy glorious bride. There shall that queen grant her forthwith a portion of the land to be her lawful domain, a portion not without tribute of all manner of fruits, and not unfamiliar with the chase. There shall she bear a son, whom glorious Hermes shall take from his mother's womb and bear away to the enthroned Hours and to Mother-Earth; and they shall place the babe upon their laps, and drop nectar and ambrosia on his lips, and shall ordain that, as a delight to his friends among men, he shall be called immortal Zeus, and pure Apollo, and, as an ever-present guardian of flocks, Agreus and Nomius, while others shall name him Aristæus.'

So saying he prompted the god to accomplish the sweet fulfilment of wedlock. Swift is the achievement, short are the ways of gods, when bent on speed. That very day decided all, and they twain were made one in Libya's golden chamber, where she guardeth a city that is fair indeed, and is famous in athlete-contests.

Some parallel for the mingled beauty, grace and humour of that may perhaps be felt in Sir E. J. Poynter's picture of 1880, *A Visit to Æsculapius*, or Tennyson's *Sleeping Beauty* (*The Day Dream*, 1842).

In strong contrast alike with this picture of mundane happiness, and with Pindar's underlying sense of a sad uncertainty in life, is his quiet confidence of an ultimate rectitude of decision. Of two passages which best express this, in the *Threnoi* (fragments 129-31, 133-7) and *Ol.* ii. 56-76, I attempt the latter, accepting Böckh's and Donaldson's emendation, εἰ for ἐι, in l. 56 to avoid what seems a hopeless anacoluthon, a protasis without apodosis.

A man possessing this [*i.e.* wealth *with virtue*, l. 53] is well assured of the future—how that the spirits of those who perish here are forthwith helpless and pay penalty; and one beneath the earth, passing sentence by stern decree, executes judgment on sins committed in this realm of Zeus! But the good, enjoying eternal sunshine by night and day alike, receive a life exempt from toil, neither do they weary the ground by strength of arm, nor yet the water of the deep, in search of vain subsistence; bat

⁴⁰ May not Lucan have this passage in mind when he describes in *Phars.* v. 176-82 the burden of dread knowledge which Phemonæ, the Delphic priestess, may not utter? :

'Accipit et frenos: nec tantum prodere vati
Quantum scire licet. Venit ætas omnis in unam
Congeriem: miserumque premunt tot sæcula pectus.
Tanta patet rerum series atque omne futurum
Nititur in lucem: vocemque petentia fata
Luctantur: non prima dies non ultima mundi,
Non modus oceani, numerus non decrat harenæ.'

among those whom the gods honour, men who took joy in keeping what they had sworn, they pass a life that knows no tears, while the others endure toil dreadful to look upon. But such as have braved the three trials in either sphere,⁸⁸ persisting in keeping their souls utterly from wrong-doing, accomplish Zeus' pathway to the tower of Kronos. There the ocean-breezes breathe about the islands of the blest, and golden blooms are shining, some on the land from glorious trees, and others, fed by the water; and with chains of these they wreath their hands and heads—such is the righteous counsel of Rhadamanthus, whom the mighty Father keeps by him on his seat to prompt him.

And such are the soothing images man still employs to comfort him in a struggle without which, as Pindar well knew, no prize is to be won; exhausting his fancy to express a hope which the visible glory of Earth herself whispers may be as far beyond his power to paint as that glory has ever been beyond him to create. To some the picture may seem insipid; but to-day, when Typhoeus has burst his bonds, and unmitigated *ἔσθρις* reigns and roars in 'advanced' seats of civilisation, the strictly human prospect does not seem to promise anything so cheering. Doubtless for ages yet the world will furnish destructive engines, red flags and barricades enow for Typhoeus and his like to glory in or die upon, though not for some centuries can brutality be made compulsory. Meantime, we would suggest, these are the kind of passages that won Pindar his title of the eagle, and strengthened the gentle hearts of Virgil, of him who saw *The Vision of Mirzah*, and of Gray. If Pindar's special subject shut him off from some things that are the glory of other poets—if he has not Sappho's vivid realisation of love passion; if he never quite reaches the grandeur of Simonides' epitaph on 'those who die in Thermopylæ,' or the exquisite tenderness of Danae, tossed in her frail chest on a wild sea and brooding over her baby's sleep 'in an hour so rude'—yet he filled Greek ears with the most varied music, he fostered in Greek hearts the spirit of *ἐπιείκεια*, of courtesy and gentleness; and he has much besides to assure us of a man who, fronting life with steady courage and self-restraint, could thankfully accept its joys and consolations, and still look beyond it to a better.

It was my hope to have added some few words on the metrical structure and divisions of Pindar's odes, and the degree in which the latter have been followed by the line of English poets, from the correct Ben Jonson to the complete triumph of the irregular Pindaric in Wordsworth's glorious Ode; but not only is myself diffident on the matter of Pindar's rhythms, but classical scholars may be diffident of the interest of the latter subject:

'But ah, of our poor Thames they never heard!'

R. WARWICK BOND.

⁸⁸ (1) On earth; (2) in Elysium.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCVI—FEBRUARY 1935

IMPERIAL DEFENCE

IN order to understand the problem of Imperial defence as it to-day faces us, it is necessary to keep clearly in mind the past history of the Empire, its system of growth and the principles which have guided its development. First, it must be realised that it was never planned; no great urge of conquest, of religious fanaticism, of economic necessity or of strategical security, persuaded or compelled Englishmen to spread over the seas. It was something more unusual than these normal urges of expansion which induced our ancestors to leave these shores. It was, in my opinion, the dissolution of Papal power and the volcanic spirit of the Reformation—that violent creative force which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries changed not only the politics and economics of European nations but also their psychology.

Whilst on the Continent the new spirit of freedom exhausted itself in the Wars of Religion and in the Thirty Years' War, no such outlet was found for the inhabitants of these islands. Here the clash was between the old feudal order and the new economic

order, between the holders of land on a military tenure and the exploiters of land for personal profit. Put otherwise, between an almost mystical system and a pronouncedly practical system; between a system which was falling to sleep and one which was rapidly awakening. Like all great changes in human history, this change had no definite starting point—for centuries the economic impulse had been dreaming; nor can it easily be pinned to facts, for it was a living urge. It created a conscious and unconscious discontent, a revulsion against changes actual and impending, and whilst on the continent of Europe this discontent largely exhausted itself in war, in this country it turned to adventure—individual buccaneering, discovering, wonder-chasing—until at length it became collective, hence Colonies and trade.

To search for a system or plan of expansion, or even to look for a concrete idea behind it, is, in my opinion, futile; for our Empire just grew up—it had no recognisable destiny, because it had no goal. Yet as it grew and expanded certain principles took form. These were as follows:

- (1) The establishment of domestic peace on a democratic footing.
- (2) The maintenance of the balance of power between foreign nations.
- (3) The establishment of secure frontiers.
- (4) The maintenance of command of the sea.
- (5) The self-government of self-controllable Colonies.

I have not the space here to enter into a historical examination of these principles. The first nurtured the spirit of the Reformation—that man should be free to judge divine causes and ends; and it was safeguarded by distance—the distance the Colonies were from centralised control. The second was in essence a politic and pacific principle, for its object was to restrict war. The third was strategic in nature and, therefore, warlike outside of Europe. The fourth was economic and complementary to the third, and the fifth was moral, constituting the final expression of the first. In brief, force was looked upon as an instrument and not as an end—not as a thing desirable in itself, but as necessary to the creation and maintenance of freedom. Hence our proverbial anti-military outlook.

Though, throughout our Imperial history, we have avoided wars with European Powers, we have seldom been able to steer clear of them when they have embraced more than a local quarrel. Great wars have, therefore, played an important part in our Imperial development, and, above all, in our Imperial psychology. So it happens that when we turn to present conditions and future prospects the whole problem is blurred when we overlook the

fact that, before the outbreak of the World War, it was fear of German dominion which compressed sentiment within the Empire into tangible form, and that directly this fear was removed by the Armistice of 1918, sentiment, though it did not actually volatilise, expanded and grew thin. In this history was repeating itself; for a guarantee of security is always the strongest bond of friendship. Before 1763 fear of France was the cement which held the first British Empire together. Within twelve years of its removal the American Colonies sought their independence. In 1879 the destruction of Zulu military power had an identical effect on the Transvaal. In order to gain their independence the Boers rose in arms in 1881, and the result was Majuba Hill. Though in 1914 it was clearly seen by the Dominions that were Great Britain defeated the Empire would fly to pieces like shattered glass, it was not realised that once the German terror was removed the Empire must become unstuck like glued pieces of wood before a fire. The glue was sentiment, the chilly atmosphere which caused it to adhere was fear, and the heat was freedom from its icy blast.

The destruction of fear was the main psychological result of the war. Its sudden elimination, anyhow for the time being, led to a loss of discipline among the masses, and a rise in the sense of dignity among the Imperial nations. Canada was faced by the United States; she had done much in the war, quite as much as her great neighbour, and her self-esteem was wounded by the thought that politically she was not an equal. Ireland, who had done little to win the war, was afflicted with the same sense of dignity when she contemplated Great Britain. Not only at Versailles were the Dominions treated as independent nations, but also, on this understanding, were they admitted to membership of the League of Nations.

What was the real stake in the war? It was national freedom, and Austria's attack on Serbia and Germany's attack on Belgium were, to the spirit of nationalism, acts of rape, as heinous in the eyes of the modern world as once was the Saracen occupation of the Holy Sepulchre. And after the war, what was the stake? Again it was freedom, and, in the British Empire, freedom run mad. Is this an over-statement? I do not think so. In 1917, at the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, the problem of after-war inter-Imperial relationships was discussed, and General Smuts said: 'It all comes down to the mere question of finding some machinery which in a permanent and responsible form will continue what is now being done by the War Cabinet.' Then came victory, peace, and the dignity complex. In 1926 Mr. Mackenzie King proclaimed the Empire to be 'a strange, mystical sort of thing,' and that same year Mr. Balfour, a semi-

mystic, defined the mutual relation and position of Great Britain and the Dominions as follows :

They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

What this actually means passes all comprehension, for it reads like the Athanasian Creed ; but what it actually led to was the unobserved dissolution of the Empire which took place on December 11, 1931, when the Statute of Westminster became law. In this statute the Crown, as 'the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations,' is placed in the preamble and so excluded from the operative clauses.

Thus by a stroke of the pen has the Empire been conjured into an immense engine without a flywheel. Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are now optional ; consequently the Empire has no legal centre. Loyalty to the Crown is no longer an obligation. Dominions are now allowed to have ambassadors of their own and to make treaties with foreign countries. All these things may be right and inevitable ; yet the fact remains that there exists no machinery of co-ordination except the Imperial Conference. Cynically enough, the sole inter-Imperial organ of co-operation existing is the Imperial War Graves Commission. Well may Robert Stokes in his book *New Imperial Ideals* say : 'In fact a single British Budget might conceivably dislocate almost the entire economic life of a Dominion.' Is this freedom a reality ? No, it is a myth, because the security of the whole falls almost entirely upon Great Britain. Sentiment, however deep, is a fickle jade ; interests change and vanish, but fear remains, and the British Navy, a concrete and not a mystical thing, still remains the one real 'institution' of Empire. Added to this, the British Air Force and Army are potent weapons of defence, for, though small, they possess great powers of expansion.

From the above brief review we see that the dignity complex has led, not to freedom, but to potential if not actual anarchy. 'Individuals may form communities, but it is institutions alone that can create a nation,' once said Disraeli, and yet the British Empire has none ; consequently, I think that Mr. Stokes is right when in his above-mentioned book he writes : 'In short, the Empire must co-operate or collapse, but it can only co-operate through institutions.' Had it possessed such institutions, then the problem of India's future would have been vastly simplified ; for not only would it have become an Imperial problem, but

it would have been dealt with by permanently established machinery, and not by 'Heath Robinson' efforts of ephemeral Governments.

As I have attempted to show, our Empire was founded on individual initiative, and to-day it stands fragmented by national initiative—that is, each Dominion is a separate nation and yet a nation which in each case is unable to resist aggression. Though the Dominions are politically free to do what they like, no single Dominion is strategically a free power. In fact, the Empire (if I may change my metaphor) has developed into a wheel without a hub. It is all spokes and tyre, kept together not so much by good-will of and towards the Mother Country as by the fear which British actual and potential fighting power still engenders in foreign nations. Since 1919 this power has steadily declined, and to-day it is out of all proportion weaker than it was in 1913. Then these islands were immune from air attack and our Navy was indisputably mistress of the seas. Twenty-one years ago it was strictly correct to say that our frontiers were the coast lines of other nations ; now it is futile to suggest, as it has been suggested, that our frontier is the Rhine, because our true frontier is London itself. Paralyse London, and the Empire, even as 'a mystical sort of thing,' is paralysed as well.

This being so, the question arises : Should we create a strategical hub which can keep the spokes together ? And the answer to this question resolves itself into a further question : Is the Empire worth consolidating as a strategical unit ? What do we mean by such a unit ? We mean a group of self-governing nations which is willing to pool its fighting forces for the security of the whole. This does not mean imperialism in the form of Cæsarism—the suppression of the weak by the strong—but unity through co-operation and mutual security in place of unity through compulsion and centralised force. To carry this principle still further, it should be obvious, though it is far from being so, that the larger the national groups or federations are, the less prevalent will wars become. Self-interest may be a cause of war, but mutual support to attain an object of common interest is surely a deterrent. It is towards this common interest that I believe the world is moving to-day ; yet were the Empire to disintegrate, I also believe that this process of world integration would receive a cataclysmic set-back.

To accentuate the importance of this problem I will put it slightly differently. The causes of war are in proportion to the number of nations into which the peoples of the world are divided, Peace has but one supreme object : the creation of a prosperous, contented and co-operative world order—that is, an order free

from revolutions and wars. The fewer the nations, the simpler becomes co-operation, and the more numerous the more complex ; consequently, as the British Empire embraces nearly a quarter of the globe and includes nearly a quarter of its inhabitants, it is of world interest that this group of nations should be preserved as an entity. To-day this interest is challenged, for, since 1919, British imperialism has been opposed by internationalism, which is not a spiritual but an economic growth, for its origins must be sought in the class struggle. Though in theory internationalism is supposed to stand for world integration, in practice it stands for class disintegration, which nationally finds its expression in self-determination—that is, a fragmentation of empires into racial groups.

Were internationalism, springing as it does from economic origins, to concentrate its attention solely upon economic problems, there can be little doubt that it would by degrees eradicate many of the economic causes of war. Instead it has interfered politically, and through its principle of national self-determination it has led direct to autarchy—that is, to every nation seeking to become self-contained in place of seeking to co-operate with its neighbours. In place of establishing a freer trade which would reduce the likelihood of war, it has so restricted trade, and thereby has caused such international friction, that to-day the word ' war ' is on every lip.

It is because of these differences that the conception of the British Empire does not fit that upon which the League of Nations is based. Whilst the aim of the one is the establishment of a group of free and independent nations bound together by co-operation and mutual assistance in times of stress, in accordance with Articles VIII. and XVI. of the Covenant, the aim of the other is to compel the nations composing it to maintain peace between themselves by the threat or application of centralised force. Though, thus far, it has been found impossible to apply sanctions—military or economic—this should not blind us to the fact that whilst the object of British imperialism is to foster peace between the members of the Empire, that of League control is to restrict war between the nations of the world. Whilst in the one free co-operation is the leading idea, in the other it is compulsion, which logically leads to the establishment of a super-national police force as demanded by Lord Davies and the New Commonwealth Movement—that is, a return to Roman Cæsarism.

It is strange that though in this country there is an increasing interest in the establishment of such a force, the idea underlying it is one which throughout our history we have opposed with all our might and all our wealth. In the sixteenth century we fought the would-be hegemony of Spain ; in the seventeenth

that of Austria ; in the eighteenth that of royal France ; in the nineteenth that of imperial France, and in the present century that of Germany. Against every form of Cæsarism we have declared war or have heavily subsidised its enemies. Writing of the last attempt, that of William II., Professor Nicolai says in his book *The Biology of War* :

If the German people possess the physical and psychical qualifications for ruling the world, it will succeed in doing so without war ; and if it does not possess such qualifications, the winning of any number of wars will not alter that fact.

This I believe to be the instinctive British feeling as regards super-national sanctions : If the League of Nations possesses the physical and psychical qualifications for maintaining the peace of the world, it will succeed in doing so without a super-national police force ; and if it does not possess such qualifications, however powerful this international police force may be it will not alter that fact. From this comparison it will be seen that New Commonwealth Cæsarism strikes at the very root of British imperialism. Whilst its aim is to maintain peace between politically independent racial groups by means of a super-national police force and tribunal, the aim of the British Empire is to establish self-governing economic areas (Dominions) free from all military compulsion, and thus far protected strategically by the fighting forces of Great Britain.

Since the conclusion of the war the strength of these forces has markedly declined, because Government after Government has become so intoxicated on the half-fermented wine of the League as to forget the principles which have in the past governed and safeguarded our Empire. Directly, our strategical power, has been reduced by unilateral disarmament ; and indirectly, by the increase in armaments among foreign nations. To-day our Navy is reduced to a one-Power standard, our Army is considerably smaller than it was in 1914, and our Air Force is fifth or sixth in size among the air forces of the world. Our Imperial strategical position is now so fraught with danger—danger in the east from Japan and in the west from a rearmed Europe—that a climax is approaching in which our Government will be compelled to review our Imperial strategical position. In fact, the problem which confronts it is one of either abandoning the Empire for the League, or the League for the Empire. This is the Caudine fork which now faces us.

Since 1919—that is, since the end of the war, or rather since its pseudo-ending, for the spirit of the war was carried into the peace treaties—this problem has been contorted by the war atmosphere, the temperature of which rises or falls in ratio to

French terror of Germany. Because we do not realise this pseudonymity, this unreality of the nature of the age in which we live, we firmly believe and proclaim that it is a warlike one, when in actual fact it is revolutionary. It is because the League cannot or will not see that *the* problem to-day is not one of international strife, but of national political reconstruction, that it wastes its time in attempting to prevent hypothetical wars in place of leading the Western world towards a new theory of peacefulness. When the nations talk of peace they are obsessed by the idea of what peace has been in place of being enthused by the idea of what peace should be in the circumstances which are now developing.

Turning to ourselves, we recognised the reality of events clearly enough after the Congress of Vienna. In 1815 we saw that a war period had ended and events soon compelled us to realise that a revolutionary period had taken its place. What did we do? Between 1815 and 1875, politically, we withdrew ourselves from Continental affairs; allowed the nations to recast their systems of government and meanwhile concentrated upon economic expansion. To-day I maintain that, as far as possible, we should do the same, and, in place of mixing ourselves up in the tangled net of international politics, we should economically develop our Empire and only support the League when it is concerned with economic problems. This means that we should withdraw from all discussions on disarmament, for weapons are political instruments, and, instead, that we should rearm and reorganise our fighting forces and with one object in view—Imperial security. In brief, we should turn from international politics to Imperial strategy.

What is our strategic problem? To begin with, it is home defence, which to-day largely means the security of London against air attack, and largely also the security of our trade routes so that we are not starved into surrender. To secure these maritime highways, it is vital to us that the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are kept open to our ships. This in turn means that we must maintain friendship with the United States and Italy. Why Italy and not France? Because France, as an eventual adversary, is sterilised by her fear of Germany, and as a friend can be won only by British hostility to that country. This, in any case, has nothing to do with securing our overseas communications. Further still, by keeping ourselves free from both France and Germany, and by entering into an *entente* with Italy, we can from the North Sea and the Mediterranean flank the Franco-Prussian problem; in fact, we can erect a strategic fence between these two antagonistic neighbours. Simultaneously, if we maintain friendly relationships with the United States, not

only are we in a strong position to localise a Franco-Prussian war, but, in the event of this proving impossible, we shall be able to keep open our sea communications should we and Italy be dragged in. To be friendly with the United States means that our attitude towards Japan must be on the frigid side, because Japan is America's *bête noir*, and because strategically the Atlantic is more important to us than the Pacific. This does not mean that we should abandon the Pacific, but that we should, together with the United States, control it strategically, which certainly would not be unpopular in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even in South Africa, for all of these Dominions come within the radius of possible Japanese aggression.

Thus we see that, by examining the problem logically, we and Italy can control France and Germany, and through this control can indirectly influence Japan. Again, we and the United States can control Japan, and through this control indirectly influence France and Germany. Such, I believe, should be the axis of our strategy. Russia is not included, because at present she does not directly threaten us. One day she may do so, and if she does, the threat will more likely be directed against Europe as a whole than against ourselves in particular. If, then, we can through our strategy stave off a European war for another generation, Russian aggression, should it arise, is not one to be feared by Europe.

Turning from strategy to tactics, it is obvious that in a brief study it is not possible to enter deeply into this question. Also it should be realised that, though highly organised armies and fleets are just as necessary to-day, as in the past, to maintain Imperial security and to render operative Imperial strategy, no Dominion is either populous or wealthy enough to share to any great extent its burden of cost with the Mother Country. As heretofore, we must meet these obligations; but with air-power it is otherwise, and it is this problem which I will now examine. The advent of the third arm has revolutionised the technique of war, because it has superimposed another dimension upon fighting: this is the greatest military revolution since primeval man invented the bow. Not only does this third arm enable armies and fleets to be avoided—that is, it deprives them of their shielding power, and, consequently, opens the civil will to direct physical attack—but by speeding up military time it indirectly reduces geographical space. It is a uniting force, and its instruments, aircraft, can rapidly be manufactured.

In 1914 these islands were to all intents and purposes unassailable; therefore they constituted not only the hub but the arsenal of the Empire. Then naval power was responsible for this immunity; it kept communications open, and it enabled the

circumference to feed the hub. Since 1918 all this has been changed. The hub is now open to direct air attack, and, as I have pointed out, no army or fleet can even mitigate this attack. In truth and in reality our whole conception of military power has been changed; for to-day it no longer rests upon man-power, but upon machine-power; nor does it rest so intimately upon wealth as upon co-ordination. To-day we stand where we stood just a hundred years ago. Then steam-power challenged the existence of an Empire founded upon sail-power; now air-power is challenging an Empire founded upon the steamship. Yet the nucleus of our tactical problem is the same: now, as then, the crucial fact is the protection of the hub from attack. Granted that this protection is provided for, it is obvious that this force cannot simultaneously protect the circumference; consequently the second part of the problem depends, first upon whether India and the Dominions can provide their own local air protection, and secondly upon whether, in the event of war, all the air forces of the Empire can combine against the common enemy.

First it should be realised that aircraft are the cheapest instruments of war, and that whilst in the past the Dominions could not afford to raise great armies and build great fleets, they can to-day afford small yet highly efficient air forces. Further still, these units, not being tied to land and sea communications, could even now be concentrated within a few days in an area thousands of miles distant from their starting-points. Obviously, if civil aircraft were not a practical proposition, military aviation would be no more than a luxury which the Dominions could ill afford. But this is not the case, and, because of the vastness of their size, civil aviation is becoming more and more a necessity to them. Here, because of their great spaces, the Dominions have a decided advantage over the Mother Country; for whilst, on account of her smallness, she must remain a terminus, they, on account of their extent, are the natural breeding-grounds of aviation. In fact, the foundations of future military power will not, as heretofore, be concentrated in the hub only, they will also be distributed throughout the circumference of the Empire. This means a change in the whole picture of Imperial defence; for no longer will the Dominions mainly depend for their security upon Great Britain, but Great Britain will in large part depend for her security upon the Dominions. Then, and then only, will they become true partners in the Empire, taking their full place in it strategically as well as politically.

I do not see how these facts can be controverted. If Great Britain is attacked, granted that a well-organised system of defended landing-grounds, on the lines of our coaling-stations, has been established, the Dominions can fly to her assistance. And

granted that a Dominion is attacked, Great Britain can do likewise. What Power, in the event of another great war, is going to attempt to bomb London out of existence, if, when this dire act is accomplished, the whole aerial might of the Empire will be turned against it in an overwhelming reprisal?

The development of air-power, which has now brought Melbourne to within three days of London, demands a recasting of our present conceptions of strategy. Hitherto time has been on our side, because under the protection of our Fleet an enemy could be so long delayed that we could make good our military deficiencies. In brief, we could afford in peace-time to be unmilitary because we were super-naval. Just as through the industrialisation of other nations we have ceased to be the workshop of the world, so through the development of air-power have the coast lines of foreign countries ceased to be our frontiers. As industrialisation has led to the consolidation of manufacture and commerce, and is now knocking at the door of the democratic Governments and is demanding that they also must scientifically be reformed, so is air-power—a highly scientific invention—pointing in the same direction: it is whispering to strategy, 'Co-ordinate and consolidate fighting power.' To accomplish this work of binding together mentally, as air-power is binding together physically, we must begin at home. Here is the simpler problem, for here everything is under our political control, and, though personalities will obstruct, nationalities do not enter into the question.

In examining this problem, the first thing which should strike us is that our existing machinery of strategical control is utterly out of date. It was created for a sailing-ship-foot-marching instrument. Steam-power forced certain modifications on it, and now motor-power on land and in the air has rendered it totally inoperative. To-day we have three Ministries controlling the three Services. Though administratively the differences between them are not marked, and though tactically their differences must always vary, strategically they should represent one fighting force. As to this there can be no shadow of doubt. But as the essence of strategy is movement, and as between them movement varies roughly in the ratio of 500 : 30 : 4000 miles to every twenty-four hours of war work, unless strategy is co-ordinated there will be three strategical plans in place of one, which means that in peace-time there can be no scientific preparation for war, and in war-time that there will be chaos. In order to remedy this defect, it is obvious that the three tactical and administrative Ministries must be brought under the control of a single strategical Ministry—a Ministry of Defence. This Ministry will not be concerned with tactics and administration, but solely with planning and

allotting the financial means for carrying out its plans. To-day the Committee of Imperial Defence attempts in part to do this; yet how can it, for its defence advisers are the three chiefs of the fighting Services?

When we carry this problem of strategical co-ordination a stage forward we pass into the Imperial sphere. Given a Ministry of Defence in Great Britain (and such Ministries are already established in all the Dominions), the next step is to superimpose on them an Imperial General Staff—that is, a strategical council which will view the Empire as a whole and its defence as one problem. Between autonomous nations such a council cannot be other than advisory, as the Committee of Imperial Defence is; but it will be a true Imperial gathering, which the Committee of Imperial Defence is not. Granted such a council, by degrees the free nations of the Empire will be able to secure themselves against external war. And as by the constitution of the Empire they are already secured against internal war—that is, war between themselves—they will become a great powerhouse of peace. Should, later on, the United States be willing strategically to be affiliated to this union, then I go so far as to say that so powerful an instrument will be created that it will virtually be in a position to prohibit war.

To-day the idea underlying the League of Nations is sound enough, but the methods and instruments proposed to render the idea operative are impossible. Obsessed by the Franco-Prussian quarrel, the members of the League have begun at the wrong end of the peace problem. They have incubated their idea in an international vacuum in place of fertilising it in the greatest aggregation of free and friendly nations which the world has ever seen—the British Empire. Here is the true starting-point of peace; and should it eventually develop into an Anglo-Saxon union embracing all English-speaking nations, then I have no doubt whatsoever that nation after nation will become affiliated to it, until it covers the entire world. The secret in this grand transmutation is this: The road to world peace is through freedom, and not through compulsion, and the freedom upon which we have built our Empire, and of which it is the living model, must be extended to all the nations on this earth.

J. F. C. FULLER.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

THE recent Trade Pact between Great Britain and the Irish Free State has once more concentrated public attention upon the relations of these two countries, so that the present seems not an inopportune moment for a thorough examination of the Anglo-Irish problem. A better understanding of the causes of the trouble must inevitably tend towards the re-establishment of a friendlier atmosphere. The *impasse* which has existed now for two years in the relations between Southern Ireland and Great Britain is a matter of very general regret, and it requires no profound political insight to realise that nothing is to be gained by a policy of further drift, but that, on the contrary, it is more than ever necessary to make a supreme effort to find that final and satisfactory solution of the Irish difficulty which has so long eluded the wit of statesmen on both sides of the Irish Sea. In the circumstances, it is no doubt more appropriate to look forward than to look back; yet constructive thought is impossible without some inquiry into the reasons for the regrettable turn which Irish events have taken since the advent of the present Fianna Fail Government to power.

However hopeful the sponsors of the 1921 Agreement were, it must have been obvious to all who were acquainted in any measure with Irish affairs that the settlement would be exceedingly difficult to work. In the first place, the Treaty did not solve the national problem of Ireland, for it left the country divided into two sections with very little inducement to unite. Partition was a solution which had always been rejected by Nationalist Ireland, and rightly so, since it is in the highest degree illogical, and every reasonable man in Ireland knew that it could not, and it would not, come to good. Unfortunately, these fears have been only too well justified, and to-day this sundering of a country destined by every dictate of Nature to be one is at the root of most of the troubles in Ireland, both north and south of the Boyne, and is the prime cause of the present strained relations between the Free State and England. The truth is that the reactions of the partition were never seriously considered by those who made it, for the political history of recent times

goes to show that the agreement embodying this so-called solution was, in the words of Lord Midleton, 'hastily made on the principle that any terms were better than no terms.' Thus once again the welfare of a people was sacrificed to political expediency—a nation was dismembered to get a disagreeable domestic problem out of the way! The result is that, much as Englishmen might have liked it, the Irish question has not been removed from English political life. Nor, since it is the teachings of history that the social idea must wait upon the national, has Ireland been able, as her friends had hoped she would be, to turn aside from politics and devote her energies untrammelled to the development of her cultural and economic life.

Again, by the Treaty of 1921, the most democratic Constitution in the world was presented to a people utterly untried in the responsibilities of government, and they were asked to make a success of it. The Irish people had constantly clamoured—since 1800, at any rate—for legislative independence, and in 1921 they got it. But the task of legislation is a very different thing to the task of government; a body which is perfectly equal to the one is not necessarily capable of the other. For responsible government not merely requires the most up-to-date parliamentary machinery—and from this point of view the Free State Constitution left nothing to be desired—it also presupposes that a certain stage in political education among the people at large shall have been reached and that social conditions of law and order shall prevail. In both these respects, however, the Free State was lacking. For practically 700 years the Irish people had been allowed no part in the government of their country, and not until comparatively modern times had they any share even in the administration of its affairs. Thus, speaking in 1922, the late Mr. Kevin O'Higgins might truly describe Ireland as a land just then 'passing out of a condition of bondage' and—still more significant from the point of view of the experiment of self-government—as 'a country in which the traditional attitude of the people is to be against the law and the Government.' It is clear, therefore, that in political education and experience the Irish were distinctly backward, and to put universal suffrage into the hands of a people like that was simply to look for trouble. Nor were the social conditions requisite for the successful functioning of democratic political institutions present in Ireland, for when Mr. Cosgrave took office the country was a prey to civil war, the worst war of all, and, though a very efficient and courageous *régime* succeeded for a time in restoring order, the revolutionary forces were simply driven underground, and to-day, open and unabashed, they once more stalk the land.

Finally, the Irish set out upon the task of self-government just

at a time when all over the world democracy on political lines was being steadily discredited. From 1848 until 1920 the parliamentary system was universally regarded as synonymous with good government—it was the goal towards which progressive nations strove. But within the last decade conditions have altered radically, and the system which ministered to the social and political needs of a former age finds itself unable to operate effectively in a post-war world, faced, as it is, with problems, economic and social, unprecedented in history. It was a particularly unfortunate moment to embark upon the responsibilities of self-government.

Indeed, in all the circumstances, the wonder is perhaps that the Free State achieved what it did. For the bitterest opponents of Home Rule will have to acknowledge that during the first ten years of its existence the new State won golden opinions. Coming to power at the close of the most tragic chapter in the history of Ireland, Mr. Cosgrave gave his country peace and prosperity at home and considerably enhanced its prestige abroad. And yet even he cannot be held blameless for the present unhappy situation, for he erected the structure of the new Dominion on too narrow a basis, and particularly he failed to appreciate the fact that loyalty to the Free State is not incompatible with loyalty to the Commonwealth. He thus made the mistake of constantly stressing the one at the expense of the other, and though due allowance must be made for the difficulties of a Republican suddenly turned constitutional Home Ruler, he neglected a great opportunity and sent the Free State down the unproductive path of narrow nationalism—a nationalism which is now displaying its worst and most devitalising features under Mr. De Valera.

The overthrow of the Cosgrave *régime* was, on the whole, a disaster for Ireland; for if the members of that Government did not rejoice in the British connexion, they were at least prepared to honour their bond. Mr. De Valera, on the other hand, frankly proclaims that an all-Ireland republic is his aim, and he is ready, apparently, to tear up the Treaty to realise that ideal. It is difficult to follow him in his reasoning about the problem of Irish unity. His remarks, in fact, are so naïve as to be utterly unconvincing. Speaking not so many months ago, for instance, on the Constitution (Amendment No. 24) Bill, he declared that the North was no more opposed to his policy than it was to that of the Opposition, since both alike are unacceptable to Ulster, and therefore it did not matter much to what excesses of separatism he had recourse! Northern Ireland, he maintained—and this is now an accepted truism—would never be persuaded to join forces with the Free State until conditions in the South become so good as to make union profitable and advantageous. Yet his method of achieving that desirable state of affairs is to

repudiate a Treaty sanctioned by a majority of his fellow-countrymen in their own freely elected Assembly, to declare a trade war against England which has proved ruinous to the farmers of the Free State, and to embark upon a fiscal policy the chief features of which are a cruel burden of taxation, a mounting toll of unemployment, a disastrous shrinkage of exports, and a complete feeling of insecurity in the business life of the country, proved, beyond a shadow of doubt, by the failure of the recent loan! Indeed, passing in review the work of the present Government since it came into office, we can only come to the conclusion that, notwithstanding lofty speeches about 'recasting the whole basis of economic life from the social and human viewpoint,' Mr. De Valera has no constructive programme, and that, having played for a stake and lost it—he expected England would give in in the economic war—he is now reduced to expedients to meet crisis after crisis as it arises. Courage no doubt Mr. De Valera has (does it not, for example, require consummate courage to abolish the Second Chamber in face of the experience of the world?); but courage without technical efficiency will not carry a *régime* very far, and this is exactly what the Fianna Fail Government does not possess. Lack of tangible achievement in the present, however, continues to be covered up with specious promises for the future, and the adherents of the Government, some of them, like the small farmers, enduring well-nigh insupportable burdens, are invited to go on hoping for yet a little while for the fulfilment that is to come. Thus it is clear that Mr. De Valera's policy, such as it is, is one which appeals more to faith than to reason; and perhaps in that very fact lies the explanation of the tolerance with which it is received in Ireland, for the Irishman has always accepted his teachings ready-made for him, and it has never been one of his characteristics to question and criticise, so much so, indeed, that the absence of a healthy public opinion has ever been the bane of Irish life. It seems likely, therefore, that Mr. De Valera can retain the reins of power for some time yet.

But there must be a limit even to Mr. De Valera's hold on the constituencies. Indeed, it seems difficult to believe that his Government will be returned at the next general election if the country gets another few years of the present *régime*. Of course, it is at all times open to Mr. De Valera to make peace with England. As a matter of fact, rumour has it that the pressure of events in the Free State is at length compelling the Executive Council to entertain seriously the necessity for some such move and that Mr. De Valera himself is on the side of the peace party. It is not surprising, in the circumstances, that optimists see in the recent Trade Agreement between the Free State and Great Britain the beginning of a *rapprochement*. But the difficulties

in the way of a move towards peace for a man who has won two elections on a cry of war to the death with England must remain almost insuperable. If peace is to be had by the present Government, it can surely be only with a change of leadership; and who that knows Mr. De Valera can contemplate him effacing himself to make way for another leader? Yet Nemesis will not be denied, and, unless the Fianna Fail Party can make peace, sooner or later a deluded country will round on them and carry to office a party—possibly composed of some of Mr. De Valera's own Right Wing together with the Constitutionalists—that will be prepared to rescue Southern Ireland from a situation which, if left to drift much longer, can only mean irretrievable ruin. It is against such an eventuality, then, that the Opposition even now ought to be preparing a concrete programme. What is the task before them? It is of a two-fold character. In the first place, they must immediately bring the economic war to a close—that is, they will have to deal with the question of the Land Annuities and other payments, the withholding of which has led to all the economic trouble between the Free State and England; and, secondly, they must give their earnest attention to the larger question—that of finding a solution of the problem of Partition, for not until this anomaly is removed can Ireland hope to be really peaceful and prosperous.

The Agreements upon which the financial relations of Great Britain with the Free State are based, in pursuance of Article V. of the Treaty, were made in 1923, 1925, and 1926 respectively between Mr. Cosgrave's Government and the British authorities. Two of these, the 1923 and 1926 Agreements, involved payments by the Free State to Great Britain, and both of them Mr. De Valera, on taking over office, refused to accept, on the ground that they had not been specifically ratified by the Dail, although it had not been expressly stated that they were subject to such ratification. He also rejected the claim of the British authorities that the Land Purchase Annuities were debts due by the tenants to the Land Purchase Fund held by the British National Debt Commissioners, and contended that the liability of the Irish tenant purchaser was, on the contrary, a liability to the State and was completely discharged when the tenant paid his annuity to the Irish Land Commission. On the other hand, this line of argument did not prevent Mr. De Valera's Government from accepting the Financial Agreement of 1925, which was, it must be admitted, ratified by the Dail, and which absolved the Free State from any liability for the National Debt, although, as a writer in a recent issue of the *Round Table* is careful to point out, this Agreement was, of course, based on the assumption that Land

Annuities, local loans, and police pensions would continue to be paid into the British funds as hitherto.

But no matter by what sophistry supporters of Mr. De Valera may try to defend his action in withholding the Land Annuities and other moneys regularly paid by Mr. Cosgrave's Government to Great Britain, the fact remains that it was, in the eyes of the majority of Irishmen, not merely questionable politics, but a deliberately dishonourable proceeding which was calculated in itself to have regrettable repercussions at home, for it was the substitution of force for argument, and as such was a particularly dangerous proceeding in a land where the turbulent element was every day gaining ground. If there was a case for revision, as there very probably was, or even for fundamental rearrangement, it ought at least to have been a matter for friendly discussion in the first instance, and ought never to have taken the form of a mere blunt refusal to pay. It is clear, therefore, that profitable negotiations with Great Britain on the subject of the Land Annuities and other payments can begin only when it is admitted that these moneys were originally wrongfully withheld. After that, the governing factor in the situation must inevitably be the inability of the Free State farmer to pay on the scale originally indicated, and if the present economic policy persists much longer his capacity to pay must be still further reduced. In any case, in addition to the disastrous consequences of the economic war, the notable increase in rates in recent years has imposed a burden on the Irish farmer which was not foreseen when the Land Acts were introduced by the British Government and which makes his position now very difficult indeed. Consequently, in any negotiations between the Free State and England the position of the Irish farmer will have to be looked at from a very altered standpoint.

In all the circumstances, then, it might be that the best solution of the difficulty lies in the capitalising of the Annuity payments and the agreeing on a definite fixed sum—this would have to be commensurate with the Free State's ability to pay—to cover all future liabilities. Great Britain would no doubt lose financially on this transaction, but her net gain in improved relations and facilities for trade would more than compensate her. While to the Free State it would be an immeasurable advantage to have what has now become a really acute problem satisfactorily resolved, and there seems every reason to believe that any Government able to put forward a final solution of the Land Annuities question on these lines would have little difficulty in raising the necessary funds by loan to meet their new obligations. No doubt an arrangement of this description would not be all plain sailing, but with both parties willing to give way on purely

legal issues, and determined that essential merits only must prevail, it ought not to be impossible to come to an agreed and final settlement.

With the economic crisis ended, statesmen should lose no time in dealing with Partition, for this is a problem which is urgent in view of its profound reactions. It is safe to say that every person living outside the six counties—and certainly a high percentage of those within that area—wants reunion between North and South. Except for the Ulster 'diehards,' therefore—who, it must be confessed, are still a very strong party, at least in the political life of Northern Ireland—an overwhelming majority of the Irish people desire to abolish the artificial barriers raised by the politicians and to see their country one. Furthermore, there is now very little difference of opinion as to the means of reaching this goal of unity, for it is universally accepted that Ulster can be brought in only by the attraction of efficient government and prosperous conditions in the South. Admittedly, when Mr. De Valera came into power a number of his followers, if not he himself, believed that Ulster could be coerced. They based their arguments on the theory that England would let Ulster down, whether in the field or at the council table, for, reading Irish history in the only way in which it can be read, they found that England has invariably abandoned her most devoted supporters in Ireland. The last to go were the Southern loyalists, 300,000 of whom were, as Lord Midleton says, left in the lurch with every pledge that was given to them broken. Is it any wonder there should be people in Ireland who believe it must now be Ulster's turn? Indeed, even in Ulster itself, if we can accept the testimony of Lieut.-Colonel Moore, M.P., there is ever present the dread of England's so-called 'genius for compromise,' a phrase that has a very sinister meaning to loyal Irishmen. But though, in the light of all this, nobody on this side of the Irish Sea puts any faith in the declarations of Mr. Churchill and others that England will stand by Ulster come what may, yet the fact remains that, even for Ulster single-handed, force has ceased to be an argument in the minds of any but a small fraction of the people in Southern Ireland. The responsibilities of office have a very sobering effect, and Mr. De Valera's party have now, on their own confession, come to see that the only way in which Ulster can be won is by the persuasive force of good government. It is true the Irish Republican Army still proclaim that they believe in war as a means to achieving the unity of Ireland, but the Irish Republican Army are a much less formidable body than their deliberately noisy and bombastic utterances would lead the credulous to believe. Ulster need have no fears; there will be no armed invasion from the South.

But how have the Governments of the Free State up to the present proceeded to impress Ulster? Surely no sane man can maintain that the happenings in the Free State in recent years contain a single inducement to Ulster to sacrifice her present relationship with Great Britain for an incorporating union with the Free State. The truth is that Mr. Cosgrave's Government, by their many manifestations of separatism, culminating in the proposal to abolish, by unilateral legislation, the right of appeal to the Privy Council, had already seriously lessened the prospect of union between North and South; that is to say, in pursuit of the shadow of an empty nationalism, they had sacrificed the realisation of a vigorous and united Ireland, while all that Mr. De Valera has since done—notably his abolition of the Oath of Allegiance, his derogatory treatment of the office of Governor-General, and the elimination from the Constitution of the Crown—has but served to drive Ulster still further away. It will therefore be seen that the ideal of a united Ireland is more difficult of realisation now than it was in 1921; nevertheless, it must continue to be the ultimate aim of every responsible Irishman—it must ceaselessly inspire policy. And when at times like the present the difficulties seem insuperable, let us remember that problems of this kind are not peculiar to Ireland alone, and where other nations have triumphed the Irish people cannot afford to fail.

If, however, there is to be a change of heart on the part of recalcitrant Ulstermen, there must first be, not merely a distinct change of heart, but of tactics, on the part of Southern Irish politicians. Only on one condition can Ulster be approached—namely, the maintenance by the Free State of the British connexion. As a matter of fact, this question of Dominion *versus* Republic was never yet made an issue at any general election in the Free State; on the contrary, it has been carefully avoided, for it is well known that, were it put as a clear-cut issue tomorrow, there would be a substantial vote in favour of remaining within the Empire, and not a few of the professed Republicans themselves would be willing to accept the British connexion if they could secure the desired union between North and South. But mere lip-service to the Dominion Constitution by the Free State's rulers will not suffice. We must have practical proof of sincerity if they are to win Ulster; in other words, there will have to be a more generous interpretation of the British association than there was even under Mr. Cosgrave; and particularly Southern Irishmen will have to learn that partnership in the Commonwealth of Nations involves not only rights, but duties. With this fundamental principle accepted, it ought not to be beyond the wit of man to arrive at a workable arrangement between North and South. What form should this take? There can be only one

answer. It must be a solution on federal lines. 'We have our Parliament,' said an Ulster leader recently, 'and we are going to keep it'; and he was simply speaking the truth. The person is indeed an optimist who could still believe, particularly in view of recent happenings, that Ulster will ever come in under an all-Ireland Parliament at Dublin, no matter what the guarantees. This solution may continue to attract ultra-patriotic Irishmen, but it is none the less a practical impossibility; and failure to recognise the fact will wreck any attempt to place the relations of North and South on a more amicable footing.

The unwillingness of Ulstermen to see the Home Rule question settled on the basis of a unitary State with a Parliament at Dublin is explained in a large measure by historical facts; but however regrettable in the eyes of Irishmen these facts may be, they cannot now be altered, and it is wiser statesmanship to face them squarely. When we come to examine the Ulster problem we find that it has its origins in the eviction of the Irish from their lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the planting of these lands by a people who had little in common with the natives they replaced. 'Men can heal the wounds of the conquered,' writes Professor Pollard, 'but those of the disinherited fester for ever'; and here exactly we have the *raison d'être* of the difficulties in the relationship between the two great sections of population in modern Ulster. Notwithstanding an association of some hundreds of years, the two peoples in that province have not been able to assimilate—present-day descendants of the planters still feel a race apart. This separatism of the inhabitants of the north-east corner is to be accounted for, in the first place, by the fundamental difference in religion which exists between them and the people of the rest of Ireland, and this, more than anything else perhaps, contributes to permanent cleavage. The typical population of this planted district, too, is made up partly of a progressive farming people which in speech and outlook are very like the lowlanders of Scotland, and partly of a vigorous industrial community having much more in common with the North of England than with Southern Ireland. Finally, their chief economic interests and prospects are not with the rest of Ireland, however desirable the Southern trade may be, but with Great Britain and countries overseas. For all these reasons, then, Protestant Ulstermen continue to regard themselves as something quite distinct from Nationalist Ireland, and on that account they have persistently refused to come under an all-Ireland Parliament at Dublin. They have made their claim good so far as to have received a separate Parliament, and since possession is nine points of the law, they are not likely to give it up.

It would be well, therefore, if practical Irish statesmen would

try to cultivate a new outlook and work out a solution of this pressing national difficulty on the lines of recognising Ulster (by which we understand the six counties) for what it is, both in history and in fact—a separate entity. There can be no comparison between conditions to-day and those obtaining when the Irish received the all-Ireland Constitution in 1782. At that time little or nothing was known about federal government, for this system was, as Lord Acton reminds us, 'the one immortal contribution of America to political science,' and in 1782 the American Constitution was as yet in the limbo of the future. But federalism is universally admitted now to be the sheet-anchor of democracy. It has solved the problems of Australian and Canadian government, while the sturdiest and most effective republics of the day, Switzerland and the United States of America, owe their stability and greatness to it. Why, then, should it fail in Ireland? The arguments that the component units would be too small and the expense of two separate administrative systems unjustified will not bear examination. On the contrary, everything here points to the successful functioning of federalism, for the differences between North and South are sufficient to make this solution of the national difficulty desirable, and yet not so marked as to render it unworkable. In such a settlement Ulster would have nothing whatever to fear. Her relations with England, no doubt, would have to be revised, and especially her financial relations; but these are matters which could easily be adjusted, while the removal of the customs barrier, involving, as it would, free and unfettered trade with Southern Ireland, must surely be a powerful argument with Ulster business-men in favour of union. Finally, Ulster might be further protected by a clause providing for her voting herself out of the federal system should the Free State attempt to break the British connexion by setting up an all-Ireland republic.

Such a solution solving Ireland's difficulties in the most reasonable way ought to be acceptable to all concerned. In the first place, it offers to Ulster what she so desires—the right to manage her own affairs in her own way and all the security which, for her, the partnership with Britain involves. 'The United Kingdom,' according to Viscount Rothermere, 'has been kept united by Ulster's courage,' and that is true; but by a union with Southern Ireland on the basis of federation Ulster could preserve, not one corner of Ireland for the Crown, but the whole of it, for in the presence of such a union the Irish Republican Party would have merely an academic interest. Similarly, to the Free State the abolition of Partition by a federal arrangement would ensure an end to all internal disorders. In other words, the Irish national problem, so long the despair of statesmen,

would at last be solved, and a new and happier Ireland could leave politics behind and turn her attention to the development of the social welfare of her people; while England, assuredly, could not gainsay a proposal which would keep Ireland within the British system and transform the Free State into a sincere friend.

Solutions of the Irish question are, of course, comparatively easy to put on paper; but no Irishman, at any rate, has any illusions about the difficulty of translating theory into practice. It cannot on that account be taken for granted that a proposal like that outlined in these pages would necessarily meet with acceptance at once, or even perhaps in the near future. On the contrary, the work of reaching an agreed solution may be long and tedious. It has been said, for instance, that the last General Election in Ulster gave proof of no growing desire towards reunion among the youth, nor do recent pronouncements of her elder statesmen fill one with hope. Still, Ulster cannot go on for ever in her present attitude of intransigence. But even if we grant that the signs from the North are none too good, those from the South, at least in recent months, are distinctly encouraging, for they indicate the development of a better and more statesmanlike outlook. Thus it is well known that General O'Duffy's resignation was accepted by his party mainly because, as Professor James Hogan put it, 'his destructive pronouncement on Ulster' was 'fatal to the policy of national unity, for which, by its very name, the United Ireland Party stands.' That General O'Duffy's colleagues were willing to forego the services of one who had done so much to rally the youth of Southern Ireland to the banner of their party is in itself a welcome proof of the determination of the constitutionalists to put the welfare of the country before the exigencies of party; it is equally a testimony to the desire to preserve internal discipline, and from both points of view it is of good augury for the future.

It may be, then, that the prospects of union between North and South at the moment are slight. But, because of that very fact, surely it is all the more imperative that Irishmen on both sides of the border who love their country should make it their unremitting task to cultivate an atmosphere of friendliness and tolerance, and to educate public opinion into realising that Ireland is, by the inexorable facts of history and geography, a single national entity, and artificial divisions erected by the caprice of politicians may postpone, but they cannot prevent, the ultimate realisation of her national ideal.

M. D. O'SULLIVAN.

THE ROME AGREEMENT

THE news that the visit of M. Laval to Rome had been followed by the conclusion of a definite agreement between France and Italy was received with unmixed satisfaction in every responsible quarter in Europe. When the details of that agreement became known the satisfaction was increased, for not only are the old questions at issue between the two Powers finally settled, but the promises exchanged with regard to the independence of Austria and to Disarmament are the brightest augury for the future. If the year 1935 can but continue as it has begun, it will establish an undying claim upon the gratitude of mankind. To understand the importance of what has occurred, however, it is first of all necessary to realise what was at stake between France and Italy, as well as to recall the tension which has existed between them since the war. There were, indeed, two sets of questions that called for settlement; the first class of problem was purely Franco-Italian in its nature, while the second also concerned the neighbours of the two Powers. With the passage of time they tended to become confused, and this certainly did not render them any easier of solution.

Of the purely Franco-Italian problems the status of the Italian residents in Tunis was the most important. The white population of that protectorate is largely Italian, and has always, with the backing of successive Administrations in Rome, fought hard against every French attempt at assimilation. The present position dates from 1868, before the French protectorate had been established, when a treaty was concluded between Italy and the Bey of Tunis by which the former was accorded most-favoured-nation rights. This agreement expired in 1896, after the occupation of Tunis by France, and was replaced by another in which Italy recognised the French protectorate and gave up her most-favoured-nation rights, while in return for these concessions Italian schools were to remain on a *status quo* basis, and Italians were to retain their nationality indefinitely. In September 1918 this arrangement was denounced by the Administration of which M. Clemenceau was the head, and it has since been regularly renewed at intervals of three months. The effect of this

continued uncertainty has been to produce a feeling of unrest, and real hardship has been caused to Italian children, for the schools of 1896 are quite inadequate to modern needs, and the French authorities have steadfastly refused to allow any new ones to be constructed.

Another cause of friction has been the failure of France to fulfil her obligations under the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915. Dr. Mario Toscano in his *Il Patto di Londra* has recently given a full and scholarly account of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of this agreement, of which Article 13 reads as follows:

Dans le cas où la France et la Grande-Bretagne augmenteraient leurs domaines coloniaux d'Afrique aux dépens de l'Allemagne, ces deux Puissances reconnaissent en principe que l'Italie pourrait réclamer quelques compensations équitables, notamment dans le règlement en sa faveur des questions concernant les frontières des colonies italiennes de l'Erythrée, de la Somalie et de la Lybie et des colonies voisines de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne.

In 1924 the British Government carried out its part of the bargain by the cession of Jubaland, but France has taken no similar step. Of late this colonial problem has become more acute, for the Italian occupation of the interior of Libya, combined with Marshal Balbo's vigorous development of the province, has raised the whole question of the latter's frontiers, which have never been satisfactorily delineated. Indeed, for some time past there has existed the danger of a second Fashoda.

It is often suggested that another cause of Franco-Italian friction has been the demand of Italy for naval parity with her neighbour. It is true that much has been heard of this during recent years, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the demand was the result of, not the reason for, the tension between the two Powers, though had there not been an agreement made in Rome last month it must be admitted that this would soon, for all practical purposes, have become a distinction without a difference. France has consistently rejected the Italian claim to parity on the ground that she has not only an Atlantic as well as a Mediterranean coast to defend, but that she has also the lines of communication with her colonies to safeguard. Since the revival of the German navy this view has been even more strongly held in Paris than before, and the consequent ill-disguised armaments race between France and Italy has alarmed the chancelleries ever since those two Powers found themselves unable to sign the agreement which concluded the London Naval Conference of 1930.

What has undoubtedly gone a long way towards making bad blood between Paris and Rome has been the air of superiority

which France has too often assumed in her relations with her neighbour. To no small extent this has been due to the long intellectual and political predominance of France in the Italian peninsula, and to a belief that without the aid of Napoleon III. Italy would never have achieved unity. Since the advent of Fascism to power this attitude on the part of so many French statesmen has been particularly irritating, and Italian resentment has steadily grown. Indeed, in spite of their common stock of Latinity, it is not too easy for France and Italy to understand one another, for the Frenchman is a sceptic while the Italian is an enthusiast. Furthermore, the activities of the *fuorusciti*—those opponents of Fascism who have left their own country voluntarily or involuntarily—have contributed to make matters worse. Their influence, exercised through the Grand Orient, upon politicians of the Left in Paris has been wholly pernicious, and has on repeated occasions been used to frustrate the efforts of the best elements in both countries to bring about an understanding.

When one turns to those questions at issue between France and Italy which also concern their neighbours it is to think in terms of the Succession States of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and of the revision of the Peace Treaties. Ever since the Paris Conference it has been the settled conviction of the vast mass of thinking Italians that their country did not get a square deal on that occasion, though it is freely admitted that this unsatisfactory state of affairs is in no small measure due to the incompetence of Signor Orlando and to the feebleness of the pre-Fascist Administrations. The result has been to range Italy alongside such States as Germany and Hungary who were demanding the revision of the Peace Treaties. For France, on the other hand, the Treaties were the pledge of her victory, as they were the basis of the very existence of her allies of the Little Entente—namely, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Nor was this all, for between Rome and Belgrade there was a gulf which, in spite of more than one attempt, had never been bridged. To no inconsiderable extent this bitterness was due to the undisguised partiality displayed by President Wilson for the Serbs, and his equally open hostility towards the Italians. The wilder pan-Serbs never ceased to agitate for the incorporation of large tracts of Italian territory in the Yugoslav kingdom, while there were not wanting Italians who demanded the annexation of Dalmatia. So incident followed incident, and the position went from bad to worse, until King Alexander was murdered at Marseilles, and half Yugoslavia believed Italy to be privy to the crime. All the time France had to back her ally, who, in her turn, did everything in her power to prevent any improvement in the relations between Paris and Rome.

In respect of Disarmament, too, there was considerable divergence of opinion, and it was generally believed in France that Italy had at any rate a tacit agreement with Germany. In January 1934 Signor Mussolini declared that he was anxious to go as far as possible to meet the German claim for equality, and believed that in return Germany should once more take her place in the League of Nations. With this general end in view he made the following definite proposals:

- (1) Any Convention now realisable should remain in force until the end of 1940.
- (2) Chemical warfare should be abolished, and there should be proper methods of control.
- (3) The bombardment of civilian populations should be prohibited.
- (4) The military expenditure of the Powers not bound by the Peace Treaties should be limited at the present level, subject to expenditure on replacements and the completion of defensive works.
- (5) The land armaments of these Powers should be similarly limited at the present level.
- (6) The German claim to a remodelled force of 300,000 men should be accepted. The German readiness to reconsider this figure if the other Powers were prepared to reduce their armaments was recalled.
- (7) Discussion of naval armaments should be adjourned until the next Naval Conference (*i.e.*, in 1935).

Like every other plan put before the Disarmament Conference, this project was side-tracked, for it was by no means acceptable to France and the Little Entente.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that deadlock should have been reached, and it is possible that no way out would have been found had not external influences supervened. By far the most important of these was the policy of Herr Hitler. During the years immediately preceding the Nazi accession to power Italy had displayed a tendency, at Geneva and elsewhere, to act with Germany in opposition to France and the Little Entente, and it was somewhat rashly assumed abroad that the establishment of a dictatorship in the *Reich* would serve to knit closer than ever the bonds of friendship between Rome and Berlin. The fundamental difference between the Fascist and the Nazi conception of society was overlooked by the foreign observer. Nor was this all, for the manifest determination of the new rulers of Germany to incorporate Austria in the *Reich* soon aroused the gravest apprehensions in Italy. The words of the old song:

Alld Deutschland braust's vom Meer zum Land,
Alld Deutsch vom Land zum Meer,

had a particularly ominous ring, and Italy had not poured out blood and money to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to put Germany in its place. It was clear that the only way to prevent the presence of Prussian troops on the Brenner, and the domination of Trieste by Prussian guns, was by safeguarding the threatened independence of Austria.

In France there was equal alarm at the prospect of an *Anschluss*. It would not only have strengthened Germany from the material standpoint and have raised the prestige of the Nazi régime, but it would have rendered the extinction of Czech independence a mere question of time. In the summer of 1934, too, it became clear that Yugoslavia was flirting with Berlin, fearful as she was of either a Hapsburg restoration or of Austria passing entirely under Italian control. It was not long before this change of circumstances began to make itself felt. Signor Mussolini was too much of a realist to believe that he could advocate revision at Budapest while insisting on the maintenance of the *status quo* at Vienna. In the middle of June he made what was to prove one last effort to persuade Germany to respect the independence of Austria, and Herr Hitler came to Venice. For a brief moment it looked as if the meeting of the two dictators might have solved the problem, and on June 16 a semi-official article in the *Giornale d'Italia* declared that the two statesmen had reached agreement on the subject of Austria that there was to be no interference with her independence. The German Chancellor proved unable or unwilling to keep his promise; the Nazi campaign of terrorism in Austria was intensified; and on July 25 Dr. Dollfuss was foully murdered. From that instant a Franco-Italian agreement came within the sphere of practical politics.

There were also other forces working in the same direction in the summer and autumn of 1934. Signor Mussolini, it is well known, has always been in favour of an understanding with France, and could be relied upon not to leave any stone unturned to effect this. He had the support of leading intellectuals such as Dr. Arrigo Solmi, now Under-Secretary for Education, whose erudite *Italia e Francia nei problemi attuali della politica europea* concludes with a passionate appeal for Latin solidarity. On the other side of the Alps the seeds of friendship, sown by the late M. Mario Simonatti in *On prépare un Crime* in 1930, were beginning to grow, while tribute must be paid to *Le Journal* for its campaign in favour of Franco-Italian amity. There was, too, a marked diminution in the influence of the *fuorusciti*, for after the murders of President Doumer and King Alexander of Yugoslavia French opinion began to question the advantages of making

Paris an asylum for every undesirable alien. Yet in spite of all this it is no exaggeration to say that the conclusion of the Franco-Italian agreement might well have been indefinitely postponed had it not been for the blunders of German diplomacy during the past two years.

Such was the background against which the conversations at Rome last month were set, and it now remains to examine in detail the decisions which were there reached. For reasons of convenience it may be well to deal first with the problems which do not affect any third party. The vexed question of Tunis has at last been settled by the arrangement that all those born in the protectorate of Italian parents shall remain Italian until 1965, though they may, if they so wish, adopt French nationality in the meantime. The Italian schools are to remain in their present position until March 28, 1955, when they will become private Italian schools under the control of the French Government. No discrimination is to be made after 1945 against any Italian who has been engaged in a profession before that date. These conditions are extremely just, for they inflict no hardship upon the present generation, while they ensure for France the eventual disappearance of a foreign community, with special rights, upon French soil. By the agreement France has also fulfilled her obligations under Article 13 of the Treaty of London. The frontier between Libya on the one hand and French West and French Equatorial Africa on the other has been modified by the cession of about 54,000 square miles, an area roughly the size of England and Wales, while there has been a rectification of that between Eritrea and French Somaliland which gives Italy a strip of coast facing the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. Hardly less important is the fact that Italy is henceforth to have an interest in the railway from Jibouti to Addis Ababa. These arrangements should put an end to all friction between the two Powers in the colonial field, and are thus comparable with the conclusion of the Franco-British Entente in the early years of the present century.

On the question of Austria agreement was, from the beginning, naturally much easier to reach. The two Governments decided to recommend to the interested parties 'the conclusion of an agreement of non-interference in their respective internal affairs, and of a reciprocal undertaking not to incite, or support any action, calculated to make forcible attempts against the territorial integrity of a political or social régime of any one of the contracting parties.' This is in the main a reaffirmation of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but the special reference to those terrorist activities which have done so much to exacerbate feeling in Central Europe during the past few months is obvious. This agreement, it was further decided, should be signed in the

first place by Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria, and it should be open to the adhesion of France, Poland, and Rumania. Moreover, if at any time Austrian independence appears to be threatened, France and Italy are to take counsel together, and with Vienna, as to the most effective method of safeguarding it; 'these consultations,' the official *communiqué* continues, 'could then be extended by Italy and by France to the other States, with the object of assuring their concurrence.'

The Rome conversations were not, however, limited to colonial and Central European problems, for it was realised, to quote the phrase of Signor Mussolini, that the Franco-Italian agreement would be mummified unless it contained some provision for the limitation of armaments, and for the collaboration of Germany. So far as Disarmament is concerned, Italy still stands by her proposals of a year ago, quoted above, to which France is now to give a favourable consideration which was then denied. Both countries fully admit the necessity of treating Germany as an equal, but they are desirous of devising some means by which neither she nor any other Power shall be able to rearm without limitation or control. Whether these developments will persuade the German Government to return to Geneva remains to be seen, and it must be confessed that the maladroit diplomacy of the British Foreign Office in pressing Berlin to be represented there during the discussions on the Saar plebiscite has not improved the prospect. Sir John Simon would be better advised to have held his hand, and not to have risked the larger object for the smaller. If Germany's suspicions can be allayed, and her collaboration secured, it matters little where her statesmen meet those of the other Powers. What is important is what is done, not where it is done.

Before considering the possible repercussions of the Rome agreement, and the problems to which it may give rise, tribute must be paid to Signor Mussolini and M. Laval for their courage and initiative. What they have effected may well prove to be the turning-point in the political history of the twentieth century, for they have based their achievements, not upon hopes for the future, but upon the facts of the present. M. Laval has succeeded where more than one of his predecessors failed, and, in particular, he is to be congratulated upon breaking with the Briand tradition of ignoring Italy. Territorial concessions are never easy to make, and in persuading his fellow-countrymen to consent to them M. Laval has set a precedent for the peaceful rectification of frontiers which it may one day be possible to follow in Europe itself. It would, too, be idle to disguise the fact that both he and Signor Mussolini were certain of the indifference, not to say the

hostility, of many of their respective supporters. No one who has travelled recently in France or Italy can be under any illusions about the feelings of the great mass of people in either country towards the inhabitants of the other. Failure would have been a severe blow to the reputation of both statesmen, but they undertook the risk. As for Signor Mussolini, he has once again proved himself the best friend of peace in Europe. Never disheartened, he refuses to abandon his conviction that European civilisation is one organic whole, and must be regarded as such: Disarmament is impossible with a suspicious Germany and the revolver supreme on the Danube. The masterly diplomacy of Signor Mussolini previous to the Rome agreement is the best augury for its future.

Of the various stipulations, that regarding Austria is by far the most important. The independence of Austria is from every point of view a vital European interest. The absorption of that country in the *Reich* would prove to be but the first step in the German march towards the Balkans, Constantinople, and the Persian Gulf. From a cultural standpoint the *Anschluss* would spell disaster, for Austria is the last refuge of the old German culture, and Nazi rule in Vienna would mean a relapse into that barbarism which exists wherever the *Swastika* has prevailed. Even the wildest of Hitler's followers, and certainly the chiefs of the *Reichswehr*, will hesitate to attack Austria if they know it will bring France, Italy, and the Little Entente against them, just as in the days immediately following the murder of the Austrian Chancellor the presence of strong Italian forces on the frontier prevented a *Putsch* to Vienna. The *Führer* to no inconsiderable extent seized power in Germany by setting the other parties by the ears; the Franco-Italian agreement should prevent him from successfully repeating these tactics in respect of Austria and the Powers. At the same time, Austria is to be saved from interference by her friends as well as by her enemies. For some months past the Little Entente has taken the line that, in spite of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it would not hesitate to use force to prevent the return of the Hapsburgs to Vienna. The solemn declaration of the signatories not to intervene in each other's internal affairs means that the Little Entente now realises that the growing demand in Austria for the restoration of the monarchy is no concern of any third party, and in this change of policy one may surely detect the moderating influence of the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul. This is most reassuring for those who believe that the best way to keep Herr Hitler out of Vienna is for the Archduke Otto to return there.

In some quarters there is a disposition to criticise the Rome negotiations as a move in the encirclement of Germany, but they can hardly bear such an interpretation unless German bad faith

in international matters is to be accepted as an axiom. The German Government is invited to subscribe to the declaration respecting Austrian independence on the same footing as any other Power, and the German right to equality in armaments is admitted. To say that the agreement is aimed against Germany is to allow that the latter harbours warlike designs on Austria, in which case it is defensible on the very grounds on which it is attacked. In any event, Signor Mussolini was more than justified in seeking direct French co-operation where Austria was concerned. Two years ago he was the author of the Four-Power Pact, of which Article 1 expressly stated that 'the High Contracting Parties will consult together as regards all questions which appertain to them.' The attempt of Berlin to solve the Austrian problem to its own advantage, and in its own murderous way, was a deliberate violation of this clause. In the summer of last year Signor Mussolini tried the effect of a personal interview with Herr Hitler, but the only result of that was the assassination of Dr. Dollfuss. Some other procedure had clearly to be adopted, and the German Government has only itself to blame if it has not, on this occasion, been consulted in the first instance.

Experience has unhappily shown that optimism is out of place where Disarmament is concerned, but it is hard to believe that the Rome agreement will not enable some progress to be made, at any rate, in the direction of the limitation of armaments. The Italian proposals of January 1934 were welcomed by Great Britain and the United States, and now that France is prepared to give them favourable consideration something should surely be effected along these lines. It is true that, even so, all the swords will not automatically be beaten into ploughshares, but the worst features of modern warfare will have been eliminated, and a fresh race in armaments will have been prevented. Then, too, now that France and Italy have settled their political differences they will no longer need to build against one another in the Mediterranean, and this should remove one of the difficulties which the coming Naval Conference would otherwise have been called upon to face. There have been too many false dawns in the matter of Disarmament to render it safe to hail what looks like a lifting of the night, but it will be hard if the Franco-Italian agreement does not take us a step further forward.

There can be little doubt but that many sections of Italian opinion are hoping that an economic revival will follow the establishment of better relations with France. In conjunction with the new monetary policy of the French Government the agreement is expected to be followed by the supply of franc credits for Italian industry. Those who take this view, point to the vast sums which France has sunk in the countries of the Little

Entente, largely for political reasons, and stress the return which would be made by investing in Italy. The lira has already responded to the feelings of optimism engendered, and the Italian financial position has been strengthened to such an extent as to encourage a hope that the existing currency restrictions may soon be removed. The patience of the Italian people, due to faith in their great leader, cannot blind us to the hardships they have suffered during the past two or three years, and it is only natural that they should hail with joy the prospect of a termination of the economic crisis. For this reason M. Flandin's recent statement that he is in favour of increasing the quotas for Italian products has been very welcome on the other side of the Alps. French credits would also enable a more thorough financing of Austria, and this in its turn would provide a further obstacle to the German penetration of that country.

The attitude of Great Britain to what has taken place at Rome cannot be other than one of cordial appreciation. Peace and justice are the two British interests in the post-war world, and the acid test for this country of any convention between other Powers is whether it is calculated to advance the cause of both. The Franco-Italian agreement is admirably adapted to this end, and is therefore sure of British support. On the other hand, there can be no question of our participation. Whether the independence of Austria is or is not worth a war between Great Britain and Germany, the people of this country would not, in their present temper, draw the sword on Austria's behalf, and, such being the case, no British Government would be justified in giving a pledge that might have to be redeemed by force of arms. What does concern Great Britain is the probable disappearance of Franco-Italian naval rivalry in the Mediterranean, and the possibility, as a result of an increased feeling of security, of an economic revival in the Succession States. Both France and Italy are our old and tried friends, and it is with every cause for satisfaction that we see them, and their respective allies, draw together.

Experience has shown that it is not the conclusion, but the working, of a pact that gives the latter its importance, and this latest agreement will be no exception. The omens are good, not least because it was not hastily reached. It will, without doubt, soon be tested by those who have no liking for it, just as the Franco-British Entente of 1904 was soon tested, but it should prove equal to the strain. If it does, then at long last mankind will be able to look forward to the future undistracted by the hatreds which were the legacy of the war.

CHARLES PETRIE.

MONGOLIA AND MANCHUKUO

METTERNICH once said that Italy was merely 'a geographical expression.' A similar view still prevails in some quarters with regard to the region of Asia known as Mongolia. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to-day to deny that there is a Mongol nation with a definite national consciousness, and if this is conceded it follows that there is also a 'Mongolian Question.' For the Mongols are divided in their political allegiance between four distinct governments, of which two have no satisfactory international status, and in such circumstances a vigorous nationalist movement cannot but present a serious problem in international relations. The four governments which divide the Mongols are those of the U.S.S.R., China, the Manchu Empire (Manchukuo, or more precisely Manchutikuo) and the Mongol People's Republic. Of these the third and fourth are established in territories which are generally recognised by other States as belonging *de jure* to the Republic of China, the sovereignty of the Mongol People's Republic being recognised by no one and that of Manchukuo by Japan and Salvador only. Nevertheless, both Manchukuo and the Mongol People's Republic enjoy complete *de facto* independence in relation to China, and are satellites respectively of two alien Powers—Japan and the Soviet Union.

Of these four governments only the Mongol People's Republic is Mongol in composition and represents a predominantly Mongol population. This fact made it from its foundation in 1924 up to 1932 the Mongolian State *par excellence* and the natural rallying-point for Mongol national sentiment. Its only rival for the rôle of nationalist leadership was the Mongolo-Buryat Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, a local unit of the U.S.S.R. formed by the Buryat Mongols of Eastern Siberia who had previously been subjects of the Russian Empire, and, since the Mongol People's Republic was itself closely allied with the U.S.S.R. and dependent on it economically and politically, there was no conflict of aim between the two republics, even though one was inside, and the other outside, the Soviet Union. From the Chinese sphere of rule there was certainly no counter-attraction for the Mongols, for Chinese policy was wholly adverse to Mongol aspirations.

A new situation arose, however, with the creation in 1932 of the new State of Manchukuo, a State set up with the support of Japanese arms and headed by the heir of the Manchu imperial dynasty, first as 'Chief Executive' and then with the full title of Emperor. The founders of the new State knew well that one of their greatest assets was the traditional attachment of the Mongols to the Manchu monarchy, and they proceeded to recognise a regional Mongol interest by cutting off the parts of Manchuria inhabited by Mongols and forming them into the new province of Hsingan with a special administration headed by a Mongol prince. With the enthronement of 'Mr. Pu-yi' as emperor, Manchukuo, or 'Manchu State,' became Manchutikuo, or 'Manchu Empire,' and loyalties dormant since the Chinese Revolution of 1911 were recalled to life. Mongol nationalism found in the trend of events that followed 'the incident' of September 18, 1931, a new programme alternative to that of the People's Republic; a new power was at hand, able to accomplish what had been beyond the capacity of the People's Republic, to deliver the Mongols of Inner Mongolia from the oppression and encroachment of the Chinese, and thereby gaining force for a historic claim to supremacy over all Mongolia. To-day the battle is joined between the two claimants for the leadership of the Mongols, between Manchukuo and the Mongol People's Republic, and therefore, ultimately, between Tokyo and Moscow. Nor is the struggle a mere clash of regional authorities played off against each other by rival Great Powers; it represents a profound social conflict, a real struggle of classes. In Mongol life the Mongol People's Republic stands for a social system assimilated as nearly as possible to that of Soviet Russia, Manchukuo for the *ancien régime*, for the Buddhist Church and the 'feudal' princes.

In 1910 all the Mongols, with the exception of the Buryats of Siberia and the far-away enclave of the Volga Kalmuks who were under Russian rule, were included in the 'Chinese' Empire—that is to say, they were subjects of the Manchu dynasty which had held sway over China since 1644. But far from regarding themselves as co-subjects with the Chinese, let alone subjects of the Chinese, they were conscious of having been partners with the Manchus in the conquest of China. For the Manchu power in the early seventeenth century was a compound of Manchu and Mongol elements under a Manchu royal line, its founder, Nurhachu, having gathered up by sweeping conquests all the various barbarian tribes of Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia before he began in 1618 to measure his strength against China. When in 1911 the successes of the Chinese revolutionaries drove the Manchu dynasty to abdicate, it was assumed in the world at large that the new Republic inherited all the territories of the 'Chinese' Empire,

and all these territories are still recognised *de jure* as belonging to it—except for the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan and Salvador, as already mentioned. But the implied principle has never been admitted by the princes of the Mongol 'banners,' who hold that their allegiance was to the Manchu monarchy alone, and was cancelled by the Chinese Revolution; this doctrine they put into effect in 1911 by an insurrection which gave Outer—but not Inner—Mongolia *de facto* independence with Russian support.

The Manchu element in the Manchu-Mongol coalition is now negligible as a nationality, but the Manchu dynasty remains and has been restored to sovereign power in the homeland of Nurhachu. The virtual extinction of the Manchus as a distinct people is due to several causes. The Manchus are distinguished from the Mongols by their language, which is Tungusic, and by their traditional culture, which lacks the pre-eminently pastoral and nomadic character of the Mongol. As mobile, warlike barbarians they were akin to the Mongols, but their original environment—the hilly, wooded country of Eastern Manchuria—was different from the open steppe of Mongolia and Western Manchuria; they were more sedentary in their habits and carried on a primitive agriculture, all of which made them more susceptible to the influence of Chinese civilisation. As the privileged element in the Manchu-Mongol coalition, the Manchus were preferred for paid garrison duty in China after the conquest, and most of them went to China to pick up what they could get, with the result that they have been swallowed up in the teeming population of China proper. Those who remained in Manchuria have likewise been absorbed by the tide of Chinese immigration which, after Manchuria had long been guarded against Chinese settlement by the Manchu emperors, was at last allowed to flow in as a counter-measure to the advance of Russian colonisation, and was at the same time greatly facilitated by Russian railway-building.

The Mongols were, before 1911, comparatively little affected by these factors of change which denationalised the Manchus. They did not emigrate to China in large numbers; their country, with its lack not only of railways, but also of rivers for transport, was less attractive to colonists than that of the Manchus, and their culture was much more resistant to Chinese influences. Nevertheless, they were aware of an increasing Chinese ascendancy. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Manchu Government at Peking became more and more Chinese in its outlook, and its fears of Russian encroachment in the north led it to bring the Mongols under a more centralised administration, an administration that was staffed mainly by Chinese officials. Chinese farmers began to encroach on the Mongol pasture lands outside the Great Wall and Chinese moneylenders

wrought havoc among the impecunious Mongol princes. By the time the revolutionaries of Canton were ready to take over the government of China from the Manchu monarchy conditions in Mongolia were ripe for an independence movement.

In 1911, after the collapse of the Manchu monarchy, the hereditary princes of the 'banners' (tribal divisions) of Northern Mongolia assembled at Urga and proclaimed the independence of their country under the rule of the Khutukhtu, or Living Buddha, the highest dignitary of the Lama-Buddhist Church in Mongolia. In view of the lack of secular organisation in the country, apart from the Chinese administration which was to be eliminated, the national movement naturally rallied round the nation-wide Buddhist hierarchy, and was encouraged by the fact that Tibet, the homeland of Lama-Buddhism, had simultaneously taken advantage of the confusion in China to declare its independence. The Mongol separatists succeeded in expelling the Chinese from the country north of the Gobi desert (Outer Mongolia), but not from the region between the Gobi and the Great Wall (Inner Mongolia). The Gobi, stretching in a broad belt from west to east, effectively divides the two parts of the country, though it makes neither an absolute barrier nor a precise frontier; it served to shield the new State in Outer Mongolia from Chinese attack. Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, was within easy reach of Peking, and the autonomist movement there was nipped in the bud by Chinese forces. Outer and Inner Mongolia thus parted company, the former achieving a *de facto* independence, while the latter became subject to the Chinese Republic. The Mongol-inhabited districts adjoining the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria were also retained under Chinese control.

The Chinese, however, were not reconciled to the subtraction of even Outer Mongolia from the Manchu estate which they claimed to inherit. They were preparing an expedition to assert their authority beyond the Gobi, when Russia intervened diplomatically on behalf of the Urga Government, and persuaded China to accept a compromise whereby Outer Mongolia was to keep its newly-won autonomy, while China was to be recognised as suzerain and was to be represented at Urga by a Resident. This arrangement was carried out from 1912 to 1918, and Russia secured substantial economic privileges in Outer Mongolia. The Russian policy which sought to profit from the Mongol opposition to China was in those days in complete harmony with the aims of Japan on the Asiatic mainland. Russia and Japan had been working together since 1910 to promote their 'special interests' in Chinese territory and to confound the 'Open Door' Powers; they had agreed on a demarcation of their respective spheres of influence, that of Russia being held to comprehend Outer Mongolia

and North Manchuria, and that of Japan, South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

All this was changed, however, by the Russian Revolution of 1917. Russia in the throes of civil war was no longer able to give protection to the autonomous Urga Government, and the Chinese invaded Outer Mongolia with a powerful army, occupied Urga and cancelled Mongol autonomy, treating the separatists with great severity. The latter looked round for a deliverer and found one in an adventurer of the Russian civil war, Baron Ungern von Sternberg, who commanded a fragment of Kolchak's defeated army and dreamed of founding a Russo-Mongol State which would include all Mongols, the Buryats of Transbaikalia as well as the Mongols of Mongolia, would be consolidated through the Buddhist Church, and would oppose a barrier to the eastward extension of Bolshevism. Early in 1921 Baron Ungern drove the Chinese out of Urga, restored the Living Buddha and proclaimed the complete independence of Mongolia. He was less successful, however, in his hostilities with the Siberian Bolsheviks, by whom he was captured and executed before the year was out. The fall of Ungern was followed, not by a return of the Chinese, but by the penetration of Soviet Russian forces into Mongolia, the war having been waged by Ungern with complete disregard of internationally recognised frontiers. The Soviet Russians had no desire to restore the Chinese, but neither had they any use for the Living Buddha and the banner princes who had been supported by the Tsarist Government and by Baron Ungern. Their idea was to sovietise Mongolia. But they proceeded with extreme caution. Hoping for an alliance with the Chinese Kuomintang nationalists, they hesitated to offend Chinese national sentiment by incorporating an area claimed by China into the Soviet Union, and they were equally reluctant to risk their gains by a premature frontal attack on the existing social order of the Mongols. They therefore refrained from shooting the Living Buddha, and meanwhile they formed a party among the young Mongols of the poorer classes, plied them with suitably adapted Marxist propaganda, and provided them with arms. Then in 1924 the Living Buddha died and the State was left headless; the sovietising Mongols at once seized power. The chief lamas, princes and nobles were killed or driven out, and at a *Huru-l-dan*, or People's Assembly, held in November the Mongol People's Republic was proclaimed. All land, minerals and natural resources were declared public property, a State monopoly of foreign trade was enacted, Church and State were divorced, and the 'workers' were conscripted for a People's Revolutionary Army.

With all this, however, the Republic neither entered the Soviet Union nor did it become an internationally recognised

sovereign State. The Soviet Union, still hoping for political profit out of Chinese nationalism, continued to recognise all Mongolia as *de jure* Chinese territory—a harmless saving of face for Chinese patriots. 'The Soviet Government,' said Chicherin in 1925, 'recognises Mongolia as part of the Republic of China, enjoying, however, an autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with its internal affairs.' In fact, the Chinese had no control whatever over the new People's Republic, which was even more bitterly hostile towards them than the *régime* of the Living Buddha had been. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, maintained a diplomatic representative at Urga who functioned almost as a governor, and the State monopoly of foreign trade was used to transfer traffic from Peking to Irkutsk. The Russian troops were withdrawn after a four years' occupation, but Russian officers remained as technical advisers and instructors and the People's Revolutionary Army was equipped with Russian armaments.

The net result of the revolution of 1924 was to strengthen Mongol autonomy in Outer Mongolia—for the People's Republic was a more formidable military power than the previous government had been—but to weaken the national movement in Inner Mongolia by splitting it on the social issue, inasmuch as the Mongol social order south of the Gobi and in Western Manchuria remained what it had been, and the privileged classes of Mongol society under Chinese rule could no longer look forward with pleasure to being delivered from China by their brother Mongols on the other side of the Gobi. They found themselves, indeed, in a deplorable situation, between the Chinese devil and the deep sea of proletarian dictatorship. In relation to the Chinese their position had been steadily deteriorating for the last dozen years. The aim of Chinese policy was to make Inner Mongolia into an integral part of China by settling the land with Chinese colonists and assimilating the administrative system to that of China proper. The officials protected the Chinese immigrants who took up the best land, ousting the Mongols and driving them towards the arid margins of the steppe. The Chinese-ruled Mongols were thus in dire need of aid, but the lamas and nobles knew well that only at the price of their own ruin as classes could aid be obtained for the national cause from the anti-feudal and anti-clerical People's Republic. They preferred to endure the ills they had. The unprivileged classes, however, lent a more favourable ear to propaganda from Urga, and a strong pro-Soviet movement grew up among them. A great impetus to this was given by the Russo-Chinese border war of 1929, which greatly increased the prestige of Soviet Russia and caused a corresponding loss of face to the Chinese.

The situation was again transformed by the Japanese action in Manchuria in 1931. The Japanese interpreted the Kellogg Pact even more broadly than the Russians had done in 1929, for while self-defence carried the latter only a short distance over the Manchurian border, it bore the former northward to the Amur and westward to Jehol. The imprudent Chang Hsüeh-liang, who after having tried it on the Russians without success had thought to recover 'face' by trying it on the Japanese, was excluded from the extensive domain which his father had bequeathed to him, and a political vacuum was created. To fill this vacuum in a manner satisfactory to Japan it was necessary to seek out all those elements in Manchuria which had been hostile to the Kuomintang and to the Chang 'dynasty.' And who more hostile than the Mongols? At last their opportunity had come, and they joined in setting up the new State of Manchukuo on condition that they should be protected against further encroachments by Chinese settlers and that their local autonomy should be respected. The Japanese sponsors of Manchukuo were not slow to perceive that the support of the Mongol minority was a most valuable asset to a government which had little prospect of evoking enthusiasm in the Chinese majority of the population. So the new province of Hsingan was formed to comprise the Mongol-inhabited areas, and was given a special administration responsible directly to the Prime Minister. The Mongol Church and nobility were freed from their recent dilemma; they were no longer compelled to choose between China and Bolshevism.

But Hsingan is ethnically continuous with the vast extent of Mongolia to the west of it. Where, then, does Manchukuo end? Where is its frontier? This is the question which, more than any other, is capable of leading to an acute crisis in the relations of Soviet Russia and Japan in the near future. The western edge of the new Manchu Empire is a military front rather than a frontier in the juridical sense, and it is as mobile as the Japanese army. According to the *Manchuria Year Book* for 1932-3, 'the area declared by the new government of Manchukuo to be its territory comprises the former Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol,' but 'the exact western boundary of Manchukuo has not yet been clearly defined.' It continues to be without clear definition, and must be so, as long as Manchukuo is not internationally recognised. A non-existent State cannot have any frontiers, and since all Manchukuo is, in the eyes of China, the League of Nations and the United States, Chinese territory, how can there be a frontier dispute either between Manchukuo and China or between Manchukuo and the equally non-existent Mongol People's Republic?

There is an old English proverb that it is as well to be hanged

for a sheep as a lamb, and it is not irrelevant to the present situation in the Far East. The Japanese have already braved the terrors of international law in carrying out their policy in Manchuria, and have grown accustomed to censures on their conduct. Geneva and the *News Chronicle* have done their worst to Japan; why, then, should Japan not make the most of the advantages to gain which she incurred their wrath. The Japanese have already fought their way through Jehol; what further sting has the Kellogg Pact if they fight their way through Chahar? The Japanese have already crossed the Great Khingan; who will now invoke the Covenant of the League if they traverse the Shabortai Gobi? The rulers of Japan are probably well aware of the dangers involved in advancing the borders of Manchukuo and would prefer to call a halt; but even without the will to advance it is no easy matter to find a line of final rest for military outposts in an immense wilderness of mountain and steppe with a population mainly nomadic and disturbed by political intrigue.

To the south-west of Manchukuo lies the main part of Inner Mongolia, comprising the three provinces of Chahar, Suiyüan and Ninghsia (in that order from east to west), which remain under Chinese rule; to the north-east is the Mongol People's Republic. Japanese detachments have already penetrated into Chahar, and are said to have proclaimed there that all Chinese territory outside the Great Wall belongs to Manchukuo. If and when they complete the absorption of Chahar into Manchukuo, the latter will have a much longer common border with the People's Republic than it has now, and will be much nearer to Urga, the capital of the Republic. The chances of a clash between Manchukuo and the Mongol Republic will be correspondingly increased. If such a clash were to be merely an affair of outposts, it would not be too serious. But it is clear that the very existence of the Mongol People's Republic is now threatened. In Manchukuo there are many 'White' émigrés, lamas and princes who fled from Outer Mongolia after the revolution of 1924, and whose one aim now is to upset the government at Urga and return to power. The stage is set for a civil war among the Mongols with Soviet Russia and Japan each backing a faction, and thus likely to be drawn into direct war with each other.

Some Japanese appear to hope that Outer Mongolia may be united to Manchukuo without any serious consequences. Mr. K. K. Kawakami,¹ speaking of the creation of Hsingan Province with special reference to the Barga Mongols in the extreme north-west of Manchukuo, remarks:

If it is followed by wise measures allowing the Mongols the autonomy they desire, yet giving them an opportunity for advancement along

¹ *Manchukuo, Child of Conflict*, p. 215.

modern lines, it is quite possible that Outer Mongolia, now under Soviet tutelage, will veer toward Barga and eventually even merge with it, thus accepting the suzerainty or sovereignty of Manchukuo. . . . Outer Mongolia, hating China and feeling not entirely at home with Soviet Russia, may yet reorientate its policy in favour of Manchukuo.

But such a 'reorientation' of policy could only be brought about by means of an internal counter-revolution in the Mongol People's Republic with support from the White Mongols in Manchukuo, and it is inconceivable that in such circumstances Soviet Russia would refrain from intervening. Russia can never allow the White Mongols to return to Urga. Such a move would extend Japanese ascendancy to the Altai, and would mean the outflanking of the whole Russian position in Eastern Siberia by a Japanese-controlled Manchu Empire.

The danger to the peace of the world lies chiefly in the fact that neither Manchukuo nor the Mongol People's Republic has any sovereign status which is internationally recognised (except for the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan and Salvador), and there is therefore no basis of legal right in accordance with which conflicts between them might be settled by the collective action of other States. Both States are established in territory that is claimed by China, and is recognised as legally belonging to her—in the one case by all but two, and in the other by all, foreign governments; both were set up with the aid of foreign armies,² and both are 'puppets' of the Powers that protect them—though they are not without wills of their own. There is a difference in that Japan has recognised Manchukuo as a sovereign State, whereas Soviet Russia still keeps up the fiction that Outer Mongolia is 'a part of the Republic of China.' But both States are in fact equally independent of China. The situation which thus exists is without parallel in the world at the present day, and if it is allowed to continue indefinitely it must lead to an acute crisis sooner or later. The League Powers, and apparently the United States, have bound themselves not to recognise Manchukuo, and it is generally felt that it would be a disastrous surrender of principle if, after the undertakings of the League Covenant and Kellogg Pact, *de jure* recognition were to be given

² The Chinese were driven from Mongolia in 1921, not by the Bolsheviks, but by Baron Ungern's White Russians, for whose action in Mongolia the Bolsheviks were not responsible. But the Chinese could probably have reconquered Mongolia after the fall of Ungern, if the Bolshevik Russians had not occupied Outer Mongolia with a strong force for four years and trained and equipped a Mongol Red army. The Lytton Commission refused to see any analogy between the cases of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria (see p. 128 of the Report), but as cases of separatism promoted by foreign military intervention they are similar, and the earlier intervention, inasmuch as its result was not effectively challenged, served as a precedent and model for the later.

to a State which could not have come into being but for the military action of Japan. Yet the Powers have done nothing to dissolve the new State or to expel the Japanese troops who defend it; they have been content to withhold recognition, and leave it at that.

This may be a fine moral attitude, but it is necessary to face its consequences; non-recognition does not abolish the unrecognised State (as the case of Soviet Russia so clearly showed), but it does put it outside the system of world international relations, in a position where it can neither be a party to treaties nor called to account for its actions. It is arguable that the two 'puppet' States, which now exist on what is nominally Chinese territory, and which China is not likely to be capable of subduing by her own strength for many years to come, would be less bound to the particular Powers which now back them, and less dangerous to the peace of the world, if they could somehow be brought into the 'comity of nations' and have their frontiers precisely defined. The problem is certainly very difficult, but present-day diplomacy has attained such skill in exploring avenues and finding formulas that we need not despair of a solution which will put an end to the anomalies of the present situation in a practical way without prejudice to the ultimate legal rights of the Nanking Government, whatever they may be. After all, we have recently seen in the settlement of the Yugoslav-Hungarian dispute at Geneva a clash of apparently irreconcilable theses ended by an agreed resolution which has been hailed by each side as a victory for itself!

G. F. HUDSON.

WHAT FRANCE NEEDS

A SCHEME FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

It has for some time been plain to most of my compatriots, and also perhaps to many foreigners, that all is not well with the French democracy. Since the war our parliamentary system has more than once shown dangerous weaknesses—*e.g.*, during the financial crisis of 1926, when it was only saved from disaster by the energy of M. Poincaré, and again during the present crisis, when the widespread corruption revealed by the Stavisky scandal provoked the massacre of February 6, and led to an outburst of popular resentment unparalleled in recent history. On that occasion the Republic was once again saved by the wisdom of a single statesman, M. Doumergue, who at an advanced age emerged from his retirement to create a party truce and to form an Administration in some respects analogous to the British National Government.

Most of the evils of the present *régime* in my country can be traced to two principal sources, two tendencies which have grown up *pari passu* and perverted the structure of the Constitution of the Third Republic established in 1875—namely, the progressive encroachment of the Legislature on the functions of the Executive and the Judiciary, which has paralysed the former and diminished the prestige of the latter; and the increasing subservience of the deputies (and to a less degree the senators) to the local electorate, *i.e.*, to individual or sectional interests, which has encouraged, nay begotten, the encroachment to which I have just alluded.

In Great Britain during the past fifty years the parliamentary system has developed in precisely the opposite direction. The power of the Cabinet has steadily increased at the expense of the House of Commons, and already in certain circles the idea of strengthening the Chamber *against* the Executive has been gaining ground. In France, on the contrary, the crying need of constitutional reform of an entirely different character has long been recognised. For years now the equilibrium between the three powers of the French State—the legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary—which is the true guarantee of liberty, has

been broken owing to the predominance of a Legislature ever more deeply enslaved to the electorate, the instability of an Executive less and less equipped for its task, and through the intervention of both in the business of an insufficiently respected Judiciary. For years the framework of the various branches of the Administration, which is the guarantee of unity, has been undermined by the intrusion of politicians, the lack of discipline of public servants, and the selfishness of individual or sectional interests. The dangers entailed by this distortion of the double mechanism of government, central and local, which I have described in detail in my last book,¹ have often been pointed out by my colleagues, by historians, jurists, and moralists, like MM. Joseph-Barthélemy, Charles Benoit, Henri Berthélemy, Chardon, Paul Gaultier, Germain-Martin, and Alexandre Millerand.

Some of us have felt that the time has come to suggest more precise remedies and to work out in detail definite proposals for reform. A number of professors in the Faculty of Law—MM. Joseph Barthélemy, Gidel, Laffemère and Bernard Lavergne; several ex-members of the Council of State—MM. Lambert Ribot, Marlio, Pichon; M. Jacques Lyon, advocate of the Court of Appeal of Paris; M. Mirkiné Guetzevitch, director of the *Institut Politique de Droit Comparé*; and M. Ernest Mercier, president and founder of the society known as *Redressement Français*, have constituted themselves into a Technical Committee for the reform of the State (of which I have the honour to be chairman) for the purpose of drafting measures intended to ensure, within the framework of the Constitution, the correction and repair of our institutions and the restoration of efficiency to the public services. It has occurred to me that some of these proposals might be of interest to the English people, who have shown the world how to remain free without ceasing to be great.

The first task to which our committee has addressed itself is the liberation of the legislative power from the grip of interested groups and individuals. We are unanimous in believing that electoral reform stands at the head of the list, because without it no real consultation of the country is possible, and it is in itself the indispensable condition of any renewal of personnel. The question of electoral reform in France has a long and somewhat chequered history. Since the days of the Third Empire two different systems for election to the Chamber of Deputies have been alternately enacted—one based on the small one-member constituency (usually the *arrondissement*, and therefore called the *scrutin d'arrondissement*), the other based on the large multiple-member constituency (usually the *département*), known as the *scrutin de liste*. The first of these was chosen by Napoleon III.

¹ *Le Drame Français*.

in establishing the Constitution of 1851, and it was adopted, in spite of the opposition of Gambetta, by the Third Republic in 1875. In 1885, however, after Gambetta's death, the one-member constituency was abolished and the multiple constituency substituted. The new system resulted in the return of a very strong Royalist element, and largely as a result of the Boulangist menace the older system was restored. This lasted till 1919, when the Republican group, thinking in this way to perpetuate their majority, carried through a reversion to the *scrutin de liste* with proportional representation. In 1927 the Radicals and Socialists were able to put sufficient pressure on M. Poincaré to induce him to accept a return to the one-member constituency and the second ballot—a fruitful source of corruption. The merits of the two systems have been much disputed, but there can be no doubt that the small one-member constituency has been one of the principal causes of the enslavement of the deputy to his constituents. As M. Joseph Barthélemy has observed, the narrower the constituency the narrower the conception which its member has of his function and the more he thinks when voting in the Chamber of the impression his vote will produce, not upon France, but upon his electors.

It is, of course, a perfectly simple matter on paper to abolish the system of single-member constituencies, which ought never to have been reintroduced, since it over-stimulates the appetite of Frenchmen, who in other respects are such staunch upholders of equality, for personal favours from the Government, as well as encouraging their inveterate passion, however strong their individualism, for electoral patronage. It has enslaved electors and elected alike, while at the same time it has offered opportunities through the second ballot for corrupt bargainings and put a premium on dishonest arrangements between the different parties. But it is a much less simple matter to replace it. How, in fact, is it possible to revert to the multiple-member constituency without crushing minorities; to reduce the number of seats without sacrificing local interests; and to introduce proportional representation without encouraging fissiparous tendencies?

In order to solve these difficult problems the following electoral system is proposed: The Chamber of Deputies is to consist of 500 members in all, of which 397 will be assigned to the departmental lists of France and Algeria, instead of the present 612. It is to be elected for six years (instead of four years) by universal suffrage; votes are to be given to women and to heads of families, and all voting is to be made compulsory. The constituency is to be a multiple-member constituency, votes being cast, not for individual candidates, but for party lists, one seat being allotted

for each specific quota of so many votes. Parties will draw up two lists—one departmental and the other national. Votes which fail to secure representation on the departmental list will be transferred to the national list. This transfer system will not only provide access to Parliament for the intellectual *élite* of the principal parties, but it will also ensure the presence in the House of elected members freed from every kind of local servitude. This arrangement is designed to safeguard important minorities, to avoid the splitting up of parties, and to assure a more or less even distribution of seats, while guaranteeing a minimum of seats to the small departments, some of which can boast a history extending over 1000 years.

Before the general election the national list of each party will be sent to the Minister of the Interior, and the candidates in each constituency will send in to the prefect their common declaration of adoption, accompanied by a statement that their local list is affiliated to the national with the approval of the party. Seats will be awarded in the order in which the names of the candidates are inscribed on the lists. The independence and the good behaviour of the parties is thus guaranteed. They each keep their organisations, their doctrines, and their programmes intact—no *blocs* or cartels, no votes of preference or betrayal of principles such as the present system involves under the second ballot. Each department will have the right to one member for every 100,000 inhabitants, without taking into account lesser fractions, and each constituency will have a right to a minimum of two members even if its population is less than 100,000, and to a maximum of five members. Departments which by reason of their population have a right to more than five members will be divided into two or more constituencies by the Council of State. In each local constituency the number of votes cast divided by the number of seats to be filled will yield the quota for the constituency, and each party will be entitled to a seat for every quota of votes it polls. If the parties do not poll a sufficient number of quotas to fill the number of seats in the constituency, the seats will be allotted to the parties according to the largest fraction. The votes on the departmental list which fail to secure representation will be transferred to the national list to which they are affiliated. On the national list one seat will be allotted for every 40,000 votes polled,² and the assignment will be made by the Council of State on the Sunday following the general election. One further provision of the scheme should be emphasised. During the session of the Legislature every vacant seat will be filled up from the list to which the retiring or defunct

² This figure, the national quota, is roughly equivalent to the total population divided by the number of seats.

member belonged in order to avoid wearying the electorate by unnecessary ballots.

The working of the system may be illustrated by the following examples :

DEPARTMENTAL CONSTITUENCY ELECTING TWO MEMBERS

Total votes polled, 89,400.

Quota, 44,700.

Party List.	No. of Votes polled.	Result.
U.R.D. (<i>Union Républicain Démocratique</i>).	46,800	Obtains <i>one</i> seat elected by quota ; 2,100 excess votes transferred to the national list.
Independent Socialists	17,100	Obtains <i>one</i> seat for largest fraction.
Agrarian . . .	10,000	No representation ; votes transferred to national list.
United Socialists . . .	15,000	Ditto.
Communists . . .	7,500	Ditto.

DEPARTMENTAL CONSTITUENCY ELECTING FIVE MEMBERS

Total votes polled, 224,000.

Quota, 44,800.

List.	Votes polled.	Result.
Republicans of the Left.	71,200	Obtains two seats (one by quota and one by largest fraction).
U.R.D. . . .	36,000	Obtains one seat (largest fraction).
United Socialists . . .	35,900	Ditto.
Communists . . .	21,000	Ditto.
Radicals . . .	16,800	No seat ; votes transferred to national list.
Popular Democrats . . .	10,000	Ditto.
Socialist Republicans.	8,000	Ditto.

Another much-needed reform is the proper revision of electoral rolls. Under the present system—which, incidentally, is very complicated—the revising Commission which sits every year is usually dominated by local officials and individuals—*e.g.*, the mayor and representatives of the prefect and the municipal council, who are open to political pressure from local interests. We propose, therefore, a clause to the effect that the president of the Municipal Commission shall be a judicial officer—a magistrate or ex-magistrate—appointed by the president of the Court of Appeal. This clause also extends the grounds for electoral incapacity to lunatics, the feeble-minded, and to criminals, and, what is much more important, it guarantees the rectitude of

electoral procedure, thus eliminating the present abuses by which absentees, dead persons, or even horses and dogs, have been known to vote. It provides that every elector shall produce a card containing his or her photograph ; that each voter shall be properly identified and sign the counterfoil of his ballot-paper ; that votes shall be counted in the presence of representatives of the lists ; that acts of corruption and violence shall be repressed under penalty of annulling elections and depriving those found guilty of such practices of their civil rights. Moreover, the independence and integrity of deputies will be safeguarded by a proviso prohibiting under severe penalties the exaction by writing from a candidate of a pledge renouncing his liberty of voting in the Chamber on any question concerning the private interest of a person or corporation. Further, at the beginning of each session every member of the Chamber will be required to take an oath that he will devote his activity to the general interest and that he will not in any way attempt to procure the modification, except by way of written question, interpellation, resolution or Bill, of any act of the Executive or of the public departments or of the judicial authorities, under penalty of losing his seat by sentence of the House.

Having freed the legislative power from the grip of sectional and particularist interests and from the corruption of electoral morals, it is essential to re-establish the balance between the three powers by limiting the Legislature and stabilising the Executive. This is the aim of eight articles which the committee proposes to insert into the Constitution with the sole desire to create a reaction against a long-standing and increasing deformation of our system of government, which has ceased, in fact, to be parliamentary. At present both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are in permanent session. Their committees usurp the function of Ministers and their interference disorganises the public services. The Government has neither the time to work nor the means of carrying on the administration. We propose to add to the Constitution of July 16, 1875, an article to the effect that the two Houses shall not sit more than six months in each year. Should it happen that after the expiry of the six months the budget for the succeeding year has not yet been voted, the current budget shall be automatically prolonged for one year. Any fresh expenditure that cannot be postponed may be voted for one year by the Senate summoned in extraordinary session by the President of the Republic. The President shall also have the right to summon extraordinary meetings of both Houses in the intervals between two sessions, if two-thirds of the deputies demand it, and in cases of public emergency.

The limitation of the financial initiative of the private member

is quite as urgent as the limitation of the duration of the parliamentary sessions. Here once more we are concerned not so much with a reversal of the existing constitution as with a reversion to the norm. In order to prevent the squandering of public funds two new articles should be inserted into the Constitution requiring every Bill or amendment, whether proposed by the Government or by a private member, which involves fresh expenditure to be accompanied by a report of the Council of State,³ and further by a report of the Economic Council, which shall estimate the expenditure and, if the occasion arises, suggest the ways and means through which it is to be met. Though Parliament grants the credits and controls the expenditure, the Government alone is to have the initiative in demanding credits and financial measures. Every amendment, whether proposed by the Finance Committee or by a private member, which has not been submitted at the proper time to the above procedure shall be ruled out of order. The urgency procedure is, furthermore, defined and strengthened. In this way a stop will be put to the present anti-constitutional practice by which the Finance Bill can be entirely overthrown by the Financial Committee and the articles deleted by it are not even submitted again to the Chamber.

In order to re-establish the balance to which I have referred, it is not sufficient merely to limit the legislative power. M. Joseph Barthélemy has in some of his lectures given a very graphic description of the lobby intrigues, hatched in the small hours of the morning—the hours of crimes and executions—against Governments who have ceased to suit the conveniences of the floor of the House. The committee is unanimous in considering that the scandalous system by virtue of which the President of the Republic has been obliged to invest six Prime Ministers and sign sixty-three decrees of appointment for heads of departments and under-secretaries in the course of twenty months must, if it is permitted to continue, involve the ruin of free institutions which are so dear to the heart of the vast majority

³ There is no institution in England at all analogous to our *Conseil d'État*, which was originally established by the 'Constitution of the Year VIII,' with quasi-legislative functions—e.g., it was responsible for drafting the laws which were afterwards voted by the Assembly. It was also an advisory body. Its legislative functions were subsequently abolished and its character changed to that of a judicial body. Under the present Constitution it is a body with very great prestige, being the Supreme Court, which takes cognisance of questions of administrative law—a court which by tradition has been regarded, like the Supreme Court of the United States, as the guardian of the rights and liberties of the individual. Among other reforms the Technical Committee has suggested a reversion to something analogous to its original function, by requiring that before being voted all legislative measures—which often to-day are carelessly drafted—shall be reported on by the Council of State.

of Frenchmen. To remedy this distressing state of affairs the committee proposes the following amendment to the Constitution: A vote of no confidence in the Government may not be taken except on three days' notice, after the presentation of a request signed by at least one-third of the members of the Chamber. If after an interval of three days from the passing of a vote of no confidence the Prime Minister shall not have requested and obtained from the President of the Republic either a dissolution or, in the case of a disagreement over a Bill, a decree of referendum, the Government shall resign. After the sovereign people has been consulted either in a general election or a referendum the Chamber shall proceed to a new vote of confidence in the Government.

Here for the first time the committee has diverged from the customary rules of parliamentary procedure as practised in Great Britain, the country which invented them. I must admit that the referendum, even though it is optional, raises many objections. It constitutes an application of that direct democracy which appears better adapted to the city-states of the ancient world, with their aristocratic village communities, than to the vast industrial empires of modern times. Ignorance in this century, which calls itself enlightened, is so widespread that there is a danger that the referendum will more often than not prove both childish and indecisive. I realise, too, that the defective organisation of the French parties, the indiscipline of their members, and the poverty of their resources make frequent dissolutions impracticable. But the referendum is a sort of semi-dissolution. It provides the opportunity of giving to the masses of the people some necessary lessons in political education.

The tragedy of France at the present moment does not depend on the fact that its constitutional laws are incomplete, but on a much more grave condition—namely, that their essential provisions (those relating to the power of the Executive) are no longer applied, either in the letter or in the spirit. What is even more serious is that as the result of a slow and progressive decay the public services of the central Government have been deserted by their most distinguished members and discouraged by outside interference to such a degree that they no longer retain either the intellectual strength or the inflexible integrity of earlier days. As for the prefectorial administration, it has no longer either prestige or authority. My colleagues and I are convinced that the setting in order of the administrative structure, which is ardently desired by the modest provincial folk of France and is an indispensable pre-requisite to economic recovery, cannot be guaranteed so long as the essential mechanism of the Executive power and the two supreme organs of impulsion and control, the President

of the Republic and the Premiership, remain the one debilitated and the other unorganised. Accordingly the committee, having enlarged the functions of the President of the Republic in the event of a conflict between Parliament and the Executive through the power of dissolution and the referendum, proposes to rehabilitate the supreme magistracy in its original dignity according to the forms of the Constitution by freeing it from the restriction implied by the Ministerial counter-signature in the appointment of the Prime Minister and the nomination of high officials. The Ministerial counter-signature, which is the corollary of the irresponsibility of the President, has in fact proved the instrument by which his office has been shorn of all power, though this was not its original intention. On paper the President's powers are very extensive. Under the Constitution of 1875 he was intended to possess a very wide prerogative. Thus, for example, if he so wishes, the Senate and the Chamber can only sit for five months in the year, and he has power to adjourn their sessions twice for a month at a time. He also possesses the right of dissolution of the Chamber with the consent of the Senate and a limited veto, being empowered if he disapproves of a Bill to require a fresh deliberation and to make a direct appeal to the nation and to take command of the armed forces of the State. He also has the right to grant free pardons. But in practice these powers have either fallen into desuetude or become purely formal, except perhaps for the power of nominating the Prime Minister, though this, too, is limited by the requirement of the Ministerial counter-signature.

The Prime Minister, by means of a provision to be inserted in the Constitution, will be given a special legal status, and also an official residence and a special staff, which will furnish him with an information department and with the lever of control.

The special status thus accorded to the Prime Minister represents a compromise between the British system (*i.e.*, selection by the Constitutional Sovereign) and the Swiss system (*i.e.*, election by the Legislative Assembly), which is in harmony with French traditions and respects the formulas of the Constitution. It is also proposed to suppress the Ministry of the Interior, and, after having transferred its control of the police (*Sûreté Nationale*) to the Ministry of Justice, to establish a Prime Minister's office consisting of the following sections :

- (a) Appointments section, detached from the Ministry of the Interior.
- (b) Statistical section, detached from the Ministry of Commerce.
- (c) Press section, detached from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior.

(d) Section for Departmental Affairs, detached from the Ministry of the Interior.

(e) Section for Alsace-Lorraine, detached from the Ministry of Justice.

The object of these proposals is not merely to endow the head of the Government with information which will enable him to follow the fluctuations in the life of the nation and with instruments which will enable him to exercise an influence on public opinion. They are really much more significant, because they are intended to provide him with the power to reorganise the recruitment for the public services of the central Administration and to stimulate the reform of the prefectorial establishments. The officials of the Prime Minister's office and of the eleven Ministries will constitute the Civil Service of the Republic, to be recruited by annual competition—one single examination for all the public departments—from any graduates in law, and persons possessing the diplomas of the *École des Sciences Politiques*. The personnel of the Civil Service up to the rank of sectional chief (assistant secretary) will be appointed and promoted departmentally ; the appointments to higher ranks in every Ministry (including the Prime Minister's department) will be made on the advice of a Secretary-General, or permanent Under-Secretary of State. These officers will be assimilated in rank to the presidents of sections of the Council of State : they will be selected without respect to age or academic qualifications, being appointed, dismissed, and retired on the advice of the Prime Minister by the President of the Republic on his personal responsibility and without Ministerial counter-signature. They will act as delegates of the Minister for the administration of day-to-day departmental affairs, and they will be present as *rapporteurs ex officio* at the Council of Directors, which will meet every week under the chairmanship of the Minister, who is alone to be charged with the function of liaison between the Executive and Parliament.

Such a reorganisation of the central Administration is badly needed. For, according to the most authoritative witnesses, the deterioration of the Civil Service staffs is paralysing the Executive. Not only have the ablest men tended since the war to leave the service for business or the professions, but, in addition, the moral fibre of those that remain has been progressively relaxed by the interference of deputies with the administrative machine. The good administrator has been discouraged, and the public official has been driven more and more to look for chances of promotion, not in his own efficiency, but rather on the favours granted to politicians. This critical condition in the central Administration is only of about ten years' standing. The same phenomenon is observable also in the provinces, but it is of much earlier origin.

It is closely bound up with the decay of the local assemblies (municipal and departmental)—a decay which, though it is less well known than that of the two Houses of Parliament, proceeds from the same causes and entails the same consequences.

In order to ensure the reform of the local administration, Secretaries-General of the departments and the sub-prefects will be chosen by the method of competition at the same time and by the same examination as the auditors of the Council of State. The officials thus recruited will be placed at the disposition of the regional prefects and directed towards the more active function of inspiring the economic life of their departments and acting as itinerant controllers.

These proposals worked out by the Technical Committee were submitted both to M. Doumergue and to M. Flandin, each of whom in their programme of reform incorporated some of their main features. Thus M. Doumergue's proposals contained three points of the committee's programme: (1) The granting of the power of dissolution to the President after the first year of the session without the necessity of consulting the Senate, which in practice means, of course, the right of the Prime Minister to ask for a dissolution. (2) The limitation of the power of the individual deputy to initiate expenditure by requiring the requisite budgetary resources to be voted first by both Houses. (3) The granting of a permanent legal status to civil servants with due *garanties de carrière*.

As everyone knows, M. Doumergue came to grief over the first of these proposals (which he might perhaps have carried had he attempted to do so a few months earlier) and resigned. The self-interest of the parliament-men was altogether too great to induce them to consent to such a sacrifice—for elections are expensive and they are frequently conducted on borrowed money, and the threat of a dissolution would enormously strengthen the hands of a Government against the predatory proposals of the deputies, inspired by local interests.

Warned by his predecessor's fall, M. Flandin has carefully avoided the 'road to Versailles'⁵ and has concentrated his attention rather on the administrative aspects of reform, and has already taken steps to strengthen the Executive by providing the Prime Minister with an official residence and a secretariat of his own. He has also taken steps to limit the initiative of the private member in the proposal of fresh expenditure, and to reform parliamentary procedure with the object of making obstruction less easy. M. Flandin has also undertaken to reform the Civil Service by giving it a more permanent status and a less

⁵ Amendments to the Constitution can only be made by both Houses in joint session as a National Assembly in Versailles.

political character and to reinforce the independence of the Judiciary by placing the promotion of magistrates outside the reach of political tampering. So far he has found the Chamber remarkably docile. But for how long? It is clear that he has 'scotched the snake, not killed it.' Not until more far-reaching reforms like those proposed by the Technical Committee have actually been carried into effect will French democracy return to its original ideal—the voluntary government of the many by the *élite*.

JACQUES BARDOUX.

‘PLANNING’ AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION

‘INDUSTRIAL Organisation,’ which not very long ago was considered to be mainly an issue between capital and labour, has in recent years attracted increasing attention from almost all quarters of public life. Problems like ‘planning,’ ‘rationalisation,’ ‘cartels and trusts,’ ‘centralisation of industry,’ ‘industrial combination’ of a various type, ‘interlocking of companies,’ ‘State interference and administration of industry,’ ‘co-ordination of industrial organisation,’ ‘industrial finance,’ etc., seem to stand to-day in the forefront of economic discussions. This is perhaps due not so much to the purely ‘industrial’ problems involved as to the fact that the industrial problems at stake seem to represent the potential starting-point of a new evolution of the whole structure of economic life. The problem of the new forms of industrial organisation seems to be regarded more and more as a decisive factor in the development of the structure and organism of the economic life of the nation as a whole. Just as in former days the rise of the factory system was not merely concerned with changes in the technique and size of the industrial unit, but was, in fact, the origin of the greatest social and political innovations of the last century, such as Socialism, trade unions, factory laws, State regulations, and the whole of the modern labour problems, one might be entitled to expect that our present problems in regard to industrial organisation may one day be considered as having been the nucleus of an entirely new general order of economic organisation.

There is hardly anyone to-day who would deny that fundamental changes in the organisation of industry are going on in the old industries as well as in the new; but the principles deduced and the conclusions drawn from these changes differ very widely. There are a good many people who have been very eager to claim that these changes, being partly due to a desire to remedy the evils of a world-wide economic disorder, represent an entirely novel system of economic organisation. They are the planners who take it for granted that the ‘old’ order of competition has for inevitable reasons come to an end and that

organisatory changes of all kind are simply the forerunners of an all-round new system of ‘planning’ which should be carried out as soon and as universally as possible. In his very illuminating study on the Great Depression, Professor Lionel Robbins exclaims: ‘But “planning”—ah, magic word—who would not “plan”? We may not all be Socialists now, but we are certainly (nearly) all planners.’¹ He himself is certainly not a planner. His book, on the contrary, is an attempt to reveal the weak points and arguments of those who wish to replace the order of ‘yesterday’ by a system of almost automatically working programmes and calculations. ‘A world of national planning is not a world which offers high hopes of political stability or economic progress.’ Another economic authority Professor D. H. Macgregor, in a book which may be considered as one of the most enlightened studies on the subject,² reminds his readers of general instances in which ideas on industrial organisation, which at one time received most fervent support, have proved disappointing later on. In his opinion, it may well be that ten years hence we shall be speaking of the ‘planning fallacy.’

The new idea [he remarks] also comes with a tendentious name, and economists of to-day would do the very thing which earlier economists are accused of, if they rode the horse of rationalisation harder than the pace of industry could keep up with. We ought to smooth the fluctuations of thought.

On the one hand, the planners would like to plan everything in the shortest possible time. A new series of intelligently composed broadsheets called *Planning* is devoted to this purpose; readers will find here everything which a planner may ask for, supported by the whole vocabulary of the new ‘movement,’ like ‘Industry’s obsolete Framework,’ ‘A New Model for Industries,’ the necessity of an ‘Enabling Act,’ under which each industry will be able to ‘set its house in order,’ ‘Planning begins at Home,’ etc. On the other hand, there are those who directly object to a planning propaganda and others who even hold the opinion that one ought to revert as soon as possible to the old order of things. Moreover, it is interesting to note here and there that even those who are aware of the facts which have revolutionised the forms of industrial organisation in the last twenty years are showing some hesitation in associating themselves fully with the ‘modern’ changes.

Where, then, does the truth lie? There can be no doubt that changes of a fundamental character are going on in many forms of industrial organisation. The question is how far these changes

¹ *The Great Depression* (Macmillan, 1933), p. 145.

² *Enterprise, Purpose and Profit* (Oxford University Press).

are of a general character applicable to the whole order of productive economic organisation, or whether they only relate to certain specific conditions of industry and to certain economic developments which may be considered '*sub specie æternitatis*'—as being of a more or less accidental and transitory kind.

Large parts of industry are represented to-day by a system of organisation which, in contrast to the earlier development of single units of production, may be called that of combined and concentrative control. In stating this I want to limit my analysis to private industry and leave out the already vast field of industrial organisation covered by the 'public concern' operated by local authorities, such as the public utility undertakings connected with gas, electricity, tramways, water, housing, etc. By combined and concentrative control in private industry I mean the domination which big concerns, holding companies, cartels, amalgamations, international combines (I am well aware that these terms are partly synonymous), etc., have acquired over formerly independent manufacturers or companies. This movement has too long been viewed almost exclusively with the object of discovering and searching the monopolist side of it. Certainly all this sort of concentrative organisation may contain, and indeed generally does contain, the germ of cartellisation or trustification, or is at least facilitating the formation of, quasi-monopolistic combinations. In this respect it matters little whether amalgamations are carried through with the definite purpose of making exploitation of monopolist conditions in an industry more effective, or whether existing monopolistic tendencies are by themselves leading to concentrative forms of industrial organisation, as, for instance, vertical combination of industrial units, which are the forerunners of larger 'concerns.' There is no doubt a link between the new forms of concentrative development in industry and cartels or trusts; but we must avoid conceiving the movement towards the new forms of industrial organisation as being exclusively designed to create monopolies. In fact, their monopolistic aspect does not by any means exhaust their significance, and it may be considered doubtful whether it is their most essential part. Professor Macgregor quite rightly expresses this in saying that

monopolistic purpose is difficult to distinguish from higher organisation, and in the last fifty years the latter has had to bear the suspicion of the former. . . . A 'higher organisation' in an industry looks the same outside as a monopolistic construction.

It is worth while to emphasise this truth over and over again, as even to-day it seems hard to some people to make this distinction. Thus, in the eyes of Professor Robbins, modern

industrial monopolies seem to be nothing else than the vicious device of capitalists to exploit natural monopolies and patents with the aid of a misguided policy of the State which is bolstering up industrial combination by tariffs and other measures. One may well wonder how long this primitive theory will be able to assert itself. It has long been known—indeed, ever since Mr. Macrosty, Mr. Fitzgerald, and myself were describing English industrial combination—that a good many strong English cartels and trusts, especially in the textile trade, were neither based upon natural monopoly, patents or tariffs. How, moreover, does this theory help to explain all those big combines which—*e.g.*, in iron and steel—are only partly based upon the domination of raw material, being rather founded upon concentrative forces of the industrial unit which have nothing to do with 'nature,' 'patents,' or 'tariffs'?^{*} It would be fatal to the progress of economic knowledge if it were not commonly realised that new forms of industrial organisation, which are of a far wider significance than mere 'cartels' and 'trusts,' are characterising the development of the industrial organism in our time.

Let us look for a moment into economic history in order to show that this development is not quite without precedent. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a large number of handicrafts, which before were practised by quite independent producers, became indirectly dependent on capital, as markets had widened and the unit of production had increased, so that the small master was generally not in the position to supply the necessary capital to meet the changed conditions. Traders in foreign goods, overseas merchants and middlemen formed a new class of capitalists which by its command of money gained the mastery of the craftsmen. What was happening was the domination of till then independent producers by capitalists who did not produce, but were financing and organising distribution on a larger scale, inasmuch as local distribution had been superseded by bulkier sales to far distant places and countries. This form of organisation was interrupted by the introduction of machinery and by the growth of the factory system. The independent manufacturer was again restored. Almost the whole of the nineteenth century was characterised by this development. But in our days another system—which in its broader scope bears some resemblance to that which I have just described—has been growing up. Single factories or joint-stock companies are losing their independence in favour of large concerns and dominating industrial combinations. Finance-capital once more is asserting its preponderance over production. The still existing independent

^{*} For more particulars, cf. my book on *Industrial Germany* (now in the press).

manufacturer or company may be compared, *mutatis mutandis*, to the craftsman of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who by himself was unable to finance the unit of production which had become profitable in regard to the distribution on a larger scale. But the financing agency or medium of to-day is not the merchant or the shipper, but either—as in Germany and the United States—the big banks or the dominant concerns arising out of a combination of the most important and financially strongest interests in the particular industry. One may deduce from this historical parallel that the history of the forms of industrial organisation shows considerable variations in the respective rôles played by the technical unit and the financial (or capitalist) organisation. At the present day it seems once more that the great changes in the economics of industry are not arising, as in the pioneer days of modern machinery, from the technical side of production, but from that of capitalist exploitation through new forms of organisation.

The development of new forms of concentrative organisation of industry ought not to be considered as caused by accidental or casual factors. The components of causes may be numerous indeed, as may be gathered from a useful enumeration in Professor Plummer's new book,⁴ but it would certainly be almost incredible that so many different factors—as, for example, technical progress, tariffs, natural monopolies, patents, international financial aspirations, etc.—should have accidentally united themselves to bring about one new development of industrial organisation. In fact, this development may be traced to a single root. The essential condition making concentrative organisation successful has been everywhere the development of the possibilities of bulk sale. These possibilities have been greatly increased during the last fifty years by the progress of transport facilities and the facilitation of national as well as international economic intercourse. Bulk distribution can be best served by concentrated production. One need only think of the Danish butter exporting business, which led to the foundation of large-scale co-operative dairies, in contrast to the traditional existence of small dairies in places or countries with decentralised local sales. Wherever the desire to sell bulk quantities to centralised markets (whether national or the world market) has coincided with the possibilities of concentrative organisation, the outcome has been the rise of industrial combination of some sort. Such possibilities can exist in many ways. They may be created by the existence of geographically concentrated natural monopolies, by technical progress leading to bigger units of production, by the rise of new industries which from their

⁴ *International Combines in Modern Industry* (1934, pp. 54 et seq.).

beginning are conducted on a very large scale (e.g., chemicals, electricity). The possibilities of 'national' concentration of industry may be fostered by tariffs, and even by legislation, and some of these factors may occur simultaneously, but in every case the possibility of selling large quantities to centralised markets will be the primarily dominant factor.

It is not a mere accident that the United States were the first to develop a big network of trusts. In no country did natural, geographical, and distributive concentration develop so early as here. The American beef industry, for instance (which replaced the local butcher), with its huge units of production, would never have developed if bulk shipments of meat from the Middle West to the East had not become technically possible and economically profitable. Wherever the said conditions of 'concentration' were latent, new forms of industrial organisation were created or developed to take care of them. That these forms were associated with, and certainly in many cases even primarily designed to effect, the exploitation of the monopolistic opportunities inherent to those concentrative conditions ought not to obscure the wider problem of the character of the new forms of organisation evolved.

What, then, are these forms? Two groups may be distinguished. The one is mainly connected with the problem of organising production on concentrative lines, the other with the performance of the financial task connected with the new concentrative movement in industry. Horizontal combination, which may lead to trusts as well as to cartellistic associations (taking the term in a wider sense than merely an amalgamation of works engaged in similar production), has been in many industries the basic starting-point of the development towards concentration. In fact, a syndicate or a cartel does not differ materially from a 'horizontal' combination, as it represents an 'agreement' between manufacturers producing the same goods, while a 'horizontal' combination represents an actual union of them. The difference is mainly formal. A cartel is expected to control a large (quasi-monopolistic) percentage of production, while a horizontal combination need not. If it does, it is growing out of a mere horizontal combination into a 'trust.' The question 'trust *versus* cartel' has been for a long time misunderstood. There can be no doubt that legal enactments and interpretations have been largely responsible for the development of the one or the other form of concentrative organisation. In the United States the strict upholding of anti-monopolist legal doctrines of the past have made cartels impossible and acted as a stimulus to the trust form of organisation. The same applies in some degree to English conditions, where the fear of infringing the law against restraint of trade has acted as a deterrent to the formation of

cartels. On the other hand, in Germany, where no such legal impediments existed, the cartel movement has been of late greatly overshadowed by a development of huge combines like the *Stahlverein* within the framework of a cartel. It rather seems that the cartel movement may be considered in many cases as a mere forerunner to the final trust form of concentrative organisation. The cartel or syndicate has its place where conditions of concentration are latent and where as yet the number of surviving competitors seem to be far too great to be merged into a single fusion. The cartel here is, so to speak, anticipating the coming development. It may even act in this direction by lessening the number of competitors through the sale of quotas. But again, it may happen that under the 'protection' of the cartel, as, for instance, in the German potash trade, the number of competitors is increased and the chances of trustification are at first lessened. At any rate, a cartel seems to be neither the final stage of industrial concentrative organisation nor even an alternative to trustification. As trusts are in general not co-extensive with the whole industry, they will be eager to uphold cartellistic organisation as a means of controlling the activities of the remaining competitors.

Cartels as a form of industrial organisation are not wanted where an industry is built up from its beginning on very large units of production. This applies, in the first place, to the new industries of the last decades, which from their start needed huge amounts of capital. In every country the making of artificial silk has been concentrated in a few units of production, which by themselves represent a trust-like character, whether we take Courtaulds in this country, or Glanzstoff and Bemberg in Germany, the *Aku* in Holland, or the *Snia Viscosa* in Italy. Here the cartel form of industrial organisation only remains important in the international field, where the numerous national interests have created competition similar to that existing in other groups of industry within national frontiers. The same conditions existed in the British dyestuff industry, which from the outset was limited to a few producers. Two of these, controlling not less than 75 per cent. of the national output, formed the British Dyestuffs Corporation in 1918. Here, conditions were entirely different from those in other sectors of the chemical 'super-trusts' formed eight years later, as the history of its other component partners—Brunner Mond, United Alkali Co., and Nobel Industries—shows the typical development of horizontal amalgamations of a great number of firms spread over a long period of years.

Vertical combination may usefully be analysed from the point of view of concentrative development in industry. When

at first some 'finishing' firms here and there began to associate themselves with the production of raw materials or 'semis,' or when the producers of raw material began to intrude the subsequent stages of production, this movement was simply explained by the desire of doing away with intermediate profits. But why, one is entitled to ask, was this method of better economy not originated by the manufacturers fifty or seventy years before? The answer is: because any such combination was of little use so long as there was no concentrative development in either of the above-mentioned stages. Where, however, horizontal combination became effective there was the danger of a monopolist domination either in the raw material or in the finished article, the producers of raw material being as much threatened by a combine of their customers as these were by one of their suppliers. This explains why vertical combination in the iron and steel trade set in so much earlier in Germany and the United States than in England. Here, coal and iron ore could be supplied from various almost unlimited sources, as the English iron trade had special facilities for importing Swedish and Spanish ores, and coal was distributed in more than 1500 colliery undertakings all over the country. In the United States and Germany the iron ore and coal supply was geographically concentrated in a few districts (Lake Superior—Connellsville; Lorraine—Luxemburg; Rhenish Westphalia—Upper Silesia) and has undergone horizontal concentration at an early date. But, apart from these monopolistic conditions (sometimes fostered by tariffs), it is evident that concentrative organisation of one section of an industry will naturally lead to a desire on the part of other sections to organise in the same way the supply of raw material and the distribution of the finished article on concentrative lines. Thus horizontal combination or concentration will develop by itself the conditions leading to vertical concentration and combination. An example of this is furnished by the modern development of the chemical industries in England, as lately described by Professor Plummer and especially by the Brunner Mond—Lever Brothers agreement. By this agreement Brunner Mond acquired the exclusive right to supply soda ash to Lever Brothers and the majority of its associated companies, and Brunner Mond in return undertook, with some exceptions, not to be concerned or interested in any way in the manufacture or sale of soap in any part of the world. The importance of this agreement becomes clear when it is realised that—(1) the Lever combine controls the vast bulk of the English soap industry and has still greater soap interests abroad; (2) that in 1919, the date of the agreement, not much less than half Brunner Mond's home deliveries of soda ash were made to soap manufacturers; and (3) that Brunner Mond's chief product is

soda ash. Here we have a typical example of vertical combination arrived at after the several stages of production have reached a high degree of concentration. It matters little in practice whether this vertical combination takes the form of fusion among the respective interests, whether the primary or following stages of production are going to be affiliated to each other within one undertaking, or whether the vertical organisation merely takes the form of an exclusive agreement, as in this case.

It will be easily understood that such vast changes in the development of industrial units as are represented by horizontal and vertical concentration must have far-reaching effects in regard to the forms of the financial and administrative organisation of industry. The one group of these new forms is represented by cartels and syndicates. It would certainly be interesting to study the various aspects of the cartel or association form of industrial organisation, which depends in the different countries very largely upon legal conditions and enactments. But while the main problems of cartels lies not so much in their form of organisation as in their policy in regard to prices, competition, trade practices, etc., the movement towards amalgamation has to a remarkable extent depended on the forms these organisations have taken. There have been cases enough where the material conditions of amalgamation were existing while it was difficult to find the organisatory form to make use of them. On the other hand, certain forms of amalgamative organisation have been so tempting as to foster a sort of trustification which could not have been justified by the existing conditions of competition. Here a sort of 'super-organisation,' an exaggerated kind of trust-like structure, has resulted, leading after some time to the necessity of decentralising what had been carefully brought together. As regards the English chemical trust, the Imperial Chemical Industries, it may be rightly contended, as Plummer has put it, that it 'took control of policy and finance, but left undisturbed the detailed management of the constituent undertakings and their subsidiaries.' This may be contrasted with the organisation of the German Steel Trust, which apparently went too far in centralisation and had recently to undergo a new process of reconstruction in the direction of greater decentralisation of its component parts.

Amalgamation in its simplest form consists in fusing companies which had been hitherto competing with each other. But another and somewhat complicated form of union, originating in the United States, is that of the Holding Company, established to control the undertakings forming the trust or quasi-trust in question without having recourse to the actual merging of these

undertakings into one corporation. This holding-company form of industrial combination has been in some countries indirectly fostered by reasons of fiscal expediency, as it is sometimes more economic to form a limited company with a small capital taking over the majority, if not the whole, of the shares of the companies to be amalgamated, whereby the costly act of creating a new corporation may be avoided. A typical example of such form of industrial organisation can be found in the international linoleum industry. This industry belongs to those 'new' industries which from their very start have enjoyed all the advantages of large-scale production. Length, width, and the general quality of the produce were easily subjected to standardisation wherever linoleum was produced, and the distinctions related almost solely to the differentiation in design. But the big undertakings are able to keep a much greater variety of patterns and designs, which is an important factor in the sale of linoleum. National concentration of undertakings was early followed by horizontal agreements in the international field. But these mere 'conventions' were supplemented by internationally centralised control. A company formed for that purpose is the *Kontinentale Linoleum Union* in Zürich, a holding company, which took over the controlling companies of the German concern. This holding company also became the owner of the majority of shares in the greatest Swiss producing company, in Giubiasco, and in the Swedish works in Göteborg, which also controlled the leading works in Latvia. It also took over the Dutch factory in Krommenie, and participations were arranged in the French *Société anonyme Rémoise du Linoleum* and the most important factory in Poland. A giant international undertaking of a trust-like character has been the final result of all these affiliations, which, considered from the point of view of industrial company structure, show a very complicated network of interlocking connexions. The functions of the combine have been to come to agreements with other producers (including the English), to pool profits and losses, and to allocate orders.

From this kind of organisation a peculiar condition of company structure has resulted, which in German has been called '*Verschachtelung*' (*Schachtel* being 'box'; the term is probably derived from those well-known Chinese toy boxes fitting one into the other), while in English there is no other word but 'interlocking' for it. There can be no doubt—and experience in Germany as well as in England is going to prove it—that such interlocking of companies and directorates may afford to the companies concerned a somewhat dangerous possibility of hiding their real relations. The defects of these rather complex forms of industrial organisation in regard to publicity have been experi-

enced in several of the famous 'crashes' which followed the 'boom' period of 1924-29.

A much-discussed modern type of industrial organisation is that of a 'community of interests,' a term which is also derived from the German term '*Interessengemeinschaft*.' This form of industrial organisation was at first preferred where a closer union of companies—in the form of fusion, partnership, holding, etc.—was not wanted. Arrangements were made (for a substantial period of years) between large concerns in regard to a common standard of dividends to be distributed and to the exchange of patents and the results of research. Though this form of industrial organisation seemed to be of a somewhat loose character when compared with the holding-company type, it has proved in the case of the German chemical trust, the *I-G Farben*, the primary stage of a most powerful trust with enormous ramifications.

All modern trust-like organisations are characterised by being headed and surrounded by a number of companies of a different type. There may be a company 'controlling' in some way or other the whole 'concern,' there may be what the Germans call a 'roof'-company (*Dachgesellschaft*), with administrative functions of a varying kind, and there will certainly be found a number of subsidiary companies connected with the parent company. These last may have various functions: they may serve purposes of production as well as of distribution; they may be concerned with financial tasks, such as taking over the shares of the concern either as mere partnerships or as a matter of control; they may be connected with the financing of the supply of raw material and even with matters of insurance.

In considering this very varied picture of modern forms of industrial organisation one is led to a conclusion of no small importance. What we are faced with is an entirely new aspect of industrial organisation; and to consider it merely from the point of view of monopolistic domination seems to reveal an extremely narrow conception of it. The monopoly complex which may certainly form one of the aims of this new type of modern organisation only represents one of its many sides, and that by no means the most important. It may even be doubted whether under modern conditions of publicity and public control, in view of the recognised harm which over-competition may cause in the days of the 'Great Depression,' there is, in fact, so much to be feared from a policy which eliminates free competition to a certain extent. On the other hand, the movement towards industrial concentrative organisation, national and international, is much too widespread, much too intimately connected with genuine economic necessities to allow any longer the old-fashioned criticism that it is merely promoted by monopolist motives and

bolstered up by 'artificial' measures. When an exponent of this obsolete view, Professor Lionel Robbins, demands that 'nothing must be done which will encourage business-men to believe that they will not be allowed to go under if they make mistakes or if the conditions of the market make necessary a contraction of their industry,'⁵ he is not, as he believes, taking an anti-monopolist point of view; on the contrary, it should follow that highly efficient concentrative organisations are quite entitled to crush weaker competitors. When early in the nineteenth century trade unions were legalised, this was considered by the exponents of pure *laissez-faire* liberalism as an infringement of individual liberty. In the same way the suppression of concentrative forms of industrial organisation, which may prove an effective weapon against economic disorganisation, and which are organically evolving out of concentrative conditions of modern capitalism, would mean nothing else than bolstering up the weak against the progressive. It would, indeed, mean interference of the most drastic kind, and it might rightly be called 'compulsory competition.' It is the organisatory and not the quasi-monopolistic aspect of great concerns which should attract our foremost attention precisely in these days of economic anxiety. This leads us back to the problem of 'Planning.'

Just as the structure of modern forms of industrial undertakings may be considered from the point of view of organisation instead of that of monopoly only, so their policy may be judged in a dual way. One part of it, at any rate, may be considered as a sort of planning—i.e., adapting supply to demand by conscious control. This particular aspect was amply discussed by the German Cartel Commission of 1927-30. It was expressly stated in one of the Final Reports of that Commission⁶ that there has been enough experience to show that cartels and huge concerns have shown a progressive attitude not only towards technical rationalisation and standardisation, but also in the matter of better commercial and distributive organisation. The Report especially mentioned that it ought to be (and in many instances already was) an important task of cartel policy to undertake a continuous analysis of market conditions and to try by this method to discover a basis for the 'commercial practice of its members.' These aims of cartel organisation, so the Report concluded, should in no way be considered as requiring restrictive measures on the part of the State, but, on the contrary, they should be regarded as meriting 'constructive support.'

We have instances enough where huge concerns have been in a position to survey market conditions and to adapt their

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁶ Part IV., *Kartellpolitik, General-Bericht*, 1930.

planning programmes accordingly in a quite different manner from any that would have been possible to earlier units of production. For it must always be a condition of such methods of business forecasting that the companies which attempt it are really handling a business big enough to allow them to form general conclusions. A most striking example of this can be found in the organisation of business forecasting by the General Motors Corporation, which is embodied in a most elaborate system of surveying market conditions by statistical research, including studies devoted to prices and all conditions of sale, with a 'divisional index' for various departments and technical units, 'normal mortality curves,' studies of the 'second- and third-hand markets,' 'monthly and financial forecast,' etc. Of course, it will not be disputed that these methods of 'planning' are in many ways due to the unique structure of the American motor industry and the dominant position of firms like General Motors or Ford. But they may be taken as a sort of 'ideal type' of the planning which results from the concentrative organisation of industry. In fact, everywhere where such concentration exists planning in some way or other will be facilitated. It may take very different forms, but the basic conditions will always be the existence of a large and uniform market. That this condition is more likely to be found where national or international concentration of an industry exists than where there are a great number of single companies competing with each other can hardly be disputed. A big company in the south of Germany producing agricultural machinery on a very large scale made the following discovery revealed by statistical research: whenever the German agricultural credit banks were issuing more mortgage bonds (*Pfandbriefe*), or whenever the circulation of such bonds was widening, the sale of agricultural machinery of all kinds increased. The taking of more credit by the farmers was a sure sign of the increasing demand for more machinery. The company in question, after having made exhaustive studies in its statistical department in regard to this connexion, was able to adapt its programme of production to these conditions. There should be no doubt that it is a privilege of the concentrative form of industrial organisation that this kind of calculation can be made. When Professor Robbins emphasises the fact that 'under competitive conditions' the price expectations of the business-man 'are based upon his knowledge of markets,' the question remains what this 'knowledge' of markets really amounts to. In the days of 'free' competition between a great number of individual firms the knowledge of markets was to a great extent 'instinctive.' In most cases one business man might have a better *flair* for coming developments than another, and he would be the more

successful. It is just this kind of 'knowledge' which may successfully be replaced where mass production and mass distribution become possible. This is in no way an argument for all-round planning! It is not a kind of knowledge which can be created everywhere; on the contrary, it is strictly dependent on the existence of conditions of bulk supplies of standardised or normalised produce. While it is possible to draw curves forecasting the sale of agricultural machinery, while big international combines may successfully try to adapt their production to regional programmes, it would probably be hopeless, and even dangerous, to attempt to 'plan' the sale of ladies' gloves or fancy cretonnes. There must be a differentiation. It seems as unfair and as unrealistic to imagine a condition of all-round wholesale economic planning as it would be to maintain that planning is mere phantasmagoria. On the other hand, it would be just as one-sided for planners to believe that a sort of red-tape planning could be possible instead of first recognising the specific economic necessities involved, which, in the form of concentrative industrial organisation, have been patent or latent wherever planning has proved successful.

One need not be a 'planner' in order to recognise and value the planning tendencies which modern forms of industrial organisation necessarily brought about. And one need not abandon any faith in individual efforts in stating that large sectors of industry are being, or going to be, subjected to forms of organisation which tend more to a planned and concentrative economy than to the earlier system of atomistic competition. I have mentioned the first beginning of capitalist domination over the handicrafts 300 years ago. Certainly the artisan of the past has lost his predominant position in industrial organisation. But he has by no means disappeared. And we must accustom ourselves to the prospect that a large part of the independent manufacturing units and individual industrial companies will pass into one of the many forms of concentrative industrial organisation, which are growing up before our eyes. But this process will still leave unaltered a great number of works, and even whole fields of industrial activity, to which such organisation may not be suitable at all. Here as in so many cases of economic evolution one must beware of generalisations.

HERMANN LEVY.

A SIDELIGHT ON UNEMPLOYMENT

We could do something to help in this most baffling and terrible of all our domestic problems, the problem of unemployment, if we would only break it up into little pieces.

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

SINCE the winter of 1932-33 I have been brought in touch with one of these 'little pieces' through my connexion with two schemes designed to 'do something about' the problem of the local unemployed in the London Borough of St. Pancras. The first of these took the form of afternoon classes of a primarily educational nature at the Working Men's College. This type of activity was deliberately chosen as being most suitable to the premises available, and also as being in keeping with the spirit and traditions of the college, which is one of the oldest adult educational institutions for working men in London.¹ The second scheme was at the Mary Ward Settlement, and, in common with the majority of other centres in the London district, it has tended to develop on very different lines, probably because the premises available were more suitable for workshops than as classrooms.² Atmosphere plays an important part in this kind of work, and a converted basement does not tend to attract the prospective student. In any case, the type of men who have enrolled latterly have shown a marked preference for things of the hand as opposed to things of the head.

Most of our men have come from the employment exchanges in the north-west part of London. The principal method of recruiting has always been to send someone down to the exchange to talk to a bunch of likely candidates picked out by the manager. Once started, the snowball principle came into operation, and those who had already enrolled told their friends. The majority of them have always been unskilled manual workers. At first

¹ For an account of the work of these classes in the winter of 1932-33, see my article, 'Classes for the Unemployed,' in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1933.

² For an account of the work of this centre in the winter of 1933-34, see my article, 'Centres for the Unemployed,' in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1934.

there was a considerable proportion of skilled and semi-skilled men and of the black-coated classes. In the winter of 1932-33 we had a number of these at the Working Men's College. At that time, when unemployment was at its worst, the distinctions between man and man tended to vanish. They all felt that they were in the same boat together. The better educated and more skilled men were of the greatest assistance in the work of organisation, running the men's committee, teas, a student's magazine, the summer camp and so on. But the numbers of these have diminished rapidly as the worst of the depression passed. Most of them have now gone back to their old jobs, though one, at least, has found congenial work in running another London centre, and is doing it very well indeed.

This winter, at the Mary Ward Settlement, some 200 men have paid their subscriptions and enrolled. About a third of these are old friends who were with us in 1933-34. They vary in age from eighteen to sixty and more, but the majority are under thirty. With the exception of a group of a dozen or so who have drifted into London from elsewhere, owing to the collapse or contraction of the industry in which they were formerly employed, they are practically all Londoners. They nearly all bear typically English names; there is no foreign element here, as there is in the East End. Amongst the older men there are a few ex-soldiers and several who, at some time or other, have had regular employment at some skilled or semi-skilled trade. But the great bulk of them have never had twelve months' regular and continuous work in their lives. On leaving school at the age of fourteen they mostly drifted into some blind-alley employment, and this would appear to be the primary reason for their present situation. They are Jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none. A lot of them get seasonal work at times when traffic is heavy at the London railway termini. The Royal wedding in November was responsible for reducing our attendance by about half for several days. Men got jobs as extra porters, waiters, programme sellers, putting up stands and hoardings, and in a dozen other ways. Round about Derby Day every year there is a great exodus to Epsom Downs, where there is always a bit of money to be earned. I remember once driving over the Downs, on my way to Epsom, the day before the first Wednesday in June. I took a wrong road in the dark and had to drive on to the grass beside a wall in order to turn the car round. My head-lamps lit up a number of sleeping forms. I recognised two of them as being regular attendants at our centre.

The list of the various ways in which these men pick up a living during the year would be a long one. Laying paving-stones, road tarring, waiting in restaurants and boarding-houses,

railway portering, driving horse or motor vans, erecting hoardings, cleaning windows, hawking anything and everything under the sun, bricklaying, sign painting, selling papers, cooking, singing or playing some musical instrument outside a public-house, peddling round with an ice-cream cart, navvying, acting as 'tic-tac' man on a race-course are only a few of them. One or two are Territorial soldiers, a side-line which has the great advantage of providing a more or less permanent reference.

For the most part they rely on their own efforts to obtain work. The employment exchanges are of less service to this type of man than they are to more skilled and regular workers. They know the odd-job labour market in their own district better than most people. Some of them do fairly well as regards the amount of work they find in the year. For instance, one man, who was an officers' mess cook in the Army, relies on getting six months' work each summer as cook on a railway dining-car. He fills in the winter doing odd jobs of cooking in restaurants, snack bars, fried-fish shops, and occasionally for a private dinner; I dare say he averages out with about nine or ten months' work in the year. He is a married man with two children, and has no facilities in his home for making or repairing furniture. He comes to us to use the carpenters' shop. Now that we are running midday dinners for the men, he can always be relied on to cook for us when he is free. But he is in a considerably better position than most. The average amount of work per man probably works out at less than six months in the year. Now let us take a man at the other end of the scale. Up to the age of sixteen he was employed in a printing works. The concern went bankrupt and the staff dispersed. The manager gave him one of the best references I have seen, which ended with the words 'he is a lad of great promise, and I predict that he will go far.' He is now twenty-six, and in the last ten years he has had no regular work at all—nothing but a few odd jobs with long intervals between. He has settled down to this life with a kind of philosophical resignation and has lost all initiative. He is one of many who represent a problem to which I frankly do not know the answer under present conditions.

In general, I think it is not unfair to say that these people are more or less sharply differentiated from the ordinary run of their fellows by the fact that they lead a perpetual hand-to-mouth existence. They can make no plans for the future. Their lives are essentially irrational. Up to-day and down to-morrow, their circumstances appear to be governed by pure chance, far more than by any other agency. (Incidentally, I think this provides the reason why gambling is so prevalent amongst them. We have discouraged this in the centre, but a lot of it undoubtedly goes on

outside.) They are seldom in want of actual food and essentials, although, of course, this possibility is not by any means ruled out: unemployment assistance is calculated on a frugal scale. A bad spell of unemployment plays havoc, too, with their clothes and boots. It becomes impossible to effect repairs or replacements; and as their appearance deteriorates, so does their self-confidence and their chance of favourably impressing an employer.³ The inevitable result of this state of affairs is that their horizon comes to be bounded by the material struggle and the constant process of adjustment to a fresh income scale.

Their position is made worse by the deep gulf that exists between them and the section of the community next above them in the social and economic scale—the semi-skilled workers and those in more regular employment. When they are all unemployed together, they rediscover their common humanity, as we saw in the Working Men's College in the winter of 1932-33. But at other times our men are regarded with the gravest suspicion by many of their more fortunate fellows. I suppose, at bottom, the trouble is that few men to-day are so sure of their own jobs that they can afford to regard with equanimity the existence of what they believe to be a large class of potential 'blacklegs.' And it must be admitted that there are times when some of our men would go to considerable lengths to get a job; and if it involved turning another man out, so much the worse for him. The very nature of their lives makes some of them pretty sharp. Few of them are trade unionists, or have very much knowledge of, or respect for, trade union principles. Nevertheless, I think the danger is more apparent than real. Most of them are not accustomed to regular work. Many can, and do, work very hard for a few days, a fortnight, or even a month. But regular work, year in and year out, is a habit like everything else, and it is a habit that many of them have lost or have never had. Personally, I would be sorry for the works manager who tried to run a factory with no other labour. I doubt if it could be done. Another and even more far-fetched suspicion, that I only mention because I have several times heard it expressed, is that these men represent raw material ready to the hand of anyone who might want to recruit a political army, either of the Right or the Left! This idea might well remind one of the story of an inspection carried out by the Duke of Wellington. After walking round the ranks of a battalion, he turned to the commanding officer and said: 'Well, Colonel, I don't know what the enemy will say to your men when he sees them, but I don't mind telling you that they frighten me.'

³ We endeavour to counter this by a periodical jumble sale. We also keep boot-repairing materials on the premises, and these are made full use of.

That is part of the trouble. There are quite a lot of worthy citizens who are frightened of them. They have become something of a foreign body in the State: very few people understand them or their problem, and the unknown is always a little alarming. It is scarcely surprising, too, that some of them bitterly resent their position. In general, active expression of this feeling is chiefly confined to the younger men. Some of the young bloods rather affect an air of bravado in the face of that visible representative of authority and 'the system' the local policeman. In most cases this stops short at 'backchat,' an art in which the Londoner still excels. But it does not always cease there, and the effect is that the relations between these people and the police tend, to say the least of it, to be a good deal less cordial than they are in districts inhabited by people in more fortunate circumstances. Those of them who have been better off, and who suddenly find themselves reduced to the status of the casual worker, often through circumstances over which they have no control, frequently tend to be more active in their expressions of revolt than those who have grown up in these conditions. One of our men, an ex-miner of about forty, and a very good fellow when one gets to know him, makes a point of attending any political meeting to which he can gain admission, and he generally contrives to get himself into some kind of trouble. I met him two days after the Fascist meeting at Olympia last summer. He had three stitches in his head, but was obviously glowing with the sense of inward satisfaction that comes from a conviction of duty done. The men who go this way are by no means the worst. In many cases they are the lads of spirit who, if properly handled, could be made the most of. But the other and far commoner reaction is to turn up the coat collar, live for the moment, and regard anything and everything outside their own immediate purview as certainly incomprehensible and probably malevolent.

