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
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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JULY, 1934.

CAN THE FRENCH REPUBLIC SURVIVE?

AN Italian who had stayed some months with me in France, put into a single phrase the malady of France and at the same time the malady of the thing we call democracy. "Every Frenchman," he said, "thinks himself a 'Monsieur.'" It is true: the bricklayer is "Monsieur," the peasant is "Monsieur," the butcher who calls on his bicycle for the day's orders is "Monsieur." Even my man in the garden from the mountains of Piedmont, where he and his family had gone hungry and barefoot, has now become more French than a Frenchman. See him in his blue apron, no longer a labourer, but a gardener, no longer "*tutoyé*" by everybody, but proud of being "*vouvoyé*," no longer Giovanni, but "Monsieur Jean." He is full of a consciousness of his dignity is "Monsieur Jean," he believes he knows his job so well that it is not necessary for him to do it, he is altogether a fine fellow, as becomes a Frenchman. But when he was plain Giovanni (as indeed he still is for me, much to his annoyance) he was also a useful fellow, who worked hard, who was grateful, who was without a silly sense of his superiority as an individual. Had he remained an Italian he would doubtless have cultivated a sense of the superiority of his nation, but he would at any rate have contributed to its greatness. Circumstances have converted him into a Frenchman—into a "Monsieur." It is a pity.

After the war there was such a shortage of man-power in France that the authorities had to go in search of foreign labourers. They had to open labour-recruiting offices in other countries and offer railway fares and facilities. I believe that no fewer than three million foreign workers thus found themselves in France—from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Italy. The proportion is considerable. These were the helots of France. They did the disagreeable work which the French disdained. The French preferred to be "*petits fonctionnaires*," shopkeepers, artisans and employees in the better occupations. I always think the Americans were, in their days of prosperity, fortunate in having Negroes who

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I

naturally performed many menial tasks ; but more deliberately the French tried to create a kind of second-zone citizen who would pass through a probationary period before he became a full-fledged Frenchman, and in the meantime do jobs which were judged inferior. An unhappy idea, as I deem it, but one of the consequences of the war. Now it may be that democracy, which postulates equality, is only possible in practice if there is a category of workers who have something less than the rank of citizens. So it was in ancient Greece, where democracy frankly reposed on the principle of slavery. As for the Romans, they acknowledged the need of dictatorships, a suspension of the normal constitution, when affairs went badly—just as the French, who profess they will not submit to a Mussolini or a Hitler, permit a Clemenceau, a Poincaré, or a Doumergue to exercise special powers until the evil effects of a democracy of “Messieurs” have been temporarily conjured away.

If one considers the future of France, here is the salient fact, to be kept always before one : France is a country of bourgeois. The peasant and the artisan are bourgeois in the meaning of the term as it is used. They all demand to be treated as equals—they are all “Monsieurs.” It is not without reason that France is one of the few countries which resist the so-called reaction ; for France is one of the few countries which ever accepted, in a practical way, the conceptions, bad and good, of democracy. In England the influence of the Monarchy is nothing like so negligible as is pretended ; if it does nothing else it imposes the suggestion of hierarchy. Besides, there is a Parliamentary tradition which largely negatives the folly of popular representation ; the elected person does not aspire to govern, he merely makes a few conventional passes, but falls obediently into the party-ranks, and the parties fall obediently into their places, and the Government is really allowed to govern for some years before, after a consultation of the people, it gives way to another Government which is really allowed to govern. It is not so, of course, in France. No Government (except in an emergency) is allowed to govern. The elected of the people take it upon themselves to govern. Are they not Democratic Republicans, who have drawn their power directly from below, and owe nothing to any person or institution above ? It is as nominees of the people that they render all government impossible.

I am not in the least exaggerating. There are compromises—there must be compromises—but when there is no apparent menace every deputy believes his function is to participate in the conduct of government. When there is an obvious danger he will reluctantly step aside—though never for long. He is abashed before his own blunders—but only until they have been partially repaired. Mr. Louis Madelin, the Academician, declares he heard a deputy of the Left say : “I will always remain an admirer of democracy. But democratic government is only possible when there are no difficulties.” That candid apology for occasional dictatorship is also a condemnation of the sort of democracy that is practised in France—reckless, blind, egotistic, individual, declining to pay the smallest heed to the realities of national life. When there are funds in the exchequer they must be dilapidated in demagogic spending—until bankruptcy threatens, when a Strong Man is expected miraculously to put matters right. When there is no immediate prospect of hostilities, an astute politician can remain in office for years on the promise that “While I am here there will be no war”—a safe statement since he would quickly be repudiated in time of peril. To me the marvel is that the Parliamentary régime, as understood in France, has lasted so long. It has only lasted so long because it is subject to periodic eclipse.

The deputy is at once the most popular and the most unpopular figure in France. It is not enough to say—as is generally said—that he is unpopular. Were that all he would soon disappear. He is likewise hail-fellow-well-met in every commune. The singular and the plural must be carefully employed : the deputy—*our* deputy—is liked ; the deputies—in general—are detested. When a Parisian passes the Chamber of Deputies—and this was true long before the riots of February—he shakes his fist at the building in execration. He chuckles when the Chamber is not in session. It would be better for the country if they would stay on holiday all the year round, he says, expressing the sentiment of every Prime Minister. Yet the same citizen will swear that never will France tolerate a Fascist or a Nazi régime. The contradiction is more apparent than real. For these régimes require a spirit of solidarity and of discipline that is at present alien to the French character. They spring out of a national movement, that is, fundamentally, far more “democratic”

than the French "democracy." Hitler and Mussolini do represent their countries—overwhelmingly, indisputably. What politician represents France? Any nominal answer would be ludicrous. Nobody represents France. The deputies represent constituencies, and the constituencies are, as the late M. Briand called them, "stagnant pools," in which a mass of noisome life pullulates.

That is the trouble. No one represents France. But the communes are represented. The individual voters are represented. The deputy is the commissioner of his electorate. He renders services to the locality. He has not so much an electorate as a clientèle—with a voracious appetite. Is a new post-office needed? Would a bridge be advantageous? Monsieur le député will pull strings, he will do the necessary. Is a pension not being paid? Monsieur le député will look into it. Are there paid posts to be had? Monsieur le député will see that some come this way. Is someone in "trouble?" Monsieur le député will use his influence; he will see the right person. So everything goes by favour, and the deputy who knows his business is invaluable. But that business is to look after the communal and individual interests of the voters; and the administration even of justice, and certainly the financial administration of the country, vitally suffers.

The deputy must please persons and communes; the Government—that is to say the Ministers on sufferance—must please the deputies. There is always such a delicate balance of majority and minority that it would never do to put the deputy in real antagonism. If deputies were members of two or three organised parties, which stood for something definite, then they would not have to be considered as individuals; but they belong to a number of groups which can sway the balance to right or to left, and they must be, however crapulous they are, respected. Every one his own Government! Every one a Dictator in his own name! That is the ideal towards which the French political system tends. Ministers must be complaisant if they are to survive at all. Governments must be influenceable if they are not to collapse ignominiously. There is, in these circumstances, a strong temptation for the deputies to sell their influence profitably. They get mixed up with financial adventurers and scoundrels. If they are lawyers by profession they can earn more money by intervening in occult ways than in

pleading. This means that they can bring pressure to bear on the magistrature itself. As for the police, that is to say the Sûreté Générale (now re-christened Sûreté Nationale!) they have long been suspect. On one side of them are the corrupt politicians, on the other side is a band of "*indicateurs*." Now an "*indicateur*" can only be valuable if he is a crook, mingling freely with crooks and he is given strange licenses in order that the police may be informed of what is going on. So it comes about that the borderlines are faint—crook, "*indicateur*," the police who may practise an indefinable policy, the politicians, the lawyers; a whole network, terribly complicated, of intrigue, of wire-pulling, which must inevitably result in scandals. And when the scandals are not too numerous or too dramatic, the citizen smiles knowingly. And when they are frequent and flagrant, and involve police, deputies, Ministers, crooks, and a dim underworld, he suddenly becomes angry, and if a foolish government loses its head and shoots him down while he is properly protesting, it becomes difficult to patch up the régime again.

The usual estimate of the French character is altogether wrong. Your French are not volatile, excitable. They, and the Spanish, are the most patient people in the world. For it is the patient man or woman who explodes most violently under the stress of insupportable circumstances. French—and Spanish—will submit for long years to conditions which would not be tolerated by the Anglo-Saxon peoples. They submit, in the case of the Spanish meekly, in the case of the French cynically. The French shrug their shoulders. Has it not always been like that? Will it not always be like that? Yet there is a point at which revolt is necessary. It is foreseeable, and the amazing fault of M. Chautemps and M. Daladier, the two Radical Prime Ministers chiefly responsible, is that they did not have the sense to see the storm that was brewing, and to handle things with ordinary sang-froid and judgment. Perhaps they tried to save their party, their friends, their governments, themselves, and so were blinded. At any rate, the first made a popular uprising inevitable, and the other turned it into an unpardonable street-slaughter of innocent citizens. The first was, perhaps, to be excused in that he was following precedent, playing the ordinary game in extraordinary circumstances; but the political excuses of the second who tried to convert a mild enough demonstration of

the disgusted populace into an armed attack of conspiratorial Fascists, or Monarchists, or goodness knows what, make his incredible blunders worse and add insult to injury.

There had come a moment when something had to break, when the elaborate system of patronage and favours, and secret funds for blackmailers and adventurers and mercenary journalists, and political finance and financial politics, and police connivance with swindlers, and lawyer-deputies' interference with justice, could go on no longer without a crash. Politicians, financiers, and police had become too careless. They relied on their immunity. They were not only corrupt—which alone does not matter—but they were likewise incompetent—which matters immensely. They had let a notorious scoundrel pursue his rascally affairs for years, putting off the hearing of charges against him nineteen times, with high authorities winking and shaking hands, and when the crisis came he who had friends everywhere rather incomprehensibly shot himself. Why? Could he not get his trial put off another nineteen times? The ugly accusation was immediately launched that he had been officially murdered—to silence him. (Later the mangled remains of a judge were found fastened to the railway track, and it is now suggested that he, too, committed "suicide.") The Frenchman had a swift vision of something rotten beyond imagining under the cover of Parliament, and he was sickened and ran amuck. When he became almost angry the Ministers fled. It would not have required very much more for the President himself to have abdicated. Had not the veteran smiling "Papa" Doumergue (ready packed to escape to Egypt) been induced to come to Paris, it is almost certain that the Republic itself would have abdicated, and that whoever had been prepared and had chosen to take control could have imposed another régime in the blood and dust and scandal of the execrated Republic. The best proof that there was no "plot," no groups, Monarchist or Fascist, prepared to execute a *coup d'état*, is that not the slightest attempt was made to seize, at this favourable moment, the Élysée and the Government offices, and to issue a proclamation to the people who were deeply stirred by the butchery of their unarmed fellows by the Parliamentarians.

Though the ramifications of the latest in a long series of scandals take us into the most unexpected quarters, I, for my part, serious as it all is, am disposed to think that many, if

not most, of those against whom an accusatory finger is pointed, have been nothing more than indiscreet, and are themselves victims of the Parliamentary system of *camaraderie*. Individuals have been guilty of much more, perhaps Prime Ministers and Ministers of Justice but, generally speaking, they would seem to have acquiesced in ignorance or in friendship. In some respects it is to be deprecated that there should be a hunt for persons who have in some way or another come into contact with men like Stavisky. They could not help coming in contact with such characters. Unless they kicked over the traces and ruined their political careers, they could hardly help falling in with suggestions made to them. They come and go, the Ministers, without really learning their jobs, without having time to enquire into vague rumours. They must make no enemies. They must accept all friendships. They are not of sufficiently heroic stature to break out of, or to break up, vicious combinations. They cannot question everybody and everything. They must continue to "play the game."

It is not the finding of scapegoats that will help. It is rather the condemnation of the whole system in which a section of the police, the politicians, the lawyers, and the financial adventurers, are inextricably mixed. What does it really matter whether X, who was at one time Minister, and another time advocate, received an excessive fee for using his influence? Doubtless he deserves to be punished, but the punishment of a particular person changes nothing in the unhappy system of tolerance that has brought the French Parliament and the Sûreté Générale into popular disrepute.

And who is the man who can clean up this Augean stable? No Hercules has yet announced himself. The Parliamentarians themselves have done what they always do on these occasions—they have set up Commissions of Enquiry. Now experience shows that political commissions trail along, stir up a lot of dust and eventually disappear, leaving things much as they were. They take a political view. There is a majority and a minority. The men of the majority do their best to minimise the offences of their friends, and pursue any suggestion, however unsubstantial, against their political adversaries. The men of the minority act in the opposite sense. The result is that when a great many names are bespattered, there is a tacit agreement to abandon the search for proofs. If politi-

cians in France, through mistaken ideas as to their functions, make poor legislators, it is certain that when they usurp the functions of judges they only make confusion worse confounded.

The Doumergue Government, on a superficial view, appears for the moment to be strongly entrenched in France, but it is encountering difficulties in every domain. Its immediate future is doubtless assured by the decision of the Radical party to support Édouard Herriot, the Radical President, as a member of the Ministry. Yet it has to be remembered that the Congress was expressing its confidence in M. Herriot rather than in a Government of National Union. M. Herriot had threatened the party with resignation if it called on him to resign from the Government; and certainly the Radicals, most of whose chiefs have been implicated in some degree in the scandals and in the drastic measures which were taken to suppress public manifestations, could not afford to lose their last remaining popular figure. While they were obliged to throw some of their leading members to the wolves, it is perfectly evident that the party retains its confidence in the men who have been partisans of the political formation known as the Cartel des Gauches—that is to say, an unnatural union of the Radicals and the Socialists. Like the Bourbons, the Radicals in France learn nothing and forget nothing. They nourish a fundamental hostility towards the National Government in which M. Tardieu and other Moderates sit side by side with M. Herriot. Circumstances are such that they cannot at present wisely attempt to overthrow a Government which is plainly demanded by the people. But at the earliest possible opportunity the men of the Left, who still possess a Parliamentary majority, will endeavour to smash up the Ministry. The mystic attraction of the Left has not diminished. Yet it is precisely this attraction of the Left that has proved to be unfortunate in the past. The Radicals tried to work with the Socialists after 1924, with the result that French finances which, it is true, had been badly conducted by earlier Ministries, completely collapsed; and it was necessary to call on Raymond Poincaré to compose a Government of National Union. History repeated itself when the Radicals again won in 1932, and Gaston Doumergue was called upon to save not only the franc, but France. The situation, therefore, is that although the Doumergue Government

appears necessary for the time being, it is merely tolerated until such time as the danger would seem to have passed. The more rigorous economic methods which have been adopted, and the more vigilant foreign policy which has been applied, are disliked by the Radical and Socialist members of Parliament. Doctrinally, the special powers conferred on the Prime Minister, who can now issue decree laws, are found objectionable. The greatest objection in the eyes of deputies who cannot understand why their political adversaries, who are in a minority, should participate in the exercise of power, is that they are out of office, and are compelled to lend unwilling votes to a Government not of their making.

Belief on this occasion in the forgetfulness of the public may be mistaken. M. Doumergue makes no secret of his intention constantly to appeal over the head of Parliament to the people. He, like President Roosevelt, addresses the people directly by radio. He has a threefold task: the restoration of the difficult economic situation, with unemployment acute, trade stagnant, and the cost of living high; the shaping of French foreign policy which has been neither strong nor weak, but simply non-existent, in the face of terrible European problems; and the reform of the political system, its purification, its revision in the light of sixty years of unhappy experience. Can M. Doumergue, aspiring to repose, surrounded by the very Ministers who have failed so disastrously, who have grown up in the system, succeed? I must be allowed, with all respect for a man who has shown tact but not energy in the past, who has won his way by his smile and not by his fearlessness, who is thirty years older than the men who have, elsewhere in Europe, undertaken similar tasks, I must be allowed to express my scepticism. But if he fails I do not think the Radicals will come back to enjoy the quiet pursuit of corrupt and incompetent politics. There will, I am convinced, be another upheaval, if reforms are not effected, and the institutions which have been undermined by abuse will be forcibly overthrown. They cannot, in any event, last. They are outmoded. Parliamentaryism, as practised in France, is outworn. Of that I am certain. But what is to take its place I do not know. There is no positive preference of the people. They are against the Parliamentary régime. They are not for anything else. The ex-soldiers, in their various organisations, are powerful, but have no

particular political purpose except that of clean and efficient government. The Royalists are comparatively few, but are well organised for parade if not for action. Is there a young and unknown Napoleon—the French counterpart of Mussolini and Hitler? No one can say from whence such a man may come, nor when, nor how. He is just as likely to come from the Left as from the Right—to be Socialist (if the term means anything) or National-Socialist, or Communist, or a mixture of all these, as to be whatever is implied by the word Reactionary. He will be, if he comes, authoritarian, and in the exaltation of the State over individual liberty and *laissez-faire*, Right and Left merge and become meaningless. What of the Duc de Guise, the candidate to the throne? Well, there is now surprisingly little hostility towards the idea of a king. He might well appeal more than a Dictator to the French. It is impossible to make predictions. All that can be said is that if the politicians ignore the recent warning, as they are temperamentally inclined to do, the days of so-called democratic institutions are numbered in France as everywhere else where they have been foolishly used for personal or party gain or prestige.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

THE NEW DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION.

WHAT are we to make of the Resolution which (when I write in mid-June) the Disarmament Conference has just passed? Must we regard it as no better than a façade, run up at the last moment to conceal for a little longer a breakdown that must soon be disclosed? Does it mean that, if we get an agreement about armaments at all, it can only be a deceptive one, likely to blow up? Or can we regard it as a victory for good sense, so far as it goes, and as offering another chance, just a chance, of achieving a world-wide, or only regional, convention which really would be of substantial value as a beginning of reduction, limitation and control of world armaments?

THE PROBLEM

Recall, to begin with, the objectives that the Conference had set before itself, and the main difficulties encountered. The Conference declared, in its Resolution of July 1932, that “the time has come when all nations of the world must adopt substantial and comprehensive measures of disarmament.”

As for the immediate objective, it was defined in the same Resolution in the following “unanimous” decision:

- (i) that a *substantial reduction of world armaments* shall be effected, to be applied by a general convention alike to land, naval and air armaments.
- (ii) That a primary objective shall be to *reduce the means of attack*.

The present Resolution expresses a conviction “of the necessity of the Conference continuing its work with a view to arriving at a *general convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments*.”

As for difficulties, the most serious have arisen, of course, in trying to effect the necessary reconciliation between the three demands labelled “Disarmament,” “Security,” “Equality.” Impossible to reconcile the claim for “equality of treatment” with the claim for “substantial reduction of world armaments” if the heavily armed Powers would not level down substantially. Impossible to induce some of those heavily armed Powers to accept such levelling down, unless

their attitude towards exploitation of their superior armed force could somehow be changed. Impossible, it seemed, to secure that necessary change of attitude unless the principle of collective responsibility for respecting and preserving "the peace of nations" was loyally and effectively sustained.

Thus, the success of the whole Conference was bound to depend to a singular extent on the policy of Great Britain, in her key position, in regard to disarmament, security and equality. If she would not support Germany's just claim to equality of treatment, and do so before too late, Germany would not come in. If she would not accept for herself such restrictions as would be desirable in Germany's case, "equality" could not be reconciled with net reduction. If she would not accept loyally and effectively a full share of the collective responsibility for safeguarding peace and the fulfilment of the Disarmament agreement, then the French agreement could not be won or Japan's militarist gamblers be curbed. And if, during the negotiations, she took sides with either France or Germany, e.g. by preparing secretly with France a plan to be thrown at Germany's head, or *vice versa*, then her valuable influence as a mediator would, of course, be compromised. So much for the nature of the problem. Now let us consider the Resolution of June 11th, section by section.

GERMANY'S RETURN

The Resolution begins by taking note of certain Resolutions lately submitted and of certain memoranda exchanged since last year. Only four memoranda are selected for mention, these being the French one of January 1st, the Italian of January 4th, the British of January 29th, and the German of April 16th. It is fortunate that the very conciliatory German Note of April 16th is thus cited, and that there is no reference to the French Note of April 17th which seemed to block the way for negotiation. After emphasising the necessity of a general convention, in terms already quoted, the Resolution resolves "to continue without delay the investigations already undertaken." Then comes an important passage about Germany's return to the Conference, which means presumably that efforts will be made to secure that return, whether through Mr. Henderson or some other channel. The Resolution "invites the Bureau to seek, by whatever means it deems

appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a Disarmament Convention, a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference."

Let us recognise that it is all to the good that this explicit reference has been made to the need to "facilitate" the return of Germany. But we must recognise, too, that it will amount to nothing, it is merely a deceptive phrase, unless Britain and France really mean to pay the price of "general acceptance of a Disarmament Convention," i.e. one to which both Germany and France would be parties.

What is that price? It is now, I think, fairly clear. Are we prepared to recognise without reserve the principle of equality of treatment, and to provide now, without offensive discrimination, for its practical application within a limited period? The French Government will presumably only say "yes" to that if it is included in a system which would provide some kind of "security for all nations." That was the formula which France accepted on December 11th, 1932, and to which she apparently adhered in her Memorandum of January 1st, 1934. France will probably insist, also, on trying to provide for a "*période d'épreuve*," a testing of the machinery of supervision, before any substantial levelling down has to be made in her own material armament, and before any substantial levelling up may be made in the material armament of Germany. Here, then, will arise two crucial questions. Will England participate adequately in such provisions about "security for all nations" as France considers indispensable? And will Germany accept such provisions for the preliminary testing of the machinery of supervision as France considers indispensable?

BRITAIN AND GUARANTEES

1. The British Government, on April 10th, was asking the French Government what it would regard as adequate guarantees of security against evasion of the Disarmament agreement. But a partial, if not a complete, answer to the question had, in fact, been given already. The French Note of December 5th, 1933, defined what the late French

Government regarded as the necessary guarantee for co-operative pressure against a violation of the Convention.

"These means of pressure," the Note said, "will be of an economic and financial kind." "Eventually," the passage concludes, "the Permanent Commission will be asked to go farther: it will be able to recommend the rupture of diplomatic relations and to invite the signatory States to lend their technical assistance to the threatened States in order to permit them as rapidly as possible to guard against the consequences of the march stolen on them by the violating State—for example, in the manufacture of forbidden materials."

Will the British Government accept something like that? I cannot see why it should not do so. Or will it stick to the hopelessly inadequate assurance offered in the British Memorandum of January 29th, 1934, viz. to consult, in the event of reported violation, in order to "exchange views as to the steps to be taken for the purpose of restoring the situation? . . ." Is it really believed, at this time of day, that we can sufficiently allay French apprehensions by so vague an assurance? Does Sir John Simon still consider it enough to say that this provision about consultation would in our opinion "emphasise the inescapable duty of all signatories of the Convention to keep in the closest touch with one another, and to do *whatever is right and possible* to prevent or remedy any violation of so important an international Treaty?"

The French position was further indicated in the negotiations that led to the formulation on December 7th last at Geneva of a detailed scheme of supervision. The British Government has not yet indicated whether it accepts this scheme. All it has yet said (in the Memorandum of January 29th) is that it will

agree to the application of a system of permanent and automatic supervision, to come into force with the obligations of the convention if general agreement is reached on all other issues.

Should not our Government be more explicit and helpful about this?

GERMANY AND A TRIAL PERIOD

2. There remains the question whether, if Britain will accept such guarantees and supervision, Germany and France can agree about a time-table for the various stages of levelling

up and levelling down, while the machinery of supervision is being tested. The French Note of January 1st emphasised that there must be a trial of the supervision system lasting for "the first few years." During that trial there would be "a reduction in French effectives synchronised with the transformation of the existing German forces" so as to standardise the European armies on a short-service basis. As for the permitted weapons, there would be *no levelling up for Germany* during the trial period. And as for the weapons to be abolished or reduced, there would be no replacement and *no levelling down for France* during that period, except perhaps in one important respect. The Note included this concession:

As regards *air armaments*, from the first years of the Convention, France not only agrees to the abolition of bombing from the air under the conditions laid down by the Conference in its resolution of July 23rd, 1932, but would even consider a proportional reduction of fifty per cent. of the material at present in commission, if such a general reduction were accepted by the principal air forces and accompanied by effective control over civil aviation and aircraft manufacture.

Now look at Germany's response, in her Note of April 16th. She would accept

postponement of the reductions of armaments of other Powers until the end of the fifth year of the Convention, the measure of disarmament laid down in the United Kingdom memorandum being carried out during the second five years of the Convention.

That is a very remarkable concession: it really concedes fully half of the case on which Germany withdrew from the Conference on October 14th, 1933. But Germany does not recede at all from her earlier position as regards her own levelling up. If the other Powers will not accept Germany's repeated proposal that all the great weapons of attack should be abolished all round, then Germany must be free from the outset of the Convention to begin building such weapons. But here, too, she offers considerable concessions as regards limitation of her aircraft and tanks for the present.

In these circumstances, the outstanding difference between France and Germany as to a period of trial has evidently been much narrowed. Surely it ought not to be impossible to reach an agreement now, provided always that Great

Britain comes in with unequivocal acceptance of the necessary guarantees and supervision. But in considering the prospect of Germany's acceptance of a convention it is not enough to take into account only the substance of that convention: the method of its preparation is hardly less important. It would be a fatal error, I suggest, to repeat the technique which contributed to the withdrawal of Germany in July 1932, and again in October 1933. We ought not to work out a plan secretly with France and America and then present it to the Germans as a sacred compromise, to be taken or left. Even if this were a sound method of negotiation in a normal case, it would be unsound in this case, since Germany's position and her state of mind are far from normal. We must try to understand why she remembers with loathing the words "*Versailles Diktat*," and why she watches with exacerbad suspicion for any semblance of a united front against her. We may detest many features of her internal policy: we may distrust her rulers' intentions as regards external policy: but if we are ever to win back the loyal collaboration she can give, we must negotiate with her, not at her.

SECURITY

The Resolution goes on to state three decisions, the first of which concerns security. A special committee has been appointed to study means of facilitating the conclusion of further "regional security agreements" "which may be negotiated outside the Conference." "It would be for the General Commission to determine the relationship, if any, of these agreements to the General Convention." It has been made plain that Great Britain, having already accepted the regional security agreement of Locarno, in the rôle of guarantor, will have no part in additional agreements.

The resolution also provides for the appointment of a special committee to study the question of *guarantees of execution*; and it provides for resumption of the work on *supervision* which has already been carried far. Much will depend on the British Government's policy in these two Committees. But whatever Britain does, there will now be an obstacle, probably insurmountable, to any general agreement. *Japan refuses supervision*; so Russia (and others) will do likewise. This is largely the consequence of our own past

weakness in dealing with the Japanese challenge. It may wreck the whole enterprise.

In addition the Conference has, by another Resolution, recommended the Governments to send in documents about their national defence expenditure with a view to application of the system of publicity which has been prepared. Publicity will be of substantial value: but the omission of actual limitation of total expenditure will, I think, prove to be one of the most damaging gaps in the Convention (if a Convention is made).

AIR FORCES

The resolution goes on to instruct the Air Committee to resume forthwith the study of the questions mentioned in the General Commission's resolution of July 23rd, 1932, under the heading "Air Forces." This is, I think, a deplorable step backwards. The text in question was the worst part of that deplorable document.

Bombing "Civilians."—The first substantial point raised by this text was as follows: "Air attack against the civilian population shall be absolutely prohibited." Is that much more than a cynical joke? If war is committed in spite of the renunciation of war, then *all* bombardment from the air may or may not be prohibited. If *all* such bombardment is prohibited, then the additional prohibition of bombardment of civilians would add nothing to its strength. If, on the other hand, *all* bombardment is *not* prohibited, then the limited prohibition will surely fail to give the civilian any reliable protection. The first bomb meant for some military objective, and dropped from a height of 15,000 feet on a cloudy night, will hit "civilians"; and then a welter of reprisals will begin. I doubt whether any value attaches to any regulations of this character for the polite conduct of war: I doubt whether a Disarmament Conference should spend five minutes of its time in discussing them: I doubt very much whether it will ever be possible, in another war between organised modern states, to discriminate between "civilians" and others: and I can only conclude that a rule of war for the protection of so-called "civilians" which must obviously fail to achieve that purpose would be merely a cruel fraud.

The Bombing Reservation.—The text in question goes on to say that "The High Contracting Parties shall agree as between

themselves that all bombardment from the air shall be abolished, subject to agreement with regard to measures to be adopted for the purpose of rendering effective the observance of this rule. . . ." The measures in question are to include limitation of military aircraft and regulation of civil aircraft. This was the most dishonest sentence in the resolution of 1932. The layman, reading it without warning, would naturally suppose that it meant to secure prohibition of all bombardment provided that certain conditions could first be fulfilled. But that was not really the lawyer's meaning. The agreement to prohibit bombardment was to be made only between the High Contracting Parties, i.e. those States which were in a position to be signatories of the Disarmament Convention. It would not apply to bombardment of non-signatories. It would not preclude England from bombarding the villages of tribesmen of the North-West frontier of India who are for the present, at any rate, unable to institute reprisals in the air. It would not preclude Irak from smashing, as British airmen have done on Irak's behalf, the homes of recalcitrant Kurdish tribesmen. It would not prevent France from bombing Arabs in the fastnesses of Morocco. Apparently the intention was to return to the old technique of making a convention based on the condition of reciprocity, and to leave States free to prepare and train for the act of bombing and to maintain bombing planes and research. New types of air weapon would thus be developed every year by the air ministries, and these would be ready for the mass production of death on the word "go."

The fact is that we come back yet again to that accursed British reservation about bombing in "certain outlying regions." It was this reservation which, coupled with Britain's negative attitude on civil aviation, did much to wreck the good prospect on May 27th, 1933, of general agreement on total abolition of all naval and military aviation. "Certain outlying regions—" one recalls the withering comment of the Norwegian delegate, who pointed out that there were so many places which, though "outlying" from the standpoint of London were not "outlying" when viewed from some other capital.

On May 27th, 1933, the British delegate found himself alone with Irak and Siam (and with reserves, Japan) in defending such a reservation. America, and France, too, at that time,

were against it. Let us hope that under the chairmanship of Dr. Lange, of Norway, the air commission may bring out once again how indefensible and short-sighted the reservation is. We should retain a weapon cheap, supremely efficient, and often relatively bloodless, for use against those who are now helpless against this particular form of "pressure"; but we should be imperilling something more precious than any modern conveniences of administrative power.

But the question of the bombing reservation is really a small one compared with the other questions about limitation or abolition of military aircraft and regulation of civil flying. I suppose that in the present welter, we must be thankful for small mercies. But this, I believe, is certain. If we now choose the way of limitation, trying to fix parities and limit tonnages, we shall soon see a net increase, not a reduction, in the world's killing power in the air. The way of total abolition is easier, technically, and a far better contribution to the true security of the world, than the way of chopping the air weapon arbitrarily in half. And if we fail now to press energetically for the internationalisation of civil air transport, we are blind to the true requirements of security and of efficiency alike.

THE ARMS TRAFFIC

The third question specially referred to is the manufacture of, and the trade in, arms. The resolution asks the committee concerned to resume its work and refers to the recommendation of the American delegate that something more should be done to control the traffic besides the bringing into force of the poor Arms Traffic Convention of 1925. Here again, as in regard to other parts of the security problem, Great Britain has hitherto hung back and has a most important contribution to bring. Our country is by far the largest exporter of arms in the world. The French Government, supported by others, has pressed for the suppression of the manufacture of arms by private enterprise; and the demand for the suppression of all manufacture and sale of arms for private profit is widespread and intense here, in America, and elsewhere. At present our Government insists on the retention of private manufacture, on the ground that it affords them a cheap and elastic capacity for expansion in time of crisis. I must not attempt to argue the matter here;

I will only recall that in June 1933, when France accepted the British draft convention as a basis for the future agreement, her delegates expressly made two reserves. Provision, they said, must be included for dealing with this subject, and also for limiting expenditure on armaments. Despairing of securing agreement on total suppression, the French proposed a detailed plan of control, which appears as an amendment to the British draft. So far as I know, the British Government has never yet publicly expressed an opinion on this plan. Although knowing that the French attach crucial importance to it, they made no allusion to it in the British Memorandum of January 29th, 1934.

Let us hope that at this last stage the insistent demand of public opinion will be effective at least to the extent of securing acceptance by our Government of such a scheme of control as France proposes. Furthermore, as preparation for later developments, if not for immediate action, an investigation might well be instituted by the Government on the same lines as that which has been officially started in the United States.

Finally the resolution leaves it to the Bureau to take the necessary steps to ensure that when the general Commission is convened by the President, it will have before it, as far as possible, a complete draft convention. The President is asked to submit to the Governments the Russian proposal that the Disarmament Conference should be turned into a permanent Peace Conference.

So I conclude by answering the question with which I began. Yes, this Resolution is better than nothing. It does offer just a chance for the conclusion of a Convention of some value as a beginning. But I see no hope of such a Convention even for Europe only unless, amongst other things, the British Government amends its policy as regards "collective security," and unless the new dealings with Germany are conducted in a different temper from those of October 1933. And at present it seems only too probable that this French Government, gambling on Hitler's embarrassments, will choose a policy of armed supremacy and exclusive alliances rather than pay the price of a Convention which Germany will accept.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

"NECESSITY KNOWS NO LAW": THE LESSON OF MANCHUKUO.

"NECESSITY knows no law," retorted Bethmann Hollweg when he was reproached for violating the neutrality of Belgium. At that moment the German armies were pouring across the frontier. The German war lords had won the day and the pundits of the Wilhelmstrasse sought an excuse. In those critical moments nothing seemed to matter but success. In the eyes of Bethmann necessity was the mother of success. In the end she proved to be the parent of disaster.

Treaties may be violated in two ways: in the positive and the negative sense. A nation may trample upon its signature by committing some definite act of aggression: an invasion of Belgium or an expedition into Manchuria. It may equally sully its honour by repudiating its treaty obligations. It may evade its pledges, such for instance as those contained in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League "the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Which is the greater, the sin of commission or omission? In both cases, however, we usually find that pledges are broken on the plea of necessity. Bethmann tears up the articles of neutrality, because he is told by his military advisers that the German army cannot force its way across the French frontier. Sir John Simon ignores our undertakings under Articles 8 and 16 of the Covenant, because his naval advisers warn him that the British navy cannot defend Hong Kong. Subsequent events proved that the German Chancellor was wrong. His policy miscarried. Surely this should have been a warning to the British Foreign Secretary, because the actions of both were based upon the plea of necessity foisted upon them by their military and naval advisers. This plea will always be advanced so long as we are committed to the system of international duelling. In this system force is the only factor to be reckoned with. The rights and wrongs of any dispute are of no account. The adjudication of an impartial tribunal is ruled out. The problem resolves itself into one of competing physical forces; the moral issues are completely ignored. Therefore, necessity is the watchword of every War Office, Admiralty, and Air Ministry, and we shall never escape from its iron grip until we have substituted a co-operative for a

competitive system of armaments. This means the establishment of an International Police Force as the only means of defining necessity in terms of police regulations, because the operations of this force will be controlled by an impartial international authority. This is the first lesson of Manchukuo.

In the cases we have cited the argument of necessity was allowed to over-ride all other considerations of policy. The obvious alternatives were to mobilise world public opinion through the medium of an international tribunal, empowered to adjudicate upon these disputes. But in 1914 the Hague Tribunal was ignored by the rulers of Europe. The proposals of the Czar and M. Pasitch evoked no response from the Foreign Office of any country. In 1932 the Council of the League hesitated and delayed. When the Lytton Commission appeared upon the scene the die had been cast, and necessity had already had its fling. In neither case was force mobilised behind an arbitral tribunal. Necessity won the day because the members of the Hague Court in 1914, and of the League in 1932, had failed to organise in advance their moral and physical forces, so that these could be automatically and unequivocally on the side of equity and justice. It is true that in Article 16 of the Covenant the authority of the League is to be supported by diplomatic, financial, economic and military sanctions, to which its members are, in principle, already committed. It is also clear that in the long run the overriding necessity of all law-abiding nations, and of the British Empire in particular, can only be served by maintaining the solidarity of the League against the aggressor, from whatever quarter this unpleasant personality may appear.

Consequently it might have occurred to Sir John Simon in 1932, even though it did not dawn upon Bethmann Hollweg in 1914, that it was more necessary to uphold treaties and to honour obligations than to bow meekly to the dictates of necessity as interpreted by War Offices and Boards of Admiralty, even at the risk of a military check or of the temporary loss of a naval base. That is the second lesson of this sorry business.

Thirdly, it is clear that diplomatic, financial and economic sanctions will not suffice to deter an aggressor from resorting to violence. These sanctions are valuable adjuncts in any policing system, but they will be ineffective so long as the physical forces of the law-abiding nations are not placed

unreservedly at the disposal of the League. The only effective method is to constitute these into an International Police Force, directly controlled and maintained by an International authority. In no other way can they exert the maximum deterrent effect upon a nation bent upon aggression. In no other way can they be mobilised promptly to extinguish the conflagration before it has assumed alarming proportions. The Japanese militarists gambled on the lack of solidarity and cohesion amongst members of the League. They believed that the pledges to sever diplomatic relationships and institute an economic boycott, contained in Article 16, would never become operative, because no member of the League would be willing to take the first plunge. No nation would be anxious to incur the enmity of Japan by taking the lead in pulling the chestnuts out of the fire. Japan's forecast proved to be right, and her people heaved a sigh of relief when they discovered that their defiance of forty-two nations seated round a table at Geneva would go unchallenged. Thus it transpired that a policy of bluff had won the day, because amongst the forty-two sat the representatives of Great Britain who believed—or professed to believe—that a League boycott of Japanese goods would be the signal for the declaration of war by Japan against Great Britain. Therefore the threat of war paralysed the diplomatic and economic machinery of sanctions, which clearly shows that these are illusory unless and until they are supported, in the words of Rousseau, "by a League fully armed."

The fourth lesson is that British naval power has ceased to function in the Eastern Pacific. In the face of Japanese naval superiority we are unable to defend Hong Kong. If there is trouble in far Eastern waters our writ no longer runs. This is, of course, unpleasant, but we may as well face the facts. It would be folly to delude ourselves. If Sir John Simon and the Admiralty are right, it follows that we hold Hong Kong and other naval stations in the Far East at the pleasure of the Japanese Government. How long this accommodation, which we prefer to call friendship, will last is a matter of conjecture. It is clear, however, that it will not stand the strain of candour and fair dealing. Therefore, unless we are prepared to support Japan in her Chinese adventure by recognising Manchukuo and by becoming her accomplice in repudiating the Kellogg Pact and our obligations under the Covenant and the Nine

Power Treaty, we run the risk of being expelled from that part of the world. But if Japan had not been in possession of a strong navy, I think we may assume that, at this moment, Great Britain would have been found championing the cause of the League, and urging its States Members to exercise economic restraints upon the aggressor.

The Japanese are a strong, virile and well-disciplined nation. In the last half-century they have forged their way into the ranks of the Great Powers. Adopting European methods and actively assisted by Great Britain, they have armed themselves with the super weapons which the scientific achievements of Western civilisation have placed at their disposal through the agency of armament firms, and with the connivance of the British Government. These facts explain the necessitous policy of Sir John Simon and his colleagues, supported by the jingo press, in their short-sighted attempts to condone Japan's acts of aggression and her defiance of the League. And, like Bethmann's ill-starred policy in 1914, it will as surely miscarry in the long run.

The fifth lesson is that the present impotence of the League is a legacy of the Washington Disarmament Conference, which firmly established Japan's naval ascendancy in the Eastern Pacific when the relative strengths of the American, British and Japanese fleets were fixed in the ratio of 5, 5, and 3·5 respectively. On this point Admiral Ballard writes: "The force actually on the spot must always be twice as strong as the defence if any effective watch or blockade is to be possible. No Power exists at present in a position to undertake such a task." Here is a concrete example demonstrating the futility of Disarmament Conferences, unless the proposals for disarmament are accompanied by provisions to ensure the security of States Members of the League and to make its writ run. This can only be accomplished through the creation of an International Police Force, under the control of the League, and sufficiently powerful to hold the would-be aggressor in awe.

To initiate this system an International Air Police will probably suffice; for can anyone doubt that if an International Air Force based upon Hong Kong, Singapore, and other strategic points in the Far East had been in existence, the militarists in Tokio would have paused before launching their attack upon China? We cannot suppose that they are entirely ignorant of the results of the test undertaken by the American

"Joint Board" which demonstrated unmistakably that the most powerful battleships can be sunk by aerial bombardment.* Confronted by this new arm of the law, necessity would then have compelled the Japanese Government to take their grievances to the League for adjudication and redress. But because the sanctions of the League, envisaged in Article 16, have never been organised in advance, mainly owing to the opposition of Great Britain, we are now invited on the plea of necessity, camouflaged as friendship for Japan, to dishonour our obligations and repudiate our solemn engagements. No wonder that the Disarmament Conference has ended in a ghastly failure. Moreover, by voting for the adoption of the Lytton Report, and at the same moment refusing to consider with our co-signatories the necessity and practicability of enforcing the diplomatic, economic and financial provisions of Article 16, we have confessed our weakness to the aggressor, and exposed our nakedness to the world. Why, therefore, does the Government still prate about disarmament when it is as clear as daylight that this policy is as foolish as it is impracticable, and that it only plays into the hands of the bully and the robber.

Shall we take these lessons to heart before it is too late? The policy of aggression is not the monopoly of Japan. If the League, as it is at present equipped, has proved to be a broken reed in the Far East, have we any right to suppose it will be any more effective in Europe when the crisis suddenly descends upon us? The gaps in its organisation gape at us and the flaws in its structure are unmistakable. Therefore, give the League those institutions, a tribunal and a police force, without which no Government in any country could function for a single week. Give it authority to make the writ run. Give it power to protect us and all law-abiding nations in Europe when the day of trouble comes. It is stupid to delude ourselves and imagine that by some miraculous intervention we can escape the results of our folly and our failure to adapt ourselves to the imperative needs of the twentieth century. "Necessity knows no law," but we shall be fools and cowards if we do not recognise the paramount necessity: the establishment of the reign of law in Europe.

DAVIES.

* Brig.-Gen. Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, pp. 204-9.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE.

AT Sir Oswald Mosley's monster meeting in Olympia, marred by such unpleasant incidents, it was noticeable that a comparatively unenthusiastic audience greeted references to the machinations of international finance with cheers. International financiers are the bogey men of to-day. In the United States they, and indeed all bankers, occupy in the mind of the public a position which differs only in degree from that of the Jews in Hitler's Germany. In Germany itself the association of Jews with international finance was an important aspect of the agitation against them. And here in England numerous books are written about the evil of "money-power"; while the feeling against the City of London is a good deal stronger than may appear on the surface. How has this situation developed and what is its justification?

It is not only since the Hatry scandal that the very word financier has seemed to carry with it a faint flavour of Wormwood Scrubs or of Maidstone. For generations the fraudulent company promoter has usually adopted the designation, and some of the opprobrium justly heaped upon this particularly unsocial class has stuck to deserving persons engaged in the legitimate business of providing the sinews for trade and industry. International Finance, or High Finance, as it used to be called, has been, however, popularly associated less with deliberate dishonesty than with the mysterious activities of powerful and ruthless men working solely for their own ends and pulling the strings of world politics in total disregard of patriotic considerations. It is widely believed that such men decided upon questions of war and peace; even the Great War has been put down to their machinations.

Mr. Lloyd George records in his *War Memoirs*—and nobody can have been in a better position to know the facts—that in July 1914 the supposedly puppet-pulling financiers were almost without exception in a state of panic which baffles description. Their whole vastly complicated world was tumbling about their ears. The Governor of the Bank of England wept copiously in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's parlour. Most international bankers and financiers made heavy losses during the war, whereas many industrialists

made fortunes. If international finance plotted Armageddon it must have been demented.

Yet these popular beliefs are perhaps not entirely devoid of foundation. The early history of international finance is largely that of the borrowings of monarchs for purposes of war. That was how the Rothschilds founded their fortunes, and other leading houses followed their example. Primarily, of course, they were merely supplying a need, but they may well at the same time have exerted a considerable influence on the course of events, and by no means always in favour of peace. After all, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries war was more or less of a business; a successful war yielded the victor a handsome profit. It remained for the Great War to prove that under modern conditions war ruined victor and vanquished alike.

The common accusation that international finance was unpatriotic, that its operations were carried out without regard to the nationality of borrower or lender, is also to some extent substantiated by history. There is reason to believe that Napoleon's Waterloo campaign was partly financed on the London market. Sorel, in his famous *History of the French Revolution*, describes French financiers who invested money in England and then plotted against Napoleon in words which might have been taken from the works of any modern anti-banking fanatic:

A party which has adherents and associates wherever there is money to place, national resources to exploit; a party of cunning opportunists who occupy, through the Treasury and its innumerable dependencies, all the avenues of the State; through their banks they have correspondents in all the financial markets, which are at the same time hotbeds of conspiracy; they have access to the Foreign Office through the bills of exchange of diplomats, to the Ministry of Finance through loans, to the Ministries of War and Marine through the markets; and finally they are intimate with Embassies where they traffic in news as much as in money and sell information as well as making loans.

The men whom the great French historian thus scathingly designates plotted with Talleyrand for peace with England. They were wise in their generation. For with the peace of 1815, which lasted with comparatively minor interruptions for a century, was to begin the golden age of international trade, and thus of international finance.

All "Liberal" economists, from Adam Smith through Jeremy Bentham to the Manchester School of Cobden, Bright and their successors, recognised that the free movement of capital across political frontiers was necessary for the achievement of that ideal world of economically divided labour at which they aimed. Had it not been for the far-flung investments of European, and particularly of British, capital, the resources of the world could never have been opened up, nor British export industries have enjoyed their remarkable prosperity. The rôle played by the City of London in this development is difficult to over-estimate. It was not only the central market for capital; it came eventually to control, to all intents and purposes, the world's monetary system, the international gold standard, which it managed with considerable success. Not unnaturally it waxed fat in the process. The "invisible earnings" of London, the consideration paid both for capital invested and for the innumerable banking, insurance, and trading services rendered, came to be one of the most important sources of the national income. International finance may have had its shady sides, its doubtful dealings with Khedives and Sultans, with Tsars and South American dictators and republican politicians; it may have landed a good many clergymen's widows with unremunerative investments, but on the whole it did a great deal both for Great Britain and for humanity at large.

Then came 1914. The war left the world exhausted, it is true. But its most serious economic effect was to produce a state of dislocation, of inherent disequilibrium. This disequilibrium ultimately shattered the traditional financial system. From the point of view of international finance the most important results of the war were four in number. In the first place it put an end to the domination of London. America had become a great creditor nation; she had collected most of the world's gold; and her industrial strength, as expressed in large exports and an exceedingly favourable balance of payments, far surpassed that of Great Britain. The Federal Reserve Banks, not the Bank of England, had the ultimate power in the international financial field. In the second place the war, and the political divisions to which it gave birth, led to a great move towards economic nationalism, to a raising of tariffs and trade barriers. In the third place,

war exhaustion and the drain of reparation payments created in Central Europe a serious leak in the system of financial circulation capable of absorbing endless amounts of capital and credit. And finally, war finance had left a comparatively high price-level based upon a credit structure inflated as compared with the pre-war period. As long as confidence could be maintained this was not a serious matter; its importance lay in the fact that a crisis could lead to general deflation on a totally unprecedented scale.

Looking back on the post-war years from the vantage-point of 1934, it is not difficult to lay down the essential prerequisites for that reconstitution of something approaching the old-world system which was the goal of nearly all economists, bankers and financiers, international and otherwise. First and foremost it was necessary for the United States to accept their new responsibilities as a creditor nation, as Great Britain had accepted them in the past, to lend abroad freely, but with discretion, and to adopt Free Trade in order to enable their debtors to pay in goods and services. It was necessary to keep economic nationalism elsewhere within reasonable bounds. It was necessary to limit reparation payments to sums well within Germany's capacity to pay during a comparatively short period. And it was necessary to adapt the gold standard to the inflated credit structure by choosing new parities of exchange corresponding to the purchasing-power of the various countries, the burden of their debts, and to support which, their existing gold reserves were adequate.

How far were international bankers to blame for what actually happened? For the basic decision to aim at the reconstitution of the old system it is difficult to blame them. They were by no means alone in their aims; none of those in control of world economy after the war had experience of anything else, and but few had a vision of new possibilities. They can hardly be held responsible for American policy. In the matter of Free Trade they were consistently on the side of the traditional angels, and from the first their influence was exercised against excessive reparation claims with little effect. On the other hand, they did, in England, make a serious mistake in pressing for a return to the gold standard at the old parity, which corresponded neither to the purchasing-power of sterling, nor to the gold reserves of the country, nor to its top-heavy debt

structure. But the real burden of the indictment against the leaders of international finance in the post-war period is that they were responsible for the orgy of debt-creation which covered up, during the years from the coming into force of the Dawes Plan in 1924 to the collapse of the American boom in 1929, a situation in essence little sounder than that left by the war.

In some articles headed "National Self-sufficiency," published in the *New Statesman and Nation* last year, Mr. Keynes drew attention to a significant change in the character of post-war foreign investment as compared with that of the nineteenth century. "At a time when wholesale migrations were populating new continents," he wrote, "it was natural that the men should carry with them into the new worlds the material fruits of the technique of the old, embodying the savings of those who were sending them. The investment of British savings in rails and rolling-stock to be installed by British engineers to carry British emigrants to new fields and pastures, the fruits of which they would return in due proportion to those whose frugality had made these things possible, was not economic internationalism remotely resembling in its essence the part ownership of the A.E.G. of Germany by a speculator in Chicago, or of the municipal improvements of Rio di Janeiro by an English spinster. Yet it was the type of organization necessary to facilitate the former which has eventually ended up in the latter.

The old foreign lending, in fact, corresponded to a natural cycle of trade; to a very considerable extent the new did not. This was particularly noticeable in Central Europe. In Germany, for example, two factors created the insatiable demand for foreign capital—the dislocation caused by the war and inflationary periods, and the drain of Reparations. Capital flowed in, partly to pay Reparations to the lending countries, and partly to supply Germany with the raw materials and other commodities she needed in order to rebuild her economic system and rationalise her industries. So far, so good. But the service of the borrowed capital, not to mention Reparations, could only be met by the achievement of a colossal export surplus of manufactured articles, in which world competition was growing increasingly severe. What was to happen to these goods when the cycle had to be completed?

The economists and financiers were not wholly blind. The fact that owing to their influence a "Transfer Committee" was set up under the Dawes Plan, shows that they knew the problem existed. But in the ensuing boom they lost perspective. International trade was expanding, world prosperity increasing. Was it not possible that this steady growth would ultimately render Reparations, War Debts, and the mounting total of private obligations, a mere drop in the ocean of general prosperity, just as the debt totals of past generations appear to us to-day? Such were the considerations influencing many of the international experts who produced the Young Plan, and particularly the American members of the Committee. European financiers, it is true, were more sceptical. In their secret hearts, however, they cherished a belief which really lay at the root of their entire post-war policy.

The troubles of the world, they felt, were mainly due to the vagaries of politicians, to the subordination of economic necessities to political desires. For political reasons the world refused to see the benefits of Free Trade; for political reasons Reparations could not be abolished. But if ever a serious crisis arose, surely reason, the inexorable logic of facts, must prevail. The politicians would have to act upon the advice of the economists and sweep away by common consent the obstacles to prosperity. In the meantime, the proper course for business men was to act in accordance with the well-tried economic laws of the past, to invest their money where the best return could be obtained, to sell their goods to those who would pay the highest price. Thus the economically diseased areas of the world could be rendered healthy, good profits made, and in the long run a balanced and prosperous economic system restored throughout the globe.

There is no need here to describe the events which led to the bitter disillusionment of to-day. They are fresh in the memory of all. Nor will I endeavour to apportion the responsibility between politicians and economists, financiers and business men. During the year so well designated by Professor Toynbee in the *Survey of International Affairs* as "Annus Terribilis 1931," one could not but feel the impression described by Tolstoy in *War and Peace*, or by Hardy in *The Dynasts*, of the "Immanent Unrecking" driving events to their fated conclusion uninfluenced by the febrile cerebrations of the bewildered men in charge of affairs.

Although three years have passed since then, they have only provided further proof that the old international financial system cannot be restored. The nineteenth century had considerable experience of default, but it can show nothing approaching the state of affairs which prevails to-day. When creditor nations refuse to accept their interest in the shape of goods or services the whole moral basis of debtor-creditor relations is undermined. When it becomes probable that foreign loans will no longer be forthcoming, even if the debtor makes sacrifices to meet his obligations as far as he may, the greatest incentive to financial honesty disappears. Some nations, Germany for instance, seem to have definitely made up their minds not to borrow again; they regard their debts as having been the cause of their troubles. And in the creditor nations this determination is more than paralleled by the deep-seated distrust of foreign investments in the minds of long-suffering investors.

In the articles by Mr. Keynes from which I have already quoted, he suggests that the world is almost unwittingly feeling its way towards a new social and economic order by a series of experiments conducted independently by the great nations, for the satisfactory carrying out of which a considerable measure of economic isolation is desirable. The same idea was put forward by Mr. Walter Elliot in a recent broadcast. Each nation is endeavouring to put its own economic system on to a satisfactory basis, as a preliminary to determining the amount of international trade it requires, the direction which it shall take, and the methods by which it shall be conducted. And a necessary concomitant of this process is that finance should abandon its international outlook and devote its attention primarily to home development.

Here lies, it may be, an important reason for the distrust of international finance, and indeed of the whole conglomeration of financial interests embodied in the City of London. Rightly or wrongly the public feel that the City is retrograde, that it still hankers after past international glories, that it is secretly but persistently striving to rebuild a system which experience has shown to be unworkable in modern conditions. They have not forgotten, moreover, what happened to the gold standard after the National Government had been formed to impose sacrifices for its protection. They have not forgotten that the economists, and indeed the National

Government itself, immediately turned round and told them that the abandonment of the gold standard was an excellent thing for the country. Thus when they hear rumours that the City wishes to return to it, it is scarcely surprising that they should feel seriously disturbed.

However little the public may have understood the intricacies of the 1931 situation, the fact that the apostles of sound finance so readily abandoned their position has created a lasting impression. It has destroyed the legend of superior wisdom enjoyed by bankers and financial experts. The public used to have a wholesome respect for the mysteries of monetary policy, which many of them studied, with greater or less profit, in the almost lyrical works of Mr. Hartley Withers; to-day that respect no longer exists. They feel, too, that financial interests work in the dark, that there is no clearly defined responsibility. The constitution of the Bank of England, for example, is not easy to defend in terms of modern political thought, and although that institution has a finer record of achievement than any other in the world, although it has been gradually evolved by typical British methods, although the Macmillan Committee reported against change, an indefinable taint of financial sorcery has come to hang about the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street.

If this analysis is correct, it is probably even more important for the City to re-establish its position at home than to defend its interests abroad. For this purpose, propaganda, of which there have been many signs of late, will certainly not suffice, although a clearer understanding of the financial system on the part of the general public is obviously desirable. Above all, practical demonstration is needed that for the City British interests come first. For many years there has existed an impression that London was more concerned to cater for South American governments and German industry than for British business men. The small man, the small concern, in particular, appeared to have considerable difficulty in obtaining long-term accommodation not granted by the ordinary banks. As the *Financial News* put it in a recent article, many deserving provincial business men, brought up in the pious belief that the City is the place which provides the finance for British business, have returned home sadly disillusioned. This gap was mentioned in the Macmillan Report, and recently several institutions have come into

being with the object of filling it. There is good reason to believe that both policy and circumstances, such as the plethora of investment funds and the obvious uncertainties of the international situation, will produce further development in this direction, inducing enterprises which have grown great in the age of economic internationalism to pay more and more attention to domestic needs.

One cannot help feeling that something else is necessary, however. The City must clear itself of the suspicion that it is only awaiting the moment to go back to the old ways. On questions like the gold standard its views are inevitably regarded with mistrust, as obviously biased. It is a hopeful sign that it is no longer so dogmatic; many bankers and financiers are prepared to admit to-day that the last word has by no means been said in matters of monetary science. Perhaps one banker who suggests that we should feel our way towards new methods does better service to the banking cause than ten who extol the virtues of sound finance.

Unless it is possible to convince the people of this country that the City is not a centre of self-interested scheming, but a valuable part of the national economy, there is a serious danger of its losing the political support which is to-day more than ever essential if the fruits of past enterprise throughout the world are not entirely to be thrown away. Exchange clearings, inter-governmental trading and financial agreements may have come to stay as part of the new order. Governments are being compelled for the first time to weigh in the balance the advantages of receiving payment from their country's debtors as against allowing competition with possible home production. Here and there the balance of advantage may be against receiving what amount to completely gratuitous goods from abroad, but in a sane economic system this can rarely be the case. The return on investments abroad and in the Empire, not to mention the payments for the innumerable insurance and other services rendered by London throughout the world, are well worth taking into account by a nation so dependent as England upon raw materials and foodstuffs which it cannot produce economically at home. But if these problems are to be considered dispassionately, and without political bias, it must be shown that the guiding principle is national expediency, and not consideration for the interests of international finance.

POWYS GREENWOOD.

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN GERMANY.

THE religious situation in Germany is inseparable from the political, and the political is inseparable from the general world-situation. The Nazi Revolution was the inevitable result of the treatment of vanquished Germany by the other States as regards both the actual situation and the reactions of "the German soul," both the facts themselves and the feelings evoked. Close as must be the relation between the citizens of a nation and the total conditions of its life, in Germany, as will be shown, that relation has been, by the policy adopted by the State and partially accepted by the Church, made even more intimate than it need be. But I assume that both the situations are sufficiently familiar to allow me to take a knowledge of them for granted, and to confine myself closely to the subject indicated by the title.

The ideas of the Nazi State must be briefly defined, as it is the transfer of them to the Church which has brought about the religious situation to be here discussed. For Parliamentary government a Dictatorship must be substituted; all parties must be suppressed, and the nation must learn to think and act as an absolute unity; the national policy must be the expression of the national spirit, and that expression cannot be secured by free discussion of varied opinions, and adjustment in an agreed policy; but that national spirit becomes incarnated in the leader who should possess absolute power, for he knows better what is for the good of the people than they can. Alien elements must be excluded from the nation, so that the national spirit may remain undefiled; and all opposition to the leader must be suppressed, so that the expression of the national spirit may be unhindered. The German race especially is endowed with a spirit that should find clear and full expression, and the Creator God wills both this spirit and its expression. Such a State, through the leader expressing the spirit of the nation, must be *totalitarian*; no interest, no activity, no relation must be beyond its direction and control.

This idea must be applied to the Church no less than to the State itself. But as the Church claims to be a universal Society within the nations, the idea of conforming every institution to the one pattern (*Gleichschaltung*) could not so easily be applied to the Church as to other institutions.

Roman Catholicism, with its world-wide organisation, could not be subjected to a national government, and so a concordat was arranged, leaving the Church its spiritual independence, but excluding it from all political action. How impossible such a separation is has been shown in the Church's opposition to the State's legislation regarding the sterilisation of the unfit for parenthood and other matters. The Free Churches—Baptists, Methodists, Moravians—possibly as too insignificant to be taken account of, and probably as having, like Roman Catholicism, intimate relations with co-religionists in other lands, were at first left alone, although their independence is by no means assured. It was against the territorial Churches, the Churches that had till 1918 been established that action has been taken, so that, while left nominally independent, they might be conformed to the pattern of the State and so used politically.

The result of the application of Luther's principle, *cujus regio, ejus religio*, was that some parts of Germany have remained dominantly Roman Catholic; in some parts the Lutheran type of Protestantism is prevalent, in others the Reformed (Calvinism) and in some, as in Prussia, there has been an external union of the two confessions. The Churches were supported and controlled by the State; not the Reich, but the separate States of which it was composed. There were before 1918 forty-one territorial Churches; but the number has been reduced to twenty-eight. After the Churches gained their independence at the Revolution, the relation to the States varied, some States continuing to collect the Church-rates, others throwing the Church on its own resources. A federation of these Churches was formed, but forbidden to deal with questions of Faith and Order. There was a widespread feeling in favour of a closer union of these many Churches, and accordingly the *Gleichschaltung* of the Churches to the unification of the separate States in the Third Reich did not meet with general opposition, although some held that any change must come from within the Church, and not be imposed on it by political considerations. It was the Committee of the Federation which on April 25th, 1933, relegated its authority to a triumvirate—its President, Dr. Kapler, Bishop D. Marahrens, Hanover, as representing the Lutheran Churches, and Director of Studies D. Hesse of the Rhineland, representing the Reformed Churches—and em-

powered them to frame a constitution for the United Church.

Although religious freedom and the independence of the Church was promised by Chancellor Hitler and other leaders, the Army-Chaplain Ludwig Müller, as the Chancellor's representative, was associated with them; and so far the State's direction was recognised; and the influence of the "German Christians," who desired the very close association of the Church with the State, began to be exerted as Müller took over the leadership of the party. A counter-movement was that of the Young Reforming party, who desired to maintain the Church's independence against the German Christian effort to make a partisan use of the Churches. To the Churches being united a constitution was proposed conforming to that of the State. Instead of representative government, "leadership" was advocated; a *Reichsbischof* over the whole Church, corresponding to the Chancellor's domination of the State, and bishops in the different provinces, corresponding to the officials appointed for the States by the Reich. To that proposal there was growing opposition, especially from the Reformed Churches, which favour a Presbyteral polity; but a considerable measure of at least acquiescence was secured, when the Committee of four just mentioned proposed as Reichsbischof Dr. Arnold von Bodelschwingh, a *persona grata*, not only on his own account, but also because of his father, the founder of the greatest philanthropic institution of the German Churches. He in the interests of the Churches accepted the office; but his pastoral letter showed that it was in no spirit of a Dictator, but as "a cure of souls," a Father in God, to use the Anglican phrase, that he undertook his task.

The German Christians were resolved to have their leader Müller, although the appointment of Dr. von Bodelschwingh was widely and heartily welcomed, even the Reformed Churches, despite their opposition to the episcopate, acquiescing in his leadership. This party relied upon the assistance of the government of the Reich; and Müller invoked the name of the Chancellor in support of his candidature. Their demand was a State Church of Lutheran type, allowing the Reformed Churches to maintain their peculiarity, an acknowledgment by the Church of the National-Socialist State, a Church composed only of ministers and officials of Aryan race, one Lutheran Reichsbischof with a Reformed *vicar* and ten

subordinate bishops, and the choice of the Reichsbischof by election on October 31st. The two points here to which attention should be called are, the Church must be Nazi and Aryan (excluding men of Jewish descent or married to women of such descent). To this the Young Reforming party opposed their demand for the independence of the Church, and their acceptance of Dr. von Bodelschwingh as Reichsbischof. The associations of "Free Protestants" (the advanced theological groups) also insisted that the Church should be independent of the State, should include all baptised evangelical Christians (against the Aryan demand of the "German Christians"), and welcomed as Reichsbischof Dr. von Bodelschwingh. During these controversies the constitution for the new Church was framed in discussions at Loccum. The first article of the constitution runs :

The unalterable basis of the German evangelical Church is the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is witnessed in the Holy Scriptures and anew brought to light in the Confessions of the Reformation. By this the full powers, which the Church needs for its mission, are defined and limited."

The details need not now concern us. The opposition to the policy of the German Christians was strongest in the Rhineland, and Lutheran, Reformed, and United Churches combined to resist any encroachment of political partisanship on the freedom of the Church, not so much on the grounds of any abstract principle regarding the relation of Church and State, as in defence of the Gospel, the Scriptures, and the Reformation Confessions in accordance with this first article.

On June 23rd and 24th, 1933, the Prussian Minister of Worship, Dr. Rust, set aside the existing and still functioning Church authorities in Prussia, and appointed a State commissary and sub-commissaries to control all the Churches, and thus committed the guidance to "German Christians." The Reichsbischof von Bodelschwingh was compelled by this action to resign the office committed to him, as he could no longer discharge its duties, but he declared his intention to recognise his spiritual responsibility towards the Churches for leadership, and he has been very worthily carrying out his task. Despite the protests of the Church authorities, the Prime Minister of Prussia, Göring, confirmed the full authority of

the Minister of Worship. The result of this arbitrary action was, however, that some of the "German Christian" party for the sake of unity and peace gave their support to Dr. von Bodelschwingh. Efforts at conciliation proved vain, and the partisans who had usurped authority in the Church with the support of the State began to threaten their opponents with deposition without pension. Nevertheless, at whatever cost the resistance was maintained ; but its organisation was for a time in large measure driven underground ; while the "German Christian" party could continue its propaganda openly. The intervention of the President of the Republic led the Chancellor to order the withdrawal of the Commissary and Sub-commissaries ; but the order was only partially carried out, and many who had been advanced to positions of authority remained in office. The election of parish councils in July showed a majority for the "German Christians," a majority obtained by means of terrorism in many cases. The trouble in the Church must be ascribed, not primarily to the desire of the State to interfere, but to the policy of the "German Christians." It must be regarded as primarily an internal Church controversy. In the higher courts of the Churches the "German Christians" by similar means obtained a majority, and in due course the Army Chaplain Müller was elected Reichsbischof, and his appointment was confirmed by the Government.

He seems at first to have been inclined to take conciliatory courses, although his toleration of extreme views—the rejection of the Bible and the Confessions, and a substitution of a German religion—intensified the opposition to him. An attempt on the part of the Chancellor to secure peace in the Church seems to have been frustrated by the intervention of General Göring. The use of the police against those resisting the authority of the Reichsbischof was allowed by one of the ministers, and under the direction of Chancellor Hitler forbidden by another ; the conflict is still going on. There is no reason for doubting that Müller's adherence to the Lutheran type of Protestant Christianity is sincere, and he has now taken action against the extreme section ; so is also that of the great majority of the German Christians ; their policy may not only be explained by political partisanship, but is not inconsistent with the attitude of Lutheranism to the State, for it has throughout its history acquiesced in a sub-

ordination of Church to State which we in this country would regard as intolerable. The issue of the conflict may be, however, the formation of a free Church; but that it would receive toleration is doubtful; and influential men are urging that the conflict be maintained within the Church.

At this point some account must be given of the extreme section just referred to. It calls itself the *German Faith Movement*, and its aims and beliefs have been set forth by one of its leaders, Prof. J. W. Hauer. The Bible and Christianity are alike rejected; although some reverence for Jesus Himself is expressed. Paul is entirely repudiated. What is substituted is a *mystical pantheism*. "The objective power to which we bow," says Hauer, "the religious leader to which we render obedience is the religious primal will (*Urville*) of the German people, which has made itself known in the great figures and heralds of German faith." (*Was will die deutsche Glaubensbewegung?* Pp. 19-20.) An Aryan-Germanic religion is opposed to a Nearer-Asia-Semitic; and these are regarded as alien to one another. Nevertheless toleration and equality are claimed for this German Faith Movement alongside of the Roman Catholic and the Protestant types of Christianity. The tone is moderate, the spirit eirenic, but the opposition is clearly and firmly stated. We have here an apotheosis of German nationalism. The description of it as a mystical pantheism may need a few words of justification. It is a mysticism because it ignores the historical mediation of German nationality, its genius and ethos, and of the Christian religion as a potent factor in its development and present character, and claims a direct access to ultimate reality in this "German primal will." As during all those centuries the historical German will has found its expression in the Christian confession, it seems a bold claim that only now has it revealed itself in its integrity and purity. An ephemeral phase of the nation's history is thus deified. It is a pantheism, since a manifestation of ultimate reality is recognised also in Semitic religion; for the recognition of a personal God would exclude the assumption of two such contradictory manifestations.

This seems to be the most appropriate connection for a statement about the Aryan policy of the German State and the imitation of it in the Church. That there are economic and political reasons, or at least provocations of Anti-Semitism, may be readily admitted. But what has made the

antagonism as violent as it is is undoubtedly racialism, and in this German Faith-movement that racialism becomes a theology or philosophy. It is quite certain that the Germans are not a pure race; some Celtic and still more Slavonic blood has "defiled" its purity; but nevertheless, this racialism as a justification of nationalism exercises a wide and strong influence even in the Christian Church, and among Christian theologians. The Prussian Synod followed the example of the State in proposing as an article of the constitution of the United Evangelical Church the exclusion from the ministry and any office in the Church of men who were of Jewish descent themselves or even who were married to women of such descent. It is true that the Synod of the whole Reich did not adopt this proposal; and that Reichsbischof Müller at first disallowed it, but would now seem to favour it. Even if the proposal remains ineffective, the attitude of the Church is worth considering.

Soon after the State took its Anti-Semitic action, a number of the leaders of the Church exhorted the members of the Churches to treat with Christian consideration their Hebrew fellow-Christians. On September 23rd twenty leading scholars issued a manifesto on the *New Testament and the Race-question*, in which, after a careful survey of the teaching of the New Testament, Christian universalism is affirmed without any reservation; and ministry as well as membership in the Christian Church is claimed irrespective of race, for Jew and Gentile alike, and the conclusion drawn is:

Accordingly we are of the opinion, that in its teaching and action a Christian Church cannot fundamentally abandon this standpoint.

The Church Assembly of the Provincial Protestant Church of Hesse-Kassel asked the theological faculty of Marburg and of Erlangen to afford guidance in this question. The theological faculty of Marburg after discussion unanimously resolved that the proposals to exclude non-Aryans from the ministry

are incompatible with the nature of the Christian Church as testified by the solely competent authority of Holy Scripture and the Gospel of Jesus Christ and by the principles of the Reformation.

The theological faculty of Erlangen, however, while recognising that the right of Jews to full membership in the Christian

Church could not be disputed, denied their claim to the ministry on the ground that "the external order of the Christian Church must correspond, according to Reformation doctrine as distinct from that of Roman Catholicism, not only to the universality of the Gospel, but also to the historical-national membership of Christian men," that the Church is a people's Church (*Volkskirche*), that whether the Jews living in Germany belong to the German people, or are a "guest-people," is a question which the Church cannot decide, but the State must deal with it as of a biological-historical character, and that as the German people feel that the Jews are a foreign people, the Church must insist on keeping Jewish Christians out of office, although exceptions may be made where Jewish Christians have given proof of German patriotism, or there is a relation of confidence between pastor and people.

Prof. George Wobbermin, whom many in this country have learned to respect in connection with the Faith and Order movement, maintains that the principle of faith as the sole condition of salvation, while requiring the admission of Jewish Christians to full membership, does not apply to the external order of the Church in regard to which "the concrete conditions of a certain historical situation" must be taken into account, as when Paul forbids women's speaking in Church (1 Cor. xiv, 34); and concludes that the historical situation in Germany, especially since the Great War, which has brought Germany "directly to the abyss of Bolshevism," from which the national-socialistic movement has saved it, demands the exclusion of Jews from office in the Church. Prof. Gerhard Kittel of Tübingen has published a pamphlet on *Church and Jewish Christians*. The guiding principle he finds in Gal. iii, 28, and this requires

an unreserved and unlimited recognition of the Christian Jew as my Christian brother, and that every believing Jewish-Christian community and congregation is and remains a full member of the *Una Sancta*.

He argues, however, that this has nothing to do with a series of practical questions of concrete human life, such as that of exclusion of Jews from office in the Church. He argues that the pastor stands in so intimate relations with his people that he must be able to identify himself with them, and that the Jewish Christian has not this qualification. He asks the

Jewish Christian whether he is showing Christian love in making his claim. He cites the choice of Hellenists for the care of the Hellenist widows in Jerusalem (Acts vi, 1) to the exclusion of Hebrews as an instance of such consideration. The influence and reputation of the Church in the nation may be legitimately taken into account. Such an exclusion need not rigidly copy the example of the State, but must correspond to "the organic nature and life of the Church." He proposes as an alternative to the Church, in which Jews and Christians are members, a Jewish-Christian Church, which because of its composition will have its distinctive message and mission.

Only when it had again become Jewish Christianity, could Jewish Christianity anew fulfil the greatest of all tasks which are appointed to it.

It is not necessary to refute these arguments in detail. It has not been shown that the comparatively small number of pastors of Jewish descent have been found unsuitable; such cases, if there were any, could be dealt with in the administration of the Church, and do not offer a reason for general legislation. These arguments are not reasoning, but the rationalisation of the psychologist, finding reputable reasons for disreputable prejudice and partisanship. Even the German Christian party now in authority desires to maintain "œcumenical relations"; but such a rule of exclusion will find no sympathy or support in the Churches of other lands; and the Bishop of Chichester was the voice of the general Christian conscience in the letter which, as President of the Life and Work Council (Stockholm movement) he addressed to the Reichsbischof. Prof. Karl Barth's protest, if expressed with more vehement censure than might be generally approved, would find a regretful echo throughout the whole of Protestant Christendom. The pastors in Germany who, at whatever cost to themselves, are resisting this tyranny, have a claim to our grateful admiration and affectionate sympathy, and even, should the need arise, to our generous support, for they are fighting the common battle of the freedom under Christ of the Christian Conscience, and of the independence of the Christian Church under His sole sovereignty.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

SHOULD THE HABSBURGS BE RESTORED?

THE restoration of the Habsburgs periodically emerges out of the Austrian chaos. It would be interesting to learn the source of the rumours and the routes by which they travel through the Press. The world would have been spared much excitement if the social and political background of the propaganda were known. In reality there was little behind it. Their practical chances in Middle Europe are no better to-day than in the past. But the propaganda has assumed a form particularly dangerous and is, indeed, apt to confuse the minds of Europe. Since Hitler's accession to power a restoration is considered by a certain section as a lesser evil. Even the blood-bath of February 12th has not convinced certain political circles of the untenability of the theory that the House of Austria, whose representative to-day is Starhemberg with his bands, is "the lesser evil."

This is roughly the theory to which we allude: Hungary is a Royalist country. It wishes for the return of its Kings. The strength of the Hungarian people rests in the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. Hungary and Austria, the Dual Monarchy, was a healthy institution in Middle Europe. The incompetent experts of the peace treaties have destroyed this "healthy unit," replaced it by "artificial states," and thus caused disorder and "Balkanised" Europe. The evil consequences of these errors are only now becoming patent when Austria comes under the sway of Nazi Germany if the Habsburgs do not return. Their restoration is thus a European necessity. Moreover, in contradistinction to Hitler, they, as representatives of an old and honourable tradition, would be prudent and lenient, and the peoples of Mid-Europe would once again get to know the good old times of good old Francis Joseph. Nothing would be easier than the restoration of the Habsburgs, who have enthusiastic adherents in Austria and Hungary and count all the malcontents of the new state system, Croats, Slovaks, etc., among their followers. Finally, there are the sentimental reasons, the pathetic widowed Empress Zita and the charming Prince Otto. . . .

It is unnecessary to bother the reader with the sources and the extensive literature which spreads these opinions about the world. It is a literature either of bought pens or, what is

worse, of writers who for a gracious Bourbon look are prepared to falsify the history of whole peoples which they do not know. Our attitude to this literature is one of deep sadness at the thought that there are men ready to falsify history in return for the gracious assurance that their Bourbon-Habsburg Highnesses consider bourgeois writers to be humans. There is no need to discuss these snobs and their literature. Unfortunately, we have heard similar opinions expressed by people who have the peace of Europe sincerely at heart. Even Left circles are suggesting that a Habsburg is a lesser evil than Hitler and the *Anschluss*.

It is astonishing how little some people understand the historic meaning of the world war. Austria has not been beaten by an "artificial" peace treaty but by historical development. History passed the death sentence on the Habsburg Empire long ago. The national resurrection of the Slavs, the birth or rebirth of a great world people, is one of the most essential results of the last century. Germany and Italy preceded the Slavs; they emerged earlier as new entities of state and culture. The result of the world war, the creation of new states in the Danube Basin, is, therefore, merely the expression of a development that had inevitably to take place. The new states are not artificial states. They fought and now fight with great internal difficulties, and their régimes during the last few years are often not exactly sympathetic. But 1918 has made a revolutionary step in history, though the gaolers of Mitrovitz are as bad as those of the Spielberg. The great cultural possibilities of the young peoples are far from being exhausted; on the contrary they are as yet at their beginning. Though regional opposition occurs in the new states, the malcontents are not at all willing to give up their nationality and their independence; on the contrary, they stand for it much more than their opponents. In face of the Italian Adriatic policy the Croats, for instance, have taken up a much more intransigent position regarding the Fiume question than the Serbs, and it was the Fiume question which gave rise to the still raging Serb-Croat discussions. The Croats then accused Pasich of giving way too much to Italy, while Italian Imperialism reckons that the Croats would not stand by their new state Yugoslavia if Italy were to attack the latter. Those Hungarian and Austrian reactionaries who base their hopes on the Slovene endeavours

for autonomy would suffer the same disappointment. Though the Slovak autonomists accuse the Prague democrat Beneš of an excessive Western orientation, and wish to give Czechoslovakia not a Western democracy, but rather a more Eastern, more Slav and agrarian character, they stand without doubt for the essential idea of 1918.

The essence of the performance of 1918 is the national revolution, the codification of a national evolution which in reality took place during the last hundred years, the result of which is the creation of new literary languages, new cultures and new states. Wedged in between Roumanians and North and South Slavs, Hungary endured a truly tragic fate. This country experienced in the nineteenth century the same national and cultural renaissance as her neighbours, and her own contribution by her poets and statesmen, her heroic fight for liberty, is perhaps the finest side of the history of the national renaissance of South Eastern Europe. It began in Hungary earlier than with the Slavs. Yet for the sake of a few social and economic advantages the governing circles in Hungary bound up their land with the interests of the throne of the Habsburgs; and when the national renaissance of the nineteenth century was codified at the conclusion of the world war, the young peoples looked upon Hungary not as the friend that it might have been but as an enemy that was to perish with the Habsburgs. It was Hungary's tragedy that her political edifice built up in the Middle Ages stood in the way of modern national developments, though it contributed so generously to them. Yet she cannot be rescued from her present tragic position by restoring the Habsburgs, that is, by the destruction of the idea of 1918, but only by espousing this idea, by sincere friendship with its younger neighbouring states.

The end of the world war brought to a head a victorious national revolution (to-day a greatly compromised word, but in relation to these events a genuine reality) and essential social progress. Reaction has since destroyed in Germany, Austria and Hungary the social result of the world war, the people's state, and replaced the new social and democratic state, the modern Western civilisation of Middle Europe, by the rule of a country-bailiff. Nothing could be more mistaken than to desire to be in league with this reaction that is out to destroy the other result of the world war, the national reconstruction of south-east Europe.

Granted even, what seems more than doubtful, that Austrian Fascism, held in check by a historic tradition, would sow its wild oats less wildly and less vulgarly than Hitler and Mussolini, we cannot admit that union with Habsburg circles is possible for sincere and earnest opponents of Hitler. If both the advances resulting from the world war are rendered nugatory, the field is clear for the new world war. The dangerous play with the Habsburg restoration has already brought about a *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Germany, and, in order to safeguard their independence of a Habsburg Austria, has fostered the desire of the new states to join Nazi Prussia rather than look on idly at a Habsburg restoration. The policy the Jugoslavs have in mind resembles that of Tisza, who also sought to ward off Austria's attacks on the independence of his country by a treaty with Germany; for even he had reason to fear such attacks despite the *Ausgleich* of 1867. No doubt the matter is not nearly so far advanced as between Hungary and the Wilhelmian Germany. The danger of the Habsburg restoration, which the new states prefer even to Hitler who is less dangerous to them, opens up the sinister perspective of the former German Middle Europe policy, whose slogan was "From Hamburg to Bagdad." If the new states feel themselves left out in the cold by the World Powers to face a restoration which tries to make believe that it is being actively supported by Italy and tolerated by the World Powers, this is the best support for the Hitler government.

A very brief survey of history suffices to prove that the sympathies for the house of Austria of which the Habsburg propaganda boasts are in reality very slight. Both in Hungary and in Austria there is a Legitimist aristocracy and a military circle, and there is also a bourgeoisie that realised its economic and social ascendancy during the fifty years between Koenigraetz and the world war, in the constitutional Dual Monarchy, in the time of the good old Emperor Francis Joseph. But the good old Emperor Francis Joseph was also young once, and the executioners of Venice and Brescia stood beside him. By the grace of the executioner the young Francis Joseph remained emperor. It is not realised in foreign countries how deeply the anti-Habsburg passions remained in all the peoples who have been ruled by the descendants of Charles V. A straight line runs from the scaffold on which died Egmont and Hoorn to the gallows where stood Cesare Battisti, at the

foot of which the Imperial officers allowed themselves laughingly to be photographed, from the scaffold in Brussels to the casemates at the Spielberg and Kufstein, right up to the gallows of the Viennese in 1934. In their fight against the Habsburgs, Netherlands, Bohemians, Hungarians, Italians, Slavs went under as nations and rose again. In that Empire on which, once upon a time, the sun never set, the peoples were for centuries oppressed and exploited in favour of a family rule, set up by the worst of the condottieri, the Caraffas, Liechtensteins and Pallavicinis, based on an authoritarian philosophy which was no more Christian Universalism than National Socialism is socialism. The fight of the peoples with the Habsburgs came to an end on the Piave. And yet, in spite of everything, it was there that the sun of the peoples rose.

BÉLA MENCZER.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE (1772-1834) was poet and philosopher, critic and preacher. He is not the first preacher—and assuredly he will not be the last—who found himself unable to practise what he preached. He had no grip on the architectonics of life, and signally lacked the ability to turn his rare gifts to practical account. Opium added to his weakness, a weakness which he finally overcame. A man may be addicted to strong drink, or even to narcotic drugs, and yet avoid failure and retain his self-respect. The cases of Byron during his Venetian period, and of Lamb, will occur to everyone; and there are many others. In Coleridge's case the addiction to opium was not the disease, but the remedy with which he sought to palliate and alleviate a disease which he felt to be well nigh incurable. For the malady itself we have no name in English; but the French know it, and are continually remarking it in those neurasthenic Russian writers who revolve helplessly in the vicious circle of Slav pessimism. They call it *impuissance de vivre*, meaning thereby a certain incapacity to face the facts of life and adapt oneself to its hard unalterable conditions. One may often see an example of it in the position of a weak and sensitive boy, the unresisting victim of oppressors at a rough public school.

Coleridge suffered from this *impuissance de vivre*, and yet he had set a noble vision before him, the pursuit of truth at all costs, and he eagerly desired to communicate this vision to the people. It is deeply significant that the two chief English critics of the nineteenth century, Coleridge and Matthew Arnold, should have been constrained to preach and to popularise. Each realised that he had a humanising task to perform, and each disdained any unwillingness in setting about it. The humanitarian impulse was a work in poetry as in life. Mallet had been stirred by compassion for the suffering poor, Thomson by the spectacle of a man frozen in a snow-storm, Akenside felt for unhappy lovers, Gray for the evils threatening the schoolboy, Shenstone for the negro slave, and Goldsmith for the misery of the deserted village. Cowper and Burns had extended the range of sympathy to animals. Wordsworth's "Peter Bell" was to glorify that faithful animal, the ass. Coleridge anticipated him in his lines, "To a Young Ass, its mother being tethered near it."

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The world was ringing with revolutionary watchwords of a universal philanthropy. Did not Coleridge represent the characteristic tendencies of the day? He laboured to found a philosophy of history; he laboured to convert criticism into a science; he combated that literary bigotry, confirmed by social panic, which confounded novelty with subversion. Politically the new forces threatened the existing organisation of society. In France a terrible grandeur is given to the work of destruction by the concentrated enthusiasm of unanimity. In the poetry both of man and of Nature Coleridge struck a new note, and he struck it with no faltering hand. Pope treats Nature as a mighty plan, of which the great First Cause was the author. To her charms he is blind; but he is never a lover, rarely an admirer. Nevertheless, as the eighteenth century advanced, poetry passed from court and city into a larger and purer air, which inspired a stronger feeling for the natural world than the faded sentimentalism of pastorals or the dainty interest of scholars. The revolt against artificial conventionalities of representation, the growing sympathy with rustic life, the spell of the law of Nature, led men to invest Nature with moral attributes and worship in her sequestered shrines. The idea of Nature as a living personal being inspired the reverence of Wordsworth, stirred the introspective mind of Coleridge, and culminated in the sensuous passion of Keats. It was, however, the subjective side of the poetical movement which Coleridge most strongly represented. Pope studied men rather than mankind, classes not humanity. His was a critical interest in fashionable persons of the day. But Cowper and Burns were poets of the people. Their sympathy with suffering is passionate; they raise their cry against oppression, stir the poor to a sense of their own dignity, value at their true worth the gold and the guinea stamp. It was but a short step further to the conception of universal humanity, the brotherhood of nations which Coleridge fondly hoped to see realised in the French Revolution.

Wordsworth and Coleridge wrote the *Lyrical Ballads*, published in 1798. Coleridge's contribution to it was *The Ancient Mariner*. In the winter of the preceding year he had written the first parts of *Christabel* and *Kubla Khan*. These three are far above all his other poems. They are new creations. The other poems are nothing of the sort. Some of

them are good poetry such as other men could write, and some read like bad prose. Like Wordsworth, and unlike Shelley and Keats, he often could not distinguish between the subject-matter proper to poetry and the subject-matter proper to prose, and this not merely in his declining years, but also in the prime of his power.

Wordsworth sometimes suffered from a kind of stupidity which only inspiration could enlighten. He had no tact, no discretion, no literary contrivance. On the other hand, Coleridge's best verse is full of tact and discretion and literary contrivance. The effects of *The Ancient Mariner* are as surely calculated as those of any poem in the language. Keats himself never wrote so many lines of pure poetry without any lapse of misjudgment. Yet it is remarkable that whereas Wordsworth and Shelley put all their interests and powers of their minds into their best poems, a great part of Coleridge's thought and learning and humanity never found their way even into *Christabel* or *The Ancient Mariner*. There is no sound of the French Revolution in their music, nor is there any inspired meditation on the purposes of life. They are full of nothing but wonder at the world in which magical new gleams have taken the place of the cold light of reason, in which the wind has shifted suddenly from east to west, changing the colour of the earth and filling the sky with a mysterious conflict of cloud and sunlight. They are pure bird-songs of the romantic spring; and *Kubla Khan* is the skylark's song of its summer, rising up and up in aimless delight, till it breaks off sharp because it can mount no higher. Yet we know that Coleridge was a philosopher from his childhood, and that in his youth "he nerved his heart and filled his eyes with tears, as he hailed the rising orb of liberty." Sometimes, it is true, thoughts of liberty inspired his verse, as in the *Ode on France*; but even in that the finest part is the pure romantic exaltation of the first stanza. When he begins to write of the Revolution, and to explain his own attitude towards it, he descends through rhetoric towards prose. Sometimes there are lines of inspired meditation also in his philosophic verse; but the best of it, like the best even of the *Ode on France*, is far below *The Ancient Mariner*, while the worst of it is far below plain prose.

Dowden used to point out the fact that there was so imperfect an alliance between the poet and the thinker in Coleridge

is one cause why his output of perfect verse was so scanty : fifty pages will include it all. This is true, no doubt. But why is this alliance so imperfect ? The doses of opium will not explain it ; for they were an effect rather than a cause, and began after he had written much of his best poetry. The reason is to be found in certain defects of his philosophy, which were the results of infirmities rather moral than intellectual in Coleridge's mind, infirmities which turned fatal through cruel circumstance. There are many people, of course, who think that poetry has nothing to do with philosophy, and Dowden declared that some will offer up fervent thanks because Coleridge's philosophical systems ceased to enter into his poetry. Yet if a poet philosophises at all, his philosophy should be the raw material of his poetry. It was so in the case of Wordsworth, and often it remains raw material in his verse. But it was not so in the case of Coleridge, and the reason was that his philosophy had no connection with his conduct. The thoughts came thick and fast, but only the sound of them lingered in his brain. They never made their home in his mind or grew there into principles. He could not choose between one theory and another, because he tested none of them in action. He was but a connoisseur in wisdom, wandering, like a tourist, through all regions and cities of thought, but never finding an abiding place in any of them. Hazlitt has written that no one can think or write about Coleridge without considering why "all this mighty heap of hope, of thought, of learning and humanity" . . . ended in swallowing doses of oblivion and in writing paragraphs in the *Courier*. Coleridge himself, more than once, in the poem written after Wordsworth's recitation of the *Prelude*, and again in *Work without Hope*, has told us how passion and thought both ran to waste in his life until both were impotent :

Yet well I ken the banks where Amarantha blow,
Have traced the fount whence streams of nectar flow.
Bloom, O ye Amaranths, bloom for whom ye may,
For me ye bloom not ! Glide, rich streams away !
With lips unbrightened, wreathless brow, I stroll :
And would you learn the spells that drown my soul ?
Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve,
And hope without an object cannot live.

Here he tells us that his passion for beauty had grown impotent, as it always must when youth departs, unless it is

strengthened by thought. But Coleridge's thought was disconnected from his passion, and seldom became poetry ; because poetry, like action, issues from a man's whole life, and philosophy cannot be heightened into poetry until it has grown to be part of the poet's life, and not merely a game of his intellect. It must be felt as well as thought ; it must turn from a theory into a faith. The tragedy is that for Coleridge it remained always a game, an idle and delusive exercise of his mind ; and at last it became, not work, but play without hope.

We have said that his *impuissance* was inborn. From the first he would rather think than act. Lamb called him at school an "inspired charity boy," and this, in another sense, he remained all his life, expecting inspiration as a gift rather than trying to earn it by action. But, to add to his native infirmity, life was very hard upon him. When we feel inclined to reproach him or Wordsworth or Southey for losing the generous ardour of their youth, we should try to imagine to ourselves what hopes the French Revolution raised in their minds, and what it meant to them when those hopes were "quenched in darkness and in blood." Wordsworth has told us in the *Prelude* that the worst of it was the outbreak of war between England and France, for that set up a conflict in his mind that nothing could reconcile.

Not in my single mind alone I found,
But in the midst of all ingenuous youth,
Change and subversion from that hour. No shock
Given to my moral nature had I known
Down to that very moment ; neither lapse
Nor turn of sentiment that might be named
A revolution, save at this one time.

Coleridge, in the *Ode on France*, assigns another reason for his despair :

Are these thy boasts, champion of humankind ?
To mix with kings in the low lust of sway,
Yell in the hunt, and share the murderous prey ;
To insult the shrine of Liberty with spoils
From free men torn ; to tempt and to betray ?

In any case the two poets were differently affected. Wordsworth's will triumphed over the shock. He made his choice

and regained his tranquillity. He built up a new faith out of the ruins of the old. Yet even for him "the second temple was not the first." The constitution of his poetical mind never recovered from the shock it had suffered, though his prose mind effected a recovery. Like Wordsworth, Coleridge feared for the order and continuance of civilisation, but, unlike Wordsworth, he feared also for himself. One has only to read *Biographia Literaria*, written when reaction was everywhere triumphant, to see this.

Coleridge occupies a great position in poetry, and all lovers of true poetry will willingly concede it. He does not occupy the same proud position in political philosophy. He cannot ever again enjoy the vogue as a thinker, almost as a prophet of wisdom, which he possessed between 1820 and 1850. That position was partly due to the brilliant personal gifts of a man whose talk had stimulated the intellectual life of a whole generation, which inevitably repaid him with the natural coin of discipleship, unstinted gratitude, and unquestioning loyalty. Party spirit, ecclesiastical and political, had also, of course, something to do with it. When the one sinner that repented was such a one as Coleridge, it was natural that Churchmen should rejoice over him as over a converted Saul, and Tories exalted his wisdom as their fathers had exalted the Burke of the *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. And, in the religious sphere at any rate, the Oxford Movement, representing, just as he did, the restoration to authority of the Fathers and of the great seventeenth-century divines, and the dethronement of Paley and the mechanical school of theology, came to bestow upon him the vogue of success in addition to that of mere celebrity. But parties change and party idols are forgotten. The philosophic conservatism of Burke is no longer, unfortunately, a very visible force in politics. The Oxford Movement is very visible in theology, yet its first force has witnessed the spending of some of it in the ritualistic follies of its less intelligent offspring or in the solution of the critical and social problems which it largely ignored. It is plain, then, that the fame of Coleridge cannot now receive much support from the parties in Church and State, who maintained it in his life and after his death. He suffers as well from a more honourable cause. The mind of Coleridge, so far as it did not belong to poetry, came to do three things. It came to deliver English thought from the exclusive domina-

tion of the literary ideals of Pope, from that of the theological ideals of Paley, and from that of the philosophical principles of Locke and Hume. And it did them all. At least they are all now done. And like the general whose victories destroyed his own importance by restoring peace to his country, Coleridge suffers from his very success.

Merely as a political writer, though he stands high, he does not stand very high. Unless we take his three great poems into account we cannot understand the eulogies passed on him by competent judges. They, for the most part, treat all his thought as a unity, and such indeed it is. Wordsworth owns that he had "seen men who had done wonderful things, but only one wonderful man, namely, Coleridge." "I am grieved," said Southey, "that you never met Coleridge; all other men whom I have ever known are mere children to him, and yet all is palsied by a total want of moral strength." To Lamb he was "an archangel, a little damaged." "He is like a lump of coal," confessed Scott, "rich with gas, which lies expending itself in puffs and gleams, unless some shrewd body will clasp it into a cast-iron box, and compel the compressed element to do itself justice." "He is the only person I ever knew," acknowledged Hazlitt, "who answered to the idea of a man of genius; his genius had angelic wings and fed on manna. He talked on for ever, and you wished him to talk on for ever." In another mood Hazlitt added that "his talk was excellent if you let him start from no premises and come to no conclusion." "He is," according to De Quincey, "the largest and most spacious intellect, the subtlest, and most comprehensive, that has yet existed among men." "Impiety to Shakespeare," cried Landor, "treason to Milton. I give up all the rest—even Bacon. Certainly since their day we have had nothing comparable to him. Byron and Scott were but as gun-flints to a granite mountain. Wordsworth has one angle of resemblance." Poetry had held the hero: Wordsworth would give her the peasant. She had held the rose: he would give her the daisy. Coleridge and he consecrated the commonplace and the common people as they had never been consecrated before. Arnold of Rugby deemed Coleridge, on the strength of the results of his thought, the ablest man in England, and this in spite of what he considered the unsteadiness of his thought. His son Matthew pointed out that "that which will stand of Coleridge is this: the stimulus of

his continual effort—not a moral effort, for he had no morals—but of his continual instinctive effort, crowned often with rich success, to get at and to lay bare the real truth of his matter, whether that matter were literary, or philosophical, or political, or religious; and this in a country where at that moment such an effort was almost unknown. . . . Coleridge's great action lay in his supplying England, for many years and under critical circumstances, by the spectacle of this effort of his, a stimulus to all minds, in the generation which grew up round him, capable of profiting by it. His action will be felt as long as the need for it continues. When, with the cessation of the need, the action too has ceased, Coleridge's memory, in spite of the disesteem—nay, repugnance—which his character may and must inspire, will yet forever remain invested with that interest and gratitude which invests the memory of founders." So Matthew Arnold, poet and philosopher, critic and preacher, appraised S. T. Coleridge, poet and philosopher, critic and preacher.

"He builded better than he knew," so runs the old saw. It requires alteration, for "he builded *other* than he knew." The immediate followers of Coleridge in the Broad Church and the High Church Schools he could have understood in 1829, but what about their descendants in 1929 and later? Would he have shown much sympathy with the Christian Socialism which has issued from the Broad Church School? Would he have shown any sympathy with the extreme ritualism which has issued from the High Church School? The foundations are those he laid, but is the superstructure in either case? And if it is, with what qualifications are we to take it? Nor can we doubt that the man who taught that permanence and progress were among the soundest elements in Church and State would have looked approvingly at the immense growth which the doctrine of development has received at the hands of Sir Henry Maine and the vigorous Historical School. The comparative point of view had been Coleridge's, and his attitude to history prepared the way for *Ancient Law* and its numerous descendants. Maitland saw his debt to the labour of his great Cambridge predecessor. When Lord Acton said he had learnt little from Carlyle because he had read Coleridge first, he expressed in an epigram the deep debt which modern speculation owes to our philosopher, a debt Döllinger freely acknowledged. There are in Coleridge's writings hints of "a

state of nature, or the Ourang-outang theology of the origin of the human race, substituted for the first ten chapters of Genesis." We do not like to say on the strength of a stray passage like this that Coleridge entertained a belief in evolution: that would be absurd. Still in his attitude to the doctrine of development, which he brought back from Germany, it is possible to say that before the days of Darwin he was groping his way towards it. There are germs in Coleridge, and these germs assume all sorts of forms. He was in truth, what J. S. Mill termed him, a great seminal mind, and a great seminal mind he remains to this day.

R. H. MURRAY.

G. B. S. ON THE ROCKS.

WHAT are we to make of Mr. Shaw's latest? We may indeed rejoice that his wit is as lambent and his satire as caustic as ever. His plays afford a welcome reassurance that the veteran's natural force is not abated. There is still vast entertainment and no little wisdom to be derived from seeing ourselves as Mr. Shaw sees us, and if the mirror in which the plays reflect society is a distorting mirror, the distortion doubles the entertainment even while it halves the wisdom. But the vein of impishness with which the life-force has endowed Mr. Shaw and which makes the plays so stimulating, works out into a dangerous perversity in the doctrines unfolded in the prefaces. If the prefaces are to be taken seriously, then Mr. Shaw has deserted to the enemy at a time of crisis. He has joined the ranks of the lost leaders.

The preface to *On the Rocks* is devoted to the defence of a paradox. It opens with a denial of the sacredness of human life, and it ends with an assertion of the sacredness of criticism. Man has no right to live, but he has a right to say freely what he thinks. One can understand that Mr. Shaw does not consider it worth while to live without talking, but it will puzzle even his genius to talk without living. However, since he is always ready to straighten things out for the muddle-headed bourgeois, he will explain no doubt in a future preface how a man is to enjoy the right of criticism while deprived of the right to live. In the meantime, he argues on the one hand that society must exercise the right to exterminate, because there is a distinct criminal class consisting of untamable persons of a ferocious and unscrupulous character, and on the other, that society must respect the right to criticise because it is so difficult, indeed next to impossible, to distinguish the true critic and pioneer from the criminal or lunatic. His solution of the problem he has thus posed is to suggest that the critic be immune so long as he only talks or writes plays. Once the critic acts on his unpopular opinions, he may lawfully be exterminated as a criminal or a lunatic. This common-sense suggestion, already acted on in modern society, has some practical utility, but it is obviously no solution of the problem. Criticism when it is merely talk divorced from action will always be irresponsible, and will be the less deserving of respect and attention precisely because

it is irresponsible. On the other hand, if you once grant to governments the right to exterminate, the right will be exercised against dangerous opinions as well as against dangerous actions, and no logical resistance to such extension is possible. Mr. Shaw's defence of the right to exterminate renders absolutely futile his closing plea for toleration.

Mr. Shaw is putting his trust in tolerant dictators. His friends and admirers underline the adjective, but it is the noun that matters. The distinctive feature of the prefaces is the advocacy of dictatorship. Mr. Shaw believes in dictators, efficient, ruthless dictators, who mean to govern, but he hopes they will leave the individual his last great right, the right to grouse. To me this seems a pitiable surrender of a great mind to the reactionary currents of the present age. Mr. Shaw has ceased to swim against the tide.

The right to exterminate!—one would have supposed that a true prophet would either denounce the right altogether or plead for its progressive circumscription until it falls into desuetude. In this country we have steadily restricted the use of this right by the State, and to-day we retain capital punishment in effect only for the crime of murder. In this regard England lags behind some modern States, but the grounds for the abolition of capital punishment are being more widely appreciated to-day. Such abolition should be our next great penal reform. But if the cause in whose service Roy Calvert died is to succeed, it must succeed in spite of Mr. Shaw. To his mind the alternatives are either "to disable the murderer once for all by making an end of him, or else waste the lives of useful and harmless people in seeing that he does no mischief and caging him cruelly like a lion in a show." The first alternative seems obviously preferable to Mr. Shaw: it is not in the least obvious to me, even on Mr. Shaw's own premises. Any force there may be in his contention depends on the assumption that some criminals are known to be incorrigible.

The real necessity arises only in dealing with untamable persons who are constitutionally unable to restrain their violent or acquisitive impulses, and have no compunction about sacrificing others to their own immediate convenience.

In criminology Mr. Shaw seems to have got as far as Lombroso. It is very doubtful whether this real necessity arises

anywhere save in Mr. Shaw's imagination, and even if there are criminals who seem incorrigible in the present stage of our knowledge and faith, they should be kept alive in order that psychologists and moralists may perfect their respective wisdoms. Society has no right to exterminate homicidal maniacs, nor is it common sense to do so.

If the preface to *On the Rocks* merely repeated shoddy arguments in favour of capital punishment, it would not deserve serious attention. But Mr. Shaw is not content to appear as a ditch-digger in defence of our existing criminal code; he insists on the political necessity of killing and advocates a more extensive use of the right to exterminate. His plea for capital punishment is nonsense: his demand for a more extensive use of the right to exterminate is dangerous nonsense. He starts from the position that the modern State must have a standard faith, and a generally accepted ideal, and that it must have the power to get rid of those who do not accept this faith, and who will not work for this ideal. This means that governments have the right to exterminate all who exhibit "incorrigible social incompatibility." In plain English, the party which can secure control of the government machine has the right to kill off its political opponents. Mr. Shaw means this or he means nothing, and the concession of any such right means the betrayal of any civilisation worthy of the name. Mr. Shaw is furthering the triumph of barbarism.

What dictator or what tyrant would not be glad to be permitted to exterminate on the ground of "incorrigible social incompatibility," when he, himself, is to be judge alike of incompatibility and incorrigibility? He is presented with a blank cheque to fill in exactly as he likes. Any champion of constitutional liberties will be aghast at such a proposal, and even the reformer in a hurry might be expected to think twice before claiming or conceding a right so indefinite. Mr. Shaw has, of course, the courage of his convictions. The indefiniteness which damns the proposal in the eyes of anyone who values personal liberty is one of its attractions in the eyes of Mr. Shaw. A wholesome terror may be inspired in the bosom of the individual citizen by the very fact that he does not know whether his existence is socially justified or not. The English are accustomed to living under a government whose claims upon them are strictly defined, and Mr. Shaw

thinks it would do us good to live under a régime of unlimited liability in morals. He thinks absolute powers of life and death may safely be entrusted to an institution like the O.G.P.U. "The security against abuse of this power of life and death was that the Cheka had no interest in liquidating anybody who could be made publicly useful, all its interests being in the opposite direction." Such a statement is either very innocent or very disingenuous. Either Mr. Shaw does not know what he is talking about or he is talking with his tongue in his cheek. Actually, one may suspect, it is a case of fifty-fifty. Englishmen will never be such fools as to surrender their constitutional safeguards of life and liberty for the worthless security which apparently satisfies Mr. Shaw.

The arguments by which Mr. Shaw supports his thesis are as astonishing as the thesis itself. They amount to this: all through history, men have been exterminating political opponents. Though all previous attempts to exercise the right have missed the point, i.e. in each case the wrong people have been exterminated, yet the constant exercise of the right, throughout history, shows it to be necessary, and at last the Russians have found out the true criminal class which must be exterminated, namely the incurably acquisitive. Unfortunately, the Russians, though theoretically sound, have proceeded to kill off intellectuals and kulaks whose services to society are indispensable. Unfortunately also they have done this, in spite of the security against abuse of the right in which Mr. Shaw has such childlike confidence. The Russian experiment in extermination is at least aimed in the right direction, but hundreds and thousands of innocent and potentially useful citizens perish along with the criminal class. The wisdom of dealing with the criminal class in this manner does not exactly leap to the eye.

If you are not satisfied with Mr. Shaw's hasty review of history, and if you do not share his admiration for the extension of social responsibility at present in vogue in Russia, he has still a *tu quoque* argument up his sleeve. Private property in capital, particularly in land, confers on private individuals the right to exterminate. Such a right ought to be exercised by the State only. Mr. Shaw is aware of the equivocation in his argument. The Highland landlord may exterminate crofters in the sense of turning them off his land. If this involves hardship and the danger of starvation for the crofters,

this is tantamount to killing them, and the entire responsibility is held to lie at the door of the landlord. The sheer dishonesty of such an argument does not need formal exposure. In any case, the suggested parallel between abuses incidental to the private ownership of capital on the one side, and the deliberate activities of the Cheka in Russia or of Goering in Germany or of the Heimwehr in Austria on the other, halts pretty badly, and if it were exact, it is difficult to see how the abuses of capitalism can be erected into rational political principles in the new social order. And once again, if Mr. Shaw's preface means anything, it means precisely that. What is done unconsciously or half-consciously by individuals under capitalism, i.e. the extermination of those who cannot fit into the existing social order, should be done deliberately by politically responsible authorities in the Socialist commonwealth.

If we ask how Mr. Shaw comes to advance with apparent conviction arguments so inadequate and, indeed, so sophistical for a thesis so dubious, part of the answer may lie in the fact that he is an Irishman. In one of George A. Birmingham's novels, *Found Money*, the cook at the vicarage, a Mrs. Hegarty, informs the narrator of a conflict which is impending between Free State troops and members of the Irish Republican Army.

"And nobody'll be sorry for them when they are dead," she went on, "for it's what they deserve." I had not the slightest idea what Mrs. Hegarty's political sympathies were. She might for all I know be a Free Stater, a Republican, a Bolshevik, or even a Loyalist. Nor did I want to find out. The political principles of every Irish party seem to boil down to the same thing in the end. They all believe that the only hope of the country lies in the slaughter of most of its inhabitants. They differ, of course, about who are to constitute the minority which is to be allowed to survive.

This amiable belief Mr. Shaw appears to share with his fellow countrymen, and it probably accounts for his eager assertion of the right to exterminate. Mr. Shaw is just a typical Irish party.

In Mr. Shaw's own view he is exhibiting, not the unregenerate Irishman's belief in the political necessity of killing, but the true Irishman's clear-headed insight into the logic of the

situation. The modern State must have a faith and must maintain its faith and its unity in the same way in which the medieval Catholic Church sought to achieve the same object, to wit, by exterminating heretics or the socially incompatible. Mr. Shaw thinks this necessity inheres in the situation of the modern State whatever faith it adopts. It does not occur to him that the necessity may attach more particularly to the faith which he himself hopes the modern State will adopt, and that the assumed necessity follows from the defects and errors of his own creed. A standard religion, he assures us, is indispensable, and compromise is ruled out by the nature of the case.

What compromise is possible between myself, for instance, who believe in the religion of creative evolution, the economics of socialism, and a diet from which the dead bodies of men, fish, fowls, and animals are rigidly excluded, and my fundamentalist neighbours who believe that all evolutionists go to hell: that children languish and die without beefsteaks: and that without private property civilisation must perish?

Our case is indeed desperate if we have to choose between two such deplorably irrational and antiquated creeds, and if, having chosen, we must either authorise the extermination of the fundamentalists by Mr. Shaw or the extermination of Mr. Shaw by the fundamentalists. Happily we need not adopt or enforce either of these creeds in the modern State, but we can recognise that Mr. Shaw's desire to enforce his creed leads him to favour the right to kill. And not merely does his desire to enforce his creed determine the argument of the prefaces, but the cardinal points of his creed support and justify his faith in the necessity of forcibly suppressing heresy.

Of the three main articles of his faith, vegetarianism, the economics of socialism, and creative evolution, the first does not call for comment unless indeed we may take comfort from the fact that Mr. Shaw, though he still believes in the hangman, is not yet prepared to revert to cannibalism. We might have expected him to argue that since our right to live depends on our being useful to society, criminals who are useless when living should be made of some use when dead. Happily, Mr. Shaw, even when in the full tide of reaction, draws the line somewhere. But the economics of socialism and the

religion of creative evolution directly bear on his advocacy of the right to kill.

Belief in the economics of socialism means simply that Mr. Shaw is a dogmatic collectivist. In regard to the institution of private property, Mr. Shaw has sunk into what John Stuart Mill used to call, "the deep slumber of a decided opinion." Unfortunately he talks and talks wildly in his sleep.

The modern priesthood (the rulers in the modern State) must utterly renounce, abjure, abhor, abominate and annihilate private property as the very worst of all the devil's inventions for the demoralisation and damnation of mankind.

A man who writes like this is no longer thinking : he is simply labouring under an obsession. No one at this time of day is going to deny the serious abuses of private ownership or to champion the unrestricted rights of private property ; but that is no reason why an intelligent person should ignore the positive values associated with private property, or turn a blind eye to the equal dangers of demoralisation and damnation under out-and-out collectivism in the totalitarian State. As for private property being an invention of the devil, Mr. Shaw might just as reasonably attribute his own fundamental natural conditions of human society to the same author.

A dogmatic collectivist is one who has not only stopped thinking on his *idée fixe*, but who is also so sure of it that he is prepared to sacrifice his fellow men and women to its realisation. Hence the wide use of the right to exterminate by fanatical Marxists in Russia, and hence Mr. Shaw's applause of their action. It is not strange if others think such dogmatists should themselves be exterminated, or if others propose to use the same right to enforce other dogmas. Mr. Shaw's prefaces are essays in defence of Bolshevism. The defence serves only to arm their opponents. His argument plays right into the hands of the Fascists or, indeed, of any other group which has a social ideal it would like to enforce and which can secure power.

Of even greater interest is the connection which Mr. Shaw traces between the right to kill and the first article in his creed, the religion of creative evolution. This religion, it seems, undermines the sense of the sacredness of the individual life, and it does this in two ways. First, "the mystic

distinction between Man and Brute vanishes." Mr. Shaw, as a vegetarian, might have deduced from this that it is as wrong to take the life of a brute as to take the life of a fellow man. He draws the opposite conclusion. It is as right and as necessary to take the lives of our fellow men if they are a nuisance to us as it is to take the lives of venomous or ferocious animals. The argument is worthless. Mr. Shaw may deny any *mystic* distinction between Man and Brute, but he can hardly deny a distinction. Our right to take animal life is based on that distinction, and no set or race of men can claim the same sort of superiority to their fellow men and any differences that exist between men cannot be used to justify the right to commit the crime of murder.

The second way in which the religion of creative evolution undermines the sacredness of human life is that it regards the individual merely as a link between generations, and never as an end in himself. This is involved in the denial of the immortality of the human soul, to which denial Mr. Shaw seems to be committed. Anyway, if you believe in creative evolution, you think of individuals merely as means to social ends, or to the accomplishment of the purposes of the life-force. As no one knows what the purposes of the life-force are, such purposes may be conveniently identified with purposes that appeal to one's self. Having reached this point, the believer in the life-force easily merges into Mr. Shaw's criminal class and finds that he has no compunction about sacrificing others, if not to his own immediate convenience, at least to his own ultimate ideals.

Happily there are truer and better faiths available for mankind. It is possible for society to believe not in the life-force, but in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and it is possible for society to believe not in the economics of socialism, which means distorting the facts and principles of economics and degrading the ideals of socialism, but in scientific inquiry in economics as in other departments of knowledge, and in a genuinely co-operative commonwealth, not to be realised by the domination of any class or any dogmatic clique. But the trend of Mr. Shaw's creed is unmistakable. The religion of creative evolution as he understands it is not an enlightened up-to-date faith : it is a degrading idolatry. Mr. Shaw's religion has landed him on the rocks.

HERBERT G. WOOD.

FRANZ WERFEL AS A NOVELIST.

AMONG contemporary poets and writers in the German language the Austrian, Franz Werfel, occupies an eminent place. Although only forty-five years of age he has done much important and original work in the various fields of literature. As a poet, he became, in the years preceding the War, a leader of the Expressionist Movement. The volumes of his poems *Der Weltfreund* (1911), *Wir sind* (1913), *Einander* (1915) are inspired by a great ethical and religious passion. This successor of Klopstock and the young Schiller deplored the hatred and disharmony among men and desired to renew the world through brotherly love and the spirit of comradeship. There is perhaps nothing more characteristic of the spiritual Expressionist tendency of this young poet than his wonderful reconstruction of the old hymn "Veni Spiritus Rector," which begins:

Komm, heiliger Geist, Du schöpferisch
Den Marmor unserer Form zerbrich,
Dass nicht mehr Mauer krank und hart
Den Brunnen dieser Welt umstarrt,
Dass wir gemeinsam und nach oben
Wie Flammen in einander toben.

As a dramatist, Werfel has dealt impressively with universal problems in the settings of historical drama, especially in his two plays *Juarez und Maximilian* and *Paulus unter den Juden*. His reconstruction of the *Trojan Women* of Euripides reveals again his supreme poetic power. It is typical of the development of this writer that he has published novels and short stories practically only in the years following the War. With increasing experience of life the subjectivity of his youth gave place to a more objective and detached contemplation of man and of society, which attitude is absolutely necessary for the maturity of a novelist.

Werfel has mastered the methods of modern Realism: he has a clear understanding of the dark regions of the sub-conscious and of the determining power of social conditions. But the exaggerations of Naturalism repel him. He wrote a short and vehement polemic against the dangers of this method entitled "*Realismus und Innerlichkeit*." One feels the warm sympathy of the poet for mankind in all his work.

Through error and suffering many of his chief characters reach a higher level of human worth and maturity, as in the novels of Dostoevsky.

Nearly all the novels of Werfel have an Austrian or Italian background. Austria is the home of the poet. He was born in Prague in 1890, the son of a Jewish manufacturer, was educated in the same city, served in an Austrian regiment during the War, and has since lived wholly in Austria with the exception of a few journeys abroad. He has, therefore, seen the change of Austria from the former proud double monarchy of Austria-Hungary, through the decline of power of the War period, to the small and dependent Austrian Republic. He was a witness of the transformation of Austrian society by revolution and inflation. Like the interesting novels *Der Radetzkymarsch* of Josef Roth and *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* of Robert Musil, Werfel's novels of Austrian life have therefore a certain documentary value. It is a peculiarity of his Austrian novels that the action always begins in the post-War period, while through the vivid memories of the principal characters the former days of the monarchy with all its magnificence and triviality are resuscitated.

Barbara oder die Frömmigkeit (1929; the title of the English translation is *The Hidden Child*) especially gives a comprehensive and graphic account of some thirty years of Austrian history (1890-1923). At the same time the book shows the development of the central character, the ship's doctor, Ferdinand R—. He is a noble, meditative, but passive figure, resembling Goethe's Wilhelm Meister and Hans Castorp in *Der Zauberberg* of Thomas Mann. His parents represent two different social types of the old monarchy. The father, a colonel in an Imperial Regiment of about 1890, was descended from simple peasant stock and remained modest and conscientious. The mother, a good-looking and worldly woman, came from the lower nobility, the so-called *Beamtenadel*, which was hated by the masses and was not respected by the true aristocracy. This frivolous woman has an outlook typical of her class as regards her evaluation of the different peoples composing the former monarchy. She idealises the romantic Hungarians with their chivalrous nobility; she respects the Germans as an industrious and capable but prosaic people; and she despises

the Slavs as a dangerous nation of servants who prepare rebellion in secret.

One of the early chapters in the book gives a striking description of an 18th of August, the birthday of the old Emperor Franz Josef and therefore a national holiday. At the *Kaisermanœuvres* the easy-going, kindly Austrian officers, who prefer amusement to the serious study of military problems, are portrayed.

Coexisting with the problem of nationality, there was in the old Austria (and there is also in the new !) another, that of the conflict between Catholicism and Free Thought. In the provincial town from which comes Barbara, the devoted nurse and guardian angel of the young orphan Ferdinand, the inhabitants depend for their living partly on coal-mining and partly on the miracles of a famous image of the Holy Virgin which attracts thousands of pilgrims annually. The processions of the priests and the propaganda of the proletarian free-thinkers were in sharp opposition. Ferdinand's difficult path passes through the Cadet School, the Catholic Seminary, and finally leads him into the War.

The revolting scenes of the War are a reflection of Werfel's own experience. During his life in the army, Werfel engaged in active pacifist propaganda, as a punishment for which he was transferred to a particularly dangerous sector of the eastern Galician Front. In the book the predicament of the Austrian military authorities is clearly shown in the description of the condemnation to death of three Czech soldiers. A whole company, with the exception of these three men, had deserted to the enemy, whereupon the superior officer, treating these three as scapegoats, ordered their execution. In a terrible conflict between his humanity and his obedience as a soldier, Lieutenant Ferdinand R—— does not carry out the orders of his sadistic superior, but at the last moment facilitates the escape of the condemned men. As a punishment for this, he (like Werfel) is transferred to the command of a notoriously dangerous outpost, and only by the greatest good fortune escapes from this hell seriously wounded.

Not only is the mentality of the Austrian soldiers and officials strikingly characterised, but in subsequent chapters the mood of pessimism in Vienna in the latter end of the summer of 1918 is as clearly developed. A morbid voluptuousness of decline was one of the hidden emotions of the

people during these days. There is the nervous weakness of the authorities. There are the struggle for food, the comedies of the trials of the usurers, the hectic activities of the newspaper proprietors and of the literary cliques, who exploit the new situation partly as plebeians, partly as snobs. These glimpses of life behind the scenes are not very edifying, but the excited mood of the revolutionary soldiers, the disorders and psychoses of the times, are analysed with great precision.

The chapters entitled *Choice of Leader* and *The Call for Blood* are especially valuable contributions to the study of the psychology of the masses and of the Revolution. But the sociological analyses of the oppressed and of the oppressors, of the men of letters and of the parvenus, do not constitute the *raison d'être* of this book. The last chapter has the same title as the first, "Whence? Whither?" and these words have a metaphysical significance. Ferdinand R—— is a typical introvert, and after his many experiences he is not hostile to the world but lives aloof from it, supported by a consciousness of his own deep dependence on God.

In comparison with the superabundant figures and ideas of this book, a further novel (1928), *Der Abituriententag* ("The Class Reunion") has greater union and conciseness. This "History of a Youthful Sin" shows deep psychological insight. The opening chapters describe the examining magistrate, Dr. Sebastian, preoccupied with the case of a prisoner, Franz Adler, who has been arrested on suspicion of murder. During the examination, the magistrate's thoughts revert to a "crime" of his school-days. These broodings are encouraged by his attendance, about the same time, at a class reunion where he meets his school-fellows of twenty-five years before. The appearances and feelings of the former classmates at this reunion are skilfully delineated by the writer. They are those of a group of men, once the commonplace students of earlier days, now mostly petty officials and employees. As one of the exceptions, the actor-manager, Schulhof, feels himself a man of the world. Resl, formerly the spoilt son of rich parents, is now an influential industrialist: he feels his own success, yet secretly envies Dr. Sebastian, who, as the son of a great official, has a welcome in the best society denied to the parvenu in spite of his millions. Komarek, once the dare-devil of the class, now fallen on hard times,

suffers with the resentment of the poor from the social superiority of his former fellows.

But one member of the former class is absent: Franz Adler. No one has had news of his whereabouts for years. Dr. Sebastian wonders if the prisoner whose examination he is conducting can possibly be his former classmate. The name, at least, is the same. Adler had been an inferior by origin and race, but a superior in intellect and maturity. For this superiority the young Sebastian had greatly envied and hurt him. Adler had been humbled by Sebastian's victory in athletics; he had been the victim of his ridicule; his prestige had been destroyed by Sebastian. Moreover, the immoral adventures of the clique to which Adler also had belonged had been caused by Sebastian. As a result of the secret excesses of Sebastian and his friends, their schoolwork suffered: fear of their parents drove Sebastian and Adler to attempt a fraudulent alteration of the class register, but they were discovered by their admired but feared professor. Once more the defenceless Adler became the victim. Persuaded by Sebastian, he secretly fled. He was said to have gone to America. Sebastian, the son of the highest judge in Austria, remained, with a clear reputation.

At the class reunion no one knows of Adler's fate. And yet Dr. Sebastian recognises that if he has now a reputation as the most humane and understanding of magistrates, this is due in no small measure to the power of his remorseful memories of Franz Adler. After the prisoner has been found to be innocent and not identical with the former unhappy school-fellow, he is acquitted and released. It is not so much the plot itself which makes this novel so remarkable, but rather the revelations of the unconscious and subconscious stimuli of human behaviour: of envy, jealousy, lust for power, of the resentments of inferior characters. This astounding penetration of the darker places of human nature is combined with a keen analysis of a certain Austrian social class in Werfel's masterly short story "*Der Tod des Kleinbürgers*" (1927). Its precision and depth give it an important place in German literature. In this *novelle*, the terror of the Inflation lies like a nightmare on the mind of the impoverished Viennese *petit-bourgeois*, Karl Fiala. He has only a very small income from his part-time work as commissionaire in a big store. His son is an epileptic, and his wife's sister, who lives

with the family, a mental defective. Fiala is tired of life, but two things yet sustain him: the memory of his more splendid past as a minor state official, and the promise of the economic security of his family after his death through the investment of his small savings in a life-insurance policy. How proud is old Fiala of the group photograph which his colleagues in his former office had presented to him on the occasion of his retirement! There he shines in all his glory, beside his official superiors, wearing a silver-trimmed three-cornered hat and a livery with a fur collar. Like Professor Kio in the "Class Reunion" of the earlier book, he was "a more stately image of another All-Highest who had ruled the Empire in those well-ordered times."

But the life-insurance policy which Fiala had secretly arranged provided for payment conditionally on his completing his sixty-fifth year. A few weeks before this date, however, the old man falls seriously ill with pneumonia, and then begins in hospital his tenacious struggle for life which provides the impressive climax to the story. The doctors at length give him up. He lies in a feverish dream, but his will to live a few days longer is indomitable, and he holds out against death, dying only when the period necessary for the success of his plans has passed. The descriptions of the dream-fantasies of the invalid, which reflect the struggle in the subconscious between the process of natural dissolution and the will of Fiala for the security of his family, are excellent. The outstanding events of Fiala's life are reviewed and distorted in his mind; an enemy from the time of his earlier life presses him hard, but he does not yield; his former colonel calls Corporal Fiala from the ranks, but he does not stir: the Catholic priest of his native town carries the Holy of Holies in a procession and calls upon the Faithful to kneel, yet Fiala remains standing in spite of the sinfulness of disobedience. The instinct for the preservation of his family is stronger in him than the power of nature.

Werfel has here illuminated the psychology of the *petit-bourgeois* type. In his book *Verdi, A Novel of the Opera* (1927), he recreates the inner struggle of artistic genius with the sympathetic intuition of a fellow artist. In his preface, Werfel expresses his doubts concerning the hybrid species of historical novel: he does not aim at the mere narration of historical facts, but primarily endeavours to reveal the inner

life of his characters. His book has therefore become a combination of novel and biography. The central idea is the tragedy of the aged artist whose inspiration has failed. Verdi in the year 1882 is the celebrated representative of Italian music: glory is his to enjoy for the rest of his life on his estate at Sant'Agata; but he cannot reconcile himself to becoming a "rentier of his glory." Ten years after the creation of the *Aida*, his greatest desire is to produce a new work, but his attempt at a new score, *King Lear*, is unsuccessful. In his despair, his great German rival, Richard Wagner, is held responsible for the weakness of his creative power. His feeling against Wagner, whose music conquered Italy at that time, is a mixture of hatred and secret admiration. Twice in Venice Verdi catches sight of the German *maestro* secretly, and inwardly longs to have a conversation and an understanding with him. But he delays satisfying his longing from day to day. Only when he has consigned his *Lear* manuscript to the flames in desperation does he find his way to the apparently more fortunate Wagner. But by now it is too late: Wagner has just died.

The inner need of the lonely but independent Verdi is impressive. Moreover, there is a profusion of Italian characterisation, e.g. the Senator, a very warm friend of Verdi, a type of the disappointed Italian liberal after 1870, and his family, an ingenious and intuitive doctor, a curious centenarian Marchese whose ambition is to outlive his contemporaries, etc. It is to be regretted that in this book an excessive preoccupation with the theory of music and an irrelevant love-affair detract from the unity of the composition. On the other hand the pictures of Venice are vivid in the extreme. Venice with its palaces, churches, canals, gondolas and the colourful pageantry of its carnivals. This can only be compared with similar descriptions in *Der Tod in Venedig*, by Thomas Mann, whose North German temperament and pure literary style is very different, however, from the more southern and exuberant character of Franz Werfel.

The contrast between these two German writers is very evident when one compares Werfel's last Italian family-novel, *Die Geschwister von Neapel* (1931), with Thomas Mann's famous *Buddenbrooks*. In both books one finds the lessening of fortunes of highly respected families. In both cases the strong ties of family tradition are loosened: in *Buddenbrooks*

they are symbolised by the Family Register, while in Werfel's Pascarella family they are represented by the strong authority of the old-fashioned but noble father, Don Domenico. The gradual disintegration of the conservative power of the family in Werfel's book does not involve decline, but only change. The three young sons and their three sisters are attractive and natural characters who love the higher values in life, music, philosophy and religion, but without becoming morbid and decadent as do the later descendants of the Buddenbrooks. In spite of the strain which exists, especially between Don Domenico and his sons, the fine bonds of sympathy between the different members of the family remain, and they grow even when the three sons have to emigrate to Brazil and when further tragedy befalls the family.

In this recent work, Werfel is wholly successful in synthesising realism and inward experience: the main figures are finely conceived without being unnatural, gracious without affectation. Similarly noble characters are to be found perhaps only in the work of a former Austrian poet, Adalbert Stifter. There is a charming harmony in this book, and in its wisdom, a combination of knowledge and observation, is a promise that this writer will produce yet more important works. For Franz Werfel is not merely a talented writer. He is also a leader towards a more humane and inspired life. For him "*L'art pour l'art*" is a false philosophy. He endeavours to point the way from our present chaos to a better order based on the value and universality of beauty and of religious experience.

ERNST KOHN-BRAMSTEDT.

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF NATIONS.

IT has been said that it is the courage of man rather than his intelligence that has raised him from among the beasts. The observation is acute, if paradoxical. Man's courage is certainly astonishing. It would seem, for instance, that the heroic endurance of modern war is easier for him than the mental effort necessary to end it. Yet that effort is not after all disproportionately great; though it would have to be made (and here the cynic will smile) by a large number of people.

Perhaps the cynic may add the comment that what is easier for a human being than mental effort is the heroic endurance of war by others. But no matter. To the economist, distressed by the spectacle on the one hand of unused food and on the other of unfilled mouths, war may well seem a desirable institution, promising as it does to reduce at one stroke both forms of superfluity; and it certainly is not the purpose of this article to make a sentimental attack upon it. The point to be emphasised here is the extraordinary character of our present assumptions about "national" sovereignty: assumptions which must be examined if war is either to be abolished or to be systematically extended.

The paradox of these assumptions is threefold; and considered together, they can hardly fail to surprise. It is strange that we should agree that any community has, on the one hand, a moral right to unlimited legal power over its members and a moral claim to their whole duty and, on the other, a moral right to be itself completely independent of external law; stranger still that the communities to which the world allows this peculiar position, or which appear to claim it, have in common no relevant characteristic whatever; strangest of all that though this fantastic confusion has practical consequences affecting everyone, it seems on all sides to be quietly accepted. No one questions the divine right of nations, though no one knows what a nation is.

If we are to argue in defence of national sovereignty as it exists to-day, we must contend that a nation is a unit so homogeneous that there is no danger of the oppression of one part of it by another, and at the same time so distinct from every other such unit that any combination, through a surrender of individual sovereignty, would mean a danger of oppression more to be dreaded than the danger of war

between independent powers. But anyone listening to such an argument, and then turning to observe the world as it is, will be puzzled indeed to find the homogeneity, and the distinctions, which he seeks. What he will find is not order, but chaos. The communities labelled nations seem infinitely various. France is a nation: well and good. But Austria also is a nation; Esthonia is a nation; India, which contains within its bounds diversities of race, religion, language, temperament, intelligence and culture as wide, probably, as are to be found in the whole human species is (he will be told) a nation; China, which has a population about equal in size to that of Europe, is a nation; Costa Rica is a nation; Haiti is a nation; the Philippine Islands are (he will doubtless hear) a nation. He may well be bewildered.

That the homogeneity and the distinctions we seek are neither racial nor linguistic is a point that need not, in this place, be laboured. The reasonable champion of national sovereignty can make only one reply. He must maintain that they are matters of the will of the individual members of the nations: that these individuals desire the sovereignty of their states. The first answer to this is that such desire on the part of the individual members of a community neither is, nor has been, invariably considered a justification of independence. The delegates from South Africa came to a recent British Imperial Conference demanding an acknowledgment of the right to secede from the Empire; but were the right to secede from the South African Union to be claimed by (say) Natal, it is unlikely that it would be admitted either by the government at Pretoria or by the rest of the world. The Irish fought for separation from Great Britain; yet no one supposes that they would of their own free will have allowed the secession of Ulster.

But the classic case here is, of course, that of the American Civil War. If ever in the world's history there was in communities a passionate desire for independence it was, I suppose, in the Southern States at that time. The unanimity in the thirteen colonies in 1776 was nothing to that in South Carolina in 1861. Yet the suppression of the South neither is nor was accounted (outside the South) as a crime. To W. E. Gladstone it seemed that the war was about nothing; and in later times Theodore Roosevelt wrote that probably there never was a war in which one side was so wholly in the right

and the other so wholly in the wrong. The comments are equally inept. The issue, of course, was, and still is, complicated in many minds by the question of slavery, a question which Lincoln explicitly declared to be irrelevant; but had the division of interest and sentiment which prompted secession been one less obviously involving religion and morals, it would be clear enough that the Southern States had a good case. It would then be difficult to justify the conquest of the South without at the same time justifying a conquest, for instance, of Holland by Germany. If it is right to keep within a state by force a community which wishes to become separate, why is it wrong to include in a state by force a community which wishes to remain separate? The descendants of the conquered Southerners acquiesce, it is true, in the Union that was imposed; but so, in the imaginary case, might the descendants of the conquered Dutch.

The more our ideas about government are considered the more mysterious, indeed, do they seem. First, it is held, apparently, to be wrong that a hundred persons should be coerced by ninety-nine, yet quite right that they should suffer the same coercion (the kind, or degree, is not thought important) at the hands of a hundred and one. Similarly, it seems to be held that a majority has the right to oppress a minority to any extent and a minority the right to secede only when it has the power. If politicians, eager for prestige or for the spoils of office, demand the formation of a new sovereign state and begin the stimulation of patriotic emotion, we do not enquire how they are likely to treat minorities that are not territorially compact, or that are otherwise too weak to exact independence in their turn. "Ruritania demands self-government," we say; "Samothracia cries for her freedom"; and we disregard the fate of individuals with the callousness of ignorant sentimentalism.

The desire for sovereignty is, then, no infallible sign of an acknowledged right to it; and moreover it is questionable how far in any case the sovereignty of a nation is willed even by the majority of its members. No suggestion is here implied of anything so absurd as that France, or Japan, is not a unity. But even in such nations as those it is doubtful whether the majority can be said to choose deliberately that their governments be sovereign. For my part I would much rather be governed by a Chinese who was capable, just and

merciful than by a cousin of mine who lacked these qualities; and though everyone naturally desires that the officials with whom he is brought in contact should speak his language and be in sympathy with his tastes, far more people, probably, than is commonly supposed prefer good government to what is called self-government—a word which may mean no more than the right to choose, at intervals, between Mr. Hocus, offered by one party machine, and Mr. Pocus, proffered by the other. Patriotism, with the suspicion and dislike of strangers, is natural to man; and these feelings are easily aroused by speeches and by the press. But unless thus inflamed, they are in most cases passive rather than active. More powerful, perhaps, than anything else that determines human conduct is the force of habit; and even on the hypothesis that a world law, established and enforced, brought men a diminution instead of an increase of good, they would consent to it, once it was a fact, as cheerfully or as stoically as they now consent to their national governments, to the weather, and to a thousand other circumstances of their lives.

No attack is intended here upon patriotism, which is a virtue created by opportunity. A man's country may be said, in the old and famous sense, to be his neighbour: that is, he should be able to perceive its excellence most plainly, and to serve it most effectively, simply because it is at hand. It is generally easier for an Australian to be of use to other Australians than to the inhabitants of Tibet; and if a Finn cannot see the good points of other Finns, he is not likely to have a just appreciation of those of the Andaman Islanders. That is the ethical case for patriotism; and a good case too. What is curious, however, is the way in which ideas of ethics adjust themselves to political facts. Conceptions of patriotism are, it would seem, rather the effects than the causes of conceptions of sovereignty. To buy goods, for instance, because they are made by one's fellow-citizens is a virtue, whereas to buy goods because they are made by one's relatives is at best a pardonable piece of partiality. It is virtuous to serve a politically independent community at the expense of mankind, but not virtuous to prefer the interest of a province or a city, though the smaller unit may be the older, and the more nearly homogeneous in race, in religion, and in tradition. The point can be well illustrated by quotation from an editorial in the *Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post*. That journal, discussing

"Our Glutted Labor Market," said: "Every device for cutting down immigration or for making it wisely selective has been put into effect only after a long and bitter fight, with national interests arrayed on one side and local, racial and other selfish interests on the other." For a philosopher, the word "selfish" in that sentence would have its own beauty.

For the advocate of peace, then, the outlook is still gloomy. To say that all the pacific effort of the last thirteen years has been wholly fruitless would, indeed, be an exaggeration; but since the tragedy of the failure of Woodrow Wilson no political leader has publicly questioned the principle of national sovereignty, and the principle of national sovereignty is the vital matter. Much energy has been wasted in urging altruism upon national governments: an attempt which culminated in the solemn absurdity of declaring that war is outside the pale of a law which does not exist and never has existed. The course is more impractical than that of our forefathers who assumed the divine right of kings and then exhorted kings to virtue; for the king admitted a duty to God, and therefore, doubtless, not only to his own subjects but to all men, whereas the democratic politician may believe that he is betraying his trust if he considers the interest of anyone but those who elected him. This ethical complication is the crowning difficulty, and dooms to everlasting sterility the hope of real friendship between sovereign nations. To expect a national government in any way to sacrifice its own advantage is to expect it to act in direct contradiction of the very nature of its being: it is to expect to put out a fire with a match.

Equally useless, we may note in passing, is the attempt to formulate "rules of war." Mr. Hoover lately proposed the "immunisation" of ships carrying food in war time; whereupon an American critic suggested that the President should also plead for the world-wide adoption of boxing-gloves for infantrymen. The comment is satisfying. For if a force is strong enough to hold nations, excited by the passion of conflict and the terror of defeat, from any act that conduces to victory, it is strong enough to hold them from war altogether. Even if at the beginning of the fight the belligerents observe the "rules," they will soon break them, each side accusing the other of being the first to do so. And here again also there is an ethical complication. If a cause be such

that it is worth the very extensive suffering that war entails, surely we must suppose that it is worth a little more. If it justifies the death of millions, the pain of wounds and disease, the crippling of bodies and of minds, and the lasting pain of bereavement, how can it fail to justify not only the sinking of food-ships, but the poisoning of wells and the killing of prisoners? If quarrels can be settled according to rule, they can be settled by the tossing of a coin.

Something, on the other hand, may perhaps be hoped from the effort of those who would persuade national governments that they usually benefit by co-operation, and that by war even a victorious power loses more than it gains. If a habit of co-operation is formed, it is always possible that nations, while proclaiming that their sovereignty is intact, may drift into an arrangement which in reality affects it. The present misery and danger of the world is, moreover, so obviously due in great part to nationalism that it would seem that the fact can escape no sensible person. Unfortunately, it cannot be assumed that national leaders are sensible; and it seems optimistic to hope to convince them all, good and bad, wise and unwise, that no war can ever pay.

There is only one way to make a lasting end of war, and that is by an abandonment of the principle of sectional sovereignty. While the right to make war is admitted, and the habit of making it unbroken, made it will be; and we shall have to continue to hear the plea that there may be worse things than war—which is plainly true, but not to the point. It is not enough that intelligent people should perceive that war brings no advantage save to a small minority: we shall not be safe from it till it no longer occurs to the minds of fools and knaves as a practical possibility. If this object is ever to be attained, sovereignty must be vested in one central power, which, while leaving local affairs to sectional governments, will decide disputes between them, codify world law, and suppress disturbers of the peace.

At present, without doubt, the project of a World State seems pathetically Utopian. The all-but-insuperable obstacle is the fact that it is, for obvious reasons, the leaders in a community who are most jealous of its importance; with the additional fact, already mentioned, that in a democratic community they may contend that any other attitude is wrong. These facts clearly make rather for the disruption of

existing combinations than for the formation of new ones. It seems now, for instance, unlikely that the British Empire will ever be federated, and likely that various members of it will in course of time proceed to assert full sovereignty. It might, indeed, probably be argued that there is not to be found in history a single instance of the cession of sovereignty by the government of a community simply because of the conviction that such a cession would increase that community's happiness. Every such cession, it could probably be shown, has had one of three causes : either conquest ; or the fact or danger (compelling combination) of alien tyranny ; or (added to the prospect of general economic advantage) the bribery of leaders. Moreover, just as in a group of individuals it is the strongest who is naturally least willing to consent to the control of law, so it is the government of the strongest nation that is most vigorously opposed to any limitation of its power. This is evident enough in the recent policy of the government of the United States, which, while protesting in general terms its love of peace, has shown itself continuously reluctant to agree to any contract which might possibly involve its having to do something it disliked.

Utopian, then, the thought of a World State must be confessed to appear. If the lover of peace is to find comfort, it must be in the reflection that great changes of mind sometimes come in the course of a few generations. The careful New England traders who wrote the interesting old bills of lading—"By the Grace of God . . . in good condition . . . slaves"—would have been surprised indeed could they have known that their great-grandsons would march to battle for the sake of conferring freedom upon the great-grandsons of those profitable Negroes ; and it is just conceivable that our not very remote descendants may think of war not only as a monster—that is, as something at once horrible and ridiculous—but as a monster fortunately extinct.

One factor which would tend to such a result would be a change in the current conception of the relation of government to the individual. So long as it is held that the state is concerned not only with the bodies but with the souls of its citizens, that it ought to save them from their sins, it is perhaps not unnatural that we should cling to what remains of the hope of being governed by people like ourselves ; though indeed it is true that there are now as wide differences

within nations as between them. But possibly our descendants may have a truer idea of the object of government, and the strength to impose that idea on those who govern, and will therefore attach less importance to race and religion, and more to honesty and competence. Then they may discard our slovenly and silly personifications of communities, and deal instead with the reality of the individual mind, the only entity capable of thought and of enjoyment, of purpose and of pain ; and may build a world government whose object is not the supervision of souls, with the forcible moulding of personal morals, but rather the defence of human life everywhere, and the protection from needless bodily suffering, involuntarily endured, of every sentient creature.

E. KER.

WHISTLER—HIS INFLUENCE UPON
ENGLISH ART.

JAMES McNEILL WHISTLER, who was born a hundred years ago, on July 10th, 1834, was the antithesis of those artists who are in themselves so humble and who work in such obscurity that their reputations suffer from our lack of knowledge of their lives. In his case our difficulty is not to find sufficient information to enable us to read his art in the light of his personality, but to see his art freed from the distractions—the irritation or stimulation, depending on our point of view, which his idiosyncrasies evoke in us. There is no lack of information about him, for whenever he occupied the stage he desired the full limelight to be concentrated upon himself, and contemporary criticism, legal proceedings and volumes of reminiscences are full of the effects of the impact of his bizarre personality upon the life of his times. Only with difficulty would a nineteenth-century Vasari have kept pace with his eccentricities.

The Centenary, coming thirty years after his death, does afford an opportunity of estimating his influence upon the art of his adopted country without his personality obtruding itself too much and when, with a knowledge of all that has happened in the world of art since his death, we no longer regard him as a revolutionary.

His reputation does not stand so high to-day as it did in the years immediately following his death. Then, the critics who, during his lifetime, had maligned and misrepresented him went to the other extreme and belauded him with extravagant praise. He was even referred to as the greatest artist of the nineteenth century. Such excessive praise can only do its subject harm by blinding us to the genuine, if less considerable, qualities he possessed. We can, of course, readily understand the chorus of praise which ascended when he died. The sunshine of French Impressionism was just beginning to pierce the Victorian darkness of English art, and our critics and artists were awakened by its beams to a realisation of the fact that for forty years Whistler had been practising his own brand of impressionism in their midst, and they had misunderstood him and reviled him. They recalled, too, how in his early days in Paris he had been an associate of Manet and Monet and others of the French Impressionists, he had sat

with them at the feet of Courbet and with theirs, his canvases had hung in the *Salon des Refusés*. Surely no praise could be too great if it could repair the wrong they had done him by their neglect. But since that time a whole artistic revolution has taken place—probably in no other thirty years in the history of art have such great changes taken place. Another and greater star than the luminists has shed its radiance in the artistic firmament. Its first glimmerings were seen by the discerning before the death of Whistler, but in England it did not burst into view until the Post-Impressionist Exhibition of 1910. And the star was Cézanne. A man to whom surface decoration and the evocation of an atmosphere were not enough, a man who wished to make of impression something solid and enduring like the art of the museums. We can readily understand that the disciples of Cézanne, pre-occupied with the representation of solid form and attempting to give to the folds in a table cloth the majesty of a mountain range, would have but little sympathy with Whistler's poetic pictures of a riverside at night where form is veiled in mystery, and all is insubstantial. Neither can the neo-primitive, worshipping at the shrine of Gauguin and haunted by the naïve simplicity of Negro art, have much community of feeling with the ultra-sophistication of Whistler.

Yet this natural depreciation of his reputation should not deny to Whistler a place of real importance in the history of English art, and the arrival in England in 1859 of this tantalising figure must be regarded as a landmark in our artistic development. For he came when English art had touched its lowest depths. The undoubted sincerity, the purity of aim, and the lofty conception of the pre-Raphaelites had for a time raised the level of artistic accomplishment; but that movement had lost its impetus. Millais, its master of technique, was descending to the banality which marked his later work, and a flood of commonplace sentiment and obvious narrative swept over it. Painting was regarded as nothing more than a vehicle for sentimental or moral anecdotes, illustrations of history or literature, and even sermons. Whistler abhorred a story-telling art, for he had accepted the doctrine of art for art's sake in its narrowest implications. To him art should have no dealings with the ordinary things of life; the sense of beauty was something infinitely precious, self-sufficient and self-contained. He was the High Priest of the religion of

pure beauty, and to its service he dedicated all his emotions and all his technical gifts. It was this which led him to eliminate from all his paintings anything which savoured of content, and to call his wonderfully sympathetic and reverent portrait of his mother *Arrangement in Grey and Black*.

It was this, too, which made him look to music, the least representational of all the arts, for an analogy and to give practical expression to the idea enunciated by Schopenhauer and repeated by Walter Pater, that "all art constantly aspires to the condition of music." His pictures he made vehicles not of anecdote, but of technical perfection: not illustrations of history, but melodies of line and symphonies of colour, and to emphasise his intentions he gave them titles borrowed from music. It is difficult for us to appreciate the storm of indignation which these pictures and their titles aroused when they were first exhibited to an artistic generation which was accustomed to finding its pictures explained for it by a quotation in the catalogue. We are all most annoyed when we least understand and the academicians of the 'seventies were infuriated because they could understand neither Whistler's intentions nor their results. People who looked in a landscape for the topographical details of a place they loved for its sentimental associations could never appreciate paintings of night in which all detail was lost in an atmosphere of misty blues and greys. They regarded them as just as much impostures as the good burghers of Amsterdam looked upon the *Night Watch* of Rembrandt in which they could not recognise themselves.

In so far as he did introduce "content" into his pictures, Whistler did influence English artists in their choice of subjects. Though a stranger within our gates and of a character alien to the English temperament he revealed to native artists poetic aspects of the beauty of their own land to which they had been blind, and in his etchings and paintings of the Thames he taught us to see beauty and romance in that avenue of commerce. In Paris he had been an admirer of Courbet, the realist, and henceforth it was not necessary for him to go to the Scottish Highlands to paint a romantic landscape; he could find it at his studio door. And after he had shown the way it was not difficult for Sickert to find subtle beauties in a Camden Town lodging house and the dim light of a music hall.

Whistler's attitude to subject and to nature as the source of all subjects was given for all time in the famous passage from his *Ten o' Clock*: "Nature contains all the elements in colour and form of all pictures, as the keyboard contains the notes of all music. But the artist is born to pick and choose and group with science those elements, that the result may be beautiful—as the musician gathers his notes and forms his chords until he brings forth from chaos glorious harmony. To say to the painter that nature is to be taken as she is, is to say to the player that he may sit on the piano."

For him, that is, art was a matter of careful selection, of tasteful discrimination between the necessary and the irrelevant. This power of selection he had learnt from Japanese art in which refinement is its chief characteristic. Indeed, the fact that we no longer find his Nocturnes difficult to understand is probably due to our greater familiarity with the art of the Far East, and Whistler's importance in English art is in no small measure due to the fact that he was the first artist to introduce Japanese canons into English painting.

In Paris he had been associated with the group of artists who had "discovered" Japanese art, and he became an enthusiastic collector of "blue and white" porcelain, and an admirer of Japanese colour prints. So enthusiastic, indeed, that in Chelsea he became known as "the Japanese artist." He surrounded himself with oriental objects and constantly introduced them into his pictures. When his friend, Fantin-Latour, wished to paint another group of his friends on the lines of his *Hommage à Delacroix*, Whistler insisted on appearing in it in Japanese costume. For the rest of his life his art was controlled by this Japanese influence and he painted not in the idiom of America, the land of his birth, nor yet of England, the country of his adoption, but that of the Far East. To it he owed his predilection for placing his portraits in silhouette, his emphasis on surface decoration and pre-occupation with pattern—so that some of his pictures have the appearance of flattened-out porcelain vases, and his ability to space the objects in his pictures so effectively that he could make a complete work with the minimum means, and in the making achieve a wonderfully tranquil result.

These qualities he used to good effect in his work as an interior decorator, for which he was peculiarly well fitted by his unique and subtle colour sense and his impeccable taste. To

him as much as anybody we owe our present freedom from the multiplicity of ornaments which crowded the Victorian drawing-room and our delight in a few well-chosen pictures on our walls rather than serried rows of mediocrity. He was an ideal collector, a man who bought things because they were beautiful, and not because they were rare, or costly. His fastidious nature delighted in nothing so much as living amongst and using exquisite pieces of porcelain and elegant examples of old English silver.

He has a further claim to fame in the part he played in the revival of etching. For a century and a half after the death of Rembrandt, etching as a pure and separate art was comparatively unnoticed, and without patronage. The passionate devotion of Meryon had rescued the art from the oblivion into which it had sunk, but during his lifetime his work, too, remained unnoticed. Whistler had learnt to etch whilst he was in the service of the coastal survey at Washington, where the process was used in the making of maps and charts. When he came to Paris and saw Meryon's work he was inspired to put his knowledge of the craft to good use, and in the next few years he produced the famous *French* and *Thames* sets, and a number of portraits which are perfect examples of his mastery of etching technique. He also inspired his brother-in-law, Seymour Haden, so that he resumed the craft in which he had been interested in earlier life and he, too, became a master of modern etching.

By his emphasis on the technical qualities of painting, and by his freeing of English art from the trammels of anecdote and the tyranny of subject, Whistler certainly exerted a considerable influence upon English art, but not so great as he might have done had he not divorced his art so completely from the life of his times. It is to him as much as to anybody that we owe the modern conception of the artist as a person distinct from the rest of the community, and the habit of mind which considers art as an appendage to life rather than a dynamic force which can enhance the whole of life. Although as a man he welcomed publicity and liked to be talked about, in his art he remained aloof from life. Though in his habits he was a man who was in love with life, in his art he would only approach it with a haughty reserve, and was as afraid of it as the primmest of his Puritan forebears in the New England of his birth. When we recall the technical facility

at his command, the way he loved the stir of city life and the discussion of "affairs," the fiery and militant spirit which made him so pugnacious a litigant, and the vitriolic fury of some of his writings, we cannot help feeling that here was an artist who could have said something, at least sparkling and witty, perhaps denunciatory, about the follies of his time. If only the passion for reform had burned within him, what might he not have given us in his art of satire like Hogarth, of mockery like Goya, and of terrible denunciation like Daumier? But however much he might lecture the public in his writing he would not use his art for a didactic purpose, and with his elimination of subject he eliminated also all the indignation he felt. Yet, within the limits he set himself, Whistler accomplished something of real importance, which had never been done before and which at that stage in English art badly needed doing. It was the fault of his virtues that his genius was a plant which had no deep root in life and in the human sympathies and human realities which are—and which alone can be—the source of all that is greatest in art.

CHARLES CARTER.

AN HOUR AT YUSTE.

AT Cuacos the tri-weekly 'bus from Plasencia set me down outside a *venta* even more primitive than the Posada de la Sangre in Toledo. The motherly soul within was very distressed because I had no food with me, and insisted on putting a quartern loaf, some ham and cheese, and a half-bottle of red wine, in a napkin and delivering the meal into my possession before she would sanction the three miles' walk to the monastery. "There is nothing there!" she said, as if I was expecting to find a Hotel Meurice: "it is a long, hard walk over rocks and stones; you will starve. Better to take some *almuerzo*, *señor*; I supplied the same to a German who passed this way three years ago. Two pesetas is the price and I will go with you, *señorito*, to put you on the right path, which is hard to find." And the good soul forthwith abandoned the cavernous, whitewashed wineshop with an earth floor, where she made a few centimos each day by selling glasses of her vinegarish *vino tinto* to passing muleteers, and walked by my side along the dusty road, past a signpost marked "Yuste" but pointing in no particular direction, until we reached a narrow cleft in the left road-bank, when she led me with agile leaps on to a low, rocky plateau where was the beginning of a rough road.

"This is the way," she said, pointing to a stone path worn away between the hedges of giant boulders: "go you straight onwards to that far chapel in the tall trees. Do not leave the path until you reach the granite cross at the end; a few steps more and you will find yourself at the ruins." Then, standing on one of the boulders and pointing to where the glorious green and purple plains lay as still as a calm ocean in a landscape by Claude, she laughed quietly to herself and asked me if I did not think the view "*muy bonita*," very bonny, which I certainly did. "The land here is rich, *señor*—O most rich! Every kind of fruit grows here in plenty, oranges, peaches, lemons, apricots, and the vines bear heavily always and the grapes are big and full of juice. It is a sweet country, this country, and the owner is pleasant to all. His name, sir?—el Marqués de Miravel, Mi-ra-vel. *Adiós, señor, pasó lo bien*: and forget not that the autobus returns at the three." And with a wave of her hand the good woman left me and I walked on in the sunshine carrying my white bundle of

food, my eyes caressing the soft green bosom of the distant forest. . . .

How shall I describe that lonely, lovely hour at Yuste, where the earth is a green paradise murmurous with the song of birds and the mountain-sides are musical with the liquid benediction of innumerable goatbells! An imperial cloak of emerald and purple and gold rippled down the long folds of the smiling mountains and round the silent and abandoned ruins, beautiful in desolation, over the vast moors to the hills that held Guadalupe. Small islands of mauve and blue shadows moved slowly across the scene from the immaculately-white clouds becalmed in the day's unfathomable sapphire, which jealously drew to themselves some of the golden light that streamed down upon the quiet earth. Birds twittered in the leaves high above my head as I threaded my way through the dappled daylight and along the rough path of polished stones towards what seemed to be the outer walls of the monastery. At a slight turn in the road I stopped to gaze at an enormous, lava-grey memorial plaque affixed to the corner of the ancient stone recording that His Majesty the Emperor Charles V, Supreme Sovereign of Spain and the Netherlands, King of Naples, Protector of the Americas, Defender of the Faith, had fallen within the precincts of the monastery. The dates were blurred with age, but the double-headed eagle of the Hapsburgs surmounting the inscription looked both ways along the deserted Emperor's road in symbolical sapience, as it had done for three centuries.

I came to a low gate in the wall and, finding it open, passed through. The hot rays of the sun permeated the intricate branches of the cluster of trees in which I found myself and struck a luxurious scent of neglected earth and decaying leaves from the path I picked out in the undergrowth. Presently I came to a stone porch standing starkly intact, with some delicately-carved cloister pillars stretching their white lengths in a green walk of long grass and overgrown nettles; and then to a deep wall of the church blackened by fire. This was the work of Napoleon's troops, I soliloquised, who had destroyed Yuste during their ruthless passage through Spain, in revenge, no doubt, for the defeat of Pavia and the capture by Charles of François Premier, whose emblazoned campaigning tent, brought straight from the battlefield, I had recently seen in the Armoury Museum in Madrid. Or perhaps it was the out-

come of the anti-religious frenzy that followed on the revolution and ushered in the French Republic. Napoleon had paid no more than lip-service to the Church, and Mass was never celebrated before any of his battles. This burning of Yuste was, in any case, senseless vandalism, as was the sawing off of the arms of Cellini's life-size crucifix which the Duke of Tuscany had presented to Philip II, and which was carried on men's shoulders all the way from Madrid to the Escorial, where it may still be seen, with the joins in the arms, in the tiny chapel behind the choir.

Hundreds of yellow tobacco leaves were hanging from the roofs of cells and the ruined refectory, like so many smoked pigs' ears, which made me think that there must be a family living somewhere in the ruins. And indeed, I had not walked ten paces beyond the one standing fragment of the old cloisters when a middle-aged peasant appeared round an arch beautiful with riotous ivy and, touching his broad hat, asked if I wished to see the church. His breath filled the air with fumes of garlic, which somewhat damped my exploring ardour, and one of his arms was shrivelled with the hand growing out of the elbow and the fingers red and smooth with lifelong uselessness. But I had learned to control my revulsions in Spain, where you will never touch the hem of Beauty's garment unless you spatter through a few puddles to do so; and after all, I thought afterwards, the man might just as well have felt a revulsion from me for my mildly garlickised breath and the fact that one of my arms was not shrivelled.

The high interior of the church, empty of all furniture or ornament, was decorated with a century's bird-droppings. The altar where Charles, holding his dead Queen's crucifix to his breast and waiting calmly for the end, had watched from his bed the Host elevated for the last time through the glass partition that divided his bedroom from the church, was a bare block of stone, and the steps whereon the prematurely aged Emperor (who, even though he was a glutton and a wine-bibber, had "God-ache" just as acutely as has Professor Unamuno to-day) had held the candles at his own obsequies—after asking his barber's advice during the morning trim on the orthodoxy of his desires—resounded to the tread of my shoes until the echoes returned from a far emptiness among the blue and gold rafters. I could hear the monks' slow chanting, for all the desolation, and see that bearded figure in

black velvet, with the family lantern-jaw, whose life, as he said himself, had been "one long journey," gazing past the altar at the wall of darkness through which he must soon pass to the last destination. In the small, whitewashed crypt, resting on two iron strips fixed to the wall, I found the lead coffin in which his body had been preserved for eighteen years, until the dutiful Philip came to carry it to the new monastery-palace of the Escorial and to set that first handful of royal dust on the top shelf of his spacious gilt and marble Panteón de los Reyes.

It was lunch time and I went and sat down on a grassy knoll beneath a towering oak tree, just beyond the main gate of the monastery, and ate some of my hunk of white bread (which seemed to have been made from coarse flour-dust) and hard cheese; but flung most of the ham to a hungry-looking dog that had suddenly appeared from nowhere, as my teeth couldn't cope with it. Tearing at the imperfectly cured meat and loosening it from my teeth in strings of red flesh made me feel like a cannibal, and I could detect a mocking voice at the back of my mind testing my knowledge of the vernacular by inquiring how much I had eaten off the sirloin from my grandmother's gardener. I had the world to myself and felt well content to sit in the sunshine clasping my knees like the youth listening to Raleigh and letting my eyes roam round that marvellous horizon where Charles had watched the lyrical spring and summer of Estremadura return while he sat on his sun-terrace, a rug over his knees, taking clocks and watches to pieces and putting them together again under the direction of an Italian watchmaker, while the fish in the green pond below the terrace rose to nibble a bait thrown by one of the Heronymite novices.

The sun-terrace, now flooded by the afternoon glow, lay on my left at the end of the long, red-brick path which had been specially made for the Emperor so that he could ride his horse right up to the doors of his modest abode. By taking the small entrance through the wall of the monastery grounds instead of continuing along the rough stone road, I had almost missed the *raison d'être* of my pilgrimage, the two-storied house of red brick built on to the south wall of the church where Charles had spent the closing months of his life, which sprang upon my vision like some enchanted castle while I was opening my bundle of lunch.

I now crossed the ground that separated me from this historic house and, walking up the path along which handsome young Don Juan of Austria had passed from his lodgings in Cuacos to be instructed in the arts of war by his illustrious father, came to a halt by Torrigiano's fountain on the terrace before a large painted shield on the wall recording the fact that the Emperor had been taken ill while seated in that spot, and had died twenty-one days later at two-thirty in the morning. It was Philip's inscription, I knew, painted on the wall to his orders, and I took a letter out of my pocket and copied on the back the sixteenth-century Spanish :

Su Magd. El Emperador Dn. Carlos Quinto nro. señor en este lugar estava asentado quando le dio el mal a los treintay uno de Agosto a las quatro de la tarde.—Fallécio a los veintey uno de Setiembre a los dos y media de la mañana : Año del Sor. de 1558.

The *portero* with the shrivelled arm came out from his meal, of which he had partaken in Charles's dining-room on the original table, followed by his grim-visaged wife and two sad and dirty children. He walked across the stone-flagged floor to indicate lithographs on the walls of certain celebrated portraits of the Emperor, and then led the way through a dark inner room that had been the kitchen, across a single narrow passage, to the bedroom where the last Emperor of the West had died with the sigh on his lips of "*Ay! Jesús,*" his head fallen on the pillows beneath Titian's *Gloria*, his favourite picture, which may be seen to-day on the walls of the Titian room in the Prado.

"Was Felipe Segundo here when his father died?" I asked the peasant, who stood immobile and silent in the middle of the room. "Nobody knows, *señor,*" the man replied; "some say yes, some say no," which proved that the minor details of Spanish history were not the strong point with some visitors, I thought, Philip (as I have recently discovered) being head over ears in a war in the Netherlands when the Emperor breathed his last.

I walked over to the glass door in the wall and looked beyond at the ruined altar, and the conviction suddenly came to me that Philip had got his idea for the plan of the Escorial, and for his own small bedroom within sight and sound of the Mass, from this death-chamber of his father in the monastery of Yuste. Of course, this was the seed from which had sprung

that amazing monastic fruit at the foot of the Guadarramas! Why had not someone else thought of it before me? Philip was a dutiful son and his father was for him the only great man in his experience. He, too, would live and die in the bosom of the Faith as a kind of monk-monarch. But Philip's end, I mused, had not been so felicitous as that of the Emperor Charles, although he had borne bravely enough the slow rotting away of his diseased body with septicæmia in the small, four-poster bed leading from his study, where he had attempted to rule the greatest Empire the world had then known with nothing but a quill pen!

On my way back to the primitive *venta* to catch the returning bus to Plasencia I rested on the steps of the granite crucifix and listened to the birds in the tall trees and to the liquid tinkle of the bells from a caravan of black goats that was winding down the mountain-side followed by a goatherd with a long whip and a blanket flung over one shoulder. And then, with a last look at the sad ruins embowered in that sweet and jealous forest, I hurried along the stone path to the village.

S. F. A. COLES.

THE MYSTERY OF THE CUCKOO.

IT is only within the last thirty years that a mystery that has puzzled the world since the days of Aristotle and Pliny—one that has given rise to all sorts of fantastic hypotheses—has been in any way elucidated. Now, thanks largely to the patient observation of many well-known naturalists and their excellent films, the Cuckoo's life with its plethora of attendant problems is almost quite revealed. Other than a few relatively minor points, only the question as to why it should be parasitic on other birds remains.

The Cuckoo arrives on these shores in the middle of April from various parts of Africa, and by the end of that month has spread all over the British Isles. The Order of Cuckoos is placed between the Hoopoes and the Owls. It is a blue-grey bird with a white, black-barred breast and a long, fan-shaped tail, white spotted. The eyes are yellow and the bill is black. The legs are feathered like those of a hawk, with which species it has many points in common in its appearance. When the bird perches, the tail is continuously dipped and fanned. In the field the plumage of both male and female is alike, but the sexes may be differentiated in three ways: first, by the call, which in the male is the ordinary "kuk-koo" or "kuk-kuk-koo." The female, however, has a curious, not often to be heard, water-bubbling, as it is usually designated, which may be likened to a faint imitation of the Green Woodpecker's "laugh," though it is more melodious and tremulous. At the beginning of June this call becomes prominent in the repertoire of the Song Thrush. Secondly, on perching on tree or fence the male Cuckoo immediately calls, whereas the female is silent; and finally, there are the peculiar actions of the latter preparatory to laying, which we shall note later. The young Cuckoo has a rufous-brown back, buff breast with brown barrings, and the white-spotted tail.

Although the male Cuckoo's call is heard far more often than the female's, the sexes are probably equal in numbers; and the Cuckoo is more likely to be promiscuous than polyandrous. The fact that except at laying time the female is accompanied by two or three males, proves nothing. Any successful female, of any species, will have a number of males in attendance at courting-time. However on this point we

have no actual proof either way, but it is worth noting that a pair of Cuckoos flying together is no uncommon sight.

Far from being a bird of prey, the Cuckoo feeds chiefly on those hairy caterpillars, avoided by other birds, such as the Drinker Moths, maintaining its reputation for strange behaviour. This habit has been cited as a reason why the Cuckoo leaves this country so early, as such a limited food supply would not last long; but, actually, there is always a good supply of hairy caterpillars for another month after the bird has left us. Another strange point about its feeding habits is that the female, and possibly the male, exists for several hours at a stretch without food, a most unusual occurrence in the avian world.

The female commences to lay during the third week in May, one month after her arrival, and all the birds have finished laying by the end of June. At this time the male Cuckoos cease calling, and both sexes soon depart the country, leaving the young birds to follow later with the great autumnal stream of migration. Each Cuckoo victimises only one species of bird, unless some mischance befalls a nest in which she has already decided to lay. For, as we shall see, there is no haphazardness about this parasitism of the Cuckoo. If such mischance should occur, then, being ready to lay, she must lay in the nest most convenient to hand, whatever species of bird it may belong to. Now, as by far the largest number of Cuckoos' eggs are found in the nests of Meadow-Pipits, and Reed and Sedge Warblers, this partiality for a particular species makes it very probable that the Cuckoo instinctively lays in the nests of those birds akin to its foster-parents; a hypothesis materially strengthened by the curious fact that the Cuckoo's egg, in more cases than not, bears a strong likeness to those amongst which it lies. The average number of eggs laid in a season by a Cuckoo is twelve, but totals greatly in excess of this have been recorded. Actually, the number laid depends largely upon the number of nests available, which, in their turn, depend upon two most important factors, "Territory" and "Race," which we shall now consider.

The female Cuckoo will return to the same haunts year after year, and possibly the males do so too. As with mankind, so certain female Cuckoos have strong characters, others weak. The strong, either by physical or by mental powers,

gain for themselves strips of territory in which no other Cuckoo may openly lay her eggs; though, of course, some manage to lay in claimed territory on the sly. Thus there are two kinds of females, those with territory and those without: the latter, "wandering" Cuckoos, whose opportunities for egg-laying will be few and far between.

An average strip of territory would be about a mile in circumference, with a number of trees dotted about, suitable for observation posts. From these observation posts the female keeps a strict watch on those Meadow-Pipits, shall we say, who are building in her territory. Their building operations probably incite her own maternal instincts, for in five or six days—the time taken by a Meadow-Pipit to build its nest and lay an egg or two—the Cuckoo is also ready to lay. Thus has Nature ensured that the Cuckoo shall lay her egg at a suitable incubating date for the foster-parent. The Cuckoo has now been watching the Meadow-Pipits for some days, noting the nests suitable for her own eggs. When the time is come she commences to lay in different nests, every other day, usually between the hours of one and five in the afternoon. Most birds lay in the early morning; but, as she likes plenty of time in which to "concentrate" on a particular nest before laying, the early morning would hardly allow her sufficient hours of daylight preparatory to laying. The nests are marked by sight and, as we shall see later, it is possible to bamboozle the Cuckoo by moving the nest slightly. Furthermore, she lays in each nest in the order in which it had previously been marked down and visited, taking no account of any desertion by the rightful owner that may have taken place in the meantime, as long as there are actually eggs in the nest. No Cuckoo will ever lay in an empty nest. Occasional breaks may occur in the alternate day system, due to a lack of suitable nests.

And now we come to the actual process of laying. It is worthy of note that the Cuckoo has a zygodactyl foot, that is to say, two toes in front and two behind. This formation enables the female to obtain a firm grasp on the rim of the nest in which she lays. The female deserts her attendant males at the edge of her territory, and flies to that particular tree suitable for a descent upon the nest that she has previously marked down for to-day's egg, and alights silently. There, stretched along a bough, almost like a Nightjar, she

perches motionless for a period, varying from half an hour to two and a half hours, gazing intently at the selected nest. This concentration appears in most cases to cause uneasiness among the future fosterers, who continually mob her without distracting her attention in the slightest. On other occasions the cock fosterer actually invites her to lay, flying up and then leading the way down to the nest, or even offering her a grub! One can only imagine that this long concentration on the part of the Cuckoo is necessary to, and connected with, the nidificatory act; more especially does this seem likely when one remembers the astonishingly short time in which the actual laying is accomplished. While thus waiting to lay the Cuckoo utters a peculiar "mewing" cry.

