

he goes to pieces, and becomes, in his own words, King Log. The book has the final virtue of being irresistibly readable.

Cæsar is Dead is no less ambitious, but Mr. Lindsay lacks his colleague's unifying power. Here the interest is dissipated among a hundred people; the story has no Claudius. It has, however, Cæsar. Cæsar is dead, but neither Brutus, Anthony, nor any of those he ruled can be free of him. This is a spirited panorama, if not perhaps a novel.

Next come a series of stories dealing, metaphorically or literally, with the shades of the prison house. *Condemned to Live* is one of those long German novels which it would be easy to 'guy' by giving a bare synopsis. Beginning with incest, it leads through some 600 pages to a matricide performed with nail-scissors in a bathroom, and a double suicide upon the railway line. Fedor Feuerhahn, left fatherless by the war, is enslaved and exploited by his mother, sent on errands to her paramour, and suffers indignity after indignity until he can bear no more. Yet the book, for all its length and gloom, held me to the end. Granted the terrible premises, the humourless outlook, it has conviction and power. The tragedy of Fedor and Beate is real, and the character-drawing the work of a born novelist. Herr Rabener is young, and his work has obvious marks of immaturity, but his best is highly impressive, and we shall hear of him again.

I See No Sin carries a similar point of view almost to the realms of parody. Never have I encountered so many manglings, particularly of animals, as occur in its earlier chapters. In the matter of disembowelled horses, pulped weasels, bashed cats, etc., Mr. Fisher makes the most fearsome fancies of Mr. T. F. Powys seem a bedtime story. The same lurid touch is applied to his hero's emo-

tional and sexual experiences. Poor Vridar, from childhood on, encounters nothing but horrors and misfortunes. It is a pity, for Mr. Fisher can write—and we are apparently to have three more volumes.

Herr Fallada takes us literally to the prison. Kufalt, whom we first meet at the expiration of his sentence, is by the end of over 500 pages safely back again.

'How good it was to be back home again. No more worries. Almost like home in the old days, with his father and his mother.

'Almost?

'It was better. Here a man could live in peace. The voices of the world were stilled. No making up one's mind, no need for effort.

'Life proceeded duly and in order. He was utterly at home.

'And Willi Kufalt fell quietly asleep, with a peaceful smile on his lips.'

All that has happened to him in the meantime, disturbing and terribly convincing as it is, exhibits the grim truth of the title. Once he has eaten out of the tin bowl, a man is sure to come back again. This is a fine story, stronger than *Little Man What Now*: the two put Herr Fallada among the best of contemporary novelists.

The Irreconcilables is told by a prisoner under life sentence. It is sincere, intelligent, thoughtful, but sometimes blurred and unnecessarily hard to read. Mr. Brett's powers show to better advantage in straight narrative; the scene between Freda and Jake, after she has written declaring her love, is wholly admirable. Mr. Cantwell, in *Land of Plenty*, takes us to the prison of modern industrial conditions. This is no book for those who think of industry in terms of trade booms and wish to believe that all's right with the world. The tension of the first chapters, and the strike scenes, are perhaps the high lights—if the term may be used in connexion with such conditions as the story reveals. Like Herr Fallada, Mr. Cantwell is no stylist, but his writing is terribly

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER



A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. CXVI

JULY—DECEMBER 1934

LONDON

CONSTABLE & COMPANY LIMITED 10 & 12 ORANGE STREET
LEICESTER SQUARE W.C.2

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AUTUMN NOVELS

<i>Claudius the God and his Wife Mes- salina.</i> By Robert Graves. Barker.—10s. 6d. net.	<i>The Huge Shipwreck.</i> By Kathleen Freeman. Dent.—7s. 6d. net.
<i>Cæsar is Dead.</i> By Jack Lindsay. Nicholson and Watson.—8s. 6d. net.	<i>Stars Were Born.</i> By Barbara Lucas. Constable.—7s. 6d. net.
<i>Condemned to Live.</i> By Johann Rabener. Boriswood.—8s. 6d. net.	<i>The Plains of Cement.</i> By Patrick Hamilton. Constable.—7s. 6d. net.
<i>I See No Sin.</i> By Vardis Fisher. Boriswood.—7s. 6d. net.	<i>Silver Collar Boy.</i> By Constance Wright. Dent.—6s. net.
<i>Who Once Eats Out of the Tin Bowl.</i> By Hans Fallada. Putnam.— 7s. 6d. net.	<i>Illyria, Lady.</i> By Constance Butler. Hogarth Press.—6s. net.
<i>The Irreconcilables.</i> By Bernard Brett. Methuen.—7s. 6d. net.	<i>Master Sanguine.</i> By Ivor Brown. Hannish Hamilton.—7s. 6d. net.
<i>The Land of Plenty.</i> By Robert Cantwell. Bell.—7s. 6d. net.	<i>Wind from the North.</i> By Joseph O'Neill. Cape.—7s. 6d. net.
<i>The Forty Days.</i> By Franz Werfel. Jarrolds.—10s. 6d. net.	<i>The Taking of the Gry.</i> By John Masefield. Heinemann.—6s. net.
<i>Dead Woman's Shoes.</i> By Charles Braibant. Gollancz.—8s. 6d. net.	<i>Heaven's My Destination.</i> By Thornton Wilder. Longmans. —7s. 6d. net.
<i>My Shadow as I Pass.</i> By Sybil Bolitho. Secker.—7s. 6d. net.	<i>A Modern Lover.</i> By D. H. Law- rence. Secker.—7s. 6d. net.
<i>Three Men Die.</i> By Sarah Ger- trude Millin. Chatto and Windus.—7s. 6d. net.	<i>Seven Gothic Tales.</i> By Isak Dine- sen. Putnam.—7s. 6d. net.

IMPRESSIVE though this list of novels is, there can be no doubt where to begin it. Mr. Graves has nowhere given such sustained and convincing proof of his exceptional gifts as in the long life of the Emperor Claudius, of which *Claudius the God* is the second volume. The achievement is a double one. Each volume is not only a masterly historical reconstruction, but a novel; and the union is rare. For some time after his accession Claudius to his subjects is still the buffoon. Then, with astonishment, they slowly realise that the business of the empire is being well and competently done. The damage done

by Caligula is repaired ('I removed a hundred and fifty of Caligula's new holidays from the calendar'), the administration is reformed, aqueducts are built, the new harbour at Ostia is planned. Next comes the campaign in Britain, with a victory over Caractacus contrived by Claudius's own cunning. Then, at his highest point, Claudius meets his tragedy. Again and again Herod had given him the advice, which was too simple and too good to take—the advice to trust no one. Claudius trusted Herod, and he trusted Messalina. Both let him down. From the moment he, the last man in his empire to know it, learns of Messalina's true character,

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effective. *The Forty Days* deals with the Turkish treatment of the Armenians during the Great War. Marched away to starvation and death, a section revolts. Herr Werfel relates, at inordinate length but with restraint and flashes of real power, the story of the revolt.

Dead Woman's Shoes, a work of great ability, exhibits the dangers of telling a good story through the mouth of a dull narrator. The first forty pages are such heavy going that one can hardly believe an absorbing story is to follow. Yet M. Braibant's portrait of the old woman Marliise Bertraux, lady of the village of Pargny and creditor of nearly every family in it, and his account of the conflict between her and her son, are in the best tradition of French writing, and many of the scenes excuse the publisher's invocation of the name of Balzac. Mrs. Bolitho's novel points a strong contrast, showing what can be gained by the choice of a narrator. *My Shadow as I Pass* is the story of a dead man, told by his wife who feels that it is she, not he, who has died. His life is built up again in her thoughts : his youth, his work as artist, and the days they had together. The manner is unusually intimate, but the story is told with such restraint and sincerity that the reader is never embarrassed. Mrs. Millin is also concerned with death. Three men die, and one woman lives. An otherwise skilful and in any case interesting story is weakened by uncertainty of purpose. Without an analysis of Julia's mind, the story lacks real meaning. Even so, it holds one to the end.

There follow three studies of human relationships. In *The Huge Shipwreck*, a novel of individuality and distinction, we are concerned with the relationship of three girls to one young man and to each other. The chapters which describe life at a girls' school are of remarkable quality, and Miss Freeman through-

out is to be congratulated on her power of creating an intensely realised and subtle world which, though it may not be the world we know, she makes us accept without question. I have a suspicion that this book will remain in my memory longer than most of its companions. *Stars Were Born*, a tale of two sisters, is unequal and unusually interesting. It suffers from too wide a disparity between what the author has felt and what she has merely invented. Miss Lucas at her best shows gifts of a high order : the dialogue between the sisters at their country meeting, when Domenica has suddenly come over from Paris, could hardly be bettered. Here, definitely, is a writer to watch.

The Plains of Cement is simple, short, and masterly. A respectable and not particularly attractive barmaid, secretly in love with the barman who regards her merely as a pal, is sought in marriage by an elderly customer. The character of Mr. Eccles, with his timid, mean, oblique advances and retreats, is magnificently drawn. A quiet, unpretentious, and wholly successful novel.

In both *Silver Collar Boy* and *Illyria, Lady* the manner is more important than the matter. The former is a period piece, the latter an *extravaganza*. The beautiful Belliza, Mrs. Van Westerfelt of Mayfair and Twickenham, acquires a little black boy. Pompey's duties are to worship his mistress, to bring her her morning chocolate, and to show off his fine clothes when visitors come. The time is the beginning of the eighteenth century, and Miss Wright's delicate, allusive prose is worthy of the period. The story is a little weak, but the book as a whole is a pleasing achievement in miniature. Miss Butler introduces us to five sets of people who, with greater or less claim to belong to the P.M.S. (Pen is Mightier than Sword) Club, set out to attend the

club's great congress in Illyria. They make the journey, encounter, gambol, and depart. Miss Butler might easily have made more of the charming opportunities she has given herself, but, though her matter is exiguous, her manner is a delight.

Mr. Brown, by way of contrast, goes in for hard hitting; and the well-titled *Master Sanguine* is a vigorous and amusing satire upon this distinguished critic's principal dislikes in the world of to-day. His hero, after various educational experiences, sets out into the welter of modern life, at home and abroad, prepared to believe all that he is told. Mr. Brown makes good use of his chances.

The next three books belong to no single category. *Wind from the North* is a story of Dublin in the eleventh century. Amateurish in places, and owing something to Sigrid Undset, it shows a feeling for character, imaginative power, and a freshness of atmosphere not unworthy of its title. *The Taking of the Gry*, though by an experienced hand, is even fresher. The plot, little more than an episode, might have been anybody's; but not the writing. The Gry is a ship loaded with arms which the narrator and his friends pilot out of Santa Barbara down a channel so dangerous that their enemies have not even bothered to guard it.

You may imagine what it feels like to be on the bridge drawing near to your port, all keyed up to bring her in in style, watching for the marks on the coast, and listening for the surf on the outlier.

I loved it best before dawn, when coming in to a land as dark as indigo, with the faintest of colour pale in the sky above. There would be the forward well and the fo'c's'le lit by the masthead light, the back of the lookout man craned over the dodger, and the gleam of the water spreading from the bows. . . . Some men fond of power love speaking to an audience, and holding it by what is living in themselves: others love the rule of an orchestra and choir, and the bringing

out of music from them. To myself, the joy is the handling of a big ship in a difficult passage, all beset with reefs, and the knowledge that my clear head will carry her clear and set her down at her marks.

I got into the way of making in my mind an image of each channel and harbour as it looked under water and as it looked above. I got to know each place as (shall we say) the seal or the gannet or the osprey might know it.

Mr. Masefield, as ever, gets the uttermost value from his expert knowledge of ships.

'Of all forms of genius,' Mr. Thornton Wilder wrote in *The Woman of Andros*, 'goodness has the longest awkward age.' George Brush, the young evangelist hero of *Heaven's My Destination*, exemplifies this truth at large. A gaol-bird whom he meets at his second incarceration tells him that he is the perfectly logical man. Simple, straightforward logic applied to Biblical premises does not endear George to those he meets, and his adventures, lightly told, have implications which no reader is likely to miss. The various aspects of his character, lovable, embarrassing, and infuriating, are caught with excellent skill, and the writing has all Mr. Wilder's accustomed cool precision.

We conclude with two volumes of short stories. *A Modern Love* will hardly enhance its author's reputation. The stories in it belong to the year 1910 or 1911, and Lawrence evidently had not chosen to put them into a volume. Some readers may wonder why they have been reprinted now. Isak Dinesen's seven long tales have a fascination of their own. Strange records of intrigue in the late nineteenth century, they attract by the distinction of their telling, by their setting (which can be summed up as 'Gothic Revival'—huge gloomy houses, candlelight, and the dark woods outside), and by such frequent touches of the macabre as the affair of the Prioress and her monkey. L. A. G. STRONG.

GENIUS AND LIFE

The Early Career of Alexander Pope. By George Sherburn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Milford.—15s. net.

The Rev. Smith, Sydney. By Osbert Burdett. Chapman and Hall.—15s. net.

The Fool of Love: a Life of William Hazlitt. By Hesketh Pearson. Hamish Hamilton.—10s. 6d. net.

Sir Richard Steele. By Willard Connely. Cape.—15s. net.

The Works of Thomas Love Peacock. Edited by H. F. B. Brett-Smith and C. E. Jones, vol. i. Constable.—£9 9s. net the set of ten volumes.

Edgar Allan Poe: a Critical Biography. By Una Pope-Hennessy. Macmillan.—10s. 6d. net.

GENIUS has been variously defined, most frequently with Buffon's insistence on patience. But whatever its definition, it has one possibly invariable concomitant—an aggravation of those inconsistencies that are in every man, that mental conflict which is the sap of poetry and makes the poet, more than any man, 'an embodied paradox, a bundle of contradictions.' It is to be found in Pope and Poe (liars both), but not in Steele or Sydney Smith. Hazlitt suffered it acutely in his loves for Sarah Shepherd, Sarah Stoddart and Sarah Walker; but Peacock, for all he was, 'very much of an universal lover,' practically escaped it. Genius is a sort of no-man's land between sobriety and insanity. Pope was fourteen when someone said of him, echoing Horace: 'Egad, that young fellow will either be a madman or make a very great poet'; and if genius is often rashly detected in children, this man at least inherited both characters—of the madman and the poet—from the child who fathered him.

If a great man exhibits contradictory traits, no less than if he makes contradictory statements (and Pope did both), he may well find supporters on each side; and the support often takes the form of bitter and blind partisanship. The biographer, particularly if his inclination is to be hostile, should beware of the axiom that of two

contradictory one must be true and the other untrue. The balance with Pope during the last hundred years has been on the side of depreciation and even contempt—a depreciation, incidentally, which injustice has extended beyond his character to his poetry. Miss Sitwell recently tried to restore the hunch-backed figure to its pedestal, but succeeded merely in knocking down nine-pins of her own setting up. What was required, and what Professor Sherburn supplies, was an impartial statement of the facts from which a new figure could be carved.

Professor Sherburn is fed full on facts, an extreme state that would only need his modest apology if he had digested them less thoroughly. He offers grateful relief in an age when biographers of the other extreme feed on wind and evacuate a hurricane. It is only regrettable that this book should cover little more than two-thirds of Pope's life. Professor Sherburn pays a just tribute to Johnson's as 'easily the most satisfactory of the lives of the poet yet written'; and, aware that 'we must distrust not Pope alone, but all of his editors from Warburton to Courthope,' sets out to establish secure premises for a new argument.

It is an attempt to reassess rather than to rehabilitate. It is shown that the evidence for Pope's ingratitude, treachery and malice before

1716 is of the flimsiest: it has been, perhaps excusably, misconstrued, but inexcusably exaggerated. After that date he exchanged 'gang warfare' with 'Addison and the rest of the Rhiming Gang' for single combat with the unspeakable Curll: venom and subterfuge were his opponent's choice of weapon, and no one was better able than Pope to fight with them. Yet, as Professor Sherburn says, 'he should have been above retort. . . . Pope should have learned the Addisonian aloofness to attack.'

The portrait of Addison is among the best in Professor Sherburn's book. It is inevitably less flattering than that etched by Thackeray after Macaulay, which has been regularly reproduced since: but Thackeray's materials were inadequate, and, even such as they were, he made inadequate use of them. Yet there is no attempt to blacken Addison; indeed, Professor Sherburn deals leniently with his propensity for playing both hare and hounds.

'It was doubtless easier to be friendly with Steele than with Addison. Steele had the warmer, more human nature. . . . The words are Professor Sherburn's: taken out of their Popean context they would serve as a motto for Mr. Connely's book. Addison and Steele first met at school: after a military interval, during which he tried religion as a cure for dissipation and alchemy as a means to settle the demands, legitimate and illegitimate, of a midwife, Steele made good use of the more stable Addison as a stepping-stone to power in journalism and the theatre. The *Tatler* and the *Spectator* were the outcome. But Mr. Connely, who writes with warm human nature of Steele, with all his follies and venial faults, gives Addison less than his due both as writer and friend: Pope too, 'a little fox,' 'a thwarted hob-goblin,' 'spleeny as a weasel,' comes ill out

of the association. Mr. Connely's intention is to combine the learning of a 'pundit' with writing 'in the approved modern manner.' He has certainly acquired a very extensive knowledge of everything to do with Steele, but he courts modernity with a jaunty and often irritating style. He is at his best in interpreting Steele's relations with the second Mrs. Steele.

Perhaps I am too easily irritated. Mr. Burdett has never made me so before. But I dislike the title of his book; I dislike the use he makes at intervals of Longfellow's village blacksmith (a parody, neither clever nor particularly apt, opens the book); and I should rather the narrative were not frequently interrupted with Mr. Burdett's views on customs and problems of an age of which Sydney Smith never dreamed. Yet the irritation is slight, soothed away by an otherwise excellent life of a much neglected man. George Russell's volume in the 'English Men of Letters' series was, and remains, the best all-round biography; but Mr. Burdett supplements this, if not with facts, at least with much sound and appreciative criticism, particularly of Smith's more serious writing and his preaching. The world now knows Sydney Smith chiefly for Mrs. Partington, for the confounded inconvenience of poverty, the compassion excited by the very name of curate, and the like. Sydney Smith as a wit, and almost as nothing but a wit, was ably portrayed by Mr. Hesketh Pearson in a book published earlier in the year: Mr. Burdett now redresses the balance.

Five months after publishing *The Smith of Smiths* Mr. Pearson published *The Fool of Love*, and some such haste seems to have gone to the writing of the second book. It is sympathetic and, as far as it goes, accurate; but the greater part of Hazlitt's life is only sketched in, while more than two-fifths of the

book—based, largely *verbatim*, on Le Gallienne's edition of *Liber Amoris*—are taken up with a love-affair that lasted less than three years. Yet Mr. Pearson does arrive, if more by intuition than by any conscious process of thought, at a singularly acceptable estimate of Hazlitt as a man. It is only for his assessment of the affair Walker—the first, if we dismiss the petulant and prudish exclamations of Crabb Robinson, Stevenson and Leslie Stephen—that the book will be read: it lacks otherwise the balance, restraint and thoroughness of Mr. P. P. Howe's excellent biography.

Balance, restraint and thoroughness distinguish Mr. Brett-Smith's long-awaited biographical introduction to the Halliford edition of Peacock. Peacock's was not an eventful life: facts are few, and therefore the more valuable, and Mr. Brett-Smith, omitting nothing, makes one or two interesting additions to the stock—not only in new poems in the body of the edition, but (to take two examples) in a hitherto unrecorded love to whom, at the age of seventeen, Peacock addressed verses, and also in recognising in Peacock's disappointment over Marianne de St. Croix the proximate cause of his proposal to Jane Gryffydd. Peacock began writing 'not particularly excellent' verses at the age of nine (Mr. Brett-Smith has surely miscalculated in his criticism of Clive Bell on this point); as a formal poet he never attained particular excellence, but the songs in the novels, as Mr. Brett-Smith says of those in *Headlong Hall*, 'approach perfection.' He wrote prose with a delicate detachment, and it was detachment that made him a better friend to Shelley than Mary Shelley was for many years prepared to admit. He lived outside the stresses of his more inspired friends. Thackeray truthfully, if none too kindly, summed him up in

1850: 'A charming lyrical poet and Horatian satirist he was when a writer; now he is a whiteheaded jolly old worldling, and Secretary to the E. India House, full of information about India and everything else in the world.'

Mr. Brett-Smith discusses judiciously the relation of *Maid Marian* to *Ivanhoe*, as well as to Ritson's *Robin Hood*; he does not take the Welsh legends in *Misfortunes of Elphin* very seriously; and he puts forward the plausible theory that *Melincourt* may originally have been a much shorter book, lengthened at the printer's instance to fill three volumes. He has sound words to say on the controversy evoked by Hogg's life of Shelley.

Poe is an author whose life and writings alike lay him open to 'psycho-analytical' treatment. For myself I can only say that such treatment seldom seems to justify itself. But the only successful resolution of the contradictions in Poe (his alternate fits of affection and spiteful, lying ingratitude toward his guardian; his tender devotion to his 'child-wife' and his ideal of sexless beauty contrasted with his erotic fancies and amatory relations with admiring older women; his recognition of a losing battle with 'the imp of the perverse'; above all, a mind critically direct yet tortuous and tortured when obsessed by the weird, the grotesque and the repellent), the only fully satisfactory resolution of these problems that I have met, is to be found in Mr. J. W. Krutch's 'psychological biography' of six years ago, a book more persuasive, because more moderate, than Princess Marie Bonaparte's '*étude psychoanalytique*.' Dame Una will have little of this: her interest, very reasonably, is first with facts and secondly with literary criticism. But when she does look below the surface she can be highly ingenious. Her theory to explain

Poe's obsession with the luxury of the East may be thus summarised :

We have no profile portrait of Poe, but certain of his story-heroes have Semitic facial characteristics. His maternal grandfather was Arnold, an actor ; his grandfather Arnold, manager of Drury Lane. The surname Arnold is 'not uncommon in Jewish annals,' and 'many Jews were connected with the theatre.' May not his obsession with the East, therefore, be 'the working out in drab America of the rich inheritance of Israel' ? And this inheritance, subconscious in Poe, may it not have roused subconscious racial prejudice among 'literary men in America,' accounting for his contemporaries' hostility and for the (subconscious) instinct 'of modern historians of American literature to tuck Poe away almost out of sight' ? Ingenious indeed, and perhaps not requiring comment. Poe, though the A. C. Smith portrait gives him a far from Semitic nose, may very well have had Jewish blood. Others certainly have had, whom historians have not tucked away ; but the historians must be granted this additional excuse—that Poe, for all his genius, had singularly little influence on American letters. Moreover, Professor Harvey Allen has warned us against the tradition of contemporary hostility ; such as it was, it would seem to derive for the most part from Poe's excessive personal and critical rudeness.

Poe's debts to earlier authors—to Pope among others—have been thoroughly analysed before, and Dame Una shows herself well acquainted with his French sources. She is less at home elsewhere. She misquotes Virgil ; she speaks of the 'hexameters' of Longfellow's *Hia-watha* as 'over-dactylic' ; nor is her English always impeccable.

SIMON NOWELL SMITH.

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The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes. Thornton Butterworth.—21s. net.

A History of the Great War, 1914-1918. By C. R. M. F. Cruttwell. Oxford University Press.—15s. net.

As the alchemist once attempted to transmute the baser metals into gold, so does the statesman still attempt to transmute the baser instincts of mankind into peace : peace at home, peace between nations, world peace—the twentieth-century Universal Solvent. The one has wonderfully succeeded—witness this scientific age ; the other has, so far, dismally failed—witness the years 1914-1918 and after. Yet I believe that whilst 400 years ago the alchemist was on the right track, so also to-day is the statesman, and that the World War and its aftermath definitely prove this.

My problem is also an alchemical one. Here are four volumes (in all, some 2500 pages), and out of them my task is to extract a little gold—their essence. Mr. Cruttwell's embraces the entire war and is a good and clear background to the other two which deal with phases of it. Sir Roger Keyes describes the drama of the Dardanelles, somewhat in log-book fashion ; and Mr. Lloyd George—surely the greatest pamphleteer and compiler of war records that this country has yet seen—'post-mortems' the tragic year, 1917. What is Mr. Cruttwell's idea ?—for a history without a soul is but a catalogue. It is : that as men of science work methodically, men of politics must cease to work alchemically. He says, 'Every country had the General Staff

which it deserved,' and he quotes a Frenchman saying, 'Modern war is too serious a business to be intrusted to soldiers.' And, had his idea been clearer to him, he would have added that every country had the Government it deserved, and that the maintenance of twentieth-century peace cannot be intrusted to nineteenth-century-minded politicians. He tells us that soldiers did not understand the sea ; Joffre and Castelnau did not value our naval power at one bayonet. He should have added clearly—he certainly hints at it—that sailors did not understand the land, and that, as regards sea and land, the politicians were in the air. Put otherwise : there was no hub to the war-wheel—it was all tyre and spokes.

Sir Roger Keyes' book is a clear exposition of this hublessness, though he seems to be quite unconscious of his discovery. Here is a man of titanic energy, one-eyed like Polyphemus. In the forcing of the Narrows—that one mile of water between Chanak and Kidil-Bahr—he sees the whole war, or, anyhow, what he believes to be its strategic essence, and he pulls every string, official and unofficial, to accomplish this end. When, after one of his fiery outbursts, General Munro said to him, 'Well, if it all succeeds, you go through the Straits into the Marmora and we occupy Constantinople, what good is it going to do ? What then ?', we get no answer—that is, no definite and strategic answer ; so his book ends, 'In the light of our knowledge to-day, can anyone doubt that the forcing of the Dardanelles would have shortened the war by two years, and spared literally millions of lives ?' Yet why, and how ? It is true that had we occupied Constantinople the Turks would in all probability

have had to abandon regular warfare; but had they replaced it by irregular warfare, *à la* Lawrence, for which they were pre-eminently suited, would our operations in Asia Minor have been any the easier?

As courageous a man as Sir Roger Keyes was Mr. Lloyd George, who could look at the whole problem, the pile of jig-saw bits which constituted the World War, and not merely at one bit depicting the Narrows. His work was to set these bits together. He was not a professional strategist, but a man of experiment. He was possessed, perhaps unknown to himself, of the scientific spirit; but he had neither scientific experience nor means. Though closely connected with the Gallipoli campaign, when in December 1916 he came into power that campaign had passed into history. He was neither a Westerner nor an Easterner, but a universalist. He did not mind where the war was won so long as it was won, and when he put his finger on Austria he put it on the crucial spot. He could not have his way, for the French were against him, and soon his attention was concentrated on securing his own country against submarine attack. Vol. iii. of his *Memoirs* is largely occupied with that subject. He saw, as he says, that 'In a war of this order, sea power was the key to ultimate victory so long as either party could manage just to hold their own on land.' But what was sea power? His instrument, the Admiralty, had been fashioned on the idea of the decisive naval action—that is, on concentration of force. The submarine entirely upset this theory, yet the Admiralty held on to its idea. The admirals could not see that defence is the foundation of offence (a Napoleonic maxim), and that the supreme object of our naval power was, not to sink the enemy's fleet, but to protect our sea roads. Means were confused with ends; hence the convoy problem,

which so largely was solved by Mr. Lloyd George's experimental urge.

As the Navy had been brought up to believe in the decisive battle at sea, so had the Army been brought up to believe in the decisive battle on land: this was the root trouble of the Passchendaele campaign, which bulks so largely in vol. iv. of the *Memoirs*. As the German submarine played havoc among our merchantmen, in place of establishing the convoy system the Admiralty urged the Army to attack the German submarine bases in Belgium. Then when this system had been established, this attack was launched in an impossible battle which cost us 400,000 casualties, gutted our Army, led indirectly to the Italian defeat at Caporetto, and directly to our own defeat in March the following year. At length disaster precipitates the first ounce of war gold—unity of command.

Looking back over these four volumes, what do we see? A number of alchemical experiments all possessed of a perfectly clear idea—the winning of the war, yet all unmethodical and unscientific. Mr. Lloyd George rightly said, 'You cannot conduct a war with a Sanhedrim.' But there were Sanhedrims within Sanhedrims—foreign, political, naval, military and individual; for Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Roger Keyes, etc., represented Sanhedrims of one sort or another. The crux of the whole problem was what may be called 'the committee system,' the direction of a war by conferences: Cabinets, Boards of Admirals and Councils of Soldiers—the Soviet system, but without a Lenin. It may be said, as Mr. Cruttwell points out, that Mr. Lloyd George possessed almost dictatorial powers, which is true. But a dictator without a going machine is no better off than a chauffeur with a broken-down motor car; for all he can do is to tinker it into action or obtain a

workable one, which is most difficult in war.

Therefore it seems to me that the gold which can be extracted from these three books is: As nineteenth-century politics led to the greatest war in history, and as nineteenth-century sailors and soldiers nearly ruined the entire world during it, should not our whole theory of peace and war be changed? Peace, as it is still conceived, is not gold, for it leads to war: war is certainly not gold, for it leads to chaos. What, then, is *that* gold which the world is in need of to-day? Put otherwise: How can the baser instincts of mankind be transmuted into a creative state of peacefulness which will fit the twentieth century? Here is a problem worthy to find a solution in the final volume of Mr. Lloyd George's *Memoirs*, and if he leaves it unsolved, then he will have written its 5000 pages in vain.

J. F. C. FULLER.



Li Tre Libri dell'Arte del Vasaio

(The Three Books of the Potter's Art) by Cipriano Piccolpasso (1524-1579.) In the original Italian, with a translation and introduction. Published by the Victoria and Albert Museum. This manuscript, the only known contemporary record of the technical processes used in making Italian Maiolica, was written in the middle of the sixteenth century. It is illustrated on almost every page. The edition is limited. £1 10s. (£1 10s. 9d.).

Herefordshire

An exhaustive survey and inventory of the Historical Monuments of Herefordshire has now been completed by the Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England. Lavishly illustrated by original photographs. Vol. I. S.W. 30s. (31s.). Vol. II. E. 30s. (30s. 9d.). Vol. III. N.W. 30s. (30s. 9d.).

Depressed Areas

The Ministry of Labour has now presented to Parliament Reports of the Investigations into the Industrial Conditions in certain Depressed Areas. The Reports are obviously of first-rate importance for any replanning of industrial life in the regions surveyed. Cmd. 4728. 3s. 6d. (3s. 9d.). All prices are net. Those in brackets include postage.

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POLITICAL BIOGRAPHIES

The Life of Joseph Chamberlain.
By J. L. Garvin, vol. iii.,
1895-1900. Macmillan.—21s.
net.

An Autobiography by Philip, Viscount Snowden, vol. ii., 1919-1934. Ivor Nicholson and Watson.—21s. net.

THE last months have given us a series of most important volumes of political biographies, and amongst them those above mentioned are notable. The Life of Chamberlain must be considered first, as it deals with a period antecedent to the others and in many ways throws light on what was to come in British history. It might be objected that four large volumes in closely-printed type is excessive as the record of the achievements of one man, however important a part he played in political history. But this particular volume deals admirably with a part of that history so important that we do not grudge its weight and length.

One thing that becomes absolutely clear in reading this well-documented Life is that the war was in no sense Chamberlain's war, as it was so often called, and that if one man was responsible for it in the sense that he was temperamentally unfitted for stopping it, it was Alfred Milner. The first part of the book gives an account of the fatal conduct of the Uitlanders leading to the Jameson Raid. Chamberlain had indeed played his part, issued his warning, done his best with Rhodes and the rest; but in spite of this the 'fumbling adventurers,' as his biographer calls them, set about the foolish escapade which was to cost the country so many lives.

The trouble seemed to be that Alfred Milner, with all his virtues—and they were many—was not the

The Life of Lord Carson, vol. ii.
By Ian Colvin. Gollancz.—15s.
net.

Letters and Journal of Reginald Viscount Esher, vol. ii., 1900-1910. Ivor Nicholson and Watson.—25s. net.

right man for the part he had to play. Chamberlain's private despatch of March 16, 1898, was a masterpiece of moderation and diplomacy and showed that he had a clear conception of the difficulties. He felt that we must endure a great deal rather than provoke a conflict, and he concluded his despatch with these wise words: 'Our greatest interest in South Africa is peace, and all our policy must be directed in this direction.' To Milner all this appeared to mean a policy of drift, and Chamberlain's injunctions were no less than galling. At this time, whatever followed later, Chamberlain was a moderate Liberal almost of the Campbell-Bannerman type who had altogether distrusted the influence of Rhodes and his allies, while Milner's view was that it was necessary 'to work up to a crisis,' for the inescapable issue between the Transvaal and the Empire was 'Reform or War.'

The long negotiations are vividly described. There was, in particular, the famous Bloemfontein Conference, when Milner, 'the high-wrought clenched intellectual,' had as his opposite the 'massive old warrior in a frock coat'—a solemn-minded, iron-hearted old man who cried in his agony, 'It is our country you want,' and who, in all his unreasonableness (and it was great), saw the hand of the Lord on his side.

Mr. Garvin thus makes us feel that his subject, a high-minded gentleman, played his part honourably, but there are things that he

does not explain. He tells us with what dislike Chamberlain was regarded by his political opponents and how vigorously he dealt with their attacks, for he was never provoked without reprisals. But he does not fully tell us of some matters that specially aroused public criticism, if not obloquy, such as the burning of the South African homesteads and the terrible suffering and mortality amongst the women and children. What he does tell us, however, elucidates many things difficult to follow, and makes us have a deeper regard for a man who came so near being Prime Minister of England, and who sacrificed that chance and estranged himself from his friends for what he considered to have been his duty.

Those who were charmed with the first volume of Lord Snowden's Autobiography, with its vivid and entrancing account of his early life, will turn with enthusiasm to the second volume. It deals with a time so different from that of the reign of Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary that we seem to have entered a new world.

In this volume Philip Snowden tells how, after an interlude of four years, owing to the result of the Khaki Election, the Labour Party formed itself into a Parliamentary Party and drew into its number a considerable middle-class element. Before that time the trade unions governed it. Already Snowden's antipathy to Ramsay MacDonald began to appear, and this is almost distressingly developed as the book goes on, even though the two were not far apart politically, for Snowden favoured the doctrine of gradualism that came to dominate his views in public affairs. The internecine dispute between members of the Labour Cabinet is one of the painful parts of the book. The formation of the first Labour Cabinet in 1924 is told with real enjoyment. That Government

lasted but nine months, but these months made it possible for the same party to come into power later (in 1929) as a recognised and more or less experienced body.

Snowden's function was clearly to be the Chancellor of the Exchequer: he had the right mind for this work, and did it amid almost universal acclamation. He is justified in taking to himself credit for his work, though the appreciation of that work is not lacking in the book.

Lord Snowden, of course, tells us the story, so burned into our minds, of the financial crisis, the Report of the May Committee and the formation of the National Government, and all this is valuable as history from within. His view is that MacDonald deliberately planned the formation of such a Ministry with himself as Prime Minister. In any case, we here have an interesting account of the development of a party which in its new socialistic character is probably going to play a large part in our history. We are told of Snowden's fourth, and last, Budget, introduced by him at a time of deep anxiety, of the going off the gold standard, and finally of the cause of his resignation. He can say bitter things, and he thinks the Labour Party has lost much of its old idealism. Its present Socialist leader would judge differently, but one comforting reflection is that a warm tribute is paid to the general purity of British political life.

The second volume of Lord Carson's Life presents a great contrast to the first, written by the late Edward Marjoribanks. This volume deals with a time of bitter political controversy, and it is written in a controversial spirit. No quarter is given to political opponents, and even certain supporters like F. E. Smith get scant recognition: there is, indeed, a rather spiteful story told of the latter towards the end of the book.

Carson's speech was plain, and Englishmen like that mode of speech, Mr. Colvin says: if so, they have plenty of it. We have the full account of the long, weary negotiations over Home Rule carried on from 1910, when the Liberal Government came into power. Carson termed Asquith 'the man with the strong face and the weak knees,' though he seemed to have a sort of respect for him not accorded to many of his colleagues. The South of Ireland never took Carson as its leader, and Carson seemed always trying to justify his attitude in its regard. There is a striking account of his visit, on his deathbed, to Joseph Chamberlain, who almost inarticulately urged the younger man to fight to the finish.

Of course, to the post-war generations the extraordinary part of the story concerns, not the signing of the Covenant, but the raising of the Volunteers and the arousing of the country against what was considered to be the probable action of the Government in the event of a Home Rule Bill being passed. Lord Roberts himself chose the commander of the Volunteers in Sir George Richardson, a retired Indian officer, and it was no wonder that the Government, as Mr. Colvin says, found this incredible. Then came the storage of 90,000 rounds of ammunition for as many men, the continual but futile attempt at arriving at some compromise, the threatened 'mutiny' at the Curragh, the resignation of Colonel Seeley, and the courageous action of Asquith in taking his office of Secretary of State for War. The whole astounding story of the gun-running—the import of arms from Germany by the *Fanny*—is told in detail. No wonder that Baron Hermann von Rütli, who had gone to spy out the land, reported that Ulster intended to fight, and that Germany was encouraged to believe that Britain would soon be in a state of civil war. While matters

were still in a state of crisis, after the Palace conference had broken down and all looked gloomy, came the dramatic events of August 1914, when a common front met a common foe.

The late Viscount Esher during the years 1900–10 held a remarkable position in English political life as a sort of liaison officer between politicians and the Crown. This might have been a dangerous, but it proved a very interesting, position. Lord Esher seems to have felt that he could do his best work in the background, and he refused several glittering offers, such as the Viceroyalty of India, in order that he might keep his freedom.

The period covered by the second volume extends to the death of King Edward VII., and during it Lord Esher devoted himself to the task of facilitating the passing into law of the Army Reforms brought forward by Mr. Haldane as Secretary of State for War. These Reforms were partially based on the Report made by Lord Esher himself after the Boer War, and, convinced as he was by their merit, he played a very useful part in commending them to those in high places. He had, in doing so, to combat the opposition of those who dreaded reduction where reduction was necessary, and those also who, like Lord Roberts, supported compulsory service as the only remedy for inefficiency.

In addition to the letters devoted to this subject, there is much else in the way of general political gossip which is interesting to those who have lived through the anxious time of the dispute between the Government and the House of Lords. We have also an account of the celebrated 'drains' letter from the Kaiser which caused a temporary rift with the King, but the main interest of the book centres upon the Army.

ELIZABETH HALDANE.

CAPTAIN-GENERAL

Marlborough, His Life and Times, vol. ii. By the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill. Harrap. —25s. net.

MR. CHURCHILL is now well in the saddle as he gallops with contagious enthusiasm over the scenes of his great ancestor's triumphs. All his instinct for military strategy and tactics, his close acquaintance with the country traversed in Marlborough's campaigns and his deep study and scholarly appreciation of the records are deftly and almost imperceptibly combined to create the rushing narrative with which he entrances the reader of this volume. He still, no doubt, indulges himself in somewhat lyrical, if not bombastic, perorations; nevertheless, he now feels secure enough of his ground to concede that his hero was mortal and sometimes made mistakes. He admits that he was perhaps too grasping of rewards and honours, he admits even that the adversaries in his own camp, the Dutch commanders and the tiresome Margrave, may have had some justification for their obstinate resistance to Marlborough's more spirited plans in the disappointing campaign of 1705. Such admissions, no doubt, Mr. Churchill feels he can better afford to make when he is describing the glories than he could in the first volume when he was fighting with his back to the wall for the earlier Marlborough's rather tarnished reputation.

Mr. Churchill is at the height of his powers of convincing description in his chapter on Marlborough's greatest achievement—perhaps the greatest piece of military strategy in history: the march to the Danube. It is certainly more remarkable than Napoleon's somewhat similar surprise march from Boulogne to Ulm, for Napoleon had not, like Marlborough, to contend

against unwilling auxiliaries on his own side, nor had he to evade and deceive such formidable adversaries as Villeroy in his rear, Tallard on his flank, and the Elector and Marsin ready for him when he attained his goal. By his description of this marvellous march Mr. Churchill enables us to follow it, with all its surprises and alarms (to the French) from stage to stage, almost from day to day, and, not content with his masterly narrative, by a succession of seven lucid plans illustrating the positions of the contending forces on critical days leaves no loophole for misapprehension. The succeeding engagements, the storming of the Schellenberg and the battle of Blenheim, are likewise told with a spirited elaboration of detail that makes real the less familiar Schellenberg and adds clearness even to the simpler and more familiar tactics of Marlborough at Blenheim. Hardly less convincing are his accounts of the storming of the lines of Brabant in the following year and of the opportunities missed on the Moselle or at 'the unfought Waterloo.'

Nor does Mr. Churchill confine himself to the military scene. The political background in Holland, at Vienna and in England, on which so much of Marlborough's successes and failures turned, is clearly and convincingly defined, and the characters of the chief political leaders are sketched with the acumen of an author versed in the great game of politics. He makes Queen Anne a more vivid personality than she has hitherto been to us, does his best for the still rather shadowy Godolphin, brings out the trouble Nottingham's gloomy zeal for the Church gave to Marlborough, finds new touches to throw up the more familiar characters of Harley and Bolingbroke, and gives us more than a bowing acquaintance with Heinsius and the

imperial ambassador, Wratislaw. On Eugene, Marlborough's great brother-in-arms, Mr. Churchill is perhaps least effective; there is, indeed, nothing amiss in his character of him; but Eugene does not quite live in the campaign and the one battle in this volume fought by him and Marlborough together, nor are his difficulties and actions on the right of the line at Blenheim clearly enough brought out. On the other hand, masterly portraits are given of the two villains of the piece in 1705: the Margrave with his princely morgue and his mortified toe, and the obstinate, sulky and disgruntled old Dutch commander Slangenberg.

Mr. Churchill's own practical and intimate acquaintance with the conditions of modern warfare and modern politics frequently illuminate his narrative and sometimes provide caustic comment on the events he recounts. Thus he is able to make an interesting analogy between the entry of Bavaria into the war on Louis XIV.'s side and of Turkey's on the side of the Kaiser in 1914, especially in regard to the strategic positions of those two States: he gives a most suggestive comparison between the functions of a commander in Marlborough's time as an eye-witness of almost every incident in a battle, and almost in a campaign, and those of a Haig or a Hindenburg, hardly ever present at an action, and directing all movements far in the background solely with the help of maps and plans, telephones and messengers, helped, too, by a vast staff organisation in contrast to the bare half-dozen staff officers employed by Marlborough and his contemporary commanders.

The questions remain, how far does he give us the complete Marlborough, and how far does he make him live? As a lover of his masterly Sarah, as a loyal servant to the Queen, as an organiser of campaigns, as the dominating figure

on a battlefield, as a diplomat in dealing with almost unbelievably difficult allies and recalcitrant commanders, nominally under him but able to cross him at every turn, Mr. Churchill's picture of Marlborough is as complete as it will ever, probably, be possible to make it. There are, however, one or two points which seem to be somewhat slurred over. The diversion of the main strategy of the war, for example, created by the admission of the Archduke's claim to the Spanish monarchy, seems to be attributed entirely to Nottingham and the English Cabinet, apart, apparently, from Marlborough. This seems hardly consistent with the preponderating weight attributed on a previous page to Marlborough with Godolphin in the Cabinet; and we should have been glad of the author's considered verdict on the merits and demerits of the new policy. But perhaps the chief omission in emphasis in this volume is as to Marlborough's control of operations over the whole wide-flung area of this war. It is true he indicates Marlborough's influence over other fields besides those where his own campaigns were conducted, but the indication is almost casual and is not enough insisted upon. For Marlborough was not merely a consummate general in battle and the masterly planner of isolated campaigns, he was also Napoleonic in his comprehension of the relations of land and sea power and in his eagle eye for the significance of events apparently unconnected with his own immediate operations. Mr. Churchill is obviously aware of this, Marlborough's greatest faculty, but he hardly brings it home to the reader in this volume. No doubt in the next volume, covering a period when Marlborough's comprehensive and amphibious gaze was even more marked, he will develop the point further.

BASIL WILLIAMS.

A PAIR OF WHIGS

Fox. By Christopher Hobhouse. Constable.—12s. 6d. net.

George Tierney. By H. K. Olphin, M.A. Allen and Unwin.—10s. 6d. net.

THE biography of a man of action, successful, courageous, and possessing all the elements of greatness, makes in most circumstances interesting reading. But when, as in the present case, are added the discrimination and independence of his biographer's mind, good writing and clever arrangement of material, the experience is vastly more enjoyable. Mr. Hobhouse has written what may well be looked upon as a model of political biography. He observes the cardinal principle of sticking to the point, and in so doing he keeps the limelight constantly fixed upon his subject's public life, refusing to draw aside and unveil the less reputable episodes of his privacy. His attitude throughout may be described as impartial and scrupulously honest; without unduly whitewashing, he refuses to deface, contenting himself with making an exhaustive inquiry into the character of the great Whig statesman.

Mr. Hobhouse renders a service to Fox. On beginning his book one is prepared by a certain dramatic tension in the author's mind for a stimulating experience: on closing it one is inclined to remember the words of Chateaubriand after his meeting with Washington: '*Je m'en suis senti échauffé le reste de ma vie: il y a une vertu dans les regards d'un grand homme.*'

It is plain that the child was father to the man. Henry Fox's curious notions about education, anticipating as they did by a century and a half a similar school of thought in the present day, consisted in not suffering his boy to be placed under any constraint and in

denying him nothing under the sun. That these theories were put into practice by a man in unique circumstances for the benefit of a brilliant son, and that the case was exceptional, is perhaps the only reason that the results, lamentable in many ways, were not actually worse. For instance, it is scarcely credible that a man should take his fourteen-year-old son to Spa and give him £5 a night to spend at the gaming tables. The result of this original idea was, as we know, to make Charles Fox run through a quarter of a million before he was twenty-five. This effect of Lord Holland's experiment with child nature was no doubt deplorable, but we can never be sure how much those same theories were not responsible for encouraging the qualities of nobility and rich, impulsive warmth which flowed unchecked from Charles's generous nature. For him neither small nor calculating instincts existed. Such a man was bound to cross swords with the virtuous and vindictive character of George III., and to antagonise his dissenting people and their paragon the Younger Pitt. Not without reason did Lord Mansfield remark in a whisper on seeing the small figure seated on the steps of the throne and listening eagerly to a debate: 'That is Fox's son Charles, with twice his parts and half his sagacity.'

He entered the arena at the age of twenty-one between the trumpets of the Wilkes affray, his first trial of strength being his championship of Sir James Lowther and the cause of landed property. As in that, so in the Royal Marriage Bill, and later in his noble India Bill, he became the recognised defender of forlorn hopes and the supporter of unpopular measures. He took his stand as the helmsman steering parliamentary privilege between

the Scylla of the Crown and the Charybdis of the people. He began as an out-and-out Tory, he became converted to Whiggism, and his character was consistent throughout his life. As a man admitting of no concessions to popular taste, he stood out against North and showed in sharp contrast to Pitt his contempt for the value of public opinion.

Fox, in fact, appears to be what Mr. Hobhouse places to Lambton's credit—the Byron of politics. His very attitude in standing alone, in throwing away his reputation when it was most necessary to him for the sake of being true to his fundamental instincts—in this case his integrity—savours of political Byronism. In fact, the author might be summing up the poet rather than the politician when he writes that Fox's genius 'was a contribution to the history of his century, and to the development of the national character. The central thing about Fox was his . . . largeness of heart.'

But besides Fox himself various of his associates and contemporaries appear in thumbnail sketches throughout these pages. Events crowd past concisely and clearly delineated in their proper sequence. The Gordon Riots, the Westminster Election of 1784 (when Georgiana Duchess of Devonshire canvassed the city for Fox), and the subsequent jubilation of the Foxites at Carlton House (when everyone, including the Prince of Wales, wore the leader's colours and the toast of the evening was 'True blue and Mrs. Crewe,' Mrs. Crewe responding 'True blue and all of you'), are admirably sketched in. Opposite the chief character in the book Pitt is summed up in a few words: 'cold, hard, brilliant, disinterested, and solitary.' There is a masterly analysis of Burke, of whom it would be interesting to read more from the pen of Mr. Hobhouse, while George III. lurks in the background, virtuous and interfering, and at all

times seeking to increase and consolidate the power of the Crown.

Of Fox's personal charm we read as much as is necessary in a political summary. But that he was able to hold spell-bound a large circle of his followers at Brooks's night after night for years on end, and that these friends were blinded by all else but his personality, is well known. That he tolerated no criticism from them, or indeed from anyone else, shows where his limitations began. He suffered, in fact, from a degree of megalomania which is not even admitted by his present biographer. 'He must,' says Mr. Hobhouse in this delightful book, 'have been irresistible.'

It would be unfair to turn from Fox to Tierney and to begin by drawing comparisons. Tierney would come off poorly. However, Mr. Olphin has devoted three years of research and labour for his biography, and has discovered some previously unknown correspondence relating to the life and times of this not very inspiring Whig politician, and his book will accordingly enjoy the merit of being a standard work upon George Tierney.

The Tierneys were a mercantile family of certain wealth, and consequently, though he possessed the ability and the money, George lacked the influential connexions owned by many of the young Whig members of Parliament; his subsequent career was perhaps partly a reaction to this disability. Tierney's first public appearance was in the City, where, as a shareholder in the East India Company, he opposed Fox's India Bill. He was on the side of the Nabobs, but little can be said for his arguments to-day. He received, however, an opportunity to display his facility for statistics, and after a flirtation with the law he determined to enter Parliament. Here Mr. Olphin gives us an illuminating account of the corrupt methods of the day, and his sketch of the new member for Colchester's

election and later of the Southwark election are sad reminders that the 'good old times' were often 'very bad indeed.' When Tierney entered Parliament the Whigs were divided by the tide of intense Jacobinism that was sweeping France. While Burke went over to the Tories, Grey and his party of respectable moderates, including Tierney, formed a society called the *Friends of the People*. They strove to steer a course midway between the extremes of Burke and Fox while at the same time eschewing the abstract principles of Tom Paine. Reform was urgently needed, and throughout the whole of his career it was—as well as to many others—Tierney's guiding star. But he was dogged by bad luck and by unpopularity for most of the time, and, to tell the truth, there is not a great deal to be said in his favour. A man of undoubted talent for facts and figures, he was, as a rebellious Foxite, disloyal to his leader, and later, as leader of the Opposition, a failure himself. Like Fox, he was the champion of lost causes, but he lacked both the personality to get away with his arguments and the confidence with which to impose himself on Ministers.

As a politician his supreme effort was his motion on 'The state of the nation.' Intended to overthrow the Ministry, it was an utter failure, and the Government was supported by more than double the votes of the Opposition. Tierney was defeated and discredited, and his influence from that moment gradually waned. In 1832 the Whigs came back at last from their long sojourn in the wilderness into power. They brought with them the Reform Bill and everything for which Tierney had striven during forty years of political life. But the satisfaction of knowing even this was denied him. He had died two years earlier.

YVONNE FRENCH.

The Observer

1791—1934

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SUNDAY

FROM KING TO PARLIAMENT

Early Tudor Government. By Kenneth Pickthorn. Cambridge University Press (two vols.).—37s. 6d. net.

England in the Reign of Charles II. By David Ogg. Oxford University Press (two vols.).—30s. net.

The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714. By G. N. Clark. Oxford University Press.—12s. 6d. net.

WHATEVER else may be wrong in this country, historical scholarship is clearly in a good way when three such excellent books as these appear together; and, let it be noted, coming from the older universities too! Each of them incorporates the results of the latest research in its particular field; and each is so just and free from *parti pris*, that they are unlikely to be superseded for a long time.

Mr. Pickthorn describes the system of government of the first two Tudors, and its modes of operation; if, indeed, 'system' is not too precise a word for what was a subtle amalgam of the customary, the legal and the personal. Of the importance of each of these elements in the mixture which Henry VII. and Henry VIII. so successfully administered to the nation there can be no doubt; it is implied in the famous summing-up of their principles of government by Bacon—a sentence which Mr. Pickthorn might well have taken as the text for his book: 'He [*i.e.*, Henry VII.] was ever an observer of formality in all his proceedings, which notwithstanding was no impediment to the working of his will.' What Mr. Pickthorn does in the second and larger of his volumes is to give us a survey of the internal mechanism

of Henry VIII.'s government, a constitutional and political history of the reign, omitting foreign policy, his wars and dealings with Scotland and Ireland; while the earlier volume on Henry VII. is designed as an analysis of the institutions of government by way of introduction to the second.

Where a nineteenth-century survey would have started with parliament, Mr. Pickthorn in the modern manner begins with kingship, the king and his council. It is the right emphasis; for in Tudor society, as indeed during most of the Stuart era, the community revolved around the monarchy as the centre of power—in a sense, its true representative and head. He notes that the people at the time of the Pilgrimage of Grace looked to the king and his council for redress and not to parliament, which hardly interested them. Parliament was much more the concern of the gentry and the townsmen, who were represented in it.

Only once does Mr. Pickthorn's political position betray itself, as when he complains that 'in twentieth-century sentiment about politics the first impulse is usually to ascribe almost a monopoly of mystical force and theological virtue to the people,' as opposed to the sixteenth-century devotion to the king. But surely this primitive reverence for the person of the king was as the head of the mystic body, the community; so that to be able to recognise the community without the aid of a totemic symbol is an advance in reason anyway.

The shifting over of power from the monarchy to parliament, the institution representative of the dominant classes in the country, which is foreshadowed in a most interesting passage on 'The strength-

ening of the Gentry,' is the subject of the two remaining books by Mr. Ogg and Professor Clark.

Mr. Ogg's *England in the Reign of Charles II.*, a work of even greater and more detailed research, deals with the struggle between Crown and Parliament, in the last phase before the passing finally from one to the other. Charles' and James's was the last attempt to recover the position of the ancient monarchy; and the decision was postponed in the reign of the former by a variety of factors, of which Charles's political sense was one, and brought to a quick head by James's foolery and obstinacy about religion. If it had not been for the latter's uniting the whole nation against him, it might have needed another civil war to effect the transition. But the real relation of the monarchy to the people was revealed in his own fate, when the monarch made the mistake of thinking that it was for him to impose what he thought upon his people, instead of the other way round.

But Mr. Ogg does a great deal more than tell the familiar story of the reign; his is, at last, a thorough analysis and description of the England of the time, from its foundation in the soil, its products and industries, going on to depict the social condition of the people, and, after dealing with all aspects of policy, foreign and home, concludes with a discussion of the intellectual achievement of the age.

It remains for Professor Clark, in his new book, *The Later Stuarts*, to complete the transition from the monarchy to parliamentary sovereignty, the principle which won in 1688. There is much that is similar in the point of view of these two authorities; each of them is rightly scornful of recent attempts to romanticise the inglorious Charles II. into the figure of a national monarch, and sees the history of those times very remarkably from the standpoint of the average Eng-

lishman. Nothing is more difficult, or, when it is successfully accomplished, makes better history. Professor Clark's book is a brilliant example of this newer attitude to history, an approach that is in keeping with all that is best in the mind of our time. This rare quality, developed to so fine a point, may perhaps be due to Professor Clark's being steeped in the knowledge of the economic and social background of the time as well as of the European scene; the excitements of Court and Parliament then fall into their proper place—for they have a place.

There is not space to do justice to the brilliance and originality of its treatment of the subject; one can only point to such examples as the chapter on James II., which almost for the first time makes the reign intelligible, so emancipated is it from any prejudice of party, so free from the desire to impose either a Tory or a Whig, a Catholic or a Protestant interpretation upon events. Or there is his account of the influence of the successive wars upon constitutional and economic development, a subject which Professor Clark has made his own and is developed here and nowhere else. Or again, his chapters on Ireland and Scottish affairs, so apt to be controversial, are extraordinarily just and illuminating; while at every point there is the fullest and most catholic appreciation of all the social and intellectual movements of the time, of literature and the arts, and, what is less common, of science, mathematics, architecture.

This volume is the first in the great new *Oxford History of England* which is being prepared under Professor Clark's direction; if the rest of the series are completed in the way it has been begun, it will be a monument worthy of the place which history holds in the intellectual life of our time.

A. L. ROWSE.

A PHILOSOPHICAL PENTAGON

Nature, Man and God. By William Temple, Archbishop of York. Macmillan.—18s. net.

Philosophical Studies. By J. McT. Ellis McTaggart. Edited by S. V. Keeling. Edward Arnold.—12s. 6d. net.

Reason. A Philosophical Essay. By Thomas Whittaker. Cambridge University Press.—10s. 6d. net.

The Serial Universe. By J. W. Dunne. Faber and Faber.—10s. 6d. net.

Must Philosophers Disagree? By F. C. S. Schiller. Macmillan.—12s. 6d. net.

THE chance of contemporary publication has grouped these five books in a philosophical pentagon, each viewing the same field from its own angle. That occupied by the Archbishop is the most impressive, whilst that of Mr. Dunne is the most unfamiliar. The other three are alike in this respect—that they consist, almost wholly, of previously published work, collected and reissued in book form.

The Archbishop's title gives him a passport, of which he makes good use, to wander without let or hindrance through the philosophical universe. Starting from 'Critical Realism,' a position which is confessedly kin to Materialism rather than to Idealism, he finishes with an Idealism, which he admits is almost that of Edward Caird or Bosanquet—in itself no inconsiderable feat. Perhaps it is this which leads to the remarkable statement that the Christian religion is 'the most avowedly materialist of all the great religions.' It may also be the reason why atoms are called a 'primary entity' like an individual person, though, unless atoms have individuality, it seems hard to understand the parallel. That a man of so many affairs should be able to undertake so long and closely reasoned an exposition leaves one wondering whether to admire the more his energy or his capacity. There can be no doubt, however, that a survey so broad, so massive,

so comprehensive in its grasp of both the wood and the trees, is an outstanding contribution to the literature of Theism, as well as an indication of pre-eminent ability.

Dr. Keeling contributes an excellent introduction to his author. Though this book consists of occasional papers, collectively they give a just comprehension of the philosophy of a man who might be described as the most religious atheist who ever lived. McTaggart thought relentlessly, and his style is as clear as his convictions. His philosophy found no place for God, yet his own place was in the Kingdom of God. His personality fascinates those whom his philosophy repels. The essay on Mysticism is particularly illuminating, in view of the ruthlessly rational character of McTaggart's writings, and shows how much deeper his intuitions carried him than did his reason. These essays give a deeper understanding of a man whose philosophy has been as great an enigma as his personality.

Mr. Whittaker, as befits a stout Hellenist, is also the henchman of reason. His book takes its title from his article in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, which is reprinted here. The remainder consists of studies of five philosophers. Mr. Whittaker is skilful in dissection of a philosophy, and in laying bare the inwardness of the matter in a few sharply stencilled

sentences. For example, 'In Mill, as in Comte, there is a theoretical opposition of man to the cosmos which seems to make of him a kind of miracle in nature'—a sentence that could furnish a text for a volume.

Seven years ago Mr. Dunne experimented with time in a book that caused no small stir. The reviewers seemed afraid to condemn it, because they had an uneasy feeling that it might be very important; but no one seemed inclined to espouse Mr. Dunne's reasonings, possibly because few could understand them. Mr. Dunne returns to the attack, and, having further cultivated his philosophical allotment, gives a name to its produce, though, unfortunately, it must be another 'ism'—Serialism. In some respects this book is more difficult for the ordinary reader than the *Experiment with Time*, for it delves into the recesses of the theory of relativity in support of its contentions, though it is possible this venture will excite more opposition than support. It is claimed that the argument affords a 'proof' of human immortality. At first glance Mr. Dunne's approach reminds one of the old series that ran to infinite regress—I know; I know that I know; I know that I know that I know, etc. But though it is based on the question how the subject, ego, or pure I, can assimilate the object, stream of experience, or Me as its expression, it demonstrates its case up to a certain point. That point is not, as it is claimed, immortality, unless one gives to immortality a very pallid connotation. That upon a regressive view of time the observer must be taken as constituting an infinite series is far from Kant's demand that immortality represents the infinitely prolonged existence and personality

of one and the same rational being. There is not much to stir the pulse in the dialectical immortality Mr. Dunne bestows upon us, though from the standpoint of his argument the conclusion seems necessitated. But would that standpoint be accepted at any other angle of the pentagon? One thing is certain, that, whether Mr. Dunne is right or wrong, he deserves to be treated seriously.

Dr. Schiller, looking from his angle at all the angles in the whole philosophic polygon, asks whether it is the nature of philosophy or that of philosophers that makes for so much disagreement. Those who know Dr. Schiller, and have followed his life-long attempts to humanise philosophy, will not be surprised to learn that he thinks the fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we so disagree. There are in all twenty-four essays in this book, and they are as wise as they are witty, as light as they are enlightening. Some of Dr. Schiller's detractors have treated him as a humorist rather than a humanist, forgetting that because he is the latter he is the former. The essay on 'Psychical Research' is a model of sense and impartiality. That Dr. Schiller can make an essay on a philosophical topic as easy to read as a newspaper article should surely be a matter for admiration, not execration. His, at least, was the only book of the five that the reviewer could read amidst the distractions of a railway journey, with such pre-occupation that only a hurried exit saved him from passing his station. Dr. Schiller's essays might have been headed 'Philosophy without Tears,' and at least philosophers may agree that this is an enviable art.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS

Men Without Art. By Wyndham Lewis. Cassell.—10s. 6d. net.

Author Hunting. By Grant Richards. Hamish Hamilton.—15s. net.

A Publisher Speaking. By Geoffrey Faber. Faber and Faber.—3s. 6d. net.

HERE are three very different books, each in its own way well worth reading, but, in virtue of a common element, far more important and instructive when read together. For all three writers are more or less seriously concerned about the present state of English reading and writing. Mr. Wyndham Lewis is an Ishmaelite critic who, like the Scotch Presbyterian sectary of tradition, is even more convinced of everybody else's wrongness than of his own rightness. Mr. Grant Richards and Mr. Faber are publishers who make no pretensions to a knowledge of ultimate values, but claim to be, according to the grace vouchsafed to them, sincere lovers of literature, who, subject to the usual proviso that one must live, would much rather publish good books at some risk than bad ones with perfect security of handsome profits. Here, of course, if the three were sitting face to face at a symposium, Mr. Wyndham Lewis would snap out at Messrs. Richards and Faber his usual nasty question: 'And what in the name of Aristotle do you gentlemen mean by a *good* book?' To which Messrs. Richards and Faber (if they had the presence of mind before so intimidating a person as Mr. Wyndham Lewis) would retort: 'And what in the name of anything do *you* mean? You have just written a long and entertaining book (not the first) to tell us, and nobody is a penny the wiser, though some may be half a

guinea the poorer.' And honours would be easy.

Yet perhaps not quite. Mr. Lewis as an afterthought does prescribe a test for one category of contemporary literature. He calls it The Taxi-cab Driver Test for 'Fiction.'

I believe [he says] that you should be able to request a taxi-cab driver to step into your house, and (just as you might ask him to cut a pack of cards) invite him to open a given work of fiction, which you had placed in readiness for this experiment upon your table; and that then at *whatever page he happened to open it*, it should be, in its texture, something more than, and something different from, the usual thing that such an operation would reveal.

This is a clumsy jest expressed in clumsy and garrulous terms, but it embodies a disconcerting truth. Mr. Lewis gives an example which he swears (and we must take his word for it) is *bonâ fide*. Mentioning no names, he reproduces the first pages of two works of fiction, trusting, rightly, that at least 90 per cent. of readers will not recognise them. The only clue he gives is that the first is from 'the most important work of fiction of a very famous author, published in 1928, and regarded as one of the landmarks of English literature in the last decade.' He then invites you to observe what you have observed already—that it is the poorest pantry-novel stuff; and finally (over the page) tells you the name of the author and the title of the masterpiece, which come as an unpleasant shock, for you pride yourself on your literary taste and remember having enjoyed and admired the book. You begin to wonder if there may not be a good deal in Mr. Lewis's prolonged lament over the decay of values.

That the usual commercial article that is stocked by the great Libraries and Book of the Month Clubs should be recommended to the public as a

good, a bad, or an indifferent specimen of the stuff they want, would be sensible and salesmanlike. That highly paid experts should (with gloves on and heavily masked) examine these masses of written matter weekly and appropriately report upon them in a newspaper no one could object to: if they said 'This is the goods, you will like *this*,' all would be well. It is when people possessing, rightly or wrongly, a great position in the literature of their very important country, are employed at portentous salaries to write weekly about these products in the way they do—lavishing upon them all the resources of their critical vocabularies—a vocabulary acquired for the appraisal of such tremendous works as *War and Peace* or *L'Education Sentimentale*—that there is something that stinks horribly in the State of Denmark, and that it is more than time to call a halt.

How and when did this rot of indiscriminate laudation begin? Mr. Lewis says that Arnold Bennett has a lot to answer for, not as the prime mover, but apparently as the arch-villain who brought the mischief to perfection. Even when he finds Bennett recognising the mischief and pleading that he and others are but victims of over-production, he will have none of it. '*Allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus.*' But it was not until the end of his career that Bennett appeared as a 'star' reviewer, and latterly, as publishers learned to their cost, his praise lost most of its selling potency. The beginnings of the mischief are to be sought in the later 'nineties, about the time when Mr. Grant Richards, as a very young man with little knowledge of publishing, but an enthusiasm for books that seems to have been undisciplined by any scale of critical values. In his cheery, inconsequential volume of reminiscences, how he took up the enthralling new sport of 'author-hunting' initiated by William Heinemann! He had neither Heinemann's judgment nor Heinemann's capital, but he had great faith in dash—he was to be the *beau sabreur* of the publishing world, and one cannot but admire his indomitable gallantry.

But like many admirable people who do good work, he set a bad example, the results of which we see to-day. The publishing trade is crowded with 'author-hunters,' who are finding, to their consternation, that the supply of first-rate (and even second-rate) game of that sort is subject to the law of diminishing returns. Hence, as Mr. Geoffrey Faber points out in his acute and none too cheerful analysis of the situation, 'author-hunting' has degenerated into a desperate competition in the manufacture of 'best-sellers,' involving, in every sense of the term, an extravagance of advertising beside which the most blushful efforts of the lingerie trade are modest. The publishers' extremity has been cynically exploited as a glorious opportunity by the unostentatious gentlemen who some years ago formed the Book Society and by a few popular newspapers. Even Mr. Grant Richards, who is not easily frightened, is appalled by the modern prospect. Back in the 'nineties he little dreamed of a time when, lined up by book societies, martialled [sic] by literary journalists, brought to obedience by excessive advertisement, the members of the reading public have now all to read the same books in the same season or they will be out of the fashion, they will miss their conversational cues.

What is the cure? Mr. Faber thinks that the root of the trouble is economic—too many publishers and too many books. He thinks it would not be a bad thing to organise the publishing trade so as to make it as difficult to become a publisher as (say) to become a Lloyd's underwriter. There is a great deal to be said for the idea. The fortunes of books and ships have much in common. But the trouble goes much deeper than economics. How deep, it would be far beyond the scope of this article to consider.

DONALD CARSWELL.

A DREAMER OF DREAMS

Experiment in Autobiography. By H. G. Wells (two vols.). Gollancz.—10s. 6d. net each.

THIS is the story of a little boy who was always dodging the grown-ups who wanted him to go to church and be a good little draper and not bother them. Later on he became a kind of grown-up himself, and was very successful and had lots of lovely cheques. Only he was really the same little boy all the time, and he never could stop making faces at the people he did not like, particularly God the Father and Karl Marx. And, because the world is, in general and so far, rather a nasty world run by rather nasty people as alien and adult as giants and ogres, the little boy could not ever quite understand it. He made several brave attempts; he tried to persuade the giants and ogres that they were nice; he had the freshness and gallantry of the twelve-year-old; he just could never see *why* we could not all kiss and be friends. All this is told by the master story-teller of our age, H. G. Wells; indeed, he would have us believe that the little boy is himself, as no doubt, to some extent, he is.

The book starts with the childhood of little Bert Wells in an unforgettably vivid setting—the respectable, crammed, bug-ridden Atlas House, the schools, Up Park. We watch the boy encountering things and cramming them ostrich-fashion into his mind, or, if they seem incredible things, somehow evading them. Accident helped him with these evasions; but oh, he was a bright boy! We watch him, avid for facts and systems, up against the educational system of the grown-up world, gobbling everything, even Latin grammar. He grows up to adolescence and London, and, under Huxley, the whole science of life itself waiting to be gobbled. Sometimes the big, nowadays, H. G. is tender to poor little Bert, but more often he goes out of

his way to explain the horridness of this dodging little-boy hero with his ridiculous clothes and conventions and fears and meannesses. That does not take us in, of course, for what nice, normal she-reader is there who does not want to pick him up and kiss him? 'I fretted for some lovely encounter that never occurred.' Poor darling!

That later educational stage raises an interesting point. We see the young student thrilled with biology and thoroughly bored with physics. Why? The answer does not simply lie in good or bad teaching. Biology then was at its most thrilling—partly, at least, because the scientific instruments for displaying and measuring had just been brought to the general level of Victorian efficiency, thus allowing a whole series of fascinating and easy facts to become plain, and giving minds like Darwin's and Huxley's the material best suited for them to work on. But the level of instrumental efficiency was not yet fine enough to lay bare the more difficult and delicate physical structure of things. Half a generation later this change had come, and the new types of instruments were beginning to give the material for men like Bohr or, later, Einstein. One can see an Edwardian or Georgian Wells fascinated by physics and finding biology dull, or perhaps an even later Wells yet more fascinated by the newer biology of the geneticists and bio-chemists, in its turn made possible by instruments of still finer precision. And would not that have made a different kind of man, a different sort of mind, a different *Time Machine* and *Kipps* and *Mr. Clissold*?

The end of the first volume has the little boy placed—a bright young writer in a world which was less hard on the bright young than it is in 1934. He has married, and then—the eternal little dodger—eloped. So one scuttles on to the

second volume to see what happens next. Quite a lot does happen—politics, editors, highbrows, an occasional superb description: 'Chesterton was heated and I think rather swollen by the sunshine; he seemed to overhang his one-horse fly.' It is illustrated by the little boy's own 'picshuas,' scribbles, half love and half caricature, which are, to me at least, as valid as anything in any autobiography.

There is some ridiculously unfair anti-feminism—the little boy putting out his tongue at something else he does not understand. There is also much political speculation. None of this is new to anyone who has read their later Wells, and much is bound to strike any reader with a fair knowledge of economics and history as amateur, if not actually a muddle. There are some quite fascinating chapters about his actual writing, including a most valuable digression on Henry James, whose standards and values have weighed so heavily and disastrously on European literature. It is always important to know what an author thinks of his own work, and, of course, especially valuable from a writer with a social conscience. Here, in chapter vii., one has laid out before one, as an example perhaps to follow or perhaps to shun, the spectacle of an artist selling his soul and seeing to it that he and the world get back the right price.

But his personal story dries up after 1900. I take it that all this is a matter of Good Taste and so on, not to speak of Libel; but if I had been one of H. G.'s loves, I should have hated not to come in. He talks in the abstract about sexual relations; and obviously they meant a great deal to him, as, equally obviously, they mean a great deal to all of us who are physiologically normal. So why leave them out in reality? This takes away seriously from the truth and objectivity of the book.

Even from what we gather, through the vagueness and abstractions about sex, it is fairly plain that the little boy's sexual life was badly muddled. In any sensible civilisation these things would not be left to chance. But with Bert Wells, even more clearly than with most young men, it was obviously a matter for skilled initiation, which would have left no ugly scars, no jarring of the idealisations, no twist against women such as appears now and then in the finished product. He has some brilliant things to say about it:

It is remarkable how much we frame our expectations upon such secret fantasies and how completely we ignore the probability that the lovers we encounter may have quite other systems of imagination.

But have his loves, in fact, always been disappointment? And if so, why?

We ought all to read the 'Planned World' chapter, in which he excuses himself and other highbrows, showing how helpless they really are. Does he, I wonder, ever think of the pitiful failure of that hopeful and intelligent paper the *Realist*? That was a lesson in how little intellect counts against money; most of the board of that paper, including H. G., were music makers and dreamers of dreams—imaginative, historical or scientific dreams. But we could not build or shake the adult world of money and power.

That is one moral of the story of the little boy. And another? Well, it may be that no writer can ever write honestly about himself or herself. It may be that no writer should ever write an autobiography. Yet, on the other hand, 'autobiographies' by those who are not more or less professional writers are usually abominably dull. So what can we do? We must just accept these two volumes, with gratitude, as a fascinating story, and above all as an experiment.

NAOMI MITCHISON.

SOME NEW POETRY

- New Signatures.* Hogarth Press.—3s. 6d. net.
- The Best Poems of 1934.* Cape.—6s. net.
- Open the Sky.* By John Pudney. Boriswood.—5s. net.
- Landscape West of Eden.* By Conrad Aiken. Dent.—2s. 6d. net.
- Homage to Sextus Propertius.* By Ezra Pound. Faber and Faber.—2s. 6d. net.
- The House of the Titans.* By A. E. Macmillan.—3s. 6d. net.
- Mountains and Molehills.* By Frances Cornford. Cambridge University Press.—5s. net.
- Choice or Chance.* By Edmund Blunden. Cobden-Sanderson.—6s. net.
- Poems of Ten Years.* By Dorothy Wellesley. Macmillan.—8s. 6d. net.
- Vienna.* By Stephen Spender. Faber and Faber.—3s. 6d. net.

IN writing the preface to *New Signatures*, now two years old, Mr. Michael Roberts outlined with great clarity an interesting situation. He maintained that traditional technique has grown obsolete in face of the characteristically modern aspects of life, and, further, that poetry loses in actuality when it fails to express precisely such differences from the past as these, which, in fact, require their own specialised and novel technique. He argues that, under the influence of modern ways of living and thinking, we feel more subtly than formerly, and the basic experience underlying poetry is thereby changed in nature. He might have added, perhaps, that the ear itself has become accustomed to a new set of sounds and rhythms in the exterior world, with the result that it finds new verbal sound arrangements significant and acceptable to it. In short, purely traditional poetry no longer convinces minds exactly sensitive to man's general environment; and this sensitiveness is indispensable in a poet, since it is part of his function to illuminate the problems of his fellows.

This preface should be read with care, not least for its approach to the 'difficult' poetry so characteristic of the times. It remains an uneasy fact that the problems behind poetry, as published and

appraised to-day, are formidable and complicated. Poetry, from one point of view, is the crowned impulse to celebrate or denounce, and in so doing to perpetuate, some aspect of an existence. It prizes, therefore, what it handles, and solicits the reader to prize it also. Furthermore, it exults in its method, and looks to be prized itself because of it. Its first problems, then, are two. What shall it prize—as a target for love or hate? And in what method shall it exult?—in the high-angle fire of exaggeration, or the flattened trajectory of exactitude? The language of extravagance owns the spectacular advantage, while that of accuracy wears the better look of truth. If the second be more finely exacting, the first is more broadly apolaustic. But it is the secondary problem which complicates the affair and lends gravity to what might have been a matter of transient importance. If the poet forgets his candidature for the suffrage of posterity, the critic is sharp to remind him.

To the advanced and forward-looking school, in poetry as in every department of life, the past has become so burdensome that man's sole remedy seems to be to shrug it contemptuously from his shoulders and go forward invigorated by the apparent ease with which this is

accomplished. In the opposite camp, are ranged those who hold by the ancestral way of life, imperilled though it is and doomed though it may be, and those who follow the traditional use in poetry, discipular but undismayed.

Such is one aspect of the matter; and it is reflected in these ten volumes.

New Signatures has reached a third edition, so that its contents are already familiar to the reader. If not, he would do well to make them so. Its nine contributors do really address themselves to discovering with exactitude what it means to live in these times, and quite deliberately in them. It is Mr. Spender who enunciates the truth that to discard the past is to be thrown back upon your own bare resources:

It is too late
to make or even to count what has
been made.
Count rather those fabulous posses-
sions
which begin with your body and
your fiery soul, . . .

Mr. Moul's anthology derives from periodicals, and not from published volumes of poetry. In point of modernity it falls somewhat behind *New Signatures*. But in it Mr. Aldington strikes the same note:

Mourn not for the wreckage, but as
the moon fades
In the quick dawn, break from the
ruins,
For life goes on.

But, in one of the shorter poems which follow his impressive short play *Joseph*, Mr. Pudney thrusts beyond that:

Yet you or I tricked out in a spring's
grass
Lusty with hope or treacled with
despair,
engined in a symmetric chord of
steel and glass,
set up our nothing here and nothing
there.

Landscape West of Eden is perhaps the most difficult and the most elusive of the ten. The investigation is delicate, after all, when one is conscious of

this little coral island of the mind
broken upon with all the foams of
nescience.

But Mr. Aiken's work invites and repays attentive study, both by passages of considerable beauty and by his sensitive awareness of the exacting nature of his task.

Mr. Pound, on the other hand, confidently draws Propertius a little to one side to contemplate, amongst other things, the subject-matter of poetry:

Thus much the fates have allotted
me, and if, Maecenas,
I were able to lead heroes into
armour, I would not,
Neither would I warble of Titans,
nor of Ossa spiked onto Olympus,
Nor of causeways over Pelion— . . .

His choice and use of these twelve poems for his own purpose, besides being a notable event in itself, is interesting as an illustration of the greater complexity of the modern poet, which makes it possible for him to appropriate the ancient as an aspect of himself.

Of Titans, however, A. E. does discourse with his accustomed mastery. This is of the other camp. It is possible to hold that the major human problems are eternal, and that ancient symbolisms can supply the modern need. This attitude is even reinforced by the abnegations which it imposes upon the poet. For the first impact of the level beauty of this kind of writing is far quieter than that of much modern work. But it is persuasive and has its reward:

' And when
Thy spirit becomes so gentle it could
pass
into another spirit and leave no
wound,
I will give unto thee this star to
lead'

To this more traditional school belong the succeeding four books. *Mountains and Molehills* breathes that enchantment which always distinguishes Mrs. Cornford's work. It touches continually upon man's eternal problem, death, and exorcises it with spells of abiding loveliness. It is not a conspicuously

modern attitude, but, where nothing avails us in the end, who shall dictate to us in the expectation? Meanwhile, the book, with its Raverat decorations, is a production of remarkable loveliness and contains Tapestry Song which is too enchanting to quote piecemeal.

Mr. Blunden and Dorothy Wellesley both exhibit the strong fact that as the modern tendency makes its way clear to all and sundry, so it must draw after it that insincerity of which it is most contemptuous. Attachment to the old ways of life must, in their peril, charge their symbolism not with new meaning but with new vigour, restoring that actuality which is incontestably present in the work of these two poets who are not yet in love with industrialism. But then both have a stiffening of satire: they have claws.

And finally Mr. Spender's magnificent *Vienna*, a modern counterpart of Milton's sonnet on 'The Late Massacre.' Milton denounces from afar and in good set terms, backed by the clear-cut partisanship of a ready-made theology. Mr. Spender wisely does not take the political case for granted, but, amongst other things by a brilliant handling of the degree to which his syntax is out of focus, and more than the weighing of evidence enters into it.

'There is no question more of not forgiving
Forgiveness become my only feeling
To understand their lack of understanding
Has absorbed my entire loving,
Yet sometimes I wish that I were
loud and angry
Without this human mind like a
doomed sky
That loves, as it must enclose, all.'

GERALD CROW.

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THIS FREEDOM

Freedom and Organisation. By Bertrand Russell. Allen and Unwin.—15s. net.

History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century. By Benedetto Croce. Allen and Unwin.—10s. 6d. net.

The Method of Freedom. By Walter Lippmann. Allen and Unwin.—4s. 6d. net.

Liberty To-day. By C. E. M. Joad. Watts.—2s. 6d. net.

How to make a Revolution. By Raymond Postgate. Hogarth Press.—5s. net.

SOCIOLOGISTS to-day, whatever pulpit they occupy, can have only one text: 'See what has happened to Liberty!' That is the most unexpected and vastest change which the nineteenth century provoked—unexpected because who could have foreseen that the 'century of progress' would lead to tyranny?, and vast because no economic change has so affected the happiness of men. Marx, whose gospel was to complete man's emancipation, and who himself firmly believed that after one wrench the body politic would find itself in joint, at last articulated, really free—Marx has given rise to a tyranny which not only brushes aside freedom, but openly mocks at liberty. The nationalism which in the nineteenth century always identified itself with liberty, to-day 'tramples upon the decaying corpse' of its twin.

Why has this happened, why has freedom collapsed? The opinion of economically minded thinkers such as Lord Russell and Mr. Lippmann must naturally be economic. Man failed to mind the machine which produced unlimited goods but could not distribute them; man permitted unworthy men to secure unlimited profits and so to ride on the shoulders of their fellow-men. Croce, being a metaphysician, sees a metaphysical cause behind it all, calls us to a new liberality and courageousness of life, in finely rounded but vague phrases—phrases the vagueness of which is perhaps

due as much to the practical diplomacy of a thinker whose body is resident in Italy as to the transcendentalism of a mind which need not stoop to exactitude. Mr. Joad, living in a free country, can speak more precisely for freedom. But he, too, owns that old arguments for liberty no longer seem to count; we are seeing a return to un-reason, though, he can only repeat, man is at bottom reasonable and liberty must and can only by reason win its way back to power. Lastly, Mr. Postgate still thinks of the making of still another revolution—to begin with argument, and so to get the people's assent; and then, that assent won, to refuse to dismount, and so, presumably, to hold on by force, until—that Greek Kalends—it has 'made Socialism.'

No European can read these books without realising that they alone are symptomatic of a very strange state of mind at this time. They are all written by able and informed men who believe in reason. They are all studying the same problem. They are nearly all in complete disagreement. How account for this? It may be due in one or two cases to a conscious animus. Lord Russell can hate what he feels to be evil, and when hating the wrong he feels, as does nearly every moralist, that he is excused from much further effort to understand. Yet with writers such as Croce and Lippmann, where animus is largely suppressed, the feeling also remains

that the diagnosis for some reason has been terminated too soon. Croce can be contemptuous of the Church and those who join it, and Joad, who can diagnose as lucidly as Russell the disgust with civilisation, instead of pushing the inquiry further only concludes that this is a passing, incomprehensible phase—that men will come back to Reason and through Reason to Liberty.

Can we venture to carry the inquiry further and see whether, if that could be done, we could have any grounds for hoping to see a return of tolerance and freedom? For there can be no doubt that, whether Europe ever regains its freedom, without that freedom Europe's unique power of inquiry and understanding will die. It will become no more than an area useless, if not dangerous, for the reminder of the world and a prison yard for its inmates. That both Joad and Lippmann demonstrate with a simple directness which, if reason were working to-day, would not only be unanswerable but would be accepted.

If the analysis of the political situation is pushed further, one remarkable fact appears. These books, which are all written by sociologists, all seem to neglect psychology. Studies such, for example, as *Subconscious Europe* and Dr. Glover's *Pacifism, Sadism and War*, in spite of being provisional, are profounder analyses than the books here reviewed, because they do attempt to penetrate down to this deeper layer of motive. All are agreed that we are seeing an abandonment of reason. Should we not, then, seek for the centre of the earthquake which undermines the reasoning mind in some urge that lies below reason?

The psychological interpretation of politics—in the particular case under review, the explanation that the abandonment of political liberty is due to men experiencing in them-

selves such a terrifying sense of being at a loss that they rush for safety to the protection of any authority which will claim to be infallible—that interpretation has been dismissed by sociologists because the Freudians have monopolised such social analysis. But the fact that the Freudian psychological interpretation has been shown to be inadequate to account for the present political situation does not mean that at a subconscious level there does not lie the real causes of our present discontents and that by psychology they may not be elucidated.

The case before us, for which we have to find an adequate cause, is an intense and sudden reversal of political evolution in Europe. To find that cause we must look in the years prior to that change for some profound alteration in man's outlook, some change sufficient to cause him to reverse his political advance. We have to ask, Did any change take place in nineteenth-century thought which could, after the due time required for ideas to penetrate into the subconscious, provoke such a profound misgiving and loss of nerve sufficient to account for the present retreat we are witnessing? For we must remind ourselves that, in spite of all the loud-speaking, what we are watching is not *au fond* an outburst of aggressiveness, dominance, enterprise, but of recessionary panic. The dictatorships are not the production of a sudden passion to explore and to open up a new age. They are indicative of a flight back to the smaller but less frightening past. The Moses' of to-day are chosen by their peoples, not to lead them on to a promised land, but back to a land of Goshen. Bluster as they may, they do not point to a vaster stage of world empire, but to the reservations for dying races, the close preserves for species near extinction. Their goal is not yet another New Rome, but Tibet.

A failure of nerve is, then, what we are witnessing. What cause was sufficient to bring about this reversal of the European mood from the high hope of last century to the paranoia of to-day? There is only one discovery of the nineteenth century sufficiently unsettling to account for the dismay of the twentieth. That discovery was the illusoriness of all progress, a discovery which gradually dawned on men's minds as they realised the meaning of Darwin's theory of Natural Selection. As Samuel Butler declared, with his practical sense of what things meant (a sense the specialist is generally denied), 'This has emptied Mind out of the Universe.' Darwin himself, detached from actual social work and responsibilities, could be unmoved. But Huxley, more in touch with life and a more philosophical thinker, realised that despair had been unloosed. His Romanes Lecture was a warning, a symptom which, sociologists should have realised, indicated an oncoming collapse of the alliance between thought and action. The long-delayed echoes to his cry at Oxford, 'Defy the Cosmic Process,' which seemed then to fall echoless on the thick curtains of contemporary comfort, crash round our ears to-day. 'Mussolini is always right'; 'We pray to our Hitler, "Give us this day our daily bread"'.—These insane attributions of infallibility to human beings are the reactions of minds to the realisation that science says the universe is mindless. It is no use to shun this relationship, as most rationalists have shunned it. We shall never understand the failure of reason and liberty—and so be able to restore them—if we do not realise why people have reason to fear reason and use their liberty to assert a desperate freedom by defying the findings of science. *Fiat justitia ruat cælum*; but if every time justice is

done the heavens do fall, then the survivors who creep out from under the wreck must begin to question whether the findings on which they based their ideas of justice were truly sound. Certain it is that after Darwin Natural Theology collapsed, and with it went the belief that there were to be found by reason, in the world around, sufficient sanctions for the ethical life of justice, reason, tolerance and freedom. From that hour Liberalism was doomed. It could no longer talk with conviction of aims and the Realm of Ends. Its only possible rational policy was now so to hope to increase means, so to heighten the standard of life, so to multiply material plenty, that men could be stupefied with physical satisfaction and thus forget that they had minds and cease to ask whether life and the universe had any meaning. It is not enough to say, as Lord Russell and Mr. Lippmann have said, that the distributory machinery has not worked as has the productive, and so the deluge of material goods which was to have drowned all questionings as to the purpose of existence only covered and suffocated the few: hence the continuing discontent of the many and their mistrust and desertion of the whole nineteenth-century system of thought. Fundamental discontent and doubt have been more active among the most thoughtful. There can be no doubt that it is this despair of nineteenth-century pure science which has at last come through and affected the action of the ordinary man. The best hope of a return of liberty lies in the fact that pure science to-day is less pessimistic, but we may not live long enough to see that new hopefulness percolate into the back of the minds of men of action and so restore freedom.

GERALD HEARD.

newspapers soon explained the significance of a revelation which had been overlooked by the editorial staffs of those journals in London.

Now, through various non-Jewish German channels, I have received copies of other documents that call for reflexion. After studying them carefully with the help of experts, I can find no serious reason to doubt their genuineness; and they bear so directly upon the safety of Great Britain and other countries that they ought not to be withheld from public knowledge. In the main they emanate from what is alleged to be a secret department of the German War Office, or *Reichswehrministerium*, and consist of communications between it and sundry German undertakings which are interested in the manufacture and development of aircraft and in methods of aerial warfare.

This secret department is called the L.G.A.—an abbreviation of '*Luft-Gas-Angriff*,' or 'Air Gas Attack.' There is also a department called L.G.V.—that is, '*Luft-Gas-Verteidigung*,' or 'Air Gas Defence.' But my information concerns chiefly the L.G.A.

The first document, which, though written on plain paper, bears official reference numbers and is dated from Berlin at the end of July 1932, is marked 'strictly secret,' and is signed with an illegible name above the words 'Colonel and Chief of the Department L.G.A.' It is a communication to an aeroplane firm and runs:

As you were informed some time ago, the gigantic French fortifications on our Western frontier make attack by infantry seem quite, and artillery attack almost, hopeless. Consequently there remains only the most intensive development and extension of the air weapon, in order that air warfare may be waged effectively and ruthlessly against important military and industrial centres and, above all, also against the civilian population of large cities.

Therefore the L.G.A. applied on June 22, 1932, to No. IX. (the number known to you from the list sent to you on June 2, 1932, of the collaborators and experts of the L.G.A.) and asked him for proposals or a memorandum setting forth how, in his opinion, attacks by air might in future be most effectively carried out.

Enclosed in photographic copy are extracts from his memorandum, received to-day, upon which you will please comment as quickly as possible.

The style of this document is not especially military—a circumstance which, did it stand alone, might be held to warrant suspicion. But the sequel tends to dispel doubt. The first page of the photographed extracts from No. IX.'s memorandum begins with an incomplete passage of which the full meaning is not quite

clear, since its opening words were apparently on the previous page that was not transmitted. The remainder of the passage runs:

in the necessary provision of raw materials by a simple transformation of the proper departments of large chemical undertakings, so as to produce Yellow Cross or compressed Yellow Cross, could easily be assured.

('Yellow Cross' is currently, though inaccurately, called mustard 'gas,' for 'Yellow Cross' is a liquid. Other German names for it are '*Senfgas*,' '*Lost*,' and '*Yperit*.')

Then follows the third section of No. IX.'s memorandum:

(b) PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS

The following procedure is proposed in order to test, in scientifically unexceptionable fashion, the conditions of raining down liquids containing chemicals or bacteria, as is desired by the L.G.A. and L.G.V. This procedure has the advantage of being extremely simple and cheap and at the same time of being practicable on the largest scale without enabling our civilian population or the secret agents of other Governments to notice anything. The idea came to me after recent conversations with No. V. at Cologne.

It is known that bacteriologists use the Micrococcus prodigiosus, which is called the bacillus of the 'Bleeding Wafer' by reason of its red colouring, to demonstrate to students of tuberculosis or similar maladies the danger of infection by tiny drops of saliva.

In these demonstrative experiments one simply mixes with saliva in the mouth small quantities of a—for human beings quite harmless—pure culture (of this bacillus), and gives one's lecture at various distances from sterilised culture plates. At the end of the lecture the plates are covered up and the germs are bred so that they may be shown to the students. From the number of the germ colonies that are found, conclusions can be drawn as to the quantity, range and trajectory of the little drops of saliva.

Since the Micrococcus prodigiosus is very rarely found in the air—according to the report from No. V. it hardly exists in the air, at least not under normal conditions—this fact would be very suitable for a test of the extremely complicated aero-dynamic effects to which—according to preliminary measurements undertaken by Nos. III., VII. and the undersigned—the raining down of liquids from aircraft at various heights is exposed. It is obvious how enormously important it is to clear up these questions in view of an effectively concentrated bacteriological or chemical attack by air.

If these bacilli could be successfully rained down from an aeroplane, with sufficient concentration, from various heights and in varying conditions of wind and weather, etc., and, as in the case of

the medical demonstrative experiments just mentioned, could be caught by culture plates on the ground, then one could study at one stroke,^a aero-dynamically and meteorologically, not only bacteriological but also chemical spraying.

The undersigned is not enough of a bacteriologist to be able to decide upon the suitability of the *Micrococcus prodigiosus* for these purposes. But he urges the staff of the L.G.A. to have this examined as soon as possible by a competent scientific collaborator, since, as has just been said, the wholly obscure questions of physics in relation to small drops might be solved to the greatest advantage of the L.G.A., and perhaps in a very simple way, by the 'bacteriological' procedure which the undersigned has planned.

The next extract also begins with an incomplete sentence :

'bring home to the Reichswehrministerium the reasons for our very notable superiority in comparison with the English and French technique of discharge (from aircraft)' (*Abwurftechnik*).

The extract continues :—

(c) MILITARILY IMPORTANT AERO-DYNAMIC INVESTIGATIONS
IN ENEMY COUNTRIES (*beim Feinde*).

In the paragraphs IVc. and d. (which are not among the extracts from No. IX.'s memorandum that have reached me) mention was made of the especial and, for us in the event of an enemy attack, decidedly more favourable conditions of the air currents in the Berlin and Hamburg underground railways, in relation to which a number of very important principles were discovered.

Quite as important, nay, much more important, would it be to investigate the conditions of air circulation in the Paris Métro and in the various London [underground railway] systems according to the Berlin scheme of measurements. Our knowledge of these conditions is still thoroughly inadequate.

The material upon measurements taken by secret agents and sent to the undersigned by the L.G.A. (reference Nos. Ic.1399/31; Ic.2144/31; Ib.1729/31 and Ic.88/32; Ib.135/32; Ic.438/32; 793/32; Ic.1207/32 from Paris; as well as Ic.1417/31; Ib.1332/31 and Ic.81/32; Ib.125/32; Ic.511/32; Ic.1301-07/32 from London) is still much too fragmentary and in part also lacking in objective^a exactness, as appears from the diagrammatic valuation. Therefore it is urgently necessary^a that the measuring instruments should be made more delicate and be simplified for agents in the way recently indicated (at the discussion in the Reichswehrministerium on June 16, 1932). This could best be done direct^a through Darmstadt, Dessau and Göttingen.

^a Italics in the original.

Nevertheless the undersigned is able to see from the figures before him that the L.G.A. scheme for the infection of large cities like Paris or London by distributing separate deposits of Yellow Cross [mustard gas] or bacilli in the systems of their underground railways ought, in the main, to be practicable. The ascertained, though doubtless abnormal, effects of the indraught of air at the entrances to many underground stations and stopping places are also very interesting (compare the measurements at the Pasteur, Montparnasse and, above all, Concorde stations in Paris, or in London at Leicester Square, Tottenham Court Road and especially Piccadilly Circus and Liverpool Street). These effects would greatly assist gas attacks by airmen upon these points, since spaces like the Place de la Concorde or Piccadilly Circus offer a typical picture from the air and are therefore very easy for an observer to spot.

The undersigned believes, therefore, that the bacteriological procedure indicated above would be of great utility in the preliminary aero-dynamic studies that are still necessary for the chemical or bacteriological infection of enemy underground railway systems.

The recipients of these two communications from the L.G.A. acknowledged and answered them only towards the middle of August 1932. They gave various reasons for the delay, one of them being that the very great importance of the questions raised in the memorandum written by No. IX. required a plenary sitting of all competent persons, some of whom were absent. They found No. IX.'s proposals 'very good' and raised no objection to an experimental 'raining' from the standpoint of technical aviation, since their aircraft, built mainly of duralium, were not susceptible to chemical influences. If desired, their aircraft could be specially varnished with bakelite, though this seemed hardly necessary. They thought the proposed method of testing the effects of raining down bacilli 'highly significant both theoretically and practically,' and urged that the needful bacteriological technique should be worked out. They enclosed diagrams of air currents, including some drawn up by the institute at Göttingen for various types of aircraft.

The next stage in the proceedings consists of a lengthy correspondence with the German War Office and the L.G.A. upon the results of experiments with a liquid culture of *Micrococcus prodigiosus* sent from Berlin in 60-litre carboys. At first these experiments failed. No colonies of bacilli grew upon the culture plates, in the preparation of which agar, a gelatinous Japanese seaweed, was used. But on January 27, 1933, the L.G.A. was delighted to find that various culture plates used in a laboratory experiment 'plainly showed colonies of the *Bacillus prodigiosus* after being kept thirty-six hours in a temperature of 25 degrees Centigrade.'

This was three days before the appointment of Herr Hitler to the German Chancellorship and the formation of his Administration. The dates of the previous correspondence, and the reference numbers mentioned by No. IX. in his memorandum, prove that the L.G.A. asked for No. IX.'s expert opinion during the von Papen Administration, and that air measurements in the Paris and London underground systems had already been made in 1931 during the Brüning Administration. But on February 3, 1933, the L.G.A. was requested by the firm which had been entrusted with the experiments to inform it of the composition of the liquid culture of *Bacillus prodigiosus* so that laboratory tests and experiments by aircraft could be more rapidly carried out. '*In the interest of national defence*,' the chief of the L.G.A. firmly declined this request on February 10. But before the end of February 1933, as a result of personal representations made in Berlin, the matter was laid before Herr Hitler himself and submitted to his decision. The chief of the L.G.A. could not foresee, '*in view of the strained political situation*,' what the decision would be or when it would be taken.

As a matter of fact, Herr Hitler gave his decision (in the affirmative) only on May 16, 1933—that is, on the eve of his famous Peace Speech in the Reichstag. When informing the experimenting firm of this decision, and enclosing the chemical formula for the composition of the liquid, the chief of the L.G.A. wrote :

Berlin, May 17, 1933.

In accordance with the decision signed by the Chancellor on May 16, 1933, which lies before us, your request of February 3, 1933, is hereby granted and the order of February 10, 1933 (reference No. IIc. 74/33) is revoked.

The composition of the solution, which you are hereby bound to keep strictly secret,³ you will see from the enclosure. It is, besides, especially necessary to note that you may neither make the culture plates yourselves nor breed upon [the germs] them, since this might easily attract the notice of the academically-educated members of your staff.

The chemical formula itself seems comparatively simple, and it may appear strange that so much care should have been taken to keep it secret, inasmuch as it is a very slight modification of formulas already known and published abroad as well as in Germany. Expert chemists assure me, however, that the modification is not quite so simple as it looks, and that many things look simple when once they have been discovered.

³ Italics in the original.

As long ago as 1899, an article by Edwin O. Jordan in No. 27 of the Chicago *Botanical Gazette* on 'The Production of Fluorescent Pigment by Bacteria' points to the value of various chemicals in developing this pigment; and volume 73 of the German *Archiv für Hygiene*, published in 1911, contains a report upon cultures of the *Micrococcus prodigiosus*. The report points out that this germ, when bred on slices of potato, regularly forms trimethylamine. The authors of the report, D. Ackermann and H. Schütze, suggested a composition in which 20 grammes of agar should be used. But, as the use of agar would have yielded a gelatinous liquid, the author of the L.G.A. formula substituted ingredients more suitable for the purpose in view. The obvious reason for the secrecy is that the L.G.A. was actuated by a comprehensible desire to prevent any hint of its schemes from reaching the uninitiated in Germany or elsewhere.

Soon after the experimenting firm had been informed of the chemical formula, a series of tests began. A civilian chemist, sent from Berlin, scraped, with a sterilised platinum blade, pure cultures of *Micrococcus prodigiosus* off potato slices and mixed these pure cultures with the chemical solution until it took on a rosy hue. Then he went back to Berlin, taking with him samples of the mixture so that the number of germs in each cubic centimetre might be accurately ascertained. Three days later he returned, and the mixture was rained down from an aeroplane flying at various heights between 5000 and 1000 metres, culture plates having been placed in suitable positions upon the flying field below. The culture plates were then taken to Berlin so that the results of the experiments might be secretly and exactly discovered.

The results appear to have been satisfactory. Before the end of July 1933 the chief of the L.G.A. in Berlin wrote urgently to the firm in question, enclosing a photographic copy of an extract from a further memorandum from No. IX. and asking the firm to express its opinions upon sundry technical points. One of these points was whether anybody had yet succeeded in calculating mathematically the initial velocity (of liquids) discharged from tubes of more than 1 centimetre diameter, or whether one of the firm's physicists had found, empirically, a workable formula. A very speedy answer was asked for, because thorough experiments on a large scale were contemplated in the course of August 1933.

The extract from No. IX.'s second memorandum consists of a long disquisition upon the velocity of drops of liquid falling through the air, together with a number of mathematical calculations and comparisons. But the beginning of the extract runs : '*As regards the experiments with the bacilli, the undersigned is glad to know that,*

in accordance with his advice, two experiments have already been made and have given encouraging results.' It seems, therefore, that the culture plates on the ground had caught enough of the bacilli rained down from the air to prove the procedure recommended by No. IX. to be practicable.

It appears, further, that No. IX. and the other scientific collaborators of the 'Air Gas Attack' Department of the German War Office had been studying the works of foreign meteorological authorities and had confirmed the well-known conclusion that drops of liquid cannot exceed a certain diameter and that the Stokes formula only applies to drops of small size. But, as No. IX. remarks, drops of this size are not desirable, for tactical reasons, in raining down Yellow Cross (mustard gas) liquid, because such small drops, as in the case of fog, fall very slowly. According to measurements taken by No. IX. and his collaborators, small drops of distilled water fell through the air only at a speed of 0.097 centimetre per second, whereas larger drops fell 585.4 centimetres in a second. The slow falling of the smallest drops would be tactically very disadvantageous. In sunshine they would evaporate rapidly before reaching the earth. The wind could easily blow them away from the spots aimed at, or a current of warm air could carry them up to great heights. This would enable the enemy, or a civilian population, calmly to reach places of safety. Therefore No. IX. strongly favoured drops of such a size as to fall with a maximum terminal velocity. As to the time taken by liquids of various specific gravities to run out of tubes of from 5 to 20 millimetres diameter, No. IX. observes that in this case the Toricelli law is valid, though only when tubes of 1 centimetre diameter at most are used, and on condition that the internal diameter of the tube is constant, and that the direction of the liquid stream is not changed by more than one bend in the tube. When the diameter is larger than 1 centimetre various factors combine to deform the stream and to make all calculation uncertain.

Coming then to experience gained by Germany in bomb-dropping during the war, No. IX. suggests that bombs containing about 100 kilogrammes of Yellow Cross (mustard gas) liquid might be used. As this liquid, technically pure, has a specific gravity of 1.26 at a temperature of 20 degrees Centigrade, 100 kilogrammes of it would fill roughly the space of 79.5 litres. To this quantity about 2½ litres of inert gas must be added so as to increase the constancy of the Yellow Cross liquid. Therefore the diameter of the bomb must be such as to allow for a volume of 82 litres in a cylinder 2 metres high.

This calculation gives a diameter of 11.4 centimetres. For reasons of safety the glass of the container ought to be at least

0.4 centimetre thick, for the thickness of only 0.25 centimetre, suggested by the L.G.A., might be dangerously thin. Thus the tare of the glass container, taking into account the difference of volume between two cylinders of 11.8 and 11.4 centimetres diameter, with a height of 2 metres, works out at about 15.4 kilogrammes. The emptying of a Yellow Cross bomb by raining down its contents would take about ten minutes through a round tube—that is to say, 132.5 cubic centimetres a second; but if other factors were taken into account it might be as much as 221 cubic centimetres a second.

No. IX.'s calculations were checked and tested by the research department of the firm in question, and, early in August 1933, were found to be accurate and in accordance with the observations of Lenard, the famous German physicist, upon rain drops. But, as regards the Toricelli law for tubes larger than 1 centimetre, experiments with water and benzine showed that this law has its limitations, and is totally inapplicable to tubes of more than 8 centimetres diameter. Mathematical treatment of the problem of discharging liquids through large tubes seemed almost hopeless, because the stream of liquid is narrowed by a number of factors and leads to irrational conclusions, as the Russian physicist, Professor Chwolson, has already pointed out. In any case, it would be far too dangerous to use any form of tank or reservoir for the liquid gas because of the stationary-wave effect that would be set up in a tank by atmospheric pressure and by the vibration of the motor and propeller. Further experiments were then undertaken to decide the best form of apparatus for the discharge either of pure Yellow Cross liquid or of bacteriological cultures. Once more, No. IX. produced suggestions comparable to the egg of Columbus. *'In technical matters one is often led, or forced, to follow very complicated paths, only to find one day a surprisingly simple solution of a problem.'*

These new proposals described apparatus for the discharge of Yellow Cross liquid from 'glass bombs' in aeroplanes, so that a bomb containing a unit of 79.5 kilogrammes of Yellow Cross (mustard gas) liquid could be emptied in ten minutes with or without pressure upon the contents. No. IX. lays down the further principles that his apparatus must be adaptable to every type of aeroplane, that there must be an emergency device to permit the whole bomb of Yellow Cross liquid to be dropped in case of need or in order to cover especially important points with great quantities of what he calls '*Haber's mortal product*' (*Tödllichkeitsprodukt*), and, by a high degree of concentration, to multiply its effects. It seems that the largest drops of Yellow Cross liquid—of which the specific gravity is higher than that of water—would fall to the ground at a speed of 8.4 metres a second.

In favourable meteorological conditions such drops could reach the earth in eight minutes from 4000 metres, in six minutes from 3000 metres, in four minutes from 2000 metres, and in two minutes from 1000 metres.

Soon afterwards, in October 1933, the L.G.A. drew up a list of plans for gas attacks upon a large number of towns and places in France. They included Diedenhofen (Thionville), Metz, Strasbourg, Mutzig, Belfort, Nancy, Briey, Verdun, Toul, Epinal, the inner city and the suburbs of Paris, Toulon, Marseilles, Lyons, Havre, Rouen, Caen, Nantes, Le Creuzot, St. Etienne, Roubaix and Tourcoing, besides eleven places in the Nord department and nine in the department of Meurthe and Moselle. The object of communicating these plans to the experimenting firm appears from a letter written by the chief of the L.G.A. towards the end of October 1933, in which the firm is requested to check the plans in relation to the prevailing air currents which had been theoretically assumed to be probable. The firm was asked to mark in red ink eventual errors in each 'gassing plan.'

Of even greater interest than these projects is a document which, at first sight, appeared incomprehensible. A double sheet of about foolscap size bore a series of numbered entries, the text being written, or rather scribbled, hastily in pencil. The paper showed clear marks of finger prints. The entries seem to have been made in the open air and the paper itself to have been laid or to have fallen on the ground, for it is distinctly dirty. It bears no date or signature, but, from internal evidence, was begun on August 18, 1933. Across the left top corner run the words—in the same handwriting as the text and underlined in red—'Please examine carefully and check by diagram.' There seemed little hope of making out what this document meant, for it consists entirely of German abbreviations and of figures. The opening lines may be given as a specimen:

'O. P. f. Vers. u. Koor. Conc. (ob.). -Mehrf. umf. -ca. 210 × 10¹²-.
Be. m. H. Pers; gen. 6 h sp. Strg. -2.47. p.m. -18.8.33.
Nr. 1: Pl. Rpq: ONOO; 3, 12 km: B 1-2; A. 8,75; nor.
neg.; s.g.ggt. K 4231.'

By careful expert study, with the help of a map of Paris, nearly all of the abbreviations and figures could nevertheless be made out. Not only does the deciphered text show how thoroughly the plans for air attack with bacteriological solutions or gas, or both, have been tested by German agents in Paris (and probably elsewhere), but it proves that the author of the document must have been acquainted with the proposals and calculations supplied by No. IX.

Though I cannot claim that the interpretation of this cryptic

document is exact in every particular, or that closer study by meteorological or other experts would not show some of the renderings to be doubtful, I may give an instance of the care with which it has been examined. The most comprehensible details of the first two lines are '6h' and '2.47 p.m. -18.8.33.' If '6h' be taken to mean 'six hours,' why should a German agent have used the letter 'h' instead of 'St.', an abbreviation of the word 'Stunden,' or 'hours'; and why should he have written '2.47 p.m.' instead of '2.47 N,' an abbreviation for the German word 'Nachmittag,' or 'afternoon'? The answer is that it is the established practice of German, as of other meteorologists and astronomers, to use Latin abbreviations in recording the times of observations, and that 'h' stands for 'hora' and 'p.m.' for 'post meridiem.'

Some knowledge of meteorology is, indeed, needed to comprehend the cryptic document, though its broad sense can be readily understood with reference to the Paris underground railway system, commonly called the 'Métro.' German agents took the Place de la Concorde as the central point of their operations and used the obelisk in the middle of it as their main point of co-ordination. At the north-east corner of the Place de la Concorde, where the Rue de Rivoli begins, there is an underground station from which lines run in several directions, one of them going north and east towards the Place de la République, another south-west in the direction of the Ecole Militaire, and another due south under the Seine to the Chamber of Deputies station on the left bank, near the end of the Boulevard St. Germain. The object of the experiments was to find out how many 'colonies' of *Micrococcus prodigiosus* would grow upon culture plates, placed in or near the entrances to various underground stations, after the Place de la Concorde, and apparently other places, had been sprayed with large numbers of these germs, and the germs themselves had been carried by the wind to the openings of the underground stations or sucked in by ventilators.

The interpretation of the two first lines of the report is as follows:

The Place de la Concorde is the zero point for tests and co-ordination of all measurements, the obelisk being the centre of the co-ordination point. The Place de la Concorde was driven round (*mehrfach umfahren*) several times, about 210 units, containing a billion (*Micrococcus prodigiosus*) germs each, were sprayed. Done with the help of assistants; and, exactly six hours later, the results were measured. The spraying itself took place at 2.47 p.m. on August 18, 1933.

Entry No. 1 deals with the results at the Place de la République station, 3.12 kilometres east-north-east of the obelisk on the Place de la Concorde. The measurements refer to the Beaufort scale of wind force (on which a report was issued by the Director

of the British Meteorological Office as an official paper, No. 180, London, 1906). Anemograph readings of wind velocity were also taken. The term '*negative*' is used to mean the direction of a wind blowing towards the point of co-ordination, and '*positive*' to mean a wind blowing away from the obelisk. Thus interpreted, entry No. 1 runs :

Result of the measurements at the Place de la République station in a direction east-north-east from the obelisk which is 3.12 kilometres distant. Wind, according to the Beaufort scale, 1—2, or an exact anemograph reading of 8.75 metres per second. In normal conditions of wind and with a wind blowing towards the point of co-ordination, conditions are very suitable, since 4231 colonies were counted on the plates.

The second entry refers to results at the Ecole Militaire station near the corner of the Avenue de Suffren and the Avenue de la Motte-Picquet. Its interpretation runs :

The point of measurement is the Ecole Militaire, especially at the junction of the Avenue Suffren and the Avenue de la Motte-Picquet, 2.2 kilometres south-west of the obelisk. Strength of the wind 2, according to the Beaufort scale, 12.33 metres per second as shown by anemograph. This position is only relatively suitable. Merely 313 colonies grew. The dissemination [of the germs] by air currents is feeble on account of the [open space of the] Champ de Mars. The wind was clearly positive, that is to say, was blowing away from the obelisk.

According to entry No. 3, the experiment near the underground station Porte Charenton was still less satisfactory. The agents may have been disturbed in their work or other circumstances may have been unfavourable. The interpretation runs :

Measurement at the underground station Porte Charenton. Result at a point opposite the Bois de Vincennes. South-easterly direction from the obelisk and 6.75 kilometres distant from it. Strength of wind, according to the Beaufort scale, 0—1. Anemograph 3.33 metres a second. Wind conditions normal. Four series of three plates each were used. Wind blowing away from obelisk. Result bad, the exposure was too short. Few or no colonies were found on the plates.

The fourth entry is likewise unsatisfactory because the work of measurement was disturbed. It refers to a run in a motor car from the underground station Solférino along the left bank of the Seine as far as the Place Valhubert. It says :

Drove in a car from the underground station Solférino along the Quai d'Orsay on the left bank of the Seine by way of the Quai Voltaire, Quai Malaquais and Quai St. Bernard. Stopped at the Place Valhubert and carried out a measurement at a spot almost opposite the Gare d'Orléans 3.9 kilometres in a bee line from the obelisk. The measurement was disturbed but the air suction was enormous.

The fifth experiment took place in the Allée de Longchamp and yielded poor results. The spot chosen was 300 metres from

the Porte Maillot station, west-north-west from the obelisk. The measurements were uncertain. Only 658 colonies were counted (on the culture plates). Nevertheless this point was thought '*perhaps suitable*.'

The sixth entry shows more encouraging results. This experiment was undertaken near the underground station Porte de Versailles, with reference also to the underground station on the Boulevard Pasteur, usually called '*Pasteur*.' The interpretation runs :

Point of measurement underground station Porte de Versailles, 7 p.m. Distance exactly 2.11 kilometres (perhaps by underground from the Pasteur station, which, in this experiment, served as a secondary point of co-ordination). Porte de Versailles very important because it is a terminus and leads to Pasteur. Wind conditions normal blowing towards obelisk. Very good result !!! 6738 colonies obtained.

In entry No. 7 the Pasteur station was (as in No. 6) a subsidiary point of co-ordination. It runs :

Another measurement in which Pasteur was again taken as point of co-ordination. Here the suction of the air was very strong. At the entrance the air was warm, and a wave of pressure was observed. The results of the measurements are marked on a special map. Wind conditions normal, blowing towards the obelisk from a south-westerly direction. The distance from the obelisk is shown on special map. 95,778 colonies were counted !!! The result was checked an hour later, and 91,389 colonies were counted.

The delight of the agent at the result of this experiment was such that he put three notes of exclamation after the number of germ colonies counted, and checked the result again an hour later.

Still better were the results of test No. 8 at the Chamber of Deputies station, 500 metres from the obelisk on the Place de la Concorde. This entry runs :

Point of measurement Chamber of Deputies station, 500 metres south of obelisk. Measurement inside the station. A flat wave of air pressure was observed. Opposite the entry is a very suitable place. Four series of three plates each, with a warm current of air, normal pressure, direction of wind towards the obelisk. 1,124,781 colonies grew because the point is so near to the obelisk. IX. is right !!! Strength of wind was 1—2, according to Beaufort scale, and 9.69 metres per second on anemograph. This inside result is annihilating !! Note particularly and repeat measurement.

The remainder of the document refers to further measurements taken on September 19, 1933, with reference to telegrams (? sent to Berlin) on July 14, August 4, and August 12. These measurements took place near the forts on the north, east and west of Paris, particularly at Corneilles, Montmorency, Domont, Ecouen-Stains, Garges, Vaujours, Paliseau and St. Cyr. The measurements in the south of Paris were to be taken subsequently.

Simultaneously with these measurements in Paris, experiments on a large scale were carried out in Berlin, apparently under the auspices of the L.G.A. itself. The results were submitted to the firm which had undertaken the original experiments with the *Micrococcus prodigiosus*, and it was asked by the L.G.A. to send in its comment with all speed, 'since weighty comparisons are to be made with the material on observations received from Paris and London.' It was suggested that the comment upon the Berlin results should be made personally in Berlin, and that special arrangements would be expedient for the protection of the person making them because the Secret State Police had recently noticed very lively activity among the secret agents of other Great Powers.

The centre of the Berlin experiments was the Tempelhof field. They were made towards the middle of August 1933, in the small hours of the morning. The Friedrichstrasse railway station was the central point of co-ordination. Subsidiary points were the flying fields at Johannisthal, Spandau and Staaken, besides a number of other centres, some of which were as far as 50 or 60 kilometres from Berlin. Upon the results of the Berlin experiments no figures or other indications are given.

CONCLUSION

From the facts which these German documents reveal, the conclusion seems warranted that the Air Gas Attack Department of the German War Office has been conducting experiments and measurements in Paris and London since 1931 for the purpose of ascertaining how the underground railway systems can best be infected with deadly germs or poison gas, or with both, whenever attack is thought expedient. The experiments in Berlin were doubtless intended to be at once a means of checking the results obtained in Paris and London and of making defensive arrangements in case of aerial attack upon Berlin.

In connexion with these bacteriological experiments it is a noteworthy coincidence that, very soon after the L.G.A. had received No. IX.'s first memorandum, at the end of July 1932, a writer in the *Militärwochenblatt* (the organ of the German General Staff) proclaimed (on August 18, 1932) the need for a new strategy of surprise which would be 'so crushing that the enemy will find it materially impossible to organise his defence.'

WICKHAM STEED.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Readers of this article will readily appreciate the fact that, for obvious reasons, Mr. Steed is unable to disclose his sources. We are forced to admit, therefore, that it is impossible to guarantee

by any direct method of verification the authenticity of the information it contains. But I have myself been privileged to examine the German documents from which the article has been put together, which contain much matter which Mr. Steed did not consider appropriate for publication. And, though in the nature of things anything like absolute certainty is ruled out, the weight of evidence contained in them leaves no doubt in my mind that the story they tell, if not true in every particular, is substantially accurate. Moreover, Mr. Steed has assured me that as much as possible of the scientific data contained in the documents has been checked by independent experts, who have reported nothing which in any way even remotely suggests that they are spurious.

That the whole story will be denied officially, of course goes without saying. Nor is it possible, in the circumstances, to produce a rejoinder which will prove the denial to be false. But official denials in matters of this type are common form all the world over, seeing that international decency demands that the secret plans of General Staffs should be discreetly veiled from the eyes of the public. That the German Ministry of Defence is the only Government department that has undertaken experiments of this nature may perhaps be regarded as improbable. In the unhappy state of the present world it is no doubt the duty of General Staffs to experiment in these terrible potentialities of modern warfare. Experiments with poison gas are perfectly legitimate, and indeed necessary for purposes of defence. But to carry out investigations of such sinister import in the capital of a friendly country is a very different matter, since it shows, beyond all possibility of doubt that the data they yield are intended, not for defence, but for aggression.