Our ex-miners stand out sharply against this background. They are men who have been accustomed to regular and better-paid work, and are, in general, better educated and more intelligent. Further, they are men of some initiative who have had the courage to pull out from their old surroundings and try their luck in a strange land. And London is a strange land to them. Many of them are Durham men, and they have told me that what they miss more than anything else is the companionship in misfortune that prevailed in a town like Seaham Harbour. There the depression had hit a whole cross-section of the community. Unemployed centres were attended and visited by people of all types and classes. Everybody knew everybody else. Arriving at King's Cross, most of them drifted into lodgings in the neighbourhood, and it was sometimes a matter of weeks before they got in touch

with anybody with whom they could exchange a word. To anyone who has no connexions there, London can be a very lonely place. A centre or occupational club can be of infinite service to these men, and they also have much to contribute to it.

So much for the men: like all human material, one can make much or little of them, according to the way one goes about it. In the first place, it is obvious that few of them have ever come into touch with the adult education movement or the excellent evening institutes with which London abounds. These have tended to become the preserve of the class of workers above them, and, as we have seen, the two do not mix easily. Also, it is the afternoons that hang even more heavily on their hands than the evenings. The London County Council have started afternoon classes at several of their evening institutes, and these have been very successful. But, like the great majority of voluntary 'occupational centres,' they specialise in handicrafts and similar activities rather than in orthodox education. The fact is that the great bulk of these men are inclined to be suspicious of education and educationists in general. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that if this kind of work is to have any permanent value, its ultimate aim must be educational, and for this purpose I would define education as the process by which a man is turned into a citizen.

How is the problem to be tackled with the type of man I have endeavoured to depict? There is one factor to be borne in mind from the outset. The men who come to us do so in circumstances that have inevitably produced in them varying degrees of mental stress. They are all unemployed and looking for work. Until one has experienced what this means, it is difficult to get an idea of its effect on a man. Beating round looking for a job is one of the most demoralising experiences to which anyone can be subjected. It tends to sap self-confidence to an almost unbelievable extent; and the more intelligent the man, the greater the strain. This aspect of the problem can never be left out of account. But the factor of strain works in two ways. If one knows how to handle him, it is possible to do far more with a man under these conditions than it is when his mind is in a state of rest, which is in many cases synonymous with apathy. This leads to the point that it is absolutely essential to have someone in charge of the centre who understands men and can handle them. Apart from anything else, order has to be kept, without the aid of any form of sanction, amongst a number of men, many of whom are in the state that regards authority in any form as the natural enemy. But a balanced and sympathetic man, with a knowledge of the world, can be of infinite service to them with a timely word of advice, and his presence in itself is something of an inspiration.

I think balance must be the first aim of true education, and it is what these people particularly need. In the citizen the three elements of mind, body, and the other thing—call it spirit, character, or what you will—should be in some sort of equilibrium. The development of any one at the expense of the other two makes for lack of balance. The one-sided development of the mind factor, in particular, is the cause of a tragic number of misfits in the world to-day.

So much for the ideals to be aimed at. What is it possible to do to attain them? The first thing is to attract men into your centre, and, as I have suggested, this cannot be done by an appeal to 'Come and be educated.' Our experience has been that the most successful appeal is that made by the idea of a useful hobby. It may be that someone else can produce the same, or better, results in another way, but we have found that the carpenters' shop meets the case very well. During the whole time that the centre is open—from 10 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. daily—there are seldom less than thirty or forty men in the shop. The benches are always full and all the tools in use. Some come to repair their own furniture, others to make something that they need. They pay for the wood that they use. The making of furniture for sale outside is forbidden, although, of course, it is impossible to check up the ultimate destination of any object. As a matter of fact, I think the rule is very generally observed, although even if it were not there would be little ground for anxiety on the part of the furniture manufacturing industry. But a lot of these men undoubtedly tend to regard the things that they make in rather a different light from that in which most people look on their household gods. To many of them furniture has an investment as well as an artistic or purely utilitarian value. If circumstances admit of little margin of income over expenditure—and one may be hit at any time by a prolonged spell of unemployment—chairs and tables sometimes take the place of the few hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of pounds of War Loan, or some other easily realisable security, that more fortunate people keep against the possible arrival of a rainy day. Much furniture undoubtedly gets sold second hand or pawned. Many men voluntarily give their time to make something of use for the centre or the settlement. A month before Christmas all hands are turned on to making toys, to be distributed from the children's Christmas tree. One or two men have gained sufficient knowledge of carpentering to fit them for more or less permanent semi-skilled work outside. Putting it at the lowest, all have found a useful hobby to fill in their enforced idleness. Putting it at the highest, some have caught a glimpse of the satisfaction of craftsmanship, which is a very fine thing indeed.

Another activity that meets an obvious need is the gymnasium. Many of the younger men, in particular, require some means of 'toning up' the body. The depressing mental and moral effect of an unsuccessful search for work tends to make men sit or lounge about without taking any exercise. The physical effects of this soon react once more on the mind, and a vicious circle is set up. A large number of them have had previous experience of horse and parallel-bar work, and the standard is quite high. Work in the gymnasium can be varied with swimming in the local baths, and often with running or physical training in the open air. It is from those who attend the gymnasium that football and cricket teams can be recruited. The value of organised games from the point of view of inculcating some kind of *esprit de corps* is immense. Leagues for both cricket and football are now organised by the London Council for Voluntary Occupation during Unemployment amongst teams representing the various unemployed centres of Greater London, and the finals are played off at those Meccas of the ambitious cricketer and footballer the Oval and Wembley. The Prince of Wales himself presented the challenge shield to the winning teams at Wembley last year.

If any permanent result is to be attained, it is essential to interest the men in running the centre themselves. The best way to do this is to get some kind of working committee going as early as possible. In the initial stages the committee serves primarily as a means of educating its members, who should represent the potential light and leading that is available. It is uphill work; but once a few of them have got hold of the idea that the centre is their show and no one else's, and that, if it is to succeed and be of any real use to its members, this result can only be brought about by their own efforts, a new horizon is opened up. At first we had infinite trouble in getting the men themselves to do any kind of communal work. One of our committeemen once solemnly put forward the objection that it was quite unfair that men should be asked to wash up their own tea-things unless they were paid for the work. Happily, we have now got beyond that stage, and fatigue men are now forthcoming for any job that needs doing by the simple process of drawing names out of a hat. We have even advanced to the point where it is possible to get one or two members of the committee to investigate and take up the cases of our members with the local assistance committees, and we hope to be able to continue this work with the unemployment assistance authorities set up under the new Act. This is a particularly valuable service, as very few of these men are capable of submitting their own cases satisfactorily, and it gives them confidence to have present someone whom they know. In many ways it would be easier to do the work oneself, but the value to

the man who does the job is immense. Any opportunity of giving them some measure of responsibility should be eagerly seized. We propose to form a special sub-committee for this work, and expert advice will always be available.

For some time we have been providing teas in the afternoon at a cost of one penny, and we have at last succeeded in getting midday dinners going as well. We find that we are able to provide a hot-meat dish and vegetables, followed by a sweet of some kind and a cup of tea, at fourpence, which is about half what it would cost outside under the cheapest conditions. The cooking is done on an ancient gas-stove on the premises. The waiting and washing-up are all done by the men themselves, who also provide the cook, when there is one available. At other times we have recourse to the services of a volunteer from outside. We now serve anything from twenty to thirty dinners daily, mostly to unmarried men, and the committee have decided to invite any man from another centre, who is looking for work in St. Pancras, to make use of this opportunity of getting a cheap meal.

We run various other activities. A lady volunteer presides over a clay-modelling class. The attendance is small, but one or two men have discovered an obvious talent in this direction, and, though their work may not as yet have a very high artistic value, this new interest has made all the difference to them. Musical-pipe making continues to draw a class of seven or eight men. We have tried to get going some more generally popular musical activity, such as a concert party, but without success. This will be far easier when we are able to keep open in the evenings. Our present premises are required for a boys' club from 4.30 onwards. A class in sign writing, also run by a volunteer, attracted quite a good attendance. Some lectures in simple biology and a class in play reading have also proved popular. We have made a start with a debating society, which promises to develop on useful lines. We have our own library, of which members are making increasing use. One of our own men, an ex-miner, is running a class in simple wireless. We encourage our members to ask for any new class or activity that they want. But, to make it worth while, it is generally necessary to ensure an initial attendance of about a dozen men. Numbers always fluctuate as men get jobs; volunteer teachers are difficult to obtain in the afternoons, and the London County Council can only supply instructors in cases where the class will keep up to a minimum of twelve to fourteen. Finance, too, is a limiting factor. Centres are probably well advised to specialise to a certain extent. We have had a demand from time to time for subjects such as French or simple accounts, but it has never been sufficient to warrant starting a class, and we have generally sent on the applicants

to some other quarter where they could get what they wanted.

In the case of the majority of our members, and particularly the older men, the conclusion is inescapable that they will never be anything but casual workers. That is what most of them have been all their lives, and it is unlikely that they are going to undergo any surprising metamorphosis now. Further, it is difficult to see how the life and work of a great city like London could go on without some kind of a pool of casual labour. However, there appears to be no reason why these men should not be encouraged to improve their position, which some of them could quite well do, even under existing conditions, without upsetting anything or anybody. A great number of them appear to be spending their time in chasing one another in and out of jobs, at which they are all equally amateurs. In many cases it would be perfectly possible to 'rationalise' their activities in such a way that they specialised in things for which they had the most aptitude and left alone those for which they were most obviously unfitted. This could hardly fail to be of benefit to all concerned—the State, the employer of labour, the trade unions, and the men themselves. Indeed, we have already succeeded in guiding several men in this direction. It would seem essential that any kind of talent should be seized on and encouraged.

This brings us to the special problem of our ex-miners. It is obviously a sad waste of human material that they should be allowed to drop permanently into the ranks of the London casual workers. We gave this matter a good deal of thought, and finally decided to start a class in motor engineering, with a view to offering them, and any other men who cared to take it, the chance of qualifying themselves for employment as motor mechanics. This class is well attended, and the idea is that men who pass a certain standard with us shall go on to the London Polytechnic, where there are evening classes in the subject providing men who pass out with a generally recognised certificate of proficiency. The authorities of the Polytechnic have generously offered to waive the usual fee in the case of those of our men who are unemployed. There will probably be a considerable wastage, but those who stay the course will have had something like a year or eighteen months' training, which should be long enough to qualify them for semi-skilled work. In any case, at the end of their time they will certainly know a great deal more about their job than a large proportion of the garage hands whom one at present encounters in London and the South of England. A trade union stalwart on the men's committee raised the objection that, however inadvertently (he was prepared to concede the purity of our motives), we might be training 'blacklegs.' The replies of some

of the men attending the class were more forcible than polite. The final answer that clinched the matter was that, under existing conditions, the men in question were potential 'blacklegs' anyway, and the only means of lessening their potentiality was to give them some training and qualify them for permanent work, when we hoped that, in the nature of things, they would join or rejoin the trade union ranks.

This experiment is obviously capable of considerable extension. For instance, the men who do our cooking could with very little trouble qualify to earn their living in that way, as, indeed, some of them have done already. The same applies to waiters. By no means the whole of England to-day is suffering from depression. There are many trades, particularly in the South, that are looking up in answer to the stimulus given to the home market. In many of these trades there is an actual shortage of skilled and semi-skilled operatives, and employers are beginning to regret bitterly the decay that has come over the system of apprenticeship. The country as a whole is in a state of transition, and this naturally involves maladjustment. It is impossible to say now whether our future lies with Capitalism or with Socialism. It is not impossible that it will include some of the features of both: the whole of our history has been a long tale of compromise solutions. But, in the meantime, by far the most important factor is the human one. The most ideal and scientific system in the world would be unworkable if the people of this country, or any considerable proportion of them, were permitted to deteriorate beyond a certain point. This many of them are in danger of doing to-day.

When we started this work we visualised ourselves as dealing with a 'Transitional Problem.' That was over three years ago, and we are beginning to see now that the problem is of a more permanent nature. Perhaps the problems of civilisation do not admit of classification in watertight compartments as 'Transitional' and 'Permanent.' The character of the solution found to the first may well have an intimate bearing on the very nature of the second. Our present hope is to join together with others of a like mind, who are now carrying on similar work in the neighbourhood, to found a permanent 'Occupational Club' serving the needs of the type of man with whom we are now dealing in the Borough of St. Pancras. There are between 4000 and 5000 of them. We believe that the utility of something of the kind will far outlast our lifetimes, and that the only sure foundation on which it is possible to build, both from the point of view of finance and that of personal service, is local patriotism. A strong body of local residents, headed by the Mayor of St. Pancras, are of the same opinion, and a public appeal will be launched in the near future.

Such a scheme is in the nature of an experiment, and the only rigid thing about it is that it must remain non-political and non-sectarian. For its members it will provide a fixed point in lives where something of a stable and permanent nature is the greatest need. For those more fortunately placed it will provide an opportunity for service and for making their contribution, in the most practical form, to the solution of our most pressing social problem. With whole-time premises of our own we shall be able to continue open in the evenings and thus cater for those of our members who are in work as well as for the unemployed. We shall have concerts, lectures on subjects of general interest, and run various social activities, and thus make a start with the breaking down of the barriers that at present divide these men from their fellows. It may be possible to include a hostel for a certain number of single men. Going forward on the lines we have begun, there is ample scope for useful work of all kinds. We cannot foretell the future; but it is not impossible that it may bring with it some general reduction in hours of work, thus transforming our present unemployment problem into a leisure problem. Anyone who has considered such a possibility can hardly fail to recognise that the latter might prove as formidable as the former. An Occupational Club such as we propose will have its contribution to make towards the solution of the one no less than of the other.

B. T. REYNOLDS.

RAILWAY SPEEDS

On November 30, 1934, a special train on the London and North-Eastern Railway ran from King's Cross to Leeds (185½ miles) in 152 minutes and returned in 157½ minutes. The start-to-stop speeds were respectively 73·4 and 70·9 miles per hour. In both directions certain small delays were experienced, and there were a number of regular service slacks. I take these particulars from the excellent report of Mr. Cecil J. Allen in the *Railway Magazine* for January 1935. These performances have attracted a great deal of attention, not only to the subject of the acceleration of express trains, but to the question of the best means of bringing about such acceleration—the steam locomotive, the internal combustion engine, or the electric motor.

Ever since railways came into existence the question of the speed of the trains has been one which closely affected the public, but it is impossible to say that the railway managers have given it the consideration which it deserves in view of its public importance. England was the first country to build railways on a large scale, and the question of railway speeds very soon became prominent. Both on the broad and narrow gauges—the former used by the Great Western Railway and its allied lines and the latter by nearly all other railways—numerous single runs were performed before the middle of the nineteenth century at speeds as high as those of nearly all the best expresses of the present day, and in a few cases regular trains were timed to run at similar speeds. The best known instance was a train timed to run the 53 miles from London to Didcot in 57 minutes, start to stop, in 1848. The Great Western Railway has made itself responsible for the statement that on one occasion the engine *Great Britain* performed the run in 47½ minutes, start to stop. Controversy has raged round this record, but there seems to be no doubt that start-to-stop runs averaging more than 60 miles per hour were frequently performed between London and Didcot at this period, so that it is most unlikely that it is appreciably inaccurate. There was therefore little fault to find with the proceedings of the railway pioneers in the matter of speed. But after a brilliant beginning the deadening grip of officialdom fastened upon the railways. The

managers of the different lines, perceiving that railways were so vastly superior to every other form of inland transport that outside competition was impossible, agreed together to do as nearly as possible nothing in the way of technical improvement or development. The effect of this on the speed of railway travel was disastrous. So far as I know, there is no instance on record before 1895 of any British train equalling the start-to-stop speed achieved between London and Didcot in 1848. With some doubtful exceptions in the United States, the same appears to be true of all the railways in the world.

In 1895 occurred a sort of race between the East Coast and West Coast lines from London to Aberdeen, in the course of which some high speeds were reached; but as the highest start-to-stop speed was reached by the smallest engine that took part in the race, over one of the more difficult sections of line, it is obvious that no very serious effort was made by the bigger engines. The run in question was made by a London and North-Western 2-4-0 engine, weighing only 32 tons, from Crewe to Carlisle. The 141 miles, which include the climb to Shap summit (915 feet above sea), were covered in 126 minutes. The average speed was thus 67½ miles per hour, or a trifle more than the London-Didcot record of 1848—at any rate, as vouched for by the Great Western Railway. The race to Aberdeen of 1895 was followed in 1896 by what was undoubtedly the most hopeful series of accelerations that have ever been made on British railways. Both East and West Coast companies radically accelerated their best trains to Scotland, and the performances of some enlarged 4-4-0 engines (*Dunalastair* class) built by the Caledonian Railway in the winter of 1895-6 were a very striking advance on anything that had been seen before in this or any other country. Between Carlisle and Stirling the Caledonian Railway (now London Midland and Scottish) rises in 45 miles practically from sea level to Beattock summit (1015 feet), while the last 40 miles before Stirling are so full of curves and junctions that continuous high speed is impossible. For 10 miles between Beattock and Beattock summit the average ascent is 1 in 80. Forty years ago trains were not so heavy as they are now, but neither were the engines so big. With coach loads from three to three and a half times their own weight (47 tons), the Caledonian engines over and over again covered the 117½ miles of excessively hard road between Carlisle and Stirling at 60 miles per hour, start to stop. It really looked as if the railways were going fully to utilise the powers of the steam locomotive for the benefit of the public. But this was too good to be true. The forces of inertia were too securely entrenched, and they, helped by the occurrence of an unfortunate accident (not on the Caledonian Railway),

quickly succeeded in stifling the new-born energy. To describe as deplorable the speed of all Anglo-Scottish services from the end of 1896 to the present day is not too strong an expression.

Up to the time of this lamentable backsliding British express trains had, in spite of the general lack of energy of the managers, on the whole been faster than those of other countries, in all of which the serious development of railways started a good deal later than in Great Britain. From December 1, 1896, Great Britain lost her premier position and has never regained it. For the whole of that time the best express trains in France, on an average all the year round, have also been the best in the world. This is due, not only to the higher booked speeds of French trains, but to the fact that when a French express is late every effort is made to regain as much of the lost time as possible, subject, of course, to the careful observance of all speed restrictions. The supremacy of the French railways is the more remarkable for the fact that a Government regulation forbids trains open to the public to exceed a speed of 120 kilometres ($\approx 74\frac{1}{2}$ miles) per hour. Practically the whole of the work is, and always has been, performed by four-cylinder compound engines of the de Glehn-du Bousquet, or Henry, type. In 1902 a 4-4-2 engine on which I was travelling ran from Paris to Amiens (81 miles) in 73 minutes 33 seconds, start to stop (66 miles per hour), in spite of a regular service slack at Creil and a loss of at least 2 minutes owing to permanent-way repairs just outside Amiens. Meanwhile, in the United States the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad had in 1897 started a summer service between Philadelphia (Camden) and Atlantic City, in which one train in each direction covered the 55½ miles in 50 minutes. The Pennsylvania, which had a line between the same points, 58½ miles long, followed suit with 52-minute trains.

So far it will be noticed that little had been done to increase start-to-stop speeds above that of the best London-Didcot run of 1848, though most of the roads over which high speeds had been achieved were harder—often much harder—than the easy stretch from London to Didcot, and the trains were usually much heavier. The first time that a start-to-stop speed of over 70 miles per hour was achieved in England seems to have been in 1904. The Great Western Railway was running some mail trains from Plymouth to London, more or less in competition with the London and South-Western Railway. That well-known expert on the subject of railway speeds, the late Mr. Charles Rous-Marten, travelled in some of these trains and was present on one occasion when one of the Great Western Railway 4-2-2 engines, with driving wheels 7 feet 8 inches in diameter, brought a train, weighing 120 tons behind the tender, from Bristol to Paddington

(118½ miles) in 99 minutes 46 seconds, start to stop (71.3 miles per hour). It was on an earlier stage of the same run, when the same train, drawn by a 4-4-0 engine, was running down the bank from Whiteball tunnel towards Taunton, that Mr. Rous-Marten timed a speed of over 100 miles per hour. This record has lately been the subject of acute controversy. Mr. Rous-Marten began by stating that the train was running at 63 miles per hour at Whiteball summit, and proceeded—'thenceforward our velocity rapidly and steadily increased, the quarter-mile times diminishing from 11 seconds at the tunnel entrance to 10.6 seconds, 10.2 seconds, 10 seconds, 9.8 seconds, 9.4 seconds, 9.2 seconds, and finally to 8.8 seconds, this last being equivalent to a rate of 102.3 miles per hour.'

The trouble begins with the statement that the speed at Whiteball summit was 63 miles per hour, for Mr. Rous-Marten's own published timing of the train up the bank before Whiteball summit makes it impossible that the speed could have been 63 miles per hour at the summit, but practically certain that it was about 53 miles per hour. Then, the northern end of Whiteball tunnel is little more than ¾ mile from mile-post 174, which is at Whiteball summit; and if speed was 53 miles per hour at the summit, it is utterly out of the question for it to have risen to 81.8 miles per hour (¼ mile in 11 seconds) at the end of the tunnel. From Whiteball summit there is a very steep fall, averaging about 1 in 100, as far as post 170½. What Mr. Rous-Marten seems to have meant is that speed rose to 81.8 miles per hour a certain distance after the train had emerged from the tunnel, probably by post 172, and then continued to rise till the ¼ mile between posts 170½ and 170½ was run in 8.8 seconds. He probably did not think it worth while giving the ¼-mile timings before a speed of 80 miles per hour had been reached. If this explanation is the correct one, it means that speed rose from about 53 to about 83 miles per hour in 2 miles from Whiteball summit and from about 83 to about 102 miles per hour in a further 1½ miles of slightly steeper descent. The greater part of the acceleration was due to gravity. As the acceleration of gravity is uniform, this explanation fits in well with the facts.

I am not quite happy about Mr. Rous-Marten's method of timing. He stated that he used to time successive ¼ miles by means of two stop-watches, one of which was started and the other stopped, alternately, by a single movement of his hand. In ordinary circumstances I consider that continuous timing by means of a split-second hand, driven off the mechanism of an ordinary watch, is a far superior method, but when an expert like Mr. Rous-Marten is in question I cannot believe that he had omitted to satisfy himself of the perfect accuracy both of his

watches and of his own reactions. The extremely regular results which he achieved in this case powerfully support this view. In all the circumstances, it appears to me that it may be accepted that a speed was attained as near 102.3 miles per hour as can be timed with a watch marking nothing smaller than fifths of seconds.

From 1904 till long after the war there is little of interest to record, but after the ravages of war had been repaired the French railways introduced many important accelerations in their ordinary services; later a few very inadequate accelerations were introduced in Great Britain, and, later still, some much more satisfactory accelerations in Germany. Actually at the present time the fastest booked run in the world made by a steam-hauled train appears to be one from Swindon to Paddington. The 77½ miles occupy 65 minutes (71.3 miles per hour). The line is one of the easiest in the world—an almost continuous gentle descent with no sharp curves. Except for this one run the general level of the fastest British expresses is much below that of the fastest expresses of France and Germany.

Coming to special efforts, several quite satisfactory recent performances on British railways must be mentioned besides the one between King's Cross and Leeds. With loads of about 200 tons behind the tender one Great Western Railway 4-6-0 four-cylinder engine covered the Swindon-Paddington stretch in 56 minutes 47 seconds (81.6 miles per hour), and another completed the return journey, which is mostly a gentle ascent, in one hour. A London Midland and Scottish 4-6-0 three-cylinder engine with 200 tons ran from Coventry to a point just outside Euston Station, 93½ miles, start to stop, in 74 minutes 20 seconds (75 miles per hour). Even the Southern Railway is said to have made one or two runs from Waterloo to Salisbury, 83½ miles in 75 minutes, though this is, of course, far inferior to the efforts of the other lines. In all cases, except perhaps the last, speeds of 90 miles per hour were maintained down-hill, even if the gradient was very slight. Similar runs have been made in the United States.

While much remarkable work has been done in France, this has nearly all been performed uphill. The engines have constantly developed horse-powers in proportion to their own weights far greater than those developed by British engines, but the French railways have recognised that with suitably designed engines speed is merely a function of power, and that, so soon as the official ban on speeds in excess of 74½ miles per hour is raised, there will be no difficulty in very largely increasing the speeds of existing engines. More than thirty years ago various designs of four-cylinder compound engine, without a number of modern

improvements, reached speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour. In these circumstances, research has been primarily directed towards increasing the power of the engines. Certain fast railcar services have also been introduced. They are used for the Paris-Trouville service—136½ miles in 2 hours—and there are runs between Laroche and Dijon, 99 miles, in 86 minutes. These are not quite so fast as the performance of the steam-hauled Sud-Express, timed to cover 70 miles from Poitiers to Angoulême in 1 hour. Recent German accelerations include the institution of a train, worked by an ordinary four-cylinder compound 4-6-2 steam locomotive, from Berlin to Hamburg, 178 miles, in 154 minutes (69.4 miles per hour), while the Diesel-electric *Flying Hamburger* performs the same run in 138 minutes (77.4 miles per hour).

For something like forty years the question of high speed on railways has aroused much interest in Germany, and all sorts of experiments have been made, usually due to private initiative. The highest speed ever attained on a railway seems to be 158 miles per hour. This speed is said to have been reached in Germany by a car driven by external explosions, running by itself without driver or passenger. A car driven by means of an air-screw, worked by an internal combustion engine, is said to have run, start to stop, from Hamburg to Spandau, about 170 miles, at an average speed of 109 miles per hour and to have attained a maximum speed of 140 miles per hour. A series of experiments with electric motors, carried out early in the present century on the Berlin-Zossen line, culminated in 1903 in the attainment of a maximum speed of 131 miles per hour.

This outline of the history of railway speeds is sufficient to show that suitably designed vehicles running over solidly laid lines can safely be run at speeds far higher than any which are normally attained at the present time. It is also true that this might have been done long ago. At a time when the railway managers appear to be slowly awaking to the desirability of making a move, it would be ungracious to insist at great length on their former failures, but it is at least permissible to express the hope that the present movement may not turn out to be yet another false start, to be followed by yet another long period of organised obstruction to progress.

We are told by no less a personage than the president of the London Midland and Scottish Railway that the question of running faster expresses is being closely studied by his officers, and he rather naïvely informs us that the introduction of a few accelerated trains has sometimes been followed by 'surprising repercussions.' This seems to be his way of referring to the fact that, when one train on a particular route is accelerated, the

passengers all abandon the slower trains and flock into the one fast one. Not so very surprising after all! Neither is the remedy far to seek. If the London Midland and Scottish will accelerate all its express trains on routes where it has so far accelerated one only, it will again be 'surprised,' not only at the remarkable evenness with which the passengers distribute themselves between the different trains, but at the increase that will take place in the total number of persons travelling. Uniform, or nearly uniform, acceleration of all express trains will also dispose of another bogey that is generally produced when the railway officials want an excuse for doing nothing. It is constantly pointed out that one of the difficulties in the way of accelerating trains is that it is hard to find a path for a train running much faster than other trains. This is true enough. All main lines have, nevertheless, to accommodate trains running at greatly different speeds. What is done is as far as possible to run the expresses, one after another, at certain periods of the day, and the slow trains at other periods. No doubt difficulties are increased if one or two expresses run much faster than all the others. Obviously, as already remarked, the proper thing to do is to accelerate uniformly the whole of the expresses. It is just as easy to run trains travelling at 90 miles per hour one after the other as it is to do the same with 50 miles per hour trains. In one way it is easier, as a 90 miles per hour train will occupy each block-section for a much shorter period than a 50 miles per hour train. As for any difficulty there may be with the signalling, by far the greater number of existing signals are adequate for trains running at well over 100 miles per hour. Anywhere where the warning given is not adequate it is a simple matter to extend the system already in use, where block-sections are very short, and to interlock suitable distant signals in such a way that they cannot be put at 'line clear' unless the line is clear ahead, not only for one block-section, but for as many as may be required.

The feasibility of great accelerations being obvious, and the favourable reaction of the public towards them being practically certain, it may be of interest to consider how they could best be carried out. As already pointed out, there are three principal kinds of motors that could be used for the purpose—the steam locomotive, the internal combustion engine, and the electric motor. I will begin with the last named.

No locomotive driven from batteries carried on its own framework is yet a practical proposition for express trains; so if electricity is to be used, it must either be generated on the engine or picked up from conducting rails or wires laid along the whole line and supplied from central power stations. The last-named method involves huge initial expenditure. I have, I suppose,

searched as diligently as most people for any figures that would justify the belief that any scheme of electrification of any surface railway (underground lines are, of course, a different matter) has up to the present shown a profit over and above that which might have been earned by the same railway if worked by the best modern steam locomotives. If such figures have ever been published, they have eluded me. I have come across endless statements and assertions extolling electrification from every point of view except the one that matters. Straightforward, comprehensible figures showing a clear profit I have never seen. I have therefore been forced to the conclusion that they do not exist. Estimates for the future electrification of railways are even more unsatisfactory. The best known estimates are those of the Government Commission on main-line electrification. If several hundred million pounds were spent on electrifying practically the whole of the railways in Great Britain, the Commission found that a small profit might be expected if everything worked out according to plan. The prospect of the estimates of an enormous Government undertaking proving sufficient for their purpose is slender enough in any case, but when it is found that important points, like the extreme difficulty of working electrified shunting yards, are hardly mentioned, it is quite impossible to take the Commission's Report seriously. If British railways as a whole are ever electrified, it will almost certainly be because it suits the plans of some political party. Such an eventuality is outside the scope of this article.

The internal combustion engine may be used for driving a railcar directly, or for generating on the vehicle itself electricity to be used for driving the wheels. The petrol engine appears to be quite efficient for the former purpose—at any rate, for single vehicles; but the great economy in fuel of the heavy-oil engine has caused much more general use to be made of the Diesel engine. An electric motor is usually interposed—the Diesel engine generates electricity, which, in turn, drives the wheels. The trouble about arrangements of this kind is that they are not only extremely expensive in first cost, but so complicated that great care and vigilance are required to keep them in working order. For each horse-power which it develops the first cost of a Diesel or Diesel-electric engine is between two and three times that of a steam locomotive.

Coming now to the last named, by far the worst trouble is the very small proportion of the heat produced by the combustion of the fuel in its fire-box that a steam locomotive converts into useful work. The very best modern locomotives can utilise, for driving themselves and their trains along, only 9 per cent. of the energy set free by the complete combustion of the fuel. Till quite

recently the percentage converted into useful work was more like 6 or 7. The steam locomotive, indeed, has suffered greatly from the indifference to progress which in the past has been so general a feature of the proceedings of railway administrators. It will be noticed that an increase in efficiency from, say, $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 9 per cent. is equivalent to an improvement of nearly 40 per cent., and, in conjunction with this, many other developments have taken place that make the best modern engines far better suited than their predecessors for running at high speeds. A short description of one of the most successful recent locomotives will serve to bring out the various points. Curiously enough, this locomotive is not a new machine, but a rebuild. The Paris-Orleans Railway, having electrified long stretches of main line, had more steam locomotives on its hands than it wanted, so when it was desired to adopt steam locomotives of improved design it was decided not to build new machines, but to reconstruct a number of old ones.

The first lot thus dealt with were some four-cylinder compound engines with the 4-6-2 wheel arrangement and coupled wheels 6 feet $4\frac{3}{4}$ inches in diameter. The features which it was desired that the rebuilt machines should possess were an abundant supply of extremely fluid steam at the highest feasible pressure together with arrangements for the easiest possible passage of the steam from the boiler, through the cylinders and blast-pipe, into the atmosphere; approximate equalisation of the power developed in the high-pressure and low-pressure cylinders; and the balancing of the moving parts so as to inflict the least possible strain upon the road. These requirements are met by a boiler pressure of 245 lb. per square inch, a Nicholson siphon (which much increases the heating surface of the fire-box and produces an intense circulation of water in the boiler), a superheater capable of raising the temperature of the steam to 750°F. , or even 800°F. (which much increases the volume of the steam and its fluidity), very large steam-pipes, poppet-valves, very easy exhaust through a double blast-pipe and chimney, and cranks on either side of the engine set at 180 degrees to one another.

The arrangement of the steam passages and poppet-valves enables so much steam to be passed that well over 3000 horse-power can be developed at 75 miles per hour, and the boiler is powerful enough to maintain this effort for long distances. To give some sort of idea what this means, it may be pointed out that the greatest effort of the very slightly smaller engine which worked the special train to Leeds was the maintenance of a speed of $82\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour up 10 miles of ascent averaging about 1 in 220. This is probably the greatest effort that a British engine has ever made; the horse-power, worked out by the most recent formula, comes to 2300. The British engine had none of

the special arrangements for rapidly passing steam through the cylinders which distinguish the French engine. It is therefore almost certain that engines which possess these advantages will be able greatly to exceed the speeds reached by the London and North-Eastern engine. As this latter reached 100 miles per hour, it is obvious that a steam locomotive designed specially for the attainment of the highest speeds would have a great deal in hand over and above the highest speeds so far reached.

An advantage of the steam locomotive which is not often mentioned is that it is easier upon the road than any other kind of motor. This is due to the fact that the piston of a steam locomotive floats in the cylinder in such a way that there is no rigid connexion between the wheels and axles and the spring-borne body of the engine. While, therefore, there can be no doubt that all the forms of motor examined are capable of working railway vehicles at speeds far higher than those at present reached, the first cost of the steam locomotive is so much smaller than that of the rival systems, and the advantages of the rival systems are so problematical, that, as things are to-day, the steam locomotive appears to be by far the most suitable motive power for working accelerated trains.

A question that arises in connexion with acceleration is that of stream-lining. The idea of stream-lining is attractive, and a stream-lined vehicle is a highly spectacular object with a considerable advertising value. But it is well not to be led away by false analogies. Aeroplanes and racing motor cars get much benefit from stream-lining. The front surfaces of these vehicles form a very large part of their whole surfaces, and, with aeroplanes, there is, properly speaking, no such thing as resistance from a side wind. With railway vehicles the front surface forms a much smaller part of the whole surface, and, with a train composed of a number of vehicles, the surface of the front of the first vehicle forms an extremely small part of the whole surface. It is well known that by far the worst hindrance arising from air resistance is that caused by a wind coming from the side which encounters the large surface of the side of the train. Railway passenger carriages are usually built with surfaces as smooth as possible, and, with corridor trains, the space between the different vehicles is largely filled up. It is very doubtful if it is worth while doing more than this. Experiments carried out in wind-tunnels are very unconvincing, because conditions in the open air are totally unlike those in wind-tunnels.

With regard to the permanent way, the only considerable alteration that would be desirable if greatly accelerated trains are to be run would be to increase the super-elevation of the outside rails on curves. The margin of safety against overturning is at

the present time enormous on all curves, except those where speed limits exist, and increased super-elevation on ordinary curves is not necessary from considerations of safety; but it would eliminate a certain amount of flange friction against the outer rail and in this way diminish the resistance of the train.

We come, finally, to the cost of acceleration. As already indicated, general electrification, whether combined with acceleration or not, must involve a huge increase in capital costs. Economies sufficient to offset this increase would have to be on a far larger scale than any which to me appear possible, while in certain, not very remote, contingencies general electrification might produce a staggering financial disaster—if, for instance, some cheap and practical method were discovered of supplying moving vehicles with wireless power, so that all the conducting rails or wires, with their appurtenances, became useless. While the internal combustion engine is free from the overwhelming risks attendant on general electrification, its use also requires vastly increased capital expenditure without any assurance of economies sufficient to offset this increase.

With the steam locomotive, on the other hand, the costs of acceleration are almost entirely running costs. Endless variations are, of course, possible, but I will take a concrete case as an example. The *Royal Highlander* is booked to cover the 117½ miles from Carlisle to Stirling in 144 minutes (49 miles per hour). We shall not be far wrong if we assume the use of an 80-ton engine with a 50-ton tender to work a train weighing 300 tons behind the tender. In 1896 a 47-ton engine with 40-ton tender worked trains weighing as much as 170 tons behind the tender from Carlisle to Stirling at 60 miles per hour, start to stop. It requires an efficiency merely equal to that of the engine built nearly forty years ago for the present-day 80-ton engine to take its 300-ton load over the same road at the same speed. It would take too long to examine all the possible increases in expense that an increase in speed from 49 to 60 miles per hour might bring about, so I will merely say that there is excellent reason for believing that the only ones of the least importance would be those due to increased coal consumption and increased maintenance expenses of the boiler. Coal consumption would probably be increased from 40 lb. to 55 lb. per mile—say, 1d. per mile; if we allow 1½d. per mile for increased costs of boiler maintenance, the whole cost of such an acceleration works out at 2½d. a mile. The cost of raising the speed of a similar train running over a road with easy gradients from 60 to 75 miles per hour should be similar. In other words, the costs of very important accelerations with steam locomotives are almost negligible.

MONKSWELL.

LITERATURE IN SOVIET RUSSIA

GOVERNMENT interference in all domains of life in Soviet Russia is so thoroughgoing and persistent that it is impossible to discuss the destinies of Soviet Russian literature without analysing the bearing upon it of this outside political factor. From the very beginning it was the intention of the Soviet Government and of the Communist Party of Russia (and the two may be, for all intents and purposes, identified) to make literature subservient to their political designs, to create a literature that would befit the only Communist and proletarian State in the world. This ultimate aim was never lost sight of, but, in the actual accomplishment of it, several outside circumstances had to be taken into consideration, and numerous obstacles to be overcome. The Government and the Communist Party, in their policy towards literature, were obliged to adapt themselves to the changing political and economic conditions. The line of that policy was therefore by no means straight; it was a zig-zagging line, with halts and breaks in it.

During the first period of the Revolution, the period of the civil war and war Communism, the Government and the party were too much beset by other, more urgent and vital, problems to take much heed of purely literary matters. Literature was more or less left to take care of itself. This practically resulted in Futurism making a bold bid to establish its literary monopoly. It was the only organised literary school that had survived the Revolution, and its position on the extreme Left of literature made its alliance with the political forces of the extreme Left natural and easy. Its theoreticians openly spoke in 1918 of their dictatorship in the field of art parallel to the dictatorship of the proletariat in the domain of politics and economics. They identified Futurism with proletarian art and proclaimed that 'art will be proletarian or there will be no art at all.' But, though encouraged by Lunacharsky, the first Soviet Commissary for Education, this alliance was only temporary: very soon the Soviet Government realised the danger that lay in this tendency of Futurism, revolutionary in form but neither Communist nor proletarian in substance, to identify itself with the proletariat

and to speak in the name of the Government. Parallel with the Futurists' bid for literary supremacy an attempt was made, through the creation of the so-called '*Proletkult*' (an abbreviation of 'proletarian culture'), to foster a separate proletarian literature. The method of the *Proletkult*, inspired by a certain Bogdanov and to some extent also encouraged by Lunacharsky, was to rear young peasant and proletarian writers and artists in specially created 'studios' conducted by *bourgeois* experts. The whole undertaking failed, however, partly because it was looked upon with disfavour by the political leaders of Communism: both Lenin and Trotsky disapproved of Bogdanov's tendency to divorce his 'cultural action' from the general political and economic activities of the Communist Party, to assert the cultural independence of the *Proletkult*.

With the end of the civil war in 1920 and the subsequent introduction of the New Economic Policy, which contributed to a considerable easing-up of the material conditions in which literature had to work, there came a literary revival. A number of young writers appeared on the stage and a large literature sprang up which tried to record the rich and varied experience of those first years of revolutionary turmoil, now in terms of tense lyrical emotionalism (Boris Pilnyak, Vsevolod Ivanov, Nikolay Nikitin), now in those of cold-blooded realistic description. The characteristic features of this early post-revolutionary fiction were its quaint mixture of realism and fantasy—quite natural if we remember that the border-line between the real and the unreal was almost obliterated in those first 'romantic' years of the Revolution—and its aversion from the traditional psychologism of the Russian novel, of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Turgenev. Of all the Russian writers of the past the young post-revolutionary prose-writers looked most to the least psychological ones—Gogol and Leskov, whose influence on them was partly direct and partly indirect, through Bely and Remizov respectively. While in the early 'Futurist' period of post-revolutionary literature, poetry, of all the literary *genres*, held the floor almost exclusively, now it was the turn of the short story, the anecdote, or, at the utmost, of those amorphous lyrico-political compositions which, like Pilnyak's *Bare Year*, are novels only in name. The young writers of the civil war were too much in a hurry to record their impressions and experiences to tackle the novel as a literary *genre*. Politically speaking, the bulk of this literary production was neutral, impartial, purely descriptive. Though on the whole in sympathy with the Revolution, especially in its romantic and elemental aspect, the young writers of this period were not partisans of political Communism—they were out neither to take sides, nor even to explain and analyse, but merely

to show, to record the events. The majority of them came to form the group which Trotsky dubbed 'fellow-travellers'—people who did not embrace the whole of the revolutionary doctrine, but up to a certain point were ready to 'travel' along the way of the Revolution. In the face of this comparative neutrality of the great bulk of literature, it became necessary for the Soviet Government to take a definite attitude to the growing literary production. The problem of the opposition between the proletarian and non-proletarian, the Communist and non-Communist, writers was also becoming more acute. All attempts to foster artificially proletarian literature having failed, the 'fellow-travellers,' owing to the superior quality of their literary technique, easily asserted their superiority. The literary stage in those years was practically held by them. But the proletarian writers were becoming more and more arrogant and insistent in their demand for hegemony. With the foundation of the groups '*October*' and '*On Guard*' and of the All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, their activities became more organised and systematic, and their campaign for supremacy assumed a more violent character. In the resolution passed by the first Pan-Soviet Conference of Proletarian Writers it was stated that the rule of the proletariat was incompatible with the prevalence of non-proletarian literature. In a class society, said the resolution, imaginative literature had no right to be neutral. All talks about a possibility of peaceful co-operation and competition of different literary groups and currents were 'sheer reactionary Utopia.' The resolution declared the writings of the 'fellow-travellers' to be fundamentally anti-revolutionary and insisted on the principle of the supremacy of proletarian literature being officially recognised.

Throughout 1923–24, violent battles were fought round this cardinal problem of literary policy. They culminated in the resolution passed by a special conference convoked by the Press Department of the Communist Party which confirmed the party's rather benevolent policy towards the 'fellow-travellers' and their literature. The resolution avoided any explicit mention of the proletarian literature, but criticised the methods of the proletarian literary organisations and rebuked them by proclaiming that 'no literary current, school or group must come forward in the name of the party.' In 1925 the Communist Party went a stage further, when its Central Committee passed the famous resolution which became a kind of literary *Magna Charta Libertatum*, a kind of constitution which for some years was to govern all literary relations in the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the 'liberties' which it granted to Soviet writers were only relative: there could be no question of full creative freedom in the Com-

munist State. This was clearly stipulated in the first paragraph of the resolution, which almost coincided with the basic principle laid down by the Conference of Proletarian Writers. It said, namely, that in a Communist society there was and could be no neutral art. But this statement was somewhat qualified, and the resolution went on to say that in the period of proletarian dictatorship the party was confronted by the problem of finding a *modus vivendi* with the peasantry and gradually transforming the latter; of admitting a certain amount of co-operation with the *bourgeoisie* and then gradually ousting it; of enrolling the *intelligentsia* in the service of the Revolution and winning it over from the *bourgeoisie*. The resolution admitted that while the proletariat already possessed 'unfailing criteria for estimating the social and political value of any work of art,' it had no such ready-made criteria where the artistic form was concerned. It denied the existence of the hegemony of the proletarian writers: the latter must still earn the right to such hegemony. The resolution recommended an attitude of 'tactful care' with regard to the 'fellow-travellers,' so as to ensure their speediest adherence to Communism. It also proclaimed the necessity to fight all attempts at 'a purely hothouse proletarian literature.'

This literary *Magna Charta* gave the 'fellow-travellers' a certain scope of freedom and something like a sense of security. This state of relative freedom lasted till 1929. It was the most fruitful period in the history of Soviet Russian literature, which saw the appearance of such works as Leonov's *Badgers*, Fedin's *Cities and Years* and *Brothers*, Olesha's *Envy*, etc. Incidentally, it also coincided with the revival of the psychological novel as a literary *genre*, which reflected a marked tendency towards psychological realism and an attempt to grasp the meaning of the Revolution and its various processes instead of merely noting them.

But in 1929, in connexion with the adoption of the Five-Year Plan, the extreme Communist wing renewed its attacks on some of the 'fellow-travellers.' Two of the leading Soviet writers, Pilnyak and Zamyatin, were forced to resign from the All-Russian Writers' Association. There was a lively controversy in the Press about the so-called 'social command' in which many prominent writers and critics took part. Most of the writers, even the Communist Gladkov, pronounced themselves against the policy of giving writers 'social commands' or setting them definite literary tasks. The moderate Marxist critic Polonsky opposed this policy from the Marxist, class point of view. But before a few months passed he was himself fallen in disgrace and divested of his leading position in the Soviet reviews. The theory of social command on a large scale was officially sanctioned, and this in a

new and much more drastic form. It was no longer a question of carrying out the implicit 'command' of the ruling class; it was decided to place literature in the service of the Five-Year Plan, to give writers explicit social and political tasks to perform, to instil new political blood into a literature that had become much too free and objective. The Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, led by 100 per cent. Communists, at last won their game and began to exercise a virtual dictatorship in all literary matters. The result was a drying-up of the creative sources of Russian literature and a narrowing-down of its themes. For about three years the Five-Year Plan became the sole subject of Soviet literature. It produced a few interesting novels (Leonov's *Sot* and *Skutarevsky*, Pilnyak's *Volga Flows into the Caspian Sea*), but they were the more interesting the more they deviated from the officially imposed task. And they were simply drowned in a vast sea of dull, purely descriptive or obviously biased writings. At the recent Pan-Soviet Literary Congress it was stated that 75 per cent. of the books published in the period 1928-1931 was really worthless.

This position lasted until 1932, when, by a new resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, all the organisations of proletarian writers were suppressed and all Soviet writers united in a single Union. This step was motivated by the successes of Socialist reconstruction, which made the existence of separate proletarian literary organisations superfluous. It was tantamount to raising the 'fellow-travellers' to the rank of full-fledged allies. The Government decided that, having succeeded in breaking the neck of literature and subordinating it to its plan, it had achieved a sufficient degree of homogeneity which now could be maintained. One of the persons who were mainly instrumental in this reversal of policy was Gorky, and since then his voice has become particularly weighty in all literary matters.

What was the general effect on Soviet literature of this new swing in the Government policy, and what was its real meaning? The literature of the Five-Year Plan gave way in the last two years to what has come to be known as 'Socialist Realism.' The transition, however, took place rather imperceptibly, and it is not always easy to draw a line between the works belonging to one and the other. In any case, by comparison with the period 1929-32 the interference of the official circles with literature is much less obvious. The organisations of proletarian writers which exercised a voluntary control and censorship have disappeared. The Union of Soviet Writers is supposed to comprise all those writers living and working in Soviet Russia who adhere to the political platform of the Soviet Government, support Socialist construction and accept Socialist Realism. Therein it

differs from all similar bodies in *bourgeois* countries: it is not a mere professional organisation; its members are held together by certain common political and literary principles. The statutes of the Union provide that all its members shall adhere to the political platform of the Soviet Government and apply in their works the method of Socialist Realism. This in itself, of course, is a check on the freedom of writers' creative personality. It is an attempt, unique in the history of literature, to impose on the whole body of writers of a given country a definite literary method. Its uniqueness is emphasised by the fact that this literary method is not an invention of that body of writers as such, but has been dictated to it by the political leader of the country, a man who has never had anything to do with literature. In fact, the catchword of Socialist Realism—this was especially emphasised at the first Pan-Soviet Literary Congress in August last—was coined by Stalin, and it was he who formulated the task of Soviet writers as that of the 'engineers of human souls.'

But what are the practical manifestations of that new-fangled literary method in present-day Russian literature, and what is really meant by it? In interpreting the meaning of their latest slogan the leading Soviet critics seem to admit that it must be taken in a rather broad sense and that it includes a great variety of styles. But in their theoretical disquisitions they fail to define it more or less precisely even in this broadened conception, and when it comes to its practical manifestations the matters become still more confused. Inasmuch as the stress in this latest literary formula is laid on the word 'Realism,' its point is directed primarily against Romanticism, as well as against certain formalistic and stylistic innovations which tend to subordinate the description of real life and living men to formal and stylistic designs. But in this the new method merely sanctions the tendency which has been dominant in Soviet Russian literature ever since 1925. 'Back to Realism,' such has been, in fact, the implied slogan presiding over the evolution of the Russian novel since its revival in 1925. And the further away from 1925 we are, the more pronounced is the tendency to clothe this Realism in its traditional classical garments. Fedin's *Brothers* (1928) is more realistic and true to tradition than his *Cities and Years* (1925), while most of the novels of the Five-Year Plan and of the proletarian Realists are still nearer to the old-fashioned realistic school than the earlier works of Fedin, Leonov and Kaverin, who were the first to revive the novel as such. It may seem paradoxical at first glance that as soon as the proletarian literature outgrew its infancy, the period of its revolutionary freaks, it became even more conservative, more traditional and old-fashioned than the literature of the 'fellow-travellers.' But this will appear natural,

if we remember the emphasis which the partisans of proletarian literature always laid on contents in preference to form.

But if the proclamation of Realism as the dominant school of the age does no more than consecrate the *status quo* that has long been in existence, its qualification by the word 'Socialist' does not help to clarify the position. Is it, after all, only the 'Socialist' contents of a work, its Socialist message, that makes all the difference? But why then speak of a new literary method and style? Some of the Soviet critics draw a parallel between Socialist Realism and what a Russian critic of the seventies of the last century, Shelgunov, called 'popular Realism' (in this connexion one may recollect the movement of 'Populism' started a few years ago by a group of French writers, and the works of Giono, Dabit and others). He opposed it to what he termed the 'aristocratic Realism' of the majority of Russian writers of the nineteenth century. A typical representative of 'popular Realism,' he saw in Reshetnikov one of the minor 'Populist' writers of the 'sixties. The essence of 'popular Realism' lay for Shelgunov in its preoccupation with social psychology above all. It focussed its attention on the 'masses,' on the middle classes and the peasants. But after the October Revolution, popular Realism, which, according to the critic in question (Pereverzev), had survived in some form or other till then, lost its actuality. And just as in the 'sixties, after the peasant reform, the Realists were now confronted with the task of discovering a new realistic method that would suit best the altered social conditions. Socialist Realism is thus called upon to reflect 'Socialist realities' and 'socialistic mentality.' Popular Realism is its historical antithesis and at the same time its essential premise. But this Marxian dialectic reasoning really leads us nowhere.

Other critics oppose Socialist Realism to plain *bourgeois* Realism as a positive form may be opposed to a negative. The traditional *bourgeois* Realism in all its varieties, they say, was rooted in the critical, more or less negative, attitude to reality. It was born of a protest against that reality and was potentially revolutionary. Socialist Realism, on the contrary, is grounded in a positive attitude to the new realities of the Communist society. Its starting-point is the acceptance of that new order of things. It is essentially optimistic—*bejahend*, to use a German word—while the pre-revolutionary *bourgeois* Realism was fundamentally pessimistic and often implied a morbid and unhealthy attitude to the world. The logical conclusion seems to be that Socialist Realism is also potentially—conservative.

There was also a tendency to oppose Socialist Realism to the revolutionary Romanticism which prevailed during the first years of the Revolution, and which still characterises the work of some

Soviet writers. But the outcome of the long and heated discussions on this subject has been the admission of revolutionary Romanticism as a necessary component part of Socialist Realism. Gorky, in one of his articles published last summer, went even so far as to say that revolutionary Romanticism was merely a 'pseudonym of Socialist Realism.' A formula was thus found solving the problem and reconciling the contending literary factions, but it hardly added to our understanding of Socialist Realism as a literary method.

Recently a Soviet critic (Nusinov) has discussed the relationship between Socialist Realism, as a method of psychological presentation, and the psychological methods of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. In Dostoevsky he sees the complete antipode of Socialist Realism, for the object of his psychologism was to reduce man's actions to a play of eternal forces of good and evil within him and to seek a religious solution and explanation. But it is also wrong, says Nusinov, to think that Tolstoy's psychological method is essentially nearer to that of Socialist Realism; in fact, it is nearer only in one point—in Tolstoy's moral optimism. But both Tolstoy and Dostoevsky showed human beings in their individual, not in their social, aspect. With Tolstoy, man is an embodiment of good so long as he is left to himself, but becomes an agent of evil whenever he is, or feels himself to be, a part of a social collective. Tolstoy's method is therefore even more harmful and dangerous than Dostoevsky's, says Nusinov. Of all the classics of *bourgeois* Realism, Balzac and Stendahl, with their social and historical approach to their themes, stand closest to Socialist Realism. Towards the end of his article Nusinov, however, lets the cat out of the bag and brings us back to the starting-point by disclosing the essentially political nature of Socialist Realism, when he says: 'The main task of Socialist Realism is to fight for the destruction of the world of property and the triumph of Socialism.'

One of the objects of Socialist Realism in literature has been described by some of its exponents as the creation of types, of typical personages of the revolutionary epoch. Till now, they say, Soviet literature has been unable to create such types. Others insist that the literature of Socialist Realism must look out for heroes, must reflect the heroic features of the great revolutionary age. And here again they recognise the failure of the post-revolutionary literature, its unworthiness of the 'heroic epoch.' On the whole this tendency to belittle the achievements of Soviet literature is a typical feature of the period which immediately followed the 'reform' of 1932, in marked contrast to the preceding period, when new works satisfying the requirements of the moment were easily proclaimed masterpieces, as

was the case with Panferov's *Bruski*. In the course of the first six months of 1934 Soviet writers and critics, led and encouraged by Gorky, were heard to complain more and more often about the 'general low level' of Soviet literature, especially of its technique, its language. Panferov's *Bruski* became one of the principal targets of these attacks on the low quality of literary production—*habent sua fata libelli*. Of late the intrinsic literary qualities of a work, its technical merits, the quality of its language, have been playing more and more part in critical estimates. A campaign was launched insisting on raising the technical standards of literary production, on learning from the 'classics,' both Russian and foreign. Gorky and some of the leading proletarian novelists, especially Fadeev and Sholokhov, played a prominent part in that campaign.

The question is, however, whether Socialist Realism has produced any typical works. One of the novels which is commonly regarded in Russia as a typical expression of Socialist Realism is Sholokhov's *The Upland Soil*. In a way it belongs to the Five-Year Plan literature, dealing as it does with the collectivisation of land in the Cossack regions. But among the Five-Year Plan works it stands out for its greater inner freedom and objectivity. It satisfies the requirements of Socialist Realism, inasmuch as it gives a picture of the Socialist realities drawn on a vast scale, and shows us a whole section of Soviet Russian life. Sholokhov is also quite successful in creating striking typical figures. Davydov, a Communist workman who combats the small-*bourgeois* instincts and tendencies of the Cossacks; Nagulnov, who represents the Left wing excesses within the Communist Party and is finally 'sacked'; Ostrovnov, a typical *kulak*, who, in joining the collective farm and even becoming its manager, pursues his own personal and class ends, are all typical figures. But there is little of 'socialistic heroism' in the novel; it portrays no heroes. The author may have meant Davydov to be the embodiment of revolutionary heroic qualities, but if so, he has hardly succeeded in making us believe in him as a hero: an unprejudiced reader does not even feel any sympathy for Davydov, let alone admire him. There is rather something to admire in Nagulnov, who from the orthodox point of view is a heretic. In general it is very difficult to say why Sholokhov's second novel should be regarded as the work of a Socialist Realist and not of a Realist *tout court*, or what there is in its method to distinguish it from some of the earlier works of Soviet literature handling the realities of Soviet life in a spirit of Realism.

The same applies to another novel which has been heralded as a great achievement of Socialist Realism—Bruno Yasensky's *A Man Changing His Skin*. Yasensky is a curious instance of a

non-Russian writer (he is a Polish Communist, I think) writing in Russian: there are at present in Soviet Russia several foreign Communists who have become Soviet writers, and the Bolsheviks are naturally proud of this proof of the international character of their literature. Yasensky is one of them. The action of his novel takes place in Tadzhikistan, in Central Asia, against the background of Socialist 'construction.' Its principal character is a young American engineer who is gradually transformed from a typical *bourgeois* into a good Communist. Yasensky tries to combine his Socialist outlook with the elements of a novel of adventures and a detective thriller; but is this a hall-mark of Socialist Realism?

Kataev's novel *Forward, Oh Time!*, translated into English about a year ago, is also often regarded by the Soviet critics as an instance of Socialist Realism. It is a novel of the second period of the Five-Year Plan literature, different in many a way from the novels of its first period (those of Pilnyak, Leonov, Gladkov and others). Here too, of course, there is a portrayal of Socialist realities. There is even a peculiar Socialist mass heroism, though tempered by some very unheroic motives. But there are neither real heroes nor real types in Kataev's novel. His Realism is rather a-psychological. In its method his novel differs from the majority of the realistic works of the latest period of Soviet literature, and in any case it is difficult to trace it back to the classics of traditional Realism whom Gorky and other exponents of Socialist Realism set up as masters and models to the younger Soviet writers. (In the case of Sholokhov and Fadeev their manner is easily traceable to Tolstoy.) Kataev's novel rather bears traces of Western European and American influences. About two years ago a curious discussion broke out in Soviet literary circles as to whether Soviet literature should learn from the Russian classics or follow the latest developments of the European and American literature and keep step with them. The nationalistic view was advocated chiefly by the conservative Realists from among the proletarian writers (Fadeev, Sholokhov and others), while some of the young '*bourgeois*' individualists (Kaverin, Olesha and Kataev among others) came forward as Westerners and 'Modernists' and called upon Soviet literature to learn from Proust, Joyce and Dos Passos. These three names are usually mentioned whenever there is question of non-Russian influences in contemporary Russian literature. But one can hardly speak of any serious influence on Russian literature of either Proust or Joyce. The only writer who had many things in common with Joyce was Andrey Bely; but, in the first place, he belongs to the pre-Soviet period of Russian literature, and, secondly, in his case it was a question, not of influence, but of treading on the same unexplored ground. Bely arrived indepen-

dently at many of the things which the Western European reader is accustomed to associate with Joyce. As regards Proust, his influence can be detected to a certain extent in the prose of Boris Pasternak, and perhaps, but to a still lesser extent, in the work of Yury Olesha. But the great majority of Soviet Russian literature is quite free from it (it is much more noticeable among the young Russian *émigré* writers, which is only natural, of course). More real is the influence exercised by John Dos Passos. His novels are being translated into Russian, his plays staged in Moscow. It is his cinematographic technique of the novel (which really goes back to Jules Romains' *Unanimisme*), with its multitude of characters, its rapidly shifting scenes, its close-ups, as well as his general revolutionary outlook and his endeavours to create a type of novel in which individual destinies would be dissolved in the mass and in a wide current of time (Romains' *Les hommes de bonne volonté* is an example of the same tendency, though with Romains individual psychology plays a much greater part), that attracts the young Soviet writers. Dos Passos's (and Romains') influence is especially felt in the construction of Kataev's *Forward, Oh Time!*. Some traces of it can also be found in the novels of Venyamin Kaverin, though in the case of this 'westernising' Romanticist it is complicated by several other and totally different influences—of Hoffmann, Edgar Allan Poe and others. But if it is possible to speak at present of any serious Western European influences in Russian literature, it is rather the influence of the classics of European Realism, especially of Balzac, in whom of late the Soviet critics and writers have been taking great interest. It is Balzac's social psychology and physiology that appeal to the adepts of Socialist Realism.

The recent first Congress of Soviet Writers (held in August 1934) once more emphasised the close connexion which exists between literature and politics in Soviet Russia. The Congress took place under the auspices of the Union of Soviet Writers and with the benevolent protection and encouragement of the official Government and party circles. Nearly every speaker deemed it his duty to introduce, one way or other, the name of Stalin, and Isaac Babel went even so far as to exhort his colleagues to emulate Stalin's style. The Government spokesman at the Congress, a certain Zhdanov, laid it down without any ambiguity that *literature in Soviet Russia must be tendentious*. And some of the most eminent Soviet writers one after another subscribed (had to subscribe?) to this view. Thus, Vsevolod Ivanov, who in 1922 belonged to the group of 'Serapion Brothers,' which in its literary manifesto flatly rejected all 'tendentiousness,' now said:

Life has quickly taught us. Through the ranks of non-party writers there passed Communist writers who . . . actively fought the lofty world

of art, the influences of alien literatures, who knew how to assimilate all the accomplishments of the *bourgeois* literature and how to reject quickly and without regret all its defects and above all its inherent falsehood and make-believe. I affirm that all those, without a single exception, who had signed the manifesto of the 'Serapion Brothers' or sympathised with it, have gone in the course of the last twelve years through this growth of consciousness, and that not one of them would not accept in all sincerity the statement formulated by comrade Zhdanov to the effect that we are in favour of Bolshevik tendentiousness in literature.

Some of the speeches at the Congress were frankly political in their purpose and spirit. Thus Vsevolod Vishnevsky, a rather bombastic Communist playwright, the author of *An Optimistic Tragedy* and other plays, made a speech full of the spirit of Soviet militarism, directed against Japan and the 'imperialist' world, and exhorted 'his friend Olesha' not to lose sight, amid his dreams about a better future, of the imminent necessity of defending the Soviet Union arms in hand against an 'imperialist aggression.' One of the problems to which the Congress devoted great attention was that of the literatures of national minorities (Georgian, Armenian, White Russian, etc.). Particular stress was laid on the fact that Soviet literature is not really confined to Russian literature, or literature in the Russian language.

But though the general mood prevailing at this Soviet literary parade was that of well-intentioned docility and readiness to carry out the implied 'social command'—that is, to glorify Socialism in terms of Socialist Realism, provided a certain scope of freedom of expression was granted to the writers—some of the mildly individualist heretics struck a note of their own which is not without significance. It was best formulated perhaps by Victor Shklovsky, a very gifted but extravagant critic of the 'Formalist' school, and among other things a sympathetic student of Sterne, when he spoke of the period of 'new humanism' and 'new sensibility,' of the signs of a revived interest in man. But it found its most passionate and brilliant expression in the speech of Yury Olesha, the author of *Envy*, one of the most remarkable and original works in the whole of Soviet literature. Olesha stated quite clearly the impossibility for a writer to fulfil a 'social command.' 'Every artist,' he said, 'can write only what he can write.' It was difficult for him to understand the character of an ordinary worker or of a revolutionary hero; he could not put himself into his shoes, and therefore could not write about him. He was primarily interested in man as such, and especially in the modern young man. As an artist he would like to go to that young man and ask him who he was, what were his feelings, what dreams did he dream, what colours did he see, what he loved, what he accepted and what he rejected. 'What

are you like, the young man of the Socialist society?' asks Olesha. 'Does reason or feeling prevail in you; can you weep, are you tender, have you grasped all that which used to frighten me?' In addressing these questions to the young man of Soviet Russia, as a stranger, as a man of another world, Olesha recognises that he, although himself fairly young (he was born in 1895), has his roots in the old pre-Soviet world: an admission that goes a long way to prove the spirit of continuity that binds the best there is in Soviet literature to the old Russian literature. In the same speech Olesha reveals that his conception of literature has much in common with the traditional moralistic conception. His tendentiousness is rather of a moral than political or social order. He thinks that the task incumbent on the writer of our days is to create books that would call forth in the younger generation a sense of emulation, a realisation of the necessity of 'becoming better.' A writer must be an educator. For Olesha, Communism is not only an economic but also a moral system. He hopes that the young people of Soviet Russia will be the first to embody that aspect of Communism, and he seems determined to devote himself to the task of helping them in this direction. It is interesting to note that Olesha's latest work, a film scenario called *A Severe Youth*, advocates the principle of 'qualitative inequality' in a Communist society, just as in his earlier works (*Envy*, *Love*, *The Cherry Stone*, etc.) he set out to vindicate the place of 'feelings' in the world of 'rational practicism.'

The principal resolution passed by the Congress on the report of Gorky does not, however, reflect any of these tendencies and confines itself to well-intentioned commonplace utterances. It says that, 'thanks to the victorious Socialist construction and the routing of the class enemies of the proletariat,' the imaginative literature of the Soviet Union has become a mighty factor of Socialist culture and of the education of the labouring masses in the spirit of Socialism. It urges the necessity of helping the writers to create 'works of art of high quality permeated with the spirit of Socialism.' The general impression one gleans from reading the long reports of this imposing Soviet literary parade is that literature in Soviet Russia has once more owned—and this time with a show of freedom from compulsion—to its status as *ancilla rei publicae*.

GLEB STRUVE.

THE LETTERS OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS¹

BECAUSE Gerard Manley Hopkins was both a Jesuit and a poet, and because there is evidence that the double vocation was not wholly harmonised, his other than purely literary critics suffer a dilemma. Either with the priests they declare that poetry must be secondary to the priestly vocation, or with the lovers of letters they regret that any adopted vocation should have been allowed (by the poet himself) to conflict with the destiny that this born poet brought with him into the world. There have been poets and priests—but possibly not among the Jesuits—who have reconciled poetry with the priestly vocation; but Hopkins did so incompletely, and on the evidence of his verse alone he reminds us more of Donne than of George Herbert. This dilemma should be stated frankly, because the two sides will never agree which should take precedence of the other. The two standards of virtue are different and, in the end, not to be reconciled. It must, I think, also be conceded that Hopkins fell short of self-unity. The simplest evidence of this is contained in a passage of letter XC. in the first volume. There Hopkins wrote:

I may as well say what I should not otherwise have said, that I always knew in my heart Walt Whitman's mind to be more like my own than any other man's living. As he is a very great scoundrel this is not a pleasant confession. And this also makes me the more desirous to read him and the more determined that I will not.

We are not always right in the judgment of ourselves, but there is some colour for Hopkins's verdict in his poetry. Therefore the fact of an inner conflict is best accepted, if only in order that the long-awaited correspondence with Robert Bridges, his literary executor and only public as well as critic, and with Canon Dixon, his admirer, may be read without distraction over the two vocations that refused perfectly to coincide.

Professor Abbott's introduction explains that Bridges's share

¹ *The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges* (edited with Notes and Introduction by Claude Collier Abbott); *The Correspondence of Gerard Manley Hopkins and Richard Watson Dixon* (edited by the same). Two vols.: Milford, 30s.

of this correspondence has disappeared; that the (temporal) diary left by Hopkins may yet be published; that a volume of his letters to Coventry Patmore and others is projected; and gives timely proof that Bridges, so far from delaying the publication of Hopkins's poetry from 1889–1918, continuously nursed the reputation of his dead friend by feeding anthologists with specimens of the poetry from 1893 to 1915—when Bridges's own anthology, *The Spirit of Man*, included seven poems. That is a telling vindication; nor can it be denied that 1918 was probably the earliest year in which the strange but beautiful poetry of Hopkins had a chance of being duly appreciated. The record of the sales of the book, however, which Professor Abbott has supplied, shows that the response was as slender in number as it was unhesitating in conviction. The few were certain, but the certain were the few. Now the taste that this, like all original poetry, has to create for itself is growing, and the slowness of its growth is evidence that the taste is likely to endure.

The examples of the prose contained in Father G. F. Lahey's *Memoir of Hopkins* showed that his prose was equally original. These letters, however, are to be considered less as examples of that prose—which, like the poetry, resembles oil-painting laid on the paper with the palette-knife or squeezed in lumps from the tube—than as a record of his thoughts and theories, particularly on rhythm, metre, and poetry. These were the only subjects on which the two friends were perfectly unconstrained. The letters to Bridges begin at the end of Hopkins's time at Oxford and continue, with one or two intervals, until his death in 1889. With a date or two in mind, we can follow the correspondence easily. Hopkins was born in 1844, went to Balliol in 1863, was converted to Catholicism in 1866, joined the Society of Jesus in 1868 (when he burned his early verses), was ordained in 1877, received a Dublin professorship of Greek in 1884, and devoted himself increasingly to music, as related in an appendix to the first of these volumes, until his death five years later. He believed in his music so far as to write in April 1885:

It is a test too: if you do not like it, it is because there is something you have not seen and I see. That at least is in my mind, and if the whole world agreed to condemn it I should only tell them to take a generation and come to me again.

This very characteristic sentence is worth quoting. It means that every impulse acknowledged by Hopkins was strong, and therefore that in a man of such diverse sympathies and capacities the harmonising of them under any regimentation was bound to be a difficult or desperate struggle. One does not wish to exaggerate this sense of frustration. The bulk of the letters are concerned with the criticism of the verses that the friends exchanged;

but whenever a biographical reference appears, it touches on this discord. If, then, the references that follow are deemed by the Society or by those jealous of Hopkins's memory to give a false perspective, the answer is that there are no others. To call this a correspondence exclusively devoted to the intricacies of metrical theory would, in fact, be an untrue description of this.

The biographical lights contained in these letters reveal four facts: that Hopkins had a very affectionate nature which missed the response that he could have found in a circle of friends; that his friendship with Bridges, though unwavering, was incomplete because Bridges was totally blind to the religion in which Hopkins was centred; that Hopkins was satisfied neither with his work—though parochial work, a post at Oxford, positions as select preacher, and finally as professor of classics and examiner were in turn given to him—nor with his poetry and music because he had so little leisure for either; and that throughout he felt deprived of encouragement, without which, he said, he could not produce happily. From all this there resulted depression and complaints of ill-health. The impression left is of a man little suited to any strict organisation; too individual to be merged happily in the ranks; and over-worried by practical responsibility—for instance, by setting or correcting examination papers, because he had the artist's temper that prefers to do an individual thing in the most personal way. There is no reason to suppose, however, that his ordination was regretted, but one fancies him to have been better suited, for example, for the Oratory. A congenial and little regimented community seems to have been his need.

He speaks constantly of his need for friendship, constantly of his need for encouragement; and the only work that seems not to have worried him was his poetry and his music, both of which he pursued whatever criticisms his friends might make. Here his poise is remarkable. He wrote (or composed) and defended his practice as one who well knew what he wanted to do and was at no loss to find reasons for his departures from common practice. Indeed, his chief musical critic found him self-willed and obdurate to argument; and if he did not fit in with musical authority he may have found obedience still harder in work that was rather a duty than a spontaneous outflow of his heart and head. He was as sensitive to the beauty of people as to that of Nature or of poetry, and this sensitiveness craved expression. Speaking of a stranger in an early letter, Hopkins wrote:

I did not know he was one of the faithful before. His face was fascinating me last term: I generally have one fascination or another on. Sometimes I dislike the faces which fascinate me but sometimes much the reverse, as is the present case.

Since he was also inclined to drawing, though this was not pursued as were his poetry and later his music, we see him drawn in several directions that he found it not easy to reconcile with the vocation that he had adopted. In letter LIII. he wrote:

I cannot in conscience spend time on poetry, neither have I the inducements and inspirations that make others compose. Feeling, love in particular, is the great moving power and spring of verse and the only person that I am in love with seldom, especially now, stirs my heart sensibly and when he does I cannot always 'make capital' of it, it would be sacrilege to do so. Then again I have of myself made verse so laborious.

The order in which different kinds of beauty waylaid him is described in letter LXIV., and perhaps in the vague suggestion of a community of friends, of beautiful characters, put forth by Whitman, Hopkins found the shadow of the ideal he much more fastidiously cherished:

No one can admire beauty of the body more than I do, and it is of course a comfort to find beauty in a friend or a friend in beauty. But this kind of beauty is dangerous. Then comes the beauty of the mind, such as genius, and this is greater than the beauty of the body and not to call dangerous. And more beautiful than the beauty of the mind is beauty of character, the 'handsome heart.' Now every beauty is not a wit or genius nor has every wit or genius character. For though even bodily beauty, even the beauty of blooming health, is from the soul, in the sense, as we Aristotelian Catholics say, that the soul is the form of the body, yet the soul may have no other beauty, so to speak, than that which it expresses in the symmetry of the body—barring those blurs in the cast which would not be found in the die or the mould. This needs no illustration, as all know it. But what is more to be remarked is that in like manner the soul may have no further beauty than that which is seen in the mind, that there may be genius uninformed by character. I wonder sometimes at this in a man like Tennyson. . . .

He hated ugliness in industrial towns, and was always refreshed by holidays in the country. Indeed, to be without the country was an active deprivation to him. In letter LXXVII. he says:

The vein urged by any country sight or feeling of freedom or leisure (you cannot tell what a slavery of mind or heart it is to live my life in a great town) soon dried and I do not know if I can coax it to run again.

Some years later, in March 1885, writing from Dublin, he remarked:

The delightful old French Father who teaches Logic here . . . will have it that I am dying—of anæmia. I am not, except at the rate that we all are; still I could do (indeed how gladly I could)—as they say—with more life.

Two months later he exclaimed: 'Change is the only relief, and that I seldom get.' A pregnant sentence (1888) is: 'It appears

I want not scenery but friends.' In the same year, the year before he died of typhoid, and while he was worried over his examination papers, there is a cry of distress :

It seems to me I can not always last like this : in mind or body or both I shall give way—and all I really need is a certain degree of relief and change ; but I do not think that what I need I shall get in time to save me.

He was also haunted by the feeling that his endeavours had ended in nothing, that he was a 'eunuch' who had bred no offspring even in the arts. That was inevitable, since virtually nothing of his had been published, and Bridges and Dixon were his only readers.

His references to encouragement are not only personal. He was fully aware how necessary this is to artistic production, and declared that a great work was like a great victory for England. His remarks on fame are noble. For himself: 'I must absolutely have encouragement as much as crops rain ; afterwards I am independent.' For fame, while placing it of course below virtue, he makes a great and serious claim :

I say it deliberately and before God, I would have you and Canon Dixon and all true poets remember that fame, the being known, though in itself one of the most dangerous things to man, is nevertheless the true and appointed air, element, and setting of genius and its works. What are works of art for ? to educate, to be standards. Education is meant for the many, standards are for public use. . . . We must then try to be known, aim at it, take means to it. And this without puffing in the process or pride in the success. But still. Besides, we are Englishmen. A great work by an Englishman is like a great battle won by England. It is an unfading bay tree. It will even be admired by and praised by and do good to those who hate England (as England is most perilously hated), who do not wish even to be benefitted by her. It is then even a patriotic duty *τῇ πατρίδι ἐνεργεῖν* and to secure the fame and permanence of the work. Art and its fame do not really matter, spiritually they are nothing, virtue is the only good ; but it is only by bringing in the infinite that to a just judgment they can be made to look infinitesimal or small or less than vastly great ; and in this ordinary view of them I apply to them, and it is the true rule for dealing with them, what Christ our Lord said of virtue, Let your light shine before men that they may see your good works (say, of art) and glorify your Father in heaven (that is, acknowledge that they have an absolute excellence in them and are steps in the scale of infinite and inexhaustible excellence).

Hopkins reminded both his correspondents that conspicuous personal brilliance was not in accord with the community he had joined, and he was probably found 'unpractical,' even in his daily employments, because he did not fit easily in any routine and found official duties of the secular sort irksome. 'Discouragement,' he wrote to Bridges, 'is not what my complaint, in my opinion, needs. Our institute provides us means of discouragement,

and on me at all events they have had all the effect that could be expected or wished and rather more.' Again, in February 1887, he wrote : 'My trouble is not the not being able to write a book ; it is not being fit for my work and the struggling vainly to make myself fitter.' A year later, after speaking of the return of poetic inspiration that a fortnight in Wales had brought, he wrote : 'far more than direct want of time, I find most against poetry and production in the life I lead. . . . Nothing comes : I am a eunuch—but it is for the kingdom of heaven's sake.' A pathetic sentence, written in August 1888, clinches the picture : 'It appears I want not scenery but friends.' From almost the last letter (page 295) we wince for him at this :

I agree to your musical strictures and almost invite your rebukes and if I do not do so heartily it is because a perfect organization for crippling me exists and the one for 'encouragement purposes' (modern English) is not laid down yet.

It was not, then, the drudgery of correcting examination papers, nor his political discomfort in the Ireland of the 'eighties when his animosity to Gladstone and to Parnell implies Unionist sympathies in himself, that explains his feeling of frustration. He seems rather to have chosen the very body into which his affectionate, artistic, and highly individual temper could have hoped to fit with the least chance of success ; and of course he blamed himself, and not his nature. We are sorry, since there existed alternatives, though the perfect one is not easy to suggest. Whatever life he had chosen, in his art—whether poetry or music—he would have played a lone hand, have been discouraged by offering work not likely to have been quickly appreciated, and so, even among a few devoted friends, have felt the want of support in his work which was one of the cravings of his nature.

It is essential, however, to distinguish between the undeniable fact revealed by this correspondence and the small, if persistent, part it holds through the letters themselves. The bulk of them are devoted to the exposition of his theories of rhythm and metre, and few more technical letters of equal number have been written by any English poet. The simplest summary of these theories is to be found in the letters to Canon Dixon, which form the second volume, because Dixon, unlike Bridges, wrote by ear and made no pretence to be a learned metrist. To Dixon, therefore, everything is explained, and the explanations are a valuable elucidation of the preface to Hopkins's *Poems* published by Bridges.

A few quotations will make the elements clear :

I had long haunting my ear the echo of a new rhythm which now I realised on paper in 'The Wreck of the *Deutschland*.' To speak shortly, it consists in scanning by accents or stresses alone, without any account of the number of syllables, so that a foot may be one strong syllable or it may

be many light and one strong. I do not say the idea is altogether new; there are hints of it in music, in nursery rhymes and popular jingles, in the poets themselves. . . .

This then is the essence of sprung rhythm: one stress makes one foot, no matter how many or few the syllables.

I call *rising rhythm* that in which the slack comes first, as in iambs and anapæsts, *falling* that in which the stress comes first, as in trochees and dactyls.

'Outriding feet,' that is parts of which do not count in the scanning (such as you find in Shakespeare's later plays, but as a licence, whereas mine are rather calculated effects); others in the ordinary scanning *counterpointed* (this is counterpoint: *Hóme* to his móther's hóuse *private* returned and 'But to vānquish by wisdom héllish wíles' etc.);

The choruses of *Samson Agonistes* are in my judgment counterpointed throughout; that is, each line (or nearly so) has two different coexisting scansions. But when you reach that point the secondary or 'mounted rhythm,' which is necessarily a sprung rhythm, overpowers the original or conventional one and then this becomes superfluous and may be got rid of; by taking that last step you reach simple sprung rhythm. Milton must have known this but had reasons for not taking it.

Though the discussion of metre takes the principal place in both series of letters, we must not allow it to bury the friendship that tied the three poets together. All were isolated men. Even Robert Bridges began by publishing through the private press of Dr. Daniel at Oxford. Canon Dixon had a tiny audience. Hopkins never had an audience at all. To Hopkins each of the other two supplied, as it were, a friendly hand out of the darkness; but since the letters from Bridges are not available, we cannot compare exactly the responses that Hopkins received. He had been sufficiently drawn to the poetry of Dixon to initiate the correspondence himself. A convenient plea was the fact that Dixon had been a master at Highgate when Hopkins had been a school-boy there. His approach was made in June 1878, and the unappreciated Dixon was transported to learn that a stranger had been moved by his own poetry enough to copy some of his verses, when, by joining the Jesuits, Hopkins foresaw that he would no longer possess books of his own. Dixon, therefore—at least, as a poet—was as much in need of encouragement as Hopkins; but on the other hand, he must have been in less need of ordinary friends and was happier in the vocation he had chosen. Bridges was much the most favourably situated of the three, but (so far as we can judge without his own replies) he lacked the beauty of spirit that made Dixon's answers so touching. In matters apart from poetry Hopkins and Bridges could never be very close; but we infer that the souls of Dixon and Hopkins would have been capable of a fine friendship even if the bond of

poetry had not brought them together. In Bridges, Hopkins had of living men the one best qualified to appreciate and to criticise his rhythmical experiments, and through this channel his hunger for friendship and inevitable desire to discuss a personal interest that could never be stifled found its outlet. Dixon supplied a similar need, but Dixon was also an admirer who tried more than one rash attempt to lure Hopkins into print. Moreover, Dixon had a beauty of character to which Hopkins was very sensible, and it is a natural regret that circumstances constrained the three to lead such separated lives and to confine their interchange of letters so largely to technical criticism. They scarcely met.

The correspondence, which has been judiciously and unobtrusively edited by Professor Abbott, has two enduring interests. The poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins has made such a profound impression upon all open to its original beauty that men's interest in the author of such poetry will deepen with time. One can foresee the probability of increasingly new and rival interpretations of the man, and so everything that he wrote will become precious. The second interest is the added light it throws upon the theories too cursorily discussed in his own preface. Hopkins's life had some of the 'terrible pathos' that Dixon found in the poetry, and the man stands apart, as does the poet in his verses, because no poet of equal originality or stronger natural impulse has been so ready to sacrifice his gift to a conception of virtue that proved nearly incompatible with its exercise. It may even prove, by a kind of poetic justice, that both the established Bridges and the still under-appreciated Dixon will strengthen their claim upon posterity by their friendship with this friend, and that Bridges himself will find one of his strongest bonds with the future to have been the memoir that he bestowed upon the one and the editing, and preservation of the letters, that performed a priceless service to the other.

OSBERT BURDETT.

POETS AND POLITICS

It is characteristic of the modern journalistic attitude to verse that the complaints which were levelled four years ago at the poetry of T. S. Eliot and his imitators are being repeated to-day as a protest against an entirely new school. The fact that a new school has arisen at all seems not generally to be recognised, although to those who have followed closely the recent development of English poetry it seems not impossible that a new and closer relationship of the poet to the public is gradually being established. As recently as 1928 Herbert Read could write with ample justification: 'There has surely never been a period in our literary history when poetry was so little read and the poet so little recognised.'¹ To the sanguine there now seem signs that that position is in process of amelioration.

The manner of such amelioration and the dangers attendant on its early stages provide the title for the present article. For a significant mark of the new school (which has as yet no name to distinguish it further) is its attention to contemporary politics. And when poetry begins to concern itself with politics it is touching ground which every reader of every newspaper is pleased to regard as 'reality.' The poet is once more giving himself the chance of becoming the voice of the people. The danger is, of course, that in so doing he may very well cease to be a poet. Lamartine was a poet because he wrote *Le Lac*, but his poems were read because he was a politician. Listen to his own testimony (in a letter, April 1848):

It is clear that I am part of the purpose of God, for I appear, even in my own eyes, to be indeed a miracle. I cannot understand, otherwise than by a breath of the divine spirit, the inconceivable popularity in which I am held here, by the poorest workers as well as in the richest salons and in the shops of the middle classes. I can go nowhere without being met by a very riot of love and admiration. . . . The heart of the country, as well as the Chamber, is secretly mine, more than it ever was. . . . At this moment I alone represent popularity.

Is this the position for which the leftward poets of to-day are preparing themselves?

¹ *Phases of English Poetry* (Hogarth Press, 1928).

For ten years English poetry was dominated by the figure of an American, T. S. Eliot. It is so no longer, though not a poet writing to-day can entirely escape his influence. To use the terms of Coleridge, T. S. Eliot served the modern poet both as 'fashioner' and 'seer,' and even where his vision is not shared his technical mastery must be a shining example to those who are striving to let ideas produce their own rhythms. His was undeniably the poetry of frustration and disillusionment, fitting a post-war attitude but not directly related to war or its consequences. 'Where are the eagles and the trumpets?' he asked, and could only answer, 'Buried beneath some snow-deep Alps.' The mermaids will not sing for J. Alfred Prufrock, for his timid bourgeois soul would never yield to their song; and Apeneck Sweeney is now the only audience for the nightingales which

sang within the bloody wood
When Agamemnon cried aloud,
And let their liquid siftings fall
To stain the stiff dishonoured shroud.

Mirages of limpid water draw us across the Waste Land, and we may desire but cannot accomplish 'the awful daring of a moment's surrender which an age of prudence can never retract.'

This defeatist element in Eliot's work, marvellous as is the perfection of its expression, appears now to have led to an inevitable reaction. It was perhaps unreasonable to expect that the poet who so vividly mirrored a state of being near to despair should also point an acceptable way to salvation, but Eliot's final refuge in the spiritual discipline of religion must have disappointed many of his followers. In *Ash Wednesday* (1930) it could be seen that he himself had found, or was finding, a way of escape. But there were many who could not pray with him

Teach us to care and not to care,
Teach us to sit still.

They were younger than he and they fiercely refused to sit still. What, then, were they to do?

Eliot had sublimely shown the tragic state of middle-class man, 'quite uncivilized, but refined beyond the point of civilization,' of man as '*le nourrisson des grandes vulgarisations*,'² a phrase used by Adrienne Monnier of James Joyce's Leopold Bloom, but equally applicable to Eliot's Sweeney. The unhappy tendencies remarked in the preface to *Lyrical Ballads* had steadily pursued their course, and the position confirmed Wordsworth's view of 130 years earlier:

For a multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind,

² *Nouvelle Revue Française*, May 1, 1931.

and, unfitting it for all voluntary exertion, to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor. The most effective of these causes are the great national events which are daily taking place, and the increasing accumulation of men in cities, where the uniformity of their occupations produces a craving for extraordinary incident, which the rapid communication of intelligence hourly gratifies.

In Wordsworth's day it was still possible to counteract this evil by the method of the *Lyrical Ballads*, but by the twentieth century a spiritual escape into the solace of the unspoiled countryside could be nothing but futile temporising. It was in retreating from contemporary problems towards an artificially bucolic landscape of their own fashioning that the Georgians made their fatal mistake. The facts must be faced. Eliot faced them for his class, the class from which poets are nowadays drawn, and retired in desperation to the more comfortable bosom of the Church. In a poem by Gavin Ewart, one of the youngest of those who obtain a critical hearing to-day, the 'poet of the Generation' thus sums up the situation in which Eliot's disciples were left :

We are swept away by a strange tide,
Did Mr. Eliot at Hyde

Park Corner in 1917 boarding a bus
Foresee it? He was not born in us

But we in him.
He gave us a voice, strengthened each limb,
Set us a few mental exercises
And left us to our own devices.

At first we ran up trees in distraction,
Mimicked his every action,
But now are back on earth again
Sheltered by a gourd and sane.³

The poets are 'back on earth,' and have yielded to a 'strange tide' so that they may be swirled away from the desolation of the Waste Land. The tide is largely a political one. The left hand has been extended for rescue and gratefully grasped. Indeed, it is scarcely surprising that revolution in some form should seem to offer the only release from a bondage that has become progressively less tolerable.

Wordsworth, as the preface to *Lyrical Ballads* shows, perceived clearly enough the beginning of the drift to the present position. In a celebrated passage in that preface he established also his faith that new ways of life, however unfamiliar to his own generation, would find new poets. 'If the labours of Men of Science should ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the Poet will sleep then no more than at

³ *New Verse*, May 1933.

present.' The appalling vulgarisation of the mind which Eliot portrayed cannot, of course, be ascribed directly to the 'labours of Men of Science,' yet without a doubt scientific progress is the most important conditioning factor of the temper of our age. And Wordsworth, at the time of *Lyrical Ballads*, was a revolutionary poet. Is there not some illuminating parallel to be drawn between the political outlook of the poets of the late eighteenth century and those of to-day?

At first the answer seems to be No. Broadly, it may be argued that poets, and especially young poets, are by nature more receptive to ideas of political revolution than their fellows. 'The protection of money and personal property by established institutions must mean less to poets than to other men, for money and personal property are to them of less value, and established institutions of less benefit, than to others. Their preoccupation with the heart and mind of man rather than with his social power or pretensions may well give them an unusually lively sympathy with the 'depressed classes' existing under any régime. To the young visionary, moreover, the principle of *festina lente* makes no appeal. He sees what he imagines to be wrong and unjust and demands that it be set right swiftly and violently. As he grows older he perceives, perhaps, that revolt too often clears the way for a worse tyranny and that there are devils in plenty waiting for the room to be swept and garnished for them. In how many besides Wordsworth himself did the Napoleonic conquests quench the flames kindled by the French Revolution! Both Southey and Coleridge, while maintaining their faith in 'perfectibility,' abandoned as the years went by their early revolutionary fervour. Godwin himself caused Hazlitt to exclaim :

Sad necessity! Fatal reverse! Is truth then so variable? Is it one thing at twenty, and another at forty? Is it a burning heat in 1793, and below zero in 1814? Not so, in the name of manhood and of common sense! ⁴

As late as 1820 Shelley could write :

the system of society as it exists at present must be overthrown from the foundations with all its superstructures of maxims and of forms.⁵

But Shelley died young.

These general considerations apart, however, it is at once seen that in so far as the poets of the French revolutionary period shared a common impulse of revolt, that impulse was different in kind from that which actuates their modern descendants, to whom we shall presently return. It was an altruistic impulse, and it had no connexion, real or imaginary, with æsthetics. It

⁴ *The Spirit of the Age*, 1825.

⁵ Letter to Leigh Hunt, May 1, 1820.

was compounded of the emotional and the intellectual; of the exaltation with which Wordsworth could write of the days of the Revolution:

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven,

and of the didactic and optimistic theories to which Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793) gave popular expression. In Coleridge the intellectual predominated; in Blake and Shelley the emotional. For Blake (wrote Swinburne) 'liberty and religion, taken in a large and subtle sense of the words, were alike credible and adorable . . . and in nothing else could he find matter for worship.' For Shelley liberty was religion itself. And when Shelley and Blake were both dead Coleridge, whose democratic allegiance had been of his mind, could change his mind:

No man was more enthusiastic than I was for France and the Revolution: it had all my wishes, none of my expectations.*

And again:

As it seems to me, the wise and the good in every country will, in all likelihood, become every day more and more disgusted with the representative form of government, brutalised as it is, and will be, by the predominance of democracy in England, France and Belgium.†

New poets, Wordsworth had prophesied, would find new manner and matter of expression, and Coleridge, cantankerously and rather priggishly, envisaged a growing disgust with the representative form of government which had once been his ideal. Wordsworth's material revolution has now come about, and the state of democratic government excites as lively a dissatisfaction as Coleridge could have foreseen. A literal *Deus ex machina* has appeared to the poets in their moment of perplexity, and the extended left hand has been gratefully grasped, regardless of implications which are now being gradually examined by the more courageous. At first it scarcely seemed to the contracting parties that this marriage of art with politics was unprecedented and might require some justification. For theirs was by no means the attitude of the young Romantics to whom liberty was a politically impossible ideal on which lyrical optimism could browse without discomfort. Far from it. Since Longinus made no mention of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Longinus must go. That Karl Marx knew nothing about poetry, on the other hand, need not prejudice him as the apostle of the new cult. The study of Donne, the examples of Laforgue, Pound and Eliot, had served to rarefy verse-craft to the required pitch. But if one is to continue with any conviction to repeat 'It is the cause, my soul,' some cause there must be.

* *Table-Talk*, July 23, 1832.

† *Ibid.*, April 9, 1833.

It must be conceded that it seemed to work. Capable revolutionary verse was produced—is still being produced, though its value is often in inverse proportion to the warmth of its political allegiance. Moreover, this was the age of steel, the machine age. Let the rolling pastorage of the verse-landscape be broken by the uncompromising verticals of pylons, and the warble even of Sweeney's nightingales be lost in the roar of nitro-glycerine, inarticulate but impressive. Thus we would at least be contemporary. But if we are to turn so suddenly from the dithyramb to the dynamo, from metabiology to metallurgy, we must consider carefully what we are accepting. Has that once potent word 'experience' been discarded with other totems? If not, what background other than a malleably theoretical one supports the poet of the machine age? Holding a shuttle is a different thing from holding a pen, and the sensitive reader of a poem about a dynamo is apt to conceive with a shudder the idea that exquisite fingers should know the stain of lubricating oil. He may even doubt whether they know any such thing, and reach the conclusion that the poetry of mechanisation, despite its naïve efforts to be contemporary, is not even genuine.

The actual machine-verse is, however, in the minority, and largely of an inoffensive and static nature. More considerable is the tendentious dynamic poetry of the left wing, accepting without question the novel idea that stasis has no place in poetry. 'A successful poem does not call a halt. It gives the order to march.'‡ This, while it can scarcely be regarded, even by its author, as an æsthetic tenet of universal application, is quite evidently believed to hold good for the poetry of to-day. It is the expression of literary Communism. It is sufficient prelude to an *apologia* for the union of poetry and politics.

Such an *apologia*, it is now recognised, must be presented as part of the credentials of the modern poet. With Communism as an æsthetic pose it is as difficult to be patient as with any other pose. Fashions of this nature can be overlooked so long as they are not unduly stressed. But when they are tacitly or overtly postulated as a necessary item in a poet's equipment some justification must be brought forward. It is thus that political poetry has had to resort to polemics to explain itself.

Already in the second number of *New Verse* (March 1933) Mr. Geoffrey Grigson felt obliged to point out that 'if there must be attitudes, a reasoned attitude of torism is welcomed no less than a communist attitude.' This is the perfectly reasonable standpoint of an editor who calls his periodical 'New Verse' and not 'New Politics,' but the fact that the statement was called for shows the extent to which the verse-reading public (*New Verse*

‡ C. H. Madge in *New Verse*, May 1933.

had 1500 subscribers after less than a year's run) has been led to associate poetry with radical party politics. Mr. Grigson, a discerning critic who refuses to be stampeded towards either left or right by poets whose work he admires and publishes (and, be it said, pays for), has, I imagine, the moral support of his no less clear-headed friend Stephen Spender, whose review of Louis Aragon's poem *The Red Front* (translated by E. E. Cummings) concerned itself almost entirely with an exposure of the loopholes in the poet's political suggestions for the very good reason that the poem itself was almost entirely propaganda.

Here are a few lines from the Louis Aragon poem :

I am a witness to the crushing of a world out of date.
I am a witness drunkenly to the stamping out of the bourgeois.
Was there ever a finer chase than the chase we give to that vermin which
flattens itself in every nook of the cities ?
I sing the violent domination of the bourgeois by the proletariat
for the annihilation of that bourgeoisie,
for the total annihilation of that bourgeoisie.

And here a passage from Stephen Spender's review in *New Verse* :

It seems to me that in spite of its effective cinematographic imagery this poem fails, because it does not convince one that the writer knows why the proletariat should kill and oppress the bourgeoisie except because the bourgeoisie is now oppressing the proletariat. He assumes that there is some absolute value in the proletarian which makes his atrocities glorious whereas the atrocities of the bourgeoisie are sordid.

Observe that this is not the oracular reply of a front-bench Conservative to a plea for the removal of restrictions on Russian trade. It is not even a statement of political faith. As a critic (in this instance) Mr. Spender's own political views, whatever they may be, are irrelevant. All that he demands is that if we must have propagandist poems the propaganda should be based on such fundamentals, and developed by such arguments, as would be likely to carry conviction with the intelligent reader to whom modern poetry is largely addressed. Hastings oratory will simply not do. And in asserting this the critic is within his rights.

The failure of the Aragon-Cummings poem (for Mr. Spender is not the only critic to be dissatisfied with it) may serve as an index to an inescapable weakness of this amorphous genre begot by politics upon poetry. Poetry admits of pure statement. Political pleading does not. When the two are united the sensitive but unbiassed reader will not accept, merely because they may be expressed in effective verse, assumptions that require elaborate justification.

In the ranks of the '*Writers' International*,' the British

section of which was established early last year, Charles Madge's theory of poetry as 'giving the order to march' finds ready acceptance, and Stephen Spender, who challenged that theory, is regarded as a lamentably lukewarm revolutionary. Yet to me Spender, a fine poet himself, appears to be doing poetry a notable service by insisting that it must come before, and not after, politics. Even in *Vienna* (1934), a poem directly inspired by the suppression of the Austrian Socialists by the Dollfuss Government, compassion never loses itself in propaganda. Its values are poetic values. It is as if Montaigne were to rise from the grave to a world that would scarcely recognise him and repeat his admirable dictum : 'A man may play the fool anywhere else but in Poesie.'

The foregoing strictures, severe as they may seem, have been severe for a purpose. If we are to appreciate the splendid poetry which is being written to-day, we must realise the attitude of the poets and the path by which that attitude has been reached. This can only be done by clearing the pseudo-poets from the foreground which they hotly clamour to occupy. For every poet who deserves his place in the new *Pléiade*, Bloomsbury and the universities throw up a round dozen of hysterical political versifiers whose vigorous waving of a red flag tends to prejudice those who serve other flags against modern poetry as a whole. If Louis Aragon were the most considerable poet of to-day, it would be wasted labour to devote an article to the political or any other aspect of contemporary poetry. But he is not.

There are W. H. Auden, Stephen Spender, Cecil Day Lewis, and Charles Madge to be considered. No straining of a sense of proportion is needed to compare the work and outlook of these four with the work and outlook of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Blake. By that statement I do not mean to anticipate the verdict of posterity as to the merits of individual poets of the nineteen-thirties, for in so doing I should incur for my rashness the same scorn which at the time of Waterloo would have answered an assertion that Shelley was worthy of the company of George Bubb Dodington. I mean merely to select four writers who, if contemporary poetry is to be allowed any value at all, may fitly represent it at its best : four whose work is being read and discussed at the present time as poetry has not been read and discussed for a quarter of a century ; four in whom the importance of the political element may most profitably be examined.

Charles Madge, the youngest of the four, is in some ways the most interesting, and his devotion to revolution as an æsthetic principle is something which the poets of the seventeen-nineties never formulated, if they ever felt it. 'Of human activities,' wrote Stephen Spender in *New Country*, 'writing poetry is one

of the least revolutionary . . . the writing of a poem in itself solves the poem's problem. Separate poems are separate and complete and ideal worlds.' To this Madge replied, in the article in *New Verse* from which I have already quoted :

Of human activities, writing poetry is the most revolutionary. . . . The problem which the poem solves is not the poem's but the poet's problem. As a consequence of the poem it is the poet, or his reader, who moves. There is no world but the world and that world is the poet's world. . . . We must certainly be on our guard [Madge continued] against political feeling taken at third hand. But the remedy is as certainly not to be found in keeping out of politics.

For one whose conversion to Communism seems to have been largely an emotional experience, Madge preserves a remarkable coolness in debate. With persuasive reasoning he shows us that nobody, least of all a poet, is justified in a changing world in maintaining an attitude of *laissez-faire*. A 'temperamental aversion to activity' tempts poets of what Madge calls the 'separatist' class to wander about Europe with their knapsacks, making their comments on the contemporary scene from the safe detachment of a café table. 'Bravo!' cry the youngsters who crowd to the feet of Madge, 'this is not the revolution; this is only the intelligentsia playing at revolution!'

Yet what is this revolution that Madge, as a poet, envisages? What is the peculiar vision that attaches to him the undergraduates who dismiss Spender as 'the pet of the bourgeois-liberal critics'?⁹ We might expect ranting of the Louis Aragon type, summons to an indiscriminate violence which differs only from Fascist violence by the colour of a shirt. Instead we get this—

We shall be differently aware, we shall see all things new
Not as a craze or a surprise, but hard, naked, true.¹⁰
And trash heaped up, torn scraps, mud, all shall glow through and through
When the electric moment passes in, making them new.¹⁰

Or this :

Joys that are shut and secret now
Will wave and thunder on each bough
And all of life, a giant tree,
Will speak, in the green time to be.

When gates of sluices are let down,
When steeply springs the newfound town,
A white and happy virgin, sound
Shall feather-sweep the broken ground.

⁹ J. D. Cornford in *Cambridge Left*, Winter 1933-4.

¹⁰ 'Instructions,' *New Verse*, March 1933.

Then you will see mountainous time,
Peak after peak, and start to climb
If air is filled with sun or rain,
And then you will be whole again.¹¹

The fact is that, in spite of his defence of propagandist poetry Madge is too good a poet to be a demagogue. He invokes Lenin (in *New Country*) because of

the cold voice
That spoke beyond Time's passions, that expelled
All the half treasons of the mind in doubt,

not because Lenin impersonates the victory, in a land further removed from England by history and conditions than by miles, of one class over another. It is altogether extraordinary that young men who have turned against D. H. Lawrence because he 'cut himself off from his class' should applaud the same voice when it issues from Charles Madge, the voice of the spiritual revolutionary.

Stephen Spender, the opponent of Madge in the controversy over propagandist poetry, has courageously faced a difficulty which the modern poet is too apt to shirk. The poets of Communism are drawn from the middle class. They are schoolmasters, engineers, scientists. A few of them maintain a precarious living by their writing. Nearly all of them were educated at public schools in the years immediately following the war. In these respects the main part of their audience closely resembles them. The proletarians whom they champion never read their poems, and would not understand them if they did. 'The artist cannot renounce the bourgeois tradition because the proletariat has no alternative tradition which he could adopt.'¹²

Accepting this unwelcome fact, Spender can yet find in the struggles of the proletariat magnificent material for poetry. As far as I am aware, he may himself be identified with movements designed to organise the working classes for political purposes. He may attend revolutionary meetings and speak from Communist platforms, as, in England, he still has a perfect right to do. But he does not attempt, in his poetry, to incite anyone to kill or dispossess anyone else, for he knows very well that his poetry will not be read by potential killers and dispossessors. He maintains, at a time when the poet is being urged to associate himself with political action, the detachment which he justifiably conceives to be proper to the artist. For him, a self-confessed bourgeois who nevertheless rightly regrets the hopeless cultural apathy of the bourgeoisie, the proletarians are 'they,' not 'we':

¹¹ 'May Day,' *Cambridge Left*, Summer 1933.

¹² 'Poetry and Revolution,' *New Country*.

They walk home remembering the straining red flags ;
 And with pennons of song fluttering through their blood
 They dream of the World State
 With its towns like brain-centres and its pulsing arteries.

The quotation is from *The Funeral*, one of Spender's contributions to the anthology published by the Hogarth Press under the title of *New Signatures*. The volume appeared in 1932, and at that time Michael Roberts, its editor, said of *The Funeral* :

Whether this represents the emancipation or the enslavement of poetry as an independent art we cannot yet say ; poetry is here turned to propaganda, but it is propaganda for a theory of life which may release the poet's energies for the writing of pure poetry as well as provide him with standards which may make simple and direct satire possible again.

But a good deal has happened since 1932, and beside the destructive hysteria of the followers of Charles Madge (though not of Madge himself) *The Funeral* seems scarcely to merit the name of propaganda. Forget the colour of the flags in the verse which I have quoted, and what remains to which an honest man of any political party would not be tempted to subscribe ?

Cecil Day Lewis, in two well-knit series (*From Feathers to Iron*, 1931, and *The Magnetic Mountain*, 1933), has developed a contemporary metaphysic of rare suppleness. He is thirty-one years of age and a Communist by faith. Faith, he wrote in a contribution to *New Country*, is 'the prime essential for the revolutionary. . . . Not jealousy, not pity, not a knowledge of economics ; not hate even, or love ; but certainty of new life.' But it was the poet to whom faith first revealed itself as an essential. Only then did a revolutionary creed appear to codify that faith. Every poet, if he could have his choice, would live in a Renaissance, and since the most salient Renaissance characteristics of post-war Europe are Machiavellian politics and a new secession from the Church, the poet must look ahead for revitalising movements. The sceptic may blame him for his choice of Communism, but what else is open to him ? Mass-disturbances stir his imagination while threatening his cherished individualism, and a conflict is thereby produced which informs much of the poetry of to-day.

Day Lewis is acutely aware of this conflict, but he declares himself willing to take the hardest way. He will not let Communism become the personal religion which is demanded by 'the liberal nonconformist conscience hoping to have its individualism and eat it.' If a united body of men can be found to put right what he sees to be wrong, he is ready to serve the common cause as an implicitly obedient unit.

For a poet that represents a great sacrifice. To many observers it may seem to represent the sacrifice of poetry itself. For

obedience, whether to an army of Communists bent on establishing Utopia or to any army of Fascists bent on destroying everything but themselves, does not consort comfortably with poetry. It is an *impasse*, and meanwhile Day Lewis continues to write excellent verse which is only propaganda in the sense that it is based on a belief in the necessity for a new system.

I have left the most important of the new poets till the last. To W. H. Auden, clearly recognised as the leader of the contemporary movement in poetry, other young poets address themselves in admiration and gratitude. Charles Madge, describing the spiritual agony of which his belief in Communism was born, writes :

But there waited for me in the summer morning,
 Auden, fiercely. I read, shuddered and knew
 And all the world's stationary things
 In silence moved to take up new positions.¹⁸

And Day Lewis invokes his fellow-poet passionately on several occasions. From Auden the temper of the revolutionary spirit is adopted. The revolution which he foresees may not come in his day, and he is content to be an unobtrusive pioneer. He tunnels, he does not use explosives. Day Lewis uses the simile of the mole in describing him, though more often he sees him as the kestrel in full and unconfined flight.

Auden is a schoolmaster. Convinced that he is living 'in a world that has had its day,' he nevertheless finds the service of a more or less traditional educational system not uncongenial. Side by side with a talent for virulent satire he has a lively compassion which makes him pray that somehow the pupils whose minds he is helping to train may survive the wrath to come. In justice he hates with an intensity worthy of Shelley, and sometimes when his pen falters—for he is a prolific writer—he reminds one a little of Shelley sitting beside the distant Arno to write :

I met Murder in the way,
 He had a face like Castlereagh.

Perhaps the publication of *The Orators*, the work which made Auden's name, contributed largely to the development of revolutionary poetry. World conditions, the inevitable reaction from the Georgians and after them from Eliot, were in the main responsible, but Auden provided at the critical moment the example that was lacking—a crystallisation of the spiritual anarchy of the war years, of the helpless apathy of the post-war decade, and of the vague but insistent demand for action which followed. *The Orators* was Communist propaganda, but it was the propaganda of one who was an artist first and a politician second. Many

¹⁸ 'Letter to the Intelligentsia,' *New Country*.

readers, recoiling from Auden's ideology, failed to appreciate the mastery of its expression; this was a pity, for Auden will have to be accepted sooner or later.

In an article on Auden in the *Bookman* for March of last year, another poet, Edgar Foxall, quoted from a misdirected reviewer of *The Orators* an inquiry as to why its author has not left England and settled in Russia. The remark serves to lead us to a point which must be emphasised in dealing with the revolutionary politics of the leading poets of to-day. Louis Aragon, as might be expected, makes great play in *Red Front* with the U.S.S.R., but, in justice to the four poets of whom I have treated in more detail, it must be said clearly and unmistakably that none of them takes orders from Moscow. Communistic ideas are not a Russian monopoly, and the poets at all events do not make the mistake into which so many of their opponents fall, the mistake of supposing that the application of a particular system in this country would be attended by the same political phenomena and productive of the same material results as the application of a broadly similar system in Russia. It is only fair that a few indications of the poets' feeling for England should be quoted as an antidote to the alarm that may well have been caused by the frequent reiteration in this article of the word 'Communism.' One catches at intervals the echoes of Blake, or of Coleridge's

Not yet enslaved, not wholly vile,
O Albion, o my mother isle!

Without faith in their country, indeed, the poets of to-day could not be the visionaries that they are.

Here is a prose excerpt, from an article in *New Country* by Michael Roberts, its editor:

It is not that we are pessimists: we have indeed greater faith in England than you. The country which first developed Parliamentary government, industrialism, banking and democracy may yet be the first to advance beyond; there are signs that English industrialists are preparing to demand far-reaching changes in the money system, and that only ten years after the first appearance of heterodox money schemes. Such changes are necessary, not sufficient.

Note well that phrase 'the first to advance beyond.' Here is not so much as an acknowledgment of an advance in Russia or elsewhere. And in *The Magnetic Mountain* Cecil Day Lewis writes:

You that love England, who have an ear for her music,
The slow movement of chords in benediction,
Clear arias of light thrilling over her uplands,
Over the chords of summer sustained peacefully;

Ceaseless the leaves' counterpoint in a west wind lively,
Blossom and river rippling loveliest allegro,
And the storms of wood strings brass at year's finale:
Listen. Can you not hear the entrance of a new theme?

And finally, between an apostrophe to Lenin and an acceptance of the 'international mind demanded by improved modern communications, Charles Madge pays his debt to the country of his birth:

Yes, England, I was at school with you, I've known
Your hills come open to me, call me crying
With bird voice, and passing I have been haunted
By a wood, I have loved you, slept with you
By moonlight. Walking home by fields known
I have seen the prints of those feet, being alone
Found you, talked to you, for you my laughing and crying
Have been no secret, you have known when I was lying.
You are always beside me, so I go haunted.
You are my one believed-in ghost. I've vaunted
And venerated you, England, knowing you
'D rise from the dead and prove my superstition true.

Wordsworth, too, loved England, but he found it 'a fen of stagnant waters.' And to-day, in many an English church, many a good Conservative rails, to Parry's music, at Blake's 'dark, Satanic mills.' Quoting Wordsworth, singing Blake's hymn, can we look back and say that Godwin's optimism was justified? Can we claim that we are even now repairing the 'moral lag' which the rapid advance of science has made painfully obvious even to the British Association?

Is it possible [asked Godwin in 1793¹⁴] for us to contemplate what man has already done, without being impressed with a strong presentiment of the improvements he has yet to accomplish? There is no science that is not capable of additions; there is no art that may not be carried to a still higher perfection. If this be true of all other sciences, why not of morals? If this be true of all other arts, why not of social institutions? The very conception of this as possible is in the highest degree encouraging. If we can still further demonstrate it to be a part of the natural and regular progress of mind, our confidence and our hopes will then be complete. This is the temper in which we ought to engage in the study of political truth.

Since Godwin's day science itself has dealt some hard blows at a rigid doctrine of human progress, but without a modern Godwin to encourage them the poets of to-day can still be optimistic. For poets, as Shelley proclaimed, and as every patron of the Everyman Library knows, are 'the trumpets which sing to battle' and 'the unacknowledged legislators of the world.' Trumpets, especially in the heat of battle, may be false of note;

¹⁴ *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*.

nor are legislators always single of mind. And behind the contemporary leaders of poetry follows a crowd of noisy versifiers whose credentials will not invariably bear examination. For the task of the poet is a hard and often ungrateful one, while that of the political agitator commands easy applause.

Once we have realised the difficulties which the modern poet has to face, it becomes easier to single out those who have faced them resolutely. The 'intellectual,' to use a vague but necessary term, continually cuts away his social supports. In the fifteenth century he made possible, though he did not actively bring about, a wholesale secession from the Roman Catholic Church, and he has never since found so comfortable a protector. His impulse to individuality, always at war with his impulse to find and serve and satisfy a cause, has betrayed him so often that now he is almost ready to sacrifice it. All that remains is to find an altar worthy of the sacrifice. Recoiling from the direct menace to himself exemplified by the rise of Fascism on the Continent—a menace which the poets of the seventeen-nineties did not know—he flies to Fascism's opposite. Dictatorship for dictatorship, will that of the proletariat be more tolerable to the intellectual than that of the bourgeoisie? Or can Spender contrive that, in any political situation, art only shall be the dictator?

These are some of the questions which the new poets, and their readers, are called upon to decide.

FRANCIS WATSON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCVII—MARCH 1935

HOUSING AND COMMON SENSE

WHAT the Minister of Health, with a valiant determination, is striving to do in the matter of national housing is primarily to catch up. If he can once get on level terms with his problem, he can draw ahead of it. If he can once abolish slums and overcrowding, he can prevent their recurrence. These are far-shining objectives that none of his predecessors were in a position to do more than aspire to. Admirable housing work has been done in Britain since the war by successive Ministers of Health and by the local authorities. But their efforts have proved Sisyphean. They have rolled the stone of housing legislation a quarter or half way up the hill, only to see it roll down again. Sir Hilton Young has addressed himself to his task more in the spirit of Hercules than of Sisyphus. The slums are his stables, and, undeterred by the disheartening object-lesson of previous endeavours, he has proclaimed the policy of the clean sweep. We have built in Britain since the war not far short of 2,500,000 houses, enough to accommodate three times the increase of population during that period. Yet the slum problem remains hardly at all affected by that prodigious output, and the Minister

of Health, introducing his new Bill, can accurately describe it as 'a great social reform which is urgently required by the conscience of the nation.' I suppose all Ministers bringing in similar Bills have said the same. The difference is that Sir Hilton Young has planned his campaign on wider lines than they, and is in a position to push it home.

Not nearly enough credit has been given to the Minister of Health for the great conception on which his measures are based. I can easily imagine Mr. Lloyd George, for instance, with only half of Sir Hilton Young's scheme to go upon, getting twice as much *kudos* out of it and firing the whole country with a crusading sense. Sir Hilton has rather preferred to let his plans speak for themselves and to eschew the appeal to the emotions in an enterprise so bristling with the dry administrative, legal, and financial details of which he is a master. Within the last year or two I have sometimes found abroad a quicker interest in, grasp of, and admiration for, his policy than among the mass of his own countrymen. It is right, therefore, to insist that what the Minister of Health has devised and initiated is by far the most comprehensive onslaught upon the housing problem that this or any other country has ever delivered. He has enabled us in Great Britain to take for the first time the full measure of the evils that have to be remedied. He is aiming, not only at their complete eradication, but at the prevention of their recurrence. He has promulgated a definite date for the completion of the slum-clearance part of his programme. He is ordering such a survey of our overcrowding conditions as will put him in a position to deal with them, also, on equally systematic lines. From first to last he will probably have committed the nation to building or reconditioning nearly 2,000,000 homes for our lowest-paid workers within the next ten years. If at the end of that period we can say that throughout the kingdom, whether in town or country, no family is without the housing essentials for decent and healthy living, the name of Sir Hilton Young will rank among the greatest of our social benefactors. That is his goal, and it mightily concerns us all to see that it is reached.

I am not in the least consoled by the knowledge that in other countries housing conditions are worse than they are in Britain. The whole world has sadly muddled what can never have been an unsurmountable difficulty, and is to-day, if it could be disentangled from its hampering accretions, a huge but quite straightforward operation—the provision of good homes for all who inhabit it. It is enough for me that wealthy and generous-hearted Britain, through generations of heedlessness and misdirection, should have failed in this primary test of a sound civilisation to a degree that must always be the nightmare of

those who have seen with their own eyes the extent of that failure and its consequences. It is the supreme social evil of our times—poisoning life from infancy, undoing much of the good which education and the medical services might otherwise achieve—that there should be millions of our people with no homes in any real sense of the word, but only often ill-constructed, insanitary, vermin-infested and foully overcrowded quarters. We must excise this malignant growth, or it will drag us down as a nation in body, mind and soul. Poulticing and palliatives are of no use for a disease so deeply rooted. It needs the knife, and Sir Hilton Young is the first political surgeon with the courage to advise and the energy to carry out the major operation. For that no tribute to him can be too high.

There is no need for me to describe here, except very briefly, the instruments he has decided to use. In April 1933 the Minister of Health issued a circular to the 1716 housing authorities in England and Wales requesting them to furnish him before the end of the following September with schemes for the demolition of all slum houses within their areas not later than 1938. The result was a series of approved programmes that, if all goes well, will eventually rehouse 1,250,000 slum-dwellers, cause some 300,000 replacement houses to be built (at an average cost to the Exchequer and to the rates of £15 for each house for forty years), and provide employment during the whole of the five-year period for over 100,000 workers. In the House of Commons on January 30 the Minister of Health gave a most encouraging report of the progress already made under this part of his scheme and of the prospects that lie before it. He was able to assure the House that there was every expectation of the 1,250,000 slum tenants being rehoused before the end of 1938. If this turns out to be the case, as I think it may, all previous records of the sort, since the war as well as before it, will be not merely eclipsed but pulverised. The average annual rate of rehousing will, in fact, be over thirty-three times greater than has ever been known before.

The second part of the Ministerial programme—the part dealing mainly with the far more complex and refractory problem of overcrowding, its cure and prevention—was unfolded to the House of Commons on January 30. Overcrowding, though by no means unknown in the rural districts, is the special vice of what Sir Hilton Young described as 'the bad old cores of the inner areas of our great towns.' When one realises that there are 50,000 families in Great Britain living four or more to a room and 180,000 families living three or more to a room, and when one attempts to assess the utterly vitiating effects of such a state of affairs, the urgency of this side of the general housing problem

needs no further elaboration. The Minister of Health has taken the first vital step towards betterment by defining overcrowding and fixing a standard by which it may be recognised whenever it is found. Whether the standard so fixed is too low or too rigid or not is at the moment of less importance than the fact that at last the local authorities and all landlords and builders have now, for the first time, a rule to work by, and that to trespass beyond it (except in special, temporary and unavoidable cases) will in future be a punishable offence. This means a disturbance, amounting almost to a revolution, in the lives of a multitude of hard-working, indomitable wage-earners who, clearly, cannot be ejected from their present habitations unless and until there are new and satisfactory homes ready to receive them.

Sir Hilton Young has accordingly called upon the local authorities to survey the overcrowding conditions in their areas and to form an estimate of the number of new houses that will be needed to take care of those whom the new standard will eventually displace. This ought not to be, and must not be, a lengthy proceeding. By the early autumn of this year, at the outside, there should have reached the Ministry of Health complete reports on the necessities of each area and equally complete schemes for meeting them. The Ministry will then determine in each instance the 'appointed day' on which the attack upon overcrowding is to open and the approximate date on which it should end in victory. But the case is more complicated than the mere provision of new accommodation—though that in itself is arduous and delicate enough—for those whom the law will have turned out of their old homes. It is more complicated in two ways. In the first place, overcrowding being usually the mark of the oldest, the least planned, the most out-of-date parts of a town, there is often no real cure for it and no genuine guarantee against its recurrence except taking possession of the entire area and redeveloping it on modern lines. In the second place, there are undoubtedly a great many cases where the requirements of the refugees from overcrowded buildings can be met by purchasing old houses and reconditioning them in the light of the new rulings as to space and accommodation.

The Minister, therefore, in his Bill empowers the local authorities to tackle overcrowding (1) by new buildings, (2) by redeveloping any zone or district in which half of the working-class houses are overcrowded or unfit to live in and incapable of being made fit at a reasonable cost, and (3) by reconditioning existing dwellings and bringing them up to the standards of 1935. Of these three methods of approaching the central problem the one that most interests me—the one that I shall watch with the closest eagerness to see how it works out in practice—is that which per-

mits the local authority to acquire an entire area and redevelop it anew. That is as near as any legislation has yet brought us to town planning where town planning is often most needed—in the congested, desultory, highly industrialised centres of our towns. There are possibilities in this provision—I am not inclined for the moment to put it higher than that—of a trail, perhaps even a road, being blazed through the grisly barbed-wire jungle, stiff with legal sharpshooters, that all must plunge into who have the audacity to challenge the 'rights of property' in Britain.

Sir Hilton Young has prudently tempered his own audacity with subsidies to the local authorities and by compensation to the owners. The Socialists have been prompt to declare that the subsidies are too low and the compensation too high. They are obviously going to take the ground that the Bill will prove a bonus to the owners of whatever sites the local authorities wish to acquire. It has also been publicly questioned whether the cost of redevelopment will not render that part of the Bill inoperative. Not only will it do this, according to some critics, but it is further argued that the sliding-scale subsidies will 'reinforce the powerful influences which create the existing vicious spiral of land values in congested areas.' But these criticisms come from a quarter where it is believed that the only true solution of the housing question is to be sought in 'planned decentralisation of population and of industry'—in other words, getting the workers and the factories out of the towns and into the country.

For myself, seeing no practicable alternative, though a good many objections, to subsidies, if the principle is once accepted that workers must be rehoused near their work and near their familiar social environment, and having learned from years of experience on housing authorities that equitable compensation to owners of property is the road to achievement—for myself, neither subsidies, nor the scale of compensation, if just, interest me so much in Sir Hilton Young's Bill as his efforts to keep private enterprise and the normal workings of the building industry closely associated with these vast national and municipal undertakings. As a former practising international architect I dislike the idea of this greatest of the arts, as Michael Angelo called it, being harnessed so rigidly as it is in Britain to governmental and local officialdom. About half of the annual British output of building is produced under public auspices, and therefore by architects who are retained or employed by these national or municipal authorities. I question whether the arrangement makes for originality of design, the ready use of new materials and processes and accessibility to the fresh ideas and the inventions of which the building industry, beyond, I believe, all other industries, is ceaselessly prolific.

Instinctively, and perhaps wrongly and irrationally, whenever I approach a building or a development scheme that I know to have been created to the order of a public authority, I look for stereotyped *motifs*, a fear of originality and a somewhat over-steadfast hewing to the line of 'Safety First.' I am therefore delighted that Sir Hilton Young should have encouraged the local authorities to give private enterprise, in the shape of housing associations and public utility societies, an opportunity of executing much of the constructional and architectural work.

We propose [he says] to enlarge the opportunities of these societies. We have as a matter of fact drafted in the Bill a kind of charter for these bodies defining their position in this matter. They are to be in a position in which by co-operation and agreement with the housing authorities they can take over any part of the work of the housing authorities which is designed for them under the law—rehousing for slum clearance, re-development, reconditioning, provision of fresh accommodation and other forms of housing effort.

Housing is a many-sided and immensely complex enterprise, and the more minds and the greater the variety of experience that are brought to bear upon it the better. It is on all fours with his fostering of voluntary action that Sir Hilton Young is also empowering the housing authorities to appoint permanent bodies of management commissioners from outside their own ranks. This is an excellent move—first, because the standards and quality of the life lived in these publicly created estates is just as important as calling them into existence, and secondly, because the risk, a very real one, of a most deleterious form of political pressure by the tenants upon their local representatives is thereby removed. Just as the Advisory Board has taken politics out of the tariff, so these management commissions (the appointment of which, in my judgment, should be obligatory instead of optional) ought to take out of politics a good deal of housing.

Another feature of the Minister of Health's proposals which many people besides myself will scrutinise with vigilant curiosity, when it comes up for consideration in the House, is the Central Housing Advisory Committee which he proposes to establish 'to provide me with a wider basis of knowledge and experience.' The knowledge and experience of most of us do not encourage any extravagant faith in an advisory committee that has no specific executive functions. The Minister, however, has indicated that he expects to rely greatly upon its assistance in such vital matters as 'reducing costs and accelerating building,' 'the grouping of orders,' and 'the standardisation and simplification of parts in building'—matters that touch the very heart of the

problem of efficient and economical construction. I fear he is going to be disappointed. There is certain force in the criticism that Sir Hilton Young is really attempting a task of war-time magnitude without war-time powers and that a strong independent council, such as was recommended by the Moyne Committee and the National Housing Committee, would be a more effective agency through which to operate than either his own very much over-worked department or an advisory committee to which no definite duties or responsibilities are assigned. A body that can recommend and suggest but has no power to see that its advice is followed is not one that is likely to attract and to hold for years on end the services of the best men. Yet only the best men ought to sit on it. The Minister's present intentions in this matter are bound to be challenged, and challenged again, by the House of Commons, because they involve the fundamental question, 'How, on what system, through what instruments and organisation, having given us this nation-wide programme, do you propose to carry it out?'

That is an issue on which, as one wholly in sympathy with the Minister's objectives and anxious only that his Bill should be strengthened so as to make them attainable, I shall have a word or two to say later on. Meanwhile, even in the briefest survey of his proposals room must be found for mentioning three points at which he has signally advanced the cause of good housing. The first relates to the countryside, where there are at least 40,000 families living in conditions which are regrettably distressing. With subsidies that begin by equalling the combined contributions of the local housing authority and of the county council, and that rise to as much as £8 per house, Sir Hilton Young will undoubtedly make an end of these quite indefensible village slums. Then again, he seems to me to have taken wise and constructive action in pooling the subsidies that have accompanied, and have been strictly allocated to, the various Housing Acts passed since the war. The anomalies and the bad feeling engendered when identical houses (on opposite sides, it may be, of the same street) are let at different rents merely because they were built under different Acts will now be got rid of—to the great gain of administrative efficiency. Finally, the Minister of Health, in devising a basis for compensating owners whose properties come within the scope of his Bill, has introduced the novel, far-reaching, but in my view entirely equitable, principle of differentiating between the good landlord and the bad.

Of a measure that goes so far, with such a sure vision and steady march, one instinctively asks whether it cannot be made to go farther still, and particularly in the direction of organising

on a national scale the ways and means of its own enforcement. I am very hopeful that the Minister will come to see that the thought-out execution of his Bill is just as important as any of its provisions, and that in his Central Housing Advisory Committee he has the raw material of what might, and should, be fashioned into the right and effective instrument for that purpose. The social and sanitary implications of his measure are immense. But their immensity cannot alter the fact that what he has set his hand to is also, and fundamentally, a colossal enterprise in the technique of building.

This enterprise, as he has conceived it, is of a nation-wide range, but is not subject to unified nation-wide direction. On the contrary, its day-to-day advancement is left to the competitive and unco-ordinated activities, and the varying degrees of enthusiasm and capacity, of the 1700 odd housing authorities in the kingdom. The Bill does not at present contemplate the regulation of these rival multitudinous activities by any outside body empowered to survey the entire field of operations and to provide for carrying them to completion in accordance with a fixed time-table. If the projected advisory committee were vested with executive authority, then we should have the sort of body needed to direct and guide the whole vast undertaking and prevent it from being jerked this way and that in response to local feeling or resources. We should have a wholesale, uniform, mapped-out prosecution of a single national programme instead of the piece-meal, haphazard, unrelated prosecution of a thousand odd municipal and county council programmes.

What comes of leaving things to the local authorities, with only nominal supervision, and no real direction, from above, has been pretty clearly shown by the history of previous Housing Acts. Each authority starts buying its materials and engaging its labour without reference to its neighbour's needs or to the national supply of the goods and operatives it is striving to corral for its own use. There is thus a definite likelihood of hectic competitive bidding all over the country in our limited building market. Up go prices and down goes the last chance of business-like procedure. Large-scale buying, the universal use of standardised fittings and accessories, a common time-schedule and the pooled knowledge of new building processes and materials—all of which factors are of the essence of economical and efficient construction—disappear from sight and mind. The thing resolves itself into a series of small, unregulated, indiscriminate scrambles, in which system, planning, the future of the building industry when the first wild rush is over, the interests of the manufacturers and their employees, and all the proved advantages of mass production are submerged in the cross-currents of local

rivalry. No suddenly evolved bureau in the Ministry of Health, almost necessarily without any technical knowledge of the organisation of a huge building enterprise, no advisory committee permitted to talk but powerless to act, can control this probable turmoil. There is the risk, if not the certainty, of its raging unrestrainedly to the end of the programme, with all of us, ratepayers and taxpayers, paying for the privilege of the spectacle.

Planned housing, it seems to me, should be an inseparable part of this Housing Act. The reduction of building costs, to my mind, ought always to be one of the aims of legislation that gives the signal for an unprecedented outburst of building energy. I am most desirous that the Minister of Health's results may be parallel with the level of his great conceptions. As things are at present, it is the fact that the measures he has initiated against the slums and against overcrowding take little or no account of the modern mechanics of planned housing or of the developments that elsewhere, outside of Britain, have brought waste in building, and consequently the costs of building, down to a minimum. It is a thesis I should be quite prepared to maintain that the high costs of construction in the United Kingdom have in themselves played a large part in creating our housing problem and that its lasting solution very greatly depends on the efficiency and organisation and the up-to-dateness with which we tackle the economics of building. But of this point of view and the practical inferences to be drawn from it there is, in the Ministerial programme, but scant recognition.

Those who have had experience, as I have had, in designing and supervising the building of skyscrapers across the Atlantic must have imbibed certain lessons and impressions that are relevant to the present housing situation in Great Britain. We learned the value of team-play among owners, architects, surveyors, contractors, foremen, manufacturers and suppliers of material, and the representatives of Labour. We agreed upon all the details of our buildings, down to the last push-button, and circulated the specifications and invited bids upon them before a single sod of earth had been turned. We found out exactly what materials would be required, in what amounts and when they should be delivered. We mapped out the work, by a 'time and progress schedule,' showing the precise date at which one section should be finished and another begun, and the number of men who had to be on the spot ready for each operation. We mastered, in short, the secret of organisation in building, with the result that almost all waste was eliminated and these towering structures were erected at about the same cost per cubic foot as comparable edifices in Britain, and in far shorter time, although the operatives in virtually all the thirty odd trades employed upon

them were receiving wages from three and a half to five times higher than their opposite numbers in Britain.

I am not going to argue that all the lessons to be derived from skyscrapers in Canada and the United States are applicable to the British housing problem. But some of them, the chief and determining ones, certainly are. Suppose, for instance, that instead of only an advisory committee Sir Hilton Young were to summon to his aid a committee charged, under his direction, with the task of giving effect to his Bills—a committee on which the best architects, town planners, contractors, and Labour leaders in the country, feeling that at last they were engaged on useful national work, would be but too pleased to serve. On what lines would a committee like that, conversant with the modern technique and organisation of the building industry, be likely to proceed, and what could it achieve? It would begin, I conceive, by regarding all the approved schemes of all the housing authorities in the kingdom as amounting, in effect, to one scheme. It would then frame an estimate, calculated with a precision that might astonish a layman, of all the materials, in the way of bricks, tiles, cement, timber and so on, called for by the programme. Long-term price agreements with the makers of these materials—agreements that would insure, over a period of years, a continuity of employment and of output and sales too long a stranger to the British building industry—would automatically quickly follow. In the special circumstances of Great Britain to-day this committee, acting under the authority of Sir Hilton Young, could so guide the activities of the local housing authorities as to relieve appreciably the pressure of unemployment, particularly in the distressed areas. With the enormous purchasing power that would be at its direction its forceful recommendations for standardised, mass-produced fittings and materials—we in Great Britain are only at the beginning of the illimitable economies that can be effected in this regard—would bring down prices with a run, while assuring manufacturers of a fair working profit and operatives of a wage and a feeling of security that hitherto have belonged to the world of dreams.

But such a committee as I am imagining, and as the Minister of Health could easily obtain the sanction of the House of Commons to establish, could accomplish more than this. It would promulgate, for example, a 'time and progress schedule' which would be applicable throughout the entire country, throughout every area, and on every specific job undertaken under the auspices of the Minister. With a committee set up with ability to say to Leeds or Manchester, or to the Hampshire County Council, 'We can guarantee that you will obtain all the materials and all the men called for by your building programme, but in

return we must request that your scheme must fit into the national "time and progress schedule"—then, and not till then, shall we have made a real approach towards efficiency in nationwide housing construction.

More than that. With its 1700 'housing authorities' Great Britain, as may well be imagined, is a happy-go-lucky chaos in the matter of building bye-laws and regulations. A committee backed by the Minister of Health, and therefore by the British Government, might conceivably modernise, simplify, and make uniform this amazing medley of rules and ordinances, many of which are antiquated and obsolete. I doubt whether any other authority, less heavily weaponed, could achieve this revolution or insist (with a due recognition of Great Britain's variety and richness of building materials) that any process, method, or material that had once been sanctioned and approved for use by the Governmental Building Research Station should be legally available anywhere and everywhere inside the kingdom. The farce which stereotypes varying dimensions for walls and timbers in different localities, and forbids a new plumbing system which has worked admirably in London to be adopted in Leeds, ought to be ended at once unless we are content to admit that, so far as the science of building is concerned, some malignant fate compels us to be in places two or three decades behind the times.

If I have made my position clear, it is not in scope or design or in bed-rock principles that Sir Hilton Young's programme, in my judgment, needs amplification. Nothing whatever can detract from the splendour of the effort which he has embodied in his Slum Clearance and Overcrowding Bills. By any scale of national or international comparison they stand in a class of their own, supreme and unapproachable in their vision and comprehensiveness. But as to the machinery for bringing them to fruition I confess to some misgivings, and to the conviction that there are gaps which ought to be filled. These are not gaps that are bounded merely by considerations of finance or of technical efficiency. I assuredly believe, however, that the filling of them would save the nation many millions of pounds and stimulate the building industry with a new sense of the possibilities open to it. Planned housing, the reduction of building costs, the reorganisation, the modernisation and simplification of the building code—these are the stepping-stones by which we must advance towards the most needed of social reforms: the conquest of the slums and of overcrowding.

ALFRED C. BOSSOM.

WHAT INDIA REALLY THINKS

THE long controversy which has preceded the drafting of India's new Constitution has not been characterised by any great display of modesty on the part of those sponsoring or criticising the proposals. A foreigner listening to recent debates in Parliament might have been surprised to learn that few of the principal speakers had made more than a short visit to the East, or given more than a small fraction of their lives to the study of Indian affairs. Probably less than 2 per cent. of either House could converse with any Indian who did not happen to know English, and comparatively few would care to be questioned on Indian history or ethnology. Collectively the House of Commons must be twenty times as knowledgeable about France or Germany—about their history, culture, religion, peasant life, and social conditions. Yet if fate had thrown the future of either of these countries into the hands of Parliament, it is to be hoped that the subject would have been tackled in a more apologetic mood—that, say, of a doctor called in to treat a distinguished medical patient. In Indian affairs the old feeling of racial superiority asserts itself. Half-unconsciously the English politician's attitude is that of a veterinary surgeon ministering to an animal unable to describe its symptoms, or to co-operate in discussing the treatment. Perhaps some speakers were influenced by the feeling that it is bad tactics to throw doubts on the capability of a body to which an appeal is being made. An atmosphere of make-believe has shrouded the controversy. There has been too much oratory, and too much abstract argument based on generalisations so vague and rash that no one would dare to apply them to a country of which their hearers had any knowledge. Some of these are very dangerous as a basis for our future relations with India, and it seems worth examining the evidence for certain views which are being widely propagated in England. A common assumption, upon which many Englishmen attempt to justify a policy or predict the future, is that Indians can be divided into two clearly defined groups—a small 'educated class' and the 'illiterate masses.' As the first is articulate, and clearly not very friendly, there is a tendency to

stress its smallness and the division of this section from the rest of their countrymen. About the latter the most dogmatic assertions are then made. They are, we are told, essentially conservative and 'loyal to the Government.' Millions of Englishmen have formed their views upon India from some vague conception of this kind.

When politicians refer to the 'educated classes' they presumably mean those who can read and write, and not those who can speak English. The latter number under 3,700,000—these figures, as the others in this article, being taken from the 1931 census. There might be some excuse for treating the 'English-educated' as a separate class. In order to acquire their knowledge they are mostly forced through a similar education, and in order to use it they are confined to a few very limited occupations, but even within this microscopical group there are wide differences in political outlook and aim. No one with any knowledge of the Nationalist movement would take this tiny section, of whom a large proportion are in Government service, as comprising the bulk of educated opinion hostile to the British administration. All the tests which are usually applied to gauge people's political feelings—the way they vote, the newspapers they patronise, the groups they join—all these suggest that there is no marked difference between the views of the vernacular-educated and the English-educated classes. The former, however, are not insignificant in number. The 'literate' population of British India alone amounts to some 23,000,000. After allowing for very small children, the Indians who can read form very nearly 10 per cent. of the population as compared with the 12 per thousand of the 'English-educated.' It is this 'literate India' which supports a vernacular Press, uniformly hostile to the Government. The vernacular-educated Indians set the tone for the provincial councils, and are an important element in an electorate, still mostly illiterate, which insists that members of council must be keen Nationalists, whatever their communal or economic views may be. They provide the great bulk of Congress supporters, and it was upon them that Gandhi relied for his solid support, as the English-speaking members tended to be hypercritical or extremist.

Generalisations about these 19,000,000 'literates' should be very guarded. The total comprises a population about the size of the modern English electorate, but scattered over an immense area. The 'literates' contain an unduly high proportion of young men and town-dwellers, but they are by no means a segregated group. In India, as in England a century ago, there are families educated 'right through,' but the bulk of literates come from families in which only a few of the younger men, and

still fewer of the younger women, have learned to read or write. 'English' education may sometimes separate children from their parents, but the ordinary vernacular training does not take a man out of his family; it does not even affect his status very much. In the mixed population round the mills of Calcutta there are men who can read amongst all classes of workers; the highest proportion would probably be amongst the Madrassis, who are doing the most lowly paid work. It is entirely wrong to picture the 'literate' as a separate class with distinctive interests. Under present conditions an ability to read and write a vernacular brings little or no material compensation. It is an accomplishment which neither takes a man out of his class nor out of his family circle, and most of the 'literate' are just individuals, lucky to have gone to school, amongst the higher grades of peasant, craftsman, and shopkeeper. Even amongst the families 'educated all through,' or belonging to the clerical castes and to the more 'comfortable classes,' there are many religious and racial divisions, while economic interests divide them politically along lines which are familiar to Europeans.

There is, of course, a strong landlord and moneylending element, 'conservative' in its attitude towards the rights of property; the professions tend to be 'liberal'; an indeterminate group, encouraged by the growing middle-class unemployment, leans towards various forms of Socialism and Communism. There is no real evidence as to what would be the relative strength of any school of thought if the dominating factor of nationalism were to disappear from Indian life. Two points are indisputable. The first is that literacy spreads far beyond the sedentary classes. Taking India as a whole, and including the States, there are about 17,000,000 men of over twenty who are classed as literate, but less than 3,000,000 are in the professions and public services, and less than 6,000,000 in trade. The second point is that propaganda attacking the present form of government and demanding a new status for India finds ready acceptance amongst all who can read or write, whether they belong to the middle class or to the far larger number of literates in the lower classes. Indian politics are controversial enough in all conscience. Communal rivalries in the north and east, the high- and low-caste disputes in the south and west, landlord and tenant quarrels in the *zemindari* areas, ensure a considerable liveliness. If there was any considerable body of opinion, even amongst the poorer 'literate,' supporting a particular view, such as the continuation of the present form of government, then some politician or some newspaper proprietor would certainly have exploited it. The Government itself has from time to time attempted to cater

for such a body of opinion favourable to itself, but always unsuccessfully.

We can dismiss the idea of a segregated group of educated Indians out of touch with their compatriots and exploiting 'nationalism' in order to further their own interests against those of the uneducated masses. Modern India does not admit such water-tight compartments. Literacy and the ballot already extend far beyond any class or caste which could combine in this way. Under a forthcoming Act the ballot will, of course, cover a still larger section of about 36,000,000; but even the present restricted franchise, under the Act of 1920, reaches well into the peasant class, and provides at least negative evidence to discount the theory that nationalism is a middle-class fad. There is something pathetic in the efforts of the more Conservative English politicians to find some section of Indian opinion or some class which they feel must be anti-Nationalist. They tried the Princes, and their intrigues in this field have done more to discredit British statesmanship and good faith than anything since Amritsar. They appealed to the cupidity of the landlords, already much harassed by the 'no rent' campaign and other Congress activities, but they were even less successful than with the Princes. They appealed to the Moslems' fear of Hindu domination, and the Moslems, like the Princes and the landlords, used their assistance to stake out very generous claims under the new Constitution, but have shown not the slightest desire to remain under the control of the British Parliament. The English 'die-hard'—to use an unhappy but convenient term—will not understand that while most Indians vaguely foresee a great economic struggle looming ahead, they are not so craven as to make this a reason for remaining under British tutelage. The French propagandists made the same kind of mistake in the Saar, with disastrous results. If there is one feeling predominant amongst thinking people in modern India, it is a desire to shape their own future. This explains the reception accorded to the Select Committee's Report. Taking a long view, it did not differ very substantially from the kind of agreement which might have been reached from the Round Table Conference, but instead of allowing the Indian delegates to return carrying their sheaves with them, there has been an intervening period, starting soon after the formation of the National Government, during which we have returned to the pedagogic attitude. No Indian can feel that he has made the Constitution now being brought before Parliament, or has any real responsibility for it. Four years ago, when the main structure of the new Constitution first emerged, there was a genuine appreciation of its possibilities. This feeling has now evaporated, and although the genesis of the idea was

Indian, this is forgotten because no Indian has had a hand in its completion.

Having failed with the Princes, with the Moslems, and with the landlords, it was perhaps inevitable that those who oppose any real transfer of authority to Indians should fall back upon the 'dumb masses' for support. Here they are on comparatively safe ground, for the argument is as old as the Nationalist movement. The peasants and workers, we are told, are grateful for English rule, and want no change. Lord Dufferin, as Viceroy, claimed to have the mass of Indian opinion behind him. Later Viceroys have been more chary about making such assumptions; but statements of this kind are repeated, in varying degrees of crudity, from platforms up and down the country to-day. We may take as typical Sir Archibald Boyd-Carpenter's speech on the second reading of the India Bill. 'The opinion of the silent masses was this: "Give us our British *Raj*." To millions of them Queen Victoria was not dead. They worshipped her to-day.' Surely, as Professor Saintsbury once said in another connexion, this is 'a generalisation, perhaps the rashest, except Tolstoi's that "all prostitutes and madmen smoke," which in the course of a large experience of books the present writer has registered.' Yet it is in this form that the argument is laid before the British public and obtains credence from the unthinking. Let us consider the evidence which is available on the subject; for if the statement is true, then the policy of the present Government and that of the Labour Party would both need to be changed.

Experience of other parts of the world suggests caution in laying down the law about villagers' beliefs, aspirations, and ideas. The countryman seems to have certain characteristics, whether he owns his own piece of land, or is a cultivating tenant, or works for another man; and India's 100,000,000 working agriculturists are about equally divided into these three groups. His isolation and the narrow margin on which he lives is apt to make him secretive and suspicious. He is not usually truculent, but is inclined to put off the inquiring stranger with the 'soft word,' the kind of answer which seems to be expected. The nature of the peasant's work does not encourage a tendency to abstract argument—the Scottish peasant is an unusual exception—though villagers like to argue over some concrete point, like distances, prices, or past happenings. For these reasons people who know villagers best are often least willing to be dogmatic about them. Many country parsons, living for years in apparently contented villages, were completely surprised by the sympathy aroused when Joseph Arch put forward what now seems a very mild case for the farm-worker, or later when the younger men

migrated from their villages as if escaping from a prison. Similarly, the resident magistrates in pre-war Ireland were often deceived into thinking that intransigent nationalism was mainly an affair of the towns and of the educated classes.

The diversity of agricultural India might equally warn us against generalisations. Here are villages not yet drained of all except a few occupations; they are still microcosms, providing a variety of holdings, crafts, shops, and services. All their inhabitants are not likely to react in the same way to the first stirrings of political life. In England the cobbler is traditionally a radical, the publican a conservative. The Indian carpenter, grain-seller, peasant, landless farm-worker and scavenger have their points of view. It is hardly reasonable to expect them to agree, even if religion and caste did not separate them far more drastically than any sectarian division in Europe. There is no need to stress the geographical and racial diversity. The Sontal and the Pathan, the Canarese Lingaiyet and the Punjabi Mussulman, the Tamil and the Sikh, the Moplah and the Dogra—are these groups, ignorant of each other and more unlike than Norwegian and Sicilian, to be lumped together as bound to have the same views, the same idea of the British *Raj*? Not only are these men different in themselves, but our rule must appear to them in totally different lights. Some in the Punjab have our great irrigation works constantly before their eyes, while others from some remote village, paying revenue for over a century, may never have seen any concrete sign of our administration, except perhaps a road, or a school in the market town. His personal experience of Englishmen must be an important factor in deciding the Indian's attitude to our rule. Millions have, of course, never seen a European, millions more have just caught a glimpse of a touring magistrate or police officer paying a hasty visit to their village. In an ordinary district hardly 1 per cent. have any personal relations with a European touring officer during the year, while in many districts there are no Englishmen who tour. It is only a tiny proportion of illiterate Indians who join the Army or Police, who work for European planters or in European-managed mills. A far larger number if asked to depict an Englishman would conjure up memories of a Eurasian station-master or a police sergeant seen when they took their family on a pilgrimage. Surely we are placing a very high value on our charm if we imagine that these very slight contacts have won us much affection.

For the last forty years the Indian villagers, isolated from the Government to an extent hardly conceivable to most Englishmen, have been exposed to a number of powerful influences, all tending to destroy their belief in British rule. First came the

era of famines, 1896 to 1902, involving great suffering, and causing a complete breakdown in our district administration. This was followed by the plague, which we failed to cure, and which in some parts we were—very absurdly—believed to have encouraged. All through that time, and during the more prosperous years before the war, there was continual propaganda, through speakers, organisers and newspapers, which reached an ever-widening range of villages. Tilak in the Deccan, the Anti-partition agitation in Bengal, Lajpat Rai in the Punjab, made a point of appealing directly to the countryman. It is nearly twenty-five years since Mr. MacNicol, most broad-minded of missionaries, found in village after village of the Deccan that the *Kesari* was being read weekly to the village elders. 'All things seem as they have been in India for millenniums, except for that voice that reads on of the murderer, and of the Bengalis shouting his name as though it were that of a saint or hero, "Kanai Lal-ke jai".' The war checked this agitation for a year or two, and then it continued with redoubled force.

Apart from the renewed propaganda, led first by Tilak and then by that far more persuasive personality Gandhi, the villagers had their special grievances. These were connected with recruitment, especially for the Labour Corps, with the collection of Red Cross money, with the economic troubles which India shared with other countries, with the influenza epidemic, and with the repression of agitation and disturbances in the Punjab and Bombay. A Government which remains deliberately aloof and 'paternal' cannot complain when it is blamed for misfortunes which are probably unavoidable. The war gave India a great mental shaking-up. The internecine struggle between Europeans killed the idea of 'white' supremacy, and the returned soldier or labourer was a focus for new ideas and strange rumours. There was a vague feeling that India had been asleep, had fallen behind in the race, and was suffering from the British connexion. Even where the Government's activities were definitely beneficial—village education, agricultural co-operation, welfare work, the higher standard of food and comfort in the Army—they also provoked thought; later would come criticism about why these things were not done before or on a larger scale. Visiting Deccan villages after the war, it was never necessary to look higher than the waist to pick out the returned soldier. His well-filled legs betrayed him, but they must also have pointed a moral not lost on every villager. Then since 1920 there have been fifteen years of strenuous politics, the repercussions of which must have reached the smallest villages. The non-co-operation campaign, the boycott, the 'no rent' movements, candidates 'nursing their constitu-

encies,' the steady spread of literacy and the vernacular Press—all these influences have been forcing politics upon the villages, making Ram Singh and Prithi Singh, Chandappa and Basappa, talk about something else but 'pice and rice' when they squat under the peepul tree in the evening.

It is not, of course, suggested that the effect of all this one-sided propaganda has been such as would be described by a Congress orator. *Homo sapiens*, perhaps fortunately, reacts against new ideas as often as he accepts them. I am only advocating a reasonable agnosticism. Such direct evidence as is available would encourage this attitude. It is extremely scanty. The British official is not a safe guide. Even those who are district officers or policemen only talk to a tiny percentage of the people, and these usually either want something or are in trouble. Those whom the officer meets casually are fully conscious of his authority, and would naturally tend to give him the 'soft word.' There are innumerable barriers to free intercourse. Any parliamentary candidate in England knows the difficulty of sensing the feeling in a constituency. Yet the largest constituency contains only a tenth or twentieth of the population of an Indian district; language, race, religion, and custom present no serious difficulties, and many local people are working to get the candidate into social intercourse with his constituents. Nevertheless the oldest parliamentary hands are frequently misled as to the feeling in their constituencies.

The British officer in the Indian Army has, in some ways, better opportunities, but his men are drawn from special areas and from families with traditions of Army service. Relations between British officers and their Indian officers and men are often admirable, but are also to some extent conventional. This was impressed upon me when, some years after the war, I accidentally met the *rissaldar major* of the regiment to which I had been attached. I had remembered him as a dominating figure, apparently untroubled by anything but a badly tied *lungi* or a badly groomed horse. At this later meeting a chance remark about politics suddenly broke down his reserve, and he told me how, even during the war, his family had gone Nationalist, and a favourite son was a suspect liable to arrest. I do not believe that the British officers, certainly not the junior ones, had any suspicion of these troubles. A still higher wall separates the factory owner or planter from the men who work for them.

Missionaries are a safer guide. They have a very intensive knowledge of certain areas, and illiterate Indians will talk more freely to them than to an official. As might be expected, their opinions vary with the locality in which they work. Some, like Mr. Verrier Elwin and Mr. Winslow in the Deccan, obviously

find the villager intensely interested in nationalism, and keenly sympathetic. So does Mr. C. F. Andrews, with his great knowledge of the peasant when uprooted from his village. In the Punjab, an area bristling with communal difficulties, the Belgian missionaries believe that villagers recognise the value of the British official as an independent authority. Other missionaries, whose work is mostly amongst the lowest castes, describe them as only beginning to take an interest in politics.