At length she glides openly to the nest, usually some seventy or eighty yards away, and alights by its side. She usually makes several of those preparatory flights before actually entering the nest, accompanied by the cock-fosterer. However, if the nest is cleverly hidden she will have some difficulty in locating the precise spot. In such a case she will willingly lay in a dummy nest, providing that it contains eggs, and is close to the nest that she had previously marked down. Having found the nest, in this case a Meadow-Pipit's, she dives in head first. Removing the egg *nearest* to the entrance, she lays her own in its place, holding the stolen egg in her beak meanwhile. While she is laying the female fosterer, who enters with her, continues to buffet her unceasingly. The Cuckoo only requires from eight to twelve seconds in which to lay, and then, backing out of the nest, flies off to a different tree with the stolen egg still in her beak. There she "bubbles" with satisfaction and eats the egg. Then, calling the male Cuckoos, she hies her off to feed.

The egg takes twelve days to hatch, and the young Cuckoo remains a further three weeks in the nest. It may then be fed for three more weeks by the foster-parents. It is remarkable that the fledgeling doubles its weight between the eighth and eighteenth day after hatching. Thus we can work out an interesting comparison between the young Cuckoo resulting from the first egg laid by the hen, and the one hatched from the last egg laid, presuming the parent to be a normal, average Cuckoo, viz.:

First egg laid May 16th, hatched May 28th. Last egg laid June 9th, hatched June 21st. First Cuckoo leaves nest June Vol. CXLVI.

18th. Still being fed July 9th. Last Cuckoo leaves nest July 12th. Still being fed August 1st. So that we see that, when the adult Cuckoos are leaving the country at the beginning of July, Cuckoo number one is still being fed by its foster-parents, and Cuckoo number two has still a fortnight to go before leaving the nest.

Directly the young Cuckoo has hatched, blind and naked though it is, it proceeds to remove the other inmates of the nest, eggs or birds, by wriggling them into the hollow of its back and heaving them overboard. This remarkable action is due partly to instinct, and partly to the extreme sensitiveness of that curious hollow in its back. Frequently the operation is carried out while the foster-mother is actually sitting, but she ignores the entire proceedings, and takes not the slightest notice of her own nestlings, dead or dying outside the nest. This practice of the baby Cuckoo is invariable, and must surely be one of the most wonderful precautions that Nature has taken to preserve this race of parasitic birds.

Various problems arise out of these proven observations. In the first place, the fact that the female Cuckoo requires only eight or twelve seconds in which to lay may be cited as an excellent reason why she should lay such an absurdly small egg for a bird of her size. Furthermore, if, as seems very probable, the colour of the Cuckoo's egg resembles those of the fosterer, through the necessary evolution in the remote past when the Cuckoo first began to lay in other birds' nests, then it is just as reasonable to infer that the small egg, approaching in size those of the fosterers, was similarly evolved. Arising out of the latter point is the question of why the Cuckoo, a bird only slightly smaller than a Jackdaw, should seek to adapt its eggs to those of small birds only half its own size. Here it seems fairly obvious that the Cuckoo has been forced to impose its eggs on small species as large birds would not tolerate such imposition; though, of course, exceptions occur of Cuckoos laying in the nests of the larger birds.

This brings us to the question of whether the victim desires the patronage of the Cuckoo or not. Judging from the erratic behaviour of the fosterers before and during the actual process of laying, there is evidently a certain amount of "fascination" or hypnotism by the Cuckoo, possibly achieved during

the preparatory period of concentration. On unimpeachable authority we have it that the Meadow-Pipit has been observed to throw out its own eggs after a Cuckoo's egg has been laid in its nest! It seems impossible that the sitting fosterer should ignore her dying fledgelings—she must realise that they are hers—unless her new rôle has been in some measure impressed upon her. But this would seem to be one of those still inexplicable mysteries to which there is no satisfactory solution. At times Cuckoo's eggs are found in nests in which the Cuckoo could not possibly have laid. In such cases it has been observed that, in the same way in which she carries away the removed fosterer's egg in her beak, so she lays her own egg on the ground and carries it to the nest in her beak.

We have referred, indirectly, to the colour of the Cuckoo's egg being similar in colour to that of the fosterer, in our first problem. Looking at the question in more detail, it would seem that, once having evolved an egg of the correct colour, it would be necessary, in order to maintain this colour, for Cuckoos of similar foster-parents only to mate: that is to say both male and female must be bred by Reed Warblers, let us say. If the Cuckoo is promiscuous, and there is no proof that it is, the three or four males in attendance on the female will all have been fostered by birds of the same species as the female, following upon the argument of our second theory. It is interesting to note that the first and last eggs laid by a particular Cuckoo in one season are considerably lighter in colour than the remainder. Does this fact suggest any interesting point? If each Cuckoo laid, say, twelve eggs in a season, it might; but as any Cuckoo can be induced by a suitable supply of nests to lay an almost unlimited number, we cannot attribute a weakening in colour to freshness or exhaustion.

A most important factor in the unravelling of the Cuckoo's secret has been the discovery that a particular hen, throughout its laying career, lays similarly marked eggs, that may be easily distinguished from any other Cuckoo's. This has made easy the identification of one Cuckoo year after year. Does one find this in other birds? Obviously it would be very difficult to distinguish different clutches of plain-coloured eggs, such as the Hedge-Sparrow's. Such similarity, year after year, supports strongly the two theories already expounded in the problem of the colour of the egg; and the thing not would seem to be a bird of long and intense inter-plomacy.

that is to say the mating of birds from the same nest or rather from eggs laid by the same Cuckoo—but free from the usual drawbacks, resulting from such ancestry. Or did this parasitic habit of the Cuckoo originate in the close breeding of early Cuckoos? Do birds interbreed at all, and, if so, what are the nearest degrees of relationship of a mated pair? This seems to have been a much neglected study, and one that might have interesting results.

Connected with the question of how the young Cuckoo expels the other inmates of the nest, is the question of whether two young Cuckoos can be reared together. As far as we know the stronger Cuckoo expels the weaker in all cases. Occurrences of one pair of birds feeding two Cuckoos have been noted, but never in the nest. And so we come to the last, and really the most important question: Why is the Cuckoo parasitic on other birds at all? There are about one hundred and thirty species of Cuckoo. Some of these are parasitic like our own. Others, such as the Great Spotted Cuckoo, are parasitic, but the young of both Cuckoo and fosterer live amicably together. Others again are normal. It appears that only by studying the various species of Cuckoo, the way in which they live, and the stages of parasitism to which they have attained—our own Cuckoo appears to have reached the most advanced stage—shall we perhaps be able to find an answer to the question.

B. R. PERRY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GENEVA'S ATTEMPT UPON ARMAMENTS.

STILL another episode has been enacted in Geneva's attempt to master the oldest menace to political civilisation: that of the armaments whereby civilisation is made to encompass its own destruction. On the face of it, the enterprise has for the last nine months looked less and less likely to achieve anything but a continuance of the popular ridicule which is normally and enthusiastically bestowed upon great promises woefully belied. But the very extremity of the apparent disaster seems in the latest phase to have excited feelings of another kind. The final failure of what Geneva has been attempting for the past two and a half years is becoming so widely recognised as in itself the potential fulfilment of the great menace, that a sober pressure of opinion is being brought to bear upon the essential problem so far unsolved. There is no disposition in any quarter in any country not to face the facts of the present failure, or to pretend that things are better than they are. The root fault of the League of Nations disarmament conference is being mercilessly exposed by every thinking person. And it is not certain that the bedrock realism to which this thing is at last being driven may not lead to a discovery of a way out of the difficulty.

What, then, are the brutal facts? It is difficult for any student of history, no matter how well-informed or intelligent he may be, to see contemporary events in a true perspective with the past, or to judge whether present diplomatic circumstances are comparatively worse than they ever were. It would probably be not far from the mark if one adopted a famous retort of an editor of *Punch* and said that "they always were." None the less there can be few people left in the world who do not now begin to sit up and search for an explanation of the international spectacle, diplomatic, economic, financial, now presented to them. When, on May 27th last, the League of Nations representative of Paraguay handed to the Secretary-General of the League at Geneva a certain statement which he asked to be circulated among the members of the Council he, no doubt unintentionally, diagnosed with critical perfection the state of affairs existing not only in the Gran Chaco but in the whole field of diplomacy.

"To her great regret [he said] Paraguay is at the present moment obliged, owing to Bolivia's attitude and in order to follow her example, to cease applying to her adversary the rules of international law in force between civilised peoples."

As a short history of the world, containing the whole result and incidental irony of human politics, supremely illustrated by contemporary politics, that simple sentence is a masterpiece. It is even comparable in its eternal truth to Shakespeare's well-worn paradox: "Security is mortal's chiefest enemy." Almost every element of every state paper of every government on the subject of war is symbolised in those few words of the Paraguayan politician. There is regret for present conduct, alleged to be made necessary by the other side's attitude; there is the mixed protest against the other's conduct and the prompt acceptance of it as an example to be followed; there is the complacent abandonment of "the rules of international law" (which, if any, are hardly worth abandoning); there is an implication that such rules were formerly "in force" (which they never were); and there is the expression "civilised peoples," written as if the adjective were to be regarded as suggestive of something incompatible with war, when everybody knows that it suggests the very cause of war.

The pass to which civilisation in its international aspect has been reduced is so bad that the League of Nations has lost the last vestige of its idealist glamour and is being given what looks like a final test as a palliative factor in the permanently mischievous processes of high diplomacy. One no longer even writes of a climax in the affairs of the present disarmament conference at Geneva. The Bureau of the Conference met still again at Geneva on May 28th, the General Commission on the following day. And this is the sort of thing that was said.

Mr. Henderson (from the chair, May 29th): "In view of the facts which I have recalled, particularly the previous positive decisions taken by the General Commission, I feel that it would be unjustifiable to surrender to pessimism and to give up that which has already been obtained. In view of the considerable material for the first Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments which is the fruit of two years' labour, I, as President of the Conference, consider that we must bring our work to a successful end. It

is in this spirit that I ask for the active collaboration of all the members of the Conference."

Mr. Norman Davis (May 29th): "We are prepared to co-operate in every practical way in efforts to secure a general disarmament agreement and thus to help promote the general peace and progress of the world. We are, furthermore, willing in connection with the general disarmament convention to negotiate a universal pact of non-aggression and to join with other nations in conferring on international problems growing out of any treaties to which we are a party. The United States will not, however, take part in European political negotiations and settlements, and will not make any attempt whatever to use its armed forces for the settlement of any dispute anywhere. In effect the policy of the United States is to keep out of war, and to help in every possible way to discourage and prevent war."

Mr. Litvinov (May 29th): "In the recent direct negotiations no agreement was arrived at. And even if such an agreement had existed it would be hardly likely to receive the endorsement of the vast majority of States which took no part in the negotiations. But would it not be politically more honest and courageous to admit that international conditions, and particularly events in some countries during recent years, had prevented the Conference from carrying out its direct task of drawing up a disarmament convention?"

Sir John Simon (May 30th): "The spectacle of actual achievement in a limited field would at this moment be of the greatest value, and I sum up the position of His Majesty's Government by declaring that, while there can be no justification for going on in a spirit of pious and undefined optimism, there is the most urgent need of deciding now what we can do and doing it without delay. If I have spoken too bluntly, the urgency of the world situation and the dark future that is before us if we dally and fail must be my excuse. We must introduce some realism into our idealism and we owe it to ourselves and to one another and to our President, who has pursued his heavy task with such unfailing devotion, to contribute the most candid expression of our views at this most critical juncture."

M. Barthou (May 30th, in a long oration, chiefly remarkable for its ridicule of Sir John Simon) made this only practical point: that the French Government would not consent to

any system involving a measure of German rearmament ; it therefore would not accept the British Memorandum as a basis of agreement, even if it were accompanied by agreed guarantees for security.

Mr. Henderson (June 5th, after M. Barthou had called him inconsistent and impartial and he had threatened to resign) : "The situation of the conference appears to me desperate if delegations continue on the lines of M. Barthou's speech. If M. Barthou does not like my resolution, let him draft a better resolution himself. If the French delegation will not submit an alternative programme, let the General Commission be informed that the Bureau has failed. That would mean an end to the Conference."

If such extracts be fairly typical of the quality of the work done—as they unfortunately are—it becomes an absurdity to chronicle the work in detail, except as a means of illustrating the need of an entirely new approach to the problem. An unhappy conference and its unhappy delegates had become enmeshed in their own luckless work, and could not even stop. They could still, as so often before, wind up with a "compromise" resolution, designed still further to postpone the form of failure. In this instance the relevant resolution was adopted on June 8th. Its tenor is exemplified by the first paragraph, in which the General Commission "Invites the Bureau to seek, by whatever means it deems appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a disarmament convention, a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference."

The essential facts, plain and unadorned, were that every government represented at the Conference was increasing its armaments ; that Japan and Germany ignored the Conference ; and that responsible politicians in Germany and Italy were making public statements in philosophic support of war as an end in itself. There is no need even to quote from the commonplace, everyday doctrine of some of the present political leaders of Germany, who systematically educate and incite the youth of Germany to regard war as a noble cause. On May 26th Signor Mussolini, in a speech before the Chamber, said : "I absolutely disbelieve in perpetual peace. It is detrimental and negative to the fundamental virtues of man."

War is to man what childbirth is to woman." When such words are spoken openly in high places, Geneva is impotent as an organiser of disarmament. But Signor Mussolini's words do suggest a simple way out for the League of Nations. The only purpose of the League of Nations is to stop war. So far its constituent politicians have not taken the first step towards that end. They have been engaged for two and a half years in a conference about limiting and reducing armaments. The Conference itself started from the axiom that France (for instance) should remain armed, and Germany (for instance) should remain disarmed. That is almost incredible to the detached mind of an ordinary person of common sense. The Conference now persists although neither Germany nor Japan any longer even participates in it. That fact also is almost incredible. The plain man wonders why the League of Nations in its collective intelligence cannot simply abandon an originally nonsensical and a proved abortive enterprise, and start again from simple elementals. It is obvious to plain people that there can be no hope of disarmament until the first principle be established that the wish for peace as a matter of principle is universal. The Council of the League of Nations could even now draft a simple question and send it for an answer to every government in the world : "Do you regard war as a crime ; and are you prepared, contingently on every other government's committing itself in the like sense, to legislate for the removal from your constitution of the government's power to make war in any circumstances whatever ?"

The immediate practical value of such a step would be to classify the nations into two categories : those which on principle want peace and those which on principle want war. It sounds comic, but Signor Mussolini, as well as General Göring, makes it a relevant, practical question. It would then be seen whether there is any sense in even attempting international agreements about armaments. Until every government has committed itself, and has passed the necessary legislation, to place itself in the first category, the category of those who want peace, there can be no beginning for work about disarmament. The sense of futility among the mass of non-political people over the work of the politicians in this important matter is such that no statement of the obvious situation can be too elemental. The analogy would be if a two and a half years' Conference were held to discuss ways and

means of regulating football competitions between France and Germany without first finding out whether France and Germany want to play football with each other. It may be objected that when the disarmament conference met on February 2nd, 1932, every delegation protested that its government did want peace. That is not the case. No government in the world has ever expressed its willingness to take part in a universal and unconditional proscription of war. The fatal reservation about "self defence" has always knocked the bottom out of governmental formulæ in that field. By the Kellogg Pact the signatories "solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another" (Article I) and "agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means" (Article II).

Experience has clearly proved that the Kellogg formulæ are too ambiguous to be of the slightest practical value. To the mind of any fair person they imply that self defence is no excuse for war, but they do not specifically say so, and it is clear that every signatory made a mental reservation about self defence. So long as the plea of "self defence" is accepted as a justification for war, so long will there be war. There never has been a war in which each side did not argue that its motive was self defence. The only reasonable formula ever proposed by a responsible representative of a government for proscribing war was based upon the principle of making a state guilty of aggression if it commits warlike acts outside its own borders, no matter what be its motive. That formula was submitted at Geneva last summer. It was submitted by Mr. Litvinov. The irony of the thing is that the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference itself adopted his formula; but the Conference has taken no further notice of it. What Mr. Litvinov proposed was: "that a State be deemed to have committed an aggression if it has committed any one of five acts—namely:

1. Declared war on another State.
2. Invaded another State with or without a declaration of war;

3. Attacked another State by land, naval or air forces with or without a declaration of war;
4. Navally blockaded the coasts or ports of another State; or,
5. Provided support to armed bands which have invaded the territory of another State despite the appeal of that State that such support be withdrawn."

It may not be in human nature that an agreement can be reached about the first principle of peace, namely the universal unconditional outlawry of war as a crime. But what sense can there be in talking about disarmament until that first principle has been established?

POLITICS AND COMMERCE.

A Polish politician, during the course of a private conversation about the prospects of an Anglo-Polish commercial treaty, expressed surprise over what he called the antiquated mentality of the British people, who, he said, alone of all the peoples in the world, seemed still to think it possible that trade could be conducted without the leave, and without the supervision and the control, of their government. The humour of that remark is that there is not a merchant in Great Britain who does not feel himself bound hand and foot by governmental interference. The truth of it is that, crippling as are the British Government's restrictions upon British trade, those of nearly every other government in the world upon their own nationals' trade are even worse.

The general effect upon trade of such political works as reparations, government debts, tariffs, exchange restrictions and the like are a source of common, everyday vexation throughout the world. The Polish Government is one of the most active practitioners of the modern art of killing trade. During the post-war years it has completely shut off the Lithuanian market and blocked the Niemen to its own trade. It waged a furious tariff war with Germany from June, 1925, to March, 1934. It has suppressed at various times and in varying degrees the sale in Poland of foreign newspapers, Czechoslovak as well as German. Polish goods could not be moved through German territory without a special agreement between the two governments. Live stock could not be moved

without a like agreement. A chronic attempt at a German-Polish governmental trade agreement, the only objective of which was to enable trade to be restarted, although the only thing that had stopped it was governmental interference, has now been abandoned *sine die*. In the first half of March a British Trade Mission went to Poland to investigate the possibilities of overcoming the political obstacles to Anglo-Polish trade. At the beginning of April a Polish delegation which had been negotiating in Paris for a renewal of the Franco-Polish Commercial Treaty returned to Warsaw without accomplishing its purpose. On April 27th the Polish Government issued a decree, to be effective from May 1st to December 31st, prohibiting the import of coal, coke and briquettes into Poland and the Free Port of Danzig. On May 6th, to prevent misunderstanding, that government issued an explanatory statement to the effect that the coal import prohibition was not meant to be an "embargo," but merely a device for bestowing upon coal, coke and briquettes the same quota restrictions as were bestowed upon general imports. What the difference amounts to is a matter for the higher mathematics.

On March 13th a French trade mission headed by M. Lamoureux, Minister of Commerce, arrived in London to begin negotiations with the British Government for a trade agreement. He spent a week talking to the President of the Board of Trade in this country. Thereupon the talks were relegated to the governmental "experts." Three months later, on June 16th, the Foreign Office in London issued an official statement: "A trade agreement has been initialled to-day between France and Great Britain. The agreement removes the difficulties which have arisen between the two countries, who will now withdraw the measures which they took some months ago and will concede to each other most-favoured-nation treatment in customs matters. The agreement will also embody various adjustments and arrangements regarding quotas as well as decisions taken by both parties to improve the conditions at present governing the trade in certain agricultural products. The conversations which have resulted in this agreement have been marked by the greatest cordiality, and the two delegations have continually had in mind the necessity for developing trade between the two countries. The signature of the agreement is expected to take place very

shortly. Discussions have also taken place in regard to the establishment of a treaty which is to replace the treaty of 1882, and they will be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible. It has been agreed that no other information will be given about the agreement which has been initialled to-day until it has been signed."

In that statement a distinction was made between an "agreement" and a "treaty" to replace that of 1882. As the whole original purpose of the Conference was to negotiate a new commercial treaty to take the place of the 1826 and 1882 treaties denounced by France, one saw no alternative to the deduction that the major purpose had been shelved and an *ad hoc* arrangement evolved to mitigate the effects of the trade war that had raged between the two countries since the autumn of 1931.

No serious person had expected that the Anglo-French trade conference could serve any purpose beyond that of clarifying the real problem that will have to be settled if and when the more general political obstacles can be removed. The chief obstacle is that of the exchanges and the currencies. As the French Government by its monetary policy would be able at any moment and unilaterally to alter the whole basis on which a convention had been negotiated, obviously it was impossible for any convention of real substance to be negotiated until some sort of finality had been reached in that monetary policy. And again, how can there be any finality in the monetary policy of any government? Even if such a thing were possible, the monetary obstacle in a particular case such as the Franco-British cannot be removed except incidentally to a general removal of such obstacles throughout the world.

The Anglo-French trade experts devoted a week early in May to a consideration of the trade in silk. The difficulty they encountered was that the British tariff against Japanese imports had mown down in its operation the import also of French silks, especially the precious silks of Lyons. It was natural that the French experts should use this fact as a lever to support the French "discriminatory" quotas in force against British goods. The matter of silk, therefore, illustrated the condition that world tariffs must be added to world exchanges as a precedent subject for settlement before there can be any serious or businesslike Anglo-French commercial treaty.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH TRADE QUARREL.

Light can be thrown upon the methods used by governments in waging trade war upon each other, by recalling some of the outstanding details of the Anglo-French trade war which preceded the meeting of the conference. France was in good form, being then at the height of a similar war with Brazil. In October last the Brazilian Government increased its import duties on French goods by the determined measure of 250 per cent., the increase being explained as a form of retaliation against the French compensatory surtax imposed upon Brazilian imports into France. That is what governments do. They use their nationals' trade as weapons in their quarrels with each other. As ninety per cent. of Brazilian products going into France is coffee, and as France is a coffee-drinking country and happens to be Brazil's best customer, the Brazilian Government was annoyed. The French Government in its turn was annoyed both by the retaliatory measure and by the discontent levied upon itself by those French firms who did trade with Brazil, and who, as a result of Brazilian exchange restrictions, had not been paid for their goods for three years.

The Anglo-French quarrel began in earnest on November 23rd last, when Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, told the House of Commons, for the information of the French Government, that unless France soon removed the fifteen per cent. surtax imposed upon British imports as compensation for exchange losses resulting from Britain's abandonment of the gold standard in October, 1931, and also removed the differential import turnover tax, then His Majesty's Government would impose *ad hoc* additional import duties upon French imports into Britain. The French Government in form conceded the first round to the British Government by promising to remove the cause of complaint as from January 1st; but the later substance belied the form. On January 11th the British Foreign Office announced that the French Government had agreed to restore 100 per cent. quotas on a "very abundant list" of British imports. The French Government now sought glory elsewhere. On January 17th it denounced the Franco-German Trade Treaty of August 17th, 1927, and decreed a drastic reduction of German imports into France. Meanwhile the British Government's

temper was not assuaged. It wanted 100 per cent. restoration on 100 per cent. of the quotas. On January 26th there was another official protest against the French quotas. On January 29th the Commercial Attaché at the British Embassy in Paris delivered an ultimatum. He informed the French Government that unless the quotas for British goods were fully restored within ten days His Majesty's Government would retaliate against French goods. (Strictly there was no French Government on that day. The Government had resigned two days before, and the new government was not formed till the day after. But the temporary lack of a personnel to direct the French governmental machinery did not deter the British Government from dealing with that machinery direct.) On February 1st the French Government answered that while it had no intention of "discriminating" against Great Britain in favour of Belgium or the United States, it must continue its prevailing quota policy intact.

The French commentators did not conceal their dialectical satisfaction over the circumstance that Great Britain was no longer the best customer for French goods, the British purchases of those goods having been halved since 1931. Belgium had taken her place. Moreover, the French balance of trade with Belgium was "favourable," and with Britain "unfavourable." Even in the matter of wines Belgium with her population of 8,000,000 now takes as much from France as Britain takes with her population of five times more. On her side France, it was argued, takes far more cotton goods and coal from Britain than from Belgium. Some play was made by British commentators on the fact that the United States, who had taken no wines from France for fourteen years, was rewarded when the Volstead Act was repealed with better quotas than Britain, whence it seemed to be suggested that the return of the prodigal son may be a good principle of economics when directed by politicians.

On February 9th, therefore, the British Board of Trade fulfilled the threat contained in its ultimatum, and announced that "an order has now been made under section 12 of the Import Duties Act imposing a duty of twenty per cent. *ad valorem* over and above the existing customs duties upon certain classes of goods produced or manufactured in France with effect from February 13th." On February 13th the French Government counter-attacked by denouncing the

existing trade agreements with Great Britain. Two days later the British Government tried the effect of an olive branch. Mr. Runciman then stated in the House of Commons that the Government had proposed to the French Government that both the discriminatory French quotas and the retaliatory British duties should be removed to allow of negotiations being started in a good atmosphere about the whole matter of Franco-British trade. On February 20th the French Government answered that it was willing to start negotiations, but on the opposite condition that the existing quotas and retaliatory duties be retained, not removed in the meantime, offering, however, not to "retaliate" further against the British retaliation for the duration of the Conference. The British Government gave in to the French Government on that point, and agreed to hold the Conference on the basis of the *status quo*. The Conference opened in London on March 14th. It reached some sort of agreement on June 16th, the value of which cannot, as I write, be assessed.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

June 16th, 1934.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE UNKNOWN GOD.*

In his new book, entitled *The Unknown God*, Mr. Alfred Noyes gives an account of his spiritual and intellectual pilgrimage from the Spencerian philosophy to the Catholic faith. His book is an ordered exposition and vindication of a living process of spiritual experience through which the author has passed. Mr. Noyes describes it as recording its author's "gropings towards the belief that he now holds." In his early days Mr. Noyes became acquainted with the writings of Herbert Spencer, T. H. Huxley, and Matthew Arnold, and as a consequence rejected the Christian faith. Yet on closer examination he discovered that Herbert Spencer posited a First Cause, absolute, infinite, and perfect, though unknowable, as the only possible explanation of Reality. He spoke of this transcendent Absolute as "a necessary datum of consciousness." Furthermore, the ethical enthusiasm of Huxley led him to adopt the great saying of Micah, which he quoted as "What doth the Eternal require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with the

* By Alfred Noyes. Sheed & Ward. 7s. 6d. net.

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Eternal?" This means that Huxley attributed ethical perfection to the unknown source of all things. Even Voltaire, in a striking passage, had said that the Supreme Being must be compassionate. Darwin had himself spoken of evolution as a "grand sequence of events" which could not be treated as meaningless or purposeless. All these statements Mr. Noyes came to recognise as "pointers" towards the complete truth set forth by the great Church thinkers, especially St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the light of his later experience Mr. Noyes rightly considers that these agnostic thinkers were mishandled by certain second-rate theologians of the nineteenth century. Instead of making the most of their fundamental admissions and confessions, these theologians fought a campaign that turned upon the often crude assertions and details of current thought, to the neglect of the deeper issues. Hence the battle was fought upon secondary details instead of upon the far-reaching implications of first principles held by both sides of the controversy. Having reached this conclusion the course became clear for a steady advance by which Mr. Noyes came to appreciate the weight of the theistic arguments drawn from the supreme Values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. So he was led forward to a spiritual philosophy which enabled him to appreciate the Trinitarian position that was the basis and substance of Hegel's transcendental system. At this point the issue arose whether such a spiritual philosophy could be held in air. If it were true it must be effective and exhibited in historic facts. Hegel himself showed that this was the case by his emphasis on the spiritual significance of the historic Christ. Hence the way was opened to the Nicene Creed, which adds to its confession that our Lord is "*Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero,*" the triumphant affirmation "*Et incarnatus est.*" Thus the tremendous affirmations of the Fourth Gospel rightly claim acceptance. The sacramental principle is reached that Reality is the outward and visible sign, the effective manifestation and conveyance, of spiritual truth. Thus the assumptions, concessions, and fundamental positions of Victorian agnosticism not merely echo the declarations of theistic thinkers but, if taken seriously, lead on to the affirmation of the Christian faith, which is a coherent whole, without which life and reality are not only unsatisfying, but in the last resort unintelligible.

It is impossible to conclude this brief survey of this book without paying a tribute to its remarkable combination of spiritual insight, philosophic competence, logical force, and poetic imagination. All these great qualities manifest themselves in a style that is remarkable for its ease and felicity. The book should be widely read, both by convinced Christian believers and by those who in these times of profound unsettlement are feeling their way towards a satisfying Faith.

J. S. L.

* * * * *

PROPERTY OR PEACE?*

Under this challenging title Mr. Brailsford presents what will appear to some readers a convincing indictment of capitalism as the arch-enemy of order within the nation and peace within the society of nations, to other readers a perverted interpretation of an economic system which has been a chief instrument in the past of raising the standard of living for all classes of the community, and which may, with a moderate policy of reforms, continue to perform its beneficent function.

His thesis is that capitalism has reached a stage of development in which it can no longer make profits by the expanding productivity and sale of cheap goods. For the modern improvements in technique and organisation signify that labour plays a smaller part in the process of production, and that the consuming power of the workers cannot supply a sufficiently large home market. As an increasing proportion of the aggregate income passes to the owning classes, the deficient consumption of the workers is not compensated by the increased consumption of the rich, who save and seek to invest a larger proportion of their surplus incomes than can function as productive capital. In each nation under this system the wastage results in class struggles to redress the balance, and in ever sharper conflicts between national groups of capitalists, supported by the diplomatic and armed forces of their governments, to attain the largest share of a limited world-market.

To this speculative theory, as it may appear when thus presented, Mr. Brailsford brings a rich array of argument and

* By H. N. Brailsford. Gollancz. 5s.

documented evidence presented with that skill of which he is an acknowledged master. Those who distrust the socialistic stress upon the economic interpretation of history will find their distrust shaken when they confront the psychological analysis of events by which Mr. Brailsford establishes his position. While many other sentiments and interests, political, racial, religious, philanthropic, play an imposing and to some appearances a predominant part in public policy, organised business takes the initiative and employs the others as adjuncts or allies in its gainful activities. As the direction of business passes more and more to the general capitalist, the financier, the public control over finance becomes the first essential step in that process of planning to which not only avowed socialists, but not a few conservatives, are looking as the inevitable successor of a freely competitive system which is disappearing in every country.

Though in his final chapters Mr. Brailsford sets out in brilliant survey the outlines of an economic plan by which the reasonable interests of each nation shall co-operate towards a policy of order and peace by means of a world federation, he gives full recognition to the obstacles that beset every path to this goal. His devastating criticism of the League of Nations rests not so much upon its visible inability to do great things, as upon the patent defects of a structure which contains none of those surrenders of national sovereignty needed for true internationalism and pooled security. These defects he attributes to the economic forces within each country which require the exercise of national sovereignty in the fight for profitable markets. The fine camouflage of honour, prestige, public obligations, mission of civilisation, should not blind us to the supreme peril which besets the world unless it can secure such a measure of planned co-operation for the utilisation and equitable distribution of its resources as will afford that security of life and livelihood which science has placed within the reach of reasonable man. Mr. Brailsford believes that large and speedy steps of social reconstruction are needed to cope with so critical a situation as exists to-day. But he would achieve this aim by the constitutional use of democracy, and he remains a firm believer in liberty of criticism for minorities. It is the most powerful presentation of the case for pacific socialism that has appeared in this country.

J. A. HOBSON.

LEADERS OF EUROPE.*

Emil Ludwig has never written a more arresting work than his study of nine outstanding political figures of the twentieth century. No one is more skilful in bringing dead men to life, or in communicating his personal impressions of people still among us. He is, however, more than a portrait-painter, for he has a very definite creed of his own. He is a liberal-minded citizen of the world, detesting cruelty and war, dictatorships and intolerance. For such a man there is no place in Nazi Germany, where his books had the honour of being publicly burned.

His attitude is proclaimed in the division of the volume into two parts, entitled respectively "Servants" and "Rulers" of the People. In the former are placed Nansen, Masaryk, Briand, Rathenau and Motta, each of whom is held up to admiration for his services to humanity. Nansen is the manliest of men, with a Viking's courage and a tender heart. Masaryk, serene in his monumental simplicity, is compared with Lincoln, though with a far wider culture and a more sanguine temperament. Briand is presented as the apostle of tolerance, in closer touch with the people than any of his rivals, hating war and working harder for peace than any man of his time. What a tragedy that the man who tried to persuade his countrymen to speak European was not in charge of the settlement in 1919 instead of the Tiger! Rathenau, who is hailed as the greatest German statesman since 1914, the greatest social educator of his time, is the only unhappy person in the company, too diversely endowed by nature to devote himself to a single lifelong task, and uneasily conscious of the barriers due to his Jewish blood. All these men are well known to the world; but the affectionate sketch of Motta, the Swiss Foreign Minister and champion of the League of Nations, is a distinct contribution to history no less than a fine tribute to the value of a highly civilised little state.

On reaching the Rulers of the People the atmosphere becomes less genial. Our author is well aware of the conspicuous abilities and resounding achievements of Lloyd George and Venizelos, Mussolini and Stalin, and he finds in each of them traits which he can admire. But they are placed on a lower level than the Servants, either because they represent an

* By Emil Ludwig. Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 18s.

undesirable system or because self plays a greater part. Of the four it is the Welshman who receives fewest marks. Warm praise is given to the social enthusiasm of his early years and his indomitable energy in the war; but the later phases of his career are censured with a sharpness displayed nowhere else in the book. Our author is particularly severe in reference to the change of government in 1916 and the General Election of 1918. Asquith is described as by far the nobler nature, and Lloyd George's treatment of his chief is pronounced indefensible, despite his recent apologia. He was afflicted, we are told, with an overpowering egoism. Though he and Clemenceau won the war they lost the peace. The latter offence was graver in the case of the British than the French statesman, for he realised the need of long-sighted moderation which his Khaki election had rendered politically impossible. It is possible for readers to approve the strictures of 1918 without taking the Asquith side in regard to 1916.

Venizelos, the Greek Odysseus, is the most romantic figure in the group, and the vicissitudes of his career almost make us dizzy. Of the four supermen he appeals most strongly to the author. "He is big-minded and warm-hearted. By nature Venizelos is of a kindly, bright and optimistic disposition. This seafarer and warrior from the Cretan mountains, who has always been genuinely and ingenuously revolutionary, has preserved from his own labyrinthine island the native character of a straightforward and single-minded man." The study of the Fascist Dictator supplements the author's well-known *Conversations with Mussolini*. The closing essay on Stalin is, perhaps, the most valuable of all, for the ruler of Russia rarely receives a foreign visitor, and still more rarely talks as freely as he did to Emil Ludwig. The impression was unexpectedly favourable, and indeed the author declares that he would readily confide the education of his children to his care. We are introduced to a slow, heavy, patient, hard-working, efficient man, lacking the genius of Lenin and the brilliance of Trotzky, dedicating his life to the task of raising the working classes to a higher level. "If my intuition be correct Stalin is naturally good-hearted. But his position has made him hard and unyielding. He is not ambitious, but he is ruthless towards his opponents." Many readers will be grateful for these clever studies of men whose work has counted so much, both for good and evil, in the life of our time.

G. P. G.

MINORITIES.

Mr. C. A. Macartney* takes, if not the very dullest, at any rate one of the most tiresome subjects known to students of diplomacy, yet contrives for the most part to hold the reader's interest by means of the detail and thoroughness with which he treats it and the perspective into which he puts it. Probably no greater amount of unnecessary emotion is excited by any human circumstance than that of national minorities. Mr. Macartney shows himself to be alive to the snares that beset sentimental people who happen not to number among their gifts any great sense of humour; for he concedes that the self-determination of nationalities is made impracticable, except on the broadest lines, by the inextricably intermixed conditions. He does not, however, show much appreciation of the somewhat obvious fact that much of the alleged discontent of national minorities is the fiction of interested parties, including professional politicians who have a stake in the results of the unrest for which they agitate. He concedes the difficulty of defining nationality itself, although it appears that he leans towards Dr. Gooch's definition ("Nationality denotes the resolve of a group of human beings to share their fortunes, and to exercise control over their own actions") rather than to Max Nordau's ("nationality resides simply and purely in language"). The author's own prescription in the difficult case of minorities is summed up in these words: "Minorities will continue to exist, and will continue to present a problem which statecraft will find insoluble until it tries the method—so rarely adopted hitherto—of applying the principles of justice, equality, and good government. Then minorities will cease to be a torment to the state possessing them, and will become instead a blessing" (page 501). With that solution most people who have had experience of such things will agree, if by "equality" Mr. Macartney means merely equality of political and legal rights. Outside that narrow field the notion of "equality" is one of the odd by-products of democratic sentiment. Mr. Macartney writes (page 494): "Like Lord Balfour, I was not convinced of the entire truth of the proposition that all men were equal." It is not surprising that he was not convinced of the entire truth of something entirely and obviously untrue. No two men, no

* *National States and National Minorities*. Oxford University Press. 18s. net.

two women, no two children were ever, or ever will be, equal in any respect whatsoever.

The historical content of Mr. Macartney's book, at any rate in what is commonly known as the purely "political" field, is of great value. He goes back to origins; he traces the course of national evolutions in every European and Near Eastern country with admirable energy, research and completeness; he chronicles in great detail that modern experiment, the attempted protection of minorities by the League of Nations; in short he gives us a full book of reference on the subject of minorities as well as an original and, in places, even stimulating commentary. He shows clearly the astonishing, boundless implications of a League mandate to "take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances," for the purpose of "protecting" an aggregate number of people amounting to 30,000,000, speaking thirty-six languages, living in sixteen countries. Mr. Macartney asserts (page 2) that this matter "deeply colours the day-to-day existence of all the minorities concerned," and that "to many of these it is a matter of such vital and intimate concern as to occupy their thoughts, words, and actions to the complete exclusion of reasonable spiritual activity upon any other public topic whatever." One often hears such a verdict given by such serious writers as Mr. Macartney. It is not easy wholly to agree with it. It seems to be true that most people have a craving for political excitement, and that many members of a given national minority are capable, under the coaching of professional agitators, of an almost bottomless sense of grievance and unrest. The difficulty is that the only available evidence is that of the agitators aforesaid. One has watched certain peaceful, happy, contented peoples in Europe, bent upon their daily rounds, what time one has held in one's hand the burning volume about their alleged miseries. It is simply not true to life that a rustic family of, say, illiterate Hungarian peasants who since 1919 have found themselves on the other side of a frontier ever even think of anything but their farms and their domestic life. The agitator who canvasses their sense of political wrong is probably the main trouble of their innocent lives. On the other hand there is abundant evidence of real distress caused to those members of national minorities who are engaged for their livelihood in commerce or other forms

of work dependent upon the continuity of contractual relationships. Such people, many of them, are terrified, not because they happen to live under whatever "foreign" government it may be, but because some fool of an agitator may one day succeed in upsetting their apple cart in the sacred cause of handing them back to another government. The extant works on minorities, not even excluding Mr. Macartney's present masterpiece of "political" history, do not seem to appreciate the truth that the economic and financial element is of dominant importance in material life, and that the first condition of economic and financial prosperity is freedom from political disturbance. There are few things in life that are worse for everybody concerned than the revision of treaties in their territorial aspect, no matter how bad, on pure diplomatic or ethnographic grounds, be the existing frontiers. Mr. Macartney's doctrine seems to amount to this, that the problem of minorities should be regarded as a problem of better treatment from their present governments. . . . To that extent his doctrine is salutary enough. There remains this further problem that governments themselves in their modern phase have become a danger to mankind, to majorities and minorities alike.

G. G.

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SEEING THE WORLD.*

In July 1912 Mr. Stanley Unwin, the well-known publisher, and Mr. Severn Storr set out upon a world tour, lasting eighteen months, ostensibly to study bookselling conditions. After spending more than five months in South Africa and Rhodesia, they crossed the Indian Ocean to Australia. Leaving Tasmania, they stayed several months in New Zealand and, after visiting the Friendly and other Pacific Islands, passed through New Guinea and the Philippines to Japan and China; and thence home via Singapore, Colombo and the Mediterranean. They were true sightseers, and indefatigable chroniclers, assimilating the varied scenes and people through which they passed. *Two Young Men See the World* contains the contemporary record of their travels,

* *Two Young Men See the World*. By Stanley Unwin and Severn Storr. Allen and Unwin. 16s. net.

as extracted from "letters written at odd moments from odd corners of the world to the family circle in the Homeland." It is not a tale of adventure, although there are plenty of thrilling moments, as, for example, when they avoided, by four feet, in a fog on Table Mountain, a precipice of four thousand feet, or narrowly escaped shipwreck off Delagoa Bay, or were caught in a blizzard on the Tasman Glacier in New Zealand.

This book is chiefly remarkable for its descriptive power and local atmosphere, and for the account of pioneer life in the Dominions, as it existed at all events before the war. With a vividness and intimacy unrivalled in any modern travel book, the two travellers show the reader the great phenomena of nature and human achievement. The Victoria Falls, the temple ruins at Zimbabwe, the great reaches of the Murray River, and the thermal region of boiling geysers in New Zealand only stand out as a few of their experiences. The reader will not forget their account of the Friendly Isles, where the Christian Tongans and the Europeans appeared to have harmonised singularly well, or the Samoan Isles, where the memory of Robert Louis Stevenson is still revered. They subsequently visited German New Guinea, and it is interesting to note the comment that "there is little doubt that officialism and militarism were at the root of German failure in colonization." The two young men spent most of their time in South Africa and New Zealand, and in each country experienced a taste of pioneer farming. They still yearn for the veldt,

that wonderful open country, treeless and without streams, its sunsets and its great stars, shimmering beside the gaunt summits of kopjes, black and erect, in a sky whence came the colour of a peacock's plume.

In New Zealand farm life bears a striking resemblance to that in England, but amid grander scenery and more primitive conditions. At the present time no doubt the settler enjoys more amenities, but his chances of success are unfortunately much less.

The text is illustrated by one hundred and thirty-three excellent photographs, most of which were taken on the tour. There is also a useful map of the route pasted on the inside of each cover.

BOLSHEVISM IN RUSSIA.*

Two years ago Dr. Arthur Rosenberg published in Germany a history of Bolshevism from Karl Marx to the end of the Five-Year Plan. This important work has now been translated into English by Mr. Ian D. Morrow. Dr. Rosenberg has played a prominent part as a Communist politician in Germany and has sat upon the Executive of the Third International. But since 1927 he has ceased to belong to any political party. Although personally connected with much of which he writes, he endeavours to treat the subject objectively as an academic study. The book is mainly concerned with the development of diverse theories about revolution and post-revolutionary policy emanating from the common source of Marx. It is a story of contending views upon the technique of revolution, usually determined by contemporary conditions. Prominent in a maze of theory, which is often tedious and bewildering, stands the figure of Lenin, relentless and dominating, picking his way as opportunity provided. Although determined in his objective, as the author says, "he never once hesitated to alter his beliefs to conform with new facts."

The volume commences with a brief sketch of the Marxian theory of revolution through the middle classes and the change, under the Second International, to the peaceful achievement of working-class reforms within the existing system. The situation in Russia, however, enabled Lenin to follow more closely the Marxian model. Dr. Rosenberg deals with the split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the revolution of 1905 and contrasting communist theories up to the Great War. The author considers at length the revolutions in 1917. The moderate government formed in March was joined by the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries who enjoyed the support of the great mass of the people. Only Lenin and the Bolsheviks remained aloof. The weakness of Kerenski, the July offensive, and the failure to expedite agrarian reform led to the rising in October which was entirely spontaneous. By a grand stroke of opportunism Lenin turned it to his own use. But although in the orthodox Marxian way he completed the middle-class revolution in favour of the proletariat, his theories were not strictly com-

* *A History of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Rosenberg. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net. *Russia To-day: What can we learn from it?*, by Sherwood Eddy. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

munist. He favoured a form of state capitalism. But the workers spontaneously took possession of the factories and drove out their employers. Lenin acquiesced.

It was thus that the Bolsheviks were led . . . to create a Socialist State in Russia after Trotsky's model. In doing so they had to face the consequences foreseen by Trotsky, namely, that a Russian proletarian revolution could only be maintained in existence by a proletarian revolution throughout Europe.

Until 1921 a revolutionary policy abroad was zealously promoted through the Third International. The European movement failed and in 1921 Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy which amounted in fact to state capitalism. The rest of the volume deals with the death of Lenin, the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, and the latter's theory of Socialism in a single country "which has become the fundamental doctrine of Bolshevism since 1924." This has involved industrialisation, socialisation of land and, what Dr. Rosenberg stresses especially, the disappearance of the Communist International as an active revolutionary force, with "no longer any influence upon the course of the proletarian movement."

The situation in contemporary Russia is compared with that in Great Britain and the United States by Mr. Sherwood Eddy in his new and striking book, *Russia To-day. What can we learn from it?* is the sub-title, and indicates Mr. Eddy's contention that in certain aspects Soviet Russia is a model to be copied. Last year Mr. Eddy completed the tenth of a series of visits to Russia, stretching back before the revolution. He enjoyed the privilege of unrestricted movement and his knowledge of affairs is weighty. But it is right to add that in many respects other visitors to Russia enjoying equal facilities have reported different conditions.

The patent evils of a paralysing bureaucracy, the denial of liberty, the doctrine of revolutionary violence and an exclusive dogmatism combine to prevent Mr. Eddy's acceptance of the Russian system. But much of this book is directed against the unbridled system of individual capitalism in which the employee is ruthlessly exploited. It is clear that Mr. Eddy's remarks are opposed especially to American *laissez-faire* which, until recently at least, contained few of those restraints and safeguards present in Great Britain. Mr. Eddy points to

Russia as providing, by socialisation of industry and agriculture, economic and social justice for all.

"Human service is taking the place of private profit upon such a scale that it is something new under the sun." He has to admit, however, that Stalin was forced to introduce piece work generally as an incentive to higher production.

The author proceeds to examine a number of superior Russian social services. The treatment of non-political criminals, for example, is "in many respects the most humane, the most scientific and the most successful of any in the world." Ignorance, economic pressure, physical or mental defect are regarded as the three possible causes of crime, and their treatment lies in education, employment, medical care and environment. But if the criminal steals communal instead of private property, he is shot. Mr. Eddy praises Russia for its exemplary work in education and culture. "Real tyranny does not educate." But it will always propagate its views, and education in Russia is saturated with propaganda. Mr. Eddy complains that in England compulsory education ends at fourteen. But in Russia at present it ceases at eleven. The question of religion is discussed at considerable length. The author argues, in effect, that we cannot complain of what is in certain aspects "a dogmatic fanatic religion of atheistic humanism," while the Churches fail to advocate the Christian doctrine of a new social order of equal justice.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

President Masaryk Tells His Own Story,* recounted by Karel Čapek, presents to English readers one of the greatest, wisest and best men of our time. The volume is abridged from the Czech version of many conversations with the founder of Czechoslovakia, ingeniously woven into a loose biographical narrative. The larger and most novel part of the story, covering the sixty-four years preceding the world war, introduces us to the blacksmith's apprentice who rose from the ranks, studied at Vienna and Leipzig, married a gifted American lady, became a Professor at the Czech University of Prague, wrote many books and entered the Reichsrat at Vienna. With the coming of the war he began the astonishing activities in many countries which he has described in detail in his monumental work, *The Making of a State*. At eighty-four

* Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

the President is still mentally and physically alert, a great patriot, a great democrat, a great scholar, a great gentleman. His mellow reflections on his own career and on life in general are well worth reading.

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All revolutions produce their political theorists and in this respect Germany is being almost prolific. Herr Oswald Spengler, however, had obtained a reputation some years ago and his work *The Hour of Decision*,* written a year ago and now translated into English, represents the culmination of his views expressed in his earlier book, *The Decline of the West*. He welcomes the German revolution because it is a step towards the Prussianism which alone can stem the tide of world disintegration and resist the menace of the coloured races. His reactionary theories are presented with a forceful, though tedious, repetition, and are supported by a distorted knowledge of history. The foundation of his reasoning lies in his refusal to recognise the higher side of humanity and in his advocacy of the cruder animal instincts of the human race. "Man is a beast of prey," and the forces which will sway the future are "the will of the Strong, *healthy* instincts, race, the will to possession and power; while justice, happiness, and peace—those dreams which will always remain dreams—hover ineffectively over them." The world depression is directly attributable to the growth of free institutions and representative government. Herr Spengler at least may be credited with frankness. The opponents of his "great and noble world" are united by "a mushy desire for revenge for some bad luck that has spoilt their lives, the absence of any instinct of honour and duty, and an unlimited thirst for money without work and for rights without responsibilities." The overthrow of democracy, which is stigmatised as Bolshevism, can only be begun by the idea of a "Prussian" existence or "Caesarism." It amounts to an immutable gradation of rank based upon the superiority of aristocratic birth and the functional subordination of the masses. It exhibits admittedly a scepticism of rational thinking and contempt for humanity. Herr Spengler does not contemplate peace or prosperity. "Conflict . . . is life itself," and "Prussianism is, above all, the undisputed precedence of foreign policy . . . over internal policy, which exists solely to keep the nation in form for this task." He exalts power as the sole object of national policy and significantly remarks that Caesarism "will not persuade, it will conquer by force of arms." It may well be doubted whether this book represents German opinion, but it must exert a disturbing influence in view of the present European situation.

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And Quiet Flows the Don† by Mikhail Sholokhow, is a picture of Cossack life in the region of the River Don. It opens with a description of the village of Tatarsk in peace, of violent, cruel, strong, hardworking

* Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

† Putnam. 7s. 6d.

farmers. The very first scene is of the villagers doing a poor little Turkish wife of one of their number to death because they didn't like her face. Prejudice and superstition are strong, and old customs and racial pride. The love story of Gregor and Aksinia dominates this first book with its passionate meetings. Behind it is all the work of the farm, the ploughing and reaping and threshing, the care of the animals, the fishing in the river, the village scandals, the violent quarrels and beatings of wives, the snow and cold in winter, the sultry heat of the harvest field in summer. Each scene is introduced with a description of the sky and the weather, the threatening storm, the wind or the rain, the bird flying across, the lie of the land and the mood of the river. Not every setting is in harmony with the incidents in the foreground, but these land pictures, the constant reference back, as it were, from the roughness and insensitiveness of the people to the ever-changing but ordered life of nature, the quiet background, give distinction to a book otherwise full of horrors.

The first mental disturbance in this unthinking village is the work of Stockman, a revolutionist who comes and settles quietly as a locksmith and begins secret meetings in a small way in his hut. At the outbreak of war he is sent to Siberia. Then comes the calling up of the Cossacks to go to the Austrian and German fronts. War scenes such as have been described on many fronts follow one another in quick succession—horrible scenes—and a growing disgust for war takes possession of many of these rough Cossack fellows. When the Revolution comes confusion is everywhere, but the regiments finally break down; many war heroes slip off home when they find they are to march to Petersburg to help to overthrow the Government of Kerensky. They are not going to shoot down their own people, even the Russians.

In the last book the war generals are gathered in the South of Russia to rally the counter-revolutionary forces. The Cossacks are divided, many are Bolsheviks but far more are against the Soviet régime. In the Civil War worse massacres are committed than on the German and Austrian fronts, and on both sides. There is a brief but poignant love story between Bunchuk, the Bolshevik Cossack, and Anna, the Jewess, both of the machine-gun detachment. The book ends with the triumph of the White Guards in that part of the Don district. And the last scene is at the lonely grave out on the steppe of the little Cossack, Valet, over which has been erected a shrine with a sorrowful picture of the Mother of God.

Later on in June, two bustards fought around the shrine. They beat out a little bare patch in the blue wormwood, crushing the green flood of ripening spear grass, fighting for the female, for the right to life, for love and fertility. And again, after a little while, under the mound, right by the shrine, in the shaggy shelter of the old wormwood, a female bustard laid nine speckled smoky-blue eggs and sat on them, warming them with her body, protecting them with her glossy wings.

But there must be a sequel to this vivid book.

*Taming Philippine Headhunters. A Study of Government and of Cultural Change in Northern Luzon,** by Dr. F. M. Keessing and Mrs. M. Keessing, is a deep and interesting study of a difficult problem. Until the twentieth century the mountain people of the Northern Philippines had been little affected by the three hundred years of Western rule and civilisation, and where it had penetrated the knowledge was too often bitter. Then some thirty years ago came the American occupation, bringing with it a different foreign influence but still Western in its outlook. The United States found in these mountain people a problem requiring tact and patience, the solution to which could only be found through years of careful study and administration. Local memories of Spanish rule have not helped the difficulties to be overcome, but the very fact that ancient enemies live and let live shows how much has been accomplished. The United States stopped head-hunting a generation ago, but it is still dangerously near the surface. "Without the moral force of the constabulary looming over all, communities would soon be on the defensive; a murder, even a woman's imaginings, would precipitate the offensive, and warfare and head-hunting would once more spread." The non-Christians, as the mountain people are termed, are less advanced than the lowland Filipinos, with the result that there is a strong social line between them. It will take years of work and suitable education to remove this prejudice; the mountaineers cling to old customs and beliefs, they are constantly suspicious of new ideas and at the same time know that the Christian Filipinos consider them inferior. They feel the clash of the old and the new; to be naked in the towns causes shame, and to be clothed in the mountains too often results in disease from sleeping in wet garments. It is not an easy world in which the non-Christian finds himself to-day; he may have ambitions which result in good educational qualifications, but which, through no fault of his own, do not lead to the desired post. He has been educated away from agriculture and hunting, his birth-right, but he is not sufficiently educated to understand that there may be too many clerks in his world. The result may be a band of discontented youths, who could cause even greater trouble than their head-hunting fathers. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, former Governor-General of the Philippines, considers in his introduction that the ultimate solution for the mountain people should be assimilation. "By assimilation, however, I do not mean that they should be submerged. If such a policy is carried out wisely and with sufficient flexibility, nothing of the sort need occur." The authors have made their researches in connection with the Philippine Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but they themselves are responsible for the statements and opinions given.

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

AUGUST, 1934.

THE TERROR IN GERMANY.

IT is difficult to write with restraint of the blood-stained tyranny which holds a great nation in its grip. Its crimes against civilisation and humanity are beyond forgiveness. We have been told by the Nazis a thousand times that the atrocities which shocked the world were invented by refugee Communists and Jews. We never believed it, for our sources of information were too numerous and too well-informed to leave us in doubt. Moreover, the public acts and official declarations of the party spoke and speak loudly enough for themselves. The indiscriminate butcheries of June 30th and July 1st, 1934, are merely the latest incidents of a reign of terror which has lasted for eighteen months. Hitler and Göring will go down to history not as the saviours of their country but as men with the stain of blood on their hands. The true character of the movement and its leaders, long known to close observers, stands nakedly revealed. It is the cult of violence.

A month ago the Nazis had a few friends outside their frontiers. To-day they have none. Men like Mr. Vernon Bartlett, who have honestly striven to find some elements of value in the German revolution, now wash their hands of the whole affair. "So far as methods of government and respect for human life and human freedom are concerned," wrote *The Times* in a memorable leader on July 3rd,

- Germany has ceased for the time being to be a modern European country. She has reverted to medieval conditions. It seemed inconceivable that the head, even the despotic head, of a modern Government should order the arrest and the summary execution of numbers of his principal lieutenants. It was even harder to believe that among the victims chosen for the massacre were men who had been his closest associates and had been rewarded with high office and entrusted with great powers. This might be credible in Russia, or in the Turkey of Abdul Hamid's time, or in some medieval monarchy.

The Times spoke for us all.
VOL. CXLVI.

At the election of March 5th, 1933, the Nazis received 44 per cent. of the votes, and it was only with the help of the Nationalist 8 per cent. that they secured a majority. Hitler, however, was the leader of by far the largest of the political parties, and he numbered among his followers some of the best as well as some of the worst elements in the country. It was believed by millions of Germans, particularly among the young, that the leader for whom they had longed in the years of suffering and humiliation had at last appeared. He was a man of the people, a manual worker before the war, a private soldier who had been wounded and gassed, a man of abstemious life who cared nothing for money or birth, the champion of the peasant against the big landowner and of the little shopkeeper against the big store. Here also was a man who would look the foreigner in the face and restore the national self-confidence of a shell-shocked people. Here too, it was believed in many quarters, was the heaven-sent reformer who would abolish corruption, override vested interests, break down the barriers of class, and give the hungry bread. The experiment of democracy in Germany had been inaugurated under conditions of treaty servitude and economic stress which made success extremely difficult and popularity impossible. People were tired of the frequent dissolutions, the ineffective coalitions, the transient Chancellors. For years before the emergence of Hitler I had heard it said that what the country needed was a Man. The ship of state, we were told, required a firm hand at the helm. The mood was intelligible, though there is such a thing as jumping from the frying-pan into the fire.

Nobody who visited the new Germany in 1933 could fail to realise that the inferiority complex of the post-war years had given way to a romantic self-glorification, based to a large extent on the Leader's gospel of the superiority of the Aryan race. There was a widespread feeling that the dark days of misery and humiliation were at an end. Healthy-looking lads in their brown uniforms swung through the streets, rejoicing to think that there was a place for them in the Third Realm. No one could deny the vigour with which the new Government attacked the economic problems of the day. Roads and other national works were inaugurated, the figures of unemployment began to fall, winter relief was organised on an unprecedented scale, and the peasant's family holding was

secured against eviction for debt. The reckless provocations to foreign Powers which make Hitler's autobiography the most explosive manual of our time found no echo in his speeches, and the Ten Year Pact with Poland seemed to promise a long term of peace. Though the autumn plebiscite on the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League was a pure farce, owing to the conditions in which it was held, the prestige of the Leader in his own country at the end of 1933 was probably greater than when he had been called to office.

That was one side of the picture. But the liberty of the Press had been so completely demolished that the ugly side of the new régime was only fully visualised in other countries, partly through the invaluable communications from the foreign correspondents and residents in Germany, partly through the reports of the exiles driven from their country by the spectres of starvation or imprisonment. The attack on the Jews, not for their religion but for their blood, was the first sensational demonstration that a fanatical despotism was installed in Berlin. A second object-lesson was presented by the creation of concentration camps, crowded with tens of thousands of victims who had broken no law, some of whom were tortured, shot "while trying to escape," or driven to suicide. A third foul stain came to light in the savagery of the scum of the Brown Army, who often paid off private scores against their enemies, and whose beatings and tortures of innocent men and women were ignored by the police and unpunished by the courts. If a country passes from a parliamentary to an authoritarian régime, that is its own affair. If it ceases to be a *Rechtsstaat*, a state based on legality, and tramples the principles of Western civilisation in the dust, that is the concern of us all. The progress of society is the story not merely, and indeed not chiefly, of the change from despotism to liberty but of the advance from crude methods of violence to the reign of law. We complain of the Nazi leaders not because they disbelieve in democracy but because they are fundamentally uncivilised. The Philosophic Despots of the eighteenth century were ahead of their time: the Nazis are behind it.

With the opening of 1934 the tidal wave which had swept away familiar landmarks in its tempestuous rush began to ebb. Fresh blunders created new foes. Bismarck had broken

a lance with the Vatican and had got the worst of it. With the Jews he had been on excellent terms, and he never dreamed of dictating to the Protestant Church. It is a measure of Hitler's lack of political judgment that he simultaneously antagonised Jews, Catholics and Protestants. Men and women who were friendly—or at any rate not unfriendly—to the new régime were wounded in their deepest feelings. The Catholics complained that the Concordat of July 1933 was being infringed, and the Protestants groaned under the yoke of Bishop Müller, an army chaplain, whose sole qualification for his post was the friendship of the Leader. Men of eminence and piety in both Churches, among them Cardinal Faulhaber and Karl Barth, joined in denouncing the neo-paganism of the "German Christians" and their contemptuous rejection of the ethics of Christ. The interference of the Government was resented all the more since Hitler himself has no interest in churches or creeds. In the name of the totalitarian state all opposition to the will of the Dictator had to be stamped out, all criticism of the Government silenced. *Gleichschaltung*, or assimilation, is the watchword of the new autocracies of Italy and Germany, in which a sterile, stagnant, mechanised uniformity replaces the manifold varieties of nature and vetoes the flowering of personality.

In addition to the growing hostility of the Churches, new grounds of discontent emerged or developed as winter passed into spring and spring into summer. The statistics showing that unemployment had been halved within a year were misleading. Though fewer men were wholly without work, more were working short time. Others were transferred to labour camps or concentration camps, driven out of the country, or concealed in some manner from public scrutiny. Some improvement took place in the home market, largely due to public works and Government orders for munitions. On the other hand exports declined with the decrease of orders from agricultural countries, whose products were excluded or limited in the interests of German agriculture. Another factor in the diminution of commerce, it is widely believed, has been the Jewish boycott, a practical reply to the shameful persecution of their fellows; but the dimensions of such individual retaliation are unknown. The difficulty of buying foreign raw materials needed by German industry has increased with the decline in the sale of her finished goods.

The gold cover is almost exhausted, and Dr. Schacht is desperately striving to keep the mark on its legs. The cost of living has risen without a corresponding rise in wages and salaries, and the mass of workers are no better off than a year ago. Hitler never promised to restore prosperity by the stroke of a pen, but the continuance of hard times produced inevitable disenchantment in the ranks of his expectant followers.

A further cause of the growing dissatisfaction as the present year advanced was the discreditable conduct of prominent leaders of the Brown Army, for whom the word gangsters was the only suitable term. Many of the misdeeds of the party were unknown except to the readers of foreign newspapers; but millions were aware that Röhm, the commander of the Brownshirts, was a moral pervert, and that Heines, the tyrant of Silesia, was a convicted murderer. Though scandal rarely touched the Leader himself, his indifference to the morals of his associates was observed with regret. As late as last autumn he made Röhm a Cabinet Minister, in full knowledge of his depravity. Decent Nazis, like other citizens, were scandalised to see such pestilent adventurers appointed to high place. The joyful conviction that the triumph of the party denoted a moral no less than a political reformation, an onslaught on materialism and the corrupting influences of city life, could no longer be entertained. Power, the acid test of character, revealed the alloy in many of the leaders, whose extravagance and dissolute lives have at last been publicly confessed and rebuked by the Leader himself.

The repeated references in speeches of Hitler, Göring and Goebbels to grumblers and critics confirmed the information that I received from various quarters that the popularity and prestige of the régime were on the wane. It was not, however, till the challenging speech of Papen at Marburg on June 17th that the pent-up flood of discontent burst forth. Though the speaker was no less a personage than the Vice-Chancellor, the text was promptly suppressed by his Cabinet colleague, the Minister of Propaganda. But not even Goebbels could prevent many of his countrymen learning that the ex-Chancellor and the President's chosen friend had denounced some of the moral scandals of the party and demanded a restoration of the right to criticise and to think. When the fact emerged that the speech had been submitted to Hindenburg and that its

author received a congratulatory telegram from Neudeck its significance was enhanced. No man had done more than the ambitious intriguer Papen to lift Hitler into the saddle, and few actors on the German stage deserve less respect. But it was a portent for the Vice-Chancellor to say in public what millions had for many months been whispering behind closed doors. The Marburg oration was the unwitting prelude to the bloody drama of June 30th.

The German people were at first officially informed that Röhm and seven Storm Troop leaders had been shot, and that Schleicher, with his wife, had been killed while resisting arrest. An attempt was made to strengthen the Government case by a vague reference to "a foreign Power." The world was asked to believe that the "cleaning up" had merely eliminated a few moral perverts, traitors and rebels. Gratitude was claimed for the efficient performance of such a salutary task by the Nazi Press, by Hess, the Chancellor's deputy, and by Goebbels, who scolded the representatives of the foreign Press, to whom we owe an incalculable debt. Even in a country so gagged and bound, so infested by spies and informers, it proved impracticable to conceal the fact that the casualty list was far longer than the Government had confessed, and that it contained such names as that of the blameless and respected Dr. Beck, the student's friend.

On July 13th the Reichstag—now a purely Nazi body—was summoned to hear and approve the Chancellor's version of the blood-bath of June 30th. A dangerous conspiracy had been discovered and seventy-seven people had been shot. The arch-plotter was Röhm, who desired to obtain control of the Reichswehr in addition to his command of the Brown Army. Röhm was in touch with Schleicher, Gregor Strasser had been involved, and a man had been engaged to murder the Chancellor himself. The explosion was timed for June 30th, and it was only prevented by the lightning strokes of the leader in Munich and Göring in Berlin.

If I am reproached with not leaving condemnation to the legal courts, I answer: In this hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation, and in these twenty-four hours I was therefore the supreme court of the nation in my own person.

Thus the official version holds the field, for those who might have told another story lie in bloody graves. When Hitler

endeavoured to overthrow the lawful Government of the Reich in 1923 he suffered one year's imprisonment and no more. In 1934 a similar attempt—if such an attempt there was—demanded no less than seventy-seven deaths without trial.

Law and order, we were informed by Goebbels on the morrow of the massacre, prevailed throughout the Reich, and the nation stood behind the Leader in unprecedented enthusiasm. We have heard that story before. *Solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant.* For a time, no doubt, there will be a deathly stillness over the land. The reverberations of the firing-squads will not so quickly die away. But can anyone doubt that the moral foundations of the Government have been weakened? Each of these Storm Troop leaders, like Röhm himself, owed his position to Hitler; and now, in the second year of the régime, they are branded and shot as conspirators and perverts. The whole of the Nazi system, as we are always reminded by its champions, rests on the principle of personal responsibility, from the lowest rungs of the official ladder to the highest. For the haphazard democratic method of selection by votes and majorities has been substituted the direct appointment of men exceptionally fitted by their personal qualities to rule. The results of the new dispensation have been proclaimed to a listening world through the rifle's mouth. Whichever interpretation of the conspiracy we adopt, the result is equally damaging to the Government. If it was a dread reality, Hitler is convicted of appointing disloyal adventurers to high office. If it was not, he emerges as a neurotic figure, seized by a sudden panic and shooting wildly at his old friends.

After such a convulsion things can never be quite the same again. All the world is asking how long the régime is likely to endure. Before the massacre it was generally believed that, except in the event of an unsuccessful war, it had come to stay, not only on account of its material strength and its wide popular support, but owing to the incurable divisions of its foes. I shared that opinion, but I do not hold it to-day. When a revolution begins to devour its children, the process rarely stops with the first mouthful. If we may assume that the power of the Brownshirts is for practical purposes at an end, the authority of the Reichswehr, which is far more Nationalist than Nazi in colour, becomes potentially supreme.

The socialist portion of the Nazi programme has never been carried out, and few people expect to hear of it again. Hitler, once the fiery champion of the little man, is becoming a prisoner of the Right.

The most powerful figure in Germany since the events of June 30th is Göring, the leader of the right wing in the party. People speak of the Triumvirate; but Goebbels, though the cleverest and most educated of the three, is not a born leader like his colleagues. His sympathies are with the Left; but he loves power more than principles, and as the party swings towards the right he will not obstruct. The Reichswehr abides its time. The Nationalists share the Nazi contempt for democracy; but they disapprove the crazy anti-Semitism of the dominant faction and the scarcely less insensate attack on the Churches. Their influence is likely to grow if Göring supplants his chief as the main inspirer of party policy. Hitler's strength in the country has rested on his personal ascendancy, rather than on his vague political and social creed. His prestige had begun to decline before the massacre, and it is now waning rapidly. Something has snapped. "Since the massacre of June 30th," writes an experienced German friend to me, "I consider Hitler to be finished. He is doomed. He possessed a source of strength which seemed to make him indispensable—the people's belief in him. It has gone." No one can forecast the events of the coming months.

What should our attitude be to the Nazi dictatorship as revealed by recent events? The answer has already been given by the British Press. With such men of blood we can have no dealings, public or private, save "correct" governmental relations. Any attempt to intervene in the affairs of Germany, such as an economic boycott or a preventive war, would be not only indefensible in itself, but would bring back Hitler's popularity in a flood. If the Terror is to be overthrown it must be cast off by the disillusioned people which, in a mood of mingled exaltation and despair, allowed it to be imposed. Dictatorships usually appear to possess irresistible strength till the hour in which they crash to the ground like a rotten bough. We can best assist a great and friendly nation by refusing to identify it with the crimes of its rulers, and by keeping intact in our own country the free institutions to which, under better captains and at the appointed hour, it will joyfully return.

G. P. GOOCH.

THE NEW UNEMPLOYMENT ACT.

THE Unemployment Act, which received the Royal Assent on June 28th, after twenty-seven days' consideration in the House of Commons, is the thirty-sixth in the rapid succession of Acts in which Parliament has sought, with immense expenditure of time and effort, to devise a permanent scheme of security for the worker against the consequences of unemployment.

This long series of Acts is a record of the failure of Parliament to find a permanent plan acceptable to those in need and within the financial capacity of the nation. The present Act has been proclaimed as the greatest piece of social legislation for decades. There is nothing in the Act to justify such a claim, and experience alone can show whether the far-reaching changes in the treatment of social poverty and the salvage proposals for workers who have suffered physical and moral deterioration through prolonged unemployment will operate smoothly and without hardship. There was little evidence during the discussions in Committee that the House of Commons as a whole had any clear understanding of the revolutionary change involved in the setting up of a new centralised National Poor Law which is the real purpose of Part II, or of the threat of this proposal to the smooth working of the contributory scheme of insurance continued in Part I.

Neither did it appear that the promoters of the Act had given consideration to the reactions of this new National Poor Law upon the tasks which remain to be carried out by Public Assistance Committees and other local services. The new Act is regarded by its supporters as a permanent settlement of the problem of Unemployment Insurance and of help for the able-bodied unemployed who are not covered by insurance. But it is very doubtful whether Parliament will have a long respite from the consideration of this subject, and it may well be asked if the centralisation of the care of so much social poverty will not inevitably lead in time to the centralisation of the medical and other services which have been built up by and are now operated with increasing success by local authorities. Certainly the nation ought not to be content (there are already signs that it is not) with the educational proposals for children in Part I. The Act reduces the age of entry into insurance to fourteen, or the school-leaving age for

the time being, and potentially raises the school-leaving age to eighteen for all who are without work. The reduction of the age of entry into insurance is a sound step under present conditions; but the implied admission that children of fourteen are subjects for Employment rather than Education, and under the Ministry of Labour rather than the Board of Education, will be widely regretted. The encouragement to children to remain at school, by crediting them with contributions to the contributory insurance scheme is better than no proposal at all, but it adds an unnecessary complication to an educational system which needs different and bolder treatment.

The provision that those who have left school should not be left to deteriorate in idleness in the streets, but should attend juvenile instruction centres or training courses when out of work, would also be entirely to the good if no better proposals were available. Unfortunately, from an educational point of view, the value of irregular attendances at instruction centres can be but little. It is impossible to arrange an educational curriculum for a floating school population. Teachers will rarely have the same classes before them; for many children will pass in and out of the centres at frequent and irregular intervals, and the brighter children, who would most benefit from continued education, will presumably retain the jobs they get, while those less desirable from an employer's point of view will remain longer in the centres.

A nation which has lost the initial advantage of an earlier industrial development and greater accessibility to the raw materials of industry than its rivals can only hope to maintain itself successfully in the competitive field by the activities of a population at least as well educated, as alert and adaptable, as that of its competitors, and cannot rely for the training of its rising generation on a mixture of casual employment and casual education. The cat and mouse scheme provided under this Act is not education: it can only be described as salvage.

If, through a variety of causes, we have entered on an era of greater leisure, then the simple principle of action should be to concentrate the increased leisure of those who are of an age to benefit from it, that is, those within the age limits of fourteen to eighteen, who can benefit from education and training, and those who have reached, or are approaching, the retiring age and are entitled to enjoy greater leisure. The

provisions of the Act are no substitute for the raising of the school age to fifteen, which is an urgent matter, and for the setting up of a well-ordered system of part-time education up to the age of eighteen. Such a scheme would not only be a source of national strength in the future, but would provide opportunities of employment for some of those in the prime of life, for whom no acceptable substitute for employment can be found, by decreasing the competition of juvenile labour, which is becoming intensified at present by the incidence of the post-war birth-rate. Some parts of this Act are not lacking in courage; bold action with regard to this section would have redeemed it from the reproach which it shares with all its predecessors that it does nothing to reduce the hard core of unemployment.

Part I continues the contributory system of unemployment insurance on terms somewhat more generous to the unemployed. The cut in standard benefits has been restored, but the rates of contributions remain at the emergency figure of 10d. per week fixed in 1931.

The chief Debate on Part I arose on the proposals to free the contributory insurance system from the incubus of the debt (amounting to about £105 million) accumulated in past years. There was a strong feeling in all parties that the scheme should be given a clear start in view of the fact that the Act contains special provisions for securing the permanent financial solvency of the Fund. The powerful arguments brought forward were unheeded. Only a trifling concession was made, with the result that the insurance fund remains charged over the next forty years with annual payments of about £5 million for the amortisation of the debt. Having regard to the fact that the debt arose in the main from the mistakes of previous Governments and their over-optimism as to the course of employment, and also to the urgency of freeing industry from every possible burden, the refusal to relieve the fund of this heavy charge seems unfair and unwise, and can only be described as a piece of financial pedantry.

If unemployment should continue to decrease, the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee would naturally wish to recommend a reduction in the rates of contribution. The heavy incidence of the debt charges could have been alleviated by reducing the contributions of workers and employers, while leaving the State contribution at a higher level, but

unfortunately the hands of the Statutory Committee are tied by the provisions of the Act. In 1925, when the debt of the Unemployment Fund had reached what was then considered to be the alarming figure of 17 millions, Parliament accepted the principle that the contribution of the State should be higher than that of the other contributors. In the Act of 1929 the State contribution was fixed at one-third, and this rigid principle is continued in the present Act. It is unfortunate that an amendment to give the Statutory Committee liberty of action in this matter was rejected in the House of Lords.

Part II of the Act is a great speculation in the treatment of human misfortune. In this part of the Act, Parliament has sketched out a skeleton scheme for a new State Poor Law, leaving administrative details to be worked out by the newly appointed Unemployment Assistance Board, over which Parliament has but a shadowy control. It has long been the desire of all political parties that the cost of maintaining the able-bodied poor who had exhausted their rights to statutory benefit should be a charge on the Exchequer and not on the local rates, and that the distressed areas should not be further submerged by the impossible task of keeping their own poor. This is in part carried out by the Act, but it is unfortunate that a certain niggardliness which tinges the major financial proposals of the Act has left the local rates charged with a small contribution towards an expenditure over which the local authorities will have no control. The widely expressed desire to take all questions of relief "out of politics" was another element which helped to make it easy to launch this new bureaucratic experiment, an object of which is to transfer the administration of the Means Test to Whitehall.

The new Unemployment Assistance Board is practically independent of Parliament, although its regulations will come before Parliament for formal approval, but those who think that it is possible, even if desirable, that the detailed control of the lives of millions of unfortunate people, for that is the real function of the U.A.B., can ever be anything less than a major political issue cherish a vain hope. Parliament has already devolved important tasks to statutory semi-independent bodies; the Electricity Commission, the London Passenger Transport Board, and the Broadcasting Corporation are cases in point, and the success of these experiments will doubtless lead to similar processes of devolution in future,

but this is the first time that Parliament has divested itself of a prime responsibility concerning the condition of the people. Our history does not provide any precedent for the centralised control of the poor, which has always been a local affair. The nearest approach to the present proposal is to be found in the Poor Law Commission of 1834, when the conduct of the Commissioners, who were known as the "Three Kings of Somerset House," aroused widespread indignation.

The new Board and its assistants will be confronted with an extraordinarily difficult task—it will have to open offices all over the country, duplicate all the machinery of investigation and appeal at present operated by the P.A.C., and also in part by the Ministry of Labour itself. One of its first tasks will be to draw up scales of help, to cover all the needs of those who qualify for its care, with the exception of medical needs, but including rent. This will immediately bring the new Board face to face with a dilemma which is inherent in an attempt to administer two centralised sources of help to the unemployed—one administering benefits at fixed rates for limited periods, and the other making non-contributory allowances without limit of amount and unlimited as to time. At all stages of the Parliamentary discussion on the Bill the wish of the House of Commons that the allowances should be generous was manifest, and assurance was given by Government spokesmen that the non-contributory allowances would be "freely given" above the "ground floor scale" of benefits under the contributory scheme.

If this is the case then it appears inevitable that applicants for benefit with long records of contributions to their credit will find themselves receiving less, at the same Employment Exchange, and possibly at the same counter, than a neighbour who has no contributions to his credit at all. Anomalies of this kind will immediately call in question the possibility of administering and, indeed, the advantage of maintaining a contributory scheme. The worker will ask himself what advantage he derives by paying 10d. a week to secure a payment of the same amount as or less than his neighbour obtains without payment at all. Similarly, the employer may begin to doubt the advantage of continuing to support a scheme from which his employee derives no special advantage. All doubts on this point, which are of great practical importance, remain unresolved, for no answer was made to criticisms

advanced during the passage of the Bill. Of the Unemployment Assistance Board it can be said with certainty that it constitutes a most powerful threat to the continued existence of the system of contributory Unemployment Insurance to which the Government and Parliament have expressed their attachment.

To the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee set up under Part I is assigned the task of making, as soon as may be after the passing of the Act, such proposals as may seem to them to be practicable for the insurance against unemployment of persons engaged in employment in Agriculture. During the Committee stage attempts were made to include in the Act a like instruction with regard to the so-called "black-coated" workers with incomes above the limit of £250 who have hitherto been precluded from participation in any contributory scheme, and also other classes who do not come under Part I and Part II of the Act because they are not employed under a contract of service. During the debate much sympathy was expressed with these classes whose only resource if misfortune overtakes them is the Poor Law, but speakers did not fail to point out that there was no obvious advantage in bringing agricultural and other workers into a contributory scheme, having regard to the assurances given that the Means Test would be operated more sympathetically by the Board, and that the receipt of the non-contributory allowance under Part II would not attract the poor law "stigma," and that the allowances given would not be limited to the amount of standard benefit. The threat to the contributory scheme still remains, but it is perhaps somewhat modified since the restoration of the emergency cuts in unemployment benefit.

These are not the only difficulties looming before the new Board and the local authorities dealing with the poor. Those who are familiar with the various forms of public help to which the poor have to look for the means of existence, know that a frequent cause of anxiety and hardship is to be found in the difficulty of deciding questions of scope and entitlement. Under the triple system of relief, statutory benefits, transitional payments and Poor Law Relief, which has been in operation since the crisis of 1931, the machinery of Courts of Referees and the investigating machinery of the Public Assistance Committees have been at times under a heavy

strain in making hundreds of thousands of determinations. It is true that the machinery has on the whole worked better than might have been expected, but it has nevertheless at all times been inevitable that some applicants have had to endure a considerable amount of hardship during the period of uncertainty as to the amount they were to receive, and the source from which it was to come. Whether the new operations of the U.A.B. will increase or diminish these difficulties time alone can prove, but it is certain that the Board and its officials will be immediately faced with some extraordinarily difficult problems of co-ordination and definition.

During the passage of the Bill through Parliament there was little evidence that the House of Commons as a whole realised the revolutionary nature of changes involved in the first attempt to set up a new national Poor Law, or the consequences which may arise from thrusting a new and untried centralised poverty service with social as well as industrial functions between the Unemployed Insurance scheme on the one hand, and the Public Assistance Board and other local services which afford help to the needy on the other.

For example, there are a multitude of families who are at present receiving outdoor relief to supplement their inadequate earnings. Under the Act, whenever the wage-earner or one of the wage-earners in these families falls out of work the family will be handed over by the P.A.C. to the new Board, and when the contributor to the support of the family falls into work again the Board will hand the family back to the care of the Public Assistance Committee, and so on. It is clear that in those districts where there is much casual labour, as, for example, in the large sea-ports, many families will be constantly oscillating from the care of one authority to the other. It is difficult to imagine a less desirable fate.

Whether this system can be made to work, and whether all these difficulties can be met and surmounted, experience alone can show. It certainly cannot be said with confidence that Parliament will not have to reconsider before long many of those questions concerning the relief of poverty and unemployment which have occupied so much of its time in the last fourteen years.

GRAHAM WHITE.

C. P. SCOTT OF THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.

AMONG the myriad daily newspapers of our time there may be a score that can be accurately described as important institutions. There are possibly about half a dozen which we think of as possessing personality, in any worthy sense of that ambiguous word. Fifty years ago the number was much larger. The world of news, like other worlds, has been transformed. Continuous expansion and mechanical processes have made the present-day newspaper a product having little in common with Delane's *Times* or Morley's *Pall Mall Gazette*. Throughout the changes which have laid waste the newspaper field a few only of the older dailies have been upheld. Their survival affords evidence of a wonderful tenacity. And one morning paper stands alone. Public men, journalists, and the world in general unite in attributing to the *Manchester Guardian* a position and influence that are unshared by any rival. This journal is not only an institution: it is a legend, a miraculous name. And while a full exposition of the phenomenon would need to take many circumstances into account, the governing fact has long been matter of common knowledge. The *Manchester Guardian* is identified with one man, who in the latter part of his career became the most famous editor in the world. C. P. Scott's control lasted for fifty-eight years. We now have his *Life*,* written by a distinguished historian and man of letters, who enjoyed his friendship and is proud of having been a member of his staff. Mr. J. L. Hammond has done two things in especial for which he deserves our thanks: he has kept the book short, and has treated the Editor's papers as what they undoubtedly are, documents of importance in the history of England.

Charles Prestwich Scott was born at Bath in 1846. His family belonged to the south-west of England and were wholly Nonconformist. Their church was the Unitarian, and they were of the influential section in that body. C. P. Scott was happy, as he always held, in being allowed to escape with a minimum of school, and he was one of the few Nonconformists who went to Oxford before the abolition of the ecclesiastical tests. Corpus Christi College was broad enough to admit him;

* *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*. By J. L. Hammond. G. Bell & Sons. 12s. 6d.

C. P. SCOTT OF THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. 145

he took a first in Greats, and in the year of the Franco-German War made choice of journalism as a profession. We see this extremely high-minded youth, who had taken his own calm line against the Anglican routine of Oxford, giving weight to no worldly consideration as he decides against entering the Unitarian ministry. He was then, as at every stage of his sixty working years, most fortunate in all the circumstances that count. The dedicated life was inevitable for him, but the initial step was the easiest possible. The *Manchester Guardian* was a family property.

Founded just half a century earlier by John Edward Taylor, it had, in 1871, been directed for ten years by his son. The second John Edward Taylor was possessed of ample means, preferred living in London, collected pictures, and had no desire to remain his own editor. From Oxford he summoned his young cousin, and a few months later C. P. Scott was appointed to the command. Taylor was sole proprietor. For more than thirty years, though not quite to the end, the partnership between owner and editor was as satisfactory as that relationship can be. In 1905 Scott became chief proprietor and governing director, and as such, down to his retirement in 1929, he held and exercised absolute power over the paper. This is a record without parallel among English dailies.

"The age of ruins is past: have you seen Manchester?" said Disraeli's *Sidonian*. Sixty years ago Manchester was a place of enormous importance and of a splendidly growing intellectual life. Scott found his spiritual home among the men who were making Owens College, soon to become the first of the new universities. They made an impressive group of intellectuals. Henry Roscoe and A. W. Ward, Adamson, Jevons, Boyd Dawkins, Balfour Stewart, Samuel Dill—these were all members of the college faculty, while Bryce and Dicey were among the visiting lecturers. The new Town Hall was being built, and Scott gave support to Ford Madox Brown who, to the stupefaction of not a few Mancunian citizens, was commissioned to glorify the town's history in a series of mural paintings. The Editor needed no apprenticeship in civic affairs. He threw himself into the pioneer housing reform and other movements, and his weight was immediately recognised. His personal life was completed in 1874 by marriage with Rachel Cook, daughter of a St. Andrews professor and one of the original seven students of the little institution

which became Girton College—a brilliant young person who was described by George Eliot as the most beautiful girl she had ever seen. It was a perfect union, and Mrs. Scott, besides being an invaluable colleague in the work of the paper, played her own distinguished part in the life of the city.

Palmerstonian Liberalism was the creed of the *Manchester Guardian* when Scott took charge, and he showed no disposition to alter the tone. When the Liberals returned to power in 1880 it was still a Whig organ, and not until the great divide of Irish Home Rule was reached was its essential philosophy and quality revealed. Hitherto Scott had been anything but intellectually adventurous. He was absorbed in the task of building a first-class morning journal, setting himself an extraordinarily high standard. He was the first daily editor in England to aim at excellence in every department, and to act on the assumption that men of authority in any field of knowledge would be glad to lend a hand. The list of his contributors in the 'seventies and 'eighties is astonishing. It includes a large number of the most eminent names in scholarship and letters, and as the years went on Scott gave opportunities to many young writers afterwards famous. He encouraged his staff to give attention to the Manchester theatre, and he treated the arts with a seriousness that cannot but have seemed queer to the bulk of his readers.

After 1886 Scott's leaning in politics was markedly towards the Left, and Mr. Hammond notes the significance of the fact that his later mind was shaped in decisive ways by the questions of Ireland and South Africa. "In the years between 1880 and 1885," says Haslam Mills in the lively short history written for the paper's centenary, "the *Guardian* had been totally unattracted by the metallic Radicalism of Birmingham. It was still governed by its old Whiggish bias." But, as readers of the *Life of Chamberlain* have recently been reminded, the union of those two opposites for the assault upon Gladstonian Home Rule was precisely what made the great Liberal dilemma. A former valued member of Scott's staff has been asking what might have happened if Scott had been attracted by Chamberlain as twenty years later he was attracted by Mr. Lloyd George. The thing most worth doing, Mr. Herbert Sidebotham points out, was to keep Chamberlain in the Liberal Party. "If that had been done, there would have been a Socialist but probably no Labour Party." But all

such speculation, of course, is idle: "things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be." Very many of its readers doubtless expected the *Guardian* to stand by the Union. Scott went with Gladstone because it had become plain to him that the English system in Ireland could not be maintained, and we may conjecture that he reached this conclusion in no small degree under the influence of his chief assistant, who had done more than any other man to determine its tone.

W. T. Arnold, a grandson of Arnold of Rugby, was Scott's first whole-hearted choice as leader-writer, and with him began the line of Oxford honours men in the editorial corridor. If he had stayed at Oxford he would have been immersed in Roman history. As it was he became one of the most thoroughly equipped journalists of his time, with a wide linguistic range, and an elaborate system of clipping and filing. His belief in nationality and in the Irish cause was a passion. If there had been any wavering about Home Rule on Scott's part, a break with Arnold would have occurred; and that was unthinkable. Arnold was disabled by a mortal illness in 1896, after sixteen years of unstinted service, not the least valuable part of which was the training he gave to the most accomplished journalist ever employed in the *Guardian* office.

Writing to the woman friend of his old age and commending *Fiery Particles* for her reading, Lord Oxford remarks that the author of those stories was at his best quite a good writer. To any journalist with a proper knowledge of C. E. Montague's work this is rather like saying that the odes of John Keats are not half bad. Montague published two or three accomplished books that brought him fame; but is there, I wonder, a single chapter in any one of them, even *Disenchantment*, to approach the finest of his leaders in intellectual and artistic quality? He was a superb journalist, the finest journalist ever employed, a craftsman of genius; and when it is said, as sometimes it is, that his was the most brilliant pen devoted to English editorial writing in our age, I for one would gladly let the statement pass. After Arnold's departure Montague took on Ireland, and then in 1899 the *Guardian* set itself like flint against the Transvaal War. Montague now had L. T. Hobhouse as his principal colleague, and upon these two rested the main burden of the paper during that prolonged ordeal:

Hobhouse with the heavy guns of knowledge and philosophical argument, Montague wielding with incomparable spirit the weapons of irony and wit and style.

Through all these years Scott could depend upon the generous support of his proprietor on the great questions of the hour, especially Ireland and the Transvaal. Had this not been so, the *Guardian* must have gone under. But as the long spell of Conservative rule drew to an end the two kinsmen fell apart. Mr. Hammond is reticent as to the cause, but he allows us to infer that it was not unrelated to the one episode in the Editor's career which is not entirely clear. In 1895 Scott entered Parliament, and he was able to hold his seat (for Leigh, Lanes) in the khaki election of 1900. He did not care for public speaking and had little interest in the House of Commons. It is hard to see how he could have hoped to combine political work in London with the direction of a great newspaper, in times of exceptional difficulty and when the fundamental conditions of journalism were being altered. The *Guardian* as a property had to be built up again after the heavy damage suffered through its Boer War unpopularity, and the owner doubtless felt that Scott's being in Parliament was a serious disadvantage, as it certainly was. Taylor died in 1905. The Editor was left with no more than an option of purchase, and the will was so drawn that the executors could plead that they were not under obligation to sell. They did so, however, at a heavy price. Scott put his private fortune into the paper, mobilised his credit, and had the great satisfaction of learning from the bank that they would accept his own signature as guarantee for the last £30,000 required. To the end he was content with his salary as editor and governing director, taking no profits out of the concern.

Scott was a man of sixty when he came into complete control of the *Guardian*. There remained to him almost a quarter of a century of editorial and public life, and his activity to the end was amazing. The new journalism offered a clamorous defiance to the old. Scott met it with vivacity and assurance, being ready for technical changes and for every development that made for the improvement of the paper: as we may see from a delightful chapter on C.P.S. in the office contributed to the Life by Mr. W. P. Crozier. His eye was on every page; he wrote leading articles almost with the copiousness of a Hobhouse, and from 1911 onwards he

followed the practice of putting down at length his intimate conversations with members of the Cabinet. This is C.P. Scott the Elder Statesman, a figure now portrayed in revealing fulness through Mr. Hammond's skilful use of the diaries.

The record begins with the Editor's inquiries in Whitehall at the time of the Agadir crisis. The *Guardian* stood with the strongest Liberal critics of Sir Edward Grey, Scott being deeply suspicious of his entire policy. He was in touch with Mr. Lloyd George on the day of the Guildhall speech (July 21st), and as a consequence the *Guardian* had no immediate editorial comment on that historic utterance. Scott was not on friendly personal terms with Asquith during the critical period, and Mr. Hammond's extracts show that before the European conflict had been going on twelve months his judgment on Asquith as war Prime Minister had become unmerciful. He had convinced himself that victory would not be possible without a change of Government, and we find him working closely with Mr. Garvin and others towards a Lloyd George Cabinet. These chapters make an extraordinarily interesting study, and all the more because the Editor was so plainly disturbed by the recurring evidences forcing him to face the truth that his own conception of victory and peace was very far from the Georgian aims. Scott was outraged by the "knockout-blow" interview of 1916, and he gave strong support to the Lansdowne letter of a year later. (Mr. Hammond, by the by, makes no quotation from Scott's diary at the time of the Wilson peace note of December 1916.) As for the record of the week-end that was fatal to Asquith, it must suffice here to say that Scott's careful memoranda serve to correct and supplement many material points in the strange diary narratives of Lords Riddell and Beaverbrook. Mr. Hammond notes that Scott was slow to realise what was happening at the Peace Conference. He did not see that the Prime Minister had gone to Paris in self-forged shackles, and therefore that a peace of justice and healing was impossible. The co-operation between the two men is not capable of summary exposition. It was a curious and complicated business, only to be understood by bringing together such essential matters as their joint memories of the Boer War, the Editor's steady enthusiasm for the Lloyd George social policy, and his conviction after 1915 that, among possible leaders of Britain, Mr. Lloyd George alone was endowed with the

requisite powers and the gift of making the nation believe in them. But no explanation can alter the fact that this was an unnatural alliance, and that Scott, who could say that Mr. Lloyd George did not know what principle meant, was conscious throughout of its anomaly and peril. The Irish Treaty gave Scott the opportunity for a friendly rounding off.

In 1921 the jubilee of C. P. Scott's editorship was celebrated along with the centenary of the paper, and we cannot wonder at the tributes paid to him on that occasion, and again on his retirement eight years later. He had created the world's most distinguished newspaper and in its columns had established and upheld a tradition of fairness and generosity, of democracy, reason and persuasion. I believe it can be stated that during this period of more than half a century the *Manchester Guardian* was never guilty of conscious misrepresentation or of abusing an opponent. The paper was stamped with the sign manual of its Editor. "Those under his eye," says Mr. Crozier, "he ruled in an almost military discipline, but he did not like it said so." "He was gentle, with a formidable gentleness," and, although the paper rarely showed it, he could blaze into sudden and terrible wrath. That eye and beard, as one of his younger men put it, were not given him for nothing. But the continuing expression was one of calmness and complete self-mastery. England did not contain a more satisfying example of energetic and happy old age. When the Bishop of Birmingham sought, in his funeral sermon, to sum up Scott's relation to fundamentals, he described him, to the astonishment of many in the great cathedral congregation, as "a perplexed Theist." One could not easily light upon a less accurate phrase. It was never perplexity, or uncertain belief, that one was conscious of in talking with C. P. Scott. Nobody could fail to see, says Mr. Hammond, that there was in him "some secret of character which gave his career its integrity and power": he spent his whole life in public affairs and "under the influence of a simple moral law." His was a serene and balanced, an entirely unified, personality. First and last, it need hardly be added, he was a journalist; and to him the calling of which he was for so long the acknowledged head owes some maxims that have the note of final insight. One of these could hardly be too often repeated in times like the present, for it might still be true of England: "Comment is free, but facts are sacred."

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND REFUGEES.

BY a coincidence the Council of the League of Nations, at its meeting in May at Geneva, was concerned with a plan for settlement of the homeless Assyrians, while at the same time the Governing Body of the High Commission for Refugees from Germany, at its meeting in London under the Presidency of Lord Cecil, was considering possible homes for the exiled German Jews. Two ancient peoples who, nearly three thousand years ago, faced each other in battle in the Orient are now engaging together the humanitarian sympathies of the world in the West. They may find each other side by side in the vast spaces of Brazil. For the Commission sent out by the League, with General Browne of the Assyrian Levies at its head, has reported that Brazil offers fair chances of a new life to the thousands of Assyrians who will not stay in Iraq*; while the organisations which are looking for other outlets of Jewish emigration besides Palestine are hopeful of directing a stream to South American lands. The absorptive capacity of Europe is narrowly limited; and the New World must be called in to redress the congestion of the Old.

Amid the much trumpeted failures of the League of Nations it is consoling to reflect on what the League has done during the last fifteen years for the most helpless part of humanity. Its first activity on behalf of a mass of men, women, and children torn up from their State and their homes was made in 1921, when a million and more Russian *émigrés* were languishing miserably, and were threatened by death from starvation, in Eastern Europe. Then it was that that great "citizen of the world," Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who had already distinguished himself by helping hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war in the wilds of Siberia to return to their country, compelled the Powers in the League to attend to the needs of these international waifs and strays. He was appointed High Commissioner of the League for Refugees; and in the eight remaining years of his life he strove heroically for the well-being of his charges. They were homeless and he gradually found homes for them in France,

* Since this article was written difficulties have arisen about the plan of settlement in Brazil; and other lands are being considered for the Assyrian home.

Czechoslovakia, South America, the United States and Central Asia. They were stateless, and he devised for them the "Nansen Pass," and convinced the Governments that they must recognise it. They were rightless; and he established an Office under the League, which should give them some measure of pro-consular protection. To the original Russians under his care he added 300,000 homeless Armenians, for whom the League had been unable to carve out a mandated national home; and later some tens of thousands of Chaldeans and Assyrians—the "assimilated refugees," as they are quaintly called—whom the conquering Turk had cast adrift from their homes.

For a time this Hercules of our age undertook the burden of a larger mass of exiles, when nearly 2,000,000 Greeks were thrown from Asia Minor, destitute and desperate, on the shores of an impoverished Greece. It was clear that neither private philanthropy nor national organisation could cope adequately with that load of distress. Nansen rushed to the rescue, roused opinion in England and America, and persuaded the League to appoint a Greek Refugee Commission to help in the absorption and settlement of a new population equal to nearly one-third of the existing Hellenic people. It was the greatest Exodus and, had it not been for the help of the League, it might have been one of the greatest disasters of modern times. Land at least was available, because the Turks, during the Peace negotiations at Lausanne, stipulated for an exchange of the Moslem and Christian populations; and the evacuated farms of the Moslems in Macedonia and Epirus were placed by the Greek Government at the disposal of the Commission. The work was done in less than ten years, with the help of a loan of £12,000,000 raised under the auspices of the League of Nations, and was so successfully done that it was possible to hand it over in 1931 to the Greek State. One million of the homeless were established in Macedonia and other parts of Greece, and have turned what was once a cockpit of warring peoples into one of the most productive parts of the Near East. Nearly another million were settled in new urban areas around the existing towns, and have brought there fresh industries and enterprises. It may be said that the interest on the loans raised by the League has not been fully paid during the last years; but the interest on other Government loans has not been paid: and

at least this money was used for salvaging and not for exploiting human lives.

Two minor exchanges of population were carried out by the League at the same time; the transfer of the Bulgarians from Greek Macedonia to their own country, and the transfer of Greeks from Bulgaria to Macedonia. These exchanges were directed by mixed Commissions and, like the major Greek settlement, were financed with the help of the League. The migration of the Turks from Macedonia to Anatolia, to occupy the derelict Orthodox villages, was done by the Turks themselves, who were too self-sufficing to accept any help of the League.

Nansen died in 1930; and with him the appointment of the High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations came to an end. His work, however, has been carried on by the Office in Geneva that bears his name, and both assists settlement and exercises a pro-consular function. Its most recent reports afford a striking illustration of the broad scope of the international activities. Amongst the 100,000 Russian refugees in China were a number of Lutherans and Mennonites, whose plight was particularly tragic. The Mennonites have been moved by the Nansen Office to Paraguay, where there were earlier Mennonite colonies. The Lutherans, descendants themselves of refugees from Germany and Switzerland, have been moved to Brazil. There were, too, some 2,000 Ukrainian refugees destitute in Rumania. They have been assisted to settle as tenant farmers in that country. During the last year the Office convened an International Conference to draw up a Convention defining the status of the stateless myriads who are disowned by Soviet Russia and Turkey. The Convention was signed last October in Geneva, and now awaits ratification. The general purpose, as defined in the Preamble, is:

"To establish conditions which shall enable the decisions already taken by the various States with this object to be fully effective"; and to assure to refugees "the enjoyment of civil rights, free and ready access to the Courts, security and stability as regards establishment and work, facilities in the exercise of the professions, of industry and of commerce, and in regard to the movement of persons, admission to schools and universities."

The restrictions resulting from the application of laws for the protection of the national labour market are not to be

applied in all their severity to refugees regularly resident, and shall be automatically suspended in their favour where they have been resident for not less than three years, or are married to a person possessing the nationality of the country of residence. The refugees are to enjoy the same rights in regard to compensation for industrial accidents, relief in case of sickness, and access to schools as are accorded to foreigners in general; and the enjoyment of rights accorded to foreigners subject to reciprocity shall not be refused to them because reciprocity is impossible. A minimum of civil rights and a certainty of status is accorded.

It would be a reasonable boon if the principles of this international agreement, when ratified, should be extended to the large numbers of stateless migrants who do not fall within its specific terms because they are not Russian, Armenian, or "assimilated" refugees. To-day it has become common for the dictator-ruled "totalitarian" States to deprive of their citizenship the leaders, and often the rank and file, of their political opponents, and to cast them adrift on the waters. Thus there are groups in Europe, Asia, and America of denationalised Italians, Hungarians, Austrians and the like, who wander helplessly from country to country. Statesmen of the League have laid down in Conventions that the condition of statelessness should be avoided. But they have not yet indicated a way of checking its multiplication, much less of remedying it. The lot of the rejected of the nations is terribly precarious. The League, indeed, at a Conference of 1927, devised a "document of identity and travel" to be issued by the different States, which should give them the liberty of staying or of moving. But the document is valid for only six months; and in times of economic stress, such as the world is passing through to-day, every State is anxious to eject those who have not a legal claim on its protection or its provision for the unemployed, and who, as it apprehends, will compete with its own subjects for work. So the document of identity and travel is turned to an instrument of one-sided traffic, as though it bore the legend: "All you who receive this paper, give up hope of return!" When the stateless person, driven from one country, enters another without a *visa*, he is likely to be thrown into prison; and then he is tossed like a ball from police-post to police-post on the frontiers.

It is time that humanity, organised in the League, took some thought for the submerged residue of Fascist and other Revolutions, as it did for the more numerous discards of the Communist Revolution. Human sympathies have been straitened since 1921; or rather, the State interests have loomed more exclusively. The number of these unfortunates is not impressive enough in any one State to conduce to action; and no Nansen is there to compel it. A Conference, indeed, was held in Geneva last winter to consider the broad questions of the assistance of indigent aliens; and the experts of the Governments drew up a draft Convention which adopts the liberal principle of "placing foreigners as fully as possible on the same footing as nationals in the sphere of assistance," and extends it to the stateless refugees as well as to the destitutes of foreign nationality. Yet, unless some State champions the cause, the Convention may incur the slaughter of the innocents which cuts short the life, or rather prevents the birth, of many generous projects of the international radicals. Even if it comes to birth, it will require the vigilant eye of the national stalwarts of humanity, if it is not to undergo the fate, together with many other good Conventions, of paving the international limbo.

The immediate concerns of the League of Nations with regard to refugees may seem quantitatively trivial in comparison with those it has undertaken in the past. The Assyrians of Iraq for whom the Nansen Office is to help to find a home number about 30,000. The Refugees from Germany, who were declared at the last Assembly of the League "to constitute a social and economic problem of which the solution required international co-operation," and who were entrusted to the care of a new High Commissioner—Mr. James McDonald of America—number to-day about 60,000. Of these more than half are still living on their own means, or with the help of their family and friends. The Assyrian problem may be capable of a fairly simple and direct solution if the funds for settlement on the land can be provided partly by the States interested, particularly Great Britain and Iraq, partly by Christian philanthropy concerned to save the remnant of one of the oldest branches of Christendom.

The settlement of the refugees from Germany, on the other hand, bristles with difficulties and is likely to be a continuous and growing problem. In the first place, the League cannot

directly tackle it. At the Assembly Germany's opposition to the proposal to establish a High Commissioner, whose appointment indirectly reflected on her humanity, was only avoided by an agreement that the Office should not be responsible to the Council of the League, but to its own autonomous Governing Body. So a Council, representative of twelve States, and presided over by Lord Cecil of Chelwood, takes the place of the League Council, and cannot use the Geneva machinery in finding a solution. Then, the German Pharaoh has reversed the process of his Egyptian predecessor; and, while the Israelites, it is said, despoiled the Egyptians, the German Government now despoils the Israelites, and makes it impossible for them to remove any but a small fraction of their property. Again, the economic crisis which has afflicted the world since the persecution began, has led the countries of asylum adjacent to Germany to restrict their hospitality to a right of residence, but not to allow the newcomers to do work save in special cases. At the same time, it has led other countries, which had been for a century lands of immigration absorbing millions of refugees from political and racial persecution, to close their doors entirely, or almost entirely. So the United States and the South American States and the British Dominions have hitherto taken a very inadequate part of the fugitives.

Lastly, some thousands of the refugees are of a peculiar character, the intellectuals of a highly developed civilisation, professors, research-workers, doctors, lawyers, artists. It might have been thought that they would be welcome guests and sojourners in many lands. The most distinguished among them have been that: Professors like Einstein, Frank, Moritz Bonn, artists like Bruno Walter and Reinhardt, writers like Ludwig and Toller, and doctors like the brothers Zondek. But in an epoch when the unemployed intellectual proletariat is relatively as great as the unemployed labour proletariat, thousands of less distinguished talents are absorbed with the greatest difficulty, in spite of the work of the bodies such as the Academic Assistance Council in England and the International Committee in Geneva for assisting Intellectual Refugees.

The problem indeed is not unmanageable; and, as Lord Cecil said at the Meeting of the Governing Body in May, the credit of our civilisation is involved in finding a solution. The

combination of private charity with international Government effort marks all the action of the League for refugees. The large Jewish organisations and several Christian, undenominational, and international bodies are assisting on an Advisory Council in the work of the High Commissioner. It is they who collect the funds for relief and reconstruction and conduct the operations of emigration and settlement; it is the three-fold function of the High Commissioner:

- (a) To get the countries to open the doors for emigrants and give them permits to work and to be trained.
- (b) To provide that third element of man who has been said to consist of body, soul, and a passport:—and lastly,
- (c) To co-ordinate and stimulate the efforts of the philanthropic organisations.

The League has hitherto not failed in any of its humanitarian enterprises for succouring refugees; and it will surely succeed in this last effort. While its action in assisting the exchange of populations marks the success of international effort in a constructive treatment of the problem of racial and religious minorities, the activities of Nansen and of the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany indicate what can be done, by the organisation of humanitarian feeling under the League, to secure a minimum of human rights for the outcasts from the nations. It cannot yet intervene to prevent the privation of the individual's rights to home, nationality, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But it can at least intervene to remedy the hapless lot of those who have been deprived, to assure them a place in the sun of law, to enable them to make a fresh start in life, and to salvage their powers and genius for civilisation.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

THE PLIGHT AND PROSPECTS OF BRITISH SHIPPING.

FOR the first time since the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849, British shipowners as a body have made a definite appeal to the Government for assistance in carrying on their trade. Their appeal has been put forward in remarkably moderate terms; it is only with the greatest reluctance, and after long hesitation, that some of the most important sections of the industry have concurred in its being put forward at all. The circumstances by which this reluctance has, at last, been overcome, afford a signal example of the evils which the frantic follies of economic nationalism have brought upon the world.

It needs very few words to depict the plight of the British shipping industry to-day. Shipowners have asked for assistance, not because they are too greedy for profits to be contented with moderate gains, but because a large proportion of voyage accounts show an actual loss, and a slump which has already lasted, with hardly a break, for a dozen years has bitten deeply into the available reserves. With freights more than one-fifth lower and running costs more than two-fifths higher than before the war, there are few owners who can earn enough to cover their working expenses and overhead charges, and to make proper provision for depreciation of a wasting asset. Not only does the tale of bankruptcies and passed dividends during the last few years make melancholy reading: it is common knowledge that many of the dividends actually paid by shipping companies were only made possible by the existence of accumulated reserves, invested outside the industry. Many of the smaller owners have already come to the end of their resources, and ships are daily being sold to foreigners for what they will fetch, or added to the dreary queues of vessels laid up to await better times.

This is not a matter of moment merely to those whose income is derived from owning, running, or manning ships. To the financial losses of shipowners, and the distress among British seamen, of whom about one-third are at present unemployed, must be added the effects of the slump in shipping on all its allied and ancillary industries; in particular, the paralysis of the shipyards, with its repercussions on the steel works and engineering shops. Shipping, too, is the greatest of

our export trades. The services rendered to the world by British ships are among the most important of the "invisible exports" which help to pay for the foodstuffs and raw materials that we require from abroad, and a drop of more than one-third in the "net national shipping income" is among the most disquieting features of our Trade Balance.

These deplorable conditions are not the punishment of inefficiency in the industry itself. There are points in the management, and more particularly in the finance, of British shipping that have given occasion for just criticism; but British shipping as a whole has no need to fear comparisons based on the quality, reliability and convenience of the services which it offers to the trade of the world, and is ready to face with confidence any competition that has a fair economic basis. Its troubles to-day are due in part to the general effects of the economic crisis on world trade, and in part to the competition of State-aided shipping built and run wholly without regard to economic considerations. Before the war, British shipping carried one-half, or slightly more than one-half, of the world's seaborne trade. To-day it is estimated that the total trade to be carried is, in volume, only about two-thirds what it was in 1913. Of this greatly diminished total British shipping carries a little over two-fifths, and much of this is carried at unremunerative rates.

The level of shipping freights is governed, like the price of all other commodities and services in a free market, by the relation of supply to demand, and even if the world's tonnage to-day remained at the 1913 figures, the appalling reduction in the volume of international commerce would inevitably entail a period of lean years for shipowners. In actual fact, the world's tonnage to-day is nearly half as great again as it was before the war. Even after allowing for that proportion of the laid-up tonnage which is never likely to put to sea again, the available carrying power is enormously in excess of the volume of trade to be carried, with the natural and inevitable result that millions of tons of efficient shipping are laid up in idleness, the ships on service are often obliged to sail with holds half empty, and freights are not merely unprofitably but ruinously low.

Little, if any, of the responsibility for this immense surplusage of tonnage lies on the shoulders of British shipowners. The increase in tonnage on the Register of the United King-

dom is comparatively small, and is entirely accounted for by the increase in the tanker fleets. Owing to the enormous increase in the consumption of petroleum since the war, the carriage of oil in bulk is the one branch of the carrying trade in which new construction has been justified by a genuine and rapid increase in demand; and as the oil-tanker, while she is the only type of ship capable of performing her own specialised task, is useless for purposes of general trade, no increase in the tanker fleets has any effect on the ordinary freight markets. Of tonnage available for general trade (for all trades, that is to say, other than petroleum) the United Kingdom owns to-day actually a little less than in 1913, and certainly not more than might reasonably expect to find employment in the event of a trade revival. Such new construction as British owners have ordered in recent years has been of a genuinely replacement character, resulting in the substitution of new ships, more efficient or more economical in working, for obsolescent vessels sold foreign or scrapped.

Meanwhile the shipowners of other countries have largely increased and in some instances have even doubled their fleets. In some countries, notably the Scandinavian States and Holland, this expansion, whether well or ill-advised, is due to the enterprise or optimism of the shipowners themselves. During the latter part of the war, when practically the whole tonnage on the register of the United Kingdom was running under requisition at Blue Book Rates, neutral shipping reaped colossal profits from the world shortage, and the reserves then accumulated have been largely expended in new construction. The ships so built are efficient and efficiently managed, and although their competition has been severely felt by British owners, it is fair competition. Nevertheless, in so far as it has accentuated the disproportion between the supply of tonnage and the demand for its services, this expansion has added to the difficulties of the world's shipping industry as a whole, and more particularly to the difficulties of British "tramp" owners, whose smaller reserves are less calculated to carry them through a long period of unprofitable trade.

In other instances, most notably perhaps in the United States, Italy, and Japan, the shipowners have received direct and substantial encouragement from their Governments. Many causes have combined to make of shipping a favourite field for the activities of that blind economic nationalism

which is the main cause of our present discontents; the pressure of vested interests created during the war and the short-lived boom which followed it; the desire to insure against the emergencies of a future conflict; the desire to assist exporters by providing them with tonnage at uneconomic rates, or to bolster up exchanges by avoiding the payment of freights to foreigners; the sentiment which insists that a State, however well and cheaply served by foreign shipping, ought to have its own mercantile marine and everything handsome about it. In the result it is estimated that £1,000,000,000 has been expended since the war in subsidising the construction and running of ships. The bulk of the £1,000,000,000 has been spent in bringing on to freight markets, already glutted, vessels whose carrying capacity the world did not require; in retaining on the registers inefficient or obsolescent vessels which only the annual navigation bounty could save from the scrap-heap; and in enabling ships, both old and new, to obtain cargoes by quoting rates that would not cover the cost of carrying them. It adds to the irony of the situation that some of the Governments who have most lavishly poured out money to maintain or increase the available carrying power have been as prominent in obstructing by abnormal tariffs, quotas, and restrictions of all kinds, the flow of the world's international commerce.

While this subsidised competition is enormously costly, directly and indirectly, to the States employing it, it has added greatly to the difficulties of British and other shipowners who are competing on the merits of their services. It is differentiated both by the scale of the subsidies and by the abnormal trade conditions from the subsidised competition met with before the war. It is not merely a question of undercutting which compels the unsubsidised owner to accept a smaller profit; it is too often a question of both ships being run at a loss, which in one instance is borne by the State.

Such is the present plight of British shipping. What are the remedies? One proposal, the reservation of the coasting trade to British shipping, can be very shortly dismissed. Despite all the nonsense talked about the capture of the coasting trade by foreigners, the share of foreign flags in that trade in 1933 was, as it was before the war, less than one per cent. Their exclusion would give little legitimate ground for protest, as

most countries reserve their coasting trade; but the additional employment provided would certainly not be worth the first step in the reversal of our shipping policy. A very much more important proposal is the reservation to British shipping of all trade with other parts of the Empire. There are precedents for such action, not only in the old Navigation Laws, but in the present practice of certain countries, notably France and the United States, in excluding foreign shipping from their traffic with oversea possessions. But apart from any objections that might be taken by the self-governing Dominions to restrictions on their choice of tonnage, this measure would involve risks out of all proportion to the gain. About ninety per cent. of the trade between the United Kingdom and other Empire countries is already carried in British bottoms. On the other hand, in more than four-fifths of the voyages in which British shipping is engaged, it loads or discharges in ports outside the Empire, and the danger of retaliatory action in foreign ports would far outweigh the small additional employment provided in the Empire trade.

Very similar considerations apply to the proposal that foreign ships shall be prohibited from carrying goods between the United Kingdom and any foreign country other than that to which they belong. This, again, is a measure which both we and other States have practised in the past, with the result of endless inconvenience to shippers and endless friction between Governments. If put into force to-day it would affect about twelve per cent. of the foreign tonnage that enters our ports, and would expose to retaliation a much larger body of British shipping employed in the carriage of goods between ports abroad.

The fact is that British shipping can gain little and must lose much by a return to the old policy of flag discrimination. The Navigation Acts, although their influence has been greatly over-rated, may have been of advantage to British shipping when they were first introduced, at a time when the policy of other nations was as exclusive as our own, when British shipping was admittedly incapable of competing with the Dutch on equal terms, and when the Plantation trade offered ample employment for all ships displaced on other routes. It would be suicidal to revive them to-day, when less than one-half of our shipping finds employment in trades to and from ports in the United Kingdom, and when any

conceivable measure of reservation would still leave a large proportion of our tonnage to seek employment in the general carrying trade of the world.

It was for these reasons, and also because a return to the policy of flag discrimination "would hamper the natural flow of trade and lead to endless quarrels among the maritime nations of the world," that the Booth Committee on Shipping and Shipbuilding After the War rejected all proposals for revival of the Navigation Acts; and even during the present crisis, the ablest leaders of the shipping industry have never ceased to press both for "freedom of the seas, in the sense of equal treatment of all flags in all ports," and for the removal of all abnormal barriers to the exchange of commodities, as the only means of assuring a genuine revival of British shipping.

Trade barriers, instead of diminishing, have multiplied, and the failure of the World Economic Conference, with its programme of "economic disarmament," went far to break the hearts of the shipowners. The essential conditions of recovery remain the same, but the prospect of their fulfilment has receded, and it has become a question of immediate urgency whether British shipping, in the absence of direct assistance from the State, can tide over the intervening period. It is for the owners of tramps—the ships that do not run on regular services but can be chartered by the voyage or for a fixed period to carry goods from anywhere to anywhere—that the crisis is most acute. These ships, which play a most important part in adjusting the supply of tonnage to seasonal fluctuations of trade and local demands, have been particularly hard hit by the shrinkage in world trade, and the Tramp Committee of the Chamber of Shipping has found it necessary to seek, and has actually obtained a promise of direct financial assistance from the Government.

The proposals jointly put forward by the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association were directed, in the first place, to the removal of trade barriers. They proposed, in effect, that the Government should make renewed efforts to form a group of States, including all the great creditor nations, pledged to co-operate in stabilising prices and currencies, to grant most-favoured-nation terms only to each other, to "restore the freedom of the seas for peaceful commerce," and to accept the fact that debts can

only be paid and exports can only be paid for, so long as they are ready to accept goods and services from abroad. They suggested that the British Government should announce, after consultation with the Dominions, that Imperial preferences will be enjoyed "only by goods imported in ships belonging to countries which give fair play to British exports and British shipping." By way of direct assistance they asked that the Government should reconsider and revise the burden of taxation laid on British shipping. It has long been a grievance of British owners that the cost of lighting the coasts, which is a national obligation, is paid, in this country, entirely out of dues levied on shipping; and since 1923 the industry has been burdened also with one-half of the total cost of the administrative supervision of shipping in the national interest.

Finally, they proposed that, pending a revival of trade and the conclusion of satisfactory international agreements, the Government should announce that "subsidy will, where necessary, be met by subsidy" and should favourably consider applications by any section of the British Mercantile Marine which can prove that a temporary subsidy is necessary to preserve it from extinction, "taking care not to prejudice other sections of British shipping thereby." The proviso is a reminder of the dangers of a subsidy policy. To embark on such a policy without clear proof of its absolute necessity to the trades concerned, full inquiry into its repercussions on others, and stringent guarantees of its temporary character, would aggravate rather than relieve the evils of the present situation. This has been fully recognised by the Government in the response which it has made to the tramp owners' appeal. The promise of a grant, for one year, of £2,000,000 is contingent upon the owners' ability to present a satisfactory scheme for its employment as a defence fund against subsidised foreign competition, and to convince the Government that British Shipowners' Associations are pressing to the utmost of their power for the international adoption of measures to equate the supply of tonnage with the demand. It is accompanied by the offer of cheap credit for new construction or the modernisation of existing ships, on condition that three tons of obsolescent shipping are scrapped for every ton built. Meanwhile, we have an assurance from Mr. Runciman that the Government "will continue their efforts to secure

international consideration of means to place shipping generally on an economic footing.

This assurance is welcome, for it would be a disaster if the discussion of this temporary emergency measure were allowed to obscure the more fundamental needs to which the first section of the shipowners' proposals calls attention. Until the normal balance is regained between the supply of tonnage and the demand for carrying power, there can be no return of genuine prosperity for British, or for any other shipping. The abolition or reduction of foreign subsidies, either as the result of trade agreements, or of the threat of countervailing subsidies in this country, would automatically relieve the freight markets of a large proportion of the burden. The root problem goes deeper still, since it turns upon the recovery of international commerce. Neither by accepting limitation to reserved Empire trades, nor so long as it is engaged in scrambling desperately for its share in a world trade diminished by "excessive tariffs, quotas, currency and exchange controls—all the miserable machinery of isolationism,"* can the British Mercantile Marine, as we have been accustomed to see it, be operated with profit to its owners, or discharge its traditional functions in the national economy. If British shipping is not merely to be rescued from its present plight, but restored to a reasonable prosperity, it will be necessary for the British Government to work unceasingly, in the face of all disappointments and rebuffs, for the eradication of that spirit among the nations of the world which looks upon the exchange of goods and services as a form of warfare instead of an opportunity of mutual benefit.

C. ERNEST FAYLE.

* Mr. R. J. Dunlop, President of the Chamber of Shipping, at Annual Meeting.

MY GERMAN YEARS.

IN February 1919 the British military authorities refused me permission to leave the country. "You are described to me as pro-German," remarked the officer who questioned me. In the "Akten" of the German authorities I am no doubt now described as "liberalistic" and pro-Jew, two adjectives as evil-sounding in Germany now as "pro-German" was with us then. For all that, the German authorities of to-day (like those of yesterday) have been most kind to me. I hope they can forgive me, if I make a further comparison. My English neighbours had all been convinced that I was a German spy—for one thing because I had moved into my home with "more than a ton of cases, *said* to be books." When at last, in June 1919, I saw the white cliffs of Dover vanishing, I felt I was escaping from a madhouse. And when, in April 1934, the train slid at Basle from the German to the Swiss end of the platform, I felt I had escaped from another madhouse. There was a difference. My German neighbours had been by no means unfriendly; indeed, the amount of reasonable, liberal and pacific thought in Nazi Germany is amazing. Still more amazing is the totality of its suppression. That indeed is what is meant by the "totalitarian" state.

We have rather forgotten what Germany went through. For every 100 infants between the ages of 2 and 4 years that died in 1913, 212 died in 1918. A Dresden family with whom I stayed in 1920 was typical of untold thousands. I took the boy of 15 to be a puny youngster of 11. His sister suffered from osteal tuberculosis. They had both been growing up on field turnips, always without milk and usually without meat, fats, or even potatoes. The father had fallen in the war, the mother had become partly crippled. Both she and the old grandmother had to go to work again. These were amongst the people who were paying reparations. In a walking tour in the Spessart in the summer of 1923 my German comrade and I could get neither jam, nor butter, nor eggs, nor lard, nor oil. We came at last one day to the shop of an "Egg and Butter Merchant," but on a slate beside the door was written: "Butter and eggs can not be had here." Near the end of 1923 Dr. Horsley Gantt of the American Relief Administration reported: "There has been chronic starvation of the people ever since 1916."

In spite of such privations there was at first no bitterness and no hatred in Germany, absolutely none. Again and again people of all classes said to me: "It is a good thing we lost the war; if we had won it, we should have been slaves of the military." In the autumn of 1919 I was the guest of simple folk living in a workmen's quarter of Munich. In German fashion they had hung a wreath of welcome outside the door of their little flat. Of course it was known in a trice throughout the building that I was an Englishman. All were kind to me. Three years later I gave a brief account of my German experiences to a large English Nonconformist congregation. I spoke quite simply and directly of the kindness I had received and the suffering I had seen. I was told afterwards that half of that Christian congregation was bitterly hostile, and I know that a deacon's wife rushed at the pastor, as soon as he came from the pulpit, and upbraided him for allowing "pro-Germanism" in his church. Bitterness was not therefore first made in Germany. This is not the place to give a history of its development there, but as early as 1920 I had written that the attempt to bind Germany captive must lead to wild nationalism. Later the fall of the mark inevitably worked for the extremists. On October 8th, 1923, a pound of butter cost 220 million marks, four days later 2,000 millions. I shall never cease to admire the people for the way they endured these convulsions, but the middle class was ruined and its children hopelessly embittered. I do not think the fall of the mark was one wit more a governmental manœuvre than the fall of the franc or of the pound. Moreover, those who accused Germany of fraudulent bankruptcy now refuse payment themselves.

What has come about since is not mysterious. Hope deferred maketh the heart sick, but also credulous. Hitler gained the same power that John Law did with his "System." Moreover, Hitler had this great asset; he gave the people a scapegoat and appealed to hate. That is the darkest feature of his "System"—indeed, one often wonders whether it is not the whole of it. A mild and brief example of its style of propaganda we may take from the Leader himself: "The Marxist is drawn to treason as the hyena to offal" (*Mein Kampf*, II, p. 344). I imagine that Hitler sincerely believes the Jews to be the cause of all evil. Associate them with "Marxism" and you have then all the prerequisites for an exalted moral fervour condemning Socialists, Communists, and Jews

alike to unquenching fires. I am not one of those who despise moral fervour, but moral fervour "rationalising" our petty and selfish motives is the most terrible thing on earth. In times of national hysteria we call it "patriotism." Bruckner has in *Les Races* caught this atmosphere exactly, and his play has been marvellously rendered at the Théâtre de l'Œuvre in Paris. The atmosphere is not insincere, but it is horrifying and rather beastly. I have known Nazi friends begin in private to talk like the actors in *Les Races*. I could only bear it by telling myself they were not quite sane.

If I mention some of my more recent memories, it is not to arouse hatred. I want to remind my readers that there is suffering to assuage. We could, as a people, do more to help. Moreover, I should like to persuade the waverers that it is better not to coquet with Fascism. I once heard a doctor touch on his hospital experiences in the worst days of ill-usage. Quickly, as if he dared not dwell on these memories long, he told me (amongst other things) of cases where the flesh of the buttocks had been reduced to such a pulp that it mortified and fell away, of others where the mere sight of a brown shirt produced nervous paroxysms—so terrible were the memories the sight aroused. One man narrated to a friend of mine how he had only kept himself from suicide in his days of torment by repeating the names of his children over and over to himself. S.A. and S.S. men have almost boasted of the torment inflicted and of the prevention of sleep which at last, as one said, destroys the resistance of the most stubborn. We are often told that this was all in the early days. Well, last December an old and trusted friend told me how in a workmen's quarter of Berlin he had seen a man beaten till he was transported to a hospital. Only a woman dared to protest, and she was at once taken into custody by S.A. men. In March of this year I heard from careful English residents of a case where a man threw himself down the well of a lift to escape the torture which would, he feared, make him implicate others.

I have no wish to continue. Every people has hideous records; every people thinks them to be hideous in others. Pardon me if, to emphasise this, I quote two sentences from the Irish Supplement to the *Nation* of April 30th, 1921. "The traveller notices that almost every day an Irishman is shot 'trying to escape'." . . . "Men who have been examined have made affidavits in more than one case . . . that they have

been flogged and tortured." The Nazis, accused of brutality, can point, *inter alia*, to the fact that at Düsseldorf the French stood by while one of the police, whom they had disarmed, was beaten to death, and another almost, if not quite, killed. (See Gedyé: *The Revolver Republic*, pp. 170-1.)

What does, however, perhaps distinguish the Nazi system is a political theory of violence, based, it would seem, on the completely misunderstood Darwinism often invoked in *Mein Kampf*. The President of a provincial law court, Dr. Dietrich, tells us in the leading law journal *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung*, June 1933, that, in pursuance of the national aim, killing, wounding, forcible detention, insult, material damage and arson are all justifiable. Thus acting, we are told, we are following in the footsteps of our Germanic forebears, by whom the traitor was outlawed and could be openly killed by any member of the nation. ("Traitor"=anti-Nazi.) A similar ideal is, *mutatis mutandis*, set before social workers in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Wohlfahrtspflege* (the semi-official Relief Work Review) of September 1933. Asocial and inferior elements are to be given only enough help to keep life going, but not enough to "lengthen it unduly." The writer (like most Nazi writers) has a naïvely simple scheme of values. Physical robustness and nationalist emotion are valuable, but for the weakly or the internationally-minded genius there is no place. Cæsar, Narses, Goethe, Christ, would certainly not have their lives "unduly lengthened." The "inferior" (slightly "defective," perhaps)—have we not all, at times, been shamed into humility before them? It is the shallow cocksureness of the Nazi that is destroying German culture. How could it survive? A scientific work was suppressed which pointed out (what everyone should surely know) that the qualities of a people are due to all sorts of things besides "race." And a medical man is plainly afraid of his own courage in timidly hinting in a health monthly that it might perhaps be unwise entirely to exclude from diet the non-German orange.

My late friend, Dr. K. E. Markel, was of German birth, but early naturalised in England. He worked here during the war on behalf of German prisoners of war and interned. It was a great task, and certainly in the interests of reconciliation. He told me that without the help of British Jews of German birth his work would have been impossible, help rendered at a time

when, as he wrote, "such work was most unpopular and even dangerous." I mentioned all this to an S.A. man who wanted to sell me portraits of Hitler, and I thought of it when I saw the yellow card of the Jewish student marking him as "non-Aryan" and shutting the door to his future. For the Jew may not be civil servant, judge, solicitor, doctor, dentist, officer, actor, author, journalist, farmer, musician, professor, teacher, artist . . . and he is even shut out from the local voluntary fire brigade. The exceptions made in the case of fighters in the war have no bearing on the future, and are even now largely illusory. For the public is continually told that no true German will let himself be cured by a Jewish doctor, employ a Jewish solicitor, enjoy the work of any Jewish musician, nor indeed buy from a Jewish shop. I know a charming little town where Jewish friends of mine (quite "Nordic" in appearance) may not advertise in press or cinema, and where municipal employees dare not come to them except (very rarely) by a back door, after dark. A very nationalist "Aryan" doctor, well known to me, was formerly (out of mere humanity) member of a society to combat anti-Semitism. For this offence he has been deprived of all his official and panel practice. The property of the society has (of course) been confiscated.

Many of us feel that we owe more than we can tell to German culture. It was a matter of indifference to us whether our teachers were Jew or Gentile; they were for us (as they were for themselves) *Germans*. The Nazis have taught us to discriminate; we see now that some admixture of Jewish blood and Jewish thought is needed to relieve Germans from a certain humourless heaviness. To persecute opinion is an intelligible brutality; to persecute race is sheer malignant nonsense.

What awaited Socialist and Communist leaders we know—at least in part. It is less known how relentlessly quite small functionaries have often been pursued. I missed a little collector whom I knew, a man glad to accept a 20 pfennig tip. "He has been put in a concentration camp," said his successor. (I once heard a Judge say, almost to himself: "It is dreadful to think what many have had to suffer in these camps.") Another small official I saw for the last time with the Nazi who was to take his place. I did not dare to speak to him, lest I should in this way direct more unwelcome

attention upon him. For I knew he had once been a Socialist and was on that account losing his job.

The treatment of opponents and protestors is, however, not uniform. Two ladies were watching tired Hitler Jugend one evening in Berlin. A motherly feeling led one to say: "It's a shame to tire these children out; they ought all to be in bed by now." Both women were then and there hurried off to a concentration camp. As they were rich nationalist ladies with influential connections they got out again, but not easily. Had they been Socialists! A member of the Secret Police was seated in plain clothes at a restaurant. He heard a man at another table denouncing the present rulers in no measured terms. He went up to him, showed his concealed badge, and said: "It is my duty to tell you that you have no business to attack our government like that." The man addressed, in his turn showed *his* badge, of still higher rank: "What do you mean? Why, *all* of us talk like that; don't you, when you're with your comrades?" The Gestapo man was silent, he knew he did. The danger of opposition, you see, depends upon circumstances. Perhaps I should add that the above report is not hearsay; I know one of the men referred to quite well.

The idea of Germany as united in its support of the present régime is, in my opinion, a legend for foreigners. The foreigner travelling in Germany may well believe in the legend. An official of higher rank, who has known me for years, came down from his office into the courtyard to chat with me. "Do you know why I've chosen this position?" he asked, and then continued: "It's because I can see here from a distance anyone who is approaching." Since then he has become even more cautious. In a room with shut windows and doors, where there is no one to listen at the keyhole, a man who trusts you may, if he is with you alone, criticise the Government. But that is (for the unprivileged) the extent of freedom in Germany now. One of my best friends, badly assaulted by an S.A. man, was told that if he mentioned the matter to a foreigner, he was *erledigt* (done for). The growing disappointment and embitterment is undoubted. I have been amazed to see how widespread it is. "They talk of the party officialdom (*Parteibuchbeamtentum*) of the past," said a former enthusiastic Nazi to me lately, and he continued with immense emphasis, "it's a *hundred times* worse now." But

if a referendum came, these men would probably vote "Ja," and certainly would if the voting cell were uncurtained and S.A. men stood near. That circumstance led an old friend of mine in South Germany to vote "Ja" last time. Nationalism can create a land of slaves.

The spirit of resistance is not dead yet in Germany. I think, for instance, of the employees, about 300 strong, ordered to attend a Nazi labour demonstration, but of whom only forty reached it. I think of a little, grey artisan who has refused utterly to join the Nazi front or to declare himself "Aryan" (though he is). "Do you believe I should be ashamed of my grandmother or my mother, if she were a Jewess?" he said; "I should be ashamed of myself if I were." I think, too, of the young unemployed man who said to his wife: "Better eat a bit less and have a clean conscience." And of others. There will be enough of these to save the city, when the time comes. But the leaders are at present lacking. At a meeting of the Church opposition I felt that most of the audience were longing for an opportunity to shout their battle-cry, but it never came. Opposition has grown, but Christians of all kinds in Germany shrink from realising that the fear of God may be in direct opposition to the fear of the State.

What is to be our political attitude to Nazi Germany? We have our own great responsibility for the whole development, and dislike of this system should awaken in us condemnation of ourselves. The danger is plain. The insistence on large families, the conception of Germany as *Volk ohne Raum*, and the further insistence in *Mein Kampf* on the right to win new land in the east with the sword are not encouraging. What shall we do? Graf Podewils, the former Bavarian Premier, once said to me, after many disappointments, "What Britain wants we never know. With France, we know what we are at; she wants to destroy us. But we never know what Britain wants." About Britain he might, with some justice, repeat these words, were he alive now. This is not a political article, but perhaps I may venture one political comment. In post-war years we have shown little international vision. The "sovereign state" is now no more possible than the sovereign individual, and if we were quicker to realise this we could do more for peace.

HAROLD PICTON.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN AND A PREDICTION.

ONE of the first things that struck me, when I visited the zone evacuated by the Germans during the war, was the appeal to the Godhead affixed on all available spaces. This appeal was: "*Gott strafe England*." I mentioned this in conjunction with the "scrap of paper" to Prince von Bülow, when I met him again after the war in Berlin at Ambassador Houghton's. "Yes," he answered sadly, "the Emperor entrusted the conduct of affairs to persons who were ignorant of the diplomatic history which led to the creation of Belgium. They were more ignorant than himself, otherwise the Emperor would have listened to the advice of wiser men than Bethmann-Hollweg." No doubt Prince von Bülow who knew the diplomatic history of 100 years ago was aware that Belgium had been created by England, and that England had placed the mouth of the Scheldt in the possession of Holland to prevent Antwerp and that river from becoming in French hands a danger to British supremacy at sea. He knew the Emperor Napoleon's famous saying that the Scheldt and Antwerp were like a pistol aimed at the heart of England. He also knew that England's interest in Belgium was not confined to the "scrap of paper," that is to say, to the treaties which provided for the neutralisation of Belgium.

I was prevented from asking Prince von Bülow for his views of what would have happened if Germany had won the war, by the arrival of other guests. I tried to get the Kaiser on the subject when I lunched with him at Count Bentinck's at Amerongen after his acquisition of the Doorn Estate. I found him so irritable on the matter that I did not press my question. I cannot be far wrong, however, in hazarding a solution in harmony with the outcome of events. If Germany had not been stopped at the battle of the Marne she would have reached Paris in a few days and, so far as France is concerned, the war would have been practically ended, in which case she would have added Belgian Flanders to her German Empire and taken from Holland the mouth of the Scheldt. Napoleon's dream would have been realised. Germany would then have had her fleet to settle her conflict with England alone. In other words, her naval policy would have been "the future of Germany lay on the sea," the device of the new Empire,

displayed in the German section at the French Exhibition of 1900. What that policy would have been no one can tell, but we know from authentic sources that Germany sought coaling stations wherever her ships were sent, and that would have been one of the objects in negotiation with Great Britain. After the battle of the Marne I learnt in 1921 in Berlin that the German staff, like that of France, considered that a deadlock on land had occurred, and that so far as France was concerned the war had become a defensive one on the part of Germany.

The future destiny of the war was chiefly economic, that is to say, a war against the food supply of England. I cannot help associating the "*Gott strafe England*" with a feeling against strangulation by famine on the part of many German soldiers who had received in England their commercial education and contracted friendships there, not to speak of military prisoners in England who would be among the sufferers. This did not prevent the submarine warfare and the sinking of ships providing nourishment for the British islands. We must, therefore, not pay too much attention to the retirement of the German fleet after the naval battle of Jutland. We must remember that the submarine warfare might have compelled Great Britain to sue for peace.

Meanwhile however, under President Wilson, the United States feared danger to the Monroe doctrine, of which Great Britain was as much the defender in the Atlantic as the United States. It was no part of German policy to weaken England in time of peace. The British colonies were among her customers, and she did a large business with them. What she wanted was equality and not supremacy at sea, but this Great Britain could not grant without abandoning the keynote of her naval policy. If she has given to America what she refused to give to Germany, it is because Japan has meanwhile developed a fleet in the Pacific which has obliged America to divide her naval forces between the East and West.

France, in demanding security before disarmament, is asking for what is essential to her safety.* The Treaty of Versailles was a mistake but it exists. When I was in Germany it was called the "*Diktat*" of Versailles. Yet it is in virtue

*The word used in the English copy of the Covenant of the League of Nations is safety.

of the Treaty that the German Government of to-day demands equality of military treatment. This was promised to her in the Treaty and she is entitled under it to take her present stand against her late enemies. She forgets, however, that statesmen are not always the same and that a treaty may be contrary to the interest which a generation later may regard as essential. Statesmen can only deal with the present and its immediate consequences. They are like the rest of us mortals, victims of posterity, and cannot foresee what new developments industry or commerce may require. Every treaty in fact is subject to the unwritten rule "*rebus sic stantibus*" (things remaining the same). This has been provided for in Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles itself.*

I passed the early years after the war in Germany and can testify to the popularity of Englishmen in spite of the "*Gott strafe England*." If the old policy of making the Rhine the frontier of France had not been revived, it is possible that France and Germany would have been reconciled also. That a busy river like the Rhine in its navigable part can be a frontier is an idea which only blindlings can evolve. In fact, M. Poincaré seems from his book not to have looked upon Alsace as a part of his scheme before the war for the conciliation of France and Germany. He confined himself in the following extract to German Lorraine, and if the Germans had won, the Rhine would have been a purely German river except the mouth :

In a letter dated March 6th, 1916, . . . Sir Thomas Barclay reminded me of an attempt made by him (towards a Franco-German conciliation) in the autumn of 1912. He came to see me at the Quai d'Orsay and said : " I am going to Berlin. I intend to see M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, whom I have known for a long time. I should be glad to contribute to a *rapprochement* between France and Germany. Do you think that the restitution to France of Lorraine would finally restore the concord ? And do you think it possible that in exchange for this restitution, France could grant some compensation to Germany, for instance, in Asia ? " I replied to Sir Thomas Barclay that I had no great illusion in the success of any such *démarche*, but as he offered to feel the ground without implicating the French Government, I relied on his tact and left him free to act as he thought best. . . . It was only by that letter

* We must not forget the Declaration of London, 1871 : that no treaty signed by both parties can be abrogated except by mutual consent ; but this declaration is not to be relied upon.

of March 6th, 1916, that I knew that he had discussed the subject with M. de Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor had replied: "It is quite impossible for us to give up Lorraine. It was annexed as a measure of security against a French invasion. It has been fortified at great cost, and involved every year great expenditure, which the Reichstag only voted in the conviction of thereby guaranteeing the National Safety. How could we now, after forty years, disavow all we have done? Moreover, compensations given by France in Asia would awaken the suspicion of England, who is already irritated at the development of our naval strength." Discouraged by this negative answer, Sir Thomas Barclay, who came back to Paris after I was elected President of the Republic, did not think it necessary to relate this conversation to me, but he had taken note of it, and when recently he informed me about it, I was not at all surprised. In his attitude to Sir Thomas Barclay, as to Baron de Schoen, M. de Bethmann-Hollweg remained faithful to the Imperial policy.

Rotterdam before the war was becoming more and more a German mercantile port. A dock for German traffic had been agreed to by the Dutch Government. This has been abandoned for the time being.

The present German Government has at the head of its Foreign Office a man who is versed in diplomatic history. If he is not a pupil of von Bülow, like him he sees things as they are, and it is possible that he and M. François Poncet (the French Ambassador) will eventually find that common ground which will lead to the peace of Europe for years to come. Baron von Neurath is well known in London where he was succeeded by a man of considerable skill, the present Ambassador von Hoersch. With the latter I had frequent intercourse in Paris, and know with what ability he carried out his mission of making friends for Germany among the French. Baron von Neurath I knew in Rome where he was Ambassador before he went to London.

That the foreign relations of England and France are in competent hands is one of the guarantees of the peace of Europe. We are passing through a crisis, but we must not forget that we have learnt a lesson, a severe one. The life or death struggle between two portions of the civilised world could not but leave an aftermath of distress for all concerned. Perhaps the crisis would have come sooner or later, owing to the change of methods of industry and commerce, without an outlet in the new outerworld which saved Europe

over a century ago. We have not yet passed perhaps the zenith of a distress. It may be for another generation to straighten out the collapsed condition in which we find ourselves at present, the victims of events which we had not wise enough men to canalise effectively. The public hardly realises that the present crisis is a revolution, if not the result of a revolution. The crisis is not economic alone, it is social and political. But it is unquestionable that its economic circumstances have been the chief causes of the revolution.

The revolution began before the war, but the war was the outcome of the incompetence of statecraft to arrest its oncoming. To what this incompetence was due is perhaps one of the problems which the future will have to deal with. It is certain, however, that the generation which preceded the war was essentially popular in the worst possible sense, ignorant, self-confident, and so satisfied with a progress towards betterment innate in the course of events. It must not be thought that I am against democracy which has a future whereas autocracy has none; the latter is dependent on that worst thing of all: power in the hands of heredity.

The crisis from which we are suffering at present may be due to the too rapid changes which the war has brought about. It has discredited democracy to such an extent that in three countries it has given the power to men who have wreaked their vengeance on honest or supposed opponents. In England and France we have seen the power of party yield to the nation as a whole. Who would have thought that in England a socialist and a conservative would have worked in harness for the weal of their country, and that an ex-president of a Republic should have brought together for the same purpose the bitterest opponents of each other? They have done this without concentration camps and left to everybody freedom to criticise the measures taken. Yet we must associate the crisis with revolution. The new revolution is that the old system under which government by party was sacred is for the moment dead. The nation as a whole takes its place. This was only possible after broadcasting had reached the stage where a nation could hear what its representative proposed and the press unmuzzled could argue in absolute freedom.

In social life broadcasting is not the only innovation of the present day. The villager can obtain the same joy of contact

with the world as a townsman. He can spend his evening even in a barn and hear the actors as if they were present. He can see in the illustrated papers the pictures of the men about whom he has read. In short, he is being educated. I am confirmed in my optimism that the future will bring solace with it. In fact, I agree with Professor Gilbert Murray that we must not indulge in pessimism as to the future. I have seen many transformations of opinions but the character of the nation remains unchanged, and we may truly say of it with the French : "*plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose.*"

We may come back to the Internationalism of the Middle Ages and even to comparatively modern times. We must not forget that in the seventeenth century Grotius wrote his book, which is the foundation of the Law of Nations of to-day, in Latin, which was the international language of the time, just as English and French at the League of Nations are the international languages of to-day. We may, therefore, say that the clouds which hover over mankind at present have a silver lining, that they may break, and that mankind may look back with kindness on a change which the rise of democracy may have entailed.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

THE ABBÉ DE ST. PIERRE.

(1658-1743.)

THE eighteenth century witnessed the publication of two treatises on Perpetual Peace. The one was published in 1713, at the beginning of the century, the other in 1796, at the end. The one by the Abbé de St. Pierre was an ambitious argument in three volumes, the other was a little tract of thirty pages, one of the last productions of Immanuel Kant. The little tract has been translated into every language and is more widely discussed to-day than it was on the day of its appearance. The larger book, after enjoying for several generations a world-wide popularity and after being the subject of heated controversy, fell into complete oblivion and is now relegated to the upper shelves of Public Libraries.

It is the object of the following pages to rescue the Treatise of the Abbé de St. Pierre from the oblivion which has for so long engulfed it, and to prove that even to-day we have still a great deal to learn from its argument. It is not difficult to understand why the contemporaries of Saint Pierre who applauded his good intentions should have ignored his teachings. In the first place, it must be admitted that the Abbé was a hundred years before his time. He had to suffer from the fate which usually awaits untimely prophecies. In the second place, as the eighteenth century proceeded, the idea of peace became more and more discredited. We are apt to look to-day upon the eighteenth century as an age of enlightenment and as the age of reason. But we must not forget that it was also the age of Frederick the Great and of Catherine the Great. It was the age which saw the rise of Prussian militarism and of British imperialism, the age which saw the invasion of Silesia and the murder of Poland. In the third place, the three volumes of the *Treatise on Perpetual Peace* were badly written and even more clumsily composed. The very bulk and size of the book was against its diffusion. For we generally find that the political works which survive are not the ponderous treatises, but the brief, terse, pregnant, tracts. Posterity has not the time to read Machiavelli's *Decades of Livy*, but it still reads the *Prince*. We are content to ignore the *Novum organum* of Bacon and the theological controversies of Milton, but we still read the *Essays* and the *Nova Atlantis* and the *Areopagitica*. We have ceased to take an interest in the *New*

Héloïse of Rousseau, but the *Social Contract* still holds its place. Not even fanatical socialists are able to digest the twelve hundred pages of the *Kapital* of Marx, but every socialist worker is still familiar with the communist *Manifesto*.

But whilst we can find perfectly valid reasons for the neglect of the Abbé de St. Pierre, it nevertheless is true that such neglect is entirely undeserved. The *Treatise on Perpetual Peace* is an epoch-making work, it remains a milestone in the history of ideas. To-day more than ever the French thinker deserves recognition as a leader and initiator of political thought, for he must be looked upon as the real Father of the League of Nations. It is not a mere accident that the initiator of the peace idea should have been a Frenchman. The French mind, clear and quick in conception, logical in argument, has ever been a pioneer both in thought and in action. Whether we consider the history of Differential Calculus or of the aeroplane, of the theory of evolution or military strategy, or socialism or bacteriology or the motor-car; the fact is that at the beginning of very many great modern ideas or inventions we generally find a Frenchman.

Still less is it a mere accident that St. Pierre's book on *Perpetual Peace* should have appeared when it did, namely in the year of grace, 1713. It is almost an historical law that, after each lengthy period of European wars, there comes the inevitable pacifist reaction. Thus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find the attempt to reconstruct the Holy Roman Empire as the guardian of law and order. Thus, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, we find the *Grand Projet* of Henry IV. Thus, after the Wars of Napoleon, we find the Holy Alliance. Thus, after the World War, the League of Nations was born. And thus, also, after the Wars of Louis XIV, the yearning for peace was universal. The pacifist tracts of Penn in England, the famous letter of Fénelon to Louis XIV, are characteristic protests against the curse of militarism. Leibnitz, for many years, was concerned with the organisation of a European Commonwealth. Possessed as he was with the passion for peace, the Abbé de St. Pierre only caught the aspirations of his day and generation, even though in the elaboration of his system he was far ahead of it.

The biography of the Abbé de St. Pierre, which extends over nearly a century (1658-1743), is strangely uneventful and is

mainly the history of his ideals and of the publication of his books. His fertile mind was ever teeming with schemes and projects. The younger son of an ancient and noble Norman family, a cousin of the Maréchal de Villars, the hero of Denain, he was destined for the Church. He is the typical eighteenth-century court Abbé. At the age of 37 he is admitted a member of the French Academy, he becomes a Court Chaplain of Elizabeth Charlotte, Duchess of Orleans, and is a favourite figure in contemporary society.

He is one of the most remarkable and one of the most encyclopædic intellects of an encyclopædic age. His is pre-eminently the prophetic mind. He is a man after Talleyrand's own heart, he is the political thinker "*qui a de l'avenir dans l'esprit*." He incarnates the reforming spirit of his age. The mere titles of the twenty-five volumes of his collected works reveal to us that almost every political or social reform which has been realised for the last 200 years, was anticipated by St. Pierre. He is a supporter of free trade, of equal taxation, of charity organisation, of the abolition of class privileges, of phonetic spelling, of the codification of the law.

But St. Pierre is not merely a great intellect, he is also a great character. He is ready to suffer for his ideas. Although a catholic priest and a court chaplain, he had the courage to attack the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. At the very time when Voltaire was preparing the classical *Life* glorifying Louis XIV, St. Pierre had the courage to denounce the frantic ambition of the Roi Soleil and to deny to him the title of "Great." For that crime St. Pierre was expelled from the Academy without being allowed to justify himself, Fontenelle alone voting in his favour. And the punishment and the persecution of the gallant Abbé did not finish with his death. It was a time-honoured tradition in the French Academy that on the decease of a member the new member should deliver a solemn eulogy in praise of his predecessor. Maupertuis, who succeeded St. Pierre, was forbidden to pay the customary tribute to one of the noblest characters and one of the most original minds of the eighteenth century. Only d'Alembert, thirty-two years after St. Pierre's death, was permitted to repair the injustice of his contemporaries. And a greater than d'Alembert, Jean Jacques Rousseau, never wavered in his admiration for a man whom he considered as "*l'honneur de son siècle et de son espèce*."

One of the most frequent criticisms of St. Pierre's *Treatise on Perpetual Peace* is that it is the work of a Utopian. Whatever may be the shortcomings of the book, it certainly is not the work of a dreamer. No doubt, he is an indefatigable philanthropist and it is significant of him that he should have added one new word, "*bienfaisance*," to the vocabulary of the French language. But he is not a mere sentimentalist. If one may make a criticism of St. Pierre, it is rather that he is too much of a realist. He does not lay down first principles. He does not urge abstract justice or self-determination. He only interprets the lessons of history and speaks the language of statesmanship. Above all, St. Pierre wrote out of the fulness of his own experience. As secretary of the French Plenipotentiary, the Cardinal of Polignac, he was present at the Congress of Utrecht which had to solve the hundred-and-one problems arising out of one of the longest and most disastrous wars of world history.* The difficulties which he raises in his books are the very difficulties which confronted the ambassadors in the course of the negotiations. Every detail of his system has been thought out and worked out. Every objection is honestly stated. Nor does St. Pierre imagine that the Temple of Peace will be reared in his lifetime. He is only the architect who plans the buildings. It must be left to future generations to complete them.

Although the system of St. Pierre was born more than 200 years ago, it is interesting to note that from the very outset he goes much further than the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. The present Covenant under the Treaty of Versailles establishes the supremacy of the Big Powers, and transforms the Commonwealth of Nations into a tetrarchy or pentarchy. From the beginning St. Pierre claims complete equality for the small states. It is worth noting that the reasons which he urges in defence of the minor powers are the very same reasons which were used in the famous Convention of Philadelphia in 1787, by the supporters of the small States of the American Union. They are the very same arguments which we would use to-day.

It seems a strange paradox that a revolutionary thinker like St. Pierre should defend the constitution of Europe on the basis of "*uti possidetis*," and should advocate the maintenance

*The *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle*, 3 volumes in 12, was published at Utrecht in 1713 on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

of a political *status quo*. We may be inclined to think that a covenant whose object is to guarantee and to ensure to the conqueror the possession of his spoils, was bound to be an obstacle to human progress and seems, at any rate, a strange method of ensuring international peace. But this attitude of St. Pierre is perfectly intelligible. It was the attitude which one would expect from a realist. The most revolutionary thinkers are often conservative in the practical application of their system. They feel the need of reassuring the timid. A League of Nations which in the eighteenth century would have started, even as Wilson's League of Nations did start, with a readjustment of every frontier in the name of abstract right and justice, would have brought chaos in its train. Let us organise a European Commonwealth and the future might be left to take care of itself. St. Pierre did not expect that Great Britain could be compelled to surrender Gibraltar to Spain, no more than President Wilson would have expected her, even to-day, to surrender Malta to Italy, or Hongkong to China, or the Channel Islands to France.

It may also appear a strange paradox that in St. Pierre's opinion, the League of Nations should consider it as one of its main objects to insure the internal peace as well as the external peace of States, that he should see in the League of Nations a means of preventing civil war as well as foreign wars. It is easy enough to say that a League of Nations which should make it one of its aims to combat revolution might be made, like the Holy Alliance, into an instrument of oppression. But in identifying internal and external peace, St. Pierre was perfectly consistent. If an appeal to force is to be deprecated in the settlement of international difficulties, it ought equally to be deprecated in the settlement of national difficulties. Here again St. Pierre reasoned not like a mere dreamer, but like a realist. St. Pierre would not have understood the attitude of the conservative politician of to-day, no more than he would have understood that of a modern socialist. The die-hard tory imperialist is quite prepared to advocate compulsion as a means of solving the Irish question, whilst he indignantly rejects it as a means of settling labour troubles. The socialist advocates compulsion as a means of settling labour problems, whilst he repudiates it as a means of settling racial differences. In other words, the tory is a pacifist in national affairs, but remains a militarist in international affairs. On the other

hand, the socialist remains a militarist and a bolshevist in domestic questions, whilst he is a pacifist in foreign policy. In the opinion of St. Pierre you cannot thus separate external policy from internal policy. And I believe that he is right. To advocate violent revolution at home and to expect peace abroad is a contradiction in terms. The identification of internal and external peace is not a weak point in St. Pierre's argument, rather is it the weak point of the present League of Nations. In vain do we deprecate the interference of the League of Nations in internal questions. But does not the most superficial study of the causes of modern wars bring us to the conclusion that the majority of European wars are due to internal questions? The Balkan Wars were due to an internal question, namely the mismanagement of Turkish administration. The Transvaal War was due to the franchise question. The Wars of Napoleon arose out of the French Revolution. The present European chaos arises mainly out of the Russian Revolution.

One of the most interesting parts of St. Pierre's book is his conception of his League of Nations as an enlargement of the Holy Roman Empire. It seems odd to think that there was a time when the German Empire might be referred to as the perfect exemplar for the organisation of the European Commonwealth. Yet such was, in fact, until the rise of Prussian militarism, the aim and object of the German Empire. German militarism is a phenomenon of comparatively recent date. German pacifism is the tradition of ages. The conception of the German people as temperamentally inclined to aggression and violence is contradicted by history. Temperamentally the German is less bellicose than the Frenchman, because he is more docile and more passive. And the outstanding fact remains, that the Holy Roman Empire constituted within the limits of Central Europe a systematic attempt to impose law and order upon some 3,000 petty sovereigns. And for years the object was largely attained. Until the French Revolution it was not the German Empire, but Spain and France and England and Prussia, which were the breakers of European peace.

Our brief analysis of Saint Pierre's system may convince us that even those parts which seem to us most alien to our way of thinking, can be easily explained if we take into account the circumstances of his time. So far, therefore, from

indulging in cheap and superficial criticisms of St. Pierre's ideas, we ought to try to understand them. We would then realise that he gives us a true interpretation of the facts of the European politics of the eighteenth century. We would then realise that even his constant references to the constitution of the German Empire contain a weighty political lesson for the present time. It may well be that this German constitution in which St. Pierre saw both a model and an instrument of Peace, that this self-same federalised Germany may yet become, in the future as it was in the past, the main pillar of the European political structure.

CHARLES SAROLEA.

A FRENCH VIEW OF THE NEW ORDER.

OFTEN enough nowadays parliamentary democracy—the political system still surviving in England and in France—is said to be utterly doomed. With equal iteration it is asserted that this system can only be succeeded by Communism or Fascism. But in France where, for reasons into which it is unnecessary on this occasion to enter, disgust with the present political machine, and indeed discontent with the whole present structure of society, are so much greater than they are here, if it is readily allowed on all sides that the old order must go, the assertion that we must embrace either Communism or Fascism is not universally accepted. There is now in France a third view of the nature of the new order, and it is commanding some attention.

In France political disgust and political discontent are chiefly felt among the young. Broadly speaking, those in France who look forward to the advent of a new order are the young. The majority of them pin their faith to one or the other of those political parties which, owing to their extremism, are more given to theorising than to coping with practical issues; the majority are either Royalists or Communists. But among the more enterprising minority a number of small political associations independent of party have lately sprung up. Their variety may be gauged from the so-called confidential reviews which most of them conduct, among these being *L'Homme Nouveau* (with offices at 18 Rue de Condé, Paris); *Pamphlet* (56 Avenue Foch); *La Révolution constructive* (4 Rue Franklin, Asnières, Seine); *Esprit* (137 Rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis); and *L'Ordre Nouveau* (11 Rue Spontini). For the most part, such associations deserve to be considered collectively as a symptom rather than to be analysed individually for their constructive views. But one stands out from the rest, both on account of the extent of the general interest it has attracted in France and of the philosophical basis which it claims for its ambitious programme. This is the association or group publishing the review *L'Ordre Nouveau* and calling itself by the same name. It is this group which has put forward that third view of the nature of the new order which in France is now commanding some attention.

The association, “*L'Ordre Nouveau*,” aims first of all at being a study group, and in order that it may be free to remain

such there has lately arisen, not so much fissiparously as by spontaneous generation, a subsidiary organisation which will look after propaganda and proselytism. This subsidiary body is called “*La Ligue d'action pour un ordre nouveau*,” and it has its own periodical, *Nous Voulons*, which is edited at 35 Rue de Grenelle, Paris. “*L'Ordre Nouveau*” is alone among the small political associations of its kind in thus having an affiliated group specially devoted to getting its theories translated into action. The measure of the importance “*L'Ordre Nouveau*” has attained in France is, however, the frequency with which articles in its review are quoted and commented upon, not only in the widely circulating monthlies such as the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, but also in the leading newspapers, notably the *Journal des Débats*. Yet, if the group is so widely known, that is perhaps because, alone among apparently kindred groups, it has sought to expound and spread its doctrine primarily by means of a series of books, which have been issued through the ordinary leading Paris publishers and have all roused much discussion. In a sense, the history of “*L'Ordre Nouveau*” is in the appearance one after another of those books, and it is by considering them in the order of that appearance that one may perhaps most clearly and most briefly indicate what the doctrine is.

“*L'Ordre Nouveau*” was founded in 1931, and from the outset its moving spirits were M. Arnaud Dandieu, a librarian at the Bibliothèque Nationale, and M. Robert Aron, an editor and publisher. At that time M. Dandieu was already the author of a book entitled *Marcel Proust: sa Révélation psychologique*, which, written in French, had had the distinction of being published simultaneously in Paris and—by the Oxford University Press—in England. The revelation which in this book M. Dandieu attributed to Proust was, if one may express it in a single sentence, the revelation that the springs of human action are not rational, but affective. When it came to laying down the basis of a doctrine for “*L'Ordre Nouveau*,” this so-called revelation, with making which Proust had been credited, was to be taken as fundamental. M. Dandieu and M. Aron were former schoolfellows. With the founding of the group they entered into a literary collaboration, and by last autumn had produced together three books. The first, which appeared in about the middle of 1931, is called *Décadence de la Nation française* (and is published by Rieder). Its relation

to M. Dandieu's book about Proust is obvious. Contending that life is exclusively concrete and cannot be other, it lavishes an abundance of wit on accusing the French of having become divorced from life. For, so it says, the French, in a mistaken obedience to the Cartesian tradition, have of late placed their trust completely in rationalism, and rationalism, being, so it argues, confined of necessity to abstractions, can never embrace the whole concreteness of life. It calls upon the French to turn their backs on the rational intellect and to give rein—and it adds, as of old—to the affective side of the mind, which alone, so it asserts, is able to cope with the actual situations of life.

Décadence de la Nation française met with an immediate and considerable success, and thus encouraged MM. Aron and Dandieu produced at the beginning of 1932 a second book, *Le Cancer américain* (Rieder*). If, in the eyes of the two authors, the alleged infatuation of the French with rationalism is a major evil of our time, another is the acceptance, said to be world-wide, of what they believe to be the American gospel of production. Often as witty as its predecessor, *Le Cancer américain* ridicules and condemns the belief now so generally accepted that the supreme science is economics, that that to which all men should bend their efforts is profit-making for a few, that what matters above all is production *alias* trade *alias* business. It declares that the American worship of business and the American theories of finance are now devouring the world like a cancer.

Le Cancer américain also met with considerable success when it was published. In the meanwhile, "L'Ordre Nouveau," organised, as I have said, into a study group, had been seeking (a) how mankind in general and the French in particular could be extricated from what appeared to MM. Aron and Dandieu to be a double bondage, the bondage to rationalism and the bondage to "productivism," and (b) what co-operation from other political associations it might expect in tackling the task of extrication. The quest for co-operation proved disappointing. Other groups showed sympathy, but they were not disposed to accept "L'Ordre Nouveau's" leadership. The group saw that it would have to work alone and advance its cause by winning individual converts. It was in this way that in the spring of last year M. Dandieu came to launch the

* This and similar names in parentheses below are the names of publishers.

little review, *L'Ordre Nouveau*. But the group never imagined that the review would make the publication of further books superfluous. For at least a year before that M. Dandieu and M. Aron had been preparing a doctrinal work, and this eventually came out last October with the title *La Révolution nécessaire* (Grasset).

Here we come at last to the constructive views of "L'Ordre Nouveau." They are reached in the book by way of a criticism of Marx. MM. Aron and Dandieu point out that if Marx declared the Social Revolution to be inevitable and demanded that all should work to bring it about, that was because he believed that the Social Revolution would eventually enable every living individual to lead a full and decent life. Then they turn to Russia and remark that the Bolsheviks have so far succeeded only in obliterating the individual by sacrificing his personal development to the development of the State, and that under the Bolshevik form of government—miscalled the Dictatorship of the Proletariat—such an obliteration is unavoidable. The truth, they say, is that the Social Revolution cannot lead to a state of affairs in which every living individual will be able to lead a full and decent life. Marx, they continue, only imagined that it would, because the nature of a full and decent life for every individual was something he had never seriously tried to picture to himself.

Having said this, MM. Aron and Dandieu turn to the fellow-revolutionary upon whom Marx poured contempt. They turn to Proudhon, author of the adage "Property is theft." They find that regarding the goal any revolution should set for itself, Proudhon was far more clear-headed than Marx. According to Proudhon, before one sets to work to transform the structure of society one must have a science of society. Such a science, he went on, has not to be invented, but to be discovered. It must be "based on the nature of man and of his faculties." MM. Aron and Dandieu thereupon indicate that, in their opinion, they have discovered what is the real nature of man and of his faculties.

They affirm in *La Révolution nécessaire* that no political system can be regarded as satisfactory which does not respect the concrete human person—each and every individual. For it is, they say, in the individual that the peculiar nature of man is embodied. What differentiates man from the animals is, according to them, the possession of mind, and mind, they

say, displays itself essentially in what they call the creative act. Creative acts are invariably called forth by a concrete situation. Being concrete, such a situation is necessarily unique, and the creative act it calls forth is unique also, and hence unpredictable and productive of novelty. The essence of what is produced in a creative act eludes the grasp of reason. For reason, by its nature, is condemned to deal exclusively in identities and types, and it can only deal in these by being abstract and excluding the *hæcceity* of any concrete situation. Thus the individual must cope with a concrete situation, they say, in some way other than the rational. It must be affectively that the individual is truly himself.

MM. Aron and Dandieu then distinguish in the work performed by human beings two antithetical kinds. There is quantitative work, the *modus operandi* of which can be laid down rationally, for it is repetitive work and how it is performed comes entirely within the grasp of reason. It is mechanical work however skilled. Then there is qualitative work—craftsmanship, discovery, invention, art. In this, while certain rational rules are usually applicable, the essence of what is achieved defies and eludes reason. Qualitative work is performed affectively; it is novel, for it is coping with a concrete situation, and that situation, being concrete, is unique; and the result is unpredictable.

Having thus distinguished two kinds of human work, MM. Aron and Dandieu go on in *La Révolution nécessaire* to declare that the only acceptable political and economic organisation, and hence the one for which we should strive, is one in which all individuals are enabled to act creatively to the full extent of their individual capacities. What is required is that quantitative work should be reduced to a minimum for any one person, in order that that person may be freed for whatever qualitative work he can do. To this end, MM. Aron and Dandieu ask that society shall put the emphasis, not on production, as capitalist society does at present, but on consumption. They ask that every member of a society shall be assured of the satisfaction of his elementary human needs—food, lodging, clothing—and they declare that the satisfaction can be assured by means of “planned production.” They would have production in the hands of a series of guilds akin to the Fascist “corporations.” At the same time they favour political devolution and the cultivation of genuine territorial

loyalties. Further, they ask that the proletarian species shall be abolished. Let all the quantitative work in a given society be divided up among all the members of that society. This, they say, could easily be done by means of what they call “civilian service,” a form of labour conscription.

Such, very briefly and inadequately, is the programme of “L’Ordre Nouveau” and its philosophical basis. It is to be noted that the group, in its insistence on the irrational and the concrete, draws support from current French philosophy. Emile Meyerson, a philosopher by birth a Pole but long turned Frenchman, who died last December, maintained that reason seeks only identities, that explanation is but the discerning of a real or imagined identity, and that man, in his striving to explain things, was invariably confronted with an element which refused to come within any particular explanation. That element Meyerson called the irrational. More recently, another French philosopher, M. Jean Wahl, has produced studies of the nineteenth-century Danish thinker, Kierkegaard, and of the contemporary German philosopher, Heidegger, and a volume, entitled *Vers le Concret*, in which he discusses William James and Whitehead. He contends that there has been for some time a general tendency in philosophy to recognise that the concrete alone matters and to realise that this concrete is irrational. However, one may question if the word “irrational,” the vogue of which M. Wahl thus prolongs in France, is in this instance very happily applied, and there a first criticism of the doctrine of “L’Ordre Nouveau” suggests itself. There does not seem to be any call for opposing an “affective” and a “rational” side of the mind. Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, distinguishes between scientific or demonstrative thinking and deliberative or purposeful thinking. Kant dealt first with the pure and then with the practical reason. Mr. John Macmurray to-day finds the essence of humankind in something very similar to MM. Aron and Dandieu’s “mind”; only he calls it “rationality.” And for my part I cannot see what is to be gained by pretending that a man ever acts successfully without acting reasonably.

By the same token, although MM. Aron and Dandieu suggest that quantitative and qualitative work correspond respectively to work that men do not and work that men do want to do, it seems to me that they would have difficulty in

demonstrating such a correspondence. We suppose that a man living seven centuries ago found in craftsmanship a joy to which any of our contemporaries to-day tending a machine are utter strangers. It does not follow that all men would be happy as craftsmen, or that craftsmanship is not to some extent skill acquired by repetition.

I am suggesting that MM. Aron and Dandieu may not have fathomed "the nature of man and of his faculties" as fully as they imagined they had. That is a second criticism of their doctrine, and then there is a third and more serious one. Assuming that it was both desirable for, and the desire of, all men to be free to act "creatively," one should not expect a particular society to consent automatically to a labour conscription. A man might himself want to do only qualitative work, and yet not be prepared to undertake quantitative work as a labour conscript so that his fellow-men might be released to do qualitative work, to act creatively, likewise. The execution of the programme of "L'Ordre Nouveau," supposing it were practicable, requires a moral sanction. But the group has not considered the moral aspect at all. A recent recruit, M. Daniel-Rops, appears to do so in the latest book put out by "L'Ordre Nouveau," *Éléments de Notre Destin* (Spes), but I think this is misleading. M. Daniel-Rops is a master in a *lycée* and a writer of fiction remarkable enough for Mr. R. H. Mottram over here to have been led to translate some of it. Lately, M. Daniel-Rops has embraced Roman Catholicism, and in his new book he seeks to link religion with political idealism. He condemns what he calls "productivism" and extols the aims of "L'Ordre Nouveau," and this he does on the ground that the first kills, and the second gives full play to, the "spiritual" element in man. The "spiritual," he contends, cannot be ignored; we must believe that every single human being is concerned in a spiritual drama, the issue of which belongs to eternity. He says that either there is such a drama for every one of us or life is meaningless and man himself but a phantom. Now, if this is true, it may be a reason for condemning "productivism," but it is not a reason for recommending the aims of "L'Ordre Nouveau."