In deciding to take the risk of publication I have based myself upon the Italian proverb *se non è vero è ben trovato*. For even if the whole tale is a forgery, the fact that anyone should deem it worth while to perpetrate such an ingenious fraud is not without a sinister significance, which makes it all the more essential that ordinary citizens should realise the kind of horrors with which modern war is threatening them.

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WHY THE DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK?

THE desire to find a scapegoat, to discover 'the real villain of the piece' and blame our woes upon him, is a deep-seated human tendency. It is one which of recent years demagogues everywhere, whether of the Left, when painting a picture of the wicked Capitalist, or of the Right, in painting a still worse one of the Communist or Jew or Alien, have exploited to the full. One sees something of this same desire to 'find a villain' in explaining the deadlock of the Disarmament Conference. One very authoritative critic says we must find out 'which nation is for disarmament and which against; which is responsible for wrecking the Conference.' Other critics talk terrifyingly of the intrigues of armament manufacturers (and, indeed, it is not likely that, 'as business men,' they have been altogether inactive); of the activities of those who profit by the 'industries of death.' As soon, however, as we begin to examine with any detachment the case as presented by each participating nation, and allow to others the right to the same motives or fears which we invoke as justification for our own policy, we see immediately that any exact allotment of blame is impossible. We shall not get very far in understanding the inwardness of this failure, nor be in a position to profit by its lessons, until we direct our inquiries less to *who* is responsible and much more to *what* is responsible.

Anyone who has had occasion during the last few years to discuss the problem with the spokesmen of the various chief countries concerned can hardly fail to have been struck by the fact that each one says honestly and sincerely the same thing. Each says:

Surely you cannot honestly expect us to do more than we have done, until others show a readiness to do as much. We have cut our defences down to the extreme limit of safety; and while we have been reducing others have been steadily increasing. We can do no more. It is now the turn of others.

A British Cabinet Minister said last month that outside those bound to disarm by treaty 'we are the only nation who have reduced our armaments. Everywhere else we are faced with increased forces and increased preparations of a warlike

character.' A month or two earlier a popular and distinguished sailor said exactly the same thing. It would be quite easy to find almost exactly those words used by German, French, Italian, and American statesmen during the last year or so. Each finds it impossible to believe that the other can say it with sincerity. But it is none the less true that each does say it with sincerity, however mistaken each may be.

The thing is possible because we have all agreed that the key word in the discussion is to be 'Parity.' But parity is a mathematical impossibility, because exact equation of different forms of power simply cannot be calculated. During the discussion of naval parity with America the British at one juncture pointed out to the Americans that one proposed arrangement gave the latter more power in a certain category of ships. The Americans retorted: 'Yes, but look at your coaling stations!' How many coaling stations go to how many ships? Nobody has ever been able to say, and nobody ever will be able to say.

It was during that discussion that a still more elusive problem in the equation of the varying factors of national power came up. We had built a new type of 10,000-ton cruiser, mounting an 8-inch gun, which the Americans were disposed to imitate, and the problem was to establish how the power of the cruiser mounting a 6-inch gun compared with that mounting an 8-inch gun. The experts in Washington made an interesting discovery. In clear weather an 8-inch gun cruiser had undoubted superiority because it could outrange the other, but in foggy weather the 6-inch gun had superiority because, operating at close quarters, it could manœuvre more quickly.

Well now, [said the Americans] look at the greater frequency of fog on your side of the Atlantic. This gives your 6-inch gun cruisers a power comparable to 8-inch gun cruisers on this side of the water, where weather is apt to be clearer. We really must take that climatic factor into consideration in the allocation of units.

How much fog goes to how many cruisers? It prompted a senator in Washington at the time to say that among the factors we had to equate were 'fogs, bogs, and hogs.' A discussion along these lines could, of course, go on to the end of time. About the only purpose that it serves is to enable the expert of each nation to prove that, despite steadily enlarged budgets, his nation is really disgracefully under-armed because the other has more resources in fogs, or bogs, or hogs.

In a sense it is certainly true to say that all the great States have been in favour of disarmament and all have contributed to make it impossible. Each, that is, has favoured the disarmament of others—would be prepared for some degree of disarmament itself if that of others were deemed to be sufficient; and each has

imposed conditions that others are not ready to accept. The dominant lines of the picture are those which indicate the positions of Germany, France, and Great Britain.

Take, first, the position of Germany. After the war she was disarmed by compulsion on the general understanding that her disarmament would be the prelude to some equivalent disarmament of the victor nations. Provided that this condition were fulfilled, Germany has been perfectly prepared to stand by her present disarmament and to renounce any rearmament. Again and again she has declared her readiness to renounce any weapon of land, or sea, or air, which the Allies are themselves prepared to renounce, a disarmament proposal more complete than any made by any other State of Western Europe. All she asks is equality of rights and status. We all know that this equality cannot be permanently denied, and Britain has declared herself ready to accept the principle. So far the German position is not that of a criminal, and no one, in view of this, could fairly cast her for the rôle of the villain of the disarmament drama.

We come to France. France says she is prepared to accept equality, but it must be real equality; differences of population, notably, must be taken into account. To ask a France of less than 40,000,000, weakened by the tragic experiences of the war, experiences seared into the mind of every French man and woman alive, to weaken her relative position just at the moment when Germany (with a population in the future, it may be, twice that of France) has been carried off its feet by a wave of fanatical nationalism, is to ask the French to jeopardise the security they have made such sacrifices to obtain—to ignore fact, forget experience. However one may blame France for her failure to seize opportunities of compromise and adjustment with Germany, the position taken broadly by the French public, that France would not be safe with a Germany armed on the French scale, is one with which realistically minded folk would surely find it difficult to quarrel. Would we do more if we were in France's position—facing the fact of a Hitlerised Germany of vastly superior population, a Germany to which France has already made great concessions in the way of advancing the period of Rhineland evacuation? Yet, even so, France has not refused to disarm. She is prepared for a large measure of disarmament—has, though the strongest air Power in Europe, offered to scrap her air arm entirely if Britain will stand unequivocally for the collective system of defence, of common resistance to the war-maker, that is, and particularly, as the condition of general disarmament, stand for the complete internationalisation of civil aviation. France is ready to disarm in exchange for a 'collective system' which is a political reality. Whatever weight may be

given to certain aspects of the French policy (some of which will be dealt with presently), the attitude taken by France is hardly one which qualifies her for the rôle of the villain.

As to Great Britain, does anyone suggest that we did not, do not, desire disarmament? It is the British draft plan of October 1933 which seems, at the moment of writing, to hold the field. Britain has had to play the difficult rôle of broker between France and Germany and to try to obtain reconciliation of their views. Put broadly, the difficulty has been that concession from France sufficient to make a disarmament agreement with Germany feasible can only be obtained by giving France security guarantees, to which large sections of British opinion are opposed on the grounds that the guarantees of the Locarno Treaties are all that France can reasonably ask. Of which more presently.

If we are to appreciate at all the attitude of foreign nations towards our claim that we are the only nation that has done any disarming and now stand all but defenceless, there are certain facts which we ought to look at objectively. In 1913-14 the French standing army numbered approximately 890,000. In 1932 it numbered 552,000 (as late as 1925 it still numbered 730,000). One of the first acts of M. Herriot's Government in the summer of 1932 was to decree a further reduction of more than 50,000 men. Nor is that all. In 1913-14 close on 700,000 of the French had done one year's military training or more. To-day there are in France only 280,000 troops, and a considerable proportion of that number have only had six months' training or less. Germany's standing army (before Captain Goering had begun to rebuild its strength) had been reduced from 850,000 two-year conscripts (an army with vast reserves) to 100,000 twelve-year volunteers (*i.e.*, with no official reserves at all). This is a reduction, however reserves may be allowed for, at least five times as great as Britain has made. Russia's standing army was alleged in 1913-14 to number not less than 1,300,000 men. At the lowest computation it was not under 1,000,000. In 1932 it numbered 534,000, together with 61,000 others (O.G.P.U. and such) in 'formations organised on a military basis.' This is a reduction of 60 per cent.¹ Even Italy's army shows a considerable reduction compared to 1913-14, though no doubt it is offset by a large increase in voluntary military organisations. Czecho-Slovakia (a fair example of the new Central European States) had no army in 1913-14; but she has reduced the numbers of her land forces since 1925 by more than 10 per cent.

As to the French air force (which France on certain condi-

¹ For these figures I am indebted to the very authoritative work of Professor Noel-Baker, who, as secretary to the President of the Disarmament Conference, has been familiar with every development and detail.

tions is ready to scrap), it should be remembered that France has three air fronts in Europe, while we have one. In air forces it is *quality* and, above all, *speed* that counts. On June 28, 1931, the air correspondent of *The Times* declared that 'Great Britain, deficient in numbers as compared with other Great Powers, has gone far ahead of them in efficiency.' He further added that :

Put into general terms, the comparisons mean that the British military aeroplane is about thirty miles an hour faster than comparable machines in other countries . . . nor is it only in speed that improvement has been made. The new aeroplanes have remarkable powers of climb and manoeuvre.

It is very commonly stated that, even in respect of naval power, 'we alone have done any disarmament.' Foreigners do not quite see it that way. Germany, who was our great rival in 1914, and who was responsible by her Navy Law for the immense expansion of our Fleet from 1900 onwards, has had her navy reduced from approximately 1,100,000 tons to 140,000 tons. She has no battle fleet at all, no aircraft carriers, and no submarines. The Austro-Hungarian fleet—an important Mediterranean auxiliary to the German navy—has ceased to exist. The Russian fleet has virtually ceased to exist; it has no modern units of importance, and naval experts never take it into account. France and Italy are weaker relatively to Great Britain in all categories of ships than they were in 1914, with the exception of cruisers and submarines, and it must be remembered that France has six battleships, nine cruisers, and various destroyers, etc., which were in service before the war, while Italy's battleships and nine of her cruisers were launched before the war. There is no unit listed in the British Navy so old as these vessels, some of which sailors regard as 'scrap-iron.'

As to the United States and Japan, both made great increases in their forces during the war (increases made in order to assist us to defeat Germany). Their building developed into a Japanese-American competition during the years 1918-21. The danger which this involved for us, as well as for America and Japan, was averted by the Naval Disarmament Treaty of Washington, under which we established a definite ratio of relative strength with both the United States and Japan. The ratio with the United States (maintained by the London Treaty) was that of parity; as against Japan we obtained a superiority of 5 : 3. These ratios have never been exceeded by the United States or by Japan; indeed, in some categories of ships they are still well below their permitted levels.

The bargain has not proved to be a bad one for Britain. Professor Noel-Baker, as the result of his study of the comparative

strengths of the Great Powers in 1914 and 1934, comes to the conclusion that

- in battle fleets our superiority in Europe to-day is not only greater than it was in 1914, but is greater than it has ever been since modern navies were first constructed.

To that conclusion the British Navy man will retort that it is beside the point to talk of our position in Europe, because our naval problem is not a European one, but a world one, and that a nation's power must be judged in relation to the task which it has to perform.

This brings us near to the heart of the whole trouble. What constitutes 'armament adequate for defence'?—which throughout has been the basis of all the calculation. What we need for defence depends upon what will be brought against us in attack. If we have two ships and our enemy one, we are strong. If we have 200 and he has 300, we are weak. A degree of armament which would be quite adequate if we have to meet only one State becomes automatically quite inadequate if we have to meet several; a degree of armament which would be inadequate in meeting a given enemy single-handed might well be adequate if we had powerful allies in meeting him. The very terms 'adequate,' 'sufficient for defence,' 'safe,' 'fair' are quite meaningless unless we can make certain assumptions concerning the political situation they are designed to meet. Adequate to meet what enemy? To deal with what situation? Who do we assume to be with us and who against us?

These are very elementary considerations, of course, but they are vital, indispensable if the discussion of what is 'fair armament for defence' is to get anywhere. Yet these are precisely the questions with which the Conference deals only quite incidentally. In so far as they were raised in the discussions of security, Britain tended to adopt, as we know, a position of great aloofness, taking rather the line that, as she could not possibly increase her Continental commitments, she could not profitably enter into further discussion.

The major effort of the Conference has throughout been centred upon finding a formula of parity. It was indispensable, perhaps, to find such formula as a sign and symbol of equality of right. We managed to find it in the case of British and American naval power because both sides, in fact, recognised that parity was a purely subjective thing, and that the mere numerical equality in units did not in the least necessarily indicate equality of power. On grounds of national dignity, pride, prestige the formula is more important than the thing. But when you come to serious preoccupations of national defence (and fears con-

cerning national defence have been the dominating motives in the policy of the great States participating in the Conference), parity as a principle of policy is quite inadequate. (We did not really fear American naval power and Americans did not really fear ours. Parity was a pure matter of prestige on their part.) The fears of the respective great States concerning the danger to defence may have been fears created by interested parties—by the services, or armament makers or what not; it may well be that they were unexamined fears, unexamined in the sense that nations have not clearly asked themselves 'Suppose we do become weaker than a rival, what will he, what can he, do?' But plainly they were fears, whatever their origin, which the statesmen had to take into account. And parity does not really assuage them. First, because, as we have seen, you can never tell when you have got real parity of power, because precise equality is incalculable; and secondly, because, if you did get it, especially in the air (in place of abolition of air forces), it might well create the most dangerous of all situations, unless accompanied by political changes which do not come within the scope of the Conference. For note this: that, while everyone recognised that it would be impossible to evade giving Germany equality of *status*, everyone desired that France and Britain should in fact be left stronger than Germany after the first Disarmament Convention had been carried out. Germany was to have 'qualitative' but not 'quantitative' equality. The Germany of Dr. Brüning might have accepted that as an instalment, and it was wise to attempt to carry European appeasement a stage further by that means. Had the Germany of Brüning secured any real disarmament from the Allies, the Germany of Hitler might never have come into being. It is a tragic element in the story, that the offer which to-day we should probably be quite ready to make to Hitler, and which he would probably refuse, we were not ready to make to Brüning, who in 1932 might have accepted it, as an instalment that would have prevented developments which to-day add so enormously to our difficulties.

Britain's attitude towards qualitative disarmament—disarmament based on the distinction between weapons which are mainly for attack and those mainly for defence—has revealed curious oscillations. Early in 1932 there seemed very good hope of securing general abolition of most of the weapons forbidden to Germany, particularly in respect of the most important—air forces. At that time Germany, France, Russia, Italy and the United States, together with all the smaller Powers, stood for outright abolition. In April of that year Sir John Simon secured from the Conference acceptance of the resolution pledging the abolition of aggressive weapons, quoting in a speech which he

made a statement by Signor Grandi that the world knew what were the aggressive weapons, because the Versailles Treaty had abolished them for Germany. Having made that speech in Geneva, indicating, presumably, the British attitude, Sir John Simon returns to London and we hear nothing more of it for six weeks, when a speech is made on Britain's behalf at the Conference, not by a Minister this time, but by an admiral, who makes it clear that in the British Government's view there are no aggressive weapons at sea, and that the doctrine which Sir John had supported so eloquently six weeks previously was not to apply to the British Fleet. When, later, President Hoover put forward once more the proposal to make general the abolition of the arms forbidden to Germany, the British delegation resisted the proposal and put forward counter-proposals which destroyed it. Disarmament on the basis of general abolition of the arms forbidden to Germany was at an end.

We know, of course, that behind these hesitations are very grave considerations of national defence, and 'defence comes first.' But if we grant to others the right to apply the same principle of placing defence first (which we must) and the right to make the same type of reservation and qualification—grant to each the right to give himself the benefit of the doubt in estimating what extent of force on either side constitutes the incalculable and imponderable situation of 'parity'—then there is no mystery at all why a Disarmament Conference fails.

Armament competition arises from the measures which each State has in the past adopted for purposes of defence, and, it may well be, with no other purpose than defence, because those measures render nugatory exactly similar measures taken by some other. Solve the problem of effective national defence, and you solve the problem of disarmament. The problem of defence cannot be solved by ignoring it. Experience has clearly shown that we must grant at the outset the right of every nation to effective and adequate defence: no conference on any other assumption could possibly get anywhere. But in that case the very first problem to solve is to know how when two States like France and Germany confront one another each can be sufficiently strong to feel secure without making the other feel insecure. For the truth is that if a nation is to be really safe it ought to be stronger, decisively stronger, than any likely to attack it—as a British Cabinet Minister once proclaimed. But in that case, what becomes of the defence of that other? Is he to have none?

This is the first problem to solve before we can hope to get very far with disarmament. By what method can A. achieve defence without cancelling automatically that of B.? The dilemma is not just a piece of logic-chopping easily disposed of by

a little compromise and adjustment, but the tragic difficulty which the most astute statecraft has never for long been able to evade. It is at the root of the deadlock now produced—as it was at the root of the last war. That war arose, not because we or others had specific grievances against Germany, but because we, like other non-German States, felt that if Germany became much stronger we should, in any dispute with her, be at her mercy—in a position of complete defencelessness, with no means of effective resistance, no means of defending our national rights.

Note that defence consists not merely or generally in the defence of the national territory. Britain has had unnumbered wars since the Norman Conquest. They have all been fought in someone else's country. The fact does not condemn them as aggressive wars. They may well all have been defensive, but plainly not defensive of the nation's soil. They were defensive of its interests or rights. But if defence means being in a position effectively to defend your rights as against any who may challenge them, it means, in fact, being stronger than that potential challenger. Note, then, the position. Each State says in effect to its potential rival, as we felt that Germany before the war said in effect to us :

We demand power adequate for the defence of what we conceive to be our rights. That is to say, we demand to occupy such a position that when we get into a dispute with you and the question is whether you are right or we are right, we can always be judge and settle it. That is what we mean by defence.

We argued, quite justly, that for Germany to occupy such a position was to deprive us of all means of defence of *our* rights. If it is asked what we were defending when we declared war upon Germany, the short answer is that we were defending the right to have any defence at all. A position of defencelessness, we said, is one which no free people should ever be asked to occupy. So far we were right. We were less right when we added that we proposed to compel Germany to occupy that position.

Germany is refusing to occupy it. She points to the Treaty of Versailles—which she regards as the product of British naval power allied to French military power—as indicating the sort of fate reserved for those who make the mistake of being weaker than their rival. She proposes in no distant future to be stronger, to tear up that Treaty and make a new one. It will not be a better treaty than the present ; it will be a worse one, and thus even more in need of revision by its victims, who will, in going to war to change it, be fighting 'for right and justice.' They may well be fighting against injustice, but will also be fighting to replace one injustice by another ; will be fighting, not for their rights,

but for the right to be judge of what those rights are in a dispute with another. Which is a very different matter.

How does 'parity' meet that situation? The more passionately convinced is each party to the dispute that absolute right is on his side, the more will each feel justified in provoking a clash 'to remedy injustice.' Where there is clear preponderance of power on one side, the obviously inferior party just has to lump it. Peace is maintained at the price of justice. German military preponderance after the defeat of France in 1870 maintained peace for more than forty years. It is extremely doubtful whether France will be able to maintain her present preponderance for forty years, especially in view of new arms—the raiding aeroplane, plus poison gas and bacteria—in the creation of which the parties start, as it were, at scratch.

It is precisely in the new air arm, employed by two parties both convinced that they are right, each fearing injustice at the hands of the other, where parity, a nicely balanced equality of power, is likely to prove the most dangerous situation of all. For on certain points touching the employment of the aeroplane all experts are agreed. The points are :

(1) Given certain weather conditions, aeroplane attack cannot be repelled. (The *Aeroplane* states in a recent issue : 'A defence force that had any serious stopping effect would have to be so large that its cost in men and machines would be out of all proportion to its value.' A big proportion of the attackers will get through, whatever the defensive provisions.)

(2) Once delivered, an attack can be paralysing, aiming, as it would, at nerve centres—railways, ports, aerodromes, water reservoirs, factories, cities. Mr. Mollison says : 'A highly organised air power would probably succeed in reducing the enemy country to a state of utter chaos within twenty-four hours.' Which means that—

(3) Victory goes to the side that can get its blow in first by making it impossible for the victim effectively to retaliate.

The air arm creates a situation in which many might deal with one, but in which nice balance between two parties is a standing invitation to both to strike before the other can do so. It illustrates the inadequacy of 'parity' as a principle for securing disarmament.

It is not parity of power as between two disputants which is needed, but overwhelming preponderance of power (which can be measured where parity cannot) to restrain either party from using his force in order to impose his judgment of the dispute on the other. If there is preponderance of power behind a workable rule of international life (*e.g.*, peaceable settlement of disputes) broadly equal for both, then might is truly being put behind right instead of being used by one party to deny right (*i.e.*, the right of judgment each claims for himself) to the other. We can

avoid the fundamental dilemma of the old international anarchy by that method of 'collective defence,' mutual assistance, in resistance to the peace-breaker, which we were the first to propose in Europe, but which we have failed since to support with much consistency. Since the war we have always looked upon any increase of commitments as something devised for the protection of France at our expense—somewhat overlooking the fact that if France were overcome by Germany we should once more be faced by the precise situation which we confronted in 1914, and which brought us into the war. We then regarded France as 'our first line of defence.' Yet we fail to see now why France (after the watering down of our commitments under Article XVI. of the Covenant, which resulted from the interpretation put thereon at the Second Assembly of the League in 1921) does not regard our undertakings under the Locarno arrangements as adequate. Apart from the fact that it is almost impossible to say what our obligations really are under the Locarno agreements, we do know that the guarantees have reference only to the western frontiers of France. But in fact we do not protect either France against Germany or Germany against France by guaranteeing frontiers. Such guarantees do not solve the problem of national defence as we saw it in 1914 and as France sees it to-day. If Germany provokes war with France, or her allies, on grounds having no relation to the Rhine frontier and defeats France, we should certainly then be in no position to implement our Locarno guarantees, and, the state of belligerency having ended the treaties in any case, their terms in the subsequent settlement with France would be disregarded. What France needs and asks for, what the stability of Europe and an effective defence policy for Britain need, is not that we should guarantee this or that frontier, but that we should guarantee peace—guarantee, not that changes are not made, but that changes are not made by war, by the preponderant power of one party to the dispute, by one of the litigants acting as judge; guarantee the equal rights of both parties to impartial judgment, and, as an indispensable part of a peace system, guarantee the observance of disarmament (assuming we can get a convention at all) by co-operating in the withholding of armament materials if it is discovered that one of the parties to a convention is arming beyond its terms.

The essential difference between the French and British views in these undertakings is that the French believe in definite pre-commitment to a defined obligation, and we do not. Our position is, 'You can surely trust us to do the right thing. We always have done so when the time comes. We will "consult." We want, meantime, to keep our hands free.' But that is to

repeat the tragic error of 1914. Twenty nations were finally obliged to take the field against the peace-breaker. Most of them had no pre-commitment. We had no League or Locarno obligations in 1914. Our hands were free. Yet we, like others, were drawn in. Freedom from commitment did not keep us out, but it is as certain as anything well can be in human affairs that commitment *would* have kept us out. Had Germany known before 1914 that twenty States would be brought into the field against her as the result of the line of policy she was then pursuing, she would not have continued along that line and there would have been no war. The vast power of these twenty States that had finally to go to war had no deterrent effect on Germany, and could have no deterrent effect, because she did not know that they would oppose her. Germany did not even know a week before war occurred that Britain would be certain to join France. With that degree of uncertainty as to the purpose of power, how is it possible that it should have a deterrent effect upon aggression? The potential power of the anti-German combination was not a force for peace because the potential war-maker was unaware that the force would be brought against him.

But if the world is to create a system of collective or mutual defence to replace that of 'each for himself and the devil take the hindmost' which lies at the root of armament competition, it will not suffice to create a preponderant *bloc* which says to a rival *bloc*: 'If you do such and such, we will fight you.' It must also say: 'If you refrain from doing such and such, we will *not* fight you, but protect you.' If the potential criminal has reason to believe that he will incur punishment whether he obey the law or not, punishment ceases to be a deterrent. When the German Ambassador on the eve of war asked Sir Edward Grey, 'If we keep out of Belgium will you keep out of the war?' Sir Edward was unable to reply 'Yes,' which enabled the German militarists to say: 'We shall face the opposition of Britain whether we go through Belgium or not.' Our force failed to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality. Grey saw, also, when the juggernaut was upon us, that he could not reasonably ask Germany to stop mobilising unless we were prepared to do our part in restraining Russia from mobilising (by withdrawing our alliance if she continued so to do). In other words, we had to offer not only coercion to Germany if she violated the law, but protection if she observed it—protection from our own allies, if need be. Our force had to be pledged first to the law, not the litigant.

The old alliances were not on those conditions and did not have that purpose. A new world-wide grouping of States opposed to Germany and Japan is now forming. If the purpose of such group is merely to promote the interests of its members in opposi-

tion to the interests of Germany and Japan, it will fail to keep the peace and disarmament will fail. If the purpose of the new grouping is to ensure to its members the right to peaceable settlement of disputes, to defend the member prepared to arbitrate and restrain the peace-breaker who is not, it can offer the same right of protection to both Germany and Japan and invite their membership. To such collective defence we shall have to come if disarmament and peace are ever to be achieved.

NORMAN ANGELL.

NATIONAL OR CONSERVATIVE?

IN the January number of this Review ¹ I ventured to discuss the prospects of the Conservative Party. Since that time the topic has been enriched by a suggestion, coming from no less a source than the Conservative Attorney-General, that the Conservative Party should have no further prospects as such, but should commit suicide and merge into a new party to be called the National Party and to include all the existing political factions at present supporting the Government. It is not unnatural that this suggestion has raised a good deal of discussion within the ranks of the party thus condemned to an untimely end, or that the discussion should have given rise to some interesting divergencies of opinion.

The most remarkable feature of the discussion is the wide measure of support that this suggestion has received. Most striking of all was the recent manifesto, signed by not less than a hundred private members of Parliament, which if not supporting the proposal as immediately practicable, at least indicated that it is upon the long view the ideal solution of the present political situation. This manifesto is the more remarkable because the correspondence in the Press which followed, quite clearly shows that even within Parliament the body of Conservative opinion in agreement with it is by no means limited to the actual signatories. It is perhaps worth while, therefore, to analyse the situation which has led to this interesting conclusion.

The present situation within the Conservative Party is interesting. For the first time for many years effective political bodies have appeared outside the Conservative Party and to the right of it, and the influence of these bodies within the party itself has not been small. Attempts have been made at various times since the war to create movements of this kind. Hitherto they had been associated with the names of three newspaper magnates, two living and one deceased, and by this time the technique of their creation is fairly well known. An embittered attack in the controlled newspapers was followed by a bye-election campaign in which a candidate of few abilities, and

¹ 'The Prospects of the Conservative Party.'

sometimes of dubious antecedents, was secured to fight as Anti-Waste, or Empire Free Trade, or Independent Conservative, or in which support was given to a candidate already in the field but prepared to advocate a policy more or less in line with the newspaper attack. This method of campaign often succeeded well enough in causing trouble to official Conservatism, but it had its serious limitations. In the first place, it lacked an effective permanent political organisation, and, in the second place, the sphere of activity was almost entirely limited to the radius of influence enjoyed by the London evening newspapers. There was another feature which deserves consideration, and which had its effect in discrediting manoeuvres of this kind with genuine Conservatives. The candidate selected, owing to one or other of the two limiting factors noticed above, had never a chance of ultimate success, and the net result of his activities (with the single exception of the St. George's bye-election) was to make more likely the return of a Socialist representative to Westminster.

Nevertheless, this guerilla Press warfare did make Conservative leaders more sensitive to criticism from the extreme right than they otherwise would have been, while the effect of these campaigns upon the prestige of the Conservative Party with the general public was undoubtedly to create the impression that the party was led by weak men and place-seekers, who habitually compromised with their political opinions and sold their supporters into the hands of their opponents. To-day there are, apart from the Empire Crusaders, at least two important Right-Wing bodies outside the Conservative organisation—Sir Oswald Mosley's Fascists and a movement of which Lord Lloyd (but wrongly it seems) is thought to be the leader, called the British Movement.

Sir Oswald Mosley's Fascists are in some ways the inheritors of the 'anti-waste' and newspaper candidates. They have the support of one of the newspaper magnates involved. Within the London area their criticisms of official Conservatives are almost indistinguishable from those of their predecessors, and within that area undoubtedly they appeal to exactly the same class of elector. They are, however, in a sense at least more powerful, for they are not subject to the old limitations. They have an effective permanent organisation, and they are not limited in their activities to the London area, although it has been suggested that the support of Lord Rothermere has been bought at the price of a serious divergence of opinion between the northern and the southern branches of the party, the northern branches looking for their support to the unemployed, whether of middle or working class origin, and the southern, by reason of the limitations imposed on their propaganda by the decided views of their distinguished patron, drawing their support almost entirely

from disgruntled Conservatives. They certainly have this in common with the old newspaper candidates—that their effect upon the Conservative Party has been wholly bad. Right-Wing Conservatism of the wrong kind has been alarmed by Fascist defection into dangerous activity, and Fascist criticism has (oddly enough) had the effect upon the uneducated public of making some of them believe that the true Conservative principles are really identical with Fascist principles, if only Conservative leaders did not compromise and hedge, as they are always supposed to do. It is to be anticipated that in southern England the Fascists will run political candidates with exactly the same object as the old newspaper candidates (the prevention of a Conservative victory even at the cost of a Socialist success), and these candidates may meet with a similar measure of support.

The other extra-Conservative Right-Wing body, the British Movement, is too young as yet to have given a certain indication of its future. It has the advantages of not charging any subscription at all for membership (a fact which leads the curious to interesting reflexions about the possible source of its finance), and of a vigorous and able young chairman in Mr. Duncan Sandys. At the moment its membership is largely confined to active members of the Tory Party, and there is nothing in its published literature to which even the most enthusiastic Conservative could object. Whether, however, it will in practice lead to a revival of a vigorous Tory democracy within the Conservative ranks, or simply operate as an added difficulty in the way of Conservative statesmanship by providing yet another means of making the position of Conservative leaders intolerable without affording the basis of any new electoral success, remains to be seen. At the moment the new movement is definitely to be ranked with the critics of the Government, and, although it has been surprisingly successful in attracting members, has absolutely no influence with the general electorate. (It has been less than three months in existence.)

Upon the whole, the effect of these two bodies upon Conservative opinion has been to make it move away from the National Government and therefore away from the Attorney-General's proposal. Conservatives are now becoming afraid, for the first time since the war, of losing their Right-Wing supporters. Nevertheless, opinions are divided into three groups, none of them absolutely clear-cut, but each sufficiently distinguishable to permit of some generalisation.

The most clear-cut of all are the few (exactly how many the outsider does not know) adherents of Mr. Winston Churchill. These may be properly described as the Conservative Opposition. To them, national government has always been an evil, and is

now an unnecessary evil. The *Saturday Review* (to some extent the organ of this faction) recently expressed their complaint—'the people did NOT vote for a National Government.' They are clearly marked off from the rest of the party by their unwavering opposition to the White Paper proposals for Indian constitutional reform. They know that with the present National Government in office there is small prospect of defeating the proposals. Therefore they desire to destroy the National Government. This body of opinion necessarily must regard Sir Thomas Inskip's proposals as anathema. It is difficult enough for its adherents to attempt to control the Conservative Party. To control a National Party which, presumably, would have to admit Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Lord Elton, and the rest into the sanctity of the Carlton Club would be for all practical purposes an impossibility. To admit of Sir Thomas's proposal in any shape or form would, therefore, be an act of self-condemnation to a permanent condition of political impotence as well as to guarantee the continuance of the present coalition, which *ex hypothesi* is wholly undesirable. Fortunately, however, or unfortunately, the opinions of this body of Conservatives are not so important, and their numbers are not sufficient to cause undue alarm. It is becoming sufficiently obvious to the holders of extreme reactionary views about politics that there is no hope of convincing the electorate of their desirability. The result is that holders of those views are faced with an unpleasant dilemma. Either they must abandon their opinions, at least in part, and appear to the world in as moderate a garb as they can assume (many do this), or else they must abandon democracy, and therefore leave the Conservative Party and destroy it as surely as Sir Thomas Inskip would do. The question 'National or Conservative?' is one which will primarily be fought, not as between the supporters of the National Government and its opponents, but between rival factions of those who at the present desire its continuance.

A second body of Conservative opinion also hostile to merger has been forming steadily in the past few months. While this body has always regarded national government as a temporary expedient, it has continued and continues to support the National Government, although it does so with a growing reluctance. This reluctance is due to a disappointment with its actual measures, and to a growing mistrust of its electoral prospects. There can be no doubt of the fact (whatever the reason for it may be) that the National Government has suffered severely in prestige during the past few months, and that the Budget, which might reasonably have been expected to restore it, has apparently failed to do so. It is not altogether correct to put down this loss of prestige wholly to sins of omission. In the eyes of Conserva-

tives, at any rate, a great deal of what the Government has done has contributed as much to the result as anything that it has failed to do. It is a mistake to suppose that intelligent criticism of the National Government has come entirely, or even mainly, from the Left. Much that has been most damaging has been in connexion with proposals which are not within the ordinary sphere of party politics at all, and consists in criticisms which come perhaps more naturally from a Conservative than from a Socialist standpoint. There is no doubt, for instance, that criticism of the Disaffection Bill comes more appositely from Sir William Holdsworth than from the *New Statesman* (a journal which recently urged an increased class consciousness on the B.B.C.) or Sir Stafford Cripps (with whom the armed forces are a 'problem' to be 'dealt with,' and who is reported as saying in a recent speech that he himself, when in power, would stamp out disaffection in the armed forces with a ruthless hand).

The truth is that while the Government is being compelled to take some measures (for instance, some move towards rearmament) which are hardly likely to increase the support it receives from the Left, at the same time its social and economic programme, which might easily, if properly managed, attain the popularity that is often the reward of Tory democracy, is rapidly alienating even progressive Conservative opinion. Mr. Elliot, to give an outstanding example, is rapidly getting into very deep water. The effect of his schemes in putting up the price of some of the commodities concerned has not endeared him to urban democracy. Conservative principle, which is thoroughly sympathetic to an attempt to benefit the British farmer, is alarmed at the way in which he appears to be developing towards economic 'little Englandry' from the more spacious lines of Ottawa. The farmers (which is most unjust) are too stupid to understand that they are likely to gain from the restrictions which are being imposed upon them, and do not appear to be in the least grateful for his activities.

The Betting Bill (which contains several measures of genuine social value) is also unpopular. The restrictions on greyhound racing, however necessary, are, from an electoral point of view, suicidal. The racing public is traditionally and effectively Conservative in politics, and an attempt by a Conservative Government to regulate betting does, of necessity, an amount of harm to the Conservative cause quite disproportionate to the importance of the results obtained. The effective prevention of big prizes in lotteries which is proposed (and probably rightly) causes the most sinister accusations of class legislation to be sincerely believed. Those who remember the 1929 election will

recall the quite surprising resentment created by a decision of the courts that the big £20,000 football competitions (which were then the rage) were illegal. Now that what is complained of can be ascribed with justice directly to the Executive, the cry 'They don't want the workers to win the big prizes,' surprising as it may seem to an educated mind, will have a good deal of force in determining the opinion of the electorate, and it is, it should be remembered, a criticism of Government policy with which a good many Conservatives (of the anti-restriction type) will have a good deal of sympathy. In the meantime, the respect of the motoring public (another Conservative body) has been largely forfeited by the proposal to reimpose a 30 miles an hour speed limit in built-up areas, the sticklers for the Constitution are offended by the Disaffection Bill, and the Nonconformists, who might otherwise have been quite pleased at what was being done, are thoroughly and stupidly alarmed at the measures of rearmament (which Conservative critics are induced to think insufficient). Consequently there is a good deal to be said from a moderate Conservative standpoint for a more vigorous Conservative policy which would make no effort to conciliate Left-Wing opinion, but would consolidate all the Conservative elements in the community in enthusiastic support, especially should such a policy be combined with a more forward industrial programme to get the support of the northern areas.

On the other hand, there is no reason whatever to suppose that freedom from its National allies would enable the Conservative Party to pursue such a policy. Whatever mistakes have been made, have been made by precisely those members of the Government who must lead the Tory Party of the future. It is quite unthinkable that the Tory Party should succeed in the next ten years in winning office without Mr. Oliver Stanley, Sir Donald Somervell, or Mr. Walter Elliot being amongst its leaders, and, as these are precisely the Ministers against whom criticism is most directed, it follows that the Conservatives cannot get rid of the responsibility for the unpopular measures of the last two months by the simple expedient of abandoning those primarily responsible. It follows, also, that nothing is to be gained, even from a purely Conservative stand-point, by abandoning at present the National connexion, as the only conceivable advantage, the achievement of a more vigorous Conservative programme, would not in fact be obtained as the result of it; and this reflexion leads one to consider the importance of a third group of Conservative opinion, probably numerically more important than the first but less than the second, to whom the National Government is not an evil, but an experiment which, it is to be hoped, will outlive its inventors. To such as accept this position, at any

rate, it may seem that Sir Thomas Inskip's suggestion might have some point in it after all.

It is, of course, fatally easy to be too shocked at the suggestion. It will not be the first time the Conservative Party has swallowed several smaller groups by the addition of a new name to its organisation. There are many people now alive who were born before the addition of the word 'Unionist' to the Conservative title, and to suggest that a process so closely analogous to that which gave the Chamberlains to the Tory Party is anything like treachery to the Tory tradition is to strain the credulity of the Conservative voter. Even though the proposed changes be unobjectionable in principle, however, it remains to consider whether anything is to be gained by the proposed alteration, either in electoral advantage or in the composition or the policy of the party, and either in the immediate future or in the further distance, and it is important, as the signatories to the manifesto already referred to have pointed out, to observe at the outset that there is nothing inconsistent with the continuation of the National Government in a rejection of the scheme for amalgamation. The National Government has got along very well without it for a period of two years, and it is hardly likely that its continued existence hangs entirely by the thread of a change of name. The manifesto, however, rejects the plan of immediate merger, and it is perfectly possible to name at least two serious disadvantages which a precipitancy would involve. In the first place, it is surely obvious that the National Labour and Liberal National supporters of the Government are valuable electoral assets under their existing denominations. In the second place, in the Conservative ranks there can be no doubt that the move would be regarded with suspicion. The representation of the Conservative Party within the ranks of the Government is already considerably below the proportion that the numbers and the ability of the Conservative members of the two Houses would entitle them to expect. It may be that the future of Conservatism lies through, and not away from, national government. It may also be that the continued alliance with the Conservatives of the better elements in the other two parties will be of great advantage both to the party and the country. It remains, however, perfectly certain that the dominant element in the partnership should be and must be the Conservative element, and, inasmuch as the proposed merger would in fact turn out to be a means of increasing the number of the non-Conservative elements without increasing their electoral value, the merger would at the moment tend to disunion and discontent rather than to renewed vigour, and the serious dissatisfaction which exists within the party would do nothing to diminish this.

As matters stand at the moment, therefore, the Attorney-General's proposal is unpracticable. The Conservatives would probably do well to fight as they are, under their own party label, with or without the prefix 'National.' Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the National Labour and Liberal National elements in the Government house would have no chance of success if they could not depend upon Conservative support. For reasons I have indicated in the earlier article already referred to, it is probable that their continued existence in the Government is desirable, and it may be, therefore, that in the case of constituencies where these are standing it is also desirable to have some immediate fusion of organisations to include all the members of the Government *bloc*. As there is no reason in principle why this should not take place, to this limited extent the Attorney-General's proposal may prove of some practical advantage within the next twelve months.

At the same time, it may be asked if the proposal for merger is worse than premature. Both the present arrangement (whereby Conservative local associations provide the means and organisation to secure the election of non-Conservative candidates) and such an arrangement as I have envisaged (whereby a Conservative central office would supply the means and organisation for non-Conservative local organisations) are simply temporary expedients. Sooner or later the party will have to face the issue, and the issue will be a choice between three possibilities. Either the non-Conservative supporters of the Government will have to swallow their pride and become plain Conservative members and candidates (which is surely most unlikely), or else the coalition will be broken up, and the Liberal Nationals and National Socialists will be left to find other political alliances (probably with the remains of the Liberal Party), or else a new National Party would have to be formed upon the lines indicated in the Attorney-General's speech. In practice the choice will be found to be with the two latter expedients, and it is between these that the chances must be weighed. There will be disadvantages in either scale. If merger be chosen, the Conservatives will have to face the possibility of a defection on the part of their Right-Wing members. On the other hand, a refusal to merge would involve the loss of a number of intelligent and able people whose support can ill be spared.

The manifesto, however, indicates that in the long run the party will decide in favour of merger in some form or other. It is extremely doubtful how far the defection of the Right-Wing Conservatives would ever become a reality. There is no *Stahlhelm* movement in this country, and they are likely to find the Fascists strange bed-fellows—a fact which would scarcely seem to require

pointing out after the disgraceful incidents at the recent Fascist meeting at Olympia. There is no indication that a Right-Wing Conservatism would find much electoral support. Upon the other hand, the value of the Liberal and Socialist elements in the Government as electoral assets is probably greater than their numbers or their actual influence would warrant. Experience since the war has shown that Conservatism is nearly always certain to secure a victory at the polls provided that in the circumstances of the moment it can appeal to that portion of the public who, but for the demise of the Liberal Party, would probably be Liberal. It is precisely to that portion of the public that the presence of Mr. Runciman, Sir John Simon, Mr. Hore Belisha, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, and the like makes a direct appeal. Moreover, the presence of new blood can hardly fail to exercise a good influence on the Tory Party. Once again the analogy of the Unionist movement proves seductive. One can hardly doubt that the palmiest days of modern Conservatism were the days immediately after the admission of Liberal elements into the Conservative fold. It might well be that history (as so often in English party politics) would repeat itself, provided that the conditions necessary to unify the party and precipitate the merger were created.

It is not enough that the coalescing elements should have in common a certain vague dread of Socialism, especially at a time when Socialism is constantly changing and redefining its own objects. What is wanted is a common programme, and an occasion for union in the shape of a pressing danger. It is not unlikely that the occasion will present itself in the event of the rise to power of Sir Stafford Cripps and the Socialist League. This body has been careful to keep within the pale of the Labour Party, while supporting a programme which that party has refused to accept. It has done so (wisely) with the avowed intention of capturing the Labour machine, knowing that without the support of that machine it will become impossible to secure a greater measure of support than the Independent Labour Party. It is by no means impossible that the plan will prove successful, for (if only from the complete lack of leadership and ability among the older men) the Socialist League is gaining ground among the younger members of the party. Should this occur there can be little doubt that Sir Thomas Inskip's proposal would become an immediate reality.

The programme of the New Party would not be far to seek. For the past ten years the country has fairly clearly desired the achievement of certain objects, but, owing to the peculiarities of party government, has not been able to obtain any of these except at the cost of abandoning the rest. This has perhaps been the

main cause of the senseless change of Administrations during the period in question. The country has desired: (1) Adequate housing and slum-clearance schemes. (2) Orthodox finance. (3) Adequate armed protection. (4) Freedom from further obligations to fight. (5) A Labour charter and a tenants' charter giving some certainty to the conditions of life among the working classes and a freedom from the capricious tyranny of a week's notice. (6) The retention of the parliamentary system.

There is nothing inconsistent in these various *desiderata*, and it is amazing that there is no party at the moment capable of offering all of them. Should one arise, it would be likely to retain control of the country for half a generation.

QUINTIN HOGG.

THE EUROPEAN KALEIDOSCOPE

A SCORE of years ago this very month the war clouds were rolling up over Europe. Journalists, like harbingers of disaster, were dashing from one European capital to another; the telegraph wires between the Chancelleries were overburdened; heads of States appealed to each other; but nothing could avert the onrush of the storm. Almost twenty years ago to a day, as I write, the late Lord Grey sat in his garden one evening and sadly remarked: 'The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.' The storm broke a few weeks later, and the foundations of the deep were opened up on a continent—on an entire world—which for ten years previously had been enmeshed in a network of alliances, all cast for one purpose—war.

Yet now, twenty years afterwards, after the high hopes set upon the League of Nations and upon a peace which was 'to make the world safe for democracy,' there is, apparently, not much of a League left; there is only the absence of actual war in Europe in place of a stablished peace,¹ and there is precious little democracy left in the whole wide world. Perhaps that is why there is no real peace; why an era of Cæsarism, as Spengler calls it,² must extol the virtues of war; why the League of Nations is now rent by defecting States-members, by political alliances of a pre-war order within it, and by reinsurance alliances and *blocs* of the same order between its own members and outside Powers. What disastrous causes have stultified the high hopes of 1919, and made of European peace no more than a pious aspiration amid resurgent war-clouds?

The causes of the present state of Europe can be traced to the genesis of the Peace Treaties and of the League itself. They derive from two simple propositions, as ineluctably as the conclusion of a syllogism. First, no peace treaty by itself can establish perpetual peace if it makes no provision for modifications in the territorial and other settlements it contains. Secondly,

¹ *Pax enim belli non privatio est.*—SPINOZA.

² Cf. the speeches of the German Vice-Chancellor von Papen at Münster on May 13, 1933, and of Signor Mussolini at Rome on May 26, 1934.

Articles V. (requiring a unanimous vote on the Council) and X. (whereby members of the League 'undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members') rendered fruitless Article XIX. (providing for revision of the Treaties) and made of the League virtually a League to maintain the Versailles settlement of Europe. This conclusion has been consistently sought, ever since 1919, by France: first, with her allies—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia; secondly, with her insistence upon extra guarantees of 'security' before any measure of disarmament could be secured, which the League Covenant specifically envisaged, and before any measure of rearmament could be permitted to Germany. The conclusion—namely, that the League's hand would be 'called'—has only emerged in the last twelve months or so; for in that period the corporate efficacy of the League in the face of Japanese aggression in Manchuria has broken down, and Japan has quitted the League; and, more recently, Germany, convinced that either the League or France did not mean business over the moral pledge to disarm, has also quitted the League and begun to rearm. The Disarmament Conference has been rendered well-nigh abortive by M. Barthou's intransigence over France's 'right to security' in the face of German rearmament. The French President and Cabinet have unanimously confirmed his stand. And, in spite of a face-saving resolution couched in terms which may please everybody and therefore commit nobody to any real achievements, the disarmament game stands at stalemate. In precisely the same *impasse* stands the entire collective security system so laboriously built up since the world war. Like a pair of Luthers, Herr Hitler and M. Barthou face each other across Europe, crying each to the other: 'Here I stand. I can go no farther.'

Nor, unhappily, is this all. Ever since March of 1933, when the National-Socialist revolution engulfed what was left of a democratic Germany, the avowed foreign policy of Nazi officials and writers has fastened upon the whole of Europe a perfect frenzy for 'security,' which bids fair to engulf Europe in war quicker than anything else. In their first intoxicating flush of ardour for the third—and greatest—*Reich*, the Nazi prophets heeded their traditional gods—Odin, Thor, and Wotan; and they raised their voices to some purpose. Nazi Germany's mission was to bring together all Germans into one vast Third *Reich* which would stretch from the north of Sweden as far south as Transylvania, and from the territory of the Flemings in the west to the plains of the Don in the east. Scandinavia, Holland, parts of Belgium and Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, the Ukraine—all these were

to be swallowed up in one huge Nazi confederation. Such a Continental hegemony had hardly been dreamed of since Charlemagne—not even by Napoleon himself. None would dare dispute with the pure Aryan, 'Nordic,' Nazi masters of Europe the hegemony of the world, except, perhaps, Japan. It was an intoxicating conception, indeed. But it was published. That caused all the trouble. Herr Hugenberg's unfortunate (and subsequently disavowed) memorandum at the London Economic Conference in July 1933, in which he referred to Germany's need to colonise 'the undeveloped East,' was followed up by Herr Rosenberg, the Nazi official 'adviser on foreign affairs,' whose notorious 'Rosenberg plan' for German expansion became quickly known.

Thereupon the fat was in the fire, and every Continental Power with it. The vexed question of Nazi interference in Austria to effect the *Anschluss* took on a more sinister aspect when Nazi—or para-Nazi—parties emerged in Belgium, Holland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Hungary. A Prime Minister was assassinated in Roumania by adherents of such a party. The Polish Minister of the Interior met a similar fate. *Coups d'état* were either forestalled or carried out in the three Baltic States. Chancellor Dollfuss put down the Social-Democrat workers of Austria by blood and iron, and was forced to come to terms with the Fascist *Heimwehr* and inaugurate a Fascist corporate State, to outflank the German Nazis. But the *Heimwehr* proved to be in touch with the Nazis of Berlin. Poland came to terms with Nazi Germany, signed a non-aggression pact, and appeared to defect from her fifteen-year alliance with France. Bulgaria seceded from the Italian orbit as the result of a *coup d'état*, and proceeded to come to terms with her inveterate antagonist Yugoslavia, thus to all intents and purposes entering the French 'camp.' Roumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, *mirabile dictu*, concluded a Balkan pact of a mutually defensive nature, but containing a secret protocol envisaging concerted force to uphold the Balkan *status quo*. Finally, Soviet Russia enjoyed a surprising 'come-back,' which began with overtures from France, was carried on by a concatenation of security and non-aggression pacts with all limitrophe and neighbouring States from Finland and the Baltic States right down to Afghanistan, and was ultimately sealed by American recognition and a security pact with France herself. Well might the confused observer of the European scene in the last twelve months rub his eyes in June 1934 and ask: 'Do I sleep? Do I dream? Or is visions about?'

Where is Europe heading? Has the League dissolved, as the Holy Alliance dissolved in 1823 after the Peace of Vienna, into a complex of conflicting forces and elements—these bent on main-

taining the European *status quo* at all costs, those on oversetting it? Are we back in the 1904-14 system of alliances, which will divide Europe into two camps prior to a more disastrous conflagration? What are, at any rate, the *blocs* and the alliances which are forming, and, if the League and the Disarmament Conference fail, must decide our destinies? To what specific ends are they directed? Is all this passion for security well founded? Or are we to learn by a yet more cataclysmic experience that 'Security is mortals' chiefest enemy'? Can we view with equanimity this European anarchy, trusting that it is only 'the chaos of pre-ordination, and night of our forebeings'? Or are we, in Europe, heading for the abyss? These are questions which vex the mind of every 'good European.' Our statesmen will give us the answers in the way they handle the facts of the present situation.

The gravity of European politics at the present moment derives from three sources—Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Balkans. Great Britain is a satisfied, almost satiated, Power; and she is pre-eminently concerned to seek peace and ensue it. France is satisfied, too, and is even more defensive in temper—perhaps morbidly so. But Germany and, to a slightly lesser extent, Italy are 'expansive' Powers, 'revisionist' Powers; they are, moreover, totalitarian States and dictatorships. Their foreign policies clash in Central Europe; but they have the same view of their missions in Europe. And their foreign policies conflict radically with the policy of France, as well as with the interests of Russia and, to a considerable extent, with the interests of Britain in Europe. Their foreign policies envisage, moreover, a radical alteration in the *raison d'être* of the League and in the Peace settlements of Europe. Thus, any understanding of the issues involved in the present European anarchy must depend, at the outset, upon the forces at work in the spheres of influence in Europe which are predominantly German and Italian, or both.

Nowhere are the interests of Germany and Italy more conflicting than in Central Europe. Ever since the proposed Customs Union between Germany and Austria in 1931 proved abortive, largely owing to French opposition, agitation on both sides of the Austro-German frontier for the *Anschluss* 'went to earth'; and the Nazi revolution in Germany last year brought into power a party in whose platform the *Anschluss* formed a principal plank. But a matter of 45 miles separates Germany from the Brenner pass, from which one may look down on the Trentino, or South Tyrol, still inhabited mainly by Austrian Germans. If the *Anschluss* came, Signor Mussolini could hardly feel secure in Italy, let alone the collapse of his Central European policy which this would entail. For Italy has long been a revisionist Power,

in opposition to France and to France's ally, Yugoslavia; and Italy has virtually created Albania, as well as making a firm alliance with Hungary. If Austria fell into the lap of the Nazis, nothing could hinder their progress through Hungary (already strongly sympathetic to Germany) towards Roumania, during which progress Czechoslovakia—that geographical anomaly athwart Central Europe—would be surrounded. Italy would then see her entire Balkan policy go by the board, for Bulgaria would be isolated; the Italian 'drive' in the Eastern Mediterranean, which began with Italy's possession of the Dodecanese Islands, would be hindered; and Signor Mussolini's much-vaunted 'mission of Italy' in Asia would be stultified.

It is therefore comprehensible that Signor Mussolini should have taken up the tools for Danubian economic collaboration relinquished by M. Tardieu and by the delegates to the Stresa Conference; that he should have signed the Three-Power declaration with France and Britain of February 17 this year, in which these Powers 'take a common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties'; that he should have brought about the Three-Power Pact of March 17 this year between Italy, Austria and Hungary, providing not only for economic preferences and 'exchange clearings' between those States, but also that they will 'concert together on all problems which partly interest them as well as those of a general nature' (my italics); and that he should finally have so impressed upon Herr Hitler at their Venice meeting on June 15 this year the absolute necessity of ending German Nazi aggression against Chancellor Dollfuss's régime that Herr Hitler at once called off the advertised 'meeting in sympathy with Austrian Nazis' scheduled to be held at Munich. Italy is therefore set against any *de jure Anschluss*. Whether the known connexions between the new Austrian Vice-Chancellor, Prince Stahrenberg, the leader of the now dominant *Heimwehr*, and the Berlin Nazis will result soon in the entry of Austrian Nazis into an independent Austria's Government, so that a *de facto Anschluss* may easily be prepared, remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether the deliberate non-renewal in the new Austrian Constitution of the Acts for Habsburg banishment and expropriation, so that they now become simple statute laws which can be rescinded by the Cabinet, heralds a return of the Archduke Otto of Habsburg to the Austrian throne. If it does, then France's allies, the Little Entente, will have much to say, and something to do; for the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, MM. Benesh and Yevtitch, have declared within the last three months that such a move would lead to bloodshed in Central Europe. This may account for the belated recognition of Soviet

Russia by Czechoslovakia and Roumania in June of this year, following on conversations between MM. Benesh and Titulescu at Geneva. The recent *rapprochement* of France and Russia over 'security pacts' at Geneva has thus put a different complexion on the forces of the Little Entente. Moreover, the position of Hungary—who first claimed Otto of Habsburg—has been rendered a little uncomfortable now that Austria's chances of securing him appear more compelling. The Hungarians remember only too well to what grim end—grim for them—the *Ausgleich* of 1867 eventually led; and M. Gömbös's Government is not exactly predisposed to another Habsburg Dual Monarchy. All this goes to show that the problem of 'maintaining Austria's independence and integrity' cuts clean across the German Nazis' aims in Central Europe. It also means *in the long run* the fundamental incompatibility of German and Italian foreign policies in Central Europe. But just how long the long run will be depends on quite another sphere of European problems, which is also a sphere of Italian interest—the Balkans. For only if Signor Mussolini is willing, or is compelled, to renounce his Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean aims will he renounce his opposition to German aims in Central Europe—since Austria remains, as ever, the gateway to the Balkans. Italy, therefore, will never acquiesce in German penetration of Central Europe, and she will never pass completely over into the German camp, as long as her Balkan policy has a chance. Has it any chance? This is the question to which I turn next.

Italy and Germany are at present in a stage of Fascism which necessitates continual reference to 'the mission of the State' in external affairs. Until Fascism consolidates itself internally and provides its citizens with adequate *panem*, the *régime* must divert criticism of its home policy by *circenses*—and in the latter category come not only the pomp and circumstance of nationalistic fervour, but also the oft-reiterated insistence upon some external 'mission' of the Fascist State. In the case of Germany, a mission was clearly at hand—the throwing-off of foreign oppression, the breaking of the foreigners' 'tyranny of interest' (*Zinsknechtschaft*), and the recreating of a mighty Germany to secure actual equality of rights in the counsels of nations. In the case of Italy after the war, things were not so simple. But Signor Mussolini contrived to rivet his citizens' attention upon Italy's need for external expansion; hence his measures to secure an expanding population, and hence his long-standing claim against France for a place in the African sun. Yet North Africa was practically monopolised, save for a barren Libya, by Britain and France, Italy's possession of the Dodecanese Islands, and her need to dominate the Adriatic, orientated him towards the Balkans, to

which orientation the virtual suzerainty of Albania, the linking of Bulgaria to Italy by the Bulgarian marriage, the alliance with Hungary, and the antipathy of Greece and Turkey to Britain and France all conduced.

But the economic and political consolidation of Soviet Russia worked against Italy in the Balkans; Turkey and Greece effected a striking reconciliation; Turkey moved slowly but surely into closer political and economic touch with Russia; and, finally, four factors brought about a startling reorientation of the Balkan peoples themselves. These were: first, as elsewhere, the external threat inherent in the German Nazis' aims, which revived Balkan fears of another German *Drang nach den Süd-osten*; secondly, the recent *coup d'état* in Bulgaria brought into power a national Government which forthwith suppressed the Mihailov Macedonians, who had so long embittered relations with Italy's adversary, Yugoslavia; thirdly, the Little Entente States set an example of coherence in foreign and economic policy in 1933 by inaugurating common economic and foreign policies under permanent councils for each subject; fourthly, Italy's Balkan and East Mediterranean policy became suspect to the Balkan Powers themselves, especially as Turkey and Greece wished to reopen the question of militarising and renationalising the Straits, thus revising the Straits Agreement of 1923, in which demand Russia was understood to concur. After protracted negotiations, therefore, the Balkan Pact was signed in Athens on February 9 this year between Greece, Roumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Pact guarantees mutually each signatory's Balkan frontiers; it provides for consultation and common action in Balkan matters; and it permits of adherence by any other Balkan State—an obvious provision for Bulgaria, who, as 'the Hungary of the Balkans,' alone has political claims against the rest. But the change of *régime* in Bulgaria has led to consultations with Yugoslavia with a view to Bulgaria's either adhering to the Pact, or to her signing a 'parallel' convention with Yugoslavia, and perhaps the other signatories. More important, however, is the fact that a 'secret' protocol was annexed to the Pact (published in *La Macedoine* of April 1) which accepts the Politis definition of aggression and provides for what is virtually a defensive alliance which could as easily become an offensive one. To set the seal on these purely Balkan events, the new Bulgarian Government is pledged to recognise Russia; Turkey and Russia signed a non-aggression pact on March 24; and Turkey and Persia opened negotiations on political and economic matters. These Balkan reorientations towards Russia and the Islam world of Asia are infinitely more important than they appear; they are in effect a clear declaration that the Balkans are to be looked on

neither as pawns on the European chessboard in a long drawn-out game between Germany and Italy, nor as a colonial field for Italian expansion. This is clearly evidenced in one single event. In a speech at Rome on March 18 to the assembly of Fascist leaders, Signor Mussolini concluded by saying that the historical mission of Italy lay in Africa and Asia :

There was no question of territorial conquests, but of a natural expansion which ought to lead to a collaboration between Italy and the peoples of Africa and the East. Italy could civilise Africa, and her position in the Mediterranean gave her this right and imposed this duty on her. She demanded no privileges or monopolies, but did not want earlier arrivals to block her spiritual, political and economic expansion.³

It is hardly surprising that the Turkish ambassador in Rome at once asked what was meant by this speech. He was informed by Signor Mussolini personally that, as Italy looked upon Turkey as a European State, the *Duce's* remarks had not for one moment been intended to refer to Turkey. But Signor Mussolini spoke again, on May 26, announcing increased armaments expenditure despite a deficit of 4,000,000,000 lire ; and in his speech he said :

I absolutely disbelieve in perpetual peace. It is detrimental and negative to the fundamental virtues of man. . . . War is to man what childbirth is to woman.

And the King of Italy, in opening the last Parliament under Fascism on April 28, had just referred to the paramount necessity for Italy to have all her youth under military training. To what conclusions could the Balkan countries come ? The Bulgarian *coup d'état* was, in effect, the answer—'*Balkania fará da se !*'

Thus the Italian Balkan policy has been left in the doldrums largely by the Balkan peoples themselves ; and by their action, any German attempt to step into the place of Italy is likely to meet with opposition from not only the Balkans and Italy, but also from France and the Little Entente in the gateway. Moreover, as far as Italian or German foreign policy in Central and South-Eastern Europe is concerned, the return of Russia as a European Great Power in matters of high policy cannot be overestimated. For, as between 1897 and 1904, the forces of Europe are lining up on the old fronts ; but they are doing so 'with a difference.' This time Italy and Germany are opposed in both Central and South-Eastern Europe ; and if Italy has eventually to renounce her Balkan policy, she cannot make common cause with Germany in a European system of alliances, which means the pre-war 'two camps' again, without reckoning

³ *Bulletin of International News* : London, March 29, 1934, p. 621.

with a stronger, more consolidated Russia, whose counsels of 'security' are now the preponderating considerations for that vast *bloc* of States which stretches from Scandinavia down to Afghanistan. This brings me to the third sphere of interests in Europe—Eastern Europe.

Herr Hitler's forced renunciation of the Nazi dream of absorbing Austria turns Germany definitely to the east. The west, now that the Saar question is virtually settled, admits of 'no serious quarrel' with France, according to Vice-Chancellor von Papen's statement this year. But in the east Germany has to reckon with four imponderables which may all prove to have an extremely high specific gravity. First there is Poland. Then there are the Baltic States. Next comes Scandinavia. And finally, looming large on the horizon, there is Soviet Russia. I shall consider them in that order.

On January 26 of this year Germany and Poland signed a 'declaration' which amounted to a non-aggression pact. Both Powers declared that 'in no circumstances will they . . . resort to force with the aim of settling such questions of dispute' as existed between them, or might arise. This came as a bombshell to France, and M. Barthou repaired at once to Poland and, as was natural in the circumstances, to Czechoslovakia. Had Poland defected from the French alliance altogether ? Or was it due only to a need for a reinsurance policy on the part of Poland ? It is common knowledge that M. Barthou was dissatisfied with his Polish visit, though he stated in the French Chamber on his return that the alliance was intact. But rumours in Eastern Europe travel far and fast. And one rumour had it that Poland, intimidated by the strength of a rearming Germany in the west which already controlled Dantzig, and suspicious, as ever since the war, of the Russian system on her eastern frontier, had made a deal with Germany by which, in the event of 'certain eventualities' in Eastern Europe, Germany was to get back the Corridor, Poland was to annex Lithuania and Memelland, and both Poland and Germany were to divide the Ukraine, including the rich Russian portion. The feeling in Eastern and Central Europe was that *si non é vero, é ben trovato*. The Foreign Ministers of Roumania and Yugoslavia, alarmed at the threat of encirclement by Germany and Poland, both went to Paris. A frontier dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia broke out. And the German Minister for Propaganda, Herr Dr. Goebbels, went to Warsaw and Cracow. But the pessimists were confounded by the course of events ; for Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, made a 'goodwill tour' to the Little Entente capitals. And the assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior on June 15 disclosed that a party of Nationalist Radicals on Nazi

lines in Poland was suspect, and that the Polish Government was intent on quashing the movement. Moreover, though the German and Polish authorities reached agreements on public information and commerce between their countries, on May 5 a new agreement between Poland and Russia was signed in Moscow, prolonging the Polish-Soviet non-aggression Pact of July 25, 1932, until December 31, 1945. This brought relief to France, who was herself at this time in close touch with Moscow, as well as to all the other East European signatories of the 1932 non-aggression pacts with the Soviet, including the Little Entente States and the Baltic States.

But the Baltic States were in a pother of their own. The Estonian Government in March proclaimed an emergency law forbidding public meetings, owing to the activities of the 'Liberators,' a party with Nazi tendencies, whose leader was arrested. In March, also, the Latvian Government resigned and was reconstituted on the lines of the Right. Lithuania almost suffered a *coup d'état* at the same time, but it was put down, and the instigator, Professor Valdemaras, a former Prime Minister, was tried by court-martial for high treason, convicted, and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. It was expressly stated that the attempted *coup* was undertaken 'with foreign assistance'! Germany and Lithuania had been at odds ever since the war over Memel; and the coming of the Nazis had brought German feeling in this predominantly German territory to fever heat. The Lithuanian Government suspended Nazi officials, and passed an emergency law for the safety of the State, against which Germany protested, alleging that it abrogated the Constitution sanctioned by the League. In April this year the Soviet Government proposed that 'to demonstrate the improvement in German-Soviet relations' a protocol should be signed guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Baltic States. Germany declined the offer on the grounds that (a) those States were not threatened, and (b) it would not improve Soviet-German relations! On April 26 the Lithuanian Government sent to the Governments of Latvia and Estonia a proposal for solidarity between the Baltic States, which was doubtless inspired by the Latvian-Estonian Treaty of February this year, providing for common foreign and economic policies and a common Council between those two States. These various *démarches* were strengthened by the signature in Moscow, on April 4, of the agreements to extend the non-aggression pacts between Soviet Russia and the three Baltic States until 1945. Thus the forces making for solidarity between the three States in the face of either German or Polish intentions were capitalised and reinforced by Russia.

Any consideration of the Baltic balance of power must include Scandinavia. The Governments of Norway, Sweden and Denmark are of the Left. Their countries are strongly democratic. It is highly significant, therefore, that already in October 1933 M. Stauning, the Socialist Prime Minister of Denmark, should have declared in the Folketing that the South Jutland frontier, as settled at the Peace Conference, was the frontier of all Scandinavia. 'Any encroachment would be a matter for Scandinavia,' he said; and M. Hansson, the Socialist Prime Minister of Sweden, replied, 'We in Sweden much desire increased co-operation between the Scandinavian States.' Significant also was the abandonment of the Danish plan for complete unilateral disarmament, which in its turn may have led the Dutch Socialist Party to abandon, in April this year, its opposition to militarism and armaments in Holland 'in view of the danger of war as the result of the change in the German attitude in regard to international policy.' The Finnish Government in April renewed the Finnish-Soviet non-aggression pact in Moscow until 1945, and has energetically put down a movement on Nazi lines in its borders. Thus the Scandinavian countries in their turn have been driven closer together in matters of foreign policy by the Nazi revolution in Germany, and by fear of its breaking out into foreign adventures towards the east. It is, in fact, extraordinary that, as far as Scandinavia is concerned, Russia presents less of a threat than Germany to-day.

Finally we come to Soviet Russia herself. It is impossible to speak of Russia's foreign policy apart from M. Litvinov. To his successes in obtaining his eastern security pacts in 1932 he added the new agreement with Britain in 1933, and, most important, recognition by the United States. Since then he has come out as the ardent defender of the French thesis that Europe can only get disarmament once she has got security. To this end he has offered France a security pact of even wider scope than the existing non-aggression pact, which more than repairs the defection of Poland from the French system. In fact, ever since MM. Herriot and Cot were in Russia last year—the latter was then Air Minister of France—Russia and France have discovered an almost-complete identity of interests in Europe, which received its unequivocal confirmation in the parallel insistence of MM. Litvinov and Barthou in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on the twin theses that 'security' must precede disarmament, and that the Disarmament Conference should be converted into a Standing Commission to preserve peace. Such a move reminds one irresistibly of the twin overtures of Czar Alexander and Prince Metternich to Britain after the Peace of Vienna, when they proposed converting the Quadruple Alliance which had defeated

Napoleon into a Holy Alliance to fasten peace upon Europe for all time. To what is this identity of French and Russian interests due?

On the French side it is due to the need for security against an over-mighty, over-weening Nazi Germany, which, after expanding to the east or south-east, will then wreak a devastating revenge upon an isolated France. The suspected defection of Poland only goes to reinforce this argument. On the Russian side it is due to the old fear of Czarist Russia—the fear of being beset on two fronts at once, in Europe and in the Far East. Soviet Russia can ill afford such an ordeal. The failure of the League to prevent Japan's seizure and militarisation of Manchuria; the failure to secure disarmament; the patent rearming of Germany; the prevarication of Poland; the equivocal attitude of Britain to a Continental war; the critical state of transport and communications over the vast east-to-west Russian territory—all these have swayed Russian counsels, and brought individualist France and Communist Russia together in so striking a fashion on the pre-war lines. Russia's preoccupation has been with her European frontiers; for war with Japan is officially expected and is being prepared for in Russia to-day. It is only the fear of a German or German-Polish 'stab in the back' which disturbs M. Litvinov; for if Russia stood alone, attacked on both fronts, she would be doomed, and with her the vast social and economic experiment which she has undertaken. This fear accounted for the 1932 non-aggression pacts with all her European and Middle-East neighbours; and it happens, luckily for Russia, to coincide with the fears of France, Scandinavia, the Baltic States, the Little Entente, and the Balkans. That is a formidable line-up of Powers, whose interests centre upon 'security,' and whose fears are concentrated upon Germany. M. Litvinov has been able to capitalise these interests and this paramount fear. But will it prevent the outcome he himself fears, or will it land Europe—and Russia—in a system of pre-war *blocs* and alliances which can only achieve its objective, 'security,' by a war in which it has overwhelming military and economic preponderance? If the latter, then Russia is doomed in any case—at least, as the Communist Russia; for Japan will certainly not lie low while Russia fights a major European war.

The answer must be given by two European Great Powers—Italy and Great Britain. They hold the key positions to-day in European politics. If Italy renounces her Central European and Balkan policies and makes common cause with Germany, seeking only to maintain her present frontiers, nothing, in my opinion, can prevent a disaster in Europe. In that disaster Great Britain would inevitably, sooner or later, be involved—sooner if France,

Belgium and Holland threatened to fall under German domination, later if France and Russia set about remoulding the map of Europe. We in Britain cannot avoid taking sides, sooner or later, in any major Continental conflict. The conflict may easily fly the Channel and awaken us to our *de facto* unity with the Continent. One victor or the other will do it for us, if we do not see it for ourselves. And then, when this country makes up its mind, the entire balance of power in Europe will again be upset. It is Britain's equivocal attitude to Continental security which for so long has restrained Italy from completely passing over into the German camp—this, and the knowledge that Britain and France are still stronger in the Mediterranean, while Italy needs raw material imports. That is still a safeguard for peace, though the junction of France and Russia has already driven the *Führer* and the *Duce* to discover that the leaders of Europe's chief Fascist States possess a 'deep spiritual communion.'

The present state of Europe is immediately due to the Nazi revolution in Germany and to its avowed aims and objects. But the real causes lie still deeper and farther back. The post-war system of collective security has not only failed; it has failed in the face of the apostles of force and *Machtpolitik*. The disastrous consequences of such a failure are now before us. Europe is again torn with conflicting alliances, parcelled into *blocs*, cut across by national States, well-nigh bankrupt, but budgeting for war, mainly on deficits. Not only is the division one of military strength; it is also now a fundamental division according to political systems. Force stalks naked through Europe, and none can gainsay him. The State in at least three Great Powers of Europe is in the hands of one, or at the most three, men; and *raison d'État* is the supreme arbiter. Even the satiated, defensive Powers of Europe can conceive of no other means to security than overwhelming force. So it may be. But the present European lapse into conflicting systems of alliances cannot, in the end, ensure that one system will so predominate as to compel peace at the point of the sword. That is the danger.

What can now be done? There are three Great Powers in the world who could together guarantee peace and security for the rest. Those are the three Powers who are most divided in their attitudes to European security. They are—the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If all these could reach common ground on their policies with regard to the Far East, and to wilful aggression in Europe, Italy would be on their side, and France too. Such a combination could achieve more for Europe, and more for the League itself, than any Four-Power Pact or League Council. Russia and the United States have no League obligations, as yet. And Britain holds the casting vote in Con-

tinental politics. But the cardinal principle on which such co-operation must take place is: common action against any State which becomes an aggressor under the terms of the Politis definition of aggression. If something on these lines is not quickly forthcoming, it is hard to resist the conclusion, from all the foregoing, that Europe is heading for the abyss.

That is not to say the abyss need be reached. Sober realisation of what a cataclysm is in store for every European State if the present lapse into alliances continues may well open up vistas from which the most frenetical apostles of *Machtpolitik* will ultimately shrink. The alliances of to-day are the work of politicians. 'The world is wearied of statesmen whom democracy has degraded into politicians'; thus Disraeli, in contemptuous mood. But now that democracy is discredited by the Continental Powers, where are the statesmen of the new order? Surely the need and the opportunity for statesmanship were never so clamant as they are in Europe to-day.

D. GRAHAM HUTTON.

THE AGONY OF SPAIN

Under tyranny men seek liberty and under liberty they seek tyranny.
UNAMUNO.

'*La vida es lucha*' ('Life is struggle'), writes Miguel de Unamuno in *La Agonia del Cristianismo*—a work which he composed, or rather which wrenched itself from his soul, while he was in exile in Paris during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. 'Struggle for life is life itself, and is at the same time struggle against death and also against the truth, against the truth of death.' So the most Spanish of all modern Spanish thinkers looks at life—and death. Subconsciously hovers in the back of every Spaniard's mind the thought of death; or rather, the idea of dying, the agony of departure. A frequent picture in the daily paper shows a corpse ready for burial, be it that of an ex-royal *infanta* or a popular bullfighter. And the most typical of all religious cults in Spain, part Christian, part pagan, is that of the Spanish Christ crucified—crucified, but not yet dead, dying in agony. Very terrible and very tragic are these crude, often coloured crucifixes in the churches and cathedrals of Andalusia, personifying the agony of Christendom and recalling those words of Pascal: '*Jesús estará en la agonía hasta el fin del mundo; no hay que dormir durante este tiempo.*' Unamuno finds the origin of man's agony—i.e., by agony he means contest or struggle, *ἀγώνια*, and by struggle is signified life itself—in the fight between the collective or social aspect of truth and the individuality and 'incommunicable'-ness of Christianity: the individual against the crowd; the fight to retain, or rather to recreate, the *ego*. 'The end of life is to make a soul, an immortal soul.'

Spain is an agonising country. And this perpetual war of its soul is reflected in its literature and its history. For the Spaniard there would appear to be a two-fold agony: the outer agony of Mysticism *versus* Rationalism and the inner agony in his soul—the agony *within* his inbred mysticism. The outer agony, which can be called alternatively the contest between the individual and the crowd (presupposing that a crowd is prone to rationalism while mysticism flames in the individual soul), is repeated in various forms in most European countries; but the

inner spiritual agony of the mystic—and every true Spaniard is at heart a mystic—is, if not peculiar to, at any rate more characteristic of Spain than of any other locality. The prevalent note of the great sixteenth-century Spanish mystics is one of agony. San Juan de la Cruz—greatest of Spanish male mystics—describes in beautiful language the revelation of God to the human soul not yet transformed and the consequent pain which follows on this revelation.

And that this dim contemplation in its beginnings is also painful to the soul is clear [he writes]. For since this infused divine contemplation has many qualities of exceeding goodness, and the soul which receives them, being not as yet purified, has many miseries, hence it follows, since two contraries cannot co-exist in one subject, the soul must of necessity suffer and be in pain. . . . This pain in the soul, [he goes on] caused by its impurity, is exceedingly great when the divine light strikes upon it. For when the pure light strikes the soul, in order to expel its impurities, the soul perceives itself to be so unclean and wretched that it seems as if God is fighting against it—that it has become the adversary of God.¹

In the ultimate union of the soul with God the agony may cease, but the process of reaching this sacred union is fraught with 'such torment for sense and spirit that they would find death itself a welcome relief.'

This intense painful mysticism, which has in its composition much that is of African origin and springs from sources anterior to the Christian reconquest of Spain, might be said to unite Roman Catholic agony and Moslem fanaticism in one perpetual semi-divine, semi-pagan embrace. The quavering *saeta*, a half-Moorish, half-ecclesiastical chant, which is sung during the Holy Week processions at the statue of some local saint or virgin, is the musical symbol of this mystical spirit, which, despite modern changes and tendencies, is the pivot of all Spanish character to-day. Not that the Spaniard is a dreamer. Far from it: he is, like so many mystics who combine practical, successful lives with intense contemplation, intensely practical. The age of the great mystical poets coincided with that of Spain's material greatness, and though to-day Unamuno, unorthodox as he may be, is perhaps the only writer approaching in thought to Santa Teresa and to Don Quixote (himself a mystic), the *spirit* of each Spaniard remains individually much the same as it always was—opposed equally to the mass culture of Communism as to that of Fascism.

The significance, therefore, of the Spaniard's traditional outlook in an age like the present is obvious. To-day the world is suffering from the disease of 'mass mentality.' With a crude violence it has suddenly reacted against the tolerant liberal

¹ Translated by Professor Allison Peers.

standards—artistic, political, and moral—of the nineteenth century, hastily dubbing them 'fetishes' and rarely stopping to inquire whether they were not based on traditions far older than those of the nineteenth century. Democracy, as being the form of government most prevalent in the last century, is consequently receiving small shrift at the hands of the modern mass-minded bully. As a political system it has obvious drawbacks, and it failed to save the world from the catastrophe of 1914. People were seized with terror. They saw monarchies falling like nine-pins (although the democratic monarchies continued to exist as before), conventional beliefs abandoned, social standards trampled underfoot. Barriers were being broken down recklessly by an illiterate horde of barbarians who believed that in so breaking them they were acting in an unprecedented fashion, that no one had ever before attacked the hierarchy of 'class,' religion, and the established order. This, of course, is the fallacy of youth. Youth feels that no one has ever travelled the path of life before him, that no one has ever before faced the same problems, that the experience of his ancestors is valueless. For this post-war decade was above all things the Age of Youth. The words of the young were treasured as pearls. The old dressed themselves so as to look as though but yesterday they had escaped from the nursery. Dignity fled, and in the words of Mr. Noel Coward:

In this strange illusion, chaos and confusion,
People seem to lose their way.
What is there to strive for, love or keep alive for?
Say hey! hey! call it a day!

The bottom dropped out of life, and a nebulous mist rose up in filmy spirals, obscuring the weather-worn rocks of the long, long centuries.

So now has come a reaction, not, of course, to pre-war ideas of democracy, but still further away from them—to Fascism, to Communism, to State-planned, State-organised, individual-killing societies. The idea of a 'strong man' as a remedy for all evils is not new. Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, Charlemagne, Charles V., are notable examples of single individuals who centralised power in their persons. No one denies that their dictatorial rule conferred on their subjects great material benefits. But a dictator, however benevolent and well-intentioned he may be, is almost invariably compelled to adopt an aggressive foreign policy and to increase his subject's internal burdens. His rule, moreover, is rarely based on anything more stable than a *coup d'état*.

The invariable excuse given for the unconstitutional seizure of power by a dictator—and it must be remembered that the modern post-war dictatorships are all conceived on a far lower

plane than ever were the great imperial schemes of Charlemagne or Charles V.—is to save the country from anarchy. The king—if, as in Spain, he makes himself a fellow-conspirator in the military *coup d'état*—assures his people that their good is his sole concern, that he desires to get more into touch with the minds of his subjects, and that for that reason he will get rid of the lying, untrustworthy politicians, close parliament, and—temporarily until all danger of anarchy is removed—rule by martial law. All dictators at their seizure of power say much the same thing. All proceed to spend a great deal of money on railways and roads, draining waste lands and building large, imposing edifices. All—or nearly all—proceed to lock up, exile, or kill those who for one reason or another fail to bow the knee before the new Cæsar. All are inspired very largely by fear—with fear of Communism or (in the case of the Russian dictatorship) fear of losing their power. It is this lack of tolerance for minorities—or at any rate, for those in opposition to the new-established order—which so unfortunately characterises post-war politics in most European countries. Whoever gains power, whether in Germany, Austria, Italy or Spain, says: 'My party represents the nation. I represent the sovereign will of the people. Whatever I do is right because I have a majority.' In other words, minorities are suppressed or ignored.

A cynical observer of the European historical pageant during the last 2000 years might maintain that minorities always have been suppressed, until they in turn seize power, when they assure the world they are the majority. But a more reasonable view is that humanity has been slowly evolving a system of society under which it may be possible for A. to differ in his religious and his political views very widely from B. and yet live in safety and in prosperity. Up to the present democracy has answered most nearly to these requirements. Those countries which, like Belgium and England, were governed by a system of constitutional monarchy withstood the strain of the war considerably better than Russia, Germany and Austria, which were ruled by autocratic despots. In the two last-named countries a period of anarchy followed the war. It was therefore very easy to set up a dictatorship. Anyone who could keep order, even if it was by the most brutal and unsophisticated methods, would gain the support of the ordinary citizen. Hence the success of Hitler, hence that of Mussolini. Here, people felt, was the Nietzschean man—the strong man whom the Press can laud to the skies, who can speak by radio to masses of Germans or Italians, who can centralise in his person the cumbersome formulæ and committees of parliamentary democracy.

For the latter, especially in its nineteenth-century aspect, has

many obvious defects. Universal franchise is apt to defeat the ends for which it was created. But it is at least a method of ventilating public opinion. If things go wrong, redress by means of parliament is easier and more feasible than it is under a dictatorship. For the only means of changing society under a dictatorship is by a revolution. A dictatorship renders society static. The intellectual element must either throw literary bouquets to the strong man or be crushed. The tendency, therefore, is for liberal-minded, tolerant thinkers under Hitler or Mussolini either to leave the country or else, in ignorance of its real meaning, to join the Communist Party. And it is this division—a false division, it seems to me—which has given rise to the cry of 'Moscow or Berlin.' The real division and the real issue is between 'Moscow-Berlin' and London, between Autocratic Dictatorship *versus* Liberal Democracy, between Augustine's City of God and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.

So, too, in the mental sphere. The great centralising spiritual force in the world, Rome, has not been slow to profit by the intellectual and moral bankruptcy which followed on the war. Catholicism is something positive and definite. It is uncompromising. It is quite sure of itself. What a contrast to the chaos of beliefs and the general amoral indifference which can be observed in Protestant countries, and often in Catholic countries too, though, naturally, Rome is careful not to stress that fact! Is it, then, surprising if many men and women are accepting unconditionally—as, of course, they must if they accept it at all—the uncompromising safe authority of the Vatican?

Her inflexible claim [says Mr. Wyndham Lewis in his brilliant study of Charles V.] upheld for so many ages is to be the Voice of God on earth the sole judge in her Divine Founder's design of True and of False, the sole receptacle of His teaching, the sole expression of His Will. The salvation of the West is neither in East, West nor South, but in the Cross of our redemption—in Rome, eternal, sacred Rome of the Popes.

Writers like Mr. Hillaire Belloc and Mr. Wyndham Lewis have been enlisted, or have enlisted themselves, in this army of Catholic evangelists. Historians of the nineteenth century burned Protestant candles before the shrine of Low Church Whigism, and, as every nineteenth-century institution or tendency is automatically attacked by the twentieth-century writers, the theories of Macaulay and Green have, naturally, not escaped censure. Mr. Hillaire Belloc with annual regularity publishes a biographical study to illustrate the harm (as he considers it) done to England and English mentality by the Reformation. Mr. Wyndham Lewis sees in the Reformation the origin of all the jingoistic nationalist wars of the last four centuries, and presumably

considers that the successful materialisation of Charles V.'s dream of a united empire would have prevented their recurrence and the growth of national competition. Rome, we are reminded, was the bulwark of culture, of profound thought, both human and divine, in the Dark and Middle Ages when the barbarians almost submerged the old Roman Imperium. Journalists like Eugenio Montes, the Berlin correspondent of *A.B.C.*, see in the Soviet dictatorship a twentieth-century replica of the Huns. Other writers imply that Lenin was the political descendant of Luther and blame the brave little sixteenth-century monk for the Marxian dreariness of Communism. Actually the ideals of Lenin were much nearer to those of Carlos Quinto than to Luther. Communism, which is an international and centrally organised force, is the antithesis of local Protestant Liberalism, whose motto, *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, was taken straight from Luther. It is not possible to blame Luther both for Communism and for national cut-throat competitions of post-Reformation centuries. Useful as he may be as a scapegoat who may, from the Catholic point of view, be made responsible for all modern tribulations, he cannot bear the blame of two social systems diametrically opposed to one another. The escape from the apparent *cul-de-sac* in which post-war society has lost itself is not to be found in Rome, however specious are the pleas with which she urges her claims. That the solution must be spiritual all thinking men and women are probably agreed. But spiritual values are not the monopoly of Rome, nor, indeed, are religious drugs of any *real* spiritual utility at all.

Now the situation in Spain, which is somewhat disconnected from the rest of Europe, forms a curious subtle commentary on the mental and political state of post-war humanity as I have attempted to describe it above. The collapse in Spain of the 'liberal idea'—the Liberalism, that is to say, of the nineteenth century—and the rise of the so-called obscurantist forces as represented by the Catholic-Fascist parties of Gil Robles and young José Antonio Primo de Rivera (son of the military dictator) are to some extent a reflexion of what is happening at the moment in other European countries. Only in Spain the stage is smaller, the limelight stronger and the drama more intense. Liberalism—that is to say, the nineteenth-century brand as opposed to the greater Liberalism of Greece and all humanistic thought—can scarcely be said to have existed as a *political* force under the monarchy, which may have been the reason why, as a *mental* force, it grew sufficiently strong momentarily to sweep away Church and Throne. Such a victory—a victory which it had envisaged only through the roseate spectacles of theoretic idealism—has been the undoing of Spanish Liberalism. For if the latter is to thrive, it requires protection, and this protection was supplied

by that very force which symbolised, in the eyes of Liberals, reaction and repression—namely, the Throne. The small coterie of bourgeois intellectuals whose moral and literary influence was largely responsible for the 1931 revolution now proclaim their innocence of such political designs. '*No soy político*' ('I am not a politician'), the professor tells us who three years ago expended all his energy in blackening King Alfonso's character. '*This isn't the republic we wanted*,' says Ortega y Gasset, the 'philosopher' of the republic. In fact, the usual tale. Those who were too advanced for the monarchy were not advanced enough for the Azaña *régime*, while with the present camouflaged monarchist Government they have even less sympathy. Their sun momentarily has set.

But the situation was more complicated under Azaña's rule than is usually the case in the early stages of a revolution. Nominally the *régime* was liberal. Nominally it had not employed force to obtain power. Nominally it represented the 'sovereign will of the people'—*i.e.*, the will of the majority. In actual fact, of course, it did not. But there is little doubt that the majority of the intellectuals—professors, writers, journalists—who suddenly found themselves at the helm of affairs believed that it did. In actual fact, again, although there had been no open display of force, there was a covert threat of 'direct action' in the seizure of the streets of Madrid by the people, which fact undoubtedly influenced King Alfonso in deciding to abandon his throne. The position, therefore, was more complicated than, let us say, in England or France, where the Puritans and Jacobins were admittedly cliques who by energy, intolerance, and determination forced their fanatical doctrines on the masses. The Spanish intellectuals, in the heyday of matutinal zeal, proceeded to draw up a theoretically excellent Constitution which in any country but Spain might have met with considerable success. Señor Azaña, easily the most capable of the new leaders, announced that Spain had ceased to be Catholic, qualifying this provocative statement by saying that he intended to apply it only to the 'intellectuals.' Even as applied to them, it is hardly accurate, as the university and most of the professors are all nominally Catholic, and the most intellectual newspaper, *El Debate*, is the chief organ of the Clerical Party. The phrase naturally was immediately seized on by the Opposition, who utilised it with the utmost success in the general elections of November and December 1933.

Azaña himself probably realised the true state of affairs—namely, the need for relying on force if he was (a) to retain the power which had fallen like a ripe apple into his ample lap, and (b) to keep any kind of order. Hence the creation of the *Guardia de Asalto*; hence the Law of the Defence of the Republic; hence

the suppression of newspapers. In doing all this he was simply acting as General Primo de Rivera had acted, only he gave as an excuse the fact that he had a majority in the Cortes. Which was true—he had. To all this the country replied: 'Your *régime* is nominally liberal. But in fact it is much more dictatorial than your predecessor's. You have abolished the death penalty. Yet in two years you have shot down more people than ever did Primo de Rivera. You persecute religion. You suppress newspapers. Your Cortes are entirely divorced from public opinion.'

The difficulty with which any would-be ruler of Spain is faced is in the nature of Cardinal Morton's fork. It seems as though this heterogeneous, strongly individual people can be governed with material success only by a dictatorship; yet the moment this is openly enforced, there is an outcry about the Spaniard's innate love of individual freedom and the historic traditions of parliament. On the other hand, when a strong hand is removed social unrest increases by leaps and bounds, and although it is true that one may live in Spain unscathed and visit the country without meeting a *pistolero*, one's own good fortune is, alas! no proof of the country's freedom from these disturbing phenomena. While this sinister atmosphere has been poisoning social and economic life, the Cortes function with a curious disregard of the unpleasant realities around them. Parliamentary crises recur with an unhealthy frequency reminiscent of monarchist times. Cabinet Ministers are changed with meaningless rapidity. It may be true, as *las Derechas* asserted, that the previous parliament, in which the Socialist element predominated, was divorced from public opinion in the country; but it is certainly the case to-day that the attention of the man in the street has been centred even less on the present Cortes, but rather on the fighting in Zaragoza, the strikers in the capital and Valencia, the situation in Barcelona. The general feeling is that, if ever matters reach a deadlock, the solution—if solution it is—will lie, not in the Cortes, but in the street.

Now the charge of non-government cannot be brought against Señor Azaña. For he certainly governed, often very drastically—too drastically, indeed, to please his middle-class supporters. The repressive measures taken to crush the outburst of anarchy at Casas Viejas, the suppression of newspapers, the deportations to Villa Cisneros—these lent themselves as easy weapons for attacking the so-called 'tyranny' of Azaña's government. But there were two other more important reasons which, according to Señor Lerroux, were responsible for the collapse of his *régime* and the consequent success of *las Derechas* at the November and December elections last winter. These were its anti-clerical policy and its alliance with the Socialists. Separation of Church

from State and even the dissolution of the Society of Jesus, were regarded by the majority of the nation as necessary and healthy enactments. But the prohibition of the Orders from teaching, and the consequent closing of many charity schools, the hostility expressed towards Catholicism in the leading politicians' speeches, above all the burning of the convents in May 1931, stirred up the Church to action. Persecution, in fact, increased the power of the persecuted. For Spain is emphatically Catholic—Catholic rather than religious. It is a country in which personalities like Santa Teresa and Ignatius Loyola are living forces even to-day. Menendez Pelayo has written that a Spaniard who ceases to be Catholic 'is incapable of believing in anything, unless it be in the omnipotence of a general practical sense, which generally is coarse, egoistic and gross.'

Secondly, the great mass of middle-class opinion—bankers, industrialists, professors—who had voted against the continuation of the monarchy in April 1931 were infuriated by the alliance which Azaña made in February 1933 with the Socialists. They had voted at the historic municipal elections, not for a Socialist dictatorship, but for a democratic liberal State modelled on the lines of the French Republic. Naturally they had small sympathy with legislation such as the confiscation of the *grandees'* estates, and laid the blame of the wretched condition of rural economy in southern Spain at the door of Señor Azaña's *régime*. As Spain had never before suffered from Socialism in any form, the outcry was not unexpected. For being so long repressed, the outburst of ranting radicalism, characteristic of English politics in the 'nineties and early nineteen hundreds, was all the more intense. The temporary reaction was natural, and the rage, fury, and bitterness of the Church and the aristocracy were poured forth in viols of journalistic wrath on the head of this Spanish Radical, Don Manuel Azaña.

Nor was it to be expected that Rome would take such attacks lying down. For many centuries the Roman Church has been the predominant force in Spanish history, and her influence in Spain to-day is still widespread. After the confusion of the republic's advent the Church set herself to the slow task of reorganising her forces for political purposes. Her interference in politics on this occasion is perfectly natural, for she has been vigorously attacked, and naturally wishes to retaliate. Under the inspiration of Don Angel Herrera, the editor of the brilliant clerical daily paper *El Debate*, a new party was built up called *Acción Popular*. Its ostensible leader is young Gil Robles, a Professor of Law in the University of Salamanca, who was formerly an assistant editor on the staff of *El Debate*. He is, however, generally regarded as the mouthpiece of Herrera. He and his friends went out two by

two into the villages of Spain and little by little prepared the way for the great *Derecha* victory of last autumn. Gil Robles is certainly the ablest Right-Wing *político* whom the republic has produced. For it should be remembered that he is as much a *product* of the republic as Azaña. His party, he says, has no links with the past, since it came into existence only after the downfall of the monarchy. It was formed to resist 'the dangerous designs of the Socialist Party, which consisted in uprooting all spiritual values from the life of the individual.' Like so many Spanish ideals, it draws a great deal of its strength from the negative character of its programme. It is anti-Marxist, anti-parliament, anti-dictatorship, anti-separatist. Naturally, *Acción Popular* has also a constructive programme of social reform, particularly a scheme of unemployment insurance benefit. (One of the party slogans is, 'He who does not work shall not eat.') But it was the 'anti' aspect of the party which gave it such vitality for election purposes.

As if, moreover, to contradict the implication that 'intellectuals' were only Left-Wing professors, a group of Catholics—possibly camouflaged monarchist writers—have been singing the praises of Hitler and Mussolini with daily regularity in *A.B.C.* and other Conservative newspapers. Ramiro de Maeztu and Alvaro Alcalá Galiano (Marqués del Castelbravo), who are the two principal writers of this group, assure us that parliamentary government is an anachronism and that 'liberty and equality' is an ensnaring myth. 'Only we provincial and parochial have accepted democracy as a novelty,' wrote the ex-editor of the Socialist paper *El Heraldo* on resigning his post. 'Government for the people by the people is a fallacy.' Events in Germany and Austria are naturally a godsend to such writers, especially as the republic's Constitution was modelled on that of the now defunct Weimar Constitution; and the victory of Dollfuss and the *Heimwehr* has certainly added fresh fuel to the triumphant *Derecha* bonfire.

Even the theatre has been utilised. An inspiring drama, *El Divino Impaciente*, by the poet Don José María Pemán, had a long and successful run at the Teatro Beatriz in Madrid last autumn at the time of the elections. It depicted the life of St. Francis Xavier, whose divinely inspired impatience to extend Christianity all over the newly discovered world is supposed to be symbolical of the non-material aspect of Spanish Catholicism in the sixteenth century. No allusion was made in the text to contemporary political events, but probably it was intended as a reply to Señor Pérez de Ayala's play *A.M.D.G.*—an attack on the Jesuits—which was performed in the same theatre two years ago. The enthusiasm with which *El Divino Impaciente* was received is

an unmistakable sign of the prevalence of the religious mysticism ingrained in the character of every Spaniard.

Rather naturally, the Socialists see in Gil Robles and his watchwords, 'Religion, the Family, Private Property,' the thin end (and more) of the Fascist, even monarchist, wedge and place little credence in his protestations of anti-Fascist feeling. Apparently they live in continual fear of a Right-Wing *coup d'état*, at which the present Cortes (so they assert) are conniving. The suggested concordat with Rome and the amnesty granted to political prisoners and exiles are interpreted as the preliminaries to such an unconstitutional plot. Gil Robles, on the other hand, tells us that his party is the only force capable of saving the country from an impending 'social revolution,' the object of which, according to its chief advocate, Señor Largo Caballero, is to sweep away the present bourgeois *régime* and set up a sort of Spanish Soviet State. Such melodramatic threats are not to be taken seriously, according to the Government. Even supposing they were to materialise, it is doubtful if a Spanish 'Left' Government would be able to alter radically the general condition of the people. But once having made these promises of making the unfortunate fortunate and the fortunate unfortunate, Señor Largo Caballero no doubt finds that he must now produce a monthly or fortnightly harangue. Fear of Fascism is certainly growing among the working classes, and on this fear Socialist speakers are playing with all their power. To buy a copy of *El Falange Español* (the Fascist newspaper) during the winter months was to run the risk of a pistol shot or a knife in the back. But this, so far from retarding, accelerated the growth of Fascism, and young Primo de Rivera, son of the Dictator, is hailed by his followers with a Fascist salute. It is possible that circumstances—i.e., the easy suppression of a Left revolutionary movement—might force Gil Robles into the same position as Dollfuss, the Fascist supporters of young Primo acting in the rôle of a Spanish *Heimwehr*. The historical link of the empire which unites Austria to Spain has often led to the history of both countries following similar courses, and at one time it appeared as though they might do so again.

The bitterness of the Socialists in Spain is very natural. It was they who drew up the advanced Constitution and the complicated electoral law. Yet the first time the electoral system is tried Socialists are everywhere defeated—except in Madrid. Again, it was the Azaña *régime* which gave the women the vote. And, largely as a result of this (for nearly all Spanish women are devout Catholics), the *Derechas* were returned to the Cortes in large numbers. In fact, the present Cortes have a strong slant to the right just as the previous Cortes slanted to the left; and it

has been suggested that Spain will now pass through two years of 'Right' legislation (*i.e.*, undoing the anti-clerical legislation of Azaña's *régime*) just as she has already borne two years of 'Left' legislation—a sort of ventilation process of '*señoritisimo*' and '*izquierdismo*.'

So the agony continues. To-day the pain is particularly keen, for there is no single individual who can absorb the nation's agony in his person. There is no one to act as a holocaust like the bull in his death agonies, like Don Quixote brought back to his village to die, like Don Alfonso in the last months of the monarchy, like Primo de Rivera at his fall from power, like Don Manuel Azaña caricatured in all the daily papers of Madrid. To-day there is no outstanding personality. Spain is without its *hombre*, and consequently feels lost and strange. The nation itself must bear its agony. And who are the combatants? Between whom is the contest? '*Derechas* and '*Izquierdas*,' answers the foreigner. But a Spaniard may have his doubts. The individual against the crowd is the agony of life—and of Spain. But both '*Derechas* and '*Izquierdas* seem to-day to be on the side of the crowd. Both, though superficially hostile to one another, unite in the hunt of the individual, in the remorseless pursuit of Don Quixote. And where is Don Quixote? Is he, indeed, any longer in existence? Is he not, too, become part and parcel of a romantic past? Fortunately, there are odd corners of Spain where his tall form lingers yet, lean and gaunt and sunbleached, on the empty toasted hills, in crumbling villages, in the *Residencia de Estudiantes*, or on the long white road that curves and sweeps over the burnished plains of that still pre-eminently royal domain, Old Castile.

PHILIP ROBINSON.

INDUSTRIAL COMBINATION: ENGLAND'S NEW ATTITUDE

It is not very long ago that any movement towards industrial combination in England was exclusively regarded from the standpoint of threatening monopolies. Cartels and trusts were mainly identified with the arbitrary fixing of 'high' prices and restricting production. Industrial combination was regarded as unsuited to English conditions, and although books, like that of Mr. Macrosty or myself, had at an early date called attention to the development of combination in English industry, the general public was led to believe that cartellisation in the German sense or trustification in the American was non-existent in England. The Report on Trusts of 1919, republished in 1924, with its statement that there were ninety-three quasi-monopolist associations in England regulating prices and production, came rather as a surprise to the English public; though it was expressly stated by Mr. Percy Ashley in that Report that by far the greater part of these organisations restricting production and controlling prices 'had come into existence since the end of the century.' Thus monopolist organisation in British industry could no longer be regarded as 'purely alien.'

The conviction that British industries would never be characterised by an all-around system of monopolist organisation of the type prevalent among their German rivals was backed by many considerations and circumstances, the enumeration of which may be useful in illustrating the changes in the attitude towards industrial combination which have taken place in recent years. First of all, the development of industrial combination in Germany set in at a time when there was indeed nothing of the kind in English industry. As early as 1883 the German cartel movement was 'discovered' by Professor Kleinwächter. The first official investigation on cartels in 1905 revealed the fact that there were 353 associations of that kind—almost fifty in the chemical industries alone. In England there was much less publicity about industrial combination than on the Continent. Associations, and even amalgamations, were keen to hide anything in their business management which could be interpreted as being 'monopolistic.'

for fear of infringing the law against restraint of trade.⁴ This circumstance, which led to much less publicity than in Germany or the United States, obscured the real development of industrial combination in England. In Germany, on the other hand, the Government, far from placing cartels under penalties or forbidding their formation, was supporting this form of industrial organisation by becoming a partner in industrial combination, as in the coal and the potash cartels. The wave of German economic liberalism—which had never been a very strong factor in German economic policy—having almost vanished by the end of the 'nineties, there was never a real popular outcry against cartels from any individualistic or liberal point of view. If there had been any really important opposition against the growing power of combines, such opposition would have been far more aroused by general anti-capitalistic considerations (the cartels and trusts being prototypes of the highest stage of capitalist development) than by a desire to uphold the principles of free competition, as would have been the case in an English anti-monopolist movement. A good many German Socialists were not even likely to oppose too strongly these new giant forms of organisation, which, in their eyes, were the forerunners of State Socialism in German industry.

A third cause which made cartellisation in England much less conspicuous than in Germany, and thereby held back a general discussion of the new problem, was the fact that English monopoly organisations were not to be found in those industries which were likely to attract general interest. In Germany the playground of cartels and amalgamations was from the beginning of the movement to be found in the great extractive and 'heavy' industries, such as coal, potash, iron and steel, and chemicals. These industries enjoy a certain general popularity. The problems touching coal seem almost as vital to the public as those affecting bread. The iron and steel industry in almost every industrial country is regarded as the key to the progress of economic prosperity. Important developments happening in these industries can hardly be hidden from public knowledge or silenced by the Press. They will be a topic of general discussion. In England, however, the first and most important combines were formed in industries of a specialised character. In the textile group no real effective association was formed in the line of general weaving and spinning, the movement towards combination being confined to such lines as sewing cotton, fine-cotton spinning, calico printing, bleaching and dyeing; while other important combinations were formed in the wall-paper, cable making, distilling, rayon industries, etc. No doubt an English coal trust or a cotton cartel, a cartellisation or trustification in the iron and steel trade (there

were associations in the rail and tube business) covering iron ore, pig-iron and raw steel, or a trust of shipbuilders, would have promptly aroused public interest and political discussion in England as much as in other countries, and industrial combination would have become a topic of profound public importance. The interest in industrial combination in the groups of industry mentioned was more or less restricted to those concerned in these lines of manufacture. It was the Chemical Trust which first attracted wider popular attention, while the long-existing combination in the alkali and soda trade had hardly been known to the English public. Yet the Imperial Chemical Industries were almost the youngest offspring of combination in British industry.

All these circumstances, by obscuring knowledge about English monopolies, had led to a belief that industrial combination would never attain any dominant position in the structure of British industry. This being the case, it seems only natural that a specific explanation was sought for the absence of English combines or their relative paucity. It was pretended over and over again—a very popular argument—that the English producer, by his individualistic attitude towards business management, was unwilling to form or join combinations. Expressed in plain English, this meant that English manufacturers disliked other people to look into their business; while, expressed in terms of traditional economic theory, it was the belief in free competition, in the survival of the fittest and the greatest possible efficiency of the *entrepreneur*, which effectively checked the movement of cartellisation. It may be conceded that the psychological ground was not exactly favourable to the formation of industrial monopolies in England. The German producer was certainly not hampered in this respect by any doctrine of *laissez-faire* or economic liberalism. But this theory, in fact, was a doctrine more than a theory. Even so liberal-minded a scientist as Professor Lujo Brentano has pointed out that the principle of coalition might just as well suit the instincts of capitalists as that of individual competition, if under certain conditions the competitive system was proving harmful to each individual manufacturer.

Has the individualistic attitude of British manufacturers really prevented the formation of combines, where they were possible and promised a common profit? I do not believe it. It is well known to economists, though not perhaps to the public, that a most powerful combination existed among northern coal-owners between the end of the eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century—the Newcastle *Vend*, a cartel which was the first of its kind. This combination should not be confounded

with the many loose arrangements frequently styled industrial combinations. There is an agreement dated 1835 which contains not less than thirty-five paragraphs and differs in no respect from the much later statute of the Rheinisch-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, which to many English coal-owners of to-day seems to be a sort of unattainable ideal in regard to the re-organisation of the English coal trade. This early combination seems to have been just as complex in its regulations as many of the most modern German cartels, combining, with the regulation of prices and output at the northern collieries, regulations concerning the shipping of coal and common understandings and agreements with the London coal trade and its quite elaborate distributive organisation. In fact, the first genuine cartel in the coal trade will not have its place in German but in English economic history. The efficient cause of the collapse of this dominant combination in the 'forties was by no means the awakening of any 'individualistic' feeling among English colliery-owners, but simply the rapid progress of railway communication throughout England, by which the London market became open to competition from almost any county, freeing itself from the 'allocations'—then called 'allotments'—of the 'limitation of the *Vend*' and its seaborne coal. This historical example shows that even English individualism was no impediment to monopoly where conditions were really in favour of it.

Of course, it cannot be denied that here or there industrial combination in England might have set in sooner, if the public attitude had been more favourable to it. German manufacturers were never hampered in their decisions by any regard for the 'anti-monopolistic spirit of the people.' In fact, such spirit has never existed in Germany. The transition from the guild system and that of patent monopolies to freedom of trade was not the outcome of such revolutionary events as England experienced in the seventeenth century, and certainly the paternal *régime* of German petty princes had never been so reckless in regard to the granting of oppressive monopolies as that of James I. or Charles I. Thus the history preceding the freedom of manufacture left no mark which could be compared with the hatred of any sort of monopoly so characteristic of the English mind. It would, for instance, have been quite impossible in Germany to attack protection as 'monopolising' the home market; sociologically the term 'monopoly' has never in Germany been the object of that specific kind of dislike so characteristic of the English anti-monopolist spirit.

In Germany—very much in contrast to the English attitude towards combination—economic science was trying to reconcile the new monopolist movement with the prevalent 'respect' for

a system of individualism and free competition. Economic historians, like Gustav von Schmoller, whose pupils had during a long time the first claim to chairs of economics all over Germany, were not averse to seeing a system of industrial organisation revived which certainly bore a greater resemblance to their own favoured field of study, namely, governmental regulation of industry during the mercantilist period, than to that of '*Manchesterism*' and *laissez-faire*. Schmoller expressed the view as early as 1905 that cartels meant the beginning 'of a quite new order of public life.' From its very beginning the development of industrial combination in Germany was regarded from the viewpoint of organisation rather than from that of monopolist attempts of profiteering. Many economists, like Kleinwächter or Schäffle, had long since argued that the much-admired system of free competition would end one day in 'anarchy.' As regards Socialists and Socialist writers, cartellisation seemed to some of them a mere preliminary development to general socialisation (*Durchgangstufe zum Sozialismus*), while 'revisionists' were eager to point out that industrial combination might have a stabilising effect in the framework of capitalism. It seems rather surprising that support of cartellisation and amalgamation should have come from the ranks of the most ardent opponents of the capitalist system, while, in fact, industrial combination had to be regarded as the very exponent of the capitalistic system. But we may remember that Socialism had always shown some affinity to the German liking of organised control. Indeed, as Professor Wolfers has pointed out with regard to the most recent attitude of German Socialists towards private monopolies, these were regarded '*als eine höhere Wirtschaftsstufe*'—a higher stage of evolution. He explains in his well-known study on cartel literature that

not so much the cartels themselves were considered the pioneers of Socialism as the newly created power of the State to control and to influence these organisations. The private monopoly controlled by the State was regarded as the last step towards that status of economic organisation in which the State was to incorporate industrial combination as self-governing small bodies into its plan for socialising certain groups of industry.

It follows from these statements that any real attack on monopoly from the Socialist ranks could only arise in connexion with the actual price policy of cartels, while as to the principle of combination there was little or no opposition. The 'monopoly' argument against industrial combination, so potent a factor in the comparatively recent English discussion, was of no value to German socialistic thought. The organisatory side of industrial combination in Germany gained a still greater significance when, after 1924, the movement towards increased rationalisation set

in. It seemed evident that the tremendous financial and technical task involved in the programmes of rationalisation could be solved in a much more efficient manner by the concerted action of producers or by big amalgamated firms than by smaller manufacturers acting on their own individual lines, and being probably unable to afford the necessary financial means. In fact, industrial combination seemed at one time the very condition for effectively carrying out the programme of rationalisation.

A review of the psychological attitude towards industrial combinations in Germany and England, as it was attempted here, shows a very remarkable contrast in the two countries—industrially, not so very much differentiated. While in England a number of circumstances have certainly led people to underestimate the importance of associations and amalgamations in the organisation of modern large-scale industry, in Germany forces of economic and political thought were actively supporting this 'new form of organisation,' or at any rate not obstructing its progress. Having this contrast in mind, it is interesting to note that a very decisive change in the attitude towards cartels and amalgamations has taken place in England of late. From a form of organisation at first regarded with gravest suspicion and from a merely anti-monopolist point of view, later on as a sort of 'alien' import, un-English in itself and hardly suited to the development of traditional English business life, the movement towards combination has now for some years been a very much discussed topic in English public life.

This change of mind is already evident from the very lucid statements in the Report on Trusts. It was expressly stated that

great possibilities of industrial and commercial improvement lie beyond the confines of free competition, and can only (!) be realised by combination in one or other of its several forms; by informal consultation and co-operation, by formal association, or by actual amalgamation.

In the Minority Report it was expressly stated:

We do not suggest that any action should be taken to prevent or obstruct combination or association of capitalist enterprise. Apart from the experience that no such interference can be made effective, we have to recognise that association and combination in production and distribution are steps in the greater efficiency, the increased economy and the better organisation of industry.

Curiously enough, the final Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade of 1929 has not gone so far as to recommend these new 'steps' to a better organisation; on the contrary, while treating the descriptive side of the problem at length, this very important official document was rather careful to avoid

drawing constructive conclusions. It was agreed that the movement towards combination had shown remarkable progress since the war, but attention was called to the fact that several of the large consolidations, which had developed out of or shortly after the war, 'had proved unsuccessful,' although it was agreed that their experiences and miscalculations had been of a special nature. It was again stated that a better economy and organisation of industry was doubtless to be attained 'where the unit of business is large, or where the various undertakings are bound together by a close agreement'; but, on the other hand, the remark of 'a very acute observer . . . possessing exceptional experience in the organisation and administration of combinations,' was significantly quoted to the effect that there was 'a general tendency in popular discussion to exaggerate the simple economics of straight-run standard lines possible through concentration and to under-estimate the costs of bringing them about.' The whole spirit in which the subject was treated here showed a great reluctance towards any far-reaching recommendations of a general reorganisation of British industries on the basis of cartels or trusts.

The changed attitude towards industrial combination has become much more evident in some reports dealing with the special grievances of certain industries on the one hand and in writings and public utterances of well-known politicians and industrialists on the other. Thus the Samuel Report on the Coal Industry had been much more definite in its recommendations than the Balfour Report. Then followed the Lewis Report, which contained a number of suggestions about combinations in the coal trade. The majority of the Committee concluded 'that the development of organised marketing in the coal-mining industry is desirable in order to avoid excessive competition, to effect economies and improvements in the marketing of coal, and to help to stabilise the industry.' Part II. of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Act of 1930 was, as one may say, the first practical step in that direction, as it became now one of the officially recognised ends of organisation 'to promote and assist, by the preparation of schemes and otherwise, the amalgamation of undertakings.'

Since that time the new attitude towards industrial combination in England has become an established fact. The time when, as the late Lord Melchett (then Sir Alfred Mond) remarks in *Industry and Politics*, every association had been indiscriminately dubbed a 'combine' was over. While in 1926 Mr. Patrick Fitzgerald, in his very able study on *Industrial Combination in England*, could still emphasise that this movement, although 'an established feature of English industrial organisation,' was, strangely enough, being 'viewed apathetically by a community which twenty years since was roused to fury against a

projected soap trust,' that view was certainly no longer correct in 1930. Far from checking or discouraging the formation of any sort of combination, the British Government went so far as to grant temporary protection to the iron and steel trade on the condition that a reorganisation on associative lines should be carried through. A committee of the industry was set up by Sir George May, as chairman of the Import Duties Advisory Committee, to consider plans of reorganisation which were to lead to amalgamation, cartellisation and associative action of different kinds. The scheme, as originally drafted, proposed that the British iron and steel industry should be organised on the basis of a number of approved associations, each dealing with a group of similar products, and a central body, co-ordinating the associations and incorporated under royal charter, or under the Companies Act, as the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain. Owing, however, to the opposition of a considerable section of iron and steel manufacturers, the scheme has been much toned down; the idea of the new composition was abandoned, and the existing Iron and Steel Federation, with a revised constitution, was substituted. All reference to amalgamation was excised and the powers of the central body were very much curtailed, leaving the initiative entirely to the sectional associations. The amended constitution was adopted by the Iron and Steel Federation in April, and at the end of May the Government announced its decision to make the duties on iron and steel permanent. Mr. Harold Macmillan, M.P., has in his interesting study *Reconstruction* (1933), collected quite a number of passages from speeches illustrating the keen interest shown and the urgent support given by prominent English industrialists and politicians, such as Sir Ernest Gowers, Mr. (now Sir) T. D. Barlow, Mr. Lennox Lee and others, to what is now called 'reorganisation,' 'co-operative organisation,' 'co-ordination,' 'reconstruction,' etc.—words which, in fact, mean nothing else than the formation of industrial combinations by cartellisation and trustification. The speech made by Sir Ernest Gowers, chairman of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Committee, to the Cardiff Business Club on February 24, 1933, is particularly interesting. We may quote the following passage:

I believe that what we really want ultimately is not only amalgamations but also a looser form of co-operation over an area wider than the industry is willing to take as its unit of production. I do not think that can be done except by building a ground floor of amalgamations first and adding this looser form of wider co-operation as an upper storey. In other words, it would mean grouping the units of production into much bigger associations—call them cartels or what you will—with two main purposes. One purpose would be to co-operate in selling and distribution. The other would be to exercise a general control over the development of the area

and to share the expense of buying and closing mines which no single unit might think it worth while to acquire, because it could not be sure enough of getting their trade.

The Times of March 15, 1934, was certainly expressing the general opinion in a much-discussed article on 'A Frame for Industry' when it claimed that 'during the past two years opinion had made such strides that it was probably no longer necessary to argue the case for a thorough reconstruction of the framework of British industry.'

This 'reconstruction,' in fact, means nothing else than industrial combination. Anti-monopolist arguments are no longer raised. The unpleasant side of combination has gone into oblivion. Competition being to-day, in its most frequent form, the outcome of glut, over-production and an uneconomic diversity in industrial structure has for some time been regarded as a curse rather than as a boon. As the level of prices has been in many cases excessively low in comparison with costs of production, the tendency has been to welcome a rise in prices. The policy of President Roosevelt has probably given strength to such considerations, even outside the United States. The period of apparent apathy on the part of the public and political leaders in England towards existing industrial combinations has suddenly turned into lively interest, even support. Industrial combination, in its new terminology, laying stress on the associative, co-operative, and reconstructive side of organisation, had lost its former menacing character as regards price-raising and limiting production. There was little room for monopolistic apprehensions, and if there had been any they would have been overshadowed by the desire to see British industries planned on a more rational and profitable basis. Thus obstruction and apathy turned into support, into a new attitude, which, as *The Times* article quite rightly remarks, may be considered as a sort of counterpart to 'the abandonment of free trade, agricultural marketing schemes, and many other developments which render it impossible for industry to continue functioning efficiently within the simple patterns of a *laissez-faire* economy.' Industrial combination in England has acquired to-day the position of a much-wanted article. Yet the failure and the slow progress of many schemes put forward of recent years, and especially the discouraging history of the Coal Mines Act and the negotiations in the iron and steel trade, tend to show that this article is not quite easy to acquire.

Once the English mental attitude towards existing industrial combinations and their economic ends was rather negative, to-day, now that this attitude has been changed into an active positivism, many people believe that the creation of effective and

comprehensive combination is merely a condition of insight and energy on the part of industrial leaders and governmental advisers—a matter of discovering the right scheme and the willingness to put it into action. While the former mental attitude has not been able to suppress industrial combination, although it may have slackened its development, it seems very doubtful indeed whether a mere change in that attitude will be able to create an all-round associative organisation so different from the former competitive prototype. It is sometimes easier to invent a catching title for a book than to write it, and it is doubtless easier to draw up a scheme leading to a tempting ideal of an 'Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain' than to bring about a plain but comprehensive English steel cartel. It would certainly be a mistake to underrate the influence of the mental attitude towards organisations. Undoubtedly psychological factors may largely contribute to the success or failure of industrial combinations. But it would be a mistake to overrate these influences. It would be fatal if such psychological considerations led one to underestimate those material, economic and non-psychological conditions which, in fact, are primarily responsible for the successful formation of cartels or amalgamations.

It must be remembered that Continental cartels and trusts, like those existing in England, have been built up on the basis of conditions which in certain very important English industries have hitherto been lacking. In many of the so-called 'new industries,' such as certain branches of the chemical industries, the rayon industry, the mineral-oil industry, some lines of the electrical industries and others, amalgamation and industrial combination were from the start facilitated by the large size of the technical and commercial unit, which characterised them from the very beginning. Where such a concentrated structure inherent in the original character of the industry was accompanied by immunity from foreign competition, either on account of a tariff or other circumstances, there was no difficulty in regard to centralised organisation on quasi-monopolistic lines. From these instances, which are frequently quoted as examples to show the success of industrial combination, quite different conditions of the old traditional industries have to be distinguished. In these industries the development of large units has in every country been the outcome of a long and very complicated process of amalgamation, of hard fighting between conflicting interests, a process of evolution in the size of the industrial undertaking almost unknown to new industries, which from their beginning were identified with a large outlay of capital on the one hand and extensive technical equipment on the other.