Indian sources are probably suspect to the English politician, with his veterinary surgeon's attitude to the problem; but the touring officials, the *tehsildars* or *mamlatdars*, would be invaluable witnesses. Unfortunately, they are mostly keen Nationalists placed in a most invidious position, and are therefore difficult to draw upon the subject. Some evidence, though mostly negative, has been provided by the Montagu Reforms. The present franchise, though very limited, goes well into the peasant class, but has not reached an electorate where a Government candidate would get much support. There is no doubt that Gandhism—as apart from the Congress Party—attracts even the sturdiest peasants. I shall never forget travelling from Delhi to Karachi some twenty-four hours before Gandhi was expected to pass through on his way to the 1931 Congress. Every station was already packed with patient crowds, the majority of whom were obviously working agriculturists—magnificent men, with hands and feet which left no question of their occupation. Asceticism appeals so strongly to the Hindu mind that some of the feeling survives three or four generations of conversion to Muhammadanism.

A rough impression from the evidence, direct and indirect, would suggest that there is little strong anti-British feeling in any except a very few special districts. Xenophobia is an aberration of towns; and so, for that matter, is extreme communalism. The British official is respected as a decent individual, incorruptible and with a strong feeling for abstract if sometimes wrong-headed justice. The idea that peasants always like a British official to settle their cases seems to be a survival from early days of the 'non-regulation Provinces.' For many years all ordinary civil cases have gone before Indian subordinate judges, and the district officer's jurisdiction is chiefly criminal. But 'law and justice' only occupy a small fraction of any working countryman's mind, and even in this limited sphere it must be confessed that 'British justice' usually connotes something foreign, unintelligible, and biassed in favour of the rich and 'literate,' whilst the police are hardly looked upon as the shepherds of their people. Man does not live on justice alone, and in later years the *raiya* and the poorer villager have come

to appreciate their economic disabilities just at a time when these are growing more and more intense.

Some years ago Lord Curzon, in his usual pontifical manner, described the Indian agriculturists' needs as follows: 'To be worried as little as possible for money, to be helped generously in times of famines, to have their disputes settled without fear or favour, and to be protected against moneylenders, landlords, and legal practitioners.' The assumption here is that the Indian lives in a static society. This has never been less true than to-day, and the Indian peasant is fully conscious of a gradually increasing pressure on his limited area of available land. Since 1921 the population has been growing at the rate of 1 per cent. annually. Towns and industries hardly absorb their own natural increase, and nine-tenths of the new population—fully equal to that of France—are living in the villages. The average village with a population of 500 after the war has now one of nearly 600. In certain areas irrigation has relieved the pressure, but in the race between procreation and irrigation the former is easily winning. Irrigation only takes the local surplus; it does not draw from many huge areas where irrigation is almost impossible. Also, the law of diminishing returns is beginning to apply to irrigation schemes, and population increases geometrically. Hence the villager has, especially of late, felt himself being gradually hemmed in. More mouths to feed in the village, but no higher prices for his surplus; nor—though the peasant may not know this—will he benefit if general prices in the world *do* rise. India (the new India without Burma) is no longer a food-exporting country. On balance, she now imports about 50,000 tons of rice and grain. The villager's only market is his own poor towns. The *raiya* is in a lamentable economic condition, with an average holding which steadily decreases and certainly grows no more fertile.

For this the English have no real solution. The *raiya* is aware of this, and has been taught to blame us for his condition. We have not even been able to relieve the hard-pressed land from the financial parasites who prey upon it. They are, to a great extent, identified with British rule. It was the English, notably Lord Cornwallis, who all unwittingly introduced the English landlord system into about half of India—an innovation as unhappy as the introduction of the rabbit into Australia. It was the British Government, from 1860 onwards, which converted the moneylender from a man advancing loans dangerously upon personal security into a mortgagee able to get the support of the civil courts, and of the imported civil laws, to tie up the illiterate peasant with innumerable legal bonds. All the later Acts for protecting tenants, all the work done for agricultural

co-operation, have only been remedial measures which have slightly alleviated the evils fastened on the country during the generation after the Mutiny. To-day there is little difference between the landlord and the moneylender; both make heavy cash claims on the land, and do nothing, directly or indirectly, for tenant or mortgagor. The Government takes about £20,000,000 yearly in cash from the 250,000,000 odd acres of cultivated land. The landlord and mortgagee probably take about three or four times as much.

The Indian countryman, gradually awakening to a realisation of his position, finds himself as a kind of serf, tied to plots of land which are gradually crumbling away. (At the present rate the average holding decreases by about a third in a generation.) He wants immediate relief from the pressure of cash payments—land revenue, rent, and interest on mortgages; and dimly he would be tempted to follow anyone who offers to save him from the feeling of insecurity which hangs over every Indian village as surely as it hangs over the home of the European industrial worker. He has little, if any, faith in the British Government to get him out of these difficulties. The British *Raj* not only made the landlord, but has supported him ever since, and the landlord and mortgagee are inextricably bound up with each other. If similar agrarian conditions existed in any American or European country, some wholesale scheme for nationalising the land and amortising agricultural debt would either have been carried through, or would be the principal 'plank' of one political party. The views of the Congress Party on this subject are rather vague, but, as the chief organ of opposition to the Government, it has acquired some of the agrarian support which in Ireland is given to Mr. De Valera. Constructive schemes for improving village life and efficiency have received considerable publicity during the last decade. Some, like the Gurgaon experiment, are official, but none have really 'caught on.' They have been like exotic plants which just survive so long as they are carefully tended, but make no growth of their own. Work along these lines certainly raises no particular feeling of gratitude towards the Administration, any more than does the belief that England has 'saved India from famine.' Railways and irrigation works are both considered, with some justification, as commercial undertakings, and memories of the last bad famine period, now over thirty years ago, are certainly not very flattering to the Government. No one knows what would happen if there should be a repetition of the monsoon failures between 1896 and 1901. There would have to be an immense importation of grain from abroad, for there is now no Indian surplus, and whether arrangements for distribution would be satisfactory is doubtful. The

local famine of 1920 showed that there is no known method of saving the cattle, even with only two bad seasons following each other; but so long as there is the present large surplus of grain throughout the world there should be little danger of human starvation, unless as the result of official optimism or procrastination, and for this there are, alas, two very famous English precedents—once in Orissa and once in the Deccan.

If any generalisations were permissible about the Indian peasant and his poorer brother the labourer they would have to be mostly negative. There is no reason to credit this mass of humanity with widespread feelings of affection for the British, of loyalty to the British Government, or of gratitude for British rule. Lord Cromer, many years ago, warned us against expecting gratitude from the Egyptian *fellah* under conditions much more favourable than over most of India. It must be allowed that part of the Nationalists' propaganda has been sympathetically received in the villages, though its effect is mitigated by the general suspicion of the countryman for the townsman. Recent happenings in the United Provinces and in Gujerat suggest that the villagers can be roused on certain agrarian issues, and the conditions which encourage such movements are likely to become more intense. We may therefore expect that self-government on a more or less democratic basis will reproduce certain phenomena which have occurred in Ireland since the war. For some reason it is considered improper to mention Ireland in connexion with the Indian question, possibly because of the many expatriated Irishmen amongst those opposed to any transfer of responsible government to Indians, or because it does not suit the book of any English political group. Certainly there is no close parallel between the formation of an Indian Federation under the present Bill and the founding of the Irish Free State, but as peasant conditions produce a peasant mentality we may well see in India some reflection of recent Irish history. Once the question of status is settled and the Provinces become autonomous, the middle-class Nationalists are likely to grow more cautious, less anxious to break the remaining English connexion; while the peasants will be the intransigent section, not necessarily Anglophobe, but prepared to take risks, and impatient of outside interference in their demand for bold agrarian and economic experiments.

G. T. GARRATT.

THE LONDON AGREEMENT

Six partners are engaged in the fateful political game which is to decide the destinies of Europe : England, France, Italy, Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the two *blocs*—*i.e.*, the Little and the Balkan Ententes. Both the *tempo* and the scene of this game are continuously changing, but its goal remains the same—that is, ostensibly, to bring about a general convention limiting armaments ; to impose on the world effective obstacles to future wars ; and, finally, to organise peace and security for everybody. Neglecting for the moment the question how far the six partners are animated by the same ideal, and to what extent they are sincere in their public declarations of faith, it is essential first of all to submit to careful scrutiny the more recent moves in this intricate game.

The London visit of the French Premier and his Foreign Minister, and the agreement they so rapidly reached with their British colleagues, has commanded more than usual interest. It was felt that a new departure was being made in international relations—in fact, that a sort of 'New Deal' had been inaugurated. The apparent facility with which both parties agreed on hitherto hopeless issues, the extent to which both seemed prepared to compromise in order to 'resettle' Europe, certainly offered a somewhat unprecedented departure in Franco-British relations. A formula at last seemed to have been found, giving as much satisfaction as possible to the peculiar national idiosyncrasies of both contracting parties—*i.e.*, France's craving for guaranteed security and England's determination not to accept any new commitments.

Not one but five separate points of agreements were adopted, some of which have old and familiar faces, while others are quite new. Thus, in the first place, the old Locarno Agreement between Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and England is to be supplemented by a new Air Convention. In case of one of the contracting parties becoming 'the victim of unprovoked aerial aggression' by another of the contracting parties, all the other signatories must send their own air forces to the victim's assistance. The second point concerns the limitation of armaments, and includes,

among other things, the cancellation of Part V. of the Treaty of Versailles, inasmuch as it limits unilaterally the arms and armed forces of Germany. The third point deals with Germany's return to the League of Nations. Finally, the fourth and fifth points are concerned with the delicate issues of the Eastern Pact and the Danubian Pact—*i.e.*, Germany's eastern frontier and Austria's independence.

A cynic might perhaps observe straightaway that the essential point about all this is not what has been actually agreed between France and Great Britain, but what they are going to do after receiving Germany's reply to their various offers. Further, he might add that the so-called London Agreement is no agreement at all. Indeed, far from 'resettling' Europe, the British and French statesmen assembled in London have merely put forward some highly tentative and preliminary suggestions for discussion among all the parties concerned. That nothing has been settled yet has been emphasised both on the British and on the French sides. In fact, in both countries the internal political situation is such that their respective Cabinets must bear in mind the possibilities of fairly imminent elections and can therefore ill afford to take any binding steps that might create general dissatisfaction, or, at any rate, add to their existing domestic difficulties. Again, it would be idle for them to agree—at least, at this stage—on any definite arrangements when the ultimate decision rests with all the Powers involved in the 'resettlement' of Europe, and must be examined by these both separately and together.

All that the London Conference has therefore achieved so far is to launch certain new ideas for a series of vast international negotiations. The importance of these ideas should not be minimised, but in order to appraise it at its full value a question of principle must first be decided. It is this : either relations between nations are entirely beyond human control, and are therefore what the lawyers call 'acts of God' (in which case only by prayer and faith can we hope to influence them), or else they are determined by certain definite human propensities and actions (in which case specific conditions must have their causes, effects and remedies). These two theories correspond to two very definite and congenitally opposed frames of mind : there is something to be said for both of them, but it seems neither logical nor prudent to mix them up ; and that is precisely what the London projects seem to be doing.

On the one hand, they display a quite unprecedented willingness on the part of France and England to recognise, all of a sudden, a number of Germany's claims with which they have been familiar for a long time. Presumably the argument is that, touched by such generous recognition, Germany will abandon her

attitude of offended innocence, will once and for all be cured of her irritating inferiority complex, and will substitute a policy of sincere, constructive co-operation for that of sabotage, bluff and blackmail pursued by her up to now. In other words, France and England are prepared to base their policy on the pious hope that Germany may become a reformed character, if only they show themselves sufficiently conciliatory. At the same time, in view of their painful past experience, they wish to safeguard themselves, and incidentally the rest of Europe, by a series of definite measures which do not appear to suggest that the above pious hope is very deep-rooted. On the contrary, they display a very thinly disguised apprehension. This is particularly obvious in the projected Air Convention, perhaps the most significant part of the five London projects as far as Great Britain is concerned. The fantastic development of German aviation, both military (as yet considered illegal) and civil, is a matter of common knowledge. In fact, it must have influenced the British negotiators to a very large extent, especially Mr. Baldwin, if he has not forgotten his famous speech on aerial warfare. How vulnerable this country is in the air has hardly yet begun to dawn on the British people, despite certain frantic Press campaigns. In the words of Captain F. E. Guest, a former Secretary of State for Air:

It is all too clear that this country has fallen far behind in the development of civil aviation. We are toiling and plodding along a timorous and lowly course, while others, so to say, are sweeping through the stratosphere. Petty minds will no doubt accuse those who point out this fact of being unpatriotic. No sillier charge was ever made. To pretend that all is well with British civil aviation is not patriotism, but suicidal conceit. . . .

Nor is it true that civil aviation has no connexion with national defence. Unless civil machines are expressly made not to be convertible they can be made convertible in a few hours. You rip out a few seats. You put in a few racks and tanks, and you have a machine swift and potent for destruction.

In the second place, unless there is a flourishing civil aviation the nation is neither air-minded nor air-skilled. Flying becomes a specialist stunt, the profession of a few in uniform and the pastime of a few rich people.

This declaration follows closely the general conclusions of General Groves' brilliant articles in the *Observer*.

In the circumstances, it is good to know that in case of an aerial aggression Great Britain (which, in spite of all the ravings of irresponsible isolationists, is a part of Europe) could rely on the assistance of her co-signatories. Moreover, it is of paramount importance that under this projected Convention the respective air forces of the participants should come to each other's assistance automatically and immediately—a considerable step forward compared with the original Locarno Treaty, which made such

intervention dependent upon the slow and clumsy procedure of a decision by the Council of the League of Nations. The full implications of this step are incalculable: if, for instance, Paris is bombed by German planes at midnight and British planes automatically proceed to bomb Berlin a few hours later, this is more than assistance against aerial aggression—it is war. For, as Philippe Barrès quite rightly observed in the *Matin*, it is impossible to doubt that England's Army and Navy would passively look on while her Air Force was engaged in active fighting. Indeed, it would appear impossible to be at war with a country as far as one type only of armed forces is concerned and at peace in respect of all the others. This means that the suggested Air Convention, with its immediate and automatic assistance clause, whatever outward shape it is given and whoever its participants may be, means an alliance with France, only under a different name. That is the sort of agreement this country has consistently refused to enter into since Versailles. Now, it is true that by the terms of this Convention Great Britain and France not only guarantee each other against German attack—a by no means unlikely occurrence sooner or later—but, in addition, that each of them also guarantees Germany against the other's attack. I do not think, however, that even in Germany there is a single responsible individual who seriously envisages such a possibility. Yet this purely hypothetical case offers German as well as British and French opposition papers the opportunity for making a certain amount of political capital. It is no mere coincidence that in his reply to Paris and London Hitler is taking the fullest possible advantage of this Air Convention project.

When these 'London Agreements' were submitted to Germany, so that she might express her opinion in principle on these tentative suggestions, it was argued that this would force Hitler into the open. If he says 'Yes' to the five projects (which nobody could really have expected), the peace and security of Europe will have at last been firmly established; but if he says 'No,' that will reveal him in his true light and show what he really is—a wrecker, an enemy of civilisation, who has only himself to blame for the consequences of his refusal to 'play.' This rather naïve argument seems to overlook the fact that, even in the case of Germany's unqualified acceptance of all five projects, the real difficulty would be found in the negotiation of the detail of each separate point, and that here Hitler would be able to find ample scope for duplicity and evasion. It also professes to ignore the question of the value of Germany's signature on an agreement, whether it be of a political or a commercial character. But Hitler has proved himself far more skilled at the game of

international diplomacy than some people were prepared to believe. He has answered 'Yes' and 'No' in one breath, thus gaining time and shifting the onus of the next move back to the London negotiators. Forgotten all the overtures to France and repeated suggestions of direct negotiation; forgotten the conversations with the *Anciens Combattants* and the promises to revise the offending passages of *Mein Kampf*. This time it is with England that the *Führer* would like to have direct negotiations, to England that he is making overtures and offering concessions. He is obviously concerned about England taking the air peril so seriously. At the same time the Air Convention legalises straightaway Germany's illicit aerial armaments. Hence the obvious thing is to accept the discussion of the Air Convention project and try to make some arrangement with England, so as to drive a wedge between London and Paris, and thus obtain a freedom of action which, in the face of an Anglo-French understanding, would be out of the question.

It is the preservation of this freedom of action that is the determining factor in Germany's foreign policy. This is so obvious that no further explanations are wanted for the silence in which Hitler's reply passes over the important questions of the Eastern Pact, the Danubian Pact, and Germany's return to the League of Nations. It does not require much insight to appreciate the precise meaning of this deliberate and eloquent omission. As to the convention for the limitation of armaments, the almost pathetic attempt of England and France to 'play up' to Germany's susceptibilities (the wording of their references to Germany's violation of her military obligations is of angelic serenity) is rewarded by a brutal denunciation of their own attitude to the disarmament question. But much more important than this rather crude transposition of true facts—and since Germany's rearmament is being acknowledged as a *fait accompli* all further discussion and recrimination appears a pure waste of time—is Germany's repeated insistence on her own need of 'security.' In plain language this means that she is now going to claim justification of her armaments, and their legalisation by France and England, on the ground of Soviet Russia's armaments. Here, indeed, is one of the most difficult and paradoxical situations for international diplomacy to solve. It is a complete reversal of the old position, when, in criminally intimate collaboration, Germany worked with the Soviets against the Allied Powers and jointly manufactured armaments with the very people she now alleges to be threatened by. Unless the present German attitude towards Russia is completely modified, the resultant situation will before long place the European Powers into positions very similar to those of 1914.

England's attitude in all this should be quite clear. Inasmuch as she joins any agreement at all whose object is to stabilise European security, she loses her place as intermediary between Germany and France. This position both England and Italy have tried to hold for a good many years. But the present trend of developments reduces the scope and the purpose of such intermediary activities to quite insignificant proportions. The truth of the matter is that no Anglo-Italian endeavours can possibly balance off against each other the interests and claims of the six partners engaged in the game of 'resettling' Europe. France wants effective guarantees of security; Soviet Russia (together with the Little and Balkan Ententes) insists on the immediate acceptance of the Eastern Pact; while Hitler claims unlimited freedom of armament and refuses to participate in the pacts promoting security. Russia and Eastern Europe consider themselves so seriously threatened that they have taken the leadership of the anti-revisionist, and therefore anti-German, policy from France into their own hands. Indeed, has not France—subject, it is true, to certain conditions—accepted the principle of abrogating one of the essential parts of the Treaty of Versailles? And do not those who would like to detach France from her old and new allies insinuate that she would be prepared to tolerate, or even to encourage, Germany's designs on Soviet Russia, if at that price she could secure the fulfilment of Hitler's pledges in Western Europe? Cynical opportunism and rank stupidity have of late characterised the foreign policy of so many countries that nothing appears surprising. But that France would be quite so stupid and so cynical is, to say the least of it, highly improbable. In fact, she is so deeply involved in the Eastern European *bloc* that the eventual signing of the Eastern Pact is one of the very foundations of her future foreign policy. M. Laval has definitely pledged himself to that in Geneva, and it is worth recalling that Sir John Simon, too, blessed the Eastern Pact when it was first suggested by the late M. Barthou.

But the more the understanding between Paris, Prague, and Moscow becomes a reality, the smaller is the part Great Britain can play on the Continent on behalf of Germany. Indeed, this country cannot absolve Hitler's *Reich* of all its responsibilities at Geneva; it cannot afford to give him the ways and means of threatening the security of France; least of all can it allow him to get into a position that would permit him to threaten Britain herself. Great Britain could, in fact, satisfy the demands of Hitler's Germany only in one case—namely, if she were herself prepared to stand out against the whole policy of European security and stabilisation. That is an alternative which not even the preachers of splendid isolation—in spite of the glorious courage

of their stupidity—could seriously envisage. For the complete rejection by Germany of the five London projects, whether this took the shape of an open action or protracted diplomatic manoeuvres leading to a camouflaged burial of the Franco-British scheme, would put this country face to face with a situation it has always preferred to ignore.

The old illusion of British foreign policy has been that everything settles itself in due course. This illusion leads to a policy of waiting instead of foreseeing, and of dealing with difficulties as and when they arise or become too pressing, instead of handling them in the order of their real importance. But the situation in both domestic and foreign affairs to-day requires a policy of action and not of mere endurance. The time that is wasted on waiting (for what?) merely helps to aggravate existing difficulties; in fact, it is hopeless to rely on 'muddling through.' Fatalism is hardly an asset for a politician and still less for a diplomat. Very often it is merely a thin disguise for mental laziness, or lack of courage, or just ignorance.

All this has a direct bearing on the topic under discussion. 'The croakings of a Cassandra,' as Mr. J. M. Keynes has had to admit, are not congenial music to British ears. But it is hard to make more pleasant sounds in looking at the present European situation, in spite of the Rome Agreement and the settlement of the Saar, which have both been acclaimed with an altogether too easy optimism as landmarks on the road to peace. The Rome Agreement between France and Italy has already been very fully dealt with in these pages. But perhaps I may be permitted to add that its significance and its effects on European policy will be determined by the fact whether or not it offers a new chance for the stabilisation of German Fascism. It may still, of course, lead to a close Franco-Italian alliance, which will, in fact, be an anti-German alliance, or at least help to isolate Germany, unless Hitler avails himself of the opportunities of the London plan and is prepared to co-operate with the great Western Powers. It was prepared with England's help and was part of this country's scheme for getting Germany back into the League of Nations, as well as for carrying through an international convention for the limitation of armaments. But Hitler's victory in the Saar has very greatly affected the position. It has rendered the possibilities of an agreement between him and the rest of Europe much more difficult. Great Britain made no secret of the fact that she considered the Saar question as the last obstacle to an agreement with Nazi Germany. Even the French very largely shared this view, and the return of the Saar to Germany appeared to both London and Paris as the essential preliminary step to a final arrangement with Berlin. They would have been

genuinely embarrassed by an adverse vote to Hitler or a strong *status quo* minority, and they certainly did not do anything to promote such an eventuality.

Here British diplomacy has made a fatal mistake. Far from exercising a stabilising effect on Germany's foreign relations and inducing her to give up her revisionist aspirations—these were the effects Great Britain and Italy desired and expected—the triumphant success in the Saar has prompted a German attack on every conceivable front. The forms of this attack command attention. There is nothing new in Germany's *Drang nach Osten*. For purely opportunist reasons she had been working hand in hand with the Soviet Government of Russia, but even then she had never quite given up her expansionist aspirations. But during the last two years the spirit of the notorious Hugenberg memorandum and of Herr Rosenberg's untiring anti-Russian efforts seems to have crystallised into something far more tangible than mere wild schemes. The *Drang nach Osten* has recently gained a new impetus in following the main lines of traditional German foreign policy. Hitler's reply to the Franco-British proposals is permeated with exactly the same old German spirit. There is nothing revolutionary or originally Nazi in it; the document is a typical product of the Wilhelmstrasse, and might just as well have been written by Baron Holstein before the *Führer* and founder of the Third Reich was even born. To all this must be added another striking feature. For the first time since the war Germany has embarked on a *Westmark-Politik*, or policy of expansion, in the west. In spite of Hitler's pre-plebiscite assurances that Germany had no other territorial aspirations in the west except the Saar, the return of this province to Germany has been followed by a rapidly growing propaganda campaign in connexion with Alsace-Lorraine; simultaneously the German-Nazi minorities from Memel to Eupen-Malmedy, and from Danish Sleswig to Austria, have become most active again.

In all probability the first attack will be concentrated on Austria as the most valuable and important prey. But the Saar was the last territory that could be won without going to war; that could be conquered by means of voting bulletins, in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles. There is no other sign-post on any of Germany's frontiers, however, that can be shifted without a war. 'There is not the least likelihood of Germany provoking an armed conflict while she is in her present state of military inferiority,' says Mr. H. Powys Greenwood in his recent book.¹ This author, who in the days of the Weimar Republic was on the staff of a German bank, seems to take a pretty friendly

¹ *The German Revolution* (Routledge).

view of Hitler's Third Reich. It is therefore all the more significant to find in his book the following passage:

However sincere the Germans may be in their pacific protestations, they want the things which may lead to war. And when they are strong they will talk in a different tone about these things.

Judging by the change in their tone, it is logical to assume that they must feel fairly strong already. Further, in another chapter Mr. Greenwood makes the following very shrewd observation:

In countless speeches the same leaders at different times and different leaders at the same times have advanced diametrically opposing views. The genius of the Nazis lay in promising all things to all men and successfully inducing belief in their promises.

To these words, which seem to sum up the situation admirably, might be added the words of Princess Bibesco, who quite rightly pointed out in *The Times* recently that no doubt Hitler was as sincere on June 28 as he was on June 30 of last year, but that to his victims these dates made a very considerable difference.

This brings me back to the original point of the spirit animating the six partners engaged in the fateful game of 'resettling' Europe. There seems to be a very large body of evidence that Germany neither is nor wishes to be a 'Geneva' Power, that, like Japan, she wishes to preserve her freedom of action, and that she would be prepared to disregard the League's decisions even if she were in it. Her answer to the London proposals, which are not a trap, but a singularly generous and sincere attempt to bring Germany back into the comity of nations and consolidate the system of collective security, rather confirms that suspicion. Hence the prospects of the Danubian Pact guaranteeing Austrian independence and of Germany's return to Geneva are far from encouraging. But Hitler does not wish to sign the Eastern Pact either, because that would mean that the foreign policy of Nazi Germany has been completely defeated. Hence his insistence that without recognition of Germany's right to rearm there can be no talk about pacts and no return to Geneva. But until Germany has joined the Eastern Pact and the Rome Agreements there can be no question of equality of armaments, answer Laval, Litvinov, and Benesh. But the acceptance of the Eastern Pact would mean a catastrophe to Germany as far as her expansionist ambitions on the Eastern frontier are concerned. Hitler and/or the Wilhelmstrasse know what they are doing when they use every endeavour to prevent the conclusion of this agreement. German Fascism cannot admit the political and military collaboration of Western and Eastern Europe—i.e., of France, Czechoslovakia, and Soviet Russia—in the task of maintaining and defending the Eastern European frontiers. In the words of the *Deutsche*

Allgemeine Zeitung, 'How dare France, a Western Power, desire to play the rôle of arbiter of peace in a regional pact of North-Eastern Europe?' This is fairly outspoken. Germany is fighting against the Eastern Pact because she wishes to preserve the right of a local aggression in Eastern Europe. The Pact endeavours to counteract this curiously self-arrogated German 'right' by opposing to it the collective force of France, Soviet Russia, and the Little and the Baltic Ententes. But this very move makes impossible the only other solution acceptable to Germany—namely, an agreement with the Western Powers, without the guarantees of Eastern European frontiers, directed against Soviet Russia. Either the Eastern Pact in its full form, with effective sanctions against an aggressor, will be signed, and thus a defensive alliance among its co-signatories created, or there will be no peace in Europe. France, for her part, appears determined to do her utmost to get this pact through, and will not easily agree to any modifications Poland and Germany may wish to introduce to make it ineffective. She assumes that the German attempt to drive a wedge between her and England is doomed to failure, and, further, that security in Eastern Europe is as much this country's concern as that in Western Europe. Thus the struggle for peace will turn around such formulas as 'non-aggression pacts' and 'security pacts' and 'armed assistance pacts' and 'defensive coalitions.'

If England could keep out of all that, she would be a happy country indeed. But it seems almost fatuous to have to repeat that every possible kind of reason—political, military, economic, financial and cultural (all of which come under the heading of self-interest and by no means that of misguided altruism)—command that she should take a part in these developments. This part, however, must be adjusted to existing circumstances. That great statesman and political thinker General Smuts recently gave a most penetrating analysis of the psychological crisis through which the world is passing. This crisis has its manifestations in every sphere of human activity—politics, finance, commerce, science, art and religion. The general plan for saving the situation—which in the Far East, incidentally, greatly resembles that in Europe—is the construction of an effective collective system. He believes in the League of Nations and Locarno, supplemented and reinforced by various other measures. That, in a sense, is precisely what the Franco-British proposals are endeavouring to achieve, and their spirit comes very close to General Smuts' panacea.

But the effective realisation of such schemes presupposes the sincere and loyal collaboration of all contracting parties, and up to the present Germany's record has not been a happy one in

that respect. Furthermore, certain factors make England's task as the promoter of a collective system of European security impossible. These factors include the growing realisation that the endeavours which have been made in Geneva, Rome, and London to achieve simultaneously the international stabilisation of German Fascism and the establishment of peace in Europe are an insoluble problem which pessimists may compare to the squaring of the circle!

From this turmoil of international politics the following points seem to emerge clearly. The Powers that 'won' the war in 1918 are faced with a situation in 1935 when the whole construction of their victory has collapsed. Germany's military power, which they never completely destroyed, but which for over fifteen years they professed to ignore, is once again so great that it has quite automatically won their *de facto* recognition. To-day there is hardly a single one of them that can stand up to Germany single-handed. There is no space in this article to go into the causes of such a staggering change. But the fact remains that, from a military point of view, Germany already is, or soon will be, so greatly superior to any one of the European States that only a coalition of them can counteract her. That is the deeper meaning of the new Franco-British *rapprochement*.

The five points of the London Agreement are the last attempt at a friendly arrangement with Germany. After that, there remains only a suicidal armaments race. That Hitler will go on rearming while the international negotiations, which have just made a new start in London, proceed, there can be little doubt. It is equally clear that the provisions of the five London projects would immediately be put into operation by the interested parties in case of emergency, whether these pacts are signed or not. Such an emergency, for instance, might be a German '*Putsch*' in Austria or an attack on Soviet Russia. So far as Germany's *bona fides* is concerned her unqualified adherence to or rejection of the Eastern Pact will be the true test—provided always that she abides by it if she does sign it. But from a European point of view it is comparatively unimportant what is put down on paper and what is not. At a given moment solidarity of interests dictates a line of conduct that is far more important than any pact—even when it happens to be such a constructive and advantageous agreement as the proposed Air Convention is to this highly vulnerable country.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

DRANG NACH OSTEN

GERMANY'S EXPANSIONIST POLICY

Oppressed territories are not restored to the bosom of the mother country by flaming protest, but by a sword that is able to strike. To forge this sword is the task of the leaders of domestic policy; to secure that it be forged undisturbed and to seek comrades in arms is the task of foreign policy.

ADOLF HITLER, *Mein Kampf*.

To those acquainted with National-Socialism and its leaders the *naïveté* of certain sections of opinion in England regarding German aims must ever be a source of wonderment. In this respect many politicians especially give the appearance of a rabbit hypnotised by a snake. Whenever the snake's attention is distracted the rabbit shakes itself and hops off, muttering 'Bad dream, bad dream,' only to fall again later, and with fresh astonishment, under the spell. Thus the Nazi attack on Austria aroused general alarm; the French protested and even the British Foreign Secretary shook a finger. Both were snubbed for their pains and the attacks continued, until Dollfuss was assassinated. The immediate outburst of jubilation at that event in Germany was quickly suppressed. The world went through a series of gesticulations indicative of indignation and horror. The watchful snake coiled itself again, and its next dart was elsewhere—the Saar. But few observers, and least of all the Viennese, have any doubt that Vienna remains the dream city of Hitler and Göring—the holy city of the future, purified at last, a worthy capital for the new German Empire which is to dominate Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and from the North Sea to the Bosphorus.

Indignation has been shown in Berlin when documents, such as those published by the *Petit Parisien* purporting to be official instructions to German agents and consuls abroad, have been given publicity. There is no need to refer to any document whose authenticity is in the slightest doubt. For such evidence there is abundant material in the speeches of leading figures in Germany, and nothing has yet appeared which is not a mere elaboration of the ideas contained in the bible of the Nazis, Hitler's own book

Mein Kampf. That book, like much of the immutable thirty-six point programme of the party itself, is in strange contradiction to the peace speeches of the *Führer*, but it remains obligatory reading for the Nazi rank and file; over 2,000,000 copies of it are in circulation, every public library must possess it in quantity, and it is bestowed upon all couples married under the Marriage Loan scheme. If it be true, as Herr Rudolf Hess proclaimed recently in a speech at Bochum, that Germany no longer deems the destruction of France to be vital for her future, then the French are certainly justified in suggesting that Hitler's book should be withdrawn from circulation. But that action is scarcely probable, and the speech of Herr Hess, coming as it did immediately before his projected visit to Paris, was obviously intended for foreign consumption. The world, indeed, has seen too much since the advent of Hitler for any serious observer to be able to attach much importance to what is said by members of the present *régime*. Not only are such pronouncements themselves frequently contradictory, but the German Government's cynical disregard of its pledges to various sections of its own community is warning enough of the insufficiency of its plighted word. By its savagery, and above all by its glorification of that savagery, the German Government has put itself outside the pale; it must expect to be judged in future by its acts, and by its acts alone.

The most universally recognised act of the present *régime* in Germany is the orientation of all national endeavour towards preparation for war. By this is not meant the long campaign against the Versailles Treaty. It may be accepted as inevitable that treaties imposed by duress will always be opposed by every possible means, unless the defeated signatory is rendered permanently incapable of the effort. It is not the German demand for 'equality' in armaments, long since conceded in principle, which constitutes the danger to European peace: that danger resides rather in the deliberate psychological preparation of her population for an 'inevitable' war, and in the attempt now being made 'to seek comrades in arms.' Material preparation is an obvious concomitant of these others. So much is already known about the moral rearmament of Germany that it is unnecessary to dwell at length upon it here. It is sufficient to recall Goebbels's boast of a year ago that he 'would make soldiers of the babies in their cradles' and to mention a few examples to show that that pledge, at least, is being kept.

In June last *The Times* reported that the higher grade boys' schools in Munich had adopted obligatory rifle drill for all boys of the four senior classes, aged between sixteen and nineteen years. The proceedings were held in such secrecy that the boys

were strictly forbidden not only to take their rifles away but even to show themselves at a door or a window. Since that date firing practice has been added and the system of drill under military instructors for schoolboys has been widely extended. In later years, of course, service in the S.A. or in labour camps continues this instruction. But preparedness is not enough; the sense of inevitability must also be given. During the past year visitors to youth camps have been struck by the frequency with which streamers or banners were seen bearing the words 'We are born to die for the Fatherland.' Not to serve or to live for the Fatherland—the word *sterben* is used the better to impress the childish mind. It is the literal truth after all, for by their masters it is planned that the children drilling to-day shall die in their war. It is only astonishing that whilst proclaiming it so boldly the Nazis should seek to maintain the silly fiction that all this feverish militarism is 'necessary for the restoration of national prestige.'

With gas drill and 'air-mindedness' propaganda, with the entire manhood of the country from its earliest years subjected to military training and discipline, with the female population trained that their sole duty is to produce fighting machines in the service of Hitler (and, upon occasion, to be what Göring calls 'the distraction of the tired warrior'), Germany to-day resembles nothing so much as a bustling camp on the eve of battle. Even the toy trade is enlisted in the universal service to this obsession. Clockwork aeroplanes are now sold which in course of flight release their load of bombs, which explode realistically upon touching the ground. One inevitable result of all this 'hardening' process is an increase in crimes of violence by youngsters, and murder in lonely country districts appears to be on the increase.

When Germany left the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933, and tendered her resignation as a member of the League of Nations, she threw a stone into the diplomatic pool the ripples from which have spread in ever-widening circles. The immediate effect was to confirm the hostility aroused in her neighbours both by the Terror at home and by a constant succession of frontier incidents, any one of which, in earlier days, would have formed a *casus belli*. For a time there was great alarm in Berlin lest her action should have been premature. Hitler's repeated 'peace overtures' to France were designed to counteract the efforts of that school there which desired an immediate 'preventive' war. When it became clear that no such action would be taken, tactics changed somewhat. Circumstances favoured the Nazis. Poland was also a dissatisfied member of the League, and Polish foreign policy lay in the hands of Colonel Beck, who has a personal grievance against France. Marshal Pilsudski himself is of

Lithuanian origin and has never been much affected by the French atmosphere of the salons of Warsaw. On the other hand, he is an admirer of Germany and bears no rancour for his war-time imprisonment at Magdeburg. His failure greatly to impress Geneva on his appearance before the League in 1927 has not increased his admiration for that institution. Smarting under the 'affront' of the Four-Power Pact proposals, and professing herself deserted by her ally France, Poland found the time propitious for direct negotiation with her isolated neighbour. At the worst, it would enable her to obtain useful economic concessions from Germany. At the best, a little political blackmail would be salutary in France, and cause the dictatorship to be bolstered by a further course of flattery for her 'Great Power' complex. An exaggerated self-confidence would appear to be a recurring phenomenon in Polish psychology. The appointment in October 1933 of one of the most skilful of Polish diplomats, M. Lipski, to be ambassador in Berlin coincided with a rapid improvement of relations between the two States.

M. Lipski had his first audience with Hitler on November 15, immediately after the Reichstag 'election' and the referendum on policy. On January 26, 1934, a Pact of Understanding, to remain in force ten years, was signed in Berlin, and on February 24 ratifications were exchanged. The first result of this change of policy was the cessation of the Germano-Polish tariff war, which had proved harmful to both countries, but particularly to Germany. Whereas the latter country had no alternative market available for the machinery and chemicals which Poland refused to buy, Poland, on the other hand, had begun to draw up plans for their manufacture at home. In addition, she had been able to substitute the export of bacon to England for the lost trade in live pigs with Germany. The fact that Germany then came cap in hand to Warsaw to solicit a speedy tariff truce was both flattering to Polish pride and provided a convenient lever for exacting concessions.

In the economic field such figures as are available show that since the agreement Polish exports to Germany have increased whilst Polish imports from that country have somewhat declined. But it is in the field of politics that Poland has been most conspicuously successful. The arrival of Hitler in power had itself sufficed to remove one nightmare—that of a Germano-Russian alliance. The Poles themselves promptly secured tranquillity with their eastern neighbours by extending their non-aggression pact with Russia for ten years. The pact with Germany carried this private insurance policy still farther. The Polish frontier wanders for thousands of miles across the European plain, undefended by any natural feature except by the Carpathians

on the south. For 1400 miles the frontier borders upon Germany. Fear of a new partition is ever present in the minds of Polish statesmen. And there had been plenty of warning from across the Vistula, apart from the violent anti-Polish campaign of the Nazis. In 1930 Herr Treviranus had said that 'the future of our Polish neighbours can only be secured if Germany and Poland are not kept in a state of unrest as a result of the unjust demarcation of frontiers.'

It is now claimed that this 'state of unrest' has been calmed by Polish diplomacy, aided by the subservience of Hitler to its demands. Never have words been eaten so gluttonously as by the Nazis in regard to Poland. Stresemann or Brüning could have made the same agreement with Poland, but had they done so they would almost certainly have fallen a victim to the terrorist methods of the Opposition, as Erzberger and Rathenau had done for no reason at all. Not merely is the Corridor question, and all use of force against Poland, categorically renounced by Germany for ten years, but even the German minority in Poland is abandoned to its fate. When last summer the *Essener National Zeitung* published an article headed 'Poor Minorities' the Ministry of Propaganda confidentially instructed the German Press that it must not be reproduced, and that similar articles were not in future to be printed.

The next and almost simultaneous result of M. Lipski's diplomacy with Hitler was an agreement for 'educating' their respective publics regarding each other. Taken alone, there can be nothing but satisfaction at the cessation of the *Press-hetze* which has raged so furiously between the two nations. Certainly the *volte-face* on the part of both is most striking. In Poland no articles are allowed to be printed which refer unfavourably to Hitler or his party, to the past of Göring, or to their claims to have founded a *régime* which 'will last a thousand years.' Since the pact was concluded an average of every third issue of the Polish Socialist organ *Robotnik* has been confiscated by the censorship, chiefly for reasons of comment on German affairs. The German Press, too, has turned a somersault. No longer are their neighbours referred to contemptuously as '*Polacke*'; instead there appear photographs and eulogistic articles designed for the first time 'to show Poland to the German people' (*Die Woche*). This is a somewhat hard task for journalists who for years have been allowed to make no friendly comment.

Partly with a view to facilitating this process of regurgitation, a party of Nazi journalists was conducted on an extensive propaganda tour of Poland during the summer. To judge by the German Press since that visit, the tour was a complete success for the Poles. Whether or not the age-long antipathy between

the two peoples can be exorcised by these inspired fanfares it is too early to say. Both countries lie under the yoke of censorship and secret police, and those sections of the population most likely to feel antagonistic are, of course, allowed no free expression of opinion. To judge by the reception accorded to Goebbels at Warsaw last June, there are considerable elements of the Polish population who will need much tuition before they learn to love the Nazis. Indeed, the difficulty experienced on that occasion by the Propaganda Minister in obtaining an audience with Marshal Pilsudski would seem to indicate that even to him not every Nazi is *persona grata*.

But that the Poles attained their aims there can be no doubt. These aims were twofold. First, they wished to show the Germans their potential importance as an ally, and, secondly, they desired to confirm the declarations of their ambassador that the pact in no sense betokened a readiness to discuss any change relating to their own territorial frontiers. To this latter end Gdynia appeared high up on the list of the places to be visited. At first this was protested by the Wilhelmstrasse, which knows the extent to which the great new port at the end of the Corridor has become the apple of the patriotic Polish eye. It required the intervention of Lipski with Herr Hitler in person to obtain consent that Gdynia should figure on the itinerary. The result justified expectations. Once they had seen its miles of quays and berths and heard the Poles dilate upon their creation from a fishing village, the young Nazi journalists could no longer harbour the idea that the Corridor could be bargained for. The Danzig question took on another aspect. It was a graphic method of rubbing home the fact that the 'Eastern Locarno' really meant recognition of the existing frontier. That fact had been written into the pact itself in the second sentence declaring that 'This declaration does not apply to questions which by international law are to be regarded as the internal affairs of either State.' But, as Spengler has said, 'Germany is a country in the making,' and Polish precaution was comprehensible.

Another region visited in the zig-zag course of the propaganda aeroplanes was the Galician oilfield, to which two separate visits were paid—the first devoted to the more productive eastern section and the other to the western end in the region of Cracow. The Polish oilfields are not of great importance in capacity of production; even at their peak figure the output did not amount to more than 3 per cent. of the world output of crude oil. But to those who have nothing a little is much. The Achilles heel of a Germany preparing for war is the almost complete absence of oil supplies within her own borders, which, together with her lack of other raw materials, must at present keep the military attendant

upon the diplomat. Great efforts are being made to develop production of oil from soft coal by the process already known, and further experimentation continues. But all this activity does not solve the problem of immediate oil supply. Diplomacy has come to the rescue, and, by her new relationship with Poland, Germany has ensured a first call on the Polish oil export market. The importance attached to the oil problem by the German Government is indicated by the fact that it has created the precedent of compelling existing concerns to finance the artificial production of oil. Dr. Schacht has formed ten lignite-producing companies into one association called the *Braunkohlen Benzine A.G.* and has given a *Reich* commissar full powers to compel it to produce benzine by the *I.G. Farbenindustrie's* hydrogenation process. German experts declare that 'in a few years' the annual production of benzine by this means will at least equal Germany's present annual consumption.

In regard to raw materials in general, Germany's policy since the advent of Hitler has been to increase her store of such metals as are indispensable and, on the other hand, to press forward developments in all branches of the heavily subsidised *Ersatz Industrie*. So far as the first is concerned, an embargo was laid on the export of scrap iron, and purchases of old ships for breaking-up purposes were negotiated in Scandinavia and elsewhere. In 1933 over six times as much scrap iron was imported into Germany as in the previous year. Production has also increased. In 1934 the figures for pig-iron production show an increase of 66 per cent., and for raw steel 55 per cent. In August 1934 a decree was issued controlling traffic in metals and forbidding the use of nickel, copper, tin, and their alloys in household fittings and for wire, etc. This was done in spite of the fact that in the spring imports of copper had been so unusually heavy as to contribute to Germany's shortage of foreign exchange.

Figures regarding the importations of nickel are even more striking. In October 1933 a representative of the *I.G. Farbenindustrie* travelled to Ottawa and concluded with the International Nickel Company a purchase of 10,000 tons of nickel matte. This is equivalent to 5000 tons of refined nickel, an unprecedented purchase at one time and a substantial proportion of the entire Canadian output. That deal caused a sensation in Canada; but even before it the German importations of this essential armaments commodity had already doubled. For the first seven months of 1932 the figure was 1313 metric tons; for the same period of 1933 it had risen to 2444 metric tons. A similar increase is found in the import of tungsten: in the first six months of 1932 734 metric tons were imported; in the same period of 1933 the amount was 1629 metric tons. Later figures

would appear to show an even greater increase, but from those available it is difficult to distinguish between imports obviously for armaments and others which might conceivably be employed for other purposes.

Great store is set upon the experiments now being made for substitutes in all the chief industries, in some of which—as, for example, textiles—considerable progress has already been made. The present strict rationing of raw materials is expected to tide over the period necessary for the perfecting of the substitutes. With the amount saved by rationing, plus the reduced importations, it is thought that a two-year margin of safety has been secured, by the end of which period the Government expects to have found permanent substitutes for two-thirds of the country's normal raw material imports. Dr. Schacht relies upon the poor state of the raw material market to prevent any general embargo. Whilst markets are so scarce it is felt that supplies will always be available to some extent, however insecure the credit of the country may become for foreign dealers.

From the foregoing it is clear that, materially and morally, German efforts are directed towards the preparation for war—to such an extent, indeed, that it is difficult to see how a return to normal conditions could be made by a successor Government without fresh dislocation of the national economy. In other circumstances the pact with Poland might well have been considered a contribution to the stability of Europe. To-day it must appear as part of the German neo-imperialistic plan for the eventual establishment of a pan-German hegemony. Germany has paid a high price for the pact; her gains from it are, however, also considerable. By it she has secured a period of tranquillity with a heavily armed neighbour whose hostility might have been extremely dangerous during her transformation period; secondly, she has weakened the League system of collective security by making Poland a doubtful starter in any outbreak of war; and thirdly, she has obtained a call upon her nearest oil supplies.

The latter-day policy of Germany may be divided into three overlapping periods: That of the 'purification' and unification of the population by Terror, with the accompanying destruction of Labour organisations and the establishment of a system of industrial feudalism. The second period, which is now well started, is centred upon rearmament, equipment of munition plants, and the perfection, so far as possible, of substitute raw materials to enable her to withstand blockade. And the third period is the ripening of the subversive efforts which have all along been made in foreign countries to sap the strength of existing Governments at home. The latter is the practical

expression of the somewhat indiscreet speeches made on numerous occasions by Nazi leaders.

Herr Alfred Rosenberg, a Balt by origin, is recognised as the chief Nazi exponent of the modern form of the *Drang nach Osten*. Rosenberg's original widely-proclaimed plan for a general heaving forward of the German frontiers towards the east was too crude even to be indiscreet. The tactics more recently adopted, though still too blatant to please the old *régime*, nevertheless accord more with general German policy. If the present *régime* endures, there is little doubt that Rosenberg's network of subsidised foreign organisations will play an important rôle in the furtherance of Berlin's schemes. Even if the Nazi *régime* should give way to a military dictatorship, something should remain to be salvaged as a skeleton framework for future action. The general objective may be stated as German absorption of Austria and, later, of Czechoslovakia; possession of the Ukraine, and hegemony over the Balkan and Baltic States. Since such a programme, at least in its later stages, must inevitably bring her into conflict with Italy and the Western Powers, it must of necessity be concealed so far as possible until a fully rearmed Germany can speak with those enemies in the gate. We are to-day only in the earlier preparatory, and therefore conciliatory, stages, and obviously no prophecies can be ventured as to *tempo*.

There are two common features in regard to Germany's relations with all the small States upon which she has designs. One is the creation of Nazi parties amongst the local German colonies, or local National-Socialist organisations where such colonies do not exist. In both cases subsidies are received from Berlin through the medium of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Department, the 'shadow Wilhelmstrasse.' The other feature is the opening of an economic offensive designed to embarrass the existing Government and create amongst the population a desire to come to terms with the Germans. The first part of these tactics has had great success in the three Baltic States. The German minorities are now Nazi by conviction and have all along been treated by Berlin as the nuclei of those forces destined to prepare the future conquest. But their enthusiasm has been such as to alarm the Baltic Governments, and at the conference at Tallinn in December the three small countries formed what is virtually a defensive alliance against German aggression and agreed upon common steps to limit Nazi activities at home. It remains to be seen how this agreement will work out in practice, for the problem in relation to the second part of the Nazi tactics is not a simple one. Germany controls one-third of the foreign trade of these States and, although the German population in the Baltic is a very small percentage of the total, German capital

has a large share of control of industry and banks. In Estonia, for example, the chief bank is entirely controlled by the Berlin 'D' banks.

From all three States the largest single export item is butter, which forms 36 per cent. of the total exports of Estonia, 32 per cent. of Latvia, and 30 per cent. of Lithuania. Owing to the fall in butter prices, all three States have resorted to subsidies to keep the industry alive. Exports to Germany have declined steeply in recent years; for a time at least, after the early Hugenberg measures, the butter trade with the Baltic was practically killed. Between 1930 and 1933 Estonian exports to Germany fell from 30 to 18 per cent. Increased purchases by Britain have to some extent relieved the situation, but prices on the protected German market are much higher than elsewhere, and the Governments therefore desire a restoration of trade with that country in order to be able to reduce their official subsidies. With Germany this is a matter for bargaining, since strategy takes precedence even over the defence of private interests in deciding policy. Latvia provided an interesting example of the way in which the butter situation can be exploited for political purposes. The Government in power is the Farmers' Union Party, and during a recent visit of the Premier, M. K. Ulmanis, to Berlin to discuss economic questions, opportunity was taken by Germany to obtain the release of certain Rosenberg agents who had been arrested in Latvia for illegal propagandist work.

The Brown House in Königsberg, in East Prussia, has a special department which serves as a clearing-house for the organising of propaganda throughout the Baltic. The responsibility of this office for the creation of National-Socialist cells in industry and for the permeation of political parties was exposed by one Harold Busch, an arrested agent of Hitlerism, in the *Jaunakas Zinas* of Riga in February 1934. Amongst other information given were particulars of the formation of a Nazi 'Baltic Brotherhood.' As a result of these activities the German population everywhere has espoused the Nazi cause, the few refractory elements being subjected to terrorism.

Lithuania, being the only one of the three Baltic States to border on Germany, has suffered most from the more aggressive activities of the Nazis, as the recent case concerning the Klaipeda (Memel) Territory showed. Until their dissolution by the authorities there were two Nazi organisations in Lithuania, both founded and directed by members of the German National-Socialist Party. One was the *Christlich-Sozialistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft* and the other the *Sozialistische Volksgemeinschaft*, formed from dissident groups of the former. Amongst other ways of seeking popularity the second of the two bodies purchased

cattle for export to Germany at higher prices than could be obtained at home, the difference in price being covered by German propaganda funds. Both these organisations worked as small replica of the German model, with storm troop groups, drill and marching, technical instruction in handling machine-guns, etc. When the headquarters of the C.S.A. was raided there was found a 'roll of honour' containing the names of persons convicted of subversive activities by the Lithuanian authorities. An indication that the Japanese are also aware of and interested in German schemes for using the Baltic as a scene of operations against Russia is given by the recent visit of a member of the Japanese General Staff to those countries.

It is well known that German Switzerland has proved one of the most fruitful grounds for Nazi activity. There, more than anywhere perhaps, have the words of Goebbels seemed to apply when he said :

The German Revolution of 1933 represents the first stage of a European revolution as the result of which Germany will consolidate for herself a predominant position throughout the world, just as after the great French Revolution France took the dominant position in Europe.

The thirteen groups of German Nazis in Switzerland have now been united, and their relations with German-Swiss National-Socialists are of the closest. A man named Hilfert was sent from Berlin as Commissar for Propaganda, whilst Fischer, the leader of the Swiss Nazis, has addressed meetings in Berlin, where he has also founded a 'brotherhood' of Swiss Nazis in Germany. Last year a German National Day was organised on the Swiss-German frontier and attended by joint organisations. Whether the fact that the Swiss Ambassador was the only member of the Berlin Diplomatic Corps to accept an invitation to the Nuremberg Party celebrations indicates sympathy on the part of the Swiss Government cannot be definitely stated. In view of the fact that French and Italian Swiss are hostile to the Nazis, and that even in Zurich the anti-Nazi section of the population forced the resignation of a too-openly Nazi professor, it may be assumed that partiality would be denied by Berne.

The solidarity felt by the Swiss Nazis with their brothers across the Rhine is sufficiently indicated by the manifesto of the recently founded Fascist group 'The People's Union' :

We assume the right to be Germans and to be proud of our people and of its saviour Adolf Hitler, to whom we, as Germans in nationality, maintain unshakeable loyalty. And we reserve the right to fight until the day when our great object is achieved—Great Germany with her southern frontier from the Alps of Valais through the St. Gothard to the Stilzer Joch. Heil Great Germany ! Heil the German Province of Switzerland ! Heil Hitler !

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the Stilzer Joch, or Stelvio Pass, is at present in Italy. Nazi activities in Switzerland may be considered as primarily an example of the effect of the 'race and blood' theory, which is the fulcrum of the new imperialism. It is doubtful whether even the wild men of the older Junker-directed *Drang nach Osten* would have considered an actual partition of Switzerland, although the projected dominance of Germany would obviously not have left that small country unaffected. Apart from these exaggerations, however, the present neo-imperialism of the Nazis is merely a recrudescence of a much earlier policy with certain necessary adaptations.

The chief aim is the acquirement of new territory giving scope for colonisation; the dominance of old and thickly populated districts, though a natural corollary, is a secondary consideration. 'Only sufficient space on this earth assures a people freedom of existence,' to quote again from *Mein Kampf*. The territory in view is the Ukraine, and to this end Rosenberg money and Rosenberg men have been active forces in the Ukrainian national movement both in Poland and Soviet Russia. It need hardly be said that the Ukrainians themselves are mere dupes and that Germany has no intention of setting up a free Ukrainian State. One may say of the Ukrainians what Hitler wrote of the Germans in the first edition of his book, 'they have no conception of the extent to which they must be deceived.'

Confirmation of these activities comes from very different sources. At the Communist Party congress in February 1934 long and detailed reports were given concerning the increase of Ukrainian nationalism in the U.S.S.R. since Hitler came to power. Some of the details were not without humour, as when a member of the 'Academy of Science' was stated to have excited the superstition of the Ukrainians by affirming that 'the *swastika* was recognised as one of the very best charms for bringing luck and wealth, and for warding off misfortune.' The Paris *Temps* quoted the *Osservatore Romano* as confirming with approval these German activities in the Russian Ukraine. On the other hand, both General Denikin and Professor Miliukov have drawn attention to 'the practical steps being taken at the present moment for the realisation of Nazi plans in Russia,' and have protested against the welcome given to these plans by certain circles of Russian *émigrés*.

It is obvious that, for a Germany with her eyes upon the Ukraine, Rumania must be an important field for diplomatic and other activities; and here again Germany is in a position to exercise strong economic pressure. French influence in Rumania since the war has depended almost entirely upon political and

financial factors; only quite recently have her imports from Rumania attained any importance at all. Of late years there has been an increasing movement amongst certain political groups of the Right which advocate the substitution of German for French tutelage. It is commonly believed that King Carol himself is in sympathy with the aims of these groups. Rumanian capitalism may be said to have developed under German protection, and until the war German interests there were predominant. In those days 81 per cent. of Rumania's total imports came from Germany, and she sent in exchange 31 per cent. of her exports. From France she imported about 1 per cent., whilst her exports to that country were negligible. After the war the position changed, but up to and throughout the crisis years of 1930 and 1931 Germany was still Rumania's best customer. Since 1932 Britain has taken that position, with France in second place. Germany, however, has never lost her place as the largest provider of goods imported from abroad, and in 1933 was the only large country with whom Rumania had an unfavourable balance of trade.

The German minority in Rumania is considerable, forming 4.66 per cent. of the population—slightly less than the percentage of the Jewish population. In Transylvania, particularly, the Nazis are strong amongst the German minority; there the leader of the movement, a man named Fabricius, claims to speak in the name of Hitler and is now engaged in organising the German minority in Bukovina. In the spring of 1934 the Rumanian authorities dissolved the Nazi organisations in Bessarabia. It was announced that much evidence of subversive activity had been discovered, but regarding the details the Government then relapsed into silence. In July the *Temps* published a report 'from an unquestionable source' purporting to show that an extensive German military organisation had been found to exist on Rumanian territory. This, said the *Temps*, consisted of

a vast and detailed preparation of material necessary for an eventual German invasion of southern Russia across Bessarabia. The documents seized confirm that the rôle of this organisation would be in connexion with the German project of annexation of Russian territory in the West extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, plans which have been announced by leaders of Nazi Germany, Rosenberg in particular, and as was shown by the Hugenberg Memorandum to the Economic Conference in London in July 1933. In the military field the project envisages a German advance across Slovakia and Moldavia in order to attack the Russians in the rear from Bessarabia, whilst in the north they would be simultaneously engaged by German troops which had invaded the Baltic States.

The despatch in the *Temps* concludes by saying that one object of the German overtures to Poland is to win over that country to

this expansionist scheme and that, for the same reason, Germany is seeking to exploit the *malentendu* between the Poles and their first cousins the Czechs.

In qualification of the latter supposition it should be added, however, that the permanence of Polish support for German diplomacy depends chiefly upon the success of the latter. At present, in spite of the activities of Colonel Beck in the political sphere, supported by a small group of wealthy landowners, relations between the Polish General Staff and those of France and Czechoslovakia have not been affected. The chief importance at present of the Polish German Pact is that it introduces at a vital point a factor of uncertainty into a situation already sufficiently chaotic. Poland may be a slender reed for Germany to lean upon, but, however temporary her support may prove to be, it is invaluable, both psychologically and materially, during the present stage of developments when Germany is preparing her expansionist schemes. Without that support Germany would have found the isolation she chose in leaving the League impossible to combine with subversive activities against her neighbours. For all their boasting, the Nazis are well aware that they have never yet met with serious opposition, and their self-confidence is not yet sufficient to enable them to bear isolation.

In the long run, Poland's action may prove detrimental to her credit, but on a shorter view she has won points in the diplomatic game which may further encourage her 'prestige policy.' She has changed the previous divisions of Europe and broken the united front of the '*status quo*' nations, although, to counterbalance this, Russia has joined their ranks. But Poland has made it clear that for her the *status quo* remains a *sine qua non*. In many ways Pilsudski's Poland is more akin to the German slave State than to a still democratic France, and another bond in common is that Poland's frontiers already extend far beyond her racial boundaries, as Germany intends her frontiers shall do. But the present relations between Poland and Germany are merely an incident in the latter's course. By her geographical position Poland's attitude can complicate matters; it is upon Germany that the issue of peace and war depends. There neither should nor can be any attempt at prophecy. If the outlook for Europe seems often to be most grim, it must also be remembered that rarely has a situation been so charged with imponderable factors, and that these 'imponderables' do not all point to cataclysm.

Of one thing we may be certain—fair words are as useless as a guaranty of peace as are 'flaming protests' to recover lost territory. No good can come of blinding ourselves to the facts of the situation, much less of recognising and fearing their creators

in secret whilst professing friendship to them in public. The new Spartan has no scales for weighing such manners. Equally useless is it to dismiss as 'mediæval' the vision of a Hitler bestriding the Continent as German Emperor. The natural political atmosphere of Germany is the Middle Ages; Hitler is the German Jeanne d'Arc, the creature who 'hears voices' and interprets the message of super-patriotism. And the German people as a whole to-day are at that same level of political intelligence which the French had reached in the fifteenth century. When, in the course of a recent interview with an English journalist, Hitler was asked point blank if he intended to revive the Holy Roman Empire, he remained silent. Hitler can probably be absolved from the charge of deliberate lying. He combines an Anglo-Saxon capacity for self-deception with that form of hypocrisy which may be considered a necessary adjunct to a dictator's character. The object of his ambition lies clear before him, but to attain it he is obliged constantly to tack and temporise.

There can be little doubt that the Holy Roman Empire, in the sense of a Great Germany grouped around Vienna, is the dream of Hitler, and that it coincides not merely with the hopes of millions of the German people but also with the desires of those who control Hitler himself, the steel men and the Junker remnant. Thus is confirmed in policy that strange union in the German character between flamboyant mysticism and plodding determination. But Germany in Vienna means Germany soon after in Trieste, Strasbourg, Bucarest and Belgrade, and that means Europe by the ears again in war. At present the man who demanded a four-year trial is beset with difficulties, and in Vienna is only von Papen, the man who sold him the backstairs key to the Wilhelmstrasse. But the four years are running out, and it is not only Hitler's personal trial which is due to end in 1937. In that year the vast programme of strategic roads linking industrial districts with the frontiers is due to be completed. By then, also, the *Ersatz Industrie* is expected to have solved its greatest problems of raw materials—from oil to textiles. And by 1937 there is time alike for many scores of thousands of men to have received that 'specialist training' which Defence Minister Blomberg considers so essential, and for much crossing of the diplomatic threads in a feud-ridden Europe. It is of such factors that European statesmanship must take account if such civilisation as exists is not to disappear in chaos.

HARRISON BROWN.

JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC

BRITISH official circles are paying increasing attention to Japanese policy, and, still more important, to Japanese actions in the Far East. Corresponding circles in the United States of America have been regarding the policy of succeeding Japanese Governments with increasing anxiety for the last five or six years. During my last visit to the United States I found unofficial opinion, especially in the west of the Union, hostile and restless. It is true to say that there is in America no pro-Japanese party, and even the isolationists and pacifists regard the future prospects of peace in the Pacific with disquietude. In regard to our own public opinion, it is not without significance that General Smuts has emphasised the importance of understanding the situation in Eastern Asia, and that Mr. Lloyd George has underlined the danger of future complications in speeches which have otherwise been devoted almost entirely to our economic problem and the domestic problems arising from it. Nevertheless, it is, I submit, most necessary to be on our guard against sensationalism in discussing Far Eastern affairs. The past year 1934 was remarkable for the crop of war rumours it produced. It will be unfortunate if Japan's actions and the speeches of Japanese leaders are used to work up new war scares.

It is the habit nowadays for the naval and military and, in some cases, the political chiefs of certain countries to make bellicose utterances. In practice these countries do not 'follow through' with policies that might lead to warfare. Examples in the West are the picturesquely phrased warnings and exhortations about the need of militarist preparations in such countries as present-day Italy and Germany. If we judged the prospects of peace in the Pacific by the declaration of highly placed Japanese they would be gloomy. Yet Japan differs from the other countries already mentioned in that her policy is not only apparently deliberate and carefully planned in advance, but that it is implemented in deeds. Japan's advance towards the overlordship of Asia is not only talked about by Japanese statesmen, but its actual movement is measurable. It is like a slow-moving glacier, the motion of which can be measured by the relative

positions of objects on the glacier itself and on the neighbouring land. Thus within the last thirteen years we have seen Japan willing to sign the Washington Naval Treaty and the Nine-Power Pacific Pact. Those treaties gave Japan security.

The Nine-Power Treaty was the first and the most important of the 'regional pacts.' It was broken by Japan in the autumn of 1931, when, after careful preparations, the movement was launched which has ended, for the time being, by wrenching three vast provinces from Chinese control. Japan, having abandoned the system of pooled security through the Nine-Power Treaty, has now denounced the limitation of naval armaments by mutual agreement achieved in 1922 under the Washington Treaty. The naval ratios agreed upon for the strength of the fleets of Britain, America, and Japan in the proportion of 5-5-3 were defended in Tokio at the time because they left the Japanese fleet with such naval strength concentrated in the Pacific as to make it impracticable for either of the other two leading maritime Powers to launch an attack upon her in her own waters. At the end of last year the Japanese delegation assembled in London for the preliminary discussions on the renewal of the Naval Treaty made demands which inevitably led to its abrogation. The conversations were broken off on that understanding. The Japanese Government, as a deliberate act of policy and in the most solemn manner possible, has since decided to abrogate that Treaty. The demand has grown from one of naval security to naval equality. In the interval a continuous propaganda has been conducted by the Japanese Admiralty, assisted by the Japanese patriotic societies, against the alleged humiliation of the Washington Treaty of 1922. The arguments, with which the Germans have familiarised us in another situation, are that anything less than naval equality with Britain and the United States of America is a national humiliation. Yet the 1922 Treaty was solemnly entered into, not by a defeated Power after a great war, but by one of the victors and partners in the victory.

The present demand for 'equality' means that, taking into account the double coastline of the United States and the far-flung territories of the British Empire, Japan, with her more compact position and her shorter lines of communication, will, if she becomes possessed of a fleet equal to that of the British Empire or the United States of America, hold a preponderating position in the Pacific. The doctrine laid down by the late Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, afterwards Prime Minister of Japan, required a fleet that would defend her against any force which could be dispatched to the Pacific by any naval Power. This doctrine has now been superseded by the new doctrine, under

which anything less than equality with each of the two greatest naval Powers in the world is to be regarded as wounding to Japanese pride and prestige.

The refusal to renew the Washington Naval Treaty next year will give Japan the right to fortify the islands in her possession in the Middle Pacific. The American answer has been swift. It is proposed to spend vast sums (including £2,000,000 for an air base at Hawaii) in adding to the defences of the American Pacific territories. A sum of £8,000,000 is to be voted for this purpose immediately. This competition in fortresses and naval bases between Japan and the United States of America gives ground for uneasiness, however calmly we may desire to regard the situation. It is, however, unlikely that this American reaction will check the Japanese General Staffs in carrying out the preparations considered necessary.

The advance of the glacier-like policy of Japan is marked clearly also by her withdrawal from the League of Nations. It is marked even more clearly by her actual deeds on the mainland of China. Let us look back to the beginning of this century. The ancient empire of Korea—its independence was at one time guaranteed by Great Britain—was slowly but relentlessly absorbed and is now an integral part of the Japanese Empire. Japan's victory over Russia in the early years of this century gave her the Darien peninsula and a predominant position in Southern Manchuria as well as the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. There followed a long period of quiescence, broken only by Japan's intervention in the Great War, from which she emerged with the former German island possessions north of the equator as a mandatory of the League of Nations. True, there were the notorious 'twenty-one demands' on China in 1915; but the Western Powers were armed *cap-à-pieds* at that time, and their pressure caused Japan to withdraw from the position she had taken up. During the years 1906 to 1931 Japan, however, played a cautious rôle. She was a good colleague on the League of Nations, and withdrew in good order from Vladivostok and Eastern Siberia after the failure of the Allies, acting in conjunction with her, to overthrow the Soviet Government of Russia. For those twenty-five years the Elder Statesmen, the men who had played so great a part in the Japanese renaissance, were all-powerful in the Higher Councils. Not only did the *Genro* play for safety, but liberal ideas were also developing in politics. Now the last of the Elder Statesmen has gone, democratic and progressive politics are unpopular, and a restless youth movement, especially strong among the younger naval and military officers, is in the ascendant. Japan has begun a new imperialist movement of conquest and has succeeded, up to the present, to a

degree which even her most ardent militarists and expansionists had hardly dared to hope for.

The latest movements of expansion were timed to begin during a period when both Britain and the United States of America were in economic difficulties, when Britain, in particular, had her hands full on the continent of Europe, when Russia was engrossed with the difficulties and growing pains of her Five-Year Plan, and China, the most important factor of all, was still divided and riven by faction. The great advance, for which careful preparations were made over a series of years, was the conquest of the whole of Manchuria and the Chinese province of Jehol. This movement began at the end of 1931 and has not yet ended.

The Chinese-Eastern Railway, built at such cost by Tsarist Russia, has now been purchased for a modest sum from the Soviet Government. Japan has thus thrust herself between the Russian maritime province and its great port of Vladivostok and Siberia proper. This year the first inroad was made into Inner Mongolia by the advance into the district of Chahar. It is not to be expected that the Japanese troops and their Manchukuo auxiliaries will withdraw from Chahar. This gives control of the roads westwards into both Inner and Outer Mongolia, and of the most important gateway of the Great Wall opening north from Peking. To understand the military position in the two Mongolias it is necessary to examine the political situation in these two vast countries. Lying beyond the Great Wall these regions of steppe and desert are inhabited by the nomad Mongol tribes who, under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, overran nearly all Asia and a large part of Europe. The former conquerors of China are now, nominally, under Chinese tutelage and sovereignty. Chinese emigrants driven north by overcrowding have settled in large numbers in Inner Mongolia. An economic revolution has taken place and the Mongol princes have grown rich as landlords. With China herself weakened by civil war, the native princes of Inner Mongolia now rely on Japanese support to maintain their position and wealth. In Outer Mongolia a social revolution has taken place. The subjects, with Russian support, have suppressed the princes and established a Soviet system of government. It is Japan's policy to extend her influence through the princes of Inner Mongolia and to support the dispossessed aristocracy of Outer Mongolia against Russia. That this policy is likely to bring Japan and Russia into collision is one of the more important elements in this extraordinary situation.

It might be supposed that with their control of all the former Chinese territory east and north of the Great Wall the Japanese imperialists would be satisfied. This may prove to be the case.

Common prudence should warn the more level-headed elements in Japan that the lines of communication are already extended too far and that the added burden of active intervention in Mongolia may be too heavy for Japanese finances. The annual expenditure on the military occupation of Manchuria and Jehol and the secret service money spent in Mongolia already amounts to 148,000,000 yen. The economic situation of Japan is difficult; half her budget is already spent on the army and navy, and the cost of these recent conquests has been heavy. The burden of taxation is severely felt, the standard of living of the crowded peasantry has been lowered, and here is a strong, growing, though as yet practically inarticulate, party opposed to further adventures. It may well be that the parties of peace and retrenchment in Japan may now have another innings. We may see a long period of non-aggression from Tokio. There may be another twenty-five years of recovery and consolidation; but it would be rash to presume that the Japanese Liberals and Socialists will be able to play a more effective part now than the corresponding bodies of opinion did in pre-war Germany.

The German policy of *Drang nach Osten* was one of the causes leading up to the Great War. Is a *Drang nach Westen* policy being followed by Japan? If so, will it be followed through? And where is the western limit? When Japanese statesmen, some of them highly placed in the Councils of State, declare that their ultimate goal is the control of India and the Dutch East Indies, is this for the ears only of the 'young patriotic' societies of Japan? or are they echoing the views of the real rulers of the country, the naval and military chiefs and the successors of the Elder Statesmen who surround the Throne? Parnell asked, 'Who can set boundaries to the march of a nation?' Are the Japanese the Romans of the twentieth century? Obviously, the overlordship of Asia, including the control of India and the Philippines, will not be attained without fighting. Is Japan deliberately following a policy which must end in war? or will she honour her signature to the Briand-Kellogg Pact, with its undertaking not to use war as an instrument of national policy? Until the proof is forthcoming to the contrary, we must presume that the masters of Japan's destiny are sincere in their declared desire for peace and in their protestations against any nefarious designs against the integrity of China proper, still less of threats to British, French, Dutch, and American possessions in the Far East.

Modern Japan has engaged in four wars. She fought China in 1894, Russia in 1904, Germany in 1914, and China again in 1931. All four were what Clausewitz would have described as limited wars. Modern Japan has not engaged in an unlimited

war such as the Napoleonic Wars or the European War of 1914-1918, or even the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. She has yet to experience a defeat. An American-Japanese naval war in the Pacific, with an uncertain Russia on her land flank, might develop into an unlimited war. Defeat or stalemate would imperil the present social order in Japan, including even the Sacred Dynasty. Japan is suffering from an excess of population. She must either find territories where her surplus people can settle and live, or else acquire assured markets under her control so that imported foodstuffs can be paid for with exported manufactured goods. This is the great urge behind the thrusting efforts of Japanese imperialists. But the risks are great. It is not unreasonable to presume that the rulers of Japan will avoid war on the great scale, if it can be avoided.

It will, however, be as well to examine the evidence on the other side. In 1926 Mr. Tanaka, then Prime Minister, was instructed by the Emperor to make a general survey of the world and to report on a suitable long-range policy for the Japanese Government to pursue. The report was presented in 1927 as a secret State document, and it remains in the imperial archives. What purports to be a copy of this report was stolen by a Chinese translator in the Japanese Foreign Office and found its way into the hands of the Kuomintang Party in China. It was published in the vernacular Press of Canton. The authenticity of this document was immediately denied by the Japanese Foreign Office. If this document was a forgery, it was certainly a very clever piece of work. The very boldness and range of the policy laid down appeared at the time to make it unworthy of serious consideration; but for the last four years the steps undertaken by the military and naval General Staffs, with the acquiescence of the Japanese Cabinet, followed almost exactly in the path laid down in the Tanaka Plan.

Japanese expansion in Asia was divided in the document into six distinct phases. The first was to obtain control of all Manchuria. It was explained how this was to be done, and the plan, including the invasion and occupation of the province of Jehol, has been closely adhered to. The next objective was Inner Mongolia. The way was to be prepared by bringing the semi-independent Mongolian princes under Japanese influences. This process has been going on before our eyes. Recently the Japanese army occupied an outlying district, Chahar, which, as explained above, opens the road to Inner Mongolia. It is not denied now in Tokio that Inner Mongolia as well as Manchuria are to be Japanese protectorates. Outer Mongolia, practically under the protection of Soviet Russia to-day, was the next objective; but progress here was to depend on the strength of

Russia and the state of Russo-Japanese relations. The first phase was therefore to be the establishment of Japanese protectorates over Manchuria and both the Mongolias, and the main part of this movement has now been accomplished.

The second phase was to obtain control over the Yangtse valley, the richest and most populous part of China. The Japanese descent on Shanghai at the beginning of 1932 was according to the so-called Tanaka Plan, supposing this plan to be authentic; but it was premature. One explanation at the time was that the Japanese naval chiefs were jealous of the success of their colleagues of the army in Manchuria, and could not be restrained. Now a great part of the valuable trade of the Yangtse valley is in British and American hands. There were protests from Washington against the original attack on Mukden, and the League of Nations, acting independently of the American State Department, also protested and made certain attempts to check what was considered unanimously as Japanese aggression, with the results of which we are familiar. The Japanese attack on the Chinese quarters of Shanghai was going too far. Whatever was said to the Japanese Ambassadors in London, Paris and Washington, and whatever was conveyed to the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokio, the fact is that the attack was abandoned. The unexpected strength of the Chinese military resistance was also a factor. We will return to the plan for Japanese control of the Yangtse valley presently.

The third phase was to be the strengthening of Japanese influence in Canton to such a degree as to ensure the establishment of a virtual protectorate over Southern China. The control of nearly all China thus obtained was to be exercised through puppet generals and mandarins. The idea of re-establishing a ruling Manchu dynasty at Peking was examined. The instrument is now at hand in the person of the present Emperor of Manchukuo. He is under Japanese tutelage, and will remain under Japanese tutelage in the event of his ascending the Peacock Throne of his ancestors. The fourth phase was to be the penetration, and eventually the annexation (by force if necessary), of French Indo-China. The fifth phase was to be the annexation of the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. It must be noted that the so-called Tanaka Plan was drawn up with a lengthy timetable. It was a plan extending over many years. The rate of advance depended on the success or otherwise of each successive step; and also on the state of Europe, the attitude of America, and other vital factors.

The sixth and last phase was to be the control of India. The argument used—and this part of it is openly discussed in Japan to-day—is that India can only be held together as an empire by

a strong alien Power; that the British are abandoning the rôle they inherited from the Moguls; and that it is Japan's destiny to furnish the authoritarian and unifying government needed at Delhi. All Asia, with the exception of Siberia, would then be under the political, economic and military control of Tokio, and Japan would be the strongest Power in the world, with an empire greater than the Roman, the British, or the Mongol Empires of the past.

This, in broad outline, is what has come to be described as the Tanaka Plan. That some Japanese consider the plan possible of execution is undoubted. General Smuts, in his famous speech at Capetown in February, described sleeping Asia as awake and stirring from one end to the other. There is certainly a new movement in that great continent. Its form is a claim to equality with the West, as represented by Europe and the countries and continents colonised by Europeans. It is sometimes described as Pan-Asianism. Some Japanese dream of their country as the acknowledged leader of this movement.

Now let us see the further developments of Japanese policy which may, not unreasonably, be considered as forming part of such a plan. On January 22, 1935, Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, declared in a speech before the Diet that Japan was willing to make friends with China and help in suppressing the Chinese Communists. The chief excuse for the Japanese seizure of Manchuria and Jehol was the need of suppressing the bandits. The bandits in Central and Southern China have the political label of Communists. They are a real menace to the republic, and certain leaders of the Kuomintang would even welcome Japanese help against them; but the present orientation of Japanese policy goes further than police action against Communists. At the end of January 1935 the political correspondent of the *Nainichi Shumbun* of Osaka announced a new Japanese doctrine for China, also attributed to Mr. Hirota. It has been described, not inaccurately, as even more sweeping than the American Monroe doctrine as applied to the American continent. No Japanese newspaper would dare to publish such a statement of policy without encouragement in high quarters. Chapter and verse were given for the new foreign policy of Japan towards China. It falls into nine sections.

The first is common form. It is the maintenance of China's integrity! To this end steps must be taken for the extermination of the Communist armies in China with Japanese help. Secondly, there are to be formal negotiations for the restoration of normal relations between the rest of China and Japan. Thirdly, there is to be an offer from Japan to extend political, economic, financial, military or any other assistance required to any individuals or

groups of sufficient strength or standing to assume full responsibility for a unified China. Hitherto the official policy of the Japanese Government has been to stand aloof from factional struggles in China; and this, therefore, marks a departure. What is apparently meant is that if any Monarchist or Fascist groups in China can show possibilities of establishing a powerful and unified Government they will receive direct assistance—material and otherwise—from Japan.

Fourthly, Japan is prepared to enter into a Sino-Japanese pact similar to the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol sustaining and defending China against all comers, providing only that China admits her dependence on Japan and is prepared to work hand in hand with her.

Fifthly, all future relations as between Japan and China are to be direct, Japan no longer recognising multilateral pacts such as the Nine-Power Treaty, admitting third parties. In other words, future Sino-Japanese relations are to be entirely independent of any influence from other Powers, notably the United States of America and the European nations.

Sixthly, China is to be invited to pledge herself never again to appeal to the League of Nations against Japan, to withdraw from the League, and to replace her European and American military and economic advisers by Japanese.

Seventhly, Japan is to invite China to enter into a Japan-China-Manchukuo *bloc* in exchange for a substantial money loan.

Eighthly, if the above matters reach agreement, a neutral zone between China and Manchukuo is to be established.

Ninthly, and lastly, the treaties foreshadowed shall be negotiated and entered into as soon as Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations becomes effective.

The general tone of Japanese official pronouncements for Chinese consumption have altered also. Thus, General Chiang-Kai-Shek is now invited to co-operate with Japan in maintaining the peace of Eastern Asia. He, apparently, is the recognised leader of the group considered sufficiently powerful to bring about eventually a unified Government; and his co-operation is invited against what is described as 'China's struggle against the age-long oppression of the white races.' Japan, far from being the aggressor, wrenching old provinces from the body politic of China, is now to be her defender against the threats to her integrity from America and the European nations. While this is the new tone adopted by the Japanese Foreign Office, other bodies have not been idle. There has recently been founded in Tokio the Great Asia Society. Its ruling council are all Japanese. Among the councillors who control this body is the President of the Japanese House of Peers and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Its objects

are stated with complete frankness in its rules. Amongst these are the following:

The establishment of Manchukuo is only the beginning of a revolutionary change in the world. In this Japan will take the lead as the master and director of Asia's unification.

Pan-Asianism has to take its place beside the future development of Pan-Europeanism and Pan-Anglo-Saxonism.

Apparently the distinguished leaders of this society consider that developments in the West are along the parallel lines of a United States of Europe and a close Anglo-American economic and political alliance.

A number of addresses have already been given before this influential body, among the lecturers being generals on active service, including the commander-in-chief of the Japanese troops in Formosa. Its meetings have already been attended by representatives from India and Canton. A branch of the society was, indeed, started in Canton; but the Nankin Government arranged for its leader to be arrested and executed. A subsidiary of the Great Asia Society is the Young Asia League, which has already held a congress attended by delegates from India, Burma, Afghanistan, Turkey, Persia, Assam, Annam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and, of course, from Manchukuo and Mongolia. At this congress members of the Japanese Parliament and senior officers of the Japanese army and navy have been welcomed as guests. The Indian delegates denounced British imperialism and declared for Indian independence; the delegate from Annam denounced French imperialism; and the delegate from the Philippines was eloquent on the iniquities of American rule in those islands.

It may be said that these activities are harmless, that the programme of Pan-Asianism is only cultural, and that the Great Asia Society is a private body. It could not, however, exist in Japan without official approval, nor would highly-placed Japanese dignitaries dare to attend its functions, far less deliver lectures or serve as councillors on its governing committee, without governmental sanction. There are in Japan to-day powerful societies of junior officers and other ultra-patriots who not only urge the most aggressive policy of which Japan is economically and militarily capable, but also follow up their words by deeds. For example, they have already murdered two Japanese statesmen who have held the office of Prime Minister because they were regarded as not sufficiently patriotic or as too conciliatory to foreign opinion.

The General Staffs of the army and navy are in a unique position in Japan, in that they nominally take orders direct from

the Emperor and in practice follow their own lines of policy, if these should be contrary to the views of the Cabinet of the day. The General Staff officers make no secret of their ambitions for their country. These certainly include the control of all Asia and the ultimate development of Japan into the greatest military, naval, and imperial Power in the world.

Japanese envoys to international conferences declare their devotion to peace, and the bearing of Japanese diplomats in the capitals of the world is beyond reproach. The so-called Tanaka Plan may have been entirely different from the published version; but the facts are that the glacier of Japanese policy advances slowly but relentlessly. A large portion of China has been seized already, and the process of infiltration in the Mongolias and in Central and Southern China is continuing as it was in Manchuria prior to the seizure of Mukden and the conquest of all China north-east of the Great Wall. There is a continuous propaganda, certainly semi-official, against Europe and America and in favour of Pan-Asianism wherever the propagandists can get a hearing.

If what I have written is a description of the dreams and desires and ideals of an important section of Japanese politicians, publicists and naval and military chiefs, what are its chances of success? Leaving aside possible British and American reactions for the moment, how far will the populations of Asia outside the present Japanese Empire respond? The Chinese are obviously the most important factor. There is no more racial affinity between the Chinese and Japanese than between the Chinese and, say, the Tibetans. The Chinese despise the Japanese as upstarts in the cultural sense; and culture, learning, civilisation, in the old meaning, are all-important in China. The comparatively new nationalistic spirit in China is strong, and growing stronger; and it is bitterly anti-Japanese. True, Chinese patriots complain that they have been betrayed by their fellow states-members of the League of Nations; they remember the opium wars, the Boxer expedition, and extra-territoriality. No Western nation now, however, threatens China. European and American advisers, some of them nominated by the League of Nations, are doing good work in helping the economic recovery of China. The Japanese, on the other hand, are near, powerful, aggressive. Japanese commercial methods are irritating. Only a very weak China is likely to accept Japanese suzerainty, and then only long enough to remove the Communist menace. What of India? Are Indian Nationalists likely to welcome a Japanese *Raj* in place of a British *Raj*? Will the Indian Princes break their oaths and assist in the enthronement of a Japanese Viceroy at Delhi? If we can succeed in reconciling India to membership

of the British Commonwealth on equal terms with the other Dominions, the dream of the Great Asian leaders will remain a dream; yet I submit there are good reasons for the increasing attention to Japanese policy in British governing circles. Ambitious dreamers with modern weapons can be dangerous to the peace of the world.

What, in these circumstances, should be British policy? Broadly speaking, I suggest that certain precautions should be taken, but in a friendly and optimistic spirit, bearing in mind that the interests of Britain and America in the Pacific are identical. In 1931 the renewed Japanese advance on the mainland of Asia took both London and Washington by surprise. The Government in Britain had been changed after a political upheaval following on an economic and financial crisis. In America, also, a great depression and a series of banking crises preceded a change of Government. Much has happened since, and both British and American statesmen have been given ample warnings. Both the English-speaking nations desire peace; both peoples desire an independent China with an open door for the traders of all nations. Both nations have possessions in the Pacific. It is obvious, therefore, that their interests are similar, and that the best hope of preserving the peace of the Pacific is by the closest collaboration between London and Washington. Japan has demanded naval equality with the United States, and her leaders propose to increase her fleet above the limits agreed upon in 1922 at Washington. The American Administration has declared that Japan cannot be permitted to build up to an equality with the American fleet, and we may therefore expect an increase in the already high American Naval Estimates. We, on our part, are hardly likely to accept third place amongst the world's navies; so an increase in British shipbuilding may be expected.

A naval race, besides having an adverse effect on international relations, will also be extremely costly; and this is where the civilian element in Japan—the manufacturers, the merchants, the farmers, and the taxpayers generally—may be able to influence events. It can be made clear that even though Japan, at the cost of immense sacrifices, may build up her fleet to the American or British level, she can hardly hope so to increase her naval forces as to be equal to the American and British navies combined. There need be no alliance between the Anglo-Saxon peoples; all that is required is an understanding. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, as Japanese policy develops, the United States may change her own policy of isolation and enter the League of Nations. China may revive and recover without Japanese help and tutelage. She may

remain a member of the League of Nations. The Chinese have long memories, and they have suffered much at the hands of Japan already. The situation is not hopeless; but that the real threat to world peace lies in the Pacific must, for the present, be taken as axiomatic. The threat can be averted. Japan's external policy may evolve through imperialism into liberalism, as has been the case with other conquering and expanding nations.

STRABOLGI.

LABOUR UNDER THE NEW DEAL

[In the interest of brevity I have used the following abbreviations throughout: N.I.R.A., the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933; N.R.A., the National Recovery Administration; N.L.B., the National Labor Board, sometimes called the Wagner Board, created August 5, 1933; A.F. of L., the American Federation of Labor; N.L.R.B., the National Labor Relations Board, created June 29, 1934.]

MR. PEARL BERGOFF, head of America's No. 1 strike-breaking agency, foresees 1935 as a boom year for his business.¹ There are reasons for believing that he may be mistaken; but he is probably quite right in thinking that 1935 will be a year of considerable strike activity, though probably not on a large scale. That an extensive automobile strike is expected in the spring is shown, among other indications, by the extent of current manufacturing activity in that industry. The steel-workers may also attempt another strike. But apart from these—and they, of course, may not happen—there is not much ground for anticipating any industrial battles on the scale of the San Francisco strike, the Minneapolis strike, or the Textile strike of 1934. More probable is a succession of skirmishes. I propose in this article to examine the various causes of strikes as a means of estimating the progress of the New Deal in American labour.

The two main causes of strikes in America to-day are—(1) dissatisfaction with wages and conditions; and (2) the demand for recognition of trade unions and collective bargaining.² Complaints about wages and conditions and demands for improvements will generally figure in all strike programmes. They are specific points which the average workman can readily apprehend and are generally a good basis for an appeal to public opinion. But public support for a wage demand is now much lessened by the fact that the codes have set wage standards; and if the employer can claim that he is conforming to these, public sentiment is likely to swing to his side. From the workers' point of view this is doubly unfortunate, since the effectiveness of the

¹ *Vide Fortune*, January 1935.

² For a more detailed analysis of 'Why People Strike,' see Mrs. Elinore Herrick's article in the *Forum*, December 1934.

codes upon wage scales has not been as great as is claimed by employers, code authorities, and visiting observers whose information is derived from these two sources. The codes only fix minimum wages, and these are definitely on the low side. The average weekly minimum fixed by codes is in the neighbourhood of \$13 to \$15 per week (less than this in the South) as compared with the Bureau of Labor Statistics subsistence minimum of \$16. Moreover, these minima tend, as might be expected, to become maxima.

Further, these rates are subject to many exceptions; learners, salesmen, etc., do not come under code provisions and often receive less than code wages. The existence of such excepted classes gives ample opportunity of 'chiselling' to an unscrupulous employer. For example, by transferring workers from department to department he can keep them for long periods in the learner class at less than code wages. Where codes merely specify minimum hourly rates the effect of reducing hours is in some cases to reduce weekly earnings—code provisions and administrative wishes to the contrary notwithstanding. Visiting observers have paid too much attention to changes in rates and too little to changes in the actual amount of the worker's weekly pay-check. They have been impressed with the statement of the Southern textile operator that codes have 'boosted' up rates by 70 per cent., and have overlooked the fact that average weekly earnings are still only about \$9 to \$10 per week and are accompanied by a 'stretch-out' system which unbearably increases the work-load. The deliberate cutting of wages below the code standard for workers of a given grade is still widespread. The larger companies are generally not guilty of this practice but it must be remembered that the average American manufacturer still employs only about forty-two men,³ and it is in the smaller places that the practice is found. One grocer in a Southern town, finding that the wages of his delivery boys were to be fixed at about \$6 per week above what he had been paying, instituted a \$1 fine for every morning they came late—and if you aren't late six mornings in the week you're fired.' A favourite technique is to compel the workers to sign wage receipts in full but actually pay them less. The compliance officers do their best, but their numbers are few, and they have to work more by bluff than by legal action. The Women's Bureau of the United States Labor Department found that in thirteen tobacco establishments 10 per cent. of employees were paid less than \$5 a week, about 50 per cent. less than \$10 a week, and that only 3 per cent. get as much as \$12.⁴ The changes wrought by the N.R.A. in

³ Figures of 1929: *vide Nation's Business*, May 1934.

⁴ *Labor*, December 25, 1934.

Pennsylvania's sweated clothing industry are described by the Department of Labor and Industry⁵ as follows:

evidence is conclusive that the N.R.A. has eliminated child labor, reduced the working hours of all employees and increased earnings for the majority . . . it appears equally definite that the N.R.A. has fallen far short of obtaining the goal for which it was planned.

While by February 1934 the forty-hour week was 'almost universally accepted' and median weekly wages had risen from \$7.51 to \$11.26, the majority of workers were still below the code minimum of \$13. When, in addition, it is realised that the cost of living has been rising, the real extent of the 'improvement' can be gauged.

That the N.I.R.A. gave an enormous organising opportunity to American labour has been frequently stated. How far that opportunity has been successfully seized is another matter. The two controlling factors in the situation are the opposition of employers, whether direct or by the sponsoring of 'company unions,' and the controversy between the advocates of craft ~~versus~~ industrial organisation for the vast field of membership now laid open. That employers will continue to oppose unionisation by every means in their power goes without saying. Their methods of coercion and intimidation are numerous and not ineffective. They range from the shooting of organisers (a recently introduced refinement is to have them certified as insane and confined in asylums) to the discharge of workers for union activity. The passage of N.I.R.A. was immediately followed by a rapid growth of company union plans. They increased markedly during the latter half of 1933, and have proceeded since steadily, if rather more slowly. The increase in membership of these company unions has been far greater than that of the trade union proper affiliated to the A.F.L. The figures revealed at the 1934 Convention of the Federation are very significant. Although the executive council estimated the total strength of the Labour movement on August 31, 1934, at 5,650,000, *per capita* tax was only paid on 2,823,750—only 697,893 more than a year ago, and the lowest figure since 1917, the years 1932 and 1933 being excepted.⁶ Of the 109 international unions fifty-five reported a loss of membership against fifty-two reporting a gain. No great claims can be made on the face of these figures.

Yet there has been great activity, as I found during a nine months' tour of the United States in 1934. This activity is a rank-and-file activity, taking place largely in those industries

⁵ *Vide The Midmonthly Survey* for November 1934.

⁶ During the depression years some unions have maintained out of reserves a paid-up membership in the A.F. of L. in excess of their real membership in order to retain their voting strength.

to which the old craft organisation is not applicable. As such it is receiving less encouragement from the old-fashioned presidents of the Federation than it might expect, although *local* officials do give it support. The fact that American unions are still predominantly 'job-conscious' rather than 'class-conscious' makes them aim at an exclusive rather than an inclusive membership. In the past they have signally failed to organise the mass of unskilled workers. The A.F. of L. after putting off the problem in 1933 had to face it in 1934. At the San Francisco Convention it did adopt a resolution approving industrial unionism in mass production industries, subject to careful safeguards for craft jurisdictions, and this has been widely hailed as 'the A.F. of L. moves to the Left.' But the reality of this move is dubious. Prospects of progressive action, therefore, look as small as the Federation's record in the past is weak. But it will continue to be the official spokesman (however inadequate) of American labour for two reasons. America's adherence to the International Labour Office will necessitate sending labour representatives to the I.L.O. annual Conference, and these representatives will inevitably be drawn from the A.F. of L. Also, it has the support of the Administration, which inevitably regards the more militant sections of labour as a nuisance.

With respect to company unions the Administration maintains an ambiguous position. Even Senator Wagner, whom no one could accuse of lack of sympathy with labour, seemed to hold the view that they might be of value in certain cases—provided, of course, that they represent the workers' free choice. It would be absurd to assert that they never do. The N.R.A. has never outlawed them as the Railway Co-ordinator has, and the N.L.R.B. has in some cases consented to place them on the ballot-papers for company elections. At one time a faint tendency was discernible towards industrial federations of company unions, which would give a limited possibility of concerted action over a wider field. And in one case at least—that of the Flat Glass Workers—a trade union sprang from the loins of a company union. But they will always be inferior to trade unions as a vehicle for collective bargaining so long as they are not independent financially.

It is indubitable that the value of a strike as a mode of organisation is well recognised. It entered as an element into the San Francisco situation and into the abortive Steel strike of May 1934; the strike of Aluminium workers in August was predominantly an organisation drive, and as such, but only as such, was successful. The chief deduction to be drawn from the Textile strike was the strength which the organisation had been able to build up in the feudal South and among workers who are

of good American stock, thus disproving the constant assertion that unions are 'un-American,' the products of 'subversive foreign elements.' Strikes to stimulate organisation will certainly be a feature of 1935. In the matter of union recognition and collective bargaining it is clear that an essential preliminary is to demonstrate to the employer that the union exists, and the most convincing demonstration is when the union can call out enough workers to bring the plant to a standstill. A number of strikes have this object in view.

It was in an endeavour to remove this particular cause of strikes that the N.L.B. developed the method of holding elections as a democratic and satisfactory method of determining whom the workers should choose to represent them for collective bargaining. Generally speaking, the results of such elections have been favourable to the outside union, whether independent or affiliated to the A.F. of L. But the holding of an election and the designation of representatives by no means solves the problem of recognition and collective bargaining, which American employers are still about as far from accepting in principle as were our own in, say, the 'sixties. Their first line of opposition was to say, 'We will bargain, certainly, to all eternity if need be, but we will make no agreements.' Against this attitude both the N.L.B. and its successor the N.L.R.B. have consistently striven, urging that the essence of collective bargaining is the emergence of a written agreement. They have had some success. But they can only hope to make progress by educating employers, and workers also, and it is probably too early to look for results. There remains yet a second line of defence to the employer: in the event of a disputed election, what is the position of the minority? Should they be admitted to negotiations, or should the agreement reached with the majority bind the whole? In this matter employers, never before particularly careful of minority rights, have now become remarkably solicitous, urging that it is unfair, undemocratic, and un-American for minorities to be subject to agreements to which they have not specifically assented. Their real object, however, is to get the representatives of rival organisations in the same room and then, by playing one against the other, to reduce organised labour to impotence. That they are able to do this is a comment on the character of American unionism.

The Government on this point has not taken a clear or consistent line. In its most recent decision, in the case of the Hoyle Engineering Corporation, the N.L.R.B. has held that the representatives chosen by a majority of a company's employees shall constitute the exclusive agency for collective bargaining. The decision is generally held to be favourable to labour, and has been violently opposed by the National Association of Manufacturers

for that reason. But, in fact, it affords no support to organised labour when in a minority. Moreover, the decision has yet to be enforced; it has taken the Department of Justice three months to reach the point of taking the Houde case into court.

Another line of objection advanced by employers to union recognition is that it implies the 'closed shop,' and that this is illegal under the terms of clause 7 (a), which equally outlaw the 'yellow dog contract.' General Johnson, in a speech at Portland, Oregon, made the meaning of this clause 'perfectly clear' when he stated that the 'closed shop' would be legal if reached by agreement between the parties, but that any attempt to enforce it would be illegal as being coercive. So far as I am aware, only two cases have come before the N.L.R.B. to which this 'clear interpretation' could be applied. In one case the Board sidestepped the closed-shop problem and decided the question before it on the basis of the validity of representation. In the second, it upheld a closed-shop agreement made by the Bennett Shoe Company of Marlboro, Mass., with the United Shoe and Leather Workers against four employees who were discharged following their expulsion from the 'United' on the ground that they were at the same time members of a rival union. As the question was part of a 'bitter struggle' between two unions, it is perhaps not a good leading case on this point. It leaves untouched the main question—namely, the extent to which employees can be compelled to join a union as a condition of obtaining or retaining their jobs. Trade union officials desire the closed shop, not only as a means of protecting their members, but also as a means of ensuring revenue through the 'check-off,' which is an important part of any such scheme. On the other hand, the opposition of employers is understandable in view of the evil reputation—by no means wholly undeserved—which trade unions enjoy among them. But there are modifications of the closed shop—e.g., the 'preferential union shop,' already operating successfully, whose example may spread. The N.L.R.B. has in many cases urged the establishment of preferential lists for hiring or reinstatement of workers.

At present the majority of cases before the N.L.R.B. are concerned with the reinstatement of workers who have been discharged for union activities. In such cases, of course, it is always stated that the discharge was made because of diminished orders, reorganisation, or the inefficiency of the worker, arguments which are in contradiction to the subsequent actions of the company or the work records of the individual concerned. The claim of the Government to modify the employer's traditional freedom to 'hire and fire' is in some respects the most significant aspect of the present Administration's industrial relations policy. Twenty

years ago E. N. Downey, in his introduction to Professor R. F. Hoxie's *History of American Trade Unionism*, wrote:

Ours is in great part a business man's government and our codes of law embody the business man's rules of the game. The business man's right to discharge whom he will . . . whenever he sees his own advantage in so doing and without responsibility for the livelihood of the industrial population—these rights are involved in the legal conception of private property . . . in support of them the business man can appeal to the police, the courts and even the military arm of the state. A challenge to these prerogatives of business enterprise is in some sort a challenge to the existing social order.

Yet how effective is the governmental machinery for making this challenge good? To answer this question we must consider briefly the complex hierarchy of regional, industrial and national labour boards, the Compliance Division of N.R.A., and the Department of Justice. The history of the labour boards falls logically into two periods separated by the Congressional Resolution No. 44 of June 19, 1934. During the earlier period, which begins with the creation of the N.L.B. on August 5, 1933, the boards were experimental and partisan—that is to say, they were composed of representatives of the interests⁷ involved. Such were the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board (created August 8, 1933) and the Automobile Labor Board (created March 27, 1934).⁸ Such, too, was the N.L.B. itself, with its regional boards, designed originally to perform a mediating function and to smooth out the difficulties in the way of the administrative programme. Unfortunately, there were several ambiguities in its position. First, its legal position was doubtful, as it had been created by Presidential invitation only, and later attempts to strengthen its position by Executive Orders did not always carry conviction to employers. Secondly, the bounds of its jurisdiction were not clear; at any moment the Recovery Administration might step in and supplant it, as happened in the course of the automobile dispute in March 1934. Thirdly, the law defining the administrative programme was not clear. So the Board found itself forced to take the position of 'handing down decisions' interpreting that law, and thus became a semi-judicial body but without the power of enforcing decisions possessed by regular courts. It was this weakness of enforcement which at last produced the disappearance of the Board. Senator Wagner's Labor Disputes Bill was a gesture of despair as the

⁷ I.e., employers and workers; it is of some significance that there were no consumer representatives.

⁸ The Petroleum Labor Policies Board (created December 22, 1933) was a non-partisan board, but this was purely fortuitous, and not the result of deliberate policy.

situation became more and more impossible. The Congressional Resolution which took the place of this Bill authorised the President to create boards to investigate controversies with power to conduct elections and to subpoena witnesses and documents.

Pursuant to the terms of this Resolution, the President proceeded to create Boards for the Longshoremen's industry, the Steel industry, a new Textile Board (actually with the same members as the Steel Board), and the National Labor Relations Board. Although the operation of the resolution is to terminate with N.I.R.A. on June 16, 1935, and the provisions themselves are more limited than those of the Wagner Bill, yet the N.I.R.B. has certain powers that the N.L.B. had not, and its sphere of jurisdiction and relation to other organs of Government have been defined. These boards, which are non-partisan—that is to say, they consist of members chosen for their abilities and not as representatives of particular interests—appear to be acting more promptly and speaking out more vigorously than did the earlier. It is, I think, a reasonable deduction from their record that in industries where labour is badly organised better results are likely to be obtained from non-partisan boards than boards organised on a representative basis. But the problem of enforcement still remains. That the Houde case has been delayed for only three months may be a sign of increasing activity. There are numerous cases which have been hanging about for twelve months or longer for action to be taken by the Compliance Division; and even when action is taken and the 'Blue Eagle' removed, it does little good to workers who are still out of a job and may not do much harm to the employer unless he tenders for Government contracts.

The Automobile Board, which was established to discover the wishes of employees in the matter of representation, has only just begun to plan elections on a scheme designed, apparently, to provide proportional representation of minority groups, which is contrary to the decision of the N.L.R.B. in the Houde case and will open the way for the company unions which are being assiduously fostered by the automobile companies. Moreover, the insistence of the N.L.B. on the *peaceful* settlement of disputes and its deprecation of strikes obtained for it the reputation among workers of a strike-breaking agency only second to that of Mr. Bergoff, a reputation which the new board will have to live down. In these circumstances, unless the vigorous sentiments expressed by the boards are translated into equally vigorous and rapid action, there is grave danger that the Government will lose the confidence of the workers. This intervention of governmental agencies on the side of the workers represents for Americans a new factor in industrial relations. In so far as it does result in

labour getting a fairer deal than before, it is welcome. But the frequency of labour's appeals to the Government during the last year and a half shows its weakness and inability to see that only through its own efforts can it hope to obtain permanent results.

Another new strike method has been the use of Federal relief money to help strikers. This practice exists, and has been exaggerated by employers just as it has been denied by workers. Broadly speaking, unless a strike has been declared to be unwarranted by a labour board or similar authority, strikers can claim relief on proof of need, and if relief is being administered by Federal officials they get it. Clearly this is a help. Where the administration is in the hands of State officials there is greater chance of the employer being able to block its distribution.

An important factor in the situation is the behaviour of the unemployed. As is known, early in 1932 unemployed groups were forming self-help organisations which by the end of 1933 had spread into all States of the Union and covered between them almost every variety of productive activity, from coal-mining to dentistry. For various reasons these groups have largely collapsed as producing agencies. But the idea of organisation among the unemployed has survived and is strong. Unemployed workers' councils are now playing an increasing part in industrial politics. Their first reason for existence is in most cases to exert pressure on local relief administrations—at the worst 'making trouble,' at the best co-operating and facilitating the work in a highly objective and impartial manner. They are also conducting among their members a campaign of education by holding open forums and classes whose teachers are frequently on relief rolls themselves. So does Uncle Sam subsidise radicalism! The important thing about this group is, however, that *ex hypothesi* they cannot be job-conscious. They have no jobs and a pretty shrewd idea that they never will have again; members who do get jobs frequently remain with the group. Therefore their education and propaganda must be on a class basis. For this reason, and also because they frequently have a Communist element, they are often *personæ non gratae* with old-time labour organisers. But with the newer industrial organisations in the mass production industries they have points of obvious contact. The latter are not on a craft basis, and the depression has taught these workers, if no others, that the American worker no longer carries an industrial vice-presidency in his dinner-bag. In practice this class-consciousness shows itself in offers of collaboration with strikers, offers which are frequently accepted. There are sometimes more unemployed on picket lines than employees.

While the productive aspect of the unemployed movement has suffered a decline, the idea has recently reappeared, this time under governmental auspices. Various State relief administrations, finding that they had derelict factories, derelict workers, and the possibility of obtaining surplus raw materials, perceived that by bringing these together they could provide real jobs for their unemployed at the same time as they provided for their material necessities. One State at least contemplates in its plan an exchange of products so made between the relief administrations of various States. Projects of various kinds—canning, the making of shoes, mattresses, furniture and clothing—have been either set up or planned amid the howls of private industry, which alleges unfair competition, increased unemployment for its own workers, and sundry other evils as a result of this movement. It is a remarkable development—not in itself, but in that a Government normally under control of business interests should have taken it up. For though no single argument advanced against the scheme by private industry has any value, the scheme itself, in its aim of producing for use rather than for profit, is a clear threat to the interests of the so-called Capitalist system.

How far is the Federal Government really backing the scheme? On the one hand, we have the Federal Emergency Relief Administrator saying that he does not care how the States spend their relief money provided that they do their job of relieving starvation, and pointing out to a deputation of New England business men who came to demand the utmost cheapness in the administration of relief that this was, in fact, by far the most economical method. On the other hand, one scheme at least (and possibly two schemes) seems likely to be abandoned under pressure. How, too, do the workers feel about it? The Ohio Unemployed League (the scheme has reached its widest developments in Ohio under Ohio Production Units Inc.) regard it as 'forced labour,' and a recent article in the *Nation*⁹ attacked it as making the unemployed into 'economic pariahs insulated by a *cordon sanitaire* from the surrounding profit economy.' Other Left-Wing papers—for example, the *American Guardian*—seem to regard the scheme with approval. The final determinant will probably be the attitude of the State relief administrations. My impression is that they are keen on the idea, and that this will keep it going so long as Washington does not definitely forbid it. This Washington has not yet done, and with so many millions of persons on relief (a formidable political and economic force) it probably will not do so.

Can any fixed points be established in this confused movement in a country some thirty times as large as our own? That

⁹ November 24, 1934.

employers are no whit abating their opposition to unionising and collective bargaining is clear. Only in those industries where the unions were already strong before the passage of N.I.R.A.—e.g., building, the garment trades, printing and motion-picture operating—have workers any considerable share in determining their own destiny. Outside these the workers' battle still proceeds with undiminished intensity. In that battle labour has so far depended too much on the support of the Administration and too little on organising its own strength. With but few exceptions (the United Mine Workers of America and the International Ladies' Garment Workers may be cited), organisation by the older craft groups has made little progress. Their influence in American labour rests less on their present achievements than on their control of the labour 'machine' and upon governmental support. Should the Administration move definitely to the right, it might well be that the A.F. of L. would move with it and approximate to a Government-run labour organisation on Italian lines. The future of American labour lies with the rank and file, in whom the depression has planted the idea that they are members of a working class and not potential employers.

Meanwhile the Administration is hedging on its major problems, and this tends to help the employer rather than the worker. On the other hand, one cannot deny that in many cases the technique of collective bargaining is as new to the labour representative as it is to the employer. Labour, equally with business, needs to be taught, and it is hard for Uncle Sam to hurry the class beyond the speed of its slowest member. But the steady pressure of the labour boards is creating new social principles, and in time, with increasing mutual confidence and responsibility in employer and labour circles, the Administration may feel able to proceed to more courageous enforcement of their decisions. And overriding every issue is that of relief of the 20,000,000 persons for whom private industry is failing to provide a livelihood who form the background of industrial conflict and social experimentation. The stark necessity of providing for these is, in my judgment, going to lead the Administration into courses which the 'rugged individualist' abhors and will vehemently attack. What of the President? He thinks faster and further than any other politician in America, and his technique is masterly; his famous smile and his excellent 'bedside manner' enable him to impose moments of tranquillity on the fiercely contending parties long enough to allow him to get from time to time the footholds he requires. But as to the direction in which he intends to move from these footholds he remains silent.

E. M. HUGH-JONES.

WHY NOT A NATIONAL TRANSPORT BOARD?

THE man who closely watches events is aware that from time to time some proposal will, as it were, float in the atmosphere. We become aware of it by insensible degrees; we perceive allusions to it in the speeches of the great, some learned professor makes it the subject of an address before the British Association, then the politicians catch the infection, and one day we awake to find our proposal embodied in costly, often futile, legislation. But the suggestion of a great National Transport Board—that is, of a single authority which shall control all transport facilities within Great Britain, whether by land, air, sea or waterway—is more easily accounted for. We observe on all sides 'the growth of the unit,' the incorporation of villages in boroughs, the absorption of small companies by big ones, and, perceiving the process to be both logical and practically inevitable, we apply it to transport and achieve the enchanting vision of a land of order, progress, and increasing safety. But the thing is not quite so simple.

At the present moment every transport industry is necessarily in more or less violent conflict with every other transport industry. The railways operate, as it were, in the centre of the transport world with competition above them in the air, on either side of them on roads and canals, and, beyond the roads and canals, on the sea. Thus the roads carry a considerable amount of traffic which logically should be moved by rail and the railways convey large quantities of material which might just as well travel by coastwise shipping. Whilst, in short, there has been a steady movement towards the co-ordination of facilities within each industry, such as railway amalgamations or the amalgamation of road transport companies, there has been no serious attempt to restrict each industry to precisely the duties it is best qualified to discharge. Neither, without some drastic change in the structure of transport, can we anticipate such a development upon a comprehensive scale. In this article, therefore, we shall deal with the unified control of transport, not as an ideal, but as a practical issue.

As a starting-point to the inquiry it will probably be advisable

for us to define the advantages which a unified system of national transport would be expected to achieve. Put briefly, such a system should enable each branch of the transport service to function with a minimum of waste, and it should, we think, bring within the range of practical politics a possible shortening of working hours without any diminution either in the wages paid to the employee or the general efficiency of the transport service. A thorough co-ordination of facilities would enable each industry to scrap a certain proportion of its own machinery, with the result that all facilities remaining after the co-ordination had established itself would be more fully employed than at present. This fact alone should result in a considerable saving in working expenses, since the more fully we employ fixed capital the lower the cost per unit at which it can operate. Neither is the absence of competition any longer a valid argument. In past days competition was the parent of efficiency, and doubtless, in the case of many small industries, it still is, but, in the case of the larger industries at any rate, competition has long ceased to discharge any really useful function. It can and does result in price- and rate-cutting, but rarely to-day is it possible to attribute to it a development of lasting advantage. In short, great industries are now conducted upon so gigantic a scale that progress is more likely to arise as a part of the policy of a single well-equipped organisation than as the chance result of competing interests.

It is not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that an effective co-ordination of transport facilities throughout Great Britain would result in considerable advantages to the community if it could be brought about; but can it be? It may be well in this connexion to point out that we cannot solve our problem merely by passing an Act of Parliament. Legislation can never do more than make a solution effective; before legislation can be of the slightest value the solution must be discovered. What, then, is the solution to this problem of a thousand conflicting facilities and ten thousand conflicting demands?

As the reader may recollect, the Royal Commission on Transport reported in 1930, and the data furnished by the exhaustive inquiries of the Commission are still of considerable value. Unhappily, the Commission relinquished its task at the precise moment at which it appeared likely to bear fruit. Just when it arrived at a definite proposal upon the larger issue it was unable to speak with any degree of unanimity. By way of carrying on the story so unhappily left inconclusive by the Royal Commission, we suggest that there are three methods by which complete co-ordination might be secured:

(1) One of the industries, presumably the railways, might be

encouraged and assisted by the State to secure a pre-dominant interest in the others.

- (2) The State could take over and administer all transport facilities in much the same fashion as it has taken over and administers the postal telegraph service.
- (3) The various industries and companies, whilst maintaining their identity, might be placed by legislation within the control of a small co-ordinating body, which we will refer to as the National Transport Board.

It is not without interest that a definite movement in the direction of the first of these solutions has already taken place. The railway companies are already largely interested in motor-coach traffic and in road transport generally, and the well-known carriers Pickford and Carter Paterson are now a part of the railway transport service. There is also already in existence an Executive Committee which endeavours to provide for co-operation between the railways and the independently owned canals. Nevertheless, there is a limit beyond which this movement cannot progress without the active participation of the State, and it is doubtful, in our opinion, whether the railway companies, as they are at present organised and controlled, would constitute the authority best qualified to administer a national service such as we have in mind.

The second solution is open to objection on the ground that the organisation of transport workers is by this time highly developed on political lines. The generally entertained idea that a State service is necessarily an inefficient service is probably less valid than might be supposed. In Germany, to take only one instance, the control of the railways by the State has not been unsuccessful. There are, however, great and weighty objections to any proposal which would make the State directly responsible for the wages and working conditions of an unduly large proportion of the electorate. It seems to us to be inevitable that in course of time the interests of commerce and the public would be subordinated to those of a much smaller but better organised body of opinion.

We suggest, therefore, without hesitation, as the system most likely to prove generally successful, the control of the five great transport industries—railways, road transport, inland waterways, coastal shipping and airways—by a small Board whose function it should be merely to co-ordinate the services they render.

The appointment of a National Transport Board is, however, no more than the beginning of those difficulties which beset the problem of co-ordinated transport. This problem has been admirably stated in the Report of the Royal Commission :

No doubt if a state of affairs could be reached whereby every passenger travelled, and every ounce of goods was consigned, by the most economical route and form of transport, many of our present transport difficulties would disappear. But, as things are to-day, is such a state of affairs or even any approach to it practicable? Who is to decide, for example, what rail services are desirable in the public interest and what amount of coastwise shipping? Or what goods should in the national interest be sent by rail, road, canal or ship? To propound the question is sufficient to bring home the immense difficulty which it involves.¹

It would be difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of the problem to which the Commission thus directs attention. For a National Transport Board merely to lay down a set of classes or categories for all transportable goods and enjoin all transport undertakings to follow a set of rules would be utterly useless. The infinite number of trade processes and commodities, their varying proportions in different industries, the numerous and complicated arrangements for contracting and sub-contracting, would deny the effort any possibility of success.

Perhaps we can best assist the reader to appreciate the immensity of this problem by indicating its scope and complexity. The jurisdiction of the National Transport Board would comprise about 20,500 miles of railway, the traffic upon a trifle more than 180,000 miles of highway at present under the control of 1500 separate authorities, the movement of about 14,000,000 tons of merchandise over 3616 miles of waterway, owned or administered to-day by the four great railways, thirty or so navigation companies and fifty or more public bodies,² and the unknown factor of coastwise shipping, which during the course of a normal year may carry as much as 35,000,000 tons from one British port to another. Finally, in its leisure moments the Board would be expected to control the activities of the many thousands of aeroplanes which within our lifetime will daily cross and recross Great Britain.³

This bare statement of the facts will suffice to disillusion the reader who pictures the Transport Board as a few able gentlemen in personal control of every branch of the transport industry. There is a limit to human capacity, and that limit would be reached by the Board before it had coped with the problems of a single working day. In short, the duties of the Board would be limited to securing the efficient and economical co-operation of the five great transport industries, each of which would be

¹ *Report of the Royal Commission on Transport*, chap. viii, section 500.

² The Manchester Ship Canal is not included in this total.

³ A further complication is to be found in the fact that many of our ports are at present owned by the railway companies. Presumably these ports, together with ports independently owned, would pass from the control of the Transport Board to that of a Harbours and Ports Board. This, however, is a possibility with which we are not immediately concerned.

responsible for running its own household. The constitution of the Board is clearly a matter which would have to be handled with care. Since this body will have little or nothing to do with the internal organisation of the industries it would control, the Board should consist of a strictly limited number of men who are not associated with any particular form of transport. Presumably the State will have its representative upon the Board as well as Commerce and Industry. If the Board is to function efficiently as a co-ordinating body it must be small, and must command the confidence, not only of the firms whose goods it will carry, but also of the man in the street whose daily life its authority will inevitably impinge upon.

The reorganisation of each of the five great transport industries—the railways, road transport, canals, coastwise shipping, and air—would, we imagine, be a first step towards the institution of a National Transport Board. The reorganisation we envisage would place each individual firm under the control, both as regards its services and rates, of its appropriate council. Thus each unit of transport, whilst preserving its individuality, would accept its policy from its appropriate council, and all these councils alike would accept their policy from the National Transport Board. In other words, a decision in policy would pass from the Transport Board to the councils of the industries concerned, and from the councils to their component parts. It may be of interest if we point out, in passing, that for all practical purposes the railway industry has already achieved the first stage in the process to which we refer, since in matters of consequence no British railway to-day takes any action except on a decision by the Railway Companies Association, which is virtually the council of the grouped companies, and whose decision is binding upon all the companies alike. There remains, however, the somewhat archaic constitution of railway boards, which in any reorganisation of the structure of transport would doubtless be superseded by smaller and more technically expert directorates.

At this point a difficulty will immediately occur to the reader. 'Your proposal,' he will argue, 'must envisage in certain cases the sacrifice of the company in the interests of the industry—what is the point in your Transport Councils if they hesitate to demand that sacrifice whenever it is needed? Your Transport Board, again, will at times ruthlessly sacrifice one industry to another—that is what it is there for; but what happens to the shareholders in all these concerns? Undoubtedly in some instances what is lost in one direction will be made good in another. The road loses to the rail and the rail loses to the road, and the losses and gains may balance each other; but suppose they do not, what then?' The objection seems so well founded

that we cannot contemplate the financial independence of any of the units concerned, although we fully recognise the danger of widespread merging, the removal of almost all incentive to effort, economy and efficiency, and the risk that improvements will benefit only slightly the units responsible for achieving them. We accept the maintenance of the unit for administrative purposes because we see no alternative, but we cannot conceive that the reorganisation of transport upon a national basis could possibly proceed except upon the assumption that every company involved would financially lose its independent identity.

It is an integral part of our proposal that immediately upon the grouping of the transport industries into five administrative units each industry shall proceed to exchange a stated portion of its stock for stock in each of the other four industries. Thus a decision of the Transport Board to transfer to one industry traffic previously carried by another would not be achieved at the entire cost of the industry losing the traffic. What the proposal amounts to, therefore, is that transport units throughout the country would be grouped into five distinct industries—rail, road, air, inland waterways and coastwise shipping; within each industry all receipts would be pooled and the council of each industry would make itself responsible for the distribution of such profits as the industry might make. Each industry, again, would hold stock in the other transport industries. The National Transport Board would exercise a co-ordinating authority over all the transport industries alike, dictating to each its policy as regards the class of goods it should carry and the rates it should charge. It is not proposed, however, that the Transport Board shall interfere with the internal organisation of any of the industries—this being the task of the council concerned—although, presumably, it would have the right to take any action to secure the efficient discharge of the responsible duties allotted under this scheme to the five councils.

Recently Sir Felix Pole, at the request of the Government of Northern Ireland, reported upon the possibility of co-ordinating transport facilities in Ulster. But the highly interesting and valuable advice which he applied to that problem is not necessarily applicable to the far more complex question of co-ordination within Great Britain. It is necessary to bear in mind that the area covered by his Report is slightly less than that of Yorkshire and that the population affected by its provisions scarcely exceeds that of Birmingham. Apart from the fact that certain railways within Ulster terminate in the Irish Free State—in territory, that is, to which the enactments of the Government of Northern Ireland are not applicable—the problem as it presents itself in Ulster does not embrace any factor that is not present in the far

greater area with which we are dealing. But the scale of the problem and the relative importance of all the factors concerned are so different that a solution likely to succeed in one case would probably fail to achieve its purpose in the other. Nevertheless, it is of interest that even when dealing with the problem upon a comparatively small scale, Sir Felix Pole is unable to support the suggestion that road transport undertakings should be compulsorily transferred to the ownership of the railways. Under his proposals the railway companies remain virtually unaffected, except that they lose any road transport undertakings they may have acquired. All road transport, whether privately owned or owned by the railway companies, is to be taken over by a Northern Ireland Road Transport Board, which will acquire the smaller road transport undertakings as and when it thinks right; all transport profits, rail and road, are to be pooled, and the railway companies are to be permitted to make further investments in the capital of the Road Transport Board if they so choose.

Up to this point the Ulster proposal does not differ in any material respect from that put forward in this article. The railways and the road transport industries preserve their separate identity for administrative purposes but cease to compete for profit. But when we turn from the result to the method by which it is to be achieved we observe a considerable difference in the principle that is applied. Sir Felix Pole, concerned only with Ulster, advocates what we may perhaps term control upon a 'Republican' basis. Road and rail secure a community of interest, meet as equals, and acknowledge no superior save the Ulster Government and a Transport Appeal Tribunal whose duty it would be to deal with appeals by the public, or by railway or road interests, regarding fares, rates, services, conditions of transport and similar matters. Faced as we are with the same problem upon a scale infinitely vaster and more complex, we propose control by 'dictatorship.' Under our proposal all the different branches of transport will be under the control of a National Transport Board.

There still remains the problem how a National Transport Board, or, for that matter, any other humanly constituted body, can effectively secure the movement of goods and passengers by the most convenient route, and also what precisely the most convenient route may be in any given set of circumstances. A moment's reflection will suffice to convince the reader of the intricacy of this problem. In some cases the transfer of goods by road shows a saving of as much as 3s. 9d. a ton over the lowest rates that the railways can quote. In the light of that figure, is it in the interests of commerce to transfer this traffic from the road to the railway? Certainly not. On the other hand, between

January 1, 1926, and December 31, 1933, 1,471,920 persons were killed and/or injured upon the roads of Great Britain, as compared with 4201 killed and/or injured in accidents on the British railways. In other words, 350 persons were killed or injured on the roads for every one killed or injured on the railways. Taking these figures into account, is it in the interests of the community to transfer traffic from the roads to the railway? Clearly it is.

Of the various industries which the Board will control, the two most difficult to reconcile are road transport and the railways. To some extent each is needed, to some extent each is redundant; to some extent each is complementary to the other. It is, of course, a simple matter in theory to suggest that the motor vehicle shall cease where the railway begins and commence once more where the railway leaves off. In certain cases, however, it is cheaper to send goods by road from the factory direct to the purchaser than by a route that involves transfer from a road lorry to a railway truck and back again from a railway truck to a road lorry. That being so, it is clear that many existing facilities could only be abolished with advantage if despatching firms were prevented by legislation from providing road transport facilities of their own. It is clear that no firm in the country will entrust its goods to the Transport Board if it can carry them at less cost in its own vehicles. We do not believe that it would be feasible to eliminate the private ownership of commercial vehicles, and for that reason our National Transport Board would inevitably provide road transport facilities in an attempt to secure the traffic. Thus parallel services by road and rail would not necessarily disappear.

Between transport in South Africa and transport in Great Britain there is necessarily a great gulf fixed. In the one country, facilities limited in variety and degree extend for great distances through thinly populated areas; in the other, facilities are extremely diverse, incredibly numerous and hopelessly complex. It may be of interest, however, to glance at the methods by which the South African Government has endeavoured to co-ordinate road and rail services within its own territory. The Motor Carrier Transportation Act regulates transport conditions within those areas and routes in, or along which, motor transport is well established. The control of transport within these areas or routes is vested in a Road Transportation Board consisting of three members appointed by the Crown, none of whom is an officer or servant of the railway administration. To this extent it may be said to be equivalent to our suggested National Transport Board. Within each scheduled transportation area, and upon each transportation route, the Board acts through a local board, also of three members.

All road transport within transportation areas and roads is

licensed, and before any new licence can be granted the local board is required to take into consideration (1) the ability of the applicant to conduct an efficient service, (2) the requirements of the public, (3) the nature of the proposed service and the charges at which it will be provided, (4) the extent to which the new service will adversely affect existing transportation facilities, (5) the possibility of co-ordinating the proposed service with existing transport services, and (6) the wishes of any local authority interested. Existing licences may be called in, or the number of vehicles operating under licence may be arbitrarily reduced, by the local board at any time. In effect, therefore, the local boards of South Africa are operating much as our contemplated Transport Council (Road Transport) might be expected to do, except that they deal on their own initiative with any attempt by road transport to impinge upon the functions and services of the railways, whilst, under our proposal, such action would frequently be taken by the council of the industry at the instigation of the co-ordinating National Transport Board.

It is necessary to recognise, however, that conditions in South Africa and Great Britain are widely different: it does not follow, therefore, that control by territories would be practicable in this country. Indeed, having regard to the infinite complexity of roads and services of all kinds, we doubt if any coherent scheme upon these lines would be feasible within Great Britain. Similarly, although an increased measure of co-ordination is both practicable and needed, we doubt whether at this hour of the day it would be possible in Britain to make road transport entirely subservient to the railways. Incidentally, it may be remarked that even in South Africa it is not an offence for a firm to deliver its goods in its own vehicles, or for the purchaser to fetch and transport them in his own vehicle.

It is particularly interesting, as illustrating the strength of our contention that the private ownership of commercial vehicles constitutes the greatest hindrance to the co-ordination of transport upon a truly satisfactory basis, that it is precisely this factor which appears to have constituted the chief difficulty in South Africa. In the first Annual Report issued by the Central Road Transportation Board we learn that the Board and local boards have as far as possible left unrestricted the normal transport operation of the merchants, traders, industrialists, manufacturers or others affected by the provisions of the Act, [and that] within their normal distribution areas their transport operations are unhampered even though such operations are conducted for considerable distances on routes parallel with the railway or established road transport services.

The South African Transport Board has found it possible to prevent the merchant or trader from acting as a general transport

agent, but neither desirable nor practicable to compel him to use what is virtually a State-controlled transport agency for the conveyance of his own goods. Thus there vanishes the dream of the perfect co-ordination of national transport.

Our National Transport Board will be able to pay its way only in so far as it can compete economically with the commercial vehicles that a firm may purchase for itself, and this fact necessarily pre-supposes the continued existence of facilities which are redundant in the sense that they duplicate other essential services, but essential, as the Salter Committee assumed, as a safeguard against the possibility of monopolistic abuse. We do not, however, seek to minimise the advantage which the Board would possess in its ability to quote a flat rate for the transport of goods and to decide for itself the particular form of transport which should be employed. Thus, for example, the volume of business at its disposal should enable the Board to run one full lorry where at present we have three lorries only partially filled. This fact, whilst reducing the dangerous congestion on the roads, should materially assist to reduce transport charges.

Nevertheless, the importance of the privately owned commercial vehicle as a factor in transport cannot be overestimated. With the advent of the internal combustion engine the delivery van or lorry established itself at the root of all transport problems, and it remains as much the problem of a hypothetical Transport Board as it has been the problem of the railways. An organisation embracing the entire transport of the country can become a possibility only in so far as it is able to meet by low charges and in other ways the competition of the privately owned commercial vehicle.

If we have appeared in this article to attach undue importance to the difficulties which beset this question, we have done so, not because we do not believe that co-ordination is desirable, but because, in our opinion, this project can be made so fruitful in the national interests that it would be little short of a disaster if it were approached from the wrong standpoint. Bound up with this question of the co-ordination of transport is the problem of goods rates. Believing as we do that the day is not far distant when the country will be called upon, at least as regards its export trade, to think and to act as a unit, it seems to us that some form of co-ordination which can secure low, simple and standardised charges for all internal transport movements, and which at a moment's notice can make a sweeping reduction in transport charges for goods destined for foreign parts, may be little short of an absolute necessity.

C. H. STUART-WILLIAMS.
ASHLEY BROWN.

IS THE SMALL FARMER DOOMED?

It now seems fairly certain that land settlement is to become part of our national agricultural policy, and that the hopes of those who have dreamed of thousands of our countrymen returning to the soil may be partially realised at an early date. How many are to be settled on the land which they or their forbears have forsaken is a question to which no one, not even the Government, can give an answer. But it is in the highest degree improbable that the number is likely to be anything approaching the 1,000,000 mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George in the first exuberance of his 'New Deal' proposals. To start with, it is estimated that any man who hopes to make a living from the land must grow produce to the gross value of about £750 annually to leave a net margin of profit for decent existence, and £750,000,000 far exceeds our total imports of food, including wines and tobacco. Mr. Lloyd George can hardly have been serious when he proposed this in the same breath that called attention to the need of restoring our international trade. If we settled even 250,000 on the land and made room for their produce, we should be in a good way to lose, not only the remnants of our foreign trade, but our Dominions as well.

Moreover, there are only a limited number of food products which small-holders can profitably grow. To attempt cereal production on a 5-acre or even a 50-acre holding is to court disaster, and mutton, lamb, and beef production is not a small man's job. A certain amount of calf-rearing, in conjunction with butter-making, is possible, and there is very wide scope for increased pig production (we import £45,000,000 worth of pork products annually), provided we do not worry too much about how the Danes are to find the means of paying for the coal, bicycles, motor cars, and textiles we expect them to buy from us. There is scope for more fruit to be grown, for fruit-eating is on the increase, and the expansion of the home industry need not all be lopped off the £12,000,000 worth of non-tropical fruits we import. If we seriously set about providing cleaner and cheaper milk and advertising it, the present so-called surplus that embarrasses the Milk Board would very quickly disappear. If

we increased our consumption from one-third of a pint to only half a pint (a pint is a normal figure for countries comparable to our own), nearly all the milk at present sold off the farms would then be going into liquid consumption. There is still room for more of the £17,000,000 worth of eggs we import to be produced at home, although not as much as our economic nationalists pretend, for some of these eggs are eaten by the very poor who cannot afford English eggs at many seasons of the year, and others come in when our supplies are low. But there is room for, say, another £3,000,000 a year to be spent on English eggs if the price is kept down to reasonable limits. Our lamentable arrangements for producing table poultry, that give us so much dear, unattractive chicken meat, could also probably be improved sufficiently to create an increased demand equal to the £3,000,000 worth we import. We import also about £11,000,000 worth of vegetables. At least half of these come at seasons of the year when we cannot produce the particular variety. So the scope for vegetables, at present consumption, could hardly exceed £5,500,000.

If we allow, say, £25,000,000 for increased pig production, £10,000,000 for increased milk sales and £5,000,000 for increased fruit production, and add these to the £11,500,000 representing increased production of eggs, poultry and vegetables, we obtain a total of £51,500,000 as a rough indication of our possibilities for agricultural expansion in commodities suitable for small-holders—assuming, of course, that we have not put out of business so many people engaged in international trade that consumption has decreased. But existing farmers and others not dependent upon any Government scheme for their farming would absorb part of this, particularly in respect of the two most important items—pigs and milk. It would not be unfair to assume they might produce half this increase, leaving £25,250,000 for new small-holders and family farmers. If it is true that a farm must produce a minimum of £750 worth of food to give the occupier a reasonable living (and few farmers would claim to be making more than 12½ per cent. net profit on their output), the scope for new small-holders would appear to be about 33,000, assuming they were all established on farms of this minimum scale. The calculation can only be a very rough one, but it is sufficient to show that it is impossible to think of putting anything like 1,000,000 additional men on the land, and how difficult it would be to establish even 100,000.

There are, however, other important considerations. We are assuming that everyone is eating as much as he needs, whereas we know perfectly well that this is not so. A large proportion—far too large a proportion—of our population is suffering from

malnutrition, and much of this is under-nutrition. Numerous reports from county medical officers show cases of rickets that amount to 30 per cent. of the children examined, and although 'the dole' may be sufficient to keep the unemployed from real destitution, there must be few of those who receive it who would not eat considerably more if they were employed at a reasonable wage. Consumption is rising as the standard of living among other sections of the community improves. Between 1909 and 1924-27 there was an increase of 7 per cent., and between 1924-27 and 1932 there was an increase of 10 per cent. This has saved us from 105,000 tons more mutton and lamb added to the glut, 193,000 tons of bacon, 147,000 tons of butter, 176,000 tons of fruit, 1,700,000,000 eggs, and 106,000,000 gallons of milk. No one, therefore, is more interested than the British farmer in a rising standard of living in this country. To no one is it more important that the wheels of international trade should be set going again. There is little ultimate benefit if an extra man put into employment in Bedfordshire merely puts a purchaser of British goods in Denmark out of a job. We need to bring an additional amount of food into consumption. The miners who will hew the coal for the Irish Free State under the new Anglo-Irish Treaty will be customers who were lost and are now found again for English beef-steak. Those farmers who press for increasingly drastic reductions of all imports are surely trying to dig their own graves. We need to be insulated against imported food that is really dumped, for that disorganises the market and brings little real benefit to anyone. We may even need reasonable assurance that what we hope to produce for a year ahead will find a market. But the hope of the British farmer, and of the new settlers we may establish on the land, is a revival of international trade to increase purchasing power and a cheapening of food between the farm and the larder to encourage consumption.

We must not forget, however, that if we succeed in settling some of the unemployed on the land they will become producers and also consumers of an additional amount of food which they will grow for themselves and which formerly they would not have purchased. Their standard of living, so far as food consumption is concerned, will have risen, and so they will have added to the total sum of the world's prosperity. Finally, there is the fact that our population is expected to increase by something under 7,000,000 in the present decade.

Taking all these things into consideration, therefore, there is a certain amount of scope for land settlement in this country. Not for 1,000,000 fresh men on the land, or anything like it. If everything is included, there might be room for 75,000 settlers and perhaps for another 50,000 employed on farms that

have taken their share in the expansion. But allowance for extra employees on the existing farms must be made with the greatest reserve. Not only is the machine replacing hand labour, but also there is a general tendency towards more efficient organisation of labour. Many farms in the old days were absurdly over-staffed, and farmers now are finding that, on a fair-sized farm, the same amount of work can be done with at least one man less when they give the labour side of their business their really close attention. It is also to be feared that the unemployment insurance scheme for farm workers will probably add at least to seasonal unemployment, for farmers, who are a kind-hearted race, will no longer have the same qualms in standing a man or two off in the slack months. The estimate of 50,000 is a very arbitrary one, and, for what it is worth, may surely be regarded as on the generous side. It means an extra hand on one holding in every eight in the country, including the smallest.

Let it be granted, then, that there is room for a moderate number of extra men to make a living from the land. The next question is, Is there the land available for them to make a living from? Without sending them to Dartmoor or the sandy wastes of the Surrey border, there is quite a fair amount of land fit for cultivation that is not being used. Inquiries initiated when Dr. Addison was Minister of Agriculture elicited that fact. But the bulk of the land would have to come by dividing up large farms or estates as they became available. Local authorities are supposed to do this under the various Small-holding Acts, but, like most official bodies and persons, the majority of local authorities find it much safer to refrain from doing things rather than to do them, and certainly they find it far less trouble. Moreover, county councils, and especially county council committees that deal with agricultural matters, are largely composed of farmers, and farmers on the whole have an in-born hatred of small-holdings. But if all the county councils of England and Wales established as many small-holders in proportion to their area as Cambridge, Norfolk and Somerset, the number of council holdings to-day would be nearly 100,000. This will give a rough idea of the possibilities for the expansion of small-holdings without doing anything in the least revolutionary. It may be noted, incidentally, that the number of small-holdings has dwindled by 60,000 since 1885.

But it may be that the biggest problem of all is neither making room for the men nor finding the land for them, but enabling them to make a living when they are there. Hitherto this has not been so difficult. All over Europe, and perhaps all over the world, it has been the peasant farmer who has withstood best the times of depression. In our own country the 1908 Act

settled 14,000 on the land, of which only 6 per cent. have failed. The 1919 Act dumped down 22,000 small-holders. Many of them had no previous experience, and all were left to fend for themselves, with no organisation and little instruction. Yet the last inquiry into their condition showed that only 10 per cent. of them had failed, although they went into farming when prices were at their peak. The resilience of the peasant farmer in time of slump is due partly to the high degree of personal care he gives to his holding, but far more to the fact that his family work for little or no wages, and as prices fall he lives more and more off the produce of his land and buys less and less from outside—not only in the way of food, but also of other goods. In other words, he meets the situation by tightening his belt, working longer hours for less money, and generally accepting a lowered standard of living. It is a debatable point as to whether he will continue to accept such conditions as the general standard of living rises. But even granted that he is prepared to sell his time and his enjoyment of more goods and amenities in return for his independence and chances of good money in a favourable year, there have been developments in the past two years that might conceivably prevent him from striking even this bargain. Progress in organisation and in agricultural engineering is challenging, for the first time, the small-holder in his own particular provinces of market gardening and poultry keeping. Until now farming has escaped the worst effects of the Industrial Revolution. From Ireland to the steppes of Tartary, from Scandinavia to Italy, the peasant farmer has carried on with his small plots of land as unchanged as when the weaver's factory was his cottage. The weaver found himself gathered up and concentrated with hundreds of others in the mills. The peasant escaped such a fate because the land could not be concentrated under a roof. But we are beginning to realise that the land, nevertheless, can be regarded as a factory. In the last of those excellent reports published by the Cambridge School of Agriculture,¹ the one common factor to all the most successful farms surveyed was the 'factory' frame of mind of their cultivators. Thus all these successful farms have a turnover of capital quicker than the average, a higher output per £100 spent on labour, and a more skilful use of by-products than is found on the normal farm. Evidence of the same tendency may be deduced from the fact that although in 1934 we had a bigger acreage of crops, and maintained more cattle and more pigs than in 1933, yet 27,800 fewer workers on the land could find employment.

In market gardening revolutionary things are happening.

¹ *An Economic Survey of Agriculture in the Eastern Counties of England* (price 2s. 6d., post 3d., from Cambridge University).

In Wiltshire and in Suffolk—doubtless in other counties as well—there are general farmers who have begun to grow Brussels sprouts by the 300 acres or so. For the small man, 5 acres was a big crop, but drought or frost might ruin it, or he might find difficulty in marketing such a small consignment. The 300-acre man, on the other hand, can manage the greater part of the cultivation of the crop with the machinery he already has for his other operations. If frost spoils it, he can feed it to his live-stock, and he can market only the best at a good price, consuming the lower grades on his farm. The salesmen are anxious to contract for his fairly large supplies of good stuff.

In the Vale of Evesham it is the same story. There the writer met last summer a market gardener with a 20-acre holding. Formerly this holding employed ten men—half a man per acre. Now the roto-tiller cultivates the land by power and has reduced the economic size of the staff to six men. There are a few times in the year, however, when these six men are rather too few, although the machinery would deal with five times the present acreage. The owner of the farm therefore finds that his 'economic unit' would be 100 acres and thirty men.

Not far away the Bomford brothers are making history² and, incidentally, adding to the difficulty of these problems. They have introduced machinery not only for *inter-row* cultivation of market garden crops, but also for *inter-plant* cultivation. Their hoes, drawn by tractor with a driver and one operator, are doing the work of about twenty casual labourers and with greater accuracy. A fair day's work among the strawberries for one of these machines is about 1½ acres, which is four or five times what can be done with a hand hoe. A transplanting machine for cabbages has changed the economics of cabbage-planting out of all knowledge by planting at the rate of 150 per minute, employing three men or five, according to the spacing of the plants. The men work seated, and so can endure long hours without fatigue. With this crop, as with others, the Bomfords record better results from machine work than from hand planting, although they can give no reason for it. Half of a 600-acre arable farm has now been turned by the brothers into a market garden, yet the labour employed is actually a little less—thirty men against thirty-five. Anyone with experience of intensive farming will realise what a revolution this means.

Again, in the Thames valley, Mr. F. A. Secrett, pioneer of market gardening on the grand scale, is producing something like 400 acres of market garden crops. This employs an army of workers who can be concentrated upon a certain crop on a

² See *Pioneers in Power Farming*, by C. S. Orwin. (Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Oxford University, price 1s. 6d.)

certain day, which enables crops to be planned for certain markets with remarkable exactness. Thus early lettuce is grown for sale to the North of England on May 15, when early Dutch lettuce finishes, and to come to an end on June 7, when Cheshire lettuce is ready. One of the farms makes its own rain. The device for making it is no mere garden hose and sprinkler, but an engineering work that has cost a sum running well into four figures. An oil engine taps an underground river and distributes the water to standpipes round the farm. Portable metal pipes, straddling the fields, are attached to the required standpipes, and the engine then pumps the water from the river and sprays the crops through holes punched in the portable pipes. But such water is lacking in some of the properties of real rain, so Mr. Secrett has installed a device of his own design in the engine-house that mixes air with the water. The quantity of air is adjustable, so it can be used to make anything from a downpour of an inch in a few hours to a light mist that falls as gently as dew on the lettuces. Yet another contraption mixes small quantities of nitrate of soda with the water to feed the crops with ammonia at the same time as they are watered. In summer, therefore, when the fields are parched and Covent Garden is crying out for fresh lettuce, Mr. Secrett's rain-making plant provides them.

A few miles further on, almost in the middle of the bricks and mortar of Hounslow, Mr. Secrett has taken an odd patch of ground extending to 10 acres—a patch about the size of the collected gardens of a row of suburban villas. Yet this little piece of land in Whitton Dene Road is yielding £16,000 worth of 'French' garden produce annually. The wages bill is £320 per acre, and every year 4000 tons of stable manure are laid upon the plot to make hot-beds for the frames. According to our estimate of £750 worth of produce to give a man a margin of profit to make a living from the soil, half an acre farmed on these lines should suffice for a small-holder. But this is what Mr. Secrett says about it :

I can only make this enterprise a success because of my other farming operations. To get these large quantities of manure at the particular season of the year that I want them, I must make contracts for the whole year and use the remainder elsewhere. At certain times, sometimes on a particular day, I need a sudden concentration of skilled labour that I could not obtain unless I had other farms from which to draw it. Transport difficulties would be almost insuperable unless my other farming ventures provided me with a use for my own transport all the year round, and the same applies to much of my other machinery.

In market gardening, therefore, which has always been regarded as the small cultivator's special province, the large farmer, with his highly organised labour force, his new machines

and his large-scale operations, is appearing as a challenger far more dangerous than anyone thought possible three years ago. But how about egg production, the other department of agriculture in which many have thought it possible for the small man to hold his own? It is becoming increasingly evident that the general farmer, if he is willing to take the poultry side of his farm seriously, has advantages that no other producer can hope to enjoy. His birds can range over the stubble, picking up, under natural and healthy conditions, grain fallen to the ground at harvest time which otherwise would have been wasted. The increasingly heavy toll of disease, that the Poultry Commissioners in their recent Report found so disturbing, is certainly due in considerable part to the great increase in small poultry farms of an acre or two, where the birds live in cramped conditions, making the ground in time 'poultry sick.' We have not, it is to be feared, seen the worst of this yet. But the general farmer can be continually moving his poultry flock on to fresh land. Not only need he run no risk of souring his land with his poultry, but, in addition, the recent developments in folding the birds over pasture by means of movable units turns them into a first-class asset to the soil, which is enriched by the regulated manuring that they give it. The general farmer can add this value to his poultry flock, but the very small farmer must regard this too intensive manuring as a liability for which he must make deductions. The general farmer running a poultry flock can make Nature his ally; the intensive small producer must try to compromise with her, and that always costs money.

And there it is. The whole situation is changing and the conditions for land settlement are already quite different from those when Dr. Addison contemplated his well-thought-out land schemes in 1930. What might have been a sound scheme two years ago would be a gamble to-day, and may well be an anachronism by this time next year.

There are two ways of approaching the problem. One of them is obvious, and at first sight easy and even idealistic; the other is difficult, and some will think it has a nasty, commercial flavour to it. The easy way is the policy of restriction: restriction either by artificially maintaining prices at a level that would let the large, highly organised farm make a big profit in order that the small man might make a living; or restriction by giving quotas to home producers so as to make certain that the small men are not displaced. Quite an attractive case can be made on behalf of this alternative by using a judicious mixture of economics with sociology and a leavening of traditional talk about the land. One can point to the prospective picture of honest men whose roots are embedded in the soil, men who can

be counted upon to be content with little and always vote Conservative, who live simple, Arcadian lives in healthy, peace-giving contact with the soil, in perpetual suspension between Mother Earth and God's blue sky. But will they always be content to work from dawn to dusk if the general standard of living rises and they find themselves unable to purchase the luxuries and amenities that have become necessities to workers in the towns? Is the land as healthy as is so easily imagined when one compares the tumble-down rural cottage, with its sweating walls and inadequate supplies of drinking water and the mediæval sanitary arrangements of many a village, with housing conditions in a modern town? Can we successfully arrest commercial history to isolate a small body of peasants in the backwater of a past order? And will honest sweat and long toil in the fields, satisfying as they are in many ways, continue for ever to be a goal of human achievement that is a reward in itself? The best thing that can be said for this picture is that it is an infinitely more attractive one than that of the depressed areas. But have we no better dreams? As for maintaining prices at a high level to cover up a possible inefficiency of the small-holder system, this article has already tried to indicate that the chief hope of making room for the extra food these extra men on the land would produce lies in cheapening food. In a smaller way, we see to-day milk distributors' charges kept unnecessarily high in order that small distributors may not be driven out of business. The result is expensive milk and a low national milk consumption, injuring everyone concerned except a small body of distributors. We cannot accept with satisfaction a policy that lowers the general standard of living in order that a selected section may benefit.

There is, however, another line of approach to the problem, more difficult because it lies over more or less uncharted country. We can accept the changed conditions—the tendency towards standardisation of goods, the bulk buying and selling, the substitution of machine for hand labour—and, although we may deplore them, try to devise a plan that fits in with these realities. We can establish the new settlers in groups, each group to have but one agency for buying and selling. That alone would remove one of the greatest disabilities that the small farmer now suffers. In branches of farming for which marketing schemes already exist, the selling agency would be no more than a collecting and forwarding centre to reduce transport charges. Each group could also come under the care of an educational expert who would arrange lectures and demonstrations for disseminating the fruits of modern agricultural research and who would be at hand to give advice when asked for it. The group would organise its own transport services and make bulk contracts for buying

manure, fertilisers, feeding-stuffs, seeds, etc. It is doubtful if the group could organise the sudden concentration of labour that Mr. Secrett finds so valuable at certain seasons; but here the small-holder's family would have to come to the rescue, remembering that under the old individualistic *régime* they would have been working overtime, not just occasionally, but always. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Mr. Secrett's skilful organisation was devised largely to compete with the advantages of family labour on Continental farms. It is difficult, however, to see how the small poultry farmer in the group would enjoy the same advantages as the large mixed farmer, for it hardly seems practical to think of the group owning collectively pasture and arable land for ranging and folding chicken. A certain amount of chicken folding might be done if there were small dairy farms in the group.

There remains the question of machinery, which is likely to play an increasingly important part. It would be uneconomic, absurd, and in many cases impossible, for every small-holder to be completely equipped with his own set of machinery for all operations. But we are always told that the co-operative ownership of machinery 'will never work, because everyone wants the same machine on the same day.' The excuse has become so axiomatic, so hoary with age and hallowed by tradition, that it is time someone gave it a good poke to see if it is really alive or only a bogey. It is ridiculous that thousands should be condemned to unnecessary toil and penury for such a childish excuse—an excuse that smacks so strongly of the kind of reason so often given when someone does not want to bother to think something out. Those 100 acres at Evesham which the market gardener mentioned above says are now his 'economic unit' must be cultivated and cropped in a satisfactory manner, whether they belong to one man or to twenty, and he himself has admitted that his unit of machinery will do it. Some of those very farmers who, working on a larger scale, condemn the co-operative ownership of machinery as impracticable are themselves proving that it is not. A single firm providing threshing machinery, steam ploughing tackle, and the enormous new machines that now plough and cultivate a farm by contract is often to be found working for a group of farmers in a district quite satisfactorily. It is extremely unlikely that every man in a group of small-holders would have the use of the machinery always at the exact moment he would like to have it; but in all these matters, including compulsory allegiance to the commodity marketing boards, it is a question of making a compromise, of weighing up a number of rights and liberties and deciding which are the more worth keeping. There is no such thing as absolute liberty in

human society. Most people would surely consider they had more freedom of spirit and action—not to mention freedom from anxiety—if they were working, say, eight hours a day for a fair living from their own piece of land, with a share in the machinery that lightened their toil for them, than if they were putting in a twelve-hour day for a pittance with no machinery to save them the dulllest and heaviest part of their labour. Lord Lyvington has visualised * the progressive private landowner as regaining his position in agriculture by providing drying plants, threshing tackle, packing and collecting stations, depôts and dairies for the farmers on his estate. If such organisation is necessary for the larger tenant farmers, it is surely far more essential to a group of small-holders. Willingness to agree to such a system and an undertaking to use the machinery provided by the group might be made a condition of acceptance as one of its members.