I consider that "L'Ordre Nouveau" shows an advance on Marxists, Fascists, and National Socialists, in that, wishing to take into account "the nature of man and of his faculties" as these fail to do, it would subordinate politics to the

individual's freedom to develop his "creative" faculties. Yet at the same time "L'Ordre Nouveau" is clearly at one with Marxists, Fascists, and National Socialists, in aiming at political perfection. To this there are two objections. Human beings are admittedly imperfect; it is therefore visionary to expect them to produce and keep up the perfect political organisation. Secondly, so far as "L'Ordre Nouveau" in particular is concerned, insisting as it does on the importance of the individual, it is involved in a flagrant contradiction. For if the individual matters, political perfection can be of no account. If the individual matters, it is not in virtue of any capacity "to act creatively." If the individual matters, the drama in which he is concerned must be conterminous with his individual life. It must be, that is to say, a moral drama. And all that can legitimately be required of any political organisation is that it shall hinder the individual as little as possible in his pursuit of a moral career. That does not mean that we must not seek to bring about political reforms. On the contrary. But we have to realise that they must be piecemeal. In politics, it is not the long view, but the short view that is wanted.

Such criticisms, sketchy as they inevitably are in a short article, will yet serve to indicate, I hope, how stimulating the writings of "L'Ordre Nouveau" may prove. In conclusion, I must mention that, although the group goes on, it suffered last autumn an irreparable loss, when Arnaud Dandieu died suddenly at the age of thirty-five. He was my friend, and I know that all of whom he was the friend can never cease to miss him.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY.

NATIONS in the grip of a crisis, taking stock of their material resources, look afresh at their colonies with a calculating eye. It is especially tempting to speculate on the possibilities of what the French used to call *colonies d'exploitation*. Self-governing Dominions must be treated as equals and therefore bargained with, but colonies which one governs directly are at one's mercy. The only limits placed on one's action are considerations of large expediency and whatever remains of a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the colonial populations. It is not, perhaps, surprising that a certain school of Imperialists should wish to surround the Crown Colonies with a tariff designed to serve the interests of British manufacturers, or that a section of opinion in Lancashire, whose cotton trade is languishing, should be inclined to forsake a generous tradition in a desperate effort at restoration.

Some extreme Imperialists hold up French colonial policy as an example of sane and profitable realism. France, they say, with her usual avoidance of sentimentality, sees to it that she enjoys a privileged position in her colonial markets and resolutely keeps other nations out, wherever her own manufacturers are capable of supplying a colony's needs. And it is true that during the economic crisis, amid the general collapse of international commerce, France has found a relative stability in her colonial trade. That trade has diminished, but not in the same proportion as the trade with foreign countries. Whereas in 1929 France received from her colonies, protectorates and mandated territories 12.5 per cent. of her total imports, the proportion rose in 1932 to 20.8 per cent. In 1929 she sent to her colonies 18.5 per cent. of her total exports and in 1932 no less than 31.6 per cent. Before accepting these figures as a triumphant vindication of French colonial policy, however, it would be prudent to examine the aims and results of that policy more closely.

Under the revised Law of 1928 the tariff relations between France and her colonies are complex. The colonies are still divided, as they have been since 1892, into two groups, known respectively as the "assimilated" and the "non-assimilated" colonies. The "assimilated" group, which includes Indo-China, Madagascar, Réunion, Guadeloupe and

Guiana, is in principle treated as if the colonies were a part of France; that is to say, goods imported from foreign countries meet the tariff of France, with modifications. The modifications of duties made in deference to the special requirements of the colonies are, however, numerous, so that in fact the tariff imposed in any particular colony differs considerably from the French tariff which is its starting-point. Imports from France into the colony and from the colony into France are free.

The second or "non-assimilated" group has a sort of autonomy, in the sense that its members have each a special tariff from the beginning. The French tariff is not the starting-point. The group is subdivided into two classes: (1) those colonies which give a preference to imports from France; and (2) those which, in observance of international treaty obligations, give no preference. Those which give a preference to France include French West Africa (except Dahomey and the Ivory Coast), Gabon and New Caledonia. In return they enjoy free entry into France for their food products, raw materials and a list of specified articles in addition. To goods outside this list the minimum tariff is applied on entry into France. All goods from France enter the colony free of Customs duties. The "open door" colonies, which include French Equatorial Africa (except Gabon), Dahomey, the Ivory Coast and the mandated territories of Togo and Cameroon, are subject to the French minimum tariff for all their products entering France, though reduction of duty or even total exemption may be accorded by decree in the case of particular articles.

It was the declared intention of the authors of the new Tariff Law of 1928 to make the régime more generous and elastic than that which previously existed, and some of the arrangements just described give evidence of increased consideration of colonial interests. But the reform does not go nearly as far as many colonials would like. Industrial and commercial organisations in the "assimilated" colonies have repeatedly expressed a preference for a tariff specially designed for each colony. It is indeed an anomaly, to begin with, that the French tariff, framed almost exclusively to meet the needs of the mother country, should be applied, with whatever modifications, to distant territories with vastly different interests. There are, for instance, goods in the

import of which France herself has little interest, and to many of these the heavy duties of the general tariff are applied. But some of these goods are imported into Indo-China in quantity, and unless derogations are granted in their favour they meet the general tariff in that colony. It is possible that the application of the tariff may recently have become more elastic, but in 1923 more than one-third of the imports of Indo-China were subject to the general tariff.

In the case of the "assimilated" group the whole of the tariff arrangements are governed by a rule which may be used either generously or oppressively, according to the whim of the home Government. Every demand made by a colony for the modification of particular duties has to be submitted to the Ministry of Colonies in Paris, where it runs the gauntlet of departmental criticisms and the possibly fatal objections of the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Finance, all of which have to be consulted. In order to meet numerous complaints of delay in dealing with applications the Law of 1928 instituted a more rapid procedure of consideration. This is very well, but improved procedure does not necessarily mean better treatment for the application.

Several events which have occurred in the last five years justify a doubt as to whether French policy, more liberal in theory, has become much more liberal in practice. The Council of Government of Indo-China, which asked for modifications of a large number of Customs duties soon after the Law of 1928 came into force, obtained almost complete satisfaction, partly because the duties it proposed were on the whole higher than those prescribed in the French tariff itself. This may be set down to the credit of the régime. But Madagascar presented a severer test of the new liberality and this colony's demand met with a very different reception.

What Madagascar asked for was the total exemption from Customs duties of certain kinds of machinery needed for development and a reduction of fifty per cent. on the duties applicable to certain other kinds. The machines concerned included motor tractors, ploughs, apparatus for treating agricultural and mineral products, and labour-saving devices for public works. About forty modifications of the tariff were proposed, but three-fourths of them were rejected by the home Government. On what grounds? There is little mystery

about the origin of the opposition. One of the organs which defend colonial interests in France wrote at the time: "It was almost sufficient for the Ministry of Commerce to declare that the manufacturers of the home country raised objection and that the Ministry gave them its support." Yet the French industries were not then in a position to supply machines adapted to tropical agriculture. They may have promised to make an effort to qualify themselves for the business, but that is small satisfaction to Madagascar, forced to accept machines at prices artificially raised by a high tariff and inferior to those which could be obtained more cheaply from foreign countries.

A more remarkable instance of the influence of French manufacturing interests on colonial policy was recently furnished by the increase of duties on cotton goods imported from foreign countries into French West Africa. This colony is not "assimilated." It has its own special tariff. Proposals for the institution or modification of duties originate in the colony and are forwarded to the Minister of Colonies by the Governor-General. In 1932 French West Africa was in economic and financial distress owing to the slump in the price of arachides, the staple crop of Senegal. The natives were in such misery that it was not only difficult to get them to sow for the new crop of arachides, but they were actually returning to their former practice of making their own clothing from cotton grown by themselves. This was the moment chosen by the textile industry in France to demand a raising of the duty imposed by the colony on cotton goods coming from countries other than France. Representations were transmitted to the Governor-General, who finally made the proposal which he was asked to make, though with certain honourable reservations. The proposal was promptly taken into consideration in Paris, and a decree, ratified by Parliament, raised the duty. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Parliamentary Bill urged that there was unemployment in the French textile industry and that the French manufacturers did not occupy the place which was due to them in the colony owing to insufficient protection.

It is scarcely conceivable that the Governor-General would of his own initiative have proposed to add to the already heavy burden supported by the native population under his charge, and it must be assumed that the motive power behind

the project was the will of the French manufacturers. On behalf of the colony it was suggested that some compensation could be afforded if the duty on foreign arachides imported into France were increased, so that a preference would be given to Senegal. This brought forth energetic protests from the French oil industry, but a moderate measure of increased protection was carried through Parliament, and this year there have also been quota restrictions. French West Africa thus obtained a modicum of compensation for the injury done to the colony. But the injury was done first.

The conflict between the economic interests of France herself and those of the rest of the Empire takes on a peculiar character in the case of the North African territories (including Algeria). These countries produce wine and cereals and therefore compete more or less directly with France. The Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, it should be remarked, do not come under the ordinary Tariff Law, or even under the Ministry of Colonies at all, but are dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1923 an attempt was made by legislation to place their trading relations with France on a regular basis. It was provided, among other matters, that the imports of Moroccan wheat into France should be rationed, the quota to be fixed each year. The original allowance was 900,000 quintals. As the Moroccan production increased the Protectorate administration in 1928 asked for a larger ration, and a quota of 1,700,000 quintals was granted. But this development has not occurred without causing uneasiness to the French agriculturists, who fear the effect of so large an import on prices. On their side the Moroccan farmers do not like a variable yearly quota, which leaves them in doubt as to how much to sow. For the moment there is a *modus vivendi*, but it is difficult to see how a permanent arrangement is possible, since every progress in Moroccan production carries the menace of a renewal of conflict.

Algeria has recently been in dispute with the South of France about wine. In the crisis of over-production (or under-consumption) the French growers complained of Algerian competition in the French market. They agreed to limit the amount of their own wine to be placed on the market, but asked for a greater proportionate restriction to be imposed on Algeria. This demand was made in spite of the fact that Algeria is in law a department of France. Parliament refused

to make this formal differentiation, and a compromise was accepted by both parties as a provisional settlement. Tunisia also is concerned in the wine quarrel. Imports into France are rationed on such terms that at present the Tunisian growers have large accumulated stocks which they cannot sell, the French duty on wines over and above the quota being very high. The modification which was made last year is apparently not enough to give satisfaction. In any case, the Tunisians are dissatisfied with their Customs régime as a whole. The industrial and commercial interests of the Protectorate demand the abolition of the quotas, and complain that while nine-tenths of French goods enter Tunisia duty free their own exports to France do not enjoy reciprocal treatment.

These examples are sufficient to show that the policy, or the various policies, adopted by France towards the other members of the French Empire cannot be regarded as working with the smoothness which is the usual mark of complete efficiency. In dealing with its colonies a country is faced by a broad choice between two policies. It can concentrate on the development of the colonies themselves on natural lines, financing equipment, encouraging the exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources, relying on the purchasing power thus created to bring it the large reward of a natural increase in trade. Or, on the other hand, it can set itself to obtain the immediate benefit of monopolising the trade of the colonies as they stand, in so far as it can be monopolised. The first has been the traditional British policy. It would not be fair to say that the second policy, in all its crudeness, has been deliberately followed by the French of the present generation, but the pursuit of immediate and visible gain for home industries, even at the risk of hindering development, has certainly formed an important element in their method.

There is no doubt, at any rate, that the British colonies in Africa and Asia have greatly out-distanced in development the French colonies which offer points of comparison. It would be a mistake to belittle the achievements of French administration in Morocco and Tunisia, in Indo-China and French West Africa, or to ignore the intelligent devotion of many Colonial Governors. But in most territories the French administrator has been far more handicapped than his British neighbours by the attitude of his home Government

difficult to avoid the conclusion that the "assimilated" group is kept in existence chiefly because the direct application of the French tariff gives a maximum opportunity for the protection of French manufactures in the markets of these colonies. It is worth noting that in 1929, the year following the adoption of the revised and more liberal Tariff Law, the Association of French Industry and Agriculture urged in a formal resolution that the derogations accorded to "assimilated" colonies should continue to have an exceptional character and pointed out that a too general extension of the demands for derogations would have the consequence of eluding the principle of assimilation.

Under the stress of the world crisis the idea of stimulating trade within the Empire, which presents itself as a sound investment by comparison with the fickle rewards of foreign commerce, has come into the field of official consideration in a rather novel form. A scheme of colonial credits has been put forward, the original object of which was to make loans to particular enterprises which are momentarily in difficulties. But it is suggested that the occasion should be used to make these loans serve the more general purpose of developing production. It is urged that they should in great part be employed to encourage the kinds of production for which France at present depends on foreign countries. This idea was last year described by M. Archimbaud, the Reporter of the Colonial Budget for the Chamber of Deputies, as "answering to the modern conception of colonisation in the domain of economics." The colonies should be directed (*orientées*) towards productions which are complementary to those of the mother country. Hence, the employment of the proposed credits in each colony would be determined by other considerations than those of the size or wealth of the territory, a large account being taken of such factors as the abundance and cheapness of labour, climate and facility of communications. Apparently, this project has been approved in principle by most of the Ministerial departments concerned, but the Ministry of Finance has not yet seen its way to accepting the obligations involved in a State guarantee, which is necessary for the working of the credit scheme.

While there is no reason to suppose that any further attempt will be made to confine colonial trade to direct commerce with France this plan has a suspicious appearance

of family relationship with the older and discredited ideas of relations between the various members of the Empire. Even so liberal-minded a man as the late M. Painlevé laid down principles which are at least disquieting. Not only did he advocate the maximum possible development in the colonies of productions which are wholly or partially lacking in France, but he urged the "intelligent" rationing of productions, such as wine and wheat, which France has in common with certain parts of her Empire—a rationing which, "according to the state of the year's crops, would make it possible first to satisfy the total needs of France and her oversea possessions without recourse to imports from foreign countries; a rationing which, on the other hand, would allow exportation if there were excess of production." Amid the prevalent economic nationalism of the time these notions do not occasion surprise. But the idea of the orientation from Paris of a colony's economic activity, however respectable or patriotic its aim may be, arouses some doubt as to what it may lead to in practical application.

W. L. MIDDLETON.

towards the colony, and particularly in the matter of tariffs.

It was realised twenty years ago that the policy of using the tariff to force the French colonies to trade with France had been pressed too far and had injured the development of the colonies. The freer colonies had made more progress than those of the "assimilated" group. Between 1892 and 1909 the "assimilated" group, fettered with restrictions, managed to multiply its imports from France $2\frac{1}{2}$ times, while its imports from foreign countries increased by only about twenty per cent. In the same period the freer group increased both its imports from France and its imports from foreign countries more than four times. The lesson was clear. The purchasing power of the colonies which enjoyed a certain tariff autonomy increased more rapidly than that of the colonies less generously treated, and French exporters themselves drew proportionately more profit from trading with them.

Some French experts would argue, no doubt, that a moderate protective policy is not necessarily incompatible with a policy of colonial development. The mother country can try to increase its share of the existing colonial trade and at the same time stimulate development. This view is taken by M. Tournan, the Reporter of the Customs Committee of the French Senate, who urges that if the mother country is able to supply its colonial dependencies with the material they need and is also ready to throw energy and capital into development, tariff policy loses in relative importance. Even after the recovery of Lorraine, however, France remains dependent on imports for a considerable part of her industrial equipment, including agricultural machinery, and if she were to go the length of claiming the exclusive privilege of supplying material to her colonies, the activity of the colonies would be largely paralysed. It has already been cramped, as we have seen, by excessive protection of the interests of French industry. Even if it be conceded that those interests need not theoretically interfere with a policy of stimulating colonial enterprise it is unquestionable that they tend to do so in practice. The spirit which demands prompt profits for French manufacturers is the spirit which grudges expenditure on development. Once politicians begin to look at the problem from the point of view of their home industries they are tempted to see the immediate and specific advantage and to neglect the distant and more general gain.

In strict justice it should be observed that successive Ministers of the Colonies have shown an enlightened appreciation of the facts of experience. There has also grown up in France an admirable school of "Colonials," including men who have been forced by circumstances to regard the problem from the Colonial side, as well as an increasing number of able administrators, who are pressing for greater liberalism. M. Albert Sarraut, a former Minister of the Colonies, who has himself been a Governor-General of Indo-China, designed about twelve years ago a vast scheme of development. He wrote about that time:

The moment is approaching when the obstinacy of the home country's former protectionism will yield to this evidence that the surest means of making the colonies good customers of the home country is to increase their purchasing power by allowing them a better chance of enriching themselves in trading with foreign countries.

This is excellent principle and accounts for some of the reforms embodied in the Tariff Law of 1928. But how does it square with certain acts of policy which have been observed under M. Sarraut's own administration? And how can the curious official attitude towards Madagascar be reconciled with it? Economically Madagascar is in a special position owing to its nearness to South Africa. In competent opinion the future prosperity of the island depends in great part on its exchanges with the large and growing market of the Rhodesian territories. At the *Congrès du Régime Colonial* held at Marseilles in 1925 a resolution was passed in favour of an arrangement by which the colony would be permitted to grant the benefit of the French minimum tariff to goods imported from South Africa, provided that an agreement for reciprocity could be made with the South African Union. It does not appear, however, that the claim of Madagascar for this particular kind of opportunity to enrich itself by trading with a foreign country was at that time given favourable consideration in Paris.

If there has been some relaxation of tariff fetters, moreover, the group of "assimilated" colonies is still maintained. Yet the old ideal of an ultimately complete absorption of these colonies into the tariff system of the mother country has long been abandoned by most of the leading politicians. It is

A COSMIC WARP.

THE twentieth century can afford to smile at the nineteenth. Theories which had apparently been established by scientific investigation have been shattered to pieces by the progress of science itself, and notions that would have been scorned in the enlightened circles of fifty years ago are coming back into favour. Old propositions of faith, recast into modern terminology, are being recognised not merely as credible, but as furnishing explanations more adequate to the modern standpoint than any other attempted interpretation. And questionings are always the children of faith. The problem of evil, for example, is only a problem to those who have been influenced by our Bible. Eastern religions, if aware of it at all, dismiss it as unimportant. The Jew was the first to raise the question in an acute form, and he did so in virtue of his growing insight into the moral character of the God in Whom he was learning to believe. It is only in those lands where the "ethical monotheism" of the Old Testament has become a fundamental category of religion, that the fact of evil has been met with protests and expostulations, with attacks and defences, since the mind of Western culture has reached at least one definite conclusion, viz., that God, if there be a God at all, must be the Ideal of Goodness.

It was the apparent evil in nature which bred most of the agnosticism of the nineteenth century. Huxley's famous verdict upon the cosmic order as "a process of becoming which has no sort of relation to moral ends," may be taken as the typical pronouncement of scientific minds. The flaw of his lecture on "Evolution and Ethics," as was pointed out by Dr. Aubrey L. Moore at the time, was its failure to include humanity in nature and to bring the heights and depths of human experience within the ambit of the cosmic scheme. But the main defects of last century were due to the dominance of individualism, which obscured for many investigators the import of social factors in evolution. Only a few voices were heard on the other side, and they failed to get a proper hearing. Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* was dismissed as the work of a revolutionary who had but an amateur's acquaintance with science. And Henry Drummond's retort to Herbert Spencer, asserting that his struggle for existence was being progressively modified by a complementary struggle for the

existence of others, was put aside as a bit of special pleading. Yet Drummond might have quoted at least one man of science in support of his contention. Dr. A. R. Wallace maintained that "the widespread idea of the cruelty of nature is almost wholly imaginary." And he justified his remark by calling attention to moral considerations which had usually been overlooked. "Capacity for acting in concert for protection and the acquisition of food and shelter; sympathy, which leads all in turn to assist each other; the sense of right, which checks depredations upon his fellows; self-restraint in present appetite; and that intelligent foresight which prepares for the future—are all qualities which from their appearance must have been for the benefit of the community, and therefore would become the subjects of natural selection." It is obvious that a recognition of the altruistic factor, seen at its best in parental devotion among the higher animals and at its strongest in the elaborate social organisation of many insects and other animals, must strongly affect our estimate of the trend of the cosmic process.

For us of to-day, however, the scientific background of the problem has entirely shifted. The progress of biology, the stress now laid upon the herd- and the sex-instincts, have emphasised the corporate elements in evolution. Above all, the electrical theory of matter has "introduced contingency into the very heart of things," and so has upset by one mighty turn of the kaleidoscope one of the most cherished convictions of our grandfathers. Yet the breakdown of the mechanical view of nature before "the principle of uncertainty" has opened up the spiritual world as a reality cognisable by science, the material and the spiritual being now regarded as parallel realms of existence interacting one upon another. This makes it possible to approach the problem from a new angle. And recently there has been put before us a very ancient speculation, which has appeared in various forms of cosmological theory in the past, and which is able to provide a satisfactory solution. Put briefly, the suggestion is that at the early stage in its development the original order of life on this planet was disarranged by malignant purpose, and that the consequences of this primeval disorder still remain. This is not simply a republication of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall. It concerns itself, not with humanity, but with this world of ours before mankind

appeared upon the scene. Its acceptance may affect any effort to describe what the doctrine of the Fall is intended to signify. But the notion of a warp in the cosmic order as now presented to us by several writers of repute deals with the pre-human situation, and tries to face all the ugly facts and to reconcile them with that form of theism which is fundamental to Western culture.

The credit for the first revival of this theory must be given to a remarkable little volume, entitled *Evil and Evolution*, published anonymously so long ago as 1896. The book came from the pen of the late Mr. G. F. Millin, a man of business, interested in science and its relation to the Christian faith. A few quotations will serve to indicate the gist of his contention. At first, he said, "plant and animal were probably alike incapable of pain. Internecine strife for existence in the lower strata of animals, while it is the means of development and progress, is probably without the least trace of cruelty. It is as entirely free from any kind of evil as the corresponding strife in the vegetable world. Nobody would think of doubting the goodness of God because a forest of fir-trees kills all the vegetation beneath its shade, or because He made an ivy to suck the life out of an elm. Struggle for existence, mutual slaughter, the 'red in tooth and claw,' over a vast tract of the animal kingdom may be exactly the same thing. If so, that disposes of all difficulty up to a certain stage in the evolution of life. There is no evil. There are none of the conditions of evil.

But in the process of the suns there must come a time when this ceases to be so, when nerves and consciousness, intelligence and devotion, begin to play their part. . . . The moment that evolution has attained that point at which the struggle begins to involve pain and unhappiness, it becomes quite another matter. As soon as the process begins to evolve, not only cruel selfishness in its most odious form, but deceit and artifice and treacherous cunning in the warfare which one animal wages with another, then I think you may be certain of one of two things, viz., either the Creator is not all-Benevolent, or the scheme is somehow working out as He never intended that it should.

As to the moment at which this disturbance might have taken place, he wrote:

It is possible to perceive traces of the principles both of love and of selfishness in the vegetable world. But, while animal life was

still so rudimentary that it had neither sense nor feeling, love (the dominant force) could not be operative, and was not needed. No suffering could come from the unrestricted play of the lower motive. But the very moment that suffering became possible, love became possible also. The very conditions of sensitiveness and consciousness and intelligence, which for the first time gave selfishness its power for evil, for the first time also made love possible and brought it into play as a counterbalancing and controlling force. There seems to be nothing extravagant in the supposition that the ruling principle (of love) must originally have been intended to hold sway, supreme and undisputed, from the very dawn of conscious life. It is just what you would expect of a Creator of perfect benevolence. And to disturb that all-important adjustment, and by some inscrutable modification of law to bring selfishness into predominance in place of love, is just what you might expect of a Being that was looking upon the work of creation with the intellect and power of a God and the malignity of a Devil. Such a disturbance would have been as astute as it was malignant. It would have been an interference with adjustment at the very heart of things. And if you can assume it as a fact, you have in that one maladjustment a complete explanation—not indeed of all the evil in the world—but of all moral and social evil. If you can assume a corresponding interference with the physical laws of creation, you have a hypothesis which covers the whole field.

So far, from the author of *Evil and Evolution*. His science reflects the popular outlook of last century. But he worked out his thesis with boldness, and in terms that all could understand, maintaining that if the normal course of the evolutionary process had not been interrupted, birds of prey and beasts of prey would never have come into existence, because "tigers and hyenas, vultures and sharks, ferrets and pole-cats, wasps and spiders, puff-adders and skunks" would have turned their capacities in more admirable directions.

Curiously enough, in reference to this notion of a disturbance in the physical order of nature, its possibility was shown by a suggestion made by the late Professor Clark-Maxwell.

"If we conceive of a being," he said, "whose faculties are so sharpened that he can follow every molecule in its course, such a being (whose attributes are still as essentially finite as our own) would be able to do what is at present impossible to us."

This he illustrated by supposing a vessel, filled with air and divided into two compartments, with a small connecting tube

through which molecules are passing: a being who can see the molecules allows only the swifter to pass from one compartment to the other, and only the slower to travel the other way; with the result that the temperature of the vessel is changed, without any expenditure of physical energy. Lord Kelvin spoke of this Being as "Maxwell's sorting demon!" It is at least noteworthy that some physicists, even in the nineteenth century, realised the possibility of a warp being produced in the mechanism of nature by a powerful spiritual Intelligence.

This notion then of a cosmic warp has to be carried back into the spiritual world. Such a step, however, does not necessarily land us in a dualistic philosophy. Some years ago Mr. H. G. Wells revived a Gnostic ditheism, asking us to believe in a Good God at work in human nature, and to relegate the universe beyond to some "Veiled Being" non-moral in character. But he seems to have now abandoned such a position: which indeed is philosophically untenable. After all, what we call the universe must be a unity, if language is to mean anything at all. Despite the specialisations of modern science, we are bound to look upon Nature as a whole and an organic whole and not some pluralistic fantasy. In the ancient religion of Persia it may be true that light and darkness are equally eternal, the spiritual contest between good and evil being endless and its issue not merely uncertain but unimaginable. This is a genuine dualism. And there can be little doubt that Iranian angelology and demonology have had an influence on the literature of the Bible. But just as the Hebrew genius, in borrowing the form of its cosmogony from Babylon transmuted its ethical content, so too the appearance in the Bible of spiritual creatures, bad as well as good, is never allowed to infringe upon the ultimate supremacy of Goodness, or to postulate the idea of a warfare that is everlasting.

In the Old Testament God is sometimes pictured as using powers of evil for His own purposes, and in the New good angels are at times divine agents of destruction as well as of deliverance and blessing. Yet the New Testament certainly takes for granted the existence and activity of spirits that are essentially hostile to God. The record of our Lord's temptation, for example, the substance of which must surely be authentic, gives a glimpse of His own view of the spiritual situation. Indeed His victory consists in the fact that He not

only fought the Adversary and overcame him, but tore the mask from his face and showed him up in his character as father of all lies, the embodiment of slander and hatred and malice, and the implacable foe of truth and love. He gives apparent sanction also to the belief that disease is the work of Satan, not only by His deeds of exorcism, but by describing one of His cures as "this poor woman whom Satan hath bound." St. Paul, too, spoke of his own physical infirmity as "a messenger of Satan." Missionaries tell us that the Chinese, and others also, are convinced that diseases are always the work of evil spirits. Perhaps, in essence, they are right. Bacteriologists have described the behaviour of microbes as "impish," likening them to mischief-loving sprites, inspired with an incalculable zest for devilry. There is nothing unchristian in such a picture. Even the animism of the savages may have a truth underlying it. The doctrine of the creation of angels, and of the fall of some among them, has always lain at the back of Catholic theology.

The hypothesis of a cosmic warp therefore rests on the dogma of a pre-cosmic fall. This notion of a malignant warp of the Creator's purpose, achieved once for all at the dawn of life upon this planet, yet persisting in its effects on plant and animal to-day, is able to bring calm and courage to our faith, vindicating our moral judgments, and yet saving us from imputing blame where it is not deserved. Dr. N. P. Williams, at the end of his Bampton lectures, deals with this point in a suggestive passage.

"The cat," he writes, "which tortures the mouse by playing with it; the wasp which deftly stings the living caterpillar in the chief ganglia of its spinal cord, so as to keep it paralysed, as a store of fresh food for her young; the microbe, which destroys a life that might have been the source of unnumbered blessings to the human race; and that most uncanny manifestation of the spirit of evil in nature, viz. the insectivorous plant, which with cold and mephistophelean ferocity disguises its death-dealing petals in the form of mere innocent blossoms, so as to allure and entrap its unwary victims—all these perform functions which are evil, in the sense that they rouse the detestation of the refined moral consciousness in man. They are free from guilt, they commit no sin, because they are but blindly following the fundamental law of their being. . . . Yet the problem is only heightened: for the guiltlessness of the brutes merely emphasises the apparent guilt of nature, which has made them what they are."

Such a problem, however, admits of one solution, viz. that behind nature there is an intelligence which has given to some of its organic products a twist in the wrong direction. Dr. Williams accepts this hypothesis as the best interpretation of the facts. "If we can assume," he says, "that there was a pre-cosmic vitiation of the whole Life-Force . . . we shall be in possession of a concept which should explain, so far as explanation is possible, the continuity and homogeneity of evil throughout all ranks of organised life, from the bacillus up to man."

Others have reached the same conclusion by a different path. Canon N. H. G. Holmes, after a long experience as a missionary in India, has stressed the need for thinking out the intellectual background of devotion. In his book, *The Presence of God*, he points out that an educated Hindu finds no difficulty in realising the fact of divine immanence in the universe, because he identifies it with energy, life, movement, which is not only ceaselessly but universally at work. But such pantheistic spirituality tends to obliterate moral distinctions, and may have disastrous consequences, as are illustrated by the religious prostitute. The pure Vedantist also, who regards God's immanence as consisting in the identity of the human spirit with the divine, may escape immoralism and pursue the spiritual way by the practice of certain physical and mental exercises, which aim at fanning into flame the divine spark within him. But the Christian dogma stands for something quite distinct from this. That ethical monotheism out of which it sprang has been expanded by the Christian drama of redemption into faith in One Who now "is above all, and through all, and in us all," in virtue of His active longing for our beatitude. His presence in His creation is not therefore to be visualised as some sort of Heavenly Ether pervading space, nor is the Name which we have to hallow that of some vital tendency absorbing the many in the One. The Christian dogma, in Canon Holmes' words,

can only mean that God is the constant and efficient Cause from which all at every moment derives its being. All that is in accordance with the will of God exists from moment to moment because He is thinking it. Nor can there be any local interval between God and His creatures, or His thoughts. Where the thought of God is, there the act of God is, and there God is immanent. But we have to recognise that there are thoughts in the

universe which are not God's. . . . No one has ever seen a cobra viciously turn, spread out its hood, hiss and strike, without being conscious that something devilish was present: a devil's thought, and not God's thought.

In other words, when we declare our belief in the divine immanence, we mean that we can discern God's presence in His creation as the source of its energy, the principle of its order, and the ground of its existence. But we have to recognise that the Spirit Who is the life-giver, the agent in organic evolution, is also the spirit of holiness and truth. Then, and then alone, can we look out upon nature with Christian eyes. Canon Holmes does not claim that the hypothesis of a pre-human fall in the spiritual world provides a short and easy way of explanation, enabling us to recognise at once what is divine and what is devilish in the operations of nature. He is aware of the danger of too facile a mode of interpretation and leaves vast areas still a mystery to faith. Yet he asks that what is to us clearly fiendish and diabolical in nature should frankly be assigned to the machinations of an evil spiritual intelligence, such a view being alone able to bring freedom and confidence to our outlook.

Is there then anything irrational in giving a welcome to this ancient speculation as providing for us of to-day the basis of a satisfactory answer? Dr. Williams thinks that "such a view of the primeval catastrophe is vaster, more solemn and more awe-inspiring, than that which regards the fall as merely an affair of our species." It moves the problem a stage farther back. But, in so doing, it does not leave it so imperious in its challenge. How to correlate our moral intuitions with the spectacle of evil around us has been perhaps the greatest problem of the ages. The wrongs and tragedies of human life will never cease to be a trial to faith. Yet to our generation it is the enigma of evil in the cosmic order which has been made to confront us with special urgency. Does not the hypothesis of a cosmic warp provide the most adequate solution? Not a few of those mythologies which embody the earliest speculations of mankind find room for some primitive maladjustment of purpose in the universe. And, as Plato said, even a myth may be true.

H. T. KNIGHT.

HOW MODERN RUSSIAN WOMEN ARE WORKING.

THE emancipation of the modern Russian woman was, theoretically speaking, a matter of a stroke of a pen. Actually, it became effective in towns like Moscow and Leningrad according to theory, but away in Georgia and over the Urals, man, and often woman herself, has hesitated for years before daring to acknowledge that woman is anything more than a beast of burden or a saleable object of domestic furniture.

Scarcely was the ink dry on the document which announced to all the world that Russian women from Vladivostok on the shores of the Pacific to Drissa on the banks of the western Dvina, were from henceforth the absolute equals of all their male fellow-citizens, in private, as well as in public life, and that in the eyes of the law they were "workers," than the women themselves who lived in the bigger centres of political and industrial activities assumed the responsibilities thrust upon them. And I say responsibilities advisedly, for by nature the Russian woman is endowed with incredible powers of differentiation and a capacity for appraising matters at their true value, so that she did not make the initial mistake of imagining that equality meant freedom without responsibility, rather she tends to err on the side of accumulating responsibility and letting it be the ruling star of her life.

For centuries the Russian woman had been compelled to restrain her instincts for self-expression and independent action, and now it would appear that the accumulated volume of latent talents has risen *en masse* in harmony and sympathy with the emancipation which she had made little effort to gain or expected to receive, together giving birth to an incredible capacity for work and for administration, a capacity which is the wonder of her own sex and of her erstwhile masters.

This fortuitous event came as a shock even to those of us who had known such Russian women as Brechko-Brechkovsky—the grandmother of the Russian revolution, now anathema to modern Russia—and others of her circle who passed years of exile wandering up and down pre-war Europe; we had looked upon them as extraordinary Russian women, not as ordinary every-day citizens; but contact with women

in modern Russia has proved to us without a doubt that they were but examples of the extremely virile race of women who are even now responsible for anything good that one may espy in the daily life of their native land. However prejudiced one may be, it is folly to imagine that Russia, the land of extraordinary experiments, has no humdrum daily life, nor bright spots on an obscured national sky. Individuals even in Russia have to live by work, and wherever there is work in that country—and I found no lack of it, some of it of a purely experimental type, some of it carried out on the most modern European lines, such as the installation of electric plants for the illumination of towns and villages, and some again of it being done as it was in the time of Ivan the Terrible—there is sure to be a group of women attached to the undertaking in the guise of workers, inspectors and welfare workers.

My first introduction to this new woman was at a Soviet Legation in a foreign country where I applied for a visa for my passport. Quite half of the staff was composed of women, who were doing their work quite as efficiently as the men of two other legations I had cause to visit in the same city. When any of the male members of the staff were nonplussed by one or other of my numerous questions, the reply—an accurate one—was forthcoming from one of the short-haired, plainly dressed, cigarette-smoking women who, to all intents and purposes, ruled the Legation. I had gone to this office prepared to wait innumerable hours for my visa and to use palm oil if it were necessary, but I soon realised that to a great extent the entry of women into state offices had speeded up Russian business methods and that my money was safer in my pocket than in my hand. Later I was to learn from more leisured observations that very slowly, but surely, graft is being attacked at its roots by an army of workers—all women—whose sole aim is to eradicate this form of vice from the life of the community in Russia.

It was at another Legation that I became acquainted with the fact that even the plums of diplomatic posts are open to women if they are prepared to offer equal, or better, qualifications than men candidates for the positions, and when I discussed with an old diplomat of pre-war days how far the women had proved capable of carrying out international activities, he made no secret of the fact that they were doing the work as well as the average man could have been expected

to do. In one or two cases with, perhaps, a little more delicacy of speech and intuition.

In Russia as in most of the other new European republics where women received instantaneous emancipation, there was a short period during the early days of the new régime when educated women made a bid for all positions that were vacant, irrespective of whether they were capable of utilising their abilities to the best advantage in the work they were about to attempt. They tried butchering, building, engineering, theatre management, in fact anything called work outside the home. Quickly the leaders amongst them realised that there are jobs in the world which can only be attempted by women and for which men are worse than useless; so, after the first mad rush to try their wings, they directed the stupendous force of new labour into the channels they now occupy, namely those of improving the physical, moral and intellectual calibre of youth and womanhood. The exceptional women, who through sheer merit, and not for sentimental reasons, have been able to sell their labour at a better price in the market when in competition with men, are still occupying the posts as factory managers, newspaper editors, financiers under state direction and heads of the various state departments devoted to the promotion of knowledge and social welfare. A certain station mistress comes to my mind who was one of the exceptional women, she could do what most Russian men never seem able to perform—make a gang of transport workers do a good day's work without a supervisor to every second worker; her will was as unbendable as the slopes of Mont Blanc.

Naturally the medical profession has attracted many of the women into its fold. Whereas in former years it was almost exclusively followed by men, it is now claimed by professors in the various Universities I visited that more than half the medical students are women. In fact one professor assured me that two-thirds of his students were of the female sex. I believe him to be an over-enthusiastic feminist. I have many pleasant recollections of my intercourse with medical women and nurses in Russia, and amongst both groups of workers there are numberless heroines of whom the world will never know. There was one young girl, only recently qualified, who let me spend a morning in her wooden dispensary, two hundred miles from the nearest town. Her

practice stretched for some sixty miles to the east of her dwelling, and forty to the west. Her only means of transport was a horse, or the springless cart of a peasant. Yet there she was living alone with only the bare necessities of life, a minimum of the common drugs; and in the interval of doctoring stray pains, setting bones, extracting teeth and bringing babies into the world, she acted as nurse to three cases—pneumonia, pernicious malaria and meningitis; she had installed these in a vacant room of her cottage, which she proudly called "my hospital." Her evenings were devoted to lecturing to the villagers on hygiene, first aid, sanitation, and preventive work against tuberculosis.

Then at one of the Universities I found a group of women medical students, many of whom were only just able to support themselves by working half the day and attending lectures when work was ended. In their odd moments they had arranged a sanatorium in the University building for students less well provided for than themselves who had broken down in health during term time, and installed a kitchen in which meals were provided for their fellow seekers after knowledge at a minimum price. This they had carried on for three years even though it meant that they had to rise daily at 5 a.m. to prepare the meal. They considered that they were merely doing their duty to their comrades.

Talking one day with the nurses in a hospital, I heard of the social service section to which several of them were finally to be attached. They specialised in house to house visiting, particularly in the large towns where there is great overcrowding. They report on all sanitary defects, contagious diseases and unhygienic conditions. To a certain degree they are working as our own social workers do, but with much wider powers. No house, factory, shop or public building is exempt from their supervision. One of their great pieces of work is the campaign against prostitution, superstition and drunkenness. To combat this latter they have a special group of workers who organise communal kitchens on a gigantic scale, and by assuring that the workers have good food and drinks under control they claim that they have found the means of attacking drunkenness at its root, and that they will eventually succeed in stamping it out altogether. They also claim that as woman and man are equal, they must rid the woman of the burden of carrying domestic drudgery on

her shoulders, as it impedes her outside utility and her activities for the state.

These same nurses introduced me to some pioneer work one of their companions was hoping to undertake—midwifery amongst the Tartar tribes. To equip herself for this, she was obliged not only to learn a foreign language, but had also to be prepared to give lectures on social problems, preventive methods against disease and the rudiments of reading and writing as well. Hundreds of women are devoting their lives to this type of work amongst the minority races, some of which are still in the migratory stage of their development and, naturally, are averse to anything that interferes with their usual method of living. To them the emancipation of woman is an evil to be combated with all the strategy at their command. Still the germ of freedom for women has entered into their clans, and the women are taking to it with avidity, a certain number of them have already cast off the veil and come out into the open as students and delegates to the national conferences. These same women return to their homes and co-operate with the pioneers from Moscow, Harkov and Leningrad who, realising that the women of the backward races must have some means of gaining a livelihood once they have claimed freedom for themselves, are putting their home industries and their peasant handicrafts on to a sound commercial basis. In some cases they are reviving forgotten arts and crafts.

Still in connection with the medical world I saw another activity in which woman is holding her own—medical research work. At the head of one large bacteriological institute I found a middle-aged, closely cropped woman surrounded by microscopes, cultures and anti-toxins. She talked to me, with one eye on a test tube full of bouillon, about the latest work she and her colleagues had been doing for the campaign against malaria in the southern and eastern republics. It was amusing to watch her male colleagues obeying her orders like a group of school children without a word of protest.

In one of the larger Russian towns I came into contact with the female tentacles which spread out over all the educational experiments that are being tried out in the country. As is usual throughout the land, the museums and the libraries were staffed almost entirely by women; a man was a rarity

in these buildings. They were women of very good, all round education, whose position entailed their giving lectures on art, books and in some cases music as well. By following closely the branches of work with which they had to co-operate, I found a group of women who are organisers of educational excursions to all places of historical and archaeological interest in the neighbourhoods in which they resided.

Then I came upon the crèche system by means of which the women workers in the factories and the fields can leave their children in the charge of trained nurses whilst they earn their daily bread. There was nothing rigidly institutional in these crèches, nor, in fact, in any of the institutions over which women were supervisors. Perhaps this is due to the Russian's inability to suppress his individuality and to eliminate the human element from his simplest action. Another interesting group of women workers was that in charge of the pre-school institutions I saw, in a beautiful sea-side town in southern Russia. They had a system of dealing with the children which appeared to combine points from Froebel, Montessori and the P.N.E.U. systems, yet to be like none of them in "*toto*." The children were certainly very jolly and brimful of ideas which they put into action by means of heaps of sand, perforated paper and the stickiest of yellow clay.

The outside world often wonders how the speculators and quiet transgressors of the law in Russia are caught and brought to book, generally paying very heavily for their crimes; but there is little secret about the matter. A large group of women are employed specially for this type of work; they join the shoppers in the markets and the main streets of the towns, and whilst making purchases themselves, they keep an eagle eye on every transaction that is made around them. They are fully grounded in all the tricks of the trade of "one good turn deserves another," especially if it is at the expense of the state, and consequently little escapes their eyes. They are avowed enemies of graft, and have no mercy if they find that it is being practised, especially if the poor dupe happens to be a worker, and they have less mercy still if the favour is being granted to any person who does not come under the heading of a worker in its restricted sense.

Women have, practically speaking, the complete control of education in all Russia. In the Ministry of Education

nearly all the principal posts are held by women. There they have the control of the appointments of new teachers, the supervision of the text-books that are published for use in schools and universities. They have in their hands the work that is being done for adult education and the stamping out of illiteracy. They specialise in work for the educating of the recruits in the army, and issue all the educational posters with which the country is flooded. The travelling cinemas which are sent from time to time from one end of the country to another with films and slides intended to spread information concerning epidemics and their prevention, or cure, always carry a good proportion of women workers aboard the trains in which those propaganda materials are carried.

In Moscow there is a special department whose work it is to study all matters that appertain to the conditions of labour in factories or industries where woman labour is utilised. Through its affiliated branches in every industrial building, it has the responsibility for all women workers in Russia; without its knowledge no woman can be dismissed from a post, and when a woman is dismissed for some misdemeanour or other, she is under the control of the officials of her particular section until another post has been found for her, when she automatically comes into the new section leader's line of control. Not only do women control the members of their own sex in commerce and industry, but they are given a large share in the control and supervision of the outlay, margin of profit, insurance of "personnel" and goods, taxes that have to be paid by employers of labour, standard of goods sent out from factories, quantities of labour given to each individual, facilities given for apprentices to learn their trade, clubs attached to centres of industry, hours of organised recreation, and the facilities that are given for illiterate workers to master the rudiments of reading and writing.

There is one profession in which the women are doing excellent work unhampered by unreasonable jealousy and that is in the legal profession. I spent an afternoon in the office of a motherly looking barrister, and thoroughly enjoyed myself listening to the various complaints she was called upon to hear and where possible to settle out of court. The majority of her clients were peasants who had quarrelled with neighbours as to the possession of various farm implements,

domestic utensils and live stock. One old man came to ask how he could force the young doctor who had recently come to the district to replace the old stump he had extracted from the plaintiff's jaw the preceding week; he thoroughly disapproved of the new curve his chin had acquired since his old friend no longer held out his lip. An irate young woman came to protest against the habit of spitting that some of the older inhabitants, living in the same house as herself, still practised in spite of the laws against such behaviour. When the afternoon's work was ended my friend handed a list of cases that had to come before the district court for judgment to another woman whose duty it was to see that any summons was served on the right person, and that all witnesses came at the hour appointed for their appearance in court. Here again was another of the recently created spheres of work for women, and I was assured that it had reduced by fifty per cent. the tedium we used to endure when, by ill luck, we were called upon to make the acquaintance of Russian legal procedure.

When I complained that the electric light in one house where I stayed was defective, I was referred to the woman inspector of public lighting, and found that I had stumbled upon the Communist property section and its women supervisors. Under this department is the control of water, light, trams, street-cleaning and, I believe, the repairing as well. The female inspectors of this group keep a wary eye on all the public baths and the laundries as well as the co-operative dwellings, and punish severely any one who is reckless enough to waste any of the public commodities. They saw that the defect in my case was remedied in a minimum of time. If they deal with all other work in like manner, the public of that particular town will have little cause for complaint where the amenities of life are concerned.

Thus it would appear to those who come into contact with the modern women in Russia, that the whole tendency in the country is to bring woman away from the home, to give to her the charge of all the branches of national labour which demand an honest and humane hand in control. That the Russian woman is taking her work and her responsibility seriously there is no doubt whatever. She is reversing the accepted order recognised by the rest of the world, namely that man is the prime factor in local, departmental and national government, and as her strongest critics are compelled

to admit, she is not failing to prove her case by glaring faults of judgment or by shirking unpleasantness when it is confronting her.

In all the women's work that I saw, there was something selfless and of the missionary type. It was inspired by the spirit which must have animated the women who pioneered in the primitive colonies. It looked like a gigantic spring cleaning followed by a complete refurnishing of the Russian national life. Sentiment had no place in its borders. There was an unending chain of co-operative links holding it together. Each new link was forged with enthusiasm and there was no end to the number of new links in the process of being forged. It was work, work with a will and with a purpose—a new régime.

M. E. WALKER.

AILSA CRAIG.

A ILSA CRAIG had long been to me one of those mysterious islands whose rocky remoteness is alluring; sooner or later they compel you to seek a more intimate knowledge of them, and this whether you are bird-lover or casual traveller. Seen from the Ayrshire coast, across cerulean seas, Ailsa is a dim, grey shape, its summit perhaps crowned with a misty nimbus whose form is ever changing. Really it is "a craggy ocean-pyramid" (as Keats called it) rising sheer 1,100 feet out of the Firth of Clyde. Access to this lonely crag is difficult. A motor-boat runs from Girvan one day in the week (weather permitting) to bring relief and supplies to the lighthouse, but otherwise you must hire your own transit, a somewhat expensive business.

I owe my first and only acquaintance with Ailsa to the kindness of Mr. J. M. Crosthwaite, the Secretary of the Scottish Society for the Protection of Birds. He had visited the island before and offered to accompany me. So, one May evening, we chartered a boat at Girvan. We had not long left the harbour before we saw gannets: the sight of these lovely birds, swerving and swooping with magnificent grace and ease about our course, thrilled me, for it was chiefly to know them and their nesting habits that I desired to reach Ailsa Craig. Sometimes one would dive, falling with half-closed wings fifty feet or more into the ocean with a splash that raised a fountain of iridescent spray. In its majestic beauty this feat rivals the headlong swoop of a peregrine, but the great bird's bulk adds splendour and awe to the performance. It has the inevitability of fate.

Meanwhile, kittiwakes and cold-eyed lesser black-backed gulls careened and curved around us, crying and calling, their breasts snow-white against the blue waves. As we drew nearer, the white walls and tower of the lighthouse and the outlines of a few buildings appeared, dwarfed by the mighty cliffs above them. Closer still, the upper slopes gleamed green at first, but gradually they became suffused with a shimmer of pearly blue, a fairy mist. For, in May, Ailsa's less precipitous sides are filmed with a delicate sheen of bluebells; their dewy radiance gentles the Craig's forbidding starkness.

The whole population of Ailsa turned out to meet us; it consists of the lighthouse keepers and their families, and

Mr. and Mrs. James Girvan, who live in a four-roomed cottage which is, except for the lighthouse, the only inhabited building. In this cottage we were quartered. The Girvan family have worked the granite quarries for curling stones for many years. Granite was at one time also got by quarrying companies, but these works are now abandoned. Before darkness fell we took a short walk along the beach; wheatear, wren, song thrush, dunnoek and common whitethroat were recognised. The first and last of these were, perhaps, migrants: it would be interesting to know what prompted the others to fix their habitation—if fixed it is—upon this lonely island where sustenance must be scarce. Gannets, of course, were everywhere.

Our first day was unfortunately very wet, and we were able only to make two short excursions along the meagre beach of tumbled rocks toward the foot of cliffs where the gannets breed. These cliffs in some places rise a sheer six hundred feet from the water's edge and upon their higher levels the nesting gannets were crowded together in immense numbers. Others were collecting large bunches of brown seaweed; the burden often seemed too heavy; the birds flapped clumsily until they gained enough speed to rise into the wind. Material is added to the nests, so Girvan told us, from April till August. During the day we saw many pairs of rock pipits, a few wheatears, a blackbird, two oyster-catchers (the only pair on the island), and many razorbills, guillemots and kittiwakes; swallows were coasting along the shore, probably migrants bound for further north. Puffins we found regrettably scarce: they are said to have suffered severely from the depredations of rats. Later on I saw one eider-duck, and Crosthwaite a black guillemot.

The next day was fortunately fine, for Girvan had promised to take me round the top of the cliffs to places where I could get close to the nesting gannets. The only access to the higher ground is by means of a steep track which ascends from near the cottage to a ruined tower or keep. Thence we scrambled along grassy slopes which fell steeply to the cliff's edge. Though the going is not really difficult if you proceed slowly, I could not quite forget that a stumble might launch me on a slippery descent which would finish with a thud at the end of six or seven hundred sheer feet. However, this did not happen, and in due course, after a rather unpleasant final

climb down a grassy slope, we reached a level patch a few yards from the top of a precipice, and—what was more pleasant—only the same distance from the gannets.

We sat down on the grass, for a rest was welcome: a mile or two's scramble along the edge of a gulf whose bottom is paved with boulders is trying both to muscles and nerves. But the spectacle before us was amazing. Less than ten yards away were a dozen or twenty pairs of gannets standing or sitting on or near their nests; the two brooding birds which were nearest left unguarded their one chalky, white egg, elliptical and much discoloured, garlanded by a circle of sea campion and seaweed: their absence enabled unscrupulous neighbours to take this heaven-sent opportunity of annexing some of the nesting material. All sat facing the cliff when on their nests. Birds returning to the cliff after a flight, and attempting to land near the sitting birds, often failed to obtain a resting-place, and flapped awkwardly against the cliff face.

Gannets as such near neighbours are weird and fascinating fowl. So strong, so graceful, so aërie on the wing, they are on land clumsy and ungainly: they shuffle along the ground or advance by a series of bumps; "jumps" or "hops" you cannot call these movements: the garden toad's progression is easeful by comparison. But though, out of their element, they seem as uncomfortable as a bachelor at a baby-show, they have a strange beauty which is alluring. It must thrill anyone but a myopic collector of egg-shells to sit at only arm's length from these unwieldy, land-bound birds to whom the winds are a playground. Dazzling white is their lovely plumage, except for the brownish wing tips, and the delicate yellow (fading from saffron into primrose as the light varies), which suffuses the sleek featherage behind the head and neck.

But the eye is their rarest jewel: it casts a spell over you, as does the basilisk eye of the stone curlew, but its charm is milder and less malevolent. The small black pupil is set in an iris of a pale, shining grey, translucent as a moonstone. Encircling the iris is a rim of pure, deep blue, a setting of lapis lazuli for this jewelled wonder. The eye's expression is calm, dispassionate: there is no "speculation" in it; the birds regard you incuriously. There is something primeval about gannets: they resemble gargoyles both in their stony impassiveness and their suggestion of mythical ancestry from

some creature, half-bird, half-lizard, long ago vanished from earth. Moonstones, shining clear and cool in ring or necklace, always now bring memories to me of gannets and of Ailsa.

The love-making of the gannet is as strange as might be expected in a bird whose shape suggests both goose and gull, though it is neither. Some couples were calmly quiescent, the male standing near his brooding mate. Other pairs were fencing amorously with their wicked-looking bills; some waved their heads in ecstasy, others stretched their long necks backwards and upwards, and mingled with these contortions were uncouth cries—a long sustained “kra-a-a” and a muffled, guttural note, “g-rrr.” (These symbols are inadequate, as human efforts to translate bird language inevitably are.) Their mating is paleolithic in its crudity; the male bird seizes the female savagely by the scruff of the neck while marital rites are consummated: as these are often followed by a mutual rubbing together of bills it would appear that such cave-man treatment is by no means resented.

I watched closely the actions of one bird returning to brood: after alighting, she shuffled heavily to the nest: arrived there she placed one large flat foot over the egg, supporting herself on the other leg as she sank down. It is stated that gannets cover the egg with both feet: perhaps the other foot is brought into action after the bird has settled herself, but it is difficult to observe what happens. A most ancient and fish-like smell pervaded the colony: even amid the salt of sea-borne breezes it was almost overpowering.

From the cliff's edge we looked down upon a sea, dappled with every mutability of green and blue, and smooth except where wind winnowed it into ripples like ribbed sand. Dim on the horizon to the south-west rose the Ayrshire hills, and north and west the Mull of Cantyre. Two basking sharks were nosing in the shallow waters close to the shore, indistinct shapes whose double fins now and again pierced and dimpled the surface. Afar off a herring whale came up to “blow”: borne on the still air its breathing seemed a long-drawn sigh. We lay there while the midday sun beat down upon us, and watched the gannets' marvellous aerial manœuvres. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, glided in a kaleidoscopic spiral above the many-twinkling ocean. Most birds were adult; in the air they were gleaming white crosses, save for the dark wing-tips. A few were immature, with some brown feathers;

others were flecked with brown and black. Some carried festoons of seaweed in their beaks. Follow an individual bird amid this airy Dervish dance, and you will find that each describes a rough circle or ellipse either upwards or downwards; hence the spiral appearance of the manœuvre. Sometimes the glittering whorl breaks up, disintegrates into particles and then re-forms. What does it all mean? Is it play, or has it some sexual significance, a communal courtship display—or is it both? Sexual exuberance sets land birds dancing. But gannets dance in the air. There were many other gannets on the sea, apparently feeding on surface food, but I saw none diving near the nesting places. They appear, at this stage of the breeding season, to seek their food at a distance. Occasionally small parties flew in from the sea in wedge formation, like geese, but this figure was not long maintained.

After watching these fascinating birds for an hour or so, we continued our walk round the Island. In places the going was easy, over smooth stretches of green turf half-veiled in a sheen of bluebells and spangled with campion, red and white. Higher up the mountain, on comparatively level ground, herring and lesser black-backed gulls were nesting in colonies. Once again we descended to the cliff's edge where a narrow chasm gashed the rocks from their summit to the sea. Its inhabitants were kittiwakes and razorbills, and at its seaward edge more gannets. From one side of the rift we looked down on the kittiwakes' nests: none of them as yet contained eggs. Dovelike birds are they, both in plumage and in their mild and gentle manners, though their harsh cry, “kitty-wake” or “wake-kitty,” is no rooketty-cooing, but wild and piercing. These lovely creatures sat in pairs near the nests. Some eyed us serenely with dark eyes, ringed with vermilion; others were billing, or rubbing their silvery necks together, or shaking their heads. Calling, their lemon-yellow bills open to disclose the blood-red membrane of the mouth, a delightful contrast. On two mornings there was a constant stream of kittiwakes flying to a rocky basin high up the cliff behind the cottage where the Horse Well streamlet comes tumbling down. They were collecting and carrying away large bunches of wet, muddy moss from the stream-bed for their nests. They gather material in this manner for a week or so, and it is supposed to be a sign of fine weather.

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In the evening Girvan rowed us round the Island in his boat, so that day we twice made a circuit of Ailsa, once on land and again by water. It was one of those memorable eventides when Nature, animate and inanimate, is lapped in a broad tranquillity. Noonday heat was waning; Ailsa was embraced in a haze of blue, melting into pale grey, dimpled with darker shadows. Even the sea seemed stilled in dreamless sleep: it lay vitreous in smooth folds, like a robe of silky satin—ultramarine and purple and malachite. Only along the cliffs' foot waves broke lazily in a wavering line of silver foam. Over the hills of Arran, vague in the distance, floated streamers of mist, snowy above and palelike lawn below.

It is from the water that you see Ailsa at its best. The granite cliffs shoot up above you, rising abruptly six or seven hundred feet from the shore; they form perpendicular stacks, like flattened pipes of a gargantuan organ, and these pillars are tinged with delicate shades of grey, red and yellow; sometimes they are divided by "faults" of some gritty stone of a darker shade. Many columns have broken off or weathered at the top, and on these or on ledges, wherever there was a foot or two of flat space, gannets were nesting in congested communities; the air, too, was full of them, gliding, careening, circling on tapering wings. Lower down were kittiwakes, guillemots and razorbills, whose cries mingled with the gannets' "kra-a-a" in a pleasing if unmusical confusion. On rocks and boulders by the shore, cormorants and crested shags in glossy green posed in statuesque, heraldic attitudes. Ravens croaked raucously from a cliff cornice; a peregrine was harrying them and their young, who, though fledged, flew but clumsily.

At the base of one of the cliffs we found the corpse of a gannet, lying tumbled and dishevelled on the rocks; it had not been long enough dead to be offensive. There were numbers of their skeletons amid the boulders; it was evident that many perish. I was told that they fight each other to the death in the mating season, and that others are in a high wind dashed against the cliffs and killed; certainly their landing often appears very clumsy. I did not see any such lethal combat or calamity during my visit, but the weather was calm. Possibly young birds fall out of the nests or come to grief in their first flight. The dead bird was an adult, and the skulls of others which I examined seemed fully developed;

I did not, however, make an exhaustive investigation of every skeleton.

We measured the wing-stretch of the corpse and found it to be six feet one inch from tip to tip. When gannets are sailing the ends of the wings look black against the white of the rest of the plumage, but seen at close quarters the primaries are brownish black. The twelve white tail feathers are pointed, and the outer ones shorter than the rest: this makes the tail look wedge-shaped, like the raven's, when extended, as it is when the birds land on the cliffs, but narrow when they are flying into the wind. The tip of the upper mandible of the long conical beak is slightly curved downwards. The black feet are webbed, all four toes being joined together: like those of the cormorant, their texture suggests American cloth; the line of the toes is freckled with a very beautiful greenish-blue, a shade which reminds me of the depths of the Cornish sea. Girvan said that the nesting birds roost on the rocks, but the others on the sea. Some gannets remain on Ailsa till mid-November; they may return as early as mid-January, but most do not arrive until February.

Another day Crosthwaite and I climbed to the summit of the Island. The ascent is steep and devious; above the ruined keep the paths are trodden only by the semi-wild sheep and goats which lead what seems a precarious existence on the island. The sheep are curious in appearance; their wool is a dirty brown, thin and scraggy at the sides: the rams have large curling horns, but in this respect they are surpassed by the goats, whose horns are long and curved. It is an uncanny experience to meet one of these uncouth creatures unexpectedly: they stand on an outcrop of rock and stare at you with obscene, yellow eyes. You wonder whether the Devil still haunts Ailsa, incarnated in one of these forbidding beasts. But to-day his disguises are more subtle and more alluring.

From the summit there were again wide and wonderful views over the surrounding ocean from Ayrshire to the Mull of Cantyre and Arran. And round the cairn which marks the top a red admiral fluttered, while swallows and martins skimmed past on their northward journey. The sky was threatening, and a scorching, suffocating heat presaged thunder; soon we heard its distant rumble, and could see two storm clouds converging on the mountain; their shapes

cast shadows of indigo on the sea's surface, though beyond them a silver seascape merged into Ayrshire hills. We decided to descend, but too late. Before we were half-way down the storm was upon us—a rather unpleasant situation on so exposed a place. Rain poured down in a deluge, and we arrived at Girvan's cottage drenched to the skin.

Ailsa Craig recalled memories of Lundy Island, for in many ways the two are similar. Both are lonely rocks plumped down (or, more accurately, thrust up) in the midst of a sea which is partly landlocked, Lundy at the mouth of the Bristol Channel and Ailsa at the end of the Firth of Clyde. In structure, too, they are alike, though Lundy is longer and flatter than Ailsa's cone; Ailsa is entirely composed of a kind of granite called Ailsite; Lundy, except for one small corner, is granite throughout. Both have ruined castle keeps, and also lighthouses, though Lundy has two in use to Ailsa's one. There are the same stark cliffs falling sheer to translucent depths of ocean; many birds of the same species haunt their precipices, but Lundy, alas, no longer forms a nesting haven for gannets. And on both of these rocky islets you are conscious of remoteness: you stand aloof, while the ships pass by; you are in the world and not of it. Such a situation is satisfying to the quiet mind: contemplation begets a peace which remains even amid the turmoil of modern life with its hurry and rush and insane pursuit of unessentials.

E. W. HENDY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

EUROPEAN "EQUILIBRIUM."

M. BARTHOUS, the Foreign Minister of France, arrived in London on July 8th to inform Sir John Simon of the progress that had been made towards the conclusion of what had popularly become known as a "Locarno" treaty for the East of Europe. What was contemplated was a pact of non-aggression and mutual guarantee. It was being discussed in every European capital. On July 2nd, Dr. Beneš gave one of his periodic excellent addresses to the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies and Senate. He called it, in its subsequent published form, "A New Phase of the Struggle for European Equilibrium." Much of it was concerned with this matter of the Eastern European Pact. For several months the French and Russian Governments had been discussing it. M. Barthou visited Warsaw (April 22nd-24th), and Prague (April 26th-27th), received Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Special Commissioner for Disarmament, in Paris (June 16th), and then visited Bucharest (June 20th-24th), Belgrade (June 24th-26th), and London (July 8th-10th). On June 13th Mr. Litvinov arrived in Berlin and had an interview with Baron von Neurath. On June 14th Herr Hitler flew by aeroplane to see Signor Mussolini in Venice. On the same day Dr. Goebbels left Berlin to see Marshal Pilsudski in Warsaw. General Weygand, Chief of the French General Staff, on June 20th arrived in London (though his visit was described as private, not official). A few days later Lord Hailsham visited the battlefields in France. And what was it all about? For the most part, and with the possible exception of General Weygand and Lord Hailsham, those men were discussing a new pact, whose exclusive purpose would be to save the European governments from making war upon each other. They contemplated the dual procedure of assuring each other that they would not make war upon each other, and at the same time of assuring each other that if in the alternative one of them did make war upon another, the rest would band themselves together and make war upon the aggressor. In the minds of the French and the Russians, the hypothetical but unspecified aggressor was clearly Germany. Germany's signature to the pact would therefore be essential

to the plan. Now the Covenant of the League of Nations contained essentially the same sort of provision as the new pact thus canvassed. Germany had given notice only on October 19th last of her decision to secede from the League of Nations. The "new phase" of pact-hunting in fact directly resulted from Germany's secession from Geneva.

The two leaders in the hunt were Moscow and Paris. For three months Moscow was saying in effect to Paris: "We will not take part in any alliance directed against third parties. If we sign a pact it must be open for signature to Germany and to any other third party." Paris during those three months was saying in effect to Moscow: "We for our part will not sign any pact that is not formulated within the framework of the League of Nations." The upshot was that those two capitals decided to accept each other's conditions and to begin exploring the possibility of formulating a pact which (1) should be open to Germany, and (2) should conform in all respects with the Covenant of the League of Nations. Mr. Litvinov had sounded German official opinion about it and was understood to have received an emphatic "No" to the proposal that she should participate in it, because it was a continuing principle of German diplomatic policy not again to recognise any sense or validity in the League of Nations. There had been no indication of any softening of that principle up to the time when these lines were written (July 15th). There was an apparent tendency in German circles even to regard the proposal as a trap; for she was in effect invited to choose between the alternatives of returning to the League of Nations or of being encircled by hostile states bound by juridical bonds to act against her. If the pact were negotiated and left open for signature to Germany, and if Germany still refused to sign it, it was inevitable that it would not be a "Locarno" pact at all, but an encircling anti-German alliance. It would be made so by reason of Germany's own refusal to sign, yet in the letter it would fulfil the Russian condition that it be "open" to general signature.

One's head reels in the contemplation of the unending succession of formulæ about European security. They are all of them in essence the same, from the Covenant of the League of Nations onwards: all of them so far equally ineffective because still one more pact where there are so many, makes no more impression upon the traditional mentality of European

diplomacy than those which went before it. The League of Nations itself, the supreme embodiment of Europe's attempt to safeguard the peace by mutual juridical guarantee, had lost its power because the motives that framed and managed it were themselves compromised. The Covenant was not merely a pact of non-aggression and mutual guarantee, it was also a means of maintaining the supremacy of the victors over the conquered. Its provisions were an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles, which prescribed the disarmament of the conquered, but not of the conquerors. The old fear which is the curse of Europe and the enemy of security was thus allowed to stultify the very purpose of the League of Nations at the outset. The League, two and a half years ago, even launched a disarmament conference on that unequal basis, with the almost inevitable result that within two years Germany had withdrawn from Geneva, and Italy was standing coldly and critically on the brink, ready to withdraw on a moment's provocation. The post-war attempt to secure peace by general mutual guarantee had failed, and was so clearly recognised as a failure that individual states had been hurriedly negotiating bilateral understandings, with the exclusive object of promising peace to each other. The ten-year "pact of understanding," signed by Germany and Poland on January 26th last, was in itself a proof of the failure of the League of Nations; and it was merely one of many.

And now there was to be another pact, this time specifically arising out of the conditions created by Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations last October. Not only had Germany withdrawn from Geneva. She was ruled by a body of men who symbolised Germany's disillusion, and her loss of faith in the League of Nations; who openly advocated a German military resurgence; and who were distrusted and feared by Germany's neighbours. Among those neighbours was Russia. Russia suddenly emerged as a new and material factor in European diplomacy. She was not a member of the League of Nations (a fact which had constituted another of Geneva's flaws); for more than a decade she had been something like an outlaw, shunned by all those States whose governments had not yet wholly lost their respect for individual property and the sanctity of individual contract; whose governments in short had not yet gone the full circle of reversing the original theory of government by confiscating

instead of safeguarding the individual's property. Russia, the outlaw, the country which in our time is distinguished as the leader of a modern political philosophy which is based upon the complete suppression of the individual—of individual liberty, individual property, individual initiative—and instead “plans” human beings as the average general drills his army, and with as little sense: that country now came to be courted in the Foreign Offices of Europe. France, who had been the bitterest opponent of bolshevist Russia on high principles of moral right, now saw in bolshevist Russia an ally against Germany. M. Barthou fraternised with and cultivated Mr. Litvinov.

The open process started in Geneva in the days following the meeting of the Disarmament Conference on May 28th. Mr. Litvinov then suggested that the Disarmament Conference having clearly failed, an alternative method of securing peace be sought by means of what he called guarantees of peace between individual States. That suggestion was thereupon discussed through the diplomatic channel. Its first fruits were in effect announced to the world by Mr. Maisky, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain, who on June 25th last made a speech at Birmingham. He was addressing a National Peace Conference. The diplomatic background makes it advisable that that speech be studied. It was inadequately, even scantily, reported in the English newspapers, for the habitual reason that the speeches of Russian politicians or diplomatists are best ignored: a reason which, other things being equal, is approved by all people who retain enough spirit in a politician-ridden world to stand up for personal freedom. But other things were not equal. Mr. Maisky made an interesting, even important pronouncement about Russia's attitude to the League of Nations, to security and to the proposed Eastern European “Locarno.” About the League of Nations, he said: “Recently some European Governments have been inviting the U.S.S.R. to join the League of Nations. I cannot say as yet what decision will be ultimately taken, but one thing at any rate is certain. The Soviet Government will make its decision as to entry or non-entry into the League of Nations solely and exclusively according to the measure in which the League of Nations, in present conditions, can play the part of a real factor in reinforcing peace.” On the subject of security, he summarised Mr. Litvinov's proposals made at

Geneva, thus: “(1) To transform the Disarmament Conference into a permanent and regularly assembling Conference of Peace. (2) To reinforce the guarantee of security by concluding general and regional pacts of non-aggression and mutual assistance against the aggressor.”

He explained at length what those two proposals might involve in practice. He started from the premise that the Disarmament Conference had failed. “The Disarmament Conference has obviously entered a blind alley. In the conditions of greatly increased distrust and suspicion affecting the relations between individual countries, caused by certain events in Asia and in Europe, there is no chance, at the present time, of bringing about any noticeable reduction of armaments.” The duties of the alternative Permanent Conference of Peace he enumerated thus: “(a) To continue its efforts to reach an agreement on a Convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments. (b) To work out agreements and adopt decisions and measures which create new guarantees for security. (c) To adopt each and every preventive measure capable of averting military conflicts. (d) To supervise the execution of the Convention and the decisions of the Conference. (e) To consult in the event of breaches of international treaties for the maintenance of peace.” He then elaborated Mr. Litvinov's theory about regional pacts. “Many,” he said, “have tried to represent this proposal as a return to the pre-war system of alliances, and as an attempt to ‘encircle’ Germany. Nothing could be more ill-founded than such accusations. The U.S.S.R. does not strive for military alliances, and cherishes no designs to ‘encircle’ any power whatsoever. The U.S.S.R. only wants peace and the prevention of war. What, then, are her concrete proposals? Mr. Litvinov has in mind two kinds of pact, regional and general (which in turn may comprise European or World pacts). Regional pacts are open for the adherence of every State in the region covered by the pact. General European or World pacts are open for the adherence of every State in Europe, or every State in the world.” Those principles, as applied to the proposed Eastern European “Locarno,” would work out, Mr. Maisky said, in this way: “The Regional pact which has been proposed most recently may be called an ‘Eastern Locarno’ by analogy with its Western prototype. This Eastern Locarno should embrace the U.S.S.R., Poland,

Germany, and a number of other States in Eastern Europe. All those who participate in the Pact assume the obligation of non-aggression, and also of mutual assistance, including military sanctions, in the event of aggression by any of those participating in the Pact. What objective does such a Pact pursue? Only the objective of preserving peace. Against whom is it directed? Only against the danger of war. To talk about this Pact striving to 'encircle' Germany is ridiculous, when Germany herself is invited to participate in it."

In the Foreign Offices of London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Prague Mr. Maisky's pronouncement was recognised as an interesting event because it acknowledged the fact that Russia had entered the field of European diplomacy as a sympathiser with French objects. It therefore set up the first real landmark in the diplomacy that has been unfolding, largely underground, since January.

In January the big uncertainty was the direction that would be taken by the main diplomatic forces, as a result of Germany's defection from Geneva and the consequent failure of the Disarmament Conference. The tripartite declaration of February 18th, 1934, in which the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy affirmed their interest in the continued independence of Austria, put an end to Germany's immediate hope of beginning a *Drang nach Osten* by means of an *Anschluss* with Austria. Two days before that declaration was made the Little Entente countries signed their new Pact of Organisation, whereby a more definite form was given to the common determination of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia to oppose three separate threats to their traditional policy, namely (1) a Habsburg restoration, (2) an Austro-German *Anschluss* in any form, and (3) revision in any degree of the territorial provisions of the peace of treaties.

The general restlessness of the times provoked a somewhat similar movement towards solidarity among the Balkan States. That movement, which started in the autumn of 1933, took the fashionable form of a hunt for a new pact. It was called a Balkan Pact. The foundations were laid in the winter when Mr. Titulescu visited Sofia, Ankara and Athens, when King Alexander toured the Balkans and King Boris went to Belgrade and Bucharest. The upshot was a Balkan Entente drafted in January and signed on February 9th, one of the main objects of which was to warn off the Great Powers

from interference in Balkan affairs. The sinister expression "balkanisation" had derived its meaning, not from Balkan disunity, but from the rival greed of the Great Powers in exploiting it. The mere fact that a Balkan Entente had now been constituted was something new in European diplomacy. Even Bulgaria's aloofness, due to the consideration that one of the objects of the Entente was the maintenance of the *status quo*, which it was Bulgaria's object not to maintain, though it weakened the Entente, only slightly lessened its historic importance. There was this in common between the Balkan Entente and the reaffirmed Little Entente, that they were provoked into existence by the disharmony of the Great Powers and the failure of the Disarmament Conference.

There was still another regional pact directly produced by those two factors, namely the agreement signed in Rome on March 17th by Signor Mussolini, Herr Dollfuss and General Gömbös: for one of the essential objects of that agreement was to safeguard Austria from German designs, in short to prevent the *Anschluss*. It is true that Signor Mussolini, being the representative of a European Great Power, and therefore ineradicably disposed towards fishing in the disturbed waters of the small Powers, had an object all his own, none other than the imposition of a political and economic lien on those Danubian States. The lever to his hand was his offer of sympathy with Austria's desire for independence, and with Hungary's desire for a revision of treaties. In each case, however, the original motive of regional consolidation was the result of the disturbances emanating from Berlin. To that extent the process was simple and straightforward. Yet no process in high diplomacy can remain simple or straightforward for long. Signor Mussolini's ulterior motive caused a certain embarrassment to the Little Entente despite its new Pact of Organisation. It was impossible for the Yugoslav politicians to look on unmoved at an infiltration of Italian influence along the Danube. A glance at the map will explain this particular manifestation of Signor Mussolini's effect. He drove Yugoslav opinion into the German camp. He even created the grotesque possibility that Czechoslovak opinion might be driven into the German camp for the like reason.

Next there emerged the new orientation of Russian policy, which in the first instance was strikingly expressed in the speeches delivered by Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr.

Kalinin in December and January last. The origins of the change were to be found in the combination of disturbances in Europe and the Far East, in both of which spheres Russia was an interested party. On the one part the war between Japan and China, the declaration of an independent Manchukuo, the secession of Japan from the League of Nations and its incidental blow to the Disarmament Conference constituted what was regarded in Moscow as a menace to Russia's interests in the Far East. On the other part Germany's defiance of Geneva, her ill-concealed determination to rearm, and her pact with Poland, suggested that Russian diplomacy was in need also of European friends. The Quai d'Orsay saw and took its opportunity. It had been foreseen even by M. Tardieu and M. Laval. M. Herriot had worked hard at it. M. Barthou has been given the opportunity to grasp it. The main common motive of France and Russia is to ensure that whatever may happen in the Far East there shall be no danger to the peace in Europe. The plan, as conceived by M. Barthou, is that there shall be for the east of Europe a treaty based on the model of the Locarno Treaty, so that all the Powers interested in the danger of war on Germany's frontiers, east or west, shall be pledged to prevent it. The signatories of the Eastern "Locarno" would be Russia, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic States, who would pledge themselves to take concerted military action against any aggressor who violated any one of them. The part that would be taken by France was thus explained by Sir John Simon in a statement he made to the House of Commons on July 13th, after M. Barthou's visit: "In addition to that there is a further feature, which I am right in saying that M. Barthou described as a condition, which would in a certain way connect Russia with the existing Locarno Treaty, in a form which may have to be considered by the statesmen of Europe if this matter is pursued: and it would take the form of a guarantee on the part of Russia to France on the one hand, and to Germany on the other, in the event of conditions arising which would bring the provisions of the Locarno Treaty into operation. Also, reciprocally, there would be, as I understand, an assurance offered by France in respect of the boundaries of Russia and also the boundaries of Germany on Germany's eastern side." By such a guarantee the French Government would in effect be

safeguarding Russia against German attack. In return for that service Russia would be expected by France to join the League of Nations, and thus to add her power to the general sanctions of the League of Nations Covenant.

But the French scheme was even more ambitious. M. Barthou further propagated the possibility of a Mediterranean Pact of the like kind. Still a third part of the scheme would be a general pact to be signed by all the parties to existing pacts of mutual assistance, with the object of correlating the separate juridical obligations with the general juridical obligations of the League Covenant. The latter instrument would need the participation of both the British and the German Governments, for they were signatories of the 1925 Locarno Pact. In form it would be an innocuous enterprise on the part of the British Government to reaffirm her existing signature to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the Locarno Pact. Yet in practice it might excite the argument among that large section of British opinion which opposes any further British commitment in Europe, that the suggested new pact in some subtle, indirect way would constitute a bond between all the pact-signatories, including those of the Eastern European "Locarno" Pact. In the case of Germany it would raise for immediate decision the question of returning to the League of Nations. The full scheme, as it was understood to have been unfolded by M. Barthou, though it had not been officially disclosed, was threefold: (1) a pact for north-eastern Europe, to be signed by the parties that have been enumerated above; (2) a south-eastern European, or Mediterranean, Pact, to be signed by Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey; and (3) a general pact co-ordinating every existing pact with the League of Nations pact. By that means, it was hoped by those who actively worked for the scheme, the embarrassment caused to the Little Entente by Signor Mussolini's Danubian bloc would be neatly allayed. Dr. Beneš, one of the shrewdest and most realistic critics of European diplomatic activity, gave his blessing to the scheme on grounds which he thus described in the speech above alluded to: "The principle of the Eastern Pact is not and ought not to be the establishment of separate and rival blocs, any more than it was the purpose of the Locarno treaty to loosen rivalries between opposing camps. The Locarno purpose, by contrast, was to establish an

equilibrium in Western Europe. Similarly, there is no intention now of forming a bloc either against Russia or against Germany. The object is to place all the States on an equal footing, and in short to establish an equilibrium throughout Europe. There is, therefore, no question of forming military alliances, one against another. Instead the object is to ensure, in conformity with the spirit of the League of Nations, and in the same measure, in the same conditions and in all sincerity, a relationship of equality, justice and security for all. It implies the establishment of an equilibrium among the Great Powers and of a system of regional understandings among the Small Powers. The general object is to liquidate the existing situation, which is utterly abnormal, between two great European Powers: Germany and Russia. That constitutes the real step forward."

In the speech of July 13th above referred to, Sir John Simon stated that (1) he was convinced that the proposal was not that of a selective alliance, but of a genuine scheme of mutual assistance; (2) that Great Britain would not herself enter into any new commitment; (3) that it would be essential for Russia to join the League of Nations; (4) that true equality for Germany being assured in this matter, it might be expected to lead to the resumption of the Disarmament Conference; and (5) that for those reasons the proposal seemed to him good.

THE GERMAN DISORDER.

In its international consequence the disorder that broke out in Germany on June 30th was one of the clear lucky things that had happened since Germany left Geneva in October last. It spoke eloquently of the fear that Germany had again inspired in all her neighbours, that the spectacle of a Germany apparently divided against herself created an immediate sense of relief in every European capital. One diplomatist in an exuberant moment exclaimed that it had put off "the war" for several years. As there is no smoke without fire, so it was not easy for the friends of Herr Hitler's government to argue that General Göring had merely purged and thus strengthened the Nazi party. What he did appear to have accomplished was the suppression before it could start of a threatened revolt on the part of several discontented elements in Germany:

item, the *Sturm Abteilung* ("Storm Detachments," known for short as S.A.) which is recruited largely from the professional middle classes who are disappointed by the economic conditions produced, or at least not mended, by Herr Hitler's exercise of power; the Social Democrats, who on principle are permanently on the *qui vive* for the chance of overthrowing such a government; and the indeterminate mass of educated Germans who are not disposed to be dragooned by a band of politicians in their intellectual and spiritual life. There were those who deduced from the events of June 30th that the discontent in Germany had gone deep. Others maintained that the plot was as much a "plant" as the Reichstag fire of February 27th, 1933, and was made a pretext for the ridding of the Nazi party of its doubtful elements, and the cowing of its critics.

It seems simpler to believe, and there seems to be more evidence for it, that the discontented elements were in fact contemplating some sort of revolt; that they misread the speech made by Herr von Papen, the Vice-Chancellor, on June 17th as an indication that the time had arrived to strike; and that Herr Hitler and General Göring "got their fist in fust." Herr von Papen's speech was delivered at Marburg University. His apparent purpose was to express the views of the Right section of the Nazi party and to give warning that Herr Hitler should recognise the dangers that beset him. He said that "the nation knows that heavy sacrifice is demanded if it is going to follow Hitler in unshakable faithfulness, but every word of criticism uttered must not be construed as malevolence, and perplexed patriots should not be stamped as enemies of the State. . . . Freedom and equality before the law are not liberal conceptions, but German and Christian ones. The fundamental basis of the State at all times is justice, and education to duty in the service of the State is necessary, but should have its limits." One had indeed heard for several months that discontent was rife. The young officials of the Nazi party, often mere boys in their twenties, who drove about in ostentatiously luxurious cars and who swaggered in the like spirit into restaurants and theatres, revolted the senior people who had expected the Hitler revolution to lead to something more sober and who themselves were suffering badly from the appalling economic and financial conditions. The younger intelligentsia,

such as the Foreign Office officials who at the beginning of 1933 had joined the Nazi party in sheer despair, believing that the parliamentary and constitutional machinery at home and the correct Stresemann-Brüning policy abroad had been proved to be of no avail to Germany, now began to see that as an alternative the Hitler Government was even worse. Economic and financial conditions at home had gone from bad to worse, and abroad Germany had lost all her friends.

The combined threat which Herr Hitler and General Göring decided to forestall on June 30th came from both the Right and the Left. General von Schleicher, who was shot dead on that day, himself belonged neither to the Nazi party nor to the Brown Shirts. But he was independently cultivating a body of Social Democratic opinion, and the discontents had marked him out as the successor to Herr Hitler if their revolt should succeed. The Storm Troopers, who have been the chief sufferers from Herr Hitler's dead hand upon German trade, number about 1,000,000. By contrast the S.S. (*Schutz Staffel*, or "Defence Force"), the black-shirted organisation of about 300,000 strong, are composed of the richer classes. They were not among the discontents. If Herr Hitler has succeeded in stamping out the disaffected sections of the Nazi party as well as the other discontents—an unlikely achievement—he will now lead a Party of the extreme Right, supported by the big industrialists. Herr von Papen, who belongs to the extreme Right, and who had inadvertently led the malcontents to believe that the present moment gave them their opportunity to strike, clearly had for his object the reformation of the Nazi party before it was too late. He was at the opposite extreme from the mass of the malcontents. There is, however, reason to believe that the malcontents themselves had decided not to attempt the overthrow of the Nazi party itself, but to aim at bringing its control within their own hands; and that General von Schleicher had promised to be the Führer of an alternative Left-wing party.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

July 15th, 1934.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE COMING OF THE NAZIS.

Though many excellent books have been written on the Nazi revolution, Herr Heiden's work* is the first detailed and authoritative account of the movement from its origin to its triumph. The author, a German Liberal now compelled to live in exile, shares the detestation of the civilised world for the savagery and intolerance of the party which holds the Fatherland in its grip. But the attack is developed by means of narration rather than invective, and the rise of Hitler is rightly explained in terms of the terrible situation created by the loss of the war. A movement, he declares, depends for its success upon its causes rather than its aims. German democracy was inaugurated at the worst possible moment, and it became identified with political humiliation and acute economic distress. Hitler, as the saying goes, was born at Versailles. The invasion of the Ruhr brought wind to his sails, and the economic blizzard which burst over Europe in 1930 brought his vessel under full sail into port.

Hitler is at once the child of discontent and the symbol of hope. As the author reminds us, the party had no defined programme. "Every kind of political theory, from the most reactionary monarchism to pure anarchy, from unrestricted individualism to the most rigid socialism, finds a place within

* *A History of National Socialism*. By Konrad Heiden. Methuen. 1934. 15s.
VOL. CXLVI.

the party. Each Nazi is left under the illusion that the party's only aim is to realise its own pet theory. Hitler makes a single categorical demand of his followers in return for this liberty: unconditional submission to his personal leadership." The movement, in fact, stands for a doctrine rather than a programme, the creation of a society in which the masses have only to concern themselves with the cares of daily life while the task of government is left to an *élite* of inspired leaders. Such a degrading conception of citizenship could only take shape in a shell-shocked people. When Germany and Europe recover their sanity, the system and its champions will disappear.

The story opens on March 7th, 1918, when Drexler, a locksmith, set up a "Committee of Independent Workmen" in Munich to advocate peace on honourable terms. From this little group of forty men in a *Bierhaus* sprang the National Socialist German Workers' Party. Under Drexler it would have remained a debating society, but when Hitler entered the party after the war the founder was brushed aside. The names of Feder and Röhm, Frick and Rosenberg come into the story; the Twenty-five points were drawn up in 1920; and in 1923 the Munich *Putsch* of Hitler and Ludendorff called the attention of the world to the movement of protest and revolt. The third chapter, entitled "The Leader: A Portrait," introduces us to a neurotic, unstable man, the greatest mob-orator and mob-leader in the world. "Hitler is not a strong man. He has powers, but the decisive test of power—self-mastery—is not found in him. He has not achieved greatness so much as had greatness thrust upon him."

If the earlier chapters of this impressive volume are the most valuable, since they throw light into many dark corners, the later are the most dramatic, as the Leader climbs to supreme power. Herr Heiden deals faithfully with the degenerates and adventurers who surround him, though he realises that the movement also possesses excellent and honest officials. "The presence of men of dubious character in the leadership of the Nazi party has been among the greatest of its misfortunes. It may some day cause it to dissolve of itself. Hitler's indifference to the moral character of his subordinates can perhaps be explained by the superiority of a personally irreproachable character devoted solely to the cause itself." But though the Leader is perhaps the best of a

bad lot, his policy of ruthlessness differs in no way from that of the rest; and in regard to the Jews he is simply insane. "Hitler has often enough declared openly that human life has no value in his eyes." His whole philosophy, indeed, like that of other Dictators, rests on violence.

What is the future of the Nazi Dictatorship? That it will last many years after the blood-bath of June 30th is highly improbable. Our author has no sort of doubt that we are witnessing an experiment based on wrong foundations and, therefore, bound to fail.

Fascism has in the long run only the choice between poverty and war. Both will prove its destruction. It is to be hoped that this will come through the former. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be prepared for the latter. Everyone who loves liberty contributes to making the end of Fascism the beginning of a new Europe. In the day of its birth this new Europe must already be alive in the hearts and minds of the peoples.

This striking book, which should be widely read, will hasten the coming of the dawn. G. P. G.

* * * * *

LORD CURZON.*

Mr. Harold Nicolson's *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925. A Study in Post-War Diplomacy*,* is the book one has wanted Mr. Nicolson to write ever since Lord Curzon died nine years ago. No man was better qualified to write it. Few men, if they had been qualified, could have done it so well. It is not only that Mr. Nicolson was himself closely associated with Lord Curzon in that last phase of his career, and knew the events at first hand, himself in some degree a contributor to them. In addition, he is a shrewd and imaginative student of diplomacy, who can chronicle those events in their fair perspective, and can give them a balanced and a true value. And he is a delightful writer, who pleases by the very quality of his thought and diction as well as by his matter. In this book he gives us a living image of the man Curzon, statuesque, brave, scholarly, brilliant, subtle in some moods, simple and pathetic in others, a tragedy and a monument of something good and attractive in human nature. It is a brilliant sketch

* Constable. 18s. net.

of a difficult but lovable character. It recalls every phase, every aspect of the man to those who knew him. It explains much that puzzled those who did not know him well.

Moreover, the book throws incidental light on other leading characters in the politics of our time, especially upon Mr. Lloyd George, than whom few men in living memory excite a greater variety of emotions among their fellows. Mr. Nicolson is so fair in what he writes about Mr. Lloyd George that even those who are habitually most irritated or angered by Georgian activity, will pause and for the first time will recognise qualities they had blindly submerged before. He is equally fair about them all : Bonar Law, Baldwin, Churchill, Veniselos, Ismet Pasha ; yet he achieves the really remarkable feat of maintaining an atmosphere of human sympathy. One can recall other writers whose judgment of men and affairs is equally precise and equally bent upon the facts without palliation or bias ; but such writers mostly write in the spirit of a judge who sums up the evidence with a cold and fish-like unconcern. Not so Mr. Nicolson. The combination of sympathy and fair placing of men and events is one of Mr. Nicolson's great gifts.

As a history of the period, the book is both complete and embellished with local colouring, that can be supplied only by a man who himself was in the thick of it. There emerges the revelation of an amazing memory on Mr. Nicolson's part ; or is it that he kept an amazing diary ? That he did keep a full diary of the diplomatic facts is clear enough from internal evidence, even if the author had not in his prefatory note catalogued as one of his sources "my own memory, as fortified by diaries and papers." The member of Lord Curzon's staff at, for instance, the Lausanne Near Eastern Conference, from whose diary much quotation is made, is, of course, Mr. Nicolson himself. But Mr. Nicolson appears to remember the colour, material, position of every piece of furniture, picture or ash-tray in Lord Curzon's rooms ("No. 53") in the Beau Rivage Hotel at Lausanne, or in the Hotel du Château, where the Conference was held ; remembers each tree on the waterfront, the kind of pavement, the thickness of the fogs on the lake, and when they descended. Mr. Nicolson's eye for detail runs through the general narrative and explains much of its value.

Nor has the author confined his material within the scope

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out. Professor Webb concentrates his argument upon the "possibility of separating the notion of religion from the idea of God," a position which, while novel, has recently attained a certain prevalence, as was shown not long ago by Mr. Julian Huxley's book "Religion Without Revelation." Those who affirm this possibility fall into two classes. The first of these consists of those who are so impressed by the insignificance of man over against the immensity of the universe, that if they seek to recognise the significance of religion they adopt pantheism on the basis of naturalism. Thus they ask the Psalmist's question, "What is man that Thou art mindful of him? or the son of a man that Thou visitest him?" while rejecting the countervailing considerations, which led the Psalmist triumphantly to affirm his theism. The second class is composed of those who, on the contrary, are so deeply conscious of the dignity of man, that they dismiss theism on the twofold ground that it is needless and that it impairs the spiritual autonomy of man. Hence they become humanists. In opposition to both these views Professor Webb insists that the characteristic features of religion, wherever it is found, are "*ultimacy* and *intimacy*," and argues, with great force, that "the *ultimacy* which must be ascribed to the object of religious reverence, the existence of which object is certified to us by the evocation of that sentiment in us, must involve the possession of a concrete fulness of being in no less degree than that in which *persons* possess it" (pp. 139-140). Were account only to be taken of *ultimacy*, the conclusion might lead to deism, that is, to the acknowledgment of a first and sufficient cause, wholly external to man, and perhaps indifferent to him. This, while it might be a rational, would not be a truly religious inference. His insistence upon *intimacy*, which is rightly regarded as essential to religion, leads the author to argue with cogency that the consciousness of God in human experience goes before and is the basis of the idea of God, as eventually formulated by theology and philosophy. In other words the *faith* of God, as a spiritual sense and attitude, precedes and supplies the material of the *doctrine* of God, as a reasoned conclusion and explanation.

It is impossible, within the limits of this review, to do justice to the chapter on "Psychological Accounts of the Origin of Belief in God," which merits, as does the whole

volume, careful consideration. It must suffice to remark, in regard to Freud's emphasis on the "father complex" as giving rise to eventual belief in the Heavenly Father, that the close relationship of these two should be readily conceded. In the presence, however, of the whole theistic argument, the more reasonable conclusion is not that human fatherhood is projected upon the universe, but that—following St. Paul's great saying "The Father from Whom every family constituted by fatherhood in heaven and earth is named," that is constituted and conditioned—the Fatherhood of God is the transcendently immanent cause of the place which fatherhood takes, not merely in the organisation of human society, but in filial affection.

It is a pleasure to commend this volume, despite the limitations imposed by the necessary brevity of a short course of Lectures, to the attention of those who are interested in the recent phases of theological controversy, and especially in the psychological considerations involved in them.

J. S. L.

* * * * *

HISTORY AND THE SELF.*

The essence of history, Miss Oakeley argues, is the conscious experience of individual selves who can only partially convey it to others; and derived from this primal source are the categories of race, institution and nation, under which we view the historic process. The dependence of the historian on the mental spectacles of himself and his age, and notably on the selection of his material which is too often accepted by philosophers without further question, demonstrates the relativity of historic presentation. But the essential self, it is maintained, lies beyond that relativity of which it is the source, being the impenetrable and undemonstrable alpha and omega without which events have no meaning, and existing potentially in the "tragic procession of peoples" revealed by Sir James Frazer and others, who have salvaged "scattered fragments of the immense wreckage of the past." Desire to transcend the narrow limits of their experience inspires men and women to creative activity, in which they are conscious of freedom to realise value; and their activity

* *History and the Self*. By Hilda D. Oakeley, M.A., D.Lit. Williams & Norgate. 10s. 6d.

attains moral value in the proportion to which they recognise the real existence of other selves. Failure to recognise it is a partial explanation, the writer suggests, of that corruption and distortion of creative activity which results in dis-value or evil, as in the case of Napoleon and others who become so blind to reality that they can only view human beings as the pawns or refractory tools of their purpose. In order to illuminate and establish her theses there is much sword play with the metaphysicians, revealing divergence from those neo-Hegelians to whom she is most indebted. Unlike Plato, Dr. Whitehead, and Professor Hartmann she holds that ideal values cannot exist apart from the individuals who reveal and interpret them; the fidelity of Horatio to Hamlet differs from that of Mary Seton to Mary Queen of Scots. "The stronger the love the more unique in every instance." Nor can she envisage with Professor McTaggart a timeless realisation of values by real selves because it reduces to illusion the experience "of which time is an essential nerve"; as examples, Sir Ronald Ross, Dr. Albert Schweitzer and Sir Wilfred Grenfell are quoted, who could not have expressed their ideal values without the temporal vehicle.

The tragedy of history is not only the failure of institutions to "express in purity the spiritual principle of their founders," but the fact that they often contradict those principles, as instanced notably by the Christian Church; although defenders of the latter could demonstrate relativity in the writer's selection and omissions. She contends that the blind factors in destiny, chance and contingency which appear so indifferent to human values, as in Hardy's *Dynasts*, are not the stumbling-block to purposive striving that we imagine. They often proceed from men's minds themselves, like the supposed necessities of political economy, or the possible courses of action to which, we assume, our forefathers were limited. That other alternatives were open to them and will be again to their descendants, is the protest of a treatise which regards the essential self, the soul of man, as intrinsically superior to blind chance as it is immune from the nightmares of some modern psychologists. This inner self cannot be pinned down like a beetle for investigation; for it is agreed with Lipps that we can never reduce the I to an object or the "not I." "To the question 'What am I?' the only possible answer to all eternity will be 'I am I'."

Psychologists analyse a secondary self "which has been formed beyond the true subject self, and which in such cases by long habit may all but completely bring about the submergence of the latter." The unsolved problem of progress is to provide advantageous conditions for creative activity and thereby reduce to a minimum its suppression or distortion, i.e. to transform moral freedom into historic liberty. Sheltered communities providing such conditions have been like "tranquil secluded pools" which the raging torrent of history has swept from time to time into its current, submerging their ideals. The ground of the author's lament and her hope might be epitomised in the words of St. Paul, who saw the whole creation groaning and travailing for the manifestation of the sons of God.

In criticism of a noble and illuminating treatise which blends metaphysics with wide human interests and sympathies, I venture to suggest that an arrangement of subject-matter which befits a course of lectures to students is less suitable for a book which appeals by its range to a wider audience. The constant deferring to later chapters is hardly atoned for by the index. Aspects of a subject united in a single picture, such as the element of chance or contingency in history, and the extent to which certain deductions from history or psychology may be regarded as true, would arrest many readers unversed in the technique of philosophy. Historical subjects have a wide appeal to-day; and the author's provision of means to ascertain their significance is a timely service.

Her attitude to mysticism, which she describes "as the last retreat of freedom" and as stealing "the jewel of life from common humanity," is puzzling. The consciousness of mystics, she implies, lies outside her province; but her main contentions surely involve a form of mysticism as do the creative activities she quotes.

D. P. H.

AMONG THE PEOPLE.*

At a by-election in June 1933 Sir Arnold Wilson was elected to represent in Parliament the Hitchin Division of

* *Walks and Talks*. The Diary of a Member of Parliament in 1933-4. By Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P. Oxford University Press. 5s. net.

Hertfordshire. It is a huge and diverse constituency, covering over two hundred square miles and embracing at least one hundred villages and five fair-sized towns. It is something of a tradition in this Division for the member to maintain personal contact with all the electors, whatever their political views, and Sir Arnold at once began to mix with the people and feel the pulse of their opinion in a way which leading articles and mass meetings fail to do. Such friendship and accessibility is really appreciated. The workman in the tap-room of the White Horse voiced the thoughts of thousands:

It's a pity that more of you gentlemen don't do it—county and district councillors too. We only hear of them at election times and never see them again. I reckon there's not much a Member of Parliament can do, but he will do it better if he knows his people. It's a better way than talking on a platform.

Upon this ground the House of Lords was supported. "There are some as ought not to be lords," said the landlady, "but I reckon most of them knows more about the country than any of us." In an urban area, this last view would doubtless be challenged.

This book is based upon a diary kept from August 1933 to January 1934, and in the main contains the opinions of numerous types upon innumerable topics. If it was ever doubted before, this volume makes plain the fact that the Englishman thinks deeply and independently over public affairs and will not suffer his views to be strangled by dictatorship. Of course opinions varied, but not so much between classes as between town and country. Take the case of wages. The farm labourer's wage is a minimum of 31s. a week, which more often than not is a maximum. The wages, for example, of a milk roundsman are fixed by a Trade Board and range from a minimum of 42s. in rural areas to 56s. in London. In the words of a small farmer, "the man who produced the milk, tended the cattle (and the horse) got less than the man who took it from door to door." He hoped that the Milk Marketing Scheme would be successful so that "it might be worth his while to sell his milk wholesale, if he could get a fair price, to save the roundsman and a horse and cart." Sir Arnold found that every farmer he met hoped the marketing schemes would succeed. They were much incensed by distributors' profits.

Housing was another topic which aroused continual interest. Higher rents were a general complaint. "Above all, the cruelty of slum clearance," said one young man in a country inn, "taking people from homes and forcing them into houses they could not pay for without starving—and then sending them to prison for non-payment of rent and rates." One foreman bricklayer preferred, under such conditions, the condemned houses. "They weren't much to look at, nor yet to live in, but there was comfort there," and "the folk in them on Old Age Pensions managed to pay three shillings rent and keep the places nice and clean, and pretty too, inside." But at a coffee-stall in Lambeth the tale was different. "Chuck everything else and push Housing," and "plenty of one-room and two-room flats, and some decent lodging-houses," added the barman.

I tell you this, what's going to knock Housing round here, unless they're careful, isn't Capital, nor yet Labour, nor yet Unemployment, it's bugs!

The acknowledged but unsatisfied need is for small, cheap dwellings.

Sir Arnold listened to the views of a Rural District Councillor upon the question of water supplies for country villages. Water could be laid on from a main supply, but it meant a water-rate and "so much less to spend on food." In his district, "the villagers mostly preferred to draw water free with their own labour than pay a 1s. a week for the rest of their lives. . . . No one could blame the Government." But the supply of water is an essential social service, and the present drought shows the iniquity of such a heavy rate and the necessity of a main supply, if only for reasons of health.

Sir Arnold paid a short visit to the most distressed areas in Newcastle and County Durham. Conditions there, of course, are far worse than in the South. The people are more poorly dressed and worse fed than in the poorest parts of London, and live in the worst slum conditions; and all accentuated by large families. There is much bitterness about contraception, as also in the South. "The knowledge of what the well-to-do know is kept from the poor" voices a common complaint. Amid all this misery there is wonderful perseverance. Sir Arnold describes the great work of the voluntary social services and Government centres in maintaining the

morale and efficiency of the men against future employment.

Belief in British democracy is well confirmed by Sir Arnold's experiences. As he truly says, "the people of these islands are able, as are no other, to pronounce judgement upon public issues placed fairly before them."

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MOTHER AND SON.

Victoria, the Widow and her Son,* is a companion volume to Mr. Hector Bolitho's biography of the Prince Consort in *Albert the Good*. His new book completes his study of the reign and has as its central theme the transition from distrust to confidence in the relationship between the Queen and "Bertie," the Prince of Wales. Mr. Bolitho has gained a justified reputation as a domestic historian, and the real value of this work lies in his presentation of the personal feelings and outlook of the mother and her son. The volume is overloaded with political history which has been written more competently and less partially elsewhere.

Mr. Bolitho has been influenced by the expressed opinion that

the books about King Edward are written at the expense of the Queen and the books about the Queen at the expense of King Edward. Some day there may be a book which will bring out, in fairness, the faults and merits of both.

It is an eminently equable view that the diversity of their characters did not impair their respective qualities. Queen Victoria was determined that her heir should be brought up along the lines of intellectual study laid down so strictly by the Prince Consort. As she wrote to her Uncle Leopold, "*no human power will make me swerve from what he decided and wished.*" She had little confidence in her son's judgment and discretion in spite of his successful Canadian tour. She suspected his frivolity, his democratic tastes. He surrounded himself with society "which eschewed the conventions and barriers which had been set up by his mother and father." Above all, the Queen was nervous of his encroachment upon and possible debasement of her constitutional powers. "I am also determined," she wrote, "that *no one* person, may he

* *Victoria, the Widow and her Son*. By Hector Bolitho. Cobden-Sanderson. 21s. net.

be ever so good, ever so devoted, among my servants—is to lead or guide or dictate to *me*." It was natural with these views that she should long prevent the Prince's participation in State affairs.

The Queen saw most events in the terms of pictures—the precious red boxes, the precious documents and the precious key, upon a table at Marlborough House, during a ribald party!

In the course of time, under pressure of public opinion and a growing appreciation of his "usefulness," she relented. But it was very gradual. During his Indian tour in 1876, as representative of the Queen, he only heard through a newspaper of his mother's assumption of the title of Empress of India. After Disraeli's last defeat, the Queen's confidence grew more rapidly and, as Mr. Bolitho points out, "the Prince's friendships with some of the Radicals did not please her, but they opened the way to a field of influence which would otherwise have been closed." He was welcomed to meetings of the Privy Council. In 1886, Lord Rosebery handed to him the Prince Consort's key to the Foreign Office boxes. In 1892 he was allowed full participation in the Sovereign's papers. In 1894 the Queen "gave a final proof of her devotion and trust in her heir after a long and unrelenting apprenticeship," by spontaneously proposing his appointment as Guardian of the Realm during her absence abroad.

Apart from his personal inaptitude for study, the Prince was a product of a new generation, sceptical of Victorian rectitude and endowed with a fuller appreciation of life. "There was a wide gap in the thought and habits of her generation and his." In the result, King Edward was more fitted for the duties of his Office than the training of Prince Albert could have provided. Despite the Queen's attitude, he had not been idle.

He had thrown himself into the maelstrom of Britain's daily life, associating himself with philanthropy, education, health reforms, social welfare, fashion, society, and harmless amusement. No other Prince ever approached the throne with such a full knowledge of and sympathy for the anxieties and frailties of his people.

Almost during the course of his mother's reign, the Constitution had broadened into a democracy. Through his peculiar gifts, the monarchy was preserved and guided along its present path.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Mr. H. R. Knickerbocker's *Will War Come in Europe?** should be carefully pondered by every responsible citizen. The experienced American correspondent after residing for many years in our troubled Continent recently travelled from capital to capital, asking the rulers the straight and ominous question: Is war coming? The replies differed widely, but the general impression we derive from the interviews so vividly recorded is one of growing danger. The heart of trouble lies in the fact that Germany is deeply dissatisfied with her lot; that the armaments race is beginning afresh; and that France's impregnable fortifications on her eastern frontier are useless against an attack from the air. The author shares the general view that our destinies will be decided more by Hitler than by any other man, and that his pacific speeches since he became Chancellor are sincere. But good resolutions, as he reminds us, may be changed when Germany's strength has grown to a point where success in war seems more probable than failure. His own conviction is that if England allies herself with France to-day, and openly declares to Germany that we will fight side by side "at the drop of the German hat," war may be postponed indefinitely. If this is the only way to prevent the collapse of civilisation, the outlook is dark indeed; for how many of us are ready for such an alliance? Mr. Knickerbocker's little book is filled with first-hand information on the supreme issue of our time, and his conversations with the men now in control take us to the very heart of the world's acute distress.

Professor George E. G. Catlin's new book *Preface to Action*† "is intended as a provocation to thought on our society and its structure." It contains no political programme but is directed to an examination of those principles which should guide political action. The argument is extremely provocative and will be far more widely challenged than his conclusions, which are admittedly vague. The author takes the permanence of human nature as the basis for the criticism and reform of institutions. He accordingly proceeds to consider the "major instincts" of man, which he divides into the erotic, economic, power and religious impulses. Then follows the main enquiry as to what institutional forms will satisfy these instincts. "The erotic desire and the craving for security against hunger and . . . deprivation of liberty . . . demand, for their stable satisfaction, co-operation with others in some aspect of friendly social life." This satisfaction in a community life is to be found in a proper "religious" impulse or "a symbolic object of ideal love." Professor Catlin is a pantheist and, treating the Christian religion as a myth, looks elsewhere. He examines in turn the contemporary "religions" of Catholicism as a political force, Toryism, Fascism,

* The Bodley Head. 5s.

† Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

and Communism, and rejects them all. In a book which is analytical rather than constructive, Professor Catlin's own conclusions are vague and incomplete. He looks for a new Platonism. He indicates the hope that in Anglo-Saxon lands "a new road, branching away from the orthodoxies of these faiths, will be found to give men a religion of the community, a tension of discipline, and a vigour of personal hope, so that they feel that this is a glorious and exacting time for men to live in."

The six literary figures in Mr. C. P. Hawkes' entertaining book *Authors-at-Arms** make a strange company. They were all at one time or another in their respective careers soldiers, but their motives and capacity for arms varied greatly. Only two were regular soldiers. Steele joined the Life Guards as a profession, but found his pen a readier way to success. Samuel Taylor Coleridge was first and last a scholar and his immersion in the army might have been a tragedy. He left Cambridge in a moment of despair and became a trooper in the then XVth Hussars. For six months he wrote the letters of his illiterate comrades and bewildered his officers with classical scholarship. Happily his identity was discovered and his brother bought him out. Gibbon and Scott were patriotic volunteers. In 1760, when England was threatened with invasion, Gibbon volunteered, and three and a half years of keen service influenced his *magnum opus*. In his own vain words "the Captain of Hampshire Grenadiers has not been useless to the Historian of the Roman Empire." Sir Walter Scott, who would admittedly have entered the regulars but for his lameness, played a leading part in forming the Royal Edinburgh Light Dragoons in 1797, and remained its Quartermaster until 1814. His love of soldiering and some of his experiences are found in the novels. For instance, a false alarm of invasion has its counterpart in "The Antiquary." Landor and Byron were inspired by ideals of independence. Of the six authors-at-arms, only the impetuous Landor engaged with the enemy, during the Peninsular War, unless we include the inspiring, yet rather pathetic, operations of Byron against the Turks. The exercise of arms played a short but important part in the lives of each. But for a proper estimation of its influence in their careers we must look further than these short snatches of biography allow.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

In his new book *Country*,† Mr. H. J. Massingham has written a delightful account of rural scenes and country life in "a certain village on the edge of the home counties," which is not disclosed but appears to exist somewhere near the Oxfordshire border. It is written with great descriptive power although sometimes couched in rather elaborate

* Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

† Cobden-Sanderson. 10s. 6d. net.

prose. He describes the surrounding country and the rural setting of his village, his own intimate experiences as a gardener, and local flora and bird life. There is, for example, a vivid account of his watching a cuckoo being hatched and reared by a dunnoek. As an accepted local figure, Mr. Massingham discusses village life and the mentality and outlook of the many cliques and social strata. Among various comments he complains that "the chapel plays a formidable part, not of course directly nor by intent, in fomenting conflict between the various dwellers in the village." He is nervous of urban intrusion and argues for a village ownership of the land in common as the basis of a corporate village society.

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The publication of a new volume in the Lonsdale Library on *Sea Fishing** is appropriately timed for the holiday season. As is usual in this series, the various divisions of the sport are dealt with by acknowledged experts, among whom the editor, Mr. A. E. Cooper, is especially prominent. It will be welcomed as a general textbook on sea fishing as much by the seeker after tunny as the angler of common mackerel. Mr. Eric Parker contributes an interesting article on the literature of sea fishing. After several introductory chapters on such matters as boat management, weather lore, rods and tackle, the different fishes are considered, beginning with the most primitive shark-like forms and ending with the more specialised species, such as the flat fishes. Two chapters deal with fishing off the coasts of South Africa and of New Zealand, where the striped marlin provides an angler's paradise. The whole book is copiously illustrated with excellent photographs and diagrams.

* * * * *

A Wayfarer in Belgium,† by Mr. Fletcher Allen, is more than a delightful guide-book. It is rather the very full notebook of an ardent traveller. Belgium is a country of surprises, containing so much in so small a place. It is famous for its flatness and its sands, for its lovely waterways and wooded hills, and for its unsurpassed art treasures. Belgium may be flat, but the Ardennes district is all the more lovely by its contrast with the sandy coast-line. Mr. Allen travels through the country-side and examines the towns from the people's viewpoint, which is the way of the true traveller. With great charm he tells the history of each place, with its troubles and pageantry, through the ages. Continual struggle for independence during centuries of oppression has made a sturdy and courageous people. Each town has its own individuality, and he wanders through Bruges, Ghent, Brussels, Antwerp, Louvain, and the Ardennes district, to mention only a few places, seeing the beauties of art and architecture and the country-side. Readers who know Belgium will enjoy Mr. Allen's descriptive journeys; and those who propose to go there for holidays will find this book of real value.

* Seeley, Service & Co. 15s. net.

† Methuen. 7s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER, 1934.

LIBERTY, LIBERALISM AND LABOUR.*

THE main issues now occupying the minds of observant men and women in this country may be seen to be three. There is the continuing problem of the condition of the people, intensified now by the trade depression; the poverty and bad environment that afflict so large a proportion of the nation; the unemployment still of two million workers. There is, second, the haunting fear of another war; the failure as yet to achieve disarmament; the visible beginnings of another race of armaments. And, third, there is the new challenge to liberty in many countries, its overthrow in some. The three are closely connected. Poverty restricts; war is an oppression; there can be no true liberty without economic comfort and security, or without peace. And there can be no sustained social progress in an epoch of wars, or, we believe, without personal and political liberty. Peace, Liberty and Social Justice, which are the three aims of Liberalism, march together. At this Summer School it is mainly the problems of Liberty that are to be discussed. But always at the back of our minds we know that they cannot arbitrarily be separated from economic problems or from the problems of world relations.

The movement towards dictatorships which followed upon the war sprang from obvious causes. It sprang from the sufferings of the peoples in the war itself and in the economic confusion which, in many countries, came after it. Those sufferings bred communism, or a confused anarchism. The politicians, placed in authority under democratic constitutions, proved, in some States, unable to form effective governments, or to relieve or even to control the situation. There came a reaction towards authoritarian governments, on the plea, whether true or false, that this was the only means of preventing the dissolution of society.

There has been at the same time a revolt against history. Many among the younger generation are disposed to say: If this war, if this depression, if all this confusion, are the product

* Inaugural address at the Liberal Summer School, Oxford.

of past institutions, if the political and social evolution of mankind has brought us nothing more useful than this, then better stop evolving on the old lines; better cut away from past traditions altogether; better start afresh on different lines. Fascists, Nazis come forward with what purports to be a positive creed. Many say: "In any case things cannot be worse," and are ready to make the trial. By a strange confusion of thought they say: "It is right to do something; this is something; therefore this is right." The past being discredited, they do not listen to the experience of the generations which had lived under absolutism. As a Spanish writer expresses it: "Under tyranny men seek liberty, and under liberty they seek tyranny."

Sometimes the movement claims a philosophic foundation. It may be based on the Hegelian doctrine of the State, regarded as a metaphysical entity, in which alone the individual man can find his own full realisation, and to which therefore he owes subservience. Sometimes it merely seeks to find some theory to justify it as it goes along, rather like Mr. Elliot's marketing schemes. "Action" is what is needed; after the act is done you inquire what its purpose is, and if there should be no clear answer that is of no special importance. By that time public attention will have passed on to the next "action." As Clough puts it, with remarkable foresight:

Action will furnish belief—but will that belief be the true one?

This is the point, you know. However, it doesn't much matter.

Sometimes there emerges as an afterthought the theory of the "Corporate State." Since Parliaments have to be abolished, because they are inconsistent with authoritarian government; and since the peoples, still somewhat under the influence of their past, have relics of the delusion that they ought to be consulted about something sometimes, a sham Assembly is set up to give—not decisions—but advice on one province among the many in public affairs, on industrial and commercial questions. Here and there, for one reason or another, on one model or another, nations have got their dictatorships, with the results that we see.

Dictatorship is one thing, prosperity another. To control political forces is easier than to control economic forces.

Italy, after enjoying a great festival of governmental achievements, finds herself the next morning with a heavy bill to pay. With a revenue about one-third of that of the United Kingdom, the realised deficit just announced for the year ending June 30th is equivalent to £41,000,000 at par (much more, of course, at the present rate of exchange). In Germany the economic and financial situation is well known to be serious, if not dangerous. The fierce antagonisms which always smoulder within the secret precincts of absolutist governments, have lately blazed out in Germany for all the world to see. The dictatorship has proved itself a centre of turmoil in Europe; it has gravely prejudiced the prospects of a general disarmament; in Austria it has brought about the tragic consequences which we know. With respect to the Polish Corridor alone has it been a pacifying influence, and that has been achieved only by a complete change of attitude. Indeed the one real advantage which a dictator possesses is that he is able smoothly and effectively to veto his own declared policies.

People who come to England from Central Europe in these days all say that the whole atmosphere here is remarkably different. They can fill their lungs with the fresh air of liberty. The Parliament, the Press, the pulpit, the platform are free. Arrest without warrant, imprisonment without trial, execution by arbitrary command, are unknown. The Law Courts dispense justice, they do not obey orders. Shall these things be surrendered? Shall we now, with this example before us, for the first time re-shape our constitution on Continental models? We should instead feel a glowing pride in our own institutions, and gratitude to our Liberal forbears who have endowed us with them; saying, in the great words of Pericles speaking of the Athenians: "We have a form of government not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighbouring States—nay, we are rather a pattern to others than they to us."

There was a moment when it seemed as though some at least among our own youth might be inclined to follow what was said to be "a world trend" away from democracy. The results elsewhere have had a steadying effect. June 30th was an unfortunate day, not only for Herr Hitler's enemies in Germany but also for his friends elsewhere, not only for the S.A. leaders but also for Sir Oswald Mosley. Indeed we now see being repeated in Great Britain in our own day, after this revolution in Germany, much the same consequences as

followed after the French Revolution of 1789 and the Terror of 1793 ; but inverted, since in Germany it has been a revolution which will prove itself to be essentially from the Right, in France it was a revolution from what we would now call the extreme Left. At the end of the eighteenth century the reflex in Britain strengthened Toryism. "Whenever our neighbour's house is on fire," said Burke, "it cannot be amiss for the engines to play a little on our own." Parliamentary reform, for which the country had been ripe, was put off for forty years. The events in Germany now are likely to strengthen Liberalism. The central mind of our nation is rallying to free institutions. The British Fascists, never more than a handful, not even venturing to present a candidate at a single one of the by-elections of the last three years, by present indications have clearly no prospect of securing even an appreciable fraction of the support of the electorate.

Liberals cannot support wars of intervention. It is not the business of foreign countries to determine what shall be the institutions or the methods of government in another State. Whether it be revolutionary France, or Bolshevist Russia, or Nazi Germany—peoples "must dree their own weird." Military expeditions to keep them in order, preventive wars which are supposed to forestall worse wars, are wrong. Moreover, they always fail in their purpose, and they usually bring results in the long run precisely opposite to those they set out to secure. We can see the truth of all this very clearly in a case where the movement to be suppressed is one with which we are more or less in sympathy ; we may not see it so clearly when the movement is one which we think pernicious. But one's faith in liberty—whether national liberty, or constitutional, or personal—is really tested, not when the other country or party or individual is doing what you think it right for them to do, but when they are doing what you think it wrong for them to do.

There is always the proviso that freedom of action is to be recognised only when it does not interfere with the equal liberty of others. So now in the case of Austria. It is not for other peoples to determine whether the Austrians shall have a Socialist government, or a Nazi government, or a Catholic government, or a government different from any of these. That is for themselves to determine. But, for that very reason, if any outside State does seek to intervene in that

matter, then other outside States are entitled, and may properly be required, to join in preventing or in repelling such intervention. The duty is not one for any individual country to take upon itself, nor for any particular group of countries. The League of Nations having been established, the province is theirs. Loyal members of the League will not be remiss, if the occasion should arise, in taking their share in such a duty.

Where democracies have fallen it has been in no small degree the fault of the democrats. That cannot be gainsaid ; it must be frankly admitted. It was the absence of efficient, honest governments, supported by stable parliamentary majorities, which gave to reactionaries their opportunities in Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The same cause has brought France to the verge of the same peril. Free government must not be weak government. It is true that executive strength may threaten the maintenance of popular liberties, but so may executive weakness. The dilemma was stated in the often-quoted words of Lincoln : "It has long been a grave question whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies."

Liberal statesmen serve democracy best when they ensure that the system shall in fact work. The observer will say that M. Herriot was right, in the circumstances in which France found herself a few months ago, in joining hands with party opponents to form a stable government under the leadership of M. Doumergue. He may have strained the allegiance of some of his political friends ; he may perhaps have weakened his party electorally. But parliamentary institutions in France were threatened with the fate that has befallen them elsewhere ; and if his action has saved them from that he has done well. So also I feel convinced that a later generation will say that in this country, in the conditions which faced the nation in the summer of 1931, the Liberal leaders were right in joining with party opponents to meet that crisis. Had we refused, and had our refusal been followed by the failure to redeem the national finances and restore confidence ; or, as an alternative, had the refusal resulted in that task being left to the Conservatives alone—in either event Liberalism would have been discredited. And although I believe that free institutions are so firmly rooted in this land that not even a continuing

financial and commercial crisis would have overturned them, yet a failure of government in that vital matter must have vastly strengthened the forces which, here as elsewhere, would be ready to attack democracy whenever the chance was offered.

But the co-operation was not absorption. It was declared from the beginning to be a temporary alliance for a particular purpose, and no more. The action taken was not at variance with the unofficial resolution moved by Mr. Hore-Belisha at the annual conference of the National Liberal Federation at Buxton in May 1931, and unanimously accepted: "That this Council reaffirms the need for the absolute and unfettered independence of the Liberal Party." It soon became clear, however, that a national emergency was to be made into a Tory opportunity. The purpose of the combination—the restoration of the national finances—having been achieved, the alliance therefore ended. We find that now the so-called "National" Government receives the support at the by-elections of only one in three of the voters on the electoral roll—hardly a justification of the name. In policy it steers a steady course north-east by south-west, at half-speed. Our foreign trade remains almost stagnant and our shipping has to appeal to the tax-payer to save it from bankruptcy. But the maxim of the Conservative Party seems to be that of the advertisers of a well-known throat disinfectant—and less legitimate in this case—"Protection is better than cure." We are discovering that it is after all not true that the best way to get tariffs down is to put tariffs up, that the best way to liberate trade is to restrict it. And we shall soon find the falsity of another example, lately propounded, of the same inverted logic, that the best way to secure a reduction of armaments is to increase them.

Again and again the actions of the Government are in flat contradiction with its declared objects. This indeed has its convenience, for if you claim the support of the whole people, while it is well known that different sections hold different views, what is better than to make declarations which satisfy one section while you carry into effect measures which satisfy the opposite section? So we find that many of those who are against trade restrictions happily support the present Government on the strength of their assurances that they themselves deeply deplore trade restrictions and are only eager to overthrow them; while those who believe in trade restrictions

also support the present Government because they see that as a matter of fact they are being extended more and more month by month. The friends of economy rejoice at the emphatic declarations of Ministers that public frugality, carried even to ruthless extremes, is essential to national welfare; while the particular interests which are looking for opportunities to help their private fortunes at the expense of the public purse, rejoice still more when subsidy after subsidy, granted this year at the steady rate of one a month, are distributed for their profit. Those, again, who are sceptical of any form of international control in world affairs and who put all their faith in powerful national armaments, are happy that the Government is adopting a large programme for the expansion of our forces; while supporters of the League of Nations and of disarmament are to be kept silent, or even are to be led to applaud, by the plea that the forces are being expanded merely for the sake of our obligations under the League and as the best means of inducing our neighbours to agree to universal disarmament. But I think that even the most simple-minded and the most docile will revolt at last at that.

There are many observers of the times who think that a majority of the nation would be prepared now, at this hour, to install and to maintain in power a strong government of the Left—a government which should place peace, the effective establishment of the system of collective control, and a general measure of disarmament, as the first aim of its policy; a government which should seek also to bring into a definite combination all those nations, and they may be many, which, realising that the world is being led to ruin by restrictions upon international trading, would be ready to agree to trade freely among themselves; a government which would adopt a comprehensive, effective policy of national development, including immediate measures of house-building on a great scale, and of land settlement; a government which, by raising the general standards of education, of industrial conditions, of environment, would lower distinctions of class and open the way to a genuinely democratic community of men and women really free.

If that be true, why is it that at this moment there seems to be little prospect of the advent of such a government? Obviously it is because the progressive forces—both of leadership and of numbers—are divided; they are divided between

Liberals and Labour ; and Labour, having tied its fortunes to the theory of Socialism, this stands as a barrier against co-operation. The Labour Party has lately issued a new declaration of policy, which is described as a *Programme of Action*. Whatever may be its right designation, it is certainly not that. A pamphlet of twenty-five closely printed pages, it comprises proposals so large and so many that its authors would, I am sure, be surprised if, in any circumstances, they could be carried into effect within the lifetime of a generation. It presents, not a programme of action, but a glowing vision of a distant ideal. Is that ideal a right one?—that is the main question.

Socialists often assume that their creed rests on a solid intellectual foundation, and that those who do not accept it are either ignorant of what socialism really is ; or else belong to the possessing classes, and oppose on the ground of sheer self-interest ; or else are indifferent to the needs of the times or are hopeless of the possibility of success. There is, of course, such opposition or inactivity, but it is not the only kind. The remarkable thing is that, after fifty years of propaganda, the volume of support which socialism receives from the leading minds of Europe and America is so small. Had the theory been sound the support would be far greater.

At the beginning, the emphasis laid by Socialists upon the part which the State might play in the conduct of particular industries, in the control of others, in the planning of towns, in a score of various forms of social activity, was useful. It was a needed counter to the creed of *laissez-faire* individualism then predominant. But having played a valuable part in helping to upset one generalisation which was found by experience to be mistaken, it did harm by trying to substitute for it an opposite generalisation, which, if tested by experience, would be found equally mistaken. That generalisation is that private enterprise, at least in the great primary industries and in banking, should be eliminated, and should be replaced by the ownership and control of public authorities.

It is assumed that if this were done, poverty and unemployment would be eliminated. It is assumed that ample productivity is now assured and could easily be maintained, while distribution would be made far more equitable. There are, however, very many people, who are neither ignorant of what the proposal is, nor stupid, nor indifferent, nor prejudiced by

self-interest, who dispute these assumptions. They hold that complicated, changing industries, engaged perhaps in trading all over the world, are unsuited for management by public authorities ; that, under such a régime, their products would be made dearer in price or worse in quality ; that the industries would not be nimble enough to keep up a rate of technical progress comparable with that which has marked the last century and a half ; that the workers, receiving a larger individual proportion of a smaller or inferior product, might be poorer and not richer. They hold, further, that the transfer of the control of the banking system to authorities under political direction would be likely to bring about a collapse of existing methods of industry and commerce before any others had been substituted for them ; immediate unemployment might be greatly intensified through the very attempt, however sincerely intended, to secure at some more distant date a permanent cure.

Liberals who hold these opinions do not for a moment dispute that the sphere of useful State action may be far wider in these days than was possible earlier. The greater competence of governing bodies and of the Civil Service, the improvement in communications and in methods of financial control, have made public action practicable now in directions where it would have been impracticable a hundred years ago in the days of the Philosophic Radicals. Year by year new experiments in new directions prove successful and bring general satisfaction. Liberals are strong advocates of a carefully considered policy along these lines, and have stated, in definite terms, the particular proposals which should form part of such a policy. The Yellow Book (*Britain's Industrial Future*), published in 1928, and the Liberal Party's *Address to the Nation* and the pamphlet *The Liberal Way*, published this year, give—the first in full, the others in brief—the particulars of those proposals.

But the new statement of the Labour Party rules out any advance along those lines. It declares in terms that “there is no half-way house” on the road to public ownership of the primary industries. Production for private profit, it says, must be “got rid of.” Not only the Bank of England but all the Joint Stock Banks should be “brought under public ownership and control.” Further, in the whole pamphlet there is no recognition of the fact that the present problem of unemploy-

ment in this country is mainly due to the shrinkage of international trade. In a brief reference the only remedy advocated in that sphere is the distant achievement of "a system of planned international exchange" to be the substitute for high tariffs. Nor, in a different province, that of the constitution, is there even a mention of the need for electoral reform.

There are many proposals in the course of the Labour Party's statement which coincide with those of Liberalism. The programme of National Development, advocated for many years past by the Liberal Party, elaborated by us in considerable detail, but not attempted in any particular by the last Labour Government, finds a place in this statement. And in the vitally important sphere of international politics the ideas of both parties are closely akin. But the reaffirmation of the whole creed of socialism, the explicit rejection even of "a half-way house," alienates very many who approve of the fundamental purposes of the Labour Movement and regret that the Labour Party should hinder their attainment by its present policy. Observing the course of events during this century, and the tendencies now prevailing, there is good ground for believing that if the Labour Party had never been induced by its publicists to tie its fortunes to the nationalisation of industry, and if in consequence the whole body of progressive opinion in Great Britain had been able to move forward as one effective, united force, the cause of social progress and of international peace would have been far further advanced to-day than it is, and its prospects for the near future would be far brighter.

An article in the *Economist* of July 28th, commenting upon the Labour Party's policy pamphlet, makes these wise comments.

If our Labour leaders will only look round the world they will see that they are out of the main current of twentieth-century developments. "Planning," in the sense in which they have used the phrase, may be possible in a comparatively undeveloped country such as Russia, but elsewhere, and notably in the United States under President Roosevelt, they will find that the tendency is to try to reach what they have rejected as a possible half-way house, namely, a reformed capitalism utilising the immense driving force, elasticity and experimentalism of private enterprise, while at the same time limiting it within the requirements of the public interest.

Precisely that should be the main task of our time in the sphere of domestic industry. And it is a task which the British people more than any other are likely to fulfil with success.

History records three great achievements which they have accomplished in the realm of practical politics. England first solved the problem of reconciling the political freedom of the individual citizen with effective national government; by discovering the principle of representation and combining it with the acceptance of majority decisions, she created parliaments and made a stable democracy possible. Secondly, through the jury, through the establishment of a police system under the control of elected authorities, and through the subordination of the military power to the civil, the British nation has established a system which maintains public order while safeguarding personal freedom. And, thirdly, expanding her territories overseas, establishing vast new nations in distant parts of the earth, Britain has discovered also how to reconcile the full autonomy of each Dominion with the continued unity of the whole Commonwealth. Now it will be her task to find the means of reconciling a better organisation of industries and a proper control of working conditions with the retention of all that is essential in private initiative and personal enterprise.

Yet one other synthesis remains to be accomplished—in the sphere of international relations. A sane nationalism is not an evil thing but a good thing; love of country, although it may be perverted into a source of antagonism and war, in its essence is among the virtues. It is a stimulus to effort, a source of fruitful emulation, a link between the ordinary man and great concerns. It needs to be harmonised with a sane internationalism, recognising that "the greatest nation is but a fragment," seeking to establish an ordering of the world which shall give to each country its status and its scope within the framework of universal law. And just as it was Liberalism which gave guidance in the accomplishment of those earlier tasks—constitutional, juridical and imperial—so it will be the ideas of Liberalism which will guide us in the accomplishment of those others—economic and international—which face us now.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

THE PARLIAMENTARY SCENE.

NOTHING has occurred of recent months to alter the long-prepared plans for a General Election to be held in or about the month of May 1936. In spite of the various predictions that are made from time to time, that a consultation of the electorate is imminent or is likely to take place within a fixed period, the omens and indications all seem to point to a continuance of the administration on its present basis, though perhaps with changes in personnel, until the latest practicable period.

It would indeed be strange to find a Government with the largest majority in recent parliamentary history, and with an opposition reduced to a diminutive form in numbers, throwing it away prematurely and risking defeat, or at any rate inviting a large and effective opposition. It may truthfully be said that the position of the National Government is distinctly better in the country than it has been at any time since the General Election and the immediately following period. The by-elections which were going strongly against it and came to their peak at East Fulham in October last have during this year, taking 1929 as the fair standard of comparison, been decidedly more favourable. This is particularly shown in the recent figures of the Weston-super-Mare and Rushcliffe by-elections, and at Twickenham. The latter, which was the second of two by-elections since 1931, clearly shows the more friendly attitude of the electors towards the Government.

The reasons for this movement are not far to seek. During the present session there has been a substantial decrease in the numbers of the unemployed, though they are still enormous. There has been a briskness in many trades, inevitably due to a change-over from a system of free trade to protection. The effect of suddenly shutting out large quantities of foreign goods must mean a temporary activity until the demand for these goods has been satisfied by local manufactures. A point must soon be reached—if, indeed, this has not already taken place—when this new market will be saturated, and unless our export trade can in some way be stimulated it is at least doubtful whether the minor boom we have been experiencing can continue, and whether we shall not be heading once more towards a depression. The development of world affairs and

our position therein does not seem to hold out much hope of an increase in international economic activity.

Furthermore, the improved financial position of the country as shown by this year's budget is naturally a gratifying feature, and properly tends to bring favour to the National Government. At the same time, the Liberal opposition are, in fact, fully entitled to claim a large share of the credit by the part they played in the formation of the first National Government and by their responsibility for the unpleasant action which had to be taken in the matter of cuts in order to restore confidence in British credit throughout the world. The Liberal Party ran great risks and laid themselves open to attack and misunderstanding by their attitude at that time. None the less, it was undertaken in the spirit of patriotic duty, and it must be satisfactory to them, though they are no longer, for reasons well known, able to share the responsibilities of government, to know that their work has not been in vain, even though they get no credit for it, as will probably be the case.

If the Government may be said to have improved its position, what of the opposition parties? They must *pro tanto* have receded in popular favour. The Labour Party shows no sign of strengthening its hold on the country beyond a normal and moderate reaction. The detached non-party voter is not transferring his allegiance to it. Nothing is more significant than the high proportion of the electorate which fails to record its vote at by-elections. The leaders of the party outside Parliament are finding it extremely difficult to return, and the only recruit of any note is Mr. J. Wilmot, who should go far. Owing to his unfortunate accident, the House has been deprived, during the past session, of the gay and vigorous personality of Mr. Lansbury. The deputy leader of the Labour Party, Major Attlee, has taken his place effectively, and has made a number of excellent speeches, those on foreign affairs being perhaps the most notable, though he has had to cover a wide variety of subjects. The star of Sir Stafford Cripps, which rose so brilliantly during the debates on the land taxes in the last Parliament, does not shine quite so brightly to-day owing to the extreme views with which he has become identified. His attractive and kindly personality, assisted by most powerful gifts of exposition and reasoning, do not counterbalance the disadvantage from which he

suffers through his intransigent attitude. This tends to discount anything that he says in the minds of supporters of the Government, and he also stands apart from the main line of Labour thought in the House of Commons. At the same time, he is a man of great parts, and one of the few distinguished ornaments of the front Opposition bench.

In the Liberal Party Sir Herbert Samuel maintains the same high level of clear, cogent argument and resolute leadership. Perhaps his greatest personal triumph during the session was the incident when the adjournment of the House was moved in connection with the desire of the hunger-marchers to present their case at the bar of the House. It is necessary for at least forty members to rise, and Sir Herbert had got up with other members of the opposition in support of this motion at the end of questions. When the debate took place later in the evening Sir Herbert had to meet at the opening the very strong hostility of Government supporters, who thought that as an ex-Home Secretary he should not have supported the motion. He was, however, by the force of his personality and the soundness of his reasoning able to compel the respect and assent of the House to the course he had taken. Sir Archibald Sinclair acted as deputy leader during Sir Herbert Samuel's visit to Palestine, and carried out his duties as ever with distinction and general acceptance. An example of persistent hard work for many months, crowned by substantial success at the close, is Sir Murdoch Mackenzie Wood's gallant struggle on behalf of his constituents on the herring question.

The Liberal Party has not had an easy task as the second and less opposing opposition. Its gradual transfer from support of the Government at the beginning of the Parliament to complete opposition has presumably been sealed by its support at the end of the session of the Labour vote of censure on the Government for its air force expansion programme. On the whole this movement has been executed with a remarkable degree of unanimity. On the floor of the House the Party has been well to the fore and very successful in obtaining useful concessions from the Government in a number of cases, a notable example being that of the Debts Clearing Offices Act. Upstairs in Standing Committee much effective work has been done on a number of measures, a notable achievement being the strenuous fight put up on the Disaffection Bill by two of the younger members, Mr. Dingle Foot and Mr. Mallalieu.

Immediately in front of the Liberals sits what is really the most powerful opposition in the House: Mr. Maxton and his two colleagues, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. McGovern. This redoubtable trio are capable on their own, if they think the occasion demands it, of keeping the House up for an all-night sitting. Mr. Maxton has on more than one occasion acted as the real leader of the House, regardless of party, in putting forward a point of view commanding general assent, perhaps on some matter of procedure or a personal question. If to the gifts of picturesque appearance, graceful personality, charming courtesy and eloquent tongue were added a practical constructive brain, there would be no limits to his career.

Making now the short passage across the floor of the House we find established in the corner of the front bench below the gangway—but only on rare occasions, and then for short periods—another redoubtable figure outside the Government, Mr. Churchill. If the Member for Epping possessed the gift of judgment he would by this time have established himself in a very powerful position and be a real danger to the Government, but he has so acted as to become the despair from the point of view of practical leadership even of the diehards most closely associated with his view. The debate on the Report of the Committee of Privileges was one of the most interesting of the session, and Sir John Simon's attack on Mr. Churchill was one of the most successful and thoroughly deserved "dressings-down" that the House has heard of recent years. The object of the appeal to the Committee, in spite of its outward appearance of anxiety to safeguard constitutional practice, was clearly revealed as a political stunt to damage the Government, and one singularly ill-chosen, particularly in including such a popular figure as Lord Derby for an object of attack. If, realising the blunder that had been made, Mr. Churchill had admitted his error, expressed satisfaction at the unanimous findings of the Committee, and thrown himself on the goodwill of the House, he would have done much to restore his position, but by his tactics he completely destroyed it. It should be said, however, that in later debates and particularly the vote of censure on air, Mr. Churchill was in his happiest vein and in the best of good humour. In an aside he appeared to admit that his previous effort had been a mare's nest, but in spite of this he will not readily recover the ground that he has lost, even though the Indian jungle to be covered next

session is territory of a nature peculiarly dangerous for the Government. I believe that the White Paper Policy will go through without any really serious trouble.

Let us turn our attention now to those who on the other side of the gangway occupy the treasury bench. The renewed illness of the Prime Minister will be generally regretted, and an early restoration to health will be the hope of all. It must at the same time be confessed that the absence of the Prime Minister does not appear to make any great difference in the conduct of national affairs. Ever since he obtained a commanding position in 1931 he has consistently failed, so far as all outward evidence shows, to make good use of it, and has appeared willing to subordinate all his old ideas and natural inclinations to the predominant views of the Conservative Party. As an innocuous and charming figurehead he is readily tolerated, and he will be allowed to remain at the head of the Government so long as his health permits it and he desires it. The retirement of the Prime Minister, little as in practice it might matter, would involve all sorts of difficult personal problems, and this it is desired to postpone as long as possible. Perhaps nothing showed the complete subordination of Mr. MacDonald to his new associates more than the humiliating spectacle of his complete surrender on the land taxes during budget discussions, when he deliberately refused to attend the House of Commons.

The Lord President of the Council occupies a position which he fills with the greatest success and dignity, and it is one surely very agreeable to him. Supreme responsibility is not demanded of him. If Mr. Baldwin's natural instincts and normal outlook governed the affairs of this country, liberal-minded people would have little to criticise, but, unfortunately, his admirable sentiments are not backed up by an equally vigorous determination to see them carried out. He is by far the greatest member of the Conservative Party, and a great personal asset to it, little as some of its members appear to appreciate him.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer must have had an agreeable session. He had a remarkable surplus to distribute, and very little in the way of criticism on the financial provisions of the year. In his somewhat remote business-like way, Mr. Chamberlain efficiently carries out his task on what are held to be safe, sound, orthodox lines.

The Minister on whom the main burden of the year has fallen has been Sir Henry Betterton. On all sides he has won praise for his conduct of the Unemployment Bill through the House. This measure might easily have ruined the career and reputation of a less tactful and considerate man, but the late Minister of Labour was actually more popular (if that is possible) amongst his main critics of the Labour Party at the end than at the beginning of the discussions. It was a triumph for a personality gentle, kindly, patient and thorough, and if anyone can make a success of the work of the new Board affecting, as it does, the lives of millions of the inhabitants of the country, it will be he. The responsibility which many of us think should have rested upon the Government itself now rests, contrary to his own expectation, on Sir Henry Betterton's own shoulders.

The session has presented many opportunities for the vigorous Minister of Agriculture to display his abilities. Mr. Elliot is a forceful and ready speaker—in his old age I am afraid he will be garrulous. His words flow forth like a mountain stream in spate. His gifts, together with great geniality, initiative and drive, make him a powerful and popular figure, in whom some see a future leader for the Conservative Party. I do not think it can be said that he has made much progress in this direction during the present session, for he has been obliged to bring forward a number of nationalistic measures for regimenting and controlling agriculture which are far from the liking of the easy-going people who inhabit the countryside. Furthermore, the continuous stream of subsidies provided by the Government, including milk, sugar, beef, wheat and shipping, are causing much searching of heart among supporters of the administration, and the curious Elliot brand of socialism is finding ever more critics. The effect of the quota on agricultural products has been to antagonise the Dominions, and to leave the Liberal Party the champion of a free exchange of goods in the Empire.

Another favourite for the highest political honours, Mr. Oliver Stanley, has recently received well-deserved promotion, and will bring sympathy and a clear brain to the work of the Ministry of Labour. He will have the support for the time being, at any rate, of a most capable Under-Secretary, Mr. Robert Hudson, who has a complete mastery of all the problems with which his department deals. Advancement in

ministerial rank cannot, however, for him be long delayed. Mr. Stanley has nearly all the qualities needed for the higher command—charm, understanding, close powers of reasoning, and graceful expression, backed up by great family influence. If he would only make an endeavour to suffer more gladly those he may consider fools, it is difficult to say what rival could stand in his way.

The conduct of the affairs of the Board of Education is most efficiently carried out by Mr. Ramsbotham, but the policy of the Department is disappointing, and in the matter of the definite refusal to consider the raising of the school age is deplorably reactionary. We are promised good things in the matter of housing by the department controlled by that able combination of Sir Hilton Young and Mr. Shakespeare, but up to date achievement, particularly in the matter of low-rented houses, has fallen far behind public opinion. The Fascist movement has no outspoken supporters in the House, and probably now but few secret sympathisers. Sir Oswald Mosley's singularly un-British movement is not likely to survive the Olympia meeting, the events of June 30th in Germany and still later ones in Austria. A great Welsh volcano has not been mentioned because it has been passing through a considerable period of quiescence. There is no reason to think that it is extinct, and subterranean rumblings from time to time remind the country that at a suitable moment Mr. Lloyd George may be seen again in full eruption with devastating effect.

Whatever may be thought of the success or otherwise of the Government in Home Affairs (and advance in some directions has undoubtedly been made) in the realm of Foreign Affairs the action of the Government continues to be a lamentable failure. There is indecision; absence of settled policy; unwillingness to give a lead or accept the responsibilities which our great position in the world has placed upon us. There have been occasions in the history of the Disarmament Conference when resolute action by the British Government would, I believe, have secured success, but these opportunities have all been allowed to pass. However much individual ministers may desire the achievement of a Convention—and no one doubts the goodwill, for example, of Sir John Simon in this direction—I do not believe that the Government as a whole have ever sincerely and resolutely applied their minds

to the task either in London or Geneva. This is not the fault of a junior Minister who is one of the coming men in the Conservative Party, Mr. Eden. The Lord Privy Seal has taken a large personal share in the various disarmament negotiations, and has everywhere obtained a reputation for sincerity and straight dealing. He is liked and trusted by all those with whom he comes into contact, and he will in time prove a great Foreign Secretary.

It has been obvious from the first that a certain price must be paid in the giving of rigid guarantees for security, in particular for the execution of the Disarmament Convention itself. No action in life is without some risk, and risks must be run for peace if the inevitably greater risks of war amounting almost to certainties are to be avoided. Unfortunately, the Government has always been too late in the race against time, and now by the adoption of an increased air estimate they have in effect really abandoned all hope of making the new system of collective security work, and are back on the old pre-war basis of competitive armaments. The process of this great betrayal has been so gradual as to make it difficult for many to appreciate that this is really what has happened.

On a general review of the situation it would seem that if a General Election were taken now the electors, while by no means enamoured of many points of the Government's programme and achievement, would be inclined in the absence of any clearly effective alternative to give them a further period of office with a small majority. The Labour Party with its pitiable exit in 1931, still not forgotten, its limited members and still more limited personnel in the House of Commons, is not making, and cannot be expected to make, an attractive appeal as an alternative strong Government. If this remains the position it may well be that the forces of the left will be out of power for a considerable period. If, however, it were possible in some manner to present to the country the foundations of a new National Government of the left, comprising Liberal, Labour and some Conservative elements, as an alternative to the present National Government of the right, the whole situation both nationally and internationally might be changed, with a profound influence on the future of the world during the next generation. I cannot help feeling that such a development is not only desirable, but possible of achievement if there is the will to achieve.

GEOFFREY MANDER.

THE TRAGEDY OF DOLLFUSS.

TO the Austrian supporters of Dr. Dollfuss and to the world at large, there is only one "Dollfuss Tragedy," that of the two revolver shots fired by the Nazi rebel Planetta in the *Bundeskanzleramt* (Chancellery) on the Ballhausplatz on Wednesday, July 25th. The political observer sees, and the historian will record, other Dollfuss tragedies of greater importance than the personal one which cut short so abruptly the Chancellor's career.

Greatest of all is the tragedy that this man with his exceptional gifts of courage, energy, determination, his political skill and unusual personal charm, unhampered as he was by a reactionary past, should have destroyed liberty in Austria in the name of Austrian independence and could find no better weapons and ideas wherewith to fight German Fascism than those which he copied from it and from the Fascism of Italy. The neutral historian will finally write of Dollfuss that he was a man who had a unique opportunity of placing himself at the head of a great popular movement for democratic liberties in Austria, from whence could have gone forth the impulse to liberate the blinded and unhearing population of Germany from Hitlerism. He chose instead the path of reaction and repression, clericalism and Fascism. At the behest of Quirinal and Vatican, he destroyed first the natural enemy of Hitlerism, the Austrian Social Democrats, and thought that then he could conciliate or destroy the National Socialists, who have now destroyed him. By this fateful decision to rely on the support of a foreign power instead of closing up the ranks of Austrian democracy against Nazi Fascism, he furnished the Nazis with their most powerful moral weapon. The accusation that Dollfuss had betrayed Germanism in Austria by putting himself and his policy under Italian protection, brought thousands into the Nazi camp who would have stayed outside it had he formed a democratic front.

Had Dollfuss been born a bigoted Fascist and Clerical, the tragedy would be less. But it was not so. It is his flexibility, combined with a determination amounting to obstinacy in following a course once adopted, which inspires such regrets that at the critical moment of his life he should have taken the decision which he did. Dollfuss's past showed him in many

different rôles. A brother officer draws for me this picture of him in 1914.

We were a crowd of *Einjäger-Freiwillige* cadets just joined up in the predominantly German-nationalist regiment of the Kaiserjäger. "Lights out" had long sounded and in the dark barrack-room an agitated political argument was in progress. I found myself alone in defending the principle of an "Austrian Mission" as something apart from that of Germany. Amidst the volume of German-nationalist sentiments which bombarded me from the darkness, came in curiously harsh notes from the far corner of the barrack-room some words of support. Next day I went to the corner to make the acquaintance of my second. It was Dollfuss.

His enthusiasm for Austrianism waned in the light of Austrian muddle and inefficiency during the war and Austrian weakness and helplessness after the defeat. He went to Germany on a mission to study agricultural methods. He returned with a boundless admiration for German efficiency, strength and honesty of character, with a tremendous enthusiasm for the *Anschluss* and incidentally with a Prussian wife. He and I had our first quarrel when we stood to attention side by side while the band played Haydn's hymn and I sang the Austrian "Gott erhalte unsern Kaiser" and he the German "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles."

It was Republican Germany which had caught his imagination, and in the early post-war years Dollfuss was an enthusiast for democracy and for the socialisation of national industries.

Yet it was this man who destroyed parliament, the trade unions, and socialist Vienna, who died execrated by German nationalists as well as by fully fledged Nazis as the man who had betrayed German-Austrian nationalism to Italy and to the interests of the Vatican.

It was perhaps his German nationalist past which rendered Dollfuss so half-hearted in the repression of Nazi terror. On the last evening of his life Dollfuss sent to the scaffold the twenty-year-old Socialist, Josef Gerl, who had tried to blow up a signal mast on a little-used railway and wounded the policeman who tried to arrest him. He, a Socialist, was the first victim of the severe decree-laws issued to check Nazi terrorism. Hundreds of Nazi terrorists had been destroying property, endangering hundreds of lives and here and there taking lives, for twelve months; not one of them was hanged as he might have been under several of the Dollfuss decrees. Again and again Dollfuss threatened; always the Nazis escaped the extreme penalty. The first Nazis to feel the long-

promised severity were Planetta and Holzweber, the murderer of Dollfuss and the leader of the rebels.

At the trial of these two Nazis, all those who had also been present at the trial of the young Socialists, Gerl and Anzboeck, eight days earlier were struck by the contrast between the treatment meted out to Socialist and Nazi prisoners. Planetta and Holzweber were given an eminently patient hearing. The greatest latitude was allowed to them and to their lawyers in the defence. They were treated very much like honorable foes whom it was unfortunately necessary to hang as an example. They bore no signs of rough handling and made no complaints of it. These were the men who had murdered a chancellor, plotted an outrageous *coup* and let loose a civil war in Austria.

A week earlier the two young Socialists had been brought up in the same building. They bore the marks of the same brutal beating by the police (among whom are many Nazis who secretly belong to the S.S.) which hundreds of other Socialists underwent in February. Gerl told how he had been chained and cruelly beaten with truncheons and wooden clubs. Anzboeck told how every time he fainted with the pain of torture, the police threw cold water over him, and when he came round, beat him again. The judge was cynical, sarcastic and brutal to these young men who were facing death as bravely as they had faced torture. When the judge asked Anzboeck how he dared to say he had been tortured, the boy pointed silently at his bandaged head. It was Social Democrats and Communists whom the Government rounded up in hundreds and interned in the last ten days before July 25th, leaving the Nazis in perfect peace to their plans for revolt.

In the face of the great "Dollfuss Legend" of the "Hero-Chancellor" and the "Martyr Chancellor" now being created, it is necessary to recall what the Dollfuss system really meant to the Austrian masses. It has a great bearing on the future; for although Dollfuss is dead, the Dollfuss system, for the moment at least, lives on. Since his death the legend has been started that Dollfuss at the last saw the mistake he had made in crushing the Socialists and was prepared to make great concessions to bring about a reconciliation. The facts are that up to the very last, Dollfuss (unwisely) despised the outwardly crushed Socialists, saying privately that their good or ill will was a matter of indifference to him. He obstinately clung to the idea that the masses had forgotten

Socialism and would accept his corporate Fascist State. One of his last decisions was to refuse the release of Mayor Seitz, who had written a personal appeal to the Chancellor not to let him die in prison and thus further provoke the workers. Dollfuss found it a supreme obstacle that if he released Seitz he would have to set free all the other Socialists not associated with the February fighting, whom he had imprisoned without trial since February.

Official propagandists maintain that the workers stood by the Government in the suppression of the Nazi revolt out of their affection for Dollfuss. Actually the *parole* given the Socialists was "Strict neutrality; let the 'Black' (Clerical) Fascists destroy the 'Brown' Fascists." The absolute obedience with which the *parole* was followed is really a proof of the continued loyalty of the masses to the orders, secretly conveyed, of their Socialist leaders. The day after Dollfuss's murder, Socialist illegal leaflets were circulated which stated:

The news of the death of Dollfuss was received with delight by the working classes as that of the death of a tyrant and murderer of liberty. Austria is experiencing her June 30th; as in the Reich, Fascists are murdering Fascists and we can look on with satisfaction at the process. Dollfuss is gone—his system must be destroyed too, but never through an alliance with the Brown Fascists.

In reviewing the internal problems which the Austrian Government has to face, one has at every turn to consider the foreign connections of the internal factors. Austria to-day stands *vis-à-vis* Italy in much the same position as Albania did when Italy put Zog on the throne in 1928. The selection of Dr. Schuschnigg as Chancellor and the standing down of Starhemberg was more the work of Signor Mussolini than of anyone else. When Starhemberg returned from his interrupted holiday on the Lido, it was with the full knowledge that whatever his followers might (and on Sunday, January 29th, did) demand for him, he was not yet considered ripe for the Chancellorship and that Schuschnigg's appointment had been approved by the Duce. One should pay rather less attention to what demand the Heimwehr will be able to enforce on the Government in the future than to what view Italy will take as to the necessity of maintaining their strength. If the Duce decides that the Nazi peril is over, he will gladly cut his Heimwehr subsidies. Already he must be regretting the lost

expenditure on the Styrian Heimwehr who mostly turned Nazi and have just defended themselves against the Starhemberg Heimwehr with the rifles with which Italy supplied them to fight Socialism at the time of the Hirtenberg arms scandal. For if Germany sends in explosives, revolvers and propaganda to the Nazis, Italy sends rifles, machine-guns and money to the Heimwehr.

Austria has for long been the chessboard (as was pre-war Turkey) on which the Powers fight out their battles. No serious threat to the beneficent socialist administration of Vienna could ever have arisen from the Austrian reactionaries, had not Italy financed and armed them for years. The internal difficulties of the Schuschnigg Government are inextricably interwoven with the wire-pullings by foreign powers. For twelve months Dollfuss was unable to carry out his tragic decision to destroy the Social-Democratic Party because France forbade it, seeing in the Austrian Socialists not merely the defenders of democracy in Austria, but the most effective counterbalance to the growing Italian influence in Austria. Although the new reactionary French Cabinet in Paris withdrew most of its protection from Austrian Socialism as Franco-Italian relations improved, Major Fey's savage bombardment of the workers' houses might yet have been hindered had not the general strike in Paris isolated the French capital on the fatal Monday, February 12th. German arms, explosives and propaganda trebled the menace of the Austrian Nazis during the past twelve months. Had Hitler not lost his nerve on July 25th, and at the eleventh hour held back his 15,000 to 30,000 men of the Austrian Legion whom he had armed and trained to overrun Austria, the country would have had a Nazi Government within twelve hours. Had Mussolini not rushed 48,000 men and scores of bombing planes to the frontier on July 25th, Hitler would certainly have deployed his Legion. And had Mussolini not also at the eleventh hour restrained his troops, the Yugoslavs would have marched into Eastern Carinthia the moment the first Italians crossed the frontier, in order to prevent Italian troops from threatening the plain around Ljubljana, while the Czechs would have marched on Vienna. So close did the contending nationalism of the various European dictatorships bring war to Europe on July 25th.

As to the Nazis, not everything, but nearly everything, depends on Germany. As long as the Austrian Government

relies on Italy, so long will they have to face a strong internal German-Austrian campaign, probably but not necessarily purely Nazi in character. While the economic distress especially of the professional and middle classes whose ears are closed to the appeal of Socialism goes on, Nazi arguments will have a powerful attraction. Neither political nor economic discontent will constitute an immediate danger for the Government if Herr Hitler cuts off the supply of desperadoes, explosives and propaganda and gives up his moral support of terrorism and rebellion in Austria. But the prospects of his doing so are not great. No doubt Hitler will order caution for the immediate future but it has yet to be seen whether the massacres of June 30th have given him back the control over the second-rank leaders which he had lost long before that date. Within an hour of the Austrian authorities receiving explicit assurances from Germany that the Munich anti-Austrian broadcasts had ceased, a British journalist's description of the heroic deaths of Planetta and Holzweber was being broadcast with many deliberate Nazi falsifications added. This will doubtless prove symptomatic. A pastoral letter of the Vienna Protestant Superintendent had to be suppressed by the Government because of its strong defence of the rebellious Nazis mingled with mild regrets for the murder of Dollfuss. Occasional bombs began to explode in Austria within a few days of the suppression of the revolt. It is clear that Nazi hostility to the pro-Italian, ultra-Clerical tendencies of the Government, though for some time at least in a much milder form than before, will continue.

It is still impossible to say whether the higher ranks of the State officials have really been cleansed of their high proportion of Nazi sympathisers. Certainly there was surprisingly little effort made to support the Nazi rebels on July 25th on the part of their friends in Austria, but that must not be taken as a sure indication that they had few sympathisers. To some extent it is a question of revolutionary material. The professional men, officials, university graduates and professors who in Vienna are the mainstay of Nazidom do not make good revolutionaries. Like the Socialist masses in February, they relied on their trained army to do the fighting. The Socialists stood by waiting for their Republican Defence Corps to save them from the Fascists and the Government forces that these commanded. The Nazis in Vienna and many other parts of

Austria waited for the Austrian legion to destroy the "Dollfuss System" for them. Both the Socialists' self-defence action in February and the Nazi assassination and aggressive revolution in July show that Lenin was right in his insistence on mass action as the only effective revolutionary weapon and in his condemnation of the uselessness of a small party army or isolated acts of terrorism. Twice a minority of the Austrian population, through its command of the overwhelmingly superior armaments of the State, has been able to defeat violent action by discontented sections of the population in one case far more numerous, in the other at least as numerous as themselves. Only in a mass uprising so general that it will sweep a considerable number of the executive with it is there any prospect of successful revolution against the artillery, machine-guns and tanks of the modern State. The success which would have attended the employment of the Austrian Legion by the Nazis would not have affected this principle, for they would not have been revolutionaries in the technical sense, but equivalent to regular troops of a foreign power, armed and trained abroad.

The ability to hold down a discontented majority by a preponderance of armaments, however, falls a great deal short of the art of governing. The Austrian Government cannot afford to perpetuate the mistake made by Dr. Dollfuss in inaugurating his "war on two fronts." Even in terms of hard cash it cannot be afforded. The destruction of the Socialists alone is estimated to have cost £2,500,000, the suppression of the Nazi revolt much more. In between the police and military expenditure has been gigantic. Sooner or later the Government must come to terms with the Left or the Right. Not sentiment but practical consideration will lead it one way or the other. A recent anti-Dollfuss Nazi joke was that Dr. Dollfuss had decided to retire with his Cabinet to Wellersdorf and proclaim the rest of Austria a concentration camp. The jest is not without political substance.

There is a possibility of health and sanity for Austria if Dr. Schuschnigg or another can follow a course different from that of Dollfuss, but with all the latter's courage and determination. Only one effective bulwark can be set up to the Nazi-Fascist danger (which will exist as long as Hitlerism)—that of a firmly established democracy. The ready-made authoritarian constitution of Austria which has fortunately not yet come

into effect must be radically altered. Dr. Schuschnigg has promised to consult the people as to the future system of government. If he will hold real elections or an honest *plébiscite*, not Mussolini-elections or a Hitler-referendum, he may easily find in its results reason to abandon the position he first took up, that in any case the corporative State must stand and parliamentary democracy remain proscribed.

From Dr. Ernst Karl Winter, whom Dollfuss appointed Vice-Burgomaster of Vienna in the hope that the latter's connections with the workers would enable them to be won over to the idea of the Fascist corporations, I have his programme of "immediate necessities" if Dr. Schuschnigg is to effect a reconciliation with the Socialists. In Winter's view there is little time left; the central organisation of the party still exists and is followed by the workers, but it is on the verge of breaking up into definitely revolutionary groups who will then hear of nothing but a violent overthrow of the Cabinet and a period of anti-Fascist dictatorship before returning to democracy.

Dr. Winter spent most of the last night of Dollfuss's life in his company, trying in vain to persuade his old friend of the necessity of reconciliation with the Socialists as such through deeds instead of seeking vainly to split their ranks by fine sentiments. His "immediate programme" includes:

1. The release of Mayor Seitz and other party leaders who have never been tried. (This will probably be effected long before this article appears.)
2. The release of all untried Social Democrats from the concentration camps.
3. Amnesty for all who took part in the February fighting unless common law crimes have been proved against them.
4. Payment of sums due to officials of the Social-Democratic trades unions and other organisations.
5. Revision of the dismissals of Socialists from the public services on political grounds.
6. The creation of a Cabinet post for a real representative of the workers.

If there is to be any hope of reconciling the embittered masses of the workers still smarting under their treatment by the Fascists before, during and after February, any action taken must be immediate and ungrudging. Above all there must be instant cessation of police and Heimwehr persecution

of those who try to hold together the threads of their old organisation. Dr. Winter's programme is no more than a beginning. The restoration of democratic Government would not only enable Dr. Schuschnigg to form a pact of mutual non-aggression with at least the former right-wing Social Democrats ; it would enable him to attract into a conservative German-National Party (who would indeed oppose Clericalism and Socialism, but by parliamentary instead of terrorist methods) a great many of what one might call "beige" Nazi sympathisers, who are not yet dyed a deep brown and who are now shocked at the murder of the Chancellor. This would be a minor matter, however, beside the all-important consolidation of a democratic front against the Nazi peril.

This would involve escape from Italian tutelage and from Heimwehr-Fascist domination. Is it inconceivable that Great Britain and France should persuade Italy that even a democratic if stable Austria would be a better bulwark against the appearance of brown shirts on the Brenner than is Austria in its present chaotic condition, which is more like that of a minor South American republic than of a European State ? Is it inconceivable that Prince Starhemberg and other Heimwehr leaders could be induced by the same Powers to get out of politics and become leaders of a new Austrian militia in which the Heimwehr and their old enemies of the Republican Defence Corps should participate ? Unfortunately it is almost inconceivable that any such practical effort should seriously be taken to clear up the Austrian mess, but the alternative is its continuance and recurrences of the violence of February 12th and July 25th.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

HINDENBURG.

ON August 2nd, 1934, at the age of 86, Field-Marshal Paul Louis Hans von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg, President of the German Reich, died at Neudeck, his estate in East Prussia. The tributes paid him in the Press of the entire world were all in the same strain : the world had lost a great historical figure and Germany a great patriot. How history will judge him is a different, and not altogether simple, matter. It is generally agreed that he was a kind-hearted husband and father, chivalrous and gallant towards women, a man of amiable manner and distinguished bearing. Everything else is disputed, with a vehemence that differs with the personal experience or political allegiance of the individual critic. We shall perhaps best be able to form a true picture of him if we sum up the main points at issue.

Even the reason why, on August 22nd, 1914, General von Hindenburg was summoned from Hanover, where he lived in retirement, to assume command of the retreating Eighth Army, is obscure. A great deal has been written about the reason for his selection as the man best equipped to defend East Prussia. But the letter which von Moltke, then Chief of the General Staff, wrote to General Ludendorff, began : " You have a new and difficult task ahead of you. . . ." Quartermaster-General von Stein added : " You must accept. The interests of State require it." At that time General Headquarters had not yet heard who was to be Commander-in-Chief. The most probable of the several versions is that Field-Marshal von Bock und Polach, a former Inspector of the Third Army division, who was also living in Hanover, was asked first, and that he declined on the ground of his advanced age and recommended the more robust Hindenburg.

The battle of Tannenberg made Hindenburg more than popular : he became the people's hero. The details of the endless discussion about his personal share in the direction of the battle are too intricate to be treated here. Ludendorff and General Hofmann each claimed the glory exclusively for himself. But it was Hindenburg alone whom the people hailed as the " Saviour of East Prussia." Continued success on the Eastern Front won him such fame that his nomination as Chief of the General Staff became inevitable. But it was only with difficulty that the Kaiser could be persuaded to appoint him

to the supreme command. It was less the ability of Ludendorff (he never thought of making an appointment without his "assistant") than Hindenburg's popularity that disturbed him. His aversion to Hindenburg was such that on one occasion, losing control of himself, he exclaimed: "If only I might never see that sergeant-major's mug again!" The authenticity of this much-quoted, and frequently repudiated, remark was expressly confirmed to me by Admiral von Müller, Chief of the Naval Council.

It was to the Field-Marshal's advantage that he represented a definite and particularly respected type of Prussian officer: its most familiar embodiment was William I. While he shared many traits with the first German Emperor, he was different from him in several respects. Bismarck had said of him: "Flattery *à brûle pourpoint* annoyed him; his appreciation of sympathy and loyalty at once cooled if he thought that they were being carried too far." That could scarcely be said of Hindenburg. Harden once asked: "How is it possible that an old man, pious and to all appearances honest, could allow himself, for four years and more, to be idolised for the achievements of others?" It is perfectly true that he made no attempt comparable to Blücher's with Gneisenau to make it clear that Ludendorff had been the army leader and his own part a purely nominal one. The same thing happened after the evacuation of the Rhineland. During the celebrations that took place he did not think it necessary to pay Stresemann, who had died a short time before, the tributes that, as a matter of elementary historical justice, were his due.

General von Kuhl, one of the historians of the world war, was once asked about Hindenburg's part in the Army Command, and replied, after some reflection, that he had helped to see that General Headquarters did not get slack in their work. Hans Delbrück called him "the greatly respected zero," and stated in his report on the causes of the collapse: "The Field-Marshal may be excused, as he no longer possessed the mental faculties required for a clear view of the situation. . . ." Admittedly, this opinion is disputed, and was, indeed, explicitly contradicted before the Reichstag Commission of Inquiry, while the great political rôle which Hindenburg later played tells against it. But it appears to be a fact that the Army Command used to supply him with only the scantiest of information. The reports of the divisional chiefs were

always heard by Ludendorff alone, and Colonel Bauer, the head of the Operations Department, has said: "Towards the end we did not tell him even where the army corps were stationed." Later, it is true, he repudiated this statement. If he was really altogether under Ludendorff's spell, we cannot lay to his charge the offer of resignation with which he extorted Bethmann Hollweg's dismissal. This pressure, exerted on the Kaiser "in the face of the enemy," has been characterised by critics as mutiny.

Hindenburg's attitude at the time of the Kaiser's departure or flight has been the object of bitter controversy. The Crown Prince criticised him harshly: "In the decisive hour, the Kaiser was abandoned by the one man who had supreme authority over him and over the people and to whom even he—the Kaiser—yielded the first place." This subject was the cause of great ill-feeling between Hindenburg and the Crown Prince. The passivity which the Field-Marshal displayed in the decisive hours was for years remembered against him by the monarchists. A man, who in later years when Hindenburg was President came into daily contact with him, told me that Hindenburg continued to be occupied by thoughts of November 9th rather than of Germany's defeat. But he was an out-and-out monarchist. He denied that he himself had advised the Kaiser to leave, but at the same time he defended and shielded the Kaiser. Public opinion noted this to his credit, and sympathised.

We may ask what the Field-Marshal and Commander-in-Chief himself has to say on the question of responsibility. When, after the second summer offensive in 1918, the Kaiser decorated him with the Blücher Star, he wrote to his wife: "What is the good of medals? . . . It will not be my fault if this struggle does not end to our advantage." Judging from this remark, he did not at that time hold himself responsible. This attitude became plainer still when the tottering Government at Weimar inquired of the Army Command whether the peace treaty ought to be signed. Hindenburg replied in the affirmative, and added: "I, as a soldier, prefer defeat with honour to an ignominious peace." This is mere rhetoric. As one of his confidants says, after reaching his decision the Field-Marshal laid his hand on the shoulder of General Groener, then his Chief of Staff, and said: "You have taken a terrible burden on yourself." This was his conception of his own responsibility.

Some American journalists who directly after the armistice penetrated the German lines, asked Hindenburg who, in his opinion, had decided the War. He replied: "The American infantry." That was a clear military statement. The interview had been arranged by the Workers' and Soldiers' Council at Cassel. A year later, the Field-Marshal was heard by the Reichstag Commission of Inquiry, and on this occasion replied to the same question: "The English General who said that the army was stabbed in the back was quite right. It is not for me to say who was responsible for this." The evening before he had been in consultation with Ludendorff. The English General in question, Sir Frederick Maurice, issued a *démenti*: he had never said or written anything of the kind. But of what use are denials? Hindenburg, the highest military authority, had lent substance to the legend of the "stab in the back" which was fraught with such dangers to the Republic. In the years of quiet that followed, he was on countless occasions pressed to speak in public. Generally he contented himself with cautious utterances about Unity and the Fatherland, and only rarely expressed the hope that the young men of Germany would one day march victoriously into Paris. He seemed so much wiser than Ludendorff, who had let his fiery temper drag him into the first inglorious Hitler adventure.