The English coal, iron and steel industries, the reorganisation

of which on cartellised lines is being much discussed, belong to the former group. It is really superficial reasoning to say that what has been effected in the chemical industries could be just as easily effected in those industries too. A closer study of the facts tends to show that even the much-quoted examples of the German industrial combination in the coal trade and the iron and steel industry, represented by the coal and iron syndicates, the *Stahlverein*, the *Rohstahlgemeinschaft*, etc., do not justify the contention that it is mere neglect on the part of the producers if combination in these groups does not yet exist in England. The history of these organisations in Germany is likely to show that the formation of industrial combination must not be considered as a simple matter of wisdom or insight on the part of manufacturers, as a sort of device, the advantage of which has only to be recognised in order to effect its realisation, but, on the contrary, as being dependent on certain material economic conditions which may differ from country to country and from industry to industry.

The German coal-mining industry has never been scattered over the whole of German territory as is the case in England, where coal of almost every quality (except anthracite) is found in almost any district. There have been always two main regions responsible for the German coal supply—namely, Rheinland, Westphalia and the Ruhr district, and the much less important field in Upper Silesia, which since the end of the war has become still more secondary in comparison with the Ruhr coal-mining district. This territorial or 'local' concentration of mines has been one of the essential facts as regards the monopolist organisation in the German coal trade, being a potent stimulus to exploit the 'advantage' given by Nature through effective monopolist organisation. The cartel, once formed and strongly established, accelerated the process of unification in two ways. On the one hand, it was in the interest of the big and most efficient collieries to acquire the quotas of their weaker competitors by buying their collieries and closing them down. This accelerated the process of amalgamation. In that respect cartellisation was responsible for the increasing size in the unit of undertakings, which quite naturally entailed simultaneously the greater efficiency of the single unit. On the other hand, cartellisation in the coal trade as well as in the mining of iron ore—which before the war was geographically centralised in Alsace-Lorraine, and, indeed, offered almost similar opportunities for monopolisation as coal—led to grave apprehension on the part of those manufacturers who were dependent on the supply of both minerals. They became eager to acquire collieries in order to protect themselves against the cartels in the extractive industries, this tendency leading to the

formation of 'mixed' undertakings, combining all stages of production in one firm, and soon became another force towards the building up of giant concerns as the profitable prototype of production. It is quite evident that these undertakings, once formed, were financially in a much better position to carry through costly technical improvements than their weaker competitors, the 'pure' works, so that this process of vertical combination, by increased rationalisation, led to another increase in the size of the technical unit. In fact, while in 1900 the collieries producing 500,000 tons a year and under amounted to 73 per cent. of the total, their percentage had come down to 24 per cent. in 1928. While in that year the percentage of machine-cut coal was nearly 78 in Germany, it was not more than 26 in Great Britain. In the Samuel Report on the British Coal Industry of 1925 it was stated that about 239,000,000 tons of coal were produced by 653 separate undertakings, while in the Westphalian coalfield in normal years about 100,000,000 tons were produced by not more than seventy undertakings.

In fact, there had never been any great pressure in England to acquire extractive properties in order to avoid the dangers of monopolisation. Coal of every kind was to be had all over the country, and the best iron ores were imported from Sweden and Spain, while Germany had to rely on the highly phosphoric ores of Alsace and Lorraine, which were particularly suited to the Thomas process practised in the German iron and steel industry. When vertical combination began in England, it was carried on rather with a view to greater economic efficiency than through fear of being shut off from the coal or iron ore supply—a factor which has not only been potent in the development of the German steel industry, but also, as will be remembered, in the formation of the United States Steel Corporation. Moreover, the big concerns in German coal-mining were as afraid to lose the steel works, when once vertically combined, as their customers were for their part desirous of acquiring iron and steel works in order to safeguard the sale of their minerals. So the formation of *Hüttenzechen* was followed by that of *Zechenhütten* (ironwork-collieries, colliery-ironworks).

The German development of industrial combination in the coal and the iron and steel industry has therefore not to be considered as being merely the outcome of practical reflections of enlightened business men and their special talents for organisation. This would be far truer of the German chemical or electrical trades. In coal, iron and steel, however, without underrating the commercial gift of those finally responsible for the formation of leading concerns, the movement towards industrial combination was primarily based upon certain material conditions favouring

monopoly, while, on the other hand, it was also the result of a very long and very arduous fight of those interested in the formation of big units against their weaker competitors. The existing industrial combinations in these groups of industries have been to a much larger extent the result of bitter struggle, leading to amalgamations and larger units, than of an adoption of some well-thought-out ready-made 'scheme.' And it ought not to be forgotten that, even under these conditions favourable to the formation of monopolies, the German Ruhr coal cartel was threatened with dissolution on the verge of the World War, as it had not been able to avoid over-production and the interests of the big 'mixed' firms and the 'pure' collieries began to show very distinct divergencies. In fact, it was only governmental pressure during and after the war which saved the cartel. And it has been the same compulsory action which has kept the potash cartel (*Kalisyndikat*) from breaking down, although it has been argued, not without reason by some writers, that it has been the compulsory syndicate in the potash industry which has prolonged the fatal over-production of that industry, as it was preventing the survival of the fittest by mitigating the struggle for existence in favour of less efficient mines and recklessly allowing newcomers to join the ranks of the still existing producers. Almost the same problem is already facing the formation of a steel combination in England. Sir W. Firth pointed out before the meeting of the London Iron and Steel Exchange on January 30, 1934, that the scheme before the committee was dependent on voluntary acceptance and voluntary price agreements. It was obvious, he remarked, that the only prices that would be voluntarily agreed to would be those that showed a profit to the least efficient plants. So in its infancy English industrial combination in the steel trade is faced with a problem well known as one of the most thorny in the chronicles of German cartellisation.

At any rate, even the history of German mining industries, which presented so many natural facilities for combination, seems to show that it is very doubtful whether industrial combination can hold its own economically when left exclusively to private enterprise. There is, indeed, a very material difference between forming a co-operative society or a trade union and organising a cartel or a trust. It would be a mistake, with regard to the problem of industrial combination in England, to overlook the fact that many of the evolutionary elements conspicuous in the development of industrial combination in other countries have been lacking hitherto in the most important English industries. It would be erroneous to criticise those who are to-day endeavouring to bring about new organisations in industry for not being

able to speed up the plans envisaged without paying due regard to the special circumstances of the structure of these industries in England when contrasted either with other British industries or with combinations in foreign countries. Special care should be taken to understand the very complicated organisatory problems of cartellisation, the various circumstances favouring or obstructing its success, the great diversity within a single industry as regards costs of production and the size of units technically and financially, and the conflicting interests resulting from this diversity among manufacturers. Only if due notice is taken of these and many other circumstances connected with cartellisation and amalgamations, and of the rôle which, according to these differentiating conditions, the State will have to play in the industrial organisation of the future, can the new English attitude towards industrial combination be prevented from jumping from one extreme to another.

HERMANN LEVY.

OUR RURAL WATER SUPPLY

THOUGH the rains of April and the earlier part of May did much to improve the national water supply, they could not make up even this year's deficit, and conditions revealed by a tour of investigation through rather more than half our counties are gravely unsatisfactory. They must so remain until some scheme of action is adopted to deal on national lines with the problems involved.

Consider our needs. In large towns daily requirements per head of population are estimated at 30 gallons—12 for cooking, washing and drinking, 8 for flushing sewers, etc., 10 for general purposes. In the Army the allowance per man in barracks is 20 gallons per day, with the same for a horse; in hospitals, 50 per head. London provides 40 gallons per head per day, and although these figures seem high, particularly in times of drought, we may remember that the daily measure among the Romans in the heyday of their civilisation was 100 gallons, and it is noticeable that when they established their camps in England they always placed them as near as possible to good water.

Rainfall varies considerably in England. West of the Pennine Range it is very heavy, in East Anglia very light; normal extremes are 21 inches in Essex and 160 inches in Westmorland. Our natural reserves have been greatly affected by the tarring of roads throughout the country. Water that used to percolate and feed deep springs runs along the surface to be carried away and lost. Untreated rainwater is not a satisfactory source of supply, because in towns it will come in contact with gases, soot, dirty roofs and neglected cisterns. The action of rainwater on lead, zinc and iron is very definite; the best cisterns, glazed earthenware and cement, are not in common use. Rainwater that has soaked through gravel soil, or the water of rivers fed by springs, is the best and purest.

The problem of the large towns is not so baffling as that of the villages. Urban authorities can secure their essential needs because they have the means to pay for long-distance pipes or deep-bore wells; but in rural England upwards of 10,000,000 people are said to take their supplies from shallow wells, and

where these are on clay the water may, and often does, fail. Many farms maintain manure heaps that drain into wells, or cess-pits that contaminate them, and there would appear to be no adequate supervision. Countrymen live and thrive where town men would die: '*O dura ilia messorum.*'

In the country the allowance deemed necessary for the farm labourer, his wife and their children will vary from 2 to 5 gallons per head, but in the past year the larger measure has been out of the question. The Ministry of Health issued a circular (No. 1338) in May 1933 calling on rural district councils and county councils to secure plentiful and wholesome water by working in conjunction with county authorities or urban districts whenever such co-operation is possible; the Ministry reminded county councils that under the Local Government Act of 1929 they may contribute towards the costs of well-considered schemes for improved supplies. So far as one can ascertain, the Ministry's appeal has met with inadequate response. Regarded as a whole, rural district councils are neither able nor willing to deal with a crisis. They are rate-conscious to an incredible extent; in many quarters one finds that increased expenditure is regarded as a far more serious matter than water shortage and its consequent evils. They are gambling on rain that at time of writing (late May) has not fallen.

Experience on a spring journey of inquiry that covered 2000 miles shows that the county councils, almost without exception, are well aware of the seriousness of the situation and are taking what measures they can to meet it. The only two counties that appear up to the present to have allowed their troubles to overcome them are Huntingdon and the Boston division of Lincolnshire, though, even where spirited efforts are being made, some conditions obtaining in England's byeways are little short of appalling. Perhaps the facts can best be set out in a brief survey of the wide area covered so recently as March and April.

In Essex, people depend very largely upon four rivers—the Stour, Chelmer, Blackwater and Ter; and while the level of some of these fell considerably as a result of last year's drought, when the country's rainfall dropped from its average of 21 inches to less than 14, there has been no really grave trouble, even though the public water supply failed admittedly in fifteen parishes. The authorities are anxious, alert and resourceful, as they may well be with a population of more than a million people to cater for. Despite their endeavour, very marked inconvenience, and even suffering, are found in those remote villages where time stands still.

Suffolk is far worse off than her southern neighbour, for,

though certain authorities declare that there is enough water to satisfy one and all if deep bores were made, the trouble is, of course, that these cost a lot of money, and when proposals involving a possible outlay are put forward objections are always forthcoming. Notes from Suffolk made so late as April record terrible conditions in corners to which few strangers penetrate. In one place the water supply is taken off the ample roof of the church and passed through a filter-bed into a well. The village slaughter-house, on the hillside a little above the well, drains into it, and this defect was only discovered by a stranger last year, to the great annoyance of certain inhabitants, who assured the writer that they had never found anything wrong with the water. In many other Suffolk villages people depend upon ponds, ditches and shallow wells reinforced by rainwater from adjacent fields, where all manner of mineral manures are used; to make matters worse, when the roads are tarred and rain follows, the tar water runs into the wells too. By the way, a doctor deeply interested in cancer research told me that in a certain district—not Suffolk—where there is a great network of tarred roads, a hospital that serves the area has recorded in the past few years a remarkable increase in cases of cancer of the lungs. In old days, before road tarring was practised, this form of cancer was quite uncommon; to-day it is met frequently. We may remember, too, the heavy spraying of orchards and how a sharp shower following the spraying may wash poisonous water into ditches and thence to ponds or wells. In a Suffolk village, where people were drinking from shallow ponds and a certain shallow well, an old resident said that although people did not like the water it did them no harm, but children who came down there for holiday sickened. In parts of the county—between Saxmundham and the sea, for example—I was told that emergency measures had been prepared to supply water by motor lorry if drought develops, the area being well-nigh waterless.

Norfolk is better off than Suffolk, having ample rivers with any tributaries. The only serious trouble comes in the country round the fens (towards Lincoln, Docketing and Swaffham, for example), though in the villages round Wells-next-the-Sea there has been abnormal shortage. The county council is vigorous; the problems are not great: it is only on passing from Norfolk into the southern division of Lincoln that one may ask whether we are still in twentieth-century England.

There are villages in the Boston division that depend almost entirely on rainwater. You can find semi-detached houses with one underground cistern between them, and, owing to the pressure of boiling silt when ground water is high, these are apt to burst; it is now considered necessary to build cisterns in reinforced

concrete. Beyond the shallow wells and rainwater cisterns, the rural area of Boston has no source of supply except the dykes. Wells in that area are described by an authority as being 'more or less contaminated'; if the shallow wells are deepened, saline or brackish water is reached. Farmers must cart from ponds and dykes for their stock unless they can utilise the large roof space of their farm buildings to collect supplies; here, as elsewhere in rural England, dairy farms are gravely inconvenienced. Perhaps half the people in these Boston byways do not clean their cisterns, so it is hardly surprising to learn that in some of the villages, particularly in one part where much shoddy is used for manuring the land, there are outbreaks of what is called blister-pox among the children in the spring and the autumn. The town of Boston depends upon the Witham, a polluted and contaminated river that was responsible for a terrible outbreak of typhoid in Lincoln many years ago, an outbreak that forced the city fathers to obtain plentiful pure water from over the border. Needless to say, the water taken for Boston is purified before use. It is worth noting that there is sufficient potable water in Lincolnshire to meet all needs.

Yorkshire in her three ridings contrives to carry on. In the East Riding, Hull is a great stand-by; with ample surplus she sends out water in all directions. The problem of the North Riding is extremely difficult, because it covers the moorland area that cannot possibly be reached by pipes; I was told of one village that is about 25 miles by road from the railway. The situation is helped by the sparsity of population—for example, there are three rural districts carrying less than 15,000 people on 250,000 acres; it is further aided in the far-off places by settlement near ponds or streams. The West Riding is well supplied, and has been helped recently by the acquisition of a certain part of Derbyshire's ample water field.

On the eastern side of England cases of bitter hardship were plentiful last year. I was told of one Lincoln village where water was sold by the bucket at a halfpenny or penny, and agricultural labourers had been forced to pay as much as 3s. a week; there were other villages that depended largely upon the polluted waters of the river Trent. Certain farmers had to travel 4 or 5 miles for water, and yet they say that Bourne, in the Kesteven division of Lincoln, has inexhaustible supplies that are wasted. The trouble with Lincoln is that it has, in addition to the richest soil in England and many of the richest farmers, three county authorities for service of less than half a million people. One authority with sufficient means at its disposal and the necessary measure of unselfish goodwill could solve the ugly problems. Individualism runs riot in fenland.

The Midland counties that survived all last year's trials can face the future without serious apprehension. Derbyshire is well off, though there are considerable areas entirely supported by rainwater. For 10 or 15 miles between the Dove and the Derwent, for example, there is a deep, dry limestone subsoil. From Hartington to Darley Dale one may walk for 12 miles and never see a stream; between Wirksworth and Buxton wells are so rare that there are ceremonies of great antiquity for dressing and blessing those that exist. Dew ponds (locally called meres) are used by some farmers, and there is much carting; milk production is difficult. In the Peak Forest, on the limestone, there is trouble; but these areas of scarcity are not typical of the county—they are remote, beautiful and desolate. Three-quarters of Derbyshire has its pipe lines, and the very high country of great scenic distinction holds but few people. I was told by a well-known expert that there is need to investigate local sources of supply more carefully; he quoted one district where a scheme involving large expenditure was under consideration when ample water was found 9 feet below the surface. A great part of the inconvenience experienced in Derbyshire is felt by the people who put up large houses, villas or bungalows on waterless beauty spots and then expect the local authorities to meet their needs; though if all available water could be distributed, even this would not be difficult. For example, on the road from Matlock to Derby one encounters the Meerbrook Tunnel, 3 or 4 miles long, dug by convicts at the end of the eighteenth century to draw off water from the lead-mine workings; it throws 15,000,000 gallons of water every twenty-four hours into the Derwent, and of this about 2,000,000 gallons are taken by a water company. The fact that Derbyshire can help to support Manchester, Stockport and Sheffield is sufficient indication of her happy state.

Nottinghamshire, which shares the Derwent Valley scheme, is equally fortunate, and knows nothing of shortage outside a few remote parishes. This county helps the town of Lincoln, and, though there are too many shallow wells of poor quality on the clay (wells yielding an intensely hard water), there is sufficient to satisfy all normal needs if only the local councils would think more of the public health and less of the private pocket. In both Derby and Nottingham there was a very definite complaint about the dangers of ribbon building; and presently I found that in nearly every county that has beauty spots, or is extending on either side of main roads, the sanitary arrangements connected with new housing are for the greater part unsatisfactory and threaten danger to health in seasons of drought. At the same time, it is fair to add that although in several parts of the country outbreaks of typhoid fever have occurred, during the past two

years they have in nearly every case been traced to defective sewer pipes, and do not appear to be connected in any way with water shortage or the failure of water companies to protect consumers.

In Leicestershire, where the rural districts are badly off and many of the wells are contaminated, there is no loud outcry, because rural population is so small and widely scattered. People congregate on the western half towards the north, and always near running water, so that where there is shortage, as at Billesdon and Melton Mowbray, it is not really a source of anxiety save to a handful of people.

It was common knowledge that Northamptonshire was hard hit last year, but a geological map serves to explain the county's trouble. Here is a range of very difficult soil—Oxford clay on limestone, Northampton sand under that, and lias clays for 700 or 800 feet. The natural water supply appears to be shrinking. I was told of certain wells that used to give 250,000 gallons a day and are now down to less than 25,000. Deep boring often yields saline water, and in all probability there will be no adequate supply for this considerable county without help from over its borders. Some ambitious schemes are under examination. The water engineers lift up their eyes to the hills—the hills of Wales.

Warwickshire is fortunate in the possession of an extremely active county council. Every rural district has been examined. Bad patches are few and far between, though one hears of places like Dunchurch, where 90 per cent. of the wells are polluted; Grandborough, where every well is polluted; Long Lawford, where, the investigator states, there is not a good well in the village; and Stretton-on-Dunsmore, where every sample taken was contaminated. This is in the Rugby rural district, which has the worst problem in the county. The medical officer of health said in January that the position would become acute in many places unless there should be a considerable rainfall. Since his report was issued the situation has been relieved, but enough has been discovered to show the need for a comprehensive system of pipe lines: in normal years shortage and pollution are in evidence; in very dry years they are a public danger. The Warwickshire County Council is bringing necessary pressure to bear upon rural district councils; and it is clear that the county, being so largely given to dairying, is greatly concerned about its milk business, which would be seriously affected by another dry summer. In the earlier part of this year farmers in the Rugby district were requested to cut down the amount used for washing cows and cowsheds. You cannot produce grade A milk without ample water.

In Worcestershire there are many parishes with shallow wells

which may not be deepened because the water below the present levels is saline. Here, again, the population lies in a comparatively small area of the county, and, from what I could hear, local authorities in remote areas are not helpful.

Gloucestershire is well off. The Wye and the Severn are a great aid, actual or potential; but in parts of the county the people must drink saline water unless they can collect rain in tanks. I heard of villages where people had to walk a mile to fill their pails and of a sanatorium where the yield from the springs fell suddenly last year from 15,000 to 9000 gallons a day, so that there was a momentary fear that it would be necessary to close the institution.

Even in the Midland counties where the situation is well in hand and arrangements were being made in the fore part of the year to meet any trouble that this summer may bring, cases of real hardship are quite common. There are always some villages in which there is no water to hand. Labourers must walk a mile or more after a day's work to fill their pail—lucky if it is fit for drinking and they are not called upon to pay for it; farmers must spend large sums of money every week on carting; milk cannot be properly cooled, churns cannot be scalded, cowhouses and cows cannot be kept clean. Even if we have a reasonable rainfall this year, these conditions will not be bettered to any considerable extent. Should there be a sustained hot spell, they will become acute.

Oxfordshire is happily situated. The county town, Witney and Banbury have an ample supply of pipe water. Two companies look after the southern areas. Only in the remote villages is there trouble; in places like Stonesfield, Roxton and Bampton people told a tale of woe. The county medical officer of health, a Lincoln man who knows what trouble is like, is trying to develop a system of rainwater collection from all the public buildings, from the roofs of church, chapel, schoolhouse and village institute. If this water could be run through a filter-bed and stored, there is no doubt that life in many a remote corner would be made happier and healthier.

Buckinghamshire, considered from the standpoint of water supply, is one of the most interesting counties in England. Houses on the Chiltern ridge have no other water than rain. Aylesbury, Newport Pagnell, Stony Stratford and other towns were cutting their service down, when I passed through; the springs of the town of Buckingham were failing. At Stokenchurch a 350-foot well, accustomed to carry 60 feet of water, was dry; there was not enough water for stock or poultry. 'All these conditions,' said a Buckinghamshire expert, 'will bring about a lowering of the public health, an increasing risk of epidemics.'

Side by side with the actual troubles of this popular county may be set the vigour and determination of the authorities ; they are grappling with the situation in a most effective fashion. Remote villages are helped by tanks fitted with hose-pipes ; the council buys the water from the companies and sells at a rate of 15 gallons a penny, losing considerably but helping the poorest of the poor. The sole undertaking that the purchaser must give is to use the water for domestic purposes only. If the water-carts could travel all over the county, Buckinghamshire's problem would be solved, because at the rate of a penny for 15 gallons every family can meet its needs. Private enterprise elsewhere has been charging a penny or more per pail.

Hertfordshire has suffered, but not badly ; only, in this county I found the authorities a little reticent, a little anxious to assert that, God being in his heaven, all is right with their part of the world. Around Buntingford and the Bedford border there is undeniable scarcity—many farm labourers go short of a reasonable minimum, dairy farmers were experiencing grave difficulties ; and the great reservoirs between Tring and Northchurch had fallen considerably, in one case 22 feet and in two cases 10 feet. A waterworks had locked its mains from midnight till six a.m., in order to save the water that was being used in garages and elsewhere to wash motor omnibuses, cars and aeroplanes.

Cambridgeshire is troubled on her Hertfordshire border, but the county town has an inexhaustible supply ; and experts told me that there is sufficient water in the fissures of the county's chalk to serve all purposes. There are cases of local hardship, but nothing more.

In Huntingdonshire, in the county highlands, I found not only grave shortage, but every sign of ineffective local authorities. I visited villages where the pump is locked up for the greater part of the day, where baths are unknown (baths are a luxury in rural England to-day), where the shallow farm ponds on the clay held no more than a small amount of a greenish, ill-smelling water, and where the village folk had to walk miles—literally miles—to a place where they could find water to wash their clothes. There are merely rumours of activities by the responsible authorities ; one is told of schemes and plans, but, however effective these may be, they are long overdue. ' We call out and nobody listens,' said one sufferer, only a few miles from the county town.

Bedford's County Council is very active ; the town is served by wells in the rock and by the Ouse, whose waters are suspect and treated accordingly. It is only in the north that there is a shortage—that is to say, in the area above Bedford, a comparatively small district with no important centres.

On my journey I asked many medical officers if they had

employed water-diviners ; with few exceptions they waived the suggestion aside. It was only in Warwickshire that I heard a dowser had been engaged and had found water in an area that was regarded as waterless. There should be no doubt among open-minded people that more use might be made of the diviner ; for if he can do nothing more, he can always say where boring operations will be useless, and can also tell you where water lies, though he may not be able to state precisely its depth or volume. Divining by the aid of hazel, wych-elm twigs or clock springs is quite a common gift, and would help the country if scientific gentlemen could only lay their prejudices aside. I made an offer to one medical officer of health, telling him that, if he would take me blindfolded over running water, a mere amateur would tell him where it was and so convince him that there is some truth in the claims of water-finders. He smiled and said he felt he was too old to change a fixed opinion on the subject.

The first conclusion arrived at, after visiting the most distressed areas, hearing expert opinion and discussing the whole situation with medical officers and engineers, is that the question of supervision of rural water should be entrusted to the county councils. In twenty-two counties it was only possible to find two that might be regarded as ineffective, and the difficulties of both are considerable. Parish and rural district councils are not fit to deal with emergencies ; they have failed again and again. Local authority has not been able to administer the Rats and Mice (Destruction) Act, it cannot handle the Poor Law ; it is not recruited from a class that has the necessary experience, capacity or freedom from selfish considerations. It was a district councillor who told me he could not understand why there was so much trouble ; he had a deep well on his own premises and he never refused anybody a pailful. Another district councillor declared that although men might be drinking from the dykes or from the polluted water of certain rivers, it would do them no harm because they were accustomed to it ; yet a third councillor (parish representative this time) said that if the Government wanted people to have good drinking water they should at least protect the ratepayers and not force them to put their hands in their pockets for folk who had managed hitherto to get along without help. It would be unfair to assume that all councillors are of this type. In certain counties they are helpful, but the case against them is serious ; as a class they are obstructionists.

Another need of the times is strict conservation of resources. The Bourne waters, the Meerbrook, the River Stour, for example, pour millions of gallons to waste every day, and when you come to examine the causes you may find the strangest reasons advanced. I was told it is often legally impossible to use water

to the fullest extent. The surplus of one river comes under certain Acts of Parliament and may be claimed by mills along the banks. These mills are no longer working, but the Act remains. Apart from sources of large supply, there are very many villages in which small streams run to waste because the parish council or rural district council will not take steps to make a small reservoir or even to put down tanks. Action of this kind should be enforced; a district that neglects its springs should be penalised.

The fact remains that, in spite of enormous loss of water by preventable causes, the rainfall in these islands, even in a dry year, is far more than enough to satisfy all needs if properly considered methods of conservation could be made compulsory. It may be said without fear of contradiction that, so far as the rural areas of England are concerned, the worst cases of hardship are due to the reluctance of the local authorities to foot the bill—often a small one.

S. L. BENSUSAN.

VITAMINS

THOUGH common knowledge and experience may not always be 'embalmed and treasured up on purpose' in that literature which becomes 'permanent,' nevertheless it appears highly probable that some knowledge of deficiency diseases has existed since antiquity. That scurvy, for example—the terror of mariners for generations—disappeared when fresh fruit or vegetables were obtained may well have been a fact familiar to Ulysses, assuming that the voyages of that intrepid hero were sufficiently prolonged.

In 1734 Bachstrov, in his *Observationes contra Scorbutum*, stated his complete conviction that scurvy was due to nothing more than a total abstinence from fresh vegetable food and greens; and in 1735 Casali, in an excellent description of the disease pellagra, noted in some detail the deficiencies of diets consumed in every case by inhabitants of pellagrous districts of Spain. Again, in 1747 an Englishman, Lind, with remarkable perspicacity divided twelve scurvy patients into six groups, and to each group made a different dietetic addition. The experiment concluded, it was seen that the pair to whose diet oranges had been added were cured dramatically, and that the cyder group also did well. Those given the other substances (*i.e.*, *elixir of vitriol*, vinegar, sea-water and a compound of garlic, mustard, balsam, and myrrh) showed, however, 'no good effect'! At about the same date 'Mr. Young of the Navy' recommended for the use of that service for eradicating scurvy a plan which consisted essentially in taking to sea for human consumption beans, peas, barley, etc., *in a state of germination or 'malting.'* (It was by such methods that Cook in his many voyages avoided a single case of fully developed scurvy.)

Earliest animal experiments by modern investigators showed that rats or guinea-pigs fed upon a diet completely deficient in food of fresh animal or vegetable origin failed to grow at a normal rate, developed various physical disorders, and died. Thus in 1881 Lunin, a worker in the school at Bunge at Basle, and the first of a distinguished succession of scientists, fed six mice on a diet containing every normal constituent of milk in

quantities quite sufficient to support life, but qualitatively so treated that its freshness was destroyed. All the animals died, and Lunin made the historic observation that, as well as the known ingredients, 'small quantities of substances' as yet unknown were present in fresh food and 'were essential for life.' This was the first adumbration of what we now know as Vitamin A. Again, in 1897 Eijkmans, a Dutch military physician, demonstrated that—as had been suspected for some time previously—the disease 'beri-beri,' then prevalent in the Dutch East Indies, was caused by the consumption for a continuous period of a diet consisting of little more than polished rice (plus the necessary fluids) and deficient completely in any fresh food or drink. With such knowledge Eijkmans cured and prevented 'beri-beri' by the addition to the diet of nothing more than the rice polishings themselves, but attributed his success, not to the epoch-making discovery—then made but unrecognised—that the pericarp of rice contained a specific food accessory factor whose absence caused 'beri-beri' and avian polyneuritis, and whose presence prevented those conditions, but to the removal, through improved digestion or neutralisation, of a toxic factor contained in polished rice and causative of the disease. Again, in 1907 two Norwegian investigators, Holst and Frölich, produced typical scurvy in guinea-pigs by depriving the diet of greenstuffs, and as easily cured it by making the necessary additions.

In the years which followed, Stepp, in Germany, extracted from bread (made with milk) a factor soluble in alcohol and ether whose presence seemed essential for life, whose continued absence caused death, and whose restoration to the diet within a sufficient period caused normal nutrition to recommence and to continue. Having worked upon similar lines, Hopkins, of England, published in 1912 his now classical experiments in which the addition of 2 or 3 cubic centimetres of fresh milk per diem to the diet of rats fed upon artificial food caused an acceleration of their growth and health quite disproportionate to that seen in the milk-deprived remainder, all of whom, after a feeble existence, became under-nourished and died. Similarly, the removal of milk from normally developing rats was followed by a cessation of growth and the occurrence of physical disorders and death, both of which could be prevented by a restoration of the factor. In June of the same year (1912) Casimir Funk published his *Ætiology of Deficiency Diseases*, and described both a successful attempt to concentrate the vitamin of rice polishings and an unsuccessful one to isolate it. Funk employed the word 'vitamine' for the first time, and, owing to current speculation as to the nature of these bodies, spelled the word with a terminal 'e.' On the suggestion of Drummond, however, the ending 'amine' (with its

implication of a relationship between the substance described and those organic bases which are derived by substitution from ammonia) has since been dropped; and, as at least two, and probably more, of the eight accessory food factors now known do not contain even nitrogen, it will be seen that such a change has much to commend it, and that the term 'vitamin' rather than 'vitamine' is more scientifically acceptable.

Though their earlier experiments were vitiated by the use of insufficiently purified milk sugar (which still contains vitamins), Osborne and Mendel, of Newhaven, Conn., demonstrated fairly conclusively that butter fat contained 'a substance' having a marked influence upon growth. And in 1911-14 McCollum and Davis, of Wisconsin, were successful in extracting from butter fat such a substance which when transferred to olive oil—normally deficient in activity of this kind—conferred upon the latter a similar function. Similarly, in 1915 the two latter investigators made the important discovery that, in addition to the anti-scurvy vitamin now known as Vitamin C, there were at least two other accessory food factors, the first contained in butter fat and the second associated, not only with 'unpurified' milk sugar (*i.e.*, with fresh milk), but with wheat germ, rice polishings, etc. They gave the name 'Fat-Soluble A' to the former and 'Water-Soluble B' to the latter—two terms which, despite certain deficiencies, embody a classification so useful that, with modifications, it seems likely to be permanent. In 1918, after E. Mellanby's classical researches upon the ætiology of rickets, it was seen that the anti-rachitic factor whose absence caused the disease possessed certain features which distinguished it from Fat-Soluble A and justified its separation from the latter and the possession of a distinctive nomenclature as Vitamin D.

As regards the exact constitution of these remarkable substances, the first speculators were inclined to attribute to them a complex physico-chemical character of the kind known to be possessed by the enzymes and the toxins. Earliest attempts to isolate Vitamin A showed it to have a capacity to withstand both heat of at least 120 degrees C. and saponification by strong alkalis, and to be present in the residue extracted with ether from the unsaponifiable fraction of milk fat. It could be destroyed readily, however, by any form of aeration even at ordinary temperatures. Takahashi as early as 1925 was able to claim that he had isolated a substance, which he called 'Biosterin,' which had a formula of $C_{37}H_{46}O_2$, and consisted, he suggested, of an unsaturated alcohol identical with Vitamin A. Drummond and others, however, were not slow to demonstrate that 'Biosterin' was in fact a mixture of many substances, none of which could be demonstrated biologically to contain Vitamin A! The

unsaponifiable fraction of the liver oil of mackerel or halibut is, however, not only highly active in Vitamin A—the halibut oil is also deficient in Vitamin D—but has been found to yield on analysis a substance with a formula closely related to $C_{20}H_{30}O$ and to acetic and β -nitrobenzoic acid esters, both of which possess a formula agreeing with that given above, and both of which, on ozonisation, furnish geronic acid. Since the latter is obtained by similar methods from both carotene and β -ionone, it was suggested that all three bodies might have a similar formula.

In addition to what might be concluded from the above, it was found that solutions containing Vitamin A absorbed so consistently the rays of one portion of the ultra-violet zone of the spectrum that the intensity of this absorption might be taken as an indication of the concentration of the vitamin itself. Liver-oil solutions of Vitamin A react also with antimony and arsenic trichloride, with the formation of a fine blue colour—due to reaction with a chromogen present normally in such oil in such a way as to suggest that the chromogen-content, measured spectroscopically, corresponds so closely with the vitamin content, estimated biometrically, that both chromogen and vitamin were suspected to be identical. Further ground for suspecting at least a very close identity was found in the fact that the carotene content of foodstuffs of plant origin corresponded very closely with the vitamin content as determined biometrically, and that carotene itself—a most remarkable discovery—was capable of replacing Vitamin A in the diet and of preventing any sign or symptom of Vitamin A-deficiency disease. Similarly, the ingestion of carotene by rats suffering from Vitamin A deficiency was found to be followed by the storage, in demonstrably increased quantity, in the liver of a substance with all the physico-chemical properties associated with Vitamin A—a discovery which led to the not unreasonable suggestion that the vitamin itself might be elaborated in the living animal body from simple plant pigment (*e.g.*, plant carotene) ingested with the food. Further experimental work confirming these speculations suggests that Vitamin A—the accessory food factor essential for normal growth and, indeed, life itself—consists probably of an alcohol with a constitutional formula of $C_{20}H_{30}O$ (though the carbon content is probably somewhat lower) and an aliphatic side chain similar to that seen in the known molecule of carotene.

The original 'Water-Soluble B' is known now to be the first member of a group of accessory food factors known as the Vitamin B complex and comprising factors B_1 , B_2 , B_3 , etc., and the first member of the series Vitamin B_1 prevents beri-beri and is present in rice polishings, from which crystalline substances with an extremely high Vitamin B content have been extracted by

various workers. From the fact that sulphur is conspicuously present in such bodies, it is believed that this element is probably a constituent of the vitamin itself. Vitamin B_1 is rapidly destroyed by a temperature of over 100 degrees C.

Vitamin B_2 is more heat-stable than B_1 , and is separated from it by an exposure of the complex containing both vitamins to a temperature of 120 degrees C., when B_2 is found not to be destroyed by such heat. Thus separated, but not as yet isolated, Vitamin B_2 is seen to possess probably a neutral or feebly acid reaction and a relatively high molecular weight. It is distinguishable physiologically from B_1 by the fact that rats fed upon a diet sufficient in B_1 but deficient in B_2 soon cease to grow, develop trophic lesions of the skin—analogueous with those seen in pellagra—and usually die. Inasmuch as the restoration of B_2 puts an end to such changes and restores normality completely, there is reason for believing that it is the accessory food factor whose absence causes pellagra and whose presence prevents it. As the latter condition was once relatively prevalent in Spain, Northern Italy, and other European countries, it will be seen that a discovery of functions of Vitamin B_2 is of no small socio-therapeutic importance. Recent German work (Kuhn) suggests that egg white, which is highly active in B_2 , owes this activity to a pigment, 'ovoflavin,' which when crystallised has a formula of $C_{17}H_{20}O_6N_4$, and which may well be a component of Vitamin B_2 itself. If this is so, a further step has been taken towards the isolation and analysis of at least one member of the Vitamin B complex.

Vitamin B_3 , though more heat-stable than B_1 , is more heat-labile than B_2 , and can thus be separated—it is true, with some difficulty—from both its predecessors in the Vitamin B complex. Though apparently not essential for the growth of young animals, the presence of B_3 appears to activate B_1 in such a way that the presence of both is necessary for a maximum effect to be produced. Pigeons, for example, fed upon a diet deficient in all the B vitamins to which only B_1 and its close associate B_3 are added gain only 80 per cent. of the weight normal for their age and size. If B_3 is added also, complete restoration to normality occurs.

Vitamin B_4 is more heat-labile than B_2 and can be separated from it by autoclaving at 120 degrees C. It can be separated from B_1 by the addition of mercuric sulphate to concentrates containing both vitamins, the precipitate formed being highly active in B_4 and deficient in B_1 . In rats suffering from both B_1 and B_4 deficiency the addition of B_1 cures the neuritic or 'beri-beri' symptoms, but a condition of weakness, muscular spasticity, and oedematous paws persists and is cured only by the addition of Vitamin B_4 .

B₅ is present in whole wheat, yeast and marmite, is more stable in alkaline solutions than B₁ and B₄, and must be present together with B₁ if the latter, added to the B-deficient diet of neuritic pigeons, is to arrest the loss of weight and permit a gain in nutrition up to some 80 per cent. of the maximum. All members of the Vitamin B complex are present in fresh yeast.

Vitamin C, which prevents scurvy, has not only been isolated from lemon and other juices, but its exact chemical structure has been determined, and has recently even been synthesised. After removal of the non-vitamin substances from lemon juice by precipitation and fermentation, the small portion of the residue which can be precipitated by lead acetate yields the anti-scurvy principle in high concentration. It has been found, also, that the living suprarenal gland contains a crystalline substance related to hexuronic acid and possessing a reducing action and anti-scorbutic effect exactly similar to that of Vitamin C. Recent work by Haworth at Birmingham, by King and Waugh at Pittsburgh, and by Tillmans at Frankfort, suggests that the vitamin molecule itself is identical with the so-called hexuronic acid, less one molecule of water. Thus 'ascorbic acid,' as it is now renamed, has a formula of C₆H₈O₆ and is identical with Vitamin C. Substances with a physico-chemical character identical with ascorbic acid have recently been synthesised at Birmingham and in Germany; but the biological tests have not yet been reported. Vitamin C—as was known to 'Mr. Young of the Navy' in the eighteenth century—is present in high concentration in most *germinating* seeds.

Vitamin D, cohabitor with A of the unsaponifiable fraction of the fats of milk, butter and egg, is the accessory food factor in whose absence the normal deposition of calcium salts in growing cartilage does not occur, and rickets is a result. As well as being contained normally in many fresh foods, anti-rachitic Vitamin D is produced in a most remarkable fashion when pure ergosterol, or food containing it, is subject to ultra-violet radiation. When the gummy resin resulting from such radiation of ergosterol is subjected to fractional sublimation in high vacuum there results a crystalline compound—'calciferol'—from which physiologically inactive 'pyro-calciferol' and active 'Calciferol II.' are subsequently derived. It is believed that 'Calciferol II.' is identical with Vitamin D, which would thus seem to have a formula of C₂₇H₄₄O. It is probably an isomer of ergosterol—C₂₈H₄₄O—and is produced by rearrangement, under ultra-violet radiation, of the atoms of the latter.

Vitamin E, the so-called anti-sterility vitamin, was discovered in California by Evans and Scott in 1922. Its existence was demonstrated only after prolonged experimentation upon the

reproductive capacity of both male and female rats. It is present, after alkali hydrolysis, in the non-saponifiable fraction of wheat-germ oil, and appears to be a relatively stable and fat-soluble substance, probably an alcohol of a molecular weight of about 400, and having several points of resemblance to Vitamin A, with which, as seen, it was originally confounded. Vitamin E is remarkable in that, as contrasted with the other fat-soluble vitamins, it is absent from both cod-liver oil and yeast. In its absence, normal development of the germinal epithelium in the male rat and of the implanted ovum in the female appears, beyond doubt, impossible. In respect of human fecundity, the importance of Vitamin E is, as may well be imagined, much less easily demonstrated, though Vogt-Moller, in the only results yet published, reports that two women to whom it was administered, each of whom had had several previous miscarriages, went through normal pregnancies.

When the first vitamins were isolated and classified it was seen that some form of international standardisation (by comparison with the physiological activity of accepted units) was an immediate *desideratum*. When the first International Conference upon Vitamin Standards met in 1919 under the auspices of the League of Nations, it was faced, however, with a position so unsatisfactory and unclarified that its Report even mentions the fact that, with the knowledge then available, not only did standardisation appear no easy task, but that a certain scepticism concerning the actual existence of the bodies (which the Commission was attempting to standardise!) was by no means unobservable. But the Conference of June 1931 met under more favourable auspices, and in respect of the four principal vitamins reached a general and satisfactory agreement. For Vitamin A the unit recommended was, 'The Vitamin A activity of .001 milligram of a sample of carotene prepared in the National Institute of Medical Research, London.' The material was to be distributed internationally in tubes of 10 milligrams, the appropriate institution in each country attending to its further use as a standard of comparison. Similarly, for Vitamin B (*i.e.*, B₁), the anti-neuritic activity of '10 milligrams of the absorption product of rice polishing as prepared in Batavia by the method of Seidell' was accepted as the standard. The unit for Vitamin C is to be the anti-scorbutic activity of .1 cubic centimetre of the juice of fresh lemon (*Citrus Limonum*), or one-tenth of the quantity necessary to prevent obvious lesions of scurvy in young guinea-pigs upon a diet deficient in Vitamin C. For Vitamin D the anti-rachitic activity of 'one (1) milligram of irradiated ergosterol' was accepted as the unit. The standardisation of these substances, as determined three years ago, is a remarkable example

of international co-operation within the machinery of the League.

Since McCollum and Davis in 1915 described two accessory food factors of which the first could be extracted by fat solvent from butter, and the second by water from a number of substances of fresh vegetable origin, some eight members of a group of accessory food factors (designated 'vitamines' by Funk in 1912) have thus been demonstrated and classified. The physico-chemical characters of at least four of them have been ascertained almost as fully as modern knowledge permits, and two have been even synthesised. International agreement as to standards to be employed in estimating the activity of four has been safely attained and is being generally implemented.

While it is true to say that fresh milk contains every known vitamin and that the recent isolation of these remarkable substances is a triumph rather of biochemical research than of applied preventive medicine, nevertheless the clear delineation of the causes of diseases so important as rickets, scurvy, pellagra and beri-beri, and of the less severe but more widely prevalent conditions of dental caries, anæmia and malnutrition, etc., which are almost certainly due in some measure to mild degrees of vitamin deficiency, should not pass unsaluted. With such knowledge at our disposal, the continued prevalence upon any portion of the globe of any of the above conditions must involve a reproach, not only to those immediately responsible, but also to the science of Preventive Medicine as internationally applied.

JOHN GODSALL.

THE NEW ADVENTURERS

SINCE the war there has come into existence a school of young mountaineers whose motives and methods are radically different from those of the older generation. To the latter the new point of view may be uncongenial, but it must be remembered that it is the gradual and inevitable changing of conditions that has just as gradually and inevitably produced the modern methods. The new technique, outrageous as it may seem to some, has in fact been nothing more than an adaptation to the altered circumstances.

In the happy days in the middle of the last century, when the vogue of mountaineering may be said to have started, there seemed to be an unlimited number of unclimbed peaks. This period may be designated as the first phase of Alpine climbing, and it was not until the end of the last century that the seeker after virgin peaks had to look further afield than the Alps. Towards the end of the last century, however, the decreasing number of unconquered summits had compelled the more adventurous to find distraction in discovering new routes to the familiar mountain-tops. Nor was this unreasonable, for the pioneers who had climbed the Swiss and Italian sides of the Matterhorn, or traversed Monte Rosa from Italy into Switzerland, or had explored the classic routes on Mont Blanc, had long ago realised that each new way of approach, to even the most familiar peak, constituted a completely different and novel expedition. For instance, only an expert would guess that the Matterhorn, whose vast bulk dominates the Italian pastures at Breuil, is the same mountain that towers so gracefully and impressively above the Swiss village of Zermatt. In fact, when approached from opposite sides, the Matterhorn is as different to climb as it is to look at, and this applies to all great peaks.

So for a time the profusion of variety to be found on each of the great mountains satisfied even the most adventurous: it was the Indian summer of mountaineering; the evil day on which it had been expected that the Alps would be 'exhausted' seemed to be indefinitely postponed, and new routes sufficed instead of new peaks. This period may be called the second

phase of Alpine climbing, and it continued approximately until the end of the European War. Throughout this second phase there was a growing tolerance on the part of the Alpine world towards guideless climbing, a practice which the majority of the pioneers had looked upon as a dangerous form of naughtiness. Since the earliest days, it is true, there had been successful guideless ascents, but they were only sporadic instances, and Canon Girdlestone's prolonged guideless activities in the 'sixties did little to change opinion, for his ingenuous narrative revealed too many hair-breadth escapes to encourage others to follow his example. However, a campaign in 1876, accomplished by Messrs. Charles and Lawrence Pilkington in company with Mr. Gardiner, was a very different affair. Within the limits of a comparatively short holiday these three carried out with unvarying success a series of guideless expeditions of all degrees of difficulty. The effect of this performance was decisive, and guideless climbing from that day gradually became respectable. Later on, too, the advent of a class of amateurs who could spend more time, money and thought on mountaineering than even the best guides could spare made it evident that men with the necessary leisure and aptitude were at least as trustworthy as guides for any expedition, however difficult. Subsequently, with the general impoverishment that followed the European War, there were few climbers left with money enough to pay guides for long engagements, and, after the war, guideless expeditions became so common that they no longer excited comment.

But even so, during the second phase of Alpine climbing, apart from this relenting attitude to the question of guideless expeditions, the views of the majority of mountaineers remained orthodox, and strict attention was still paid to the fundamental principles as preached and practised by the pioneers. The latter had always drawn the sharpest distinction between difficulty and danger. While admitting that mountaineers might enjoy difficulty with clear conscience and not be deterred by danger, they maintained that true mountain craft consisted not merely in conquering difficulties, but also, as far as possible, in circumventing dangers. Thus they held that no degree of mere difficulty could excuse an experienced mountaineer if he fell off his mountain. But they also declared that it was inexcusable for anyone to venture into the sort of place where the mountain was likely to do the falling and might fall upon the mountaineer. According to this theory, risk from falling stones and avalanches could nearly always be avoided. To run such risks voluntarily was, in the orthodox view, prejudicial to the good name of mountaineering.

After the war these ideas, which had worn so well, came

to be discredited and repudiated by a new school which now arose among the numerous young guideless climbers. The third phase of Alpine climbing may now be said to have begun, and the greatest revolution that the ethics of mountaineering have yet undergone began to take place. It was partly caused, perhaps, by a war-worn attitude of mind, but chiefly by what has been often described as the 'exhaustion' of the Alps. Now, it has been maintained very plausibly that the Alps can never be exhausted, and this is true, no doubt, in the case of those who love them best. On the other hand, in the case of a man whose motive in climbing may be a passion for exploration, he will surely find that for him the Alps have been exhausted long before the last route up each gulley, ridge, face or quarry has been charted with dotted lines and classified in the last and most exhaustive climber's guide-book of some future age.

The Alps have been referred to by a great writer and mountaineer as the playground of Europe. Such an analogy is disagreeably suggestive of gymnastic apparatus and asphalt schoolyards. Certainly, if the Alps have become a mere playground to us to-day, there is some excuse for the young generation's rejecting the hallowed traditional methods of mountaineering and the present state of affairs can be accounted for. When the best pitches of the playground are overcrowded, when play is becoming stale and the peaks, with all their routes, have been traversed again and again, what novelty or uncertainty is there left? The only solution is to alter the rules of the game, and the young generation will not scruple to do so. They will make the new principles clear by their deeds; dangers must be faced, chances must be taken, uncertainty can be improvised. Are not the very few great mountaineering problems that are left in the Alps all of them dangerous to solve as well as difficult? The word 'impossible' is to have no meaning to the new mountaineer; he is to conquer tempests as well as precipices of ice and rock; it is not for him to wait upon the weather. For him mountaineering is the same thing as war, and, as the enemy gives no quarter, all means are fair. Thousands of feet of rope, scores of hooks, clasps, pegs, wedges, stirrups, slings, hammers, or anything else in the world that can be dragged or carried up a mountain, may be used: no manner of mechanical means need be rejected; this is the new spirit.

It is curious that no English names are to be found in the records of this peculiar school of mountaineering. It seems that its general principles do not appeal to Englishmen; at any rate, the English do not appear to put them into practice as far as climbing mountains is concerned. But the new attitude to the mountains, whatever Englishmen may think of it, is respon-

sible for some astonishing exploits, edifying and the reverse. On the enormous northern precipices of the Grandes Jorasses a campaign is waged annually, and during one of the numerous unsuccessful attempts to storm the impregnable heights an incident occurred which may serve to show the spirit of the new movement. During the first day's assault upon the tremendous cliffs, which are notoriously exposed to falling stones and falling ice, the rope joining two of the climbers was severed by falling stones and the head of an ice-axe which was suspended in the belt of one of the men was, as their report states, 'obliterated' owing to the same cause. The mechanical means employed on some of these attempts are often in accordance with the new principles, and in one attack on this same ghastly precipice the assailants used 750 feet of rope, seventy-eight pegs for rock, twenty pegs for ice, twenty-five karabiners or swivel-hooks, ten stirrups, and six hammers. The attack failed and two of the climbers were killed.

A more successful effort was the celebrated *tour de force* of the brothers Schmidt on the previously unclimbed northern face of the Matterhorn. One of the young men had already taken part in a new ascent of the Ortlerspitze, in Tirol, and the route chosen on that occasion had been described as 'an enormous ice-couloir situated between threatening rocky banks and under the constant menace of the gigantic overhanging sérac-bastion of the upper Ortler Glacier.' The critic went on to say that only a person desirous of uselessly exposing his life would dream of ascending this funnel, swept as it is by continuous stones and ice avalanches. But the brothers' ascent of the Matterhorn was a longer and more serious business, for the north face of this mountain is peculiar in that it is probably only possible to attack it with any chance of getting up alive when the conditions may be said to be at their worst—that is to say, when the rocks happen to be plastered with ice and snow. Without the coherence which an armour of ice and snow supplies, the whole face is a precipice in process of disintegration, discharging incessant volleys and avalanches of stones. Owing, therefore, to the conditions under which the brothers were obliged to make the attempt, holds for hands and feet had to be scraped with an axe in the ice and snow. Slowly they worked their way up the long, steep slope, grooved by stone falls. Occasionally the leader was able to hammer in a peg in order to secure the rope uniting him with his companion, but there was no security from the stones falling from hundreds of feet above. In places the thinness of the ice that coated the rocks allowed only the smallest notches to be scratched for hands and feet. Only one halting-place could be found before they were obliged by the onset of

darkness to bivouac, crouching roped to the cliff. The constant toil had permitted them only time to eat one bar of chocolate since dawn, and the rope was frozen as stiff as a hawser. Next morning at seven o'clock they staggered on again from their roosting-perches and reached the top of the Matterhorn at two in the afternoon. Throughout the latter part of the climb they had been in great danger from the storminess of the weather, and in descending from the top to Zermatt they wasted considerable time, because, as they had never been on the mountain before, they were unfamiliar with the way. One of the brothers has since perished on a very difficult climb on the Wiesbachhorn.

Of a similar ascent on the south face of the Matterhorn, also only recently effected, one of the successful party writes:

with the rising sun stones began to fall methodically and we were involved in their unpleasant company during ten hours. We were obliged to proceed by rushes, steering towards big boulders or other obstacles that might afford shelter. But the stones were kind to us and fell only at regular intervals, thus permitting us to pass between successive showers.

Yet another side of the Matterhorn to be recently climbed for the first time is the east face. It is easier than the other two faces, except in the upper part, where the victorious party were occupied for eleven hours in climbing only 1000 feet. On this side, too, the mountain is notorious for its avalanches of stones, and so great is the danger from this cause that on several occasions it has proved impossible to recover the bodies of victims that have fallen to the base of the precipice.

As a further instance of astonishing performances by ultra-modern climbers the first ascent of the north face of the Grosse Zinne may be quoted. The Grosse Zinne is a peak of 9850 feet, situated in the Dolomites. As the *Alpine Journal* points out, the ascent was only accomplished by means usually employed by steeplejacks in dealing with factory chimneys. In this case the party used:

- 800 feet of ordinary rope.
- 500 feet of supplementary rope.
- 500 feet of light rope.
- 90 pegs.
- 50 karabiners (swivel-hooks).

As the *Journal* states, the north wall of this mountain is one of the most forbidding and impossibly smooth precipices in the Alps, and the operations to conquer it had extended over several years. By the end of 1932 one of the attackers attained a point in the precipice only 350 feet below the top, and with only that amount more of vertical precipice to overcome. By August 11, 1933, various guides had reduced this interval to little more

than 160 feet. On August 12 it was again reduced, but a terrible overhang still remained. Next day, as darkness came on, the young guide Dimai, in one last desperate effort, stormed the overhang. This brought the party to a portion of the face, no longer quite vertical, though still terribly steep, where they were able to bivouac. Starting at 6.30 the next morning, with easier going, the summit was reached in three hours. The ascent was repeated soon afterwards by two men who spent their first night suspended in slings on the precipice and remained the next night on the top of the mountain.

In the Himalaya, also, the new spirit is stirring. The campaign for Kangchenjunga is frankly regarded by many of the protagonists as a prolonged battle in which lives may be sacrificed. The exaltation of such a state of mind will seem strange to most Englishmen. One of the English members of the international expedition, himself a hardened mountaineer, wrote :

after nineteen days it was a relief to get back to the base camp. I have never spent a more nerve-racking time in my life, for during the majority of those nineteen days one never felt safe from the huge avalanches that fell down Kangchenjunga. . . . I can only say that anyone who approaches this side of Kangchenjunga must take his own life and the life of his porters in his hand.

These remarks are scarcely surprising, for the expedition was encamped all the time on glacier-plateaux that were liable to be swept by ice avalanches a mile wide. Some idea of the difficulties on Kangchenjunga may be gathered from the fact that one of the climbers while step-cutting on an ice slope, although at least 4 yards below the knife-edged crest of the ridge in which the slope culminated, suddenly saw to his horror that a blow from his axe had broken right through the mountain and that blue sky was showing in the hole that the axe had made. As the editor of the *Alpine Journal* says in regard to the second Bavarian expedition in 1931 :

No one . . . can have realised hitherto how terrible and tremendous is an attack on Kangchenjunga pushed right home. . . . Two solid months anchored to a knife-edged and bepinnaled ridge ; never a single step to be taken lightly, never a moment of relaxation of tension, and with the ever-present menace of the inevitable Kangchenjunga tempest.

Indeed, all these attacks on Kangchenjunga are quite a new departure in Himalayan mountaineering, for before these attempts very few Himalayan climbers would have ventured to embark on ascents that would have been considered difficult and dangerous even according to the most exacting Alpine standards, quite apart from the question of altitude.

To attribute such astounding feats as these solely to vanity or to a craving for notoriety seems absurdly inadequate, for it

is probable that these strange heroes are often dismayed by the publicity which their performances confer on them. One explanation of their actions may be that they are the result of a new attitude to the conduct of life. Again, it is possible that the mainspring actuating the behaviour of the generation subsequent to the war is a contempt for life so deeply buried in the unconscious mind that no pessimism or despair betrays itself save when it leads to the perpetration of deeds such as have been described. At any rate, whatever the cause, it may be worth while to study the method of this madness, for it is possible that those who have a more conventional outlook on life than the new adventurers might find that there is something to be learnt from them. It is even conceivable, too, that the lesson might be profitable.

C. F. MEADE.

COLERIDGE THE CONSERVATIVE

A CENTENARY STUDY

ONE HUNDRED years ago, on July 25, 1834, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, poet, critic, philosopher, died in his sixty-second year. He had been a man of immense and varied intellectual power—a man of conspicuous and unquestionable genius. All who had met him had been impressed by the wide sweep of his knowledge, the vividness of his imagination, the keenness of his analytical faculty, the profundity of his thought, the flow of his inspired language, the infinite charm of his personality. William Wordsworth, one of the oldest and closest of his friends, said that though 'he had seen many men *do* wonderful things, Coleridge was the only wonderful *man* he had ever met.' Thomas de Quincey, another of the intimate companions with whom he had been accustomed to traverse the lovely region of the lakes, spoke of him as possessing 'the largest and most spacious intellect, the subtlest and most comprehensive, that has yet existed among men.' With this exalted eulogy Walter Savage Landor entirely concurred: he placed Coleridge in the same supreme class as Shakespeare, Bacon and Milton. Similarly, Sir Walter Scott described him as 'the only person I ever knew who answered to the idea of a man of genius.'

Nevertheless, when this undoubted genius died, he seemed to have lived almost in vain. For what did he leave behind him, save vanishing memories of an evanescent splendour of conversation? One superb ballad, *The Ancient Mariner*, together with a few fragments of what might, if finished, have become great poems, e.g., *Christabel* and *Kubla Khan*—fragments exquisite in melody and rhythm, but wholly devoid of any message to mankind. A few unsuccessful and unimportant plays. A number of newspaper articles buried in the files of periodicals for the most part long extinct. Flashes of penetrating criticism lighting intermittently the dark wastes of his *Biographia Literaria*. Occasional speculations reaching the loftiest heights of faith, from amid the arid and sophistical flatlands of his *Aids to Reflection*. That is almost all, except the enigmatical utterances of his few *Lay*

Sermons and his 'disorderly and fragmentary' dissertation on *Church and State*.

After his death, it is true, his reputation was vindicated and his influence enhanced by the devoted labours of a group of reverent disciples who made it their life's work to recall his sayings, collect his writings, and expound his ideas. Chief among these were his nephew and son-in-law, Henry Nelson Coleridge, who, *inter alia*, published from long-accumulated notes his uncle's inimitable *Table Talk*; his daughter Sara (H. N. Coleridge's wife), who disinterred from the buried files of the forgotten Press the best of her father's articles, which she issued in 1850 under the title *Essays on his Own Times*; and, last but not least, his intimate friend the philosopher-surgeon Joseph Henry Green, who, retiring from practice in the year of Coleridge's death, spent the remaining twenty-nine years of his own life in trying to systematise and make intelligible to the world the mystical theology of his master.¹ It is largely through the labours of these devout disciples that we know the essential Coleridge, and get a glimpse (otherwise obscured) of the radiance that illuminated and overawed his contemporaries, just as it is from Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle that we alone know the essential Socrates.

Coleridge was, with all his great intellectual powers, a man of more than normal frailty. His unproductiveness, his futility, his chaotic incompleteness, were mainly due to his own moral failings. He was infirm of purpose, weak in will, devoid of manliness, incapable of resisting temptation, unable to stand up to any devil, however small. When he was about thirty years old he became a victim to the opium habit, and for some fourteen years (1802-16) he was sodden, apparently beyond the reach of redemption.² In 1816 he had, happily, just sufficient resolution left to place himself under the care of a strong guardian with instructions that virtually made that guardian a gaoler. 'I must not be permitted,' he wrote, 'to leave your house unless with you. Delicately or indelicately, this must be done, and both the servants and the assistant must receive absolute commands from you.' He was singularly fortunate, moreover, in finding the ideal guardian in Mr. James Gillman, of The Grove, Highgate, who opened his attractive house (which commanded a magnificent

¹ Cf. J. H. Green, *Spiritual Philosophy, founded on the Teaching of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. (Edited, with a memoir of the author, by John Simon, 2 vols.: London, 1865.)

² Mr. Joseph Cottle in his *Early Recollections* makes the almost incredible statement that 'in 1814, S. T. C. had been long, very long, in the habit of taking from two quarts of laudanum a week to a pint a day, and on one occasion he had been known to take in the twenty-four hours a whole quart.' For a normal person the maximum dose of laudanum—i.e., tincture of opium—is forty drops!

prospect over London) to the distressed and degraded debauchee. Here at Highgate he remained, under the wise and strong rule of Mr. and Mrs. Gillman, for the remaining eighteen years of his life. He never wholly broke the opium habit, but he ceased to be its helpless victim. He was able to resume his thinking and his writing. He was even able to plan great works, not one of which, however, he had sufficient energy or method to begin. But, above all, he was able once more to meet his fellow-men, clothed and in his right mind. Here it was, at Highgate, that the choice spirits of the age gathered to hear him talk. Hence radiated the influence that made him one of the major prophets of the nineteenth century. From this secluded spot went forth such men as William Wordsworth, Thomas Carlyle, John Henry Newman, Julius Hare, Frederick Denison Maurice, Charles Lamb, and even the Benthamite John Stuart Mill, often bewildered but as frequently inspired, to spread abroad, in a world that was tired of materialism and utilitarianism, the gospel of transcendental idealism.

What was the message of Coleridge to his age? What were the essentials of his mystic creed? To answer these questions, however briefly, it is necessary to go back in thought to the century of Coleridge's birth, and particularly to that cardinal event of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution, which occurred when Coleridge was seventeen years old.

The eighteenth century prided itself on being the Age of Reason, or, as Coleridge (following the terminology of Locke) would have preferred to call it, the Age of the 'Humane Understanding.' That is to say, it was the age of cold logic, of mere intellect, of all-pervasive scepticism. It boasted its emancipation from the credulities and enthusiasms that had made the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a period of religious and political upheavals, of sectarian massacres, of fanatical assassinations, of the burning of heretics, of the hunting of witches, and of the general prevalence of irrational fury. The French *intelligentsia* took the lead, and, as they lived in a country whose Government was hopelessly mediæval and incompetent, whose Church was both obscurantist and corrupt, whose aristocracy was degenerate and debased, they had an easy task in their work of criticism and destruction. Montesquieu effectively undermined the doctrine of the divine right of kings; Voltaire poured corrosive ridicule upon the hypocritical yet persecuting priesthood; Rousseau swept away with his torrential eloquence the dogma of the natural superiority of the feudal nobility.

England was saved by its 'glorious revolution' of 1688 from that extreme and violent contrast between emancipated ideas and established institutions that characterised France. Its monarchy had been constitutionalised; its Church made tolerant

and latitudinarian; its aristocracy diluted with a moneyed bourgeoisie. Hence its thinkers, too, from Locke to Paley, seemed on the whole to be contented with things as they were—that is to say, with a State controlled by property, and with a Church that was little more than the Whig Party enjoying its week-end repose.

Early in the reign of George III., however, a new ferment began to make its presence felt among the people. The ideas of Rousseau—and even for a short time Rousseau himself—crossed the Channel and generated a demand for social equality. John Wilkes and the illusive 'Junius' between them organised a new Radical Party, bent on asserting the sovereignty of the people, and insistent upon parliamentary reform. In the sphere of religion, John Wesley and his itinerant preachers revived throughout the country the flame of personal piety, imparting a glow of long-extinct 'enthusiasm' even into unitarian nonconformity and deistical Anglicanism. When, therefore, the French Revolution broke out in 1789 it found not only a French nation ready to welcome it and secure its triumph, but also an English nation in the main sympathetic. To hopeful and generous souls, such as Charles James Fox, it seemed to be the dawn of the millennium:

Good was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven.

So sang Wordsworth, as he recalled the ecstatic optimism of his early days. And the enthusiasm of Wordsworth was but a pale emotion compared with the fiery zeal of the adolescent Coleridge. Witness the second stanza of his fine ode to France (1797):

When France in wrath her giant-limbs upreared,
And with that oath which smote air, earth and sea,
Stamped her strong foot and said she would be free,
Bear witness for me how I hoped and feared!
With what a joy my lofty gratulation
Unawed I sang, amid a slavish band:
And when to overwhelm the disenchanted nation,
Like fiends embattled by a wizard's wand,
The monarchs marched in evil day,
And Britain joined the dire array;
Though dear her shores and circling ocean,
Though many friendships, many youthful loves
Had swoll'n the patriot emotion
And flung a magic light o'er all her hills and groves,
Yet still my voice, unaltered, sang defeat
To all that braved the tyrant-quelling lance,
And shame too long delayed and vain retreat!
For ne'er, O Liberty! with partial aim
I dimmed thy light or damped thy holy flame;
But blessed the pæans of delivered France,
And hung my head and wept at Britain's name.

But Coleridge when he wrote this magnificent ode was, like Wordsworth, completely disillusioned. The Revolution had run its course during eight dreadful years. At home it had degenerated into persecuting atheism and a sanguinary reign of terror; abroad it had made itself a mere military despotism destructive of the peace and independence of all the Continental peoples. Particularly atrocious and unpardonable appeared to the liberty-loving Coleridge the subversion of the little republican States of Venice and Switzerland. Hence he became a penitent disciple of Burke, acknowledging with almost abject humiliation the errors of his Jacobinical days, and developing rapidly into a philosophical conservative.

The conservatism of Coleridge, however, differed from the conservatism of Eldon or Sidmouth almost as much as the radicalism of Jeremy Bentham differed from that of Thomas Paine. Eldon and Sidmouth, mere die-hard Tories, held the simple if uninspiring creed that 'any change, at any time, for any purpose, is highly to be deprecated.' They were instinctively and immovably opposed to all so-called reforms, just because they involved the modification of a world in which they themselves were comfortably settled—a world that seemed on the whole as good as any that the reformers were likely to create. Coleridge, on the other hand, was under no illusions respecting the actually existing state of affairs. Things were not all for the best in the best of all possible worlds. He felt that there was urgent call for change; but it was change, not in the direction of the novel and untried—it was change in a backward direction, a return to the original ideas of Church and State which had been forgotten, a recovery of a pristine purity that had been lost. As strongly as Eldon and Sidmouth, he deplored and denounced the doctrinaire radicalism of Paine, who would sweep away all existing institutions and remake communities on the theoretic lines of the social contract and the rights of man. As vehemently, too, as the die-hard leaders did he deprecate the utilitarian radicalism of Bentham, to whom nothing was sacred or immune from criticism—a radicalism that would apply to every institution, new or old, the short-time test of the hedonistic calculus, 'Does it conduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number?', and if it failed to pass that test (as applied by the radicals) would abolish it.

Both Paine and Bentham were individualists to whom Church and State alike were merely means to the realisation of personal ends. The Church, if it served any useful purpose at all, was an instrument through which the individual soul could attain eternal felicity; the State, if necessary in an imperfect world, was but a device intended to safeguard the liberty and the property of the

individual subject. Coleridge had come to have a very different conception of both State and Church. In his raw Jacobinical days, it is true, he had been as individualistic as anyone: as a philosopher and a political theorist he had at first been an avowed disciple of Locke, Hartley, and Godwin. But he had learned from Plato, from Kant, from Schelling, and above all from Burke—the thinkers who became the great lights of his later seeing—to regard society as an organism; or at any rate, as more akin to an organism than to a mechanism. He had come to a consciousness of the solidarity of the community; he had grown into a vivid realisation of the truth that men in society are all members one of another, all parts of a veritable body-politic. Hence he wished to reform the State by means of a return to this forgotten Platonic idea. In other words, he emphatically rejected the *laissez-faire* policy of the philosophical radicals and the political economists, and advocated a wider extension of the activities of government. He recognised, of course, as essential the 'negative functions' of government, as set forth by Locke and his disciples—namely, the protection of life, liberty, and property, to which he added reputation and religion. But he went on, in a manner novel and startling to his generation, to prescribe a number of 'positive functions' for government. The more important of these he summarised in *The Friend* and again in his *Second Lay Sermon* as follows: (1) To make the means of subsistence more easy to each individual; (2) to secure to each of its members the hope of bettering his own condition or that of his children; (3) to provide for the development of those faculties which are essential to his humanity—that is, to his rational and moral being. Here was a conservative programme that served as a charter to Frederick Denison Maurice and the Christian Socialists.

But although Coleridge's conservatism was willing to do everything for the people, it was strenuously opposed to allowing anything to be done by the people. Coleridge was as intensely anti-democratic as had been his great master, Plato, himself. He shared Burke's profound distrust of the political capacity and the moral stability of the average man. He had an instinctive dread of 'the mob.' Nor was his dread unfounded. He was old enough to remember the Gordon Riots (1780), when for a week London had been at the mercy of a maniac multitude. He had lived through the period of the frightful excesses of the Parisian *sansculottes*.

Every brutal mob [he cries] assembled on some drunken Saint Monday of faction is THE PEOPLE forsooth, and now each leprous ragamuffin, like a circle in geometry, is at once one and all, and calls his own brutal self, US THE PEOPLE!

Coleridge held that political power should be the peculiar

prerogative of property, and he had a curious theory as to how the power of property should be distributed in the English Constitution. On the one hand, the landed interest, which stood for permanence, stability, and the maintenance of venerable tradition, should be dominant in the House of Lords. On the other hand, the moneyed interest—that is to say, the class comprising the merchants, the manufacturers, the financiers, the professional men—should control the House of Commons, and from its benches should ensure the continuance of progress. For Coleridge realised as clearly as Burke that in a changing environment a healthy organism must constantly adapt itself to new circumstances. Cautious reform would be the only alternative to violent revolution. The two great reform measures to which, concretely, Coleridge was called upon to apply his principles during the closing years of his life were the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829 and the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1831-2. To both these measures, as they were presented to Parliament, he was opposed, and the causes of his opposition are eloquent of his fundamental political and religious ideas. Of his antagonism to the Parliamentary Reform Bill we know most from his *Table Talk* of 1831-2: it is evident that during those two years the principles of parliamentary government were the constant theme of his conversation. He condemned the proposals of Grey and Russell because, he contended, they were breaking up the great old 'interests' that alone had a claim to representation; they were introducing 'the mad and barbarising scheme of a delegation of individuals'; they were substituting the idea of the franchise as personal right in place of the idea of the franchise as a civic responsibility. 'Alas,' he cried, 'I look in vain for some wise and vigorous man to sound the word DUTY in the ears of this generation.' When the Bill of 1832 became law he lamented the victory of violence over reason, and deplored the advance of the Constitution towards democracy.

Coleridge's opposition to the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829 gave rise to one of the most important, most interesting, if least coherent, of all his writings—namely, his dissertation on *The Constitution of Church and State according to the Idea of Each*, published in 1830. Since Coleridge was a religious teacher even more than he was a political philosopher, and since in this work the main lines of his religious doctrine are more fully set forth than elsewhere, it may be worth while to examine its contentions in some detail.

As to the relation between Church and State, Coleridge took up a position midway between that of sixteenth-century Hooker and eighteenth-century Warburton. Hooker had identified the Anglican Church with the Elizabethan State, and had contended

that every Englishman was by right of birth a member of the ecclesiastical establishment. It was not difficult for either Puritan or Catholic to show that this confusion obliterated the fundamental evangelical distinction between sheep and goats, and even between God and Mammon. Warburton, on the other hand, had maintained that even though Church and State might consist of the same persons, yet ideally they were separate and distinct institutions, having no necessary connexion with one another, but were directed to entirely different ends or purposes. Coleridge endeavoured to harmonise and reconcile these apparently conflicting views by drawing a novel and highly interesting distinction between the 'National Church' and the 'Christian Church.' He agreed with Warburton that the 'Christian Church' was necessarily universal in its scope, other-worldly in its aims, dedicated to the salvation of souls, purely spiritual in its character, and sharply defined by divine authority in the matter of creeds, ritual, and government. The members of this Church were 'believers' who, on the one hand, included multitudes outside the limits of any single nation, and, on the other hand, might (and unfortunately did) exclude many within the nation. But, he argued, side by side with this 'Christian Church' there was, or should be, a 'National Church' coincident with the State, a Church supported by the Government, and in return supporting it; an estate of the realm, represented as such in Parliament, devoted to the great secular work of education and culture; free from the restrictions of creed and ritual; not necessarily Christian at all. The teachers of this Church he called 'the clerisy,' and the State endowments by means of which they were to be maintained he termed 'the nationalty.' Of course, Coleridge ardently desired that the 'Christian Church' and the 'National Church' should be as nearly as possible identical—that is to say, that the latter should be a section of the former; the Christian clergy the prime constituent of the national 'clerisy'; and the endowments of the 'nationalty' mainly assigned to the support of parish priests. But he recognised that the essential condition of this identification was the national acceptance of the Christian creed. Now the Christian creed was in his day being vigorously assailed from two sides—namely, the side of philosophy and the side of science. Hence Coleridge made it the major task of his later years to effect a synthesis of the three—theology, philosophy, science—and to formulate a new 'spiritual philosophy' which all thinking men could accept.

The basis of Coleridge's 'spiritual philosophy' was a distinction which he laboured to establish between the 'understanding' and the 'reason.' The 'understanding'—the mere intellect of man, the logical faculty of the human mind, the

faculty supreme and indeed solitary in the realms of philosophy and science—could not, he contended, by itself attain to a knowledge of God, could not comprehend the Christian creeds, could not reach a consciousness of the reality of human freedom or personal immortality. But, he maintained, beside and beyond the understanding, man possessed a 'reason' which enabled him to attain to comprehension and certainty in these concerns of the soul. The 'reason,' of course, did not in any degree conflict with the 'understanding'; there was not, and could not be, any antagonism between them. The 'reason' included the 'understanding,' but transcended it; it included also the emotions and the will, and in addition a sixth sense—namely, faith, by means of which the spirit of man was brought into direct and immediate contact with the eternal and divine. What, therefore, was undiscoverable to the logic of the 'understanding' was evidently revealed to the noetic of the 'reason,' the vision of the soul.

Coleridge's was a mystic creed of doubtful validity. It proved to be an unsubstantial foundation for the 'spiritual philosophy' which the devoted Joseph Henry Green tried to erect upon it. The 'reason' of Coleridge too much resembled the 'faith' defined by the schoolboy as 'the faculty which enables you to believe what you know to be false.' Nevertheless, it was a great conception, and, as adopted and developed by Frederick Denison Maurice and his disciples, it lies at the heart of present-day Modernism. Equally, too, is it present in that Anglo-Catholicism which, giving up all attempt to separate the rational from the irrational in the Articles of the Church, devotes itself exclusively to ornate ritual, extreme sacerdotalism, and good works. A perpetual memorial, moreover, to the Coleridgian theosophy is King's College, London, which was founded in 1828 under the direct inspiration of the prophet of Highgate. '*Sancte et Sapienter*' was, and is, its motto. The harmonisation of religion and science was the professed purpose of its establishment. Coleridge's nephew and son-in-law, Henry Nelson Coleridge, was the first secretary of the college. Joseph Henry Green joined its staff as professor of surgery, and remained a member of its council until the day of his death in 1863. Sir J. T. Coleridge, brother of Henry Nelson, sometime Justice of the King's Bench, maintained in the college council the Coleridge tradition and connexion until the late seventies of the nineteenth century. And the essence of the Coleridge tradition in the sphere of education was the indissoluble union of secular and sacred learning.

'The proper object and end of the National Church is civilisation with freedom,' and the prime function of its ministers, the 'clerisy,' is 'to form and train up the people of the country

to be obedient, free, useful, organizable subjects, citizens, and patriots, living to the benefit of the State and prepared to die for its defence.' Can it be said that Coleridge has no message for the present age?

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

MALLARMÉ

A STUDY IN ESOTERIC SYMBOLISM

ὦ ἄστρον ὑπέρτατον
 Τί δ' ἔθηκες ἀμάχανον
 ἰσχυρὸν τ' ἀνδράσι
 καὶ σοφίας ὁδόν,
 ἐπίσκοτον ἀτραπὸν ἐσσυμένα;

PINDAR, fragment.

MALLARMÉ has become increasingly important since his death (1898), and in the last twenty-five years especially the peculiar æsthetic values associated with his name have aroused a considerable amount of energetic discussion. Since these values are to a great extent revolutionary (or at least are usually interpreted as such), and since they have played a preponderant part in determining much of the most notable poetry of the past half-century, and are likely to be similarly operative in what will probably be the most interesting poetry for a long time to come, it is desirable, and indeed imperative, that criticism should have a clear idea of what they are. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that such an idea has yet been established. It is not that Mallarmé has not been the object of busy critical and expository attention; a large, an oppressively large, quantity of writing has been consecrated to his greater glory and to telling the world what he really meant. To name only a few typical examples, M. Thibaudet published an ambitiously comprehensive study in 1911, and he thought it worth while to reissue this in 1926.¹ But M. Thibaudet, in spite of much that is suggestive and permanently useful in his book, goes sadly astray in many of his exegetical efforts, for he has failed to seize certain of the main principles whence Mallarmé's æsthetic issues. As he himself confesses, he has reduced Mallarmé's system to an order of ideas which Mallarmé constantly sought to avoid; furthermore, he confesses that after all his attempts at interpretation, there remains over a 'residue' with which he has not been able to deal; as it happens, it is precisely this residue that is the most distinctive and the most valuable part of Mallarmé's poetry. M. Paul Valéry, who

¹ *La poésie de Stéphane Mallarmé* (edition de la Nouvelle Revue Française).

proceeds in some measure from Mallarmé, and who had the great advantage of knowing him personally and of being admitted to his intimacy, has spoken of Mallarmé's system in more than one essay which is highly illuminating.² But M. Valéry's contributions are partial, fragmentary and incidental; he has done little more than throw out suggestions, and has attempted no *vue d'ensemble*; and, audacious as it may seem, I cannot help saying, that in my estimation even M. Valéry has more than once gone wrong in his presentation of the history and significance of Symbolism. M. Jean Royère, founder of *La Phalange*, one of the most enterprising Reviews of some twenty-five years ago, is perhaps the most fervent and the most faithful of Mallarmé's disciples, and his own poetry, more than any other so far published in this century, seeks and often happily attains effects of arcane mystery that are distinctly Mallarmean; he is exceptionally qualified to give us a book on the inner principles of Symbolism, and he has done so at least twice.³ But, admirable as many of his passages are, he rarely comes to clear-cut and definite conclusions; he rather talks or, more frequently still, muses round the secrets he adores, and he does little to dissipate the penumbra in which Mallarmé chose to leave them. As he himself says, he projects shadows on to the subject the better to illuminate it; but most readers will not be conscious of any illumination. In any case, M. Royère is far from having presented us with the fairly coherent and well-developed body of doctrine which Mallarmé certainly possessed, and was at great pains to enunciate in his own sibylline way. M. Marcel Raymond, in his *De Baudelaire au surréalisme*,⁴ which appeared only a few months ago, necessarily takes stock of Mallarmé's æsthetic, but he does so in a very cursory fashion, and he cannot be said to have disengaged and correlated the governing principles of that æsthetic. The Germans, of course, have not neglected Mallarmé, for his 'obscurity' could hardly fail to call into activity that ponderous ingenuity of which so much German criticism is the expression. I shall content myself with mentioning Herr F. Rauhut's *Das Romantische und Musikalische in der Lyrik Stéphane Mallarmés* (1926),⁵ for it may be taken as a sample of the Teutonic tomes devoted to the analysis and decipherment of Mallarmé. Most of these works have the respectable qualities of the mole: they are indefatigably laborious—but they are

² See, particularly, his *avant-propos* to Lucien Fabre's *La connaissance de la Déesse* (1920), and his *Lettre sur Mallarmé* in Jean Royère's *Mallarmé* (1927). The former of these has been reprinted in *Variété* (editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française).

³ *La Poésie de Mallarmé* (Emile-Paul, 1919); *Mallarmé* (Simon Krâ, 1927).

⁴ Editions R. A. Corrêa (1933).

⁵ G. Braun, Marburg a.d. Lahn.

blind. Mallarmé has attracted a certain amount of amateurish attention in England itself. Mr. Arthur Symons' book on Symbolism⁶ is well known, and it is usually accorded a very kind reception. But most of the time it is treading delicately on a circumference of the subject, very far from the centre; still, it had the merit of being the first noteworthy (if not the first altogether) English critical work to attempt to conduct English readers within sight of the twilight country of French Symbolism. In 1927 Mr. Arthur Ellis published a version of Mallarmé's poems in very competent English verse, and Mme. Turquet-Milnes furnished a long introduction to these essays in translation.⁷ Mme. Turquet-Milnes returned to the subject of Symbolism the other day, in a study of the work of Paul Valéry⁸; and Miss Theodora Bosanquet brought out a book on the same theme towards the end of last year.⁹ With regard to these two studies, we will do no more than say that, agreeable or edifying as they may be in other respects, they have little or no value as contributions to the elucidation of Symbolism; for neither of these writers has succeeded in grasping the fundamental doctrines upon which particular theories and the resultant practice of Symbolism are based.

These doctrines, then, have never been expounded in a way that can be accepted as being tolerably adequate; even in France they have never received fully satisfactory statement,¹⁰ save in the hermetic pages of Mallarmé himself, and almost all readers would regard Mallarmé's statement of them as being the opposite of satisfactory. I undertake the bold task, therefore, of giving a tentative account of them, which may serve until something more authoritative and definitive takes its place. In doing so, I shall closely follow Mallarmé's presentation of them in various passages scattered (often at long intervals) over the two most considerable of his prose writings¹¹; and (a thing I should not attempt to do for his poetry) I shall endeavour to convey Mallarmé's meaning somewhat more lucidly than he did himself, for he developed (or rather enveloped) it in exceedingly and designedly cryptic language, which the vast majority of readers, even French, find altogether baffling, and no doubt look upon as the meanderings of a man not quite right in the head.

For Mallarmé, ordinary speech, as used in conversation,

⁶ *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*, 1899: reprinted in *Studies in two Literatures* (Walter Secker, 1924).

⁷ Jonathan Cape.

⁸ *Paul Valéry* (Jonathan Cape).

⁹ *Paul Valéry* (the Hogarth Press).

¹⁰ The lengthy thesis of M. Barre (1911), the most exhaustive work that has yet appeared on the whole subject, is far from achieving this desideratum.

¹¹ *Divagations* and *La Musique et les Lettres*.

or in much literature of the conventional sort, touches the reality of things in a purely external fashion; or, as he puts it, commercially: it is useful only for purposes of intellectual or social barter, or for getting along in a practical way; in this case, its function and value are simply that of a counter. He insists that this applies to writing in which one narrates or teaches, and even to writing in which one is principally concerned to *describe*. (Description, of course, had been one of the chief preoccupations of the Romantics, and, after them, with a greater solicitude for accuracy and elaboration, of the Realists and Parnassians and after these latter again of the Naturalists, and then once more of such writers as Loti; on the whole, description, one may say, was accorded a very large place in the æsthetic of the nineteenth century, and indeed of all centuries before it; and doubtless, owing to a false estimate of the powers and functions of literature, it will always be one of the main concerns of the great majority of literary craftsmen). Writing of this kind—narrative, didactic or descriptive—is for Mallarmé simply a kind of 'reporting,' and he attaches no more value to it than belongs to such a lowly exercise; he even reacts strenuously against it, and would give it no place in the art of letters. In literature of the highest kind, such as Mallarmé has in mind, one would not seek to present things in their crude externality; one would refer to them delicately, 'allusively,' and seek to disengage from them and convey a quality or combination of qualities embodying, in the purest state possible, what Mallarmé calls an 'idea,' taking that word in a sense that is largely Platonic. It is *la notion pure*, and not the obtrusive, hard concrete thing that one should do one's best to evoke. *Evocation*—this is the word that sums up one of the sections of Mallarmé's teaching—evocation as opposed to statement of a concrete sort. The poet should never speak of an object directly, he should summon it up by a process of subtle illusion, and as a step in this process he should expressly create a shadow, a gloom, an obscurity round it; so little directly, so obscurely, should he speak of it, that he should almost create an impression of silence, of absolute suppression of all discourse concerning it. A beauty charged with 'generality' is a *délice*, the most delightful, the most voluptuous creation that a poet can achieve, and Mallarmé is constantly concerned with seeing that nothing too definite shall intrude upon it with transgressive force. The kind of natural scenery he loves most is that in which one can find a 'virginal absence dispersed in solitude'; and he would have nothing (or nobody) break into this spell, even if it should carry with it a suggestion of that which is absent—on the contrary, that is what he would least desire; when he is in these moods of hieratic ecstasy, nothing on this earth must be allowed

to come to him with a usurping reminiscence of the 'ideal flower' that has been ravished from him, and which henceforth he will possess only in terms of absence. And as regards his own psychological states, the most desirable condition for him is *une exquisite vacance de soi*: an emptying of his personality of all the things that beset it in this world, of all that constitutes him a person in the eyes of other men. He would wish to be left undisturbed, in the exclusive purity of his poetic self, on what he finely calls the 'furtive threshold' of his kingdom. Even the vibrating verse in which he conveys his Ideas and his Absences must be so delicate, so fragile in its constitution, that it almost seems to disappear. As nearly as possible, 'the immortal Word' itself must be 'tacit'—it must be the projection of a Silence in which is embodied an Absence.

Finally, even the blanks, the virginal white spaces of the poet's page, assume for Mallarmé a significance in terms of this conception. In his highest moods he would leave the page a complete blank; he would inscribe on it nothing that would be a disturbing and diminishing intrusion upon the vision of absolute loveliness that the page represents. But this mood of course, precisely because it is a mood of absolute achievement or fulfilment, is nihilistic, and it could only lead to an annihilation of all poetic text. And so Mallarmé comes to terms with the conditions imposed by this life, and his poems are not a collection of blank pages. In his last work, however, *Un Coup de dés*, one of the sections of the great Book towards which all his life tended, and which he was never to complete, he uses the blank as an instrument of technique. In this poem the blanks are an integral part of the composition, and their disposition and size are of real importance; they prolong into further suggestion and dream the suggestions and dreams of the text.

Poetry should have everything to say, and yet should not say it: this is a doctrine implicit in the æsthetic of certain of the German Romantics¹²; and this is the ideal of Mallarmé, who probably had little or no acquaintance with the work of these writers. He gave much better expression to the theory than they, developed it altogether much further, and applied it far more successfully than they did.

In July 1866 Mallarmé wrote to Aubanel that he had made a momentous discovery: he had 'found the key to himself,' and henceforth his life's work lay clear before him. What he meant by this he did not make altogether plain to Aubanel, who scratched his head and remained puzzled. But the explanation of this enigmatic statement is provided in a letter written by Mallarmé

¹² On this point, see 'German Romanticism. A Progressive definition,' by C. J. Brennan, in the *Modern Language Review of New South Wales* (January 192

to Coppée in 1868.¹³ 'Two years ago,' he says, 'I committed the sin of looking upon Dream in its ideal nudity.' And now he is confronted with the 'horrible vision of a pure work,' and he was obsessed and tormented by this vision until the end of his life. The struggle it imposed upon him, which he accepted with sublime courage, killed him.

As I have indicated, there is something Platonic (and, one may add, Spinozistic, Hegelian—Absolutist, in a word) in all this part of Mallarmé's thought. But there is also something in his system which sharply differentiates it from these absolutist conceptions as they are ordinarily understood. His aspiration towards the Ideal does not end in the unsatisfying pale abstractions, devoid of all vivid distinguishing qualities or content, of the world of most absolutist philosophy. There is no 'unearthly ballet of bloodless categories'¹⁴ in his work. The Idea of his perfect flower, *l'absente de tous bouquets*, rises 'musically' when he summons it into being. It is not a dialectical entity, but a thing of music, and in a lesser degree a thing of plastic form, and it has a sharp appeal for the senses. Mallarmé, even when he is most a philosopher, always remains a poet, a devotee of the Word, an uncompromising man of letters. This, we may note, is one of the many points upon which Mme. Turquet-Milnes goes seriously wrong in her estimation of Mallarmé. She says, for example, that 'his ideal is not literary but philosophic'; that he is 'a purely intellectual genius,' and she reinforces this in another passage by saying that he is 'all intellect.' According to her, he did not 'feel the beauty and voluptuousness of things through love,' but as a matter of fact he did in a very large degree; even in the specific case of love for woman's physical charms, Mallarmé was sensitively responsive, and he constantly gives expression to sensuous and even sensual appreciation. Mme. Turquet-Milnes opposes him to Baudelaire, who, she affirms, was 'all senses,' which he was not; the truth is that Mallarmé's senses were as sharp as Baudelaire's, only they were less crude than the latter's, and they provide much of the material of his poetry. Elsewhere, however, Mme. Turquet-Milnes says that Mallarmé 'takes the tangible universe for his foundation,' that he 'rests on reality,' and 'takes pleasure in describing nothing but ordinary objects' (a statement that needs considerable qualification). This is an instance of the contradictory confusion of thought that often makes her work remarkable. M. Thibaudet says the right thing in this connexion: Mallarmé, he declares, was possessed of acute, very delicate and somewhat morbid sensibilities, which were constantly aroused to a state of exasperation. We may also

¹³ Published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (October 1, 1923).

¹⁴ F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic*.

take note here of another of Mme. Turquet-Milnes' amazing affirmations. 'His great weakness—we shall never cease to say it—is that of interrupting the flight of his thought for the pursuit of words.' Even if Mme. Turquet-Milnes never ceases to say it, no one who knows his Mallarmé will ever cease to deny it. Mallarmé was unswerving, as much as any man in the history of literature or thought has ever been, in pursuing the flight of his thought to its furthest consequences. It is precisely that that constitutes him a hero, as Mockel and others of his disciples proclaimed him. To miss that point is to miss the central and directive fact of his moral life. And, one may add, would a man whose ideal was 'not literary but philosophic' be likely to be preoccupied merely with words in the way and to the extent suggested by Mme. Turquet-Milnes?

The securing of this impression of *silence*, the conveying of a notion lying behind the object—a notion elusive and almost absent—is, Mallarmé considers, a form of creation, and a very high one: to present the object in this way, he maintains, is equivalent to creating it; and of course he is right, for the artist who thus transmits the object has virtually brought forward something that was not there before; or at least something that was not there for ordinary vision.

Absence, then, and Silence are two of the key-words that give us access to Mallarmé's æsthetic. The poet should constantly be suggesting something that is not immediately there—that may have been there once, and that may never at all have been on this earth; this suggestion of what is absent is much more powerful poetically than the presentation of something in its concrete presence. This leads to a third stage in the doctrine; things have not so much value in themselves as in being signs of something else lying beyond them, of something else that in the full meaning of the word is transcendental. This is the famous Theory of Correspondences, which Mallarmé received primarily from Baudelaire, who inherited it from a tradition extending over many centuries. Things in this life, on this earth, correspond not only to one another—colours to sounds, sounds to perfumes, etc.—but to other and much greater things, which belong to a further world, and are much nearer to ultimate Reality than those of which we have cognisance. The writer who confines himself to things in their immediate present aspect misses all their mysterious inner potentialities arising from the fact of their relationships with transcendental things. One of the chief aims of the poet should be to seize and suggest these relationships, and this cannot be done in terms of the older systems of æsthetic. It is from this particular stage that the whole doctrine derives its name of Symbolism. Certain things here are *symbols* of certain

other things here, and of other things, again, which are transcendental. It is unfortunate that the whole doctrine has been named after one of its parts, and that perhaps not the most important part. Of course, the Symbolism of which we are speaking should be sharply distinguished from other sorts—from that of Maurice Scève and Gongora, for instance, and especially from that of Vigny, who is often in bad text-books described as one of the founders (or at least precursors) of the Symbolist school of which Mallarmé was the chief figure and the legislator. There is nothing new in Vigny's symbolism; it is simply the simile or the metaphor employed on a larger scale than it usually had been in the past; and, compared to Mallarmé's, it is thoroughly external all the time. It is arbitrary, it does not deal with real relationships at all, and least of all those that are involved in the intimate and ultimate structure of the universe. In order to differentiate the kind of symbolism employed by Mallarmé from the older, banal sort, I have chosen to refer to it as 'esoteric.'

M. Valéry, in his summary definition of Symbolism,¹⁵ reduces it exclusively to an aspiration to appropriate the effects of music—a thing with which I shall deal presently. But even the most cursory account of Symbolism must take cognisance of the Symbol, as we have defined it in what precedes. Although it was not the only preoccupation of the Symbolists, it was an essential part of the æsthetic of many of them, and in particular of Mallarmé himself. And the Symbol has not necessarily anything to do with the effects of pure music which the majority of these writers strove to attain.

Yet another stage of the doctrine is reached when the individual writer himself is considered; for, viewed as a personality, he is something very much more than a ratiocinative mind. Every soul, says Mallarmé, is a melody, and as such does not merely wish to express itself in rational language; it has a need to sing, to give forth its inner music, and this music is highly individual, it is not the same as that of another person. Once again, therefore, it will not express itself in terms of utterance that all men employ on ordinary occasions.

All these things considered, poetry, so far from being something reducible to logical, plain, straightforward speech, is, on the contrary, something highly mystical; as Mallarmé himself puts it, it is a species of sorcery. A verse (of the Symbolist sort) is a 'supernatural term,' into which utterance resolves itself when things are transfigured. It has an inner life of its own, quite independent of the meaning and ordinary functions of the words composing it; these words, set in the verse, acquire

¹⁵ In the aforementioned *avant-propos* to *La Connaissance de la Désesse*.

powers that they never have when they are isolated, or when they are employed in common speech; they reciprocally light one another up with new splendour, as do precious stones set together in a strand. Out of these words combined a new word is made, complete in itself, the like of which has never existed before in the language; and this word is incantatory, insists Mallarmé, always returning to the point that there is magic in the whole thing. There is a relationship with forces that lie beyond this world. Again, insists Mallarmé, a true verse is not merely ancillary, it does not merely serve to bring to light already existing types or kinds of beauty; it is creative of new beauty, for once the magical process of poetry is set in operation, a thousand elements of hitherto unassociated beauty rush to take their place in the verse, and they compose a new order. Moreover, the resources of verse provide mankind with a means of offsetting the grievous defects due to chance and accident to which all human speech is subject. As a good Symbolist, Mallarmé would wish that the structure of a word in all languages should correspond to its meaning; but this is far from being the case, for the same meaning is represented by different words in different languages, and these different words are often not even similar to each other. Here at least there seems to be a failure of correspondence in a very important matter. If this were irremediable, the thorough-going Symbolist poet would be sadly handicapped; but the supernatural term created by the verse is able to surmount all obstacles inherent in language. Thus chance in speech is 'sovrantly denied,' and this gives us the 'mésure of the apotheosis of the soul of man.' One of the gravest defects of a verse, in Mallarmé's eyes, is that each word of it should live its own individual life, and thus be no more than one of the elements of a mosaic,¹⁶ instead of losing its individuality and serving simply as a 'transition' in a 'gamut' constituting a new unity. All this, one may add, applies in some measure to any verse of real poetry, even of the kind secured by traditional means; but it applies much more to verses that in the fullest sense of the word are Symbolist. In these there is much more sorcery, much more invasion and stirring of transcendental presences.

Furthermore, a writer, if he is going to use poetry for these higher, subtler purposes, must invest it with more powers than it has been the custom to accord to it; he must extend to it many of the prerogatives which are looked upon as being proper only to music.

Mallarmé had no doubt that these prerogatives were no less

¹⁶ He gently reproaches his friend Coppée with this fault: see letter, December 5, 1866.

proper to literature than to music; and he went further than this—he maintained that they belonged to literature even more than to music. He affirmed that true music is resident not nearly so much in the 'elementary sonorities' of instruments—wooden, copper, stringed and other—as in the 'intellectual Word at its apogee.' Music has really appropriated what properly belongs to literature, and it is now time for literature to come into its own again. And so poetry will regain 'the shocks, the slipping, gliding movements, the illimitable and unfaltering trajectories, the quickly elusive opulences,' and all the other properties of music. One which delights Mallarmé particularly is '*une inaptitude délicieuse à finir*'—a reluctance to advance to anything direct, hard and sharp, clear-cut, conclusive; there must always be the hint of things beyond, always the twilight merging into obscurity.

Thus, says Mallarmé, '*on possède les moyens du Mystère*': the poet who works in these terms has the best means of approach to mystery, the best means of evoking it, and, what is more important still, the best means of creating it; for, as already indicated, poetry of the sort in question is, in part at least, an act of genuine creation, besides being a revelation of transcendental forces, and as such having mere representational value, although representational value of a very high order indeed. Mallarmé further says that this æsthetic provides modern man, '*ce civilisé édenique*'—this being who, in spite of all that civilization has done for him and has to offer him, cannot but continue to aspire after some Eden—with a possession more precious than all other goods, and brings him within reach of supreme felicities; for it gives him a doctrine whereby he can happily adjust himself to the universe as he now experiences it; and it also leads him to a country, a country which he will recognize as his true home, and wherein his spirit may find repose.

In other words, if one may expand the all too compressed thought of Mallarmé, this æsthetic is nothing less than a religion; as spiritual and mystical as any other, and yet making no hard and impossible demands upon the reason; for nothing merely conjectural, nothing of the absurdity so dear to Tertullian and Pascal, enters into it; and it is nobler than any other, for it makes no appeal to the lesser, basely selfish side of man's nature, which is desperately concerned to prolong its individuality, however little worth preserving it may be; its sole appeal is to the highest part of man, the part that seeks towards what else is highest in this world, and thence to what is highest in the transcendental world. And it reinstates man in his Eden; or, better still, conducts him to an Eden greater than any that he may have known and lost in any part of his odyssey in the past.

It offers him sure salvation, and salvation of the only acceptable sort.

Mallarmé certainly inspired his disciples and friends with a feeling that the doctrine for which he stood had within it the elements of a religion. 'There was something religious in the air,' says M. Valéry, talking of these times; and he tells us that certain minds found the new æsthetic so beautiful that they could not help thinking of it as supra-human, and that they made it the object of a cult, and worshipped it. And, referring to the same attitude in another passage, he records that a new religion was very nearly founded. Mallarmé himself was never in doubt as to where the highest religious truth and beauty lay. The flamboyant Barbey d'Aurevilly one day enthusiastically read him the Apostles' Creed, and no doubt thought he was conferring a signal benefit upon him. 'I believe the world will be saved by a better literature,' was Mallarmé's magnificently disconcerting response.

And yet Mme. Turquet-Milnes assures us that Mallarmé's perpetual cry was that he was 'dying for want of finding' his Eden—whereas he was fully confident that he had found the only Eden that was worth finding; that he continually sought the Absolute, and found 'only the ephemeral and the contingent'—whereas he himself, who knew better than Mme. Turquet-Milnes, was sure that he had a means of access to the Absolute; that, unlike Villiers de Lisle-Adam, who 'had the courage to go further,' and 'take refuge' in Christianity, he 'failed' because he had not a 'true religion'! To say that criticism of this sort is gratuitous is to treat it very mildly.

Such, reduced as far as possible to ordinary plain speech, is the substance of Mallarmé's teaching, and such, we may be sure, was the purport of what he delivered to a group of admiring disciples on his famous Tuesdays; many of those who assisted at these receptions or *séances* have told us how marvellous Mallarmé's conversation was, but not a single one has succeeded in conveying what it was all about. (It is not only in written reports that one can find no satisfying enlightenment on this subject. I have questioned a certain number of people who attended the Tuesday gatherings, but none of them has been at all clear as to what Mallarmé actually said; even such a highly competent authority as Charles Whibley, a very close friend of Mallarmé's, was disappointingly vague when he discussed the matter with me. And no less so was George Moore, another of Mallarmé's Tuesday congregation, who, like Charles Whibley, loved to talk of this period of his life, and was by no means inclined to make a pious impenetrable mystery of Mallarmé's vaticinations. As for the French devotees I have met, I have found them, with regard to

what Moréas calls the 'noble dialectic' of Mallarmé, no more explicit than these two English familiars of the great master.)

A few words are demanded on the subject of Mallarmé's 'obscurity.' Mme. Turquet-Milnes denies in effect that the obscurity exists; according to her, all that is required is that Mallarmé's verse should be 'rendered into English,' when, she assures us, it 'becomes crystal clear.' We will not pause to consider this phenomenon of a body of poetry becoming limpid only if and when it is rendered into another language; we will only remark that Mr. Arthur Ellis's versions, to which she appended a *vade-mecum* or guide-book to Mallarmé, and of which she is probable thinking, do not give the remotest idea of the essential qualities of Mallarmé's poetry, however admirable they may be as exercises in English verse. But Mme. Turquet-Milnes is surely in a class by herself in possessing the happy privilege of finding Mallarmé 'crystal clear'; all other readers of Mallarmé (and some of them are very clever people) recognize that in certain sections of his work at least he is very obscure. And the fact that Mme. Turquet-Milnes does not find him obscure is a proof that she has not seized what is one of the cardinal principles of his æsthetic. For, as we have already made plain, he deliberately meant, at least after he attained poetic maturity, the greater part of his work to be obscure. Obscurity as he conceived it—that is, not as something due to clumsy thinking, but as something issuing from superfine thinking or ecstasy—was for him a saving grace or virtue; it was a very important, an integral part of his technique that raised poetry to a higher power, and he cultivated it sedulously. M. Valéry is wrong when he says that the obscurity of Mallarmé's poetry is due merely to its refractivity. The refractivity is only one of the causes collaborating to produce obscurity. Mallarmé himself is quite definite on this point, as the following words of his show:

... la face alternative ici élargie vers l'obscur; scintillante là avec certitude, d'un phénomène, le seul, je l'appelai l'Idée.

That is, there is in his work an obscurity *tout court*, existing in its own right, independent of all other considerations, and deliberately cultivated; and there is such obscurity as may accompany the presentation of the Idea, although he himself hopes that this presentation will be an illumination. Any obscurity incidental to this presentation arises from the fact that Mallarmé does not seek to convey the Idea *en bloc*, in its immediate entirety, but in its 'prismatic subdivisions,' as he puts it; and this is the kind of obscurity that M. Valéry is thinking of. M. Royère is much nearer the mark when he says that Mallarmé's obscurity is due to the fact that Mallarmé so organizes language that it shall yield results

far beyond those which the ordinary run of men can hope to obtain from it.

This leads us to the attempts to 'interpret' Mallarmé. There are many such endeavours to explicate the more obscure of his writings.¹⁷ It follows from what I have said above that all these attempts are necessarily nugatory, and that they do a real disservice to Mallarmé. For they ignore or contravene what is most essential in his æsthetic. If one is not ready to take Mallarmé on his own terms, the best thing to do is to leave him alone altogether.

I have not examined, as one would have to do in a complete study of Mallarmé, the various philosophical ideas inherent in his system: his conception of the Absolute and of Chance, the Theory of Correspondences, etc. What I have been most concerned to do is to insist upon the supra-logical powers of poetry which Mallarmé sought to develop, and the avenues of dream which he sought to open up. These latter things belong to poetry independently of the afore-mentioned philosophical considerations. The sort of poetry after which Mallarmé aspired is not altogether new; there is something of it in previous literature, and particularly in English literature (but in this previous literature it is only incidental, accidental, precarious and sporadic; and Mallarmé tried to make it sure and central). As M. Valéry says, it issues from 'all the experience of previous literature'; it is 'the supreme flower of the most profound culture.'

As this year happens to be the centennial anniversary of his death, one may cite Coleridge especially as having anticipated or adumbrated certain of the more important doctrines of Mallarmé. The greater part of the time, the latter would have been thoroughly at home in the intellectual society of the most various, the furthest-ranging, the most richly-gifted mind in the whole history of English letters, one of whose many titles to fame is that he is the profoundest æsthetician yet produced by this country; and Mallarmé would doubtless have affirmed that Coleridge's work at its best was, as pure poetry, superior to that of any of his predecessors, not excluding Shakespeare.

Let us note very rapidly a few of the points which constitute Coleridge a precursor of Mallarmé in his most developed stages. Coleridge's philosophy, which contained many elements of Platonic or neo-Platonic Idealism, has as its foundation the notion of the absolute and infinite Reality. In Coleridge's view, the finite, to be truly actual, must have its subsistence in this Reality; if it wills itself to be actual otherwise, under 'impossible conditions,' that is, it gives rise to a 'strange contradiction,' and

¹⁷ Cf., in particular, those of M. Camille Soula, all published by Edward Champion.

this is the cause of what is known as evil in the world (*Opus maximum*). Coleridge's great ambition was to prove that the material universe, as well as the spiritual, is the expression of an Idea. The individual mind, according to him, receives the Idea 'to comprehend the universe, the world without and the yet more wonderful world within' (*ibid.*). The aim of poetry, he held, no less than of philosophy, is to effect 'the union of the universal and of the particular' (*ibid.*). What is important is not *the all* but *the whole*: '*all* is an endless fleeting abstraction; *the whole* is a *reality*' (*Table Talk*); and this is the reality which poetry must seek to capture. Science cannot do this, for 'the full applicability of abstract science ceases the moment reality begins' (*Op. max.*). 'I was to take from history its accidentality,' says Coleridge, speaking of the same thing from another point of view (*Table Talk*).

And so for Coleridge 'all genius is metaphysical; because the ultimate end of genius is ideal, however it may be actualised by incidental and accidental circumstances' (*Table Talk*). 'No man,' he says elsewhere, 'was ever yet a great poet without being at the same time a profound philosopher' (*Biog. lit.*). And in another passage he says that the poet must be 'impelled by a mighty inward force,' the 'obscure impulse' in him must 'gradually become a bright and clear and burning Idea' (*Prelim. : Treatise on Method*). How is the Idea, which 'is above form, and is its essence, the universal in the individual' (*On Poesy or Art*), to be conveyed by the artist? 'An Idea, in the *highest* sense of the word, cannot be conveyed but by a *symbol*' (*Biog. lit.*). The artist must imitate that which is within the thing . . . and discourse to us by symbols' (*On Poesy or Art*). Beauty may be defined as 'the subjection of matter to spirit so as to be transformed into a symbol in or through which the spirit reveals itself' (*Biog. lit.*).

Here we have something analogous to Mallarmé's doctrine that supernatural forces are at work in a true verse of poetry. Very interesting in the same connexion is Coleridge's assertion that in Nature we have a scale in which 'the maximum of each lower state becomes the base and receptive substrate, as it were, of a higher kind, commencing through the irradiation and transfiguration by the higher power, the base of which it has become' (*Op. max.*). Mallarmé would have argued that this process of 'irradiation and transfiguration' takes place in an eminent and supreme degree in a line of poetry of the highest kind; and he would have welcomed Coleridge's statement that imagination is a 'synthetic and magical power' (*Biog. lit.*).

He would also have rejoiced at Coleridge's assertion that 'Beauty is an immediate presence, between which and the be-

holder *nihil est* ' (Table Talk); that to a sensitive mind the beauty of a landscape is 'music,' and the very 'rhythm of the soul's movements' (*Semina rerum*); that poetry 'has a logic of its own, more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes' than the logic of science (*Biog. lit.*); and that the poet solicits us to do nothing more than 'to yield ourselves to a dream' (*ibid.*). It is also noteworthy that Coleridge said that to please him 'a poem must be either music or sense' (*Table Talk*); thereby implying that there is a valuable kind of poetry whose virtue consists in its musical qualities, altogether independent of what the world knows as sense. Coleridge even anticipates Mallarmé on the much-vexed question of obscurity, and provides an excellent *apologia* for Mallarmé's technique. 'The charge of impenetrable obscurity,' he says, 'is at one time or another brought against every great discoverer and benefactor of the human race; excepting only when the discoveries have been capable of being rendered palpable to the ordinary senses, and have therefore come under the cognisance of our "sober judicious critics," the men of "sound common sense"; i.e., of those snails in intellect, who wear their eyes at the tips of their feelers . . . ' (*Omniana*); and he draws, as Mallarmé was to do, a distinction between journalism and other writing of a practical sort on the one hand, and on the other that kind of creative expression which alone is worthy of the name of literature. 'An ignorant coxcomb may very effectively wield a pen in a newspaper office' is his withering comment (*Table Talk*). It would be easy to amplify and develop all this: but enough has been said to indicate that in many striking ways Coleridge is a predecessor of Mallarmé. A satisfactory account of Coleridge's æsthetic has yet to be written.

The only writer in English who has attempted in a consistent fashion to apply the principles of Symbolism is C. J. Brennan, a name completely unknown in England. He is by far the most considerable poet (and scholar) yet produced by the British Empire outside Britain, and I am dealing with him in a work to appear shortly,¹⁸ in which I have used a certain amount of the material that has gone into the making of this essay.

¹⁸ To be published by P. R. Stephensen & Co., Ltd., Sydney, Australia.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXC—AUGUST 1934

THE FUTURE OF WARFARE

THROUGHOUT Europe, no less than at home, feeling has been stirred by the disclosures made last month in this Review in my article 'Aerial Warfare: Secret German Plans.' As the *Observer* aptly said, the prospect of air attack upon crowded cities with gas and germs 'forces civilisation to look horror in the face.' Efforts have naturally been made to deny the authenticity of the German documents which I revealed, or to belittle their significance. Had I not weighed beforehand every conjecture that could tell against them, including the hypothesis—unlikely in the circumstances—that I had been the victim of an astute fraud, I should have been guilty of lightmindedness in crediting them at all. The only hypothesis which fits the facts as I know them is that the documents themselves are entirely genuine and that they reached me through trustworthy channels.

It is expedient, none the less, to place on record various official, semi-official, and other statements that have been made. The first place belongs to the denial issued in Berlin on July 1, three days after the appearance of my article in the *Nineteenth Century and After* and the simultaneous publication of copious

extracts from it in the British and foreign Press. On Sunday, July 1—the morrow of the murders of General von Schleicher, the former German Chancellor, and his wife, and of the 'executions' of Captain Röhm and other prominent Storm Troop leaders at Munich—a Reuter telegram from Berlin reported:

'A crime against Europe and humanity' is the phrase used in an official declaration issued here on the article by Mr. Wickham Steed in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, which contained startling allegations of German plans for poison gas and bacteria attacks by air on London and Paris. The statement says:

There are no secret German documents of the nature alleged by Mr. Wickham Steed. There is no air gas attack office at the *Reichswehr* Ministry. Germany has not concerned herself with any such things, desires nothing but peace, and rejects as a crime against Europe and humanity the attempts of mischief-making elements to sabotage the efforts to achieve an understanding between Germany and other European Powers.

Whether or not Germany has 'concerned herself with such things' may presently appear. Meanwhile my 'crime against humanity' need not shun comparison with the doings of Herr Hitler, General Goering and Dr. Goebbels on June 30 and the days immediately following.

In the House of Commons on July 4 Sir N. Grattan-Doyle asked the Prime Minister whether he was aware that evidence exists that experiments are being made and secret German plans perfected by the *Luft-Gas-Angriff* Department for the destruction of human beings in war by aircraft carrying deadly disease germs; that experiments have been made concerning the vulnerability of underground railways in London and Paris; whether he had considered the evidence; and what action, if any, he proposed to take. Mr Stanley Baldwin answered:

I have seen allegations to this effect in a published article. They have been officially denied by the German Government. The question of the vulnerability of the underground railways in London is kept under constant observation as part of the general question of air raids precautions, but I do not consider it in the public interest to make any further statement.

Pressed by Sir N. Grattan-Doyle to say whether he was aware that the allegations referred to were very definite and precise and were supported by very strong evidence, and whether, in these circumstances, it was not a matter which ought to engage the urgent attention of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Baldwin replied: 'I have nothing to add to the answer I have already given.'

On July 5 the morning edition of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, now a Nazi organ, commented as follows upon Mr. Baldwin's answers:

If Mr. Baldwin had taken the opportunity to express himself in a less neutral form upon the scandalous charges brought against Germany by a notorious agitator like Wickham Steed it would have been useful for the tranquillisation of England and for the removal of the growing lack of trust which public opinion in Germany places in England's policy. Wickham Steed has not the slightest proof, of any striking value, for his assertions. They have stuck in his throat as did those of the *Petit Parisien*. It would have been appropriate for Mr. Baldwin to have pointed this out, all the more since he spoke expressly of the 'vulnerability' of the London underground railways. Is this lukewarm treatment of such a matter as Steed's lies meant to foster the preparation of Barthou's visit and the hue and cry of English newspapers upon the events of the last week-end in Germany?

As I have not the honour to be in Mr. Baldwin's confidence I cannot say what his intentions were. He may have felt that the information in possession of the Government upon the aggressive designs of Germany did not allow him to accredit, even indirectly, the German official statement that my allegations were baseless or 'a crime against Europe and humanity.' But few of his fellow-countrymen will suspect his 'lukewarm treatment of such a matter,' of having been inspired by either of the motives which the Nazi organ imputes to him.

One other observation calls for comment. In a leading article on June 28, entitled 'Glass Houses,' the *News-Chronicle* wrote:

If the documents be genuine—and the technical details contained in the published extracts would point to skill of a high order in forgery—it is important to remember that probably every Government in Europe, including that of this country, is experimenting to-day with all and every method [*sic*] of utilising poison gas and bacteria in the event of war. It is, in fact, the business and the duty of all General Staffs to make such experiments. Indeed, this is the sort of thing that we—the voters and taxpayers of every country—are paying them to do. To suppose that Germany is alone in this infamy would be wholly erroneous.

The suggestion seems to be that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones; and, as was natural in the circumstances, it was warmly welcomed by the German Press. I believe it to be wide of the mark—certainly in so far as experiments by the British or other foreign General Staffs with bacteria in the German underground railway systems are concerned. It is highly probable that Germany is 'alone in this infamy.' On the other hand, it is certain that all General Staffs have been and are experimenting with poison gases and seeking to discover means of protection against foreign air attack by gas or germs or both. With the kind of 'objectivity' displayed by the *News-Chronicle* I have little sympathy—just as little as with expostulations uttered, before the Hitlerite 'clean-up' in Germany, by some

well-meaning people whose memories are short, that no civilised people would dream of doing such things as my documents showed the Germans to have done. But I agree very heartily with the conclusion of the *News-Chronicle's* argument that my documents

may best be regarded as lifting the corner of a curtain which masks a latent horror, destined to annihilate civilisation sooner or later, unless the civilised world, redeeming the failure of its statesmen so far to achieve an effective will to peace, determines that these things shall not be.

If civilisation is 'to look horror in the face,' the horror should be looked at steadily and as a whole. The worst hypothesis ought to be the most optimistic working formula for sober thought. While it is true that not every ascertained abomination needs to be made public—and I have deliberately refrained from mentioning some that are known to me—it is the plain duty of democratic Governments not to leave their peoples in ignorance of the nature of future warfare. Rather should they, and the British Government in particular, frame and expound a policy designed to range the resources of civilisation against warfare itself. To think or to talk of 'the next war' in terms of the last war is futile, and may be suicidal. To conceive and to recommend 'peace' policies with a mental reservation in favour of 'keeping out of it' when the 'next war' comes is to put a premium upon catastrophe. The only reasonable way to deal with 'the next war' is so to load the war-dice against all or any who may think of throwing them that the hardest premeditator of so real a 'crime against humanity' will feel the deadly game to be too hazardous.

To this conclusion the German secret documents which I revealed last month unerringly point. Other German documents, not secret but publicly recorded (though perhaps not observed) in our Patent Office, point the same way. On December 17, 1926, the well-known German producer of poison gases, Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg, of Hamburg (whose name was associated with the mysterious phosgene disaster at Hamburg on May 20, 1928), applied for a German patent entitled 'Procedure for the attainment of a field of drops from great heights with especial reference to the combating of [insect] pests.' The application was only laid open to public inspection on July 18, 1929, in the German Patent Office; but, on the expiry of the two months' period for objections, it was published on October 17, 1929, given the number DRP. 485,574 and registered on November 2, 1929. For some unknown reason Dr. Stoltzenberg allowed his patent to lapse, on account of non-payment of fees, long before it would otherwise have fallen in. Yet, as appears from a communication which he made to No. 56 of the *Chemikerzeitung* (pages 751-52) in

1932, his interest in the raining down of 'mustard' and similar gases had by no means declined. This communication concerned 'Protective suits against spraying with skin poisons,' and dealt exclusively with Yellow Cross or mustard 'gas.' A passage from his statement runs:

For the protection of troops against the raining down [of gases] by airmen, I have developed a cloak that shields the soldier and all his clothes and equipment from the falling drops, as well as the bit of ground on which he stands. While the airmen's rain is passing over him, he is able to pull on his protective boots that reach above the knee, and thus to get away, with his whole equipment, from the sprayed area even if it be covered with high grass or wheat or maize. Then, indeed, he must discard the mantle by throwing it away from within so as not to be touched by the drops running off it. He can get rid of the protective boots by shaking them off. Since, in war-time, the mantle must be discarded after being used once, the mantles have to be made of very light and comparatively cheap materials.

The date of Dr. Stoltzenberg's article (1932) is significant. Had he heard of the studies and tests which the Air Gas Attack Department of the German War Office was organising, or had his earlier patent been taken up and developed by a big aircraft firm so that he had no further interest in keeping it 'alive'? In any event, the 'claim' for his patent alleges that

in general it is not possible to attain a field of drops (*Tropfenfeld*) of the desired extent from heights of more than 500 metres with relation to a given target, because, even with knowledge of the prevailing strength and direction of the wind at the height at which the aircraft is flying, air currents of various kinds impede the aim. The evaporation of the liquid gas is another disturbing factor, for it allows only the smallest quantities to reach the ground from great heights unless the drops of liquid are themselves enriched by elements of the atmosphere. These drawbacks can be obviated if the drops are provided with a protective covering.