To sum up. There is room for perhaps another 75,000 small cultivators on the land, but only provided that (1) food is cheapened to the consumer rather than made more expensive, and (2) the purchasing power of the 93 per cent. of the community not engaged in farming is raised from its present level. The farmer is as interested as anyone else in the restoration of international trade. There should be no real difficulty in finding land for them, but the tendency of modern developments in farming is for the smaller man to find it increasingly hard to compete with the larger. If it should be agreed (and this is open to question) that it is desirable to encourage these small, individual units, then the only practical means of enabling them to meet modern conditions with the hope of extracting a decent living from the land is to settle them in groups, with compulsory co-operation in buying, selling, processing, and ownership of machinery.

L. F. EASTERBROOK.

* See *Horn, Hoof and Corn*, pp. 54-55.

TELEVISION

TELEVISION is the name given to the technical art of reproducing images of stationary or moving objects at a distance. Ever since the invention of the speaking telephone which reproduced sounds made at a distance, the idea was cherished by inventors that the same thing might perhaps be done for vision. The discovery that the material selenium could have its conductivity for electricity altered by light thrown on it provided the starting-point for the early experiments of Bidwell, Llewelyn Atkinson, Nipkow, Weiller, and others. But it was not until 1926, when J. L. Baird gave his first public demonstrations, that modern progress in the subject can be said to have begun. The basic truth connected with it is the persistence of vision, or the fact that an impression made on the retina of the human eye remains for a small fraction of a second after the stimulus of the incident light is withdrawn. It is in virtue of this persistence that when a lighted squib is whirled round we see a circle of light or when a meteor shoots across the sky we see a streak of light.

The same effect renders possible the 'moving picture.' In this case a series of photographs are taken at regular very small intervals of time of some scene on a film. Each picture differs very slightly from the preceding or following picture. These are projected in succession on a screen. During the operation of changing the picture the screen is left dark, but the image of the picture just withdrawn lingers in the eyes of the spectators and slightly overlaps the picture which next appears and so gives the illusion of viewing moving objects. If it were not for this persistence, neither moving pictures nor television would be possible for us. It is possible that it is more pronounced in some persons' eyes than in those of others. Suppose, then, that we take any black and white picture—say, a photograph of a face—and rule across it thirty lines, dividing it up into thirty narrow strips of equal width. An examination of each strip will show it to consist of little patches—some white, some black, some an intermediate shade. If we were to cause a ray of light to create a small illuminated area or spot of light on the photograph not wider than each strip and make it move along each narrow strip in succession,

when the spot passes over a white patch a good deal of light will be reflected from the paper; but when the spot passed over a black patch very little light would be scattered, and for patches of intermediate grey shade light would be reflected of corresponding intensity. This process of causing a small spot of light to travel over an object or a picture in a series of closely adjacent parallel lines is called 'scanning' it. Suppose, then, that at a distant place another similar small spot of light is made to scan a white screen and that by some means this second spot is made to keep step with the one scanning the picture, or to be always in the same relative position on the screen as the first spot is on the picture and to vary in brightness in accordance with the light reflected from the picture at the place where the first spot happens to be. If these two spots moved slowly and in step we could follow them with the eye in their journeys. If they completed all their journeys, say, in one-twentieth of a second we should see on the white reception screen a reproduction of the portrait, very fairly shown, because the eye looking at it would integrate into one visual impression all the spots of light due to persistent vision. This, then, is the broad general principle of television.

We have next to explain how the scanning spot at the sending end is made to produce an electric current exactly proportional to the intensity of the light scattered at any moment from the spot of light scanning the object or picture. This depends on a wonderful set of discoveries with regard to light and electricity called the photo-electric phenomena.

In the course of his researches on electric-wave production Hertz noticed that when light, especially violet light, was allowed to fall on a metal ball it facilitated the discharge of negative electricity from it. In other words, the light helps electrons to get out of the metal. This effect varies much with different metals and light of different colours or wavelengths. It is called the photo-electric effect. It is very considerable in the case of the alkali metals, sodium, potassium, or caesium. The curious fact is that it does not take place at all unless the vibrations of the light exceed a certain number per second, which is fixed for each particular metal. Thus for zinc violet light will cause an electron escape, but red light will not. It is the same with the photographic phenomena. We can use a red lamp light in our dark room without risk of spoiling plates, but a very little white or violet light fogs our plates. A modern photo-electric cell is, then, constructed in the following manner: A sheet of silver is coated with a thin film of caesium and the sheet is enclosed in a glass bulb highly exhausted of its air. In front of the caesium is a grid or network of metal, and connexions with the grid and the plate are sealed through the glass bulb. A battery of cells

supplying a steady voltage has its negative terminal connected to the silver plate and its positive through a high-resistance coil to the grid. If light falls on the caesium it emits electrons which are supplied by the battery, and these pass across to the grid and neutralise the positive charge on it. Hence an electric current flows in the battery circuit and a fall of potential is created down the high resistance. Such a photo-electric cell constitutes an electric 'eye,' and it can be made more sensitive by placing a small quantity of an inert gas such as argon in the bulb. Its response to light is absolutely instantaneous, and the electric current produced by it is proportional to the quantity of light falling on the cell.

The cell is used as follows: The slender beam of light which creates the scanning spot passes through an opening in a screen, on the farther side of which a number of photo cells are arranged. The scanning beam falls, say, on a human face, and light is scattered from the spot to an amount which depends on the nature of the surface on which the spot falls, whether light or dark, flesh, hair or garment. This scattered light falls upon the sensitive surface of the photo-electric cells, and it generates in them an electric current which is proportional to the amount of light scattered and therefore to the brightness of the surface of the spot at that moment. This current can then be amplified by thermionic valves, just as in the case of the ordinary wireless receiver, to any required amount. In order to propagate this effect to a distance we have to generate, exactly as in the case of broadcasting of speech or music, a radiation of electromagnetic waves of a certain wavelength. The electric current which is created or controlled by the photo-electric cells can be used to modulate or vary the amplitude of these radiated electric waves, just as in the case of sound broadcasting it is the microphone current which is so used.

There is, however, a great difference between the two cases of sound and sight broadcasting which must be explained later on. Meanwhile, we may point out the methods employed to create the scanning spot and cause it to make its repeated displaced journeys over the object to be televised. There are several methods now used. One is by the use of a metal disk having in it a set of small holes arranged in a spiral of one turn. The holes are equidistant, but each successive hole is a little nearer the centre of the disk. This disk was invented by a Polish electrician in the last century named Nipkow. If the disk is placed in a parallel beam of light and revolved quickly by an electric motor, the holes permit a slender beam of light to pass, and a series of such beams can sweep across an object placed on the opposite side of the disk to the light source. The holes are so placed that each

beam is shifted a little above or to one side of the previous beam.

Another appliance is the Weiller mirror drum which is employed by Mr. J. L. Baird. In this case a drum or wheel has mirrors attached to its circumference. One of these has its plane parallel to the axis of revolution of the drum, and each successive mirror is tilted over at gradually increasing angles. When a slender beam of light is allowed to fall on the mirrors it is caused to sweep across an object in gradually shifted lines so as to scan it in a certain number of journeys. There is a third method, due to Jenkins, which employs a glass disk with the edge bevelled off at gradually increasing angles. In any case, the essential elements of the television transmitter are the scanning beam and the photo-electric 'eye.' Then at the receiving end we have a similar spot of light which has to move exactly in step with the transmitting spot and to be modulated in brightness exactly in accordance with the light scattered from the transmitting spot.

In the less recent television demonstrations the spot at the receiving end was created by the use of the spiral hole disk of Nipkow or by the mirror drum as above described. It will not be necessary to describe in detail these former mechanical systems of reception, because they have all been, in fact, replaced and rendered somewhat antiquated by a far more useful type of appliance called the cathode-ray tube. The drum and disk receivers are limited by the impossibility of safely causing any apparatus to revolve more quickly than at a certain rate without chance of accident or danger. In the cathode-ray tube the only motion is that of a column of electrons or particles of electricity which have quite negligible mass and inertia and can move with any required rapidity. The general construction of such a tube is as follows: A glass tube about 2 inches or more in diameter is expanded in one half into a cone the closed end of which is nearly flat or slightly curved. The inner side of this closed wide end is coated with a fluorescent material, the exact composition of which is generally a carefully guarded secret, but such materials are zinc sulphide, zinc silicate, or calcium tungstate. At the small end of the tube is a filament of tungsten or of platinum-iridium alloy coated with oxides of barium and strontium. This is called the cathode, and when heated by an electric current gives off electrons just as in the case of a thermionic valve used in radio receivers. The tube is sealed and exhausted of its air. At a little distance in front of the cathode is placed a metal plate with a very small hole in it. This is called the anode or gun, and it is kept at a high positive voltage of 500 to 2000 volts or more by a high-tension battery. Surrounding the cathode is a metal cylinder called the shield, which is kept nega-

tively electrified. The electrons emitted by the hot filament are attracted to the gun or anode, and they are all squeezed together by the electric action of the shield and shoot with great velocity through the hole in the anode. Then there are two pairs of slightly separated but parallel plates in sequence, with their planes at right angles, called the deflecting plates. The stream of electrons passes between these pairs of plates and, striking on the fluorescent screen, makes on it a very small brilliant point of light which may be of a green or blue or, better, of a white colour. By the electrification of the deflecting plates the direction of the stream of electrons is altered, and the spot can be made to move over the screen in any required manner. If, for instance, a difference of potential is made between one pair of plates, the bright spot, or place where the electrons hit the fluorescent screen, moves across from one side to the other of the screen. If it moves sufficiently quickly, we shall merely see a bright line. If the plate voltage is reversed and made much higher, the spot will 'fly back' so quickly that it cannot be seen. If the voltage of the other pair of plates is slightly raised and the voltage change repeated on the other pair, the spot will again move across the screen and fly back quickly. But the path of its line will be slightly higher or lower on the screen. If then these processes are repeated we can make the spot describe a close series of lines, and the effect on the eye is a uniform illumination of the screen, but there is really only one spot of light at one place at one time, and all the effect of uniform illumination is due to persistence of vision. In the next place, by slightly altering the shield tube voltage we can alter the apparent size of the spot and make it appear brighter or duller or nearly vanish.

It is not possible to describe without many diagrams the arrangements by which it is possible to make the light spot on the fluorescent screen of the cathode-ray tube keep in step as regards position with the scanning spot at the transmission end and also alter in brightness exactly in the same manner. The reader must be referred for these technical details to books on television. Suffice it to say that the manufacture of these cathode-ray tubes has been brought to such perfection that we can use them as commercial appliances.

Then it must be noted that with mechanical receivers it is not easy to obtain a closer scanning than corresponds to about thirty to fifty scanning lines per picture. But this does not give a sufficient detail in the image. It has been generally agreed that at least 180-line scanning must be used and a picture frequency of twenty-five pictures per second for high definition or multiframe pictures compared with the thirty-line scanning hitherto used.

The next matter for notice is the necessity, generally speaking, for a short wavelength in the transmitter. Most people know

that the B.B.C. music and speech transmission is accomplished for Great Britain with electromagnetic waves of length from about 200 to 1500 metres. The frequency is reckoned in kilocycles—that means, the number of thousand vibrations per second. The kilocycles are obtained by dividing the number 300,000 by the wavelength in metres. Each transmitting station has allotted to it a certain 'carrier frequency' and also a certain range on either side to give it, as it were, elbow room. In the case of sound broadcasting a width of 10 kilocycles, or 5 on each side, is sufficient elbow room. But for television this range is not nearly enough. The changes of amplitude of the carrier waves are then so sudden and extreme and irregular that a width of wave band of 100 kilocycles is scarcely enough. Now it is easy to see that when the wavelength is long and frequency small we can only put a few wave-band widths in the space of one octave of vibration. But when the wavelength is small we can put in many more. For this reason it is essential to use a short wavelength of 6 to 10 metres for television as compared with the 100 to 1500 metre waves used for sound broadcasting. Some time back the Baird Television Company obtained a licence to use one of the towers of the Crystal Palace, which are nearly 600 feet high, for this purpose, and from an aerial at the top and a generating station at the bottom they can sprinkle down all over Greater London, and within a circle of 15 miles radius or so, 6-metre waves just as a fountain or lawn sprinkler sends down its drops of water all over a certain area.

These 6-metre waves will not travel well over irregular ground, nor through buildings and houses, and hence it will be necessary to shower them down over selected areas from high towers, or pylons erected for the purpose. A beginning will probably be made for public television purposes at the Crystal Palace, where the Baird system has been in operation successfully for some time.

Such being the general and brief description of the apparatus used, we may next consider to what uses television may be put for public entertainment or education. It is now possible to produce on a large cathode-ray tube a picture about 1 foot square or more well visible to thirty or so people in a large room from any point. It is possible, also, to project much larger pictures on a screen visible to a large audience.

It is desirable, then, for the public to understand what is possible and what not possible for this new achievement of technical science. In the first place, the necessity for using a short electric wave, and therefore an aerial radiator placed at a great height, implies a special and expensive transmitting station, and only a few of these can be erected at once until the reaction of the public to this new entertainment is better known. The

same thing applies to the cost of cathode-ray receivers, which, it is said, will be at first from £50 to £80. No doubt mass production will decrease the cost, but this cannot begin until television transmission is fairly well provided.

At present the limited degree of television which has been provided by the B.B.C. has been conducted with the normal medium-length waves employed in music broadcasting and also with a thirty-line picture for which mechanical receivers of simple construction have been available and much used. For the new high quality pictures of 180 lines, 6-metre wave, and twenty-five picture frequency, amateur construction of receivers will not be possible for a long time to come.

We have next to discuss the problem of programmes. The characteristic of music and speech radio transmission is the practically unlimited amount of useful material available for broadcasting, but that is not the case at present for television, and hence there are many people who doubt the permanent entertainment value of television; and, in any case, the few initial stations and high cost of receivers will make it at first something of a luxury for a limited few. It will not be very satisfactory at first to attempt to 'televisionise' a large scene with many small quick-moving figures in it, such as a cricket match.¹ But it may be possible to do it for the finish at the winning-post of the University boat race or the Derby race. It is, however, now possible to photograph on a film with a 'movie' camera a series of pictures and develop, wash, fix, wash and dry the film inside of one minute of time and then project it by a television transmitter which scans and sends out the series of views which can be picked up and seen as a moving picture by cathode-ray receivers. This increases greatly the possibilities compared with direct-object transmission. There is, however, a large and very useful educational purpose available for it. School lessons could be broadcast as at present, but music scores, maps, pictures, simple scientific experiments and teachers' diagrams on a blackboard can all be shown to school classes of thirty to fifty children. Is there any reason why, except financial, this should not be done at once in London County Council schools?

It is to be hoped that television will not degenerate simply into a picture palace by the fireside or home 'movies' of the kind of which we have too many already. Appeal to the eye is far more powerful, as all advertisers know, than appeal to the ear.

As regards television programmes, we are to be dependent on

¹ A short word is needed for the act or process of transmitting images by television apparatus. The word here used, 'televisionise,' is too clumsy. How would 'telize' do? It is a means of 'telling your eyes' what is taking place at a distance.

the B.B.C. in future in regard to what we are to see as we are now in music and speech as to that we are to hear. The public have no direct control or voice in the matter or means of making their wishes known except by 'writing to the B.B.C.,' who have been given absolute control of the most powerful means of influencing the public mind since the invention of printing.² It is to be hoped that they will employ their enhanced powers wisely and well, not reducing the televisions merely to the level of a domestic cinema, but availing themselves of it as a great possible educational appliance. Many improvements will no doubt be made in the near future. Even now, as we write, it is understood that the Post Office Television Advisory Committee is considering the question of the transmission of Television electric currents over a network of special type of cable rather than by the micro waves issued from aërials on high towers.

² In the *Morning Post* of February 15, 1935, an important innovation was announced concerning radio broadcasting in France, in virtue of which listeners' councils are to be formed which will be given a share in the power of forming programmes and the administration generally of radio stations.

AMBROSE FLEMING.

UNPARLIAMENTARY LANGUAGE

IN the House of Commons recently there were two curious cases in which abusive expressions, of a kind hitherto held to be unparliamentary, were allowed to pass unreprieved by the Chair. In one case, which has had wide publicity, a member in debate called the Prime Minister a coward, mountebank and swine. The House was in committee at the time, and the Chairman of Committees did not call the member to order. In the other case, which occurred a few days later, the Speaker was in the Chair. A member called his attention to the fact that another member had referred to him in debate as a toady and lick-spittle. The Speaker first replied that he was not quite sure what the words meant, and when a further protest was made to him he said, 'I was under the impression that the hon. member who used those words really was not serious, and thought it was rather an amusing vein. Do those cases indicate that the bounds of parliamentary invective and vituperation have been wider set?

The only way an M.P. can definitely find out whether a particular piece of abuse which he is thinking of applying to an opponent is or is not parliamentary is by using it. There is no official 'black list' of words and expressions. Even that great work *Law and Usage of Parliament*, compiled in the early 'sixties by Erskine May, Clerk of the House of Commons, and edited and enlarged by successive Clerks, affords but little guidance to a member with a turn for invective:

The use of temperate and decorous language is never more desirable than when a member is canvassing the opinions and conduct of his opponents in debate. . . . The imputation of bad motives, or motives different from those acknowledged, misrepresenting the language of another, or accusing in his turn of misrepresentation; charging him with falsehood or deceit, or contemptuous or insulting language of any kind—all these are unparliamentary and call for prompt interference.

In a note the book gives a list of the following words which have been declared unparliamentary:

'dodge' 'jockeyed' 'wind-bag' 'hooligan'
'blackguard' 'traitor' 'slanderer'
'hypocrites' 'pharisees' 'cowardly'

'offensive' 'scurrilous' 'dishonest'
 'a scandal' 'vicious and vulgar'
 'insulting' 'shabbily' 'a dirty trick'
 'criminal' 'disgraceful' 'wicked',
 'corrupt' 'impudence' 'impertinence'

The censors of 'language' in the House of Commons are the Speaker and the Chairman of Committees, or, in a phrase commonly used, 'the Chair.' They can back their decisions on questions of order by penalties. Refusal to withdraw offensive language, or to apologise for misbehaviour, is punished by exclusion from the House for the rest of the sitting. Should the direction to leave the House be disregarded by the offending member, he is 'named' by the Speaker (which means referring the matter to the House). This involves suspension for five days for the first offence and twenty days for the second, and, if necessary, his removal from the House by force.

Among the expressions I have heard ruled out of order are the following :

'Members opposite go to their constituencies with their mouths full of lies' ;

'Nothing is too despicable for the Government to do in order to gain a point' ;

'If the hon. member opposite could only be induced to act intelligently and in a gentlemanly manner' ;

'The right hon. gentleman has resorted to another card trick' ;

'The denial of the hon. member is not worthy of credence' ;

'The hon. member is very loose in his statements' ;

'The right hon. gentleman's myrmidons' ;

'Subservient creatures' ;

'The right hon. gentleman has furnished a good example of the flippant audacity which usually characterises his speeches' ;

'Cowardly attack' ;

'Factious opposition' ;

'Hollow pretence.'

The words 'impertinent' and 'impertinence' have had a curious parliamentary history. Sometimes they have been condemned and sometimes overlooked. Disraeli was allowed, without rebuke from the Speaker (Shaw-Lefevre), to say that Sir Robert Peel (senior) was impertinent. But when Sir Edward Watkin said, with reference to Sir Robert Peel (junior), 'I pass over the impertinence contained in a repetition of my own words,' the Speaker (Brand) said, 'Such an expression as has been used by the hon. member cannot be allowed in the House.'

It was withdrawn. I remember Joseph Chamberlain in 1906 angrily interrupting a criticism of him by Campbell-Bannerman, then Prime Minister, saying that he was not going to be 'lessoned' by the right hon. gentleman, and adding in his icily cutting tones, 'The right hon. gentleman's interference I regard as entirely impertinent.' Amid great uproar the Chairman of Committees (Emmott) was asked from the Liberal benches whether it was parliamentary to say that the Prime Minister was 'impertinent.' He ruled that there had been no breach of order. This decision caused general surprise, having regard to the former ruling that the use of 'impertinent' was inadmissible. The Chairman, in fact, concluded that the word was used in the exceptional sense of irrelevance to the matter in hand (which on this occasion was open to doubt), and not in its general sense of a breach of good manners. When next his attention was called to the use of 'impertinence,' he ruled that the word in its general sense only was disorderly. 'That was the sense in which I used it,' said the offending member candidly. Thereupon the Chairman said he must withdraw it ; and he did. On a later day I heard the expression used in its generally accepted sense by Emmott himself, when repelling a reflection on his impartiality as a chairman. A Conservative member, speaking in committee on the Budget, suggested that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been arranging with Emmott for the acceptance of a motion to close the discussion. 'That,' said Emmott indignantly, 'is most impertinent.' The House generally cheered. Probably this is the only time that the word in its unparliamentary sense has been used without a call to order. It raises the interesting question whether the Speaker or Chairman may call himself to order.

A distinction has always been drawn between remarks adverse to a member as a man and remarks reflecting on a member as a politician. Expressions of the former kind are in all cases considered unparliamentary, while those of the latter kind rarely meet with a reprimand from the Chair. Illustrations of both and how they are regarded by the Speaker were afforded one night in the session of 1896. The expressions were applied respectively to a prominent member of the Opposition and to the Leader of the House. It was said of the former that he had been a 'monumental instance of inconsistency throughout his political life.' Here we have an allusion to a member as a politician. It was met with cries of 'Order, order!' and 'Withdraw, withdraw!' from the Opposition benches ; but Mr. Speaker Gully stopped them by saying, 'The hon. member has not used any unparliamentary language.' Later on in the debate the Leader of the House was told that 'by a "subterfuge" he was going to palm upon the House a resolution.' 'That,' said the Speaker, 'is

hardly proper language to use.' The word 'subterfuge' was withdrawn, and, amid laughter, 'misapprehension' was substituted.

To be told that one is a 'monumental instance of political inconsistency' must surely be as offensive as to be charged with having resorted to a 'subterfuge' in parliamentary tactics. Yet the different reception given by the Speaker to the two personal allusions is in accordance with precedent. Nevertheless, there is always a tremendous show of indignation when 'inconsistency,' whether 'monumental' or not, is bandied in debate. No accusation is repelled with greater heat; and that it has not been made unparliamentary must be because it is an essential element of parliamentarianism. Indeed, if hon. members were not freely allowed to taunt each other with inconsistency, the business of the country could hardly be carried on, and certainly some hon. members would choke in their anger against the restrictions of the Chair.

The exclamation 'Ah!', short as it is, often means much. Henry Labouchere called attention to an Egyptian loan issued by a firm of financiers in which Goschen (Chancellor of the Exchequer) years before had had an interest. In the course of Goschen's explanation Labouchere ejaculated 'Ah!'. It seemed to imply—'I have you now.' Goschen, in a voice hoarse with rage, demanded what Labouchere meant by his 'insolent interruption.' Labouchere's reply was to ask Mr. Speaker Peel whether a member had the right to say of another that his interruption was insolent. 'I hope,' said the Speaker, 'the right hon. gentleman will withdraw the word [insolent], which is not parliamentary.' Goschen complied, but added that he had used the word 'under considerable provocation.' Labouchere's 'Ah!' was allowed to stand.

The rulings of the Chair are occasionally contradictory in regard to particular expressions to which exception has been taken at various times. Mr. Hope (Chairman of Committees) once ruled that 'impudence' is unparliamentary and that 'insolent' is not. Mr. Lansbury had referred to the 'cynical impudence' of a Minister:

THE CHAIRMAN.—I cannot allow the hon. member to use the word 'impudence.'

MR. LANSBURY.—May I ask whether 'insolence' is a parliamentary expression?

THE CHAIRMAN.—It is not an unparliamentary expression.

MR. LANSBURY.—Well, then, I will say the cynical insolence with which the right hon. gentleman has treated every argument put up.

This is a good example of a ready ruling by the Chair. According to the dictionaries, 'impudence' means bold-faced; without

shame or modesty—a more offensive expression, surely, than 'insolence' in its meaning of contemptuous haughtiness towards others. There is another noteworthy ruling by Mr. Hope. Asked whether a reference by Saklatvala, the Communist member, to a soldier's job as that of a 'hired assassin' was in order, Mr. Hope said, 'The rules of order do not coincide with the rules of good taste. The hon. member's observations may or may not be in good taste, but they are not contrary to the rules of order.' Expressions applied not to members but to persons outside the House are not out of order; however objectionable. Mr. J. H. Thomas once caused some uproar by applying the word 'humbug' to a tariff offer to Great Britain made by the Canadian Premier. When called to order he withdrew the word as a description of the man, but stuck to it as a description of the proposal. 'The word "humbug",' said Mr. Speaker FitzRoy, 'is a colloquial expression which is hardly suitable to our debates.' There was much merriment later when Mr. Snowden stated that he found 'humbug' defined in *Murray's Dictionary* as 'a word very much in vogue with people of taste and fashion.'

In the session of 1932 a Labour member said the majority of the supporters of the National Government had been returned on 'lying statements.' Captain Bourne (Deputy-Chairman of Committees) was asked whether the expression was parliamentary. He said he deprecated the use of such language, but it was not out of order, as it referred to statements made outside the House. Three years earlier Captain Bourne had given quite a different ruling on the same point. Mr. Will Thorne, the Labour member, having said that the Unionist election posters were 'lies from top to bottom,' Captain Bourne called upon him to withdraw the expression 'lies.' 'I will do nothing of the sort; it is a parliamentary expression,' said Mr. Thorne. 'If you like, I will say it was a perversion of the truth.' 'I can hardly take that as a withdrawal,' said the Deputy-Chairman. 'You will get no more, then. If you like, I will walk out of the House,' was Thorne's retort, and, persisting in his refusal to withdraw the expression, he had to leave the chamber. Mr. Thurtle, another Labour member, then called the attention of the Deputy-Chairman to the fact that the word 'lies' had been used, not of anybody in the House, but of posters on the hoardings, and was accordingly in order; but Captain Bourne held to his ruling, on the ground that the word was unparliamentary and could not be used in the House in any manner relating to members.

A common subterfuge takes the form of withdrawing a direct expression condemned by the Chair and substituting another of an equivocal nature. Mr. Jack Jones stigmatised a member as 'a liar,' and, being called to order, apologised and substituted 'a

terminological inexactitude.' Mr. John Burns, attacking Joseph Chamberlain (Secretary of State for the Colonies during the South African War), described the newspapers which supported the war as being 'owned by blackguards, edited by ruffians, and read by fools.' Mr. Speaker Gully took no notice of the expression, its application being to persons outside the House. But when Burns went on to describe Chamberlain's speech on the war as being couched 'in the language of the pot-house, and in the spirit of the prize-ring,' the Speaker sternly declared that such an expression could not be allowed. Burns thereupon withdrew it and substituted 'the language of the Stock Exchange,' which made the House roar with laughter.

Calling a member directly 'a liar' is always sternly condemned by the Chair. But it can be said of a statement, without offence, that it is not true. Mr. Speaker Peel was asked whether it was in order to say of a Ministerial answer to a question 'The right hon. gentleman has had a lie put into his mouth.' 'I noticed the expression,' said Peel, 'but I did not understand the hon. member to imply that the Minister had stated that which was not true, but that a statement was supplied to the right hon. gentleman which was not correct.' Arthur Balfour referred to an Irish member as having shown 'great readiness in matters of assertion.' This was regarded a scharge of lying, though phrased in euphonious or smooth-sounding language, and the attention of the Chair was called to it. 'The right hon. gentleman has gone near to the limit of order,' was the ruling of the Chairman of Committees, Leonard Courtney. Sir William Harcourt readily turned to unparliamentary uses a ruling of the Chair. He was alluding to some statements by Arthur Balfour as having been 'brought forward to mislead the House and deceive the people,' when Courtney, as chairman, interposed and said, 'That is not a parliamentary expression.' Harcourt then proceeded: 'I will not characterise the conduct of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, because the Chairman has reminded me that it is difficult to do so in parliamentary language.' Henry Chaplin, replying to an attack on the Unionist Government by Lord Randolph Churchill (after Churchill's resignation in 1886, of course), referred to 'the extremely foolish sentiments' of the noble lord. 'I believe the right word would be "claptrap",' Chaplin went on to say, 'but I will not use it, Mr. Speaker, as I do not wish for a moment to depart from the courtesies of debate.'

On the whole, debates in the House of Commons are models of good temper and decorum. Notwithstanding that business is mainly of a controversial nature between political parties of irreconcilable opinions, month after month passes by without the smallest ruffle of invective on the surface of the deliberations.

This is due to the ready acceptance of discipline by members generally in the chamber itself, and the disappearance of party divisions in their social contacts in the rooms where they eat and drink and smoke. After all, unparliamentary language, as such, is rarely heard. Ejaculations of a partisan character, sharp in point and cutting in edge, are common enough in debate, but not expressions offensive and insulting personally; and there is no undue restraint of invective even in personal attacks (forcible in censure, but not abusive), from which party warfare cannot be wholly free.

Even so, protests have been raised against what is called the squeamishness of the Chair in rulings of unparliamentary expressions. One was made by Mr. Thurtle, Labour member, in the session of 1928. Mr. Speaker Whitley called him to order for describing the answer of a Minister to a question as 'Pecksniffian cant.' Next day the following interesting conversation took place:

MR. THURTLÉ (Shoreditch. Labour), addressing the Speaker, said,—
In the course of yesterday's sitting, you ruled out of order as unparliamentary and invited me to withdraw the words 'Pecksniffian cant.' As I may, on some subsequent occasion, desire to use either or both of these words, I should be glad if, for my guidance, you would explain the nature of your objection—whether your objection is to the adjective 'Pecksniffian' or to the word 'cant'?

THE SPEAKER.—I am not prepared to discuss my ruling (loud Ministerial cheers), but if the hon. member seeks information for his guidance I may inform him that I take objection both to the one and the other, individually or combined. (Ministerial cheers.)

MR. THURTLÉ.—May I be permitted, as a member of this House who believes in the right of members to use ordinary, vigorous English, to record my protest against your ruling? (Ministerial cries of 'Oh,' and some Labour cheers.)

THE SPEAKER.—That does not affect my decision. (Ministerial laughter and cheers.)

There are members of so explosive a nature temperamentally that they feel unduly curbed and restrained by the rulings of the Chair. Often they can only think what they would like to say, growing red in the face, and would like a wide expansion of freedom of expression—if only to relieve the strain of their blood pressure. Indeed, my experience of the House of Commons, based on close on fifty years' observation from the Reporters' Gallery, is that it is not so highly susceptible to moral indignation. Members, generally speaking, secretly rejoice over the utterance of a particularly racy and adroit unparliamentary expression for the excuse it affords of rousing themselves out of their decorous selves and shouting and yelling at what they pretend to regard as the outrageous character of the language used. Another thing

worthy of note is that in my time I have never heard an expression which so shocked the reporters that they felt obliged to disguise it by describing it as an 'opprobrious or indelicate epithet.' Of course, it would take a great deal to shock reporters.

Sometimes the House is made to feel that it is about to snatch a fearful joy in this regard, only to be disappointed. I can recall two instances in the session of 1928. 'Ministers smile,' exclaimed Lloyd George, 'but why the ——' To the disappointment of the House, the right hon. gentleman closed his lips suddenly on the next word; and members wondered what he was going to say. Perhaps, after all, it was no more than 'Why the Helephant an' Cawstle ——' Mr. Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, caused the same sort of expectation, mitigated possibly with a little shudder of apprehension, when he declared, 'You may think our scheme is wrong, but by ——' There was a pause, which was filled by gleeful cries of 'Go on; say it,' from the Labour benches; but Churchill revised the expression—slowly, as if with reluctance.

MICHAEL MACDONAGH.

ART AND THE MACHINE

THE industrial bazaar which has occupied the galleries of the Royal Academy this winter will close in another week. It has had a bad Press. I come in so near the death that I do not risk helping to water any sparks of illumination it has kindled by discouraging visitors. One part of the criticism was of doubtful substance—namely, an attack on the Academy for joining in this enterprise at all. It has been urged that the mission of such a body is to uphold what survives of the manual arts against invasion by the mechanical, and that what we have seen is a capitulation to the enemy—a view strongly held within the Academy itself, notably by the late Sir Alfred Gilbert, one of the few designers for the crafts among its painters and sculptors. Against that contention it might be argued that neither painters nor sculptors are exempt from the mechanical invasion: that many portrait painters more or less avowedly make use of the camera, that the old popular line of dramatic painting has been annexed by the films, and that one of those who remain faithful, Mr. Sickert, practises and applauds a recourse to the photograph. A more subtle defence would be to say, 'Here are the effects of the machine on design; judge between new and old.' To that the critic will reply, 'Have we had a clear opportunity to do it?'

The preliminary propaganda was intense and voluminous, echoing the most popular catchwords of robot advance. Put briefly, it came to this: we were to see the art of the machine, as distinguished from that of the hand-controlled tool, freed from ornament imitative of handicraft but mechanically reproduced, and capable, by mass production, of satisfying the demand for useful objects at popular prices. It was assumed that use or 'function' would result in a bare beauty or shapeliness, often missing in *manu*-facture. A secondary object was a display of new materials or novel applications of the old.

With these claims in mind one entered the Exhibition. The first object to meet and arrest the visitor was the turnstile barrier. This was executed in a new patent material, 'Staybrite' steel. It was exceedingly, even excessively, 'brite' for its purpose, but

doubtless has the promised staying power. Beyond that point the maker does not seem to have given much attention to utility. The barrier is inconveniently low; I passed easily through the gap when the stile was closed, and I am told that there are other defects of use in the new as compared with the old. But more surprising was the heavy efflorescence of ornamental work on the gates, of a kind eminently characteristic of handicraft. The same material was employed, on a contradictory scale, in the large interlacing circles which support the catalogue stalls. In these, it is announced, the material has been 'hand-hammered' for the first time. In fact, one of the mistaken features in 'arts and crafts' production, the exaggeration of hammer-marking on beaten silver and copper, is here carried to extremity. In an official publication¹ which appears as I write, there is a like initial surprise. The frontispiece reproduces an elaborately engraved glass beaker which simulates, if it does not depend on, much hand-directed toil.

I have lingered on the threshold because these are by no means solitary examples of a confusion which is destructive of the intended demonstration. Among the specimens of craftsmanship present are stone carvings, entirely the work of hand and tool, and those other forms of sculpture which from of old have depended on the mechanical aid of casting for translation and multiplication in metal and in other materials. Under this head comes the wider field of moulded work in stoneware, pottery, china and glass. In all these the machine is an old auxiliary, and does not exclude appropriate ornamental detail. Again, in one of the largest sections of the Exhibition—that of textiles, carpets, curtains, furniture coverings, dress materials—the substitution of the power for the hand loom, of the steam for the hand press, does not affect the character and elaboration of pattern which the designer is free to provide, so long as the design is a set one, with no element of impromptu in the execution. In silver-ware and jewellery, once more, handiwork and traditional methods have not been banished. In another large field, that of posters, and the yet larger of book-printing, the use of machinery for multiplication is familiar, and the conditions it imposes on design. When all these wares have been surveyed we are still in search of design peculiar to the latest inroads and triumphs of the machine. Unfortunately, there is no demonstration by division of exhibits, and neither catalogue nor book helps us. In *The Conquest of Ugliness* the contributors, who ought to have set out plainly the bounds in various sections, give us a minimum of information, a maximum of hot air. Few of the specimens

¹ *The Conquest of Ugliness*, edited by John de la Valette. (Methuen & Co.)

illustrated are exemplary. The carpet is not only irrelevant but ~~sketchy~~ sketched in design, and the furniture little better. Of Miss Betty Joel we are told that

into the somewhat sultry atmosphere of British furniture design shortly after the war she entered like a gust of fresh air. . . . She combines a Celtic exuberance in conception and a Scottish appreciation of reality in achievement with a broad human understanding. . . .

But her praiseworthy sentiments about House and Home are accompanied by an example of which the caption tells us :

The dull starkness of the timber shop is fortunately disappearing from our 'functional' furniture. In this little writing desk (made by Betty Joel Ltd.) Alister Maynard has introduced a delicate touch by means of bow-shaped ivory handles.

We are back, then, at trimmings added to function, in this case ill-disposed flutings which would be better away, and the inappropriate fancy of handles like bow-ties. What we want to know about the furniture is the part played by standardised units in its construction. The 'assembling' and fitting of these is presumably by hand.

Out of the blasts of hot air, then, this little conclusion seems to emerge—that the growing contribution of the machine to design in household gear is the 'standardised unit.' Architects are rapidly being subjected to the same cramp upon variation: the engineer provides in quantity economical windows, doors and other fittings; the architect 'assembles' them. The rôle of the machine is to impoverish design by limiting variations in the interest of cheap multiplicity. If it effaces many possibilities of ugliness, it cramps beauty. It is equally a check on utility. Fewer men now have shoes or clothes expressly made to fit them: they buy the nearest fit the factory provides.

There is, of course, no limit to what the machine *could* do in reproducing fine variations or elaboration in handiwork, which it far surpasses in the microscopic precision of scientific instruments. I talked some years ago with an inventor who was imitating, for mechanical bakeries, the peculiar lunge and sweeping twist of the baker's arm when he mixes his dough. It would be child's play for such an inventor to contrive that his production should be peppered to taste with the minute irregularities of hand-work. It is only cost which stands in the way.

The economy, therefore, of the ready-to-wear and reach-me-down in household gear is very much like that of 'Basic English,' which would limit the use of semi-synonyms and of words with

shades and grades of meaning and variety as sound. The poet who proposes to say

She keeps the shadowy kine

must desist, faced with

She keeps the shady cows.

Putting aside the irrelevant sections, a visitor to the big stores-like profusion of the Exhibition in search of 'Basic English' in household furnishings will find, with patience, some quite tolerable stuff of a modest kind, chiefly in glassware and ceramics, silver and cutlery. New requirements in bathroom and kitchen, wire and air communication have called for new forms, and inventions in material, like 'plastic glass,' are welcome novelties. The architects have not been very successful in giving order to the show, the shopkeepers strangely incompetent in their window displays; and the vulgarity of some outstanding features was lamentable, such as the huge scarab-like shape in Gallery VIII., with its poisonous assemblage of colour.

The sweeping simplification of shape and ornament has had more causes than one. The superabundant and degraded incrustations of the Victorian house, where simplicity was only to be found in the kitchen, would have provoked a reaction in any case, just as in pre-industrial times the luxuriance of 'Louis Quinze' forms gave way to the more puritan 'Louis Seize,' with its return towards the box form for bureaux and straight instead of curved in chairs and sofas. Ornament will come back again as a fashion, and the devils of 'Art Nouveau' are ready to occupy the cleaned and swept architecture, as some recent building illustrates. But stronger than taste and fashion is economic pressure, restriction of space and fancy owing to taxation and the cost of rent, rates, and service. In the typical cell of the London flat-dweller furniture must be scanty and compact, its surfaces smooth and easily cleaned. Dust is the enemy; carpets, hangings, coverings, wall-paper, are not favoured; for 'objects of art' there is no room, any more than for books, and pictures are under blight as figurative art; a circle or other geometrical abstraction suffices for contemplation in minds subdued to the machine. When the standardised bed-sitting-kitchen-room has been reduced to its strictest terms for its standardised tenant we shall probably see the bed replaced by a hammock, the table by a board which can be strung up to the ceiling, and the bath fitted under a flap in the floor.

There is one piece of furniture which appears to resist the economist—namely, the padded easy-chair; even when reduced to cubist blocks it remains pudgy. Its obstinacy brings up the

assumption that utility or function pursued for its own sake results in beauty. That depends a great deal on what is the function. When furniture is made of glass, as in some specimens shown, the function which has taken command is that of the duster, since glass is certainly not so agreeable for this purpose as wood. Or take the case of a teapot. The shape of the old-style pot, that of its spout, the levels at which it takes off and ends, the shape and placing of the handle, and so forth, are closely moulded on use in holding and pouring and balance in the hand. But those projections are easily chipped or bashed or broken. If the over-riding function is protection against accident and convenience of packing in a hamper or in the pile of a teashop, spout and handles are sunk below the surface and the rounded shape replaced by square: the result, less handy for the main purposes, is a featureless cube. Both creatures are framed for function, but they differ in possibilities of beauty as do the greyhound and the hedgehog—one built for movement and attack, the other for inert defence as a ball of spikes. So it is with the easy-chair. In French civilisation the chair was a device for sitting up and talking with alert restraint. Its function altered with the English drive to 'comfort,' to padding and lounging, to the supine attitude which our novelists describe as 'prostrate' or 'prone.' This relaxation the clubman does not easily renounce, even when offered the tubular alternative, inspired by the bathroom and clinic. Of such comeliness as padding permits the Exhibition has one excellent example—the scarlet and ivory leather settee in the centre of Gallery V., to whose source no clue is given.

So much for the Exhibition and its objects of household use. For huge invention in mechanic forms we must go outside, to the monster shells and traffic ways of industry, and to machines themselves. There is some ambiguity in the word. The human or animal body, with its vital source of power, has a semi-mechanical apparatus, controlled by brain and nerves, infinitely variable in application, and extended by hand-tools and the simpler kinds of machine proper. Revolution lay in the substitution of immense new sources of power—steam, electricity, combustion—and the development of metal in place of bone and muscle. The wheel was an old friend; but with cog, piston, turbine, a host of contrivances, were developed the usurpers of human limbs. What has been the gain or loss in the accounts of Beauty?

I insisted, twenty years ago, to the discomfort of the Art Workers' Guild,² on the revolutionary contribution to art, the creative art of the engineer, inaugurated by England in the nine-

² The discourse is printed in *Confessions of a Keeper and other Papers*. (Maclehose, 1931.)

teenth century, on the Crystal Palace and railway stations, 'a new construction in glass and iron comparable, in its fundamental logical daring, with Amiens and Beauvais, or the stone and glass of Gloucester Cathedral.' The new world was unfriendly in material, with unpleasant accompaniments of smoke, grime, and smell; but it had its own measure of grim grace arising from necessities in such structures as a suspension bridge, a crane, an Eiffel Tower. It had no overflow of beauty in imagery, and was too much covered up by shamefaced lendings from 'art' as commonly understood, like the mediæval nonsense at the Tower Bridge and St. Pancras. We are not yet free from that confusion. For the magnificent stone engineering of Waterloo Bridge is being substituted, by the collaboration of the official head of his profession with the æsthetic of Mr. Herbert Morrison, something which is neither plain engineering nor good architecture. A compromise in which the stone arch pretends to rival the span of the concrete beam has the virtues of neither.³

Ruefully, twenty years later, one may reckon what has been lost of beauty by the headlong advances of the new art. Obviously, being metrical rather than rhythmical, geometrical, not vital, its graces belong to a lower order. There is a further and immense restriction in the fact that the workings of mechanical contrivances outside factory or engine-room are so little visible: it is the packing, the case, that we see. Just as the explosive propulsion of the bullet cut out the greater part of heroic action and attitude in warfare, along with arrow, sword and spear, so the motor car, superseding the horse for riding or haulage, is shot through space like a packet without visible cause, and agricultural engines abolish all the ancient imagery in the Labours of the Year, along with the men who laboured. The windmill and the water-mill, visibly using natural forces, have gone, and the ships which played one of them against the other with the glorious structures of mast and sail. Only the 'stream-line' remains to modify the hotel-at-sea. All the old everyday spectacle, the pictorial aspect of man's exertions and the tools he handled, is being made over to his successor. The substitution of the 'tank' for the lancer on his charger is typical of the revolution which is wiping out the former drama of field and road life, and accommodating landscape itself to the engineers. Only in sport shall we presently find echoes of an unmechanical world, of heroic human action and conflict. It is the 'Philistines' chiefly who are doing this for us, in the 'reserves' of golf-links, race-courses, playing-fields for football or tennis, the liberties of the hunt. But what great breeds of seamen and landmen are being broken up, turned into

³ See a remarkable paper by Sir Gilbert Scott (anno 1858) reproduced in the *Architectural Review* for February.

parasites as yachtsmen or lodging-house-keepers or despatched to the garage.

The contraction of visible beauty, then, has been accelerated in those last twenty years by the break-neck speed of engineering advance. How does the balance stand in the scales of use? Obviously there have been notable increases in convenience of transport, lighting, and communication; and the field labourer and seaman, such as survive, may bless the machine for relief from exposure and danger. But Frankenstein begins to be nervous about the future of his amazing monsters. Those handsome contrivances, after edging out so many working arms and legs, threaten to obliterate humanity wholesale in future wars. Even in the modified warfare we call 'peace' there are suicidal symptoms, as in the cars made for speed whose multiplication is choking to a standstill the race-tracks replacing roads, and whose frequentation turns into an eczema the 'beauty-spots' that have been expensively preserved. But there is a more formidable prospect ahead, which we are awaiting with a singular complacency—the transfer of this congested traffic to 'benight the air.' Omnibus, taxi and private 'plane will hurtle, above our heads, in streams, not one deep, as on land, but at many levels, with problems of control more bewildering, in a geometrical progression, than those which baffle Mr. Hore-Belisha. The sky above mountains and sea, even, will no longer be quiet, nor houses safe from demolition by a momentary loss of control. We shall have to oblige this new race of rigid-winged 'swifts,' military or civilian, by living underground.

We may well be astounded at what brain *versus* hand has accomplished in the mechanic art—at the creative energy and resource which have a device for every problem; small wonder if painting and sculpture are stricken with anæmia and architecture with asthma, restricted and bullied as they are. But whether life is heading for any sort of paradise or for a very perfectly appointed and monotonous hell remains to be determined.

D. S. MACCOLL.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON AMERICAN SPEECH

I MUST not fail to emphasise, at the very beginning of this survey, the absence of official standards for English, comparable with the standards set by several European academies for the language of their particular country.¹ Philologically, the Yorkshire or Sussex, the Wisconsin or Virginian dialects have as much claim to priority as those of Oxford and Boston, which are arbitrarily spoken of as the 'best' for the two countries they represent. The misuse of ethical terms, however, and the intrusion of class-consciousness into a consideration of language are responsible for a bias which is incompatible with the scientific treatment of a linguistic problem, and the particular problem of the comparative study of English and American speech has further suffered from the irrelevancies of national prejudice and personal animosity. I have referred to the mal-effects of class-consciousness in the theoretical treatment of language. In speech itself it is the principal factor which makes men abandon their dialect for the arbitrary standard of the intellectual centres. But it is intended in this essay to ignore social distinctions as such, and to regard language simply as a means of communication; dialects as normal developments from a common source; accent as a regional variation whose principal criterion is intelligibility; and vocabulary as an index to a people's linguistic resourcefulness. The class or group distinctions, running transversely across the regional variations, can be considered by the same criteria.

There are two factors which must be taken into account in a consideration of any American problem. The first is the size of the continent in which most of the forty-eight states are bigger than the English mainland; and the second is the racial heterogeneity of its population. The first of these, the regional factor, was far more operative in the period of expansion, which may conveniently be confined within the nineteenth century. The new century saw the so-called conquest of space, and there is, indeed, no country in the world in which distance is of so little

¹ For a discussion of this question, see the article by the author, 'English and the Need of an Academy,' *Quarterly Review*, No. 505, July 1930.

account as in America. This development of communication—not only through transportation but by means of wireless telegraphy and other voice-distributing inventions—has no doubt had a tendency to smooth out regional differences; although not so much as class-consciousness and elementary education have done in England, neither of which factors is so potent a standardiser in American speech.

The factor of heterogeneity and racial peculiarities of speech react in a contrary tendency by *increasing* regional differences. Immigrants tend to settle by families, clans, and nationalities in definite areas, and they are bound to make some changes in the pronunciation and vocabulary of the adopted language. Examples of such settlements are those of the Irish and Italians in New York; the Dutch in Pennsylvania; the English in the Kentucky hill country; the French in Illinois and Wisconsin (*cf.* such place-names as St. Louis, Terre Haute, Marquette, Fond du Lac); the Greeks and Poles in Chicago (both nationalities have their own newspapers and radio programmes); the Germans in the Milwaukee region of Wisconsin; the Norwegians in the Green Bay peninsula; the Japanese along the Pacific sea-board; and the Italian peasants in the South-west. In the case of the New York accent, the Irish-Italian influence is definitely traceable; so is the German contribution to vocabulary, but the other immigrations are too recent or too diffused to have yet had any measurable effect. They must be taken into account, however, in any scientific survey of American dialects, such as that which is now being made on a nation-wide scale by the American Council of Learned Societies.²

In a study of this magnitude it is not practicable to do more than generalise in the attempt to indicate, within the limits of a single essay, the main trends of American English. I shall begin, therefore, with a classification based on five great geographical, historical, and social divisions, as including five main dialect tendencies: the East in general, with New York singled out as representative; New England in particular, with the Bostonian accent most resembling English; the South, with considerable inter-state variations, but with certain very definite common characteristics; the Middle West—the social and geographical borderland—with elements from all other dialects and diversified with an enormous immigrant population; and the West and South-west, represented by the peculiar nasal and laconic accent of the ranch country. Not only is this sweeping division arbitrary, but the choice of representative accents is also largely a matter of personal interpretation. This is especially so

² It is estimated that this survey, begun in 1931, will take ten years to complete (*see School and Society*, August 1, 1931).

with the Southern speech, and some observers might argue for Georgia, some for the Carolinas, and some for Tennessee as the most characteristic.

Now if these geographical divisions are regarded as extending across the American continent horizontally, group distinctions—one must avoid the word 'class'—pass vertically through them, and can be quite definite enough to counteract regional differences, as they do in England and elsewhere. Thus, the university group tends to adopt a common standard, though it is more often differentiated by regional preferences than in England. This standard of the educated group, moreover, does not necessarily represent the best American, as university English presumably represents the best English. This distinction is generally claimed—and without much opposition—by the Boston accent, the accent of the traditional centre of New World culture, of Harvard and the near-by universities, and of the legitimate stage. Standard American—one uses the term with considerable apprehension—differs as much from this variety as it differs from English. For Bostonian is not only affected in American ears—as H. L. Mencken puts it:

The average American . . . associates it unpleasantly with spats, Harvard, male tea-drinking, wrist-watches, and all the other objects of his social suspicion.³

But often it also outdoes the English in the use of the crucial broad *a*, as though the speaker dreaded identification through flat *a* with common American. Hence Bostonian has not only *drāma*, but *drāmatize*; not only *māsk*, but *gās-māsk*; and often *rātionāl*, *āccēt*, *fāncy*, *hāve*, *mān*. Some affected American speakers use nothing else. But standard American invariably has the flat *a*—*drāma*, *māsk*, *āsk*, *ānt* (for *aunt*), *cānt* (for *can't*), etc., etc., and seems, indeed, to prefer any value other than the broad continental *a*. Hence we sometimes hear *drayma*, generally *tomayto*, and always *clurk* (*clerk*). Other characteristically common vowel sounds for identifying American are short *o* and long *u*, both of which undoubtedly mar American speech in English ears from the point of view of euphony. Short *o* becomes either a nasal sound between flat *a* and *ah*, as *gahd* (*god*), *frahst*, *pahpular*; or *aw*, as in *dawg*, *gawne*, and others. This latter variation, however, is present in standard English, as in *cross*, *lost*, *Austria*, pronounced with an *aw* sound. The degrading of *u* into *oo* is deplored by even the most uncompromising defenders of American speech. Few escapes, but *noo*, *dook*, *aooty* are exceedingly common. A fourth criterion of standard American is the slovenly enunciation of medial consonants, *little* becom-

³ H. L. Mencken, *The American Language*, 1919, p. 173.

ing *lid'l*; *Saturday*, *Sad'dy*; *sit up*, *siddup*; *constitution*, *cans'stooshun*.

While these are some of the common characteristics, we meet with definite regional variations, which make any generalisations questionable. Some of these we shall now consider in connexion with the major geographical divisions chosen for the purpose. That of Boston has already been spoken of as the 'best' American and as not differing greatly from English. It is comparable to 'Oxonian' in that it is limited to a traditional intellectual centre outside which it is not particularly popular.

The second characteristic accent is that of New York City and the surrounding district. It is as phenomenal a dialect as Cockney, to which, as the speech of the larger and poorer population of the nation's largest city, it is peculiarly comparable. The basic elements of this offshoot are the Irish and Italian variations of English—these nationalities representing the biggest groups in New York. This fact, together with the German and Yiddish influences, seems to be the explanation of such pronunciations as *toity-toid*, for *thirty-third*; *dis* and *dat*, for *this* and *that*; *chore*, for *jaw*; *hens*, for *hands*; *kite*, for *guide*; *bees*, for *piece*. Such a pronunciation is generally accompanied by irregular grammar and a special vocabulary, largely drawn from the cant of gangsters, hoboes, and thieves.

The Southern accent⁴ shows as striking a difference from that of the North as the Yorkshire dialect does from Cornish. It is at once evident that the enormous negro population has affected it, although the negroes have definite tonal and verbal differences all their own. But the real Southern accent, with its absence of medial consonants and slow delivery, is almost African in contrast to the harsh, gabbled speech of Northern radio broadcasters. Especially characteristic of the South are: the omission of medial *r*'s (which are invariably burred, rather than trilled, in the North, Middle West, and West); the substitution of an *aw* sound for a middle syllable containing *r*, and of *ah* for a suffix, *-r*: hence, *pawticulah*, for *particular*; the diphthongisation of vowels, hence *me-ulk*, for *milk*, *doh-wah*, for *door*, *hai-yer*, for *hair*; slurring and elision, hence *mizz*, for both *missis* and *miss*; and a special vocabulary reputed to be Elizabethan in the Kentucky mountain region and the islands off North Carolina. The Roanoke Island fisher-folk, for instance, have been isolated for almost three centuries, and the evidence of their dialect points to settlement by Raleigh's sailors. Expressions such as *a couthy woman*, for *a capable woman*, survive, and the simple, dignified vocabulary

⁴ For a specific study, see *American Speech*, vol. viii, No. 2, 'Southern American Dialect,' pp. 37-43.

retains archaisms like *disremember*, *fleech* (flatter), *disencourage*, *heerd* (heard), and *memorize* (remember).⁵

One cannot leave this rich Southern speech without reference to the colourful language of the negro, who has not only developed his own version of English, but a rhetoric, poetry, and song all his own. The latter is now incorporated into world-culture in the form of 'spirituals'; the poetry is not as well known as it should be; and negro rhetoric must, of course, be heard to be judged, and it reaches its climax in the negro churches of the South. Such sermons are invariably occasions for emotional outbursts, which resemble in no coincidental fashion the tribal rites and orgies of the jungle. The preacher plays (quite involuntarily) the rôle of medicine-man, and by his incantations incites the audience to a state of frenzy, variously manifested by hysteria, fainting, and shrieking, in which the Christian religion is only an outlet for the loosing of elemental passions. And it may be that such periodical emotionalism is necessary to the otherwise indolent and care-free negro. We give as an example of negro rhetoric and pronunciation this excerpt from a sermon:

An ah tells yo bedum and cistern, cistern an bedum e salbashum ov de Lawd as e reveal in e Gubbuk an e mouf of e possel an e siple an Nebbachademus an Belebub an all e res ov e saint is jes bout puzakly lak dissa yeah:

When yo all wan mek yoself a grumshun fine dinnah lak foah weddin oah frunrul oah oddah casum ob rejoicin, an yo all gits yo out in de roos fo ketch yo a fet frium size chicken, does yo all pick out de sick an de po an de halt an de bline an de measly chicken? No-sah-whoosa, doan yo all know dat you doan? Well ah figgah dat e salbashum ob Gawd am puzakly de same way when yo daid an stan afo e jumment seat ob de froam ob Gawd wid de cesspool angel on de right han wid de serpin an de terrapin wid e golen crown on ay haid an e golen slippah on ay feet an e golen hahp in ay han, an on de lef han is de smoke poen out ob de buhnen pit ob brimstones an toahment.

Well, bedun an cistern an cistern an bedun when yo all come for stan attaway foah de jumment seat ob de froam ob de Lawd God Amighty does yo all reckon de Lawd gwine pick he out de wus niggah lak de po an e measly chicken fo lib wid he in e cesspool palace? No-sah-whoosa, he nevah, he pick out de fet frium chicken; Gawd, he doan wan no sick chicken no mawn yo all.⁶

The accents of the Middle West and West do not have distinctive features to the same extent as the Eastern and Southern dialects. The accent of Chicago, for instance, the capital of the Middle West, will merely vary with the region and group from which the speaker comes. Russian, Jewish, German, and negro features are particularly evident; so, too, is the nasality which

⁵ For further information, see the *National Geographic Magazine*, December 1933, 'A Bit of Elizabethan England in America,' pp. 695 ff.

⁶ *Dialect Notes*, vol. v, pp. 362-3.

increases as one goes west. This notorious American nasality, it should be noted, is not so much due to speaking through the nose, which merely produces an adenoid effect, but to the flatness of the vowels—particularly the short *a* and *e* sounds—and of the tone in general. *Cănt* for *can't* (nearly universal in the North American continent) becomes *cěnt* (with a hard *c*, of course), and even *caynt*; *aunt* becomes *aynt*. One hears 'out west' *spind* for *spend*, *iny* for *any*, *splindid* for *splendid*, *far* for *fire*, *tard* for *tired*. The Westerner is, moreover, often intentionally careless, as though he suddenly felt that what he is saying is, after all, of no great importance. The flatness, the drawling, and the specialised vocabulary increase as one goes west, into the ranch country of Nebraska and Texas. Most of the independent characteristics of Western speech are rapidly disappearing, as dialect variations are disappearing all over the English-speaking world. Such expressions as *sheep scrape* for a general cleaning-up in preparation for an occasion, *sky pilots* for itinerant preachers, *Fontanelle plasters* for bank notes, *closed winter* for a hard winter, *Excuse-me-mams* for bumps on pioneer roads, all betray their origin and are vividly representative of life and manners in early Nebraska.⁷ Obsolescent Texan expressions of the same variety include: *hoodlum wagon* for a supply wagon, *brain tablet* for cigarette, *shake a leg* for to make haste, *vamoose* (from the Spanish) for to disappear, and *goosey* for nervous.⁸ Most of these racy expressions have disappeared like the covered wagon. Regional differences are being smoothed out by educational and group influences, so that we may now hear as good English on a Californian ranch as in Inverness.

It could be argued that the American pronounces every word differently from an Englishman; or, to be more exact, that the total effect of his whole speech is different. This is due partly to mental habits, partly to intonation, partly to accent, and partly to vocabulary. This difference may be exemplified by the two methods of expressing emphasis; where the Englishman would say 'I feel really splendid,' the American would not use such circumspect terms, but would prefer 'Boy! Do I feel good?' 'Don't mention it' is paralleled by American 'You're welcome' or 'You bet.' English 'I know that' becomes 'Are you telling me?' Both kinds of statement are expressive of national character, though it is not always easy for an Englishman to admit the legitimacy of the American phraseology. It is then that we must have recourse to some such objective criteria as expressiveness and intelligibility. If a phrase crystallises the speaker's thought, and is intelligible to the listener, it is likely to

⁷ See *American Speech*, vol. viii, No. 4, 'Nebraska Pioneer English,' pp. 48-52.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, No. 1, 'Ranch Diction of the Texas Panhandle,' pp. 25-32.

become 'good' or standard. Conversely, pronunciations or words which afford the greatest number the greatest difficulties of understanding are least likely to become current, and cannot be 'good' in the linguistic sense. Much of American slang is of this variety and certain aspects of American pronunciation—especially to English ears. This is particularly so with place-names and surnames, which it often needs a trained ear to catch. *Florida*, for instance, becomes *Flawda*; *Eleanor*, *El'ner*; *Campbell*, *Cam'l*. The Americans bring the same accusation against the English; many of our place-names and surnames, they say, are notorious—Worcester, Magdalen, and Cholmondeley! Place-names and their metamorphosis, however, are a problem of their own. Far more important is the clearness of everyday speech. In this respect there is an interesting phenomenon as far as the author's personal experience goes. It is that American speech is easier to understand at close quarters than English, but that English is clearer from a distance. This conclusion is based on a comparison between conversation and oratorical delivery. American conversation is not always pleasant to the ear, owing to a certain tonal monotony, to unusual variations from standard English, to harsh expression, and to a limited vocabulary; but it is never difficult to follow. English can be very difficult—especially where the speaker wobbles his words, or mumbles through closed teeth and motionless lips. Again, the American avoids a series of unstressed polysyllables. He says *dormit'ory*, *matrim'ony*, *liter'ary*, *diffic'ulty*, *authorit'ative*, all accented on the penultimate syllable; and though this may sound ridiculous to us, it is unquestionably easier to say and hear. It is almost impossible, when speaking quickly, to accent *temporarily* on the first syllable and not to swallow the other four. It would seem, then, that the American pronunciation of these polysyllables is preferable by standards of intelligibility. The same observation does not, however, hold good for the pronunciation of short words like *détail*, *address*, *délude*, *résearch*, *inquiry*, *advertisment*, in which the prefix is stressed and the root neglected. But then, if English is superior in its pronunciation of these words, how can we explain away *décadent*, *démonstrate*, *adversary*, and the like?

It is evident that in two countries separated by an ocean new things should receive different names, even in the same language. We may illustrate with the simplest examples like American *cow-catcher*, synonymous with English *plough*; *drug-store* with *chemist* (the two being by no means the same, however); and *side-walk* with *pavement*. Other differences may have no significance: *elevator* for *lift*, *candy* for *sweets*, and *truck* for *lorry*. It is wrong to assume, as many people do, that Americans prefer a shorter and simpler word. *Street*- or *surface-car* is longer than

tram; *mortician* more pompous than *undertaker*; *penitentiary* more prudish than *prison*; and *tonsorial parlor* more pretentious than *barber's shop*. It would seem, however, that they have shown greater resourcefulness in inventing neologisms and slang, to which Americanisms there has always been considerable opposition. The nineteenth-century hostility towards certain expressions like *lengthy*, *reliable*, and *scientist* is indicative of this. Other expressions, provided they were restricted to the American scene, were accepted without much opposition, and these will be discovered in the investigations now being conducted by Sir William Craigie on American speech. Among those under the letter *B*, we may instance *backwoods*, *bee-line*, *belittle*, *boarding-house*, *business-man*, *boss*, *bunkum*, and *boom*. These represent no inconsiderable addition to the range and usefulness of the English language. We can hardly say the same of such vulgarisms as *semi-occasional*, *to gentle*,⁹ *go-aheadativeness*, *to donate*, and hundreds of others in half-use, which merely indicate a deficient vocabulary or mental laziness. Some are unexpectedly pedantic, like *gubernatorial*, *societal*, *doxologise*, and these are surely the most infelicitous of all.

From the borderland of current but unstandardised words it is not far to cross into the wild and sometimes barbarous country of slang. The special cant of certain social groups—criminals, tramps, cowboys, lumber-jacks, and railwaymen, for instance—cannot be touched upon here, but for those who wish to explore this region I append the principal sources in a foot-note.¹⁰ A few remarks on common slang is all that can be attempted here. Some of it is colourful: *rubber-necking*, *joy-riding*, *sky-scraper*, *lounge-lizard*; some, simply slipshod—*gas* for *gasoline*, *ad-writer*, *pard* (partner), *pop concert* (popular concert). Some is comparable to the national habits of rushing about and gobbling food in 'drug stores'—notably the abbreviations, of which there are dozens: *O.K.*, *N.G.* (or *N.B.G.*), *G.O.P.* (get out and push), *N.R.A.* Some is pure vulgarity: *dolled-up* (dressed-up), *balled-up* (perplexed), *crazy* (stupid), *blame* (damned). Some is commonplace and effete: *cute*, *swell* (perhaps the most used American adjectives), *smoothy* (sophisticated), *Oh boy!* and *Yes, sir*; and some is artificial and preposterous: *sodalicious* (*soda plus delicious*), *warphan* (*war plus orphan*), *splendiferous* (*splendid plus?*).

After the extraordinary effervescence of American slang, it is something of an anti-climax to consider three such aspects of the

⁹ Describing the trial run of a new stream-lined train, the *Chicago Tribune* reports: 'The engineer gentled the charger through the suburbs of Los Angeles.'

¹⁰ Wilson Bulletin, vol. viii, No. 4. *American Slang: a Selected Reference List*, pp. 220-1, 234. See also articles in *American Speech* and elsewhere.

speech as grammar, spelling, and style, but they must be touched upon before finally considering the possibilities and prospects of an American language. Neither grammar nor spelling is of great importance in the development of an essentially non-inflected language like English. As far as we may generalise, American speech has more syntactical irregularities and so-called bad grammar than English. For instance, educated people constantly use the singular subject with the plural genitive and the plural verb construction in public addresses and sometimes in writing. Grammar is not considered worth the additional attention required to avoid such errors. Some of the expressions which may originally have been bad or loose grammar—*he has gotten himself, to go places, feel good, he was going some*—have now the prerogative of idioms, and parallels in standard English may be brought forward to justify them if necessary. One can well imagine some future grammarian devising a neat explanation for *places* in the second example, dignifying it with the title: accusative after a verb of motion by analogy with *go home*. At present such constructions may be ascribed to the tendency towards simplification, which is fundamental in English, and carried to the limits conformable with intelligibility in American. Nevertheless, this tendency is not evident in such constructions as *he said to do this*, and *he would like for you to do this*; nor is simplification accountable for the preference for *someplace, anyplace, to somewhere, and anywhere*. Everyone is more or less familiar with American spelling, so it need not detain us here. Simpler spelling, such as *-or* for *-our*, *program* for *programme*, *tyre* for *tyre*, and the preference for the semiphonetic *-ize* rather than *-ise* represent a step in the right direction. Otherwise, it is sufficient to note that, whereas orthographical reform is desirable when sponsored by authorities like Webster, Skeat, and Bridges, it soon results in greater confusion if undertaken by cranks or busy-bodies—and there are plenty of these in the United States.

Language which makes many concessions to the immediate spoken effect is bound to become a less and less suitable medium for literary prose. The art of conversation and the technique of writing are so different that it is common for an effective conversationalist to be an ineffectual writer. This generalisation holds good of American speech, which is a vivid and incisive enough means of immediate self-expression, but which is inversely adapted to the production of periodic prose. There is still another cause, which Schele de Vere observed in 1871: 'We still speak English,' he wrote, 'but we talk American,' implying that the Americans were, in a sense, bi-lingual. Their conscious effort to master two means of self-expression—American for

speaking and English for writing—is expressed more explicitly by Mencken:

To the average American, bent upon expressing his ideas, not stupendously but merely clearly, it [*i.e.*, English parliamentary oratory and leader-writing] must always remain something vague and remote, like Greek history or the properties of the parabola, for he never speaks it or hears it spoken, and seldom encounters it in his everyday reading. If he learns to write it, which is not often, it is with a rather depressing sense of its artificiality. He may master it as a Korean, bred in the colloquial Onmun, may master the literary Korean-Chinese, but he never thinks in it or quite feels it.

This fact, I daresay, is largely responsible for the notorious failure of our schools to turn out students who can put their ideas into words with simplicity and intelligibility. What their professors try to teach is not their mother-tongue at all, but a dialect that stands quite outside their common experience, and into which they have to translate their thoughts, consciously and painfully. Bad writing consists in making the attempt and failing through lack of practise.¹¹

This seems a very plausible explanation, and it is lamentably true for practically the whole body of American text-books, manuals, primers, theses, and academic writing in general. These are chock-a-block full with scientific clichés like *data* (never *facts*), *objective*, *criteria* (seldom *standards*), *homogeneity*, *evaluate*; jarring verbs: *contact*, *verbalize*, *locate*, *institutionalize*; ponderous circumlocutions: *to be economical of* and *gubernatorial direction*, preferred to the simpler *to save* and *government*. Whence the perpetration of this kind of sentence: 'The meanings of definitional generalizations are epitomized in concepts'¹²—a style characteristic of doctors' theses.

At the other extreme is the journalism of the yellow Press, which effloresces in lurid headlines, gruesome stories, and ghastly photographs. It is not for us to digress on the subject of American popular journalism, or to judge it by English standards. We should note, however, that, while it approximates to the common speech of the people, it is not a fair standard for assessing that speech, any more than it is for judging the people themselves. Much of it, notably the headlines, would be unintelligible to an English reader. Compare, for instance, *Dublin Blows Up Shaft To Queen* (meaning, Dubliners dynamite a monument to Queen Victoria); and *Sign Firm Head Injured By Gang Wielding Bats* (meaning, manager of a sky-sign advertising firm was attacked by hooligans armed with clubs). It is peculiarities such as these which cause some observers, both English and American, to maintain that the American is, for all intents and purposes, a different language from the English.

¹¹ Mencken, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹² An actual example taken at random from a treatise on Education.

Before leaving the question of American speech, it is necessary to correct any bias which may have resulted from concentrating on the differences, and neglecting the similarities, of the speech of the two nations. It is over-emphasis on the innumerable irregularities, heightened by certain nationalistic prejudices, which has led many students to declare the independence of the American language. We again turn to Mencken, as the most vigorous exponent of this doctrine; he claims 'the American people are now on their own in speech, as they have long been on their own in business.'¹³ A more extravagant and prejudicial point of view is expressed by a French observer, M. Feuillerat, who writes to the *Yale Review* of a time

... When the American civilization, having severed all links from English civilization, desires to assert itself in the adoption of a truly national mode of expression,

and recommends to this end an American academy on the lines of the *Académie Française*.¹⁴ Such an attitude as this, with its implied dislike of English culture and its patriotic admiration of a national institution, is opposed to any scientific and impartial examination of the problem. First, it is unlikely that the American people ever should, or ever would, wish to 'sever all links from English civilization.' There is nothing to be gained by so doing, unless aggressive nationalism and artistic philistinism be considered gains. Secondly, it is not certain that an official academy can aid the *development* of a language. This is neither its purpose nor function, but, judging from the *Académie Française*, it can only conserve and consolidate language, which, as long as it is spoken and alive, will continue to grow by its own self-direction. And so, as a final observation, we prefer the conclusion of Sir William Craigie, a scholar and lexicographer, and one whose opinion is less likely to be biased by prejudice:

A new American language is . . . impossible, for the reason that it can no longer develop by itself, but must keep in touch with that wider English which concerns the world at large.¹⁵

¹³ *American Mercury*, editorial, January 1930.

¹⁴ *Yale Review*, June 1929, p. 830.

¹⁵ Cf. the article on 'The American Language,' *Saturday Review of Literature*, February 21, 1931, p. 615.

J. HOWARD WELLARD.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCVIII—APRIL 1935

GERMANY REARMS

THE Armistice of 1918 had dealt a blow to the old German army from which it could hardly recover: the return of the troops to a disillusioned and impoverished country accelerated the process of decay. Political disunion and discontent still further combined with financial and industrial pressure to prohibit any regeneration of that once formidable instrument of war. Then came the Treaty of Versailles. By the conditions of that Treaty the future German army was fixed at a strength of 100,000 men who must serve on a long-service twelve-year engagement, while, in addition, various stringent conditions very considerably limited the effective fighting power of the new creation.¹ Except amongst the most advanced circles of the Left, the vast reductions thus enforced met with bitter feelings throughout Germany. But the internal troubles that culminated in the great inflation of 1922-23 left no option for Germany but to submit.

¹ The establishment was fixed at seven infantry and three cavalry divisions, or sixty-three battalions, sixty-nine squadrons, sixty-five horsed and seven tractor-drawn batteries, with a proportion of technical troops. Aerial, gas, railway, heavy artillery, and tank units were prohibited. The establishments of arms and ammunition stocks were rigidly fixed.

As current events have since woven themselves into a background of resentful memories and future illusions, Germany's aspirations towards a military resurrection came more and more to colour her whole attitude towards the world around her. The Allied Commission of Control, appointed by the Treaty to supervise the disarmament of the country, and lodged in Berlin, became the object of intense national hatred. From the very outset of its activities there is every valid reason for stating that the German authorities put obstacles in the way of the fulfilment of the Commission's task, whilst attempts at evasion of the Versailles obligations became almost a normal procedure. In the matter of arms and aircraft there was perhaps less opportunity for imposing upon the Commission, but in the matter of military personnel and military spirit analogous rules could not be applied, so that it may well be said that the militaristic genius of Germany was never eradicated—it was temporarily curbed. Thus it has been alleged that even the old *Kriegsakademie*, the staff college of Imperial days, was preserved under a decentralised and camouflaged form; voluntary associations of old soldiers representing old regiments were encouraged by Herr Noske. So by these means all the traditions of the past were religiously preserved.

It is indeed possible to trace the military reincarnation of Germany along two channels—the first being the official German attitude towards the army as illustrated by public pronouncements and acts, the second being the clandestine measures whereby the actual technical efficiency and reorganisation of a new army were to be facilitated and finally brought to fruition. The first channel is perhaps in reality the more important, since it has led to the inspiration of the whole nation with a martial spirit, which is the true danger that now looms behind rearmament. So the education of young Germany has been permeated with an almost religious glorification of the triumphs of war and by the beatification of German valour.

Even so, in its beginnings, finer and more restrained sentiments were to prove highly beneficial to the creation of the new German army of 1919. By the soldier much that was then done can be regarded with sympathetic admiration, if not with whole-hearted approval. The first step towards the creation of the new German army was the appointment in 1919 of General Walther Reinhardt to command a composite brigade which was to serve as the nucleus of a new '*Reichsheer*.' At the camp of *Döberitz*, near Berlin, Reinhardt set to work and gradually collected his first long-service recruits—every one a physically and morally picked man. With such material Reinhardt speedily laid the foundations of a fine and efficient force. Even now in Germany there are old soldiers who can declare with pride that they once

served in the '*Döberitz Brigade*.' But it was even more the spirit that he succeeded in inspiring in his men rather than the actual framework of the new force that was remarkable. Still more noteworthy is the fact that, owing to prevalent conditions, Reinhardt found it both easy and preferable to regard his creation as a united national army: henceforth the *Reichsheer* knew no particularist State distinction: it was to represent Germany as one whole and to be the servant of a central Government.

In April 1920 Reinhardt handed over his command to General von Seeckt, an able administrator and a competent soldier. Though not a Prussian, Reinhardt had devoted all his energies to reviving all the soldierly qualities associated with the Prussian army of old in his *Reichsheer*, which became a veritable museum of the military past of Germany. Seeckt ably carried on his work until, in January 1921, the Minister for Defence, Dr. Gessler, was able to state that the new army was complete; whilst von Seeckt added, 'The *Reichsheer* is now a finished creation. A new chapter of German army history is opened.' In spite of many difficulties, Seeckt's creation can be acclaimed as a striking success. Since his time the quality of the *Reichsheer* has never deteriorated; recruits have been so plentiful that the authorities have only had to pick and choose; the cream of the nation is embodied in its ranks. A remarkable, perhaps the most remarkable, characteristic of Seeckt's army was its clear dissociation from current politics; to such effect was this so that it was to stand literally neutral even through the political chaos of early 1933.

For ten years the *Reichswehr*, as it was now generally styled, went steadily on its way, improving its training and fitting itself for the dual rôle which Seeckt had foreseen. First, it might need to serve as a corps of picked troops, relying on their quality alone to face greatly superior numbers with success; secondly, it might be required to act as a '*Führerheer*'—i.e., an army of leaders and commanders—should the country ever need to raise a large popular host in a moment of emergency. Its training became more effective as time went on; the 'forbidden' weapons and machines—gas, tanks, aircraft, and the like—were always imagined or, where possible, have been represented by dummies. German military thought resumed its studies of future warfare, taking into its purview every improvement and new weapon now known to armies that are not shackled by Treaty restrictions.

Outside the army German military aspirations were also leaving their impression on the people. In Germany, as had happened in Japan, in the Soviet Union and in Italy, the education of the young became a matter of great concern. Clearly it is through this medium that the future outlook of a nation can most

readily be moulded. In Germany, therefore, the *Jugendertüchtigung* (or the 'strengthening of the young') soon began to loom large on the national horizon. To some people the idea appeared to be needed as a means of 'social uplift'; to them it seemed an effective manner of checking Communism; but to the majority it unquestionably appealed as the straight road to national regeneration in a military sense, or, as one German writer puts it, 'the first step towards the gradual loosening of the fetters of the forcible peace of Versailles.' The idea rapidly grew in intensity, and so far gripped the nation that, in September 1932, the President issued a statement by which he assembled a *Reichskuratorium* (or board) to standardise and superintend the entire process of physical training whereby German youth as a whole was to be moulded. 'The youth of Germany,' stated the President, 'is the future of our race. The hardening of the body, the education of youth to discipline, love of order, comradeship, and readiness to self-sacrifice for the community, are tasks which it is the duty of the State to assume.' This decree gave immense satisfaction to the growing number of Germans who, by reason of the trend of politics and of prevalent disunion, looked to a restoration of compulsory universal military service as a panacea for social and other ills.

Such a view of the training of youth is not new. Philosophers have sought to discover a 'moral equivalent for war,' and in so doing have generally ended by electing some form of common social service. But in Germany the distinction between this type of soldierly education in a broad sense and military training, unashamed and unadulterated, has come to be whittled down to a mere shadow. In practice, the militaristic bias in all these juvenile exercises and 'defence sports' is not far to seek, even though some regard may be paid to the letter of the law—that is, the Treaty of Versailles. Numerous organisations had already existed in Germany for bringing up the young much as the Boy Scout movement is doing all the world over. Outstanding among these was the organisation founded by Baldur von Schirach, an enthusiast who dreamed of the resurrection of the Fatherland. All these organisations grew and prospered until unified, under the Nationalist-Socialist régime, into the body now known as the *Hiltlerjugend*. The groundwork prescribed for training the young was largely based on the practice of the *Wehrsport* (or 'defence-sport'), which in several respects could not be distinguished from physical training for the profession of arms. The encouragement of this *Wehrsport* extended yet further until it spread to all establishments which provide training for the young as well as for adolescents.

Another step was the introduction of instruction in the

'science of defence' in all higher schools throughout Germany. After the war of 1870 it had already been pointed out that a serious defect in the conduct of that campaign had been revealed in the ignorance of statesman and soldier alike of their reciprocal parts in the common task of war. After 1918 this lack of understanding, both in the politician and in the soldier, was recognised to be yet more serious and to have contributed in no small measure to defeat. This new subject of education was then designed to remedy this weakness. So far as it goes, and in theory, there may not be so much fault to be found with the curriculum. That it goes perilously near infringing Article 277 of the Versailles Treaty is admitted by Germans themselves; but they save their conscience by claiming that the subject is treated solely from a political and theoretical angle, and that no military exercises are permitted therein. They further point to the actual military training which enters into the education of the French boy. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the curriculum does lend itself to abuse, and that fanatics such as Professor Banse, of Brunswick, both in speech and in writing, exceeded the already weakened limitations of Article 277 of the Treaty. Although these may constitute genuine exceptions, the whole tenor of this 'scientific' teaching, when coupled with the more barefacedly Chauvinist exercises, parades, and speeches that are being habitually stage-managed for the benefit of the young in present-day Germany, are very far from giving the impression that the young German is now brought up in a pacifically inclined atmosphere. And this impression is further enhanced by the flood of literature that was, and still is, instinct with a spirit that can only be regarded as purely militarist in character.

In the meantime, the discontent felt in competent circles over the low establishment of the *Reichswehr* was gradually aggravated and spread by the tedious discussions that were taking place at Geneva regarding European disarmament. The declarations made by M. Briand on behalf of France in 1927 seemed to allay German impatience in the matter of her status in defence matters. But subsequent disappointment of her expectations led Germany to further measures which could only be interpreted as designed to rectify her military inferiority. From the conception of the 'defence' training of youth, as outlined above, it was no far cry to a claim for the restitution of universal training for the adult. The first step was a demand, now put forward, that, if the victorious Powers of 1918 did not propose to disarm according to the spirit, let alone the text, of the Versailles Treaty, Germany must be granted an increased military establishment. The figure for such an increase came to be fixed for an augmentation of the *Reichswehr* from 100,000 to 300,000 men. Nothing

much was said of terms of service nor of any proposed organisation—a serious omission from the purely military standpoint.

The problem before Germany was not easy to solve, for a return to a pre-war military establishment based on two-year service with the colours and on nation-wide recruitment was ruled out definitely, partly owing to the certainty of foreign opposition and partly because of financial stringency. Still, there was not wanting a vast body of opinion which saw in Germany's huge droves of unemployed an immense reservoir of potential recruits immediately at hand. It was urged that military training would alone save these men from moral and physical decadence. There followed a spate of speeches and writings all calling for the reinstitution of universal military training. Had it not been the salvation of Germany in 1813? Had it not been the source of her triumph in 1870? By her armed strength alone would Germany regain her place among the nations and the respect of the world.

At length Germany claimed the right to put into force the concessions to her in the shape of an augmentation to be made in the *Reichswehr*—only on the understanding, however, that this increase should consist of short-service troops. On the other hand, Germany was prepared to admit that existing limitations imposed on 'heavy' and other weapons should persist; and, lastly, that the long-service *Reichswehr* should suffer some decrease in numbers. Accordingly it came as no great surprise when the President at the inauguration of the Kyffhauser Military Association on January 15, 1933, in Berlin stated in the course of his speech:

I would once more declare that we desire but the same measure of security as other countries, and that I consider universal military service as our most meritorious aim. Different circumstances necessitate different measures. I therefore have in mind a 'militia.'¹ But you may rest assured that whatever may be the outward form of our future defence force, it will always remain animated with the spirit which was and is now its very own. Tradition, such as we understand it, is shackled neither by numbers nor exterior shape.

No doubt could exist that this term 'militia' was a sop to the ex-Allied Governments, to pacifists all the world over, and to the League of Nations, to which Germany at that time still belonged.

In putting forward this scheme von Hindenburg was but repeating what had been stated before. Even in June 1931 von Seeckt, in addressing a gathering of students at Munich, had put into plain language the conception of the future German army that he had long cherished:

¹ German, 'Militia.'

As to the outward form of our future army [he said] there can be no possible doubt. In one shape or another universal compulsory service will be restored. Nothing can replace that form of service. First we must create an army, small, if need be, but highly trained; by its side there will be some organisation resembling a militia.

In August 1932 von Schleicher, in addressing a memorandum on the equality of armaments to the French Government, wrote to a similar effect. This division of forces into two distinct categories had long been a pet theme of von Seeckt. As he foresaw the development of armies, he deemed it essential to keep on one side the highly effective long-service troops, capable of handling every scientific adjunct of warfare, fit to undertake the maximum bodily exertion; while by its side there should exist a 'popular' army fit to undertake minor work in the field, ready to mobilise at due notice for all tasks of a less strenuous nature or calling for a less skilled personnel. The basic principle is that there should be inequality in length and nature of training to correspond to the inequality in the tasks a modern army may be called upon to perform. The idea of a militia, however, proved far from meeting with universal approval. Much ink was spilt in Germany in order to prove that a 'militia,' properly speaking, would fail in its purpose. History was ransacked, from the French revolutionary epoch of 1792 down to 1918, for examples to demonstrate the weaknesses of extemporised or short-service armies.

Much stress was laid on the necessity for a small long-service 'cadre' army to supply much that might be lacking in the short-service force, as well as to supply the highly trained force required for certain operations of modern war. The General Staff was to be reconstituted, the ban on the 'forbidden' arms and weapons was to be raised, whilst freedom for fortifying her frontiers, with an abolition of the 'demilitarised' Rhineland zone, must be obtained. The parallel existence of the *Reichswehr* of 100,000 with the militia of 300,000 was put forward by military authorities as a desirable and practical scheme. A system of national military labour was to be instituted as a complement to the new armed forces.

The declaration made in December 1932 by the ex-Allied Governments, whereby Germany virtually received equality of status and the right to increase her *Reichswehr*, was accepted in Germany as the signal for putting into execution the scheme for the expansion of her army. A historic blunder was perpetrated by the ex-Allies in not seizing the opportunity to settle the matter then and there. Events in German politics were moving quickly. Social and economic discontent were reinforcing the political grievance. Germany was in the dangerous condition in

which all individual dissatisfaction coincided with a national cause.

At this juncture occurred the National-Socialist *coup d'état* of 1933, and with the consequent growth of the Hitlerite *Sturm Abteilungen* and *Schutzstaffeln* the German defence problem soon entered upon a new phase. The political turmoil following on the Reichstag election complicated the issue. The 'S.S.' (the black-shirted *élite* of the National-Socialist movement) could not be slighted by the creation of a rival force. The 'S.A.' (the brown shirts) were too numerous and too valuable to be overlooked. It seemed that these corps must become the new militia, and little doubt exists that the heads of the Brown Shirt army took this more or less for granted. But the authorities controlling the *Reichswehr* did not altogether welcome the new 'troops.' The *Reichswehr* officers were in command of a magnificent body of men; they would never consent to see it infected with a virus such as that which had manifestly borne fruit in the Brown Shirt organisations. Better take the ploughboy from the farm or the young worker from the factory than the hooligan or unemployed street loafer who had been parading the towns in a state of political frenzy. The German military Press whole-heartedly expressed approval of the 'revolution'; it could scarcely fail to do so in so far as the new *régime* put forward so strong a cause for national regeneration and for a higher status for Germany among world Powers. The Hitler Government, under the ægis of the aged President, showed itself most friendly disposed towards the *Reichswehr* and the military classes generally. But the German officer is nothing if not professionally minded, and, although General von Blomberg, the Minister for Defence, was able to issue cordial manifestos of confidence in the Hitler Government, the attitude of the *Reichswehr* at large towards the 'Brown Shirt' organisation did not alter. Although very little has been uttered in public—and no reference has been made to this subject in the Press—it is probable that the rise of Hitlerism and of the paramilitary organisations, which virtually brought the *Führer* to power, may be regarded as a weighty cause leading to the eclipse of the idea of a German militia.

In the autumn of 1933 came the secession of Germany from the League of Nations. With that gesture any lingering hesitation remaining in the German mind as to the expediency of proceeding to a rearmament seems to have receded still further. On the contrary, Germany believed that, now freed from the ties of Geneva, she could rearm freely. No scruples need further restrain her to follow the glorious example of 1807-13; the only restraining influence was fear lest Western Europe should resent too bold a progress in that direction. The first step was, therefore, to

reorganise some semblance of a standing army and to resuscitate a wider military service. It is indeed amazing how far in popular German estimation the professional soldier could be made out as unworthy of his trade and country; the paid soldier was branded as no better than a hired cut-throat: the same writers who expatiated upon the glory of the mercenary troops of the great Frederick were the first to revile the principles of the 'hireling' army of modern Germany. The demand for a reintroduction of universal service became more vocal; the military Press became quietly and confidently prophetic as to the rise of a new army. The clamour for the revival of the old military system has become an act of faith.

The idea of a militia being abandoned, a return was made to the original plan of a 300,000-man army much under the conditions which Germany claimed to have obtained from France. Little has been made public as to how much was accomplished in this direction, but it is certain that in April 1934 the first batch of recruits to expand the *Reichswehr* to an establishment of 300,000 men was selected. The terms of service are to be eighteen months with the colours, but the exact composition of the new regiments is not yet clear; no definite statement was published as to the future intentions of the new Government. It would appear doubtful if, for the present, any reduction in the *Reichswehr* or its disintegration into training cadres is in any way probable.

But the expansion of the *Reichswehr* brought to a head the discontent felt in the Brown Shirt army at its exclusion from the new force. This feeling was probably the main cause for the intrigue against the *Führer*, as a result of which the shootings of June 30 took place, to be followed by the virtual disbandment of the 'Brown Shirts' as a 'political army.'

From its inception the Hitler *régime* had seemed inclined to strengthen the position of the *Reichswehr*. Not the Treaty of Versailles alone became the target of German military reform. Here and there in many lesser directions some kind of return to the old Imperial military system has been noticeable. Emblems, flags, cockades and titles went back to former usage. Symptomatic of the process is the repeal of article 156 of the Weimar Constitution, whereby all appeals against sentences imposed by military courts should be addressed to the President: a return was made to the pre-war law, whereby military justice stood outside civilian law.

Other symptoms significant of further developments were not wanting. The defence estimates for 1934-35 amounted to about 900,000,000 marks (at gold parity, £45,000,000). The navy received over 230,000,000 marks; the *Reichswehr* was allotted

650,000,000 (an increase of over 35 per cent. on 1933); from other sources the Air Ministry obtained 40,000,000 (an increase of nearly 170 per cent. on 1933). In addition, there were shown items totalling 450,000,000 marks (police, storm troops, defence sports, etc.) which might well be regarded as probably military in character. A close analysis of these various items can only lead to the conclusions that the navy was spending heavily on new construction; that the army was increasing its effectives and acquiring the 'forbidden' weapons; that the Air Ministry was organising a large national air service.

The establishment of compulsory 'labour' service was yet another innovation of the Hitlerite Government. Although from a strictly military standpoint its importance may have been altogether exaggerated, it has a dual significance in German eyes which could not be overlooked. In the first place, it seemed to supply that corrective to the habits of idleness which the abolition of conscription had engendered in Germany and the growing measure of unemployment had intensified. In the second place, it supplied an invaluable foundation whereupon to erect the superstructure of an industrial conscription in the event of war. It is easy to sympathise with the former motive, just as no objection could be raised to the second, in view of what has been done in that direction in the United States, France and Italy. But as part of a whole movement it can but breed mistrust.

The training of the recruits taken in April was proceeding apace under conditions of the strictest secrecy. The new men were segregated in 'training' units which not even neutral visitors, who could not be suspected of anti-German or anti-Nazi sympathy, were able to see at work.

In these circumstances, with all this and much other evidence accumulating as to the remilitarisation of Germany, it is not surprising that, following on a question raised by Mr. Winston Churchill as to the adequacy of British defence measures, Mr. Baldwin should have made his now well-known statement in the House of Commons on November 28. This statement, which alluded to Germany's military preparations, summarised the situation in the sense in which it has been portrayed above. Before making public this statement, which may be regarded as the deliberate pronouncement of His Majesty's Government, a copy of its contents was presented to the *Führer* in Berlin by the British Ambassador. It is not without interest to note that on receiving it Herr Hitler is alleged to have given vent to a passionate outburst. From this statement it was but a step to the publication of the White Paper which preceded the presentation of the British Estimates for Defence to the House of Commons. This was followed by the invitation to Germany to participate in an

'Air Pact of Non-aggression to be entered into by the Western Powers.'

In January 1934 it was the turn of the black-shirted S.S. It was disarmed, reduced to a shadow, whilst its better elements were to be absorbed into the *Reichswehr*. The latter, having now the *Führer* at its head, stood out as the unquestioned arbiter of Germany's destiny. It was now time for Germany to come out into the open: concealment of the further steps she was taking to secure her rearmament would have been useless. She now claimed that she must be treated as an equal sovereign State. The *Führer* notified to the various Powers, following on the discussion and adoption of two-year service of conscripts in France, that Germany had begun to raise an air force on March 1. This declaration was followed on March 16 by the announcement that, since the various Powers who had secured the disarmament of Germany at Versailles in 1919 were not carrying out their pledges, Germany must reintroduce conscription and raise an army of 500,000 men organised in twelve army corps of thirty-six divisions.

Such is the development of the German army that is to be. What of the air? Since all military aviation was forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, it is far more difficult to give any consecutive narrative of the inception of this new German air force, because everything connected with aviation in Germany has been shrouded in the maximum of secrecy. Nevertheless, there can be no alternative to the assumption that work has been in progress for the creation of an air force during many years past. The output of the German aviation industry and the state and outward appearance of the air units that paraded in Berlin on March 16 are alone sufficient evidence of what has been achieved. It is also legitimate to draw attention to the semi-military complexion of the numerous aeronautical clubs and flying schools of Germany; to the uniforms and martial characteristics of their members; to the aero-engines of a purely combatant nature being sold to foreign customers; to similar engines being bought abroad; to the network of 'air offices' now established throughout Germany on a plan that certainly bears an all but declared military impress. In addition, there has swept over the country a wave of enthusiasm regarding possible air defence, including the education of the population in all the details of preventive measures against gas warfare.

Of official German statements there are scarcely any. In October 1933 General Goering, the newly appointed Air Minister, in an interview granted to a French journalist, is reported to have said:

I want to show that we need a minimum of defensive arms in the air as on land and water. I ask for a little fleet of aeroplanes too light to serve

as bombers, and even, if it is desired, with only a small fuel supply preventing long flights. These little chaser 'planes, no use for attacking, would serve me against aggressors.

At a memorial ceremony to Oswald Boelcke, the celebrated German war aviator, General Goering repeated his claim, which, he declared, must be conceded. Oh, innocent Goering! Like the housemaid who is crying for forgiveness over her unwanted babe 'because it is such a tiny thing,' are you not forgetting that these little strangers have a persistent habit of growing larger and larger as the years go on? Yet already in 1928 General Niessel, in France, drew attention to the fact that the official German army regulations were obviously being based on the assumption that aircraft would be available to support their troops in war: the various types of aircraft-fighter, reconnaissance and bomber, are all specifically quoted by Niessel as being named in correct proportion to army divisions and corps. In 1934 General Armengaud, writing in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, estimated that Germany must be regarded as a great air Power of the future; already, he declared, she possessed an air force numbering some hundred machines. Finally, on November 28, 1934, Mr. Baldwin stated in the House of Commons that Germany already possessed some 600 to 1000 aircraft available for combatant purposes.

Let us examine the 'open' side of the question. No sphere of German activity was penalised more heavily by the Treaty of Versailles than that of aviation. The air forces surviving the Armistice were obliterated; the future defence forces of Germany were to possess no aircraft of any sort or kind. Further, when Germany at length began to think of constructing new civilian aircraft, various fresh obstacles were placed in her path, the most serious being the restrictions imposed on the design of any future machines. These conditions were conveyed to the German Government in 1922 by the Council of Ambassadors, and until 1926 they were rigidly enforced. It was then realised that the situation was growing impossible, and a new agreement was made whereby Germany regained her full liberty both in the matter of aerial navigation and as regards construction of aircraft. But meticulous restrictions, designed to prevent German civil aircraft, flying schools and clubs alike, from being employed for anything approaching a military purpose, were renewed. That the limitations thus imposed on Germany's aviation in 1922 proved galling to her *amour-propre* and irksome to her aspirations goes without saying, but she was in no position to kick at the pricks. Germans consoled themselves in two ways: first, by the development of gliding and sail-planing; secondly, by the evolution of the small, light aeroplane. In both directions German

thoroughness and inventiveness were to accomplish much that was noteworthy.

Gliding had been practised in Germany since 1906, when Herr Lilienfeld, who subsequently came to a fatal end in the course of his experiments, began to study the use of the glider. In 1922 the practice of gliding became a popular sport, and its practice has since made rapid progress. In addition, aerial navigation with airplanes devoid of all motive power became a recognised pastime.* These movements spread throughout Germany, until gliding and sail-planing clubs are now numerous and enthusiastically supported. The importance of the sport from a purely military standpoint is very considerable, since a pilot skilled in gliding or sail-planing will generally pick up the use of power-driven aircraft in a very short time; in fact, in certain cases it is said that a single hour's instruction is sufficient to convert the skilled glider into a passable pilot. No more need be said than that the practice of gliding and the coming of the light aeroplane have gone far to produce a remarkable growth of 'air-mindedness' in Germany whilst creating a reserve of potential war pilots.

In view of the relaxation of restrictions, and still more of their infractions, which passed unpenalised, it proved easy for the German Press to renew its jeremiads as to the hopeless state of defencelessness in which Germany found herself as the result of an iniquitous treaty and of the subsequent jealousy of the enemy Powers: the immense strides made by German constructors, the growth of civil air communications based on German airports, the skill of German pilots, all were being lauded to the skies. Thinly disguised propaganda for the creation of a new German air fleet found a fertile soil; the detailed reports concerning the growth of great aerial armadas in France, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia hastened the growth of the germs so plentifully spread by the Press.

In the meantime, commercial aviation has made great headway in Germany. It may be that the surrender of her commercial shipping combined with the loss of her colonies has caused Germany to turn to the air as an outlet for her thwarted ambitions overseas; but her vision and the scale of the organisation of her air services are alike remarkable. German commercial air-lines serve not only German territory alone, but radiate far into all neighbouring countries; her connexion by air-lines with the Soviet Union alone is extensive and thorough. In 1933 the *Deutsche Lufthansa*, the greatest of German aerial undertakings,

* This form of aerial navigation depends on the utilisation of upward-flowing air currents, these movements of the air being caused chiefly by solar heat or the approach of storms.

was maintaining forty-five services, seven of which were run exclusively for mails and freight. The daily distance flown by the *Lufthansa's* aircraft exceeded 23,000 miles. There are now twelve major airports in Germany, all laid out on a modest modern plan, and managed with characteristic efficiency. In addition, there exist some sixty-five landing-grounds, including seaplane stations on the North and Baltic Seas. The types of the machines employed on these services are not without interest, as they certainly include models that might conceivably easily be modified in constructional plan and details so as to serve combatant purposes. Among the heavy passenger-carrying machines might be named the latest Junkers 'G. 38'; a smaller twin-engine type, carrying six passengers at 150 miles per hour for 400 miles; another three-engined monoplane, with a speed of about 170 miles per hour, a ceiling of 19,000 feet, and a range of over 500 miles; lastly, there is the new 'H.E. 70,' with a speed of 230 miles, a ceiling of 19,000 feet, and a carrying capacity of six. In addition, there are a series of high-performance 'mail-carriers' of about 160 miles per hour and of long cruising range. Among these latter types are some that approximate closely to bombing aircraft in their characteristics. Germany had set her stage and furnished it in such a fashion that transformation from civil to military aviation could be carried out with the minimum of dislocation and the greatest rapidity; although it is still true that the creation of a great 'army of the air' would take some time, probably a few years, to carry through.

Now let us ask ourselves what Germany means with this rearmament. Germans, being what they are, are not likely to lift a finger to take any aggressive military action again—unless, indeed, they are seriously provoked thereto—until they are ready for such a move. They are too thorough, too methodical; and the German soldier has far too great a respect for solid might and numbers to take such incalculable risks as he would be doing by rushing into war under present conditions; he does not consider himself prepared to plunge into the maelstrom at the present moment. The cynic may see in the present divergence between official Government pronouncements and current militaristic manifestations a clear proof that the German is merely biding his time. Small wonder!

If the writings of the German military world of the present day are of any value in solving this problem of the future, then, indeed, it may be asserted that there is little change of outlook in influential and military circles towards war. The German is too imbued, by instinct, by tradition and by practice, with a profound belief in force to undergo such a sudden metamorphosis. German technical writers, after examining minutely the circum-

stances of modern war, cannot see their way to renouncing the philosophy of force which is represented in the writings of Clausewitz, Moltke, and Schlieffen. They still point to Clausewitz's pronouncements on such themes as *The Armament of the Nation* and *The Conditions of Power*, in order to show that the great military battle is still the main road to victory in war, and thereby to success, in a conflict of nations. They have studied 'economic warfare,' 'psychological warfare,' and 'aerial warfare' to some purpose. Yet they cannot abandon their old-time faith in the victory to be gained only by the use of the armed land forces of the nation. To some extent this opinion may be nearer the truth in the case of an armed struggle between Germany and France than it would be in the event of war between Germany and Great Britain. That is of little account: the importance of such a view lies in the fact that the German has not ceased to believe in the great armed forces which, in the nineteenth century at any rate, were the source of his victories and of his vertiginous rise to power. But, mindful of the Great War, he foresees in the future an army complete with every weapon that modern science and invention can place at its disposal. Gas, tanks, aeroplanes—every adjunct that can increase the power of the military instrument is to be acquired. Behind that instrument stands the national will to conquer. And now, as we behold destiny shaping both policy and acts in Germany, we realise that this will to conquer has been for some years in process of creation; the instrument of war is being forged. Whether or not these conditions will make for European peace can only depend on factors which are not of a military nature.

H. DE WATTEVILLE.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AT THE CROSS-ROADS

THE unpopularity of the National Government throughout the country must be ranked as a remarkable phenomenon even in the history of democracy. Elected as it was at one of the most critical moments of our history, it also took office on the crest of a wave of popular enthusiasm to which it is difficult to find a parallel in the records of Parliament. Nor can it be said that it has failed in the tasks then entrusted to it. On the contrary, it must be admitted on all sides, not merely that it has admirably fulfilled the main purpose for which it was formed, the restoration of the financial credit of the country, but also that no Government of the century has a comparable record of sane and constructive legislation.

It is probable that in the distracted year 1931 any action, however drastic, would have commended itself to a nation which had begun to despair of finding in normal politics a way of escape from the profound dangers in which it found itself. But, in spite of the manifest temptation, the Government never for a moment surrendered to the modern cult of action for action's sake; instead, by a judicious combination of caution and of daring, within the strict framework of parliamentary practice, it brought about the recovery of which we are now witnesses without the loss to anyone of a single constitutional liberty. No other country or Government has been able to achieve as much, and it might reasonably be supposed that the Government to which so much of the credit is due should be able at this moment to face a general election without undue alarm. As we all know, this is not at present the fact, and it is worth while analysing why it is that if the Government went to the country to-day it would in all probability lose some 250 of the 509 seats that it holds at the present moment.

It is true that the by-elections have not resulted in the loss of very many seats to the Opposition. To a large extent this is fortuitous, since by chance the vast majority of the seats which have become vacant were safe Tory strongholds which even the worst of candidates would have found it hard to lose. In many

of these by-elections this last consideration was vitally necessary for success. Nevertheless, an analysis of the voting, even where the Government was successful, is not encouraging to its supporters. As was to be expected, the panic vote of 1931 has completely disappeared. Such a vote will never be repeated in normal circumstances. But, what is much more serious, the vitally important floating vote which seems now to have become the deciding factor in any election is being withheld from the party which should in theory make a special appeal to it. The rival political caucuses of the Conservative and Labour Parties are now approximately equal in strength throughout the country. Each may count on obtaining roughly 8,000,000 votes apiece, even in elections of the most unfavourable character. The appeal of the National Government did not materially reduce the vote of the Labour caucus in 1931; the Government's overwhelming success was due almost entirely to the support given to it by the middle party of former Liberals and Right Wing supporters of Labour. That support, on which it must again depend, has now disappeared. It is not being given to any other party in the State. The Labour Party seems to be making no headway whatsoever at the moment. But it is becoming increasingly plain that this middle opinion is shifting gradually to the Left, and that, unless the Government can effect a radical change in the situation, Labour will stand a reasonable chance of attracting a sufficient number of these non-party voters to give it a sporting chance of a clear majority at the next election.

It will presumably be helped in this ambition by the virtual extinction of the Liberal Party. Amid the other alarms and excursions of the Wavertree musical comedy little attention was paid to what seemed to me the most fundamental lesson of that by-election. Wavertree, in Liverpool, is largely dependent on the shipping trade. The fiscal policy of the Government must be blamed for some (and can plausibly be blamed for all) of the depression in the shipping trade. A more suitable constituency in which to preach the pure gospel of Free Trade could hardly be found in England. Yet the very able, hardworking Free Trade Liberal candidate could only secure some 4000 votes and forfeited his deposit. It is difficult, in face of that result, to disagree with the candidate's own comment, 'People do not seem to be interested in Liberalism any longer.' The disintegration of the Liberal Party and the consequently increased importance of the vote which owns no party allegiance are the two main factors which any Government desiring to obtain power must of necessity take into account.

As I have already pointed out, the Government has lost the one and has not yet obtained the other, and it may well ask

itself the reasons for its failure. The first and most obvious is that the Government is going through a phase common to all Administrations which enjoy a long life. The enthusiasm of the first years has departed and the programme on which it went to the country is practically completed, but the platform on which it proposes to stand at the next election is not yet revealed. The consequence is a natural slowing up of *tempo*. Everything that it has done is open to be assailed and criticised by the Opposition; its followers have not as yet any constructive alternative plan to offer and are on the defensive. In such circumstances any Government might well expect to find its popularity diminished. But this by no means accounts for the whole of the slump in the present Government's stock.

It is frequently said that the fault of the present Government lies in its lack of any directive force at the centre. The Prime Minister is accused of being unable to hold his team together properly and of not possessing that directive capacity which is necessary if a Cabinet is to work as a single unit and not a number of individuals. Such a charge can hardly be sustained. Few Administrations have been composed of more diverse types of political thinkers. The Ministry of All the Talents was a homogeneous unity compared to the present Cabinet. Yet few Administrations have held office for so long with so small a change of personnel. The Prime Minister must be given credit for having held his ill-assorted team together, just as each member of the team must be given credit for the necessary subordination of his own peculiar point of view in the interests of the Cabinet as a whole. Nevertheless, two disadvantages have followed from this very success.

In the first place, the incessant strain of day-to-day administration carried on without a break over a period of years is bound to test all but the hardest intelligence. Signs of strain have already become apparent to the country. It is not only that the Government is tired, but the members of the Government are beginning to act as tired men without enthusiasm and without decision. It is not enough that a Cabinet Minister should act rightly. He must also give the impression to the House of Commons and to the country that he knows that he is acting rightly. Such an impression is not being given by the Government at the present moment. It is this lack of confidence in the enthusiasm and freshness of the Cabinet which, more than anything else, has disappointed those who remember its early days of swift and decisive action.

The Government, moreover, has not been well served by the methods which it has used to make known its achievements. As I have said, taken as a whole, those achievements form a very

remarkable record. If they had been clearly formulated when the Government first took office as a programme which it intended to carry out before the next General Election, they would have ranked almost as high as the 'New Deal' of President Roosevelt and certainly, as a programme of constructive social reform, a great deal higher than the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George.

The Government entirely failed to understand the prime necessity of taking the people of the country into its confidence. The modern democracy cannot be swayed by the propaganda methods of the nineteenth century. In those days the electorate was small and literate; each particular detail of the Government's policy could be read and discussed by those who were ultimately to be called upon to vote upon it. To-day the same conditions do not hold good. It is now necessary first of all to collect all your proposed administration into one simple short programme, and then step by step explain to your democracy how the success of that programme is working out. The piecemeal legislation of the Government, conveying a wholly deceptive appearance of lack of purpose, has absolutely no effect upon the modern democrat, accustomed to have all the knowledge which he desires to acquire potted for him into the convenient shape of headlines or slogans. Moreover, it is only by thus announcing your vast programme in advance and keeping people well informed of its progress that sufficient enthusiasm can be engendered in the electorate in order to prevent the swing of the pendulum, which until this new method was invented was regarded as almost inevitable. It is quite absurd, for instance, when the monthly figures of unemployment are published that the Minister of Labour should not in person explain them on the wireless in a short broadcast talk. Similarly, the Minister of Health should at least once a week broadcast a report on the progress of the new housing schemes.

It is only by these trivial means that the modern electorate can be persuaded to take an interest, not merely in the manifold problems with which it finds itself confronted, but also in the active measures which the Government is taking to relieve them. The only effective form of modern political propaganda—as President Roosevelt has found—is to create a feeling in the minds of the people that they are watching a struggle, not between the Government and the Opposition (which interests them hardly at all), but between the Government and the vast forces of economic and social evil of which they themselves are only too well aware. Once that impression of struggle has been created, one can maintain enthusiasm for the Administration, even if its efforts are not always crowned with success. Democracy will tolerate almost any number of failures to-day if it can be really persuaded that

its Government is making an honest effort to make progress. One of the main faults of the Government's propaganda has been to give the quite erroneous impression that it has really more or less accepted the situation as being quite beyond control, and that any efforts it may make to alleviate circumstances are at the best sporadic and half-hearted.

Unfortunately, this impression has been to a certain extent confirmed by a tendency which has lately developed in the Government to administer small but irritating pinpricks to all classes of its supporters in the form of departmental Bills. The most obviously unnecessary of these particular irritations was the Betting and Lotteries Bill, which irritated vast numbers of the Government's Conservative supporters without in any way pretending to deal with the main problem of gambling. This product of the Left Wing conscience was rapidly followed by a silly little Sedition Bill, designed, apparently, to appeal to the extreme Right Wing of the Tory Party. This Bill, coming from nowhere, sponsored by no department and serving no purpose which has yet been explained, has done as much to alienate the middle party supporters of the Government as any other measure. The last of these blunders has now been committed by the Ministry of Transport in imposing a speed limit which is certain to lead to the conviction of any number of perfectly careful drivers and which nobody (not even the Minister responsible for it) seriously supposes will reduce road accidents in any degree. The truth is that these three Bills all show that the Government, in its pre-occupation with the great issues with which it has to deal, has forgotten that the main purpose of legislation ought to be to make people happier, and that if you fail in this purpose the people will not forgive you on account of the fact that certain evils or grievances have thereby been mitigated. It is very easy for a department, anxious to pass through a particular piece of legislation, to argue that the people affected or irritated by it will be very few in number. Nothing destroys a Government more quickly than the creation of a large class in the community with many and different grievances.

The final reason for the weakness of the Government's position must be found in the ranks of its own supporters. The National Labour members, while no doubt contributing largely in brains and ability, have never pretended that they could bring with them any very large number of voters. It would, in fact, be absurd to pretend that any member of the Government speaks for organised Labour to-day. The Liberals are still divided among themselves, though many of them will in the present crisis no doubt be more inclined to follow the constructive statesmanship of Sir John Simon, rather than the very disingenuous arguments

of Sir Herbert Samuel. But, as everybody knows, it is to the Conservatives that the National Government really looks for its main support, and, unhappily, the Conservatives are not altogether united among themselves. The Right Wing of the Tory Party has always existed, and so far has never found itself incompatible with its more Left Wing colleagues. There are signs, however, that under the strain of finding itself under the leadership, not of a Left Wing Conservative, but of a Right Wing Socialist, its loyalty is beginning to waver. Those mainly responsible for the signs of the revolt which have recently shown themselves would be the last to claim that they were altogether disinterested in their motives. It is clear that the formation of a purely Conservative Administration would return to power many of those who at the present moment are insignificant back-benchers.

Although the revolt at the moment is not serious, in spite of the result of Wavertree and in view of the fiasco of Norwood, two things must not be forgotten: First, that the country as a whole, and the Conservative Party in particular, has always had a strong dislike for coalitions. It will tolerate statesmen of different political views forced together by the pressure of circumstances to form an emergency Cabinet, but when the emergency has passed the natural inclination of the English voter is to suspect—usually quite wrongly—that such a Cabinet is being held together more from love of office than from political conviction.

Secondly, it must not be forgotten that although at the present moment the dissentients in the Conservative Party are a mere handful of 80 among 500, yet of that 80 at least 65 hold safe seats in the South of England. If a General Election, therefore, should prove unfavourable to the National Government, the solid *bloc* of 65 may well become sufficiently powerful in a greatly reduced majority to be able to exercise a decisive influence upon Cabinet decisions. The threat, therefore, of a split in the Tory Party should not be discounted too lightly because at the moment the rebels are in an insignificant minority.

With all these factors working against it, the National Government would clearly be extremely unwise to attempt a General Election before the spring of next year. By that time the India Bill, which is still the nominal focus of the discontent in the Conservative Party, will be out of the way. During the autumn the Government will find time to prepare the constructive plans on which it intends to fight the next election. During the winter its supporters will have time to close their ranks and prepare their patter for the hustings. If I had been writing this article a few days ago, I would have suggested that these considerations could only be outweighed and an appeal made to the country in the

autumn if a gigantic success was secured in foreign affairs—the bringing back of Germany into the League, the signing of the Eastern Security Pact, and the Air Locarno. To-day it is not worth while discussing such a contingency.

The Government, then, will almost certainly fight the election next April after a 'prosperity' Budget and with a reconstructed Cabinet and an ambitious programme of industrial reform. If the reconstruction meets with the approval of the voters and the programme has anything of imagination in it, the Government should obtain another resounding triumph. If, however, reconstruction is considered to be eyewash and the programme sterile, then the National Government will, it is true, almost certainly be returned with a working majority, but will almost equally certainly be overthrown at the end of two years in favour of the Labour Party. The alternatives as far as the reconstruction of the Government goes are strictly limited in number. It will be possible to placate at any rate one section of the Conservative Party by the inclusion of Mr. Amery, whose loyal support of the Government during the last four years certainly marks him as of a different calibre from those other 'disappointed' men who have been its most enthusiastic detractors. In addition, youth will no doubt be given its chance, although the experience of this Government at any rate gives little hope that it will take it.

The real interest of any possible reconstruction will lie in the fact whether two comparatively old men, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George, are to be included in the Cabinet. Mr. Churchill, of course, has already bitterly antagonised not only the Prime Minister, but also the Conservative members of the Government, by his intemperate attacks either upon them personally or upon their policy. Moreover, it is now doubtful whether, to the country at large, he is anything more than a joke. Certainly he would not command a voting strength comparable in any way to that of Mr. Lloyd George, who, in my opinion at any rate, could still swing 1,000,000 voters if he had the mind.

Nevertheless, I think it highly unlikely that Mr. Lloyd George will ever find himself again in a National Cabinet. For one thing he is growing old, and, although it is possible to maintain the appearance of youth in opposition, the cares of day-to-day administration have usually proved too much for even the most resilient politician of his age. Moreover, it seems quite clear that if Mr. Lloyd George is to be a member of the Cabinet, Mr. Neville Chamberlain will have to resign. The Conservative Party, in any case, have hardly forgiven Mr. Lloyd George for the Irish Treaty: if they were asked to sacrifice Mr. Chamberlain to make way for a Liberal with such a record, it is quite certain that their loyalty

would not stand the strain. If, therefore, neither Mr. Chamberlain nor Mr. Lloyd George is to be included in the reconstructed Cabinet, the Government must depend for its main appeal on its constructive programme. It is, in my opinion, highly unfortunate that the Cabinet did not find it possible to make known that programme last autumn. If they had done so, all sections of their supporters would have been able to embrace its details before the controversial India Bill distracted their attention to other things.

The Government has always made it plain that, in its view, its task was a double one: first, the task of salvage, and then the task of reconstruction. It has successfully achieved the first but has hardly begun to tackle the second, with the consequence, as I have already mentioned, that its supporters find themselves forced back either on to a barren recapitulation of its past triumphs or on to a vicious, but usually irrelevant, attack on its opponents. Nor is the task made easier by optimistic speeches typified by the recent reply of the Minister of Labour in the debate on the Civil Estimates. It may be perfectly true to say, with Mr. Stanley, that although we may have 2,000,000 unemployed, the matter really only affects 400,000; but to minimise the problem in this way evades the main issue which the Government must face before the next election, and that is not merely how to get rid of the 400,000 by public works or by land settlement, but how to insure that the remaining 1,600,000 should no longer be employed on an average only thirty-two weeks in the year, but, on the contrary, should have a regular employment, even, if necessary, with shorter hours.

If the Government would really face up to this issue and provide a plausible solution for it, they need have little fear as to the result of the next election; but in order to do so they must, so it seems to me, delve a little more deeply than they have done into the facts of our economic situation. The 1,800,000 men now in part-time employment are largely concerned with the export trades. Nothing that the Government can do is likely to increase the productivity of those export trades very much. The main problem to be faced, therefore, is whether it is right to keep our export trades at their present level. In a word, whether it is not really better for us to sacrifice some of our export trades and our foreign lending in order to put back into sheltered trades a large proportion of those who are at present unemployed; and whether in so doing we should not take the opportunity of so increasing our agricultural population as to afford ourselves that cultural background without which no nation has remained great for very long in the past.

It is absurd to pretend that any such measures could be

achieved without a complete revolution, not merely in the relative importance of our export and our internal trades, but also in the relations of the Government to industry. It is possible to take the view that such a revolution is unnecessary—to follow Mr. Runciman and to believe that Free Trade will, partially at any rate, soon be restored to the world, and that all we can do in the meanwhile is to make the best of a bad job. On the other hand, there is the sharp difference of opinion expressed by Mr. Elliot, who feels that the era of Free Trade has passed for ever, and that England as a great export nation must adapt herself as well as she may to her changed circumstances. It is quite impossible that these two points of view should be pursued for very much longer without coming into sharp conflict one with the other. It is very little less than a miracle that the conflict has not developed before. Harmony may reign within the Cabinet: harmony certainly does not reign between the Cabinet's different policies. Sooner or later the choice will have to be made: To develop the internal market by making a vast experiment, or to continue to rely upon what has been our great strength in the past (our export market) in the hopes that the trend of economic nationalism of which we are the chief victims will in time disappear.

As a Conservative I hold that the cultural value of a large landed population is so great as to outweigh almost all other considerations; but whether I am right or wrong, it is quite clear that the Government must formulate a policy on one or other of these two lines. The formulation of such a policy must of necessity involve the reconstruction of the Cabinet; but it is also clear that, unless some definite industrial policy of action is quickly formulated, the Government will have outlived its usefulness and its days are numbered.

DUFFERIN AND AVA.

WHITHER AUSTRIA?

It appears to me to-day that it was fate that I should have been born, of all places, in Braunau on the Inn. For that township lies on the frontier of those two German states the reunion of which seems to us, at least of the younger generation, to be a life-task to be achieved by any and every means.

THUS Adolf Hitler at the very outset of that astonishing book *Mein Kampf*, which, with its confused thought and uncultured style, has become the Bible of the Third Reich. When he wrote these lines Hitler was a small political adventurer, penned up in a fortress, with nothing in his record but the story of a beer-house revolt and an unheroic flight. To-day he is leader of a nation of 65,000,000 souls; to him every soldier, every civil servant, every youth in Germany has sworn an oath of personal allegiance; at his command stands an army which experts believe to be equal to that of Imperial Germany in 1914 and an air fleet that ranks third, possibly second, in Europe. In the programme of the National-Socialist Party there are many promises that have been honoured rather in the breach than in the observance; but in one point Hitler has never faltered. The Austrian leader of Germany has set his heart irrevocably on Austria becoming German. He cannot brook being a foreigner in his own country.

When he came to power it almost looked as if he might, without too much difficulty, succeed in his Austrian designs. Austria was weak and seemed scarcely capable of independent existence. Her people were politically divided into three warring sections. There was the Pan-German group—conservative, race-conscious and reactionary, ready to welcome with open arms this new glory rising in the German heavens. There was the Social-Democrat group—which, though it clung with pathetic inefficiency to Republican traditions, had always preached reunion with the German motherland. Finally, there was the Clerical group—the only one of the three really opposed to the *Anschluss* because it feared the hegemony of Protestant Prussia. The landowners, industrialists, and upper middle classes were Pan-Germans; their swift evolution towards Hitlerism led to their

being joined by thousands of enthusiastic youths and unthinking malcontents. The working class and the bulk of the smaller *bourgeoisie* stood in the Social-Democrat ranks; but they did little more than stand—they did not march. They had leaders who had a constitutional aversion from anything like exertion. Most of the peasantry and, of course, the clergy, with part of the professional classes, were massed around the Catholic banner. They also were merely massed, standing passively.

Then came Dollfuss—a little man with nothing of the statesman and little even of the politician; a peasant, a soldier, and a Catholic. His greatest asset was his indomitable courage, moral and physical. He galvanised the halting Catholic masses; he electrified them with his own faith—his faith in something that was both real and great, in that 'other Germany,' the Germany of humanism and culture, of art and faith. And he linked up this vision with a conception that was in essence new—the conception of Austrian nationalism. It was new because it had never had any *raison d'être* before. Austria had been the nerve centre of a conglomerate empire, an assortment of many races and creeds and tongues; it had been the executive headquarters of the Hapsburg monarchy. It had never been itself a country. The historic merit of Dollfuss is that he created—or appeared to create, for it is as yet too early to judge of its permanence—the idea of an Austrian nation: an Austrian nation that was to be the keeper of all that was valuable to the world in Germanism, that was to conserve German humanism for mankind. This was a great thing to have done. But to carry it out required statesmanship. Dollfuss had vision, he had courage; but he did not know the art—or is it a science?—of politics.

There was a way of handling the situation; it was the way of Catholic democracy. The supineness of the Social-Democrat leaders made that way comparatively easy. No doubt an unrelenting section of convinced Marxists would have stood out and gone over to the Communist camp, but that would probably have been an ineffective minority. Given the slightest encouragement, the Social-Democrat leaders would have supported a Catholic democracy in its stand against Hitlerdom. The masses of the Social-Democrat rank and file would have followed with scarcely a murmur. Backed by the sympathy of the great Western democracies, supported in its own interest by the Little Entente and even by Italy (which cannot afford to have the *Reichswehr* on the Alpine passes), that Catholic-Democrat Austria would have been able to defy all assaults.

Dollfuss chose another way. Perhaps had M. Briand or M. Barthou been at the Quai d'Orsay things would have been different. But French foreign policy was in the hands of smaller

men who had other political fish to fry. Downing Street could hardly be expected to interfere. It is a far cry from London to Vienna. Dollfuss felt himself left in the cold by the great Western democracies. He grasped the extended hand of Mussolini. It was a powerful grasp. The fullest diplomatic support was accorded; military assistance was pledged should the need arise; economic aid was freely promised. That this last was only froth poor Dollfuss did not realise, for he was even less of an economist than he was a statesman. Before he knew where he was he was completely in Mussolini's grasp. Mussolini believed that the allegiance of a Fascist Austria would be much more secure than that of a democratic Austria. Democracies may flirt with dictators, but they do not marry them. From Mussolini's point of view Austrian democracy must be smothered. In Austria itself a powerful voice was tirelessly preaching from the same text. Prince Starhemberg, who after tasting of Nazi fare had been seized with disgust at its grossness, is an able young man, but a young man with a simple mind. For him politics resolve themselves into a problem of three colours: Nazi brown, Socialist red and Fascist black. Socialist red he had hated from the cradle. Nazi brown he had learned to loathe. Fascist black was the only thing left. Young men with simple minds, even if they are able, and especially if they are courageous, have no use for compromises. Politics is for them what a naval campaign was for Nelson—an adventure that can only end with the annihilation of the enemy. The enemy most in evidence (for it held Vienna, the capital, in a firm grip) was Republican Social-Democracy.

Timid remonstrances filtered through from Paris as, during the winter 1933-34, it became increasingly apparent that Dollfuss was preparing to crush the Republicans. But then came the Stavisky affair. It became evident that the French Radical Ministry was doomed. In the Palazzo Chigi as well as in the Ballhausplatz it was fondly believed that the French democratic régime was tottering to its fall. On February 6 the 'Ligues' on the Place de la Concorde overthrew a Ministry that had that very day secured a decisive majority in the Chamber. Dollfuss decided to act. Major Eiffler and twenty other leaders of the Republican 'Schutzbund' were arrested. On February 12—by a curious irony, on the very day on which in France a general strike 'barred the way to French Fascism'—the Austrian Social-Democrats took up arms in reply to a series of deliberate governmental provocations. Since they had allowed the Government to dictate the time and place of battle, since they went into the fight in characteristically haphazard manner, and since, to crown all, they applied a strategy that was of necessity a short cut to disaster, they were swiftly and decisively beaten. Mussolini

and Starhemberg had their way. The Austrian Republic was dead. The Austrian Fascist, or Corporate State, was born.

Across that river Inn on the banks of which he was born Adolf Hitler must have smiled. Here, surely, was his chance. The Social-Democrats, after all, represented about 40 per cent. of the Austrian electorate. They were disorganised, disheartened, full of hate and a thirst for vengeance. Had Hitler waited till preparations were complete, he might have succeeded; but he was in a hurry. Things were going none too well in the Third Reich. There were alarms and excursions. The blood-bath of June 30 rankled in many quarters up to then favourable. A striking success abroad was urgently needed to distract attention. The rising which had been originally scheduled for September was suddenly ordered to take place on July 25.

As all the world knows, it resulted in ignominious failure. The main blow, despite the atrocious murder of Dollfuss, miscarried. The expected mass-rising of the population was restricted to a few bands of Nazis, especially in Carinthia. The S.A. leaders pleaded desperately with the Socialist and Communist local leaders to join them against a *régime* they had every reason to hate. But neither Socialists nor Communists were of a mind to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Adolf Hitler. To crown everything, Italian armies massed on the Brenner. Hitler whistled back the hounds he had unleashed! He even pretended to whip them for having tried to carry out his behests. The Nazi frontal attack on Austria had been so decisively repulsed that it is safe to say that a second attack will never take place.

After General Sir Redvers Buller had suffered a terrible reverse in attempting a frontal attack on the Boer positions on the Tugela River, an American military visitor to whom he was showing the battlefield suddenly asked him: 'Was there no way round, General?' Hitler is taking a way round. The movement is to-day in full course of development. It is not showy and so escapes attention, but it is all the more dangerous. Before examining its character and prospects it would perhaps be well to outline the present political and psychological state of affairs in Austria. The present Government—and that implies more than the Ministry, it implies the *régime*—does not command the support of more than 10 per cent. of the population. The economic distress is grave, and is increasing rather than diminishing. The *régime* is being held partly by the 140,000 bayonets in its pay, but mainly by the mutual antagonism of its critics and opponents.

The official commentator reading these three statements would doubtless try to disprove them by adducing two items of statistical information. He would point out that the number of

unemployed in receipt of the dole has greatly diminished, and that the number of Austrian citizens of both sexes enrolled as members of the governmental organisation, the '*Vaterländische Front*,' is nearer to 40 than 10 per cent. of the total population—which merely goes to prove that statistics even technically accurate often serve to conceal rather than to reveal the truth. Take the recruiting for the *Vaterländische Front*. Every kind of moral, social, political and financial pressure is brought to bear on every Austrian to join this organisation. To start with, every State servant, every municipal worker, everyone in public employ from Secretaries of State down to street sweepers, is forced to join. Otherwise he ceases to draw his pay. Every taxpayer, if he wishes to avoid being endlessly harassed by the tax-collector with inflated claims and contested returns, must be a member of the *Vaterländische Front*. Every man or woman out of work and applying for the dole must fill up a schedule; prominent on that schedule is the question: 'What is the number of your membership card of the *Vaterländische Front*?' Every person applying for a job of any sort knows that, in self-defence, his prospective employer will inquire: 'Are you a member of the *Vaterländische Front*?' An employer of labour told me the other day with a grim smile: 'The *Vaterländische Front* wrote to me some time ago, drawing my attention to the fact that out of 187 men in my employ only six were members of that organisation. I put it to my men. They replied sullenly that they would be damned before they would pay a single Groschen to join that organisation. I received a second letter advising me very strongly, in my own interest, to apply pressure to my employees. It was hinted that otherwise my works might be closed down. I knew it was useless, and I was not going to upset my whole concern by sacking everybody and engaging a new lot of unskilled men. So what could I do? I drove down to the office of the *Vaterländische Front* and entered up 181 employees and workmen, paying their entrance fees and subscriptions out of my own pocket!' Instances of the kind might be multiplied indefinitely. There is hardly a middle-class burgher of Vienna who does not wear the red-white-red ribbon of the *Vaterländische Front* in his buttonhole; but ask him privately what he thinks of it. He calls it, humorously enough, the '*Existenzklammer*' (the 'existence ribbon'). The inflated ranks of the *Vaterländische Front* constitute a gigantic Potemkin village that only impresses him who knows nothing of the facts.

The unemployment statistics are not less deceptive. Of course the number of persons in receipt of the dole has been reduced, but that does not mean that there are less unemployed. It means that there are scores and scores of thousands of unem-

ployed who no longer receive the dole—either because, being political fanatics, they refuse to bow the knee to the Baal of the *Vaterländische Front*, or because some member of their family has work, or for one of the fifty odd reasons for which unemployed are held to have forfeited their claim to the dole. Not receiving the dole does not satisfy their hunger, however, nor does it add to their ardent enthusiasm for the powers that be. Another factor that has reduced the number of official unemployed is the recruiting for the *Heimwehr* and the other para-military organisations. These lads receive uniform, food, and a trifle in the way of pocket-money. Better that than to sleep on the Danube quays and beg in Vienna streets. But one wonders how this kind of thing helps the economic prosperity of Austria. There is cause for much wonder in these unemployment statistics. Thus, we learn from the official unemployment insurance journal that in one year the number of employed persons coming under the Insurance Act has decreased by 6608. How it is possible, given a total population that has not decreased, for both employed and unemployed to decrease simultaneously is one of those little mysteries of officialdom that defy the rules of logic.

The economic distress and political dissatisfaction of the Austrian people are facts which the Government may deny, but of which it is in reality acutely and anxiously conscious. To do it justice, it is doing its best to produce a remedy. But so far it has only produced palliatives, all of them ineffective save one—the invaluable financial help afforded by the League of Nations. But the Geneva institution cannot be expected to go on indefinitely filling up a bottomless cask. Economic salvation cannot come from State mendicity. The tragedy of Austria is that, even were world conditions to improve, economic salvation could not come from Austria itself; for just as there never has been an Austrian nation proper, so there never has been an economic unit called Austria. The tiny pastoral country with its huge capital city—a puny body with an abnormally large head—is not economically viable. It used to form part of an economic and political entity that embraced the Danubian States. It can only recover its equilibrium by a close economic union with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. The Austrian Government has of late shown signs of a genuine desire to move in that direction; but the way thither is long and thorny, for it raises all manner of diplomatic complications. The best service, indeed the only real service, the League of Nations could render Austria would be to facilitate the creation of a Danubian economic bloc.

These, however, are diplomatic considerations, and the man-in-the-street in Vienna, as elsewhere, thinks out his life,

not in terms of diplomacy, but in terms of bread and butter. To-day he lacks not only butter, but bread, and he blames his Government. That Government, in its heart of hearts, realises that it is helpless in the economic field, so it is driven to concentrate its efforts on the political field, where no remedies are to be found, but only palliatives and doubtful expedients.

Threatened as it is by the constant Nazi menace, the Government has apparently come to the conclusion that things cannot any longer be allowed simply to drift. You can govern a certain time by muzzling the Press, by opium-dosing the public, by setting night and day armed guards in front of even branch post offices, by brandishing incessantly before the public the might of 140,000 mercenary bayonets. You can do that for a certain time, but you cannot do it all the time. Some new method must be devised. The Schuschnigg Government appears within recent weeks to have evolved two such new methods. The first is to try and win over the working classes. The second is to prepare the way for bolstering up (and in due time supplanting) the present régime by the Hapsburgs. Two men are specially active in the first of these two directions: the assistant Mayor of Vienna, Herr Winter, an extremely able but somewhat befogged economist, and Herr Kunschak, an old war-horse of Labour, erstwhile leader of the Christian Trade Union movement. Both these men are strenuously earnest and honest, but their efforts have hitherto borne little fruit. The average working man remains deaf to their appeals. He reasons this way: 'We built up with our contributions magnificent social and provident institutions; they have been stolen from us. We erected the most splendid system of working-class housing in the world; now we are made to pay hugely increased rents for it. We laboured to construct a trade union organisation that gave us assurance of fairplay, and now we find that this has been destroyed overnight and replaced by a system of "corporations" we neither understand nor have any faith in. And this is the régime you invite us to support? Away with it!'

The Government has gone yet further in its attempts to conciliate these masses. Many of the trials of the Socialists for their participation in the February 1934 rising have been adjourned indefinitely; some abandoned altogether. Thousands of Reds have been released from prisons and concentration camps. Perhaps in course of time this policy, belated though it be, may bear good results; but so far there is not the slightest sign of anything of the sort. The Republican masses remain sullen and indomitably hostile. The second method is, on the whole, more promising. The Hapsburg tradition stands for past greatness, and especially for past prosperity. On all hands one

hears men say: 'Under the Hapsburgs we were much better off.' And many men of Liberal opinions—and the Viennese *bourgeoisie* is of pronounced Liberal tendencies—add: 'Under the Hapsburgs we enjoyed far greater liberties than now. And it was a Hapsburg emperor who gave us the universal suffrage and the secret ballot, which the present *régime* has taken away from us.'

There is no chance whatsoever of the Schuschnigg-Starhemberg Fascist State ever getting a strong foothold among the Austrian people; but there undoubtedly is a chance of the Hapsburg idea gathering fairly strong support—at least, from the middle classes and the peasantry. Such a solution would entail grave diplomatic complications; but we are concerned here, not with international diplomacy, but with the internal situation in Austria. A Hapsburg restoration may be a potential danger to European peace, or it may not; at all events, it is a conceivable way out of the present internal political anarchy in Austria. As such it is, of course, anathema to the National-Socialists both in Vienna and in Berlin, and it is not by mere chance that the new dawn of legitimist aspirations has coincided with the opening of the second phase of the Nazi campaign for the conquest of Austria.

On February 4 of this year a courier brought from Berlin new instructions to the Nazi leaders in Austria. The following quotation from a secret circular that was forthwith sent out to all Nazi groups throughout the country gives a fair idea of the nature of these new instructions:

The Saar campaign must serve as a model for action in Austria. Events, for the time being at least, are not favourable to an armed rising, and all manifestations of terrorism must be formally discouraged and put down by the responsible leaders. The Government of the *Reich* is doing all that is necessary to render possible the holding of a plebiscite that will lead, if not to the *Anschluss*, at least to the establishment in Austria of a *régime* prepared to act in every way in accord with the *Reich*. Since the opening of the plebiscite campaign may be foreseen some time during the month of March, every National Socialist group must from March 1 be placed on a footing of immediate readiness.

Months ago Alfred Rosenberg wrote: 'After the Saar will come Dantzig, then Memel and Austria.' The Saar has gone home. A general election that approximates to a plebiscite is being forced on the citizens of Dantzig. The Memel trial now going on has lifted a corner of the veil from the Nazi intrigues to 'plebiscite' that territory. Now the ground is being laid for a similar game in Austria.

The new campaign is avowedly directed not to a rising, a revolution, or a series of terrorist acts. These are antiquated methods, thinks Hitler, now that they have failed. Plebiscite is a fine word, a fashionable word; in short, it is *the* word. I

the Austrians can be duped or bullied into setting up a *régime* which, while nominally Austrian, will in reality be subservient to the Wilhelmstrasse, the battle will be won. No foreign country, Berlin somewhat naïvely believes, could object, since it would be the result of a purely internal Austrian political manoeuvre, and since it would not in any way disturb existing frontiers. The *Anschluss* cannot be obtained save by war, and for war the hour has not struck—not yet. But '*innere Gleichschaltung*' (i.e., the 'internal co-ordination') of Austria, until it reaches the same political and ideological plane as Germany, is a matter of purely local concern.

Such being the policy, what are the tactics that are already being used, and very efficiently used, to carry it out? They may be summed up as tactics of peaceful penetration, concentrated (at first, at any rate) on the most exposed and vulnerable parts of the Austrian governmental front—the Press, the army, the business world, youth and the unemployed. One cannot restrain a feeling of admiration for the swiftness and thoroughness with which the new policy is being applied. Let us consider the various departments in their order:

The Press. This at first sight might appear to be a somewhat unpromising field, since the Austrian Press is so closely controlled by the Government. Yet there are signs which may be read, if not by him who runs, at least by him who stands in the wings. The *Reichspost*, for all that it can claim to be almost a semi-official organ, has farmed out its advertisement columns to a company of German origin and Nazi spirit. Advertising is not editorial, it is true; but it is equally true that the two sections are Siamese twins. When one finds the editor-in-chief, Dr. Funder, reading curtain lectures to other Vienna papers for taking sides against Germany in the present international game of diplomatic chess, one is left wondering whether this is the result of Nazi advertising connexions or of the said Herr Funder's intimacy with Dr. Oskar Bamm, who has for decades been one of Germany's most active agents in Central Europe. Much the same tendency, due to causes only a trifle more obscure, is to be observed in the *Neue Freie Presse*. A big packet of shares in the hitherto staunch *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* has just changed hands, and the new hands are such that informed readers are anxiously watching the editorial columns day by day to catch the first straw that will reveal the way the new wind blows. What might be called the financial texture of the Viennese Press is altering so rapidly that at this rate the only important papers left without a secret pipe-line to Berlin will be the *Tag* and the *Stunde*, which are notoriously spoon-fed from Prague. Much the same thing is happening in the provinces; and as for the small weeklies and

illustrated papers, no one glancing at them can fail to realise, for all their lip-service to the *Vaterländische Front*, what master they really serve. These efforts are not restricted to Austria. During the month of February the Nazis purchased several provincial papers in Hungary and Rumania, articles from which frequently 'happen' to be reproduced in the Austrian Press. A news agency has been founded in Switzerland, and several more obscure in Paris, with the object of flooding Austrian papers with cheap news items that look interesting enough but are calculated to leave a Nazi taste in the mouth.

The Army. It is exceedingly difficult to gauge how far the Nazis have been successful in undermining the allegiance of the army, but a passage from another secret circular of theirs is significant in this respect. The circular is dated February 16. It reads :

The success of our efforts to extend our personal foothold in the federal army has far exceeded all expectations. It should be realised that the winning over of one officer may in certain cases mean the neutralising of a whole unit. In the case of the *Heimwehr* and like formations, prospects with the officers are not promising, but work among the rank and file has been shown to yield excellent results.

The Business World. No one can go about the cafés of Vienna and the places where business men congregate without being struck by a persistent double campaign : economic *défaitisme* as regards Austria ; economic optimism as regards Germany. ' Travellers,' always of avowedly ' neutral ' opinions, just come back from the Third Reich, and full of tales of the most amazing Nazi prosperity, abound everywhere. That is one approach to the business world. The other is the financial way. An interest is bought in important Austrian banking, commercial or industrial undertakings ; this interest carries with it a seat on the board and a voice in shaping the firm's policy. The peaceful penetration of Austrian business is being carried out apace.

Youth. This is a department in which the Nazis are specially skilled. Many of the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides groups in Austria are to-day, unknown to the powers that be, led by men and women who are pledged to Hitler. A chance revelation the other day showed that one of the biggest youth organisations was entirely honeycombed by the Nazis. Schoolmasters who on the lapels of their coats wear the ' existence badge ' of the Government instil daily in the State schools the virtues of Hitlerism into the minds of their pupils. The great sport organisations are carefully ' worked,' with astonishing results. The famous Austrian Alpine Club, for instance, is notoriously a Nazi preserve. Every day sees the foundation of some new small ski-ing club, for

instance, where youths, on the occasion of their week-end trips into the snowclad hills, are taught the elements of Nazi thought.

The Unemployed. Here direct and personal action is systematically employed. Anyone going of an evening to certain popular and cheap cafés like the ' Grenadier ' or the ' O.K.' in Vienna, where unemployed seek refuge from the cold outside, may observe Nazi agents entering into conversation with them, full of sympathy, winding up their talk with offers of practical help if they will join the illegal Nazi organisations.

These are the broad lines of the present campaign. They are intelligently conceived and efficiently executed. There can be no doubt that they are, in their cumulative effect, singularly dangerous. Popular opinion is being prepared for the idea of a plebiscite, and at the same time the results of such a plebiscite are being prepared in advance. It is the kind of agitation which the authorities can hardly cope with so long as they have not got a large part of the public on their side. It is, moreover, a kind of agitation that is not showy and that may go on for months without being unduly noticed. The idea itself is clever, for the Republicans, who, despite their set-backs, still number probably about one-third of the population, are naturally, in principle, favourable to any kind of popular consultation, whether it be a parliamentary election or a plebiscite. No opposition to the scheme of a plebiscite can therefore be expected from them. But they obviously want such a plebiscite to include a possibility of the restoration of a parliamentary régime.

It is difficult to estimate what the result of such a consultation would be at the present time. It would all depend on the questions put to the electors. The fairest list would obviously be : the present régime, a Parliamentary Republic, a Hapsburg Monarchy, or the *Anschluss*. In such a case there is little doubt that the Republic would win hands down. But such a wide range of choice is unlikely, and the Nazis will stake everything on a straight vote for or against the present Schuschnigg-Starhemberg régime, with a German National régime as the alternative. Such is the hatred which the present Government has succeeded in accumulating among the broad masses of the public that the result of such a plebiscite would be extremely doubtful, and thousands of Republicans would probably vote against the present régime on the principle that nothing could be worse. Obviously a very foolish policy, but in the circumstances not altogether surprising. The Nazis are speculating on this. The Government will, of course, in duty bound, move heaven and earth to prevent a plebiscite, but it is conceivable that, if the Nazi campaign proceeds as at present, it may find itself forced to give way. In that case those who have a care for the preservation of European

peace would do well to insist that the contest is not confined to a mere 'for' or 'against' the present *régime*, but that if the Austrian people is to be allowed to settle its destinies by means of the ballot-box, it be given the widest range of choice possible.

Hitler's 'way round' must be met. If it is not met by force, it must be met by ruse. The present hybrid species of artificial Austrian 'Fascism' cannot last. It is questionable whether it could last even if it were to be reformed by Starhemberg, who has undoubted ambitions to do so. If it is not to be replaced by Nazism or something very like it, a barrier must be set up. A Hapsburg restoration might constitute such a barrier, but would probably entail dangerous foreign complications. The only popular force at present able to withstand Nazism in Austria with success is, and remains, Republican and Democratic sentiment.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC

A REPLY

IN his article appearing in the March issue of *The Nineteenth Century*, Lord Strabolgi drew attention to certain disquieting features arising from Japan's actions in the Far East. That the situation should give rise to serious apprehension is but natural. At the same time, Lord Strabolgi did well to stress, at the very outset, the necessity of being 'on our guard against sensationalism in discussing Far Eastern affairs.' In view of this eminently sound warning of his, it is unfortunate that he himself should have given currency in his own article to statements which in some instances are definitely misleading and in others are either palpably incorrect or, at best, open to doubt. This is doubly regrettable in that, on the basis of these assertions, he has drawn deductions which do not appear wholly warranted.

Apart from a number of minor errors,¹ there are several of a more serious nature. Referring, for example, to the announcement of a new Japanese doctrine for China attributed, by the paper that published it, to Mr. Hirota, Lord Strabolgi asserts: 'No Japanese newspaper would dare to publish such a statement of policy without encouragement in high quarters.' If Lord Strabolgi believes this, he has been curiously misinformed, and would most certainly change his opinion if he went to Japan for a few years as a foreign correspondent. Japanese newspapers, even those of the highest standing, have no hesitation whatever in publishing statements of apparently complete authenticity on the flimsiest of foundation and, not infrequently, on no basis at all. It is, in fact, on record that a British consul in Japan once ruled 'that anything appearing in a Japanese newspaper is no evidence at all as to its having happened.' The foreign correspondent who goes to Japan quickly learns from bitter experience how well merited was this consular observation, for it is hardly

¹ E.g., 'Darlen' for 'Dairen,' 'Mr.' Tanaka for 'General Baron Tanaka,' 'Naimichi Shumbun' for 'Mainichi Shimbun,' and the curious assertion that 'Now the last of the Elder Statesmen has gone,' when in actual fact Prince Saionji is still playing a far from unimportant part on the Japanese political stage.

an exaggeration to say that a foreign correspondent in Tokyo spends half his time in seeking to check up the truth or otherwise of reports appearing in the vernacular Press, while a not inconsiderable portion of the other half is spent in replying to queries from his own head office in England or America regarding reports from other correspondents who have cabled news items of this kind without troubling to confirm or disprove them.

The particular Press 'statement' to which Lord Strabolgi refers may or may not have been justified. From bitter personal experience as a former Tokyo correspondent, I myself would be inclined to discount it to a large extent as having emanated, in all probability, from the editor himself or from one of his assistants, who either attempted to indulge in 'intelligent anticipation' or else wished to float a balloon of his own in the hope that it might meet with the approval of those in high quarters and of his own readers. One thing quite certain is that it is wholly erroneous to imagine that 'no Japanese newspaper would dare to publish such a statement of policy without encouragement in high quarters.'

Similarly, it is equally incorrect to contend, as Lord Strabolgi appears to do, that the Japanese operations at Shanghai were 'abandoned' on account of pressure from abroad. The initial fighting appears to have been precipitated, not by any deliberate design on the part of Japan, but by a serious miscalculation. Japan, at the outset, believed that a show of naval force would be sufficient to overawe the Chinese and bring them to heel. This was the first bad error. The second and still more fatal mistake was made when the naval landing forces, finding that a mere show of force was insufficient, allowed themselves to be drawn into street fighting, an action unjustified both by their relative weakness in regard to numbers and by their particular form of training. Having once become involved, however, they had no choice but to go ahead with the task to which they had so unfortunately committed themselves. Had they attempted to extricate themselves and withdraw to their ships, not only would Japan have suffered a severe loss of prestige, but the position of Japanese and foreigners alike would have been seriously endangered, as the 19th Route Army and Chinese soldiery in general, elated with their victory, would have poured into the Settlement and murdered and looted to their hearts' content. Well was it said, at the time, by Shanghai foreign residents with little love for the Japanese that the only thing to be feared more than Japanese success was Japanese defeat by the Chinese, as the position of everyone would then have become intolerable.

Having once committed herself to these operations, Japan, therefore, had no alternative but to carry them through to completion. And what was meant by completion? Japan

announced at an early stage what she intended to do. This was to drive the Chinese back to a minimum distance of 20 kilometres from the city and to ensure by signed agreement that they remained there. This is exactly what she did. Having completed this and achieved her object, she withdrew her troops to Japan without delay as promised, much to the astonishment of those who had been declaring that the Japanese were there to stay, and that, in fact, they intended to go on to Nanking and even further. To say, therefore, that Japan 'abandoned' her 'attack' on account of pressure from abroad and the unexpected strength of the Chinese military resistance is not only misleading but, from all available evidence, devoid of foundation. Certainly the Chinese 19th Route Army put up a far better resistance than was expected; but, following their landing at Liuho, the Japanese very quickly had the Chinese on the run, and, had they been disposed to do so, could have kept them on the run for many miles beyond the 20-kilometre line.

It seems necessary to stress this point, as others besides Lord Strabolgi appear to have fallen into the common error of believing that Japan 'abandoned her attack' and withdrew from Shanghai as a result of pressure from abroad. Some observers have even professed to see a parallel between this withdrawal and our own withdrawal from Gallipoli; yet even the most cursory examination of the facts should have served to show that the circumstances were entirely different. Mistaken beliefs of this kind take all too firm a root and gradually gain currency as accepted facts. As such they become a positive danger, as they are used to support the arguments of those who contend that Japan will back down before pressure from abroad and that she can be defeated and deflected with little difficulty from carrying out her considered plans. Lord Cecil and, more recently, General Smuts and Lord Lothian have all apparently fallen into this error, as each one of them appears to think that it only requires the application of pressure from abroad to check Japan's alleged aggressive intentions. General Smuts advocates a virtual Anglo-American united front against Japan as the best means of dealing with the dangers which, quite rightly, he sees in the Far Eastern situation. Lord Lothian urges us to 'mobilise the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty' against Japan. Lord Strabolgi considers that the peace of the Pacific can best be preserved by 'the closest collaboration between London and Washington.'

Anglo-American friendship and collaboration are undoubtedly necessary if a peaceful settlement of the Far Eastern problem is to be obtained, but the present dangers are likely to be increased rather than diminished if this collaboration entails bringing

pressure to bear on Japan. That is what General Smuts and Lord Lothian appear unable to recognise. Japan, if approached in the right way, may listen to reason and show herself ready to accept a *quid pro quo*. She will never accept any attempt to dictate to her. Rather will dictation and the application of pressure from England and America, or from her co-signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, serve to stiffen her attitude and increase her truculence; for in her mind will be conjured up bitter memories of the Triple Intervention, memories calculated to unite moderates and extremists together into one solid body.

Lord Strabolgi refers to the existence of a 'strong, growing, though as yet practically inarticulate, party opposed to further adventures.' In this he is probably right, and, provided no external pressure is applied, it seems reasonable to suppose that this 'party' will gradually increase in strength, in numbers, and in articulation, as there are already signs that the country as a whole is losing interest in the 'crisis' and is anxious to return to more normal conditions. It seems probable, in fact, that, had it not been for the expedient of floating huge bond issues in order to balance the recent succession of inflated budgets, the voice of moderation would by now have had the support of the taxpayer in general, as taxation would have had to be increased to a considerable extent. The time is rapidly approaching when higher taxation will become inevitable. The influence of the more moderate elements will therefore, in the ordinary course of things, almost certainly increase, as nothing is more likely to win support for the cause of moderation than an increase in taxation, which touches everyone's pocket. Surely it would be the height of folly, then, for England and America or the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty to take any action smacking of coercion or pressure on Japan. It would most certainly do more harm than good, as not only would it serve to stultify the otherwise natural development of the movement in favour of moderation, but it would intensify the very dangers that it was hoped to dispel. The Japanese taxpayer, who, in normal circumstances, may be expected to rally to the cause of moderation when his pocket is touched, will respond readily to whatever additional burdens of taxation may be imposed in order to resist any attempt by the Western Powers to bring pressure to bear on Japan, and taxpayers and moderates alike may be counted upon to form a solid front with reactionaries and extremists to oppose any such pressure.