The question of responsibility came up again in 1925. The parties of the Right were convinced that only Hindenburg's extraordinary popularity could win them the presidential elections. Fehrenbach, a former Chancellor, wrote to a party colleague: "This old man, without any political experience, a puppet in the hands of his backers, obedient to the commands of his All-Highest Master. . . ." That was the general opinion. The parties of the Left made full use of it in their election campaign. Circles on the Right wavered between hope and fear when they assumed Hindenburg would be a "puppet." Hindenburg himself did not shirk the responsibility. Even before the election he was being fêted as the future "Saviour" and calmly accepted this homage as his due.

The Right was disappointed. The President endorsed and supported Stresemann's policy. Locarno, Germany's entry into the League, the Kellogg Pact, the Young Plan and the evacuation of the Rhineland followed in close succession. This

was not the "salvation" the nationalists had played for. Disappointment began to express itself in attacks. In 1928 an agrarian paper reported instances of "active resistance," particularly in nationalist officers' cliques. "Everybody knew from events in the past that Hindenburg was not a man of independent initiative: he was always willing to listen to the theories of his *entourage* and to accept their demands. On the whole, his character is purely passive. . . ." Soon the attacks became more pronounced. After the laws that enacted the provisions of the Young Plan had been signed, the *Deutsche Zeitung* (at that time the organ of the military and nationalist circles) appeared with a broad black border. "No merit," it declared in an article, "is so great that guilt cannot wipe it out. . . . To-day he has completely forfeited the immense confidence which he formerly enjoyed." General Litzmann, a National-Socialist and a contemporary and former subordinate of Hindenburg, declared at a meeting: "Unfortunately we have no secret *Feme* tribunals to render these signatories harmless." *Feme* tribunals are synonymous with murderers. Young National-Socialists gouged the eyes out of Hindenburg's portrait and yelled out: "Judas the traitor." Goebbels asked in his paper: "Is Hindenburg still alive?" When the presidential elections came round again in 1932 Hindenburg was put up as the candidate for the Social-Democrats and the Catholic Centre Party. Chancellor Brüning wore himself out in campaigning for him. He felt himself bound to the old man in friendship and loyalty, and looked on him almost as a father. Hitler, the opposing candidate, mocked the old man of 84 and boasted loudly that he was forty years younger and would survive him.

His ancestral estate at Neudeck had been given him as a present on his eightieth birthday by a group of industrialists. Meissner, his Personal Secretary of State, once complained to me that whenever Hindenburg had been in residence there for a few weeks "nothing could be done with him": he was completely under the influence of the aristocratic landowners who were his neighbours. Oskar von Hindenburg, his son and adjutant, arranged the first meeting with Hitler.

From this time on foreign and military policy no longer stood in the foreground of public life: successive Ministries were all equally unyielding on these points. The problem of the impoverished East Elbian estates occupied the political

stage. Hindenburg's attitude hardened. "You can't tell me any tales: I know how much I have to send to Neudeck every month," he once said to a Minister who had ventured to express mild doubts about the policy of the big landowners. Brüning was dismissed as an "Agrarbolschewik." One after the other the Ministers who had enjoyed and lost Hindenburg's confidence fell: Schiele, Treviranus, Dietrich, Schlange-Schöningen, and finally Schleicher, who, thoughtless and all too confident that he had earned the President's trust, took up the challenge which the Agrarians' leaders threw down. Years before, Hitler had given solemn assurances to a representative of the big landowners, Fürst Eulenburg.

At a meeting in 1926 Stresemann had exclaimed: "He has taken the oath to the Constitution. I think there can be no one depraved enough to believe that Hindenburg does not appreciate the meaning of this oath and would not abide by its implications to the smallest detail." Confidence in Hindenburg's oath was the decisive factor in the second presidential election. The workers, the Catholics and the Liberals knew perfectly well that their candidate did not share their views, but they trusted his oath. It was on these lines that the election campaign was fought. Every hoarding proclaimed: "Trust for Trust!" "Loyalty is the Essence of Honour!" "He stands by you: keep faith with him!"

Hindenburg's election agent, Gerecke, is to-day in prison. The President of the Reichstag who administered the oath to Hindenburg did not escape the concentration camp. A popular joke in Berlin ran: "Have you heard that Hindenburg is going to inspect the concentration camps? He wants to see his supporters again." As late as August 1932 the President assured the Jews, who suspected trouble ahead, that they would continue to enjoy "the civil rights guaranteed them by the Constitution." To-day they no longer possess them. At the opening of the first National-Socialist Reichstag Hindenburg was received in Potsdam by two evangelical pastors. He said to them piously: "I thank God that we have reached this day." A year later the two pastors were banished abroad. Shortly before her violent death, Schleicher's wife wrote to a friend: "Sometimes now my head goes round . . . Hindenburg's ingratitude. . . ." Hindenburg's last public act was to send a message of congratulation to Hitler on the "purge" of June 30th.

By birth, tradition and calling, Hindenburg belonged at heart to the Monarchy, the Army, and the East Elbian estates. He had been unable to do anything for the Kaiser. He protected the Army. His work on behalf of the big landowners was great and far-reaching, even if regarded in historical perspective. From all that we know to-day it is impossible to doubt that it was his work. How will history judge him? That depends, in Germany at least, on who writes it. As long as the situation in Germany is so unstable, we cannot be sure.

RUDOLF OLDEN.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THE emphasis which was naturally laid upon domestic matters during the first stages of the Roosevelt experiment has caused less attention than really deserved to be paid, inside as well as outside the United States, to American foreign policy. Recent events, however, such as the acceptance by the Philippine legislature on May 1st of the Act of the U.S. Congress which will give the islands independence by 1945, or the ratification by the U.S. Senate on May 31st of a new Treaty with Cuba surrendering the American rights of intervention, or the passage of a resolution of Congress looking towards American membership of the International Labour Organisation, should put an end to this neglect. It should be realised that, to the extent to which deep-seated popular prejudices on the one hand, and immediate domestic emergencies on the other, have allowed, the Roosevelt administration has been living up to its declared policy of making the U.S. a "good neighbour" to its sister nations, and has been developing a foreign policy as striking in its way as that domestic policy to which the name "New Deal" has been given.

Most particularly has this been so as regards Latin America. The Treaty of May 29th with Cuba, which was ratified by the Senate within the astonishingly short time of two days, is only the latest of a series of moves designed to establish new and equal, and therefore more friendly, relationships between the United States and its sister republics to the south.

Such a policy had, of course, been already initiated before Mr. Roosevelt assumed office. It may perhaps be dated from President Coolidge's appointment of Dwight Morrow as Ambassador to Mexico. The sincere, and on the whole successful, efforts that Mr. Morrow, and his successors Reuben Clark Junior and Josephus Daniels, have made to reconcile legitimate American interests and natural Mexican prejudices, and to establish agreement in the place of coercion, have not merely vastly improved Mexican-American, they have had considerable influence on general Latin-American and North-American relations.

This policy was carried further by President Hoover and Secretary Stimson. They withdrew American marines from Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua, and disclaimed the

policy of thus interfering, even for well-intentioned purposes, in the internal affairs of smaller American states. They presented to Congress, and published, and thus gave some measure of official sanction to, a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine which had originally been drafted in 1928 by J. Reuben Clark, then Under-Secretary of State. This restatement expressly stated that the Doctrine did "not concern itself with purely inter-American relations." It stated a case of "United States versus Europe, not of the United States versus Latin-America." So far as Latin-America was concerned, the Doctrine was, as it had always been, "not an instrument of violence and oppression, but an unbought, freely bestowed, and wholly effective guarantee of their freedom, independence and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe."

Latin-America was, however, slow to convince. President Roosevelt found when he assumed office, and despite his geniality and sincerity to their representatives in Washington, Secretary Hull found when he met delegates from all the American countries at the Pan-American Union Conference last December in Montevideo, that there was still throughout Latin-America a well-nigh universal feeling of distrust and dislike for the United States. This feeling must have been largely abated by the policy of the Roosevelt administration.

That administration has taken the greatest care, even in the face of immense provocation, as in Cuba since the fall of Machado, to avoid individual or undue interference, and to prove the truth of Mr. Clark's statement, that the Monroe Doctrine was not, and that the United States had no thought of making it, "an instrument of violence and oppression" so far as Latin-America was concerned. Its new treaty with Cuba, renouncing rights of interference legally held by treaty, and not merely claimed under some unilaterally imposed doctrine, rights, moreover, for which there is real justification, in view of the nearness of Cuba to the United States, of the extent of American interests in Cuba, and of the actual danger in which American lives and property have so often been owing to Cuba's somewhat stormy politics, should afford striking proof that such claims on the part of the United States are now, whatever they may have been before, wholly sincere.

The new treaty retains of the so-called Platt Amendment

clauses of that of 1903 only those entitling the U.S.A. to lease Cuban territory required for its naval base at Guantamo Bay. The other clauses, limiting Cuba's right to enter into contracts with foreign states, or to incur debt, and giving the United States the right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence and to maintain a government capable of protecting life, property and individual liberty; and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of peace (i.e. with Spain) on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba," are omitted.

Realising that interference may sometimes be necessary, apart from special privileges, if Latin-American countries aggressively or fraudulently towards some other state, that, since the Monroe Doctrine prevents any extra-American state from intervening to protect its own interests in such a situation, a certain responsibility is inevitably imposed on the state enforcing the Doctrine, Mr. Roosevelt now wants to make such interference, and the maintenance of the Doctrine, a pan-American and not merely a United States' affair. He tried during the Cuban troubles, even before the new Cuban treaty was signed, to avoid acting on his own, and under the Platt Amendment, and instead to collaborate with the other American states, on the basis of ordinary international law, and as one member of the Pan-American Union with others. He has since tried, in using the new power which Congress has granted him, and imposing an arms embargo, first on shipments to Paraguay and Bolivia, and more recently on shipments to Cuba, to associate with him in this step at least the larger South American states, or those whose co-operation he "deemed necessary."

In the larger question of war prevention, in relation to the Leticia and Gran Chaco disputes, he has taken a similar line. He wishes to act with other American states and to emphasise that they, as well as the United States, have a responsibility for maintaining peace upon, and for preventing foreign interference in, the American continents. In this matter also he has maintained the attitude first adopted by the Hoover-Stimson régime, and which contrasts strikingly with that of the Harding-Hughes régime, of welcoming rather than of criticising the intervention of the League of Nations. He realises, that is to say, that the establishment of the League

of Nations as well as the coming of age of other American states, has altered the circumstances in which the Monroe Doctrine operates, and has made it necessary, not to sacrifice the Doctrine, but to interpret it differently.

He has also similarly tried to distil a new spirit into the economic contacts of the United States and the rest of the Americas. Big-stick diplomacy, and those aggressive financial and economic policies on the part of American interests which so frequently made big-stick diplomacy necessary, are both out of favour in New Deal Washington. Interests which seek special privileges of an improper character or by improper means cannot expect to find the Department of State waiting to get them out of the difficulties they have brought upon themselves.

In the place of the old, one-sided, aggressive, economic and political contacts of North with South America, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull hope to establish new, equal, friendly, and mutually advantageous contacts. They indicated at the Montevideo Conference that they had high hopes of the Americas proving a more favourable field than the world did at the London Conference for the working out of the liberal international economic plans to which Mr. Hull has always been devoted, and to which the new American Tariff Act, giving the President wide bargaining powers, is meant to point. Little progress has been made in that direction so far, or can be until knowledge of the new North American attitude towards Latin America is sufficiently widely appreciated south of the Rio Grande as to dissipate that prejudice against the United States which was Mr. Hull's chief obstacle at Montevideo. But an indication of a new direction of American policy has at least been given.

A similar spirit is evident in American policy towards the United States' own overseas possessions. Philippine independence is in this connection as much of a landmark as Cuban independence, consequent upon the dropping of the Platt Amendment, is in connection with Latin America. The growth of a movement in the United States in favour of Philippine independence has been largely due to the reaction of special American interests against Philippine imports and immigrants. The Hawes-Cutting Act, which was passed by Mr. Hoover's second Congress over his veto, owed more probably to this selfish desire of Americans to be free of

Philippine competition than to an altruistic wish to give the Filipinos what they were demanding. Mr. Roosevelt has, however, induced his Congress so to amend the Act as to take some of the sting out of this charge. He has also obtained amendments designed to allow more time for the necessary adjustments consequent upon taking the Philippines out of the American tariff area. The result has been that whereas the Philippine legislature rejected the original Hawes-Cutting Act it has quickly and thankfully accepted the amended Act.

According to the terms of this new Act the United States will, in 1945, when the islands become independent, surrender its military bases in the Philippines. The question of naval bases, which the United States wishes still to retain, as she retains Guantanamo in Cuba, is left for mutual agreement between the American and Philippine Governments. To show that the United States is not selfishly motivated in these matters, Mr. Roosevelt has stood between Congress and the islands, indicating that he will veto unfair limitations, like the increased duty on coconut oils, placed by Congress upon Philippine trade. He has also welcomed the Tydings Bill, establishing in favour of the Philippines a credit of \$24 million in connection with the reduced gold content of the dollar.

In the administration of the Philippines, in which, for the moment, the United States will continue to be the actual executive, as well as the ultimate sovereign, authority, the Roosevelt Government has tried to conciliate local feeling as much as possible. A similar policy is being pursued in the United States' other overseas possessions, particularly Porto Rico. In each case every effort is being made not merely to give the territories good government, but to make that government as much as possible self-government.

It is, moreover, intended as a mark of the President's special interest in, and sympathy for, the U.S. overseas possessions that he has planned to visit four of them—Porto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Panama Canal Zone, and Hawaii—during his present summer vacation.

The definitive settlement with regard to Philippine independence inevitably raises the matter of American policy in the Far East. Apparently an amicable, if informal, understanding has been come to between the United States and Japan, which makes it possible that the islands will be able, after the establishment of their complete independence, to be

neutralised, and to be open to the friendly economic penetration both of Japan and the United States.

There is a marked movement of public, as well as of official, opinion in the United States in favour of better relations with Japan. The war fever, which was definitely present two years ago, and even the strong lack of sympathy with Japan, which has been present throughout the Sino-Japanese dispute, have both subsided. There is still alarm at Japan's intentions. The Vinson Bill which, if actually carried out (the full appropriations have not yet been voted), will bring the U.S. Navy up to treaty strength by 1939, while mainly advanced for tactical reasons, with a view to the 1935 conference, and as part of the public works programme, was partly an American reply to Japan's aggression in Manchuria, to her naval construction, and to her extensive claims. So, though its major motive was trade, was the American recognition of the U.S.S.R. So perhaps, though their major motive was undoubtedly trade, and a certain sympathy for China, towards which the United States has always been warmly inclined, were the American loans to China.

The Secretary of the Navy has thought it necessary to warn Japan that if she attempted to attain naval parity, or to build in excess of treaty limits, the United States would have to consider strengthening her naval bases in the Pacific. Other, less open, warnings have been given to Japan that her action is regarded in the United States as having disturbed the political *status quo* on which the Washington Conference settlement was based.

The Roosevelt-Hull régime has also maintained the attitude of the Hoover-Stimson régime of refusing to recognise the fruits of aggression, or that multilateral treaties, such as govern the action of the Great Powers in the Far East, can be altered by unilateral action. All attempts of Japanese diplomacy to arrange special conversations with the President have failed largely for this reason, that the United States is not willing formally to exonerate Japan for her action during the last 2½ years or to recognise the resulting situation.

There has, however, been a marked tendency on the part of the United States since Mr. Roosevelt assumed office to withdraw from the position of active leadership of what the Japanese have regarded as an anti-Japanese campaign. It was, for instance, strongly felt in Washington this April, after

the Japanese pronouncements claiming China as their special sphere of influence, that international action, if any, to check Japanese expansionist policy, should be initiated elsewhere, and preferably in London. The United States contented itself with a diplomatically worded reaffirmation of the sanctity of treaties and of its own rights in China. It is unlikely, if the events of 1931-2 were to be repeated, that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull would act quite as vigorously as Mr. Hoover and Mr. Stimson did. They would prefer that other states should incur the concentrated Japanese ill-will that was in 1931-2 unduly directed against the United States.

The view is growing in the United States that she has little cause, certainly much less cause than Britain, for enmity with Japan. American-Japanese trade is largely complementary, Japan absorbing American cotton and the United States absorbing Japanese silk, whereas Anglo-Japanese trade is so largely competitive. Only an alarmist could think that Japan has any aggressive designs on the continental United States. Many Americans welcome the withdrawal from the Philippines as removing that possible cause of American-Japanese enmity. There is, therefore, a new and growing feeling that the long-standing American-Japanese hostility is wholly unjustified, and should be ended as soon as possible.

It is probable that the Roosevelt administration shares this view. In so far as it can, without condoning Japan's aggression in Manchuria, or unlimited claims with regard to China, it will probably sincerely try to establish the same sort of feeling with Japan that it is, on the whole successfully, establishing with Latin America and the Philippines. It is even possible that the Asiatic exclusion provisions of the American Immigration Law, which are so bitterly resented in Japan, may be repealed, and Asiatics put formally upon the quota system, their actual exclusion, if continued, being provided for by a "Gentleman's Agreement" such as that so rudely torn up by the United States in 1924.

If relations with Europe have been less friendly than those which have been described with other continents it is because the debt negotiations, for which each continent blames the other, and the abortive Economic Conference, for whose failure Europe holds the United States responsible, and the Disarmament Conference, for which the United States blames Europe, have embittered the continents against one another, and have

prevented America from offering as much as it otherwise might have done, or Europe from appreciating properly even what America has offered.

Actually the United States has offered a good deal. Mr. Roosevelt is willing to conclude a pact against aggression, and a disarmament convention, including provisions for inspection, and for consultation. While unwilling to remit decisions to any other body, and opposed in any event to military sanctions so far as the United States is concerned, he is nevertheless ready, as part of a satisfactory disarmament convention, to recommend his country to agree, if it concurs with an international verdict and course of action against an aggressor, at least not to oppose such action, either positively or negatively, by insisting on its full neutral rights. The United States is further ready to accept a simple definition of aggression, the moving of armed forces across the frontiers of another state. So far as disarmament is concerned, whether naval, military or aerial, she is ready to accept proportionately as much as any other country, or as the Conference can agree upon.

This may not be at all what Europe wants. But Europe ought to realise that it is all that Mr. Roosevelt, or any American President, could possibly offer. If he is not willing to join the League of Nations, Mr. Roosevelt is willing fully and amicably to collaborate with it. He is actually ready to join the International Labour Organisation, and is already empowered by Congress to accept the invitation which has just been offered to him. He is also ready to join the Permanent Court of International Justice, and will do so when he finds the leisure to force the protocols through the Senate, which has been holding them up for years. He is, besides, particularly anxious, as is American public opinion, for some international control of the arms traffic, recent disclosures with regard to which have profoundly stirred him and his people.

Finally, he is now, as he was not a year ago, ready to consider international economic agreements. The economic nationalists, such as Professor Moley and Mr. Bernard Baruch, who were very influential a year ago, are no longer. Internationalists like Mr. Hull, and realists who appreciate the fallacies of nationalism, like Mr. Wallace, now have the ear of the President. The New Deal, moreover, has entered

its second stage in which international agreements are not merely permissible, as they were not in the emergency stage last year, but necessary.

American opinion is being prepared, much to the satisfaction of the President, for this new stage, by the speeches and publications, particularly of Secretaries Wallace and Hull. The former, the clearest thinker and one of the strongest personalities in the Cabinet, and indeed in the country, has come out definitely for a middle course between nationalism and internationalism. He apparently intends, if he can, to use the new Tariff Act, giving the President power to raise or lower tariffs by fifty per cent., to buy markets for America's chief surpluses, especially agricultural surpluses, by carefully considered openings in the American tariff wall, designed to allow additional imports of foreign manufactured goods, in categories in which the United States is relatively at a disadvantage and in, militarily speaking, non-essential industries, as well as of raw materials and tropical foodstuffs.

Immense difficulties, as he would be the first to recognise, stand between him and his objective. It is, however, significant in this period of extreme nationalism that he, and by implication his chief, should be setting themselves such objectives. It is further proof of the fact that the New Deal is original and liberal in international matters as well as in national ones.

FRANK DARVALL.

MARY STUART ON THE STAGE.

NOTHING is more interesting upon the stage to-day—a stage where the general level of acting is perhaps higher than it has ever been before—than the revival of historical drama. Whether the subject be a medieval king or a Tudor queen or an eighteenth-century empress, whether we are asked to follow the career of Clive or to study the family secrets of the Brontës or the Barretts, it is clear that the historical element makes a strong appeal to many playgoers who may possibly be sated with the peculiarities of contemporary life. Good playwrights need not of course be good historians. Great plays have notoriously been built on the weakest historical foundations. The average playgoer is quite ready to allow the dramatist any liberties he asks, to put up with inexactitudes and even caricature. But he wants a picture to satisfy his eye and a story to satisfy his feeling for romance. If these things can be plausibly associated with famous and familiar persons, the object sought by most people perhaps in historical drama is attained.

The pictures presented to us in some recent historical plays and films have been eminently satisfying to spectators. Fine effects of space and colour, of dignity and simplicity, have been secured. The problem of dress has not always been so satisfactorily settled. The ablest producers have not yet quite succeeded in making medieval ladies look young and unencumbered in their clothes. That problem seems to call for fuller study and freer treatment than it has yet received. Over-dressing has sometimes a curiously dowdy effect. But a high degree of taste and skill has been brought to bear on theatrical productions. Gordon Daviot has delighted the public with a play built upon the story of Richard II. And her bold attempt to throw the same glamour round the most familiar tragedy in history has inevitably stirred and troubled once again the waters of debate.

No story lends itself to drama more readily than Mary Stuart's. Few subjects have been more often treated or maltreated on the stage. And for none is a greater wealth of material available, historical and speculative, personal and public, human and engrossing. Opinions on the play at the New Theatre will vary. It is not proposed to discuss criticisms which have been expressed elsewhere. But no one will deny

that the play contains scenes of great effectiveness, cleverness and charm, or that several figures stand out with distinctness in the picture. The Queen herself remains a problem, indicated rather than explained. The Regent Moray—he is Regent before the play ends—is one of the most baffling of sixteenth-century statesmen, a character on which historians have never quite made up their minds. If the play leaves us with our doubts about Moray unsettled, there can be no doubt that the part is played at the New Theatre with admirable dignity, and handled by the author with discretion and restraint. Darnley's part again owes much to its interpreter. It could not have been easy to invest with charm and pathos the handsome, weak, petulant, intolerable boy, who proved so deplorably ill-fitted to rule himself, his wife and his kingdom. Lethington, also cleverly acted, may be less acceptable, less easy to reconcile with our conception of one of the most adroit and subtle politicians of his day. And the Bothwell of the New Theatre is drawn in outline only: many will ask themselves if it is the outline of a man who could have fascinated and dominated Mary Stuart. This method of touching in a portrait very lightly, and leaving it to the audience to fill in the details—a method at times perhaps rather hard on both the actors and the audience—is very characteristic of the play.

But there is no denying the deftness with which in *Queen of Scots* this method is pursued. Gordon Daviot has a long story to tell, a highly complicated and interesting period to cover. Even the two fateful years from the marriage with Darnley to the flight of Bothwell are packed with character and incident far more than enough for any single play, and the dramatist here undertakes to cover five years more. It is almost impossible for any playwright to trace the development of the characters in those years in detail. The question is how much may he fairly leave to the knowledge of the audience. Gordon Daviot shows intrepidity in assuming that the audience knows the story through and through. Of many important episodes in the Queen's life we see little or nothing. Chastelard is a shadow. Knox does not appear. Mary's surrender to Darnley—if indeed she did surrender—is hinted at only. The struggle which makes the supreme interest of her story, the struggle between loyalty, duty, pity on the one hand, and her absorbing passion for Bothwell on the other hand, is not

easily detected. Yet there must have been such a struggle if Mary had any character at all. We have two or three little domestic scenes, prettily sketched but not essential—the Queen going marketing in disguise, a humble house at Leith, a cottage near the Solway. But some episodes of great importance—Mary's share in the plot for removing Darnley, her behaviour after Darnley's murder, the mock trial, the scandalous marriage, the rising of the nobles, Bothwell's flight, the Queen's abdication, the imprisonment at Lochleven, the escape to the West—are for the most part left to be inferred.

This reserve is skilfully maintained. It may be dramatically necessary. To convey the facts of the story with so little effort, if they are conveyed to the audience successfully, shows quality and art. One is reminded of Scott's picture of Mary at Lochleven. The great romancer's instinct introduces only incidents which move our compassion for the Queen, recalls only by a word or two the doubts and tragedies behind. How far can a dramatist tell his tale in this way, by inference and suggestion chiefly, by a few significant sentences and striking scenes, and leave the memory or imagination of the audience to supply the rest? It is an interesting question. If the audiences at the New Theatre are satisfied by this restraint, if they feel that the tale is adequately told in the scenes selected and the hints conveyed, then the success of Gordon Daviot's drama is assured.

It has been suggested that the author has not quite made up her mind on the cardinal issue whether Mary did or did not connive at Darnley's murder. It may be so. But it is not less possible that the dramatist is deliberately declining to pronounce on facts which she assumes the audience to have mastered. She shows us the Queen sitting by Darnley's bedside at Kirk-o-Field, while they are arranging the gunpowder in her bedroom underneath, remarking on the griminess of Paris' hands, sending for the coverlet upon the King's bed to save it from destruction, and in the next scene clasping the chief murderer in her arms. It would seem that the author could hardly be doubtful as to the conclusions which these incidents convey. But it is perhaps more interesting to consider how it comes to pass that anybody in these days can seriously suppose that Mary was unaware of what was going on under her eyes. The legend of her innocence—

simplicity may be the better word, for no one but the most resolute of simpletons could have failed to understand the meaning of her counsellors' hints and her lover's actions—is one of the curiosities of history. Where does the myth come from? What has given it so obstinate a life? Why does it still appeal so strongly, especially across the Border, to many intelligent men and women? A vague sympathy with the Stuarts generally is, no doubt, one of the contributing causes—a gentle confusion of loyalty and sentiment towards a picturesque and unfortunate race. Pity for a brave and unhappy woman is another—a woman of rare fearlessness, intelligence and charm, confronted with the cruellest misfortunes, none the less cruel because they resulted so largely from her own errors and sins. Mary had all her great-uncle Henry's astonishing facility—her cousin Elizabeth had the same gift—of putting a fine front upon unpardonable conduct. Whatever doubtful actions she committed, her air of high and innocent composure rarely failed. The Tudors and their descendants were not alone among contemporary Sovereigns in their power of persuading themselves that all they did was right. Scottish patriotism is another reason for the myth. It has been made a personal question between a Scottish Queen, maltreated and misunderstood, and an English Queen, insolently pitiless and successful. It is sometimes forgotten that Elizabeth also was fighting for her life and crown. Love of paradox has strengthened the illusion. There are still writers who prefer to think that Richard III was a model for mankind. But the strongest influence in Mary's favour has been of course the Roman Catholic Church. Circumstances made her the figurehead of a fierce religious controversy. The position of her supporters would have been impossible unless her innocence had been made an article of faith. And on that unfortunate ecclesiastical necessity the legend of her blamelessness has been laboriously built. The fatal thing about it is that no man can accept it, unless he is prepared at the same time to admit that one of the most vivid protagonists of history could have been little better than a puppet and a fool.

It is worth while to ask ourselves again, nearly four hundred years after the event, not what later apologists have argued, but what Mary's contemporaries thought at the time. The possibility of her guilt was by no means so startling in those days as it may seem in our own. Mary's agent, the Bishop of

Ross, was content to argue, in defending her, that, even if the murder were admitted, it could not deserve extreme punishment in a Prince, that King David had been both adulterer and murderer and yet was not deprived by his subjects. Assassination was no unfamiliar resource in politics; the statecraft of Philip and Alva, of Catherine and the Guises, even of many Scottish nobles, would have seen nothing peculiar in views like these. Mary's relations in France saw at once the inconveniences to which a belief in her guilt would expose her: but they do not seem to have felt much difficulty in accepting the belief itself. The Duke of Norfolk, one of the latest of Mary's suitors, who like the Queen had already made three ventures in matrimony, and to whom, for purely political reasons, Mary addressed some of those love-letters in the writing of which she excelled, found it possible apparently to refer to her as "a notorious adulteress and murderess," but had not the wisdom to put aside completely the temptations of a crown. Lethington, who fought for Mary's interests to the last, could have had no doubts whatever on the subject. Moray, Morton, every man concerned in the story, must have been well acquainted with the facts. If the Queen's friends were driven to suggest that Bothwell was a necromancer who had bewitched her, and to rest their argument on the danger of allowing subjects to depose their Princes, it is evident how little they depended on the merits of their case. To contemporaries who knew Queen Mary and were fully informed of her actions, whether Scotchmen, Englishmen, Frenchmen or Spaniards, there was nothing incredible in the theory of her guilt.

Some points in that astonishing romance will, no doubt, always be matter for conjecture. Did Mary fall in love with Darnley? We do not know, and we are not entitled to dogmatise about it. The motives for the marriage were at first clearly political. But it is not impossible that the handsome and insolent boy captured for a time the fancy of a Princess obviously sensitive to the admiration she aroused, very capable of passion, and at least in love with the idea of love. If Mary at first loved Darnley it would make more intelligible the recoil she felt. The view is not impossible, and it lends both force and probability to the story told by Mr. Maurice Hewlett in *The Queen's Quair*, one of the greatest of historical romances, and perhaps the finest portrait ever drawn of the

unhappy Queen. Did Bothwell, again, we may ask, fall in love with Mary? Did he ever respond, as she longed for him to do, to her passionate appeal:

"Mon Cœur, mon Sang, mon Ame, et mon Soucy"?

Bothwell was clearly a man of parts and understanding, soldier and leader, courtier and noble, after the roystering fashion of his day, and a good deal more than a pirate and a ruffian. Of Mary's absorbing passion for her lover there can be no question. It is the only theory on which her actions can be understood.

What were those actions? The leading facts are beyond dispute. Mary, a daughter of the Stuarts and the Guises, came on both sides of high-spirited and hot-blooded stock. She was brought up at the Court of Catherine de Medici, and inured from childhood to the morality which reigned there. She had admirers from an early age, and she undoubtedly enjoyed and welcomed admiration. She was unreserved and familiar with her intimates: the stories which gathered round Chastelard and Rizzio cannot be quite without significance. She was careless of appearances and disdainful of opinion, fearless, imperious, passionately alive. She had, it seems, all the armoury which a woman can have of sensitiveness, subtlety and charm. Surrounded by difficulties, personal, political, religious, faced by troublesome and rebellious subjects, she took her own way, sometimes with skill and sometimes with recklessness, gave free rein in the end to her ambitions and desires. She married Darnley to strengthen her claims upon the Crown of England. She never forgot that she was Queen of Scotland, had been Queen of France, might, if she chose perhaps, be Queen of Spain. Among her schemes of policy love overtook her. Her surrender to Bothwell was complete. Wearied of Darnley and bitterly offended with him, she allowed her closest advisers to suggest and to plan his removal. She recalled Rizzio's murderers as a part of the bargain. There can be no question that she knew of the design. She helped it on by going to Glasgow and bringing Darnley up to Kirk-o-Field. There she occupied the room below him till it was wanted as a storehouse for the powder. She absented herself on the night the explosion occurred. Within a few days she was dancing and feasting with the man whom all the world proclaimed the murderer. She heaped

grants and gifts upon him, even Darnley's horses and clothes. She refused an enquiry as long as she could; when the Court was at last set up its President was Argyll who had given his consent to the murder. She allowed Bothwell to bring an army into Edinburgh, but limited Lennox's following to six. And directly Bothwell was divorced from his wife she made him her husband. Can even the most determined partiality explain away such facts as these?

If these facts be admitted, as they must be, one wonders why so much importance should ever have been attached to the Casket Letters. The reason perhaps is that Mary's apologists wished to distract attention from events which there is no gainsaying, to writings which many people from different motives tried to keep secret, and on which consequently it is easier to throw some doubt. In a sense the Casket Letters do not matter at all. Our judgment of Mary Stuart must be the same, whether they be or be not accepted. But few people who saw them at the time seem to have doubted their authenticity, and Mary was clearly intensely anxious to prevent their publication. Neither in the letters themselves nor in the story of their discovery is there anything improbable, anything which does not fit in with the natural view of Mary's conduct. Despite all the attempts made to create suspicion, there is no mystery about them which cannot be explained, and no reason for rejecting them except the necessity of maintaining the innocence of an unhappy Queen.

There is indeed far more mystery about the theory that the Casket papers were forged by some miscreant undiscovered to this day, and that the secret of the imposture has defied all the attempts made to expose it. No one has ever plausibly suggested who the forgers were or how the forgery was done. Moray is out of the question, for the existence of the papers was known before he returned to Scotland. Morton and his confederates at Carberry Hill had no need to fabricate such documents, even had they had the skill to do so, because Mary's guilt was notorious already. Had it not been they could never have dethroned her. Lethington could not have failed to hear of and to disclose any forgery committed: he was acting with the confederate nobles at the time when, if ever, it must have been done. And for most men of open minds the letters themselves bear the stamp of truth. What forgers, one asks, could have been so foolish as

to fabricate thousands of unnecessary words, when a few sentences would have served their purpose and when every line added increased the risks of detection? And what consummate artists must these unknown forgers have been to compose documents so infinitely human, which seem to reveal at every turn the character and temptations of the woman who wrote them, her quick and poignant charm, her doubts, her recklessness, her shame and self-surrender, and above all the overmastering passion which had taken possession of her body and mind !

The best answer to the charge of forgery is to read the letters and sonnets themselves. If the interests of any Church or party really at this date require their suppression, require us also to reject every natural inference to be drawn from Mary's conduct, and to write her down an innocent in every sense of the word, by all means let those who like it take that view. But those who feel free to judge for themselves will not be content with such illusions. It is Mary's intensely human weakness which has made her name immortal and her tragedy a drama of deep interest on the stage.

CHARLES MALLET.

SECURITY FOR EUROPE.

EVERYBODY wants peace. But war is dangerously near. Some well-informed persons believe that there is an even chance of war in Europe within the next five years. The war that is beginning to threaten can be prevented. No nation, and no Dictator, will face the risk of having to fight against overwhelming odds so long as there is any hope of obtaining justice by some other means ; or, if not absolute justice, then at least what the world as a whole, after an independent inquiry and open discussion, regards as a tolerable approximation to what is fair and equal.

Two conclusions follow at once. In the first place, every State must be given a reasonable chance of obtaining justice by peaceful process. In addition to such other methods as already exist for the revision of treaties, if need be against the will of one of the parties, Article 19 must be made practically effective. The following procedure has been suggested to this end :

1. When a Member of the League desires the Assembly to advise, under Article 19 of the Covenant, the reconsideration by Members of the League of a treaty (on the ground that it has become inapplicable) or the consideration of specified international conditions (on the ground that their continuance might endanger the peace of the world), a Commission of Inquiry should be appointed to report on the facts and to recommend what, if any, action should be taken.

2. After considering the report or reports of the Commission of Inquiry, the Assembly should "advise" ; and, if the Members of the League who are parties to the treaty or are responsible for the international conditions in question do not act upon the advice within a reasonable time, it may be desirable that the Council should consider the matter under Article 11.

While, however, the maintenance of justice is binding upon all State Members of the League, so also is a scrupulous respect for treaty obligations. It is necessary in the interests of justice that the collective system of international co-operation centred in the League of Nations shall not be used to "stereotype" any particular treaty settlement. But on account of treaty obligations it is also indispensable—and this is our second conclusion—that collective defence (diplomatic, economic and, if need be, military) must be organised ; and that

it must be sufficient to prevent successful aggression. Many ways of organising collective defence in Europe have been proposed at different times.

There is, in the first place, the system of the Covenant, or rather the systems, for Articles 10 and 16 have different origins and are differently conceived. When the United States Senate refused to ratify the League's Covenant, it soon became clear that Britain could not be relied upon to join in working either system. The obligation to defend the victim of aggression (Article 10) or to prevent "all financial, commercial or personal intercourse" between the aggressor's nationals and those of any other State (Article 16) might, if the United States claimed the right of a neutral to trade with the aggressor, have involved a risk of Anglo-American war; and that risk Britain could not face.

Without Britain and the United States the Covenant systems of security would not work with any certainty. Another system was therefore devised to reinforce the Covenant. It was embodied in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, but was rejected by the British Labour Government in 1924. In the following year still another plan with the same object in view met with the same fate, except that the British Government rejecting it was Conservative instead of Labour. The British people, on the whole, approved of both rejections and for the same reason: they wanted, if possible, to keep out of war and they were determined in no circumstances to run any risk of the immeasurable calamity of a war between Britain and America. That was nearly ten years ago. Since that time there have been great changes in the attitude of American public opinion, and of the Administration of the United States, to the problem of collective defence against aggression; so that to-day the risk that British action against an aggressor indicated by the League might lead to an Anglo-American war over interference with neutral trade is practically negligible.

But the British Government, and in particular Sir Austen Chamberlain, its Foreign Secretary, were not prepared to leave the problem of European security where it stood when they had killed the Geneva Protocol. Attacking the problem from a new angle, Sir Austen, with the cordial co-operation of M. Briand and Herr Stresemann, produced the Locarno Treaties whereby Britain and Italy joined with Germany,

France and Belgium to ensure the defence of the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers against aggression from either side. In one respect, the obligations undertaken by this country at Locarno exceeded anything contemplated by the Geneva Protocol. Under the Protocol, the pledge to join in collective defence against aggression was conditional upon the all-round reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement. But the security guaranteed by the Locarno Treaties was independent of any disarmament, and even of any promise to disarm.

On the other hand, the security in a régime of disarmament provided by the Protocol was as wide as the League itself, instead of being confined to the comparatively small region with which the Locarno treaties were concerned. But it is true that, at Locarno, when Germany inquired what further obligations for collective defence she would be undertaking by entering the League of Nations, she was informed, in the language of the Protocol, that the obligations of States Members of the League to join in collective defence implied willingness "loyally and effectively to co-operate in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with their military situation and takes their geographical position into account."

Since this interpretation of the Covenant was given by Britain as well as by France, Italy and Belgium, this much at least remained of British obligations under the Covenant to join in collective action against aggression anywhere in the world. Its value as a guarantee, or even as evidence, that Britain would "co-operate in resistance to any act of aggression" was diminished by the fact that, except within the region covered by the Locarno agreements, Britain would judge for herself whether aggression had occurred and, if so, who was the aggressor. Even in the Locarno region, where the Council of the League had to indicate the aggressor, Britain could veto the Council's decision if she chose; but it was hardly conceivable that this power of veto would be exercised in order to escape an obligation which all, or almost all, the other Council Members publicly declared to have arisen. As regards other regions Britain is ready to "co-operate in resistance to any act of aggression" anywhere in the world "to an extent which is compatible with her military situation, and takes her geographical position into account."

But this assurance would provide a far more substantial contribution to collective security if Britain would agree that, outside the Locarno region as well as inside it, the Council of the League, rather than Britain for herself, should decide when aggression has occurred and indicate the aggressor.

The Locarno treaties were intended by their negotiators to be followed by similar regional pacts covering between them the whole of Europe. For a number of years nothing was done to realise this intention. But of late the idea has been revived. The U.S.S.R., after advocating universal and complete disarmament, has lately become as anxious about security as France herself. The Hitler régime in Germany and the Manchurian adventures of Japan have led to this result; so that to-day there is no more ardent advocate of European security than Soviet Russia and her Commissar for foreign affairs, M. Litvinoff. Indeed, the revival of interest in regional security owes more to M. Litvinoff than to anyone else.

Fortunately the British Government is not going to depart from the policy of Sir Austen Chamberlain. So long as regional security pacts offer a genuinely mutual guarantee, are placed under the auspices of the League, and are designed to support the Covenant, no opposition from the British Government is to be anticipated. On the other hand, the British Government would discourage any system of alliances directed against a particular power.

Accordingly Germany is being invited to co-operate on equal terms with Russia, Poland and other powers in an Eastern Pact of Mutual Guarantee. It is, however, of the very greatest importance that Germany should make no mistake about British policy in this matter. If such a mistake were to lead to Germany's refusal to participate on equal terms in an Eastern Pact, Poland might doubt the wisdom of going forward when Germany held back. In that event the U.S.S.R. might well abandon hope of organising security through the League of Nations; and there might be an end of her proposal to seek admission to the League this summer.

Since so much is at stake, Britain should make it abundantly plain that her policy is to encourage the formation of regional security pacts, genuinely mutual in character, within the system of the League of Nations, and between them covering the whole of Europe. Such pacts would, of course,

provide for collective action, not against any named nation (such as Germany) but against any party to the pact who might be indicated as an aggressor by international authority. Lord Cecil has suggested that aggression might be defined as meaning a violent infringement of the sovereign rights of a State, carried out with a view to injuring or destroying its political independence or territorial integrity. Each pact might further provide that, in case of any dispute as to the character of the infringement, it would be for the Council of the League to determine the point. In reaching its determination the Council would have regard to, but would not be bound by, the definition of aggression* submitted by the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference on May 24th, 1933, as well as the declaration† made by President Roosevelt on May 16th, 1933.

Since each pact would be within the system of the League of Nations it would be right and proper that all States Members of the League should join with the signatories to the pact in applying diplomatic and economic pressure to any aggressor thus indicated. But there would be no obligation upon any Member of the League, outside the parties to a regional pact, to use any military, naval or air force against an aggressor except in the doubly unlikely event of the aggressor resorting to the use of force, and of the combined forces of the other parties to the pact being insufficient to restrain the aggressor. Only in that case would the other States Members of the League be obliged to use force against the aggressor "to an extent which is compatible with their

* ARTICLE I:

1. Declaration of war on another State.
2. Invasion by armed forces of the territory of another State, even without declaration of war.
3. An attack by its land, sea or air forces even without declaration of war upon the territory, vessels or flying-machines of another State.
4. A naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State.
5. Support accorded to armed bands, which organised on its territory shall have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal in spite of the demand of the invaded State to take in its own territory all the steps in its power to deprive the bandits aforesaid of all aid or protection.

ARTICLE II: No consideration of a political, military, economic or any other character shall serve as an excuse or a justification of aggression as defined in Article I.

† "All the nations of the world should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression. They should solemnly reaffirm the obligations they have assumed to limit and reduce their armaments and, provided these obligations are faithfully executed by all signatory Powers, individually agree that they will send no armed force of whatever nature across their frontiers."

military situation and takes their geographical position into account."

States not yet Members of the League are bound by the Briand-Kellogg Pact not to use war as an instrument of national policy. Statements made by President Hoover's Secretary of State (Mr. Stimson) in August 1932, and by Mr. Roosevelt's Ambassador-at-Large (Mr. Norman Davis) in May 1933, have placed beyond all reasonable doubt that the Members of the League, when they render each other mutual assistance against aggression, can now rely upon the United States if not to co-operate at least to claim no neutral rights which might lead to conflict with the League.

Thus the collective system in Europe would consist, not of three concentric circles as M. Paul-Boncour proposed, but of two concentric circles surrounding several inner rings different in different regions. In any one of these regions the innermost ring of the collective system would consist of the parties to the local regional pact: their duty would be to use whatever means were necessary to restrain an aggressor indicated by the Council of the League. In support of this inner ring would be the other States Members of the League: an intermediate circle pledged to use diplomatic and economic pressure to restrain an aggressor, but not obliged to use force unless the aggressor resorted to force and the combined forces of the other parties to the regional pact proved insufficient to stop the aggression. In the outermost circle would be the non-League Powers who might co-operate in collective action in any particular case, but whose pledged support for the collective system would be confined to consultation with the League, and to non-interference with the action taken by the signatories of the regional pact or by other League States for the purpose of restraining the aggressor.

Great Britain need have no hesitation in declaring her willingness to co-operate whole-heartedly in such a scheme as this.

"I hold," said Sir Austen Chamberlain in the Guildhall, on April 12th, 1934, "that our safety is not in isolation, but in the recognition that the aggressor is the common enemy of mankind, and in the establishment of a system which makes it certain that against the aggressor there will be mobilised a force which is irresistible and which must deny to the aggressor the benefit he hoped to derive from his aggression."

It is not to be denied that, for one hundred years after Trafalgar, Britain ruled the waves unchallenged and unchallengeable, because of her unrivalled financial position, and her pre-eminence in industry. She can do so no longer. Since M. Blériot flew across the Channel a quarter of a century ago, Britain has ceased to be an island. Our Navy, Army and Air Force are no longer certainly able to defend our country or our Empire. If we were to try, as at the beginning of this century, to supplement our national forces with those of certain other countries by forming alliances or *ententes*, they would be faced by rival alliances or rival *ententes*. The final end, as in 1914, must be world war. So there is no sure defence, even for Britain and the British Empire, save in the collective system. In short, collective defence is the only sure way to make British territory and British trade routes safe against attack. Our vital interest demands it.

Collective defence would, moreover, enable national armaments to be reduced by international agreement, since it would give France and other countries the security without which they dare not further disarm. It would also give Germany equality of status in armaments without any large measure of rearmament. The promises made to Germany before she signed the Treaty of Versailles can only be fulfilled by a policy of collective defence. Our national honour is pledged to it.

Finally, collective defence—all for each and each for all—is the only Christian policy. Samaritans, foreigners, are our neighbours with whom we must seek before all else to build on earth God's Commonwealth in which all nations are provinces.

It is time that the people of the United Kingdom showed beyond all doubt that they are willing to prevent the "next war" by joining in collective defence. So soon as the world knows that the British people are ready to join in such collective action as will prevent aggression from being attempted, or, if attempted, from succeeding, the real difficulty in the present world crisis will be overcome. Let us make no mistake: *the defence of each is the responsibility of all*. We cannot have peace unless we accept this responsibility.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

IN THE SAAR THIS SUMMER

THE Saar Basin, since the National Socialist Revolution in Germany, has acquired an unexpected notoriety and an undreamed-of importance. Since the Treaty of Versailles this territory has been ruled by an international Commission of five members nominated by the League of Nations at Geneva; next January its inhabitants are to decide by plebiscite whether they wish to return to Germany, to become French, or to retain the *status quo*. Now the overwhelming majority of the Saarlanders is unmistakably German, and nobody expects more than a handful of votes for France. But to choose between Nazi Germany and the *status quo* under the League is to choose, as it were, between two opposed social principles, and from every point of view the verdict of the Saarlanders will compare significantly with the election in the Reich in March 1933, when the National Socialists, it will be remembered, failed to win their fifty-one per cent. The referenda of November 12th, 1933, and of August 19th, 1934, with their foregone conclusions, are relatively dull. It seems, perhaps, absurd to compare the verdict of less than a million Saarlanders with that of the whole Reich. The Saar, moreover, will be asked to pronounce upon two years' Hitlerism without having directly experienced it. Its inhabitants have, nevertheless, been very close to the National Socialist experiment, and theirs is the only German judgment which has any immediate opportunity of relatively free expression. Though the circumstances of the Reichstag Elections of March 1933, and of the Saar plebiscite of January 1935, appear to be totally different, the effect of moral intimidation, and conversely the freedom of the vote, will probably be roughly equivalent. It must not be supposed that every vote for Germany will be a vote for National Socialism, but every vote for the League may be safely interpreted as a vote against Hitler.

A Committee of Three, under Baron Aloisi, was appointed last January to prepare a plan for the organisation of the plebiscite in the Saar. An agreement, in which France and Germany concurred on June 2nd, was adopted by the Council of the League at Geneva on June 4th. The chief points of this agreement are that the plebiscite is to be held on the second Sunday of next January, that France and Germany abjure

all intimidation, etc., that the Governing Commission is authorised to increase the police force, and that a plebiscite commission of three shall establish a plebiscite tribunal, with eight subordinate courts, in the Saar. This tribunal is to sit until January 1936, and appeals of all kinds, arising directly or indirectly out of the plebiscite, can be brought before it. With this agreement the Saar was plunged into what may be regarded as a seven months' election campaign.

The two most obvious characteristics of the Saarlanders are that most of them are Catholic, and that an even larger majority consists of industrial workers. This is to say that before Hitler came to power the Nazi party in the Saar was weak; the industrialists, after all, had more sympathy with the *Volks-partei* or the Hugenberg Nationalists, while the Centre polled forty-eight per cent. in the Landesrat elections of November 1932, the Communists twenty-three per cent., and the Socialists thirteen per cent. When, however, the National-Socialist Revolution in the Reich had decimated the Left and dissolved the Centre, the Nazis in the Saar were able, in September 1933, to stampede the Saar Catholics into a "German Front." This organisation professed to be above party and to have no object but the restoration of the Saar to Germany: as, however, relations between Nazis and Catholics within the Reich worsened, the Saar Catholics became increasingly uneasy. In March 1934, therefore, presumably through the influence of Papen (then Reich Commissioner for the Saar) and Röchling, the great iron magnate of Völklingen, the *Deutsche Front* was reorganised on a less specifically Nazi basis; its incompetent and anti-clerical leader, Spaniol, was replaced by the insignificant Pirro.

The ambition of the *Deutsche Front* is an all but 100 per cent. poll for Germany next January; it claims to have incorporated ninety-three per cent. of the Saarlanders and professes certain knowledge that the remaining seven per cent. is nationalist at heart. It works with a number of advantages. In the first place the Saarlanders are obviously Germans by race and language and habits, they have naturally resented the presence of French troops until 1930, they have resented French officials in the League administration and in the mines, which were, according to the Peace Treaty, taken over from the Prussian, by the French, State. The League Commission which is not only international, but also

authoritarian, has aroused inevitable indignation. Thus, to many Saarlanders it is inconceivable that they, as Germans, should vote next January against Germany, whatever the government of the Reich may be. Many people say "The plebiscite involves a permanent choice; we may not be Nazis, but Hitler is not there for ever." The alternative is unattractive—the prospect of indefinitely remaining the subjects of a small, anomalous, buffer State between Germany and France.

The second advantage of the *Deutsche Front* may be described as the practice of Nazi technique, a judicious combination of unscrupulous propaganda with terrorisation. Bankrupt Germany places unlimited funds at the disposal of the Nazis of the Saar, so that large parties of Saarlanders can be taken upon expeditions into the Third Reich, where they are shown the more shining successes of Nazi rule, and are, at the same time, fêted as martyrs for Germany. While the German wireless declares that the Saar has been impoverished by its separation from the Reich and will be ruined if it does not return, it is impressed upon every individual that if he does not join the *Deutsche Front* he will risk losing his job—at the least—when German sovereignty is fully re-established. "Only desperadoes who have nothing to lose have failed to come into the *Deutsche Front*," one Nazi assured me. Outspoken opponents are occasionally beaten up, or at any rate assured of brutal treatment after the vote, and even if the June agreement can prevent such things taking place, many people are just as much intimidated by threats which may never materialise. This means that they dare not go to an anti-Nazi café or advertise in an anti-Nazi newspaper; there are Nazi spies everywhere, and threats by post and telephone are generously dispensed. Why, it may be asked, cannot the Governing Commission prevent these things? To this question one must hasten to reply that the Saar Government has stemmed the tide of terrorism with fine determination and impartial legislation. But it depends upon an executive which is more or less *gleichgeschaltet*. Mayors and policemen are *auf '35 eingestellt*, *petits-bourgeois* who dislike priests and Socialists, and have no intention of losing their jobs next year. Among the lawyers there is more variety; there are some who are admirably impartial, but a Nazi stands a better chance any day in the courts than a Communist. It

is greatly to the credit of the Governing Commission that, in all the storm and stress, every political party, from Nazis to Communists, is free to publish its newspapers and to hold closed meetings. It is amusing sometimes to see a Communist flag hanging out just round the corner from the Commission's headquarters at the Schlossplatz in Saarbrücken; no one could accuse Mr. Knox* of Leninistic leanings, but while party flags and badges are forbidden, the flag of any sovereign State may be flown, and Russia and Germany are equal before the League. When one drives about the Saar country-side—if country-side it can be called, where garden plots and wooded slopes mingle with iron foundries and smoking chimneys—one will find "Save Thälmann!" scribbled in large letters on the walls and an answering "Down with Thälmann!" a little further on. One day last June I had a fairly disturbing journey in a Saarbrücken tram, when a Nazi accused a young Communist labourer of being a follower of Dollfuss. The fury of the Communist was only equalled by the conductor's anxiety. An elderly working man came to the rescue; he contrived to soothe the exacerbated company with a sympathetic whisper of "Ni't so rot, ni't so rot" to the Communist boy.

"How dreadful!" cries the *Deutsche Front*, "that Germans should still have to hear Marxist names and still be compelled to see anti-Nazi newspapers for sale in the kiosks!" For where the Press is still technically free the *Deutsche Front* cannot have everything its own way. And despite its advantages, all is not well with the *Deutsche Front*. The removal of Spaniol last spring reassured a good many Catholics, but it brought out into the open a new and formidable opponent. The Catholic *Landeszeitung* had been incorporated in the *Deutsche Front* Press, but its editor, Johann Hoffmann, now led a group of anti-Nazi Catholics into open revolt against Pirro. Hoffmann proceeded to found a new paper, the *Neue Saar Post*, which first appeared at the beginning of May and rapidly increased its circulation; it is probably the best paper in the Saar to-day and it is now pledged to a "Vote for the *status quo*" policy. The position of the Catholics in the Saar is complicated by the fact that they live under the authority of the Bishops of Trier and Speyer, who are

* The English President of the Governing Commission.

hostages in the Reich for the good behaviour of Saarlanders.*

Nevertheless, many Catholics, including the priests in the Saar, refuse to keep silent. On June 17th, when Papen was delivering his Marburg speech, there was a gathering of Catholic apprentices in Homburg (in the Saar), to which apprentices from the Reich had come. A certain Pfarrer Bungarten made, perhaps, the most striking speech; he denounced the breakers of the Concordat, and the revilers of Faulhaber,† in the Reich; he welcomed "before all, our brothers from the Reich who have come here in spite of every chicanery and every obstacle." He called on his own young men to defy the familiar threat of the "concentration camp in 1935." "In the Saar to-day we are, thank God, still free!" he cried. "Some day we all want to go back to Germany, but to a Germany which leaves our holy mother, the Catholic Church, to work in peace."

Within a fortnight of the Homburg gathering the clean-up of June 30th had occurred, and among the Catholic victims for whose death no official excuse has even been so much as attempted were Dr. Klausener,‡ and the Youth Leader, Adalbert Probst. The cremation of Klausener added blasphemous insult to dastardly injury. The *Neue Saar Post* was unable, in the next few weeks, to publish sufficient copies to satisfy the demand; even the *Landeszeitung* showed signs of disapproval. Then the murder of Dollfuss filled the cup of Catholic indignation to its brim.

"These are the most abominable of all the separatists!" a passionate Nazi declared to me, angrily striking a table upon which the *Neue Saar Post* lay. But if Johann Hoffmann is the most alarming antagonist of the *Deutsche Front*, it has many other enemies to fight, and several puzzling economic arguments to demolish. The Saar is relatively prosperous; its government is innocent of indebtedness; unemployment, never very great, is diminishing, while relief is available without any insurance contribution having been demanded from the unemployed man. The real value of wages is

* For some time the Pope has had a special representative in the Saar, the Italian, Monsignor Testa, who was recently recalled; it is thought that Pius XI may now send a German-speaking, perhaps an Austrian, commissioner to the Saar as the direct envoy of the Vatican.

† Recently abused as a *Schwinehund*, etc., in East Elbia.

‡ Herr Hess has recently announced that Klausener committed suicide—see interview in *Le Petit Journal*.

undoubtedly higher in the Saar than in Germany, and there can be little doubt that the Saar worker is better off while his trade union organisation, which the return to Germany would destroy, survives. Saarbrücken can be distinguished from the towns of the Reich by the absence of "To let" notices in its windows. While Germany is patently courting financial catastrophe, Saarlanders since June have had difficulty in changing their marks into francs.* Though the Nazis make much of the war pensions which Germany could withhold, and though they are discovering new *ad hoc* iron mines in South Germany, it is notorious that the Saar would be seriously hit by an economic divorce from the ore of Lorraine† and by the loss of favours from France.‡ The fact must, of course, be faced, that however the plebiscite goes, the Saarlanders will be less well off in the future; if they vote *status quo* and remain in the French customs zone, they will obviously forfeit the German customs concessions they now enjoy.

It is Hitler's recent betrayal of the Left to the Right which is particularly damaging to National Socialism in the Saar, where the bulk of the voters are miners and metal-workers. "Will not June 30th have alienated many of your working-class supporters?" I asked a Saar Nazi, somewhere about mid-July. "Only those who have just come to us from the Communists," he said, with embarrassed haste. He was making a large admission, for the *Deutsche Front* claims to have won over all but a handful of the Communists who in 1932 constituted the largest but one of the parties in the Saar. The Socialist and Communist parties are not behind-hand in the exploitation of these circumstances. The Communists, for instance, have been distributing forged leaflets (in the name of the *Deutsche Front*), in which the Saarlanders are entreated not to believe the malicious rumours to the effect that Röchling's ironworks will be nationalised by the Nazis after the plebiscite, or that the 150,000 francs salary of Mayor Neikes of Saarbrücken may be reduced. Both Röchling and Neikes are good party comrades, the leaflet continues, and it is clear that nothing will be done to

* Since the German inflation, the Saar has officially used French francs, but most people keep marks in hand too.

† Röchling has already laid in large stores of iron against the closing of the Lorraine frontier.

‡ Saar coal is specially favoured in France while the Saar mines belong to the French State.

deprive them. Many Saar workers may enjoy this joke.

The organisation of the political groups on the Left has, up to the present, been bad. This can be partly explained by the fact that the men on the Left were, until 1933, largely concerned with the organisation of opposition to the French mines direction, and were therefore strongly in favour of Weimar Germany. The Communists, who are weakened by division into many small groups—two brands of Trotskists at one time competed with the orthodox Muscovites—were slow to be reconciled to the prospect of supporting the League. But Moscow and Geneva are drawing closer, so this hesitation has melted away. The Communists have now joined the Socialists in a *Freiheitsfront* to fight for the maintenance of the *status quo*; it is even whispered that Dimitroff has a finger in this pie. There are, of course, the most serious financial difficulties and unfortunate quarrels between some of the leaders. Max Braun, the courageous Socialist leader, is weakened by his close association with France upon which the separatist charge can be based.

The *Freiheitsfront* hopes much from Germany's difficulties in the coming months. It was therefore disappointed by the choice of so early a date as January 13th next year for the plebiscite day; the decision was regarded as a concession to the *Deutsche Front*, and therefore as a demonstration of weakness on the part of the League, which should rather have given more time for National Socialism to be exposed. It should be pointed out that Germany's acceptance of a Plebiscite Tribunal, whose authority shall endure for twelve months after the hypothetical reincorporation of the Saar in the Reich, was the biggest concession of all, even if it is later repudiated. Neither Nazis nor *status quo* people attach much importance to Baron Neurath's renunciations* of pressure and reprisals. Neither the League nor the *Freiheitsfront* indulges in threats, while everyone expects a certain amount of Nazi violence; it is inconceivable that the young S.A. men will attempt nothing against people they have been taught deserve to be torn to pieces, even if they must wait an extra year till the Plebiscite Tribunal be gone. And if political leaders can be safeguarded by publicity, the small man on a Nazi black list may be beaten up long before January 1936, without any Tribunal being the wiser.

* In the official answer to Aloisi on June 2nd. M. Barthou sent an identical letter.

On July 1st, together with the news of the German "clean up," the Plebiscite Commission of Three arrived in Saarbrücken to investigate a situation of acute, indeed of increasing, tension. A little *Freiheitsfront* turbulence was rapidly overshadowed by the revelation of Nazi technique. For the Governing Commission was able to unveil the treachery of Nazi police officials, and on at least two occasions in July loyal police officials narrowly escaped Nazi revolvers. Herr Röchling, who is the real mind behind the *Deutsche Front*, has an engaging way of explaining to foreign learners that National Socialism is built up upon a "basis of love," and his definition has been finely illustrated of late. A wireless talk, broadcast on July 7th from the official German stations at Frankfurt and Stuttgart* on behalf of the Saarlanders, announced defiantly that Germany on June 30th had not surpassed the murderous achievements in recent years of France, Belgium and Great Britain, the nations to whose citizens the unhappy Saarlanders have been mainly subjected since the peace. At the time of writing the attempt to incite the Saar miners to strike against the French Mines Direction has just been revealed. Is not Herr Röchling, who is said to have offered to finance this scheme, a little over-reaching himself?

Some people consider that the most important part of the Saar agreements at the beginning of June was that which empowered the Governing Commission, at its own discretion, to increase the police force; this is to be done locally "jusqu'à la mesure du possible," but when that has been passed, recruits are to be found abroad. Had Mr. Knox and his colleagues required any further justification for energetic recruiting, the *Deutsche Front* has gracefully provided it; an Englishman, Mr. Hemsley, has now been appointed Chief of Police and Gendarmerie in the Saar Basin.

Two questions remain to be considered, but they cannot be answered. How will the voting on January 13th finally go? Will the tension in the Saar plunge Europe into war?

To the first question the answer depends largely upon the events of the next few months; one can but suppose that the German Government will at least attempt an *ad hoc* truce with

* In the August number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* I appear to have stated that Herr Röchling himself broadcast this speech; this mis-statement was due to a misunderstanding through which the proof of this article had never been corrected. —E.W.

the Pope. And anyway, Saarlanders are notoriously furtive. The second question, which was very ably dealt with by Mr. Knickerbocker at Chatham House on May 15th, requires subdivision, but whether one considers the period before the plebiscite, or the period immediately following it, the danger is great. If, however, the Governing Commission, with an unreliable police force of some 1,200 men, has succeeded in keeping 15,000 or more Nazi troopers more or less in order until now, one may hope that an addition of some 2,000 policemen should be able to quell mounting passions until January.

However the voting goes, the prospect after January is dismal. An easy German win spells a vindication of Hitlerism, and much victimisation of a more or less violent nature. If the *status quo* wins, Germany far from accepting defeat, will contemplate more effective violence. The administration of the Saar will have to be reorganised upon a permanent basis—France will soon annex it, the Nazis of course say. The Peace Treaty lays down that the voting is to be by groups of communes, and that the League is to apportion the territory accordingly. This introduces the possibility of partition, the favourite solution of many of those who have been most concerned with the question of the Saar. But partition again is fraught with difficulty, and the Nazis will cry “not a kilometer, not a millimeter, of German soil!” Even if Germany wins she has got to buy back the mines, whose value the Nazis declare the French to have destroyed. It is extraordinarily unlikely in view of the plight of the Reichsbank, that she will make any attempt to hand over the sum decreed by the arbitrators. The French do not intend to give up the mines till the money is paid; that may mean French soldiers guarding the Saar mines. Indeed, something like a miracle will have been achieved when the Saar Basin no longer endangers the peace of Europe.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

WANTED: A MINISTRY OF FINE ARTS.

IN spite of the immense building activity which has been rampant in London during the last few years, and which shows little sign of diminishing, it will, I think, not be denied that this development has been proceeding on very irregular, not to say chaotic, lines. In some instances, it is true, attempts have been made, not altogether unsuccessfully, to cope with a problem which is, if not an insoluble one, at least one that presents great difficulties. Perhaps the most formidable of these is the immense size of the metropolis, which has long ceased to be a city and has become a county in itself. We are being reminded nowadays that all sorts of vast improvements are taking place in this respect in other European capitals, and what has recently been achieved in Rome is instanced as an example of what can be done where sufficient determination and energy are present. Of course the comparison, like most comparisons, of our activity, as well as for the matter of that of our ways of life, with those of other nations, has little bearing on the matter, and too slavish a desire to do as others do is a policy as sheeplike as it is futile. But there is beyond this a fundamental difference between our capital and, say, Rome; and it is to be found in the relative size of the two places, which results in the fact that what is done in the latter comparatively small city is patent to all and makes a fine and impressive showing; while if the same sort of work is carried out in London (and, indeed, it has been in the case of Aldwych and Kingsway) it appears to be but a relatively trifling, almost localised, undertaking when the immensity of our metropolis is considered.

The trouble with us has always been that in spite of the efforts and admonitions of earlier town-planners, we have only occasionally given ear to their suggestions and have, with a regularity that has become almost chronic, met their schemes with the cry that we have no money to spare for such things. When the classic opportunity occurred by which we could have made the then exiguous city a really fine one in 1666, Wren was met with the cry of indigence, although, as we know, money was being squandered prodigally enough on far less important things. When Gwynn, in 1766, drew up his less drastic but yet far-embracing plan for the widening of streets, and incidentally the development of the south bank

of the river, it was disregarded, although many of the improvements he advocated were carried out piecemeal by later town-planners who have not thought it necessary to give him the credit. When in 1837 Sydney Smirke published his *Suggestions* for the architectural improvement of the west part of London, suggestions much less far-reaching than those of his predecessors, he was met with the same cry; although I may remark that had his ideas been attended to as a whole, we should have had much of what has been done later, and done at far greater cost. I will give the authorities credit for one thing and that is that when they determined to make Oxford Street and Holborn one continuous thoroughfare, thus obliterating for all practical purposes the inconvenient Broad Street, they were, in 1847, carrying out one of Smirke's suggestions made some fourteen years earlier; a suggestion by the way which Gwynn had already adumbrated.

True we can point to some fine improvements, but in nearly all of them there is that lack of vision and foresight which has resulted in so much extra cost in money and convenience. For instance Bazalgette's great embankment was a splendid scheme splendidly carried out (it had, by the way, been anticipated by Colonel Trench, in 1825); but with the unfortunate result that Waterloo Bridge was still permitted merely to feed the narrow Strand, instead of having alternative sloping approaches to the new wide roadway by the river. Again the formation of Northumberland Avenue was a fine and much-needed improvement, but one which was made, quite unnecessarily as it was afterwards realised, at the cost, monetary and artistic, of demolishing what was the one example of a great Jacobean residence in London. Even when Aldwych and Kingsway were formed and the Strand was widened, so long a period elapsed between the suggestion for that very necessary and drastic clearance and its actual beginning, that immense sums had to be paid in compensation for structures which had in the meanwhile been erected, as well as for the housing elsewhere of those who were carrying on business or were living in them.

To turn to another aspect of the indifference shown to the artistic requirements of the city; how many fine structures have we not seen ruthlessly destroyed to make way for others which, architecturally excellent as some of them may be (many are frankly hideous, of course—but then we have been

passing through an era of ugliness in all branches of art—music, painting, sculpture and literature, as well as architecture; so we had to expect some of the things that disgrace London), have no associations; their disappearance has gradually helped to snap all links (except such as memory may afford) with the past. One would imagine, when we consider the wholesale demolition that has taken place in the past few years, that we had lost all sense of the beauty which we had inherited, and had determined to obliterate anything that might remind us of any activity but our own. We have done our worst (well, not perhaps quite our worst, for Carlton House Terrace still remains and that, as all the world knows, has been threatened) with the work of John Nash whose achievement was at least characteristic of a period by no means artistically the worst in our annals. We have apparently, too, had enough of Robert Adam, judging by the way his handiwork is being stultified and destroyed—as witness the encroachments on his Adelphi, and the desecration of Lansdowne House—which, by the way, we were assured would be kept inviolate. Fine houses all over London are being ruthlessly pulled down and if this were not bad enough, are being replaced by structures which in many cases cannot be said to be specially dignified except by size, and on that score they certainly are impressive. Indeed massiveness seems to be the one object aimed at in modern architecture, with the result that what are in themselves not necessarily offensive erections become so when set cheek by jowl with the remains of an earlier time with which they are in juxtaposition.

It may be asked what remedy can be suggested by which at least due reverence for such remains can be made to go hand in hand with the architectural efforts of a later period, and so assimilate them as to keep the former intact while not unduly influencing the tendencies of the latter, and thus to preserve the essential individuality of both without allowing either to be too predominant. There are various ways in which this could be done, although some of them might seem too drastic to be received with favour either by the partisans of the old, or the supporters of the new, style. But without slavishly copying the methods of other nations there would appear to be one solution which has been found to work as satisfactorily as any official organisation is capable of doing,

and by which many invaluable relics of the past have been preserved without unduly impinging on the freedom of action of those responsible for the erection of new buildings : This is the creation of a Ministry of Fine Arts. I do confess that one is loth even to suggest humbly an addition to bureaucracy in this country. Already it has reached proportions that are vaster than anyone could have conceived possible. But in this case the personnel of such an office would not require to be unduly large, although one is not prepared to say that its labours would be either light or limited.

How, let us remind ourselves for a moment, does such a system work in France? There, when the question of the demolition of an old building or even the sale of it is on the *tapis*, the Minister of Fine Arts is duly notified, and where it seems that without State intervention such a building, if regarded as of historic or personal interest, is in danger of destruction or spoliation, the Government steps in and secures it ; creates it a national monument, and so preserves it for all time ; as was done, to instance but these, in the case of the Hotel Biron Gontaut and the Hotel Massa in our time, and the Hotel Carnavalet and the Hotel Cluny, many years ago. Had we had such a Ministry as this in our country, one cannot for a moment suppose that Temple Bar would have been permitted to be carted away to an alien environment, or Crosby Hall to have been removed from its original site ; or, worst loss of all, that Northumberland House should have been destroyed, against the wishes of its owner and to the regret of all who realised what a priceless architectural feature it was.

But it is not only with regard to the safeguarding of such remains that a Ministry of Fine Arts would act the part of a censor and guardian. It would be able to keep a vigilant eye on the proposed demolition of old landmarks in general, and the country would thus at least be given the chance, even if it was not always able to make use of it, of preserving something which had else been removed before anyone in authority was aware that it was even threatened. Had such a power been in existence years ago, one cannot imagine its permitting the pulling down (to take a single instance) of the little house in St. Martin's Street, Leicester Square, in which Sir Isaac Newton, one not only of England's but of the world's greatest men, once lived and where in later days Fanny

Burney wrote a portion of *Cecilia*. A tablet marked that double association, but London only learnt that the place was doomed when the housebreakers were already at work. Even then the building might have been erected elsewhere, but we are less imaginative than other nations, and it was left to America to purchase the materials and set them up in the New World. One wonders if our authorities remembered what Lord Macaulay once wrote concerning that shrine : that it " would continue to be well known as long as our island retains any trace of civilisation " !

What would seem to be necessary is not only such a Government Department as I here indicate, but a by-law by which it would be obligatory on the part of an owner of any property dating, if a limit of time be necessary, from, say, before the beginning of the nineteenth century, to report to that Ministry his intention of selling or otherwise dealing with such a possession. One need hardly say that no attempt would be made on the sanctity of private property, but at least opportunity would be given for discussion as to the advisability, or otherwise, of some action being taken towards acquiring and preserving some relic associated with a famous man or event, or an architectural achievement of special interest. It would be obviously impossible to safeguard everything of this kind ; but London has become gradually so denuded of such things, that there would be little fear of too many claiming the Minister of Fine Arts' attention. It may be objected that we have already something of the kind here indicated in the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Buildings, and no one is better aware than I of the splendid work done by that body and its energetic secretary ; but that Society is not a Government office, and its exertions are naturally limited by the fact that its funds depend on private subscription, and its conclusions are naturally less capable of realisation than had they an official *imprimatur*.

But it is not only in the preservation of historic or otherwise interesting structures that a Ministry of Fine Arts would find work to its hand. One of its chief functions would be the conserving of the amenities of the city generally against the almost bloodthirsty activities of the creator of new buildings. Perhaps one of the worst consequences of the destruction of what has come down to us from former times is the erection of such as may carry our present architectural taste down to later

generations. We have a number of eminent architects working among us, and we can show outstanding examples of work which is in itself excellent. But between fine architectural achievement and adequate town-planning there is a great gulf. What is chiefly wanted in the rehabilitation of London as now being carried out with such feverish energy, is a sense of proportion, a realisation that what is being set up shall be in certain senses in accord with what already exists and is likely to remain so long as bricks and mortar cohere. Let me take some concrete cases in illustration of what I mean. The great building of the Port of London Authority in Trinity Square is a fine example of impressive design, perhaps a little on the wrong side of aggressiveness, to some tastes rather too dominant in its upper portion, but still a notable piece of work. Now the vast size of that structure would, if situated in a narrow street, have been overwhelming; but it happens to have ample open spaces around it and, therefore, can afford to be Brobdingnagian. But when we find a kind of West-end *rifacimento* of it, the new Masonic Temple, erected in so relatively narrow a thoroughfare as Great Queen Street, even if or when that street is to be brought into alignment with Long Acre, a sense of incongruity and disproportion affects us, and we lose our admiration for an effective piece of work, in realising that it is in the wrong place. To some extent the same may be said of the Head Offices of the Underground Railway in Broadway, Westminster. In its special style, whether it be to our taste or not, it cannot be denied that the building has many merits. But its position is such that it overwhelms us by its bulk. It strikes me personally as one of those admirable things which one fails somehow to admire. Perhaps the juxtaposition of Queen Anne's Mansions, than which nothing more appallingly ugly has ever (and it is saying much) been permitted to desecrate London, has something to do with giving the District Railway buildings a relatively distinguished air; but in any case it is its lack of cohesion with its surroundings and its want of adequate surrounding space that makes it appear incongruous.

It is concerning such matters that a Ministry of Fine Arts would have to deal, either by suggestion, warning, or if need were, command. Nowadays it would appear that anyone can throw up towards the long-suffering heavens anything that may be regarded as a means of money-making or a medium of

ostentatious advertisement. Everything is on a scale of vastness except our streets; and concerning vistas we are so indifferent that there is hardly a great building in London which is approached by one. If you look up at St. Paul's, you find its façade cut in half by Fleet Street; the Abbey is hidden by St. Margaret's, and the War Office overshadowed by Whitehall Court. One attempt has been made to create a long and wide thoroughfare in Kingsway, but Bush House can hardly be said to be worthy of such an impressive approach. No one seems to know where the Law Courts begin or end, and the Royal Exchange is encountered so suddenly and amid so amazing a congeries of vast surrounding structures that its earlier dignity has been lost; while the centre of the City's vast authority, the Guildhall, is tucked away in a yard and approached by a third-rate thoroughfare.

It is surely time for London to awake to the importance of preserving at least something of its past. As it is we are becoming so inured to constant change and so familiar with the destruction of everything that makes for picturesqueness and is capable of reminding us that if we have a great future before us we have a great past behind, that we are apt to envisage with indifference what is happening to our old possessions. Every nation, however progressive, gains something by the memories it has amassed through the centuries, and if we allow ourselves to become oblivious of such things we shall sink back to the state of those who have no history, and therefore no traditions. Architecture is the outward and visible sign of these things. It may appear to contemporaries *démodé*; it may often seem to be negligible; but at least each successive phase of it marks the various eras of our civic existence. When, too, it is associated with the memories of notable men and women, and has become, as it were, part and parcel of our annals, it takes on an additional interest and value, and should thus doubly appeal to our sentiment and our reverence. Just now we are passing through a phase when the present is exploited to the detriment of the past, and it is doubtless true that each era should be given its proper prominence in our outlook. But wholly to do this without regard to the forces that have made us a great nation, is to set an example to future ages so to disregard our existing scheme of life; and if we light-heartedly destroy the work of our ancestors we may obviously expect our descendants to do the

same with what we are to-day laboriously creating and no doubt supposing will be *ære perennius*.

It is with a view to obviating so sad and desolating a consummation that we should take steps to preserve, where possible, such things as are, in the opinion of those best fitted to judge, worthy of retention; and at the same time should create what future ages will also regard as things precious in themselves and made more so by being linked with the careers of those who have made and are making our own era notable. That is why, as it seems to me, we ought to set up some form of official machinery by which this desired end can be compassed and made effective, our legacies from the past preserved, and our contemporary achievement supervised with discretion and the reverence with which all great work, whether of the past or present, deserves to be treated.

E. BERESFORD CHANCELLOR.

A COMPARTMENT WORLD.

ONE of the peculiarities of life in the last century has been the gradual disintegration of an earlier unity and the development, in its place, of a sectional and compartment view of human existence. In almost every sphere of life, whether it be in the ordinary occupations of men, professions or trades, or in philosophy, art and science, the same tendency towards disintegration is apparent, and seems, on the face of it, to be proceeding with a fatalistic rapidity. The individual man, or group of men, occupied with his own little branch of life, more and more specialised as time goes on, finds himself cut off from his fellows and connected with them only in matters of the shallowest kind. Completely anchored, or more correctly submerged, in his own little corner of things he is unable and even unqualified to judge of anything else than what he does himself, and, in consequence, quite unable, even if he desired, to realise in what direction he is moving. Like his own little way of life other ways have come into being and are there, while the question of their origin, much less of their aim, remains an insoluble mystery. They exist and they seem to develop—that is all. Moreover, as the process goes on, men become more and more deadened as to its effect, and are more ready, not only to hear every possible point of view, but to go on exactly as before after having heard them. Humanity becomes staid through sheer passivity, the passivity, it is to be feared, of a lifeless personality.

What has been lost in this ever-increasing multiplicity is the old sense of unity or order, one that was once not only exceeding broad, but also exceeding deep, the unconscious inheritance of an ancient civilisation. Before the modern era began, some two centuries ago, a certain feeling of this kind did exist in the European world and manifested itself strongly enough to be still perceived in the literary and other creative activities of the age. It derives ultimately from religious sources, refined, however, by the operation of reason, and was creative, as one would expect of a life directed to a common end. It was the weakening of this feeling, for reasons which will shortly be made plain, which led the way to the modern disintegration and the "compartment" life of to-day.

Religious feeling, in its simplest form, is a certain "awareness" of a final unity, a sense of the existence behind the

world of a source which is adequate to it. By the word "awareness" we mean simply that the thing is there but defies analysis and that it is something prior to human reason while by no means hostile to it. By the word "adequate" we mean that this source is not merely a scientific force which explains the mechanical operation of the world, but also something equivalent to the highest needs of man, a source adequate, that is, to Shakespeare as well as to Einstein. It is not a blind mechanical force, nor a mathematical formula only, but something which is human in some part of its being, however small that part may be in the whole. This "awareness," felt before it is known, has two important manifestations in the history of man, each of which has its meaning for the present day. The first is natural religion, its manifestation in the realm of Nature, a phenomenon which is seen in the rhythm of biological and sexual life; the second is the rational idea of unity as seen in the speculations of philosophers, the union of the two creating the true and oldest religion, and, in its experience, the highest form of life. The second, it is true, derives from the first, but as it has its own separate history from the age of the Greeks down to our own times we shall treat of it as a separate subject before dealing with the former.

The philosophy of the Greeks, like that of the medieval Christians, was governed completely by the idea of metaphysical unity, and in the whole course of its development, from Plato down to Plotinus, and even beyond, it never lost sight of this source. While they were quite aware of the reality of Nature, and of its physical processes, the Greeks were so intimately obsessed with the idea of final causes that they were never able to break loose from them and to develop, what we know to our cost, the modern obsession with immediate ends. As an example of what is meant by this we can point to the fact that the Greeks, in the infancy of science, discovered the principle of the steam engine, without in the least being moved to make use of it for practical ends, simply because the practical end, in the mind of the Greeks, was a secondary consideration. The immediate end, the end which science aims at, was subservient in the Greek view to a final end, and in consequence, down to its last days, speculation continued in the ancient world to bar the way to science. This explains why modern industry, the product of

a point of view directed towards an immediate end, could not arise until the human mind had radically changed its orientation, and why in the coming years, if humanity does not realise the danger in time, civilisation will succumb to the machine.

It is hardly necessary to add that the revival of religious "awareness" in the first centuries of the Empire, whether in the Christian, gnostic or Manichean form, could only reinforce the Greek metaphysical point of view and contribute, if anything, to divert it even more from practical ends. The philosophy of the Christian religion itself, as developed by Augustine at one end, and by Aquinas at the other end, of the medieval period, was a magnificent attempt to rationalise the mystical "awareness" and to erect on a metaphysical foundation a structure which should satisfy the human mind. The attempt was a failure, as such attempts must always be, but it succeeded in the sense that while it lasted it satisfied the deepest feelings of man, both in a mystical and a rational sense. The Christian God, who represents almost equally these two needs of the human spirit, was brought down from heaven and nailed to a cross, thus manifesting, by the rhythm of birth and death, the truth of the tragic view of life. Now as it happens it is precisely this sense of rhythm in Nature itself, closely linked up with the Incarnation, that has been lost in recent times, and reveals, by its very absence, the malady from which we suffer. It was an outlook on life which embodied the deepest feelings of which men are capable, and its artistic creations, such as the Greek tragic drama, the *Comedy* of Dante and the tragedy of Shakespeare and Racine, seem to mirror the mystery of human life itself. The intense dualism of human experience, the strange connection between catharsis and human disaster, even the old belief in original sin, implying a fault in human nature, find their most elevated expression in the Western tragic outlook, the feeling for which, characteristically enough, is nearly dead in the world to-day.

But while we admit the intimate connection between tragic drama and the Crucifixion on the one hand, and the fertilisation myths and natural rhythms on the other, the conclusion should not be drawn that the latter are in any adequate sense the explanation of the former. The source of tragic feeling, for which, after all, Nature is purely the instrument, is the human mind itself, when, and only when, that

mind is able to apprehend the source which is known as God. Only then does Nature become rhythmical and the intense dualism of life make itself felt. One end of the tragic structure admittedly lies in natural phenomena, as sure as man is born with a body of flesh and blood, and it is true also that such conceptions as the "scapegoat" described by Sir James Frazer suggest plainly enough how that structure arose. The vegetation myths of Attis and Adonis, of Demeter and Persephone, and works of art such as the *Comedy* of Dante and the *Alcestis* of Euripides in which the earth-maiden (Beatrice, Alcestis) rises from hell to heaven, belong to the same order, and it is even possible, in some of them, to draw a very close analogy with the Crucifixion. But what creates the rhythms, what makes a meaningless succession to be felt as something with a terrible meaning, is not Nature, which has no meaning by itself, but solely the "awareness" of unity in man, the belief in God which is the unique gift of the human being. Not the rhythms create tragedy, but tragedy the rhythms,* and behind the tragic structure lies the depth of human feeling which sees God through Nature and realises what intense loss the world itself represents. Nowhere in the world—and we must remember that there is no part of the world where Nature myths have not evolved—save in Europe has this point of view been developed, and it stands as the one great contribution, the supreme contribution, of that region to the civilisation of this world.

This awareness of God, or rational sense of unity, remained unweakened in Europe from the age of the Greeks down to the beginning of the modern period, down to the crisis, that is, which is known as the Western Renaissance. It is not that the older obsession with unity was without defect, since a whole side of human nature, the very side which is interested in immediate ends in their proper sphere, was starved in the Middle Ages, but it remains true that the advantages in other directions were of an importance which can hardly be appreciated to-day. The Western world, both in a material and a spiritual sense, felt itself as one community, whether in religion, art or even nationality, and reacted along lines which were common to all its inhabitants. Moreover, and this is still more important, the feeling of unity supplied precisely that depth of intensity on which the tragic catharsis depends,

* The naturalists would, of course, deny this.

the atmosphere, to put it plainly, which alone gives human life its significance.

The reaction in favour of the disunity under which the World now lies came from a variety of causes, the origin of which was a shift in the mental outlook of human beings.* The Italian philosophers of the Cinquecento, the English practical philosophy of Francis Bacon, the rational philosophy of the French Cartesians and the movements of the Reformation have at least this much in common—that they moved the centre of interest from a unity too rigidly conceived to ends which were of a local and immediate kind. The whole movement, indeed, may be summed up as a polemic against unity in favour of multiplicity, as a shift from God as universal to God as particular, and the result, as history now relates, was of an extremely far-reaching nature. The famous polemic of Bacon against Aristotle, his exhortation to philosophers (or rather to scientists) to concentrate on experimental rather than speculative research, on the inductive rather than the deductive method, together with the new inspiration derived from the physical theories of Democritus and the atomists, was the signal for a new order of things, or more correctly for the disorder which is prevalent in the modern world. It led in religion to the Reformation sects, in literature to the romantic movement, in labour to the industrial revolution, in society to democracy and nationalism, all of which, in spite of many redeeming features, are so many forms of disintegration. Most disastrous of all, it led to the decay of the tragic sense and to the debilitation of human feeling which is such a prominent symptom at the present day, the feeling manifested in the popular novel and the cinema. Slowly but surely the world drifts towards insensitiveness, towards a mental oblivion which, obscured behind a frenzied activity, represents a spiritual death in the compartment minds of men.

The problem of the rights and wrongs of the Reformation movements in general, including in particular the genuine abuses of the Roman hierarchy, do not concern us here and we shall concern ourselves strictly with our own aspect of the case. What distinguishes the sects, both in the age of the Reformation and since, from the Roman Catholic Church, is on the one hand a stronger sense of individuality, leading, for a time at least, to a deeper sense of religion, on the other a

* The Marxists would argue that environment caused the "shift."

weakening of the sense of unity which had hitherto prevailed. How far individualism can really exist for any length of time apart from a real sense of unity is itself a very debatable point, however, and the latter history of the sects, clearly enough, shows how difficult it is. Without in the least pretending to defend the Roman Church, nor to underestimate the work that the Reformation did for human freedom, it remains true to say that the decay of the old unity was bound to engender a weakening of religious feeling and to lead, slowly but surely, to the present condition of the world. On the other hand, it is also true that certain of the new creations, as for example the Church of England, were moderately successful in finding a *via media*, and it is even quite conceivable, if events had taken a slightly different course, that unity on some sort of national basis might have been preserved. Unfortunately a deeper and more fundamental cause than nationalism, the weakening of the old tragic sense, has undermined the foundations of religion and has been transformed in most Western countries into a doctrine of progress which will receive a more detailed treatment later.

The literary development of the last three centuries may be summed up as a narrowing down of the mental range of vision, on the one hand into the Cartesian mathematical "*raison*," on the other into the romantic anti-rational cult of "feeling." One of the great defects of the movement of thought in post-Renaissance days, among many advantages, of course, was the over-emphasis of mathematical logic and the belief, widespread at one time, that it was the final solution to the mystery of human life. Revolting against this assumption the French and German romantic writers, desirous of returning to a wider and freer outlook, rejected it entirely and turned to the realm of feeling for solution to the same mystery. Instead, however, of reconstructing some kind of intuitive philosophy in which feeling and reason both enter, the outcome was that they constructed a theory that the world of art was "irrational," a fairyland of dream aspiration divorced from the rules of mathematics. Hence arose the theory of the "essentially poetic," the reflection in language of the romantic point of view and the rise of a school of "art for art's sake," which turned its back on reality. The fact that a number of men of genius, including such names as Goethe, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, of an exceptionally gifted kind

were still able to create the old unity out of their own resources is significant in its suggestion of unspoilt human energy, but hardly typical, unfortunately, of the condition of the human race. What none of these could do—although Goethe came very near it—was to create a tragedy of the supreme kind, the existence of which demands not only genius but also an audience capable of appreciation. Such an audience, unfortunately, no longer exists in a humanity out of which the spirit has largely been crushed and the creation of it can only come from a dynamic and therefore religious source.

The most important outcome of the break-away, however strange it may seem to those who are not accustomed to think in philosophical terms, was the rise of the modern industrial system, the transference, that is, of *Cartesian rationalism* on to the *applied plane of human activity*. The phenomenon of capitalism in modern times, partly an outcome of unrestrained individualism, partly of a modern kind of asceticism, shows clearly enough what is likely to happen when human activity, once directed towards a common end, is cut off from the centre which religion formerly provided. The habit of spending the money that the individual earned, a habit common to all ages but encouraged in the Middle Ages by the condemnation of usury, was obviously a habit that blocked the way to the amassing of capital in the modern sense, and it is not surprising, in consequence, that a system which depended on saving as a principle, should have arisen first in Protestant countries. The belief in hard work and in the predestined prosperity of those who performed it—a characteristic of the Calvinistic view of life—combined with a reluctance to spend the fruits of work on the frivolities of this life—furnished the money necessary for modern industry and brought into being a new and original kind of "saint," the influence of whom is still apparent in the world to-day. When, however, the original religious aspiration began to weaken, as it tends to do when divorced from unity, the pursuit of wealth in the service of God transformed itself into the pursuit of wealth for its own sake, and created the welter known as modern industry, modified, it is true, by humanitarian teaching and the socialistic tendencies of the nineteenth century.

Before entering on a brief analysis of the philosophy of modernism, it should be observed that the division of human interests into compartments: science and industry on the

one hand, art and literature on the other, indicate clearly enough in what way the modern world has mistranslated the unity of earlier times. Socially the disintegration to which we have referred led to a greater equality between the classes which is in itself most desirable, and in particular to the political outlook which is known to-day as democracy. Unfortunately, as modern nationalism seems to indicate, democracy has come to mean the ever-growing tendency of small groups to assert their individuality at the expense of larger groups, and the result has been further disintegration of a most detailed kind. There is, of course, a good deal to be said for nationalism and a good deal to be said for the cult of local cultures, provided only that *pari passu* with eternal subdivision some kind of feeling for the whole could be preserved, the kind of thing which, however unsuccessfully, the League of Nations represents. We have to note merely that disintegration will go on and will continue to create new nations and new tariff barriers, until the individual at last wakes up and re-creates, if he can, the unity which has gone from his mind. But to what extent it has gone from his mind, and even from the minds of philosophers, a brief remark on post-Renaissance metaphysical speculation will perhaps help to make clear.

The philosophical aspect of modern industrialism is too large a subject to be dealt with here, and would if attempted consist of little more than a list of schools of philosophy. As the reader is probably aware, however, it was characteristic of ancient philosophers, with the significant exception of the atomic system of Democritus, to accept the idea of unity almost as an axiom and to maintain stubbornly the primacy of the One over the Many. It was, moreover, a consequence of this attitude that none of the older philosophers, at least down to the age of Spinoza, ever laid claim to any foundation save that of the international human reason, and remained blandly indifferent, in most cases, to the national or racial origin which they happened to call their own. The pride which modern nations have often taken in their own private philosophies, not because they were sound, but because they were their very own, is in itself a mark of disintegration and, it is hard not to feel, one of an inferior quality. The Gallic logic, exemplified so admirably in Descartes, the English practical sense which appears in Locke and Hume, the German

idealism of Fichte and Hegel, have certain advantages, it is true, but also disadvantages, and it is precisely the national aspect which is the source of their shortcomings. It is, after all, not without meaning that Cartesianism should have led to romanticism, that German idealism should have led to Russian realism, and even that English empiricism should have been followed, by a curious reaction, by the form of continental idealism imported by Bradley. The true value of a rational point of view is, of course, the contribution it can make to human philosophy as a whole, not when added, unit by unit, to other national philosophies, but when impregnated, almost unconsciously, with the international spirit. It is probably by virtue of this internationalism that certain philosophies, despite their many defects in certain branches of knowledge, owe their lasting fame, the fame, for example, of a Spinoza or an Aquinas or of a Plato.

But the real obstruction in the way of unity lies in the theory of progress, the importance of which is, perhaps, not fully realised in the world to-day. Partly as a result of the Cartesian belief in human perfectibility (the conception of a human being as an equation awaiting solution), partly as a result of scientific discoveries, the theory of a continuous amelioration in human conditions has come to be accepted, in some spheres, as a form of religious belief. The Christian idea of original sin, which has now almost ceased to convey any meaning to the majority of people, implied that there was a streak of evil inherent in human nature and that the passions and instincts of man, in the absence of divine grace, were bound to lead, under whatever conditions, to a life of conflict. Observe that the theory in no way denies scientific discovery nor the increase in knowledge, but simply an unchanging element in human nature, a defect that only the help of God, applied to individuals, and not to the race, can avail to remedy. In opposition to this, although not always aware of the opposition, the theory of progress imagines not a fallen man, but a man rising from the ape, complete in himself and capable, as time goes on, of a fundamentally better life, until finally, on this terrestrial globe, a fraternity of mankind comes into being.

The attraction of this point of view is great, and it has exercised and will continue to exercise enormous influence on the human mind. Yet it is so far from the real truth about life, and so insidious in sugaring over the real facts, that it is

necessary by all possible means to undermine it before it is too late, before, that is, it destroys what is left of Western civilisation. What it really implies, as the reader will no doubt have realised already, is a transference of the old absolute or mystical foundation on to a temporal future in a way that reveals, convincingly, to what extent unity has lost its former meaning. The adequate ground of which we have spoken has to be adequate, not only for the future, but also for the past and present, and to suppose that a centre of unity, itself placed in the time series, can supply this function in any real sense is simply a misconception of human needs in their deepest meaning. It is the mark of tragedy, as it is the mark of the Crucifixion, and indeed of all great art, that it promises *nothing, absolutely nothing*, offering only itself and expecting, from the onlooker, the affirmation which can alone bring salvation. The fact that a few modern poets realise the affirmation demanded by the Christ, who came "like a tiger"* rather than like a philanthropist, does not mean that the mass of men realise it, and the reason why they lack such realisation is the obsession, unconscious but real, with the belief in progress. Belief in progress, by concentrating hopes on the future to the oblivion of the present, has cut off man from his own sources and by depriving him of a foothold in eternity has left him stranded, the slave of hopes which will never be realised, sterilised and disappointed in a world gorged with material wealth.

Yet there is hope for the human race despite the pessimism of the view represented above, and the hope, as always, lies in the human individual. There is still a minority of people in the world who have an inkling of the truth, and it may be, as events gradually disillusion the majority, that their number will increase. The modern world, as M. Benda has been proclaiming in France for some years past, is obsessed with practical aims and is to-day perishing from the atrophy which empiricism creates. The only belief that can give catharsis to the human mind and a real peace, is the belief in eternal values, in the same permanent and unchanging unity which the Greeks first established in the West. A return to the old values will not cripple action, but rather deepen it; it will make it less egotistic and more efficient, and this efficiency, almost forgotten to-day, is the world's only salvation.

F. McEACHRAN.

* "In the juvenescence of the year came Christ the tiger" (Gerontion).

THE SANCTUARIES OF OLD LONDON.

SANCTUARY, like Mercy and Redemption, was always numbered among the blessed words, and in days when justice was rough, verdicts were arbitrary, and shrift was short, it was doubly blessed. For in medieval London anyone could be hanged for stealing a shilling, although not for a lesser sum. Thus in 1327 John de Reynham, who had stolen a surcoat and hood in Ironmonger Lane worth tenpence, was imprisoned from March 25th until Good Friday and then dismissed with a flogging, while in May of the same year Laurence de Felstead was hanged for stealing six shillings'-worth of woad at Stonewharf. Such rough justice was mitigated by the right possessed by every felon to fly for refuge to the protecting arms of the Church. Every parish church in London was sanctuary, and their churchyards, too, as far as the churchyard gate, and within these bounds the fugitive could remain unmolested for forty days. To this gate, as soon as the felon's whereabouts were known, came the coroner and sheriffs to interrogate him and give him his choice either to surrender to justice, or, declaring himself to be "a felon of the lord the king," to abjure the realm. If within forty days he failed to do either, his surrender was expedited by the stoppage of his food supply.

On agreeing to abjure the realm the felon was sometimes allowed to choose his own port of embarkation, and at other times a port was assigned him by the coroner. Thus in 1322 a certain Richard atte Crouche, who had taken refuge in the church of St. Mary at Hill, was assigned the port of Dover, to be reached in four days, staying the first night at Dartford, the second at Rochester, the third at Ospring, and the fourth at Dover; while in 1324 John de Wheteley, who had murdered John the Bellringer at Dowgate and fled to the church of All-hallows the Great, chose for himself the port of Bristol, and was given five days to reach it, by way of Wycombe, Oxford, Highworth and Malmesbury. The journey was made on foot, and the scantiness of the felon's attire left little room for comfort by the way, for as the law of the early fourteenth century has it: "He that abjureth the realm shall keep his jacket, shirt, and breeches, and whatever else he has shall be confiscate." He was, however, allowed to take a small sum of money for his expenses, in a purse suspended from his neck,

and he carried in his hand a cross, to show that he was under the protection of the Church.

When a felon fled to sanctuary it was the duty of a select body of the inhabitants to watch the church day and night to prevent his escape, a duty insisted on by the secular authorities, but condemned by the Church, which in 1257 threatened with excommunication any who obstructed the fugitive's food supply. Stow shows us how the watching was performed in 1414, when a certain esquire and nine of his men fled to the church of St. Anne, Aldersgate, after murdering the Archdeacon of Huntingdon. The inhabitants boarded up every possible point of egress from the church and picketed it day and night from July 22nd, when the crime was committed, until August 21st, when all ten forswore the land, and were led through the city towards Calais in their shirts and breeches, each carrying a cross in his hand and having a purse about his neck.

This matter of watching the church was always obnoxious to the citizens, perhaps by reason of potential quarrels with the Church, and in 1298 the Court of Aldermen passed a resolution that it should cease. This led to a long dispute between the Corporation and the King's justices sitting at the Tower in 1321, ending in a royal pardon granted to the City for past negligences in this respect on condition that in future they set a watch in conformity with the law and custom of the realm. Accordingly, in November of the same year, when a man fled to the church of Austin Friars (now the Dutch Church), after committing a murder in Abchurch Lane, the men of the wards of Bishopsgate, Broad Street, and Coleman Street, were summoned to keep watch. How well they performed their task may be gathered from the fact that the fugitive escaped early in the morning without anyone observing it.

Sanctuary was less a right of the persecuted than a privilege of the Church, and the Church, if it thought fit, could withdraw it as easily as it could confer it. As might be expected, such a refusal of sanctuary was exercised when the crime affected a member of the Church's own body. This is illustrated in 1321, when, as recorded in the French Chronicle of London: "a woman, Isabele de Bury by name, slew the clerk of the Church of Allhallows near London Wall; and kept herself within the same church for five days, until the Bishop of London sent his letters to the effect that the Church

would not save her; whereupon she was carried out of the church to Newgate, and the third day after was hanged." In the same way, in 1480, five thieves who robbed the church of St. Martin le Grand, the most notorious of London's sanctuaries, were put to death, three of them hanged on Tower Hill and the other two pressed to death.

The worst thunders of Holy Church were, however, directed against those who broke sanctuary by attempting to drag fugitives from the altar, and it must be said that in all such contests the aggressors always got the worst of it. In 1266 all London was temporarily placed under an interdict by a great assembly of priests carrying their crosses, when William Fitz Richard, the King's Warden of the City, forcibly removed a thief from the church of St. Sepulchre, and in 1334 the Archbishop of Canterbury summoned the Mayor, Reginald de Conduit, to appear before him at St. Paul's, where he sentenced him to perform penance for a similar "transgression against the peace of God and liberties of the Church" at Allhallows, Lombard Street. In the records of the fourteenth century most of the City churches, including St. Paul's Cathedral, are found extending hospitality to thieves and homicides, and in nearly every case it is reported that the felon afterwards escaped by night, none so escaping ever being recaptured. Several fugitives are recorded to have abjured the realm, and in only two instances did they surrender to the King's peace to stand their trial, in both cases where a good defence appeared possible.

Side by side with the sanctuary of the parish churches went another kind of sanctuary, never heard of until about the fourteenth century, which was not limited to a forty days' sojourn and appertained to the larger religious establishments, the hospitals, monasteries, and priestly colleges, and it was this unlimited sanctuary that afterwards became such a scandal in London and led to an enormous increase in crime, with banditry in the streets, retaliatory riots, and civil commotions. This extended privilege was supposed to be conferred only by special grant from the King, confirmed by Papal bull, but in effect it was possessed by all the religious houses in London, which thereby became colonies of permanent "sanctuary men." What angered the citizens most of all was the immunity enjoyed in these places by "foreign" craftsmen, who could set up in business free from all

obligations of citizenship and craft regulations, underselling the legitimate tradesmen and often swindling the public with inferior products.

Why it was that places whose original purpose was the merciful one of protecting the persecuted and providing a haven for the hunted should develop into asylums for petty tradesmen and artificers to set up shop in defiance of the governing authorities in London may be a subject for speculation. One can understand in a measure how they frequently became the haunts of robbers, who would rush out and despoil the citizens, returning hurriedly to sanctuary when pursued; for after all these were the very people the Church set out to protect, with a view to their reclamation; and lax administration by the dean and canons would account for the rest. One could also, perhaps, understand the development of illicit trading had it started after the Reformation, when the monastic establishments and priestly colleges were deprived of their old governors, often lying more or less derelict while they were dealt out piecemeal to various royal favourites; but when it is realised that such practices are found even in the fifteenth century the question becomes more difficult. The chief difficulty is that of the provision of private houses and shops within a religious enclosure, and this apparently must be attributed to the financial position of the monks themselves. In the provinces monasteries were frequently overlords of huge surrounding estates, which often included villages and townships yielding great revenues, but in London their bounds were strictly circumscribed, although, enclosed as they were on all sides by the great city, their ground became valuable out of all proportion to its size. They early found the advantage of selling "corrodies"—board and lodging for life in return for a lump sum—and it was but a step from this to the building of private houses for well-to-do tenants, who came the more readily that they could thereby avoid obligations entailed by living in the City proper.

It seems also that their ecclesiastical hosts were not slow to exact the limit of payment from those who came to live with them of necessity. William Ebesham, writing to Sir John Paston in 1469, remarks: "And God knowith I ly in saint wayer at grete costs, and amonge unresonable askers." Ebesham was in for debts he was unable to pay, but many others succeeded in passing a pleasant existence after

defrauding their creditors, by selling all their property and taking the proceeds with them into sanctuary. In 1379 a law was passed that in such cases the bankrupt should be summoned to the church door once a week for five weeks, and if he failed to surrender judgment should go against him, and his goods were seized for the benefit of his creditors, any collusive deed of gift notwithstanding.

In the fifteenth century St. Martin le Grand more than any other sanctuary provoked the ire of the citizens. It was the worst of them all and so near their doors that it became a constant danger and irritation, and principally to the craftsmen, who suffered from the competition of the denizens. So far as the fraudulent work of these strangers was concerned it is on record that once, in 1447, the dean of St. Martin's was so impressed by the representations of the Goldsmiths' Company that he allowed their officers to go round the precinct smashing up false work, but took care to accompany them in person to make sure they did nothing to impair his rights of sanctuary. Such consideration for the interests of legitimate business was not repeated, for later in the century a statute of Edward IV against fraudulent goldsmiths' work specially exempted St. Martin's from its operation, and thereafter imitation jewellery acquired the name of "St. Martin's beads."

At intervals throughout the century the dean had many a bout with the City, and even with the King, and each time he came off victorious. As early as 1405 the citizens petitioned Henry IV against St. Martin's, praying that its privileges might be annulled, but unavailing. The first overt act against the sanctuary appears to have been in 1430, during the mayoralty of Sir William Eastfield, and when Thomas Bouchier, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal, was dean. This was the attempted seizure by the sheriffs, in obedience to a writ of the King, of certain runaway canons from the Augustinian monastery of Waltham. The dean complained to the King, who appointed special commissioners to consider the matter, and here arises a difference of opinion, for whereas the City records declare that the affair was decided in their favour and the canons were restored to their abbot, the records of St. Martin's imply that they were restored to sanctuary.

The next bout in this perennial quarrel occurred ten years later, at a time when the citizens were making a general attack

on the privileges that had grown up around St. Martin's, Blanchappton, Whitefriars, St. Bartholomew's, and St. Katherine's. On September 4th, 1440, when Philip Malpas and Robert Large were sheriffs, a soldier, in Newgate for debt, was being conducted from there to Guildhall for the trial of the matter, when as the escort passed the great gate in Newgate Street five confederates issued out of Panyer Alley, snatched him from the sheriffs' officers and hurried him into the sanctuary. The sheriffs came and demanded his surrender, and this being refused by the commissary of the dean they forced their way in, seized all six, and conveyed them to Newgate. The canons wrote to the dean, who was at Cambridge, dwelling upon the ill usage of the prisoners, which was likely to cause them "to be ded in all hast." The dean complained to the King, who sent Lord Huntingdon with letters demanding the restoration of the prisoners, but the citizens reminded that nobleman that he himself had an action against the soldier for a debt of £100, and could sue the sheriffs for that sum for permitting the prisoners to escape. Eventually both sides argued their case before the Star Chamber and the City was compelled to restore all the prisoners to sanctuary.

In 1450, when one Cayme, a confederate of Jack Cade, took refuge at St. Martin's, even the King himself had to give way to the dean when he displayed his bulls, charters and muniments, as well under "Iede as wax." Again, in 1452, when William Oldhall, chamberlain to the Duke of York, fled to the sanctuary, there came Matthew Philip, alderman of Aldersgate, with the Earls of Salisbury, Wiltshire, and Worcester, with other lords and their servants, and "all at once, and in a multitude, armed with grievous force, not having the fear of God before their eyes, unseasonably entered the said Sanctuary between the eleventh and twelfth hour of the night, when forcing open and breaking all the doors and chests of our, the Dean's, house, in search of the said William Oldhall, and descending into the nave of the church by a certain tower, they drew forth William Oldhall by force, and brought him on horseback to the royal palace at Westminster." Once more, when the King was appealed to, the prisoners had to be restored, and the dean did not fail to put the whole affair on record, that it might remain a precedent for future times.

However, the constant abuse of sanctuary at St. Martin's led to articles being drawn up by the King's Council in 1457 for its better government. A register was to be kept of all those seeking sanctuary, with the reasons for their so doing, and they were to deliver up their arms, offensive and defensive, and find sureties for their good behaviour. Forgers, "sotile pikers of lokkes," and other immoral characters were not to be allowed in, and gambling within the sanctuary was to be prohibited. As for those issuing from sanctuary to commit felonies and then returning, the best the City could obtain was that they should be imprisoned by the dean as long as they remained, but could leave when they wished so long as it were by daylight.

St. Martin le Grand and Blanchappton were the two chief storm-centres of the riot known as Evil May Day, a riot of apprentices in 1517 directed against the foreigners who at that time crowded the City, and in the shelter of the sanctuaries carried on trade in a way that almost deprived the natives of their livelihood. When the rising was suppressed thirteen men were condemned to death, but after one had been executed orders came from the King that the rest should be respited and all concerned should appear before him in Westminster Hall in their shirts, with halters about their necks. This surely must have been the queerest scene ever enacted in the old hall, for the culprits, who had now been joined by others who had at first escaped in the confusion and now resolved to participate in the expected pardon, numbered 400 men and 11 women, all on their knees, bound together with ropes, wearing nothing but their shirts, with the halters about their necks, crying "Mercy, gracious lord, mercy!" When the pardon was finally pronounced the whole company, with one great shout, arose from their knees and threw their halters up to the roof.

Another record shows us how murderers could become sanctuary men and remain there apparently for the rest of their lives, or, we must presume, until they obtained the royal pardon. This concerns the monastery of Westminster, whose sanctuary rights had been insisted on as early as King Edgar's charter of 969. Machyn describes a procession of the abbot and convent on December 6th, 1556, in front walking the regular sanctuary men with the cross keys of St. Peter embroidered on their garments, and behind followed three

murderers, George Darcy, son of Lord Darcy, who had killed Lewis West, son of Sir William West, as he returned from Rotherham Fair; another who had murdered a man in Long Acre; and the third a Westminster schoolboy, son of a hosier living near London Stone, who, throwing stones in Westminster Hall, had smitten beneath the ear another boy who sold papers and printed books there. The diarist adds that George Darcy, clothed in a sheet, was whipped as he went.

When the Reformation came the citizens joyfully anticipated that at last these places, that for so long had been a thorn in their side, would now fall into their hands, but for this happy consummation they had to wait more than a century. Blackfriars, Greyfriars, Crutched Friars, and Austin Friars were surrendered to the King on November 12th, 1538, and St. Helen's thirteen days later, and it is said that immediately afterwards, when the Mayor sued to him for the custody of the first-named, he replied that he was as well able to keep the liberties as the friars were. By Act of Parliament of 1540 all dissolved religious houses were vested in the Crown, and it was because they yielded the King a revenue from fines, escheats, deodands, and the goods of felons that the City had such difficulty in obtaining control. The inhabitants, even the better class, were as much concerned in maintaining the privileges, for they were thereby exempted from keeping watch and ward, paying rates to the City, furnishing their quota to the militia, or serving on juries and inquests, or as common councilman, alderman, sheriff, or mayor.

It is only necessary to mention the names of the sanctuaries at this period to show what a great area of the City remained outside the jurisdiction of the Corporation. Among them were Whitefriars, Blackfriars, St. Martin le Grand, Holy Trinity at Aldgate, the Minories, where had stood the nunnery of St. Clare, Bridewell, Ely Place, St. Mary of Graces, where is now the Royal Mint, St. Katherine's, on the site of St. Katherine's Dock, St. Bartholomew the Great, Bethlem Hospital, and such unlikely places as Mitre Court, Ram Alley, and Salisbury Court in Fleet Street. It is surprising to find Bethlem among them, and yet it was one of the worst. After its suppression by Henry VIII it was handed over to the City, and the condition to which it was allowed to descend suggests that the Corporation, in their efforts to capture the others, were

actuated less by a love for law and order than a wish to extend their own powers. This seems to be confirmed by the curious fact that three important religious sites against which no complaint is ever heard after the Reformation were all taken over by the great City companies, St. Thomas of Acons in Cheapside by the Mercers, St. Helen's nunnery in Bishopsgate Street by the Leathersellers, and Austin Friars in Broad Street by the Drapers.

At length, in the sixth year of James I, the City obtained a royal charter giving them the custody of Blackfriars, Whitefriars, Holy Trinity, and Coldharbour, but still leaving St. Martin le Grand beyond their power. Already by 1593 the latter precinct contained 196 persons—men, women, and children—not free of the City, and was ruled by a constable and headborough in place of its ancient dean. But by this time the word sanctuary had become a misnomer, for the right of felons to escape the penalty of their crime by this means was formally abolished by Parliament in 1624, and all that remained outstanding was a matter of the domestic government of the City.

The dispute as to this still went on until by Act of Parliament in 1697 the privileges of several more places were abolished, including the Savoy, Salisbury Court and the neighbouring courts in Fleet Street, together with others in Holborn and Gray's Inn Lane. But after all it was St. Martin le Grand that had the last word, notwithstanding it had long been a public street with five popular taverns in it. For ages it was the "King's Free Chapel," until Henry VII bestowed it on the monastery of Westminster, and it was still subject to the government of the dean of Westminster up to the eighteenth century, with magistrates separate from the City. This is shown by an entry in the churchwardens' accounts of St. Anne, Aldersgate, in 1703. Again, in 1726, when summoning those who had failed to pay the poor rate, those living in the freedom part were brought before the Lord Mayor and those in the liberty part before a Westminster justice. This state of things actually continued until 1815, when the Act of Parliament was passed for building the General Post Office, which thereafter occupied the greater part of the site, and St. Martin's became part of Aldersgate Ward.

CHARLES PENDRILL.

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION IN CHINA.

A BETTER WAY THAN COMMUNISM?

ONE significant phase of the rural life of China in these days of storm and stress was brought vividly to the notice of readers of *The Times* by the articles of Peter Fleming on Communism in China, on November 13th and 14th last. The present ferment is far from being confined to the areas in which a communist régime has been established. The events of the last few years have combined with the basic importance of the rural economy in Chinese civilisation to focus attention upon the sufferings of the farmer and the necessity of according him a prominent place in programmes of national unification and social betterment. Numerous efforts at reconstruction are going forward in different parts of the country. They are as varied as the bodies interested in them, and these include the Central and several Provincial Governments, the Kuomintang or National People's Party, famine and flood relief agencies, educators and social reformers, research groups and bankers, Young China and the Christian movement.

General Chiang Kai-Shek has not unnaturally been seeking for a policy that will win the hearty allegiance of the villagers in territory won back by the Government from communists, and every effort is being made to secure that this policy shall be well founded on the experience of other countries adapted to Chinese conditions. Not only have all in China who have any special knowledge been consulted, but the Government has sought the assistance of foreign experts. Professor Love, of Cornell University, U.S.A., is engaged in directing agricultural research, especially in plant improvement, and Dr. Dragoni, who has been associated both with the International Institute of Agriculture and with the International Labour Office, in March of last year prepared a comprehensive report on agricultural policy and the means of administering it, after some months' study of the situation.

Moreover, the Government has benefited from the experience of flood and other famine relief agencies, which have increasingly tended to switch over from simple relief to preventive and reconstructive measures. The outstanding examples are the China International Famine Relief Commission,

formed ten years ago, and the National Flood Relief Commission, in connection with which Sir John Hope-Simpson did such splendid work. The latter body not only carried out an extensive policy of farm rehabilitation on a loan, but has provided for the permanent use of the funds so employed in several of the Yangtse provinces for the extension of the excellent system of co-operative credit for farmers initiated by the China International Famine Relief Commission in the North.

These larger rational efforts have necessarily been preceded by much local investigation and experimentation. The fruits of early scientific study of Chinese rural economy by universities and special research institutes have been made available and admirably interpreted for English readers by another Briton, Professor R. H. Tawney, in his illuminating book, *Land and Labour in China*. A growing realism in seeking a scientific understanding of Chinese institutions and in applying scientific technique to the problem of their improvement is happily becoming increasingly discernible.

This greater realism finds one of its chief manifestations in a willingness to build patiently from existing foundations: taking the people as they are and utilising while adapting the institutions which still shape their individual lives. Two examples must suffice. One of the foremost pioneers of this movement is Dr. James Yen. Born of a family noted for generations for its scholars, and educated for several years abroad, Dr. Yen first became intimate with farmers in the Chinese labour battalions in France during the war. Writing their letters home or teaching them to write themselves, he became convinced of the importance of removing the tremendous handicap of illiteracy, and on returning to China dedicated his life to this task. Having first worked out his method and applied it with encouraging success in some large cities, Dr. Yen turned his attention to the villagers. For the last eight years he has, with the assistance of a group of colleagues, devoted himself to the means of creating a literate peasantry and secondly to studying the uses to which his new tool should be put when it has been placed in their hands. In other words his venture has led him right into the heart of the problem of creating a progressive countryside, of bringing into the village new ideas in agriculture, in co-operative enterprise, in village industry, in health—personal

and public—in education and in citizenship, and a higher cultural life.

While Government activities have been largely concentrated in Kiangsi and Chekiang, Dr. Yen has been at work in Hopei, at a point south of Peiping (Peking). In the neighbouring province of Shantung an equally instructive undertaking is being led by a man of contrasted experience, and approaching the problem from a different angle. Mr. Liang Shu-Ming is himself a Chinese scholar, deeply steeped in Confucian learning and Buddhist lore, but remarkably receptive to modern ideas. Mr. Liang began with the purpose of modernising and enlarging the scope of local administration. Co-operating with the provincial authorities he chose from each county two picked men, to whom he gave a special training, after which they returned to their respective localities to exercise leadership on lines that Mr. Liang had mapped out and to advise with the local people in their problems, keeping in touch all the time with Mr. Liang himself.

What is significant and promising about the present phase of such activities as these is, first, the way in which their experiences tend to unite them in a common conception of rural needs, and secondly the fact that they are developing to a point which makes possible a national rural policy. An illustration of the latter fact is the calling of one of Dr. Yen's lieutenants to assist the authorities in the distant province of Kueichow to carry out a similar rural policy there. Dr. Yen at first carefully avoided political matters, but the success of his efforts has led to an arrangement by which he has been given administrative control of the county in which his work is being carried on. He was occupied last summer in building up a reliable personnel, free from corrupt practices, as the first step in a series of progressive reforms. In this way he hopes with an administration willing to implement his education policies to create a model county. The idea of the model county is one that is being taken up in other quarters also. Though himself a Christian, perhaps because he is one, Dr. Yen felt it advisable to avoid everything religious in his work. But the necessity in a peasant community of seeking a spiritual basis for village life, giving unity to its various activities, has become increasingly clear. In this he has come into line with Mr. Liang, who has from the first been conscious of this need and been led by it to a broad educational programme.

On its educational side—and a movement of this kind is essentially an educative process and a process of education—it is becoming clear that it means two things. In the first place, it means a cultural education giving a new outlook on life adequate to the new order it is hoped to build, blending all that is most valuable in Chinese culture with the best that the West has to offer. Perhaps the most illuminating example of what is needed is the method by which Grundtvig created a new rural culture in Denmark, which united the ancient Danish traditions with the liberal ideas and liberal Christianity of his time. The Chinese problem is the more difficult. In the second place it means the creation of a progressive economic life in harmony with the new culture and embodying its values. The technique that commends itself almost universally in China for this purpose is that of co-operation. A beginning has been made with the agricultural aspects of co-operation; especially rural credit on the lines first developed by Raiffeisen in Germany and since applied in India and Japan. In Hopei there are already unions of such simple societies, each of which is usually confined to a single village. The educative effect of these unions has prepared the way for advance into more difficult fields. This was demonstrated a year ago in one region when such a union undertook the collective marketing of some of its members' cotton. It succeeded in putting it on the city market in better condition than usual and in securing a better return for the farmers. It is in connection with such co-operative enterprises that leading Chinese bankers see a new opportunity for economic development in the interior, on a basis which offers a prospect of success with a smaller degree of political stabilisation than is required for other alternative forms of economic organisation.

There is a hope in some quarters that the co-operative organisations familiar in modern peasant agriculture may be adapted to the development of decentralised village industries. There are many grounds for this opinion, which cannot be given here; but, what is more important, at least one promising experiment has already been made in the North, where such industry is most needed because of the hard winters and the uncertain rainfall.

The Christian movement in China is obviously deeply affected by the far-reaching possibilities of rural change thus

briefly indicated. In some fields, indeed, it is making important contributions of its own. Its colleges of agriculture, its medical services, and the departments of sociology and economics in its universities have an honourable record. The National Christian Council, with a Rural Committee to assist the village churches in bearing their part, is making tentative efforts to modify its rural schools to fit them more closely to the real needs of the villagers, since they were founded as preparatory schools in a system intended to train doctors, teachers and preachers. This is a difficult task which can only be accomplished slowly. Perhaps the greatest contribution the Church can make will be to envisage the way in which the various forces being set in motion can meet in the new and enlarged type of rural community, which will be one of the richest results. It is not extravagant to believe that it may be in such local cells in the national organism that the real fusion of the old and the new in Chinese civilisation is destined to take place.

JOHN BERNARD TAYLER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE NAVAL CONFERENCE

ANOTHER conference is to take place next year about naval armaments. The governments of the world that are to be mainly interested in it—those of the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France and Italy—have for several months in advance been preparing for it, partly by an exchange of preliminary views. That exchange began early in June as a result of an invitation sent by the British Government to Washington, Tokyo, Paris and Rome at the end of May, asking those capitals if they would be willing to enter at once into preliminary bilateral consultations through the diplomatic channels on questions of procedure and certain technical matters.

Since the 1922, 1927 and 1930 conferences the problem has in some ways been transformed, yet its essence remains the same. It is primarily a question of the relations between the United States, the British Empire and Japan. The United States is a purely Western Power. Japan is a purely Eastern Power. The British Empire is both Western and Eastern. Canadian interests dictate sympathy with the United States. Australian interests dictate sympathy with Japan. But whereas in 1922 the issues were largely coloured by the fact of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—to which Canada had always been opposed and which Australia had always supported—the field is now clear of formal commitments. Moreover, the policy of Japan in the past three years has somewhat altered the basis of British policy. In 1922 the British delegation was concerned for fair play for Japan, and believed that by satisfying Japan the United States and the British Empire could best protect the principle of the open door in China. The basis of that belief was that if the United States, the British Empire and Japan were the willing signatories of a treaty, the two first Powers would be able to exercise some control over Japanese policy in the Far East.

As the result, however, of European confusion, made worse by Nazi German influence, and of America's absorption in her domestic economic adventures, the Japanese politicians have in late years shown impatience of both American and British restraint. On April 18th of this year, for example, the spokes-

man of the Japanese Foreign Office made a statement to the Press unconditionally claiming a position of special responsibility in the Far East, with particular reference to China, despite the seven other non-Chinese signatories of the Washington Treaty of 1922. There is ground also for the belief that at next year's Naval Conference she will claim parity in naval strength with Great Britain and the United States. A Japanese newspaper has even protested against the Singapore base on the ground of its being a menace to Japan. On April 25th last, Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, invited Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, to say whether Japan still respected the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. The answer, as one could have foretold, was a formal affirmative; but though the principle of equal rights was thus formally upheld, there is little doubt that Japan contemplates a revised programme, both about China and about naval strength.

Sir John Simon, for his part, has made it clear by recent statements in the House of Commons that British policy is bent upon giving full legitimate satisfaction to Japanese ambitions in the Far East; but he has made it equally clear that the Japanese claim to a position of special responsibility in China wholly conflicts with British policy, and will be resisted. If any claim were to be made out for a special position in China, the British Government itself might have a case, for the bulk of the capital and engineering work that have gone into China originated in Great Britain. But Great Britain has no intention of making any such claim, just as she has no intention of admitting any such claim on the part of Japan.

The position of the British Empire as an Eastern and a Western Power was never more difficult than it is now. But the complicated nature of the British problem is not confined to that particular circumstance. It happens that Great Britain is also a European Power. While the United States and Japan are able to ignore European problems (and experience proves that they do ignore them), British policy is bound to consider American, Japanese and European interests alike.

The object of the conference will be to reach an agreement about the relative sizes of the various navies. It is obviously better that the governments should fight for supremacy by the method of diplomatic conference than by that of war,

especially as there are now operative certain inducements, such as the drastically lowered standard of life in all the countries concerned except perhaps Japan, for stabilising the relative strengths on a low level. Nor is it a matter for regret that few people in their hearts expect that the delegates will merely coo like doves. The general disillusion about the processes and effects of high diplomacy is so complete that disappointment is no longer a likely consequence of failure.

The history of post-war naval armaments and that of the conferences they have given rise to is as curious, if not so obviously futile, as that of every other aspect of post-war diplomacy. In this matter the Treaty of Versailles plays little part. The naval clauses of that treaty were directed exclusively to the destruction of the German fleet (Articles 181-97). The only other bearing that treaty had upon the question of naval armaments emerged from Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which said that "the members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations": an unbusinesslike observation, for it begs the question in the first part and postulates something unlikely to be achieved in the second. There is probably only one more innocent article in that famous treaty, namely Article 274, which says: "Germany undertakes to adopt all the necessary legislative and administrative measures to protect goods, the produce or manufacture of any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, from all forms of unfair competition in commercial transactions." There are few books in the world so full of light reading as the text of the Treaty of Versailles.

The origin of post-war diplomacy on naval armaments derived directly from an historic change in American diplomatic practice. Throughout the history of the United States it had been a fixed principle never to conclude a treaty with more than one other signatory. The refusal of the Senate to ratify President Wilson's signature of the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent negotiation by President Harding of a bilateral treaty with Germany, conformed with that tradition. The Washington Conference of 1921-2 broke it. On December 10th, 1921, the United States agreed to a treaty with Great Britain, Japan and France, of which the object

was to guarantee to each signatory its existing island possessions in the Pacific Ocean, and to preserve the peace in that sphere. That was also the beginning of the modern epoch of naval diplomacy among the Powers. The said treaty was No. 3 of the seven treaties collectively adopted at the Washington Conference on February 6th, 1922. The first of the seven was a Five-Power Naval Treaty (the five Powers being the British Empire, the United States, France, Italy and Japan), which provided for the limitation of naval armaments, and of the British, American and Japanese fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. The second treaty, signed by the same five Powers, regulated the use of submarines and poisonous gases in war. The sixth was the Nine-Power Treaty (the nine being the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium and China in addition to the five above-mentioned), whose purpose was to stabilise conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and the principle of the "open door" (that is, equality of opportunity for the eight Powers in their intercourse with China). In addition to those seven treaties there were twelve Resolutions, mainly concerned with the Far East and with China's internal organisation.

It is necessary, if next year's problems are to be appreciated, to recall in its broad outline the history of 1922, 1927 and 1930. The Washington Treaty, signed on February 6th, 1922, was designed to remain in force till December 31st, 1936; but a provision was inserted that in view of possible technical or scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other contracting parties, should arrange after eight years for a conference of all those parties to consider what changes, if any, might be necessary to meet those developments.

The provisions of the treaty itself were mainly concerned with capital ships. Capital ships were defined as warships, other than aircraft carriers, whose displacement exceeded 10,000 tons, and whose gun calibre exceeded 8 inches; aircraft carriers being defined as warships with a displacement of less than 10,000 tons, designed for the specific and only purpose of carrying aircraft. The treaty provision was that the United States and the British Empire should have a total displacement in capital ships of 525,000 tons, and Japan 315,000 tons (a ratio of 5:5:3). France and Italy were allotted a displacement tonnage of 175,000 each, France

having held out for 350,000 and having finally given way only on condition that she be allotted 90,000 tons for submarines and 330,000 tons for cruisers and auxiliary ships. That French condition was responsible for the main defect in the treaty. Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the British Empire, proposed the complete abolition of submarines. Mr. Hughes, on behalf of the United States, proposed a submarine tonnage of 60,000 for the United States and the British Empire, 31,500 for France and Japan, and 21,000 for Italy. As France refused to accept a less tonnage than 90,000 for her submarines, Mr. Balfour announced that the British Empire could not in that case agree to any limitation of anti-submarine craft. The result was that the treaty had to be drafted without incorporating any limitation for submarines or auxiliary ships.

Such was the chief result of the Washington Conference. The next step was taken at the beginning of 1927, when President Coolidge addressed a Note to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to suggest that the problem of disarmament on the sea be considered separately from that of disarmament on land (for the League of Nations had already started its preliminary work for the Disarmament Conference which began on February 2nd, 1932), and that the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives at Geneva should discuss with an American delegation the possibility of extending the Washington 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships to apply to all auxiliary vessels not provided for in the 1922 treaty.

A conference duly met at Geneva on June 20th, 1927. It ended on August 4th without agreement. Indeed it never looked as if it could even begin to agree. The chief Power on whom agreement about the auxiliary ships depended was France. France refused to attend the conference. Within a few days of receiving President Coolidge's suggestion the French Government (February 15th, 1927) had sent its answer setting out the reasons which made it unable to accept it. The French Note began by welcoming the complete identity of ideals and purpose between the American and French Governments, and immediately went on to say that France could not share America's present purpose because such a conference as the one suggested would compromise the chances of success at the general disarmament conference then being prepared by the League of Nations. The Note added four detailed arguments in that sense, thus: 1. The authority of

the League of Nations would be weakened if the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference were deprived of an important part of its programme, and a special conference, limited to a few Powers, were set up. 2. A special agreement between the five great naval Powers might be appropriate for capital ships; but all the navies of the world were concerned with lighter craft. 3. Disarmament should be treated as a whole and not in detail, and naval disarmament could be brought about only by each Power being allotted a definite tonnage to distribute as it pleased among battleships and light units. The American proposal ignored those two guiding principles of French policy. 4. It was unlikely that a new conference would be any more successful than the Rome Conference of 1924 in inducing the Powers not represented at the Washington Conference to adopt the principles there agreed upon. The French Government therefore suggested that the American proposal should be submitted to the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, at Geneva.

The Italian Government, on February 21st, gave an equally decisive refusal to Mr. Coolidge, but for less precise reasons. In its turn the Italian Government expressed its sympathy with the idea of international co-operation, and went on to reject the present suggestion for international co-operation. The Note stated that Italy herself could not be accused of excessive naval construction. It argued that the various branches of armaments were interdependent, that if any agreement on disarmament were to be effective it must be universal, that Italy had peculiar geographical circumstances which made it impossible for her to restrict her freedom in the matter of naval defence (item, she depended for supplies on lines of communication through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles; item, she had a vast coast line to defend as well as her lines of communication with her possessions in the Mediterranean), and that therefore Italy must decide her policy in the light of what other nations were contemplating, and so must refuse President Coolidge's suggestion.

The conference therefore met without the participation of France or Italy. It was not a League of Nations Conference, though it was held in Geneva. The participants were the United States, Japan and the British Empire (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish

Free State). For six weeks those three parties unfolded a continuous tale of disagreement, except only that they did agree on a joint final statement setting out the precise grounds of their disagreement.

The statement is important as showing the formidable gaps which at that time divided even the three naval Powers who alone had consented to attempt an agreement. It read thus: "The American delegates presented the view that within total tonnage limitation, which they initially suggested should be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and the British Empire, and between 150,000 and 180,000 tons for Japan, each of the Powers should have liberty to build the number and the type of vessels which they might consider best suited to their respective naval needs, with freedom, subject to the limitation of the Washington Treaty, to arm these vessels as they saw fit. The British delegates, whilst putting proposals tending to a limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, have opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone on the ground that the largest ship and the heaviest gun permissible must inevitably become the standard. They desired, first, a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton 8-inch-gun cruisers; and, secondly, the establishment of a secondary type of cruiser of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons carrying guns of a maximum calibre of six inches. The British delegates contended that the establishment of this type would alone enable the British Empire, within a moderate figure of total tonnage, to attain the numbers which it regards as indispensable to meet its special circumstances and its special needs. The Japanese delegates presented the view that low total tonnage levels should be fixed which would effect a real limitation of auxiliary naval vessels. As for the question of the 8-inch-gun cruiser, while the Japanese Government could not agree to any restriction as a matter of principle, they had no difficulty in declaring that, provided a tonnage level of 315,000 tons for auxiliary surface vessels were fixed for Japan, they would not build any further 8-inch-gun cruisers until 1936, except those already authorised in existing programmes. Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made and the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates

for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restriction as to armament already set by the Washington Treaty."

One incident of that conference may be recalled to illustrate the sort of controversy that is piled upon controversy in diplomacy by conference. Mr. Hugh Gibson, the United States Ambassador at Brussels, who presided over the conference, made the debating point in a speech he delivered at the end of the conference that at the Washington Conference the British Government had expressed satisfaction with the figure of 450,000 tons as the maximum tonnage for auxiliary surface craft, but now demanded more than twice as much, namely an additional 647,000 tons. Within two days (August 6th) Lord Balfour issued a correction in fact to Mr. Gibson. He said that at Washington, on behalf of the British Government, he had accepted "450,000 tons as a reasonable and equitable amount for the auxiliary ships of the Fleet, but I made no references at all to the numberless purposes for which other auxiliary ships would be required for such an Empire as our own." The full text of what Lord (then Mr.) Balfour said at the Washington Conference shows that he did clearly circumscribe his remarks by the qualification that he was speaking of auxiliary ships as an integral element in the battle fleet. The American Press reports all omitted that qualification, and Mr. Gibson had taken his present text from the Press reports.

The third post-war attempt to agree upon a comprehensive scheme for the limitation of naval armaments was begun in London on January 21st, 1930, when the King's voice for the first time was broadcast round the globe. He opened the conference in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. Hopes ran almost as high as they ran three and a half years later, when the World Monetary and Economic Conference was opened, also by the King, in the new Geological Museum in South Kensington. In the first, as in the second, case the hopes were destined to be disappointed, although Mr. MacDonald had taken the precaution during the previous summer (1929) of entering into a preliminary personal consultation with Mr. Hoover.

The main purpose of the conference, after what had happened in 1922 and 1927, was necessarily confined to limiting

the size of the smaller craft (8-inch-gun cruisers, 6-inch-gun cruisers, destroyers and submarines). France and Italy together—but it was France who was primarily responsible—had made such an achievement impossible in 1922 and again in 1927. Those two countries together now again made it impossible. The conference ended, after a three months' duration, on April 10th. It had failed. A treaty was indeed agreed and signed, but it was a ramshackle formality lacking substance. The French and Italian Governments refused to sign the important part of it which stipulated the limitation of naval strength.

The document (British Cmd. 3556. 1930) was something of a diplomatic curiosity. It began with a preamble written in the names of five Powers, namely the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy, containing these words: "Desiring to prevent the dangers and reduce the burdens inherent in competitive armaments, and desiring to carry forward the work begun by the Washington Naval Conference and to facilitate the progressive realisation of general limitation and reduction of armaments, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for the limitation and reduction of naval armament. . . ." The relevant part of the treaty that followed, the part namely that provided for "the limitation and reduction of naval armament" was signed, not by those five Powers, but only by the United States, Great Britain and Japan.

There were five parts to the treaty. Parts I and II recorded an agreement on technical matters and on a "holiday" in battleship construction. Part IV gave a list of rules for "humanising" a submarine (one of the grim conceptions of high diplomacy). And Part III was the substantive part, prescribing the agreed limitation of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. France and Italy, who had failed to agree with each other because France refused to concede the Italian claim to parity and Italy refused to drop it, settled the matter by standing wholly aloof from Part III of the treaty, which thereby took on the character of a Three-Power Treaty inserted in the middle of a Five-Power Treaty and containing the only substance discoverable in the treaty. It was like a currant bun, from which the bun was missing. Part III was given a special preamble of its own to the effect that the United States, Great Britain and Japan "have agreed as between themselves . . ." etc. By that agreement the total

aggregate tonnage in the four classes of ships above mentioned was fixed at 541,700 tons for the British Empire, 526,000 for the United States and 367,050 for Japan.

Next year's conference will be the fourth post-war attempt to agree upon the comprehensive limitation of naval armaments. In the first three conferences the three chief naval Powers did reach an agreement "as between themselves": but the two minor naval Powers robbed that agreement of its full value by refusing to take their own essential part in it. Next year the voice of France and Italy will again be decisive. If it is again found to be impossible to overcome the French addiction to submarines and the Franco-Italian issue over parity, then again the conference must fail.

Moreover, this time an agreement between the three major naval Powers themselves will be more difficult than it was in 1922, 1927 or 1930. The probable Japanese claim for parity with the United States and the British Empire has been well advertised. The likely thing is that the conference will fail, as most diplomatic conferences fail. The cheerful thing is that its failure will cause little surprise, and therefore little disappointment.

It is at any rate clear that the seeds of controversy are well and duly sown in advance of next year. In theory it is to be a conference for the limitation of naval armaments. There is probably not one thinking, experienced man in the world who believes that the conference will be even pacific in its effect. The men who think, indeed, are no longer even interested in the possibility that diplomatic politics may ever achieve their theoretic purpose of saving mankind from war. In their hearts they know that diplomatic politics are the continuing machinery of war. What does interest them is the philosophic or metaphysical fact—it has to be accepted as a fact—that nearly every manifestation of intellectual activity, including politics, is destructive in its effect.

The purest manifestation of intellectual activity is what is called, for lack of a more precise or descriptive word, "science": the mental process whereby man (as distinct from every other form of animal being) explores the physical properties of the world, recognises their physical principles, and then exploits those principles for the use of mankind. It is not wholly physical. Man can speak. Pure science cannot fathom the original faculty which makes man able to

express his thoughts in words, though it can control the superstructure of a formulated language. The original faculty of human speech must be accepted as a mystery. Without that faculty the scientists could never even have begun to work. But they have that faculty, and they do work. With what result? They have discovered the mechanical principles which enable a bird to fly through the air. They imitate and parody a bird by inventing an aeroplane, which promptly becomes an instrument of war. The natural process of a bird's flight is adapted by man for the purpose of man's destruction. The scientist similarly imitates the process of a fish swimming under the sea by inventing a submarine, whose object—in this case the only object—is the destruction of human life and other human inventions, such as ships, which bear upon human life. With or without the inspiration of a duck sailing over the surface of the water, he invents a ship for human uses, which are not, apparently cannot be, divorced from the destructive purposes of war. He even copies a caterpillar to invent a method of propelling the instruments of war over uneven ground. He discovers that sound travels by means of air waves. He invents a method of transmitting sound, intact, through an unlimited range of air, so that human thought and human noise can be the more quickly and the more widely broadcast among human beings. Is there a man who has been brought within the range of wireless sets who yet thinks that the science of wireless broadcasting is a blessing to mankind? It increases the monstrous babel of human life, and still further restricts the already restricted chance of quiet on earth. It also has its destructive uses and is used for the purposes of war.

The speculation that interests the thinking man is to what degree, on the balance of effects, any single achievement of scientific enterprise does harm rather than good to human life or creates more human misery than happiness? Medical science, by discovering and exploiting the mechanics of lungs, heart, nerves and the like, although ignoring the mystery of life itself, does indeed (of this the proof is overwhelming) sometimes rescue a human life from death, even though no such rescue can be final and death in the end must win. But, on the balance of the two, what man, who has thought profoundly over the matter, will unhesitatingly claim that medical science does more good than harm to human life?

Even in the restricted field of pain, is it so certain that a surgeon relieves more pain than he causes? If there be one activity of science which more unequivocally than another depends for its very justification upon the saving or the comforting of human life in its physical operations, that activity is medical science. Yet medical science also is enrolled for the purposes of war, for the destruction, not the saving, of life. The "bug-merchant," who in his cleverness plans the bacterial processes to overcome disease, lends himself also to the opposite cause of planning them for the propagation of disease in war time, for war purposes.

The scientific aspect of modern politics is an increasingly relevant aspect of the problem. In its crudest form the problem is how to make the world safe for human beings despite the scientists and the politicians. It is not a problem that is likely to be solved in 1935 any more than it was in 1922, 1927 or 1930.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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NATURE AND LIFE.*

It is a pleasure to call attention to Professor Whitehead's little volume, recently published in the series of "The Cambridge Miscellany." And this, not only because of the intrinsic importance of the book, but because it furnishes a very valuable introduction to the author's more elaborate and difficult works. In furnishing this help, Professor Whitehead avoids those drawbacks of terminology and style which make his work so difficult, not only to the ordinary reader, but even to well-equipped students. The volume, which is composed of two lectures delivered before the University of Chicago in October 1933, is straightforward reading, and is as simple as the complexity of the subject and of Professor Whitehead's outlook will permit. The lectures stopped short of giving Professor Whitehead's "systematic metaphysical cosmology," but they "indicate those elements in our experience in terms of which such a cosmology should be constructed" (p. 96). The summing up is that "the key notion, from which such construction should start, is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life."

* *Nature and Life*, by Alfred North Whitehead. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d. net.

The outlook from which Professor Whitehead criticises the views, philosophic and scientific, which have prevailed in the past and are still widely current may be summarised as follows. The concept of activity must supersede that of static passivity in our investigation of the nature and meaning of Reality. The cosmos is in *process* and, therefore, cannot be explained by what it manifests itself as being in any one sphere or at any one moment of its unceasing evolution. The universe is characterised by wholeness and, therefore, the ordinary divisions into provinces and planes—even the separations between mind, life and matter, while departmentally useful, are abstractions and must be transcended by any adequate philosophy. Reality must be construed as a self-consistent whole, and not in terms of any isolated part. This wholeness of Reality is not that of merely external relations, but of universal immanence and ceaseless interaction. Above all, the importance of life, which combines “absolute self-enjoyment, creative activity, aim” must be fully recognised in all attempts at world-explanation. The recognition of “aim,” as the outstanding quality of life, would, if carried out to its consequences, lead on to the characteristic features of Professor Whitehead’s philosophy. The book, thus briefly noticed, stops short at this point. It can be highly recommended as a valuable guide to and exposition of the stand-points from which the author’s systematic thought must be approached.

J. S. L.

* * * * *

A STUDY OF HISTORY.*

In the prime of life Professor Arnold J. Toynbee has written three volumes, to be followed by many others, and in these three he seeks, like his uncle, to place before the reader the *idées-forces* that have changed the course of history. The three volumes in our hands are at once exceedingly important and fascinating; important because they are almost the first of their kind in English; and attractive because of the agreeable English in which they are written. We almost despair of setting before the reader the wealth of contents of these

* *A Study of History*, 3 vols., by Arnold J. Toynbee. Clarendon Press. 52s. 6d. for the 3 vols., or 21s. each.

three arresting volumes. Volume I begins with an introduction which could scarcely be bettered, for in it we have an exposition of the relativity of historical thought, the field of historical study, and the comparative study of civilisations. Professor Toynbee then proceeds to point out the geneses of successive civilisations. Volume II analyses the range of challenge and response, and this analysis includes the varied forms of stimulus at work, the stimulus of hard countries, of new ground, of blows, of pressures, of penalisation, and the attempt to realise the golden mean due to competing and completing stimuli. Volume III concerns itself with the growth of civilisations, explaining the problem of these growths, their nature, their process, and the questions of differentiation that arise through growth.

At this stage in our notice of these very able volumes a reader may remark that all we have done is to give a catalogue of the contents. Yet it is vital to give such a catalogue, for otherwise we cannot set down the richness and the variety of the learning that the author unfolds before our eager attention. Professor Toynbee does many things for us, and not the least is the definite challenge he throws down to some of our current notions. Most of us, for example, are inclined to regard progress as a matter of course. Knowledge expands, we think, and there is no reason to think why it should not continue to expand indefinitely. This was not so with the Greeks. They, for the most part, conceived on the contrary of the possibility of a process of deterioration, a cycle or succession of cycles. The majority thought that there had been a Golden Age, long since past. Moreover, there seems to have been the feeling that this age was distinctly dull. Beyond the Pillars of Hercules once existed Plato’s “Atlantis”: it is now lost to sight of men in the depths of the sea. In it innocence and happiness reached the highest possible stage: the utmost man can expect is to return, however distantly, to this stage. Similarly, there had once been a body of knowledge: the past knew far more than the present can ever hope to know. What George Meredith called “the rapture of the forward view” was for the most part denied to the classical writers. The implications of such an attitude are worked out by Professor Toynbee with rare power and even rarer insight.

Since 1914 it is easy for us to hold that development includes retrogression. There are many side currents as well as

the main current in the stream of the evolution of the past, and repeatedly we are astonished with the masterly manner in which the author contrives to mingle his side currents with the flowing river. We see how the man of the ancient world inherited the natural love of mankind for old associations, and he inherited a sense of reverence. The old, simply because it was old, must be better than the new. If he was obliged to strike out a new path he diverged as little as he could from the old and tried way. He also encountered the difficulty of finding a new word for a new thing. He invariably took an old word with fine associations and adapted it to the new sense. It is impossible for a country, especially a primitive one, to effect an entire break with the past. Perhaps the greatest of all breaks with the past was the French Revolution, and yet for its ideals it entertained a return to the simplicity of the natural man. Mental philosophers cry "Back to Kant," political philosophers cry "Back to Kant," and some scientists at least cry "Back to Newton."

The author has successfully traced the history of society back to its dim beginnings in his own illuminating fashion. His standpoint is philosophic, his style dignified. You are borne along the current of time, with this lucid and just spirit upholding and instructing you. Serene you float above the forces that are making history, and ever as the panorama unrolls itself, the measured voice of the writer whispers the true meaning of the scene into your ear.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

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A WAR INQUEST.

Mr. Francis W. Hirst has written for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the concluding volume* of the British series in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*. The book is easy to read and easy to use for reference. It contains the main facts that are wanted by those who are still determined to know the full extent of what the war did for them. Mr. Hirst was clearly the right man to do the work. In his preface he surrenders in advance to the charge, if charge be made, that his own opinions obtrude. Why should

* *The Consequences of the War to Great Britain*. Oxford. 10s. net.

they not? The only odd thing is that any opinion should differ from his, that the world should still hold people who are capable of thinking that the last big war, or any war, was fought for any defensible purpose. Yet Mr. Hirst's views are a small element in the book. Its main body is the historical statement of what did happen during the war and what did result after the war, in finance, economics, politics, and social conditions. The author gives the figures of budgetary expenditure, quadrupled; of taxation, more than quadrupled; of national debt, multiplied twelve times; of unemployment, multiplied ten times; of the millions of killed and maimed; of the lost British industrial markets abroad; of the war debt at home and abroad.

"War loans," he writes (page 246), "enable nations to go on fighting until they are bankrupt; and when accounts are wound up, there is nothing to show for them but slaughtered or maimed soldiers and dead-weight debts which have to be repudiated or partially confiscated, or at best continue for generations as a mortgage on the wealth and resources of nations."

That is a good remark. It is curious that Mr. Hirst's views are not totally anarchist in the literal sense of the word; in the sense, that is, of being opposed to every competence of governments or politicians outside the sphere of punishing murderers and thieves within the boundaries of the State. Outside that sphere every single thing the politicians touch, they ruin. To the above quotation about war debts Mr. Hirst adds:

It is a melancholy reflection that a vast proportion of the world's debts, more especially those of the Great Powers, are of this nature. They were incurred mainly for war and armaments, and sometimes in the case of defeated countries they are partly made up of indemnities or reparations.

To his honour, Mr. Hirst is one of the men who can claim that they never caught the patriotic fever of the war period. His views (and he expressed them) in 1916 were the same as now. While, unfortunately, prominent men, Cabinet Ministers and others, were talking public rubbish about "the country fighting for its very life and existence" (when obviously it was doing exactly the opposite) Mr. Hirst had the courage to talk common sense. There is no greater test of courage than the exercise of common sense in circumstances, such as war,

wherein the politicians are given their head. Mr. Hirst in this book equally shows how the politicians ruin trade in peace time by the quasi-belligerent use of tariffs and such devastating weapons. The mere fact that "free trade" should be a subject of political controversy proves that there is no sense in politics; for how can there be any trade if it be not free? In the case of Soviet Russia, as Mr. Hirst observes on page 270, "all foreign trade was monopolised and ordinary commercial intercourse with other nations was ended." That is only the full logical manifestation of political interference with commerce.

Mr. Hirst is, of course, most interesting and most valuable on the subject of finance and commerce. But he has some curious things to record in what is called the "purely political" field: about such monuments, for instance, of human self-stultification as D.O.R.A. Altogether an invaluable book. The only criticism the reader will make is that he would have appreciated a more detailed index. After reading the book one's mind is full of good or shrewd things Mr. Hirst has written about a particular person, or country or subject. The index merely gives a string of page-numbers where those persons, countries, or subjects are mentioned and if one wishes to look again for a passage one vividly remembers, one has to look up all the pages in turn till one finds it. Such an index as is to be found in, for instance, Mr. Nicolson's *Curzon* would be a boon to users of Mr. Hirst's excellent book, especially as it is a book for constant reference, as well as for the initial "once-over."

G. G.

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BRYNMAWR: A DISTRESSED AREA.*

The story of Brynmawr is the story of a distressed area and this study pictures a typical small community in the South Wales coalfield. The facts were obtained by a group of citizens, some of them miners and shopkeepers, but they were aided by the headmasters and by teachers, by the bank manager and even by the station master. The survey occupied three years from September 1929 to August 1932,

* *Brynmawr: A Study of a Distressed Area*. By Hilda Jennings, M.A. Allenson. 10s. 6d. net.

and the hope was entertained that it might form a basis for reconstruction. In any case the inquiry is important partly because of the results that have been obtained and partly because it shows what a Community Study Council can accomplish with hard work and imagination. There is an introduction dealing with the whole of South Wales as a distressed area and then follows the growth of the community and its development of natural resources, its industrial relationships, its local administration, housing, transport and religious influences. A large part of the importance of this study is due to the fact that a group of workers have been engaged in relief under the leadership of Peter Scott of the Society of Friends. It is natural, therefore, that they should have turned their minds to the problem of devising some means of bringing about the permeation of industrial relationships by a new spirit. At the same time it was clear that if they could discover some avenues of employment which might gradually obviate the necessity for relief they would have accomplished a piece of work which might conceivably benefit all similar relief areas. The result of the Survey in the end revealed the fact that it was no longer possible to be optimistic with regard to the coal-mining industry, so far as Brynmawr was concerned, and possible developments along other lines were suggested. The result was the formation of a small boot-making group and the registration of the Brynmawr Valley Industries. With the help of the Mansion House Fund some of the initial difficulties were overcome and the main objects now kept in view are a development of the new industries, like furniture making and weaving, and the reawakening of the spirit of craftsmanship. There can be no doubt about the value of this experiment or of the Survey which springs from it.

P. A.

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A QUEEN OF HEARTS.*

This book is sure of an appreciative reception, both from those who were contemporary with the beloved Lady here so gracefully portrayed, and those to whom she has become almost the Fairy Princess and Rose. Queen of a legend.

* *Queen Alexandra*. By Sir George Arthur. Chapman & Hall, 1934. 8s. 6d. net.

Following an experienced biographer we can trace her life, and realise the secret of that irresistible charm which from youth to age enthroned her in the hearts of her adopted people.

First and foremost was, of course, the loveliness to which the illustrations in this book, and the many tributes quoted from foreigners and others, bear eloquent witness. Then there was the combination—appealing specially to the English mind—of the stately dignity of the leader of society with an innate love for simple things—for her Norfolk home, for example, with her garden, her dairy, and her pets, or the country retreat at Hvidore, where she and her sister, the Dowager Empress of Russia, spent part of each summer after their widowhood. In early years, the frequent sight of the young mother with her children made a further appeal to the affection of the public. But largely it was won by her lifelong, impulsive sympathy with the sick, the poor and the suffering, which found practical expression in such schemes as the Unemployed Fund of 1905, the Diamond Jubilee Dinner to 400,000 poor guests, and the Alexandra Trust for supplying cheap meals; above all, in that personal service for hospitals and nurses with which the name of Alexandra will be always identified. The organisation of Army Nurses and a hospital ship in the Boer War was mainly due to her initiative, and the first installation of a Finsen Lamp at the London Hospital in 1899 was, as Sir George Arthur reminds us, entirely so; she had considerable distrust to face. Perhaps the finest instance of the Princess's sympathy, and of an indomitable courage, is seen in her repeated visits, here described, to the poor, unspeakably disfigured patient at this Hospital, from whom even those who served him shrank involuntarily. Courageous also was her disregard of risk in hastening to Russia to her sister's side after the assassination of the Tsar in 1881. Her religion was a true and deep factor in her life. (In this connection, we must remark that the application of Keble's lines (p. 96) will jar on most readers.)

The portrait drawn suffers somewhat from the absence of shadow, of suggestion of such slight limitations as are known to have been hers—a playful reminder of her unpunctuality is the nearest approach to it—while a few very guarded allusions are the only recognition of certain “difficulties against which only a persistent sense of duty would be proof” (p. 57). The

Princess's personal relations with her august mother-in-law were happy from first to last, but her position, having regard to the Prussian sympathies and relatives of the Queen—especially with the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein following so shortly on her marriage—was a trying one; the choice of her brother as King of the Hellenes did not make it easier. But she held her own with quiet firmness and had the satisfaction of knowing that her husband's sympathies, and those of many English people, were with her. A fervent dislike of Bismarck was at any rate one bond between the Crown Princess of Prussia and herself. The kindness she showed later in trying to make her Russian sister-in-law, the Duchess of Edinburgh, feel at home was probably inspired by remembrance of her own discomforts. From politics in general she kept aloof, but it is interesting to note that she preferred Gladstone to Disraeli; her friendship with the former began, as we are reminded, with the cession in 1864 of the Ionian Islands to Greece, so strongly championed by him. At a banquet given by Disraeli on one occasion, she accepted from him a “bright . . . bouquet studded with butterflies and humming-birds”!

In conclusion, attention must be drawn to one or two printing errors, e.g. “pratiqueant” (without the final “e”) on p. 108, “in” twice for “is” in the second line of the verse on p. 109; and the insertion of “Charles, later Haakon VII of Norway” among Alexandra's brothers in the family tree. The Index is sketchy, and it is often not easy to identify the year in which an incident occurred; a few more dates, perhaps at the page or chapter headings, would have been useful.

E. G. S.

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NAPOLÉON III.*

Further valuable material dealing with the foreign policy of Napoleon III has been made available by Sir Victor Wellesley and Mr. Robert Sencourt in their *Conversations with Napoleon III*. The volume contains a collection of private dispatches, mainly unpublished hitherto, from ambassadors in Paris

* *Conversations with Napoleon III*, by Sir Victor Wellesley, K.C.M.G., C.B., and Mr. Robert Sencourt, M.A., B.Litt. Benn. 21s. net.

during the period of the Second Empire. They record in the main conversations with the Emperor and throw additional and confirmatory light upon his character and policy. The editors have selected from the Vienna archives a number of letters written by Baron Hübner, who was Austrian ambassador in Paris until 1859, and by his successor, Prince Richard Metternich, who enjoyed unrivalled popularity and influence at the French court. There are also a few dispatches from Count von der Goltz, the Prussian Minister, and his more trusted subordinate, Prince Reuss. A large proportion of the collection, however, is drawn from the letters of Sir Victor's grandfather and the Duke of Wellington's nephew, Lord Cowley, who occupied the Paris Embassy during most of this period, from 1852-67. Lord Cowley, who stands in the front rank of nineteenth-century diplomats, is described by Mr. Sencourt as

a quiet, grave man, a man who scarcely shone in the *salons* of the new and glittering society of the Second Empire. But he knew everything. No one has asked where he obtained his information, and he himself does not disclose the sources of it: but it seems that he combined a knack of winning people's confidence with an unequalled system of espionage.

It was customary for ambassadors to write to the Foreign Secretary private reports which would not be published. Apart from obvious necessity in many cases, it avoided the issue of Blue books which caused consternation among foreign diplomats. Lord Cowley kept thirty volumes of copies, from which those published are extracted. The documents selected are loosely strung together with little attempt at narrative or ordered comment. Unfortunately the editors have made the volume subsidiary to Mr. Sencourt's two works, *Napoleon III: the Modern Emperor* and *The Empress Eugénie*, which are intended to provide the connecting and explanatory background.

This collection contributes doubtless, as Mr. Sencourt claims, to the secret history of the Second Empire in its international relations. But it mainly substantiates our knowledge of the enigmatic personality of the Emperor, who was at once a dreamer and an opportunist and combined a measure of sincerity with appalling duplicity. Mr. Sencourt says that he "spoke more freely to foreigners than he did to his own

subjects." Napoleon boasted to Hübner, "When I open my heart to someone I speak frankly, and that is my way of doing diplomacy." But though he usually made a show of openness, it was too frequently subject to the whims of policy. At times Lord Cowley was impressed with his sincerity. "If he had but men about him," he wrote in 1856, "with the same honest intentions as himself, what a country they might become." Napoleon was then playing with Austria over the Italian question and conferring with Cavour at Plombières. "By visiting Plombières," Hübner innocently reported, "he reckoned on improving his health, and amusing himself." The question of Italian liberation was drawing England farther apart from France, and the Emperor strove for the best of both worlds. In 1860 Lord Cowley concluded that he was not a wilful deceiver, "but he thinks himself perfectly justified in breaking his word if circumstances in his opinion render it desirable." Perhaps the chief interest of this collection is not the record of single letters, apart from those on the Crimea, but the comparative study it affords of Napoleon's conversations with different ambassadors upon the same topics.

In exile, Napoleon III told Mels "I have had one motive only, the happiness and greatness of France." "Louis Philippe fell," he said to Hübner, "because he let France fall into disrepute. I must *do* something." He sought every chance for French expansion and greater prestige, but was always careful to keep open a way of escape. The Emperor stood midway between the reactionary powers which supported autocracy and the national movements which claimed his idealism. He admitted as much to Prince Richard Metternich in 1860:

I am accused of having two distinct policies. It is true! I am obliged to have two, because my origin forbids me to be reactionary, and I dare not be revolutionary on account of the dangers it would involve.

But he always kept a sheet-anchor in the English alliance, even though, as during his Italian difficulties, he found that "England is sometimes difficult to handle." On one occasion he told Rothschild, "Je regarde l'Angleterre comme ma femme, les autres comme des maîtresses." Lord Cowley was right when he wrote: "I am convinced that the

Emperor, so long as he is master of his own position, will engage in no war which he thinks will bring Great Britain into the field against him."

In an interesting introductory chapter, Sir Victor Wellesley compares the methods of diplomacy under Napoleon III with those of to-day. Personal influence over the sovereign was still a vital function. But already the invention of the telegraph had decreased the personal responsibility of ambassadors. The growth of democracy and the predominance of economic problems in international affairs was gradually evolving a new technique in diplomacy which Napoleon dimly sensed. He was "the great liaison" between the old and the new.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The Age of Reason,* by Professor R. B. Mowat, is a companion volume to his earlier work, *England in the Eighteenth Century*, and is devoted to continental Europe. Professor Mowat finds the "peculiar aspect and charm" of the eighteenth century "not so much in economics or politics as in culture" and endeavours successfully "to present it in its chief cultural aspect and its natural background of society and politics." Diverse verdicts have been passed upon the *ancien régime*. The author shows almost unqualified admiration for an age, which knew the secret of life, of perfect balance, and was "compact, satisfied with itself, knowing what it knew, worldly, a little cynical, humane, religious but not 'devout,' tolerant, progressive, slow." It was an era of revaluation and revolt against traditional dogma. Admiration for nature "produced a passion, but a restrained passion, for liberty in a despotic age." The pursuit of knowledge and intellectual pleasures requires no national frontier. Europe rejoiced in a sane cosmopolitanism, represented at its highest in Goethe and Voltaire. The great defect of the century was war. But wars were still waged between governments rather than nations. During the Seven Years War, for example, Lawrence Sterne could cross to France and be received with no antipathy into the social life of Paris. It was essentially an age of great personalities, and much of this book is concerned with the intellectual giants in literature and music, in philosophy and political science, and with the so-called "enlightened monarchs" who patronised and themselves dabbled in, the new ideas. When so much of the new nationalism was directed against the traditionalism of the Roman Catholic Church, religious scepticism was inevitable. But Professor Mowat considers that

* Harrap. 6s. net.

it is "unfair to call the eighteenth century irreligious, seeing that it had Jansenism in the beginning and Febronianism at the end, and in the middle the Wesleyan and Moravian movements." He cites the character of St. Alphonsus and the saintly life of the Protestant Pastor Oberlin. But their influence never reached the *salon* or the educated aristocracy, which followed strictly the fashionable pastime of free and sceptical discussion. As Professor Mowat points out: "European Liberalism was too much an affair of the study." New theories of government and most national reforms were not allowed to leave the academic stage. As the unavailing efforts of Turgot and Necker showed, privileged despotism was an overwhelming barrier against peaceful reform in France. This book covers enormous ground and should prove a valuable general survey of European culture in the eighteenth century.

Mr. Robert Dell's *Germany Unmasked** is an able, well-informed, passionate little book. His thesis is that Nazi Germany is not a normal civilised country. "Gentlemen like Hitler and Goebbels and Göring, who dress in the same way as people in other civilised countries, eat the same sort of food, use baths and all the other mechanical contrivances of modern civilisation, are barbarians." Most of his readers will agree with the fierce indictment of the blood-stained tyranny which holds Germany in its grip. But he goes far beyond that and launches an attack on Germany itself. He publicly confesses that he has been wrong in his judgments of the post-war years, during which he championed the Weimar experiment and denounced the bullying policy of France. He now declares that the Germans are incapable of self-government, and that it would have been better had the Kaiser remained. He dismisses the explanation of Hitlerism by the severities of the Treaty of Versailles and its consequences, and traces it to older and more fundamental causes lying deep in the failings of national character. So furious is he that he is beginning to doubt "whether there is any way of saving Europe from the German peril other than that of destroying German unity and breaking the country up into several States." Such a crazy suggestion illustrates the shattering effect of the Nazis' crimes on an experienced and humane journalist. It is a pity that a book so well worth reading should be marred by such bitterness.

Poland's Access to the Sea,† by Casimir Smogorzewski, a greatly enlarged edition of a volume published in 1930, is the best defence of the present Polish frontiers yet written. His arguments are conveniently summarised in an Introduction and are worked out in twelve massive chapters. With two intervals, he reminds us, the Corridor has always been Polish; the equities of the problem were carefully

* Martin Hopkinson. 5s.

† Allen & Unwin. 16s.

investigated by experts before the Treaty of Versailles was signed; the population of the Corridor was always predominantly, and is now overwhelmingly, Polish; it is at once the guarantee of Poland's political independence and the condition of her economic prosperity; the port of Gdynia will not ruin Danzig but share with the older city the growing trade of a rapidly increasing Polish population, now numbering 32 millions; the severance of East Prussia from the rest of Germany is a purely sentimental grievance, since the traffic of goods and passengers is in no way impeded. Such are the chief propositions which lead up to the conclusion that the Corridor has come to stay, and that nothing but a lost war would tear it from the Polish grasp. The learned author calls on German statesmen to recognise facts and cease their anti-Polish propaganda. Since the book was finished the German-Polish Ten Years' Pact has been signed, and the problem of the Corridor has lost its immediate urgency. Whatever the future may be, this admirable statement of the Polish case deserves the closest study.

Just before his death, Dr. Lewis R. Farnell completed in *An Oxonian Looks Back** the memory-sketches of his long and distinguished academic career. He went up to Exeter as an undergraduate in 1874, and now vividly recalls the outstanding personalities of his earlier days and the social life and condition of the University. He was elected a fellow of his College in 1880, and during the subsequent decade spent a great part of the vacations upon the Continent in classical archaeological research. As recreation, he was very fond of river travel, and gives an exciting account of a trip down the Danube by canoe from its source to Vienna. Dr. Farnell took a leading part in University politics and fought against the separatism of the colleges in favour of a strong University, "to make Oxford an organic whole and not a mere aggregate of rival or isolated colleges." He aimed "to widen the whole scope of our studies" and to give to the University a controlling influence. In 1923 his aims were in large measure fulfilled by the reforms instituted by the University Commission. Dr. Farnell was elected Rector of Exeter in 1913, and in 1920 he began his term of office of Vice-Chancellor, which attracted acute controversy both within and without the University. As Subrector of Exeter, 1882-93, and Senior Proctor, 1896-7, he had come into unusually close contact with the life of the undergraduate. "Through the ages he remains the same kindly and attractive personage." He welcomes the social changes and declares that the University "was a better place when I left it than when I entered it." Unfortunately, in 1919, the undergraduates were influenced by the post-war reaction into an excessive irresponsibility incompatible with academic study. Moreover, Oxford was becoming a hot-bed of political agitation, especially by revolutionary extremists, as the

* Martin Hopkinson. 16s. net.

notorious periodical, *Free Oxford*, demonstrated. As Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Farnell was determined to root out these evils, and in this book he stoutly defends his acts of repression. With the examples of Russian and Spanish universities in his mind, he envisaged ruin to Oxford and danger to the State "if the agents of violence can work through students'-clubs." Dr. Farnell recognised the need for free political opinion, but was determined to "fight to the death to prevent it being misused for the purposes of political propagandism, whether red or white." Few to-day can doubt that he was right. These memoirs, with their vivid reminiscences and quiet assertions, should find a wider public than university men.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The centenary of General Gordon's birth in 1833 provided the occasion for a refutation of Mr. Lytton Strachey's distorted strictures, and for a more balanced appreciation of the great soldier's life. Mr. John Buchan has continued this process by his brilliant narrative and judicial interpretation in a new volume of the Great Occasions series, *Gordon at Khartoum*.* He provides a masterly sketch of the four figures round whom the epic turns, Gordon, Gladstone, Lord Cromer and the Mahdi. He is careful to emphasise the point that Gordon never exceeded his instructions, namely, to evacuate the Soudan and to leave behind some form of government. Although he blames Gladstone for his procrastination and refusal to realise the issue and, even more, Lord Hartington, for "his tardy resolution" in threatening to resign, Mr. Buchan refrains from allocating guilt. "Tragedy," he concludes rather charitably, "sprang more out of rival greatnesses than out of rival follies."

The importance of modern history in the curriculum of the secondary school is becoming more and more appreciated. Miss Elizabeth Underwood has taught history for ten years, and is well qualified to fill the essential need of a good outline of modern world history. Her *Short History of the World from the Renaissance to the League of Nations*† does this, and even more. Mr. Nowell Smith, the former headmaster of Sherborne, describes it in his Introduction "as a brilliant and masterly sketch of modern history." Within the limits of three hundred and twenty-four small pages, Miss Underwood has compressed a comprehensive survey of the period with a bare outline of historical fact. The volume is written with great clarity and simplicity and exhibits, as is inevitable in an elementary book, unhesitating dogmatism upon

* Peter Davies. 5s. net.

† Alexander Maclehose & Co. 3s. 6d.

questions of historical controversy. Designed primarily for secondary schools, it should provide a valuable foundation for further study. Miss Underwood has included a large number of excellent illustrations, mostly of well-known pictures. The value of the book, however, is somewhat diminished by the absence of a bibliography and index.

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In the *Prison Letters of Countess Markievicz** Miss Esther Roper has edited the letters of the Irish republican leader, written intermittently between 1916 and 1926 from various prisons in England and Ireland to her sister, Eva Gore-Booth, the poetess. The Countess will long remain a controversial figure. In her love and work for the poor she became convinced in all sincerity that their lot was due to exploitation by the alien English. She saw in the 1916 rebellion the realisation of her dream of an independent Co-operative Commonwealth, and subsequently denounced the compromise of the Treaty of 1922. Her stubborn character and bitterness against the English find less place in these letters than her gentleness and perseverance. As censored correspondence, they contain mainly valueless, though interesting, comment upon her work, her prison life, and reflections about people and things in general. Miss Roper has written a biographical sketch which is more of an introductory tribute than an impartial historical account. The volume contains in addition a few of Eva Gore-Booth's political poems and an introduction by President de Valera.

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Shortly after the suppression of the Austrian Socialists in February, Mrs. Naomi Mitchison paid a month's visit to Vienna in order both to relieve distress among the Social Democrats and to show them the international solidarity of the Labour movement. Her *Vienna Diary*† is an emotional record of her work. She spent most of the time in surreptitious relief work and in listening to lurid accounts of brutality by the Heimwehr and police. Mrs. Mitchison was admittedly "living with the heart" and not the head, and with the aid of her intimate and dramatic style describes with great pathos heart-rending scenes of distress and hardship, all of which are doubtless true. But in the depth of her emotion she forgets the origin of a conflict in which the Socialists at least invited bloodshed and were not altogether guiltless.

* Longmans. 6s. net.

† Gollancz. 5s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1934.

THE PLIGHT OF GERMANY.