This covering, Dr. Stoltzenberg suggests, may be made of glass, celluloid, greased paper or thin metal, or other substances which 'would burst on impact and would thus give the desired field of drops.' His 'claim' does not explain why insects and other pests should be combated by poison gas 'from great heights' at all. But if the 'pests' upon whom this rain from heaven is to fall are assumed to be troops, or the inhabitants of cities, Dr. Stoltzenberg's technique becomes intelligible. Some 250 litres of protected drops could, according to his 'claim,' be discharged simultaneously from an apparatus fixed beneath the aeroplane. Their contents might be hydrogen cyanide, carbon-dioxide, phosgene, chloride, cyanogen-chloride, and nitric oxide. Mustard 'gas' is not expressly mentioned in this connexion.

Suspicion that Dr. Stoltzenberg's patent may have its uses as a military device is strengthened by a pamphlet, or rather

series of pamphlets, which he published in 1929 under the title *The Ultra-Poisons*. Five of these pamphlets are preserved in a public London library. Their contents appear, from internal evidence, to be a series of lectures given by Dr. Stoltzenberg to superior officers of the *Reichswehr*, since in the introduction he uses the form of address: '*Meine hohen Herren Militaers*' ('My High Military Gentlemen').

In the first pamphlet, or lecture, Dr. Stoltzenberg discusses bacteriological warfare and refers to assertions of an officially recognised Italian writer, A. Pagnello, in 1925, that attempts were made by Germany and Austria during the war to spread glanders and typhus among the enemy, and draws the conclusion that Germany must 'plumb the uncharted deeps' of the bacteriological world, since warfare with germs might be a much more frightful weapon than any yet used. But in the second pamphlet, under the titles *Methods of Attack in Gas Warfare: Aircraft and Ultra-Poisons*, he writes:

A domain in which hitherto little has been published is the combination of aircraft with poison. Whereas pacifists give much space to this new domain in their imaginations, practical men are by no means unanimous upon its value. (Hanslian, *Das Chemische Kampfmittel im Kuckunfshrieg*.)

But, Dr. Stoltzenberg goes on, if a weapon is blunt, quantity must do duty for quality. Under cover of night the efficacy of anti-aircraft guns, and of defence by hostile aircraft, disappears in view of the heights—4000 to 5000 metres—which laden aircraft can now reach. Therefore surprise attacks with gases of various sorts might give incomparable results. The simplest method would be to enclose the gases in small glass balls so as to prevent evaporation or deflection by air currents and to attain an equal distribution of the contents by the bursting of the balls on impact.

Another method would be to freeze, or to solidify with gelatine, the poisonous substances; and a third method would be to enclose them in bombs timed to burst at given heights. The two former methods had not yet been tested under war conditions, but the third method had given excellent results with pear-shaped bombs of 20, 50 and 100 kilogrammes. At the end of this chapter Dr. Stoltzenberg states that

an aeroplane capable of carrying one ton net weight, and with an eight-hours' flying radius, can carry four bombs of 100 kilogrammes each, six of 50 kilogrammes and fifteen of 20 kilogrammes. The bombs must be discharged from heights of 250 metres upwards to 5000 metres, since the centrifugal fuse can only be used with safety at 250 metres or over.

These explanations to 'High Military Gentlemen' seem to suggest, at any rate, the potential nature of the 'pests' which were to be combated by Dr. Stoltzenberg's patent. He goes on

to discuss in great detail the problem of raining down ultra-poisons, and points out that foggy or humid atmospheres facilitate the sinking of gas clouds to the lowest atmospheric strata and 'exercise a favourable influence on the development of the gas clouds themselves.' He had, he said, observed that drops of hygroscopic substances increase in volume by falling through air saturated with humidity. He adds:

Since a field of falling drops extends constantly because big drops divide themselves again into normal drops, the possibility of creating artificial rain and of directing it towards desired areas is theoretically demonstrated. Naturally such rain can only be created by means of aircraft; and thus we reach one of the most attractive domains that are opened up to human research and the spirit of invention in connexion with the development of the utilisation of ultra-poisons.

Why Dr. Stoltzenberg, in his address to the 'High Military Gentlemen' of Germany, thought this domain of research so attractive appears from a passage in his second pamphlet under the sub-title 'Artillery Fighting with Ultra-Poisons':

With this glance at the new problems of the future we will conclude the chapter on offensive warfare and rejoice that, in various countries, the preparations for this warfare are still giving rise to long-winded Geneva disarmament proposals and well-powdered suggestions for a return to the good old times of halberd knightliness!

In spite of the assurance officially given in Berlin on July 1 that 'Germany has not concerned herself with any such things,' it would almost seem that she has been concerning herself with them since 1926 at latest. And in view of this possibility—not to say certainty—Herr Hitler's repeated asseverations that Germany has fulfilled the Versailles Treaty raise the question whether the first two paragraphs of Article 171 of the Versailles Treaty are covered by his statements. These paragraphs run:

The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.

The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.

Dr. Stoltzenberg's own infringement of these clauses was amply proved by the phosgene disaster at his Hamburg works in May 1928; but particulars are to be found in the British Patent Office of a German Patent (DRP. 467,659), dated November 24, 1926, and entitled 'Distribution and Atomisation of Means for the Combating of Pests from Aeroplanes.' This patent belongs to the well-known German firm of aeroplane makers, Junkers, of Dessau. The claim for it describes various means of raining down or spraying poisons from aircraft without danger to airmen and

so as to cover considerable stretches of country ; and in a further claim for a German patent (DRP. 477,164) the interesting remark is made that the poisonous liquids can be discharged under pressure from gas. In these circumstances it is noteworthy that the raining down of mustard gas liquid, with or without pressure, was a feature of the simplified apparatus invented by No. IX., the expert collaborator of the Air Gas Attack Department of the *Reichswehr* Ministry, and mentioned on page 9 of my article in the July issue of the *Nineteenth Century and After*.

It remains to bring these things into perspective and to draw from them some obvious conclusions. A learned French professor has, I understand, criticised the revelations in my former article on the ground that the deadliness of bacteriological warfare is not proven, and that bacteriological cultures discharged from shells would be killed by the heat which the explosion of the shell would engender. I am well aware that the feasibility of infecting healthy populations by cultures of germs is a debated scientific problem ; and that, if the possibility of spreading typhoid, or perhaps cholera, through the iniquation of water supplies be admitted, the efficacy of other forms of bacteriological attack may be doubtful. But, as readers of the *Nineteenth Century and After* will have perceived, the secret German documents bore mainly upon attack by mustard 'gas,' the *Micrococcus prodigiosus* being utilised to test the dissemination of this 'gas'—or of deadly germs, should they be employed—by the air currents in underground railway systems. No mention was made of shells. The reference was to glass 'bombs' or containers of mustard 'gas,' the contents of which could either be rained down from great heights, or dropped, together with the glass container, upon targets which it might be desired to swamp. No competent bacteriologist, chemist, or soldier of my acquaintance questions the extreme danger of attack by mustard 'gas,' and one of the foremost biochemists of the world has expressed to me his considered opinion that mustard 'gas' will either kill war, or war with mustard 'gas' will kill civilisation.

This, indeed, is the root of the whole matter. Those who wish to study it would do well to read Sir Norman Angell's latest work, *The Menace to Our National Defence*,¹ which was published last month. Most if not all of his arguments are unanswerable. To-day there is no adequate defence against aerial attack. Reprisals may be feasible, unless attack should succeed in paralysing its victims completely. But where would European civilisation be on the morrow of successful reprisals, say, by French or British, or, for that matter, Polish or Czechoslovak, aircraft upon Germany? The fact that Germans were being

¹ Hamish Hamilton, 3s. 6d. net.

burned and blistered, poisoned and asphyxiated would be poor comfort to those of our people who had suffered a like fate. No ! There is only one way to overcome the horror which civilisation is compelled to look in the face. This way is to get rid of warfare altogether by the overwhelming strength of an effective international organisation against war of any and every kind.

This conviction is now widely shared. When two men of views so divergent as those of Sir Norman Angell and Mr. Winston Churchill find themselves agreed upon this point, the time ought to be ripe for action. The question remains : What action ? Sir Norman Angell, recognising that the majority of Powers have declared in favour of abolishing national air forces and of internationalising air transport, declares : 'On that fact our Government could, if it would, build a policy that would give a lead to the world.' Mr. Winston Churchill wrote recently in the *Daily Mail*.

Surely it should be our policy to use the instrument of the League of Nations [and, I would add, the Kellogg Pact] to band together a confederation of the peace-loving and peace-interested Powers, which should be so strong that there is no chance of their being attacked.

He calls upon those Powers, 'in the calm security of matchless strength,' then to endeavour to mitigate grievances and 'faithfully and humbly seek to do justice among men.'

All this is good, as far as it goes. M. Barthou's 'Eastern Locarno' may be good, if it comes off—though, even then, it would leave unsettled a matter of principle which affects this country. To my mind, nothing was less pleasing in the comments of the British Press upon M. Barthou's visit, and in the House of Commons debate upon it, than the parrot-cry that we have incurred no new commitments and are determined not to incur them. Will our Government and our people never understand that it is not a question of extending our 'commitments' for the sake of others, but of our very existence ? If war breaks out in Europe we are unlikely to be able to stand aside. From August 4, 1914, until the beginning of 1917 the United States thought it could stand aside while the devastation of Europe went on. In April 1917 President Wilson had to admit that 3000 miles of ocean were too narrow to enable the United States longer to hold aloof. How, then, can we, whom 21 short miles of sea separate from the Continent, hope to stand aloof in future ? In the unlikely contingency of our escaping direct attack, two factors of our national security—which, at bottom, are one—involve us in the fate of the Continent. We cannot stand by and see France crushed by Germany, nor can we allow Belgium and Holland to fall under the domination of a great military Power. If war

should arise anywhere in Europe, either of these dangers might compel us to intervene. We should then be obliged to abandon neutrality in the name of our national safety, after having declined to abandon it in obedience to an overriding principle of international safety against war.

War will never be got rid of, nor will disarmament become feasible, as long as Great Britain clings to the outworn shibboleth of 'neutrality' and fondly imagines that an international community can be organised against war without extending to that community the fundamental principle of law and order in this country—that is to say, the principle of non-neutrality on the part of individual citizens as between the law and law-breakers. On this point the history of neutrality during the past twenty years is as illuminating as it ought to be convincing.

During the first two and a half years of the war we had endless trouble with the United States over 'the freedom of the seas,' or, in other words, the rights of neutral seaborne trade. At the end of 1916 the United States was not far from deciding to enter the war against us in order to uphold the rights of neutral trade and shipping. But in January 1917 the Germans 'went one better' than the Allied blockade by proclaiming an 'unrestricted submarine campaign' against enemy and neutral shipping alike. On April 6, 1917, this campaign brought the United States into the war against them in the name of 'the freedom of the seas.' On January 8, 1918, President Wilson laid down, in the second of his 'Fourteen Points,' the doctrine that in future there should be absolute freedom of navigation on the seas, outside territorial waters, both in peace and in war, save as the seas might be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. Some ten months later Germany invoked these 'Fourteen Points' as the conditions for an armistice, and President Wilson's adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, discussed the proposal with Mr. Lloyd George. The British Prime Minister flatly refused to accept 'the freedom of the seas' as a basis for the armistice; and Colonel House, on behalf of President Wilson, warned him that, should Great Britain persist in this refusal, the United States would build for the protection of its trade the biggest navy the world had ever seen—such a navy, indeed, as its people had long desired. The wrangle ended in a postponement of the issue until the Peace Conference.

At the opening sitting of the Paris Peace Conference it was decided to make the drafting of a League of Nations Covenant the first point of the agenda. A Drafting Commission was set up. It sat from February 3 to February 13, 1919; and, as appears from its proceedings, the principle was accepted that 'neutrality

disappears within the League of Nations.' On February 14, 1919, President Wilson read the Draft Covenant to the Conference, which adopted it unanimously. To a group of American citizens who complained that the Covenant made no mention of 'the freedom of the seas,' for the sake of which the United States had entered the war, President Wilson replied that, in future, there would be no freedom of the seas, since 'in the League there will be no neutrals.'

So far was this from being an improvisation that, on February 13, 1920, when Switzerland was admitted to the League, the British delegate, Mr. A. J. (afterwards Earl of) Balfour, moved a resolution stating that while 'the conception of neutrality of the members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to co-operate in enforcing respect for their engagements,' Switzerland was in a unique situation, which nevertheless did not relieve her of 'the duty of co-operating in such economic and financial measures as may be demanded by the League of Nations against a Covenant-breaking State.' The League Council was unanimous in maintaining the principle that non-neutrality is essential to the organisation of the world against war.

It is sometimes imagined that the League Covenant was drafted by humanitarian theorists who took little heed of practical realities. The exact contrary is the truth. The Covenant is a minimum of the provisions against war upon which statesmen and lawyers whose countries had just come through the Great War could agree; and it cannot be rightly understood without reference to the war atmosphere in which it was drafted and to the conditions which would again prevail should war break out. When the United States rejected the Peace Treaty and the Covenant, the principle of neutrality reappeared. Its reappearance enfeebled, if it did not destroy, the binding force of Article 16, of which the opening lines run:

Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenant under Articles 12, 13, or 15 it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League.

In place of non-neutrality the blessed word 'parity' presently cropped up; and, as the event has shown, 'parity' is another name for equality in distrust. Mr. Winston Churchill rightly argues that 'nothing brings war nearer than an equality of forces between rival Powers.' From the Washington Conference of 1921-22 to the unsuccessful 'Coolidge' Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927, the twin phantoms of neutrality and parity frightened the United States and Great Britain into suspicious rivalry, until President Coolidge's Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg,

put forward, on December 28, 1927, the proposals for the renunciation of war that afterwards took shape in the Kellogg Pact. As I have the best of reasons to know, the object of President Coolidge in launching these proposals was to convince Great Britain and the world that the United States could not and would not be a friendly neutral towards any State which, having renounced war, should engage in it.

This intention was again clearly marked in the important statement made by Mr. Kellogg's successor, Secretary Henry L. Stimson, in his address to the New York Council of Foreign Relations on August 8, 1932—a statement which the British Foreign Secretary required three months even to acknowledge publicly! Mr. Stimson's thesis that the renunciation of war revolutionises the whole conception of neutrality is unassailable—just as unassailable as the converse proposition that insistence upon the right of States to be neutral invalidates the renunciation of war. We cannot have it both ways. If we would get rid of war we, and all other Governments that desire to abolish war, must renounce neutrality.

From this plain doctrine two important consequences follow. The first is that the renunciation of war restricts the legitimate function of all armaments to a police function. The second is that, while a state of non-neutrality does not necessarily entail active intervention on the part of every non-neutral country in every dispute that may arise anywhere, it does entail the inclusion of its economic and financial resources among the elements that police the world against war. The duty of active intervention may be delegated to States geographically near or directly interested in the scene of the dispute. Hence the expediency of regional pacts. But these regional pacts would take on a new complexion, if they were local expressions of a universal principle, and did not appear to be leagues of security directed against, and seeming to encircle, some potential disturber of the peace.

'Locarnos,' Western or Eastern, have this drawback in common—that they are not placed under the ægis of the one overriding principle in the name of which the world can be effectively organised against war, in the first place, and presently, for the promotion of peace, in the second. If, having looked horror in the face, Great Britain, the British Dominions, and the defenders of Western civilisation cannot agree to undertake the 'commitment' of non-neutrality, they had better prepare to carry through reprisals for surprise attack by gas or germs or both—and let civilisation go hang!

WICKHAM STEED.

M. BARTHOU'S FOREIGN POLICY

AMBULANT diplomats have of late very considerably displaced, if not altogether replaced, the post-war system of conferences. The routine of these conferences is well known: politeness is the keynote of all of them. Such unusual occurrences as Lord (then Mr. Philip) Snowden's vitriolic outburst at the Hague, or M. Barthou's biting sarcasm recently at Geneva, are not, strictly speaking, within the rules. Normally one speaker succeeds the other, congratulates him on what he has just said, and then proceeds to prove that this was utter nonsense and offers his own platitudes instead. The system is not dead yet, but has very nearly run itself silly. The new method is different. Like an army of commercial travellers, politicians and diplomats from all over Europe travel from country to country and in their coffers they carry a delicate merchandise indeed: the peace and stability of the world, the very fate of civilisation. Among these political travellers two must be singled out for the particular importance of their missions—Signor Fulvio Suvich, who travels for Italy, and Captain Anthony Eden, who travels for England. Their itineraries are not always the same, yet they have a great deal in common and not infrequently overlap; complete coherence, however, has not yet been reached.

Both these political travellers are young, and are typical representatives of the post-war brand of diplomats. But now a new traveller has come along, of a totally different kind, and within a remarkably short time has scored a series of real triumphs. M. Louis Barthou will forgive me if I state in cold print that he is seventy-two years of age. Yet his lucidity, vigour, and alertness should form the object of envy even of the most successful young man. M. Barthou first entered Parliament at the age of twenty-seven, and has been a deputy or a senator for the past forty-five years. It is twenty-one years since he was Prime Minister of France for the first time, and many shrewd observers can see him occupying that position again in the not too distant future. During the few months that have elapsed since he went to the Quai d'Orsay the foreign policy of France has acquired a powerful impetus and has regained its old vigour and clarity. The inter-

national prestige of France has grown enormously, and credit for all this is due very largely—though by no means entirely—to M. Barthou's personal qualities. His recent visits to the capitals of Central and Eastern Europe, and finally his trip to London, have done more than anything else in recent diplomacy to stabilise the European equilibrium.

The international equilibrium, which has not been particularly safe or stable since the end of the Great War, became manifestly threatened with Hitler's advent to power. It is not surprising, therefore, that this was followed by an almost panic-stricken reshuffling in international politics. The cause was simple. Whether they like to admit it or not, for the first time since 1918 foreign Chancelleries saw the danger of war as a reality. For years the secret military preparations of Germany had been known to most of them. For years they were deliberately shutting their eyes to them. But Hitler's action promptly removed what self-imposed shadow of doubt there could have been in their minds—not merely the actual facts of military preparations, drilling, or armaments. At the same time a not unnatural feeling of disgust and protest against Hitler's methods of government rapidly developed in most of the civilised countries and filled even the most dispassionate observers with doubt and apprehension. Intricate diplomatic negotiations began between all those who felt they might be affected by a military outbreak. Not only Germany's immediate neighbours—*i.e.*, France, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland—but also Italy and Soviet Russia (both of them supposed to be especially friendly to Germany), as well as some of the countries that were neutral in the last war, promptly readjusted their foreign policy. The fact that Switzerland or Denmark, for instance, who are certainly not aggressive and have no bias against Germany, felt called upon to take definite steps to prepare for a war emergency is a striking proof of how Germany's present temper is judged by the coolest and most peaceful countries in Europe.

As to the others, their concern and their desire to do all they can to safeguard themselves are obvious. What is sometimes less obvious is the course they chose to pursue. Some of them sought to placate Hitler—as if Germany could be placated—by suggesting concessions. Others have tried to form new alliances and to wait for the worst. Others, again, have merely talked or muddled up their more perspicacious friends and have postponed their own decisions. The *tertius gaudens* in this game of international diplomacy, however, has been Soviet Russia, which suddenly became the hero of the day, everybody seeking to buy its friendship, or at least its neutrality. Meanwhile Hitler—who had seen by the Soviet's seventeen years' record that you can insult the

rest of the world as much as you like, or default on your financial obligations, or generally ignore all civilised methods of international intercourse, not to mention gangster methods in domestic affairs, and still get away with it all—paid little attention to the changing diplomatic scene and pursued his own course.

If all these developments prove anything, they have certainly shown that there is no longer any specific Franco-German question, but that the very much wider issue is that of Germany's relations with, and her place in, the rest of Europe. That France should be most concerned and should be doing everything in her power to prevent such a calamity hardly requires an explanation. Any step or any measure that can help to maintain even the present unsatisfactory *status quo* is better than a breakdown or an adventure. France does not want a war—least of all a preventive war. To stabilise and consolidate the international equilibrium is, therefore, the most urgent objective of French foreign policy. And this proceeds from the essential and immutable article of faith in France's foreign relations—the quest of security. There is something degrading and irritating in the necessity of continuously having to repeat that peace, and not war, self-preservation, and not expansion, security, and not aggression, constitute the very foundation of French policy, quite irrespective of what Government happens to be in office.

A great truth was spoken by M. Barthou in his programme speech at the Chamber of Deputies last May when he declared that there was no Right and no Left foreign policy, but only the policy of France. This speech may have disappointed the Right, who were hoping for an announcement of a definite break with 'Briandism' (they loathe the word), and also the Left, who were hoping for a similar announcement of a break with the policy 'dictated by armaments manufacturers and the General Staff'—yet another bogey. Nevertheless, M. Barthou made a democratic, truly parliamentary speech and emphasised the continuity of French foreign policy. Indeed, there is no reason why the National Government of M. Doumergue should interrupt that continuity. Outward forms may vary, also the tone in which France talks to the world or is being talked to; changing circumstances may demand adjustments, and a given situation may require certain definite steps. But the general trend remains the same: France is determined to pursue a policy of security and peace, which is a common cause for all Frenchmen. The deeper meaning of 'Briandism,' just as of M. Barthou's recent endeavour, is to bring about an international combination that will guarantee that peace. And here the ultimate decision does not depend on France alone. While Prague, and Bucharest and Warsaw, not to mention Rome and Moscow, are of the utmost importance to the forms

taken by French foreign policy, the key to the situation is really in London. The analogy between the present situation and that of July 1914 is often stressed nowadays. It is reasonable to assume that if England had made her position clear at the time, Germany would not have invaded Belgium and the world war might have been averted. Equally so it may be said that if only this country took a clear, firm and definite stand to-day, the international position would immediately improve beyond recognition, and the threat of a new calamity bringing wreck and ruin on humanity could be avoided once and for all.

It is a painful thing to admit, but history does not know of many cases of a foreign policy so ambiguous, provocative and demoralising as that pursued by Great Britain since the war. The blame for that rests, not with the Foreign Office, which has produced an unusually strong and able team of diplomats, but with politicians and financiers. For years their joint efforts seem to have been directed towards weakening France and strengthening Germany, in spite of warnings by competent authorities as to the ultimate results of such a policy. The German attitude in the rearmament negotiations (which, owing to some peculiar perversion, have usually been misnamed 'disarmament'), and again the arbitrariness with which Germany has chosen to treat her creditors, have revealed the extent of this folly in almost striking manner.

Now it has suddenly become obvious to this country how seriously it is threatened by the possibility of air attacks, and to what extent the French army can be of value to Great Britain as well as to France herself. In spite of all the ravings of irresponsible isolationists, the fact remains that England, whether she likes it or not, is part of Europe and cannot cut herself adrift. It is a truism to say that in time of peace her prosperity depends on international trade, and in time of war her food supplies and the very safety of her shores depend on the state of affairs on the Continent. That is a thing, however, which people in England refuse to see or to admit. Not aware, or only partly so, of the dangers to which they are themselves exposed, and not prepared to assume any responsibilities, they blandly call on France to reduce her own armaments while allowing Germany to increase hers. Furthermore, while anxiously pressing France to reduce her army on land, England has shown little inclination to accept any restrictions of her own aerial or naval rearmament. It was part of M. Barthou's diplomacy to raise this question during his London visit and to make it quite clear that it is a vital point; if England claims a free hand with her Air Force and her Navy, France is equally entitled to the army she has and means to keep.

Is there any wonder that France's attitude to the disarmament question has been so determined and forceful? Can one blame her if she has refused to separate the issues of disarmament and security and will not accept any arrangements that legalise an open breach of existing treaties, and the weakening of her political and military position? Had Great Britain shown a different attitude, France might have been prepared to modify her uncompromising stand. For every agreement this country has entered has been accompanied by limitations and qualifications to the effect that it did not really mean anything, and that Great Britain wanted no commitments in Europe. If only during the long and painful period 1919-34 England had seen fit to say that in case of conflict she meant to stand by France, and had said so in a way that convinced the world she really meant it, the whole international situation to-day would be vastly different. But England has invariably refused to say or write any such thing.

Yet recent political and economic developments have brought about a situation which even though it does not amount to a declaration on the above lines is not so far removed from it as may appear at first glance. Of course, M. Barthou did not return from London with a defensive alliance or any sort of treaty or agreement in his pocket. But nobody expected that, nor does it particularly matter at the present juncture. What did happen in London was a real heart-to-heart talk between the representatives of France and Britain, when both parties made their respective positions quite clear and told each other what could and what could not be expected. Within limits there is once again a Franco-British understanding, the two countries find themselves on the same side of the barricade, and for the time being at least they will work in friendly co-operation instead of working against each other. Nothing has been signed, yet presumably the naval and military experts talked serious business, which must result in a certain co-ordination of the existing defence forces, and especially of the future—i.e., general rearmament and expansion of air defence in particular.

This new Franco-British *rapprochement* is due very largely to M. Barthou's skill and ability, but also in no small measure to Adolf Hitler. For years the Nazi leader has boasted that he alone possessed the secret of winning England and Italy over to Germany's side. The fact is that he has achieved the very reverse. He has managed to destroy England's somewhat inexplicable post-war attraction to Germany; and Italy, too, appears very lukewarm. In fact, the *Führer* can consider the Duce's friendship as lost, if ever it existed; and this for more reasons than one. It may have flattered Mussolini to be regarded as the only foreign statesman supposed to have great influence over Hitler and thus

to assume the position of arbiter between Nazi Germany and the rest of the world. But the prospect of Hitler-Germany swallowing up Austria, and of 75,000,000 'Nordic Aryans' stretching as far south as the Brenner Pass, never appealed to the Duce. At Venice, Hitler asked him to name a price for Austria, and Mussolini informed him he wasn't selling! But Austria is not the only thing that stands between Italy and Germany. Mussolini to-day is faced with economic and financial difficulties of the greatest magnitude. That and other considerations drive him towards a better understanding with France. Yet it is obvious that no real Franco-Italian understanding is possible until Italy abandons her implied or active support of Germany. Finally, it may be mentioned that Italy is not in the habit of finding herself on a side where Great Britain is not, and therefore it is to be expected that she will follow this country's lead, which should be towards a closer co-operation with France. Thus with Hitler's help France is entering an era of much better relations with Great Britain and Italy than she has enjoyed for many years past. As far as Italy is concerned, Rome is supposed to be M. Barthou's next port of call, and there is every prospect that his personal talk with Mussolini will provide a finishing touch to this new chapter of diplomatic history.

But the aged French diplomat's peregrinations have been fraught with many other interesting results. In the Eastern European capitals he was met with quite remarkable enthusiasm, and his presence did a very great deal to pave the way for a closer co-operation between the countries involved, the preservation of existing frontiers, and the general consolidation of peace. In Poland, however, the reception of France's representative was not so cordial. The Poles seem lately to have become curiously attracted by the idea of friendship with Germany and seem somewhat to resent the tutelage of France. In this connexion the following extract from an article, 'The Way to Middle Europe,' which appeared in the German economic paper *Der Wirtschaftsdienst*, is interesting. It sums up the struggle between France and Germany over Poland, and says:

Poland used to be the strategic and political centre of the French system in Europe. She was also the link between the Baltic countries in the north-east and the Little Entente in the south-east. . . . Now Hitler has broken the ring around Germany at its strongest point. . . . To Germany, apart from the fact that the situation in the East has lost its tensivity and that this will have its influence in the West, the main importance of the Germano-Polish agreement means something else: the way to the East and to Central Europe is clear. . . .

If these sentiments are considered together with those expressed by another representative German paper, the *Berliner Börsen-*

zeitung, the programme of Hitler-Germany as far as Russia is concerned once again becomes quite obvious.

The task of the near future [says that paper] is to create a continental European large economic territory. Germany's task consists in . . . uniting the South-Eastern territories of Europe with the Northern ones and with the zones of the Northern and Baltic Seas. This circle one day must include Russia, too.

And the paper goes on to argue that the existence of the British Empire, the American *bloc*, and the Sino-Japanese *bloc* make it imperative for Germany also to create a large economic province of her own. Very little doubt is left at whose expense this is to be done, and the designs of both Germany and Poland on Russian territory (especially the Ukraine) are now an open secret. If the Poles persist in their present anti-French and pro-German attitude they stand to lose a great deal more than the French, and, incidentally, this loosening of ties with Poland will considerably facilitate the new Franco-Soviet friendship. Further, if Germany and Poland do not abandon their present hostility to the idea of joining an eventual 'Eastern Locarno,' France will continue her endeavours to assure peace and security by making other arrangements.

This idea of an 'Eastern Locarno' has received a great deal of attention in the daily Press both at home and abroad. There does not appear to be any need, therefore, to go into the details of a scheme the sponsoring of which formed one of the main purposes of M. Barthou's ambulant diplomacy. In his quest of peace and security the representative of France has put forward two main ideas: an Eastern and a Mediterranean pact. The Eastern pact is to include Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia, and the Baltic countries—the latter, incidentally, like the Little Entente, seem to be entering into a particularly close arrangement with each other which is prompted both by their domestic and their international interests. This pact, then, is to assure non-aggression and mutual assistance in the case of an unprovoked attack on one of the participants. At the same time Soviet Russia is to join the League of Nations, and finally France is to guarantee these arrangements; while Soviet Russia, in her turn, guarantees the existing Locarno Agreement, which stabilises the frontiers of Western Europe. In other words, perfect equilibrium of Eastern and Western Europe would thus be created, and everybody's guarantee could be used in favour of or against everybody else, as the case may be! Somewhat similar arrangements would be made between Greece, Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia, and France—the Mediterranean pact.

Both these projects of the French Foreign Minister have provoked much interest among the parties concerned. The

Eastern pact has received the qualified approval of Great Britain. She is prepared to recommend the idea to Berlin, Warsaw and Rome, although in no circumstances will she expand her own responsibilities beyond those undertaken in the original Locarno Treaty. That is one of the weak points in the construction, which, in theory, looks most attractive. Others are that in the unlikely case of Germany's agreeing, the value of her signature is rendered problematic by her present political situation, and the complete enigma as to the value of anything undertaken by the Soviet Government. On this point the French themselves are most uneasy. While it is to their interest at the present moment to play the Russian trump card, they have no illusions about the U.S.S.R. They know only too well the reasons that are prompting the Moscow Government to assume its present attitude, and what the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' really thinks of Geneva, the cause of peace, disarmament, world equilibrium, freedom and democracy. Further, Soviet Russia is not only threatened by military adventure in the West, but also on her Eastern frontier, where a war with Japan appears as almost unavoidable. And her economic position is once again admittedly bad. What, in the circumstances, would be the comparative value of France's guaranty of the Eastern Locarno and Soviet Russia's endorsement of the original Locarno?

Finally, there is no definite answer in the proposed pact to Germany's claim that her illicit rearmament should be legalised. M. Barthou firmly maintains, of course, that there is no direct or even indirect connexion between the realisation of this pact and an armaments convention; that alone is sufficient to prevent Germany from agreeing to it. If an attempt is made by France to carry through the idea regardless of the participation of Germany and Poland, England and Italy will no doubt assume their favourite part of 'honest brokers' and try to bring about a compromise. And in those circumstances no progress will have been achieved, for once again Rome and London will offer—advice, instead of acts and guarantees (which alone could satisfy the French), so that France will be constrained to invent some new device. As to the Mediterranean pact, it is as yet in too embryonic a state to deserve serious discussion. The Western idea appears, unfortunately, as unrealisable as the Eastern one, for from the very outset there is a fundamental difference in the interpretation of both these constructions. Is it to be a system of alliances under a different name, or a system of conciliation, arbitration, and mutual concessions as between the parties concerned?

It may now be asked: Where is the success of M. Barthou's diplomatic voyages, if all he has succeeded in producing is an

idea, the application of which seems doubtful if not altogether improbable? That success consists, first of all, in the fact that through him France has taken the vacant leadership of the Concert of Europe into her hands. It consists, secondly, in the fact that France's relations with some of her old allies in Eastern Europe have been consolidated and inspired with new vigour; that Italy is being drawn closer to her Latin sister; that, opportunistic though her reasons may be, Soviet Russia is at present with France and against Germany. Finally, that this country, in spite of her latent dislike of France and her tender feeling for Germany, is beginning to think of the Germans and the French in a much truer light. Here is an enormous chance for France. Will she take it or will she miss it, as she has done so often in the past?

If France is to lead the Concert of Europe, or at least play the part to which she is entitled, she must be healthy and strong internally. Further, she must have men who not only enjoy a high standing at home and abroad, but who also understand the world outside France and know how to deal with it. On both these points the French are at the present moment rather sadly lacking. To begin with a minor issue: France's foreign representation is, with rare exceptions, hardly worthy of that great country. Her diplomats are mostly underpaid and overworked, and seldom capable or desirous of extending their work on behalf of their country beyond their official duties. It would be possible to draw up a long list of foreign diplomats in London alone who represent far less important countries than the French Republic, but whose personal connexions and standing give them a position of great influence in the State to which they are accredited. Gone are the days of the Brothers Cambon—true princes among ambassadors! Again, the same applies to the Press and to the gentle art of propaganda at home and abroad. Thrift, that rare and great quality of the French, can sometimes lead to entirely negative results. They do not always know how to show the best sides of their national character. That is one of the reasons why foreigners who visit France get a completely distorted idea of the country. French society is most exclusive and does not entertain strangers a great deal. Most of the French people with whom a foreigner comes into contact are those who sell him things—his food, or hotel accommodation, or his pleasures, and who usually make him pay through the nose. The really kind, generous, cultured Frenchman he hardly ever meets, unless he happens to be particularly lucky. Nor are any adequate manifestations of French art and culture sponsored or encouraged abroad; and if they are, they frequently happen to be of the wrong kind.

To send, for instance, a most venerable company of aged actors playing in the dulllest possible classical *repertoire*, and this at the height of the London season, cannot attract a great deal of attention or interest and bring about the desired results. Again, a certain London organisation, whose object it is to promote international understanding, gave a series of national parties. The Germans offered a subsidy of several hundred pounds, and their party was a great success: the French, on the other hand, offered a couple of guineas and their party was an utter failure. This is a typical case. The absence of funds can hardly be pleaded as an excuse, for France pours millions down the drain year after year in subsidising various sinecures or her own little blackmailing papers, as the Stavisky inquiry has recently revealed.

The world's first reaction to Hitlerism was a strong wave of anti-German feeling and a very friendly attitude towards France. French diplomats, politicians, and newspaper men, however, completely failed to take advantage of the situation and to consolidate it. It took eighteen months of Hitlerism, culminating in financial default and the recent massacres, to create an anti-German, and at least partly pro-French, public opinion once again. That all this should be so is a matter of comparative indifference to the foreign observer; but from the French point of view it is quite unpardonable. It has its roots in the internal maladministration of the country. The process that finally led to the Stavisky business and to the riots in February has been minutely examined here in a previous article.¹ In that article I ventured to remark that M. Gaston Doumergue, the popular ex-President of the Republic and now head of the National Government, can placate, but that the real question is: Can he lead? Several months have now elapsed since he took office, much against his wish and in a spirit of true self-sacrifice. He has accomplished a great deal; yet nothing like enough. Hardly a day elapses without fighting breaking out in some part of France between the partisans of the Right and of the Left. Each group accuses the other of provocation, but the truth of the matter is that they are both on the warpath again, and the 'political armistice' agreed upon after the February riots is now a dead letter. If the present trend continues, France is threatened with nothing less than civil war. A most dangerous regrouping has taken place in both camps, of which the recent Socialist-Communist alliance is a striking and alarming symptom.

The masses are irritated and disappointed with the slow tempo of the Government's activities; they are being whipped up by irresponsible leaders and a venal Press, and consequently they are getting daily more attracted by the active and dynamic

¹ 'Crisis in France,' the *Nineteenth Century and After*, March 1934.

elements of both the Right and the Left. The Stavisky inquiry drags on and is practically dead. It gives the impression that there is and has been an enormous amount of wire-pulling behind the stage. M. Tardieu's sudden outburst against M. Chautemps is obviously a political manoeuvre—his first step in the coming election campaign. Whether it will split the Cabinet and force an election immediately, or whether the situation will be allowed to drag on till the autumn, the National Government appears to be slowly dissolving. The personal prestige of M. Doumergue is still such that if he were to step into the arena, and instead of being an arbiter became a leader, the whole of France would follow him. He seems to underestimate his own strength, and that, both from the French and from the international point of view, is a great pity. He has, of course, given hints that he may take special powers into his hands and rule France in the authoritative way she is obviously in dire need of. But if he wishes to act he should not delay his decision much longer. France's leading international position cannot be maintained if she does not pull herself together. If the process of internal decomposition is allowed to go much further, if she becomes manifestly weakened by domestic trouble, her quest of peace and security will have proved of no avail and the ground she has recently gained abroad will be lost—perhaps irretrievably, for who knows whether such internal difficulties will not be eagerly seized upon by her enemies in a last and desperate attempt to smash her.

The world to-day is rapidly becoming divided into two camps—those who believe in civilisation and those who are actively or passively destroying it. This is the essential issue; the rest are trivialities. It would be a thousand pities, therefore, if all those who are prepared to fight for the preservation of civilisation allowed comparatively unimportant differences to stand between them. In her intercourse with foreign nations France, like every other big Power, has not always been easy to deal with. That is not her essential peculiarity and is a characteristic she shares with many other countries. But the one that distinguishes her from most of them and gives her an almost unique position in the world is that, in spite of everything, she remains a true and most precious bulwark of civilisation.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

THE RIDDLE OF GERMANY

I. JULY IMPRESSIONS

ANY Englishman who undertakes publicly to record the impression left on his mind by conversations in Germany with Germans in many walks of life, by what he has seen, and by the trend of events in that country so far as they are known, does so to-day in the certainty that he will incur the disapproval, if not the hostility, of the majority of his readers on both sides of the North Sea. Not since 1914 has public opinion in England, so far as it is reflected in the Press, been so hostile to any foreign country, nor the gulf between our mental attitude and that of Germany been so wide.

This article is an attempt to set down, not uncritically but in good faith, things heard from German lips, and seen through German eyes, between July 1 and 16, during which period, in fulfilment of a long-standing engagement, I was delivering lectures at universities, including Frankfurt, Friburg, Leipzig and Königsberg, following on a similar mission, in May, to Hamburg, Berlin, Munich and Bonn. I was in some places the guest of leading men in industry, in others of professors and, on several occasions, of the students themselves, sleeping in a hostel, sharing their meals and to some extent their life and outlook. Men, especially young men, often talk more freely to visitors whose discretion they can trust than to those with whom their lot is cast. I had many opportunities for private conversations with men of very different types, not, indeed, representatives of the small minority on whom the hand of Government lies heavy—known former Communists—but of several Jews, and of Germans who felt that the anti-Semitic trend of thought in new Germany would in the end prove a source of weakness rather than strength.

All emphasised that the National Revolution of 1933 was, on balance, the best thing that could have happened; but its significance could not be fully understood by anyone who had not lived through the terrible years after the defeat of 1918 and the Revolution which followed. Everyone, Jews included, and especially individuals who had left Germany in 1931 or 1932 and had returned in 1933 or 1934, testified to the profound change for the better in the popular outlook. Hope and confidence

now reigned where despair had ruled: suicides were fewer; beggars in the streets were rare—a fact I had myself noticed; the marriage rate in May 1934 was twice that of May 1933, the birth rate up, the illegitimacy rate down; venereal disease, notably among younger folk, showed a very marked decrease. Doctors at two great clinics confirmed these statements, adding that they had noted a drop in cases of nervous ailments and an improvement in public health which, before the Revolution, had been causing anxiety. Less alcoholism, less mean and violent crime, the unemployment figure cut in half—only 10 per cent. of the reduction being ascribable to public service works camps, the finest institutions in modern Europe.

On these solid achievements, statistically verified, the minds of professional men dwelt, as permanent gains to the national wealth. On the debit side some noted that the younger generation—boys up to sixteen in the Hitler *Jugend*—were being overworked physically: too much marching, too much physical drill, too much excitement. But already, in June 1934, the edict had gone forth to relax the pressure. It was generally felt that the intense interest and active participation of undergraduates in political movements was bad for scholarship. The obligation to spend the first two terms in a *Kameradschaftshaus*, a hostel for fifty to 150 students, with its emphasis on strenuous physical exercises—not for the few, but for all alike—left insufficient time for brain work. Six months in a public service works camp, spent in company with young men of the working classes from all over Germany, made a breach in the academic curriculum not easy to fill. These factors tended to lower the standard of achievement at the top. Scientific and philosophic thought had been of old the greatest of German exports: could it be maintained?

Yet, on the other hand, it was claimed that these new ideas were now a part of true education in the Miltonian sense, an essential part of the quest for national unity, and for the elimination of class distinctions, not by class war, to which the Communists pinned their faith, but by the methods of the class-room. The physical condition of the mass of undergraduates had improved amazingly. The director of physical instruction at Leipzig showed me statistics and photographs recorded, with Teutonic thoroughness, for every student in the university. The games master at many schools was to-day the doctor—or at least, had a doctor's degree. On the long view, the emphasis on healthy bodies was wise. It permeated every elementary school and public service camp in Germany to-day. Not the purse of the parent, but the need of the child as assessed by the doctor, decided whether milk is to be given free, and the dentists saw

more of children and adolescents than of adults. The health of all adolescents was a primary concern of the State: the emphasis on mental achievement seemed, at present, secondary.

The regimentation of political opinion in the universities has deprived them of some fine spirits, and Germany of men who might have contributed greatly to the progress of invention and the development of synthetic products. It had gone further in some universities than others: there are still Jewish professors, and they enjoy unqualified respect. The progressive exclusion of Jewish students and those with Jewish ancestry was not seriously defended. They had of late predominated unduly; they had not been, on the whole, a good influence. We in England had the gift of assimilation, and our Jews the quality of citizenship. The clannishness of the race had shown itself in many ways. It had become a menace in some professions. Sooner or later there would be a reaction: the boycott abroad was perhaps delaying the recognition by Government of a change in this matter of public opinion.

Hitler [said a Jew to me] could have had us on his side with a single word. It is true that many of our faith were Communists; so were many Nazis. Not lack of patriotism, but lack of hope and the fatal weakness of many of our poorer people, without a real foothold in the country and with no contact with the soil, and a change of outlook following the war, consequent on immigration from the east and north, proved our undoing. We shall survive, and yet prove of service to the only country we have known.

He was looking ahead, for popular opinion is still hostile and anti-Semitism is in some areas officially encouraged, though not so effectively at the present moment as by ill-tempered and exaggerated foreign criticism.

At Heidelberg I saw an open-air theatre being built on the Heiligenberg, on the summit of a hill 3000 feet above the town, by 1000 men—all volunteers except for a sprinkling of students, working in four shifts of six hours. Off duty they wore a neat uniform which eliminated class distinctions; on duty they were stripped to the waist and brown as the bread they ate. Thousands of tons of rock were being blasted on a site midway between a Roman camp and the ruins of the earliest Christian church. I passed a party going back to camp singing lustily; in another camp I shared the men's midday meal, in yet another their supper—good, solid food. The camps are mostly permanent buildings with electric light and central heating, so placed as to give for the next ten years access to work of a remunerative type, but not such as can be given over to contract. Flood protection, land drainage, afforestation, land clearance and improvement, and river draining account for nine-tenths of the work on which

250,000 men are engaged, of whom 10 per cent. are students. All alike get free uniform, and a set of working clothes which they take away when they leave, food and medical attendance, an insurance card and some hours a week of general education, and 2s. 6d. a week pocket money. The system is at present voluntary, but is likely before long to become compulsory as a part of national education: in other forms it is being extended to young women from the universities, whose enthusiasm is one of the happiest features of new Germany.

The city architect and town planner of Leipzig and chief assistant took me to see their new settlement of small-holders and explained to me on the spot their plans for slum-clearance. Few of the buildings they looked on with such disapproval were over fifty years old, and few would be eligible for clearance in England. The fact is that the German standard of amenity in such matters is higher than ours. Every group of 500 selected families has a manager, on Octavia Hill lines, who collects rents, visits regularly, and exercises all the influence he needs by virtue of the fact that all occupants are for three years on probation. I visited several houses—all built in the last nine months, and all well cared for, with well-tilled gardens. The first difference I noticed on flying back to Croydon was that half the back gardens and allotment areas in England were derelict; not 1 per cent. in Germany had been 'let down.'

The tenement buildings outside Hamburg, in Berlin and elsewhere were good, but official opinion is turning against them. There is not much economy, though greater comfort, and the German workman and his wife, who have seldom lost touch with the soil, covet a bit of ground they can call their own, on which they can eke out the dole in case of need, and sometimes, by means of chickens, pigs and potatoes, attain a healthy if Spartan level of subsistence. On another city estate 1000 men were building small houses of excellent design of four different sizes. Most of them were technically unemployed men; they got their benefit, plus two free meals, on the job. In return for this they had to work six hours daily, but would have a preferential claim to one of the houses when built. A feature of these settlements is a 'settlers' association,' which arranges insurance of effects, purchases of seeds and tools and the like—purely voluntary associations with no official status.

On Saturday afternoon I heard in the Lutheran Church at Leipzig a fine choir give a recital from Bach to a large congregation. Next morning, July 8, I attended service. The church was well filled by men and women of all ages, many young women hatless, and men in walking kit with open shirts. Each man as he entered before taking his seat stood to pray, as was the custom

in England not long ago : every hymn tune was familiar. One of them was *Nun danket alle Gott* (Rinkart's paraphrase of Ecclesiasticus, ch. 50, vv. 22-24). The whole congregation sang it unaided by the organ : this was to me the great new Germany but also the old. I was as much carried away by it as those round me, for all I had seen in Germany had convinced me that this, and not militarism, truly represents the spirit of the nation if not of some of its leaders. The service closed, as was natural remembering the intense anxiety of the past week, with *Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott*, the tune composed by Martin Luther in 1529, which Mendelssohn introduces into his 'Reformation Symphony.' The effect was overpowering.

Then out into the sunshine to the great square facing the State Opera House, where the previous evening I had been on of a crowded house at a performance of *Der Vögelhändler*. A grand stand had been erected, from which some 2000 persons could watch the procession of detachments from miniature rifle and archery clubs from all over Germany. The procession was 6 miles long and took two hours to pass us. The men were of all ages, but mostly of middle age dressed exactly like the Greek Man in *Struwwelpeter*. They were short, stocky men, neatly dressed, amply bemedalled, with cheerful faces, a prey to no doubts. The younger men carried banners. Interspersed in the procession were some forty brass bands, a few S.S. and S.A. detachments and Hitler *Jugend*, many Nazi flags (which all stood to salute), detachments of mariners from Hamburg, of naval ratings and of former colonial troops. A *Bundeschiessen* (or shooting club) from the Saar was greeted with loud applause there were also waggons to remind the world of the former German colonies, and of the need for Germany to have tropical possessions. One poster read as follows :

	Population (millions).	Area of colonies (millions of square miles).
Portugal . . .	6	$\frac{3}{4}$
Belgium . . .	8	1
Great Britain . . .	45	2
		(Crown Colonies only)
France . . .	42	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Germany . . .	65	Nil.

Give us back our Colonies in Africa.

That afternoon I bathed at Markleber, a suburb of Leipzig.

on the turf round the pool were 2000 or 3000 people of all ages—all but the older men in slips, not expensive costumes, almost all deeply sunburned. At four o'clock Herr Hess, Hitler's trusted lieutenant, was to begin to speak from Königsberg. A small crowd began to gather on the grass near the loud-speaker. They listened in silence at first, but enthusiasm was soon evoked by the declaration that Hitler had, by his bold action and acceptance before the nation of full responsibility, saved Germany from a great catastrophe. Heads went up ; then some stood up, and finally there came a round of applause. *The Times* correspondent in Berlin, in describing the speech—which he, too, heard over the radio—noted that this part of the speech was received at Königsberg in puzzled silence. An Englishman who was there told me that the silence was due, in his opinion, not to such feelings, but to the simple fact that the audience were too intent on listening, and so curious to hear what was to follow, that, like the ranks of Tuscany, they forgot to cheer. I have seen that happen in much more august assemblies. The later references to foreign intervention, which were received with applause in Königsberg, evoked no such enthusiasm in Leipzig, which, unlike East Prussia, has had no recent experience of foreign invasion, though every city in Germany has once been a battlefield. I asked some students what they thought of the speech. 'Grand,' said one ; 'but we must wait for Hitler next Friday for the whole story.' 'It is an immense relief to me,' said another ; 'that is a song I can sing.' 'Better than Goebbels,' said a third ; 'he makes me want to discuss what he says and I don't always agree, but Hess—I can always follow him ; he always gives us a '*Verklärung*'—a clarification—of the spirit.'

Rightly or wrongly, I felt from that afternoon onwards that the crisis had passed. The first universal reaction in the black week-end of July 1 was of resentment and horror at the thought that the new Germany has so nearly been betrayed by men who, though known adventurers and reprobates, had, none the less, been true to their leader in the dark days of his fight for a national resurgence. Then followed a mood of elation. Hitler had once more shown himself a leader : he had blasted the hopes of the enemies of the German people. Only to save the republic would he have constituted himself *suprema lex*. The people had trusted him blindly and would do so again. Some, indeed, said openly that the accused men should have been tried.

Another Torgler trial, [was the reply] only far worse. How much of the evidence could be given in open court, and what would be said if it was given behind closed doors ? Another mock trial in the rooms of the Law Society in London ? Another torrent of scorn and hatred in the Jew-led Press abroad ? Did Bela Cohen in Hungary or Kurt Eisner in Bavaria,

or the Bolsheviks in early days, have recourse to courts of law? It was well, with such people in the background and across the frontier, to take no risks. Hitler did well to follow for once the precedent of the U.S.S.R. and not to seek shelter behind legalistic forms, nor to use the courts, to the detriment of their repute, as a shield rather than one of the weapons of the State.

Then came the news of further killings—most of which, quite obviously, were not authorised—of men who had disappeared, who were in concentration camps, or under surveillance. Elation gave way to depression. Was the nation destined to be betrayed again, as at the end of the war? There was resentment and anxiety. Hess was the first to bring relief, after a week's anxiety.

Five days later I was at Königsberg, listening on the beach at Cranz, amongst a great silent crowd of earnest listeners, to Hitler's address to the Reichstag. For nearly an hour and a half men and women stood listening; none talked, scarcely one turned away. In the words of the *Manchester Guardian* on July 16:

To the general mass, there is little doubt that the Chancellor's account was convincing, and that state of mind which was developing into scepticism, even among the unthinking, has been restored.

That was precisely the impression I derived on Friday night and on the following days in Königsberg, Marienburg, and Danzig. In one city an English waiter in a hotel sought me out. He had been three months in Germany after a year in Paris and two in London, where he was born.

Folk at home [said he] are all wrong about these Nazis. They're the goods; they know where they're going, or they think they do, and that's more'n we can say. Hitler's got everybody with him again after last night.

He told me he was comfortable and liked his fellows: the staff quarters were better than in most English hotels, and he liked the freer life and public amenities of the city. My hosts—professors and students—were soberly relieved and rejoiced that the episode was closed, though here and there (not at Königsberg) I heard voices: Were Catholics to be treated like Jews? Why was no list published? This was not Hitlerism, but Himmlerism (Herr Himmler is chief of the Secret Police). It must not happen again.

East Prussia, now cut off by the Polish Corridor from the main body of Germany, is in a sense a German colony, but isolation has intensified the local *Deutschtum*. Here the most important statements of policy are first delivered by German statesmen. Close by dwells Hindenburg, and here is being developed, by some of the best brains of Königsberg University, of the Prussian State and the German *Reich*, the famous 'East Prussia Plan' to which the Nazi Party are pledged. This region

is being dealt with as we shall, perhaps, deal with our 'distressed areas.' The plan involves, first, the extension of existing local industries—wood pulp factories, saw-mills, brick and tile yards; secondly, the transfer of certain industries from other parts of Germany, so far as they can use raw material locally available—tanneries, for example, and certain textiles. The aim is less industrialisation than diversification of employment. The intention is to encourage small units with a large employment ratio rather than to promote a policy of rationalisation with its emphasis on dividends at the expense of the welfare of the local community. Large-scale barter is favoured, rather than commerce on conventional lines, and there is great emphasis on inalienable hereditary land tenure, on lines traditional in the Punjab.

East Prussia covers 37,000 square kilometres, of which two-thirds is in the hands of peasants, and has a population of 300,000, which is more than the soil can carry. The towns are too big for the hinterland; markets are distant and freights heavy. The climate for nine months is severe, though the province lies south of the latitude of Birmingham. But the plan is making headway. I visited the responsible department of the university and saw a vast array of graphs and statistics; nothing is being left to random speculation, and every effort is made to enlist the co-operation of farmers and students and professors. '*Spartam nactus, hanc exorna*,' is their motto.

My last lecture on 'The Outlook and Character of the English People' was at Königsberg, on the eve of the Chancellor's address to the Reichstag. The great hall was full, and at least two-thirds of the audience of 300 or so knew English. I felt that the moment was propitious here, as elsewhere, for a frank personal exposition of the English outlook on Germany. At the end of my address on 'The Character and Outlook of the English People,' after expressing admiration for many aspects of the new Germany, I spoke as follows:

Friends may speak their minds to each other freely. You will allow me to do so, if only because soldiers are by tradition allowed to speak thus. There soon grew up after the war in England a real anxiety to resume our former friendly relations; this desire grew steadily till two years ago. Then came changes which, however greatly needed in Germany and however good in themselves, were accompanied by acts which cannot be explained or defended in terms acceptable to any Englishman who is true to his national tradition—harshness of outlook and action in racial matters and a presentation of the outlook of the new Germany which offended English ideas. Whatever your ideals—and I have the greatest sympathy with them—the methods used to promote them were in our eyes unworthy. Not what you did, but the way you did it, hurt us, and in saying this I refer also to the events of June 30. We care deeply, more deeply than we often realise, for what Germans think and do, because we know that it will affect the whole world. The Press has indeed misrepresented you, some-

times grossly, often cruelly : it has enhanced the evil effects abroad of certain aspects of your policy, but it is not wholly unrepresentative of English opinion. These two matters, the question of the Jews, of propaganda (to which may be added the relation of the State to the Christian Churches), must be dealt with on different lines if relations between the two countries are to improve.

The large hall was crowded by an attentive and silent audience, the great majority of whom understood every word. Many high officials were present. Nothing that was said to me afterwards made me regret my outspokenness here or elsewhere, where I used similar language.

The next morning's air mail brought *The Times* with details of the proposed new Pacts. Every German I met was bewildered at the scheme and at the hasty comings and goings of General Staff officers and French and English statesmen which preceded them. The Pacts meant to them the hegemony of France in Europe, and the inclusion of Russia in the scheme for the encirclement of Germany. Reformed poachers may be good gamekeepers, but only in a society where both sides have a common tradition and social outlook. Soviet Russia shares neither with her neighbours. The implications of the plan, on a preliminary investigation, seemed to level-headed Germans almost equivalent to giving legal form to a world-wide catastrophe. Not only would it stabilise existing frontiers—which in places are and must remain open sores, such as the frontier along the Vistula, which in no way represented the ultimate intention of its sponsors at Versailles—but it would create more problems than it solved.

Had Germany been consulted beforehand as to what, in Sir John Simon's words, constituted 'a suitable group of nations,' his emphasis on mutuality and reciprocity would have carried more weight. The circumstances surrounding the negotiations savoured, to Germans, rather of exclusion, tempered only by the deduction, from the Foreign Secretary's cautious words, that he did not expect Germany or Poland to accept the Pact. This 'new Russo-French initiative' does not seem to Germans 'to afford the best ground for the resumption of negotiations for the conclusion of a Convention such as would provide for a reasonable application of the principle of German equality of rights under a *régime* of security for all nations.' These are not my comments; I record them, not critically, but as they were made to me by men of repute in different cities who were strangers to each other. It seems unlikely that progress will be made in this direction. But there is little ground for despondency and none for despair. The important thing to-day is for us to understand Germany and her rulers, as, after fourteen years, we are

trying to understand the rulers of Russia, though we have almost no ties and no relations with the Russian people.

The Germans have triumphed over stupendous difficulties : they have raised the national morale against adverse winds, to a height which gives me confidence in the future of a Europe which can contain them and which, a few years ago, seemed impossible. The new Germany is no more inclined to seek conquest or revenge than we are, and the arguments of the toy-shop (*The Times* correspondence columns of July 17) have no more relevance than our Boy Scouts, O.T.C. or Territorials. A stable German State was in 1916 regarded by Mr. Balfour and Sir W. Robertson, as Mr. Lloyd George shows in his second volume (pp. 133, 177), as an essential British interest ; it is equally so to-day.

Nothing can be done by exchanges of notes ; much might be achieved by a frank exchange of views between leading statesmen on both sides. Until conversations with German statesmen can take place as freely as with those of other nations, the German feeling of isolation will continue and be intensified with the passage of time. '*Tout comprendre rend très indulgent.*' Our present attitude is damaging our interests and inflicting injury on the German people, with whom both by tradition and by commercial ties we should be in close communion. Let us not judge a hard-pressed nation by the equivocal acts of its rulers at their worst moments ; above all, let us avoid the Pharisaical note, the often-heard voice of the world's senior governess, which does us so much harm and hardens the heart of those whom we wish to influence. The German people, especially the younger generation, deserve our sympathy. They deeply respect the traditions of England ; they need our help, on lines mutually advantageous ; given both, we could criticise with the certainty that they would listen, and with every probability that we should exercise great influence.

A. T. WILSON.

THE RIDDLE OF GERMANY

II. HITLER OR REICHSWEHR?

THERE has been a marked tendency in the Press, especially in France and in Austria, to declare that June 30, 1934, established a military dictatorship in Germany. Such a statement without further qualification is extremely misleading, though it is in certain respects fundamentally true. It is misleading until it is brought into relation with the more recent history of the political influence of the army in Germany, because it implies that a greater change has occurred than has actually taken place. It is, even now, rather potentially than actually true.

Throughout the years from 1870 to 1914 the generals had more influence at Court than the politicians—this is perhaps the best definition of the Prussianisation of Germany. Bismarck was the only civilian who was able to stand up to the soldiers, and the Reichstag was at everybody's mercy. We thought that we had changed all that in the war for democracy, but the Social Democrats of the Weimar Republic called in the surviving cadre of the old army to save it from its own revolutionaries. From that time the two bases of society, the *Machtfaktoren*, in Weimar Germany were the millions of civilian trades unionists on the one hand, and, according to the Versailles Treaty, 100,000 professional soldiers on the other. The trades unions, by striking, defeated the Kapp *Putsch*, just as the army struck down Communists and the Hitler-Ludendorff revolt. Gradually the balance of power shifted in favour of the inconspicuous military partner, whose power was immensely strengthened when its old Field-Marshal was elected President of the Republic in 1925—guardian, that is to say, of a Constitution which was alien to his whole tradition. By 1931 the trades unions ceased to be a *Machtfaktor*, for the slump destroyed their wealth, and the growth of unemployment made a general strike into an empty threat. Meanwhile a general, Kurt von Schleicher, had become increasingly important in political affairs, and at last, for a bare two months round about Christmas, 1932, he actually held the office of Chancellor. He knew that the National Socialists had become

as important a popular force as the trades unions, so he tried to reconstruct things upon a basis broad enough to include them both. He hoped through the most reasonable of the Nazis, Gregor Strasser, to be able to bring this about, and it is perhaps for the constancy of Schleicher and Strasser to a broad conception of this nature that the wild men, who ousted them at Christmas, 1932, have successfully murdered them at midsummer, 1934.

The generals, as a whole, had stood aside from Schleicher's political venture. They distrusted him, and they preferred that soldiers should be kept in the background. Yet, by their very passivity, they made possible the National Socialist revolution, for they commanded the only force which could be opposed to it. With Schleicher, they shared a more democratic respect for public opinion than Englishmen associate with the military mind. All along their attitude had been that they must recognise, moderate, and stabilise the public will, whether it be Marxist or Hitlerist. This implied that the Nazis should be brought into the Government to be made acquainted with responsibility, and the army approved of the Nazi-Nationalist Cabinet of January 30, 1933, with Hitler as Chancellor, and with one of its more Nazi-friendly generals, von Blomberg, as Minister of Defence. Here was not yet a revolutionary event; not until the Storm Troops flooded the federal State capitals, evicted their Ministers and occupied their Government buildings, had a National Socialist revolution occurred. By acquiescing in these nursery conquests the *Reichswehr* acquired the chief responsibility for an epoch-making event. Many people had expected military intervention at the instigation of the Nationalist members of the Cabinet. This would have been technically possible and constitutionally correct. For the Constitution safeguarded the federal rights of the States, and the President was anxious to remain constitutionally correct. The S.A. (Storm Troops) had presumed upon an election, which, with all the intimidation they could command, had not provided their party with the much-advertised requirement of 51 per cent. of the poll. But the army looked on and the President agreed. The trades unions were destroyed, and, in their place, the Storm Troops of the Hitler movement, the *Sturm Abteilungen* and the *Schutz-Staffeln*, shared actual power with the *Reichswehr*.

The patriotic jargon of the S.A. was more palatable to the soldiers than the Marxist phrases of the Social Democrats; they approved the 'manliness' of the anti-urban, anti-intellectual ideology of the Nazis. Yet in the new Nazi state the *Reichswehr* was no more inclined to accept less than the full partnership to which it was accustomed. The S.A. represented as real a popular movement as the trades unions, one which cut vertically, rather than horizontally, across the population, but which rested upon

the broad base of a pyramid. The number of the Storm Troops were estimated at 2,500,000 S.A. and 250,000 S.S. guards on the eve of June 30, and behind these men stood the formidable political organisation of the party. The S.A. were never so homogeneous as the trades unions, and after Hitler came to power they became less so, since students and others were compulsorily enrolled. As for their pseudo-military appearance, this rather put ideas into the Storm Troopers' own heads than imposed upon the professional soldiers. The National Socialist State, however, claims to be totalitarian, and it was perfectly consistent that that profligate, but competent, gangster Röhm should require that the army be *gleichgeschaltet*, and that he and his friends should reap the rewards of their 'fourteen years' tremendous struggle and sacrifice' by at least sharing the higher command with the older generals. If the Catholic Party and the police forces had been compelled to be Nazified, why should not the army be forced to abdicate? Why should not the masterly inactivity of the army permit another 'tremendous' victory like the conquest of the provinces in March 1933? If the S.A. were called out for a picturesque march, and were acclaimed by an apparently eager populace, who would dare to withstand this newest manifestation of the people's will? Why should this not inaugurate a Second Revolution to socialise industry, nationalise the land, and Nazify the army? In defiance of Versailles, the army was expanding its numbers from the old 100,000 to something like 300,000, and for good S.A. men it was exasperating to observe how 'reactionary' a form this process was taking. For the new recruits were carefully and invariably picked from outside the S.A. and the S.S.; it was extraordinary that they should be chosen from those whose questioning showed them to be non-party men, in a Germany where no other *Weltanschauung* but that of the party is recognised as tolerable for any but these military servants of the State.

Perhaps it is most accurate to say of June 30 that Röhm had forced a choice upon Hitler and that Göring and Himmler determined that a decision in favour of the generals should be exhaustively exploited to sweep out of their way the growing opposition which was making itself felt in every direction. And Papen, as usual, played the decisive part of which no one of his personal friends can ever believe him capable. He was the real rebel of June, and, as usual, everyone else has paid the price. Papen has always been the instrument of those conservative forces which hope to come fully into their own by giving the Nazis enough rope to hang themselves. Reactionary, and even presidential, circles aware of the universal discontent within and without the Nazi movement, encouraged the Vice-Chancellor to deliver his famous

Marburg speech on June 17 without previous consultation with the Chancellor. From a Nazi point of view this was open revolt, and the Government must reassert its power. Too weak to quarrel with the army, it was compelled to take the army's side against the ambitious S.A. If the whole crisis were to be made the occasion of a more than ever ruthless *coup*, based upon the familiar allegation of fearful danger to the State, a gesture of weakness might be disguised as a gesture of strength; all old scores could be settled, all dangerous tongues could be silenced for ever, and discontent or dismay be driven once more underground. Perhaps no one will ever know the whole truth about the Reichstag fire, nor about the Röhm conspiracy. Göring told Hitler on the night of February 27, 1933, that the Communists had fired the Reichstag, and Hitler, it seems, was content to believe him. Göring, no doubt, told Hitler that Röhm had conspired with Schleicher and with France, and Hitler, it seems, was content to believe him; it required a fortnight for it to be possible to describe with sufficient exactitude how the conspirators had planned to occupy Government buildings and had seduced police officers in Berlin, Saxony, and Silesia. Even then the details were unnecessarily perplexing, for Ernst is known to have let his house and to have started for Madeira on the day when, according to the Chancellor's statement, he was waiting in Berlin to head off the revolt. General Göring believes in good, *alt-Germanisch* revenge; if the Schleicher-Strasser plan had succeeded in December 1932, his own career would have been nipped in the bud. When Gregor Strasser's brother, Otto, declared the whole thing to be explicable along these lines, he was perhaps only guilty of a slight exaggeration. He knew this intuitively, according to his statement at the trial.

So much has already been written about June 30, or rather about the 'action' of that week-end, that it would be superfluous to do more than underline two or three of its more significant aspects. Of these the official favourite is, in fact, the *alt-Germanisch* technique employed. Of revengeful impulses let loose, official propaganda has little to say; after all, there is no end to revenge. But leadership, ruthlessness and cremation, all official manifestations of the ancient German spirit, have had a splendid innings. To the West European mind it seems that leadership has broken down when it finds no remedy but death. In the S.A. Hitler as *Oberster Führer* possessed complete powers of life and death; legally no S.A. man had a right to be heard. But when Hitler announced the extension of this principle to the whole nation, when he declared that for twenty-four hours he had been the Supreme Court of the German nation in his own person, the flagging spirit of that nation appeared to be, not outraged, but

resuscitated. How this claim can justify the exploits of the S.S. during that week-end remains to the foreign observer incomprehensible; he can only rejoice that when Dr. Brüning's old colleague, Herr Treviranus, heard that the S.S. were coming down the road, he had the Nordic energy to take one spring into his car and drive away into obscurity. The ancient Germans cremated their dead, and, if rough with one another, were kind to their animals. Their descendants have, indeed, striven to be true to this tradition. One young man, who was out with his dog, was dragged off by the S.S. for an indiscreet remark; he must have tried to escape: he has never been seen again, but the dog was returned in perfect condition to his home, together with the news of his master's death. Already in the middle of May a new law was introduced to facilitate the noble German practice of cremation in cases where the dead man had not had the opportunity to express his desire for it, but where it would be likely to have met with his approval. This prophetic piece of legislation has been generously applied; an urn of ashes is even less loquacious than a corpse.

As for the effect of June 30 upon the alignment of forces in the *Reich*, it is too soon to speak with any certainty. For the moment the wreck of the S.A. is on leave; it is clear that the *Reichswehr* no longer shares real power in Germany with a great popular force, but at most with the S.S. For when Lutze and Daluge have completed the purge of the S.A., and when it returns to 'rule the German streets again' (according to the Chancellor), the position will be fundamentally the same as that created by June 30. Hitler himself has declared aloud that the one bearer of arms in the State is the *Reichswehr*, and that this one bearer is not to reflect the political complexion of National Socialism. It is an almost incredible surrender; in future the S.A., the soldiers of his movement, are to be wholly demilitarised because they are not the soldiers of the State.

Already it feels different to be in Germany. There are less brown uniforms than in the days of the Papen Cabinet two years ago. There are no more S.A. meetings, no collecting on the streets, and the luxurious cars flaunted by Röhm and his fellows at the harassed passer-by who dared not refuse the jangling money-box are hidden in courtyards round corners, waiting to be discovered and removed. The S.A. weekly, *Der S.A. Mann*, is a strange mixture of eulogies for the loyalty of all but a handful of traitors, with disciplinary threats of an unprecedented harshness. Moral tales describing the more brutal moments in the life of Frederick the Great are told—how once, for instance, a dying ensign cried out in pain on the battlefield of Kolin. 'Die decently, can't you?' growled the passing king, and the ensign was ashamed

and as he died he shouted 'Long live the King.'¹ Will they 'die decently'?—that is the great question. The new S.A. Chief of Staff, Viktor Lutze, is a good, undistinguished sort of creature, a pre-war post office official. General Daluge, successor to Ernst in the Berlin-Brandenburg area, is no doubt of harder stuff. They are weeding-out. People suppose that the S.A. that 'comes back' will be but half a million strong. And who are they to be? The 'best' elements, as we are led to believe? Then the unemployed will be adrift when Communist propaganda is redoubling. Or is the S.A. to become a kind of convict army, an open-air prison for the unemployed? Whichever choice is made, the *morale* of the S.A. can never be the same. Ernst, the young ex-waiter S.A. leader, was really popular in Berlin; his old comrades are now prepared to say that if he was untrue to his leader it was right that he should die. But many of them do not look you quite straight in the face as they say this, because they are afraid and in doubt. For there is fear and doubt in the S.A. for the first time. In Innsbruck among the Austrian revolutionaries there is a new version of the *Horst Wessel Lied* going round, with this as its second verse:

Herr Hitler hat die Hände uns geschlossen—
Von unsern Sturmlokalen steht der Reichswehrmann,
Und 100 Kameraden sind erschossen
Und diese Toten Klagen furchtbar an.²

So now the German *Machtfaktoren* are the forces behind the S.S. leader Himmler and the forces behind the *Reichswehr* Chief of Staff, General von Fritsch. This means that the broad popular basis of the Government has gone. At first one feels Himmler to be alarmingly powerful. He has recently become the head of the Secret Police throughout the *Reich*, and the S.S., which was originally devised as a select troop of Nazis to be, as it were, the prefects over the S.A. boys, has been invisibly converted into the auxiliaries of this terrible *Gestapo*, the German *Ogpu*. An extraordinary situation has consequently arisen; men with every tradition of decency behind them, who joined the S.S. to avoid the roughness of S.A. service, have suddenly discovered themselves to be part of the most remorseless police machine that the modern world knows. What was the horror of such men when summoned to shoot batches of victims in the cadet school of Lichterfelde! It was little consolation to be told that they would be shooting in firing squads of eight, so that each man could suppose himself to be innocent of the deadlier shots. The

¹ *Der S.A. Mann*, Munich, July 7, 1934.

² 'Hitler has tied our hands and the *Reichswehr* man is standing outside our quarters. A hundred of our comrades are shot, and these dead ones cry out in a terrible lament.'

morale of the S.S. is no longer what it was. For this reason, and for others besides, the S.S. could be brushed aside like flies by the *Reichswehr* itself. Numerically there is not much to choose between the two forces. The S.S. is generally estimated at a quarter of a million; the *Reichswehr* is well on the way to the coveted 300,000. But, for all their smart appearance, the S.S. are quite out of the running as soldiers, and the *Reichswehr* brings this home from time to time. On the day of the 'clean-up' *Reichswehr* troops left Döberitz, the German Aldershot, for Berlin, leaving some S.S. troops on duty; it is said, by those who know, that the S.S. men tried to handle some of the weapons they found, and were compelled to beat a humiliating retreat. A great S.A. rising all over the country, and backed by the people, would have been difficult for the army to handle, but since Hitler, Göring and Himmler have destroyed that possibility, there is no doubt that the *Reichswehr* is the unchallengeable master of Germany.

'Armed forces and State have become one.' It is astonishing that this sentence should have appeared in an article on 'The Armed Forces in the Third Reich,' by the Minister of Defence, an article which was published in the Nazi *Völkischer Beobachter* on June 29. Upon that day the implication to all but the most far-seeing was that the State had conquered the army; twenty-four hours later the army had conquered the State. Behind the simpler character of von Blomberg the dominant military figures are Chief-of-Staff General von Fritsch and the tank expert, General von Reichenau. Perhaps they were responsible for the prophetic announcement in the Minister's article. By the following Monday the circumstances had changed so quickly, so greatly and so tragically that the authority of the generals had become the only unshaken power in the country. In which directions will their irresistible influence now be exerted? Briefly it may be answered—they will try to effect the recovery of Germany's reputation abroad and the conciliation of public opinion at home, for no professional soldier can contemplate with anything like tranquillity the hatred which Germany has aroused abroad, nor the hatred which saps her vitality at home. They will have, that is to say, to attempt a profound modification, for the immediate aftermath of June 30 is a generally increased governmental violence in all directions. The wild attempt to exploit traditional hatred of France by attempting to incriminate M. François-Poncet³ in the Schleicher-Röhm legations was

³ The German Press reviled Schleicher because an article in the *New Statesman* showed that he had got French support for the return of some colonies. And as I heard a retired diplomat say, 'No one could help meeting François-Poncet in Berlin—he's all over the place.'

followed up by Herr Hess' peculiar outburst on July 8, which completed the international conspiracy effect. 'Are the French really going to attack us?' bewildered Germans asked.

Goebbels' notorious outburst followed—a demonstration with something of the lost battle about it.⁴ An equally uncalled-for piece of aggression was broadcast from Frankfurt on July 7 by Herr Röchling, the pillar of the German Front in the Saar. For the effect of June 30 in the Saar was tremendous; since that week-end the new anti-Nazi Catholic newspaper cannot print enough copies to satisfy demand. Herr Röchling was stung into great indiscretion. By way of defending wholesale murder on the part of the heads of the German Government, he complained that the *Saarländer* had been oppressed for fourteen years by French, Belgian and English rulers 'from Rault to Knox.' All three nations, he declared, had murdered, too, in their time, and there was a tremendous tirade about the 'Black and Tans.' It is difficult to recollect at what point an English Government boasted of 'Black and Tan' methods—surely every effort was made at least to hush them up, and our own public opinion soon registered an effective protest. Herr Röchling's tone agreed ill with those parts of Hess' speech which cried aloud for reconciliation, and his broadcast was not reported in the Press. The Germans are complaining now that Barthou's visit to London was successful; they are distressed to discover in Sir Eric Phipps' proposals to Baron Neurath a revival of the pre-war 'encirclement' policy. Even the Venice meeting has failed; Mussolini proved insensitive to the *Führer's* magic, and is acting with Great Britain, while Dr. Dollfuss is making the most of the reprieve of June 30.

At home, too, the Government seems to be following up its *tour de force* with parallel provocation. The atmosphere of terror is being exploited to coerce and muzzle the Protestants more completely. Just when an agreement over the disputed points of the *Concordat* had at last been reached, the 'Action' itself has intensified the resentment of German Catholicism. The murder of Klausener and the Catholic Youth Leader Adalbert Probst, both of them deservedly respected public figures, will be hard to forgive, and not only co-religionists are grateful to Dr. Bares, the Catholic Bishop of Berlin, for his tribute to Klausener and for his ill-concealed protest against the arbitrary cremation. The new people's court is likely to send men like Thälmann and Torgler⁵ to their death without any formal hesitation, while

⁴ Nothing could describe Goebbels' position better than the Low cartoon in which he kneels in terror behind Hitler, who is shooting the S.A.

⁵ It should be observed that the Nazi lawyer, Dr. Sack, who defended Torgler, has been taken into protective custody, ostensibly because he had been friendly with Ernst.

Berlin workmen are being dismissed for failing to attend the May Day celebrations.

It is almost impossible to give any indication in words of the effect of these conditions upon the German mind. When the first news was sold in the streets of Berlin on June 30 the crowd devoured the papers in complete and ominous silence. The other day a man was condemned to five years' imprisonment for being dissatisfied, but an arbitrary Government can only strike here and there. In general one can be certain that unless one has known people for years, or unless one brings a special recommendation from an old friend, no German in Berlin or in Munich or in Breslau is likely to be frank to any degree. People who write to *The Times* to say how happily all the Germans speak show an incredible incapacity to grasp that it is foolhardy for Germans to make the slightest indications of discontent in the presence of foreigners. Early in July one of my friends said as soon as we met, 'You will understand that I cannot express any opinion?' I said, 'Yes. And will you understand that we feel rather shocked?' 'I can understand that exceedingly well,' was the answer. Only the contented German can afford to be frank, and he seems to live in an unreal world of credulity. The Nazi Party, the political organisation as opposed to the S.A., is at present probably reassured, for its faith in Adolf Hitler has been reinforced. But even here something new has happened; it has been admitted that everything has not been in order, although Hitler has been in power, whereas before June 30 the people who now admit this hotly denied it. In some curious intangible form public opinion still exists and even makes itself felt.

But all these processes are far slower than they were before the Press was taken into protective custody by Goebbels; foreign news has to trickle through, and, beginning in the bigger towns, it scarcely percolates beyond the smaller ones into the countryside. Many village S.A. groups are just a new name for the parish 'boy scouts' and 'girl guides' and are quite untouched by political upheavals.

It is the economic circumstances which perhaps do most to undermine confidence in the Government. Already all those concerned with banking and foreign trade are in despair. Wages are down and food prices up. It is an open question as to how far men prefer to be off the dole without being the richer for it; the healthier people are probably glad to be working on roads in the country, but for the weaker ones it is a terrible strain, and the breaking up of family life is often unpopular.

In the next months the economic strain is bound to be intensified. Just after the 'cleaning,' the Minister of Economic Affairs was provided with completely dictatorial powers. A

ministerial order of July 18 provides the Minister with rationing control over finished articles; raw materials and half-manufactures were covered by an earlier decree. But nothing will do so much to shake the faith of the *petit bourgeois* and the peasant, the original backbone of Hitlerism, as the food shortage which is now approaching. The German public has bitter memories of food cards in the war, and the potato shortage in the big towns early in July stirred apprehension. This was partly due to the drought, but at other times it would have been easy enough to correct the shortage from abroad. The dealers in Berlin, for instance, were not allowed to raise their prices, so they went home as irritated as the housewife with a large family who found herself restricted to two pounds on a Saturday, not an ounce more than the spinster who lived next door. This was nothing but the shadow of what the next twelve months may bring. The harvest is poor and the farmers will lose heavily, because they are not to be allowed to raise their prices appreciably. A parallel fodder shortage means that it will be difficult to prevent them butchering their cattle; that means a dearth of milk and butter, and Germany tends always to be short of fats. When stocks of raw materials run out, factories will have to close down. Many people expect this to make itself felt next spring. In his speech to the Reichstag on July 13 the Chancellor said:

If our trade balance, owing to the economic closing of foreign markets, or through the political boycott, becomes passive, we shall find a way, through our ability and through the talent of our researches and chemists, to make ourselves independent of the importing of those things which we are in a position either to produce ourselves or to substitute.

'Brave defiance,' cried admirers, but the thought of that post-war tea and coffee brought a wry expression across many an unseen face. The prospect is an entirely gloomy one, and even German newspapers are allowed to publish 'Stagnating Foreign Trade' as a headline. 'And all so lamentably unnecessary,' as many people mutter gloomily.

It is true that internal supply and demand have been temporarily stimulated, and the motor industry, for example, is flourishing upon tax exemptions. But the whole internal speeding up depends upon internal loans and anticipation of revenue. Any thought of raising more by taxation has been abandoned as impracticable; on the contrary, some fiscal relief in 1935 has just been promised in a newly published taxation scheme. Since the budgetary position cannot improve for some time, the whole structure depends upon more borrowing at home. Under dictators internal loans are a euphemism for forced loans, but it is doubtful whether the most ruthless coercion can squeeze indefinitely, if

potential lenders really try to sabotage. It is here that popularity is still of direct importance to the *régime*.

To this unhappy, distracted Germany the *Reichswehr*, we have seen, is in a position to dictate. It is obvious that the generals engineered the fall of Röhm and the demilitarisation of the S.A., and we know that they participated in the initial stages of the operation. While agreeing that mutineers should be shot, and willing perhaps that Hitler should exercise his despotic power within the Brown Army, it is wholly improbable that the army contemplated a week-end of butchery which should stain Germany's reputation throughout Europe and America, and most of all in the Vatican city. Indeed, it is known that the generals called a halt on the Monday after 'Bloody Saturday.' Nothing could have served their own power better than to have left the chief operation in the hands of the S.S.; S.A. and S.S. were already on bad terms, and, since many old S.A. men will now regard the S.S. as their executioners, the S.S. have lost any popular backing they have had. They depend upon the support of the Secret Police whom they serve, and upon the professional soldiers whom, rather helplessly, they revere. The importance of two other potential factors is easily overrated. The uniformed police are docile and stupid; most of their officers count for little, except to obey orders. The *Stahlhelm*, to which, for instance, disillusioned Nazis and others had been turning in unexpected districts like the Ruhr, and whose influence might have gained importance, has been so weakly led by Seldte that it does not count. Now, like the S.A., it has been sent on leave, when the S.S. is kept on duty all the time. Even the married men in the S.S. are still ordered to report all their movements.

And now what do the generals make of the situation they have helped to create? They are still anxious to remain in the background, and will, for a time, do nothing conspicuous to check the violence of the Hitler-Göing-Himmler triumvirate. They have got all they want with regard to military developments, and to these they will continue to devote their main attention. But they will advise moderation, and, if their advice is flouted, the most skilful observers believe that the time when the generals will insist upon more than a free hand in military matters is a great deal nearer than it has ever been before. Men like Fritsch and Reichenau are aware of the painful impression created abroad by June 30. But, what may be more important, they have become aware of the disruptive effects at home. When Jews and Marxists were beaten up, lunch parties in military and kindred circles were not upset; they had no particular reason to believe it true, they knew no one who had beaten or been beaten. But when Schleicher and Bredow were killed, Mackensen and Hammerstein

were enraged. When the best types of S.S. men were called out to shoot the victims, *Reichswehr* circles heard the echoes of their dismay. Nor can the cold-blooded shooting of von Papen's close associates, von Bose and Edgar Jung (one of the anti-separatist heroes of the Palatinate), have been welcome to army officers; after all, von Papen himself was placed under the special protection of the *Reichswehr* by Hindenburg himself. There was something rather forced about the congratulations which Hitler received from Hindenburg and Blomberg before many murders were known; it is whispered that Fritsch has sometimes felt Blomberg to be too susceptible to the Hitler spell, and has pointed out that it is he (Fritsch) who directly represents the authority of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.

Though the Chancellor hurled his antarkist defiance at the world on July 13, it is in the direction of the resurrection of foreign trade that the forces of moderation are already at work; it may be assumed that the *Reichswehr* is in whole-hearted agreement, if for no other reason than Germany's lack of copper, which is indispensable for rearmament. Already the antarkist Kessler has been removed from the post of *Führer der Deutsche Wirtschaft*, and von der Goltz, his temporary successor, is pressing the importance of efforts to revive export trade. One growing difficulty has been that the exchange restrictions were so irksome that business men preferred to avoid them and concentrate their efforts upon exploiting the increasing purchasing capacity at home. Industrial companies have now been warned that their exchange allotments will be cancelled if they neglect export trade on account of more profitable domestic business, a warning which might, of course, cut in both directions. There is, however, no reason to anticipate much immediate success for this push to 'revive foreign trade.' In the eyes of the old Left Wing Nazi, the objective is in itself reactionary. While the army is undoubtedly in more general sympathy and contact with Junkers and industrialists than with peasants and workmen, it should not be regarded as a blind instrument of capitalism. The untranslatable *soziale* flavour one associates with Schleicher was not quite peculiar to him alone among soldiers. It looks as if the colleagues who spurned him may come back to his plan—'a short period of military rule and then the Social Reich.' If they fail to win the working population, they will in the end fare worse at the hands of the Communists than their predecessors of 1918.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

NEARLY a century has gone since a small group of Rochdale weavers introduced the methods of store-keeping and productive manufactures known as the Co-operative Movement. The society founded by Lancashire operatives has now become a social force of notable strength and dimensions. In the economic domain the Co-operative Movement had long been gathering power, but toward the close of the Great War it made an official entry into politics. It is not improbable, in the present temper of the membership after the inclusion of the undistributed 'surplus' within the orbit of income tax, that the movement will now assume a more conspicuous place among the advocates of social reconstruction. The governing body in the British movement is the Co-operative Union, to which 1199 societies were affiliated at the end of 1932. That huge aggregation comprises the wholesale societies established in England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively—an organisation for wholesale purchase jointly formed of the first and second bodies in that triad; 1055 associations of consumers engaged in retail distribution; and seventy-four associations of workers engaged in the production of goods.

To gain an accurate view of the movement we should begin with the 1055 retail distributive societies, with a membership of 6,937,000. Each society is managed by a voluntary committee, elected generally by a small proportion of members who care to use their vote. In December 1933 the share capital subscribed by the members amounted to £122,000,000, whilst £22,000,000 of loan capital and savings bank deposits had also been subscribed by the membership. The rate of interest is fixed on share and loan capital—it seldom exceeds 5 per cent., and at the moment is generally 4 per cent. Reserve and insurance funds, accumulated over many years from the undistributed portion of the surplus (that part on which the Legislature has recently decided to levy income tax), amounted to £12,000,000. Stocks were valued at £18,000,000, and land, buildings, fixtures, and house property in the societies' ownership at £47,500,000. Their investments, including their shares of the capital employed by the wholesale societies, amounted to £103,000,000, while the sum owing from

members for goods reached the respectable net total of £6,500,000. Experience has shown that 95 per cent. of that outstanding debt will be liquidated in the ensuing twelve months, such is the moral stability of the debtors with whom the societies transact their 'mutuality' and hire-purchase trade.

The sales of the retail societies in 1933 are estimated at £199,000,000, a decrease of nearly £19,000,000 in comparison with 1930. The average purchases per member, a sure index of the wage-earner's position, declined in 1932 to £32; in 1924 the average was £37. It is stated officially that the figure for 1933 shows that the decline continues. Rather less than £5,000,000 was absorbed by interest on capital. In 1932 the net surplus was £20,000,000, representing 16 per cent. on the share capital and 9 per cent. of the retail sales. Of that amount £19,500,000 was distributed as 'dividend,' an average of 1s. 10½d. in the £1 on sales. Employees in the service of the retail stores numbered 193,000, of whom 129,000 were employed in distribution. These drew rather more than £25,000,000 as wages throughout the year. If the material existed it would be interesting, therefore, to compare the expense of distributive wages per £1 of sales in the large departmental stores and chain shops with the average 19·56d. per £1 of sales in the co-operative retail establishment. The average sales per distributive employee reached £1587. Some 64,000 persons were employed in their factories and workshops, whose wages amounted to nearly £9,000,000. The dominating productive work of the retail societies is in connexion with baking, slaughtering, the preparation of certain articles of food, tobacco, laundering, and building. The total value of their products is returned at £36,000,000 for 1931. Expenditure on materials was slightly in excess of £24,000,000; the net values which their employees added to the final product was therefore £11,750,000.

The stronghold of the Co-operative Movement is still the north of England, but the last fifteen years has witnessed large additions in the south. Membership is most rapidly compiled where there is comparative uniformity in wages and employment, where the turnover of labour is at minimum ratios, and in districts where migration among the wage-earners tends to be replaced by stable residence. Nevertheless the membership of retail societies varies as widely as the extent of the districts they are authorised to serve by the Co-operative Union. In its latest return the mammoth London Society announces that the names of 581,000 persons appear on its enrolment; the Royal Arsenal Society, whose headquarters are at Woolwich, claims 280,000. Eighteen societies each have more than 50,000 members. At the other end of the scale 934 societies embrace a membership of not more than

5000 each. At the close of 1931 the membership of each of 479 societies did not exceed 1000.

The formation of the English Wholesale Society was undertaken in 1863, the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of the preceding year having bestowed legality on the desire of the 300 retail societies then existing to pool a portion of their capital for the establishment of a wholesale buying agency. Business was begun in Manchester in 1864. Four years later a similar organisation was promoted by the Scottish societies. The Irish Wholesale Society, wholly concerned with the marketing of agricultural products, was registered in 1897. With the passage of time the English and Scottish Societies have extended their activities into many fields beyond the contemplation of their founders. They are now the most substantial importers in the United Kingdom. While the movement has consistently opposed the propaganda for Imperial Preference, the wholesale societies, as the largest single buyers of foodstuffs raised in British Possessions beyond the seas, nevertheless perform an important part in the introduction of Empire produce to working-class markets. Without directing their policies by considerations other than the freedom to purchase where the consumer's interests receive the greatest satisfaction, the huge buying power which the wholesale societies control provides a substantial share of the market in Great Britain for Dominion and Colonial products. For several years, for example, the English Society has financed the movement of the Western Australian wheat crop, involving the outlay of about £4,000,000 annually.

Long-continued depression has reduced the monetary value of the retail societies' trade. Nevertheless, in 1932 the sales of the English Wholesale Society to the retail organisations exceeded £83,000,000, while the Scottish Wholesale Society sold goods to the value of £16,500,000. Capital for the wholesale societies is raised by subscription from the retail organisations. The share capital of the English undertaking exceeds £10,000,000, loans and deposits account for £59,000,000, trade and bank reserves for £2,000,000, insurance funds for £2,250,000, and reserve balances, at the end of 1932, were rather more than £3,000,000—a total capital of £76,500,000. The Scottish Society has a capital of £10,000,000. Dividends on purchases were distributed to the retail societies at the rate of 4*d.* and 6*d.* in the £1 by the English and Scottish Societies respectively.

The buying departments of the English Society purchase overseas produce to the value of £35,000,000 annually, a circumstance which causes the directorate to prefer stability in foreign exchange; in the home market they are responsible for the purchase of commodities—principally food, dairy produce, and coal—to the value

of £18,000,000; in the 105 industrial undertakings which the society controls, employing 33,500 workers of the total 42,000 engaged in its service, manufactured articles are produced or food is prepared to the market value of about £28,000,000, the net value added to the products during the manufacturing process amounting to £9,000,000; the directorate is responsible also for the Co-operative Wholesale Society Bank, which, acting as a monetary clearing-house for the movement while it maintains contact with the banking and financial institutions of the outer world, attained a turnover in 1932 of £657,000,000 in connexion with 53,000 accounts; and, in conjunction with the Scottish Wholesale, the twenty-eight directors control a subsidiary insurance society with an annual premium income of £5,250,000 and accumulated funds of £14,250,000. Finally—and as though it were necessary to give an arcadian turn to much that is material in outer appearance—the English Co-operative Wholesale Society farms directly 17,500 acres, unhappily not without incurring a net loss of £1.60 per acre.

Housing occupies a subordinate place in the operations of a few of the larger retail societies. The Royal Arsenal Society derives an annual rental of £8200 from its houses on the Bostall Estate, while its Progress Estate at Well Hall, managed by a subsidiary company formed for that purpose, has a capital value of £500,000. In sixty years the Bolton Society advanced nearly £3,000,000 for house purchase, and recently the London Society has increased the sum which can be lent on mortgage from £500 to any amount at the discretion of a responsible committee. But generally the management committees are averse to sinking capital in house property, either to let or on mortgage.

This review of the principal elements affiliated to the Co-operative Union cannot be concluded without reference to the seventy-four associations of workers—'producers' societies,' the last remaining and, it is to be feared, diminishing evidence of the constructive aspects of the Christian Socialist campaign of Kingsley and Denison Maurice. They had in 1931 a membership of 35,000 and a share and loan capital of £5,250,000, and their trade amounted to £6,250,000. To the 15,000 workers employed an average wage of £114 annually was paid, for an average output of £394. From an aggregate surplus of £211,000 rather less than one-fifth was distributed as a bonus to employees. Experience has worn to thin proportions the once inspiring idea of the self-controlled workshop. In fifty-seven of these associations employees shared in the provision of capital to the extent of 29 per cent., while the management was by committees, of whom 57 per cent. were actual employees elected by their fellow-workmen. Almost the whole of their product is sold to the

wholesale and retail societies, whose buyers, especially where they act on behalf of the larger consumers' organisations, are among the keenest in the markets for food and household supplies. Indeed, the producers' societies have a standing complaint that the co-operative buyers frequently pass their products by and bestow their favour on the manufacturers of orthodox profit-making enterprise. The wholesale societies prefer that production should be directly under their control and on the ordinary basis of employment at standard rates of wages.

In assemblies of the Co-operative Movement it is customary to assert that its members aim at the realisation of a 'Co-operative Commonwealth.' In the history of working-class activity this conception has been variously interpreted. When the earlier experiments in co-operation were dominated by the teachings of Robert Owen a co-operative commonwealth was understood as a society where producers and consumers adjust their efforts to their needs without the intervention of independent owners of capital, or of the State. That idea still survives, but its conscious adherents are few.

Groups of workmen had preceded the Rochdale weavers of 1844 in the distribution of the surplus in proportion to personal expenditure at the store, but the Rochdale men were the first of the associations to combine the principle of self-help with the common ownership of land and certain forms of capital. The comprehensive, Owenite conception of a commonwealth with the nation as a single economic unit finds but slender recognition in the objects of the society subsequently known as the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers. Its members were to arrange for their pecuniary benefit and to improve their domestic condition by the establishment of a store for the sale of provisions and clothing, by building or purchasing a number of houses in which the members would reside, by manufactures and the cultivation of land (for the primary purpose, apparently, of providing employment and wages), and by the erection of a temperance hotel. The Owenite proposal for a gradual withdrawal from capitalist society survives in the suggested formation of colonies on the land. But exchanges are no longer to be regulated in accordance with Communism, or by the calculation of labour time of equal intrinsic value without relation to the character of the product. On the land and in the society's workshops the labourers are to be recompensed by wages—that is to say, since the products will be sold at the market price, by wages which are finally decided by the wage rates prevailing in competitive industry.

A concession to the memory of Owenism is to be seen, also, in the importance which the Pioneers, and the numerous societies founded on their example in the next twenty years, continued to

attach to education in citizenship, political history, and the economics of trade. But the stress was not upon the Communist elements of industrial co-operation; emphasis was on the control, by methods of democracy, of the capital which consumers could employ for their own advantage and for the benefit of the wage-earners in their service. In pursuance of that policy a sum of capital, collectively owned by the group, was brought into being by the continuous addition of the undistributed portion of the surplus. That accretion of working-class property, with the experience which its administration procured, gained Socialist approval, side by side with support from the orthodox individualist who wished to do the best for himself, preferably while assisting his fellow-men in a corresponding experiment. By the year 1862 the model rules of the Pioneers advise the management committees of neighbouring societies to 'use your own consumption . . . to save up capital for yourselves.' Ceasing their obeisance to the idea of a commonwealth where monetary profit is unknown, they became tributaries to the demand for working-class enfranchisement, for the extension of democracy without directly supporting the labourer's claim to share in the work of the State. That element of the Co-operative Movement of which the Rochdale Pioneers were the original exponents was, and still remains, the principal stronghold of Liberalism among the working class.

Many variants of the weavers' doctrine have appeared since the small shop was opened in Toad Lane, Rochdale. A most formidable development is the frank individualism of the normal housewife who regards the 'dividend' as a means of saving, a view which explains the adherence of three-fourths of the co-operative membership. Here is a body of opinion without expression at the annual Congress of 2000 delegates, or in the many hundred district conferences held by retail societies in the course of a year. Nevertheless, it is an opinion so decisive that the bulk of the membership is ever ready to transfer expenditure to the private traders' shops when these proffer a gain which outweighs the slow acquisition of dividend. Hence the repeated appeals for 'loyalty' by the directors of the English Wholesale Society, which occupy so large a place at the quarterly meetings of that organisation. The members whom the delegates represent understand the co-operative commonwealth as a State where prices are negligible, wages are high, and dividends substantial. That vast core of almost indifferent adherents which thinks of the retail society only as a medium for shopping might be the strength, as it is now the weakness, of the movement. Given the initiative required for the production of articles which the poorer consumer needs, and the skill in marketing that would defeat the com-

petitors who battle so strenuously for the wage-earner's custom, the wholesale societies and the retail stores would then command the larger part of working-class expenditure. The vital question would still remain, however: Could the retail price be high enough, and the surplus therefore so large, that the consumers could supply all the capital required for distribution, and collateral production, while the dividend was maintained at a rate sufficient to secure the housewife's approval? The question restricts co-operation to the supply of household goods alone, but unless the principle is first victorious in that sphere it is doubtful whether it can win the heavy industries, or staple manufactures, agriculture and finance.

Another variant of the Rochdale plan would apply the rules of voluntarism in a manner that should gain assent from political disciples of Herbert Spencer. The abolition of taxation is proposed, and, incidentally, the supersession of the State, except so far as it may be necessary for purposes of police and defence. The process of production, like the consumption of wealth, would be organised by groups voluntarily formed for the interchange of commodities and service. It would still be necessary to provide funds for education and public assistance; local authorities would still require a revenue to meet the cost of highways, drainage, and the preservation of the general health. But neither rates nor taxes would be levied. A central council would apportion the share of public costs to fall on each association of producers and consumers; the final selling price would be adjusted accordingly. No longer contributing to the charge for education or old age pensions in proportion to his income, or on the basis of the rental value of his premises, the citizen would pay directly with the extent of his purchases. The scheme would seem to allow some opportunities for evasion. Certain sections of the co-operative membership regard the proposal as the essential characteristic of a co-operative commonwealth.

Elsewhere it is proposed that local authorities and Government departments should become constituent members of the consumers' societies, drawing dividends on expenditure and utilising the proceeds in lieu of rates and taxes, or to reduce the amount which is levied. Another section, probably of small numerical strength, contends that the movement travels on toward a Communism, without money and without price, as the form it will ultimately assume. Confronted by this medley of opinion as to the meaning of the phrase most often on the lips of active members, it is not surprising that the National Education Council, in its report to the sixty-fifth Annual Co-operative Congress at Birmingham in June, should regret that the number of students enrolled in the 'classes for adults in social subjects' in 1932-3

was 'far below what it should be in a movement which is seeking to reform the social organisation.'

What vitality the Co-operative Movement has recently displayed is more the result of the attack fostered by the Beaverbrook Press than of an awakening on the part of its rank and file. The criticism of co-operation by an ill-informed propaganda increased the membership and stimulated the trade of the retail societies, but there is small reason to believe that the idealist resources of the movement have been strengthened. Relatively they may be weakened by the influx of new members which denunciation has brought throughout the country. When the campaign was at its highest fervour the Liverpool Society was enrolling 300 members weekly and sales were rising at Manchester by £100 a day. In every part of the country co-operative managers regarded the campaign as excellent publicity. The Scottish societies reported that the attack was 'a great service.' At Birkenhead in February the receipts on share capital account were twice the amount paid out. The London Society made 30,000 new members in one month, while the Royal Arsenal Society increased its sales by £10,000 weekly. Such large additions to membership and sales bespeak a desire to share in the personal benefits which result from mutual trade, rather than an active wish to change the capitalist system. On that point there can be no doubt, but it is difficult to see what advantage the Beaverbrook campaign confers upon the private trader.

The views which the responsible leaders advance as their challenge to the capitalist system may be summarised as a belief that the ownership and direction of the means of production by associations of consumers would preclude the individual appropriation of rent in any of the forms with which contemporary economists are familiar, exclude the tribute now imposed in the extraction of monopolistic gains, and also cause a cessation of profits which are now derived from the normal excess of price over necessary costs of production. In their opinion, no other scheme of social organisation has equivalent recommendations. In the latest report of the Central Board (the committee of management of the Co-operative Union) the

co-operative ideal of 'Each for All and All for Each' [is defined as] based on a significant ethical principle, the evident justice of replacing the private ownership of materials and the means of production and distribution by popular co-operative control, with its implications of democratic government, the equitable distribution of derived economic advantages, and the provision of important social services complementary or supplementary to those of public authorities.

As with many another 'object clause,' the Central Board's pronouncement does not gain by diffusion. It would seem, however,

by the last clause in the declaration that the commonwealth is visualised as a consortium of obligatory and voluntary associations, of free societies and statutory bodies functioning with the sanction, and by the consent, of a central authority, and discharging their appointed duties in a spirit of adaptation and mutual adjustment. It is a concept of the State which allows for almost endless experiment in the science and art of government.

In the light of so cautious a statement on their general objective it is natural that the responsible leaders of the Co-operative Movement should be deeply interested in the problems by which it is immediately confronted. Tariffs and quota schemes they describe as 'quack remedies . . . a poison to the whole economic body of the nation and the world.' The economic theories which the leaders propound are more drastic in adherence to freedom of trade than Adam Smith or Mill, Marshall or Pigou, ever ventured to advance. Tariffs, the board affirms, 'are weapons of economic suicide'—whatever be the course which other nations adopt in the commercial struggle with Britain. The Government's marketing schemes are condemned as failing to give adequate protection to consumers, while the recent agitation against the taxation of the surplus was largely dependent on the view that the rich strive to shift the cost of the social services on to the shoulders of the poor.

It is this natural tendency to stress the consumer's welfare which causes division between the trade unions and the Co-operative Movement. Many well-intentioned efforts have been made to diminish its breadth. A joint committee with the Trades Union Congress has been constituted; and in several industrial disputes, by the issue of credit and the free gift of supplies, the co-operative stores have rendered signal aid to workmen. In the productive establishments there is cordial adherence to trade union standards in respect of wages and working conditions, but the trade unions refrain from an official call upon their members to spend their wages at the co-operative store. The majority of trade unionists (4,800,000) are employed in private trading undertakings; the total number of the Co-operative Movement's employees was reported as only 270,000 in 1932. This disparity explains the official attitude of trades unionism.

This divergence of view is acute in respect of the distributive workers. The wholesale and retail societies employ some 160,000 persons in distribution and service, the majority of whom are eligible for membership of the trade unions of shop assistants, of which there are several. The National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers contains the larger part of these employees.

* No substantial alteration in co-operative wage rates had been made since the general stabilisation in 1923-4, but it is now the view of the management committees that those standards impede development. Since 1929 the average purchase per member at the retail stores has fallen from £35 17s. to £31 11s. in 1931, with a further decline in 1932. It has been necessary to curtail redundant staffs, to reduce wages through the agencies for negotiation and conciliation which the movement has established, and to spread employment by a system of shorter working time, with corresponding diminution of the weekly wage. At almost every stage of this readjustment the retail societies have encountered active resistance from the employees' trade unions. The management committees complain that in their dealings with the National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers especially there is a general refusal to recognise the position in which the societies stand. On the north-east coast and in the distressed areas, for example, the retail societies suffer financial extremity by reason of the prolonged industrial depression. Unemployment and reduced wage payments in the local factories, mines, or shipyards have grave consequences on the turnover of co-operative stores. The Central Board, in these circumstances, can be pardoned for the incorporation of not a little feeling in its report when it states that, in economic affairs, the movement is 'the sport of circumstances, not the dictator.' Nevertheless the National Union turns a deaf ear to every appeal. It maintains that neither a management committee nor its chief officers should alter conditions of employment, or dismiss an employee, without consent of the district officers of the trade union. In the opinion of the Central Negotiating Board that proposal involves an 'unwarrantable interference' with the legitimate functions of management. But the union does not abate its demands. It holds that in spite of the general superiority of co-operative wages and conditions, these are not excessive in comparison with the standards adopted by reputable employers, nor more than the movement as a whole can afford to pay.

There is consequently not a little difficulty in procuring the adoption of the National Conciliation Board's awards. 'Recurrent rebuffs and the rising disinclination on the part of individual societies to observe decisions' indicate that 'the board is not yet firmly entrenched in the societies' confidence.' The unsatisfactory outcome of inquiries where no decision has been reached and the union's challenge to the management are the reasons assigned for this unfortunate position.

Meanwhile, the general lethargy of the members continues, and not more than 4 or 5 per cent. trouble to vote on matters

affecting the conduct of the societies. An atmosphere of such profound indifference to their own affairs is favourable to the development of the employees' propaganda, and there are not a few societies where the management committee is in danger of passing into their hands. So far, in spite of the idealism which survives in a movement that is much of this world, co-operators have not yet devised a means to obtain service from their employees at the highest standards within their command; nor have they found the way to establish peace between labour and capital in working-class ownership.

For seventy years the movement followed with fidelity the practice of the Rochdale men in avoiding direct contact with politics. The war compelled a change of attitude. During the early part of the struggle the control of supplies was vested in authorities to whom the Co-operative Movement was either unknown or highly disagreeable. At first the system of regulation was heavily in favour of the private trader; and later the tribunals were obsessed with a belief that assistants in a co-operative store was not so necessary at home as the staff employed by the competitive shopkeeper. For the defence of the movement it was resolved to form a political party. The Co-operative Party now claims the adherence of 462 societies with a membership of 4,083,000. Unlike all other political parties, it is not autonomous. Its programme and its policy require assent from the annual Congress, which includes representatives from the 630 societies not affiliated with the Co-operative Party, many of whose nominees are engaged in local administration as Liberals and Conservatives. Apart from the anomalous position to which the party is thus reduced, it would seem that, unless it can devise a new species of propaganda, it enters the political field too late. A majority of the men are already nominally connected with the Labour Party through their trade unions. And the trade union has the first claim on the mind of the wage-earning producer who designs the establishment of the equalitarian State. On the other hand, there is no effective political organisation for the wage-earner's wife. If the Co-operative Party can succeed—as it may with the aid of the women's guilds—in the political instruction and organisation of the women who compose the overwhelming part of the membership of every retail society, it will then have made a contribution to history.

Under the shelter of liberal legislation increasingly tolerant of experiments in the voluntary organisation of the working class, in the course of 100 years there have arisen many associations whose contributions to the general welfare have been fruitful and beneficent. At one time feared as a revolutionary force, the trade union now acts in conjunction with the State for the mitigation

of the disturbance due to unemployment and those dislocations of industry which seem to be inherent in progress. Even more sympathetically regarded by the classes who still control the economic machine, the friendly societies pursue their tasks of mutual aid. Increasingly, however, the need to preserve the general health impels the community, acting through the Government, to share the burdens which the wage-earner first accepted as a volunteer long before the nation was aware of the waste and folly of preventable sickness. Trade unions and friendly societies now look to the State for aid in dealing with the workless, the underpaid, the incapacitated, and the failing. The Co-operative Movement, closely allied though it is with these associations, yet stands apart with a character all its own.

It does not ask for aid. Here are millions of the common people spending wisely, not hoarding, but truly thrifty, inculcating temperance and learning self-respect as the more imaginative and constructive minds among them strive to lay the foundations for a vast experiment in the control of the means by which they live. That effort in self-direction could not be made but for the limited freedom conferred by the Acts of Parliament which authorise this form of industrial society. The dividends which they earn, without increasing price, have been of notable assistance to multitudinous men and women since their mode of trading seized the minds of the forgotten founders of the first struggling societies of Lancashire and Yorkshire. But more than the dividend, more than the millions of capital which are held in common ownership as the result of care and sobriety, is the hope which sometimes stirs the most sluggish thinkers among them—the belief that the working people themselves can make some splendid contribution to the relief of mankind from industrial disorder and for the continuity of international peace. At the moment they fear that those who pin their faith to the need for competitive trade and the acquisition of private gain are organising to destroy the structure which nearly a century's effort has erected. It is thus they interpret the latest amendment in taxation. What a thousand pities the nation would be forced to share if their fears should have any real foundation!

EDWIN C. FAIRCHILD.

THE CASE AGAINST BIG BATTLESHIPS

THE fact that conversations have, very properly, begun in order to clear the way for the Naval Conference which, under the terms of the London Treaty, is due to take place next year, renders it particularly necessary that a very thorough, unprejudiced and scientific examination should be made of the problem of the size of the units of the fleets. Reasoned arguments are urgently needed to show precisely and logically what governs the size of the fighting ship. On this question there is a variety of opinion which is astonishing; but there is an equally astonishing lack of reasoned argument to show why it has become necessary for the principal fighting ships to be from twice to three times the size, and to cost from seven to ten times as much, as those of a bare generation ago.

What the reasons are which convince foreign Governments that their ships must be of these portentous sizes we have not yet been told. But we have had some indication of some of the reasons why our own authorities believe that it is impossible to make reductions below the figure which they advocate—a figure, it is to be observed, considerably lower than that adopted by the other maritime Powers. That figure has been reduced from 35,000 tons by successive steps to 30,000, 25,000, and, finally, 22,000. Below 22,000, we have been told, it is absolutely impossible to go. One explanation of this was given by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty sixteen months ago,¹ and it is with that explanation alone that I wish to deal. We need 'capital ships,' it was said, because the abolition of the capital ship would make the cruiser the capital ship of the future, and this would, in the opinion of the Board, lead us into 'considerably increased expense.'

This reply indicated a complete misconception of what the words 'capital ship' mean, and of what constitutes a 'capital ship.' Indeed, the mental confusion is plain, for while in one part of the sentence the 'abolition' of the capital ship is spoken of, the very next words indicate that, in spite of abolition, the capital ship would continue to exist. In practice the capital ship is, and always has been, nothing more than the largest ship.

Hansard, vol. 275, No. 51, March 16, 1933.

The term has no quantitative connotation. It means no more than 'principal' or 'most important.' So a 'capital city' is the most important, irrespective of its actual size, and a 'capital East Indiaman' or a 'capital frigate' were the largest vessels of those types. The largest type of destroyer of to-day, called the 'flotilla leader,' is a 'capital' destroyer.

It is a complete mistake to imagine that the effect of reducing the tonnage allowed for the principal fighting ship to that now allowed for what are called 'cruisers' would make the cruiser into the capital ship. It would lead to embodying the characteristics needed in a 'ship of the line of battle' within a hull of a more restricted tonnage—a tonnage, it needs to be observed, that was deemed fully sufficient not many years ago. No cry was then raised that any country was in danger in consequence of the 'cruiser' being as large as the capital ship. There then was, and there again would infallibly be, a marked differentiation between the characteristics of those vessels intended for the line and those for the cruising and detached services which are associated with the term 'cruiser.' The reason is perfectly simple. The ships built for the specific purpose of serving as units in large fighting concentrations of force would be designed, as they have always been, to be as powerful as the available or permissible tonnage allowed. A ship-of-war is a compromise between fighting power, speed and endurance. If the need for one of these elements predominates in the functions the ship has to perform, as it does in the different types, sacrifices have to be accepted in other elements. The principal differences between the 'ship of the line of battle' and the 'cruiser' lies in the fact that the duties of scouting, of patrol, of protection of communications call for higher speed than is needed in ships of the main body, and can be performed by less powerful vessels.

The battleship—to use the shortened term—must be strong enough to meet the most powerful units of an enemy force; to 'lie in the line' against whatever ships the constructive skill of that enemy has been able to produce within the existing limitations of knowledge, money or agreement. If, therefore, a certain limit of tonnage is accepted and imposed, the designer of the battleship devotes as large a proportion of the weight available to fighting power; and this he does at the expense of speed. The designer of the 'cruiser,' on the other hand, needs speed, for which he has to sacrifice fighting power. Under a mistaken conception of the problem of trade attack and defence cruisers grew to the size of battleships at the end of the last century. But they remained cruisers; they were not 'capital ships.' The difference is illustrated by actual cases. We in this country possessed simultaneously 'battleships' (the 'Russells') and

'cruisers' (the 'Good Hopes'), each of about 14,000 tons. Though the sizes were the same, the difference was vast, for while the 'battleships' had a broadside of 4000 lb. and a speed of 19 knots, the 'cruisers' broadside was 1560 lb. and the speed 25 knots. The Russians similarly had battleships (the 'Retvisans') of 13,300 tons and a cruiser (the 'Gromoboi') of 13,600, in which the same differentiation occurred.

If—to use the inaccurate phraseology—the capital ship were 'abolished' and the size reduced to that of the present cruisers, a precisely similar differentiation would be bound to result. The efforts of the naval authorities throughout the world would be to produce within the 10,000 tons—or whatever figure were adopted, preferably a lower one—as hard-fitting an instrument as possible for service with the main body, and no higher speed would be given to her than the essential needs of fleet operations demand. We should see differences of opinion as to what that speed should be, for the simple reason that no absolute criterion, no 'proper speed' for a battleship, exists; but those differences would not be great—they never have been. But beyond any doubt whatever, we should witness as marked a differentiation between the battleship and cruiser of 15,000 or 10,000 or 8000 tons, or any other accepted tonnage, as there was between the two types of 14,000 tons of the earlier period. Even if the cruiser should remain at a totally unnecessary size of 10,000 tons she most certainly would not 'become the capital ship.' Equally certainly, the expense would not be increased, but diminished, for it is hardly to be supposed, even by the maddest of mathematical strategists, that a number of ships of a certain tonnage would cost as much as an equal number of ships of more than twice the size. Indeed, a restriction upon tonnage would tend towards a curbing of that strategically unscientific craze for speed which, as the most costly of all elements in a ship, has operated so greatly to increase the cost of all navies. To this objection that the 'cruiser' would become the capital ship other reasons were added for considering that 22,000 tons is the irreducible minimum size for this unit of the fleet. There are three needs of a technical character which render reduction below this figure impossible. They are—the needs of adequate protection, sufficient endurance, and 'tolerably decent living conditions.'²

If these are really the reasons why it is impossible for the battleships of the world in general, and this country in particular, to be less than twice the size they were a few years ago, they can only be called inadequate. 'Adequate protection' is the first. What does this mean? Protection, presumably, against the disabling blows of an antagonist. These blows are those from

² *Hansard*, March 16, 1933.

the gun fire of a surface opponent, the torpedo fire of a surface or submarine opponent, and the torpedo or bomb fire of an air opponent. Size does not contribute to power to resist gun fire, for the very obvious reason that the prospective antagonist has also increased the size of his ships and his guns, and that 'hitting power' increases with size in a greater proportion than defensive power. We have an ample amount of that best form of evidence, the practical experience of war, to demonstrate conclusively that the larger the ship, the less is the punishment she can take *from her like opponent*. The old Russian battleships, bad as many of them were, stood more blows from their adversaries in the Russo-Japanese War than their far larger successors of double their size stood in the late war. Big ships were sunk by a few shots at Jutland. Smaller ships survived a greater number of hits at Tsushima and Ulsan.

Abstract reason and practical experience lead to the same conclusion that great size is in no way whatever a factor in defensive power except against smaller vessels. The larger two combatants become, the less punishment can either take. This fact is so familiar that one can only conclude that it is not protection against other 'battleships' that the Admiralty have in mind when they assert the need for great size on the score of 'adequate protection.'

Is it, then, needed to give protection against the torpedo? The very reverse is the case. So far as the submarine is concerned, nothing could be plainer than the fact that the small ship ran the least, and the largest ship the greatest, risk. The small ship defended herself by her ability to attack the submarine, by her nimbleness, by the small target which she presented. The big ship could not attack the submarine, could not defend herself, nor, for all her construction, was she immune from injury and disablement; and the loss or laying up of one great ship means a heavy proportional loss to the whole force. In face of this, a claim for great size for protection against the submarine is merely absurd. It is, indeed, not without relevance to recall that, although one of the purposes of a navy is to protect a country against invasion by sea, it was considered necessary in the late war to retain a large number of troops in the country. Mr. Balfour, Lord Riddell tells us, wished to know the reason. He was told by Sir William Robertson that the reply was obvious: we had to defend the country.

You know that the Navy say that they cannot prevent invasion. *They cannot risk capital ships to prevent an attack on our coasts.* It is therefore the duty of the military authorities to make ample provision to repel an invasion.³

³ Lord Riddell, *War Diary*, p. 177.

Thus the capital ship had become so large and so valuable that she could not be risked even to fulfil one of the objects for which she existed—a truly singular result of the policy, and need and utility, of great size!

The torpedo can also be used in battle. We are told that, since a long line of battle presents so great a target, torpedoes fired at the line cannot miss it; therefore, ships must be capable of sustaining the consequent injury. But this solution is purely material; and it treats as axiomatic a certain formation in battle. It does nothing to reduce the probability of being hit—we often say that prevention is better than cure. Moreover, though ships may float after being hit, it is by no means certain they can continue to fight—one under-water shot put the great *Lion* out of action at the Dogger Bank; and even though they may continue to fight, they may be very difficult to dock afterwards for repair, and when docked they will be out of action for a long time. The military method of dealing with such a threat is to reduce the probabilities of being hit by tactical dispositions, as Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge remarked many years ago. There is nothing sacrosanct in the formation of a single line of battle as a tactical formation. The two outstandingly decisive naval victories, Trafalgar and Tsushima, were not fought, *by the victors*, in line, though many indecisive battles were so fought; while the surrender of Yorktown, which finally decided the fate of England in America, was due to the British admiral not beating the French fleet, primarily for the reason that, though he could have crushed the enemy van, he delayed attacking until he had formed line.

Thirdly, there is attack from the air. But here again the big ship, though the extent of injury done to her by bombs may be mitigated by armour and under-water construction, is more liable to be hit because she presents a larger target, and the size of a target is a matter of no small importance when dealing with weapons of such a low degree of accuracy as the bomb and the torpedo. Further, the efficiency of a massed attack—and all attacks by light craft must be massed, otherwise they are innocuous—depends upon numbers. If the ships are large, the aircraft-carriers are large, and the numbers that can be thrown into attack are consequently greater.