One almost certain outcome of such pressure would be the strengthening of the Pan-Asiatic movement. This movement, to which Lord Strabolgi refers in his article, has made considerable headway in Japan during the past few years. Even prior

1931 it had gained a certain amount of prominence for itself; but, generally speaking, the occasional outbursts of Pan-Asianism had evoked little more than academic interest from the Japanese nation as a whole. Following the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble, however, its principal exponents, who included a number of Indian seditionists and political refugees living in Japan, seized the opportunity to exploit the feelings of resentment aroused by the unfortunate handling of the whole affair at Geneva and drummed it into the minds of the people at large that Western denunciation of Japan's actions was solely due to jealousy on the part of the 'white' races, who resented the rise of Japan, an Asiatic Power, and were determined to 'put her in her place.' War-time psychology—for such, in effect, was the highly inflamed national sentiment existing in Japan at the time—provided fertile ground for such propaganda. The movement spread rapidly, and tirades against Western 'imperialism' and 'domination,' combined with cries of 'Asia for the Asiatics!' and 'Liberate our Asiatic brothers from Western bondage!', became the order of the day. With Japan's withdrawal from Geneva and the resultant easing of the general situation, however, Pan-Asianism in Japan died down very considerably. It was revived subsequently for a brief period as a result of the Indian trade dispute; but, following the successful conclusion of the Indian Trade Agreement early last year, Japanese enthusiasm for the Pan-Asiatic cause has temporarily faded once more, despite sporadic attempts on the part of the little handful of irreconcilables to keep it alive.

I say 'temporarily' advisedly, as there is little doubt that untimely and ill-considered action by Great Britain and America, or by the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, would inevitably lead to a renewed, and possibly even more virulent, outburst of Pan-Asianism in Japan—an outburst that might well have serious repercussions in India and elsewhere. It is, of course, extremely doubtful that the Japanese as a nation have anything more than an academic sympathy for the alleged sufferings of their fellow-Asiatics in India under British 'bondage.' It is even more doubtful that any responsible Japanese statesmen or others seriously contemplate ever embarking on a crusade to 'liberate' India from British control or to seize India, the Dutch East Indies, or any other such territory for Japan. But there is a very real danger that ill-judged action on the part of Western Powers may force Japan into using the rallying cry of 'Asia for the Asiatics!', with results seriously disturbing to the peace of the world.

The fact is—and it is just as well to recognise it—that Japan can be an extremely valuable friend and an extremely dangerous

enemy. Which she is to be will depend very largely on the way she is approached. If we try to bring pressure to bear on her, she will most certainly resist and be antagonised. If we show a more sympathetic understanding of her problems and her motives, it should not be beyond the powers of wise statesmanship to find a way by which we can satisfy her natural aspirations and relieve her fears in regard to national security, without in any way sacrificing our own or any other nation's legitimate interests. Such a settlement of the Far Eastern problem would ensure her friendship, and, in view of her strong position in the Far East and Western Pacific, there can be no question but that friendship with Japan would be the cheapest and most effective safeguard for our own great and important interests in those waters. That, of course, is where the Anglo-Japanese Alliance proved of such inestimable mutual benefit. It is strange indeed, therefore, that so discerning a statesman as General Smuts should be found expressing satisfaction that the Alliance no longer exists, as most of the present unrest and instability in the Far East can be traced directly or indirectly to the abrogation of that valuable instrument, an action which left Japan with a serious grievance and a regrettable feeling of insecurity.

Lord Strabolgi appears surprised at the change that has come over Japan since 1922, when, as he puts it, she entered into the Washington Treaty, not as 'a defeated Power after a great war,' but as 'one of the victors and partners in the victory.' He professes inability, therefore, to understand why she has now denounced that Treaty; but surely he must see that it is not merely Japan's attitude that has changed. The whole situation which, in 1922, rendered the Treaty satisfactory to Japan has likewise undergone a change. In so far as the question of 'humiliation' is concerned, Japan—rightly or wrongly—has come to the conclusion that the implied inferiority of the 5-5-3 ratio has had a psychological effect on the Chinese, in whose eyes Japan has, accordingly, suffered a serious loss of prestige. To this loss of prestige she attributes the fact that the Chinese felt confident that they could flout her with impunity, a confidence which proved unfounded, as Japan hit back eventually in 1931, with the results we know. This, then, is one of the reasons for Japan's change of attitude towards the Treaty concluded in 1922; but the change is due also to a number of other factors, most of which bear directly on the question of national defence. These include the immense developments witnessed since 1922 in the offensive powers of aircraft, the increased radius of action of battleships and cruisers, the increased responsibilities to which Japan has committed herself under the Manchukuo Protocol, the huge expansion and development of Soviet armaments, and

Japan's own withdrawal from the League and consequent inability to depend on that body for support. To these Japan adds the assertion that the increasing activities of the League and of individual Powers in China serve to aggravate the general situation in the Far East and have therefore added to her 'responsibility' for the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

To this last contention it may be retorted that no one has ever asked Japan to accept responsibility; but from the Japanese point of view this self-appointed task is not unnatural. She has seen how Britain has accepted responsibility for the protection of foreign lives and interests in Egypt as well as to safeguard certain Imperial interests vital to herself. She has seen, too, how beneficial to the principal parties concerned has been the American Monroe Doctrine. Is she, therefore, to be blamed for concluding that something akin to a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for East Asia would prove, in the long run, the best and surest means of stabilising the situation in the Far East and safeguarding her own vital interests there? Other nations besides Japan, it is true, have immensely important interests in the Far East; but a conciliatory approach on the part of these other Powers might well prove the best way to ensure that these interests were as well protected as the interests of third parties have been in Egypt or Latin America, especially if it is recognised that Japan's interests in East Asia are as vital to her as are our own in Egypt or those of the United States in Central and South America.

But there are other reasons besides her increased 'responsibilities,' and the other factors already noted, that have led Japan to denounce the Treaty to which she agreed thirteen years ago at Washington. Closely linked to this Treaty is the London Naval Treaty of 1930, to which a strong section of Japanese naval opinion has always been bitterly opposed. In agreeing to sign this latter Treaty against the advice of their own Naval General Staff, the Japanese signatories were undoubtedly swayed to a large extent by financial considerations, as the Government of the day was pledged to a policy of economy and retrenchment and was firmly convinced that the Treaty provided the best means for reducing naval expenditure. As Admiral Richmond, however, so aptly remarked in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, economy at the expense of security is apt to prove false economy, as it leads eventually to demands for an increase of armaments in order to ensure security. This is just what the Japanese Naval General Staff has always contended, and naval developments in Japan since 1930 appear to have justified this contention. Moreover, the ratios and allotted tonnages agreed upon at Washington in 1922, and at London eight years later, have compelled each of the parties concerned to build up categories which they do not

really want, and in some instances have left them deficient in those essential for their own particular requirements in the matter of national defence. We ourselves have been forced to build submarines and large cruisers which we do not desire and have had to be content with a far smaller total number of cruisers than the safety of our sea communications and our Imperial responsibilities demand. America, too, has had to maintain more submarines than she would otherwise require, while Japan, like ourselves, would prefer smaller but more numerous cruisers and smaller battleships. And so it goes on.

Whether one agrees with the Japanese point of view or not, there seems no valid reason to doubt Japan's sincerity when she says that one of her main objects in denouncing the Washington Treaty is to replace it with a new agreement, which will enable each of the signatories to reduce the total tonnage at present allowed to them and, at the same time, enable each country to use the allotted global tonnage according to its own particular requirements in the matter of defence. When, therefore, Lord Strabolgi declares that 'her [Japan's] leaders propose to increase her fleet above the limits agreed upon in 1922 at Washington,' it is difficult to understand on what authority he bases this assertion. One can only conclude that he has fallen into the common error of believing that, because Japan is now demanding naval equality in principle, she intends to build up to the same level, ship by ship and ton by ton, with Britain and America. 'Her leaders,' however, have surely made it clear enough that this is not their intention. All they desire is the removal of the stigma of inferiority which, to them, is implied by the present ratio system and, at the same time, to be at liberty to decide for themselves the number, size, and type of ships best suited to their requirements within a total 'upper limit' fixed by agreement between the Powers concerned.

It is unfortunate that Japan's demand for naval equality has served to arouse such misunderstandings and apprehensions, for this has undoubtedly tended to becloud the true issue. The stubbornness of this demand has led many to assert that upon Japan alone lies the grave responsibility of making agreement impossible. A calm consideration of the facts, however, would seem to indicate that such a sweeping judgment is neither true nor fair, although, at first sight, Lord Strabolgi's comparison between 'the double coastline of the United States' and Japan's 'more compact position and her shorter lines of communication' might appear to point to the contrary. What, then, are the facts? Briefly they are, that America's claim for equality with England is based solely on the question of prestige and bears little or no relation to her real defensive requirements. Similarly, her

insistence on superiority over Japan rests primarily on her desire to be in a position to threaten, if not actually to carry out, active intervention in the Far East in order, if considered necessary, to maintain the principle of the 'open door' in China. All that Japan wants, on the other hand, is to ensure that the United States shall no more be in a position to interfere on the Japanese side of the Pacific than that she, Japan, should be in a position to interfere on the American side of that ocean. In the final analysis, therefore, it would seem that it is America, with her insistence on equality with England and superiority over Japan, and her insistence on big ships and big guns, that makes agreement so difficult; for Japan recognises—unofficially, if not openly and officially—that the British Empire, with its far-flung territories, is fully entitled to naval superiority. So long, however, as America insists on equality with England, Japan considers it necessary to demand equality with both. As one well-known British naval authority recently put it, what is really required if the ratio system is to be maintained, and if it is to be based solely on defensive requirements (as it should be), is that the ratio should be 5-3-3, not 5-5-3, as it is at present.

Fundamentally it is hardly too much to say that the present state of tension and unrest in the Far East and Western Pacific has been brought about by Japan's anxiety regarding her own serious population problem, for it is her anxiety on this score that has led her into doing everything within her power to safeguard her vital interests in East Asia. Unfortunately for her, she elected to shut herself off entirely from the outside world for the space of more than 200 years during what Admiral Ballard, in his *Influence of the Sea on Japan*, so aptly describes as 'the vitally important seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the colonial empires of Western Powers were taking definite shape in many quarters of the globe.' Too late Japan awoke to a realisation of the folly of her seclusion policy, as a result of which she has been left with few outlets for her surplus population, few markets of her own under her own control, and a sad deficiency of the raw materials and natural resources required for her people and her factories. With immigration practically debarred to her in most lands and with tariff bars being raised higher and higher against her manufactured goods, she is left with no alternative but to take such steps as she considers necessary to ensure the safety and development of her vital interests on the neighbouring mainland of Asia.

What, therefore, is required is to avoid driving her to desperation by applying pressure calculated to increase her anxieties, and to strive instead, by friendly means, for a *quid pro quo*, which will relieve Japan of her possibly exaggerated fears and, at the

same time, ensure the safety of the legitimate interests of our own and other countries. For this, mutual understanding, friendship, and co-operation between Britain, Japan, and the United States are essential. To seek merely American friendship and co-operation at the expense of Japan would be fatal—just as fatal and foolish as to seek Japanese friendship at the expense of the United States.

M. D. KENNEDY.

UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE: THE CRISIS AND THE WAY OUT

THE event which, more than any other, has stirred British political waters in the current session of Parliament has been the sudden suspension by the Government of their brand-new centralised scheme of unemployment relief. The Unemployment Assistance Act of 1934 had been held out as a major social reconstruction, which would not only solve once and for all the baffling problem of administering State aid to the 1,000,000 of our registered unemployed, who were not otherwise provided for (by insurance, etc.), but would also carry a stage further the break-up of the local Poor Law which has been proceeding gradually for the past twenty-five years. The keynotes of the new system were the elimination of local administration, uniformity of allowances, and the central control of the whole machine by an independent Unemployment Assistance Board. The latter would happily lift the 'dole' out of both local and national politics, but loopholes were left for Treasury and parliamentary intervention.

The intention of Ministers was undoubtedly to improve the hard lot of the unemployed poor, and at the same time to put themselves in a stronger position to regulate expenditure of Government money. His Majesty's Treasury decided to go the whole hog with centralisation. In future, civil servants would show the local authorities how the Poor Law *should* be run! The departments had already proved their skill in the four centralised schemes of social insurance (Health, Old Age and Widows' Pensions, and Unemployment), and they were confident that our 300-year-old Poor Law could be tidied up and immensely improved by the same methods of intelligent mechanisation. And both Houses of Parliament agreed with them. Some members had their doubts about the curious status of the Unemployment Assistance Board, but all parties were in favour of a uniform scheme of Needs Payments, and were not inclined to bother themselves overmuch about administration or about the unwisdom of cutting off this new poverty service from among all the other poverty services which still belonged to local authorities. They thought mechanisation would work, and, apparently, they

still think so. It is the purpose of this article to contest that view.

As a prelude to the discussion of future policy, readers will wish to be reminded, briefly, of the course of recent events. Since 1931 we have had three systems of payment for the unemployed. By far the greater number of claimants have been carried by the insurance scheme paying fixed benefits, including dependants' allowances, without any test of means. Benefit was, however, limited to twenty-six weeks in a year and was based on a contribution condition of thirty stamps in the preceding two years. Behind insurance there was a system of non-contributory transitional payments at the same maximum rates as benefit, but subject to a household means test administered on a Poor Law basis by the 200 local public assistance committees of the county or borough councils. Thus the Treasury paid the bill, though the actual payments, subject to the maxima, were determined by local elected bodies. In two northern areas lax administration led to the supersession of the local public assistance committees by Government Commissioners, and in about a dozen other areas, including two or three in South Wales, the Minister of Labour had to make representations as to the easy-going way in which the test of household resources was being interpreted. At the third and lowest tier, the local public assistance committees relieved out of the rates the needs of nearly 200,000 of the able-bodied who had never been in insurance (e.g., agricultural workers) or had for some reason failed to qualify for payment on either of the first two tiers described above. The Poor Law was also there to meet any marginal needs of claimants drawing State payments.

Then in 1934 came the new Unemployment Act, extending the range of insurance benefits, restoring the 1931 cuts, and, above all, establishing a new centralised service, not only for the ex-insured and the transitional payment class, but also for practically all the able-bodied poor among our 17,000,000 wage-earners. The agency of the local public assistance committees was to be dropped, but the local Poor Law was still left with the non-able-bodied and a negligible fraction of the unemployed. It was, however, prohibited from supplementing State payments, thus leaving an *unlimited* liability to the new centralised service. In due course the Unemployment Assistance Board was set up, together with its staff of 6000 officials, to conduct the new national service. A new scale of needs payments was approved by Parliament and appeared to be reasonable, or even generous; but it was clear from the first that, as compared with existing transitional payments, most single persons would lose a shilling or two and that the rigorous assessment of household incomes

and earnings would lead to some revisions almost everywhere. At the same time an equally large number of families with small children or high rents would probably be better off.

The transfer of the transitional payment class (but not the rest of the able-bodied poor) to the new service began on the first Appointed Day, January 7 last. The new scale and means test were applied and the appropriate cuts and increases were abruptly enforced. By the time the Unemployment Assistance Board had taken over from the local public assistance committees about half the 750,000 cases, daily demonstrations of protest were being reported, particularly from Wales and from the North. There were one or two riots, and deputations of public assistance committees began to descend upon the Minister of Labour to speak for their late clients. It was indeed an unprecedented rally of local feeling to the public assistance committees (*i.e.*, to the Poor Law). Not for 100 years has the local Poor Law been so popular! For a week or two the Minister of Labour had a very unpleasant time. On top of the deputations he had to face protests from members of all parties, including his own, in the House of Commons. Ultimately the Government decided to take the extreme course of calling upon the Board to halt. This was on February 5, and a few days later Parliament sanctioned the Temporary Provisions Act, which assured the repayment of reductions to practically all aggrieved applicants and suspended any further cuts. The increases were, however, to stand. Meanwhile the second Appointed Day (March 1) for the taking over of the separate Poor Law class was postponed indefinitely.

Such is the position at the time of writing: it is a return with a vengeance to the observance of varying *local* standards in the expenditure of national money. For the time being a large body of civil servants is required to divine the hypothetical intentions of the 200 public assistance committees as if the latter were still making the determinations; they then have to observe them to the nearest penny. Everyone will agree that this confused interregnum is a stain on our administration and should not endure a day longer than is absolutely necessary. The question is what, if any, changes will be made in the new system when the manacles are once more taken off and the Board resumes its operations.

Unfortunately, the uproar which culminated in the 'standstill Order' of February 5 was, outwardly and in fact, a matter of cuts in allowances, the family means test, and the operation of the rent scale in the northern areas. The Board were not spending enough money. These issues are irresistible to politicians, but they are the end-results of the system and are liable to distract attention from the real root of the trouble. Under

the surface there was an uprising of local sentiment, both good and bad, against the imposition of bureaucratic formulæ by Whitehall. There was a sudden rediscovery that the basic relief of poverty was, after all, a neighbourhood affair, no matter where the money came from, and no matter how eager the local authorities had been in 1934 to get rid of their troublesome task. Unemployment benefit and services giving legal rights to fixed payments—yes, they can and should be nationalised and administered in detail by rule and regulation; but when it comes to a basic service like the Poor Law, providing for all the needs of the man and his family, then no conceivable code of instructions, in no matter how many volumes, can cover all the infinite variations of circumstance that will have to be catered for. There you want an entirely different and more elastic method of approach. The mechanistic factor should be sparingly used and should leave scope for the human factor and questions of personality. But the methods of the comptometer leave no room for personality. They are just as damaging when they result in over-payments or payments too long maintained as when they ignore some essential need, because the machine has no slot in it for the particular circumstance.

For the real exercise of the discretionary power local bodies of some kind are essential. This is no function for civil servants, especially those in the minor grades; and under the present scheme it is only the humblest and youngest officials who actually see the applicants. The higher officials, who possess the discretionary power, deal with the cases on paper, and there are thousands of cases to each officer. As the Royal Commission of 1930-32 pointed out, 'If discretion is a desideratum in the administration of unemployment payments, it must be provided for by assigning to some authoritative local body an effective part in the scheme.' In other words, the primary responsibility for assessment should be decentralised. The 'front line' work could be entrusted to nominated local interviewing committees, just as it is, in a minute degree, to the Appeals Tribunals and Courts of Referees, and as it was, on a large scale, in 1926 to the old rota committees of the local employment committees. A wide measure of devolution on these lines might do a great service in floating the scheme and establishing local confidence. Actual contact at interviews with all cases referred by the Board's area officers would be an essential function of the district committees, and that is where the chief use of the discretionary power would come in. In the complex cases—and they form a large proportion nowadays—not merely a man's monetary needs, but his present and future opportunities of re-employment, could be helpfully discussed, together with any other troubles that are keeping him down. Very often these have

little to do with unemployment. As in the Poor Law, nothing less than the rehabilitation of the family in a state of independence and freedom should be the ultimate aim. But the new system quite definitely does not work that way.

It may be objected that these poor people on transitional payments or the Board's allowances are, not the 'Poor Law class,' but simply an unfortunate section of ordinary wage-earners, who need nothing more than a decent maintenance from the State to carry them on until steady work can be found again. That is only partially true; the Board's clients are very mixed. Some are in and out of work just like the class on insurance benefit. Others are definitely below that standard and include thousands who have lost or never possessed the capacity for regular self-support. The more prosperous the area, the poorer the average quality of the men on transitional payment, and in the southern half of England it would, in the writer's opinion, be hard to distinguish most of those now drawing the Board's allowances from those families that are old friends of the public assistance committees. For the latter types, wherever they may be found, the all-round treatment attempted by any decent public assistance committee was definitely more appropriate than the mechanical service of the new Board. And to that extent it follows that there will be a regrettable loss of quality when, on the second Appointed Day (now postponed), the Board takes over the remainder of its large family—i.e., the 200,000 able-bodied who have been on out relief under the public assistance committees. Indeed, the question must be asked: 'Should there ever be a second Appointed Day?' Is not this a case where politicians will serve their country best by doing nothing?

That these questions are well worth considering may be illustrated by another serious defect of the new scheme. Half of our local health services and local housing and much of the education service are devoted to relieving the needs of the poorest householder and his family. Under the Act of 1929 these inter-related functions were all lined up with public assistance under the same local authority. That was one of Mr. Chamberlain's greatest reforms. Now, however, he has thrown away a large part of his own achievement by cutting out from the alignment the whole class of able-bodied poverty, which was, from a social point of view, the section calculated to profit most by the 1929 plan. Already such cases as the following are coming to light: A man with five children has a disability pension of 18s. and a full unemployment allowance from the Board for himself and children. His wife has deserted him, and he asks the county council to take three of his small children away to the Poor Law schools. There is no destitution, and the council does not see

why it should take the children and save money to the Board. Indeed, it wants the Board to pay the whole cost. This case (and there are many others) also illustrates a potential clash of two means tests applied to the same family—one imposed by the Board and another, less generous, imposed by the local authority. Which is to prevail? Which authority is to bear the major financial burden?

But now we come to a very different issue which bears directly on the fundamental question of local machinery and devolution of the discretionary power. To-day the poverty question is so inflamed that no Government or central board can do its work in peace so long as it insists on retaining *direct* responsibility for assessing needs payments to 1,000,000 individuals. When the means test was introduced in November 1931, the Minister of Labour left the actual determination of transitional payments to the 200 local public assistance committees, and that gave him the necessary shelter from an intolerable bombardment. Now, under a completely centralised system, neither the semi-independence of the Board nor any other pious safeguards of the 1934 Act seem to be any protection. His position is indeed unenviable, and perhaps untenable. The debate on the Regulations and the events of last January are a clear warning. How can the Board and the Minister of Labour be given reasonable protection? How can Imperial Parliament be prevented from continually embroiling itself in wrangles over local or individual grievances? The danger can scarcely be taken too seriously.

Here, again, local devolution is the way out, even though it involves a limited dose of dualism. The Board may, in time, exercise its power under the Act to set up regional advisory committees of some kind; but will committees that are nominated and merely advisory be anything more than window-dressing? Probably not. They must have some local sanction behind them, or they will be ignored. Partisans will rush straight to Westminster whenever feelings run high about excesses or deficiencies of payment or about the application of some disciplinary measure. Nothing but an organic relation to elective bodies will suffice. And that brings us back to local government and the existing public assistance committees in 200 county and borough areas. Such a conclusion will, of course, be disappointing to those reformers who have lost patience with the whole local lay-out. They are, of course, thinking of the small minority of areas where the local relief of poverty has been turned into a political debauch. But is there no new way in which the reasonably harmonious and honest co-operation of local with central government can be secured in this field? Over and above the district interviewing committees, referred to previously, the Board or the

Minister of Labour might set up regional commissions or councils representing groups of adjacent public assistance authorities. There might be more than a dozen, but less than fifty, to cover Great Britain. The main personnel would only be indirectly elective, and the method of grouping would, it is hoped, tend to moderate the political counsels of the most extreme or reactionary elements. Additional members to the extent of one-third should be appointed on the ground of their knowledge of social conditions, thus bringing in a most useful element which is often ignored at present. As a rough illustration of what is intended, there is the Metropolitan Asylums Board, which, prior to 1930, served the twenty-nine boards of guardians of London.

Each regional council should be invited to frame a detailed policy of assistance for its area, but only within the broad lines of a national code which would be based upon regulations approved by Parliament. The code should establish the normal scale and the principles upon which rents and family incomes are to be treated, but there must be real scope for local discretion. The central authority should not attempt, as the Board is attempting, to prescribe what is to be done in every type of case. That, surely, is labour in vain, as everybody who has done Poor Law work will admit. London cannot possibly tell how every household is run in Lancashire and the Isle of Lewis. Complete uniformity is a false ideal—a typical fault of the bureaucratic machine. Adaptability and local acceptability are much more important. The regional scheme would be one of the safeguards against abuse. It would have to be approved in detail by the Board or the Minister, and if any region in South Wales proved entirely recalcitrant, it might have to be surcharged, or even superseded, by a commissioner. But, once approved, the scheme would be the operative document in the area, which the staff and the interviewing committees would have to implement. That staff would be the out-station staff of the Unemployment Assistance Board which is now in post. It is an admirable section of our national Civil Service, and, as such, it can be relied on to keep the whole administration steady. Another safeguard would be the use of an expert inspectorate to lead, guide, and check local action.

The use of local bodies as agents for the expenditure of national funds, under safeguards, is nothing new in this country. Such partnerships are becoming more, and not less, necessary in current affairs, and it is unfortunate that, just at this time, there should be a number of local authorities of particularly irresponsible temper. But that does not mean that local self-government and local politics can safely be side-tracked or shouldered off the field by Whitehall. Such short cuts may be

tempting to officials, but fatal to Parliament; they may be the height of unwisdom in a country which is still hoping to train its democracy to the better use of representative institutions. We need the virtue of patience; but, as a distinguished veteran in social administration recently remarked to me, 'Ever since the bicycle was invented, patience has lost its charm for the world.'

Above all, we need patience with local government in this delicate matter of the service of poverty. The obstreperous areas are very few. Tyneside and Durham are only a small region, and the whole of Wales includes only one twenty-sixth part of our insured population. Short-sighted policies should not be forced upon the rest of Britain simply because of temporary conditions in parts of South Wales. It is believed that, in the country as a whole, the guarded measure of devolved responsibility proposed above would be workable and would be the safest way out of the crisis. It is an emergency service that we now have to provide for some of our unemployed. There is no room for a permanent secondary State service in between unemployment insurance and local public assistance, and we ought not to deal with the momentary crisis as if we should always have 750,000 genuine wage-earners outside the scope of wages and insurance benefit and in poverty. It is a condition that is not permanent; nor can we make it tolerable. Ultimately we shall drain off the surplus unemployment either by turning it into the well-used leisure of the young (half-time instruction to eighteen) or by retirement of the elderly or by a combination of these with industrial measures. Then we shall wish to slide back the relief of poverty on to 'regional' local government where it properly belongs.

Public opinion, nowadays, actually tends to exaggerate the magnitude of our surplus labour problem, which is not really so crushing that we need despair of its solution. The United States have 10,000,000 workers on Federal relief, locally administered. Outside insurance we have less than 1,000,000, and that includes a margin of able-bodied poverty and dependence which persists at all times. In the whole of Britain $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of insured men are clients of the Unemployment Assistance Board. It is a bad business, but in the southern half of the country, covering half the insured men, only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. fall to the Board. These percentages include the *nil* determinations—i.e., cases in which no allowances were payable under the needs test. If women workers are included in the count, the percentages fall from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 per cent. for the whole country, and from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to just over 2½ per cent. for the southern half. These figures relate to January 26, 1935. Although it

might be too soon to say that in the south of England a reasonable equivalence had yet been reached between the demand for labour and its total supply, the writer would be prepared to argue that employment conditions in that area are better to-day than they usually were before the war. Do we need, over the greater part of Britain, three full-blown social assistance services—national unemployment insurance, the local social services, and, spatchcocked in between, a national Unemployment Assistance Board which is geared to neither of the other two and is likely to cause a good deal of confusion to both? That, of course, is only a rhetorical question now. The Unemployment Assistance Act of 1934 is there, and we must try to work it. But the question and the statistical argument preceding it do seem to reinforce the plea that the new Board's task is essentially regional; it differs in kind as between a limited number of truly depressed regions requiring temporary 'mass' relief, and the rest of the country, which requires nothing of the same order. Should not the method of administration correspond with such facts by including a wide measure of regional and local devolution?

RONALD C. DAVISON.

BRITAIN'S POSITION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

MANY industries may legitimately claim inclusion within the select category of so-called 'key' industries, but in the case of Great Britain few have a better right to this title than the merchant marine. Divided into many sections and sub-sections, such as coasters, colliers, ocean-going tramps, tankers, cargo liners and the large passenger liners, all are of major importance to the country's economic welfare in times of peace and invaluable in times of national emergency. The work of the merchant service during the war was the subject of universal praise, and it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that its existence and its great achievements largely contributed to the nation's salvation.

During recent months the Government's proposal to subsidise tramp shipping, in self-defence against the subsidies of others, has attracted public attention to the serious plight of that section of British shipping. In practice it is doubtful if the tramp section is in much worse plight than certain other sections, and the malaise is far deeper than can be set right by a small subsidy, even if a subsidy be acknowledged as the right way of dealing with this national problem.

There is much evidence to support the view that the average British citizen is becoming less interested in the merchant marine than he used to be. This may be due to many causes: the practical cessation of emigration, and the growing tendency of the population to move southwards, which has left the great ports of the north and west (Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull, Newcastle and Cardiff), with their respective hinterlands, less influential in the nation's councils, though the rise of Southampton may perhaps be expected to offset this to some extent. Approximately one-fifth of the population of the country, located in and around the metropolis, knows little of ships and shipping. Yet London is one of the world's greatest ports, closely vying with Antwerp, New York, and Hamburg for world leadership. With the ocean trade of London valued at over £600,000,000 in a recent year, it is extraordinary that shipping plays such an insignificant part in London's life. The citizen of Hamburg or of Altona is familiar

with his ships; the circulating area of Liverpool is the pier-head, and many business men crossing daily from the Cheshire side, though engaged in other walks of life, have more than a nodding acquaintanceship with the build of ships, their funnels and their house flags. Of the worker in San Francisco the same might be said, and even of the New Yorkers, many of whom 'commute' daily across the Hudson. Yet Westminster, in spite of its passing barges, smoky tugs and shallow coasters flying the Dutch flag *en route* to Wandsworth, Fulham or Brentford, at times appears as far removed from the London below Tower Bridge as Washington is from New York—at any rate, Washington is much more lavish with its ocean transport subsidies.

Foreign observers studying British policy during the last seven years have been much intrigued by the order in which industries have been placed for receiving doles, or protection, from the British taxpayer. First there was the manufacturer of private cars, incidentally producing what was then a luxury; early in the list came sugar-beet, which over eleven years has received £42,000,000; later came the change in fiscal policy, by most regarded as desirable and by some as inevitable, yet calculated to shut out imports and to level up the adverse balance of visible trade, without—so its proponents thought—injuring the prospects of the British exporter. But the degree to which the new policy could be judged successful was equally the measure by which the disabilities resulting therefrom to the merchant marine and the port administrations could be reckoned.

In spite of the obvious effects of this change in fiscal policy, no provision was made to assist the industries which must inevitably be hit by any lessened degree of ocean commerce—mainly, of course, the shipping industry, and, secondly, the ports and the transport systems serving the latter. The new policy, even with the assistance given to the country through the departure from the gold standard, has achieved its greatest success in the limitation of import and export trade. If measured by volume, retained imports in 1934 reached 97·1 per cent. of the 1930 figure, but domestic exports only reached 84·4 per cent. of the 1930 figure: on a value basis the comparable figures were 73·3 per cent. and 82·2 per cent. The visible adverse monetary balance has fallen, but the country has suffered materially as a centre of *entrepot* trade, which has dropped in value from £87,000,000 in 1930 to about £51,000,000 in 1934.

Even if, thanks largely to sound financial guidance and avoidance of heavy capital expenditure on unremunerative public works, this country can claim to have come through the 'economic blizzard' in a somewhat less battered condition than certain of its neighbours, it cannot be claimed that the small debit

in its balance of payments revealed by the latest Board of Trade figures is a result which is sufficiently satisfactory to call for hearty self-congratulation. It is true that these Board of Trade estimates record a slight recovery in our net national shipping income to £70,000,000 in 1934 after a fall to £65,000,000 in 1933, but such figures include disbursements by foreign ships in British ports, and there is, unfortunately, a growing tendency for the percentage of tonnage entering our ports in foreign bottoms to rise in a most disturbing fashion. In December 1934 only 61 per cent. of the net tonnage that arrived at British ports with cargo flew the British flag, a drop of 1 per cent. on December 1933. It may be that the tramp shipping subsidy during the next two years will prevent any serious increase in this trend; but little has so far been done by the Government, except its financial assistance towards the construction of the *Queen Mary*, to aid the cargo-liner or passenger-liner companies. British ownership of such vessels is important for many reasons, both strategic and economic; but amongst such advantages is the tourist travel they attract to this country, thereby assisting to bring about a balance of international payments, presumably taken into account by the Board of Trade under the heading of Estimated Net Receipts from other sources, a figure which dropped from £15,000,000 in 1932 to £10,000,000 in 1933 and failed to show any resilience in 1934.

Unfortunately, this country falls far behind certain others in the information available as to the amount spent by foreign tourists in Great Britain, but an excellent survey made by Professor Ogilvie a year or two back placed the amount spent in 1929 as almost £22,500,000. Americans were responsible for the bulk of this expenditure, a most valuable form of invisible exports. Admittedly a great part of this huge sum is accounted for by visitors from France, Belgium and other European countries and those travelling on business, whilst an important proportion must be accorded to Dominion visitors and those home on leave from various parts of the Empire and the Far East. Also, it is recognised that the volume of this tourist travel has fallen by at least half since 1929; probably the amount spent by each visitor has decreased more than proportionately. Even so, the volume of American and Canadian tourist travel is by no means negligible, and, if one assumes that rather less than half of the more than £8,000,000 estimated to have been spent by American tourists in the United Kingdom in 1929 was expended in 1934, it is traffic which this country should make every endeavour to cherish and retain, since it cultivates good-will between two great nations and assists in off-setting Britain's seemingly permanent adverse balance of trade with the United States.

British steamship lines for close on 100 years have been pre-eminent in the North Atlantic trade, ever since the *Britannia* sailed from Liverpool on her maiden voyage on July 4, 1840, thanks to the exertions of Samuel Cunard. In 1934 the British share of passenger traffic on the North Atlantic was approximately 44 per cent. of the total, or 204,000 passengers, a figure which cannot be regarded as unsatisfactory in view of the large subsidies which are given to competing lines by the American, French, Italian and other Governments. Nevertheless, last year is likely to prove a landmark in the history of North Atlantic passenger travel, since it witnessed the forced amalgamation of the two great British companies, the Cunard and the White Star, and the passing away of the famous Atlantic Transport, Red Star, and Leyland fleets. The last named, primarily a cargo-carrier, dated back to 1870, but in 1901 control of the line passed, so far as its Mediterranean services were concerned, into the hands of the late Sir John Ellerman, whilst a controlling interest in its Atlantic services was acquired by the American International Mercantile Marine Company. Before the war period the Leyland fleet consisted of nearly fifty vessels, and as late as 1925 it operated about forty steamers, some nominally belonging to the Dominion Line, engaged in the Canadian trade and also dating back to 1870. Control of this latter line also was acquired in 1902 by the I.M.M., but both Leyland and Dominion vessels continued to fly the British flag. The Leyland fleet has been gradually disposed of during recent years, but, fortunately, another Liverpool line interested in the trade with the Gulf ports, the West Indies, and the Spanish Main has taken over about seven of the Leyland cargo ships and carries on the Leyland service, whilst three others are now running under the flag of the Donaldson Line, of Glasgow.

The Atlantic Transport Line, dating back to 1889, with its famous '*Minne*' ships, for many years sailed regularly each week from London direct to New York; like the Leyland Company, control of the Atlantic Transport passed into American hands in 1902, when the I.M.M. of New Jersey acquired all its ordinary share capital. Its vessels, however, continued to fly the British flag and were manned by British crews, and the ships stood the country in good stead during the war period, being used as transports and on food-supply work. The passenger vessels, such as the *Minnewaska* and *Minnehaha*, though slow, were renowned for their steadiness, and were consequently largely used for the carrying of race-horses and prize live-stock across the Atlantic; virtually all its large passenger ships were lost during the war. Nevertheless, the post-war *Minnewaska* and *Minnetonka* built up a good clientele for themselves, though during

the last seven years they have suffered from the competition of the subsidised American Merchant lines, running much smaller steamers but also carrying passengers from London to New York. With the falling off of Transatlantic trade the Atlantic Transport, although American owned, was unable to obtain subsidies because its ships were of British registry, and gave up the unequal struggle.

Its two fine vessels the *Minnewaska* and the *Minnetonka*, which were the largest cargo-carriers in the world, were temporarily laid up. Converted for tourist-class passengers only, they were transferred by the I.M.M. to its Antwerp-New York service, commonly known as the 'Red Star Line.' On this service they ran in conjunction with the somewhat smaller *Westernland* and *Pennland*. Both these steamers, of about 16,500 tons, have had most interesting histories. The *Westernland* was constructed as the *Regina* during the war by Harland and Wolff for the Dominion Line service from Liverpool to Canada, operated jointly with the White Star Line. Reconstructed for passenger work at the close of hostilities, she was fitted with the furnishings intended for the *Statendam*, under construction at Belfast for the Holland-America, but destined to be lost during the war after being taken over by the British Government. Entering the St. Lawrence service in 1922, the *Regina* proved an exceptionally popular vessel, both with Canadians and with her crew, who remained loyal to her when many other British liners were having great trouble in retaining their crews in American and Canadian ports owing to the then existent trade boom, which now seems so far away. A good sea ship, she was also a happy ship, but, being Leyland-owned like the other Dominion vessels, and not belonging to the White Star, she was destined to be transferred to the Red Star Line, like her sister ship the *Pittsburg*, later known as the *Pennland*. The remaining vessels of the Red Star fleet were the pre-war *Lapland*, of about 18,000 tons, and the post-war *Belgenland*, of about 27,000 tons. All the vessels of the line flew the British flag and were built at Belfast by Harland and Wolff. Including the *Minnewaska* and *Minnetonka*, of about 21,000 tons each, the total tonnage of the Red Star Line was 140,000 of first-class liner tonnage, available to this country in time of war and with an average age of about twelve years, or approximately 60 per cent. of the life of a good Atlantic liner.

Future students of British policy in 1934 may well pause to wonder how it should have come about that this splendid fleet, each unit of which was a travelling exhibit of the highest class of British workmanship, should have been allowed to pass away without any attempt at replacement. That the I.M.M., now allied with the efficient United States Lines operating American-

built vessels flying the American flag and manned by American crews, was forced to part with its British registry tonnage, if it was to obtain American subsidies, is not a matter for surprise. But few would have been sufficiently incautious as to foretell that the British Government of the day would raise no finger to prevent the disappearance of these liners from the British registry, and would actually prevent certain of the vessels being acquired by other British interests to prevent their falling into the hands of a progressive and competitive German line. Yet such appears to have been the case. The *Minnewaska* and the *Minnetonka* have been sold to shipbreakers in Great Britain, the *Belgenland*, flagship of the fleet, has become one of the finest vessels in the American merchant marine, and the largest, if one excludes the *Leviathan*, which has nearly reached the close of her days. As the *Columbia* of the I.M.M. Panama-Pacific Line, the *Belgenland* received almost a civic welcome at New York, and Mr. P. A. S. Franklin, president of the Roosevelt-International Mercantile Marine Company, is reported to have said :

This steamer is the largest and most important vessel that has ever been transferred to the United States flag and should be very attractive for cruising purposes for the American people, and we hope they will patronise her. And, further, she will be very useful as a strong auxiliary to the navy in an emergency.

It is understood that she will be mainly employed on cruises from New York to Nassau, Miami and Havana. With the *Lapland*, the oldest of the fleet, now scrapped, there remained the *Westernland* and *Pennland*, and few vessels, even if they be large Atlantic liners, can have obtained such prominence in the Press as have these two favourites with Transatlantic travellers. Indeed, the tragedy of their passing into foreign hands has neither been unhonoured nor unsung ; but the importance of the question is not to be measured by the tonnage concerned, but rather by the principle involved.

The whole matter is clothed in considerable mystery, and members of Parliament, mainly for constituencies with great shipping interests, who asked questions in the House (the matter was raised several times and in both Houses), received the most bewildering series of replies, many of which appeared to cancel each other out. In studying the answers given to questions in the House it should be remembered that the proposal of the British group who wished to take over the vessels from the American interests controlling them was to operate these Red Star liners both as cruising ships and also as a Transatlantic service, the distinguishing feature of which was to be a method of charging fares different from that at present in force by the

so-called Conference lines—that is to say, the various companies now operating between Northern Europe and the United States and Canada. The suggestion was to charge a transportation rate of £10 as passage money whilst the individual passenger would pay for his meals separately, as is done on shorter sea passages—for instance, across the North Sea. There is no question but that such a service would be popular with many whom the high fares across the Atlantic have up to the present prevented from taking a holiday in the United States or in Great Britain, as the case might be.

To-day excellent accommodation can be obtained on vessels cruising from British ports at all-inclusive rates varying from 30s. to £2 per day, whereas cabin-class fares across the Atlantic in summer, although differing widely as between one vessel and another and also between cabins of the same class on one vessel, work out at approximately £50 to £60 for the return voyage, or, roughly, £3 10s. per day at sea. It is well known that cruising prices are rock-bottom prices and leave little margin of profit, but in practice the North Atlantic passenger services of nearly all kinds have not resulted in a much bigger margin of profit, and many lines, such as the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique*, or French Line, have operated at heavy deficits. Transatlantic ships of the cabin class carry some cargo, and cruising ships carry none at all, so that the 100 per cent. difference in the fare per day must be accounted for in other ways. Liner service on the North Atlantic is not excelled in any other ocean trade, but the traffic has changed greatly in character during the last decade with the virtual elimination of European emigration and the heavy fall in first-class traffic. It is doubtful, as a result of the existing social revolution in the United States, whether the pre-war luxury super-liner will ever enter into its own again, since within the next quarter of a century it is reasonable to suppose a satisfactory air service will be functioning with regularity.

It was natural, therefore, that any proposal looking to the establishment of a Transatlantic service with a unique basis of fares should have been regarded with some concern by the newly-formed Cunard-White Star Line combine, with its huge commitments in regard to the giant super-liner *Queen Mary* still under construction. But a study of *The Times* reports of the various answers accorded to the questioners reveals such contradictory statements that it is impossible to say whether this was the ruling consideration in the mind of the Government when upholding its ban on the retention of the Red Star vessels under the British flag. For instance, on November 30 the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in the House that, as public money to the

extent of £9,000,000 had been made available to secure the rationalisation of the North Atlantic passenger trade, and as one of the proposals in connexion with the new concern was to construct vessels comparable with certain valuable units in the merged fleets of the Cunard-White Star Company, the proposals would be bound to result in the frustration of the rationalisation so recently attained, and therefore the Government, in the interests of the British position on the North Atlantic, could only discourage it. The best way of controlling foreign competition is to make British interests as strong as possible. It would appear from this answer that the Government's action was to protect the Cunard-White Star from competition, and that, in the main, the objection was to the proposed construction of new tonnage, rather than to the transfer of the existing Red Star ships. As a consequence the promoters of the new scheme offered not to build new tonnage without consulting the Government.

A few days later the Chancellor, in replying to questions, stated that, in the opinion of the Treasury, it was not in the national interests that the Red Star proposal should take effect, and he did not like the idea of asking the Government to take the responsibility of saying whether or not new ships should be built on behalf of people with whom the Government had no concern whatever. It was pointed out by other members, however, that the alternative might be that the Red Star vessels would be run under a foreign flag on an equally competitive basis; but this argument failed to make any impression, and Mr. Chamberlain stated categorically that he could not regard favourably a proposal which laid upon His Majesty's Government a recurring responsibility of an embarrassing character in respect of a concern in which it had no financial stake. It must be admitted that this reply bids fair to rival the fame of the answers given at Delphi hundreds of years ago.

By December 12 it was clear that a progressive German line was in negotiation for the purchase of the vessels, and several further questions were asked in the House by Conservative and Liberal members, one asking whether the Minister considered the use is justified of the authority of the House of Commons to refuse to allow English trade to be extended without any authority from Parliament, and another as to whether the Minister considered that foreign competition will be met by fortifying it. No reply was vouchsafed to several of these questions.

In a strong speech in the House of Commons before adjournment for Christmas Colonel J. Sandeman Allen, Conservative member for Birkenhead, pointed out that two of the Red Star ships had already gone to the shipbreakers, that one had been transferred to a foreign flag (two vessels still remaining unsold),

ship-repairing; the proposal was to lay out a public park, a children's playground, and start a cabinet-making industry. Praiseworthy as the scheme is, how much better would have been the repairing of Atlantic liners! Unemployment amongst seamen was about 33 per cent. of the total insured last December, and in February unemployment in the shipyards, according to Sir Alexander Kennedy, amounted to 47 per cent. It is difficult to understand a policy which deliberately prevents work being given which would reduce these terrible figures and relieve the human misery which they represent.

Whether the construction of the *Queen Mary* was a wrong or right decision, time alone can tell, but few conversant with present Transatlantic trade believe that she can ever prove profitable unless world trade is healed by a miracle. Even in France the completion of the great *Normandie* was condemned in the French Senate by Monsieur Hennessy:

It is an error to think that the *Normandie* will ever pay her way [he exclaimed]; there are hardly any *nouveaux-riches* left, and even Hollywood stars take more modest suites. . . . Who wants to sleep in a Louis XV. bed going across the Atlantic? Even if you can fill this liner, it will only mean that all the others will be emptied.

Few realised, however, that a subsidy for the construction of the *Queen Mary* would prevent any other new British passenger vessels being built for the North Atlantic. The merger of the Cunard and White Star Line fleets is regarded by many as unfortunate; each line had its *clientèle* and its own methods. Americans account for 75 per cent. of the Atlantic traffic, and to them the White Star, with its American affiliation, was always a favourite line. Transatlantic travel leading to Europe is unique for its individual tastes—it must compete with the National Parks, Canada, Mexico, and the West Indies for the favour of the American tourist; it was Captain X. or Purser Y. who really weighted the scales in favour of a European visit. Favourite ships have gone, too. Within the last year four British vessels, all to be counted amongst the fifty largest vessels in the world, have been taken off the North Atlantic—the *Adriatic*, the *Belgenland*, the *Minnewaska*, and the *Minnetonka*. As with all mergers, personal touch must inevitably be lost; already there are only five White Star ships left in regular service, and the coal-burners the *Laurentic* and *Doric* have been replaced by the slower, older, and smaller oil-burning Cunarders *Antonia* and *Andania*.

The fame of the Cunard Line, with its proud record of nearly a century, will always be one of the great boasts of the present-day British citizen, and it is justly popular in Canada and the United States; but there is every sign that it will face a heavy task,

even with enormous subsidies, in retaining its share of Transatlantic travel, and many of its finest ships will fall due for replacement within the next ten years. Neither the *Queen Mary* nor her projected sister can replace seven or eight separate vessels, and in war-time they would be an anxiety rather than an asset. The popular and financially successful vessel to-day is the luxury cabin-liner, such as the *Britannic* or the United States Lines' *Washington* and *Manhattan*, which increased that company's share of the North Atlantic trade in 1934 both proportionately and absolutely—the only line to show a large increase. Early in March the *Manhattan* set up a record for the New York-Queens-town-Plymouth run of 5 days 14 hours 20 minutes. The year that the British Government forcibly combined the Cunard and White Star fleets witnessed the announcement of the loosening and modification of the Hamburg-Amerika and Nord Deutscher Lloyd union of 1930.

If the official action in regard to the Red Star Line had prevented competition, something might have been said for it, but the *Westernland* and *Pennland* are to run under the German flag with German crews. They offer fares of £23 single and £41 8s. return from Southampton to New York; whilst the following were the provisional passage rates under the British group's proposal: first class £20 single and tourist class £10, with meals extra, or, if inclusive, estimated at £5 for a first class passenger. In short, the competition remains, but the ships are lost to the country, the crews unemployed, and the shipyards without the work. The recent publication of a charming book, *Pioneer Shipowners*, by Clement Jones, tells the romantic story of the creation of the British mercantile marine in the nineteenth century by Sir Samuel Cunard, Thomas Ismay, Charles Booth and others, including Frederic Leyland. If they had lived till to-day they would surely not have left a stone unturned to prevent the Red Star-Leyland tragedy, which perhaps marks the surrender of British pre-eminence in the North Atlantic.

C. E. R. SHERRINGTON.

THE FAIRBRIDGE MODEL

Where the public and private interests are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now, in monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of his subjects: for no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or depression, to maintain a war against their enemies.

So wrote Hobbes in *Leviathan*, there being, indeed, no king at the time in England; but there was a kingly Protector, whose view of the Empire was wide enough to express itself to 'little Englanders' in suitable terms:

God's interest in the world is more extensive than all the people of these three nations. God has brought us hither to consider the work we may do in the world as well as at home.

What Cromwell taught and practised we shall do well to remember and pursue, though the methods of our day will, perforce, be very different from those of three centuries ago. In the future, methods of peopling our Dominions from parental stock will even have improved on those which prevailed before the war. Never again, so far as can be seen, will self-governing oversea States permit indiscriminating influx of untested migrants. This plan savours too much of an empire founded in a fit of absent-mindedness, and is quite alien to our modern mood. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada will rather avail themselves of their undoubted right to exclude any who, in their judgment, might become a burden, rather than a gain, to the community. They have no wish to recruit man-power from the feeble-minded or weak-bodied, from the criminally tainted or habitual loafers. The last thing they desire is to swell the ranks of their own workless, or to lower the standard of life for their workers. In this they are right, whatever the implications—which are considerable. But, right or wrong, they are the relevant facts, with which we must make our account.

This is not to say that far-seeing statesmen of the New World are slow to realise the necessity—no weaker word will serve our turn—of recruiting strength from the home land. The sense of that need has grown vastly in the last dozen years. At no time

throughout the slough of depression has Australia, though unable to bear the burden of assisting passages, refused to admit those who might be expected to make good, and who could bring a small capital with them. It does mean that scientific care must henceforth be taken for new arrivals to have their fair chance in conditions untried. The result of this new view coming in as a flood, that increased emphasis be laid upon 'training,' will be much advantage every way. Few tragedies are more pathetic, in any walk of life, than that of the untrained human being. And among tragedies one most devastating is that ill-advised assumption of amateurs—that in a strange climate, in conditions unknown, without experience, they can make a success of farming, that most ticklish of operations. Yet this, as countless catastrophes have shown, is a type of gambling which has been advocated by self-seeking agents and swallowed whole by credulous gulls. The 'returned empties,' who, as an Orient Line captain told me eight years ago, always outnumbered the immigrants he was carrying (there were 1200 of them), are largely of this class. Their failure does untellable harm, both here and overseas. It gives at home a bad name to Lands of Promise, and there it engenders suspicion of new-comers. A new model has been forced into prominence by invincible circumstance, and the rapid welcoming of the germ thought from which the tree has grown is gratifying and remarkable.

The original Fairbridge Farm School in Western Australia has been working for twenty years. It has battled through adversity to recognition. In the process it has trained over 1000 children to independence and prosperity in that huge State. But only within the last two years has it convinced the authorities that here is the new model for Empire settlement. The advantage of transplanting oversea settlers while young has long been understood. In their tender years they can far more readily, and unconsciously, adapt themselves to the conditions of the New World. They grow into citizenship feeling none of the wrench which sometimes racks the bones of older men. That is common ground with all. And when those young settlers can remain under the natural guardianship of parents, whose main concern is their equipment for the future, that is the soundest of all plans. Where that is impossible the next best must be sought, the nearest substitute for family life.

Now each State in the Dominions has, after a century or more, developed strong local idiosyncrasies. Ill-advised is a new arrival from the Old World who fails to accept and adjust himself to them. The effort not infrequently fails of success with middle-aged men whose characters and tastes are formed. And failure in this respect has ruined many a fair prospect. But not always

has it been realised that family life, or the nearest possible reproduction of it, is the essence of the matter. For a family implies loving oversight and day-by-day training. It brings with it unremitting after-care when the child has left its parental roof, and provides a home with ever-open doors to which over-wearied or hard-driven sons can return as to a refuge. This insistence on individual love and care-free chance of happiness has, at Fairbridge, resulted in such general success that openings for hundreds more boys and girls on up-country stations and farms could be supplied. So much for the oft-repeated cry that Australia refuses to accept migrants. She not only accepts them; she undertakes their education and contributes, from both Commonwealth and State resources, to their maintenance during five years' training.

When it was slowly realised that here was a method of peopling our Dominions with migrants who would become efficient settlers, who would prefer to till the waste and tame the wild, because love of animals and open-air work has been implanted in them from earliest years, when it was also quite clear that the huge scandal of unemployment could not in the end be abated, apart from transfer of population from an overcrowded island to a scantily peopled Imperial farm, and that this method, the only one able to survive the years of depression, was still welcome to statesmen in the Dominions, then the demand was certain to be raised again (as it had been urged continuously by those who had seen the principle at work) that schools on this model should be multiplied and planted in other portions of the Empire. It should be, not merely philanthropy, but philanthropy with an Imperial intention, actuated by a noble design to give the very best preparation to those who fall to be beneficiaries of the founders, and to supply the very best of manhood to countries dowered with this the realest form of wealth.

They who would adventure into the realms of creation—man's highest prerogative—do well to follow the Divine plan. Of this, note one outstanding counsel: 'It is not good that the man should be alone: I will make him an help meet for him.' A guiding principle fulfilled in the system of cottage-families of twelve to fifteen, in which a house-mother gives herself to the tutelage of her male or female family. It is continued in an after-care supervision, involving thousands of miles of travel yearly, which links the growing limbs with the parent tree. Nor has it been overlooked that true creation demands that each new plant contain the 'seed within itself': the young sprig, that is, must be endowed with self-repeating power to shape its own career. Philanthropy which issues in dead ends is appalling waste, ministering, not to life, but to death. The taste and allure of productive work, with love of beautiful Nature, is this seed.

Against this truth men need not to weary themselves by fighting. Loyal acceptance of it has here redounded to prosperity and blessing.

Financial advisers of His Majesty's Government have most wisely laid it down that individual voluntary enterprise shall show the way. Small attempts shall prove the soundness of an experiment and, upon success, public countenance shall support extension of the project. Gone are the lavish days in which exchequers could pour out supplies for unproved or broken-backed adventurings. A misfit it is when after heavy disbursements there are small profits and only quick returns. Economic stringency has enforced the learning of wisdom. Every workshop of oversea settlement schemes should draw strength from the lesson. They will wish henceforth, as may be confidently hoped, to consider quality rather than quantity—to work on long-term policies, from small beginnings to ever-widening commitments; and they will realise the unremitting need of maintaining confidence in their management by regular and open statement as to their stewardship. Have they supplied the goods, and have they met the bill? Critical auditors will tighten purse-strings against whosoever neglects these conditions. A better instructed public and official experts will be at one on this head.

Lest this exposition of principles should seem too arbitrary, I may cite, in illustration, what has occurred during the last year. On St. George's Day, 1934, the Archbishop of York, at a City church, advocated the raising of funds for extension of the Fairbridge Model in Child Emigration. This was followed up in June by a public meeting at Grocers' Hall, which His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales attended in person. With Mr. Stanley Baldwin, he asked for £100,000 to establish three new farm schools—in Vancouver, New Zealand, and Queensland. He himself headed the list with a cheque for £1000, and other moneys flowed in. The fund now stands at £64,500, and a site for a first new farm school in Vancouver has been bought. A party of children will be sent out in May. Canadian authorities are no less welcoming than Australian, and Whitehall experts are instant in giving very real support to the venture. They believe in the principle, the management, and the almost illimitable prospects. That is a cautious step forward, duly warranted, as it is believed. It may well seem that this is no half-hearted acceptance, by private benefaction and public authority, of a comparatively fresh claim. But there is more than that to record as part of the year's advance. The ferment was working in far-seeing and benevolent minds. Lady Northcote, as wife of a former Governor-General of Australia, had taken note of the need of population, and had condemned the desultory, haphazard

methods on which its overseas supply had rested. She studied the Fairbridge Film and made exhaustive inquiries. In the result, she left her fortune in trust, to found and carry on in perpetuity one or more farm schools in Victoria on this model. It was a welcome token of approval to the Child Emigration Society. They had been the inspiration of her generosity. And this accretion of strength will ensure, when the new establishments in Vancouver, New Zealand, and Queensland are in full blast, that 2000 extra children will be in receipt of substantial benefit. Without a doubt, within a short time these precedents will be copied and improved upon by other groups of workers, as is our English way. Well begun is half done. Bettered they may assuredly be, and enlarged in scope. For no sane judge of the situation will be persuaded, even if 50,000 instead of 300 children were being trained up to husbandry in the greater world, that more than a fringe of the whole population problem had been touched. The new arrivals in Vancouver, for instance, will not begin to come into bearing before 1940. That consideration should allay any apprehensions that the labour market will be disturbed by their advent. In five years' time it may be reasonably hoped that world trade and industry will have improved. On this basis of faith we all work. But meantime there is a stirring in the dry bones of wider emigration. The desire of South Australia to plant 50,000 people on its less settled areas may not be overlooked as a quivering into life. The reports from Canada are fuller of promise and encouragement than they have been for three years. Can the Fairbridge Model be made adaptable to family and adult conditions? It can certainly give useful leads.

There is this noteworthy and engrossing fact to be remembered. Just as, after publication of *The Bitter Cry*, university and college settlements attracted many of our best youth to work in the slums, so now in longer range with overseas farm schools. There is a call of the wild and a longing to be of use to their day and generation which scores of graduates, men and women, do not wish to resist. Not patiently, it may be, can they contemplate the dreary wait, till they shall have found a worthy niche in their profession. In the meantime a human and motherly interest in those of their kind who most need it, and whose nurturing carries with it the charm of new experiment, brings a glow to generous hearts. There is nothing ignoble in the large longing to see with their own eyes conditions of existence outside these islands. And there is real satisfaction in the secure sense of being fellow-workers where the work is of first-class value. It approaches criminal folly if we are unable to make use of this waiting army of volunteers. The world has shrunk since Oxford House and Toynbee Hall were founded. For permanent better-

ment of the race, not less devotion is now due to planting of our stock in distant fields than to cleansing of our slums.

Already it has been suggested that community farms for public school boys, *mutatis mutandis*, could be worked on the Fairbridge principle. There is readiness enough to send such boys on personally conducted Empire tours, whereby they gain a slight and passing glimpse of new countries. Gushing welcomes by governors and mayors with abundant hospitality can relieve the tedium of travel, and may incline youthful minds to scenery and sunshine. Nothing less than two years' work, when daily food depends upon labour of the hands, can give any true criterion of conditions. Could they have been made inmates, for even six months, of something in Australia analogous to Wye or Cirencester Agricultural Colleges—with liberty to complete a full course of instruction if they so desired—their harvest of knowledge would be far richer. Existing agricultural colleges, such as Roseworthy in South Australia, for all their technical excellence, would not strike them as opening such welcoming arms as a settlement, in which school-fellows of their own might be found. And the ability of parents to find £200 for such an educational tour implies that money capital will be forthcoming. This removes a great difficulty in the minds of authority. Such boys will not become a public burden. They ought to add, as New Zealand has discovered, some wealth of character as also of substance. When successful they will draw many of their like, relatives and friends, to join them. But not one whit less essential is it for them, than for any Fairbridge child, to serve their apprenticeship and learn their trade on the spot, in the climate and surroundings of their adoption. Nor, for them, can the protective guidance of well-wishers be dispensed with, as protection against the exploiter and the shark. If such a home and refuge, where their characters and ability were understood, had been open during the last five years, untellable misery and destitution might have been spared. For want of it, many hundreds of most valuable lives have been shipwrecked on the shoals of economic depression. And this is waste of good material which could be avoided. In a well-run Empire it must be.

But there is even greater readiness among educated young women to seek a career overseas. Their numbers grew in 1934, and will speedily increase with the returning confidence of trade. They adapt themselves to strange conditions more readily than young men of the same age, and need never be out of employ, even in the worst times. Instinctive love of animals and open-air work overcomes for many of them that sense of isolation which, till the arrival of wireless and airplanes, was a bugbear of the bush. The charms of a well-run farm school, in which they could feel

their feet and test their tastes—what a boon to themselves and to the neighbourhood which they enriched! Here would be missionary work of the finest. That which monasteries did in our own land for culture and agriculture will, in the fulness of time, find its modern sequel in some such way. The call of Rousseau and Defoe is again being heard. It will demand outlet.

There are welcome signs that the churches at home are anxious to help any plans which can allay the curse of unemployment. Also there is growing anxiety to eradicate roots of trouble and provide something more than mere palliatives. Canterbury Cathedral, among others, is to enforce, at its Jubilee accession service, Oliver's word: 'God's interest in the world is more extensive than all the people of these three nations.' It is making a collection on that day towards Fairbridge Extension—may many others follow the lead!—convinced that here is sure empire-building and missionary value.

It chances that His Majesty's accession day, May 6, is St. George's Day (old style). The rising vogue of our English saint has secured revival of rejoicing on that day, quite apart from a Jubilee which stirs all hearts with thanksgiving. Among many schemes to be put forward for marking that Jubilee with fitting memorial, it may be taken for granted that none will gratify their Majesties which does not regard the uplift of their people:

No king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or depression, to maintain a war against their enemies.

It is the glory of our Georgian monarch to have known what Master Hobbes taught and to have ensued it with all his might. Therefore does it seem likely that willingly on his name day would he see our thanksgivings minister to the spread of his people over his Imperial farm. The amounts raised at any such services—for churches have many calls upon them—are of less importance than propagation of the germ thought: that here is a notion, whose seed is in itself, which merits, in dark days, careful study from Christian people and loyal Englishmen.

ARTHUR G. B. WEST.

DEPRESSION IN THE 'EIGHTIES

JUST fifty years ago a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the 'extent, nature and probable causes of the depression now or recently prevailing in various branches of trade and industry and whether it can be alleviated by legislative or other measures.'

The Commissioners, headed by Lord Iddesleigh, included some of the leading industrialists and financiers of the time. They produced their first Report (C. 4621) within two months, consisting entirely of replies received, from consular officers abroad and from trade unions and chambers of commerce in this country, in reply to a carefully compiled questionnaire. Their Final Report appeared in December 1886. It was not an epoch-making document: it proposed no fresh legislation; it left many stones unturned and many avenues unexplored. The Commissioners saw clearly that wars, and monetary disturbances the consequences of war, were the main causes of depression. The majority recommendations contain little that is new, and little that is worth repeating to-day, but much of the evidence given is applicable to the year 1935: much of it might well have been tendered to the Commissioners who last year investigated conditions in the distressed areas.

Mr. Robert Giffen, then an Assistant-Secretary to the Board of Trade, was asked how he would define depression. He replied that it meant, subjectively, 'the present state of mind of people in business' and, objectively, 'a diminution of business itself or of the profits of business.' It was, he added, common to all countries. In France duties on agricultural produce had been raised in order to relieve depression; in the United States many workmen, particularly in the iron and steel trade, were unemployed, and there was a great drop in the returns of the New York bankers' clearing-house. In Russia distress was very great, as also to some extent in Holland, Vienna and Germany; in Belgium it was severe, with no sign of improvement.

Over-production—'i.e., the accumulation of great stocks'—was one of the chief causes of depression. Another was the uprising of Germany as a new commercial nation, like Japan

to-day, 'determined to do what it had not done before, to found manufactures, and to have a voice in the industrial as well as in the political world.' The constant 'dumping' of goods on the British market by indirect subsidies was regarded as a main cause of unemployment.

Evidence was given of the evil effects on British export trade of foreign tariffs, of sugar bounties and of the low wages paid by foreign shipowners: witnesses from the British Foreign Office admitted in evidence that official representations on such subjects were as fruitless then as they are now. The growth of international railway traffic—*e.g.*, *via* the St. Gothard—had unfavourably affected British trade and shipping; factories were being erected all over Europe, notably in Italy, sometimes with British capital, to make goods hitherto imported solely from Great Britain. The French Government gave large bounties to national shipping, but they had proved ineffectual in practice.

The past twenty years had witnessed a complete change in the conditions of industry. Raw materials were cheaper, and processes of manufacture more perfect, but competition had increased and profits had fallen. The consumer alone prospered. The middleman was being eliminated by the forced sales of commodities below cost.

The awful depression of trade involved disaster for manufacturers. There were few houses left where the work was of as high a standard as it was fifty years earlier. The growth of limited liability companies had brought 'ignorant enterprise' into many branches of industry: much money had been lost by gullible shareholders, and solid, well-managed firms had suffered from such amateur competition. The Companies Acts had, on the whole, done more harm than good, but had no serious effect on the depression.

The Official Receiver had no doubt that, as in France, directors and managing directors should have a greater personal liability than shareholders. The average rate of income tax was 5*d.* in the pound, but the exemption therefrom of co-operative societies was a source of grievance. The profits from coal mines had been halved; those from water and gas companies and similar monopolies had been increased. The consumption of spirits was steadily decreasing; that of beer tended to rise, but there was in every walk of society a steady growth of sobriety.

Some fifty chambers of commerce were asked for their views on the cause and remedy of trade depression. Nearly all agreed that foreign tariffs, cheap foreign labour, and constant fluctuation of exchange between countries having a gold and those having a silver value, and over-production, were the primary causes. The unduly low prices of raw material did not help trade; the shorter hours of labour were a handicap, but not one which any chamber

of commerce desired to see changed. The depressed state of some trades was due to excessive profits made during 'the wars' (the American Civil and the Franco-Prussian Wars), which led to an increase of productive capacity far greater than could be absorbed by the normal increase of consumption. The flour milling trade suffered much from excessive imports of foreign flour. Birmingham suffered from high railway rates, from agricultural depression, and from the inferior technical education of British workmen: the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce was one of several which favoured Empire Free Trade and Bimetallism. Bristol, like several other chambers, demanded a reform of the Land Laws, the abolition of the laws of primogeniture and of entail. Falmouth asked for preferential railway rates for the carriage of fish and for close seasons for oysterages. Wages had a purchasing power which had never been equalled: the Factory Acts required revision.

'Spinning and weaving machinery has been largely exported to the Continent, where machines are run up to twenty-two hours a day, which is not allowed under our Factory Acts. A searching inquiry is needed into relative costs of production of textiles at home and abroad. How shall manufacturers increase production without adding to the hours of labour? The answer is *more freedom* under well-considered rules for the sanitary and social welfare of operators.'

Gloucester asked for the emancipation of canals from the control of the railway companies, for a Minister of Agriculture, and greater power for the Railway and Canal Commission. Greenock for 'a real shipping council, drawn from owners, merchants, underwriters, officers and seamen,' to foster the mercantile marine, strong diplomatic action to persuade foreigners to adopt free trade; 'the perfect cure for our grievance would be the abolition of sugar duties.' The merchants of Greenock had, like many others, a sturdy disbelief in the virtues of legislation, and preferred to rely on 'the laws of supply and demand.' The growth of manufacturing capacity in Canada was a subject of complaint, as also of high taxation and long credits, which were a sure sign of bad trade and tended merely to delay revival. The exemption of the dividends of co-operative societies from the incidence of income tax was pointed to as an example of discriminatory legislation which hampered private traders. Huddersfield and Leeds felt keenly the increased imports of foreign yarns combined with high tariffs, high wages, short hours, and over-supply of capital, resulting in undue credit facilities. Liverpool merchants were bimetallists to a man, and wished to see Burmah financially independent of India; they were all in favour of free trade, on the understanding that it was strictly reciprocal, failing which we should tax foreign imports for revenue purposes. The

shipowners did not believe in remedial legislation, but drew attention to the danger of bounties and subsidies and the inflation of credit which had called into existence many ships which were not needed and would otherwise not have been built. Their best customers were still English farmers, and agricultural depression was reflected in every retail trade. 'Free trade' had killed certain trades—e.g., the watch-making industry. 'The bulk of operators before dying suffered greatly, became casual dock labourers, and entirely sunk in the social scale.' Men now used cheap watches which did not last, in preference to time-pieces which endured a lifetime, and no one was the better, or more punctual.

The Manchester Chamber regarded the depression as far the worst in living memory and forwarded a robust proposal

to repeal all Acts which in any way interfere with trade, to remodel the Foreign, Colonial and India Offices and the Board of Trade, dismissing the entire staff, and replacing them by men of sound commercial training.

North Shields, Tynemouth, and the tin-plate makers desired a board of arbitration between capital and labour, want of sympathy between which had tended to damage trade. North Staffordshire desired a reduction of local rates and cheaper transport. The Oldham Chamber (stout fellows) observed that

the causes of depression of trade were so widespread that an inquiry . . . will not result in any practical legislation likely to benefit trade, and respectfully decline to occupy its time by framing answers to the Royal Commission's questionnaire.

The merchants of Nottingham, equally stout-hearted, declared, quite simply, that they stood for the principles of free trade, and that was all that they had to say.

The Sugar Refiners' Association desired the abolition of sugar duties all over the world. The Cleveland iron-masters and the Leather Trades Association desired a reduction of foreign tariffs. The North of England iron manufacturers believed in Empire Free Trade, an inquiry into mineral royalties, by a Commission with power to fix fair sums in cases of dispute, but, for the rest, preferred to rely on 'natural laws.' This insistence on the need, not for nationalising, but for regulating, mineral royalties occurs again and again throughout the Report and the evidence. It has since been effectively secured by Act of Parliament.

The General Shipowners' Society saw no prospect of any improvement: over-production was endemic; legislation would do no good, and, if undertaken by those not intimately acquainted with shipping, might do much harm. The Institute of Builders complained of lack of confidence and want of enterprise on the part of the public; they wished to see the Land Laws simplified

and revised, a note which frequently recurs. Mechanics had become specialists, but the average proficiency was lower, thanks to the evils of jerry-building, of which many examples were given, and the lack of competent inspection by official bodies. It is to be feared that 1935 in this respect shows little improvement over 1885.

The Mining Association of Great Britain attributed depression to the immense amount of capital invested as a consequence of high prices and profits realised during the Franco-Prussian War, as a consequence of which old mines had been reopened and new fields exploited; the output was far in excess of the demand. Meanwhile, as a direct consequence of the high prices of coal during the year 1872-4, there was a growing economy in the use of fuel for domestic purposes, in ironworks and under boilers. There was a drop of 3,000,000 tons in the output of coal in 1884—an unprecedented occurrence, due to adverse tariffs. The railway companies were killing the trade by high charges and by the preference given to foreign competitors. Wages were too high, and men were allowed to starve by the unions sooner than accept a lower wage, which would make it possible for coal masters to employ them in competition with foreigners. The trade had never recovered from the ill-effects of the coal famine of 1872-4 and the high profits and high wages which followed.

The Oldham master cotton-spinners spoke of over-production:

'We are not producing more than the world requires, but more than it can afford to pay for. We must lessen our production costs to the last possible degree.'

The post-war inflation of 1872-4 had resulted in a great increase in spindles; a number of technically unsound concerns, floated as limited liability concerns, had a depressing effect on the trade. Nevertheless, the increase of spindles from 1876 to 1884 in Great Britain was only 2,000,000: abroad it was four times as great.

The Sunderland shipowners took great exception to the Board of Trade, which handicapped British shipping—then in a positively ruinous condition, for a steamer cost more and deteriorated quicker when laid up than did a sailing-ship. Unless shipping speedily revived, its bankrupt condition would become a source of national weakness.

The Royal Commission did not restrict their inquiries to industrialists: they approached associations 'representing the interests of the working classes,' mostly trade unions, in all parts of the kingdom. The trade unions secretaries' replies, some sixty in all, are reprinted in full. Not all of the unions answered. One wrote to say that 'as they had no confidence in the Royal Commission, they declined to answer their questions.' Another wrote

to 'decline to waste time in such a fruitless occupation as giving replies to persons who, to some extent, have prejudged the whole thing.' There was general agreement that things were bad and getting worse; there was a vast emigration of skilled artisans, and an immense number of unemployed: there was an ever-increasing proportion of youths and a decrease, both absolute and proportionate, of skilled adults at work. The quality of work turned out was improving in some trades, but not in all.

'We have not quite got into what Thomas Carlyle called the cheap and nasty,' [wrote the Glasgow branch secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers] 'but the quality of the work put on engines is not equal to twenty years ago, though there are honourable exceptions. No doubt greater competition among masters and beating down of prices will explain this in some measure.'

The purchasing power of wages had risen, but there was less security of employment, owing to the increased use of machines tended by boys, which resulted in over-production. Hours were shorter, but men worked harder: 'it is run, run, be sharp, everywhere.' Youths earned more and skilled men less than they deserved. There were general complaints of systematic overtime, which increased wages for a short period but was followed by longer periods of enforced idleness. 'Ninety per cent. of those who worked overtime are not one whit benefited thereby, and I say emphatically, would to God we had none of it! Then we would have better times.' Among general legislative remedies suggested were reform of the Patent Laws, regulation of royalties on minerals, and the prohibition of systematic overtime.

The apprentice system had by common consent broken down: youths were 'cast loose on the shop, to pick up what they can and how they can.' No attempt was made in most shops to teach them systematically, and apprentice schools run by employers were regarded with suspicion. Masters were more anxious to secure the premium than to make good men; they tended to keep boys at one class of work, with the result that when an apprentice reached man's estate he could often do nothing with credit. The exodus into the towns of the rural population was noted by the unions, and deplored; it tended to lower wage rates and to reduce the potential home market, which should be stronger, for engineering products. Reform of the Land Laws was desired in order to improve the lot of the agricultural worker. 'Farmers, having nothing to spend, make us all feel it.'

The boiler-makers of Hartlepool were, owing to foreign tariffs, on the verge of starvation: great numbers of vessels were laid up, requiring neither replacement nor repair: there was over-production of ships and, though wages had dropped, the masters

pressed for further reductions, thus encouraging buyers to hold off in the hope of lower prices. Mechanisation had, according to one iron-founders' society, in twenty years doubled the productive capacity of a man. It was, however, not regarded so seriously as the damage done to trade by unscrupulous financiers. Companies were floated at double their value: 5 per cent. was thus paid which on an honest system would have been 10 per cent. on the true capital sum invested. Private firms were carried on by men who knew their business and their employees; public companies by shareholders and their nominees who knew neither. Customers were disgusted and jobbery was rife. Boys were always in demand; adults with a family to keep were turned out to starve—seldom by the private firms, but without scruple by limited liability companies whose shareholders had no contact with the men and no interest in anything but dividends.

The trade unions secretaries were in general not 'free-traders.' The free import of ready-made doors and window-sashes from Sweden, Norway and Germany, and of manufactured goods in general, was resented. They noted that the gentry were 'apt to live in the country for most of the year, but to make their purchases in London, thus depriving local tradesmen of their business.' It was not an economical process, but arose partly from a love of ostentation, partly from laziness. Women were at this time, as later, great offenders: they never stopped to think of the effect on employment of purchasing goods made abroad, and they seldom considered quality. The opportunities of women to spend money had enlarged greatly in recent years: they were more apt than men to spend it unwisely on cheap novelties and fripperies from abroad.

The Operative Bricklayers' Society were very severe on

the scandalous system of jerry-building under which vast estates in South-East London are being covered with hovels, the product of the leasehold system, the jerry-builder and the Land Laws.

There was lack of confidence and lack of enterprise; many houses, badly built, made by unskilled men at the lowest rates, stood empty. There was no doubt whatever that the quality of the work turned out by the building trade was lower than twenty years previously. Its fall was due to the permeation of the trade by unscrupulous and grasping men, who employed the cheapest labour and the worst material. In the building trade alone, bad contractors drove out good. Local authorities had powers of inspection, but they abused them shamelessly, putting in men who had neither knowledge of the trade nor, in some cases, honesty. Efficient inspection and a reform of the Land Laws was strongly urged. But here also there were sturdy voices

raised ; the secretary of a branch of the Operative Stonemasons' Friendly Society wrote :

I anticipate that if we, as a nation, uphold our honour and credit abroad, trade will get better at home. Capitalists will have more money for improvement of property and will be able to subscribe more freely to the building of public institutions.

The Hammersmith secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners gave a vivid example of the effect of bad workmanship which deserves quotation in full :

A gentleman bought an estate calling it Bedford Park and laid it out for building in the Elizabethan style on plans by Norman Shaw. There was a great demand for these houses. Street after street was let or sold. The proprietor thought the work cost too much. He discharged his journeymen and invited tenders from sub-contractors. Nigger-driving and scamping commenced : quantity, not quality, was demanded. The tenants found the ceilings fell, the doors would not shut, the windows did not keep the weather out. They ran away and operations stopped with the estate half covered. (December 1, 1885.)

The general tenour of the evidence was that of Spenser's query in 'The Shephard's Calendar' :

'Must not the world wend in his common course
From good to bad, from bad to worse ?'

During 1886 the Commissioners made two interim Reports and one Final Report. The first submitted evidence, taken at twenty sittings, relating to the iron and steel and textile industries, of eminent industrialists such as Sir Lowthian Bell, Mr. T. E. Vickers, Sir Jacob Behrens, and Mr. Henry Birchenough. The second Report, published in June 1886, declared that a world-wide depression presumed a world-wide cause ; and that cause was, in their view, 'the relations of the precious metals to other commodities.' The purchasing power of gold had increased, and therefore prices, measured by a gold standard, had fallen. The supply of gold had fallen, and the demand had increased, owing to the demonetisation of silver in several countries and the increased absorption of gold in India. The currency question and our monetary system at home and abroad, in its relation to the rest of the world, needed early and separate examination, under terms of reference carefully prepared and drawn so as to include all branches of the subject. On this Report no action was ever taken.

The Final Report, published in December, emphasised that the condition of working men in regular employment had undoubtedly improved, but at the expense of those casually employed. During years of depression the accumulation of capital and the production of commodities had proceeded more

rapidly than the increase of the population : there were signs of a growth of material prosperity and of increasing savings ; the consumption of food was higher. The total volume of profits assessable to income tax had increased, but the distribution was different. The reward of capital and management was less, of labour somewhat greater, but rapidly increasing use of machinery, though it helped to increase the national wealth, had created acute, though temporary, distress among working men who could not at once transfer their labour or find markets for the increased production. The number of persons with incomes of less than £2000 a year was growing ; of persons with over £5000 it was falling. 'The depression' differed from its predecessors only by reason of the length of time it had endured. Producing power had, for the moment, outrun consuming power ; the protectionist policies of foreign countries prevented the restoration of equilibrium. The Commission absolved trade unions from blame ; 'they have on the whole been conducted with propriety and judgement.' They declined to make far-reaching recommendations of the type that had been pressed upon them, such as the adoption of the metric system, the conversion of the consular service to a status of commercial travellers ; they attached little importance to the question of mining royalties and to the alleged excessive charges by railways, though they agreed that the development of canals was most desirable. They urged the need for better technical education ; for amendments to the law relating to trade marks and the fraudulent description of goods, and to the Limited Liability Acts. They concluded by expressing the conviction that

if our position is to be maintained, it must be by the exercise of the same energy, perseverance, self-restraint and readiness of resource, by which it was originally created.

A weighty minority Report emphasised the paramount cause of the depression to be a falling off in the supply of gold and the larger supply or diminished demand for silver : the signatories observed that the Commission was reluctant to enter into an inquiry into the merits of 'free trade' :

It was to convert the world. After forty years no nation of importance has adopted it, and some have abandoned it. It was to confer great benefits on its votaries, and corresponding evils were to assail those who rejected it. Enterprise was to be paralysed and invention stifled where free trade did not prevail. Germany and America have rivalled, if not excelled us, in enterprise, and to neither country has free trade contributed its stimulus. A system which can confer prosperity on its votaries only when those who abjure it are also prosperous, and which permits depression to assail with strict impartiality those who adopt and those who reject it, appears to require . . . some further justification than those arguments

which prevailed before prophecy was falsified by history. . . . Those who are most zealous for free trade have passed into that phase of opinion when inquiry is deemed pernicious, their zeal for the dogma outweighing a like consideration for its truth and concern for its effects. What is now needed is an inquiry whether the circumstances of 1886 are in all respects equally appropriate as those of 1846 to the adoption and application of free trade precisely as it was then adopted and applied. . . . The first duty of a State to its citizens is to protect its industries from invasion. A Government which confesses its impatience or professes reluctance to fulfil that duty abdicates one of its primary functions. Diplomatic efforts have failed: can legislation effect what had baffled diplomacy? The appeal for legislative aid is by many keenly resented. Yet if diplomacy was right in its object, how can legislation directed to the same purpose be wrong? Is it only the method that is obnoxious?

Another notable minority Report, extensively signed, questioned whether, in the face of foreign tariffs, we should ever be able to command sufficient employment for our growing population. Thanks to mechanisation, the amount of labour required for a given amount of production was incomparably less than forty years earlier, and was being further reduced. The problem was no longer how to remedy a scarcity of necessities, but 'how to give an adequate share of that employment which affords the masses their only means of obtaining a title to such necessities and conveniences.' They urged the imposition of tariffs on manufactured goods, sufficiently to neutralise the effect of foreign tariffs, lower wages, and longer hours. The national interest demanded such a change of policy, and measures to reverse the decline of agriculture, if only in view of its effect on the physical health and moral and social condition of the people.

Such were the views expressed fifty years ago by our grandfathers. It is clear that the movement against free trade was already strong, and in many trade unions popular, in the 'eighties: the danger of allowing agriculture to decay was widely recognised, alike by masters and men, but the mercantile and the money-making interests preferred to close their eyes to danger so long as they could make money out of the increased value of property near towns. On this subject history shows writers of the minority Reports, as so often happens, to have been better prophets and statesmen than the complacent majority. '*Gouverner, c'est prévoir*,' wrote Talleyrand. Foresight was not the strong point of most industrialists, still less of bankers, or of Governments with an eye to the next election. It is likewise clear, in retrospect, that monetary troubles, as one of the interim Reports suggested, were fundamental. The development of the cyanide process in South Africa, and the discovery of fresh goldfields in Western Australia and the Rand, by increasing the world's stock of gold, created an inflationary movement which brought temporary relief during

the next decade, and made it possible for world trade to reach fresh and higher levels from which it has never quite receded. The same thing happened in 'the hungry 'forties' which followed upon the Napoleonic Wars, and were relieved by the discovery of gold in California in 1848.

If we could be assured of a correspondingly great increase in the world's stock of gold during the next few years, we might reasonably hope to emerge by the same road as our forbears, who trusted in gold that it would deliver them. But there is no such prospect before us, and three major factors have arisen. The first is that we have for the moment abandoned the conventional use of gold as a convenient medium for the settlement of international trade balances. The second is the creation of debt at by far a greater rate than the creation of wealth—faster, that is to say, than it can possibly be repaid. As a direct consequence the great banks and insurance companies are now faced with the fact that there is not sufficient property outside their lien to provide for the issue of fresh obligations, on which process 'the City' has come increasingly to depend for its prosperity. Hence the sinister approbation for policies which create fresh debts—*e.g.*, the nationalisation of mineral royalties, the demand for 'public works' on a great scale, and the creation of unwieldy public bodies such as the London Passenger Transport Board, which has driven hundreds of 'small men' out of business, has reduced services, and incidentally employment, in order to pay dividends on its vast capital. The third factor, which, as Mr. Philip Mumford shows in his *Technics and Civilization*, has been of growing importance, is the transfer of the burden of production from muscular labour to the labour of machines operated by various forms of power—*i.e.*, solar energy. This factor has, as the Commission saw, created the problem of distribution, already in their day urgent. In the view of the present writer, the only solution, consistent with the growth of freedom—freedom to man to choose whom or what cause he will serve, and how he will order his life and spend his leisure—is to pay as high wages as possible to the greatest number possible and let men and women settle for themselves how they spend what they have earned. Reduce taxation and let money fructify, not in public works, but in the public pocket. Auberon Herbert's *Voluntaryist Creed* shows him to have been a prophet born out of due time: but that is another story.

ARNOLD WILSON.

THE FORESTRY COMMISSION AND THE LAKE-DISTRICT

THE Lake District is the most beautiful part of England and takes high rank among the beautiful regions of the world. Wordsworth, in a passage of penetrating analysis, argued that in several respects its scenery was superior to that of the Alps, and, though a comparison between such different types of beauty may seem hardly possible, few who know them both will deny the truth of Wordsworth's contentions in regard to the particular points upon which he lays emphasis. With western Norway, with the Salzkammergut and with the lakes of Carinthia, comparison is easier, for the resemblance between these regions and our own lake country is unmistakable, and while most people would acknowledge each of these to be pre-eminent in some things, it can hardly be maintained that any one of them can claim a general superiority in loveliness over the lakes and fells of Cumberland and Westmorland. In many ways the English Lake District is unique. Where else can you see colour at once so splendid and so subtle in gradation as on the slopes of its hills when they are, in Wordsworth's phrase, 'clothed in the sunshine of the withering fern'? Where else can you find so much variety in so small an area? This variety was noted by Wordsworth, and in his *Guide to the Lakes* he indicated its cause. Most of the lakeland valleys radiate from the mountain mass, of which Scafell and Great Gable are the centre, 'like spokes from the nave of a wheel.' Hence each stands in a different relation to the sun. And that means, not only that the play of light and shadow is not quite the same in any two of these valleys, but also that they differ from one another in the direction and degree of their exposure to those influences of sunshine and frost and wind and rain which do so much to determine the shape of the rocks and the character of the vegetation. The weather, too, is extremely variable, so that the colour and aspect of the scene may change completely in a few minutes, while on the summits the weird and sudden transformations wrought by the wizardry of the mists can stand comparison with anything that Scotland or Norway has to show. But, further, the Lake District is uniquely English. More than

any other part of England, it presents the curiously poetic and particularly English characteristic of a landscape which is completely harmonious and deeply humanised. The ancient villages and farmsteads are of a piece with the fields and the hills, and share in their beauty. As redolent of old-world friendliness and security as the loveliest and least spoilt villages of Gloucestershire or Berkshire, you feel at once that these farmsteads are English homes and—like those Berkshire homes of which the Poet Laureate writes—

Have been the heartfelt things, past-speaking dear
To unknown generations of dead men,
Who, century after century, held these farms.

But though the Lake District has this in common with some other parts of rural England, it stands alone, not only in England, but among all mountain regions with which I am acquainted, by reason that this touching homeliness is fused in so subtle a harmony with the grandeur and mystery of the hills. Man is not here, as in the Tyrol, clinging uneasily and insecurely to the edges of the mountains. He has made his home among the mountains and all is of a piece. Just as in our English ethic the deepest loyalties and most enduring devotions are connected with the intimate relations of the family and the neighbourhood, so here there is no separation or disharmony between the sublimest of peak and crag and the little white homesteads with their closes and cowsheds. From the buildings, which, as Wordsworth says, 'in their very form call to mind the processes of Nature,' the eye travels gradually, without jar or interruption, to be delighted by 'the beauty and intricacy with which the fields and coppice-woods are often intermingled,' and thence passes over the soft and varied colouring of the hill pastures to the mountain heights whose 'apparent forms and colours are perpetually changed by the clouds and vapours which float round them.' Everywhere there is an 'endless melting and playing into each other of forms and colours,' an 'intermixture of delicious hues,' an infinite variety and at the same time an intimate and harmonious unity.

There is nothing mysterious about the harmony of this lake country landscape. It has its root in a simple fact of economic geography. The lakeland farms are sheep farms based economically upon an alternate use of hill pasture and valley meadowland, and the fell-side sheep-walks run right up to the crags, and are not, like the alpine pastures, severed from the meadows and the lower slopes by a thick belt of trees. The farms are small peasant farms; and thus the homespun individuality of a hardy peasantry is reflected in the small scale and the odd, irregular shapes both of the buildings and of the

closes and coppices, so that all is in harmony with the varied and irregular forms of the hills and the infinite variety of their colour. Hill-side and valley are linked, not severed, by the trees, for rocky knolls jut out here and there in the meadows, and these knolls are frequently covered with native deciduous trees similar to those which, again here and there, straggle up the slopes of the hills in irregular stretches of woodland, while a stray yew or holly, high up among the bracken and the rocks, will sometimes give a touch of dark green that makes a harmony with the yews and hollies about the cottage doors.

To all who really know and love its beauty it is obvious that such a landscape is easily spoilt. In a harmony of this kind a regular straight-sided plantation of conifers, uniform in height and uniform in colour, is like a roof of corrugated iron in a Cotswold village or the blast of a fog-horn during the performance of a Brahms symphony. Those who only know the Lake District in high summer, or have only seen it hastily from a car, may think such a statement exaggerated, for there is less subtlety and less splendour in the colouring during the summer than at other seasons, and the gentle and exquisite harmony of the scenery cannot be appreciated in a passing glance. Perhaps a passage from Wordsworth's *Guide to the Lakes*—a passage in which he describes 'the autumnal appearance of any of the more retired valleys, into which discordant plantations and unsuitable buildings have not yet found entrance'—will help to establish my contention:

In such spots, at this season, [writes the poet] there is an admirable compass and proportion of natural harmony in colour, through the whole scale of objects; in the tender green of the after-grass upon the meadows, interspersed with islands of grey or mossy rock, crowned by shrubs and trees; in the irregular enclosures of standing corn, or stubble fields, in like manner broken; in the mountain-sides glowing with fern of divers colours; in the calm blue lakes and river-pools; and in the foliage of the trees, through all the tints of autumn—from the pale and brilliant yellow of the birch and ash, to the deep greens of the unfaded oak and alder, and of the ivy upon the rocks, upon the trees, and the cottages.

During Wordsworth's lifetime the beauty of the Lake District was in danger. It was threatened by schemes for roads and railways, by the building of tasteless and ostentatious villas, and by 'discordant plantations.' Of all these the poet had much to say. And though a native of Cumberland and a resident in the lake country for all but the whole of his life, he was emphatic in maintaining that the preservation of this mountain sanctuary was a matter of more than local concern. The railway question, 'though seemingly local,' he considered to be 'really one in which all persons of taste must be interested.' And that section

of his *Guide* in which he discusses the problems of building and planting concludes with an appeal to 'persons of pure taste throughout the whole island, who, by their visits (often repeated) to the Lakes in the North of England, testify that they deem the district a sort of national property, in which every man has a right and interest who has an eye to perceive and a heart to enjoy.'

Wordsworth was a lover of trees. The passages quoted above show how sensitive he was to their beauty. But of the various dangers which threatened the lake country there was none he dreaded more than that of 'discordant plantations.' Speaking of 'the management of the grounds and plantations,' he says 'it is from abuses in this department, far more even than from the introduction of exotics in architecture (if the phrase may be used) that this country has suffered.' Large-scale plantation of conifers was clearly the thing he regarded as most objectionable. Firs and larch were being planted by some 'with a view to profit,' but 'in many instances for the sake of ornament.' The attempt to use the valleys of the Lake District for profitable timber production he deemed wholly wrong.

To those who plant for profit, [he wrote] and are thrusting every other tree out of the way to make room for their favourite, the larch, I would utter first a regret that they should have selected these lovely vales for their vegetable manufactory, when there is so much barren and irreclaimable land in the neighbouring moors, and in other parts of the island, which might have been had for this purpose at a far cheaper rate.

The larch was apparently the tree most frequently planted in masses in Wordsworth's day, but most of his objections to the larch could be urged with even greater force against the planting of spruce. As regards choice of trees he urges that they should be limited 'either to those found in the native woods, or to such as accord with them.' The introduction of a few exotic trees he considered justifiable 'provided they be confined almost to the doors of the house.' The Scotch fir, he says, 'may be placed along with the sycamore near the house.' But the more closely his discussion of planting is studied, the clearer it becomes that his main objection was not to this or that tree, but to the uniformity and regularity which is necessarily characteristic of large-scale plantation. In regard to the ornamental planting, the main force of his argument is directed against that kind of planting which approximated most nearly to the kind employed in timber production. This is apparent, not only from the reasoned discussion of the problem, but also from his casual and contemptuous references to 'platoons of firs' or to the 'melancholy phalanx' of Scotch firs 'left to spindle up by each other's side' upon one of the islands in Derwentwater. But the most significant part of the main discussion must be quoted as nearly as

possible in full. The poet has been ridiculing the absurdity of 'whole acres of artificial shrubbery and exotic trees among rocks and dashing torrents.' He continues as follows :

But this uniformity, bad as it is, is not so obtrusive as the small patches and large tracts of larch-plantations that are overrunning the hill-sides. To justify our condemnation of these, let us again recur to Nature. The process by which she forms woods and forests is as follows. Seeds are scattered indiscriminately by winds, brought by waters, and dropped by birds. They perish, or produce, according as the soil and situation upon which they fall are suited to them. . . . From low and sheltered places, vegetation travels upwards to the more exposed ; and the young plants are protected, and to a certain degree fashioned, by those that have preceded them. The continuous mass of foliage which would thus be produced is broken by rocks, or by glades or open places, where the browsing of animals has prevented the growth of wood. As vegetation ascends, the winds begin also to bear their part in moulding the forms of the trees ; but, thus mutually protected, trees, though not of the hardiest kind, are enabled to climb high up the mountains. Gradually, however, by the quality of the ground, and by increasing exposure, a stop is put to their ascent ; the hardy trees only are left : those also, by little and little, give way—and a wild and irregular boundary is established, graceful in its outline, and never contemplated without some feeling, more or less distinct, of the powers of Nature by which it is imposed.

Contrast the liberty that encourages, and the law that limits, this joint work of Nature and time, with the disheartening necessities, restrictions, and disadvantages under which the artificial planter must proceed. . . . In the first place his trees, however well chosen and adapted to their several situations, must generally start all at the same time ; and this necessity would of itself prevent that fine connexion of parts, that sympathy and organization, if I may so express myself, which pervades the whole of a natural wood, and appears to the eye in its single trees, its masses of foliage, and their various colours, when they are held up to view on the side of a mountain ; or when, spread over a valley, they are looked down upon from an eminence. It is therefore impossible, under any circumstances, for the artificial planter to rival the beauty of Nature. But a moment's thought will show that if ten thousand of this spiky tree, the larch, are stuck in at once upon the side of a hill, they can grow up into nothing but deformity ; that while they are suffered to stand, we shall look in vain for any of those appearances which are the chief sources of beauty in a natural wood. . . .

Let me then entreat that the native deciduous trees may be left in complete possession of the lower ground ; and that plantations of larch, if introduced at all, may be confined to the highest and most barren tracts. Interposition of rocks would there break the dreary uniformity of which we have been complaining ; and the winds would take hold of the trees, and imprint upon their shapes a wildness congenial to their situation.

The *Guide to the Lakes*, in which these passages occur, was first published in 1810, but it is significant of the strength of Wordsworth's convictions on the subject that the same doctrines were reaffirmed with scarcely any alterations in the various editions

which he issued during the next twenty-five years. The poet's text attained its final form in the edition of 1835. And now, just a century later, the Lake District is once more threatened by a danger of disfigurement similar in kind to that against which he protested, but unfortunately far more serious in the degree and range of spoliation which we have to fear. The worst things to be dreaded 100 years ago were the comparatively limited activities of private owners with bad taste in the way of 'ornamental' planting, and the necessarily limited enterprises of private speculators in timber production. But the danger to-day comes from a Government department able to spend vast sums of money, armed with powers of compulsory purchase, and guided by a policy of timber production on a gigantic scale. When Wordsworth spoke of 'tens of thousands' of larches he probably thought that the worst that was likely to occur. But by the end of September 1933—the date to which their last Report comes down—the Forestry Commission had already planted in the Lake District nearly *one and a quarter million* larches and over *five million* spruce. That is the record of their plantation as regards these two types of trees in Ennerdale and on what is known as their Thornthwaite estate, which runs up the Keswick side of the Whinlatter Pass. They have planted other trees too ; but the vast majority of those others have also been conifers—Scottish and Corsican pines and Douglas firs. Their plantings of deciduous trees of the sort which harmonise with the landscape have been negligible. Of the land afforested, as distinct from that reafforested, 1144 acres have been planted with conifers in Ennerdale and 1308 acres have been so planted on the Thornthwaite estate, while the area planted with broad-leaved species amounts to only 27 acres at Thornthwaite and only 18 acres in Ennerdale. Of course the Whinlatter Pass is not among the greater glories of the lake country, and the plantations in Ennerdale, though they have already spoilt part of the valley, do not extend to the head of the dale under the dome of Great Gable, nor to the lovely lower reaches about the lake. But we cannot be sure that the plantations have reached their limit even in these two places. And the Forestry Commission has recently bought a large estate in upper Eskdale—one of the most beautiful, and most secluded, and least spoilt, of all the lakeland valleys. Finally—and this is a point which must be emphasised—the Acland Committee, whose Report it was which led to the establishment of the Forestry Commission, in a schedule of land surveyed, gave the area of afforestable land in the Lake District as 129,500 acres.

The Eskdale project has already led to emphatic protests from those who know what they are talking about. Mr. Hugh

Walpole, who lives in the Lake District and has made it the scene of some of his best-known novels, in a letter published in *The Times* on February 19 said :

Eskdale is one of the wildest and most lovely valleys in the whole world. Its beauty is dependent on its wildness and unencumbered distances. To plant Eskdale with larch and spruce is to ruin it once and for ever. . . . It is not weak sentiment that has caused so many of us to plead for the preservation of Eskdale's wild beauty. That beauty of uninterrupted rock and fell is, in any case, so rare in England that to lose the most perfect expression of it would be wilful and heartbreaking folly.

Mr. Arthur Gardner, who not only knows the lake country intimately but has a photographer's knowledge that must be almost unrivalled of its scenery, as well as of the scenery of the Alps and of the Scottish Highlands, has expressed his opinion in a letter to the *Spectator* of March 1 :

The man in the street does not yet seem to realize that a commercial forest is not necessarily a thing of beauty, but a comparison between the glorious natural woodland along the upper end of Loch Maree, if we may take a more distant example, and the Forestry Commission's desecration of the lower end of the loch, should convince him at once of the necessity of keeping that useful body's activities away from the chief beauty spots of our land. No man loves trees more than I do, but a fir plantation can never become a real wood, and when the time comes to cut the timber the scene is one of hideous desolation. To blot out upper Eskdale under a dense carpet of regimented fir trees all exactly alike is as great a sacrilege as to place an aerodrome in Hyde Park. What is the good of all the efforts of the National Trust, the Society for the Preservation of Rural England and similar bodies, if a Government department is working against them in this way, even if in a moment of repentance it may hand over to their control the mountain tops which it cannot use ?

And just as Mr. Gardner points the moral of Loch Maree, Mr. Kenneth Spence, the honorary secretary of the Friends of the Lake District, writing from Ambleside to the *Manchester Guardian* on February 7, takes the Ennerdale plantations as his text :

Those who have walked up the Ennerdale valley recently [he says] will have noticed the dull regimentation of that uninteresting tree the sitka spruce, and will realise that with time this will become ever more threatening, until the walker will find himself between walls of undecorated Christmas trees shutting out every glimpse of the Pillar Rock and of Great Gable.

He adds that 'Ennerdale is not by any means the most beautiful valley,' that 'Eskdale and Dunnerdale both have far greater claim to this position,' and that in them 'the threatening forests will work the greater harm.' I can endorse what Mr. Spence says from my own knowledge. I know Eskdale and Dunnerdale, and

I spent several days in Ennerdale last September. Further, those who know the Lake District know that it is futile to preserve a bit of a valley, even its head, as a kind of museum specimen to show what the scenery once was. All is intimately connected and of a piece in this region. As Sir Arthur Somervell says, in a letter to *The Times* of March 1, 'Almost every tree matters. One regiment of conifers, marching up near the top of one of these little mountains, will destroy the whole illusion and reduce the scale for miles around.'

It cannot be too emphatically asserted that these æsthetic considerations are not the mere concern of a few. This new threat to the scenery of the lakes has come at a time when ever-increasing numbers are learning to appreciate its beauties and seeking to explore them in the only way in which they can be fully enjoyed—afoot. This point is emphasised in a letter from Mr. W. C. Costin which was published in the *New Statesman and Nation* of March 2 :

The English Lake District is a precious national possession, and the appreciation of its beauty is increasing among all classes. Those who can afford to take their holidays in Switzerland or Norway can no doubt find some substitute for their holidays in the Lakes—at a loss to the little farms and inns which depend so much upon visitors. But this remedy is not open to the clerks and operatives of the Lancashire and Yorkshire towns, who, as I have noticed when I have been in the Lake country, are tending in increasing numbers to seek in the peace and beauty of Lakeland what they cannot get in the drab surroundings of their working days.

Closely connected with the increasing appreciation of the Lake District is the question of freedom of access. In reply to a question in the House of Commons, Sir George Courthope, speaking on behalf of the Forestry Commission, said 'there is no intention of interfering with existing rights.' But this does not meet the real point, as was recently indicated in the correspondence columns of the *News Chronicle*. Pedestrians have no legal right of way over the fell-sides of Cumberland, but by the old-world courtesy and good sense of the present owners and tenants they are always allowed full liberty to wander about as they please. In countless rambles extending over the whole district, and stretching in time over more than a quarter of a century, I can only remember one occasion in my own experience when my liberty was challenged, and that was when a farmer mistakenly supposed that I was about to walk across a meadow of mowing grass. The Forestry Commission has, so far as I know, given no guarantee that this delicious liberty will be continued. Access to the summits by defined paths would be no substitute for it. Such paths would be thronged and trodden down : the sense of

seclusion, the magic of the wild, the joy of the unrestrained, would be gone.¹

Nothing can justify the Vandalism which would be involved in the extension to Eskdale, or, indeed, to any of the main valleys of the Lake District, of afforestation such as that which has already taken place in Ennerdale. But Vandalism is not the only charge which can be brought against the schemes of the Forestry Commission. On purely arboricultural and economic grounds their concentration upon conifers, and more especially spruce, has been challenged by competent critics. Herr Alwin Seifert, speaking from an intimate knowledge of forests in Germany, has pointed out that in the pure pine forests of Eastern Germany and in the spruce districts of Southern Germany the ravages of moths have been a serious menace, 'for with the destruction of all the broad-leaved trees all the birds withdrew, and we can do nothing to save the life of those trees but spread arsenic from aeroplanes.' He adds:

We may kill the caterpillars by this means, but certainly all the rest of animal life, so necessary to the intricate life of Nature, meets the same fate. Truly the last state of these forests is worse than the first.²

Then Mr. Ian Macpherson questions the economic value of spruce, and says he marvels at the Forestry Commission 'choosing to plant such a poor timber-tree.' He says that he knows estates whose woods were sold, 'but the spruce could not find a purchaser; it was not even fit for firewood.'³ These are technical matters of which I am myself quite unable to judge; but on general grounds of 'rural economy' there is much in the action of the Forestry Commission which seems indefensible. In the lakeland valleys afforestation means the displacement of sheep and the abandonment of the ancient sheep farms. These are genuine peasant farms, the homes and livelihood of a race of men whom all visitors to the lakes have learnt to admire. They have maintained themselves, through good times and bad times, for centuries; and the subsidiary industry of catering for visitors makes their future assured. Though far indeed from being, in general, an advocate of small holdings, I am utterly unable to see any justification for the expenditure of public money on an enterprise which involves the curtailment and, if pressed far, the uprooting of these little farms in the one district

¹ Mr. R. H. Hall, in a letter published in the *Observer* of March 17, says: 'The use of footpaths, even if they are provided, cannot be compared with the freedom which is now enjoyed through local courtesy.'

² See Herr Seifert's letter to *The Times* of March 6. Will 'freedom of access,' one wonders, be worth much if tourists are liable to be sprayed with arsenic?

³ See Mr. Ian Macpherson's letter to the *Manchester Guardian* of February 18.

in which they have held their own, and, if uninterfered with, will continue to hold their own, in modest but self-supporting prosperity. It may be urged, and was, in fact, suggested by Mr. Scrymgeour-Wedderburn in a letter to *The Times* of February 8, that forestry employs more men than sheep-farming. But the actual record of the Forestry Commission in the matter of employment is not much to boast about. It is fairly easy to 'give employment' if you have got nearly half a million of the taxpayers' money to spend every year. The question is not, surely, whether more men are employed per thousand acres of forest or per thousand acres of sheep pasture, but whether the net increase of employment produced by this large expenditure of public money is greater when it is thus used to displace sheep-farming than when it is used in some other way. Now the latest Report of the Forestry Commission shows that, while they are still receiving a Government grant of £450,000 a year, the number of persons employed in the Commission's Forests has never reached as many as 4000. Further, the difference between the minimum number employed in summer and the maximum number employed in winter is large. The figures for 1933 were 2845 for the minimum and 3735 for the maximum. In other words, more than 23 per cent. of the labour employed in these forests was casual labour. Moreover, a comparison between the numbers employed in sheep-farming and the numbers employed in forestry would in any case only be pertinent if afforestation could only be carried out in districts where it involved the supersession of sheep. But one of the most inexplicable facts about the work of the Forestry Commission is their virtual neglect of large areas where their activities would neither disfigure scenery nor displace sheep. 'There are plenty of places in the Pennines, the Yorkshire Moors, or Central Highlands,' writes Mr. Gardner, 'where even conifers would be an improvement.' Mr. Costin reminds us that the Forestry Act of 1919 gave the Forestry Commission powers of compulsory purchase, and his letter concludes:

When they choose to exercise their activities among the Cumberland sheep farms rather than on the Yorkshire moors they force one to ask whether they really prefer to displace sheep and peasant and spoil the happiness of visitors rather than displace the grouse.

It certainly seems curious that the latest map of the areas acquired by the Forestry Commission shows a complete blank in the whole region of the Pennines between the Tees and the borders of Derbyshire, with the exception of one property in Arkengarthdale, which was acquired in 1932 and on which 148 acres had been planted by September 30, 1933.

Whatever else may be urged in favour of the programme of the Forestry Commission, it cannot be maintained that the economic argument is indisputably on their side. Twice in the course of their brief history the whole range of their activities has been subjected to review in an independent inquiry directed to the economic problem, and on both occasions the report was unfavourable. The Geddes Committee on National Expenditure—as the Commissioners themselves note in their Report for 1921-22—'recommended that the afforestation policy adopted by Parliament after the war should be completely scrapped.' The Committee on National Expenditure, before which the Forestry Commissioners gave evidence in May 1931, reported as follows:

After weighing up all these considerations we recommend that no fresh acquisitions of land be made for the present and that no more forest workers' holdings be created, but that afforestation proceed at the rate of 20,000 acres per annum for five years on the land already acquired. This course is estimated to save £478,000 next year and £560,000 per annum in subsequent years as compared with the present policy.

On both these occasions the Government compromised, but a reduction in the forestry programme was forced upon the Forestry Commission, and they are now working upon the five-year reduced programme which was eventually agreed upon in November 1931, and which will presumably come up for reconsideration in 1936.

I make these criticisms in no carping spirit. I am a lover of trees and no enemy to afforestation. I know that the Forestry Commissioners are a public-spirited body whose zeal for what they believe to be the national interest cannot be questioned. Most of them give their services to the State without reward, and their devotion is worthy of our admiration. But the very fact that their services are unrewarded necessarily restricts membership of their body to those who are inspired by zeal for the cause of afforestation. And zeal has its dangers. It is always liable to make men see nothing but their goal, and neglect considerations other than those which, for want of a better term, may be called 'departmental.' Further, the range of the Commission's activities is so vast that it is obviously impossible for the Commissioners to have a detailed personal knowledge of local conditions on every part of their great estate. I am sure they do not wish to spoil the beauty of England. But I am equally sure that they will do it irreparable injury if they persist in their schemes for afforestation in Eskdale or extend them to any other part of the heart of lakeland. The Forestry Act of 1919 empowered the Commission to sell land which proved unsuitable for afforestation. May we not hope they will recognise

that land which cannot be afforested without disfiguring the most beautiful part of England is unsuitable for afforestation? I hear that negotiations and discussions on the problem are taking place with the National Trust and with the Council for the Preservation of Rural England. An agreed solution is much to be wished for. But on the main question there can, I fear, be no compromise. The valleys of the Lake District cannot be saved by the preservation of bits of them as museum specimens. And surely the very interests of forestry themselves require that the Forestry Commission should not alienate public opinion, for by its very nature afforestation must be planned for many years ahead and needs the continued support of Parliament. In one of their own Reports the Commissioners speak of 'that continuity in policy and outlook which is so essential to success in forestry,' and say that 'uncertainty is the worst enemy of the Commissioners' work.' But the necessary support of public opinion cannot fail to be endangered by schemes such as that for the afforestation of Eskdale. Those of us who love the English lakes are hostile to these projects, not out of a passing whim, but because our love for this beautiful land is deeper and stronger than words can easily express.

REGINALD LENNARD.

CONTROLLING BROADCAST MUSIC

To *The Nineteenth Century* of October 1934 I contributed an article on the subject of broadcast music, and, after referring to Sir Henry Wood's ideal of making universal the beneficent effect of music, ended with the statement of this opinion: 'But much more remains to be done, and its successful accomplishment will depend upon the more progressive, enlightened and, above all, the larger-minded co-operation of Broadcasting House.' Elsewhere and at various times I have expressed the view that, in the broadcasting of symphony and chamber concerts and operas, the composer frequently is required to take a back seat in order to allow the engineers to produce at least a semblance of the score as he originally conceived it. These opinions, it seems, have been taken by Broadcasting House as being almost a personal affront, if one can be personal when confronted with so austere an impersonality. Needless to say, I was not a little flattered, not only that my words were read in the House but also that they were deemed to be worthy of some attention.

The first sequel was that I was invited to lunch by Dr. Adrian Boult to discuss the matter. Now here it is necessary to make clear that Dr. Boult and I have been friends for several years. There was no question of any personal criticism. The offending articles, in fact, were written in the course of my daily life as a critic who believes his function is to be continually observing and appraising. But it was clear that Dr. Boult believed that I was doing less than justice to the purely musical aspect of broadcasting. Accordingly, he suggested that I should listen to a symphony concert in the Balance and Control cubicle at headquarters. He wished me to see exactly how it was all done, how the concert was translated to listeners and how the qualities of the broadcast version compared with a remembered direct experience. Having taken an early opportunity of listening to a concert in this way, I am now in a position to extend the inquiry into this important problem.

The reader, of course, must be convinced that the problem of broadcasting music is important before any headway can be made. That is, he must be aware of some kind of difference between the

stream of sound which is now available in almost every house, hotel, hospital and institution in the country, and those more utilitarian streams of light and heat which we count among our home comforts. Not everyone is aware of this difference. To those who are not, this inquiry must necessarily seem superfluous. But broadcasting itself has helped to bring about a notable increase in the numbers of those who can never listen to music as a background, those for whom listening means a whole-hearted and whole-minded experiencing of the composer's creation. Evidently the B.B.C. so far recognises this numerical increase as to attempt to convey, as far as is mechanically possible at present, a clear version of the interpretations. Musical values do count. When I was there Mr. Stanton Jefferies was in control. He followed every work with a full score, and from beginning to end was effecting compromises with the altogether laudable idea of keeping the composer in the centre of the picture; or rather, let us say, with the idea of presenting the composer's features with a minimum of distortion. Mr. Jefferies' problems are many. On the engineering side, he must keep the dynamics and intensities of the performance within prescribed limits; on the musical side, he must know, first, the main outlines of the score as regards texture and gradations of tone, next, the modifications of the written score which are inevitable even in the most conscientious interpretation, and, last, the acoustics peculiar to the hall or studio in which the performance is being given. A soloist in a concerto and the singers in an opera bring him added responsibilities, for each soloist presents a separate problem in relation to the microphone, and if he (or she) be a singer, that problem may sometimes be very nearly insuperable.

I have referred to the compromises which the controller must make; and let me say at once that in the programme I heard (Elgar's Introduction and Allegro, Beethoven's Fourth Piano-forte Concerto and Brahms' Second Symphony) he made these with an ingenuity born of long practice. Always his main consideration is one of compression. If the range of dynamics of a given composition is represented by 300, he must reduce that range to a figure near 100. Moreover, he must be continually making adjustments in accordance with the music's behaviour. For example, a long *crescendo* passage cannot be carried right through on a single scale; the reduced range necessitates the reproduction of such a passage in a series of shorter *crescendos* on different scales. The skilful manipulator is able to effect this well enough to deceive the ordinary listener's ear, but he can hardly hope to hide the device from a trained ear. Another problem is to anticipate a *fortissimo* entry by choosing a suitable (which means an unrevealing) moment for reducing the scale; and yet

another is to establish a scale at the very outset of a work or of a movement. The latter especially calls for an uncommonly sharp ear and something akin to sleight-of-hand.

The experience of listening to that programme under the controller's hands and in his company convinced me that there is no particular reason why his sharp-eared practice should be condemned as sharp practice. It is not as if we are or need be ignorant of the imperfections and changed values which are inherent in the broadcasting of music. No broadcasting agency has ever pretended that every one, or even any one, of its listeners will be given in his home precisely the same view of a symphony or concerto as that which can be obtained in the concert-hall. It is generally understood that, for all but the most ordinary of listeners, there are many and great differences between the direct and the indirect experiences. The purist has no case against radio as such, whatever case he may have against the B.B.C. If he would hear Delius' *A Mass of Life* in its natural state, let him go to Queen's Hall. If he is unable to go, and still would hear that work as the composer conceived it, let him turn off the wireless and wait until he *can* attend an actual performance. I have given a work by Delius as an example because he is one of those composers whose music does not take kindly to the medium of broadcasting. But in music of less complex texture, even the purist can obtain through broadcasting a view of the structure which will at least bear some recognisable relation to the whole and direct view. This is not to say that radio could not reproduce a more faithful view. For my part, I believe it can, and I shall return later to that aspect of the subject. The point for the moment is that, under the present conditions of radio, it is possible to obtain some kind of recognisable view.

In any case, whether or not the purist is inclined to give broadcasting its due, the massive fact of broadcasting itself remains and cannot be gainsaid. The suspicion and fear with which it is regarded by numbers of musicians are frequently the result of a fundamental misunderstanding. There is a way, and a logical way, of regarding all forms of mechanised music as an extended development of instrumentation. For the simplest of all music we must go back to that for unaccompanied voice. That represents man's original impulse to make music. Experience can be immediately expressed by the single voice. When other voices join it, even in unison, the experience and its expression are separated. Then, with the addition of vocal parts, instrumental music is already foreshadowed. The singer as his own composer and the composer as his own singer represent music in its purest simplicity. How far we are now removed from that blessed state

can be seen in that few contemporary singers write their own songs and that no composers sing.

The earliest problems of technique arrive with the first instruments that can produce tone as well as rhythm, and technique, however primitive, lets in sophistication. First the player must concentrate upon the taming of his instrument. Not until he has passed this stage can he consider the nature of the music he is to play. If by chance instrument and music are not in accord, it is to be expected that the instrument, since it has given the player a sense of new power, will prevail. We reach the point where the player requires of the composer music which shall be apt for his instrument. Music at this stage is conditioned by physiological and mechanical factors as much as by 'impulsive experience'.¹ Then follows the development which results from endless experiments in combining instruments of every kind and quality. At length we arrive at the full orchestra of the present day with its embarrassing riches. If we would see at least one reason why the conductor has assumed such great importance in our time, we have only to consider the gulf which separates an unaccompanied folk-song and, say, Shaporin's Choral Symphony in C Minor. In the one, conception and performance are adjacent; in the other, they are so far removed each from the other that it is necessary before performance to publish verbose explanations of the music's birth, environment, style and, in general, its credentials. (Even so, the B.B.C.'s publicity department found it impossible to compose a coherent account of the work, before its recent performance in London.) Sometimes the composer himself has difficulty in rediscovering the exact nature of the experience that impelled him to write a work for a post-war orchestra, for between that 'impulsive experience' and its final significant form lie so many technical problems that the way back is easily obscured.

This brief survey of the expansion of music's ways and means leads directly to an appraisal of that stage of development which we call mechanised music. The term is used to include the gramophone, the piano-player and radio, each of which can be looked upon as a continuation of the instrumental phase. The viol and recorder are instruments under the player's direct control. Keyed instruments are less directly controlled. Still less direct is the conductor's control of his orchestra. And relayed and recorded music remove the control by one further step. Dr. Boult may have established a complete understanding with his players in the matter of interpreting Elgar's Introduction and Allegro, but before that interpretation can be conveyed to an audience outside the Queen's Hall we have to reckon with Mr.

¹ The term is used in the sense which Professor Abercrombie gives it in his *Towards a Theory of Art*.

Jefferies. And he in turn, however carefully he co-operates with Dr. Boult's rehearsals of the work, must reckon with differences of stress and *tempo* which are bound to occur between the final rehearsal in an empty hall and the actual performance when the audience's influence is at work. The increased problem, however, does not alter the nature of the case. Radio and the gramophone are instruments of music. If the reader denies this because a spring must be wound or a battery charged before music can be recorded or relayed, he is almost refusing to believe that a trombone is an instrument because the player's lungs must be charged and a slide adjusted before it can reproduce its part of an orchestral score; and if he denies it because in radio and gramophone music human agency is twice removed, must he not also deny that an orchestra is a composite instrument for the same reason? He may not believe that the invasion of art's field by the middleman of science is an unmitigated blessing; he may wish it were possible to enjoy music, and perhaps the whole of life, in the conditions of the nineteenth or the eighteenth century; but he can hardly remain blind to the eagerness with which creative and interpreting musicians have pressed the amenities of mechanised music into their service, or to the line of development which the new phase represents.

If mechanised music is seen, not as a retrogression, but as a logical extension, much of the suspicion which it has aroused will be removed. The phase it represents can be described as that of 'intensive instrumentation.' Now, each successive step in the expansion of musical means has involved fresh technical problems; and it was to be expected that this latest phase would give rise to a whole new set of obstructions as well as opportunities. Chief of all the problems of mechanised music has been that which concerns the faithful presentation of reality. To create the illusion that Kreisler is really and truly playing to the Digweed family in their home at Tooting—that now seems an impossible achievement. Even the Digweeds cannot any longer be hoodwinked. Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that since instruments have never failed to impose their own peculiarities and limitations upon the music they are called upon to play, so broadcasting and the gramophone will exert their influence upon the music of the future and also interpretations of existing compositions. The engineers of reproduced music, having discovered their own level, will draw up their regulations and, for the good of all concerned, expect them to be strictly observed. We may suppose that there will be more and more composers who, paying some heed to those regulations, will write works specially for radio performance or for gramophone reproduction. It is not impossible that musicians of a new generation will rearrange for

radio performance those classical scores which are then still in vogue, and not think it a sacrilege.

Indeed, rearrangements of works in the established orchestral repertory are already being made, and can be heard almost every day. They are not overt rescorings, it is true, but, in effect, they amount to the same thing. For example, after each of his rehearsals Dr. Boult confers with the Balance and Control Department. The subject of these conferences is adjustment; that is to say, points are ceded, first by one side, then by the other. The Director of Music, we can be certain, does not easily give in on a question of sheer musical values. On the other hand, since he is in the service of a broadcasting corporation, he cannot kick against the pricks. He must quickly differentiate between what is lawful (and perhaps essential) in music and what is expedient in broadcasting, for the two things do not always coincide. He is sensible enough to avoid a Stokowski-like attitude in the face of radio's relentless machinery. Not even a Toscanini or a Weingartner can stand out for a cherished effect of interpretation if the broadcasting of that effect is likely to over-tax the capacity of the transmitter. Even such apostles of integrity must occasionally climb down; for if they claim to wield the power of beneficent tyranny, radio can make the same claim. Moreover, radio founds its claim on a basis of great numerical strength. If Toscanini—or, lest I do him an injustice, let me say, a conductor of the standing of Toscanini—insisted on having no interference of control during certain *pianissimo* passages in Mozart's G Minor Symphony, 'Control' could politely but firmly tell the great man that, without its guiding hand, those particular moments would be entirely lost on the great majority of listeners; and then, more firmly than politely, could add that, since broadcasting exists to give the maximum of pleasure to the greatest number of people, he must devise a more practical, which means a more audible, *pianissimo*, or, rather, permit 'Control' to devise it for him. That is the answer to those who, after the question has been aired these many months, still persist in asking, as if the very question would shake Broadcasting House to its foundations, why a performance of a symphony cannot be transmitted exactly as it sounds in the concert-hall or the studio. There are others who, having with much difficulty accepted the official answer to that inquiry, are ready with another. 'Why cannot the process of control be made automatic?' they ask. That, again, has its corresponding official reply, one that has been in currency for some time. It runs after this fashion: 'Assume the receiving set to be incapable of reproducing a loud passage above 3000 units of sound or a soft passage below 500 units. Automatic control would bring all soft passages (presumably,

even a Toscanini's all-but-inaudible *pianissimo*) up to the level of 500 units, and all loud passages down to the level of 3000 units.' There it is, plain enough for all to understand. Yet there is still with us that type of so-very-ordinary listener who would not object at all to a performance of Elgar's *Falstaff* in which every degree between *mp* and *ppp*, and again every degree between *mf* and *fff*, was of exactly the same intensity in reproduction. What are we to say of such a listener? Is there any hope of salvation for him? The B.B.C. has never despaired of such cases. Always it has worked on the magnificently generous assumption that all men are, or at least—if only the good work can be carried on for long enough—can be made, musical. And so we read in one of the official pronouncements on this subject of automatic control: 'It was to relieve an inartistic situation of this description that the process of musical control was evolved.'

Having written so much in defence of broadcasting as a manifestation of music's continued life and its extended power, I can the more fairly turn to inquire how far in truth the B.B.C.'s method of control can be called musical. In the first place, we must ask what the B.B.C. means by 'musical' control. We shall not be far wrong, I think, if we take it to mean control which has for its chief motive as great a fidelity as possible to the composer's intentions. At least, when I saw Mr. Jefferies with a full score of each work in the programme, I assumed that this was the meaning. But note that 'as great a fidelity as possible.' Mr. Jefferies related to me an incident which revealed how unenviable is the position which requires him to serve two masters. A young assistant was trying his hand at control for the first time. It is not without reason that this department is called Balance and Control. This young man's interests were not sufficiently balanced for the immediate undertaking of the work. His bias was too much towards musical considerations. Very soon he was lost in the full score and gathering in sensations from the performance. Meanwhile the indicator was showing that the transmission was 'boiling over.' He was relieved of his responsibility until he had acquired a greater balance of interest.

The ideal man for control work is one who is both a musician and a radio technician, and no more of the one than of the other. He will not leave the composer out of the picture. Of course not. Has not the B.B.C. taken steps long ago to relieve an inartistic situation by evolving this process of musical control? Still, there is no dodging the fact that in dealing with some composers this is an extremely delicate process. The great majority of composers whose works are broadcast wrote them without a shadow of an idea that radio's complications would have to be considered in their future interpretation. The purist's

attitude is that these works should never be heard except as the composer imagined them—in fact that, with a few exceptions, they should never be broadcast. But that is an impossibly ascetic point of view. It is one thing to condone the magnifying of Bach's Toccata and Fugue in D Minor to Philadelphian proportions, and quite another thing to fall in with the amenities of mechanised music. For all that, we do well to recognise the transvaluation which almost every composition undergoes in the process of being broadcast. I have referred to compression as being the controller's main preoccupation, and also to his method of reproducing a long *crescendo* in a series of shorter gradations. Now, that means that listeners outside the hall are hearing, not the same performance as the immediate audience are hearing, but a 'similar' one. We cannot even use the word 'similar' in its Euclidean sense, since the radio version is not the actual performance on a perfectly reduced scale, with all parts and features and lines corresponding, each to each. Indeed, the chief business of control is to be continually altering the scale of intensity; so that the radio version of Brahms' Second Symphony which I heard, and to which I have referred, can be described as a series of 'shots' of the Queen's Hall performance with a different scale for each 'shot.' We may confidently contend, as I have suggested, that the difference between the scale of one 'shot' and that of its successor is so small as to be indistinguishable by the average listener; even so, we cannot overlook the fact that, for the understanding Brahmsian, it is precisely upon these fine gradations of intensity that the structure of the symphony depends. And when a symphony by Brahms is broadcast, surely those who love and understand the composer's mind are at least as important as any others among listeners. To be sure, these Brahms-lovers can take the advice I have offered to Delius-lovers who intend to listen by wireless to their composer's works, the advice being, 'Don't.' But Brahms is not the problem that Delius is as regards broadcasting his music. And there are many composers whose works and whose followers deserve the greater attention of those responsible for the technical departments of broadcasting. Earlier in this essay I have remarked that even the purist can listen to a work of music by radio and, if he knows it well, obtain some kind of recognisable view of it and gather some notion of the line of interpretation. But I come now to the stage in this argument where perhaps I can urge that the B.B.C.'s research department should once again make every effort 'to relieve an inartistic situation' by developing a process of even more 'musical' control. I am fully aware that the time is not yet at hand where the range of dynamics of a work like Strauss' *Till Eulenspiegel* can be reproduced on a consistently parallel

scale, but, it seems to me, there has been too much inclination to stay content with the present system. When all is said and considered, it is only a little less inartistic to transmit a symphony on shifting scales of intensity than to level all tonal quantities above and below given limits. This was one of the items I had in mind when, in that earlier essay, I pleaded for a more progressive Broadcasting House. There is a real danger lest the machine works less fast and smoothly as it increases in size and complexity.

Another aspect of the 'transvaluation' of orchestral music through the medium of broadcasting is that which can be described as perspective. In the programme which I heard in the Control Room a striking instance was Elgar's Introduction and Allegro, where a string quartet is contrasted with the whole orchestra of strings. An actual performance of this work depends largely upon the relative positions of the players, and, without a doubt, these positions were an important factor in the conception of the work. Ever since music-lovers have formed the concert-going habit this factor has influenced their manner of listening to music, until the staging of an orchestra has become as essential a part of performance as the producing of a play. The players' positions in the Play Scene in *Hamlet* are one of the producer's surest means of working his end upon our senses, not only upon the eye, but also upon the ear. And when in the concert-hall we see the trumpets or the horns stealing out by a back-door during a performance, we know at once that the composer had something of this 'staging' instinct in his make-up. In a sense it can be said that all nineteenth and twentieth century composers for the orchestra have had this sense and, consciously or unconsciously, have employed it in the fashioning of their scores. The Romantic phase demanded its exercise, and we can safely assume that no composer of that era wrote without bearing in mind the general arrangement of the players. This is not to say that orchestras have always and everywhere been arranged in the same way; only that *some* kind of arrangement has commonly been made and with the definite idea of moulding the surface of the music. An orchestral score, in fact, can be looked at as a relief map, by which the heights and depths and plains of the music can be readily judged.

In a radio performance the tendency is to exalt every valley and to make low every mountain and hill. I myself can claim to have a strong sense of visual association; yet in the majority of cases I find that in transmission an orchestral score gives the general effect of a flat surface. Its features have been ironed out. Paradoxically enough, the result is often the sudden emergence of a contour which, in the concert-hall, would not have been

prominent. It may be due to the composer's marking or to the texture, or merely to the proximity of a microphone; or something of all these may enter into the matter. It is this quality of general flatness, with its resultant rearrangement of contours and features, that commends broadcasting to a certain type of listener. Whatever the conditions, this type always prefers a broadcast to a direct performance. He is usually the analytical listener—one who is more interested in dissecting a composition than in receiving it as a complete experience. And, since my belief is that music should be analysed before and not during performance, I cannot but deplore the encouragement which radio has incidentally given to that particular type. The B.B.C., I suggest, would do well to concentrate less on the cold-blooded, hawk-eyed analysts of music and more on those whose purpose is to follow music purely and simply for musical experience. If the Balance and Control Department aimed at reproducing more faithfully the surface-mouldings of orchestral music instead of a frozen, 'two-dimensional' aspect, it would do much to disseminate and intensify a genuine appreciation of the master-works.

BASIL MAINE.

THE CHARM OF FLY-FISHING

THERE is nothing which shows the inside of a country so well as fly-fishing. Railways and roads often follow river valleys—among hills they must. But railway travellers and motorists go too fast; and so, even, do bicyclists. All these are travellers, tied to their permanent way, hasting to their respective destinations, more concerned with arrival than with their journey. Though motorists and cyclists may stop to admire the view (and eat their food and often, alas, scatter their paper), they must, when travelling, keep their eyes on the road, with only an occasional glance on their surroundings. Walkers are the nearest to fly-fishermen in opportunity for seeing a country, though the modern 'hiker' is apt to keep to the road or the path. But even the old-fashioned people who made long walking tours had to think of their journey's end and the inn scheduled for the night's rest: they must leave the river if their haven lies to the right or to the left. Only the fly-fisher, fishing his way up some lonely stream in the hills, is content to follow a road which leads 'nowhere' for the world at large, but which is everything to him.

The float-fisher, it is true, sees his small fraction of the country more thoroughly, even, than the fly-fisher. When he leaves first the smoky city and then the road, when he pushes through the wet grass in the sparkling sun of a September morning, when he settles himself on the clay bank of his deep, placid river, he makes his own, for the day, some 50 yards of country. He must keep still, and he has, therefore, perhaps even a better chance to watch the wild things than some fly-fishers. But it is a serious business, float-fishing; and concentration on his float, which is vital, leaves him, often, oblivious of all but that. And, if he fishes with a club or in a tournament, there must be movements and conversation which rob him of any advantages which his long immobility—the dry-fly man must also be deadly still at times—may give him over the fly-fisherman. In any case, his range is strictly limited: he swims his float again and again over the same length of water: there is almost the same monotony as in putting a ball continually over a net.

Almost, but not quite—for nothing can happen to the ball

except to hit the net or miss it; whereas the silent float is an emblem of mystery, a tiny clue to the unknown beneath the surface of the waters. And if the float-fisher, confined to his swim, can enjoy the mystery of the unknown, how much wider and more varied are the unknown mysteries of the fly-fisherman, who searches with his fly, not one, but many pools and streams; and who, if he is a trout fisherman fishing the dry fly, or a salmon-fisherman fishing the greased line, actually sees his prey and does not rely on the float to tell him that his fish is there? The float may never bob, and the float-fisherman may waver in doubt whether the depths hold mysteries: the sight of a great trout, just below the surface, sucking in duns, or the rise of a salmon from below the ledges, as the Blue Charm swims across, tells the fly-fisher of a yet more thrilling certainty.

If the first great attraction of fly-fishing is that it gives, besides air and exercise and the sight of birds and beasts and insects, a view of the country that is wide and yet intimate, if its second charm is that it affords glimpses of the unknown—and what human instinct is stronger than the desire to lift the veil of the mysteries that surround us?—there is yet a third pleasure, the joy of technical skill and achievement. Far be it from me to disparage the skill of the expert float-fisher who, with the finest of tackle, can lure and land the shy roach or the wary carp. But as—at any rate, while one has the use of one's limbs—the active seems better than the passive, so, to some of us, the action of the fly-rod seems more attractive than the passive skill, however great, however deeply thought out and painfully acquired, of the roach-fisher. The difference between float-fishing and fly-fishing is that in the first you take up your position and strive to attract your fish to you: in the second you go to find your fish—you are the hunter who seeks his quarry, and not the still hunter who waits for his game to come to him. In both forms of hunting you must be properly equipped and have learned your art. But in fly-fishing there is the added excitement of the initiative. What, then, is this fly-fishing which gives great things in high degree—the key to the country, a revealing, however small, of mystery, and the joy of physical achievement?

Speaking generally, there are three methods of catching fish in fresh-water, in these islands and elsewhere: on the bottom, in mid-water, at or near the surface. Bottom fishing, the pursuit of those fish which live usually and search for their food in the deeps, requires weights to bring your bait down to your fish: you must use a weighted hook and a float, or other contrivances, such as legers and paternosters, which need not concern us here. Mid-water fishing with minnows, real and artificial, also generally needs weights to reach the fish when they are low in the cold

water in the spring of the year : though salmon and trout are to be caught, by modern methods of spinning the minnow and with the lightly leaded prawn, quite near the surface, sometimes, in the warmer and clearer water of summer. Fly-fishing, on the other hand, means fishing on the surface or just under it. And in trout-fishing it means fishing with something which imitates the natural insect, whether as a nymph on its way to the surface, about to hatch into a winged fly, or, having escaped its enemies and passed into its fly stage of existence, floating with the stream, itself to lay, or having laid, the eggs which sink through the water to become fresh generations of nymphs and flies. What, if anything, the salmon-fly imitates is doubtful. But though the salmon-fly does not, as a rule, consciously imitate any winged or other insect known to man in this country, and though in this country the salmon does not regularly feed, like the trout and the grayling, on the natural insect, yet, by long convention, the ordinary lure for salmon is called a 'fly,' and the use of the salmon-fly is essentially surface fishing. It is presented to the salmon in the same manner, with the necessary modification, as the trout-fly is offered to the trout in wet-fly fishing. It is an integral part—some would say the most important part—of the great art of fly-fishing. And, like all fly-fishing, it has a long and interesting history.

Major Hills, in his *History of Fly-fishing for Trout*, dismisses rather summarily the early references to fly-fishing—for learned research into which we are indebted to Mr. Radcliffe's *Fishing from the Earliest Times*, and to Mr. A. J. Butler in the fishing chapters of *Sport in Classic Times*. The fact that trout were caught with a fly, as described by Ælian in the second century A.D., in a river of Macedon is, says Major Hills, interesting rather than important, because it had no influence on subsequent development. But Major Hills is not quite consistent, for later on he makes very clear what some of us feel—the charm of knowing that our sport is 'rooted in the past.' And, if we can know from Mr. Radcliffe and Mr. Butler that that past does not begin in the Middle Ages but goes back to Ælian, the second-century Græco-Roman, who first put on record that the grayling smells of thyme and could be caught with a small fly imitating the mosquito—surely a 000 hook or something less. If we can go back still earlier and find the poet Martial, in the first century, treating it as a common-place that fish (sea fish, it is true) can be caught with the fly, we get a literary tradition of sport. It is broken, of course, by the age of the barbarian Celts and Germans (who, no doubt, like their modern descendants, made base use of spurge and lime and shooting). But it is 'rooted in a past' earlier even than that which begins again with the invention of

printing, the revival of learning and the *Treatise of Fishing with an Angle*.

And, of course, the modern literature of fishing begins with the *Treatise*, the book of St. Albans, which we may as well, as no other claimant has appeared, still attribute to Dame Juliana Berners, the learned nun of Sopwell. She proves that fishing is the best of all sports—better than hunting, hawking, or fowling. She describes the necessary tackle, all, except the line (says Major Hills), of practical excellence for the methods of the day. Her value is shown by the fact that her list of twelve flies has been 'pirated by Mascall (1590) from the *Treatise*, by Walton from Mascall, and from him by numberless writers for hundreds of years.' The right spirit is all there and the nun of Sopwell knows how the true fly-fisher feels:—'You will not desire greatly many persons with you'—a pleasant under-statement.

From the *Treatise* onwards there has been, in England, a succession of writers on fly-fishing, a tradition of fly-fishing literature. If Walton cannot be claimed as a fly-fisher pure and simple, he has much to say about flies, 'pirate' though he may be, and he says it in the perfection of language. His 'adopted son,' Charles Cotton, living in Derbyshire, a country of trout and grayling, was first of all a fly-fisher. And if he did not write as well as Walton, he was probably a better fly-fisherman. He confines himself to his own trout and grayling; and though he mentions salmon in the Trent—not now, alas, 'doubtless one of the finest rivers in the world and most abounding with excellent salmon'—he gives no directions for salmon-fishing or description of the fish. Walton, on the other hand, though he clearly had no personal experience of salmon-fishing, has a chapter on the salmon founded on bookish and other information. To him, and to Franck (author of *Northern Memoirs*, 1694, who was the first to describe Scottish fishing), the salmon was already the 'king of fresh-water fish,' or, as Franck, who was a Cromwellian, puts it, perhaps from the republican angle, 'as the salmon is a monarch and king of the fishes, so he is the ultimate result of the angler's conquest.' Walton describes no salmon-flies: according to him a salmon 'bites not usually at a fly, but more usually at a worm.' Franck, who had caught salmon, has distinct views on salmon-flies:

Now to recreate with the fly, [meaning the artificial] that's another sort of exercise for the angler's diversion; which ought to be considered and diversely consulted, in regard of so great variety of form, lustre, beauty, and proportion. For that end let me advise you that the ground of your fly be for the most part obscure, of a gloomy, dark, and dusky complexion; fashioned with tofts of bears-hair, blackish or brownish discoloured wool, interwoven sometimes with peacock's feathers, at other-whiles lap'd about with grey, red, yellow, green or bleuish silk, simple

colours, or colours sometimes intermingled. For instance, black and yellow represent the wasp or hornet; and a promiscuous brown the flesh-fly: and so of the rest.

He describes also the hackle or the

fly-substitute, found without wings and drest up with the feather of a capon, pheasant, partridge, moccaw, phlimingo, paraketa or the like, and the body differing nothing in shape from the fly, save only in ruffness and indigency of wings.

If you have a wing 'it ought to proceed from the Teal, heron, malard or faulcon. The pinion and wing thereof ought to be close, and so snug as to carry the point exactly downward.' The day for fishing 'should be promiscuous and dark, occasioned by smooty and discoloured clouds.' The rod 'ought in all respects to represent the rush in its growth . . . and be sure it be streight and plient.' The line 'must be accurate and exactly tapered'—surely a modern touch. 'But the last thing material is the moderate stroak which always proves mortal'—is this the stroke of the gaff?—and best succeeds if used without violence; the line also, keep that streight as occasion requires': excellent warning against that worst of dangers, a slack line. And then, as to choice of flies, 'consult the humour of the fish, who, to humour your exercise, puts himself out of humour.' Franck knew a good deal about salmon-fishing, not least—what all salmon-fishers come to learn—that no one can say what fly a salmon will take, or when, or why.

There were many writers on fly-fishing for trout in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both verse and prose. But with the beginning of the nineteenth there came, whether caused by the romantic revival, or by the growth of wealth and leisure and the settlement of the country, a general flowering of the literature of Sport. Colonel Thornton's *Sporting Tour*, which earned a rather sarcastic review by Walter Scott in the *Edinburgh* in 1805, shows how the richer classes were beginning to feel what it is the fashion to describe as 'the call of the wild.' Colonel Thornton travelled to Scotland with a retinue like a nabob, and went chiefly for shooting. But though he clearly preferred, in fishing, to catch pike with his trimmers, he caught five salmon (he says) in one morning. Peter Hawker (*Instruction to Young Sportsmen*, 1814) also travelled to Scotland to shoot, and was chiefly interested in shooting. But, as we know from his diaries, he fished incessantly (sometimes in January) for trout in his own Test, often enough with the minnow—though on a famous occasion he threw his fly from his horse's back. Sir Humphry Davy's *Salmonia*, which appeared in 1828, shows that the intellectuals as well as the soldiers appreciated the charm of fly-fishing for salmon and trout

and grayling. Sir Humphry fished in many of the Scottish rivers for salmon, as he fished for trout at Denham and grayling at Leintwardine, with the fly. He also fished in Norway, one of the first of the long series of Englishmen who have fished those glorious rivers. He caught grayling in the Alps, and huchen (though not with the fly) in the Traun. And, if his style is rather heavy, he had the fisherman's right feeling for Nature, and could apply the scientific mind to fishing problems, though perhaps he did not teach us much. Maxwell (*Wild Sports of the West*, 1832) and Medwin ('late of the First Life Guards and Author of the Conversation of Lord Byron,' who published in 1834 *The Angler in Wales*) were of the school of Thornton and Hawker, military men who sometimes found civilised life irksome after their campaigns were over, but who seemed rather to have felt that they were condescending when they visited the wilds of these islands in search of sport: they were explorers and sportsmen, but they wished it to be known that their home was Pall Mall. All the same, they were fly-fishermen, though Medwin seems to have caught, and eaten, an unconscionable number of salmon parr. Maxwell, who held strong views about salmon-flies, and sniffs at Sir Humphry Davy as a philosopher, and not a practical fisherman, wrote in the stilted style of the day, as did the anonymous author of *The Angler in Ireland* (1834), who will not hear of anything but the fly. His description of hooking a salmon is typical of the school—ornate language combined with some sound sense and practical observation:

Where the curling water denotes the latent rock, in the very throat of the rushing current—surely beneath that ledge the monarch of rivers must be resting! The fly, bright with the plumes of Ind, has reached his lair! That instant the parted water shows his dark blue back and silvery sides! He has darted down on the tempting deceit with eager mouth! A single moment—a moment of breathless and palpitating suspense—a single moment is given him ere the barb of death is struck, with nice yet firm hand, into his closing jaws . . .

And so on, ending with a quotation from Horace and another from Virgil. Perhaps these, like the free use of synonym ('plumes of Ind' = jungle-cock feather), were relics of school days devoted to Latin verses and nothing else? In spite of the language, the author knew where he would meet a salmon and that the fish would come down on the fly, not up. So when Scrope, also a fashionable gentleman, but a country gentleman as well, published in 1843 *Days and Nights of Salmon Fishing*—the first book definitely devoted to that branch of the art by an expert—he had many predecessors of more or less merit and importance. His preface, indeed, apologises for yet another book on fishing:—'the subject is utterly exhausted: 99 books have been written on it

already'—an exaggeration, perhaps, but showing how men's minds were turning to the sport and loving to read about it. Scrope's book is a classic, the first classic since Walton. He has technical knowledge, and power to set it forth. He has deep interest in salmon problems: he has ardent love for the country, and a sense of humour which Walton lacked. Three years later came another classic, St. John's *Wild Sports of the Highlands*. St. John was a Treasury clerk who gave up London for the country life. He glorified Morayshire, and did for its natural history what Hugh Miller did for its red sandstone. If he preferred the gun to the rod, if there is nothing in his fishing pages to equal *The Muckle Hart of Benmore*, he defended fishing as he knew it against the silly strictures of Dr. Johnson and Lord Byron; and he described fly-fishing as a fly-fisherman who could write English. *The Moor and the Loch*, the first edition of which preceded Scrope and St. John, is better known in its later and enlarged form, which has more to say about fly-fishing. John Colquhoun, its author, was a serious fisherman, and I think he was the first to describe and advocate the practices of 'shooting the line' and 'backing-up' in salmon fishing.

With St. John and Colquhoun the elaborate, formal style, hitherto thought necessary in writing of sport, which is found even in Scrope—one might call it a 'Regency' style—becomes sobered. In Charles Kingsley's 'Chalk Stream Studies' (*Fraser's Magazine*, 1858) we get almost the first description of fly-fishing in modern, vivid, intimate English by a master of the art as then practised in Southern England. He begins with a half-laughing, half-serious defence of all things English against 'Popish Appennines' and Mr. Ruskin: then of English, especially chalk stream, fly-fishing against the prevalent fashion for Scotland. Then he comes to the fishing itself: it is already upstream fishing, though not the dry-fly, but with flies purporting to represent the natural insects, of which he gives the natural history so far as then known (and that was a great deal), and the means of imitating them, so far as the tackle-maker's art had then gone. Kingsley fished the chalk streams with two flies, and fished them sunk—wherefore the purist dry-fly school that came later have not much to say of him. Thanks to Mr. Skues and his nymphs, we know better, and can fish the sunk fly in Hampshire without being ashamed of ourselves or dear Charles Kingsley. For he was a real fly-fisherman, a real lover of Nature and of running water, as can be seen from others of his books—the fishing chapter in *Tom Brown at Oxford* (1861) and, of course, the *Water Babies* (1863). Another great writer, who fished with Charles Kingsley, Froude the historian, also glorified south country fly-fishing in *Fraser's Magazine* (1879)—the last part of his essay on 'Cheneys and the

House of Russell,' republished in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*. It is all too short, this description of the silver Chess—now fallen, I am afraid, both its water and its fish, from the high standard of Froude's day. For the water companies tap its springs; and when the flow of a river decreases, all pollutions have more power and fish dwindle in size and finally disappear. But Froude's few pages are a masterpiece, and he will be happy in the Shades to think that he had such a wonderful day, and that 'two large baskets were filled to the brim,' before the trouble came.

For my last 'classics,' though the last half-century has seen other books which come near to classic level, I will take three which, in their several ways, can claim that rank. The first shall be *A Cotswold Village*, by Arthur Gibbs (1898), which does for Gloucestershire and its Coln what St. John and Colquhoun did for the Highlands: that is to say, though it treats chiefly of local natural history and wild life, there is much of value about fly-fishing. Happily we in England have many books with as good descriptions of Nature and the country, such as White's *Selborne*, and most of Richard Jefferies', and many books of Hudson's, and several others. But none of these writers was first of all a fisherman, as was Arthur Gibbs; and his fishing pages will stand criticism from fishermen and as literature. Next comes *Fly-Fishing* (1899), by Lord (then Sir Edward) Grey—the best book, in the opinion of many, which has been written on the art. It may be that this is a subjective judgment: Grey expresses so exactly the feelings of that generation which loves the country, but is tied and bound in London. Behind all that he writes is the desire to escape from London, and the knowledge that escape is only possible on certain dates and for a limited time, if at all. Therefore the desire is focussed on the nearest suitable river that one can reach in the permitted time. And therefore Hampshire, with its Test and Itchen (though they are lovely and desirable in themselves), is looked to as a way of escape—a desired haven, a celestial city, to which his thoughts are always turning. All who feel as he did remember (even if they fail in achieving Grey's ideal London house) that 'the best plan is to live within a walk of Waterloo, and, as you cross the river in the early summer morning, you may feel more reconciled to London than at any other time, and understand Wordsworth's tribute to the sight from Westminster Bridge.' So (it seems to me) it is his dry-fly chapters and his account of Winchester days which are the heart of the book. Though he says somewhere, 'To me there is nothing in all sport equal to the glory of success in salmon-fishing,' and claims that 'the supreme moment is undoubtedly the hooking of the fish,' he seems to totter on his pedestal a little when he disparages the actual playing of a salmon. Since, sad to say, in his later

years Lord Grey, owing to increasing blindness, was unable to fish the dry fly, and spent more time with the salmon, let us hope that he revised his opinion. For while the first pull of a salmon is, we all agree, the greatest thrill in fishing, a battle with him when hooked on light tackle in a fast stream will give memories for the rest of your life. Chaytor, whose *Letters to a Salmon Fisher's Sons* (1910) I take to be the best practical book on salmon-fishing (though, of course, he wrote before the greased line was invented), would never—to take an extreme example of what Lord Grey hints at—have handed his rod to his gillie as soon as he had hooked his fish. He would like, he says, all fishing writers to tell us more than they do 'about the fish that they have caught—about the fights that they made for their liberty, their success or failure, and the angler's view of their desperate battles.' Chaytor gives accounts of some such fights in his book. But it is for his sound opinions and practical advice as a salmon-fisherman, rather than for descriptive power or as great literature, that I put his book among the classics.

The writer of an anonymous pamphlet on *Fly-fishing in Salt and Fresh Water* (1851) advises the angler to take with him on his fishing Ronald's *Fly-fisher's Entomology*, Hofland's *British Angler's Manual*, Davy's *Salmonia*, and Scrope's *Days and Nights of Salmon Fishing*. I have omitted from my list (much as I love Hofland) all general fishing books—Francis Francis, the Badminton and Lonsdale Libraries, Sir Herbert Maxwell's excellent book in the 'Angler's Library,' and the like. Nor have I mentioned the more technical writers, Ronalds and Halford, great as their services have been in the matter of trout-flies. The critics will notice, too, that I have said nothing of Stewart, who is given such a high place by Major Hills; of Stoddart and Henderson, who, in their different ways, glorified the Tweed; of Andrew Lang, who embraced the whole Border in his love; of a whole host of more modern writers such as Edward Hamilton, Charles Barrington, H. T. Sheringham; and of Mr. Skues, Mr. Eric Parker, Mr. Patrick Chalmers, Major Morritt, and many others who still carry the torch. Then there are the writers on fishing in Norway—Lloyd, Pottinger, Kennedy and others, most especially Bromley-Davenport's famous chapter in *Sport*. Where there is such richness of choice the only criterion is personal preference. But if I ever thought to take fishing-books with me on a fishing holiday I should choose Scrope, Grey, and Chaytor, though that is not to say that I do not read all I can—for profit and pleasure. Odd as it may seem, when one considers the large numbers of fishing-books which have been, and are, produced, there are very few which are not pleasant to read, or from which one cannot learn something. And to read about fly-fishing is the next best thing to the road to

the river. For fly-fishing appeals to man in all his moods: as hunter in pursuit of his prey, as primitive adventurer tempting the unknown, as a romantic communing with Nature, as muscular Christian seeking exercise, as scientific expert in search of the exact imitation of some Ephemerid or Phryganid, as a lover either of the open air or of good English writing. So, in special degree, shall the fly-fisherman have what the nun of Sopwell promises to all good fishermen—the blessing of God and St. Peter.