IN a lecture at Warsaw a few months ago the German Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, defined the relationship between dictatorship and democracy as follows: "People and Government are one in Germany. The will of the people is the will of the Government and vice versa. The structure of the modern State in Germany is a kind of ennobled democracy in which there is authoritarian rule by virtue of a mandate from the people." While the last plebiscite was being prepared, leading persons in the Third Realm expressed themselves similarly, and Hitler himself went so far as to say that Germany was the most democratic land in the world because he caused the plenitude of his usurped power to be confirmed by a vote. The truth is that the leaders of the Third Realm pay their respects to democratic principle from time to time merely to make a favourable impression abroad. In this way they endeavour to conceal the fact that they achieved power in an implacable struggle against democratic forms and principles.

How great is their hypocrisy may be seen in the circumstance that the new science of government in Germany does not hesitate to characterise the referendum as a farce. In the *Grundriss der allgemeinen Staatslehre*, by Professor Kollreuther of Munich University, who is also "Councillor of State" (*Staatsrat*) and member of the Academy of German Law, the following passage occurs: "In the national constitutional State (*Rechtsstaat*)"—a curious term incidentally for the Hitlerite despotism—"there is no room for the forms of political democracy. This is particularly true with regard to direct democracy. . . . The principle of creating majorities by the ballot is altogether foreign to the nature of the *Führerstaat*" (a State based on the principle of leadership), "especially when the ballot takes the form of a referendum. Referenda only come into question as a particularly ceremonial declaration of assent to the political actions of the leaders." Here is the whole thing in a nutshell. A referendum can only be used as long as the certainty prevails that the

result will be in accordance with the intentions of the *Führer*. It must involve no risk for him. Every possibility of danger must be eliminated. To the people is assigned the part of the chorus in a Greek tragedy: all they have to do is to accompany the words and deeds of the hero with words of laudatory recognition. "Ennobled democracy" is therefore a pure deception.

It would be a deception even if the plebiscite itself and the registration of the returns were surrounded by all the guarantees of law and equity. It is not enough if the citizen is able to decide freely with regard to his Aye or No at the moment when he fills in his ballot-paper and throws it into the ballot-box. He must be able to form an opinion as to the probable consequences of his decision in advance. This he cannot do where the right of assembly and combination and the freedom of the Press do not exist, where the task of enlightening and instructing the masses is reserved exclusively for the Government and its organs, and where all public criticism is followed by inhuman penalties as an act of treasonable hostility to the Government. The referendum is thereby debased to a kind of military parade. A mockery is made of democratic principles under the pretence of showing them every respect. But this mockery becomes all the worse when those who are in power do not shrink from falsifying the returns. That this was done on August 19th to a large extent and in many places is beyond a doubt. The falsifications carried out by subordinate officials who wished to demonstrate how favourably disposed their own regions were to the Government (falsifications for which they were duly thanked) have surpassed all the manoeuvres which, until now, aroused the derision of the western European peoples for certain countries in the Balkans or in South America. If we take into account the number of those timorous people who—not unreasonably—feared that all kinds of harm would come upon them and their families should their opposition attitude be known, the repulsive picture is completed, the picture of a plebiscite which has formally conferred upon Hitler a power such as is held by no ruler of any community that can claim to be a civilised State.

Both the open and the secret opposition are indubitably much greater than is revealed by the official figures. Furthermore, it is a grotesque piece of misrepresentation when the

governing clique proclaims the necessity of converting the minority which, so far, has not been won over to the ideas symbolised by the Swastika. The governing clique behaves as though the Noes represented no more than a residue of the population which had hitherto failed to appreciate the Hitlerian gospel. The truth is that these Noes reveal the beginning of a new resistance. They are a manifestation of the millions who are turning away from National Socialism precisely because they have experienced it and have recognised its character. The great question of the future is: Does the dictatorship possess the means to lead these dissentients back to the True Faith, or will the courage they have shown exercise a power of attraction over those multitudes who still waver and hesitate? One thing is certain: Hitler will never allow a referendum that could leave him in a minority. And whatever his policy may be, every caution will be taken to prevent dissatisfaction from expressing itself in figures more unfavourable to dictatorship than those of August 19th. But even if, contrary to all expectation, such a thing were to happen, a dictatorship that only goes to the country as long as it can mould the popular will according to its own desires would not be eliminated. We must guard ourselves against the illusion that Hitlerism can be overthrown by a plebiscite or an election. Its overthrow can only come about in two ways: either the system will collapse by its own incapacity to solve the problems which confront it or, being itself based on force, it will be overthrown by force.

It would be strange indeed if Hitler had not recognised these dangers and if he were not to do everything to circumvent them. But it is doubtful whether this ambitious man, with his lack of self-restraint and self-knowledge, clearly recognises what a burden he has placed on his own shoulders. He has put a crown upon his head that would be too heavy for a man stronger than himself and for one who could wear it with greater dignity. It is hardly to be expected of him (when all his characteristics are considered) that he will be abashed by the divine attributes with which he is credited; but it will soon be evident that he has overstepped the limits set for mortal men, and perhaps he will yearn for the time when he shared the formal responsibility with a President, behind whose broad back he could hide himself whenever he would not or could not keep the promises made during his

rise. Demands and accusations will be addressed to him personally, and the excuse that there are forces within his Government which thwart the execution of his good intentions will no longer make an impression. Moreover, the myth with which National Socialism invested both itself and its leader has begun to dwindle since June 30th. The stark reality is coming to its own. The intoxication of the first period is vanishing, and, having reverted to their everyday mood, people are no longer satisfied with propaganda, but wish to see results. The results that must be achieved can no longer fit in with the National Socialist programme. Amongst the obstacles that stand in their way are those that have been created by the policy of the Third Realm. Germany's situation is truly desperate. She is politically, economically and morally isolated. Her credit has been ruined in every respect. The material means and the confidence are lacking, both of them absolutely necessary for a State that is not willing to sink into poverty and barbarism. Will Hitler, with such a plenitude of power at his disposal, be able to save Germany?

Surely not, if he continues in the same path. The present "Leader of the Reich," as he is now termed, endeavours to remove all the blame from himself and from his policy and to transfer it to the outside world, just as he did when he was Chancellor. And those who speak and act in his name and on his behalf follow his example. Germany, so they argue, is in difficulties only because the other Powers are obtuse and malevolent. She looks round upon a hostile world that will not recognise her peaceful intentions, and is always refusing the friendly hand she is holding out. This theme is repeated day in, day out, always in the same manner. All Hitler's speeches are fundamentally the same. All actions that have aroused and promoted the distrust of the outside world are passed over in silence. Just as little is said about a rearmament that contravenes international treaties, about the brusque exodus from the League of Nations, about the intrigues directed against the independence of Austria, as is said about the education of a whole people in the spirit of militarism and about the cruel persecution of all real supporters of a pacifist ideal. In these circumstances, every declaration that the Third Realm wishes to live on friendly terms with all, and especially with France, loses its validity and appears to the outside world as a tactical manoeuvre. The outside world is at least compelled to ask whether such

declarations are worth anything for more than a moment, and cannot fail to register the fact that, at a time when warlike complications threaten in the East rather than in the West, these gestures that seem to promise and to desire nothing but peace are directed exclusively towards the West.

To break this ring of distrust Hitler would have to give German foreign policy an entirely new direction. He would have to bring his country back into the comity of nations, dispel every suspicion of aggressive expansionist policy, give guarantees of non-intervention in Austrian affairs, and above all refrain from determining the extent of his armaments according to his own arbitrary will. The great question is this—is he not only willing but, in consideration of his fellow Nazis and of the Reichswehr, is he able? He would be compelled to destroy many conceptions called forth by himself and to abjure doctrines laid down in his book, *Mein Kampf*. This will not be easy, for even an absolute Dictator is a prisoner of his propaganda and of those with whose help he was victorious. It is a mistake to suppose that it is easier to change political direction in a despotism than in a democracy. A dictatorship is condemned to consistency more than any other form of government. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that a skilful education could make a reversal in the course of his foreign policy acceptable to the masses. For many have confidence in the *Führer*, in accordance with Dr. Goebbels' admonitions, even when they do not understand him, or because they do not understand him, and because, despite all military display, the desire for military adventures is small, at least amongst the older generation. But there is a sphere in which all the arts of propaganda are bound to fail in the end, namely the sphere of economics, in which it is the realities that speak and cannot be drowned by any verbal agitation, however impressive.

It is sufficiently remarkable that, as far as the economic system is concerned, Hitler has conferred his dictatorial powers first upon Herr Schmidt and now, after the alleged illness of the latter, upon Dr. Schacht. Is it recognition of his own ignorance, is it the lack of interest in subjects that do not readily fit into the scheme of his public speeches, or is it the hope of being able to make others seem responsible in case of a fiasco, that has led the *Führer* to limit his own competence in this matter? Whatever the reason, in the end he himself will be held accountable for the deeds and the omissions of

his subordinates. It is, after all, in accordance with Hitler's own policy if Dr. Schacht places the responsibility for all economic and social distress and difficulty on the outside world and on previous German Governments, while denying the mistakes—they might even be called crimes—committed in the name of National Socialist policy. It must, of course, be admitted that the complete failure of all attempts to achieve a reasonable international co-operation in economic matters has helped to make the German situation more desperate; but the President of the Reichsbank is grossly misleading when he tries to create the impression that the severe economic crisis in which Germany now finds herself is not principally due to the measures approved and promoted by himself against his own better knowledge.

Let us summarise. Unrestricted rearmament has swallowed huge sums. To carry out this rearmament the import of raw materials needed had to be increased, so that the trade balance and the balance of payments were over-burdened, seeing that the manufactured goods remain in the country. The Government has endeavoured to justify this expenditure not only by the necessity of warding off hostile attacks but also by considerations of a social nature. How dubious it is to combat unemployment by artificially stimulating the armament industry hardly requires emphasis. But even if the desired aim is momentarily achieved to a certain extent, the means for creating this or similar unproductive work as well as for the maintenance of the brown-shirted militia were made available by discounting bills and by burdening the budgets of future years in advance. In addition, agriculture and industrial concerns received big subsidies. In this way the public finances have been ruined and the gold held by the Reichsbank has been almost used up. The result is an increase in the floating debt to almost 8,000 million marks and a decrease in the gold reserve to 75 million marks. The situation of the working class, taken as a whole, has not grown better but worse. A small percentage enjoy higher wages, but the total wage bill has decreased even where employment has increased, while the prices of the most necessary foodstuffs are steadily rising. Nor is unemployment removed when hundreds of thousands are sent compulsorily to labour camps which largely serve a purpose of military training.

The shrinking exports which accompany these phenomena might perhaps be attributed to causes that are not determined

by German policy alone. The world crisis, the tendency shown in all States to shut themselves up, the devaluation of the pound and the dollar, have narrowed the foreign markets for German goods. But it must not be forgotten that Germany has herself contributed much to her own blockade. The proclamation of self-sufficiency was one of the essential points in the Hitlerite agitation. The barbaric methods of the Government, the persecutions and expropriation of the Jews, have led to an open or secret boycott of German products. Perpetual declarations of hostility to Bolshevism have led Russia to place orders in countries other than Germany. Duties on agricultural products and compulsory cartels have raised the cost of German industrial production, so that no one can honestly assert that the passivity of the trade balance, which reached 258 millions in the first seven months of 1934, while German foreign trade in the corresponding period in 1933 still had a favourable balance of 316 millions, could be principally attributed to the ill-will of the rest of the world.

How will the Dictatorship get rid of the chains which it has forged for itself? It has begun by strangling imports and, with them, production and employment. But this method would only promise success if it were accompanied by a radical breach with the system followed hitherto, that is to say, if the Government had the courage to put the budgets of the State and the public corporations in order, and to recover at least some confidence abroad by forgoing its wild rearmament programme and by ceasing to finance "productive work" for the unemployed—in other words, by returning to healthy and rational economic principles. But the Government knows that this way is full of danger—it would mean a departure from its ideology and, even worse, an increase in the already considerable social tension, seeing that the working class and the middle class would be deceived in all their hopes. Thus the Government proclaims through the mouth of Dr. Schacht the continuation of its present policy, come what may. Germany is to be barricaded against the world, to be entirely self-sufficient, and to make up for the lack of raw materials by the production of artificial substitutes, until foreign trade would then assume the character of medieval barter. But we should do Dr. Schacht an injustice if we were to assume that he himself believes that such a plan could be carried out. His purpose is to bluff foreign creditors and those who are interested in selling their products to

Germany. While threatening them with the complete self-sufficiency of the Reich and with the cessation not only of political but also of private debt-payments, he believes that he can make other countries more willing to make concessions. He believes that, so as not to lose everything, they will be willing to agree to the several years' moratorium which has been demanded and to the reduction of the interest payable later on, besides granting new industrial credits at once.

Even if this speculation were correct, the difficulties confronting the régime would only be removed for the time being. But is it correct? Will those who are in a position to help Hitlerism allow themselves to be blackmailed by Hitlerism? It is hardly conceivable that they will risk everything in the very insecure expectation of a small advantage. It is still less conceivable that they will give a Government, which imperfectly conceals its preparations for war behind peaceful speeches, the possibility to obtain the raw materials it needs for armaments. This is the point which may be decisive for the future of the Dictatorship. Trade and industry cannot be saved by the National Socialist recipe which Dr. Schacht has adopted. But a system that intolerably tightens the belt and delivers the German people over to extreme distress cannot last. The forces of the Opposition which were stirring even before June 30th and then again on August 19th will increase and rally. The determination of this Opposition will not be expressed in a referendum, but in a very different manner, and it will not again be stifled in blood. To make any prophecies with regard to the period and the phases of this development would be idle and dangerous. It would be quite mistaken to hope that the Dictatorship will be overthrown in the near future and that the rule of brute force will be replaced by a Democracy all at once. There will be transitional stages in which those who are united in rejecting the Dictatorship will begin to struggle with one another. But the sense of freedom and justice, which, as must unfortunately be admitted, has hitherto been little developed amongst the Germans in comparison with other nations, will be fortified in the school of suffering, and in the end a State will emerge in which unity between Government and People will be more than one of the phrases of mendacious demagoguery. Perhaps Hitler will figure in history as the man who, by destroying Democracy, prepared the way for the victory of Democracy.

RUDOLF BREITSCHIED.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TRAFFIC IN DANGEROUS DRUGS.

IN the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for 1912 I described the origin of the international effort to restrict the use of opium and other dangerous narcotic drugs to legitimate medical purposes, and in articles in 1923 and 1925 recorded the progress made under the League of Nations to effectuate the Opium Conventions and secure their universal operation. Since 1925 further progress has been made, fresh difficulties have been encountered in regard to illicit traffic, gaps in the international control of production and distribution of drugs of addiction have been disclosed, and it is evident that concentration and extension rather than relaxation of effort are required if the excessive manufacture of dangerous narcotics is to be arrested and the lucrative trade of international smugglers eliminated.

The League of Nations, after a report from its Health Section, arrived at the conclusion that the legitimate medical requirements of the world would be met by the annual production of nine tons of morphine, two tons of heroin and five and a half tons of cocaine. It has, however, to be borne in mind that morphine to the extent of some twenty tons is used for the manufacture of codeine and other preparations not hitherto scheduled as "Dangerous Drugs."

In 1931 a fresh Conference was assembled at Geneva with a view to amending or strengthening the Opium Convention of 1925 and securing the limitation of manufacture of the dangerous alkaloids derived from the poppy and coca leaves to strictly medical purposes, as indeed was contemplated by Article 9 of the original Hague Opium Convention of 1912. The Conference resulted in a new Convention for the limitation of manufacture of the narcotics in question, not, as was originally proposed, by national quotas, but in accordance with estimates supplied in advance by each of the signatory countries. The Convention also set up a new supervisory body, the Permanent Central Opium Board, to see that the estimates supplied are not exceeded and exercise control over international imports and exports. Reports made by the new Board appear to show that the statistics supplied by the various countries for the legitimate manufacture of morphine, heroin and cocaine are approximating to the estimates of

world requirements of these drugs as formulated by the League of Nations. Unfortunately, some producing countries are not parties to the several Conventions, and others, although signatories, have failed to supply the required statistics; while, over and above the amount of legitimate manufacture, there is abundant evidence of unrecorded or illicit production of narcotics in several countries. Great Britain, by the Dangerous Drugs Acts, 1920-32, has faithfully put into legislation and administration the undertakings contained in the Opium Convention of 1912 and the subsequent treaties. If all other parties to these obligations had proceeded with similar vigour the menace of the drug traffic would have become less than it still is.

Recent experience from Egypt suffices to show how resolute action can rapidly effect amelioration both nationally and internationally. T. W. Russell Pasha in 1930 astounded the Opium Advisory Committee of the League of Nations by declaring that during the previous five years Egypt had become a nation of drug addicts. It was estimated that some 500,000 were enslaved to narcotics and that they expended some millions of pounds annually on purchase of the "dope." Morphine, heroin, cocaine and hashish had been pouring into the country, and huge fortunes were being made by the skilled gangs of smugglers who organised the business. It was discovered that much of this contraband emanated from a drug factory in Alsace, and from this mid-European centre passed to Genoa, Trieste, Piræus, Constantinople and Cairo. It was indeed alleged that in 1928, from this one firm alone, 4,349 kilogrammes of heroin had issued, or more than enough to meet the legitimate requirements of the world. Russell Pasha, as Director of the Narcotics Bureau and Commandant of the Cairo Police, has tracked out, exposed and, by heavy fines and imprisonment, eliminated the chief agents of this lucrative and nefarious traffic in the Levant. Indeed, in his latest report he is able to claim that the number of convicted addicts undergoing imprisonment has fallen from 5,681 in 1929 to 674 in 1933, and he believes that the menace which threatened Egypt five years ago has been removed.

No sooner is one source of illicit manufacture of narcotics discovered and rooted out than others take its place. Three factories, on a large scale, of morphine and heroin in Istanbul were exposed and suppressed two years ago, and Turkey

was welcomed, at last, as adhering to the Opium Conventions. Shortly afterwards, however, interest was centred on Bulgaria, which has become a large opium producer and has been unmasked as harbouring ten secret factories of morphine and heroin, not less than 3,000 kilogrammes of the latter drug having issued therefrom during the past year.

Besides Turkey and the Balkan states, Persia, India and China are the chief producers of raw opium, and to them must now be added the new territory of Manchukuo. Persia has been reluctant, largely on financial and economic grounds, to fall into line with other Powers in the matter of the Opium Conventions. It has been reported that there are some 70,000 acres under poppy cultivation in Persia yielding 600 tons of opium annually, valued at £2,000,000 a year, equal to nine per cent. of the national revenue. One-fourth of the population is said to be directly or indirectly associated with the opium traffic and one in ten is said to smoke opium.

The Indo-Chinese opium trade was, of course, the chief subject of contention in "the opium question" last century, and in the early part of the present century a new policy for its progressive cessation was initiated by Lord (then Mr. John) Morley when Secretary of State for India in 1906, and that trade ceased in 1917. The undertaking that China would synchronously abolish the cultivation of the opium poppy was at first observed; but with the chaos following the fall of the Central Government there has been a lamentable recrudescence of opium production in that disturbed country. There is also too much reason to think that China has been the dumping ground of much illicit morphine and other alkaloids, and indeed it is stated that secret drug factories have been established and are increasing in number in China itself.

In 1929-31 a Commission was dispatched by the League of Nations to Bangkok to inquire into opium smoking in the Far East. The Hague Opium Convention of 1912 had contemplated "the gradual and effective suppression" of opium smoking and the "prohibition" of the traffic in "prepared" opium (for smoking) either immediately or as soon as possible. The protocol arrived at by the Geneva Conference in 1925, however, postponed the desired "suppression" until not more than fifteen years from a date when exports of raw opium from producing countries should no longer be an obstacle to such suppression. The Bangkok Commission

(on which China was not represented) made some valuable suggestions but very justly concluded that "the whole problem of poppy cultivation and its control enters very materially into the question of suppression of the opium-smoking habit," and "that the limitation and control of poppy cultivation will alone assure the total suppression of opium smoking."

India is, of course, still a large producer of opium, under Government monopoly, and continues to supply "prepared" opium for smoking to countries in the Far East, deriving considerable revenue therefrom. Lord Reading, when Viceroy in 1926, announced a new policy of progressive reduction of the export of opium except for strictly medical purposes. Among the countries supplied with opium from India are Crown Colonies like the Straits Settlements, North Borneo and the Federated Malay States, a considerable percentage of whose revenue is derived from opium. When my co-delegates and I were about to sign, on behalf of Great Britain, the first international Opium Convention of 1912 at The Hague, we were instructed to attach the following declaration:

The articles of the present Convention, if ratified by His Britannic Majesty's Government, shall apply to the Government of British India, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, and Wei-hai-Wei in every respect in the same way as they shall apply to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

That the Indian Government should continue to be a considerable purveyor of opium for smoking gave rise to accusations of inconsistency at Geneva, and Mr. Lyall, the President of the Central Opium Board, has commented on the fact that smokers in the Crown Colonies bought opium from a Government that had given a solemn undertaking to suppress opium smoking. It is certainly anomalous that a person purveying opium for smoking in this country should be liable to a fine not exceeding £1,000 and possibly ten years' penal servitude, while the Indian Government continues to export opium for smoking at a handsome profit. One is reminded of the cynical dictum of Warren Hastings in regard to opium to the effect that "it is a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted but for the purpose of foreign commerce only."

The "Limitation of Manufacture" Convention of 1931 did not extend to the production of raw opium or of the leaves of the coca shrub, and it may be recalled that the American and Chinese delegates withdrew from the Geneva Conferences of 1925 because the control or restriction of the production of the raw materials was ruled out of the purview of those Conferences and excluded from the resultant Conventions. The American delegates maintained

(1) That if the purposes of the Hague Opium Convention are to be achieved according to its spirit and true intent, it must be recognised that the use of opium products for other than medicinal and scientific purposes is an abuse and not legitimate. (2) That in order to prevent the abuse of these drugs it is necessary to exercise the control of the production of raw opium in such a manner that there will be no surplus available for non-medicinal and non-scientific purposes.

These principles had been approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations and by its Health Committee, and it is good to know that now, at long last, instructions have been given to prepare the necessary data for a Conference which shall devise means for limiting the production of opium and coca leaves to the amounts required for strictly medical purposes, and thus cut at the root of the illicit and demoralising traffic in drugs of addiction.

WILLIAM COLLINS.

THE SATELLITE GARDEN TOWN.

EVERYBODY knows what a garden city is. Letchworth and Welwyn have become household names among those who are interested in the planning of a better England. Relatively few have heard of the *satellite* garden town, which is likely in the near future to be far more important than the garden city. Instead of the gradual sprawling growth which was typical of our cities in the last century, the satellite garden town should be deliberately planned by a great municipality so as to preserve permanently all the amenities of a large district, and to include not only houses and parks, but also a factory area; the population working partly in the area and partly in the mother city.

The most imaginative and important enterprise which the Manchester City Council has undertaken for many years has undoubtedly been the development of the Wythenshawe satellite garden town, covering an area that will house about 100,000 persons, and will include a considerable number of factories. Many of the residents will not only live but work in Wythenshawe; the remainder will live in Wythenshawe and work in Manchester or neighbouring areas. The development is on such a scale and has been so well planned that it is certainly the most important experiment in satellite garden town building which is now going on in England—and perhaps anywhere else.

The plan covers a total area of approximately 5,500 acres. The first decision was to reserve a permanent agricultural belt of 1,000 acres, so that whatever development may occur the residents shall always have access to green fields. The agricultural belt will also provide for all time cheap playing-fields, so that old-established cricket clubs will not be destroyed by the encroachment of the speculative builder, as has so often been their fate elsewhere. Apart from the agricultural belt another 1,000 acres is reserved for open spaces of one sort and another, including the preservation of the ancestral park of the Tatton family as a fine permanent open space of 250 acres. Another 100 acres is being reserved for a golf course: whereas a course rather farther out from Manchester, but in an unplanned area, is at the present moment threatened by the speculative builder.

One of the most original and important features of the plan for Wythenshawe development is its use of the parkway

system. There are to be two parkways running right through the estate. The parkway is an American invention; it consists of a main road, used for through traffic only, and having wide margins planted with grass, trees, and beds of flowers on either side; in the case of Wythenshawe parkways these margins average over 150 feet in width. Footpaths for pedestrians are provided along them. The houses which front on the parkway are, therefore, separated from the street by 150 feet of open space. Access is provided to the houses by subsidiary roads parallel to the parkway but on the farther side of the houses. Cars drawn up at the houses will be on the subsidiary roads; these are connected at intervals of about a quarter of a mile with the parkway, the use of which is, therefore, confined to through traffic. This fact, combined with the reduction in the number of road junctions, renders possible much faster speeds without risk of accident than on ordinary roads. A further important advantage of the parkway is that it effectively prevents ribbon development, and from the extra value which the surrounding land acquires by reason of the amenities and convenience of the parkway, it may be expected that much of its cost will be recouped. Already a mile and a half of the parkway has been built and laid out with skill and taste; anyone who walks or drives along it cannot fail to see what a beneficent revolution has been effected in comparison with the ordinary main road which is still being built almost everywhere else.

Three thousand acres are reserved for housing. The plan shows a minimum of four houses to the gross acre and a maximum of twelve; altogether there should be about 25,000 houses, housing a population of 100,000 persons. Great care has been taken to preserve the natural beauties of the estate, the coppices and streams, and especially the thousands of fine trees. Schools are being built, largely on the open-air principle, and from five to ten acres of land are being allotted to each school. The two new schools which are now in full operation provide almost perfect surroundings for the children who are lucky enough to attend them. Having been planned before the development of the estate they have been so arranged that as far as possible the children attending them have no main roads to cross. A suitable site has been reserved for a civic centre; old farms are being preserved; one is already being used as a community centre, another as a

temporary church. Two hundred acres have been set aside as a factory area ; it will, of course, be a condition that the factories shall be smokeless and shall not be a nuisance in any way. Five factories are at present in course of erection, and will give employment to a considerable number of Wythenshawe residents under ideal conditions.

Manchester did not secure full control of the estate till 1931. Development was at once begun with great energy. Before anything substantial could be done in the way of building houses it was necessary to deal with the main drainage system. This was put in hand in 1930, and the first portion, providing for the first few thousand houses, was finished at a cost of £226,000 in about two years. Meantime access to the estate was limited to one narrow bridge over the Mersey. Further access had to be provided by a new bridge over the Mersey connecting up the parkway with one of the main avenues into Manchester. This was finished by 1932 at a cost to the city for the roadway and bridge which, thanks to a substantial grant from the Ministry of Transport, did not exceed £88,000.

It was not until 1932 that it was possible to begin with the actual work of building houses. In that year just over 400 houses were finished, in the following year well over 3,000. This was a magnificent beginning ; no doubt development would have continued on this high level but for the change in the Government's housing policy. Sir Hilton Young, in 1932, abolished the Wheatley Act under which these houses were being built ; and practically stopped municipal building for the time being in order to concentrate on slum clearance. The result is that at the time of writing the future rate of building of municipal houses in Wythenshawe is quite uncertain, depending as it does largely on Government policy. The following table shows the number of houses completed up to the time of writing :

Year ending	No. of houses completed
December 31st, 1930 ...	142
" 1931 ...	—
" 1932 ...	411
" 1933 ...	3,363
March 31st, 1934 ...	690
Total ...	<u>4,606</u>

In addition, since the incorporation of the area, the following houses have been erected by private enterprise, viz. :

Year ending December 31st, 1931 ...	65 houses
" " " 1932 ...	104 "
" " " 1933 ...	100 "

Private enterprise has been building many thousands of houses in areas surrounding Wythenshawe, but for some reason has not yet taken up building on the estate with any vigour. One interesting point is, however, to be noted : the city is wisely using its power as landlord to control the amenity of the private-enterprise houses. Generally speaking, private enterprise is building quite good houses, but the speculative builder rarely employs an architect, with the result that the appearance of these estates is frequently deplorable. The City Council has tackled this problem by itself planning the estates which are to be used for private development, so as to secure a good layout and the preservation of trees and other amenities, and by insisting on the elevations and designs of all buildings being approved by Mr. Barry Parker. Those who have built houses and factories in Wythenshawe have welcomed his help (for which they do not pay!) ; the result is that the private-enterprise buildings are well planned and attractive ; in striking contrast to private-enterprise building in neighbouring areas.

Such is the plan which is being carried out by the Manchester City Council to-day. Contrast the way in which development took place in the nineteenth century : for example, in the neighbouring city of Salford. Salford grew in the normal nineteenth-century manner, with no plan and very little control. Every factory owner put his factory where he thought it would pay him ; every speculative builder put his houses where he liked, built them how he liked and at whatever density he liked, subject to a gradual development of control by by-laws as the century went on. The result is what we see in Salford to-day—an unplanned, chaotic, inconvenient, ugly and overcrowded city.

Those days are gone, but even to-day planning is far from perfect. The development of the land on the southern borders of Manchester, in the county of Cheshire, is not seriously planned. It is true that a regional plan is being

discussed; but there does not seem to be any serious effort to plan these areas ahead as is being done in Wythenshawe. Agricultural belts and open spaces are not preserved; the speculative builder ruthlessly mops up every open space out of which he hopes to make a profit.

The one form of development which is regarded as being typical of the twentieth century is the garden city. Welwyn and Letchworth are splendid examples of what can be done, and provide almost perfect conditions for the workers in their factories. But unfortunately their development has been exceedingly slow: they have both suffered from two things: lack of capital at low rates, and lack of people willing to come and live or build factories in them. The result is that in spite of much devoted work they have grown slowly, and that there are no signs to-day of other similar garden cities developing.

Wythenshawe is the first serious effort by a great city to produce a satellite garden town which offers amenities similar to those of the independent garden city. Wythenshawe, although effective work only began in 1931, has already a larger population than either Welwyn or Letchworth; correspondingly more money has already been spent on its development. The reason for the difference is obvious: the Manchester City Council is in a position to provide the two things which Welwyn and Letchworth lack: cheap capital in whatever quantities it is required, and houses in large numbers to make the capital remunerative. There is no difficulty or danger in that kind of development so long as capital is available and development occurs sufficiently rapidly to make the capital invested in such things as main drains, roads, water, gas and electricity, productive without undue delay. Any great city can ensure these two conditions. Only a great city can ensure them. The Government could help the garden city movement by making cheap capital available, but it would be difficult for the Government which does not itself build houses or factories to ensure rapid development. A great city, which itself builds thousands of houses a year and is also the master of ample capital, can alone provide both the necessary conditions for success. That is the importance of the Wythenshawe experiment. If the garden city movement is to extend it must be sponsored by our great cities.

But the history of Wythenshawe shows that there are two further conditions which are vital to success. The first is that

the city must own the land, or at least the major part of the land. The powers of the city as local authority are limited to such powers as are expressly given by statute, and are totally inadequate to ensure satisfactory development. But the powers as landlord are limited only where actions are expressly prohibited by statute; the landlord can lease land subject to any conditions he likes to impose. It is the landlord power which is enabling Manchester to preserve the amenities of Wythenshawe in all kinds of ways which would not otherwise have been possible.

The second condition is that the city should also itself be the local authority for the satellite garden town. A little consideration will show this to be almost essential. Some services must be provided in advance of building, e.g. roads and sewers, others during the course of the building—specially schools. The city intending to build makes its decisions and has confidence in its own intentions to carry out these decisions; as we have shown, Manchester committed itself to an expenditure of many hundreds of thousands of pounds at Wythenshawe before a single house was built. If Wythenshawe had remained under the County Council, the County Council must inevitably have said to Manchester, "Yes, you intend to build. But suppose you do not carry out your intention? If we commit ourselves to the provision of roads, sewers and schools to serve a population which will inhabit five or ten thousand houses, and you then do not proceed, what is our position going to be? What guarantee can you give us that you will in fact build those houses?" Of course, the city can give no such guarantee, and a deadlock inevitably arises. It is clear that for large-scale development of satellite garden towns the whole of the land concerned must be included in the area of the city which is taking the responsibility for the building.

Parliament, to-day, is taking the view that no extension of cities should be allowed unless and until they can prove that their existing area is completely built up. So long as Parliament maintains this view the possibility of the building of satellite garden towns by our county boroughs is excluded. This seems to me to be narrow and short-sighted. Our great cities are still expanding; even though the population may not increase much more, the rebuilding of the slum areas at lower densities will force a large number of families from the

slums to the outskirts where they ought to be housed in garden cities. If Parliament maintains its present attitude they will be driven out into areas controlled by rural authorities which will be unplanned or ineffectively planned. The conditions may be fairly good but they will be far from the excellence of Wythenshawe.

If, on the other hand, great cities are not only allowed but encouraged to extend their borders and to purchase land, more Wythenshawes will grow up, and the twentieth century will be marked by the development of a series of satellite garden towns which will be one of its chief glories.

ERNEST SIMON.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST.

EVENTS in Germany and Central Europe have diverted attention from the Near East, where many interesting and important changes have occurred during the last few months. The most noteworthy change is in Turko-Italian relations, and it is regrettable to have to record that these relations have greatly deteriorated. The deterioration dates from the spring, when Signor Mussolini made a speech in which he referred to the need of "Italian co-operation with (or expansion into) Asia." This utterance created considerable alarm in Turkey, and Vassif Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, was instructed to seek explanations from the Duce. Vassif Bey was told that the Italian Premier did not regard Turkey as being part of Asia, and that, therefore, the speech in question must not be considered as being directed against Turkey.

Such an explanation, it is needless to say, did not have much effect in Angora, and the Ghazi Mustapha Kemal at once left on a visit to Smyrna, Chanak, Balikisri and other strategical points in Western Anatolia. When he returned to Angora, the Ghazi summoned his Ministers, and after several protracted sittings of the Cabinet, Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister, announced that the Army, Navy and Air Force were to be strengthened. The Grand National Assembly—the Turkish Parliament—at once voted a substantial credit, running into several millions of pounds sterling, for national defence. Many new taxes were levied, the proceeds of which, it was officially stated, would go to defray the increased expenditure on the fighting forces. Simultaneously, the Turkish Press published articles in which Signor Mussolini's speech was severely criticised.

It is extremely unfortunate—to put it mildly—that all this should have occurred, because Fascist Italy and Kemalist Turkey—two powerful Mediterranean powers—had gradually grown to esteem and admire each other. Students of Near Eastern politics will recall that ten years ago—when Great Britain and Turkey were quarrelling about the ownership of the Mosul oilfields—Signor Mussolini made a speech at Tripoli which frightened the Turks, and which was popularly supposed to have contributed not a little to the eventual peaceful

settlement between the Turks and ourselves. In any case, whether it was or was not intended as a threat to the Turks, the fact remains that from 1926 onwards Turko-Italian relations slowly but surely improved, until France, and perhaps other states too, became almost jealous.

The Duce played a prominent part in reconciling Turkey with Greece. He met Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, at Milan, where the basis of a Turko-Greek understanding was laid. Thereafter, Italy, through Signor Orsini Barone, her talented Ambassador in Angora, fostered by every means in her power the Turko-Greek Entente. It is, indeed, not too much to say that this Entente might never have come into existence if it had not been for Italy. Apart from politics, Italy was active in the economic and financial sphere. Italian banks and business firms interested themselves in Turkish affairs; a small financial credit was granted to Turkey by a leading Italian bank. The Turks placed orders for warships in Italian dockyards.

Despite this *rapprochement* between Rome and Angora, the fear of Italian expansion into Asia Minor had never entirely died away from Turkish hearts. The Turks knew, and know, as well as anybody else, that Italy has a large surplus population, and that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Italian Government to know what to do with its citizens. Therefore, the Turkish General Staff was always on the *qui vive* and kept a careful watch on Italian naval and military activities. The fact that Italy owns several islands in the Dodecanese, which are unpleasantly close to the Turkish mainland, has always made the Turks a little anxious. Of recent years the fortification by the Italians of Leros and other islands in this archipelago has made the Turks doubly suspicious. This, incidentally, explains to a large degree the two unfortunate incidents which lately took place along the Ægean coast. In one instance a party of British naval officers, out for a bathe, were shot at by Turkish sentries, with the result that one officer was killed and another wounded. In the other case, an Italian fisherman was killed. It has now been learnt that Turkish sentries and coastguards along the Ægean seaboard have orders to prevent any unauthorised persons landing on their shores, using force if they deem it necessary. The actual instructions lay down that the sentries shall warn the occupants of any strange craft to stop; if they do not

obey orders at once, shots shall be fired into the air; if this proves ineffective, the sentries have orders to open fire on the occupants. It can readily be understood that such orders can easily result in innocent blood being spilt, while it is also obvious that the Turks are very nervous and suspicious about the movements of any foreign craft along their coast.

Well-informed observers in Turkey and elsewhere do not really believe that Italy can have any hostile intentions towards the Kemalist Republic. It is argued that the debacle suffered by the invading Greek army only twelve years ago must be a warning to any other country which envisages attacking Turkey. In addition, the well-known fighting qualities of the Turks are thought to be yet another factor capable of making the Italians reflect before they embark on any Asiatic adventure. Whether these observers are right or wrong, it remains certain that Turkey is scared of Italian plans and designs, and this apprehension exercises a disquieting effect in the Near East.

Besides being suspicious of Italy, Turkey has for some time past not been too well disposed towards Bulgaria. The unwillingness of the Bulgarians to enter the Balkan Pact (concluded early this year in Athens between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania) did not please the Turks, who regarded it as an unfriendly act. Consequently, Turko-Bulgarian relations have suffered, especially because the Turks believe that Rome and Sofia see eye to eye on many questions affecting the Balkans. The result of this has been a revival of Turkish interest in Eastern Thrace, the European province of the Kemalist Republic. The first step was the creation of an Inspectorate-General in Thrace; Ibrahim Taly Bey, an able administrator, who had made his mark in Kurdistan, was appointed Inspector-General, with his headquarters at Adrianople. His task was to reorganise the civil administration, improve communications, and—perhaps unofficially—settle Turkish refugees in Thrace.

It cannot have been pure coincidence that just about the time that Ibrahim Taly Bey was sent to Adrianople several other events occurred in Thrace. First, the Turks renewed their demand to fortify the Straits, the northern banks of which are in Thrace. Secondly, important troop movements took place, it being alleged that the number of troops in Thrace was insufficient for national security. Thirdly, prac-

tically all the Jews, who happen to be Turkish subjects, living in Thrace and in the Gallipoli Peninsula, were persecuted and obliged to leave their homes. It is not, of course, suggested that Ibrahim Taly Bey was a party to this persecution; it is, indeed, fairly certain that he was opposed to it. But it is certainly curious that all these events should have occurred almost simultaneously, and it is not unnatural that the Bulgarians should be nervous regarding Turkish intentions.

At present there is a "demilitarised zone" between Turkey and Bulgaria. Turkey, it is understood, would like this zone suppressed so as to be able to fortify Adrianople and/or the surrounding country. Bulgaria is believed to be opposed to the suppression of the zone. Another matter which has caused friction between Turkey and Bulgaria is the ill-treatment which the Turks allege that the Bulgarians are inflicting on their minorities in Bulgaria. There are about half a million Turks who have been living in Bulgaria for many years; they are, in fact, relics of the days when Turkey owned what is now Bulgaria. The Bulgarians deny ill-treating these minorities, and, in their turn, accuse the Kemalist Turks of carrying on an active campaign among the minorities. This campaign is said to be aimed at making the minorities discontented and thus persuading them to return to Turkey. So far the alleged campaign would not seem to have met with much success, although some thousands of Moslems have recently arrived in Istanbul from Bulgaria.

It will thus be seen that Turkey is now not on good terms with Italy and Bulgaria. The writer would like, however, to stress the point that there is little danger of Turkey attacking Bulgaria; but the Turks seem to feel that the Bulgarians may one day make common cause with Italy and cause them difficulties in Eastern Thrace.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Government has given an assurance to the British Government that, in view of the troubled state of affairs in Europe, it will refrain from raising the question of the fortification of the Straits for the time being. Despite this assurance, it is as certain as anything can be that the Turks are determined to fortify the Straits in the not far distant future. They argue—and there is a good deal to be said for their point of view, even if one does not agree with it—that they should have sovereignty over their own territory. In addition, they point out that Great Britain holds the key

to the western entrance to the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, so why should not they—who own the land bordering on both sides of the Straits—hold the key to the eastern entrance?

Soviet Russia has already made it known that she supports the Turkish demand, but the attitude of the other Great Powers who are signatories of the Straits Convention is not clear. These Powers are Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. Given the actual state of Turko-Italian relations, it is unlikely that Italy will support the Turkish request; the attitude of France and Japan is one of expectancy; that of Great Britain would appear to be hostile, as we always stood for the "Freedom of the Straits." In practice, the Turks could, however, fortify the Straits within a few hours, whether the Great Powers were agreed or not, and this consideration is bound to carry a certain amount of weight when Turkey brings the question before the League of Nations.

Turkey's foreign policy has for the last few years been closely concordant with that of Russia. The Soviet proved to be Turkey's only friend when Western Europe backed the Greeks in their absurd Anatolian adventure, and the Turks have not forgotten this gesture. It would be, in fact, suicidal for Kemalist Turkey to fall out with Soviet Russia. Such a situation was at one time viewed with dismay in Western Europe, but to-day, with the evolution of Soviet foreign policy, it is a state of affairs which may prove to be a guarantee of peace. If Italy should ever make up her mind to attack Turkey with the object of settling a few million of her subjects in Asia Minor, a warning from Moscow that she will find herself opposed to Russian, as well as Turkish, soldiers should have a salutary effect.

Yet another way in which the Soviet can be helpful to Near Eastern peace lies in the Balkans. During the summer the Russians and the Bulgarians resumed diplomatic relations after a lapse of about seventeen years. A Russian Minister will soon be appointed to Sofia, and he will be able to witness at close quarters the difficulties against which Bulgaria is battling. It would not be surprising if the Russians used their influence to bring about a better feeling between Angora and Sofia. The policy of the Soviet in the Near East has undergone a vast change in the last few years. Formerly, the Russians were interested in the stirring up of "Red" propaganda and their activities were viewed with the greatest apprehension

throughout the Peninsula. To-day, the Russians, while still eager to spread Communistic doctrines, are also anxious to keep the peace, as they realise that they will be the losers, and not the gainers, by any European upheaval.

Yet another interesting development in the Near East is the attempt at a Turko-Persian understanding. The Shah Pahlavi of Persia has just concluded a state visit to Turkey. He stayed in the country for about three weeks and was the guest of Ghazi Mustapha Kemal. After three days of official celebrations in Angora, the two rulers went on a tour of the provinces, and it was noticeable that Kemal showed the Shah military aerodromes, naval bases, and munition factories, while imposing military reviews were held in his honour.

On good authority it is learned that Turkey was anxious to enter into a military agreement with Persia, but the Shah, so it appears, was unwilling to commit himself. His visit to Turkey had been planned for a long time, but had always been postponed. The Persians wanted the Ghazi to promise that he would return the Shah's visit; the Turks refused to give this promise, but eventually the Shah decided to make the voyage to Angora without obtaining the much desired assurance. Various reasons are advanced for the Shah's refusal to entertain the Turkish proposal of a military understanding; first, it is surmised that His Majesty did not want to commit himself to any arrangement which might not win Russian approval and which might also arouse suspicions in Great Britain. Secondly, the Shah may have thought that Turkey had more to gain by a military understanding than Persia had. In any case, the Shah's attitude did not satisfy the Turks, and there was a marked change in the cordiality which had at first attended his visit.

It is now necessary to refer to the Balkan Pact—that unfortunate instrument which was so hurriedly concluded in Athens in January of this year, and which has since been the cause of much unseemly bickering in Greece. It is now generally conceded that the Pact—as it stands at present—is a failure. The avowed object of the four signatory Powers was to further the cause of peace in the Near East. So far, the only result which has been achieved is that the interests of the "Haves" have been furthered at the expense of the "Have-nots," for the aim of the Balkan Pact is the maintenance of the *status quo*. Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece all gained vast

strips of territory after the Great War; Turkey lost much of her Asiatic territory, but the Treaty of Lausanne conferred other benefits upon her.

Bulgaria, on the other hand, suffered great injustices after the War, and none of these injustices have been removed. Situated as she is in the centre of the Balkans Bulgaria must be a party to any Balkan Pact which is to prove of any value. Successive Bulgarian Governments have, however, been unwilling to adhere to a Pact which would spell complete renunciation of all their claims. In this refusal they have had, to a certain degree, the support of Yugoslavia, which has recently shown herself better disposed towards her Slav neighbour. It is very unlikely that Bulgaria will join the Pact unless the clauses thereof are radically remodelled, and the same consideration applies to Albania, which has also preferred to remain outside.

Yet another danger threatens the Balkan Pact. This concerns the attitude which any one of the signatory Powers would have to adopt if another one were attacked by a country which is not a signatory to the Pact. If, for example, Italy attacked Turkey, would Greece be obliged to go to Turkey's assistance? This is a point which M. Venizelos raised in the Greek Parliament and which has never been satisfactorily settled, because the wording of the Pact is apparently open to several different interpretations. If, of course, Greece found herself obliged, under the Pact, to assist Turkey, then a most dangerous situation would ensue, and most, if not all, of the Near Eastern Powers would find themselves involved in a war which was no direct concern of theirs. Enough has been written to show that the Balkan Pact is a thoroughly nebulous instrument, which, it is to be hoped, will soon be denounced by all the interested parties.

No mention has yet been made of the rôle which is being played by France in the Near East. At the time of writing, French influence stands very high in the Balkans and in Turkey—higher than it has stood at any time during the last twenty years. The reason is that France is strong, is rich, knows what she wants and has not been afraid to pursue a continuous policy. Turko-French relations were strained for many years; partly because of the squabble over the Ottoman Debt, partly because of the vexed question of the Syrian frontier. Now that these two matters have been amicably settled, there is nothing to separate France from Turkey.

Rumania and Yugoslavia belong to the Little Entente, which is France's creation, while even Greece is now very susceptible to French advice. On account of the better feeling which has characterised Anglo-French relations in the Near East during the past few years, there is no need for us to view with anything but favour the increase in French prestige. Indeed, provided that it does not spell too many commercial contracts for French firms, we should encourage this current of opinion among the various Near Eastern races. Our policy is necessarily a more detached one than that of Continental nations, but there is more in common between us and the French than there is with any other great European Power.

Before concluding, it may be worth while to see who is governing the Near Eastern nations. Turkey still has Ghazi Mustapha Kemal and Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister, not forgetting Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff. All these men are as vigorous as ever, and their policy, if necessarily autocratic, seems well suited to Turkey. Greece is governed by old politicians who spend much time wrangling about internal questions. MM. Tsaldaris and Venizelos will, it is thought, soon have to make way for younger men who have more drive. On the other hand, Greece still remains one of the few European states where the parliamentary system of government is held in respect.

Bulgaria presents a thorny problem—both for her rulers and for foreign statesmen. King Boris has, it is to be feared, lost some of his grip, and the political situation is uncertain. The actual Premier, Colonel Kimon Georghieff, is a young and practically untried man. Most of the elder politicians are discredited. Yugoslavia has King Alexander, who is a tower of strength and who shows no signs of losing his control over the Triune Kingdom. In Rumania, King Carol is not too secure on his throne and a Fascist outbreak is always a possibility. Albania has King Zog, but the Italians are known to be dissatisfied with his attitude and his rule may not last for long.

All the six states are suffering from economic and financial troubles, and despite the talk of a Balkan Customs Union nothing tangible has yet been achieved in this direction. Still, all things considered, the Near East is calmer than it usually is, and the only real cloud in the sky is the state of relations prevailing between Turkey and Italy.

Constantinople.

J. WALTER COLLINS.

SOME MEMORIES OF GLADSTONE.*

I TRUST that Lord Gladstone and other members of the family who are present will not consider me frivolous if I introduce a few personal anecdotes; nor will think me guilty of the fault of obtruding myself if I recount incidents of which I was an eye-witness. My only object is to give greater life and reality to the presentment. In the first place, what was his outward aspect? How would some observant person, who saw him when in his full vigour, have described him?

He was of sturdy and athletic build, slightly above middle height, light and springy in walk, rapid in gestures, somewhat pale of countenance, of strongly marked features, the nose aquiline, with compressed lips and deep-set and commanding eyes. He looked you straight in the face, and you somehow felt that he expected your own gaze to be as direct as his own. But the wonder and charm of his voice! Who shall describe it? The deep, melodious baritone, wielded with incomparable although unconscious skill, and capable of every variety of inflexion! Some rather shallow people seem to think that there is a certain amount of insincerity in the artistic use of a great variety of tones. I have heard such a person say, after a great oration, full of moving passages, "All very fine, no doubt, but too like an actor," with the unspoken inference that the orator, preacher or lawyer was only simulating emotions, just as an actor infuses an air of reality into a part depicting imaginary sensations. The answer to this is surely obvious. The skilled actor reproduces the actual tones of passion, pity, indignation or irony which he hears in the voice of able speakers when they are genuinely moved by these respective feelings. The tones themselves are natural, as natural as Nature can make them, although it is not given to everyone to possess them, nor, even when possessing them, to reproduce them with full effect. Their absolute naturalness is proved by the immediate response which they awaken in the breasts of all who hear them; and hence we may draw the exactly opposite conclusion from that of the critic who maintains that perfection and intensity of delivery implies insincerity, namely that the greater the vehemence and naturalness of the tones of the speaker the more likely was he to be profoundly convinced of the truth of what he was saying.

* Address given on Founder's Day (June 29th) at St. Deiniol's Library, Hawarden.

It would not, I fancy, be far wide of the mark if we said that, generally speaking, the two dominating motives in Mr. Gladstone's life were, first, the pursuit and acquisition of the knowledge of essentials, and, secondly, the impressing this knowledge upon the mind and conscience of others. This disposition might perhaps be described as "the missionary spirit"; but whereas the missionary, strictly so-called, is only, or at any rate mainly, concerned with the duty of impressing one aspect of the truth upon his hearers, he was strongly drawn to convert and convince those with whom he came into contact, whenever the subject and occasion seemed of sufficient import. In short, if we were to ask ourselves whether he were what is called of an argumentative spirit, the best answer would be that, whilst gifted to a high degree with the power of argument, he rarely, if ever, argued for the sole pleasure of doing so, but only in order to bring his interlocutor round to his own view. He had not the fencer's delight in swordplay for its own sake; he reasoned to convince, and not to disable.

Again, it has been asked whether he were ambitious. When the late Lord Morley and my father were his guests at Hawarden, he asked the former whether he thought that he was ambitious. With a characteristic uplift of eyebrow, Morley answered that he could hardly doubt it. He turned to my father, who agreed with Mr. Morley. "Well," he said, "you are both wrong. You may think I am, and the world probably thinks so, but I am not." He then went on to say that it was true that he continuously strove for power, but only to be able to promote what seemed to him a useful, and to prevent a dangerous, policy. The weight of responsibility was a burden, the ceremonies were a weariness to the flesh. Even the power of awarding appointments, titles and honours brought more perplexity and anxiety than profit or pleasure. Perhaps he remembered Talleyrand's saying that, when you conferred a post, out of a hundred candidates you made ninety-nine enemies and one ungrateful man.

His conscientiousness in this connection was excessive, especially in making ecclesiastical appointments. Whenever a Church dignitary died, groans resounded in the Secretaries' room; not solely on account of grief for the loss of a good man, but because we knew how many hours of our Chief's precious time would be swallowed up in weighing the respective

claims of candidates. Besides examining all the recommendations which poured in on him from every quarter, he wrote numerous inquiries to all and sundry whom he thought qualified to help him in his choice. The Secretaries sighed for the days of Palmerston, who used, if rumour is to be trusted, to hand over all ecclesiastical appointments to Lord Shaftesbury, and trouble himself no further in the matter. Indeed, I was once so bold as to suggest to my colleagues that we should ask our Chief to let us undertake all preliminary investigations, but this suggestion was promptly squashed, on the ground that he would never allow it, and that if he did, we should make so many mistakes as only to add to his trouble. As I am on the subject of ecclesiastical preferment I may relate a story which Mr. Gladstone narrated with much gusto. A certain Bishop Philpott was regarded as giving too large a share of preferments to his own family and relatives. A friend once ventured to throw out a hint to that effect. "Not at all, my dear Sir," the good Bishop answered, "all the young men to whom I give preferment are excellent young men. I do not prefer them because they are my relatives, but because being my relatives I naturally know them well, and knowing them well I can judge of their fitness for the posts to which I nominate them. It is true that other people recommend young men whom I have never heard of; but in such cases I had much rather trust my own knowledge and judgment than theirs." Mr. Gladstone could certainly not be accused of nepotism, and he was apt to be suspicious of unsolicited recommendations. In answering these he was always careful to put in a saving clause, which ran, "that he would carefully examine Mr. X's claims and qualifications, in conjunction with those of other candidates."

We have heard him at times described as disingenuous, and it is worth while to examine how such a charge can have been brought against a man who in all his public as well as his private actions was the very soul of honour. The charge, which was often laid and sometimes quite sincerely, must, I think, have had its origin as follows. Like many men of accurate mind, capable of deep and subtle distinctions, he was especially anxious to avoid ambiguities, which would obscure or distort his meaning. Conscious that a change in circumstances might necessitate a corresponding change of policy, he wished to anticipate and provide for such contingencies as

far as possible, and so free himself from a charge of wanton or capricious change of front. In order to effect this he often resorted to exceptions, provisions and conditions, frequently included in a parenthesis. But however seemingly involved his sentences might appear in consequence of these parentheses, to anyone who followed them closely they were always perfectly co-ordinated and carried out, not only with grammatical, but also with logical exactness. These sometimes perplexed the duller witted of his hearers and gave a pretext to the more malicious of his opponents for alleging that they were only so many devices, or loopholes of escape, for freeing himself from what seemed to be pledges. In fact, it was his very anxiety to avoid ambiguity which caused him to be accused of it. Now there was a further development of this, which it is interesting to trace. Casuistry, whether good or bad (for there can be good casuistry as well as bad, although the word generally bears an ill meaning, especially to English ears), is often connected with the methods of the Jesuits. His critics argued as follows: "Mr. Gladstone is known to be a High Churchman, he uses subtle distinctions, so do the Jesuits, therefore Mr. Gladstone is a Jesuitical casuist." Not very good logic, though sufficiently so to the mentality of men who were not trained logicians, nor were exactly prejudiced in his favour.

I have been asked whether he were an exacting master. He certainly expected those who served him to give him of their best, and so long as they did this he was satisfied. He was never unreasonable, never unjust, hardly ever showed irritation and then very seldom against individuals. One very hot afternoon in the summer of 1880, when the thermometer was at 90 degrees, I had to make a précis from various flimsies which had come over from the Foreign Office relating to the difficulties and delays caused by the Unspeakable Turk in carrying out the provisions of the Treaty of Dulcigno, after the close of the Russo-Turkish War. I settled down to my work, and unfortunately in a big armchair, but as I had been dancing for several nights up to two or three in the morning, gradually the boundaries of Thessaly, the delimitation of Montenegro, the procrastination of the Sublime Porte, all melted into one beatific haze. Suddenly a door was thrown open, a violent draught sent all the flimsies whirling about the room, and the Prime Minister stood before me. All that

he said was "I shall be glad to have that précis when it is ready," adding, as an afterthought, "An armchair is not a very good thing to work in, in such hot weather." I can hardly bear to think of it even now.

The Secretaries took it in turns to attend on Sunday mornings at 10 o'clock for any urgent work which might have to be done. One day, in mid July, when it was my turn of duty, I slightly overslept myself, but got to Downing Street in time by going without my breakfast. When the work was done Mr. Gladstone said, "Where are you going to church?" I had not the courage to say that I was going to walk across the Park to the St. James's Club for a late breakfast, so gave a non-committal reply. "Then you had better come on with me to Marylebone, to hear Canon Barker; he preaches an excellent sermon." This was more in the nature of a command than of an inquiry; so off we went at four miles an hour in the blazing sun. On the way he discoursed volubly on the Council of Trent, a subject with which I had only a bowing acquaintance. In the course of this he said, without any irony, for he always thought that everybody had the same range of information as himself, "You remember, of course, what Fra Paolo Sarpi said?" I had to confess my ignorance not only as to what had been said, but as to who it was that had said it. He stopped dead: "What! You don't mean to say that you never even heard of Fra Paolo Sarpi!" I put in a humble demurrer that I had taken my degree in Greats and not in History, but even this did not seem to lessen his surprise. After the service he kindly invited me to go back with him to luncheon, so away we went again at the same brisk pace. By luncheon time I was fairly famished, and, as local reporters say, "did full justice to the ample repast." Mr. Gladstone thereupon remarked: "I always say that there is nothing to give you a good appetite like a walk to and from church on a Sunday morning." I did not dare to add, "and having had no breakfast."

As another illustration of the way in which he expected everybody to be well informed, I may mention an incident, when I was taking up some papers to him, in 1880, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. He turned round and flashed out a question: "What was the Sugar Duty in 1842?" "I will look it up, Sir." "What! You don't know?" Hereupon I could not help rejoicing, although I fear that

it was hardly respectful: "I should have thought, Sir, that is a question that would come more naturally from me to you." He was not at all offended at the freedom of my remark, and only said: "You are quite right; it was I who should have known what it was."

It has been said that he was deficient in humour. This is not the case, though it is true that he naturally took a serious view of any subject which might be mooted, and did not look at everything from a jocular aspect. Indeed, joking upon certain topics he regarded not only as bad taste, but quite impossible. You felt this instinctively, and I know of no instance of any questionable jest being made in his presence. As you sometimes see a notice in France, "*Chasse réservée*," so, not only did he never cross these forbidden boundaries, but, in his hearing, humorists were strictly warned off the premises.

Apart from these restrictions, nobody had a more genuine and spontaneous sense of fun. At Walmer Castle, when my uncle, Lord Granville, was Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, Mr. Gladstone was his guest in the early 'eighties. My cousins, who were then children, were going to a circus at Deal one afternoon, and Mr. Gladstone insisted on accompanying them, saying that it was long since he had seen a circus. He enjoyed the fun as much as anybody, he courteously returned the dignified ringmaster's respectful bow, beamed on the young lady in spangles when she jumped through the paper hoops, was interested in the strong man's effort in painfully raising the enormous weights of cardboard painted to look like masses of iron, and roared with delight at the clown's most well-worn jokes and antics. All the time he was quite unconscious that he was more the centre of attraction to the audience than the performers in the ring. The onlookers were enchanted to see him enjoying himself, and without realising it he was the leader of the applause. As we were leaving he sent for the proprietor and complimented him on the performance. The proprietor conveyed to me in a whisper that if, in his own language, I could get the old gentleman there to-morrow it would be a fiver in my pocket. I resisted the temptation, but the town was placarded the next day with posters announcing the performance as patronised by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Mr. Gladstone often honoured my father by staying at

Holmbury, our house in the Surrey hills. It was at a time when the Irish partisans of physical force were making themselves prominent by dynamite explosions and threats to the lives of Ministers. Detectives were accordingly sent down by the Home Office to act as his bodyguard. This was no easy task, as he resented their presence apparently more than he was disturbed at the possibility of attack. It was my anxious duty to inform the detectives of his probable movements and to arrange with them how they could keep in touch with him without his noticing them.

It was on one of these visits that he enjoyed a feast of gooseberries in the kitchen garden. Indeed, he ate so many that Mrs. Gladstone grew apprehensive and asked my father to stop him. My father said that he really could not prevent his guest from eating his fruit if he liked it; so Mrs. Gladstone took the bull by the horns and said: "William, dear, I don't think you ought to eat so many." "And, pray, why not?" "Well, you see," sinking her voice to a confidential whisper, "I am afraid that there won't be enough left for Mr. Leveson's guests." Although this was a wildly improbable reason, as there were enough gooseberries to feed a regiment, the hint was enough for a man of his courtesy and consideration to cause him at once to desist.

Any intimate account of Mr. Gladstone would be indeed imperfect if it did not include a tribute to that kind and gracious lady, the loving partner of his life and partaker of his joys and sorrows. Whilst fulfilling—and more than fulfilling—all her duties to their numerous family, she was ever the careful guardian of his health and comfort, ever watchful to relieve him of anxieties and importunities, ever eager to promote his relaxation and amusement. Not only was she a loving wife and a devoted mother, but her great and noble heart was ever ready to alleviate, as far as in her lay, whatever tidings of sorrow, suffering, sickness, or distress came to her knowledge. Among those who were privileged to know and to love her who can forget the little nod of sympathy, the quick smile of understanding, or the warm and ready clasp of her friendly hand? At that last sad moment in Westminster Abbey, when we saw the Heir to the Throne bend to kiss that hand, all felt that it was a tribute not only royally bestowed but worthily rendered in her bereavement to a great and noble lady.

Mr. Gladstone was an admirable conversationalist. He was at his ease with everybody, and in consequence, in spite of his rather alarming appearance, made everyone at ease with him. He was interested in everything, except gossip. I remember his having a long chat with a fine old yeoman, a neighbour of ours in Surrey, on the rearing of chickens, when he delighted old Mr. Hamshire by the shrewdness of his questions and remarks. When he was at Sir Charles Tennant's house, The Glen, in Peeblesshire, during one of his Midlothian campaigns, he was nowhere to be found when it was time to start for a big meeting. At last he was discovered at the end of the garden engaged in an animated discussion with the head gardener as to the merits and demerits of a new kind of American axe. The gardener apologised for having detained him, and afterwards said: "'deed, but ye wad ha'e thocht that he'd naething in his mind but axes."

On landing at Inverness, after a five weeks' cruise in 1885 in the Norwegian Fiords with Sir Thomas (afterwards Lord) Brassey on his well-known yacht, *The Sunbeam*, he made a point of shaking hands with every one of the crew, down to the cabin-boy. I remember that during this cruise we had to cross on foot a foaming river by a rough wooden bridge, through the planks of which you could see the rushing waters below. Although the bridge was some ten feet wide, he asked me to give him my arm, as anything of that kind made him very giddy. I remember being surprised that a man of such powerful intellect and will should be affected in this way.

He was considerate; and very courteous, not only in demeanour but in fact. I think it was in 1891, when we were in Opposition, that I was asked to speak in the House, on a motion in favour of the Redistribution of Seats. I was called on by the Speaker just before the dinner hour, when it is the custom that the sitting is adjourned for half an hour. At the end of that time the Member who had been called upon before the adjournment has to be in his place and begin his speech. Naturally in these circumstances the audience is scanty. On this occasion when I rose there were exactly four other Members present; but one of them was my old Chief. I spoke from the bench behind the Front Opposition Bench, upon which he sat immediately beneath me, gazing full in my face, with hand to ear as though eager not to miss a syllable. It was an act of pure kindness on his part and a great honour:

but all the same it was an appalling experience. I felt exactly like a small boy in Lower Remove sent for by the Headmaster to give an unseen construe, in order that the Head might see how he was getting on. I was conscious that if I made a mess of it, it might prejudice my future career. The poor little speech, such as it was, was made in dead silence; there was nobody to cheer, though once or twice he encouraged me by a sign of approval; there were not even interruptions or objections to enliven things by affording opportunity for a rejoinder. Needless to say how glad I was when it was over. Not content with his goodness in curtailing his dinner hour, Mr. Gladstone was so kind as to write a charming little note to my father, which greatly touched us both.

It is now time to pass from these personal reminiscences to some consideration of his general policy and method of dealing with public business. It would obviously be improper, on this occasion, to enter upon a defence or advocacy of his political measures; but it might not be out of place to observe that, whilst the political parties to which he was attached at various periods were different, the main lines of thought which guided him throughout his life were the same. From the time when, as a young man, he was the hope of the stern, unbending Tories, during the intermediate phase when he followed Peel on the disruption of the Tory Party through the repeal of the Corn Laws, and down to the closing period of his career when he gradually grew more and more in sympathy with the views of the more advanced wing of the Liberal Party, his leading principles, as I previously remarked, did not vary.

How can these be most readily summed up? In the first place a consistent love of peace, and as a corollary to this a constant desire for franker and better relations with foreign Powers; in the second place an ardent pursuit of economy, whereby the nation's resources might be fostered and strengthened, concurrently with an ever-increasing standard of comfort and well-being for all classes, especially the poorest, of the community; and lastly a gradual but progressive extension of the powers of self-government both in the spheres of imperial and local administration. These three leading principles have been aptly summarised in the phrase "Peace, Retrenchment and Reform." This phrase has been by custom attached to one political party, but the aims which it symbolises are so universal and their advantages so obvious, that there is no

reason why it should not be adopted in its widest sense as a watchword by any political party in the nation.

I may recall three especially illuminating remarks made to me by Mr. Gladstone. The first, in which he pointed out that the yield of Income Tax varied substantially according to the prosperity of the nation, how in good times taxable incomes were not only far more numerous than in times of depression, but that their individual, as well as aggregate, amount was much higher. So that one penny of Income Tax in times of prosperity brought in more revenue than a tax of three or four pence in a season of depression.

I once asked him whether he did not think it unfair that the rate of duty should be the same on all grades of tobacco, and that the poor man should have to pay as much duty per pound on the cheapest tobacco as the rich man paid per pound on the costliest Havana cigar. He said that he had considered this, but had given up the idea of differentiating the duty, chiefly for the following reasons. In the first place it was very difficult to assess the exact value of the tobacco or cigar, a difficulty which would occasion much dispute and delay; and, secondly, that as the poorer classes were untaxed in all the necessities of life (as they happily were in those days) and were exempt from Income Tax and similar imposts, it was but fair that they should contribute a certain moderate amount to the revenue of the country.

His third remark related to the composition of political parties. He observed, and, as it seems to me, very justly, that it was far preferable that the dividing lines between parties should be vertical rather than horizontal. By which he meant that each party should include within itself elements of different social, economic and cultural strata. In other words, that a man or woman should not say to himself or herself "I will join this party because I am rich," or "such another party because I am poor"; but that each should be guided in his preference by his intellectual or moral judgment and not by material or class considerations. He saw, and none more clearly, that if political parties became thus limited to a contest between the "Haves" and the "Have-nots," the standards of political thought would fall and political contests be degraded to an undignified, sordid and perilous scramble.

And now with reference to his Foreign Policy. This was animated in the first place by an ardent love of freedom, which

he believed to be the chief means whereby men became good citizens and useful to their own country and to the world at large. He desired that the rights of other nations should be respected by Great Britain, as fully as we required ours to be respected by them. He had a more than usual horror of war as a means of enforcing political decisions, and an equally strong desire to substitute arbitration in its place.

It was not in Mr. Gladstone to "prophesy smooth things, to prophesy deceits," and his very vigour of denunciation and a certain masterful impatience of obstacles often thwarted his measures and gave the victory to his opponents. The fact is, like many great and good men, he had too high an opinion of human nature. A lovable fault indeed, and how far better than the opposite defect of under-valuing everybody and everything. When a course of action struck him as being just and right, he perhaps did not always pause to ask himself whether at the moment it was feasible. His quick intelligence did not always realise that some novel aspect of truth which rapidly commended itself to him, was only borne in more slowly and gradually—sometimes even painfully—upon less sensitive and receptive minds. Then again, in his ardour in pursuit of an aim he made small allowance to his adherents if they occasionally slackened in their efforts or did not respond with the ready zeal which he expected. For the same reasons he under-rated, even if he gave them a thought at all, the effectiveness of honours and rewards, of little flatteries and attentions, which go so far to encourage the wavering and confirm the doubtful. He cared for none of these things, why, therefore, he thought, should others? At any rate, he would say to himself, he had far too much to do and far too little leisure to waste time on conciliating support by such methods as these.

As an instance of this I may mention the way in which he occupied every spare minute, in the lobbies of the House during a Division, with his correspondence, writing for dear life until the Teller's cry of "Door! Door!" summoned lingerers to vote. More than once when I was a Whip, I ventured to interrupt him by asking whether I might bring up for a moment or two some supporter who would have greatly prized a few words from him. He generally glanced up impatiently and said "No! No! not now. Can't you see that I'm busy? Some other time, perhaps." But that "other

time" never came, for he was always busy. In passing, one may notice that the Prime Ministers who were the greatest adepts in these arts of personal conciliation were Fox, Canning, Palmerston, Disraeli and Mr. Lloyd George; whilst those who neglected such means of strengthening their position with their immediate followers, besides Mr. Gladstone, were Pitt, Wellington, Peel, Russell and Lord Salisbury.

Moreover, he was always, so to speak, at concert pitch, ready to press forward in a moment. This gave him his almost unique power of raising wave after wave of enthusiastic response to his glowing appeals to the nation. But he sometimes forgot that popular enthusiasm is apt to die down or to be diverted into other channels, and that persistence is one of the rarest and hardest of the virtues.

However, his work remains. Much he effected with his own hand and in his life; more has been and will be accomplished through his guidance and example. He has been a shining light and an inspiration to many. The seed of his eloquence and teaching has borne fruit in many hearts and minds, and these again will hand on to those who come after them the message of wisdom and goodwill. Indeed of him it may be truly said:

For this abides amongst us yet
Of those who won their way to fame,
The echo of a long regret,
The shadow of a mighty name.

GEORGE LEVESON GOWER.

SCIENCE AND THE COAL INDUSTRY.

THERE has been an enormous advance in our knowledge of the right use of our coal supplies since Professor Jevons published his book on the Coal Question in 1865. His son made a prophecy in 1915 that in 1931 we should be raising 396,000,000 tons of coal a year and exporting 172,000,000 tons. The advance of science both here and in other coal-producing countries, together with the utilisation of foreign oil, has falsified those figures. During the last ten or twelve years the demand for coal has declined, with the result that some 300,000 or 400,000 miners have been thrown out of work and over 200,000 must be regarded as permanently unemployed. The present production of coal is about 207,000,000 tons a year, and as compared with 1923 is only about half its value. Apart, therefore, from the heavy charge on the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the terrible suffering involved in the case of the miners and their families, the right utilisation of coal must be of immense importance. We are now beginning to see that the burning of coal in the raw state is a wasteful method of employing the energy of coal, and gas undertakings have led the way in showing how great economies can be effected. A ton of coal will now produce a much larger number of therms of gas than was formerly the case, a saving in fact of more than forty per cent. during the last twenty years, but in addition to that immense saving there is the fact that with the combined output of gas, coke, coal tars, and chemical by-products we can now claim that an up-to-date gas undertaking gives us eighty per cent. of the energy value of the coal. We may even improve on this in the future. For the moment it is sufficient to say that just as the gas undertakings by constant research have made efficient the production of gas, so science has improved the efficiency of boilers where raw coal is used, and the coke ovens where metallurgical coke is produced. An immense saving has thus been made in the production of iron and steel. The latest developments in the economical use of coal consist in low temperature carbonisation, providing in the main a smokeless fuel, and the hydrogenation of coal, the principal product of which is high grade petrol and middle oils. We cannot ignore this question of oil, since oil is taking the place of coal both at sea and on land, and the ships of the British Navy and a very large number of big passenger vessels

are driven by steam which is raised by the burning of oil. The percentage of ships burning coal has fallen from 88·84 per cent. in 1914 to 53·56 per cent. in 1933. It does not follow, of course, that oil will continue this rate of progress, for it obviously has some disadvantages; but it is important to remember that the displacement of coal owing to increase in the use of imported oil has amounted to 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 tons during the last few years. It seems obvious that oil, petrol, gas, and electricity are taking the place of the burning of raw coal, and this will mean a saving in the amount of coal used, though it is too soon to say how far the coal miners will suffer by this more economical use of coal. One other point seems fairly conclusive, and that is that the use of raw coal for domestic consumption will gradually decrease. To-day the housewife much prefers to use gas for cooking and heating, and however much we may like the coal fire we have to acknowledge that only one-fifth of the heat contained in the coal is utilised in this form, and the rest finds its way into the atmosphere which it pollutes, with resultant injury not only to our vegetation but also to our clothes and our buildings. Moreover, we are losing by the burning of coal in its raw state valuable tars, oils and other by-products which are of great commercial value. So far as the actual damage is concerned, it is estimated to cost the country nearly £40,000,000 per annum.

The two important experimental industries to which reference has already been made, viz. low temperature carbonisation and the hydrogenation of coal are, in a sense, linked together, since hydrogen can be utilised to improve the heavy tars of low temperature carbonisation. Science has now taught us how to make hydro-carbon oils from coal, and in this way coal may be able in the future to compete with oil from other countries. For some years past we have been in the habit of using National Benzole Mixture, which is one of the results of high temperature carbonisation. Benzole is obtained partly from the gas and partly from the tar, but mainly from the gas by a process which is described as "scrubbing" the gas with oil. In this way we get an excellent motor fuel, but, of course, only the most modern gas-works recover the benzole, although the number is gradually increasing. At the moment it is estimated that 25,000,000 gallons are being produced in this way. Another great improvement is in the manufacture of coke for metallurgical

purposes. When the beehive ovens were in regular use all the gas and benzole and other by-products were lost, but the recovery ovens have effected an immense saving and if they were in common use it is estimated that the amount of refined benzole available would be something like 60,000,000 gallons. In addition the coke ovens have so cheapened the production of iron and steel that the amount of coal required for the production of one ton of iron has been greatly reduced.

For the production of oil and motor spirit from coal, the method known as hydrogenation is the most successful. In 1933 the Prime Minister made an offer that the Government preference of 4d. a gallon would be allowed on the home-produced motor spirit, with the result that the Imperial Chemical Industries produced plans for building at Billingham-on-Tees a plant which would cost £7,000,000. That scheme has been somewhat modified, but the cost of the new plant now being constructed will be about £2,500,000, which, added to the existing plant already carried out, will mean that something like £4,000,000 will have been spent on this experiment. Will this huge expenditure be justified? The method is so to treat coal by pulverising it and mixing it with heavy oil under heat that it becomes in the end a hot fluid. Hydrogen made from hydro-carbon gases and steam is compressed and forced into the converter containing the liquid coal; a reaction between the hydrogen and the coal takes place with the result that the oxygen, nitrogen, and sulphur in the coal are largely removed, and the remaining hydro-carbon matter in the coal liquid combines with the hydrogen to form hydro-carbon oils. The oils are then distilled and a crude light oil is recovered which is refined as motor spirit, while the heavier oil can be used as Diesel oil or further hydrogenated to make a motor spirit. One ton of motor spirit can thus be made from a consumption of 3·15 tons of coal if it is dry and ash-free, and in the Billingham plant it is estimated that they will be able to produce 30,000,000 gallons of motor spirit a year from the consumption of 365,000 tons of coal. We must not expect a very large number of miners therefore to be employed as a result of hydrogenation, but we may expect a big saving to the nation in the future.

The method of hydrogenation is due to Dr. Bergius of Germany, and the first tests in England were carried out by the British Bergius syndicate; others were made by

the British Government at the Fuel Research Station. Subsequently the Imperial Chemicals Industries bought the rights of the syndicate and are now engaged on what may prove to be a revolution in the treatment of coal. Low temperature carbonisation is in its initial stage and has its own advantages. It is still in doubt as to whether this method will be entirely satisfactory from the point of view of cost. The products of low temperature carbonisation are smokeless fuel called coalite, oil, petrol, and a rich gas. Only about 200,000 tons of coal per annum are at present being carbonised by low-temperature methods and up to the present there has been a demand for all the coalite produced at 30s. per ton, but it is very doubtful whether there would be a sufficient demand at this price if some millions of tons of coal were treated in the same fashion. It is possible that the price of the smokeless fuel would then drop by some 10s. a ton. Of course if legislation compelled the use of coalite the whole situation would be altered, but there is no prospect of Parliament taking any such step. The gas produced cannot always be profitably utilised, and one of the problems facing the Low Temperature Carbonisation Co. is the efficient use of the by-products like gas and oil, if these should be produced in much larger quantities. Quite recently it has been suggested that the hydrogenation plant could be profitably employed in connection with low temperature carbonisation for the hydrogenation of the tar oils produced in these plants. To convert tar oils into petrol would cost about 4d. per gallon as compared with 5d. per gallon by the direct conversion of coal to petrol by the Bergius process. The whole question is at an extremely interesting stage, and the next ten years may see a great change in this problem of the right utilisation of our coal supplies. Another development of the near future is the use of coal gas as a motor fuel. Many commercial vehicles have already adopted this method, using the coal gas of the ordinary gas undertakings or the coke ovens. Steel cylinders constructed to withstand very high pressure, into which gas is forced, are at present employed. One great difficulty consists in the construction of cylinders that are light enough and strong enough to withstand a pressure of 300,000 lb. to the square inch. The Birmingham Gas Department has made successful experiments along these lines, and the cost is considerably less per mile than with petrol-driven vehicles.

Up to the present coal gas as a means of propulsion has been used chiefly in the case of omnibuses, but the weight of the cylinders has limited the range of action. One other method of using gas for propulsion purposes is that of generating producer gas by forcing steam and air through coke or charcoal, heated to a high temperature. The gas is generated on the vehicle itself, and it is thought that producer gas may be suitable for light commercial vans although not for the heavier omnibus. The advantage of using this method is that the cost of running is about a quarter that of petrol, and if coke is used as over against charcoal it would, of course, mean the consumption of an additional quantity of coal. Whatever may be its uses for heavier vehicles it is not likely to appeal to the private motorists, and, indeed, in most cases it is much too heavy and bulky for light cars. If, then, the desideratum be an increased use of our coal, with a view to employing more miners on the one hand and making the import of foreign oil less necessary, the State should encourage in every way the economical use of coal for the purposes we have described. It is obvious that if we pay £40,000,000 a year for overseas oil and petrol, and if most of this oil and petrol could be produced in this country, the question which has troubled us for some time past, viz. our decrease in the exports of coal and coke, would not be so serious a matter. It must be remembered that the Government, though it would gain by reason of the additional number of miners employed and also by the addition of a large number who would be engaged in the refining industry, would nevertheless lose an important source of revenue in the tax on motor spirit from abroad. The tax on motor spirit, which is 8d. a gallon, brings in £35,000,000, and although the tax upon heavy oils has been reduced by 1d. a gallon the loss to the Exchequer would have to be taken into account. At the same time the loss is more apparent than real. There are other points to be borne in mind, and one is the possibility that some of the sources of oil supply may in a few years be dried up, and although others will doubtless be discovered there is no absolute certainty that these new sources will provide all that is required. A second point is that in all probability there will be an increasing demand both for motor spirit and for oil, and therefore for some years to come any motor spirit produced in this country would not necessarily displace imported petrol.

There is an increase of these imports every year, and for that reason if for no other it might be well to encourage production and forgo at least a portion of the tax on imported oil. There is little doubt that if the exchange of goods and service between different countries were more or less equivalent we could then export our coal and import our oil; but while we have large reserves of coal we cannot obtain a sufficient supply of oil from within the Empire, since we only import from the Dominions about two per cent. of the petroleum produced throughout the world.

There is no doubt that our exports of coal are decreasing and are likely still further to decrease, and the only solution is therefore to find some uses for coal in the home market, and the direction in which such a use can be found is clearly in the production of motor spirit and oils. If we take the example of the Works at Billingham, which the Imperial Chemicals Industries are now constructing, we see that although the Exchequer may lose in taxation by its preference of 4d. a gallon something like £500,000 a year, it will be directly and indirectly employing some thousands of men and therefore saving unemployed benefit, and will also increase the purchasing power of these men in such a way as to offset the loss on the Exchequer. There are many other matters that ought to be taken into consideration, such as the employment of British oil tankers and the investment of British money in oil fields; but although it is difficult to prophesy the future, it is not likely that there would be any real loss to the country, and in the end there would doubtless be a very considerable gain. An argument which is often used in favour of the production of our own oil and petrol is that employed by those who are concerned for the defence of the country. They are using oil for the fighting Services on an immense scale, and one reason for the building of fast cruisers is the necessity for protecting our supplies not only of food but also of oil. The defence forces would therefore be in favour of the production of our own supplies if it can be shown that this was not accompanied by too great a loss. The Navy has adopted oil burning as being more efficient than coal burning, and no sudden reversion to former practice is at all possible. We must therefore take it for granted that in our lifetime we shall never go back to coal, but shall employ oil whether manufactured at home or imported from abroad.

PERCY ALDEN.

DEMOCRACY OR DICTATORSHIP?*

DURING the past century the dominant movement in British history has been the trend towards democracy. By some great men, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Sir Henry Maine, and Mr. Justice Stephen, this movement has been deplored: they have seen in self-government the negation of good government. By the majority of political thinkers, however, the movement has been welcomed and applauded; in particular, the philosophical radicals from Jeremy Bentham to John Morley have regarded the merits of democracy as immeasurably outnumbering and outweighing its defects. But neither lamentation nor laudation has seemed to have had the slightest effect upon the ceaseless if slow advance of the people to power. It has resembled the irresistible movement of a glacier, or the overwhelming rise of a river in spate. The stages of its progress have been marked by five great Reform Acts: the first, and in principle the most important, namely the Act of 1832, extended the franchise from the upper middle class to the lower, that is to the farmers in the counties and the *petite bourgeoisie* in the towns; the Act of 1867 enfranchised the urban artisans; the Act of 1884 conferred the vote upon the agricultural labourer; the Act of 1918 opened the electoral roll to Victorian matrons and spinsters, while the concluding and conclusive Act of 1928 let in the flood of Edwardian "flappers." Unless infants and imbeciles can assert and establish their right to share in the government of their country, British democracy can hardly advance further in the political sphere.

Some time, however, before British democracy attained to its present formal completeness, an antagonistic tendency had begun to display itself. For the larger the electorate the more difficult had it become to get it to make up its mind or to do anything. Hence social reformers filled with eager zeal, political idealists in passionate desire to realise their dreams, religious enthusiasts burning with missionary ardour, all sorts of revolutionaries in a hurry, had become disillusioned and disgusted with democracy, and had begun to make experiments in methods of more rapid and more direct action. For

* The substance of an Address delivered to the Summer School at the University College, Southampton, on August 2nd, 1934.

example, in industrial concerns the weapon of the strike had begun to supersede the democratic method of discussion and agreement: the years 1906-14 were pre-eminently the period of belligerent syndicalism. Similarly, women in their demand for votes had begun to abandon argument for violence, and by means of incendiarism, window-breaking, fisticuffing, and horse-whipping—methods which were the very negation and destruction of the democracy that they sought to share—had commenced to carry on their assault upon the constitution. Again, in Ireland, Nationalists in the south and Orangemen in the north had begun to arm and drill in view of a probable civil war. In short, the movement towards dictatorship had set in. If it be asked why I regard these experiments in direct action as essentially dictatorial in character, I would reply by comparing as briefly as possible the fundamental features of the two forms of government—democracy and dictatorship.

The most famous of all definitions of democracy is that of President Lincoln: according to him it is "government of the people, for the people, by the people." This famous definition, as I have elsewhere had occasion to show,* is open to criticism; but, in spite of its defects, it serves to bring out the cardinal fact that the essence of democracy is the sovereignty of the community-as-a-whole, the supremacy of public opinion, the dominance of the communal conscience, the ascendancy of the general will. Democracy stands for the reign of reason in politics, as against the tyranny of brute force. Its method is discussion, argument, debate. Hence it necessarily involves freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of public meeting, freedom of the press.

Dictatorship is the negation of democracy. It is the form of government best connoted by the Greek term "tyranny," that is to say the irresponsible rule of one man. It stands for the dominance of force in politics, as against reason. Its method is violence. It involves the suppression of liberty—the prohibition of freedom of speech, the censorship of the press, the abolition of the right of public meeting, the silencing of criticism, the crushing of opposition, and even (it would appear) the murder of possible antagonists. That dictatorship of some sort may in certain emergencies be necessary, few would venture to deny. The term "dictator" comes to us from Rome, and the Roman republican constitution provided

* *Democracy at the Crossways* (1918), p. 12.

that on occasions of grave public peril all power should, for a strictly limited period and for a clearly defined purpose, be placed in the hands of a single irresponsible ruler. The reason why in such cases of sudden and extreme urgency dictatorship is preferred to any other form of administration is that the single unfettered will of the individual can operate with far greater promptitude, decisiveness and efficiency than the composite and corporate will of any body of debaters.

But if dictatorship has the virtue of necessity in cases of urgent public danger, and for short periods of time, as a permanent system of government it has disadvantages of the gravest kind. To establish it as a normal type of administration is (as Burke might have said) to convert the medicine of the constitution into its staple diet. To deprive the citizen of all share in the government of his country is to degrade the standard of citizenship, and to create a passive and servile type of humanity. The suppression of freedom in the spheres of politics and religion necessarily involves the destruction of independent thinking in science and philosophy. Already has Germany lost the leadership which she once possessed in the realms of the mind. The Nazi terror hangs like a blight over the whole intellectual horizon. Further, if dictatorship has the merit of promptitude and efficiency, if it is free from the slowness, the vacillation, the hesitation, the incompetence of an executive dependent upon a popular vote, it has the defect that it is out of touch with public opinion. It cannot tell when it is outraging the conscience of the community, when it is offending national prejudice, when it is defying the general will. Hence it is liable to go on sinking deeper and deeper into disfavour until at last it is engulfed in an abyss of loathing and disgust. For if it is a merit of democracy to provide an alternative government, it is a grave defect of dictatorship not to do so. There is under a dictatorship no organised opposition ready to assume the responsibility of office. Bolshevism in Russia, Fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, stand supreme and solitary. All rival parties are extinguished. No change of administration can be effected except by violent revolution, and to obviate the ever-present peril of such a revolution, dictatorship does not shrink from the extremest measures of espionage and terrorism. The life of suspects is made a hell from which death is a welcome (and usually speedy) release. There is, moreover, no sort of guarantee that

protracted dictatorships will retain their pristine purity and efficiency. The dictator may (like Pilsudski in Poland) grow old and lethargic, or he may (like Lenin in Russia) break down in health under the strain of omnipotence, or he may (like Hitler in Germany) find that he has undertaken a task wholly beyond his powers. From one cause or another, dictatorship, if prolonged, is almost bound to collapse of its own inherent weakness. And then the last state of the nation over which it has exercised sway is probably much worse than it was under the domain of the discarded democracy. A decadent dictatorship is, indeed, the limit of badness in government.

If, then, we compare dictatorship with democracy, we may say succinctly that while democracy stands for the force of argument, dictatorship stands for the argument of force; that the appeal of democracy is to reason, but the appeal of dictatorship is to irrational violence; that democracy is based on freedom, but dictatorship on subjection; that democracy counts heads, while dictatorship breaks them. The one valid excuse for dictatorship, indeed, is that, in circumstances of extreme emergency and for a short period, it provides what, under those conditions, is a good government. It may, I think, be freely admitted that Italy under Mussolini's rule has enjoyed a distinctly more efficient régime than that of the corrupt and incompetent democracy which it superseded. The ideal of democracy is rather self-government than good government. Mr. Bernard Shaw, if I remember rightly, somewhere says in effect that democracy is a device by means of which a people can assure itself of being governed as badly as it wants to be. Abraham Lincoln, the greatest exponent of nineteenth-century democracy, explicitly asserted that "self-government is better than good government." There is, of course, no necessary antithesis between the two. Probably, indeed, in the long run good government and self-government are identical. But in our present imperfect world, with its vast uneducated electorates and its crowds of imperfect politicians, self-government is often far removed from good government. Every extension of the franchise in Great Britain since 1832 has resulted in a degradation of parliament and a weakening of the executive. The introduction of democracy into India has meant a distinct deterioration in the administration, and its further extension under the White Paper scheme will inevitably result, at any rate for a time, in

enfeeblement and demoralisation. Democracy in India will, indeed, almost certainly doom millions to death. The cost of freedom and autonomy is not infrequently a very high one. Nevertheless, if self-government is better than good government the price may have to be paid. Professor A. N. Whitehead assures us that "the essence of human civilisation lies in the substitution of persuasion for force." The way of democracy, then, is the way of progress, and it must be pursued even though it leads through regions of mortal peril. The way of dictatorship is the way of retrogression. It marks a return to barbarism.

In Great Britain the tendency towards dictatorship was immensely aggravated by the great war of 1914-18. For, as Mr. Herbert Spencer long ago pointed out, a belligerent community is almost necessarily authoritarian and autocratic. An army cannot be successfully commanded by a debating society, and a state at war needs to be governed by a unitary and swiftly operating will. Hence, although the war was fought on the part of the anti-German allies "to make the world safe for democracy," it was inevitably waged by increasingly anti-democratic methods. And democracy has never fully recovered from the injuries which it received during the four years of its supersession. Moreover, the return of peace did not suffice to rehabilitate it. For the years from 1918 onward were a period of appalling strain and stress, marked by exasperating realignments of frontiers, painful migrations of populations, difficult disbandings of gigantic armies, widespread disorganisations of industry, oppressive taxations, incalculable fluctuations of currencies, poverty, disillusionment, disgust. Amid the universal disappointment and unrest democracy was scarcely able to recover itself even in its ancient homes such as France and England, while its attempts to establish itself in new homes, such as Russia and Germany, were spectacular failures.

First in Russia (1917) came the overthrow of the transient and embarrassed democracy of Kerensky, and the establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship of Lenin. Then in Italy (1922) followed the blow by means of which Mussolini and the Fascists displaced the corrupt and incompetent ministry of Facta. Next ensued the revolution in Turkey (1925), whereby Mustapha Kemal abolished the old Mohammedan régime and initiated his amazing revival of the secularised Ottoman State.

In the succeeding year (1926) occurred the somewhat similar national resurrection of Poland under the victorious Marshal Pilsudski, whose dictatorial administration swept away the divided and ineffective government of Witos and Wojciechowski. In 1929 was established the royal dictatorship of Alexander of Jugo-Slavia, rendered necessary by the irreconcilable feuds and sanguinary furies of Serbians and Croats. Then, finally, in 1933 came the strokes whereby Hitler superseded the Weimar constitution in Germany, and the heroic but ill-fated Dollfuss in Austria ended the envenomed triangular duel between Nationalists, Fascists, and Communists. And beside these seven major dictatorships we have to note the establishment of partial or temporary dictatorships in Spain, Greece, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. It would seem as though autocracy were sweeping the Western world.

What remains to democracy? In many of the smaller states it continues to flourish and to function quietly yet efficiently. Among these may be mentioned Holland and Belgium, the Scandinavian kingdoms, Switzerland, and various Baltic, Balkan, and American republics. But among the major states three have to bear the burden of its maintenance, namely the United States of America, France, and Great Britain. And in each of these three, tendencies towards dictatorship are manifest.

1. In the United States a tremendous financial crisis in 1933 brought President Roosevelt into power. He at once established what at first sight looks like a dictatorship. Nevertheless, such it is not. It differs *toto caelo* from the tyrannies of Lenin, Mussolini, or Hitler; it more closely resembles the constitutional dictatorships of antique Rome. For, to begin with, it was established by Congress: President Roosevelt exercises powers that have been duly delegated, not powers that have been violently seized. Then again, the president's powers, vast as they are, are limited and checked by all sorts of constitutional safeguards. The electorate is still active and expectant, waiting for its chance to confirm or condemn the presidential novelties. The press is still free; public meetings are open; organised labour and combined capital flourish with undiminished possibilities.

2. In France, too, it survives, although it is menaced by external foes and by internal corruption. On the one hand,

it is threatened by two distinctly dictatorial movements. From the right, the monarchists, whether Bonapartist or Orleanist, watch for the opportunity of a *coup d'état*. From the left, the Jacobins, whether communist or syndicalist, look for an occasion of effective revolution. On the other hand, and more seriously, French democracy is endangered by its own corruption and weakness. There are too many parties in France, and they are divided from one another by animosities too intense and by differences of principle too profound. All ministries are necessarily coalition ministries, for no one party can ever secure a clear majority. And all the kaleidoscopic coalition ministries are feeble and ephemeral. Brief and insecure tenure of office lessens the sense of ministerial responsibility, and deprives the ministers of any effective incentive to make themselves efficient. Hence incompetence tends to prevail, and moral scandals to arise. These administrative defects are gravely aggravated by excessive taxation, by currency fluctuation, and by a growing lack of employment for the restless and disgruntled *intelligentsia*.

3. Great Britain, too, is passing through her period of storm and stress. Parliament is under a cloud: it seems to have lost the prestige which it carried without question in Victorian days. Faced by problems of appalling magnitude—problems international, imperial, social, economic, military, ecclesiastical—it appears to be incapable of making up its mind or of doing anything decisive. It tends to drift, in the evident hope that problems will solve themselves, or that something will turn up. Hence it is flanked on both sides by parties of action, each committed to policies of violent innovation, and both as hostile to one another as they are contemptuous of parliament.

On the one side are the Fascists, imitators of Mussolini and Hitler. There are three separate and mutually hostile groups of them in Britain. First, there are the so-called British Fascists (founded in 1923), who are frankly and simply anti-democratic and anti-semitic. Secondly, there is the Imperial Fascist League (1928), formed to oppose Socialism and Little-Englandism. Both these bodies are merely negative and almost negligible. The third body is more important. It is the British Union of Fascists, established in 1932 by the chameleon-like Sir Oswald Mosley. It has a more comprehensive and more positive programme. Like its rivals, it is anti-democratic, anti-semitic, anti-socialistic, and anti-

cosmopolitan. But it also has, as a positive policy, the founding of the corporative state on the Italian model. And it is prepared to carry out its policy by means of the doses of castor oil and the other dictatorial devices which proved effective in Cisalpine Gaul twelve years ago.

The Fascists on the right are counterbalanced by the members of the new Socialist League on the left. Sir Stafford Cripps and his fellows tell us quite frankly what they mean to do. They intend, by unmitigated denunciation of the National Government and by lavish promises of "social reform," to secure a parliamentary majority, and then they propose by means of an emergency bill, forced through parliament in a single day, to get parliament to commit suicide and transfer its powers to a collective dictatorship which will at once carry through the social revolution. If the House of Lords obstructs, it will be swamped by proletarian peers. If the King declines to create the necessary pack he will himself be put upon the retired list. If the judges boggle at the enforcement of the new spoliation, they will be superseded by special administrative officials of the true red type. If the menaced capitalists show signs of resistance they will be ruthlessly crushed. In short, while Sir Oswald Mosley models himself upon Mussolini, Sir Stafford Cripps takes Lenin as his leader and guide.

There are some who profess to laugh at these threats of dictatorship in Britain. Mr. Ramsbotham, Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Education, for instance, maintains that they may be treated as "at the best a good joke and at the worst as a bad one." He thinks that *Punch* or *Pour Rire* is an adequate prophylactic. "Nothing kills like ridicule," he remarks, "and a French or English caricaturist could quickly put an end to a would-be autocrat." I wish I were as confident as Mr. Ramsbotham. If it were to come to killing quickly, I should back a revolver against ridicule. In all probability before the caricaturist had concocted his destructive cartoon the would-be autocrat would have suppressed his paper and in some way have extinguished him himself.

No: the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and if Great Britain is not to lose its heritage of democratic self-government it must resolutely resist all temptations to take dictatorial short cuts, even though they are said to lead directly to a people's paradise.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM RIGHTS OF HUMANS?

THE ideas of most of the people with whom I have talked about this fundamentally important question are almost as hazy, or as narrow, as their ideas about politics, health, and a number of other vital subjects! Here are two typical examples of what these people have said: "I think it's a shame to prohibit the sale of certain things at certain hours, and to close cinemas at certain times. This is D.O.R.A., curtailing our rights as citizens." Needless to say, the "certain things" included alcoholic drinks, and forms of betting and gambling. "Well, I should say that all humans have a right to food, clothing, shelter, and safety." I scarcely ever find anyone who has given the matter thorough and open-minded thought.

And yet among the striking features of recent legislation have been these two: the extension of more rights (the vote, "education," free speech, and so on) to more individuals; and the curtailing of other rights for the majority. One might have imagined that an intelligent public would have asked itself what the essential Rights of Humans really are.

The Lord's Prayer contains a request that we shall have to-day the *artos* that is *epiousios*. The 1611 rendering, "daily bread," is agreed by scholars to be inaccurate. I find that most of the authorities are in favour of the view that *epiousios* meant "for the coming day." And it is obvious that *artos* represented not merely "bread," but "food"; it is surely legitimate to extend the word still further, and to make it cover the rights of humans. Anyhow, it is interesting that, if we assume *epiousios* to refer to the immediate future, there is an aspect of rights that is often forgotten: namely, that they must be of a prospective nature—they must bring into account not only the present but the coming needs.

The minimum Rights of Humans must take into consideration some provision for the day or days ahead. And one thinks immediately of the handicap that there is when workers, though they may have enough food, etc., for the moment, do not feel confident that their supply will be certain directly. An essential feature of a right is its extension beyond to-day. And surely the feeling of security of necessities beyond the moment does help good work, in contrast to the

feeling that the rights are ephemeral, as who should say, "Why should I toil with a view to the future if my reward may cease almost at once?"

But to go back to the list of rights!

The orthodox list mentions the above-named rights—food, clothing, and shelter; it adds warmth, safety of life and property, education. And it is generally taken for granted that such rights should be given freely by the Government, or by the Home or other Institution, at least to children and others who are not in a position to get such things for themselves.

I find that nearly all these words are used in rather a vague way. A clearer definition is obviously needed. Thus food may be ample in bulk, but not conducive to health and efficiency. Food should be not only sufficient in general quantity, but also, however little it may cost, on the one hand pure and good and well prepared, on the other hand well-balanced as regards the different food-factors—the body-building, energy-giving, and so forth. Drink is usually ignored, unless it is to be included under the heading of food! It is only just beginning to be realised by the millions that water is valuable for many reasons.

Again, when food is mentioned, there is little or no mention of the negatives. There is an occasional warning against excess of alcoholic drinks or strong tea; but there is scarcely any recognition of the fact that the good results of otherwise fairly satisfactory meals may be cancelled by the bad results of undesirable additions: as when, in the slums, children are given gin and pickles. We can pause for a moment to emphasise an aspect of these rights which is scarcely ever even mentioned: namely, that quite apart from the securing of any other rights, such as education or safety of property, it pays a nation and a home, at compound interest, when the foods and drinks are well-balanced and right and contain the minimum of harmful additions.

"Clothing" needs to be defined as not merely of sound material and clean, but also healthy in its shape. It is sad to think of the filth and discomfort of much of the clothing—especially the underclothing—of the poor. As to "Shelter," this, again, should be clean. It should, besides, be well ventilated and lighted, and have reasonable space. It would abundantly pay the nation to give to numbers of the unem-

ployed, instead of a part of the dole, good food, plenty of water, sound clothing, and shelter. Thousands of the unemployed are unemployed partly because they are badly fed, badly clothed (the ragged or dirtily-clothed applicant for work has a poor chance), and because they and their clothing have suffered from exposure to cold and rain. One must add that a great deal of unfitness is due to the execrable ventilation in many "homes," where the easiest way of getting warmth is to keep the entrances of fresh air, and the exits of foul but hot air, closed.

Little need be said about safety of person and property. This is probably the right which Government neglects least of all. But there should also be a far cheaper provision of justice. Surely, most of the justice should be free to the poor—and, indeed, to every citizen. A great deal has been done in the direction of Employers' Liability. I feel that employers' rights would often be better secured if now and then there was a little more legislation as to employees' liability!

We come now to that vast subject, education. As to what may be called technical or vocational education, I shall say little, except that I am convinced that every citizen has the right to be taught at least the solid and sound foundations of not less than two money-earning occupations. Out of a host of branches or aspects of education, I can select only one or two, and these only for a few notes. The first branch is physical. I cannot conceive of any more absolute right than the right of physical education—especially in a country where the grown-ups have set such a bad example to children. I am amazed to find how many elderly and influential (I had almost said influential) people appear to be almost utterly neglectful of such elementary items of physical education as at least reasonable mastication and insalivation of foods, correct posture of the body, depth and fulness of breathing, and scrupulous cleanliness of the whole person inside and out. Children have the right not only to be told what is best for their bodies (and minds), but also to have good examples shown them by those whom they naturally respect and imitate.

Another part of true education is what the Greeks called *metanoia*. The word sometimes included "repentance," but in its widest sense it meant "thinking differently." Things are improving to-day, but there is still left a vast handicap to

national efficiency and well-being in the slogan, "Custom and authority are always correct." Surely, if the first general commandment of Jesus (according to our records) was "Think differently," this should be one of the first rights and privileges of humans, even of the young—to have their own views, and to think for themselves. Among many ways in which this right of questioning and of asking questions is important is that it should compel the elderly to open their minds, to think freshly and young-ly, so as to find "a reason for the faith that is in them"—in so far as it has an adequate reason.

Side by side with this freedom of opinion—and, to some extent, of action, so long as it does not injure others—there must be Discipline. Every one has a right to be disciplined in accuracy and neatness, in self-control and self-mastery, as well as to be encouraged in self-expression. An excellent sign of the times is the candour with which the public is urged to attend to its self-sanitation. But, so far as Government is concerned, the public—I am speaking here of the millions—is deprived of the right of free sanitation in the usual sense of the word. It is an utter disgrace to our civilisation that an exorbitant charge is made for the performance of a national duty, a "duty towards one's neighbour"—cleansing of the skin and the bowels. It is not at all an exaggeration to say that millions are actually "fined" for doing what they ought to be fined for not doing. Can any fair-minded person deny that free sanitation—free facilities for washing and excretion—must be not merely a right of every citizen, but also a cheap and remunerative investment for the nation, a leveller of class differences (this aspect of the matter, this exclusiveness of cleansing equipment, is seldom appreciated), and—for, after all, this is the way to get a thing done!—a fine election-eering appeal? Here is an employment for which numbers of the unemployed are pre-eminently suitable.

Let there be, besides, abundant fresh and clean water available throughout the land for drinking—confound the vested interests of public houses and restaurants and tea-places! Let the people be encouraged to be clean inside and out. Let there be an official leaflet about it.

And would it be a terrible thing if the moral and spiritual symbolism were alluded to? Or would it be introducing something "religious" where it was quite "out of place"? Is it not one of our rights, as humans, especially if we profess

to follow the Master, to be told how certain things and acts have a soul and a spirit within their superficial and material "body"?

Another Right of Humans is rest—and facilities for rest. Some churches—thank the Lord and the clergy—are open night and day: St. Martin-in-the-Fields is the best known of these churches. But where can we sit alone, in a warm place in cold weather, under cover in rainy weather? Where can we sit and rest—or think quietly? Where is the "place apart"? Recreation is another Right of Humans; and here we are better off than years ago. Yet what healthy and interesting games are there in cities, outside such institutions as the Y.M.C.A.? "Squash" has become popular among the fairly well-to-do. But why are not some of our empty buildings adapted for (hand-)fives, bat fives (needing only an almost imperishable solid indiarubber ball and a plain piece of wood), and a few other games—not omitting indoor cricket, football, and hockey—available almost free of charge? How we waste our buildings! And our opportunities of making money! A small charge for those who could afford it would make such institutions pay handsomely.

And, by the way, one of the items in our education is to be told how best we can use our leisure. Some "social" life would be given by this means. We all have the right of enjoying home life and social life. And it is not a real right unless it has its obligations as well as its privileges. Every one is entitled to have any genius or *flair* recognised and encouraged. That is a "tall order." But we, as a nation, lose untold millions of money and break hundreds of hearts, by the plan of crushing the unusual and the "unlike." I do not mean, of course, that faults and weaknesses should be condoned. We have the right to get these pointed out and corrected: this is part of the discipline which I included among our rights. But we do need to look out for and appreciate, encourage, and promote originality and talent.

We have a right to general advice and sympathy. Even those who have parents do not always find in them just what they need. There should be hundreds of individuals part of whose work would be like that of the best heads of junior reformatory institutions—to listen and learn and guide in a friendly way. Above all, humans have a right to get work—as healthy, and as helpful to others, and as appropriate to the

individual's penchant as possible; but—work. And fair remuneration for work.

But the great mass of our rights are our own. We do not need to have them given to us: we possess them already. All we need is to know about them, and to use and develop them. To my mind they outweigh the rights granted us by others. There seems to be a notion that a right is not a real right unless we are given it by others: in fact, some rights are looked upon as necessitating a demand. Our finest rights are in the hands of no one except ourselves. Yet we have the right to know—to be told authoritatively, as an integral part of our education—that these rights are *our* rights. And our obligations. Every one of them is an obligation, a duty.

We have a right to words. We can refuse to use some: we can insist on using others, even if we only use them silently. The effect of saying—simply saying—quietly to ourselves such words as Power, Peace, Prosperity, Plenty, Patience, Purity, Progress, is great. What is there to prevent us? We can control our posture and expression—or, rather, our many expressions: our gestures, our tone of voice, our eyes, our mouth. This is our right and obligation. We have the right to our thoughts, especially about others; to our wishes and aspirations; to our prayers; to our theories of life; to our faith in the Father; to our imaginations, of success, or lovely scenery, of inventions, of kindnesses.

We have the right of seeing the funny, whimsical side of persons and things, instead of the grim worrying side: we can keep the humorous aspect to ourselves. We have that right, too. To music—we can sing any song or tune we like, noiselessly if we are afraid to sing out loud! We can draw; there is plenty of paper everywhere, and burnt matches! We can write: what a privilege! How little we use this power in the best directions! We can read; old daily papers and other papers can be had for the asking. The news may be ephemeral—thank the Lord, it often is; but the excellent general articles are for days beyond the day of publication.

We have the right to breathe really fully, and to exhale well, and to do numbers of other exercises. We have the right to stretch, and so counteract some of the bad effects of so much sitting and leaning forwards. We have the right to relax our muscles, and so ease our nerves and our minds. We have the right to rest more often than we do, and to have little spells

and pauses: for instance, to close our eyes now and then.

We have the right to our own memories of pleasant and helpful things. We have the right to observe, to reason, to work out analogies, to realise that we must be worth while, or else we should not be here now!

It seems to me absurd that political economy, which I used to study in the text-books of past decades, does not set out the rights of humans as at the very foundation of its ideas. For what could be more political? What could be more economical? If the nation, instead of lavishing millions of pounds on so many loans to foreign countries, so many commissions of enquiry, so many military and other expenses, were to invest a small sum in giving every citizen at least some of these rights, I am firmly convinced that the money would come back in a very short time in health—and the saving of hundreds of millions of pounds now lost through avoidable ill-health; in happiness, which helps the whole of life, including its finance; in efficiency in every department.

From another point of view, are we truly civilised if we fail to give these rights to all—or at least the majority of them to the majority of people? For the inevitable objection to my suggestions will be that it would be utterly impossible to grant even half these rights even to half the people! Very well, then: let us do something. Let us provide more water in more places; more sanitation in more places; more healthy meals at a little over cost price in more places; more real health-education in more places; more work in more places! If we do not do something considerable, and do it quickly, I fail to see how we can compete with our national rivals. The workhouse, the dole, "charity," individual efforts—these are not the solution of the problem.

Let us, as a nation, face the question, "What are the minimum Rights of Humans?" And then, having discussed the matter without prejudice, let us decide what we *can* do—even if it means appointing a commission! For, strange though it may seem, there have been times when a commission has decided promptly, and has carried good measures through. We are not treating humans as humans should treat humans. And, until we do, we cannot deserve national success, although we may get large orders for machinery and military paraphernalia from abroad, and build the biggest steamer in the world.

EUSTACE MILES.

TEN YEARS OF SUGAR-BEET.

THE total amount of State assistance to the sugar-beet industry since 1924 has amounted to over £39,000,000. The original scheme was designed for the ten crop years, 1924-25 to 1933-34, and the policy was then to come up for review. The subsidy period has since been extended to cover the year 1934-35, and a committee has been appointed to inquire into the results of this heavy expenditure.

The history of the industry in this country is interesting. In spite of the stimulus of high sugar prices during the war and a complete remission in 1922 of excise duties on home-grown sugar, giving a preference of 25s. 8d. per cwt. against foreign sugar and 21s. 5d. against Empire sugar, the acreage of sugar-beet was only 16,000 acres in 1923, and the existing two factories were losing money. When the Finance Act of 1924 reduced this considerable aid by lowering the sugar duty to 11s. 8d., it was decided to provide a subsidy for the industry, at the same time reimposing the excise duty, though maintaining a preference over foreign sugar. The British Sugar (Subsidy) Act, passed in March 1925, granted a subsidy of 19s. 6d. per cwt. of home-grown sugar for the first four years, including the 1924-25 season, 13s. for the next three years and 6s. 6d. for the remaining three years. During the first ten years, the subsidy totalled £27,189,000 and the revenue rebate a further £9,649,000. Under this stimulus the industry developed rapidly and by 1930, a peak year, the number of growers had increased from 4,000 in 1924 to 40,000, and the number of factories from 3 to 17; sugar production rose from 24,000 tons to 424,000 tons; and the number of factory workers increased from about 3,000 to 9,900.

The reasons given for the granting of the subsidy were threefold: to relieve agriculture and maintain the arable area; to increase employment, both urban and rural; and to establish a new industry. The time has now come to balance the achievements of the subsidy against the probable expenditure of over £40,000,000. The assets must be gauged by the extent to which the subsidy has achieved the above objectives.

The primary purpose of the subsidy was the relief of agriculture from the severe depression which followed the drop in prices between 1921 and 1924; but only a portion of the subsidy has reached the farmer. As early as 1926 Mr.

Runciman warned the House of Commons that "the main portion of the profit which accrues from the scheme goes to those who own and finance the factories and not to the farmers." In the first seven years about one-half was retained by the factories; in later years a larger share went to the farmer, but it is open to question whether such a method of distribution can be justified. So far as the factories are concerned, their returns during the ten years have not been disappointing to the shareholders. Dividends have, in general, been maintained above the 5 per cent. level.

Even that part of the subsidy which did eventually reach the farmer afforded only very localised relief; it is not a national measure. About two-thirds of the beet acreage is found in Norfolk, Suffolk, Lincolnshire and the Isle of Ely, and it is probable that over 70 per cent. of the farmers' share of the subsidy went to these four counties. It is claimed in extenuation of this distribution that these areas were mainly arable and the most depressed. That may be true, but a large part of the subsidy has gone to the less needy parts of these counties. The growing of beet is concentrated on the better classes of soil. One of the Cambridge University reports cites an area of 250,000 acres of Huntingdon and West Cambridge, with 60 per cent. of the land under the plough and within easy reach of beet factories, described elsewhere as "one of the most depressed, if not the most depressed, district in the Eastern Counties," in which only 0.8 per cent. of the farm area was under beet in 1932. A similar situation is found over 200,000 acres of boulder clay in N.W. Essex and S.W. Suffolk. The chalk and limestone belt was another of the hardest hit areas, yet in the five counties containing it, only 1,701 acres out of 725,177 were under beet in 1932. Allowing for the factories' share and for these four beet-growing counties, little more than one-sixth of the total subsidy can have been left for the remaining forty-eight counties of England and Wales and for Scotland.

The area of arable land in Great Britain has not been maintained; it fell by over two million acres in the ten years, 1923-32. The 400,000 acres of beet are, of course, not a net gain, since the beet displaced other crops. It may have helped to prevent land going out of cultivation, but this is unlikely since beet growing is in general found on the better farming land which is the last to go down. By not helping

the marginal land the beet subsidy may have even emphasised the decline in arable land. During the three pre-subsidy years the arable area in the four beet-growing counties declined at the rate of 0·68 per cent. per year, and in the rest of England at the rate of 2·38 per cent. In the first seven years of the subsidy the rate of decline in the beet counties was almost the same, 0·69 per cent., but it had slowed down to 1·99 per cent. in the non-beet counties.

It is difficult to estimate the effect of the subsidy as a means of creating employment, either on the farm or in the factory. About two-thirds of the crops displaced by sugar-beet, such as turnips, swedes, mangolds and potatoes, had high labour requirements, both regular and seasonal, so that the net gain is confined to the areas where beet has displaced grain crops. In Norfolk and Suffolk there was an increase in regular farm workers during the first three years of the subsidy, but there followed a decline and regular employment was, in 1932, less than in 1924. Farmers state that the subsidy has enabled them to keep on regular workers and give longer employment to casual workers, but it will always be open to doubt whether a similar or stronger claim could not have been made if fodder roots and cattle feeding had been subsidised. So far as factory employment is concerned, the results have not come up to expectation. Lord Moyné stated, when the subsidy was mooted, that every hundred acres of beet would give factory employment for ten men. At that rate the 1930 acreage should have given work to about 35,000 workers, yet the official report stated that the number was only 9,900. Moreover, it must be remembered that for almost four out of every five of the workers, the employment created is limited to 60-114 days in the year.

Has the industry established itself after the generous assistance of the past ten years, and can it continue without a liberal measure of state assistance? Factory income and expenditure are such that, if the subsidy were to disappear, though maintaining the present revenue rebate, the price for beet might fall to 27s.-28s. per ton. Judging by existing costs of production, it is safe to assert that the beet acreage would be reduced to less than half the present area if there were no marked drop in farm costs or increase in factory costs.

Costs might be lowered if yields were increased; but the most disturbing feature of the British industry during ten

years of subsidy has been its low yield of beet and the very slight increase in the output of sugar per acre. When the subsidy started a yield of about 12-13 tons of beet per acre was counted upon; it has averaged just under 8. Apart from seasonal fluctuations, the yield of beet per acre has remained practically unchanged since 1924. Considering the continuous efforts made by factories, advisory centres, research stations and other bodies to increase the output, the result is disappointing. Germany and Czechoslovakia, the main continental beet countries, obtain about 3,700 lb. of sugar to the acre; the British yield is 2,493 lb. The yields from sugar cane are on a still higher level and are increasing rapidly as the result of improved breeding and extracting. Bridges and Dixey stated in 1928 that it remains open to doubt whether the yields in this country can ever reach the same level as do foreign yields.

It may well be questioned whether sugar-beet can ever compete with cane sugar without artificial stimulus. Foreign countries have striven for longer than ten years to put the industry on its feet. The United States is now paying over £44 million a year, Germany £24 million, France £15 million, and Italy £5 million, with similar lack of success. There seems to be no end to the liabilities incurred in attempting to establish sugar-beet growing.

The sugar-beet subsidy was originally definitely planned as a short-time temporary measure; it was limited to ten years and provided for the progressive scaling-down of the subsidy. Temporary aid is usually justified on two grounds, to establish a new industry or to tide an industry of national importance over a temporary depression or crisis arising from markedly abnormal causes. No one, not even the most fervent defender of the sugar-beet subsidy, can hold that the expenditure of almost £40 million has *established*, on an economic basis, a new industry in the country, a fact emphasised by the clamour raised for the continuation of special state assistance.

Temporary relief from abnormal factors should fulfil three conditions. It should not aggravate the causes of the depression, otherwise it will be intensified and lengthened. It should not stimulate false developments and establish lines of production which are grossly uneconomic and which can never "stand on their own legs" in normal times; vested

interests, once established, become deeply rooted and difficult to eradicate. It should not retard the invention and application of new methods to suit changing conditions. Can it be claimed that the sugar-beet subsidy meets these requirements? It has intensified the drop in sugar prices; just as the subsidy started, over-production of sugar was becoming evident; the International Sugar Council has estimated that normal sugar stocks in the countries which are members of the International Sugar Plan, should be 1,003,000 short tons, but the actual carry-over is now over 7,500,000. Throughout this period of increasing supplies the British subsidy has artificially stimulated production; during a depression resulting in part from a severe restriction in international trade, the subsidy has reduced it still further.

An industry has been started which gives little or no hope of ever being able to compete either with continental sugar-beet or with cane sugar without continued financial assistance; it has created vested interests which will prove difficult, if not impossible, to placate without considerable further burden either to the taxpayer or the consumer. The beet crop has undoubtedly valuable qualities; it is a crop with a high labour requirement; it provides an immediate cash income; it gives useful by-products for stock-feeding; and it requires little capital outlay on the part of the farmer. But it has failed to fulfil the conditions which were to justify its existence. The money would have been better spent in assisting an established branch of British farming which had proved itself capable of carrying on in normal times.

If it is decided to continue the subsidy in some form or other, it must be considered as a method of granting permanent assistance to farming, since it has none of the qualifications of a temporary measure. The aid will be restricted to the present factory areas, and to the better class lands in these districts; it must always remain a very local relief measure (incidentally, it is to almost the same areas that the other direct financial aid, the Wheat Subsidy, penetrates). Before such a decision is made, there should be a frank examination of the results of this ten years' experiment of alternative methods of granting assistance, or even of the possibility of cutting the annual losses which will be incurred by its continuation.

KEITH A. H. MURRAY.

SELF-EXPRESSION, SELF-REPRESSION, SELF-REALISATION.

ONE of the most universally adopted and most skilfully advocated cults of the moment is undoubtedly that called Self-Expression; and it is equally undeniable that this satisfies an ever-clamant human need, and sustains an invaluable principle of human experience. This is because self-expression meets that demand for freedom, for individuality or even creativeness, which springs from the rebellion against becoming enslaved by either society, custom or tradition, and which has the supreme merit of insisting that no one should be a mere copy of others' ideals, no matter how fine these in themselves may be. In the same spirit it emphasises the truth that the very essence of human nature is to be dynamic, to be not only a conduit, but still more a source, of psychic energy that is unique both in its character and its products. This is often stated in negative terms: man is never a passive instrument or channel of life and consciousness, in the same way that the animal world transmits these attributes from generation to generation. To this it may be retorted that man himself is no more than an animal of superior type. This is certainly more accurate than the witty description of mankind as an anthropoid species afflicted with megalomania. Nevertheless, however closely we may trace the common origins of man and his animal kin, as well as their biological continuity, we can never permit these features to obscure that "enormous expansion of the powers of discrimination based upon acquired knowledge," which forms "the fundamental distinction" so profoundly differentiating even the most primitive peoples from all the rest of Nature.* Far more incomparable and incalculable, then, must be the genius of artist and scientist, of mystic and saint; so that if man be an animal, he is none the less an organism that has unquestionably attained a status wholly unparalleled, which empowers him, and him alone of terrestrial beings, "from Non-Being to bring forth into Being."†

It follows, therefore, that the more urgently self-expression stresses individuality and creativeness, the more inadequate

* Prof. Elliot Smith, *The Evolution of Man*, p. 63.

† Prof. N. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 243.

and illogical must any classification of man as nothing more than an animal become. It is almost as if, in an excess of purely logical zeal, we were to include metals and non-metals, or elements and compounds, in one undistinguished group. But surely, when we pay due regard to the unceasing triumphs of thought, the innumerable achievements of æsthetic feeling and emotion, the keenness of the moral sense and the insuppressible yearnings of religion, and when we realise that "even the highest animals have only the barest rudiments of such possibilities,"* the outstanding contrasts between animality and humanity must far outweigh their resemblances, many and significant though these admittedly are.

Doubtless the unrestricted manifestation of self-expression is simply the inevitable reaction from the exaggerated repression of earlier days. Nevertheless it is a fatal misconception of the facts to suppose that release from repression is identical with the abandonment of all control. For it is Freud himself—the psychologist whom Professor McDougall has compared to Aristotle, and who has most clearly revealed the evils of repression—who insists on two equally cardinal principles: first, that human nature always needs effective guidance, and secondly that this can originate from only one source—that is from the dynamic function of Reason. "We have no other means," Freud contends, "of controlling our instincts than our intelligence. The human intellect is weak in comparison with instincts. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds."† In the case of any other writer this might be called nothing more than abstract intellectualism; but Freud's consistent emphasis on the unconscious and the superconscious, on the emotions and their allied non-rational factors of experience, absolutely immunises him against any such criticism. For Reason, it must be repeated, is essentially a "dynamic function," best exhibited in such familiar pleas as "Be reasonable," "Take a reasonable view," "Think the matter over," that must so often be addressed to impetuous and impulsive people. Reason in its true and proper sense, that is to say, is never the mere abstract content of some textbook

* Dr. Julian Huxley, *What Dare I Think?*, p. 151.

† *The Future of an Illusion*, pp. 83, 93.

on Formal Logic. This is simply the skeleton of Reason; and while a skeleton is certainly indispensable, it is never sufficient. And the commonplace phrases just cited are only the popular versions of the fundamental and universally accepted principle which compels a judge or jury categorically to reject an unreasonable legal contention, a scientist to exclude unreasonable theories and a statesman an unreasonable policy—attitudes that are instinctively adopted on all such occasions. In every instance of this kind the charge of unreasonableness, or what is exactly the same defect in the more formal terms of irrationality or illogicality, is fatal. Of course this does not imply that man always acts and argues rationally, nor that when he does so he discovers and applies a perfectly logical and irrefutable principle. On the contrary, as no psychologist has more clearly shown than Freud himself, Reason must submit to "endlessly repeated rebuffs." The essential and remarkable point is that, in spite of these, "it succeeds"; which means that no normal and sane person ever embarks on any course which he clearly sees to be unreasonable, not even if this will yield some nefarious or immoral advantages; for he himself at least judges his plans to be, under the given conditions, the most reasonable means to whatever end he has in view. Similarly, the wisest of us make serious mistakes; but these can be avoided or remedied only by finding sounder—that is, once again, less irrational—principles of action than those hitherto employed; while even the most generous and noble impulses demand their justification on some grounds of Reason. Not even art can furnish any proper exception, since, as Ernest Newman has cogently maintained, both Beethoven and Wagner expressed a "marvellous and far-reaching logic":* in other words, an æsthetic logic that is actually the richest artistic fulfilment of the Formal Logic of the textbooks.

In fact, it is precisely in the vast realm of art, so far as this is imperishable and immortal, that the indestructible intimacy between expression and control is best perceived. For every artist, needless to say, expresses himself even while at the same moment he expresses far more than himself. Now artistic self-expression is never merely capricious, no matter how skilfully it may simulate caprice in many of art's finest

* *The Unconscious Beethoven*, pp. 120, 148; *Wagner*, p. 221.

achievements. It is obvious that æsthetic formality, and still more absolute outline, lucidity or bareness, can be attained only by rigid control of material and method; while profusion may demand an even sterner mastery. The very title "Master" itself implies this, simply because a master who exerts no dominance can be such only in name. And here the analogies to Nature and life are of the closest possible order. All wild animals, individually and collectively, must unconsciously obey an autocratic instinct if they are to survive the ruthless struggle for existence. Very much the same is true of savage communities. "Relentless taboos claim his life in forfeit if he violates the letter of their prescriptions";* so that however irrational this may appear to the civilised mind, it is their powerful influence that prepared the thorny path towards the social organisation of to-day. Further, it seems to be increasingly clear that all future social advance, in every direction equally, necessitates more or less drastic regulation, as the entire Western world appears to prove. This principle is accepted, openly or implicitly, by every one of the fiercely contending parties in all countries, so that the actual issue is not whether control is necessary, but whether fascist or democrat, communist or conservative, is to exercise it in practice.

Now since no citizen can claim absolute exemption from these conditions, two crucial difficulties must arise. In the first place, how is personal freedom to be sustained? For to curtail individual liberty too drastically is plainly to set up a despotism to which no political party would plead guilty in principle, no matter to what lengths it might carry its powers of control. But secondly all really *social* authority must from its very nature be communal or collective, the sole alternative, once again, being a more or less absolute dictatorship; and although the domination of the executive may certainly be dictatorial in its formal aspects, still this is actually intended merely to ensure due efficiency and not to abolish the ultimate appeal to society at large, even if only to a majority; to endeavour to evade such an appeal is simply in the long run to sow the seeds of revolution.

If, then, we thus exclude the dictatorship of the individual, as distinguished from that of the social group, it at once

* Dr. R. R. Marett, *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*, p. 58.

becomes the paramount duty of every citizen to fit himself to assume his own degree and type of that co-operative control from which he can himself never escape. Apart from this he is obviously abandoning his inherent claim to exert some share in government, and at the same moment parting from vitally important civil rights. However speciously this may be camouflaged, he thereby sinks into slavery to some authority external to himself, and so becomes an obstacle, dangerous or even fatal, to all finer ideals of social order which demand excellently equipped and free citizens, no matter how diverse their capacities may be.

Now this ideal, admittedly remote though it is, can be attained only by directing and moulding self-expression in such a way that it takes on the higher character of self-realisation. But this necessitates an unavoidable measure of repression. For it is never repression, in itself and as such, that is to be condemned, but only such mischievous forms as were too often applied by our predecessors. Again we must learn from the artist, if not from Nature. The painter, for example, represses his enjoyment of the noonday sun and works in the cold illumination of the north light, in precisely the same spirit as the athlete who represses his appetite for dainties in order to smash some fine record; and when we remember that the word asceticism really means effort and exercise, we realise that the mystic and the saint have something to teach even the most matter-of-fact John Citizen. For all personality has a most complex organisation or structure, which is nevertheless plastic and highly adaptable in spite of its definiteness. In this respect it may be compared to some intricate mechanism which responds, delicately yet precisely, to the varying demands made upon its capacities. Perhaps the best example is a liner's steering and stabilising gear, or the electrical plant in a vast modern power-house. It must never be forgotten, however, that selfhood incalculably outrivals these marvels of adjustment, because its properties are not those of matter but of life and mind. Selfhood is therefore most accurately regarded as the highest type of organism—highest not merely in its actual structure but still more in its limitless potentialities. "We are only at the very threshold of an undreamed-of control over living things, including ourselves," observes Needham;* but this

* *The Great Amphibium*, p. 14.

depends absolutely on the same conditions, as govern the rearing of some rare and beautiful plants. This must certainly be provided with abundant food; but it must also be skillfully pruned, sometimes so drastically that it is cut back almost to the roots, whence it springs up anew in fresh fragrance and colour. For this indispensable culture the plant depends on the gardener; personality, on the contrary, must exercise its own inherent powers of thought and knowledge, of artistic and moral sensitiveness, so as to combine self-expression with self-repression and transform both into the highest type of self-realisation.

J. E. TURNER.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH GUIANA.

UNLIKE its neighbouring West Indian colonies which, prior to the partitioning of Africa, were the most important tropical colonies in the British Empire, British Guiana, Britain's only possession on the mainland of South America, has remained undeveloped during the 130 years it has been under the British Crown. Recently M. Georges Lamy, for twenty-eight years administrator of Madagascar, passed through British Guiana on his way to French Guiana to relieve the Governor of that colony. M. Lamy will direct a 21,000,000 francs development scheme, part of the programme of which is said to be the gradual abolition of the penal settlement at Devil's Island. This announcement, together with the information that a £200,000,000 project has been launched for the peopling and development of the great spaces of tropical Northern Australia, has aroused in the people of Guiana a strong desire almost akin to unrest to see their great country, possessing greater possibilities than most other tropical possessions of Great Britain, at last on the road to development.

The chief cause of the stagnation of the Colony has been the lack of population, coupled with a fear on the part of sugar-planters that new industries would entice the present labour force away from the plantations. With an area of nearly 90,000 square miles, British Guiana has a population of only 310,000 souls, while to people it as thickly as Barbados would require 55 millions. The present labour supply for the sugar plantations, represented by 130,000 East Indians, is adequate, but there is not in the interior of the Colony any vast indigenous population, as in African colonies, constituting a labour supply for the development of hinterland industries of any magnitude, and the introduction of labourers from other colonies may not be welcomed without suspicion by sugar proprietors, who may fear that any resulting raising of standards of living may react to the detriment of their plantations. The history of any industry, apart from sugar, will illustrate this.

The earliest attempts to grow rice in the Colony were thoroughly discouraged. Raiding parties were often sent out

to destroy the rice cultivations of runaway slaves. When the Demerara Bauxite Company began mining operations on the Demerara river their wage scale was on the level of that of similar organisations in the United States employing coloured labour. A rush to the mines set in, and eventually the wage level was lowered and no loss of labour was suffered by the plantations. Indeed, the higher wages had attracted labourers from the neighbouring West Indian colonies. The Republic of Panama, now suffering acutely since the Roosevelt administration has permitted the sale of beer in the Canal Zone, is hastily repatriating West Indians, thus increasing the problems of the already saturated islands. At present there are proposals on foot to settle Jamaicans and Barbadians in British Guiana. A survey of potential settlement areas, chiefly sugar estates, has been made, but it is unlikely that any migration will take place, as the prospective settlers are chiefly semi-skilled labourers, who may not easily adjust themselves to conditions. But there would be a rush the moment any railroad, hydro-electric or other large undertaking began to operate. The British labour that built the Panama Canal is now idle.

The dominant products of British Guiana to-day are sugar and rice, and there is room even here for much expansion. There are about 62,000 acres under sugar cultivation, producing around 100,000 tons of sugar annually, but the total area of easily accessible land, presumably well suited for sugar-cane cultivation and at present not beneficially occupied otherwise, amounts in round figures to 1,620,000 acres. This area, if fully planted and reaped under modern conditions of cultivation and manufacture, could yield a comfortable 2,500,000 tons per annum. The total area under rice is estimated at 77,400 acres, with an annual yield around 80,000 tons of rice. Great extension of the lands under cultivation with rice would result if the prejudice against the colour of British Guiana rice can be overcome in the markets abroad. Mr. H. C. Collier, Secretary of the Canada-West Indian League, while on a recent visit to British Guiana, declared that Canada would be able to absorb the whole of the Colony's rice production, especially if the rice was presented for sale in packets.

There are other resources which are practically illimitable; their utilisation, however, is checked by difficulties of transportation into the interior of the Colony, though the

hinterland road constructed by the aid of Imperial Loans now throws open to the capitalist one of the richest areas of the Colony, being in size equal to Jamaica.

Since the visit of Sir Walter Raleigh to these shores in 1618, the name Guiana has been associated with El Dorado, and with gold. In 1881 a few individuals started placer mining, but it was not until 1885 that gold was found in paying quantities, and since then the industry has progressed steadily, though for a period competition with diamond mining lowered the export figures. Recently, however, due to the world demand for this metal, the industry is attracting almost as much attention as Raleigh's fabled city. The major portion of the gold obtained from the alluvial washings has been won by the tributor, or, as he is locally called, the "Pork-knocker." The origin of this name is unknown, but it was first given to a large class of men who originally started work in the fields as labourers with a claim-holder, and who, after the companies and syndicates ceased working, remained in the districts and continued to "fossick" on their own account on the claims abandoned by their employers. Under the direction of the Colonial Office a geological survey of the Bartica-Potaro-Tiboku triangle, an area rich in mineral resources, is being carried out by Dr. D. R. Grantham, Mr. S. Bracewell, and Dr. Gordon Williams. Dr. Grantham is a geologist of wide experience, having served as assistant geologist to Sir Albert Kitson in his examination of the Kakamega goldfields in Kenya, which aroused so much interest recently. Prior to the arrival of Dr. Williams, Dr. Grantham and Mr. Bracewell paid a visit to the Potaro gold workings with the object of reviewing the types of grounds which are known producers, before the main survey in unknown country was undertaken. In an official *communiqué* issued to the local press they stated that although the pork-knocker had produced so much gold for the country the best results could only be obtained by engineering skill and capital.

Large quantities of diamonds are also found, British Guiana being the world's third largest producer, ranking after South Africa and Brazil. Apart from bauxite, already mentioned, other mineral resources of the colony include magnetite, which has been obtained near the Yarikita and Hotakwai Hills in the North-West District. Referring to

mineral oil and pitch, the late Professor Sir John Harrison, when Director of Agriculture, stated :

The existence of mineral oil in the North-West District has been suspected for many years, pitch or bitumen having been noted there as early as 1750. In 1916-17 two bores were put down at Courida Point and Sangretal Bay. The former was bottomed, at 600 feet, in the decomposition products of closely underlying igneous rock whilst the sinking of the latter had to be abandoned at 440 feet in a thick stratum of water sand. Both these borings were unsuccessful, neither of them giving any reliable indications of the presence of oil in the vicinity. Owing to the unfavourable topographical conditions at the sites selected the cost of boring reached the prohibitory figure of approximately 73 shillings per foot drilled. In 1919 the British Controlled Oilfields Ltd. sent a party of geologists under Mr. George B. Reynolds to examine the oil possibilities of the district. Their final decision was to the effect that in view of the expenditure which must be incurred to prove the existence of what there is at present no reason to believe exists, viz.—an anticline—which can only afford oil of inferior or asphaltic quality . . . the only conclusion which can be arrived at is that it is inexpedient to incur the expenditure necessary finally to dispose of the question at issue.

For the past 180 years pitch and mineral oil have been found on the Essequibo Coast, but their origin has not yet been traced. It may be noted, however, that this region is about the same distance from the Trinidadian pitch lake as is the bitumen lake at Bermudez in Venezuela.

But it is probably in her forests that British Guiana possesses her greatest wealth. The utilisation of these illimitable forest resources has been held in check all these years by the great difficulties of transportation, but there is little doubt that an enormous development of the timber industry should follow the institution of transport facilities by Imperial roads to the Potaro and Mazaruni Districts. Such roads are now under construction.

The trees composing the forests of British Guiana are rarely of social habit, many different kinds of trees existing in any one area, though it is usual for various kinds of trees to predominate, and to give to the locality the name of the prevailing timber, such as the greenheart, wallaba and crabwood forests. Greenheart is commercially the best known of all the timbers of the Colony. Large quantities have been regularly exported for many years. It is rated as a first-class

wood at Lloyd's and it is chiefly used for submerged works, such as wharves, piles, docks and lock gates. Crabwood, a light wood of reddish colour, takes a high polish, and is much used by cabinet makers. The mora grows to a great size and is plentiful. Its timber, tough, cross-grained and not liable to split, rivals Australian jarrah as the most suitable for use as railway sleepers. Of the two woods mora is definitely superior, but it is not as well known as the Australian product, which is much advertised. Cedar is a reddish-brown wood, of fairly coarse grain. It is serviceable, handsome and valuable, taking a good polish. It is admirable for cigar boxes, and can be recommended for wainscoting rooms. Then there is kakaralli, a greyish-brown wood with a glossy surface, fine-grained and dense, which is known in the Colony to be more durable than the world-famed greenheart. It is extremely hard compared with boxwood, planes hard but well, turns well, and polishes extremely well. Like greenheart, kakaralli resists the toredo, or ship-worm, and barnacles. The trees, which grow tall and straight, are common throughout the colony, being in some places abundant. The bark may be used for tanning.

The earliest Spanish and Dutch traders exchanged beads and other trinkets with the Indians of Guiana for the handsome letter-wood. This is a dark-brown wood, marked in a striking manner with rich nut-brown or black patches, bearing a resemblance to letters or to the markings on a snake's skin. It is fine-grained, and darkens considerably on exposure. The heartwood, which is excessively hard, comparing with ebony, polishes superbly, possessing a lustrous surface, and is used for making walking-sticks, paper weights, paper knives, Tunbridge ware, small ornamental turnery, and for inlaying. The locust is a wood of orange-red colour, of good appearance, and is never attacked by worms or dry rot. It is used for mill-beds, trenails and furniture, and is one of the best woods for building railway carriages. The tree yields a gum resembling anine or copal, used in making varnish.

There are many other woods in the Colony besides those above described, but their mere enumeration would require a separate article. Among other forest resources are the latex of the balata tree, which when tapped and dried forms the balata of commerce, the vanilla, which grows wild, and many fibres suitable for rope-making, such as the giant

It should also seem unlikely that, in spite of the fact that within the last two decades alone thirty-one experts have visited the Colony to advise on works of development and in other directions, a country possessing such potentialities should have remained undeveloped for 130 years under the British without any serious effort ever having been made to exploit those resources. Such efforts were made, but each failed. Here we will mention three such proposals.

In 1907 Colonel J. W. Link, an American, of an old Virginia family of prosperous tobacco planters, came to British Guiana. As a young man he had served in the American Civil War, after which he was engaged in engineering work for some years in the Amazon valley. At an early date he seems to have conceived the idea of linking up the Amazon with Georgetown by means of a railway, believing that the possibilities of this port were much greater than those of any other point on the coast of the South American continent, north of the Amazon. Upon the outbreak of the Franco-German War, Colonel Link, recommended by General Sheridan, joined the German forces. After the war he settled in London, becoming a naturalised British citizen in 1870. In 1908 Colonel Link put forward his scheme of railway and rubber development to the Government of British Guiana, but after consideration his proposals were not entertained. He then went to Brazil and secured concessions for that end of the scheme, and returned to British Guiana in November 1911, for the purpose of re-introducing his proposals in a modified form, but in January 1912, Colonel Link died suddenly of a heart attack in Georgetown. His railway scheme died with him.

In July 1912, the new Governor of the Colony, Sir Walter Egerton, arrived with the avowed intention of developing its resources. Realising from the outset the importance of adequate transport facilities Sir Walter proposed to build a railway from Georgetown to the Brazilian frontier on the south-west of the Colony, with the view that in later years private enterprise or the Government of the State of Amazonas would extend the line from the frontier to *Manãos* on the Amazon river. Sir Walter Egerton himself made three trips into the interior over the proposed route, then in an address delivered to the British Guiana Royal Agricultural and Commercial Society in 1914 he outlined his proposals.

In revising his address for publication in May 1915, the Governor found it necessary to add the following footnote :

There is, in my opinion, no doubt that the people of the Colony are very strongly in favour of the construction of a railway, and the scheme I have laid before the Secretary of State, which is outlined, in some of its aspects, in this paper, has met with the consistent and warm support of the local press. Only on the part of some of the leading men connected with the sugar industry has there appeared an inclination to hold that a very large additional amount must be spent on immigration of labour for the coast districts simultaneously with initiation of railway construction. It will be a pity if an exaggerated anticipation of the effect of railway construction on the labour for the sugar industry should lead to opposition to a scheme which must ultimately benefit every section of the community.

The following year Sir Walter Egerton went on leave and resigned. But the possibilities of railway development still remain.

In 1931 Mr. Henry Ford made an offer to build a motor road through the Colony to his rubber plantation in Brazil, but the conditions attaching to that offer were not acceptable. In the meantime, however, due to the energy of Sir Edward Denham, the present Governor,* a 110-mile road has been built to within a short distance of the Kaieteur Fall, bringing within the reach of tourists and others this famous waterfall. A branch road, tapping the Mazaruni goldfields, runs for seventy-six miles through primeval forest, eliminating many dangerous cataracts on the Mazaruni river, which have hitherto claimed many lives. The need is still felt, however, for a highway to tap the vast interior savannahs, which have been proved very suitable for white settlement, and which adjoin some 12,000 square miles of savannah country in Brazil. The Imperial Government has generously granted loans for road building and for unemployment relief, but further development is almost impossible without the introduction of outside capital for the construction of railways and the building up of new industries. At present there is an American expedition examining the Colony's possibilities; we would like to see British enterprise take even a like interest in the Colony.

GUY E. L. DE WEEVER.

* Sir Edward Denham is now Governor-Designate of Jamaica. Mr. G. A. S. Northcote, Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast, it is announced, will be his successor in British Guiana.

A SAGA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

HITHERTO all the poetry of the American Civil War has been partisan poetry, mainly on the Northern side. The fervour of Whitman, the moral earnestness of Whittier, the quaint humour and deep indignation of Lowell, were all exerted on the Northern side. For some occult reason, the poem which has most caught the popular fancy in this country has been Whittier's *Barbara Freitchie*; though in fact Stonewall Jackson is as much the hero of the story it tells as the nominal heroine. Whittier shows his bias in making Jackson blush at the sight of the Stars and Stripes, whereas the real Jackson was as fully convinced of the righteousness of his cause as even Lincoln was.

A poet has recently arisen to tell the story of the war from a more impartial standpoint, and he has taken for his title the opening words of the familiar song:

John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave
But his soul goes marching on.

He calls it *John Brown's Body*. The poem has had an immense success in America, and is known and read all over the United States. On this side of the Atlantic, though it was noticed at the time of its appearance by one or two of our more literary reviews, it is still unknown to all but a select few. This fact and the poem's intrinsic merits are a sufficient justification for attempting to introduce it anew to English readers.

Stephen Vincent Benét, the author, was born in 1898, and is the son of a Colonel in the U.S. army. He began publishing verses at the age of 17, and has published more than one volume of poetry. *John Brown's Body*, which is undoubtedly his masterpiece, was published in 1928, at the age of 30. It extends to 377 pages, and is divided into eight books. It covers the whole history of the war, from John Brown's raid to the assassination of Lincoln. Yet it is not in the ordinary sense of the word a history; I use a more appropriate term when I call it a saga, for as the author says:

My cyclorama is not the shape of the world,
Nor even the shape of this war from first to last,
But like a totem carved, like a totem stained
With certain beasts and skies and faces of men
That would not let me be too quiet at night
Till they were figured.

All the essential part of the history is there, with vivid portraits of the leaders on both sides; but it is shown by a series of episodes—a cyclorama, as he calls it—part historical and part imaginary. Quite apart from the poetry, the story alone is more interesting than most novels.

I have used the word impartial, but it is the wrong word. Benét is no reasoner, striking a careful balance between contrary opinions. Rather does he as a poet enter into the spirit of each party in turn and show the war alternately through northern and through southern eyes. He is a Northerner, and his fundamental judgment is for the North, against state rights and against slavery, but his portrait of Lee is as sympathetic and as beautiful as his portrait of Lincoln himself:

Oh, he could bear the shifts
Of time and play the bitter loser's game,
The slow, unflinching chess of fortitude,
But while he had an opening for attack
He would attack with every ounce of strength.
His heart was not a stone, but trumpet-shaped
And a long challenge blew an anger through it
That was more dread for being musical
First, last, and to the end.

His full-length portrait of Lincoln takes the form of a soliloquy. The President is waiting for news of the battle of Antietam in order that if it is a victory he may issue at long last his proclamation freeing the slaves. While he waits he goes over in his mind the events of the previous eighteen months, and his own life and career, as he asks himself the question, "What is God's will?" This is followed later in the poem by a picture of Lincoln reviewing the troops ("endless columns crunching across new snow") as they start out for the battle-field in the last year of the war:

"So that was him," they say, "So that's the old man.
I'm glad we saw him. He isn't so much on looks
But he looks like people you know. He looks sad all right,
I never saw nobody look quite as sad as that
Without it made you feel foolish. He don't do that.
He makes you feel—I dunno—I'm glad we could see him.
He was glad to see us but you could tell all the same
This war's plumb killin' him. You can tell by his face.
I never saw such a look on any man's face.
I guess it's tough for him. Well, we saw him, for once."

It is the great paradox of the war that while the North was victorious, and had probably the more righteous cause, the romance of the war apart from that one immortal figure, the most heroic leaders, the greatest devotion, the greatest enthusiasm, the heaviest sacrifices, were all on the side of the South. (I say probably the more righteous cause, because one has to realise that to a southerner of that day the logic of the southern position must have seemed quite unassailable. Thirteen independent states had joined together in a voluntary union for their mutual advantage. Surely if they found the partnership no longer advantageous they were entitled to dissolve it! If the issue had not been complicated by the question of slavery, there might have been much to be said for the southern position.)

The North had no generals who could inspire in their men the unwavering trust, the enthusiasm, the devotion almost amounting to worship, which was felt for Lee and Jackson by the men who served under them. There were none who were the equals of Lee and Jackson in military capacity. The disparity of resources between the two sides makes the prolongation of the war for four years little short of a miracle. Nowhere has this been more forcibly pointed out than in President Wilson's *Epochs of American History*.^{*} "Stupendous," he says,

as was the war struggle from every point of view, its deepest and most extraordinary qualities are revealed only when it is viewed from the side of the southern Confederacy. The material resources of the North . . . never lacked or were doubted; they even increased while it spent them. On the part of the South, on the other hand, the great struggle was maintained by sheer spirit and devotion, in spite of constantly diminishing resources and constantly waning hope. Her whole strength was put forth, her resources spent, exhausted, annihilated; and yet with such concentration of energy that for more than three years she seemed as fully equal to the contest as did the North itself. . . . There is in history no devotion not religious, no constancy not meant for success, that can furnish a parallel to the devotion and constancy of the South in this extraordinary war.

All this, and along with it the half-mad fanaticism of John Brown, the greatness of Lincoln, the dogged persistence of Grant, the anxieties of the two capitals separated from each

^{*} Book III, Chap. X.

other by so short a space, are displayed to us in a series of marvellous portraits. There is not a leading figure on either side but is sketched for us, sometimes in half a dozen lines, sometimes in a detailed study, so that we have a definite impression of the man as he lived and was. This power of portraiture, of making his characters live, is one of Benét's most remarkable gifts. He stands with pencil and sketch-book before each of the statesmen and soldiers in turn, and sets them down with their hopes and their ambitions, their achievements and their failures, so that we say like the troops who had seen Lincoln,

"So that was he!"

His fictitious characters are no less alive than the historical. The slow-thinking giant of a Pennsylvanian farmer; the runaway slave; the little overworked, underfed slavey in a southern hotel, whose life is largely made up of boots and beds and slops, but who has her own dreams and her own little spark of romance, are drawn with the same sympathy, the same consummate skill, as he gives to depicting the president of the Confederacy. The most superb of all these portraits is that of the mistress of Wingate Hall,

as slightly made
And as hard to break as a rapier blade,

representative of the Southern women who

Kept the house with the men away
And baked the bricks where there was no clay,
Made courage from terror and bread from bran
And propped the South on a swansdown fan
Through four long years of ruin and stress,
The pride—and the deadly bitterness.

The result is that we get from the poem as living a realisation of the atmosphere of the conflict as we get of the court of Louis XIV from *The Three Musketeers*, or of the spirit of the Middle Ages from *The Cloister and the Hearth*.

After a prelude giving a gruesome account of the experience of a young ship's officer serving for the first time on a Yankee slave-ship, just to give atmosphere and make us feel the full horror of the slave trade, we are shown Jack Ellyat, of Connecticut in the North, wandering in the woods with his

dog on an October afternoon in the year 1860 and wondering whether it will come to war. On the whole, he thinks not. Then the scene shifts abruptly to Georgia in the far south, and we are given an outline of the history of the planter family of the Wingates, and shown young Clay Wingate riding back to Wingate Hall on that same October afternoon, and pondering in his own way the same problem as Jack Ellyat. This gives occasion for a beautiful description of the Georgia autumn with its hot noons and its deep-starred nights,

A brown seed-kernel that splits apart
And shows the Summer yet in its heart,
A smokiness so vague in the air
You feel it rather than see it there,
A brief, white rime on the red-clay road
And slow mules creaking a lazy load
Through endless acres of afternoon.

I like that "endless acres of afternoon." It just gives the sense of the warm sun and the still air, and the feeling that it will be hours and hours before there is any perceptible change.

Jack Ellyat and Clay Wingate appear and reappear throughout the poem, and their fortunes are interwoven with the progress of the struggle. The traditions, the prejudices, the enthusiasms of the South are recreated for us through the medium of the Wingate household. We are shown the contest for Clay Wingate's love between Lucy Weatherby and Sally Dupré. Lucy Weatherby is the purely heartless beauty who likes to keep three admirers on a string at once, and is so beautiful and so charming in manner that she is able to do it. Sally Dupré is one of the neighbouring clan of Appleton and was his playmate as a child, but socially she is regarded as not quite "it" because her mother eloped with and married a French dancing-master. We are shown Cudjo, the coloured butler, whose interests are absolutely bound up with those of the family he serves. He can't understand why John Brown should be stirring up trouble—

Nigger's bizness ain't white folks' bizness.

When the tide of fortune has begun to turn unmistakably against the South there is a moving scene in which Cudjo and Mary Lou Wingate bury the family silver by the light of a

lantern, and look at one another across the grave as the last sod is replaced.

The poem is not faultless—far from it. There are passages which, if they were written in prose, no one would suspect of being anything but prose. There are other passages in which the poet has taken such liberties with his metre as to make it seem almost like free verse. But always the poem is alive. It has always a story to tell or a picture to paint. It is interspersed here and there with lyrics, some of them of outstanding beauty. The song of the Coming of Love :

What things shall be said of you
Terrible beauty in armour?
What things shall be said of you
Horses riding the sky?

almost recalls the Song of Solomon. Through it all runs the allegory of John Brown's body, a theme that forms a background to all the varied music of the saga.

Ask the tide why it rises with the moon.
My bones and I have risen like that tide
And an immortal anguish plucks us up
And will not hide us till our song be done.

So at last, when the tale is done, and the grass and weeds have grown above the mouldering bodies of the slain, John Brown's body becomes a seed out of which emerges the age of machinery ; the age of the dynamo and the furnace flame :

So, when the crowd gives tongue,
And prophets, old or young,
Bawl out their strange despair
Or fall in worship there,
Let them applaud the image or condemn
But keep your distance and your soul from them.

And while the prophets shudder or adore
Before the flame, hoping it will give ear,
Say neither, in their way,
"It is a deadly magic and accursed,"
Nor "It is blest," but only "It is here."

S. R. DANIELS.

SCENES IN EASTERN POLAND.

THE four Eastern provinces of Poland are a country of broad low horizons where the sky plays the major part in every view. There are few railways and, save for the two great chaussées leading from Kiev and Moscow to Warsaw, most of the roads are sand tracks. Forest and marsh alternate with open fields, the latter crossed here and there by slowly flowing sandy rivers and dotted with the small grey wooden huts of the peasants. The traveller is left with an impression of illimitable space and time. The only large city is Vilna, which lies in the extreme north: it is an attractive place with many narrow streets bordered by high cloister walls, and a wealth of baroque churches. The town, and the ancient university founded by Stephen Batory, where Mickiewicz, the national poet, studied and was imprisoned, play an important rôle as an influence of Western civilisation through the whole Vilna province. A number of ruined medieval castles and, in the south, vestiges of earthworks thrown up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries against Turkish invaders remind us that the country is not devoid of history. But, since the early decades of the last century when a series of charming arcaded market halls was built, life, until recently, seems to have stood still even in the towns.

The Kresy Wschodnie or Eastern Marches, as these four provinces—Vilna, Nowogrodek, Polesia and Volhynia—are often termed, covers an area equal to that of England and has a population of some 5,600,000. It stretches from the Russian frontier to a line running roughly north and south from Brzesc (Brest-Litovsk), and is bordered on the north by Lithuania and Latvia, on the south by the Polish province of Galicia. Ever since the advent to power of Marshal Pilsudski's Government much time and money has been spent on the general development of the Kresy, and, as I learnt recently when travelling through the district after several years' absence from Poland, there is already visible evidence of their work. The present problems of the Kresy, however, are by no means as simple as its outward appearance, and each successive Government has been called on not only to undertake the difficult task of administration and development, but also to face three major political problems which cannot be avoided: the development of White Ruthenian

and Ukrainian national movements among the indigenous peasantry, the former in the north, the latter in the south; Communism; and the Orthodox Church. All three are inextricably mixed up.

In order that the Kresy and its problems may be fully understood, it is necessary to know something of the antecedents of the district. These four provinces formed part of the territory seized by Russia at the Partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. Whilst, however, the districts west of Brzesc which had always been essentially Polish were allowed to retain a certain measure of independence, those on the east immediately became an integral part of the State and underwent a rigorous course of Russification. The Polish language was banned, all the peasants who were Uniates were forced into the Orthodox Church in 1838, and dissension was encouraged between large landowners, who were justly regarded as the mainstays of Polish patriotism, and the peasants. But this vast territory east of Brzesc, for many years on the borderland between West and East, Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, although it had never been completely Polish, could not in the course of little over a century be made completely Russian. The four provinces handed over to Poland by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 as a share of the ancient "borderland" were no easy heritage.

Both national movements are of post-war growth and are based on language; Ukrainian has a literature, White Ruthenian has not. The majority of the peasants had not previously been race-conscious and only became so as a result of teaching. Nor were the implications of citizenship comprehensible. What they most readily understood was allegiance to a religion. Roman Catholic was generally synonymous with Pole, but members of the Orthodox Church would call themselves simply Orthodox; and in some cases they would be merely "of this place." In the early years after the War, when theories of racial independence were widespread, the White Ruthenian movement found champions among certain Polish intellectuals. Support also came from the other side of the frontier which, as a result of the Treaty of Riga, cuts clean across the territories inhabited by the White Ruthenians and the Ukrainians, leaving half on the Polish side, half on the Russian. Bolshevik agents, whilst teaching the peasants that they were White Ruthenians, told them that their real

home was in Russia, where there was a federal White Ruthenian Republic. This was naturally accompanied by Communist propaganda. Owing to a change of policy, support is no longer coming from Moscow, and the movement has lost much of its impetus. But it has gone too far to be suppressed and one more minority race, of growing importance, has thus been added to the long list in Europe.

The much stronger Ukrainian movement in the south (i.e. Volhynia), where the population is wealthier and more developed, has spread since the War from the neighbouring province of Galicia, the centre of Ukrainianism, but which had previously been cut off by the Russian-Austrian frontier. For the moment it has been most successfully diverted by the completely individual policy of the Governor, Jozewski. He has skilfully forestalled subversive teaching by encouraging Ukrainian culture within the bounds of a Polish political framework, and a position has now been reached when it is habitual for meetings of the Government Bloc to be conducted in the Ukrainian tongue. It is doubtful whether this spirit could survive in face of the greater attraction of a Federal Ukrainian State in Galicia—were such a State ever created—but for the time, at any rate, it has produced an era of most unexpected calm.

In as far as the champions of the minorities come from Russia, Communism is mixed up with both the White Ruthenian and Ukrainian Movements, but it also works over a far larger field. Ever since the institution of the collective farm, however, there has been a distinct cooling-off towards Russia, and the news is gradually being spread by Russian peasants, who manage every now and then to escape to Poland, that life under such conditions has not even the merits which are attributed to it. The frontier is carefully guarded on both sides by a special defence force, and on the Polish side there is no part of it which is not visible from one of a series of carefully arranged watch-towers; but it is crossed fairly frequently, particularly in spring, when food is scarce in Russia. Teaching which, it is felt, might pave the way for Communism has recently begun to spread from another and quite unexpected source: the Baptists and other Evangelical preachers. Their greatest success has been in Polesia and southern Volhynia, but it is one for which it is difficult to find an exact reason. The most likely would seem to be that the

peasants being left without moral support from the Orthodox Church, which is in a very decayed condition, have found satisfaction for their spiritual needs in the mysticism and simplicity of the new teaching. Not the least surprising aspect, perhaps, is that the preachers are often converted Jews.

Even if the Baptists have had a certain success, we cannot say the same for the apostles of a revived Uniate Church. But the work deserves our attention if only in view of the immensity of its object, namely, to create a base for the ultimate conversion of Russia to Roman Catholicism. The Uniate Church (more correctly Roman Catholicism of the Eastern rite) came into being as a result of the Union signed at Brest-Litovsk in 1596 between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox bishops of eastern Poland. The Orthodox were to acknowledge the Pope, and to recognise the supremacy of Rome in all questions of dogma. On the other hand, they were to retain their own rite, the much revered "old Slav" liturgy, and to be allowed independence of action in matters of habit or custom. The marriage of priests, for instance, or the use of certain coloured altar-cloths are regarded as matters of custom, a belief in the Immaculate Conception or Papal Infallibility is a question of dogma. By the Ukase of 1838, when the Russians were in possession of the Kresy, all "lapsed brethren" were once again, as stated above, "admitted" to the Orthodox Church. The process of revival, started by the Bishop of Siedlce and a small group of followers under the influence of Rome, is by no means as simple as the wholesale conversion of 1596, headed by all the ecclesiastics both high and low. The peasants either repel the Union as some form of trickery, or, in the rare cases when they do go over, do so because they wish to be rid of an Orthodox priest who prefers the world to his spiritual duties, or, more likely, who overcharges them. Union is treated as a matter of convenience rather than conscience. So far, 30,000 is a liberal estimate for the number of Uniates in the whole of the Eastern Provinces; but, were the teaching in the hands of the Poles, with a thorough understanding of local conditions and of the Slav mentality, and not those of monks and priests from a variety of foreign countries, it is possible that the revival would meet with more success. Whatever we may feel as to the merits of the ultimate object, it is legitimate to wonder whether Russia is a country in which anything with the taint of Polonism is

likely to meet with success. The Polish Government, it must be added, has never regarded the revival with favour. The Government knows that in many Orthodox minds it will inevitably be connected with the revival; and although it would doubtless be pleased to see the disappearance of the Orthodox Church, it has no desire to stir up a hornets' nest about its ears by incurring an accusation of interference with religious liberty.

The constructive task which the present Government has set itself in these provinces is twofold. It wishes to improve the economic situation of the inhabitants and, by drawing them out of their age-long apathy and stimulating their mental capacity, to put them in a position to benefit from the changes to the full extent. In spite of a fundamental desire to create a closer union between the Kresy and the rest of the country, it has not resorted to any forceful measures. The benefits which the minorities will derive from this constructive policy should reconcile them in some measure to the Polish State; and all the peasants in whom race-consciousness is dormant should be brought within its orbit, owing to the fact that all the constructive work is being done by Polish officials and that they thereby come into friendly contact with the State more and more each year. Moreover, the Poles are helped by the prestige of being now the ruling race, an honour which had previously belonged to Russia.

The greatest change is undoubtedly being effected by the Agrarian Reform Laws, of which the object is the creation of a large class of self-supporting peasantry. The peasants had only been liberated from serfdom in 1866, and at the birth of the new Republic the land was very unevenly distributed between them and the large landowners; some fifty per cent. of the former's holdings were under 12½ acres in size, and thus below what is considered the minimum for subsistence. At the same time, in a typical village where the Reform has not yet taken effect, it is not unusual for a holding to be divided into as many as ten or twenty different strips, scattered about in different places, and of the most surprising dimensions. One may see plots of land scarcely large enough to graze a cow, and others that are perhaps 1½ miles long and but 10 yards wide, the latter a crystallised survival of the ancient three-field system. Not only are such holdings most difficult to cultivate, but a great deal of land is wasted on roads and

boundaries. Though in somewhat less aggravated form, similar conditions prevailed everywhere in Poland. Here, however, the medieval picture was completed, for grazing lands were sometimes held in common by a whole village, and the peasants had retained their ancient rights of pasturage and wood collection on the large estates to which they had previously been tied.

Under such conditions life is possible, but little more. Many of the peasants, among whom twelve children in a family is not abnormal, are desperately poor. Even those with dwarf holdings may be able to produce enough for their own nourishment, but they have no surplus to sell. Their needs, it is true, are few. Their huts have two rooms, one for the family, one for the animals, both with floors of beaten earth. The women often grow and spin their own flax, and in any case they weave the linen from which they make their clothes. Fences are tied together with birch twigs, thus avoiding the use of nails, and shoes for use in the fields are made of woven birch bark. But salt and sugar have to be bought, and also such things as boots for the cold weather. The most frequent excuse for non-attendance at school in the winter is that the children have nothing to wear, and in most cases it is one which the schoolmasters know to be true.

As a result of the Acts of 1920 and 1925 and certain subsidiary Acts conditions are in a state of rapid change. The holdings are being unified; the easements are being liquidated; and the progressive reduction of the arable area of large estates to a maximum of 450 acres is providing land for parcellation among the holders of dwarf properties or for the creation of new holdings for the landless. The unification of the holdings in the Vilna district has been completed in twenty-eight per cent. of the villages, and both here and in the other provinces it is estimated that the whole work will be completed in fifteen years. The employees of the Land Bureaux, in spite of the delicate nature of their task, appear everywhere to be on the best of terms with the local population, and in many cases they are so interested in every detail of their work that it is a rare pleasure to travel with them. The liquidation of the easements (by which the peasant receives a certain area of land in return for the surrender of his rights) and the work of parcellation have been left as much as possible to private initiative under official supervision. The

easements should all have been liquidated two years hence. The parcellation has not been effected on as radical a scale as in certain other countries, for it is realised that the large estate has its own rôle to play in State economy, particularly in cases where it is the centre of a rural industry. In practice, the law is only regulating a natural tendency; for the large proprietors, assured in the possession of their forests, are in most cases only too delighted to find purchasers for a part, or all, of the rest of their land.

In every aspect of the Reform one cannot help noticing the Government's desire to promote the spirit of self-help, and its belief in the force of example; experienced farmers are settled, wherever possible, under the obligation to advise their neighbours; where land needs drainage, as is often the case, the peasants are given expert advice, but left to put it into practice themselves; agricultural schools have been founded for the sons of peasants. The Government is carrying its work to a logical conclusion by assisting the growth of co-operative societies for the sale of surplus produce, and by providing an assured market for flax, of which it is actively promoting the home production.

The three branches of the Reform are carried out concurrently, and when completed the village should consist of a group of compact holdings all above the minimum in size. The village street, dusty in summer, thick mud in winter, disappears; for the houses, all crowded together and built of wood with thatched or shingle roofs, are taken to pieces and transported to the owner's new and compact holding.

The removal of the houses from the village street is in a certain sense symbolic of a change which takes place in the owners themselves. They become more independent, and lose their inherent sense of subservience to the common will or custom. All observers in the country are agreed that not only has production been increased, but that the peasants have gained in self-respect and initiative. The beneficial effects of the Agrarian Reform on the life and development of the Kresy will be remembered for all time.

Travelling in the east of Poland one has the constant impression that the country is waking out of a deep slumber. This feeling is the result of many things, besides Agrarian Reform, which cannot be dealt with here in full. There are the elementary schools, even in the remote villages, where

eighty per cent. of the children receive education as opposed to thirty-six per cent. in 1922, and where they learn from the earliest age that they are Polish citizens and that they share in the inheritance of a tradition greater than that of their own village. At Lida there were two particularly fine schools, one elementary, the other secondary, both equipped with admirable laboratories, and the former with a model counter at which any child who wished could, in its final year, be taught approved methods of serving in a shop. Details such as this, of which there are innumerable examples, would never have been dreamed of ten years ago. Then there are the small towns, such as Pinsk, or Lida itself, centres of a growing civilisation and incidentally of Polonism. Their influence on the country round will continue to increase in proportion with the improvement of communications. In the Nowogrodek province thirty miles of metalled road were built last year, and this year, by utilising the whole of this province's share of the new State Employment Fund, it is hoped to construct some ninety more. Lastly, there are the widespread Youth organisations which now exist in practically every village. Mental action in the young is stimulated by play-acting and similar pursuits, and under the admirable guidance of the Society of Country Youth they are taught to realise that chicken do not suffer from being regularly fed, and that fruit-growing is, to say the least of it, a useful pastime. Their early training, coupled with that which the boys receive during their military service, turns out something which is very different from the older generation, and in many cases Youth rejoices in the fact.

I ended my tour at Korzec, a small town on the Russian frontier. On both sides the landscape and the inhabitants were identical. On the Russian side were a deserted church and village and the long, low dwelling-house of a co-operative farm out of which the peasants were trooping to their daily work; on the Polish, a privately owned sugar factory and a group of reorganised and independent holdings. Two civilisations stand face to face. It remains to be seen which will prove the more enduring.

M. B. WINCH.

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M. B. WINCH.

THE CONQUEST OF THE AZTEC GODS.

HOW was it that in the early sixteenth century a few hundred Spaniards were able to subdue the vast and populous region that we now call Mexico? It is true that the invaders possessed a dozen small cannon, but these early firearms were almost equally dangerous at either end. It is true that the invaders possessed nearly a score of horses, a terrifying novelty at that time and place. But the novelty would have soon worn off, and the terror spread over seven hundred thousand square miles must have been a trifle thin. What then is the explanation of the Conquest?

I had always understood that the Aztecs were a gentle and confiding people, and this seemed to be the reason of the Spanish success. It had struck me as a nasty jab at disarmament. When I got to Mexico I discovered my mistake. The conquest of the Aztecs by the Spaniards is not a triumph of militarism over meekness. Far from forming an argument against pacifism, it forms an argument for it.

It was in the Museum at Mexico City that enlightenment came to me. There I found a great room given over to the stone carvings of the ancient races. A few of these sculptures were both fine and beautiful. I saw a rattlesnake with scales of cunning workmanship. I saw a man's head that might have been fashioned in ancient Greece, save that the profile with its beaked nose and short pouting upper lip was typically Mexican. But the greater number of carvings represented the old gods. These, and in particular such as were of Aztec origin, struck me as the most horrible objects that my eyes had ever lit upon. I am not criticising their artistic merit. From this point of view they are immeasurably superior to the totems of African or of Red Indian worship. It is just in this that lies their horror. The hall is a nightmare, an orgy of petrified obscenity.

At first the full meaning did not come home to me. I gazed blankly at great squatting stone forms with greedy, leering faces and large bowls sunk before them. One in particular riveted my attention. There was a foul delight in his expression as, with fat protruding tongue, he licked sensuous lips. Over what could this god be gloating? What was the purpose of the great round bowl between his feet? And the little incised channel, what had flowed along it? To gain

enlightenment I bought a guide. It was in Spanish, and my acquaintance with that tongue was both very recent and very brief. Indeed, my whole education in connection with Mexico seemed to have been deplorably neglected. Still, I might be able to make out something. I began slowly to translate. As I laboured on, a dreadful disgust began to crawl over me. It could not be true, I reassured myself. My lack of Spanish was the fault. The stone bowl could not have been filled with the still-quivering hearts torn from living men and women. The channel could not have drained off the over-brimming human blood. Twenty thousand victims could not have been sacrificed in a single year. No, it was impossible. Such things could not be.

But, even as I denied, I knew that such things had been. No lesser horror could have produced the evil joy upon that carved stone face, upon all these carved stone faces. Besides, I now saw corroboration in surrounding statuary. A man, presumably a priest, was bearing a platter of what my awakened eyes recognised as human hearts. It must have been a good likeness of some definite man, for I met him again unmistakably in another group. And there was a figure of tragic countenance with a great hole in his breast. Without the guide I knew that this had been one of the victims. They were tearing out his heart.

But twenty thousand such sacrifices in a single year. It still remained incredible. Even were the number exaggerated, how could it be true? The Aztecs would have risen in revolt against their gods. No race could have survived that annual offering. Then I read further, and this too was explained. It was not their own people, but captives taken from other tribes, whom the Aztecs sacrificed. But if this was their custom, the Aztecs could have hardly been the gentle and confiding race of my imagination. No, very much the opposite. And these other tribes who supplied victims to gods not even of their own, how maddened, how despairing they must have grown. To them these strange white men from over the sea must have come not as conquerors but as saviours. They would joyfully have banded with them against the Aztec oppressor and his monstrous deities. In this lay the explanation of the Spanish Conquest. It is a very old one. "For all that take the sword shall perish with the sword."