There is thus no case whatever on the basis of adequate protection. The 'small' ship, whether engaged with her like or against the various forms of mosquito craft, is better protected than the large one. It is, however, necessary to recollect that the ultimate object of a man-of-war is not to achieve her own protection; it is to destroy the enemy. The object of a navy is to protect the country; but increase in size, even if it should have the justification claimed for it of increasing the safety of a

certain small number of its units, so far from increasing the country's security has most markedly diminished it; for the cost of the ships has become so great that the number needed for our security in one of its elements cannot, it would appear, be afforded. Hence these restrictions upon our cruiser and flotilla numbers which have left us to-day in a position in which we cannot, in certain circumstances, maintain in war the trade without which we must undoubtedly succumb, nor move an army where it may be needed.

'Suitable endurance' is the next factor. The Admiralty assert that suitable endurance cannot be obtained if our 'battleships' are smaller than 22,000 tons. Is the battleship, then, independent of the cruiser? Does a fleet not need scouts? Do not these battleships, however large, need their protecting satellites? If it should be true that the requisite endurance can be obtained only on a tonnage of 22,000 tons, of what use are the cruisers we build of 5000 or 7000 or even 10,000 tons and the destroyers of 1500? For it follows, if the assertion represents a fact, that these cruisers and destroyers cannot possess the endurance necessary to accompany the battle fleet. As a matter of mere fact, however, the cruisers of these lower tonnages have sufficient endurance. The reason of endurance will not stand a moment's examination.

Finally, the size is said to be essential in order to give 'tolerably decent living conditions for the people who have to pass their lives in the ship.' A seaman who has served, as most of us have served, in ships of from 400 tons upwards must needs rub his eyes when he reads this extraordinary statement. Are, then, the living conditions in cruisers not 'tolerably decent'? Was life too hard to be borne in those 5000-ton cruisers we served in before the war, or in those of from 3000 to 10,000 which have been stationed all over the world since the war? These small cruisers worked in the North Sea, in the North and South Pacific, in the Indian Ocean. The idea that there were not 'tolerably decent living conditions' in them is ridiculous. There certainly never has been any reluctance in the Navy to serve in small ships, nor have I ever heard that such service was considered hard, much less 'intolerable.'

That, however, is not all. Apparently these conditions are considered necessary only for that particular set of officers or men who serve in the fifteen battleships. Why is this? Why must this particular set of individuals be singled out for comfort and the vast majority who serve in the cruisers and the flotillas be relegated to conditions which by hypothesis are intolerable? Clearly this reason, like those which preceded it, has no substance whatever in fact.

It has been asserted that great size is an intrinsic necessity in British defence, so much so that, even if all the other Powers should be prepared to abolish the great ship, we must still possess them. This truly strange theory places a new meaning on the word 'battleship,' which, as remarked earlier, is merely a shortened form of the expression 'ship fit to lie in the line of battle.' What made a ship fit to lie in the line was simply her capacity to fight, on equal terms, the ships which formed the enemy's line. There was no other reason for size than the size of the enemy's ship. Our ancestors, who knew something of their business, never thought it necessary to utilise ships of the line in parts of the world where their enemy had none, though, for occasional convenience, as they possessed such ships, they made use of them. But what we are told to-day is that, although there should be no such ships to meet in 'battle formations,' no 'mass' to oppose, we must still possess these great ships. One asks, what for? Obviously it is not to form masses, or fleets, which no one can oppose, because there is none to oppose them. The idea appears to be that they are needed for the defence of convoys. In fact, it is not 'battleships' in the true sense of the word that are demanded, but very large cruisers. The duty is cruiser duty, and what we are in reality affirming is that it is necessary for us to have cruisers larger than those of any possible enemy.

Many years ago Sir Reginald Custance remarked that it is futile to aim at building ships more than equal in power to those of other nations, and other naval writers expressed a similar view. We may confidently dismiss the possibility of such a contingency arising as that in which other Powers acquiesce in an arrangement which would allow this latitude in cruiser construction to this country. Apart, however, from this plain fact, the proposal is a vicious one. It is a repetition of an exploded policy. It is about forty years since we embarked upon precisely such a policy, forced through the Admiralty by the then Controller of the Navy and the Chief Constructor in opposition to the First Sea Lord, which resulted in the building of those monstrosities the *Powerful* and *Terrible*. That act vitiated our cruiser policy ever afterwards. *Drakes*, costing a million, *Minotaurs*, costing a million and a third, followed. Our 'light' cruisers, the true cruisers, suffered, and when the war came we had not enough of them. The fiction that the big cruiser would 'sweep the seas' was exploded by the experience of war, as every thoughtful man knew it would be.

Where, then, is the reason for this asserted necessity for ships of this great size? It is not the minimum which will give adequate protection, nor is protection the sole object of warship design.

It is not necessary for endurance, for smaller ships have as much endurance, and, if they had not, the battleships would be tied by *their* endurance; they cannot conduct campaigns alone without scouts or flotillas. It is not necessary for comfort, for the conditions of living are perfectly tolerable in the smaller ships. It is not possible that we alone could possess them, nor, if it were possible, would it be necessary to have them if other Powers were without them.

All attempts to represent the need of size as intrinsic have been answered at different times. But there remains another reason which is, admittedly, as grave—other nations insist upon having them, and we cannot, therefore, be without instruments as powerful as theirs. The reason why some of those other nations have them is, however, merely that we and others have them. Both Italy and Japan were ready and anxious to make reductions in size some years ago. France had no desire for such great ships, though lately she has come under the spell. It is not impossible, however, that those others who consider that there are intrinsic reasons for great size may have no better foundations for their belief than our own authorities. Those
h I have seen are certainly *equally untenable*.

HERBERT RICHMOND.

MADAME CURIE AND HER SUCCESSORS

THE late Mme. Curie lived just long enough to see the brilliant discovery of artificial radioactivity by her daughter and son-in-law, Irene and F. Curie-Joliot. In the first stage of her own career, in collaboration with her husband, Pierre Curie, she had discovered radium, and had taken a leading part in the establishment of correct conceptions of the nature of radioactivity. She contended that radioactivity was a property of atoms, and set investigation on the right path. The scientists at the end of the nineteenth century, when radioactivity was discovered by Becquerel, found the phenomena baffling. Their conceptions of the operations of Nature were expressed in the terms of the mechanics of continuous change. This habit of thought, fixed deeply by three centuries of successful use, prevented scientific conceptual imagination from working freely on *data* not describable in terms of the mechanics of continuous change. The paralysis of the conceptual imagination by the peculiar *data* provided by radioactivity led in the six years following 1896 to the proposal of many fantastic theories of the nature of radioactivity.

Throughout this formative period Mme. Curie firmly steered the physicists towards the conception of radioactivity as an intrinsic property of certain atoms. Her experiments on uranium showed that its radioactivity was not a chemical property and was not dependent on chemical reactions between molecules of different substances, as the activity depended only on the amount of the uranium present and was not affected by its combination with other substances. As certain uranium minerals were known to be more radioactive than uranium itself, Mme. Curie deduced that these minerals must contain some substance more active than uranium, because the high activity could not be due to the chemical reactions of uranium with other substances. If the uranium mineral contained different sorts of radioactive atoms, these different sorts should be separable by chemical analysis. Directed by her theory, Mme. Curie boldly made a chemical analysis of the uranium mineral, and succeeded in separating from it two new very active substances, radium and polonium.

A consideration of Mme. Curie's theoretical acuity and courage, combined with fine experimental skill, shows that she was a great scientist. In the atmosphere of groping speculation caused by the discovery of facts that could not be accommodated by scientific conceptions that had served for three centuries, she successfully formulated a correct theory from the results of exact experiments, and employed this theory as an immediate guide to the experiments which enabled her to discover radium and polonium. The combination of qualities in her scientific work shows that she is entitled to be called great. Her discovery of radium was helped by less than the usual quantity of luck which helps the discoverer of profoundly original knowledge. For instance, she owed less to luck in her discovery of radium than Ørsted in his supremely important discovery of electromagnetism. She belongs to the class of scientist which includes Ørsted, Davy and Faraday, and she is the only woman in history that has made a supreme scientific discovery.

Her greatest discoveries were made in her earlier years. She became a unique personality, and received overwhelming honours. She is the only person that has received more than one Nobel prize. Her fame attracted large endowments, used for building the Radium Institute in Paris. She was appointed director of research and provided with relatively large quantities of the rare radioactive substances, and with magnificent equipment. With these provisions she was able to create a school and a tradition of radioactive research.

Those interested in the conditions of the progress of science will do well to study the history of her career. Her famous discovery of radium was made in 1898. The brilliant discovery of artificial radioactivity was made by her daughter and son-in-law in 1934—thirty-six years later. Compare these dates with those of Rutherford's career. He saw how radioactivity could be turned to the analysis of the structure of atoms in 1903–1905, and announced his determination to make the research. In 1932 his colleagues Cockcroft and Walton showed how atoms could be disintegrated by machinery. This parallel suggests that a school and tradition of supreme research requires a generation for growth. It is difficult in less than a generation to accumulate resources and to perfect a multifarious technique. When a school of research has grown during thirty years it can solve an astonishing number of problems, because any new fact can be investigated in a dozen different ways by a group of experienced and accomplished scientists. While the school is being founded it is led by a brilliant investigator with moderate resources and a small number of students. The leader will make great discoveries, but his colleagues will as a rule be helpers

rather than original discoverers. The subject will be in an early stage of development and present few aspects sufficiently developed to be susceptible of swift solution. After one or two decades various aspects will become more clearly significant and the technique for investigating them will have grown. After a generation new problems will be solved soon after they appear, and the school will in a short period make an extraordinary number of important discoveries. The school possesses a mental attitude that enables it to recognise phenomena significant to the theme of its researches. The recent history of the schools of radioactive research at Paris and of atomic physics at Cambridge illustrate these tendencies. Paris is pre-eminent in those aspects of recent radioactive research that resemble the aspects of radioactive research explored by Mme. Curie thirty years ago. The tradition she has cultivated has given her school a special facility in those types of radioactive research which she had herself so much developed. The Rutherford school now established at Cambridge is pre-eminent in the study of atoms and atomic structure, and has a special facility for recognising the atomic aspect of new knowledge.

In 1930 Bothe and Becker discovered that if the metal beryllium is bombarded with swift helium atoms it emits a very penetrating radiation. They assumed that it was a wave-radiation and made many experiments with it. The Curie-Joliot became interested in this radiation and made a very striking experiment with it. They discovered that if a plate of paraffin wax was placed across the radiation a large number of atoms of hydrogen were knocked forward out of the wax. They measured the energy of the ejected hydrogen atoms, and deduced from it the energy of the beryllium rays that had struck them, assuming the beryllium rays were waves. They found the beryllium waves must be extremely energetic, several times as energetic as the helium atoms used to bombard the beryllium. The Curie-Joliot interpreted these results as showing the existence of a new type of interaction between waves and particles, in which waves of very high energy could be produced by particles of much lower energy.

The explanation of the paradox was discovered by Chadwick, of the Rutherford school. He perceived that the beryllium rays were not waves, but streams of a new sort of particle without an electric charge. He brought the most suitable mental attitude and technique to the interpretation of a sort of phenomenon traditionally familiar to his school. Chadwick's courage in postulating the existence of the neutron started a new period in physical research. In the intellectual excitement following his discovery, Cockcroft and Walton were inspired to attempt the

disintegration of atoms by machinery, and succeeded. Investigators throughout the world began to look for new particles. Six months after Chadwick's discovery Anderson, of California, published some evidence for the existence in connexion with cosmic rays of the positive electron or positron, and his suggestion was confirmed by Blackett and Occhialini early in 1933. Chadwick, Blackett, and Occhialini searched for laboratory methods of producing positrons that did not depend on cosmic rays. They had noticed the Curie-Joliot's observation that negative electrons sometimes seemed to be moving backwards in a Wilson chamber traversed by the mixture of neutrons and wave-radiations from bombarded beryllium. They considered these particles might be positive electrons moving forwards from atoms struck by the neutrons or waves, and showed experimentally that positrons could be produced by bombarding pieces of lead with the mixed radiation from beryllium.

The production of positrons by bombarding atoms with neutrons or wave-radiations was of remarkable interest in connexion with Dirac's theory of positrons. He conceives the positron as a hole in the universe marked by the absence of a negative electron. When a negative electron drops into this hole two units of wave-radiation are emitted. Conversely, wave-radiation is capable of being converted back into pairs of positive and negative electrons. The Curie-Joliot named this process 'materialisation,' as particles were produced out of waves. They found, also, that positrons might be produced by another sort of process, as a by-product of the artificial disintegration of atoms of aluminium. They found that atoms of aluminium and other light elements emitted positrons when bombarded with the swift helium atoms ejected from polonium. While investigating this phenomenon they discovered a very remarkable fact. The emission of positrons from aluminium does not cease immediately after the removal of the polonium which provides the bombarding helium atoms. The bombarding helium atoms do not simply disintegrate the aluminium atoms; they transmute them into a state in which they can emit positrons after an interval of time. The rate of emission of positrons after the polonium has been removed decreases in the same way as the rate of emission of particles from natural radioactive substances. This means that the bombardment converts the aluminium foil into a radioactive condition. This was the grand discovery of the possibility of making artificial radioactive substances. Like the discovery of radium, it has immense practical besides theoretical interest. This aspect will be discussed presently. The Curie-Joliot immediately discovered that boron and magnesium could also be converted into a radioactive condition by bombardment with

helium atoms obtained from polonium. They found that the number of positrons produced from bombarded boron was reduced by 50 per cent. after 14 minutes, the corresponding figures for magnesium and aluminium being 2 minutes 30 seconds and 3 minutes 15 seconds respectively.

Besides providing the first examples of artificial radioactivity these experiments proved the existence of a new sort of radioactive radiation. Hitherto, three sorts of radiations from radioactive substances had been recognised: helium particles, negative electrons, and waves. The Curie-Joliot showed that positive electrons could also constitute a radiation from a radioactive substance. A consideration of the structure of the boron atom suggests that it might produce an unstable form of nitrogen when bombarded by a swift helium atom.

Then the Curie tradition exerted its influence. Like Mme. Curie thirty-six years ago, the Curie-Joliot immediately attempted to separate the new radioactive substances by chemical methods. They bombarded the substance boron nitride, a compound of boron and nitrogen. When boron nitride is treated with caustic soda gaseous ammonia is produced. They found that the radioactive material formed in the boron during the bombardment is carried away with the ammonia. Hence the radioactive material was almost certainly a form of nitrogen, because nitrogen is one of the two constituents of ammonia. The other constituent is hydrogen, and it was very improbable that the hydrogen had been made radioactive. They found that the active substance in bombarded aluminium could be separated by solution in hydrochloric acid. It was carried away with the hydrogen released from the acid, and appeared to form phosphine. It could be precipitated by zirconium phosphate. These experiments indicated that it was a radioactive form of phosphorus. The magnesium appeared to give a radioactive form of silicon. The Curie-Joliot named the three new substances radio-nitrogen, radio-silicon, and radio-phosphorus.

The manufacture of radioactive substances by bombardment with helium atoms suggested that bombardments with other sorts of particles might be effective—in particular, particles accelerated by electrical machinery. J. D. Cockcroft and E. T. S. Walton had made the famous experiments on the disintegration of atoms by machinery. It was not surprising that these masters should inquire whether radioactive substances could be made with their machines. With the collaboration of C. W. Gilbert they discovered that ordinary carbon when bombarded by hydrogen atoms, or protons, was converted into a radioactive condition. The number of positrons emitted from the bombarded carbon decreased by 50 per cent. after the lapse of 10 minutes.

They concluded that the carbon atoms were transmuted into atoms of radio-nitrogen by the incorporation of the bombarding protons. Within two months of the discovery of artificial radioactivity a radioactive substance had been manufactured by electrical machinery out of two of the commonest substances, carbon and hydrogen. It is impossible to exaggerate the wonder of this achievement. Since the discovery of the neutron in 1932, the initiative has passed from the theorists to the experimenters. During the last two years the experimenters have discovered the neutron, the positron, the artificial disintegration of atoms by machinery, artificial radioactivity, and the manufacture of radioactive substances out of common materials by machinery. Other astonishing experimental discoveries will be described presently.

Is it surprising that the excitements produced by the implications of the principle of indeterminism have declined? For six years after 1927, when Heisenberg formulated the principle, there was much discussion of its implications, and how they might indicate the limits of scientific inquiry. A belief arose that the principle implied that scientific inquiry had unexpectedly narrow limits. Many asserted that the scope of scientific progress was lessened, and that the aspirations of scientists must be curtailed. Undoubtedly the reports of these discussions that reached the public persuaded many to believe that the methods of scientific discovery were less important and effective than had previously been supposed. The prestige of the scientific method had been reduced. Everywhere discussions on the limitations of science were heard. These discussions have become a little lame after the almost unparalleled riot of experimental discovery during the last two years. The principle of indeterminism did not, in fact, imply limitations on the possibilities of science. It showed that scientific observation contained an unsuspected subjective element. The recognition of this fact, and its incorporation in the philosophy of physics, was an advance that provided the physicists with a better view of the processes of Nature, and this better view has led to the astonishing discoveries that have been mentioned. The creators of the philosophy of the quantum theory, of whom Niels Bohr is the chief, have always deplored and opposed exponents who misinterpreted their ideas concerning the limitations of scientific method. The principle of indeterminism does not imply that there are better methods than the scientific for the discovery of new knowledge. It implies only that there are limits to the possibility of observation. Observation remains the basis of knowledge. The principle does not imply a relative increase of prestige of those mental activities least closely connected with observation. Bohr's school does not consider the limitations implied by the principle of indeterminism

are a ground for pessimism concerning the contribution of science to the comprehension of Nature. Achievements prove that physical scientists were never more confident, bold, or brilliant than they are to-day.

The first chemical separation of new artificial radioactive substances performed in England was done by O. R. Frisch, a talented young physicist who is a refugee from Hamburg. He found that sodium and phosphorus could be converted into a radioactive condition by bombardment with swift helium atoms. The half-life of the substance produced in sodium was about 7 seconds, while that of the phosphorus substance was about 40 minutes. He deduced that the sodium substance was probably a radioactive form of aluminium, while the phosphorus substance was a radioactive form of chlorine. He confirmed the second conjecture by chemical analysis. The bombarded phosphorus was burned and the products of combustion were dissolved in caustic soda. The solution was treated with nitric acid and a trace of ammonium chloride. Then an excess of silver nitrate was added. This produced a precipitate of silver chloride which was found to contain more than 50 per cent. of the original activity.

The radiations emitted by the artificial radioactive substances prepared by the Curie-Joliot consisted of positrons. Alichanow, Alichanian, and Dzelepov, of Leningrad (whose laboratory I have seen, and who kindly explained to me their ingenious apparatus), have found that an artificial radioactivity which emits ordinary negative electrons may also be obtained. If magnesium is bombarded with swift helium atoms it is converted into a radioactive condition in which positrons are emitted, as the Curie-Joliot found. But Alichanow has shown that negative electrons also are emitted by the activated magnesium, the number being about four times the number of emitted positive electrons.

In their original paper the Curie-Joliot had suggested that radioactivity might be induced in carbon by bombardment with atoms of heavy hydrogen. This suggestion was confirmed by Henderson, Livingston, and Lawrence, of Berkeley, California. They bombarded carbon and many other substances with atoms of heavy hydrogen accelerated to an energy of 3,000,000 volts. They found evidence of the production of radioactivity by this treatment in carbon, the activity decreasing to half its original value in 12 minutes. An activity with a half-life of 40 seconds was produced in calcium fluoride. Calcium chloride gave one of 13 minutes, lithium carbonate and ammonium nitrate gave one of about 2 minutes, aluminium nitrate gave one of 3 minutes, and magnesium one of 9 minutes. Two radioactive substances appeared to be produced in beryllium, one with a half-life of

9 minutes and the other of 3 minutes. Crane and Lauritsen, of Pasadena, obtained radioactive gases from carbon and boric oxide by bombarding them with heavy hydrogen. They found that the radioactive gas could be driven out of the boric oxide by heating it to about 200 degrees Centigrade. The radioactive atoms could be condensed out of the gas by passing it through a liquid-air trap. This radioactive gas is probably radio-nitrogen. Alichanow has pointed out that the radio-nitrogen produced by bombarding carbon with heavy hydrogen has the same radioactive properties as the radio-nitrogen produced by bombarding boron with swift helium atoms.

Atoms of helium, hydrogen, and heavy hydrogen had proved to be efficient projectiles for producing artificial radioactivity in various substances, but only in light elements such as carbon, aluminium, and boron. They had not transmuted atoms of the heavier elements, such as iron. This was to be expected, as the bombarding particles carry a positive charge of electricity. They would not be able to approach the nuclei of the heavy atoms because they would be repelled by the large positive electrical charges on the nuclei of the atoms of the heavy elements. The limitation of the hydrogen, heavy hydrogen, and helium particles, in virtue of their electric charges, does not apply to a neutron. As it has no charge it should have no difficulty in penetrating the nuclei of all atoms, and perhaps of producing rearrangements leading to the formation of new radioactive nuclei. Professor Enrico Fermi, of Rome, began experiments to see whether neutrons might be efficient producers of artificial radioactivity in other substances. The results of his experiments are astonishing. Scientists were peculiarly interested in them, because Fermi has not hitherto been known as an experimenter. He is one of the world's leading theoretical physicists, and his researches were concerned with the most recondite investigations of mathematical physics with which the names of Heisenberg, Dirac, and Schrödinger are associated.

Fermi prepared a convenient source of neutrons by sealing a mixture of radium emanation and beryllium powder in a glass tube. The helium particles emitted by the spontaneously disintegrating radium emanation eject neutrons from the beryllium atoms. Tubes emitting 1,000,000 neutrons per second may be made in this way. With the collaboration of D'Agostino, Amaldi, and Segrè he obtained a remarkable series of results. Phosphorus became strongly radioactive under the neutron bombardment. The electrons emitted by the disintegrating substance produced in the phosphorus could be photographed. Chemical separation showed that the substance was probably radio-silicon. Iron provided a radioactive substance with a half-life of about

3 hours. Chemical treatment showed that it was probably radioactive manganese. Aluminium gave a substance with a half-life of 12 minutes, and the disintegrations could be photographed. Silicon gave a substance with a half-life of about 3 minutes, and the disintegration electrons were photographed.

Chlorine gave a substance with a half-life much longer than that of any other substance produced in the series of experiments. Vanadium gave a substance with a half-life of 5 minutes. For arsenic the half-life is 2 days. A strong effect was obtained with silver, the half-life being about 2 minutes. Tellurium gave a period of about 1 hour. Iodine gave an intense effect with a half-life of 30 minutes. Chromium gave an intense effect with a half-life of 6 minutes, and the disintegration electrons were photographed. Barium gave a half-life of 2 minutes, and fluorine of 10 seconds. Effects were obtained also with sodium, magnesium, titanium, zirconium, zinc, strontium, antimony, selenium, and bromine.

All of these results were mentioned in a short letter to *Nature*. The vast extension of new fact made the scientific imagination reel. They were followed by even more results of an equally remarkable kind. Fermi and his colleagues found that at least 47 elements could be converted into radioactive substances by neutron bombardment. They investigated the sign of the electric charge on the electrons emitted by the disintegrating substances and found it was always negative. All of the new radioactive atoms produced by neutrons emitted negative electrons. This was in contrast with the new radioactive atoms produced by helium bombardments, which emitted positive electrons. They found that the atomic number of the substances produced in aluminium, chlorine, and cobalt was two less than that of the parent atoms. In four cases—phosphorus, sulphur, iron and zinc—it was one less. In the cases of bromine and iodine the active element is an isotope of the bombarded element—*i.e.*, the atoms of bromine and iodine are converted from inactive into active atoms, but their chemical properties remain unchanged.

With the assistance of Rasetti and D'Agostino, Fermi investigated the interesting problem of the effect of neutron bombardment on the atoms of uranium and thorium. These are the very heavy natural radioactive substances. The experimenters thought that a series of new disintegrations might be started by a neutron bombardment in these naturally unstable atoms. Their experiments showed that this was correct. Uranium and thorium both showed a large increase in activity after bombardment. Two new radioactive substances appeared to be produced in the thorium, and five in uranium. The half-lives of three of the uranium substances are 10 seconds, 40 seconds, and 10 minutes. The half-lives of the remaining pair are between 40 minutes and

1 day. The 13-minute substance can be separated by chemical treatment. The uranium preparation is treated with nitric acid, and a small quantity of a manganese salt is added. The manganese is precipitated in manganese dioxide by boiling the solution with sodium chlorate. A large part of the active substance remains in the manganese dioxide. This chemical treatment shows that it cannot be a form of thorium or palladium, or bismuth or lead or ekacæsium or emanation. The atomic number of uranium is 92, and those of the other elements mentioned are 90, 91, 88, 89, 83, 82, 87, and 86. If the 13-minute substance is not one of these, what can it be? Perhaps it is a uranium atom that has incorporated part of a neutron, and increased its mass from 92 to 93 units. Such a substance should have chemical properties resembling those of manganese, according to the periodic law of the chemical properties of the elements. As the 13-minute substance seems to follow manganese through chemical reactions, it may be element 93.

The number of elementary atoms known to chemistry was 92, the lightest being hydrogen and the heaviest uranium. Some theorists had offered arguments to show that not more than 118 could be possible. Later the maximum number was reduced to 96, and recently two physicists argued that the maximum number was 92. The apparent experimental discovery of element 93 is rather awkward for them! Fermi thinks that element 94 or 95 may also be produced in the neutron bombardments. The heaviest atom found in the earth is that of uranium. Heavier atoms may have existed at some time in the past, but they disintegrated æons ago. Jeans has suggested that radioactive atoms of masses 94 or more might exist in the stars and provide some of the stellar energy by disintegration. If Fermi's substance is element 93, he will be the first man to have made an element. His predecessors have only discovered chemical elements or prepared radioactive varieties of known elements. The manufacture of elements provides a new attitude in chemical science. Hitherto chemists investigated the properties of atoms provided by Nature. Now they have the prospect of investigating the chemistry of an atom prepared by themselves. While the chemistry of No. 93 will resemble that of certain other elements, according to the periodic law, it will in detail be unique. Preparing a new atom implies the invention of a new chapter of chemistry. The problems of the chemist were previously set him by Nature. He is no longer entirely dependent on Nature for his problems. He can invent them for himself, by manufacturing atoms not found on the earth, or observed in the heavens.

Fermi's artificial production of element 93 was followed by

the announcement on July 5 of the discovery of this element in the Joachimsthal pitchblende by Dr. O. Koblic.

What are the implications of the indescribable burst of physical discovery during the last two years? Until about six months ago 92, or perhaps only 91, chemical sorts of atoms were known. Most of these were stable atoms, such as those of oxygen, or iron or gold. The stable atom was regarded as the typical atom. Unstable atoms, such as those of radium, were known, but they were regarded as exceptional. During the last six months the number of known sorts of physical atoms has been almost doubled; some evidence has been found for at least 60 new isotopes. Is it not possible that the old idea that normal atoms are stable, while unstable atoms are abnormal, may have to be reversed? In the future hundreds of sorts of unstable atoms may be discovered, and the 100 stable old atoms and their isotopes, such as those of oxygen, iron and gold, will be regarded as abnormal. Ordinary stable atoms will be regarded as singularities and remainders in a vastly more multifarious possible world of unstable atoms. At some period when the universe was very young it contained more than 92 sorts of chemical atoms, and hundreds of unstable varieties of these atoms. The interactions of matter and radiation at that time were the exception and unstable atoms were the rule. That universe would to an observer have appeared extremely dynamic, and our own universe of slow chemical reactions between stable atoms would in comparison appear almost deadly static.

The practical value of the manufacture of radioactive substances may become great. The natural radioactive substances, such as radium, are rare and expensive. Radium costs about £300,000 per ounce. The rarity and commercial value of radium increase the difficulty of investigating and applying its medical properties. The new artificial radioactive substances may be more effective and more convenient than those so laboriously ground out of the rocks. The improvement in the technique of their manufacture will in future probably make them available in large quantities at reasonable prices. While many persons will be impressed by visions of future manufacture of radioactive substances and their applications in medicine and in goods for human convenience, others will be impressed by the sudden multiplication of the aspects of the material universe. Almost every month the theorist finds new fundamental facts rising before him in profusion. What new conceptions must he devise to comprehend the new facts, and in what perspective will the problem of the nature of the universe and existence be placed? Shall we in a few years' time reach a conception of the evolution of the material universe profoundly different from the one which we have at

present? Theories of the internal constitution of the stars must be deeply modified by the discoveries of the new science—the chemistry of the nuclei of atoms. Atoms of lithium can be disintegrated by protons travelling under the electrical pressure of 30,000 volts. This is quite a trifling voltage. The electrical transmission lines from the Boulder Dam power station being erected in the canyon of the Colorado river in America will operate at 287,000 volts—*i.e.*, at a tension almost ten times that sufficient to disintegrate lithium. If the voltages of mundane human power stations are commonly to be so much greater than the voltages necessary to disintegrate certain atoms, what must be happening inside stars, where the physical conditions are so extremely violent? Atoms must be disintegrated and the parts recombined in a turmoil of reactions. The complication of the details of these reactions will require vast extensions of astrophysical theory for its description.

The common use of voltages so very much higher than those necessary to make some atomic disintegrations inevitably suggests that immense developments in the human control of Nature will arise before many years have passed. But it is also certainly true that scientists cannot at present see how these developments can be made. Scientists are enjoying the exhilaration of swift advance, and approach the problems of Nature with more confidence than ever. The pessimism derived some years ago from inadequate discussions of the implications of recent theoretical discoveries is shown to be unnecessary. Scientists are acquiring new knowledge at an astonishing pace. But they are anxious that civilisation shall not collapse, and that humanity shall not fail to benefit from the new knowledge. Everyone who appreciates the achievements of contemporary science must be anxious that civilisation should be ordered in a way that these achievements shall not be wasted.

J. G. CROWTHER.

THE BATTLE OF THE BRIDGES

ALAS, as these lines are written, and as some will read them in print, there is disappearing one of our national monuments, a bridge the memory of which will live on in London's long story. There are many reasons why it should not be forgotten. Its name spelt alike history and victory. It was triumphant in its stark simplicity, with so little elaboration or decoration, but that long line of level arches striding out from either shore was so supremely satisfying. Many bridges step delightfully, even trip, over water, but our great Waterloo was marching, almost a part of the very foundations of our glorious Somerset House on the northern shore, and inviting—no, demanding—that architecture as fine should rise up to meet it and greet it on the southern.

Need we have lost it all? In its centre two piers had given way; we knew that its arches were of a type which on the curve of the river made its navigation difficult. The barrier was down—would it be right to build it up again, a barrier once more? But could we not have saved a few of those royal arches, and might we not, by some kind of shipway, have still freed the river? There were men of light and leading who thought some such compromise might be arranged; but, alas! compromises are rarely satisfactory, and when both sides in a heated controversy are certain that they stand to win they are impossible. Two years ago, when Parliament spoke, the majority cheered. The other evening, when it spoke again, it cheered and laughed, loudly and long. It held the money-bags. It was prepared to be the chief subscriber. It had won. Thank heaven, the bridge was saved.

And then—horror! A newly-elected Council of London rose up, to be defiant! They saw a great opportunity to be thoroughly spectacular, and took it. 'We do not want your subscriptions,' they said; 'we will pay.' And it was now their turn to laugh, some quietly—almost shame-faced—some loudly. And, they being the authority responsible, all poor old Waterloo's royal arches will soon be nothing but a dismal and distressing memory. That curtain is rung down, and our interest in the bridge which will replace it will be frankly utilitarian. The sentiment has departed. And now what next? The position is not happy:

indeed, it is ridiculous. The bridge so many love is coming down, the bridge so many loathe still stands triumphant in its ugliness. All our difficulties remain the same. Think that they were there, fully recognised, before the war, and that year in and year out we have discussed them ever since the war ended. We bury schemes, piling them one on another till they are lost, and most of them quite happily forgotten.

Mr. Editor—if I may break accepted rules and address you—almost all the troubles which worry us to-day were recorded in the pages of your great Review twenty-three years ago last January.¹ So many of us foresaw the difficulties, the possibilities, the mighty opportunities, as long ago as that. We had got so far that our County Hall was plotted out, we had noted that long stretch of neglected southern shore from Westminster to Blackfriars, asking, indeed imploring, to be brought in to add to the beauties of our mighty city, had fixed our eyes on those ninety acres, the key of the position, in the hands of five great corporate bodies anxious to be helpful, and even wandered further afield behind and beyond, east, west and south, over those many miles of less valuable property, finding so many dull streets, so few trees or gardens or any kind of greenery anywhere. In that quarter there are no real lungs. Southwark Park is miles away to the south-east, Battersea as far to the west. At Lambeth the Archbishop a few years earlier had nobly given up a portion of his garden—christened 'The Archbishop's Park.' What else was there to hope for—anywhere? And all waiting so patiently, so pathetically, for some action by those high personages who by voice and pen and pencil discuss everlastingly and eagerly the possibilities of Charing Cross Bridge with fingers itching for their drawing-boards, all of them determined on one thing at least—never, never, never to agree.

If only more people would pass over into South London and wander round, if only the London Society and similar bodies, whose work is invaluable, would organise pilgrimages, not only to visit fine houses and interesting places, but look further afield and realise the dulness of these treeless, gardenless square miles, waiting to be opened up and discovered as a definite section of Central London, really no distance away, but, across the river, and flat and featureless, and so reckoned of no account!

There are times when dates are of value and interest. Men come and go, their memories cherished or forgotten—the views they expressed now applauded, now scoffed at. It is often a matter of fashion only. But the results of their advice and influence and actions live on. Think that it is a generation since

¹ 'A "King Edward" Bridge,' by Captain George S. C. Swinton, *Nineteenth Century and After*, January 1911.

the development of old London's poor relations on the south side began to attract the notice of her more affluent cousins in the City, the Strand and the West End! From the County Hall I have secured the following information as to how at intervals of over thirty-two strenuous years this question has been tossed about. '*Quot homines, tot sententiæ.*' I wonder whether anywhere, on any matter of town planning, that dictum could be applied with more truthfulness.

On October 21, 1902, at the old Spring Gardens offices, when the proposal was put forward to buy a section of the Adelphi, pull down all the Adam houses and build a new County Hall there, the division resulted in a tie! And the proposal dropped. An amendment to go to the present site had been ruthlessly voted down. We had gathered only nine into our lobby!

On April 18, 1905, the Council, having taken two and a half years to think over that amendment, decided to adopt it and move to the present site, and the development of the neglected southern shore had begun.

On March 9, 1912, with much pomp, His Majesty the King laid our foundation-stone.

On July 18, 1922, there took place the first meeting of the Council in their great new County Hall.

On January, 1, 1923, London was thrilled by the announcement that the South-Eastern and South-Western Railway systems were to be amalgamated, for at long last this did look like real business. It was now a question for the Southern Railway.

In July 1925, there was received Sir Edwin Lutyens' report on his proposals, excellent in the opinions of some, impossible in the views of others.

On November 30, 1926, Lord Lee of Fareham's Committee reported in favour of the combined rail and road bridge, which was given the name of 'the double-decker.' Criticism was now in full swing and one of our most prominent and forceful architects rushed into the Press, declaring that such a thing would be 'disastrous.' But others held different views. As I write there lies before me a letter from one whose high standard of taste is acknowledged everywhere. It runs:

If there should be any active opposition to the double-decker Charing Cross Bridge—opposition, I mean, on the question of principle—I should very much like to give evidence. In point of fact the double-decker bridge at that point might be one of the really fine monuments of London.

Alas, how opinions do differ!

And then, in July 1929, a really great surprise! The Southern Railway, as the combined South-Eastern and South-Western

had become, suddenly agreed to move Charing Cross Station over the river. In July 1934, five years later, all that we can show with regard to bridges over that section of the River Thames is that Waterloo, the one road-bridge which so many have acclaimed as a supreme work of triumphant architecture, is being pulled down, while Hungerford Bridge and Charing Cross Station, neither of which has ever succeeded in exciting world-wide admiration, are now so rapidly acquiring a reputation of municipal sanctity.

And then, quite suddenly in this battle or game of politics—call it which you will—there are developments unexpected and most interesting. What a curious world we live in! Should we be able to withstand the shocks of tragedy if comedy did not at times intervene in contrast? Is it possible that the hands which struck down Waterloo are now reaching out to welcome Charing Cross? Are they apologetic, and anxious to show it? Well then, let us all pull together for the public advantage—for combination means strength, and the moment for it is ripe. For how long have many of us been preaching that the key to the solution of what we might call the South London problem lies in that triangle between the railway and Waterloo bridges and spreading out from it; how long have we been keen to induce a different atmosphere there—wide streets, fine houses, gardens, trees and beauty. Well, our new rulers at the County Hall have arrived at the same conclusion; how fortunate! Politics do not come in this time. Who is not in favour of a Charing Cross bridge, and who does not realise the supreme importance of the landing-place which must receive it on the south side?

But still one wonders whether it is quite understood what the real trouble now is? Do the public, at any rate, realise why of late everything seems to have been hanging fire with no progress? Probably very few have grasped the immensity of the problem over which many far-seeing persons have been puzzling their heads. It is nothing less than this:

Can the Southern Railway—the old South-Western and the even older South-Eastern, now in combination—be induced to step down from its raised lines and platforms to ground level, or even to go further and burrow underground? Is such a thing within the bounds of possibility? We all know that it is difficult to make railway viaducts things of beauty; they are so terribly uncompromising, so unfortunately monotonous; the engines used to belch their smoke out skywards, and though, thank heaven, this is now largely a thing of the past, they still take noise to the level of bedroom windows, destroying privacy and amenity and the value of property, while they often ruin architectural effects by attacking them at all angles. There is no question that they

are much more than a nuisance, that they are a long trail of ugliness, and that they ought never to have been allowed. But there they are, and it is difficult to see how in that neighbourhood they can be improved. In North London they do not obtrude themselves to any considerable extent, for there they are further out, where there are folds in the ground in which they are sunk; but cross the river, and instantly, all along parallel to its course at different points, they face us, an ugly bar raised high above the low flat ground. South London has spread out behind them; but there can be no question that river and viaducts running more or less in parallel lines for some miles eastward and westward have prejudiced the value of a great stretch of property. It may not be bad, but it is dull, featureless, uninspiring. Can we lend a hand to improve conditions?

So we are faced by this possibility, startling to many, incredible to some! Is such a solution conceivable as a great Waterloo Station no longer raised in the air, with all its offices and buildings and lines and sidings, but sunk? What would such sinking mean—in far-reaching disturbance, in money, and time? To the vast majority to whom such a suggestion is made it is midsummer madness, but, apparently, by quite a number of the personages whose views cannot be strongly brushed on one side, it is considered, quite seriously, as a subject worthy of discussion. In that case it must be discussed, fought out, agreed to or swept out of sight and memory for ever.

We have come to this. Waterloo Bridge is disappearing—for some years, at any rate. The many who for a generation have been fighting for a great new Charing Cross Bridge will, we hope, now be asking eagerly for a thorough investigation of all its numerous possibilities; but it is quite useless to speak or argue now about any question with regard to the improvement of South London in that neighbourhood until these proposals to lower the railway lines—whether they be authorised or quite unauthorised—are thrashed out to a decision which will be permanent.

Has any responsible body, or even individual, worked out the answer to this simple but rather necessary question—what would anything of the kind cost? It is so easy to talk, and the talkers often seem to think that the bigger they talk the more they will enthuse their audience; but this 'going to ground,' with all its questions of drainage and other difficulties that may be found there, is no simple matter. Levels and leases will alike be troublesome, but the most serious point of all is: How long would it take to bring it about? Consider the disturbance over some square miles of South London!

It is to be hoped that this question of the improvement—

perhaps even entire reconstruction—of a large area in central South London is going to be tackled really seriously at last, and at once. Everything is dominated by this railway problem, and it must be decided by Parliament. It goes far beyond the province of the County Council. In the future, are the Southern lines to be up in the air, on the ground, or sunk beneath the ground? When this decision is arrived at it should be enforced—immediately, for, until it is, we shall not know what can be arranged about Charing Cross Bridge. Indeed, over that whole district not only can nothing be done, but nothing can be imagined until this possibility is officially brought forward, accepted, blessed with many, many millions of public money, or killed stone-dead for ever.

In conclusion, it may be well to note down for reference the possibilities which we shall be called on to consider in any case—whether this all-governing idea is adopted or relegated to the scrap-heap. There is nowhere in our mighty London, or perhaps in any of the greater cities of the world, a site comparable in importance to that occupied to-day by Charing Cross Station. For architecture it stands up and dominates. If properly treated, no place ought to be more convenient as a centre to which everything can come, and from which everything can be dispersed in different directions and at many different levels. Then, southward from it, there should be a really great bridge—triumphant. This should lead us across that glorious curve to another architectural triumph, also dominating. We know that that large plot of low-lying ground lies waiting for it. Upstream there must be some appropriate linking on to the purlieu of the County Mall. Downstream, to Blackfriars, we should have hopes for the future. In both directions, if possible all along that sweeping river frontage, a mile in length, we should have, not another Embankment roadway, but a garden walk—not too many trees, but shrubs, flowers, grass pushed out on to what is to-day nothing but a shelf of mud, a walk tempting South Londoners out to look on London's greatest open space, with its fine architectural prospect, and to enjoy what is perhaps, in her throbbing centre, the nearest we can get to silence—a joy which is priceless.

What can or will happen behind this frontage or façade it is naturally, at the moment, quite useless to consider. All improvements of every kind, all buildings, all levels on the wide hinterland, depend on this railway question. Its influence in every way and in every direction will be dominating and far-reaching—as long as London lasts.

GEORGE S. C. SWINTON.

STUDIES IN IMPERIALISM

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

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Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925. A Study in Post-war Diplomacy. By Harold Nicolson, with 10 illustrations and 4 maps. Constable & Co.—18s. net.

Egypt since Cromer, vol. ii., 1919-29. Macmillan & Co.—21s. net.

THE garden of imagination in which stands, somewhat stiffly, the frock-coated statue of Lord Curzon was turfed and planted with stately trees by Lord Ronaldshay. In his present work Mr. Nicolson has adorned it, from intimate personal knowledge, with flowers and a few bitter-tasting but healing herbs.

Mr. Nicolson here takes up the tale at the point where he laid down his pen in *Peacemaking*, 1919. 'No one,' said the Prince de Condé, following Plutarch, 'is a hero to his own valet.' Heroes, it may be added, do not desire adulation, but loyalty, from their servants, and Mr. Nicolson's affection for and loyalty to his hero have not blunted his critical faculties. In this volume, which has a breadth and depth greater than anything which Mr. Nicolson has written, he rightly sees Lord Curzon's post-war imperialistic ideals as fair, scientific, moderate and liberal, based on knowledge and experience, and the source of high inspiration:

To the older Imperialist the glory of Empire had been purchased by self-sacrifice, integrity and effort. In democratic imperialism they recognised a tendency to retain the former and to evade the latter; a tendency to 'shirk the responsibilities of Empire and at the same time to take the profits.' This tendency filled them with shame and dismay; yet when they tried to correct it they found arrayed against them the combined forces of national exhaustion and party misrepresentation.

Of British diplomacy Mr. Nicol-

son has much to say—and never has it been better said:

... Our old diplomacy was the least self-conscious diplomacy which has ever existed; and the most concrete. It never sought for spectacular triumphs or verbal victories. It sought only for silent, practical achievements. There was nothing about it which was either vulgar or vain.

Conscious that they were pursuing only national aims, diplomats and their chiefs alike took for granted the consent and approval of the electorate. Avoidance of publicity was dictated solely by fear of waves of popular emotion which now, as ever, are a cause of war and an obstacle to goodwill amongst men.

Of the conflict between Lord Curzon, an Orientalist but a bad European, and Mr. Lloyd George, the empiricist, Mr. Nicolson writes with inner knowledge and undeniable authority:

Curzon's judgment was fortified by centuries of tradition, by a lifetime of experience, and by knowledge of detail such as no living statesman possessed. Lloyd George's intuition was encouraged by his loathing of the traditional, by his distrust of technical experience, by his marked dislike of all but the most amenable forms of knowledge, by immense self-assurance, and by an aversion to detail which was almost pathological. Through Curzon's mind marched countless memories and reflections. . . .

Lloyd George's preoccupations were more immediate: what was he to say on Tuesday morning to Orlando about the Istrian frontier, and what to Clemenceau on Thursday about that Polish report?

In his references to Eastern countries Mr. Nicolson is less happily inspired:

There is no liberty in Persia to-day—there is fear, corruption, dishonesty and disease. Is national independence so far more important than personal freedom? That is a question which the present generation are unable to answer.

This statement may or may not

be true of certain Western countries and of the U.S.S.R. : it is certainly less true of Persia than of Europe.

Relations with Egypt, Russia, Turkey, Greece, the verbal spate of conferences, ending with Lausanne—of all this and much more Mr. Nicolson writes brilliantly and with knowledge. On the subject of Mosul he shows Lord Curzon, replying to Ismet Pasha, at his best, quoting Mr. Washington Child's remark in his diary that

the contrast between Ismet Pasha's statement and Lord Curzon's reply was as that 'between a Greek temple and a dish of scrambled eggs.' . . . Without a glance at his notes, he reeled off fact after fact by which he proved the Turkish arguments to be dishonest, ignorant or absurd.

This remarkable work, which deserves the closest study alike by diplomatists and historians, business men and schoolboys, ends with a chapter entitled 'Some Remarks on the Practice of Diplomacy, and especially on the Dangers of Democratic and Professional Diplomacy,' which must be read in the light of M. Cambon's little essay on the same subject to be appreciated, so greatly are they superior in depth and breadth of view. Mr. Nicolson's belief in the educability of democracy, his insistence on the scientific method, and on the need for fusion of the Diplomatic Consular Foreign Office Services and the D.O.T. deserve to be proclaimed from every platform, for it is to be feared that they will find few advocates to-day in Whitehall.

When, in 1895, Sir Alfred Milner, as he then was, published his *England in Egypt* he created a precedent, and set an example which has become a tradition. Less than twenty years later appeared Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, planned on ampler and more controversial lines. Lord Lloyd has taken up the chain of events where his predecessor left it; he has disentangled it from the accretions of time and irrelevant

growths, and has presented the English-speaking world with a closely reasoned, continuous narrative of unassailable accuracy.

This book is a faithful record; it is also a record of faith. In style it excels both its predecessors; there are no mannerisms, no over-emphasis, and but little of the deliberate under-statement which, for constitutional reasons, is the mark of many State papers. Lord Lloyd's thesis, expounded with moderation but with intense conviction, is that we were called to Egypt, or at least accepted by its inhabitants, because we had the reputation, and professed the intention, of providing good administration in a country which for half a century had suffered from the misdeeds of its rulers. For a generation or more we pursued the ideal of equal justice, of honesty and of efficiency. Then, at the behest of men who postulated the maintenance in all circumstances of a reasonably just and fair administration, employing foreign experts whose views would be accepted with respectful assent, we substituted for this ideal a political conception.

Had this conception been one of 'independence' on Persian or Turkish lines it might, after a period of travail, have taken a practical shape which would have appealed to popular imagination. But 'independence,' in our minds, was secondary to 'self-determination'—to be expressed by the purely Western and generally unsuccessful method of the popular assembly, of direct elections involving in practice the gravest abuses.

This volume deals, clearly, honestly and fully, with the years 1919-29, beginning with Lord Allenby's release of the four deportees from Malta and ending with his departure—in circumstances which reflected credit on no one but himself. Of Lord Allenby's régime he speaks with the greatest

generosity, of his own period of office with admirable restraint. His own loyalty to the Declaration of 1922 is not in question, but he held—and held rightly, as few will deny, in the light of subsequent events—that it could only succeed if the reservations were accepted as loyally as the Declaration itself.

Here he came into conflict with Mr. Arthur Henderson, whose whole conception of statesmanship, as that of his successor, revolved round 'liberal' interpretations of vague formulæ, in contrast to the earnest search of statesmen and diplomats of an earlier age for precise statements, in which were set forth, in authoritative form, the intentions of the parties. Mr. Henderson chose to announce in the House of Commons his disagreement with Lord Lloyd at a moment when neither Sir Austen Chamberlain nor Mr. Baldwin were present. The former 'had suddenly left England and was to remain absent for a little while. . . . He knew the facts, and apparently has had no subsequent opportunity of stating them.' Lord Lloyd was indeed the fourth High Commissioner in succession to vacate his post as a result of serious differences with Whitehall, but he was the first to be publicly rebuked in the House of Commons.

Of subsequent developments, which have brought us back in 1934 where we were in 1920, Lord Lloyd gives a succinct and convincing narrative, which, though it stops at 1929, is for most purposes complete, for since then nothing practical has been done on either side towards a permanent settlement. The attitude generally

adopted was that to foresee difficulties was tantamount to opposing progress in any direction. The need for British troops, whose departure would to-day be the signal for widespread anxiety and something approaching a financial panic in Cairo, was ignored: the existence in Egypt of foreign interests, to protect which we are formally committed, were passed over. The view that we must cut our losses and clear out held a field which was occupied only by tired or superficial minds.

The concluding chapter deserves to rank as a classic in the literature of British polity. It is a plea for a definite policy, honestly and courageously adhered to, eschewing unilateral declarations and pious expressions. Lord Lloyd has no patience with those who reply to him that 'we live in an age of transition' and must therefore drift; his view is that of Pindar, 'The fortunes of the world follow heroic souls,' and he points to recent developments in many countries in support of his thesis.

Lord Lloyd's work, darkened by tragedy and bitter failure—not on his part, but of the will of the nation which he represented—is the latest addition to the long list of warnings. *Usque quo Domine!* We in Great Britain, trained in a different school, shall not soon succumb to totalitarian theories; but they are gaining ground abroad, and have always been popular in the East. Can we reconcile our domestic practice with the pursuit abroad of other methods? That is the problem raised by this work, and it has yet to be answered.

A. T. WILSON.

IS IT PEACE?

- Will War Come to Europe?* By H. R. Knickerbocker. John Lane.—5s. net.
- These Hurrying Years.* By Gerald Heard. Chatto and Windus.—7s. 6d. net.
- New Governments in Europe.* Edited by Raymond Buell. Thomas Nelson & Sons.—10s. 6d. net.
- Democracy.* By J. A. Hobson. John Lane.—2s. 6d. net.
- These Times.* By J. A. Spender. Cassell & Co.—5s. net.
- Germany's Third Empire.* By Moeller van den Bruch. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.—10s. 6d. net.
- A History of National Socialism.* By Konrad Heiden. Methuen.—15s. net.
- Young Oxford and War.* By Michael Foot, R. G. Freeman, Frank Hardie, and Keith Steel-Maitland, with a preface by Professor Harold Laski. Selwyn and Blount.—6s. net.
- The Hour of Decision.* By Oswald Spengler. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.—8s. 6d. net.
- Germany Unmasked.* By Robert Dell. Martin Hopkinson.—5s. net.

'I say it is fifty-fifty,' Dr. Benesh told Mr. H. R. Knickerbocker. 'I mean by that that if the present state of national tension that can now be observed in Germany were to continue for five years, then the chances of war would be more than fifty per cent.' But there is always a catch in the most forthright-seeming oracle. Dr. Benesh added hastily that he was not at all sure that Germany five years hence will be the same Germany it is to-day; and with that admission, the basis of his prophecy vanishes.

It is this instability of things as they are in Europe to-day that confounds the most skilful and indefatigable observer. It reduces the record of Mr. Knickerbocker's investigations to a collection of the day-before-yesterday's newspaper cuttings. It must dispirit, if they realise it, the earnest Americans who pore over the essays on the latest European political experiments which Mr. Buell has collected for their edification. For while they pore over them, the

experiments themselves have changed their form or vanished.

The lot of the theorists is hardly happier. Economic nationalism means war. Mr. J. A. Hobson's 'closed States' involve, owing to their 'nationalism, imperialism, militarism and protection,' potential war. Yet internationalism is not enough. 'Internationalism is inevitable unless the world smashes,' remarks Mr. Gerald Heard shrewdly in his odd, rather interesting book, 'but unless internationalism comes to understand values, it and the world may be smashed by nationalism just to prevent the other alternative.' The League of Nations, Mr. Hobson intimates, must at the very least retain in its own hands the power of maintaining peace, if peace is to be maintained. Yet to strive to force any such power on a body quite incapable of exercising it effectively in the world as it is, is (so the cool common-sense of Mr. Spender urges on the other hand) to invite the catastrophe from which we are

seeking escape. The contradiction is apparent rather than real; but that it should exist at all is a measure of the difficulties that beset us.

Practically all these writers are agreed that it is from Nazi Germany that the danger to peace threatens—not immediately (for that would be suicide) but at no very distant date. So militant a creed can, indeed, scarcely be sincerely pacifist in any case. Herr van den Bruch's book is, we are told, the Nazi's Bible. They might have a worse. It has the usual stigmata of Nazidom—the respect for force, the grotesque reverence for 'race,' the hatred of Jew and Liberal, intellectualism and England. But it is free almost wholly from the abominable odours of the gutter and the gaol, which have made triumphant Nazidom so offensive a neighbour. It is rather a noble-tempered book.

But the charge against Herr Hitler's Government is specific. As Mr. Dell formulates it, the charge is that, behind a façade of peaceful protestations and regional pacts, Nazi Germany is, and has been from the first, preparing for a war which shall establish the victorious German *Reich* as the dominant power in the world. Mr. Dell's own international outlook has been subject to cyclonic disturbances; and his indictment of Germany would be more effective if it had not been preceded, not so very long ago, by an equally vehement indictment of French policy. But his charge is a matter of fact, not opinion. Mr. Dell has two main 'exhibits': the garbling of the English version of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and the secret official instructions alleged to have been sent to its agents abroad by the German propaganda department.

Of the authenticity of the latter (damning if they are genuine) some doubt is still possible. The German Government has officially denied their genuineness; and a perfectly

innocent Government, absorbed in home affairs, convinced that it was faced with a deliberate campaign of calumny abroad, and temperamentally somewhat cynical, might quite well decide to do no more. But Mr. Dell's masterly analysis of the garbling of *Mein Kampf* is certainly staggering. Some of the passages which he quotes are not translations at all: they are falsifications of the original text which scarcely can have any other intention than to deceive the English reader. No one would dare to handle a book thus without the consent of the author, who cannot, therefore, escape responsibility for this brazen example of mendacious propaganda.

It is of some significance that Herr Konrad Heiden, the author of the most authoritative account of the Nazi movement which has yet appeared, supports Mr. Dell's view. Herr Heiden is a far better authority for the early days of Hitler's movement, of which he had direct personal knowledge, than for the later developments of which he writes in exile, as a definite enemy of the movement, from sources which must be indirect. But he, too, thinks that only economic disaster can prevent the Nazi Government drifting into war. He may be wrong: recent events at least suggest the possibility that the movement may simply fade into something very different, and perhaps far less dangerous to the peace of Europe.

But we shall deceive ourselves if we believe that the happiest accident can free Europe permanently from the dangers which menace it. Their cause lies deeper. One illustration of this is furnished by the four young Oxford champions of peace who enter the arena from very different angles. They are all in earnest, all intelligent, all well informed and all quite articulate. What one misses in their essays is the one thing that

might have been expected to be found there—the fervour of a fiery conviction. Not one of them gives the impression of being quite sure of himself: from first to last they are on the defensive. This is intelligible, and even natural, having regard to the intricacy and delicacy of the enormous problems to be faced, and the infinite peril of a wrong decision. But it is none the less disconcerting.

For it is not confidence in himself and his doctrine which the apostle of 'Prussianism' lacks.

Nothing is easier than to make game of Herr Spengler. 'Man is a wild beast. I shall say it again and again'—apparently on the dubious hypothesis of the Bellman that 'what I tell you three times is true'. Why must we be pestered every few pages with the Gracchi, Marius, and Julius Caesar? Why not, for a change, Tubal Cain and Chedorlaomer, who had quite as much to do with the Gold Standard and the New Deal as Julius Caesar? Yet no one with any sense for the power of language can fail to be impressed, even in a translation, by the magnificent sweep of the generalisations, the arrogant march of the truculent argument, and the way in which the very sentences seem to sparkle with the hatred and contempt which inspire them. So long as this fire blazes in the vast stubble field of Europe's miseries and discontents, we may pray for the peace of our Jerusalem; but it is an act of faith to believe in it.

STUART HODGSON.

—John Murray—

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MOTHER INDIA

Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India. By E. Thompson and G. T. Garratt. Macmillan.—21s. net.

A Foreigner Looks at India. By P. Staal. Cape.—7s. 6d. net.

India at the Parting of the Ways. By Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Wyllie. Lincoln Williams.—8s. 6d. net.

Letters of an Indian Judge to an English Gentlewoman. Lovat Dickson.—7s. 6d. net.

Child Marriage: the Indian Minotaur. By Eleanor Rathbone, M.P. Allen and Unwin.—2s. 6d. net.

THE history of India has always been a conflict of personalities against numbers. It is a stirring record, full of great events and fine characters; and at a time when the Indian controversy is occupying wide attention Messrs. Thompson and Garratt have provided a scholarly and balanced review of the whole course of British rule in India. They had a difficult task, but it has been exceedingly well done.

There is an unusual range and variety in their combined experiences: Dr. Thompson is a former Bengal educationist and Mr. Garratt served India as a Bombay civilian. The combination helps them, for instance, to appreciate the widely different problems with which Warren Hastings, Dalhousie, Curzon and Irwin had to deal. The authors have covered the range of facts from 1599 to 1933 with fairness and conciseness; and in their judgments—they are more often judgments than criticisms or commentaries—there is castigation as well as praise, both for British and Indian. They are the first to praise, but they are not the last to blame when they think it is due. In dealing with the pre-Mutiny period Warren Hastings, Cornwallis, Minto, Lord Hastings, and Dalhousie come in for warm approval. The Mutiny cast a long shadow. The causes and consequences—one of them the Nationalist Movement—of the deplorable estrangement which it brought about are ade-

quately stated. While special attention is given to the administrative side of the story, the social and economic factors are not neglected; but some of the authors' economic generalisations will be unacceptable to those who follow the strictly Conservative school of thought. Indeed, one would not acquiesce readily in all their opinions, although about many of them few thoughtful readers will complain. The survey of the last decade will arouse the greatest criticism. Speaking of the growth of Indian nationalism the authors say:

We reflect that no controversy has been more miraculously preserved from irreconcilability than this one between England and India. . . . The struggle in India has been accompanied by bloodshed and savagery. Yet, when all has been said by the extreme protagonists of both sides, its conduct justifies a guarded belief that its outcome may be a sane and civilized relationship between the two countries.

It appears to be the main conclusion of Dr. Thompson and Mr. Garratt that Britain's greatest gift to India has been to teach her people to think in terms of India, not of Bombay or Bengal or Madras. They believe that the welfare of India lies in social and religious reform, not in politics.

It must be doubtful whether a rigid Federation can long survive without great economic and social changes which would normally precede rather than follow the establishment of such an immense democratic organization. For a period the British connexion, the

great bureaucratic machine, and the presence of British troops will combine to prevent fresh patterns from being shaken in the Indian kaleidoscope; but events in other parts of the Empire show that once England has given up complete and direct responsibility for a territory there is little urge to interfere in subsequent developments. Possibly the future will see a number of almost autonomous units, based roughly on the existing Provinces and larger States, but each developing along its own lines, and merely sacrificing a measure of its sovereignty to a body like a miniature League of Nations.

Some useful appendices, a bibliographical note, and thirteen maps (three of them full size) add to the value of this accurate and authentic survey of British rule. It is indispensable to all students of Indian history and politics. A few trivial slips should be corrected in the next edition.

Mr. Staal, who was Consul-General for the Netherlands at Calcutta, writes forcibly and with understanding of the great political experiment we are about to make in India. His opinions carry this weight—that they are formed without the influence of our own traditions, prejudices and passions. The book will not encourage those who are vowed to optimism about the future of a self-governing India. The author maintains that the Indian Councils Act of 1861, bringing Indians into the Legislative Councils for the purpose of making laws, started a policy which will end disastrously if it is carried to its normal conclusion. Western democratic institutions, he says, can never be the instruments of government in India, where, as in other Oriental countries, authority cannot be combined with consent although it may easily combine with acquiescence. Some stress is laid on the view that our position in India is a European and not merely a British interest. By abandoning all the advantages accruing from Indian trade 'Britain would shirk the duty she is called upon to fulfil, not only towards the British, but

towards the whole of the white race. Europe seen from the East is England.' Mr. Staal does not appear to consider the historical connexion or logic of the proposed constitutional reforms, or the motives which have inspired British administrative action during three centuries. Holding such views, he must be very apprehensive of the policy adopted by his own Government, who have to deal, in the Dutch East Indies, with a problem very similar to our Indian problem. In 1916 they introduced a *Volksraad*, or peoples' council, as the first step towards the development of self-government, and the Constitution Act of 1925 granted a measure of autonomy in internal affairs.

India at the Parting of the Ways is described on the dust cover as 'one of the most informative books about India ever written': it is highly estimated in the Introduction by Sir Michael O'Dwyer; but it is, in fact, no more than a tendentious attack on the policy of the India White Paper. The point of view is abundantly familiar—the White Paper embodies a Socialist policy; no pledges have been given to India; there is no mandate for the National Government to deal with India; in short, it is a crime for Indians to want self-government and a greater crime for us to give it to them, and the proper destiny of the White Paper is to provide a meal for a huddle of cockroaches.

No one, to be sure, is wholly unbiassed, but one may be alive to the dangers of bias when considering a very difficult problem. This book gives no idea of the true situation which makes the Government's proposals intelligible. It is intemperate, particularly in dealing with Montagu, Reading, Irwin, Gandhi and Whitehall, 'where honest principle seldom triumphs over tortuous policy,' and contains many inaccuracies.

Almost from the beginning there has been a higher purpose in our

Imperial task than appears in official records. It is to be found in the opinions of Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, Charles Metcalfe, Herbert Edwardes, James Thomason, and other unquestionably honest men who left their mark on India as enlightened administrators. The general integrity of our rulers in India would be hard to explain if the history of our administration, particularly during the last few decades, were as Colonel Wyllie has written it.

I wish I were happily convinced that the letters of 'Arvind Nehra' were really the letters of an Indian judge to an English gentlewoman. I have known many Indian gentlemen, of as many fashions of thought, but not one of them, I am certain, would express *all* the sentiments in this entertaining book. Nehra is an Indian, yet he writes 'Badmarsh' (Badmāsh) and 'Ghandi' (Gandhi). While there is the characteristic omission of the definite article and the common confusion of tenses, there is also a puzzling inconsistency of style and, at times, a remarkable use of idiomatic English. 'In Assembly mouths spout veritable Niagara of hot air,' he writes in one place; in another, 'Burma has got on quite well without me. Here are the same large and unlikely blossoms upon the trees. Blossoms that must always suggest to me a little the unearthly flora that bloomed on the wallpaper of my rooms in Cambridge.' But 'the bitter Karela growing and seeding' is a true Indian touch. If the assassination of a Governor by Nehra's son were a historical fact—which it is not—concealment of the author's name would be superfluous.

However, the publisher vouches for the authenticity of the letters and my doubts must be laid to rest. And whether they be fact or fiction matters little, for these delight-

ful letters are full of a quiet dignity, sincerity, and fortitude that is very refreshing. They are a shrewd commentary, written with sly humour, on social and political matters, English as well as Indian. Few of us would quarrel with Mr. Nehra when he says: 'They [Indians] have much to learn, but I cannot see they will learn it in any good heart until there is friendship between them and their masters.'

Like *Mother India*, Miss Rathbone's book contains many distressing revelations. But whereas *Mother India* was written more in the aloof spirit of a Blue-book, *Child Marriage* is full of sympathy for the small band of reformers who are fighting this insidious evil. They are striving against immense odds. To quote from one of Mr. Nehra's letters: 'Thorny is the path of those who endeavour to introduce foreign standards into the home circle!' Miss Rathbone writes with commendable restraint, for the temptation to go all out on this subject is great. The argument that early marriage is only a betrothal is eyewash: medical testimony from Indians themselves is overwhelmingly against it. Since the Sarda Act was passed in 1929, raising the marriageable age, it has been practically a dead letter. Millions of under-age marriages have taken place quietly in British India, and in the small French settlement of Chandernagore, near Calcutta, they are solemnised in flagrant disregard of the law.

Miss Rathbone claims for Indian women wider voting rights and a larger share in administration, and urges them to organise extensive propaganda against this outrage on Nature. They are to play the part of Theseus, who slew the Athenian Minotaur. Victory rests largely with them.

DUNCAN MCCLAY.

ANNA REDIVIVA

The Peace and the Protestant Succession. By George Macaulay Trevelyan. Longmans—21s. net.

Anne of England. By M. R. Hopkinson. Constable & Co., Ltd.—12s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR TREVELYAN has completed his trilogy, and on closing his last volume we end the history of England under Queen Anne. So passes the adolescence of the eighteenth century, developing itself along the broad lines of tolerance and strength into the civilising influence which we know it to have been. In his latest volume Professor Trevelyan continues the account of the great processes whereby England, after almost a century of mutability in thought and politics, set her house in order, and, guided by the administrative ability of a captain of genius and a sovereign possessed of great moral worth, established herself as a power in Europe and an example of social and domestic order at home. In the preceding volumes we have seen how Queen Anne, almost alone in her confidence of Marlborough, was rewarded in that confidence by the successive victories of Blenheim and Ramillies. We have also seen how far she was personally instrumental in securing the Union with Scotland, an aim which lay very near her heart. In the present volume we begin with Malplaquet, and pass from thence to the succeeding peace in Europe and the Hanoverian or Protestant Succession at home. Although an important event, the latter was, at the time, an undistinguished one. No clamour attended the entry into England of the Elector of Hanover, while subsequent history has demonstrated the lack of influence which was exercised by George I. over one

of the most powerful Parliaments this country has ever known. But the immense consequence of Queen Anne's legacy has been lasting progress and increasing power.

However, Professor Trevelyan is not immediately concerned with the Queen. Although he honours her, it is true, he is apt to think of her as an amiable and indolent autocrat. She appears to him to be a rather shadowy sovereign guided partly by an obstinate character and partly by the wish to do her duty to her people. She is the connecting thread between Marlborough and Godolphin, Harley and St. John. It is not so much that he disavows her value as that he concentrates more upon the events of the reign than upon the Queen's active influence; and yet one knows that, but for her solid principles, her moderate opinions and her indulgent toleration, the aspect of the whole reign would have been a very different one. By virtue of her inherent and disarming honesty, she was able time after time to deal with the predicaments in which she found herself placed in the face of factional intrigue, and although Professor Trevelyan takes her to task for the manner of her dismissal of Godolphin, he makes no mention of the vexations which she had for years undergone at his hands. He says that she 'chose to dismiss the Treasurer as a squire would dismiss a cheating bailiff.' Actually her letter of dismissal to him contained the following words:

... The many unkind returns I have received since, especially what you said to me personally before the Lord ... makes it impossible for me to continue you any longer in my service but I will give you a pension of four thousand pounds a year, and I desire that instead of bringing the Staff to me you will break it, which I believe will be easier for us both.

But episodes like these are only aspects of the more personal issues in the story. The major events—the great and lasting developments, the examination into social and political conditions—have met with such triumphant results that one can only marvel at the clarity of Professor Trevelyan's discernment, clear thinking and impartial judgment. There is an admirable account of the impeachment of Dr. Sacheverell, and a most lucid exposition of its cause and its consequences.

The favourites, Sarah Duchess of Marlborough and her successor Abigail Hill, are relegated to a position of comparative unimportance. The camarilla at the palace had sufficient authority to plague the Queen and obtain preferences, but had not the slightest influence upon the sovereign concerning questions of major importance. Relying upon the wisdom of Godolphin, the prestige and genius of Marlborough, and the moderation of Harley, Queen Anne was as fortunate in her advisers as was Queen Victoria, and there are many occasions when a great similarity of outlook is discernible between the two women. Professor Trevelyan does, indeed, compare the dismissal of Godolphin with the dismissal of Gladstone in the later reign; but there is more than that—there was also an identification of sovereign and subjects in moments of national emotion which was dictated solely by simplicity of heart and the direct belief in the triumph of right over wrong. For instance, in the Sacheverell trial—the complexities of which Anne surely failed to apprehend—she relied upon her instinct. Her consequent attitude of support was overwhelmingly popular, and the Whigs were warned off ecclesiastical interference for a century to come. Later on the Queen was to repeat herself in doing the right thing on the occasion of Guiscard's attempt upon the life of Harley.

In fact, she gave him an earldom and appointed him Lord Treasurer. It was just such a gesture as might have been made in the enthusiasm of the moment by Queen Victoria a century and a half later.

And so one turns to Mrs. Hopkinson's *Anne of England* for a much more personal portrait of the Queen. For one thing she definitely commits herself in the work of portrayal, and we watch the unfolding of a life against a background of four reigns. Happy in her childhood and marriage, Queen Anne was thwarted, in her years of probation as heir-presumptive, by her sister, Queen Mary, who is painted here in the blackest of shades and as a most odious person. 'Bovine' is the descriptive adjective employed by Mrs. Hopkinson. Dressed in garish colours, heartless and with a forced vivacity, she seems a very different personality from the devoted friend of Dorothy Osborne, and we can scarcely reconcile the two conceptions of the same woman.

Mrs. Hopkinson's sketch of Anne herself is most sympathetic, though perhaps a little lacking in robustness. The general tendency is at times a little soft and sentimental. But it gives a remarkably agreeable portrait of a woman of character and, on occasion, energy. One smiles at the impression of Queen Anne in the bright rays of the Augustan sunlight, stout and red, driving herself at a furious rate down the glades of Windsor Forest; her high chaise bowling along at an incredible speed—her horse, owing to her driving skill, frequently covering 40 miles in a single afternoon without a mishap. It is a very comfortable impression. One has the conviction of the presences of Pope and Handel and Sir Christopher Wren, and the sure knowledge of sound construction going on in every sphere.

YVONNE FFRENCH.

PRE-WAR ENGLAND

A History of the English People: Epilogue, vol. ii. By Elie Halévy. Translated from the French by E. I. Watkin. Ernest Benn.—25s. net.

M. HALÉVY'S *History of the English People*, of which the second volume, covering the period from 1905 to 1915, has now appeared, is of value to the English reader, and indeed to all readers, precisely because it is the kind of history which an Englishman would not have written, and even because it differs in important respects from the judgments which Englishmen pass on their own proceedings. Yet M. Halévy is by no means characteristically French in his approach to history. If he does on occasions generalise, and if his pages are now and again salted with epigrams in the Gallic manner, he is nearer the German in his careful and patient study of detail. The present volume contains a series of monographs, as they may rightly be called, on such subjects as the Education Question, Labour Legislation, Army Reform, the Women's Movement, each of which might have been written by a specialist in the particular subject.

But so much detail on so many subjects makes it the more difficult for the historian to keep in the main stream of history and to distinguish between what is of archaeological and what is of historical interest. M. Halévy does well to lay stress on the social and economic aspects of the history of these years; but here again excess of detail makes it difficult to trace the main stream. Further, when we get into the main stream, certain inferences which would be natural in other countries become doubtful when applied to British politics. Thus it is not, I think, a fair statement of the case to represent the

Government and Parliament of 1906 as having been 'compelled' by 'the pressure of the working class' to go forward with Workmen's Compensation and Trade Union legislation. There was in 1906 no such division between working-class and middle-class opinion as is implied in that statement. The association of the British bourgeoisie with the working-class demand for radical social legislation is a point which the foreign observer easily misses, but it is vital when we come to consider the causes which have so far prevented the doctrine of class war from taking root in Great Britain.

M. Halévy illuminates our domestic affairs with many shrewd observations from without; but inevitably at times he seems to an Englishman to get the values wrong, and his notes, which reveal a miraculous industry in the reading of books and periodicals, will now and again raise a smile by the mixture of the authorities—good, bad, and indifferent—which he cites. His study of the constitutional struggle between Lords and Commons is admirable in its scholarship and the fulness of its detail; but here again the English reader sometimes misses the instinctive judgment, founded on custom and tradition, which simplified the issue for him.

On the other hand, M. Halévy's general estimate of the foreign policy of Great Britain during these years seems to me to get the main values right. He notes, as most foreigners do, the remarkable composure with which the British people watched developments which threw Europe into alarm, the 'ice-ness,' at times so exasperating to the French, of Sir Edward Grey, his determination and that of his colleagues not to be hustled beyond the point at which they could rely

on the support of the nation, the combination of sentiment and practicality which entered into their final decision. M. Halévy also lays proper stress upon the part which the persistence of the Germans in challenging Britain at sea played in shaping her policy.

There are, inevitably, many points on which an Englishman is tempted to dissent, but here I have space for only one or two. It is a pity to see again in this history the version of the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November 1912 which has been so often denied—the version that it was the result of negotiations 'lasting a month' and crowning a French effort to extend the Entente into something like an alliance. The story is fully told in Lord Grey's *Twenty-Five Years* (i., pp. 96-98), and the facts are beyond dispute. The letter to Cambon was drafted in the British Cabinet at the instance of Grey's critics, not for the purpose of extending the Entente, but for the exactly opposite one of limiting it by a stricter definition. The sequel makes it a classic instance of the danger of definition; but it is a singular irony that this correspondence, initiated by those who wished to limit and curtail Britain's obligations, should have got into history as a landmark in the extension of these obligations.

M. Halévy fetches a long compass, taking us round by China and India, to explain the final phase before the Great War. Some of this, I confess, seems to me fanciful. The documents tell a simpler story. In the Austrian the final drift to war is marked by the conversion of the Kaiser in the autumn of 1913 to the theory, which till that time he had resisted, of 'an inevitable war between East and West.' On October 26 he went to Vienna, and in an interview with Berchtold gave

him *carte blanche* for a forcing policy in the Balkans. The reasons for the Kaiser's change of view come out pretty clearly in Conrad's *Memoirs* and other military records. The two Chiefs of Staff, Conrad the Austrian and Moltke the German, were agreed that the power of the Triple Alliance was at its zenith, that it had already suffered a blow in the Balkan wars, and that, if time were given to Russia to build her strategic railways and accelerate her mobilisation, she would have both Germany and Austria at her mercy. Now, according to this argument, was the time to strike—later would be too late; and the probability that Russia would intervene if Austria struck at Serbia was therefore not a reason for shirking, but rather a reason for inviting, the inevitable conflict. From October onwards Germany was the horse and Austria the rider.

One other point. The idea that Grey in 1913 and 1914 was pursuing one line of policy through one set of permanent officials and another line through another set is, I am sure, mythical. It is quite out of keeping with Grey's character and with British Foreign Office methods. Nor, again, is it true that fear of revolution entered into British hesitations before the war. The fears, if any, were those of bankers and capitalists, who thought that war would be ruinous to trade and commerce. But it would be ungenerous to pursue criticisms of this kind. M. Halévy has made a contribution of the utmost value to current British history, and if in some respects his point of view differs from ours, that rather increases than detracts from its interest. I have not read the book in French, but, so far as I can judge, the translation is excellent.

J. A. SPENDER.

A GREAT JOURNALIST

C. P. Scott of the 'Manchester Guardian.' By J. L. Hammond. Bell.—12s. 6d. net.

THESE are not times in which it is probable that any journalist, however gifted in moral and intellectual purpose, can again build up such a newspaper as the *Manchester Guardian* and a world reputation as editor, like C. P. Scott, whose public life—which was almost the whole of his life—is here recorded with restraint and gravity by one of his intimate contributors. Mr. Hammond is in perfect tune with his subject, and his book is a model of interpretive portraiture. The political background of the immediate pre-war, war and post-war years, which was Scott's most active period, is sketched in with a fair balance of judgment on men and events; and Mr. Hammond has made judicious use of Scott's private notes left in charge of the British Museum.

Half-way between the Boer War and the outbreak of the Great War Scott was in full financial as well as editorial control of the *Guardian*, which was then recovering slowly from its set-back in the South African conflict and the arrival of the big-circulation newspaper. The profits had fallen almost to nothing from the £12,000 to £24,000 a year period of 1870 and 1898. When his cousin, the chief proprietor, J. E. Taylor, died in 1905, Scott expected to get the paper at a nominal figure, but owing to a faulty will he had to raise about a quarter of a million to secure it. At one time it looked as if he might lose the *Guardian* altogether.

But in all he was editor from 1872 (when twenty-five) to 1929, and editor-owner from 1907. We learn that at no time did he allow himself a larger salary than £2000

as editor and £500 a year as governor-director. These modest emoluments are instructive as to how Scott put influence first and profits second as the chief keynote of his career. Mr. Hammond shows how completely his aims and ambitions were sunk in what Lord Cecil once described as making 'righteousness readable'; and also of how favourably character and opportunity worked hand in hand in creating an international organ with a semi-provincial background so unique that it could scarcely be cited as an ordinary newspaper enterprise.

Scott was fortunate from the start. He came from a high-minded Unitarian family, and as a youth had a temperament without 'fears, remorse or scruples.' He had such marvellous health that he was without a headache for eighty years. He was also fortunate in being born into a Victorian period suited to his type of cultivated earnestness, which was reason touched with ethics and emotion. He was fortunate in an editorship so early in life and in the wide control of policy and administration he enjoyed under his cousin. They only seemed to get out of step a little towards the end over Women's Suffrage and Proportional Representation (two of Scott's pet causes) and Local Veto. He was perhaps most fortunate in an ideal marriage to a gifted and charming woman. In the office he had three valuable colleagues in W. T. Arnold, L. T. Hobhouse, and C. E. Montague; and the last gave Meredithian sparkle to the *Guardian's* leading columns when Scott was fighting the Liberal Leaguers like Rosebery, Haldane, Asquith and Grey, and Lloyd George was his only rising Liberal hope after Campbell-Bannerman.

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But it is quite clear from these pages that Scott's rule at the *Guardian* had always the flavour of a personal dynasty, and that there was little room in it for democratic consultation. There cannot have been much ordinary team-work, such as is now necessary in most great newspapers, under his direct and incisive day-in and night-out authority. There are some delightful glimpses from inside by Mr. W. P. Crozier, the present editor, on Scott's attitude to 'the new journalism.' 'Good God! Must we have photographs of weddings?' he exclaimed when illustrations had to be introduced. When at last persuaded to have an illuminated sky-sign over the building he said: 'Very well, have it—but don't let it wink, John.'

The difference between a Scott and a Northcliffe as newspaper-owner autocrats was entirely, of course, in the methods they used and the ends they pursued. On this there is an illuminating letter in which Scott reflected on Northcliffe's career:

The tragedy of his [Northcliffe's] life seems to me to lie in the fact that though he knew how to create the instruments not only of profit but of power he had not the least idea what to do with his power when he got it. Only in Ireland does he seem ever to have counted for anything that was not commonplace and flashy. But what a picturesque career!

Yet there was always a certain paradox or even perversity in the way Scott hitched the *Guardian* to the equally 'picturesque career' of Mr. Lloyd George during and after the war, and in the personal friendship that in the end survived even the 'Black and Tan' outrages in Ireland—the Irish question having been the turning-point in Scott's moral passion in politics.

During the Agadir crisis Scott found Mr. Lloyd George 'not immune from the microbe of Germanophobia.' During the Coupon Election he said: 'Lloyd George

doesn't know (it is an intellectual defect) what principle means.' Very early in the war he had been writing to him: 'It isn't munitions alone you will have before long to organise, I expect, but the Nation for War'; and he was kept well informed about the cabal which destroyed the Asquith Coalition, even to the extent of once seeing Northcliffe in London.

There may be two psychological clues to this Scott-Lloyd George mystery. Scott had his bad patch in the Boer War and Suffrage days, when Mr. Lloyd George and he were in the thick of the same conflict; no doubt, like so many other men, he went back to the period of greatest strain for his loyalties. Furthermore, there appears to have been some deeper layer in Scott's Puritan soul to which Mr. Lloyd George's more romantic intrepidity made subconscious appeal. No other statesman could have survived the austerity of Scott's political conscience and had his soul saved so regularly. Perhaps the chief secret and quality of Scott's disinterested public mind is that he went on to the end, without being soured or baffled, as so many sensitive idealists are, by evil circumstance or man's own stupidity in the wrecking of his cherished causes. He always looked forward and let the past sleep in its own grave. There is a beautiful letter on this point full of gentle stoicism, discussing 'the destruction and the wickedness that is going on.'

It would [he said] seem like a denial of God. But one has always to remember how vast are the spaces of history and how sure its revenges, and that in the end it is always the spiritual forces that prevail. But what a need for patience and for faith—and fortitude!

Mr. Hammond has succeeded in giving us C. P. Scott in his own faith and courage; and that, surely, is true biography.

J. B. HOBMAN.

SCIENCE AND PROGRESS

Science To-day. Planned by Sir J. Arthur Thompson.—Eyre and Spottiswoode.—8s. 6d. net.

The Progress of Science. By J. G. Crowther. Kegan Paul.—12s. 6d. net.

Scientific Research and Social Needs. By Julian Huxley. Watts.—7s. 6d. net.

HERE are three new books on Science. Two of them, though they break new ground, are along more or less conventional lines in discussing the achievements and significance of modern science. The third, by Professor Julian Huxley, strikes out in an entirely new line, and is of great importance in being one of the first books specifically to examine the relation between human affairs and the progress of science.

Science To-day was planned by Sir Arthur Thompson shortly before his death, and is edited by Mr. J. G. Crowther. It consists of a very diverse collection of essays written for the larger part by men of mature years. The book as a whole reflects the outlook of the older generation, and except for one or two of the essays does little to merit its title. The book has no very clear plan, though Mr. Crowther, in his introduction, makes a brave show of providing the reader with a pattern into which the various essays may be thought of as fitting. Without his guidance, however, the book would be likely to appear only as a miscellany of disconnected essays. The pattern Mr. Crowther suggests is in itself a good one, and is drawn on the very sound assumption that an understanding of science must depend upon an understanding of man himself. But in spite of Professor Hogben's excellent opening essay, which discusses the influence of heredity and environment in shaping men's behaviour and interests,

most of the writers pay very little regard to the excellent lead which he has set them.

Mr. Crowther's own book, *The Progress of Science*, is a model of good scientific popularisation. In it he discusses a number of the most recent discoveries that have been made in science, and does it in a way which must arouse, not only the interest of all those who wish to keep in touch with the development of scientific knowledge, but also the admiration of those who appreciate the difficulties of explaining the results of modern science in a non-technical way. The book is of particular interest in that it conveys a vivid impression of the personalities of some great scientists and shows the importance of the personal factor in scientific work. It has the further virtue of avoiding all suggestion of the 'mysterious' that so often finds its way into the popular writings of many specialised scientists whose standard of general culture falls far short of their standard of scientific attainment.

Professor Huxley's book, *Scientific Research and Social Needs*, is a book with a very different aim and raises much more fundamental issues. Its moral is that

Science is not a disembodied sort of activity that some people would make out, engaged on the abstract task of pursuing Universal Truth, but a social function, intimately connected with human history and human destiny.

The popular conception of science is chiefly derived from the ideas of the 'pure' scientist. But it is quite wrong to suppose that specialists in science, however well they may be qualified to speak on their own special subjects, are qualified to give any account of science in its wider bearing. Pure scientists are recruited because of their specialised abilities, and because they have absorbing interest in particular

problems. To them it seems that the kind of interest they have in their work must in itself provide the explanation of the development of science from its very beginning. The inadequacy of such a view is not very generally recognised, though it at once begins to become apparent when we ask why modern science should have begun to develop when it did, and why it subsequently developed as it did. To answer such questions it is necessary to look beyond the individual consciousness of scientists, and to examine how their interests and work have been influenced by the social conditions in which they live. Unfortunately, few of the authorities from whom the popular conception of science is derived have ever looked at science from this sociological point of view, and we find even the most distinguished scientists showing only a very slight recognition of close interdependence of social conditions and scientific discovery.

The chapters in Professor Huxley's book deal with science in its relation to such social needs as food, building, clothing, health, and communications. In addition there are chapters dealing with science and war, science in its relation to industry generally; and one, which takes the form of a discussion between Professor Huxley and Professor Blackett, is on 'pure' science. In this chapter Professor Blackett shows himself to be much more alive to the relation of science to society than most workers in 'pure' science by pointing out that

Newton did not himself think of all the problems he so brilliantly solved. The problems were there, waiting to be solved,—it was essential both for industry and navigation that they should be solved. A more accurate theory of mechanics was essential for the development of many machines in

industrial use, and also for the improvement of guns. Then the development of astronomy was required for the developments in ocean-going navigation. For instance, the problem of determining a ship's longitudes at sea was urgent. This demanded either an accurate chronometer or a knowledge of the motion of the moon. So important were these problems that the Government of the day offered prizes for both these things; thus effectively, and quite impartially, stimulating both pure and applied science.

At all times the development of research is very strongly influenced by practical needs, and Professor Huxley shows very clearly how this is as true to-day as it ever was. Just as in the last century the physical and chemical sciences were most vigorously pursued because their results were directly applicable to the further efficiency of mechanical and chemical industry, so to-day new researches are endowed and encouraged in proportion to the extent to which their results are likely to be profitable. Professor Huxley describes the immense increase of productivity that has resulted from scientific research: how, for example, the application of scientific method to the production of foodstuffs has opened up the immediate possibility of at least doubling their output. At the same time he reminds us that though we should like to think that every technical improvement was always wholly to the advantage of mankind, it is only too shockingly clear that this is not so. Besides adding to the horrors of war, science, by raising efficiency, has helped to aggravate a situation in which men lose their employment and cannot afford to buy the abundance which technical progress has made possible.

JOHN PILLEY.

PSYCHOLOGY OLD AND NEW

Mesmer. The History of an Idea.
By Margaret Goldsmith,
Arthur Barker Ltd.—10s. net.
A Hundred Years of Psychology. By
J. C. Flugel. Duckworth.—
15s. net.

*New Introductory Lectures on
Psycho-Analysis.* By Sigmund
Freud. Hogarth Press.—
10s. 6d. net.

Modern Man in Search of a Soul.
By C. G. Jung. Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.—
10s. 6d. net.

Man and his Motives. By J. C.
Flugel. Kegan Paul.—10s. 6d.
net.

EVEN the histories of psychology are inevitably coloured by the convictions of their authors, though both Miss Margaret Goldsmith and Professor Flugel are as free as is humanly possible from any taint of bias. Indeed, the psycho-analyst will regret that Miss Goldsmith has not probed deeper, from his point of view, into the life and work of Mesmer; but if she had done so her book would probably have had a narrower appeal. As it is, she has written a very readable introduction to the history of abnormal psychology for the layman and provided the professional with material for the inferences she has not drawn. Professor Flugel's book on what psychology has done in the last hundred years, to some extent, covers the same ground, but includes also an account of the development of very different schools, such as those of the systematic and physiological psychologists. It is lucid, scholarly, and comprehensive, and thoroughly deserves the success it has already gained.

In an age of superficial materialism Mesmer rediscovered methods of treating functional disease that had been practised, in some form or other, by sorcerers and medicine men all over the world. He established a *rapport* and produced a beneficial *crise*. He did not, however, understand the mechanism of his own success, and his theory of animal magnetism, while having the merit of being at least

naturalistic, showed no real advance on the demon lore of more primitive practitioners.

His intellectual descendants branched into divergent groups, some of which are as anxious as he would be to disclaim the ancestral relationship. There are the spiritualists who interpret the unconscious fantasies of hypnotised subjects as revelations from another world, the faith-healers who use the *rapport* to suggest away the symptoms, and the psycho-analysts who analyse it (in the milder form of transference) to remove their cause.

Meanwhile psychologists of a very different type were making progress in another field. These were the philosophers who displayed a strong resistance against the investigation of the intimacies (and indecencies) of human desire and concentrated upon the 'purer' sphere of reason, which they artificially (as we now think) separated from it. In course of time they, too, gave rise to many schools, which still flourish independently in so far as they are not actively hostile to each other. Professor Flugel distinguishes five contrasting types: structural and functional, associationist and configurationist, introspective and behaviouristic, mechanical and purposive, conscious and unconscious.

Freud's new series of lectures contain restatements of well-established parts of psycho-analytic theory together with some account of its recent developments and of

the uncertainties and problems that still remain. The years have brought little or no change in the theory of dreams; but there has been rapid advance in the theories of personality, and of anxiety and instinct, which is by no means yet consolidated. 'Femininity' is still a controversial subject, even in psycho-analytic circles, and 'telepathy' (from one unconscious to another) has become a serious problem. On the practical side, too, there has been steady progress. Psycho-analytic knowledge has begun to be applied to the education of children and to the treatment of delinquents, and Freud makes the extremely interesting suggestion that the psychoses may cease to be inaccessible to analysis if 'in the future our knowledge of the action of hormones . . . will provide us with a means of coping successfully with the quantitative factors involved in these diseases.' In his last lecture he reaffirms his empirical position and dissociates himself again from all systems of philosophy; he has nothing to offer those who seek comfort in the 'synthetic *a priori* judgments' of Ethics or Metaphysics.

The uncompromising empiricism of Freud's 'Lectures' contrasts strongly with the ethical and almost mystical tone of Jung's *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*. While Freud is content to remain the founder of a science, Jung aspires to become the prophet, or rather the midwife, of new ideals. According to Freud, life is distressing or intolerable to the neurotic because of something in his unconscious that he cannot face. If he becomes conscious of this, it turns out to be not so bad after all, and even many of his real difficulties in the external world (which were associated with it) lose their former terror. But instead of learning to tolerate what is intolerable as long as it remains unconscious, he may cover it up with some comforting illusion. In

particular, he may take refuge in religion or philosophy and so lose his neurosis by developing a psychosis. According to Jung, on the other hand, neurosis is due less to the presence of anything intolerable in the unconscious than to the absence of 'a religious outlook on life'; and since, unlike Freud, he does not regard this as the result of an illusion, he endeavours to impose or to restore it. Thus what to Freud is a psychotic flight from reality is the aim of Jung's technique. But if modern man must have a soul at all, he might do worse than let Jung help him find one; for among the alternative caterers are Hitler and Lenin.

With Professor Flugel's *Man and his Motives*—a book containing a number of essays on applied psycho-analysis—we return to the strict empiricism and 'amorality' of the Freudian school. Where Professor Flugel's sociological interests are involved he readily confesses his own desires; but, unlike the politician or the prophet, he does not identify them with the Will of God (or of the Categorical Imperative, to give Him His philosophic name). Professor Flugel supports such causes as birth control and the Esperanto movement, and considers jealousy an undesirable emotion which should be deprived of the legal encouragement it now enjoys. But in arriving at these opinions he is very careful first to analyse the motives on both sides. Many of these turn out to be irrational, which suggests that such investigations are indispensable preliminaries to national decisions on all social problems.

Mrs. Flugel, in two contributions, studies the influence of names on character, occupation, and even marriage, and exposes some interesting (and amusing) parallels between the fox-hunting rite of 'bleeding' and the totemic sacramental meal.

ROGER MONEY-KYRLE.

ORTHODOXY IN OUR TIME

The Unknown God. By Alfred Noyes. Sheed and Ward.—7s. 6d. net.

Orthodoxy Sees it Through. Edited by Sidney Dark. Barker.—8s. 6d. net.

A New Argument for God and Survival. By Malcolm Grant. Faber and Faber.—12s. 6d. net.

Religion and Theism. By Clement C. J. Webb. Allen and Unwin.—4s. 6d. net.

After Strange Gods. By T. S. Eliot. Faber and Faber.—3s. 6d. net.

OUR civilisation, as Dean Inge has pointed out, differs from its predecessors in this—that whereas they were destroyed by barbarians from without, 'we breed our own.' In politics this is only too obvious; but, not content with this, an increasing body of writers is busily undermining its intellectual foundations. The trend of science away from strict materialism, combined with a general sense that the world is hopelessly out of joint, provides them with a most convenient jumping-off ground, from which they confidently repudiate the whole movement of mind which may be said to have started with the Renaissance. Because nineteenth-century science was somewhat overconfident of having the whole nature of things taped, we are urged to reverse the policy advocated in the parable of the tares and the wheat and scrap both in order to be rid of the tares—the wheat in this case being that empirical temper, that unwillingness to believe in any 'order' other than the natural order, and that toleration of all sorts of opinion which (whatever evils they may have brought in their train) have accomplished the gradual enfranchisement, still far from complete no doubt, of the Western

mind from the bogeys and oppressions of unreason. Or so we had thought; until this new brood of prophets arose to tell us that we are mistaken, that it is mediæval theology which really represents the free exercise of reason, and that ever since the days of Bacon and Descartes we have been falling ever deeper into the slough of dogmatism and superstition.

All of these books, except perhaps Professor Webb's, are in their different ways documents of this *trahison des clercs*. The first three represent an ascending order of sophistication or professionalness, like the personages introduced at the beginning of Plato's *Republic*. Mr. Noyes, like Cephalus, is comparatively simple-minded about his Unknown God. 'Lying awake at night in childhood,' he tells us, 'with the sea breaking in the distance . . . it seemed to be breaking in accordance with some everlasting and inscrutable Power.' And the child was father to the man; what the surge of the sea had begun, a night spent in looking through the hundred-inch telescope at Mount Wilson observatory—combined, indeed, with wide reading—completed, and the sudden loss of a dear friend finally landed him safe in the bosom of the Church. (It is curious that the appeal a religion makes to people in trouble should so often be paraded as evidence of its truth: is the moment when one has just been knocked down and thrown into a ditch the ideal one for making up one's mind on the gravest and knottiest problems?)

If Mr. Noyes may be compared to the aged and benevolent Cephalus, two of the contributors to *Orthodoxy Sees it Through*, Mr. Arnold Lunn and Mr. Douglas Jerrold, answer no less well to the truculent Thrasymachus. They are

the blackshirts of the New Reaction. 'In religion, as in politics, the interesting and hopeful feature of our age is the swing back to authoritarianism,' says Mr. Lunn. And again: 'Reason can prove that God exists and that the Catholic Church is infallible.' 'The historical method applied to the field of archæology,' says Mr. Jerrold, 'has vindicated the Christian social and moral philosophy,' and the fact that 'with the decay of spirituality and the growth of materialism societies fall by their own weight' is a 'historical vindication of the doctrine of original sin!' After this we need not be surprised to be told by Father D'Arcy, S.J., who writes on *Orthodoxy and the New Morality*, that the sexual appetite 'serves the most important of the purely human and social purposes of man' (*i.e.*, reproduction—an odd view, surely, for a religion which lays such stress on the fate of the individual soul), that 'the policy of sterilization does not belong to any moral principle of sacrifice,' and (of course!) that self-control is 'the secret giving the true solution to most of our sexual problems.'

Mr. Malcolm Grant's book is on an altogether different level. Mr. Grant is a little out of place in his present company: in the first place, he puts his money on a 'completely rationalised' Protestantism; and then, he really argues. He deduces the existence of God from supernatural happenings, which he considers so well attested that only prejudice can reject them. To assume that they obey laws as yet undiscovered is, he thinks, less reasonable than to accept them as miracles. But a miracle implies a cause, like anything else, and an 'intelligent' miracle—*e.g.*, prophecy—an intelligent and therefore personal cause, which we may as well call God. Mr. Grant is not afraid of awkward facts: some miraculous

pronouncements are undoubtedly false; therefore, God can deceive. Mr. Grant manages, however, to convince himself 'from wide premises that God is benevolent and just' and that 'the natural course of things favours good rather than evil'—assumptions, some might say, at least as rash as the assumption of a hidden law behind apparent miracles; hence God must deceive us, and make us suffer, for the good of our souls. In this way most of the hoary 'ethical' arguments—*e.g.*, for immortality ('it's all too senseless if there isn't a next world' and so on)—are let in by the back door, so to speak. But whatever the flaws in Mr. Grant's argument, he is a formidable and a bold reasoner, and has written a remarkable book, which contains among other things an extremely interesting survey of the chief forms of 'occult' phenomena.

Professor Webb's book stands somewhat apart from the others in its urbane and uncontroversial tone. It is chiefly concerned with showing that the agnostic and scientific exponents of 'religion without revelation'—it seems to be Professor Julian Huxley's fate to be the general object-lesson here—are in truth making theistic assumptions, and indulging their fundamentally theistic emotions, all the time that they are rejecting theism—a point also made by Mr. Lunn. 'Tis true, 'tis pity; but how does it support the case for theism? It can be taken just as plausibly as evidence of the half-heartedness of their rationalism—that they are sheep in wolves' clothing, in fact. Incidentally, Professor Webb, like Dr. Kirk in the *Orthodoxy* volume and unlike Mr. Lunn and St. Thomas Aquinas, believes that no argument for theism derived from natural experience can stand; 'only specifically religious experience,' he holds, can serve here.

With Mr. T. S. Eliot, who believes, like Mr. Jerrold, in original

sin and writes the Powers of Evil with capitals, we return to the New Reaction. Mr. Eliot wants us, 'worm-eaten' as we are with Liberalism (of which he appears to take his view from the Tractarians), to return to tradition, the 'inherited wisdom of the race,' and points to certain writers like Hardy and Lawrence as awful examples of what happens when the individual cuts adrift from it. He does not say much about the content of this wisdom, what it prescribes (except orthodoxy); but some of his remarks throw a considerable, and alarming, light on the general tendencies of the movement. Thus, discussing the conditions favourable to the growth of a tradition, he says that

the population should be homogeneous . . . what is still more important is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and religion combine to make a large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable. . . . And a spirit of excessive tolerance is to be deprecated.

Mr. Eliot is so fond of the word 'provincial' that he must have some idea where his capital is. All he tells us, however, is that

much of our writing seems provincial and crude in the major intellectual centres of Europe—everywhere except northern Germany and perhaps Scandinavia.

One wonders which these centres can be, apart from the obvious one, Paris, still the fountain-head of fashion. But when he connects this provinciality with Protestantism, albeit a decayed Protestantism, we may be forgiven for suspecting that we know from which quarter the wind is blowing.

It is Mr. Eliot himself who provides the best comment on the whole situation when he says:

The acrimony which accompanies much debate is a symptom of differences so large that there is nothing to argue about. We experience such profound differences with some of our contemporaries, that the nearest

parallel is the difference between the mentality of one epoch and another.

Exactly. It may be, as Mr. Jerrold, following Spengler, says, that our civilisation is doomed to die unless it returns at once to orthodox belief—i.e., if it persists in trying to be intellectually grown up. No doubt the world of the rationalist is an infinitely bleaker place than the world of the believer. Undoubtedly the adult often has reason to look back on his childhood as a (comparatively) golden age. But what should we say of a grown-up, or perhaps elderly, man who turned in disgust from the harsh facts of life to devote himself henceforth to the fairy-tales and tin soldiers of his childhood, which Tradition had piously preserved in the lumber-room?

ALAN HARRIS.

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THE CRAFT

The Freemasons. By Eugen Lennhoff. Methuen.—21s. net.

THE second edition of this book, which first appeared in Vienna in 1928, is now published in an English translation by Messrs. Methuen.

The account of the early history of the Craft before the crucial year 1717 is on the whole adequate, though the author presents us with a collection of the various views in which the possible and the wildly improbable are jumbled together with little attempt at discrimination.

The non-instructed reader will experience some confusion at this point, but towards the end of the chapter the encyclopædic style is suddenly abandoned and we are given an excellent statement of what is known about the rise of 'speculative' Freemasonry in Britain in the seventeenth century.

A good, if condensed, account follows of the formation of the Grand Lodge of England in 1717, from which all present-day Freemasonry the world over is derived. An attempt is made to give historical significance to the date by a highly-coloured picture of the distractions of seventeenth-century England in which not all of us will recognise our mother country.

These three allied aims—of toleration, peace and freedom—form the substructure of the remaining portions of the book, which describe the spread of the new movement through the world and its adventures in the various countries to which it penetrated. The supposed connexions with the Jacobite intrigues and the French Revolution are faithfully dealt with, and we are given a graphic picture of the campaign of calumny and persecution which has more than once threatened to overthrow the fraternity in the less enlightened countries.

The recent suppression of the Craft in Italy and Germany is fully described; the chapter dealing with the implacable opposition of the Roman Catholic Church is of great interest, as also is that in which the author points out that Freemasonry is not and never has been an organised world system, each sovereign Grand Lodge working in complete independence.

The English reader will, however, feel that throughout these latter portions of the book insufficient emphasis is laid on the distinction between those Grand Lodges which have adhered to the narrow path laid down and consistently followed by the Grand Lodge of England and those which have in varying measure departed from it. Thus, while recognition is given to the importance of the cessation of relations between the Grand Lodge of England and the Grand Orient of France from the time when the latter body abolished the requirement of belief in a Supreme Being as a necessary qualification for membership, no prominence is given to the question whether certain of the Grand Lodges mentioned in the book may have fallen away from the standard in the matter of politics. The injunction to Freemasons to refrain, as Freemasons, from discussions of a political or religious nature cannot be restricted to the exclusion from the Lodge of party politics or religious differences, but must logically be extended to preclude participation as an organisation in any practical question of political or religious interest; and Herr Lennhoff appears to have failed to draw the inference, which emerges so clearly from his history, that careful observance of this point might have averted many of the troubles which have befallen the fraternity in the less liberal-minded States.

DENIS BURNETT-BROWN.

THE BRONTË POEMS

The 'Shakespeare Head' Brontë. Edited by Thomas James Wise and John Alexander Symington. (Vol. i., *The Poems of Charlotte Brontë and Patrick Branwell Brontë*—25s. net; vol. ii., *The Poems of Emily Jane Brontë and Anne Brontë*—25s. net.) Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1934.

CHARLOTTE BRONTË died in 1855. Her husband, Mr. Nicholls, inherited her property, including her rights and a huge nondescript mass of manuscripts which Mrs. Gaskell saw while preparing her *Life of Charlotte* and to which she did not attach much importance. In 1861 old Mr. Brontë died, and Mr. Nicholls went back to his native Ireland, carrying with him the said manuscripts as well as various Brontë relics.

Charlotte was not the only author of those manuscripts; many of them were the work of her sisters or of Branwell. There were also letters from various correspondents. In our days it is probable that the biographer of a writer like Charlotte Brontë would have all such documents copied, while critics would not be long collating the copies with the originals. But Mrs. Gaskell was not the woman to do that: critics, unfortunately, waited for the second growth of the Brontë fame; and Mr. Nicholls, judging by his treatment of the portrait now in the National Portrait Gallery, seems to have had no idea of the value of the treasures he possessed. In time he began to sell individual manuscripts to collectors, and pretty soon they were scattered all over the world, passing from hand to hand and difficult to trace in their vagaries.

A disastrous situation, of course. As the reputation of the Brontës became more secure, collectors felt in duty bound not to keep what

they possessed from the public. But these so-called editions were strictly for private circulation and seldom numbered more than twenty-five or thirty copies. Sometimes an unpublished poem would have a slightly better chance in the Press or through the Brontë Society; but the melancholy truth is that, so far, the publishers of the Brontë works have been chiefly autograph-hunters. Even the larger edition published in New York in 1902 by Dodd, Mead & Co. was limited to 110 copies, one of which somehow found its way to me. The poems of Emily, very badly edited by Clement Shorter (1910), with a ridiculous introduction by W. Robertson Nicoll, did not exceed 1000 copies. Nor did, I think, the excellent edition of Charlotte's poems by Clement Shorter and that great Brontë scholar C. W. Hatfield (1923). And the tendency is so strong that even the two volumes I am dealing with are also for comparatively private circulation—500 copies being printed in England and 500 more in America.

They are two substantial, handsomely presented volumes, to the second of which are added invaluable facsimiles of the manuscripts of Emily and Anne in Sir Alfred Law's Honresfeld collection: what they are, from the point of view of scholarship, remains to be said. They offer us a good text, which is no small praise when one knows how difficult Brontë manuscripts are, and how badly even such a piece as *No Coward Soul is Mine* was treated by Charlotte. Readers of the *Nineteenth Century and After* cannot have forgotten the masterly article by Mr. Davidson Cook, published in this Review in 1926. Several wrong attributions, for instance, of poems by Branwell or Anne ascribed to Emily, have been corrected. Finally, we have here a

tremendous increase of Branwell and Anne material, Anne's poems filling 112 pages, while Branwell's spread to 177, not including the translation of Horace's *Odes*, published a few years ago by Mr. Drinkwater. As for Charlotte, many readers will be surprised to find that addition after addition has swelled the collection she herself published in 1846 to 251 pages, and Angrian material, wisely reserved by the editors for future volumes, might have made her share even larger.

Here it is that we begin to wonder. Nobody can find fault with the Shakespeare Head editors for trying to be complete, but we sincerely regret that their object does not seem anywhere to have been critical. The autograph-hunter tradition has been at work again. What is good, what is indifferent, in that enormous production? Mr. Drinkwater thinks that Branwell is the second best poet of the family, and he is right; but is Branwell nearer to Emily than he is to the other two? I have noted passages in the new material which have the Emily ring or recall Emily's peculiar emotion. But how few! And how often, on the contrary, Branwell's facility turns out to be the merely verbal fluidity of the versifier! But the old habit of judging the Brontës emotionally—that is to say, from infantile preferences aired in everyday conversations by people who should have no vote—is sure to reappear. Branwell just now is the beneficiary of a reaction against the misjudgments piled on him as well as on his father. People will conclude from the quantity of his output the quality of his inspiration. They will not find a word in these volumes to counteract such an impression. Many reviewers are not, cannot be, Brontë specialists; they will have to steer through these books with their general notions of English literature. It is astonishing that we

should hardly find an allusion to the Brontë literary models. On the other hand, people on the lookout for cheap originality will have innumerable chances to build on a hemistich whole theories about the lives of the Brontës. Remember absolute romances like Romer Wilson's *All Alone*!

The editors may plead that publishing is not necessarily literature, and that, at all events, they have given us orderly material. It is true. One ought to be thankful to them for the chronological order of the poems. But even this arrangement raises many questions which remain unanswered. Chronology would evidently be vastly helped by indications of location which we constantly miss. This is most important in the case of Emily (to wit, the controversy about the 'alien fire' which was *not* the Hegers' fire), or in the case of Branwell. One interesting indication in this edition concerns a trip of his—unknown to me—to North Wales in 1845. Another, psychologically important, concerns an impromptu he is said to have written while sulking away from his friends—a strange source of inspiration, but which, apparently, cannot be denied.

The most immediate need for Brontë students is undoubtedly a synchronised table of their movements in connexion with their production. Working recently at the British Museum Library on lectures intended to bring my book on the Brontës up to date, I felt the need of such a table at every moment. One man could make it as accurate and minute as it can ever be hoped to be made—that is Mr. Hatfield. But I am surprised that some American scholar has not as yet taken advantage of a Guggenheim fellowship to start on this essential piece of work. It should be accompanied by a critical apparatus, of course. The Shakespeare Head editors think, contrary

to Charlotte's assertion, that *No Coward Soul is Mine* was written three years before Emily's death. But not a word will they give us in support of this conjecture which the mere inspection of the manuscript leads one to think is well-founded. In the same way, people who have not had the same chances as these editors to go over the juvenile attempts known as the *Angria* or *Gondal* materials are disappointed to find themselves confronted by many puzzling allusions.

So, there is still hanging over the Brontë studies the old discouraging veil of incompleteness of apparatus, and we do not know which is its worst consequence—the hesitancy of serious scholars or the charlatantry of fantastic hypotheses. The poor Brontës have reason to envy writers whom good critical editions protect against such dangers. This means that a final edition of the Brontës has yet to be prepared, and it ought to be prepared, while Mr. Wise and Mr. Hatfield are alive, on lines which so far do not seem to have attracted the former.

There exists a model, but to my knowledge only one, and that is the selection of the Brontë poems given, in 1915, by A. C. Benson. Here was the beginning of really sympathetic and illuminating criticism.

We owe the Shakespeare Head editors two things—first, the end of haphazard Brontë publishing which had been going on for eighty years; and second, the admirable facsimiles at the end of the second volume. I do not mean that these photostats will enable a few of us to make up our minds about divergent readings of Emily's poems and her haughty way of treating minor details, but that they will enable all of us to get at once infinitely nearer to Emily and Anne, the women, than has been possible till now. That is literature, as a good portrait is psychology.

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TWO ENGLISH POETS

Geoffrey Chaucer. By John Livingstone Lowes. Oxford University Press.—8s. 6d. net.

Ben Jonson. By Herbert Palmer. Routledge.—12s. 6d. net.

The Road to Xanadu is a work of great originality in which Professor Lowes has traced the far paths that lead from Coleridge's strange and wide reading down into the 'deep well' of his unconscious cerebration, and thence up once more into worlds lit by the gleams of sorcery and the *Aurora Borealis*.

In his latest work on Chaucer Professor Lowes has attempted a similar method, recognising the limitations that are imposed by the difference of the task. He has tried to reconstruct from Chaucer's reading and travels the sort of world in which alone Chaucer's implications can be understood. Anyone reasonably equipped with text, glossary, and notes can derive joy and meaning from Chaucer; but the perfect joy, the full meaning, is only apparent to those who have learnt to think mediævally—to have a sure command over the astronomical innuendoes of mediæval common knowledge; to be familiar with the ancient doctrines respecting illnesses and dreams; to study the old maps of the world; the exact and fastidious rules for the right conduct of a love-affair; or the delicate counterpoint of allegory in the French manner.

Chaucer, like his contemporaries, is a learned poet; he is also a poet of mundane experience, a traveller, a man trusted in affairs. Thus fully to know Chaucer it is necessary to know the context of his thought: namely, all mediæval science, the principal Latin classics (Ovid especially), the poetry of France, of Italy, and so forth—a daunting list. Professor Lowes, however, has not been daunted: he has

spent his life largely in mediæval, and especially in Chaucerian, erudition. Like most scholars (contrary to general belief), he is also very much alive to human relationships, to sly humour, to the interpenetration of life and letters; indeed, if this book has a fault, it is too jaunty, too boyish, too infectiously enthusiastic; it is built upon lectures.

It would, however, be ungrateful to deny the great interest, charm and value of Professor Lowes' book simply because of a shiny phrase here and there; it is a book which rescues many a sly and many a hearty joke from the eclipse of time. His learning responds to Chaucer's learning and sets it in clear and vigorous form, so that the common assumptions of the Middle Ages, now largely lost or relegated to scattered notes in Skeat or elsewhere, become agreeably comprehensible to the student, whether he be serious or light-hearted. Often a great deal of learning can rescue no more than a comma; here, however, in friendly and flowing discussion, is the basis for a greatly enhanced enjoyment of the subject. Professor Lowes has creamed off his learning; the cream adds a great flavour to Chaucer's fruit.

An honest and temperate admiration for Ben Jonson is the mainstay of Mr. Palmer's study, which is a readable and straightforward biography shot through with literary criticism. Professor Herford and Mr. Simpson seem already to have covered this ground in more detail; but their volumes, if definitive, are aimed at a scholarly public. Mr. Palmer seeks to interest the general reader. His book is competent, but is deficient in that power to surprise which the study of a gigantic being (such as Jonson was) should impart. Our insight into the nature of Ben Jonson is

here consolidated rather than expanded. Mr. Palmer is orthodox, moderate and objective; he is juster to both Jonson and Drummond than some critics have been. In a brief account of the 'Humours Theory' he contends that Jonson's creatures are abstractions from real observation of Elizabethan life, and not *a priori* puppets, which would be a point well taken if it had been elaborated and not left as an assertion self-evidently true. *The Fox*, *The Alchemist*, and *The Silent Woman* he names, with as much justice as orthodoxy, Jonson's masterpieces: he recounts his rise to fame and favour; his uneasy partnership with Inigo Jones, their quarrel and Jonson's eclipse. Mr. Palmer's chief interest is in Theatre, which has led him, unfortunately perhaps, to neglect Jonson's lyrical writing—the only kind in which he was not outsoared by his beloved friend Shakespeare.

But the sense of prodigy, of something larger, louder and more lordly than life size, which (among his contemporaries) was the acknowledged and central fact in Ben Jonson, is nowhere communicated by this study, still less accounted for. The chief moral fact in him on which Mr. Palmer insists is the truthful bluntness that forced him to scold his public and forbade him to flatter his Prince: but this is only one, and the most obvious, 'humour' in the man; there are further reaches, the sense of which might help to body forth the prodigious element which was the essence of Jonson. For instance, the study of so apparently simple a question as 'What did Jonson think funny?' reveals in him an astonishing streak of physical cruelty. Every 'comic' situation in *The Silent Woman*, to take one example, depends on someone being hurt or humiliated or both; was Jonson's partly a Sadic humour? Or again, the many paradoxes in Jonson (which here

can only be suggested) might have been investigated by Mr. Palmer, to the revelation of a fuller Jonson than that which we already know, as thus: Jonson to meet, one of the most violent men of a most violent age. Jonson to read, one of the most sedate. Jonson the inexhaustibly vital inventor of character; yet not one of them recognisably human. Jonson the *nonpareil* of plot constructors; yet who can remember one of them? The tenderest writer of lyric; yet married to a shrew. Jonson the huge, the physically momentous Dictator to Poets, achieving this ascendancy in an age of aberrant individualism with no squeamish hankerings for dictatorship. What gave him this fantastic ascendancy? A loud voice? What has lost it for him since? These, at random, are a few of the problems to which Mr. Palmer's capable attention might have been turned more closely. Jonson has become a static figure; the duty of his biographer is to present him as the dynamo that he was.

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WHATEVER difference there may be between Oxford and Cambridge does not explain the contrast between the late Dr. Farnell and Lowes Dickinson. One is chary of pressing it, because the objective Dr. Farnell must here be judged by his reminiscences, while Lowes Dickinson is delineated by the sympathetic art of Mr. Forster, and biography and autobiography are not convenient for comparison unless the subject of them happens to be the same. The two men, however, having little but scholarship in common, make a piquant foil to one another.

The contrast begins in their boyhood and is maintained throughout their lives. Farnell was one of those fortunate people who slip into life easily and remain free from astonishment. Every new experience filled him with wholesome joy. While it is no surprise that he should have enjoyed learning Greek, not everyone would share his joy in the 'sulphurous inferno' of the old Underground by which he travelled daily to the City of London School from Primrose Hill. Much later, when he became estates bursar of Exeter, he enjoyed riding round the college farms, and when he was appointed senior proctor he also found patrolling the streets 'physically and morally' a pleasure. He was a hard worker and a keen sportsman, particularly on the water, and no matter how many or conflicting were the things he had to do, he found time

and energy for all of them, and on no serious matter was he at issue with the world in which he lived. For his work in classical archæology he traversed Europe, from Scandinavia to Moscow and from Sicily to Constantinople, but the interesting journeys that he describes, while full of the adventures of a traveller who leaves the beaten path, do not convey a sensitive imagination. They suggest rather a keen, hard-working man who would have been an ornament to any profession, but who would rarely question the end or canons of it, or be conscious of the world at points which his profession did not touch.

The feeling that he was, in fact, a man of action deepens when we reach the later chapter describing the rather stormy period of his vice-chancellorship shortly after the war. At this point, at any rate, the movement of his narrative quickens, and something more than his surface is revealed. It fell to him to deal with post-war Oxford when extreme politics and Grand Guignol plays threatened to absorb the undergraduates, and he experienced local opposition and newspaper attacks. He makes an excellent defence of his attitude to these questions and reveals reserves of strength that seem to show a talent for administration. True, he also reveals the secret that a petition for his dethronement from the vice-chancellorship was sent to Lord Curzon before his third term of office began, on the ground that his zeal had been excessive, but one cannot rule a multiple institution in difficult times without incurring odium. For the sake of his office he reacted vigorously, and nowhere is administrative zeal more suspected

than in an ancient university. In these chapters his true character seems best revealed, and his style becomes personal and pungent. It cheers the heart to read of 'so unpleasant a literary subject as the history of journalism in the twentieth century,' for that note of conviction was not conspicuous before. His reminiscences of Oxford will certainly be indispensable to the historian of the university during the past fifty years, and no biographer could have described his stormier experiences better from his point of view than he has himself. Page 299 is numbered '299-303,' which suggests tactful editing. The waterman, too, will find his voyage down the Danube in a canoe both exciting and uncommon reading, and his travels as much as his administration suggest the man of action.