MAURICE HEADLAM.

QUELQUES REFLEXIONS SUR LE REGIME PARLEMENTAIRE EN GRANDE BRETAGNE ¹

JE suis infiniment sensible à l'honneur que m'ont fait Messieurs les Directeurs du *Temps* en m'invitant à participer aux conférences organisées par ce grand journal sur des sujets d'actualité intéressant le monde politique contemporain. En même temps, je suis en proie à une inquiétude toute naturelle, voire même à une réelle nervosité, en me voyant chargé d'inaugurer cette série de discours, d'autant plus que, tandis que je suis ici à titre purement privé, c'est M. Flandin lui-même, chef du gouvernement français, qui préside cette réunion et c'est M. Laval, ministre des affaires étrangères, qui m'a fait l'honneur d'y assister. J'en suis profondément touché, car c'est là une démonstration nouvelle de la cordialité de nos sentiments personnels et du resserrement des liens d'amitié qui unissent et qui uniront toujours nos deux pays. En outre, il existe une raison de plus, tout à fait particulière, qui m'inspire une timidité extrême au moment où, sous les auspices du *Temps*, j'aborde ma tâche. Récemment, de temps à autre, je relève dans les pages de ce journal, signés du pseudonyme 'Lancelot,' des articles intitulés 'Pour la défense de la langue française.' On y discute maint détail de votre belle langue—par exemple, le problème de savoir si le mot 'aéronef' doit être masculin ou féminin, ou encore certaines subtilités dans l'emploi du subjonctif, et autres finesses. Eh bien, Monsieur Lancelot est instamment prié de ne pas recueillir pour sa collection les spécimens de fautes et de solécismes qui abondent dans mon petit discours. Cela serait trop facile, et, après tout, la chasse trop facile n'intéresse personne—sauf la victime, bien entendu ! Je suis persuadé que vous serez indulgents et que, selon la formule anglaise 'to take the will for the deed', vous prendrez la bonne intention pour le fait. Quant à moi, je me console quelque peu en songeant que, si difficile que ce soit pour les étrangers de posséder les nuances de la langue française, celles-ci ne sont pas plus difficiles à comprendre—je ne veux pas dire à imiter—que l'esprit de la constitution anglaise.

¹ A lecture delivered in Paris under the auspices of *Le Temps* newspaper on February 28, 1935.

On peut dire que la constitution de chaque pays tend à incarner les qualités et les défauts nationaux. Je n'ose pas juger devant vous ceux de mes compatriotes, mais peut-être est-il possible de les déduire dans une certaine mesure de la constitution elle-même. Vous trouverez dans notre constitution un manque de logique, un certain mépris du formalisme, un grand respect pour les leçons du passé, un sens profond des réalités, et, surtout, une grande modération qui fait que nul ne réclame jamais la satisfaction stricte et littérale de tous ses droits, si le bon sens s'y oppose. En fait, un critique pénétrant a observé que, si en Angleterre chacun exigeait que les droits qu'il tient de la constitution fussent intégralement respectés, celle-ci ne pourrait plus fonctionner.

Toutefois, là n'est pas la seule difficulté que comporte mon sujet. Il existe un obstacle plus grand encore à l'explication de la constitution anglaise. C'est qu'à proprement parler il n'y a pas de constitution anglaise. Vous vous rappelez peut-être le chapitre célèbre au sujet des serpents de l'Irlande dans une œuvre d'histoire naturelle, qui consiste en la seule phrase 'En Irlande il n'y a pas de serpents.' Eh bien, en Angleterre il n'y a pas de constitution. En d'autres termes, le solide édifice des institutions politiques de mon pays n'a pas pour base un document intitulé '*Constitution anglais de l'an x*' contenant un grand nombre d'articles où toutes les éventualités sont prévues, mais représente au contraire le fruit d'une longue expérience non-codifiée du gouvernement parlementaire. Ce système est moins précis, mais plus souple. On peut prendre avec lui certaines libertés très commodes dans une situation nouvelle, mais susceptibles d'être dangereuses sans le frein que constitue pour le peuple britannique son respect de la tradition. On peut aussi faire observer que, dans les pays qui possèdent une constitution écrite, une procédure spéciale est en général prévue pour modifier celle-ci : chez nous, au contraire, il suffit de voter une loi par la procédure ordinaire. A vrai dire, nous n'avons pas de lois fondamentales : ou, si vous préférez, les lois fondamentales de l'état sont exactement sur le même pied que les autres lois. Par exemple, au point de vue des formalités nécessaires, il serait tout aussi facile au parlement d'abroger la *Magna Charta* de 1215 que de voter une loi sur la mise en quarantaine des chiens venant de l'étranger ! Il faut, bien entendu, dans les deux cas que le bon sens du peuple anglais l'accepte. C'est en cela que réside la véritable sauvegarde de la constitution de mon pays.

Il est naturellement impossible, dans le cadre de cette causerie, de vous faire un tableau complet de nos institutions politiques, ou d'entrer dans les rapports entre le pouvoir législatif, le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir judiciaire. Je me bornerai à illustrer le

trait particulier dont je viens de parler—c'est à dire cette combinaison extraordinaire d'une persistance pendant des siècles des instruments de gouvernement les plus importants avec un manque absolu de la protection qui résulte du formalisme d'une constitution écrite.

A cette fin, je vais choisir deux exemples qui vous montreront à quel point notre système britannique dépend peu de textes de lois et de réglementations écrites, et beaucoup, par contre, de la coutume et de l'évolution continue mais silencieuse : ces deux exemples sont *le Cabinet* et *le Premier Ministre*.

Le Cabinet britannique, c'est à dire l'organisme qui exerce la direction de notre politique et qui constitue l'autorité exécutive suprême, est une institution totalement inconnue de notre droit écrit. Impossible de trouver la moindre allusion à cette institution dans les actes du parlement ; sa composition, ses fonctions et ses responsabilités ne sont prévues nulle part. Ainsi donc, l'instrument de notre gouvernement qui fait la paix ou la guerre, qui dirige la politique extérieure et intérieure de la Grande Bretagne, est né de la coutume et constitue le résultat d'une évolution constitutionnelle dont les origines sont incertaines et se perdent dans la nuit des temps. Il n'existe même pas, dans notre droit écrit, de dispositions définissant et délimitant ses fonctions. Même la règle en vertu de laquelle un membre du Cabinet britannique doit appartenir soit à la Chambre des Communes soit à la Chambre des Lords n'a pas de base juridique. En fait, il est parfois arrivé que, pour un court laps de temps, un membre du Cabinet n'a pas rempli cette condition. M. Gladstone lui-même, au cours de sa longue carrière, s'est une fois trouvé dans ce cas. La raison pour laquelle on respecte cette coutume est fort simple : c'est que, si on ne l'observait pas, la collaboration entre les Ministres et le Parlement deviendrait impossible. Vous savez qu'en Angleterre personne n'a le droit de prendre la parole à la Chambre s'il n'est pas député. Une considération purement pratique à l'origine s'est donc ainsi consolidée au point de devenir une convention constitutionnelle toujours respectée. C'est là un simple exemple d'un élément que l'on retrouve à maintes reprises dans notre système parlementaire.

La fonction de Premier Ministre en constitue un autre exemple. Vous pouvez fouiller de fond en comble dans le recueil des lois britanniques : vous n'y trouverez aucune allusion à ce personnage. Son autorité suprême et ses pouvoirs ne sont définis nulle part. Malgré cela, aussi bien dans le cas du Premier Ministre que dans celui du Cabinet, le résultat est parfaitement clair et compris de tous. Les qualités du caractère britannique, qui apprécie et qui conserve des institutions parce qu'elles donnent satisfaction et qui, tout en manifestant un grand respect pour la

tradition, accepte volontiers que cette tradition se modifie lentement de manière à répondre aux nécessités du moment—ces qualités, dis-je, suffisent amplement à donner de la précision et de la valeur à des conceptions telles que le Cabinet britannique et la fonction de Premier Ministre. L'autorité de l'un et de l'autre est d'autant plus grande qu'elle n'est inscrite dans aucun texte, et que, par conséquent, personne n'en peut attaquer la validité en invoquant une disposition constitutionnelle limitative.

Il convient peut-être ici que je vous donne quelques brèves indications sur les fonctions et les pouvoirs actuels de ces deux éléments essentiels du système constitutionnel britannique.

Prenons d'abord le Cabinet. Pour commencer, il faut comprendre la différence qui existe entre le Cabinet et le Ministère. Tous les Ministres britanniques ne font pas partie du Cabinet. Les réunions du Cabinet (qui, en temps normal, ont lieu une fois par semaine) ne sont pas des Conseils de tous les Ministres de la Couronne, mais seulement d'une vingtaine d'entre eux qui détiennent les portefeuilles les plus importants. Les titulaires de certains Ministères y ont toujours droit : le Premier Ministre, naturellement, les Secrétaire d'Etat (actuellement au nombre de 7), le Chancelier de l'Echiquier, le Lord Chancelier, le Premier Lord de l'Amirauté et le Président du Board of Trade, etc. D'autres sont sur la frontière : le Ministre des Postes, par exemple, peut, suivant les cas, faire ou non partie du Cabinet. Le titulaire actuel de ce poste, qui était en dehors du Cabinet lorsque le gouvernement actuel est venu au pouvoir, en est maintenant membre.

Cette organisation trouve son origine dans la coutume qu'avaient jadis les Souverains de choisir certains de leurs Conseillers comme collaborateurs intimes. Le Conseil Privé comprenait un grand nombre de membres, et les rois de la dynastie Stuart eurent tendance à se fier aux avis secrets de certains d'entre eux. La reine Anne fut la dernière à présider régulièrement la réunion hebdomadaire de ses Ministres (qui à cette époque, au début du dix-huitième siècle, avait lieu traditionnellement le dimanche soir). Quand elle mourut et que Georges I^{er} monta sur le trône, le Souverain britannique cessa de présider en personne les séances du Cabinet. Et pourquoi ? Pour une raison purement fortuite, mais suffisante : Georges I^{er} ne savait pas l'anglais, et s'intéressait surtout au Hanovre ! Voyez à quel point l'influence de cette circonstance imprévue est caractéristique du développement presque inconscient de notre système constitutionnel ! Grâce à elle, l'évolution du Cabinet britannique a franchi une étape importante sur laquelle elle n'est jamais revenue. Depuis deux siècles, l'absence du Souverain est devenue la règle, et c'est naturellement le Premier

Ministre qui préside. Cependant, l'évolution des méthodes du Cabinet se poursuit. En voici un exemple tiré de ma propre expérience. Lorsque j'ai fait partie pour la première fois du Cabinet, il y a maintenant vingt-trois ans, en vertu d'une autre règle bien établie, on ne faisait pas de procès-verbal des discussions. M. Asquith, le Premier Ministre d'alors, adressait un court rapport au Roi, mais ce rapport n'était communiqué à personne d'autre.

Il y a seulement vingt ans que le Cabinet a un ordre du jour pour ses séances, et qu'un secrétaire du Cabinet a été nommé. C'est le nombre croissant des questions à résoudre et la nécessité de conserver le texte précis des résolutions prises, qui ont entraîné ce changement. C'est pendant la guerre que M. Lloyd George a introduit cette innovation. Une fois la guerre finie, on se demanda si l'on reviendrait à l'ancienne méthode—moins formaliste—et une certaine divergence d'opinions se manifesta. M. Asquith, par exemple, qui avait 30 années d'expérience de l'ancien système, préférait une procédure plus familière—mais il ne faut pas oublier qu'en réalité il n'avait jamais participé à l'application de la nouvelle méthode. D'autres hommes d'Etat, au contraire, tels que Sir Austen Chamberlain et Lord Curzon, qui avaient fait l'expérience des deux systèmes, défendirent la cause de l'innovation parce qu'ils y voyaient, non seulement une réforme nécessaire en temps de guerre, mais une amélioration à conserver en temps de paix. J'ai, moi-même, connu les deux systèmes, et je crois qu'à l'heure actuelle il serait difficile de trouver quelqu'un dans le même cas qui proposerait de revenir à l'ancienne manière d'agir.

Notre procédure actuelle est donc la suivante : un fonctionnaire investi d'une responsabilité particulièrement lourde et délicate, le Secrétaire du Cabinet, assiste à toutes les séances aux côtés du Premier Ministre. Avant la réunion du Cabinet, il fait distribuer un ordre du jour approuvé par le Premier Ministre, ainsi que les documents confidentiels qui s'y rapportent. Un membre du Cabinet peut conserver dans son coffre, fermé avec une clef spéciale, tous les documents qui lui ont été distribués pendant qu'il est resté en fonction, mais il doit les restituer tous au Secrétariat du Cabinet lorsqu'il quitte son poste. Evidemment, un ancien Ministre peut écrire ses Mémoires (je me garde bien de particulariser), mais grâce au bon sens et au respect de la chose publique, on évite les difficultés.

Et les secrets ? Je me rappelle qu'un des anciens secrétaires particuliers de M. Gladstone m'a raconté un jour qu'au moment où un nouveau Ministère prenait le pouvoir, on demanda au grand homme d'Etat si on autoriserait les secrétaires particuliers des membres du Cabinet à avoir la clef des coffres ministériels,

en même temps que leurs chefs. M. Gladstone répondit qu'il avait connu des cas regrettables de divulgation de secrets ministériels, mais jamais, à sa connaissance, on n'avait pu les attribuer—à un secrétaire particulier !

Il convient peut-être d'ajouter que c'est le Premier Ministre qui, en soumettant au Roi la liste de ses collaborateurs, indique quels sont ceux qui, dans son projet, formeront le Cabinet. Comme tous les membres du Cabinet doivent avoir le titre de Conseillers Privés, si un nouveau Ministre ne l'a pas encore, il doit prêter le serment de Conseiller Privé en entrant dans le Cabinet. C'est ce qui lui donne le droit au titre de 'Très Honorable' et c'est par ce serment qu'il s'engage formellement à garder les secrets d'Etat.

La création du poste de secrétaire du Cabinet, dont j'ai parlé tout à l'heure, a entraîné la formation d'une organisation qui s'appelle le Secrétariat du Cabinet. Il y a là une institution qui joue un rôle particulièrement important pour le bon fonctionnement du mécanisme gouvernemental anglais. Son chef actuel, Sir Maurice Hankey, qui est d'ailleurs le premier titulaire du poste, a ses journées (et parfois ses nuits) bien remplies, soit par ses fonctions mêmes de Secrétaire du Cabinet, soit dans sa qualité de Secrétaire du Conseil de la Défense impériale, soit par l'organisation du travail de ses collaborateurs dont le nombre, à l'heure actuelle, ne dépasse pas une dizaine.

Je passe maintenant à mon autre exemple—l'évolution des fonctions et du rôle du Premier Ministre.

Jadis, lorsque les Souverains britanniques dirigeaient effectivement les affaires de l'Etat, le Roi choisissait un petit nombre de Conseillers Privés qu'il consultait plus spécialement, comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure. L'idée d'avoir un Premier Ministre est venue beaucoup plus tard. En réalité, je crois même que notre expression 'Prime Minister' vient du français 'Premier Ministre.' On considère habituellement que Walpole a été le premier en date de nos 'Premiers Ministres,' en ce sens qu'il a été reconnu comme chef unique d'un gouvernement dont il dirigeait l'action et la politique. Cependant, notre droit écrit ignore tout autant l'expression 'Premier Ministre' que le mot 'Cabinet britannique.' Malgré cela, grâce à ces transformations silencieuses qui s'opèrent constamment dans nos institutions, la charge de Premier Ministre s'est créée peu à peu, avec ses fonctions inhérentes particulières, dont je vais maintenant m'efforcer de vous donner une idée.

Ce qui précède vous explique pourquoi le Premier Ministre doit être en même temps titulaire d'un Ministère déterminé. Le plus souvent, il est Premier Lord de la Trésorerie—portefeuille qui, aujourd'hui, ne comporte guère de fonctions spéciales mais auquel est attaché un traitement, tandis que le Premier Ministre

n'en reçoit pas à ce titre. Jusqu'à il y a environ 30 ans personne, à la Chambre des Communes, n'avait adressé la parole au Premier Ministre en faisant usage de ce vocable. Lorsque M. Gladstone était Premier Ministre, les questions qu'on lui posait au Parlement étaient toujours adressées au 'Premier Lord de la Trésorerie' !

La longévité moyenne assez grande des ministères britanniques fait souvent l'objet de commentaires et de comparaisons. Pourquoi les ministères britanniques durent-ils si longtemps ? Il me semble qu'on en peut trouver la véritable explication dans les trois facteurs suivants.

D'abord, en Angleterre, les partis politiques ne sont pas aussi fragmentés que dans d'autres pays, et par conséquent, une fois qu'un ministère est constitué avec l'appui d'une majorité, celle-ci persiste en général pendant toute la durée de la législature.

En second lieu, un vote défavorable de la Chambre des Communes qui se produit à l'improviste ne renverse pas le ministère. En Angleterre, le gouvernement ne pose pas la question de confiance. La chute d'un ministère n'arrive que si le gouvernement est battu sur une question d'importance capitale, ou si la Chambre des Communes vote un blâme au gouvernement après un grand débat.

Finalement, les membres de la majorité hésitent le plus souvent à voter contre le gouvernement, le cas échéant, parce que si le ministère est renversé, il est bien probable que le Premier Ministre conseillera le Roi de dissoudre la Chambre—considération qui, dans tous les pays, tend à ramener les députés au sentiment de la discipline, sinon du devoir.

D'aucuns paraissent supposer qu'en Angleterre le Premier Ministre a le droit absolu, à tout moment, de décider de procéder à de nouvelles élections ; mais, à mon avis, cela n'est pas tout à fait exact. Sans doute en temps normal le Roi donnerait suite à cette suggestion, car un Premier Ministre n'offrirait jamais un tel avis à son Souverain sans raisons suffisantes. Par exemple, lorsqu'en 1909, la Chambre des Lords refusa d'approuver le budget de M. Lloyd George, M. Asquith soumit au roi Edouard VII un avis qui aboutit aux élections générales de janvier 1910. Un nouveau Parlement fut alors constitué, mais la même année, en décembre, M. Asquith conseilla de nouvelles élections—qui eurent lieu—en vue de soumettre directement au pays la proposition soutenue par ses partisans tendant à limiter les pouvoirs de la Chambre des Lords.

Ces cas vous montreront qu'en Angleterre, un Premier Ministre proposerait une dissolution prématurée de la Chambre non pas comme manœuvre contre la majorité, mais afin d'obtenir pour la majorité même le mandat renouvelé des électeurs. Si, dans ces conditions, son avis n'était pas suivi, il démissionnerait. Le Roi

devrait alors chercher un chef politique susceptible de former un nouveau ministère ayant la confiance du Parlement. S'il y réussissait (ce qui est bien peu probable) il ne suivrait peut-être pas le conseil donné par l'ancien Premier Ministre de dissoudre le Parlement. La véritable raison pour laquelle, en pratique, l'avis d'un Premier Ministre de procéder à de nouvelles élections est généralement suivi est que si le Premier Ministre refuse de rester en fonction sans de nouvelles élections, aucun autre ministère ne pourra être formé, de sorte que de nouvelles élections deviennent inévitables.

Ceci m'amène à signaler que ce choix de la personnalité à qui sera confiée la charge de Premier Ministre constitue un des cas très rares où, dans notre système moderne, le Souverain est appelé à exercer un jugement personnel sur une question d'ordre public. Par exemple, après la démission finale de M. Gladstone, ce fut la reine Victoria qui, parmi les chefs du parti libéral, préféra Lord Rosebery à Sir William Harcourt, et vingt ans plus tard, après la démission de Bonar Law, le roi Georges V a choisi M. Baldwin et non pas Lord Curzon parmi les chefs conservateurs. En dehors de cela, à l'heure actuelle, le Roi dans toutes ses décisions politiques publiques, agit conformément à l'avis de ses Ministres, et ne cherche pas à s'en écarter ou à l'ignorer. Les observateurs étrangers ont eu fréquemment tendance à s'exagérer le degré d'influence que le Souverain britannique peut exercer sur la politique. Nous avons eu le bonheur de posséder dans les temps modernes trois Souverains de grande expérience et remarquablement dévoués au bien de l'Etat : la reine Victoria, le roi Edouard VII et le roi Georges V. Leur autorité morale a été énorme : mais de nos jours le roi d'Angleterre ne cherche plus à imposer sa volonté en matière politique.

La solidarité du Cabinet dépend dans une large mesure de l'ascendant exercé par le Premier Ministre sur ses collègues. Le célèbre homme d'Etat et écrivain, feu Lord Morley, décrivait la fonction de Premier Ministre comme étant 'la clef de voûte de l'arche du Cabinet.' Cette phrase pittoresque est fort exacte, car c'est la clef de voûte qui fait tenir toute l'arche et occupe la position la plus importante ; cependant, pour tenir en place, elle dépend de l'arche ; elle est essentiellement l'un des éléments constitutifs de l'arche. Telle est précisément la relation entre le Premier Ministre et ses collègues.

Il me serait impossible, même au cours de l'esquisse la plus rapide du système parlementaire britannique, de ne pas faire au moins une brève allusion aux règles solidement établies qui régissent les recettes et les dépenses publiques. Il va sans dire qu'aucun impôt ne peut être créé sans la sanction du Parlement, et qu'aucun denier des fonds publics ne peut être dépensé

pour une fin quelconque sans une autorisation parlementaire spéciale.

Toutefois, la clef du système financier de mon pays se trouve dans une règle qu'applique toujours scrupuleusement le Président de la Chambre des Communes, que nous appelons 'Mr. Speaker.' En vertu de cette règle, les propositions comportant des dépenses ne peuvent être faites que par un ministre. Aucun député de la Chambre des Communes n'appartenant pas au gouvernement ne peut proposer d'augmenter les charges publiques, même par voie d'amendement à un projet de loi déposé par le gouvernement.

C'est par ce moyen qu'en Grande-Bretagne nous nous efforçons d'équilibrer nos budgets et d'ajuster les dépenses et les recettes en tenant dûment compte d'intérêts parfois opposés. Au sein même du gouvernement, l'autorité de la Trésorerie en matière financière est suprême. Aucune proposition comportant une dépense ne peut être soumise au Cabinet avant d'avoir fait l'objet d'un examen et d'un rapport de la Trésorerie. Il est essentiel de bien comprendre cela si l'on veut suivre le fonctionnement du système financier britannique. Il peut, d'ailleurs, paraître assez surprenant qu'un ministère aussi puissant que la Trésorerie, qui exerce une influence si vaste, n'ait qu'un personnel de soixante-cinq fonctionnaires administratifs. Inutile de dire qu'ils sont tous placés sous la direction et l'autorité du Chancelier de l'Echiquier, et par son intermédiaire, sous celle du Cabinet tout entier. Le chiffre que je viens de vous donner ne comprend pas, évidemment, les fonctionnaires des autres administrations financières : ceux, par exemple, des contributions directes et de l'administration des Douanes et Accises.

J'ai mentionné tout à l'heure un autre personnage de la plus haute importance dans notre système parlementaire—'Mr. Speaker.' Son autorité dans la conduite des débats de la Chambre est telle que, dans une expérience personnelle d'à peu près trente ans, je ne me rappelle qu'une seule fois où il fut forcé d'avoir recours à la suspension de la séance.* Il ne possède même pas une sonnette ! Et la raison ? peut-être la trouve-t-on dans le phlègme et le sang-froid des Anglais. Cependant, il y a une raison de plus. Selon une tradition parlementaire ancienne et toujours respectée, au moment que Mr. Speaker se lève pour calmer les esprits excités, tous les députés sont tenus de s'asseoir. C'est déjà le commencement de la sagesse !

Dans le tableau que je viens de vous brosser à grands traits, je ne suis efforcé de vous décrire d'une manière objective quelques-uns des éléments les plus importants du système constitutionnel

* There have in fact been six instances in twenty years—May 22, 1905, July 24, 1911, November 13, 1912, May 21, 1914, April 11, 1923, May 9, 1924. In the last ten years there have been two—November 16, 1927, and July 2, 1931.

britannique ainsi que leur mode de fonctionnement. En conclusion, je voudrais formuler deux observations qui ont une répercussion directe sur tout ce que j'ai dit.

D'abord, étant donné que je m'adresse à un public étranger, j'espère qu'on ne m'accusera pas d'admirer béatement le caractère et le fonctionnement des institutions de mon pays. Je peux vous assurer que chez nous elles n'échappent pas à la critique de l'opinion publique ! Les lacunes et les défauts d'un système apparaissent surtout à ceux qui doivent l'appliquer. Par conséquent, je vous demanderai de vouloir bien ne pas me considérer comme une sorte de Dr Pangloss anglais, qui déclare que le système que j'ai essayé de vous décrire est le meilleur système possible dans le meilleur des pays. Le principal mérite que je revendique pour notre organisation, c'est qu'elle est bien adaptée à nos besoins, ou, en d'autres termes, qu'elle est le résultat de l'expérience acquise par mon pays dans les circonstances qui lui sont propres.

Il y a quelques années, je présidais une commission chargée d'étudier la réforme de la Constitution de l'Inde. Dans le rapport de cette Commission au Parlement se trouvait un passage que je me permets de vous citer, parce qu'il me paraît être tout à fait à sa place ici :

Le système parlementaire britannique s'est formé au fur et à mesure des besoins journaliers du peuple. On pourrait le comparer à un vieux vêtement qui peu à peu s'est adapté parfaitement à son propriétaire, mais il ne s'ensuit pas qu'il épouserait aussi bien les formes de n'importe qui. La coutume et la commodité y ont laissé subsister diverses dispositions qui, conçues pour une certaine fin, servent maintenant à une autre. Un grand nombre de ses rouages ne fonctionnent que parce qu'on veut qu'ils fonctionnent, ou parce que tout le monde est d'accord pour ne les utiliser qu'avec modération.

En second lieu, la difficulté à laquelle on se heurterait si l'on voulait copier les institutions britanniques dans un autre pays est évidemment renforcée par le fait que je vous ai si souvent signalé ce soir—c'est à dire que notre système est le résultat d'une évolution lente et continue, échelonnée sur des siècles sans interruption. Ceci me rappelle une anecdote qui circulait à Oxford il y a une quarantaine d'années, alors que l'ambassadeur actuel de la Grande-Bretagne, Sir George Clerk, et mon ami fidèle M. Jacques Bardoux et moi y étions étudiants ensemble. Un riche Américain visitait les jardins d'un des collèges, et admirait beaucoup les pelouses. Il voulut voir le jardinier et lui demanda comment on faisait pour avoir un aussi splendide gazon. Le jardinier, innocemment, répondit au visiteur d'outre-atlantique : 'Monsieur, c'est tout simple : on ensemeence le terrain avec de bonnes graines ; puis on arrose, on passe au

rouleau et à la tondeuse régulièrement—pendant trois siècles. Et voilà tout !

Il y a pourtant une raison toute particulière pour laquelle les citoyens de la France et de l'Angleterre doivent étudier leurs institutions réciproques, afin d'apprendre les uns des autres. C'est que nos deux pays sont les seuls grands Etats d'Europe qui, à une époque où de nouveaux systèmes de gouvernement ont été adoptés et où la popularité des institutions parlementaires semble pencher vers son déclin, ont conservé un gouvernement démocratique et parlementaire.

Quelles que soient les différences qui existent entre nos deux systèmes, elles sont infiniment moins importantes que cette simple analogie. C'est parce que je viens d'un pays où l'on respecte la liberté individuelle, où les élections se font librement et ouvertement et où l'opinion publique s'exprime par le jeu des institutions parlementaires, que j'ai éprouvé tant de plaisir et de fierté à m'adresser à un public d'hommes et de femmes dont la patrie a apporté une contribution si longue et si éclatante à l'histoire et à la pratique actuelle des libertés humaines.

JOHN SIMON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCIX—MAY 1935

'AND ALL THE PEOPLE REJOICED'

By H. C. DENT

It would be easy to imagine a Silver Jubilee quite artificial in character, the result merely of a feeling that such an event had to be marked by a certain amount of formal rejoicing. At best, business in a number of trades and industries would be stimulated, and the mass of the people would have a good excuse for holiday-making and junketing. At worst, the occasion might prove a rather pathetic, if not cynical, farce ; public men and writers would feel it incumbent upon them to utter panegyrics they did not sincerely mean, and these would be received by the people with amused or irritated scepticism. The result could hardly fail to be grievously damaging to the prestige of sovereignty.

No trace of such apprehensions exists to-day. The

speaker or writer who ventures to pay a tribute of praise to His Majesty King George V. is in the happy position of knowing that nothing is demanded of him but the truth. The whole truth, indeed, he cannot tell, for none save His Majesty's most intimate friends and closest advisers can be aware how strenuously and unremittingly our King has laboured on behalf of his people through twenty-five of the most arduous and anxious years a monarch was ever called upon to face, and how absolutely he has during that time identified himself with the public and personal interests of millions of subjects throughout the world.

Few people could have anticipated in 1910 that such words would come to be written in all sincerity in 1935. The great majority of us knew little of either the man or the monarch who on May 6 ascended the Throne of Britain. The *Daily Chronicle* summed up our knowledge when it said:

To his subjects he is somewhat of an unknown quantity. . . .

Some things, indeed, are clear already. The absolute blamelessness of his private life, his modesty and good nature, his insistent sense of duty, his frankness and honesty, these are fundamental attributes that declare themselves in his face, his demeanour, his every speech and action of his career. And from time to time some electrifying word of his, like his famous 'Wake up, England!' has thrilled the country with a sense of an individuality more vivid than it had suspected, and has led it to believe, what is indeed the fact, that the new Sovereign does his own thinking, is a man of decided views, and will not hesitate to give expression to them when he is convinced that expression is necessary.

How true those words have proved! It is the supreme triumph of our King that, by virtue of those simple and forthright qualities which the *Daily Chronicle* so justly attributed to him, he has in twenty-five years elevated himself from the status of a comparatively unknown and untried prince to become the very corner-stone of the Constitution and, at the same time, an example of all we admire and respect in the British character. Succeeding to the Throne 'at a moment of internal crisis,' as the *Westminster Gazette* said, 'the gravity of which it would be idle to ignore,' confronted during the war with a responsibility that might well have overwhelmed any man, and faced afterwards by the terrific task of leading the nation towards reconstruction of a shattered world, His Majesty has throughout addressed

himself to his destiny with such patient understanding and unfailing industry that he has become, as it were, a personal expression of the dogged common-sense, good humour, tact, moderation, and practical idealism characteristic of the Briton at his best.

As monarch, the King was confronted on his accession by three main groups of problems. Europe lay already under the threat of imminent war; and among the main causes contributory to this state of affairs was the fact that 'England and Germany were pulling in opposite ways.' Secondly, there was the great 'constitutional question,' which has been canvassed so thoroughly by historians that there is little need to explain it here; suffice to say that the dispute between Lords and Commons was dividing the country into two bitterly hostile camps. This controversy served to give point and clarity to the third and gravest source of unrest in Britain—namely, the rapidly growing consciousness of vast masses of the people that their lot could and therefore should be bettered. In its bitterer form this feeling found expression in such verse as the following¹:

To-day in Britain, Demos rules,
And we, some forty million fools,
With Pomp and Parliaments are fed:
We've got the circus. Where's the bread?

In more moderate language, but with equal depth of sincerity, the *Westminster Gazette* summed up the case for the worker:

. . . the better-class workman of the new generation is filled with a deep discontent of the conditions amid which his lot is cast. He will not settle down in the surroundings which were good enough for his father. The schools have given him education, he has travelled more, he reads, if it be no more than his daily paper. He is uneasy at the dirt and squalor amid which he finds himself, and yet he scarce knows what is wrong with him. Deep down in his soul is blind revolt against life as he finds it.

One peculiar and prominent expression of this class-consciousness was the revolt of woman against her age-long political inferiority. The campaign of the militant suffragettes, at the time regarded by most people with amused or irritated contempt, is now generally recognised as a gallant if misguided sally on behalf of the vast army of the 'have-

¹ *Rowton House Ballads*, by W. A. Mackenzie (Blackwood).

nots' then mobilising to wrest some portion of power and privilege from the hands of the 'haves.'

Nothing could have exceeded the promptness, courage, and dignity with which the new Monarch applied himself to his multifarious and difficult duties. From the first he took his people into his confidence, addressing them not only as subjects, but as friends. After his coronation he told them how deeply he had been touched by the 'affectionate demonstrations' of good-will he had received from all over the Empire, and continued:

Believing that this generous and outspoken sympathy with the Queen and myself is, under God, our surest source of strength, I am encouraged to go forward with renewed hope. Whatever perplexities and difficulties may lie before me and my people, we shall all unite in facing them resolutely, calmly, and with public spirit, confident that, under Divine guidance, the ultimate outcome will be to the common good.

Prophetic words! Three years only remained before Armageddon, and ere the stern discipline of war came to achieve that ideal unity of which His Majesty spoke, there were, in spite of all his efforts, to ensue days of estrangement and disunity among his subjects. Yet those years were not unprofitable for the King, since they afforded him ample opportunity to develop those qualities which have made him so beloved.

It quickly became apparent that, to him, as to his forbears, rich and poor, mighty and meek, black and white, were alike the object of his concern. With the Queen, he went to India to announce his accession to the Imperial Throne in a Darbar of unparalleled magnificence. To the assembled feudatory princes he said:

I rejoice to have this opportunity of renewing in my own person those assurances which have been given you by my revered predecessors of the maintenance of your rights and privileges, and of my earnest concern for your welfare, peace and contentment.

To the countless millions of his Indian subjects he sent a gracious message:

We fervently trust that our visit may, by God's grace, conduce to the general good of the peoples of this great

continent. Their interests and well-being will always be as near and as dear to me as those of the millions of my subjects in other quarters of the globe.

His Majesty's passion for getting to know at first hand of the lives and daily work of his people is well known. No monarch has so assiduously visited the industrial areas of his country. His sympathy with all in time of trouble is equally well known. When in July 1912 a dreadful disaster occurred at the Cadeby colliery, in the West Riding, Their Majesties happened to be touring the district; and not content with immediately telegraphing his deepest sympathy, the King, with the Queen, later motored to the colliery, after fulfilling the engagements of an arduous day, personally to condole with those who had lost their loved ones.

When in February of the next year news reached England of the tragic end of the Scott Antarctic Expedition, it was not many days before a gracious announcement appeared that

His Majesty has been pleased to grant to Mrs. Kathleen Scott the same rank, style and precedence as if her husband, Captain Robert Falcon Scott, R.N., C.V.O., had been nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath, as he would have been had he survived.

In June 1914 the first representatives of the Maori race of New Zealand were granted an audience at Buckingham Palace. The occasion might well have been made one of stiff ceremony and elaborate etiquette; but instead, as one of the New Zealanders told the *Daily News and Leader*, 'it was all so friendly that it hardly seemed that a great King could be honouring us in this way.'

The last few weeks before the war showed the King in sterner mood. Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Bill, introduced into the Commons in 1912, had led step by step to political strife of a bitterness unknown for half a century. After playing the part of mediator and peacemaker with unremitting devotion for many weary months, His Majesty finally, in July 1914, called the leaders of the opposing factions to a round-table conference and spoke to them after a fashion rarely heard from the lips of a constitutional monarch:

My intervention at this moment may be regarded as

a new departure. But the exceptional circumstances under which you are brought together justify my action. . . .

We have in the past endeavoured to act as a civilising example to the world, and to me it is unthinkable, as it must be to you, that we should be brought to the brink of fratricidal strife upon issues so capable of adjustment as those you are asked to consider. . . .

Your responsibilities are indeed great. The time is short. You will, I know, employ it to the fullest advantage. . . .

Unhappily, even this courageous stroke failed: but a fortnight later Europe was in arms, and all thought of domestic squabbles was swept from the minds of men; King and people stood solidly united to face a world at war.

I shall follow your every movement with deepest interest [wrote the King to his Expeditionary Force], and mark with eager satisfaction your daily progress; indeed, your welfare will never be absent from my thoughts.

It was hardly to be expected that such a King could be content to wait on events from the security of home; the war was not much more than three months old before His Majesty was in France, 'the first British Sovereign to join his Army on active service in a foreign country since 1743.' This first visit was but a prelude to many others. Among these one loves to remember that paid in March 1918 during the agonising days of the retreat that almost lost the war; and particularly that precious incident recorded by *The Times*, of how His Majesty, coming upon troops resting by the wayside, descended from his car to exchange quips with them, and finally challenged them with a rousing 'Are we down-hearted?' That is the type of monarch for whom one would feel it an honour to die.

But it was not only the fighting forces—the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force—that His Majesty cheered by his constant visits. He remembered also with equal care those who toiled day and night—often at great risk of life—in munition factories; and he was particularly solicitous on behalf of those who found themselves troubled 'in mind, body or estate' by a then new horror of war—the air raid.

In his leadership of the nation and of the Empire His Majesty was nobly supported by his family. The Queen placed herself at the head of all womanly interests, and her only daughter became a working nurse. The Prince of Wales, then barely twenty years of age, joined the Army within a week of the outbreak of war, and prayed to be sent to the front like any other officer. In spite of all opposition, even that of the redoubtable Kitchener, he succeeded in being posted to France, though only in a Staff capacity. Soon, in every mess and dug-out, stories of his adventurous escapes from General Headquarters into the firing line began to delight the troops in the trenches. How many of the stories were altogether true will never be known, but it is quite certain that no soldier would ever have been surprised had the Prince walked into his firing bay and offered him a cigarette. Yet the King's eldest son was no hare-brained madcap; though he craved the adventure due to youth, he had inherited from his father the latter's serious and understanding attitude towards life. He loved the fun and comradeship of campaigning, but he realised the toll of war. As early as the beginning of 1916 he was already emerging as the champion of those stricken in the fray. There is a class, he told the first committee called in connexion with the Naval and Military Pensions Act, to whom the whole sympathy of the nation will go out, and who may count upon the hearty consideration of this Committee, those who in the prime of manhood and vigour of health have been permanently disabled.

One of the fadeless memories of the war, to those privileged to witness it, is the wonderful scene that took place outside Buckingham Palace on the morning of November 11, 1918,

The first thought of thousands, as soon as the signing of the Armistice became known, was for the King, and in dense streams they made their way to the Palace to cheer and if possible to get a glimpse of their Sovereign.

It was a unique and unforgettable tribute of loyalty and deepest affection, utterly spontaneous, nor anticipated by authority. It could have occurred in no other country in Europe. Yet His Majesty must have known, even in that moment of triumph, how stern were the tasks which still lay

before him. Ere the clamour of rejoicing had died away, his voice was heard urging his people towards the duty of reconstruction.

I am informed [he told representatives of Local Authorities in April 1919] that the immediate need of working-class houses for England and Wales alone is estimated at approximately 500,000. To meet this need the same untiring energy and enthusiasm will be required as that which enabled the country to meet the demand for munitions of war.

A few weeks later he was informing the London County Council that

The awakened consciousness of the nation demands new developments and the removal of many and grave defects in our social system. . . .

Of housing I have already spoken. . . .

I am convinced, also, that nothing is more essential to national prosperity and happiness than education. The potentialities, physical, mental and spiritual, of every member of the community should be developed to their fullest extent. A true education would embrace all these, would cultivate them all in due proportion and would transform our national life in a generation. . . .

The care of the weak and helpless, the protection of our infant life, the guardianship and training of those who, by infirmity of body or mind, are unfitted to engage in the daily struggle of life, are also matters very near to the hearts of the Queen and myself.

Those are the words of a man of vision; and the most casual recollection of the social reforms of the past fifteen years will remind one how amply they have borne fruit.

It was in this same year that there began a partnership unparalleled in the annals of monarchy. The Prince of Wales, trained to responsibility in the stern school of war, set out upon those world-wide travels which have earned for him the title of 'The King's First Ambassador.' For six years he constantly journeyed abroad, visiting almost every corner of His Majesty's vast Empire, seeing for himself its extent, power, variety and beauty, and carrying everywhere the Royal assurance that to the Throne all subjects were equal and that no distinction was made between peoples of different

race and clime. But he did more; he carried into every land an intimate sense of family relationship.

I want Canada [he said over there in 1919] to look on me as a Canadian, if not actually by birth, yet certainly in mind and spirit, for this, as the eldest son of the Ruler of the great British Empire, I can assure you that I am.

Canadians will not soon forget that day in Toronto when the Prince, in full sight of 40,000 people, chased after a wounded soldier's hat which had blown away, and himself replaced it on the man's head. And it is not only as an ambassador in foreign lands that the Prince of Wales has endeared himself to the British people. He has attached himself in this country pre-eminently to those causes which should make appeal to a young and virile heir apparent—of the ex-service man alongside whom he fought, of the dwellers in our slums, and of youth. The speech which the Prince delivered when this year he initiated the King George's Jubilee Trust will rank among the most memorable of Royal utterances:

I can think of no other cause that makes so universal an appeal as the cause of the rising generation. . . .

There is no sadder sight in the world than aimless and dispirited youth. . . .

We must help boys and girls to grow up with just those qualities of physical, mental and spiritual fitness, those ideals of mutual service that make a people great.

A Nation's Youth is a Nation's Future.

Had His Majesty possessed none other than his 'First Ambassador' he must have felt that he could with complete confidence delegate to such a son the most responsible of duties. But he has three other sons, each of whom has played right nobly the part of Royal Ambassador; one has only to recall the visits of the Duke of York to Australia and New Zealand in 1927, the Garter Mission to Japan of the Duke of Gloucester in 1929, and the extensive tour of South Africa made in 1934 by Prince George, now Duke of Kent. Each has also, like his elder brother, closely identified himself with vital interests at home.

In an article such as this, written in haste at the express desire of the Editor, one can hardly hope to do more than hint at what the King and his family have meant to Britain and the Empire during the past twenty-five years. In my

recent book, *Milestones to the Silver Jubilee*, I have printed without comment—since the book is an anthology compiled from contemporary documents—a large number of excerpts from the public speeches, letters, telegrams and other utterances of His Majesty. Anyone who reads carefully through this collection, which represents but a fragment of the whole, cannot fail to be impressed by the sense of a vigorous, wise, sympathetic and gentle personality. I embarked upon the book with a feeling of deep respect for and loyalty to His Majesty, but as I searched through the newspaper files I found myself coming more and more closely into contact with one who was more than a King—one who, while possessing all the attributes of kingship, was intensely human, possessed of rugged strength, yet infinitely tender, and filled with an overflowing love for each and every one of his people.

I speak no flattery; I relate simply, though all too inadequately, a real experience. There are those who say that Royal speeches are written by skilled and devoted secretaries; I pretend to no knowledge on such matters, but I can testify that throughout His Majesty's public utterances there runs an individuality which is unmistakable. That others have felt as I have is clear from the remarkable demonstrations of affection towards their King which from time to time the British people have manifested. To one such, the scene outside Buckingham Palace on the day of the armistice, I have already made reference. When His Majesty lay dangerously ill in November 1928 hundreds of letters and telegrams of sympathy arrived 'each day from all parts of the Empire and the world, and from all classes.' The marriage of the Duke and Duchess of Kent affords another instance. According to the *Daily Telegraph*—

There were two memorable moments at Buckingham Palace after the marriage ceremony.

First when the King and Queen and the bridal party stepped on to the balcony to be acclaimed by the throngs for the space of many minutes. And again when the Prince of Wales led the party of Royal confetti throwers who chased the honeymoon coach.

The secret of the extraordinary hold the Royal Family has upon the affections of their subjects seems to me to be revealed in those three simple sentences. They express the

perfect union of majesty and humanity. And it is just because of the possibility of that union that the Monarchy remains the only possible Head of the British peoples, or, indeed, of any true democracy. An elected head can never be completely at one with his subjects, for he represents no more than a majority of them. However popular he may be personally, he stands an isolated and transient figure, deliberately separated from his fellows by reason of his office.

A king must stand for all his subjects, though he may by reason of personal qualities alienate their affections. The British Constitution offers two avenues for closest unity between King and People. We owe allegiance to His Most Excellent Majesty the King in Council—that is, to the King identified with ourselves; and the position of constitutional monarch in this Realm and Empire affords innumerable opportunities for personal relationship. Of those opportunities King George V., and with him his family, have taken the fullest advantage; and in this year especially we hold the fact in grateful remembrance. As Supreme Head of the British Commonwealth of Nations we honour and respect him as the worthy representative of the mightiest monarchy upon earth; but we love him best when he sits in his study at Sandringham and says

I would like to think that you who are listening to me now, in whatever part of the world you may be, and all the peoples of this Realm and Empire, are bound to me and one another by the spirit of one great family. . . .

May I add very simply and sincerely that if I may be regarded as in some true sense the head of this great and widespread family, sharing its life and sustained by its affection, this will be a full reward for the long and sometimes anxious labours of my reign of well-nigh five-and-twenty years?

It needs no year of Jubilee to assure His Majesty that in very truth we do regard him as our father and our head, but at least the occasion grants us a long-desired opportunity to demonstrate our loyalty and love in fullest and warmest fashion.

H. C. DENT.

THE GREAT OPPORTUNITY

By AUSTIN HOPKINSON, M.P.

It would appear probable that a reconstruction of the existing Government will take place at an early date, though no very great changes in its constitution are demanded. Whatever our views as to the part played in administration by the Prime Minister, all agree that he is now free to retire with credit. The work taken in hand in 1931 has been done, and no one should expect him to continue in office until he breaks down under the strain of the last few years, which has been severe indeed, though mitigated by the loyal support of his colleagues—a pleasant thing which he has never before experienced. Immediate retirement would ease the situation, bring well-earned rest to a tired man, and establish a reputation which can only be depreciated by a failure to tackle successfully new problems, demanding for their solution a freshness of mind and toughness of body no longer his. Furthermore, as a large section of organised labour is vindictively hostile to him, he can no longer hope to effect that union of all classes which must be the immediate aim of the nation's leader. Were the danger of remaining too long on the stage not present to his mind, the example of a living ex-premier might well afford a warning. But no warning is required. The Prime Minister is less concerned with the question of whether to retire than when and how.

To suggest as his successor any other than Mr. Baldwin would be absurd. It is inconceivable that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald would advise the King to send for anyone but the man who has supported him with rare loyalty, has resisted all demands for his betrayal, and has more influence than any other politician with the best in our nation. There are other Conservative leaders of character and ability, but none who so enjoys the confidence of the common people. In my

opinion—and I had very unusual opportunities for forming a correct judgment—Mr. Baldwin's action in the crisis in 1926 saved us from revolution because he understood his fellow-countrymen. The manual workers know but little of him, for the Press regards him as a person with but small 'news value'; but they have a deep-seated and justified feeling that he will give them a fair deal and can sympathise with them—better, perhaps, than their own leaders. The policy which alone can enable us to emerge from our present discontents is one the success of which depends wholly on the degree of confidence with which the leader is regarded by the masses. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is, through no fault on his part, out of intimate touch with the nation; Mr. Baldwin has qualities, both good and bad, which make him an honorary life member of all classes.

Assuming, then, that events take their natural course, that the Prime Minister retires with his reputation at its height, and that Mr. Baldwin forms a Government, how can it achieve success? The result of the next General Election is doubtful; there are several factors in the situation which make success questionable. The policy of the Liberal Party seems to be based upon the determination to do mischief because it can do no good. On the whole, its efforts are devoted once more to assisting the Socialists to destroy any hope of preserving political and personal liberty, and it has distinguished itself by its enthusiastic support of the unscrupulous peace campaign of the enemies of the Government.

A second danger is to be found in the efforts of Mr. Winston Churchill to wreck the Conservative Party. It has long been a theme of academic debate among us politicians whether he is more dangerous in office or out of office. The conventional view has always been that it is safer to give him office than to leave him outside. I contest this view, and trust that arguments which I adduced against it some years ago may have contributed to place him where he is. But it would be foolish not to recognise that, even out of office, he is capable of doing much harm. The House of Commons, always charitable to those whose interest in their own careers engenders rhetoric, is now less patient towards him than formerly. But some local Conservative associations really

believe that he is a statesman. So he also is likely to be of great assistance to the Socialists at the General Election.

It is, fortunately, very doubtful whether Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook have any appreciable effect upon public opinion. Certainly their long and bitter campaign against Mr. Baldwin has been an utter failure. Their united efforts may give a few seats to the Socialists. But until, by a careful study of the *Daily Herald*, they have learnt how to make newspapers, apart from advertisements, interesting and attractive, their influence will continue to wane.

The greatest danger of all is to be found in the cunning and poisonous activities of the peacemongers, who do not scruple at elections to circulate every lying innuendo that malice and party rancour can suggest. Millions of ignorant women voters will be deceived into thinking that, by voting for Socialist or Liberal candidates, they will avoid otherwise inevitable war. Professional lovers of humanity in general, now as in previous generations, are mainly distinguished by their virulent hatred of that part of the human race with which they come into contact, and no considerations of truth or justice are allowed to stand in the way of the indulgence of that hatred.

How, then, is Mr. Baldwin to defend political liberty from the open assaults of Socialist, Communist, and Fascist revolutionaries while the walls are being assiduously undermined from divers angles by the enemies enumerated above?

Let us first consider what circumstances of the present time can be used to strengthen his position. The most obvious factor is the acute and well-justified fear of all sections of the community that Great Britain, following the example of so many other nations, may deliberately repudiate all that men have hitherto striven to attain, may surrender liberty in return for the promise of economic security, and thus reverse the whole evolutionary process. If that fear is less widespread than I hope and believe it to be, it must be fostered by telling the people in the plainest language that responsible leaders of the Socialists have openly declared their intention to produce financial chaos and complete insecurity of livelihood for the workers. In other words, the ghastly mess which they made in 1931 is to be as nothing when compared with the mess they intend to make when they

again have the power. And all the world knows that, if they carry out their policy, we shall be faced with a Fascist rebellion which they will be totally unable to suppress.

The leaders of the trade unions are well aware of this danger, and we industrialists know it too. Both we and they are anxious to save our country from the misery and shame of a Fascist dictatorship such as must follow the breakdown of civilisation resulting from the practice of Socialism. The trade unions begin to realise that they have been cheated by the Socialists, who have made use of their wealth and power to further their own selfish ends and to work for the institution of a *régime* in which trade unionism must be entirely annihilated. We who are responsible for the direction of industry will not permit the enslavement of ourselves or our men without a struggle. Thus all engaged in industry are ready for the advent of a real leader who will tell us what sacrifices are required of us in order that liberty may be saved.

The practical application of these considerations is by no means obscure. No party can hope for success at the General Election unless it has a cure, or a pretended one, for unemployment. The people are already somewhat suspicious of the quack remedies which, in the form of elaborately gilded pills, are once more being offered to them by Mr. Lloyd George, the Socialists, and other vendors of plausible rubbish. Clearly, then, the time is ripe for telling them the plain truth, which is that no Government by legislative or administrative measures can really reduce unemployment. The utmost that it can do is to maintain a state of affairs in which it is possible for those engaged in industry to employ all the men now out of work. A Government, as the Socialists showed in 1931, can produce conditions in which gradually all productive industry is brought to a full stop. And a Government, as the present one has shown, can restore conditions in which productive industry can survive and can even increase its activities.

But when once the latter conditions prevail, industry itself must put its house in order, or the efforts of the Government will be wasted. Two years ago, in the pages of this Review,¹ I made an analysis of the unemployment problem

¹ 'A Plea for More Wages': *Nineteenth Century*, May, 1933.

and pointed out that the fundamental cause of unemployment is the fixing of wage rates in such a way that they cannot rise or fall to meet the requirements of varying economic conditions. This view was quickly recognised as correct, and no economist would now suggest that unemployment can be reduced appreciably below the two-million mark unless wage rates are made more elastic and an increase of the aggregate of wages paid thus rendered possible. For my part, I see no possibility of effecting this unless the State restores to the trade unions the functions and the powers which it has filched from them. The fixing and the alteration of wage rates can only be done without disaster and strife if the task of guarding against unduly onerous conditions for the workers is reassumed by the trade unions. If the State continues to be the arbiter, every industrial dispute assumes a revolutionary character, and political considerations force Governments to fix wage rates above the economic level, with a consequent increase of unemployment and decrease in the aggregate of wages paid. The mere fact that a statutory minimum rate exists in any industry is proof that the rate in question is uneconomic, since if it were otherwise there would be no reason for making it statutory. The mere fact that employers accept a rate, even after a struggle, is *prima facie* evidence that the rate in question is economic or can be made so. Experience, in the era before political interference neutralised all the natural forces tending to restore equilibrium, showed that trade union action could at times force wage rates above the economic level. But the consequent increase of unemployment and the resultant strain on trade union funds were potent factors in causing an early readjustment.

The reader will perhaps forgive me for stressing these truisms if he will remember that it is only within the last year or two that the real cause of unemployment has been recognised. The old fallacies, however, are now being revived by Mr. Lloyd George and others, who, in the face of all evidence, still try to persuade the people that doles with no return and wages paid for constructing unwanted public works really increase the purchasing power of the workers. We could build a whole fleet of Atlantic liners which cannot earn their keep, and could convert into arterial roads the few remaining acres of our country not already so covered, without

increasing by one penny the purchasing power of the people. For the latter operation can only be effected through the payment of wages for the production of something which is wanted—in other words, something which private enterprise will hasten to provide. My plea for more wages as the only solution to the unemployment problem is a plea for wages in the true sense of the word—for money paid in return for services rendered, not money paid in return for what is worthless and must, on that account, be provided by the State since no one else will provide it.

The cure for unemployment, therefore, which Mr. Baldwin must put before the electorate is one which no prominent politician has hitherto dared to suggest, though it is, in fact, the only real remedy for the disease which is sapping the vitality of our nation. He, and he alone, can hope to turn the people from their pursuit of the false lights which have drawn them into the morass.

What we require from him, as soon as his Government is formed, is a definite pronouncement to the effect that the presence of two million unemployed in our midst constitutes an urgent peril and may well drag us, by the usual route through Socialism, to a condition of utter slavery under the domination of some semi-Asiatic sadist. He can rightly claim that the National Government has at the least made it possible for the bulk of the unemployed to be absorbed into industry. But the people must be told that this is the limit of what can be effected by political action. Industry itself must now take advantage of the opportunity thus presented; and if trade unions and employers refuse to do their duty, Mr. Baldwin will make no attempt to win in the coming General Election, but will leave them free to go their own way to the hell of Communism or Fascism. The first objective must be to get the problem stated in language so plain that all can understand it. And the great question at issue is whether personal and political liberty is to be preserved or destroyed.

This first objective having been attained, his position will be very strong. For it will be manifest to all that only a Government which cuts clean across party lines can hope to do what is required, and that he only can hold together such a Government. Room must be found in it for leaders of organised labour who see the danger and are willing to help.

But there must be no hesitation in excluding from it professional politicians of all parties. Above all, the man who has been mainly responsible for our present perils and discontents must never be admitted.

There must be no programme of legislation, but rather an undertaking that every effort will be made to induce conditions enabling much unwise legislation to be repealed. The whole basis of Government policy must be the recognition of the fact that statutes, no matter how drastic, cannot possibly take the place of willing effort on the part of all sections of the community.

The repeal of existing statutes must be effected step by step as conditions render it safe to dispense with them. As soon, for example, as the trade unions have begun to understand that they are expected to accept responsibility for the well-being of their members and to take up again those beneficent functions of which Mr. Lloyd George deprived them, we can begin to repeal that great mass of statutes relating to unemployment, hours of work, regulation of wages, and other subjects which are not the business of Governments, and which, if regulated by statute, force trade unions to become little more than revolutionary societies—much, I believe, against their will. For we may note in passing that if the State settles conditions in any industry, any attempt to alter those conditions is rebellion. The coal strikes of 1921 and 1926 were revolutionary movements, not because the Trades Union Congress wished them to be so, but because it could only hope to get what it wanted by frightening the Government into passing legislation. We have forced the trade unions into a position of antagonism to the nation at large, and are responsible for the existence of the Labour Party, which alone among parties openly proclaims itself the champion of the interests of a section against the commonwealth.

But the trade unions may well hesitate to accept the very heavy responsibilities mentioned above, unless they have some assurance that capitalists and employers of labour will not take advantage of the transition stage to impose harsh conditions on the wage-earners. We must here bear in mind that, however callous and selfish, we employers are well aware of the danger impending, and equally aware that we can be

saved only by sacrificing a great deal. We must be prepared to raise all wages by the amount, not only of the 'employers' contribution,' but also of the 'State contribution,' to the various funds now statutory, but soon to be voluntary. By this means the trade unions will be in a position to obtain from their members a revenue sufficient to enable them to provide benefits approximating to the existing scale. If any man does not wish to join a union, and refuses to provide for contingencies through a friendly society, he must take the consequences.

The second responsibility laid upon employers is to prove that the flexibility of wage rates, under trade union control, will in fact increase the aggregate of weekly wages. It may prove impossible at first to give clear proof of this. If so, our own drawings and our ordinary shareholders' dividends must be thrown into the common stock. It is cowardly to stand shivering on the brink with the prairie fires of Communism and Fascism rapidly approaching. I took the plunge years ago, and find the cold water refreshing.

For years we capitalists and employers have unctuously informed the public that we are, after all, merely trustees for the wage-earners; it would appear to me that the time is ripe for Mr. Baldwin to take us at our word. For at least another generation the manual workers will not be capable of looking after themselves. Nor can their trade unions as yet give them security. Our duty is clear, and if we evade it any longer we shall deserve our fate.

To the banks also a warning is necessary. It is in the general interest that they should finance legitimate speculation up to a certain point, unfettered by rules imposed from outside. But some of them have disgraced themselves in recent years, not only by allowing swindlers to rob them of great sums, but also by helping gamblers. A hint from Mr. Baldwin that, if they do not behave reasonably, he will leave them to Sir Stafford Cripps might be salutary.

I have omitted much, but I hope that what I have written will suffice to indicate the underlying principles of the policy suggested, which may be summarised as follows:

1. Unless the problem of unemployment is in a fair way to solution by this time next year, the General Election will be followed by a Socialist Administration.

2. A Socialist Administration would render inevitable a state of economic insecurity which would give rise to a Fascist rebellion.

3. A Socialist Government cannot use the armed forces of the Crown to suppress such a rebellion; so civil war would supervene.

4. The solution of the unemployment problem demands a complete reversal of the policy which has given rise to it.

5. A reversal of policy is impossible without the co-operation of organised labour.

6. Such co-operation is now available, for trade union leaders appreciate the danger to which a Socialist Government in office will expose them. But it will be withheld unless very great sacrifices are made by the other parties in industry, who must produce definite proof that they will give the wage-earners a fair deal.

In conclusion, no Government except a non-party Government, and no political leader except Mr. Baldwin, can inspire sufficient confidence in all sections of the community to make every man pull his weight in the great contest before us. The 'People's Budget' and 'Ninepence for Fourpence' have, at last, produced the inevitable result. The war delayed the actions of the toxins then introduced into the body politic, but their effect is now manifest. The man who inoculated us with these malignant bacilli has raised a new culture from the same stock and has charged his hypodermic syringe once more. We may trust Mr. Baldwin to see that he is prevented from using it. Then, giving thanks to Heaven, we can take the first steps towards recovery.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

THE FLIGHT FROM THE FIELDS

By SIR DANIEL HALL, K.C.B., F.R.S.

THE Census figures for the last sixty years show a continuous decline in the numbers engaged in agriculture, as may be seen in the following table, which summarises the returns for England and Wales under the three categories of farmers and graziers, then relatives helping upon the farm, and employees of one kind or another. In certain respects the figures are open to correction, but not such as would affect the general trend.

TABLE I.—NUMBERS OF MEN AND WOMEN ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

Census Returns for England and Wales

	1871.	1881.	1891.	1901.	1911.	1921.	1931.
Farmers . . .	249,907	223,945	223,520	224,299	228,788	254,093	248,246
Relatives . . .	76,466	75,197	67,287	89,165	97,689	80,257	80,782
Employees . .	996,654	890,175	798,912	643,679	678,472	618,296	511,455

The number of independent farmers has been maintained relatively constant throughout the period, and, though the figures did not fit with the number of agricultural holdings in the returns of the Ministry of Agriculture, the constancy of the occupation figures show that no great change in the system of land-holding has occurred during the period. The excess in the number of holdings over the number of farmers may be explained by the fact that many men hold a plot of land as a subsidiary occupation, and that many substantial farmers manage several holdings for which separate returns are made. The number of employees — almost wholly labourers on a weekly wage — declined at the rate of about 10,000 a year, except during the decade 1901-1911. Over the whole period 1871-1931 the numbers have shrunk from a

for purposes of commerce. It is true that among the population of small farmers certain larger units existed—the latifundia, demesnes of the overlords, temporal or spiritual—and on them crops and live-stock produce were being raised by hired labour, not only for the support of the great household, but for commerce. Cities and towns had to be fed and clothed, and even international commerce began early—as, for example, the English wool trade—so that a certain amount of farming for business inevitably accompanied the beginnings of any organised society.

But while we can perceive a real distinction between farming as a mode of living and farming as a means of making profits, there is no sharp distinction to be drawn between the two classes. Obviously the great estates are farmed for production as commercial enterprises and the family farm is mainly supplying food for the family; but even the smallest holding will have something to sell, and in extreme cases may be so devoted to crops for sale that most of the food is bought. I have known small holdings selling butter and eating margarine, selling pigs and buying Argentine corned beef, because it was cheaper than bacon.

Let us trace the course of events in England. We begin over a great part of the country with land farmed in common fields, in each of which a tenant of the manor held a certain number of acre or half-acre strips. From the fifteenth century onwards we find enclosures becoming active, one of the chief motives being the high prices that could be obtained for English wool. The common fields were divided into several holdings, mostly freehold, of areas equivalent to the strips the tenant held in the original manor. With enclosures came better methods of farming, which could only be pursued when each man had his land under control, could fence it against straying stock, and could grow winter fodder crops and make manure. The output from the land must have been at least trebled, and it was the economic pressure exercised by the potentiality of higher production in an England that was expanding commercially and industrially that supplied the driving power towards enclosure, especially during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The same economic pressure carried the development of our landed

system a stage further; it led almost to the extinction of the yeoman who had received a small holding under the enclosure award. At any rate, in one way or another our land-holding took its present shape early in the nineteenth century; peasant farming no longer predominated, but became exchanged for small business farming, though, of course, the transition was never absolute—yeomen and small renting farmers still persist.

As late as 1930 out of 396,000 occupiers of land in England and Wales no less than 255,000 were holders of less than 50 acres, but they held less than 16 per cent. of the total cultivated area. If we eliminate the occupiers of less than 5 acres, who are, as a rule, people with some other occupation to which their farming or gardening is only subsidiary, the numbers become 182,000 small holders in a total of 323,000 farmers—i.e., 56 per cent. by number but holding only 15 per cent. of the total cultivated land.

The larger holdings of above 50 acres represent 84 per cent. of our cultivated land, the average area being 151 acres. Of course this average is swollen by the sheep-walks and rough grazings, but it reflects the fact that the typical English farm is a small business enterprise with a master and a certain number of paid labourers.

A closer examination of the number of holdings of the various size groups, decade by decade, provides some evidence of the trend of change in our farming, and these returns are set out in the accompanying table from 1870 to 1930. The earlier date belongs to the old farming before the great depression.

TABLE II.—NUMBER AND EXTENT OF HOLDINGS IN THOUSANDS : ENGLAND AND WALES

Year.	1-5 Acres.		5-20 Acres.		20-50 Acres.		Total.	
	No.	Area.	No.	Area.	No.	Area.	No.	Area.
1870 . .	113	339	128	1,920	75	2,625	450	25,957
1885 . .	114	321	127	1,420	73	2,463	475	27,710
1895 . .	98	301	127	1,422	75	2,502	440	27,683
1905 . .	92	—	198	—	—	—	433	27,406
1915 . .	91	280	121	1,358	78	2,634	433	27,053
1924 . .	77	241	112	1,264	80	2,691	409	25,877
1930 . .	73	227	104	1,179	78	2,640	396	25,380
1934 . .	69	—	99	—	76	—	384	—

Small holdings provided by county councils since 1908 :

1908 . . .	505	1925 . . .	29,932
1913 . . .	11,363	1930 . . .	28,177
1918 . . .	13,270	1933 . . .	30,440

Beginning with the group of smallest holdings, 1-5 acres, the numbers have continuously declined, from 113,000 to 69,000, by approximately 40 per cent. in the sixty-four years. This loss possesses little agricultural, though considerable social, significance, for so many of these holdings must have been gardens and accommodation lands near the towns that were swallowed up by their growth. It is, however, significant that of the next group, 5-20 acres, 24,000 have been lost—18 per cent. of the original number. The numbers of the next group, 20-50 acres, have been maintained and even slightly increased, though there has been some decline in the last decade.

Account must, however, be taken of the operation of the Small Holding Acts, the first of which came into operation in 1908. Thereby county councils were empowered to acquire land for division and equipment as small holdings. Under these auspices some 13,000 small holders were put on the land before the war, after which came the scheme for the establishment of ex-service men as small holders, whereby the number of statutory small holdings has been increased to over 30,000. The size distribution of these statutory holdings is not available; in the pre-war time a considerable proportion consisted of accommodation holdings of a few acres near the villages, but most of the post-war creations were full-time holdings of at least 20 acres.

It can hardly be doubted from the trend of these figures that the factors leading to the secular decline in the yeomen and small farmers, which had been going on for two centuries, were continuing in operation during the last sixty years. The losses in the 1-5 acre group may be ignored, but the reduction in the number of holdings of the 5-20 acre group are real, and the 20-50 acre group has only been kept up by the artificial creation of holdings by the county councils. It is significant that the losses in the whole 5-50 acre group are heavy in counties like Nottingham (30 per cent.) and the East Riding of Yorkshire (20 per cent.), where ordinary

arable farming predominates. But in Kent, Worcester, and Salop the number of small farms has been increased by 11, 17, and 13 per cent., these being the counties in which market gardening and fruit growing have developed. The only reasonable conclusion is that during the period under review the small mixed farm of under 20 acres had become an uneconomic proposition, only able to hold its own when the occupier was engaged in fruit growing or market gardening. The larger 20-50 acre holding was more able to maintain itself, but even that group had only kept up its numbers by the artificial addition of the statutory small holdings.

The decline in the number of small holdings revealed by these figures does not account for the shrinkage in the agricultural population—indeed, the Census returns show no diminution in the number of farmers to correspond with the holdings lost. The loss has fallen upon the labourers, who are, as far as numbers go, the predominant element in our agricultural community. In other countries, however, as the following table shows, the usual method of dealing with the land continues to be the family farm.

TABLE III.—LAND AND LABOUR STATISTICS (with acknowledgments to the International Institute of Agriculture)

Country.	Independent Farmers (thousands).	Labourers (thousands).	Helpers (thousands).	Per cent. of Working Population employed in Agriculture.	Average size of Holding (Acres).‡
Great Britain (1921)	399	908	—	6.8	114.2
France (1926)	5,803	2,395	—	38.3	14.9
Germany (1933)	2,182	2,530	4,517	17.9 * 28.9 †	26.9
Belgium (1920)	252	224	133	15.8 * 19.1 †	18.2
Denmark (1921)	186	151	107	28.9 * 34.6 †	40.6
Netherlands (1920)	216	400	—	22.9	26.6
Italy (1931)	5,434	2,476	—	46.2	10.4
Czechoslovakia (1930)	887	773	1,002	28.3 * 38.3 †	23.8
Poland (1921)	2,687	1,486	6,053	57.7 * 76.2 †	23.3
India (1931)	64,437	38,017	—	66.4	5.6
U.S.A. (1930)	6,012	2,733	1,660	18.7 * 21.4 †	65.5
Australia (1921)	213	261	30	21.6 * 22.6 †	180.0

* Excluding helpers.

† Including helpers (chiefly seasonal workers for sugar-beet).

‡ Area of cultivated land ÷ farmers.

Whereas in Great Britain the ratio of paid labourers to employers is 2 to 1, or even 3 to 1, in other countries it rarely exceeds unity, and may be less. In every country there is a certain amount of large-scale farming with paid labour, but only in Great Britain is it the characteristic method of handling

land; elsewhere the peasant structure prevails—in new countries as in old. Doubtful as these figures are in detail, owing to the different methods of assessment adopted in different countries, the general trend is evident. The more the peasant holding predominates, the smaller becomes the average size of the holding—a truism, doubtless; but it is significant to see to what minute division a country like Italy is committed. The other point manifest from the table is that as the small single-man farm becomes dominant in the country, the greater is the proportion of its working population engaged on the land. In Great Britain less than 7 per cent. of all people at work, masters or men, were agricultural; the proportion is about 30 per cent. in Western Europe and rises to 70 per cent. or so in Poland and Eastern European States. Of course we must discount our low figure in consideration of the fact that we produce less than 40 per cent. of the food we consume, whereas the other countries are more nearly self-supporting, or are even exporters of food. But the general conclusion remains that British agriculture earlier moved out of the peasant system in which European countries are still involved; our organisation has advanced some distance towards the efficiency of production that can be obtained on the larger farming units, and, though our gross output is limited by the small area of land available for cultivation, we are in relation to that output calling upon a relatively small amount of man-power. Under proper organisation it is a reasonable assumption that one-tenth of the working population on the land could produce the food required by the whole community without any lowering of the standard of living. This assumption presupposes the climatic and soil conditions of Western Europe and something over 2 acres of land per unit of population to be supported. The large proportion of the working population that is engaged upon the land even in France or Germany is indicative of the comparative inefficiency of the peasant system as a means of production, if we define efficiency in the engineer's sense as economy of man-power in relation to output. The inefficiency is even more evident in the difficulty peasant agriculture has experienced in maintaining itself against the competition created—on the one hand by cheap overseas production, on the other by the internal intensification that modern science has rendered

possible on some of the larger units in every country. Until four years ago British agriculture had to stand up to world competition, but with few exceptions Continental countries had embarked upon high protective policies in order to preserve so large an element of the population as its peasants constituted, protection that latterly had to be reinforced by all kinds of fiscal devices. It is clear that peasant farming cannot live against the competition induced by scientific advance in agricultural processes, and, while the Continental high protective policies may have been inevitable in order to prevent, or at least delay, the transformation of the peasant structure, Great Britain is in the happier position in that the rationalisation of farming and the drift of men into industries and commerce have been proceeding for a couple of centuries.

Viewed thus historically and in broad outline, the evolution of the farming systems stands out clearly enough. In the beginning the greater part of the community are wringing a hard living out of the soil by manual toil; as machines were invented, from the first ox that was harnessed to the primitive plough to the modern combine harvester, as science increased the possibilities of output per unit of labour by fertilisers and improved varieties, etc., so the number of men required has diminished, and so the area required for the economic utilisation of the new powers has increased. Economic pressure converted the English strip farming into several holdings (the farms of the small yeomen), and then consolidated most of them into larger units. In so far as the advances of science, machinery and organisation demand still larger units for the most economic production, the process of consolidation will go on in this and other countries. The advantages of large-scale working are not confined to wheat growing or ordinary mixed farming; they are equally manifest in milk production and in fruit and vegetable growing. No Lancashire or Ayrshire cowkeeper with his twenty cows in milk can rival Mr. Hosier in cheapness of production; no small orchard is kept so clean, so well pruned, so fruitful, as Mr. Spencer Mount's plantations; no single-handed market gardener can exceed Mr. Secrett even in output per acre.

But how does this general trend bear upon the necessity

that is upon us at the present time to reduce our unemployment figures and to increase the output from the land in order to lessen the imports for which the other nations are becoming unwilling to take our manufactured goods in exchange? For a solution many devoted and careful students of the question look to a great development of small holdings, to parcelling out the land again into family farms. The economic argument is the greater production per acre that obtains on small as compared with large farms, when viewed statistically. The argument is invalidated because it does not take into account the differences of quality of the land under comparison, nor the difference in the types of farming. When a grass farm in the Vale of Evesham is cut up into small holdings on which the occupiers grow asparagus and plums, a great increase of output follows; but close at hand there are large farms turning out the same class of produce with even greater intensity. The increase is due to change of system rather than change of size. True, the large farmer is often indifferent to or incapable of the intensification that is forced upon the small holder if he is to live.

More to the point is the argument that small holdings provide means of starting and opportunities for men of energy to rise to bigger things. Farming, like any other industry, is always in need of new blood; and since it is not so organised as to afford openings for young men without capital who can train on to become managers, that new blood has to enter as independent farmers, on however small a scale. Others see the small holders as the repositories of civic virtues; their devotion to work, their indifference to hours, their political stability and the freedom with which they rear healthy country children, early broken to hard work, are assets to the community. Unfortunately, the small holder values these opportunities less than the statesman; as our own statistics show, an experience repeated in other countries, the peasant leaves the land, or rather his sons do, whenever the chance of industrial employment offers itself. Moreover, the setting up of small holdings has been a costly business. When a little land with some buildings upon it can be bought reasonably, and the buildings can be cheaply reconstructed, it is possible to obtain an economic rent for the outlay; but when an estate has to be developed on plans

that satisfy the county council and the Ministry of Agriculture, when roads, drainage, water supply and fencing have to be provided for the new houses, a considerable part of the capital outlay has to be written off before a fair rent can be struck to pay interest on the remainder. Even at present costs the 20-50 acre holding that is to earn a living for a family is likely to cost the State some £400 of irrecoverable outlay.

It may be contended that as, in any case, farming nowadays has ceased to be remunerative, and since all farmers have to be subsidised, the money may as well be spent on small holders. The question then resolves itself into a consideration of the comparative costs involved and of the validity of the idea that agriculture, at a level above the peasant's extraction of a living from the soil, is necessarily a losing business beyond redemption by exact and scientific methods. The experience of so many of our public men on their own estates has doubtless firmly imprinted the conviction that farming is impossible as a business proposition. But to attempt to increase employment upon the land by reverting to the old single-man type of farm is really a setting back of the clock, a denial both of past experience and of all the potentialities of science and modern organisation—a policy which must result in limiting production and making food dearer. There is room for more men upon the land if it can be exploited scientifically and with the technical skill exhibited by many of our better farmers, for on these farms employment will generally be found to have increased. It is intensification that will make a prosperous countryside—brains, in fact—rather than the slogging hard labour which would be the contribution of the small holder. It may be a more difficult policy to operate; it demands leadership and management, and the exercise of some control over both land and men, but then the farming community has accepted control in exchange for the protection and monopolies of the Marketing Boards.

But even if intensification be pursued, it is yet possible in certain forms of production to find a place for the small holder, provided he is made a unit in some large organisation. A number of pig producers, for example, could be grouped round a bacon factory, each with ten or twelve sows (about the limit of a single man's management), and with enough land to provide a run for the 'in-pig' sows, a few acres of

kale for the green meat required, and the vegetable plot and fowl-run that the occupier would require for his family food. The producer must be bound to supply his pigs to the factory and to breed and manage them as the factory demands; on the other hand, the factory would supply the meal and the other food requirements for the standard rations at cost. On such a scheme a small holder would be able to obtain a net cash return, not perhaps as large as a labourer's wages, but which would be an addition to the food for man and family already drawn from the land. It is the essence of peasant farming that the holding shall provide most of the food for the family.

A similar organisation could be applied to egg production and to vegetable and fruit growing—the essentials being the enforcement of uniformity in production, and centralised processing and marketing, with, again, the centralisation of such operations as the spraying the fruit growers require.

It is urged that small holders will never accept the ties involved in such schemes, that they are asking for land to use as they think best. But compulsion need not enter; the men seeking small holdings would be offered an opportunity to which conditions were attached. Doubtless, however, such schemes will have to be left to some voluntary enterprise; neither Ministry nor county council can ignore the popular demand for a self-contained holding and a free hand.

The method thus suggested is not applicable to all forms of agriculture, and has only been rendered practicable by the advent of Marketing Boards for particular commodities, a policy which affords security to the specialist who directs his farming to a single end. Specialisation, which in itself makes for efficiency, will be particularly helpful to the young unemployed man who has to be taught his craft. A farmer, even a small farmer, cannot be made by a year's training, but a man can pretty well be put through the routine of pig or poultry keeping, however much he will still lack the insight that comes from long experience. Considering that we are producing less than 40 per cent. of the produce we consume, there is plenty of room for intensification without cutting into those sort of products, like oranges and bananas, that do not belong to our climate, without even trying to grow our crude sources of energy like wheat and sugar. Indeed, an

industry like pig keeping buys these raw materials in order to convert them into meat. And such intensification might well put a lot of men back on the land, though not the numbers (approaching half a million) that the land has lost within the last sixty years. But many enthusiasts for more men upon the land conceive of colonies or groups of men who will be content to put aside the cash return for their labour, who will live simply on the produce of their land, and not assess their living against the wage rates in the towns. Germany is aiming at creating a peasant aristocracy of this kind of families who cannot alienate their land. Italy glorifies her peasants even when warning them that they will need to draw their belts tighter. But it cannot be supposed that in Great Britain any considerable section of the community will agree to segregation as a class with a lower standard of living than their fellows enjoy. Nothing less than the return of starvation will re-people the little crofts abandoned on the hillsides and the margins of cultivation. Non-economic communities have a value if they are to be treated as a means of relieving the unemployed young men—as temporary training fields, not as a permanent mode of living. They could be run at little greater cost than the unemployment allowances of the men they embrace, and they would be a means of restoring self-respect and a habit of work as well as a possible introduction to permanent employment.

To sum up, the decline in the number of men employed upon the land has within the last sixty years been very great; at the same time the small farms have been diminishing in numbers, in spite of the legislative attempts to restore them. The small mixed farm has become definitely uneconomic in Britain, as in most Continental countries, and every year of progress, every invention of science and machinery, increases the efficiency of the large farm as compared with the small. Further employment upon the land is to be obtained, not by a return to earlier conditions of sub-division, but by an intensification of the methods of production on larger units of cultivation. Under organisation even modern production of certain selected commodities will admit of the participation of single-man units, the lack of efficiency of which is offset by the social and psychological advantages they confer.

A. D. HALL.

PROBLEMS OF THE VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS¹

By SIR CHARLES HARRIS, G.B.E., K.C.B.

OUR Voluntary Hospitals form a characteristic British institution of venerable age. That of St. Bartholomew, in Rochester, still active, was founded twelve years after the Battle of Hastings, and three others within a century of it. In the eighteenth century hospitals were founded by dozens, in the nineteenth by hundreds, and they are still being founded by scores, their numbers now exceeding a thousand in Great Britain. The definition given by Lord Cave's Voluntary Hospitals Committee (1921) may here be quoted:

An institution other than an Out-patient Dispensary, managed by a responsible committee and wholly or mainly supported by voluntary sources (including income derived from endowments or investments), the object of which is to provide medical or surgical treatment of a curative character.

The last phrase excludes other institutions which provide for incurables or retain their infirm inmates for life; and perhaps the definition might have made clearer that not only governance and funds are provided voluntarily, but the treatment of patients is in the main given gratuitously by 'visiting' doctors. Such a hospital appeals strongly to local patriotism; to everyone connected with it, it is *our* hospital; and with its atmosphere of zeal and charity it is a living demonstration that payment is only one way—and not the best—of commanding devoted service for the public good. What wonder, then, if these institutions, with their age-long records of sufferers healed and science advanced and their secure hold on the affections of the public, have preferred independence to combination? If this article suggests some change of

¹ Most of the figures in this article were communicated by the Central Bureau of Hospital Information to me, as one of its Honorary Financial Consultants, for review before publication in the forthcoming *Hospitals Year-Book*; but the responsibility for criticisms or opinions is mine alone.

attitude, assuredly it is not from any want of admiration for past and present performances, but because recent events oblige the hospitals, through no fault of their own, to face the supreme test of vitality: adaptability to changes of environment. Let us look first at their present financial position as shown by the *Hospitals Year-Book* figures for 1933.

In that year, Great Britain had roughly 1000 voluntary hospitals with 80,000 beds: 160 (18,000 beds) in London, 720 (52,000 beds) in the rest of England and Wales (the 'provinces'), and 120 (1000 beds) in Scotland.² Their total receipts exceeded £15 millions, and expenditure of £14½ millions left £½ million in hand. Invested funds, totalling £40 millions, produced income of £1½ millions (at the reduced rates of interest); and, even under the prevailing financial depression, both the total receipts of the hospitals and the excess of receipts over expenditure have been rising since 1931. Here, surely, is a great institution, still in the van of progress, higher than ever in public favour, and flourishing despite our unexampled load of debts and taxes. Why not let it alone? There are two main reasons: first, closer examination of the figures does not altogether confirm the first impression of abounding prosperity; and, second, a new system of hospitals, backed by public money, is rapidly growing up alongside.

A voluntary hospital embarking on large capital expenditure (say, rebuilding or extension) does not accumulate funds in advance, but collects them either before, during or after the execution of the work as best it may. Whatever the theoretical objections to this plan, it succeeds triumphantly in practice; but it makes comparisons between the hospital's total receipts and expenditure during a burst of building activity meaningless until the figures for capital and working expenses ('maintenance') have been separated. Only on the latter account does an excess of receipts over expenditure mean prosperity and the reverse a danger signal; and as the *Year-Book* 'surplus' or 'deficit' refers only to a particular year and the next *Year-Book* starts again with a clean slate, it does not tell the whole story. A man may be a millionaire though he has

² The *Year-Book* covers Ireland also, but present conditions there are so different from those in Great Britain that to include the Irish figures here would obscure the picture.

dropped a hundred thousand in his last year, or bankrupt though he has gained a similar sum; only his balance-sheet can tell, and at this the Year-Book makes no attempt. Further, the published figures are aggregates covering many hospitals, in which a deficit in one hospital disappears if there is a surplus in another to balance it, whereas in reality it does nothing of the sort. Looked at in this light, the 'maintenance' figures give the following results for the three areas:

Of the 935 hospitals for which figures are available, 685 received in 1933 more than they spent, but one in every three in London and one in every four outside spent more than they received, by £230,000 in all. Dividing them into Large (100 beds and over), Medium (30 to 99 beds), and Small (under 30 beds), there were deficits on the year in 58 large, averaging £2350; 98 medium, averaging £750; and 94 small, averaging £200. The average maintenance incomes of the hospitals with deficits were: large, £28,500; medium, £7300; small, £1900; so that in a single year the medium and small overspent by about 10 per cent. of their incomes and the large by about 8 per cent. Annual deficits have a deplorable tendency to repeat themselves, but no figures are published to show what the *accumulated* deficits of these hospitals may be. The above figures for losses in 1933 are still averages of large numbers of hospitals, and there is high probability that some of them must be seriously waterlogged. That so large proportions of all hospitals should be in this case, despite the massed wealth of the whole, is danger signal No. 1.

Next, allowance must be made for growth, at an average rate of about 1500 beds a year in new and old hospitals together. To relate income and expenditure to this growth, they must be reckoned 'per available bed.' As an example of the effect, the aggregate *increase* of maintenance income in the provinces in 1933, £217,000, is seen to be a *reduction*, per bed, of some £2 2s. a year. Between 1931 and 1933 total maintenance income per bed in Great Britain fell by some £1 2s., the fall affecting all the main sources of income (voluntary gifts, investments and legacies) other than services rendered (payments by patients or by public institutions on their behalf), which rose by £3 15s. a bed. As will be seen further on, this one expanding item is seriously threatened

for the future. Thus income, and especially the largest and most characteristic source, voluntary gifts, is not keeping pace with expansion. In Liverpool the Cozens-Hardy Commission found that 'no policy should be adopted which would have the effect of substantially increasing the number of public (non-paying) beds that will have to be maintained.' Danger signal No. 2.

Legacies received in the three years to 1933 totalled £6 millions, of which £1½ millions were 'earmarked' by testators to specified services and £4½ millions were 'free' to be used as governing bodies might see fit. The latter are classed as available for maintenance, and in each of the three areas the aggregate yearly surplus of income over expenditure on maintenance is derived wholly from these legacies, representing in London only about one-quarter of their total, in the provinces four-fifths, and in Scotland five-ninths. The figures for these vitally important receipts, after eliminating mere year-to-year fluctuations, show a trend persistently upward (per available bed) for some years up to 1931 and definitely downward since. Earmarked legacies—some of them magnificent sums—come in too irregularly to exhibit definite trends over short periods; but no increase of these will remedy the falling-off in the free. On the contrary, they generally result in more beds and are rarely accompanied by sufficient endowment to maintain them; very roughly it may be said that while the total capital cost of new beds is £1000 each, it takes the interest on £4000 (£6500 in London) to maintain one. With a shrunken national income and a budget policy which seems to aim at the extinction of the 'very rich' and the over-taxation of the 'well-to-do,' it must be expected that the wills coming forward for proof in future will show signs of drought in the springs of charity. If this continues, how will the average voluntary hospital secure its annual surplus? Danger signal No. 3, especially for London.

Hospitals, as large buyers of commodities, have profited by the continuous fall in price levels, and especially in food (about one-seventh of their total expenditure), where the fall between 1929 and 1933 was 29 per cent., of which the hospitals saved only about half. Moreover, that saving served in their accounts only to mask, in whole or in part, an equivalent or even greater rise per bed under salaries and

wages, in London reaching £8 per bed and in Scotland £6 12s. Since 1933 the price level has been steady with a tendency to rise, but it may be that the hospitals, having been very slow in beginning to follow the fall, will show some further reduction in 1934. But there is nothing to indicate that the rise in salaries and wages is over; the general tendency, with increasing specialisation of apparatus, etc., involving more paid special technicians to apply it, must be upwards—at any rate, in the principal hospitals; and there will be no savings on prices to balance it. Danger signal No. 4. Such signals, even from several sides at once, do not necessarily mean a crash, but they call for prompt precautions. The vitality and resilience of the voluntary system, so often a surprise to its friends, may once more assert itself; but it will not do to rely any longer on the great reserve strength of the patient without some remedial measures.

The new challenge comes from the emergence, under the Local Government Act of 1929, of municipal hospitals arising by metamorphosis from the old Poor Law infirmaries, etc. Transferred from boards of guardians and other minor bodies to county and county borough councils, they were meant to extend (and are being reorganised for that express purpose) their functions from chronic cases, infirmary work and the like, to the curative functions characteristic of the voluntary hospitals; and section 13 of the Act instructs the councils to consult with those hospitals and their professional staffs as to the further accommodation to be provided and the purposes for which it is to be used. In the words of Sir George Newman,

all these hospitals (voluntary and municipal) have to-day one common and identical purpose, viz., the relief of suffering, the conquest of disease and the saving of life. . . . The differentiation is less definite than formerly . . . and the problem before us is the development of a practical and unified system of co-operation between them.

The largest of these municipal hospitals are far larger than the largest voluntaries, and they have a much greater aggregate of beds already—e.g., in London more than twice, and in Liverpool four times, as many; they have the keenness developed by able men organising a new service; and they can count securely on practically unlimited funds from the rates. The voluntaries meanwhile remain, as before, separate

units unorganised for any sort of combined action. It is true that in London King Edward's Hospital Fund to some extent plays the part of an equalisation fund, distributing annually a large sum (£320,000 in 1934) on discretionary lines, after satisfying itself of the needs and claims of each hospital and making such conditions or suggestions as it sees fit, so that unmerited poverty or unavoidable calamity may be mitigated. But this valuable work of outside donors, structurally regarded, is not the germ of a hospital organisation higher than the individual unit, but a recognition that no such germ exists; while for the provinces and Scotland there is as yet no corresponding fund, though the desirability of one has long been recognised.

Early this century a 'British Hospitals Association' was formed from such voluntary hospitals in Great Britain and Ireland as are willing to pay a small annual fee to cover office expenses. It has a regional organisation and at the centre is closely connected with the Joint Council of the Order of St. John and the British Red Cross Society, with its Central Bureau of Hospital Information and with the Hospital Officers' Association (Inc.), which publishes a monthly journal (the *Hospital*), devoted exclusively to hospital interests. The Central Bureau also publishes the *Hospitals Year-Book* (already referred to), containing financial and other statistics of the same general character as the King Edward's Fund publications (of which it incorporates the figures), a *Directory of Hospitals*, and various technical papers of a character to assist and improve hospital administration. Taken together, these activities are of high value in the way of dissemination of information and advice; and the British Hospitals Association, in particular, goes further and takes cognisance of larger questions affecting the hospital world. In 1929 it was incorporated, and in 1931 held with the Hospital Officers' Association a three days' conference to consider 'its future and policy' in view of the new legislation. Its council, addressing its members, thus described the position:

There are three facts that must not be forgotten:

- (a) That the hospitals . . . are a collection of absolutely independent units so far as methods of management are concerned.
- (b) That the Association has never possessed, does not now possess, and has no wish to possess any executive powers whatever.

- (c) That the hospitals, both in the provinces and in London, are confronted with a totally new situation. . . . Hospitals had never learnt, nor had they thought it necessary, to take counsel together in order that collectively they might guide the State. They had never thought fit to set up machinery for this purpose. They have therefore now to choose whether, as in the past, to continue each to pursue its own solitary way, or at the eleventh hour to achieve such a measure of co-operation as will enable them to make a coherent and considered contribution when matters concerning the health of the people are before Parliament. The former course leads to the one and only end possible when the organised meets the unorganised. The latter course, even if accompanied by modifications of attitudes of mind and of custom, of a far-reaching character, may—probably would—guarantee a life of continued usefulness for an indefinite period. For this purpose an Association of a somewhat different character is necessary to that which has sufficed in the past. Not, indeed, an Association to attempt to impose its will upon its members, or lay down rules and regulations—quite the reverse. That independence which is the chief source of strength in the Voluntary System, if properly understood and guided by common sense, can still be preserved. . . .

A clear call to an urgent task of self-preservation. Over four years later (January 1935) the Liverpool Hospitals Commission under Lord Cozens-Hardy, an independent local *ad hoc* body set up by the Liverpool General Hospitals Co-ordination Committee and the Medical Charities Committee of the Council of Social Service in that city, found that the voluntary system there

is without the means of taking common action. . . . The municipality are both equipped to discuss it [*sc.* the relations between municipal and voluntary hospitals] and are ready and anxious to begin discussions. . . . They can confer upon their negotiators plenary powers, but they do not know with whom to negotiate. They cannot negotiate with twenty different sovereigns at once. Yet that is what they find, on the voluntary side—some twenty different hospitals with similar interests, but with no single body authorised to speak on behalf of them all, even on a question which is of vital interest to their own future. (Report, pp. 42-3.)

And the same is true all over the country, though here and there something has been done, such as the valuable *Joint Survey of Hospitals in the County of London*, prepared by the London County Council and an *ad hoc* committee of representatives of the voluntary hospitals. Each side has thus been fully acquainted with the facts about the other's hospitals,

and the County Council is in touch with voluntary representatives qualified to expound the bearings of these facts, if and when required. But from such a committee to a body with anything like plenary powers to negotiate on behalf of all the voluntaries in the area, with instructions based on a common policy for the whole of Great Britain, is a long step which has not been taken. Meanwhile the London and other councils are tackling their jobs in their own ways: segregating patients, engaging higher professional staffs, reorganising buildings, administrative methods, accountancy. Some of the municipal hospitals are providing clinical material in their wards for the instruction of students by their own teachers from voluntary hospitals; and it seems likely that before long the question will arise whether part-time consultants employed by municipal hospitals should not have some share in the teaching; and almost certain that a large share of the work for which (as shown above) the voluntaries are being paid from municipal funds under the head of 'Services Rendered' will pass back from them to the municipal hospitals, with serious results to voluntary finances.

Here are questions which (as it seems to me) may go by default unless the thousand sovereign units manage to reconcile their prized independence with their solid common interests so far as to support a common policy, though it be arrived at by something less than unanimity, and to take the initiative in negotiation, if necessary, while there is still open water ahead. I do not presume to sketch, even in barest outline, the 'somewhat different character' which the council of the Hospitals Association saw in 1931 to be necessary. It may be that what is wanted is not so much new articles of association as a more lively realisation of impending dangers. It may be, again, that among the thousand and more trust deeds on which the legal existence of the hospitals reposes there are provisions which may be held to stand in the way of desirable changes. If so, there are remedies known to the law; we are not as the Medes and Persians, and the dead hand of benefactors under vanished conditions cannot be allowed to stand in the way. It is certain that there has been hitherto some lack of the will to effective combination for action. The British Hospitals Association seems to hold the field as the only existing organ

which can either itself take on whatever new powers and duties may be required or can give birth to a national association on a new model, suitably empowered for the action which every believer in the voluntary system must see to be necessary. To quote, once more from the Cozens-Hardy Report, the words of a witness :

If things go on as they are, the voluntary hospitals will drop out, one by one, as their reserves become exhausted, and all that will then be left will be for the city hospitals to pick up the bits.

And, last but not least, it must be remembered that there exists a school of political thought in the country holding so strongly that in the whole sphere of our social services there is no place for any institution which is, or has been, tainted with the spirit of charity in place of the claim, as of right, of any member of the community to be provided with whatever he needs at the expense of the taxpayer, that it has inscribed on its banner the total disappearance of the voluntary hospitals as a desirable reform.

In the general stocktaking of the position now necessary there are other problems to consider, and particularly the following. No discussion of them, in any way adequate, could be attempted in a single article, but the sort of considerations to be weighed may be here indicated.

(a) The working relations which should exist between different units, and especially the proper functions of the cottage hospital. At present it results too often from a gift or legacy, inspired by pure benevolence, from some resident near a small town or village to whom it has never occurred that so useful an institution could be misplaced, or that, before it is created, an expert survey is wanted of the needs and existing facilities of the countryside for many miles round. In such matters the narrower patriotism always prevails over the wider if left to itself; and the results are shown in the Year-Book tables. Under 'Work done and Finances' of individual hospitals will be found such extreme cases as less than one patient a day, the year round, with six beds available; only three with fourteen beds, and so on; and of course the costs per patient (through no fault of the management) run to absurd heights—in one instance up to 13 guineas a week. For that sum, six patients could be

treated in a hospital better situated—a sad waste not only of money but of nursing skill and public-spirited endeavour. Telephones, the motor ambulance, and motor roads have changed the whole question of transport of patients; and doubtless within an easy journey of the hospitals above instanced there are long waiting-lists of sufferers for whom some over-full sister institution can find no bed.

Generally stated, the question is: should the cottage hospital remain an isolated unit, doing its best, as finance may permit, to be a general hospital in miniature, competent (within limits) to deal with 'any case any day'? Should it be treated as an endowed nursing-home for use by the local practitioners? Or should it be definitely associated with some larger regional hospital to which it would send cases requiring specialised apparatus for their treatment, or a special degree of surgical skill and experience, receiving in return patients from that hospital in the early stages of convalescence, so that the beds where the best conditions and apparatus are available may deal with a larger through-put of patients every year, to the great benefit of the surrounding population, whose cure is, after all, the paramount object of the whole scheme? Though, in matters of business, the doctrine of central planning, compulsorily enforced by bureaucratic methods on all and sundry, has no attractions for me, we are here dealing with human life and the relief of pain and disease; and the argument for some measure of rationalisation in the industry is overwhelmingly strong. The fact is that no cottage hospital can command the same efficiency of apparatus and healing skill as the larger institutions with their wider experience. It has been well said, for instance, that 'X-ray plates taken by non-specialists and interpreted by non-specialists are a public danger.' To spend large sums on plant that will be used only occasionally is wasteful; but if it were for the good of the patients, that might be condoned. The decisive point is that the operators, unless they are constantly exercising their skill and enlarging their experience, are not, and cannot be, efficient.

And similar considerations affect to some extent larger hospitals also. For instance, the serious falling-off from the high standard to which Sir Robert Jones and his orthopaedic associates in the war brought the treatment of fractures had

been realised and discussed both regionally and centrally by the British Hospitals Association, but no definite action had resulted. The British Medical Association appointed a Committee, from the report of which (February 1935) it appears that while a number of hospitals (of which some are municipal) have organised fracture clinics in which his special technique is followed, there are many general hospitals of all sizes in which this is not the case. The results obtained in these latter are markedly inferior, both in the length of time the patient is disabled and the proportion of cases in which disability becomes permanent, with heavy loss in wages to the worker and in workmen's compensation to the employer and the insurers; and it has now become an urgent question how all the general hospitals in an industrial area, voluntary and municipal, should co-operate in constituting complete fracture units to take these cases.

The organisers of the municipal hospitals will have no difficulty in grading them in a 'hierarchy' analogous to that of the hospitals (field, stationary, base and special) in a theatre of war. But any such arrangement of the voluntaries will have to pass through various stages: discussion, decision on the principle by the 'somewhat different' association, consideration locally of its application to particular groups of hospitals, and, finally, in each group adoption in practice, with all due regard to susceptibilities. If these processes threaten to be long, all the more reason for avoiding further delay. It may be found that financial arrangements would be facilitated by a scheme of consolidated workmen's contributions, covering both a central hospital and its outliers, such as has worked for years past with the Radcliffe (Oxford) as centre. But individual units must be ready to sacrifice their own predilections if necessary and follow the majority in trying out new plans in the interests of the patients. If particularism is still to govern, how can the voluntaries, with no bottomless public purse and no adequate organisation, expect to retain the professional supremacy that is still theirs?

(b) The difficult question of modifying the time-honoured principle of unpaid visiting staffs. We have already come a long way from the splendid paradox by which the hospital patient, just because he was unable to pay, enjoyed a higher standard of skill and a better environment for his exercise

than the great majority of the professional and middle classes—many of them subscribers to hospitals—could afford for themselves. For many years hospitals have provided 'pay beds' in private wards, where members of visiting staffs could treat private patients who, though unable to afford the charges of private nursing-homes, paid the hospital the costs of accommodation and service and made their own arrangements (of which it took no cognisance) with physician or surgeon. Free treatment and maintenance in the public wards, for those who could pay nothing, continues as before; but as the advantages of institutional over home treatment in serious cases were more appreciated by patients as well as doctors, workmen and others above the poverty line were admitted to the public wards on making such contributions to hospital funds as they could afford. Workmen, etc., also began to make small weekly payments under 'contributory schemes,' contributors to which might be admitted to available beds in the public wards without being expected to make any further payment to hospital funds. There were now three classes of patient: the original 'charity' patients on the free list; the paying patients who pay for their 'private' beds at full rates and fee the doctor 'outside the hospital'; and the intermediate or contributory class, in the public wards but paying, either through a 'scheme' or through the hospital almoner, a sum which generally covers neither the full costs of the hospital nor any fees for the visiting staff.

In addition, there are patients paid for by State, municipal or other public authorities, and, under recent Road Traffic Acts, victims of road accidents for whom, in some cases and subject to statutory limits, payment is made by insurance societies. A Joint Committee of the British Hospitals Association and the British Medical Association, with Lord Linlithgow in the chair, reported in 1932 in favour of recognising in principle the claim of the visiting staffs to 'some share in the monies raised for the treatment of patients in hospital, other than those provided by voluntary subscription or donation for the treatment of free patients,' of making the institution of contributory schemes universal and of fixing the scale of contributions (as an 'ideal') to cover both the cost of maintenance of the patient and a fee for the visiting staffs. The committee had found great diversity of

practice in different hospitals, but as regards payments by public authorities and insurance societies 'the practice commonly obtains of earmarking an agreed percentage of all such monies for the visiting staffs.'

This report did not command universal assent; and indeed, by recommending the institution of a standing joint committee to watch the development of the situation, the Linlithgow Committee recognised that it had not said the last word. It did not adequately meet the practical difficulty that since contributory schemes do not in most cases fully cover the hospitals' present costs, and the members of such schemes have not shown willingness to pay more per week, the visiting staffs are in the dilemma that any share paid to them would in fact be a levy on the funds of the hospital. On the other hand, there is no equity in requiring doctors to treat gratuitously the class of case that commonly results from motor accidents. And, again, there are other considerations, such as those summed up in the Cozens-Hardy Report in two sentences: 'Appointment as an Honorary is the recognised hall-mark of the consultant'; and 'Without it, an address and a brass plate in Rodney Street [the Harley Street of Liverpool] will bring no patients.' To the layman it is not clear that the same rules must necessarily be applied indiscriminately to all hospitals and all members of their visiting staffs; or that the committee gave full attention to the possible repercussions of a policy of payment all round on the flow of donations and subscriptions. The fullest study by the longest and wisest heads in the profession is required, if an ideal solution is to be found; but the difficulty will only be increased if further delay allows ill-considered vested interests to grow up here and there.

(c) There is room for much more systematic attention to economy in hospital administration, and better team-work by the hospitals is the necessary foundation. It is easy to see why of the two ways of balancing a budget—more income or less expenditure—the hospital tradition stresses the former. Appeals, flag days and other forms of high-pressure begging are pleasurable activities in which members of the public gladly share; the dreary task of seeking and enforcing economies has no such delights, and every administrator of a public institution honestly believes that he permits no waste

and that the only way of saving is to sacrifice essential services. Did not Chancellors of the Exchequer and other Ministers, relying on the strict Treasury control of all Government expenditure, emphatically give such assurances to Parliament on the very eve of both the Geddes and the May Committees on National Expenditure? The administrator of any complex concern can detect waste only by the use of statistics, financial and other, properly designed and promptly produced. Here King Edward's Fund has given the lead, obtaining standardised accounts from every hospital in London and publishing comparisons of analysed in-patient and out-patient costs of individual hospitals, grouped according to their character and size—the object being 'to assist hospital managers to see whether at their hospital the cost appears to be high and in what class of expenditure the source of the excess is to be found; to reduce it wherever it cannot be justified, or to justify it wherever it cannot be reduced.'

In making use of such comparative costs it must never be forgotten that each hospital has what may be called its 'personal equation,' the extent to which its costs are affected by its structure, lay-out, heating system, and other factors which in domestic life make a house expensive or cheap to live in; but, making full allowance for this, the range between highest and lowest costs in apparently similar hospitals doing the same character of work in the London area is not always easy to account for. While London renders its accounts within three months, some 8 per cent. of the hospitals outside fail to do it in ten; even of the largest, many do not yet separate out-patient from in-patient expenditure, though the latter in a large hospital may be £30,000 or more in a year; and in so simple a matter as the year of account a minority go their own ways. The statistics used in this article to show the general trend of financial results are even for that purpose incomplete, and the very large number of hospitals which do not ascertain their own costs in analysed form can neither believe in the value of comparisons nor realise that without standardisation they are misleading. In other directions also, both in and outside London, hospitals do not get full value for their money, as is shown by their failure to secure more than half the market fall in food prices, or any part of the large savings, on commodities generally, obtainable by several institutions pooling

their requirements in purchasing, as the three Fighting Services have learned to do for many items. This method does not involve distribution from a common stock held at a central store; but it implies the adoption of identical patterns of furniture, utensils, etc., and specifications of consumables, so that manufacturers can produce on a large scale instead of in dribblets as at present.

Finally, has not hospital administration become a business requiring special training? A hospital manager should know something of accountancy and book-keeping, statistical methods, contract practice, markets and price levels, and, in view of the capital expenditure of some millions annually on bricks and mortar without any definite machinery for its financial control, something of the ways of architects, surveyors and builders on big jobs. There is no certainty that a beginner will acquire this essential training by entering any one of the thousand separate hospital offices. Should there not be, in connexion with the Incorporated Association of Hospital Officers, an approved body of doctrine, provision of courses of instruction in it, for juniors who have been long enough in a hospital to realise what it all means practically but not long enough to pick up devotion to rule-of-thumb, with a certificate at the end of a course successfully taken, and a system of filling vacant posts by selection from qualified men with experience in other hospital offices? On some such lines as these it should not take long to produce a progressively higher standard of efficiency.

If the voluntary principle is to hold its ground, it is necessary for its adherents to demonstrate that, in these as in national matters, the intelligent co-operation of free men can achieve better results than bureaucracy or any form of dictatorship. But neither a policy of drift, nor obstinate adherence to the ancient ways, nor interminable discussion will suffice; somewhere there must be power to decide on a line of action, and willingness to conform to it after a fair hearing of individual views. The problem of to-day for the voluntary hospitals is to create voluntarily a machinery for effective combined action before it is too late.

C. HARRIS.

EUROPE AND THE WORLD

By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

It may be thought that, with events of great political significance tumbling over one another in Europe and with the Far East ready to follow the European example, any review of the situation is doomed to be dislocated by further developments before it emerges from the printing press. In present circumstances the answer to this contention is that the most useful purpose of such a review is to guide the mind away from the more immediate situation to the more general principles on which it is based, and thereby to bring the whole European and world question into a position from which individual events can be seen in a better perspective.

The first impression of the foreign political situation at the time of writing is that of an almost indescribable political mess stretching from the Straits of Dover to the Yellow Sea, and even across the Pacific to the American continent. The European muddle has become a globular one, apparently so intricate and perplexing that there is a tendency to cynicism, and a temptation to treat the matter as a huge joke. We see in many countries the most unusual political systems controlled by the most unusual men; we hear of treaties being broken and pacts piled up one on the top of another. We read of an increase of armaments on all sides, while pacifists pass resolutions and write letters to the newspapers. Meanwhile, the most irresponsible war talk makes people think of gas-masks, and causes the more hysterical to take refuge on the steps of the League of Nations Union. But when we hear of European statesmen rushing about from capital to capital, and their movements recorded on little maps in the popular Press, we begin to wonder whether the intention is to promote civil aviation and to swell the dividends of the *Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits*. Possibly, however,

the most confusing aspect of the matter is the increasing number and complication of proposed pacts to augment or supersede the formidable array already in existence. It has even been suggested that there should be an 'inner and outer circle' of pacts. Indeed, the peace effort is becoming so involved that when the critical moment comes we may find ourselves sending troops to help the wrong country. Possibly Mr. Bateman might be able to throw some light on the absurdities of such a situation! Yet, returning to the more serious side of the matter, it is difficult to see the use of conferences and consultations in the case of a rapid outburst of hostilities, making the position quite uncontrollable long before the delegates can possibly meet. When it is realised that such delegates may quite possibly be blown, suit-case and all, into the next world before they even reach the railway station, it is not surprising that people are inclined to be sceptical of what is being done in the interests of peace.

Let us now consider the fundamental factors underlying the discord, uncertainty, and suspicion so prevalent among the nations. The primary cause of unrest is, of course, in the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, which not only gave to some and took away from others, but by placing restrictions on the latter put them in a position of inferiority, psychological as well as material. Moreover, the binding up of the League Covenant with the Treaty of Versailles has tended to make Geneva a *status quo* stronghold, and has created distrust of the League of Nations on the part of those seeking redress of grievances resulting from the Peace Treaties.

Although it is unnecessary to define afresh the attitudes of the *status quo* and revisionist Powers, it is essential to emphasise the fact that these attitudes remain for the most part unchanged in principle, in spite of bilateral non-aggression pacts and other diplomatic instruments of a temporary variety. While the former are piling up armaments to safeguard their new possessions, the latter are either seeking permission to do so owing to the aggressive policy of a neighbouring State, or have already done so to strengthen their position for regaining their losses. Hence, armaments are the result of dissatisfaction on one side and fear on the other, and no final solution can be found until the causes of

dissatisfaction have at least been much reduced. At the same time, it is sincerely hoped that means can be found of maintaining peace for the next decade, on the grounds that a temporary arrangement is a substantial step towards one of a more permanent nature, and that much may happen in ten years to ease the general situation. By this means it is possible that the way may be cleared for the careful application of remedies to the principles underlying European discontent. Meanwhile, the aggressive attitude of the greatest treaty revision Power has not only stiffened the armaments policy of all the *status quo* Powers, but has even succeeded in frightening less powerful revisionist colleagues; and, what is more, has transformed the most extensive Power in Europe from a supporter of treaty revision into an upholder of the *status quo*. We therefore have in Europe to-day a formidable array of Powers with a policy of peace based on further maintenance of the *status quo*, in some cases on principle and in others through necessity, *vis-à-vis* one Great Power determined to achieve her political aims at all costs.

In order, however, to appreciate the complexion of these principles as manifest in Europe to-day, each case must be taken separately. As a result of the conditions imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany has been subjected to a heavy burden of humiliation. Apart altogether from loss of territory and the payment of reparations, she has been placed in a position of all-round inferiority. Not only has she been deprived of her military prestige, which has been her most cherished possession since the time of Frederick the Great, but she has been deprived of many of the ordinary privileges enjoyed by other Great Powers. If nominally she has been accepted as an equal, she has never possessed in the fullest sense the position of an independent sovereign State. By this I mean that Germany has never been free to carry out a policy of her own making without considering the possible displeasure of her former enemies. For seventeen years after the close of hostilities an enterprising, industrious and high-spirited nation, straining for expansion, has been subjected to treatment calculated to build up an inferiority complex. Moreover, the military restrictions imposed upon Germany have stung national pride and have produced a feeling almost amounting to desperation. If we in this

country can imagine how we would feel if compelled by France and other Powers to confine the Royal Navy to a small fleet of light cruisers, we can have some idea of how the Germans feel about the restriction of their army and armaments.

We must also bear in mind that Germany is in every sense a military nation, which has never been a British ambition. Yet there is more behind this military question than meets the eye of the casual observer. In Germany the army is the national symbol of independent sovereignty, without which the whole German nation, individually as well as collectively, feels hopelessly inferior. The Germans feel, and rightly so, that with their army reduced to a small *Reichswehr*, their diplomatic power of negotiation is seriously impaired. In these circumstances military inferiority has a wider aspect, which makes the German attitude more intelligible. The fact is that the restrictions of inequality imposed upon Germany are not in reality confined to those mentioned in the treaties. Whether these restrictions have been justified or otherwise, the fact remains that they have given rise to determination on the part of Germany to restore her position of equality, irrespective of opposition by other Powers and of possible isolation in consequence. Germany left the League of Nations because she saw in it no hope of treaty revision; and she left the Disarmament Conference when she saw no further prospect of obtaining equality of armaments. Now she has taken the matter into her own hands as the only possible way out of her difficulty, in full knowledge that external opposition would not be supported by force. Hence, Germany refuses to return to the League of Nations except on a basis of fully recognised equality in all its aspects, and she is reconstructing her armed forces according to what she considers to be her needs. This illegal action of Germany, constituting a breach of the Treaty of Versailles, should either be retrospectively recognised as a legally granted concession, or repressed by material action. To continue regarding German rearmament beyond the treaty limits as illegal without taking any steps to repress it is merely encouraging Germany to continue the practice of taking the law into her own hands in questions such as those of Poland, Memel, and the demilitarised zone, as well as the important and

dangerous question of Austria. Furthermore, it is as well to realise that, with Germany in her present mood, aims and objects realised by unilateral action are much sweeter morsels than those grudgingly, or even ungrudgingly, conceded. This is nothing more than a perfectly natural psychological reaction, and should be calmly viewed in this light.

Having rearmed and assumed as far as possible a position of independent equality, Germany has clearly set herself to attain certain objects in her foreign policy. Among these are the restoration of Memel by Lithuania, of the 'Corridor' and Upper Silesia by Poland, and the absorption of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia within the German *Reich*. In order to achieve these objects peacefully, she has to make the best use of the European situation in her own interests, and this she can only do with her powers of diplomatic negotiation supported by armed force. If she cannot obtain what she wants, and intends to have, by peaceful means, she will resort to war as soon as she is fully prepared, provided always that she can foresee adequate prospects of success. For this second alternative armed forces are all the more necessary. Meanwhile, with Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar closed questions, Germany wants freedom of action in the east of Europe with security in the west, and therefore favours the stiffening of Locarno by an Air Convention. Here lies Germany's true reason for refusing to participate in an Eastern Pact of mutual assistance, although the non-aggression pact with Poland and reluctance to co-operate, if necessary, with Bolshevik Russia have been put forward as plausible excuses. Indeed, plausible excuses are turned out in Germany to-day almost as rapidly as armaments, one of the most far-fetched being fear of attack by Russia as a justification for rearmament. If one thing is quite certain in a situation full of uncertainties, it is that no Power has, or can have, any aim or object in attacking Germany. Yet no less than eight Powers—Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, France, Belgium, and Great Britain—are liable to German aggression in the interests of German policy. In these circumstances there are three courses open to the Powers anxious to preserve the peace of Europe. They can give Germany all she wants; they can confine her by force to her own domains by what the French are pleased to call a '*Cordon Sanitaire*'; or they can

compromise by satisfying some of her demands by negotiation on the condition that she co-operates in a system of mutual assistance against aggression. While the first course is obviously impracticable as well as undesirable, the second is a short-sighted policy which merely postpones and aggravates the inevitable reaction. The last course is therefore the only one that deserves consideration, and I shall return to this subject later.

Let us now consider the position of the other revisionist Powers—Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Russia. Austria, having probably suffered more real hardship than any other country as a result of the Peace Treaties, has had a further burden placed upon her by the German attempt to absorb her by internal political manœuvre within her own frontiers. Although the present Government in Vienna is strongly opposed to an *Anschluss* with Germany, there is no saying what the opinion of the Austrian people would be if subjected to a plebiscite now or at some future date. The fact is that the independence of Austria is more important to other countries than to the Austrians themselves; and there is no possible doubt that Germany intends sooner or later to absorb this centrally situated territory, irrespective of any undertakings applicable to the present. Here, again, the Powers interested in preserving the independence and integrity of Austria must be prepared either to accept such action on the part of Germany, or to prevent it, if necessary, by force. As things are, it is difficult to say with certainty whether France or Italy or any other Power would be ready to wage war for the preservation of Austrian independence, and a most difficult position would arise in the event of a plebiscite on the *Anschluss* question being in favour of Germany. Definite decisions on a basis of action, not of consultation, are here urgently needed to meet every eventuality.

Meanwhile, the Austrian Government seeks to increase the strength of the army for defence against a former revisionist colleague, although the Austrians have been consistently passive with regard to any revisionist claims which they hold. Hungary, on her part, fully realising the danger to her of an Austro-German *Anschluss*, is perfectly prepared temporarily to drop her revisionist claims and co-operate with her neighbours, provided that she is accorded full equality of

status, can retain her postponed claims to treaty revision by peaceful means, and is guaranteed fair treatment for Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. It has been suggested that, in view of the Franco-Italian *rapprochement* and Signor Mussolini's more recent gesture of friendship towards Yugoslavia, Hungary would tend to range herself on the side of Germany, but I am assured on good authority that this is not the case. Not only are Hungarian interests in conflict with Germany's Austrian policy, but the Hungarians know too much about horses to put their money on another loser. They prefer to follow a policy of cautious co-operation in the interests of peace, without compromising a prospect of their grievances being redressed when calmer conditions prevail.

Italian policy, always opportunist, has also temporarily abandoned treaty revision in the interests of peace, which is essential to her progress; but Italy's friendly attitude towards France and Yugoslavia, direct outcomes of Germany's attitude, do not imply that Italy has become a *status quo* Power. She is, however, prepared to co-operate in the defence of Europe's frontiers against aggression until such time as differences of principle can be remedied by treaty revision. Hence the Rome Agreements are a solid contribution to European stability, as well as solving many difficulties in Africa. Italy sees real danger in an Austro-German *Anschluss*, and considers its prevention to be a matter of primary importance. Therefore, while the question of whether the Italians are prepared to fight on this issue depends on the attitude of other Powers, it is quite clear that Italy's position demands armed forces to strengthen her diplomacy. I have always maintained that this has hitherto been the principal reason for strong Italian armaments. But perhaps the most striking development of Italian policy has been the establishment of good relations between Rome and Moscow, in spite of the great difference of internal political *régimes*, which proves that internal policies need not affect international relations. This precedent is particularly interesting in view of the new aspect of Anglo-Russian relations.

Whereas Russia was formerly a revisionist Power in the sense that she hoped to profit from the attitude of those seeking a redress of grievances, she has been compelled by Japanese policy in the Far East and German policy in the

West to abandon her previous courses of action, and to adopt a policy of safeguarding peace in friendship with those Powers favouring a further continuance of the *status quo*. Having become a member of the League of Nations, Russia now appears as a realistic promoter of peace with valuable proposals of a practical nature to put forward. The Government of Moscow does not believe that war is inevitable, but that it can only be avoided by practical and immediate methods. Regarding the Treaty of Versailles as a most unfortunate diplomatic document, the Russians favour revision, but have now reached the conclusion that this cannot be done in present circumstances without war. They further maintain that, if war were to take place, there would be no guarantee of any better result. They therefore take the view that the *status quo*, with all its shortcomings, should for the present be maintained. This is in complete harmony with British policy, and brings Russia into line with those Powers striving for peace by co-operation. But perhaps the most important value of the Russian view lies in its realistic quality. Pious peace promises, and even bilateral non-aggression pacts, are now regarded in Moscow as futile guarantees against war, the Russians rightly believing that the only safe guarantee is that of mutual assistance whereby an aggressor would be faced by a combination of overwhelming force. In the West Russia has to safeguard herself from attack as a means to the solution of Germany's eastern questions, while in the Far East she needs security from possible aggressive action on the part of Japan. Russia therefore forms a gigantic link between the European situation and that of the Far East, thereby giving rise to a similarity of interests between Germany and Japan, the latter being in many respects the eastern counterpart of the former. Hence there is a tendency for Berlin and Tokyo to come closer together, and even Warsaw has shown signs of interest. The point, however, is that Russia wishes to keep Germany and Japan in their places in the West and East respectively, which constitutes a complex of world forces which the United States cannot ignore. Indeed, it looks as if some practical guarantee of peace in the Far East will be needed to supplement such guarantees as may be set up in Europe; and such a guarantee without the United States is almost unthinkable.

We now come to the position of the *status quo* Powers—France, Poland, and the Little Entente. Poland's position between Germany and Russia places her in a most difficult position, demanding the utmost ingenuity for the preservation of her restored independence. Poland, however, cannot be regarded as a buffer State, as she is not capable of absorbing shocks, but would react immediately to pressure from either side. As her chief political difficulties rest in the questions of the 'Corridor,' Danzig and Upper Silesia, Poland knows that her principal danger lies on the German side. Indeed, not long ago fear of a German invasion of Western Poland almost led to a preventive war, which was only averted by lack of support from France. The consequence was that the Poles, realising that a peaceful arrangement with the Germans was the only alternative, signed with them a bilateral pact of non-aggression, giving them temporary relief and time to consolidate their position. But as Poland has a similar arrangement with Russia, as well as alliances with France and Roumania, her position is somewhat complex. Yet the underlying principle of preserving her possessions on a *status quo* basis remains unchanged, although there is talk of a German-Polish settlement on major questions. Poland is therefore most reluctant at present to take any security steps likely to antagonise an increasingly powerful Germany, or to become involved in any arrangement of mutual assistance in Eastern Europe containing any germs of her possible partition later on. Hence, while Poland is still in principle a *status quo* Power, she has at present a distinct German orientation. Meanwhile, the eastern danger spot has shifted from Danzig to Memel. France and the Little Entente, however, are soaked in the principle of the *status quo*, their policies being intensified by Germany's attitude on one side and Russian friendship on the other. This combination of Powers—France and Czechoslovakia in particular—is determined to safeguard itself by every possible means from German aggression. Indeed, France and Czechoslovakia may be expected to conclude an immediate mutual assistance pact with Russia, leaving the door open for German participation. In this system, backed by the strength of modern armies and the destructive power of modern aviation, lies the only practical safeguard against aggression.

It is quite unnecessary to recall the French attitude with regard to security, but it is necessary to realise that France intends to have security as much as Germany intends to have a free hand. A Franco-Russian mutual assistance pact, with or without other Powers, would be a most formidable combination, and would without Germany mean a return to the old system of the balance of power in Europe. Yet it is hoped that some way will be found of obtaining German support for a wider system of mutual assistance.

Ever since the Great War repeated attempts have been made to prevent the outbreak of a similar or worse catastrophe; but of all the agreements reached, Locarno is the only one with any practical value. While all the other pacts and agreements are completely flabby, Locarno is stiffened with the ingredient of armed force. It unfortunately has to be admitted that the surest way to peace is by applying to nations the principle that 'the bad hate to sin for fear of punishment.' The mutual assistance provided for in the League Covenant is too general, too theoretical and too vague, with next to no means of putting these provisions into practice. The Portuguese cannot be fired with enthusiasm to protect the Chinese frontiers any more than the Baltic countries can become excited over the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. Moreover, immediate action is essential under the conditions of modern war, and arrangements have to be made beforehand for every eventuality. When a crisis arises, there will be no time for the League Council to meet or for mutual assistance arrangements to be made. If peace is to be maintained, preventive measures against war must be previously arranged in detail, so that they can be given full application at the shortest notice. As things are at present, all the League of Nations can do is to pass resolutions and protest, which has already been done—to the amusement of Japan and detriment to the League.

It is not, however, in principle that the fault lies at Geneva, but in the arrangement of the League system and in the lack of means of putting it into effect. European co-operation is not yet ripe for the League system of today, which badly needs a solid foundation of armed force to enable it to function. While it may not be desirable that the League should actually rest on armed force, it is

essential in present conditions, when European patriotism is in its infancy, that armed force should form an integral part of peace safeguards acting independently, though in concert with the League organisation. Whatever pious theorists may argue to the contrary, it is only by the threat of brute force that security can be guaranteed. While the Kellogg Pact is nothing more than a demure promise of the nations, all dressed up in their Sunday clothes, not to be 'naughty boys,' bilateral non-aggression pacts are little more convincing in present circumstances. But in Locarno, an outcome of the League principle, we have a model on which to base pacts of mutual assistance, which are now the only means of preserving peace with any prospect of permanence. By setting up a series of regional pacts of this nature, the principle of the League Covenant would be applied in limited and more compact terms as a step towards future development. By this means neighbouring nations whose Governments and people know each other in terms of interests would guarantee each other's security by armed force, and the method of doing so would be a matter of intimate knowledge and interest to all concerned. The Balkan Pact has already been tested by Bulgaria's reluctance to seize the recent opportunity of settling her differences with Greece. Moreover, regional pacts of this nature appear to have the further advantage of tending to localise conflicts in the event of war. It is therefore suggested that such systems of guarantee be set up in the Danubian area, in Eastern Europe, and possibly even in the Far East. If France will guarantee an Eastern Pact of mutual assistance between Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the three Baltic States, Russia has said that she will return to guarantee Locarno. While the Western European group of countries is a solid political structure, its eastern counterpart is made of much more fragile material. It is therefore in Eastern Europe that war is most to be feared. With modern inventions as good conductors of war, hostilities breaking out in the east would rapidly spread to the west. When this is considered in view of Germany's ambitions, it is clearly on Eastern Europe that the fate of nations depends. This eastern door of European security may perhaps be shut by eastern security pacts, but the key for locking that door is in the hands of Britain.

Although at the time of writing it may be unwise to say much on the subject of British policy, there are certain points which should be emphasised. Situated as we now are in a position of good relationship with all European countries, and with no particular interest in European affairs, our rôle as mediator is of the greatest value. But, in order fully to exercise this rôle, we must be prepared to practise what we preach, and also to follow the principle adopted by others of strengthening diplomacy with adequate armed forces. Otherwise we shall fail as a great nation at a dramatic moment in our history. A weak or irresolute Britain is a danger to Europe and to the world. If British commitments are necessary to guarantee peace, we must shoulder them unflinchingly. No British Government that courageously upholds our national honour by making war in Europe impossible need have any fear of the British electorate. We can prevent war by declaring our intentions without hesitation, and by providing ourselves with the necessary means of carrying them out in case of need. Without such action on our part, we are a source of weakness and danger to others as well as to ourselves. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that Britain should ask others to shoulder burdens which she herself is unwilling to share. The pleasant conception of splendid isolation is a dangerous delusion. Not only would the pursuance of such a policy increase the probabilities of war, but would have a most damaging effect on our influence throughout the world. In any case, we cannot under modern conditions exclude ourselves from European affairs. Although we have no alliance with France, British interests and those of France are so intimately related that, in the event of aggression by Germany, we cannot afford not to support France, and France cannot afford not to support us. In the higher strategy of modern war Great Britain and France form one indivisible unit. No diplomatic instrument of agreement beyond Locarno is therefore necessary. In Eastern Europe, however, the situation is different, owing to the absence of an eastern Locarno. Although we have no direct interest in the political questions of that region, our influence is great if we care to exert it; or perhaps it is more accurate to say that our indifference to Eastern European affairs is partly responsible for Germany's attitude in that direction.

Our relations with Russia have become such that there is practically no clash of interests from the Baltic to the Far East. The old Tsarist policy regarding Constantinople and the Straits has been abandoned, Russia now wishing to maintain the integrity of Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. A similar change of policy has taken place with regard to India. Indeed, there is every reason why Russia should wish peace to be maintained during the internal development of her vast domains. Moreover, Russia has no need for external markets in India, has no investments whatever abroad, and has abundance of raw materials. But perhaps the most important peace factor in this direction is the absence of any pressure of population, the density of the population of Russia being twenty-five per square mile. In the Far East Russian interests are to maintain peace, to preserve the integrity of China with a policy of the open door, and to prevent Japan from becoming too powerful and aggressive. In all these areas the interests of Great Britain and Russia are at present almost identical, and there is no reason why they should not remain so, provided that the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs is strictly maintained.

We are faced with two alternatives—an agreed system of mutual assistance against an aggressor involving the use of armed force but with limitation of armaments, or defensive alliances drifting back to a balance of power in Europe. The fact that one or even two Powers may at present refuse to participate in a system of mutual assistance does not prevent the other Powers from making their own mutual arrangements, always leaving the door open for late comers. To say that the ultimate decision rests with Germany is to attempt to shift the responsibility from our own shoulders. The final word rests with Britain, and Europe is waiting to see what Britain is going to do. Let us make the best of our opportunity, and let us do it with wisdom and courage. The time for conferences and consultations is past. Definite action is now demanded, if peace is to be maintained in Europe and the world in general.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

BRITAIN AND ARABIA

By H. ST. J. B. PHILBY, C.I.E., I.C.S. (RETD.)

ON May 20, 1927, the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and H.R.H. the Amir Faisal, Viceroy of the Hijaz, signed the Treaty of Jidda which was to come into force and remain operative for seven years from the date of its formal ratification on September 17. Subject to six months' notice on either side, the treaty would have expired on September 17, 1934. No such notice was, however, given, and the treaty remains in force. Britain and 'the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia' remain, therefore, in treaty relations as since the conclusion of the Treaty of 'Uqair on December 26, 1915. This treaty link between the two States is the symbol of a basic mutual friendliness, equally necessary to the welfare of the one party and the far-flung interests of the other, maintained unbroken in an exacting and chaotic period of world history. The cordiality of Anglo-Arab relations has, indeed, been an oasis of peace in the diplomatic wilderness of the modern world. For this result credit is due, first, to the Arab King himself, who has ever envisaged the friendship of Great Britain as a cardinal factor of his political outlook, and, secondly, to Sir Andrew Ryan, who came to Arabia in 1930 as the first accredited British Minister to the Wahhabi State and will very shortly be completing the normal tenure of such posts, though that need not necessarily mean the end of his services to the cause of Anglo-Arabian understanding. The post of Minister in Arabia is in many respects unique. An exacting climate, though compensated for by long annual periods of absence from the scene, is one, but only one, of the problems to be considered. The strangeness of Arabian diplomatic ways is by no means the least of them, and it needs a man of nimble mind and more than equable temper to deal with a Foreign Office which, peripatetic at the best of times, has always at

its disposal the safe refuge of a forbidden city and of still more forbidding deserts as a ready counterpoise to diplomatic pressure. Such matters are, however, merely incidental. The main point lies in the danger of changing horses in mid-stream, and it is almost unthinkable that there should be any change in the diplomatic representation of Great Britain at Jidda until a new treaty has been negotiated to replace one which is now liable to termination at six months' notice. Sir Andrew Ryan's successor, when appointed, must have a solid foundation to work on, well and truly laid by Sir Andrew Ryan himself.

The resumption of negotiations from the point where the late Sir Gilbert Clayton left them so successfully seven years ago is, perhaps, not in itself a matter of imperative urgency. So long as the present personnel on both sides remain in the saddle, they will ride forward with all the sense of companionship and compromise which they have developed during the past five years. But time is inexorable, and British friends of Arabia cannot look forward without apprehension to the indefinite postponement of a settlement that should place the relations of the two countries on a satisfactory basis for at least another seven years. If, therefore, Sir Andrew Ryan needs a rest from his labours or his country needs him for other work, his task of the next few months is clear; and there is good ground for supposing that he has returned to Jidda fully prepared to undertake it.

In many respects the political situation at the present moment has points of similarity to that which gave birth to the Treaty of Jidda seven years ago. At that time Ibn Sa'ud, following up the breakdown of the bungled Kuwait Conference in the spring of 1924, had flung his army into a general offensive against the Sharifian front, and, to the general astonishment, had annexed the Hijaz by the end of 1925 and caused himself to be proclaimed as king therein a few months later. Since those days he has shown that the then almost universal fear of a reactionary régime in Arabia was founded on ignorance. He has established peace and security where those luxuries had never been known before, and, in spite of the serious blow dealt to the country's financial resources by the still prevalent economic depression, he has not only maintained peace, but has never lost sight of the

urgent need for financial equilibrium and administrative reform. Nevertheless, he had, strangely enough, failed to secure widespread recognition of his unique pre-eminence in the Arab world, and he was called upon in the spring of last year to demonstrate to a bewildered world that the supposedly powerful State of the Yaman was but as a field of ripened corn before the scythe of 'Wahhab's rebel horde.' It is true that he then preferred a treaty of friendship to the consummation of his victory, but so practical a demonstration of the probable outcome of any further trial of strength between the only two really independent States of Arabia will doubtless not be lost sight of by the British Government in coming negotiations.

That the recent Yaman campaign has enormously enhanced the prestige of Ibn Sa'ud and the respect in which he is held by the Powers interested in Arabia admits of no denial. It is equally manifest that the shape and form of the 1927 treaty—itsself a compromise between the 1915 text and the full-blooded nationalism of Arabia—no longer fit the basic facts of the present situation of the country. What is required, therefore, is a fresh review of the existing position. Such a review cannot be complete or satisfactory to the national consciousness of modern Arabia without frank discussion and serious consideration both of the reservations in the Treaty of Jidda and of certain later developments which have affected, or may affect, the interests of the two contracting parties. Among such developments subsequent to the 1927 treaty may be mentioned, first, the recent activities of the Wahhabi Government in the direction of developing potential oil resources in the Hasa province, and, secondly, the diversion of the British air route to India—owing to difficulties raised by the Persian Government—to the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. Such a matter as the imminent creation by the Wahhabi authorities of an effective harbour at Ras Tanura, both for the ultimate handling of any oil that may be won from their territories and for the avoidance of the needless expense involved by the present unsatisfactory arrangement under which goods in transit for Arabia have to pay an extra duty at Bahrain, will also inevitably come under review. And, lastly, the establishment of direct motor routes for pilgrims and others from the Iraq and the

Persian Gulf to the holy cities of the Hijaz will necessitate the friendly co-operation of Great Britain with Arabia to ensure the welfare of pilgrims who, under present conditions, have to travel, say, from Basra to Mecca *via* Syria and Egypt or by way of India. Arabia has, indeed, changed very greatly since 1927, for the carriage of pilgrims by motor car had only been tentatively tried in 1926.

As for the reservations of the Treaty of Jidda, the most important arises out of the fact that it left the northern frontier of the Hijaz (the holy province of Islam) in suspended dispute between the contracting parties. The matter, indeed, cries for final settlement to remove a possible source of friction from the furthest extremity of a long frontier line, beginning in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, where treaties with Iraq and Transjordan have converted a hotbed of mutual raiding into an accepted dividing line between the administrations on either side. Another question is that of the Hijaz Railway—the 'holy Hijaz Railway'—constituting an open sore, with the one side clinging tenaciously to ill-gotten possessions, scarcely now to be relinquished without disastrous consequences, while the other refuses to abandon a now empty claim. These two questions could certainly be resolved by statesmanship on both sides; but such statesmanship will have to face, boldly and bravely, the immense task of a general survey of Anglo-Arab interests and contacts from one end to the other of the desert peninsula. The third point left indeterminate in 1927 is a very minor one, but liable to be interpreted, according to the point of view, as an attack on the very foundations of civilisation itself or as an unwarranted aggression against the independence of Arabia. The issue of slavery in Arabia is a very minor one, and heaven and earth would not be shaken from their foundations if the British Government should decide to renounce the privilege, usurped without any sanction other than that of superior might, of manumitting and repatriating runaway slaves taking sanctuary in the Legation at Jidda. Article 7 of the Treaty of Jidda is little more than a little harmless balm for sentimental consciences, and the time has come for a formal or tacit acknowledgment that the exercise of the right of manumission is no longer necessary. With rare exceptions the domestic slavery of Arabia is not what it is

imagined to be by those who write and talk about it most frequently; and its formal abolition is as little likely to materialise as the legalisation or toleration of prostitution.

This brief summary of various matters likely to come under consideration in connexion with the negotiation of a new treaty may give the reader an idea of the manifold points of contact between Great Britain and Wahhabi Arabia. There are, indeed, other questions, not less important, which will have to be rediscussed and disposed of before a really comprehensive treaty can be drafted. These questions are, however, of a less palpable nature than those already discussed, and arise generally out of what may be regarded as a clash between British Imperial interests and the claims of Arab nationalism, as distinct from the specific interests of the Wahhabi State, which has nevertheless, in virtue of its hegemony of the Arabian peninsula, a responsibility towards Arab public opinion which it cannot lightly jettison for any material gain of the moment. And Ibn Sa'ud, for all his acute sense of political realism, is the last person to relinquish at this stage of his career the task to which he devoted himself some five and thirty years ago, when a youthful indiscretion placed him unexpectedly on a throne.

No one more frankly than the desert King recognises the great historical rôle played by Great Britain in converting the Pirate Coast of a century ago into the peaceful Trucial Coast of modern times, when such extravagances as piracy, gun-running, slave-smuggling and the like are practically unknown. And Great Britain herself will not be slow to admit the vast improvement effected by the Wahhabi monarch in the establishment of security throughout the immense hinterland of the Gulf littoral, extending now to the Red Sea westward to the southern shore of the great sand-ocean of the Rub' al Khali, and northward to the borders of Bashan and Gilead, Moab and Edom. In former times, indeed, it was Wahhabi influence on the Pirate Coast that forced on Great Britain the rôle of policeman in the Persian Gulf; but the new Wahhabism is a vehicle of peace and goodwill, while the new imperialism of Great Britain at least professes respect for national independence wherever it can be recognised without obvious danger to the ideals of humanity and civilisation. The great Dependency of India is already at the

threshold of a new era, and Egypt is almost within sight of the millennium. Iraq has been freed of her shackles and Persia has peacefully secured practical recognition of her independence. Is it, then, too much to expect of Great Britain that she should leave Arabia to her immemorial freedom?

The matter is, indeed, not without complications, mainly of very recent growth; but those who have closely followed Arabian affairs since the early days of the Great War scarcely need to be reminded of the great, though perhaps informal, charter of independence drafted by Great Britain herself in 1915 and enshrined in the famous Macmahon correspondence with the late King Husain of the Hijaz. Arabia under that charter was, within certain specified limits, to be independent. The arrangement postulated, of course, the existence of a leader capable of ensuring the peace and prosperity of the whole area in question; and it was not altogether the fault of Great Britain that, having envisaged Husain in that rôle, she found to her disappointment that he was not the man for the part. Another, greater than he, rose up among the Arabs to displace him. Meantime, to be sure, there has been controversy enough and complications, resulting, at length, in the exclusion of a very large part of the area envisaged in the original charter from the sphere of its operation. All the north has gone west—Iraq and Syria, with Palestine and Transjordan. What of that? It would, indeed, demand irredentism of a very extreme character to claim now the undoing of that huge tangle of arrangements which have committed all northern Arabia to some sort of imperialistic control or supervision. But what of the rest, the desert peninsula itself, even to the coasts of its various fringes?

Fortunately perhaps, the segregation of the northern provinces has been sanctified by the formulation of treaty boundaries extending from Kuwait in the east to some point (still under dispute) near 'Aqaba. The Wahhabi King does not, and will not, demand any ratification of that line. Perhaps the fact of British responsibility beyond that line, however disguised, makes for the stability which Wahhabi Arabia needs for its own development. But south of that line there are no boundaries, if we except the Anglo-Turkish frontier of 1905 between the Aden Protectorate and the Yaman, and

the more recently agreed but still undemarcated boundary between the Yaman and Wahhabi Arabia. Nevertheless, the British Government is in treaty relations with the various principalities from Kuwait to Maskat, and also with the ruler of Shihr and Makalla on the southern coast, although the inner (land) frontiers of such units have never been defined. And finally, as it would seem, the collapse of the Yaman during the recent war with the Wahhabis has encouraged the British Government to a more sympathetic interest in the future of that interesting country than was possible when, only a few years ago, its friendly greetings were generally dropped on the frontier villages by the Royal Air Force.

There is a definite danger to be avoided in this otherwise harmless recrudescence of British interest in the Arabian borderlands—a temptation better resisted than yielded to. But the facts must be faced if the present harmonious relations between Great Britain and the largest and most powerful political unit of all Arabia are to be perpetuated on a firm foundation in the new treaty. The anxiety of the British authorities to secure a safe and permanent air route for their Imperial communications is intelligible enough, and there is no reason to suppose that such a route could not be secured by friendly negotiations with Ibn Sa'ud, whose goodwill would seem inevitably to be an essential condition of complete safety. The building of forts on a desert coast—as has already been done at Sharja, for instance—is a procedure not to be recommended, and there is still perhaps time to adopt a policy less provocative of misunderstanding. But the attitude of the British Government towards the development of the potential economic resources of the Arabian littoral (and its hinterland), notably in the matter of oil, raises questions of a totally different order and suggests imperialistic yearnings. In a series of recent agreements negotiated with the various independent States of the Gulf coast the British Government has insisted upon the insertion of a clause debarring the States concerned from granting any oil concession in their territory to any person or body not previously approved of by the British authorities. Such a clause constitutes a serious limitation of the independence of the littoral States and, as such, is repugnant to Arab sentiment. But, more than that,

it suggests a tacit reproach to the Wahhabi Government itself, which only last year, after prolonged negotiations with numerous competitors, including at least two British concerns, adjudicated the Hasa oil concession to the Standard Oil Company of California for the sole reason that it offered the best terms. Not the least intriguing part of the story is that the same Standard Oil Company of California is operating with success a similar concession in the British-controlled islands of Bahrain, the concession having been originally granted to a British company which, failing to interest the various British oil companies, disposed of it to the Gulf Company, which, being technically debarred from operating it by reason of its participation in the Iraq Petroleum Company, transferred it in turn to the California. In those days nobody believed that there was oil in Bahrain. Great Britain is liable to create a false impression in the world if she claims economic preference in areas whose independence she proclaims from the housetops.

One result of the insertion of such clauses in her agreements with the various littoral States is to raise in a disagreeable form the question of their land frontiers—a question that can only be decided by negotiations with the Government of Sa'udi Arabia, whose view of its own frontiers is likely to run counter to British conceptions of a suitable boundary. The Standard Oil Company of California is also directly interested in this issue in virtue of the fact that the whole of Sa'udi Arabia eastward of a line drawn along the eastern fringe of the Dahna sand-belt is included in the area of its concession. The neutral area separating the territory of the principality of Kuwait from Sa'udi Arabia may give rise to some difficulty in view of the possibility of its turning out to be an oil-producing tract, but it should not be difficult to devise a scheme for the partition of this 'no-man's land' between the two States or to arrange for joint operation of its oil resources. The arrangement may give rise to difficulties, but the legal position in the region is too clear to justify serious controversy. A large area of Sa'udi Arabian territory extends from the neutral zone along the Gulf coast to the little principality of Qatar, which seems likely to provide a problem of some delicacy. Its boundary in the direction of Sa'udi Arabia has never been defined, nor has there hitherto

been any need of its definition. But the oil business has now introduced a complication, and a reasonable case can be made out for either of two contending interpretations of the territorial position. The obvious solution is surely that both parties—Great Britain and Sa'udi Arabia—should recognise the effective independence of the Shaikh of Qatar and, if necessary, jointly guarantee both his independence and his neutrality. On that basis the definition of his land frontier would occasion no difficulty; and Ibn Sa'ud is on such terms of cordial friendship with his neighbour that he would readily co-operate in such an arrangement. But the independence of Qatar must be real.

Proceeding along the Wahhabi coast—with a very minor complication arising out of the inlet of Khaur al Wudaïd, at the base of the Qatar promontory—we come to the Trucial chiefs, with whom the British Government has long been in treaty relations which nobody wants to disturb. The land boundaries of such little principalities as Abu Dhabi, Dabai, and Sharja should not occasion controversy. These States owe their existence to piracy and pearls. They have no interests whatever in the great desert hinterland behind them, where roams the populous tribe of Manasir, acknowledging the writ of Ibn Sa'ud even to Buraimi eastward, an inland town of purely Wahhabi complexion on the Oman border, which, incidentally, not many years ago refused admission to Mr. Bertram Thomas when he was touring in the neighbourhood as Prime Minister of the Sultanate of Maskat. The allegiance of the Manasir tribe is the determining factor in this area, and there can be no question but that the Wahhabi King, through his redoubtable lieutenant, 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi of the Hasa, exercises exclusive control in the hinterland of the Trucial Coast. If, then, it is considered necessary to define the land limits of the various Trucial States, the problem should present no insuperable difficulties. It may nevertheless be suggested that Great Britain and Sa'udi Arabia should agree jointly to guarantee the effective independence and neutrality of each of the Trucial States, whose boundaries might well be defined as extending from the coast to the usual three-mile limit at sea and, on that same analogy, to a similar three-mile limit from the coast inland. There remain the Sultanate of Maskat, with the mountain pro-

vince of Oman, and the Hadhramaut, both technically independent States, though each is subject to some measure of British control pending its emergence into the full dawn of independence. In any case, Ibn Sa'ud has little interest in these tracts, and it would not be difficult to devise satisfactory inner frontiers for them on a basis of tribal affinities and allegiances. The territory of the Manasir and Murra tribes, for instance, would fall naturally into Sa'udi Arabia; that of the 'Awamir and Duru' equally inevitably into Oman; and that of Karb and Sa'ar into the Hadhramaut confederacy.

These suggestions are offered in the light of actual present-day and traditional considerations. Such matters as future British Imperial, strategic, and economic requirements are excluded as unacceptable criteria to Arabs. On the other hand, they are based on the fact that Ibn Sa'ud, while he has a general responsibility to discharge towards Arab opinion, has no specific territorial ambitions in relation to any of the above States. He is content that they should be effectively independent, and it remains for Great Britain to display a corresponding altruism if, as her true interests unquestionably demand, Arabia is to settle down in the future as a land of peace, proud of her own independence and devoid of ambitions involving the political and territorial integrity of her neighbours.

The stage is thus set for the opening of negotiations for a new treaty between Arabia and Great Britain. The country which is on the point of launching a new Constitution for its great Indian Dependency has no reason to regret the scheme for an Arabian settlement devised by its own experts twenty years ago. Sir Andrew Ryan must by now have the instructions of His Majesty's Government, while the Amir Faisal and his deputy at the Arabian Foreign Office, Fuad Hamza, who spent a good part of the past summer in London, foregathered with the King and his other advisers at Riyadh to receive their instructions for the conduct of the negotiations. Everyone will join heartily in wishing the parties a successful and satisfying issue to their parleying; and it only remains, by way of conclusion, to refer to one matter which might be left unmentioned but for the possibility that it may prove a stumbling-block in the negotiations.

Those conversant with the recent history of Arabia will

not need to be reminded that Ibn Sa'ud in April 1913 captured the province of Hasa from the Turks, and thus put an end to Turkish rule in Arabia outside the limits of the provinces of Hijaz and Yaman. Nevertheless, certain negotiations took place in London at various times during that and the following years between the British Foreign Office and the Turkish Embassy, in consequence of which the negotiating parties, ignoring the *de facto* position in Arabia, agreed upon certain boundary lines purporting to demarcate a so-called zone of British influence or protection from the rest of Arabia. The details of those essays in frontier-making may be studied by the curious in the texts of the resultant treaties, one of which was, incidentally, never ratified, and obviously ceased to be open to ratification with the outbreak of war between the High Contracting Parties. But that pre-war indiscretion on the part of the British Government, which knew perfectly well at the time that Turkey neither had the right to sign away any part of Arabia dealt with in these treaties nor was at the material time in a position to implement the terms thereof, is better consigned to oblivion. And, fortunately, there is an excellent precedent for ignoring those treaties in the fact that the British Government, when negotiating with Ibn Sa'ud the frontier between Kuwait and Najd in 1922, found itself forced to admit that the line laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of July 1913 could not be regarded as having any validity. The precedent thus set by the Kuwait-Najd frontier negotiations will without doubt be followed in discussing other boundary problems of Arabia. But it is necessary to place on record that the frontier envisaged in the Conventions of 1913 and 1914 was fantastic. It would be interesting to know whether the War Office was ever invited to consider practical ways and means of garrisoning the Empty Quarter! And it would be terrible, if it were necessary, to contemplate the widespread chaos that would ensue upon any insistence on such a boundary.

H. ST. J. B. PHILBY.

THE BALTIC PACT, VILNA AND MEMEL

By ROBERT MACHRAY

AMONG the important political events of 1934 must be numbered the treaty (popularly styled the Baltic Pact) signed at Geneva on September 12 by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the outset of their history Estonia and Latvia, faced with determined opposition from Bolsheviks and Germans, aimed at the formation of a consolidating league or union. In August 1920 the late M. Meierovics, the first Foreign Minister and, later, Premier of Latvia, proposed that the three States should form a close *entente*. Lithuania was, however, then involved with the Russians in their war against Poland, and no decision was reached; the occupation of Vilna by the Poles in October of that year entirely changed the situation. Lithuania sought the support of Estonia and Latvia against Poland, but they could not see eye to eye with her on this question and declined to adopt her point of view. Even before the Vilna controversy plans or schemes for a larger and much more inclusive Baltic League had been mooted. In 1922 a pact, signed at Warsaw and covering Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Poland, came to nothing, because Finland, doubting the stability of Poland, withheld ratification. Meierovics took an active part in that conference and, anticipating perhaps the defection of Finland, concluded, while still at Warsaw, a 'political accord' between his own country and Estonia which, in 1923, developed into a defensive alliance, with a pooling of their military resources.

Estonia and Latvia were at first constantly preoccupied with Soviet Russia. They were afraid of her, for, though the Soviet Government had made treaties of peace with them in 1920, it secretly fomented internal insurrectionary movements. Not having a common frontier with Russia, Lithuania was in a different position. Her preoccupation was Poland, not only

because of Vilna, but also from the fear that the Poles would attack her. She still tried to bring Estonia and Latvia over to her side, but the Vilna controversy remained an unsurmountable obstacle. Lithuania, moreover, based her anti-Polish policy first on Soviet Russia, who remained as unfriendly to the two other States as before, and secondly on Germany, whom these States tolerated rather than liked. The occupation of Memel in 1923 by Lithuania, though resented by Germany, made at first little difference.

Two sets of events in 1932-33 produced a momentous change in the general situation of Eastern and Central Europe. One was that Soviet Russia, under the pressure from Japan in the Far East, concluded as fast as she could non-aggression pacts with her western neighbours. One consequence of these pacts was that Estonia and Latvia no longer went in fear of Russia; another was that Lithuania was henceforward unable to reckon on Russian support against Poland, since Poland was included in the series of non-aggression pacts. Deprived of the Russian prop to her policy, Lithuania had nothing to put in its place, and Germany was now pronouncing against her.

All three Baltic States were deeply concerned in the second set of events—the Nazi revolution in Germany. In spite of the fact that it was administered by Russia in the Tsarist days, the tract of territory which now constitutes Estonia and Latvia was in reality ruled by a local German aristocracy, the ‘Baltic barons,’ and many of its other inhabitants were of German descent. Viewed as a whole, its culture was undoubtedly German, not Russian. Soon after Estonia and Latvia came into existence they legislated the barons out of their large estates, which were divided up and handed over to the landless native peasantry. Most of the aristocrats withdrew to Germany, where they soon began an agitation for the recovery of their lands. But Germany was not then in a position to do more than pursue a policy of economic and cultural penetration, which was made easy by her great industries and the widespread use of her language in the two States. Towards the end of that period Lithuania had become embroiled with Germany over Memel and Memelland, most of whose people are German or Germanised, though many of the latter are of Lithuanian descent, while Memel itself is as

German a city as Danzig. The territory had been given a Diet; it was predominantly German and there were constant disputes between it and the governor, an appointee of the Lithuanian Government. The dependence of Lithuania on Germany *vis-à-vis* Poland no longer existed, and she was left in the same position as Estonia and Latvia respecting the *Reich*. She thus was completely isolated.