It happened that the very next day was the Feast of Our

priests in gorgeous golden vestments were at the altar conducting the service in the detached manner of the Roman Catholic Church. There were acolytes with swaying incense; there was music. The picture above the altar was now discernible. I saw a fair young face, gentle and devout, a girlish figure in a shell-like enveloping cloak of stars. How beautiful, how tender, I felt appreciatively.

Suddenly there came back to me the horrible grinning countenance of the stone god at the Museum. The Spaniard, with all his cruelty and oppression, did, after all, bring something to this country. He replaced a religion of hideous savagery by a religion that was—nominally—one of love. It is true that suffering must have gone to build these mighty churches, but the natives, perhaps out of contempt, were spared the terrors of the Inquisition. And in place of a brutal Aztec deity holding between his feet a bowl of red, pulsating hearts, the Indian was given an innocent girl to worship, with crimson roses flowering as she trod.

EDITH ZANGWILL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

HERR HITLER'S CONSEQUENCES.

RECENT events have had the incidental effect of directing a less antagonistic, almost a lenient, general interest in Herr Hitler and his works. The climax of antagonism was reached in the last week of July, when the assassination of Herr Dollfuss was directly traceable to Nazi German intrigue. But the very completeness of the misfortune that is modern Germany has had paradoxically good effects. When A and B both distrust C, there develops a form of sympathy between A and B. Herr Hitler has had the effect of fostering the sympathy and improving the tone of nearly the whole world outside Germany. He helped to bring Russia into the League of Nations, thereby rescuing the League itself from an apparently inevitable collapse. He provoked a Franco-Italian reconciliation which ended the bitter feud of a decade. By the same token he revived the hope that next year's naval conference may not wholly fail. The cause of naval disarmament in 1922, 1927 and 1930 alike was baulked precisely by the Franco-Italian deadlock. Even if the Japanese problem is to be solved next year it will be necessary, if the conference is to succeed, also to solve the Franco-Italian problem. It is Herr Hitler who has inclined France and Italy towards reason and friendship, so that there is now a chance that they may compose their chronic differences about naval armaments. It follows that not only Europe, but the whole world has cause for gratitude, left-handed as it may be, to Herr Hitler.

If one recalls the circumstances attending the murder of Herr Dollfuss one can hardly be surprised that they made an impression on normal people. Not only had Munich frankly broadcast the threat; there was other evidence in appalling abundance. On July 19th, only six days before Herr Dollfuss was assassinated, Herr Alfred Frauenfeld, the Nazi regional leader of Vienna, broadcast from the Munich station the undisguised threat that if certain Nazi terrorists then waiting trial in Austria were condemned, Herr Dollfuss would be killed. On July 20th there began a widespread series of bomb outrages in Austria. On July 22nd a consignment of German bombs was seized on the Swiss-Austrian frontier. On July 23rd a similar consignment was seized on its way from

Bavaria to Austria. It could be proved that the explosives used in the Socialist and Communist outrages perpetrated in Austria were supplied by the Nazis. Every day the Munich station attacked Herr Dollfuss as the barrier to Austria's destiny as a German nation. On the day itself (July 25th) it was Dr. Rieth, German Minister in Vienna, who negotiated with the surviving members of the Austrian Cabinet for the safe conduct out of Austria of the Nazi assassins. On the evening of that day every wireless station in Germany broadcast the identic story that the Austrian "rising" had been directed personally against Herr Dollfuss as a traitor to Austria.

There is no room even for doubt about the facts. Even the method employed for the murder of Herr Dollfuss was that of daylight gangsters who forced their way into the Chancellory and held up the Cabinet, then meeting, at the point of the revolver. Herr Dollfuss was shot and callously allowed to bleed to death. There cannot be many analogies in history to Herr Hitler's deadly efficiency in antagonising every decent person everywhere. He himself, however, seems to be wholly unaware of his own qualities. On September 12th he held his first Presidential reception of the foreign ambassadors in Berlin. This is what he said to them: "It is my unshakeable will to make Germany a stronghold of peace." The odd thing is that Herr Hitler has indeed made Europe almost secure from war. The very friendlessness of Germany is an asset for peace.

TRADE AND POLITICS IN AMERICA.

The cotton textile strike that started in the United States on Saturday, September 1st, showed how big were the conflicting forces that had been set loose by the attempted political control of commerce. The strike itself was of big proportions. It involved physical outrage and bloodshed. But there is something of deeper interest in it than is suggested by the immediate context. It symbolises an outstanding feature of the material conditions in which most of the world now lives: the increasing extent to which human life in all its phases, economic, financial, even spiritual and cultural, is subject to political management. The main difference between what is happening in the United States and what is happening elsewhere is that up to last year the United States

had preserved much of its individualist freedom, whereas every other "civilised" country except Japan was in greater or less degree socialised—that is, planned by its politicians. Of the Great Powers, Russia, Italy, Germany and Great Britain have for many years in varying degrees been used to a condition of life in which the individual cannot move hand or foot without his Government's permission, approval and control. In the United States by contrast individual freedom, enterprise and responsibility were still the ruling motive until last year, when Mr. Roosevelt by a combination of unfortunate circumstances found himself competent to impose upon the country a comprehensive plan of political dictatorship. Whereas in other countries the suppression of personal freedom had been gradually accomplished by the slow spread of socialist practice, in the United States the change was sudden and total. Its suddenness gave a strong impetus to the cause and what is called, but miscalled, "organised labour": the cause which seeks, on governmental authority—that is, by virtue of the power of an electoral majority—to dictate to employers of labour the terms and conditions on which they shall conduct their own business.

When, at 11 p.m. on September 1st, the cotton textile workers in the Southern States began their great strike their objects were these: (1) a reduction of the hours of labour from forty (the original figure prescribed in Mr. Roosevelt's cotton textile code) to thirty-four a week, without any reduction of weekly wages (in a six-day week, that would work out at less than six hours a day); (2) the reinstatement of all workers who had been discharged for belonging to the Textile Workers' Union; (3) the recognition by the employers of the Textile Workers' Union as an organisation holding plenary power over all the textile workers in their relationship with their employers; (4) the abandonment by the employers of their right to assign more looms to one weaver; (5) the appointment of a tribunal of arbitration, which should be competent to settle disputes between employers and workers. In other words the control of employers by workers—which is the central object of all socialism that derives its power from an electoral majority—had within two years of Mr. Roosevelt's launching his plan gone beyond that plan. In its crude simplicity the plan was this: that in any industrial enterprise in which a capitalist sinks his capital,

the respective functions of capital and labour shall be thus divided : labour shall decide how little work it does and how much it shall be paid for doing it, and shall decide what men or women the employers shall employ ; the employers shall pay the wages and continue to make the enterprise succeed, no matter what it may cost to produce the goods and what the goods can be sold at. To the detached student the interesting thing is this : Capital and labour are necessarily opposing forces, for it is the business of capital to make capital as remunerative as possible, and it is the business of labour to obtain the highest possible wage. Both sides are right. The game is fair. "Organisation" is fair, both for capital and for labour. It is a wholly sound device for labour to organise itself, if it can, so that by means of a strike it can force higher wages from employers, just as it would be wholly right for capital to force down wages, if it could, by agreed common action among employers, including the device of a lock-out. The two forces, if left to themselves, would find their own level, because capital cannot dispense with labour any more than labour can dispense with capital. If labour be abundant, it is either cheap or, if artificially kept dear, the balance is redressed by unemployment. What is neither fair nor practical is that labour should use political means to coerce capital by virtue of the democratic fact that the workers outnumber the capitalists. A hold-up on the high road is hardly justified on any exalted criterion by the mere fact that the robbers outnumber the victims. The democratic basis of political civilisation may make socialism inevitable because it ensures the triumph of the majority over the minority. That is the triumph of force. But it does not follow that it is fair or practical. It is not practical because an employer of labour, using his own capital, must himself decide the conditions on which he can profitably employ it or he will not employ it. Why should he? From his point of view he had better squander it in riotous living. It is the demonstrable fact that in present socialist conditions large hoards of capital are lying idle and are not used for industrial enterprise, because they cannot profitably be so used.

Something of interest, therefore, is to be gained by tracing the consequences of the New Deal (to give the process the absurd name by which it is commonly known) launched by Mr. Roosevelt in the late spring of last year. The process itself

has been so involved and so many-sided that it is not easy to keep the main outlines clear in one's mind. Its essential feature is the attempt by the political authority to dictate to industry the basic terms of hours and wages on which it is to be conducted. It is now possible to consider the results of that attempt as so far established. Let it be remembered, in defence of Mr. Roosevelt, that when on March 4th, 1933, he became President of the United States, the provocation presented to him to attempt something new in American experience was almost overwhelming. Indeed, he was forced by circumstances and by an expectant nation to take immediate action, of his devising, to meet an appalling emergency. On that day no bank in New York was open, a nation-wide panic had burst, the banking and general financial system had stopped functioning. The extent of the panic was illustrated by the fact that he had himself been shot at, and narrowly missed, by an assassin. In his inaugural address he announced that he would himself ask Congress (if Congress itself would not take action) for "broad executive power to wage war against the emergency . . . as if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe." He stated that "the withered leaves of industrial enterprise lie on every side." Such was his justification. He gave it as his view that "the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure and abdicated." He was promptly given virtually full powers by Congress to translate the United States into what was currently foreshadowed in the political circles as a "balanced social State" through the regulation of hours and wages and the general control of industry. His full plan embraced the immediate relief of unemployment by public works, a scheme of fiscal economy and plans for economic and financial reorganisation. His economic plan was to establish dictatorial control over all industry and in particular to fix minimum wages and maximum hours of work, to regulate production and in other ways to promote, encourage and demand what he called "fair competition." The instrument he fashioned was the National Industrial Recovery Act, which tabulated a series of "codes of fair competition." The cotton textile code, for example, prescribed that cotton operatives should have a forty-hour week and a minimum wage of twelve dollars. When he signed N.I.R.A. on June 16th, 1933—it had been

passed by the House of Representatives on May 27th and by the Senate on June 13th—he announced that his object was “to restore our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity.” He stated dogmatically that less work and more pay was the means to that end. “The idea,” he explained, “is simply for employers to hire more men to do the existing work by reducing the working hours of each man’s week and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter week.”

He therefore had a theory. It was essential to his theory that prices should be kept low so that the increased paper wages should remain real wages and thus not defeat his object of restoring the “rich domestic market” by “raising its vast consuming capacity.” He gave the specific warning that “if we now inflate prices as fast and as far as we increase wages, the whole project will be set at naught.” It was a surprising theory. To keep up wages—that is, costs, while keeping down prices—that is, profits—was to attempt a complete reversal of the ordinary cycle of business, exemplified by Mr. Henry Ford, of expanding profits, expanding production, expanding employment, expanding consumption. Mr. Roosevelt put expanding consumption first and expanding profits last from an apparently moral, not economic, differentiation between the interests of different classes of consumers, for increased dividends, resulting from increased prices, would on economic grounds be at least as good a means of increasing consumption as would an increase in wages, even if the increased wages could retain their real relative value. Every boom since 1897 has followed the cycle above described. By reversing it, or stipulating its reversal, Mr. Roosevelt was making an unbusinesslike demand upon employers which many employers simply could not grant, if they would; and at the same time he was exciting the socialist appetite into hopes that never could be fulfilled (as socialist hopes obviously never can be fulfilled if the satisfaction even of the socialists themselves be the criterion). The fact that not much more than twelve months after Mr. Roosevelt launched a cotton textile code based upon forty working hours a week the entire body of cotton textile workers were on strike for a thirty-four-hour week, illustrated both the futility of a forty-hour week itself, when imposed from the outside against the economic grain, and the essentially insatiable nature of a cause whose main

object is to ensure that a minimum of work be done for a maximum of pay, on the absurd ground that prosperity is a capitalist preserve. Moreover, Mr. Roosevelt’s codes made the specific claim that “employees shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” Within three months of those codes being promulgated the workers of the United States were on strike from coast to coast, for the central principle of collective bargaining had been seized upon as a simple device for enforcing ever-increasing wages and ever-dwindling work. They even bit the hand that fed them; for on October 13th three labour unions sent out a band of strikers to march upon the headquarters of N.I.R.A. itself. As month followed month the industrial upheaval in the United States increased in intensity, until Mr. Roosevelt, after an experience of fourteen months, was constrained to consider the revision of his own handiwork, with what result history had not told when these lines were written.

N.I.R.A. was given the best possible chance by the chaotic conditions out of which it arose, for the whole nation was ready to follow a lead. It was launched with the emotional uplift of an exaggerated “ballyhoo.” The “blue eagle” insignia was featured as the insignia of an almost holy crusade. General Johnson, the administrator of the Act, organised the initial campaign with such enthusiasm that even employers wondered if they could not safely abandon the fruits of their experience and the dictates of their common sense in the expectation that the very force of national exaltation would carry the thing through, as it carries a nation through wars and other absurdities. Thirteen codes applicable to particular industries were forthwith promulgated, capped by a general or “blanket” code designed for industry as a whole for the limited period to December 1st, 1933. In the opening days of the campaign no fewer than 700,000 employers who in the aggregate employed 6,000,000 workers signed the codes. General Johnson boldly and confidently anticipated that by September 4th (Labour Day) the whole field of American industry, in which some 35,000,000 workers are employed, would be harmoniously working in the new conditions. On July 29th, eleven of the New York banks—which in March had been castigated by Mr. Roosevelt—announced their willingness to finance the schemes contained

in N.I.R.A. for the production and distribution of raw materials, food and other goods. But the patriotic spirit (for such indeed was the spirit that supported Mr. Roosevelt) was short-lived. As early as October 1933 the farmers of the Middle West lost patience because prices were not rising. It was even more essential to them than to the industrialists that prices should rise. Mr. Roosevelt had decreed that prices should not rise. In his embarrassment he conceded a measure of the monetary inflation which the farmers demanded and thereby upset the bankers and the industrialists in the East. Although on September 12th, 1933, General Johnson could declare that eighty-five per cent. of employers acknowledged allegiance to the blue eagle, it was already obvious that many of them did so as "chiselers," that is as a means of warding off attention from their own disregard of the codes' provisions. Also the newspaper and publishing businesses began to chafe under the appearance that they were being controlled by Washington. But the chief danger that emerged was that the workers' organisations looked wistfully but not wisely at the instrument that had been put into their hands. On October 10th General Johnson felt it necessary to warn the unions against the temptation to organise their own direct strikes. The warning was both ineffective and difficult to reconcile with the contemporary activity of the Administration itself. It happened that the coal owners had stubbornly resisted the coal code. Throughout October Mr. Roosevelt and the United Mine Workers' Union combined to force the coal-owners into submission, and the form of pressure used by the Union was precisely that of a strike. It was not till the beginning of November that the coal-owners capitulated and accepted the full demands made by the unions and Mr. Roosevelt. In October also the farmers' strike, in this case waged, not on the side of Mr. Roosevelt but against him, assumed alarming proportions. Its object was to force up the price of agricultural produce by starving the market. The Governor of North Dakota supported that object by placing an embargo upon the export of wheat from the State. In the South Senator Thomas of Oklahoma led a farmers' agitation in favour of inflation and of a guaranteed price of 20 cents a pound for cotton. In the Middle West five governors of agricultural States went in a deputation to Mr. Roosevelt, to demand the fixing of a guaranteed price for

about a dozen of the chief agricultural products. The demand was rejected.

Mr. Roosevelt, in short, had already found that the machinery of commerce is a complicated and sensitive thing. His initial simplicity in assuming that he could simply decree increased wages and reduced work involved him in a commitment to keep down prices. The keeping down of prices made impossible the recovery of prosperity among the farmers. It was another of his essential objects, as he expressed it on October 22nd, "to establish and maintain a dollar which will not change its purchasing and debt-paying power during the ensuing generation." How such an object could be achieved out of the President's chair baffles the imagination. But he boldly affirmed on the same day that the Government "must take firmly in its own hands the control of the gold value of the dollar." He set up a gold market of his own device. Commerce is the natural growth of human interests of an infinite variety, a manifestation of life, that adjusts itself to varying conditions and finds its own level in the ever-changing circumstances. The waving of a politician's wand over commerce is interesting only as a curiosity. The effect upon the politician is still more curious. Mr. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, on November 11th last gave expression to some of the perplexities that had dawned on him in a short experience. "We absolutely must," he said, "receive great quantities of goods from abroad and must not be disturbed by the clamour of the people who are hurt thereby. If we follow a national programme, we must resolutely plan to keep fifty million acres of land out of use, no matter how loud may be the outcry of certain carrying, handling and exporting interests."

At the end of Mr. Roosevelt's first year of office there gathered in Washington (March 5th, 1934) a vast body of N.I.R.A. code officials. There were 4,000 of them. They discussed the business done. Mr. Roosevelt took the occasion to reaffirm what he still was driving at. His object, he said, was "to increase the buying power of wage-earners and farmers so that industry, labour and the public may benefit through building up the market for farm and factory goods." He admitted his "social" motive: "Never again will we permit the social conditions which allowed vast sections of our population to exist in an un-American way, which allowed a maldistribution of wealth and of power."

Three months later in a message to Congress (June 8th) about the business of the next Congress he showed himself to be increasingly bent upon the social part of his object. He said that the Government would plan for "the security of the men, women and children of the nation," by such means as the modernisation of houses and the building of new ones, the better use of the nation's land and water, and social insurance against unemployment and old age. It is normally found by all democratic governments that once they embark upon the socialist path they can never turn back, but must ever offer more and more to the electorate. The American election will take place in November. Already the President of the American Federation of Labour has demanded that Mr. Roosevelt introduce legislation to establish a thirty-hour week in all industries: a five-hour day for six days a week. Mr. Roosevelt himself has apparently felt the inevitability of moving in that direction. On August 22nd he ordered a reduction in the hours of work in the cotton garment industry from forty to thirty-six a week and an increase of ten per cent. in the minimum rates of pay. Yet it is at the same time obvious that there must be a limit to such politics. Much of Mr. Roosevelt's initial support came from Republican members of Congress. It is one of the normal duties of a politician to blow and to blow cold. While Mr. Roosevelt was promising less and less work and more and more pay to the electoral majority, he was concurrently offering the very opposite to allay the growing restiveness of the Republican members of Congress. On the very same day that he ordained less work and more pay for the cotton garment makers (August 22nd) his Secretary of Commerce broadcast an address, in which he said that it was not the Administration's object to destroy private initiative or to eliminate the motive of profit in industry. He explained that N.I.R.A. aimed merely at putting private enterprise back on its feet, in which happy event private enterprise would be given back "responsibilities which, under normal conditions, belong to business." *Facilis descensus*. . . . It is impossible for any democratic country to retrace its steps from socialism; for at each succeeding election the main competitive appeal is the offer of more and more benefits to the majority at the expense of the minority. Mr. Roosevelt's offers have not been uniformly well chosen. Within five days of his offered boon

to the cotton garment industry, that industry held a representative meeting and unanimously decided to reject it on the ground that it was no boon at all, and that its effect would be to increase unemployment in the industry.

N.I.R.A. has been operative for fifteen months. On September 1st last the textile strike leaders claimed that the strikers numbered 1,000,000. That was an overstatement, but they did number nearly 700,000. The official objective was given as a thirty-four-hour week, but the chairman of the strike committee announced to the silk workers who plunged into a sympathetic strike that the objective was a thirty-hour week. The N.I.R.A. itself was split. Some of its officials were more impatiently socialist than others. Mr. Richberg, Secretary of the President's Co-ordinating Committee, and Miss Perkins, Secretary for Labour, launched a broadside attack upon the chief administrator, General Johnson, himself, on the ground that his bias was to the Right. Mr. Lewis Douglas, Director of the Budget, resigned his post on September 2nd last in protest against the vast and increasing governmental expenditure, the extravagance of which contrasted with Mr. Roosevelt's initial promise of fiscal economy. Mr. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labour, has stated that the present total of unemployment is 11,000,000 and is increasing by nearly half a million a month. The Government is spending \$175,000,000 (say £35,000,000) a month for the relief of unemployment alone. The administrator of Federal Emergency Relief announced on August 31st that the funds already voted to that purpose by Congress would be exhausted by January, and that a further \$600,000,000 (say £120,000,000) would be necessary to bridge the gap to the end of the present fiscal year (June 30th, 1935). The Budget is unbalanced to the fantastic extent of some \$8,000,000,000 (say £1,600,000,000). Mr. Roosevelt is spending at the rate of \$40,000,000 (say £8,000,000) a day; thereby breaking the record hitherto held by Mr. Lloyd George of £7,000,000 a day. In July last a general strike was declared in San Francisco and Oakland to support a two-month-old strike of the longshoremen. The general picture is one of decreasing industry, increasing unemployment, increasing governmental expenditure, increasing strikes: the grim parody of less work, more pay that lies at the basis of N.I.R.A.

It is not as if the United States lacked the contrasting experience. The United States is indeed the traditional home of private enterprise. Mr. Henry Ford, who himself at the age of fourteen spent his day working on his father's farm and his evenings repairing clocks for no pay and with the only objective of finding out how clocks worked, is a product of the United States. When as a young man he walked to Detroit, the headquarters of his present gigantic business, he took a job as a mechanical apprentice working sixty hours a week for $2\frac{1}{2}$ dollars. In addition he worked four hours every evening in a jeweller's shop for 2 dollars a week. Before 1914, in the early days of his own private enterprise, he paid his workmen less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ dollars for a nine-hour day. Since the war he has quadrupled his rates of pay and is now paying 8 dollars a day to half a million people. But the whole point of his life has been that work comes first and that profits must be increased before wages can be increased. He pays more wages than Mr. Roosevelt's codes themselves demand, yet has been the stubbornest opponent of N.I.R.A. for the simple logical reason that you cannot pay wages first and then make your profits, nor can the workers or the Government dictate to employers the terms on which the employers are to conduct their own businesses.

The contemporary history of the United States does not differ from that of most other civilised countries. Civilisation has overstepped itself. Political organisation, which originated as a means of safeguarding the common security of life and property, has itself become the greatest menace to life and property. Politics destroyed 10,000,000 men in the Great War. Politics are robbing the propertied classes and distributing the proceeds unproductively among the electorates that keep the politicians in power; and as the process develops, more and more officials, politicians and seekers after office obtain a stake in its continuance. The disease has spread its roots deepest in Europe, where business enterprise, international commerce and even religious freedom are the pawns of political strife. The United States has entered upon the like path. Japan, being, fortunately for herself, fifty years behind the times, is the only remaining country in the world where freedom is understood and respected.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE EPIC OF BRITISH INDIA.

"Indian history has never been made interesting to English readers, except by rhetoric." That is a faithful saying. It is taken from *The Times* of forty years ago, and is one of many epigraphs planted with unusual aptness along their line of march by the authors of a fine book, which itself is calculated to afford a disproof of the statement. Dr. Thompson, Leverhulme Research Fellow in Indian History, and Mr. G. T. Garratt, a former member of the I.C.S. in Bombay, have together accomplished an exceedingly fine service. They have worked over the amazing record of the British in India, and in 650 pages have produced a brilliant piece of narrative and interpretation—invaluable as history for the general reader, vital in style, and fascinating throughout. Here in short is the one-volume history of British India for which we have been waiting, brought down to the White Paper. One cannot doubt that its permanent place is assured. During the century between the accession of Elizabeth and the death of Cromwell, the authors remind us at the start, a

* *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India.* By Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt. Macmillan. 21s.

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fiercely competitive England hunted for markets. The markets were found and opened, at the cost of unlimited effort and danger. The East India Company's struggle with its rivals makes the most romantic story in the whole history of colonial trade, and fortunately, as Thompson and Garratt put it, the Company's correspondence, now available in lavish fullness, is of unsurpassed interest and individuality. Our authors quote continually as they move along, and they have the keenest eye for a picturesque point and a telling phrase. Five divisions of the book carry us through the era of conquest and expansion, on to the eve of the Mutiny. No imperialist adventure in any age can have attracted so many daring and masterful men, and in no other field can certain characteristics of our race have been more astonishingly displayed. Here, set forth with a ringing confidence of knowledge and understanding, are the actors on this tremendous stage—the pioneer adventurers, the reckless commanders, the administrators learning their craft by doing seemingly impossible things. One by one the men and their performances are weighed afresh; one by one they stand out in their almost incredible arrogance and audacity. There is a note of hard fairness in the authors' judgment of motive and character; and in a similar tone they discuss the attitude of the older British rulers of India towards such central institutions of Hinduism as Suttée and Untouchability. What, one wonders, would have been the general upshot in India if the method and temper of Sir Charles Napier had stood for the policy of the Houses of Parliament and the Court of Directors?

It is when they come to the events and movements of the modern period that Thompson and Garratt tread their most difficult stretch. The opening of this period is marked by the viceroyalty of Ripon and the founding of the Indian National Congress half a century ago. The whole of the latter part, dominated by the unique figure of M. K. Gandhi, is, of course, steeped in controversy. Readers familiar with the earlier constitutional stage of the Congress will probably feel that the treatment here is slight, especially as regards the remarkable group of men (too many of them, unfortunately, rhetoricians) who, in shaping the Congress, showed that they had been nurtured entirely in English political thought. For that reason, no doubt, among others, their mark upon the India of to-day is hardly visible. The authors strive to end upon

a note of hope, expressing their conviction that, despite all the miseries of the past twenty years, there is no reason why "a far healthier relationship" between Britain and India should not be established with the making of the new Constitution. When the book went to press they were anticipating that the India Bill would be in Parliament this year. If it can be carried before the next general election, all parties, save the extremists, should be relieved and gratified.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

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THE VICTORIAN TRANSFORMATION OF THEOLOGY.*

Frederick Denison Maurice was expelled from his Chair at King's College, London, for heresy in 1851; in 1931 the College built the sepulchre of this prophet by founding a course of lectures in his honour. The present reviewer, who had some part in the inauguration of the lectureship, cannot refrain from expressing his pleasure that Dr. Scott Lidgett should have been chosen to give the second series. No one could have been found whose thought and work are more in harmony with the spirit of Maurice. Dr. Lidgett has been well inspired in the choice of his subject. Maurice cared intensely for theology, and his social ideals had a close connexion with his belief about God and Christ. These lectures are a fine tribute to a great man. They essay to estimate his influence on theology and they are written by one who has drunk deeply of the well whose water he praises. The author sets out to show that Maurice was the most significant figure and the most creative personal influence in Victorian religious thought. This thesis is sustained by an account of the intellectual and spiritual conditions of the Victorian Age, followed by a sympathetic analysis of Maurice's leading conceptions.

Maurice had, unfortunately, no gift of style, and this defect will probably always prevent him from being as widely read as Newman; moreover, he founded no party, so that he has not the glamour conferred by partisan hero-worship; but discerning students will always give him a foremost place

* *The Victorian Transformation of Theology*; the second series of Maurice Lectures. By J. Scott Lidgett, C.H., M.A., D.D. Epworth Press. 2s. 6d. net.

among those who re-interpreted Christianity for the modern world. Dr. Scott Lidgett is right in laying great stress on the change which Maurice produced in the spirit of theology. He moved away from the Calvinistic conception of God as pure sovereign will and from an exclusive preoccupation with the "scheme of redemption." The doctrine of the fatherhood of God was brought into the centre of Christian teaching and established as the guiding principle of theological construction. Johannine rather than Pauline thoughts were given the pre-eminence. We knew from his earlier writings that Dr. Lidgett agreed with Maurice on this fundamental question, and it is encouraging to note that he has not been shaken by the recent recrudescence of Calvinistic conceptions of God. "If God," he writes, "be 'altogether other' in the sense of Otto and still more of Karl Barth, it would appear that He can, in no sense, come into relations with man, and that the grace, which Barth seeks to magnify, must operate by a miracle which is wholly unthinkable." These words go straight to the vulnerable point of the Barthian theology. Space does not allow us to follow Dr. Lidgett in his exposition of the Incarnation and Atonement from a Maurician standpoint. He has shown the permanent value of Maurice's contribution to modern Christian thought and will send many readers back to the works of his hero. In these days of carping books about great men it is refreshing to read a study which is inspired by a whole-hearted and discriminating admiration.

W. R. MATTHEWS.

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NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY.*

F. W. Maitland, who was accustomed to weigh his words, pronounced Gierke's *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* the greatest work he had ever read. In 1900 he published that well-known book *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, and published it with an introduction not unworthy of Gierke himself. Now Professor Barker translates five sub-sections of Gierke's fourth volume, which was published in 1913. He

* *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800*. By O. Gierke. Translated with an Introduction by E. Barker. Cambridge University Press. 2 vols. 308.

translates them lucidly and he also translates the notes, adding occasionally within brackets sources of later information. These two volumes do him great credit, and deserve a place on our shelves beside Maitland's book. In effect, we have Gierke's survey of natural law and the theory of society from 1500 to 1800, accompanied by a lecture on the ideas of natural law and humanity by Troeltsch, whose premature passing we still deplore.

It is plain that Gierke exercises over Professor Barker the fascination he exercised over Maitland. Gierke reached the ripe age of fourscore when he passed away in 1921, but on his passing in 1906 Maitland was only fifty-six. He ought to have had another twenty years of life before him, and we sigh in vain as we dream of all he might have done in those twenty years. A portion of his spirit has descended upon Professor Barker, who is continuing, in the two volumes before us, the task Maitland began. Behind the introduction of the editor the main ideas of the great German scholar stand out with boldness. In 1888 he published his *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, and in this publication the ideas of Althusius are apparent. Althusius' *Politica* is the work of a mind uninspiring yet original; though published in 1603, it possessed slight influence. No doubt Grotius and Pufendorf, Thomasius and Rousseau, attest the influence, however slight, of Althusius' book. Gierke pronounced that there was need of only one man akin to Althusius in spirit to awaken to new life such a personality and such a life—even after the lapse of more than two centuries. The book of 1603 awoke to life under the magic of the pen of Gierke. Nevertheless, for the most part it was lost sight of till a generation ago, and to-day its influence not only has increased but is increasing. Its outstanding merit in our day is the theory of the corporation which Althusius expounds, and Gierke's *Genossenschaftstheorie* traces its lineal descent from the *Politica*.

Althusius opens his book with the statement that "Politics is the science of linking human beings to one another in for a social life," and the transition to the *Genossenschaft*, the co-operative association, is not hard to trace. It goes back to the proposition of Aristotle that man is a being living in communities. Political life for Althusius assumes in general the consociational nature and in particular the method of governing by estates. The membership of a higher association,

like the city, included the membership of lower associations, like the family. Social relationships form the essence of the State, while Althusius emphasises its corporate nature. The State is the community organised for co-operation towards the attainment of the higher life. At the same time Gierke holds that the corporations, composing the State, claim kin with it, and they appear "not as artificial persons, but as living members of the highest collectivity." Every association creates for itself a common life with a common will, and gives up to the higher union, the State, only so much as the higher union demands for the attainment of its ends.

For our own part we must confess we entertain a dread of the State as the all-devouring "Leviathan" of which Hobbes dreamed. We therefore read with particular pleasure this exposition of natural rights as they present themselves to Gierke's mind in the centuries from 1500 to 1800. The Reformation era was saturated with the ideas of natural law, and no one bears stronger testimony to its potency than Calvin. This natural law is also plain in Althusius, though Gierke reveals how far-reaching was its power over thinkers we little dream that it fascinated. Under many guises he perceives the attraction that the law of nature possessed. Perhaps his greatest achievement was the freeing of jurisprudence and political science from the hard and fast hypothesis that had repeatedly ruled them, and substituting for them a new method of approach. He wrote ten thousand pages—and he did not write a single page too many—and in all of them he attempts that most difficult of all tasks, to see the Many in the One and the One in the Many.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

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EGYPT.

Lord Lloyd's second volume on Egypt* deals with the troubled and controversial course of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the post-war period. Lord Lloyd himself played a prominent part in the story. His four-year tenure of the post of High Commissioner (1925-9) is of considerable dramatic interest,

* *Egypt since Cromer*. Vol. II. By Lord Lloyd. Macmillan. 21s. net.

because it was an open secret at the time that Lord Lloyd's precise views on what may perhaps be called Imperial philosophy were not uniformly shared by those who directed policy from Whitehall. When Mr. Henderson became Foreign Minister in the summer of 1929 he made certain open criticisms of Lord Lloyd in the House of Commons, which gave Lord Lloyd no alternative to resignation. From the official documents already published, one knew that Sir Austen Chamberlain also had not seen eye to eye with Lord Lloyd on all matters. It is therefore right, as well as interesting, that Lord Lloyd should tell his own story. The personal issues—whether Mr. Henderson was fair or not to Lord Lloyd and the like questions—are not nearly so interesting as the insight we are given into the difficulties that almost unavoidably arise between an active and earnest diplomatist abroad, concentrated objectively on the work in hand, and the executive politicians at home who have an eye on three objectives: (1) the work in hand; (2) the electorate; and (3) the governments of other countries.

Lord Lloyd reveals the whole story in great detail and in due order. Although the casual reader would enjoy the book more if the matter had been more compressed, it is clear that Lord Lloyd's main purpose, achieved at the expense of a certain amount of overlapping, is to leave nothing out: in short to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but. In effect he is writing a personal apologia. Yet he does not write in a defensive spirit. It is one of his attractive qualities that his sincerity, simplicity and straightforwardness enable him to write without any personal bias. Even those who do not like his views will like the man.

As for views, the conflict revealed is intensely interesting. There is no denying the chronic muddle in Egypt or the indeterminate objects pursued by the political executive at home. What is the basis of any Imperial policy? In the first instance it is the conquest of a foreign people by force for the benefit of the conqueror. The altruistic motive in the first instance is a bit hypocritical, if unconsciously so. In British Imperial mentality there is a traditional afterthought concerned largely with the interests of the conquered. There is the famous notion that the British Empire depends for its bond upon goodwill. In some cases that is true. In others—as Lord Lloyd rightly argues—the Whitehall attempt to mix

conquest with goodwill falls between the two stools. This is how Lord Lloyd puts it (page 10) :

Until 1914 we had been sure of our Imperial mission. There were domestic quarrels as to how that mission should be carried out, but no serious doubt as to its existence. After 1920, on the other hand, self-determination will be found to have shaken to its very foundations our faith in an Imperial policy of any kind. Self-determination will be found to govern our dealings with Egypt, and to obsess the minds of all concerned. After the passage of a decade it is perhaps not too soon to assess the results that this new theory has produced. It has been at work not only in Egypt, but through the whole of Europe and Asia. With the havoc it has wrought elsewhere we are not directly concerned, but there may be useful lessons to be learned from tracing its course in the Nile Valley.

What is clear is that predominant Egyptian opinion since the war has not wanted British rule. The British Government has attempted in effect to force Egyptian opinion to want British rule. By contrast, Lord Lloyd's philosophy has the merit of consistency, simplicity and honesty. Yet such are the muddles of this imperfect world that the true full logic of Lord Lloyd's philosophy would be a continued subjugation by the sword. And that, also, is folly. G. G.

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SHAKESPEARE STUDIES.*

In the space available for a review of this composite volume, with its fourteen expert contributors and three appendices, it is, of course, possible to deal only with some of its outstanding features. But it may be said at once that the two editors are justified in claiming that it is "a book, not a mere assemblage of discourses." Through the various chapters (as they may be conveniently called) there runs a unifying purpose and outlook.

Mr. Granville-Barker is not only a co-editor, but in his chapter on "Shakespeare's Dramatic Art" he has furnished the core of the work. For this he has unique qualifications, combining the practical experience of an all-round "man of the theatre" with critical vision and a highly sensitive prose

* *A Companion to Shakespeare Studies*. Edited by H. Granville-Barker and G. B. Harrison. Cambridge: At the University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

style. In some forty pages he here gives us the pith of what he has set forth in more detail in his well-known "Prefaces to Shakespeare." Nowhere has the case for the boy actor of women's parts in Elizabethan plays been so convincingly put. With illustrations from *Romeo and Juliet* and *Antony and Cleopatra* it is shown how Shakespeare safeguards the position by never setting the boy to do anything ridiculous or embarrassing, or making any call upon "sex appeal." Another aspect of Shakespeare's technical dexterity is illustrated in his treatment of the conventions of place and time on the Elizabethan "cipher" stage, evidenced, for example, by a comparison between *Richard II* and Marlowe's *Edward II*. And in the concluding section of his chapter, "Fireside versus Theatre," Mr. Granville-Barker, while putting fairly the "fireside" view, shows, in my opinion, conclusively that it is in the theatre alone that dramatic art can command its full appreciation.

Thus his chapter leads back to that on "Theatres and Companies" where Professor C. J. Sisson says to much the same effect: "It is right to think of Shakespeare in terms of the stage as well as of literary categories. He worked in his medium and there was evidence enough that he was content to do so." Dr. Sisson's researches in the Public Record Office into documents bearing on the Elizabethan theatrical annals are well known, and he draws upon them in his discussion of the distinctive characteristics of the boys' and the actors' companies and of the "public" and "private" theatres.

From another point of view Mr. Granville-Barker's chapter leads forward to those on "Shakespeare the Poet," by Mr. George Rylands, and on "Shakespeare and Elizabethan English," by Miss G. D. Willcock. Mr. Rylands, with a gift for illuminating phrase, traces the stages in the development of Shakespeare's style, and dwells on his use of imagery, conceits and metaphor. Miss Willcock opens fresh ground in the contrast she draws between the mid-sixteenth period of hesitation about the future of the English language contrasted with the settled position of Italian. About 1580 began an era of growing confidence and energy. "Acquisition was in the air; there was a buccaneering spirit abroad in language as well as on the high seas." Shakespeare therefore "turned dramatist at (linguistically as well as otherwise) a singularly fortunate time. Ten years earlier or ten years later

would have made significant difference." Words sufficed as the medium of his art, and as Professor E. J. Dent emphasises in his informing chapter on "Shakespeare and Music," in spite of his musical knowledge and sensitiveness, "he never adopts the principle of opera. . . . If Shakespeare had had any conception of the Italian operatic principle, he would have made Hamlet or Othello burst into melody at moments of crisis."

Another group of chapters deals with Shakespeare's background. They are, so to speak, headed by Dr. J. W. Mackail's austere restrained presentation of the known facts of the dramatist's life disentangled from all legend and conjecture. Dr. G. B. Harrison, the co-editor of the volume, deals with "The National Background." Of this, as his three *Elizabethan Journals* have shown, he has a peculiarly intimate knowledge, and he does a service in reminding us that behind Elizabethan drama from *Tamburlaine* to *Hamlet* lay the vicissitudes of a great war and the disturbing question of the succession to the throne. One may question, however, some of the detailed applications, as in the cases of Falstaff and Laertes. Miss St. Clare Byrne is similarly well qualified to discuss "The Social Background." There are few more sparkling pages in the volume than those in which she contrasts the *bourgeois* arrangements of the Capulet household with those of a great Tudor mansion, or the informality of Macbeth's castle with the etiquette of the Elizabethan court. The "background" group is completed by the chapter on "Shakespeare and the Drama of his Time" from the accomplished pen of Mr. Bonamy Dobrée.

Of the more technical chapters on The Sources and the Text, Shakespearian Criticism and Scholarship, and Shakespeare in the Theatre, contributed by such authorities as Mr. Attwater, Dr. A. W. Pollard, Mr. T. S. Eliot, Mr. J. Isaacs and Mr. Harold Child, and of the useful reading lists and tables, I can only make mention. If the lists are occasionally (as I think) tipped rather overmuch on the side of books of to-day, as compared with those of yesterday or yesteryear, this must be left to the verdict of to-morrow. In this Cambridge Press volume every Shakespearian will find in the fullest sense of the current phrase a "good companion" to his studies.

FREDERICK S. BOAS.

PEACE AND NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The recent aerial manœuvres over London demonstrated once again the ineffectiveness of defence against air attack and reminded us that in a future war the issue will be decided within a few days, if not hours, of zero time. Sir Norman Angell, in his recent book,* has examined the problem of national defence with especial regard to these dominating factors. He fully recognises the need for waging war for the purpose of defence, but his main argument really resolves itself into the maintenance of peace, for as he says in one passage, "it is broadly true to say that if you solve the problem of defence, you solve the problem of peace." He is here brilliantly expounding a fresh approach to the collective system which is alone the guarantor of peace. His thesis is directed to the collective sanction of force behind the rule of international law. The effort for peace has become too often associated in the minds of many with the advocates of a sentimental pacificism which can add nothing to the attainment of international justice. "To the normal man . . . the Pacifist or the League advocate seems to disregard the needs of defence, to be asking us to take risks with our defence on behalf of some extraneous moral ideal." Sir Norman does well to restore a balanced outlook, for, as he points out, the case for the collective method as a system of defence and therefore of peace must depend upon its effectiveness.

Sir Norman begins his argument by endorsing the now accepted view that the only defence against the overwhelming destruction of an air attack is the threat of retaliation. When will such a threat be effective? Only when the contingency of retaliation is specific and exclusive.

In order to make a threat of punishment effective it does not suffice, either in the case of men or nations, to say: "Do this and I will punish you." It is also necessary to say: "Refrain from doing this and I will not punish you." For if he has grounds for thinking he will incur the punishment in any case, your threat loses all effectiveness.

The Great War was an illustration. Germany offered to respect Belgian neutrality if England remained neutral. No undertaking was given, and "the Germans therefore

* *The Menace to Our National Defence*. By Sir Norman Angell. Hamish Hamilton. 3s. 6d. net.

argued : ' We shall have British power opposed to us whether we respect Belgian neutrality or not. In terms of military realism therefore it does not matter whether we go through Belgium or not.' " Had Germany known before 1914 that her course of conduct would have brought the world against her, she would have avoided the struggle. It follows that " the technique of using power as a deterrent . . . lies at the very heart of the problem of defence."

The effectiveness of a threat of retaliation as a deterrent will depend upon its use in a collective system and upon the purpose of its exercise. Between rival nations or alliances of states, it can provide no guarantee against war. Sir Norman discusses a policy of isolation and concludes that it is only compatible with peace if we surrender national armaments, which is realistically impossible. The sufficiency of armed defence must always be tested by its relation to the strength of the potential aggressor. Since a deterrent is useless unless it be superior in force, there begins inevitably a race in armaments and alliances which ends, as in 1914, with an attack as a method of defence against the rivals' increasing power. The restraint imposed by a preponderating group of states is more effective but at most it cannot make for permanent peace, because it has made itself judge in its own cause. " Both parties were putting might not behind right, but behind each party's view of its own rights." The purpose of collective power, like a national police force, is to prevent a party to the dispute from deciding the issue by arms.

If an alliance says : " We intend to pool our power for the purpose of securing third party settlement of disputes ; join us and we grant you all the privileges we claim "—then the states so addressed *have* an alternative to competition for power.

Sir Norman is not worried about the location, composition or command of an international police force. The existing national forces become police forces " from the moment that they are the instruments of an international policy which embodies a workable rule of international life."

Discussing the question of national grouping, Sir Norman envisages a Germanic-Japanese alliance with the possibility of a war against Russia, in which both Japan and Germany can satisfy their dreams of expansion. Against this alliance will be formed in one common defensive purpose a preponderating group of nations. Nevertheless, following his main

argument, the power of such a combination will be no deterrent unless it forgoes the idea of unilateral judgment and pre-commits itself to the common purpose of ensuring that the issue be determined by an impartial tribunal. As the whole gist of Sir Norman's case is that the deterrent, to be effective, must guarantee equality of right, the court itself must be established and regarded as impartial by the party to be deterred. Would Germany or Japan have such trust in the World Court or other tribunal in the circumstances supposed ? This is a point which Sir Norman does not answer, although it is vital to his argument. The answer is that confidence in the interpretation of international law, as in the other instruments of a collective system, will be proportionate to the impartiality exhibited in former cases. It must be upon the slow growth of precedent that the collective method will be ultimately raised.

The need for a co-operative system, whether it be within the League or in external grouping, has been accentuated by the overwhelming danger of air attack. Sir Norman concludes his book by pleading to the British Government to work for its abolition. Both France and Germany are sympathetic. " The majority of powers," he emphasises in block letters, " have declared in favour of abolishing national air forces and internationalising air transport."

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Rossini.* The story of Rossini provides a very interesting view of the development of Italian opera. His output in youth and early manhood was prodigious, his first opera, *Demetrio e Polibio*, having been composed in 1806 at the age of 14. He would receive an order to produce an opera, which he turned out in three weeks or so after receiving the *libretto*. Time and again these performances were failures, partly on account of popular prejudice against innovations, partly because they were considered too German. With all his lightness of touch, his cadenzas written for a particular singer, the poverty of the wording and frequently the absurdity of the plots, Rossini's underlying ideal was Mozart, and his style was of a higher order than the Italian opera of his day. His more elaborate orchestration and the introduction of new and more numerous instruments gradually won recognition, but he had a hard struggle. *Tancredi* was his first great success. The public was

* *Rossini : A Study in Tragi-Comedy*, by Francis Toye. Heinemann. 10s. 6d.

charmed by the "new vitality of the music and above all by the originality and charm of the tunes." Mr. Francis Toye, in this full and fascinating account, discusses opera after opera and enlists the sympathy of the reader with his subject, a very mixed character. Those of us who only know *The Barber of Seville*, the *Stabat Mater*, *William Tell* and perhaps the *Boutique Fantastique*, will want to hear others which had a furore in Venice and Rome and Naples and which made his fame. The account of Rossini's life in Paris at a later stage and of his long period of musical inactivity after the age of 35 is full of interesting stories of his relations with other great musicians. The famous Saturday evenings, when singers and players came to Rossini's house to make music, were thronged by all the world, and invitations were much sought after. There was a London visit in the winter of 1823-4, where Rossini became the favourite of Society and even sang duets with King George IV.

George had a flabby bass voice (rather like his person) and Rossini, whose natural quality was that of a light high baritone, used to sing tenor and, of course, to play the piano. It is said that on one occasion His Majesty interrupted the performance, saying that he had made a mistake in the time; to which Rossini replied with courtly irony: "Sire, you have every right to do exactly as you please; I will follow you to the grave." The spectacle of these two fat gentlemen—for Rossini by this time had already begun to put on flesh—singing *buffo* duets from *Cenerentola*, and such-like operas, must have been highly diverting. It provided material for the caricaturists of the time.

Perhaps one of the most surprising friendships was that of Wagner, who visited Rossini once in Paris and had a long discussion with him on theories of opera. In spite of so great difference, Wagner found more pleasure in Rossini's music than is usually supposed. After the visit he is reported to have said that of all the musicians he had met in Paris "he alone is truly great." The greatness is brought out and the qualifications of it are very carefully and sympathetically handled in this excellent book.

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Professor J. B. Trend's recent work, *The Origins of Modern Spain*,* is a valuable contribution to the study of the movement for the intellectual emancipation of Spain. It is mainly an appreciation of the band of liberal thinkers who worked to remove the obstacles to knowledge and culture imposed by Catholic dogma and clerical control of education. The volume begins with the state of moral and intellectual stagnation under "that impossible lady," Isabella II. After the failure of the republic of 1873, which was monarchist at heart, the restoration of the Bourbons witnessed a violent clerical reaction. But the struggle continued, and Professor Trend describes the aims and work of the reformers. He begins appropriately with Sanz del Río, who instituted "a renaissance of philosophic studies and of scientific activity . . . and opened the eyes of Spain to the intellectual life of Europe." He

* Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

inspired Francisco Giner and his colleagues in their tangible work of progress. They were convinced that "the only hope for the regeneration of Spain lay in the spread of education in the broadest sense." Inspired by the example of England and Germany, Giner saw that the object of true education was to encourage the development of personality. In glaring contradiction to the Jesuit methods, the pupil was to be given "facts, data, individual and concrete forms upon which he can afterwards build his own conclusions." From the foundation in 1876 of the Free Educational Institute as a protest against clerical and state control, the work has steadily progressed. Through their diffusion of culture and learning, the influence of Giner and his followers, such as Salmerón, Costa, Azcárate and Cossío, with whom the author specifically deals, laid the foundations of a new moral and intellectual consciousness among the Spanish people. To them will be largely due the success of the second republic which, says Professor Trend, is proving "generally a great deal better than the old monarchy."

Dr. A. E. Richardson's new book *The Old Inns of England** is an attractive survey of this great English heritage. Some 132 superb photographs and a number of excellent drawings by Mr. Brian Cook are an outstanding feature of the volume. The history of the English inn reaches back to the early Middle Ages. Dr. Richardson points out that the earliest remains which now survive are a few fragments of the 14th-century tavern, as in the traceried windows of "The Coopers' Arms" at Hitchin. "The George" at Glastonbury is a fine example of a 15th-century pilgrims' inn. With the dissolution of the monasteries and national expansion, the 16th century was a heyday for the inns, and, with the advent of coaching in the 17th century, their prosperity and usefulness steadily increased until the rise of the railways. Contemporary architecture is faithfully reflected in the English inn, and Dr. Richardson cites many typical buildings of each period and gives us a glimpse of their internal arrangements and traditional hospitality. He wisely treats separately the smaller inns and alchouses which have retained their local atmosphere and tradition in contrast to the cosmopolitan tendency in the larger urban establishments. Contemporary life and events frequently determined the tavern sign. Dr. Richardson gives long and interesting lists of names and, incidentally, doubts the popular theory that "The Goat and Compasses" is derived from "God Encompasseth Us"; "the compasses are more likely to be masonic." But for the most part he avoids the continual controversy upon this question of nomenclature. A history of inns could be compiled from contemporary literature, and Dr. Richardson cites a number of well-known quotations from *inter alia* Chaucer, Shakespeare, Dr. Johnson and Dickens. This survey and appreciation of the traditional English inn is especially welcome in these days of its renewed activity.

* B. T. Batsford Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Dr. Otto Piper's *Recent Developments in German Protestantism** is a most instructive little book. Dismissed from his Professorship after the Nazi revolution, he was invited to lecture in Manchester University on the latest phases of Protestant thought in his own country. The volume, however, gives more than its title suggests, for it begins with a very careful analysis of Luther's theology. The gigantic figure of Luther, indeed, dominates the whole work, and the author's admiration for his depth and range is unbounded. The main portion of the lectures is concerned with post-war theology, which falls into the conservative and the progressive schools. Both of them emphasise the factor of doctrine, unlike the liberal schools of the pre-war decades. But they differ in many ways, and within the Progressive School itself there are wide variations. Even Karl Barth himself, its outstanding figure, has changed his position and may change it again, for he is still in the full tide of his intellectual growth. The reader will also find a useful summary of the teaching of Gogarten, Emil Brunner, Tillich, and other leaders of the younger generation. There are a few references to the crisis in the Church caused by the tyranny of the totalitarian state and the emergence of the "German Christians" as its champion. But Dr. Piper writes with restraint of the distressing features of the present situation, which must sorely grieve him both as a Christian and as a patriot. The book is packed with thought, and it contains a mass of information not easily accessible elsewhere.

* Student Christian Movement Press. 4s.

Historians and antiquarians, especially in East Anglia, will be grateful to Mr. Claude J. W. Messent, A.R.I.B.A., for his new book, *The Monastic Remains of Norfolk and Suffolk*.† He has compiled in alphabetical order a list of nearly three hundred abbeys, priories, hospitals, leper houses and other monastic establishments in both counties. Mr. Messent has included in a bare historical sketch of each institution an account of its foundation, type, and monastic order, the value of its property at the Dissolution, where possible, and the subsequent owners, and describes the extent of any existing architectural remains. The author has largely relied upon Richard Taylor's *Index Monasticus*, published in 1821. The text is supported by a large number of excellent drawings and plans. The greater monasteries have their own literature, and Mr. Messent's catalogue of the smaller institutions and their remains gives to his volume its real value. The buildings of many have entirely disappeared and others are forgotten and fast decaying. This book is both an invaluable record of what remains and an incentive to the better appreciation and preservation of our architectural heritage.

* Student Christian Movement Press. 4s.

† H. W. Hunt, 14 Orford Hill, Norwich. 7s. 6d. net. Limited edition.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

NOVEMBER, 1934.

A QUAKING WORLD.

THE assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the death of the French Foreign Minister, M. Barthou, at Marseilles on October 9th, have thrown Europe and the world back into the atmosphere of July 1914. While it is right to insist that the Marseilles outrage is not a second Sarajevo, it is wrong to imagine that the disappearance of King Alexander and, in some degree, of M. Barthou, can fail profoundly to affect the alignment of the forces that are striving against and those that are working for war. So intricate is the international position that it seems doubtful whether half a dozen statesmen in Europe possess the capacity, the knowledge and the experience to grasp its complexities. And notwithstanding the obvious differences between the circumstances to-day and those in July 1914, some features are common to both. Of these the first and the most urgent is that if, as in 1914, the European Governments which care for peace allow matters to drift while they gaze in bewilderment on a troubled scene, they may once more awake, too late, to find that events have passed beyond their control. I say this the more deliberately because I was convinced in July 1914 that war might be averted by a clear intimation that Great Britain could not and would not stand aside should Austria-Hungary and Germany turn the Sarajevo murder into a pretext for war. Whatever influence I then commanded was, albeit unavailingly, used to that end. To-day there is scarcely room for doubt that if the British Government had been willing and able, even as late as the third week of July 1914, to say what it would do, the Great War might have been averted. Not less strongly do I now feel that only by a firm and timely British stand against war, a stand which would be supported by all the peace-loving elements in the world, can the dangers inherent in the present position be met and overcome.

Unexpected in the time and place of its occurrence, the murderous outrage upon King Alexander could not in itself surprise careful observers of tendencies in Central and South-

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Eastern Europe. For some years his life had been in danger—and he knew it. Well do I remember a conversation with Dr. Marinkovitch, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, at Geneva, in September 1930. King Alexander had abolished the Constitution and made himself dictator in January 1929. It was already plain that the dictatorship could not yield the results which the King expected, and he and his advisers were looking for a way out. Dr. Marinkovitch maintained that a return to constitutional and parliamentary methods must be gradual, and that a beginning might be made by restoring perhaps 25 per cent. of former liberties. I answered that, if I were King Alexander, I should tell my advisers that it must be one thing or the other. I should say: "Twenty-five per cent. of constitutional freedom will satisfy nobody. It will leave me with all the odium and deprive me of some of the power. If things go wrong I shall be shot, not you. If you want some of the power, take it all and bear the responsibility, or leave me with the sole responsibility and the power alike."

"That is exactly what the King does say," returned Dr. Marinkovitch.

"Then the King is more intelligent than you," I replied.

In September 1931 a "twenty-five per cent." Constitution was granted. When Dr. Marinkovitch asked me what I thought of it, I said: "You are perpetuating a bad system." Twice in the course of 1932 I received warnings from Yugoslav acquaintances, both of them Serbians, that unless the methods of what was still a virtual dictatorship were radically changed "anything might happen, at any moment, even the worst." In the early autumn of that year I passed on these warnings to a Belgrade official who came, apparently on behalf of his Government, to consult me. I asked him to tell his superiors that my answer to both warnings had been that the assassination of the King would be the last and worst blunder that Yugoslavs could make.

King Alexander may not have been entirely a free agent. He had to reckon with certain military influences: and the astute old Prime Minister, Pashitch, had contrived to compromise him in connection with the executions that took place after the—apparently simulated—attempt upon the King's life in 1917. But King Alexander probably came to understand, if he did not understand at the outset that, of all

forms of government, dictatorship is the most dangerous and the hardest to replace without disaster. He is believed to have urged his brother-in-law, King Carol of Roumania, not to imitate his example. As Primo de Rivera and ex-King Alfonso discovered, one cannot easily climb down from a scaffolding of bayonets. The motives of a dictator may be pure and noble. But he needs agents, whose doings he cannot verify because he depends upon their reports; and their shortcomings or delinquencies are inevitably laid to the charge of their master. How many more lessons will rulers, and partisans of one-man systems of hypothetical "efficiency," need to learn before they comprehend that the margin of inefficiency in democratic and representative systems is the insurance premium that peoples pay against the risk of catastrophe when a change of government is expedient!

Only last August, it seems, King Alexander was advised—and well advised—to give up an intended visit to Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, because machinations against his life had been discovered. Those machinations were attributed to a group or gang of political extremists whose members were camped at Jankapuszta on the Hungarian side of the northern Croatian border; and the sudden closing of that border by the Yugoslav authorities, after certain "frontier incidents" that were discussed recently at Geneva, was alleged to be due to the operations of this gang. The Hungarian Government hastened, on the morrow of the Marseilles outrage, to repudiate "all insinuations tending to construct any link whatever between this country (Hungary) and the tragic events of Marseilles." It could hardly have done otherwise. But it would assuredly have done better not to lay itself open to suspicion by its undeniable toleration—to say the least—of the plottings at Jankapuszta.

In normal times such conduct on the part of an ostensibly friendly Government would be looked upon as a flagrant breach of international law. But times are not normal. Violence, official and other, does duty for law in more than half the continent of Europe. Besides Hungary, Fascist Italy long maintained groups of Croat and other political desperadoes in Italian Adriatic centres, under the supervision of a notorious personage, and these groups may well have been concerned in the rising in the Croatian province of Lika about a year ago. Subsequently, when the Hitlerite menace to

Austria began to disquiet Signor Mussolini, and Nazi emissaries, including the late Captain Roehm himself, were seen to be busy in Yugoslavia, the funds for this Italian organisation were curtailed and its operations damped down. But even these offences against international decency were less flagrant than the training and equipment in Southern Germany of a Nazi "Austrian Legion" in readiness for the projected Hitlerite assault on Austria. Nor can Yugoslavia be held entirely blameless. There have been and still are some 3,000 Austrian and German Nazis on Yugoslav soil, not far from the Carinthian border. Since the end of July, at all events, this "Carinthian Legion" has been tolerated if not encouraged by sundry Yugoslav authorities. While it may be true that its members are paid and equipped exclusively by Nazi Germany, and trained by German officers, it is not less true that their very presence within the Yugoslav frontiers has been a standing menace to such precarious tranquillity as Austria may be said to enjoy.

Of these unseemly and dangerous doings the British Government has doubtless been informed, though the public, upon whose alleged "opinion" official action may depend, has not been made aware of them. Yet they formed the substratum of the Central European situation even before the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, on July 25th, and the simultaneous Nazi attempt to capture the Government of Austria. Our people were told, indeed, that this attempt had created a highly critical position. They did not know why the position was so critical, or that the mobilisation of more than 100,000 Italian troops on the Austrian border, ostensibly in readiness to uphold Austrian independence by force of arms, was accompanied by a concentration of Yugoslav troops in readiness to forestall or to resist an Italian occupation of strategic points in Carinthia that are held to be vital to the defence of North-Western Yugoslavia. The crisis was more acutely Italo-Yugoslav than Italo-German or even Austro-German. Nor is the British public quite sure what all this Austrian trouble is about or whether our Government have been wise to declare that "Austrian independence is essential." Why cannot we hold aloof from these miserable squabbles in Central Europe and flatly decline to let ourselves be dragged into the mess by the League of Nations or otherwise?

The answer is that if the peace of Europe be broken at any point there may be no means of localising the conflict, and that one overriding consideration prevents and must always prevent us from looking upon a European war as a solely "foreign" affair. This consideration is care for our own safety which could not fail to be affected by any notable change in the political or territorial configuration of the Continent. We have only to ask ourselves where we should be if France and Belgium were smashed. For some years we were disposed to look upon this matter as chiefly the concern of France, to deride or to deplore the French mania for "security," to speak with contempt or irritation of French "satellites" in Eastern, Central and South Eastern Europe, to toy with the idea of "Treaty revision," and generally to behave as though Continental nations ought to be grateful for our high-minded and disinterested advice without asking us to take any practical interest in their troubles. For a long time the leading organs of our Press made light of the stealthy rearmament of Germany. They supported Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in conceding "equality of rights" to Germany at Geneva in December 1932, and appeared to imagine that this theoretical concession would satisfy German cravings and would not forthwith be turned to positive account. When, on October 14th, 1933, Herr Hitler suddenly decided to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and from the League because the German interpretation of this "graceful concession" was not accepted by Great Britain and France, British public opinion received a serious shock—and broadcast voices adjured us to ask ourselves whether something more could not be done to soothe German susceptibilities.

These curious tendencies prevailed also in some official quarters and, most noticeably, in leading financial circles up to the Hitlerite "clean-up" on June 30th and the following days. That bloody process did alter British public feeling, and would have altered it still more if our Press had reported the approximate truth that the German "purge" cost the lives, not of 77, as Herr Hitler stated to his Reichstag, but of well-nigh 1,200 adherents and opponents of the Nazi régime. It is true that, weeks before this spectacular exemplification of Nazi quality, British Cabinet Ministers had been disconsolately weighing proofs of Germany's aggressive designs, and had been wondering what ought to be done.

Plans for strengthening our aerial defences were drawn up and preparations made for carrying them out by degrees. Few hints of official anxiety were, however, publicly given until Mr. Baldwin startled the House of Commons by declaring that "our frontier is on the Rhine."

Technically, if the Locarno Treaty be taken at its face value and construed with a maximum of good faith, Mr. Baldwin's statement cannot be gainsaid. But a wider view of national interests warrants the assertion that our political frontier is wherever European peace is threatened. By this I do not mean that we should undertake or accept military commitments or incur obligations to intervene wherever and whenever hostilities may threaten to break out. What I mean is that our national interests require us—and the whole British Commonwealth—to take the lead in creating a united front of peace-loving nations against war and war-makers everywhere. It is not enough to be tardily alarmed at the terrific speed and vast extent of German rearmament, deeply significant though they are. Nor can it suffice that *The Times* should admit, as it admitted on October 4th, that "There cannot indeed be any real doubt that the primary causes of the upward tendency of armaments have been Japanese policy in the Far East, and the deliberate rearmament of Germany under the Hitler régime." These two connected causes, with their natural effects, were perceived in the autumn of 1931 by all who understood that, in failing to uphold the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact against the methods of Japan in Manchuria, Great Britain and France were gratuitously abandoning the first line of defence of peace and security in Europe. Now *The Times* assures us that the number of regular soldiers in Germany has been raised to approximately 300,000 and that "some day or other the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles will be denounced." German military estimates, it points out, show a huge increase over those of the pre-Hitler years; preparations for gas warfare have certainly not been retarded and "it would probably be a moderate estimate to say that Germany possesses a thousand aeroplanes convertible to military use."

Thus we are at length being told something of the truth about German military preparations though, if detailed information in my possession be any guide, the half has not yet been said. I think it would be a moderate estimate

to state that Germany possesses more than 2,000 military aeroplanes, or aeroplanes convertible to military use; that the published estimates of her military expenditure represent only a fraction of her real outlay on armaments; that behind her 300,000 highly trained Regulars she has some millions of men wholly or partly trained; that in no country is the proportion of skilled pilots to the population so high as in Germany; that her preparations for gas and bacteriological warfare are far advanced, both in quality and quantity; and that the will to utilise these resources, so as to deal paralysing blows without warning in any direction, will not be lacking whenever the favourable hour is thought to have struck. If our Government were to tell the country all it knows of German readiness for war, it would spread alarm wide and deep. Hence, perhaps, its reticence.

Nor is it only the military situation that has turned in favour of Germany during the past twelve months. The political situation on the Continent has been radically altered since the conclusion of the Polish-German pact of non-aggression last winter. Whether or not the Franco-Polish Treaty of Alliance remains in force, it seems to have been superseded in practice by a working alliance between Pilsudski and Hitler, if not between Poland and Germany—even the press of the two countries is now being "co-ordinated"—and for this the authors and supporters of Mussolini's defunct "Four Power Pact" have chiefly themselves to thank. Of that Pact the undisguised object was to promote "Treaty revision," with especial regard to the Polish "Corridor." Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who flew with Sir John Simon to Rome to receive the draft of this Pact early in March, 1933, described it to the House of Commons on March 23rd, 1933, as having "as its general purpose, peace, and its big and almost only detail revision of Treaties"; and though he felt it would need retouching so as to allow the nations whom Treaty revision would affect to have some say in the matter, he thought that "the most effective work for peace which has been done since the War will have been accomplished" under the Italian plan.

In reality the Italian plan began the most effective work of European disintegration that has been done since the War. Poland straightway refused to have anything to do with it, and suspended the appointment of a new Ambassador to Rome.

M. Titulescu, the Roumanian Foreign Minister, came to London as the special Ambassador of the Little Entente to inform Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon on April 6th, 1933, that "Treaty revision means war." Dr. Beneš simultaneously intimated to the French Foreign Minister, M. Paul-Boncour, that while France had a perfect right to sign the Four Power Pact, she would strike out her signatures to her treaties with her Central and South-Eastern European allies by the same stroke of her pen if she exercised that right. So the Four-Power Pact was whittled down, hedged about by restrictions and presently died of suffocation.

But Herr Hitler was quick to profit by the dismay and resentment it had caused; and when Poland, thrown back upon her own resources and exposed to German agitation against "the Corridor," asked him bluntly whether he wanted war to-morrow, next year, in five years or in ten, he promptly concluded with her a ten-years' pact of non-aggression which, with all its obvious advantages for Poland and despite the harmlessness of its published terms, seems to be flanked by tacit or explicit conditions that make Marshal Pilsudski a working partner of Herr Hitler and, at least, a sleeping partner in Hitlerite designs upon Austria.

"Treaty revision" forsooth! Every politician on the Continent, and every British public man whose brains are not addled, knows that unless and until war has been effectively ruled out as a means of settling international differences, to talk of territorial treaty revision is to talk of war. None knows this better than Mussolini who, in truth, has more reason to fear "treaty revision" than anybody else. Yet he has intrigued with Hungary for it, ostensibly in the interests of "justice for Hungary" though really in order to worry Yugoslavia and the Little Entente; and as late as Saturday, October 6th, he mitigated the good effects of his otherwise conciliatory speech at Milan by telegraphing to the Hungarian Prime Minister, General Goemboes, that in speaking of "peace with justice" he had Hungary in mind.

Allowances must be made for the Italian "Duce." He is in a tight place, politically and economically as well as financially. The courtesy he has shown to the Yugoslav warship bearing the remains of the late King Alexander back to Yugoslavia, and his orders to the Italian Press not to report Yugoslav demonstrations against Italy, are all to the good. Moreover,

while he preaches war and extols it as "the supreme court of peoples," no ruler of any European country fears it more. Had M. Barthou lived he might have brought about an Italo-Yugoslav understanding under French auspices, and might thus have eased international tension for a while. But, with all respect for the dead statesman's acknowledged merits, I have never been able to look upon his methods without misgiving or to feel that his efforts to encircle Germany would not one day end by giving Hitler the knife by the handle.

M. Barthou's outstanding achievement was his patronage of the admission of Soviet Russia to the League of Nations. As things stand, the British Government was wise in supporting this potential increase of the League's strength. The League has steadily refused, perhaps rightly, to set itself up as a censor of manners and morals among its members. After having been silent upon the misdeeds of Italian Fascism and (save for Mr. Ormsby Gore's courageous and timely utterance last year) upon the graver misdeeds of Nazi Germany, it could not well ostracise Soviet Russia without labelling itself the champion of capitalist morality. The League's chief object is to prevent war, if it cannot organise peace. Russian membership of its Council, particularly in view of the Russian pacts of non-aggression with so many neighbours, is certainly not a disadvantage; and whatever its influence may be upon the position in the Far East, it may have a sobering effect both upon Poland and upon Hitlerism.

But developments such as these are and must remain make-shifts and palliatives until some great nation has the pluck and the vision to tackle the prevailing evil at its root. This evil is the growing belief in the likelihood, nay, the inevitability, of war. If things be allowed to drift, I believe war, sooner or later and perhaps sooner than later, to be likely. I do not believe it inevitable if the peril be stoutly faced without loss of time. If war comes it will come, without declaration, by swift aerial attack. The attack will be so devised as to paralyse its victims by clouds of incredibly potent poison gas, billions of deadly bacteria and tens of thousands of thermite bombs. Against it there will be no effective defence. Should its objects escape utter paralysis, they may take reprisals and help to devastate Europe. The only chance of preventing war is forthwith to organise so overwhelming a preponderance of anti-war forces as to make it certain that no

aggressor could hope to prevail against them. This ought to be done on the principle that war is a crime in regard to which no civilised people can think of being neutral.

If the British Government would submit to the Governments of the Dominions a policy framed in this sense, inform the United States of it without asking for American approval and, as soon as the Dominions had assented, would invite the peace-loving nations of the world to adhere to it, the whole atmosphere would be changed overnight. Then we might begin to think of "peace with justice" all round.

WICKHAM STEED.

KING ALEXANDER: A MEMOIR.

THE first long talk I had with the late King Alexander was in March 1919, although I had been presented to him on previous occasions when he was little more than a schoolboy and, again, when he became Crown Prince Regent of Serbia. It was only a few months after the proclamation of the united Kingdom of the Southern Slavs, and Belgrade still bore the aspect of a war-riven, ruined city. The Royal Palace, partly destroyed by shell-fire and generally uninhabitable after the departure of the Austro-Hungarian forces, had been sufficiently repaired only to hold the National Assembly in the large throne-room, and the Prince Regent had taken up his quarters across the way in a private house which had also not escaped enemy bombardment and a looting soldiery.

From a very dilapidated vestibule I was ushered straight into a once beautiful drawing-room whose furniture displayed sabre slashings across its damask upholstery and roughly darned hangings. The audience was timed for five o'clock, and on the stroke of the hour a slim young man in uniform walked in briskly.

"I am very glad to see you," said the Crown Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, as he held out his hand. "I know that you were in Serbia with your mother during the occupation, and I want to hear how you managed to carry on your secret relief work in spite of the vigilant eye of the enemy."

We spoke of those terrible years when Serbia was overrun by three armies, and he listened with evident satisfaction while I recounted what he already knew about the fortitude of the people and their undying faith in the Serbian Army and ultimate victory. In grateful terms the Prince then recalled the generosity of the British organisations which had alleviated the sufferings of the Serbs both on their own soil and in exile.

This gave me the opportunity of begging a favour. I told H.R.H. that I would take his message of appreciation back to England, but that there were a number of distinguished English men and women who would like nothing so much as a signed portrait of himself. I quote this little incident because it shows what I often experienced afterwards, that he was a man of detail and true to his word: "If you will send me a list of these persons I will let you have photos for them

in a day or two." Twelve signed photographs of Crown Prince Regent Alexander reached me within the week, and I had the privilege of distributing them later to the friends in London for whom they were intended.

In those days Alexander's hair and moustache were jet-black, and his oval, weather-tanned face, with its dark-brown eyes behind their *pince-nez*, was that of a young man exuberant with energy and confidence for his future tasks. Already he was shouldering heavy responsibilities, but he counted on the goodwill and intelligent support and co-operation of all those who had helped to establish the new Kingdom. Later years registered a marked change in Alexander's countenance. Energy he possessed to the end, but it developed into balanced vitality and virile devotion to duty, instead of remaining the easy assurance of an optimist. His hair was rapidly growing grey.

In the spring of 1924 I was received in a joint audience by King Alexander and Queen Marie, and never have I seen two happier-looking people together than were the young Queen with her golden hair and radiant complexion and her soldier husband. When King Alexander opened his cigarette-case the Queen laughingly told me that she preferred her own brand which was not so strong. Both were interested in my recent tour of the United States, and the Queen asked me questions about American child welfare centres and made some remarks about similar institutions in England, which revealed an amazing knowledge and deep interest. Queen Marie had already started those social services in Yugoslavia which have developed so successfully under her guiding hand.

Once when the Queen and the Royal children were on holiday in Slovenia and the King had been detained on State business, he received me at the little country residence of Topola. It was a broiling July afternoon, and when I alighted from the car I was taken into the garden where the King was waiting for me in a shady summer house. "I am sorry to have made you come out so far in this heat," he said, "but I know you have been travelling in Southern Serbia and I rather wanted to hear your impressions. We that are always in the country are less able to gauge the changes and improvements which strike a newcomer so readily." This was so characteristic of King Alexander. The humblest had access to him, and he liked to hear even their opinions and suggestions. The

King poured out tea for me and he himself toyed with silver knife and fork and a ripe fig. He gave me two hours of his time on that occasion, and then accompanied me across the garden to the house where he instructed a waiting A.D.C. to show me the church which stands high on the hill overlooking Belgrade. The King was often wont to spend a quiet hour of prayer and meditation in this beautiful Byzantine edifice, where his remains now lie beside those of his ancestors.

Alexander had deep religious convictions and whilst remaining a devout member of the Orthodox Church he always showed great understanding and appreciation for the needs of his Catholic subjects. He knew that I myself was a Catholic, and that I was connected with many Catholic activities in Yugoslavia, and he often spoke to me with sympathy and interest of our problems and efforts. He was eager, too, for closer co-operation between the two great Christian denominations, and I remember once when we were speaking of this that he quoted a passage from St. Paul. I must have appeared somewhat bewildered for he laughingly added: "Now you don't remember where that comes in!" and he promptly gave me chapter and verse.

The last time I saw him was in June at Dedinye Palace in the large study where I had often been before. Sitting at the desk he had his back to the window and faced the door. In the centre of the room was a settee with a small round table in front of it and two armchairs. Flowers, as always, abounded in large vases; they were of his own cultivation, for gardening was one of his hobbies. When I was shown in the King left his desk and came forward to meet me with that reassuring smile of welcome which has so endeared him to his subjects. He motioned me to one of the armchairs and he sat down opposite. Offering me a cigarette he gaily asked me if I could distinguish the flavour of Bulgarian from Yugoslav tobacco. "You must have one of each and then tell me which you think is milder," he added. I noticed that he had no patent lighter, but used ordinary matches. Lighters are not encouraged in Yugoslavia as they injure the match trade, and so King Alexander set an example to smokers.

I had just been to Angora and the King questioned me on what I had seen. Then he told me of the trip which the Queen and himself had made to Constantinople in the spring, adding: "It was the first time that I had the opportunity of

going to that part of the world. I had always wanted to see it, and I am glad that Yugoslavia has now been able to start friendly co-operation with Turkey." He dwelt on the importance of the Balkan Pact, and touched on the subject of Bulgaria and the forthcoming visit. He spoke with affection of King Boris and Queen Joanna, his cousin, and said how greatly Queen Marie and himself were looking forward to their journey to Sofia.

Whenever Queen Marie was mentioned a happy smile lit up King Alexander's face and he always showed pleasure when one ventured to make a remark about the Royal children. On that bright June day when I saw King Alexander for the last time I could not help noticing that, although he appeared to be in excellent health, the lines about his mouth and cheeks had grown deeper and the iron-grey hair of last year had grown almost white. But his face did not look old—a face which so readily relaxed into a smile could never really age—yet in repose it wore a look of gravity and poise which I had not seen before.

During the last few years of his life King Alexander had certainly tasted much sorrow and endured much moral anguish. How often were his noblest and most selfless intentions misinterpreted and used against his character! He was aware of criticism and of hostility, and although fearless for himself in his endeavours, he desired explanations and frank discussions which could set matters right.

Something that King Alexander said to me in this last interview confirms me in my belief that he was neither headstrong nor prejudiced as people said during his lifetime (and as they will no doubt increasingly say now that he is no more). It was with reference to a prominent person whom he had received.

"—is genuine," said the King, "and he is the type of man whom I would encourage to say anything he liked to me."

"But surely, Sir," I ventured, "you always want people to tell you the truth?" "I certainly do," replied the King. "I must have the truth, but from those only who bring it before me in a sincere desire to help me to remedy what is wrong. But I do not want those so-called truths which are told me with the express object of making me feel that all I do is a mistake. I have had people who come to criticise for

the mere satisfaction it gives them, and who are not really sincere. What use can they be? Honest critics and helpers, yes! Mere carpers, no!" said the King with a slight tone of bitterness.

Speaking with King Alexander this last time—although I cannot say that I had any presentiments—I felt that he had placed himself completely at the service of his country, and that neither personal ambition nor thought of safety played any part in the scheme which he had before him. He believed in the necessity of a policy of peace with Yugoslavia's immediate neighbours and, as he hinted to me on this occasion, such a policy could not be universally popular as long as memories of war and disputes and disagreements persisted. There was much to forget and to overlook when striving for a great purpose, and the King said these words deliberately: "One must even take risks, nothing is achieved without risks." Had he any immediate premonitions of disaster as he spoke? I do not think so, but he knew that his life was always in danger.

King Alexander, Hero and Martyr, as he will ever be called by his people, has now passed away to a higher life, but he has accomplished the main part of his task, that of unifying the Southern Slav people. His son, King Peter II, for whom he made such ample provision in his Will, already has the love of the nation and he will have it in a larger measure still, because of the disproportion of his years to the burden that has fallen upon him. Queen Marie possesses the warm-hearted attachment of her late consort's subjects, and as his widow she can count on their constant loyalty and support.

As I took my leave of King Alexander on the threshold of his study, less than four months ago, his parting words to me were: "Remember that all those who are devoted to Yugoslav ideals are my friends, and you are one of them." I bid him now a last farewell with deep sorrow, but it is a sorrow tempered with that hope and confidence in the future of Yugoslavia which he always inspired.

Ave Alexander atque vale, your labours and your sacrifice have not been in vain.

ANNIE CHRISTITCH.

BULGARIA UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

ON May 19th the Bulgarian nation awoke to find a new Government in power, the change having taken place in one night, without bloodshed and without a hitch. For over a week Sophia had been in the throes of a ministerial crisis, but discontent with the system of party politics had existed throughout Bulgaria for over a year. One must admit that the party system in Bulgaria has ended in complete failure. This small agricultural country has the highest percentage of educated youth of the Balkan States, and as industry is still under-developed owing to lack of capital, the educated class have had few prospects of employment outside Government jobs or political work. The result has been an undignified scramble under each Government—amongst the parties—for the spoils of office, a system which not only undermined administrative efficiency, but caused much superfluous expenditure. Growing dissatisfaction with the handling of public affairs by politicians led to the recent *coup d'état* and explains the general approval of the nation. It was a model *coup d'état*, carried out between midnight and 7 a.m. by a group of reserve officers led by M. Kimon Gheorghieff, all members of a small club called "Zveno." The new rulers of Bulgaria are all middle-aged men, they have all belonged to one or other of the political parties; we find a democrat, an agrarian, some Tzankovists. It is a national Government.

I must explain at once that the new Government is not a dictatorship; it is going to govern Bulgaria by decree for one year; but that is in conformity with art. 47 of the Bulgarian Constitution which provides that: if the internal situation of the country becomes critical the King, advised by and on the responsibility of his Ministers, may command the Government by Royal Decree for one year, after which the Sobranie must ratify all the decrees. The present Prime Minister, M. Kimon Gheorghieff, is able to dispense with Parliament for a year, after which he has announced that it is to be reconstituted with one-third of the deputies to be elected and the remainder chosen to represent corporations and various public bodies.

The Bulgarian people are above all a democratic nation. The general tendency is always to associate all the nation

with the Government. The people are the only rulers. The Bulgarian Constitution was drawn up in April 1879 by the Russians on the lines of the Belgian Constitution, which is the most liberal one of Europe. This Constitution suited the Bulgarian temperament, but inevitable difficulties arose from the fact that it was going to be applied to a nation absolutely unprepared for civic life after centuries of Turkish oppression. In spite of all, the adaptable Bulgarian race resolutely advanced on the road to progress and prosperity, and owing to the work of clever leaders and eminent patriots the country made giant strides in what I would like to call the last normal years preceding 1912. The trials of the last wars, the disappearance of the old generation, a new influx of dangerous tendencies, the poverty of the villages, the growing desire of the country people to live in the towns, are some of the elements which upset the democratic system of Bulgaria.

Before the last *coup d'état*, Bulgaria had no less than 36 political groups—the Sobranie only numbering 247 members—with the same electoral system as in France, the lists of candidates for Parliament getting longer and longer at each election; there were often 10 to 12 candidates for one seat. The results were that the social and political programme of the State became completely paralysed by the complicated manœuvres preceding and following an election, by thwarted ambitions, by an illegal distribution of appointments and by many injustices, all these evils being increased by the press. The Bulgarian nation had become thoroughly dissatisfied with a system built on petty struggles. Stronger and stronger grew a feeling of patriotism versus party politics and the desire that order should be re-established and incompetency crushed. For the last two or three years the Bulgarians were praying for reforms, but it seemed impossible to find the reformers in the ranks of the political parties. The weariness of the people, the deplorable economic state of the country and the quarrels of the politicians were being closely observed and followed by the one and only element above suspicion and above compromise—the Bulgarian Army. The Army in Bulgaria has always been a non-political unity. It has always represented and crystallised in itself all the sterling qualities of the Bulgarian race: honesty, sincerity, courage, perseverance and hard work. This Army, realising that the good name and repute of the Bulgarians were at stake,

decided that there could only be one pacific solution of all these thorny problems, namely the suppression—even temporary—of the parliamentary system to enable political rivalries to be absorbed in one great patriotic movement. I would like to stress that the *coup d'état* of May 19th was not, therefore, a sensational improvisation, but the logical result of years of indifferent government. The fact that the change encountered no opposition, but was, on the contrary, greeted throughout the country with the greatest enthusiasm, proves that the right thing had been done at the right time.

Since my return from Bulgaria last July, the situation has become much clearer and during the last four months an enormous improvement has taken place throughout the country in all spheres of national life. The achievements of the new Government include a balanced Budget with considerable economies over the last one, economies amounting in fact to over one fifth of the total Budget of the State. The revised Budget suppressed all superfluous posts in the Civil Service and cut Civil Servants' salaries by three to five per cent. and their pensions by five to six per cent. But on the other hand, all the State salaries have been paid since May 19th; the service of pensions has once more become regular. The Internal Loan was a complete success, and was over-subscribed in a few days. Wise reforms in the education system and in the administration of Communes have taken place, and considerable savings have been effected, in spite of the fact that Bulgaria was already crushed by taxation and that the general standard of salaries in Bulgaria was already reduced to a minimum. When last in Bulgaria I was struck by two things—the unanimous approval of the nation for the new order, and the excellent work steadily being carried out by the new Government. The programme of the new leaders is admirable in substance. Whether they can fulfil it to the letter or not remains to be seen, but they have started well. It is based on peace within and without the frontiers of Bulgaria, and a drastic reform of the evils perpetrated throughout the country as the result of party politics.

Within the last two months the new Government have completely reorganised local administration. On June 8th the King signed a decree creating a new State Institute; the Department of Propaganda known in Bulgaria as the

"Obnova." This Institute is under the direct authority of the Council of Ministers; it is divided into two sections, one of which supervises the press, the wireless, films, literature and propaganda, with the collaboration of the *Direction de la Presse* and of the Ministry of Public Instruction. The second section is devoted to administration and is represented in every Bulgarian province by committees, in which the villagers take part. I may, perhaps, quote here the letter I received lately from one of the directors of the "Obnova."

The chief aim of our organisation is the political and social education of the people. It goes without saying that the process of moral reform is long and difficult; to re-educate does not mean to destroy traditions, the past, the soul of a nation or its original aptitudes. On the contrary, our ambition is to strengthen this moral capital and to develop it in the light of civilisation and progress. We will try to uproot the undesirable defects of our national character: jealousy, opposition to authority and discord, replacing them by the qualities essential to the prestige of the State and Nation.

As a means of achieving its objects the "Obnova" will come into close contact with the Church and the Schools, as well as with every cultural body in the country: theatres, libraries, etc. These will be under the supervision of our organisation inasmuch as they will retain their private character. Theatres, museums, school libraries, etc., which are already controlled by the State will only be "inspired" by us so as to obtain unity of action.

Two forces will serve to promote our new creed; it will be promoted by word of mouth (public speaking and the wireless), as well as by the press—the latter directed by us—the publications of our Institute, etc. Cinemas will come into the propaganda schemes. We also deal with work among the linguistic and religious minorities and we keep watch over the communists.

May I repeat that we do not intend to become a political party—as we stand for non-party government; but the gap left by the dissolved parties has to be filled so as to enable the nation to co-operate with the government. We foresee in the future the need of Parliament, but only as a body of advisors to the Government. The Prime Minister must not be as before: *primus inter pares*. (Translation.)

Since May 19th all the political parties of Bulgaria have been dissolved, including the Zveno Club, and all the minor newspapers abolished, including those of the Extreme Left; these reforms were not opposed in any way. The people do

not even seem specially anxious for the Parliament to be re-elected, though this is foreseen by the new Government at some "future date." It is reported that the clergy and the Civil Service will be represented by several members in the new Bulgarian Parliament, as well as the corporations and other public bodies.

I hear from Bulgaria that no one questions the honesty and goodwill of "the austere and extremely hard-working ministers, each of them pre-eminently suited by his previous experience and education for the portfolio he holds." Indeed the country feels that these new leaders are inspired by the patriotic spirit of those who fought for the liberation of Bulgaria, such as Hristo Botev and Levsky. The peasants are satisfied with the new legislation against corrupt functionaries. The foundation of the Bulgarian Credit Bank under the direction of the National Bank has been approved by Bulgarians and foreigners alike. This compulsory amalgamation of all the numerous provincial banks into one is a big step towards cheaper credit, concentrating savings and abolishing overhead charges. The initial share capital is 125 million Lewa, of which the State, through the National Bank, will subscribe 50 million. The Government has also passed a new law dealing with the subject of Trade Unions. Every person who has a regular occupation shall be entitled to membership of the relative trade union, civil servants excepted. Masters and men shall not be members of one and the same union. Each trade or occupation shall only have one union. By this law, all forms of labour, employers of labour, trades and professions will be organised into collective bodies, and in due course each of them will be given Parliamentary and municipal representation.

The new Ministers are the most diligent and conscientious of workers. They are in close personal contact with the King, who receives them several times a week. The Prime Minister, Colonel Kimon Gheorghieff, born at Pazardjik in 1882, entered the Royal Military School as a cadet, and served during the wars of 1912, 1913, and the Great War, in the Infantry, being severely wounded in the last war. He entered politics in 1922 and served for a short time in the Tzankoff Cabinet as Minister for Railways, resigning in 1926 as he could not agree with the policy of the Government. He is a man of high integrity, with outstanding ability for organisation.

Most of his colleagues have had distinguished public careers. The Minister for War, General Zlateff, graduated at the Imperial Military Academy of St. Petersburg. He served during the war, and has been on the General Staff at the War Office since 1927, becoming Inspector General of Cavalry three years ago. The able Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Batoloff, born in 1876, studied law in Paris; he entered politics in 1903 as a member of the Democratic Party, was Member of Parliament in 1908, then twice elected Mayor of Sophia. Married to a Frenchwoman, he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Paris in 1931, holding that post up to the time of his present appointment.

Regarding foreign affairs, the new Cabinet has not departed one inch from the programme of Monsieur Monchanoff's last Cabinet—and in fact of all the Bulgarian Governments since 1918—namely to maintain good relations with all the neighbours of Bulgaria, to avoid the pitfalls of separate pacts and contribute to the peace of Europe by preserving order within its frontiers. The good work started by the last Cabinet regarding closer ties of friendship with the other Balkan States has been continued with hopeful results.

Last August the Sovereign and the Cabinet enjoyed an interlude from the responsibilities of foreign politics, in the heart of Bulgaria, during the inauguration of a massive stone tower, erected upon the Schipka Pass, to commemorate the liberation of Bulgaria and the heroism of the Russians and Bulgarians, who fell there in the fiercest of battles in 1877. These celebrations developed into a symbolic reunion of King Boris, Prince Cyril his brother, the entire Cabinet, the garrisons of Stara-Zagora, Kazanlik and Tirnovo and crowds numbering over 90,000 people. A special issue of postage stamps was made to celebrate this inauguration. I received the following letter from Schipka, written the day after the inauguration:

We have spent three unforgettable days here. It has been a unique experience, uplifting and reassuring in every sense, carrying us all back to the episodes of that noblest of wars of 1877 when Bulgarians and Russians held the Pass against Turkish troops, far superior in number, and having no more ammunition used stones, broken rifles and earth to keep the enemy at bay. Very like Thermopylæ—but nearer us somehow! The little town was full of officials, veterans wearing their medals, workmen, peasants, and I cannot describe the jumble of vehicles which brought them

all! from Cadillacs to donkey-carts! The evening celebration, when the King unveiled the monument to the fallen, took on a very special significance to every mind. It was like a beautiful ray of light dismissing the gloom and distorted shapes of surmisal and conjecture. It seemed to signify that King, Government, Army and People were all resolved to collaborate for the prosperity of a new Bulgaria, liberated for the second time! There may have been 100,000 people on those mountains, all eager, cheering, rushing to see the King, who looked splendid on horseback. The King's speeches were excellent; the Russian Generals were all in tears and the Bulgarian Veterans ecstatic. The King moved about freely amongst the people. Really, it is not the fault of nations to-day if they deteriorate in a sordid world, and I think occasions like Schipka are God-sent to awaken pride and remind one of the things that count more than politics or economics. (Fedora Stancioff, Schipka, 29, viii, 1934.)

The Bulgarian papers attached great significance to an anecdote told by King Boris, while sitting at Schipka between the Prime Minister, M. Gheorghieff, and the War Minister, General Zlateff. His Majesty recalled that during the war he was once sitting in a trench between the two same officers, when a shell burst close by, and by a "miracle none of us was injured," said the King, "and we have all lived to serve Bulgaria."

King Boris also had a great personal triumph a few weeks before, when he opened a students' hostel at Berkovitzza on August 12th, unattended. At every possible occasion lately the nation has rallied round their Sovereign with demonstrative marks of affection which the austere Bulgarians are usually reluctant to show. He has just celebrated the sixteenth anniversary of his accession to the throne and once again the nation has acclaimed him and the young Queen Joanna. His democratic spirit, charming personality and courage have won for him the love and confidence of Bulgaria and in the last two years, by his visits to foreign countries, he has done much to bring his country before the governments and peoples of Europe. One can say that at the present hour Bulgaria's horizon, as regards foreign politics, is quite clear. Negotiations with Rumania for a settlement of matters outstanding between the two countries upon a basis of reciprocity are still going on. The renewal of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Russia has taken place with the minimum of

sensation or comment. It seems to have received the full approval of Turkey. There is no question of Bulgaria joining the Balkan Pact, unless it be cast in a new mould; for the Pact itself as it now stands is one of the most superfluous and meaningless of documents. (The question has already been thrashed out in these pages.) The sad fact that Bulgaria's outlet to the Ægean, guaranteed to her by art. 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, has not been granted to her after sixteen years of patient waiting remains the greatest blot on Europe's diplomatic record, but this problem will no doubt be solved by a just fate sooner or later. There are some other unsettled questions still dividing Greece and Bulgaria; but the spirit is better on both sides.

Regarding Yugo-Slavia, by one of the most cruel blows that destiny can inflict, the death of King Alexander has taken place at the very hour when, owing to his efforts and those of King Boris, an era of friendship had dawned for both Yugo-Slavia and Bulgaria. One can only pray that the death of the Martyr-King will inspire his afflicted people to continue his policy, and carry out his wish that the two Slav countries should work together in an atmosphere of peace and trust. The news of the tragedy of Marseilles has filled Sophia with gloom and horror and the whole nation mourns the loss of her newly acquired friend with the most sincere grief. The sorrow of King Boris to whom the recent visit of his Royal Colleague had brought such deep joy can be imagined. After a three-days' visit to Bulgaria, thought out, and carried out with a thoroughness which does full credit to the Bulgarian Sovereign and Government, the Rulers of Yugo-Slavia reached Belgrade safe and sound. The visit, to quote a Bulgarian witness, "has created an atmosphere of goodwill such as we could not have hoped for a year ago." The most active precautions had been taken by the police; but quite apart from the perfection of the official programme, and the cordiality of the Royal speeches, one must stress the point that never were ovations so rousing and so spontaneous as those which the strong, silent Bulgarians gave throughout the Royal visit to their Royal guests and to their own Sovereigns. The people thus showed their approval of the Government's policy of friendship with Yugo-Slavia. The fact that M. Yevtitch, the Yugo-Slav Foreign Minister, accompanied his Sovereigns and witnessed all these manifestations permits

one to hope that this Minister will loyally carry out his dead master's wishes with regard to the understanding with Bulgaria. It is too early as yet to consider the results of the visit ; but it is evident that the two Balkan Slav nations are now following the same road. Discussions on the subject of Macedonia have no doubt taken place between M. Yevtitch and M. Kimon Gheorghieff during their excursion to the Rilo Monastery, which was one of the items of the official programme. It is strongly felt in Bulgaria that the last ten years of Bulgarian history have proved that nothing has been, or could be, gained for the improvement of the Macedonian question by violence or bloodshed. Direct intercourse with the Yugo-Slav Government may bring the desired amelioration ; the Macedonians will not be sacrificed in the process, and it is worth trying a different method for the solution of the problem. *Festina lente!* but Belgrade must do its part ; for the harsh treatment of the Macedonian minority by the Yugo-Slav authorities for so many years has given the population a genuine grievance.

Bulgaria is following the new negotiations with Yugo-Slavia with approval, but there is a general distrust throughout the country of pacts and alliances to be. "Is not the League of Nations enough?" is the usual remark one hears. There is an opinion current that a new Peace Conference would be the best remedy against a future war ; with the right of negotiation and discussion to be granted to all without exception. One feels that only by a conscientious fulfilment of art. 19 of the Peace Treaty will a lasting peace ever be obtained in Europe. *Ficta omnia celeriter, tanquam flosculi decidunt, nec simulatum potest quidquam esse diuturnum*, said Cicero.

At the present day Bulgaria has many sound assets which should be helpful towards the cause of peace. She now has a strong, resolute and hard-working Government of Patriots ; a Sovereign who is granting them the assistance of his sound political instinct and advice ; the co-operation of the former party leaders who are prepared to support the new venture ; and a very contented population.

NADEJDA MUIR.

October 14th.

THE NEW LABOUR POLICY.

THE main significance of the work done by the numerous body of Labour Delegates who met and separated at Southport in the beginning of October, lay in the fact that it suggested the main lines of the new Labour policy for a coming General Election. It did not itself formulate the more condensed definitive programme which will be circulated by millions when the date of this General Election is accurately determined. Indeed, the amount of literature produced by the National Executive for the use of this Conference was far too extensive for the more limited digestion of the average elector. But it was not too extensive for the more specialised digestion of a National Labour Party Conference. Undoubtedly, it had been eagerly received and perused, for the Socialist League, the successor of the Independent Labour Party within the ranks of orthodox Labour, had produced amendments to the original text which in some cases rivalled and even exceeded it in the bulk of their details. The result was that debates took place and decisions were made which are vitally significant for forecasting the future achievements of any possible Labour Government.

Truth to tell, the expectation or in some cases the menace of such a General Election was continually present to the minds of these Labour Delegates. Thus, when the mode of operation of the Industrial Programme was in full discussion, and the issue was raised as between Compensation and Confiscation, the Assembly was warned off the latter policy by the reminder of the results produced at the General Election, which placed the National Government in power by the suggestion that working-class investments were in danger. There was no intention at Southport to be rash or impracticable, or to suggest a programme which, when the Party came into office, could be conveniently ignored as a utopia built in the blue. Indeed, it appeared to be universally felt and acknowledged that the Labour movement would suffer a set-back for many years, if it had again to pass through the same tribulation which it had certainly endured during the two previous Labour administrations. Nor was it at all easy by a mere reading of the reports of general debates to get a true idea of the prevailing spirit of the Conference. As has already been pointed out, the reports were many and voluminous, and the

amendments quite rivalled the bulk of the reports. It seemed a hopeless situation to get through them all in a week's talk on events, but the Conference Arrangements Committee was equal to the occasion. The movers of the amendments were got together. The plight of the Conference was revealed. It was agreed, and the agreement was ratified by the Conference itself, that there should be a big debate on the general principles of each subject, and that the movers of certain miscellaneous amendments had a prior claim to take part in these debates, so far as time allowed. Thereupon, when the time limit allowed to the particular subject had elapsed, the allowed amendments were to be put to the vote of the assembly without any further discussion.

This method was not without its disadvantages, and these disadvantages were revealed most conspicuously in the opening and most important discussion on Socialism and Peace. In this discussion it was apparent from the first that Mr. Henderson's unique experience had won the day in the elaboration of Labour Policy on this particular point, and that a future Labour Government would present at Geneva a plan of action in the cause of Peace and Disarmament, which had been elaborated by his own skilful hand. But a day afterwards a somewhat heated speech from Lord Hailsham was reported in the Press in which the Minister for War accused the Labour Party of having decided to leave Britain undefended, because the Party Conference was in favour of something like unilateral disarmament. Why this discrepancy? Simply because, owing to the operation of the plan conceived by the Conference Arrangements Committee, the debate on Peace before the adoption of the official policy was almost wholly occupied by the movers of extreme amendments, those who said the League of Nations was a hopeless capitalistic institution, those who would have Britain lay down her arms without any heed to her neighbours, and those who fondly hoped that a mass movement of the workers in the form of a general strike would bring them with a great stride to the goal of their desires. When the vote came, the defenders of these "impossible loyalties" were swept away like chaff before the wind.

But what was to be the leading article of this Labour Policy of action? There appeared to have been a great deal of preliminary skirmishing directed to this special point. As is well

known to newspaper readers, Sir Stafford Cripps, in a series of preliminary speeches in the country, had been setting forth with some force and fierceness the view that the first article of Labour Policy should be the abolition of the House of Lords. It was plain that the Executive had not been won round outright to the adoption of such a view. The first discussion in the Conference, indeed, centred round the House of Lords. To this extent Sir Stafford Cripps appeared to have won his point. But the official policy, as it was expounded in a voluminous appendix, appeared to be more akin to the old Liberal policy of "filling up the cup." Peace and the Social and Industrial Programme were to come first. Great constructive measures were to be laid before the House. The House of Commons procedure itself was to be simplified and expedited. And if, on some of these great measures, the House of Lords were to obstruct, then the new Labour Government, having previously asked from the people a mandate to deal with any opposition from the Peers, was thereupon to swamp them and thus to sweep them roughly out of its path.

Surely there are implications in this new Labour Policy of the supremest constitutional importance. It may be remembered that in the last speech which he delivered in the House of Commons Mr. Gladstone warned his fellow members that the Lords barred the way and would ultimately have to be faced. But when the "filling of the cup" was accomplished, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman introduced resolutions which neither mended nor ended the House of Lords, but led up to the Parliament Act, which only permitted the Peers to "kill" a measure in the closing years of a Parliament, while in the opening years they could only delay it for a period of two years. It is significant that neither in the Executive reports nor in the speeches of Labour leaders at the Conference was any mention made of an appeal to the Parliament Act. It was rather presupposed that a call would be addressed to the King to create new Peers so as to carry a threatened measure, and thereupon to abolish the Lords. But what if the appeal of Conservative Conferences should prove successful and a National Government should decide to "mend" the Second Chamber? What if, as in the case of amending schemes of Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Cave, this mended Second Chamber were removed altogether from the scope of the Parliament Act? Then the objective of the Labour Party could only be

attained by some course of procedure which could really be described as revolutionary. And—as if to prepare the way for any future crisis—the Labour Executive, in one of their appended memoranda, manifested a certain fondness for delegated legislation and the use of Administrative Orders, only premising, in the case of the latter, that they should be brought, for confirmation and endorsement, before the attention of Parliament.

It was not the House of Lords, however, but the questions of Peace and Disarmament which, for the reasons already stated, are quite evidently to stand at the forefront of the Labour Programme. And it was interesting to note what proposals, according to Mr. Henderson's practised judgment, a Labour Government could with reasonable hope submit to all the nations at Geneva. Here is the plan which comprises the first articles of the new Labour Peace Policy :

- (a) The abolition of all the arms forbidden to the Central Powers by the 1919 Treaties, with a system of regular supervision and guarantees ;
- (b) the limitation of armaments budgets ;
- (c) the abolition of national air forces, the internationalising of civil aviation, and the creation of an international air-police force ;
- (d) the nationalisation and drastic international control of the manufacture of and trade in arms ;
- (e) a Treaty of Non-Aggression, linked with the Sanction system of the League ;
- (f) machinery and obligations for settling all disputes by pacific means.

These bold and comprehensive proposals were quite enthusiastically accepted by the Conference, but from Mr. Henderson's opening statement it was evident that a general strike or mass insurrection of the workers on the occasion of a war, which had been accepted at the Hastings Conference of 1933, was not yet removed from the Labour Policy of action. It was also stated that, on the occasion of a threat or the actual occurrence of war, the trade union forces of the country were to be called together to consider their attitude. What is the relation of this mass action to the general collective system ? Is it in the event of the latter not functioning automatically that recourse is to be had to the former ? Or in any case are the trade union forces in any country to say as a last resort under which system they are to act ? These are

questions which somewhat clamour for an answer, and there is no doubt that the success of the Labour proposals for a collective system at a future League meeting at Geneva would depend on the answer that might be given to them. The actual application of collective sanctions and the question what particular sanctions should be applied cannot be left with the consent of the rest to the judgment of a single nation. It has been plain from the very beginning that Peace and Disarmament can never be actually achieved without some surrender of national sovereignty.

On the whole, however, it was Industrial Reconstruction, apart from an opening speech by Mr. Henderson in the Peace discussion, which attracted by far the finest quality of the debating talent. This is not to be wondered at. If there was any reproach levelled more frequently by the Labour movement as a whole at the Labour Governments of 1924 and 1929, it was that they had no constructive ambition and no industrial imagination. Like the German Socialists after the War, they were accused of having failed in the region of industrial planning. The rank and file took the view in many important quarters that a Labour Government in the minority should have gone down fighting as a Government with some big reconstructive measure on the stocks, rather than to have tinkered here and there in an effort to preserve the *status quo*. It was not denied that Mr. Herbert Morrison's National Transport Board, in the second Labour Government, was an effort to fill up what was regarded as a yawning gap ; but this Transport measure had not been finally passed when the second Labour Government was hustled out of office, and its provisions were easily modified and adapted to their own purposes by the other side. Such was without any question the feeling widely diffused among Labour supporters in the country, and it was no doubt to secure themselves against its spread that the Labour National Executive attached such prominence in their sketch of future policy to schemes of Economic Reorganisation. These schemes are not intended for the operation of a minority government, for on this point again it is felt that unless in very extraordinary and unusual circumstances a Labour Government should not take up the reins of power unless it really possesses a working majority in the House of Commons.

In these circumstances it is interesting to observe that the

new Labour Industrial Reorganisation Schemes, which show signs of having enlisted in their elaboration the experience and skill of the trade union movement, could never be described as either extreme or revolutionary. Indeed, they were quite definitely Centre proposals, separating themselves distinctly both from the Right and the Left. In the first place they did not constitute a general plan, operative uniformly over the whole field of industry like the Soviet Five Years' Plan. Certain industries such as banking and credit, transport, electricity, water, iron and steel, coal, gas, agriculture, textiles, shipping, shipbuilding, and engineering were marked out as immediately ripe for schemes of "drastic reorganisation"; while, in the case of other industries not included in the above, they were only to be subject to "reorganisation" when they had shown themselves "recalcitrant to the demands the community makes upon them." In the second place they were not unduly bureaucratic as in the case of those who sounded the Socialist slogan that once stormed every door, the "nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange." Their general idea was to work the fundamental industries by means of public utility companies under the control of the community, but the constitution of such public utility companies was to be regarded in each industry as a separate problem, and in the case of the iron and steel industries especially, their representative on the National Executive, exposing himself to the reproach that he was bringing in a Corporate State, insisted that his industries should be run by experts who knew the business, and should not be subject to the harassing interference of politicians. In the case of the joint-stock banks they were to be "amalgamated into a single banking corporation and run by a small directorate appointed by the Government on grounds of ability"; but in the case of coal all that is laid down beforehand is that it should be "a comprehensively reorganised industry, planned on national lines." In the third place—and this was one of the surprises of the policy—no definite plan was worked out for what is loosely termed "workers' control." Previous Conferences of the Labour Party had been very insistent on this point and their instructions are formally obeyed in a clause of the Executive scheme, which declares that "the Labour Party also believes that the employees in a socialised industry have a right, which should

be acknowledged by law, to an effective share in the control and direction of the industry." In the case of the transport industry "it is also proposed to create a consultative committee in which organised Labour, users of transport and Local Government Authorities should sit to discuss with the board the effect of its policies upon their various interests"; and in the case of the National Agricultural Commission, under the Minister of Agriculture, the "members would be appointed for their special knowledge of administration, finance, marketing, etc., and would include representatives of the farmers, and farm workers and consumers, including the Co-operative movement."

The future of the House of Lords, the Peace Programme, and the schemes of Economic Reorganisation constituted the articles of the new Labour policy that were most adequately discussed at the Southport Conference. What was the spirit in which they were discussed? In the first place there was visible throughout the meeting a chastened sense of responsibility—the delegates were obviously determined not to promise more than they felt themselves in the long run competent to perform. Compensation was to be based on "net reasonable maintainable revenue"; and even the Boanerges of the Socialist League claimed to "temper the wind to the shorn lamb." In the second place it may be said that the whole economic proposals marked the triumph of the trade union element in the Party against the influence of which, at the previous conference at Hastings, a part of the local Labour Party section had protested so loudly. This triumph was not gained in discussion, for Mr. Bevin was their only prominent representative in the debates, but by the experience, moderation and skill which they brought to bear on those parts of the programme in which they were directly interested. In the third place there was apparent in the whole proceedings a diffused sense of deep underlying unity. The period of disillusionment and bitterness which had supervened on the accession of the National Government had given place to a responsible concentration on the task in hand. Save a solitary and not unwarranted reference by Mr. Clynes to Mr. MacDonald, there were no attacks on the Leaders who had left them, and who now almost appeared to have altogether faded from their memory. In the fourth place the National Executive, which at Hastings appeared to have lost ground

with the rank and file, seemed now to have altogether re-established their influence, though the decision to make the future secretary an administrator rather than a great political power, which was a victory gained by the body of the hall over the platform, supplied a clear indication that there was no room in the movement for anything like a dictatorship. In the fifth place the delegates, while favourable to the Soviet Union, were diametrically opposed to the brand of Communism which functions as its representative in this country. The knowledge that the Relief Committee for German and Austrian Sufferers from Fascism was coquetting with Communism caused that society to be proscribed in the face of a strong and touching appeal from Professor Laski, who is himself personally popular with the whole Labour movement. This means that the Professor will have to choose between membership of the Committee and membership of the Labour Party.

And in the last place it was evident at this significant Labour Conference that the whole movement is democratic to the core. The Chairman—balanced, quiet, impressive, and with a singularly pleasant voice—made a decisive onslaught against Fascism in his opening address, and the clear, ringing note which he first sounded was afterwards made manifest again and again throughout the subsequent proceedings of the assembly.

J. H. HARLEY.

THE REFORM OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THE Fascist Grand Council on December 5th, 1933, passed a remarkable resolution to the effect that : "the further stay of Italy in the League is conditional upon a radical reform of that organisation, to be effected in the shortest possible space of time, and which must touch the League of Nations in its constitution, its working, and its objects."* A little later (March 18th, 1934), Signor Mussolini, in a speech before the leaders of the Fascist régime, referring to the Disarmament Conference, declared : "If the Conference fails, there is no need to reform the League of Nations ; it will suffice to record its decease."

Signor Mussolini's statement seemed to strike a despairing note. At any rate this, and the resolution of the Fascist Grand Council, expressed a dissatisfaction with the existing organisation and conduct of the League which was felt by many people besides the members of the Fascist Grand Council. The League had fallen on bad times. It had not prevented (though its Economic Section had foreseen) the great economic depression. The international movement for the settling of all disputes between nations by the sense of justice of the member-states had failed. Instead of accepting the common rule of justice as expressed by the League, governments, when concerned in what they chose to call a vital interest, took decisions into their own hands and disregarded the League. Bolivia and Paraguay fought for three years over the perfectly arbitrable question of the Gran Chaco (1932-4), while the Council at Geneva and a League Commission in South America were vainly pressing them to keep their engagements. Japan, when the Council of the League adopted a report contrary to what she wanted in the affair of Manchuria, immediately served notice of withdrawal (February 1932). The German Government, faced (it must be confessed) with a wholly unwarranted check at the Disarmament Conference of Geneva (October 1933), not only withdrew at once from the Disarmament Conference, but also, as if to show complete despair of the international movement, served notice of withdrawal from the League. Here, then, are three Great Powers (and Great Powers are the props of the League,

* *The Bulletin of International News*, December 7th, 1933.

without which it cannot continue) ; two of them have given notice of withdrawal, while the third has declared that it will withdraw unless reforms are made. Of the remaining active members of the League in the first half of the year 1934 only two were Great Powers, one of which, France, very properly regards the League as an asset, while the other, Great Britain, looks upon it as a liability. The tragic, heartbreaking history of the Disarmament Conference, which met in such high hopefulness, and then groped for two and a half years in pathetic ineffectiveness, further diminished the reputation of the League of Nations.

On the other hand, a welcome accession came to the League with the entry of Russia at the Assembly of September 1934. It was, of course, easy for critics to point out that Russia's approach to the League was the result of her embarrassments in the Far East and elsewhere. But whatever the motive, the entry of Russia into the League is proof that the League has utility, and that it is sincerely based on the principle of universalism. In the discussion in the Sixth Committee on September 17th, Mr. Eden said : " His Majesty's Government associate themselves with a step which will effectively assist to universalise the League, by including the Soviet Union within its ranks." Although there were some dissentients, this view was endorsed by the representatives of over forty states. And after Russia came Afghanistan.

A continually recurring form of criticism is that the League is expensive and that it "overbudgets." Overbudgeting in itself is no great harm to anybody, as an excess of revenue at the end of one year would automatically relieve the finance of the next ; in any case there is not much in the charge of overbudgeting at all. There is more in the charge that delayed payments or defaults in payment by certain member-states increase the contributions of the states who do pay regularly. The total League budget (September 1934) is something over 30 million gold francs. The United Kingdom pays about 10 per cent. of the total.

It is only elementary justice to point out that all the criticism of the League amounts to criticism of the states which compose the League ; it is not valid criticism of the League itself. "The League does nothing" is the remark made by everybody, intelligent or unintelligent, who knows nothing about the League. These critics, uninformed though

they all are, are important, for they form the great, sluggish, prejudiced public opinion which dictates much of the policy of states. They are the majority of voters. Yet to their parrot-like remark "The League does nothing" (although it is quite untrue) there is an obvious and easy reply. If the League does less than it ought to do, it is because they are doing less than they ought to do. The League is a League of Nations. It can do just so much as the nations which comprise it authorise it to do and support it in the doing. The League cannot do more than the Governments which send the delegates to Geneva want it to do ; and the Governments are actuated by their public opinion, largely made by the uninformed individuals who say, "The League does nothing." So far as the League is ineffective, this is due to the indifference or hostility of the ordinary citizen.

It is a curious yet undeniable fact of social psychology that many people take a positive pleasure in contemplating the failure of a great ideal and a great crusade. The reason of this remarkable fact is that the failure of something noble justifies to the ordinary man or woman their having been too lazy, cynical, selfish or unintelligent themselves to take part in it. To foretell and then to observe the failure of something morally superior to himself consoles the average individual for his sense of inferiority. Because many a man has not sufficient public spirit to support a great and possibly distant ideal, and not sufficient independence of mind to discard old prejudices, he says : "Aha! I told you so, and I knew that this is all that would come of it." Such critics are not to be ignored or dismissed carelessly. They probably form the bulk of educated people and they should be very patiently and sympathetically argued with ; for every one of them is worth winning, and when they all see the light the League will have won the whole world. The uninformed critic, though not to be dismissed lightly, does not present a problem difficult to understand. It is quite easy to explain to him that the League does a good deal, and could do a great deal more—with his help.

The informed critic is, naturally, more difficult to deal with ; for anyone who speaks with knowledge has to be respected. His arguments carry weight and should do so particularly in the minds of the people he is criticising. The informed critics are not very numerous, and most of them are

friendly. Of those who are not very friendly to the League, the ablest and most trenchant in expression is Max Beer.* Here is a man who is passionate for peace and for justice; and he looks to the League to assure these blessings. To federate the nations for the peaceful dispensing of justice is a grand enterprise and experiment. "If the experiment is honest, it must arouse our enthusiasm; if not, our indignation." Max Beer is not afraid to make definite charges. The administration of the League has been too diplomatic. Difficulties have been evaded and trouble avoided by the invention of formulas. The Secretariat has become technically perfect; the balance of nationalities has been nicely, skilfully, maintained among the officials; an admirably functioning machine has been created by an admirable Secretary-General. But has it been made conscious of its mission, buoyant, enthusiastic, forceful? Herr Beer says no.

Another criticism of the League is that it is too much occupied with the by-products of international activity. Nobody, of course, will underestimate the social importance of these agencies nor the urgency of their demands nor the beneficence of the League's handling of them. The drug traffic, the "white slave" traffic, black slavery, pestilence, famine, flood—these are terrible evils and their problems have been nobly and energetically taken up by the League. The sections, committees and commissions, the devoted men and women who have given their thought and labour to the problems, deserve the highest praise. It is no criticism of them to say that these problems are not the chief business of the League. Its business is to assure peace and so enable the peoples of the world to have a full and progressive social life. The drug traffic, slavery and the other humanitarian problems which the League handles have their bearing upon the condition of peace and progressive social life and they have their place in League activities, though obviously not the chief place. This must be occupied by political problems which, as they appear in international affairs, also include economic problems. The political section and the economic section are the chief agencies of the League; on them it is based, and by their activities it is justified. The other agencies may be ever so successful, but they will not "carry" the League if its political and economic sections fail; and the League will be

* M. Beer, *The League on Trial* (1933).

the grandest success in history if the political and economic sections fulfil their object, whether the other activities exist or not.

Petulant notices of withdrawal are evidences of criticism which must be taken seriously even if it is not always justified. The Spanish Government gave notice of withdrawal in 1927, though it revoked the notice before the interval of two years expired. Japan gave notice in 1932, Germany in 1933. An organisation is not working well if it is treated as a convenience to be discarded by any member who does not receive the verdict or report that he wanted.

Reform of the League, clearly, is demanded and is necessary. Many institutions, like the British Constitution, develop and reform themselves by custom. The League, too, has developed in a customary way, but unfortunately the use and practice which are its customary developments have been in the direction of relaxing its authority and not employing its powers to the full. When the League was established, it was meant to be a body which would enforce its authority and compel respect for the law of nations if Governments disregarded their obligations under the Covenant. Article 10 was meant as a definite undertaking on the part of the member-states to ensure by co-operative methods including sanctions, the territorial integrity and political independence of each and all. By article 16 the member-states undertake to consider themselves as being at war with every one of them which resorts to war in disregard of its covenants. These two articles, and others, have by the use and wont of fifteen short years fallen, not into desuetude indeed, but into a vague interpretation which divests them largely of solidity or content. Customary development in the case of the League's strongest articles has simply been the taking of the line of least resistance. This customary development must be stopped, and the intention of the articles must be precisely defined. And if an issue arises in which it is clear that the Covenant has been broken, the League must face the issue and enforce the Covenant; otherwise the League will be proved to be a sham and will die.

Far worse, however, than the fate of articles 10 and 16 has been that of article 11. This article declares that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole League, and that the League shall take action to safeguard the peace of

nations. But by some extraordinary blunder, probably just oversight, this article was not exempted from the unanimity rule. Thus, in order that action can be taken under article 11, both parties to the dispute must agree to the action being taken! Clearly, what the framers of the article meant was, as in article 15, that any action to be taken must be the result of agreement by the members of Council *other than the parties to the dispute*. The article should, accordingly, be explicitly amended in this sense.

A group of Oxford tutors has drafted a plan for the employing of sanctions, mainly economic, which will make the League judgments effective. The proposal is that a covenant-breaking state shall have no financial support or accommodation from outside; that all imports from it be refused; and that no exports to it be permitted. Further, each state will have to take to itself, by domestic legislation, the powers necessary for enacting embargoes; and, in addition, there will have to be set up an International Blockade Commission, charged with preparing for the joint action among the component states, without which economic sanctions will not be effective.* The nations have at any rate learned one thing in the course of the present depression—economic control: control of finance, control of trade. Most of them already possess legislative authority for enacting prohibitions, quotas, for rationing “foreign exchange,” for “blocking” financial accounts. If there are any states without such powers, they can soon take them. In time of crisis, if the member-states are agreed, they have a wonderful apparatus and technique in the various governments for so controlling trade and finance that no covenant-breaking or aggressor state is likely to be able to resist.

Yet, in the ultimate analysis, economic sanctions may have to depend upon force, and probably on naval force. An essential condition, therefore, of the use of economic sanctions is that the United States, being along with Great Britain the chief maritime Power, and that Russia, the largest European land Power, should be, either in the League or at any rate prepared to act with it; this condition seems likely to be fulfilled. The League then should redefine the articles in which the enforcement of the Covenant is envisaged,

* *Economic Sanctions*, Oxford, March 1934 (a leaflet, obtainable from L. N. Fraser Queen's College, Oxford).

or should at any rate clarify them by a declaratory act. It should also prepare a plan for the employment of sanctions against a covenant-breaking or aggressor state. If the declaratory act and the plans for sanctions are adopted in the Council and Assembly, it will be proved that the member-states honestly wish the League to be an effective federal union; it will be proved that the League is a reality, and this is the surest promise of success.

Except for the permanent seats which are assigned to Great Powers, membership of the Council of the League is decided by election in the Assembly. The competition for votes has given rise to considerable heart-burning, and on one occasion brought about the notice of withdrawal from the League on the part of Spain, and it always creates a sense of disappointment, even of indignity, on the part of a state which offers itself for membership of Council and is rejected on a vote. Moreover, although voting is free and any member-state may be nominated as a candidate, it is understood that one seat shall always be filled by a South American state, another by an Oriental, another by a Scandinavian, another by a Balkan state. In view of all this it might be far better to adopt a suggestion made by *The Times* after the last election, that the system of voting for members of Council should be abolished and the simple expedient adopted of making membership rotational and automatic.

The basis of the whole League is the Political Section; everything else is ancillary. Yet it is seldom that the officials of the Political Section appear abroad. Members of the various technical commissions travel far afield, and help usefully to organise their subject-matter, which may be drugs or copyright, in various quarters of the world. But if the high officials (who are not very numerous) of the Political Section visit governments and peoples the public knows nothing of this, though the voyage of every technical commission is widely reported. Governments, at any rate Great Powers, would probably not greatly relish visits and advice from members of the Political Section of the Secretariat; but minorities and mandated peoples would benefit from the attention; and in time even Great Powers would become used to this. When the peoples realise that the League is a political body, the great step will have been taken towards a real federation of the world.

Although intellectually it is possible to draw a distinction between politics and economics, these two things are really one science. Most of the ills of the world come from the separation of the two, from the ignorance or contempt of economics shown by the men who are in control of national politics. The Secretariat of the League has not made this mistake. It has a Political and Economic Section, and they understand and assist each other. The League has also another economic branch which should be given far greater prominence than it at present enjoys. This is the International Labour Organisation.

The political fears of the world which the League is there to allay are closely involved in economic circumstances. Peoples with high standards of living are apprehensive of the increase of population and expansion of trade of people who have relatively low standards. The International Labour Organisation was designed to meet all this. It was one of the wisest and noblest efforts of the Peace Conference of 1919, and it ought to be one of the most cherished results. It is based on two simple principles: (1) that the denial of social justice to large numbers involves continual danger to the nations' political stability; and (2) that widely differing standards of living as between nations give rise to excess of economic nationalism and to much political distrust and discontent. The International Labour Organisation exists to investigate labour conditions all over the world and to negotiate conventions for levelling upward these conditions where they are unduly depressed. It represents, in effect, what is now known as "Planning," only in the case of the I.L.O. it is international planning, intelligently conceived, based on the principle of the general good, and not on the chaotic principle of individual national interest. I have never understood why all those people, men and women in public life, and all the masses of private citizens, who are interested in peace and goodwill, have not made more of the International Labour Organisation. They should give all their mind and thought to it, speak about, support it, educate themselves and all the world in its methods and principles. The League of Nations and all the societies for advancing the League of Nations should put the I.L.O. along with the Political and Economic Sections of the League at the head of their programmes. And by some simple adjustment of internal organisation, the I.L.O. should

be brought into closer relations with the Secretariat of the League and with the Council and Assembly.

The reform of the League, about which so much is spoken, is after all not the prime necessity. The League is only a constitution, a piece of political machinery. This machinery is not badly devised. Doubtless it can be improved. The prime necessity, however, is not improvement of the machinery, but the revival of unity of principle and driving force. For this two things are needed: a statesman of moving personality; and an insistent public opinion. The League statesman has to have the faith that will move mountains. There have been some who had this faith or came near having it, men who had experienced the infinite tragedy of the World War and yet kept their belief in humanity. But most of them were already old or middle-aged when the War ended. Wilson died in 1924; Stresemann in 1929; Briand in 1932. Benes, Politis, wise and active, are restricted in influence because they do not speak with the authority of a Great Power. Lord Cecil is a big personality who has worked unremittingly for the League, but has never been called by his only half-convinced people to fill the highest office. Signor Mussolini, perhaps the sternest critic of the League, has the genius, the strength of mind, the political position necessary for carrying the collective movement through to success. Why not? Italy is the home of the collective movement, of the universal tradition of the ancient Roman Empire and of the medieval Church. Macchiavelli did not preach state-egotism; he only analysed the existing situation at the opening of the modern age. If the Italian people, under Signor Mussolini's leadership, resumed their command of the international movement, they would justify the claim of Gioberti, that premature internationalist of the nineteenth century, to a "moral primacy" of the world.

Behind all questions of statesmanship, however, is the question of public opinion. This, as M. Avenol declared on his first visit to London as Secretary-General of the League, is the force on which the League must rely. The unique fact about public opinion to-day, as compared with the pre-war Age, is that it is planned opinion. Governments, for instance in Italy and in Germany, actively create, foster and direct a natural public opinion which is exclusive to the nation. "One might compare," said M. Avenol, "public opinion in

such countries to a whirlwind revolving within their frontiers." The League is, or should be, the place of contacts for these national public opinions and for the opinions of the whole world. Accordingly, a suggestion made by Mr. E. J. Phelan of the International Labour Organisation might well be adopted, that there should be representatives of the unofficial "League of Nations Societies" on the official bodies at Geneva—for instance in the Assembly or even in the Council.* There might also be always one or two members of a national League of Nations Union or League of Nations Society given temporary work in the Secretariat, in the way in which, for instance, Professor Manley Hudson of Harvard, has given his services to the Secretariat in a series of Long Vacations. If some such system of representation were adopted the League would be not only an association of governments, but a focus or *forum* of public opinions. Expressed, tested, and mutually accommodated in the gatherings at Geneva, these public opinions would become factors of the public opinion of the world, of the great driving force of the League, humanity's greatest adventure.

Small states, naturally, always stand for justice; they cannot exist without it. But Great States, being powerful enough or believing that they can be powerful enough, to stand alone, are tempted ultimately to base their policy not on the principle of absolute justice, but on the principle of "vital interest," and only on vital interest as they interpret it themselves. Thus it seems as if the world may be considered as grouped into two classes, "justice-states," which comprise all small states and some great states, who desire only to see what is fair between states; and power-states, comprising every state which holds that the pursuit of its vital interest (including its "greatness") is an "imperative necessity."

When the world realises clearly the distinction between "justice-states" and "power-states," the problem of international relations will be solved. For no states, no civilised peoples anyhow, can long resist the compelling attraction of the eternal principle of justice. Then, indeed, there will be peace, but not the peace envisaged in *Mein Kampf* "based

* Mr. Phelan's actual proposal or suggestion was that the International Federation of League of Nations Societies should nominate a representative or representatives to the Council of the League of Nations (see *Problems of Peace*, 1933, p. 98).

on the victorious sword of a master-nation bringing the world into the service of a higher culture" (*ein Friede . . . begründet durch das siegreiche Schwert eines die Welt in den Dienst einer höheren Kultur nehmenden Herrenvolkes*).^{*} That Herr Hitler is himself disposed to support the League and to withdraw the notice of withdrawal may be inferred from the speech of Herr von Neurath, delivered before the International Road Congress at Berlin on September 19th. Speaking of the League, Baron von Neurath said that Germany was not the only nation which believed this institution had been shaken to its very foundations by its failure to achieve disarmament. Germany believed that radical reforms were required before the League could become a real instrument of peace in accordance with its own statutes. Its grave shortcomings could be made up only by the return of old members and the entry of new States.[†]

R. B. MOWAT.

^{*} *Mein Kampf*, p. 438.

[†] *The Times*, September 20th, 1934.

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC AND
OLIVER CROMWELL.

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S new book on Oliver Cromwell is published with a flourish of trumpets. On the dust cover we are told that "between the eulogies of Cromwell's admirers and the vituperation of his foes the portrait of the man himself has been lost to view. In these pages Mr. Belloc shows us the real Cromwell. . . ." No one would hold Mr. Belloc responsible for a publisher's enthusiasm, but he is eager to blow the trumpet himself, and he announces to the world that his is the first true portrait of Oliver, and that all other biographies can now be put aside. The first paragraph in the first chapter headed "Myth and Reality" runs: "This book is not another life of Oliver Cromwell; there are dozens too many, the earlier batch a mass of slander, the later a mass of panegyric—all of them myth. My object here is to seek reality; to discover what was within the nature of the man's motives, the quality of his actions as witnesses to the moral truth about himself."

This is the third time Mr. Belloc has dealt with Cromwell. In 1927 he wrote the short book in Benn's Sixpenny Library; last year he gave us a portrait of Cromwell in his *Charles the First, King of England*, and now we have the fuller study contained in some four hundred pages. Mr. Belloc surveys his handiwork and finds that it is good. Here at last, he again and again assures us, we have truth and reality. He deplores the fact that all modern writers are apologists for Cromwell, and finds them guilty of pretence. Their arguments (in one capital instance), he says, remind him of the worst kind of modern theology. The writings of every accepted and national writer are, he complains, vitiated by "the new kind of anti-Catholicism." Sometimes, when he reads the attempts to vindicate Cromwell's character and conduct, he is distressed by the "mental gymnastics" and "acrobatics quite unworthy of history." In one passage he puts all the modern biographers together in the dock: "Carlyle does not (of course) even attempt to weigh the evidence; but it is unfortunately the same with men better balanced than Carlyle. They follow each other throughout the period immediately before our own in a long string of denials, refusing any story, tradition or even known fact which did not conform

to their imaginary picture of one whom they now set up to worship."

Sorrowfully Mr. Belloc regards these misguided men and reveals to us that he would gladly have followed in the same tradition. "I could wish to have settled my own judgment comfortably in that rut; but truth is the greater friend."

Although Mr. Belloc does not (except in the case of Carlyle) mention by name the writers who come under his ban, it is fairly clear who are included in his list. They are, I assume, David Masson, Frederic Harrison, Lord Rosebery, John Morley, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, Sir Charles Firth and Professor G. M. Trevelyan. If Mr. Belloc wishes us to set aside the books of these men (in so far as they relate to Cromwell) he is asking a great deal. Before we part with their writings Mr. Belloc must convince us he has something better to put in their place.

There is, first of all, Carlyle's *Letters and Speeches*. Mr. Belloc has no use for Carlyle. If he refers to him at all it is with contempt, and nowhere has he a word of recognition for the services Carlyle rendered in making the speeches and letters of Cromwell easily available to the English reader. Carlyle's labours, one would think, deserve some tribute, but Mr. Belloc has no comment to make except an expression of his scorn.

After Carlyle we have Samuel Rawson Gardiner. The debt the English people owe to that great man has never been sufficiently acknowledged and can never be adequately discharged. His life was deliberately devoted to the study of the Stuart period. He gave forty years of concentrated labour to the writing of his *History*, and allowed nothing to come between him and the fulfilment of his task. His sustained effort stands out as one of the noblest achievements in the whole history of English letters. His chief characteristic was devotion to truth and, as Professor York Powell says, whenever he has given a verdict "he himself has been most eager to supply us with the means of arriving at a conclusion for ourselves." The work of Gardiner was continued by another great man of the same school, Sir Charles Firth. His services to this generation in the study of Stuart history it would be presumptuous to praise. Very few of us would care to travel more than a few steps in that territory without the advantage of his guidance and the benefit of his research.

The work of Gardiner and Firth extends well over half a century. Both these historians have given us extended studies of Cromwell and his time. Both have given us their conclusions upon his character and place in history, and they have been careful to state the evidence on which their conclusions are based. Mr. Belloc is presumably well aware of the incalculable debt we owe to these two men, but in his books under review he makes no acknowledgment of this, and indeed, were it not for a footnote and a casual reference, they might never have existed. In all essential particulars the conclusions of Mr. Belloc (when dealing with the character of Cromwell) are wholly different from those of Gardiner and Firth. We know the Cromwell of Gardiner: "No divinely inspired hero, indeed, or faultless monster, but a brave, honourable man, striving according to his lights to lead his countrymen into the paths of peace and godliness." We know the Cromwell of Firth: "No English ruler did more to shape the future of the land he governed, none showed more clearly in his acts the plain heroic magnitude of mind." Sir Charles Firth quotes Carlyle's conclusion, "Not a man of falsehoods, but a man of truths," and he tells us "subsequent historians and biographers have accepted that conclusion as sound."

In this list of subsequent historians and biographers we have now to include the name of Mr. John Buchan, whose masterly biography of Oliver appeared on September 3rd. Mr. Buchan states his reading of Cromwell is in substance that of Gardiner and Firth. His contribution to Cromwellian biography has been acclaimed everywhere as an outstanding achievement.

Now, however, we have Mr. Belloc's Cromwell (as portrayed in his three books). He makes some general concessions in Oliver's favour. He finds he is no hypocrite, he is simple, sincere and unambitious. These generalities are however made meaningless by the long indictment against Cromwell. Space can be found only for some of the counts. His worst vice was a pleasure in cruelty. He broke faith outrageously, particularly with Papists, and quite especially with Irishmen. He snatched at the crown and withdrew his snatching in terror. His quarrel with Manchester was mainly inspired by the fact that he was a Montagu, a member of the family which had supplanted the Cromwells. Because of this deep-

rooted antagonism Cromwell hounded Manchester out of the Parliamentary Army. He contrived the Self-Denying Ordinance in order to jockey a rival out of the supreme command, and at the same time succeeded in his design to keep his own commission. He was in his last years abnormally nervous through fear of assassination, and in his dread he lost all sense of proportion. Chivalry was certainly abhorrent to him. He juggled with his enemies. When occasion arose he could wheedle, or persuade, or cheat. He played dirty tricks one after another upon his companions, and his very dependants. He laboured to deceive his colleagues by religious eloquence. He used at will dupes or knaves against his fellow-citizens. He laid ambushes, wove plots, and all the while smiled on his victim. He used a humble, candid and devoted follower and adherent to make him an unwilling party to a base treason. His whole public life was a tissue of false declaration, often belied within a few hours. It is true, of course, that not a word he said should be believed merely because he said it. The most obvious truth concerning him is his power of deception, and he practised an unrivalled duplicity.

In setting out these counts of the indictment (a few of many) I have been careful to adopt Mr. Belloc's own language. The epithets are his and not mine. Mr. Belloc is specific in his instances of Cromwell's "lies." He lied in his letters describing the fight near Grantham, and the battles of Marston Moor and Naseby. He lied in his conversation with the King after Cornet Joyce's intervention. He lied in his assurances to Parliament when difficulties arose in the Army, and when he professed to abhor the very idea of Charles being put to death. He probably lied in his testimony against Manchester after the Battle of Newbury, and lied again when he took refuge from the storm aroused by Manchester's counter-accusations. He was possibly lying when he told his second Parliament in April 1657 of his conversation with John Hampden in the early stages of the war, when he insisted on the need of "such men as had the fear of God before them, and made some conscience of what they did." This catalogue of Cromwell's falsehoods and dissimulations will be generally familiar to those who have read Heath's *Flagellum* and the scurrilities of Restoration writers, but Mr. Belloc now and again adds a touch of his own to the Restoration portrait. He makes it clear also that in his list of offences he has

selected "but a few salient points taken at random. One could make a list of a hundred."

The main basis for Mr. Belloc's charge of duplicity, falsehood, cunning and dissimulation is Cromwell's alleged plot to bring about the King's death. The plot is Mr. Belloc's main theme. He propounds the question. "At what date did Cromwell determine to kill the King?" That, he says, is the capital question, and he uses italics to emphasise its importance. Mr. Belloc, in one of his books, seems to put the date of this decision in May 1647, that being the time when "Cromwell made his speech to dupe the Parliament." In his last book he appears to have revised his opinion, and he puts the critical date in October 1647, or, at the latest, early in November. Charles was not brought to trial until January 1649. Mr. Belloc concludes that the Cromwell plot was a "long business of eighteen months or more, indeed nearly two years." During this interval Cromwell is presented to us as the arch-conspirator. The King is at Hampton Court under the control of the Army, and his gaoler is Colonel Whalley, a cousin and creature of Cromwell. Cromwell decides that Charles must be incited to escape and lured away to the Isle of Wight where the Governor of the island, Robert Hammond, is (wonderful to relate) another cousin and creature of Cromwell. He must be induced to escape at the right time and, having escaped, must be persuaded to fly in the right direction, but he and his friends must not suspect that the inducement comes from Cromwell. Quite unaware that they were acting under the control of Cromwell's power of suggestion, Charles and his friends do just what he desires. The King passes out of the control of one cousin and creature at Hampton Court into the control of another cousin and creature at the Isle of Wight, and there he is to be kept under the right control until "he is ripe for the axe." Whilst the plans are maturing Parliament and people must be deceived by speeches leading them to think that Cromwell had friendly intentions towards his victim. If the Parliamentary majority proves hostile to his design they must be wheedled and cajoled until they can be got rid of. If the soldiers become impatient they must be cozened and managed lest the intended murder, taking place too soon, should give rise to a dangerous Royalist reaction. If Colonel Hammond (Cromwell's cousin and creature) proves uncertain or refractory he must be soothed

and duped until the moment has come to strike. As Mr. Belloc watches the development of the plot he is moved to admiration. Again and again he eulogises the skill of the careful manœuvre, the unceasing vigilance, the patience with which Cromwell carries out his design, retreating when retreat is necessary, watching for the crisis and then striking not a moment too soon, not a moment too late. All the while he dissimulates, plays the part of a moderate, masks his real intention, and is all things to all men. Reading Mr. Belloc's story one almost comes to share his admiration for all the cunning and skill.

Unfortunately for Mr. Belloc it is not history. The Plot, as he describes it, did not exist. He has chosen to make the Plot the central feature of his representation of Cromwell. He speaks of "the all important test of Cromwell, his negotiations with Charles Stuart, his manœuvres for the putting of that King to death." The Plot theory is rejected by every historian since the contemporary records became fully available and is contradicted by the evidence.

Not only has Mr. Belloc chosen to make the non-existent Plot the very centre of his presentation of Cromwell, but he has also chosen to base his Plot on the assertion that Cromwell, in pursuance of his plan to murder the King, induced him to escape from Hampton Court and to take refuge in the Isle of Wight.

Let us recall the facts. Charles is in the custody of the Army at Hampton Court. Early in November 1647 the Leveller movement amongst the troops causes unrest. Some extremists are calling for the King's death. Cromwell writes to Whalley warning him of these dangers and urging him to strengthen his guard. This letter Whalley shows to the King. About this time the King receives an anonymous letter advising him of his danger. On November 11th, Charles escapes, accompanied by Legge, Ashburnham and Berkeley, and after certain adventures, reaches Carisbrooke three days later.

Mr. Belloc's case against Cromwell may be summarised in the following sentences. He decided that Charles should escape from Hampton Court and go to the Isle of Wight. He made Whalley a party to his designs. He incited the soldiers to frighten the King by calling for his death. He writes a fraudulent letter to Whalley which was intended to provoke the King's fears. He probably writes the anonymous letter

informing the King of the danger of his assassination. He induces Whalley to leave unguarded the place from which Charles can most easily make his escape. He somehow dupes Ashburnham (a loyal servant to the King) to shepherd his master into the Isle of Wight. He probably arranges with Hammond for the King's reception in the Island where he is to be held until he is "ripe for the axe."

For no one of these propositions does Mr. Belloc offer any credible evidence, and not one of them will stand investigation. They rest upon hearsay, conjecture and imagination. They are disproved in material points by the direct and written statements of Ashburnham, Berkeley, Hammond and the King himself. They are rejected by Gardiner, Firth, Masson, Trevelyan, Buchan and the writers in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, *The Cambridge Modern History* and the *Political History of England*. The Carisbrooke trap theory, although accepted by Marvell and many of his contemporaries, is rejected by every historian who has had the opportunity of consulting all the records now available. Gardiner indeed dismisses this trap theory with the words that it is "too absurd to need refutation." Every historian lays special emphasis on the fact that the Scottish Commissioners were in close touch with Charles at Hampton Court in October and November, pledging the support of Scotland and urging him to escape from the control of the Army. The memoirs of Berkeley show how important a factor the Scottish advice was in the mind of Ashburnham and the King. This factor apparently does not count with Mr. Belloc. To admit this evidence would destroy his case built up upon guesswork and theory.

All the evidence is of course available to Mr. Belloc as to the other writers. I cannot recall that, except in one instance, he quotes any evidence not dealt with by them. That exception is important. Mr. Belloc states that on December 16th, 1647, that is four weeks after Charles came to Carisbrooke, Cromwell himself arrived at the Isle of Wight and remained there until December 23rd. Mr. Belloc attaches much importance to this alleged visit. He came, we are told, to make "as certain as he could by personal contact that 'dear Robin' would not fail him." "Dear Robin" is Hammond. This visit of Cromwell to the island, extending over eight days, is not mentioned by any one of the other historians. It may be

that their silence is attributable to the fact that the visit never happened. Mr. Belloc says he remained there until December 23rd. He gives us no authority and quotes no reference. It can, however, be proved that during part of the time of this supposed visit, Cromwell was at Windsor at the Army Headquarters. Mr. Belloc's admiration for Cromwell's dissimulation knows no bounds, but when it leads him to show us Cromwell by the side of the uncertain Hammond in the Isle of Wight at the same time as he was undoubtedly at Windsor his enthusiasm goes too far. The theory of Cromwell's double life need not surely justify a belief in his ubiquity. Even the hero-worshippers with all their deplorable "mental gymnastics" have never contrived to put their man in two places at the same time.

Mr. Belloc commences his last book with a lofty gesture. He makes claims, which had they been made by a less distinguished writer, would have been regarded as arrogant. Denouncing the myth of other historians he has based his whole presentation of Cromwell on a myth. Having formed a theory he selects only the evidence favourable to his case, and the great body of evidence contrary to his conjecture is either dismissed or ignored. The three books are full of interest in their revelation of Mr. Belloc. As a revelation of "the real Cromwell" they might as well never have been written.

ISAAC FOOT.

THE FUTURE OF MINORITIES.

THE protest against the Minority Treaties made by Poland at the meeting of the League of Nations Assembly on September 13th, and at the session of the Sixth or Political Commission of the League a week later, emphasised by refusal to recognise the League's right to interfere further in her internal affairs, has given another shock to a Continent which now for twenty years has known neither tranquillity nor a sense of security. Speaking for Great Britain on the earlier occasion Sir John Simon vigorously contested the idea that multilateral treaties could be annulled by the will of a single signatory State, and the representatives of France and Italy less warmly endorsed that, the only possible rejoinder to the Polish claim. None the less, the British Foreign Secretary himself entered equally dangerous ground when he suggested that the continued application of the Minority Treaties did not rule out their modification to suit altered circumstances, and even allowed Poland's spokesman to understand that accommodation in that kind was feasible.

The episode is important as bringing to light once again the singular conceptions on the subject of the sanctity of international engagements which appear to prevail in some of the new States whose creation was one of the results of the Great War. While, however, it is disconcerting and ludicrously inconsistent that so abrupt an attempt to invalidate and disown treaty obligations solemnly entered into should be made by a Government which for fifteen years has never ceased to declare that not a jot or tittle of the Treaty of Versailles can be either expunged or varied, it is a fact of greater moment that there has been presented to the late Allied and Associated Powers and the Arcopagus of Geneva a problem the handling of which will prove a severe test of their statesmanship and the sincerity of their will for justice and harmony.

The kernel of the Polish Government's case is its contention that the limitation of the Minority Treaty obligations to the new and enlarged States, leaving the older States free from any sort of interference by the League of Nations, is invidious, unfair, and contrary to the principle of equality which is implicit in the League's Covenant. It holds, therefore, that these stipulations should apply generally or not at all, and by way of proving that it means what it says it has

given formal notice that unless and until minority protection under the supervision of the League applies all round it will refuse to co-operate further with international organisations—by which must be understood not only the League of Nations and its commissions and other agencies, but presumably the international judiciary at The Hague also—in giving effect to such protection in the Polish republic.

To recall a few facts relating to the origin of the Minority Treaties will make clear the wide scope and the gravity of the issue which has thus been raised. Incidentally it will also show that the idea of generalising measures of minority protection is not new. President Wilson, in that capacious bag of good resolutions and laudable intentions with which he crossed the Atlantic in December 1918, brought the outline of legislation for minorities far more generous than that which was eventually embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the minority conventions. The third draft of the League's constitution as he designed it stipulated that the Executive Council should

"exact of all States seeking admission to the League the promise to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and fact, that is accorded to the racial or national majority of their people," and further that "the contracting Powers agree, and the League shall exact from all new States and all States seeking admission to it the promise that they will make no law prohibiting and interfering with the free exercise of religion, and that they will in no way discriminate, either in law or fact, against those who practise any particular creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals."

When it came to the point, however, the European Great Powers, though ready enough to impose minority stipulations upon the smaller States, rejected Wilson's very modest proposals to restrict likewise their right to "do what they liked with their own." The later proposals of the German Government, as contained in its letter of May 9th, 1919, to the Allied and Associated Powers, would similarly have made the protection of minorities a "special object" and duty of the League, and they had also the merit that the conditions to be laid down were to apply to all affiliated States alike, but the letter was ignored. To the subsequent German claim

that cultural economy should be granted to all the national minorities which were to pass under French, Belgian, Danish, Polish, Czech, and Lithuanian sovereignty owing to annexations of territory the Allied Powers replied (June 16th) that they would only accord guarantees, under the protection of the League of Nations, for the educational, religious, and cultural rights of the minorities to be transferred to new States. Their own minorities were to be refused such protection: it was premature as yet to make the world too safe for democracy.

The first of the Minority Treaties was that which Poland was required to conclude with the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan as a prior condition of their recognition of her as a sovereign, independent State. How important the Powers regarded that treaty is proved not only by the elaborate system of protective stipulations and guarantees which it embodies, but by the carefully worded justification of its necessity which is contained in their letter of June 24th to the Polish President. After citing precedents, including that of the Treaty of Berlin, the letter continued:

"The . . . Powers are of opinion that they would be false to the responsibility which rests upon them if on this occasion they departed from what has become an established tradition. . . . It is to the endeavours and sacrifices of the Powers that the Polish nation owes the recovery of its independence. . . . There rests, therefore, upon these Powers an obligation, which they cannot evade, to secure *in the most permanent and solemn form* guarantees for certain essential rights which will afford to the inhabitants the necessary protection, whatever changes may take place in the internal constitution of the Polish State."

In order to make more impressive this assertion of their "obligation," the Powers inserted in the Treaty of Versailles a clause (93) by which Poland formally "accepted and agreed to" the embodiment in a separate treaty of "such provisions as might in their opinion be necessary in order to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion." That treaty was duly signed on July 28th, and the reader who is concerned to know how comprehensive and weighty its stipulations are is strongly advised to read its twenty articles. Three years later Poland entered into a special and very far-

going convention on the same subject with Germany relating to Upper Silesia. So determined were the Powers at that time that the minority rights stipulated in their treaty with Poland should be faithfully observed, that the rights were declared to constitute "obligations of international concern," they were placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations, they might not be modified by Polish law or by the League itself except with the assent of a majority of the Council, and every member of the latter body was given the right to invoke action by his colleagues in the event of either actual or threatened default. Further than that it was hardly possible to bind a treaty-signing State. One must also believe that the Polish Government itself then seriously intended to fulfil its pledges, since most of the minority stipulations were embodied in the national constitution of March 17th, 1921.

But in their concern for minorities the Powers did not stop at Poland. With modifications suited to the circumstances similar provisions were introduced into treaties with Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, Greece, and in 1923 with Turkey; while the Declarations made to the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva by representatives of Albania (1921), Lithuania (1922), Latvia (1923), and Estonia (1923) were to the same effect. In the case of Lithuania, whose minority obligations relate almost exclusively to inhabitants of Memel Land, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan explicitly transferred the latter territory to the sovereignty of the Lithuanian republic subject to the conditions as to good government and minority protection stipulated in the Memel Statute, and like Danzig the territory was put directly under the League of Nations.

The important fact to which the foregoing exposition points is that the obligations imposed on the States to which alien populations were assigned have a four-fold validity and force, since they were undertaken vis-à-vis the national minorities themselves, the States whose territories were annexed, the Allied and Associated Powers, and the League of Nations. Any adequate consideration of the question how far the guaranteed obligations have been fulfilled would require a separate article, and a brief reference to Poland must suffice. Here I will quote Polish testimony. In no part of the republic is the protection of minorities so efficient on paper as in the annexed eastern part of Upper Silesia. Yet not long ago, in

surveying the measures adopted for "polonising" that region, the *Gazeta Polska* of Warsaw boasted that the "historical process" had exceeded all expectations, inasmuch that the German population had been reduced to about one-fifth of its former number, and it explained that this result had been obtained by expropriating the large German landowners and dividing their estates into small holdings settled by Polish cultivators, and by a systematic policy of proselytism carried on in the schools. By these and other measures, it said, that part of Upper Silesia had become more Polish since the peace than it had been made German by two centuries of Prussian rule. What the Ukrainians of Poland have suffered and still suffer the records of the League of Nations only too painfully tell. But Poland is not the only defaulter, for the same story of broken pledges has to be told of other States created or enlarged by the peace treaties, though of several better things might have been hoped.

However imperfectly it may have been applied, however it is the validity of this body of minority stipulations, all guaranteed by international treaties, that is now called in question. For if Poland obtained release from any of her obligations, even to the extent of exemption from League of Nations supervision, two results would inevitably follow: all the other States similarly bound by treaties or declarations would advance the same claim—in some cases with greater justification than Poland—and sooner or later minority protection would cease to exist, and in not a few European States in which alien populations are fated to live the malignant spirit of intolerant nationalism would not be appeased until the last traces of their racial and cultural individuality had been stamped out.

What shall be done to avert the cruel fate which menaces millions of hapless "strangers in strange lands"? Here is a dangerous opportunity for the exercise of the subtle cynicism which seems to be inseparable from diplomacy and in these days, more or less, from ordinary politics. Unfortunately the past record of the League of Nations, still dominated as it is by Governments—our own not excluded—which hitherto have shown a remarkable capacity for evading big and difficult questions, and fobbing on the world petty achievements calling for the exercise of little moral courage and entailing no risks to political reputations, is not reassuring. It is

regrettable that the attitude adopted from the first by the League Council has leaned less towards the suffering minorities than to the suzerain Governments. This attitude, which an earlier British Foreign Secretary specially sponsored, is dictated by the assumption that the minorities which have been divorced from their true fatherlands, and hence from associations the most precious and sacred in life, must not be regarded as "communities created in the midst of nations, yet perpetually alien to their national life." (I quote the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain as spoken at Geneva.) But why not? By what right are these minorities bidden to be what nature and nature's Maker never intended them to be, and what all the best and strongest of them are determined that they never will be? If natural rights exist at all, the most elementary of them is the right of men and women to breathe spiritually their native air—in other words, to live the life, think the thoughts, share the culture, and cherish the aspirations of the race and folk to which they belong. Most rightly do these minorities repudiate a forced nationality which is to them an imposition and a hypocrisy, and no serious headway will be made with the solution of this problem until we face that stubborn fact.

The source and origin of the minority difficulty must be sought in the worship of the archaic fetish of the so-called "national State," and the baneful egoisms, arrogance, and exaggerated claims to which the adherents of that cult are prone. The conception of nationalism in itself should not be saddled with the blame, for let cosmopolitan ideologists talk as they will of the coming of the "Parliament of man and the federation of the world," they will never destroy the persistent faith in nationalism as one of the most powerful stimuli to human progress. I have elsewhere called it "the principle of specialisation applied to the most important of sciences, civilisation"; and who can count the number or measure the value of the contributions which it has made to that progress? The sentiment and spirit of nationalism may be an inspiration to as great achievements in the future as in the past, and all the more in proportion as they are humanised, refined, and emptied as far as may be of selfishness. The consciousness of belonging heart and soul to one dear land rather than to any other part of the world gives to every man of normal instincts and emotions a satisfaction and a pride which belong to the

greater values of life, and to deny to others the same satisfaction and pride is a crime against the human spirit.

So long, therefore, as the minority problem remains with us, a fertile cause of aggravation and bitterness to the victims of intolerance and of friction and antagonism between nations, it should be the duty and desire of all good citizens to do all that is possible to decrease the number of the sufferers by bold and large-hearted measures of redress and readjustment, and simultaneously to prevent new additions by preventing new wars of conquest. It is from this standpoint that the solution of the minority must be approached if it is to be based on moral principles and so to count on permanence; and the action of Poland will not be altogether regrettable if it should force Governments, statesmen, and political thinkers everywhere to exercise themselves upon this question with a new ardour and determination to find a way or ways out of the present *impasse*. It is to be feared that the principal obstacle will prove to be less the obstinacy of Poland and the other States against which fifteen years ago the Allied Powers, unfairly as they maintain, discriminated in the matter of minority protection, than reluctance on the part of these Powers to "do as they would be done by." Poland's claim, that if obligations and regulations and League of Nations' supervision are to apply at all they should apply all round, is perfectly just, and having been so seriously pressed it is impossible to believe that it will be withdrawn. Will not the authors of the Minority Treaties show magnanimity, pocket their dignity and pride, and accept gracefully the restrictions which they were so ready to impose on other States? By so doing they would gain in respect and confidence, remove from the minor nations the sense of inferiority, and give a great impetus to the amelioration of the status of minority populations everywhere.

It remains only to add suggestions as to three directions in which, given a united will to attack this problem earnestly and boldly, the greatest of all existing menaces to European peace might be averted.

1. In the case of the new and enlarged States there should be an equitable revision of frontiers wherever it can be shown to be expedient and possible, to be effected without undue delay by agreement, so avoiding the risk of later revision as the result of war. The urgent need of the moment is the

creation of a body of international opinion sufficiently representative and strong to force this aspect of the question upon the League of Nations as a first step to practical action. It is a hopeful fact that in more than one country from which sacrifice would be expected there is already readiness to negotiate on the subject.

2. As complementary to frontier revisions the policy of the exchange of alien populations should be adopted on the largest possible scale. Here Greece and Turkey have set an example, proving that such an exchange need involve no insurmountable difficulties. The reader must be referred to the text of the Lausanne Treaty of January 30th, 1923, for the details of this notable experiment, by which 189,916 Greeks were transplanted from Turkey to Greece and 355,635 Moslems from Greece to Turkey.

3. Even when everything possible has been done for the reduction of minorities by the measures just indicated many alien populations of large or small extent will remain, and the position of these should be alleviated by conferring upon them autonomy in everything that relates to their civil, cultural, and religious life. The qualifications for this status would naturally be determined by various factors, such as the size of the minority relatively to the aggregate population of the country affected, its incidence, i.e. whether centralised or widely dispersed, financial resources, etc., and on the requisition of a prescribed proportion of its members any minority duly complying with the statutory conditions should be entitled to be constituted an autonomous community and endowed with large rights of self-determination. In the formulation of these rights the guiding idea should be to make the country of adoption as much as possible a congenial "home from home" for the unwilling aliens. Perhaps the position of foreigners resident in any civilised country at the present time, or better still of the members of the international bureaucracy of the League of Nations at Geneva, will best suggest the status which should be given to these communities.

Here again it is possible to point to precedents, both old and recent. Some such autonomy as is here envisaged was conferred upon the colonies of English and Scottish nationals which settled in Danzig, Elbing, Königsberg and other seaport towns of Eastern Germany from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries forward. Although drawn to that European

Ultima Thule by the glamour of commerce and gold, they clung tenaciously to their national habits, forms of religion, and institutions, and their hosts did not grudge them the needed facilities.

Are we not civilised enough to emulate that chivalrous example? To its great credit the new Baltic republic of Estonia; the smallest of the new States, has answered that question for itself affirmatively. Its Autonomy Law of February 5th, 1925, gave to racial minorities of a specified size the right of self-government in relation to matters affecting culture, religion, and social welfare generally. The minorities recognised are the German, Swedish, and Russian populations and others comprising not less than 3,000 persons, and the Germans and the Jews have exercised their right. It might be more difficult for States of great area and population to experiment on these lines than it has been for Estonia, but only a statesmanship poverty-stricken in ideas, resource, and imagination will contend that it is impracticable. Latvia has legislated on somewhat narrower lines.

Those who contend that such measures as these latter would constitute a dangerous invasion of political sovereignty, create States within States, and weaken the cohesion of great empires, need not be anxious. They would upset nothing that is fit to stand, and weaken no political institution or doctrine which has not in itself the germs of decay. That they would strike a blow at the spirit of domination, which is of the essence of our egoistic nationalisms, may be admitted, but until that curse has been destroyed all the efforts of all the peace organisations in the world will be so much futile beating of the air. Not domination, which derived from Rome and now for the good of mankind is going the way of Rome, but permeation holds for the future the secret of true national greatness and worth and power—permeation as exemplified by the gracious influence of Hellenism in the intellectual and spiritual life of the modern world, and (we may say it to ourselves, but not to others) in no small degree by the peaceful penetration of the best of our English ideas in its cultural and political life. Military empires rise, fall, and pass away: only empire of the spirit can defy decay and the inexorable flight of time.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND THE EXERCISE OF FORCE.

THE present world-situation is not only highly dangerous to civilisation, but is strikingly contradictory. On the one hand, the desire for peace, at all events for the present, is almost universal. It has led, not only to the institution of the League of Nations, but to the almost universal acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Yet, on the other hand, fear, the sense of humiliation, especially in Germany, and the unsatisfied needs of populations lead to widespread apprehensions of war, and to preparations for it. The war-spirit must be aroused, here and there, in order to make nations willing, or even eager, to bear the disastrous burdens of these preparations. The stimulation of this spirit is now, as it has always been, the standing resource of dictators, whose utterances seek alternately to rouse the fighting instincts of their supporters and then to allay the fears which they have thereby created.

From all these causes has come the revival of an excessive nationalism, which contradicts the ideals, hinders the success and disparages the work of the League of Nations. This excessive nationalism, accompanied by the pressure of economic needs, has led to the adoption of short-sighted, and eventually futile, measures to secure national self-sufficiency in the economic realm and guarantees of safety by sectional alliances. Over against this disastrous policy stands the persistent endeavour of the League of Nations to secure the conditions of universal peace and progress by co-operative guarantees, arrived at by the counsels of wisdom and goodwill, to be made effective, should necessity arise, by the use of various sanctions, and, in the last resort, of co-operative force against aggressive and recalcitrant states.

Thus the present situation is, at once, a contradiction in terms and, what is more serious, a psychological conflict between the spirit of man and the realities, both material and social, which condition not only the well-being but even the existence of his civilisation. The conditions of modern life have made mankind fundamentally one and the nations universally interdependent. The material means of immediate and universal fellowship that applied science has

brought into existence are so compelling and insistent as to demand an adequate spiritual response to them, if even the material welfare of nations is to be secured, and still more if the higher values of mankind are to be realised. Failing this response, even the material advantages of human life will become destructive to civilisation, and eventually fatal to human life. The closeness of contacts and the immediate information as to events and emergencies, which raise not merely local but universal problems, have created throughout the world an awareness, a sensitiveness, and an apprehensiveness which are positively dangerous unless mankind can be raised to the level of a truly catholic outlook and sympathy. In view of the existing failure of mankind to respond to the dominant facts and conditions of human existence, the declaration "Ye must be born again" is as applicable to nations as to individuals.

The ideal of catholicity first became effective by the rise and spread of the Christian religion. It finds a welcome in the hearts of multitudes both within and without the Christian Church. The civilising influences of Christianity throughout the ages bear witness to its energy and efficacy whenever and wherever this spirit has prevailed. It has still its formal witness and embodiment in the Catholic Church. Yet the Romanising of Western Christianity, with all its consequences, has wellnigh destroyed its uplifting and redemptive significance, so far as the nations and human life as a whole are concerned. Only by evoking the free spirit of man, inspired by the spirit of Christ and directed thereby to the advancement of mankind as a whole, can true catholicity prevail. The sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular, the narrow institutionalism, the subdual of the human spirit to absolute authority and external regulation, have gone far to extinguish the hope of mankind in the Church, because of its suppression of much that is essential to true catholicity.

In these circumstances it is not only inevitable but obligatory that all Christians who seek to live after the mind of Christ should face the world-situation; especially that they should consider what should be their attitude to war, and by what policy they may best promote its total abolition. When the generous, but impulsive, enthusiasm of youth rebels against the horror and the futility of war, it behoves the Church, as a whole, and individual Christians to face the

problem. Nor is it surprising that some Christian ministers in this country, and some thousands of Christian ministers in America, have declared outright that they will take no part in any future war.

In considering this question, however, it is needful to make the necessary effort of "thinking together." There is need to take a comprehensive and consistent view of evolution and history. This must include an examination of the part that force has played in the process and progress of mankind, including the consideration of its permanent function in upholding civilised life and maintaining the salutary achievements of the past. Such an examination must, for Christians, be conducted in the light of the authoritative teaching and example of our Lord, with the ideals thus imposed upon His followers.

Our Lord revealed the Divine "Polity" of Heaven, of which, as St. Paul says, Christians are citizens. This polity is transcendent, yet its very nature, as a spiritual experience, demands its manifestation in all the relations of human life. The law of the Spirit is absolute. The new life of the Spirit is Love; with the Righteousness, Truth and Self-control that are essential ingredients of Love. Hence, negatively, the principle incumbent on Christians is "Resist not evil," and positively "Overcome evil with good." Christ was Himself the first martyr to this principle, and His disciples were also to be martyrs to it. They were to be sacrificial witnesses of the new life and way of love. What is binding upon persons is binding upon the community—the Church—to which they belong. Its only legitimate weapon is Love.

Yet our Lord's teaching and example are primarily and explicitly for the new community, the Church and its members. He does not deal with the life of nations, as such, nor with the relations of His followers to nations. Democracy, broadly speaking, was non-existent, and His concern was for the complete fulfilment of the Life of Love in the character and conduct of His followers. The primitive expectation of His early return, if illusory except in the spiritual realm, was beneficial, if not essential, for it created the only condition under which the new life could be manifested without consideration of earthly consequences or earthly connections. Only thus could the Eternal Life of the Spirit be revealed as absolute Truth and final Reality.

Yet the Absolute Truth has, of necessity, been confronted by and entered into the temporal process, which has shaped past history and has presented the actual situation to the successive generations of men. Christians must needs enter into this process and play their part in it. As far as I can see, neither our Lord nor His Apostles left authoritative guidance for the juncture between the absolute and the relative, between the Eternal and the Process, between the life of the Church and the civilisation of mankind. The nearest approach to such guidance is to be found in the Parable of the Leaven. This parable teaches that "the Kingdom of Heaven" has been introduced as a hidden yet diffusive and transforming influence, working secretly but energetically and eventually overcoming the contrariety of the whole meal by the aggressive affinity, which in transforming assimilates it. In this light it would appear that the many-sided problem of the juncture between the Life of the Spirit and Secular Evolution, of which the attitude towards war is so outstanding a part, must be solved, not by express direction, but by the practical promptings of Reason, informed by the mind of Christ.

The problem which Christians have to solve is twofold. It is both subjective and objective, both spiritual and historical. On the one hand, they have to decide how the mind of Christ can be most completely manifested and brought to bear upon the affairs of the world, as the only sufficient remedy for the spiritual evils of mankind. On the other hand, they have to envisage the actual world-situation in all the complexity of its factors, deeply rooted in history and in human nature, and ask themselves in each emergency by what line of conduct the Divine purpose, which is being manifested in human history, can at the moment best be forwarded and most effectually saved from events that would thwart or hinder it. The unification of these two concerns, while ultimately attainable, is not at present as simple as some pacifists assume. That the use of force has in past history been ruled, or overruled, by God to the advancement of mankind appears to be unquestionable. For example, Christian apologists are accustomed to point to the preparation for Christ that was brought about both by the spread of the Greek language and literature, and subsequently by Roman civilisation. They are obviously right in this

contention, for without both these influences catholicity alike as an ideal and as a fact would have been impossible. The universalism of Christianity assumed both Greek culture and Roman government as its instruments. Yet both of these would have been non-existent, as far as we can see, had it not been for the conquests of Alexander and of Rome. Even the hateful tyranny of Assyria and Babylon was made the means of carrying forward the spiritual reaction which, through the prophets, saints and heroes of Israel, gave to mankind the noble Theism upon which Christianity itself is based. Indeed the whole course of history went to supply the inspiration of Abraham Lincoln's glorious Gettysburg Address. This background has to be taken into account in forming a sound judgment as to the tasks and duties of the present age. God, we may conclude, has combined the absolute with the relative throughout the chequered progress of mankind.

A survey of the whole situation appears, to me at least, to lead to the following conclusions :

1. Force, as we term it, has from the Creation been an activity of Nature, and has been supplied by Nature to mankind. This fact must be borne in mind by Christians lest they fall into Manichæan Dualism.

2. Men have, from the beginning, been endowed with a measure of force in order that they may come to themselves over against Nature. Without this primitive endowment, for protection and advance, mankind would have perished at the start.

3. Yet the Force supplied by Nature to man was totally inadequate. In so far as mere Force is concerned, man is among the most helpless of the animals. This comparative helplessness provoked and evoked the activity of reason and understanding. It fostered the development of human fellowship, with its social order and its morality. In short, helplessness was the price of manhood.

4. The advent and progress of civilisation has led not to the exclusion but to the ever-extending subordination and utilisation of Force. By means of this progress man has so appropriated and transformed the natural Forces that were originally over against him that they have become incorporated with him as instruments for strengthening and extending the effectiveness of his will for all the purposes of human life.

5. Hence the essential meaning of human progress is simply the ever-increasing ascendancy of Reason, Morality, and, therefore, of Fellowship over Force.

6. Thus, as the community life of mankind has developed, the use of Force has been subdued and organised until it has been limited to police and protection. The process of well-ordered social and national life has been to substitute the exercise of goodwill and the persuasion of Reason, with its considerateness of general rights and needs, for Coercion. Coercion, however, remains as the last resort for securing the good of the community as a whole.

7. This means the ever-increasing moralising of Force by the sense and practice of community.

8. Clearly mankind has now reached an epoch when this sense and practice of community should become universal in spiritual response to the material environment by which human life is by this time conditioned as an organic whole, to the subordination even of national particularism. The exercise of Force, save as Police and Protection, is a manifest contradiction of the outstanding fact and truth of human community. It is, therefore, both criminal and futile.

9. It follows that Christians, and indeed all men of goodwill, are called to wage a ceaseless crusade in order to establish this sense and practice of universal community, with all its consequences in every sphere of life. They must so cultivate their own sense of this community as to further all wise endeavours of every kind to promote the fellowship of mankind in mutual understanding and in collective efforts to advance all the highest values of human life. It goes without saying, therefore, that they must ceaselessly support the League of Nations, as the indispensable instrument of this community, and must antagonise the fears, the resentments, and the sectional ambitions, or even needs, that weaken the force of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Not only must international hatreds be exorcised, but appreciation of other nations must supersede, not only enmity, but the prejudices of pride and strangeness. The watchword of Christians should be that of St. Paul, who, speaking after the manner of men, declared "the times of this ignorance God winked at, but now He commandeth all men to repent"—that is so entirely to remodel their spirit and conduct as to make them correspond with the realities of the Kingdom of God.

It is in the light of all these considerations that, as it appears to me, Christians must decide their personal attitude towards war. Aggressive warfare they must absolutely withstand. In the case of defensive war, or of warfare in fulfilment of trusts, liberty of conscience must prevail. Until a consensus of conviction can be reached each must decide for himself how best the mind of Christ may be so applied to the exigencies of mankind that the purpose of God, who "wills fellowship," as the Lambeth Conference declared, may be advanced. This liberty of conscience should be respected in view not only of past history but of present responsibilities. The ideal of a martyr nation is not so simple as some Christians assume. Presumably each nation stands, not merely for material existence which might be renounced, but for Values and Trusts, which should be preserved and fulfilled in the interest not only of the particular nation but of the well-being of mankind as a whole. The governing principle of each Christian should be simply how the mind of Christ may be most effectively applied in asserting and making good the Commonwealth of Mankind, with the consequence of converting the exercise of Force, whether military or economic (which latter may, indeed, be as deadly as actual slaughter), to the police and protection of this Universal Commonwealth.

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work of pure humanity. At the right moment it gave to a Europe ready to receive it a compendium of the methods of the "Third Reich." The failure of the second volume of the *Brown Book* might have been foreseen by people who know how to read the signs of the times. Moral indignation is always a transient emotion, and it is not prolonged by the piling up of fresh material. What Europe now wants, above all the youth of Europe, is political guidance. Everything else seems to them, whether rightly or wrongly, nothing but empty talk. The interest of the outside world in the political developments of Nazi Germany is very great, and is proved by the steadily rising flood of books dealing with this theme published in England.