The admirable photograph of Lowes Dickinson in a Chinese cap gives rise to different reflections. So soon as he had left home even for a private school, he ceased to feel at ease in the world. He found the choice of a profession difficult. He joined for a time a little agricultural Utopia. He nearly became a doctor. His University Extension lectures were not without their trials. Nor when he had been elected to a fellowship of King's was more than his direction settled. No book of pure scholarship came from his pen, for, like Plato, he was perturbed by the imperfections of society. Wisdom rather than knowledge he thought should be diffused, and his true vocation was that of a teacher, who was, however, more inspiring to his personal pupils than he managed to be by his books. Mr. Forster draws a true and vivid portrait of him; but even Mr. Forster finds the secret of his inspiration elusive. He never sought administrative posts and might have been baffled by the problems that aroused Dr. Farnell. When reason and per-

suasiveness had done their best, one feels that, in spite of his moral 'wiriness,' his instruments might have been exhausted; yet the problem of government is with unreasonable men, with passions and greed, and all those things that Dickinson most hated. But he would not have been so good a teacher if he had not gone into the world beyond Cambridge, felt so bitterly the war, done his utmost for a League of Nations, and written *The International Anarchy*. His own spirit being quickened, he could quicken others. He was rather a Socrates than a Plato, since his books—they have been compared with translations—lacked something which his personality radiated. Someone called him 'the best man who ever lived.' Mr. Forster makes us understand how this term could be chosen, and there is one happy thought that may dispel the demon of doubt. Plato is great because he has inspired many by his writings. What, then, must we not think of Socrates who inspired Plato? It is possible that only such a crisis as Socrates had to face would have set Lowes Dickinson's rarity on a hill for all to see. If the imagination of Mr. Forster, the novelist, is kindled by character rather than by situation, then perhaps he may give us a story devoted to the charm, as his biography is to the record, of this 'indescribably rare being.'

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NOTHING could well be happier at the present time than the following by Mr. Collier:

'Upon my word!' cried Willoughby, in a tone of the liveliest enthusiasm. 'Do you always wear underclothes of that colour?'

'Not always,' replied this engaging young woman, suiting the action to the word.

There is some dispute among the philosophers as to whether the delights of love are better experienced or imagined. They are certainly better either than described . . .

Sic transit gloria immundi. And quite time, too.

After all, the benign office of fiction, if it have one, is to adjust, at chosen levels of awareness, the significance, not of its particular content, but of life at large. The reader suffers annihilation of his own existence, with all its problems and purposes, in order to

become aware of a life, much or little like his own, transacted beyond the reach of his interference, in oblivion of his shadowy presence. He has responsibilities at present neither to it nor to reality. He has gone away and left no address. But, unless he be wholly enslaved to fiction, as its print-sodden addict, or its patient drudge, laying down one book only to begin another, he returns expectantly to the actual world, ready to view it with just that corrected vision, not as a meaningless flux but as a significant whole.

To this end he must either accept the writer's level of awareness, or close his book. And this level is not necessarily that at which life is or might be lived, but quite arbitrarily that at which it can be described, the coagulation point at which it unifies into such

manageable form that every detail is relevant to the whole. At a given degree of intensity experience achieves significant verbal form, and a tale is born.

Unfortunately, the more intensely the reader is asked to share an experience, the more deeply does he become enmeshed in the particular, and the less general, therefore, can be the significance of that experience and so much the more copious must be his draughts from the polluted source.

The real public nuisance is that, in the collapse of traditional standards, there is a drift towards the view that feeling, if it be but sufficiently deep or sincere, acquires a validity transcending the hard-won conclusions of thought. Variety and intensity of experience begin to be good in themselves, and freedom for the try-anything-once brigade becomes the whole of the law. This is very well for the novelist, who, strictly, requires a world neither good nor bad, but simply describable. But it is not so well for the reader, fiction having a disturbing habit of dramatising and bedevilling in advance the experiences of actual life and setting them impossible literary standards. The plain world of endeavour is clogged with day-dreams and unappeasable dissatisfactions, and these introspections themselves become a part of life, in due turn, infinitely describable, infinitely described.

A novel's significance can, clearly, be of two kinds, according either to its effect upon the development of fiction itself or to its management of that teasing relation between the subject of awareness and its object. In the first matter, novelists have so busily extended the province of their art as almost completely to vindicate their right to treat as they will of what they will. Daring is no longer of moment. None is shocked, though many are wearily disgusted. What is of interest is

the shaping of a new fastidiousness, a modern reticence. The second matter is kindred to this. Man is not merely intellectually aware of his experience. He is implicated in it. He is all too conscious of himself as part of it, as moulded by it, or as concerned to direct it. The percipient subject is part of the perceived object. Fiction experiments with this relation. The reader contemplates an imaginary world with greater or less detachment, as the writer affords and he accepts opportunities of identifying himself with what is afoot. The significance of life lies just here. Of what kind is the subject's awareness of that bewildering subject-object, himself, enmeshed in various levels of existence? There is a fastidiousness which withdraws. There is a zest which plunges.

Of these twenty books *The Artificial Princess* is that most completely withdrawn from life's robust contacts. Ronald Firbank was not merely infinitely sensitive to life, but unerringly so. He knew perfectly what it was from which he had withdrawn. It was not, with him, that trifles were all: simply, they were enough. They signified, for so delicate an instrument as his mind, all those weightier shocks of which they were the dying reverberations. So fragile is this sensitiveness that all his characters share in it. His exquisite unwinding wit is their continual protection, a tact fending them off from damaging one another. On them descends his own vivid comprehension, giving them an immediate intuition of one another's subtleties. It is his brilliant and courageous genius to spare them, and in them the reader, the too heavy pressure of life upon human awareness.

Mr. Kincaid's clemency extends no further than to the reader. For *Cactus Land* can justly be called lovely in its acquiescence to griev-

ous vicissitudes marshalled in a formal movement of impressive beauty. From a piece of random wantonness is born a personality exposed to the less tender usage of the world, favourite and out-cast by turns, until the same random wantonness engulfs her in the end. Yet everything between is so ordered and inevitable as to make even of that randomness an appropriate thing charged with meaning. So clumsy and unthinking a cause sets in motion consequences which return to confer upon it something of their own dignity, subduing by implication life's most aimless parts to a prescient ordination of the whole.

But acquiescence questions nothing and is content to forgo the explanation of its necessity, so cogent is it in its own eyes. It offers nothing to the mind. Thomas Mann questions the eternal past to explain man's unquiet in terms of destiny. In the patriarchs were men much like ourselves in broad essentials, men driven by an unrest divinely sanctioned—not a *malaise* to be subdued, but a seeking to be followed. Such an unrest is unquiet even about its own justification. It pierces time backward beyond the creation of matter, to find the soul, 'an oldest thing,' amorous of physical experience. It finds, also, the intelligent spirit, 'the second emissary,' sent to trouble the soul and lead it back to its spiritual origins. In *Tales of Jacob* this doctrine is exemplified on the simpler, heroic scale of that familiar story. But since this conflict is man's earthly destiny, the characters being made recognisably such as we still are, the significance of Jacob's story is manifestly for us and for our children.

Defy the Foul Fiend has already been cited as an entirely welcome second emissary, leading the novel back to its eighteenth-century origins. There is something so distasteful to the mind in the

fleshy wallowings of the truant soul that it is occasionally constrained to come to its own rescue and leave the soul to its fate. Once it can take a holiday from its mission of delivering the soul from physical entanglements, the mind's concern is with its own brilliancy. By various delicious expedients Mr. Collier is able to initiate the guileless Willoughby into diverse contrasted experiences of the world. The whole texture of the book is worked brilliantly with that kind of wit which preserves the integrity of the mind from emotional implications.

In *The Captain Hates the Sea* Mr. Wallace Smith uses an engaging air of farce to prevent tragedy from becoming poignant. The tragedy is there, and gallantly carried off by its isolated victim who joins the ship for so short a time in mid-voyage. But the interest is in how the coming and tragic going of a single downright personality can exhibit the entire company in its true colours. The whole thing is enormous fun and brilliantly sustained. And the realities are solid behind it.

News from Havre holds the life of an embarrassed French family in prolonged suspense, so that their characters and those of their neighbours can be studied in leisurely retrospect. They are not racked with anxiety, but live expectantly from hand to mouth, and all is seen after a sufficient lapse of time to rob it of its urgency. The legacy will come. Meanwhile it is a question of ways and means. M. Georges Duhamel's indulgent irony displays his characters in a queerly lovable light and gives us a very fine book indeed.

Holy Deadlock has none of that intensity which burned in *The Secret Battle*. It is an entirely competent and businesslike exposition of how difficult and grimy the process of divorce can be for decent people. Everyone should read it,

quite apart from the fact that it is extremely good reading. It is an admirable illustration of the muddle in which human relations can become involved for those who demand too much of them. Mr. Herbert's assumptions are highly compromising to the second emissary. In his world the fundamentally decent have a kind of natural goodness, if you do not try them too high, and that is all the goodness there is. The function of human institutions is, therefore, to accommodate themselves to such. Circumventing knaves is another matter. The institutional spirit reassures the soul.

Dark Interval, too, is everybody's book. It should be said at once that Miss Cornwall spares us the dark terrors of the complete downfall of the mind, as well as the more concrete horrors of the institutional treatment of the insane. Her problem is how such treatment appears to returning sanity. Perhaps not unnaturally, it appears, with all its knowledge, so devoid of comprehension. Where, after all, is the stable mind with sufficient knowledge, sufficient imagination, sufficient courage and sufficient charity to identify itself completely with the instable and discern its needs from within? Meanwhile Miss Cornwall has given us an interesting study of sanity's hardened consciousness of itself in the presence of its opposite, and a book with a queer beauty and even gaiety of its own, emphatically worth reading.

But there is a broader traditional human sanity which consists in a sense of responsibility to the future and the world, the sanity, not of individuals, but of societies. The remaining twelve books might all be considered as studies in social irresponsibility. Mr. Graves has well caught the feeling of anxious relief with which the Emperor Claudius must have reviewed the principates of his predecessors. A donnish and detached mind at the

mercy of the Roman nightmare of irresponsible power, suspicion, and intrigue might well have thus reassured itself that times were changed and there was nothing more to fear, by examining the past as if it were a cross between a matter of history and a half-comic half-frightening dream.

In *The Deacon* the central figure wields an irresponsible power over the small Welsh circle which he dominates, until he is forced to realise that his zeal for righteousness is no more than thirst for power. Mr. Llewellyn reproduces in all its ugly intensity the inward struggle and the outward ruin.

Our special modern irresponsibility lies in having lost control of our destiny. *Rhondda Roundabout* presents a fine series of pictures of the Rhondda during the depression. Life does not go all to pieces; it goes on—its politics, worship, singing, dancing, gambling. And in the background are the pits, idle or greedy of human life. Here it is simply courage that keeps the spectre at bay. Mr. Jones does not intensify the agony. He does not even stress the courage. But it is there. Mr. Waugh's longish book, *The Balliols*, traces in the fortunes of a single family some of the paths conducting to our present condition—the good times, the suffrage movement, the war, the boom, the slump. It is a study in parallel deteriorations, personal and public: institutions breaking up, an old business in difficulties, the soldier going to pieces after the war, and the fine flowering of the movement towards women's freedom in a charming, irresponsible idiot of a girl gravely wondering whether to break up another woman's married life or not. Mr. Waugh recounts the story from the point of view of an onlooker not deeply involved, pondering the significance of it all. In *Under Proof*, Miss Cannan is on a similar track. She throws the standards of present-day England

into contrast with those of the Boer War period by jumping the intervening years. Apparently the trying-anything-once young woman's point of view is that there is something to be said for Victorian standards after all, because when you get into exciting 'jams' with dagoes decent men will fish you out and even marry you. It cramps your style so, if young men want to be irresponsible idiots too.

Strip Jack Naked explores a kindred problem under a different guise. The dashing elder brother is killed before he can marry the girl who is going to bear his child. The steady, shy young brother comes to the rescue and marries her himself. The difficulty is to create exactly such characters as will make this credible, which Mr. Hampson very convincingly does.

Miss Thompson's *Breakfast in Bed* is an oddly feline book, purring and rubbing itself, with an occasional scratch, against the furnishings of life. Elegance is examined from the point of view of those who enjoy it, of their servants and, by contrast, of the struggling poor. There is a due allowance of sentiment as well as the apparently inevitable concern with the reactions of young women who omit the preliminary of marriage.

Swallows is a lighter book than Mr. Llewellyn's. Miss Montgomery's Rector is a self-deceiver, but an irresponsible noodle, by no means a powerful personality such as the Deacon. The straits to which he brings his family are well contrived, the descriptions are telling, and the characters seen with an admirable irony which keeps the book clear of pathos. But they are mostly, in varying degrees, eccentrics. There is no arguing from them to their species. Eccentricity of another sort pervades *Falling Star*. *Grand Hotel* depended upon an admirable concentration not here present. But Hollywood itself is an eccentricity. It is difficult to

know what is credible concerning it and what is not. But the author creates, for the time being, a credible world significant to itself in which the temperaments of film stars are of vital moment and the advisabilities and difficulties of getting oneself seduced acquire a kind of interest, even if one is not a star of any discernible magnitude. It is a bewildering business.

Miss Evans writes with really remarkable power. The appropriate sexualities and sadisms and drunkennesses and frustrations of a small and perhaps, even at this date, abnormal world are all exemplified in characters of indisputable flesh and blood. Now and then the second emissary gives a faint wriggle. The soul has not yet quite shaken him off, even in *Turf or Stone*. In spite of Miss Hurst's oppressive preoccupation with the physical aspects of flesh and the visceral aspects of feminine awareness, *Anitra's Dance* is interesting. The absorbing question of how young women are to dispose of their virginity to the best advantage continues to bulk large. But, quite apart from that, the effect of this vivid character upon the diverse personages who surround her is interestingly handled.

Mr. Golding follows the fortunes of the daughters of a Jewish family through wealth and poverty, in and out of marriage, hither and thither about the continent of Europe, and safely home to the kitchen in Oleander Street where the anarchists no longer drink Mrs. Silver's tea-and-lemon. What these fortunes are, Mr. Golding convincingly reveals to readers who can survive sentences such as the following:

But she would pay for it for days and days after, so twisted she would be with aches and pains, and her hair falling all over the place, and not able to keep her food down properly, it was sometimes so bad as that.

GERALD CROW.

MUSIC AND MUSICIANS

Rossini. By Lord Derwent. Duckworth.—15s. net.

Rossini. By Francis Toye. Heinemann.—10s. 6d. net.

Liszt. By Sacheverell Sitwell. Faber and Faber.—15s. net.

THE first thing the English musician will look for in any study of Rossini is a satisfactory explanation of that 'great renunciation' which made so early an end of his career. Lord Derwent's interpretation is a sensible one; and there now seems little reason to doubt that good sense, a share of good fortune, and bad health were the chief factors in the composer's decision. Of himself the composer said that he had facility and a great deal of instinct, and, after reading this study, one is led to believe that he was intent upon investing these gifts so that he might lead an agreeable life. It is a reasonable view. Intelligence, a lively personality, and a love of society were qualities with which he could have made a success in another calling; 'but,' writes Lord Derwent, 'the gods, with the alarming inconsistency of which they are sometimes capable, had given him the gift of writing music, and as what he really desired was *Life*, not *Art*, music was pressed into service to achieve that end.' There is this, too, to consider; a year after his return to Bologna he was separated from the extravagant La Colbran, and his new companion, Olympe Pelissier, vulgar and tiresome as she was, also was economical and a good nurse. With these facts in mind it is no longer possible to make a picture of Rossini's retirement as being something in the nature of an heroic sacrifice. It was just an instance of Italian common-sense.

Lord Derwent has no hesitation in admitting that Stendhal's

Rachmaninoff's Recollections. Allen and Unwin.—10s. 6d. net.

Music Ho! By Constant Lambert. Faber and Faber.—10s. 6d. net.

Practical Musical Criticism. By Oscar Thompson. M. Witmark & Sons, New York.—\$2.

enthusiasm has been a continuous influence in his own book. He even condones the inaccuracies in Stendhal's writings, and confesses that, as for him, they are all expiated by one ounce of the vitality which is to be found in the merest of his foot-notes. It is true that he inclines to verbosity in describing the music's effect, forgetting that the experience of music calls for precision rather than profusion if even the faintest echo of it is to be conveyed. But his method is preferable to Mr. Toye's, which too readily falls into *clichés* and vain repetitions. Apparently, the highest praise that this author can bestow upon the best episodes of Rossini's work is expressed in the word 'agreeable,' the most indefinite and colourless of all epithets. 'In short, the *Stabat Mater*, if uneven, is a very characteristic and agreeable work.' Such a sentence has the appearance of a short cut only too thankfully taken. Whatever may be thought of the good qualities of the splendid *Inflammatus* or the *Eja, Mater*, 'agreeable' is hardly the appropriate summary. Mr. Toye is an enthusiast; that is clear. But from a critic we have the right to expect something more qualified, less bald than this, relating to the second act of *William Tell*: 'It is, with the possible exception of two choruses a masterpiece from beginning to end. Nobody, not even Wagner or Verdi, has written anything more effective for the stage.' And is not the cart before the horse in the succeeding sentence? 'Indeed both those great masters owe much to this magnificent music; witness

the Verdian vigour and the Wagnerian contours of Tell's address.' The debt of Verdi and Wagner to Rossini would have been more convincingly shown had we been given instances of Rossini's style, however modified, in the others' compositions. If the vigour which Mr. Toye has in mind were truly Verdian and the contours truly Wagnerian, it is not likely that they would be found in *William Tell*.

Without being in any sense a perfect study—it could have been pruned with advantage—Lord Derwent's is more evocative, therefore more readable, than Mr. Toye's. Lord Derwent is learned in the period, but the learning is lightly and brilliantly worn. One of his best chapters is the first, where he describes the transition from the classic period—'the period of music for music's sake,'—to that of Romanticism. Here he skilfully summarises the characteristics of Italian composers of the eighteenth century, the pioneers and the schoolmen, the leaders and the nonentities, the famous and the obscure. He calls attention to the spreading influence of the Italian style through musicians travelling in England, Spain, Denmark, Russia; and takes into account the Italo-German rivalry in the musical life of France. In so doing he emphasises the importance of that other rivalry between voice and instrument, stage and orchestra, and makes clear that it was Rossini's spirit which helped the latter to gain supremacy. This was not the least of the results of Rossini's admiration for Mozart. Grétry, answering Napoleon's inquiry on one occasion, distinguished between Mozart and Cimarosa by saying that the former built up his statue with the stage as a mere pedestal, whereas the latter made the stage a statue and the orchestra a pedestal. In this and in other matters Rossini declared for

Mozart. Indeed, it passed his understanding, so he confessed in later life, that a people which had produced Mozart could ever forsake him for Wagner. Rossini was fully alive to Wagner's powers; but how well we understand his famous judgment: '*Monsieur Wagner a de beaux moments mais de mauvais quarts d'heures aussi.*'

If the *prima donna's* agency is required to promote a Rossini fashion, the virtuoso pianist or conductor must be pressed into service to make a complete success of a Liszt vogue. Such a vogue is long overdue. In spite of Busoni's great influence, in spite of a marked turning of present-day public taste towards Romanticism, Liszt has never wholly come into his own. If it were possible for an author to start in movement a wave of enthusiasm, then we could be easy on Liszt's account after the publication of such a study as Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell's.

Let the present writer confess that he is always on guard when he is reading a 'literary' author on music; and then let him also confess that he quickly dropped it after reading the first few chapters of this book. There Mr. Sitwell brings his young hero to Paris, describes his meeting with the hard-hearted Cherubini, tells how he became the ninth wonder of that far-off, fantastic world, and shows him becoming enamoured of Madame d'Agoult, and takes care that to the reader she shall appear as a very ordinary woman. Later, when Wagner becomes the dominating figure, Mr. Sitwell's interpretation continues to fascinate even if it is not always convincing. Only by projecting himself as an actor in this florid play could an author set the stage and paint the Romantic scene with so much art. The book carries blemishes which, one would say, are almost part of its nature. The style is so exquisite as sometimes to be irritating, par-

ticularly as regards Mr. Sitwell's passion for commas. To him a comma is a diamond, to be set as carefully and displayed as frequently. His pages are a-glitter with them. Also there are mistakes; to the Carl Rosa must be given the credit of an earlier production of *The Damnation of Faust* than that at Monte Carlo; Cornelius did not write a *Caliph of Bagdad*; Frederick Corder was not knighted; Donizetti's *Lucrezia Borgia* has not 'perished for ever'—I saw it in Florence last year. But these incidents do but make the whole achievement seem more brilliant. In his little study of Mozart Mr. Sitwell confessed himself 'a complete and uninitiated amateur' in music. That may be so. Both his *Mozart* and his *Liszt*, nevertheless, fully justify his entry into the field. Writing so fine and imaginative as this cannot fail to enrich the general body of criticism.

On the other hand, Mr. Lambert's *Music Ho!* can only be regarded as an intoxicant. The value is momentary, exciting the 'body of criticism' for a brief spell, but doing nothing to advance its health and strength. Already some of Mr. Lambert's readers are looking back with the sad realisation that the party's over now. At the outset he disclaims any intention of providing an ordnance map of modern music. His publishers would have blessed him, had he given them this, for they know what a large appreciation-fed public is waiting for such a map to help them on their little outings and excursions. If it is not an ordnance map, *Music Ho!* is the next best thing, being full of quick judgments, facile comparisons, and explosive epigrams. So many sharp shots are there, so many bells do ring, that the reader finds himself in the atmosphere of a shooting-

gallery. At first he is inclined to applaud unthinkingly; only later does he discover that this crack shot is shooting with the right hand and pressing a bell-push with the left. If Mr. Sitwell has a weakness for commas, Mr. Lambert is consumed by a passion for comparisons. Each of his experiences (and they are remarkably dispersed and admirably recorded) immediately sets out to find a mate. *Sacre du Printemps* finds D. H. Lawrence, Schönberg finds James Joyce (three periods, each to each), Debussy rejects Borotra in favour of Baudelaire, and so forth. It is an amusing but unprofitable game.

If a book of the very opposite kind is required, Mr. Oscar Thompson's *Practical Musical Criticism* can be named. For all that the author is American (for six years he has had an excellent reputation as critic of the *New York Evening Post*), no sharp-shooting, no wisecrack is to be found here. The title fully explains the book. Mr. Thompson sets out to explain the music critic's job. He does so thoroughly, relying upon sound sense rather than literary frills. The public for such a book, no doubt, is even smaller than for one on a general subject of music; but that the demand exists at all is symptomatic of this age of radio and diffuse culture.

One book remains in the bag. Oskar von Riesemann has set down in a reverential tone all that Rachmaninoff has told him of his life, and Mrs. Rutherford has translated the narrative for the Composer's numerous English admirers. The capital C indicates the author's attitude, which, after all, is most proper in the case of one who, by nature, belongs to Liszt's world of romantic virtuosity.

BASIL MAINE.

KING WILLOW

The Cream of Cricket. By William Pollock. Methuen.—5s. net.

W. G. Grace. By Bernard Darwin. Duckworth.—2s. net.

The Book of Cricket. By P. F. Warner. Dent.—7s. 6d. net.

Moreover. By Hugh de Selincourt. Howe.—7s. 6d. net.

'*Ranji.*' By Roland Wild. Rich and Cowan.—15s. net.

Books on cricket nowadays seem rather more recurrent than boundaries before lunch in the average County Championship engagement. Many of these works are by great players of the game; but we must not make flippant remarks! We can never be quite sure who has written them. There are certainly no John Nyrens nowadays (if, indeed, John Nyren was his own author); there is not even an A. E. Knight, the professional who years ago played for Leicestershire; he wrote *The Complete Cricketer*, and was the first of the 'moderns'—that is, he was the first man—to risk a flowery passage in praise of a great innings, a great cricketer. Knight's description of Victor Trumper, and A. G. Gardiner's essay on '*Ranji*,' began a school of cricket literature which at the present time has achieved a yellow decadence. In every newspaper we find accounts of Test matches composed red-hot, accounts in which vast armies of adjectives march proudly and recklessly forward to slay the noun, or perish in the attempt. Even those authors who have been drawn from the ranks of our captains of cricket—even these prefer to split an infinitive rather than explain in prosaic detail the processes of an inswinger.

Mr. Pollock's book is refreshing because it is full neither of jargon nor of purple periods. He gives us the ripe conversation of the pavi-

lion; his easeful vein of reminiscence suggests lazy wisps of tobacco smoke. He used to go, as a boy, to the cricket weeks at Hastings. 'I was caught young in the net of cricket worship, and I have never got out of it—and probably never shall.' The 'probably' is superfluous; Mr. Pollock babbles of green fields with the eagerness of a man who is unhappy when he is not on one of them during the summer-time. He tells a W. G. Grace story I have not heard too often—a juicy one:

The first ball of the local fast bowler just took his leg-bail. The Old Man was not in the least put out, however. He just stooped down, said to the square-leg umpire in his high-pitched squeaky voice, 'Windy to-day, isn't it, George?', put the bail back in its place—and went on and made a hundred.

Mr. Pollock has many yarns as good as that.

The full-scale book on 'W. G.' has not yet been written; it was A. C. M. Croome's job, but he was content to talk gorgeously about Grace; he loved his memories too much to make a book of them. Mr. Bernard Darwin's little picture of the Master is an admirable 'outline' of an enormous subject. He wastes not a word, and he puts his man into the Victorian scene. 'W. G.,' like Falstaff, must always be discerned by the imagination against the background of historical circumstance. The difference between the great players of to-day and 'W. G.' is that none of them is absolutely indispensable. 'W. G.' was cricket itself. And to the student of the game who knows the ways and means of cause and effects, 'W. G.' is still cricket itself. He was the fount that made the small brooks to flow! Besides, he wore those symbolical whiskers, and he weighed immense stones, and he never left a Test match with a

strain or a headache or a damaged big toe. Any damage to 'W. G.'s' big toe would have been a small event on the periphery of things. Mr. Darwin's book gives us much in little. And how graciously he writes—true style because it is not aware of its own elegance!

Mr. Warner's *Book of Cricket* is nearly a quarter of a century old; this new and revised edition is proof that somebody does read books on the game after all, though I never catch anybody in the act, and I know of no cricketer who has a library. Mr. Warner's little encyclopædia is the ideal introduction to cricket: here is the boy's plenty; he will learn from a passionate lover of bat and ball the history and the technique; also, he will get a good idea of the artists who have done all the unforgettable deeds. Mr. Warner has, I fancy, altered his account of the greatest game he ever played in—the match between the M.C.C. team in South Africa at Johannesburg in January 1906. I seem to remember that in his first edition of the *Book of Cricket* he declaimed at the point of crisis (where Relf bowled a full toss on the leg-side to Sherwell): 'O Relf! Relf!' The passage is toned down now to

then Relf sent a full-pitch on the leg-side, and Sherwell seized the opportunity and hit it to the boundary.

Mr. Warner in his writings often does less than justice to his own youthful and expressive eloquence. His book is enriched by some of Mr. G. W. Beldam's incomparable action pictures. Photography, like many other things, is supposed to have achieved great advances in recent years. Mr. Beldam was one of the pioneers of the action-portrait; and nobody has gone beyond his work in significant poise and gesture. He put out of date, and rendered obsolete, the old static representations of bowlers caught in eternal attitudes—right hand up, like a strap-hanger.

Mr. de Sélincourt's *Moreover* is a risky experiment; *apropos* of cricket, he talks about himself, uses the game as a theme upon which to play many charming and personal variations. The trouble is that now and again he drops into the English habit of discovering in cricket a code—a way of life. We all know what he means, but it has a heavy sound sometimes.

It is easy to laugh at the 'flannelled fool,' still easier, perhaps, at the 'muddled oaf.' Yet the desire to show himself a man is deeply rooted in human nature, as in bird nature is the gorgeous display of himself in song and plumage of the bird. The play instinct is woven into the fibres of life.

Moral platitudes come frostily into a cricket book.

But Mr. de Sélincourt is delightful when he writes of the village cricket fields of Sussex.

'Ranji' did not wish his biographer to deal with him only or even mainly as a cricketer. Mr. Roland Wild's 'Life' was obviously 'authorised.' It is well and conscientiously done. But cricketers will skip the parts that discuss 'Ranji' talents as Indian statesman or administrator. The most magical of all batsmen did not as student of affairs, depart from the common-sense of the straight bat. His politics were shrewd and amelioristic and not particularly distinguished. But Mr. Wild depicts the character of the man who when he lost an eye while shooting did not make a noise about it. This was the 'Ranji' whose bat o light willow once on a time flicked the terrifying short 'bumpers' of Ernest Jones off his left ear. 'Ranji' brought to our English meadow game the dark, graceful genius of his own land; his lik will never be seen again. He was entirely original—and Nature has broken the mould. He deserves to live for ever in a book written in the prose that Hazlitt used when he wrote about the Indian jugglers.

NEVILLE CARDUS.

SHERLOCK IN BOOKLAND

An Enquiry into the Nature of Certain Nineteenth Century Pamphlets. By John Carter and Graham Pollard. Constable.—15s. net.

THIS is a most sensational book. Indeed, the revelation that it makes is so astounding that the authors may consider that they have demonstrated once again that truth is stranger than fiction. Mr. Carter and Mr. Pollard may look upon themselves as expert bibliographers working carefully and methodically in the remote and restricted book-collector's world, but in reality they are a loss to Scotland Yard and have produced a 'shocker' almost perfect in its technique.

The nineteenth-century pamphlets with which the authors deal are fifty-one in number and comprise the rarest and most desirable possessions of the collector. They are the work of the most famous and unassailable writers, and have naturally commanded high prices wherever they have appeared for sale. Dickens, Thackeray, Tennyson, the two Brownings, Swinburne, Matthew Arnold, George Eliot, Rossetti, Morris, Ruskin, and Stevenson, there is hardly a great name in Victorian literature that is not represented, and in every case by a rare privately-printed pamphlet that becomes a first edition by preceding the published edition. It can readily be understood that large sums of money are involved. Mrs. Browning's *Sonnets from the Portuguese* have fetched over £250 at auction, Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur* £100, and for at least a generation the reputation of these pamphlets has been unquestioned.

Beyond all question Mr. Carter and Mr. Pollard have now proved that thirty out of the fifty-one are certain forgeries, and that the remainder are so suspicious in their origin that only a meticulous con-

science would give a verdict of non-proven. It has always been considered that, unlike other works of art, books could not be faked, and I think it remains true that actually to copy a first edition is an impossible task. Even in this case the forgeries have been ultimately unmasked, and it was only an unusual combination of circumstances that enabled them to be imposed so long upon the world. To begin with the forger had a brilliant idea. He did not fake copies of a rare first edition already printed; he actually created a first edition, so that there was nothing with which it could be compared. Then, fortunately for him and disastrously for collectors, his work actually deceived the experienced eye of a bibliophile whose judgment was universally trusted. It is not surprising that other collectors, who have been accustomed to look upon Mr. Wise as the pattern of the modern book-collectors and to use his elaborate bibliographies as the test of their own collections, should have accepted without question pamphlets vouched for by him and surrounded by him with a mass of apparently conclusive evidence. Up to a point, then, the forger was fortunate, but, like all criminals, he made mistakes.

There will probably be some who will regret this exposure. As the possessor myself of many of these pamphlets, I know how annoying it is to find things so prized yesterday worthless to-day. It is true, of course, that the second edition now becomes the first, but these second editions are not so rare, and financial loss is inevitable. The collector, however, should be careful what he discards. In my opinion, several of these pamphlets are piracies rather than forgeries, and I believe it will be found that Dickens's *To be Read at Dusk*, Kipling's *White Horses*, Ruskin's

Leoni, Stevenson's *Story of a Lie*, Swinburne's *Dead Love and Cleopatra*, and Thackeray's *Interesting Event* still remain first editions. On the whole, I consider that collectors should welcome this disastrous event, however catastrophic may be its immediate effect upon the market. The whole essence of a first edition is the value of its text to the student, and we must be sure that the text is genuine. To be sure of this we must eliminate the forger, and this case has the merit that it makes it quite clear that even with all the advantages in his favour the forger cannot escape the eye of the expert.

And what eyes these experts have! Starting with no more to go upon than a rumour, they build up their case by deduction and then proceed to reconstruct the crime. They begin with the *Sonnets from the Portuguese*, and note that no copy is recorded with presentation inscriptions from the author or her husband, that no copy is in a contemporary binding, and that the book is never referred to in contemporary correspondence. They then proceed to the examination of the paper, and discover under the microscope that ten pamphlets supposed to have been printed before 1860 contain esparto grass, which was not used before 1861, and that twelve pamphlets supposed to have been printed before 1874 contain chemical wood, which was not used until after 1874. They then turn to the type, and discover that sixteen pamphlets, five of them new ones, supposed to have been printed before 1874 are printed in a kernless type not used before 1880, and that all sixteen, and, indeed, probably all the fifty-one, are printed by the same printer. They then apply the test of collation, and discover that five of the pamphlets are printed from a later text. No clue, however obscure, has been overlooked. Printers whose imprint is on the

pamphlets have been searched for and found never to have existed. Auction records have been examined, and it has been found that not a single one of the suspected pamphlets has an author's presentation inscription or a contemporary date of acquisition, none of them are in contemporary bindings, and most of them are not excessively rare. The chain of evidence is completed by the ominous fact that no copy of any of the fifty-one pamphlets appeared anywhere, either in a museum library or in an auction sale or in a bibliography, before 1888.

The authors of this book and the victims of this accomplished deception are, of course, intent on the discovery of the forger. But no one can be so eager to trace him as Mr. Wise, who has unwittingly played so large a part in the distribution of the forged pamphlets. He presented twenty-three of them to the British Museum and fifteen to the Cambridge University Library. Mr. Wise was the cashier, manager, and later proprietor, of the firm of Herman Rubeck. Mr. Schlengemann, an employee of that firm, sold the first two forgeries to the British Museum in 1888. Mr. Otto Rubeck sold four more to the British Museum in 1890. Mr. Gorfin joined the Rubeck firm in 1892, and from 1898 acted as Mr. Wise's agent for the sale of these pamphlets. Of the fifty-one suspected pamphlets Mr. Gorfin purchased thirty-four in various amounts from Mr. Wise and sold sixteen on commission for Mr. Wise. It was natural, therefore, that the investigators, having reached this point, should ask Mr. Wise to enable them to go the one necessary step further back and provide them with the name of the man from whom all these copies were derived. In everybody's interest it is essential that the question should be answered at the earliest possible moment.

ESHER.

PILGRIM'S PROGRESS

Walks and Talks: The Diary of a Member of Parliament in 1933-4. By Sir Arnold Wilson. Oxford University Press.—5s. net.

THE author of an extraordinarily happy idea which he has incorporated in this book compares his journeys among the people of his constituency to Cobbett's rural amblings on his nag, except that *he* goes on foot. But Sir Arnold's idea was so superlatively good that, like many other good ideas, it possesses a long traditional ancestry. It was the method of the Founder of Christian ethics to gird the loins and go forth among the common people of Galilee. It was the practice of the Jesuit Fathers among the Indians, of many a mediæval friar, Buddhist itinerant, Chinese sage and Dissenting preacher. The attraction of Bunyan's great epic that age cannot wither nor custom stale is not in its doctrinal opinions, but because it relates the journey of a human soul among all sorts and conditions of men who are not the less men from being labelled as allegorical figures. Sir Arnold has set forth upon the same grand old highway that the ancients trod, and we follow his adventures and discoveries among the divers types and classes and circumstances of men with something of the same attention we have given to the masterpieces of old. It is true that the philosophy that accompanies his mission is expressed as the rather conventional credo of a normal Conservative member of Parliament. But no reader, whatever his political faith, need concern himself much with Sir Arnold's party allegiance. The absorbing interest of his book is, with all respect to him, not what he has to say, but what other people have to say to him. What we have to admire in

the author are the brilliance of his idea, the fidelity with which he pursued it, the catholicity of his attitude, the generous democratic warmth and sympathy which he brings to the problems, the anxieties, the hardships and injustices of so many different kinds and conditions of men.

If Sir Arnold had not so much as mentioned his political professions, it would in no way have affected the colour, the quality and the drama of his book. Our impression of him is conveyed in such sentences as these: 'The chief ends of education are the development of the diversity latent in human beings and the encouragement of socially valuable trends and tendencies in individuals'; 'A society based on freedom is fundamentally more healthy than one which has surrendered the freedom of its citizens to think and act on their own responsibility.' I like, too, the unexpected snatches of quotation from the Psalms, from Milton, Goldsmith, Dr. Johnson, Piers Plowman and other men or books, simply because they and the sentences I have cited reveal that Sir Arnold was well and truly qualified for the task whose results are embodied in his book—the task of lending a sympathetic ear to the frustrated and often semi-articulate grievances, social maladjustments, economic hardships and remedial ideas that not merely remain unvoiced by way of the ordinary machinery of government but even unknown. While I was reading Sir Arnold's experiences it struck me very forcibly that if this variety of view, these concrete and particular manifestations of a just discontent, possessed the due channels for self-expression, the burdens of our time would be sensibly lessened. The divisions between classes are not so pervasive as they used to be. But the division between an official

bureaucracy and the people, the actual living beings whom it exists to serve, remains a gulf that seems impassable, yet Sir Arnold, to his honour and in his own person, has bridged it.

The material gathered by the author during the course of such patient walks and multitudinous talks—nearly all conducted within the bounds of his constituency in 'happy homely Hertfordshire'—is so diverse that it is impossible to give more than a fragmentary impression of them here. A large number of them bear no relation to the orthodox subject-matter of high politics, and are none the worse for that. Many of the casual conversations refreshingly ventilated on highway and byway group themselves, for instance, round the starvation and deterioration of the old rural communities. This starvation is a moral and social rather than a physical one, for the towns have not only drawn off the most energetic of the young countrymen, but infected the countryside with their vulgarities rather than elevated it with their culture. As Sir Arnold tells us, there are 120,000 fewer men on the land than there were in 1921. He had many meetings with the habitués of country 'pubs,' which a wise parson in one neighbourhood told him was a school of manners, and of discussions in the art of conversing. I can endorse that from my own experience, and also the disastrous effect upon village life of the Hadow Report, an effect of which Sir Arnold gives many examples. The decline or elimination of the village school is a setback both to education and the vitality of the local community. Sir Arnold also supplies much documentary evidence in the best form it can be obtained—namely,

from the mouths of the people most deeply concerned—of the evil of withholding information about contraceptives from the poorer classes, and this applies even more pertinently to small country places than it does to town slums, where there is less ignorance and prejudice. Few who have not actually lived in a village are aware of the conditions of bad housing in incredible numbers of country cottages, picturesque enough in their externals, and of what life is like for a large family that lives in one of them.

But these topics and the vital need for the restoration of agriculture are only a handful of the total subjects discussed, subjects which constantly throw flickers of light upon the personalities who discuss them. We have an illuminating comparison between the casual ward, where the victims of misfortune are so often treated as ticket-of-leave men, and homes for mental deficient, where the inmates are well fed, well housed, well attended and provided with many little comforts and amenities. There are talks about the murderous toll of the roads, and it is interesting that the views stored up by the author from this man and that man were unanimous that the real remedy was to limit the speed of motor cars by law. There is, again, a story given by a Borstal vagrant which epitomises the unmerited, ironical misfortunes by means of which the social mechanism forces a man into the dust. Sir Arnold's comment has an oddly traditional ring, and is somehow exactly right for the particular rôle he plays in this book: 'I walked on for several hours reflecting on what I had seen and heard during the day.'

H. J. MASSINGHAM.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCI—SEPTEMBER 1934

CIVILISATION AND LIBERTY

THERE are some judgments about our time which we can be pretty certain a future historian will make, because they are so big and clear that even we, for whom the wood is so much concealed by the trees, cannot miss them. He will say that in our days, for the first time in human history, all the races and peoples of mankind were brought within a single political and a single economic system. He will observe that the Great War demonstrated the political interdependence of all peoples, and that the world-wide depression which followed the war demonstrated their economic interdependence. He will note that although, in earlier ages, the conflicts and distresses of one part of the world had no traceable influence upon other parts of the world,—although the dynastic revolutions of China produced no effects in Europe, and the fall of the Roman Empire was almost unfelt in India, and the incessant turmoils of African or American tribes might have taken place in another planet for all the influence they exercised in Europe or Asia—in the twentieth century it had come about that nothing of importance could happen in any part of the world without affecting every other part. Again, our

future historian will certainly observe that, after æons of struggle against the forces of Nature, mankind had in our time, and with remarkable rapidity, obtained such a mastery over the resources of his planet, and had, through scientific discovery, swift communications and flexible methods of finance, made the products of the whole earth so readily available for the use of all its peoples, that there was no longer any reason (other than human folly or incapacity) why the mass of mankind should suffer from the poverty and the drudgery which have been their lot since time began.

These two achievements—the bringing of the whole human race within a single political and economic system, and the conquest of the earth's resources so as to make universally diffused well-being attainable—are of so dazzling a character that they ought to mark our time as one of the noblest moments in the history of humanity, and the opening of a new era. Of course these great results have not been suddenly or miraculously achieved. Our historian will certainly record that both of them were the outcomes of the progress of Western civilisation during the last four centuries—since the time when, in the sixteenth century, the European peoples began to extend their power, their traffic, and the influence of their ideas and methods, into the non-European world. This process was slow at first, but it gathered momentum until, in the last two generations, it has proceeded with a dizzy acceleration. But to our historian, looking back from a thousand years hence upon the long vista of the generations, these four centuries will seem a very brief stage in the progress of mankind. They are no longer than the history of Britain from the coming of Julius Cæsar to the withdrawal of the last Roman legions. They are no longer than a single Egyptian or Chinese dynasty.

It is probable that the future historian will treat these four momentous centuries as no more than a preamble to the age which is beginning now. Whether he does so or not will depend upon what he has to say about the next generation or two. Perhaps he will have to record that, after achieving so much, and opening out for humanity so glorious a prospect, Western civilisation committed suicide; that it shirked the responsibility of its own achievement; that it turned its back upon the methods and principles which had brought it so far; that it refused to accept the fact of interdependence; that it would not allow the world's abundance, now available, to reach the peoples who needed and wanted it; that it failed to obtain from its statesmen the leadership which was requisite if so great an opportunity was to be used; that it allowed itself to be ruined by the internecine conflicts of short-sighted nations, all striving after an

unattainable self-sufficiency; that it used the mastery of the forces of Nature which it had won for the purposes of destruction rather than of progress, and so plunged humanity back, possibly into barbarism. If this is the story he will have to tell, his narrative will trace a blind development that led to a dead end, and he will be chiefly concerned to exhibit the weaknesses of our civilisation which caused this failure. But it may be that he will have a different story to tell. He may record that, taught by the sufferings of the Great War and of the Great Depression, the peoples of the West, after some wavering, learnt in time how to avoid disaster, and led humanity into a great era of world-peace and of growing well-being. In that case, he will treat the history of the four centuries as the preamble to the Great Age; and his attention will be fixed upon the virtues of our civilisation, which enabled it to achieve so great a triumph. In either case, these four centuries of Western civilisation will certainly appear to him to have been among the most significant eras in human history. It is worth while to ask what aspects of the four centuries are likely to seem to him most remarkable, as having shaped the course of events whereby the conditions of to-day were produced.

Four hundred years ago, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, there existed on the face of the globe four highly developed civilisations—the Chinese, the Indian, the Islamic and the European. Though there had been contacts between them, in their inner spirit they were deeply differentiated; they had developed quite independently, and each of them had during long centuries lived 'to itself alone.' Had there existed in 1500 anyone who had a real knowledge of all four, it would have been impossible for him to assert that the European civilisation was in any obvious way superior to the others. Neither in population nor in power, neither in scientific knowledge nor inventive skill, neither in the fine arts nor in the industrial arts, neither in philosophic depth nor in poetic imagination, could any inherent superiority be claimed for the Europe of 1500 over its rivals.

For nearly a thousand years Europe had carried on a struggle with its nearest neighbour, Islam, and had not got the better of it. The Crusades were an episode in this age-long conflict; they had ended in the defeat of Europe, and been followed by the Islamic conquest of Constantinople, one of the main centres of European culture. As late as the third decade of the sixteenth century, Islam had advanced into the very heart of Europe, and had with difficulty been beaten back from the walls of Vienna, the seat of government of Europe's premier power (1529). So far was the civilisation of Europe from establishing its superiority over the rival civilisations.

Yet within four centuries from this date the European civilisation had not merely established its superiority, it had won the domination of the world. It had explored, conquered, exploited and peopled vast regions in Africa, America, and Australasia that were unknown in 1500. It had disclosed to mankind the character, resources and limits of the planet which is his home. It had imposed its methods and ideas, and to a large extent its political authority, upon the other civilisations so completely that, even when they began to revolt against its ascendancy, what the other peoples of the earth demanded was that they should enjoy in independence the methods of organisation which Europe had wrought out; and if they strove after economic freedom, it was freedom to develop within their own realms the industrial and commercial methods they had learnt from Europe. The civilisation of Europe had, in effect, become the civilisation of the world.

What was the explanation of this astonishing achievement? Some may say that it was the superiority of Europe in the material aspects of civilisation, and its fertility in invention, beginning with gunpowder and the mariner's compass, and going on with all the mechanical inventions that have distinguished the modern age. But China knew of gunpowder and the mariner's compass long before Europe: why did she not advance beyond these beginnings? Others may say that it was the ingenious and flexible methods of European finance, whereby the innumerable rivulets of private thrift were canalised and made available for gigantic undertakings such as the conquest of India by the East India Company. Yet others may say that it was the more efficient methods of political organisation, the more powerful loyalty and the firmer discipline, which the nations of Europe were enabled to secure by the development among them of the national type of State. All these factors contributed to the great result: they may be described as the principal instruments of the conquest. But how did it come about that Europe, after so many centuries of comparative stagnation, was able to utilise these factors, while the other civilisations remained in stagnation? Why was there such an outburst of inventive, creative and exploratory energy in the Europe of the sixteenth and following centuries?

If our historian is a man who looks below the surface of things *rerum cognoscere causas*, he will perceive that there must have been a spiritual cause for this remarkable forward movement. And he will find it in the powerful and many-sided striving after the emancipation of the human spirit, which was at work in Europe in many forms during these centuries, and which led to a progressive release of the immeasurable potency of individual capacity and energy. The best name for this

movement as a whole is Liberalism; though the name itself did not come into use until the nineteenth century, and the philosophy which it expresses only began to be formulated in the eighteenth, or, at the earliest, the seventeenth. It was this movement of emancipation, and the spirit that inspired it, which formed the creative force in Western civilisation, and drove it forward to the mastery and the unification of the world.

It had two root-principles, which may be described as the vital principles of Western civilisation. They had been obscured and devitalised during long centuries; but they came alive again, and began to work like yeast, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One was the Greek veneration for the power of human reason, the Greek resolve to pursue the truth whithersoever it might lead, the Greek refusal to be bound by tradition and custom, the Greek readiness to make bold experiments in adjusting law to the demands of reason, and in reshaping society so as to make the good life possible. This Greek inspiration came alive again in the Renaissance. The other, and yet more vital, root of the movement of emancipation was the revolutionary teaching of Jesus of Nazareth that in the sight of God all men are of equal value: Jew or Greek, bond or free, they are all alike sons of God, and may equally be the vehicles of His inspiration, and His fellow-workers in the unending struggle for rightness. This conception, however much defiled or obscured, obtained a new life in the searching discussions that accompanied the Reformation.

The Renaissance and the Reformation opened the great age of European history, because they gave a new force, a sharper edge, to the most vital principles of Western civilisation. In proportion as their significance was realised, the Greek principle of the sovereignty of reason, and the Christian principle of the equal value of all human personalities, when brought into conjunction, challenged men to pursue a new conception of human society, in which it would be based upon liberty rather than authority, upon reason rather than custom, upon argument rather than force, upon the Golden Rule rather than the *lex talionis*. The Liberal idea was born. And in face of many obstacles and many setbacks, Western civilisation, for the most part almost unconscious of the course it was pursuing, has in the main been guided by this ideal throughout the four centuries we are considering.

In proportion as it has succeeded in any country, this movement of emancipation has released the energy, the vitality, the originality of its people; and the nations which have played the greatest part in the achievements of the modern age have been the nations which have given to it the freest play. Where

it has been shackled lest it should endanger the authority of Government—as for a long time in Spain—the result has been stagnation, followed usually by disordered violence. It has been a creative force as powerful, and sometimes as disruptive, as the scientists tell us we may get through the break-up of the atom. It has led to great abuses, by giving too often to the strong the opportunity of exploiting the weak; but, on the other hand, it has caused that quickening of the social conscience which distinguishes our age from all earlier ages, and impels us to find remedies for these abuses so that the liberty of the weak may be as secure and as real as that of the strong. It has brought into the world, not peace, but a sword, and most of the conflicts of the modern age can be traced to its yeast working. But, on the other hand, it has given birth, after all these struggles, to the conception of a world in which peace shall reign, because discussion and agreement can and must be substituted for dictation and force in the settlement of human differences. This Liberal ideal which has been working in the modern world, and has brought us to where we stand, has been no anæmic or sentimental ideal; it has been a tremendous explosive force, which has reshaped, and is still reshaping, the conditions of human life.

The movement of emancipation has striven after several different forms of liberty, which have been attained in varying degrees in various countries. None of them has been secure until it has been placed under the guardianship of law. For liberty is dependent upon law; it is not only precarious, it is unreal, until it is both protected and regulated by law, upheld by the common will. This is as true of the freedom of nations as of the freedom of individuals: until the freedom of nations is placed under the guardianship and control of a law enforced by the common will, national freedom spells international anarchy, and must itself be perpetually insecure and fearful.

The first of the liberties after which men have striven has been freedom of the person. This involves the abolition of slavery, which has existed, and has seemed to be part of the order of Nature, throughout human history. At the opening of the modern age serfdom, if not actual slavery, existed everywhere in Europe, and indeed everywhere in the world, except in England, where it had finally disappeared in the previous century. In Western Europe it did not disappear until the French Revolution; in Eastern Europe it survived far into the nineteenth century.

While Europe was making slow progress towards personal liberty, slavery in its most repulsive form was introduced through the development of the negro slave trade, which was actively carried on throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was a profitable iniquity, and no country made

greater profit out of it than Britain. Yet it was Britain that took the lead in destroying it, first by the abolition of the lucrative slave trade in 1807, then by purchasing the freedom of every slave in the British Empire in 1834. This was one of the first victories of organised Liberalism in England—a noble act, of which we have just celebrated the centenary. It was not until a generation later that slavery came to an end in the United States, and not until 1884, at the Congress of Berlin, that the civilised countries agreed to abolish it in all lands under their influence. Now, with the triumph of Western civilisation, this ancient abomination, which mankind has tolerated throughout the course of its history, has almost been banished from the face of the earth, save in a few remote and backward districts.

But freedom of the person implies more than the abolition of slavery. It implies security for every man against the possibility of arrest, imprisonment or personal violence otherwise than by process of law. In other words, it implies the sovereignty of law. Thanks to the traditions of Rome, respect for law has always been stronger in Europe than in other regions of the earth. But so long as slavery or serfdom existed, their victims were largely at the mercy of their masters; and wherever despotism has existed, personal liberty has always been liable to arbitrary invasion. Before the nineteenth century this vital liberty cannot be said to have been secured for all citizens in any countries save England and perhaps Holland and Switzerland; and even in England it was not really secure so long as the press-gang continued to be used for the recruitment of the Navy. But during the nineteenth century—the great century of Liberalism—it was established throughout Europe (outside Russia and Turkey) and in all the Western lands. Personal liberty under the protection of law had come to be regarded as an essential mark of a civilised State. To-day it has been destroyed in countries that claim to be civilised.

The second and yet greater freedom that the Western world has won is freedom of the mind: freedom for all men, not only to think and believe, but to speak and publish, what seems to them true; freedom to persuade their fellows to accept their beliefs; freedom to co-operate with others to make their beliefs prevail, which is freedom of association; and all this under the regulation of law, to ensure that this freedom is not used in such a way as to impair the corresponding rights of others. It was in the sphere of scientific investigation that this freedom was first and most widely secured: by the middle of the seventeenth century the risk that the man of science might have to endure the trials of a Galileo had disappeared in every civilised country, and even despotic rulers were establishing academies of royal

societies for the discovery and diffusion of knowledge. To this freedom Europe owed the progress of science, which has been due to the co-operative work of men of many countries, and which has given to the Western peoples their increased control of the forces of Nature. In the fields of politics and religion, the struggle for freedom of discussion has been a slow and painful process. It was won earlier and more fully in Holland and in England than in other countries; yet even in England it was not securely established until the end of the seventeenth century, and not fully enjoyed until the coming of the Liberal *régime* in the nineteenth. Then England became a place of refuge for those who were forbidden to think and speak freely in their own countries, and our fathers learnt, what we are beginning to unlearn, that the best way to deal with 'dangerous' opinions is to allow them to be openly discussed, and not to drive them underground, where their pent-up gases may generate explosions. Over the greater part of Europe real freedom of thought, speech, publication and association were not fully won until the second half of the nineteenth century. But on the eve of the war these freedoms seemed to have become, by universal assent, one of the essential marks of a civilised State. Who can measure the extent to which the progress of our civilisation has been due to freedom of thought and discussion?

The third freedom which the Western world pursued was freedom of enterprise: freedom for every man to make the most of his powers and his opportunities. When the modern age opened this freedom was denied or restricted by the existence of caste barriers, of rigid customs, of established monopolies, of trading prohibitions imposed by craft guilds and other such organisations, and of unintelligent governmental controls. In England these restrictions upon free enterprise were already being modified in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and the progressive removal of them during the following centuries was one of the main reasons why England led the world in the material developments of the modern age. In the nineteenth century these old restrictions and inhibitions came to an end in all the more progressive countries. The result was an extraordinary outburst of energy and enterprise, the opening out of innumerable new fields of activity, the eager utilisation of the discoveries of science, and the ransacking of the world's resources. Beyond a doubt the amazing variety and richness of life in the modern world has been primarily due to the inexhaustible fertility and inventiveness of free enterprise, using the gifts of science. Beyond a doubt, this has been the cause of the rapid rise in the standards of life which has, in this country, brought about a fourfold increase in the average income of the mass of working-folk, besides

adding inconceivably to the variety of the enjoyments open to them.

But it soon became apparent that freedom of enterprise, like other freedoms, needs to be brought under the regulation of law. Unchecked and unregulated, it placed the weak at the mercy of the strong, and denied to all but the fortunate any real opportunity of making the most of their own powers. Monopoly of a new type, restricting and inhibiting freedom of enterprise, was seen to result from unregulated freedom. It became obvious that law and the power of the State must be used, in the economic as in other spheres, to prevent abuses of power, and to make liberty real for all, and not merely for the strong, the daring, the unscrupulous or the fortunate. From the very beginning of the *régime* of organised Liberalism there was therefore an unbroken succession of measures devised for this end—Factory Acts, Mines Acts, Truck Acts, Company Acts, Education Acts, Public Health Acts, Employers' Liability Acts, and the like. The problem was, and is, no easy one: how to preserve the driving force of free enterprise while guarding against its dangers and defects. One school of thought, blinded by these visible defects to the astonishing progress that free enterprise has made possible, has persuaded itself that free enterprise in itself is an evil thing, and must be destroyed. This is a counsel of despair; to accept it would be to sentence us to a slowing down, perhaps to a cessation, of the progress which has brought us so far. What has to be fought against is, not the existence of economic freedom among the few, but the denial of economic freedom to the many; and this is to be achieved, not by the creation of new monopolies wielded by the few who act in the name of the State, but by the regulation of monopolies so that they may not become tyrannies. The monopoly of opportunity in any sphere, whether by a class or a vested interest or a powerful trading organisation, always tends to be tyrannical and to repress free enterprise. It is the duty of the State to ensure that these dangers are averted. They can be averted by wise legislation. But the most dangerous form of monopoly arises when the State, which ought to be the watchdog and guardian of freedom, identifies itself with the creation and maintenance of a monopoly power. Free enterprise is still, and must always be, the mainspring of progress. But it must be free enterprise under the regulation of law, because it is only under this regulation that abuses and injustices can be avoided, and that all men, and not merely a favoured few, can be free to use their powers to the best advantage. In no field is it more true than in this that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

The fourth freedom towards which we have seemed to be

moving is freedom of intercourse—the maximum possible freedom of movement over the face of the earth for ideas, for men, for goods and for capital. Governments have commonly regarded this freedom with suspicion, and have striven to restrict it. But rapid transport and communications have made its growth inevitable, and intercourse between all the peoples of the earth has become progressively closer during the modern age. Indeed, the countries of the West insisted upon breaking down by force the barriers to intercourse that were raised by such ancient and self-complacent societies as China and Japan. Through growing freedom of intercourse, the world's empty lands have been peopled and their resources developed for the service of all peoples: unless these lands had been irrigated by the immigration of men of enterprise, and by the free flow of capital from the developed countries, the world of to-day could not have come into being. The free movement of ideas and of goods from land to land has turned the intellectual and material wealth of the whole world into the common inheritance of all its peoples. Until yesterday, a growing freedom of intercourse, both in the traffic of goods and in the nobler traffic of ideas, seemed to be the best hope for the future of humanity, and one of the greatest achievements of Western civilisation.

Finally, the Western world has seemed to be moving steadily towards political liberty. This is the crown of the whole structure of freedom, and indeed its keystone, for upon this the security of the whole arch depends. Political liberty means not only the sharing of all citizens in the determination of their own destinies; it means the substitution of discussion for dictation, and of reason for force, in the direction of human affairs. We have seen this great conception, which had never previously been realised on any larger scale than that of the city State, brought into operation in the internal concerns of great nations, first among the English-speaking peoples; then, in the second half of the nineteenth century, among most of the European peoples; and finally, in our own days, we have seen the demand for political liberty as one of the essential conditions of civilised life put forward in almost all the lands of the non-European world. The ideal of political liberty seemed to have conquered the world. And in the institution of the League of Nations the world seemed to have resolved that the substitution of reason for force could be and must be extended even to the sphere of international relations.

All these five forms of freedom—freedom of the person, freedom of the mind, freedom of enterprise, freedom of intercourse, and freedom in government—are mutually dependent. It is impossible that free men with free minds should not demand freedom of enterprise, and freedom of intercourse with their

fellows. All these freedoms can only be enjoyed in security under a system of free government. The repression of free enterprise and of free intercourse must in the long run involve the destruction of political liberty; and those who, distrusting democracy, set themselves to replace it by an autocratic system, find themselves compelled also to invade freedom of the person and freedom of speech.

It seemed, until yesterday, that the progressive and rapid achievement of these liberties by the civilised peoples had demonstrated that human society *can* be organised upon a basis of liberty regulated by law. It seemed also, in view of the immense boons which these freedoms had brought, that such a system could bring well-being and happiness to man as no other system could. For the marvellous advance of the modern age in knowledge, in wealth and in kindness; the progressive unification of the world; the visible possibility of an era of secure peace and widely diffused prosperity—all were due to the emancipation of the human spirit by the Liberal movement. But then, with amazing suddenness, when we seemed to be about to enter upon a wonderful new era, the greater part of the world turned its back upon the ideals which it had hitherto pursued. Those liberties towards which we had laboured were denounced and repudiated, some of them in all countries, all of them in some countries; and Liberalism, which (whether it was recognised or not) has been the real guide of Western civilisation during these four great centuries, has suddenly come to be regarded as a lost cause and a forsaken belief.

In some of the greatest countries arbitrary arrest and punishment without trial have become commonplace; freedom of speech and publication have been suppressed by violence; political liberty has been overthrown; while in the international sphere the attempt to substitute law for force has been defeated—at any rate, for the moment. As for freedom of intercourse, all the Governments of the world seem to be in a conspiracy to destroy it. They shut out one another's goods by means of tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions. They make the movements of people as difficult as possible by restrictions on immigration, Alien Acts, and elaborate passport regulations. They even try to check the movement of ideas by banning foreign books and newspapers, or taxing them severely. Freedom of enterprise, which has made the modern world, is coming to be regarded as an evil thing. Parties of the right compete with parties of the left in waging war against it, and in confining it within the strait-waistcoat of a rigid Government control. To take a single small example, no Englishman may now grow hops for sale unless his name is on a Government list. In short, the

whole world appears, as if by a sudden universal conversion, to have decided to reverse the course which it has hitherto pursued, and to have abandoned as an empty dream the idea of organising human society on a basis of liberty protected and regulated by law. Is this only a temporary phase, a momentary aberration? Or is it a permanent change of direction? Upon the answer to that question depends the future history of the world.

There are good reasons for believing that the present divergence from the main course of human development can only be temporary; though it may last long enough to bring upon us a catastrophe. After all, the reaction is a very recent thing. It is the outcome of the rancours engendered by war, which is always hostile to the spirit of Liberalism. Even in the post-war period, the current appeared to be setting strongly in the Liberal direction: witness the growing strength of the League of Nations down to 1931, the universal establishment of the democratic system in Europe and its rapid extension outside of Europe, and the gradual healing of sores that was then coming about. It was, in truth, only under the stress of the economic blizzard which struck the world in 1929 and was intensified in 1931 that the reaction became violent.

A reaction so sudden and so violent is likely to lead to a swift counter-reaction unless it can be shown to have brought good results. And is there anybody living who really believes that the world, or any country in the world, has drawn benefits from the insane restrictive policies of the last few years? It is not the system of free enterprise that has failed (as some contend); that system needs regulation, but it has produced the potential abundance which the world might be enjoying. Nor is it the system of free intercourse that has failed (as others contend), for this system has never been fairly tried except in a few countries, to which it brought prosperity; and every increased restriction of intercourse has brought increased suffering to the world. The world's distresses are due to the policy of restriction which its Governments have been pursuing during the last few years. The Governments themselves recognise that this is so. Each of them protests that it is only pursuing the course of folly because of the wickedness and unreason of the others.

All the peoples of the world, with the exception of a few worshippers of force, earnestly desire peace, liberty and a revival of trade; and these can only be secured by a return to the methods of Liberalism. If some of them have turned to the worship of force, it is only because they despair of justice. They await a lead from one of the greater nations, a lead which would be eagerly welcomed. Of all nations, the one to which this lead would most naturally fall is Britain, which has in the past led

the world along these paths. The future of civilisation may depend upon the course of British politics in these momentous years.

It is probable that Britain will not fall a prey to the system of dictatorship: the tradition of free government and of free speech is too deeply rooted to be easily overcome. But more than this is needed. Democracy must be saved from disrepute by being purged of its weaknesses; it must cease to be largely a sham and a cover for party dictatorship; it must be made a more effective means of bringing into positions of leadership the men who are most capable of using them, and who are often excluded from public life by the rigidities of party; the system of government by discussion must be made more real and more efficient. Is there much chance that Britain will be able to lead the way in the rehabilitation of democracy? It is probable, again, that Britain will always be ready to sympathise with measures for the pacification of the world. Whatever party may govern her affairs, she will not take any active steps to destroy the collective system. But is she likely to take the risks that have to be taken if the collective system is to be made effective, or will she timidly drift back into an isolation that must bring ruin upon the world and upon herself? It is probable, yet again, that Britain will be as ready as any other country to acquiesce in the desirability of restoring world trade. But will she give a bold lead in this direction, or be content, here also, to drift with the stream, which at the moment seems still to be setting in the direction of restriction and self-sufficiency? It is impossible to avoid deep misgivings as to the answers to these questions.

The cause of Liberty is not dead, though it is momentarily obscured. It is still an open question whether the now unified world will prefer the path of freedom and reason, or the path of dictation, exclusion and force. The ideal of organising human society as a whole, and each of its members, on a system of freedom protected and regulated by law, is still the greatest of political ideals. At this turning-point in history we have still to fight for freedom of the person, freedom of the mind, freedom of enterprise, freedom of intercourse, and the substitution of reason for force and discussion for dictation both in national and in international affairs. And if those who love liberty, and appreciate the magnitude and profundity of the choice which lies before humanity, are at this moment, in all countries, few, disheartened, and disorganised, that is no justification for relaxing their efforts.

RAMSAY MUIR.

FIRST ROUND TO ROOSEVELT

MR. ROOSEVELT'S first Congress has completed its work and adjourned. Mr. Roosevelt himself has felt satisfied enough with the rate of progress so far to venture upon an extended cruise. Everyone who can has left Washington and is enjoying a well-earned summer vacation. The centre of interest in the American political scene is being shifted to the constituencies, to which members of Congress have mostly returned, and from which they will have to seek re-election in November. Already in many States primary elections have been held, and have yielded further evidence of the great popularity of the President, and of the danger of opposing him. Within a few weeks the actual autumn election campaign itself will be in full swing. The present brief interval marks the transition between one stage of the Roosevelt experiment and the next. The coming elections will turn very largely on the public's reaction to the first stage of the New Deal. The second stage of the New Deal, which will open when the new Congress meets in January 1935, will depend very largely on the results of these elections. This is therefore a convenient point to attempt a more considered judgment of Mr. Roosevelt's record than has so far been possible, while new unprecedented measures were tumbling one after the other from that Pandora's box which the Roosevelt landslide brought to Washington. It is too soon to come to final judgments; but it now seems possible to come at least to some preliminary conclusions on such questions as these: What is the New Deal? Whose is it? Is it succeeding? What is likely to happen next?

It is doubtful whether you would get an agreed answer from very many Americans, even from members of the Roosevelt Administration, to the question What is the New Deal? Nothing has been more confusing to the inquiring visitor to 'New Deal' Washington than the multitude of varying answers that such a question was certain to provoke. The Capitol end of Pennsylvania Avenue would almost certainly, if it gave any lucid answer at all, give a somewhat different answer from that which was forthcoming from the White House end. Even at the White House end the answer one might get in a conservative department, like

that of State, would be somewhat different from that vouchsafed by a radical department, like that of Agriculture. The wish is so often father to the thought when Americans, inside as well as outside the Administration, discuss the true meaning and tendency of the New Deal. There is therefore ample justification for widely differing views as to what the New Deal really is, and as to what Mr. Roosevelt intends to make of it. It is, however, possible to group certain aspects of the New Deal under a few broad headings, which would be admitted by most cautious observers to correspond to the known objects of its authors.

In the first place, the New Deal is clearly more an attitude of mind than anything else. Its very name, 'New Deal,' and its chief object, as announced from so many platforms—namely, to help what Mr. Roosevelt calls 'the forgotten man'—offer clues to this attitude. It is one of deep dissatisfaction with the state of America, not only as it was when Mr. Hoover left and Mr. Roosevelt entered the Presidency in March 1933, but even as it was in what Mr. Hoover would have considered the good old days of 1928-29. It is one of determination to end the evils—such as unemployment, poverty, agricultural depression, insecurity of livelihood, excessive speculation, unethical business, and political standards—which, to the minds of Mr. Roosevelt and his friends, disgraced American civilisation even during the years of so-called prosperity. It is one of confident belief in the power of enlightened democratic leadership to end such evils, as well as to bring about economic recovery. It is one of impatience with traditions, prejudices, vested interests, accepted theories, which stand in the way of the rapid elimination of such evils and the attainment of recovery. It is one of willingness to attempt, and indeed of positive belief in, a 'trial and error' method of tackling the nation's problems, without the expectation of being always successful, and without fear of being sometimes obviously in error, in the hope that, one way or another, out of such experimentation, workable solutions will be attained. It is an attitude of confidence in existing constitutional and other machinery, which it deems adequate even to such emergencies as the present. It rejects the idea that only a thorough-going transformation of American politics and society, whether in a Fascist or Communist direction, can lead to lasting recovery and sound reform. It believes in the fundamentally sound intentions of capital and labour, of private individuals and interests. It believes that, given the opportunity, each will rise above its former failings and will unselfishly collaborate in the interests of all. It involves a preference for an ordered planning of the nation's resources, and industrial and agricultural development. But it rejects the view that such ordered planning must involve far-reaching State

regimentation of individuals or interference in the details of national economic life. It is an attitude of intolerance towards the former dictatorship of big business and to that inequitable distribution of national wealth which made such dictatorship possible. It involves a preference for debtors against creditors, for small men against large, for wages against profits, for agriculture against industry, without, however, ever admitting that the interests of such classes are necessarily incompatible.

Such an attitude of mind is a great contrast to the attitude which used to prevail. That it should have come to dominate Washington and also a large part of the country is an outstanding result of the Roosevelt experiment. But an attitude of mind is not in itself sufficient equipment for an Administration. What does this attitude involve so far as practical policy is concerned? It involves, first of all, the resolute handling of the emergency with which the United States was faced in March of last year, an emergency which has largely, though not wholly or perhaps permanently, abated. In five matters of outstanding importance the Roosevelt Administration had to act quickly. Faced with a creeping paralysis of confidence and credit which was threatening banks and credit institutions, municipalities, railroads, and other corporations with imminent collapse, it hastily brought into action all the resources of Federal finance. The banks of the country were closed by Federal authority, to prevent their being broken by a continued run upon them by their depositors. Their position was rapidly examined, and such as were reasonably solvent, or could be made so with moderate financial assistance from the Federal Reserve Board or the Government, were quickly reopened. To prevent a further run upon them the hoarding and export of gold were forbidden. To equip them to meet their liabilities the discount regulations of the Federal Reserve System were amended; liberal advances, either in the form of loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or of purchases by that body of their preferred stock were made available, and the dollar was divorced temporarily from gold and ultimately anchored to it again at a lower parity. To give the public confidence a system of mutual deposit insurance, carrying with it a Government guarantee of deposits, was instituted—in the first place up to \$2500 and subsequently up to \$5000. Finally, measures were prepared to hasten the reopening, or where that was impossible the liquidation, of banks not at first sight solvent.

The widespread default on mortgage and other debts, leading to foreclosures and evictions of debtors and, because of the impossibility of disposing of the foreclosed properties except at an appalling loss, to the bankruptcy of creditors, including banks and insurance companies, which was impending when Mr.

Roosevelt entered office, was averted by further emergency measures. The Government provided funds for the refinancing of a great volume of debt and placed its credit behind debtor and creditor alike, so that defaults, foreclosures, or bankruptcies could all be avoided. Further, by the Frazier-Lemke Bill, the last measure of the retiring Congress, it legalised the postponement of maturities in respect of many of these obligations. The bankruptcy of railroads, utility corporations, and even of State and City Governments, which seemed imminent in March 1933, was avoided by making Federal loans freely available through the medium of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This willingness of the Federal Government to lend money to other agencies, and even to individuals, has been extended rather than checked as the session has proceeded, and one of the most recent Acts of Congress legalised direct Government loans to industry.

The improved system of relief, which was carrying on its back entirely or in part the maintenance of an army of 13,000,000 unemployed and their families, and which was threatened with the exhaustion of its funds, was largely taken over by the Federal Government, which had always previously bitterly resisted assuming any such responsibility. Ample funds were made available, by grant or loan, to the existing relief agencies, which continue to be many in number and various in character. The Federal Government, moreover, itself entered the field of relief. It created forestry and other work for 250,000 young men in the Civilian Conservation Corps and later the widest variety of tasks for 4,000,000 men and women during last winter under the Civil Works Administration. Its Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) has been spending huge sums, and is quick to come to the aid of anyone requiring relief, as has recently been shown in the drought-stricken areas of the Middle West.

Finally, so far as the main emergency measures are concerned, the New Deal involved the balancing of the ordinary (as distinct from the emergency) Federal budget. The rest of the emergency policy depended, and still depends, largely on Federal credit being good, so that ample supplies of Federal money could be available to keep the rest of the nation going. Federal credit had slumped badly in March 1933, largely because Congress could not bring itself to impose taxes or to cut expenditure, especially on pensions. It has been restored by the speedy lopping off of \$1,000,000,000 of Federal expenditures, including \$400,000,000 on ex-soldiers' pensions and allowances, and by the imposition of heavy new taxes, thus enabling the ordinary budget, including interest and sinking fund on emergency expenditures, to be balanced.

Emergency measures, undertaken not for theoretical but

wholly practical reasons, and allowing little time for debate, merge easily into recovery measures—the second main expression of the New Deal. In this field monetary policy has been the chief instrument employed. The dollar has been depreciated in terms of gold, and so far as possible in terms of goods, in order to lessen the burden of costs (of which debts fixed in terms of money are a large element), and thus to make possible domestic and foreign sales at a profit. By the depreciation of the dollar, and by other means, the credit basis of the country has been enormously increased. Credit inflation has been carried some distance, and powers have been taken, though not yet actually used, for currency inflation. Finally, a large silver-purchase programme—which is considered by some to foreshadow a bimetallist experiment, and is obviously designed to lift purchasing power in the silver-producing regions—has been set in operation. In order to get this extra volume of money (chiefly bank money) into circulation various methods have been employed, such as open market operations by the Federal Reserve Board and more recently huge Government expenditure. This expenditure upon public works as well as upon relief, though disappointingly small to people who believe in this method of bringing about recovery, has risen to a level of between \$300,000,000 and \$400,000,000 a month.

Meanwhile the National Industrial Recovery Administration has tried to create purchasing power by inducing employers to shorten hours while maintaining, and indeed increasing, wages, thus enabling more men to be employed, and more money to be got into the hands of the working classes, who are the chief purchasers of consumers' goods. It has further tried to reverse the tendency towards unfair competition and price cutting, which was creating a vicious spiral of lower wages, lower prices, lower purchases, lower profits. At the same time the Agricultural Adjustment Administration has tried to lift agricultural purchasing power, the destruction of which even before 1929 was so important a contributory cause of the depression. It has taxed the processor, and therefore ultimately the consumer, of various primary products, and has paid over the proceeds to the farmers in an attempt to lift their incomes in relation to their costs. It has used these subsidies to the farmer as a means of bringing about a reduction of supply, the producer being in effect bribed to plough under part of his cotton or not to plough part of his arable land. It has, finally, tried to get the farmer a better share of the better price by helping him to organise his marketing.

These and other measures, the chief motive for which has been the desire to accelerate economic recovery, merge into the reform measures, the third main expression of the New Deal. An

attempt has been made to prevent a repetition of wild speculation which unsettled conditions before 1929. Acts have been passed providing for public commissions to supervise the operation of the Stock and Commodity Exchanges. Even in advance of these measures the Federal Government forced the exchanges to curb speculation, by limiting operations on margin, and by fixing the permissible daily rise or fall in quotations—in the case of wheat, for example, at 5 cents. The banks have, moreover, been required to be more circumspect in lending money to finance margin operations on the exchanges. Abuses in the field of banking and investment have been tackled. Commercial and investment banking have been separated, the great commercial banks being obliged to divorce their security affiliates. Private banks, like the house of Morgan, have, if they wish to remain entitled to receive deposits, to submit to many of the obligations—including some relating to publicity—imposed upon public banks. A Securities Act has been passed to enforce certain standards of accuracy and honesty on issuing houses and advertisers. Somewhat similar, though less severe, is the Foodstuffs and Drugs Act, designed to prevent the misleading advertising by the vendors of so many patent foods and medicines. The machinery of the National Recovery Administration has also been used to check, at least for a time, long-standing abuses, which it has proved impossible to deal with by other means, such, for instance, as child and sweated labour. Finally, an attempt has been made through the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and through projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), to provide for a modest measure of social planning. The ideal of planning has also inspired other of the Administration's actions—e.g., Mr. Roosevelt's reliance on the advice of his so-called 'brain trust,' his creation of a Federal Emergency Council, his authorisation of an inquiry (by a committee meeting at the Department of the Interior and under the secretaryship of Dr. Lorwin, of the Brookings Institution) into the possibilities of real national planning.

Such, then, would appear to be the outlines of the New Deal, which is largely an attitude of mind, but also a complicated practical policy designed to achieve the three objects of averting disaster, bringing about recovery, and carrying through reform. Whose policy is this? Is it the policy of the Congress which has given it legislative authority? Is it the policy of the Democratic Party, which has had a great majority in Congress and in the country? Is it the policy of the Administration, which has played a much more leading rôle in New Deal than is normal in Washington? Is it the policy of the 'brain trust,' which, more than the

Cabinet, has appeared to be the board of strategy of the Administration? Is it the policy of the President, who has dominated Congress, party, Administration, even 'brain trust,' as few of his predecessors have ever been able to dominate Congress or their colleagues? Is it the policy of the public, to whose prejudices all American politicians are so responsive, and whose opinion Mr. Roosevelt takes such pains to discover?

The answer is, I think, that it is wholly the policy of none of these, that it is partly the policy of all of them, that it is more nearly the policy of the President than of any other individual or group. It is clearly not the policy Congress would have carried on its own. The record of Bills carried by majorities in one or other House, and never ultimately placed upon the statute-book, shows clearly how different a programme Congress, if left to itself, would have carried. And yet Congress did help to give shape to the policy adopted. It refused the President some things, such as the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty, for which he had asked, and made it impossible for him to get others, such as an Oil Control Bill, or authority to deal with foreign debts, which it was known he wanted. It forced on him some things—further veterans' payments, for example—which he did not want, and induced him to accept others, such as inflationary powers, which he would not have taken, in the form ultimately adopted, if he had been a free agent in the matter.

The rôle of the Democratic Party, whether in or out of Congress, was not markedly different from that of Congress as such. The party would not have adopted anything like the New Deal if left to itself. Many of its old leaders, such as Vice-President Garner and Senator Robinson, were secretly very worried by much of the New Deal programme, though unwilling to oppose it openly. Some of its most respected leaders actually opposed parts of the New Deal either because, like Senator Carter Glass, they thought that they went too far, or, like some of the 'soft money' Democrats, because they thought, at least as regards inflation, they did not go far enough. But the party as a whole, and particularly that party in the House of Representatives, has mostly followed the President's lead, venturing upon very few revolts.

The Administration as a whole has been too divided to give definite shape to its programme. The old bureaucracy, which was neglected, and the new, which dominated Washington; the regular Cabinet, which was rather ineffective, and the new Emergency Council, which has been carrying the main burden of work; the right wing of the Government, representing the conservative section of the Democratic Party, and the left wing, representing Mr. Roosevelt's young radicals—all these elements

have had too little in common to be an effective force. They have been working along separate lines, with the President as the point of contact between them. And they have frequently been offering conflicting advice, with the President acting as arbiter. Though the so-called 'brain trust' has recently been proved to have no existence in a formal sense, its members have nevertheless had a good deal of influence. It may be true that there has never been, except during Mr. Roosevelt's election campaign, an organised group of experts, meeting frequently together to formulate policy. It may be that the members of that group, and the many other experts whom Mr. Roosevelt has since called in, have come to represent not one but many points of view as to what should now be done. It may be that the group is now no more than a fluctuating list of people, some in, some out of, Washington, to whom the President often turns for advice, and whose advice, when he seeks it, he as often rejects as accepts. It is, however, equally true that some of these individuals, notably Professor Moley in the early days, Professors Warren and Rogers last winter, and Professor Tugwell throughout, have had apparently more influence than anyone else in helping to shape the President's policy, and that there has been among many, though not all of the experts who might be regarded as having been at some time or other members of the 'brain trust' in the sense of being occasional advisers of the President, a bias in the direction of social planning and radical action which has affected the President, and through him the New Deal.

It is, however, in the last resort the President who has been personally responsible for his policy. The New Deal as it has worked itself out, and as I have attempted to describe it, is more nearly what Mr. Roosevelt has appeared to want than what anyone else, even Mr. Tugwell, has wanted. Other people have influenced the President. No one is readier than he to accept advice. He has bent his preferences to the exigencies of the political as well as the economic situations. No one is, except upon matters of important principle, more yielding than he. But he has never ceased to be his own master, and the master of Washington. If he has been dominated by anything, it has probably been by public opinion. No President has taken more trouble to understand the public, and to see that it understands him, than Mr. Roosevelt. The tacking and turning, the inconsistencies, the bias, of the President's policy do not only reflect his own opportunist, non-doctrinaire, sentimental liberal characteristics, they are the product of similar characteristics on the part of the public. The New Deal has not been the thought-out product of a single brain, or group of brains; it has been the growth of time and of events, the product of the action and

interaction of Congress, party, Administration, 'brain trust,' public, President, and of the impact upon them of the changing emergency. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is not a logical or simple thing.

Is it succeeding? It is difficult to tell. If we mean by that question, 'is it winning the support of the public?' the answer is, probably, 'Only partially.' To judge from the *Literary Digest* straw vote, 61.15 per cent. of the electorate are ready to declare themselves as 'on the whole' in favour of it. Only 38.85 per cent. are as yet ready to class themselves as 'on the whole' opposed to it. But many of the 61.15 per cent. in favour must have misgivings, must support some and oppose other parts of it. It is probable that far fewer than 61 per cent. of the American people, having thought the matter out, would be in favour of the whole of the New Deal. More than that percentage might favour its general attitude. More would favour most of its purely or mainly emergency measures. More perhaps would favour half of its recovery measures. Fewer than 61 per cent. would favour the remaining half of the recovery measures—for instance, the recovery aspects of the National Recovery Administration. Much fewer than 61 per cent. would favour the long-term reform aspects of the National Recovery Administration and other parts of the New Deal, except, of course, for details such as the abolition of child labour.

The battle is now being joined between the supporters and opponents of the New Deal, with the latter making its reform measures, and particularly its interferences with individual initiative and local responsibility, the focus of their attack. Their opposition is handicapped because they are divided among themselves, because many of them are discredited as representatives of Wall Street or some other great, unpopular interest, because Mr. Roosevelt's personal prestige is still so great. Their success or failure in the near future will turn on many other factors besides the genuine reaction of the American people towards the New Deal. But so far as that factor is concerned they can be more hopeful than many people think, for the American electorate is, in my opinion, as yet by no means permanently converted from its former individualist leanings.

In the other sense in which one can ask the question 'Is the New Deal succeeding?' (that is, 'Is it succeeding in a material sense?'), the answer must also be, I think, 'Only partially'—very partially. It is naturally impossible to attempt any quantitative measurement of the success of an attitude of mind. It cannot be doubted, however, that the New Deal attitude, open to criticism though it may be, as shirking some of the practical issues involved in its sweeping generalisations, and as simplifying

too much an extremely complicated situation, has come like a current of fresh, clean air into the overheated, unhealthy atmosphere of 'depression' America. It has recreated in the American people self-confidence and confidence in political leadership. It has awakened a lively, and in many respects constructive, interest in political, economic and social problems, especially on the part of younger people and of members of the university class. It has begun to attract such people, who previously looked down on politics, to the Government service, and even to professional politics, as a career. It has checked for the time being the development of movements of a mainly destructive character. It has, at least temporarily, lessened the distrust and ill-feeling that was developing between different sections of the American people, although in one instance only, that of the relations of capital and labour, it has, in consequence of the relative failure of the National Recovery Administration to bring about agreements between employers and employed, had the unforeseen result of adding to, instead of checking, such mutual antagonisms.

So far as the purely emergency part of the New Deal is concerned, a very great measure of material success has been achieved. There is no longer any immediate danger of a collapse of confidence, credit, or order. Banks, governmental and other agencies, including relief agencies, mortgage corporations, railroads, though all faced with great difficulties, are no longer faced with immediate collapse. It may be that this avoidance of disaster has been the result to too great an extent merely of Government expenditure. It is true that it is Federal money and credit more than anything else which have stood since March 1933, and which are standing to-day, between the United States and the disasters which seemed a year and a half ago to be impending. But few people would deny that, even so, the New Deal should be regarded in this matter as successful, there being no alternative that one can think of that would have served as quickly and as fully as the Roosevelt policy to fill the breach that was opening up in the walls of American security.

The recovery parts of the New Deal have been less successful—it is difficult to say exactly how much less successful. It would not, however, be an unfair estimate to say that they had been 50 per cent. successful. I mean by that two things—that the recovery parts of the New Deal have achieved about 50 per cent. of the success that their sponsors had expected of them, and that of these recovery measures about half have succeeded and about half failed in realising to a reasonable degree what was expected of them. So far as the first point is concerned, it has been recently suggested by Mr. Raymond Moley (who was basing his

remarks on the United States Department of Labor statistics for March 1934) that unemployment has been reduced during the first year of the New Deal from 13,203,000 to 8,021,000, a reduction of 39·2 per cent. Many observers would consider this estimate too generous. The inadequate statistical service in respect of American unemployment makes it difficult to prove whether it be, in fact, too generous or not. It would, however, be generally admitted that at least 3,500,000 of last year's unemployed, or 25 per cent. of the total, have obtained jobs since then, largely because of the New Deal. In regard to pay-rolls, Mr. Moley tells us that they were in March 1934 higher than at any time since August 1931. Here again, though a carping critic would say Mr. Moley's estimate was a little high, few people would deny that there had been a striking increase in the total pay-roll bill of the nation's industries—an increase which had won back at least the ground lost during the last two and a half years.

Mr. Moley says that average weekly earnings are up since March 1933 by 41 per cent. This figure is much higher than other estimates I have seen, some of which are nearer 25 per cent. than 40. But even the lower figure would indicate a striking improvement, even after making full allowance for the reduced real value of money wages owing to the rise in prices. Other figures that I have seen would indicate—though such a conclusion must be regarded in the absence of more complete evidence as merely tentative—that profits are, on the average (excluding a few particularly depressed lines of business), back to a higher level than any attained since 1931—back, indeed, more nearly even than wages to the pre-depression level. Production seems to have recovered greatly, though it is still far below its former level—and even that was below capacity. Production of consumption and capital goods taken together is perhaps 30 per cent. above its low point during the depression, but is still at least 33 per cent. below its pre-depression maximum. This recovery has been more marked with respect to consumption than with respect to capital goods, though the production of the latter, which had fallen further during the depression, has since made relatively the greatest recovery. The volume of production of capital goods is now probably nearly 100 per cent. above the depression minimum, but still hardly more than 50 per cent. of the pre-depression maximum. Purchases have not recovered as greatly as purchasing power or as production. They are, however, rising, especially in rural areas.

Such a measure of recovery—a little greater, perhaps, than the United Kingdom has made during the same period—though encouraging, is far less than the American people wish, or than the sponsors of the New Deal originally led them to expect. It

has failed to affect agriculture as much as industry, in spite of the supposedly agricultural bias of the Roosevelt following. Agricultural income, including subsidies, is only a little higher than last year, though the income of rural areas, because of the concentration of public works in them and the great flow to them of relief funds, is very considerably greater, a fact which is largely responsible for improved retail sales in such districts. But it is not sufficiently higher to make up for the increase in agricultural costs because of the 19 per cent. rise in industrial prices. Finally, the New Deal leaves at least 8,000,000, and perhaps more, industrial workers unemployed. In any case, the recovery is based to a dangerous extent on the expenditure of Government money, so much so that it is possible to trace the parallel movements on a graph of lines indicating emergency Federal expenditures and general recovery. It has, for this and for other reasons, not produced much confidence in natural or lasting recovery; it has, however, begun to make increases of personal expenditure and private business possible. And the snowball of such expenditures and of prices and employment and profits should soon begin to roll more rapidly.

On the whole the National Recovery Administration—except for the elimination of child and sweated labour—the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and many of the currency experiments have been far less successful than their sponsors hoped as a means of bringing about recovery. On the other hand, Government loans and grants to relief agencies and to industry, and Government relief and public works expenditure, have clearly contributed greatly to increased business activity. The reform parts of the New Deal have, I think, achieved an even smaller success—perhaps a 25 per cent. success. They have eliminated, or checked, certain obvious abuses. They have not seriously altered, and, as many people believe, cannot seriously alter, the conditions of economic competition in the United States. They have probably checked recovery. They have probably annoyed conservative opinion and private enterprise. They have not satisfied radicals or even begun to replace private enterprise by social planning. Some of them, like the National Recovery Administration, have started a dog fight between conservatives and radicals. Many parts of the New Deal have, of course, had too short a time to prove themselves. It is doubtful, however, whether they will be given sufficient time to do so. The American electorate is not noted for its patience. And it is in fact, unless I am mistaken, really much less keen about reform than about recovery. If recovery picks up, then Mr. Roosevelt's prestige will rise again and he will get a longer time to work out his existing policies. If recovery lags, then his prestige will wane

ground of the 1934 election, as it was in 1931. The last year has seen a realignment of policies on something like the old fronts,

The importance of the election, in fact, lies in the form in which parties, and not principles, will emerge from it. The events of 1929 and after inevitably unsettled party stability; what remains to be seen is the extent to which electors will rally again to one or other of what used to be the two chief groupings—Nationalists and Australian Labour Party. Throughout the late Parliament a general vagueness characterised the objects, as well as the name, of the United Australia Party. Some fairly diverse personal elements were held together for a time within its ranks by common attachment to the reconstruction plan. But for the past year this arrangement has not worked with entire smoothness. It will be an aid to clarity if the election determines just where the centre of gravity of the party now is, whether towards those who still see significant functions for a 'united' party in which minor differences are sunk, or towards those who are able to discern in the old Nationalist Party principles of action which are not only precise but sufficient. For Labour, just as the present differences are deeper, so the election will be more decisive. A.L.P. (the Australian Labour Party) was once a term that denoted a high degree of cohesion. The official party is still strong, but the inroads of the Lang section have been enough to make the coming election a test of some anxiety. And, on a smaller scale, a similar test is ahead of the third political grouping represented in the Federal Parliament, the Country Party, which has recently been disturbed by the dissatisfaction of an independently minded wing with the official control. The manner in which these internal questions in all three parties will be resolved, and the consequent character of the new Parliament, is the most interesting speculation of the elections.

The interest is partly one of personalities, an indication of the scarcity of real political issues. On the Ministerial side, Mr. J. A. Lyons will again go to the country as Prime Minister and leader of the United Australia Party. But it is not unnatural that since 1931 he should have lost his appeal as the man of the hour. When, literally, he shut the door on his colleagues in the Labour Cabinet and rose by a strange turn of political fortune to the leadership of a new anti-Labour Government, he carried the country with him, Australians being very ready to applaud individual initiative. But the Government's supporters are not now so sure that they want to go on being carried with him. Mr. Lyons, it is recognised, has done all that he undertook to do, and has demonstrated his sincerity as well as his political astuteness: none the less, he has never claimed, and does not possess, the imaginative gifts which would render him indefinitely accept-

able as a leader in the succession of G. H. Reid, Alfred Deakin, or Mr. W. M. Hughes. It is no longer a secret that strong efforts were made a year ago to secure the return to Federal politics, as party leader, of Mr. S. M. Bruce. Mr. Bruce himself disposed of these invitations by making it clear that he still regarded as the best arrangement the continuance of his own functions as Australian representative in London with the retention of Mr. Lyons in the Prime Ministership. The leadership of the United Australia Party after the elections remains, however, a sufficiently open question to permit of some free speculation in Victoria and New South Wales, the States which have always regarded it as a matter of course that they should provide the leader of the party variously called, since federation, Fusionist, Liberal, Nationalist, or United Australia. Mr. Lyons comes from the small State of Tasmania, and is clearly not in this tradition. Just as clearly in it is Mr. Menzies, the brilliant Attorney-General of Victoria, whose intended entry into Federal politics at this election is regarded as significant in some quarters. The present deputy-leader of the United Australia Party, Mr. J. G. Latham, who is the only other member of the Cabinet at all familiar to the country, is retiring from politics and will probably pass on to the High Court bench. All of which need not imply that a change in the leadership of the United Australia Party is necessarily imminent; but there is no doubt that the occasion which brought Mr. Lyons to the post has passed, and that the strong conservative elements in Sydney and Melbourne are beginning once more to press for their due influence.

It is held by some responsible opinion in the Commonwealth that a necessary qualification in any leader of the United Australia Party after the elections will be the ability to co-operate, or even achieve unity, with the United Country Party. Some kind of accommodation has been reached between the two parties for the purpose of the election, but recriminations recently exchanged by the two leaders hardly suggest that this is likely to lead to anything more permanent. And the need for a better understanding will be urgent if the Country Party, as is possible, holds the balance of power in the next Parliament. Hitherto the only real obstacle to agreement has been the tariff issue and the rather inflated demands of the Country Party for Cabinet representation. Of these, the former has lost some of its importance since the downward trend of the tariff under the Lyons Government, and the latter has depended largely on the personal intervention of the Country Party's leader, Dr. Page. The opinion is consequently to be heard that, whatever the leadership of the United Australia Party, a change in the leadership of the United Country Party may also be necessary before there can be any

more serious approach to unity than there has so far been. Dr. Page has staked his influence on the retention of the Country Party's independence. There is no sign yet that the question of amalgamation will arise in a practical form in the near future, but if Dr. Page sets his price too high even for co-operation it cannot be taken for granted that the party will unreservedly follow him, in spite of the present strength of his authority. In proportion to its numbers in the House of Representatives (16 to 39 Ministerialists and 18 Labour), the Country Party has had little voice in affairs in the past two years. It is sanguine of its prospects in the election and it will not be disposed to allow a too rigid memory of old controversies to deprive it of effectiveness for another parliamentary period. Dr. Page's services to the Country Party movement in Federal politics are not to be underestimated; in the last fifteen years he has provided an enduring rallying-point for 'low-tariffists' and for the champions of the farmer against the supposedly harmful dominance of the cities; but he, and the party with him, has suffered from the very narrowness of these objectives, and he is perhaps neither so adaptable nor so fertile in policy as to match the party's numerical claim to a share in the national administration.

In the Australian Labour Party the position of leader is always thankless. If he is successful, the party caucus and the trade union 'bosses' are jealous to assert their ultimate control; if he fails, the same agents are ruthless in removing him. The safe course is thus a difficult mediocrity. Mr. Scullin in any case did not find his task in the recent Parliament an easy one. He had to support the Opposition in the House in the face of the palpable success of most of the Government's measures; outside Parliament the dissident Lang group threatened to draw more and more adherents from the official movement of which he is Federal leader. His authority was never outstanding, but in these circumstances it has been further impaired. Although a forceful election campaign and a good Labour poll might temporarily re-establish it, the open suggestions already made for a change in the Federal Labour leadership remain. The degree to which Labour voters withstand the encroachments of Langism will depend rather on loyalty to the official party organisation than on any superior compulsion of Mr. Scullin's personal influence to that of the forceful New South Wales politician. And it should be recorded that even that degree is not anticipated with any great optimism by Federal Labour.

The Australian's customary attitude towards politics in ordinary times is tinged with a faint cynicism. He is apt to be uncritical of a picturesque and vigorous personality; he is agreeably casual in the face of any attempt to compress him in rigid

party forms. The spectacle of seven Parliaments at work in a population of 6,000,000 gives politics an appearance of, not greater, but less reality. The elector is content for the most part to stand aside and to watch with detachment party vicissitudes which normally end, as they begin, with professional politicians. When the time comes at intervals to make a choice, many voters—and most of the others are of Labour affiliation—are unable to discern any set of principles which override matters of immediate moment. Such matters, consequently, often decide elections; more particularly State elections, but sometimes also in the Commonwealth, as in 1929, when the proposal to abolish the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, represented as an attack on the standard of living, cost the Nationalists office at a time at which in general their financial principles might well have been preferred. Those principles were, in fact, preferred, in exceptional circumstances, two years later, but as a rule the Nationalist Party, or United Australia Party (which in spite of its name actually has no wider appeal), is far more dependent than is the Labour Party on temporary issues. Since the early days of the Commonwealth when Deakin described the coalition of his Liberal Party with Reid's Free Trade Party as 'not a fusion but a confusion,' the anti-Labour party in Federal politics has hardly ever been anything more than anti-Labour, so far as a general line of policy goes. If perhaps the qualification should be added that after all, thanks mainly to Deakin and Mr. W. M. Hughes, the party has had an Imperialist character and has promoted preferential trade and immigration, this is none the less not very relevant to the United Australia Party as it finds itself at present. The Commonwealth has overcome its recent difficulties mainly by measures of internal and short-range application; party leaders will be expected still for some time to come to state what they are prepared to do here and now to consolidate what has already been won.

In deciding to go to the country several months before it was necessary, Mr. Lyons may be assumed to have chosen what was likely to be the most favourable moment. As the Budget was presented just before Parliament rose it is evident that the Government regards itself as still on its strongest ground with finance. And the Budget proposals, though not of the importance of those of last year's 'recovery Budget,' are in fact accepted as a satisfactory introduction to an appeal to the electorate. The promise of another surplus next year, with its prospect, perhaps not quite so near, of tax remissions and further restoration of cuts, added to the admitted achievements in financial reconstruction of the last three years, is a weighty initial advantage of which Government spokesmen have made the most during the election

campaign. In other respects, however, neither the Ministry's record nor its intentions are so clear. It is asked with some pertinence whether the most has been made of the great opportunities for national leadership since 1931, and whether the return of a Ministry of much the same constitution to another term of power will ensure the exercise of a more imaginative statesmanship. On the critics' side it is held that within the scope permitted by the operation of the Tariff Board the Government has shown no signs of a decisive tariff policy either way; that the regulation of overseas trade relations has been harmfully delayed; that the Government must bear some responsibility for the embarrassing stage which the Western Australian secession movement has been allowed to reach; that a practicable scheme for the development of the empty north of the continent is as far off as ever; that with the threat of export restrictions ahead insufficient provision has been made to safeguard the primary producer. However, if they cannot point everywhere to results, Ministers can at any rate point in some places to endeavour, though of uneven quality. Thus an attempt has been made to dispose of the annually recurring question of wheat-growers' assistance by means of a sort of sliding scale bounty; the vexed matter of State demands for Federal subvention was referred, with good sense if also from a desire for postponement, to a peregrinatory commission, and a promising beginning was made with a new phase of relations with the neighbouring Pacific countries, through a mission of good-will which was amiably received from Batavia to Tokyo. For the rest, the Ministerial policy for the next three years is to repair some omissions and to persevere in what was half done in the last three.

From a detached point of view, it is a policy abundant, but lacking in cohesion. The conclusion is hard to resist that the lack could best be supplied by co-operation, or fusion, with the Country Party. In its effort to hold the balance between city and country interests the United Australia Party has probably been sincere, but the effort has been at the expense of consistent planning. The Country Party, on the contrary, has a clear idea of what it wants. In particular it has an excellent plan for rural rehabilitation which is the corollary to what the United Australia Party has already been able to do for the primary producer. And in general the Country Party, on account of its strictly practical and limited aims, carries with it an amount of good-will which would save a joint Government from much of the suspicion and antagonism that befell some of the well-meant endeavours of the present Ministry. In its continued insistence on familiar demands it is possible that the Country Party does not see how completely its existence has already been justified. In the last

few years the primary producer has won recognition of his right to be treated, not by special favour, but as a member of the economic community on at least an equality with the city manufacturer; and the tariff has come more or less insensibly to be regarded no longer as the specific means of industrial protection, but as a general economic instrument to be used in various ways for various ends, and in any case an instrument which cannot now be used at all except with reference to commitments and conditions abroad uncontrollable by any single party in the country, whether high protectionist or free trade. When both Country Party and United Australia Party realise this, there will be, apart from transient personal obstacles, good prospect of a profitable understanding.

A good deal of eloquence has been spent recently in the Sydney and Melbourne Press in urging a Country Party-United Australia Party combination on the ground that only in that way can a secure front be formed against extremism—*i.e.*, Labour. But as the Australian elector is not apt to be impressed by general exhortations of this kind, it seems to be more important that such a combination should enable the declaration of a positive programme, of which neither party by itself is entirely capable, as a counter to the well-defined Labour policy. For it is admitted, notwithstanding the good financial record of the Ministerialists, that Labour holds the strongest electioneering card of all. This is the proposal for the nationalisation of banking and credit, which is likely to be the chief issue of the election. For the two groups of Labour the proposal has a corresponding significance. Federal Labour under Mr. Scullin contemplates a gradual process, the only step immediately planned being the entry of the Commonwealth Bank into competition with the trading banks. The Commonwealth Bank was originally a Labour creation, and this is permissible under its constitution. Hitherto the bank has assumed more and more the character of a central bank; but, says Mr. Scullin, it must now be made 'the people's bank, free to compete vigorously with the private trading banks, utilising the fullest powers to mobilise the nation's credit to carry on public undertakings, to encourage the development of industry, and to lighten the crushing burden of interest.' And again: 'All public accounts, including those of State Governments, municipalities and other public bodies, must be placed in and operated through the Commonwealth Bank. These will be practical and substantial strides towards the nationalisation of banking.' The more extreme Lang Labour Party would proceed at once to nationalise all banking credit.

This is a policy which must be taken seriously. It would be a mistake to suppose that Mr. Lang's vigorous, though clumsy,

campaign of three years ago against deflation and high internal and oversea interest rates fell as flat as his subsequent downfall seemed to suggest. It has had, on the contrary, a profound influence among people not even habitually Labour supporters. The part played by the banks in the application of the Premiers' Plan has been sufficiently rigid to lend colour to the belief that they would not hesitate to impose further deflation on the country if that was necessary for the extinction of the remaining Budget deficits; but there is a wide feeling that the country has deserved the very opposite. In holding out the promise of a restoration of purchasing power, of a means to reduce the still persistent unemployment, and of extended public works, Labour is on strong ground, all the stronger because the Australian people, as the history of industrial arbitration has shown, are not afraid to follow a policy in all its logical implications. And the electioneering case becomes formidable when there is added to it (though not without some confusion of thought) uncompromising advocacy of protection for the industrialist and unrestricted production for the farmer. Too much need not be made in this connexion of the split between the two Labour groups, which is a matter of more concern to the Federal Labour leaders in Parliament than to anyone else. Reconciliation, it is true, has been found impossible in the key State of New South Wales, but it has been achieved in South Australia, and in Victoria and Tasmania the whole Labour movement is more than casually tinged with Langism.

It can be observed, in conclusion, that the state of parties in the next Federal Parliament will have little bearing on some of the main questions which the Commonwealth will sooner or later have to settle. These have already been touched upon—the difficulties that have become apparent in the Federal Constitution, the development of the north, the future of export production, trade relations abroad. They are all of interest to the outside observer as affecting the Commonwealth's standing among the Dominions; none of them is susceptible of a purely party treatment. Constitutional reform, at least, is likely to be a capital task for more than one Parliament to come; between the present condition of friction in the Federal-State relation, with its implied threat of a break up of the federation, and the Labour Party's remedy of complete unification, there is no doubt a satisfactory middle course, but it will take an agility hardly less than that exercised by the fathers of the Commonwealth themselves to find it.

J. D. L. HOOD.

THE HUDSON BAY ROUTE

HUDSON Bay and Strait form together the last great waterway for international trade about which any serious controversy exists. Here is a strait 430 miles long with an average width of 100 miles; it leads into a bay which could contain the British Isles, yet after three centuries the question of its practical use as a trade route is only now being decided. To see why this should be so is to understand the history of Canada, but there are certain points which can be easily grasped.

During the sixteenth century the search for the north-west passage to India led to a fuller exploration of the northern American coastline than would have been justified by the local economic prospects. The love of discovery for its own sake contributed, although such voyages were spasmodic and followed no general plan, and by the time Hendrik Hudson had made his great expeditions men were becoming reconciled to the view that the passage, even if found, would be useless for all practical purposes. They began to realise, however, the possibilities of wealth in the north-western territories, and in 1670, sixty years after his mutinous crew set Hudson adrift to die in the great bay which he had discovered, Charles II. granted a charter to 'The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay,' which made them 'true and absolute lords and proprietors' of the whole region. The trade at that time was almost entirely confined to furs, but it was valuable enough to lead to plenty of friction with the French, who had colonised the St. Lawrence valley. For 100 years an intermittent guerilla warfare was waged for the control of the territory, varied during the American war of Independence by a successful attack on Fort Prince of Wales, where Churchill now stands, by the French admiral La Pérouse in a seventy-two-gun man-of-war. In 1811 Lord Selkirk, as Governor of the Company, brought in settlers and planted the Red River colony at the southern end of Lake Winnipeg; our first line of communication with western Canada was thus by way of the Hudson Bay route.

But until the coming of the railway Canada meant little more than a thin line of settlements strung out along the St. Lawrence

gulf and estuary and the north shore of the great lakes. British Columbia was a far-away and self-contained community reached by the long sea voyage round the Horn; between it and Toronto stretched 2000 miles of untrodden mountain, prairie, and rock and scrub country. Then in 1867 the Dominion of Canada came into existence, and British Columbia joined it partly under the inducement of a trans-continental line. The railway unrolled itself in a long ribbon from east to west, and unrolled with it the future development of the country. At that time suggestions were made for a line to the shores of Hudson Bay which should tap the wealth of the future prairie provinces, but the scheme was premature, eastern business interests were lukewarm, and the Canadian Pacific Railway went through to the west coast. Western Canada shipped its growing flood of grain to the European markets by way of the great lakes, Montreal and the St. Lawrence, and the shipping which used Hudson Bay was confined for another fifty years to the Company's vessels and an occasional whaler or the ship of some scientific expedition.

One of the results of the settlement of the prairie provinces was that representation in the Federal Parliament at Ottawa had to be granted, and a growing number of farmers' representatives began to arrive, nominally Liberal, but with definite regional interests which cut sharply across those of their fellow-Liberals in Quebec, and were equally at odds with the Conservative manufacturers of the Ontario cities. These farmers were wholeheartedly for free trade; they had something the whole world needed—cheap wheat—and they wanted no restrictions on the imports which they were ready to take in exchange. They soon discovered that the price they were being paid for their product bore little relation to that paid in Europe, and they came to the common-sense conclusion that the freight rates were largely responsible for the discrepancy. The shorter the route to market, the smaller the cost. The earlier suggestions of a Hudson Bay route to Europe were revived and developed, and finally in 1910 the Federal Government authorised the beginning of work on a railway to the south-western part of the bay. Progress was delayed by the war, and disagreements about the choice of a terminal port were eventually settled in favour of Churchill; but the work went forward, and by 1931 the railway was complete and the port ready to receive shipping. Yet in three seasons not more than twenty-one freight steamers have used the route, in spite of considerable publicity. On the face of it this is an extraordinary situation, which might suggest that the advantages of the route have been grossly overrated.

What, then, are the facts? In actual distance to Europe, what does this route save the western farmer? From the two

ocean terminals of Churchill and Montreal respectively, the distances to Liverpool are about 2900 and 2700 miles, figures which represent a very small variation in freight charges, other things being equal. Other things are not equal; but more of that later. If Regina, the capital of Saskatchewan, is taken as a representative centre for rail comparison, it will be found that the distance to Churchill is 841 miles, and to Montreal 1713 miles. The distances by rail from Edmonton or Saskatoon are even more favourable to Churchill, and the great lakes route for grain to Montreal does not materially affect the mileage, while the economic factor of a double transshipment has to be taken into account. Evidently, then, the Hudson Bay line saves the farmer up to 1000 miles of freight charges, whereas the sea passage is approximately the same in each case. But here enters the problem of the ice.

The finest waterway in the world is useless for trade if the navigable season is too short for reasonable profits to be made, and it is upon this question that the whole matter of the Hudson Bay route therefore turns. A glance at the map will show that there are two main openings through which ice from elsewhere may drift into Hudson Strait, the first from the north by Fox Channel, the second from Davis Strait and the north or south shores of Resolution Island. It will also be seen that there is a group of large islands at the western end of the strait where it joins the bay. Ice from Fox Basin drifts south with the current at some time during November, and is either carried into the western entrance of the strait or collects off Mansel, Coats or Southampton Islands, comparatively insignificant quantities of it ever reaching the bay, which, apart from shore ice, appears to remain open throughout the winter. A second volume of ice, including many large Greenland bergs, arrives off Resolution Island rather later in the season, and is carried into the strait by a westward current along the shore of Baffin Island. The great majority of these bergs do not penetrate the strait for more than about half its length, but are then caught up in an eastward-moving current along the south shore, which eventually carries them out of the strait and down the coast of Labrador. To these incoming bodies must be added the ice which forms off shore in the strait itself. With regard to the effects of these movements on the navigation season, the most favourable estimates give an average of four months for ordinary unstrengthened freight steamers—that is, from about July 20 to the middle of November. At the other extreme there is the fact that the season from the point of view of Lloyd's was, for 1933, no longer than August 10 to October 7. Between these two limits there is scope for endless argument, but it is possible to arrive at a

tentative estimate based on a study of all the reports available. Personally, I should be inclined to suggest a safe season of from August 1 to October 20, which could be extended in favourable years, and in any case with the help of ice-breakers. Extension would be safer at the end rather than at the beginning.

Here it may be of interest to give the outline of a passage I took on board the steamship *Pennyworth*, of the Dalglish Line, which was the first ship to use the route commercially in 1933. She is a vessel of 5388 registered tonnage, with a maximum speed of 12½ knots, and fairly representative of the type of tramp steamer that can profitably be used on this route. She was equipped with electric sounding apparatus and gyro-compass in addition to the wireless, and had made the same passage the year before, though not with the same skipper. We sailed from Antwerp on July 28 with 2000 tons of mixed freight, kept a northerly course round Cape Wrath, and from there had a clear run to a position 60 miles off Cape Farewell, the southerly point of Greenland, whose icy mountains were just visible as dark violet shadows on the starboard horizon; but since the Spitzbergen and East Greenland pack moves south-west in the earlier part of the year and sometimes fragments from it pile up round Cape Farewell to more than 100 miles off shore, we had to be on the safe side, although in this case practically no ice was visible. That day we met one large berg, but then no more until we reached the entrance to Hudson Strait. We arrived off Cape Chidley before midnight on August 9, in spite of having steamed at half to three-quarter speed for several days so as not to arrive before the terms of insurance permitted entry into the straits. In the early hours of August 10 we entered, and were met by the Canadian Government's ice-breaker *N. B. McLean*, which patrols these waters during the navigation season. She preceded us as far as the bay, and wirelessly constant and detailed reports of any ice sighted, either bergs or 'growlers.' The latter are fragments of bergs or of old Arctic pack ice, and are more dangerous than they appear, as such a very small portion shows above the surface, although there may be enough below seriously to damage or even to sink the ordinary tramp steamer. After the first day the strait was practically clear of ice of any kind, and the general opinion was that the quantity reported and met was rather less than in Belle Isle Straits on the St. Lawrence route at the same time of year.

The Government has established five direction-finding stations—at Resolution Island, Cape Hopes Advance, Nottingham Island, Chesterfield Inlet on the north-west shore of the Bay, and Churchill itself—besides certain fixed and occulting lights for the most part unattended. They are essential aids to safe navigation, especially on a little-tried route, and by their help our

course was laid and periodically checked with such efficiency that we were, as Captain Gofton put it, 'passed along like a baby' from one end of the strait to the other. To add to these and the help given by the *McLean*, the *Pennyworth*, unlike many ships of her type, carried a gyro-compass. There is a good deal of professional controversy about the necessity for this instrument over the Hudson Bay route which the layman is incompetent to decide. The installation costs several hundred pounds, but it appreciably reduces the insurance premium, and there are therefore those who maintain that it will pay for itself in the course of a few voyages. Furthermore, owing possibly to the proximity of the Magnetic Pole in Boothia Felix, there are certain areas on the route, notably one not far from Churchill, where influences on the ordinary magnetic compass are so great that it 'goes mad' and becomes for the time entirely useless. But whether the work of the direction-finding stations renders the gyro-compass an unnecessary luxury, or whether it remains a vital supplement, must be held at present an unsettled question.

We met with fog for a few hours on two days; but otherwise visibility was good, and when the sun was out and the sky clear almost too good, in the sense that a mirage continually showed land ahead where there was no land. The rocky capes of the mainland, for instance, were visible in some detail from points over 100 miles off, while double and even triple icebergs hung on the horizon like a troupe of balancing elephants. The mainland and islands are both desolate-looking country, here some distance north of the tree line, and a wind shifting from north-east to north-west reminded me, even on the brightest day, that I was dressed for the heat of the prairies rather than for air blowing clean from the Pole. What vegetation exists along the shores of the strait is definitely Arctic, and the few hundred Eskimos in this region live simply by hunting and fishing. The probable mineral wealth, on the other hand, is as yet unexploited and can only be guessed at. We had entered the strait early on August 10; on August 13 from far out in the bay we picked up the great white bulk of the terminal elevator, and arrived at Churchill in the afternoon, welcomed by the entire population, including two Eskimos who had come into town to trade from their nearest settlement to the north, and who stared at the ship for some hours trying to believe their eyes.

Churchill is in most respects a perfect natural harbour, and, without personal knowledge of the Nelson roadstead further south, it is hard to believe that there was ever a serious question of making Nelson the terminal instead. The mouth of the great Churchill River is bottle-necked with the outlet to the north-east, and this outlet is through a passage between rocky headlands,

so narrow that the scour of the river does the work of dredging the main channel, yet wide enough to admit any ordinary ship. The headlands, which rise to a height of between 40 and 70 feet, are so placed that only gales from the north-east can affect the inside area, and then only a short strip on the opposite shore from the dock, which has been constructed under the cliffs on the eastern bank. At present there are berths for three large steamers to load simultaneously and ideal moorings for three or four more. The wharf site, however, is capable of almost indefinite extension with easy dredging, and at a cautious estimate berthing could be provided for twenty vessels in a straight line, with moorings for another twenty. Churchill hopes soon to be a port for general trade with Europe, but as yet it has been very little used except for wheat, and the elevator is the dominant feature of the landscape. It has a capacity of 2,500,000 bushels, and can be expanded to four times this figure. Loading is done by a modern conveyor-belt system at the rate of 80,000 bushels an hour per ship. The town has a population of perhaps 300 people in the season and a tenth of that during the winter; no one is likely to be there unless he has a job, and the casual visitor will find nowhere to sleep or eat except in the train or ship by which he arrived, and little sight-seeing except the ruins of Fort Prince of Wales on the further bank of the river, and what evening performances the Northern Lights may give him. There are no trees, for it is just north of the tree line, which curves sharply north-west from the shores of the bay, and little grass can grow where there is such scanty soil. The 500-mile journey to The Pas is interminable to anything more human than a grain of wheat, through featureless muskeg swamp, with its frozen subsoil, or non-committal wooded country, broken once magnificently by the valley of the Nelson River where the railway crosses the Kettle Rapids. At The Pas, a boom town which has never lived up to its early expectations, the Hudson Bay Railway ends and the Canadian National system proper begins, and with it the farm lands of western Canada.

This, then, is the Hudson Bay route. It has its difficulties and dangers like others, but the only relevant comparison is with the St. Lawrence, where, if the season is longer, the dangers of navigation are at least as great and probably greater. Captain Gofton in his official report gave it as his considered opinion that this route is considerably easier than the St. Lawrence, owing, among other factors, to the advantage in fog conditions and the immensely wide deep channel of the strait, which presents no obstacles in any way comparable with the bed of the river between Quebec and Montreal. It shortens by 1000 miles the distance from western Canada to Europe, the safe season is long enough for two or three round trips by the same ship, the need is genuine,

the potential supply of wheat enormous, the port admirable. Why, then, has it not grown as it deserves?

The reasons are a blend of finance and politics which it is extremely difficult and perhaps unnecessary to disentangle. In the first place, it is almost impossible for an Englishman not familiar with Canada to guess what a dominating influence the growth of the railways has been in her economic life. It is not too much to say that for the last half-century the history of the Canadian Pacific system has been the history of the country. In England the fertile rural districts had been settled from time immemorial, and the Industrial Revolution had been in progress for fifty years before the railways arrived—to speed up and develop enormously the nation's economic life, it is true, but not to change fundamentally the location of its basic industries, nor to open up territories for settlement which had before been virgin land. But in western Canada there was next to no settlement before the railway came—therefore no agriculture, therefore no surplus for export, therefore no demand for manufactured goods. The result of this has been to make the Canadian Pacific, together with the group of companies reorganised as the Canadian National Railway, the real arbiters of their country's destiny. For climatic reasons the economic channels have tended to run east and west rather than north and south. The eastern provinces at one extreme and British Columbia at the other were established long before the middle; Montreal and Toronto became the centres of the financial and business interests, and when western wheat and other products began to seek an outlet in foreign markets, it was inevitable that they should flow through the already well-established channels of eastern trade. In these circumstances Fort William, at the head of Lake Superior, and Montreal, as the point of transshipment for ocean-going traffic, became the strategic centres of the grain trade; millions of dollars were poured out in dock and elevator, millions more in rolling stock and lake freighters, while brokers, banks, and railways rubbed their hands and saw no reason why the profits should ever cease.

Over-production in the financial sense is a modern phenomenon, and has apparently taken each industry in turn by surprise. During the war, when England's buying power expanded dizzily, the western Canadian farmer was selling his wheat for two dollars a bushel, and the possibility that this prosperous period would be followed by a time of deflation, with falling prices abroad and an increased burden of debt at home, seems not to have entered his head. Then he began to find that the eastern manufacturing interests of his own country were pressing for, and to an increasing degree obtaining, higher tariffs

to exclude European goods, which competed with their own and in many cases under-cut them owing to lower wage costs. He was getting less and less for his wheat, he was paying more and more for his manufactured goods; he had taken on commitments during the optimistic war years which now weighed like a millstone round his neck, and, in the majority of cases, he found it necessary to mortgage his farm to a greater or less degree.