In 1932 fear of Germany had replaced fear of Soviet Russia, alike in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It increased in 1933, when it became clear that the Third *Reich* aimed at the possession of the whole of the Eastern Baltic up to the Gulf of Finland. If Hitler himself was silent, the utterances of Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, who was by birth a Balt, and of other Nazi leaders left no doubt as to what was in view. The official Nazi calendar for 1934 carried a page that clearly indicated this policy. Two illustrations of Baltic scenes with German troops in action gave point to the legend ‘*Deutsche Wacht im Balticum*.’ Below the pictures was a scroll on which were inscribed in German some sentences to the following effect:

The Baltic has an almost entirely German population; in 1915 the victorious German troops were greeted with joy; the Russian Bolsheviks set up a terrible reign of blood; in 1918-19 German volunteer regiments conquered the country; in 1920 the Peace Treaty of Versailles set up a foreign Government over its people.

Under the scroll came the words in large capitals, ‘*Das Balticum wird wieder deutsch werden*’—the Baltic will again be German!

While the meaning is plain, the statements are far from true. It is not the fact that the Baltic has an almost entirely German population, or that the victorious German troops were greeted with joy in 1915. The Russian Bolsheviks did a great deal of mischief in 1918, but German volunteer regiments did not conquer the country in 1918-19. Nor is it true that the Treaty of Versailles set up a foreign Government in the Baltic. There was never a more complete travesty of history. In 1920 the status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as independent, sovereign entities was established by treaties signed with Soviet Russia, and had nothing whatever to do with the Treaty of Versailles. But men like Rosenberg are not content with mere statements affecting opinion in Ger-

many and her neighbours, for they have fed with funds, as well as campaign literature, various movements for the subversion of the three Baltic States by revolution from within.

Early in 1934 the signature by Germany and Poland of a ten-year non-aggression pact caused indignation in France and general surprise. Baltic statesmen were already perturbed by Nazi activities in Latvia and Lithuania; trouble was looming ahead in Estonia. They concluded that Poland had effected a reinsurance treaty with Germany on top of her pact with Soviet Russia, and that the interests of the three States would best be served by a closer political and economic union. On February 17, 1934, an agreement was drafted which, while enlarging the alliance between Estonia and Latvia, contained a clause leaving the way open for the admission of Lithuania. It soon transpired that Lithuania, dreading the isolation in which the course of events had placed her, wanted to establish normal relations with Poland—for years there had been no diplomatic or other intercourse between them—and had actually taken the initiative in suggesting the clause in the new agreement. As both Estonia and Latvia persisted in disinteresting themselves in the Vilna controversy, this could only mean the shelving, if not the solving, of the quarrel. These two States certainly took it in that sense; they rejoiced to think that this dispute was to be got out of the way, and that the three could now combine. Other negotiations that concerned them nearly were on foot elsewhere and caused some delay, which, however, came to an end when Hitler in April refused to agree to a proposal made by the Bolsheviks that Germany and Russia should enter into a pact guaranteeing the independence and territorial inviolability of the three States.

That Germany had now become the sole preoccupation of Lithuania no less than of Estonia and Latvia was made still clearer when, a few days after Hitler's decision was announced, Lithuania submitted a memorandum on the need for all three States to join at once in preserving their independence by adopting a common foreign policy. Both Estonia and Latvia were sympathetic; Estonia shortly before had crushed a threatened Fascist *coup d'état* which she believed had been promoted by Nazis, and Latvia was taking drastic action against subversive elements. But they thought that the

memorandum required careful study before acceptance. They wanted their position respecting Vilna to be perfectly clear in any event, as M. Julius Seljamaa, the Estonian Foreign Minister, assured the Polish Government when he visited Warsaw in May.

Lithuania was disappointed by the delay, and her anxieties were not lessened when on May 3 the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact was renewed for ten years. One of the provisions of that treaty expressed the *désintéressement* of the Soviet Government in the matter of Vilna. The isolation of Lithuania was emphasised anew, particularly as she was being subjected to heavy pressure from Germany at the same time. In February the Lithuanian Government had arrested more than a hundred Memellanders (Germans) for high treason; they had been kept in prison without being brought to trial, and Berlin protested vigorously, though it was common knowledge that German secret societies were hard at work in Memelland and even in Lithuania proper, with Tilsit, in East Prussia, just across the frontier, as the centre from which they drew support. German propaganda asserted that the city of Memel was a 'Free City' State, like Danzig—which it certainly was not.

During May 1934 there was an unexpected development in Latvia which deferred still further the consideration of the Lithuanian memorandum. During the night of May 15-16 M. K. Ulmanis, the Prime Minister, suddenly proclaimed a 'state of emergency' and, backed by the army, seized the supreme power, on the plea that good government of the country was impossible owing to the ineffectiveness of the Seyma, or Parliament, as a result of the factiousness of the too numerous parties and groups of which it was composed. Probably the foremost patriot in the Baltic since the death of Meierovics, Ulmanis had been Prime Minister of Latvia several times before, and wielded great personal influence. The revolution, which made him dictator, was bloodless, though there were many arrests, mostly of Socialists, including the Speaker of the Seyma. For fifteen years Ulmanis had been a keen advocate of the political union of the three States, but his attention was now wholly concentrated on preserving order in Latvia.

Three weeks later Lithuania herself was in the throes of

an attempted *Putsch*, led by the formerly redoubtable Professor Voldemaras, twice Prime Minister of the State. The vigorous action of President Antanas Smetona quelled the revolt, and confirmed him in the dictatorship of the country that he has held since 1931, with the aid of the Prime Minister, M. J. Tubelis, his brother-in-law. Though pro-German and anti-Polish elements were associated with the *Putsch*, its main object was the overthrow of the Smetona-Tubelis combination. This affair, too, led to further delay in the negotiations for the union of the three States. What, in addition, suggested pause was the publication of the 'Eastern Pact' proposal, initiated by M. Litvinoff, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, and supported by M. Barthou, then French Foreign Minister, for a treaty of mutual assistance to cover these States in an *ensemble* including Germany, Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the backing of France. The pact was described as constituting an Eastern Locarno, and it was welcomed by the Baltic countries, but coldly received by Poland and Germany: their opposition to it crystallised later.

It was precisely at this stage (in mid-June of last year) that Colonel Prystor, a former Prime Minister of Poland, arrived at Kaunas (Kovno), the capital of Lithuania, on a special mission from Marshal Pilsudski. An old legionary, Prystor was one of the marshal's most intimate and trusted friends, and it was no secret that Pilsudski, himself of Lithuanian stock, and willing to end the feud with Lithuania, had sent him to sound the Lithuanian Government on the prospects of a settlement. It is true that Prystor went informally to Kaunas, for nothing else was possible in the circumstances, but it was well understood that some compensation was to be offered to Lithuania for the cessation of the Vilna conflict. Prystor spent some days in Lithuania, and returned home with good hopes of an accommodation, if not of a definitive settlement, between the Poles and the Lithuanians.

During July the opposition of Poland to the Eastern Pact hardened; her Press was almost unanimous in its hostility, and this brought the French Press into the field. The Polish-German Pact, Poland's non-acceptance of the Four-Power Pact, and other matters regarding which Poland had taken a different line from France were adduced as demonstrating

that Poland, though by treaty the ally of France and the recipient of French favours in the past, was now to be considered a very dubious friend. M. Barthou used strong words; it was alleged that he issued an ultimatum, but that was not the case, and Poland was not lost altogether to France. At the Quai d'Orsay it was thought that some pressure on Poland might be effective, especially if applied in a quarter about which the Poles were peculiarly sensitive.

M. Pfeiffer, a well-known French journalist and a distinguished member of M. Herriot's party in politics, now appeared in Kaunas, not as a journalist, but with a diplomatic passport, as representing the French Government. He found that Prystor had made a decided impression. Lithuania, anxious to escape from her isolation, was turning to Poland, her old-time ally, who was easing the path for her by certain concessions, the upshot being that the controversy over Vilna would have to be closed, or at least hung up indefinitely. That controversy had been the chief stock-in-trade of Lithuania's politicians for years, and they were loth to abandon it. They told Pfeiffer that they could not help themselves—it was a sheer, indubitable instance of *dernier ressort*. 'But not at all,' said Pfeiffer; 'there is France! She will stand by you against Poland, and take the place of Germany, on whom you used to lean.' From that moment the negotiations with Poland were broken off, and when they knew the reason the Poles were furious, not so much with Lithuania as with France, whom they accused of betraying their interests in a cardinal point of their policy. Their resentment was intense and by no means inarticulate. Instead of reacting favourably, as had been expected in Paris, to this pressure, they became more and more anti-French in their outlook. Whatever chance there had been of Poland's acceptance of the Eastern Pact because of France disappeared. The French Press thereupon proceeded to denounce Poland as the 'veritable ally of Germany,' and rumours were once more spread abroad that these two States had entered into an agreement for the partition of Lithuania and the seizure and occupation of the Russian Ukraine, but nothing was said in the French papers of the intervention of M. Pfeiffer.

It was in reply to this campaign of vilification, and not

out of any hostility to the Baltic Pact, as was stated in some British journals, that Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, visited Estonia and Latvia during the latter half of July. He was well received in both Tallinn and Riga; in neither capital was there the slightest notion or suspicion that Poland had become the ally of Germany, or he would not have been welcomed as he undoubtedly was. For obvious reasons he did not go to Kaunas. Estonia and Latvia had assured him that in no case would they sign a pact with Lithuania except with the categorical declaration that Vilna was no concern of theirs, but they told him that, with Vilna barred, they would join Lithuania. And so they told Lithuania, while intimating their regret at the breakdown of the negotiations with Poland. They added that they disinterested themselves likewise respecting the Memel controversy with Germany, which was then at a very acute stage.

Germany still remained their common preoccupation, and, as Lithuania agreed to the reservations concerning Vilna and Memel, it was enough. Accordingly representatives of the three States met at Riga during August and initialled an agreement which, without change, was signed at Geneva in September, a copy being filed with the League of Nations, though no claim was made that the pact had been negotiated within the 'framework of the League.' The League, *qua* League, had never come into the matter at all; it merely recorded the agreement. The new treaty, ratified a few weeks later, replaced the February treaty already mentioned in this article, and its character was clear from its first clauses, which stated that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed to 'collaborate' in their foreign policy by means of semi-annual or more frequent conferences of their respective Foreign Ministers. A third clause excepted certain 'difficult' but unspecified problems from this collaboration, the reference being, of course, to the Vilna and Memel controversies. The Vilna question is not active, but the Memel question is, and it is possible that Estonia and Latvia will find it far from easy to disinterest themselves completely about it.

Shortly after the Baltic Pact was concluded at Geneva a conference at Riga of the Foreign Ministers of the three States ratified it. While it is evident that the Baltic statesmen had the example of the Little Entente before their eyes, the

Baltic Pact does not bind its members as does the Little Entente Pact, which is backed by secret military conventions. The Baltic Pact has nothing of the sort behind it, and can scarcely be described as constituting a defensive alliance. The defensive alliance of Estonia and Latvia still subsists, but Lithuania remains outside. The main objects which the pact will secure are the mutual acquisition and transmission of information of importance on hostile propaganda and intrigue, and its mutual discussion with a view to joint action. A conference of the three Foreign Ministers was held at Tallinn on November 30-December 1, and some steps were taken towards the 'consolidation of their internal political order.' No doubt they had before them reports of whatever underground activities were disturbing the peace of the three States.

As may be expected, the attitude of Germany to the Baltic Pact, which has its genesis so obviously in fears of Nazi aims, is not friendly. Her Press makes few allusions to it, and scarcely a paragraph has appeared about the conferences that have been held in Riga or Tallinn. On the other hand, much has been said of Memel and Memelland. Towards the end of October the German Government appealed to the guaranteeing Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan are the guarantors of the statute constituting the territory autonomous) against certain measures taken by the Lithuanian governor which were declared to be *ultra vires*. Similar appeals had been made before without effect, but Lithuania now expressed her readiness to have the whole subject brought before the League of Nations; because she had left Geneva, Germany discountenanced this suggestion, which she said would never have been made if she had not withdrawn from the League. But what made German comment particularly bitter was the fact that the trial of the Memellanders who had been thrown into prison in February on a charge of high treason had not yet begun. It was believed throughout Germany that many of these men had been starved and tortured into giving false evidence. The trial started in December; the decision of the court was announced on the 26th of last March. Of the 126 persons accused, ninety-five were convicted and sentenced—four to death for murdering a fellow-Memellander whom they suspected of betraying them

to the Lithuanian Government as plotting to seize Memel, and the rest to penal servitude for various terms—imprisonment for life, and from twelve years downwards.

Herr Hitler received the news in the course of the Berlin talks with Sir John Simon and Mr. Anthony Eden, but is reported not to have discussed it with them, though he must have felt it acutely. His silence was more than made up for by the storm of patriotic indignation that swept over Germany. In her efforts to cope with the Nazi agitation Lithuania had gone too far, and that the protests of the German Government had a certain justification. The guarantor Powers, however, had not been idle. In January of this year England had advised moderation in both Kaunas and Berlin, and on March 13 England, France and Italy reminded Lithuania that they were responsible for the fulfilment by her of the statute and had no intention of neglecting their duty. But by that date the course of events in Germany had exacerbated the situation still more. Hitler's success in the Saar, which was represented as a typical victory for the Third Reich and its expansionist tendencies, had shifted the centre of interest in Germany from that territory to Memel, and demands arose for a plebiscite in the latter. Thus the *Westfaelische Landeszeitung* described Memel as the 'Saar of the East' and called for a vote to be taken. Yet there was no real analogy between the Saar and Memel, the political conditions being quite dissimilar; the idea of a plebiscite was none the less popular in Germany, and the 'Mémel Song' replaced the famous 'Saar Song' as the proper thing to go with the *Hort Wessel Lied* at all Nazi meetings. German nationalistic feeling was further profoundly stirred by Hitler's conscription manifesto of March 16—in which, indeed, Estonia and Latvia, as well as Lithuania, saw a darkening of the menace of the Third Reich to the Baltic, a view supported by the tone of the leading German journals; but Memel remained the chief object of attack, both before and after the verdicts in the treason trial.

On April 1 Sir John Simon stated in the House of Commons that England, France and Italy had informed Lithuania that the present situation in Memelland, in which no directorate (Cabinet) possessing the confidence of the Diet existed, was incompatible with the principle of autonomy

guaranteed to the territory by the statute, and that it was the duty of the Lithuanian Government to bring this situation to an end without delay. This uncompromising statement pointed to the real weakness of the case for Lithuania—namely, that she had acted as if she had full sovereignty over Memel, whereas her rule was conditioned by the statute. It was therefore to be inferred that the dissidents had ground for complaint, as Germany alleged; nothing was said of the Nazi intrigue and pressure which had forced Lithuania to take the action thus condemned. Her immediate reaction was her announcement of an appeal to the League for cancellation of the statute; but more prudent counsels prevailed, and it was the announcement that was cancelled. Meanwhile the German Government had remained silent about the result of the trial, but it was generally expected that a commutation of the sentences would take place and ease the tension, though it was known that German troops were being concentrated in East Prussia close to the frontier, with Lithuanian forces in strength on the other side. There was certainly the possibility of an explosion, but this was appreciably modified by the attitude of Poland, between whom and Lithuania there had been some signs during the winter of an approach to better relations. Marshal Pilsudski now let it be known that Poland could not be indifferent to an attack on Lithuania; more than that, he declared that the independence and territorial integrity of the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—were a prime interest of his country. As already said, these States of the Baltic Pact were strongly in favour of the Eastern Pact; Poland continued to oppose it, and the marshal took the opportunity of assuring them that their preservation was a fundamental factor in Polish policy. In other words, Poland stands by the *status quo* in the Baltic, which includes the 'Corridor.' This is the way in which she reads her ten-year non-aggression pact with Hitler, however the *Führer* himself may read it. England, too, has an interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Baltic; the turning of the Baltic into a German lake, as is the aim of Rosenberg, would be fatal to her in all that region. For the whole non-German world this is at bottom the deep significance of the Memel controversy, but Lithuania must set her house in order.

Since the foregoing article was written two things have occurred which should now be added. One is that, according to Sir John Simon's account on April 9 of his talks with Herr Hitler, Germany declines to enter into a non-aggression pact with Lithuania. And the other, which is certainly not less interesting, is that as the German frontiers are now 'closed' to Lithuania, Poland has made a point of intimating that her frontiers, hitherto 'closed' by Lithuania, stand always wide open to the Lithuanians.

ROBERT MACHRAY.

MASARYK OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By DONALD A. LOWRIE

TOMAS G. MASARYK is sometimes called the last of the great classics. Few men of our age have so successfully combined qualities of mind and character, often quite opposed to each other. Philosopher and man of action, savant and statesman, journalist and revolutionary leader, his eighty-fifth birthday on March 7 recalls one of the most romantic biographies of modern times. The teamster's son, born in serfdom, has become founder of a new State. The present map of Europe, for which Masaryk more than any other single man is responsible, tells one part of the story of his achievement. Where once was the solid block of Austria-Hungary there now stand three new self-governing States: Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia leads the world in progressive social legislation, in internal democracy, and in genuine goodwill as a foreign policy. Great estates have been broken up, and a new generation of sturdy farmers own their land and can look the whole world in the face. The awkward-looking boundaries stretching from the Ore mountains to the Carpathians are the symbol of a liberated nation.

The altered map is but one of the amazing changes which this man's lifetime has embraced, and for many of which he has been responsible. When Masaryk was born serfdom had not quite disappeared from Austria. Peasants were born to remain servants all their lives. Property and position were the monopoly of a small minority. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was a medley of discontented minority peoples, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, struggling to avoid complete absorption in the prevailing German culture.

One of Masaryk's earliest memories is of his father on his knees before the lord of the manor, begging permission for his son to have the two years in the village school which was

all the education he could ever hope to get. Most peasants' sons did not try to rise above their normal station, and could read and write as little as the elder Masaryk. He, sturdy Slovak farmer, left alone, might never have dreamed of school for Tomas. But the boy's mother had served in the kitchen of a great house in Vienna. She had seen how 'the quality' lived, and she had made up her mind that her own boy should have all the education she could give him.

Tomas forgot neither his father's reluctant obeisance before the master he secretly despised, nor his mother's ambition for him. He has throughout his life retained a firm desire to learn, a determination to make the most of himself and his talents, and a deep-seated hatred of injustice. A story of his boyhood years illustrates his early passion for justice. The village boys long carried on a feud, half-serious, half-fun, with the boys of Podvorov, an adjoining village so poor that it had no chapel, and the villagers had to come to the larger town for church services. Podvorov boys sometimes tried to ring the church bells, a privilege the local youngsters claimed for themselves. But young Tomas Masaryk astonished his comrades by taking the side of the Podvorov boys against his own town; he could have no part in a domination based merely upon inequality in the size of the two contesting groups.

As head of a new State, Masaryk has never forgotten what it means to belong to a national minority. Under him the varied minority groups of Czechoslovakia have become full participants in the regular life of the country. He has insisted upon equal justice, educational rights, and a full suffrage for all, whether they be Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians or Jews. 'We are all equal,' he insists; 'we must all be equally free.' No other State in Europe has so satisfactorily solved its minority problems.

The series of events which resulted in Masaryk's not only entering the village school, but passing thence to spend two years in a near-by academy, are romantic. At fourteen he had finished school, but was too young to be a teacher. Too poor to pay for further education, his father, unwilling to have the boy idle, apprenticed him to a blacksmith. Years later, when he visited Tolstoy, the great Russian remarked the bent fingers of Masaryk's right hand, which bear witness to the severity of the labour of those early years.

An accidental meeting saved Tomas from remaining in the smithy for life. One of his former teachers, chancing upon the sooty-faced apprentice, was so shocked to see his former apt pupil thus unprofitably engaged that he immediately found Tomas a place where he could go on with his studies without ceasing to earn his living. Older than most boys in his classes, Masaryk stood at their head, and thus was often in demand as a private tutor. The connexion with certain leading families which he then established enabled Masaryk to earn his way to a doctor's degree in the University of Vienna. He taught as a 'substitute' in a Vienna 'gymnasium.' He wrote occasional articles for the papers. He was even able to help support his younger brother.

At the university Masaryk quickly took a leading place in the Czech patriotic society. Such societies were organised by minority peoples—Czechs, Croats or Poles—to help preserve their own language and national identity against the dominant German culture of the Hapsburg Empire. So strongly did the student Masaryk feel the call to struggle for his people's rights, that he adopted a new middle name. He began to sign himself Tomas Vlastimil Masaryk. Vlastimil means 'one who loves his country.' He founded a club whose purpose was to meet, fourteen years after graduation, 'to give account to my comrades of how my life in the meantime had been used to realise our motto: "Through truth to our rights".'

After taking his degree in Vienna, Masaryk moved to Prague as assistant professor in the university there. Here the young patriot discovered that his first battle for truth must be fought against the overwhelming majority of his own people. The conflict is still referred to as the battle of the manuscripts. For thirty years Czech patriots had enjoyed the sense of cultural superiority provided by the discovery of some ancient manuscripts of Czech poetry, supposedly dating from the eighth century. If genuine, these manuscripts proved the existence of a high Czech culture at a time when other European nations were 'wearing skins and living on acorns.' The authenticity of these manuscripts was questioned, and Masaryk soon became convinced that they were forgeries. In the *Athenæum*, a magazine he was then editing, he wrote articles to support his conviction.

In spite of the storm which broke about his head, Masaryk persisted in the argument. Every newspaper in the country opposed him. He was accused of having sold his Czech birthright to the Hapsburgs, who wished to discredit the Czech nation. The university faculty made every effort to expel him from the school. The *Athenaeum* was ruined, and Masaryk lost all the small savings he had invested in it. But he won his case. Within a few years the country accepted his position that no nation should attempt to build its reputation upon a falsehood.

Before long the cry of 'traitor' was again raised against the diligent Czech professor of philosophy. Historians report it as the Hilsner case. A Jewish tramp was accused of ritual murder. The case was clearly trumped up by the corrupt Government, to serve its own ends; but, playing upon long-dormant superstitions, it gained, thanks to the advocacy of most of the daily newspapers, popular support. A hurried trial resulted in an unjust death sentence. Masaryk at once undertook, in his own paper, a campaign which attracted world-wide notice. The professor of philosophy arraigned the judicial system of the Hapsburg Empire. International opinion was aroused: the Empire ordered a retrial 'because questionable evidence appears to have been presented.' The tramp's life was saved; Masaryk earned the undying gratitude of world Jewry. But the authorities could not overlook such boldness. Masaryk soon felt the heavy hand of official displeasure. Organised demonstrations interrupted his lecturing. Newspapers spread slanderous tales about his home and family. He was almost ready to give up struggling for justice and leave the country; only the courage of his American wife supported him. His duty, she insisted, lay with his own people, and Masaryk agreed to remain in Prague.

A few years later he was elected to the Vienna Parliament. Here he speedily became the recognised leader, not only of his own people, but of all the oppressed minorities, in their battle for just treatment within the empire. He wrote their programmes; he led their organised efforts to win a measure of autonomy from the Hapsburg Government. Every speech of his was a national event; here was one member who had the courage to speak the truth. His broadside against the Government for its dishonesty in the case of Bosnia and

Herzegovina was a terrible blow to the prestige of Austria abroad. With all the power of the Hapsburg Empire against him, one man, armed with the truth, fought through to victory.

At the outbreak of the war Masaryk decided to try to save, out of the impending collapse of the Austrian Empire, a free and independent State for his own people. First he organised a secret society of patriots at home. The record of their service through four long years of war, code messages, gaol sentences, executions, reads like a novel. Then, leaving home for what he knew would be permanent exile should his plans fail, Masaryk set out to carry his battle into other countries. His first task would be to win the Allied Governments to his view that the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be broken up. This proposal ran counter to the strongly entrenched tradition of both French and British Foreign Offices. After months of arduous work in France, writing, interviewing, carrying on a voluminous correspondence with Czechs throughout the world, Masaryk received his first encouragement in an interview with Briand, who appeared willing to recognise a free Czechoslovak State. Some friends in England gave him further encouragement, and he could take the next step.

Leaving the larger portions of the effort in the hands of an able national committee in Paris, Masaryk set out for one of the most dangerous of all his war-time adventures. The Allies were little interested in a professor with an idea; what would they think of a commander with an army at his disposal? In Russia were tens of thousands of Czech prisoners of war, former Austrian soldiers. He organised them into an army at the disposal of the Allies, and it began that saga-like march which took it around the globe.

His prospects began to improve. From London and Paris came new proclamations recognising the rights of minority peoples. But this was not enough. America had entered the war. Masaryk saw that the key to his problem was in the hands of Woodrow Wilson. He started across Siberia and the Pacific for Washington, won Wilson to his cause, and promulgated the declaration of independence for Czechoslovakia—a new State whose Government was in Paris, its army in Siberia, its future President in America, and

its territory in the hands of its enemies! Soon followed the peaceful revolution in Bohemia and the Armistice. A National Assembly in Prague cabled to Masaryk, who was still in Washington, that he had been unanimously chosen President of the new republic. A month later he returned to Prague. The teamster's son who had been chiefly instrumental in the overthrow of the Hapsburgs now came to live in their historic palace on the hill above the city.

Few men have lived to enjoy so fully the fruit of their labours as has the President of Czechoslovakia. His life's ambition was realised when he was nearly seventy; during the past fourteen years he has seen the new State consolidate its independence on his chosen basis of humanity and justice. Czechoslovakia has a record many far older States might envy. It is a firmly established democracy; almost alone among the States of Europe it has enjoyed fifteen years of internal peace. It has almost displaced Switzerland as a refuge for the politically oppressed of all nations, for Masaryk, himself once a political *émigré*, has turned the minds of his countrymen towards a policy of true liberality.

Under his leadership the new republic has done more than maintain peace and justice within its own borders. Czechoslovakia has steadily supported the League of Nations. 'I believe in world co-operation,' Masaryk told me once. 'If you believe in humanity, you must believe that in the long run sensible international institutions must triumph.' Or again: 'Consider in how short a space of time man has moved up from barbarism. We have not yet attained the nature of doves, but we can see the road of development ahead. We have the League of Nations and other international institutions. Give us time, and we shall find the way.'

Nothing could be more characteristic of Masaryk's attitude towards his country and himself than his resolute refusal to permit his election to the Presidency for life. The choice of Masaryk as first President was almost axiomatic. He had conceived and brought to birth the idea of a free Czechoslovakia. Almost single-handed he had transformed that idea into a reality. What national leader ever had a better claim to become executive head of a new State? As often before, Masaryk opposed the overwhelming desire of his people and insisted that no exception to the constitutional

regulations be made in his case. As a final compromise, it was agreed that Masaryk alone should have the right to be re-elected to successive terms of office. Everyone knows the story—since: at three successive elections Masaryk has been chosen President for a seven-year term.

This conviction of the value of democracy, the insistence upon the application of all the laws to himself as to every other citizen, is one of the secrets of the smooth road the new State has since travelled. By virtue of his moral authority Masaryk has aided the people from whom he sprang to overcome all obstacles. His life, both before and since the war, has been a powerful example alike to his countrymen and to the world.

Even in the last few years Masaryk has not lost faith in democracy. He believes, in his own words, in democracy '*sub specie eternitatis*,' and that dictatorships in Europe are but exceptions to the great mass of the world's States which still preserve democratic forms. Democracy, honestly applied, will solve the problems of to-day, be they economic or political. 'It is not the fault of democracy,' Masaryk says, 'that the world's financiers and economists have not untangled the world's financial and economic difficulties.'

Within the State, Masaryk's policy of applied democracy has solved the minority problems—at least as acute in Czechoslovakia as in any of the post-war republics. True democracy, he holds, produces freedom; and, conversely, 'freedom is the chief creator of democracy. It works automatically. Not equality, for we are not all exactly equal, and perhaps never shall be. But freedom is a practical thing.' For Masaryk the classic example of practical democracy is England. 'I wish our people might look steadily toward England,' he said in a recent speech. 'With all their difficulties of unemployment, and heavy taxation to pay for a war they won, I have never heard an Englishman speak a disloyal word about his country.' This is free democracy. Masaryk is to-day perhaps the world's foremost champion of the truly liberal State.

'Happy is the State which has no history.' The peace and good order of Czechoslovakia have become almost proverbial. In internal as well as external relationships Masaryk's principles of humanity and justice have been

steadily put into practice. 'Better than defensible frontiers,' he says, 'are frontiers which one does not have to defend.' No small State has more loyally supported the League of Nations than Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Masaryk. 'Chauvinism, racial or national intolerance, is the enemy of nations and of humanity,' he has said. 'Love of one's own nation does not mean hatred of others.'

And fortunate is the lot of the national leader who has so eminently succeeded in realising his ideals for his own people. A prominent philosopher from northern Europe recently journeyed to Prague 'to see one truly happy man.' Philosopher and statesman, patriot and world citizen, man of vision and practical politician—the modern world has rarely seen such a personality. All nations join with Czechoslovakia in the Slavic greeting—'May he have many years!'

DONALD A. LOWRIE.

A FRENCH COLONIAL CONFERENCE

By W. L. MIDDLETON

AFTER Wembley, Ottawa; after the French Colonial Exhibition, a Conference. Since last December some 200 delegates, representing all principal productive and distributive interests at home and overseas, have been engaged in making a survey of the position, present and future, actual and potential, of French intercolonial trade. There have been public as well as private sessions, at which the products of each territory have been considered in turn. Ports and canals, roads and railways, development and research, all have been discussed in detail, and a vast mass of data placed on record for the guidance of statesmen and administrators in the years to come.

As at Ottawa, the outstanding problem discussed has been how to develop and regulate trade within the Empire, for most Frenchmen, like many Englishmen, hold that the surest way to increase the wealth of the world is to encourage each nation to cultivate its own garden, even if the process, interpreted one-sidedly in terms of cash, appears for a time to show a loss.

From 1929 onwards French colonial trade has been growing in relative importance, though it has diminished in value and bulk. The exports to French possessions have risen from 12.8 per cent. of the total export trade in 1909-13 to 32 per cent. for 1933, imports from 11.1 to 23.7 per cent. in the same period. For 1934 the figures were 30.7 and 27.6 per cent. respectively. These figures show clearly the preponderance of colonial trade, and explain the importance attached to the conference.

Minor disturbances which occurred in Algeria while the conference was sitting served to illustrate the view, long held by competent observers, that the underlying causes of unrest

on the southern shores of the Mediterranean are economic; political agitation, such as that of the Moslems for extended rights of citizenship, has been fostered by the depression in trade from which both the native and the European populations are suffering. A Moslem problem exists; but the time has not come to attempt a legislative solution, and M. Regnier, the Minister of the Interior, on his return from a tour in Algeria was silent on the subject. Meanwhile, more real powers are being conferred on the authorities on the spot, and particularly on the Governor-General. Three of the four regions into which Algeria is divided are departments of France, endowed with prefects directly dependent on the Ministry of the Interior. This system lends itself to interference in the administration by the *ronds de cuir* of the various Ministries, under parliamentary pressure. If, as is suggested, the prefects were to be placed under the Governor-General, their hands and those of their chief would be freer.

In deciding to grant 550,000,000 francs for the purpose of restoring the economic situation in Algeria the Government has adopted the readiest means of bringing momentary relief. But the fundamental causes of distress will remain. The crisis which has overtaken Algeria is world-wide; but it has peculiar features, due to the relationships of Algeria with the French market and the conditions which are imposed on the colony by the economic and fiscal policy of France. In some ways the Algerian situation resembles that of Tunisia and Morocco. In all three regions during the time of prosperity and expansion agricultural enterprises enjoyed ample credit at high rates of interest. With the collapse of the market for their products many were unable to pay interest on, still less to pay off, loans. As in the case of enterprises in other young countries, the reserves were negligible, and in Algeria many small agriculturists have been menaced with bankruptcy.

In Tunisia, when the courts reopened in October after the summer vacation, the cause lists included 3000 applications for the compulsory sale of property. M. Marcel Peyrouton, the resident-general, boldly set up conciliation committees, with power to decide whether the debtor was able to pay. Where inability was proved, the creditors were virtually bought out, being given bonds issued by the *Caisse Foncière*

with a State guarantee. M. Peyrouton denied any intention of establishing a moratorium, urging that the bonds merely replaced commercial paper of doubtful value, and justified his energetic measures by declaring that, unless something was done, 300,000 peasants might be expropriated.

North African territories have long occupied a position of unrivalled importance in the French Empire, with by far the largest share of the total colonial trade of France. Algeria was first in 1932, with more trade with the mother country than all the other French colonies put together. Tunisia in the same year was seventh in the list of French customers and Morocco eighth. Their proximity to Europe favours direct colonisation; Algeria has a population of 500,000 persons of French origin. But the outstanding, and disconcerting, fact is that the soil of North Africa yields, in considerable quantity, certain agricultural products which compete with those of France. The resulting difficulties are even more serious for France than for Great Britain.

North Africa should in theory be, according to a favourite expression of French writers, a *prolongement* of the mother country. When trade across the Mediterranean consisted in the sale of French manufactures in return for raw materials and agricultural products which, in quantity and quality, gave no uneasiness to French producers, North Africa was looked on as a *prolongement* of the mother country. But, with consumption falling, the repeated surpluses of home-grown wheat and wine gave occasion for jealous fear of the 'invasion' of rival North African products. The value of French imports from Algeria rose by 48 per cent. between 1927 and 1933, thanks mainly to a twofold increase in imports of Algerian wines. Morocco, moreover, which formerly exported to France only a negligible quantity of wheat, now sends an agreed quota of 1,500,000 quintals. Three-fifths of the total imports of France from her overseas territories consist to-day of agricultural products.

Variations in tariff policy as between various overseas possessions complicate the issue. Algeria, nominally incorporated in France, enjoys, for most purposes, free trade, but Tunisia has been treated with singular inconsistency. The protectorate grants freedom of entry for important classes of French goods, and buys 70 per cent. of her supplies from

France, but Tunisian salt is taxed on entering France. Of Tunisian wines, only a quota of 550,000 hectolitres enters France free of duty, while a further 500,000 hectolitres may be imported on payment of half the minimum tariff. This 'one-way' tariff system has, on the whole, maintained a favourable trade balance for France, but has hampered the development of Tunisia.

Morocco is in a different position. The protectorate is bound by treaty to grant equality of tariff treatment to all countries, but for some years past France and Algeria together supplied nearly half its imports, and from 1927 to 1931 France sent to Morocco two or three times as much as she received. Latterly, the fall in the purchasing power of the protectorate and the increasing importance of its wheat exports have altered the situation, but France still enjoys a favourable trade balance.

A movement has been on foot for some time to secure an agreed revision of the international *régime* on lines favourable to Morocco. It is claimed that the present tariff system leaves Morocco without defence against disordered international exchanges. In 1934, for example, Japanese imports into Morocco rose from the sixth to the second place with 8.4 per cent. of the total imports, as compared with 4.25 per cent. in the previous year, whilst England, which had 6.45 per cent. in 1933, had only 4.5 per cent. in 1934. The advocates of tariff autonomy for the protectorate point to these figures, which menace, in particular, imports of Manchester goods, and hint at measures which would guarantee for British exporters a recovery of some of their lost trade.

All goods for France must be carried in French bottoms if they are to profit by the tariff concessions. The French mercantile marine profits, but colonial trade suffers. The suppression of competition makes the cost of transport depend on the cost of running the French services, which has greatly risen in consequence of the application of the eight-hour day to the French mercantile marine, with anomalous consequences. At a time when the mines of Algeria and Tunisia were suffering severely, French manufacturers imported iron ore from the Spanish zone of Morocco because it could be carried cheaper in foreign ships.

So long as there is a plethora of agricultural products the

problem of North African competition will remain difficult. A simple refusal of France to accept imports or a one-sided suppression of production is not a practicable solution. France cannot turn her back on the magnificent creation of Marshal Lyautey, who, with rare independence of ministerial control, built boldly and rapidly. Most of the development was carried out while prices were high, with the result that the debt service now accounts for 28 per cent. of the Moroccan budget. The protectorate has for years been urging the increase of its quota. Moroccan growers, who have free entry into the French market for their quota, have for years been urging that it be increased. They have made their financial calculations on the basis of prices obtainable in heavily protected France, which are much higher than world prices. They are, therefore, not favourably placed to compete in the open market. Finally, it must be remembered that it has been a cardinal principle of French policy to make trading associations with all their oversea territories as close as possible. That fact alone carries with it a certain obligation.

The most interesting of the solutions which have been considered starts from the principle that home and oversea production should be dealt with as a whole, and it is proposed to set up committees on which French and North African producers would both be represented. This would mark a distinct advance in the consideration shown to oversea interests in matters of imperial economic policy. It would be the business of the committees to seek a friendly agreement among the producers as to the general policy of cultivation, and with a view to equating production with consumption. North African growers are already encouraged to cultivate more hard wheat instead of the soft wheat which competes with French production. An agreement on future policy would be preferable to a precarious annual import quota. Such committees will probably be set up for cereals and, perhaps, for industrial products.

In the case of wine the obstacles to a settlement are more serious. Feeling runs high on both shores of the Mediterranean. The Resident-general of Tunisia pleaded strongly before the Imperial Conference that the quota of wines from the protectorate going into France duty free should be raised to 1,050,000 hectolitres, by including in this category the

500,000 hectolitres which at present pay half the minimum tariff. Quite recently, however, the Beverages Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, which largely reflects the opinion of the South of France, passed a resolution opposing any further increase in the quota. The limitation of the wine-growing area and the uprooting of vines would be the simplest solution. But the wine trade is to-day a pillar of the Algerian economy. Nor do the colonists forget the origin of their industry. In the eighties of last century, when phylloxera menaced the French vineyards with extinction, Algeria was pressed to apply herself to viticulture in order to make up for the lost supplies of France. If, in the present crisis, wine-growers are to be asked to turn to other forms of culture (such as the growth of oranges), it is suggested that they should be given financial help in the transition. It takes ten years to make an orange plantation commercially profitable; meanwhile, some kind of subsidy would be necessary.

Outside the special case of North Africa, policy has to deal with rather different problems in the rest of the empire. It is true that the young coal, iron and steel industries of Indo-China have caused some qualms among French industrialists, and the import of rice has not passed unnoticed by wheat-growers. Rum and sugar imports are also regarded as competitive. During the early days of the Colonial Economic Conference M. Albert Sarraut, the president, himself Minister of the Colonies in 1920, described the general object to be pursued as being 'relative autonomy,' and deprecated the idea of forming a close system excluding the rest of the world.

The general scheme of colonial development, setting out the programme of public works needed in each colony in order of importance and urgency, made by M. Sarraut in 1920, has been brought up to date, and a nine-year programme elaborated, as the first instalment, with an expenditure limited to, say, 5,000,000,000 francs. As a method of ensuring results there is more to be said for the instalment plan, which is definite and promptly reliable, than for an omnibus scheme which tends to disperse energies. It is proposed to finance public works by a fund to be established on the lines of the British Colonial Development Fund. Loans for port works, for instance, would be advanced to a colony at first on extremely easy terms of interest, so that the burden of the

debt would not fall on the colony until increased revenues were in sight.

Much is hoped from the regulation of production and of trading relations between different parts of the empire. Circumstances are such that administrators will be driven to concern themselves for a time less with large principles than with particular measures. Such questions as the future relationship of Madagascar to the Rhodesian market are of high importance, but the attitude previously adopted by France hardly suggests that external arrangements of the kind will be considered timely. The field of possible action in the stimulation of exchanges in given commodities between France and the colonies and between colony and colony is very large, and delicate adjustments between colonial interests and those of the mother country will be necessary.

One line of possible accommodation is suggested by the nature of the exchanges. Broadly speaking, France sends to the colonies industrial goods and receives in return raw materials and foodstuffs. Value for value, such exchanges tend to be unequal, especially since the fall in the prices of raw materials. It is therefore suggested that raw materials from the colonies should be given increased tariff protection in the French home market against similar import from foreign countries. The tariff—which has usually been framed without much consultation of colonial interests, and perhaps with inadequate concern for them—has been largely based hitherto on the principle that raw materials needed for industry should be admitted free. A moderate duty would offer some satisfaction to the colonial producer, partly because he would be surer of his market and partly because prices would be slightly raised. Something has been done in this direction already. A few months ago the ground-nut crop from French West Africa was protected by a duty. On the other hand, lead and phosphates from Tunisia are unprotected in France. Should this policy be adopted, French industrial interests will look for compensation in the form of higher protection in French colonies for French manufactures.

For some time before the Imperial Conference met the possibility of a more general accommodation between French and colonial production had been much discussed. A system of colonial credit had been suggested, originally with

a view to helping enterprises endangered by the economic crisis. This tentative project does not, however, appear to have proved practicable.

At the beginning of what may well be a complicated process of readjustment of economic relations within the French Empire it must be a question how far experience justifies the hope of good management. The Ministry of Colonies has to-day a unique opportunity of acting in the light of full information. But the Ministry has its traditions, and not all of them are reassuring. In the matter of tariff dispositions affecting the interests of French exporters to the colonies, or of industrial interests which conceive themselves to be affected by imports from the colonies, the pressure on the Ministry is often strong. It is difficult to see how the declared object of tightening the relations between the mother country and the oversea territories can fairly be achieved without a reasonable opening of the French market to colonial products. When it is a question of protecting French goods in French Empire markets the claims of the home manufacturers are put forward promptly; and the Ministry of Commerce has, of course, to be consulted. These representations have in the past frequently proved irresistible, and, in this time of strain, all interests are more than ever vigilant.

It is hardly likely, moreover, that the principles of long-term colonial policy will remain completely in suspense during the coming period of readjustment. A few years ago a tendency towards greater liberalism was manifest. The arguments of such bodies as the admirable *Union Coloniale Française*, which had presented a broadly conceived imperial policy with no less good sense than generosity, seemed to have had some effect. The Tariff Law of 1928 seemed in principle to favour greater autonomy, though it was not consistently administered in that spirit. The present trend of ideas seems to be towards a comprehensive view of oversea interests, and there is to-day in France every hope that, in spite of the preoccupations of the crisis, the economic problems of the empire will be handled on broad and statesmanlike lines.

W. L. MIDDLETON.

THE HISTORICAL FILM

By SIR CHARLES PETRIE, Bt.

THE last ten years have witnessed a revival of the interest in history on the part of the general reader. In the middle of the Victorian era a group of historians attracted the attention of the public of their day to the record of the past; and with such success that, to quote but one example, no less than 3000 copies of the first two volumes of Macaulay's *History of England* were sold before the day of publication, while within four months the book had reached its fifth edition. As the nineteenth century drew to its close, however, the writing of history became increasingly an affair of specialists, historical works were written by the academic for the academic, and the mass of the reading public, determined not to be bored, turned to the volumes of *Memoirs* which now began to make their appearance with remarkable rapidity. Since the war there has been another change, and a number of writers, whom it would be invidious to mention by name, have once more popularised history, and, above all, biography. It is true that their work has been of uneven merit, but that criticism applied with equal force to their Victorian predecessors; a Lytton Strachey was no more inaccurate than a Macaulay, or more prejudiced than a Froude; and on the whole there can be no doubt that they have done far more good than harm. Now the film has arrived to supplement their activities, and the extent to which it can usefully be employed is becoming a subject of much discussion. As is so often the case, the appearance of a new factor of this nature has given rise to a good deal of somewhat inapposite comment, and the distinction is by no means always realised between the historical film that has been made solely for entertainment purposes and that made primarily for instruction. Yet it is

essential to grasp this difference before attempting to assess the place of the historical film in modern life.

The entertainment film must necessarily have a popular appeal, and this imposes definite limitations. In the first place, at least as many people go to the cinema—at any rate, outside the West End of London—to see a particular actor or actress as to see a particular film. This means, from the box-office point of view, that it is essential to have one or more 'stars' in a film if it is to be a success. To some extent the same is true of the stage, but with this difference. There are many plays with an established reputation; the public will flock to see this actor's interpretation of Hamlet, or that actress as Lady Teazle. No one ever went to a cinema to see Cicely Courtneidge or Herbert Marshall in a particular scenario. People go to see them as individuals. Such being the case, the scenario has very often to be adapted to those who are going to play lead, and not infrequently, from the standpoint of historical accuracy, with disastrous consequences. Prominent characters in history thus tend to appear represented by those who are physically unlike them, and in situations which in real life they never knew, but which must be interpolated in order to give scope to the peculiar talents of their impersonators. Yet this criticism may be carried too far, for the entertainment film, even if historical in character, must be artistic, and art and history often diverge. No one would condemn *The Winter's Tale* because in it Bohemia has a coast, or the sonnet *On First Looking into Chapman's Homer* because Keats confused Cortes with Balboa. Each case must be judged on merits; though it must be freely admitted that there have been of late too many 'historical' films where both history and art have been sacrificed to the popular appeal, and even to sheer buffoonery.

This does not, however, mean that, in its historical background, the entertainment film need be inaccurate, even if it has, in other matters, to sacrifice truth to art or the box-office. Years ago I saw a film in which one of Cromwell's troopers struck a match on the seat of his trousers, and, although things have improved since those days, glaring inaccuracies still appear on the screen. In one of the most successful films of recent times, for instance, the Yeomen of the Guard in the sixteenth century made their appearance in the

uniforms they first wore at the coronation of James II. Mistakes in matters of furniture are still too common, and one often sees our ancestors proceeding along the metalled roads of to-day. It is true, and encouraging, that greater attention is now being paid to such details. *The Dictator* is a notable example of such improvement. The theatrical producer takes great pains to get his background right, and whether or not we agree with Shakespeare's interpretation of the character of Richard II., we do not portray the latter in a silk hat and morning-coat, as past generations were wont to depict historical characters in the costume of their own day. In many cases these mistakes have occurred because the producer did not know where to obtain the necessary information, and by no means the least of the services which the British Film Institute is rendering the trade and public is by putting producers into touch with those who can give them the advice they require.

The historical entertainment film is also subject to another handicap—that of theme. It is not necessary, if the producer knows his work, for it to deal with a period familiar to the public, but it must not, on religious or political grounds, antagonise any large section of popular opinion. This rules out some of the most dramatic incidents in history. The stage is less circumscribed. It costs relatively little to produce a play, and, unless the latter is written from a very cranky point of view, the chances are that there will be enough sympathisers with its theme to make the loss of no great importance. The production of a film is a costly business: if it is even to cover expenses, it must be shown to millions of people all over the world. It is international to an extent that the stage is not, save in respect of a few dead dramatists. Consequently it must be extremely careful not to offend. The progress of the Reformation, or the career of Napoleon, for example, would lend themselves admirably to treatment on the screen, but it is probably beyond the wit of man to write a scenario round Luther which would not antagonise the Churches; while it is difficult to imagine a Berlin audience remaining quietly in their seats enjoying the spectacle of the *grande armée* marching through the streets of their city after Jena. Nearer home, who could portray the battle of the Boyne so as to give equal pleasure to the patrons of the cinema

in Belfast and Dublin? At the same time, it is clear that many suitable and non-contentious themes have so far been ignored. Given, too, the necessity of finding parts for actors and actresses who shall be box-office assets, numerous opportunities have been neglected. One instance will suffice. It would be difficult to find a woman who more closely resembles Mary Queen of Scots, both in features and figure, than Madeleine Carroll: yet no producer has ever cast her for this part, or, apparently, seriously considered a scenario dealing with one of the most dramatic periods in British history.

At the same time a slight theme, if properly treated, may make an excellent film. A case in point is *So Ended a Great Love*. The dialogue is just sufficient to explain the action; the acting is admirable, and there is no jarring note. The love of the Archduchess Marie Louise for the Duke of Modena is, in fact, incidental to the portrayal of the ambition of Napoleon, and so the cumulative effect is to convey a faithful impression of the European situation at the time.

When one turns from the historical film, made for the purpose of entertainment, to that which is intended for instruction, it is to be confronted with an entirely different set of problems. Accuracy is here the primary consideration. Before, however, discussing these problems in detail, it is necessary to discriminate between what may be described as the background film, and that of which the object is solely to instruct. The background film can be most profitably employed for adult education, though not unsuitable for use in the higher forms of secondary schools. In some cases an entertainment film might serve this end, and the viewers of the British Film Institute have seen one or two films of this type which have appeared to them suitable for background purposes. Nevertheless, the number of entertainment films which can be so employed must necessarily be limited, for their object is what their name implies, while that of the background film must be accuracy. Not, of course, that the standard need be so high as if the film were solely intended for the class-room, for the latter must sacrifice everything to accuracy. The entertainment film is to the teaching film what the historical novel is to the text-book, and just as no one would confuse the functions of the latter, so those of the former must be kept distinct.

The first question to answer is what subject is the most suitable for the historical teaching film. The box-office demands the dramatic, which the class-room would do well to eschew. The modern world is already over-endowed with the head-line mentality, and it should be the task of the school to see that the rising generation has a greater sense of proportion than its parents. History is not a series of sensational episodes, but a long and slow progress, by no means always in the right direction. This raises another problem, which the film has so far failed to solve—namely, a satisfactory method of depicting the passage of time. It is so much easier in cinematography to deal with events than with processes. Too many historical entertainment films give the impression that events which in reality were spread over several years were crowded into a few weeks, if not days. The Jubilee film, *Royal Cavalcade*, suffers severely in this respect. The war scenes are hopelessly confused, and the sequence of events is impossible to follow without previous intimate knowledge of the period. For example, most of those who see it must go away with the impression that the submarine menace reached its height at the very moment that the Fifth Army broke in March 1918. It is highly undesirable to create such an illusion in the youthful mind. On the stage the difficulty can be met by statements in the programme, by the dialogue, and by the lowering of the curtain. None of these devices is equally open to the film producer. Few people look at the programme in a cinema; the dialogue on the screen is not normally suited for this purpose; and the lowering of a curtain implies an interval, which would be impracticable in the case of a continuous performance. The teacher has the advantage of being able to stop the film and explain what is happening, but that is by no means desirable. Indeed, the only practical solution would seem to be to go back to the caption of the old silent days, and say bluntly that at this point a certain period of time must be supposed to have elapsed.

Is the silent, sound, or talking film best suited to historical instruction? Owing to the shortage in this country of films made solely for educational purposes it is not easy to give an answer based upon experience, but there can be little doubt that the sound film is the most satisfactory medium, whether

the oral part is limited to a commentary, or whether the characters themselves speak. Its advantage over the silent film is obvious, while the 'talkie' suffers from several severe handicaps. In the first place, the line taken by the spoken commentary might not be one that commended itself to the teacher, for it is possible even for the best people to differ as to the construction that should be put upon particular historical events. In the case of a film dealing with the reign of James II., the spoken commentary of Professor Trevelyan would hardly be couched in the same terms as that of Mr. Hilaire Belloc. It is not practicable, for financial reasons, to overcome this difficulty by having several films on the same subjects with commentaries from different points of view. The reproduction of the vernacular, too, is by no means easy; if the characters use contemporary phraseology and pronunciation they will not be understood, while if they employ modern speech they will run the risk of not appearing real. One of the few films in which this difficulty has been successfully surmounted is *Lorna Doone*. There the rustic speech is preserved, but not to the extent of being unintelligible to an audience unfamiliar with the dialect of the West of England. Indeed, had the plot not been presented in so involved a manner, *Lorna Doone* would have been one of the best films of recent years. Above all, the film is supplementary to the work of the teacher, and this must never be forgotten. Any attempt to usurp his or her place would be fraught with disaster, and would seriously damage the whole educational system. As has already been suggested, the teaching film must be treated on the same footing as the text-book. There is an even more serious objection against the 'talkie' in this connexion. Some body, presumably the Board of Education or the British Film Institute, would have to authorise the spoken commentary, and that would in the long run inevitably result in an official interpretation of history such as prevails to-day in many Continental countries. The implications of this are too obvious to require enumeration, but they constitute a strong argument in favour of the sound over the talking film.

Most teachers hold that the best teaching film is not that which deals with the dramatic episode. Any well-written narrative, or picture, can impress that on the pupil's mind,

and the aid of the cinematograph is not necessary to implant in a child's memory the legend of Alfred burning the cakes, or Drake's game of bowls on Plymouth Hoe. The film is invaluable in portraying the daily life of our ancestors, or the progress of an industry from the earliest times. The history of invention cannot easily be explained without demonstrations in a workshop, or pictorial representations. We often forget how strangely a child's mind works. After seeing a historical entertainment film recently, a small boy was very dubious of its merit because the soldiers in it stood up to fire. It is never safe to take anything for granted where a child is concerned; the simpler the film is the better. Dr. Frances Consitt, in her *Report on the Value of Films in the Teaching of History*, recommended, where possible, the addition of one or two animated maps, which, together with the showing of natural scenery, would give that physical background which children can seldom visualise, and so help to break down the artificial barrier between history and geography. She also concluded that there is scope, especially in the case of younger children, for the biographical film, and for the film with a child as the central character.

Experience of the teaching film in other fields shows that certain conditions are necessary for success. Teachers must know in advance exactly what they are getting—*i.e.*, they must see the film. No teacher would give his pupils a text-book he had not himself read. The schools, too, must get the films just when wanted, for these must be fitted into the curriculum not the latter adapted to the films. A few preliminary remarks are advisable, and after the film has been shown the pupils should be encouraged to ask questions; indeed, the younger the class the more good will be done by a general discussion. Length is also an important consideration, and there is no need for the film to be as long as one reel. A film of several reels might be shown at the beginning of term as an introduction to the period to be studied, and at its close for the purposes of revision, while, in the interval, parts of it could be used for direct instruction.

Estimates of the value of the historical teaching film must to a large extent be based upon guesswork, for the films from the use of which the necessary evidence might be obtained do not yet exist in this country. The reason for this is

primarily the expense of installing projectors in schools. In France the Ministry of Public Instruction gives subsidies to the amount of one-third of the cost, while in the case of rural schools there is an additional third from the Ministry of Agriculture. In Germany there has recently been set up a special institute with the object of installing one projector in every school within the next five years. The expense is being met by levying a small subscription on all children attending school. The estimated cost is £800,000, including both the installation of projectors and the production of films. In Great Britain there is still a vicious circle to be broken. The producers say that they will provide the teaching film when they are assured of their market. The teachers declare that they will agitate for projectors when they are satisfied of the existence of the right type of film to use. The only way out would appear to be a subsidy for the production of the historical teaching film, combined with every encouragement to amateur cinematograph societies to co-operate in the task.

There was undoubtedly a tendency soon after the war to make learning too easy. It is not suggested that the teaching film should be regarded as a further step in that direction; it is merely an aid to the acquisition of knowledge, not knowledge in itself, for its uses are clearly limited. Yet it can be a very powerful auxiliary. Some people are more receptive to what they hear, others to what they see, and still others to what they read. A combination of teacher, film, and printed word is calculated to reach all alike, whether they be children or adults. Nevertheless, if it is to have its maximum effect the teaching and background film must be carefully prepared. As Dr. Consitt points out, the teacher, the historical expert, and the professional producer (the last is indispensable even if the cast be amateur, as suggested above) must collaborate in order to guarantee acquaintance with the needs of those who will derive instruction from the film, with scholarship, and with technical knowledge. As these films will clearly have to be suited to various ages, and as expense is of the first importance, each film might well be made in various forms, for different ages.

Historical films, whether designed for entertainment, background, or teaching, will always arouse more criticism and comment than any others. There used to be a good deal

of talk about scientific history, but history is not, and never can be, an exact science. Two and two by no means necessarily make four, and there are few absolute standards. Pilate's jesting remark about truth contains the enigma which has perplexed historians down the ages. To-day it is being raised in a new form, and we are being called upon to distinguish between history and propaganda: for the dissemination of the latter the film is a peculiarly suitable medium. What is one man's history is another's propaganda, and it is increasingly difficult to draw a line between the two. One can imagine a first-class Italian film showing the growth of the Fascist movement, the March on Rome, and the subsequent achievements of the new *régime*: the scholar would probably regard it as very valuable documentary evidence, but the Conservative, Liberal, or Socialist politician might easily object to its public exhibition on the score that it was calculated to influence an audience in favour of Sir Oswald Mosley. The same observation would apply to a film dealing with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Propaganda may also take the form of a deliberate falsification of history, as in the case of the film *Ten Days that Shook the World*, where all reference to the part played by Trotsky in the Bolshevik Revolution is omitted. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage the cumulative effect of a number of propagandist films as definitely instructive. For example, had cinematography been in existence at the time of the French Revolution, the film would have been used as propaganda by the various *régimes* which succeeded one another with such rapidity; and the exhibition, in succession, of the various propagandist films made by each would have given an excellent idea of the development of revolutionary ideas and policy during the period. The propagandist films of Eisenstein, Pudovkin, and other Russian dictators illustrate the same point, and their historical value is greatest for those to whom their propagandist value is least. Such productions as *Potemkin*, *The End of St. Petersburg*, and *New Babylon* are thus possessed of a historical significance to audiences sufficiently intelligent to view in the right perspective the propaganda they contain, and to regard them as an insight into revolutionary mentality rather than as objective history. *The House of Rothschild*, too, is propaganda with a definite value.

It is of the first importance that all films which deal with contemporary events should be carefully preserved, for they are the historical documents of to-morrow. The British Film Institute has, in fact, as one of its immediate objects the formation of a library of films, and in the interests of history in the very widest sense it is to be hoped that the necessary funds will soon be forthcoming. What would we not give for a film depicting the entry of Charles II. into London on the day of the Restoration, or of Pitt rising to reply to his health at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on the morrow of Trafalgar? It is surely our duty to see that we leave our descendants fully documented. When the colour film is perfected the value of this pictorial evidence will be even greater than it is to-day. It is true that there is still considerable uncertainty as to the life of a film. The oldest films in existence do not date back more than thirty-five or forty years, so it is too early to say how long a film will keep without deterioration. Experts maintain that although the nitrate film has a longer history than the acetate, the latter is the more suitable for preservation, since it is known to be more stable, and is not so highly inflammable. The films must also be carefully stored in special conditions, and should be examined every five years for signs of deterioration. In any event, it is probable that most films kept for more than fifty years will have to be photographically reproduced, though further experiments may result in improved methods of storage.

Closely allied with the historical film, and subject to all its advantages and disadvantages, is the religious film, though its possibilities have so far received little attention. An exception is, perhaps, De Mille's *King of Kings*, though, as a recent writer has put it, in this case 'lavishness of production serves as a cloak to cover up banality of treatment.' It may not be possible to treat a religious theme in a manner equally satisfactory to the various branches of the Christian Church; though the Bible is common to all. Missionaries, in particular, would surely find such films of the greatest service, and it would seem that the various religious bodies need only have their attention drawn to the matter to prompt them to take the necessary action.

The historical film of all types suffers from its inability to portray the development of institutions. It would be easy

to write a scenario depicting the Crown and the Estates of the Realm at various stages in the national history, but that would give no idea of their respective relations one with another, of their traditions, or of their inner meaning to contemporaries. The stage has somewhat more scope in this direction, but constitutional history must continue for all time to be studied in books and documents. It would, indeed, be a serious mistake for cinematograph enthusiasts to pitch their claims too high, for over-statement spoils the best case. Cinematography is an art, and, like every other art, it has its limitations. Its peculiar province is to show motion, and, as so much of life is concerned with motion, its field is a wide one, but its width must not blind us to the fact that there are barriers. There is a real danger in these latter days of every new invention being hailed as a complete break with the past. Because there are aeroplanes, we are told that man will never fight again except in the sky; though science may one day discover a means of putting the internal combustion engine out of action from any distance, and so render aeroplanes and tanks quite useless for purposes of warfare. So it is with cinematography. It will always appeal primarily to the eye, and it is with this in mind that its makers can render the greatest service. Some things it cannot do well, others it alone can do, and upon them we must concentrate.

In spite of the popularity of the film with every class of the population, it is doubtful whether—at any rate, in Great Britain—more than a handful of people realise its potentialities for good and evil. With wireless and the motor car, cinematography has come to stay; and whether it is regarded as the greatest blessing, or the greatest curse, of the age, the best must be made of it. History has been well defined as philosophy teaching by example, and it is difficult to imagine a more suitable medium than the film for the portrayal of that example. Each century judges its predecessor by the use which the latter made of the fresh knowledge it acquired. The present age is very critical of the Victorian era in this respect, but it would do well to take care that it does not lay itself open to reproach at the hands of its successor. The wise employment of such new factors as cinematography will be the test of its claim to distinction.

CHARLES PETRIE.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

The Nineteenth Century was established nearly sixty years ago, to provide, in the words of its founder, James Knowles, 'an entirely free and open field, where all forms of honest opinion and belief (represented by men of sufficient weight) should be not only tolerated but welcomed.' From this principle there will be no departure. Yet the editor, like his contributors, has parts and passions, and a natural bias derived from past experience, present occupation, and outlook on the future. No man or woman can write without bias of matters about which he cares greatly, or of a faith which he holds with conviction. It cannot be indicated by a label, nor expressed in a few words, but it should be known to readers. For this reason the present editor proposes, in his individual capacity, to record from time to time personal views on current topics and personal experiences that have fallen to his lot during the previous month. *Castigat ridendo mores*, but not in malice: if he should sometimes express a personal conviction, he is not unaware that there is another side to most questions. The title of this diary is that of a work published last year¹ in which the writer first attempted to record, day by day, impressions left on his mind by daily contact with his fellow-men.

* * * * *

On Monday, April 1, after an eight hours' debate on the India Bill, the House rose soon after 11; I walked to Euston to take the 12.30 a.m. express to the north, in fulfilment of a promise to speak at Buxton that morning. I hired two pillows and a rug and stretched myself out over four seats in a compartment, which I shared with one middle-aged man. We

¹ *Walks and Talks*. Oxford University Press: London, Humphrey Milford, 5s. net.

exchanged courtesies and began to talk. He was an aeroplane fitter returning to his home in Manchester. Having been unemployed for some time, he had come up to London to look for work. He had refused three offers in three days: terms not good enough; the men pressed too hard, and required to work twelve hours a day—including, of course, overtime. A lot of semi-skilled work needing skilled supervision, such as he could give, but no guaranteed minimum of say 25s. a week, as of old. One firm offered him £3 10s. a week. His lodging, bed, breakfast and supper would cost 30s.; he could not send less than 35s. to his wife at home, for he paid 17s. 6d. rent in Hulme. That left 5s. for all other outgoings—dinner, tobacco, clothes, travelling. It was not worth it, and he was going home to wait for a job on the spot.

Why not bring the family south? I asked. 'No house to let within miles,' was the reply he had received everywhere; and his wife had never left Manchester, and did not want to come south, anyway. His three children were all just starting in life—one at a technical school, one in a drawing-office, and the girl in a rayon factory: it would be wicked to uproot them. What would help men like him would be good lodging-houses—hostels, inns, call them what you like. All he wanted was a good bed and a cubicle. Why should such be beyond the reach of a working man?

We talked of freedom. He held stoutly to the Manchester view. Better be out of a job at times, and able to take one's choice at others than to have a safe job of sorts without the option of a refusal. It was good for industry to have men of his kind refusing jobs because the pay was not high enough: the price mechanism worked, after a fashion. Demand and supply interacted. He would do better in Manchester.

At 4 a.m. the guard roused me from deep sleep. I had to leave the express and wait three and a half hours for the train that would take me to Buxton. The sky was clear, the air cold: there were four waiting-rooms on each platform—all cheerless, dirty and cold. In four rooms fires were burning, but in every case so feebly as to give little warmth. I borrowed a poker from the porter's room; the coal was not suited to the domestic hearth and I could do little. There was nothing for it but to sleep soundly till 6.15, when the

porter woke me. The station was filling up with workmen, but the refreshment-room was shut. I missed the trestle table and the cup of hot coffee and a roll, such as one sees abroad for early birds; it would do them good, and would surely pay.

Just before the train came in the doors of the station buffet were furtively opened by a stout female dragon, and I entered with two workmen whom I invited in to have a cup. It was handed to us, scalding hot, quite undrinkable by men with a train to catch: nothing to eat but very stale buns and packets of biscuits. No fire in the grate: the room dingy, the windows dirty. They do these things better abroad.

We took our seats in the train, where my two acquaintances met a friend, who began to talk of the relative merits of various friendly societies. Each belonged to a different one. The talk turned to fire insurance. The premiums were absurdly high for a workman's furniture, and for his house, for that matter, and one of them claimed to know some of the snags when it came to getting payment. Group insurance was the thing, if someone could be found to run it. Two got out and left one alone with me. He was, he told me, a tractor driver: he lived in Wigan, over an hour distant by train, but was well content to rise early and return late and keep his good home, which suited his wife. No job lasted for ever; the great thing was to be mobile. Rail, omnibus, motor cycle, push bike, all had their uses. The pay was good: he would take to a motor cycle after Easter. A genial soul, with a good word for his employer, and even for the railway company for cheap workmen's tickets.

I reached Buxton before 9, and two hours later addressed a conference of 350 Girl Guide commissioners, county secretaries and guiders. There is no better audience in England: keen and alert women of all ages from eighteen upwards, including many of experience and distinction in various fields—a picked audience from which one would gladly select women for almost any public service; none of them, so far as I could judge, 'professional' in their outlook, and the vast majority blessed with the sanity which comes from personal contact with humanity; soft of heart but hard of head, with a sober distrust of humanity in general and a

firm belief in the virtues of the particular individual or group. Some very good questions were asked; then, after a hasty lunch, back to the station, or rather stations, for there are two within 50 yards, each complete, and, as it happened, each with a train leaving at the same minute, of which one would convey me to London. But which one? The porters seemed doubtful and I almost missed it.

* * * * *

I reached Southend seven hours later, just in time to address a 'political'—another good audience, almost all women. The subject set me was 'Problems of the Future'—which, of course, also means the present. I put 'population' first—a net increase of a million a year in Japan, and the population both in Germany and Italy increasing faster than that of their neighbours. In each case the problem lay in the fact that (unlike Russia or the British Empire) they had within their boundaries, or under their flags, no considerable area of land which they could so develop as to provide themselves with the essentials of life. They were not potentially self-sufficient. Emigration was impossible. Pressure of population compelled them either to produce manufactured goods, mainly from imported raw materials, to exchange for foodstuffs, wool, cotton and metals, or to seek fresh territory in which to settle, as did their and our ancestors from the earliest times. They could find new fresh pastures to-day only by force, or by the voluntary cession to them of sparsely occupied territory now held by others. A lower birth rate might some day solve the question, but not during the next thirty years.

The true pacifist, abjuring the use of force, holds that in no circumstances should we resist force applied by others. If a Power should insist on taking territory now in our hands, or in that of the Dominions, we must protestingly submit. The pacifist would place a premium on, and indeed enthrone, force by refusing to challenge it. This was not moral or physical cowardice, but courage. I respected it, but felt it was morally wrong to allow force to conquer. We must be prepared to make concessions, but also to maintain a sufficient force to contribute, in the ultimate resort, our fair share to the pooled security of the world. The phrase might some

day entail an international force, but that was a solution that we should scarcely reach in our generation.

* * * * *

One Friday night I went to a village-hall to address a newly-formed branch of the Junior Imperial League. The audience was, for once, really junior—average age not much over twenty. There were coffee and cakes in front for the audience, and beer and buns behind for me—after I had played my part. The concert party had kept things going for an hour, and the conjurer was still to come.

They were good listeners, and the leaders on the platform began by saying clearly what they wanted me to speak of.

The journey there and back from town took me three hours: I spoke for half an hour and spent as long in conversation. But I do not count the time wasted; 'They wanted to know,' and I to tell, as far as I could, the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

I travelled back to town with a doctor with a good general practice, and we talked shop all the way. The last six months had been a bad season for doctors—very little sickness, and what there was mostly among pauper patients. His takings for the last six months were £300 below the average of five years. Doctors depend on sickness, not on health, for a living; this was fundamentally wrong. Health, not disease, should be their first concern.

His views on hospitals were not unlike those put forward with such authority in these pages this month by Sir Charles Harris. Indeed, he went further. The Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health should be a layman with the strength and the will to tackle the whole great problem of national health services, personal and institutional.

Hospitals should be a national charge. A State Medical Service must come. He had not always thought so, but had slowly come round to that opinion. But it needed talent, inspiration, and courage given to few men to frame a just scheme.

* * * * *

I left St. Pancras one Sunday afternoon to speak to a 'political school' at Buxton—a pleasant journey of four and a half hours. I selected as my travelling companions two

youths whom I saw putting a cycle tandem into the guard's van. They proved to be employed by a London firm of engineers on maintenance work all over England. They were pals: the tandem carried kit and tools. The firm encouraged them to travel thus, and they had a list of thirty-two counties thus visited in three years: they were connoisseurs of scenery and industrial efficiency, of cheap inns and lodgings, of seaside resorts and spas.

But they had another interest in which they were almost childishly absorbed. They had a note-book in which they recorded systematically the number of every railway engine they saw, in its proper class, each with a careful technical description. It is a game which railway companies might popularise with advantage.

The 'school' at Buxton was well attended and successful: I reached the hotel at 8, began to speak at 8.30, and left for Stockport by car soon after 10, in heavy rain, to catch the 11.40 for Euston. I sought a pillow and blanket, which are lent to travellers at 1s. each per night (a magnificent rate of interest), but the porter laughed at me.

'Stockport lads don't wrap up o' nights,' said he; 'no demand.' 'What about a pillow?' I asked. 'The lasses use the lads as pillows and the lads each other,' he replied; 'no pillows for them.' But a company that cared for third-class passengers would see that ordinary pillows were available.

The train was, in fact, fairly full, but I found a third-class carriage with one spare corner—the other three occupied by young soldiers returning from leave in Lancashire, and a sergeant in civilian clothes. We soon got talking. He had seen service in France, and hoped darkly, his companions assenting, that we should be on the right side next time, and better equipped than we were then, or now.

'What of unemployment in Lancashire?' I asked. He replied, a little diffidently at first, glancing at the youths, whom he did not wish to offend, that there was a lot about, but he had been recruiting last year and the year before, and what worried him was the great number of healthy youngsters who preferred the dole to the Army. They feared, not death, but hard work; not exile, but discipline.

'Isn't that it?' he asked the boy opposite him, who came from Manchester, but looked as if he came from the moors.

'There's some of them like that,' was the reply, 'and a lot more older ones that's no good to anyone.' One in every four that's on the dole, either wouldn't work if they could or couldn't work if they would—all ages and all sorts.'

'I often think,' continued the sergeant, 'that if a man could chuck the Army whenever he liked, and join up again when he felt like it, we'd have a lot of unemployment and a lot of men on the dole.' 'And,' added one of the boys, 'if we had panel doctors we'd have a lot of men sick.'

'We'll never get things to rights till there's some compulsion somewhere. "Work or maintenance" is all right, but, says I, that means it's compulsory to work, whether you like the job or not, same as in the Army. Every town ought to have some test work to put men on: it mightn't pay, but it would be good for them.'

The talk turned to physical inefficiency of recruits. He put much of it down to smoking too much—a direct cause of caries through acidity, so a dentist had told him; much was due to neglect after leaving the elementary school. The way boys forgot what they learned there was amazing: lots could scarcely read or write better than a ten-year-old by the time they enlisted. Nearly all put on weight and breadth after six months in the Army.

The young soldiers, encouraged by free talk, asked me questions about India, whither they were soon due to sail. They had relations who had seen half the world from a troop train or from the deck of a battleship. They had been pestered with good advice, and had been reading the daily papers. 'Was India all right?' I reassured them.

Silence came over us all, and sleep over the young men. We let them curl up on the seats, the sergeant and I facing each other stiffly in opposite corners. 'We're old hands,' he murmured; 'they need it more'n we do. They'll get what's coming to 'em when they get into barracks again, but I wish there was three-decker sleepers for third-class—six in a compartment and no extra charge. A night sitting up in a train is a day lost to most men.'

At 4.30 we reached Euston and clambered stiffly out into the cold air, to be cheered by a bright sign announcing that the refreshment-room was open. It was just that. The waiting-room was indeed open, but the radiators were cold.

A boy of fifteen or sixteen, who should have been in bed, was struggling to provide tea or coffee from a pair of urns to a queue of nearly a hundred passengers. No warm or appetising food—only railway buns and biscuits. Some of us, tired of waiting, sought the street, where coffee-stalls, not yet licensed out of existence by the local authorities, are old-fashioned enough to cater for popular needs at a price cheaper by far than in the railway buffet, where a cold boiled egg is 4d. I took the three soldiers to a stall I knew five minutes' walk distant. Coffee, saveloys, hot pies, banbury cakes and a multitude of other delicacies awaited us; under a bright light a genial stall-keeper served us like customers, not suppliants. How different from the buffet ladies. We shook hands at last and parted regretfully. All soldiers have something in common.

* * * * *

It is good to know that a Royal Commission will shortly sit to consider the unification of local governments on Tyne-side. The need was stressed by Captain Euan Wallace, the value of whose report on this 'depressed area' was recognised on both sides of the House and of the Tyne. An area of 87 square miles, with a population of about 800,000 and a rateable value of £4,500,000, is administered to-day by thirteen separate and independent local authorities lying in two counties. A man may work in one town, sleep in another, send his children to school in a third, and as often as not shop in a fourth. There are nine fire brigades, six police forces, nine smallpox hospitals, eleven institutions for infectious diseases, including six for tuberculosis, and ten independent authorities in control of elementary education. Small wonder that the rates are high.

It is the fashion to decry committees and commissions as a safe haven for awkward questions. But a strong commission, sitting in public, has no equal as a means whereby all relevant facts may be ascertained, and opinions weighed, before the publication of recommendations for action. As Lord Chancellor Bacon wrote to James I. in January 1620,

for the good that comes of particular and select committees and commissions, I need not commonplace . . . it will make many good spirits, that we think little of, co-operate in them.

Only thus can the Government of the day enlist the aid of private citizens of weight, regardless of party affiliations and the mere publication of the evidence, and the subsequent issue of a considered judgment often does much to remedy abuses.

But the commissioners must be independent, and not representative of particular interests, as in the case of the Royal Commission on Licensing Laws; and the terms of reference must not be too narrow, as in the case of the Royal Commission on Lotteries and Betting. The appointment of a committee or commission should be regarded as a pledge to take action on the greater part at least, if not on all, of the recommendations made. Many of our most urgent social problems to-day would be far less intractable had energetic action been taken in the past on the reports of such bodies.

* * * * *

Thirty years ago most Governments had foreign policies which they attempted, or claimed, to follow, often for long periods. It was possible, or at least not unreasonable, to predict in general terms the attitude of a Government; the personality of the head of the State and of the Foreign Minister was always an important, but not, in general, a decisive factor. The instability of foreign politics to-day is due largely to the absence of settled policies in most great countries. The final decision in the United States of America, in Russia, Poland, Germany, Austria and Italy, and in Persia and in Turkey, is the sole responsibility in each country of one man, and not of a Cabinet. Much, indeed almost everything, depends on the impression that one august personage may receive of the views and intentions of another individual, equally august. Policies become subjective, rather than objective, with an increasing element of caprice, for '*Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point.*' The task of ambassadors becomes even less enviable than of old, that of our Foreign Secretary increasingly arduous, the avenues to be explored, in terms of mileage, yet longer, for the new august seldom attend conferences except within their own territory, and never meet at Geneva. Yet some of them, with all their power, perhaps envy the member for the Spen

Valley, who holds the seals of office from a beloved monarch and enjoys the support of a united House of Commons.

* * * * *

One day this month a woman, not a constituent, came to me at the House with a request for advice. A little over two years ago her son had been sent to a Home Office school (formerly called a reformatory or industrial school) for three years for having had a child, when he was just sixteen, by a girl just under that age. After two exemplary years at the school, during which he won all the best prizes, he was released on licence to do a year's course at a technical school. He did one term there and earned a good report. Then, quite suddenly, in the middle of the second term, he made an excuse to go home, where he placed before his mother a form which he said the school wanted her to fill up before he returned. She signed it, she said, without looking. Thus armed (with the written permission of his surviving parent to marry) he went to the registry office and married the girl.

He knew that a condition of his licence, and of pupilage at the school, was that he should not marry, but he forgot the consequences. He, a married man with a wife and child, was at once sent back to the school he had so joyfully left.

His mother was keeping the wife and the child and paying for his keep, and now (three months later) it was known that another child was coming. Could I assist to secure his release? I advised an appeal to the Home Office, which was successful.

* * * * *

The very remarkable report of a Committee, on '*Fractures*,' appointed, not by the Government, but by the British Medical Association, under the chairmanship of a great surgeon, Mr. H. S. Souttar (published last month), deserves more attention than it has hereto received, though Sir Charles Harris refers to it elsewhere in this Review. After careful investigation the Committee has reached the conclusion that in the majority of hospitals to-day there is no efficient organisation to deal with fractured limbs, that elementary principles of treatment are neglected, resulting

in a vast amount of permanent disability that might easily have been avoided. The loss involved—to the public, to individual sufferers, to employers and to insurance companies—is enormous.

'Whereas incapacity remains permanently in only 1 per cent. of patients treated in organised clinics,' in a series of 276 typical cases treated in general hospitals or by their own doctors, 'no less than 37 per cent. were permanently disabled.'

The Committee remarks that during the war great advances were made in dealing with fractures: a high perfection of technique was attained, and standardised by organisation. 'This fine organisation has largely disappeared, the treatment of fractures in the majority of hospitals has not materially altered, and in few centres is there any organisation superior to that which existed twenty years ago.' They recommend the establishment of a model fracture unit, the provision of rehabilitation centres in each industrial area, and close institutional co-operation, beginning in London.

It is a disturbing report, and can scarcely be passed over by those who administer King Edward VII.'s Fund, or who control our great voluntary hospitals all over England. It should not be ignored by insurance companies. Public opinion is increasingly critical of the medical services in this country. The present system, one aspect of which is here so severely criticised, has clearly failed to ensure even moderately effective treatment of common fractures. Believers in private practice and voluntary hospitals will do well to bestir themselves.

* * * * *

The Upper House is usually a better forum for the discussion of current controversies than the Commons, for the Lords have no constituents to consider, nor so many sectional or regional interests to represent and, on occasions, to placate. The debate in April on 'Ribbon Development' proved an exception. All the speakers took the same line, with a unanimity that concealed the real difficulties. There is another side to the question.

Probably half of all houses in the 'ribbons' have been built during the past ten years, not by private enterprise, but by local authorities under housing schemes. Almost none

of them would have been built had not sewers and water mains, and probably also gas and electric light and power services, been laid down under or along the road expressly to provide for such houses, often with money borrowed, after inquiry, for the purpose.

Houses along main roads are not unpopular; on the contrary, they are greatly sought after. They are not so liable to be overlooked as are houses on the new estates, where every backgarden is overlooked from half a score of upper windows. The omnibus services are at the front door and the country at the back door—an ideal that many seek. They are, in general, cheaper, for the construction of roads and subsidiary service mains of all kinds, for a small estate means something like 2s. a week extra rent.

Much land adjoining highways has been sold at high prices by local authorities to builders for development, often with reasonable covenants and subject to 'building and improvement lines' under the Acts of 1925 and private Acts. Two thousand five hundred miles of roads have been thus protected up to March 31 last. The power to purchase land within 220 yards of the centre of a road has been vested in the Minister of Transport since 1915, but almost never exercised, either on behalf of the central Government or of county or local authorities, who have long had power to purchase land abutting on a road. The cost has proved too great, and the public at large are not interested. Parliament may pass a Bill giving county councils power to deprive landowners of access from their land to highways and, perhaps, power to fix a building line, but county councils will be slow to act.

The complaint that motorists cannot enjoy the country side as they career along the highways because local workmen are living in houses on either side is not entirely sincere, especially when it is accompanied by brazen demands for higher speeds. We must remember that those who live in the houses can and do enjoy what they can see of the country. The proper remedy is to promote more garden cities like Letchworth and Wythenshawe, where men and women can find not only a home but a living.

Since the war the Commissioners of Crown Lands have rebuilt Oxford Circus without adding a yard to the roadway,

which is no broader than Nash designed it. There is in consequence no room for access by subway to the tube station. No one protested. The Corporation of the City of London allowed rebuilding opposite the Mansion House, rejecting the last chance of relieving the worst traffic centre in Europe. The adjoining landowners asked and obtained, on a valuation, vast sums for the tiny strip surrendered, though far less than they asked. So long as similar obtuseness is visible in every large town, impoverished farmers and owners of agricultural land which has some value as a building site are entitled to ask that they should have no less equitable treatment than is accorded to investors in office and shop sites in our great cities.

* * * * *

The Jubile, to use for once the spelling of the word in Leviticus xxv., whence we derive it, was ordained to the children of Israel as a holy year of thanksgiving in which they were 'to proclaim liberty.' In that year bondmen were to be released, the poor brother, fallen in decay, was to be relieved. The King's Jubilee Trust Fund is conceived in that spirit, and should set the tone of rejoicings in all parts of His Majesty's realm. The monarchy is an essential and inseparable element of democracy as we know it: it has been given to King George to strengthen it in this country at a moment when it has wilted or perished elsewhere. The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council is the magnet which enables men under many Governments, but of the same mettle, to come together and remain united. The King's sons, travelling freely and widely, have carried the royal tradition to the most distant parts, and have also acquired, like the Queen, a knowledge of every aspect of our national life which few commoners, and none of their age, can claim. To her, and to them also, gratitude is due. When, in this year of Jubilee, we count our blessings we do well to give first place to Their Majesties, who, with their family, are to every citizen the embodiment of our national life and hope.

In every church and chapel in the realm will be sung, as at the Queen's Jubilee, Rinkart's paraphrase of Ecclesiasticus i. 22-24, *Nun danket alle Gott*, in Winkworth's translation.

Now thank we all our God,
With heart, and hands and voices,
Who wondrous things hath done,
In whom His world rejoices.
Who from our mother's arms
Hath blessed us on our way.

O may this bounteous God
Through all our life be with us,
With ever joyful heart,
And blessed peace to cheer us;
And keep us in His grace,
And guide us when perplexed.

Let us remember, as we sing, that in Germany, whence came the hymn and the tune we love so well, it is being sung, with no less sincerity, by a nation not less united, nor fundamentally less Christian in temper, whatever we, or they, may think of their Government.

Regnavit deus, irascantur populi. The Lord is King, be the people never so unquiet.

ARNOLD WILSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Book of the Month is, to me, Douglas Jerrold's *England* (Arrowsmith, 3s. net). It has all the vigour of his classic pamphlet, *The Lie about The War*, for which he has never been forgiven in some quarters where 'ideals' are more important than factual truth. Were I the headmaster of a Roman Catholic public school, I would make it a text-book; were I headmaster of a Protestant public school, I would think twice, but still make it a text-book. It makes chastening reading for Tories and Socialists alike—more epigrammatic than Dean Inge and more apposite to the issues now before us.

In six introductory chapters the author tells us in something more than outline the English story from the days of Julius Cæsar to 1931, seeing in the process rather the aggregation of property than the diffusion of liberty as the central *motif*. He takes the more modern view of the constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century, and claims that the increased powers of the men of property which were obtained were at the expense of the people rather than at that of the Crown. The contemporary survey is in four chapters: 'England under State Capitalism,' 'England as a World Power,' 'English Character and Opinion,' and a concluding chapter on 'Prospects.' Our present politico-economic system he regards as just as clear and striking a departure from the pre-war *régime* as Fascism or Communism, and gives some challenging reasons for an unconventional judgment. Equally original is his analysis of the post-war 'organisation for peace,' which he assesses as resting on a statistical instead of a moral basis, and for that reason foredoomed to failure. He uses in this lecture, I fancy, some of the arguments which he put forward in a striking lecture at Chatham House a year or two ago.

The Will and the Way to Socialism. Major C. R. Attlee, M.P., 1935 (Methuen, 2s. 6d.) Major Attlee is Deputy Leader of the Socialist Opposition. He is not one of the long-haired, long-legged, long-winded, long-chair group of writers on this and many other subjects. He has a good war record, has taken an active part in municipal affairs and has held high office. He is a hard worker and diligent. He deserves a

respectful and attentive hearing when he sets out, as in this work, to explain not *why* the Socialist Party 'challenge the whole basis of society in this country and the world,' but *how*, by democratic methods, it will take 'the next step.' He claims that 'the age of abundance has begun—that poverty can be a thing of the past if we so determine.' Shelley said as much in his *Defence of Poetry* in 1821.

We have more moral, political and historical wisdom than we know how to reduce into practice. We have wide scientific and economical knowledge that can be accommodated to the just distribution of the produce which it multiplies.

'The typical English figure of John Bull is not a stout old farmer in top-boots, but a man with a white tie and diamond studs, corduroy trousers and broken boots on his feet, the part of him which supports the whole being worst treated.' Thus Major Attlee. Such a cartoon would do us all good, but alas, as Mr. Jerrold points out, John Bull's place has been taken in popular cartoons by Strube's 'little man'—a bewildered, helpless clerk, a typical city-bred slave. 'Conservative politicians like Mr. Macmillan, and business men like Sir Basil Blackett and Lord Melchett,' says Major Attlee, would agree with him in claiming for the State the duty, and therefore the right to become the directing force in industry: but they and he would plan for different kinds of society. Like Mr. Amery, Major Attlee demands an Inner Cabinet or a Planning Committee of the Cabinet, but, unlike Mr. Amery, he considers that this involves control by the Government of the mechanism of external trade, finances and basic industries.

Space forbids further questions: it is a book to be studied carefully by those who desire to understand not merely not what Socialists want, which differs little from what everyone desires, but how one of their leaders would set about getting it.

A. T. W.

Towards a National Party, R. C. Davison (Longmans, 2s. 6d.), is twice as long as Major Attlee's little book, but not half as good. The Preface by the Prime Minister is much the best thing in it. The rest consists of five essays by Members of the National Labour Committee. Lord Elton asserts that a National Government is indispensable and claims for it the crowning virtue of strength, and ability to

make laws quickly. If his essay was the best that could be said in favour of a National Government its supporters might well feel down-hearted.

Mr. R. C. Davison writes well on social policy ; he thinks that women are ousting men from employment to an extent which is undesirable and unsocial. He speaks uncautiously of the wonderful success of the forty-hour week in the U.S.A. He believes in part-time education for adolescents and the development of a State medical service. There is nothing here to which any serious student of affairs should object on principle. Mr. Denman contributes a note urging the raising of the school-leaving age. He nowhere reminds us that parents can, and are urgently pressed, to keep their children at school but seldom do so, even when from £5 to £10 a week is coming into the family. The fact is that neither the parents nor the children believe that the elementary school, as it is, holds anything for them after fourteen. The last day of school is eagerly welcomed : for whatever reason, after sixty years of experience, most parents believe that the children have had enough of it at fourteen. And no nation spends money on elementary education so lavishly as we do. The other National Labour M.P., Mr. K. Lindsay, makes the now familiar case for 'self government in industry' as misleading a slogan as was ever coined by the Political and Economic Planning Group, of which he is Secretary. He is for compulsion all round, a great hierarchy of planners, with powers to compel minorities to conform to the desires of the good and great captains of industry. Of the Kreuger crisis and the Royal Mail debacle he is discreetly silent. This essay might more suitably have been published by the New Fabian Research Bureau.

Professor Zimmern's contribution is six months old. He fancifully divides the European countries into Welfare and Power Groups. In the former he places Britain, the greatest of world powers, with Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In the latter, apparently, the other Great Powers, as though, for example, Italy and Germany were less concerned than we are with the welfare of individual men, women and children. The distinction is fanciful, and his conclusions unhelpful. The National Government will not assist its cause by circulating this little book.

A. T. W.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCC—JUNE 1935

AN UNDEFENDED ISLAND¹

By RUDYARD KIPLING

I AM, unfortunately, a producer of fiction ; but outside office-hours, I plead guilty to an interest in facts.

Will you allow me just to run through a few facts which may be of interest to our England of to-day ?

First, let it be granted that when men are dead, they cease to live, and, as Solomon says, 'neither have they a portion any more for ever in anything that is done under the sun.'

Great Britain's quota of dead in the War was over eight hundred thousand when the books were closed in '21 or '22. It would be within the mark to say that three-quarters of a million of these were English. Furthermore, a large but unknown number died in the next few years from wounds or disease directly due to the War. There is a third category of

¹ An address delivered to the Royal Society of St. George on May 6, 1935. Reprinted with the permission of Mr. Rudyard Kipling.

men incapacitated from effort by the effects of shock, gassing, tubercle and the like. These carry a high death-rate because many of them burned out half a life's vitality in three or four years. They, too, have ceased to count.

All these were men of average physique, and, but that they died without issue, would have continued our race. The selective elimination of so many men of one type, and their replacement by so many persons of another type and their children, led to an extensive revision of all standards of English thought and action.

Now, there were a number of persons who, for various motives, had dissociated themselves from the War at the outset. These, however, were all able to answer to their names at the close of hostilities and to rejoin the national life with a clear field before them.

Still they were not happy. There is a necessity laid upon man to justify himself to himself in order that he may continue to live comfortably with himself. Our initial errors, as we all know, are trivial. It is what we say and do to prove to ourselves that our errors were really laborious virtues which build up the whole-time hells of this life.

So it was in exact accord with human nature that, very shortly after the War, a theory should have sprung up that the War had been due to a sort of cosmic hallucination which had infected the nations concerned with a sort of cosmic hysteria. This theory absolved those who had not interested themselves in the War and, by inference, condemned those who had; thus supplying comfort and moral support where needed. Naturally, the notion bore fruit. For this reason.

Most children and all nations, when they have hurt themselves, instinctively run indoors and ask to be told a pretty tale. So it was with us, and so to us, too, a tale was told. (You may remember we were all a little fatigued at the time.) The special virtue of our tale was that its moral bases were as inexpugnable as the most upright preceptress could desire. Here they are:—

All pain—whether it come from hitting one's head against a table or from improvising a four years' war at four days' notice—is evil. All evil is wicked. And since, of all evils, war gives the most pain to the most people, wickedest of all things is war. Wherefore, unless people wish to be thought

wicked, they must so order the national life that never again shall war in any form be possible.

Granted the first premiss, the rest of the reasoning is unanswerable—on paper. But why the entire commination-service should have been addressed by ourselves to ourselves is a little obscure. For if ever there was a converted nation since the days of Saint Augustine, it was us.

A little later—in '22 or '23—on the heels, you might say, of Rachel mourning for her children—our electorate was enlarged by the enfranchisement of all Englishwomen over twenty-one.

This gave renewed impetus to our national ideal of an ever-rising standard of living and the removal of want, discomfort, and the accidents of life from the lives of all our people. To this end we built up, and are now building, gigantic organisations to control and handle every detail of those lives. But for reasons which I shall try to show we chose—we *chose*—not to provide that reasonable margin of external safety without which even the lowest standard of life cannot be maintained in this dangerously congested island.

The world outside England had other preoccupations. Like ourselves, it had dealt—had been compelled to deal—with an opponent whose national life and ideals were based on a cult—a religion, as it now appears—of war, which exacted that all his nationals should be trained at any cost to endure as well as to inflict punishment.

In this our opponent was excusable. He had won his place in civilisation by means of three well-planned wars waged within two generations. He had been checked somewhat in his fourth war, but soon after the close of it—in '24 or '25—seemed to be preparing for a fifth campaign.

In this, also, our opponent was excusable. His path was made easy for him. Stride for stride with his progress towards his avowed goal, *we* toiled, as men toil after virtue, to cast away a half, and more than a half, of our defences in all three elements and to limit the sources of their supply and renewal. This we did explicitly that we might set the rest of the world a good example.

That the rest of the world—down to little uneasy neutrals who had seen what can happen to a neutral at a pinch—was openly or furtively trying to arm itself against whispered

eventualities had nothing to do with our case. It was laid upon us to set the world an example, no matter at what risks. And we did.

For several years—more than ten, I believe—our responsible administrators dwelt, almost with complacency, on the magnitude of the risks we were running, and on our righteousness in running them, and through all those years our people were made to appear as if they loved to have it so.

But through all those irrecoverable years a large part of the world outside England had not been idle.

To-day, State-controlled murder and torture, open and secret, within and outside the borders of a State; State-engineered famine, starvation and slavery as requisite; State-imposed godlessness, or State-prescribed paganism; are commonplaces of domestic administration throughout States whose aggregate area is between one-fifth and one-fourth of the total land-surface of the Eastern hemisphere. These modern developments have been accepted in England without noticeable protest even from quarters usually quick to protest.

Nevertheless, the past year or so has given birth to the idea that our example of State-defended defencelessness has not borne much fruit, and that we have walked far enough along the road which is paved with good intentions. It is now arranged that, in due time, we will take steps to remedy our more obvious deficiencies. So far, good; but if that time be *not* given to us—if the attack of the future is to be on the same swift 'all-in' lines as our opponents' domestic administrations—it is possible that, before we are aware, our country may have joined those submerged races of history who passed their children through fire to Moloch in order to win credit with their Gods.

And yet, the genius of our race fights for us in the teeth of doctrine! The abiding springs of the English spirit are not of yesterday or the day before. They draw from the immemorial continuity of the nation's life under its own Sovereigns. They are fed by a human relationship more intimate and more far-reaching than any the world has ever known. They make part of a mystery as unpurchasable as it is incommunicable.

One has but to look back over the last century of our past to realise how that Royal relationship set itself—through

Mother, Son, and Grandson—to consolidate and prepare for our future and to meet the hazards of our present. Three generations of our Ruling House have accepted whatever burden of responsibility, whatever merciless demand for effort, whatever of personal risk, the honour or the needs of their people laid upon them. Each generation in turn has bowed the neck to unbroken sacrifice, devotion and patience.

These things are assuredly not exhibited for the sake of example only. But they have come, by cumulative weight of virtue and toil, to create, to stiffen, and to inspire, the whole taken-for-granted fabric of sane and silent discharge of duty—both in the island and throughout our Empire—on which our destiny depends.

That—behind and beyond all—is our strength and hope. It is in that hope that I ask you to drink to England and the English.

RUDYARD KIPLING.

THE RAPE OF ABYSSINIA?

By W. G. FITZ-GERALD

The British have come with the Abyssinians to Wal Wal. But you Somalis are as lions; and if lions meet prey on the path, they leap at the throat and kill it! You will do the same. . . . Now I go to speak with these people, and see what they want. Hitherto my aeroplanes have come, but armoured cars will come also, each one with three guns. When these are here, *you* will not need to make war upon the Abyssinians; for the machines that run on land and machines that fly in the air will alone suffice. Then you shall see what I can do—I will grind the Abyssinians like coffee!—CAPITANO ROBERTO CIMMARUTA, Inspector of the Frontiers, to his native levies at Wardair, in the Ogaden, November 23, 1934.

LITTLE did that artillery officer think that his fiery words, uttered amid the mimosa-scrub and limestone of the Somali marches, would ever be published on this page. I take them from testimony sworn on the Qu'ran by a deserter from his own *banda*, and given to members of the Joint Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Commission, sitting at Haradijit, on December 11, 1934. The document before me is signed by Lorenzo Tazaz, Alex T. Curle, and, lastly, with 'a thumb-print of the left hand' of Egal Yusuf, a young Italian conscript who kept a store at Wardair.

Six days before this, Captain Cimmaruta's force had opened fire without a moment's warning, with tanks and aircraft in support, upon the Joint Commission's escort at the Wal Wal wells under Fitaurari (or 'Leader of the Advance-Guard') Shiferra Balcha, who is Governor of the Ogaden. At the moment of onset the Abyssinians were in their tents doing repairs, or else out grazing their horses. Shrill whistles blew, and the orders rang out: '*A terra—Fuoco!*' At the first volley Fitaurari Alemayehu fell dead, and with him many other officers.

All told, Abyssinia's killed in this onslaught were 107 men and 45 more wounded.

Luckily, there were five British witnesses on the spot; and the report of our own Commissioner (Lieut.-Colonel E. H. M. Clifford, R.E.) is conclusive as to the origin of an affair of far-reaching international import. Both he and his Abyssinian colleague, Fitaurari Tessama Bantié, were astonished to find their passage barred by an Italian *banda* 'armed with modern rifles.' The British Mission hoisted its flag in the face of this truculence. Then a joint letter was sent to Captain Cimmaruta at Wardair, 'protesting against aggressive opposition of the Italian *banda* in Abyssinian territory. . . .'

The British Mission [Colonel Clifford goes on to say] made every effort to arrive at an equitable solution, but was constantly thwarted by the unconciliatory and disobliging attitude of the Italian officer. This may be judged from his remarks, several times repeated: 'Take it, or leave it,' and also by the threat that, in case of refusal, 'he would send for several hundred soldiers.'

Now came two Italian 'planes flying lower over the Missions—'who were busy at the moment with Captain Cimmaruta. . . .' 'During the last series of dives, one of the crew of aeroplane S.O.4 was seen training a machine-gun on the Commission.' Colonel Clifford then 'expressed to Captain Cimmaruta his great indignation at this provocative demonstration.' And Fitaurari Tessama Bantié asked how such conduct agreed with the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty of Amity and Conciliation signed on August 2, 1928.

All of Cimmaruta's letters were minatory in tone. Thus on November 23, 1934, he wrote *in Arabic* (a language which the recipient could not read):

To the Commander of the Amharas [Fitaurari Sheferra Balcha, Governor of the Ogaden]: Understand me well. Until I convene thee for a parley, I beg thee not to provoke any incidents with the *banda* now at Wal Wal. If thou hast anything to do with us, apply to me at Wardair. Understand that well, and I wait thy reply.

Three days later that same Abyssinian governor received another letter—this time in Italian:

as requested by you. . . . You have asked [the Captain wrote] that we should refrain from any act of violence. I have done so. I am ready to receive you, and can have you escorted to Galadi. Yesterday I went to Wal Wal to tell you of this, and also sent a message through a *capo shesha* [chief brigand, or bandit!] of your own. But I have received no reply.

Who would believe that such language could be used by a foreign trespasser, just then fully 100 kilometres within Abyssinian territory, to a high dignitary of that ancient empire?

The 'act of violence' was not long delayed. And Italian 'planes followed it up by dropping five more bombs on the Boundary Missions' luggage at Ado, where Ato Ali-Nur had been left in charge after the retreat.

News of this tragedy was despatched from Haradijit on December 9 to the Palace Chamberlain and Foreign Minister in Addis Ababa—Belathen-Güeta Heruy Wolde Selassié: his son is a Cambridge graduate and has served on our Political Staff in the Sudan. This Minister—who is also chief adviser of the Emperor—was aghast at the story. And to him promptly came Signor Mombelli, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, with a very different version of it: 'Armed Abyssinians have attacked us without warning, and in force. Our killed and wounded are not yet known.' The Emperor's attention was urgently called to 'so grave and gratuitous an aggression.' Pending further instructions, Mombelli was 'to register the most emphatic protest' against an outrage 'for which the Royal Government intends to exact ample apology and complete reparation, which it will define as soon as possible.'

Replying to this in an Amharic dispatch dated 'Kedar 30th, 1927' (December 9, 1934), Foreign Minister Heruy invoked 'Article V. of the Treaty of Amity and Arbitration between our two Governments.' On December 11 Signor Mombelli was instructed to say that 'Captain Cimmaruta's conduct was quite correct,' since 'there can be no doubt that Wal Wal and Wardair belong to Italian Somaliland.' And again: 'Armed Abyssinians, without any provocation, launched an attack in force upon our post; consequently, the responsibility for this sanguinary clash lies entirely with the Abyssinian Government.'

Now came the terms of 'a formal apology and reparations commensurate with the serious losses and damage we have sustained.'

(1) Gabré Merriam, Governor of the Harrar, will proceed to Wal Wal there to make due amends, while his troops render honours to the Italian flag.

(2) The Abyssinian Government will pay to the Royal Legation in

Addis Ababa a sum of two hundred thousand M.T. dollars for our heavy losses in dead and wounded.

(3) All persons concerned in this attack must be arrested and deprived of their commands. They will be present at the Flag-ceremony, and thereafter must undergo suitable punishment.

In reply to this the Foreign Minister proposed 'an arbitral tribunal' to settle the matter 'in the interests of our two countries.' The Emperor was most anxious about this. It was sharply declined, however: 'so definite and clear' were the facts of the affray, 'that there can be no doubt of its nature as a surprise attack.' Therefore Article V. of the 1928 Treaty could not apply in so flagrant a case. 'The Italian Government must insist that the reparation and apologies due to it shall be made without delay, at the same time renewing its former demands.'

Then, for the first time, Belathen-Güeta Heruy sent a radio-telegram of appeal to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations 'for communication to the Council and States Members.' In a few lines the salient facts were set out, with 'the gravity of the situation' stressed, and—'detailed confirmation and documents to follow.'

Six months elapsed. During that time Signor Mussolini withdrew his civil governors from Asmara, in Eritrea, and from Mogadiscio, on the Indian Ocean. These he replaced with the ablest soldiers he could find—Generals Emilio de Bono and Rodolfo Graziani—at the same time dispatching a large modern army to Massua, 2500 miles away, and to the Somali port, which is almost as far again. By the end of April, £10,300,000 had been spent in war preparations, and immense purchases of foodstuffs and raw materials made in Yugo-Slavia. Such momentous steps could only portend one of two things: an armed invasion of the old highland empire, or else a 'Prussian' *diktat* to Hailé Selassié I., which that cultured and all-too-progressive little monarch could never accept without losing his throne as 'King of Kings,' and throwing his loose and feudal realm back into the fierce chaos from which rugged Menelik of Shoa had rescued it by main force a generation ago.

For over fifty years Italy has eyed with necessitous longing this singular domain in North-East Africa. Her economic problems are acute, and resemble Japan's: poverty of the soil

and sub-soil at home, with a teeming population and scant outlets for their energy overseas—even in the continent to which Italy has always looked, instinctively and geographically, for her imperial expansion. It is to be hoped that this 'Japanese' analogy will not be pressed too far; that Abyssinia may not turn out to be a second 'Manchukuo,' viewed as so vital an urge to the interests of a proud and needy people that they will face even a rupture with the League, if it should pronounce them to be in the wrong in an armed quest of what looms to *them* as their right—in the tragic Hegelian sense of clashing human motives.

Now it is a long way—much longer politically than in point of time—from the Italy of Francesco Crispi to that of Benito Mussolini. *Il Duce* I consider the ablest constructive statesman of our post-war period. What he has done for his people, spiritually as well as materially, is a miracle to us who knew the languor of Italy under Giolitti and the old régime of cynical intrigues.

But, as all the world knows—from his own forceful lips—Mussolini's god is the Gun; is it not his glory to place it even in the hands of babes, those little 'Sons of the She-Wolf'? He could not plough a pioneer furrow, nor scatter wheat in Littoria, his new reclaimed province in the Pontine Marshes, without having each act punctuated with cannon-salvoes, in order to drive home to his colonists the sovereign efficacy of Force in human affairs.

Si monumentum requiris, circumspice! Well might this blacksmith's son and life-long rebel, whom Fate forged into a dynamic titan, repeat the proud tag as he surveys the nation he has roused and re-created by sheer strength of will and prescient sagacity.

Yet it is not enough, the Duce feels. A still greater guerdon would be a rich '*Italia Ultramarina*'—a tropic storehouse of the primal needs of modern industry: coal, iron and copper, fuel-oil and cotton, sugar, coffee and grain. All these, with rare metals and more, exist in the Abyssinian plateau's glorious climate. An anarchic land is this one: a strange survival unto our own day, socially based upon chattel slavery; roadless and bridgeless, with rock-salt passing current as 'money' outside the few squalid towns. A forgotten Christian polity is here, trailing away into African

savagery in the lowlands—Moslem and heathen—to say nothing of a metropolis where the very elements of sanitation are still left to the hyenas and pariah dogs of the dusty lanes and the eucalyptus woods beyond.

All this is true—though I must say Addis was given a drastic (and very costly) clean-up for the coronation in 1930. Nearly £200,000—an enormous sum for a barbaric treasury to find—was spent on those weird and glowing displays. For Ras Tafari desired, not only to impress his foreign guests (the Duke of Gloucester was among them), but also to justify to his own warrior princes the awesome honorifics of 'King of Kings and Elect of God, Power of the Holy Trinity, Conquering Lion of Judah and Emperor of Ethiopia!' But when all is said, this remains a primitive land, with the Semitic Amharas 'on top' as the ruling (and highly intelligent) caste, and a jumble of negroid races below them.

So Italy adds to her other pleas for a free hand her mission as an agent of our white civilisation in the last stronghold of African negation. Her voice on this score is very loud. Mussolini has a well-drilled propaganda department under his son-in-law, Conte Galeazzo di Ciano. So Italy's 'case' is made to ring through the Old World and the New, whilst Addis Ababa's is hardly heard at all; it is like the tinkle of an Alpine cowbell beside skilled radio-broadcasters whose views cover the whole earth.

But if we of Britain have any passion, it is surely for fair play, especially where the weak are pitted against the strong. For this reason unbiassed facts may be welcomed on the drama which is about to be staged in those hot coastal lowlands which are Abyssinia's first line of defence.

Mussolini is Italy. All power is his; and the note of him is pride, as a study of his own *Scritti e Discorsi* reveals, or a session in the Senate galleries when *Il Duce*—a magical mover of men's minds—thrills the Chamber with 'the character and extent of our precautionary measures'—at Ethiopia's anxious door. In this (he insists) 'nobody can arrogate the intolerable claim to intervene in our concern. Only Italy may judge in so very delicate a matter; this Italy, who "has in her history a dramatic, bloody and unforgettable experience on this point".'

Here Mussolini alludes to the utter annihilation of General

Baratieri's army in 1896, and the humiliation and shame which that rout entailed at home and abroad. Then, as now, the acquisition of Abyssinia was the goal. But Menelik, King of Shoa, lay in wait for the invaders with 90,000 of his men strongly posted in the hills above Adua. One after the other, Baratieri's four brigades were overwhelmed, cut up or captured. Foremost among the fugitives was that sorry Commander-in-Chief himself. His court-martial in Rome, with its bitter verdict; the fall of Crispi's Cabinet amid public fury; the large indemnity paid to Abyssinia and the first of many treaties made with the Emperor—these tumbling events belong to history.

But vengeance for that disaster is a live motive in Italy's present ferment. One saw 'Adua' chalked on the troop-trains at Messina and Naples during the recent mobilisation, with fervid vows to wipe out that disgrace. For those fierce Shoans, Amharas and Gallas had mutilated their prisoners and the wounded in a way that may not be named. These survivors were put out of the way at home: and from that day to this hatred on the one side, mistrust and contempt on the other, have marked all relations between the two countries. This fact may account for Captain Cimmaruta's conduct at Wal Wal last December.

But if Crispi was over-eager to seize his African prize, Mussolini has outdone him by transporting a large army at heavy cost to Massua and Mogadiscio, with port facilities there of the slimmest, and waterless deserts inland. His first desire is to unite the useless Eritrea with far-off Somaliland by a new railway—as the tentative Pact with us in 1925 sought to do. But in 1923 young Ras Tafari (the present Emperor) had squeezed Abyssinia into the League of Nations with rare skill, on the promise that he would abolish chattel slavery in a mediæval land where Church and State have for a thousand years been founded upon what the United States planters of 1860 called 'our peculiar institution.'

In 1932 Lord Noel Buxton and Lord Polwarth went to Addis Ababa to see Hailé Selassié ('Power of the Holy Trinity') on this question. Of course, little or nothing had been done—nor even can be, while Abyssinia remains intact. The Emperor's anti-slavery edicts are no more than pious wishes. His feudal lords go their own way in a vague

'heptarchy' where the dominant race have no love for labour, and where their Galla serfs on the land are a gay and care-free lot, knowing less of the outer world than do the Chinese of Turkestan.

A grave and graceful figure is the little Emperor—a man of hieratic pose, speaking perfect French; and even fair English with our Minister, Sir Sidney Barton, in whom he confides as a proven friend. His one desire is to be left in peace, hoping by degrees to uplift his very mixed peoples, with Japan as his model polity—the Japan into whose millennial stagnation America's guns broke so rudely in early Victorian days. 'And look at her now!', muses Hailé Selassié. He leans to white nationals who have no *arrière-pensée* in dealing with Abyssinia. Belgian and Swedish officers have drilled and modernised his army. Norwegian doctors and nurses staff new hospitals copied from those he saw in Paris and London during his tour in 1924. A Swiss jurist advises his slave courts. To American engineers the Emperor looks for roads and bridges in the chief towns. His prospecting geologists are either Germans or Anglo-Egyptians. And, after years of doubt and hesitation, the famous barrage works at Lake Tsana, in the Gojam mountains, were entrusted to the J. G. White Engineering Corporation of New York.

That much-debated dam was to conserve the waters of the Blue Nile upon which the Soudan's economic life and Egypt's own must depend. It is still 'in the air,' however. Flowing out of a crater at 6000 feet in a sacred region of churches and shrines, that vital flood has figured in Anglo-Abyssinian pacts ever since 1902, when old Menelik agreed not to interfere with it without our consent. Here, then, is another *crux* in the Abyssinian affair. In 1925 Italy offered to press our claim to build this dam, if we would help her in the Eritrea-Somali railway concession. But this line would ruin the Djibouti-Addis metre-gauge of France, which has long carried 80 per cent. of Abyssinia's trade. And again, our own possessions have for many years been harried by raiders after cattle, ivory and slaves; and these the Emperor has been powerless to stop. It was these same forays which Mussolini's assistant, Signor Lessona, had in mind during the recent Abyssinian debate in the Roman Senate. To that Under-Secretary of State this long-marooned Empire loomed

as 'a permanent danger to adjacent European colonies.' France, he said, had suffered outrage: 'Great Britain can present a long list of bloody invasions and slave-drives in Kenya and the Sudan.' Clearly, then, 'it was Fascist Italy, as the Power primarily interested in Abyssinia, which was to-day defending the lofty cause of civilisation over there in the general interest of Europe.'

Neither would the dictator himself brook any dictation from outsiders, howsoever suave, in 'the timely forethought' he was showing in landing troops—'though the number of workman sent to East Africa perhaps exceed the soldiers.' *Il Duce* preferred 'the reproach of having erred on the side of excess, rather than to fall short when the security of our Colonies and the life—be it only one of our home or native troops—might be endangered.' At least 100,000 men of all arms, with full panoply of acquisitive coercion, if not of downright invasion, are now on the spot, and are being added to each month, though Italy's budget shows a deficit equivalent to eight weeks' revenue.

This being so, the strictures of the Conte di Ciano's Press show a lack of humour. In the *Giornale d'Italia* Virginio Gayda scathes all those who inspire and aid the 'mad war preparations of the Abyssinians.' In a few weeks, we are told, 10,000 mausers, 200 machine-guns and 2,000,000 cartridges were delivered to them. And quite openly the Emperor went down to Djibouti (nearly 500 miles from Addis) to receive yet more munitions from Liège and Prague. Germany, too, was said to be sending chemicals for gas, as well as Junker 'planes. In Berne, Italy's Minister complained to the Federal Government about the sale of passenger aircraft by the 'Suissair' concern.

All this reprobation takes a queer cast when we find Japan's Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, posing awkward queries to Italy's own envoy in Tokyo. What of this military air base—the largest on Asia's mainland—which General Lordi is directing at Nanchang, after the Conte di Ciano had himself arranged it as an Italian contract involving \$1,000,000? The Japanese had already protested to the United States State Department over the Central Aviation Academy at Hangchow.

This was staffed with American instructors under a

colonel on the reserve list. Then Captain Frank Hawks, a daring United States ace, was giving joy rides and demonstrations to Chinese *tuchuns* over the river in Shanghai. And as a result, big bombers were sold at £25,000 apiece: Japanese cities, it was pointed out, were within the radius of these machines: hence plain, naked words from the 'Misty Barrier' which is Tokyo's Foreign Office.

But the Americans have been eclipsed through the efforts of Mussolini's son-in-law. As Minister to China some years back, the Conte di Ciano was able to raise both Italy and China's missions from legations to embassy rank. In return, Nanking agreed to receive an air-mission from Rome, while Italy was to refund part of her Boxer indemnity in the shape of aircraft and equipment. As a result, twenty experts under General Lordi were sent to Nanchang, the air general headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist campaign in Central China. Soon the Italian officer was given first place as an air-adviser. Twenty thousand coolies levelled nine square miles of land near the city for an all-weather landing-field, besides repair-shops and four concrete hangars, each 180 feet by 160.

To-day General Lordi's pilots (who still retain their home commissions) are training over 100 Chinese cadets—to the grave displeasure of Japan. So much for the ethics of supplying arms. But whereas Japan is a military Power of the first rank, Abyssinia is still confused and crude—an unknown force even in her own defence, as her many appeals to Geneva have shown. Her Note of mid-May begs the Council to take note of Italy's 'warlike preparations' in sending shiploads of troops and material. 'Moreover, the official speeches which accompany these acts leave no room for doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Royal Italian Government.'

In Addis Ababa, Count Vinci invited the Emperor 'to choose arbitrators of Abyssinian nationality.' But His Imperial Majesty was not so simple as all that. He preferred 'persons of complete independence, high repute and undisputed authority and experience in arbitral tribunals.' All along, the Government in Addis have affirmed their pacific intent:

They again renew the request they have frequently made since the Wal Wal incident—that arbitration shall be at once resorted to. And

sions, given the present state of mind in Addis Ababa, especially among the lesser chieftains who are hostile to any arrangement with Italy.'

Europe, the Duce went on to assure us all, need not fear that the African venture to which he is now committed will in any way weaken or distract his councils nearer home. In the Senate he pointed to 'our military machine,' now 900,000 strong and tended 'with our most vigilant care.' But how will Italy's finances bear such a strain if a colonial war is to be added to it and that in so forbidding a *terrain*, four times Great Britain's area; roadless, rugged and wild, with every man's hand—12,000,000 of a fighting race—against white invaders who have been regarded with peculiar odium for the past forty years?

But Mussolini's heat is manifest. There is in him much of the Mazzini-Garibaldi dash; but no Cavour is in sight to pick a prudent path with *le tact des choses possibles* for these troublous times. A fearless leader, he will take this high African hazard in the spirit of his Florentine mentor, whose advice to 'The Prince' even great Elizabeth read and followed. After all, he reasons, a protectorate would be a godsend to these forlorn and backward Abyssinians.

This new Italy is the glory of a single man. Yet he hopes to crown it by seizing a rich African domain, one that may free his people from what the Fascist Grand Council styles 'our war-servitude'—which is to say, dependence on foreign supplies. Of such a possession this dictator has dreamed, and neither Tripolitana nor the Red Sea and Indian Ocean colonies—as they are—can ever give it to him. But Abyssinia would be a priceless memorial to leave behind when he has passed. It is Italy's last opportunity in a vast Africa, whereof her own share has been but a few casual desert doles. For this reason is it, then, that Mussolini, intent and proud, appears to be moved with the wistful Horatian urge:

Exegi monumentum aere perennius
Regalique situ pyramidum altius!

W. G. FITZ-GERALD.
(*Ignatius Phayre.*)

GERMANY IN MAY

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens, insanientis dum sapientiae consultus erro, nunc retrorsum vela dare atque iterare cursus	My prayers were scant, my offerings few, While witless wisdom fool'd my mind;
cogor relictos: namque Diespiter, igni corusco nubila dividens plerumque, per purum tonantes egit equos volucremque cur- rum;	But now I trim my sails anew, And trace the course I left behind. For lo! the Sire of heaven on high, By whose fierce bolts the clouds are riven,
(HORACE.)	To-day through an unclouded sky His thundering steeds and car has driven.

(CONINGTON.)

It is to-day possible to visit six capitals of Europe in as many days without spending more than three hours in the air on any one day and at a cost no greater than the price of a wagon-lit between the same points. Yet travellers are not more numerous; indeed, Englishmen bent on studying local conditions are less common than in easier times. It is not necessary for a visitor to stay long in the right company at any capital to learn on the spot much more than can be gathered even from *The Times*, or from debates in Parliament.

Of a certain type of writer on peace in Europe (without regard to justice) it may be said to-day, as Carlyle said of an unctuous preacher, 'he is praying for treacle; he will get brimstone.' To seek *à outrance* to maintain the *status quo* at every point is to head straight for war. Few persons in the countries most affected believe it is worth the price; there is neither the will nor the means to do so, except perhaps in Russia. The problem set to statesmen by the nations is to devise some instrument other than war as a means of change. Article XIX. of the Covenant exists, but is unworkable, and

the machinery of the League has hitherto been used to prevent changes. This was foreseen by Sir Eyre Crowe in a memorandum¹ written in October 1916, in which he indicated precisely why 'collective security' will not for long serve to maintain a territorial settlement imposed by a Peace Treaty.

No territorial settlement could be permanently just, even if it was so at the outset. By degrees some Powers would feel it to be unjust, and there would be a division of Powers into two groups—revisionist and anti-revisionist. When a combination of Powers command a preponderance of force—in the widest sense of the word—and the necessary means of aggression, would it be actively resisted, or even passively opposed by economic means which might lead to war? He thought not. A conference could mitigate hasty aggression, but could not prevent it; it could make the issue clear. In the last resort the balance of power reappears as the fundamental problem. Limitation of armaments by agreement, Sir Eyre Crowe observed, presupposes confidence which does not and is not likely to exist: it would fix relative strengths, which would not long be adequate; for as nations grow, and decline, their relations with each other change. Agreements between a few countries are, of all pacts, the most dangerous, because any alteration in the strength of nations outside the agreement (*e.g.*, Russia, Japan, and the United States to-day) would upset its basis and stimulate a new armaments race. The Covenant retained war as a last resort if Article XIX. and other peaceful means of change should fail. The Kellogg Pact banned this weapon; henceforward the only way to secure a change in the *status quo*² was by agreement, or by a breach of treaty obligations.

Whenever heads of Governments, brushing aside the ambassadors whom they formerly retained in foreign capitals to transact business, but now use oftener as post-offices and interpreters, meet each other, the pulses of pressmen beat faster and national temperatures rise. This has not always followed a meeting at Geneva, but, as Lord d'Abernon's memoirs show, it is in general true of International Conferences from Rapallo onwards. It was the immediate result of

¹ Mr. Lloyd George's *Memoirs*, vol. iv., p. 1793.

² It is worth noting that in common parlance the phrase '*status quo*' is an abbreviation of *status quo ante bellum*—not *post bellum*.

the meeting at Stresa and of the special session of the Council of the League called to register the decisions there reached. Mr. Eden's visit gave pleasure in Moscow, but not in this country or elsewhere. Sir John Simon's visit to Hitler, though eighteen months late, opened one door, whereupon the French hastily shut several others. The Stresa conversations demonstrated, not the unity of the Powers there represented, but their inability to act in unison. The status of Abyssinia, for example, is the subject of an Anglo-Franco-Italian Treaty: does anyone suppose that the settlement of this question was advanced by the meeting? Signor Mussolini played a prominent rôle at Stresa; but what weapons are at his disposal to-day? Italy has an immense and growing deficit. She has spent great sums in Austria, in Albania, and in Bulgaria in the hope of securing the hegemony of the Danube basin; the Little Entente stands athwart Mussolini's path. His prestige and that of the Italian army are Italy's only assets to-day. Both have been brought into play recently in the Mediterranean basin and in Abyssinia. In one region, or in both, she must find an outlet for her virile people, whose special gifts for colonisation are insufficiently recognised, but she cannot fight simultaneously in two continents.

The Jubilee celebrations in England and the revelation of the extent of German rearmament, almost on the day that the Peace Ballot closed, have done much to restore a sense of national unity, dulled by the slowly growing sense of emergence from a period of crisis.

France to-day lacks the fervour and discipline that characterise her neighbours. The nation has lost its sense of direction; the youth of France lack unity of ideals, the Government lack confidence. The Communist vote has increased: the cost of living is cruel. Disillusionment reigns and scepticism is widespread.

These are the Stresa Powers. Associated with them to-day is Russia, the great Slave State, home of a sad-faced race, governed by gloomy rulers who have the wolf by the ears and cannot let go. The successors of Lenin still aim at setting Europe ablaze—as the next step towards world revolution. This is their creed, and, whatever Mr. Anthony Eden may have been led to believe, it must remain their goal, though we may readily believe they would prefer to do so by intrigues

at Geneva than by military intervention, which might be disastrous to them.

The next category of Powers to be considered are 'the poor relations' of the countries represented at Stresa—Austria, the Little Entente, and the Danubian States. Austria is the hardest hit. The majority still looks westwards to Germany for economic salvation, but not for a philosophy of life or for a system of government. But only a mere accident prevented a bloodless and popular victory for the Rintelen Government last year. Close co-operation with Germany would have followed, but not incorporation in the Reich. Austrians have an inherited gift for compromise, and South Germany, not Prussia, to-day rules in Berlin. The Chancellor is, of course, an Austrian; Rudolph Hess, born in Egypt, is of South German origin; Goering of Upper Bavaria, Goebbels of Westphalia, and von Neurath of Wurtemberg. With such men Austria can come to terms. Nor have we in Great Britain any reason to intervene. There is little justification for the official view that the maintenance of Austrian independence is a major British interest. We willingly referred the proposed *Anschluss* to the Hague, where it was defeated by eight votes to seven, our representative being in the minority, and in good company.

The late Lord Balfour and Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, in memoranda^a written in 1916, regarded some sort of unification of German-speaking Europe as desirable in British interests. Our best rôle is surely one of friendly non-intervention and complete dissociation from Italian and French manœuvres. There is no doubt that a plebiscite would reject Italian tutelage, and would favour friendly co-operation on economic grounds with Germany.

The voice of Austria is not heard; it is stifled by leaders who, dependent upon Italy, have no support in the country, and by men who have forgotten the events which ended the Triple Alliance in 1915. But memories in Austria are longer than in most parts of Europe, and the sound of the drum on the plains of Lombardy causes little alarm. What is the strength, and what can be the duration of, a Central European Pact, achieved by trampling on Austria, and on the false

^a Mr. Lloyd George's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 833, 877.

premise that Hungary will forego her claims to territorial changes? Trade with Germany is essential to Austria, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria and Hungary. There is no other customer to take her place. Germany takes 20 per cent. of Austrian exports and is increasing her purchases of timber from Carinthia, the Tyrol and Salzburg. Italy has done her best to provide Austria with an alternative market—to the detriment of British trade. She has given bounties and subsidies till she can give no more: she has abandoned the most-favoured-nation treatment in order to give Austria special advantages, but in vain. The natural current of trade between Germany and Austria has been little affected. No commercial agreement which does not include Germany as an active partner can succeed.

Let us now turn to Germany and her outlook on the proposed Eastern Pact, pressed on Herr Hitler by Sir John Simon, on behalf of France and Russia, in July last, and again last March. It proved wholly unacceptable. It brought Asia, represented by Russia, as a party to European territorial issues. That was enough to condemn it in Berlin. Nothing—nothing will induce Herr Hitler to co-operate with Russia. His view is that one cannot touch pitch without being defiled. Communism is the child of want and despair, but it is also a militant creed which can succeed only if it is universal. To make it so, many Russians live, and more will die. Germany has had experience of it: she alone can combat it. She may or may not be right in fearing Russian military forces, but we cannot blame her for refusing to take risks. Mr. Eden (*The Times*, May 16) begs Germany to believe that the fear of Soviet aggression is 'a geographical anachronism,' which can be insured against by 'collective security.' 'Do you believe this yourselves?' replied a German to me. 'Because Afghanistan and Russia are members of the League, have you reduced the garrison on the Indian frontier? Will you abolish a single department at Scotland Yard because Litvinov has been heard to sing "God Save the King," whilst M. Maisky fills his salons with your aristocracy? Only a few months ago you spent weeks forcing through Parliament an unpopular Bill against sedition, though England has never had a Communist Party. To ask us to act on the strength of Mr. Eden's impressions, gained on

a forty-eight-hour visit, is not merely unreasonable—it is an impertinence. Would France have made a treaty with Russia last week if Russia was for us a geographical anachronism?’

Everything in Europe to-day depends upon the personality of a few men. Hitler's first Cabinet contained eleven men, of whom only three had not, for physical reasons, been in the front line. Five had been wounded. What Cabinet in Europe has such a record? They know what war means. Why doubt their desire to avoid it, or their conviction, which those who know something of Russia share, that there are worse horrors than those of war? Yet, for all their passionate hatred of what the philosophy of the Soviets stands for, these determined men, the accepted leaders of a great nation, are, like the French Government less than a generation ago, like the Spanish Government a few short months ago, like Robespierre 150 years earlier, themselves actively supporting the anti-Christian campaign associated with the name of Rosenberg and called the German Faith movement. In so doing they are undermining the strength of Germany and weakening the greatest asset of a great nation—the national character. It was the actively Christian elements in Germany that resisted the disintegrating influences of the post-war period, that opposed the materialistic creed of Communism by proclaiming Christian philosophy, upholding the Christian ethic and the reality of the other self—the spirit of God in man which finds daily expression in self-sacrifice. The Churches as an organised body did little or nothing: the Catholic Centre Party intrigued with either side, as Centre parties do. Yet it remains true that, but for his Christian supporters, Hitler would have failed: he might never have emerged. And he has behind him still a great body of men and women, not active members of the Churches, but Christian by outlook and tradition.

There is beneath the surface to-day a movement definitely hostile to Christianity as such: children are told that a Christian cannot be a good German, that Christianity is a faith which the world has outlived, that the only valid religious conception in modern Germany is a vague theism reminiscent of Hindu mythology. The time may not be far off when professing Christians in Germany may be treated as the Jews have been treated, and proscribed as enemies of the State.

With this spirit, if it develops, there can be no compromise. We have, to our shame, shut our eyes to the horrible persecution of Christians in Russia, in Spain and in Mexico: it is assumed in Germany that as we shut our eyes to these things so readily in our desire to trade with Russia, so shall we, as shopkeepers, be careful not to allow our ethical outlook to embarrass our relations with them. I believe they are wrong, for Germany was once, and is perhaps still, the backbone of Europe, and matters to us and to the world far more than Russia or the rest of Asia.

Though on this matter, for the present, we must suspend judgment, developments are more imminent than I realised when I wrote and spoke on the subject last month—in this Review and in the House of Commons. There is in Nazi doctrine and policy much that is true and good, much to inspire the hope and confidence in the youth of the world. But if those in the party who seek to destroy Christianity gain the upper hand, and the lower triumphs over the higher, then, in my belief, Europe is doomed as surely as if the Soviets, and not Hitler, had emerged victors from the last conflict. The appetite grows with indulgence, and the outlook of some highly-placed officials of the third Reich towards Christianity is a by-product of their persecution of the Jews. It is not a trait which commends itself to us, but it is well to remember that in the past few years persecutions every whit as cruel have been seen, and not long ago, in France, and that cruelty to minorities is a common failing of every country in Eastern Europe and of most countries in Asia, including Turkey, and is one of which Fascists in Italy are not guiltless.

Let us now examine the internal situation of those European Powers most anxious to maintain the *status quo*—too often the equivalent on men's lips of the word 'peace.' All alike are in some form or another allies of France. In Czechoslovakia 6,500,000 Czechs are seeking to hold their own against a minority of Slovaks. The latter consider that the agreement between themselves and Czechoslovakia of November 1918, which alone enabled Masaryk to claim to speak for the nation, has been grossly violated. There is also a dissident and despairing minority of Germans whose economic plight, like that of the Slovaks as a whole, makes them favourably disposed to a policy of economic co-operation

with Germany with full local autonomy. They have just secured a very notable triumph at the polls. The most they claimed to expect was forty-five seats. They secured forty-four. It is clear that the military forces of Czechoslovakia could not, in an emergency, be used with safety beyond her borders. It is stated that she is preparing aerodromes to receive the aeroplanes of her allies, but she is more likely to be a liability than an asset except as a base for air action, and her own industrial centres, though mainly populated by Germans, are within easy reach of Germany.

Rumania has her own discontented and oppressed German and Hungarian minorities in Transylvania. Her army could not safely be used beyond national boundaries. She is a neighbour of Russia, and M. Titulescu shares Herr Hitler's rather than Mr. Eden's view of the danger of Communism. He is most reluctant to have any relations with the Soviets. Yugo-Slavia also has a minority of Slovenes and Croats who resent bitterly, and not unreasonably, the way they have been treated. The Serbs are masters to-day, and the Slovenes and Croats look back upon the Hapsburg *régime* as almost a golden age; yet they would march shoulder to shoulder with Serbs against Italy, the traditional foe of them all, at their door. Each member of the Little Entente is thus faced with serious and deep-seated internal difficulties, as well as with incurable economic ills. Their present condition could scarcely be worse; but it is their life, and change would probably mean decay, if not destruction, for them.

Against the Little Entente and France in the Danube basin are Hungary and Austria. Hungary is discontented and determined; her leaders are moving towards a policy of reconciliation with Germany. Austria is governed by a few men, upheld by Italy and France and, apparently, by the British Government. They have no support among their own people, who would certainly turn them out on a free vote and adopt a policy of friendly co-operation with Germany, to which Bulgaria is also inclined.

Finally, Germany is a potential enemy of the Little Entente, if only by reason of the German irredentist minorities existing in growing numbers in Yugo-Slavia and Rumania. Germany is near, France is far off. In such circumstances little reliance can be placed upon non-aggression or mutual assistance pacts,

so complicated in their interrelation with each other that even the Chancelleries are uncertain as to their effect in any given set of circumstances.

Poland has gone far to reach a practical, as opposed to a paper, agreement with Germany, and Pilsudski's death is unlikely greatly to affect Polish policy. Dictators find it easier to make agreements, and keep them, than democratic Governments. Progress will be slow, but Poland, like Rumania, distrusts French flirtations with Russia. The great killing of suspects in Moscow a few months ago shocked public opinion in Warsaw and is not forgotten, as in far-off England.

Pilsudski's death serves to remind us of the ephemeral nature of political views, especially in England. By defeating the Russian army he did more than even Hitler to save Europe from the fate of Russia. Yet it was his lot to be persistently vilified, as was Mussolini in his early days, by many daily and weekly newspapers in England, represented as a monster who had forcibly dissolved a Parliament, and ruled, not with policemen, but with an army. He has died a revered figure, and Europe breathes less easily till his successor has proved his worth.

The *régime* in Lithuania for the past decade—and the history of Memel since Versailles—has been a growing cause of irritation which, at the moment of my visit to East Prussia, had reached the more perilous stage of genuine national indignation, a force to which any man less strong or secure in his office than Herr Hitler might have capitulated. Memel is a very ancient stronghold of *Deutschtum*, deeply steeped in German tradition, part of Prussia since its foundation, with an assured place in German history. Behind the Lithuanian *régime* is Russia; behind Russia, France; much depends on what line Great Britain takes. The *status quo* here is not long to be tolerated, and will not last. International law has been disregarded, and the Powers have done nothing till the last moment. Memel is a poor advertisement for the League.

The number of published mutual security and non-aggression pacts in force to-day is very large; their relation to each other often obscure, sometimes contradictory. The most important of them all is the newly-concluded Franco-

Russian Treaty, to which, more than anything else, is due the unresponsive attitude of the German Government in recent conversations, and for its rearmament declarations. The Treaty has gone far to undo the Pact of Locarno, which was, in fact, getting rusty from disuse. It is not enough to promise assistance: it is necessary to study ways and means of affording it. With the French General Staff such discussions have taken place, but with them only. It seems clear that such pacts can do little more than antagonise those against whom they are clearly aimed, for, in the words of Bismarck:

No treaty can guarantee how much zeal and what force will be brought into play when the text and its earliest interpretation is not reinforced by the private interests of the parties. That is why all treaties of peace in this world are provisional and not for all time.

Hitler's declaration enables us, as Mr. Baldwin's speech seemed to recognise, to envisage a *régime*, not of isolation, but of frank and direct relations with Germany as an equal, if once defeated, Power. It is to-day possible to extricate ourselves, and later Europe, from the atmosphere of suspicion, created by German policy but heightened by paper agreements, and to make a fresh start.

Herr Hitler has declared that, having obtained the restitution of the Saar, he has no territorial claims against France. He has stated that he will agree to the limitation or abolition of any type of weapon which the Allies themselves will abandon. But he will not dispense with heavy guns, tanks, etc., which the Allies already possess. By agreeing to destroy such weapons the Allies could do much to reduce the cost of armaments, which cripples every civilised Power. Germany has also agreed to supervision, provided it be mutual and reciprocal.

There remains the question of aerial bombardment, which is so serious a menace to densely populated countries whose industrial centres, like ours, are within easy reach of neighbouring States. Herr Hitler has once again declared himself ready at once to enter into an Air Pact which would prohibit the bombing of non-military areas. Such a pact would eliminate one of the major horrors of war: the incentive to build aircraft for warfare would be reduced, for the elimination of the long-range bomber would be followed by the disappearance of

interceptor types of fighting aircraft and defence squadrons. The air force would consist of machines needed for actual warfare in the fighting zones.

This bold and constructive proposal has hitherto, at the instance of France, been put aside pending the conclusion of an intricate series of international settlements regarding air strength, which must take months to work out, and can scarcely endure. The question seems to have been lost sight of at Stresa and ignored at Geneva. If it is to be achieved, it must be negotiated through diplomatic channels, and not entrusted to overworked amateurs, acting as principals on the international stage. It would save money and make an agreement as to relative air strengths easier to reach, though aeroplanes are harder even than battleships to place in rigid categories.

Germany is financially embarrassed: dentists cannot get more than a little of the gold they need for their business. Stocks of man's essentials of peace as well as of war are low. The knowledge that they are reduced to such straits makes Germans, not humble, but bitter, prepared to suffer, but also to cause suffering. Public confidence in the Chancellor is not waning; the winter has passed and prices have remained steady—there has never been since the war so little acute want or distress; but as financial stringency grows, so does the temper of the militant leaders grow sharper. The anti-Jewish campaign has started afresh; there have been violent demonstrations against Catholics and Protestants—a strange commentary on official solicitude for German minorities in adjacent countries. There is an undercurrent of anxiety regarding the economic situation, yet, speaking generally, so completely is the nation organised, so readily and at every point does it identify itself with the Chancellor's will, that the position of Germany in Europe seems far more favourable than Germans themselves seem to believe.

It appears to me that France has overplayed her hand and has already lost the game; she can no longer hope for the hegemony of Europe. Germany is on the high road to securing it. If, as a result of the errors of others, it falls into her hands, Germany may be dangerous, for moderation has never been a German virtue in international relations, and she cannot forget the envenomed reception of Hitler's accession to power. In England, though public opinion, apart from

certain journals, has tried to be fair to Germany, harm has been done by a group, supported, surprisingly enough, by a former Foreign Secretary, which, under the misleading title of the 'Friends of Europe,' publishes *ex parte* pamphlets with a strong anti-German bias on the specific assumption that Nazi Germany can only mean war.

A strong British Government, genuinely friendly and confident in her military strength, can alone deter France and Germany from unsettling Europe once more. Germany will not return to the League as at present constituted. Unless it is converted into an instrument of treaty revision, it will, as Lord Lothian said last month, disappear or become of quite secondary importance, and such a conversion is scarcely possible under present conditions. Yet if Great Britain is strong enough she can ensure that inevitable territorial and other changes come about without bloodshed. But she cannot do this unless she can show that British youth is prepared, like the youth of every country in Europe, to submit itself to discipline and to be trained in arms.

The most effective deterrent to militarism on the Continent, the greatest encouragement to Germany and to our other friends, would be the knowledge that the youth of this country will in future receive, on a voluntary basis, effective training in arms through expanded territorial units, beginning with free instruction at the universities in flight—of recently developed human capacities, the greatest. To this, as a parallel development, might well be added compulsory physical education, of which we stand in sore need, at schools and universities; classes in physical education, on a voluntary basis, for young adults would follow.

I do not for a moment believe that Germany, separated from us by Belgium and the North Sea, regards England as a likely enemy or potential victim any more than does France, but it would be almost as foolish for us to act on either assumption as for the Germans to assume that Russia, separated from them by Lithuania and Poland, is a 'geographical anachronism.' Let us strengthen our territorial armed forces, particularly in the air, and make the fullest use of our incomparable Diplomatic Service.

Thus equipped for the arts of war and peace, we may with confidence await the time, perhaps six months hence, when

war between Germany and England will be seen as an event no less improbable than war between either Power and the U.S.A., and men will see clearly that these three alone could secure to the world 'peace by justice out of revision.' The next great step is to grant Herr Hitler's often expressed wish to meet Mr. Baldwin, who is an honorary life member of all classes in this country and alone is able to represent it with complete authority.

ARNOLD WILSON.

May 24, 1935.

STRESA, GENEVA, AND AFTER

By PROFESSOR MAURICE GEROTHWOHL, Litt.D.

'WHY should the British Empire speak with bated breath?' quoth General Smuts during a session of the Imperial Conference, when France was challenging in the Ruhr both a disarmed and bankrupt Germany and the legal and ethical demurrer of the Marquess Curzon. A few days later, happening myself to inquire of one of the then leading lights of our Foreign Office the reason for our weakness in not standing up to M. Poincaré, I received for all answer the tremulous remark: 'But what about those 2000 French aeroplanes?' To-day, our political and diplomatic pundits are no longer worried by those 2000 French aeroplanes, perhaps because they know so many of them to be obsolescent! But General Goering's 1000 or 1100 winged and brand-new messengers of doom have produced in our midst, I will not say a panic, but a scare. So we are being urged, not merely to increase and improve our own defences in the air—which may be all right and necessary—but to court and canvass the alliance, whether in the air or in all three arms, of other Powers, or, at least, to solicit reciprocal obligations of mutual assistance between ourselves and the French, and ourselves and the Germans.

It is, nevertheless, a queer thing that, at the present juncture, neither the British people nor, especially, the British Government, should appear to realise their might as an international factor. For a cool and objective survey of the whole position would show that we have no more need than of yore to court and canvass the alliance of foreign Powers, nor to enter into any fresh commitments. Why, even in our present state of halfway rearmament, a British guarantee of security is still the major object of almost every other Power, and the top market value in such political debentures;

so desirable, so indispensable even, do we appear to all as prospective allies in their own prospective feuds. Some of them would never fight unless assured of our support, nor others unless assured of our neutrality. Hardly one of them but has craved, on repeated occasions since the 1918 Armistice, either a material British guarantee, or, when its inability to secure this was realised, at any rate our moral and diplomatic aid. Now, the clear meaning of this is that, if ever we were attacked, our aggressor would find at least two or three of the great Powers, together with probably half a dozen of the smaller, rushing or flying to our rescue, in order to enjoy the previously, if vainly, coveted advantage of fighting with our resources at their back. Were Germany to attack us—and she realises this full well—we should not require to ask France, Italy, and their satellites to come to our assistance. They would be there without the asking—France, especially, whose very existence as a great Power with a great colonial empire is conditioned by our survival. On the other hand, were France the aggressor, both Germany and Italy—the latter in spite of the recent Rome agreements—would literally leap to our side, if only to reap their reward in the division between them of France's rich but, from the white man's standpoint, poorly populated colonies. I will go further. I am confident that, should the British Empire and Japan ever come to grips, even peace-minded America would promptly join us, to secure the long-sought privilege, which she might not otherwise enjoy, of fighting Japan with the British Navy at her side. However, to pledge our blood and credit in advance to any foreign Power (and I am thinking now in terms of Europe only) would merely encourage such a Power in its war-mindedness.

The argument against foreign commitments derives further strength from the new and paramount consideration that, at this crucial turn in our Imperial history, we could not risk the destinies of the motherland without the full sanction and co-operation of the self-governing Dominions. If we engaged in a European war, and the Dominions proclaimed their neutrality, the ties between us, whatever the outcome of the conflict, would be thinned to snapping point. Besides, not one of the Dominions, with the single exception of Canada, could, in these circumstances, really rest assured that its

neutrality would be respected by any of our opponents which happened to control a navy. Thus the thesis, apparently favoured by Mr. MacDonald and the Foreign Office, that the Dominions should not object to our entering into fresh European commitments, so long as we do not bind them (which, admittedly, we cannot do) to active participation in such commitments, is radically unsound and highly dangerous. The Dominion Governments fully appreciate this fact. But our professional diplomats, with their pre-war vision, prejudices and attachments, are beginning to chafe under the democratic check on British diplomatic and military adventures in Europe which the Dominion Parliaments imply. For in those great overseas dependencies the last word on the supreme issue of peace or war lies with the Parliaments, and not, as here, with Ministers or their permanent officials.

Legal and positive commitments, however, are by no means the most fraught with peril in the case of a country such as this, endowed with a keen national sense of honesty and honour. I remember how a foreign statesman who knows us thoroughly (M. Titulesco) once warned the Quai d'Orsay that, to an Englishman, his word is far more sacred than his written contract. Thus, in our case, moral commitments are ultimately found to be no less binding and entangling than duly registered international conventions. For this reason I feel bound to deprecate the moral approbation which the British Government has been so incautious as to express of Signor Mussolini's projected Danube Pact for the safeguarding of Austria against any foreign interference other than Italian. Similarly, I regret the platonic blessing bestowed by Sir John Simon on the Barthou-Litvinoff conception of an Eastern Locarno; more particularly as he proceeded, with true lawyer-like serenity, to devise, for the future participants Nazis and Bolsheviks, Poles and Russians, would be expected to vie with one another for the privilege of dying for one another! Nothing, of course, came of a scheme juridically so ingenious, but, when translated into terms of human nature, so wantonly absurd, which, in any case, has failed to avert a Franco-Soviet pact. Yet a strong word from our Government to the French, spoken firmly and in reason, would have averted such a blunder. France would not,

she could not, have hesitated, if frankly bidden, to choose between the British Lion and the Red Beast.

What would warrant our distrust no less is the new Geneva slogan of Collective Security. For the exiguous measure of risk entailed for either the police or the community, in their tracking down and bringing to justice the single malefactor, bears no comparison with the risk involved for the so-called Comity of Nations in any attempt to repress and subjugate an aggressive Power of the first order. If altruism there must and should be amongst States as among individuals, let it be enlightened altruism! You cannot insist that any nation should risk its own and wholesale destruction by intervening in a war which does not immediately affect its most vital interests. Moreover, caution in the avoidance of all war commitments is particularly enjoined at a time such as this, when the international temper and outlook are ugly, as they most certainly are in Europe at this date. That ugly temper and outlook I am tempted to ascribe to a conspiracy between national pride and national prejudice, the balance of pride being on the German side, and the balance of prejudice on that of France, Italy, and ourselves. The mischief is aggravated by a third factor, the malice aforethought of the Soviet Government and the Third International, whose programme might be realised by a 'preventive' war, in which Germany was overwhelmed by a European coalition. The bolshevisation of Germany would inevitably follow on her defeat, and a bolshevised Germany would signify the early triumph of the Communist creed throughout the European continent. These isles might escape contamination; but how long would they escape molestation by a united and bolshevised Continent?

Yet, only four months ago, it looked as if Europe had definitely averted this peril, and as if a peace settlement were at last in sight. I remember, on the evening of February 3, the dramatic and moving interpretation which M. Laval, that most broad-minded of French statesmen, gave to the Anglo-French Declaration issued that afternoon. Turning to a small group of French and British journalists, he exclaimed: 'Do not tell me that I have not worked for peace! Just look what I am offering Germany: free and equal negotiation; the abrogation of Part V. of the Versailles Treaty; and some-

thing that even the British Government has hitherto denied her—the right to possess an air force. You must admit that I have been more daring than even Briand?’ And, assuredly, that Declaration seemed to be the biggest move since Locarno in the direction of European conciliation. It envisaged a general settlement *freely negotiated* between Germany and the other Powers, and a reciprocal Air Pact between the five Locarno Powers, which, to use the words of the *communiqué*, ‘would go far to operate as a deterrent to aggression, and to ensure immunity from sudden attacks from the air.’

Nevertheless, before Stresa was reached, these fine hopes and aspirations had already gone by the board, for two very simple reasons. The ‘prompt negotiation’ of the Air Locarno was insidiously deferred by those forces in London, Paris, and Moscow which are opposed to any agreement with Germany, and the latter was refused, in practice, the promised status of a free and equal negotiator. At the Stresa Conference the three participating Powers actually took decisions of a momentous character, the first and most momentous of which was ‘a common line of conduct’ in relation to the French resolution, condemning Germany’s unilateral rearmament.

It was further stated, before the Conference, that the British delegates would undertake no fresh commitments on behalf of this country. Indeed, on the evening of the first day of the Stresa proceedings, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in addressing the lobby correspondents, made a strong statement in reply to a question about Stresa and such commitments, declaring that the Cabinet had decided that none should be contracted. This statement, which was widely broadcast in the London Press the next morning, greatly irritated the French and Italians at Stresa, and caused Mr. MacDonald’s official spokesman at the Conference to state that ‘there was no need to pay any attention to London. The authority of the British Government is here’—at Stresa! This seemed a curious constitutional position for the Prime Minister to take up, regardless of the decisions adopted four days before by the Cabinet. It is impossible to feel as confident as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary that no fresh commitments were entered into by our representatives at Stresa. Legal commitments, perhaps not. But new moral commit-

ments were undoubtedly implied by the loudly-trumpeted solidarity proclaimed by the three Powers in their Joint Resolution. This solidarity was, for all practical purposes, tantamount to their alignment against Germany. It has been so interpreted, alike in Germany and in France and Italy.

The conclusions of the Stresa Conference regarding the proposed Danube Pact also require close scrutiny. The limited undertaking of the British Government to ‘consult’ with the other Powers in an Austrian emergency would make it difficult for this country to stand wholly aside from the relevant negotiations. Great Britain, indeed, is to be represented at the Rome Conference by an ‘observer.’ It is to be hoped that, unlike his American prototype, this British ‘observer’ will be entitled to make observations, should any endeavour be made to frame this particular system of pacts on lines which would not commend themselves to the good sense, or to the sense of justice, of the British people. The term ‘non-interference’ calls for a most careful and impartial definition. There exists, to cite one point, no treaty or other legal ban on a Hapsburg restoration in Austria. Nor is there any legal or moral warrant to prohibit the Austrian people from securing, by a free majority vote, should they so desire, either an Austrian Nazi Government or a Social Democrat one. But the Little Entente Governments have laid it down that the question of a Hapsburg restoration must be excepted from the ‘non-interference’ clause; France and Italy are both determined to prevent a free vote on the Nazi issue, and Italy to frustrate a Social Democrat victory. The British Government should declare against any pact which does not ensure for the Austrian people the right to determine for themselves their own political *régime*.

Another and most vital passage in the ‘Joint Resolution’ of the Stresa Conference, concerning the proposed Air Pact for Western Europe, urges ‘the study of the question, with a view to the drafting of a pact between the five Powers mentioned in the London *communiqué*, and of any bi-lateral agreements which might accompany it.’

What is meant by such ‘bi-lateral agreements,’ if it be not the immediate or early conclusion of a series of Air Pacts of Mutual Assistance between the four Powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium—other than Germany, leaving

it to the latter to come in later, if and when she had satisfied France and Italy in the matter of the Danube and Eastern Pacts?

Such a policy, however, would constitute a flagrant repudiation of the Anglo-French *communiqué* of February 3, in which no such discrimination was established between Germany and the other Powers in the 'prompt negotiation' of the Air Locarno, and an equally flagrant violation of both the spirit and the framework of the original Locarno-Rhineland Pact of 1923, which, as we have been told, the new Air Pact was designed to implement. The original Locarno Treaty does not admit of such one-sided pacts, which are nothing but alliances against the other signatories. It holds an even balance between France and Belgium on the one side and Germany on the other. Since 1923 the French Government had repeatedly suggested to the British the conclusion of certain Anglo-French military staff agreements. But hitherto the British Government had always refused to do anything of the kind, on the ground that, if we concluded such an agreement with France, we should be bound to conclude a parallel agreement with Germany, which would be a manifest absurdity.

What is true of one-sided military agreements would apply equally to one-sided air agreements, which might furnish Germany with a moral pretext and a legal right to denounce Locarno.