But instead of guidance the *émigrés* in Paris are editing a little book, *Naziführer sehen Dich an* (Nazi leaders look at you), as foolish and full of mistakes as if it had emanated from the people against whom it is directed. The demagoguery of the *Gegenangriff* is inspired by the demagoguery of National Socialism. National Socialism won its way to power by the method: what cannot be proved must be asserted. Its banal and brutal ideology gave every help to success. The editors of the *Gegenangriff* seem to forget that they only appeal to readers who can be convinced by reason alone. They forget that their own Marxist ideology is incomprehensible, not because of its intrinsic difficulty, but because it is too enveloped in a cloud of involved phraseology to make an impression on readers who have still to be won. Many people who were already won over have now been lost again because they are disappointed in men who seem not to understand what they are preaching. The political short-sightedness of the German Communist Party, despite all previous experiences, has been shown by their behaviour in the Saar question, the crux of European politics at the present moment. Surely the obvious course would have been to strengthen the anti-fascist front, that is, to support those who have made up their minds to vote for the *status quo*. What were the feelings of the most simple-minded novice in politics this summer when he read in his *Gegenangriff* that this paper, together with the central committee of the German Communist Party, puts forward the watchword: the Red Saar, something not submitted to the vote. Every vote cast for this phantom would be a vote for the "German Front" of National Socialist Fascism. It was a

long time before the central committee recommended a change of tactics, and supported the *status quo*. It is not yet possible to estimate the effect of this blindness on certain sections of the workers.

Not that the German Communist Party has had no critics amongst its members. On the contrary, both at the meeting of the Executive of the Third International and at the meeting of the chairmen of this Executive there was much plain speaking. The reproaches levelled at the German delegates for their failure to produce the "subjective conditions" for revolutions (i.e. revolutionary leaders) were such as might have been raised by any political opponent. Among the points mentioned were the petty jealousies among the *émigrés*, which led to entrusting more or less important jobs to men and women totally unfitted for such responsibility, the ineptitude of the communists in their dealings with the social democratic working men and the middle-class intellectuals. On these and other points good advice was proffered as to how things might be better managed.

The world's Press in general pays no attention to all these questions which agitate the communist movement. Possibly in this indifference there lurks the mistaken prejudice of the war and post-war years, that there is no need to learn the language of the "enemy." But in reality it is very necessary to learn this language. The relation between the communist sections of the different countries and the Third International is of present importance, firstly, because the summons has been issued for a congress of all sections of the Third International, secondly, because the leadership of the Third International is in the hands of the man who, as General Secretary of the Russian Communist Party, is in reality, if not in form, the leader of the Soviet Union. This personal union is fraught with possible consequences for the future history of Europe, greater than might be guessed from the lack of attention paid to it in the Press.

Even if one is not a member of the Communist Party it is still possible from the pronouncements of the Third International and the reactions of the separate sections to these pronouncements to form some idea of its policy. On the other hand it is a more delicate problem to assess the degree in which the future line of action of the Third International will be determined by the domestic problems of the U.S.S.R.

which since January 1933 has been the largest communist section outside Russia.

From the standpoint of political education this uncertainty was more damaging than any straightforward folly. If the Third International continued to demand that the workers of all lands should go on fighting for the socialist fatherland of all workers, the policy of this fatherland, riddled by the criticism of the Social Democratic Party, failed to convince the masses of its genuineness as a "fatherland," and of its desire to bring about in other countries the conditions which made it the "fatherland of all workers." In Germany the opinion gained ground that the more loudly the bureaucrats of the Third International trumpeted their revolutionary slogans the less they really intended to put their ideas into practice in the various European countries. The good relations between the Soviet Union and Fascist Italy had for years caused considerable reflection in certain communist sections. The pact policy has lent a new significance to this fact. A further and even more significant fact in respect of the connection between Soviet foreign policy and the Third International is the relation between Russia and Bulgaria. For years Russia's relations with Bulgaria had been bad. After the recent *coup d'état* which gave Bulgaria a Fascist régime, the relations utterly changed. The Soviet Government may say, as they did in respect of France, that it was not they who had changed their point of view, but the other countries. The fact remains that every pact needs two partners. In all these cases the objective observer cannot but note that the identity of the Third International and the Soviet régime produces stresses which must necessarily weaken the Communist Party of other countries. High functionaries of the Third International, for instance Pjatnitzki and Knorin, openly confess this. At the above-mentioned meeting of the Executive of the Third International in the beginning of this year, attention was drawn to the fact that workers who leave the social democratic trade unions do not join the communists, and some weeks ago the German communists were accused of not having made propaganda among the lower middle classes and the peasantry.

Till now efforts were directed towards forming the united front from below. That is to say, the Communist Party was to win the social democratic worker, while at the same time

attacking the Social Democratic Party. Now all at once the Third International makes a *volte-face*. For years the greatest counter-revolutionary sin was to advocate collaboration with the Social Democratic Party. Now this collaboration is demanded. Russia has entered the League of Nations: the Third International longs to co-operate with the Second International. This is the significance of the invitation issued by certain communist groups to the social democrats of their own countries. Of course this policy is most important for Germany, where National Socialism only succeeded because there was no united anti-fascist front. The Moscow leaders would certainly never have resolved on such a decisive course if they had not known that the Communist Party alone would never succeed in overthrowing Hitler. The treatment of the socialist workers by the communists despite the expressed intention to win them over, the lack of understanding for the intelligentsia, the short-sighted neglect of problems of education, culture, etc., which exposed communism to the attacks of Hitler's "Kulturpropaganda," have at last convinced the leaders of the Third International that Hitler cannot be overthrown by the single efforts of the Communist Party. The communist call for a united front is intended to bring about what was expected to take place when Schleicher became Chancellor, namely an alliance between the army and the trade unions. This would entail the resurrection of the German Social Democratic Party, if not in its former shape. That would undoubtedly mean the disappearance of the Communist Party unless the latter takes steps to improve its relations with the Social Democratic Party.

All those who see in a resolute democracy the deliverance not only of Germany must learn of this development. Unless we realise the crisis of democracy there will never be a resurrection of democracy. That is understood by a part of German academic youth which is bitterly disappointed with Hitler and is hesitating between the communism of Trotsky and the "German socialism" of Otto Strasser. In the recently published autobiography of Kerensky, *The Crucifixion of Liberty*, there is expressed the surprising opinion that the attitude of a government to social problems is "irrelevant." Kerensky is, however, right when he says that the measure of the progressiveness and liberalism of a government or a party is its attitude to the freedom and the rights of the individual.

ALBERT MALTE WAGNER.

FORTUNATO AND SOUTHERN ITALY.

CONSTITUER l'Italie, fondre ensemble les éléments divers dont elle se compose, mettre en harmonie le nord et le sud, offre autant de difficulté qu'une guerre avec l'Autriche et la lutte avec Rome. So wrote Cavour on the eve of the opening of Italy's first Parliament. But although he and other leading politicians realised the gravity of the problem awaiting them, no one, in that dawn of national life, understood its true nature. Few Piedmontese statesmen, however much they might have travelled in the principal countries of Europe, had penetrated as far south in Italy even as Florence; while the political exiles who thronged Piedmont naturally looked upon the question as essentially constitutional in character. The Bourbon régime, they reasoned, was the negation of liberty. It oppressed and corrupted the people, who had lived for generations in abject servitude. Once Italy were united and the people educated, the South, so rich in natural resources, would quickly put itself on an equality with the rest of the peninsula.

Unification was achieved; but the reports sent from Naples by the Government representatives betrayed extreme anxiety. The southern provinces, resenting the introduction of conscription and new taxation, were becoming more than ever a prey to brigandage; while the northerners who came down to fill the posts of minor officials were nervous and suspicious of a population that they regarded, in accordance with the current belief, as lazy and corrupt, yet endowed by Nature with intelligence and fertile lands. Thus misunderstanding on both sides only increased the general unrest. Not until after the defeats of Custoza and Lissa was some definite understanding of the problem attempted. For it was in that difficult period—when the nation's faith in the future had become so shaken, and when, in the general economic depression, personal effort seemed confined to personal gain—that a group of young men, all destined to have a considerable share in their country's revival, began their work of preparation. Realising the necessity for the creation of a capable governing class, and the education, moral and technical, of the people, they set to work on a number of problems almost totally ignored by the nation as a whole. Among these the most serious was the question of the South.

Pasquale Villari had said, after the defeat of 1866, that the Italians themselves were Italy's worst enemies; and as though moved by these grave words, Leopoldo Franchetti,* a young man from Leghorn, of Jewish birth, wrote at this time: "If any Italian would learn the true state of his country, let him cease from studying books about it, and let him arise, gird up his loins and go forth to see with his own eyes and hear with his own ears; let him establish facts for himself, and judge whether they bear out the theories of the writers." He himself, after pilgrimages to England, France and Germany, to study their administrative systems, went forth in the autumns of 1873 and 1874 and explored on horseback those mysterious regions of the new Italy—the Abruzzi and the Molise, Calabria and the Basilicata. In 1875 he published his valuable little volume *On the economic and administrative condition of the Neapolitan provinces*, which reveals, amidst a wealth of data set down in a spirit untouched by class or party prejudice, that deep feeling of pity for the tragic rural population which was to be the dominant note of his whole life.

The following year, with his friend Sydney Sonnino, who, also Jewish, was to become Prime Minister of Italy, he travelled throughout the length and breadth of Sicily. Together they published, in 1877 and 1878, the two volumes of their famous inquiry, until then the most courageous and intelligent work on the subject of southern Italy. It is unnecessary to dwell on the interest these writings aroused in political circles; the two young men were striving to reach the hearts of the Italian people themselves, and in this hope they now launched a weekly review (*La Rassegna Settimanale*) in which all the major problems of Italian life were examined and discussed. One day Pasquale Villari, whose *Letters from the South* had been the first attempts to discover the underlying realities of the southern question, introduced to this group of writers a young man from the Basilicata, who, as yet unknown, was to integrate all the research of that ardent generation on the evils afflicting southern Italy, in a life-work

* Well known later in Italy and abroad for his writings, and for his experiments in colonisation in Eritrea, where his aim was to settle Italian agricultural labourers on the land; and also for the model scholastic institutions created on his Umbrian estates, which in certain respects led to the later Italian scholastic reforms. An enthusiastic believer in the small agricultural holding, he left his property at his death in 1917 to be divided among his peasants.

of clear-sighted and compassionate endeavour. His name was Giustino Fortunato (1848-1932).

Born in Rionero of a family of well-to-do landowners,* his childhood had left him with certain ineffaceable memories: of the earthquake of 1851 (the most disastrous of modern times in that region) and of the terrible anarchy into which the rural areas relapsed when the Bourbon régime was overthrown in 1860 by the Garibaldini. The middle classes, always fearful of the peasantry, were divided by local intrigues and jealousies; and amid the numberless trials on charges of complicity in the prevailing brigandage even the Fortunato family had not escaped unscathed, for they were accused by personal enemies of aiding the famous brigand Crocco. After his acquittal Giustino's father had left his home in disgust for ever, to settle with his children in Naples; while an uncle of theirs ended his life in voluntary exile in England. But despite the unfortunate impression produced during those years by the rural society of the South, Fortunato had come to hope much from the regenerating power of national unity. In the scrupulous and loyal conduct of the Piedmontese officials, sent to bring order into the new provinces, he found the promise of their future transformation, through "the leveling-up of which history shows so many examples whenever different peoples unite." And he became, although he belonged to a pro-Bourbon family, an enthusiastic supporter of unity.

He had been much struck by Franchetti's small volume on the Neapolitan provinces, and had many discussions now with his new friends, fresh from their Sicilian experiences. Sonnino proposed that to alleviate the hard lot of the peasantry, ground down by centuries of economic servitude, the existing form of *patti agrari*† should be abolished and agricultural credits, where advisable, granted; while Franchetti favoured the creation—especially among the Apennines, where the Crown lands were situated—of some type of small freehold property which might arouse in the peasant's mind an interest in his country's welfare. But Fortunato, reacting against the prejudice of those who explained the social upheavals of these years simply as the result of Bourbon corruption, saw farther

* His paternal grandfather had been the first Prime Minister of non-aristocratic birth in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

† *Patti agrari* are collective contracts between landowners and labourers.

and more clearly than his friends. The evil was too widespread and went back too far into history to be accounted for solely by political tyranny, by the iniquity of the *patti agrari*, or by unjust land distribution.

Why was the South so little known even in Roman times, or known merely as the land of nomad shepherds, of almost inaccessible mountain villages, of the *latifondo* and of agrarian uprisings? And, during the fourth and fifth centuries, why was it that in the southern provinces and the islands the imperial gifts in land to the Church became so extensive that the latter was able at the subsequent rise of the Papal State in Latium to establish sovereign rights throughout the whole of southern Italy? Why were northern and central Italy able to put up considerable economic resistance to the barbarian invasions in the Middle Ages, and why was a handful of adventurers strong enough to set up the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, under which the people were continually to be victimised, not only by the foreigner, but by the most hateful form of feudalism the world has ever known? And as to the division of landed property, why, in modern times, was the average number of landholders so much higher in the North than in the South? And why was it that, whereas the *métayage* system had brought great prosperity to Tuscany as it spread northwards from the Tiber, the system of granting perpetual leases (which prevents any interest on the part of the landlord in the improvement of his property) had become established in the South?

For long Fortunato pondered these questions during his wanderings on foot from province to province in southern Italy. Knowing so well the melancholy of the barren uplands, the stagnant waters of the Ofanto, "sacred to malaria," and the lonely ruined monuments of his native land, he had but to chance one day on Ritter's observation that "the physical conditions of a country influence its history," and the "memorable saying" of Herder that "climate is the great historical factor in the disparity and development of peoples," to realise in a flash the tremendous effect of "geographic fate" upon human material. For all his questionings led to but one explanation: the poverty of the land in southern Italy. All his life he insisted on this fundamental factor in the social and moral life of the people. All his work bore witness to it. He would never have given so much time to research on the

modest monuments of his own region had he not felt what tragic and eloquent confirmation was afforded to his theory by history. Nor would he have agreed to enter Parliament in 1883 as member for Melfi if he had not believed it his duty to urge his convictions upon the country at large. For the general inferiority of the South, he argued, was due to poverty, and this poverty was caused by disastrous geographic conditions. If, therefore, Italy were not to lose what a handful of men had so miraculously conquered, the ingrained scepticism of the people must be overcome, and reforms prompted by a sense of reality and justice introduced. The most urgent of these was that reform of taxation which Fortunato considered "a question not of finance but of morality."

The Italian system of taxation does not, in fact (as Nitti's well-known work on the subject has shown), distribute its burdens in accordance either with justice or equity. Firstly, because the proportional tax at so much per cent. weighs less heavily on the well-off than on the poor, since those who pay a tenth of ten thousand suffer less than those who have only one thousand and pay a hundred; and also because, owing to the fact that their wealth is in the form of landed property, the southern provinces cannot either partially or wholly escape taxation, as the industrial North, with its capital wealth, is able to do. And just as the different classes pay unequally, so do the different regions. Whereas before the war northern and central Italy contributed 21·66 per cent. of their revenue, southern Italy and the islands were paying as much as 25 per cent. Moreover, direct taxation was applied just as unfairly, for, as regards landed property, the South is loaded with mortgages; as to the tax on buildings, little relief can be gained from the exemption accorded to rural areas, since for fear of malaria the wretched habitations of the peasants crowd together upon the hilltops, thus coming into the category of urban house taxation; and as to income tax, the scale is much higher in the southern than in the northern provinces. Finally, in the South, where so much is needed in the way of public works, taxation becomes doubled through the additional duties levied by the province and the commune.

But according to Fortunato the reform of taxation would not be sufficient in itself to revivify southern finances. It must be accompanied by a wise general policy, by the free movement of capital, by cheap money—the *causa causans* of

national wealth—and by the stimulation of production in commerce, industry and agriculture. Now the South, ever since unification, has always suffered from an extreme scarcity of capital, partly owing to its absorption in the numerous public loans raised for urgent necessities by the State, province or commune (loans which, with their high rate of interest, have represented a better investment than that offered by agriculture); partly to the reform of the laws of inheritance, which split up many estates, creating mortgage debts; and partly owing to the sale of ecclesiastical property at an exceedingly low price, payable by instalments over a long period, thus causing a veritable scramble for land, and more than ever alienating capital from employment in technical improvements. This speculation was furthered by the perilously liberal credit granted, after 1885, by the Banca Nazionale and the Banco di Napoli in rivalry with one another. Fortunato maintained that to ensure a healthy circulation of money not only must the artificial stimulation of credit, which encourages unproductive expenditure, be avoided, but also the incurring of debts by the State for extravagant expenditure on public works, which has the fatal result of drawing savings away from their proper employment.

These proved the most controversial among the theories of the great southerner, and earned him the title of *Apostolo del nulla*. No more public works? The stoppage of all those roads, bridges, aqueducts, drainage operations and schools which represent the advance of civilisation? Could this be a solution? If, replied Fortunato, the art of politics be not that of walking blindfold towards an unknown goal, but on the contrary what it always has been since the time of Aristotle and always will be—that is, the art of adapting the end to the means—courage must be found to put a stop to all lavish public works beyond the means of the Italian exchequer, all charity in the form of so-called "special laws," and, above all, to introduce free trade and great reduction in taxation.

Certain public works were undoubtedly necessary to progress and essential to the economic welfare of the South, particularly those concerned with the water supply and with reafforestation. But if inevitable financial crises were to be avoided, patience was required. The people must learn not to look for impossibilities but to face the truth. A plan of indispensable public works must be put into operation, with an eye both

upon the State exchequer and upon the taxpayer, who could not be asked for further sacrifices, but must be relieved of those excessive burdens which reduced his productive potentiality. "Betwixt public works and credit on the one hand," Fortunato used to repeat, "and reduction of the taxes on the other, the antithesis is violent and irreconcilable." It is true that, after some years of experience in Parliament—that Parliament whose members were, in his view, so superior to and so much more highly educated than the bulk of the people they represented—he was under no illusions as to the possibility of changing the general direction of State policy. Certain time-worn prejudices on the subject of agriculture in the South were still too deeply rooted.

The oldest of these prejudices was that the climate was so good; whereas the climate, Fortunato maintained, far more than the soil, was responsible for the economic inferiority of southern Italy, where its chief characteristics—winter rains and summer drought—are a serious hindrance to agricultural improvement. The sun and rain, in fact, are of little benefit down there to vegetation; for while the sun shines it scorches the earth, and when the rain falls it destroys. Therefore the ancient pastoral traditions of the country should be revived, with the migration of the flocks and herds from the plains to the hills; traditions which, from the dawn of Mediterranean civilisation, had always been held to constitute the true wealth of the South. The pastures must be renewed, and the shady woods and timber forests so improvidently sacrificed during the last fifty years; while the exaggerated spread of corn-growing must be replaced by that arboreal growth—vines, olives and almond trees—which derives most advantage from the long spring and autumn and the scanty moisture in the air.

Like other great agrarian economists, Fortunato held that to bolster up the cultivation of grain by protective duties was an obstacle to land development in the South; and, having seen the unfortunate repercussions which the tariff imposed in 1887, after the breaking off of commercial relations with France, had upon southern finances, he was naturally a firm opponent of protection. Protection does not create capital, it causes it to change hands. And where political education is limited, as in Italy—where the democratic parties dared not oppose protection because of the bog of unemployment, where

liberalism did not perceive economic freedom to be the logical corollary of the freedom won in the religious and political sphere, and where nationalism proclaimed itself expansionist and protectionist, as though the expansion of productive energy did not clash with the protection of parasitic industries—it was easy for the dominant oligarchy in industry to manipulate capital to the advantage of a coalition of private interests, and to the great detriment of the peasants, who form the majority of the Italian people. Thus agriculture suffered serious harm, and with it the South, which is the one part of Italy exclusively agricultural.

These are the fundamental principles which for more than forty years Fortunato upheld in his writings, and in his speeches, which are amongst the finest ever made in the Italian Parliament.* He always refused office, for fear of being forced by political exigencies to compromise with his convictions. For him it was reward enough to see the practical results of his work in his native region, which owes him, among other advantages gained, the railway connecting Potenza, by Melfi, with the Pugliese table-land. Moreover, it was through his tireless activity that the law providing for a State supply of quinine was drafted and carried through in 1910, thereby greatly reducing the mortality from malaria. At the beginning of his political work he had dreamed of creating a progressive party which should unite all those in favour of increased State control in matters affecting the interests of the community; but experience left him fundamentally liberal in his convictions. "Nationalisation, socialisation," he wrote, "are words in fashion, but closely allied in meaning with another, bureaucratisation, which is always the mark of weakness in a country." And against abuses and violence, whether on the part of democratic organisations or State authority—the inevitable outcome of abandoning the liberal method, which is the one political system compatible with human dignity—he fought until his death, caring only, in the chaotic post-War years, for the saving of those moral values which are the very breath of freedom.

"Above all," he wrote, "we need a new and manly younger generation of the governing classes, pledged to ideals of self-denial and justice; for no country has ever risen to eminence whilst

* His speeches are collected in two volumes, *Il Mezzogiorno e lo Stato Italiano*, 1926 (Collezione Meridionale Editrice). Palazzo Taverna, Rome.

remaining, like ours, *resigned* or *rebellious*, shirking responsibility and work. . . . And may these young men remember that no Utopian dreams can bring about the spiritual and economic revival of their country, but only the slow transformation of social life ; that neither warships nor big guns can assure power, and that the wealth of a nation cannot be improvised from one day to the next. Let them remember that laws and reforms acquire or lose their virtue solely from the men called upon to apply and carry them out : and that the blind, abject worship of material success is corrupting the rising generation, whereas it is disinterestedness, above all else, that endows a man of ability, and his political work, with strength, authority and prestige."

UMBERTO ZANOTTI-BIANCO.

THE STORY OF THE PUN.

NOTHING illustrates the uncertainty of literary taste more clearly than the vicissitudes of the pun. Everybody knows how Shakespeare revelled in punning, how, as Macaulay says, "the Chancellor quibbled on the Bench, and the Chancellor was Francis Bacon," how the grave Milton played with the names of his antagonists and put puns in the mouth of Satan, and how the Cavalier historian Fuller out-punned the regicide poet. But what happened ? The "clenches" of Shakespeare and Jonson were anathema to Dryden ; and one of the few flaws detected by Addison in *Paradise Lost* was Milton's indulgence in this form of "pleasantry." During the whole Augustan age the pun was under a cloud, and Dr. Johnson, because Burke's humour showed itself occasionally in this fashion, refused him the praise of true wit.

But the wheel revolved, and in the nineteenth century the pun returned, having taken unto itself seven spirits more boisterous than itself. The recognised humorists of the period were all punsters. Theodore Hook divided his time between practical jokes and playing on words. Hood, a true poet if ever there was one, had to make his living by pouring out an endless series of paranomasias. The pages of *Punch* are crowded with verses, such as those of Shirley Brooks, of which the sole merit, if merit it be, is a certain ingenuity in the punning trick. Burnand followed in the same line, until the jaded readers refused to smile, and once more the land had rest. But after a respite, more or less uneasy, the pun is reviving once again. The clues in cross-words show the old ingenuity, and prove the hydra-like vitality of the device, to which it is probable no Hercules will ever be able to deal the final *coup de grâce*.

The fact seems to be that the pun is almost inextricably bound up with human nature, and that it may be expelled with a pitchfork, but will constantly recur. And, when we inquire into its origin, we find that it belongs to our nature's strongest and most permanent part. Like the swing, skittles, kiss-in-the-ring, the tug-of-war, and war itself, it is a branch of religion, and was used in the service of the gods, or as a means of discovering their will, almost as soon as language itself was invented. There was nothing witty or humorous

about it in its beginning : it was as serious as an oracle, and charged with destiny like a thunderbolt or the ominous flight of birds. That its estate is now lowly no more disproves its lofty descent than the fact that children now play at cat's cradle casts doubt upon the ancient power of Atropos and Lachesis.

The farther back we go, the more visible is this religious and spell-like force. The idea seems to have been this, that when the gods made language, they in their omniscience saw all the ambiguities which it admitted, and *intended* them.* When men discovered them, therefore, they were revealing divine secrets, sacred cryptograms, in which were hidden the purposes of the rulers of the world. The gods had acted like the Sibyl, who wrote her prophecies on leaves, and scattered them on the winds. He who could collect them, and put them into order, could read the Fates. Thus, in what at first sight was an accidental amphibology, the wise man could detect a regulated predestination. To take a familiar example, if an army is assembled for an expedition, and a fig-seller cries "Cauneas," figs, this is the heavenly warning, "*Caue ne eas*," take heed and go not : and that warning has been written by the Fates from the foundation of the world.

It is scarcely too much to say that the Book of Genesis (to say nothing of many other Eastern books) is built upon this conception of the pun. Give a child a name with one meaning : if the name chance to bear another, or can be twisted into doing so, then the destiny of the child will be other than the destiny the parents meant to give it. Leah called her adopted child Gad or Happy ; but the same sound may mean "to press," and a like sound means "a troop" : hence we have, in another passage, "Gad, a troop shall press upon him, but he shall press upon their heel" : and it is *this* prophecy, rather than the one foretelling happiness, that was fulfilled in the history of the tribe.

A dozen other examples could easily be given from this one book. Esau, cheated by his brother, recognises too late that his name had destiny in it. "Is not he rightly called Supplanter,

* Thus Cratylus, in Plato's dialogue of that name, says (and Plato to some extent agrees with him) : "It seems to me, Socrates, that some Power greater than human first gave names to things, in such wise that they were of necessity the right ones" ; and the derivations which Plato assigns to words in that dialogue clearly show that to him a pun was not an accidental likeness of sound, but something mystical and fore-ordained, which it was the business of men to interpret.

for he has tripped me up these two times ? " Joseph means "to add," and his mother sees in the name an omen that God will add to her another son ; but it also resembles a word meaning "to take away" ; hence she says, "God hath taken away my reproach." When her second son is born, at the cost of her life, she calls him "Benoni," son of my sorrow ; the father tries to destroy the omen by substituting "Benjamin," son of the right hand.

The later prophets follow the same path, and seize at once on any chance provided by a name. "Gaza," says Zephaniah, "shall be forsaken" (*gazubah*) ; and "the houses of Achzib," says Micah, "shall be Achzab" (a deception) ; "at Beth-leaphrah have I rolled myself in the dust" (*aphar*). Sometimes the pun is acted as well as spoken. "The Lord showed Amos a basket of summer-fruit" (*kayits*), in token that the end (*kets*) is come upon Israel ; to Jeremiah he shows a stem of almond (*shākēd*), for he watches (*shākād*) over his people.

Nor, though the main strength of the pun is in the East, is it unknown to the West : and the more religious the Western poet, the more eagerly he searches it out. "Can it," says the pious and reverent Æschylus, "can it have been some Power, of those whom we see not, who, guiding his tongue with foreknowledge of destiny, gave to Helen her fatal name ? "

Helen, nay, but a hell
(Read we the riddle well),
A hell unto ships on the sea,
And to men upon earth is she,
And a yawning hell to the town
That into her gulfs went down.

This is the same spirit as, a thousand years later, stirred St. Gregory when he saw the captives from Deira. They were to be saved *de ira*, and, their king being Aella, Alleluia should be sung in their land. Who can doubt that, when Gregory heard from Augustine the good news from Canterbury, he recognised that the assonance was no accident, but had been written, before the ages, in the books of God ? Pass another seven hundred years, and we find pious Catholics rejoicing to discover that the word Lollard sounds, by Divine Providence, very like the Latin *lolia*, and that therefore the heretics

had been branded, centuries before, by Christ himself, as the tares in the field :

Lollardi sunt zizania,
Spinae, vepres, et lolia,
Quae vastant hortum vineae.

From the sacred, or if we choose so to call it, the magical use of the pun, the transition is very gradual to its use as a rhetorical engine. When a poet puns, it is often extremely difficult to tell which of these conceptions was uppermost in his mind, and doubtless he could often hardly tell himself. A stern denunciation, uttered in the name of the Lord, and pointed with a crashing paranomasia, would seem to him to be specially inspired ; for the Lord himself, in teaching man language, had arranged the coincidence. Thus when Isaiah says, "Fear, and the pit, and the snare (*pachad, pachath, pach*) shall be upon thee, O inhabitant of the earth," he hears in the alliterative assonance the very voice of God, bidding him *repeat* it to the sinful world. I know nothing anywhere in literature more impressive than that *finale* of the "Song of the Vineyard"—"He looked for judgment and behold oppression, for righteousness, and behold a cry"—He looked for *mishpat* and behold *mispach*, for *tsedakah* and behold *tseakah* ; but I do not think that to the prophet it was *mere* rhetoric : it was *neum Yabweh*, the saying of the Lord.

None the less, it degenerated slowly into a beauty, a figure of speech, a convention, and finally a mere jest. The sad pun of Ajax (Aias) on his name, in Sophocles—"I may well say *Ai, Ai*, once, twice, ay and thrice," is less fully informed with religion than the Æschylean play on Helen ; and when, in Euripides, Meleager cries that he is rightly called "Sorrowful Huntsman," for he has hunted the Calydonian boar to his own destruction, we feel that we are moving from religion to rhetoric. In the East, to-day, the paranomasia is a necessary ornament of poetry, but it is, I believe, usually no more than an ornament. I have been told that Persian critics censure FitzGerald for omitting all the *real* beauties of the Rubaiyyat—that is, the plays on words. The famous lines,

And Bahram, the great Hunter, the Wild Ass
Stamps o'er his Head, but cannot break his Sleep,

lose, they say, their charm because in the original "wild ass" and head (or rather "grave") are the same word. But, as far as I can learn, the paranomasia is *only* a beauty : the compelling magic has departed. Similarly, whereas in the dialogue of Plato, Cratylus declares that the likenesses between words are part of the ordered governance of the gods, the plain-minded Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, sets them placidly down among other figures, as useful aids, on occasion, to the orator, but no more divine than oxymoron or hendiadys. There is to Aristotle nothing mystical in the saying of Isocrates, that the archē or dominion, of the Athenians was the *archē*, or beginning, of their ruin. We read such a saying with very different feelings from those with which we read Plato's epitaph on Aster, the Star :

Thou wert the morning star among the living,
Ere thy fair light had fled ;
Now, having died, thou art as Hesperus, giving
New splendour to the dead.

It may be thought strange that I do not reckon Aristophanes among the true corrupters of the pun. The fact is, I think, that even he, with all his wild profusion of quibble, "clench," parody, and eternal word-play of every kind, did not *quite* forget the religious meaning of the device. His plays were part of a religious service—that kind of service in which comedy, and even sheer farce, were demanded. A laugh was part of the liturgy, and a jest was prescribed in the rubric. Many of the hearers, perhaps most, forgot the sacred significance and enjoyed the fun without a thought of the listening deities. It is to be feared that the poet himself too often forgot also. But if you had caught him afterwards, and had asked for an "Aristophanes' Apology" he might have answered, with a measure of sincerity, "I pun from piety. These likenesses in words are *there* : I did not *make* them, I *perceive* them, and draw them out for others to see. The gods, in their inscrutable wisdom and omniscience, contrived that they should exist, and, as philosophers unfold the meaning of the material world, so I unfold the meaning of the universe of words ; and, in doing so, I pay honour to the god of this festival. And, as to my punning 'Transcripts from Euripides,' I answer that Euripides is the enemy of the gods, who have deluded him into writing lines which admit of the twist I give

them. If he becomes ridiculous, it is the gods, using me as their instrument, that make him so. Cleon, again, is the enemy of the State, an enemy, that is, of the gods who guard the State. Is it mere chance, then, that suggested to me to make him a Paphlagonian slave of Demos, because *paphlazo*, to bluster and splutter, exactly hits off the fellow's tub-thumping oratory?"

Whether Aristophanes is here telling the whole truth or not, there is at any rate some truth mingled with his irony; and we miss the real intent of his comedies if we do not realise that behind all the buffoonery and pantomimic punning there was a subconscious religious purpose.

The real decline and fall of the pun is seen not in Athens but in Rome. The Romans were one of the least imaginative of peoples, and were rarely troubled with mystical glammers. Their young men saw few visions, and their old men dreamed practical dreams. Their language was a business-like language, and was used for mundane ends. It was sharp, brief, and forceful, and lent itself easily to sarcasm and irony. In the hands of masters it could be terse and epigrammatic to an astonishing degree. No orators have been more rhetorical, in our sense of the word, than those of Rome, but their words were directed towards deeds. Naturally, therefore, they were fond of the pun, which would stick in the minds of the audience: but there was nothing transcendental about it. It would be easy to collect hundreds of instances from their literature, but few or none would move us as the lines on Aster move us. Plautus, the virile and robustious dramatist, pours out his puns like an Elizabethan playwright, but they were meant to raise a laugh, and succeeded: there is every indication that his audience enjoyed them like the Shakespearean groundlings. The less vigorous and more refined Terence has his puns on *amens*, mad, and *amans*, a lover, or on *verbera*, blows, and *verba*, words. Even the sober Livy makes a Roman magistrate say that his office has been onerous rather than honourable—a pun repeated by Ovid (*non honor est sed onus*). But the chief practitioner is the greatest master of Roman rhetoric. Not only does Cicero, in his treatises on Oratory, give a place to what he calls "annomination" among the telling figures—he instances Cato's *nobiliorem mobiliorem*—but he sets the example to his pupils, careless whether it be good or bad. Some of his puns, indeed,

are no better than our music-hall performances. In one of his essays he declares, in Terentian style, that schoolmasters chasten their boys both *verbis* and *verberibus*; and he warns his readers not to fall into the violence of the vinolent: these may perhaps pass; but many of those of which he boasts to his friend Atticus are first-rate specimens of the forcible-feeble. He was as much pleased when he had perpetrated a pun as when he had got off a criminal whose guilt was as clear as noonday.

Those of Martial are usually better, and they may sometimes be compared favourably with those word-plays which, in certain modern light verses, give a pleasurable surprise to the reader at the end of the poem. Thus, when he sees a number of sluggish boatmen, and after a dozen well-turned lines, suddenly turns and says, "I do not call you *nautae*, but *Argonautae*" (which may mean "lazy sailors" as well as "Argonauts"), the little twist is satisfying, and reminds us of certain of Hood's best somersaults, or even of the surprises which give point to so many of Heine's lyrics.

When, compressing the accomplishment of many years into an hour-glass we come to the Elizabethans, we have a somewhat different, and yet analogous, story to tell. Their age was an age of discovery—one in which a new map was constantly being wanted for the augmentation of the Indies, and in which the heavens were daily being more accurately explored. We have seen many discoveries and inventions in our time, but none, I think, have stirred us to the exhilaration to which those of Drake, or Frobisher, or Tycho, stirred our ancestors. The discoveries, however, were not physical only. In the world of words they were ever being made. Ronsard and his companions led the way in France; Spenser, Harvey and others followed in England; and we can see that they delighted as keenly in unearthing forgotten words of Chaucer, or in inventing new forms, as in learning of "fruitfullest Virginia" or "Amazon's huge river."

Among the virtues of words in which they thus delighted was the fact that many of them had two or more meanings, and that they could be played with. This discovery was like finding a new healing herb, or the detection of a new white magic: and the poets revelled in it. When Shakespeare noticed that his name could mean half a dozen things, he

may have said to himself, as he said afterwards to another,

Whoever has his wish, thou hast thy will,
And will to boot, and will in overplus.

He thinks of the word "light," and runs through all its significations. Hence, when Jessica, in her boy's dress, has to carry a torch, she says,

What, must I hold a candle to my shames?
They in themselves, good sooth, are too, too light.

Again and again the whole form of a sentence is determined by the double meaning of a word; it begins with one meaning, and, the poet's mind seizing on the other, it takes an unexpected course. Of a hundred examples choose one;

She that from whom
We all were sea-swallowed, though some cast again,
And by that destiny, to perform an act
Whereof what's past is prologue.

Here the word "*cast*" means "cast up by the sea," but, before Shakespeare has left it, it has suggested the cast of a play; this in turn suggests an *act*, which again means not only the act of a drama, but a deed: and in this case a murder. And in Othello,

She in the essential *vesture* of creation,
Does *tire* the ingener,

whatever the true interpretation of the difficult passage may be, it is impossible to doubt that Shakespeare's thought ran on from the word *vesture* to the idea of *attire*, and thence to *tire* in the sense of *weary*.

These instances, and the scores of others which might be adduced, will show, I think, that the attitude of Shakespeare, and probably that of most of his contemporaries, towards puns, was somewhat different from that of later punsters. Apart from the obvious ones offered for the mere amusement of the vulgar, which would usually be put in the mouths of the clowns, the idea, subconsciously or consciously present to Shakespeare's mind, was that here was a phenomenon in language, presented to the audience as a kind of puzzle to solve, or as a revelation of something new for them to enjoy.

"Have you noticed this before?" the poet seems to say, or "How long will you take to see that I am playing with this word or that?" The nearest analogue in our day would be the clever clues of some of our best cross-word composers. These we do not regard exactly as puns but as analyses or dissections of words, which we have by habit looked on in one way, but are now taught to look on in another. The pleasure of the hearers would be enhanced by the exercise of their ingenuity in detecting a play of this kind. I imagine that the actor gave a hint by tone or gesture, and that a quick hearer would whisper to his neighbour, "Did you notice that?" In the case of the dubious equivoques of a Mercutio, the answer might be conveyed by a knowing snigger: for neither the poet nor his audience was squeamish.

The puns of Milton had a different origin. A good Hebrew scholar, and even after his blindness having a chapter of the Hebrew Bible read to him daily, he would have Isaiah's *pach* and *pachad* for his exemplar, and what the inspired prophets had welcomed it was not for him to disdain. The pun had the imprimatur of the Holy Ghost. Nor, though he could not know, as we know, that a score of the sayings of Christ himself were pointed with paranomasia, could he fail to remember the one pun that could be rendered into Greek, the famous words at Cæsarea Philippi, "Thou art *Petros*, and on this *Petra* will I build my Church." With a sanction like this, he would feel more than justified in giving us "beseeching or besieging," or the "small infantry"; and that archangels should pun on the plains of heaven would seem to him in full accord with the eternal nature of things.

With the seventeenth century the pun sinks into a slumber of generations, and awakes like Rip van Winkle to find a changed world, to which it has to adapt itself. It becomes rhetorical, conventional, a figure of fun: and once more dies, or at least slumbers. It may rise yet again, and we may see, in the *Punch* of 1950, sets of verses like those of 1860, in which the sole merit will once more be verbal twists and turns. But it is as well, in prophesying, to imitate the caution of Tiresias:

O Laertiade, quicquid dicam, aut erit aut non.

E. E. KELLETT.

THE MODERN WORLD'S ENIGMA.

PROUD and reserved, the Japanese always seem inscrutable to peoples of the West. The mystery of their challenge to the world at large, moreover, is not lessened now that many of them have absorbed much of our culture. For we of the Occident seldom really read the thoughts of those secretive, busy and ambitious little people who latterly have made such strides in most mental and physical fields. Nevertheless, in Japan's three-hundred-odd newspapers and magazines, some of which own a circulation approaching two million copies, every sort of topic, national and international, is fearlessly discussed. Thoughtful Europeans and Americans are therefore increasingly studying such journals; to discover if possible for themselves just how this fecund race, now numbering some sixty-eight million souls and multiplying yearly by a million, is likely to affect humanity in the future.

Maybe the above inquirers are comforted and perhaps surprised to find that secular journals like those in question allot ample space nowadays to articles and advertisements concerning Christianity. Sales in Japan have been so much increased by this last modern policy, indeed, that at present one of that country's largest publications actually retains an editor solely to handle its religious news!

With characteristic acuteness, Japan's first act when some seventy years ago she decided to open her borders to Western ways and knowledge, was the acquiring of a strong navy for defence of her straggling empire. She manned her ships, too, with a well-trained personnel. The instruction course for this force, by the way, is sufficiently illuminating. So exacting is it that only cadets of all-round fitness, drawn from Japan's best families, succeed in completing it. Physical culture, particularly swimming, has always been held in highest repute throughout Japan. Small wonder, therefore, that young officers, before passing out of that empire's naval college, should be expected to swim round the island in the Inland Sea on which this building stands—a distance, it may be mentioned, of some thirty miles. Training for such a feat, as can easily be imagined, proves supremely gruelling work. Stronger pupils, however, often give their weaker brethren a breather in deep water, by allowing these to rest

awhile upon their shoulders before sending them forward to complete their heavy task.

Worthy to be placed beside its navy is the modern mercantile marine of that Britain of the East, which hitherto has obtained its men from the large fishing-population inhabiting Japan's many coastal isles. Officers for these liners receive their nautical instruction at one or other of the empire's two principal maritime colleges, or upon the training-ships maintained by such. Or lessons perchance will take place aboard one of the barque-rigged, four-masted, screw-driven vessels connected with Japan's eleven smaller nautical schools.

Several years of steady work ashore precede any actual seagoing in Japan; a fact that enables the naval student to gain a proper grounding in the many subjects needed by a modern sailor. None know better than Englishmen how smart, practical and helpful Japanese tars can prove in an emergency. But those clever seafarers are making terrible competition nowadays. Ships flying their flag convey cheap wares across the world to-day, and appear in all the busiest ports. Lately they have even been seen in waters previously considered almost exclusively a British preserve—those fringing Africa's far-stretching eastern coasts. Must our manufacturers now lose these markets, too? The low-priced goods of Japan, of fair enough quality, be sure will suit only too well the usually scanty means of Ethiopia's children!

Less than twenty-five years have fled since Japan's far-sighted Government perceived the immense advantages offered by aviation to its country of scattered isles and tangled mountains. Yet the members of its useful air force are among the world's foremost fliers to-day. Tokyo was also the world's first municipality to employ an air policeman, having appointed Zui Yoshimura to this post some three years ago. Civilian flying in Japan, as here, has been greatly fostered by certain powerful Press combines, one of which controls no less than nine large magazines, the combined monthly circulation of which totals six and a half million copies! This undertaking and others are earnestly striving to remove misunderstandings and to promote international friendship by interpreting Japan to the West, their pages, written in excellent English, setting forth industry, commerce, agriculture, art, literature, beauty, ethics and social

efforts as these actually exist in the Island Empire at this moment.

The above passion for practical thoroughness, so awkward sometimes for ourselves and other nationals, is one of the chief characteristics of the patient Japanese, who fully realise the necessity for effort in acquiring useful knowledge. Book-learning, however, can only come through reading. But a pupil in the Land of the Rising Sun must devote eight studious years simply to mastering the difficult alphabet of his country. In the towns, notwithstanding, most Japanese are well educated; competent observers declaring that they surpass ourselves in this respect.

One-half of Japan's population now dwells and works in cities. Its agriculturalists, nevertheless, find existence very difficult in face of the price decline of all primary products; a position accentuated by their land's mountainous nature. Wherever possible its hills are, therefore, terraced to their summits. And saddening is it to see the endless trains of farmer folk with head-loads of manure toiling painfully up those slopes in the lambent, stilly evenings; bent at whatever cost on refertilising their tiny fields.

Surrounded by scenic beauty, the Japanese are in general a highly artistic race, even selecting the stones for their famous gardens with due regard to size and shape. These features, they say, show forth the stones' inner meaning, and thus admit of their being placed in one position only.

Nature would seem to have achieved perfect harmony in Japan. The rugged grandeur or pastoral peacefulness of other lands perhaps is often wanting here. Except for blossoming trees and shrubs, flowers, too, as we know them are not abundant in Japan. Each item in its delightful panorama, however, blends tastefully with others; sky, sea, rocks, mountains, trees, lakes, rivers and waterfalls combining enchantingly, and supplying inspiration for Japan's peerless if peculiar style of landscape gardening.

Japan's attractions have at last aroused in its people a desire, now becoming vocal in their Press, for certain parts of their country to be set aside in perpetuity as national parks. Several localities worthy of this honour are indeed being momentarily considered, and a decision upon the point may even have been taken by now. Modern transportation methods naturally have made accessible to-day regions of

superlative natural beauty hitherto unfrequented. A difficulty of choice amongst so many scenic jewels thus somewhat delays decision.

Japanese well qualified to judge assert in public speeches and articles in the Press that possession by their State of a park or parks as described will attract further visitors to their well-loved, beautiful fatherland. That this should be better known to the outside world seems nowadays their wish, indeed, and they therefore offer no objections to foreigners examining such quaint manners, customs and items of dress belonging to fast-vanishing Nippon as still exist. For although Japan behind her former seclusion of centuries has evolved a special art and culture, these are certainly being quickly transformed at present through contact with an alien civilisation.

The ancient practices of Japan do not disappear immediately, of course; change there being so gradual that many old customs continue flourishing beside modern innovations. These conditions give rise to curious contrasts, causing numbers of Japanese to live a sort of double life. Frequently one sees soldiers, public officials, clerks in banks, businesses and shops, schoolboys and teachers, chauffeurs, conductors and others engaged in imported occupations, wearing Western garb to-day. Such clothes, notwithstanding, are merely the uniform of working hours. The Japanese, with few exceptions, never wear them when once more in their homes. Private dwellings and hotels in Japan generally possess at least some rooms furnished in national fashion with *tatamis*—heavy straw mats covering all the floor—cushions upon which to kneel or sit cross-legged, and small, low tables which we should probably consider merely "trays with feet." But the remaining apartments are mostly arranged in Western mode. All shops there have a wireless set, each loud-speaker vying with its neighbour in its deafening din. The streets of Japan's large towns thus resemble the corridors of a madhouse. Raucous cries mingle constantly with the clanging of passing trams, to the steps of which passengers cling like swarming bees as these vehicles flash by.

Throughout Japan, evidence of a struggle for precedence between old things and new is afforded by the funerals often crowding the overburdened ways. Two sorts of such processions sometimes may be seen there simultaneously.

Mourners in Western dress follow the modern motor hearse, while the palanquin-housed coffin is borne upon the shoulders of several sturdy fellows; white-robed priests, banners and kimono-clad relatives and friends streaming afoot behind.

Marriages, moreover, often present contrasts in Japan. The bridegroom usually wears Western morning coat and trousers. But his dainty little bride will have her broad linen head-band, to denote that never, never will she exhibit feelings of jealousy towards her newly made husband. Otherwise she is adorned by a handsome, heavily brocaded kimono. This garment is wearable by both sexes, only slight differences of cut or trimming distinguishing a man's kimono from a woman's. A Japanese gentleman in European clothes bows native fashion to his knees, maybe, when encountering a friend who although clad in a kimono will very likely carry a cane, and sport, possibly, a soft felt hat!

Coolies drawing wagons crawl at a foot-pace through Japanese streets, but those pulling rickshaws run. Numerous electric cars and private automobiles rush past the dusty pedestrian, while the slower, horse-drawn conveyances add to the congestion of the roads. Motor cars, clothes and many aeroplanes, nevertheless, do not alone testify to a Western civilisation flourishing alongside of hoary, out-moded survivals. Cafés, cinemas, clubs and even beauty parlours quite frequently jostle gorgeously carved old temples and venerable shrines. But the Japanese find a consistency in this sort of thing, declaring they will always assimilate only such occidental notions as they happen to like.

As if to confirm the above assertion, many Japanese theatres remain almost wholly native in construction and in the costumes and manners of their exceedingly able players. Some of these amusement halls certainly have now banished from their auditoriums the eating of regular, set meals and unlimited smoking; small paper tickets, moreover, have replaced the former huge wooden tokens of admission, and smartly dressed, attractive girls instead of men to-day usher people to their places. Modern playhouses in Japan also are fitted with rows of comfortably padded tip-up seats. But rooms where ladies can partake of tea—Japan's unfailing beverage—attire themselves or attend to their elaborate coiffure, are still attached to all theatre restaurants. In old-style Japanese theatres, the four-foot-square railed-off

spaces in the pit for spectators who squatted on the ground rather resembled sheep pens, while places to accommodate four persons were merely partitioned off roughly in the balcony or circle. Even in modern playhouses, the stage is not the sole spot where actors "mime," since a narrow platform, styled the *Hana-Michi*, or "Flower-way," stretching from the left of the stage to the back of the auditorium, serves this purpose, too. The *Muwari-Butai*, or revolving stage, partitioned into several scenes shown in quick succession, has also long been an essential part of all well-equipped Japanese theatres, though a novelty in Britain. The performers in Japan's popular ballets, with specially written texts, are invariably men, these being employed, as once with us, for portraying female rôles. Like other Eastern countries, Japan has hitherto jealously hidden away its women—excepting geishas—and only now is the gentler sex there beginning to assume its rightful social place.

In those distant regions, women until recently were quite subordinate. Educated Japanese coming temporarily to Europe or America have in consequence always been tremendously impressed by the white man's treatment of women—his own or theirs. Accordingly, they start imitating this behaviour towards beings whom they had previously slighted. Naturally this delights their charming little ladies, whose joy, notwithstanding, is usually short-lived. Few of their lords have the courage or desire to continue their courtesies on returning to Japan, where the sexes are segregated in public, and a wife out walking with her husband trots submissively behind! A hostess at Japanese parties or banquets never takes food with her guests, whose wants, however, she sees to carefully. This is not specially difficult; a chatelaine in Japan has plenty of servants. Though badly, sometimes shamefully, treated, maids in the Mikado's land are willing and hard-working, toiling for a pittance from dawn to dark with cheerfulness. Japanese girls make excellent nurses, as British or American matrons who, at times, have had to employ such can and do testify. Like all persons under preparation in that land, these young women are always wonderfully trained. Thus whether as attendants upon children, or as assistants in maternity or ordinary hospital cases, they are prompt and supremely efficient.

No sojourner in Japan can fail to notice the tea-pot, kept

going there day and night. Its contents look and taste to us much like a hay infusion. But the Japanese imbibe quantities of such tea, purchased at twelve shillings per pound—and upwards. They swallow this, by our reckoning, somewhat expensive drink on all occasions. Numerous festivals of infinite variety also cluster round the national function of publicly “tasting” this heavenly brew, each being accompanied by some punctilious but picturesque ceremonial. That a leaf employed, after all, solely for an infusion should be one of Japan’s chief products and principal exports scarcely seems so surprising when we consider how all Westerners find that kingdom enveloped in an enchanted, unreal atmosphere. This unsubstantialness, indeed, characterises several other of its special products. Thus peppermint oil and its resultant, menthol, both of them increasingly important to the world, nowadays come principally from Japan, as does, too, the bulk of natural camphor, so much needed for the celluloid used for films.

When gazing at the scenes upon our favourite “silver screen,” how many of us remember that nothing shown there could rival in thrill the true adventures of those who, at risk of their lives, procured the product which made moving pictures possible, when both these and the camphor industry were infants? The particular laurel tree, the wood of which yields camphor when distilled, flourishes almost solely in the mountain gorges of Formosa—Japan’s dependency since 1897. The camphor forests, however, stand far from civilisation, in what were formerly the last fastnesses of that isle’s fanatical aborigines. These furies often ambushed the unlucky woodsmen engaged upon the trees, or even surrounded the lonely, wire-defended factories. So frequent and successful, indeed, were the raids of those head-hunters that at last there arose the saying, “every ounce of snowy camphor represents at least one drop of crimson, human gore”! But thirty-six years of firm rule by those determined little Easterners have finally subdued the savages of Formosa, transforming the previously fearsome place into a region of thriving plantations which render it to-day the empire’s tropical storehouse.

THEODORE RUETE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN TRADE.

RUSSIA has emerged into the light of the good causes, having for a generation impartially served the other causes. By a combination of propitious circumstances during the past few months her Government has taken its place among those which regard peace as an object worth striving after. By a further coincidence that Government has at the same time decided to play a part, not in the further destruction, but in the rescue of international trade. The figures published by the British Board of Trade are all the more agreeable because at first sight there is something of a mystery in the established fact that British iron and steel manufactures, machinery, machine tools and the like are being sold in increasing volume to a bolshevised community, and that British shipping is carrying its increasing share of the traffic.

The mystery is somewhat dissipated if one observes the progress of the Russian retreat from bolshevism. In April last the Russian Government issued a loan within Russia—it has not yet qualified to enter any other capitalist market—for the amount of 3,500,000,000 roubles. The workers of Russia, who for nearly twenty years have been taught that the investment of savings is the basic injustice that afflicts the workers of the world, happened to be the only available source which their Government could tap for the money it wanted. Out of the hypothesis, those workers were not likely to be sympathetic capitalists. They had to be encouraged. The rate of interest was, therefore, put at ten per cent. ; which figure ought to attract, if not to satisfy, an even rapacious capitalist. But it was hardly enough to dislodge the deep-embedded prejudices of the deluded proletariat. Half of the bonds were, therefore, issued as a lottery, whereby the gambling instinct was mobilised to eke out the atrophied capitalist instinct. The resultant resurgence of spirit had itself to be formulated and its extent prescribed. It was made known by the Government that every industrial worker was expected to apply for the equivalent in bonds of at least three weeks’ wages ; and an attempt was made to encourage subscriptions even from the peasants. Thus did Moscow emulate the rudimentary capitalist device of receiving back with the left hand

the wages it was paying out with the right hand so that the wages could continue to be paid.

Of even more symptomatic interest was the formal abolition of the infamous "O.G.P.U.," the "Unified State Political Department" or Tcheka, which has been the terrorist instrument of dictatorship. The decree issued by the All-Union Central Executive Committee and dated July 10th last did not, it is true, formally abolish the OGPU. It achieved essentially the same result by merely decreeing that it be merged in the newly instituted Commissariat for Internal Affairs. In their new guise the former departments of the OGPU which have been taken over by the new body are empowered to continue their detective work, but their work has to finish with detection, and they have to submit the evidence they collect to the ordinary judicial bodies, whose competence it will be to take whatever action they may decide upon. The former OGPU officials can no longer punish crime except "administrative" crime, whatever in practice that may mean. They can no longer put people to death in their unfettered discretion.

Russia, then, in general ways is moving away from bolshevism at home, and renewing contacts abroad. That tendency no doubt explains why the trade agreement signed in February last appears to be working according to its authors' intentions. It is a temporary agreement in the sense that it can be cancelled at any time by six months' notice on either side, although there is otherwise no limit to its period of operation. In Article 3 the Russian Government undertook to readjust the balance of trade between Great Britain and Russia. That balance had been heavily unfavourable to Great Britain. In the House of Commons on March 1st last Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, recalled that the total value of Russian imports into Great Britain during the preceding two years had amounted to £124,000,000, whereas the figure of British exports to Russia in the same period was only £40,000,000. The method of adjustment promised by the Russian Government was an increased expenditure in Great Britain of the proceeds of its own sales in Great Britain. That increase was to conform with a prescribed schedule, thus: By December 31st, 1934, Russia agreed to spend in Great Britain ten-seventenths of the proceeds of her sales in Great Britain. That ratio was expressed as 1 : 1·7.

In the year to December 31st, 1935, the ratio was to be 1 : 1·5; to December 31st, 1936, 1 : 1·4; to December 31st, 1937, 1 : 1·2; and in subsequent years 1 : 1·1.

It is not yet possible to estimate even approximately how near the mark will be the result established on December 31st next. What is possible is to indicate whether the process so far operative conforms with the object of reducing the adverse trade balance against Great Britain.

For the six months' period, March-August 1934 the following figures have been officially disclosed. (The figures for the corresponding period of the two preceding years are here added for comparison.)

	1932	1933	1934
	£	£	£
Imports of Russian products to Great Britain	8,155,000	6,068,000	8,314,000
Exports of British products to Russia	4,524,000	1,797,000	1,801,000
Re-exports from Great Britain to Russia	534,000	597,000	1,543,000
Total foreign exports to Russia	5,058,000	2,394,000	3,344,000

It emerges from those figures that Russian imports into Great Britain, which sharply declined in 1933 as a result of the boycott that followed the famous arrest and trial of the British engineers in Moscow (March-April 1933), this year more than recovered their losses; whereas on the face of the table the British export trade recovered hardly any of its losses. On the established figures of the first six months of the operation of the trade agreement therefore hardly any progress was discernible towards the fulfilment of the prescribed ratio of ten-seventenths of British to Russian purchases, so far as the direct, visible trade was concerned. The total of £1,801,000 compares with £1,797,000 last year, and with two and half times that amount in 1932. The trade agreement however in the prescribed computation of the ratio included "invisible" with "visible" trade balances. The invisible balances include those of re-exports, that is, of Russian

purchases in the British market of products manufactured outside Great Britain, and the balance of payment for "services" (such as shipping) as distinct from goods. In the category of the invisible balance the figures reveal a totally different state of affairs. They show an increase of nearly three hundred per cent. Some British commentators have pointed to those figures with a finger of scorn, and have drawn the moral that such is the stuff of Russian good faith; that in short it is a typical manifestation of Russian dishonesty and shifty dealing. An article published in an English newspaper on October 3rd, for example, suggested that Great Britain had not in the least benefited by the trade agreement. It is not easy to follow such reasoning. It would no doubt in one point of view be better if Russia had within six months increased the figure of direct British exports to Russia: of iron and steel, machinery, motor-cars, coal, textile goods. The point of view referred to is that of the politician who believes in tariffs, who believes that he can foster British heavy industries behind a tariff wall. But that is not the only relevant point of view. It is arguable, and is argued by probably a majority of working business men and financiers, as distinct from political theorists, that no tariff wall ever did, or ever will do, any good to anyone. The thing that matters most is the balance of payment, not the balance of trade. Re-exports are of essential interest to Great Britain. The business of a market is as real a business as that of a workshop. The re-exportation of non-British goods from the British market is of direct interest to banks, insurance companies and to a host of other concerns. It is not easy to understand why a political tariff-builder should regard a profit accruing to, say, a manufacturer of motor-cars as something more real or more valuable than a profit accruing to, say, a shipping company which sells services as distinct from goods. In the first six months of the present year for example the chartering of British vessels for single-journey carrying to Russia has earned for the shipowners an aggregate sum of £850,000 the corresponding figure for last year being £450,000. The difference is nearly one hundred per cent. The figures for continuous charterings show the like proportionate increase.

Moreover it has to be remembered that the changes in the sphere of "services" are apt to be reflected in Board of Trade

statistics more immediately than those which fall in the sphere of "goods." In the iron and steel trade it takes an average of nine months for big orders to be executed and paid for: and until they are executed and paid for they do not figure in the statistics of the Board of Trade. It is known for example that in that period one single order was given by Russia to one single British firm involving over £1,000,000—in itself more than half the actual figure of British exports officially published for that period. In the month of August this year—the last of the six months above alluded to—the total amount of orders (as distinct from completed contracts) placed by Russia with British firms came to £812,000, which figure contrasts with £553,000 for the corresponding month of 1933. Those figures reveal an actual increase in British trade of forty-seven per cent., whereas the published figures in the table printed above in effect conceal that improvement. It seems therefore worth while to supplement the "trade" figures given above by the figures of "orders," thus:

	August 1934 £	August 1933 £	Jan.-Aug. 1934 £	Jan.-Aug. 1933 £
Machinery and industrial equipment	43,556	2,585	915,509	155,283
Alloys of iron and steel	95,827	105,816	1,130,111	268,626
Non-ferrous metals	184,918	265,652	1,435,207	1,176,561
Rubber	240,450	64,329	1,660,640	239,582
Textiles	15,202	69,281	269,635	287,037
Tea	94,705	30,425	707,321	556,993
Herrings	106,822	Nil	206,822	Nil
Miscellaneous	30,554	15,200	337,024	142,230
Total	812,034	553,288	6,662,269	2,826,312

Several important facts emerge from those figures. This year for the first time Russia has given substantial orders for British herrings, which is a matter of immense importance to a big British industry. Next, it is interesting to see how the figures in Great Britain's case compare with those of other countries, particularly of Germany, who in the past has been the biggest exporter to Russia. The comparative figures are made available in the economic supplement to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 16th last. In the first six months of 1934 the Russian imports into Germany slightly decreased (80,400,000 Marks as against 83,100,000 during the first half of 1933). But at the same time German exports to Russia fell catastrophically from 173,500,000 Marks in the first half of 1933 to 36,000,000 Marks in the first half of 1934. In their turn the 1933 figures of German exports to Russia were less than half of those of 1932. Since 1932 the Russian Government has taken part in the world-wide governmental game of reducing imports; but it is demonstrably the case that Russian purchasers of certain goods have been transferred from Germany to other countries, among whom Great Britain has received thirty-one per cent. of the resultant benefit. That is one reason no doubt which explains why in the Russian official figures published for August last Great Britain now displaces Germany at the head of the list of exporting countries to Russia. After Great Britain comes Germany, followed by the United States of America, the Netherlands, Italy and France, in that order.

THE COCKPIT OF EUROPE.

Europe is not the only cockpit in the world. Indeed it looks as if most of the civilised world—America, Europe and the Far East alike—were one monstrous cockpit. By contrast the uncivilised peoples seem to lead a quiet and a reasonable life. But Europe is certainly the worst example of what civilisation does for us. On October 9th last King Alexander of Yugoslavia landed upon French soil. He was on his way to Paris to engage in diplomatic conversations with the Foreign Minister of France. M. Barthou went from Paris to Marseilles to meet his visitor. Within five minutes of the King's landing both he and M. Barthou were fatally shot by an assassin in an open place in Marseilles, lined by crowds of people. Already

this year Dr. Dollfuss, Chancellor of Austria, and General Schleicher, sometime Chancellor of Germany, had been assassinated. In 1932 M. Doumer, President of France and in 1923 Mr. Stamboliski, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, were murdered. Since the war Kevin O'Higgins, Vice-President of the Irish Free State (1927), Sir Henry Wilson and Herr Rathenau (1922), Herr Erzberger (1921), Kurt Eisner, Karl Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg (1919) have also been murdered. Europe holds the world's record for political murder, with no other comparable area of the world's surface coming anywhere near it in the competition. Afghanistan, being less civilised, has merely murdered two of her Kings since the war: one in 1933 and one in 1919. In the four and a half years 1914-18 ten million men were slaughtered in a European political quarrel.

The study of Europe in the political sense offers much that is baffling and little that is cheerful to the student. After some years of such study the student feels inclined to lie back and take it all for granted. He suspects that ten years hence the same game of *macabre* musical chairs will be played as is played now and as was played ten, and twenty, and sixty years ago. It is only the occupants of the chairs that change; only the incidence of murder that shifts.

Since the grisly day, July 25th, when Herr Dollfuss was murdered, there has been enacted before our eyes a typically European conflict of nervous bickerings and intrigues carried on by rival sets of politicians and their followers. The main centre of disturbance was to be found in the Balkans: for the independence of Austria was the cardinal factor, and was of immediate concern to every country in South-Eastern Europe. Even before Dr. Dollfuss was killed by German Nazi agents, Signor Gayda wrote in the *Giornale d'Italia* (July 20th) something like a blunt warning to Germany that she should keep her hands off Austria, lest trouble brew for Germany. The moment the news of Dr. Dollfuss's murder was received in Rome an Italian army and air force were dispatched to the Brenner and Carinthian frontiers. That fact was announced from Rome in an official statement issued on July 26th. On that same day Signor Mussolini sent a telegram to the Austrian Vice-Chancellor to assure him of Italy's determination to safeguard Austria's independence. Three days later (July 29th) there began a spirited campaign

against Germany in the Italian Press, which on that day had been released from an official restriction which had prevented such an outburst before. Now it is impossible for Italy to move troops to her northern frontiers without exciting alarm in Yugoslavia. At the junction of the Austrian, Yugoslav and Italian frontiers heavy fighting of a mixed and muddled kind was reported within four days of Dr. Dollfuss's murder. German newspapers raised an immediate outcry against Signor Mussolini's movement of troops to the Austrian frontier, and German agents in Zagreb and Belgrade took the opportunity of fanning Yugoslav misgivings. In their turn the attacks upon Italy that now began to appear in the Yugoslav Press had a provocative effect upon Italy. Signor Gayda for example, on August 5th published one of his famous articles in the *Giornale d'Italia* alleging that the Austrian Government had documentary evidence of Yugoslav complicity in the Dollfuss murder and adding that the French Government had protested to Belgrade on that ground. Signor Gayda even gave a detailed list of six machine-guns, 400 rifles and 60,000 cartridges of Yugoslav manufacture which had been carried by the Nazis who had crossed the frontier into Austria. Next, on August 7th the *Piccolo* of Trieste published a dossier of alleged evidence of Slovene sympathy with Nazi Germany and even of the formation of Nazi organisations in that country.

The Italian troops which had been stationed along the Austrian frontier were not withdrawn till August 16th. But Signor Mussolini's diplomatic activity was thereupon redoubled. On August 21st he was visited at the Villa de Marinis near Florence by the new Austrian Chancellor, Herr Schuschnigg and immediately thereafter issued an official statement in which these sentences appeared :

There was found to exist an effective community of views upon guiding principles and on the methods to be adopted as regards the independence and integrity of the Austrian State. . . . Those guiding principles which were initiated and championed by the late Chancellor Dollfuss will govern also in future the relations between Italy and Austria.

Herr Schuschnigg himself when he left Italy on August 22nd gave a Press interview in which he announced his willingness to renew normal relations with Germany as soon as that country ceased to take "offensive" action against

Austria. On August 24th Signor Mussolini delivered a speech which, while hardly differing in its tone from his former speeches about foreign relations, was in the now prevailing circumstances read abroad with more than usual interest and concern. He was addressing a concourse of ministers, officials and army leaders at the end of the army manoeuvres that had been held from August 17th to August 24th. The importance of his speech was manifest in that it left no doubt in any mind, German or other, of his determination to maintain Italian armed strength at a high level. For good or for bad that fact was recognised throughout Europe as one which was bound deeply to influence the future diplomacy relating to South-Eastern Europe. A few of his passages are therefore worth quoting.

"Nobody in Europe," he said, "wants war, but war is in the air, and might break out at any moment. We must not prepare for a war of to-morrow, but for a war of to-day. At the end of July there arose suddenly a situation which recalled that of nineteen-fourteen. We responded promptly by sending troops to the frontier and so saved the situation. We must bring up Italians to be military minded—if you like, a militarist people. Nations rise and fall as a result of force. . . . I recall to you that military forces represent the essential element in the hierarchy of the nation. Nothing has yet been discovered which can take the place of that which is the clearest, most tangible, most decisive expression of the total strength of an entire people—that is to say, the size, the prestige, the power of its arms on land, on the sea, and in the air."

The more strongly did Signor Mussolini parade his readiness for war, the more sympathetic became Croat feeling towards Germany. That circumstance produced its reaction in Austria. On August 29th the *Reichspost* made these accusations : that "Nazi fugitives, driven from Austria since July 25th and numbering some 2,000 are being concentrated and drafted into units in the territory between Maribor and Bled; in Yugoslavia"; that the expenses of that work were being met out of German funds and the work supervised by emissaries from Munich; and that the Yugoslav Government's attitude to what was going on was "passive, if not benevolent." German agents concurrently made full use of the material to their hand. In divers ways they suggested that if Austria were to be annexed by Germany, Carinthia would be handed over to Yugoslavia as a reward for her good fellowship

and help. On the very day when that article was published the Yugoslav Government issued a formal, unequivocal denial of its allegations, and went on to stigmatise it as an attempt to help another foreign Press (unspecified, but clearly that of Italy) to make mischief between Yugoslavia and France. An example of the way in which Press vendettas inflame feelings was thereupon enacted by the Yugoslav Press. On August 30th the *Vreme* launched an attack on the *Reichspost*, and in the course of it suggested that if Austrian opinion really wanted to discover where lay the threat of war it must look to Italy, whose Government was openly militarist and was in effect challenging the world to make war.

By the end of September the tension between Italy and Yugoslavia had become so great and the concomitant attraction of Austrian sympathy to the Italian side and of German sympathy to the Yugoslav side had so clearly shown itself, that both Paris and London became alarmed. It was left to Paris to make the initiative in an attempt to arrest the mischief. M. Barthou arranged that King Alexander should visit him in Paris (October 10th-15th) and that he himself should then go to Rome. Although the British Government did not directly intervene, it took steps through the diplomatic channels to second M. Barthou's object of promoting a reconciliation between Italy and Yugoslavia. It was made informally known to Rome and Belgrade that the British Government regarded the unfortunate bickerings between the two countries as an obstacle to any attempt at economic or political stability in that part of Europe. It was therefore known in advance that when King Alexander reached Paris on October 10th M. Barthou would be able informally to quote British support in the cause he proposed to plead, namely that Yugoslavia's true interests could be served only by the re-capture of friendly relations with Italy. The explanation of M. Barthou's initiative was to be found in the assumption, common to Paris and London, that the Saar in January will revert to Germany and that thereupon will begin the real struggle between Nazi ambitions and a good Europe. That struggle, it was expected, would be decided by the fate of Austria. It is indeed Austria that lies at the root of nearly every phase of contemporary European diplomacy: of the exchanges that have taken place between Poland and Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Rumania and Germany,

and those which were impending between France, Italy and Yugoslavia when the murders of Marseilles intervened. When King Alexander reached Marseilles on October 9th there were two features of the general situation which gave rise to the hope that the disaster of a German acquisition of Austria next year might be averted. The first was a report that Herr Hitler contemplated a proposal, in the first instance a bilateral proposal to Signor Mussolini, that a joint guarantee be given for the specified period of ten years that Austria's independence be respected. To British and French eyes the importance of such a guarantee would be that it might make it more difficult for Nazi Germany to attempt an annexation of Austria at an early date. The second good sign was that on a certain interesting piece of evidence it began to look as if the Rumanian influences that remained loyal to the Little Entente had strengthened their position within the Rumanian Cabinet. The evidence was that the newspaper *Curajul* which belongs to Mr. Stephan Tatarescu, the Prime Minister's brother, was on October 4th suppressed by the Ministry of the Interior for publishing an article in which, over Mr. Stephan Tatarescu's own name, appeared this passage: "While maintaining in its entirety our alliance with France, I none the less consider that those among our compatriots who make a speciality every day of declaiming against the new Germany and its leaders are performing a poor service to our country . . . if we were to maintain good and friendly relations with this great people, it would benefit our commerce and help to defend our national patrimony." The suppression of the newspaper on that score was generally interpreted as a victory for the policy of Mr. Titulescu.

NAZI METHODS IN MEMEL.

Light is thrown upon the methods of German Nazi propaganda abroad by certain disclosures lately made in the Memel territory. By the provisions of the Memel Statute the organisation and administration of public education are assigned to the autonomous bodies, but the central Lithuanian Government has the right of general supervision. Up to now, however, that Government has refrained from exercising that right, and has preferred to trust in the loyalty of the autonomous bodies to the provisions of the

Statute. It has however become increasingly clear since the present German Government came into power that the schools in Memel (Klaipeda) were being used by Nazi organisations for purposes other than those of pure education. In March last the Kaunas Government appointed a School Inspector to investigate what was taking place. Since then he has visited some thirty out of the 244 schools in the Memel territory. What he found determined the Government to hold a fuller inquiry, with results it is now possible to assess.

The two local Nazi organisations (the *Sozialistische Volksgemeinschaft* and the *Christlich Sozialistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) in collaboration with Berlin have virtually re-staffed the schools with these remarkable results: that most of the teachers are either ignorant of the Lithuanian language or speak it badly; the walls of the schools display portraits of German personalities and pictures of German scenery, the Lithuanian State emblem having been found in only one school; the curriculum in history and geography is taken entire from the Prussian school curriculum. Textbooks are almost wholly German; and the diplomatic aspirations of the present German Government are explained as a matter of school routine. In more than one historical textbook it is stated as a fact that the Memel territory was taken from Germany by the Versailles Treaty and handed over to Lithuania against the wish of the inhabitants ("gegen den Willen der Einwohner").

In the course of the investigation many of the teachers turned King's evidence and made depositions. For an obvious reason their names cannot be disclosed. Many of those witnesses confessed to the financial inducements that had been given them to train their pupils in an exaggeratedly German sense. Some of them confessed that they had been to Berlin for a course of instruction in such propaganda, one such course being addressed by Herr Hitler himself. The Lithuanian Government has drafted the full evidence in a document that has been circulated to the interested governments, including the British Government.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 15th, 1934.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES.*

There is always a measure of risk when even a distinguished author collects and publishes a selection of his occasional Addresses and Essays. Frequently such lectures only deal in a more popular or cursory way with subjects that the author has dealt with more thoroughly elsewhere, while the Essays are so detached from one another and too special to be of interest to the general reader. These drawbacks and risks are escaped by Professor A. E. Taylor in the volume of *Philosophical Studies* which he has recently published. They form an extremely valuable contribution to philosophical thought by one of the most competent and distinguished thinkers of the present time. Moreover, while the eleven Addresses and Essays contained in the book deal with a wide variety of subjects, they are knit together by the constitutive principles of Professor Taylor's philosophic outlook, and each subject is dealt with so thoroughly as not only to do justice to what is immediately in hand, but to fortify the author's characteristic point of view.

* *Philosophical Studies*, by A. E. Taylor. Macmillan. 15s. net.

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It is impossible, within the limited compass of this review, to deal in detail with a collection of papers that treat of important problems raised by the interpretation and development of Greek philosophy, with Neo-Platonic and Scholastic thought, and with some of the outstanding personalities and subjects of modern metaphysics. It must suffice to give a general indication of the scope of the volume and to summarise some of the most important general conclusions reached by Professor Taylor.

In regard to Greek Philosophy, the volume treats of Æschines of Sphettus, one of the less-known disciples of Socrates, with the relations of Parmenides and Zeno, the Eleatic philosophers, with Socrates, with the relations between Forms and Numbers in Plato's *Metaphysics*, and with the meaning of *ἑπιστήμη* in Plato's Seventh Epistle. As to these, only two general remarks can be made. In the first place, they are marked by the extensive learning, the thorough investigation, and the independent reasoning that are the marks of all Professor Taylor's writings. And, in the second place, they go to establish, wherever Socrates is concerned, both the trustworthiness of Plato's portrait of the epoch-making thinker and his philosophic importance in regard to the doctrine of the Ideas and of "participation" in them, which, while developed by Plato, was received by him, in its more tentative form, from his great teacher.

In regard to Neo-Platonic and Scholastic philosophy, Professor Taylor makes two noteworthy contributions. His Essay on Proclus exhibits the importance of that hitherto neglected thinker as second only to Plotinus and in some details superior to him, an estimate which is established by a careful exposition of his principal, the *Elements of Neo-Platonism*.

The Address on St. Thomas Aquinas as a Philosopher is of special interest and value. Delivered at Manchester in connection with the celebrations of the six hundredth anniversary of the Canonisation of St. Thomas in 1924, the Address not only rightly vindicates the outstanding greatness of the Angelic Doctor as a philosopher, but shows how his Aristotelianism must be qualified by due recognition of the way in which he carries over into it the Platonism which he inherited through the writings of St. Augustine. In particular, Professor Taylor emphasises the point that St. Thomas adopted the

more religious tendency to Theism in Aristotle's earlier writings as against his later trend towards Naturalism.

Coming to modern philosophy, the volume contains noteworthy addresses delivered to learned Societies, on Francis Bacon, Butler's Essays, and David Hume on the Miraculous. In regard to Bacon, Professor Taylor argues that his real significance for philosophy consists in his quest for "Forms," by which "connection" is established between objects, as distinguished from the mere "conjunction," that is the only result of ordinary induction. In this way, Bacon becomes linked with Leibnitz, whose doctrine of monads, though vitiated by its individualism, exhibits the self-same emphasis on "Forms," the internal structure and significance of the particulars that are inter-connected in the system of Reality. As to Butler, an exhaustive examination of the *Three Sermons*, the *Preface* and the *Dissertation* leads Professor Taylor to express the personal opinion that "in a situation of life which would have made devotion to pure speculation a moral duty or even morally permissible, Butler might have approved himself the greatest metaphysical intellect of his century" (p. 295).

In dealing with Hume's attack upon Miracles, the author offers the explanation that it was designed in order to secure notoriety by shocking the opinion of his times, and points out that Hume must have been conscious that his arguments were equally fatal to the rational trustworthiness of Natural Science. Professor Taylor dissects the well-known argument into eleven heads, showing up the changes of definition and the shiftings of reasoning by which the argument is vitiated.

Hence the conclusion is reached that "as a contribution to logic, Hume's Essay is thus an attack not so much on the credibility of 'Miracles' as on the validity of induction" (p. 355). Professor Taylor does well to insist that our judgment on Miracles must depend upon the view that is taken of God and of the consequent meaning of the World.

Space will not allow of comments upon the Essays on "Knowing and Believing" and on "Is Goodness a Quality?" with which the volume concludes. Sufficient, however, has been said to give some account of its contents and to show its great interest and importance.

J. S. L.

THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND.*

Professor Alison Phillips has edited a three-volume history of the Church of Ireland which at once steps into an authoritative position. Among the contributors to these three volumes are historians of established reputation such as the late Goddard H. Orpen, Archdeacon Seymour, Canon Jourdan, Mr. Chart and Dean Webster, and among the younger writers are men like Mr. Meissner, who writes the larger portion of the first volume, and Mr. Emerson, who writes much in the last volume. All the historians are sober in outlook, scientific in treatment, and skilful in welding together seemingly incoherent masses of facts and building out of them a coherent whole. The only criticism we feel inclined to offer is that the contributors are so anxious to be sober, scientific, and skilful that at times they fall to a level of dullness, a feature distinctly noticeable in the third volume, where more might have been said of the fruitful labours of the Church of Ireland in the task of the education of the people. It is quite clear that the historians are in touch with recent knowledge, and the bibliographies they offer put the reader on the track of fresh information where he desires more. These bibliographies are usually short, and we wish that occasionally there were comments on the worth or the worthlessness of the writings duly set down.

The salient fact in the first volume is that Ireland, to her own lasting loss, never fell under the yoke of the Roman Empire, and that her patron saint displayed none of the qualities of a statesman. From Mr. Meissner's pages it is easy to see that the life of St. Patrick is one of ceaseless activity and of as ceaseless resistance on the part of the people towards this activity, and it is no mean tribute to pay the saint when we state that the activity achieved a triumph over the resistance. Though he was a bishop, he did not breathe the spirit of compromise. To the day of his death he was unconscious of the magnitude of his achievement. He was hampered by the incessant squabbles of the chieftains, their sons, and their descendants, who were sapping the strength of the races in the land. A Dunstan might have settled at least some of them,

* *The History of the Church of Ireland from the Earliest Times to the Present Day.* Edited by W. Alison Phillips. Oxford University Press. 3 vols., 32s. 6d. net.

but St. Patrick could not. The truth is that he was better fitted to look after the things of God than the things of Caesar, and yet even a saint cannot afford to neglect the things of Caesar. It mainly falls to Canon Jourdan to record the causes, the courses, and the consequences of the Reformation. The movements initiated in the world of thought by Erasmus and in the world of action by Luther left Ireland entirely unmoved. There was a Renaissance in Europe both in learning in general and in theology in particular, but there was no Renaissance in Ireland. There was a Renaissance, of course, in England, and this new birth affected the sister country through the policy of the rulers. Canon Jourdan renders all this abundantly plain, and he brings out some curious points. He shows, for example, that the men who moulded the destiny of Roman Catholicism in the sixteenth century in Ireland were in many cases Englishmen, not Irishmen, and he offers instance after instance of this fact, a fact contrary to not a few conceptions of our day.

We have always wondered at the intellectual giants of the seventeenth century, and equally we have wondered at the circumstance that they never exerted so much influence upon mankind as their eighteenth-century successors who were distinctly less able. The Church of Ireland is no exception to this rule, for she numbers among her sons men like James Ussher, Jeremy Taylor, John Bramhall, Narcissus Marsh, William King, and Jonathan Swift.

The last volume largely centres around all that led up to the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland and the consequences flowing from it. Mr. Emerson and Dean Webster tell this tale, and they tell it with impartiality. Indeed this impartiality is carried to such a degree that we do not altogether see completely brought before us the heroism of the clergy in trusting the new financial institution, so well-known to-day as the Representative Church Body, with their financial future, when Mr. Gladstone offered to each of them his income with a State guarantee for its payment. With a nobility worthy of all praise, the clergy practically to a man accepted the security of an altogether unknown body, and had they not manifested this trust we do not quite see how the Church of Ireland could have continued in a corporate form without undergoing a transition period of grave and incalculable change. Perhaps this is not the place to notice

the consequences of disestablishment, and Dean Webster treats it rather implicitly than explicitly. Still, the cases cited in his pages sufficiently attest the circumstance that the State will not relinquish her hold upon the priest. After all, he is a citizen as well as a priest, and in the former capacity it is nothing but fitting that the State should possess jurisdiction. What is not perhaps realised is that the formularies of the Church of Ireland can come under the consideration of a civil court, and this is manifest in Dean Webster's narrative.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

* * * * *

ITALY.*

Three recent publications afford a remarkable testimony to the abiding interest of English students in Italian history, art and literature—the late Dr. Armstrong's *Italian Studies*, the special number of *The Times Literary Supplement* devoted to them, and now the present volume, so ably edited by Professor Gardner. By his previous work on Dante, on St. Catherine of Siena, and on the Arthurian legends in Italy, the Editor has earned the classic tribute paid to Mrs. Brown-ing, fashioning an "*aureo anello fra Italia e Inghilterra*"; his contributions here are among the most attractive where all are on a very high level. Each chapter has been entrusted to a distinguished specialist, Italian or English, and is followed by a valuable bibliography. The amount of scholarly information, covering so wide a range of topics and periods, that is conveyed in a limited space is extraordinary; one may regret that the scheme does not allow a section on science to the land of Volta and Marconi (Galileo's treatises are noticed), and that in the remarks on the modern stage a word was not spared for Eleonora Duse. Throughout the book one finds admirable, compact sketches of personalities, with their life-work, writings or teaching: taking a few very diverse names at random, one may instance Piero della Francesca, Benedetto Croce, Ugo Foscolo, Machiavelli, Tasso, Bernini, Carducci. The map and index are helpful additions, and the printing is excellent; we have detected two trifling errors only.

The opening chapter describes the development of modern Italian, "the speech of imperial Rome grown to maturity,"

* *Italy: A Companion to Italian Studies*. Edited by Edmund G. Gardner, Litt.D., F.B.A. Methuen & Co. 12s. 6d. 1934.

its dialects, and the claim of the *lingua toscana* to be the norm: in discussing the genius of the Italian people, it is suggested that this has shown itself *par excellence* in the *arti figurative*, "architecture, sculpture, painting and all the minor arts connected with them," the Italian mind being essentially "formative."

Italian art and Italian civilisation, whenever Italy could follow and express her own instincts, alike bear the impress of this *forming* spirit; keen in the creation and definition, or determination, of things; keen in the achievement of unity and order out of casual variety; keen in the formulation of law out of the shapeless and boundless multitude of human motives.

Of these major *arti figurative* a masterly survey is given by Dr. Borenus in his two chapters; where so much is lavished it may seem ungracious to ask for more, but a brief account of the "minor arts" alluded to would have been welcome, e.g. Venetian glass-making, intarsia work, the illuminated choir-books to which many of the great painters set their hand, or the glazed pottery more particularly connected with Gubbio and Faenza. A delightful essay on "Italian Music," by Professor Dent, completes the æsthetic section.

The chapters on literature—medieval, Renaissance, and modern—are a storehouse of information, much of which will be new to some readers, or has not been presented in such convenient form elsewhere. They will prove invaluable for reference, while not overlaid with biographical details or facts; they abound in discerning criticism. The vernacular sermons of St. Bernardino of Siena, taken down verbally as many of them were, might have been mentioned as an example of colloquial, fifteenth-century Tuscan, full of anecdotes and topical allusions.

It was, perhaps, an impossible task to attempt to compress Italian history, rendered complex by the vicissitudes of the various city-states, the Papacy and the Empire, into four chapters, totalling some seventy-six pages: the *résumé* tends here and there in the earlier periods to become a catalogue of names and events, from which the human interest has largely evaporated; no idea is conveyed, for instance, of the dramatic, emotional setting of the fight at Montaperti; "to Canossa we do not go." The bibliographies supplied are, of course, intended as a supplement, and this criticism is only ventured in the hope that in a future edition more space

might be allotted to history, even at the cost of enlarging the book. In the section on the *Risorgimento*, due recognition is paid to the statesmanship of Cavour, which has been sometimes rather eclipsed by the exploits of the lion-hearted Garibaldi. The account given of the difficulties with which Italy had to contend, both in the years immediately following on her Unity and, later, on the War, is very enlightening. Dr. Pellizzi rightly considers any detailed discussion of Fascism not to be "within the scope of the present summary"; all readers, whether they share his conviction of the permanence of that régime or not, will believe that his great country has before her a future worthy of her storied past.

E. G. S.

A FRENCH PHILOSOPHER.

The name of Maurice Blondel evokes his famous thesis on *Action*, defended at the Sorbonne in 1893, which, in spite of attacks and mistrust, founded a new school of thought in modern philosophy. Subsequent writings bore the same imprint of originality, and the present volume may be looked upon as the fulfilment of forty years' labour and experience in the domain of metaphysical speculation. To my mind there is no exaggeration in claiming for it the importance of Descartes' *Discours sur la Méthode* or Leibnitz' *Monadologie*. As a rule the publication of a great book does not bring an immediate sense of revelation, and creates less stir than those of superficial brilliance. A great book sinks in and convinces, which takes time. Blondel's *La Pensée** is not a study of theories of cognition, but of metaphysics. And those who still frown at the word should realise that everyone of us, even the man in the street, has recourse to metaphysics, without knowing it. Fortunately the author's manner of expressing himself, his warmth of style and use of illustrations, assist understanding, and indeed charm the reader even when he is doubtful or inclined to dissent.

In Part I Blondel considers thought as cosmic, organic and dynamic: that is to say, the thought that is contained by the world of reality, in virtue of which that world exists and evolves. We might call it the inner logic of the universe,

* *La Pensée*, par Maurice Blondel. Vol. 1. La Genèse de la Pensée et les paliers de son ascension spontanée. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1934.

the spiritual force of its becoming, the implicit need for a higher order which it summons, stage by stage, in its progressive development. With greater accuracy he speaks of it as thought, even before this process of implications and exigencies arrives at "thinking thought," because the metaphysical content of the universe is thought, and its inward need tends always towards a conscious intellectual order. Thus, at the limit of psychic thought, the need is felt for the emergence of consciousness. Thinking thought has its dawn, its rising and its noon-day. This is admirably treated in Part II, in which Chapter II is the masterpiece of the book. Part III deals with the "normal unfolding of intellectual spontaneity." The author studies the dynamic unity of its genesis, the first sense-realizations—"provisional incarnations"—of its rational function, and its development as reason. His analysis is at once subtle and profound, especially in his study of what he calls the "fruitful hymen of object and subject." The first volume concludes with an interesting chapter on "The ladder of reason and the problems solved and posed by the idea of God," a masterly chapter that calls for the further developments of Volume II now in the press.

In the Appendix there are "*Eclaircissements et Assainissements*," elucidations of remarkable interest, completing the ideas in the text. The value of the work lies in the solidity of its construction and its inner consistency. Blondel can truly say:

We noted that at every stage it was necessary to rise to a higher rung, under pain of collapse; or rather, since there can be no retreat or station, we saw that in spite of successes achieved, there remains a want, a crack, a chasm reaching to the summit of our metaphysical speculation or moral eminence. And then to strengthen the building, to fill in the fissure from above, there arose the idea of God, recourse to God. But here was a cruel difficulty: this idea, this recourse, which for a moment seemed enlightened and consolidated, are they not merely myth and artifice? We must fully understand this objection, and the new effort it demands.

And here he returns to his fundamental *motif*: the co-existence in every grade of reality, from the cosmos to man, of a duality, the elements of which Leibnitz defined as geometric, rational, noetic on the one hand, and qualitative, pneumatic, spiritual on the other. These two-fold elements, according to

Blondel, find no unification, fusion or synthesis, but interchange, in a continual symbiosis, remaining irreducible the one to the other. It is this heterogeneity that gives rise not only to a reflexive consciousness, "but even to the intervention of freedom, of an option necessarily prepared, or more or less deliberately exercised, in the presence of opposing terms." Thus this symbiosis of two-fold thought not only forms the natural history of a spontaneous development, "but creates a new phase, an order of intellectual duties, and prolongs, through moral and religious responsibilities, all the antecedent dynamism of thought, which it leads towards the final term of its function and destiny. That is why the problem of God cannot be fully solved by dialectical demonstration, however exact, normal and probing this may be." By this he does not mean to invalidate the proofs he has given, but merely to insist on the final exigency of thought which, to reach God, brings into play the exercise of freedom, creates the sense of a duty, and calls for the crowning intervention of the will.

LUIGI STURZO.

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THE SURVEY OF MERSEYSIDE.*

Some five years ago the University of Liverpool was enabled to undertake, through the generosity of the Rockefeller Foundation, an enquiry into the social and economic condition of Merseyside. Under the brilliant direction of Mr. D. Caradog Jones the task has been completed, and the publication of these volumes is a landmark in the science of social investigation. Rivalled only by the great surveys of London, it is unique in the provinces and needs to be followed in the other great industrial centres. The compilers of the survey were able to regard their area as a compact unit, and the comprehensiveness of the work is its striking merit. The area surveyed comprises the city of Liverpool with Bootle and its other subsidiary municipalities and Birkenhead, Wallasey and Bebington-Brombrough on the Cheshire side of the Mersey. Though still administered by a series of local councils, the whole comprises a single urban unit with a population in 1931 of nearly 1,300,000.

* *The Social Survey of Merseyside*. University Press of Liverpool. Hodder and Stoughton. 3 vols. £2 5s. net. Vol. I, 15s. net; Vol. II, 21s. net; Vol. III, 25s.

The purpose of a social survey is the investigation of facts, and in these volumes "the sole object has been to arrive at and to present the true facts." While official and other statistics provide a large proportion of the material, especial use has been made of the "household sample" which "is the key to the whole plan and method of the survey." Registration districts were used as units and a sample, in the ratio of 1 in 30, was taken of all inhabited working-class buildings, making a total of nearly 7,000 families sampled in the whole area surveyed.

The first volume is devoted to questions of poverty and housing. In both cases the survey creates its own standard. Its poverty line, based upon a bare sufficiency of necessities, for the traditional family of five is 37s. 7d. a week, compared with the unemployment benefit rate of 32s., with proportionate variations for families of different sizes. Over the whole area, the proportion of families below this poverty level was 16 per cent., while 70 per cent. enjoyed an income 50 per cent. above the line. The household sample showed that the average income of working-class families in Liverpool was 62s. 6d. a week, or 15s. a person. A more reasonable standard of subsistence, however, is to be found in Mr. Seebohm Rowntree's "human needs" standard, which exceeds the survey's poverty line by 50 per cent. The percentage of families below the former nearly doubled to 30, so that

in round numbers some two thousand families out of the random sample of seven thousand that were investigated failed to secure what Rowntree termed "the bare essentials of a civilised life."

The survey's definition of overcrowding closely approximates to "the Manchester standard," but increases the level of bedroom accommodation. Upon this basis 10·8 per cent., rising to 30 per cent. in the worst wards, of the families sampled were living in slum conditions. The relation between poverty and overcrowding is highly significant. The survey estimates that 56 per cent. of the families could afford to pay higher rent for more adequate accommodation. In Liverpool the Corporation has assigned ten years for a programme of slum clearance and the provision of nearly 16,000 dwellings at a cost of £7,750,000.

The second volume of the survey is directed to the industrial condition of Merseyside and the state of unemployment.

The method has been to compile for each industry indices of unemployment and industrial attraction. Unemployment in a particular trade is contrasted with the average unemployment in all industries during the decade 1923-32. Conversely the index of industrial attraction indicates the increase of employment in a particular industry compared with the general trend of trade. It is suggested that such records should be available in every Juvenile Employment Bureau. The unemployment figures cited are those for 1932, and to this extent are out of date. The gradual revival of industry, however, during the last eighteen months has barely affected conditions on Merseyside, which is so dependent for its prosperity upon the revival of foreign trade. The survey concludes that

a growth of demand for labour sufficient to absorb all the existing surplus, especially in shipping, shipbuilding, and the dock services, within the next ten years or so is beyond reasonable hope.

The moral, mental and physical condition of the population, with an account of the local social services, is dealt with in the final volume. It is unfortunate that no separate treatment of crime, with its close relation to unemployment and social conditions, has been included. In a valuable chapter upon the use of leisure, which amounts to an average of six hours a day, the influence of the cinema is at once apparent. It is estimated that 40 per cent. of the total population visit a cinema once a week and that 25 per cent. go two or more times. In 1932, 37 per cent. of the films were devoted to "social drama" or love stories, and 30 per cent. to "thrillers," usually gangster plays. On the other hand it is gratifying to know that use of the public libraries is slowly but steadily increasing. Registered readers in the lending libraries have increased from 3.25 per cent. of the population in 1900 to 16.5 per cent. in 1930-1.

Most of the material used in the survey was collected between 1929 and 1932, so that some of the figures relate to conditions prevailing before the great over-riding slump of 1931. The household census was taken in 1929-30. But it cannot be doubted that the survey presents an accurate and comprehensive account of contemporary conditions. Moreover, it provides the basis for future investigations which, it is to be hoped, will be regularly undertaken. The comparative

study of surveys, both in time and place, is invaluable and demands acceptance of common standards by the various enquiries. In this connection it is satisfactory to know that this survey has accepted broadly the definition of the working-class laid down by Professor Bowley for the New London Survey. It should be possible to agree on other standards, such as the nature of overcrowding.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The insidious influence of the international traffic in arms has recently attracted wider publicity than it commonly receives. Two Americans, Mr. H. C. Engelbrecht and Mr. F. C. Hanighen, have produced a powerful exposure of the menace in their *Merchants of Death*.* The book is well authenticated and the moderation of its tone serves to increase its force. The authors describe the rise of the great pioneer firms, such as Du Pont, Colt, Winchester and Remington in the United States, the great armour-plate factories of Krupp at Essen, Vickers and Maxim in England, and de Schneider in France. It is a grim story of international rivalry and competition, of political graft and Press control and the quite unscrupulous supply of weapons and ammunition, all in the service of fat dividends. It was, and is, not uncommon for one concern to supply both combatants; as, for instance, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1879, when Remingtons admittedly manufactured upon one plant "thousands of cartridges for the combatants to fire against each other in deadly battle." Prior to the Great War Germany supplied Russia and Belgium with guns, and in the Dardanelles campaign there were "British ships foundering on British-made mines and crippled by British cannon." Since the war the arms merchants, especially upon the continent, have become increasingly active, using the old methods and urging greater armaments under the guise of patriotism and national security. The armament industry in Europe to-day is dominated by the French Schneider-Creusot group. It controls the great Czech firm of Skoda, which supplies with arms the "powder magazine" of Europe. It is significant, though not peculiar in the armament industry, that two directors contributed to the funds of the Hitler movement. The authors also point to the re-arming of Germany. In a short concluding chapter the two remedies of government ownership and international control are both rejected. The non-producing countries will not agree to the former. Few governments desire the latter because it will impair the strength of their national defences. Disarmament is the solution and entails a new spirit in the

* Routledge. 7s. 6d. net.

human race. Meanwhile "the arms industry is plainly a perfectly natural product of our present civilisation." The international agreement to prohibit the export of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay is, it may be said, at least a step in the right direction.

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Contemporary accounts of Russian society in the early years of the nineteenth century have been made available by the Marchioness of Londonderry and Mr. H. M. Hyde in *The Russian Journals of Martha and Catherine Wilmot*.* In 1803, at the age of 28, Martha left Ireland for Russia and during the next five years remained the guest and adored companion of the celebrated Princess Daschkaw who, forty years before, had actively plotted for the accession of Catherine the Great. In 1805 Martha was joined for two years by her elder sister Catherine. Their time was principally divided between the Princess's feudal estates and life in the most brilliant society in Moscow. Both sisters were ardent observers, and committed to their diaries and correspondence detailed impressions of their visit. They were immediately struck by the luxury and wanton extravagance of the upper classes. Dinners of forty courses were a daily routine, and the lavish display of wealth was the hall-mark of society. "Diamond epaulets and sword knots are as plenty as Mushrooms after a summer's shower" is typical. Martha delighted in describing the fashions and foibles of the nobility and "all sorts of little nothings." "Such trifles often let one into the manners of a place more than graver subjects." But it was Catherine who really penetrated the hard crust of Russian society. She had already travelled extensively in France and Italy, and her letters, which unfortunately are all too few, display amid sparkle and wit a greater perception of reality and contain some shrewd conclusions. She recognised the French veneer of the nobility, its wantonness and superficiality, together with appalling ignorance and superstition. "Have you ever seen a clumsy romping ignorant Girl of 12 years old with a fine Parisian Cap upon her head? So seems to my eye this Imperial Realm." She saw in Russia "the cloister'd ignorance not only of the 12th but of the 11th Century" and noted that the whole framework would succumb to any sudden method of reform. Lady Londonderry has written an interesting and necessary introduction, while Mr. Hyde's historical footnotes of persons mentioned in the text are extremely useful.

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The Irish Free State: Its Government and Politics,† contains a useful and dispassionate study by a young Irishman. The author, Mr. Nicholas Mansergh, has attempted "to discover the underlying principles at work in our political structure." The book contains comparatively little upon the question of Anglo-Irish relations. He is content to declare

* Macmillan. 21s. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

that the Irish regard their autonomy as based upon inalienable natural right rather than upon any treaty provisions. While the other Dominions are content with the substance of independence, the Irish people are intent upon the recognition of abstract rights. They prefer Rousseau to Burke. President de Valera maintains that the declarations of the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, culminating in the Statute of Westminster 1931, enabled the Free State to denounce the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Mr. Mansergh does not come to a conclusion upon this point. For the most part, however, he is concerned with the internal structure of government. The framers of the Constitution were anxious to obtain the predominance of the legislature compatible with a strong executive. All the devices of democratic theory were invoked, and some were incorporated in the Constitution. The referendum and initiative were introduced, and the danger of a group system under proportional representation was offset by the introduction of external ministers upon the Swiss pattern. During the last decade, however, the cleavage over the Treaty has resulted in the two-party system, and the referendum and the permanent ministers have disappeared. Practice is closely approximating to the English cabinet system. Mr. Mansergh's view that "we are creating a new democratic state" is, so far as structure is concerned, very doubtful. In addition to the three traditional organs of government, he discusses the growing powers of the Civil Service and deals at length with local government, where the city manager appears to be superseding the ordinary system of direct control by councils. As the Warden of All Souls says in his Foreword: "this book helps all to know the Free State."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Miss Margaret R. Shackleton has contributed an important addition to the University Geographical Series in her *Europe a Regional Survey*,* which is intended primarily, though not exclusively, for university students. Realising that for a true appreciation of the nature of the earth's surface, some knowledge of internal structure is necessary, Miss Shackleton has written her book from a geological standpoint. But being essentially a geographical work "an attempt is made not only to correlate structure with relief, but also relief with climate and all three with vegetation." Europe is divided into six regions and after a brief general survey, Miss Shackleton deals with each in detail. The divergence between the divisions of natural phenomena and political and economic boundaries makes any dissected region incomplete in itself. Miss Shackleton has preferred to include a whole national unit at the expense of natural uniformity. In her section on Southern Europe, for example, she has included North Italy and the North of

* Longmans. 15s. net.

Spain. In the Western European region she has deliberately omitted a detailed account of the British Isles, which can be found easily in other publications. In this connection one may mention the excellent geographic and economic survey by Dr. L. Dudley Stamp and Mr. Stanley H. Beaver in their recent work, *The British Isles*. Miss Shackleton's book is clearly written and the text is illustrated by numerous maps and photographs.

Professor H. J. Rose's aim in writing *A Handbook of Greek Literature from Homer to the Age of Lucian** has been to provide a work of moderate length which covers the whole ground and which embodies the latest research. For the beginner with no knowledge of classical literature, Professor Rose has written "a continuous account of all those movements which are of importance to the literature of Greece or of the world generally." Such a narrative must be largely dogmatic and the author has interspersed in the text paragraphs in smaller type which provide a slightly more detailed study and touch on controversial topics, as for instance the Homeric question. The innumerable footnotes are designed for the advanced student and the specialist. But the book is primarily an elementary survey and, for the sake of comprehension, Professor Rose has cut down æsthetic criticism to the barest minimum. It is an ambitious and valuable attempt to give in a single volume the concentrated essence of Greek literature and should lay the foundation for the full appreciation of the classics obtained by reading the authors themselves.

Provincial life in the early eighteenth century is well illustrated in the diary and accounts of a local doctor edited by the late Dr. Edmund Hobhouse, M.D., in *The Diary of a West Country Physician*.† Dr. Claver Morris practised in Wells from 1686 to 1727 and this volume contains extracts from his personal diary, compiled from 1718 to 1726, and from his daily accounts, which he meticulously kept during the whole period. The diary contains comparatively little about his practice and therapeutic methods, which appear to have been confined, as Dr. Hobhouse says, to "bleeding, purging, clysters, sweating or emetics." There is one interesting medical entry in August 1723 when he witnessed an operation "to take out a Stone from a Young Fellow by the new Method of Cutting throw the Belly," a practice which is now universal. Dr. Morris was a versatile man and committed to his diary all manner of information upon his daily life, his family, the education of his children, his recreation and public work. He was passionately fond of music and we get a glimpse of the musical tastes and the instruments in use at his "Musick-Clubb." Dr. Morris became a Commissioner of the Sewers and also took a leading part in carrying out local enclosures. Typical of his age and class, these intimate entries are interesting records of life in a small cathedral city.

* Methuen. 21s. net.

† Simpkin Marshall. 5s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

DECEMBER, 1934.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SECOND TRIUMPH.

THERE has been virtual unanimity in the early comments upon the elections of November 6th. In American politics no movement is more regular than the reaction of the electorate in the polls that come at the half-term. Very rarely can an American President be described as politically popular after his first year of office. No matter how large the congressional majority given him in the election of leap year, the assumption is that he must lose a good part of it two years later, and the American public is not greatly surprised when, as sometimes happens, the majority is almost wiped out. The three Republican Presidents who followed Woodrow Wilson experienced the full force of this swing over, Mr. Hoover especially, in 1930, being given a warning of disaster that threw his party managers into a panic. The year 1934 was marked by an absence of the customary signs. It was not denied that Mr. Roosevelt found himself in rough water. Recovery was not going well. From May onwards the trade and employment returns were ominous. The New Deal was being attacked on all sides. The N.R.A. and the regulating Codes, resented by a growing section of the business world, had come under comprehensive denunciation from the American Federation of Labour and all the parties of the Left. The sense of peril that is inseparable from any government which is adventuring in the field of currency was increasingly prevalent. It seemed impossible at the end of the summer to combat the evidence that a strong drift away from the Roosevelt policy and methods had begun. And yet there was, and could be, no doubt whatever as to the result of the November election. The Republican opposition could not at any stage of the campaign persuade themselves that the tide had turned. The Democrats were sure of winning: or, to put it more accurately, the President's position was so invulnerable that the success of his party at the polls was never in doubt.

But it seems to be agreed that no political expert in the
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country—not even Mr. James Farley, the Postmaster-General, who is the master of the Democratic party machine—anticipated a victory of this sweeping character. It was believed that the Democrats could hardly fail to be dislodged from certain Republican strongholds, both in the conservative East and in the progressive West, which had been lost to the Grand Old Party in the Hoover *débâcle*. The Democrats, it was said, could count upon gaining a few seats in the Senate (a third only of which body is elected at one time), but in the House of Representatives a transfer of thirty seats might be regarded as a reasonable mid-term sacrifice, and it would leave them still in control. All such speculations proved to be wide of the mark. The tide was overwhelming. The country voted in 1934 as in 1932—with a mass weight and passion which proclaimed that the New Deal must be given a full trial, that the President would be upheld without any question during the second half of his four years. In the Congress which meets at the New Year the Democrats will have a full two-thirds majority in the Senate, while in the House their strength is three to one. No President since the Civil War has been backed by a party representation on this scale after the midway election, and Mr. Roosevelt has a further advantage by reason of a small though important constitutional change brought about at the end of Mr. Hoover's time. Under the former rule governing the terms of Congress the arrangement of dates was obsolete and excessively inconvenient. The Houses elected in November were not convened until December of the following year, which meant that the second Congress of the presidential term did not assemble in Washington before the President in office was preparing for re-election and the programme of legislation was being rounded off. Under the new rule the President meets Congress within two months of the polling—on January 3rd—so that he shapes his later policy in daily contact with the Senate and the House upon whose support depends the fate of the measures which must in great part determine the issue of a second presidential term. The practical effect of this change in the case of the New Deal should be considerable.

Mr. Roosevelt's position has from the beginning been unexampled. It is now so extraordinary that one would search the annals of the United States in vain for any instance that

could be taken as a parallel. Not George Washington himself, at the dawn of the Republic, could call upon so vast a percentage of the nation, while every later President has known that his popularity was balanced by the weight of a powerful and compact opposition. Mr. Roosevelt enjoys (if that is the word) the reality of power without the political opposition which constitutional government, in the English view, always demands. It was not his party which annihilated the Republicans, nor need we say that their hosts were swept away by enthusiasm for the New Deal. The Republican party has been destroyed by the great Depression, aided, there is no doubt, by the power of false doctrine and incompetent leadership. Mr. Roosevelt is, of course, the beneficiary. His opportunity is unique, but the accompanying peril is such as to appal a responsible and sensitive man. It is manifest that the upshot of the election does not simplify his position. On the contrary it increases his difficulties and concentrates more than ever the responsibility for the Recovery policy in the President himself. That, obviously, is the great question of to-morrow in the United States. Before coming to it let us glance briefly at the more conspicuous features of the election campaign.

There would be no point in dwelling upon the personal and regional aspects of the Republican rout. Nor need anything be said here individually about the defeated Senators who made up the remnant of the Republican Old Guard, with one exception. Mr. David A. Reed, of Pennsylvania, a commanding veteran and an implacable opponent of the New Deal, was beaten by a regular Democrat. This was the most important single event in the senatorial contests. Pennsylvania was "rock-ribbed" in party loyalty. The Republicans took it for granted as an impregnable party stronghold. Democratic politicians in most parts of this State have been as much at home as Liberals and Socialists in Belgravia or South Kensington, and Senator Reed is in the direct line from the Republican autocrats of the last century. He is, moreover, the political adviser of the Mellons and the guardian of their interests, and it was he who, more than any other member of the Senate, drove forward the legislation which was designed to modify the immigration laws in the direction of a Nordic interpretation of racial origins. An election in which a Senator Reed goes down in the most powerful of Republican

States is an upheaval so abnormal that for Americans it leaves little room for surprise in relation to other happenings in the field, such as the defeat of Senator Fess of Ohio and other members of the Republican Old Guard. These men mean nothing to the multitude of new voters in the American cities; but their disappearance from Washington marks the end of an epoch. With them goes the old Republican party as America has known it since the frustration of Theodore Roosevelt and the insurgent Progressives of twenty years ago. This was the most powerful political organisation ever built up. It had financial resources on a scale never dreamed of in Europe. It was supposed to include by far the larger portion of political talent and administrative experience in the country. The general assumption was that it possessed a reserve of potential leaders and—most important of all—that since they were a permanent majority, the Republicans had merely to avoid party divisions in order to hold the federal Administration in perpetuity.

Such notions as these were not seriously challenged until the middle of the Hoover term, when it became apparent that the Republican philosophy and Republican leadership were alike wilting under the Depression. No Republican of political experience would to-day be ready to argue that the choice of Mr. Hoover as presidential candidate six years ago was other than a serious mistake in strategy; but at the same time it should be pointed out that no Administration could have had any hopes of survival through an economic crisis spreading beyond a full presidential term. Throughout the extraordinary decade of Harding-Coolidge-Hoover the Republican party, its assumptions and strategy, its practices and leading personalities, functioned as a complex whole which in American political history will provide material for an almost incredible narrative, and we cannot doubt that the collapse of this once invincible host under the assault of a Roosevelt will seem not the least inexplicable chapter. The party lies to-day in ruins. One would find it almost impossible to exaggerate the significance of the fact itself; and yet we should be well advised to avoid what might seem to be the obvious inference, since the developments of the next two years may prove any such inference to be altogether astray. To all appearance the Republican party has melted away. But the United States is a country of two regular established

parties and no third. At present the Republican managers in every State are doubtless suffering from the extreme of depression. Neither they nor any of their predecessors have ever had to confront a set of results such as those of November, 1934. They may, however, be reminded that some little reinforcement of spirit should be obtainable from the recent experience of their adversaries. In 1920 the breakdown of Woodrow Wilson left the Democrats in despair. Their party looked like a collection of mutually repellent factions, incapable of being welded again into a national organisation. Eight years later, when Governor Al Smith was overwhelmed by Hoover and Prosperity, the Democrats were plunged into an abyss more hopeless still. But how much validity is left in political prophecy, under the conditions of universal suffrage, of mass suggestion and regimentation? The tremendous victory of the Democrats leaves the Republican machine intact, and presumably also the substance of the party's voting strength in being. So far the historic loyalties in America have been unconquerable. Few things, for example, seem to the European student of American institutions more curious and revealing than the continuance of the solid Democratic South in defiance of modern economic and social changes, or the repeated failure of all movements in the direction of a third party. The evidence of all the recent past would appear to be on the whole in favour of a revised Republican party and a restoration of the old two-party organisation; and there can be no doubt that for all regular Republican politicians the predicted failure of the Roosevelt policies is being regarded as a condition precedent to such revival. But what, at the end of 1934, is it possible to say as to the party prospect and the re-emergence of a Republican opposition in the country? Plainly, very little, for the economic outlook is extraordinarily perplexing, the welter of revolutionary elements is without parallel, and the absence of any national leadership save that which is embodied in the President is a phenomenon hitherto practically unknown in the United States. The view is increasingly held that economic realities and the social facts of North America have at last created a situation which makes the continuance, or restoration, of artificial parties impossible: that the American people must now abandon the old politics, throw their machine politicians on to the scrap-heap, and recognise the

necessity of a straight antagonism between Right and Left. This may be so, as regards the main lines of a new division of political forces. It may be admitted that a re-drawing of party lines is becoming inevitable; and further, that the swift economic changes of the Southern States must at long last obliterate the party lines that were so deeply graven by the Civil War and the Negro question. But even so, it must be borne in mind that a new political alignment could not be a straight national division as we in Britain understand it. The United States is a huge continental area. Its geographical differences are very great; the economic and social forces of its several regions are conflicting. Each of the political parties, organised on a national basis, has inevitably found room within its own household for sections which, judged by the accepted standards of political theory and economic interest, seem from the outside to represent clearer and more important antagonisms than any to be discerned in the formal programme of the contending parties. Whatever the frontiers of any new national parties, it would seem that these difficulties must to a large extent remain, and, therefore, many Americans argue, the country will continue to be saddled with Republicans and Democrats, with Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Nevertheless, it is by no means improbable that Franklin Roosevelt is the man of destiny, in this as in other respects. The Recovery policy will either fail, or will attain a relative degree of success. Should failure be written over it by the end of Mr. Roosevelt's four years, the coming of an American Fascism would (as Mr. Hoover rightly says) be almost certain, and the danger there implied is such as in anticipation to freeze the blood. But should the reasonable hope be fulfilled, and a measure of world revival bring its natural results in North America, the re-election of Mr. Roosevelt in 1936 would be taken as a matter of course. It would involve, as a preliminary step, the reorganisation of the Democratic party so as to force an opposition of conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans, and the mobilisation of the immense progressive contingents in both the old parties in support of a national Democratic policy as foreshadowed in the New Deal.

One chief aim would be to create a new Democratic party which could make an appeal to all the forces of moderate Labour as against the Communists and Left-wing Socialists,

whose strength, there can be no doubt, has been greatly increased during the bitter labour conflicts that have raged in many States since the establishment of National Recovery Administration. The longshoremen's strike on the Pacific coast, with its culmination in San Francisco at midsummer, was a grave warning, though not essentially more portentous than the series of violent upheavals in great centres of the Middle West, from Pittsburgh to Minneapolis.

Looking over the whole field of the autumn election, one is led to take for particular mention three striking developments, each in its own way typical of the present political chaos, and all alike hinting at volcanic possibilities. These three are: the revival of agrarian radicalism in Wisconsin and the North West, the return of Tammany in New York, and the sensational candidature of Mr. Upton Sinclair.

In Wisconsin the remarkable La Follette influence is again in control. Senator Robert La Follette (second of the name) has kept his seat, while his brother Philip has recaptured the governorship. These sons of a late famous Senator ran as independent Progressives and succeeded against candidates of both the older parties. In several north-western States the Farmer-Labour combination, fighting upon a Radical-Socialist platform far to the left of the La Follettes, brought a note of aggressiveness into this region of America which had not been heard for ten years.

The resurgence of the Tammany power in New York is an extraordinary phenomenon. Following the defeat of 1932 this seemed, to the easily soothed public, an event that could not happen within a generation. Before the presidential election the municipal corruption of New York had been unveiled through a series of investigations which exhausted the citizen's capacity for indignation and his power of belief. All the horrors of preceding exposures were transcended; these things came up through the jaws of hell. Tammany, it was said, was finished; the system had been thrust into the pit, there was no possibility of its resurrection; surely, the Tammany crowd could never again get its hands on the government of New York. But Tammany is indestructible, and it has come back. The Democratic tide has swept over both City and State, with, in the City, this paradoxical result: that those people who wanted the election of Mr. Roosevelt to the Presidency were in New York mainly found rejoicing over the

victory of Mayor LaGuardia (Republican), the champion believed capable of cleansing his city from the Tammany stain. And to-day, as a Democratic politician, Mr. Roosevelt is expected to welcome the return of the Tammany bosses!

We come now to Upton Sinclair and California. His candidature is an astenishing single adventure into the chaos of Western public life. The author of *The Jungle* is, of course, a Socialist, but he was forced to the belief that if a reformer meant to do anything at all in American politics, he must carry one of the two accepted party labels. For obvious reasons he chose the Democratic: it appeared not unlikely that the New Deal could be made to cover his own Eric plan (End Poverty In California). He made the direct attack, and captured the Democratic nomination as candidate for the governorship of the State. His large majority in the primary, coupled with the fact that in California the registered Democrats outnumber the Republicans and with Mr. Sinclair's unsurpassed gift of publicity, aroused the fear that he might succeed. He visited the President, and it was taken as probable that Mr. Roosevelt might give his imprimatur. He did not, and the leading Democratic regulars turned against Sinclair. In the end he faced a consolidated opposition such as, one may suppose, no known candidate in an American election has ever encountered. The daily press was a unit against him; the news-reel was turned to account, with terrifying pictures of hordes of hoboes and wastrels pouring into California for the sweets of the Sinclair Utopia, and the full resources of the radio were employed for the denunciation of his programme and, it is alleged, for the discrediting of the novelist-politician's character. Defeat in these circumstances was a foregone conclusion. Church hostility was whipped up on the cry of atheism and free love (Mr. Sinclair being an implacable puritan), and the charge is made that in Los Angeles county the District Attorney struck 100,000 voters off the register when it was impossible to get them back in time. Never was so tremendous an effort for the defeat of a lone democratic crusader, starting without funds and without a party. Upton Sinclair's large poll in the face of all this is a portent of the insurgent West. He is certain to tell the full story of the adventure. It will make a resounding book.

In what degree can the election be taken as a referendum on the New Deal, and what, after this second popular triumph,

will Mr. Roosevelt wish or be able to do? The outstanding fact of the hour is that the only practicable course for America is to follow the President. The absence of an alternative Republican policy and the action of Republican candidates in support of the New Deal have made this plain to the American people, while the evidence from all over the country as to the growth of Left-wing feeling compels the business community to realise that Mr. Roosevelt, as national leader, is the bulwark against a revolutionary multitude. Moreover, the recent consultations with prominent bankers and industrialists, taken along with such important statements as those of Mr. Donald Richberg (who, since the removal of General Johnson, is the authoritative exponent of the N.R.A.), clearly imply that the Administration is resolved to reach an accord with Capital. The coming year must bring large adjustments over the entire field; and it is beyond question that the President will find the control of Congress a task of enormous difficulty, for the Democratic majority includes advocates of many fantastic nostrums. But it is not accurate to say that for Mr. Roosevelt the immediate choice is either a turn to the right or to the left. That choice will come later. For the next year or two at least the present policy must be maintained, although we may almost certainly anticipate early and important changes in the system of the industrial Codes. The basic economic condition of the country admits of no argument in respect of federal loans, unemployment relief, and the expansive programme of public-works expenditure. With some 15,000,000 families in need of relief at the beginning of the sixth winter of the depression, what other policy is possible or imaginable? And, meanwhile, we continue to watch with fascinated interest the actions and the demeanour of the President, driving along the middle way of controlled Capitalism, or what Mr. Walter Lippmann has defined as a "compensated" economy. Before the end of 1935 the United States and the world will know whether the New Deal can achieve the end which Mr. Roosevelt set before himself at his inauguration, of putting the American people back to work. One part of the answer would seem to be incontestable—namely, that the first condition of relative success must be a genuine movement towards world recovery. And how near, or how real, is that?

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

THE WRITING ON THE WALL.

"And let Men beware how they neglect and suffer Matter of Trouble to be prepared ; for no Man can forbid the Sparke nor tell whence it come."—*Bacon*.

EUROPE has been shocked by the murder of yet another Serbian ruler, the fourth since Serbia was freed from Turkish rule, rather over a century ago. Those who have not been murdered have been forced to abdicate. A sorry record. We do not wish to condone the deed. We detest all forms of violence ; they but provoke reprisals. But for the sake of peace, not only of the Balkans but of all Europe, it is our duty to analyse the causes of this crime and not to allow our judgment to be distorted by its horror.

In Serbia political murder has been the means always used to obtain a much-desired end. The rival dynasties of Obrenovitch and Karageorgevitch fought each other till in June 1903 the last Obrenovitch, his Queen and many of their relatives and partisans were slaughtered in a night of horror by a gang of traitorous officers, who then replaced the Karageorges upon the bloodstained throne. There were several reasons for this murder. The main one was the fierce desire of a strong military party to reconstruct the medieval empire of Stefan Dushan, an ambition unrealisable under the weak and rather Austrophil Alexander Obrenovitch. The pursuit of this object became a ruling passion. When the writer visited Serbia in 1906 she was told rapturously that the plans were going ahead, the whole energy of the country was to be poured into the army. France was supplying arms and money. Why France ? Because, as Léménon, the French publicist, announced in 1910, "a strong Serbia would be a dagger in the flank of Austria." Set on the throne by the soldiers, King Peter acquiesced in the steps they took towards the creation of Great Serbia. It is idle to-day for Belgrade to complain that Austria, Italy or Hungary have harboured her malcontents. The Serbs themselves boast that it was thus that they undermined and destroyed the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Officers have described how they enticed lads from Austria and Turkey, trained them in a comitadji school, partly subsidised by the Government, and sent them back to their homelands to practise all the arts of murder. Vienna protested vainly to Belgrade. *Attentats*

followed *attentats* and culminated in the murder of the Archduke in 1914, shot by lads trained and armed in Belgrade.

If other lands have harboured and encouraged the murderer of King Alexander, Belgrade has but been done by as she did. The Archduke, like Alexander Obrenovitch, was slaughtered as a step towards Great Serbia. All Serbia knew this. One of the Belgrade students refuged in London during the war said to the writer when she denounced that crime : "Yes. It is a pity so many men were killed in the war. But our plan has succeeded. We made you fight Austria and we have made Great Serbia." The belief that political murder leads to triumph was thus planted in the popular mind. The late King further encouraged it by permitting streets to be named after the murderers and a monument to be erected to their glory.

The Powers at Versailles were aware that up to 1914 the Serbs had been unable to form a stable Government and that their history was punctuated by murder ; but yet handed over to them a heterogeneous mass of peoples—a kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It was understood that these three should have equal rights. Belgrade was permitted to retain the large part of Bulgarian Macedonia which she had seized in 1913 and also wide lands inhabited mainly by Albanians. That the Powers had qualms as to how much justice would be meted out to subjects other than Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is proved by the Minority clauses in the Treaty, which stipulated that such peoples should have liberty of language, schools and religion. King Alexander accepted the kingdom on these terms and made not even a pretence of keeping them. Serb troops poured into the newly annexed lands. Serb officials were appointed. Instead of being "liberated brethren" Croat, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Slovene found themselves treated as trophies of war ; the raw material from which Great Serbia was to be welded. As a Great Serbian once said to the writer : "We shall be a great Power. If not given all that we claim, we shall be a danger to Europe."

The Croats, a people of Western culture who had never formed one nation with the Serbs, were subjected to a pitiless persecution by a people of a lower civilisation. Zagreb, when it was known as Agram, flew its own flag, displayed national colours, had a strongly nationalistic University ; its Opera

House staged plays of the Croat heroes of old. By all reasonable methods Croatia strove to obtain justice and that status within the triple kingdom which it had been led to expect. Stefan Raditch, the beloved leader of the Croat peasant party, when detailing to the writer the sufferings of his fellow countrymen, said very earnestly that never should the Croat stoop to the terrorist methods of Belgrade. The Croat cause was so good it must obtain a hearing and justice. But the Powers turned a deaf ear, and Raditch, the man of peace, was shot down with his son and his colleague Bassaricek in the Belgrade Parliament in 1928 by a partisan of the Government, Punisha Ratchitch.

The Government showed its approval of Ratchitch's crime by the farcical manner of his trial; by his comparatively light sentence, and by the fact that when Stefan's widow and daughter went to put wreaths on his grave, they were arrested, the flowers were torn from their hands and the grave trampled by the police. As were Alexander Obrenovitch and the Archduke, so were Raditch and his colleagues victims upon the altar of Great Serbia.

Croatia being deprived of leaders, King Alexander arbitrarily revised the Treaty which had trusted him with a triple kingdom, and without obtaining the consent of his subjects called his state Yugoslavia—a euphemism for Great Serbia—and has ever since tried by violence to force all into one mould. We have not space to detail the efforts of Dr. Koroshetz to obtain justice for the Slovenes. He was persecuted for his pains. His noble gesture of forgiveness over the dead King's body has set an example which should be followed by both rulers and ruled.

New Croat leaders arose, men who did not resort to violence but merely expressed opinions. They were hunted down. The trial of Dr. Machek created a scandal; foreign correspondents were able to verify the fact that "witnesses" had been cruelly tortured to extort "confessions." In February 1931 Dr. Shufflay, a professor at Zagreb, was bludgeoned to death one night in the street. His friends traced the criminals who, as they were police agents, were never punished. In 1932 a similar attack was made on Dr. Budak. The crowd rescued him and captured his assailants, but they were released by the police. Croats escaped with difficulty over the heavily guarded frontiers. In 1929 Dr. Ante Pavelitch and M.

Perčec visited Sofia in order to join forces with the yet more persecuted Macedonians. For this they were condemned to death in absence, and an attempt was made to carry out the sentence by sending agents to murder them abroad. In 1929 and 1930 the Croats appealed to Geneva and begged that a commission be sent to investigate the brutality of the Belgrade police. Among the many cases cited was that of a woman flogged though pregnant and of men beaten till their ribs were broken. Some thirty thousand Croats refuged in America, in Belgium, in France and in Germany, also petitioned for justice to their homeland. Geneva turned a deaf ear.

Things were even worse in Macedonia. Belgrade evaded the Minority clauses by stating that the inhabitants were not Bulgars but Serbs who had forgotten what they were and must be made to remember. The sturdy people resisted fiercely and demanded at least the rights they had wrung from the Turks—use of their language, schools and churches. Said Stefan Raditch: "Under the Turk, Macedonia was a goblet of blood; under the Serb it is an ocean of blood." He, too, vainly tried to obtain justice for Macedonia. Serb governors drew the line at no form of cruelty in their endeavours to crush Bulgar nationalism. Said Zhika Lazitch: "The old law said an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. For a tooth I shall take the jaw; for an eye, the whole head." After conducting a reign of horror in Macedonia he was promoted to the Ministry of the Interior. The tortures inflicted on women whose husbands had fled over the border or were suspect are among the worst. Mara Buneva, a young girl, tried to avenge them by shooting dead Prelitch, the governor of Skoplje. She saved herself from torture by suicide.

Henri Pozzi, a well-known French journalist, correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*, in his book *La Guerre revient*, says:

When I came from Macedonia I was revolted and sickened, as a free man, by the spectacle of cruelty and oppression I had witnessed. . . . One must have been where I have been inquiring in Bulgarian Macedonia, which is shuddering impotent under the heel which tramples its neck; and in that Croatia where men among the most cultivated in Europe are stripped, enslaved and assassinated by their "racial brethren." . . . I know nothing so odious as the oppressed when he becomes the oppressor.

Over thirty times have the Macedonians petitioned Geneva; have detailed the brutalities to which they are subjected and

have offered to prove their facts to an international commission. Geneva turned a deaf ear. Belgrade laid the blame on the Macedonian revolutionaries. This Committee said it would cease its work provided the Minority clauses were observed. The committee suspended all its operations for three months, during which it was hoped Belgrade might amend its ways. In vain.

Finding Macedonia a tougher problem than had been expected, and wishing moreover to secure Yugoslavia's rear in case of war on another frontier, Belgrade brought pressure to bear upon Sofia and ordered that support for the Macedonians must cease or the Serbs would take stronger action. Bulgaria, helpless between Greece and the Serbs, had to acquiesce. The deputy for Skoplje, Alexander Bukovitch, is reported to have said publicly: "Yugoslavia, Greece and Roumania are preparing to divide Bulgaria. That is why King Boris has come to kiss our King's hand and beg for mercy." To save Bulgaria, Macedonia was cast to the wolves. Desperate, she has struck a deadly blow. Montenegro, much smaller than Macedonia, was crushed earlier in the day by similar means. From twenty-six pages of examples three may suffice. For refusing to betray the whereabouts of some insurgents Serb soldiers tore the tongue and the ears of Peter Rakochevitch with red-hot pincers. For similar reasons two women, Plana and Stanitzza Bulatovitch, were hung over a brazier. Hundreds of Montenegrins now refuged in U.S.A. demand justice for their country. Said Lord Gladstone in 1920: "What worse could have befallen Montenegro if, instead of being our ally, from the first she had fought in the enemy's camp?"

How far was the King, who has now paid so dearly for it, responsible for this policy? Was this mad attempt to bludgeon his people into one mould forced on him by the knowledge that Alexander Obrenovitch and the Archduke had been slain to make Great Serbia; that he owed his throne and his State to those two murders, and that what the military have done once they can do again? Last year the King's sister wept and lamented to a friend of the writer that her brother might be murdered any day. What was the sinister power behind the throne that drove him to his death? His right hand during the dictatorship has been Pera Zhivkovitch, the officer on guard who, in 1903, admitted the

murder gang to the palace. For years this man has commanded the royal bodyguard. Does a King sleep sweetly whose slumbers are guarded by the murderer of his predecessor? It is a question that needs investigating.

It is asserted by some in defence of this "unifying" policy that a strong Yugoslavia is needed for the peace of Europe. Is it? Belgrade, which protests vehemently against any proposal to revise frontiers, at home persistently teaches her conscripts and her students that there are yet wide lands to be "redeemed." She calls for a realm that shall reach from the Black Sea to the Adriatic; from the Danube to the Aegean. The wilder spirits have even envisaged a Serb King at Byzantium. In the textbook entitled *What I must know as a soldier* the conscript is told: "Do not forget that 500,000 Slovenes are under Italian domination; that many Serbs are under the rule of those fierce beasts the Bulgars and Hungarians." The maps which accompany such teaching show Trieste, North Albania with Scutari, parts of Austria and Hungary, half Bulgaria with Sofia, and also Salonika included in a vast Yugoslavia. None of these aims can be accomplished without war. Belgrade prates peace at Geneva and plans war at home. She taxes her people to the bone to support her great army; she calls for a navy to make the Adriatic wholly and inalienably a Yugoslav sea. It is to this end that Serbism is forced upon her people and that those who oppose it are murdered. It is not by these means, nor with such an object in view, that a State that will conduce to the peace of Europe can be formed.

The formation of Yugoslavia has cost Europe too dearly already. Peace stable and lasting can alone save European civilisation. Not so much the unhappy man who wrought the tragedy of Marseilles is responsible, as are those Powers who entrusted Belgrade with a task for which she was unfitted and then failed to keep their promises to the peoples they handed over. And of all the Powers France is most heavily responsible. She it is that has armed and financed Belgrade since 1906. France has now paid dearly. We do not forget that it was at Toulouse early in 1914 that certain members of the Serbian Black Hand decided to murder the Archduke. It is time that this long series of murders should end.

Both Belgrade and her allies have failed grievously in their duties. The King will not have died in vain if a truce be now

sworn. And a truce can be made if those concerned will follow the example set by Koroshetz and pardon the past. Once again the world has been shown the folly of trying to wash out blood with blood. When we pity the grief of the widowed Queen and her children we must pity, too, the many widows and orphans who are the victims of the Great Serbian policy. Let all reprisals and recriminations cease. Belgrade cannot justly blame France for having taken insufficient precautions. The Press censors of Belgrade have systematically done all possible to conceal the internal state of the country. The extensive precautions taken when the King visited other towns have been suppressed and he has been represented as being enthusiastically received. It is not long ago that the *Times* correspondent was ordered to leave Belgrade. Other foreign papers have suffered similarly. Nor can Belgrade complain if her unhappy subjects have sought shelter with her neighbours. Let us hope both Geneva and Belgrade will take this last lesson to heart. That Geneva will no longer ignore her duties towards those she is pledged to protect. And that no thirst for vengeance, no thwarted ambitions, shall be allowed to imperil the world's peace. We cannot have Europe again set on fire to create Great Serbia.

That Belgrade, who has brought this catastrophe upon herself and who is herself a past master in the training of assassins, should try to make an international affair of it would indeed be deplorable. Belgrade, who refused to allow Austrian police to aid in tracing the Serajevo crime, cannot demand the right of inquiry elsewhere. When, in 1914, two days after that crime, the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, von Storck, asked M. Gruitch, Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "What measures the police have taken or intend to take to follow up the traces of the crime?" he received the reply: "Up till now the police have not occupied themselves with the affair." The police smuggled the accomplice Ciganovitch out of Belgrade and denied all knowledge of him, and he was subsequently employed by the Government as *agent provocateur*.

A generous amnesty of political prisoners and complete revision of a system which has failed so dismally, can alone lead to a pacification of the peoples. Not only the annexed peoples but many of the Serbs themselves have watched with dismay the progress of the Dictatorship and would welcome

a more representative form of government. Such men should be given a hearing; the elections should cease to be a farce. Each of the various peoples has its qualities which may be of value to all. The thousands of exiles abroad would cease to be a danger to the State—it is they largely who have financed the revolutionary movements. Were they satisfied that all was well in the homelands, many would gladly return. The Croat leader, Dr. Machek, is still in prison and his health is said to be injured by his treatment. Dr. Trumbitch, the Dalmatian lawyer to whom King Alexander was largely indebted for his State, has been interned. Svetozar Pribitchevitch, once a rebel against Austrian rule, is now an exile in France. Raditch's son, Vladimir, is in exile. So is his son-in-law, M. Kosutitch. The latter saved his life by a hazardous flight across the border. The prisons are full of political prisoners of minor note, but equally suffering. And the conditions of prison life are reported as often insanitary to the last degree. Some form of local autonomies, to be arrived at by consulting the leaders of the various peoples, is far more likely to establish an understanding than any further bludgeoning. The past histories of these peoples differ profoundly. They have their own habits and beliefs which demand consideration. Above all there should be a strict observance of the rights of the Minorities and a generous acknowledgment that the Macedonian Bulgars come under that heading; and a reform of the penal law which now permits the torture of prisoners. The new rulers of Belgrade have a supreme opportunity. A reign of justice may yet win the confidence of their subjects. Even under intense suffering many peasants clung pathetically to the idea that the King could not know how they were treated—that the police and soldiers were responsible. The task of reconciliation will not be easy. An animal long maltreated requires much kindness and patience before it ceases to snap and snarl. It dreads even the hand that offers gifts. Let Belgrade take warning before it is too late. And let Europe beware lest despair in the Balkans light another blaze. So may the Boy King be the first of Belgrade's rulers that is not forced from his throne by abdication or murder. One question remains to which we can give no answer. "Is there a sinister power behind the throne which will make any peace efforts null?"

M. E. DURHAM.

FRANCE—SENTINEL OF EUROPE.

AS I was waiting for my train at the Gare du Nord one day in July, a friendly *agent* came up to me and, discovering that I was English, began to express his satisfaction with M. Barthou's reception in London—and its results. "Ah!" he said, "at last you have realised." I knew what he meant—the events of June 30th in Germany were fresh in everyone's mind. "But," I said, "it has taken us a very long time, and now perhaps it is too late." "Oh no," he said, "you English take a long time to make up your mind, but no matter, for it means that when you have committed yourselves we know we can rely on you. And now we needn't build up our navy and incur still further taxation." The last remark, shrewd and characteristic, found confirmation almost at once in M. Piétri's visit, and the calmness with which French opinion received the news that Italy proposed to build two new thirty-five thousand ton battleships.

The late M. Barthou indeed, after a shaky start, deserves all praise for his achievement of recovering for France the initiative in the Sisyphean labour of organising peace in Europe. At the end of last year French diplomacy had, to all appearances, been out-manœuvred by "Fascist" or Vatican stratagems in Central Europe. Then the German Government, reckoning on British and Italian support, over-played its hand, and gave the Quai d'Orsay its chance of bringing out the Russian trump. Thus, the German-Polish pact for a ten-years' truce was effectively countered and the journeys of M. Barthou to Warsaw, to Bucharest and to Belgrade really only set the seal on a process of *rapprochement* with France's treaty satellites which was in the nature of things from the moment when the threat of a revived German military hegemony in Europe became the dominant factor in European diplomacy.

From the point of view of revitalising the League of Nations as an effective peace-making and peace-keeping agency, indeed, M. Barthou's jaunt to London had achieved precisely nothing. The benevolent neutrality of the British Foreign Office for any French projects for regional and Continental pacts of mutual assistance had inspired British declarations in the Security Commission of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva fifteen months previously. The satis-

faction with which certain sections of British opinion on the Left hailed the London negotiations was, therefore, to say the least of it, premature. And the aftermath has shown that any hope of getting back to the situation of the spring of 1933 even, when the patience and constructive efforts of the Daladier-Cot Government had at last made practicable a policy of disarmament *through* security, was an illusion. The opposition of the German Government to any suggestion originating in France was to be expected. M. Barthou, moreover, evidently miscalculated the extent to which Poland had been charmed into the worst kind of prestige-policy by siren voices in Nazi Germany. When in September the spokesman of Soviet Russia endorsed the Polish declaration in favour of bi-lateral non-aggression pacts rather than the regional groupings favoured by France, the bubble was finally pricked.

Does that mean, however, that France is simply left sitting on the safety-valve as at the beginning of this year, with Germany unblushingly providing herself with those "defensive" armaments which the other States claim to be necessary for their security, and the familiar triangular contest between France, Italy and Germany for the spoils of Central and South-Eastern Europe in full swing? Not at all. In the first place real statesmanship on the part of the national leaders of the smaller States, responding to the leadership of the new Turkey, has put an entirely new complexion on the Balkan sector of the diplomatic chess-board. It has been well said that the watchword in that part of Europe now is "*Balkania farà da se.*" The *rapprochement* effected between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia before the dastardly outrage at Marseilles had already paved the way for a Balkan "Locarno," so to speak, which offers real hope of peaceful revision, under the ægis of the League, of frontier questions outstanding from the Peace Treaties. The Regency in Yugoslavia under Prince Paul, who seems to be disposed to stand up to the pan-Serb clique, is another healthy symptom. The importance to France of a gradual spread of stability from the East and South-East, through the good offices of Russia and Turkey, need scarcely be emphasised.

Secondly, M. Barthou scored heavily in London when he obtained British support for the entry of Soviet Russia into the League.

Finally, and this was the crowning achievement of French

diplomacy during the year, France has now got Britain, as the saying goes, "where she wants her." Here my chatty *agent* saw clearly. M. Barthou came to London with two alternative moves for the chess-game of diplomacy as it is understood in Paris. It was to be a Franco-Russian combination to drag the Disarmament Conference out of its ruts *or* a Franco-Russian alliance, old-style, and in either case all that France wanted from England for the present was a free hand. The French knew perfectly well that if they proposed any direct participation by Great Britain in new pacts of mutual assistance, the answer would be "Nothing doing." But they also knew that, unless the queening of the Russian pawn could in some way or other reanimate the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, the British Government was in a mood to give the Service Ministers their head, and British foreign policy would then conveniently lapse into its pre-war connection with France. And that is exactly what happened. Indeed, before the Barthou visit, and without so much as a murmur from that "public opinion" which had been so critical of the French "security" policy at Geneva, the die had already been cast. Did anyone imagine that General Weygand came to London in June just to see the races? Was it conceivable that the British Chief of Staff, the Secretary of State for War, and forty staff officers, should have returned the visit, just for a ceremonial review of the Aisne battlefields? The co-ordination work of the high command of the British and French air forces, which was announced, was another sure sign of preparation on that plane for an Anglo-French *entente*, identical with that hypothetical arrangement which, for all Lord Grey's protestations, involved this country in war on the side of France in 1914. While the spokesmen of the Government were still, ostensibly—Micawber-like—waiting for something to turn up at Geneva, Lord Londonderry and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell indicated the real mind of the headless Cabinet in speeches which assumed that a disarmament convention at Geneva was now out of the question. This was the curtain to Mr. Baldwin's sheepish performance in the House of Commons on July 30th when he announced the increase of the British air force by some fifty per cent., and the army and navy by unspecified figures. He took care not to mention that, to meet the German air menace, the defence ministries of Great Britain and France had confabulated and

reached an understanding on a forward defensive zone of action across the Channel, exactly as in the years before 1914. That would have been too obvious an admission that Locarno, essentially a guarantee applying equally to France or Germany, was being nullified. But he did blurt it out in his characteristic way with that reference to the Rhine as Britain's frontier—to which Herr Rosenberg replied with the obvious *tu quoque* about the Thames being henceforth Germany's frontier. The fact that Britain's rearmament is represented as being in aid of the "collective system," when it is really no more than a contribution to an armed alliance against Germany, was not the least damning factor in a thoroughly unsavoury episode.

The policy of the Foreign Office—policy is hardly the word for a meek acquiescence in the demands of the Service Ministries—is intelligible only on the assumption that, provided our flank is covered, we can keep out of a European war. 1914 is there to show the utter nonsense of such an assumption. In these days of air transport, it is a blunder of the first magnitude. That, with their eyes fixed firmly on the Pacific, the oligarchy which directs British foreign policy is, nevertheless, hugging some such illusion, was foreshadowed by Lord Lothian's letters in *The Times* as early as May 1934. Lord Lothian, in effect, entered a plea for a line-up of non-aggressive "neutrals" on the basis of the Kellogg Pact—the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and the Dominions, etc.—leaving turbulent Europe to stew in her own juice or, as he phrased it more elegantly: "gradually to find its way to an internal equilibrium and a limitation of armaments by political appeasement"! Thus, he suggested, "stability by balance" would be attained in place of the military preponderance of France and her associates. At the same time, however, he went on, "there are certain things which everybody knows we could not tolerate, as for instance, a renewed invasion of Belgium or France." But what does this mean? It means that the British Government abandons the rôle of honest broker as between France and Germany, which has, admittedly, translated itself in practice into an undignified game of wibbly-wob at the Disarmament Conference, *and, while still paying lip-service to the League, in fact contracts out of its obligations under the Covenant.* In so doing it hopes to have the support of the unthinking multitude who, without

subscribing to the isolationism of Lord Beaverbrook, are easily persuaded that Franco-German asperities are due to a special dose of original sin on the part of those two peoples, and are ready to say: "A plague o' both your houses!" The recent visit of Mr. Eden to the Scandinavian countries must be regarded as another portent of this decision to follow the line of least resistance, and let Germany and her neighbours rearm to their hearts' content. Thus, the National Government commits the self-same fatal error with regard to Germany and Europe as with regard to Japan in the Far Eastern conflict. The expansionist elements in Eastern and Central Europe are able to gamble on Great Britain's abstaining from any "commitments," thereby preventing any progress towards the integration of Europe. Sir John Simon refuses to give any guarantee for Austria's independence other than the pious declaration of February last and then, after the Marseilles crime, tells us (*vide* his speech at Northampton, October 22nd) that the United Kingdom continues to "counsel prudence and moderation in all directions." Ye gods!

When public opinion wakes up to the fact that the consistent refusal of the Government to endorse a system of European security involving automatic sanctions has, nevertheless, put the British conscience in French keeping, there is likely to be such an outcry that it may well be as fatal to the National Government as was the Anglo-French naval compromise in 1928 to the Baldwin Conservative Government. There is nothing more distasteful to the average Englishman, particularly of the younger generation, than a factitious revival of the *Entente Cordiale*. Yet we have only ourselves to blame. (I say "we," advisedly, for until a few years ago I took the common view of opposition to any guarantees policy as demanded stubbornly by France.) For a succession of British Governments, cleaving to the past, have been able to trade upon the sneaking sympathy of the overwhelming body of British public opinion for what is loosely termed "treaty revision," the obverse of which has been seen in a sustained opposition to any suggestions of making the League of Nations system effective, originating in France. France's stand-pat policy, we said, is the cause of all the trouble, Hitler's Germany is the misbegotten creation of M. Poincaré and so on. The implication is that the treaty of Versailles—ditto of St. Germain and Trianon—was a monument of injustice, and

that this country's support must never be given for any policy of respecting and preserving the territorial and other features of those treaties. Those who are most vocal about the bad treaty, however, in England and in America, seem to be entirely oblivious of certain essential facts which I may perhaps enumerate:

1. That Great Britain has as much responsibility for the territorial settlements of 1918-9, inasmuch as concessions to the demands of France or her *protégés* were set off against the gains of Mr. Lloyd George and his backers, writ large in the Admiralty's achievement of destruction of the German battle and mercantile fleet, seizure of German private property abroad, etc.
2. That the wicked treaties, *for the first time in history*, contain within themselves provision for peaceful change, in Article 19 of the Covenant.
3. That the Covenant and the treaties are indissoluble—President Wilson saw that there was no other way of bringing the League of Nations into being—"a foundation on which others may build."
4. That, while France as much as any other country accepts the principle of *treaty revisability* (M. Clemenceau himself vouched for it when he described peace as "*une création continue*") that is a very different proposition from "treaty revision" in the vernacular of the dissatisfied Powers. If this point were grasped, there would never have been the outcry about M. Barthou's diatribe on revisionism when he went to Bucharest.
5. That, finally and fundamentally, whether we are dealing with the particular question of transforming the dictated peace of 1919 into an assented peace, or we have in mind the deeper need of providing a permanent and regular procedure, within the League system, of peaceful change—in either case useful work can only be done *on the basis of a ground-plan of international security*.

When, as a result of compromise between Wilsonian idealism and diplomatic tradition, a League of Nations was set up which left the task of the prevention of war through the organisation of peace to the future, it was natural enough that the chief architects of the New Europe should have taken thought for collective defence in the Anglo-American Guarantee Pact, which was designed to smooth the passage for disarmament. There followed the great betrayal, the refusal of the American Senate and then the British Government to underwrite that insurance premium. Relentlessly, facts and events every day are bringing it home that there

can be no disarmament, no treaty revision until, in some way or other, it is underwritten. From 1926 until that phase of the Disarmament Conference which revealed the dilemma to be inescapable—that the *sine qua non* condition of “disarmament” was

that every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its security by means of its own armaments but should also be able to rely upon the organised collective action of the League.—*Assembly Resolution, September 26th, 1927.*

—during those six or seven years nothing was done to work out the ways and means of “organised collective action.” Need we look any further for the cause of the present death-agonies of that Conference?

The whole story of British policy *vis-à-vis* the Continent since 1919 is one of shirking responsibility. Sir John Simon thinks that he has said all that need be said when he affirms that “it is not the Anglo-Saxon habit . . . to make defined engagements for undefined circumstances,” when he throws Austria to the Fascist wolves rather than assume any responsibility for preserving, as with China, that “territorial integrity” which is the clear obligation of the Covenant; when finally he pooh-poohs the suggestion that British troops should ever be called upon to back Mr. G. G. Knox and his Governing Commission in the thankless task of maintaining law and order in the Saar. In such irresponsibility, many of us think with Lord Allen, the Government “reads falsely the mind of the British people,” which has left the stage of “peace-at-any-price” behind, recognising that it is short-sighted and futile. The result is that the international policing work, which should be done on behalf of and in the name of the whole European community, is carried out by Signor Mussolini on the Brenner, by France on the confines of the Saar, with all the immeasurable danger of the explosive material heaped up being ignited into a war of alliances of the 1914 type.

I am concerned here with the effect on France. It simply means that France continues sentinel of Europe, of a federal union of States, which is in the womb of contemporary history—as Briand saw—but which cannot be brought forth unless Britain plays the part of midwife. A French Europe is no more acceptable than a Europe directed and controlled

from Berlin. The principle of diversity of national cultures is Europe's hall-mark, and it means practically nothing to the intellectualist Frenchman. What France *has* done, under Herriot, under Briand, under Barthou, is to set forth times without number the pattern of institutions—international air police, European air transport, etc.—appropriate to a twentieth-century world, indeed essential, as Lord Cecil declared in his address at the University of Brussels,* “if Europe is to survive.”

For the time being, despite all alarms and excursions, there is an unstable equilibrium in Europe which precludes war. But the armaments race is well under way. It can only be arrested by a bold policy, under French direction, of de-militarising the air, ending the nonsensical notion that the air-space above a country can be described as subject to the “sovereignty” of that State—when sovereignty is essentially territorial—and thus removing the dominant factor of fear. But Britain too must pull her weight, swallow her pride in accepting, as France is ready to accept, an overriding authority acting and speaking for Europe—the transfer of sovereignty need only apply to air power, in its two forms, armaments and transport. That France does not alone inspire the necessary confidence to be the head and corner of a European security organisation we saw when the Continental Security Pact came up for discussion at Geneva last year and Holland and Belgium refused to participate because Britain held aloof.

France, as I say, stands sentinel. She is waiting for the logic of events to complete the process whereby British opinion, however reluctantly, is being converted from sentimental idealism to the Continental conception of an effective League. There is a race going on between the forces of destruction released by the upheaval in Germany and the awakening impulse of responsibility to and for Europe in the British mind. The urgent need is not so much any mechanical apparatus for the collective system, to which now British statesmen give full measure of fine words, as for us islanders to learn “to speak European.”

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

* Lecture on “International Democracy” given to the University of Brussels, February 14th, 1934.

WHAT THE SAAR REALLY WANTS.

DURING recent months the Saar district has become more and more the centre of European interest, and on January 13th, 1935, the date of the plebiscite, it will have reached the peak. For only then will the attitude of the people be clearly revealed, while prior to that date the most exacting researches cannot accurately foretell the result. Only one thing is clear to-day: if, in the Saar district, it were merely a question of a return to Germany or union with France, the plebiscite, even in present circumstances, would show a majority of about 95 per cent. for Germany. Whatever can be said against the present régime in Germany, all the social distress and exploitation, the infringement of all existing rights, the economic catastrophe, the political prisons, etc., would not induce the German population of the Saar to vote for a perpetual separation from the Fatherland. These are facts that must be well known to all thoughtful Frenchmen; for, once the dark fog of Versailles had somewhat cleared, nobody has maintained the assertion of the existence of 150,000 French in the Saar. They never did exist, and to-day less so than ever. The fact I have just stated was less known and only recently fully understood in France.

When, on Hitler's assumption of power, the Saar began to be a problem, there were many forces in France ready to believe in a new South- and West-German separatism inimical to national German unity. In the dislike of many millions of Germans of National Socialism they saw a welcome instrument of French policy. We will not condemn them for this, for I confess that in the course of history my people has only too often nursed such hopes. But on this occasion a factor entered which remained unknown to foreigners and is difficult to define even in technical statements if it is not to appear as tendentious argument: in the depths of its consciousness the German people, with keen presentiment of the future, does not regard National Socialism as permanent. Both friends and opponents of the régime recognise this, hence the intolerance of the one and the almost sovereign patience of the other. Particularly in the Saar, where political instinct is augmented by knowledge of the true state of the "Third

Reich," one would never have been willing for the sake of transient inconvenience to sacrifice national cohesion with the rest of the people. Moreover, the people of the Saar, with the mentality of frontier-folk whose nationality has at times been in doubt, particularly desire to have a share in the German Reich.

The possibility provided for in the Saar statute of the Treaty of Versailles of voting for the *status quo* thus became on Hitler's accession a bone of contention, and to-day is the cause of bitter quarrels between Germans. Only the prospect of the *status quo* permitted patriots who are not National-Socialists to debate whether Germanism could not be better served by temporary separation from the Reich. The Social-Democrats, who had so far worked the hardest for the immediate return (just as the Austrian Social-Democracy had been the principal exponent of the *Anschluss* idea before Hitler came to power), decided after most conscientious examination of all the circumstances to work for the *status quo*. They realised that it was their national duty to save the political and intellectual liberty of the Saar people from immediate destruction in the Third Reich. They justly held that the Fatherland had a claim upon the life and activities of its sons and could demand that they should not be led astray by insults such as "traitors" and "French slaves." This courageous decision of the Social-Democrats was approved by part of the democratic *bourgeoisie*, and last spring a powerful Catholic *bloc* joined them. The Communists also decided to join, not, it is true, on national but rather party grounds. They hoped for greater possibilities for propaganda under the *status quo*. When, therefore, I leave them out, what common ground have all the other groups who fight for the *status quo*? What is their common bond in the face of all the dividing schisms of their programmes? I reply: the feeling of responsibility to the German nation. Because of this they know that Germany is within them. No abuse, no calumny can deprive them of this as long as they themselves do not renounce it. They must be determined to participate in German events even beyond January 13th, 1935, as it was for this they submitted to the harsh and terrible persecution of the National-Socialist organisation in the Saar, the so-called "German Front."

This determination applies to two demands made at the

September session of the League of Nations at Geneva and reappeared at the November session :

1. The promise of a constitution giving to the people of the Saar in accordance with modern concepts of the State that to which they are unconditionally entitled, namely responsibility for and participation in the government of the country. The present governing Commission should be recalled. It ruled the country well and conscientiously, but it could not establish contact with the people.
2. The promise that permission will be given at some later date for a return to Germany. The few "separatists" desirous of permanently separating the territory from Germany do not count ; they do not yet number 3 per cent. Since the decision on the *status quo* is merely a temporary solution on the part of the Saar people, its real will must be ascertained. No doubt it will ask for a return to a free, no longer National-Socialist Germany. In accordance with the duty of the League of Nations and the general principle of self-determination of the peoples, their will must count. No one has a right to interfere in a negative sense in the decision of the League, and no one has any just interest in doing so. For a free German Saar is a guarantee of peace for Europe, a guarantee of a coming new order in Germany when the present order shall have gone down in blood and smoke.

The National-Socialists are the only people interested in destroying this development. In the past weeks I have spoken with numerous people all over the country and gained the impression that the whole structure of National-Socialism will probably collapse whenever the Saar is guaranteed German management and the subsequent return. This would be a blow to the present party government in Germany, and to ward it off it is willing to sacrifice all true national interests. Here is the proof. In an "open letter" to M. Barthou, Herr Pirro, the leader of the so-called "German Front," protested on September 30th against any revision of the present constitution of the Saar if it should decide for the *status quo* on January 13th. He also protested against the promise of a subsequent chance of returning to Germany and appealed to the Treaty

of Versailles! (which, as is well known, is specially holy to the National-Socialists). *Difficile est satiram non scribere*. Thus it appeared that Herr Pirro, and with him the official policy of the Third Reich, intends to sacrifice the Saar if on January 13th it refuses to return. Rather than injure the National-Socialist party government 800,000 people, and with them one of the most important German industrial centres, is to be lost for all time. For a *status quo* plebiscite in the Saar would hit only the National-Socialist party and not the German people who urgently need a fresh territory. The prospect of building a German model State on the Saar, an example for the rest of the 65,000,000 people within Germany, seems intolerable to National-Socialism. For this reason they are combating the will of the Saar people who wish to retain the territory for the coming Reich. They are guilty of the treason of which they accuse their opponents. I am arguing this at some length because in England I have repeatedly been advised against fighting National-Socialism, and particularly against the Saar combat, with the slogan "right or wrong, my country." This is a saying which is most plainly inscribed on the banners of Hitler's opponents in the Saar.

When, during the last session of the League of Nations, I presented all these matters to the different delegations, I was generally confronted with the question of the future Saar constitution. To answer this in detail would be premature. Speaking generally it might be said that this constitution will have to conform to the special position of the new State : its edifice is intended not for all time but only for an interim period. While this lasts it would have to be sufficiently stable to withstand both the illegal and the so-called "legal" National-Socialist revolutionary endeavours. Even with a strong majority for the *status quo* the fact remains that the National-Socialists present a single compact mass materially supported by the Third Reich (with money and arms) and morally (with propaganda material and the like), while the "*status quo* front" comprises the most varied groups, who are by no means unanimous. If, therefore, the whole success of so much trouble and sacrifice is not to be destroyed on the day after the plebiscite, the Saar Constitution must be given the necessary assurance. It will, therefore, have to be democratic without giving the effective means of democracy to its worst enemies, as was foolishly done in the Weimar Republic.

The future Saar Parliament should be faced with a strong executive force whose administrator, the head of the State, should have an important legal position beside the legislative bodies of the country. The formation of a second Chamber might also be considered, to function side by side with the elected Parliament. This second Chamber would represent the organisations of the workers, the peasants, the employers and the intellectual life side by side with members appointed by the head of the State. No one should be allowed to perform a public function who is not unconditionally on the side of the German mission of the sovereign Saar State—"Pfalz-Saarbrücken," as its correct name should be.

With regard to danger from without, such as an invasion by the S.A. and the like, this would be most effectively combated by a declaration of guarantee by the League of Nations. For the moment the Third Reich is still afraid of serious conflicts in its foreign policy. The Saar territory, so long as it desires to exist, should be neutralised and placed under the protection of all the signatory Powers. In discussing what the Saar needs and desires I have intentionally omitted the economic side of the problem. It is admittedly important, for the present customs tariff with France and the freeing from the German economic crisis has great advantages for the population; and yet it is not important. For the question at issue is purely a national one, and if Germany were still Germany, no inhabitant of the Saar would hesitate to return even to the greatest poverty. Finally, all those in the Saar territory who to-day are prepared to give their life and that of those belonging to them for their conviction have not taken up so heavy a burden in order to secure material advantages. It is love of Germany, their great home, for which in their small territory they have assumed the whole responsibility. That this may be recognised is perhaps the warmest wish of this territory on which the future of a continent may depend.

PRINCE HUBERTUS LOEWENSTEIN.

CATALONIA AND THE SIXTH OF OCTOBER.

THROUGHOUT Catalonia—where, as in other Continental countries, important national events are often named after the days of the month* on which they happened—the ill-fated 6th of October, 1934, will live in the memory a shorter time only than the glorious 14th of April, 1931, the day which saw the foundation of the second Spanish Republic. In Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, there was proclaimed on each of those days one and the same thing—"the Catalan State (*Estat Català*) of the Federal Spanish Republic." Neither proclamation, strictly speaking, became effective; for, if the makers of the second were defeated and taken prisoners within a few hours by force, those responsible for the first, and others associated with them, were persuaded to modify its terms by means of arguments which, had they failed, would no doubt have been succeeded by a display of force no less terrifying. Yet because, in the movement of April 14th, Catalonians were all but unanimous, and because, beneath their various differences with other Spaniards, there was unity on the main question of republicanism, that day will be looked back upon as a day of achievement, whereas this more recent day will be counted as one of grief and loss.

Nor is this the case merely because the earlier movement attained a great part of its object and brought a measure of liberation to downtrodden Catalonia, whereas the later movement attained nothing and may well mean for the unhappy region which it victimised a partial return to subjection. The Catalonians have suffered again and again in the cause of liberty and have nothing but pride in the remembrance of their sufferings. The tragedy is that a headstrong group of politicians, representing a party (the *Esquerra*, or Left) returned to power for the purpose of constitutional government, have for months been estranging popular opinion by using language of unrestrained discontent, and finally, without mandate and in the face of dwindling support, have, by an insensate farce of a rebellion, involved the whole region in their well-merited fall.

That this is the opinion, not only of the *Lliga Catalana*, or Moderate Party, but of many advanced thinkers, is clear to

me from private correspondence received since the failure of the revolt (which, as at the time of writing the newspapers of the Left are suspended, is the principal method by which Catalan feeling can be tested abroad) and also from the expressions of growing uneasiness with which the public utterances of Senyor Companys, the President of the Generalitat, were received during the summer. Since the adverse judgment of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, in Madrid, upon the Catalanian Agrarian Law, and especially during the four months of conflict that immediately followed it, Senyor Companys had been indulging in violent recriminations and scarcely veiled threats, not only with regard to this particular crisis, but also concerning Catalonia's attitude to the Central Government in general. "This Government," which is charged with the guidance of the Hispanic peoples," he said, for example, at a meeting in Gerona on September 2nd, "is no longer loyal to the Constitution. It cannot throw off the cloak of imperialism and the education which it received from the Monarchy. These men are not Liberals; they cannot understand the federalist idea. If in Madrid they cannot create the Hispanic ideal, we will proceed to create a Catalanian nationality."

It is easy enough to assess the value of this reasoning by pointing out that the Constitution of 1931 expressly discards federalism and that therefore it is those within the Spanish Republic who continue to advocate the federalist idea that are the offenders against that Constitution. It is easy to see from the last phrase that the ideal of the Lone Star party had been seducing the ex-President, and indeed the increasing ascendancy over him of *Estat Català* had for some time been common talk. But the chief interest of this and similar pronouncements is the light which it throws on the crisis of October 6th. It was not to gain complete independence for Catalonia, but to free Catalonia, and the "Hispanic peoples," from what they described as "monarchising" influences that Senyor Companys and his colleagues became rebels.

This is evident from the speech delivered by the ex-President at the proclamation of the "Federal Republic." Though too long to be quoted here in full, it merits the attention of those who would understand the true reason for the rising. The opening paragraphs convey no suggestion of disloyalty to the Spanish régime, but rather seem to present

to their hearers a group of disinterested patriots striving for its fulfilment:

Catalonians!

The monarchising and Fascist forces which for some time have been attempting to betray the Republic have attained their objective and captured power. . . . Recent events have given all citizens the clear impression that the Republic, as to its fundamental democratic principles, is in the gravest peril. . . . All the authentically republican forces in Spain and the advanced social sectors, without distinction or exception, have risen in arms against this audacious move of the Fascists.

Catalonia—liberal, democratic and republican as she is—cannot stand aside from this protest, triumphant throughout the land, nor can she keep silence or fail to proclaim her solidarity with the sister Hispanic countries who are fighting, even to death, for liberty and right.

These lines, like the rest of the speech, are full of unwarranted assumptions and inexactitudes. One would have supposed, on hearing them, that a new Primo de Rivera had proclaimed a Fascist dictatorship in Spain and that from Galicia to Andalusia, from Extremadura to Valencia, the whole country had taken arms against him. What had actually happened was that in the re-shuffling of a Radical Republican Government three members of the group most strongly represented in the Cortes returned at the last General Election had been included. The C.E.D.A., to which these members belong, is neither monarchist nor monarchising, still less is it a Fascist organisation. In no sense can the "protest" be said to have been "triumphant throughout the land": on the contrary, such success as it attained was strictly local and confined to two regions alone. The "Hispanic countries," outside Catalonia, the Basque Provinces and Galicia, do not, unless we include Portugal among them, exist as separate entities, and, though many observers believe there is a future for federalism in the Peninsula, that future is obviously distant. The whole of Senyor Companys' picture, in fact, is the product of a febrile imagination brooding over fictitious wrongs. But it is a picture drawn by one who is anxious, not to create an independent republic in Catalonia, but to save the republican principle in Spain. The speech of the poet and ex-councillor for education in the Generalitat, Senyor Gassol, is equally emphatic. "This

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movement," he cried, "in defence of the Republic of the 14th of April is triumphing in all the countries of Spain (*a totes les terres d'Espanya*). Not, it will be observed, "in defence of the Republic of the 6th of October."

It is clear, then, that the rising of Senyor Companys and his colleagues was an attempt to restore power to the Socialists, probably under Señor Azaña, a move which they thought, and no doubt thought rightly, would have resulted in the restoration of further privileges and concessions to Catalonia, including some embodied in the Statute of Autonomy as voted by the people all but unanimously in the referendum of August 1931 and torn from it during the debates in the Cortes to placate Catalonia's enemies. The *Esquerra*, which held power in the Generalitat longer than Señor Azaña was able to do in the Cortes, has been closely linked with that able demagogue since the very establishment of the Second Republic. He had been a signatory to the Pact of San Sebastián, which, in August 1930, initiated the alliance. He had taken part in the preliminary conversations which smoothed the path, in the latter half of April 1931, between Barcelona and Madrid. As Prime Minister of Spain, he had championed the draft Statute through its four-months' struggle with the small body of anti-Catalanists in the Cortes. His three-hour speech in its support on May 27th, 1932, with its close and detailed reasoning followed by a peroration of tremendous power, was read throughout Catalonia. When the Statute all but came to grief on the question of education, it was a friendly and conciliatory speech by Señor Azaña that pulled it together and did much to soften the disappointment felt by those who were hardly able to accept the wholesale mutilations of Committee and Cortes. Finally, in September of the same year, when the Statute, signed and sealed, was formally delivered to the Generalitat, the occasion was marked by a dramatic and telling allocution made by Señor Azaña to the people of Catalonia in their own capital. "Now at last you belong to the Republic!" he cried, three times in succession, and each time the immense crowd roared a frenzied "Sí." Then he drove home his lesson with a force of which perhaps no other politician in Spain is capable. The Republic, he said, is establishing the new Spain on bases of equity and justice: Catalonia and the Republic must stand or fall together.

Can it be wondered that, when the leader of the Spanish

Left was heavily defeated at the polls last November, and, instead of remaining head of the powerful group which for nearly two years had imposed its will on the people, found himself with the merest remnant of his party, the Catalonians, always a chivalrous people, should have remained faithful to him? To them he was not the promoter of the hated Law for the Defence of the Republic, the enemy of the religious Orders, the chief agent in the deportations to Africa, the sinister figure in the slaughters of Casas Viejas, as he was (rightly or wrongly) to so many in Spain. To them he was the saviour of Catalonia, the man who had defended the Statute of Autonomy when, after being voted by the people with a majority of nearly 200 to 1, it was in danger of being shelved indefinitely. As he dominated the Cortes when in power, they looked at him with admiration; now, back in the House, for all his impotence, to them he was still a hero, to whom they accorded their respectful sympathy.

Soon, however, Señor Azaña began to forfeit the esteem of many in Spain who had followed him in the past (and who saw no disgrace in the defeat of one who would in due course conquer again) by speaking openly and violently of revolution and claiming that what could not be won by fair means must be taken by means which the plain man calls foul. Even then, however, opinion was kind to him in Catalonia. Going no farther than first-hand personal impressions, I was astonished last spring to find how many people in Barcelona who in 1931 had spoken with misgiving of the possibility of a Red dictatorship were complacently contemplating the prospect, and regarding it as likely, in 1934. Nevertheless, feeling in Barcelona seemed to be hardening against the Socialist malcontents during the summer, and there were signs that the *Esquerra* was outstaying its welcome in power, though it must be allowed that the partisans of the *Lliga Catalana* were disappointed that at the last trial of strength they had not made greater progress.

That the plan of Senyor Companys was for Barcelona to be the headquarters of the Provisional Government of a Third Republic under Señor Azaña there can be little doubt: only his name is omitted from the proclamation and no other name could be thought of in such a connection. "In this solemn hour," declared the President of the Generalitat, "in the name of the people and the Parliament, the Government

The future Saar Parliament should be faced with a strong executive force whose administrator, the head of the State, should have an important legal position beside the legislative bodies of the country. The formation of a second Chamber might also be considered, to function side by side with the elected Parliament. This second Chamber would represent the organisations of the workers, the peasants, the employers and the intellectual life side by side with members appointed by the head of the State. No one should be allowed to perform a public function who is not unconditionally on the side of the German mission of the sovereign Saar State—"Pfalz-Saarbrücken," as its correct name should be.

With regard to danger from without, such as an invasion by the S.A. and the like, this would be most effectively combated by a declaration of guarantee by the League of Nations. For the moment the Third Reich is still afraid of serious conflicts in its foreign policy. The Saar territory, so long as it desires to exist, should be neutralised and placed under the protection of all the signatory Powers. In discussing what the Saar needs and desires I have intentionally omitted the economic side of the problem. It is admittedly important, for the present customs tariff with France and the freeing from the German economic crisis has great advantages for the population; and yet it is not important. For the question at issue is purely a national one, and if Germany were still Germany, no inhabitant of the Saar would hesitate to return even to the greatest poverty. Finally, all those in the Saar territory who to-day are prepared to give their life and that of those belonging to them for their conviction have not taken up so heavy a burden in order to secure material advantages. It is love of Germany, their great home, for which in their small territory they have assumed the whole responsibility. That this may be recognised is perhaps the warmest wish of this territory on which the future of a continent may depend.

PRINCE HUBERTUS LOEWENSTEIN.

CATALONIA AND THE SIXTH OF OCTOBER.