This Canadian aspect of the world depression has had two reactions on Hudson Bay trade. In the first place, western enthusiasm for the route has increased; in the second, eastern opposition to it has crystallised. The railway line, begun in 1910, was only completed by 1931 as the result of continued pressure from the west in the Federal House of Commons. The farmer, hard pressed as he was, tended more and more to support a route which minimised the freight charges for his grain, since only in this way could he hope to sell at a profit in the European market. The Canadian Pacific Railway, however, and to a lesser extent the Canadian National and other transportation companies, could not be expected to look with equanimity on a route which might, they felt, eventually halve their profits as carriers, seeing that if it were not for the grain trade their lines would hardly pay their way during the depression. At the same time the various grain-shipping organisations held a powerful weapon—if one may so describe a state of affairs which has nothing sinister about it—in the possession of those elevators, lake freighters, and so forth before referred to. These tremendous assets would become equally tremendous liabilities if any really decisive percentage of the western grain crop were diverted to the Hudson Bay route, and, with the country as a whole in increasing financial difficulties, they would have been entitled to convey to the Federal Government, whether they actually did so or not, that anything more than a modified backing for the new line and port would have disastrous influences on an already disturbing unemployment problem in the east. The Government, like all Governments, found itself between two fires, and, as all Governments do in such circumstances, it compromised. That is to say, it made the west the concession of free winter storage at the Churchill elevator, but did nothing to prevent the transportation companies cutting rates over the eastern routes if they wished to in future, and, above all, gave no assistance to the shipping using the western route in the matter of insurance rates.

What followed in the course of the 1933 season might have been foreseen. The world price of wheat, unaffected by the speeches of politicians, continued at a low level, and those organisations which were concerned with the Canadian export crop no doubt found themselves compelled to under-cut the new

western competitive route. At one time wheat was being carried, according to figures published in Winnipeg, at considerably less than the economic rate over the eastern lines and great lakes steamship routes; and, although this might have been offset in the case of Churchill by the shorter mileage from the prairie provinces, the advantage of seasonal marine insurance rates in favour of Montreal was sufficient to turn the scale, together with the fact that the majority of the western grain companies have their own storage facilities along the eastern routes, and without some strong counter-inducement would be inclined to ship in that direction to earn the storage revenue, rather than shipping through a Government-owned elevator at a loss. To put this aspect of the question shortly, so much capital has been tied up during the last half-century in the development of the great lakes-St. Lawrence grain route on the part of a variety of organisations that probably nothing short of a large and consistent measure of Government support, guaranteed over a period of some years, can be expected to balance it effectively, even in the case of a route offering such striking natural advantages as does the Hudson Bay. That support has been forthcoming, it is true, but neither so generously nor so consistently as to be effective in a time of world-wide financial depression, and the crippling discrimination in both hull and cargo insurance against the bay route would remain a decisive obstacle even if others were overcome. At the time of writing the details of certain new concessions by the underwriters for the 1934 season have not been announced, but it would be too much to say that the prospects for this year are particularly bright.

Up to this point the discussion has been confined entirely to the question of wheat, since it is, after all, by this commodity that the immediate success of the route must stand or fall; but some reference must be made to the matter of west-bound cargoes, and also to the possible increase of other exports besides wheat. In 1933, as in the previous year, the *Pennyworth* was the only ship which carried any west-bound cargo, consisting in this case of 1000 tons of Tyne coal and another 1000 tons of mixed freight in small consignments, destined for various parts of western Canada. This freight included anthracite, beer and spirits, steel castings, railway discs and wheels, window glass, fireclay, woollen goods, and nitric and sulphuric acids. Of course, an import total of 2000 tons, though encouraging as far as it goes, can have little real effect on the problem of two-way cargoes which—questions of insurance and land freight rates apart—must be developed if the route is to become a permanently profitable one for the steamship companies. Ships which can make profits on imports will then be able to offer still lower rates for the carrying of export

grain, and this, it is hoped, will benefit the producers in the form of a better price.

Western Canada is nowadays not only a 'wheat mine' as it was a quarter of a century ago. With falling prices the farmer has learnt his lesson and no longer keeps all his eggs in one basket. Cattle, hogs, poultry, honey, and dairy produce are now raised in sufficient quantities through the prairie provinces for there to be a surplus for export, and Churchill is the obvious point for such shipments, not only owing to the shorter mileage, but also because this type of merchandise can most easily be kept in condition over a route which includes as short a rail haul as possible. In the case of cattle, in particular, the elimination of stop-overs for feeding, the reduced damage from bruising, and the fact that they shrink more on rail than on water can be regarded as strong arguments for the northern route, and the successful trial shipment of 200 head from Saskatchewan at the end of last season as contributory evidence. Insurance rates on cattle are said still to work out at four times those of the eastern route, but the saving in other respects is so great that as long as this country is prepared to import any western Canadian livestock at all there seems to be a strong case for using Churchill, where the cattle can be loaded direct from the railway cars into the ships. An interesting development this spring has been the proposed construction of a line from Montana, over the United States border, to connect with the Hudson Bay Railway, so that cattlemen in that State and in Wyoming and Colorado should be able to gain the advantage of the short route to Europe.

Taking things as they are to-day, no one will be surprised to hear that the Hudson Bay Railway, which is under Government ownership but is run as a subsidiary of the Canadian National system, does not pay its way. Yet, when one considers the enormous natural wealth of the territories it serves, there seems to be no inherent reason, even in a time of financial depression, why it should not show a profit on its working, and indeed there are signs that this may soon be the case. The growth of westward cargoes referred to above would of course be the most satisfactory solution, but even without these the striking developments in mining in the northern territory may render the line self-supporting. Geologically the mineral belt of northern Manitoba is volcanic pre-Cambrian, and in it are found rich gold-bearing quartz, copper-zinc deposits, and silver. The exploitation of these deposits has been long in coming owing to their remoteness and inaccessibility as much as to the large amounts of capital necessary to develop them, but the building of the railway is solving the problem. The branch lines that run to the Flin-Flon and Sherritt-Gordon mines are a foretaste of what may be

expected as the international demand for these metals grows more pressing.

Reference has been made throughout this article to the financial handicaps under which the Hudson Bay route has suffered since its opening. It is very necessary to insist on this, even though they are handicaps shared to a certain degree by all other routes at the present time, since they bear especially hard on a new venture, which even in good times would need all the financial backing and official encouragement it could get. It is not too much to say that circumstances have combined to prevent this route being given a fair chance in the three years of its working. Yet if the prosperity of agriculture is to be taken as the index of a nation's economic health, the Hudson Bay route must be given the opportunity to succeed as it deserves.

J. D. BENNETT.

NOTE.—The Imperial Shipping Committee state, in their Report on Hudson Bay Marine Insurance Rates for 1934, that as the result of negotiations with the Joint Hull Committee reductions amounting to 10s. per cent. in hull insurance will be granted for the 1934 season. (Cargo insurance rates also show some reduction.) At one point the Report says: 'It would, therefore, be difficult to appreciate the reasons for the disparity between the rates for the suspension of warranty in respect of Churchill and Montreal, if these rates were intended only to reflect the difference in the risks involved. We recognize, however, that Underwriters conduct their business on the basis of recorded results, and it must be admitted that, as long as the route is used by comparatively few vessels, a total loss may more than account for the whole profit of a season.' The reference is to the loss of the *Bright Fan* in Hudson Strait in 1932.

LONDON'S AIR DEFENCES

THE fortunes of States, like those of individuals, are often predominantly governed by luck. Where luck has been constant it is difficult to persuade an individual to take the normal precautions, and it is equally so with States, which so easily assume that their own chastity will still the lust of the world. In no respect is this truer than in the preparation for and the conduct of war by Britain, which, in the past, with one or two brilliant exceptions, has been such as to justify the impeachment of Ministers and the court-martial of commanders. Yet generally the material advantage has been ours, though it is as well not to forget that the United States might have been the fairest jewel in the Imperial crown. Success was due largely to luck backed by certain racial qualities—'the latent "grit," the power to take things smiling, the lack of nerves and imagination,' as Galsworthy puts it. But while defining them thus Galsworthy felt that they provided no sufficiently satisfactory guarantee, and he added that these very qualities are 'almost vices, now, perpetuating the rash belief that England could still "muddle through" without special effort. . . . ' If, of course, she can, then there is no need to worry. Certain changes, however, have taken place. So stunned have we been by their revelation that we have not yet assimilated them to the extent of taking even the elementary precautions.

In the South African War, which also lasted some four years, and which then seemed to us a serious affair, our total casualties, both killed and wounded, amounted to 28,603. Between 1914 and 1918 this figure was often exceeded in one minute, and over the four years it was merely the approximate average weekly loss. In the future there is a prospect of losses just as great, if not greater, but of a different and more revolting sort. For they will not be confined to men conveniently grouped together in gladiatorial combat on a foreign soil, but will be spread over the whole civil population without discrimination. In this war there will be no front and there will be no rear. There will be no place of safety. The old will perish with the young, the women with the children, the pacifist with the fire-eater, the indispensables with the conscripts, the sick with the healthy, emperors, kings, presidents, even generals and politicians, with the simple sailor, soldier

or airman. Even if we could face such casualties we could not do so on the ghastly principle of comparative attrition, for the repetition of which our military power is being organised and trained. For whereas our birth rate has fallen to the lowest figure recorded since civil registration began and exceeds our death rate by .3 per cent., thus allowing for an approximate increase in population of some 150,000 a year, there are potential enemy countries who show a corresponding increase of nearly a million.

And then there is the question of cost, which has leapt to almost incalculable proportions. A day of modern war, which achieves little more than destruction, costs more than past expeditions which added greatly to our possessions. Do we realise, as Sir Herbert Samuel recently pointed out in the House of Commons, that our accumulated war debts are costing us some £700,000 a day in war pensions and interest on Sinking Fund on debts incurred. If to this we add current expenditure on armed forces, war expenditure reaches £1,000,000 sterling a day on all but eight days of the year, and thus absorbs more than the whole of our income tax. It is doubtful whether the country can carry a greater burden than this, which a further war would, even if successful, impose: it is even doubtful whether the present burden can be discharged. The apparent conclusion is that for us, at least, there can be no more war, as we can afford neither the casualties nor the expenditure. We have shot our bolt in this respect.

On the other hand, we have got everything we want and, given peace, we can consolidate our gains. Unfortunately for us, other peoples have not got all they want, and, as Cicero put it very moderately, 'Wars are to be undertaken in order that it may be possible to live without molestation.'¹ The task of defence, however, is not impossible, nor is it necessarily so crushing as at first sight appears. Only it involves a vast difference in outlook and procedure.

Mr. Baldwin, who for longer than any other individual Minister since the war has been responsible for our defence, has made two statements which are needlessly discouraging. One of these is to the effect that another war will cause the end of our present civilisation, and the other is that the bomber will always get through. The first of these statements is certainly true *if the next war be prepared for and fought like the last*. The second is also true, but it is necessary to add that it does not mean—and Mr. Baldwin has made this clear in his later speech in the House of Commons on July 30 last—that *all* bombers will or need get through.

¹ *De Officiis*.

Our huge expenditure, our enormous casualties, have in the past been the result very largely of preliminary unpreparedness. Not only were our armed forces maintained in faulty proportion, but no provision had been made for adequate expansion. Our Navy was as unprepared for the new submarine warfare as our Army was to meet either the open or the trench warfare methods of the enemy. Naval construction and armament were found to be inferior and our military equipment was both unsuitable and inadequate. The new air arm had been neglected, and for much of the war depended on French manufacturers for its existence. The system of governmental control in war, though it had been revised as a result of the South African War, was incapable of quick decision or co-ordination, while the organisation of industry, for an industrial war, had not been contemplated. Yet again we muddled through. But I venture to think that this time the cost has not been forgotten except by those responsible for the organisation of our defences.

It is not comforting to reflect that 'The only lesson that history teaches is that history teaches no lessons,' but it is certainly true so far as our defensive preparation is concerned. For we are to-day worse prepared than we were in 1914. We can no longer claim that 'Britannia rules the waves.' It is doubtful whether we could produce more than one Regular division as an expeditionary force, and our Air Force is sixth in point of size in the world. Our organs of command, both governmental and military, show no improvement in co-ordination on 1914. But what is perhaps worst of all is that the older services are still training for a war like the last, which, as we know, will be fatal to our civilisation even if it is successful.

Advice on defence is given to the Government by the Chiefs of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The result of that advice is shown by the following figures. Out of the total of £109,000,000 of this year's estimates for the defence services, only £17,000,000 is accorded to the Air Force. And while the Navy obtained, as compared with last year, an additional £3,000,000 and the Army £1,462,000, the Air Force was originally granted only an extra £26,000. Yet the Navy is no longer our first line of defence. And the Army battalions can only fight with all the gallant futility of the past and could be blotted out by a few machine-guns. Neither service can carry out its old function if there is efficient air interference. The Air Force, therefore, has become both the primary attacking and defending arm of the present and of the future, so far as we can see into it. National safety depends primarily on it. This is reflected neither in the original estimates, nor in the recent supplementary estimate which, under the guise of increasing the Air Force to adequate proportions,

merely promises that in five years it will be as strong as it ought to be to-day. An admission, on the part of the Government's advisers, of the degree to which we should be defended against air attack would amount to a declaration of the real power of the air arm, and to an admission that England is defenceless, and this would involve a very different allocation of estimates. But if air power is what it is accepted to be by the other Great Powers, then by their absorption of practically all the moneys allotted to defence, the older services from being assets have become almost unlimited liabilities.

Let us for a moment consider London from the strategic point of view. It is, of course, our greatest individual seaport. But it is far more than that, for it deals with one quarter of the total tonnage entering our harbours. The only other ports which approach it are Liverpool and Southampton, and their combined total only reaches that of London. The value of London's overseas trade is even to-day over £600,000,000, which is greater than that of any other seven ports in the United Kingdom. The docks cover an area of nearly 3000 acres. Of this area over one-third is occupied with meat and grain, supplies without which we cannot exist. However great the inaccuracy of bombing, it cannot be such as to leave an area of this size immune. And then it should be remembered that docks are easily damaged (it took three weeks to repair the damage done by a small bomb to a Zeebrugge lock in the war), and that bombs, timed to explode long after a raid, may be dropped both in the river approaches and in the docks themselves. To displace London as a seaport would clearly be impossible, yet to use it in circumstances in which it was not adequately defended would be difficult.

Not only do over 8,000,000 people inhabit London, but at its railway termini each day there arrive a further 1,000,000. To displace the whole population would be impossible, and it is clear that any attempt would involve hopeless disorganisation. Even if part of this population could be removed, it could not possibly be supplied without vast changes in the whole system of transportation, and during that period of change the remainder of the country, for which London acts as the principal distributing centre, would be deprived of many of the essentials of life. It need hardly be added that it would take years, and not days, to effect any considerable change. London, then, will be the same London to all intents and purposes when a war begins, the headquarters of government, finance and commerce, the focal point of transport, communications and life. It cannot be displaced or replaced. Its disorganisation involves that of the whole country, and would be felt throughout the whole Empire. Its adequate

defence is a cardinal factor of our organisation ; its exposure might be a fatal weakness.

Now let us examine what steps are being taken to defend it. (It is unnecessary to consider this in the case of other cities or towns in this country, since for them nothing has yet been done.) First of all it is necessary to realise that, apart from the Prime Minister, there is no single co-ordinating authority for air defence. The Home Office is responsible for all questions affecting the population. The War Office is responsible for the ground defences so far as they affect the searchlights and the guns. The Air Ministry is responsible for the air defence and for the Observer Corps. There is, therefore, no one authority who can assume complete control in peace, unless it be the Prime Minister, and there is certainly no existing authority who could do so in war. It may be that the Committee of Imperial Defence, which is considered to act as the co-ordinating centre of defensive activities in other directions, has some hand in this. An examination of the present situation will show to what degree that charge has been fulfilled in peace, and in war, of course, this Committee has no executive authority.

In the House of Commons on November 10, 1932, in answer to a question as to what precautions were being taken to protect London, Mr. Baldwin said : ' I will not pretend that we are not taking our precautions in this country. We have done it.' During the following year all the Great Powers were concentrating on air defence. Plans were being tested in practice in Rome, Berlin, Tokio, and Marseilles, both by day and by night. The civil population was being taught what to do in the event of bombing ; practice in ' blacking-out ' towns was carried out ; civil and military authorities perfected liaison ; fire brigades, first-aid organisations and essential services were all exercised in the duties they would have to perform. Ground defences were likewise tested while aircraft carried out raids and reported on what they saw. The thoroughness in dealing with the matter is illustrated by the fact that motorists, moving in the area of operations, were issued with coloured screens for their headlights. Some apprehension was felt because, beyond the air exercises which the Royal Air Force carried out, nothing similar was taking place in this country. It surely was not considered that we were the only Power which did not need to take precautions, particularly when London was not the least but the most vulnerable capital in the world ?

It was about a year after Mr. Baldwin's statement, on November 3, 1933, that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was presiding at a lecture in London University. A student asked him what was being done about London's defence, and he

gave a reply which confirmed all doubts on the subject of the inadequacy of measures already taken.

As a matter of fact, [he said, as reported in *The Times*] the Home Office have taken the matter up *in the last six months* [my italics] and have appointed a very senior and able officer to go into the whole question which they are dealing with, but what the details are, even if I knew them, it would not be for me to disclose here.

It should be noted that the appointment of this officer occurred six months after Mr. Baldwin's statement of November 1932, and also that even the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was unaware of what the plans were. This shows to what degree co-operation between the Defence Ministries is actually lacking in this matter, for what secrecy need there be in plans which the public must know before they can be carried out ?

The Home Secretary, when questioned in the House of Commons, has persistently given evasive answers, with again the hint at necessary secrecy. The last announcement on the subject was that of Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons on July 30 last :

We feel with regard to the protection of the civilian population that our plans have been carried as far as possible without wider publicity than has hitherto been deemed in the public interest.

This carries us no further, for no announcement has been made and no practice has taken place, but it prompts the comment that the main interest of the public is not secrecy but safety. He did add :

The next stage involves communications with local authorities, with public utility companies, and so forth, and with all those on whom responsibility for action would fall in the emergency contemplated, and before long steps will be taken to communicate the necessary instructions to the general public.

In other words, the plan is not yet complete even in theory, and when it is, it will no longer be kept secret. The secrecy, in fact, merely covers lack of preparation.

This, then, is the sum total of what has been accomplished by the Home Office. It has gambled, successfully so far, with the safety of the population, and it may win. But if anything happens even during the next year, which will certainly elapse before plans can be completed and are able for the first time to be tried out, the gambler will be caught out. Is it really necessary to gamble thus when there is available for defence nearly £10,000,000 sterling a month ? The part played by the War Office is even more unsatisfactory. For, in the first place, it has failed to create a sufficient number of units ; in the second, it has relegated

ground defence to Territorial units ; in the third, it has neglected these units disgracefully both as regards equipment and personnel.

On paper there are four Air Defence brigades. These are units which contain normally two brigades of anti-aircraft artillery, a battalion of searchlights, and a signal company. The searchlights are supposed to find the enemy aircraft and keep them ' lit ' for the gunners, while the signals maintain the necessary communications between the two. Of the four Air Defence brigades only one is a Regular unit, and, as that would be required for the Army, it could not be allotted to home defence. Only two of the other three have all their units, the third having only one battery in all. Bad as the situation is already seen to be, it is rendered still worse by the following facts. An artificial restriction exists which prevents recruitment up to full strength, although these units might be required within an hour of the commencement of war. In addition to this, strengths have been allowed to dwindle unchecked, and units to-day are as much as 75 per cent. short of their establishment. The two searchlight battalions for the protection of London had on July 1 last a total of 538 men, whereas their full strength should be 1704: the corresponding figures for the four artillery brigades on that date were 970 and 1812. These figures are the more serious in that the training in these units is highly technical, quite unlike anything in civil life, and cannot be improvised.

Of the equipment of these units it need only be said that their transport lorries are so old that they have acetylene lamps, and artillery instruments, which are essential on the scale of several per battery, are allotted on the scale of one instrument to six batteries. These units could at best give an efficiency which reached 30 per cent. of the possible, but might quite easily be unable to serve at all, and constitute a real danger to the city they exist to protect. The only other units which exist to provide ground protection are three groups of so-called independent searchlight companies situated respectively in Essex, Surrey, Kent, and Middlesex. Their strength is, like that of the defence brigades, gravely deficient, for they have only 1247 men out of a total of 2830.

As the question of cost may be obtruding itself on the reader's mind as an excuse for this condition of affairs, it should be mentioned that Territorial units cost next to nothing: to quote one example, a searchlight battalion, even allowing for depreciation, costs £18,000 a year to maintain. A Regular battalion, for purposes of comparison, accounts for £99,000.

A further question which may arise is whether ground units can be effective. As the speed of aircraft increases, the likelihood of artillery scoring hits certainly decreases, even although technical

improvement is continuous. But aircraft nowadays tend to fly in formation for protection, and this not only makes the artillery's task easier, it causes the bomber to fly out of range as long as he can. The searchlights have a double function. They light up the artillery target and they show the enemy craft to our own fighters. They do this even through cloud, sometimes, by silhouetting the enemy to fighters above. Searchlights have a fundamental weakness in being useless in fog, which, however, is in itself a very great protection against air attack.

The main impression gained during a recent night raid over London by the Royal Air Force, which I was allowed to accompany, was the paucity of searchlights and the weakness of their beams. There was nothing like the barrage of 700 which the Great War produced, the moral effect of which, alone, would be very great: it looked more as if there were only twenty or thirty altogether. After our formation had been found by them—and the greatest precautions had been taken that they should find us—it was only a few minutes before a fighter was attacking. London is spending less than £100,000 per annum on its searchlights. Is this an adequate insurance for a city of this importance? There can be little doubt that ground defences can play an important part, but the War Office is clearly not interested in the matter. The disproportion, however, between the allotment of one Regular brigade for the air defence of the Expeditionary Force and that of two and a bit for the remainder of the population is a somewhat disturbing comparison.

The Air Ministry's part is twofold, for it, too, possesses a ground organisation as well as its air formations. This is the Observer Corps, which is a volunteer organisation the function of which is to report the approach of enemy aircraft. All that need here be said of this devoted corps, which serves its country without any reward, is that the communications provided for it were unequal to the demands it made on them during the air exercises this year, and a temporary breakdown was the result. Had the attack been real, the work of the Observer Corps would have been largely negated.

As regards the aircraft themselves, the situation is so well known as a result of the publicity given to the recent supplementary estimate for air expansion that it is only necessary to add a few remarks. In 1923 Mr. Baldwin, as Prime Minister, announced that the programme of home defence decided on was fifty-two squadrons. That programme had not been realised ten years later, nor is it yet completed. The further expansion now decided on, thirty-three new squadrons for home defence in five years, leaves us in a condition of comparative defencelessness up till the moment it is fulfilled. If in the meantime other nations

continue to expand their air arms, then, when the programme is completed—and there is no guarantee that it will be—we may still be in a position of comparative inferiority. The defence of London and of these islands depends primarily on the Air Force itself: other measures, however effective, are merely auxiliary. And so even from Air Ministry policy we cannot get more than a crumb of real comfort.

So much has been said about the inevitability of our being bombed that the subject of air defence has been looked upon with some hopelessness by the general public, and apparently, too, by responsible Government bodies. It will not be out of place, therefore, to show that defence, even under the conditions of the last war, was able to be effective. Nor is it inappropriate to recall that the situation, from the point of view of air defence, is far easier of solution than that which has faced these islands from the sea over the last 2000 years. Our naval problem was that we alone had to be prepared to face the world, for the Colonies, and later the Dominions, found naval defence prohibitively costly. But both Colonies and Dominions can support us in air defence, and the British Empire can achieve, if it will, an air hegemony which can to-day be a better guarantee of world peace than was our naval power at its greatest.

Here is what Mr. Baldwin said in modification of his own phrase, the 'bomber will always get through,' on July 30 last:

The last German air raid on London was a very severe one, but it was the last. . . . Of those who crossed the coast a quarter were brought down and destroyed. That kind of proportion is true of later raids over Paris. Sixty per cent. of the raiders were turned back that night at the coast and more than a quarter of those reaching the coast were destroyed.

Yet only a year or so before 121 machines failed to find sixteen Gothas which were attacking Harwich, and of ninety-four that went up to find the German machines in the first daylight (Gotha) raid on London only five found the enemy. The improvement towards the end of the war was, then, very marked, and certainly such as to augur well for the future of defence. Since that period there have been further developments which militate in favour of the defence. The greatest of these are radio-telephony, which enables the ground to direct the fighters in the air, and the improved performance of the fighters themselves, which can now reach bombing height in a very few minutes. There are also war methods such as the balloon aprons, consisting of wires suspended between balloons, which could be revived and possibly even improved, but which appear to have fallen into abeyance in these days.

To those who pin their faith and their hope to an international

repudiation of bombing a warning is necessary. However much to be desired such an instrument would be, it is liable to be as ineffective as former instruments of the sort have been in connexion with both land and sea warfare: gas and submarine attacks form recent examples. A nation will always find a way of keeping within the law when it wants to. To keep from violating the Briand-Kellogg Pact Japan refrained from a declaration of war on China; so did Bolivia and Paraguay, on each other, for a long time. Similarly General von Hoeppner justified the attacks on London on the grounds that London was the centre of the war strength of the Allies, and that attacks caused the retention of large air forces at home (which they certainly did even at a critical period during operations in France). It may be remembered by some how Germany declared herself justified in bombing civilians owing to the *Baralong* case, in which it was alleged that British sailors had shot the crew of a German submarine after their surrender. Thus 'reprisals' can be used as an excuse to waive any treaty.

'That a nation might be forced to sue for peace through an air offensive against its most important centres has been put forward as a post-war doctrine, and a study of the results of the (comparatively) slight German daylight raids in 1917 will lend support to this teaching' is the very moderately expressed opinion of the official air historian of the Great War. It is the will of the people, more than any other force, which makes victory possible or defeat inevitable in the war of masses. The will of our people is to-day dangerously unprotected from enemy air action. Peace is and should be our aim for moral reasons. But it is dangerous to make its pursuit a necessity owing to weakness, for, as the late Lord Birkenhead said, 'Persuasiveness in diplomacy marches hand in hand with reliance on adequacy in defence.' The penetrating cynicism of Galsworthy is equally apt: 'All hangs, for us, on safety from air attack. Even the wise can understand that.'

J. R. KENNEDY.

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

There has been nothing for centuries like the vogue of political assassination which threatens, if it goes any further, to submerge the civilisation of a continent. The ordinary decencies of public life, the conventions which raise human society above the life of animals, the bonds of family relationship—all these are being swept away by political desperadoes who respect no laws and recognise none of the common obligations of humanity, but who choose to consider that their own particular purpose may and should be achieved by any methods, however barbarous or inhuman. . . . The full story [of Chancellor Dollfuss's assassination by the Nazis] is making the name of Nazi to stink in the nostrils of the world. A system which flourishes on such methods inspires loathing and disgust everywhere. —*The Times*, July 27, 1934.

ON Wednesday, July 25, the train of Nazi aggression against Austria, which had been ignited when the Nazis assumed power in Germany in January of last year and had been sedulously fanned from Berlin and Munich ever since, reached its objective. An explosion of murder and violence at the hands of the Nazis plunged the whole of Austria into civil war. Dr. Dollfuss, who in May 1932, had undertaken the onerous task of preserving Austria's integrity and independence, and who had contrived to restore to a surprising extent her civil and economic order after the economic crisis of 1931 and after the political deadlock between Social-Democrats, *Heimwehr*, and Nazis, was murdered in the study of his chancellery on July 25 by Nazi assassins, who allowed him neither medical nor spiritual ministrations. For the ensuing three or four days war was waged up and down Austria between the well-armed Nazi forces and the combined divisions of Chancellor Dollfuss's 'Patriotic Front'—the army, the police, and the *Heimwehr*—and within a week the Nazi rebellion was crushed. The civilised world was appalled at the dastardly outcome of Nazi aggression against Austrian integrity, with its campaign of vilification, intimidation, and calumny levelled at the late Chancellor himself by officially recognised broadcast propagandists in Munich. For three days the atmosphere in Europe was electric. It seemed to many observers in all countries—at least, to those who could recall the events of late July 1914—as if a second Sarajevo were about to engulf Europe in general

war. Armies were rushed to Austrian frontiers. Foreign Ministers rose in Parliament after Parliament to answer, with grave mien, interpellations on 'the Austrian question.' But the tension subsided, and fears of a general European conflagration passed.

To what were the events, which had so unnerved an entire continent, due? Nazi moral and physical aggression against Austrian independence constituted rather a *causa causata* than the *causa causans*. If we are to seek the real reasons for the late unhappy events in Austria we must go back to nineteenth-century history, to the times when the political philosophies which largely created and almost wholly still inspire the German Nazi movement first emerged. It is pertinent, therefore, to review some of the tendencies in past German-Austrian relations in their bearing on the two factors that have just resulted in the Austrian explosion—namely, the conversion of Germany into a 'totalitarian' (Nazi) State, and the political and economic impotence of post-war Austria.

The seeds of dissension between Prussia and Austria were already sprouting in 1789. In the north, Frederick the Great of Prussia had, by brilliant feats of diplomacy and arms, extended his rule from that of the small principality of Brandenburg to that of a Prussia which was to reach from Tilsit to the Elbe; and it was obvious that if his successors continued his policy and prowess the leadership in the German Confederation, which in 1815 was still held by Austria, would be challenged by Prussia. To this development of Prussia nothing had so much contributed as the crushing defeat which she suffered at the hands of Napoleon at Jena in 1806. This first major disaster which befell the growing Prussian State worked more positive achievements, through the reactions it evoked, than innumerable victories. For it was after Jena that Prussia, in the persons of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Gneisenau, von Stein and Hardenberg, took her own renaissance in hand and set in action that system of political, military and social reforms which, within a decade, was to make her a Power to be reckoned with at the Congress of Vienna. While Metternich persisted in his policies of absolutist repression in the Austrian dominions, the masters of Prussia, spurred on by the utterances of Fichte and Hegel, were rushing the male population through a short-service conscript army, freeing the serfs and making them peasants, and training a bureaucracy of the first order. The experience of Jena, like that of Versailles over a century later, did not work in the end for political liberty; for the forces of reaction in Prussia had as their aim the welding of the young Prussian nation into an efficient striking force as a nation State.

Between 1815 and 1848, Prussia had combined economic

concessions with diplomatic skill and, in the shape of the *Zollverein*, had cast her mantle over all the North and South German States, except Hanover, Hesse, Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe. The first trial of strength between Prussia and Austria came hard on the heels of the 1848 revolutions. A national German Parliament was then set up, to realise German unity; Austria was to be admitted, but not the ramshackle Austrian dominions in Central and South-Eastern Europe. As a result of the Tsar's assistance to the Austrian Emperor, Kossuth's revolt in Hungary had been quelled; and Schwarzenberg had taken over the helm in Austria with a strong hand. His reply to the so-called German Parliament was to attempt to revive the old Germanic *Bund* with Austria, as ever, at its head. This threw the twenty-eight German States into the arms of Prussia. The National Parliament even offered the King of Prussia the crown, as Emperor of Germany, in March 1849. But Frederick William declined; and when Schwarzenberg withdrew the Austrian representatives from the National Parliament, Frederick William also withdrew the Prussian representatives. The effort to create a united North and South Germany, to the exclusion of Austria, had failed.

In 1850 Schwarzenberg moved Austrian troops into Hesse-Cassel, where disorders had arisen, in order to prevent Prussia from acting the rôle of protector in the German States; and there ensued the 'humiliation of Olmütz,' where Schwarzenberg dictated terms to Prussia which enabled him, before the end of the year, to revive the old Germanic Confederation with Austria at its head. But this second victory of Austrian reaction over liberalism was barren; for Prussia still led the North and South German States in the *Zollverein*, from which Austria was excluded. In addition, Schwarzenberg's policy of unification and co-ordination in the Austrian dominions was stirring up dissension in Austria's Italian, Hungarian and Czech territories. Moreover, though Austria still led the Germanic *Bund*, these Austrian dominions were not included. Finally, in 1860, Frederick William of Prussia died, and William I. succeeded. The new king, on the advice of his Minister for War, the famous Albrecht von Roon, sent for a promising diplomat, the Prussian Minister in Paris—Bismarck. Bismarck's policy was to maintain friendly relations with all Powers save with the one for which the reckoning by 'blood and iron' was in preparation. The Austrian proposal for a Germanic Federal Union with a permanent Council in which Prussia, Bavaria and Austria were always to be included came too late.

Within five short years Prussia had risen to the hegemony of the North and South German States. Austria was finally shut out from the new Germany. She had enough to occupy her at home; for Italy was gaining strength, and was soon to become

very much more than that 'geographical expression' at which Metternich had once jeered. After 1866 Austria looked to the south-east; made her *Ausgleich* with Hungary in 1867; penetrated into Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina; and began to work out that somewhat unstable system of cultural autonomy and administrative devolution which kept Vienna the capital of Central Europe right up to 1914. The Austrian system committed grievous faults. Hungary's autonomy after 1867 laid up trouble, for the Magyar leaders oppressed Croats, Serbs, Slovaks and Roumanians within Hungarian territory. And it was one of the ironies of fate that the Austrian heir-apparent, who understood only too well the dangers laid up for the Austrian Empire by the centralisation fanatics of Vienna and by the Magyarisation fanatics of Budapest, should have been murdered at Sarajevo in 1914.

From the date of the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 Austria became almost doomed to economic dependence upon the fortunes of her vastly more powerful northern relation. Though Vienna served as a clearing-house and commercial cross-roads in the very heart of Europe, Austrian industry came under the influence of the growing German trusts and cartels; German business men opened up the Balkans; and even Vienna's *entrepôt* trade began more and more to depend upon German initiative. Austria's heavy industries, particularly, became permeated by German influences and trade connexions; and with heavy industry went foreign policy. Moreover, between 1871 and 1914 there developed that extraordinary Pan-German movement in Austria which, deriving its force both from anti-Semitism and from the antagonism to every non-German element in the heterogeneous Austrian dominions, drew to itself those German Austrians who were dissatisfied with the self-imposed mission of Austria after Sadowa—the civilisation and 'culturisation' of South-Eastern Europe. These Pan-Germans definitely renounced the idea of an independent Austria with a 'ramshackle empire.' They were prepared to join, as Bavaria and Saxony had done in 1871, as a *Land* in the great German Empire of Bismarck, safeguarding, perhaps only for a season, the Habsburg dynasty at Vienna.

It must be remembered that between 1871 and 1890 there was little evidence that the rule of 'blood and iron' was either dangerous or unprofitable. On the bombastic *Machtpolitik* of Treitschke, who exclaimed gleefully just before the war with Austria that 'the decision has passed from ideas and votes to power,' there was reared a whole philosophy of German might and nationalism; and it is hardly surprising that the pure Germans in the Austrian Empire should look longingly at the vast and

increasing economic and political might of their northern relations, rather than to the congeries of petty, quarrelling subject races in Austrian dominions to the south-east. As for Catholicism and Austria's 'culture,' had not Bismarck been worsted by the Vatican in the *Kulturkampf*, and had not Bavaria retained her distinctive culture? Thus, from 1890 to 1914, Austria was a prey to internal dissensions, springing now from the Pan-Germans, with their anti-Semitism, now from the Czechs, and now from the Croats, Slovaks and Roumanians under Magyar rule. When Aehrenthal, with the connivance of Berlin, annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 to safeguard the Berlin-Baghdad railroad and to scotch the Panslav pretensions of the southern Slavs, it became obvious to outside observers that the inevitable drift of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was towards greater and greater dependence upon the policy and resources, economic and military, of Berlin. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was seething with revolt, and, though radical reorganisation might have saved it, had there been no war—Austria would have slowly been forced into vassalage to Berlin.

We now pass to the Germany and Austria of 1919. It has been too long the fashion to talk as if the Treaty of Versailles epitomised all the injustices of peace. Actually, Germany's loss of Alsace-Lorraine was only the righting of the wrong of 1871; her loss of the Corridor could be justified and was carefully weighed beforehand on ethnological grounds; the loss of the Silesian coalfields was perhaps less easy, and her loss of the colonies almost impossible, to justify. Nevertheless Germany emerged in 1919 as a Power less hard hit by territorial provisions than by her own economic wastage during the war. Quite otherwise was the condition of post-war Austria. Shorn of her South Tyrolese, Slav and Magyar territories, which had formed the market for her manufactures, deprived of her sources of raw materials, bereft of any outlet to the sea, and retaining only a straggling strip of territory across Central Europe containing 8,000,000 people, of whom 2,000,000 inhabited the former capital of a vast free-trade empire, Austria's vitality was sapped from the outset. The 2,000,000 who lived in and around Vienna were mainly Social-Democrats, the proletariat of a capital dependent upon exports and *entrepôt* trade for an area which, after 1919, was split up into and among six sovereign States. The Austrian countryside had formerly depended upon tourist traffic from the rest of the former empire, but was now ringed round with ultra-nationalistic neighbours. Tariffs sprang up on all sides, mainly to foster self-sufficiency in the new nation States. Austria's national economy bore the brunt of these developments. She could not export to her full industrial capacity, so that industrial unemployment

became serious; at the same time, owing to her diminished exports, she could not afford to import much of her food, and was therefore forced to embark on the slippery slope of agrarian protectionism, along with all the other succession States; and that was suicidal, since Austria, less than any of them, could hope to become self-sufficient by equilibrating her full industrial capacity with agrarian self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, aided by financial assistance from the Great Powers, she contrived to mask the growing disproportion between her industrial and agrarian capacities, until the crash of 1931 made her economic impotence patent to the world.

The post-war history of Austria should be an object-lesson to Socialists, economic nationalists of all kinds, and, not least, to the Great Powers. For the lack of industrial exports drove Vienna and the manufacturing cities Socialist; while the high cost of living necessitated by agrarian protectionism to safeguard the peasants placed successive Austrian Governments on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the peasants and big farmers, ardently Catholic and mainly monarchists, sorely needed the important German tourist traffic. On the other hand, the Social-Democrat workers of the capital and of the industrial towns were anti-clerical, but no less ardently desirous of a closer link with the seemingly successful Social-Democratic Weimar Germany. Germany had cleansed her Augean stables after the inflation, and on a basis of extreme 'rationalisation' was easily contracting large foreign loans. On the surface Germany appeared to be forging ahead to what seemed a brilliant economic future. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the Austrian Social-Democrats attempted to do likewise. They even made the much-discussed *Anschluss* with Social-Democratic Germany a plank in their political platform. They also contracted foreign loans and embarked on extensive building and public works programmes; and the Christian-Socialists of Austria raised little protest while the going was good.

As time was to show, the 'rationalisation' and capital-import boom of Germany was raised on unsound foundations. But the rottenness of Austria's economic foundations was even more apparent. In 1928 raw material prices first began to fall; the record wheat harvest of that year hit the Danubian countries extremely hard, and as prices fell, and the proceeds of their exports fell with them, their purchases of Austrian exports were severely curtailed. As Austria's exports declined, as the prices of her peasants' produce also fell, and as the tourist traffic fell, unemployment rose, and the burden of Austria's debt structure increased. Political divisions in Austria became more acute. Already in 1927 the general strike of the Social-Democrats and

their attack on the Law Courts in Vienna had led to fighting with the *Heimwehr*, a nationalist armed force largely financed by 'big business.' This force was originally intended to protect Austrian frontiers and to combat Socialism in Austria; and it had as its leader in Upper Austria the young Prince Starhemberg. The Socialists wanted the *Anschluss*. But a strong and influential body of opinion ever since 1919 had centred upon Dr. Seipel, the Catholic priest who had become Christian-Socialist Chancellor. Dr. Seipel hoped to make of post-war Austria, in time, a centre of Catholic culture and toleration in Central Europe; and he hoped, also in time, that the Habsburgs would once more be seated on the throne in Vienna. Dr. Seipel found in the *Heimwehr* a body of sympathetic, patriotic, Catholic listeners—among them Prince Starhemberg. And gradually, around the increasingly Fascist *Heimwehr* as a nucleus, there assembled all the 'cultural' forces of old Austria: Habsburg legitimists, anti-Socialists, 'big business,' militant Catholic patriots, opposed to an *Anschluss* with a materialist, Socialist Germany.

In Germany the Nazi star first came into the ascendant in 1930; and with it came talk of one vast German State, incorporating every pure German from the Low Countries to Russia and from the Baltic to the Adriatic seas. The Nazi headquarters were in the Brown House at Munich, very near to Vienna; and the Nazis began to extend their activities in Austria itself, working from a Brown House in Vienna. The Austrian workers at first flirted with the Nazis, seeing in them a possible foil to the increasing strength of the *Heimwehr*. But the course of events in Germany gradually disillusioned the Austrian workers, who, to their great discomfort, found themselves between the upper and nether millstones. On the one hand, the *Heimwehr* was gaining political power; on the other, so were also the Nazis. The question was, which way would the Christian-Socialists go? Very soon the Socialists of Vienna realised that the Christian-Socialists were Austrian Catholics first and Socialists not at all. From the moment, in 1930, when Dr. Schober was overthrown by Herr Vaugoin, the Minister for War, the die was cast; for Prince Starhemberg of the *Heimwehr* was made Minister of the Interior in the Vaugoin Cabinet. Henceforward the *Heimwehr* had little need to threaten a *Putsch* against the Socialists of Vienna and the 'talking-shop' of Parliament. They had done so once, in 1929, when they drew the threat of open intervention in Austria from the Powers. The *Heimwehr* did, it is true, prepare a *Putsch* in November 1930, and, though the Vaugoin Cabinet were ready to permit it, the news leaked out; the Powers again threatened intervention, and Prince Starhemberg resigned. But the *Heimwehr* went ahead with its armaments and organisation;

and it was clear from the elections of November 1930, when the Socialists obtained seventy-two seats against sixty-six of the Christian-Socialists and eight of the *Heimwehr*, that parliamentarism in Austria had already produced a deadlock. Henceforth both the Socialists and the *Heimwehr* prepared for a decision by force of arms. While these internal dissensions were sapping Austria's energies, the economic crisis was intensifying, and the Nazis were driving a wedge into Austrian politics. Then, in May 1931 came the crash of the *Creditanstalt* and the economic blizzard was let loose over Central Europe.

Dr. Dollfuss took over the Chancellorship from Dr. Schober on May 20, 1932; but the parliamentary deadlock continued. In August of that year came the sweeping success of the Nazis in the German elections. In January of 1933 Hitler was in power. And on March 9, 1933, after the *Gleichschaltung* of Saxony, Baden and Württemberg, Bavaria, the Catholic and cultural stronghold, whose Government said it would fight for its independence as a German *Land*, capitulated to the Nazi 'co-ordinator,' General von Epp. Henceforth Munich became the centre of Nazi activities against Austria and against its Government. Already on March 19, 1933, the new Nazi Minister of Justice in Bavaria, the notorious Dr. Frank, made violent speeches against the Austrian Government, openly stating that General von Epp would, perhaps, be entrusted with looking after Austrian affairs. This first official declaration of German Nazi aims in Austria provoked reactions which were soon to end in tragedy. Dr. Dollfuss's Government arranged co-operation between the army, the gendarmerie and the *Heimwehr* to defend Austria's frontiers; and, as a result of the political deadlock in Austria, Parliament 'put itself out of action' by the collective resignations of Speaker and both Vice-Speakers. From that time until his death Dr. Dollfuss ruled without a paralysed Parliament.

Meanwhile, the Nazi agitation and terrorism in Austria increased. In April 1933 the Styrian *Heimatschutz*, among whose leaders was Dr. Rintelen, acknowledged Hitler as their leader, and made common cause with the Nazis. Early in May the Nazi Bavarian Minister of Justice, Dr. Frank, the Nazi President of the Prussian Diet, and other officials announced that they were flying to Vienna on the invitation of Austrian Nazi leaders. Though Dr. Frank was officially informed on arrival that his visit was 'not considered very desirable,' he spoke at Graz, the capital of Styria, promising his hearers that they would receive an early visit from Herr Hitler, and asserting that his own visit was for the people of Austria. He was then deported from Austria threatening reprisals. The *Reich* Government raised the *visa* fee for Germans visiting Austria to the prohibitive figure of £50 (gold)

per head. This was the first German Nazi reprisal, and it was a serious blow to Dr. Dollfuss, for it deprived the Austrian peasants of their income from the annual influx of German tourists; the peasant districts consequently became sympathetic towards a Nazi Government, or rather to the *Anschluss*, which would bring back the German tourists. In June 1933 a murderous attempt was made on Herr Steidle, a *Heimwehr* leader and member of the Provincial Government, at Innsbruck. His Nazi assailants escaped into Germany; but leading Innsbruck Nazis were arrested, among them being the notorious Herr Habicht, whom the German Nazi Government had appointed as their Press attaché at the German Legation in Vienna in order to secure his diplomatic immunity. He was promptly deported, and began his campaign of vilification and incitement against the Dollfuss Government from Munich, where he was styled Herr Hitler's 'Inspector-General for Austria.'

Outrages in Styria and Carinthia in June finally led Dr. Dollfuss to proscribe the Nazi Party, its uniforms and badges, and to place all Austria's defensive forces, except the army, under Major Fey, the Minister of Public Security, and the leader of the Vienna *Heimwehr*. Thus the forces of the *Heimwehr* and of the Catholic Christian-Socialists—the *Ostmärkische Sturmsharen*—became vital to Austria's independence. But the inclusion of Prince Starhemberg and Major Fey, with their Fascist leanings, and with the whole force of the *Heimwehr* behind them, meant that the chances for the Social-Democrats of Vienna and their force, the *Schutzbund*, looked grim. By July 1933 the Social-Democrats realised that they were bound to be crushed, either, as their German fellow-Socialists had been crushed, by the Nazis, or by their inveterate enemies, the Fascist-Monarchist *Heimwehr*.

On October 12, 1933, Dr. Dollfuss finally incorporated the *Heimwehr* in the 'Patriotic Front' which he had formed against the Nazis; and from that date the *Heimwehr*, in the persons of Prince Starhemberg and Major Fey, gave the new Constitution of Austria a Fascist hue. In October, also, the Nazi outrages increased, culminating in an attempt on the life of the Chancellor by a young man who was proved to have been a member of the Nazi Party. On January 8, 1934, the Government announced that in ten days 140 outrages with explosives had been perpetrated; and on January 11 Major Fey was appointed chief of all the executive forces in Austria. The Austrian Government made diplomatic representations in Berlin. They availed nothing. So on February 5 it was decided to appeal to the League of Nations. Signor Mussolini, however, did not wish at that moment to be embroiled with Berlin over Austria, and the appeal was postponed. The Austrian *Heimwehr* mobilised, and on February 12

they proceeded to seize the Socialists' strongholds all over Austria. The Social-Democrats of Austria went down fighting. But Dr. Dollfuss was henceforth entirely dependent on the armed forces of his colleagues, Prince Starhemberg and Major Fey. After the first plunge into civil war in Austria, in February of this year, Prince Starhemberg became Vice-Chancellor and Major Fey Minister of Public Security.

The extent to which the Austrian Nazi movement was directly fostered and controlled from Nazi Germany is hardly realised. As early as July 5, 1933, Herr Habicht, who had only just been deported from Austria, broadcast a manifesto from Munich denouncing Dr. Dollfuss as a traitor, and urging Austria to follow Nazi Germany's example and unite with the Third Reich. On February 19 of this year he even went so far as to broadcast an 'ultimatum' to the Dollfuss Government offering an eight days' truce from Nazi terrorism. If at its expiry the Austrian Government had not admitted the Nazis into full co-operation in the State, the struggle would be resumed. For such an 'ultimatum' in peace-time, on a matter of internal politics, from one State to another, there can hardly be any parallel in modern times.

But that is not all. A legion of renegade Austrian Nazis has been quartered in Bavaria, just a few miles off the German frontier, for upwards of a year. It was variously reported as being from 10,000 to 40,000 strong; it had been fed, equipped, and drilled by German Nazis, awaiting a successful Nazi *Putsch* in Austria, when, so it was said, it would march over as a 'liberating legion' into Austria. This legion was making warlike preparations just before the recent Nazi revolt in Austria; but when it was learned that the Austrian Nazis who had captured the Chancellery and murdered the Chancellor had secured the intervention of the German Minister in Vienna, Dr. Rieth, in order to obtain their free passage to Germany, Dr. Rieth was hastily recalled for 'having exceeded his instructions,' and the Austrian legion in Bavaria was as hastily confined to barracks and disbanded by German S.S. men. Further, on the remnants of bombs exploded in Austria were found the words '*Heereswaffenamt, Berlin*' (Army Munition Dépôt, Berlin). Again, on July 22 last—only three days before the assassination of Dr. Dollfuss—a motor-boat, seized in Swiss waters on Lake Constance, was found to be carrying arms and explosives into Austria from the German Nazi headquarters in Lindau, and the Swiss Government protested forthwith in Berlin.

Nothing, however, is quite so damaging as the instructions issued by the official Nazi *Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro* to all German papers, at 10.45 a.m. on the fatal day, July 25—i.e., before the capture of the Vienna broadcast station and of the Chancellery by

the Nazis—that 'all reports of to-day's events in Austria must be published in the form communicated by the *Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro*.' Within half an hour of the Nazis' capture of the Austrian Chancellery, that German Press agency announced to the German papers that

The people have risen to judge the Government of Dollfuss . . . it is the whole people in Austria who have revolted. . . . The new Government will see to it that order is restored, and that Pan-Germanism is given a home also in German Austria.

This report was subsequently withdrawn; Herr Habicht was dismissed for 'circulating unreliable reports on Austria'; but the report appeared in *The Times* of July 30. That the German Nazi authorities were counting on a successful Nazi revolt in Austria seems reasonably certain. That the sudden appointment by President Miklas of Dr. Schuschnigg, the Catholic-Monarchist leader of the *Ostmärkische Sturmsharen*, as the head of an Austrian provisional Government on Dr. Dollfuss's death, checkmated the Austrian Nazis is equally certain. For, from that moment, Major Fey's worth as a hostage in the beleaguered Chancellery declined; Dr. Schuschnigg took over the reins; the army, *Heimwehr*, and police proved loyal to the provisional Government—not to Major Fey in the Chancellery—and the arrival of Prince Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor, spelled the end of the Nazis' attempt to abolish Austrian independence.

Austria is still independent, though the Nazi movement has not been wiped out—indeed, its activity continues; but the victory of Austrians for Austria's sake has not been possible without the support of the Great Powers. In February France, Italy, and Great Britain made a joint declaration 'as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant Treaties.' These Powers had previously (August 1933) made representations in Berlin about the Nazi activities against Austria; and in the same month they had agreed to an increase of 8000 men in the Austrian standing army. But it was obvious to Dr. Dollfuss that the utmost France could do was to press her Little Entente allies—Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia—to be reasonable, while he marshalled whatever external aid of an economic and material order he could find. It was equally obvious that the British Government would provide him with little beyond fair words; indeed, a few days after Dr. Dollfuss's assassination, the British Foreign Minister was saying in one and the same breath that his Government stood by the Three-Power Declaration of February 17, but that 'the question of intervention in Austria did not arise.'

It was natural, therefore, that Dr. Dollfuss, in the last few months of his life, should have turned more and more to, and drawn closer and closer in co-operation with, the one Power for whom a Nazi *coup d'état* in Austria would have been most damaging—Italy. Frequent visits to Signor Mussolini gave Dr. Dollfuss the assurance of Italian support; and the longer the Nazi terrorism continued, the more outspoken became the usually docile Italian Press in matters affecting Nazi Germany. Herr Hitler's meeting with the Duce in Venice in June was the occasion for an 'understanding' that Austria's independence should be secured. Indeed, Signor Mussolini could be under no illusions as to the fate of the (Italian) South Tyrol once Austria had been incorporated, in fact or in form, in the Nazi 'Third Reich.' But the 'understanding' between Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini proved inadequate. After the tragedy of July the vials of Signor Mussolini's wrath were poured out upon German Nazidom. To words Signor Mussolini added deeds, as he had promised Dr. Dollfuss. Four Italian army corps, with air squadrons, were moved up to the Italo-Austrian frontiers; and this, more than any other news, in all probability brought home to Herr Hitler, to the Wilhelmstrasse, and to the more sober and realistic *Reichswehr*, what the consequences of Nazi aggression against Austria might prove to be. The German Nazi authorities did all in their power to absolve themselves from 'any responsibility for the recent events in Austria.' Their *volte-face* was so precipitate as to confirm the world's worst suspicions.

What is to become of Austria? The answer depends, as it has depended ever since 1919, on the answers to two further queries. What can give Austria political stability? And what can give her sufficient economic vitality to maintain political stability? Austria's political stability in the immediate future seems as remote as ever. The Socialists' memories of last February's civil war will not die easily. And, although there is good reason to believe that the Nazis to-day form only a small minority of the population, they, and their agitation, must be reckoned with. The new Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, himself a devout Catholic, the successor of Dr. Seipel, and a friend of Cardinal Innitzer, cannot renounce the Catholic Corporate State. And the *Heimwehr* is the real guardian of Austria's integrity. The new Constitution cannot be jettisoned, and the Socialists, at least, must be reconciled to it. Already Herr Seitz, the Socialist leader and former Burgomaster of Vienna, has been set at liberty; and, if this is an earnest of the new Government's attitude to Socialists and workers, it may be that their leaders will be enabled to co-operate in the new Constitution, in order to

save themselves from a worse fate under the Nazis. Here is an opportunity, on both sides, to collaborate in a task upon the success of which the existence of Austria depends; and there is evidence that Prince Starhemberg is now more sympathetic to the workers than either he or Major Fey were at the end of last year.

It is rather the second query, as to Austria's economic *Lebensfähigkeit*, which is crucial. The economic accords concluded last March between Austria, Hungary, and Italy, though they promise Austria slightly increased exports and, more significantly, the use of Trieste as a port, do not offer hopes of a sufficiently rapid expansion of Austrian exports to redress the serious loss of German markets and German tourist traffic. (Herr Hitler's protestations of amity and good-will towards Austria, notably through the mouth of his new Minister to Vienna, Herr von Papen, have so far not been carried out in practice to the point of abolishing the prohibitive *visa* duty on Germans visiting Austria.) Economic nationalism of the most rabid kind in the other Danubian succession States still persists, in spite of the invitation of Signor Mussolini to other Powers in the Danube basin to accede to the March Protocols. The three Little Entente States have their own permanent economic council, as well as a permanent council on foreign affairs. No sign of concerted economic action is yet visible in the Danubian basin. In such circumstances the recent visit of Prince Starhemberg to Ostia, where he conversed with Signor Mussolini and Signor Suvich, is significant. It is reported that Signor Mussolini has agreed to continue to help Austria with deeds; and it is understood that 'deeds' now mean financial assistance to defray the costs (a) of the February civil war, (b) of the suppression of the Nazi *Putsch* in July, and (c) of the maintenance of the Austrian *Heimwehr* in the future. If this be true, Italy has gratuitously assumed for the present the financial burden which the Great Powers have been compelled periodically to shoulder on Austria's behalf ever since 1919. But the economic foundation which Italy will afford Austria is of the flimsiest nature, hardly calculated to withstand great stresses in the future. Moreover, Italian patronage alone is irksome to patriotic Austrians, who feel that, after all, they have more in common with the Germans.

It would appear that Austria to-day is at the cross-roads. She can only proceed as an independent State if she can effectively collaborate in a much wider economic territorial unit. Ever since the war her economic destinies have seemed bound up with Germany's economic and political development. Germany's adoption of Nazism and of the 'totalitarian' State has made Austria feel more Austrian than German; and her independence

seems to her worth preserving. To France, Italy, and indirectly to this country, too, Austrian independence is worth preserving; for the *Anschluss* in the present state of Europe means war. But there seems little hope of that wider economic area in which alone Austria can find salvation. Without it, indeed, no degree of internal political stability can be achieved—not even by the restoration of Otto of Habsburg, in the teeth of the three Little Entente States—for post-war Austria has reached the limits of her independent economic endurance.

It is to this question—shelved time and again, since 1919, by the temporary expedient of a fresh international loan—that the Great Powers should address themselves. Italy and Hungary alone cannot provide what Austria most needs—export markets and tourists. Germany will only provide them on Nazi terms. Herr Schuschnigg's forthcoming visits to Rome, Paris, and London will provide an opportunity to repair the damage done to Austria since the war, and a test of the Great Powers' pretensions about Austria's independence. If the last opportunity is missed, it may well be that an exhausted Austria may drop into the lap of Nazi Germany, without a sign of the Nazi aggression so patent in recent months. If Italy could but urge her ally, Hungary, into a Danubian economic union; if France could only influence her Little Entente allies to enter the same system; if Great Britain could forego certain already evaded most-favoured-nation rights; and if all three Great Powers could agree not to exploit that union for their own purposes, then there would be hope for Austria's independence and integrity. But what do these Powers want with Austria? And how far are they prepared to act in common to achieve it? That is the Austrian question.

D. GRAHAM HUTTON.

LHASA : A RETROSPECT

ON September 7, 1904, there was signed in the Potala at Lhasa the first treaty concluded between the British and Tibetans. But the Tibetans had strongly opposed the despatch of a mission to the sacred capital of their secluded country. Force had to be used to overcome this opposition. And the use of force had been condemned by many in the British Parliament. The Tibetans had a perfect right to their isolation, it was contended, and the use of force could not advance our commerce or enable us to make friends with them. This contention made at the time of the despatch of the mission has been repeated since. In a recently published history of the British in India¹ the Mission to Tibet is spoken of as a military expedition and characterised as 'the least justifiable of all England's little wars, forced upon an essentially pacific and practically unarmed race.' So before this latest pronouncement passes into the final verdict of history let England judge for herself of her action in 1904 by comparing the state of British relations with Tibet during the thirty years previous to the despatch of the mission to Lhasa with the attitude of the Tibetans towards the British during the thirty years since the conclusion of the treaty.

In the year 1873 the Government of Bengal, one of the three Provinces of India which border on Tibet, thought that opportunity might be taken to develop commercial intercourse with Tibet. A century before this Warren Hastings had sent first Bogle and then Turner to establish commercial relations with the Tashi Lama, and they had been quite favourably received: it was only through pressure from the Chinese that the Tibetans had not come to an agreement. And now the successor of Warren Hastings thought these efforts might be renewed. He was led to believe that the Tibetans themselves had no ill-will to foreigners and would, if allowed, gladly receive Europeans. Tea plantations were then growing up round Darjiling and in Assam. The Tibetans were great tea drinkers; and the Bengal Government thought that profit might accrue from the interchange of tea,

¹ *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, by Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.).

Manchester and Birmingham goods, and Indian indigo with wool, sheep, cattle, Tibetan cloths and other commodities from Tibet. The matter was taken up with the Chinese Government, who three years later undertook to protect any mission which should be sent to Tibet. But no attempt was made to send a mission till 1885, when Mr. Colman Macaulay, Secretary of the Government of Bengal, pressed the idea of sending a commercial mission to Lhasa. He went to Peking itself and succeeded in getting the necessary permit, but while he was organising his mission at Darjiling the whole enterprise was countermanded because the Chinese had not willingly given their assent, and their agreement to a convention in regard to Burma was considered by the British Foreign Office to be more important.

There followed an unexpected result. Evidently the Lhasa lamas had been alarmed at the extent of the preparations being made for the contemplated mission. Thousands of Tibetan troops had been collected on the frontier, and had even crossed it and occupied a post 18 miles on the Indian side. And on hearing that the mission was abandoned they became so elated that they boasted they would occupy Darjiling. The Government of India attempted through the Chinese Government to procure the withdrawal of the Tibetans. Then, a year having elapsed without the Chinese having been able to effect that withdrawal, a letter was written to the Tibetan commander warning him that if he did not evacuate his position in three months' time he would be expelled by force. But the letter was returned unopened, and a similar letter written to the Dalai Lama himself was likewise sent back. The British thereupon assumed the offensive, and the Tibetans for the time being retired. But two months later they attacked the British camp with 3000 men, and, though they were repulsed, they for the third time crossed the border in September 1888 and in a single night threw up a wall 3 miles long some distance within the British border. Again the British had to take the offensive: they attacked this wall on the following day, dispersed the Tibetans and pursued them over the border.

This series of Tibetan aggressions roused Government to make energetic protests to the Chinese suzerains of Tibet, with the result that at length the Chinese sent a representative to the frontier to effect a settlement and assured the Government of India that they 'would be able to enforce in Tibet the terms of the treaty.' Eventually in 1890 a convention was signed laying down the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, and by December 1893 regulations regarding trade were agreed to. On May 1, 1894, a trade mart at Yatung, a place just immediately inside the Tibetan border, was to be 'opened for all British subjects for

purposes of trade.' Seemingly a start would at last be made with what the Government of Bengal had been urging for twenty years, the development of trade between Bengal and Tibet. But expectations were not to be fulfilled. The Tibetans asserted that the treaty was signed by the British and Chinese and they had nothing to do with it. In any case, they maintained that they had a right to impose what taxes they chose at Phari, a few marches inside the frontier, so long as goods were allowed to pass Yatung free. Attempts by the British in conjunction with the Chinese to lay down boundary pillars were also frustrated. The pillars that were erected were knocked down by the Tibetans. And, as to the Chinese, they appeared to have no authority whatever over the Tibetans, and at any rate did not exercise it. They had formerly been feared to a certain extent because they had sent armies through Tibet and even across the Himalaya into Nepal. But they now had only a few hundreds of troops in Tibet, and they had had experience of the turbulence of the monks in the great monasteries, for these monks had attacked them in formidable riots in 1810 and 1844, and had attacked the Nepalese in 1883. So when at the end of five years from the signing of the trade regulations the Home Government asked for a report as to progress made, the Bengal Government had to reply that the boundary had not yet been demarcated and that the trade stipulations had been inoperative: Yatung was in no sense a trade mart.

Upon receiving this report it seemed to Lord Salisbury that as during recent years Chinese advisory authority in Tibet had been little more than nominal, it would be preferable to open direct communication between the Government of India and the Tibetan authorities. Accordingly, in 1899 Lord Curzon, who was now Viceroy of India, made a series of attempts to open up direct communication with the Tibetan authorities. But each failed. And now a new development occurred. While the Viceroy of India was making effort after effort to get into communication with the Dalai Lama and was each time being repulsed, the Dalai Lama was having direct communication with the Tsar of Russia. In October 1900 it was announced in the *St. Petersburg official Gazette* that the Tsar had received a certain Dorjjeff, and the Russian newspapers said that this Dorjjeff was a Russian subject, a Buddhist Siberian, who had been settled for twenty years in Tibet and who was now charged by the Dalai Lama with the task of establishing good relations with Russia. The Russian Foreign Minister assured the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that though Dorjjeff was described as the envoy extraordinary of the Dalai Lama his mission had no diplomatic or political character: it was of the same character as those sent

by the Pope to the faithful in many lands, and was concerned with religion, not with politics. And this may have been—and, indeed, subsequently proved to be—perfectly true. None the less, the practical effect as regards the British in India was serious. The Russians were at that time very much in the ascendant in Asia, and had not yet been defeated by the Japanese. For some years they had been steadily moving southward. They had been absorbing the khanates up to the borders of Afghanistan. They had annexed the Pamirs, sent several semi-scientific expeditions to Tibet, overrun Manchuria and seized Port Arthur. It was commonly believed that it was only a matter of time before they established themselves in Chinese Turkistan and Mongolia. Reports reached the British Minister in Peking that they were making a secret agreement with China in regard to Tibet. And the result was that the Tibetans themselves—or at any rate, the Dalai Lama and his intimate advisers—came to think that they could look upon the Tsar as their protector and snap their fingers at both the Chinese and the British. This might have embarrassing consequences. For the Himalayan range, though difficult of passage, is not impassable. The Tibetans themselves had brought two or three thousand men across it only a few years previously. And in the previous century the Chinese, with Tibetan assistance, had made a wonderful march into Nepal across the Himalaya. A truculent Tibet, believing it had the support of Russia, might cause the British considerable anxiety as regards Nepal, Bhutan, and other States situated on the Indian side of the Himalaya but in direct relationship with Tibet. It was not precisely a danger, but it was a trouble which any Government responsible for keeping the frontier in order must take account of and provide against.

Since 1873 the Government of India had been striving to regularise the intercourse with Tibet. Now they revived the proposal abandoned in 1886—of sending a mission to settle our future relations with Tibet; and in April 1903 His Majesty's Government approved of a proposal by the Viceroy that a mission should be sent to Khamba Jong, situated a few miles on the Tibetan side of the frontier, to meet Chinese and Tibetan representatives. No proposal for the establishment of a British Agent either at Lhasa or Gyantse was to be made, as such a political outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate with any benefits which might be gained; but negotiations on questions concerning trade relations, the frontier and grazing rights might be undertaken. All the efforts of thirty years were now brought to a focus—the efforts of seventeen years to obtain an agreement and of thirteen years to get that agreement observed. For years the British had acquiesced in

the denial of all those rights of intercourse which usually subsist between neighbouring States. For years they had borne with the repudiation of the Convention which had been so laboriously negotiated. Now the limits of forbearance had been reached. The foundation of all intercourse between States has necessarily to be the observance and maintenance of treaties. The British could not allow a treaty which had been entered into with such deliberation to be ignored and repudiated. Were this permitted, their influence in the neighbouring States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan would inevitably suffer decay. The relations between India and her northern neighbour must be put on a permanently satisfactory basis. And this was the main object of the mission which was now despatched to Tibet.

Colonel Francis Younghusband, of the Indian Political Service, was appointed Commissioner in charge of this mission, and with him was associated Mr. J. C. White, who had served for many years on the Sikkim frontier, and Mr. E. C. Wilton, of the Chinese Consular Service, while Captain O'Connor was appointed secretary and interpreter. In accordance with the usual practice of the Government of India in sending missions to regions across the border where protection might not otherwise be available, an escort of 200 Indian troops was provided. And with the cognisance and consent of the Chinese Government, whose suzerainty was recognised throughout, the whole mission assembled at Khamba Jong in July 1903. Here both some Tibetan delegates from Lhasa and a Chinese official met them. But the Tibetan delegates declined to report to Lhasa a speech which the British Commissioner made or to accept a copy of it, translated into Tibetan, which he handed to them. They took exception to the presence of the Commissioner's escort in Tibetan territory, though all the time Tibetan troops were occupying a position at Giagong, on the Indian side of the frontier line laid down by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. And in any case, neither the Lhasa delegates nor the Chinese official were of sufficient position or empowered with sufficient authority to conduct negotiations. No progress, therefore, could be made at Khamba Jong, and, in view of this conduct of the Tibetans, His Majesty's Government felt that it would be impossible not to take action. They accordingly sanctioned the advance of the mission to Gyantse, half way to Lhasa, though they laid down that this should not be allowed to lead to occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form: it was to be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction for the breaches of the Convention, and as soon as reparation was obtained a withdrawal was to be effected.

The escort to the mission was now very considerably increased.

It was to consist of three battalions of Indian infantry, two British mountain-battery guns, two companies of sappers and miners, two machine-guns and two seven-pounders. This escort was put under the command of Brigadier-General Macdonald. But, in pursuance of the aim of Government to preserve the essentially diplomatic character of the undertaking, the charge of the whole was to be retained by the Commissioner. It was now November. Winter was beginning, and it had hitherto been assumed that early summer must be awaited before an advance across the Himalaya could be made. But the Commissioner and Major Bretherton, the very energetic and capable supply and transport officer attached to the mission escort, had had experience of Himalayan passes in winter, and the Commissioner recommended to Government that the advance should not be delayed. If the Himalayan passes were crossed in the depth of winter, it would be proof to the Tibetans that their country was accessible at all times of the year. If advance were delayed till after the spring, the Tibetans would think that they would only have to be obstructive through the summer and the mission would be compelled to withdraw on the approach of the next winter. It would be a diplomatic advantage to advance at once.

The Government of India agreed, and in December the advance began. But this time it was made through the Chumbi Valley from Yatung, and the mission and its original escort were withdrawn from Khamba Jong. The Jelap-la, 14,390 feet, into Tibetan territory, was crossed on December 12. It was a bare, rocky ridge with a steep ascent and sharp descent. Snow was lying on it, and the march was trying to troops and transport. Also, one coolie corps struck work and many local men deserted, for now and through the succeeding months the opinion was prevalent on the frontier that the mission was advancing to its doom—a feeling which was indeed shared by many in England; for Lord Rosebery in the House of Lords had spoken of its bearing a melancholy resemblance to the war in Afghanistan, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in the House of Commons had said that the associations connected with the name of Cavagnari did not invite us to undertake a similar policy again. No opposition was met with on the pass itself, but on the following day at Yatung, as the Commissioner was passing through the gateway, a small official seized the bridle of his pony and protested against his entry. The Tibetan general and a local Chinese official joined in the protest and urged the Commissioner to go back to Sikkim, where the Chinese resident and Tibetan councillors would come to discuss matters. But it did not strike the Commissioner that the Tibetan general himself particularly objected to the arrival

of the British. The crowd which collected was quite good-humoured. And during the next few days as the mission proceeded up the Chumbi Valley it was found that the villages were ready to bring in supplies of grass, buckwheat, turnips and potatoes for purchase, and to hire out their mules and ponies, while the women and children who had run away to the hills returned to their homes in perfect confidence. The outlook was more promising than had been expected. But at Phari, at the head of the Chumbi Valley, things took a very different turn. Representatives from the three great monasteries at Lhasa and a general from Lhasa had arrived. They said they would discuss nothing until the mission went back to Yatung, and they prevented the people from bringing in supplies. A Chinese official deputed from Lhasa also told the Commissioner that it was impossible to get the Tibetans to do anything, and they would pay no respect to the Chinese as they were so fully convinced that they could rely upon Russian support.

It was under these conditions and with the thermometer 18 degrees below zero that the advance was made on January 8 across the Himalaya by the Tang-la, 15,200 feet high, on to the Tibetan plateau. The local people, and even the Chinese, thought the British were advancing to their destruction. They were not impressed by the number of the British and Indian troops. They knew there were thousands of Tibetan troops on the far side of the pass. They believed that the new Lhasa-made rifles would be more effective than the old Tibetan weapons. Also, the troops had charms from the lamas against British bullets. And behind all was the Dalai Lama with his supernatural power, against which no British force could possibly prevail. On the Tibetan side of the Himalaya there is a descent of only 200 feet, and the mission and a flying column from the main escort encamped at Tuna, still 15,000 feet above sea level. A Tibetan force was close at hand and a night attack at any time might be expected. Fortunately, none was made, and General Macdonald, after establishing the mission with 500 men in a walled enclosure, returned across the pass with the remainder to make preparations in Chumbi for the further advance to Gyantse.

While these were going forward the Commissioner determined to make efforts to get in touch with the Tibetans. So far he had had no real conversation with responsible men. He had not been able to get the 'feel' of them and understand where the difficulties lay. He therefore decided to leave his escort and, accompanied only by Captain O'Connor, the interpreter, ride without warning into the Tibetan camp, about 14 miles distant in the village of Guru. Arrived there, Tibetan soldiers and villagers were found strolling about, but they showed no sign of

animosity and readily took the British officers to the house in which the Lhasa general was located. Nor did the Lhasa general show any ill-feeling. He and the Shigatse generals were perfectly courteous and conducted the Commissioner into a room in which three Lhasa lamas were seated. But here at once a difference was observable. The lamas made no attempt to rise from their cushions and made a barely civil salutation. Tea was now served and cushions placed for the British officers on the right side of the Lhasa general. The British Commissioner then explained that he had come over in this informal manner in order to see if there were any means by which a peaceful settlement could be reached. He said the British could quite understand the Tibetans wishing to keep themselves to themselves, but the situation had become very unneighbourly, for, whereas the British allowed the Tibetans to travel and trade and reside in India with perfect freedom, the Tibetans prevented British and Indians alike from travelling or trading in Tibet; and while they refused to receive letters from even the Viceroy, they were sending letters and presents to the Tsar of Russia. This, the British Commissioner said, was a one-sided arrangement which the British Government wished to have altered: they wanted to make an amicable agreement for trade and intercourse with the Tibetans; and that was the object with which the mission had been sent.

The Lhasa general replied that all the people of Tibet had a covenant that no Europeans were ever to be allowed to enter their country. The lamas, corroborating, said that their religion must be preserved. And both generals and lamas said that no negotiations could take place there: the mission must go back to Yatung. The Commissioner asked that, anyhow, what he had said might be reported to Lhasa. They replied that they could not even report that they had seen him. In that case, said the Commissioner, he must now return to his camp. 'No,' said the lamas, 'you must stop here till you promise to return to India with all your troops.' The situation became critical. A general left the room. Trumpets sounded outside. And attendants closed round the British officers. But the Lhasa general was not so inimical as the lamas. And when the Commissioner said that he, like they, had to obey orders, and that all he could do was to report to his Government what had occurred and await instructions, they eventually agreed to the suggestion that he should return to his camp for this purpose. The tension was relieved; and, though the lamas continued surly and remained seated, the generals were still courteous and conducted the Commissioner to the outer door. Risk had been run, but the Commissioner had satisfied himself as to the true position of affairs. The common

people had no ill-feeling. The higher class laymen, as represented by the generals and their officers, were not unfriendly. The obstruction came from the lamas: they wished, as they expressed it, to preserve their religion.

After his return to Tuna the Commissioner occupied himself with the question of Bhutan. Bhutan lay on his right flank. The people are of the same race as the Tibetans and of the same religion, and look to the Dalai Lama as their spiritual lord. And as they had had no relations with the British for many years and had grossly insulted the last British official who had entered their country, it might have been expected that they would align themselves with the Tibetans rather than with the British. To test their attitude the Commissioner had entered into communication with the Bhutan chief, with the result that a Bhutanese official of standing had come to his camp at Tuna. To him the Commissioner explained the British attitude, and he became so interested that he volunteered to go over to the Tibetans and persuade them to be more reasonable. He failed to make any impression, but later on the chief himself joined the mission and accompanied it to Lhasa, where, as we shall later see, he was of the greatest assistance.

By the end of March General Macdonald, having completed all military arrangements for the further move forward to Gyantse, arrived at Tuna with a total force of about 1200 men. The Tibetans had also received reinforcements and had built a wall across the road to Lhasa and erected *sangars* on the hill-side above it. A collision might therefore be expected. But the Commissioner, in accordance with the spirit of his official instructions and with the express personal injunctions of Lord Curzon, was anxious up to the last moment to work for a peaceable solution. He therefore, on the previous day, gave warning to the Tibetans that an advance was going to be made. When within 1000 yards of the Tibetan position he halted and invited the Tibetan generals to a final parley, when he assured them that the British would not attack them if they did not attack the British, but insisted that the road must be left clear for the British advance. Their only reply was that the British must go back to the frontier. The Commissioner reminded them that the British had for fourteen years tried to get matters settled inside the frontier, but without avail; now an advance must be made to Gyantse in the hopes that there responsible negotiators might arrive to make a settlement. Time would be given to them to return and withdraw their troops from the wall. After that the British troops would advance. This definite warning was given to the Tibetans. But they were not in the least alarmed at the prospect. They were in superior numbers, in a strong position,

and had the supernatural power of the Dalai Lama behind them. So why should they withdraw?

When the period of grace had expired the Commissioner authorised the advance of the troops, with the reservation that there should be no firing till the Tibetans fired. The first shot must come from the Tibetans. It was much to ask of troops, because it would mean that they would lose all the advantage of long-range gun and rifle fire. But it was one last effort in the cause of peace. Accordingly the British advanced without firing, while the Tibetans remained behind their walls, also without firing, till the two came straight against each other with only the wall between them. The Commissioner again saw the Tibetan general and told him that the British would have to disarm his men. Then the attempt to disarm began. But as the arms were being seized the Tibetan general fired his revolver. Other Tibetans fired their matchlocks. The British then opened fire. For half a moment the situation was critical for the British, as the Tibetans were in superior numbers and might have swarmed over the wall and borne them down. But the moment passed. The accurate fire of the British told, and in a few minutes hundreds were killed and wounded. It was a dreadful incident, but by no possibility could it be avoided. General Macdonald immediately ordered the whole of the medical staff to attend the wounded, while the advance was continued. A few days later a regular action had to be fought at a gorge across and on the sides of which the Tibetans had built a wall; and on April 11 the mission and escort reached their destination at Gyantse. Here the ordinary people were found to be perfectly friendly, bringing in supplies for sale and establishing a market just outside the camp. But no negotiators appeared. On the contrary, towards the end of April rumours came in of fresh assemblages of troops. And while Colonel Brander was attacking one gathering which threatened communications, another made a night attack on the mission itself. Then for two months the mission, with its escort of 500 men, was besieged by some 6000 Tibetans, till, reinforcements having arrived, General Macdonald brilliantly stormed and captured the strongly-built masonry *jong*, or fort.

While the mission was being besieged, His Majesty's Government, recognising the difficulty of getting any settlement at Gyantse, had instructed the Commissioner to inform the Dalai Lama and the Chinese resident that, unless duly empowered negotiators arrived at Gyantse within a month, the negotiations would have to take place in Lhasa. The Commissioner's letters conveying this intimation were returned unopened by the Tibetan generals. And at the beginning of July the advance to Lhasa began. At the Karo-la, 16,600 feet, the Tibetans again

opposed the advance; but General Macdonald, by a skilful flanking movement executed at an altitude of 18,000 feet, was able to dislodge them and the advance was continued. Then negotiators from Lhasa at last appeared. But they said they were only prepared to negotiate at Gyantse, and tried to persuade the Commissioner to return there. He, on his part, said that he was quite prepared to negotiate, though only on the way to Lhasa, and only there could a treaty be signed. The Tibetan delegates then hinted that the unruly elements in Lhasa might cause a disturbance if the British went there. And General Macdonald, arguing from a strictly military point of view, pointed out to the Commissioner the risks of advancing to Lhasa. There was still another range to be crossed, and beyond it the great river Brahmaputra. Supplies might be unattainable. The whole country might be raised against the British. And at Lhasa itself were nearly 20,000 fanatical monks who might join in the rising. It was like putting one's head into a hornet's nest. Would not more be gained by holding out the threat of going to Lhasa but not actually going there? To this the Commissioner's reply was that the Tibetan negotiators would merely dally till winter came. Then the British would either have to retire or in the end still have to march to Lhasa. The advance was therefore continued. The officer responsible for the safety of the mission was perfectly justified in pointing out dangers ahead. But 'safety first' could never be the motto of a mission across the Himalaya. Again and again risks had to be run. All that could be done was to be sure that each had its adequate object and that none was unnecessary.

On crossing the last pass a letter was received from the National Assembly acknowledging the receipt of the draft of the proposed treaty which the Commissioner had sent to them through the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan. This was a step forward. It was the first written official communication received by a British official from the Tibetans since the time of Warren Hastings. But it said that the Tibetan religion was very precious. Coming to Lhasa might create a disturbance and be a fresh cause of dispute. So they begged the Commissioner to negotiate with the delegates now being sent. On reaching the Brahmaputra River a letter from the Dalai Lama himself arrived, brought by the hands of his chamberlain. The Dalai Lama said it would be well if matters were discussed with the delegates now sent. But it would not be well if the British came to Lhasa contrary to his wishes. The delegates, also in conversation with the Commissioner, pressed him not to go to Lhasa, saying that the Dalai Lama was sincerely anxious to make a settlement. But if the British went to Lhasa turbulent monks might create a disturbance. To all these representations the Commissioner replied that the

capital of a country was the usual place in which to negotiate a treaty of this importance, that attempts to negotiate one—first at the frontier, then half way to the capital—had failed; and now it could be negotiated nowhere else than in Lhasa itself. As to the possible turbulence of the monks, he trusted that those in authority would see the necessity of curbing it. The Brahmaputra River was crossed on July 31. Renewed attempts by delegates to stop or delay the advance were made on the other side of the river. And finally, when only 12 miles from Lhasa, the chief abbots of the three great monasteries, the Dalai Lama's private abbot, and the chief general arrived and made a special appeal on account of their religion. To these also the Commissioner gave much the same reply; and on August 3 the mission, with the escort of about 1500 men, including half a battalion of British troops, arrived at Lhasa.

Lhasa had been reached, but the treaty had still to be negotiated—and negotiated before winter, for Government could not let so many troops and transport animals be locked up in Tibet. And the Dalai Lama, with Dorjjeff, had now retired into the interior for spiritual contemplation, the National Assembly, with whom the final word rested, was an amorphous body with which to negotiate, and the Chinese resident, who was nominally responsible, had so little power that the Tibetans had refused to furnish him with transport to enable him to proceed to Gyantse. The prospect of success was small. After a few days, however, the Ti Rimpoche, who had been appointed regent by the Dalai Lama, came to visit the Commissioner. He was a philosopher and, as he explained, unversed in worldly affairs; but he was a man of dignity and influence, and through him a start was possible. Then there were other forces which the Commissioner was able to marshal and direct on to the single objective. The Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan had arrived in Lhasa, and, through Mr. White's influence, was interesting himself energetically in persuading the Tibetans to make a settlement. So also was the experienced and astute Agent of the Nepalese Government resident in Lhasa. Mr. Wilton, with his knowledge of the Chinese language and his long experience of the Chinese, was working to secure at least the acquiescence of the Chinese. Captain O'Connor, with his real love of the Tibetans and inexhaustible patience in reasoning with the delegates all day long, was sapping into their obstructive spirit. And, lastly, the discipline maintained by the General and by the commanding officers over the troops was having an extraordinary effect upon the Tibetans, who were quick enough to see that a Power which could maintain such brave yet well-behaved troops was a Power with whom it was worth being friends.

Under the pressure of all these influences, even the obduracy of the Tibetans was giving way. Still, by the end of August not a line of the draft treaty had been definitely accepted, while the military had informed the Commissioner that his escort could not be kept in Lhasa longer than September 15. He was in a critical position. Yet he was sure that the Tibetans really had it in their minds to agree. No one of them cared to get up and say so. But if the onus of agreement could be put on all, all would gladly agree. This was how he saw the situation. So a meeting of all responsible Tibetans, lama and lay, was convened by him in the presence of the Chinese resident and his staff, and the Commissioner restated his own arguments and heard all theirs. Then he gave them a week longer within which to negotiate, after which, he said, if no agreement was reached, he would have to consult with General Macdonald. They outwardly protested, but in the end, with a sigh of relief, agreed. And on September 7 they cheerfully affixed the seals of the Dalai Lama, the Council, the National Assembly, and the three great monasteries to a treaty by which they engaged to respect the Convention of 1890 made by the Chinese, to open forthwith trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok as well as at Yatung, to appoint an agent at each mart who would receive from the British Agents letters for the Tibetan or Chinese authorities, to pay an indemnity, and not to admit the agent of any foreign Power or permit any foreign Power to intervene in Tibetan affairs.

With the signing of the treaty the air of relief intensified. The worst had happened: the British had come to Lhasa. But the dreaded effect had not resulted: their religion had not been spoilt. So scowls turned into smiles. The Commissioner and his officers were welcomed and entertained at each of the three great monasteries and were shown over that Holy of Holies of the Tibetans, the Jo-khang Cathedral. And since the departure of the mission the treaty has been scrupulously carried out. The frontier has been respected, the trade marts have been established, and a British Agent has been maintained continuously at Gyantse. As to the Dalai Lama, after returning to Lhasa he had to flee from it to India on account of the advent of a hostile Chinese army, but on the withdrawal of the Chinese he returned there and, impressed by the warmth of his reception by the British, remained friendly till his death last year. He invited Sir Charles Bell, Colonel Bailey, Colonel Weir, and Mr. Williamson to visit him in Lhasa. He sent Tibetans to be educated in England and officers to be trained in the Indian Army. He commissioned Sir Henry Hayden, the geologist with the Tibet Mission, to go round Tibet in search of gold. And at the outbreak of the Great War he offered 1000 Tibetan soldiers and told the Viceroy that prayers

innumerable were being offered by holy lamas throughout the length and breadth of Tibet for the success of the British arms.

With the Bhutanese, also, good relations had been established. As a reward for his help an order of knighthood was conferred upon the Tongsa Penlop, and when he became Maharaja of Bhutan a treaty was made with him and he was accorded a salute of seventeen guns. And British officers have frequently visited his country.

Thus good political relations have been established and maintained with Tibet and Bhutan as the result of the Tibet Mission. But the Government of India had in mind the establishment of something more than formal political relations. They wished to secure and keep the real good-will of the Tibetans. Officers serving on the Indian frontier know only too well the dire result of leaving a sore behind: they have perhaps had to carry on in the very part where fighting had recently occurred. The Commissioner therefore attached far more importance to securing the good-will of the Tibetans than their seals to a treaty. Without that good-will the treaty would be useless and the lives of the officers who would have to remain at the trade marts would be in danger. So by succouring the wounded after the fighting, by treating the prisoners well, by paying liberally for the supplies, by courteous treatment of Tibetan delegates while negotiating, by every scrupulous care for their susceptibilities, the effort was made, by civil and military officers alike, to win the good-will of the Tibetan leaders and people during the progress of the mission. And the different officers who have been in charge of British relations with Tibet since then have carried on the same tradition of the Indian frontier; and Sir Frederick O'Connor, Sir Charles Bell, Colonel Bailey, Colonel Weir, and Mr. Williamson have thereby won the sincere friendship of the Tibetans.

So the net result of the thirty years' effort up to 1934 has been that for the thirty years since the Government of India have been free of all serious anxiety regarding their north-eastern frontier of 1000 miles. They have been able to feel that in Tibet and Bhutan they have sincere friends instead of aloof strangers or potential enemies, and decent neighbourly intercourse has subsisted between them.

And this longer and more intimate knowledge of the lamas in Lhasa itself has brought with it a deeper appreciation of the real reason of their desire for seclusion. They always spoke of their fear that their religion would be spoilt; and it had been imagined that this meant fear of losing their priestly influence and the offerings of the faithful. This may have been true to some extent. But it was a too superficial and cynical a view.

Looking deeper, we can see that they do genuinely regard their religion as a man would a jewel of priceless value. To them it is something so precious that it must be guarded at all costs. And so jealous are they of their treasure that it is not only Europeans that they keep from it, but even Japanese and Chinese monks of other forms of the Buddhist religion. This is the discovery made by Sir Charles Bell during his year of almost daily intercourse with the Dalai Lama at Lhasa. It is a discovery of the greatest importance. And our attitude towards the Tibetans should be regulated by it ever onward.

Many of the rude superstitions of the Tibetans will rub off in the contact with the outside world. But may that contact also spur them to probe ever deeper into the great truths of their religion. For then perhaps they may see that their surest contentment will come, not through estrangement from their fellow-men, but from a more profoundly spiritual intercourse with them—and especially with that neighbouring people from whose midst their greatly prized religion originally sprang.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

SOME BYGONE FOREIGNERS IN LONDON

ENGLAND has for so long been regarded as the asylum for the persecuted, as well as the haven of safety for those who have found themselves at variance with their own Governments, that it is hardly surprising to find its capital dotted with the spots to which the presence of illustrious foreigners has given a special interest. It is probable that few notable men and women of other lands have not, within at least the last two centuries, resided in London for more or less extended periods. Many have, of course, been but flying visitors, differentiated from the ordinary tourist only by the fact of their achievements and their renown. Some have frankly been glad enough to leave us; our climate, our ways of life, our very personalities, according too little with their own ideas to make a sojourn of any length pleasant or desirable. But others have discovered that we are not so bad as we are often painted, and that familiarity, far from breeding contempt, has elucidated much in our natures which was hidden from a too superficial inquiry, and that, take us for all in all, we compare not unfavourably with other nations. The lengthened stay of certain illustrious aliens in our midst has not, I grant, always been due to such a recognition. Too often it has been compulsory, or at least has been found to be a wise precaution on the part of our visitors. But from whatever cause their presence has been due, that presence has materially added to the fascination exerted by the streets of London, and when we can point to such and such a street as having been that in which Voltaire once lodged, or to another as containing the former abode of Rousseau or the dwelling of Heine, we are adding to our conception of the city another phase of picturesque retrospect.

There have been certain European crises which have resulted in the emigration from other lands to our own of large numbers of foreigners. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the outbreak of the French Revolution, the actions of Napoleon I. towards the German States, the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and the effects of the defeat of France in 1870, were all responsible for this influx into a land pre-eminently that of a liberty difficult to be found elsewhere. There have too, of course, been various

other causes for the flight of men and women from their own countries. These have been chiefly political; but not infrequent social quarrels, the too-outspoken criticisms against those wielding powerful influence, and other reasons, have resulted in the appearance on our shores of men whose fame has not been sufficient to shelter them from the rancour of those they have adversely criticised.

Among these exiles were here and there to be found men and women whose names are a part of the annals of their respective lands. Added to these, others famous in politics or art, in music or literature or science, have descended on our shores and have made their homes for a time among us. Of these Voltaire may be regarded as the most famous, for his is a name of world-wide importance, and although many of his ideas have raised up enemies to his memory, as they did to himself in his lifetime, his sympathy with the oppressed, his hatred of tyranny, and his constant efforts to secure toleration and freedom of thought, have obliterated much of the enmity that was once felt for his attitude towards religion and his antagonism against recognised authority.

Twice was he exiled from France—once in 1716 and again in 1726—on account of the freedom of his strictures, and twice was he committed to the Bastille, his second incarceration being due to the fact that he resented an insult shown him by a dissolute young nobleman, the Chevalier de Rohan. It was after his liberation on this occasion that he came to England, where he remained some two or three years. It is not quite clear where he first lived on his arrival in London. It may possibly have been at the house of Mr. Cavalier, in Billiter Square; certainly he asked a friend of his, a Mr. John Brinsden, to send him news concerning Lady Bolingbroke's health to that address. Like many foreigners—Bassompierre in the reign of Charles I. was an instance, as was Sorbière—he found our names a difficulty, and the nearest he can get to Billiter is Bellitery. But a better known lodging of his was over the shop of a hairdresser, with the sign of the White Peruke, in Maiden Lane. There he certainly was in December of 1727, as on the 14th of that month he wrote from there a letter to Swift asking him to use his influence in obtaining subscriptions for the epic he was writing. It seems, indeed, probable that one of Voltaire's reasons for choosing England as a refuge was the hope that the proverbial wealth of its inhabitants might be drawn upon in order to launch *The Henriade*, the first complete edition of which he dedicated to Queen Caroline.

While living in London he at one time made his headquarters at the house of Sir Evered Fawkner, at Wandsworth, while he is also known to have been the occasional guest of Lord Peter-

borough at Parson's Green, a house at which he first met Swift, with whom he became better acquainted at Lord Bolingbroke's in Golden Square. Not unnaturally, his fame and his attractive wit made him an acceptable guest at many houses, and Pope and Young and Congreve were among the notable literary men with whom he came into frequent contact. His visit to the last named is indeed famous. Congreve was then living at a Mr. Porter's in Surrey Street, Strand, and he invited the illustrious Frenchman to come and see him. Voltaire's visit was not exactly a success, for Congreve affected to disdain his own literary performances and wished to be regarded rather as a man of leisure than as a writer. This attitude irritated his visitor who plainly told him that had he been merely a gentleman he would never have troubled to call on him, and he adds, in recounting the incident in his *Lettres sur les Anglais*, 'I was very much disgusted at so unreasonable a piece of vanity.' But Voltaire was not always the annoyed party when he sallied forth from Maiden Lane or Sir Evered Fawkner's to pay visits, for on one occasion when dining with Pope his free and easy conversation so annoyed, and indeed horrified, the poet's mother that, unable any longer to endure it, she rose and left the room.

The roll of anecdotes of the illustrious, unlike the proverbial stone, has a habit of collecting accretions, and so the story of one of Voltaire's adventures in London, related by Leigh Hunt, may not be true, but is at least amusing. Thus it is said that on one occasion the great man, during one of his walks about the town, was ridiculed by the crowd, who greeted him with the proverbial epithets reserved for Frenchmen in particular. At last he stopped at a door, mounted the steps, and harangued the crowd on the great qualities of their nation and that liberty which has always been its characteristic. There is no mob so good-tempered as an English mob, and the result of Voltaire's harangue was that 'they first cheered him and then carried him shoulder-high to his lodging.' *Se non è vero . . .* Voltaire was indeed a man who was capable of inspiring friendship and enthusiasm, but was also one who created in many an active dislike. We know Walpole's opinion of him, from his letters, and Gray, on his own showing, 'detested him.' But, on the whole, his visit to London was a triumph, in that he became on terms of intimacy with many of the most brilliant people of the day, and laid the foundations of his fortune by the success of his epic, the political allusions contained in which were powerless to affect an alien people who subscribed nobly for its sumptuous publication.

It was about forty years after Voltaire's visit to England that the other great eighteenth-century French writer, Jean Jacques Rousseau, appeared in our midst. It was after the con-

demnation of *Émile*, following a criminal prosecution, that Rousseau was obliged to flee from France to Switzerland, where, however, he found but a temporary shelter from insult and vituperation. It was in consequence of an attack on his house in Neuchatel in 1765 that he sought shelter first in Berne, then in Strasbourg, and finally, through influence, was enabled to return to Paris. But he soon found it wise to make a more drastic change, and in the following year, accompanied by his friend David Hume, who had been living in Paris for three years, he came to England. On his arrival he was first received by Hume's friend, John Stewart, at his house in Buckingham Street, Strand, but later removed to some lodgings a few doors off. Rousseau's presence here created much interest and curiosity, and we are told that many people also called on him 'from civility.' At one time during his stay in England Rousseau resided in a house at Wotton, in Derbyshire, belonging to a Mrs. Davenport, which that lady had placed at his disposal, and it was here and in London, at Lisle Street, Leicester Square, where he was later the guest of Hume, that he occupied himself in writing his famous *Confessions*.

Authors are proverbially sensitive, and Rousseau was of all men one of those afflicted by a readiness to take offence. Thus it was that he quarrelled with Hume. The course of the disagreement was one of the strangest in the many strange annals of men of letters: he accused Hume of insulting him while talking in his sleep. Few of those who wander from Leicester Square into little Lisle Street realise that they are passing a spot where one great philosopher was 'snoring in French' and another was listening with all his ears to the unconscious meanderings of his host—heard, one supposes, through an insufficiently substantial partition. There would seem to have been, however, another and more likely cause of the rift between these two great men. Horace Walpole, being then in Paris, wrote a letter, in the name of Frederick the Great, to Rousseau, which created at the time quite a stir in the French capital, and was afterwards translated into English. Walpole's delight in his joke is evidenced in his correspondence, where he is constantly referring to the matter, and takes the trouble to copy the text of the letter for at least a couple of his correspondents. Rousseau replied in what Horace calls 'a most weak and passionate' answer. Then Rousseau became persuaded that Hume had written, or had at least had a hand in the production of, the letter; and, in spite of all Hume had done for him, he still continued to abuse him in all kinds of ways, and to act in a manner that only self-love and a one-sided view of the matter could have made possible. Those interested in the question will find in Horace Walpole's letters

ample references to the Frenchman's attitude both towards his fictitious epistle and the friend who had really done him so many services. It was probably during the period when Rousseau was in Derbyshire that he desired his correspondents to address letters to him 'à M. Josué Rougemont, banquier, Green Lettice [Lettuce] Lane, Cannon Street, à Londres.'

From Cannon Street to Regent Street is a far cry, but it is in the latter thoroughfare, now so changed, that another great French writer, Madame de Staël, lived when, on being banished by Napoleon, she visited England in 1813. There is, indeed, a connexion between the two famous authors, for, impelled by her admiration for Rousseau, Madame de Staël's first published work was a series of letters devoted to the study and exposition of his character and books. The actual house in which the lady lodged was No. 30 Argyll Place, or, as it has been more recently rechristened, Great Marlborough Street. There that rather exuberant authoress was far from seeking the rural privacy which Rousseau loved, or affected to love, and here, as well as at No. 3 George Street, where she also resided for a time, she held her receptions à la Madame Récamier. Her rooms were crowded with all sorts of notable people, including many of those *émigrés* who found in Necker's daughter a link with the *Ancien Régime*, and heard, not, one supposes, without derision, talk of the fictitious splendour of the new Empire. That these receptions were not unnaturally of a mixed kind, the eclectic character of the hostess was a sufficient proof, and Byron, who was among her guests, once said that they reminded him of the grave where all distinctions are levelled.

Another of her visitors was Crabb Robinson, who used to see her also in George Street, Hanover Square, and he records in his *Reminiscences* how on one occasion he found her in the latter abode closeted with John Murray, discussing the terms which she was to receive for her *De l'Allemagne*. This work had been written during the years 1807 and 1808, partly in Germany, but when published in 1810 it was suppressed by order of Napoleon, and all the copies, or at least as many as could be laid hands on, destroyed. When, therefore, Crabb Robinson in 1813 speaks of a discussion as to the amount the authoress was to receive for this particular work, it must refer to a new edition. In any case, he tells us that he helped to draw up the agreement, and that the sum to be paid for it was £1890. Napoleon's attitude towards Madame de Staël was one of not a few petty tyrannies which disfigured an otherwise epic character. It would seem that he disliked the lady personally as much as he resented the tendency of her writings, and it was due to his influence that she remained an exile till his abdication in 1814.

When Madame de Staël was producing her work on Germany she probably little thought that there was then living with his parents at Düsseldorf a boy who was destined to become one of that country's most famous men. But so it was, for Heinrich Heine was just ten years old in 1807, and was attending a Jewish school, while his country and its social aspects were being described by a native of the land to which he afterwards showed such a partiality. Heine came over to England in 1827, and stayed but a few months (April 23 till August 8, to be precise) in London, taking lodgings at No. 32 Craven Street. If his intention in visiting our shores was in order to gain information, one fears his quest was rather a barren one. He appears to have brought no introductions with him, and, as one of his biographers remarks, the only English society he got to know was the narrow-minded *bourgeoisie*, which found its most characteristic self-expression in the unspeakable English Sunday. Other things militated against his enjoyment, and in his *English Fragments* we learn how unpleasant he found the climate, and how difficult the acquisition of the language. Added to such *désagrémens*, such a character as Heine's was hardly one to make the best of things; and he seems to have thus drawn those hasty conclusions concerning an alien land which ignorance of its manners and customs and indifference to its history are always likely to engender. However, he does begin one of the chapters of his *Fragments* with the remark that he had 'seen the greatest wonder the world can show the astonished spirit,' and although he later adds the admonition 'send a philosopher but no poet to London,' and, like Johnson at Charing Cross, took his stand at the corner of Cheapside and there learned 'more than from all the books of the last Leipsic fair,' he qualifies such generalities by adverse criticism in detail. I suppose if any of us could now be set down in the London of that period we should be ready to echo many of the poet's animadversions.

Craven Street is a relatively small thoroughfare, but it so happens that it has in the past been what the old topographers were fond of calling 'well inhabited,' and the temporary home of at least two illustrious visitors. One of these was Heine; the other was Benjamin Franklin. Franklin's first visit to London had been in 1724, he having arrived there on December 24. The lodgings he first occupied, with his friend and fellow-visitor, Ralph, were in Little Britain, and they paid 3s. 6d. a week for their accommodation. Almost immediately on his arrival Franklin obtained work in Palmer's printing office, then situated in Bartholomew Close, where he remained nearly a year. It was at this time that he was employed in setting up Wollaston's *Religion of Nature*, but while doing so it occurred to him that

certain of the author's conclusions were illogical, and he therefore wrote some remarks on them, calling the piece *A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain*. Only a limited number of copies of the pamphlet were issued, but the fact of his authorship drew Mr. Palmer's attention to his employée, and was otherwise the means of enlarging his acquaintance. So great a man as Sir Hans Sloane was one of these, and as a result he invited Franklin to his house in Bloomsbury Square to see the curiosities he had gathered together there.

On leaving Palmer's, Franklin obtained work at Watts's, in Wild Court, near Lincoln's Inn Fields, and changed his lodgings to rooms over an Italian warehouse at No. 6 Duke Street, later Sardinia Street, near by. Here he also paid 3s. 6d. a week for a two-pair-of-stairs room, a sum, by the way, which his landlady, the daughter of a clergyman, who had become a Roman Catholic, reduced to 2s. rather than let him go. Readers of Franklin's *Autobiography* will remember how he was accustomed to spend his evenings with this old gout-ridden lady, often sharing her meal, which generally consisted of 'only half an anchovy each on a very little slice of bread and butter and half a pint of ale between us.' 'But,' adds Franklin, 'the entertainment was her conversation,' and the earnest young man was quite content to spend his leisure in company which the ordinary run of youth would hardly have found exhilarating. The circumstances which led to Franklin's engagement, first at Palmer's, then Watts's, have been thus recorded by himself:

Ralph and I were inseparable companions. We took lodgings together in Little Britain. . . . I then got into work at Palmer's, then a famous printing house in Bartholomew Close, and here I continued near a year. I now began to think of getting a little money beforehand, and expecting better work I left Palmer's to work at Watts's, a still greater printing house. Here I continued all the rest of my stay in London.

When Franklin was again in England in the year 1775, on this occasion in the important capacity of colonial agent for Pennsylvania of which State he was afterwards to become President, he once visited Watts's establishment, and, going to a certain press, he said to the men then working there, 'Come, my friends, we will drink together. It is now fifty years since I worked like you at this press as a journeyman printer.' In consequence of his one-time connexion, the business was subsequently christened the Franklin Press, a token issued by the firm bearing on the obverse a printing press which was obviously copied from the one at which the great man had laboured.

In the meanwhile Franklin had paid another visit to London in 1757, and, according to one of his biographers, on this occasion he had, at the invitation of his friend Collinson, first stayed

with that gentleman till he could find suitable lodgings. These were discovered at the house of a Mrs. Stevenson, at No. 7 Craven Street, Strand, and so comfortable did he find them that then and on his subsequent visits to England in 1762, and again in 1764, he made his headquarters there. The house formerly supposed to have been that occupied by him, and on which in that belief the Society of Arts placed one of their commemorative tablets, was on the west side, and has been rebuilt. But later more careful investigation on the part of the London County Council has proved that what was in Franklin's day No. 7 and was occupied by Mrs. Margaret Stevenson is now No. 36, and is on the east side of the street. It is interesting to find that after Franklin's final departure the house was occupied by the 'Society for the Relief of Persons Imprisoned for Small Debts,' which, curiously enough, had been inaugurated by Dr. Dodd, himself a person particularly acquainted with debts of all kinds, and who, as all the world knows, was executed for a forgery of Lord Chesterfield's signature in a daring attempt to free himself from some of them just two years after Franklin had gone back finally to America.

It is unfortunate that we have no record of the actual habitats in London of such men as Grosley and Kilmansegge and C. P. Moritz, who have all left fascinating and valuable records of their impressions of England, and of its capital in particular. But among the foreigners who have come and stayed in the metropolis were a number of illustrious musicians, and from Handel to Mendelssohn we can trace their temporary abodes with a certainty which is sometimes lacking in the case of native talent. Handel lived so long in London—for no fewer than thirty-four years, indeed—that he has almost come to be looked upon as a compatriot. He took up his residence at what is now No. 25 (but was then No. 57) Brook Street, a house on the south side of the thoroughfare, four doors from Bond Street, in 1725, and continued to live in it till his death there in 1759. But his first visit to London had been in 1710, and at least for three years before acquiring the Brook Street house he lodged under the protection of that great patron of art and literature the Earl of Burlington at his splendid palace in Piccadilly. Handel is appropriately buried in Westminster Abbey, where he lies beneath the impressive monument which was the great Roubiliac's last work.

It was just five years after Handel's death that the young Mozart, with his father, mother and sister, came to London and first took lodgings over the shop of a Mr. Cousin (or Cousins), a baker, in Cecil Court, St. Martin's Lane, subsequently transferring themselves to No. 20 Frith Street, Soho, then occupied by Mr. Williamson, one of the churchwardens of the neighbouring St. Anne's. In addition to the public recitals given by the

Mozart family, some semi-public concerts were held in their lodgings, and here the public, as notified in the contemporary news-sheets, were enabled, at 5s. a ticket, to have an opportunity of putting his (young Mozart's) talents to a more particular proof by 'giving him anything to play at sight, or any music without a Bass, which he will write upon the spot without recurring to his Harpsichord.' It was during this visit that the boy was taken to the British Museum, then domiciled in old Montagu House, and in commemoration of his visit wrote a short anthem at the request of the authorities, the manuscript of which is among the treasures of that place. This was in 1765, on July 25 of which year he returned to the Continent, never again to return.

There are at least three localities in London identified with the one-time presence of yet another great musician. For when Joseph Haydn came here in 1791, he stayed for the night at the house of a music-seller named Bland, at No. 45 High Holborn, a building subsequently demolished to form part of the First Avenue Hotel. The next day he went to join his fellow-traveller, Saloman, the violinist, in his lodgings at 18 Great Pulteney Street, Golden Square, where his landlord was, as he himself wrote, 'an Italian cook, who gives us four excellent dishes; we each pay 1 florin 30 kreuzers a day, exclusive of wine and beer,' but, he adds, 'everything is terribly dear here.' After a time Haydn's sensitive ear could not abide the noise of so central a position, and he then moved to the comparative solitude of Lisson Grove. Soon becoming a lion in the London society of the day, he was to be found both at Buckingham House, where he says 'the princesses sang with me,' and at Carlton House, where he went frequently to accompany the Prince of Wales, who was, like his grandfather, no mean performer on the 'cello. He was, too, present at the Handel Festival held in the Abbey, and when the great Hallelujah Chorus was played, and the whole audience, led by the king, rose to their feet, he is said to have wept like a child, and to have exclaimed, 'He is the master of us all.' But it was when listening to the singing of the 'Old Hundredth' by the children of the United Charity Schools in St. Paul's that, he afterwards said, he received the most wonderful impression of his life. He came again to England in 1794, when his reception was even more impressive than had been that on his first visit. On this occasion he lodged at No. 1 Bury Street, St. James's, and, although much sought after, continued to compose a number of symphonies and other pieces of concerted music.

During the succeeding century a number of great musicians visited London. For instance, Spohr came, at the invitation of the Philharmonic Society, in 1820, and while here lived at what

was then 49 Charlotte Street (it is now 1A Devonshire Street), Portland Place, appearing at the concerts held at the Argyle Rooms, Regent Street, as Weber was to do six years later and Mendelssohn in 1830. There his red waistcoat (as famous as Théophile Gautier's was to be in the Romantic Movement) attracted general attention, and caused him to be followed in the streets by a not always duly reverent crowd—the explanation being that at that moment general mourning was being worn for the death of George III., and the 'foreigner' was supposed to be flouting public susceptibilities. The presence of Weber in our midst was a short and tragic one. He arrived in London as the guest of Sir George Smart on March 5, 1826, and stayed with his host at No. 103 Great Portland Street. His chief reason for coming to London was to conduct the production of his opera *Oberon*, at Covent Garden, on April 12. Although in the last stages of consumption, he not only carried out this programme, but he also conducted one of the Philharmonic Society's concerts. His disease, however, made such rapid strides that on June 4 he died in Smart's house, where he was found lifeless in bed the next morning. Like Handel, he ended his career in a strange, although a sympathetic, land.

It was in Great Portland Street (at No. 103, later No. 79) that Mendelssohn lodged when he first came to London in 1829, and he appears to have stayed here on three later occasions. Unlike many foreigners, he loved London, and was thoroughly at home here, whether he was conducting at the Argyle Rooms or playing the organ to the Queen and Prince Albert at Buckingham Palace, or wandering about the streets, on one of which last occasions he and some friends—but let him tell the story:

The other day we three walked home from a highly diplomatic dinner-party at Bulows, having had our fill of fashionable dishes, sayings, and doings. We passed a very enticing sausage-shop in which 'German sausages, Twopence each' were laid out for show. Patriotism overcame us; each bought a long sausage; we turned into where it was quieter Portland Street, and there consumed our purchases.

Mendelssohn's great contemporary, Chopin, was twice in London, once in 1837, but no record remains of where he lodged, and again in 1840, when he first went for a few days to No. 10 Bentinck Street, thence to No. 48 Dover Street, and finally to No. 4 St. James's Place, for which last lodgings he paid 4½ guineas a week. He gave recitals at the house of Mrs. Sartoris (Adelaide Kemble), and at Lord Falmouth's in St. James's Square, and also played at the Polish Ball at the Guildhall. But, like Weber, he was approaching the end of his short life, and in the following year he died in Paris, where he lies in Père la Chaise, appropriately near the graves of Bellini and Cherubini.

From St. James's Place to Tower Hill is a long way, but they are both associated with the presence of great masters of music. For it was at No. 10 Queen Street, near the Tower, that Richard Wagner, with his wife, passed the first night of their arrival in England in 1839, at a hostelry known as the Hoop and Horse-shoe. The following day, however, saw them transferred to another inn, the King's Arms, in Old Compton Street, Soho. Unlike Mendelssohn, Wagner had no love for London; but circumstances brought him there on several subsequent occasions, his last visit being in 1877, when he stayed with his friends Professor and Mrs. Dannreuther, at No. 12 Orme Square. But his health was then indifferent, and he left after some weeks for the more salubrious climate of Venice, where he died in the Palazzo Vendramin Calerghi, on February 13, 1883.

Those who wander about the London streets which have for them a fascination, not merely from the events with which so many have been associated, but also an added glamour from the one-time presence of the great ones of the past, will, I think, be glad to have recalled these stray records of certain illustrious foreigners who have made their temporary homes in our midst. The dreariness of Maiden Lane is somehow lightened by the vivacity of the great French writer; the purlieus of Leicester Square, changed as they are since his day, become more attractive than mere age can make them by the presence there of that most confessing of men, Rousseau; Brook Street links up the eighteenth with the twentieth century both architecturally and through the residence of Handel, many of whose lovely airs must have there found their first outward expression on the master's harpsichord. One likes to think of these things, and of young Mozart entrancing audiences in Soho, and Chopin voicing a nation's aspirations in the stately environment of St. James's Square. But best of all, I think, it is to visualise Mendelssohn and his friends fresh from their aristocratic surroundings awakening the echoes of Portland Street with their gay laughter, and each holding in his hand an incontestable product of his beloved fatherland.

E. BERESFORD CHANCELLOR.

DR. JOHNSON AND MRS. THRALE¹

It has always been a difficulty with admirers of Johnson to account for his unreasonable resentment at Mrs. Thrale's marriage to the Italian musician, Piozzi, and for the rupture of their long friendship. To explain Johnson's unnatural bitterness it has been asserted on eminent authority that there is only one good reason—that Johnson was in love with his 'mistress.' Such an explanation fits in with the trend of a generation which is convinced that it knows so much more than its elders of the workings of human nature and the motives of men and women. Where innocent old gentlemen have befogged themselves with poring over scraps of information the wisdom and experience of youth can show us the way. Let us no longer put our trust, a popular biographer advises us, in the dry bones of evidence, but rather trust to the 'soaring wings of imagination.' They are wings that are apt to let us down like the wings of Icarus, and I do not propose to rely on these flights of fancy.

Admittedly there is nothing very improbable in the theory. Johnson had his full share of susceptibility to feminine attraction and knew his weaknesses. That he might be in love with Mrs. Thrale is natural. Not enough stress has been laid on Johnson's deeply affectionate nature, as shown by his extraordinary regard for Bathurst and for the not particularly lovable Taylor. It is the explanation of his affection for that strange compound of silliness and acuteness, James Boswell, and of his liking for that very ordinary man, Thrale. His tender heart and sensitive nature are shown again and again—in his sympathy for the unfortunate and the afflicted, his devotion to his wife's memory, his chivalrous consideration for old Miss Williams, and in the touching scene at the deathbed of his mother's old servant. Johnson was one of those men who cannot be continuously thrown with any one reasonably likable without coming to have some degree of regard, and when it comes to a woman, such a nature can hardly escape some degree of affection. And Mrs. Thrale had the quality which draws like a magnet and makes others

¹ Being the substance of a paper read to the Johnson Club.

seem pale by comparison—intense vitality. There is no substitute for those who are so individual that no one can be compared with them.

On the face of it, then, we might assume that it was more likely than not that Johnson should be more or less in love with this very attractive woman. But I can find no contemporary evidence in support of the view. Mangin suspected it, but he is ridiculed by Sir James Fellowes; while Mrs. Thrale herself, when asked whether Dr. Johnson was an admirer of her 'personal charms,' is reported to have replied: 'I can only say that his devotion was at least as warm towards the table and table-cloth at Streatham.' This negative evidence seems to me extraordinarily strong; I shall revert to it later. And we may note that Miss Seward (who might be trusted to hand on any bit of malicious gossip) explains: '*He* loved her for her wit, her beauty, her luxurious table, her coach and her library; and *she* loved him for the literary consequence that his residence at Streatham threw around her.'

Now let us look at the known facts. In Thrale's lifetime Johnson was a constant inmate of the villa at Streatham. Thrale not only seems to have tolerated his living there for most of the week, but to have welcomed it. It is true that, having plenty of his own little affairs, Thrale would not have minded very much about his wife's having an elderly admirer. But everything points to there having been no such suspicion, and (as a man always gives himself away when he is in love) it is almost impossible that the keen eyes and ears that hung upon Johnson's every word and movement would not have pounced upon his secret. The absence of any allusion to an over-fondness for Mrs. Thrale seems to me to be almost conclusive. But after Thrale's death, did Johnson, the stern moralist, allow a dormant and repressed affection to well up in his bosom, now that he was free to indulge it? We must not forget that Johnson was seventy-one and already in failing health. He could hardly have been a very ardent lover of a buxom widow of forty. It is true that Fanny Burney writes about some new shoe buckles and a sprightlier manner, which seems to point to some suspicion on her part. But it is doubtful whether Fanny Burney herself would say that this was to be taken seriously.

Admittedly, there was a certain amount of gossip by outsiders. The Press (with a licence exceeding that of the Society paragraphs to-day) published lists of candidates for the widow's hand. In a list which included George Selwyn, Sir Richard Jebb, Crutchley, Seward, and Piozzi it was inevitable that Johnson's name should be found. We shall attach no importance to that. Boswell tells us that the talk was without foundation—in spite

of his indelicate verses, with the offensive witticism on Johnson's wife :

Porter no longer shall be praised,
'Tis I myself am Thrale's Entire.

True, Miss Seward records that Boswell told her that Johnson wanted the widow for himself ; but the source is suspect.

It is difficult to visualise the exact relation between Johnson and Mrs. Thrale. Probably neither of the parties could have defined it exactly—there is no thermometer to register emotion—but everything points to its being only friendship. In a friendship between a man and a woman there may well be a little sentiment, a tinge of tenderness, and a little consciousness of the romantic ; but that a friendship can exist which is nothing more than friendship has been proved by experience. On Johnson's side there was admiration of a very attractive woman and a playful affectation of gallantry. As for Mrs. Thrale, she tells us explicitly that she revered Johnson as one might reverence Pascal, and implies definitely that it ended there. It is not the whole truth, because no woman does what Mrs. Thrale did for Johnson if he is no more to her than an elderly philosopher. Clearly she had something of that half-maternal protectiveness for the helpless male which is latent in most women.

We might attempt to gauge Johnson's feelings in the light of inferences and hints in letters. But here we must be very careful. The modern practice of building up from documents a story that differs from the version current among contemporaries seems to me to be almost as dangerous as the imaginative method. I once knew a solicitor of whom it was said that he never wrote a letter without considering how it would sound if read to the jury. Such a correspondence as his can safely be left to the prying eyes of posterity. But in the case of those who are less circumspect there is infinite room for misunderstanding and misconstruction. A very curious letter of Johnson's to Mrs. Thrale is a case in point—a letter in the John Rylands Library, published in 1932. It has been argued, I understand, that this letter throws a strange light on the relationship between Johnson and Mrs. Thrale. It certainly does—by itself it might be taken to convey implications that are almost scandalous. But the notes supplied by Mr. J. D. Wright give us a complete explanation of it—with a letter from Mrs. Thrale which appears to be her reply. Johnson's letter is in French—a language only occasionally used by him in correspondence, and presumably employed for the sake of greater secrecy. Admittedly it is a very odd letter indeed. The explanation disabuses our minds of any scandalous interpretation, but it throws a new light on the moods—almost amounting to insanity—from which poor Johnson suffered ; moods in which he could not

trust himself, and found in Mrs. Thrale someone to whom he could surrender himself, as a patient might nowadays to a sympathetic nerve specialist.

It is a strange picture. Johnson implores Mrs. Thrale to take away his power of going away from where she wishes him to be. It will only give her the trouble of turning the key twice a day. It must be done *en maîtresse* so that her judgment and vigilance can come to the aid of his weakness. He begs her not to forget her promises and to keep him in the servitude which she knows so well how to render happy. Mrs. Thrale (in the letter which seems quite clearly to be the answer to Johnson's) protests that she has never forgotten her promises to take care of him and says : ' Do not quarrell with your Governess for not using the rod enough.' Nor was this an isolated episode. It is clear from passages in Johnson's letter that he had been in this case before ; in fact, the sojourns at Streatham had begun with the occasion when he was found in a deplorable state at Bolt Court and carried off by Mr. and Mrs. Thrale.