The Geneva Resolution of April 16 may be considered from the three-fold aspect of Law, Equity, and Practical Expediency. From the legal aspect the issue is, to put it cautiously, a highly doubtful one. But, in any case, if it was to be dealt with from this aspect, it could not properly be dealt with by the League Council, as it was, under Article XI. of the Covenant, which is purely political and empirical. For the method of Judicial Settlement is governed by Articles XII. to XV. Article XIII., in fact, stipulates that disputes as to the interpretation of a Treaty, as to any question of International Law, as to the existence of any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to Arbitration or Judicial Settlement. For the consideration of any such dispute the Court of Arbitration to which the case is referred *shall* be the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Moreover, the Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Eden) had himself declared at Geneva in January last, when adjudicating on the dispute between Hungary and Yugo-Slavia, that the League Council was not a Court of Law, but a Court of Equity. True, successive French Governments, with a consistent and massive insanity, have clung, and still cling, to the legal letter of Part V. of the Versailles Treaty. But the British Government, as far back as the autumn of 1932, in a series of Notes and speeches by Sir John Simon, had declared that the question of German rearmament had now passed from the domain of legality into that of equity and of practical expediency. Signor Mussolini, in his published Memorandum of January 1934, went a good deal further than the British Government when he wrote:

The impossibility in which the armed Powers, signatories of the said treaties, find themselves of immediately reducing their armaments to a level approaching the German level gives to the German claim for rearmament a juridical and moral force, of which it is not easy to deny the evident truth.

How, in view of these past statements, could the League Council, and, in particular, its British and Italian members, presume to pass judgment on Germany from the legal aspect? Even in the capacity of complainants, they would have been 'estopped' in any but a mock-trial or an international 'Star Chamber.'

Mr. Eden, as I recorded above, described the League Council as a Court of Equity, as opposed to Judicial Settlement or Arbitration. But when the League Council is sitting as a Court of Equity, it must, once more, sit under Articles XII. to XV., and not under Article XI. Besides, under the equity procedure, the votes of the parties to the dispute are not counted in the Council's decision. Thus, had the League Council really meant to deal with Germany's offence from the equity standpoint, the votes of France as the proposer, and of Great Britain and Italy as joint seconders, of the Resolution should not have been reckoned in the final count, nor, possibly, those of the other members of the Council who are also signatories to the Versailles Treaty. In a word, the whole proceedings might be dismissed as 'grotesque and ridiculous,' had they not proved so harmful to the cause of peace. France, Great Britain, and Italy forced on the

League Council an utterly irregular procedure; and of the many and eminent jurists on the Council, or on the Secretariat, not one would seem to have remembered, or to have dared to remember, the only proper one!

Viewed, now, from the standpoint of practical expediency, the French Resolution, which was foisted on the League Council by the consortium of the three great Powers—doubtful in law, monstrous in equity—can only be described as idiotic. So far as the British Government is concerned, it has always asserted its genuine desire to bring Germany back to the League. But could any procedure have been better calculated—as, indeed, it was designed by the Powers other than Great Britain—to prevent Germany from returning to Geneva? Furthermore, there is the dangerous proposal, also acquiesced in by our delegates at Stresa and Geneva, to elaborate, for the purpose of future unilateral violations or denunciations of Treaties, even when unaccompanied by any threat of aggression, a system of financial and economic sanctions which goes beyond that embodied in Article XVI. of the Covenant, so wisely confined to material acts of aggression.

As Mr. Baldwin has pointed out, economic sanctions may easily involve a naval blockade, which is almost bound to lead to war, if any attempt be made to apply it to a first-class Power; and the League cannot expect, in the case of a technical Treaty violation, unaccompanied by any act of aggression, the co-operation in such a system of the Powers outside the League, like America and Japan. But without their co-operation, how could it be put into effective operation? The Washington Senate, to this day, hesitates to forego in advance either America's neutral status or the 'Freedom of the Seas,' even in the event of an actual aggression.

The plain truth, to quote Señor de Madariaga (Spain's permanent delegate at Geneva), is that 'it is not possible for States, even for the most righteous reasons, to divert economic life, which has its own laws.' Now, Señor de Madariaga, who coined this truism on May 10, had voted for the Resolution of April 16. I have seldom read a more honest confession of intellectual dishonesty. What a comment on the independence and genuineness of the Geneva vote!

Australia's representative, who occupied the seat reserved

to the British Dominions on the Council, also voted with the 'Ayes.' Nevertheless, the Canadian Government, with the virtual backing of all the other Dominion Governments, has since notified the Secretary-General of the League that it could never commit itself, before the event, to participation in any sanctions which might be proposed in the circumstances envisaged by this part of the Resolution. Indeed, during the recent talks between British Ministers and the Dominions' spokesmen in London, the latter were unanimous in criticising the Resolution of April 16 and its endorsement by this country. Apparently, they took the view, already taken by American opinion, and heroically acted on by little Denmark alone among the Council Powers in her abstention from the vote, first, that such a Resolution could but delay and hinder the desired agreement between Germany and the other Powers, and, secondly, that its effect, if not its intention, would be to perpetuate the Versailles system.

At any rate, the undoubted impression conveyed both to Germany and to the outside world by these recent Geneva proceedings was that the League was being used and misused by a *Junta* of the Great Powers for this very purpose. Moreover, for the League Council to elaborate a system of sanctions to repress and punish any technical violation of the Peace Treaties, without, at the same time, setting up a parallel procedure for giving practical operation to Article XIX. of the League Covenant (which deals with the reconsideration of obsolete or inapplicable treaties), is an untenable proposition in either law or equity. What we are witnessing, in fact, is nothing less than a piecemeal and insidious revival of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, intermittently extolled by Mr. MacDonald.

Unfortunately, Article XIX. of the Covenant, in its present form, is itself inapplicable, because the vote of a single contracting party can veto the reconsideration of any treaty. This was clearly shown in each of the only two endeavours actually made to invoke it since the League's foundation. The first of these endeavours took place over a dispute between Chile and Peru, and the second when China petitioned for the revision of her 'unequal' treaties. In both instances other Powers than the parties themselves intervened to prevent any application of Article XIX., lest

a precedent should be created for Germany and the other vanquished European States. Nevertheless, in the now forgotten 'Official Commentary,' issued by the original framers of the League Covenant when they published their new creed to the world, it was emphatically stated that Article X. (on the territorial integrity of member States) and Article XI. (on circumstances calculated to lead to international disturbance or to a breach of the peace) should be read with and in the light of this very Article XIX. Unless that article can be made, and is made, into a sufficiently flexible instrument for the timely, sensible and equitable revision of treaties, the League is bound to perish of moral atrophy, despite the vested and highly-potentiated interests of its Babylonian Secretariat, and despite the not altogether selfless devotion to it of statesmen whose genuine talents or pretensions are in inverse ratio to the dimensions of the countries they so often over-represent.

But the League Covenant does not stand alone in its urgent and imperative need of a drastic overhaul. There is the Kellogg Pact, which, in banning any and every war as an instrument of national policy, might easily be construed or misconstrued as prohibiting even a war of liberation by a century-long oppressed people. I am not sure that the Kellogg Pact, or even the League Covenant, would not have condemned the support which Great Britain and France gave to Belgium in her 1830 struggle for independence against the Netherlands crown, or, again, the assistance which France lent the House of Savoy in freeing Lombardy and Venetia from the Austrian yoke. Indeed, it is perhaps not without interest to recall that when Mr. (now Sir Austen) Chamberlain in March 1925 announced at Geneva the rejection of the ill-starred Protocol by the second Baldwin Cabinet, the objections of the latter were admirably set forth in a composite statement, which bore many traces of Lord Balfour's hand. One of these objections laid due stress on the frequent difficulty of distinguishing between the real and the technical aggressor, whilst another referred precisely to the historic impossibility of condemning a genuine war of national liberation.

The League Council's Resolution of April 16 was followed by not a few international 'sensations,' although not by that

which most of us had expected and many would have welcomed—namely, a tempestuous gesture by Herr Hitler. In the brief and quiet *ad interim* reply, which he dispatched to the Council Powers in connexion with that Resolution, he protested in terse language against the claim by the principal Versailles Powers to arrogate to themselves the right of condemning Germany, and of acting in their own dispute with her both as plaintiffs and as judges. In a word, he manifested a most admirable, and, as some appeared to think, an unexpected, not to say disappointing, self-restraint! France, on the other hand, has since taken two unwise and unfair steps. She has sent her Air Minister to Rome, to negotiate with the Italian Government a separate and bilateral Air Pact, obviously directed against Germany; and she has signed a more comprehensive pact with Soviet Russia in the self-same spirit. This pact must singularly enlarge and complicate France's liabilities under Locarno, and, indirectly, our own, although M. Laval's personal misgivings on the subject have produced a final draft, which bristles with Byzantine loop-holes for eluding the *casus fœderis*, should it prove unwelcome to France in any particular emergency.

The post-Geneva sensations I referred to above are three—not all of equal value. I hardly know in which category to place Mr. MacDonald's contribution to the *News Letter*. In view of his coming retirement, I am a little tempted to describe it as a bitter swan-song in international ideology. Its bitterness, on the eve of the Anglo-German naval preliminary talks, recalled that of his earlier and hardly less ill-starred White Paper.

The sudden announcement that Germany had laid down, or was preparing to lay down, or had ordered the laying-down of, a dozen submarines took British public opinion by surprise. I wish we had been given a clarification of the curious departmental methods and motives by which this news was first disclosed in London. As a naval Power, whose naval security remains, and must remain, despite the competition of the air arm, a paramount consideration, we are rightly sensitive to any menace to that naval security, which includes that of our Imperial communications and our world trade.

Still the German claim to, at any rate, a qualitative

equality at sea is the natural and inevitable corollary of her claims, quantitative as well as qualitative, in the air and on land. I do not see that we need be either shocked or astounded by it, however great, admittedly, is the need for vigilance in this direction. The fact remains that this naval problem, which is so essentially our own, has got to be tackled, promptly, resolutely, in a firm but large-minded spirit. If Germany is to enjoy equality of rights in the naval domain, even if this be limited to qualitative equality only, you cannot deny her claim to a submarine quota, should other Powers continue to enjoy and, as might easily be shown, to abuse that right. Frankly, we do not want to see any German submarines. But we have never wanted to see either French or Italian submarines. We have always wished to get rid of that ugly weapon. At Cannes, in 1922, Mr. Lloyd George offered M. Briand a British guarantee of French security against any unprovoked German attack, but this on a number of conditions, the first of which, in both place and importance, was her abandonment of the submarine. At that very moment, however, M. Briand went out of office, and M. Poincaré came in. The latter rejected both the guarantee and the abolition of the submarine. And we blundered badly, in 1925, when Locarno was being negotiated, and we bestowed equally on France and on Germany a British guarantee, without stipulating afresh for the abandonment in perpetuity of the submarine by both. But it is not too late to seize the opportunity which then was missed. It is true that France, to whom the reappearance, whether in the narrow waters of the Channel or on the high seas, of the German U-boat should be no less distasteful than to this country, has adopted the strange attitude that she cannot brand the submarine as an offensive weapon in Germany's hands, because, in her own, she has always described it as a defensive one. Which simply means that France is afraid of being once more urged to drop it by Great Britain. But in France's persistent clamour for reinforced British guarantees we possess a lever of which we should not hesitate to make the fullest use.

For Italy has declared time after time, during the naval negotiations of the past fourteen years, that, if only France would discard the submarine, she (Italy) would not ask for

its retention; and Herr Hitler has declared that he would not ask for any weapon which the other Powers would be willing to discard. So why should not we get rid of the submarine pest at one fell stroke by telling France that, unless she agrees to abandon the submarine, she must expect no reinforced guarantees from this country, and by taking Herr Hitler at his word and Signor Mussolini at his?

As with the Navy, so with the Air. The Western Air Locarno was the one proposal with which Herr Hitler fell in at once, on the basis, it is true, of air parity with the other participating great Powers. But Germany's claim to parity was, in the circumstances, only natural and inevitable. The position now is that this once hopeful and comparatively easy proposal has been shelved again and again because of some legal quibble, or of the Eastern Pact, or of the Danube Pact, or of other things which matter infinitely less to the peace of Europe and to our own security.

From this situation there is but one mode of escape still open, the adoption of which, however, should require neither extraordinary intelligence nor extraordinary courage. That is, to negotiate the Western Air Locarno forthwith, on the basis of parity, when we may get what we all appear to be trying for: security in the air for the participants—Great Britain, and Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. For on the basis of parity a German air aggressor, or any other air aggressor among the signatories, would find himself confronted by three times his 'weight of wing,' or, including Belgium, perhaps a little more—even allowing for a certain superiority which Germany might possess by implication in her more powerful and better organised civil aviation. Assuredly, that is a consideration well calculated to deter any aggressor.

So, once more, let us call a halt to one-sided talks and conferences, and to mutual recriminations, and get down to the one vital matter, which is 'a general settlement *freely negotiated* between Germany and the other Powers'—freely negotiated in order that there shall be no warrant or excuse for violating it. But, first of all, let us put through that Western Air Locarno!

MAURICE A. GEROTHWOHL.

FORCE AND FRAUD AS INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

By PROFESSOR F. J. C. HEARNshaw

ONE of the most ominous and deplorable features of present-day politics is the recrudescence of the damnable dogma that force and fraud, violence and deceit, terrorism and treachery are legitimate instruments of statecraft. These diabolical instruments were employed and defended by Germany in 1914 when she treated her solemn pledge to maintain the neutrality of Belgium as a mere 'scrap of paper,' and when, on invading Belgium, she sought to break the Belgian resistance by a process of merciless barbarity. They were also employed by the Bolshevik fanatics who seized power in Russia at the close of 1917, when they repudiated all the restraints of law and morality, and when they stamped out all opposition to their criminal *régime* in an orgy of robbery and murder. Similarly, five years later, the Fascists of Italy frankly avowed themselves the disciples of Machiavelli, and openly acclaimed the methods of the lion and the fox. It is clear that they would have stuck at nothing, but would have committed any sort of crime which appeared necessary for success. Fortunately, circumstances did not drive them to extremes. They were not called upon flagrantly to break faith, and, although murders such as that of Signor Matteotti showed that the shedding of blood was not repugnant to them, normally the administration of castor oil was sufficient for their purpose. To-day Germany, under the leadership of Herr Hitler, once more advances into the political arena armed with the Machiavellian panoply of perfidy and terror. On the one hand, she repudiates good faith, refuses to make payments morally and legally due, violates treaties, regards contracts as scraps of paper and oaths as mere puffs of breath; on the other hand, she shoots down opponents, suppresses

free speech, persecutes religion, and lays up stores of illicit armaments so that once again, in her own chosen time, she may seek to impose her perverted will upon a prostrate world.

These are great and notorious examples. It would be easy to find others in less conspicuous spheres. For the Machiavellian disease is widespread: its infection has corrupted many States, even those that call themselves democratic and pride themselves on constitutionalism. The republicans in Spain have established their novel *régime* by means as sanguinary and deceitful as ever marked the Bourbon tyranny at its worst. The record of French administration in Algiers, Morocco, and Syria is far from free of stain. The rulers of Iraq, in spite of the presence of mandated guardians of the peace, have crushed Assyrian independence in treachery and blood. The recent history of Southern Ireland is an almost unbroken record of violated treaties and terrorist assassinations. Even in our own country, where politics are kindlier and cleaner than in most parts of the world, there have been from time to time grave indications of a tendency towards violence and dishonour. Too many times have strikes broken out in defiance of solemn contracts; too often has 'direct action' taken the place of argument and debate. In particular, the great 'general strike' of 1926 was an outstanding manifestation of a craft that recked nothing of agreements or pledges, and an appeal to force wholly divorced from either mercy or reason.

I have mentioned the name of Machiavelli thrice already, and I have done so of set purpose. For Machiavelli was the first avowed exponent of the dogma that force and fraud are proper instruments of statecraft, or, in other words, that politics are divorced from ethics, that public and private virtue are things different in kind, and that in national affairs the end justifies the means.

No doubt many rulers had acted on Machiavellian principles in ages long anterior to the Italian Renaissance. Machiavelli himself, indeed, maintains that he is merely generalising inductively, and setting forth truths derived from his reading of history and his experience as a Minister. Both his *Prince* and his *Discourses* are replete with examples of successful violence and triumphant treachery drawn from the pages of

Livy and from the careers of such contemporaries of his own as Cæsar Borgia and Pope Alexander VI. Nevertheless, the fact remains that prior to Machiavelli the villains of history had been inarticulate. They had played the parts of the lion and the fox with the same freedom from philosophy as the beasts whom they imitated. It was left for the Italian theorist at the beginning of the sixteenth century to formulate in precise terms the dogma of the non-moral state, and to defend the employment of terrorism and treachery as political instruments. Listen to his words :

Where the deliberation is wholly touching the safety of the fatherland there ought to be no consideration of just or unjust, pitiful or cruel, honourable or dishonourable, but rather, all other respect being laid aside, that course ought to be taken which may preserve the life and maintain the liberty thereof.¹

He does not, of course, urge the universal and indiscriminate use of force and fraud by statesmen. He recognises the fact that they are dangerous instruments reserved for exceptional emergencies. He, indeed, blames such operators as Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliverotto of Fermo for employing them so freely as to dull their efficiency. But, all the same, he regards them as essential elements in the statesman's equipment, and he severely condemns those who have failed to employ them when circumstances have demanded their use. Thus he commends Romulus for the murder of his brother Remus : unity was necessary for the nascent state of Rome. Similarly he defends the sanguinary severity of Brutus after his overthrow of the Tarquinian monarchy.

This is always well known to those who read ancient stories, [he says] how that after a change of state some memorable execution upon the enemies of the new order is necessary.²

Conversely, he decisively condemns Gian Paolo Baglioni of Pérugia for his failure through squeamishness to avail himself of a golden opportunity to exterminate at a single blow his enemy Pope Julius II. together with twenty-four cardinals !

As with violence, so with craft and fraud :

It is necessary for a prince that will achieve great matters to learn to be a cunning deceiver, [for] that man who will profess honesty in all his

¹ *Discourses*, III. 41.

² *Ibid.*, III. 3.

actions must needs go to ruin amongst so many that are dishonest. Wherefore it is necessary for a prince who desires to preserve himself to be able to make use of honesty, or to lay it aside, as need shall require.³

Machiavelli's *Prince*, in which the ethics of the lion and the fox are more succinctly set forth than in the ample *Discourses*, was never intended for publication. Written in 1513, it was prepared for the exclusive perusal of the Medicean tyrant who had just overthrown the Florentine republic. It was meant to serve him as a book of instructions as to the means by which he could conserve the power that he had so recently and doubtfully acquired. It was not, as a matter of fact, published during Machiavelli's lifetime, nor until five years after his death, when (in 1532), for some reason not easy to imagine, Pope Clement VII. (cousin of the tyrant to whom it had been dedicated) let it loose upon the world.

It at once had an immense vogue. Translated into every European language, it became the statesman's *vade mecum*. Nor is this remarkable. Its brevity and pungency ; its admirable literary style ; its freedom from convention ; its boldness ; its complete emancipation from theology ; its frank realism, all gave it an irresistible appeal. Its influence was prodigious. It guided Thomas Cromwell in his unscrupulous service of Henry VIII. ; it was the inspirer of Catherine de Medici in the intrigues that culminated in the massacre of St. Bartholomew ; it fortified Philip II. in his efforts to entrap and assassinate Elizabeth ; it strengthened Elizabeth herself in the great game that she played—with crown and life at stake—against Mary, Queen of Scots. In the seventeenth century its principles were conspicuously illustrated by the ferocious dragonnades and the abysmal duplicities of Louis XIV. An even more perfect exemplar of the Machiavellian idea appeared in the eighteenth century in the person of Frederick the Great of Prussia. Could Machiavelli himself have conceived a more superb piece of camouflage than the publication of the treatise *Anti-Machiavel* on the eve of the seizure of Silesia ? From Frederick the Great the Machiavellian tradition descended to the Prussian statesmen of the nineteenth century. Its influence was displayed in the craft with which Bismarck lured the rulers of Denmark, Austria, and France in turn into ruinous wars ; and in the barbarity

³ *Discourses*, II. 13, and *The Prince*, XX.

with which Moltke and the militarists pursued their victories. Indeed, Machiavelli seemed once again to become incarnate and eloquent in Clausewitz with his treatises on war, and Treitschke with his lectures on politics.

The main Machiavellian element in Clausewitz is his defence of sheer terrorism as a means of breaking down in a hostile nation the will to resist: the civil population is to be left with nothing but its eyes to weep with! In Treitschke the more complete philosophy of violence and mendacity is displayed. He starts from the assertion that 'the State is Power' and that 'the renunciation of Power is for the State in the most real sense the Sin against the Holy Ghost.' Hence 'the State has no higher judge above it' and can be bound by laws and treaties only so far as it sees fit in its own interest to observe them. One of the prime functions of the State is to wage war, for 'without war there would be no State at all,' and 'war is the only remedy for ailing nations.' 'The living God,' he blasphemously continues, 'will see to it that war constantly returns as a dreadful medicine for the human race.' He pays tribute to his great Italian forerunner: 'It will ever remain Machiavelli's glory that he set the State upon its feet and freed it in its morality from the Church, and above all that he declared clearly for the first time—the State is Power.'

The poison of Machiavellism, conveyed through the writings of men like Clausewitz and Treitschke, and spread broadcast throughout a Prussianised Germany in the still more pernicious outpourings of blatant militarists such as Bernhardi, did much to precipitate the Great War of 1914, and much to give it its character of peculiar barbarity. It was the appalling dogma that the State is unmitigated Power, supreme in its own cause, exempt from all restraints of morality and religion, that led the Germans to repudiate all the humanisations and limitations of warfare that had been effected by international lawyers since the days of Grotius; that led them to the use of poison gases, to the sinking of hospital ships, to the bombing of open towns, to the bombardment of seaside resorts, to the shooting of Nurse Cavell, to the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*.

It only remains to be asked: What has been the effect of Machiavellism in practice? Has the free employment of

force and fraud, terrorism and treachery, had the triumphant success that Machiavelli and his disciples anticipated? The answer, surely, is abundantly clear. They have not. Nor are the causes of their failure far to seek. On the one hand, the theory of the State which justifies their employment is a false one. The State is not primarily Power; it is primarily Justice. For, as Augustine says: '*Justitiā remotā, quid aliud est regnum quam grande latrocinium*' ('In the absence of Justice, what is the State but large-scale brigandage'). The State comes into existence to conserve life; it continues in existence to maintain the conditions of the good life. Its end is moral. And this moral end cannot be dissociated from the means by which its attainment is sought. There must be congruity between the two. As well might you expect to gather figs from thistles as look for the fruit of justice from the root of violence and deceit. On the other hand, the verdict of history is quite decisively clear: Machiavellism has not, in fact, succeeded. In the long run the lion and the fox do not prevail. The cruelty of the one and the craft of the other not only do not save them, but are the very causes of their destruction. As Talleyrand would have said, Machiavellism is worse than a crime; it is a mistake.

Machiavelli himself, having applied his principles in the conduct of his own ambiguous career, died in exile and dishonour, distrusted and hated by all. Similarly, Cæsar Borgia, the man inimitable in craft and merciless in cruelty, whom Machiavelli exalts as the model Italian potentate, excited by his ferocity and perfidy so unutterable a loathing and dread that he was ultimately hounded out of Italy and driven to perish in the Pyrenees. The Machiavellian Thomas Cromwell ended his life on the scaffold to which he had sent so many of his fellows. The sanguinary and treacherous Catherine de Medici lived long enough to witness the death of all her sons and the extinction of the Valois House on whose behalf she had sinned so deeply. Louis XIV., by his persecutions and perfidies, roused against himself a coalition of enemies powerful enough to bring him to the ground. So, too, Frederick the Great, although by deceit and violence he won a brief success in Silesia, ringed Prussia round with foes and prepared for her the ruin that fell upon her at Jena. Napoleon I. himself, perhaps the greatest of all Machiavellian

practitioners, paid in St. Helena the penalty for the barbarities and treacheries that had roused all Europe against him. Finally, the moral of the Great War stands out with unmistakable clarity. Germany was crushed because her abominations had caused so deep a dread, so ineradicable a distrust, so profound a horror and disgust, that the allied nations of the world felt that no sacrifice of life and property on their part could be too great to rid the earth of so hateful a horror. It was inconceivable that Germany could be allowed to win and establish the principles of Machiavelli in permanent possession of mankind.

In spite, however, of the plainest lessons of history, it would appear that large sections of the human race are lamentably determined to put Machiavellism to the test of practice once again. In particular, both Fascist Germany and Bolshevist Russia seem still to believe that by repudiating good faith and by piling up the instruments of terror they can attain to world dominion. They are apparently prepared to worship any devil, provided he promises them the kingdoms of the earth. It is devoutly to be hoped that they will wake to wisdom before they put the issue anew to the test of experience. For nothing can be more certain than that if they seek dominion by the methods of force and fraud they will in the end be destroyed. Machiavellism will not and cannot be permitted to triumph. The conscience of mankind has declared against it, and the fears of mankind will secure its frustration. For, as I have elsewhere remarked, human society is established on moral foundations, and righteousness must in the end prevail.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

SONS OF THE POOR AND SCHOOLS OF THE RICH

By CYRIL NORWOOD

THE title which I have chosen may perhaps be justly criticised as too rhetorical, but in broad outline it is a true statement of the factors in an educational problem which has never been seriously faced, and which, in my opinion, cannot be for much longer neglected with safety. For the last twenty years, during which I have been trusted with the leadership of two famous public schools, I have never felt quite comfortable in the back of my mind when I have reflected that there were more than 2,000,000 young English boys at school at any given time, and that not one of these, whatever his fitness and whatever his promise, could hope ever to pass the doors of either school. I remember very well on an occasion, now a good many years ago, when representatives of the Trades Union Congress met the Committee of the Headmasters' Conference, the tone of genuine regret in the voice of one of their speakers when he dwelt upon the fact that the secondary schools were open to them, and the universities were open, but the public schools were totally inaccessible. And all that we could say was, 'Tis true, 'tis pity, and pity 'tis 'tis true,' and that if a way could be found to alter it no obstacles would be set up on our side. It was a lame and impotent conclusion, and nothing whatever has been said or done to alter it since.

The problem is one which is, as a matter of fact, very difficult to handle, and I am very well aware that anyone who attempts to deal with it lays himself open to misunderstanding in several quarters, and must not mind rebuke or abuse. However that may be, since I taught for sixteen years in secondary schools, and dealt with many ex-elementary school boys, and for more than that time in public schools, during which I never saw one, I have at any rate an experience which

has not fallen to many, and I mean to be bold enough to set down what I think, even though I stir up opponents in both camps. This is a problem, as I see it, which is too big and too important to be governed by the jealousies of schoolmasters and the rivalries of types of school. The future of our country seems to me to depend upon our being a united nation, and the possibility of combining real freedom with democracy rests upon our possessing a citizen body which is capable of enlightened common action, because it shares the same ideals, and is bound together by mutual understanding and sympathy. The nation of the future must be created in the schools: it is a very comforting thought that in so many of them to-day the flame of this ideal burns so steadily.

I could quote from book after book and speech after speech of the past fifteen years eloquent confessions of this faith: indeed, the thought of national unity to be created by education, of a citizen body made fit for citizenship, has given hope and meaning to all the great development which has taken place since 1902. But it is easy to express the ideal: it is a more unpalatable duty to deal with hard facts. A close observer can hardly fail to notice that, when these books are written, and these speeches are made by those whose work has lain in the secondary schools, or by those whose sympathies lie with the Labour Party, they are nearly always coloured by a distrust or a dislike of the public schools. And no one can have failed to observe that ever since the war there have been constant direct attacks by novels, by articles, and by speeches, all directed to the showing up of the system, in spite of the fact that the public schools have never been more liberal in thought, more tolerant of diversity, and more open to change than they have been since the war. In spite of these attacks they have enjoyed a 'boom': their doors have been thronged with entrants. Several new boarding-schools have been founded, and have been filled. What has been the reason for it all? One of the main reasons is this, that up to the year 1902 boys of good social class, sons of well-to-do parents, went quite contentedly to their local day-school: after 1902, when these schools came to accept grants from the State, and as a condition of the grant accepted a proportion of boys from the elementary schools,

this particular social type became rarer and rarer in the day-school. He became a boarder somewhere—often, indeed, at great parental sacrifice. You may call this snobbery, and I am not concerned to deny that snobbery had much to do with it. One may, however, be permitted to observe, in passing, that snobbery is by no means confined to the upper middle class. You may assert, as many headmasters have asserted, that at the end of the school course no one could say which were the fee-paying and which the 'free' scholars, and that assertion would be true. You may maintain that the presence of this element of hard-working, ambitious, and able boys was of great benefit to the school. And this also would be true. But the fact remains a fact, that the sort of boy who was in these schools in 1902 was not there in 1930: the mayor might be an 'old boy,' but the mayor's son was at Rugmarlchester. And there, human nature being what it is, you have one of the reasons why Rugmarlchester has come in for such a lot of criticism: it is extremely annoying to find that what was good enough for the fathers is not by those very fathers (and still more by the mothers) thought good enough for the sons.

Those who shaped the Act of 1902, and those who have so devotedly interpreted that Act, had a great purpose before them—the purpose of creating in this country the opportunity, for all who were worthy of it, to enjoy a real secondary education: the spirit of Matthew Arnold must have brooded benignly over their counsels. But, though they had the best of intentions, they did not entirely succeed. For the result has been to create two types of education utterly cut off from each other, yet doing the same work—one leading through the elementary and secondary school, and the other through the private preparatory school and the public boarding-school, to the university, where the products tend to meet like strange dogs, or to the professions and to business, where they are at any rate in danger of forming separate castes. As the years have gone by the whole system has hardened. Misunderstanding, jealousies, lack of sympathy, class animosities are the inevitable result, and it is idle to talk of building a united nation in the schools so long as this hard-and-fast division continues to obtain. There is much ignorance on both sides. Many public school masters are extremely—I had almost written

disgracefully—ignorant of the secondary schools and the great national system of education: many on the side of the secondary schools write and speak wildly, as when one in a high administrative place the other day said that my proposals were of no interest, since Eton and Harrow would have to conform to the standards of the London County Council secondary schools, or as when others point to the number of secondary school boys who win scholarship awards in open competition at Oxford and Cambridge, and draw from that the conclusion that they are far better educated than the public school boy, while ignoring the fact that boys picked from a class numbering 200,000 are here competing against boys picked from a number barely one-eighth of that total. Such mutual ignorance and animosity darken counsel: wisdom is apt to disappear when tempers run high. We shall never get the harmony of a single purpose throughout our education so long as this deepening fissure exists: we shall never have a really united nation unless our schools are fellow-workers in a real union.

Those who are in a hurry to build the new Jerusalem would agree with what has just been said, and would find in it a reason for destroying at once all that does not conform to a uniform type. They would wipe out of existence the private preparatory schools and the public boarding-schools: they mistake uniformity for unity, and hurry on to produce equality by the denial of liberty, as the equalitarians always do. It is, as a matter of fact, the real strength of English education that it is built on variety of type, whether you take it in the elementary, the secondary, or the university stage, and each type has its special value. But of all the types that supply our secondary education the public school is unique, the most rooted in the soil, the most spontaneous growth. Boarding-schools are, in the first place, necessary. Most of us, indeed, live in cities and towns, but we are still far from the time when we shall all live in a street with a good day-school round the corner. The public schools are good in themselves, and the education which they give is on the whole, in my opinion, somewhat broader and more liberal than that of any other type. This is due to their independence, to their comparatively high leaving age, to their ability to influence a greater proportion of the pupils' time, and to the higher

qualifications of the teaching staff, which, through the total inducement of their salaries and general conditions, they are able to provide. If ready adjustment to environment is a sign of life—and I know no other test of the life of an organism—the public schools are very alive: in their curriculum, in their attitude to art, music, literature, and drama, in their political knowledge and interest, they have undergone profound change and development in the last thirty years. More than any schools in any country in the world they are able to create a life-long devotion in their pupils. They are no artificial creation of a code: they were not thought out in Whitehall. They are a perfectly natural growth thrown off from the national life, and at any time they reflect faithfully the strength and the weakness of the national character. It would be mere doctrinaire folly to seek to destroy at the dictate of a political creed something which is so deeply rooted and, if rightly treated, so responsive to national need.

And there is something more to be said. In every generation of boys there are a good many who will only give of their best under the whole-time control and all-round stimulus of the boarding-school. This is not meant to imply that there are not boys in the boarding-schools who would not be better if they were at a day-school, and a very few who are not really fit for the education of any school. But it is equally true that there are in the day-schools a good many who would do better if they were transferred, for reasons of their own personality in some instances, and more often because of their home conditions: it is a satisfactory memory to me that in my day-school days I did succeed in transferring a certain number. For this reason alone boarding-schools in any system of national education ought to exist. And honesty compels me to add, even though the statement may arouse strong dissent, that the product of the boarding-school is on the average better fitted for life in the sense that he is more capable of dealing with its situations and problems. I believe that this is due to his having lived for years amid the free criticism of his equals and having undertaken more real responsibilities. I wish that this were not the case: I wish that the product of the day-school did not so often leave with a totally unnecessary inferiority complex so that he is unable to 'mix' early and readily. But wishing that things were

different does not alter the facts. I have helped to interview boys for the service of Imperial Chemical Industries, and for the coal industry and other purposes, and it was obvious that as a rule the public school boy was readier, more at ease, more capable of responsibility, and likely to understand other people better than the boy from the day-school. This impression, itself based on a good deal of experience, has been strongly confirmed to me by another observer, a man of great educational administrative experience, and, like myself, the product of a day-school, who drew the same conclusion from many interviews for Kitchener scholarships.

If, then, the boarding-school is for some the right type of education in any case, and if the above impressions are true, that it does send out products better fitted for some of the purposes of life, notably administration and leadership, is it right that we should leave all this side of our education as a monopoly of the well-to-do, and keep the door to it banged and bolted in the face of the ablest children of the poor? It may be said that there are scholarships, and that, indeed, a very cheap form of education is to hold a scholarship at Eton or Winchester. But the winning of one of these scholarships means that a very high standard of intellectual precocity has been attained, only to be reached by attendance for several years at a preparatory school, where the fees alone are more than the family income of a great many homes in this country. As they stand, the public school scholarships are quite illusory as any contribution to the solution of the problem, and indeed, as has been said, the practical solution is very difficult to find. Boys enter the public schools at the age of thirteen and a half to fourteen, and they are expected to have a knowledge of scripture, English, history, geography, Latin, French, possibly Greek, arithmetic, algebra and geometry. Boys leave the elementary schools at eleven with a knowledge of English subjects and a little mathematics, mainly arithmetic. There is therefore a gap of two years, and the two systems do not dovetail: no direct entry from the elementary school into the public school is possible. It might seem obvious, therefore, that candidates should be found in the ex-elementary school boys who have gone to the secondary schools, and have there for two or three years made a beginning in Latin, French, algebra, geometry, and science. This proposal was indeed ventilated

more than ten years ago, and roused such a storm of hostility that it was incontinently dropped: it was represented as an attempt on the part of the public schools, knowing that they were going to be beaten out of the field in the competition for scholarships in Oxford and Cambridge, to rob the secondary schools of the very boys who were to be the instruments of their downfall, and so bolster up an obsolete and decaying institution. It was not so intended: the purpose of the scholarships then proposed was not to skim the intellectual cream from the day-schools. Intellectual attainment, indeed, was not to be the first qualification looked for. But there was no doubt about the genuine passions which the scheme aroused, and I well remember flinching before the storm of invective, that the education in the secondary schools was as good as—yes, and a great deal better than—that of any public school, which poured from the lips of some earnest protagonists who themselves had their own sons down for Marlborough. That is why I believe that this scheme can never be worked out by schoolmasters, who are naturally too jealous of one another, and too intensely bound up with the fortunes of their own particular school, to be able to take a broad view. After all, it is not human nature to expect a schoolmaster to part willingly with a boy who has real promise in him. It is not wise, and it may not be right, to take the boys from the secondary schools.

The scheme failed also in those days because it did not, apparently, rouse even a spark of interest in those who presided over our education in Whitehall. Whether they realised that there was growing up under their patronage and in the name of a national education a dichotomy which was hardening year by year, a system of schools with a social cachet completely and increasingly sundered from their own system which lacked it, whether they realised it and did not care, or whether the maxim, so beloved in Whitehall, '*quieta non movere*' prevailed with them, I do not know. But it is clear that without the support of the national purse no scheme can go forward: the public schools can bear part, but only a part, of any practical scheme that can be advanced. The boarding-schools are indeed still more expensive than they were then, from causes which are entirely outside their control. The State by its action has created pension rights,

increased salaries, increased rates, and raised the level of wages. Parental demands for better food, more luxury, more dignified buildings, combined with the pride of schoolmasters and 'old boys,' have done the rest. Yet, pressed as most of the public schools are, I think that they would be prepared to give free tuition, or its equivalent, and would not refuse to stand in with a scheme in which one-third of the cost fell on themselves, one-third on national funds, and one-third on those of the local authority. Nothing can prevent the scheme in any form from being expensive. But if a scheme can be devised which will put an end to our having one set of schools completely confined to the classes and another set devoted to the needs of the masses, a scheme which will prevent us from shutting our eyes and calling the present dualism a national system of education, and a real equality of opportunity, then I think that the expense of it, even though great, would be justified. For it would make for unity, sympathy, and understanding; it would build healthier social tissue: that is what I meant when I said that we should be a healthier nation if ex-elementary school boys were to be found at Eton.

Reflection through the years which have elapsed since the failure of that plan have led me to feel that the boys ought to be chosen direct from the elementary school at the usual age when they are now picked for scholarships, shortly after eleven, and that they should be then sent for at least two years to a private preparatory school. The transition from the elementary to the public school would otherwise be too violent, and a space of time must be found during which the selected boys can learn not only the rudiments of Latin, French, algebra, and geometry, but something of the ways and habits of their future home. I do not see why, so long as the proportion entered is very limited, all preparatory schools should not be required to co-operate as well as all independent public schools. I have in mind but a small percentage in any case; one such boy for every 100 in the school admitted every year would be enough. At the end of five years every school of 500 would be carrying its maximum of between twenty and twenty-five boys. It would, of course, be important that no school should escape the obligation, for otherwise the recalcitrant would gain the

advantage of becoming the last citadel of snobbery. That is an additional reason why the scheme should be imposed from above, and not left to the mercies of voluntary co-operation.

It is clear that the scholars could not be chosen on intellectual performance, nor should precocity, in my opinion, count in a boy's favour. A sensible use of the school record, intelligence tests, the schoolmaster's report on character, the doctor's report on physique, together with an interview, should enable a wiser choice to be made than would be possible through a written examination. We should look rather for the promise of independence and strength than for purely intellectual gifts.

Nor ought we to be too rigid and pedantic in our definition of poverty. Not all the parents of boys in the State-aided schools are poor: not all the parents of boys in the public schools are rich. It is far otherwise in a number of cases, for there are those who sacrifice all the savings which they possess and others who spend half their income in securing for their children the education which they desire. Though I should have in mind in any scheme primarily the boys who are naturally to be found in the elementary school, I would not so draw up its terms as to exclude the son of the poor widow or the victim of misfortune for whom the boarding-school has become impossible if they are properly qualified.

I have said that the scheme would be expensive, but it would only be so in comparison with scholarship systems at day-schools. As compared, for instance, with the amount of public money now being spent to prove that sugar-beet is an unsuitable crop for English agriculture, the cost would be merely fractional. A quarter of a million pounds a year, when the scheme was in full action, would, in my opinion, be quite adequate for all its demands.

It may be urged that the scheme would be unwelcome to the public schools. But I have never seen any reasons for thinking so. I have discussed it many times with many headmasters, and I have never found any objection on socially exclusive grounds raised against the proposal. Indeed, most schools would be anxious to co-operate, but no individual school could afford to begin it by itself. Nor would the new

scholars receive anything but fair treatment from the boys themselves, once the boys knew that it was a social experiment and in the national interest. Boys do not receive due credit for the tolerance and broadmindedness which they undoubtedly possess. Nowhere do money and social position count less and individual worth more than at school, in the general opinion of the community.

Such is the scheme as it roughly shapes itself in my mind. I believe it to be practicable, and likely, once it was in working order, to return increasing dividends of mutual understanding in our education and of mutual good-will among our citizens.

CYRIL NORWOOD.

SUPER- AND SUB-REALISM

MR. STANLEY SPENCER AND THE ACADEMY

By D. S. MACCOLL

How do you know but every bird that cuts the airy way is an immense world of delight, closed by your senses five?—WILLIAM BLAKE

THIS article was to have paid tribute to the progress in liberal administration at the Royal Academy since I was its critic a generation ago, with suggestions for further improvement: but that must wait; the Stanley Spencer incident is an unfortunate set-back. That the young Associate had formally no case in rebelling against rules to which he had subscribed has been amply made clear: none the less, the Council's action in rejecting two of his pictures was a more serious mistake in policy and common sense, to put it at the lowest. Here was a painter elected in full knowledge of his 'queerness'—one who might be described as in some respects a village simpleton, but waywardly and genuinely inspired; at a time when any tincture of genius in painting is rare he had been admitted for what he was, and had given to last year's exhibition its chief, however disputed, distinction. This year two pictures, no more Spencerian than those accepted, have been thrown out, under a plea of 'standards,' 'suitability,' and even 'discipline': smarting under the snub, the painter has resigned and is lost to the Academy. There could be no more luckless sin of committee.

That kind of sin, which consists in approving every man not in but out of his humour, was the text of John Sargent's evidence as witness from within the Academy at the Chantrey inquiry. Contemplating the woeful record of purchases, and reluctantly but honestly testifying, he spoke of the tendency to jib at any full or extreme expression of artistic

quality, and to play for safety by choosing some watered-down substitute; a weakness which dogs all committee-choice, whether exercised upon Old Masters or new talent. If Jerome Bosch were alive his Prado pieces would horrify Sir William Llewellyn's Council, and the 'Mocking of Christ' admitted to the National Gallery is uncharacteristic, a mild, almost friendly affair, in which no one is doing anything definite in the way of suffering or persecution, or even of being very odd. The weakness against which Academies have to fight is the habit of canonising oddities when virtue has gone out of them and only mannerism remains. It is easy to detect the wrong thumb on a Stanley Spencer hand, but the prevailing academicism in hands is a relic of Sargent's sketchy, if vigorous, approximation; any virtue has gone out of the rags of fingers which once were an offence, but now are 'cover': artistic victories, no more than military, are won by taking cover; the 'offensive' must be renewed. A Sunday paper, in its notice of the current exhibition, furnished so perfect a formula for the eclectic nullifying of all specific quality that I must quote it, with abbreviations:

'Lady (Gomer) Berry and her Daughter' is a modern version of the traditional English Grand Style in portraiture. Classical in . . . , it is romantic in . . . ; traditional in . . . , it is yet modern in . . . Fortunate in the attractiveness of his sitters, dextrous and tactful in presenting them so decoratively, W. G. de Glehn, R.A., has produced a picture which is certain to be immensely popular.

In despite of those pyramidal, but possibly, in view of the concluding words, ironic claims to my admiration in a picture which I confess had not arrested me, I think of how I have been haunted for a year by the figure with a load of grass above his head in Stanley Spencer's Swiss panorama, and of the vivid imagery in one of his Tate pictures, that bit of the ordinary, white curtains blowing out from the windows, become, in the seeing, more visionary, more other-worldly than ghosts in the street below. For such chinks, broken in through our careful town-light, Burlington House, I think, might well have endured with patience, if not humility, while this unusual reader of the Bible and of Cookham made something memorable of graves and swans and dustbins, of village louts and vixens and inconveniently resurrected persons, while spiritual 'buddies' bulge upon his inner eye,

organ of an unorthodox, but Franciscan, *Cantico delle Creature*. His St. Francis is, after all, more like Giotto's stout friar than are the sentimentalised figures of non-Catholic fancy, and more like that rich reveller turned village simpleton with the genius of a saint, who fell in love with lepers, with poverty, with flowers, having compunction to spare for his troublesome brother Body, the Ass. It was his worry also to see the fraternity academicised, his *joculatores*, Clowns of God, straitened into the 'rule' of the regular orders by a Pope called Innocent.

The wild deer, wandering here and there,
Keeps the human soul from care.

Uncovenanted genius guards it from too much of that Innocence. The Real, seen with vigour or with fineness, is the daily bread and wine, the centre-field, the classic domain of painting. But an exhibition like that of the Academy, which professes to give a fair general review of talent, must allow for what it is convenient to call, borrowing from current slang, 'Super-Realism.' I avoid the word 'Imagination,' because that belongs to all good image-making, and therefore to Realists as well. By Super-Realists I mean those who are visionary as well as visual, who see in one way or another violently or strangely, under whose contemplation the form transforms, swells or deflates, rigidifies or melts, is satirically distorted or ironically juxtaposed, is given the freedom, even the irrationality, of dreams, explores the craziness of the mind off-guard, wool-gathering, mystical, frantic.

If to after-banquet political speakers, who cast an apologetic and facetious glance at the arts, it seems obviously undesirable that painting or sculpture should be permitted such excursions, or a so-called 'Academy' display them, it might be enough to recall the tolerance with which the Government of this realm is dangerously and deliberately committed to the mixture of parties, not excluding Communists, Fascists and Anarchists. The rooted English conviction that all should 'blow off steam' in a common assembly and find their level in common debate not even the Tory disavows. But consider what in the sphere of another art, that of Literature, would be banned if a censorship should

refuse publication to flights of 'imagination,' whether celestial or nightmarish. The Apocalypse must go, the Paradise as well as the Inferno of Dante, the upsetting discoveries of Captain Lemuel Gulliver. But the first of these is read in churches; the second prescribed for all students of poetry; the third has become a fairy-tale in the nursery, along with the elastic Wonderland dimensions of 'Alice.' Things seen are no doubt more shocking than things read; yet that is due to weakness of evoking faculty in the reader rather than to intention of the writer.

But these considerations are really beside the mark; there is no such exclusion of Super-Realists from the Academy; they are present, and if they do not shock the Jury, they do, many of them, discomfort the sensitive and intelligent visitor. Let anyone who doubts this take the trouble to examine with some care the following pictures, all hung in the chief room, No. III: 'Lady from Millbank' (168), 'The End—the Beginning' (176), 'Apollo' (180), 'Bathers attacked by Swans' (193), 'Sideshow' (213), 'Ballet Fantasy' (218), or in Gallery XI, to which the 'Workmen' and 'Builders' of Mr. Spencer have been relegated, the 'Christ in History' of the late Mark Symons.

These excite no scandal either because their powder is drenched with a jam of sentiment, or because their vivacity is not sufficient to press them on the attention; but if exclusion of the extravagant there is to be, Mr. Spencer ought not to lack company. The truth is that in the shallows of popular painting there is a sentimental excess corresponding to the distressing noise called 'crooning' among singers, and 'crooners' are numerous among sculptors as well as painters, particularly the funerary section. Sculpture, when it is monumental, does call, like architecture, for censorship, because, being public, and perhaps for centuries permanent, it may be a public nuisance. Just as in the lower reaches of fashion there are bad habits, such as geranium lips and crimson nails, destructive of the form of face and hands, which the police ought to prohibit in public places, so with disorderly buildings and ridiculous sculpture.

The feature of poor visibility, low blood-pressure, lack of visual vigour and attraction affects also the majority of

painters who are neither eccentric, sloppy, nor aggressively vulgar. Them I call Sub-Realists. They are faithful, in their fashion, to fact, to the tame 'mirror' of fact, without emphasis or abstraction or heightening, without that lucid trance before the actual into which the strong and fine Realists are carried away even while they look. Sir John Simon, at the banquet, quoting, I conjecture, from his reading of Ruskin's 1870 'Lectures on Art,' brought up as first principle of Leonardo's *Trattato*, that the painter should work by comparison and competition with the mirror's reflection of his subject. He had not read so far as the qualms which beset Ruskin later on; for example, in 'The Black Arts' of 1887. Ruskin knew, if he did not expressly say, that mirror-control was the tragedy of Leonardo as a painter—the reason that he painted so little. The Italian masters had a curious *naïveté* in this matter, undisillusioned, as they were, by the photograph. Ruskin knew that imitative light-and-shade, as Leonardo pursued it, in a hopeless chase, *ad infinitum*, was destructive not only of colour but, in the end, of *chiaroscuro* itself. From the mirror, from the over-modelling blackness of his finished pieces, from his abandoned, over-cerebrated projects and ideally beautiful faces turning sour, Leonardo took refuge in the privacy of his Journals, confiding to their pages a curiosity in bestial types and holiday spurts of caricature. It was in the abstraction of line, which the mirror never taught him, in drawing unvexed by colour-and-tone, that he became a freedman of art.

The schooling of the mirror, Ruskin also knew, if schooling there is at all, must be a part of 'discipline' for the painter; but if he takes from it the habit of taming out all impulse, of inhibiting any vivid sensation and subduing a natural liking or disgust, he may have such success as is open to the Sub-Realist, and no more. The modern equivalent for mirror-control is photograph-copying or emulation. The portraits of Sir William Llewellyn, the portraits and mountain landscape of Mr. Gerald Kelly in his present phase have eminently this negative virtue, whether by direct aid or influence of the camera. Inhibition is written all over those laborious and respectable works. As R. A. M. Stevenson used to say of John Collier, in pre-photograph days such imitative exactitude would have seemed to a Vasari miraculous.

At a dinner of art scholars, editors and museum conservators, when still fresh in their minds were a tale by Kipling and Von Bode's encounter with the ambiguously Leonardesque bust which contained the waistcoat of Cockle Lucas, Robbie Ross warned his hearers that for each of them waited 'a Bust at the End of the Passage.' 'Bust,' in the vulgar sense of the word, is the danger that waits upon the Sub-Realist. When, on May 3, I saw upon the posters 'Crash at the Private View' I wondered whether a Sub-Realist had exploded. There must have been, for some of them, a secret hour of anguish on discovering that they disliked or distrusted their own natural vision, disapproved, intimately, of themselves. Two ways lay open: the charioteer could give his horses their head, however risky the road, or rein them in for a steady trot along the boulevard. For the Brockhursts and Framptons there was probably no shock: in Browning's phrase, they 'break through' painting and with competence and confidence insist. The shock is ours. But what may happen is that after a decorous career, free from any scandal, the *démon du midi*, as the French translate 'the destruction that wasteth at noonday,' may get going and take his fling. In this most unstable of times not academicians are secure. William Orpen was visited at intervals by a Puckish humour in his highly skilled portrait-making; an explosion carried Sims, never without visionary gleams, to disastrous lengths; Mr. Glyn Philpot has also broken away from conventional bounds, and suffered recently the fate of Mr. Stanley Spencer. I cannot believe that Mr. Kelly, who is the most restless mind and most disturbing carp of criticism in the academical pond, will always plod on; those painful mountains will one day be shaken by earthquake. The amiable and accomplished President, if anyone, is safe; yet that tartan of the Grants in No. 174 is a little risky beside Sub-Realist flesh. What we may be sure of is that if disruption should ever threaten he would go forth like a gentleman, to face it in strict seclusion.

So unstable are we that the Realists themselves are not secure. Mr. Augustus John's rare power, never thoroughly organised except for improvisation, is subject to uncertainty and failure. In his 'Lord Conway' the power is 'on'; a striking head has called out a rough, vigorous solution,

which makes shadows of its neighbours; in other pieces there is interruption or fusion of the wires. In days when painters were used, and held to commission, were 'disciplined' to some purpose, what wealth we should have had from a source that has been too much uncanalised and dissipated! Mr. Sickert's is a different case. To him are now accorded the immunities, the uncritical acceptance of a Grand Young Man; on what he has accomplished and done he has earned, like the blacksmith, an evening's repose and amusement. The determined Realist, who fought for his drawing and cultivated with intense application a natural gift for indoor 'values' in the gaslight of music-halls, and for the pleasures of paint, has thrown up the sponge, goes to the camera or to prints for his drawing and fills in the forms with bright arbitrary tints. The 'Viscount Castlerosse' is, I presume, enlarged from a photograph, a good one, for the pose is striking and the expression ineffable. But the slight drench of pinkish chocolate makes no distinction between clothes and complexion, and grunts at the separate blue of the carpet.

Against those and many more instabilities it is heartening to set the great Realist of our time. The sixteen pictures and sketches by Wilson Steer at Barbizon House range from 1887 to 1935, and the filmy delicacy of the last is the testament from a long integrity of vision. His disciple in the Academy, Mr. Philip Connard, has learned the lesson well, with an individual variation; his 'Meditation' (574) is one of the scanty few that count as colour in the exhibition. Colour, like drawing, is never a constant possession; it comes and goes with other preoccupations or occasions. Mr. Ernest Procter has given one such surprise; he suddenly arrived at good colour and design in a carpet which was one of the best things of the Industrial show.

I shall be met, not unreasonably, by the question, How is a jury, to whom the uncouth element in a Stanley Spencer is repellent, to judge among the Super-Realists who acutely challenge their prejudices—to know, to put it bluntly, whether they are concerned with an awkward customer of talent, or with a charlatan, one who puts on an antic disposition to court attention? Here is a real dilemma which I am bound to face, and I believe I can offer a solution.

Charlatanism is easier to suspect than to prove and is rare as a consciously 'pure' activity. What is commoner is a twist, with plausible theoretic excuses to justify it in the artist's mind and aggravate it in his practice. There was a very enlightening instance of this in the career of Roger Fry, whose reputation will rest, not on his painting, but his writing. Him also the 'demon of highnoon' attacked. In his New English Art Club days he escaped from dull naturalism into pastiche of several varieties, and became a Saul, breathing disapproval on modern art, especially French painting. Then a crash, a conversion, happened. On his way to a Damascus of the Grafton Gallery he was met by Picasso, and a Paul emerged, with eyes unscaled for anything French and modern that was not yet established. He embraced it all, and in his practice for a time took on, under a purely theoretic stress, every charlatanism of the moment. But his natural vision was unaltered, and to that he relapsed in a painting which would have been indistinguishable, without his name, among the more ordinary works in an exhibition, say, of the 'British Artists.' The *Nation* or *New Statesman*, therefore, was hasty in describing him as 'of course' a better painter than poor Reynolds.

The moral I draw from that adventure for those who cannot trust to their instinctive reactions before the eccentric is to test the Super-Realist by his dealings with the real. William Blake is the crucial example. That explorer of Heaven and Hell and Bowlahoola, when he turned his eye upon the ordinary Earth, saw a quintessence of beauty in a field of corn, a traveller hasting: he had songs of Innocence as well as of Experience.

When, therefore, I fail to find authentic inspiration but rather self-deceiving cerebration in the much applauded monumental excursions, the 'busts' (in the vulgar sense) of Mr. Epstein and Mr. Dobson, I find confirmation when I turn to the 'busts' (in the ordinary sense) which accompany them. Mr. Epstein undoubtedly had talent; his early work on the Strand building, which we all defended and defend, remains his best, and is now once more threatened with removal by new owners, a greater outrage than would have been the suppression of his 'Rima.' But that gift has not developed; a declension is evident in the portraits, with

their features that strain the head and surface corrugation transferred from clay modelling to an unpleasant kind of bronze: the 'Einstein' stood out as an achievement among the later pieces. Mr. Dobson's was a more slender gift from the first; his brass coal-scuttle head of Mr. Osbert Sitwell was perfect in its amusing kind, and his head and arms of Mlle. Lopokova graceful; but the far follower of Maillol, credited by the critics with unprecedented 'plastic discoveries,' is less vital as he proceeds. The 'Pax' is, like Mr. Epstein's 'Christ,' a geometry imposed upon life, not discovered in it, a mongrel of sculpture and free-stone building.

Mr. Stanley Spencer, I submit, passes this test: witness the dint made on one's memory by last year's 'Portrait,' and the peculiarity along with intensity of his vision from student days. I am not asking anyone at Burlington House to 'like' his work; 'liking,' indeed, is not what I feel myself. But to warn him off humanity; to say 'Keep to Scarecrows and do not meddle with Saints (who did not scare the birds but do scare us)' is to import too much private taste into a public institution. Better, surely, to include Epsteins and Dobsons as well as Jagers, and let the *orbis terrarum* judge. No one can foretell where Mr. Spencer will end, but what I began by calling a mistake in policy and common sense may possibly be something more grave—a sin against the Spirit.¹

D. S. MACCOLL.

¹ The above article had been passed for press before the further incidents occurred in which Mr. Epstein and Mr. Sickert are concerned.

GAS OR ELECTRICITY FOR DOMESTIC HEATING?

By PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. BONE, D.Sc., F.R.S.

QUESTIONS are often asked by householders as to the relative costs of gas and electricity for domestic heating and cooking. The writer is a fuel economist with no other than the public interest to serve, who regards the prosperity of the undertakings supplying both commodities as essential to national well-being, and, as gas involves coke also, the latter cannot be excluded.

The gas industry, dating back to 1812, is much the older of the two; for more than a century, marked by continuous progress, it has converted coal into smokeless coke and gas, with tar and ammonia as by-products. It has successfully adapted its methods and policy to changing circumstances and needs and has never failed to maintain public supplies. In co-partnership with its own employees it has produced, for ten million consumers, the cheapest coal gas in the world, with fair and constant dividends upon the £160 millions capital now invested in it. The statutes under which the industry operates automatically ensure that the consumer secures the greater proportion of any economy achieved in the cost of producing gas, a condition that hardly applies as yet to public electricity supply.

The electrical industry, on the other hand, is a comparatively recent factor in the national economy. Barely fifty years have passed since the first public electricity undertaking in this country was started; most of the development has taken place in the last fifteen years. It has the attractiveness and the self-confidence of youth, and it inspires in uncritical minds the impression of superiority with which adolescence is sometimes imbued. The fact is that electricity is preferable for some but not for other purposes; and

among the latter, when cost to the consumer is considered, may be counted both the heating of rooms and the cooking of food.

Thermal comparison between gas and electricity may be considered from two points of view—namely, either that of fuel economy, *i.e.*, the proper utilisation of our national coal, or that of domestic economy, *i.e.*, the cost to the family budget. The first is a national and the second an individual question, and both are important.

Gas and electricity are the only two forms of potential heat energy derivable from coal which can be transmitted as a public supply from a central generating station through mains to every would-be consumer within an area and made available for instant use in every room in his house. Gas is conveyed in pipes, electricity along cables and wires; both can be accurately measured and easily controlled. Therein lies their great convenience. Of the two, electricity has the advantage of being carried by more flexible conductors, *i.e.*, by wires instead of pipes, and at the point of use it can be made to discharge more functions than is the case with gas. Both can equally readily be transformed into heat at any desired point—electricity merely by interposing in the circuit some 'resistance' to its flow, gas by burning it in admixture with air, in each case without smoke or ash.

In this country both gas and electricity are ultimately derived from coal—in the first case, by 'carbonising' it in closed retorts or chambers at bright red heat (say about 1800 degs. Fahr.); in the second, by burning it in a boiler-furnace, and making the steam so generated work a machine called a turbo-generator, or, in other words, a combined turbine and electricity generator.

According to official returns, the total coal carbonised by authorised British gas undertakings in the year 1933 was 16.714 million tons, while that consumed in authorised electricity supply undertakings was 10.33 million tons. The total capital invested per ton of coal consumed at the works per annum was £9.65 in gas, and £29 in the electricity undertakings. And while of the 293,230 million cubic feet of gas made 286,144 million cubic feet, or 97.4 per cent., actually reached consumers, of the 11,533 million units of electricity generated only 9.501 million units, or 82.4 per cent., reached

consumers, transformation and transmission losses being always higher with electricity than with gas.

Gas has the great advantage of being cheaply stored in bulk in holders, whereas the storage of electricity is so cumbersome as to be impracticable on a large scale. The storage capacity of a gas undertaking is usually between 1.0 and 1.5 of an average day's output, and between 0.65 and 1.0 of its maximum day's output. Hence, while the undertaking can use its holders to help it over the 'peak' demand, thereby averaging the daily load upon its works, an electricity undertaking must install sufficient machinery to cope with the 'peak' demand, and an important part of its business consists in ensuring as good a 'load factor' as possible by smoothing out the hourly demands upon its central generating plants. In other words, whereas a gas undertaking can hold up its supply while its customers sleep, and wait their convenience, an electricity undertaking has to push its commodity on them, sleeping or waking, by adjusting its prices. Thus, while the former will always supply a domestic consumer at a flat rate for all purposes throughout the twenty-four hours of the day, the latter will usually seek to charge him at widely different rates for different purposes at different times and seasons. From the points of view of heat economy and the utilisation of coal, a gasworks can always show a much better balance-sheet than an electric power station, a fact inherent in the respective processes. For whereas a ton of coal, carbonised in a gasworks, yields not only some 15,000 cubic feet of gas but also about 10 cwt. of saleable coke, some 10 gallons of tar, and about 7.5 lb. of recoverable ammonia, the over-all thermal efficiency of the process exceeding 80 per cent., the most modern electric power station generates electricity only, and in so doing consumes at least 1 lb. of coal for every unit of electricity sent out, which represents a thermal efficiency of just over 25 per cent.

In comparing these two figures of 80 and 25 per cent., however, it must be borne in mind (1) that the grade of coal consumed under the boilers of an electric power station is often inferior to that required for gas-making, so that the two operations are complementary as regards the utilisation of coal, and (2) that the electric power station sends out energy

at a much higher 'potential' than that of either coke or gas, and therefore cannot be expected to achieve the high thermal efficiency of a gasworks. From this point of view electricity has a much greater 'potentiality' than is needed for domestic heating operations, and merely to degrade it into heat is not using it to the best advantage. Indeed, deliberately to sacrifice three-quarters of the heat energy of coal at an electric power plant in producing a higher form of energy destined, a few seconds later, to be degraded into heat a mile away in a domestic fire or oven can only be excused by the need to ensure a good 'load factor,' thereby reducing the cost of current.

From the point of view of a domestic consumer, both gas and electricity represent so much potential light or heat, ultimately derived from coal, which is literally 'on tap'; his chief concern is the cost. And as the heating requirements for a household much exceed those of its lighting, they are of paramount importance.

A short digression must be made here to consider how gas, electricity, and the heat they are capable of generating are measured. The most obvious way of measuring and charging for gas is according to its volume, e.g., so many, or so much per, 1000 cubic feet, and formerly this was universal throughout Great Britain. But after the war Parliament enacted that in future it should be charged for according to its potential heat content. Hence it is now charged for at so many pence per 'therm,' the latter being 100,000 British thermal units (B.Th.U.s.), or an amount of heat required to raise the temperature of 60 gallons of water from 45 degs. Fahr. to its boiling-point at 212 degs. Fahr. More simply, a 'therm' represents an amount of heat sufficient to prepare ten hot baths (say 15 gallons at 112 degs. Fahr.) from water at 45 degs. Fahr., supposing no loss to occur. And to a London consumer the cost of a gas therm is 8.6d.

Electricity is measured in terms of a unit called a kilowatt-hour, of which the heat equivalent is 3413 British thermal units. Hence the potential heat in a single gas 'therm' is equal to that in 29.3 units of electricity. And a London gas consumer buys as much potential heat for 8.6d. as would cost an electricity consumer nearly half a crown at 1d. per unit.

The potential heat in a ton of coal (or coke) is approxi-

mately 300 therms, and on carbonisation in the gasworks it yields approximately 150 therms in the form of saleable coke and 75 therms in the form of gas. And, seeing that the last named represents the heat equivalent of what the most modern electric power station sends out in the form of electricity from a ton of coal, it follows that, on purely thermal comparison, the whole of the coke and tar produced at a gasworks represents the gain of its operations over those of a power station.

If now 'interest charges,' on, say, a 5 per cent. basis, in respect of the potential heat supplied to the public by gas and electricity undertakings respectively be compared, it will be seen how favourable they are to the former. On such basis the average 'interest charge' per ton of coal carbonised in British gas undertakings is 116*d.*, and the potential therms sent out therefrom are 150 as coke and 75 as gas, or a total of 225. The 'interest charge' would thus be practically 0.5*d.* per therm if spread over the whole of such heat output, or if charged on the gas only, then 1.5*d.* per therm. On the same basis, the average 'interest charge' per ton of coal consumed in British electricity undertakings is 348*d.* As the potential heat in the current sent out therefrom is 75 therms, this means an 'interest charge' of 4.64*d.* per therm.

Both gas and electricity are, however, considerably dearer than coke at, say, 40*s.* a ton, in which form a 'therm' costs as little as about 1.6*d.*, the difference being what the consumer pays for the much greater convenience and cleanliness of the two former. The following comparative figures show the prime cost of a 'therm' in each commodity:

As Coke at 40 <i>s.</i> per ton.	As Gas at 8.6 <i>d.</i> per therm.	As Electricity at 1 <i>d.</i> per unit.
1.6 <i>d.</i>	8.6 <i>d.</i>	29.3 <i>d.</i>
Ratio to Coke . . .	5.375	18.3

These figures refer only to prime cost of the fuel, as delivered at the householders' premises; in the case of coke the figure should be increased probably by about 25 per cent. before the cost of the fuel at its point of consumption could

be ascertained. The ratio of gas and electricity to coke at their points of consumption would then become approximately 4.3 and 14.65 respectively.

The importance of coke to the domestic consumer lies in the fact that it is the cheapest smokeless fuel he can buy for central heating and hot-water purposes; a gas undertaking ensures him regular supplies of both coke and gas at the lowest possible prices compatible with the state of the coal market and a moderate return of about 5 per cent. upon the capital represented by its carbonising and distribution plants. An electric power station can supply electricity for lighting, power, and heating purposes also, but nothing equivalent to coke. Difficulty is sometimes experienced in arriving at a true comparison between the prime costs of gas and electricity for heating purposes, because, as already explained, while a gas undertaking usually charges consumers a uniform flat rate per therm, the charges of an electricity undertaking are often made up of (1) a fixed overhead 'service charge,' e.g., as determined by the floor area of a house, *plus* (2) a charge, which sometimes varies from summer to winter, for current actually taken. Unless both (1) and (2) are taken into account it is impossible to make a correct comparison.

The Gas Undertakings Act of 1934 has, however, now empowered gas companies to adopt a new system involving differential over-all charges to small and large consumers respectively, as, for example, by means of a two-part scale comprising (1) a fixed 'service charge' according to some standard requirement, *plus* (2) a 'therm consumption charge' at a rate considerably below the published 'flat rate.' By such means gas might be made cheaper than now to domestic consumers using it for both cooking and heating purposes, and gas undertakings are at last enabled to meet the competition of electricity on common ground as regards flexibility of tariffs as between small and large consumers.

What are the usual heating requirements of a modern British house? They comprise (1) the heating of rooms, corridors, etc., (2) hot-water services, and (3) the cooking of food. The problem is how to provide them cheaply with safety, convenience, cleanliness and comfort. And as we are dealing with the feelings and hygienic needs of human beings, physiological and æsthetic requirements are a ruling considera-

tion. The human body is unceasingly transforming the potential energy of food into heat; it can only discharge its various functions properly provided that its temperature is maintained within very narrow limits. Normally the mean body temperature is automatically maintained constant at 98.4 degs. Fahr. by various adjustments in the system itself, which has a remarkable power of rapidly responding to any changes in the physical conditions of its environment.

The heat generated in the body—amounting in the case of an adult man of sedentary occupation to about 12,000, or, in the case of a man engaged for eight hours per diem in moderate work, to (maybe) as much as 20,000 B.Th.U.s. per twenty-four hours—must be dissipated as fast as it is formed, or otherwise the body temperature would rise to a point incompatible with health. This dissipation is effected, to an extent of 10 to 20 per cent. only of the whole, through the lungs, the remainder being by radiation and evaporation through the skin. And the science of clothing, as well as that of indoor heating and ventilation, largely resolves itself into helping the skin to maintain the normal body temperature without discomfort.

The natural conditions of comfort and health are those prevailing outside on a balmy summer day—namely, warm ground for the feet, radiant heat of the sun on one side of the body, and a cooling breeze on the other side and round the head. There is no monotony, but continual variation, in such conditions. Bearing this in mind, let us consider for a moment the characteristics of our trying British winters. What makes them so insupportable is not so much their *severity* as measured by the thermometer, but their *dreariness* as caused by long, monotonous spells of leaden sky, lack of direct sunshine, and moisture-laden atmosphere, with frequent fogs or drizzle. The average mean daily air temperature for Great Britain and Ireland during three winter months (December to February) for the years 1881 to 1915 inclusive was just under 40 degs. Fahr., and the relative humidity a little over 80 per cent., the daily ration of bright sunshine averaging an hour and two-thirds per diem only.

Such considerations perhaps explain the Englishman's preference in his home for radiation from a bright fire to the 'stuffiness' of central heating. For, oppressed as he is during the-daytime by the humid airs and dreary sunless skies of his

winter environment, he seeks relief at home at night by his radiant fireside. There is much to be said in favour of open fireplaces; and the real problem is how to combine their undoubted advantages with economy in fuel and labour, and, as far as possible, smokelessness. The old system of open coal fireplaces in both kitchen and living-rooms, without any accessory heating, involves so much labour and dirt, as well as the disadvantage of only certain rooms being heated, that it has now been largely superseded, although the open fire still retains a considerable place in the domestic economy. The prime consideration in heating a house should be to avoid cold rooms by raising the temperature of the incoming air to about 50 degs. Fahr. This can best be done by installing a sufficient number of hot-water radiators in entrance-hall, corridors and passages, and then to rely upon some form of radiant open fire for what may be termed the secondary heat requirements of living-rooms.

It is not enough, however, merely to satisfy the heat requirements of the inmates of a house; adequate ventilation is equally important. And, from this point of view, the chimney of an open fireplace acts as a powerful ventilator. Indeed, the modern practice of building houses without open fireplaces and chimneys should be condemned, not merely because it practically restricts the householder to the use of electricity—the most expensive fuel of all—for his heating and cooking requirements, but as being unhygienic. In this connexion the hygienic importance of the ventilating effects of the chimney-pull from open fireplaces in the bed- and living-rooms of a dwelling-house, whether coal or gas fires be installed therein, cannot be too much insisted upon. And the building in London and other large cities of workmen's dwellings in which the rooms, save kitchen and perhaps one other, are provided only with ventilating grids instead of chimney flues is an innovation that should be prohibited as false economy and inconsistent with any proper standard of health. The use of 'flueless' rooms for human habitation necessitates the installation of heating appliances whose ventilating effects are negligible, a practice which on hygienic grounds is indefensible. So long, however, as the law allows of 'flueless' rooms in dwelling-houses, 'flueless' heating appliances must be tolerated; and although electric radiant

heaters may seem preferable as having no products of combustion, there are now equivalent gas appliances in which combustion is so perfect and efficient that they can be used quite safely and at a much lower fuel cost.

The primary heat requirements of a house—*i.e.*, heating its incoming air in entrance-hall, corridors, etc., to, say, 50 degs. Fahr.—can perhaps best be met either (1) in large houses, by a separate central heating system with coke-fired boiler and radiators in circuit, or (2) in small houses, by installing a coke-fired boiler for hot-water heating and including two to three radiators (in corridors) in its circuit; and in either case the heat would be primarily generated by the combustion of coke, the cheapest smokeless fuel of all. The efficiency of a coke-fired boiler may be anything between 35 and 75 per cent., according to its size and the care taken in stoking and regulating the flue.

As regards the secondary heating requirements of rooms, the British winter climate being what it is, some form of radiant open fireplace is undoubtedly best. This may take the form of either (1) a solid fuel (coal, coke or coalite) fire, involving considerable labour and dirt, and which must be constantly replenished, or (2) a gas or electric fire, which can be turned on and off, regulated to a nicety, and needs no replenishment.

Despite the objections to the much-maligned open coal fire, it still holds its own, and will not soon be displaced. A good type of modern coal fireplace will directly radiate into the room about 25 per cent. of the heat developed by the combustion of the coal in its grate. Nearly all the remainder passes up the chimney, but in so doing it (1) vents some 15,000 cubic feet of air per hour, which, for an ordinary living-room, is excessive, and (2) warms the walls of the house. Indeed, a coal fire is by no means as wasteful as is often supposed; and were architects and builders to avoid the stupid practice of building chimneys on outside walls, our houses would be better heated at a smaller cost in fuel. Lastly, the variability of the radiation from a coal fire is in its favour, and, if monotony of conditions in our heating arrangements are to be avoided, the coal fire has no equal. As regards prime fuel cost, it is the cheapest for any room in which a fire has to be regularly maintained for upwards of four hours per diem.

The present-day radiant gas fire has reached such a high pitch of thermal and hygienic efficiency, combined with low cost, that for rooms in which a fire is only occasionally used, or is required for less than four hours per diem, it is actually the cheapest to maintain. And it is only after six hours' continuous use per diem that, as regards cost of fuel, it becomes sensibly dearer than a coal fire. It imparts to the room, chiefly by healthy radiation, up to about 55 per cent. of the gross heat of combustion of the gas; and as regards ventilation, it will change the air of a good-sized living-room about three or four times per hour. With gas at 8.6d. per therm its running cost for a given heating effect is little more than half that of an electric fire using current at 1d. per unit. The thermal efficiency of an electric fire is, of course, the highest of all, being practically 100 per cent., but its ventilating effect is negligible; and with current at 1d. per unit its running cost for a given heat effect is about 1.85 times that of a gas fire.

Next to the maintenance of proper temperature and hygienic conditions in living-rooms, the most important requirement of a modern house is a continuous hot-water service. For this purpose nothing could be so cheap and effective as an independent hot-water circulating and storage system comprising a coke-fired boiler—which in small houses may be located under the kitchen chimney—and a hot-water storage tank at a suitably higher level, with draw-off taps at as many baths and lavatory basins as may be required. Moreover, it is always feasible to include in the circuit a limited number of controllable hot-water 'radiators,' thereby securing a welcome amount of incidental heating in corridors. In my own residence, where such a system is installed, a day and night hot-water service is maintained, together with two radiators in circuit, for a household of five persons, at a fuel cost (coke) of 1s. per diem. In the hot summer months, when a coke-fired boiler is undesirable in a kitchen, a small thermostatically controlled gas-fired heater can be substituted for it in the circuit. Where an independent supply of hot water for 'washing up,' etc., purposes is needed in the kitchen, gas at 8.6d. per therm has great advantages as regards cost over electricity at 1d. per unit. Small gas-fired water-heaters, of either the 'instantaneous' or 'storage' type, can be

installed capable of quickly providing about 10 gallons of hot water at about 130 degs. Fahr. at a cost of 1*d.* only as compared with about 2½*d.* if an electric water-heater were used.

In modern houses in towns and cities, gas or electric ovens are rapidly displacing those of Victorian coal-fired kitchen ranges. The question of whether gas or electricity is to be preferred for cooking purposes has thus become of paramount importance. Although with gas at 8·6*d.* per therm and electricity at 1*d.* per unit the prime cost of a heat unit developed in an electric oven would be 3½ times that of a unit developed in a gas oven, the matter at issue is not so easily disposed of, and there are many who, notwithstanding such disparity, still believe that cooking by electricity is no dearer than by gas. And it is difficult to persuade them otherwise.

The matter has, however, been thoroughly investigated in two comparative series of trials—one carried out in 1926, and the other as recently as 1933; and it may be of interest to summarise the results and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The first series of comparative tests were carried out during 1925-6 at the Willoughby Lane works of the Tottenham District Light, Heat and Power Company, which then controlled both gas and electricity works. The object was to ascertain the relative costs of cooking certain standard meals by gas and electricity respectively in the best-known appliances under ordinary domestic conditions. The gas used had a gross calorific value of 500 B.Th.U.s. per cubic foot and the electric current was 220 volts D.C. Three sets of typical meals were arranged, each consisting of breakfast, dinner and tea for six persons, and these were repeatedly cooked in each of the ovens investigated by persons familiar with the proper working of the gas and electric appliances selected for the test. Every effort was made to keep the cooking conditions strictly comparable by conducting precisely similar operations simultaneously in gas and electric cookers. The results showed (1) that, to equal gas in cost for cooking under ordinary working conditions, electricity must be supplied at a price per unit not more than one-twenty-fourth of the price of gas per therm; or, in other words, to equal gas at 8·6*d.* per therm, electricity would have to be no more than 0·385*d.* per unit; (2) that with similar joints,

equally well cooked, there is no difference between the loss in weight whichever type of oven (gas or electric) is used; (3) that the temperature control of the gas oven was better and more flexible than in the electric oven used; and (4) that electric hot plates are very slow as compared with gas hot plates.

The 1933 tests were carried out by the staff of the Good Housekeeping Institute at 49 Wellington Street, Strand, London, under the direction of Mrs. Cottington Taylor. Three pairs of modern gas and electric cookers, considered suitable for families of three, five and seven persons respectively, were selected for trial, and each cooker was tested on a seven-day week menu, composed of meals intended to be representative of the kind which a middle-class housewife, catering at the rate of 10*s.* per head per week for food alone, would provide. The cookers chosen for the trials were those recommended and sold or hired by electricity and gas undertakings for the number of persons referred to, and were representative of cookers found in houses in the London area. The results showed that (1) to equal gas at 8·6*d.* per therm in cost for such cooking operations electricity would have to be supplied at no more than from 0·41*d.* to 0·54*d.*, or, say, an average of 0·5*d.* per unit, according to the particular oven used; (2) that, with skilled operators, there is little difference between the amount of operation of taps or switches as between gas and electricity, such as there is being in favour of gas; (3) that cooking generally is faster with gas than with electricity; and (4) that there is little or no difference between the quality of cooking or of shrinkage loss with gas and electricity respectively. The results of the 1933 tests, which may be said to have substantiated those of 1926, have shown that, for cooking purposes, 20 units of electricity are required to do the work of 1 therm of gas, and that with gas at 8·6*d.* per therm and electricity at 1*d.* per unit the cost of cooking by electricity would be on the average about twice that of cooking by gas, and without any compensatory advantages. Therefore, until consumers generally in the London area can be supplied day and night the year round with electricity at ½*d.* a unit, gas should easily be able to hold the field against electricity for cooking as for other domestic heating operations.

As a typical example of how the substitution of electricity for gas for domestic purposes would probably affect a household budget, I will cite the case of my own residence, for which exact accounts of heating and lighting costs have been kept for some years past.

At present the heating and hot-water services of the house are effected by (1) a coke-fired boiler in the kitchen, with two radiators and hot-water storage in circuit, the coke consumed (5 tons per annum) being purchased from a local gas undertaking; (2) by coal fires in two living-rooms, the coal consumption being $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons per annum of Derby Brights costing 38s. per ton; and (3) gas fires in dining-room, study, and four bedrooms. The cooking (for five persons) is also all done by gas. The lighting of the house is throughout by electricity *plus* two oil lamps in corridors. With gas (400 therms per annum) costing 9d. per therm *plus* a meter rent of 10s. per annum, and electricity for lighting (300 units per annum) at $4\frac{1}{2}$ d. per unit, the present total annual fuel consumptions and costs for lighting, heating, and cooking are as follows:

	£	s.	d.
(1) $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons of coal at 38s.		4	15 0
(2) 5 tons of coke at 39s.		9	15 0
(3) 400 therms of gas at 9d. <i>plus</i> 10s.	15	10	0
(4) 300 units of electricity at $4\frac{1}{2}$ d.	5	12	6
(5) 12 gallons of oil		12	0
	36	4	6

If, however, electricity were to be substituted for the 400 therms of gas per annum at present used for heating and cooking purposes, I estimate (on the basis of 18 units of electricity being required per therm of gas) that our total annual consumption of electricity would be some 7200 units for heating and cooking *plus* the present 300 units for lighting, or a total of 7500 units. Of these, I estimate that 5000 units would be required during the winter (October to March) and 2500 units during the summer (April to September). The lowest terms on which the local electricity supply company would give us such a supply would be an over-all charge of £7 per annum *plus* 1d. per unit for winter current

and $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per unit for summer current; and the annual bill would then work out as follows:

	£	s.	d.
(1) $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons of coal at 38s.		4	15 0
(2) 5 tons of coke at 39s.		9	15 0
(3) Electricity service charge	7	2	4
5000 units at 1d.	20	16	8
2500 units at $\frac{1}{2}$ d.	5	4	2
		33	3 2
(4) 12 gallons of oil		12	0
Total	48	5	2

Hence it would appear that the substitution of electricity for gas for heating and cooking purposes would involve an increase of £12 os. 8d. per annum (or about one-third) in my present heating and lighting bill. Needless to say, I am not tempted to make the change.

The domestic consumption of gas and/or electricity for cooking and heating will vary considerably according to circumstances, among which economy on the part of the user should be reckoned, for there is a great difference between consumers in this respect. A wasteful consumer of the one commodity is not, however, likely to be economical in regard to the other.

In an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of February 3, 1935, on the 'Development of Domestic Demand of Electricity,' by Sir William Ray, M.P., executive chairman of the British Development Company, it was estimated that whereas the smallest household using electricity for lighting, cooking, and ironing could easily account for 1500 units a year, the addition of an electric wash boiler and of electric and water heating will easily bring the annual demand of such a household up to 4500 or even 6000 units a year; and if, say, about 250 units be deducted therefrom for lighting, the balance would give the heating and cooking load, and this divided by 18 would give a close approximation of the equivalent gas therms required for the same duty. On such basis, together with the local tariffs for gas and electricity respectively, consumers may make their own estimates as regards comparative costs.

In regard to the use of electricity for cooking purposes, it may be pointed out that, inasmuch as British meal-times mostly fall within three short periods daily, and are not likely to alter, anything like a universal adoption of electric cooking would involve awkward peak loads on the generating plant at the power station, and thus thwart present efforts to ensure a good 'load factor,' which is so vital to the cheap production of electricity. Indeed, there would seem to be a limit upon the encouragement of electric cooking beyond which, in their own interests, the electricity undertakings would not be likely to go. And for this reason, apart from the question of cost, most British households will continue to use gas in preference to electricity for cooking purposes.

Although my primary purpose has been to compare the relative fuel costs of domestic heating and cooking by gas and electricity, respectively, at prices now ruling in Great Britain, a few words about central heating of large buildings may not be out of place. The problem of heating a large building usually comprises (1) transmitting heat as cheaply and economically as possible from some selected fuel or energy source to the water circulating round the pipes and radiators of the particular heating installation involved, and (2) ensuring that the last named is best suited to the particular building concerned. But it is only in regard to (1) that the question of which is the cheapest of all available energies (*e.g.*, the potential energies of coal, coke, gas, or electricity) arises. Since it is important that the process of transmitting heat from the fuel to the circulating water in a central heating installation shall be as automatic and thermostatically controllable as possible, in order that the building shall be maintained uniformly at some selected mean temperature day and night independently of the outside temperature and weather conditions, the choice of fuel will not always be determined solely by its prime cost, for sometimes other advantages, such as greater and easier controllability, may outweigh that of cheapness. The two cheapest suitable fuels for large central heating installations are coke and oil; and nowadays the combustion of, and heat transmission from, each in the boiler can be thermostatically controlled and an over-all efficiency of 75 per cent. maintained.

In recent years imported oil has been employed for heating

large buildings in London, chiefly because it combines the advantages of easy control, flexibility, smokeless combustion, and complete freedom from ash and clinker troubles with low prime and labour costs. From such point of view, undoubtedly in normal times oil-firing is an attractive proposition. But when hundreds of thousands of British coal-miners are unemployed, any unnecessary importation of fuel oil is to be deprecated; and on such account the Government has discouraged its use by imposing an import duty of 1*d.* per gallon, or about a guinea a ton. Notwithstanding this, however, a suitable imported oil of specific gravity 0.89 (1 ton = 252 gallons) and calorific value 19,300 B.Th.U.s. per lb., or 432 therms per ton, can be delivered at a central heating plant in London at approximately £4 per ton (including duty), which works out at 2.22*d.* per therm, or about 50 per cent. higher than a therm derivable from coke costing, say, 30*s.* per ton *plus* a 25 per cent. labour charge on the plant. The competition of imported oil has roused the gas industry to the necessity of introducing automatic coke-firing for the boiler of central heating installations. Large boilers can now be installed in which coke can be burnt at a rate regulated by a thermostatically controlled motor which closes the damper according to the heat transmission required, a constant 'pull' over the boilers being maintained by a draught stabiliser at the bottom of the stack. Such arrangements provide a similar degree of automatic firing as can be obtained with any other competitive fuel. Moreover, for large contracts, the gas company supplying the coke now undertakes to do so at an inclusive annual charge which covers all fuel supply, attendance, boiler maintenance, and ash removal. And for a contract, say, of 250 tons of coke per annum, such 'all-in' price would to-day be approximately 33*s.* 6*d.* per ton, or a prime cost of 1.34*d.* per therm of potential heat, 75 per cent. of which can be transmitted to the water in the boiler. Thus the cost of heat actually transmitted to the circulating water in the boiler would be as low as 1.79*d.* per therm.

Undeterred by such relative cheapness of gas coke for central heating systems, for some time past electricity undertakings have been offering supplies of current to large consumers between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m. at between 0.2*d.* and 0.25*d.* per unit; the underlying idea is that such

large consumers should buy their whole daily requirements of current for central heating from the power stations during the slackest quarter of the twenty-four hours' day and instantly transmit its potential heat to the water in the storage tanks of their circulating system, whence the hot water is circulating continuously round the system, under thermostatic control, during the entire day. In this way the hot-water storage tanks of the heating system are made the means of holding up the potential heat of electricity until it is required for heating the building. Such a system is doubtless capable of great refinement as regards control; but even with current as low as 0.2d. per unit, the cost per therm transmitted to the water is as nearly as possible 6d., or 3.35 times the cost of the same potential heat actually transmitted from gas coke to the water. Indeed, to equate electricity with coke for such purpose it would have to be supplied at something like 0.06d. per unit only.

I have shown above that the average interest charge on the potential heat in the current sent out from an average British electricity undertaking is 4.64d. per therm, equivalent to 0.158d. per electric unit; and as the cost of 1 lb. of coal, the minimum required to generate such unit, would be another 0.062d., a total of 0.22d. per unit is reached for the combined interest and fuel costs. Thus it would appear that an electricity undertaking selling current to a consumer at 0.20d. to 0.25d. per unit does so at much below actual cost price, and is charging him nothing for either 'depreciation' or the operating costs of the generating plant. And the consumer who buys it at such a 'knock-out' price is wasting money in acquiring potential heat at something like 3.35 times what it would actually cost him in the form of potential heat from gas coke.

WILLIAM A. BONE.

THE FUTURE OF THE B.B.C.

By STEUART WILSON

THE Postmaster-General has recently announced the terms of reference and the names of the Committee who will report to him their views as to the 'constitution, control and finance of the broadcasting service in this country,' and will advise him generally on Empire broadcasting, television and 'the system of wireless exchanges,' and how all this is to be conducted after December 31, 1936, at which date the Royal Charter under which the B.B.C. operates will expire. The Committee, with Lord Ullswater (a former Speaker) in the chair, consists of four members of the Commons—Major Astor, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Clement Davies, K.C., Mr. H. Graham White—three of whom have had experience in administration in the Post Office; two members of the Lords—Lords Elton and Selsdon, the latter of whom is an authority on the technical side of broadcasting; and two non-political members—Sir William McIntock, who represents financial knowledge, and Lady Reading, on whom, with Lord Elton, presumably devolves the general knowledge of 'what the public wants,' and all that this knowledge implies. Neither of them would claim any direct personal acquaintance with the entertainment industry, into which the corporation has so deeply plunged.

It is perhaps worth while to call attention here to 'the case against the B.B.C.' as professional musicians see it. It cannot be denied that we—for the writer is himself a practising musician—have a case, and that case needs exposition and deserves a hearing, not on its own merits alone, but also because so much is done by the B.B.C. itself to create the impression that they have done more for music than anyone else and that we who complain are those disgruntled ones who are either permanently 'agin' the Government' or else have

not participated in the benefits as we think we deserve. Being 'agin' the Government' is the most natural charge to bring first, and we propose to file our defence against that.

What is the government of the B.B.C.? Their charter defines it as the governors with their chairman and vice-chairman, making in all five persons, and the chief executive officer, called the Director-General. They have power to appoint committees to advise them. The executive officers below the rank of director-general are not mentioned, but we believe that the hierarchy descends through 'controllers' in the various branches, including finance, personnel and programmes. For our case the last is the all-important. The Controller of Programmes has in his department the whole musical staff and the whole musical programme, which amounts to more than 80 per cent. of the total programme time. Until recently this post was held by a former secretary of a golf club, and then passed into the superior hands of a regular soldier (a colonel) still serving in the Army. The Director of Music is an inferior servant of theirs. There is not at present, and there never has been, any governor who had any *real* knowledge of music in this country from any but the most amateurish standpoint. A good deal of trouble arose owing to Lady Snowden being credited with a knowledge which she did not and could not possibly possess first-hand of musical life in England. Early in the history of the company which preceded the corporation, a Musical Advisory Committee was appointed containing eminent names. Their terms of reference did not allow them to initiate any matter, but only to advise on matters submitted to them, and in fact most of the matters so submitted were already *faits accomplis*. Until they themselves protested—somewhat late in the day—their names were invariably quoted by the B.B.C. in their publications as a guarantee that their musical policy was directed by the leading professional musicians of the day. This was a misstatement which was never exposed as it deserved to be. The musical policy of the B.B.C. is actually planned by a Programme Committee. Until quite recently this committee consisted entirely of officials of the B.B.C. in the Programme Department. One of them had been an electrical engineer who joined the old company, and is musically capable of some children's songs; another had had a not

very successful career as a conductor who financed his own concerts; a third had left the university, whence he migrated to the B.B.C. Let it be said that all these young gentlemen possess brains, but none of them possess experience. The Director of Music, who possesses experience without administrative brains, is a member of this committee, at which he can be outvoted by his subordinates. This is very democratic, no doubt, but does not convince us of good administration.

In short, it may be said that there is on the administrative staff one, and only one, person at present who deserves the confidence of practising professional musicians by reason of his experience, and that is the Director of Music, Dr. Adrian Boult. Unfortunately, he has the responsible position of conductor of the orchestra attached to this post, and therefore the actual administration is left in the hands of those whose brains outrun their experience and sense. No attempt has been made to recruit to this staff anyone of experience in handling music in England from any professional standpoint. The technical conducting staff is not separate from the administrative staff, and in this we have the gravest cause of trouble. The orchestra themselves have on at least two occasions protested by 'round robin' against the incompetent conducting of members of the administrative staff who are allowed to act as sub-conductors, but after a judicious withdrawal they reappear again—no better than before. The Director of Music in an article communicated to the *Journal* of the Royal College of Music, of which he is a distinguished member, stated that the B.B.C. was 'not the place in which to learn your job,' but several of his sub-conductors have been trained by him—in so far as they have been trained at all—in the B.B.C. orchestra at the expense of the listening public.

The administrative staff of any large undertaking, whether it be for war or peace, must be separated from the executive staff. This policy is fully recognised at the War Office and the Admiralty, and equally recognised in business and in the foreign opera-houses, which all have their '*Intendant*' as well as their conductor, and do not expect one man to fulfil two diverse functions. We believe that the B.B.C. are now realising this, but they still make the cardinal mistake of

allowing their Director of Music to be their chief conductor, and likewise of permitting an occasional outburst into execution from their administrative staff.

In short, why we are 'agin' the Government' is because we cannot think that the government knows anything about music. It is only reasonable that the governors should be advised by their own officials, and we have shown what the nature of their previous training has been and on what basis of experience they will report. The result has been in the past that many important steps have been taken upon insufficient advice, and many of the experiments involved have proved failures and had to be withdrawn.

As to having not participated as much as we think we deserve, and being therefore disgruntled, we do not expect so easily to shake off this well-worn charge. We rely on the charter, which makes it clear that the corporation is to do its job; to quote the very words of the charter, 'as a means of education and entertainment we deem it desirable that the service should be developed and exploited to the best advantage and in the national interest.' Does 'the best advantage' mean the greatest annual income to the manufacturers of radio sets, who created the first company and profited, no doubt, by the first incorporation? Or does it mean the same thing as the 'national interest' read in conjunction with the words 'education and entertainment'? In the early days Sir John Reith made it clear that he stood for education first. What subtle powers have, in Mr. Maynard Keynes's irreverent words, so 'bamboozled that old Presbyterian' that he thinks that the B.B.C. is still given up to higher thoughts? Does he reckon up the hours and hours of dance music and vaudeville—with its 'border line' jokes and indecencies—and yet say, 'We are doing a great work, you know: think of the Scottish crofter who can listen to Brahms' symphonies and Sir Walford Davies and Sir James Jeans,' while what the crofter has actually got to put up with that night remains mercifully hidden from Sir John. We deem ourselves to be worth cultivating as English musicians in the national interest; we deem our serious musical compositions worth while, and we deem it to the best *real* advantage that this nation should grow up in the belief that it can provide for itself serious musicians, both executants and composers. The

advantageous position in which the B.B.C. stands frees it from the necessities of 'watching the box-office.' They can—and we have good reason to believe they do—create a 'box-office return' for their own favourites; at any rate, if their favourites have any sense at all, they can hire postcard writers and make by force a 'box-office return.' The B.B.C. does this for its own purposes, as was shown recently by its letter to thousands of aspirants informing them that their services would no longer be required as unfavourable reports had been received upon their performance. As several of the recipients of this letter had, to our certain knowledge, been accepted at an audition, but never engaged and therefore never heard on the air either favourably or unfavourably, we can only conclude that the 'box-office return' is made to indicate what the B.B.C. inferiors wish it to indicate. The word 'inferior' implies that we cannot readily believe that the governors and the directors are a party to it, only that they not unnaturally believe their advisers. These 'inferiors' are bound together by the much-vaunted loyalty of the B.B.C. staff, which is often little else but the loyalty of subalterns and schoolboys 'against the old man.' In passing, it may be observed that when Sir John Reith was attacked recently in the Press, and it was said that the B.B.C. was 'seething with unrest,' a letter of confidence in him was passed round the office to sign. What did Admiral Carpendale and Colonel Dawnay make of so flagrant a breach of good administration? Did they forget, happily, what My Lords and the King's Regulations lay down for similar occasions? What would be the fate of the man who refused to sign? Or can it be that they knew nothing about it? Or does their 'loyalty' extend to an occasional Nelson touch with the blind eye?

Again, the disgruntled musician is often told that the representatives of other national wireless systems have always returned after a visit to Portland Place, like the Queen of Sheba, marvelling at its perfection. That is not surprising, for the chief pre-occupation of the directors of most foreign radio companies is to find advertisers to 'buy their time,' and thus to find an income to live upon. No wonder they envy Sir John Reith. If there were no monopoly, competing services would have to secure the best talent they could at

competitive prices, not merely secure any talent at any price as the present arrangement allows, and then announce to the listening world that they are producing the finest available talent. 'Competitive prices' is worth considering for a moment. The biggest American company spends *upon performers* a sum of money which is approximately five times as great as that which the B.B.C. shows to have been spent *upon programmes*. Exact comparison is impossible, because the B.B.C. accounts are careful to include in 'programme expenditure' all office staff and salaries, and even, we believe, the rental for trunk lines paid to the P.M.G., and what is actually paid over for performing artists remains a still smaller sum than the amount shown. Naturally the musician feels that he would prefer competition to 'public utility.'

This, then, is our case, and for its remedy we look to a modification of the expiring charter. We have a right to demand that the governing body of the corporation should contain a professional musician of experience in this country, and that the administration should, as far as music is concerned, be made directly responsible to a musician who has no other duties than administration. If the enterprise is to be considered as national, and the corporation to be regarded, as the charter states they should, as 'trustees for the national interest,' we demand the most unqualified support for English music. If it is to be genuinely in the national interest, we demand that the programmes be chosen, as, in the old 'prom.' days, Robert Newman and Henry Wood chose them, to lead a public into new tastes to a sympathetic guidance, not by alternately pandering to the crowd by incessant 'light music' and cringing to the extreme modernists who cannot listen to any music but that which comes from Berlin or Vienna. We cannot any longer adopt the attitude the B.B.C. wish us to take up—that of the fireside cat whose privilege it is to look up at his regal master. We may play on catgut, we may make night hideous with our cries, but we have not forgotten that the lion and the tiger are also of our race, and our claws can still be unsheathed at will.

STUART WILSON.

WILLIAM COBBETT: 1763-1835

By W. BARING PEMBERTON

'WHAT a figure shall I make in the history of these times!' So wrote William Cobbett in the highnoon of his career. Two days after his death an obituary notice in *The Times* said of him that 'He was an English episode, and nothing more.' Which of these two pronouncements can posterity from a distance of a hundred years judge to be the truest estimate of Cobbett's place in history? The answer would seem to be that in a sense both estimates are correct. The *political* Cobbett was indeed an episode. Cobbett the politician is forgotten; his *Weekly Register* mostly unreadable; his hobby-horses—and no man had such a stableful—are dead; his rantings have lost their sting; his prophecies have been falsified by time. But as a social force Cobbett lives—not so much in what he attempted to do, but what he failed in doing. He laboured to restore what he regarded as the Saturnian age of the peasantry in which he had been born, failing to see that this age was being destroyed as surely as Stephenson's *Rocket* was destroying the stage-coach. But in defence of the peasant of the past he unwittingly became the protagonist of the artisan of the future.

He was born in 1763 behind the sign of 'The Jolly Farmer,' a small beerhouse in Farnham kept by his father. The name is something more than a fact in Cobbett's life: it is a symbol. The 'Jolly Farmer' he became and remained throughout all the permutations of his career. Cobbett was altogether home-brewed like his father's small beer. He is a native-bred agitator, and in this quality he is almost unique. He owed nothing to the 'feelosofers.' He was the source of his own philosophy. His keen eyes, the eyes of a countryman which saw much that escaped the town-dweller, took the place of books. The rest was supplied by his emotions.

Such a philosophy is necessarily limited by vision. Only what Cobbett saw did he feel; only what he felt did he write: but as he was continually on the move, so his view-point continually shifted, so his ideas underwent constant modification. 'What I have written I have written' was a meaningless phrase to one who, according to Hazlitt, 'is like a young and lusty bridegroom that divorces a favourite speculation every morning and marries a new one every night.' For all these wayward tendencies, there was (besides Mrs. Cobbett) one love to whom he remained faithful to the last. For that countryside of his youth, for those happy times when he never knew 'a labouring man go to his work in the morning without his bottle of beer and a satchel of victuals,' for that golden age of peace and plenty, he had an affection that was unquenchable. The full belly of the peasant is the *summum bonum* of Cobbett's political philosophy. It is 'abundant living which is the great test of good government and the sure basis of national greatness and security'; it was 'the foundation of public morals and the only source of all real public peace.' To that vital full belly all else became subordinate. Whatever threatened the peasant's dinner, be it paper-money and high prices, Corn Laws and scarcity, borough-mongers and high taxation, he opposed them with all the vigour and vituperation of his pen.

Cobbett's real life began at the age of twenty, when some sudden impulse induced him to try his luck in London, and, of all things, upon an office stool. The ploughboy who stood six feet one in his socks, and whose muscles were like iron bands, found the pen more unmanageable than the plough. London was a prison of brick and stucco. Only on Sundays, in St. James's Park, could he see the trees he always loved so well. Humiliated and disappointed, he enlisted. But it was no ordinary recruit who took the King's shilling. The sense of his own shortcomings had shamed him, and he set to work to perfect his English by committing to paper and learning off by heart the whole of a 'grammar.' He was soon promoted, and with this came an irresistible urge to teach others. Like many a self-educated man, Cobbett developed a profound respect for learning combined with as great a contempt for the accepted channels of education. All his life he was to be at once a learner and a teacher.

After nine years of such exemplary conduct as would have put 'The Industrious Apprentice' to shame, Cobbett, a sergeant-major 'promoted over the head of thirty sergeants,' was assured of a commission. But his simple indignation had been aroused by discovering jobbery to be rampant in the quartermaster's office. Claiming his discharge, he brought his case before an astonished War Office, only to find that these malpractices in the Army were the accepted rule. With the wife he had just married he fled from the hornet's nest he had disturbed and migrated to America.

Had America been a loyal British Colony, Cobbett would in all likelihood have become a fierce republican. He was incapable of being on the dominant side. He had to have his grievances. Repulsion was the breath of his life. Settling in Philadelphia, a hot-bed of anti-British sentiment, the ex-sergeant-major became more British than his king who had 'gloried in the name of Briton.' An unpatriotic speech from one of his own countrymen, the celebrated Dr. Priestley, roused his indignation. In that instant the great controversialist was born. One pamphlet led to another. With every line he wrote his appetite increased. Loaded with vulgar abuse and question-begging statements, his writings nevertheless showed polemical maturity. Shrewd and fearless, he quickly achieved notoriety. That he could have known next to nothing about his subjects worried him neither then nor at any time. His knowledge grew out of the problem in hand. Readily he acquired the trick of skating over thin ice. He soon showed too that he possessed the controversialist's indispensable weapon of an unswerving belief in the sanity of his own case and, by implication, in the mental defects of his opponents, a conclusion to which he frequently persuaded his readers. In seven years he had achieved not only unrivalled fame in the United States, but had become virtually the 'pamphleteer extraordinary' of England, where his writings had been published and read with enthusiasm. Feeling assured of a rousing welcome, eager to place his pen and his services at her disposal, he embarked for his mother country.

On arriving in London, whence he had fled with every appearance of ignominy, Cobbett was warmly received by the patrician William Windham and by him invited to dine

in company with Pitt and Canning. Fortune seemed to be knocking at his door. The war had been going badly, and the Tory Government, not unmindful of the services of a patriotic writer of proved ability, offered him control of a Government newspaper. Cobbett, however, scenting the possibility of dictation and restricted liberty (conditions under which he could never live and write), declined the gift. He preferred to retain his sturdy independence, and with the backing of Windham and others he presently launched out with his famous *Weekly Political Register*. This, with one trifling break, he edited for over thirty years till the day of his death. In its hundred odd volumes can be traced his political history. Here the political Cobbett is to be found with all the twists and turns, all the inconsistencies and tergiversations, of his creed—with much common sense and not a little nonsense, but with a redeeming sincerity in every line. At first Cobbett is the Tory, pouring scorn upon Burdett and the reformer, Thomas Paine and the Jacobins, spurring the Government on to war against revolutionary France. He is still living in his Pennsylvanian dream. The English Constitution he still considers the most perfect, her Ministers the wisest, her poor the most contented. Disillusionment was not far off.

As a guarantee of his support he had been offered 'slices' of a Government loan. His discovery that without touching the scrip he would be able to make a small fortune by selling out at a premium staggered the honest Cobbett. It seemed to him immoral. He started to read Adam Smith. The result of his researches

opened my eyes. . . . It set me to work to understand all about the debt and the funds, and at every step I found the thing more black, and more and more execrable; . . . and that the nation could never be happy again until it was got rid of. . . .

In the face of this revelation Napoleon and the war began to fade away into the background. Cobbett started to turn his gaze inwards and homewards, and the discoveries that met his eyes affronted his simple yeoman soul. More than a million pounds paid away every year on sinecures and places; pocket-boroughs openly advertised for sale; paper-money. Of an unconvertible paper-currency he had all the countryman's distrust, which the recent headlong collapse of the

Assignat had done nothing to diminish. He regarded a bank-note not only as an immoral thing but as a dangerous weapon in the hands of a Minister. In his eyes the cancer which was eating away the fine old tissue of the Constitution had been brought about by abuses, malpractices and innovations which had crept in over a number of years—many of them illegal and all of them unconstitutional. The disease, he believed, could only be cured by the surgical excision of what he called 'The Thing.' This was his generic name for the borough-monger, the stock-jobber, the loan-monger, the manufacturer, the placeman, and everyone involved in the vast conspiracy of corruption. It was idle to appeal to Parliament to undertake what would be a task of self-mutilation. Nothing short of a reformed House of Commons could, in his opinion, carry through the operation. Cobbett the Tory had become by 1808 Cobbett the Reformer. But for him reform spelt, not innovation, but restoration. To Perceval and his Ministers, seared by memories of the Terror, the mere word 'reform' was synonymous with revolution. Ever since Cobbett had declined Pitt's offer of a newspaper, the Tories had regarded him with uneasy suspicion. When now he threw in his lot with the Reform movement, he became a menace. The sooner he was behind prison walls, the freer they would breathe. They had not long to wait.

Since his Army days Cobbett had been acutely soldier-conscious. When one day he read that at Ely some militiamen had been flogged, by men of the German Legion stationed in the neighbourhood, for mutinying over arrears of pay, he flung all caution to the winds.

Five hundred lashes each! Aye, that is right! Flog them; flog them; flog them! They deserve it and a great deal more. They deserve a flogging at every mealtime. 'Lash them daily, lash them duly.'

The 'little malignant Perceval' rubbed his hands with glee. The most dangerous critic of the Ministry had committed himself. Proceedings were begun which ended in Cobbett being sent to Newgate for two years, fined £1000, and bound over to keep the peace for a further seven years.

In a simile which he would have appreciated Cobbett was down for a count. But it was no knock-out. By paying twelve guineas a week he was able to rent a suite of rooms

and so have with him constantly one or two members of his large family. With their help he continued to edit and publish the *Register*. To that extent the Government had failed. In punishing him, moreover, they had turned a critic into a martyr. Newgate now became an object of pilgrimage for Radicals and Reformers all over the country. Nevertheless, Cobbett came out of prison, at the end of two years, savage, embittered, and financially embarrassed. The *Register* was enjoying none of its earlier success. Being out of direct touch with the political world, its editor had lost much of his punch, and people were more interested in the victories of Wellington than in the enormities of 'The Thing.' Public apathy was reflected in a diminishing circulation which at one time sank as low as 500 copies a week.

With Waterloo came peace, but not plenty. Unemployment grew apace, and in a frantic attempt to sustain prices the Government passed the celebrated Corn Laws. The effect upon the agricultural population was disastrous. With wheat at 120s. a quarter and wages stagnant, poverty stalked through the countryside, filling Cobbett with the direst of forebodings. 'The play is over. We may now go to supper,' the exultant Press had declared on the morrow of Waterloo. 'No,' replied Cobbett. 'You cannot go to supper. You have not yet paid for the play. And before you have paid for the play, you will find there is no money left for the supper.' His arguments at the time seemed irrefutable. He did not know that those 'dark satanic mills' of Blake belching forth their 'accursed' smoke were to pay for Pitt's lavish expenditure and to make England the workshop of the world. He merely saw that the interest on the National Debt was so enormous that a labourer earning £18 a year was paying no less than £10 in taxation. This debt, incurred in his detested paper-money and, in his opinion, by fraudulent means, was held by vermin who had no moral claim to repayment—stock-jobbers, loan-mongers, and contractors. Only by wiping out their holdings and so watering down the debt to a fraction of its amount did he believe the country could weather the storm.

For a storm certainly was blowing up. A succession of cold summers and bad harvests accentuated the general distress. Everywhere the small farmer was being over-

whelmed with debt and, together with his labourers, being flung upon the parish. Riots, rick-firing, machine-smashing broke out, and there was an ugly feeling abroad. To Cobbett such violence was sheer madness. It could do no good and would only make the Government more repressive. Yet it was just these acts of violence which led Cobbett to take the most momentous and far-reaching step of his life.

A suggestion had been made that he should use his influence through the *Register* to dissuade workers from such outrages by explaining to them that their miseries were not caused by their employers, but by the system under which both master and man suffered. A necessary corollary was that the *Register* should be reduced to a price within reach of all. Hitherto it had been selling at 1s., which included a stamp tax of 6d. Short of clubbing together, there was little hope of the labourers ever taking in the *Register* at that price. Cobbett, however, adopted both suggestions, and in November 1816 he issued a cheap edition which, by omitting all items of news, he was able to sell as a pamphlet at 2d. Its solitary feature was his famous 'Address to Labourers and Journeymen.' In simple, straightforward language he explained to them how the strength and resources of a country sprang exclusively from the labour of its citizens. The cause of their distress was, of course, 'the enormous amount of taxation,' the '*Deadweight*,' as he called it, of interest, pensions, sinecures, and the upkeep of the two Services. This 'intolerable weight,' in turn, is traceable to the want of parliamentary reform. To this end he urged his readers to proceed resolutely but peaceably.

. . . I know of no enemy of reform so great as the man who would persuade you that we possess nothing good and that all must be torn to pieces. There is no principle, no precedent, no regulation favourable to freedom which is not to be found in the laws of England. . . .

These words rang like a clarion across the country. In two months more than 200,000 copies had been sold. Their effect was profound. Riots became rarer as the masses began to realise the need for concerted action. 'The labouring classes,' wrote Cobbett, 'seemed as if they had never heard a word on politics before. The effect on their minds was like what might be expected to be produced on the eyes of one bred up in the dark and brought out all of a sudden into

broad daylight.' Taking every advantage of the occasion, he proceeded to publish in pamphlet form many of his earlier articles, which were now read with avidity in village tap-rooms and round countless cottage hearths. In the opinion of Harriet Martineau, 'Never before had any single writer in England wielded such a power.' Cobbett had become more than a newspaper editor: he was virtually 'a fourth estate.' At first the Government tried to have him 'written down'; but their literary hacks were no match for him. Then the Ministry brought out their heavy artillery and suspended Habeas Corpus. Cobbett took this 'dungeon measure' to be aimed directly at himself, and before either the Government (or his creditors) knew anything about it he had slipped off to America, where, purchasing a farm on Long Island, he lived for two peaceful years. He had one son with him; the rest of his family he had left behind.

For this flight Cobbett has excused himself on the ground that from America better than from a dungeon cell he could continue his *Register* and his campaign to save old England from 'The Thing.' But there is little doubt that this move was one of the greatest mistakes of his life and was responsible for making so much of his political career 'an episode and nothing more.' By imprisoning him seven years before, the authorities had turned him into a martyr. Would they in times far more inflammable run a similar risk? Even had they applied their Suspension Act to Cobbett, they could hardly have kept him in gaol for any length of time; and on his release he would more than ever have dominated the Reform movement. As it turned out, his absence in America lost him much of the ground gained by his celebrated 'Address.' He had continued to edit the *Register* from Long Island, but his comments on current affairs (always his principal attraction) lost their appeal when three months out of date. Worse than that, the Massacre of Peterloo, which occurred during his absence, had roused a large number of the middle classes from their apathy and had induced the Whigs cleverly to adopt the Reform movement. At that critical moment Cobbett was not there to take the lead. When ultimately the forces of Reform carried the fortress it was not the banner of Cobbett but that of the Whigs which floated in triumph from the battlements. To

anticipate the celebrated witticism, the Whigs had caught Cobbett bathing and had stolen his clothes.

Nor were the circumstances surrounding his return from America calculated to improve his position. No sooner had he reached London, than the financial embarrassments which he had suffered all his life, and which were alleged to be the cause of his flight, came to a head in bankruptcy proceedings. He, who ceaselessly assailed the Government for its financial mismanagements, ran his own affairs in a manner which would have brought ruin to a State in a fortnight. Had it not been for a panel of opulent friends, who time and again came forward to settle his debts or pay his damages, he would long before have sunk into indigent obscurity. To complete his tale of calamities, hardly had he landed than Castlereagh's Six Acts came into force. One of these, designed to strike at cheap publications, made it impossible for Cobbett to continue to produce the *Register* for 2d. He was compelled to put the price up again to 1s., and in consequence lost many of his readers.

Yet this succession of disasters brought out some of the finest qualities in Cobbett's character. Never did he give greater evidence of his yeoman attributes than when, with a large family dependent on him, he was sold up and had hardly two half-crowns to rub together—when, indeed, he had to borrow £20 to carry on the *Register*. 'Never did I know a single moment,' he wrote some years later, 'when I was cast down, never one moment when I dreaded the future.' - At the age of sixty, when many men were sinking into retirement, Cobbett started to retrieve his fortunes by turning to literature. From that moment he ceases to be a mere episode and becomes a living figure in the social history of his country.

During the next twelve years an astounding assortment of books flowed from his pen. Already from Long Island he had published his well-known *English Grammar*, which has the distinction of being the only amusing book on that arid theme. In this, as in all his writings during these years, he addressed himself principally to the working classes, maintaining his simple, unadorned style, stressing his points by frequent repetition, and making every argument crystal-clear to the lowliest of intelligences. Nor could he keep his

King Charles' heads from thrusting themselves into the most unexpected contexts. To heighten the moral or to underline an argument Castlereagh, the borough-monger, Malthus, Pitt, the fund-lord, were dragged in to do service, whatever the subject. In this respect his *Grammar* afforded him especial facilities. Illustrations of syntax abound in such remarks as 'The never-to-be-forgotten cruelty of the Borough-Tyrants.' 'The Lords, *who* made the first false report, and the Commons, *that* seemed to vie with their Lordships in falsehood, became equally detestable.' Examples of collective nouns are given as 'Mob, Parliament, Rabble, House of Commons, Regiment, Court of King's Bench, Den of Thieves.' Of his other works which have a permanent value is his *Cottage Economy*, in which he attempted to rouse the labourer out of his sottish apathy. 'I despise the man that is poor and contented, for such content is a certain proof of a base disposition, a disposition which is the enemy of all industry, all exertion, all love of independence.' He would have him 'bold and free.' But such qualities are only to be achieved on a full belly; hence the need for him to make his own bread. 'Give me for a beautiful sight, a neat and smart woman, heating her oven and setting her bread! And if the bustle does make the sign of labour glisten on her brow, where is the man that would not kiss it off, rather than lick the plaster from the cheek of a duchess?' The labourer too must brew his own beer if only to put an end to the drinking of tea, which he regards as 'a destroyer of health, an enfeebler of the frame, an engenderer of effeminacy and laziness, a debaucher of youth and a maker of misery for old age.' But the fine flower of his virulence is reserved for the potato, 'Ireland's lazy root,' and 'the root also of slovenliness, filth, misery and slavery,' the cultivation of which 'has increased in England with the increase of paupers.' Let the labourers keep their own pigs and cows and there would be no degrading pauperisation. 'A couple of fitches of bacon,' in his opinion, 'are worth 50,000 Methodist sermons.' Cobbett, in effect, would re-establish the economy of an age already slain by enclosures and the Industrial Revolution.

Further to elaborate his case for his old England, he went on with astonishing effrontery to produce a *History of the Protestant Reformation*. As a contribution to history the

work is valueless. He was too concerned with driving home his points to worry about accuracy. Though no friend of the Catholic faith, Cobbett saw nothing but evil in the effects of the Reformation. Till then charitable relief had been in the competent hands of the monasteries. There was no Poor Law, no pauperism, no absentee clergy, no grasping stock-jobber-turned-squire. With Henry VIII. away went this happy system; the monasteries were parcelled out to favourites; corruption and jobbery stepped in where before there had been charity and godliness. Here, in fact, Cobbett professed to see the origin of that iniquitous 'Thing.' The Queen who attempted to right these wrongs was not to be called 'Bloody': that epithet he transferred to Elizabeth, who had made the Reformation settlement permanent.

His next noteworthy production was *Advice to Young Men*. It is largely autobiographical, for Cobbett loved to illustrate his rule of life by reference to himself, to his family and to their education. It contains his complete philosophy of life, the philosophy of a man who, at the age of seventy years, despite all adversities, could say in all sincerity, 'I have led the happiest life of any man I have ever known.' Notwithstanding its egotistic traits, this book is one of the best written and most readable of Cobbett's writings.

Rural Rides, published in 1830, is the culmination of Cobbett's literary period. It is the crown of his work, and the most enduring. These 'Rides' extended over a period of about ten years, during which their author covered nearly every part of the country. He travelled principally on horseback, his keen eyes alert to notice every detail of the countryside—a beautiful landscape, a fine forest of trees, acres of ripe standing corn; and, in the midst of this land of loveliness and abundance, labourers with pinched white faces, clothed in rags, 'their dwellings little better than pig-beds, their food not nearly equal to that of a pig.'

This is the Cobbett who was more than an episode. Here, where before a working-class audience he is struggling to restore to the peasant, fast sinking into servility and pauperism, his ancient independence, he stands head and shoulders above his contemporaries. His forebodings of disaster were negatived, or at least postponed, by the industrial prosperity of Victorian England. But to the new artisan

of the North and Midlands, who devoured his words, he became their mentor who years before had hoped to have been that of their masters. He helped to give them strength of purpose and a consciousness of their own destiny. To-day no history of the working-class movement in England can ignore the debt which that movement owes to Cobbett. Yet, had he lived, Cobbett would almost certainly have opposed its subsequent trend. His sons died Conservatives—a name unknown in his day, but one which Cobbett would have heartily approved. Not to tear down, but to preserve the Constitution, with all its lawful privileges and immunities; not to abolish private property, but to restore it to those most qualified to get the best out of it. Such was the basis of his political creed.

With the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832 Cobbett, as a member for Oldham, entered that 'Collective Wisdom' which for thirty years he had scolded. Characteristically he at once seated himself on the front bench, and just as characteristically he was on his feet at the earliest opportunity opposing the election of the Speaker. His opening words were in the best Cobbett vein: 'It appears to me that since I have been sitting here I have heard a great deal of unprofitable discussion.' But it was soon evident that Cobbett's style of rhetoric was more suited for the market-place than the floor of the House of Commons. His is not the only case of an agitator finding himself cramped within the walls of St. Stephen's. A senseless attack on his old enemy Peel made him slightly ridiculous; but as he grew more accustomed to parliamentary procedure he became a competent debater and a most conscientious member. Like more than one firebrand, he developed into something of a popular character among a body which will tolerate anyone except the bore.

The last tragic laugh of Cobbett's life lay with this Parliament which he had reviled hardly less in its reformed than in its unreformed state. The protracted debates, the late hours, and the close atmosphere contrasted unfavourably with his previous open-air and regular life. He, whose habit had been one of early to bed and early to rise, found these irregular hours undermining his constitution. He struggled on bravely, fighting the cause of the under-dog, presenting petitions, assailing the administration of the new Poor Law.

He was attacked by inflammation of the throat, but fought on till his voice was barely audible. At last he was persuaded to take to his bed. Three weeks later, on the afternoon of June 18, 1835, he was dead.

Admittedly Cobbett had many faults. His ideas on economics and finance were often crude and sometimes false. His passions gave him strength of arm, but not direction of aim. Like some angry giant, he laid about him with a will. Down went his enemies; but down, too, went his friends, if they questioned the wisdom of his progress by so much as a word, and few of them escaped unscathed. Yet, with all these failings, Cobbett stands redeemed by the simplicity of his character and by the depth of his sincerity. He was as free from vice as he was hide-bound by prejudice. He was every inch an English yeoman, hating cant and affectation, loving sport and the prospect of a fight. 'The pattern John Bull of his century,' Carlyle sums him up; 'strong as the rhinoceros, and with singular humanities and genialities shining through his thick skin.'

It is in those moods that Cobbett is at his best. It is, as Chesterton puts it, 'especially his bad language that is always good.' He reproduces in only a slightly expurgated form the rich, unvarnished vocabulary of an infuriated farmer. In this misnamed 'Billingsgate' Cobbett is without an equal. Castlereagh was described as 'shallow and impudent,' Sheridan as 'profligate,' Grenville as 'dull and arrogant'; Malthus is 'the nasty, greedy parson,' Wilberforce 'a retailer of bombast,' *The Times* is generally 'the Bloody old Times,' and Pitt's friends 'would have put Tartuffe to the blush and would literally sing you a smutty song to a psalm tune.'

Cobbett has been likened to Dean Swift, that other master of outspoken English; but in Cobbett there is little of the polished irony and the incisive satire of the great publicist. Yet in one respect there is a similarity. Both men were splendid haters. Had Cobbett adopted an epitaph for his grave-stone, it would have been hard to have chosen one more effective than that of Jonathan Swift: '*Ubi saeva indignatio ulterius cor lacerare nequit.*'

W. BARING PEMBERTON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

THE Jubilee celebrations in London served as an outlet for the widespread desire of men and women in every walk of life to show in their own way their loyalty to King George and Queen Mary, whose personal popularity has perhaps been insufficiently stressed, and to the idea of national unity for which the Royal Family stands. No discomfort was unbearable to the happy folk who lined the streets, and amid the cheers there were tears of joy and thankfulness in many eyes.

The procession itself was almost wholly domestic. No detachments from the Indian Army, nor of Dominion or Colonial Forces : no place was found for representative units of the Royal Navy or Royal Air Force ; indeed, when the plan was made, almost no troops were included. There were no representatives of foreign countries in the procession, yet it would have done them good to have passed through the streets. Only one Embassy—over which the Nazi *Haken Kreuz* flies—was within sight of the line of march : it was gaily decorated, as part of a scheme embracing the whole of Carlton House Terrace.

Outside the City and West End the decorations were scarcely less gay and far more spontaneous. Many streets in Hoxton, Dalston and Shoreditch, strongholds of militant Socialism, were brilliant with flags, and in those parts of England where local left-wing politicians had been busy crying down the Jubilee, notably at Nelson and Abertillery, popular resentment against disloyal kill-joys in office came to the surface. If the villages of Hertfordshire are any guide to the rest of rural England, the Jubilee will be a memory treasured alike in the schools, the public-houses and the almshouses, as well as by the public at large. Decorations were to be seen everywhere—on the spokes of boys' bicycles, on

church towers, and in every shop window except a few of the multiple-shop, chain-store and co-operative type. In my own village the fishmonger, unable to paint his shop front by day, spent all night doing it by candlelight so that it should be a resplendent and integral part of the gala dress of High Street.

For weeks past our intellectuals have been criticising the Jubilee in their chosen organs. How hard on the King ! How clearly designed to give the National Government an advantage at the next election ! How extravagant ! The event has shown, as usual, how little such folk understand England. Those who seek to equate left-wing opinions with churlishness do an ill-service to those for whom they profess to speak. How splendidly George Lansbury towered above the peevish little penmen when, in the House of Commons on May 8, he seconded the motion for a loyal address to His Majesty !

* * * * *

After a political meeting in the Midlands in one of the new Council estates I found myself at Snow Hill Station, in Birmingham, waiting for the midnight train. I sought the refreshment-room. I had not been there long before a naval rating entered, bearing round his cap the ribbon of a sloop well known to me in the Persian Gulf during and after the war. We fell at once to talking over coffee and sandwiches : Muscat, Bahrain, Henjam and Basrah ; consuls and politicals, soldiers and Indian Marine—we had a whole world in common, in which we had both played our part at almost the same age, for my days in those waters began in 1907 when I was twenty-three, his when he was twenty-one.

The talk turned to India and the merits of the Army and Navy as a career. There was much that he liked in the Army : his was a military family with a tradition dating back to the Peninsular Wars, so he had been told, and he had a brother in a line regiment in India now. The Army had two faults. A boy could stay at school till fifteen and then go straight to the Navy—as he had done : almost no one was accepted for the Army till he was seventeen and a half or eighteen. The other point went deeper. There was too much drill in the Army : the gap between officers and men was bigger, and kept wide open by sergeants and sergeant-majors who did not care who gave orders as long as they had the power.

The result was that Navy men were, by the age of twenty-one, a better lot than private soldiers, though they all started level. And military service was too short for those who loved it, too long for those who wished to get out. Above all, too much of the sergeant-major; and his brother thought the same. The Army wanted a change of method, and a change of heart too: fewer inspections of brass buttons and pipe-clay, more of the informality which made life in the Navy a choice he seldom if ever regretted. He talked good sense, and his views deserve attention. But he would not have been a good witness before a Departmental Committee or a Royal Commission.

By this time we had reached Reading—at 2 a.m.: he left the train on his way to Portsmouth, and I curled up to sleep till I was turned out at Paddington, of all London termini the most friendly to early birds; that is not saying much.

* * * * *

Heard in an omnibus passing the Royal Exchange:

'Who's that old man in a chair?'

'That's George Peabody, what made a fortune out of Peabody buildings everywhere. He invented the idea of tenement flats; but there's no money in it now, with all this cheap transport.'

'Why is he in a chair, Daddy?'

'That's where he did all his work; now there's the Duke of Wellington; he's on a horse—see? That's how he did his job.'

* * * * *

I hastened from the House of Commons, after two hours in Standing Committee, to catch the 2.10 from King's Cross to my constituency. I noticed a group of young men, clearly strangers to London, each with his bag. I listened to their speech. They were talking Welsh. It was a Thursday, so they were not footballers.

'You for Letchworth?' said I.

'Oo aye,' said they in chorus.

'Going to the Training Centre?'

'Oo aye,' came the chorus again.

'I know the place,' said I; 'the manager's a good man and there's good teaching to be got. You'll like it.'

'We've got to like it,' replied one. 'It's go there or get struck off at the "labour".'

'What trades do they learn a man?' asked a bright-eyed youth, wearing a paternal R.A.S.C. cap badge in his button-hole.

'Bricklayer, plasterer, painter and decorator, carpenter, machinist, fitter, body-builder, panel-beater, welder,' I ran through the list.

'Which is the best paid?'

'The best is, to my mind, the most regular. They're not training more men in any one line than they can place. There's no bricklayer and few plasterers out of a job these days, and not many painters.'

'Where'll they send a man? Anywhere?'

'Most anywhere, but they'll try to send you near where you come from if there's a demand. They might send you chaps to Bristol, for example.' (They were all from Pontypridd.)

The train came in, and when it stopped the door of the buffet car was opposite them. They entered with their bags and took their seats. I followed. Once started, the attendant asked what they would take. 'Nothing,' was the answer; 'we've brought our own.' The attendant began to explain, and the embarrassed youths exchanged a few words with each other in Welsh. Wishing to put them and the steward at their ease, I ordered a cup of tea and a sandwich all round. They accepted it with well-bred dignity. We passed through the last tunnel and came to open fields.

'It's terrible flat country,' said one. 'I've been looking out for mountains like we've got in Wales, but there's none. I like to see a mountain at the back of a place.'

'We've passed through seven tunnels,' said I—'that means seven hills; and here's a viaduct, as high and long as any in England, I believe.'

They looked admiringly at Old Welwyn below us, but were not to be beaten.

'There's a bigger bridge than this near our place, and a better view too.'

The talk turned to football; then to Letchworth. Were there plenty of cinemas? Were there talkies? What other towns could a man visit? Could you get to a dance on a

Saturday? Were the lodgings good? By the time I had answered their questions we reached Hitchin and I wished them goodbye and good luck. They replied politely—with a proper reserve. They were stout-hearted lads, but not one had been out of Wales before. It was as great an adventure for them as going to a boarding-school for the first time.

* * * *

After long hours spent in the House listening to the debate on the Unemployment Assistance (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Bill, I walked up Whitehall to Trafalgar Square. Opposite the National Gallery a crowd of nearly a hundred youths had collected, forming a queue—one of the strongest instincts of our race (notably absent at a railway ticket office in France during 'rush' hours). Presently a van marked 'Feed the Hungry' drove up and distributed slabs of bread and margarine. Each man took his portion and ate it hungrily, but it was not a square meal. Not one of them had a cigarette, but they were mostly cheerful and talkative. One group of three, standing apart from the rest as they ate, attracted my notice. They were not at home in such surroundings. Their faces betrayed a different and higher standard of education. They wore their clothes differently, but their boots were worn. I spoke to them. They were all three seamen from the same ship, now sold to the United States. 'We've been "driven off the Atlantic",' they remarked, 'and we're here for the Jubilee; it'll be something to see the King in naval uniform, to remind us that ships and sailors and the sea used to matter more than anything else to old England.' They were not penniless; but the seamen's homes were full: they would not go to a lodging-house. It was not so cold that they could not sleep out and keep their pence. We went to the nearest Corner House and they regaled me with fo'c'sle yarns covering half the world in exchange for sausages and mash. I certainly had the better of the bargain. They were not sullen or down-hearted, but full of hope; for they were still in the prime and had some months' 'benefit' to draw, and some savings.

* * * *

In December last Dr. G. F. Walker, an experienced doctor with an extensive practice in Sunderland, wrote to *The Times*

to combat, in his own words, 'a certain complacency growing up in national feeling about the distressed areas.' He asserted that there was a serious and progressive decline in public health, which he described under six headings. The Minister of Health arranged for an immediate inquiry by expert officials of the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education. Their Report,¹ made after consultation with the medical profession in Sunderland and county Durham, does not sustain any of Dr. Walker's statements. The decline in surgical tuberculosis has been 'remarkable'; rickets has much decreased; there is no evidence of increased mortality, and little, if any, increase of disease. The physical condition of adult men is fairly maintained, but there is evidence of some increase of neurotic conditions. The mental rather than the physical effects of prolonged unemployment are stressed. There is no justification here for complacency, but equally none for discouragement. Local authorities and local voluntary organisations are doing their work well. Little pasteurised milk is consumed in this area; but 'no milk epidemics have occurred, and non-pulmonary tuberculosis is falling very rapidly.' Such reports, dealing comprehensively with particular areas, are of great value. Sir Hilton Young would do well to initiate a similar investigation in South Wales.

* * * *

On Jubilee Sunday I had to go to South London to give an address to a thousand Scouts and Guides for a vicar who was an old friend of my father, his curate the son of my father's curate. I travelled with a young railway clerk who was studying Continental tours. He was just twenty: he had been five times to Australia as steward in a P. & O. liner and had now 'settled down.' He was keenly interested in foreign countries and foreign policy. He had been rather in favour of stopping traffic in arms, but Italian indignation at countries which sent arms to Abyssinia seemed so unfair that he was all on the other side. He had been through Germany on a bicycle with £3 and a few words of German, and had vastly enjoyed himself—much more than in France, where things cost more and people were less friendly. No *ugend bebergen*, and the roads not so good. He felt the

¹ Cmd. 4886, April 1935 (9d.).

Germans were more like us than any other race in Europe. All the same, that man Hitler was doing such un-English things that the League of Nations ought to step in and stop him! As for the French, there was trouble ahead there; and those Greeks! Travel had helped him to acquire a sense of superiority which would last him a lifetime: but he was ambitious, and was critical of what he read in newspapers.

* * * *

I left Liverpool Street at 8.30 on the evening of May 14, arriving at Hamburg punctually at 3 o'clock. Amongst my fellow-travellers was an English public school boy on his way to Germany to spend three months, or perhaps more, with a German family. I urged him, after three months of hard work at the language, to get leave, if he possibly could, to join a public works service camp (*Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst*). 'That,' I said, 'will be for you an introduction to the New Germany of greater value than a year in a family, and a passport to any university as a foreign student. If you get the chance, seize it with both hands. Whether you like the New Germany or not, you will see it working there and you will get behind the scenes.' He was a strongly-built youth of seventeen, a worthy representative of young England. I believe he will take my advice, and I hope he will get his chance.

I walked for a few minutes by one of the great lakes which make Hamburg a beautiful city as well as a great port. I saw a crowd of twenty or thirty persons watching three boatmen, each in his own skiff, trying to get an elusive something out of the water. It was a day-old duckling which had lost its mother. It was captured and restored at last. The crowd cheered as though it was in Hyde Park. The burgomaster came a few minutes later to show me some of the slum clearance and housing schemes in progress in the centre of the city. Hamburg borrowed heavily and spent wisely in post-war years: few cities in Germany can boast of finer working-class dwellings. But the observation which fell from his lips, in reply to my eulogies, was true in the double sense in which he intended it: 'We did not perhaps deserve all the credit we got for this.' Thence to a new scheme to promote national unity and the good understanding between men in different walks of life, a '*Betriebsgemeinschafts-Schule*.'

Twelve firms in Hamburg send to the school a director, senior clerk, and a workman or craftsman, thirty-six persons in all, to spend a week together in a country house, sharing dormitories, eating their meals together, walking and talking, playing games together, and giving lectures to each other upon their respective aims, responsibilities, difficulties, hopes, and fears. The Industrial Welfare Society in England does something of this kind in its summer schools, but this if it grows, as its promoters hope, into a nation-wide movement, has a far wider scope.

On the following morning I left Hamburg by car at dawn to visit the land reclamation work which is being undertaken by the public works service organisation on the North Sea coast north of the Kiel Canal not many miles from the Danish frontier. It was a long drive of 150 kilometres or more over good roads, crossing the Kiel Canal by ferry. We stopped for breakfast at Meldorf, a delightful little town with a marvellously good 'land and folk museum' which we had time to inspect. It included specimens of every culture from the paleolithic upwards, maps showing the gradual extension of the coast in successive centuries, models of old houses and of ships, with specimens of all household goods and the farmers' tools for nearly 1000 years. I could have happily spent the whole morning there. Adjoining the inn was a barn which was, in its way, a scarcely less interesting exhibition of German ways of life in the fifteenth century.

We reached the land reclamation works just before midday and were taken over it by the engineer in charge. The ultimate aim is to reclaim several hundred square miles which were overwhelmed by the sea about 300 years ago. The old coast is still indicated by a chain of islands, the Hamburg Hallige. The last great step was accomplished in 1926 by a patriotic merchant, Sönke Nissen, who built a great dam, or *Koog*, to give protection, in the words of my guide, to an area of land on which enough corn could be grown to feed a city of 5000 souls—a proud memorial. We put on heavy top boots and drove to the edge of the marsh. A hundred young men, almost all of Hamburg, were working here, up to their knees in water, but protected by their tall boots. They were building protective groins through which the muddy tide entered twice daily, leaving behind a heavy

deposit of rich mud. The scheme would take ten years to accomplish. It was hard work and cold, but the men looked fit, and I was told that they got extra pocket money and extra food in recognition of the heavy strain of working, almost always between wind and water, for from six to twelve months. They had been at it for two and a half years. We returned to lunch at the camp and had a square meal in the temporary barracks, taken from the same great cauldrons which contained the men's food. Nothing attracts me more than these public works camps. They began, like other things in Germany, as voluntary institutions, but have been so successful that they have in the public interest been developed by an increasing element of compulsion. Land reclaiming in any other circumstances is unprofitable. There is something inspiring in this peaceful conquest of broad acres recaptured from the sea, man's oldest enemy.

We returned by way of Schleswig through beautiful country closely resembling Southern England—orchards and beech woods and may trees, tall hedges and winding roads, the cattle mostly Friesian and famous throughout Germany for their milk and butter, the roads good and being rapidly improved. In Schleswig I saw a mobile unit of the *Arbeitsdienst*. Six lorry bodies, as large as furniture vans, formed three sides of a square; within them slept 100 men, in bunks in tiers three deep. The centre, canvas-covered, was their mess-room. They were going from village to village, cleaning ponds and doing odd jobs according to a schedule carefully planned with the local authorities. They carried their own tools, cooked their own food and left behind them a brighter and cleaner countryside. It is this sort of thing which constitutes the real strength of Germany and the hope of a better world. It is harder to work for one's keep and 3s. a week for a year than to join the Territorials or even the Regular Army, and, notwithstanding an element of compulsion, the men in these service camps are for the most part volunteers, and work with a minimum of supervision. The general improvement in the health and morals of the German people, which I noticed last year, has been amply maintained. The suicide rate, which was one of the highest in Europe under the old *régime*, has dropped fast and continues to go down. That, I believe, can be said of no

other country in Europe. The marriage rate has gone up, the birth rate likewise. A young German said to me in the train on my way to Berlin next day: 'We have lost freedom in some directions, we have gained it in others. We are servants of the State, our minds and bodies are disciplined, but we have thrown off the psychological fetters that bound us. We are achieving a social unity of which the republicans of old never dreamed. We have achieved an element of economic freedom which is greater than we could have hoped for two years ago. We are content for the present to be led. We feel as sure of our leaders as you feel of yourselves. Is our confidence less justified than yours? Hitler has saved Germany, and therefore Europe, from Communism. But for him you would perhaps have had no Jubilee celebrations, for Communism spreads like a disease. To withstand it when times are hard a society must be strong and united as we are.'

Thence to dine as a guest of the *Friedrich Sthamer Gesellschaft* at their inaugural dinner. This is an Anglo-German society, founded to keep alive the memory of a great Hamburger who was the first German Ambassador to Great Britain after the war. Thanks largely to him, relations with Great Britain were restored earlier and more completely than with any other of the great belligerents. His *vis-à-vis* in Berlin was Lord d'Abernon, who, like Sthamer, was not *de carrière*, but he was in Berlin only for five years. Seen in retrospect, the two countries have reason to be grateful to their two representatives, and the experiment of appointing business men to the great diplomatic posts was more than justified. In speaking to the company of German and English merchants, whose personal experiences embraced practically every great port and great commercial country in the world, I paid a tribute first to Herr Sthamer, and secondly to the part which commercial leaders had played, and might still continue to play, in international relations. I had much to say in praise of modern Germany, but nothing that I had not already said to audiences in England—not always wholly sympathetic, something also critical, less of German aims, than of German methods, believing, as I do, that Anglo-German societies and clubs can perform useful functions only if their proceedings are marked by complete freedom of expression.

After dinner conversation became more general. We discussed the German Faith movement, which found warm defenders amongst my hosts. They were hurt at British newspaper references to 'the new paganism,' and at the suggestion that the movement had anything in common with the envenomed atheism of Russia. 'We Germans,' said one, 'believe profoundly in God. Religion, whether Lutheran or Catholic, has long been losing its hold upon the people in this country, as in yours. Judged by results it has failed during the last half-century to play its part in uplifting Christendom or mankind. The new German faith is not atheistic, but theistic, not anti-Christian, but rather unitarian in its outlook. You English, of all people, should understand what we are trying to do. Your King is anointed with holy oil as Supreme Governor of the Church. Your Prayer-book is prescribed by Act of Parliament, your archbishops and bishops are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, who may be of any religion or none, a Presbyterian or a Jew. The Church of England is "by law established," but other religions have complete freedom. Your bishops are political partisans, often giving expression to strong views upon every conceivable aspect of internal politics. Some of our German ecclesiastics, too, have been better politicians than bishops. We wish to restore to them their ancient prestige as religious leaders. We do not require their advice in the sphere of internal politics or social legislation. Yet the keynote of the German Faith movement is faith—faith in God and our country and in each other, hope for the future and our children, and charity, as far as lies in us to-day, to all men, but especially to those of our own race. Was that not exactly what Saint Paul taught? "If it be possible, so far as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men," and "do good to all men, especially to those who are of the household of faith"?' The man who spoke had been a student of theology. He was himself steeped in the Lutheran tradition. His feet were set upon the old ways, as are mine. But the young men had seen visions: he was not prepared hastily to condemn, and there could be no doubt of his burning sincerity, though I could not agree.

It was after midnight before the party broke up and I went back to the hotel to meet a German merchant, Herr Robert Wonckhaus, whom I first met in 1907 when he was

carving out for his firm and for Germany a great import and export trade in the Persian Gulf. I had met almost all his employees. It had been my duty on the outbreak of war to arrest several of them. I was the official liquidator of his firm's affairs in Mesopotamia. We had many friends and a few enemies in common, and it was two in the morning before we parted.

On another occasion I heard from eye-witnesses of events in Berlin during the war tests last month. They spoke highly of the ground organisation. So thorough had been the preparation, so complete the organisation, that a raiding squadron might well have missed Berlin altogether. Men who knew the district well could identify nothing. It was a triumph of organisation, a victory for the willing and orderly discipline among the civilian population of Berlin—the realisation, in fact, of Ruskin's plea sixty-five years ago for 'firmness to govern, with grace to obey.'

Elsewhere I talked to a number of Germans—university professors, soldiers, airmen, and students. None seemed unaware of the difficulties confronting their country or Europe: all were soberly confident in their leaders. '*Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna*' was their motto. 'This is our Sparta, rough but incomparable; we are Germans, poor but indomitable.' They would play their part and would survive, and emerge. They would hold to their conceptions of race. With the northern races, including Great Britain and the Dominions and the United States, they had affinities which would some day become the basis for a cultural unity. That time was perhaps far off, but, like their leader, they counted time in terms of generations. The future of the race was what mattered, not the individual, who was no more than the leaf of a great oak which, having nourished the parent stem, passed away.

I left Germany feeling that events in Europe had already taken a turn for the better: that provided we were wise, and strong, war would be impossible. Hitler's speech, and Mr. Baldwin's sober and generous response, have since served to strengthen this conviction.

ARNOLD WILSON.

PARTING LOVERS

m. 1888 1926 1934 ob.

SAD thought for lovers, we must part :
 One taken, and the other left—
 For death will claim one beating heart :
 One folded in eternal peace,
 One lonely, utterly bereft,
 To weep, and wait in life's decrease.

Would it were mine to spare you this,
 To stay, and count the agelong hours :
 To give, not take, the final kiss
 On the pale brow, and leave you there,
 My bride, with myrtle in your hair,
 And round you all the garden flowers.

But if it be not mine to wait :
 If the die falls the other way,
 And you are still outside the gate,
 When my call comes and I must go :
 To mourn me, wait, and work, and pray,
 Be mine in thought when roses blow,

When larches wear their thin, green veil
 And buds are ripening on the beech :
 And all the may is pink and white,
 And daffodils are your delight :
 When you can find a primrose pale,
 And see the blossom on the peach,
 Think on these things, and think of me,
 ' O well is thee
 And happy shalt thou be.'

PARTING LOVERS

When the soft bracken fronds unfold,
 Or their great leaves are burnished gold :
 When, over summer fields, the sea
 Glitters in distant mystery
 Behind the long arm of the wood
 Where you and I so often stood,
 Then think of me,
 ' O well is thee
 And happy shalt thou be.'

When swallows twitter in your eaves,
 And in the glorious, rosy dawn
 You hear the blackbird on the wall,
 The goldfinch, or the linnet call,
 Or watch the kestrel o'er the lawn,
 Or Jenny Wren among the leaves :
 When all the West is lit with fire,
 And Dartmoor's brow is gleaming bright,
 And Hay Tor like a distant spire,
 And Cawsand like a dolphin's back :
 When Haldon's woods are purple-black
 All changing with the changing light,
 Then think of me,
 ' O well is thee
 And happy shalt thou be.'

When the slow moon behind the farm
 Comes up the blue, the owl will cry,
 The night-hawk whirr, and Isca's tide
 Show silver mirrors to the sky :
 Let such an hour bring healing balm
 As in the night your wound you hide.
 Be comforted, for you are free !
 Great love is kind and suffers long,
 No man escapes his destiny,
 The bonds of life are far too strong.
 Be comforted, your spirit soars
 Unfettered now. The gain is yours.
 Think not of me,
 ' O well is thee
 And happy shalt thou be.'

FRANCIS NEWBOLT (1926).

BOOKS RECEIVED

Der Neue Gott. Broder Christiansen (Felsen-Verlag: Munich, 1934). Christiansen is one of the clearest and not the least profound of the philosophers of modern Germany. This, his latest work, is the outcome of nearly thirty years' meditation, often in solitude, based in the first instance upon the Kantian ethic. He recognises two main principles which influence human life. The first and most elementary is the will to live—whence we derive our moral principles, without which we could not live in social groups, and whence we derive the ideas of progress and of social betterment, of nationality and of the importance of the family, and much else.

The second and higher principle is the *daemonischer Wille*—the dæmonic in the Greek sense of the word. From this principle we derive our 'heroic' aims and ideals. It actuates the Alpine climber and the scientist, the soldier and the martyr, the great saints of all ages and the revolutionary. Men in whom the second instinct transcends the first are truly great; nations and religions which accept it achieve heights denied to those whose first concern is the complacent pursuit of the first principle.

Bacon's *Essay on Death* suggests the same idea:

Revenge triumphs over death; love slights it,
honour aspireth to it: grief flieth it. . . .
Above all, the sweetest canticle is *nunc dimittis*
when a man hath obtained worthy ends.

The glory of Christendom is the numberless acts of self-sacrifice by obscure men and women. When a man, following the Master's example, gives his life for another it is sometimes by calculation, but oftener by instinct—the triumph of the second of Christiansen's principles. To the author, the future of religion, and above all of the Christian religion, depends upon the willing acceptance and the victory of the second principle. This is the spirit of God within us. As Pindar wrote 2000 years ago,

The fortunes of the world follow heroic souls
For the fit few, the many live.

A Christian, looking to our Lord as the supreme example of the emergence of 'the heroic will,' will find in this book much to admire, much to provoke thought. In its essence, the thesis is Christian, or at least theistic rather than pagan—a fact of importance to-day.

The Faith of a Schoolmaster. E. Sharwood Smith (Methuen, 6s., 1935). Schoolmasters who write books have a special claim on readers. We have all been to school—our children will follow us thither. We are in youth as clay in the hands of the potter, according to one theory; but it is true of children, as of the most valuable clays, that the most prized and most useful material is often the most 'refractory.'

This book has a special claim on our attention, for it is written, not by the headmaster of a great public school, but of a small grammar school—at Newbury; and it is noteworthy that few headmasters of such schools have placed on record their matured views and experience. Yet these 'secondary' schools, the fruit of Balfour's Education Act of 1902, following on the Cockerton decision, which denied the county councils the right to levy rates for other than elementary education, have changed the whole face of public education in this country in the last thirty years. Adequately to notice this book would require a whole article in this Review: it is a storehouse of wisdom, a well of enthusiasm. The present reviewer can recollect no recent book on the subject of education which has left so deep an impression on his mind. It is a book that no schoolmaster, parent, or boy can read without feeling happier, more hopeful, and more convinced that secondary education on such lines is the very foundation of 'the good life' of Plato, whom the author has studied with such affection.


Origins and Development of Applied Chemistry. J. R. Partington, M.B.E. (Longmans, 45s. net). This great volume is for the young student a veritable garden in which he can wander at will with a fresh interest at every step, for practical scientific workers a mine, and for scholars a quarry, for there is much beneath the surface that will repay the seeker. It is as much a book for the archæologist as for the chemist, as indispensable for the student of art as of history. 'It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the honour of Kings is to search out a matter.' Thus Proverbs xxv. 2. Dr. Partington has in this volume done Queen Mary College, in the University of London, honour, and students in many lands a service. The documentation from Sumerian times onwards is admirable, the index a blessing to busy men. The book covers a vast variety of materials—animal, vegetable and mineral, metal work and pottery, wood-working and textiles, dyes and disinfectants, drugs and lubricants.

the writer demonstrates, more conclusively than any of his predecessors, that science is not only international—it is of immense antiquity, and its home was in the East. Each successive civilisation has inherited knowledge and traditions from a past so remote that it has left almost no trace. The book will be for many years a standard work—and not only in English-speaking countries, for it has no counterpart in any foreign tongue.

Growing Opinions. A Symposium of British Youth Outlook (Methuen, 6s. net). The title of this book is a happier description of the contents than the sub-title. The sixteen young writers, of whom twelve are men, all have something to say worth saying, and they say it well and not without a certain modesty. The views expressed remind me of a somewhat similar collection of essays written in the early 'eighties by Sir Michael Sadler and some of his friends: there is the same doubt as to the validity of current views, the same diversity. But youth in the 'eighties believed in 'progress': their grandsons seem to doubt if it can be maintained, and revert to the wistful queries which echo through Disraeli's *Sybil*. The book is full of contradictions, as such a book should be: individuality is stressed, but also the need for a vast and co-ordinated national policy. The folly of war is emphasised, but no word is said to indicate by what other means an intolerable *status quo* is to be changed by its victims. Jack Lovelock on 'Youth and Modern Sport' is to me excellent, so also Warren Triggs on 'Youth and Pleasures'—partly because I agree with most of what they say, partly because they write concisely without introspection of matters of which they can speak at first hand. Mr. Barrett's appraisal of the value of the Greek tradition is almost precisely that of Horace (*Epist.* II., 1, 63-75). The introductory note of Professor J. B. S. Haldane, with its vague reference to 'science' as a panacea, couched in language of slightly sour superiority, is out of place, and adds nothing of interest to the book, unless, indeed, by way of contrast, for these young people are neither sour nor superior.

The Problem of Noise. F. C. Bartlett (the Cambridge Miscellany: Cambridge University Press, 1934, 3s. 6d. net). The Professor of Experimental Psychology in the University of Cambridge here expounds concisely the outcome of recent exhaustive, and exhausting, researches. The subject is of real and increasingly social importance, for noise is one of the few nuisances which are steadily increasing, thanks to motor cars, aeroplanes, and wireless broadcasts. But it is extremely difficult objectively to define 'noise.' The reply to the question 'What noise annoys an oyster?' is 'Noise in our childhood, 'A noisy noise annoys an oyster.' Professor Bartlett can with certainty say no more than that.

A. T. W.



32
V1-56m N35
N35-117