THROUGHOUT Catalonia—where, as in other Continental countries, important national events are often named after the days of the month on which they happened—the ill-fated 6th of October, 1934, will live in the memory a shorter time only than the glorious 14th of April, 1931, the day which saw the foundation of the second Spanish Republic. In Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, there was proclaimed on each of those days one and the same thing—"the Catalan State (*Estat Català*) of the Federal Spanish Republic." Neither proclamation, strictly speaking, became effective; for, if the makers of the second were defeated and taken prisoners within a few hours by force, those responsible for the first, and others associated with them, were persuaded to modify its terms by means of arguments which, had they failed, would no doubt have been succeeded by a display of force no less terrifying. Yet because, in the movement of April 14th, Catalonians were all but unanimous, and because, beneath their various differences with other Spaniards, there was unity on the main question of republicanism, that day will be looked back upon as a day of achievement, whereas this more recent day will be counted as one of grief and loss.

Nor is this the case merely because the earlier movement attained a great part of its object and brought a measure of liberation to downtrodden Catalonia, whereas the later movement attained nothing and may well mean for the unhappy region which it victimised a partial return to subjection. The Catalonians have suffered again and again in the cause of liberty and have nothing but pride in the remembrance of their sufferings. The tragedy is that a headstrong group of politicians, representing a party (the *Esquerra*, or Left) returned to power for the purpose of constitutional government, have for months been estranging popular opinion by using language of unrestrained discontent, and finally, without mandate and in the face of dwindling support, have, by an insensate farce of a rebellion, involved the whole region in their well-merited fall.

That this is the opinion, not only of the *Lliga Catalana*, or Moderate Party, but of many advanced thinkers, is clear to

movement," he cried, "in defence of the Republic of the 14th of April is triumphing in all the countries of Spain (*a totes les terres d'Espanya*). Not, it will be observed, "in defence of the Republic of the 6th of October."

It is clear, then, that the rising of Senyor Companys and his colleagues was an attempt to restore power to the Socialists, probably under Señor Azaña, a move which they thought, and no doubt thought rightly, would have resulted in the restoration of further privileges and concessions to Catalonia, including some embodied in the Statute of Autonomy as voted by the people all but unanimously in the referendum of August 1931 and torn from it during the debates in the Cortes to placate Catalonia's enemies. The *Esquerra*, which held power in the Generalitat longer than Señor Azaña was able to do in the Cortes, has been closely linked with that able demagogue since the very establishment of the Second Republic. He had been a signatory to the Pact of San Sebastián, which, in August 1930, initiated the alliance. He had taken part in the preliminary conversations which smoothed the path, in the latter half of April 1931, between Barcelona and Madrid. As Prime Minister of Spain, he had championed the draft Statute through its four-months' struggle with the small body of anti-Catalanists in the Cortes. His three-hour speech in its support on May 27th, 1932, with its close and detailed reasoning followed by a peroration of tremendous power, was read throughout Catalonia. When the Statute all but came to grief on the question of education, it was a friendly and conciliatory speech by Señor Azaña that pulled it together and did much to soften the disappointment felt by those who were hardly able to accept the wholesale mutilations of Committee and Cortes. Finally, in September of the same year, when the Statute, signed and sealed, was formally delivered to the Generalitat, the occasion was marked by a dramatic and telling allocution made by Señor Azaña to the people of Catalonia in their own capital. "Now at last you belong to the Republic!" he cried, three times in succession, and each time the immense crowd roared a frenzied "Sí." Then he drove home his lesson with a force of which perhaps no other politician in Spain is capable. The Republic, he said, is establishing the new Spain on bases of equity and justice: Catalonia and the Republic must stand or fall together.

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Left was heavily defeated at the polls last November, and, instead of remaining head of the powerful group which for nearly two years had imposed its will on the people, found himself with the merest remnant of his party, the Catalonians, always a chivalrous people, should have remained faithful to him? To them he was not the promoter of the hated Law for the Defence of the Republic, the enemy of the religious Orders, the chief agent in the deportations to Africa, the sinister figure in the slaughters of Casas Viejas, as he was (rightly or wrongly) to so many in Spain. To them he was the saviour of Catalonia, the man who had defended the Statute of Autonomy when, after being voted by the people with a majority of nearly 200 to 1, it was in danger of being shelved indefinitely. As he dominated the Cortes when in power, they looked at him with admiration; now, back in the House, for all his impotence, to them he was still a hero, to whom they accorded their respectful sympathy.

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me from private correspondence received since the failure of the revolt (which, as at the time of writing the newspapers of the Left are suspended, is the principal method by which Catalan feeling can be tested abroad) and also from the expressions of growing uneasiness with which the public utterances of Senyor Companys, the President of the Generalitat, were received during the summer. Since the adverse judgment of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, in Madrid, upon the Catalan Agrarian Law, and especially during the four months of conflict that immediately followed it, Senyor Companys had been indulging in violent recriminations and scarcely veiled threats, not only with regard to this particular crisis, but also concerning Catalonia's attitude to the Central Government in general. "This Government," which is charged with the guidance of the Hispanic peoples," he said, for example, at a meeting in Gerona on September 2nd, "is no longer loyal to the Constitution. It cannot throw off the cloak of imperialism and the education which it received from the Monarchy. These men are not Liberals; they cannot understand the federalist idea. If in Madrid they cannot create the Hispanic ideal, we will proceed to create a Catalan nationality."

It is easy enough to assess the value of this reasoning by pointing out that the Constitution of 1931 expressly discards federalism and that therefore it is those within the Spanish Republic who continue to advocate the federalist idea that are the offenders against that Constitution. It is easy to see from the last phrase that the ideal of the Lone Star party had been seducing the ex-President, and indeed the increasing ascendancy over him of *Estat Català* had for some time been common talk. But the chief interest of this and similar pronouncements is the light which it throws on the crisis of October 6th. It was not to gain complete independence for Catalonia, but to free Catalonia, and the "Hispanic peoples," from what they described as "monarchising" influences that Senyor Companys and his colleagues became rebels.

This is evident from the speech delivered by the ex-President at the proclamation of the "Federal Republic." Though too long to be quoted here in full, it merits the attention of those who would understand the true reason for the rising. The opening paragraphs convey no suggestion of disloyalty to the Spanish régime, but rather seem to present

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to their hearers a group of disinterested patriots striving for its fulfilment :

Catalonians!

The monarchising and Fascist forces which for some time have been attempting to betray the Republic have attained their objective and captured power. . . . Recent events have given all citizens the clear impression that the Republic, as to its fundamental democratic principles, is in the gravest peril. . . . All the authentically republican forces in Spain and the advanced social sectors, without distinction or exception, have risen in arms against this audacious move of the Fascists.

Catalonia—liberal, democratic and republican as she is—cannot stand aside from this protest, triumphant throughout the land, nor can she keep silence or fail to proclaim her solidarity with the sister Hispanic countries who are fighting, even to death, for liberty and right.

These lines, like the rest of the speech, are full of unwarranted assumptions and inexactitudes. One would have supposed, on hearing them, that a new Primo de Rivera had proclaimed a Fascist dictatorship in Spain and that from Galicia to Andalusia, from Extremadura to Valencia, the whole country had taken arms against him. What had actually happened was that in the re-shuffling of a Radical Republican Government three members of the group most strongly represented in the Cortes returned at the last General Election had been included. The C.E.D.A., to which these members belong, is neither monarchist nor monarchising, still less is it a Fascist organisation. In no sense can the "protest" be said to have been "triumphant throughout the land": on the contrary, such success as it attained was strictly local and confined to two regions alone. The "Hispanic countries," outside Catalonia, the Basque Provinces and Galicia, do not, unless we include Portugal among them, exist as separate entities, and, though many observers believe there is a future for federalism in the Peninsula, that future is obviously distant. The whole of Senyor Companys' picture, in fact, is the product of a febrile imagination brooding over fictitious wrongs. But it is a picture drawn by one who is anxious, not to create an independent republic in Catalonia, but to save the republican principle in Spain. The speech of the poet and ex-councillor for education in the Generalitat, Senyor Gassol, is equally emphatic. "This

movement," he cried, "in defence of the Republic of the 14th of April is triumphing in all the countries of Spain (*a totes les terres d'Espanya*)." Not, it will be observed, "in defence of the Republic of the 6th of October."

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over which I preside assumes all the attributes of power in Catalonia, proclaims the Catalan State of the Federal Spanish Republic, and, in renewing and fortifying its relations with those who are directing the general protest against Fascism, invites them to establish in Catalonia the Provisional Government of the Republic, which will find in our Catalan people the most generous impulse of fraternity in our common desire to erect a Federal Republic, magnificent and free."

That such grandiloquent language was in fact the language of party politics is shown by the failure of Catalonia to respond as she did to President Macià's proclamation of 1931. General Batet, the divisional chief of the army and as good a regionalist as any, expressed the feelings of the man in the street when he added to the military edict establishing martial law these words: "As a Catalan, as a Spaniard and as a man whose sole aim and aspiration is the well-being of humanity, I lament this moment and trust that the good sense of all concerned will prevent bloodshed." Shortly after this edict had been posted, the City Council met to consider the Government's proclamation, adherence to which was carried by 22 votes to 8. The minority was composed of the members belonging to the *Lliga Catalana*, whose leader, Senyor Duran i Ventosa, refused so much as to discuss a proceeding which he described as disloyal to Catalanism as well as to the Spanish Republic.

The *Lliga Catalana* is now left in possession of a deserted field, with its reputation indeed untarnished and its hands clean, but with the unenviable prospect of having to labour for a Catalonia largely discredited through the indiscretions of the *Lliga's* political opponents and to fight against opposition which it can only too well understand. Fortunately there is a good prospect of a long period of enlightened Conservative rule in Madrid; it is to be hoped, in the interests both of Catalonia and of Spain as a whole, that counsels of moderation and prudence will prevail and no attempts will be made, as they were made under the Dictatorship of 1923, to repress a people with a strong and growing self-consciousness who have already tasted the satisfaction of obtaining some degree of independence.

E. ALLISON PEERS.

THE DISCONTENTED BASQUES.

LAST November I visited the Spanish Basque country, than which few places in the world are more delightful. It is a broad strip of land lying along the coast of the Bay of Biscay; the area does not greatly exceed that of the West Riding of Yorkshire. A considerable part is mountainous; many of the peaks are higher than Ben Nevis. It has been called the Spanish Switzerland, but the country possesses few lakes; the valleys are too narrow to hold much water. Most charming is the scenery on the railway journey from San Sebastian to Bilbao; and thence to Santander and southwards. The high hills are clad with chestnuts and pines and on all fertile spots the vine and maize grow luxuriantly. Streams run foaming down the hill-sides, and from time to time one crosses broad and turbulent rivers.

Like all Spaniards, the people are most friendly to strangers. To travel with such courteous companions is a perpetual delight. But from their kindly and cheerful demeanour towards visitors it must not be supposed that they are a facile race, or that they will fail to resent the slightest attempt to take a liberty. They resemble the Welsh in their good nature combined with a fiery temper and keen sense of dignity. A recent visitor remarks: "The abiding impression made by the Basques is that of a fine stalwart people, healthy and robust in mind and body, a race of hardy mountain folk with mountain virtues, who know their own minds and can defend their traditions and convictions with a courage and a spirit of independence amounting almost to fanaticism, and whose hearts are set on one thing, namely, to endure." These men will not give up their birthright to any republic.

Bilbao is the finest modern town in Spain, i.e. although it is old and there is a picturesque old town, a great new city has sprung up on the other side of the river, with boulevards and avenues which would be admired in Paris. It has a resemblance to Lille but surpasses the French town in both natural and artificial beauty. The population is 168,000. It is surrounded by high hills and intersected by the river Nervion. Its main industry is the shipping of iron ore. Over three million tons of this ore are produced annually—the bulk in this region. The town has long been famous for its metal and has given our language the old word of *bilbo*, which means

either a keenly tempered blade, or a fetter. It is used by Falstaff in the first sense, by Hamlet in the second.

San Sebastian is politically the leading town. King Alfonso brought it into great favour as a summer resort, and the climate is excellent all the year round. It is now a handsome and well-built town, and usually the first Spanish place encountered by travellers, but it is too cosmopolitan to be representative of any part of the Peninsula. Santander is a busy port; its ships, which come up to the quay-side within a hundred yards of the principal hotels, go to all parts of the globe. It is also a favourite summer residence for those who wish to avoid the scorching summer heat of Castile and Aragon.

Sturdy and usually barely of middle height, the Basques are the most athletic race of the Peninsula. Their endurance in dancing is referred to by Molière. They have practised their national game of pelota for many centuries, and have taught it to the world. The powers of the (French) Basque, M. Borotra, at lawn tennis are well known. The Basque women do not possess a grace equal to that of the Madrileño or Sevilleña, but their well-cut features and large eyes, their thick chestnut or black hair dressed in a simple and effective manner, their stately walk and healthful bloom—all give them a distinctive charm. There is a remarkable similarity in their appearance; the large Basque nose is hardly ever absent. This may be a sign of the persistence of their racial characteristics and the absence of foreign intermixture. A hundred years ago Ford described them as "highlanders, bred on metal-pregnant mountains, and nursed amid storms in a cradle indomitable as themselves . . . have always known how to forge their iron into arms," and when they were incorporated into the Spanish monarchy, "the national *fueros* were rigorously retained; and these, Kings of Spain, as Señores only of Biscay, swore on their successions to maintain." It is this matter which is now causing trouble.

The cessation of the Monarchy has had one most unfortunate result for Spain; it threatens to bring about disintegrating forces of any moment, and the first has vanished and the second has been assailed. A large number of hitherto independent races were forced into an artificial unity by the Spanish Kings, but all of these care for little except the welfare

of their own village and its adjacent territory. The Catalanian going to Madrid talks of going to Spain, and the Basques are equally centrifugal. The Castilian Government at Madrid, however constitutional, has never been a unifying influence. It is disliked as foreign, and it is a perpetual grievance that these foreign rulers spend the money raised in Biscay lands on objects which are of no benefit to those who find the funds. Some of the most popular works of the great Basque novelist, José Maria de Pereda, deal with the corruption and self-seeking of the capital.

The late Major Martin Hume often told me that the proper form of government for Spain was a federation, which would give local autonomy to the various nations inhabiting the Peninsula. Spanish patriotism is local; particularism reigns everywhere. The people do not understand delegating their own powers, their own rights to others who will exercise them in a distant city, and, in fact, will hand over these powers and rights to an alien and self-seeking government. Major Hume, in one of his admirable works, wrote:

For the Spaniard, until historically recent times, Spain was no fatherland; it is only so in a very limited sense to this day. The real fatherland of the Spaniard was his town, or the particular fold in the hills that formed his world. His countrymen were not those who spoke a similar tongue on the other side of the mountains, but those who made common cause with him on this side. The central thought of each man was his own independence of his fellows, and there was no object in common to melt their personal pride into one mass."

Stimulated by the success of the Catalonians, Basque discontent is now increasing and is likely to become more intense every month; the opportunity presented by a new form of government—in its origin revolutionary—is being eagerly seized. When I was in Bilbao and Santander the people were looking forward to the General Election, which was to take place almost immediately. Their goodwill towards the Republic was not conspicuous; their whole thought was for the grievances of the Basques, which they believed had been aggravated by the recent changes. A newspaper remarked that the Republic had promised *la paz, el orden, el progreso*, but on the contrary in two years its policy had landed the country *en ruinas, desolaciones, y fieros males*. This attitude is quite

typical of the general disillusionment. A consular officer told me that Basque separation would give even more trouble than that of Catalonia. The general stagnancy of trade made resentment against the Government the more bitter.

The tradition of resistance to authority is well established. In the Peninsular War, although they were fighting to repel the hated and adjacent neighbour, the Basques would do nothing unless they were placed under their own leaders and allowed to fight according to their own plans. They kept up their Carlist partisanship to the last, not so much out of devotion to the pretenders, but because the antagonists of the Carlists were hostile to Basque privileges and Basque religion. "No people on earth," says Borrow, "are prouder than the Basques. They have no nobility amongst them and no one will acknowledge a superior. The poorest carman is as proud as the governor of Tolosa." A Montmorency boasted to a Basque that his family dated back a thousand years, who replied: "And we cannot be dated at all." Pride and tenacity to custom are the main Basque characteristics. It was impossible not to suppose that this proud and independent race would make use of the revolutionary circumstances to push forward their cherished projects. As early as 1916 they demanded the restoration of their old rights and some form of home rule, and the movement has been growing apace.

The old subject of dispute has now arisen in an acute form. We have seen how tenaciously the Basques cling to their *fueros*, of which the most precious is the right to tax themselves. When they reluctantly admitted the sovereignty of the Kings of Spain, these rights were expressly reserved. Their juntas were allowed to retain important powers; the edicts of the Cortes and Spanish legislation in general had no force in Basqueland unless ratified by the juntas. The central Government, as was natural, looked with little favour upon these exemptions, but the Basques retained their privileges unimpaired until the nineteenth century. They delight in proverbs and there are two that express their ineradicable feeling. One is, "Heavy is the hand of foreigners," and the other, "A foreign land is a land of wolves." And to them all lands in Spain are foreign, except the little strip on the coast of Biscay. Latter-day kings sought for opportunities to curtail Basque privileges. The popular adhesion to the Carlist

cause served as an excuse. The long-drawn struggle came to an end in 1876 and the Basques, as the losers, lost most of their privileges. But they were still allowed to tax themselves and to pay a lump sum to Madrid.

With the arrival of the Republic, it was desired to bring about complete uniformity all over the Peninsula. Yet it was clearly shown that the over-riding of the various component nations could not be effected with impunity. Catalonia demanded and obtained home rule, and the Basques were not slow to attempt to follow them. At least the people were unanimous that their ancient rights of taxation must remain inviolable. The mayors of the most important towns met together to arrange meetings for the purpose of defending their rights. The Government had forbidden them to take this step, but the prohibition was ignored at San Sebastian and elsewhere, and many mayors were arrested.

This disaffection is causing great embarrassment to the Government, which depends for its existence upon several discordant parties whose united support is necessary. The raising of any such controversial point is likely to lose their support in various quarters, and perhaps to put an end to its existence. The Basque is not going to be deterred from his purpose by threats and coercion. The mayors gave the same reply which used to be given to kings: "We bow to your Majesty but we will not comply." The Catalonians are showing sympathy and putting pressure on Madrid to change its policy.

The disaffected Basques, who seem to include almost the whole community, have been making every effort to evoke the ancestral and historic spirit. The Catalan and Basque deputies visited Pedernales, the burial place of Sabino Arana, the founder of Basque liberties. They also assembled at Guernica under the tree which sprang from an acorn of the sacred oak—*Guernikako Arbola*—where the Basque assembly used to meet. The police seized several national banners, there were more disturbances, and a deputy was involved in the scuffle. The executive committee, long ago declared illegal by the Government, has ordered that all members of the municipal councils shall resign as a protest against the oppressive official measures. The Bilbao newspaper, *Euzkadi*, has been fined 10,000 pesetas for writing against the Government, and the town remains without a mayor. This official

had been removed some six weeks ago and no town councillor will fill the vacancy.

All these things appeared to be small matters, but within the last month Spain has again become an item in the news. There, horrible events in the neighbouring Asturias have shown that the Communists are ever ready to take advantage of discontent of every description. Little was heard of the Basques' legitimate complaints, but the Communists of Bilbao have seized the opportunity. The result was bloodshed. The truth is that the Spanish Government at the present day cannot afford to neglect any local manifestation of discontent. The defeat of the sinister forces in November 1933 enraged the subversive elements in every part of the world, and these will pretend to make common cause with Basques, Catalans, Andalusians, and every other possibility of trouble. At heavy cost the revolt has been suppressed, but it will soon break out afresh unless statesmanship intervenes and legitimate grievances are redressed.

The Basques are the most individualistic people in the world and also the most mysterious, for the problem of their origin and language has baffled all investigators. The Romans make frequent mention of a tribe living on both sides of the Pyrenees and employing a language which was not understood by their neighbours. But the nomenclature is confused—the Asturi and Cantabri also lived in this neighbourhood. Juvenal refers to the Vascones as possessing magic powers, and Silius Italicus says that they always fought bare-headed. But they were among the earliest of the Spanish tribes to submit to the Romans, whereas the Cantabri were by far the fiercest and kept up their resistance to the last, when Augustus, by a great effort, succeeded in reducing them. We must, therefore, consider the identification doubtful, and no evidence which we have throws the smallest light upon their origin or their history before the coming of the Romans. After the fall of the Roman Empire the Basques had a very bad reputation as "pirates and satellites of the Devil"; it seems to have been their practice to plunder all strangers, and in particular pilgrims visiting the famous shrines of northern Spain. Their later history is comparatively well known; we have seen that their characteristic was a sturdy independence. To their intense individualism their peculiar language contributes in no small degree. It is said that the Devil came

to this country, but soon left because he was unable to learn the language; there are various versions of the legend. The origin of the language is quite as unknown as that of the race. Lately it has been conjectured that Basque is Minoan. Mr. F. G. Gordon tells us that he has made a systematic comparison of the two languages, neither of which is Aryan—if that vague term may be permitted. He says: "Not only did the system yield a language indistinguishable (at present) from Basque, but it revealed unmistakable references to Hellenic deities, several old Greek names, and three poems, one in hexameter verse, one in elegiac, and one in couplets, consisting of a hexameter and a line of three dactyls and an odd syllable, closely resembling the metre of the *XII Epode of Horace*. It is evident, therefore, that the puzzle continues, although the subject has been studied for more than three centuries.

It seems hardly doubtful that the sympathies of the world (as far as it is cognisant of the subject at all) will be with the Basques. Universal regret is expressed at the passing of local customs, and at the tendency towards a monotonous and mechanical uniformity in all things. The Basques, with their picturesque national costume, their indefatigable dancing, their game of *pelota*, their ancient methods of cultivation, their simple and kindly habits, are a welcome exception to this tendency which has spread ugliness over the "civilised" part of the globe. Further, while a great part of Spain suffers from poverty and apathy, every corner of Basqueland, whether agricultural or industrial, enjoys considerable prosperity. Thrift, industry, and enterprise flourish. None of these qualities have been apparent in Spanish administrations for a very long time, and it is this Central Government that now wishes to introduce its unsuccessful fiscal methods into prosperous Basqueland. Also, there is general sympathy for a people that jealously preserves its independence and liberty.

If their claims were allowed, the Basques would remain under the Spanish Republic, and they would be contented—a source not of weakness but of strength. The Madrid Government will be well advised if it brings forward really ameliorative measures and allows the cherished privileges to remain. Otherwise, it is certain that this obstinate and delightful people will be a hard nut for the Spanish Republic to crack.

W. A. HIRST.

ISLAM AND THE LEAGUE.

JUDGING from the various activities of the League which I have seen personally in Geneva, I have come to the conclusion that an honest attempt is being made here by the various peoples of the world to understand the many facets of international questions. If I judge correctly, it is at the back of their minds here that a thorough, frank and dispassionate exposition is the only sure basis upon which an edifice of friendship between the nations can be built. It has been realised, too, by the greater minds in both the East and the West, that so long as we do not have an opportunity of understanding another man's point of view, we continue in an atmosphere of suspicion which is the reverse of world-friendliness.

I had the experience once of travelling in a train with an Englishman when I was wearing a garb consisting of "top" boots, a leather jerkin highly embroidered with gold lace, a cartridge belt slung across my chest, and a good and true Damascus blade well and truly nestling multi-coloured in my kamarband. For some hours together we regarded each other suspiciously and distantly; he was not at all sure of me and evidently did not like the look of a walking arsenal! For my part I, too, was anxious, wondering whether he might use my glass to pour in a certain kind of beverage from a bottle standing beside him and thus "pollute" a Moslem's drinking receptacle, as our religion prohibits the drinking of wine. When well out from the Pass area a mere incident opened conversation between us, and it was indeed astonishing to discover how much we had in common. He realised I had no intention whatever of attacking him, and I perceived he had no desire of "polluting" my glass, for he proved to be the director of a prohibitionist propaganda, and his bottle contained only water. Anecdotal as it may seem, the story had yet a deep meaning: it shows how detachment breeds misunderstanding. What men do not understand they fear, and against that fear, in self-defence, they begin to provide themselves with means other than peaceful.

This brings me directly to the subject under review. Is Europe certain that, if it solves its political difficulties in the West, that fact alone will maintain peace in the West? Holding, as I do, the view that all political entanglements are

but part and parcel of economic and industrial considerations, and that these factors are now so interwoven that no one nation or continent can adopt a policy of splendid isolation, self-sufficiency is impossible in world affairs to-day. Thus far, perhaps, is merely traversing familiar ground; but one has to emphasise the obvious, for I wish to draw attention to the urgent need of thinking about the world of Islam in connection with this interdependence, and, thereby, inviting attention to the significant fact that no scheme of international study and co-operation can be effective without regard being paid to the part which the people of Islam can play in knitting the world together for the common purpose of maintaining peace upon this earth.

The claim of the Moslems to be given an opportunity of assisting in this noble effort towards mutual understanding is based on their assertion that they, without exception, are the first people in the world to have possessed internationalism. The equality of man was proclaimed nearly fourteen hundred years ago by Mohamed, when he stated in his last sermon in Mecca: "Remember, ye Moslems, that ye are brothers—each to other a brother as like a blood relative." That, above all else in his pronouncement, proved the strongest slogan for Islamic brotherhood. The blackest of black men in Western Africa, the blond Caucasian, the suave Persian, the yellow-complexioned Chinese, and the Afghans, awoke to a new destiny. The people of Islam, speaking numerous languages, living under varied political and economic spheres, found a remarkable connecting-link—that of being Moslems.

The idea that "All Moslems are brothers" caught on to the imagination of men as no appeal in human history had done before or since; for it broke the barriers which separate heart from heart and segregation-grouping was abolished. There remained no colour, creed or linguistic disparity. The confidence and power which this unity of ideal bestowed upon yellow men, black men and white men covered generations with its shade; history bearing witness to the fact that this slogan added mighty strength to the bejewelled sceptre of the early régimes of the Leaders of the faithful. Though, as ever in human experience, this idea through the course of fourteen hundred years had to see a change. The symbol of unity—that is, "All Moslems are brothers"—pronounced as it was with an intense religious passion, due to the gradual ebb and

flow of political evolution, shifted to other angles. It became traditionally more in the form of an historical heritage rather than viewed as a mere article of religious faith, and it is with this aspect of its appeal that we are concerned here. Indeed, as a student I have no hesitation in stating that, even despite this swerving from its original flight, the ideal has succeeded in continuing to exist in the minds of one-seventh of the human race up to this time. Regarding this brotherhood we learn not so much in theological colleges as at home. Time and again as a child I remember rising from my seat to welcome the blackest Abyssinian one could imagine, and whom we did not know from Adam: only that upon entering the courtyard of our house he had uttered the magic sentence: "Assalam Alakum"—"May peace be upon you"; which is the Moslem salutation. Everybody in far-off Afghanistan received the stranger as brother, obliterating the miles between our two distant countries.

The geographical distribution of the Moslem world is now to be noted. Look on the map of the world at the vast network of Islamic peoples. Begin from the westernmost part of North-West Africa, from Morocco work eastwards to Algeria, Tripoli, Egypt; cross over the bridge of the Suez Canal the whole of Arabia, then travel upwards to Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan, North India, Chinese Turkestan, up to the solid block of the Chinese Moslems. Work downwards into Bengal, Burma, Java, Sumatra: cross over to East Africa, Zanzibar, and right across the Dark Continent to the Black Sultanates of West Africa, not excepting, of course, the Cossacks of the Black Sea and millions in Russia and Turkey. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that the network is so complete that there is hardly a single country in Asia where the Moslems do not form a significant factor. Having established their position on the map, you will, of course, observe that due to their geographical distribution these men live under very different economic and political conditions. Some are independent, like Afghanistan, Arabia. Others less so, till we find them subjects of some European nation or other. Regarding the possession of material wealth, too, they differ. Some are multi-millionaires, others live in abject poverty. Their local spheres at times differ so greatly as to have no common meeting-ground. The linguistic affinity between, say, a Chinese Moslem and an

Arab is as far apart as the two poles. In temperament, too, there is no approximation, say, between two groups of so adjacent countries as the meek Moslems of Bengal in India and the man with a fiery temper who dwells beyond the inhospitable spurs of the Khyber Pass.

These points give one a good study in contrast. Looking at it all superficially, who can say that there exists any cohesion in such a dispersed society? And yet there does exist a link—the same link and connection of brotherhood that was its glory and the source of its strength. In the earlier part of this review it has been observed how two total strangers, from two different countries, embrace each other upon hearing the magic cry of Islamic salutation. They do more. Something traditional, something emotional is stirred up in their hearts, each other's woes and pleasures are shared, not only is advice given, but practical help afforded. This has no propaganda value in it. These things are done almost involuntarily, because, if a common phrase be used, it is now in our blood to act thus towards another Moslem; and again let it be reiterated that this is manifested with no definable religious background, but as an integral part of a Moslem's social being.

A practical example may be given in this regard. There was an Arab war a few months ago—an Arab war that did not touch the lives of Javanese Moslems, or the Afghans, or the West Africans. And yet what happened? Within twenty-four hours of the declaration of hostilities between these two Moslem States, delegates from all parts of the Moslem East poured into Mecca on one side, and Samoa on the other, to bring peace between their warring co-religionists. No other power could have done it. The war lasted only a few days—to be precise, seventeen days. Compare it with the "little war" that has been going on in Southern America, for the pacification of which the moral forces of the entire Western civilisation have been mobilised for a year or two without results. If this is not peaceful influence which Islamic public opinion expresses, and which killed the flames of the Arabian war, what else was it?

Let us look at the reverse aspect. As in peace, so in respect of war, Moslems have been a factor of considerable concern. It once formed part of my duty to report on a fight between two peoples on a frontier post. These Moslem tribesmen were told to march and capture the machine-guns of a certain

European power. If they were killed, they would be killed in the cause of Islamic brotherhood. Each man had wrapped his funeral shroud round his head as his turban, hoping not to return alive. Seven hundred, with battle-cries of "Allah is great," "Allah is great," yelling and shouting, faced the rain of machine-gun bullets. The three surviving men captured the machine-guns. The rest had gone to Paradise. From this you can draw your own conclusions, but let it be added that such exhibitions do not connote savagery, nor mere courage either, but a belief in the sociological tradition of Islam and the spirit of sacrificing one's life-blood for a cause of internationalism.

And when you find men so closely allied in their outlook, whether in peace or in war (and their attitude the course of history has not changed); when a trouble between the Moslems and the Jews in Palestine is felt at the other end of the African continent; when protest meetings take place in the heart of India; when from the pulpits of Kandahar in far-off Afghanistan sympathy is expressed and active support is promised from the Golden Samarkand to their co-religionists in the Sudan; when in the rose-gardens of Omar Khayyám in Persia praises of an Indian poet are sung, you can readily realise how deeply the Moslems feel the concerns of each other, how active their co-operation both in peace and war can be when pronounced in the name of that slogan which runs "All Moslems are Brothers."

Having proved, I hope conclusively, the unity of ideals amongst so vast a population of the world, it now only remains to ask whether a people so intimately associated with each other, with ties which time has only served to strengthen, who could be instruments of war or peace according to the way the appeal was made to them, whose solidarity no political or economic changes seem to affect, and whose strength is appreciated even in areas where they form a minority, are a people who deserve urgent consideration as co-workers in the noble effort which the West is making to maintain peace in the world. I cannot help repeating that it is not enough for Europe to set her house in order for the requirements of a universal peace: the active and immediate co-operation of the East is an essential factor in any peace organisation. Observe also that here are a people in whose life-sap internationalism already exists. They have been practising it for centuries. Nothing is new to them when you

say that national barriers should be lifted: and that cash, creed and colour, economic and political considerations, should count for naught when the common good of humanity is in view. It is, I think, begging the question to say that their moral and material assistance will enormously help in maintaining the strength of the League of Nations. Most of them are unaware that their co-operation with the League will be welcomed. Think of the colossal force where one-seventh of the human race will stand out and say, "We shall have no war"; and they can carry out their promise without any international conference, without preparing the ground to receive the seed of peace, because the ground has never lain fallow in their hearts. Think what mighty force you can harness to your work.

In conclusion one might express feelings both of challenge and appeal. A challenge not in its usual application signifying an unfriendly attitude of mind. It is intended to awaken your interest in certain very potent forces which lie neglected for the cause of universal peace: for I am one of those who believe in the excellence of many peace movements in Europe and America notwithstanding. No abiding peace can be ushered into the world unless its application is universal: and it cannot be universal so long as one-seventh of the human race stands aloof from its deliberations. I therefore warn Europe that without Asia, without a section of humanity wherein nothing but internationalism is the guiding force, where "intellectuals" either force men to war or divert their attention towards peace, without understanding their minds, no permanent peace can exist even in Europe; for you are up against not armaments, guns, powder and shot, but a high wall of Asiatic mentality over which you must peep, and gather adherents to your noble fold. The process is not easy, because these people have no conception that you are willing to use their efforts for the common good of mankind.

Nor is this a religious grouping. I have, I hope, made you realise during my survey of the Moslem mind that the religious appeal has long ceased to exist amongst the Moslems. It has become traditional, a sociological factor of immense importance. If I, as a good Moslem, pray five times a day, I act thus according to the injunctions of the Koran: but when I embrace a Chinese or a Don Cossack Moslem, I do so because my

father, my great ancestors, have done so, and not to make common cause with my fellow Moslem will go against my grain. This psychological idea should be appreciated and not be confused with any religious observances of Islam.

And now there is an appeal. If you are exploring the avenues of world peace, and are truly desirous, as I believe you are, of securing peace, the sphere of your activities must embrace a people who are always fighting—that is the Moslems. You can ascertain for yourselves if you take the file of a newspaper like *The Times* of London for any given year, you will find that out of any seven days of the week, at least during four days there has been a disturbance of the peace amongst the faithful: there is either the chasing of a tribesman in Algeria, or there has been pot-shooting across our own glens on the Afghan frontier: there is some riot or other in India: there is a bomb thrown somewhere in the ancient capital of the Caliphs: there is an attack of Chinese Moslems against the Kashgar authorities. These discordant factors can be multiplied. Surely it stands to reason that these disturbances, when they occur with such pernicious insistence year in and year out, are but indications of the fact that a section of the race is ever disquiet, and peace should be ushered in its midst? Indeed, I will go a step farther by saying that when you are adjusting the European entanglements, fearing that these European factors may precipitate war—I say may precipitate war—you are safeguarding against possibilities where, as you are disregarding the actualities, positive facts of disturbances are occurring nearly every day in the world. Is it not your duty to address yourselves to the task of curing a patient who is already suffering—thus to disinfect your own house, fearing that measles may invade your homes? I am not suggesting any interference whatever in the local politics of any European powers—I do not wish to trample on anybody's corns!—but I do submit it as an appeal for you to study ways and means to share the good things of the world with others. Surely the sharing of peace is the highest service you can render to mankind: why not extend it to the World of Islam, and this I speak with feeling words—words which like a tossing buoy, floating on the surface, betray where the anchor is hidden?

IKBAL ALI SHAH.

MALTHUS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION.

THE direct importance of the Rev. Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) in the history of political economy is enormous: his indirect importance is also enormous. In political economy he opposed his own concrete method of observation to the abstract approach of Ricardo; and the latter triumphed, thus setting back the subject for sixty years when the method of Malthus at last won the decisive victory. His indirect importance is also immense, for he is the grandfather of the evolution theory, which finally disposed of the fixed Utopias dreamed of by the men of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. There are coincidences in the reading of great men, but is there anything to equal the parallelisms of Darwin and Wallace, the co-discoverers of evolution? It is not altogether surprising that both should have read Chambers's *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation* (1844), or Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1830-33). Nor is it surprising that both should have read Humboldt's *Personal Narrative* (1814-18). But surely it is amazing that both should have read Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population*. How out of the common it appears from the following quotations from F. Darwin's *Life of C. Darwin* and A. R. Wallace's *My Life*:

DARWIN

In October, 1838, that is fifteen months after I had begun my systematic inquiry, I happened to read for my amusement *Malthus on Population*, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had got

WALLACE

In February, 1858, I was suffering from a rather severe attack of intermittent fever at Ternate, in the Moluccas; and one day, while lying on my bed during the cold fit, wrapped in blankets, though the temperature was 88 Fahr., the problem presented itself to me to think of "the positive checks" described by Malthus in his *Essay on Population*, a work I had read several years before, and which had made a deep and permanent impression on my mind. These checks—wars, disease, famine, and the like—must, it occurred to me,

a theory by which to work ; but I was so anxious to avoid prejudice that I determined not for some time to write even the briefest sketch of it. In June, 1842, I first allowed myself the satisfaction of writing a very brief abstract of my theory in pencil, in thirty-five pages, and this was enlarged during the summer of 1844 into one of 230 pages.

act on animals as well as man. Then I thought of the enormously rapid multiplication of animals, causing these checks to be much more effective in them than in the case of man ; and while pondering vaguely on this fact there suddenly flashed upon me the *idea* of the survival of the fittest—that the individuals removed by these checks must be on the whole inferior to those that survived. In the two hours that elapsed before the ague fit was over, I had thought out almost the whole of the theory ; and the same evening I sketched the draft of my paper, and in the two succeeding evenings wrote it out in full, and sent it by the next post to Mr. Darwin.

“Where goods are increased, they are increased that eat them.” The “struggle for existence”—Malthus uses this very phrase—is a present fact, as it has been a past fact, and will be a future one. In a herd of animals the units are simply the fittest who have survived the struggle for existence. The principle of population is in the foreground ; there are no checks to it but famine, disease, and death, the very checks on which Malthus was the first to lay sufficient emphasis. We can therefore understand how the study of the *Essay on Population* led Darwin and Wallace to explain the origin of species by a generalisation which Malthus had known and named, though he did not pursue it beyond man. Indeed, Sir Charles Lyell is so much impressed by these conclusions that he even denied the originality of Darwin and Wallace. Darwinism is Malthusianism on the largest scale : it is the application of the principle of population, animal and vegetable.

Just as Adam Smith had inquired into the nature and causes of wealth in 1776, so Malthus inquired into the nature and causes of poverty in his famous book published in 1803. An ardent believer in human progress, like Condorcet or Godwin, might urge that the French Revolution had ushered in the golden age that was dawning, while a sober inquirer

like Malthus saw a serious obstacle standing in the way. Is progress possible when population, being unchecked, increases in geometrical ratio while subsistence increases only in arithmetical ? “A slight acquaintance with numbers,” Malthus dryly observes, “will show the immensity of the first power in comparison with the second.” With remorseless logic he shows that “the race of plants and animals shrinks under this great restrictive law, and the race of men cannot by any efforts of reason escape from it. Among plants and animals its effects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death ; among men, misery and vice.” In old countries like those of Europe population is constantly checked by want of room and want of food, by vice and misery, and by the fear of vice and misery. In new countries like America there is room and there is food ; but the price of the latter is toil, and this toil is at the expense of the women. In old Europe, people double their numbers once in a century. In new America they perform the same feat, despite toil and the difficulty of rearing children, once in twenty-five years. Obviously, in the happy society which Godwin contemplates,

Where all are proper and well behaved
And all are free from sorrow and pain,

the rate of increase will be infinitely faster than doubling the population once in twenty-five years. Godwin, Condorcet and the French school, like some of the socialists of our own day, are entirely wrong in attributing all inequality to human institutions. The passion of man and woman to reproduce themselves is the root cause of the whole difficulty, and always will be—until, at least, we all become as wise as eugenicists like Dean Inge want us to be.

Godwin imagined a society where all were equally comfortable and equal in fact all round. Assuming that it could be established—and Malthus plainly deemed this an unwarrantable assumption—it would inevitably crash through the growth of population. Condorcet, like a true Frenchman, cares more for equality than liberty. He dreams of a future which is to witness the disappearance of inequality among nations, the appearance of equality among the people of every nation, and the “*perfectionnement réel*” of man. The disappearance of inequality among nations will be due to the abandonment by Europeans of their commercial monopolies, their

treacherous practices, their custom of proselytising, and their attitude of contempt for those of another creed or colour. Nations, of course, will never be alike, but they will all direct their path towards freedom. With all his fervent hopes for the destiny of our species, Condorcet saw clearly some of the rocks that loom ahead of mankind in the nearer or more distant future and threaten to wreck the ship of progress. He anticipated the problem which was raised in an acuter and more insistent form by Malthus. With the advance of science and industry the earth will undoubtedly be forced to yield a greater quantity of food, and hence to support a larger population; but must there not come a time when the increase of population outruns the means of subsistence, with the result either of widespread misery or of a reduction of the population, which in turn could not be effected without acute suffering? Thus it might be argued by Malthus that the perfectibility of the human species is strictly limited by the amount of sustenance that can be extracted from the earth, and that though such progress may possibly reach that limit, it can never transcend it. Were the visions of Condorcet or Godwin to perish before the realities urged by Malthus?

Convincing as the argument emphasised by Malthus in 1803 may sound, Condorcet refused to admit it as conclusive. He observed that, should such a time ever come, it must necessarily come at a very distant date, and that in the interval mankind will infallibly have attained a degree of knowledge and enlightenment of which we at present can hardly form any conception. Who, he asked, would venture to predict what may one day be done for the conversion of the elements into substances fit for human use? And even though population should ultimately reach such a limit inexorably set by Nature on this planet, Condorcet refused to despair; for, as he pointed out, men could meet and evade the difficulty by limiting the production of food to the amount necessary to maintain the inhabitants of the earth in welfare and comfort. Thus there would be no need to reduce the surplus population by the cruel and barbarous expedients of abortion and infanticide, to which Malthus drew renewed attention in his epoch-making volume.

Condorcet had trusted to the outward development of the arts and sciences while Godwin trusted to the inward development of the mind. By different ways they arrive at the goal

of progress, and Malthus meets them on their arrival. He points out to Godwin that there is no sign that the body is becoming subjugated to the mind. Even philosophers, he dryly remarked, cannot endure the toothache patiently, and he had yet to learn that a merry heart will enable a weak man to walk as fast and as far as a strong man. There is no change in the human body, so declares Godwin, and little or no change in the relation of the mind to it. The dreams of Condorcet are, in turn, subjected to the cold analysis of the mathematician, for Malthus has been ninth wrangler. If the arts have made the lengthening of life "indefinite," they have not made it "infinite." Gardeners can grow carnations "indefinitely" large, but can they grow them "infinitely" large? No man can ever say that he has seen the largest carnation that ever will be grown; but this he can say, that a carnation will never be as large as a cabbage. The limit is there, though it is undefined. There is a limit to the lengthening of human life, though no one can fix it to a year. In truth Condorcet has proved earthly immortality simply by a misuse of the word "indefinite." Is there any organic change in man which would prove even the possibility of perfection in this world? The Rev. Thomas Malthus can see no evidence that there is.

There were such anticipators of the main doctrine of Malthus as Dr. Robert Wallace, Süssmilch, and Dr. John Bruckner. The last had faintly foreshadowed Malthusianism, yet Malthus is so amply entitled to the credit of putting it upon a basis of accuracy that, in the measured judgment of Alfred Marshall, he claims a place among the founders of historical economists. As astrology is to astronomy, so are Wallace, Süssmilch, and Bruckner to Malthus. Malthus saw the importance of the general principle of population, and he also saw comprehensively its many-sided bearings. Out of the chaos of fact he educed the cosmos of the cause of the fact, and this constitutes his real title to greatness.

In 1798 Malthus published an essay on the principle of population which he very much enlarged in the 1803 edition. In the intervening five years the author had learnt much. The visions of the future, as depicted by Condorcet or Godwin, no longer attract him. The past and the present are the chief matters that concern him. In the preface to the new edition he informs us that he has "so far differed in principle" from the first edition "as to suppose the action of another check to

population which does not come under the head of either vice or misery." This, of course, is prudential restraint. The comparative pessimism of the first edition is replaced by the comparative optimism of the second. True, the pressure of population remains, but there also remains the pressure of civilisation, which is greater. The disorder, ignorance, and intemperance of the Middle Ages are replaced by the order, knowledge and temperance of modern days. True, the physical checks on population still exist, but they fall into a subordinate position. A check is positive when it cuts down an existing population, and it is preventive when it keeps a new population from growing up. Among animals the only check is misery. Among savage men it is vice as well as misery, and among civilised men it is vice, misery, and moral restraint. Among animals the check takes the positive form: among men it increasingly takes the preventive form. Among men, misery may act both positively and preventively. In the shape of war or disease it may cut down hosts. In the shape of its coming it may prevent marriage, and thus keep down the possibility of a new population. Malthus lived long before birth control, but we can easily believe how warmly he would have welcomed such a check to population. One line of approach to the famous *Essay on Population* to-day assumes the form of eugenics. If evolution were the true doctrine of the development of living forms, then our generation, following in the steps of Sir Francis Galton, thinks it desirable to take stock of the varieties of man, to measure their evolutionary value, and to shape the future of mankind by deliberate purpose. As a probable effect of deliberately running counter to nature, Galton adduced the law of celibacy in the Roman Catholic Church by which the most gentle, sincere and humane of both sexes were forbidden to leave progeny, and attributed to it the brutality of the Middle Ages. So he set down the decay of Spain to the annual removal by the Inquisition of those with the greatest tendency to independence of thought. In the same spirit, though he did not anticipate the modern popularity of the neo-Malthusian doctrines grouped under the phrase birth control, he denounced in advance all tendencies to a reduction in the fertility rate affecting the classes of society with the greatest intelligence and self-discipline. It is to be noted that he advanced more quickly than Darwin in the application of natural law to the mental and moral qualities as well as to the

physical qualities of mankind; and that he differed absolutely from the thesis advanced by Huxley in his Romanes lecture as to the independence of the moral law from the cosmic process.

Galton's theory of eugenics could not be excluded from a Utopia in which the units on which it had to play were abstractions. But does it apply to the real world of men and women? The question raises many difficulties on which scientific opinion is not so certain as Galton assumed. First, there is the interplay of inheritance and environment. Galton admitted that the best seed would fail, or at least not surpass seed of a baser stock, unless it were sown on a good soil. He admitted, for example, that a child brought up in an atmosphere of reverence for truth and devotion to free inquiry would be far more likely to succeed as a man of science than one nurtured in dogmatic respect for conventional beliefs. But he ascribed preponderating weight to natural inheritance. He laid much stress on an investigation he conducted into the character of twins. He distinguished between twins which might be of different sexes and were no more alike than any two of a family, and what he called "identical twins," always of the same sex, and presumably the product of the abnormal division of a single egg-cell. He thought, from evidence he had collected, that identical twins brought up and living their lives in different environment continued to show an identity of physical, mental, and emotional constitution. Naturally he did not believe in the transmission of acquired characters, and therefore, for the improvement of the race, relied entirely on the selection of favourable and the rejection of unfavourable inherited constitutions. Apart from the controversial scientific side of the case, there remains the practical side. The control of human breeding offers a maximum of difficulties; the amelioration of the human environment commands universal sympathy, and instead of being a Utopian principle is a plank of every political platform. Yet take an instance: John Napier was born before his father completed his sixteenth year. On eugenic principles, who can defend the father of the inventor of logarithms?

If each generation has its capacities limited by its constitutional inheritance, the more reason for supplying the physical, mental, and moral environments which will make the most of a possibly indifferent seed. We may suggest a final difficulty

in eugenics. Were the scientific problems solved, did it become possible to act on Galton's scheme of developing a "gifted race" by selecting men and women of rare and eminent talent, and mating them together generation after generation, how are we to choose and who is to choose the physical, mental, and moral qualities? Is it to be Pascal or a pugilist, a Helmholtz or a Hitler? Are we to breed for reverence or for freedom of thought, for the artist or for the mechanic, for endurance or for beauty? Galton entertained the happy belief that on the average, great men were of great physical constitutions; an equally good case might be made out for the correlation of poor health and unusual ability. Darwin and Seeley are cases in point. Hobbes, Newton, Bentham, Burke, Constable, Keats and Dickens were all weakly children. Hume, Byron, Scott, Chatterton, Goldsmith, Fanny Burney, and Landor were all backward children. Possibly there might be general agreement in selecting a fraction of one per cent. of the population from whose progeny only disaster might be expected, and a half of one per cent. as worthy of encouragement. But even in the thoughtless conditions of the modern world the absolute dregs of the population are discouraged almost to elimination, and reward somehow reaches the supreme. With the aims of the eugenists we feel in sympathy: it is the method of carrying out these aims that baffles us.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

RELIGION AND THE CRITICAL ATTITUDE.

FOR long centuries the study of logic was moribund, so Bertrand Russell assures us,* because logicians spent all their time discussing syllogisms. Thus, in principle, they used to argue that if all men were liars and if they were men, they must be liars—a conclusion of which none would have dreamt without the dialectician's art. After a millennium, however, it chanced that while a German was reading a comic number of a philosophical magazine, he said: "Everything in this book is a joke, therefore the advertisements are jokes."

"I have," says Bertrand Russell, "never come across any other case of new knowledge obtained by means of a syllogism. It must be admitted that, for a method which dominated logic for two thousand years, this contribution to the world's stock of information cannot be considered very weighty."

Yet even syllogisms have their uses, for they help people to judge their neighbours. If, by the use of syllogisms, they become convinced that the remarks of their neighbours are absurd or inconsistent, they no longer give serious attention. But if the implied meanings are consistent, they ought to be willing to hear. Thus, Mr. Bertrand Russell has discovered that objects exist everywhere except where they are, and nowhere except where they are not. Therefore, people ought to be very careful when they listen to him speaking on matters philosophical.

It follows, then, that although syllogisms are indispensable they do not teach us much that is new. If we lived in H. P. Blavatsky's enchanted world, where messages from the Great Masters keep fluttering from the sky to provide us with premises, things might be different. But even theosophists are now forgetting those trans-Himalayan Mahatmas. The age of deduction is going—going even in the mathematician's realm, for it has transpired that those convenient premises, the axioms, were by no means necessary truths.

But with deduction and the syllogism there goes the last hope of proving anything. Up till a few hundred years ago it

* *Outline of Philosophy*, 1927, p. 82.

was thought that a perfectly certain system of knowledge could be built up—a system based on rigid proof. The theologians, for example, used certain arguments for God's existence which they claimed allowed of no doubt whatever. God was the Absolutely necessary Being, the First Cause, the Creator and Designer of the Universe, and so on. Now Kant argued what is nowadays obvious, that none of these arguments could supply any rigid proof. He proceeded to base the ground of belief in God in Ethics instead of, or perhaps as well as, experience. He said there was a moral law in his mind, and with great caution he drew the conclusion that its presence was due to a God who had implanted it. He hoped to discover an absolutely valid ground of belief in God: no doubt he thought he had succeeded, but it is now widely recognised that he did not.

It is now clear that since Nature provides men with no premises, they are unable to draw any *certain* conclusions. It has, therefore, been necessary for man to devise some way of reaching conclusions without premises, and the only reasonable starting-point is experience.

The new* method is to observe Nature and then guess what might have caused the observed events. Such a guess, known as an *induction*, may always be wrong, for any one of several guesses might have been equally successful. Therefore, however successful a guess may have been, it can never be known for certain that it was true. A good illustration is afforded by the argument of a book published in 1798, entitled *A treatise on the sublime science of heliography, satisfactorily demonstrating our great orb of light, the sun, to be absolutely no other than a body of ice. Overturning all the received systems of the Universe hitherto extant, proving the celebrated and indefatigable Sir Isaac Newton, in his history of the solar system, to be as far distant from the truth as any of the heathen authors of Greece or Rome* (by Charles Palmer. Gent. London). The author argued that if the sun could be removed and a terrestrial body of ice placed in its stead, it would produce the same result. It concludes that "the sun is a crystalline body receiving the radiance of God"—and operates exactly like a lens.

Since a guess may always be wrong, scientists have thought of various ways of testing its correctness. Two main methods

* It can be traced back to Aristotle, though only recently has it become widely used.

are used, neither of them fool-proof, namely, the power to predict, and the use of analogy. In the first case the guess itself is used as though it were a premise, and attempts are made to deduce the results which would follow if it were true. If the guess was true, correct results ought always to be obtained, and *vice versa*. But again difficulties arise. At best a guess is most of the truth and there may be other disturbing effects, so that few observations are really crucial. Besides which, human ingenuity is such that, with little exaggeration, it can make any theory fit any fact. Even when Galileo had demonstrated that bodies of different weights fell to the earth in the same time, the professors at Pisa solemnly told their students that since Aristotle must be right, their senses must have deceived them.

It is sometimes possible to calculate the chances against the occurrence of a given observation or series of observations on the assumption that a certain guess or hypothesis is not true. If the number comes to be very large, the hypothesis is considered to be confirmed. Thus in chemistry it was found that about half the elements had atomic weights which approached whole numbers, and the chance was shown to be many millions to one against so large a number doing so. This suggested, though it did not rigidly prove, that all would be whole numbers were it not for interfering causes. These causes were ultimately found to be isotopy and variable packing fractions. By similar methods the size in the ring in simple sugar molecules has been determined.

What is known as *correlation* affords another example of the same thing. If it is suspected that a certain frequently occurring event is dependent on another common event, curves may be plotted of the incidence of the two events, and if they are found to follow one another closely it will be evidence that the events are connected. But, as before, mistakes may result. For example, it has been discovered that if the incidence of cancer in the United Kingdom for recent years is plotted against the number of bananas eaten, the curves follow one another closely. Another example was furnished in a hospital where it was found that the proportion of successful cures in the basement was much lower than in the other wards. This suggested that lack of sunshine, etc., was the cause, but the real reason was that very ill patients were not moved upstairs.

The statistical method has been a fruitful one in natural science. It has, however, been little used in the field of religious thought, though some attempts have been made to use it. Sir Francis Galton applied it to the effects of prayer by working on the assumption that clergymen's sons and kings were the most prayed-for people in the world, and if prayer was efficacious they would, therefore, be expected to live better lives than other people. He found the effects of prayer to be slightly deleterious, but not sufficiently so to warrant the conclusion that prayer did actual harm. But investigations of this type are so complicated by the large numbers of possible interfering effects that the conclusions reached by them do not carry conviction. Similar remarks apply to experiments on sick patients.

More to the point, perhaps, was Samuel Butler's application of statistics to the problem of whether baptism benefited children. He appears to have examined more than a hundred cases, and in an autobiographical passage in *The Fair Haven*, he describes his own conclusions:

The majority had not been baptised; yet the good and bad dispositions were so distributed as to preclude all possibility of maintaining that the baptised boys were better than the unbaptised . . . The children of God . . . the members of Christ and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven, were no more spiritually minded than the children of the world and the devil. Was then the grace of God a gift which left no trace whatever upon those who were possessed of it—a thing the presence or absence of which might be ascertained by consulting the parish registry, but was not discernible in conduct? . . . There must be a screw loose somewhere.

The investigation appears to have been stopped by a rector who complained that the school was being disturbed by it.

Butler also laid the foundation of a very ingenious statistical method for discovering the soundness or otherwise of ecclesiastical systems. Compilations are made of the Biblical texts which teach doctrines and of those which bear on human conduct. In each case the number which is not taken at their face value is noted and the ratio to the whole computed. For the true Church—if there is one—the two ratios must be about the same.

In addition to these modern applications of statistics to religion a few attempts were made, though never in a satisfactory manner, by the medieval theologians. Thus Guazzo* observed that broken fragments of thunderbolts were more prone to lie near the tombs of saints than other people, this being evidence that demons disguise their abominations "under the aspect of some omen of blessing."

Some pioneering work was also done by Caron† to determine whether consecrated water differed from ordinary water. He obtained a number of identical cups and half filled them with strong wine. He then filled them all to the brim, some with ordinary water, some with holy water. The cups were set in front of demoniacs and it was found that those containing ordinary water were instantly emptied, but the demoniacs could not be induced to drink one single drop of the others, but shuddered when the cups were raised to their lips. This result is of considerable interest in view of the confident assertions of the Bishop of Birmingham that there is no spiritual method of detecting the difference in the consecrated elements.

Usually—but especially in subjects which are connected with life and religion—the above methods fail, and what is called the *argument from analogy* has to be invoked. This is the least satisfactory method for obtaining new knowledge, for no one has yet discovered the conditions under which the argument is valid, though such conditions must exist. It can only be said that the closer a general system A tends to resemble another system B, the more "probable" it is that a given part *a* of system A has its counterpart *b* in system B. Obviously any attempt to make this rigid involves a vicious circle, for it can only be rigid when the two systems are completely identical, and if this is known, the proposition to be proved is known also.

The difficulty about the argument from analogy is that the word "probability" has a very illusive meaning when applied to a given event. One day someone may think through the difficulties, but up to now they have baffled all who have tackled them. The argument from analogy is used to confirm or to destroy inductions, but it is also of value in arguing to new conclusions. Reliance on it is the great danger of those

* Francesco-Maria Guazzo: *Compendium Maleficarum*, 1608, Bk. 2, ch. xii.

† *Anticrist Unmasked*. Quoted by Henry Boguet. *Discours des sorciers*. ch. lvi.

who attempt to make their religion "scientific." Even able men will often argue that since there is one sun in the sky which gives us physical light, so it is probable that there is one God who gives us moral light and mystical experience. The argument only sounds plausible until the thought suggests itself that there may be as many gods as there are stars.

If it is often difficult to discover whether a guess is a true guess, it is far more difficult to make a sensible guess at all. It is exceedingly remarkable to observe how differently the human mind works in the processes of induction and deduction. In the first case the critical attitude, which is of the utmost value in examining guesses, is worse than useless when it comes to making them. History shows that the best guesses have been made when criticism was at its minimum. Kekulé made brilliant inductions in visions which he experienced when returning home on a bus late at night, or when musing by the fire. Einstein is reputed to say that music helps him. Faraday worked ceaselessly in attempting to detect electromagnetic induction; left the work for a holiday, and made his discovery immediately his mind came back to the problem. Archimedes was inspired in his bath. Inductions may even come in sleep, in short, they mainly come at times when the critical faculties are least active.

In conformity with this is the extraordinary way in which discovery has so often evaded learned people. Many of the great discoveries of physics in its early days were not made by physicists. Arrhenius remarks concerning those who developed the law of the indestructibility of energy: "It is very significant that not one of these men was a scientist by profession."*

Not only were the greatest men often unable to make inductions, but history shows abundant evidence that they were often unable to recognise them when made. In such cases the critical attitude becomes the greatest barrier to truth.

Then, again, even where scientists are involved, it is almost the rule that the greatest discoveries are made by young men. There are whole branches of science (e.g. stereochemistry†)

* *The Life of the Universe*, 1909, Vol. II, p. 228.

† Cf. B. K. Singh: *Stereochemistry and Pasteur's Law*, Jour. Ind. Chem. Soc., 1932, ix, 18.

where every main advance has been made by men below the age of thirty. Once again it appears that when the critical faculty is at the minimum the mind is most fertile in ideas, and except where the critical faculty is temporarily renounced induction cannot take place. As Max Planck* has recently written: "The progress of science is an excellent illustration of the truth of the paradox that man must lose his soul before he can find it."

Mr. McCabe, in a book named—or rather mis-named—*The Existence of God*, published in the Thinker's Library, says that he has never known any Theist to mention, far less explain, the fact that education so often produces atheists. Perhaps this line of thought will suggest a possible explanation. The resemblances between religious faith and induction are so exceedingly close that thoughtful people who believe in God naturally regard religious faith as a form of induction. It cannot be obtained while the mind is critical, and yet when it does appear as a shining light it survives and is even strengthened by criticism. Not that this proves God or Christianity, but at least it removes all cause for the amusement which some people seem to find in the words of Paul:

I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent will I reject. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe . . . Not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: but God chose the foolish things of the world, that He might put to shame them that are wise; and God chose the weak things of the world, that He might put to shame the things that are strong; and the base things of the world, and the things that are despised did God choose, yea and the things that are not, that He might bring to nought the things that are: that no flesh should glory before God.†

ROBERT E. D. CLARK.

* *Where is Science Going?*, 1933, p. 137.

† 1 Cor. i, 19-29: Cf. Llewelyn Powys. *The Pathetic Fallacy*, 1930, p. 42. "And who was it but he (Paul commonly called Saul) who found out, through his deep taboos and totems, half Jewish, half God knows what, the world-undermining doctrine about the weak overcoming the strong, the foolish overcoming the clever, and . . . things that are not, overcoming the things that are!"

CHARLES LAMB.

ARE the young people of the rising generation, one ventures to wonder, acquainted with the writings of Charles Lamb? Are they even so much as aware of him? Or is he relegated to the shelf as one of the literary old fogies nobody cares to bother about in these hustling days, when there are so many brilliant and enthralling moderns to engage our attention?

Certainly, Lamb was not a writer for the million and, just as there are those who cannot appreciate an old or rare wine, so many readers might not be able to appreciate the writings of Elia. Like a fine vintage he must be savoured. He is not, perhaps, everyone's drink, though he is assuredly a taste for the finest literary palates.

Yet, this literary aspect apart, a writer who is so intensely human, so self-revealing, so much one of ourselves, should from that standpoint alone appeal to readers in this self-conscious age. For Lamb, with a naïveté justified by his genius, assumes from the first that his readers are with him, that they are interested in his personal thoughts and affairs. And, chiefly from the way in which these thoughts and feelings are presented to us, we are interested the moment we open his pages. The matters dealt with are, perhaps, ordinary enough, but it is the individual appeal that holds us. Lamb talks directly to his reader, strolls about with him in his mind, taking his arm and pointing out this or that way of looking at things in a manner no one has ever assumed with us before. His gaiety is irresistible. We smile and nod with him, feeling the glow of his rich mind, and hurry to pick up the *largesse* he throws continually about him. His charm is indefinable. It partakes largely of the quality of the unexpected. All the delicate fabric of his imagination is spun out of himself, and is shot with a luminous sheen of the most delicate humour. But the material defies analysis; it cannot be handled any more than gossamer. One might as well hope to capture quick-silver as to fix or define the particular genius of Charles Lamb between ruled lines or pages. He winds in and out of his conceits and fancies like a mischievous, sparkling boy, leading us through a labyrinth, yet triumphantly bringing us out with peals of laughter at the end.

A boy! Ah! Here we have the clue! Charles Lamb never

grew up! To the very end of his days, despite the well-known tragedies and agonies of his life, he retained the joyous heart of a boy. Equally this same youthful spirit made him detest all literary starch and buckram, as is evident in his comments upon *Burnet's History of his own Times*.

Full of scandal which all true history is. . . . None of the cursed philosophical Humeian indifference, so cold, so unnatural and inhuman! None of the Gibbonian fine writing. . . . None of Dr. Robertson's periods with three members.

Yet for all this, though he was never stiff or ponderous, Lamb himself, in some of his rarer passages, could rise to a height of lyrical prose that proclaims him no unworthy pupil of the great sixteenth- and seventeenth-century prose writers in whose works he loved to steep himself. Not Jeremy Taylor, Milton or Sir Thomas Browne, or his contemporary De Quincey, can surpass him when, in a sort of rhythmic prose, he chants his reminiscences of certain old worthies of *The South Sea House*. Or take that even more immortal passage, known almost too well to need quotation:

Come back into memory like as thou wert in the day-spring of thy fancies, with hope like a fiery column before thee, the dark pillar not yet turned, Samuel Taylor Coleridge—logician, metaphysician, bard!

Many of Lamb's Essays, also, both as regards style and subject, reveal him as the almost direct literary descendant of those quaint Character Writers, Earle and Overbury, with here and there perhaps a trace of Sterne, Swift or Addison thrown in. He uses the old-fashioned "thou," or "your" in referring to his reader or subject: "In tale or history your beggar is ever the just antipode to your king." His Essay, *Poor Relations*, is similarly written in this Caroline manner. Nothing was too lowly or apparently insignificant to interest him: Beggars, Chimney-sweepers, the humble Ass even, and his most brilliant work is often found in his treatment of some humdrum subject no one else would have thought of handling. Who else, one wonders, could have achieved a masterpiece upon so uninspiring a subject as "Roast Pig." His whimsicality is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in his essay on *The Convalescent*. It is a subject that appeals to most of us, and is as fresh in its humour as if written

yesterday, for he is always more than usually delightful when he is airing a grievance.

"If there be a regal solitude," he muses, "it is a sick-bed. How the patient lords it there. . . . How king-like he sways his pillow, tumbling and tossing, and shifting and raising, and lowering and thumping, and flattening and moulding it to the ever-varying requisitions of his throbbing temples. . . . He changes sides oftner than a politician . . . and none accuses him of tergiversation. . . . How convalescence shrinks a man back to his pristine stature! . . . The scene of his regalities, his sick-room, which was his presence chamber, how it is reduced to a common bedroom! The trimness of the very bed has something petty and unmeaning about it. It is made every day!"

Hand in hand with this whimsicality goes a child-like perversity that always induces Lamb to long passionately for something he has not got, and to wish it away when he has it. For years his letters are filled with his groans and re-vilings about his drudgery at East India House. "*Improbe labor!*" he exclaims to Coleridge in a letter of the year 1819. "I write six hours every day in this candle-light, fog-laden at Leadenhall." And again, "Hang 'em! my brain, skin, flesh, bone, carcase, soul, time is all theirs. The Royal Exchange, Gresham's Folly, hath me body and spirit."

But his fundamental good sense cancels out all his grumbles:

"Henceforth," he writes elsewhere, "I retract all my feul complaints of mercantile employment, look upon them as lovers' quarrels. I was but half in earnest. Welcome dead timber of a desk that makes me live."

As everyone knows, he was delivered from this long drudgery, and in a famous letter to Wordsworth in 1825 he writes:

I came home FOR EVER on Tuesday in last week. The incomprehensibleness of my condition overwhelmed me. It was like passing from life into eternity. Every year to be as long as three, i.e. to have three times as much real time—time that is my own in it! I wandered about thinking I was happy, but feeling I was not. . . . Now when all is holyday, there are no holydays.

These are but brief samples culled out of many to illustrate the peculiar contrariness of his nature.

Yet, beneath all the spirited, brave, almost boyish fun and laughter, beneath all the sparkling wit and brilliance, there is in the writings of Charles Lamb a deep, sad humour, a mood of tragic suffering entailed by the circumstances of his life, by the recurring madness of his beloved sister Mary, by those breakdowns in their domestic harmony that again and again broke up the home, and left him intermittently a disconsolate mourner at a lonely fireside. In a letter to Coleridge in May 1800, he says:

I don't know why I write, except from the propensity misery has to tell her griefs. Hetty died on Friday night. . . . Mary, in consequence of fatigue and anxiety, is fallen ill again, and I was obliged to remove her yesterday. I am left alone in a house with nothing but Hetty's dead body to keep me company. . . . My heart is quite sunk, and I don't know where to look for relief. . . . I am completely shipwrecked.

But, although the sadness of his life never darkened his writings, there is in some of them a touch of wistfulness, a hint of an unsatisfied yearning for a culture and an education which, from his humble upbringings, had been denied him. Who can read his account of *Oxford in the Vacation* without a pull at the heart-strings for one to whom Fate had denied entry to that Grove of Academic Learning.

"I can here," he writes, "play the gentleman, enact the student. . . . I seem admitted *ad eundem*. I fetch up past opportunities. I can rise at the Chapel bell, and dream that it rings for me. In moods of humility I can be a Sizar or a Servitor. When the peacock vein rises, I strut a Gentleman Commoner. In graver moments I proceed Master of Arts. . . . Only in Christ Church reverend quadrangle I can be content to pass for nothing short of a Seraphic Doctor. The walks at these times are so much one's own. . . ."

What a scarcely concealed, pathetic passion of desire transcends these words of the pitifully poor, proud, brilliant man, feeling himself one of this exclusive intellectual company by right of mental stature, yet outside it all and with no hope of entering that seeming paradise! Merely "their overlooked beadsman."

Charles Lamb was a passionate lover of London: he might be well and truly dubbed "the great cockney!" His letters abound in references to his abiding delight in the streets and

haunts of his beloved city. In a letter to Wordsworth in January 1801, he writes :

Separate from the pleasure of your company, I don't much care if I never see a mountain in my life. . . . The lighted shops of the Strand and Fleet Street : the innumerable trades, tradesmen and customers : coaches, waggons, playhouses : all the bustle and wickedness round Covent Garden : the very women of the Town : the watchmen, drunken scenes, rattles life awake, if you awake, at all hours of the night : the impossibility of being dull in Fleet Street : the crowds, the very dirt and mud, the sun shining upon houses and pavements : the print shops, the old book stalls, parsons cheapening books : coffee houses, steams of soups from kitchens : the pantomimes—London itself a pantomime, and a masquerade : all these things work themselves into my mind, and feed me without a power of satiating me. The wonder of these sights impels me into nightwalks about her crowded streets, and I often shed tears in the motley Strand from fulness of joy at so much life.

This love of London remained with him all his life. He felt an exile even in Edmonton. To Wordsworth in 1830 he writes : "In dreams I am in Fleet Market . . . I would live in London shirtless, bookless." He shared this love of his birthplace, as also his affectionate delineation of the quaint characters its many hidden nooks and corners harboured with that other great Londoner—upon whom it may surely be said some part of his mantle has fallen—Charles Dickens. It is impossible not to concede that the great Victorian novelist must have owed much of his inspiration to the work of Elia. Reading two only of Lamb's most famous essays—that on *The Two Races of Men* and *Captain Jackson*, we can scarcely be unconscious of the originals of two of the most brilliant creations wrought by Dickens. Of the great Borrower we read :

When new supplies became necessary, the first person that had the felicity to fall in with him . . . was sure to contribute to the deficiency. For Bigod had an *undeniable* way with him. . . . When I think of this man, his fiery glow of heart, his swell of feeling, how magnificent, how ideal he was, how great at the midnight hour. . . .

Or again of *Captain Jackson* :

And was I in danger of forgetting this man—his cheerful suppers. . . . You saw with your bodily eyes indeed what seemed a bare scrag. . . . But in the copious will, the revelling imagination of

your host—"the mind, the mind Master Shallow"—whole beeves were spread before you, hecatombs—no end to the profusion. . . . "Let us live while we can," methinks I hear the open-handed creature exclaim. Wine we had none . . . but the sensation of wine was there. Some thin kind of ale, I remember—"British beverage," he would say! "Push about, my boys; Drink to your sweetheart girls." . . . You got flustered without knowing whence, tipsy upon words, and reeled under the potency of his unperforming Bacchanalian encouragements.

In such studies and many more, surely we have the germs of those gorgeous growths which later came to full florescence as Pecksniff and Micawber!

Apart from some weak sentimentality—which he shared with some of the great poets of his day—Lamb's critical judgment was sound. He admired Defoe, and was one of the first to be impressed by the as yet unrecognised genius of William Blake. Byron he did not like, nor did Shelley appeal to him, but from the first years of their coming together he was conscious of the greatness of his friend Coleridge. To Wordsworth, in 1816, he writes :

Coleridge is absent but four miles; and the neighbourhood of such a man is as exciting as the presence of fifty ordinary persons. 'Tis enough to be within the whiff and wind of his genius for us not to possess our souls in quiet.

Lamb's dramatic criticism is invaluable and outstanding, witness his discourse upon *The Artificial Comedy of the Last Century*, where he estimates for us the greatness of Congreve's Art. Also how delicious is his fine irony in respect of Sheridan's portrayal of the respective characters of Joseph and Charles Surface. What, again, can be more subtle than his analysis of the parts of Iago or Malvolio. Yet to realise fully Lamb's greatness as a critic it is necessary to peruse his essay on *The Tragedies of Shakespeare*, in which he puts forth the original and daring theory that "the plays of Shakespeare are less calculated for performance on a stage than those of almost any dramatist whatever. . . . There is so much in them which comes not under the province of acting, with which eye, and tone and gesture have nothing to do." In illustration of this he instances the case of Lear :

to see Lear acted, to see an old man tottering about the stage with a walking stick, turned out of doors by his daughters in a rainy night, has nothing in it but what is painful and disgusting. . . .

But the Lear of Shakespeare cannot be acted. . . . The greatness of Lear is not in corporal dimensions, but in intellectual: the explosions of his passion are terrible as a volcano: they are storms turning up and disclosing to the bottom that sea, his mind, with all its vast riches. It is his mind which is laid bare. The case of flesh and blood seems too insignificant to be thought on, even as he himself neglects it.

Yet, just as Lamb felt it futile to offer our greatest dramatist on the stage, it is equally futile to present the rich banquet of wit, humour and intellect offered us in the pages of *Elia* by a mere handful of broken pieces snatched at random from the table, which is all that can be attempted in a few pages.

Many of his letters are almost as entertaining as his *Essays*, and reveal to us the man as he moved, thought and lived. Of his personal appearance we have a valuable account in a letter of Sir Thomas Talfourd, who subsequently edited his *Letters*.

A light frame, so fragile that it seemed as if a breath would overthrow it, clad in clerk-like black, was surmounted by a head of form and expression the most noble and sweet. . . . Who shall describe his countenance—catch its quivering sweetness—and fix it for ever in words? There are none, alas, to answer the vain desire of friendship. Deep thought striving with humour: the lines of suffering wreathed into cordial mirth; and a smile of painful sweetness, present an image to the mind it can as little describe as lose.

Gentle and sensitive to an exceptional degree, Lamb was characterised by a deep and broad humanity which finds eloquent expression in many of his essays: his plea for those small, unhappy children who, a century ago, were employed in the sweeping of chimneys, will be remembered. Elsewhere, also, as in his study of *The Genius and Character of Hogarth*, in his *Reflections in the Pillory*, or in his ironical comments upon the *Gallantry* of his day, are voiced his occasionally scathing protests against many of the social abuses of his time—protests which undoubtedly influenced the public opinion of the England of a hundred years ago. The evils he condemned have been swept away, not so his humane and courageous condemnation of them. These outbursts, together with his wit, his fine critical appreciations, his happy pleasantries and delightfully humorous reflections upon life as he knew it, remain, and have secured for Charles Lamb an undisputed literary immortality.

ALICE LAW.

THE STATE AND LABOUR IN GERMANY.

IN the political system of feudalism, political rights and duties are linked to land tenure. This system arose out of the primitive German constitution, "the union of the beneficiary tie with that of commendation completed the idea of feudal obligation."* The commendation as a personal relation consisted in a man submitting himself to a lord whose vassal he became. Holdsworth† describes the new feudalism which arose in England in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the following terms.

The new feudalism compassed its ends, not by direct attack but by perversion of the machinery of centralised government. It was a bastard imitation of the old order of society founded upon the weakness of the crown and corruption of the ruling class. That ruling class did not represent the great body of the nation.

This quotation may be applied literally to the recent developments in Germany. Moritz J. Bonn‡ described the transformation of competitive capitalism into authoritarian capitalism which used the forms of feudalism. Monopoly capitalism, with its trusts, cartels and similar organisations, developed into an economic system with security and without risk, dominating the will of the State and perverting the machinery of centralised government. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means§ have employed the same terms in describing with regard to the U.S.A. the transformation of American corporations to autocratic semi-public organisations similar to those of the feudal system. The real political force in Germany until 1930 was the combination of militarism, large-scale industry, bureaucracy and socialism created during the war.|| Socialism, however, was only a tolerated and awkward partner who in 1931 was dismissed from this partnership. The final stage was reached in the National Socialist State, which has expressed the idea of the new feudalism clearly in the new "Law relating to the Regulation of National Labour" of January 20th, 1934 (*Gesetz zur Ordnung der Nationalen Arbeit*). It expresses the

* William Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England*, 5th edn., Vol. I, p. 275.

† *A History of English Law*, II, pp. 417-18.

‡ *Das Schicksal des deutschen Kapitalismus*, Berlin, 1930.

§ *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York.

|| Cf. M. J. Bonn, p. 59.

actual dictatorial power of the employer and the potential power of the State, and it disguises these facts by the "bastard imitation" of the terminology of German feudal law.

In seven paragraphs the Law deals with (1) "The Leader of the Concern and the Council of Trust" (*Führer des Betriebes und Vertrauensrat*); (2) "Trustees of Labour" (*Treuhänder der Arbeit*); (3) "Factory Rules and Wage-Decrees" (*Betriebsordnung und Tarifordnung*); (4) with "Social Justice pertaining to matters of Honour" (*Soziale Ehrengerichtsbarkeit*); (5) with "Protection against Dismissal" (*Kündigungsschutz*); (6) with "Work in Public Undertakings" (*Arbeit in öffentlichen Unternehmen*); (7) and "Transitional Regulations" (*Schluss- und Uebergangsvorschriften*).

1. The employer as leader of the concern and employees and workers as vassals work together in the concern and for the furtherance of the aims of the concern and for the common benefit of the people and the State. (Section 1.)

Decisions in all business matters affecting the vassals lie with the leader (section 2). Section 1 represents the "bastard imitation," section 2 shows the real state of affairs. The leader may, and sometimes must, appoint a deputy leader (section 3). In undertakings where at least twenty people are employed, the leader is advised by Men of Trust (*Vertrauensmänner*), who under his chairmanship constitute the Council of Trust (*Vertrauensrat*). Candidates for these posts have to be selected jointly by the employer and the chairman of the National Socialist Workers' cells. The workers can either approve or reject the list. If they reject it, the members of the Council may be appointed by the Trustee of Labour. The Council is a mere advisory committee. Its sole legal function extending beyond advisory functions is the right of appeal to the Trustee against the enactment or the contents of factory rules by the leader.

2. The Trustees of Labour are civil servants of the Reich. Their duties consist in the control of the Councils of Trust, in the control of factory rules, in the decision in cases of mass dismissals, and in the issuing of decrees relating to the regulation of wages and labour conditions.

3. In any undertaking with at least twenty employees and workers, the employer has to issue factory rules containing

provisions for the allocation of working time, periods of rest, and so on. Only where the fixing of minimum wages is obligatory for the protection of the employees may the Trustee issue such decrees for the regulation of wages and other labour conditions, which, when issued, form a part of the individual contract between master and servant.

4. Apart from the existing Labour Law Courts which decide actions between master and servant, Law Courts of Honour (*Ehrengerichte*) are introduced, whose function is the punishment of severe violations of social duties emanating from the community founded in the undertaking. For the purpose of determining these disciplinary measures new courts are set up, district Courts of Honour (*Ehrengerichte*), and a court of appeal, called the Reich Court of Honour (*Reichsehrengerichtshof*), situated in Berlin.

5. The former law relating to the protection against dismissal, as laid down in the Law relating to Workers' Councils (*Betriebsrätegesetz*), has been altered to the disadvantage of the employees.

6. The Law does not apply to employees and workers in public undertakings of the Reich, the Federal States, the municipalities, the Reichsbank, the Reichsbahn (railways), etc.

What is the social significance of this law? In Germany it has been celebrated as the manifestation of German socialism in contrast to Marxian and international socialism, as the beginning of a new era no longer recognising classes and class struggle, in which employer and employee work hand in hand as partners, not as rivals. To gain a real insight into the social significance of the Law relating to the Regulation of National Labour, we must briefly describe the foundation of the German social system from 1919-32.

German legislation recognised that the ownership of the means of production grants power over men, that a contract between master and servant is free only in the legal sense of the term, and that the restoration of real liberty necessitates intervention to limit the freedom of the employer. Such intervention took place in three different ways. The State itself intervened. The staff in each undertaking took part in the management of the business in so far as their social interests were concerned by means of elected Workers' Councils. Finally, the working classes, represented by the

trade unions, were vested by the State with the right of collective bargaining. Collective agreements entered into between single employers and trade unions, or between employers' organisations and trade unions, regulated minimum wages and labour conditions. The validity of these agreements could be extended by the Minister of Labour in his administrative capacity even to non-members of the unions and employers' organisations. Individual contracts between master and servants violating the collective agreements were declared void and the provisions of the collective agreements then replaced the invalidated sections of the individual contract (Decree of December 23rd, 1918).

The *Betriebsrätegesetz* limited the dictatorial power of the owner by granting some rights to the Workers' Councils, which were elected according to proportional representation wholly uninfluenced by the employer or the State. If we draw a parallel between the organisations of the State and a concern ("*Betrieb*"—technical business unit of undertaking) we can say that the *Betriebsrätegesetz** introduced the principle of constitutional monarchy into industrial law. Like the State, the concern rests on power and regards the doctrine of the separation of powers as valid. It has legislative authority in that it issues factory laws, administrative authority in that it engages and dismisses men, judiciary authority in that it inflicts penalties upon those who violate the provisions of the factory laws.

All three were vested in the employer until the *Betriebsrätegesetz* came into operation. This law distributed the powers between employers and the Workers' Councils. Legislation, the enactment of factory rules, was to be exercised jointly by both parties. In the sphere of administration, especially with regard to dismissal, the councils co-operated even in business management. Their influence was slight. They appointed representatives—usually two—to the supervisory boards of limited companies, and could, to a limited extent, control the balance sheets and the profit and loss accounts of the undertaking. The social significance of the progressive Weimar legislation must not, however, be overestimated. In the main, this kind of direct industrial control, supplemented by the adult education of the unions and of the State, served only to educate trade union officials and prepare

* Cf. Guillebeaud, *The Works Council*, Cambridge, 1928.

them for the future task of industrial democracy. The Workers' Councils created an excellent body of workers, conscious of their duties, experienced in all matters of factory business, excellent negotiators and fitted for the bigger task of industrial democracy.

Of all this the new order has made a clean sweep. The Council of Trust is no longer an independent body. Its origin and management rest mainly with the employer, the leader. The Council's functions are merely nominal. It has the right of appeal, but only against "general" regulations, not against individual orders of the employer. And even if it makes use of its right of appeal, it stands in fear of being sentenced because of wrongful denunciation. German trade unions have been dissolved. Employers' organisations as well as trade unions are destroyed. The German Workers' Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*) is now the sole organisation embracing individual employers and individual workmen. Already thousands of employers, led by Herr Krupp von Bohlen-Halbach, have joined the Front. In the near future this organisation will become a central union of individuals without any differentiation of craft or industry. The second important step is the establishment of a new organisation, "*Nach der Arbeit*"—"Kraft durch Freude" ("After Work"—"Strength through Joy"), similar to the Italian *dopolavoro*, which has the task of organising leisure.

At first it was possible to believe that the trade unions would continue to exist as State organs, as in Italy. But certain legislative measures proved puzzling to the attentive observer. Although after their capture they had become trusted organisations, they were deprived of their power of collective bargaining by the Law of May 19th, 1933. Thirteen Trustees of Labour were appointed, who were, with one exception, all former legal advisers to employers' organisations. These were given the exclusive power of regulating wages and other labour conditions and were responsible only to the Minister of Labour. The seizure was thus followed by castration. The unions had become organisations with none but educational functions.

But very soon a new opposition arose within the rank and file of the membership. It was not a political opposition. It was based upon either acceptance of, or at least neutrality towards, the National Socialist system. It was, in any case,

not hostile to it, it was neither communist nor socialist. The confidence of the trade unionists in their former leaders had completely vanished. The new opposition arose out of the contrast between the social reform programme of the National Socialist Party and its anti-capitalist propaganda against the Brüning, von Papen and Schleicher Cabinets on the one hand, and its actual economic and social policy on the other. This new movement, together with the experience of the Rossoni conflict in Italy in 1928, led to the third phase, the destruction of the unions and the transformation of the German Workers' Front to an organisation of individual employers and individual employees without any of the features of an ordinary trade union. In the interest of the monopolies, the National Socialist Party renounced its aim of "winning the soul of the worker" through gaining control over him while at work. For this purpose another organisation, "Strength through Joy," was set up, which was to win the worker's soul in his leisure time.

Collective bargaining has disappeared. The individual contract between master and servant is, according to section 32, the normal type of regulation of wages. An antiquated liberalism rose from the dead. Even in the issuing of wage-decrees by the Trustees of Labour, all bodies for the control of their execution are lacking. Law can only be called law if coercive machinery exists guaranteeing its operation. This general sociological principle has to be remembered especially as far as protective labour legislation is concerned. The enactment of an eight-hour day is very valuable, but is useless without any machinery of control and coercion. Control can be exerted either directly by the State and its officials or by social organisations, i.e. trade unions. German trade unions were not only the creators but also the administrators of the collective agreements. Such unions no longer exist. The new law does not set up a new machinery, which to be effective would have to have an enormous scope if it were to replace the thousands of trade union officials entrusted with the control of the legal duties. The Councils of Trust are not suited for control; neither in their origin nor in their operation are they independent bodies. The Trustees of Labour, apart from the fact that they were in their majority former legal advisers to employers' organisations, have no effective machinery.

Germany's labour legislation stands now lower than that of any civilised nation. Three main forces remain, private property as expressed especially in the monopolies, the National Socialist Party with its military organisations, SA and SS, and the State. The actual economic, social and therefore political power lies with private property. Its strength increases if joined with the power of the Party and of the State. It is usual to-day, especially for Jewish firms, to employ high officials of the brownshirts or blackshirts (SA or SS), who, of course, will often be appointed in agreement with section 3 of the Labour Code as deputy leaders, so that, if National Socialist workers dare ask for higher wages or better labour conditions, the deputy leader can reject the demands not only by virtue of his industrial but also by virtue of his political leadership. The Law Courts of Honour will have the same effect. These Courts will surely become a means for the final extermination of Jewish and "politically unreliable" employers and employees, unless they prefer to pay contributions to the Party or, in the case of employers, engage high Party officials.

The union between property and the State is even more evident than that between property and the Party (that is, the leaders, not the mass). The German Minister of Economics, Dr. Schmitt, the man responsible for the new law, Dr. Mansfeld, former legal adviser to the coal-owners' union and now high official in the Ministry of Labour, Dr. Grauert, former counsel to the steel-producers' organisations of the Rhineland and Westphalia and now Under-Secretary of State in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Herr Keppler, Hitler's economic adviser, and Herr Göring—they are the real and effective representatives of German monopoly industry. Thus what Holdsworth describes as the new feudalism has come to pass. It is, therefore, no mere coincidence that the new law employs the terminology of German feudal law, for this disguises the naked rulership of monopoly capitalism.

Everyone believed that Germany would go the way of Italy and follow the path to the corporate State. The corporate State is undoubtedly the cleverest and most skillful mask of authoritarian capitalism.

Capitalists and workers are no longer called capitalists and workers, but producers. Private property is called from now on

national wealth. . . . Lowering of wages is described as patriotic sacrifice. The violent oppression of each free and socialist criticism is named national discipline.

This is the description of the social system of Italian Fascism by Ignazio Silone,* who provides the best exposition of Fascism because he deals not with its legal organisation or its ideology, but only with the social, economic and political facts. Germany seems to renounce Italy's method of constructing a complicated system of syndicates (and later corporations), whose faults only an experienced eye can discern. Germany destroyed the trade unions even in their emasculated Italian form as State-dependent bodies, obviously because of her fear of opposition even by National Socialist unions. She chooses instead the feudal terminology, though nothing but the terminology. The employer is no longer called employer but leader, the employees are no longer called employees but vassals, class struggle has become work in common, private profits are called common benefits of the people and the State. Just as the lord of the feudal system had to grant protection and security to his vassals and provide them with weapons and horses while the vassals had to pay him homage, especially in case of war, so the leader of the undertaking must, according to section 2, "care for the welfare of his vassals. They have to be faithful to him."

The question arises, therefore, as to how the recognition and stabilisation of the dictatorial power of property is reconcilable with the main idea of Fascism, "the totalitarian State." Totality means that no sphere of private life is closed to State intervention, that every important function in society becomes a State function, that the relation between the State and the individual is determined principally by the predominance of the State and that the liberal principle of private rights, existing before the State, is reversed. Production and distribution of goods are indispensable functions in modern society and the nature of the totalitarian State can, therefore, be seen chiefly in its relation to the economic system. It must be borne in mind that Fascism has but one theory and one ideology, the maintenance of power. This is its sole philosophy of State and society. It accepts all ideas which might help it to compass this end, and it compromises

* Ignazio Silone, *Der Faschismus*, Zürich, 1934, p. 229.

with all institutions and all men for the sake of this aim.

"We can afford the luxury to be aristocrats and democrats, conservatives and reactionaries, reactionaries and revolutionaries, to obey laws and to disobey them according to the conditions of time, space, environment—in a word, according to the history in which we are compelled to live," said Mussolini in *Il Popolo d'Italia* of March 23rd, 1921.*

For what purpose, however, do German professors exist? Carl Schmitt, Professor of Constitutional Law in the University of Berlin and member of the Prussian State Council, Leader of Law Professors in the National Socialist Lawyers' Organisation, had even in 1932 developed a new theory of the totalitarian State, intended to meet the needs of the union of National Socialism and monopoly capitalism between Hitler and Thyssen. In his lecture entitled "*Gesunde Wirtschaft im starken Staat*" (Sound economics in a strong State) delivered before the most powerful German industrial organisation, the "*Langnam Verein*,"† he discriminates between two categories of the totalitarian State, between the State total in quantity and the State total in quality. He rejects the notion of the totalitarian State interfering with all matters of individual life, especially with economics, and adheres to the conception of the totalitarian State strong in quality (in political affairs) but leaving the economic system free from State interference.

The idea of the totalitarian State is in fact the Marxist theory of the State in the transition (revolutionary) period. The Fascist State is not total. The society of property-owners rather becomes total and dominating. National Socialism represents the total domination by dictatorial means of the society of monopoly property-owners over the State, using the terminology of the totalitarian State. It represents a new feudalism, and the new law, therefore, unconsciously uses the terminology of German feudal law in describing the relations between master and servant. Property to-day is no longer a private institution. Property organisations—corporations, trusts, cartels and combines—are no longer private organisations. They are public institutions. Property to-day is a political function of the State.

FRANZ NEUMANN.

April 1934.

* Quoted after Silone, p. 108.

† Published in *Mitteilungen des Langnam Vereins*, 1932, p. 18.

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MONTAIGNE THE EDUCATOR.

FRANCE is the country of miniature art. She has never produced any work which may be called monumental in the sense which we attach to Dante's *Divina Commedia*, Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, Shakespeare's Dramas, Goethe's *Faust* or Wagner's *Ring*. But this does not imply that she did not create works on a smaller scale which, owing to their sparkling brilliance of aphoristic thought, clothed in matchless form, will live in the history of epoch-making spiritual events. The most outstanding type of this kind of literary and philosophical achievement, on account of its intrinsic and timeless value, is Montaigne's *Essays*.

With Montaigne we enter upon a new era in the history of thought. The work of his predecessors had been inseparable from the problems affecting the Catholic Church. Political controversy, scientific research, religious speculation, artistic expression, briefly, every manifestation of the intellect was bound up with the dogma of Rome. Even those who struggled to free themselves from the hard-and-fast postulates of the Church—Dante, the first Protestant of Latin race, included—felt that they had to wage war within the precincts of the *Ecclesia Romana*, subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Pontiff. How different is the atmosphere in Montaigne's work! When studying his essays we feel as if all the doors and windows of the old structure of the Middle Ages had been opened wide to let in the invigorating air of spiritual freedom. The right of Man to assert himself, to look boldly into the Blue-Beard chamber, the key to which had up to now been jealously guarded by the Vicar of Christ, becomes the shibboleth of the Renaissance whose most dazzling spokesman is Montaigne. Passionately interested in everything under the sun, widely if not deeply read, manfully claiming the right to investigate, to doubt, to contest, to contradict himself, he was the very man to hurl the most withering anathema against the dogmatists and conscience-mongers of his age. "It means," he says, "to attach too much value to our convictions if we go so far as to roast a man alive for their sake." In spite of his haughty statement: "In my opinion we ought to *lend* ourselves to other people and *give* our best only to ourselves," his essays remain amongst the most precious legacies left to humanity—stimulating, in some

chapters, such as in his famous dissertations on education, full of valuable suggestions even to our own age.

Montaigne's evolution was influenced by several factors which in their sum-total alone would single him out amongst his contemporaries. He was, on his mother's side, of Jewish descent, a fact which perhaps accounts for his keen analytical and critical instincts. Born in the South of France, the cockpit of religious wars, he must have witnessed numerous deeds of cruelty, the outcome of the stark intolerance of his times. His education differed in itself essentially from that of any of the children brought up in the exclusive atmosphere reigning in the French aristocracy during the sixteenth century. Not only was his father original in the method of guiding his son's curriculum, having him, for instance, taught Latin as a living language; but, being himself of a singularly democratic bent, he brought the future sociologist at an early age into close contact with the life of the peasants on his estate, thus fostering a feeling of profound pity for and understanding of their humble life. To this democratic upbringing Montaigne owes that deep sense of moral responsibility which so many critics, misled by his supposed scepticism, failed to notice. "Look at those poor folk working on the land; they know neither Aristotle nor Cato, nor precept; and yet Nature draws from them daily examples, showing strength of character and patience different from those we learn at school."

This intimacy with the oppressed and disinherited is at the bottom of another of Montaigne's qualities, rarely to be found in the sixteenth century: his tolerance regarding religious and political problems. "It is silly presumption to despise and condemn as false what seems to us improbable." The man who made such a statement could have looked only with horror at the cruelties perpetrated by his contemporaries in the name of justice. "It is not truth one obtains through torture, but just what one wants to hear. Force and violence may achieve something, but not all." This intellectual detachment was fostered in the first place by his historical studies: "History is my hobby," proclaims the student of Plutarch. But even more than the abstract outlook upon life derived from his book-lore, Montaigne was influenced by intercourse with all the nations of Europe, an intimacy due to his extensive travels which he describes so delightfully in his little-known *Journal*.

All those happy coincidences of his education, which alone would have contributed towards the making of an exceptional personality, were rounded off by the vastness of the *milieu* in which Montaigne spent his life. He was a child of the Renaissance, and many traits of his character and trends of thought which may seem to the superficial observer at variance with his otherwise surprising modernity, will find their explanation in this fact. The preponderance of classical studies, the radical difference between the ethical and æsthetic teaching of antiquity, and the restrictions enforced upon the human conscience by the complicated system of Christian dogma, finally the enthusiastic eagerness of the men of the Renaissance to adopt the sum-total of classical thought and artistic expression, added to the growing dissatisfaction with the life-denying asceticism of catholic ethics, all these considerations raised a grave problem: Whom are we to follow, the pale Galilean pointing to a problematic heavenly recompense for the miseries of life, or Dionysus, the joy-giver? Christ's "Lead us not into temptation" was gradually giving way to Euripides' "Here let the Bacchæ celebrate their rites!" And with the final victory of the pagan affirmation of man's right to the full enjoyment of life, the whole aspect of thought became altered. Montaigne lived in the very midst of all that throbbing glory of vitality moving to the sweet piping of Pan and characterised by the exclamation of the German humanist Ulrich von Hutten: "It is a joy to be alive!" We shall see how far Montaigne was influenced by this aspect of the Renaissance in his views on Education; in reality one might consider his whole work as an all-embracing study of educational problems.

Meanwhile another historical event of even greater importance to Montaigne's philosophical point of view must be stressed: the Reformation. Renaissance and Reformation are both aiming at progress, but a retrograde progress, for both are looking for their ideal in the past, the one in classical antiquity, the other in primitive Christianity. Now Montaigne, with his fervent admiration for Latin and Greek thought and longing for peace, was the sworn enemy of all disturbing elements in the life of the individual and the community. This Goethean attitude towards everything revolutionary in thought and action made him blind to the latent greatness of the Protestant movement, the more so as he could only view

it in its beginnings, where it acted as crudely and cruelly as its opposite party. Besides, there was an ideological reason for Montaigne's aversion to Protestantism. His principal tenet was based on the instability and lack of reliability of human reasoning. "Only fools are certain and decided," he wrote (I, 26), and in another passage: "Can we call truth what is divided from others by mountains and what is called untruth on the other side of the frontier?" The adherents of the Reformation may not, after all, be surer of their tenets than the Catholics, both of them being subject to error. And not only cannot their statements be accepted as truth, which according to Montaigne is unobtainable by Man, but their fanaticism must be made responsible for all the bloodshed and cruelty perpetrated in the name of Religion—another instance of the tragic inability of even a great thinker like Montaigne to appreciate the possibilities for good in an incipient movement. Moreover, Montaigne, the *Uomo universale* of the Renaissance, considers the Reformation an æsthetically anæmic movement, averse to all the pomp and circumstance of the Catholic Church, its symbolism and pageantry. In the same way he attacked atheists, an apparent inconsistency in a freethinker. To him it seems scarcely worth while to exchange a vague, but consoling hope for a negation, equally uncertain, whose logical consequence must be pessimism and despair.

A similar conservatism, almost amounting to fatalism, distinguishes Montaigne as sociologist. He is an upholder of the existing laws, not because they are immanently just, but because they are laws. "This is the mystic basis of their authority." According to Montaigne it is necessity which makes human beings congregate and merge into composite units. This process was later on consolidated into fixed laws. But what is governing these laws so as to make them stable and willingly obeyed by the masses? "A generous heart of the rulers." "No other quality can influence and hold the will of the people as much as this." Montaigne insists (*Les Cannibales*) on the primitive state of Nature as the cornerstone of civilised society, thus foreshadowing the theories of the eighteenth century, above all, of Rousseau. The thinker's imagination is utopian and republican, the practical sociologist remains conservative. "A democratic rule seems to me the most natural and equitable." His life-long

friendship with Étienne de la Boétie, the author of *le Contr'un*, that remarkable compendium of sixteenth-century Bolshevism, has undoubtedly influenced Montaigne's political theories and might have unsettled a less well-regulated brain.

And now let us turn to another aspect of Montaigne's philosophy, his so-called scepticism. What is a sceptic? In the Greek sense, a research worker. In the modern sense, a man who is doubtful about the truth of his findings and—this is important—who does not go any further, who is satisfied with the existing state of uncertainty. Such thinkers were La Rochefoucauld, Voltaire, in our times Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. This scepticism was imputed to Montaigne by Pascal and by Encyclopædists of the eighteenth century. To Pascal anybody not believing in revelation was a sceptic; to the Encyclopædists he who denied the efficacy of reason was a sceptic too.

Religious truth in its dogmatic sense certainly did not exist for Montaigne. He stood up for the Catholic religion, but partly for sentimental reasons—his beloved father was a fervent Catholic—partly true to his conviction, *Quieta non movere*. Otherwise he sees in religion chiefly the evil which has been done in its name. It may affect the individual for good; as to the masses, it can only act as a means of promoting party strife. And yet, as far as the moral teaching derived from Christianity is concerned, Montaigne was far from being negative. A man who could write with such profound conviction about the education of children, about the influence of will-power and resignation, "the triumph of will and intelligence," a thinker who stood almost alone amongst Humanists in his clear perception of moral virtue, cannot be classed amongst sceptics. It is true that this Anatole France of the sixteenth century arrived at his conclusions with the enigmatical smile of the cultured dilettante, whilst Pascal suffered the pangs of hell on his spiritual way to Calvary. But the reason for Montaigne's emotional aloofness was again a positive one. He, for whom classical thought had said the last word, firmly believed that Christianity was a played-out experiment. In Pascal's case revelation was the final haven for his tormented soul: "Thou wouldst not have found me, if thou hadst not sought me," proclaims Pascal's God.

Montaigne's attitude towards religion was intimately

connected with his unalterable belief in Man's incapacity to arrive at a determined knowledge of the last reasons of our life, the Kantian "thing in itself." "To make sure of the phenomena we need an instrument, to control the accuracy of this instrument a demonstration, to verify this demonstration another instrument, and thus we are moving in an eternal circle." To make things still worse: to Man's intellectual limitations must be added his physical weakness, subject to outward influences of a thousand kinds. Just as he rejects religious dogma on account of its anthropomorphism, he ridicules anthropocentrism as unjustified and unreasonable in his delightful passage on animals. "When I am playing with my cat, I am not sure whether she is not more amused at my expense than I at hers." We need not wonder that a thinker gifted with such keen insight into human frailty was just as impartial towards himself. "All conflicting qualities," he says in his *Autocritique*, "are to be found in my mentality: according to circumstances I am bashful, talkative, morose, bad-tempered, jolly, a liar, truthful, indolent, etc. *Distinguo* is the most potent argument of my logic." Briefly: "Man is doomed for ever to seek and never to find" (Lessing). But let us not despise ignorance as long as it is not bred of conceit. To declare oneself ignorant, if resulting from honest research, is a noble confession.

A cursory perusal of Montaigne's essays may give the wrong impression that their author was nothing but a keen, analytical thinker. But the more careful student will be struck by a not infrequent note of mysticism, toning down the philosopher's frank "*Ignorabimus*" to a gentle, but never morbid resignation: "Asleep we are awake, awake asleep; nobody can be sure of either state. Even sleep often plunges dreams into nothingness, but when awake we are never certain of dreams not interfering with our wakefulness." And Death inspires Montaigne to some of his most wonderful meditations, it holds no terror for him. "Let us be on good terms with him, it is uncertain where he may wait for us, let us wait for him everywhere." The same man who probed human nature to its very depths, and found it wanting, kept one corner of his heart for the unconditional cult of friendship. "If you ask me why I love Étienne de la Boétie, I can only say because he was as he was and I as I was; we sought each other before ever having met. Heaven must have ordained it!"

We have seen that Montaigne's way of thinking was deeply rooted in the Renaissance and humanism. The vigorous vitality characteristic of those movements can be traced also in Montaigne's views on education. He had a predecessor, not less famous, in Rabelais, whose dissertation on the Abbey of Thélème, a kind of Eton for giant aristocrats, shows a healthy reaction against medieval education, dividing as it did the training of the mind from that of the body. In the amalgamation of both Rabelais sees his ideal, and the Renaissance agreed with him. Rabelais and Montaigne aim alike at the education of the aristocrat, Montaigne's chief object being the cultivation of a delicate epicurean taste, whilst together with Rabelais he is opposed to a preponderance of mental training, thereby neglecting the body. But here he parts company with the author of *Gargantua*. Rabelais' young Giant is a walking encyclopædia, whereas Montaigne's pupil will be a distinguished amateur, a ready linguist and a well-mannered cosmopolitan, not a mere scholar, a "*Fachmann*." "Books have not served me so much for instruction as for exercise. Education ought to aim at making us wise; instead of it our teachers try to turn us into scholars. We are not taught to love *virtus*, but only its declension and etymology." The lower Montaigne places mere book learning, the higher he values the influence of travel: "To be able to give an account of the manners, customs and laws of foreign nations and to sharpen our wits by associating with our neighbours." In spite of the stress he lays upon the aesthetic side of education he does not underrate its moral aspect. "Cripples," he exclaims, "are unfit for exercises of the body, and lame souls for those of the mind." It is curious to note that the ethics of sport and games are already clearly understood by Montaigne. "Indeed," he remarks, "games ought not to be meant as a mere play, but should be considered as serious actions. There is no game, however insignificant, where deceit should not be strictly censured."

Regarding the problem of punishment he does not hesitate for a moment: "I condemn all violence in the upbringing of a sensitive child destined for honour and liberty. I have never observed that whipping had any other effect but to make a boy cowardly and obstinate." But he also provides for the case of the intractable pupil. With uncompromising

thoroughness, which will not tolerate mediocrity, he offers the following advice. "If the pupil has no inclination towards culture and the finer aspects of life, there is only one remedy: place him, even if he were a Duke's son, as an apprentice with some pastry-cook."

Montaigne's influence was truly amazing. Scarcely a single French author could free himself from the powerful hold of his *Essays* and their style and method of expression. Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Anatole France, may claim Montaigne as their spiritual father, without whose guidance the very essence of their work would be missing. England numbers, apart from Shakespeare, who assimilated several passages of the *Essays* in his plays, some of her most brilliant authors like Burton, Charles Lamb and Walter Pater, amongst his admirers. And our own time seems to draw practical results from the study of his work. Dr. Montessori's system, the Activity School in Austria, and the Salem School in Germany with its motto, "vigorous and joyous exertion," show features which can be directly traced back to his teaching. Emile Faguet has summarised, perhaps better than any monograph, the practical lessons to be derived from the study of Montaigne in the words: "One ought to read him at the age of twenty, in order to learn how to approach life; one often reads him towards the end of one's life to learn how one ought to have lived."

M. JOUBERT.

RACIAL DECAY AMONG SAVAGES.

TWENTY years ago, in an essay on the depopulation of Melanesia, it was pointed out that in the forty years between 1832 and 1872 there had been a decrease of over sixty-eight per cent. and that some islands, once the homes of happy people, were now uninhabited, and in spite of occasional local fluctuations which read superficially as an increase the decline is still steady and fast. The white man, to hide his obvious guilt, claims that the people were a decaying race before Europeans descended upon them ; and when anthropologists with annoying insistence state that not only is there no evidence of this but much data to indicate the contrary, there come common slander, misrepresentation of native customs that are not understood, and the written words : " the disappearance of the race is scarcely subject for much regret."

Native people in general have a very low opinion of whites, and no wonder ; for they have learned to their cost that the stranger in their midst, who in many cases was welcomed to the land as an incarnate god, not only acts as a devil, but an extraordinarily petty and contemptible devil into the bargain, one who teaches truth is sacred and lives by transparent lies ; one who preaches that war is wicked, yet slays his fellows. Syphilis is called the white man's disease, alcohol the white man's medicine. We claim to be a superior people, yet contact with us is the touch that kills ; tribal organisation shatters before the frown of our justice ; native arts and crafts expire in the fetid breath of our industry ; and the civilising force of *tabu* and *mana* sinks to death beneath the icy pall of our religion. As theologians, as administrators, as traders, we have brought disease and despair, disintegration and death upon a people whose right to live was no less than our own, and whose title to the land they lived in was far greater. Now, as anthropologists, we must face the problem we have created and, before the remnants of the subject races have expired, do something to restore joy in life and pride of race to the people.

We have made the vast blunder of believing that culture could be cast off like a worn-out garment, and we have learned that it must be flayed off like a skin causing the victims of our folly to suffer in the shedding. Just as the Church was power-

less to prevent venereal disease in Europe, so it is powerless to preserve South Sea Islanders ; just as the doctors came to the rescue of sick humanity at home, so must the anthropologists go to the rescue of the decaying races abroad. For anthropology consists not only in recording outlandish speech, collecting crude carvings and listening to savage obscenities, but it does this in a manner enabling us to look on native life through native eyes and see, not filthy and revolting exhibitions of degradation in savage customs, but part of a vast culture complex which represents the life of man.

Below is a selection from hundreds of alleged reasons for racial decay, together with the proposed remedies.

ALLEGED CAUSE		PROPOSED REMEDY
1.	Insanitary houses and habits.	European-type huts and education.
2.	Native marriage customs, including juvenile marriage, infantile sexual activity, and inbreeding.	European marriage customs and morality.
3.	Inter-tribal warfare and head-hunting.	Curtailment of the power of the chiefs.
4.	Sorcery and witchcraft.	Christianity.

Let us examine a little more closely into these factors. Sanitation is largely a matter of opinion : continental Europeans visiting the islands declare the conditions unhealthy in this direction, whilst the average Englishman fails to discover much attempt at sanitary arrangement on the Continent. Actually the South Sea Islander is generally very abstemious in his habits ; food is rarely consumed within doors, nor excrement deposited near the village. True enough huts are unventilated and dark, frequently full of mosquitoes, and often abuzz with flies that have previously been feasting among the pigs ; but how much better is the average home in the poor quarters of a European city ? Pigs are not kept in Bethnal Green back-yards, but dustbins are.

Let us make one great stride from the fever-infested Tropics to the frozen North, from the brown-skinned Pacific Islanders to the pale-eyed Eskimos. These latter people, it was discovered, died at a comparatively early age from pulmonary affections, and their living conditions were held responsible. The permanent dwelling-place consisted of a small, windowless hut of stones cemented with moss and mud, with an open hearth in the centre. Round this the entire family and its dogs, sometimes as many as twenty of the latter, slept in a happy heap with the tiny arched doorway almost hermetically sealed. Obviously to trained European eyes this was the root of the evil. Huts of frame and asbestos sheet were introduced, with windows that would open, a stove having an efficient flue, and out-of-doors serviceable weather-tight kennels for the dogs. In this simple manner longevity was thrust upon the Eskimo, but, alas, the next census showed that Eskimos died of pulmonary affections at an even earlier age. Why? Because broken, draughty windows were entirely covered in with good oily sealskin; the patent stove flared the light peat fuel up the efficient flue without extracting its calorific maximum, and, deprived of the animal warmth of his dogs, the inhabitant of the Polar Regions lay through long nights shivering and sleepless, though in the old days, when travelling, he had been able to sleep warm and well in a hut built entirely of blocks of snow. European huts proved more lethal than the ill they were intended to remedy.

The savage marriage customs to which the civilised European most strongly objects may be divided roughly into three groups: infantile marriage and sexual activity, polygamy, and inbreeding. In the first place, when people have pride of race and are particular in matters of marriage, there is no reason why troth should not be plighted at birth by the parents of the parties concerned. It seems unfair that subject races should not be granted the privilege enjoyed by British prize flocks and herds. As for infantile sexual activity, it were well to remain forever silent lest some educated South Sea Islander may laugh, since eminent psychologists have given the game away so completely. Polygamy is the natural state in which herd animals live, and man, despite his twentieth-century achievements, is biologically a herd animal, as his secondary sexual characteristics prove. If we have developed a pious preference for monogamy, it does not mean that we

must force such conviction on others, nor persecute those who resolutely refuse to abandon six out of seven legally wedded wives. More than one missionary has found himself reduced to rather questionable behaviour when faced with such a situation, for an intelligent native primed with his knowledge of natural habits observed among the birds and beasts can often put up a better argument for polygamy than the missionary, frequently ignorant in biology, can against it. Inbreeding, in spite of all the popular chit-chat, has been shown to be beneficial to a species. It should be remembered that Cleopatra of the Nile was neither feeble-minded nor physically deformed, yet she was the offspring of a brother and sister, who in turn were the productions of long generations of incestuous ancestors. There are many communities of closely inbred fisher-folk about the more isolated coasts of Scotland and Ireland, who are as healthy and hardy as any race of men under the sky; whilst the Jews, who habitually marry cross cousins, just as South Sea Islanders do, cannot be shown to suffer more from imbecility or deaf-mutism than the Gentiles, who marry wherever the eye comes to rest.

Leaving these complainings thus half dealt with, simply with an assurance that they will not hold water, in which other of his marital relations does the savage prove inferior to the civilised? A gratifying silence indeed; and yet a disgraceful silence when we reflect on the magistrates' and divorce courts. Pray, let no European marriage customs and morals be imported into savage society, lest wife-beating and child desertion become as common there as here.

Native warfare and head-hunting cannot account for so many deaths in a year as our own World War did in one day; and in any case not an increasing death-rate but a declining birth-rate is the sign of racial decay. The great Plague of London swept away two-thirds of the citizens, yet the population increased. Pogroms ought to have exterminated the Jews, but the Jews flourish. Reasons must be sought deeper than figures delve—in the psychological reactions of a race—and one of the surest ways of rendering savage people dispirited, and ready to die of very shame, is to curtail the power of their chiefs and so take the *mana* (virtue—holiness) away from the subjects.

Missionary and Government official alike are culpable in this. They, feeling no doubt that trousers make Christian

gentlemen, and that all such have respect for a policeman—setting about the solution of their problems from the wrong end, appoint a village constable, whose power, by dint of lying, tale-bearing and perjury, is supreme. A “mission boy” usually holds the post, and mission boys are always, needless to say, Christians. Being a Christian to a South Sea Islander means something rather different from being a Christian in England. To the savage it means that *tabu*, that marvellous civilising force, is powerless to affect you, just as it is powerless to affect the white man; and you, like him, may now commit any crime or sin so long as you are crafty enough to avoid detection. That is the meaning of Christianity to a savage, not because the missionary has not striven mightily to teach the fair truth as it really is, nor because he has refrained from cruelly tramping over holy ground, or washing his head in a cooking-pot, just to demonstrate that savage gods are but sticks and stones, powerless to hurt, but because the Founder of the religion Himself said in a parable, “and some fell upon stony ground.” The savage proves the very flintiest soil, because although he accepts the truth, and has faith even as a child has faith, the conception of “God the Father” may be entirely beyond his comprehension, and certainly must be if he belongs to a matrilineal system in which the physical side of fatherhood is not understood.

It may be somewhat startling to have thrust upon one the fact that there are lusty adult men in the world who not only are ignorant of the part they have played in the production of their own progeny, but who resolutely refuse to believe it when they are told the facts in most carefully chosen terms, and given lessons in the fertilisation of plants; yet such is the case and no more can be done here than simply state the position. Under such a system children become exclusively the property of the mother; the father is only the mother’s husband, the infant’s nurse, the child’s playfellow, the youth’s instructor, and the young man’s companion. He does not even contribute to the upkeep of his family, but works to support his sister, for the sole masculine authority in a family so constituted is vested in the maternal uncle. Under such conditions the text: “God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son” is without emotional value, and Christianity becomes merely the white man’s magic by which he avoids the consequences of evil behaviour; and it may act

in the same manner for the converted savage, to whom religion is a more essential part of life than it is to the European. Births, marriages, and even deaths cannot occur without its aid. To the savage, real religion is represented by magical practice, and the high priest is the shaman, sorcerer, or witch-doctor. This functionary is often the most intelligent and, under European jurisdiction, the most badly treated person in a tribe. He is perpetually in danger of arrest and imprisonment on a charge of sorcery or witchcraft, despite the somewhat illogical contention of the white man that such powers are non-existent. If a member of a savage community falls sick, and the witch-doctor refuses to attend the case, then the tribesmen may accuse him of murder; if he does, the village policeman may inform the authorities. Cures are definitely effected by witch-doctors, many of whom have confided their secrets to sympathetic listeners. Hypnotism is admittedly used, but after all hypnotism has been advocated and applied in European medicine, with undeniable therapeutical effect. If the shaman of the village, attending a birth, declares he is in communion with the spirits of departed ancestors, he commits no greater crime than the numerous spiritualists in our midst; yet they, far from being imprisoned, are permitted to publish a journal, and produce books purporting to have been written through their agency by spirits of the departed.

Thus we see that several reasons given for racial decay among savages are active factors in our own civilisation, yet at home they are matters of no importance, and certainly not contributory to our own decadence. The suggested cures are far from beneficial to the natives, and it seems that there is no way out of the quandary. We have committed mass murder for a little copra and cannot make amends.

The planters complain that savages are naturally lazy, yet in their native state they perform admirable feats of industry in growing, from pride alone, much more food than they can eat; in building beautiful canoes, and sometimes in making long and hazardous sea voyages to visit friends abroad. That the natives do not suffer from common laziness is indicated by the above, and also by their having a word to describe the condition. The word means “sick of life” more than lazy. Under the crushing pressure of European administration they have lost the incentive to live. Asked why they do not produce so many children as in the past, they reply that they do not

wish to ; the old days and old ways are no more, and who cares to exist *mana-less* ?

The decline in the birth-rate means to the missionary and administrator that the native women are wickedly consuming drugs to prevent conception or cause abortion, and to the trader that the people have a mystic control of these matters. Both are correct. The women do take drugs, but chemical analysis reveals that the herbs so used are powerless to prevent nature taking its course, just as the most potent poison used on the island of Dabu, a brew causing almost instant death to the unfortunate drinker, proved to have no more toxic properties than a cup of weak tea. The traders are correct in assuming that the people possess mystic power, but the power is not under conscious control. It is to be sought in the deep layers of the unconscious mind wherein the "pleasure principle" and the "reality principle" are for ever at work. The race that has the will to live is able to survive all the evils that beset it, but the race that is dispirited and dejected will die of *ennui*.

It is obviously our Christian duty to repair the vast damage, restore power to the chiefs, dethrone the cheap policeman and, instead of attempting to proselytise, spend our zeal in protecting ; for the frenzied prayers of the South Sea savage fell upon the ears of the God who created him, whether that God was represented or revealed. Life to the savage meant service to his fellows, and service to his God. He had discovered that the teleological end of human existence is "to be good, great and joyous, beautiful and free," and he lived up to his ideal before we brought ruin upon him. The savage was, and in some cases still is, spiritually superior to the man in the streets of London, Paris and Berlin.

Humanity demands that the missionary, the administrator and the trader shall lend an ear to the anthropologist and, if he will not admit defeat and retire in good order, at least mend his ways, and hold the fort with a more sympathetic outlook upon savage customs, and with greater respect for the human rights of the unfortunate subject races so rapidly moving along the rough road to total extinction.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GERMANY AND THE SAAR.

THE German diplomatic fronts—the word is suggested by the existence of a titular "German Front" in the Saar—launched into a new and better form of activity at the end of October. Within two months the objects aimed at, or some of them, became clear. It had already become a common assumption among those students who know their Germany that German diplomacy was concentrated upon the Saar as the essential first step in its general European plan. It was equally assumed that all activity would be suspended, except in the Saar territory, till January 13th. The second assumption was wrong. It was proved to be wrong when on November 8th Herr von Ribbentrop, who holds the curious position in Berlin of specialist in the subject of disarmament and adviser in that subject to Herr Hitler's Government, slipped quietly into a London hotel ; and when, on November 9th, Herr von Hoesch, the German Ambassador, visited the British Foreign Office. The fact appeared to be that it had by now been borne upon the minds of those who direct affairs from the Wilhelmstrasse that the Saar could not be kept in a separate diplomatic pigeon-hole.

That discovery was immediately followed in Berlin by the further discovery that the whole foreign policy of the Nazi Government had driven Germany into an uncomfortable corner from which it would be well to escape as quickly as could be arranged without damage to German prestige. With the bluntness that so often distinguishes German diplomatic method it was decided that the most promising means to the end was the cultivation of cordial relations with the British Government, the end itself being no less ambitious than the return of Germany to active membership of the League of Nations. If such an end could indeed be achieved, by no matter what method, one of the main obstacles to European pacification might be removed.

That decision being made, no time was lost in acting upon it. For many months certain negotiations had been in progress between Dr. Schacht and the British long- and medium-term creditors of Germany. Dr. Schacht had adopted the simple uncompromising position that it was politically

preposterous—for the Dawes and Young loans were regarded virtually as a form of reparation payment by Germany—and financially impossible for Germany to regard those debts as serious obligations. He had confidently maintained that attitude for more than a year. Suddenly, on October 28th, he was summoned to a conference with Herr Hitler and Herr von Bülow. Two days later, on October 30th, he announced to the British negotiators that the German Government had agreed that 55 per cent. of the proceeds of German exports to Great Britain should be made available for the payment of British exports to Germany (which appropriation would be enough to meet that payment in full) and that the Dawes and Young loan service should henceforth be adequately assured. That announcement came as a surprise to those who did not appreciate the diplomatic background.

The plain fact was that it had dawned upon German official opinion that secession from Geneva had done more harm to Germany than to any other party. Even in the matter of the Saar it had removed every obstacle that otherwise might have been placed against the use of French troops as the potential keepers of law and order. It had enabled Russia to enter the League of Nations with the prestige of a Great Power greatly honoured. It had diverted Russian trade orders from Germany to Great Britain. It had consolidated against Germany a united British-French-Italian front. To prevent still further mischief Herr Hitler apparently decided that something must be done about it.

Dr. Goebbels promptly got to work. It was made known in devious ways that Germany's attitude to Geneva was, not so much that she had given notice to secede, but that she had suspended co-operation until such time as the League should be fair to Germany by granting her true equality; that in such an event there would be no difficulty about the return to Geneva of Germany's League officials, the resumption by Germany of her part in all the League activities including that of the disarmament conference; as well as Germany's acceptance of the Eastern Pact and her participation in a general undertaking to respect the independence of Austria. When Herr von Ribbentrop came to London he inspired the timid notion that he had come for a holiday and that, after seeing a few friends in London (including, he hoped, Sir John Simon and Mr. Anthony Eden) he proposed to continue his

holiday in Scotland. He did, in fact, see Mr. Eden on November 12th and Sir John Simon on November 13th. So confident was German official opinion of the likelihood that on the first friendly gesture from Berlin the British Government would open wide its arms of welcome, that Herr von Hoesch was instructed forthwith to expound to the British Foreign Office the German view of the proposed use of French troops as a precautionary measure against Saar disorder during the plebiscite of January 13th.

He went to the Foreign Office on November 9th. What he said was something like this. From 1919 to 1926 French troops had occupied the Saar by general virtue of their occupation of the Rhineland. In 1926, that is after the signature of the Locarno Treaty and the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, the French troops had been withdrawn, but France had stipulated that in the event of trouble in the Saar she should have the right again to take her troops into the Saar to protect her important railway junctions and lines of communication. The fact, he said, that the Governing Commission had itself made provision for protecting the French communications robbed the French case of its value. To call in French troops at the present time for the ostensible purpose of maintaining order during the impending election would, he submitted, be preposterous, because France is a party interested in the results of the election. It would be as fair to call in German troops for such a purpose. Moreover, history has proved, he said, that it would not be difficult for French agents to provoke the circumstances which would constitute an excuse for French troops to be called into the Saar. The analogies of the Memel and Upper Silesian risings and the agitation of the Rhineland Separatists showed how easy it would be for the French troops to connive at, or even to excite, anti-German trouble in the Saar for the precise purpose of ensuring that they themselves be called in to quell it. There was no danger, he said, from a German *Putsch*. There was grave danger of an anti-German *Putsch* provoked by France.

The main interest of Herr von Hoesch's communication was the evidence it gave of the assurance which prompted it; for it ignored one of the obvious points at issue, which was that Germany's withdrawal from Geneva constituted a main reason why it was hardly now possible to interfere with the

existing understanding whereby the sanction for the maintenance of order in the Saar was to be provided, on the League's authority, by French troops. He also rather missed the point that the present hypothetical function of French troops is not primarily concerned with the Saar railway junctions.

It seems well, therefore, to recall the full facts on which is based the right claimed by the Saar Governing Commission to call French troops into the Saar for the purpose of maintaining order. It will thus automatically appear wherein Herr von Hoesch, and many others besides him, were confused.

The kernel of the matter was put by Mr. Knox, the British Chairman of the Saar Governing Commission, in January last, when at a meeting of the League Council at Geneva he stated that the authority of the Governing Commission in the Saar Territory derived ultimately from the Commission's right in a case of emergency and of necessity to call upon the assistance of the nearest available French troops. The Commission, he said, had that right of its own competence, and was not bound to obtain the previous special permission of the League Council. Indeed, he said, that right rested upon the definite formal resolutions passed by the Council in 1926 and 1927.

In those early years there had been some prolonged controversy upon the subject. On the strict wording of the Treaty there never was any justification for the presence of French troops in the Saar. The Saar Annex to the Treaty of Versailles in paragraph 30 stipulated that "There will be no military service, whether compulsory or voluntary, in the territory of the Saar Basin, and the construction of fortifications therein is forbidden. Only a local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order may be established. It will be the duty of the Governing Commission to provide in all cases for the protection of persons and property in the Saar Basin."

In fact, however, the Saar Basin had been occupied by French troops ever since the German collapse in 1918. When the Governing Commission arrived in Saarbrücken in February, 1920, it found itself on the one hand under a treaty obligation to protect "persons and property," and on the other hand presented with a ready means to that end by the presence of French troops. It decided, therefore, not unreasonably, to retain the French troops until the local police

force prescribed by the Treaty could be organised. Little time was lost in the organising of such a force, the first gendarmes being, in fact, enrolled in October, 1920. In that year and again in 1921 the League Council approved the Commission's retention of the French troops as a temporary means to the protection of life and property.

If, however, a beginning had been promptly made in the enrolment of the gendarmerie, the further progress was slow. In October, 1923, it counted only 155 men; in March, 1924, only 355; in February, 1925, only 755. Yet the Commission estimated that a force of 3,000 would be necessary before the French troops could safely be withdrawn. There was something equivocal as well as unfortunate in the position of a governing commission which retained in the Saar a force of French troops whose presence did not rest upon a clear treaty provision. German propagandists made the most of it. The German Government addressed to the League of Nations a series of protests against it.

It was as a result of that equivocal position that Sir Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary, made a certain proposal at the League Council meeting of March, 1925. His proposal was that when the Saar police reached the strength of 1,000 men (a number adequate in his view to ordinary needs) the French troops should be withdrawn from the Saar, but retained near the frontier; and that the Saar Governing Commission should be given authority, in the event of serious disorder, to call in those troops. Saargemünd and Forbach were only ten kilometres from Saarbrücken and therefore the French troops could be stationed within quick recall.

In answer to Sir Austen Chamberlain's proposal the Council in March, 1925, resolved:

The Council of the League of Nations, after having heard the Italian representative's report, the observations of the representative of Great Britain and the explanations of the president of the Governing Commission: (1) Approves the Governing Commission's proposal to increase the local gendarmerie by 250 men during the financial year 1925-1926. (2) Requests the Governing Commission to submit to it for consideration a report on the manner in which it would be possible, in the absence of troops, to carry into effect sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 30 of the Saar Annex to the Treaty of Versailles, which lays down that it will be the duty of the Governing Commission to provide in all cases for

the protection of persons and property in the Saar Basin. In preparing its report, the Governing Commission should take into account the possibility of obtaining the assistance of troops stationed outside the Saar territory. (3) Requests the Secretary-General to communicate a copy of this resolution to the German Government, in reply to its note of February 19th, 1925.

The Governing Commission's report, which was not made available till the end of January, 1926, emphasised the serious nature of the responsibility imposed upon it by the Treaty of protecting life and property in all circumstances; stated that such responsibility could not be met without a police force of at least 3,000 men; objected that the financial resources of the Saar territory were not equal to the provision of so big a force; quoted the decision of the Council of the League of Nations of February 13th, 1920, whereby the Council was empowered to demand the maintenance or the recall of the French troops, in whole or in part, to preserve order in the Saar, pending the constitution of the police force prescribed by paragraph 30 of the Saar Annex; stated that the police force had now reached the limit in strength imposed by the financial conditions, but that it was inadequate to meet the full implications of the responsibilities imposed upon the Commission of safeguarding persons and property "in all cases," and therefore submitted that the Commission should be entitled at any time and immediately to call upon troops stationed outside the territory, but near to it.

In that same report the Commission went on to quote paragraph 33 of the Saar Annex: "The Governing Commission shall have power to decide all questions arising from the interpretation of the preceding provisions. . . ." It stated, as its own interpretation of that paragraph, that in case of need it was entitled in an emergency, on its own responsibility and immediately, to call upon troops stationed outside the Saar Territory to protect persons and property within the territory, and particularly to protect the mining installations and the railway system, the use of which, in the Commission's view, ought to be safeguarded in any contingency and by all available and appropriate means. It therefore formulated as its considered view that only the power to call in troops from without the territory could enable the Commission to discharge one of the most important obligations conferred upon

it by the treaty. The report ended with a statement that the Commission had asked the French Government to withdraw from the Saar territory a battalion stationed at Saarbrücken so that the garrison would be reduced to one regiment of infantry and one of cavalry.

On March 18th, 1926, the League Council considered that report. The *rapporteur* announced that the French Government had confirmed the information given by the Saar Governing Commission about the French troops in the Saar, and had also declared that the withdrawal of the troops that remained in the territory would be effected step by step. He ended with a suggestion that pending the completion of the French withdrawal the Governing Commission should be reminded of its duty to safeguard in all cases the freedom of transit and of transport over the railways of the Saar territory, and that the Commission itself be invited to submit proposals in that sense in time for the next meeting of the Council. The Council thereupon passed a resolution "noting" the Governing Commission's report and approving the suggestions made by the *rapporteur*.

The proposals thus invited from the Governing Commission were not made available to the Council till its meeting of March 12th, 1927. They were embodied in a new report dated February 18th, 1927, to which, however, the Saar member of the Governing Commission had refused to agree. It proposed (1) that there should be placed at the Commission's disposal a special railway commission ("whose activities must be limited to the protection of railways, telephones and telegraphs"), and a special railway defence force of 800 men whose exclusive purpose it would be to safeguard transit and transport through the Saar territory; (2) that in the event of any danger arising to the Saar railways, the railway commission should have at its direct disposal not only the special defence force now proposed, but also two battalions of French troops to be stationed outside the territory at Saargemünd and Forbach, the particular duty of those battalions to be the protection of certain specified sectors of the Saar railway lines.

The League Council at that meeting passed a resolution which took note of the Saar Governing Commission's report, and promised that the proposed Railway Commission and Railway Defence Force should be constituted "within a

maximum delay of three months, and therefore the troops stationed in the Saar will be withdrawn within that period." The particular need for a special force to defend the railways arose from the circumstance that the lines of communication of the French Army of Occupation in the Rhineland passed through the Saar territory.

The Saar Railway Commission and Railway Defence Force were duly constituted according to the Council's resolution. The Defence Force was composed of contingents from the French, British and Belgian Armies of Occupation. It arrived at Saarbrücken near the end of June, 1927, by which time the remnants of the French troops had been withdrawn from the territory.

At the end of 1929, the British Army of Occupation left the Rhineland, and the Railway Defence Force thereafter was composed only of French and Belgian troops.

Inasmuch as the Railway Commission and the Railway Defence Force left the Saar territory on December 12th, 1930, there no longer remained any practical value in the League Council's resolution of 1927. The only remaining juridical instrument that is applicable to the case is the Council's action of March 18th, 1926; but on that date the Council did nothing except to "note" the Saar Governing Commission's claim that by virtue of the terms of the Saar Annex it was entitled in case of necessity to call in the nearest French troops for the purpose of protecting life and property. It has, however, been assumed in both British and French diplomatic quarters ever since March, 1926, that the Saar Governing Commission has had conferred upon it by the League of Nations the power to call in the French troops. Indeed, on March 1st, 1926, a British Note was addressed to the French Ambassador in London stating that "His Majesty's Government entirely concur in the view that the Saar Governing Commission should be empowered to call in the French troops stationed near the frontier in case of emergency." It has certainly been the view of the Quai d'Orsay since that time that France had accepted the responsibility on behalf of the League of Nations to provide the troops, if they should be called upon to do so by the Saar Governing Commission, to safeguard life and property. At the League Council meeting of September last the late M. Barthou, then Foreign Minister of France, declared that

France "had no intention of repudiating or evading her obligation if an appeal be made to her."

The present relevant facts, whatever be the strict juridical value of what took place at Geneva on March 18th, 1926, are that the French troops are posted ready for action; that the Saar Governing Commission regards itself as entitled as of its own right and independently of the League of Nations to call upon them in case of need. That title is not disputed by any party except Germany; and Germany's position is that she has ceased to be an active member of the League of Nations and therefore can only protest from the outside.

THE NAVAL "LOCKJAM."

The conversations preliminary to the naval conference of 1935 were resumed in London on October 23rd. On that day a meeting took place at 10 Downing Street, under the presidency of Mr. MacDonald, between the Japanese and the British representatives. The Americans were not represented, because a full Anglo-American exchange of view had taken place in the summer. At the meeting of October 23rd the Japanese explained verbally their claim for naval parity with the United States and Great Britain. After it, the consultations became general between the three delegations. The American delegation, for example, visited the British on October 29th to discuss the information that had been given to the British delegation by Mr. Matsudaira and Rear-Admiral Yamamoto the week before. Thereupon the conversations fell into what the Americans called a "lockjam."

But the apparent stagnation that thereupon characterised the Japanese, American, and British delegations was in one important sense misleading. Below the surface a somewhat grim tactical manœuvring was taking place. There were no longer any journeys from the Japanese Embassy in Portman Square either to the American headquarters at Claridge's Hotel or to the British in Downing Street; but it was obvious that the British and American delegations were simply waiting with the greatest courtesy and patience for what they had reason to know would be the next step: namely the Japanese denunciation of the Washington Treaty. The Japanese delegation had not at that time informed the others that such was the intention of the Japanese Govern-

ment, but no shadow of doubt was felt about the fact itself. Desultory explanations were asked and given about minor points of detail in the Japanese proposals. But the proposals themselves were in their main point totally unacceptable to the American delegation, as they were to the British delegation.

The tactical interest of what was taking place was this. Theoretically the conversations were preparing the ground for next year's conference, as prescribed by the 1930 treaty. But it was assumed to be the Japanese tactic that the conference that would actually take place should by contrast derive from another origin, namely, from a denunciation of the 1922 Washington Treaty and the resultant operation of that clause of the Treaty which stipulates the holding of a conference within twelve months of such denunciation. The distinction was important. Japan had claimed parity in naval strength. By denouncing the Washington Treaty she presumably expected to enter a new conference with the slate wiped clean of the 5.5.3. ratio. The ironic situation was thus disclosed that the detailed subjects of conversation so far tabled—the rival merits of global tonnage limitation and limitation by categories; the unpromising search for an agreement about what are "offensive" and what "defensive" craft; the possibility of limiting gun-calibre, and the like—were tacitly recognised by all the parties concerned as a mere means of marking time until Japan decided the essential tactical preliminary of the basis on which the conference was to be held.

While no doubt was felt about what that decision would be, it would be wrong to deduce that either in British or in American quarters there was any sense of grievance. Japan was fully entitled to denounce the Washington Treaty. It was even recognised that Japan's domestic background, the engagement of her prestige in Chinese eyes with the achievement of naval parity, constituted one of Japan's chief problems. On the other hand the 5.5.3. ratio constituted the rigid basis of both American and British policy.

On November 7th a further meeting took place between the British and Japanese delegations. The position then was that as the British Government was the inviting party in the discussions, and as a deadlock had been reached on the basis on which the discussions had been formerly conducted, it was the clear duty of the British Government to make an alter-

native suggestion. The opportunity was provided by the fact that the Japanese delegation, while rejecting the 5.5.3. ratio, had made the offer that if parity were conceded, Japan might enter a commitment not in practice to build up to the limit. On neither side were any formal or written proposals made. The procedure was wholly tentative. But such was understood to be the Japanese meaning. To the British delegates, therefore, the only visible chance of continuing the discussions (having regard to the tacitly understood Japanese intention of denouncing the Washington Treaty) was to encourage the Japanese to disclose more precisely what they were prepared to do.

Wholly without prejudice, therefore, to British policy, and solely as a means of clarifying Japanese policy, a suggestion was on that day made in this general sense: (1) If it be the case that Japan finally rejects the 5.5.3. ratio, then a treaty to define quantitative limitation becomes impracticable, because the British Government is united with the American Government in insisting upon the 5.5.3. ratio. (2) In that case would Japan agree, as a means of obviating competitive building, to the device of concluding a formal treaty from which the 5.5.3. were excluded but which would be supplemented by a "gentleman's agreement" to restrict in practice the relative building of the Three Powers within limits to be agreed upon? (3) Would Japan be willing to agree to qualitative limitation, that is, the limitation in the size of ships and of gun-calibre? It would be wrong to deduce that those suggestions constituted a considered British "offer" to Japan. Their main object was to produce a formulated Japanese view. It was fully appreciated, for instance, by the British Government, that the method of qualitative limitation could not be expected to appeal to the American delegation, whose case for big ships rests upon the well-known circumstance that the lack of naval bases, coupled with the length of communications, postulates ships big enough to carry fuel and food for long-range cruising without reducing speed. The Japanese delegation submitted the British suggestions to Tokyo. The American delegation was visited on November 8th by Mr. Craigie, of the British Foreign Office, and fully informed of what had taken place the day before. The conversations were thereupon virtually adjourned pending the answer from Tokyo.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND.

In the speech he delivered to the Czechoslovak parliament on November 6th, Dr. Beneš dealt somewhat frankly with Czechoslovak-Polish difficulties. What he said was the more remarkable because in one and the same breath he observed that "our political relations with Germany continue to be good, and are supported by normal economic contracts"; and that "The mutual political reserve between Poland and Czechoslovakia continues." He explained the position in these words. "The dissonance which arose last spring between the two countries as a consequence of the Polish press campaign initiated after January 26th, 1934, has lost nothing of its local character—it was declared to be such by official Polish authorities—but, on the other hand, the difference in the views of the two countries on several important questions of general European politics has been substantially emphasised, as exemplified by the present state of relations between France and Poland, by the Polish reply to the proposed Eastern Pact, by the visit of M. Gömbös, the Hungarian Premier, to Warsaw, the relations of Poland to the Little Entente, the continuation of the anti-Czechoslovak campaign in a certain section of the Polish press, and other matters of a formal and also material nature which it is unnecessary to expatiate upon at the moment." He went on: "Without, of course, exaggerating the true significance and extent of those manifestations we must none the less look upon them by no means as passing tactics but as important and permanent political facts, and must calmly count with them for the future. While certain disadvantages arise therefrom for us, *there also arise for us at least equally great advantages* of which it is our duty to avail ourselves. We shall therefore not lose sight of either the former or the latter, and we shall bear these events in mind for the future in our political calculations, even though we regret certain aspects of them. Poland cannot, after all, be reproached or called to account because she pursues a policy of her own interests as she understands them. We do the same and shall continue to do so without at the same time concealing in any way our aims and plans which never were, are not now, and will not in the future be directed against Poland, but which are designed resolutely and consistently to vindicate and to protect the vital interests and prestige of our State."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 15th, 1934.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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DR. INGE'S FAREWELL.

Dr. Inge's *Vale** is a truly beautiful and moving book. It is the product of his ripest wisdom, using his learning as its instrument, and tempering his high courage with a gentleness and forbearance that the distinguished author has never hitherto so manifestly displayed. The narrative of events is so given as to reveal and place on final record the values, which have been disclosed to Dr. Inge, to fashion his outlook upon life and constitute his witness to the present age. The story is made the natural vehicle of reflection and is presented in the author's inimitable style.

Dr. Inge treats this little volume as his Farewell, not only to the Deanery of St. Paul's, to kind friends and varied interests, "but to active life itself." It is to be hoped that this withdrawal will only be partial, and that while he is relieved of the burdensome details of active life he may remain as a searching, yet kindly, critic and commentator upon events

* *Vale*, by the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, K.C.V.O., D.D. Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.

and spiritual moods or movements for years to come. It may be true that, as he says, Dr. Inge has "said his say" and given his message, but fresh applications of the message may be needful, and should Dr. Inge be moved to say his say again he will not want those who are eager listeners.

Dr. Inge's account of his early life and of the stages by which he passed from an old-fashioned Tractarian home to his ultimate destination at St. Paul's is exceedingly interesting and instructive. Still more important is what he tells us of the reason which led him to the study of Mysticism. In his endeavour "to find a sound intellectual basis" for his religious belief, he was confronted by four claimants to the seat of authority—"an institution, a book, the inner light, and human reason." Yet "the centre of gravity in religion has shifted, in our day, from authority to experience." The Mystics have above all claimed to base their teaching upon an experience which, while confined to the few, yet represents the fullness of the religious life that in germ and promise is shared by the many. "In truth," Dr. Inge says, "the typical mystical experience is just prayer." The testimony of the Saints and Mystics "has far greater evidential value than is usually supposed," for "they can testify to what we most wish to know—that the eternal things, which are not seen, are real." It followed that Dr. Inge should be led to make a special study of Plotinus, the greatest of philosophical mystics, and should exalt him as a spiritual teacher, though agreeing with St. Augustine in finding all that he wanted in regard to man's ascent to God, but needing the still more important descent of God to man—the Incarnation.

It is impossible in this brief review to speak of the many books which have come from Dr. Inge's pen, or of his views in regard to many most important problems of modern life. His chief message has been derived from philosophical mysticism. He has borne consistent witness to the supremacy of Spiritual Values—the True, the Beautiful and the Good—as the true quest and reward of life, attended by searching, and often scathing, criticism of those who lead their fellows to seek lower satisfaction than the pursuit and enjoyment of this supreme end. By this unfailing witness and criticism Dr. Inge has attained a unique and unassailable place in the spiritual life of our times.

J. S. L.

ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

Dr. Schiller has recently published a miscellaneous collection of his Lectures and Essays in a volume entitled *Must Philosophers Disagree?** The title is somewhat misleading, for the inviting problem he proposes is only discussed in a brief occasional paper read to the Aristotelian Society, and the rest of the volume is extremely miscellaneous, ranging from the Psychology of Examinations at the outset to Psychical Research at the close. These miscellaneous contents are divided into three parts, Educational, Historical, and Speculative. The Historical part consists of three Lectures on William James, and Lectures on Nietzsche, Herbert Spencer as a moralist, and James Thomson, a poet of pessimism. All these are of interest, and especially the account that is given of William James, the outstanding philosopher of Pragmatism. Of the Speculative Papers, perhaps that on *Pragmatism, Humanism and Religion* is the most important, for, as Dr. Schiller says, he "can deal with Pragmatism and Humanism because he made one of them himself, and had a hand and sword in fashioning the other."

The title of the volume is, after all, perhaps not seriously misleading, for in the brief pages of the opening essay Dr. Schiller sets out the distinctive positions which govern the whole of his philosophical thought, and therefore his treatment of all the subjects that he discusses in the following chapters. The author rightly contrasts philosophy, which is concerned about Wholeness, with the Sciences, which of necessity are departmental. Yet the views of Wholeness entertained by various philosophers depend upon their differing personalities. Hence Dr. Schiller insists that their differences are psychological, and not logical. He is the champion of personality and its values, a point of view that not only explains philosophical differences, but is the foundation of Humanism, which treats the relativity of human consciousness not as a disability, but as a qualification for arriving at truth.

Dr. Schiller is always interesting and challenging. His acuteness and sincerity enable him almost always to strike at the heart of things, although he sometimes appears, especially in popular addresses, to be slapdash and rather

* *Must Philosophers Disagree?* by F. C. S. Schiller. Macmillan. 12s. 6d. net.

superficial. He has a niche of his own among philosophical thinkers of the present time, and those who have been stimulated by his previous writings will turn to this volume with interest and appreciation.

J. S. L.

BRITAIN'S POLITICAL FUTURE.*

Lord Allen brings a well-equipped, independent and courageous mind to the consideration of security and progress. He is a firm believer in the possibility, indeed the necessity, of reason as the guide of political and economic government. In a world which to many appears to have abandoned democracy, he remains a democrat as regards national government, and lays down the conditions necessary for peace and progress alike for the single nation and for the society of nations. But a reasonable public opinion demands a type of leadership which differs alike from the partisanship of the past and the new self-imposed autocracy, which has obtained a more or less enforced acceptance in many countries which had taken on the form of popular self-government. Lord Allen believes that man, not only in the individual but in the mass, desires a pacific reasonable settlement of all economic and political problems, when his better nature is not upset or influenced by the combative spirit of false leaders. The appeal to class-war with its unsound presentation of economic hostility between capital and labour, the extension of this false doctrine to the international economic field, and above all the foolish and futile attempts at disarmament before the intellectual and moral foundations of security and pacific co-operation have been laid, he regards as the main obstacles to a reasonable progress. His most urgent demand is for "a new technique of leadership." An effective appeal to popular reason for friendly co-operation in the utilisation of those economic resources, now generally recognised as sufficient to produce plenty in a world of widespread poverty, must come from the stimulation and education of a moral *élite*; for though the popular mind desires security and progress it does not know how to get these desirables in the complex human society of our time. No return to pre-war conditions is

* By Lord Allen of Hurtwood. Longmans. 6s.

possible. Unless there is a powerful and fairly rapid development of reasonable co-operation in the fields of politics and industry with a moral inspiration to vitalise it, class-war and international war must bring our civilisation to ruin. The extremes of political partisanship of the right and the left, with their bellicose doctrines of rights and the need of enforcing them, must give way to combinations of energetic and constructive citizens in this and other countries, who will take the initiative in quick changes of public policy, if we are to avert the disasters that confront us.

"There is no doubt that if our country is now to be saved for democracy, if a new era of swift and active achievement is to be inaugurated and policies of world-peace and intellectual reconstruction promoted, a government of all the talents will have to be formed, not out of the National Government, but in a quite different way. This will require great sacrifice from all politicians of vision, humanity and goodwill. It will in all probability mean an association of the younger generation of the Conservatives with the Liberal and Labour parties, and with Labour at the helm." Can these younger politicians shake off the shackles of party? If they can, is there enough "reason" in the electorate to respond to their appeal? Is the desire for peace habitually dominant? These are the root issues that form the staple of Lord Allen's argument. My presentation of the case here has been perforce confined to generalities. But Lord Allen gives much space to the practical reforms needed in our political constitution and methods. The reasoning of his book is exceedingly convincing. Those who reject it will not be able to refute it, but will fall back upon a disbelief in the sufficient rationality of human beings as men and citizens.

J. A. HOBSON.

AFTER HITLER'S FALL.

After Hitler's Fall, by Prince Hubertus Loewenstein,* continues the work of criticism and construction begun in his remarkable volume, *The Tragedy of a Nation*, published a few months ago. Having delivered judgment on both the Weimar politicians and the Nazis, he proceeds to outline the system

* Faber & Faber. 7s. 6d.

which he desires to follow the existing régime. That Hitler and his associates will vanish he has no doubt whatever. "An absolutely free election, one in which every party was allowed to make its own propaganda, would not result in a vote of even 25 per cent. for the National-Socialists. They are finished. But the death-agony, the convulsive struggle to retain power, may last for a long time yet." He is confirmed in his view of an inevitable collapse by the diminished support of the Government revealed by the plebiscite of August 19th, in comparison with that of November 1933. On the other hand he confesses that he almost hopes that National-Socialism will not collapse too quickly, "as at present there is nothing to take its place or to give new hope to the masses and a new meaning to their lives." The Communists have their own organisation and their own programme, but the author detests it no less than the Nazi tyranny. What is needed, he argues, is a new force, a new creed capable of replacing National-Socialism and resisting Communism. To the elaboration of the new system in its political, economic, social and spiritual aspects, the bulk of the volume is devoted. Prince Loewenstein writes as a Liberal and a Catholic, with such a firm grasp of the importance of economic reconstruction that he allows himself an eloquent tribute to the greatness of Marx. Some of his readers may complain that he exaggerates the importance of his mission and his schemes. Others will applaud his energy and his courage, his fervent patriotism and his inflexible faith. His hopes for the future are rooted in his admiration for Germany's political and cultural achievements in the past. From England he asks not intervention but moral support. "However chaotic Europe may become, there will always be hope for the rebirth of free nations as long as England remains unshaken."

G. P. G.

THE WAR AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE.

The third and fourth volumes of Mr. Lloyd George's story* relate to the period of his own Prime Ministership up to the end of 1917. Of course, the story is interesting. Mr. Lloyd George was the man who, probably more than any other single

* *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*. Vols. III and IV. Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 218s. each.

man in the world, was responsible for the course taken by the Great War in its second and final stage. He himself supplied what was probably the main driving-force on the "Allied" side. He personally made decisions which affected the course of human history in one of its biggest phases. The lives of men by the million were at his disposal. The interest of it all is terrible in its magnitude. Mr. Lloyd George issues his memoirs sixteen years after the war ended. He is now a man of more than three-score years and ten. It is inevitable that in the mind of ordinary human beings the deepest interest of these volumes should derive, not from what the author has to say about strategy, about Field-Marshal Haig, about Passchendaele ("the campaign of the mud"), about his political colleagues, about victory and the means whereby it was achieved; but from the effect of so monstrous an experience upon the man himself, as revealed by himself, in the light of sixteen years' reflection. It is true that in these particular volumes he is in the very middle of his account of what actually took place. It would therefore in one point of view be inappropriate to expect to find in them anything of philosophic value in the revelation of his own attitude to what he records. Maybe there will be something more humanly satisfying in the final volume. Yet the reader who lived through that war, who experienced at first hand what that war meant, who knew the part played in it by Mr. Lloyd George, will no doubt expect even in these volumes to find at any rate a glimpse of imaginative appreciation on the author's part of the wicked futility of everything he records, or did. Such a reader will be disappointed. In the preface to the third volume he will read these words: "The tale is one which does not always give me any pleasure to tell; quite the reverse. There is much of it which I wrote with intense reluctance." Those words read almost as a promise that something satisfying in the human sense above referred to is about to follow. But the promise freezes as the very next words are read. The reason for the author's reluctance is promptly given in these pedestrian words: "For I found it necessary in the interests of a truthful record to relate facts which constitute a severe criticism on the action of men whose memory is honoured by their fellow countrymen for many sterling qualities which they possessed in a remarkable degree. My disinclination for revealing to the public unpleasant truths which reflect on distin-

guished public servants is naturally enhanced by the fact that some of them are no longer present to defend themselves." Such is the language of a Prime Minister speaking *ex cathedra* and with conventional unreality about his colleagues. Is it really so important that Mr. Lloyd George regarded Field-Marshal Haig as a muddler, and the ghastliness of Passchendaele as one of the results of his muddle? Obviously all generals and all politicians make muddles all the time. The notion that any brass hat in war-time ever topped anything else than a bewildered and straggling brain, hopelessly out of touch with what was happening in the war itself, belongs to the domain of heroic story-writing. The bigger the war, the bigger the political and military muddle. As for Passchendaele (pp. 2110-2251 of Vol. IV), which Mr. Lloyd George calls (p. 2251) "indeed one of the greatest disasters of the war," it merely differed from the rest of the war in its spectacular horror. Every man who was killed, maimed, blinded on a "quiet" front in a "quiet" interval constituted as great a disaster as every man who met the like fate in the mud and blood of Passchendaele. It is impossible for any person of ordinary intelligence, ordinary decency and ordinary common sense to read through the thousand and a half pages of these two volumes without receiving a cumulative shock that the leaders of political civilisation could become so engrossed in a war, could so unquestioningly convince themselves that their folly was heroism, could so exaltedly beg the whole question of what they were doing.

On its own level, however, that of a first-hand account of one man's civilian part in the Great War, these volumes are crammed with matter of historical interest. In a short review it is impossible even to suggest its range, or its complexity. As a feat of pure intellect, of grip upon a vast subject infinitely detailed, of industry and vitality, these volumes are deeply impressive. The physical labour of writing so big a work and of handling and mastering its enormous material in itself is proof of Mr. Lloyd George's resilience and strength. Written under such pressure as must clearly have been necessary, it would be unreasonable and absurd to expect the English style to be uniformly well polished. Historically the volumes are indispensable, for much of Mr. Lloyd George's first-hand evidence could not otherwise have been made available. It is comprehensive. It reveals in detail the military facts and

problems, on land, on and under the sea, in the air; the domestic political interplay in Downing Street and Westminster; the military and political difficulties between Allied Governments, the unifying of the supreme command; the diplomatic manœuvres, including the German and Wilson Peace moves of December 1916, the Austrian peace move, the Rome and Petrograd Conferences, Stockholm; the Russian Revolution; and the problems of labour unrest, food supplies and the like.

Through it all there shines the record of Mr. Lloyd George's own part in the drama. From that matter there does emerge a certain interesting question of political philosophy, namely how far the political authority in time of war should leave discretion to the generals. Mr. Lloyd George is of course a staunch champion of what he regards as the democratic principle of civilian control. It is clear that he has no great opinion of the intelligence of military and naval commanders; an opinion which will be heartily shared by most people. But the whole war was the product of collective political folly, and the politicians in effect were wholly unable to control the mischief they had set afoot. There is little consolation to be derived, even on the evidence of these volumes, from the achievement of putting the generals into their place. No soldier ever wants a war, or would not be ready at a moment's opportunity to stop it. It is the politicians who make and prolong wars.

G. G.

* * * * *

THE LEAGUE COVENANT.

Sir John Fischer Williams has made an important contribution to the study of the Covenant in his recent book, *Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations*.^{*} The volume contains the substance of lectures delivered in Oxford in the autumn of 1933. Sir John refuses to apply strictly legal rules of interpretation to a document which is "a statement of principles, not always in very precise language, rather than a detailed enunciation of legal rules." His analysis is based essentially upon the existing condition of the world and the consequent impossibility of applying from above precise

^{*} Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

rules and physical sanctions upon independent States. But while the Covenant is mainly an enunciation of principle it yet contains "the essentials for the beginnings of the establishment of a better international order." The Covenant is not a constitution and the vagueness and generalisation of its articles both indicate the infancy of the League and the possibility of a gradual growth. As Sir John points out in discussing Article 15, which deals with the settlement of disputes, the combination of quasi-legislative and semi-judicial powers vested in the Council "is characteristic of an early stage of organization." The avoidance of precise demarcation allows for a constitutional progress impossible within the limits of a precise and rigid framework.

Like the British Commonwealth of Nations, the League was a conception unknown to international law, and Sir John very carefully refrains from bringing it within any accepted category. It exhibits neither the features of a loose confederation nor the signs of a federal system. It is only "above States in the sense that it is something beyond them." By analogy in private law, he likens the League to a corporation "in the possession, by a union of many individuals, of a separate legal personality distinct from that of the individuals," with its own rights and duties. It represents more a devolution of function than an abdication of power. Under the conditions existing in 1919, and indeed to-day, the maintenance of national sovereignty was inevitably a cardinal characteristic of the Covenant. As Sir John emphasises,

the sovereignty of members of the League, in the sense of their right to determine their own action, except in so far as they themselves have in certain definite respects limited it . . . remains intact.

As evidence of this, he cites, for example, the right of withdrawal under Article 1, the unanimity rule in executive decisions, the exclusion from the League's consideration, under Article 15, of a matter "which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party" and the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine.

Above all the limitation of the Council and Assembly to giving merely advice upon the solution of political disputes and the "gap in the Covenant" which admits in certain circumstances the right to resort to war are clearly acknow-

ledgments of national independence. But although the latter is "formally secure," "the natural and necessary consequence of the League's existence is a limitation upon national sovereignty. The World Court, the International Labour Office and the League Secretariat are new and potent factors in the growth of international society. Sir John lays especial stress upon the value of a civil service as a guarantee of permanence. The Covenant itself contains tentative approaches. Article 11, for example, states the principle that war is a matter of concern to all members of the League. Although the preamble to the Covenant invokes the establishment of international law, Article 16 appears to challenge the whole doctrine of neutrality, when it enjoins an economic blockade by members of the League against a defaulting member who resorts to war, even to the extent of excluding intercourse with a non-member. It was presumed, when this Article was agreed, that the United States would become a member. Sir John argues that this country is not *politically* bound. The obligation must be considered in the light of the original conditions, and it should not apply if it is "to involve hostile relations, not with the Power for whose coercion the Article was intended, but with the Power whose co-operation in the coercion was a condition of its efficiency."

Sir John's interpretation of the Articles dealing with disputes emphasises the essentially advisory function of the Council. Discussing the so-called "automatic sanctions" under Article 16 he points out that no self-acting piece of machinery has been devised. A resort to war and a breach of the Covenant are conditions precedent to be determined by each member. A decision could not be given *ex parte* by the Permanent Court, and if the defaulting Power were willing to submit the matter to judicial proceedings, "it would hardly have taken the sort of action which must have given rise to the trouble." In the Sino-Japanese dispute, Sir John considers that the Powers were wrong in assuming that Japan did not "resort to war." It appears from that case that the phrase will be very cautiously and narrowly construed.

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Like the British Commonwealth of Nations, the League was a conception unknown to international law, and Sir John very carefully refrains from bringing it within any accepted category. It exhibits neither the features of a loose confederation nor the signs of a federal system. It is only "above States in the sense that it is something beyond them." By analogy in private law, he likens the League to a corporation "in the possession, by a union of many individuals, of a separate legal personality distinct from that of the individuals," with its own rights and duties. It represents more a devolution of function than an abdication of power. Under the conditions existing in 1919, and indeed to-day, the maintenance of national sovereignty was inevitably a cardinal characteristic of the Covenant. As Sir John emphasises,

the sovereignty of members of the League, in the sense of their right to determine their own action, except in so far as they themselves have in certain definite respects limited it . . . remains intact.

As evidence of this, he cites, for example, the right of withdrawal under Article I, the unanimity rule in executive decisions, the exclusion from the League's consideration, under Article 15, of a matter "which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party" and the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine.

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like the Geneva Protocol of 1928. He thus lays great stress upon the Kellogg Pact.

What are wanted are a few outstanding principles, simple in character, on whose application men of goodwill who are not specialists may find it comparatively easy to arrive at a common conclusion.

"One of the great virtues of the Covenant itself lies in its establishment of a central authority which can weigh right and wrong and embody the force of world opinion. As an example, Sir John cites the Manchurian case in which the nations "advanced farther than they had done previously on the road to the establishment of the Collective System." The outstanding merit of this book is its recognition of contemporary limitations and the possibilities of constitutional growth.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The maintenance of peace is so often discussed in terms of alliances and armaments that an argument simply directed against the war mind is most refreshing. In *Peace with Honour** Mr. A. A. Milne has set out to make people "think again, and from the beginning, about war." His irony and sense of humour and imaginary dialogues with a reactionary elder statesman, a cleric, and a patriot who rather unfortunately is stigmatised as a warmonger, all help to enliven the argument. "War is the ultimate expression of man's wickedness and man's silliness." While the wish for peace is universal, the will is restricted by innumerable reservations. Mr. Milne ruthlessly demolishes the traditional supports of the martial edifice. National honour is a euphemism for prestige or "a reputation for the will to war." A nation "recognises only one God: Itself," and unlike an honourable man fails to "follow right in scorn of consequence." Mr. Milne is rather unjust to British foreign policy. He easily dispels the sentiment of glory in modern war "which is almost comically unheroic." Organised religion is attacked for its subordination of Christianity to patriotism. "Has any national Church ever denounced its own country?" National leaders play so much with the lives of others rather than their own that Mr. Milne suggests that, were war coincident with their own destruction, peace would never be endangered. War is simply a human convention for deciding disputes and can be eradicated by a single-minded determination for peace. The great obstacle is mutual distrust due to the

* Methuen, 5s. net.

absence of honour. The claims of security and sanctions are attempted, but prove inevitably futile safeguards against the bad faith of nations. "How are they to ensure Good Faith?" Mr. Milne, in an imaginary peace conference, suggests after the settlement of urgent differences "an oath to renounce aggressive and defensive war, and to submit all disputes to arbitration," to be taken by national leaders and the people individually in the most solemn form. "For the first time in the history of the world, men will not have to divide their allegiance between Honour and Patriotism, between their Country and their God." The security is the preservation of the national honour and the sanction moral force. Then might a nation "follow right in scorn of consequence." Such is peace with honour. The great value of this courageous and outspoken book lies in its emphasis upon the moral basis of any system of permanent peace. Much in the volume is plain and obvious, but demands continual propagation for the conversion of the public mind.

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Mr. J. A. Spender's *A Short History of our Times** is a forerunner in miniature of a larger work which has been long in preparation. The need for such a sketch, he tells us, was brought home to him by contact with teachers and students. No better guide through the troubled story of the last half-century could be desired than the veteran Liberal publicist who has seen the drama at close quarters and indeed has often been behind the scenes. Those who know little of the subject will be grateful for the skilful grouping of events and the clarity of the narrative. Those who know more will find the chief interest of the book in the author's judgments of men and measures. On many of the outstanding issues and controversies he has recorded his opinion in his biographies of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith and his recent impressive survey of international relations entitled *Fifty Years of Europe*. Most of his verdicts on important issues will probably command the assent of most of his readers, for instance his condemnation of the war-guilt clause in the Treaty of Versailles. He ends on a note midway between complacency and defeatism. Great Britain, as he says, is the land of compromise. We live and learn, we adjust, we invent. We have at least as many grounds for thankfulness as for anxiety. There are a few minor slips in the book, among them the statement that the Emperor Karl was the grandson of Francis Joseph.

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The second volume of *The Life of Lord Carson*† by Mr. Ian Colvin is principally devoted to the struggle over Ulster. The General Election in January 1910 vested in the Irish Nationalist Party the balance of power, and in February Mr. Redmond expressly conditioned his support of the Government upon the immediate passage of a Home Rule

* Cassell, 10s. 6d.

† Gollancz, 15s. net.

Bill. A few weeks later, Sir Edward Carson accepted the leadership of the Irish Unionists and commenced a contest the climax of which was only averted by the outbreak of the World War. The embarrassment of the Liberal Government is naturally a target for Mr. Colvin's attack. Writing with all the vigour of a zealous partisan, he pours more scorn and irony upon the ubiquity and vacillation of the Cabinet and of Mr. Asquith in particular than they justly deserved. Mr. Colvin exploits to the full the intense drama of the struggle. Carson's progress through Ulster, the formation of the Volunteers, the signing of the Covenant, the defection of the Army in the Curragh, and the smuggling of arms, receive, for instance, full attention. Although not recognised as their leader by the Southern Loyalists, to whom he himself belonged, Sir Edward aimed from the first to destroy the whole scheme of Home Rule. When in 1912 he supported an amendment excluding Ulster from the Bill, he believed that thus the whole measure would be wrecked. Such a decision was for both Carson and Redmond, says Mr. Colvin, "a last resort; a surrender, when there was no longer hope, to save part of the whole for which both fought." It became increasingly clear that Ulster's only hope lay in such a compromise and, at the end of 1913, the Southern Unionist representatives acknowledged to Carson its right to independent action. It is interesting to read of Lord Carson's opinion, given long afterwards, that had Redmond accepted the "clean-cut" principle, "he would thereby have won Ireland for Home Rule, since the Protestant Minority would not have been strong enough permanently to hold the whole Province of Ulster." Mr. Colvin has also written a chapter on the Marconi Case, in which Carson made a brief appearance for the Crown. This volume is a brilliant piece of writing, though lacking somewhat the balance of sound biography.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

*The Cambridge Shorter History of India** makes available to the general public the recent research embodied in the volumes of the full *Cambridge History of India*. The shorter history is an ambitious volume of nearly a thousand pages and exhibits a coherence and continuity impossible in the larger work. It covers the whole period from its known beginning until the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919. Each of the three main divisions has been written by a specialist. The first part is contributed by Mr. J. Allan, who begins with the earliest records recently disclosed by archaeological research, and deals, in particular, with Hindu and Buddhist India. Sir T. Wolseley Haig covers the period of Muslim conquest and domination.

* Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

The editor, Mr. H. H. Dodwell, is responsible for the largest section, on early European influence and the history of British rule. It is important to add that while taking full advantage of the material in the full history, the authors have used their own judgments as to its disposal. This volume is, therefore, a distinct work. A special series of maps has been included. The book should prove invaluable to the student of India, especially perhaps of the earlier history, which has been less accessible and less appreciated in the past.

The new volume in the Lonsdale Library on *Mountaineering** contains both a technical exposition of the sport and short sketches of the principal ranges where good climbing can be found. As is usual in this series, the various aspects of the subject are dealt with by well-known authorities. After a chapter on the general principles of mountaineering by Mr. G. Winthrop Young, such matters as rock climbing and snow- and ice-craft are considered by Mr. E. R. Blanchet and Mr. C. F. Meade. Opportunities for climbing in the British Isles are described by Mr. W. P. Haskett-Smith, and a long chapter on the Alps is contributed by that great mountaineer, Dr. Claude Wilson. Mention should be made of Dr. T. G. Longstaff's chapters on the Himalayas.

Mr. Cherry Kearton has acquired a justified reputation for his descriptions of wild life, and his latest book, *The Lion's Roar*,† is no exception. Couched in the form of a story he describes a volcanic range in Central Africa, clothed in legend by the village lying in the foothills. The interest of the book is in his vivid description of the sudden eruption and of the terrified flight of men and animals. His unique knowledge of wild life makes the account singularly interesting: the book is full of fine photographs.

The interest in Persian art first kindled in many by the Exhibition of 1931 will be fanned afresh by the *Millenary of Firdausi*.

Anyone in quest of a distinctive yet inexpensive token of Christmas wishes for a beauty-loving friend should get and give the *Firdausi* supplement to October's issue of *The Near East and India*.‡ The decorative cover attracts, the contents will delight. The first illustration shows the poet's noble head. There follow extracts from the "*Shah-Namah*," two columns of text translated, and eight illuminating articles, the last interpreting Omar Khayyám, enough to tempt the hungry mind to feast on the whole!

Two recent publications in the New Art Library should provide great assistance to those concerned with the practical side of drawing

* Seeley, Service & Co. 21s. net.

† Longmans. 6s.

‡ 1s.

and painting. In *Picture Making, Technique and Inspiration*,* by the late Mr. Charles Sims, R.A., the student may enjoy the advice and knowledge of a great artist and technical authority, especially upon all questions of tempera painting. The extracts from his studio-journal reveal the actual painting of his own pictures and the methods employed. Mr. Alan Sims has contributed a fair and reasoned appreciation of his father's life and work. The forty-seven plates in monochrome and colour include a number of Sims' most delightful pictures, such as "The Little Archer," and also four of his impressionist "Spirituals," which Mr. Alan Sims regards as his outstanding work. In *The Drawing and Painting of Dogs*† Mr. Vernon Stokes has brought to bear his great knowledge of animal subjects. With the help of sketches he discusses in detail the actual drawing and explains the touches and technical tricks which give life and action to the picture.

Pace as a factor in modern life is well demonstrated in the new Batsford publication, *The Book of Speed*.‡ A principal feature of the volume is a fine collection of 150 photographs which illustrate the various methods and uses of high-speed transit. The growth and characteristics of each are discussed by well-known experts. In considering the post-war developments of aircraft, Captain G. de Havilland lays great emphasis upon the close relationship between demand and design. Speed contests as such "have had little effect in civil aviation." The race to Australia, however, is "a great incentive," because the rules stipulate the usual certificate of airworthiness. "The route compels the greatest possible weight per horse-power to be carried without exceeding the normal certificate." Personal impressions of speed are contributed by Sir Malcolm Campbell, Flight-Lieut. G. H. Stainforth the winner of the Schneider Trophy, Engine-Driver C. Peachy of the "Flying Scotman," and others.

69567. The sixty-seventh volume of *Chatterbox*§ makes an excellent present for any boy or girl. It contains well-told stories of all kinds, short articles in many subjects from astronomy to athletics, poems, puzzles and many illustrations. The whole book is well written, up-to-date and really interesting, it is in fact a modern annual in spite of its age. Its two companions, *Leading Strings*|| and *The Prize*|| written for tiny children and those a little older, are equally attractive and up-to-date in their material.

* Seeley, Service & Co. 21s. net. † Seeley, Service & Co. 10s. 6d. net.

‡ B. T. Batsford. 5s. net.

§ Simpkin Marshall. 5s. net. Cloth boards, 7s. 6d. net.

|| Simpkin Marshall. 2s. 6d. net.