We see from all this that Mrs. Thrale was much more than an admiring disciple and an indulgent hostess. It was clearly an extraordinarily intimate relationship, but the more one sees behind the scenes, the less does there seem to be any indication of love in the ordinary sense. More than that, we have a definite statement that it is not Mrs. Thrale who supplies the feminine interest of Johnson's mature years, but another woman. This is a revelation which seems to have been ignored by Johnson's latest biographer, although the evidence for it has been in print since 1913, when the late Mr. Charles Hughes printed some extracts from the jealously guarded private journal called *Thraliana*. I will give the extract in Mrs. Thrale's own words, recorded in 1779 :

It appears to me that no Man can live his Life quite through, without being at *some* period of it under the domination of *some* Woman, Wife, Mistress or Friend, Pope and Swift were softened by the Smiles of Patty Blount and Stella, and our stern philosopher Johnson trusted me about the Years 1767 or 1768, I know not which just now, with a Secret far dearer to him than his Life : such, however, is his nobleness and such his partiality, that I sincerely believe he has never since that Day regretted his Confidence or ever looked with less kind affection on her who had him in her power.

Note that Mrs. Thrale assumes that she herself has never filled this *rôle*, and that she assigns it to some unnamed woman. Had she felt that she herself had played the part of a Patty Blount or Stella, she would have noted in her secret journal that before 1779 she had succeeded to the *rôle* of the unnamed. It seems to me to point very clearly to Mrs. Thrale's having regarded her

friendship as something quite different. In any case, we have here the evidence of some very important event in Johnson's life of which we know nothing—'a Secret far dearer to him than his Life,' which placed him in Mrs. Thrale's power when he had confessed it.

It was no early romance about a Molly Aston or Miss Hector, as to which Johnson had no reticence. This is some secret about a woman which he wished to conceal. We think that, thanks to Boswell, we know nearly everything about Johnson. Yet we know nothing of what was probably the biggest thing in his life. For Mrs. Thrale's comparison with Stella implies that this was no casual and transitory affair, but something that had dominated Johnson's life for years. It is true that Mrs. Thrale is not a very reliable witness, but (making every allowance) we are faced with a very explicit statement. Nor would it be surprising that an episode of this sort should escape us. We know little of Johnson's life before 1763 except what he chose to tell Boswell. And much may be hidden even at the time from our most intimate associates.² It has always been recognised that Mrs. Thrale knew Johnson much better than Boswell did and might well be aware of a part of Johnson's life that no one else had imagined. A man reveals himself to a woman as he seldom does to another man, and in any case Johnson was not likely to open out his heart to a man like Boswell, who could not have comprehended any depth of feeling, and would have babbled in his cups or perpetuated a lampoon.

These confidences on Johnson's part seem to confirm the view that it was Mrs. Thrale's sympathy and kinship of mind that were the attraction. He felt that she would understand him as no one else could.

I know, dear lady. [he writes] that in the perusal of this—such is the consanguinity of our intellects—you will be touched as I am touched. I have indeed concealed nothing from you; nor do I expect ever to repent having thus opened my heart.

Johnson's happiest days were spent at Streatham. 'There,' says Fanny Burney, 'he was gaily sociable' and 'full of mirth and sport,' playing with the children or challenging Thrale to

² It has been suggested that what Johnson really confessed was an attachment to Mrs. Thrale. I do not think that Mrs. Thrale's words allow of this interpretation—they imply a surprising revelation, not the admission of something of which an acute woman would have been aware already. Besides, such a confession could not have placed him 'in her power.' To be known to have an affection for Mrs. Thrale would not be seriously damaging to Johnson, although it might have jeopardised the continuance of his visits to Streatham. On the other hand, Mrs. Thrale would have risked a good deal by divulging such a confession. A woman is always accused by her own sex of encouraging an admirer. In June 1783 Johnson wrote to her: 'I have loved you with a virtuous affection.' This would be inconsistent with a confession of love years before.

get drunk. But one may suppose that the conversational sallies which have been reported give very little idea of the nature of the intimate talk when Johnson and Mrs. Thrale were alone. It must have ranged over a wide field, both grave and gay, but for the most part serious and earnest; 'Metaphysical reasoning he most delighted in,' his hostess tells us. Theology, too, will have occupied much of their time, for this lively and amusing woman was deeply concerned with the propagation of religion, and given to pestering her friends about the salvation of their souls. But it was not all metaphysics or religion; Mrs. Thrale describes Johnson's anecdotes as 'exquisitely comical and amusing,' while 'it was inconceivable,' she says, 'what strange and surprising happenings he could relate.'

Each had a great deal to give the other. Mrs. Thrale, with her gaiety and sparkling wit, her quickness in repartee and keen sense of enjoyment, was outstanding in the choicest company; 'into whatever company she fell, she could be the most agreeable person in it.' Her poetry is depressing, but she could write easy and entertaining prose, and her accomplishments made her the acknowledged rival of the famous Mrs. Montagu. If, like many women, she made a show of more learning than she really possessed, her social gifts were unquestioned; Sir William Pepys said that 'he had never met a human being who possessed the talent of conversation to such a degree,' and Wraxall is nearly as enthusiastic. Even her own sex came under her spell. 'Her conversation,' wrote Anna Seward, 'is indeed that bright wine of the intellect which has no lees.' There was much that is admirable in this vivacious little woman—still pretty at forty-three; a plump little person, with a rather long nose, nice colouring and dancing blue eyes. Her vitality enabled her to retain her spirits in spite of the deaths of seven children, which might give reason for an accusation of callousness. Pretty little Harriet's death at school in 1783 (making an eighth loss) was a regrettable incident in the midst of the turmoil about Piozzi. But such tragedies were common in the eighteenth century, and Niobe was not expected to weep. She was apparently kind-hearted and sympathetic up to the point that people with intense vitality and zest for life can be—in so far, that is to say, as it does not interfere with their own lives or mean the suppressing of their own individuality. She was good-natured and had the equable temper which comes from perfect health. Only on one occasion did Johnson see her out of temper—when he frightened her by taking Queeney on the walls at Chester in the dark. And Miss Reynolds tells us that she 'bore Johnson's occasional rudeness with unruffled good-humour.' Fanny Burney gives the same testimony.

Mrs. Thrale had shown her best side to Johnson, as such women do to a good man; and Johnson had pictured her rather as what he liked to believe her to be than as she really was. Fanny Burney saw her more clearly when the first violent enthusiasm had evaporated and the rather strident voice had become noticeable. Fanny probably had an inkling of the Mrs. Thrale of *Thralliana*—with the scandalous tongue and no very nice sense of the proprieties; and she was upset at times by Mrs. Thrale's tactlessness and want of good taste. In spite of her ancient lineage, dear Mrs. Thrale was sometimes not *quite* a lady. But Johnson's observation was less acute and his perceptions less delicate. The illusion was maintained up to the time of the fatal marriage.

In the light of all this, Johnson's dismay and unreasoning anger at this second marriage seem to me to be perfectly understandable. It would be comprehensible even if Mrs. Thrale had stood for far less in Johnson's life than she did; for most of us can recall instances of the selfish resentment that is roused when a popular and much sought-after woman becomes engaged to be married, and is no longer at the beck and call of her friends. We must remember, too, that Thrale had been no obstacle to the intimacy. He was a dull man, but he kept Johnson in order and had his uses. So he was not in the way; and he had a convenient habit of going to sleep in an evening. Piozzi would be very much in the way, and would be unlikely to fall asleep, or to go to bed when Mrs. Thrale sat up with Johnson till the small hours of the morning, making tea for him. We have seen how Johnson had come to rely on Mrs. Thrale, and how her interest in him had become an essential part of his life. We know that Mrs. Thrale had been wearied now and then by the great man's authoritative airs, even in the Southwark days; and it seems to be a fact that after Thrale's death she was getting a little tired of Johnson.

Just about that time her interest in Piozzi began to be serious, and this new interest could hardly fail to make poor Johnson's society less welcome; he was mainly concerned now with his maladies, which is not very enlivening. Unpleasing ways and habits, tolerated hitherto, began to grate more on his 'mistress.' Such habits do not improve with old age and sickness, and one is not surprised at a growing distaste for them. The great Dr. Johnson—so profound and so entertaining—had become a tiresome old invalid. By the end of the year 1781 it was Piozzi who had the first place in Mrs. Thrale's thoughts, and she wished Johnson out of the way. But she did not neglect Johnson, for she nursed him carefully at Streatham in the following spring and was terrified that he was going to die. Nevertheless, when

the immediate danger was over, Mrs. Thrale felt herself free to make her own life.

Johnson had accepted the friendship with Piozzi quite amiably. 'You will have two about you now that love you,' he wrote; but there is a hint of jealousy in the next sentence. Then he became miserable about it; and when the whole truth was told him, it was devastating. He needed Mrs. Thrale more than he had ever needed her before, and here was the collapse of all that might help to mitigate these dreary days and give a little interest to life. The intellectual companion, the object of his gallant admiration, was wanted now, not only to cheer him with a little brightness, but as a nurse and a ministrant. His ill-assorted household had disappeared, and Johnson was one of those men who need domesticated life. 'I am now broken with disease,' he wrote, 'without the alleviation of familiar friendship and domesticated society.'

The possibility of Mrs. Thrale's remarriage would hardly have occurred to Johnson. In the eighteenth century a woman of forty-three, with wealth and position, the mother of budding daughters, would normally have retired into dignified widowhood. She had never been flighty or flirtatious. The 'soft passion' (as she tells us) was unknown to her. She had said herself that she would 'never marry again except for love—and perhaps not even then.' And love seemed unlikely to come to a woman in the forties. It was natural for Johnson to assume that things would go on as before till his days were over. He was unaware that Mrs. Thrale had been very much taken with Piozzi before Thrale died. Soon after Thrale's death she was in pursuit of Piozzi. Mrs. Thrale became distraught, tormented by the conflict between her passion for Piozzi, her duty to her daughters, and her pity for Johnson. Piozzi was dismissed to Italy. But he had to be recalled, and Mrs. Thrale at last resolved to brave it out. There is nothing for which we can blame her except the excuses with which she deluded herself that Johnson did not need her now. Within five months Johnson was dead.

There is a tragic note in this history, and one could wish indeed that Johnson had died in February 1782, when Mrs. Thrale was nursing him to a partial recovery at Streatham. He would have been spared much. He had no right to expect any woman other than a wife to take upon herself all that is entailed in ministering to a very sick man. But to see his 'mistress' give herself up to a stranger at the very time when the darkness was closing in was more than human nature could bear. It is one of those cases in which one can sympathise with both sides. One cannot withhold one's sympathy from Mrs. Thrale; the current of a woman's love seems to run more deeply and passionately

when it has not been roused until she is past her youth. Mrs. Thrale had fought and struggled against it and had alarmed her physician by her state of mind. It was on his advice that the family had sent for Piozzi. For the first time in her life this woman (who had borne twelve children to a man who had never even pretended to be in love with her) had found the meaning of love. Her second marriage brought her (as she confides in her journal) twenty years of a felicity that she had never imagined. By all accounts Piozzi was worthy of her affection.

It would be difficult for any man, who has been spoilt and petted by a woman for years, to comprehend all this. For a man plunged in despondency and afflicted with peculiarly distressing maladies, it would be almost impossible; there is some excuse for Johnson's joining in the general cry of indignation.

It seems to have been assumed that Johnson's outburst requires explanation, because he had been more angry about it than anyone else. But this is very far from being the case; in fact, Johnson was less violent than some of the others concerned. All that we can say is that Johnson was in a very special relation to Mrs. Thrale; and that if he had shown his usual good sense, he could (as Dr. Whalley remarked) have influenced others to take a reasonable view.

Lord Lansdowne has recently published the letters from Fanny Burney to Queeney Thrale, then a girl of twenty. They give us an idea of the incredible pother that had been created; from reading the letters one would imagine that Mrs. Thrale was about to commit a crime. It was to Fanny Burney that Mrs. Thrale had first confided her secret, not only as one of her greatest friends, but because Piozzi had been a friend of the Burneys. In fact, Fanny had recommended Piozzi to Mrs. Thrale as 'just a man to her natural taste.' Yet Fanny Burney was outraged at the idea of the marriage and writes long letters to condole with Queeney. Mrs. Thrale had apparently disregarded the conventions of the period by arranging meetings with Piozzi, and in a rather prudish way Fanny is scandalised, actually writing to Queeney that it was shocking for her mother to have private meetings with a man 'universally believed to be her lover.' This wagging of heads over Mama's delinquencies is not a pretty picture, and one has the impression that Fanny caused a great deal of mischief. If she had taken a common-sense view of it and been more a woman of the world, she might have made Queeney look at it differently. As it was, that rather unpleasant young woman told her mother to her face exactly what she thought about it. One hopes that these tales did not reach Johnson's ears. If they did, we need look for no other explanation of the unfortunate letter and its most hurtful phrase: 'You have

forfeited your fame and your country.' But it is very unlikely that anyone would have dared to repeat them to Johnson—Fanny Burney did not even dare to tell him of the projected marriage; and we can be fairly certain that in saying that the story was 'universally believed' Fanny had only adopted the usual formula of the talebearer.³

There is very little doubt that in the beginning the attraction had been mainly on Mrs. Thrale's side. There is an ancient prejudice that womanly modesty must wait to be wooed, but it has no basis in Nature or in reason. All the same, in fairness to these indignant friends, one must remember that it is easy to be wise after the event. No one could have foreseen that Mrs. Thrale's infatuation was no evanescent madness, but was to be an enduring affection for the one man who could bring her happiness. The main difficulty was, of course, the children, although it need not have been a difficulty. Everything seems to show that Piozzi would have been a kind, or at any rate a harmless, stepfather. The storm raised by Queeney, abetted by Fanny Burney, made it impossible for Piozzi to hang up his hat at Streatham in the normal way; Mrs. Thrale had to choose between giving up Piozzi or leaving the children to the care of others—and the youngest was only seven years old. One has to admit that Mrs. Thrale was not a motherly woman. One can divide women into those with whom the children come first and those who think first of the man they love. Undoubtedly Mrs. Thrale belonged to the latter category—neither was she by nature self-sacrificing or self-effacing. But, even if we discount the flamboyant phraseology of eighteenth-century letters, it is clear that Mrs. Thrale did not leave her children without a hard struggle; it is equally clear that she was able to forget about them once she had started for Italy.

Whatever may be the rights or wrongs of this debatable question, it is evident that Johnson's anger had nothing to do with his being in love with Mrs. Thrale. He was only taking the same line as all her friends; with her doctor, Sir Lucas Pepys, Dr. Whalley, and the witty and good-natured Murphy among the few exceptions. Johnson was convinced, like everyone else, that this marriage would never have been contemplated if Mrs. Thrale had not become obsessed with Piozzi and run after him at the loss of all self-respect and decency. To Johnson it was an impossible alliance, rather like a wealthy lady of to-day making up to the piano-tuner. The man was a foreigner of unknown antecedents. He was not even some sort of count or baron.

³ Probably Fanny Burney used the word 'lover' in the more innocent sense that was common until the last few years. But the word was equivocal even then.

Foreign titles are generally spurious and always contemptible, but they do at least give a cloak of respectability. Mrs. Thrale, in Johnson's eyes, was oblivious of her fatherless children, indifferent to public opinion and her good name; she was quite without a sense of duty. To make matters worse, Piozzi was a Papist. Johnson was sympathetic to the Catholic faith. But this was no occasion for sympathy or tolerance. Mrs. Thrale had not only cast aside everything that counted in this world, but had compromised her future in the next.

Johnson had wanted to see Mrs. Thrale in order to make a last effort to dissuade her. But the die was cast, and she had circumvented him. She had escaped from Johnson, and he wrote the famous letter in reply to one that he had received from Mrs. Thrale, giving him formal intimation of her intended marriage. Mrs. Thrale's letter was (as she claimed) 'tender and respectful.' Johnson makes one last appeal. He fears that it is too late and that already she is 'ignominiously married'; but if it is not too late, he pleads once more with her whom he had loved and revered and 'had long thought the first of human kind.' It is strongly worded, but Johnson is desperate.

Mrs. Thrale's answer to Johnson is sensible and dignified, and Johnson writes once more—a touching letter in his gentlest strain. It is a letter of sad farewell. The marriage takes place; Mrs. Thrale has arranged for a chaperon for her girls, and goes abroad for three years with the man of her choice. In Italy she met the Piozzi family and found, ironically, that they would be charming people if they were not so consumed with their own consequence. That Mrs. Thrale could voluntarily and cheerfully endure this long separation from her children, especially little Cecilia, is certainly a charge against her. At the same time it must be remembered that she had been made to feel, not only that she could not live down the disgrace of her marriage, but that the odium would even attach to her children; they were at least spared the shame of association with their mother until the excitement had died down.

While his mistress was touring in Italy, Johnson was failing rapidly, and before the end of the year he was sinking—facing calmly and bravely the death that he had dreaded for so long, but unconsolated during his last days by the 'kindness which soothed twenty years of a life radically wretched.' Did his mistress's thoughts turn to poor Johnson? Probably not very often. But, as if with a sense of foreboding, she wrote a few days before Johnson's death to Samuel Lysons: 'Do not neglect Dr. Johnson; you will never see any other mortal so wise and good.'

S. H. SCOTT.

THE CULT OF ASSASSINATION

THE words 'regicide' and 'tyrannicide' sound antiquated in connexion with present-day politics, reminiscent of mediæval controversies. In its literal sense—the killing of a king—regicide has largely ceased to be a fundamental issue at a time when constitutional reform and revolutionary programmes no longer centre upon the question of hereditary monarchy, and the king is not the type of capitalism or of autocratic government; but in the more generic sense—the murder of a ruling official—regicide is a moral and political problem that never dies. Recent events in Austria are a reminder of this fact, and there have been others during the past year. As the mentality which prompts certain violent natures to strike at rulers will continue to lead to the reappearance of this act at all periods of history, so, too, regicide will always have its place in revolutionary tactics. Governments will continue to be perplexed by the difficulty of suppressing the hidden menace of the assassin, as during the Anarchist terror of the 'eighties and 'nineties, and revolutionary parties will continue to be reft by the moral and strategical disadvantages of this somewhat disreputable weapon, as was the Young Italy Party at the time of Mazzini. Political murder will continue, at particular moments of crisis or social discontent, to make an appeal to public opinion; it will continue to be justified on political pretexts; and so the cult of tyrannicide, that strange tradition which has grown for centuries, will remain a living force.

A striking proof of the existence of this cult occurred during the early months of the Hitler *régime*. At the ruined castle of Burg Saalbeck, in Thuringia, 4000 Nazi Storm Troopers and Stahlhelmers gathered for the unveiling, in the presence of Herr Sauckel, the Statthalter of Thuringia, and the late Captain Röhm, of a memorial tablet to Erwin Kern and Hermann Fischer. These two young men were the assassins of Walther Rathenau, who shot themselves at this castle in July 1922 to avoid capture. They belonged to a patriotic secret society under Captain Ehrhardt, which was responsible for the murder of Erzberger and the attempt on the life of Herr Scheidemann, and which, be it noted, has since been absorbed into the Nazi organisation. Captain Ehrhardt

was himself present to unveil the tablet, which describes the 'heroic death for Germany' of the assassins. In his address Captain Ehrhardt said that Kern and Fischer had died 'an exemplary manly death,' and paid a special tribute to their surviving companions, Herren Techow and Ernst von Salomon, as 'their loyal helpers' at the assassination.

Captain Ehrhardt's words are only the repetition of eulogies that have been pronounced before on political assassins. History contains examples enough of such ceremonies as this strange gathering at the castle of Burg Saalbeck, and the glory of such acts as the murder of Rathenau has before now been officially adopted as its own by a revolutionary party or a new Government. The murder of King Carlos of Portugal and his eldest son in 1908 was similarly commemorated by the Republicans when they attained power two years later. A Museum of the Revolution, set up by the Provisional Government of the new Republic, contained a special room set aside for 'relics' of the assassination, which included portraits of the 'glorious regicides,' Buica and Costa, the weapons with which they committed their crime, and the cloak worn on the occasion by Buica. There occur periods when, as seems to be the case in disturbed post-war Germany, party feeling in a country being inflamed to the pitch of fanaticism, there is a strong current of sympathy for the political murderer. He becomes the symbol of revenge for cherished grievances, of heroic justice, of a great idea. Such a state of public feeling has generally produced its crop of assassinations. It is a definite regicide mentality. It lends a willing ear to the poems and hymns, the oratory and pamphleteering of tyrannicide *apologia*, from which the funeral oration pronounced by Captain Ehrhardt claims respectable literary descent.

The regicide cult is a composite tradition of philosophy, of poetry and declamation, and of mythical personages. Regicide, styling itself tyrannicide, has its body of apologetics, its literature, and its heroes and heroines. Nor is this idea in any respect a fanciful one: it is a conscious tradition, and during periods of regicide propaganda (*e.g.*, the Wars of Religion in France, the reign of Louis-Philippe, not to enumerate further) it is the inspiration of publicists and, not less, of those who commit political murders. How familiar is the invocation to Brutus, coupled with a tirade against tyrants, in the literature of the French Revolution and the Romantic movement! Brutus and a whole line of legendary figures have been studied and imitated by political assassins, as Charlotte Corday set off for Paris carrying her Plutarch. Every such age adds also to the literature of tyrannicide and to its heroes. The older apologists of political murder used the word 'tyrannicide,' and this best describes the

philosophical tradition. The more modern term, however, frequently adopted by extremists themselves during the last century and a half, is 'regicide,' and Continental criminologists have used the same term to distinguish the assassin type.

The doctrine of tyrannicide itself is hallowed by antiquity, descending directly from the political ideas of Athens. As the word 'tyrant' is a Greek word, so it was in Greek city-states that it possessed its most definite and clearly marked meaning, from which its more or less metaphorical use by political philosophers of later times has been derived. Against an unconstitutional monarch every city has the right of insurrection or common murder, and this teaching was handed on from ancient times to the philosophers of the Middle Ages. Tyrannicide is defended by John of Salisbury and St. Thomas Aquinas, the former of whom describes it as an act of piety and adduces a long list of instances of the just and bloody end of tyrants, from Bible personages to Roman emperors.

Yet actually, a fundamental change has taken place in the conception of tyranny since the Greek writers. For Plato, the genuine king, as distinguished from the tyrant, meant one who occupied his proper place in an established system of law and government; he was the constitutional monarch in the plainest secular sense. During the Middle Ages this distinction between the lawful monarch and the tyrant was reintroduced by supporters of Papal authority in the controversy of the Investitures, and their chief concern was to insist on the divine nature of the kingly office, the duty of the king towards the Church and the eternal laws of God. Consequently, although they admit the duty of the rightful king towards the written law and customs of the State, and draw their inspiration from the Greek secular conception of the constitutional monarch, there gradually takes shape from their writings the new conception of natural law, of the duty of rulers to an eternal justice which is in Nature, and flows from God. It is this natural law, dependent on God, which finally becomes the basis of Jesuit apologetics of tyrannicide in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Suarez, Mariana, Molina, Bellarmine only continue, as regards the fundamental principles of Church and State, the views of Pope Gregory VII.; but they give an altogether more disruptive violence to their criticism of the State by developing, on the one hand, the revolutionary and democratic side of natural law, and on the other stressing the transcendence of things religious and ecclesiastical over the civil power. We, for example, find Suarez stating that the tyrant can be killed by the first citizen, if there is no other means of curtailing his power; while we learn from the Jesuit Rossæus that 'tyrant' now signifies a heretic king, whom he

further defines as follows: 'every king who mixes himself with ecclesiastical questions, who does not chase from the Church the heretics condemned by the bishops, who does not prevent the meetings of heretics.'

Both sides at the Reformation, Catholics and Protestants, maintained the right of the people to revolt against a ruler who was not of their faith: the law of Nature became a maxim of sedition. The followers of Calvin, however, do not allow this open right to all classes and persons to murder the tyrant. Such an act rests with the people's representatives, such as the Spartan ephors or the Roman tribunes, but not with individual initiative and hazard. 'Although the Lord takes vengeance on unbridled domination,' Calvin writes, 'let us not therefore suppose that vengeance is committed to us, to whom no command has been given but to obey and to suffer.' He adds, 'I speak only of private men.' Among the Huguenot writers only Beza, following Jesuit ways of thinking, allows that if the magistrates are ineffective to resist the tyrant we should look for an assassin among private people.

There is not space here to trace the doctrine of tyrannicide through history. It is certainly not in any way a ghoulish peculiarity of the Jesuits, any more than their oft-quoted maxim that 'The end justifies the means' is peculiar to them. What in sixteenth-century philosophy is named 'tyrannicide' crops up in different guises, enveloped in different jargon, according to the ideologies of the period. It is on everybody's lips during the years of the French Revolution, and a regular school of political fanaticism is formed under the high patronage of *La Reine Th  os* or *M  re de Dieu*. There is a virulent regicide agitation kept up by the Press and the caricaturists against Louis-Philippe. Most significant, perhaps, is the Anarchist doctrine of 'propaganda by deed,' as first preached in the 'seventies, ranging from theft and minor assaults to bomb-throwing and acts of political assassination, because it reveals the essential individualism of the tyrannicide mentality. Anarchism made a principle of maintaining no organisation and admitting no leadership, and outrages were not directed from a headquarters. Members of the party acted on their own initiative, and in the trial, for instance, of Caserio, the murderer of President Carnot, the police and the presiding judge made entirely fruitless efforts to prove conspiracy.

But incitements to outrage were not wanting. The doctrine of regicide flourished in the Anarchist Press—some papers advertised dynamite and simple recipes for the confection of bombs. Perhaps the best-known advocate of regicide was the German Anarchist Johann Most, who in 1881, and again in 1901, was sent to prison for regicide articles published in his paper *Die Freiheit*.

On the former occasion Most, writing just after the assassination of 'Czar Alexander II. by Nihilists, praised this 'Brutus-like action' and 'heroic deed,' which, he said, would make all the 'long-forfeited heads' of sovereigns and ministers tremble from Constantinople to Washington. His article was entitled *At Last!* and bore some German verses which were translated at the time:

Seize these, seize those, and hold them fast,
But one shall reach thee still at last!

The second occasion was the murder of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz. Shortly before the assassination Most reproduced in *Freiheit* an essay on political violence by Karl Heinzen, a revolutionist of '48, and in the drive against Anarchists which followed the crime he was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for inciting to murder the heads of States.

Finally, we should mention the place held by tyrannicide in the policy of Mazzini. The Young Italy Party descended from the Carbonari, and continued the methods of a secret society; and there seems no doubt that Mazzini's methods included not only terrorism, but the removal of rulers by assassination. He was concerned in the separate attempts against the life of Napoleon III. by Pianori and Tibaldi; and there is evidence that he aided and abetted a certain Antonio Gallenga, a member of the Young Italy Party, who journeyed to Turin in 1833 with the intention of murdering Charles Albert. The whole policy of terrorism, as also that of sporadic insurrections that caused fruitless loss of human life, was subjected to criticism by Mazzini's colleagues and caused a rift in the party. The methods of the assassin were abhorrent to Garibaldi: even Orsini, later to organise the attempt against Napoleon, broke away from Mazzini on this question; and in May 1856 Manin wrote openly to *The Times*, announcing that the time had come for the Italian independence movement to clear its name in the eyes of the world by abandoning this doctrine which justified political assassination, a doctrine which he described as the Theory of the Dagger (*Teoria del pugnale*).

Mazzini's reply is a very interesting document on tyrannicide. While there are passages which epitomise the eternal lyricism of the cult, the letter does not remain on the level of the medi  val philosophers, for whom the act is a gesture of national right and abstract justice. For Mazzini it was a more scientific question, a question of tactics, and he considered that on occasion the murder of a certain ruler might prove a decisive blow in the cause. He refers eagerly in a letter to the attempt on Charles Albert: '*quel colpo decisivo, ma decisivo assolutamente*,' and when accused by Cavour of plotting the death of Victor Emanuel he wrote in reply: 'the life of Victor Emanuel is protected firstly by statute,

and secondly by the fact that the crime would be a useless one.' The *apologia* of regicide is argued, not in the phraseology of the schools, but with the arts of the platform orator. He starts by denying the existence of the doctrine of assassination alleged by Manin in *The Times*. 'But in the name of a whole party, I solemnly ask you: when has the Theory of the Dagger been sanctioned in Italy? Who has suggested it? Who supports it, by deed or word?' He goes on to that appeal to feeling which is always used by the extremist parties to exonerate themselves from responsibility for murders which occur, and which appears in the Republican Press under Louis-Philippe, in the Anarchist Press during the 'eighties and 'nineties terror, as at other times of regicide agitation. No one encourages these outrages, says Mazzini, but who can blame an oppressed people when they are driven to desperate means of vengeance?

But there are passages of the letter in which he states the principles of terrorism, conceived as revolutionary tactics, less equivocally. The two practical reasons he gives are the essential reasons for terrorism at all times. First, that only continual practice can train up a revolutionary temper in a subject class or a subject nation. Insurrections are the only school for revolution (see Lenin's comment on the 1905 uprising in Russia); and the same applies to all forms of sporadic violence—attacks on officials, bomb explosions, assassination.

Your first and sole duty [Mazzini thus apostrophises the Italian nation] is to make men and citizens of yourselves; all education begins there; there can be no progress by a nation that is nothing; *rise* therefore and *be*; rise and strike fear into those who, in the name of brute force, block the paths to which Providence guides you; rise sublime in cruelty. . . . Overcome by ambushes and surprise attacks the armed force by which the foreigner robs you of honour, substance, liberty, your rights, your life.

Secondly, there are turns in the political situation when the sudden removal of a king or minister may have positive, even decisive, results for the success of a cause. These occur, for instance, at the moment of a *coup d'état* or when the *régime* depends entirely on the personal prestige of a single man. Thus, a *coup d'état* in Imperial Rome regularly took the form of the emperor being murdered by the Prætorian Guard or by his own freemen, and during the Napoleonic Wars a legend arose around the attempts of Pitt to get the Emperor assassinated by hired emissaries, '*les poignards de Pitt*.' It is this decisive value for the success of the revolution that Mazzini claims to justify a policy of regicide.

And he concludes with a passage which is perhaps the most remarkable description written of tyrannicide. Here he is

carried far away from the tactics of the party chief into the fiery regions of the real tyrannicide inspiration. His words acquire a new lyricism. They breathe the exaltation which is peculiar to tyrannicide rhetoric and to the hymns of the Dagger of Justice.

Holy in the hands of Judith is the sword that cut short the life of Holofernes; holy the dagger that Harmodius crowned with roses; holy the dagger of Brutus; holy the knife of that Sicilian who struck the first blow at the Vespers; holy the arrow of Tell. When all justice is dead, and a tyrant by terror annihilates the conscience of a nation and God who willed it free, and when one man, pure of hate and every lower passion, inspired only by reverence for his country and for the eternal human right incarnate in him, stands up face to face with the tyrant and cries: 'You are torturing the millions of my brothers; you hold back what God decreed for them; you destroy their bodies and corrupt their souls; through you my country suffers daily agony; you are the centre of a whole edifice of slavery, dishonour and crime—I cast down that edifice in destroying you'—I recognise, in that manifestation of fearful equality between the master of millions and a single individual, the finger of God.

In the foregoing pages I have attempted no more than an outline of the tyrannicide tradition; a separate study could be written on the regicide theme in poetry, the legendary heroes and heroines of the tradition, the text-books (including the Bible) which have inspired its devotees. As regards the doctrine of tyrannicide, it has, of course, been the object of a number of monographs, both historical and philosophical, to which M. Coville's work, *Jean Petit. La Question du tyrannicide au commencement du XV^e siècle*, is a noteworthy recent addition. Here I have merely given a general account of what might fairly be termed the tyrannicide 'myth,' in the sense of Marx's class-war myth. It is a dynamic tradition. The paragraph last quoted from Mazzini reveals the emotional appeal which the drama of assassination, surrounded with its aura of heroes and legends, makes to a man and an age ready to receive the message. The whole of his letter to Manin is, too, a restatement of the doctrine of tyrannicide in terms of the *Risorgimento*; indeed, the apologetics of political murder, though in some ages written by theologians and philosophers and in others by revolutionary journalists, remains essentially the same. The language of mediæval apologists has become nowadays somewhat of a legalistic mumbo-jumbo, because the vindication of political violence is based no longer on constitutional right but on economic right. The Brutus action is committed, not in the name of citizenship, but of the proletariat. Yet the essential formula is always the 'right' to kill, rather than utility—in other words, a moral rather than a political motive. 'No bourgeois is innocent,' Anarchists used to say, when accused of causing the deaths of innocent people by

bomb explosions. Tyrannicidal doctrine will only reappear at times when national feeling views political and social problems as problems of intense moral principle, and, above all, at times of religious struggle. It is then that the general state of feeling is likely to be worked up to the regicide mentality.

In the course of history such periods of fanatical dissension in the State have shown a heavy proportion of attempts made on the lives of kings and ministers. As a gesture assassination expresses the mentality of an individual and a fanatical party, in which one can trace a pathological strain; but its use in the *coup d'état* implies a purely political motive. The history of Oriental despotisms, for example, is one long record of assassinations. These were the work of conspiracies in the palace, and constituted the more or less normal method of removing a caliph or sultan. Years which counted a number of such violent deaths did not necessarily correspond to any exalted state of political feeling in the country. Similarly, the use of poison and the dagger among the Italian princes of the fifteenth century was a question of political method and not of popular psychology. On the other hand, the assassinations characteristic of what I have called the tyrannicide mentality at certain periods are the work of individuals generally unconnected with any organisation and acting without the orders of party chiefs.

Tyrannicides kill from natural predisposition more than reasons of State, but they are worked up to the point of action by the environment of their age. They live among violent partisans, listening to tales of wrong and threats of vengeance. They read the pamphlets of religious bigots or inflammatory articles in the revolutionary Press, and hear the wild rhetoric of wandering friars, or it may be soap-box orators, or, for that matter, of men in more responsible positions. The question of the connexion between the opposition and outrage is perennial. The Phoenix Park murders caused Parnell to be accused of moral responsibility for political crime in Ireland, and Mr. Kipling composed his diatribe *Cleared*—'Their sin it was that fed the fire—small blame to them that heard,'—and the Pigott forgeries purported to implicate Parnell in conspiracy. All one can say is that invocations to the avenging hand of a regicide have certainly been uttered in the past, as when Philip I. of Spain published his famous Ban setting a price on the head of William of Nassau, which resulted in five attempts against the Dutch prince and, finally, in his death at the hand of Balthazar Gérard; and further, that when a nation or a class or a sect is inspired by intense moral indignation and a deep sense of wrong, even the more responsible leaders of revolt are united in one spirit with the most disreputable of their adherents. Both the Phoenix Park murders in 1882 and

the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson in 1921 were symptomatic of a tyrannicide mentality in the Irish nation.

It is possible roughly to divide off, not merely certain ages, but whole epochs during the last three or four centuries when a state of exalted political feeling has prevailed leading to frequent assassinations. Thus, from the end of the seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century might be characterised as a period of comparative tranquillity, while during the second half of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century the regicide spirit entered the political struggle, owing to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and again during the nineteenth century, owing to the two forces of revolt unloosed by the French Revolution—nation-consciousness and class war. Tyrannicide found its object of hatred during the nineteenth century in the foreign oppressor and capitalist domination. Desmarest in *Quinze ans de haute police sous le Consulat et l'Empire*, describes the rising nationalist sentiment in Germany directed against Napoleon and haunted with ideas of regicide:

Il est connu que les écoles, les comptoirs et les cafés de la Saxe, de la Prusse et autres parties de l'Allemagne, exhalaient des idées de meurtre. Il existait même, sous la forme de *compagnie d'arquebuses*, etc., etc., des réunions où l'on s'exerçait au tir, dans le but avoué par leurs règlements et leurs circulaires de porter des coups plus assurés à l'ennemi de la patrie allemande.

Nevertheless, class war proved, of the two, the more sinister force. Anarchism, the desperate revolt of the working class against middle-class tyranny established in the institutions of representative government, produced a regular war of spontaneous outrage. Unorganised violence occurred throughout Europe and the United States. The Anarchist terror of the 'eighties and 'nineties counted the assassinations of Alexander II. of Russia, King Humbert of Italy, the Empress Elizabeth; of President Carnot in France, Canovas del Castillo in Spain, and President McKinley in America. This is without including other attempts against the lives of rulers such as the two previous attacks on King Humbert by Passanante and Acciarito, or the continuous occurrence, month by month and sometimes week by week, of bomb-throwing, shooting and robbery with violence of which M. Aubry attempted a detailed list in his study *Contagion du meurtre*. No doubt Anarchist outrage, like other forms of crime, proved catching. The Anarchist Press commemorated the martyrs of the movement, and songs were composed about the exploits of Ravachol, murderer and author of bomb explosions, who became a legendary figure. Photographs of him were circulated, and the Anarchist paper *Le Père Peinard* published an almanac of the great deeds and martyrs of the movement.

The contagion of political murder is equally a phenomenon of Louis-Philippe's reign. A spirit of regicide was kept alive in the opposition by its orators and journalists, and the venomous satire of the caricaturist Press, run by Phillipon, who employed, among others, the artist Daumier. These attacks were directed against the king personally. A nice specimen of Parisian wit at this time is the following remark from the *Charivari*: '*Hier, le roi-citoyen est venu à Paris avec sa superbe famille sans être aucunement assassiné.*' The Press, sometimes discreetly, sometimes blatantly, excites sympathy for the men who attempt the king's life. Particular heroes are Fieschi, inventor of the infernal machine which caused a massacre in the Boulevard du Temple, his accomplice, the veteran revolutionary Morey, and, later, Alibaud, who shot at the king as he was driving from the Tuileries. There was a romantic cult of young Alibaud; pilgrimages were made to his grave, the Press praised his '*mâle énergie.*' On Fieschi's sanguinary attempt an opposition paper next morning made the following comment: '*Cette fois la République n'a manqué son avènement que d'une demi-seconde.*' Subversive societies revive as soon as they are suppressed by the police, under new names and with clandestine organisation, and the *Légions Révolutionnaires* is founded with the avowed object of regicide. Cavaignac, the Republican leader, makes the following proud boast:

Le roi ne vivra qu'aussi longtemps que nous le voudrons bien; nous avons dans la Société des Droits de l'homme une centaine de séides dont l'aveugle dévouement n'a besoin que d'être contenu.

The most striking efflorescence of the regicide spirit synchronises, however, with the struggles of the Counter-Reformation. I have already mentioned how political murder was officially sanctioned by Philip II.'s Ban against William of Nassau, and the very real results which that document obtained. The Wars of Religion in France at this time produced a number of fanatical crimes on the part of isolated individuals, apart from organised murder such as the Massacre of St. Bartholomew or the murder of the Guise brothers by Henri III.'s emissaries. The former Duc de Guise had been shot by a Huguenot, Poltrot de Méré; Henri III. himself was stabbed by the Dominican monk Jacques Clément; and finally, with the establishment of Henri IV. on the throne, the long-inflamed hatreds of the religious wars culminated in eighteen attempts against the king's life, the last of which was Ravallac's.

The views of contemporaries on these crimes are significant. Ravallac was supposed to have been instigated by his Jesuit confessor. The Order had previously been expelled from France on the occasion of an attempt against the king by one Jean

Châtel. During the course of the religious wars both de Méré and Clément were commemorated as heroes and martyrs. Ballads glorifying them told the story of their crimes in ferocious detail. De Méré was compared ecstatically by the Huguenots to Judith, Brutus, Decius, Mucius Scævola. Poems and songs described him as an 'executor of divine vengeance' who 'gave up his life to posterity.' The news of Henri III.'s murder was greeted in Paris with inconceivable rejoicings. The League party treated Clément as a martyr, and organised pilgrimages to the scene of the crime, while to crown the celebrations his mother, a peasant woman, was brought to Paris and received by a choir chanting 'Blessed be the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck!' After lodging at the mansion of Mme. de Montpensier, the poor woman was conducted out of the city by a *cortège* of forty monks.

This period is also remarkable in that it seems to have been the only time during the last four centuries that there has been a regicide movement in England. At the time of the Danish invasions England was a notorious home of political murder, and a cryptic passage in the *Saxon Chronicle* mentions 'In this year all the Danes in England were assassinated'; but during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the few crimes of this sort which occurred here seem to have been the idiosyncrasies of mere lunatics, like Bellingham or the idiot youth who is alleged to have fired at Queen Victoria. Fanatical crime, the protest for an idea, does not seem to have appeared in England. Perhaps it is due to the orderly and practical character of the English in politics. Nevertheless, however things may be now, the persecution of Catholics by the Governments of Elizabeth and James I. generated a desperate extremism which manifested itself in numerous plots. It is difficult to get at the actual truth regarding the alleged designs against Elizabeth's life formed by Dr. Parry or Somervyle or her physician, Lopez, or a certain Edward Squyer, alleged to have attempted to poison the Queen by means of a powder fatal to the touch. There was unmistakable evidence, however, of the mood of English Catholics at this time in Gunpowder Plot, that grandiose protest against tyranny which aimed at destroying King, Ministers and Parliament at one blow.

In the following years the rising tide of social revolution and Puritan zealotry brought national feeling to a pitch of fanaticism which eventually burst out in the Civil War. Tyrannicide made its appeal in England. John Felton, the assassin of Buckingham, appears as the only true tyrannicide, killing for an idea, in modern English history. Yet his act was a natural fruit of the times. He admitted that his final incentives were the Commons' remonstrance, the promotion of Papists, and the protection of Arminians

under the patronage of Laud and Neal. Search of his luggage revealed also a vitriolic pamphlet, pleasantly entitled *Golden Epistles*, by a certain Dr. Eglesham. There was a whole propaganda behind this crime, which expressed accurately the fierce hostility felt by certain elements towards the Court. Felton was cheered by numbers of people as he was taken up to London, and there appeared an *Ode to his confined Friend, Mr. Jo. Felton*, by one Zouch Townley, Master of Arts and several times Public Orator of the University. It should be added that there were those at Court who realised the temper of the Government's enemies. Buckingham had been warned to wear a shirt of mail, but refused. It would be no protection, he said, if he were set upon by the mob, 'and as for any single man's attack, I take myself to be in no danger: there are no Roman spirits left.' Experience goes to show that when party hatred is ripe it brings forth such 'Roman spirits.'

It is not surprising if eulogies of regicide have reappeared during recent years. Revolutions and armed risings have brought their inevitable accompaniment of political murders since the war, leaving their natural legacies of hatred and vengeance in the countries concerned. The political chaos which prevailed during the post-war years has, however, now yielded to two significant phenomena in Europe and elsewhere. One is autocratic *régimes*, largely relying on police and military, with persecution of dissidents. The other is the organisation of terrorism, generally accompanied in the past by regicide. Outstanding European examples are the Nazis in Austria and the Anarcho-Syndicalists in Spain. Spanish Anarchism has a long record of regicidal attempts. Fanatical Nazi propaganda is likely to produce a cult of tyrannicide among adherents of the movement.

RICHARD COMYNS CARR.

CORRESPONDENCE

'AERIAL WARFARE: SECRET GERMAN PLANS'

REVELATIONS OR FORGERIES?

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—I beg the hospitality of your columns for the following observations on the authenticity of the documents upon which Mr. Wickham Steed based his article on recent German plans for air attack in your July number.

The most impressive of the documents 'revealed' by Mr. Steed is without question that which purports to give the results of certain experiments alleged to have been carried out in Paris by German agents. If we examine this document we find the following data concerning wind strengths:

(1) Beaufort 1—2	Anemometer 8.75
(2) „ 2	„ 12.33
(3) „ 0—1	„ 3.33
(4) „ 1—2	„ 9.69

Mr. Steed and his experts interpret these anemometer readings as 'metres per second.' The Beaufort values and the anemometer readings are supposed to refer to the same wind velocities. Mr. Steed will perhaps be surprised to learn that a wind velocity of approximately 10 metres per second indicates a fair gale. It is the more astonishing, therefore, that Mr. Steed permits a gale of 9.69 metres per second to blow inside the *Métro* station of the Chamber of Deputies without raising any objections. The document, however, only gives quite low values of Beaufort 0—2 for the corresponding anemometer readings—e.g., a velocity of 9.69 metres per second does not correspond, as Mr. Steed imagines, to Beaufort 1—2, but to Beaufort 5—6. The real velocities in metres per second corresponding to Beaufort 0, 1, and 2 are respectively 0—0.5 metre per second, 0.6—1.7 metres per second, and 1.8—3.3 metres per second, whereas the document has 3.3 metres per second as the lowest and 12.33 metres per second as the highest value. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Steed and his experts failed to recognise this terrific contradiction. They ought to have noticed that the anemometer readings in the documents are given to two decimal places, whereas they are usually only given to one place. Two decimal places for anemometer readings in metres per second are a monstrosity.

These contradictions do not, however, in themselves pronounce against the authenticity of the document. Mr. Steed has merely made a mistake in his interpretation. If he were to substitute kilometres per hour instead of metres per second all would be in order. The Beaufort figures if referred

to the older scale (London, 1906), which is of merely historical interest to present-day meteorologists, then agree with the anemometer readings, and there is no improbability in the wind velocity in the *Métro* stations. What my argument does, nevertheless, establish is that the examination and interpretation of the documents by Mr. Steed and his collaborators has been anything but expert.

Mr. Steed assumes that the notes on the results of the experiments were made by a German, and by a scientifically educated German at that. I maintain that the forger of the document was no scientist and no German. Look at the abbreviations: *nor.* for *normal* is quite impossible. Every German with any scientific training would use the abbreviation *norm.* Let Mr. Steed try the experiment with any number of educated Germans and ask them to write down a sentence containing the word *normal* in the shortest possible abbreviation. He would always get *norm.*

According to Mr. Steed, the alleged German agents abbreviated the place name 'Place de la Concorde' as '*Conc.*' Now, in German scientific practice, the abbreviation *Conc.* is the usual abbreviation for *Konzentration* [concentration]. Moreover, it is not easy to see why, since two lines lower down 'Place de la République' is represented by *Pl. Rpq.*, the Place de la Concorde is not given the analogous abbreviation *Pl. Ccd.* Further, the abbreviation *s.g.ggt.* in line 4 is supposed to represent *sehr gut geeignet*. Every laboratory assistant in Germany would in this case use one or more *plus* signs to indicate a particularly positive result, and express the contrary with the *minus* sign.

Mr. Steed maintains that these investigations made by secret German agents with a view to the preparation of future plans for gas attacks were very thorough. If the document were genuine, it would prove, on the contrary, that they were extremely clumsy and superficial. In two cases it is expressly stated that four series of three plates each—i.e., twelve plates in all—were exposed. But for all twelve plates only one figure for the colonies of *bacilli* is given. Is this figure an average of one series, or of all the plates, or what? It is also not stated whether the time data, which are given in minutes, and the accuracy of which is in one place particularly emphasised, refer to Paris or to Berlin time. Furthermore, it is not easy to understand how, since we are dealing with supposedly exact observations, such vague descriptions as *mehrfach umfahren* [driven round several times] and *wenig oder keine Kolonien* [few or no colonies] can occur. Also, there is absolutely no information as to the time of exposure (which is, of course, important) of the culture plates to the air currents, though the wind strength is given twice over—once according to the Beaufort scale and once according to the anemometer readings. How, moreover, can one obtain a Beaufort scale reading in an underground station which contains neither leaves nor twigs nor tree branches, on the observation of which the Beaufort scale depends?

On further investigation this remarkable sheet of paper will reveal itself as quite an impossible composition, for it contains a lot of things which in the nature of the case ought not to be there, and, on the other hand, lacks others which it ought to contain. For example, we should expect the distances of the various places where the experiments were made from the point of co-ordination, the Obelisk in the Place de la Concorde, to be written on quite a different piece of paper. The secret agent, if he really existed, would surely be able to work them out much

better at his own desk with the help of a large-scale map of Paris, a protractor and a ruler. Why should he have written them down out of doors in the thick of traffic, in an underground station with faltering handwriting, so that the paper even dropped on the ground, when he could have done all this much better in the quiet of his own room? As to the enumeration of the colonies of bacteria on the culture plates—which needs quite special apparatus, a lot of time (since the colonies take twenty-four hours to develop), and all sorts of calculations—this can, of course, never have been made out of doors at the actual place where the experiment was carried out. What, too, could have induced an agent to write down figures obtained in his secret laboratory out of doors on a dirty piece of paper? Moreover, in cases of this kind it is a fundamental rule not to put the whole material together in one document, as we find it here, but to separate the various data artificially with a pair of scissors, in order to present it in separate pieces and so render discovery more difficult.

Let us now examine the important data which this remarkable document omits. Surely the strength of the wind blowing outside the underground stations at the time would have been of fundamental significance for these experiments. It was the variable on which, in the first instance, these experiments depended. But it never appears in the document. Similarly, all more precise data concerning the exact place of exposure of the culture plates are wanting. It is surely not a matter of indifference whether they were placed in a horizontal or vertical position, whether in the shelter of a pillar, or in the middle of the in-going air current at the entrance, whether on the ground, or at the height of a man's eyes, etc. All this proves that the forgers could not have had the slightest idea of practical scientific investigation. Otherwise they would, in the first place, never have chosen the particular date August 18, 1933. For on that day, according to the records of Le Bourget aerodrome, there was a stiff gusty west-south-westerly wind—strength of B.5—with light showers of rain. That means that the day in question was highly unfavourable for the experiments reported, since a mass of air which swept over the Place de la Concorde at 2.47 p.m. and received the sprayed bacteria would already a minute later have moved on 500 metres, and after an hour would have been about 30 kilometres distant from the Obelisk. At the moment when the alleged measurement took place in the underground station at the Place de la République, the same air, which had been sprayed six hours earlier with bacteria, would already have been somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Belgian frontier.

Again, the document does not state whether the spraying of the bacteria over the Place de la Concorde took place from a motor car or from an aeroplane. The abbreviation *mehrf. umf.* [*mehrfach umfahren*] can refer to either, but the experiments were clearly made with reference to a subsequent discharge from aeroplanes. With the strength of wind obtaining on August 18, 1933, the drops would have reached the earth some kilometres from the point of discharge. As the strength of the ground wind cannot be estimated from an aeroplane, even such big targets as the Place de la Concorde or Piccadilly Circus could hardly be hit with any degree of certainty. Moreover, the persistence of the bacteria contained in the liquid sprayed out is also dependent upon several other variable factors. The disposal of very small floating droplets out of big falling drops can take place in different ways. The smaller the drops are,

the more difficult it is—even perhaps impossible—for the germs enclosed in such tiny fluid membranes to free themselves. The dispersal of bacteria in the air is therefore presumably to some extent dependent on the formation of these very fine little drops. The formation of the latter is, however, determined by a number of variable conditions, such as the dampness of the air, its electrical condition, its dust content, the action of the rays of the sun, etc. For the author of our document this quite incredibly complicated process which represents the history of a falling drop was apparently a fearfully simple matter: his notes tell us absolutely nothing about all these conditions.

Let us now examine the bacteriological ideas and data contained in the document and the light they throw on the work of the forger. In the first place, the expression *Micrococcus prodigiosus* which is used in the document has in German specialist circles long been displaced by the nomenclature *Bacterium prodigiosum* or, alternatively, *Bacillus prodigiosus*. The alleged scientific expert No. IX., who first makes the suggestion that this *bacillus* should be used, is, it is true, himself no bacteriologist, as the text says. But he says he got the idea from a conversation with a bacteriologist. It is difficult to see why this bacteriologist did not use the customary designation. This employment of an obsolete nomenclature becomes intelligible, however, if we realise that the forger was not a German. In France the designation *Micrococcus prodigiosus* is still everywhere current, as the following sentence from Dr. Dopter's *Épidémiologie*, p. 58, shows: 'The bacteria most commonly present [in the air] are the *Bacillus subtilis* and the *Micrococcus prodigiosus*, etc.' Incidentally, in Mr. Steed's documents we find a statement to the exact contrary: 'The *Micrococcus prodigiosus* is very rarely found in the air—according to the report from No. V. it hardly exists in the air.' How can this contradiction be explained? Of course, the French bacteriologist is right. That our *bacillus* is to be met with in the air is, of course, proved by the phenomenon of the 'bleeding host' (or wafer), whose red spots are simply colonies of these *bacteria*. But a *bacillus* which commonly exists in the air could not be used for such experiments as are 'revealed' in Mr. Steed's documents. For one could never tell how many of the germs caught on the culture plates were derived from the normal contents of the air and how many were due to the artificial release of the *bacteria*. In order to compose his documents the forger had to falsify the facts of Nature. All the statements made in the documents concerning the culture medium required by our *bacillus* must be included among the falsifications—e.g., the special formula for whose disclosure Adolf Hitler is supposed to have given his personal permission. In fact, our *bacillus* is not nearly so particular in its requirements. It is, in fact, notorious on account of the ease with which it multiplies in any artificial medium, not only agar-agar, but ordinary meat broth, potato slices, bread, etc. These facts deprive a part of the secret correspondence of all claim to actuality.

Now for the numbers which our document gives for the colonies counted on the culture plates. They are as follows: 4231; 313; few or none!; 658; 6738; 95,778 (91,389); 1,124,781. It is quite intelligible that in their magnitude and apparent accuracy they should make a marked impression on the *naïf* reader. But let us examine them more closely. First, it is clear that they could not have been obtained from direct examination, colony by colony, for merely to enumerate the last-

mentioned figure would have taken hundreds of hours. In the meantime the colonies on the plates would have grown together into a thick sort of turf. They must, in fact, have been obtained by a form of indirect calculation, in which the culture plates in question are divided into sectors (for the most part eight in number), which sectors are again divided into sub-sectors sub-divided into smaller and smaller squares. The direct enumeration of the actual colonies is confined to certain sample squares selected from different parts of the plate, and the total sum is then obtained by multiplication. It is clear that the method of enumeration applied must reflect itself in common quotients in the final figures. In this manner one could prove at any rate whether the figures were well or badly invented, if the crudity of the forgery did not already show itself in other ways. The figures given in Mr. Steed's documents are quite impossible. A million germs of a thousandth of a millimetre in diameter on an agar plate could be appropriately symbolised by taking a sheet of paper a thousandth of a millimetre thick, and 1 square metre in area, and tearing it into a million pieces and scattering them over, say, an ice rink 600 square metres in area. But in twenty-four hours each of these germs would have grown into a colony at least 1 millimetre in diameter. Let us be even more cautious and assume an area of 1 square millimetre for each colony. Now a normal culture plate has only a surface of about 6000 square millimetres. Hence some of the figures which appear in Mr. Steed's document are much too high. Never could 1,124,781 colonies, as mentioned in experiment No. 8, be counted in this way off a single plate, or even off twelve plates.

It is very remarkable that the secret agents should have chosen precisely the most circuitous and most easily discoverable method for their experiments. They would have had a simpler job in a private laboratory—which, according to the documents, they must have had at their disposal—if they had taken a vacuum flask of known cubic capacity and opened it at the place of experiment. Then the air which they wanted to examine would have entered the flask under its own pressure. They could then have washed out the germs contained, placed a fraction—a hundredth or a thousandth—of this bacterial solution on an agar plate and then have easily calculated the comparatively few colonies, and finally, by the addition of two or three noughts, attained their final figure. In fact, they must have been remarkable agents to pursue their experiments by the most unprofitable, dangerous, and circuitous methods that could be invented.

Now as to the identity of the forger. That he was not a German I have already established. That no one who was trained in scientific investigation could have had his hand in the game is also certain. We can go further and say that neither a bacteriologist, nor a meteorologist, nor a physicist had a part in it—nor a chemist, else he would have known that 'Yellow Cross' was never the official covering-name for the substance 'Lost,' and that in a genuine letter from an expert the phrase 'Yellow Cross or compressed Yellow Cross' could never have occurred, because 'Yellow Cross' is a liquid, and compressible liquids do not, in fact, exist. That no military expert could have stood godfather to the preparation of the documents one concludes from the alleged plans of attack on the forts of Paris. The specialist Press of England, France, and Italy has long ago clearly mapped out the military 'technique' of air attacks on the centres of great cities. It is, militarily speaking, nonsense to use the same methods against two such different objectives as the civil population and the

besieging of any forts. But the circle round the authors of the documents can be drawn still closer. From the selection of the scientific data we may conclude that the forgers did not choose what they needed in all freedom out of a large accumulation of facts, but rather tried to give more than they possessed. Is it mere chance that for the experiments in Berlin no further details are given, while the documents for Paris at any rate betray some topographical knowledge? One could track the place of origin of the documents further on the strength of several indications, which I have not cited here, with the aid of the Library Catalogues of the British Museum and the libraries of Paris; but that is rather a task for Scotland Yard.

But there is one thing worth adding, which has been forgotten in the documents. In fact, the *Bacillus prodigiosus* has for a long time been used to verify certain currents—not air currents, as in the documents, but subterranean water currents. In these cases our *bacillus* plays the part of a living dyestuff, with the particular advantage that even though quite only infinitesimal traces are recovered they can quickly be restored, by placing a drop of the water in question on a culture plate, to a visible and measurable quantity. It was therefore not at all a bad idea to use the *bacillus* for testing, not invisible water currents, but invisible air currents—except for the fact that the air already contains these *bacilli*. Nevertheless, if through spraying a solution one could create a much greater concentration of *bacilli* in the air than is normally present, then such an experiment is conceivable. Now, hitherto there have been no occasions for measuring air currents thus differentiated. But to-day, when anti-gas cellars and underground spaces, natural and artificial (such as underground railways, for example), are being investigated in all countries with a view to their utility against gas attack, the occasion for such measurements certainly exists. It is quite conceivable that the process could be applied in investigations for town-planning purposes. Indeed, it is possible that somewhere and at some time culture plates have been used for an experiment of this kind. It is more probable, however, that the idea has in fact only been discussed verbally or on paper in a narrow circle, from which it found its way in a confused and mangled form to the knowledge of the forgers, who have for ever discredited a perhaps useful and highly peaceful idea.

I am, sir, yours faithfully,

ERNST BURKHARDT.

C/o the *Hamburger Tageblatt*,
Hamburg.

P.S.—I should like to add a word on one point mentioned by Mr. Steed in his second article which appeared in the August number of *The Nineteenth Century*. On p. 133 he states that Dr. Stoltzenberg's pamphlets on 'The Ultra Poisons' appear from internal evidence to be lectures given to superior officers of the *Reichswehr*, because he uses the form of address 'Meine hohen Herren Militaers.' Mr. Steed is mistaken. On inquiry I find that Dr. Stoltzenberg, who was in the German gas service during the war, was occupied between 1922 and 1927 as constructor of gas factories in the Spanish army, a post which he accepted because there was no scope for his specialist activity in Germany after the war. The lectures, which were given by request in his official capacity, were delivered in Spanish to Spanish officers and were subsequently translated into German: hence the phrase cited by Mr. Steed, which in the original is represented by the words 'ustedes mis distinguidos señores militares . . .'

E. B.

MR. STEED'S REJOINDER

In reply to the above, Mr. Wickham Steed writes:

HERR ERNST BURKHARDT's effort to disprove the authenticity of the secret German documents, which I cited in the July issue of the *Nineteenth Century and After*, is as unimpressive as the nine articles on the same theme which appeared above his initials during July in the *Hamburger Tageblatt* and the *Cuxhavener Tageblatt*.

He makes two main assumptions that are essential to his thesis. The first is that the documents are the work of a forger; and the second that the forger is a non-German, working, presumably, in Paris. Both assumptions are false. The documents are not forgeries. All of them were written by Germans. All of them reached me from Germany, through German channels, and all of them emanated from, or consisted of secret communications with, the Air Gas Attack Department of the German War Office.

One admission I readily make. Through an oversight, the wind velocities in the abbreviated report upon the German experiments in Paris were given, in my interpretations, in metres per second instead of kilometres per hour. On this point Herr Burkhardt's criticism is valid. I am grateful for it. As he says, it does not affect the document itself; and, by bringing the Beaufort figures into agreement with the anemometer (or anemograph) readings, strengthens my interpretation.

I will deal with Herr Burkhardt's principal contentions. His quibble over 'nor.' instead of 'norm.' as an abbreviation for 'normal' is as unconvincing as his suggestion that a German agent in Paris would have written 'Pl. Ccd.' instead of 'Pl. Conc.' as an abbreviation of 'Place de la Concorde.' Equally vain is the remark that 'every laboratory assistant in Germany' would have used a *plus* sign to indicate a particularly positive result rather than 's.g. ggt.' (*sehr gut geeignet*). It was not a question of indicating the number of *bacilli* in the air, but of suggesting that a given place in given circumstances would be favourable for attack.

The abbreviated document, or cryptogram, was not in the nature of a full and definite report upon the experiments. It is a series of notes jotted down and intended for examination and analysis by German military experts. This appears both from the instruction written across the left top corner—'Please examine carefully and check by diagram'—and from the reference, at the end of the document, to telegrams dated July 14, August 4 and August 12 (1933).

Incidentally, the incompleteness and, to some extent, the puzzling character of several details of this document would be evidence of its authenticity, if such evidence were needed. A 'forger' does not usually furnish documents which he himself cannot understand, and which he is not sure that the recipients will be able to read. As a matter of fact, the 'cryptogram' was only deciphered in London, by dint of study, some weeks after it had been received. Even then the interpretation was, and is, tentative and imperfect. But the authenticity of the document and the general accuracy of the interpretation are not open to doubt. The

German military experts for whom it was intended will have had no difficulty in reading it, since they possessed the key to the abbreviations in which their secret agents wrote it, and the scientific data to which it referred. Those who deciphered it in London had none of these advantages.

Herr Burkhardt appears to assume that I believe the cryptogram to have been written 'in the thick of the traffic in an Underground Station'—as if the German secret agents had recorded the wind strengths and counted the 'colonies' on the spot. It is true that I state that the entries in the document are hastily scribbled and that they *seem* to have been made in the open air, but these facts could be accounted for by a number of different hypotheses, and I have never for one moment asserted that the document in question was actually compiled in this highly improbable manner.

If my interpretation errs in any important respect, it may be in my use of the word 'plates' (which is not in the document itself) and in my translation of the abbreviation 'K.' as 'colonies' instead of 'cultures.' The experts whom I consulted thought either rendering admissible. They also pointed out that culture plates will probably have been used in a laboratory, not in or near the Paris Underground stations, to test the bacteriological content of the air, after samples of the air had been taken by agents, probably in sterilised vacuum flasks, much in the way which Herr Burkhardt supposes. But as these matters were not indicated in the original document I saw no reason to introduce a number of technical details which might have puzzled my readers. The same applies to the method of counting the germ colonies, or cultures. In expatiating on these matters Herr Burkhardt is carrying coals to Newcastle. Nor does it much matter if the numbers counted were odd or even. It makes little difference whether the germ colonies from the Chamber of Deputies station be given as 1,124,781 or only 1,124,000. The interest lies in the largeness of the total, and in the reasons for it. No weightier is the argument about the strength of the wind above the flying field at Le Bourget on August 18, 1933, and its strength in Paris. Wind velocities may differ considerably on a gusty day, according as they are measured in an open space outside a city at a considerable height from the ground, or on the ground in the centre of a city, even if the measurements are taken at the same hour. On this point Herr Burkhardt is indulging in mere speculation.

His denial that 'Yellow Cross' was the official German military name for 'Lost,' or the chemical substance which Germans call *Dichloräthylsulfid*, is preposterous. German chemical and technico-military text-books give him the lie. (Cf. J. Meyer, Hanslian, and Schwarte.) Nor is the term '*Micrococcus*' instead of '*Bacillus*' *prodigiosus* by any means uncommon. The case is on all fours with that of the germ of syphilis, which many German and other scientists still call '*Spirochæta pallida*,' although the more modern term is '*Treponema pallidum*.' The later terminology has not yet replaced the earlier.

But Herr Burkhardt makes play with this trivial point in order to suggest that, since a French scientist speaks of the '*Micrococcus prodigiosus*,' the 'forger' of my documents was a non-German working in France. It would have been as pertinent to conclude that, because the British authorities Buchanan and Fulmer use the term '*Micrococcus prodigiosus*' in their *Physiology and Biochemistry of Bacteria* (1930), vol. iii., p. 85, the 'forger' was an Englishman working in England! Quite as shaky is Herr Burk-

hardt's quotation from the same French source to suggest that the *Micrococcus prodigiosus* is among the bacteria 'most commonly present in the air.' All the bacteriological authorities whom I have consulted agree that it is rarely found in the air; and in this they are at one with the German authorities Kolle and Hetsch, whose important work *Die experimentelle Bakteriologie und die Infektionskrankheiten* Herr Burkhardt would have done well to consult. He might also have read it with advantage upon the number of germs that the tiniest drops can contain, since as many as 200,000 have been found in the small drops of saliva expelled by the coughing of tuberculosis patients. And if the *Micrococcus prodigiosus* is 'commonly present in the air,' why is it so frequently used by medical professors to demonstrate to their students the danger of infection by tiny drops of saliva from the mouths of sufferers from tuberculosis?

It may interest Herr Burkhardt to know that a bacteriological analysis made in 1920 of the air in the London Tube railway system showed the presence of no less than fifty-five different micro-organisms, but *Bacillus prodigiosus* does not appear in the list. (See Graham Forbes, 'The Atmosphere of the Underground Electric Railways of London' [*Journal of Hygiene*, vol. xxii., pp. 121-55 (1924)].) Dr. Graham Smith's bacteriological report Observations of the Quality of the Air in the House of Commons during 1904 [*State Papers*, 1906, vol. xciv., Cd. 3068] also (p. 70) throws an interesting light on the accuracy of Herr Burkhardt's statements. For of the control experiments carried out in the research laboratory of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, Experiment I., in which sixty-six plates were exposed, 'not one showed a colony of *B. prodigiosus*, although there was a good enough growth of colonies of other micro-organisms deposited from the air on the surface of the plates . . .'; while Experiment III. gave the following result: 'of the 110 plates exposed in this experiment, one plate showed infection with *B. prodigiosus*, of which it developed one colony. . . . The remaining 109 plates were entirely negative as regards *B. prodigiosus*.'

Herr Burkhardt does not appear to be aware, moreover, that if the *Micrococcus prodigiosus* multiplies itself in any artificial medium, including ordinary meat broth, it sometimes fails fully to produce its most useful peculiarity—a marked reddish hue—in media which, like meat broth, are too rich in albumen.

Nor can I acquit him of superficiality, to say the least, when he remarks that the phrase 'compressed Yellow Cross' could never have occurred in a genuine letter from an expert, because 'Yellow Cross is a liquid, and compressible liquids do not, in fact, exist.' The reference to 'compressed Yellow Cross' in No. IX.'s memoranda to the Air Gas Attack Department of the German War Office was obviously to Yellow Cross 'under pressure' from inert gas, which, he suggested, should be pumped into a glass container, nearly full of Yellow Cross, so as to increase the constancy of the Yellow Cross liquid and to enhance its effects on bursting if the container itself were dropped from an aeroplane.

Herr Burkhardt's pseudo-scientific farrago cannot invalidate the authenticity of my documents. There is no need of Scotland Yard to discover their origin, or to invoke British and French library catalogues. It will suffice to study the secret archives of the German War Office and of sundry German aeroplane firms.

WICKHAM STEED.

'HITLER OR REICHSWEHR?'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—In my article on Germany in your August number (p. 169) I erroneously stated that Herr Röchling himself broadcast the speech from the Saar on July 7. The speech was officially broadcast from Frankfurt and Stuttgart, but not by Herr Röchling in person. This misstatement and various minor errors were due to the fact that I had no opportunity of correcting the proof of the article, which had to be written at the last possible moment.

Yours faithfully,
ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

London, August 14, 1934.

*Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the
NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street,
Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCII—OCTOBER 1934

THE IMPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A SHORT time ago Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons said: 'Without this increase [in the Air Force] which we are proposing, we shall certainly not be capable of effective co-operation in any system of collective security under the League of Nations.' It is therefore pertinent to inquire what are the essential elements of security. First, security is an atmosphere in which the national mind lives, moves, and has its being. In this atmosphere each nation feels that it is free to work out its own destiny, to develop its own culture and its own ideas without forcible interference on the part of its neighbours. Security strikes an even deeper chord. It expresses the state of mind of a nation which is free from the haunting fear that at any moment the lives and property of its citizens may be at the mercy of an armed host. This dread of physical and material suffering is very real in the consciousness of Continental peoples, and can hardly be appreciated by other nations whose historical associations are so different and whose geographical position has, in the past, rendered them immune from these tragic experiences.

Secondly, a sense of security can only be developed on the basis of Justice. Nations, like individuals, will not acquiesce in any international system which does not assure them equality of treatment and fair play. In the words of Justinian, 'Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render everyone his due.' If nations can be convinced that each will receive 'his due' at the hands of some impartial supernational authority, the sense of security will be firmly implanted, because it will be grounded in the concepts of justice and equity.

Thirdly, there must exist in the mind of a nation the conviction and the certain knowledge that, in the event of an attack by an aggressor, the organised forces of mankind would hasten to its assistance. In other words, there must be such a combination of circumstances that the possibility of an attack is reduced to a minimum, because moral and physical force have been combined in such a way as to produce the maximum deterrent effect. In our own country the sense of security enjoyed by the individual is derived from the knowledge that every member of the community is morally and legally bound to assist him if he is attacked. Originally expressed in the ancient customs of outlawry and hue and cry, and incorporated in the common law, this principle has become the bed-rock of our domestic security. It is based upon the concept of justice: that no man shall be the judge in his own cause, or the punisher of his own wrongs. In any disputes it involves an appeal to reason instead of to force. It implies equality in the sight of the law and the existence of an impartial court, backed by the sanctions imposed by the whole community. Centuries ago these sanctions were crude. The collective obligation to catch the thief, or to outlaw the criminal, was a mass demonstration of the whole parish or township. There was a general hue and cry. At a later stage the policing function was put into commission—the sheriff and his posse arrived upon the scene. The Bow Street runners were the forerunners of Scotland Yard, whilst the *régime* of the sheriff and the watchman was superseded at a comparatively recent date by the institution of modern constabularies. Moreover, the local policing measures were reinforced by a central authority whose military resources were available to quell incipient tumult and civil disorder.

Broadly speaking, the security of individuals has been evolved in this fashion. Behind it is the idea of collective responsibility, the obligation of mutual protection which still remains the foundation upon which the whole structure of every civilised community has been erected. The same principle should be applied to nations, because experience has shown that it is in accordance with the requirements of human nature, which, we are told, is always the insuperable obstacle to any international reform. So when

Mr. Baldwin speaks of collective security he can only mean the inauguration of the reign of law, which, in effect, involves the establishment of this principle as the basis of international relations.

What are its implications? They are two-fold. First, the existence of effective machinery for the settlement of all international disputes on the basis of justice and equity. Secondly, the provision of an international force for the protection of the law-abiding members of the international community, and to uphold the decisions of any institutions which may be created for the pacific settlement of all disputes. Clearly these are functions which can only be exercised by an international authority, commissioned and empowered by its members to make the writ run within the circle of its membership, and to protect them from acts of aggression emanating from within or without this circle.

These are the implications of any system of collective security. They are also implied in the Covenant of the League. Article VIII., for instance, lays down the responsibility for 'the enforcement by common action of international obligations.' Article XVI. describes the sanctions which may be invoked by the members of the League, which include diplomatic, economic and military measures. The statesmen who drafted the Covenant were emphatic on this point. President Wilson in his speech at the Plenary Conference said: 'Armed force is in the background in this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a League of War.' General Smuts, another member of the Commission, wrote: 'I do not think the League is likely to prove a success unless in the last resort the maintenance of the moratorium is guaranteed by force.'

It is obvious, therefore, that the founders of the League intended it to become an international authority. That its powers have not been developed, and its sanctions never clearly defined or properly organised, does not invalidate them or the fact that all the members of the League have become parties to the new system. When they signed the Covenant they solemnly repudiated the old system of international duelling—the ancient practice of trial by battle—and in principle accepted the policing system in its stead. Later on, when they signed the Kellogg Pact, they outlawed war—the duel—as an instrument of policy. Henceforth war could only be tolerated in defence of national rights, but the question of who was to define these rights and to be responsible for their enforcement was still left unsolved. It is clear, however, that the implications of the Kellogg Pact are

similar to those of the Covenant. It means that in future national armaments can only be employed for defensive purposes—in other words, for policing purposes, so that in the last resort the moral force of the world shall be supported by its physical force.

Internationally, however, this means that we are still in the stage of hue and cry, because the will to peace has not yet been expressed in living and practical institutions essential to the progress and welfare of the world as it is constituted to-day. It is true that moral principles and good intentions are set forth in treaties which, when the crisis comes, as it did in the Sino-Japanese War, may or may not be observed. But, with the exception of the French plan submitted to the Disarmament Conference, there has been no attempt to modernise the international legislative and policing functions by putting them into commission—a tribunal in equity and a police force. It is only through the establishment of these institutions that the determination of all virile and law-abiding nations to provide means for the peaceful revision of the public law, to maintain the peace and, if necessary, to enforce justice, can find its practical expression. Until this has been done collective security will be a myth and a delusion, and we shall still be at the mercy of any dictator or faction in Europe bent upon increasing armaments and employing the threat of war as an instrument of national policy.

Consequently Mr. Baldwin was bound to admit that 'it is impossible for us, however reluctantly, to remain as we have been, but that we shall have to follow the example which is set by those other countries, because if we do not, we may find ourselves later on in terrible jeopardy.' Clearly this is a terrible admission. The policy hitherto pursued by successive British Governments since the Armistice of limiting, restricting, and abolishing armaments having failed, as it was bound to fail, the spokesman of the Government now declares that we must follow the example of other countries who are bent upon a new race in armaments. Whose example have we followed during the last fifteen years? Certainly not that of France, which is supported by a number of the smaller European States at Geneva. French policy has consistently advocated a policing system for Europe, the placing or earmarking of certain armaments to be at the disposal of the League and handing over others—*e.g.*, bombing machines—to its direct control. Collective security was the essence of the plans submitted by Tardieu and Herriot to the Disarmament Conference, coupled with a gradual reduction of national forces and proposals for the settlement of disputes by recourse to arbitration.

Had the British Government accepted the principles underlying this plan and joined those nations who were prepared to

inaugurate the reign of law, the new armament race might have been nipped in the bud. For the acceptance of these principles would have signified our willingness to co-operate in the elaboration and development of the system of collective security and the pacific settlement of all disputes. On the contrary, however, we chose to follow the example of Hitler and Mussolini. We joined in the chorus of equality in armaments, we emulated the example of America, whose policy is isolation and no commitments. Both these examples are based upon the old system of competitive national armaments, however much restricted and curtailed, and upon the demand to be the judge in one's own cause, and the assessor of one's own rights, however mediæval such a conception may be in the twentieth century. Even after the experience of the greatest, bloodiest and most costly war in history, we still reject the idea of co-operative and policing armament, which is the basis of collective security, and which can only be achieved by developing the League into a real international authority instead of allowing it to sink to the level of a mere debating society.

Had the British Government accepted the fundamental conceptions underlying the French plan, we should at least have eliminated the menace to this country arising from the existence of a huge air force on the other side of the Channel within striking distance of our vital nerve centres. Incidentally, this would have been a great advantage to us. But, what is of much greater moral significance, we should have taken the first step in establishing the reign of law in Europe to which, by our signature of the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Treaty of Locarno, we were in principle already committed. We should have rallied a number of the smaller European States in support of the new Continental system. We should have forced the reactionary elements in Europe to declare their real intentions. They would have been compelled to choose between relying upon their own national armaments for security and the redress of their grievances or of joining their neighbours in setting up a system which would give to every nation equality of status in the sight of the law. On the other hand, by rejecting the principles of the French plan we definitely ranged ourselves on the side of the dictators and international anarchists whose example in the field of national rearmament, Mr. Baldwin tells us, we are now bound to follow.

We now propose to repudiate the implications of our membership of the League and of all the pacts we have signed during the last fifteen years. We repeat in Europe the short-sighted and hypocritical policy which we pursued in the Sino-Japanese War, when, in effect, we sided with an aggressor, declared to be such by an impartial commission presided over by Lord Lytton, one of the most able and distinguished of our fellow-countrymen.

Why should we always emulate the example of the backslider and reactionary? Have we lost all power of initiative and abandoned all hope of 'bridging the gulf' which Mr. Baldwin tells us exists between France and Germany? Have we, unconsciously perhaps, betrayed the 'immense responsibility resting on this country for the peace of Europe'?

Mr. Baldwin declares against isolation. He quoted Robert Walpole: 'Isolation is the bubble of a distempered imagination.' Then, if we cannot isolate ourselves from Europe, we have to choose between two examples—one good and one bad. Co-operative armament or competitive national armaments—a policing system, or trial by battle. Collective security in which the rôle of force is limited to the police function or a new armament race. Law and order or international anarchy. An appeal to reason or a resort to force. The development of the League into an authority or its gradual disintegration and decline. The harmonising of national rights and aspirations under the reign of law or the extinction of Western civilisation.

Broadly speaking, these are the alternatives. There is no other choice. It must be one example or the other. In our attitude to the employment of force we must be either abolitionists, duellists or policemen. If we belong to the first category, we are obviously Utopians and visionaries, because force is still an essential element in the structure of human society. Force is not immoral—it all depends upon the purpose for which it is employed. The real problem in the twentieth century is, not its abolition, but its right or moral use, and until the millennium arrives we cannot dispense with its services. Therefore Mr. Baldwin was quite right when he condemned the idea of unilateral disarmament. He was equally wrong when he pleaded for a continuation and an increase in national armaments, thus perpetuating the competitive and duelling system.

There is still the third and policing category, and one cannot help feeling that Mr. Baldwin is really an international policeman, for in the same speech he said: 'Before we are through, that collective security may be the ultimate security for Europe'; and again: 'When you think of the defence of England, you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine.' But no responsible Minister has any right to declare his belief in any system unless he is prepared to face the implications which such a system inevitably involves. A muddle-headed, indefinite, and unorganised plan of collective security is worse than no plan at all, because it only leads to misapprehension, uncertainty, and hesitation.

Surely this was the lesson of 1914. Twenty years after the crisis we now realise that war could have been averted, or at any

rate postponed, if the attitude of this country had been made clear and unequivocal. Had Germany known that we should be prepared to defend the neutrality of Belgium, a restraining hand from Berlin would have curbed the bellicose propensities of Vienna. Instead, we sat on the fence until the last moment. Our intervention came too late to prevent the catastrophe and reluctantly we unsheathed the sword, just as now we 'reluctantly' participate in a new armament race. The supreme merit of the collective system is that it is the best means of preventing war, by providing a sufficiently strong deterrent. As Pascal says, 'There are always the bad men.' But this result cannot be achieved unless and until the combined forces are organised in advance—before, not after, the crisis is upon us. That is the lesson of 1914. On that occasion in the dispute between Austria and Serbia the Hague Tribunal was ignored by the rulers of Europe. A similar fate will overtake the League unless its law-abiding members are prepared to pool their resources in advance for the sole purpose of maintaining peace and the enforcement of the public law.

Consequently, we are faced with the task of abolishing the duelling system in the relationship of States and substituting a policing system in its place. Clearly this transformation cannot take place until the new system has been expressed in terms of organisation. A policeman cannot function without a court. It is equally true that a judge cannot dispense justice without the aid of the policeman. Therefore, if force is to be limited to the police function in international affairs, there must at least be a court to administer the law, for in any dispute or breach of the peace the duties of the policeman are confined to the protection of law-abiding citizens, compelling appearance before the court and executing its verdicts. He is not concerned with the merits of any dispute or of the decision of the judge. But the existence of a judge presupposes a law-maker, and at the moment, as between States, force is the only law-maker. The public law is mainly embodied in treaties, and treaties are the result of duels. Further, no peaceful method exists for the revision of treaties, which are found sooner or later to become out of date, and must consequently be revised and adapted to meet new conditions which have arisen since they were signed. If the procedure of negotiation (which is the old method of diplomacy) and conciliation (the method employed by the League) break down, what is left? Nothing but a resort to force.

We are therefore driven to the conclusion that what is described as international law is really only a compilation of principles, rules, bargains, and settlements, which may or may not be observed. It is not law, but the appearance of law—a mirage

—which only deludes people by inculcating a belief in something which is unreal and inoperative. The reason is obvious: it is that this so-called law possesses no sanction. It cannot be enforced, and in every society, whether it is composed of individuals or nations, there are, unfortunately, depraved and evil-minded persons who will not voluntarily conform to any law unless they are compelled to do so. Hobbes' *dictum*, written three centuries ago, still holds the field: 'Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.' It follows that our first duty is to make provision for 'the sword,' without which the enforcement of covenants and treaties cannot be guaranteed.

This cannot be done unless simultaneously a court of justice and an arbitral tribunal have also been established—the former to adjudicate, on the basis of law, upon disputes which are capable of determination by judicial settlement; the latter to determine, on the basis of equity and good conscience, political disputes, including those which have to do with the revision of treaties. Such a court already exists. It is the Permanent Court of International Justice which sits at the Hague. The jurisdiction of the court, however, is in effect limited to disputes described as justiciable. It has no authority, except at the request of both parties, to pronounce a verdict on grounds of equity and good conscience. The tribunal in equity has not yet made its appearance as an integral and permanent part of the machinery of the League. Therefore, disputes which are non-justiciable in character, those to which no law or treaty applies, or which are concerned to alter existing treaties, cannot be dealt with effectively or satisfactorily by the League as it is at present constituted. These disputes usually arise out of political issues, which have always been the main causes of war.

Under existing conditions political disputes are referred to the Council and Assembly of the League, whose members are the representatives of the Governments of its States-members. These bodies are composed exclusively of political personages who take their orders from their Governments. In this condition of things they cannot, nor are they expected to, reach decisions on grounds of right and equity. The interests and policies of their respective countries are the paramount consideration. Further, if the Council or Assembly fail to reach an unanimous decision, the parties to the dispute may resort to war. This they will probably do, despite the provisions of the Kellogg Pact. And even when the decision is unanimous, as in the recent case of the Sino-Japanese dispute, there is no certainty that sanctions will be applied, even those specified in Article XVI. of the Covenant. On the contrary, it is certain that the fulfilment or non-fulfilment

of these obligations will depend, not upon the dictates of justice, but upon the exigencies of policy. Although the most flagrant act of aggression has been committed, the sword will remain in its scabbard. Not even the blunt edges of its diplomatic, financial, and economical sanctions will be employed.

The reason for this impotence is not so much the unwillingness of States-members to vindicate the authority of the League as the lack of any plan or organisation to ensure common and united action. Each State-member distrusts its neighbours. They fear that if they take any individual action to compel compliance with the decisions of the League they will be left in the lurch to bear single-handed the results of their intervention. Could they rely upon common action planned in advance against the aggressor or defaulter, they might be willing to co-operate. What is everybody's business is nobody's. Experience has shown conclusively that there is no way of circumventing this difficulty, except by the centralisation of force under the direct control of an international authority. This is the system which has been evolved in every civilised community, where the obligation of individual citizens under the common law to assist in its execution has, in practice, been organised and undertaken by the national executives and transferred by them to the policing authorities.

This devolution of responsibility does not mean that the members of the community have been relieved of their obligation to assist in the maintenance of order. It does mean, however, that the primary responsibility now falls upon the police and, in the last resort, upon the military forces, and that the personnel of both these organisations are engaged to act on behalf of the whole community. The system of centralising force and devolving its execution has superseded the old methods of hue and cry and outlawry. It has also resulted in the disarmament of individuals, because when the latter were guaranteed police protection and were assured that the arm of the law could safeguard their lives and property, weapons became superfluous and were consequently discarded. The same principle is exemplified in the fusion of kingdoms, the development of federalism, and all those unifying political processes which have tended to centralise force and to promote the security of the co-operating communities. As Mr. Oscar Crosby has said, 'Centralised force tends to eliminate all force, including itself.' In the international sphere, however, this principle has been entirely ignored. Instead of bending their energies to discovering how force can be reduced to the exclusive purpose of the police function, nations and Governments have been wasting their time in trying to achieve disarmament, always forgetting that when they have solved the problems of justice and security, disarmament is logically bound to follow. It is clear,

therefore, that under existing conditions the relationships of States are only one or two stages removed from the law of the jungle, with the supremacy of force and the resort to trial by battle as its ultimate sanctions.

To remedy this state of affairs the League was called into existence. Its primary duty was to prevent breaches of the peace and to provide machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This machinery, however, has not yet been developed, though the League is asked to undertake the task of administering justice, without which no durable peace is possible. It is expected to perform this duty without being equipped with the elementary organisation which has been found indispensable in every civilised State. There is no law-giver and no sanction. There exist an Assembly, a deliberative body whose proceedings are governed by the rule of unanimity; a Permanent Court with powers of definition and interpretation; a Council, a quasi-executive body whose composition does not inspire confidence; and a Secretariat, an embryonic international civil service.

Here are the rudiments of a political structure corresponding to the institutions existing in European communities centuries ago when they were beginning to emerge from a condition of barbarism. Obviously they are inappropriate to the needs even of the international community in the twentieth century. Outlawry and hue and cry may suffice for nations armed with bows and arrows, or even thundering culverins. But they are inadequate, to say the least, where aeroplanes, poison gas, submarines, and 'Big Berthas' are involved and when the fate of civilisation hangs by a thread. No, these rudiments will not suffice. In an age when international contacts and mutual interdependence are more widespread and intensive than they were in the national communities a century ago, an international authority armed with powers of restraint becomes an urgent and imperious necessity.

What, therefore, are its minimum requirements, which will suffice to safeguard civilisation from the impending disaster and which will conform to the moral principles we have laid down governing the right use of force? First of all, there is the principle of equality in the eyes of the law. Nations, like individuals, must be treated on a basis of equality. Whether they are strong or weak, great or small, rich or poor, they should appear as equals at the bar of justice. But real equality, however much it may be invoked in theory, will be unattainable in practice until the international authority possesses a reliable and adequate sanction. Secondly, force cannot be limited to police action in the international sphere until provision has been made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which may involve political

issues and the revision of treaties. Clearly this is equivalent to the establishment of an indirect method of legislation in the affairs of nations through the tribunal system.

The time has not yet arrived when the Parliament of Man can be ushered on the stage, equipped with all the paraphernalia of modern government. World consciousness, its sense of unity, and insistence upon common interests have not yet reached the point when they demand a full-fledged legislature. Deliberative equality, the right to speak and to be heard, has already been recognised in the proceedings of the Assembly. That is a great advance, because it provides a forum for the free and open discussion of international grievances. But the Assembly is not the law-giver, nor, in its present form and constitution, will it ever become one. Many acute controversies and debatable points will have to be settled before it is able to initiate and enforce statutory reforms.

This constitutional change is, however, not vital at this stage in the evolution of international law and order, however insistent it may hereafter become. The principle of equal and equitable participation in the settlement of political disputes and the revision of the public law can be achieved by a more practical, direct and appropriate procedure—namely, the submission of all these questions to an impartial tribunal empowered to settle them upon grounds of equity. This body would be composed of persons chosen, in the words of the 1924 Protocol, 'from among persons who, by their nationality, their personal character, and their experience, appear to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality.' They would be appointed, not by their national Governments, but by the international authority. Consequently, they would not represent the policies and interests of the Governments of the countries to which they happened to belong. They would bring to bear upon the issues in dispute a free and unfettered judgment, with the sole object of securing a fair and equitable settlement. During their tenure of office these elder statesmen, versed in the conduct of public affairs, would become exclusively the servants of the League. They would retire from any participation in the internal politics of their respective countries and they would become the repository of a world conscience seeking to make straight the paths of justice and thus to ensure peace. They could not initiate international legislation. Their services would only be requisitioned at the request of the Council or Assembly of the League, or when one or other of the parties to a dispute invoked their jurisdiction.

The inclusion of such a tribunal as a permanent institution in the organisation of the League would mark a further stage

in the development of the arbitral system. In the history of civilised nations this system has always been the precursor of legislative assemblies and the forerunner of parliamentary representation. If, in consonance with human nature, the international organism develops on similar lines, clearly this is the next stage in its evolution. Then why should this reform not be undertaken? The Lytton Commission has already exemplified the working of the tribunal system. It has demonstrated its practicability. The rejection of the Report by Japan does not invalidate the system. It only proves the necessity for an organised sanction which could be enforced by the international authority.

Fifty years ago Sir John Seeley wrote as follows :

There has been found hitherto but one substitute for war. It has succeeded over and over again : it succeeds regularly in the long run wherever it can be introduced. This is to take the disputed question out of the hands of the disputants, to refer it to a third party whose intelligence, impartiality, and diligence have been secured, and to impose his decision upon the parties with overwhelming force. The last step in this process, the power of enforcing the decisions by the federal union only, is just as essential as the earlier ones, and if you omit it, you may just as well omit them too.

These, then, are the implications of the collective system, and until they are consummated we shall not have done our utmost to liberate our country from the curse of war.

Adaptation is the secret of existence. It is therefore the highest patriotism. We are not a nation of cowards, nor are we devoid of common sense. Therefore, when we see the clouds gathering and the storm approaching we should be foolish if, in a fit of sheer obstinacy, we refused to take the only step corresponding to our interests, consonant with our professions, and consistent with our morality. Let us therefore adapt our defensive policy to meet the imperative requirements which the march of science has imposed upon us. Instead of timidly and furtively withdrawing from our commitments and responsibilities, let us boldly take a hand in shaping the destinies of Europe as the surest guarantee of our own liberty and prosperity. Let us not, weak-kneed and irresolute, pause in this fateful hour ; let us remember that in the past our ancestors have been the pioneers of political institutions and the architects of the reign of law in distant territories. In the twentieth century we, their descendants, are faced with harder tasks, but let us not shirk them, believing that the innate common sense, practical wisdom, and political sagacity of the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic race can still make its contribution towards the solution of those problems which in these days perplex Europe and the world.

DAVIES.

ARMIES OF THE AIR

IN 1921 there was published in Rome a book entitled *The Mastery of the Air* ; its author was the late General Giulio Douhet, an Italian artillery officer with a distinguished war-time record, but a man of advanced views which found no great favour among the Italian higher military authorities of the day. The book, moreover, appeared at an inopportune moment, since the country, as a whole, was then far too much engrossed in political troubles to pay great attention to the writings of one who was generally regarded as a fanatic. *The Mastery of the Air* was followed at intervals during the next six years by other writings from the same pen ; they all dealt with the same thesis, but, except in air circles, attracted little attention. In 1927, however, when the new Fascist régime had become firmly established and problems of national defence came strongly to the fore, the book suddenly loomed up as the centre of acute controversy : a second edition was rapidly exhausted, and even old copies were eagerly purchased. The younger and more enthusiastic men then at the head of affairs took up the subject with zeal, whereupon General Douhet became the focus of bitter attacks both in the lay and the technical Press. But he replied to his critics with so much success that he finally carried the day, and as the outcome of his victory there was set up in Rome an independent Air Ministry. This step was followed during the next three years by a complete reorientation of Italian defence policy which gradually came to be based almost entirely on the doctrines expounded by Douhet. A prominent figure in this task was that forceful personality General Italo Balbo.

The theories championed by Douhet are simple, and can be summarised in a few sentences. The Great War had shown that, on the ground, the power of the defensive has effectually outstripped that of the offensive to so great an extent as to cripple the methods of the old-fashioned military art. Air forces, on the other hand, had demonstrated the fact that their employment was as yet in its infancy, whilst they possessed a potential efficacy that was never properly tested between 1914 and 1918. The opportunities for waging war in three dimensions had, in

fact, never been correctly appreciated; such air forces as were used in the Great War had been maintained in a state of complete subservience, chiefly to armies for purposes of ground fighting. They were only employed to assist the attainment of victory on land and sea, or at best for subsidiary purposes; consequently, they hardly, if ever, were afforded a clear opportunity of proving what they could achieve independently. Yet, even in spite of such limitations, a glimmering of the potency of the air arm was obtained. The effect of a few petty raids by enemy aircraft on Paris and London is sufficient to substantiate the claim of aviation to be considered as a possible instrument of victory.

From these fundamental facts, so argued Douhet, it has become urgent to recast the current doctrine of war. In the first instance it is obvious that subsidiary or auxiliary air forces of the current pattern are totally incapable of acting effectively against opposing and superior air forces that have been expressly designed for the purpose of gaining the mastery of the air. Yet without the help of such auxiliary air forces it is equally manifest that existing land or sea forces would stand in a grave, if not decisive, state of inferiority as against any opponent who possesses the means of gaining effective air superiority. The first step, therefore, must be to acquire that condition of air superiority which will place an opposing belligerent in a corresponding plight of inferiority in the air both over land and sea. This result will only be achieved by concentrating all available air forces to win the necessary mastery of the air: that is, by reducing to a minimum all auxiliary or subsidiary air forces and massing all aircraft for work as one whole under one command; this process being no more than an elementary application of an age-long principle of war—namely, that of the concentration of force, a principle that has been accepted as irrefutable ever since armed forces have existed. The Germans during the Great War were but working tentatively in that direction when they evolved the Richthoffen 'circus,' or picked fighting squadron, for action on the Western Front: conversely they failed to put it into practice by devoting one squadron of bombers alone to the attack of London.

The two great qualities of aircraft in war are extreme rapidity and, within limits, a considerable radius of action. By concentrating aircraft, therefore, it becomes possible to swing their power from one theatre of war to another; to assist armies or fleets; to work with other services or independently just as the strategic needs of the moment may demand. Year by year, ever since Douhet first propounded this theory, the amazing developments that have taken place in aircraft construction and in aerial navigation alike seem to have reinforced the validity

of these views. As time has gone on the practicability of working with a central mass of aircraft has increased, and many of Douhet's prognostications have been shown to lie completely within the bounds of practical politics. Even now it is admitted on all hands that the development of aircraft for warlike purposes is far from having reached as much as maturity. Time is unquestionably on the side of Douhet.

The same line of argument, moreover, led Douhet to further and yet more important deductions. If the mastery of the air, he next asked, has been gained and the opposing armies and fleets are deprived of their air support, what is to hinder the air arm from proceeding by itself to win a war? Judging by the events of the Great War, there is nothing, in fact, that could prevent a great air force from bringing a belligerent to his knees once he has lost the mastery of the air. Consequently, if such be the case, why not attempt to win a war out of hand in the first throes of a declaration of war by the devastating power that resides in the air arm? If that be granted, says Douhet, it follows naturally that a modern State, which may aspire to defend itself by force of arms, must concentrate its combatant resources on its air power—even, if necessary, at the expense of its naval and military forces. This argument does not entail the abolition of auxiliary air forces to act in conjunction with land and sea forces, since aerial weapons must be regarded as integral parts of armies and navies. But such subsidiary aerial forces must be cut to the bone so that the central air force may be rendered more powerful. The mastery of the air once won, these subsidiary air forces, even if very small, will be adequate for all naval and military objects. Hence follows the principle which Douhet raised to the level of an axiom applicable to the needs of his own country: in war it is essential to act in mass and offensively by air whilst remaining on the defensive by sea and land.

This conception of the 'integral' war of the future cannot be altogether dissociated from the Fascist ideals of the totalitarian State endowed with a strong centralised government. So it is not surprising that Douhet next put forward a strong plea for the appointment of a single commander of the entire armed forces of the State, supported by a general staff, superior to all three existing services. In addition, Douhet's views as to the organisation, the strategic and tactical use of his army of the air, as well as the nature of its tasks, led to his defining very clearly the nature of the aircraft that should be constructed to meet his theories. This was a difficult question, which is still now obscured by the rapid changes that are going on in aircraft development. Douhet advocated the adoption of a single standardised type of aircraft—that is, a large, heavily armed, multi-seated bomber,

that should be capable of beating off most attacks by lesser single-seater fighters. This ideal type of aircraft was keenly criticised, particularly in France, apparently with adequate justification, on technical grounds alone. Nevertheless, time has brought such changes and improvements in aerial construction that General Armengaud, a high French aeronautical authority, writing some ten years after Douhet, though admitting the difficulty when describing the types of aircraft that should become standardised in France, does not see an insuperable difficulty in defining a machine corresponding largely to Douhet's requirements. Indeed, he formulates a specification for a multi-seated medium bomber that should satisfy the majority, at least, of all the tasks that can reasonably be set before aviators, whether they be acting as an independent air force, with sea forces, or with ground forces. It is perhaps in this direction that technical progress stands the greatest chance of coming to the support of Douhet. The potentialities in aircraft construction are still such that an overwhelming surprise might be gained at an outbreak of war by the mere introduction of some new and unexpected type of aircraft.

To clothe the bare bones of his theory with something more fleshly and tangible, Douhet next published a study entitled *The War of* This was a hypothetical case in which a German army of the air, composed of aircraft such as had been consistently advocated by the author, and commanded by a competent aviator named von Reuss, delivered a surprise attack on France and Belgium after a period of political tension. Both France and Belgium, close allies, possessed air forces of the present-day conventional type. The German force was depicted as consisting of 1500 machines, each of 2000 to 6000-horse power, or of a total of 4,000,000-horse power. They could carry a total load of between 3000 and 4000 tons of bombs to a distance of 300 miles from their bases. The Franco-Belgian forces possessed a total of 6000 machines of fourteen different types; these were organised mostly as co-operation units, but there was an independent air force which mustered some 800 machines, of which only 420 were bombers. The Germans attacked *en masse*, in accordance with principles already put forward by Douhet; they were met chiefly by single-seater French and Belgian fighters, much as might actually occur in the execution of some scheme of defence such as is now contemplated for the defence of Paris or London. Heavy losses on either side ensued; but the disjointed attacks of the Franco-Belgian fighters ended in their undoing, since they were incapable of maintaining a systematic attack. So the defence scheme gradually broke down. The manœuvring and fighting powers of the powerful German machines began to tell

more and more as the attack lost its dash and method. The rearmost waves of the German armada had an easy task in achieving the purpose of the attack, which consisted in the bombing of all points and centres vital to the French military mobilisation scheme; the destruction of all communications throughout a special zone or belt so as to paralyse all military movement; and lastly, the bombing of four French towns as a reprisal for the previous bombing of German towns by a French independent air force. The German attack resulted in such a complete paralysis of the French army mobilisation, together with such a disorganisation of the Franco-Belgian air forces, that within forty-eight hours the allied Governments were signifying their desire for an armistice to Berlin.

This whole scheme, as Douhet pointed out, although most coldly and logically reasoned out, was purely academic. There are several flaws, both technical and tactical, in the narrative. But the author's great object was, not so much to establish a sensational claim for the potentialities of his army of the air, but rather to attempt to illustrate by a hypothetical case the manner wherein his theory of warfare differs totally from that which is now accepted. Most futurist writers consider aerial warfare so largely from the standpoint of air fighting, that they concentrate on descriptions of heroic deeds by aviators and thus tend to lose sight of the object of war, which is the destruction of the enemy's powers of resistance. By analogy it is commonly reasoned that since battle is the goal of land armies, so aerial combat must remain the supreme object of aerial armies. Consequently the single-seater fighter is unduly exalted in its place in present-day air forces. Douhet, on the other hand, claims that an army of the air, properly equipped and working according to a correctly reasoned scheme of action, can achieve the main purpose of 'integral' war—that is, the annihilation of the hostile powers of resistance. His ideal aircraft is built and armed, not primarily to destroy the opposing fighters, nor to carry on a victorious air battle, but to enable it to achieve its true rôle in war: a war which has to be regarded from one single aspect, and not from the particularist standpoint of a single service or arm.

To Douhet's arguments four main groups of objections were raised in Italy, and other critics of the new theory in other countries do not appear to have departed very far from their predecessors. These objections are thus worth examining. The first group deals with the question of auxiliary air armies. How could it be imagined that armies and navies can dispense so far with their own air arms? To that objection Douhet retorts: 'What good will those auxiliary arms be if they can be reduced

to impotence by a properly organised army of the air? Are not such auxiliary air forces standing at the root of that dispersion of forces which will lead to defeat? They can only be superfluous, or even harmful, if they stand in the way of the mastery of the air.' Air forces can and must assist both sea and land forces, since they possess a degree of mobility that will bring them rapidly to the assistance of either service in time of need. But if navies and armies require their own particular air arms, then let them create them. Since those two services must remain the best judges of what they require, they must calculate their needs; but then they provide them out of their own particular financial and material resources: the size of such particular arms must be a matter of proportion in estimating the entire scale of national defence.

The second group of objections is based on the reproach that the army of the air of the new pattern neglects the whole question of the recent improvements achieved in aerial defence. To this Douhet answered that if it could be proved that a really effectual and complete system of air defence could be devised to cover all vital objectives in a country, he would gladly abandon his whole theory of war.

The third objection rests on the question of the battle in the air. It is obvious that in the air no aerial armada can hope to go on patrolling the skies *ad infinitum* in the hope of forcing the enemy's air forces to battle. Should the stronger air force, however, encounter or be attacked by a weaker force, then it should turn and destroy that weaker force. Superiority in the air battle counts for so much that the weaker side may try to avoid it; a weaker force cannot be brought to battle in the air in the same fashion as a land or a sea force. But it is probable that the weaker side can be compelled to fight by attacking that weaker side's territory—that is, by the bombing of such targets as the weaker side is bound to defend by battle. This, after all, is much what the British admirals did in the eighteenth century: by seemingly laying open their own country to invasion they would try to draw the hostile fleets from their lair and so to their destruction.

Lastly, there is the fourth objection that the air cannot be the decisive field in war. All problems of national defence, replies Douhet, turn on the cardinal principle of extracting the maximum value from the resources at hand. This lies at the root of the Fascist doctrine of 'integral' war. If it is impossible, for material and economic reasons, to be superior simultaneously at sea, on land and in the air, it is necessary to seek superiority in that element which will yield the greatest return. It is not a question of entrusting national defence to one service alone, but of endow-

ing all three with that proportion of resources which is best suited to obtain decisive victory by combined action. The question of aerial superiority has indeed become so urgent that if the air is not to be the scene of a decisive conflict, no harm is done by being strong in the air. The air peril, it is obvious, is most imminent at the very outbreak of a war. Therefore great strength in the air is necessary; for on land it is still possible, to a certain degree, to extemporise and organise armies with a view to subsequent expansion; even at sea something can be done. But in the air never: if the decision is to come from the air, then it will come in the space of a few days, and no amount of belated effort will ever retrieve a situation that is already utterly lost. The position is such, sums up Douhet, that war can now only be regarded as a whole; it can only be conducted by men trained to regard it as such. Should there arise any jealousy between services, should there exist rivalry or lack of confidence between them, then woe betide the Power that trusts to divided counsels.

This theory was revolutionary indeed. It was not until after 1927 that it became more than partially accepted even in Italy: then, as the result, Marshal Badoglio was appointed Chief of the General Staff to control all three services, a post the creation of which Douhet had for six years never ceased to urge. This was but the first step towards the creation of a Ministry of National Defence, which now virtually exists in the hands of Mussolini himself. The new Italian Air Ministry, under General Balbo, next organised some long-distance flights to supply data for the establishment of the new theory of war. The Western Mediterranean was crossed; then the Eastern Mediterranean—both with complete success. Next came the flight to South America. Lastly, the flight to Chicago and back. Exulting in his success, the jubilant Balbo could write: 'With our air force we shall be able to attack our enemy wherever he may be, on land and sea alike; and we shall strike him to the heart!' Again he wrote: 'Douhet is no visionary, but a prophet!' Meanwhile, in Italy, side by side with theory, construction had not been idle: to supply the new army of the air with types of aircraft best suited to the new aerial war became the goal of every designer. In August 1931 the Italian air manoeuvres witnessed no less than 900 machines in the air, of which 350 were of new powerful types adapted to put into practice the new doctrine of air warfare.

For the first few years after the appearance of *The Mastery of the Air* the French reaction thereto was one of scepticism; indeed, Douhet's writings were mostly ignored. But the developments of the year 1927 in Italy could not fail to attract attention. In 1928 General Niessel published a counterblast to Douhet's work, *The Mastery of the Air*, under that self-same title. Other

writers followed suit, and the attack on Douhet, though weakening to-day very greatly, still continues. In the main the French criticisms centred, and still centre, upon the following arguments : first, air power alone can bring no decision ; secondly, the bombardment of targets in the enemy's home country will only occasionally prove remunerative, whereas it may lead to heavy aerial losses which may prove disproportionate to the object in view ; thirdly, the utilisation of aircraft *en masse* in conjunction with ground operations is the first condition leading to the success of the latter—consequently there must be no subdivision of air forces which belong primarily to land and sea forces ; fourthly and lastly, the national aim should be to develop the single-seater fighter for defence purposes, since these will bring about the desired air superiority at the decisive point.

Such arguments, however, have been more and more combated in France by such thinkers as Generals Tulasne and Armengaud, who have virtually succeeded in converting French opinion to accepting in *very great measure* the new Italian doctrine. It is perhaps worth summarising General Armengaud's line of argument. First, he claims that it has been abundantly proved by the Great War that ground operations alone will lead to no speedy decision, and modern operations infallibly run the risk of degenerating into static warfare once more ; secondly, it is equally clear that independent air warfare, provided adequate resources are devoted thereto, must sooner or later lead to the complete collapse of the opposing belligerent ; thirdly, there is at present virtually no method of holding an aerial offensive in check when the latter is *conducted on a large scale*. Again, writing only this year (1934), he says :

The army of the air is the most decisive instrument of war. Land or sea forces will first secure those positions which the air force may need as points of departure or bases for its activity, either by maintaining them against enemy action or by forcible occupation during the very first phase of a war ; for once those early days have gone by, it may be too late to occupy any such points. Next the army of the air will gradually pave the way for the conquest of enemy territory by the land forces, or of hostile coasts and sea communications by naval forces. In the end it will prepare the way for final victory by the combined three services.

General Tulasne's views on Douhet's thesis are largely those that have already been developed in these pages : on the whole he has been a trifle more conservative than General Armengaud. The latter, indeed, has boldly stated that France must bow to the inevitable and adopt the Italian theory so far as to create a French army of the air in answer to the Italian menace. For the Italians have made no secret that, in the case of need, they contemplate destroying the French Mediterranean bases and ports

by means of their newly created aviation. At the same time French official opinion has not yet accepted the new Italian doctrine of war down to its ultimate and significant conclusion. Each country's needs are somewhat different ; the situation may change from year to year. Italy is, indeed, in such a geographical and economic situation that she may be justified in planning an air war as she is doing. To guard the barriers of the Alps with small detachments of mountain troops and concrete works while launching a great aerial offensive may be perfectly correct Italian strategy. To rely on fast ships supported by a great aerial armada may be the most advantageous course for Italy to pursue at sea. But will it suit France ? In spite of these doubts, the defencelessness of the sky, as General Armengaud aptly terms that phenomenon of to-day, has driven France to begin building a new aerial armada—a policy which has now been endorsed by legislative action.

In 1933 M. Delesalle, acting as *rapporteur*, introduced the air estimates in the French Chamber with various reflections regarding the state of the French Air Force :

Nations such as England and Italy have since 1918 pursued an entirely different air policy from us. The Italian General Douhet, in particular, has championed an entirely new conception of air warfare ; it is as a result of his efforts that Italian aviation has turned to totally new views of an air material that must be able to fulfil the purposes which are in view. British aviation has taken the same road. These two nations now possess a military aviation whose offensive quality could not be doubted.

French methods need revolutionary changes if it be desired to make up the leeway. In normal times international security demands that the maximum credit must be devoted to research and experiment ; in times of political tension money will have to be lavished on mass production. To meet this situation every formation must be in possession of such experimental machines for training purposes.

The future is to the aircraft capable of fulfilling many *rôles*. Aircraft must act alone or in combination with other arms : alone at the outbreak of war ; in combination with sea or land forces as soon as these services are in a position to move. The single-seater fighter will not be able to cope much longer with the growing power of the multi-seater battle-aeroplane. Our whole military and naval air forces must adopt an offensive outlook : to close one's eyes to this evolution would be to commit the worst of mistakes.

M. Delesalle then proceeded to inveigh against the policy of maintaining fleet aircraft-carriers. For many technical reasons, he stated, such ships are ruinously expensive and of doubtful value. Shore-based aircraft have shown themselves to be more economical and adequate : the French navy does not contemplate action at more than 2000 miles from its shore bases, neither in the Atlantic nor in the Pacific basins. As the Western Mediterranean can be wholly controlled from existing air bases, why

trouble about such an expensive and questionable luxury as the aircraft-carrier? These arguments were reinforced by opinions put forward in the French technical air Press to the effect that, in time of war, the French air forces considered it possible to render untenable for naval purposes any foreign naval base existing within 500 miles of a French aircraft base; and the same reasoning held good of any harbour which an enemy Power might propose to use for commercial purposes.

In 1934 General Dénain, the French Air Minister, in making his annual statement before the Finance Committee, foreshadowed a complete reorganisation of the French Air Ministry and the Air Staff. A new organisation which is to supervise all manufacturing operations, from scientific research to mass production, had been set up. Large sums are to be spent on re-equipping the French air forces. These forces are to be organised on a new plan of defence, co-operation and combat, to be combined with an offensive policy against the vital centres of an enemy. As a result of the air policy pursued since 1918, continued the General, France was in a state of inferiority compared with certain other European countries. German aviation was virtually being organised on a military basis and was progressing rapidly, while in Italy great advance had been made with seaplanes. In Great Britain aviation was wholly directed to the defence of the country. Other countries were giving an offensive turn to their aerial armaments. France had therefore been obliged to modify the conditions hitherto governing the development of her air arm, especially in view of the increased technical efficiency of the aeroplane and the bomb as instruments of destruction. In consonance with these principles the French *Armée de l'Air* had now been called into being: the existing air forces are being converted into the new service. The necessary legislation to give effect to the change was recently passed, while large credits had been voted by the Chamber for the re-equipment and rearmament of the new aerial army.

In conjunction with this development it is a remarkable fact that a still, small voice has been making itself heard in France: it pleads for a complete reconsideration of the military problem before the country. The present-day French army, based on compulsory universal service, no longer satisfies national requirements: it is too cumbersome; modern weapons need long-service soldiers; and it is just hinted that the mobilisation of such armies are becoming too slow and hazardous. What can this mean but that an enemy aerial attack may disorganise all hitherto accepted mobilisation schemes? Anyhow, the proposal is seriously put forward that France should abandon her present army and military system so as to revert to the army of the days

of Napoleon III.—that is, to a small professional long-service army of 300,000 men. On examination the proposal may not prove to be so revolutionary as may appear at first sight. France, strange though it may seem to many, already possesses 150,000 soldiers serving on long-term engagements: her new defence system on her north-eastern and eastern frontiers needs to be manned instantly on the outbreak of war; her tanks and mechanical adjuncts require fully trained men, not reservists. Such a change from short to long service will probably come in time, if and when France feels that her security is no longer guaranteed by her new *Armée de l'Air*. But that such a proposal should be put forward at all is significant indeed. If that change comes to pass, France will resemble little else but a defended national aerodrome.

In the United States the new theory of war has made no progress. General Mitchell, who once commanded the American air forces, has made known his views, which are highly in favour of the new doctrine of war and of the independence of the United States air forces. The long-established theory, he stated, according to which the destruction of the enemy's armed ground forces are a necessary prelude to victory no longer holds good. A mass aerial attack against an island State like Great Britain or Japan might prove decisive, since the inhabitants might find themselves unable to find adequate shelter against air attacks, whilst they might soon be brought to their knees through shortage of food. But General Mitchell's views, though supported by independent writers and speakers, have found little support in official circles. Only quite recently the Hon. George H. Dern, Secretary of War, in a statement made before the Committee on Military Affairs in the House of Representatives, spoke strongly against two Bills that have been placed before the House for the purpose of forming a separate air force out of the Army Air Corps. It may be noted that many of the arguments advanced by Mr. Dern are entirely similar to those brought forward in this country against the creation of a Ministry of Defence. Anyhow, he made it clear that in the United States war is still regarded as the preserve of the army, and that any attempt to remove the Army Air Corps from the swaddling-bands of military tutelage will be strenuously resisted. That, however, matters but little, since the defence problems confronting the United States are so peculiar that the ultimate control of the Army Air Corps is almost a matter of indifference, unless, indeed, the U.S.A. should again mobilise a land army numbering millions. In the meantime the Army Air Corps will probably and soon be largely increased; it might then conceivably happen that it is the air corps which might eventually swallow the army.

It is also not without interest to consider the attitude of German thought to this problem, since it has followed the entire controversy with noteworthy acumen. A leading German aeronautical expert, Captain Ritter, has expressed approval of the main thesis evolved by Douhet, although he is not prepared to accept it as a whole. German military thought is far too deeply saturated with the idea of the decisive, bloody battle on land yet to abandon all thought of a military victory. Indeed, what else could be expected? Disciples of Schlieffen, admirers of such a battle as Cannæ, often forget that Hannibal's victory could not give him Rome; that Napoleon's entry into Moscow was the preliminary to defeat; that even the great Frederick's shattering victory at Rosbach did not end a war. No: Ritter will admit that an army of the air may well be able to terminate an armed struggle 'in particular circumstances, but as a general rule—not.' On the other hand, German detailed calculations, which are of sufficient merit to have been translated into French, claim that a modern air fleet such as has been envisaged by Douhet should be able to cripple the important mobilisation centres and arteries of a belligerent country to so great effect as to paralyse its capacity to call into being the armies that were set on foot in 1914. In this respect there is close agreement with the possibilities depicted by Douhet in his work *The War of*

How far Germany may actually be contemplating the creation of an army of the air is a question which may be left out of account, since such armament is definitely forbidden to her by the Treaty of Versailles. Suffice it to say that as far back as 1928 General Niessel, writing in France, claimed that the German army handbooks were based on the assumption that on mobilisation every German division and corps would be provided with a due proportion of aircraft for all purposes, inclusive of bombardment. It was then estimated that out of a total of 1100 aircraft in Germany some 500 were ready for conversion to military purposes. Be that as it may, it is abundantly clear from the German technical Press that the idea of the formation of an army of the air has not been abandoned—very far from it. It would also appear that Douhet's writings have aroused the utmost attention throughout German air circles, where, as General Goering recently stated, it is accepted that Germany's 'future' lies in the air: that can only mean by aerial war.

Nowhere, however, has aerial warfare received greater popular support than in the Soviet Union. There the powerful national association, the 'Osoviakhim,' is but a symptom of the importance attached to the question; it proposes to instruct the nation as to the importance of air warfare; it undertakes to teach the

people the principles of defence against air attack; lastly, it sets out to improve, and enlarge, the national air forces. No more formidable popular instrument of internal propaganda is in existence to-day. Behind it stands an air force of which critics usually hostile to Russia speak with respect.

In matters of air warfare Russian opinion inclines to ruthlessness, although it seems to be swayed by the writings of the German experts, particularly by those of Ritter. The Russian attitude was well epitomised in 1929 in the *Krasnaya Vierda*, which contained some illuminating paragraphs which ended much as follows:

If the political and moral level of the enemy is not high, the position of its Government may not be secure; in such a case the attack of the enemy's territory and civil population in rear of the battle front is strongly to be recommended. If, on the other hand, the people is robust in mind and loyal to its Government, the latter may reckon on popular support. In such a case a more modest aerial strategy should be followed which will be more suited to the attainment of final victory. Accordingly the destruction of the enemy's combatant forces may be the best first points of attack, whilst every effort should be concentrated against the chief source of the enemy's resistance—namely, the will of the nation.

Similar reasoning is manifest in German writings on future aerial warfare. The bombardment of open towns and consequent retaliation, it is said, will constitute a trial of endurance between two nations. Like a boxing match of a punishing character, the struggle will depend on the effects produced by the attacker's selection of targets and the sufferer's reactions thereto. But as it is emphasised, by French, Italian and German writers alike, that the bombardment of such open towns may not be productive of the desired results, it is as well to remember that the destruction of correctly selected military objectives is ever regarded as highly remunerative, whilst obviating the stigma of barbarism. The stronger air force would therefore probably begin by confining its action against such targets as have been regarded as legitimately open to attack in the past, varied, perhaps, by attacks against the enemy's seat of national government and centres of food supply.

The cogency of all these arguments and the knowledge that an outbreak of war would nowadays almost inevitably be initiated by these ruthless aerial attacks has moved every nation to action. Thus it has come about that Europe is now being swept by a feverish anxiety to create large air forces. Let us now see what lies at the back of this sudden desire. It is assuredly, as General Armengaud claims, the knowledge that the skies are defenceless, that there exists no barrier to a sudden incursion from the air. No country in Europe can regard itself as secure

against surprise aerial attack. And this sense of weakness is all the more oppressive when it is felt that the opening hours of any hostilities are precisely the moment of greatest danger, and when the heaviest blows could be struck from the air. Even in those countries where anti-aircraft defences have been set up, it is precisely the surprise aerial attack, the literal 'bolt from the blue,' which stands the greatest chance of catching the defences at a deadly disadvantage. It is for this reason that Italy, Germany, and now France, not to mention the Soviet Union, have issued drastic regulations with regard to the enforcement of 'passive' anti-aircraft measures which are all designed to mitigate the destructive and demoralising effects of an attack which has caught the 'active' anti-aircraft defences unprepared.

Nevertheless, there has been a tendency—and this is dangerous in more senses than one—to exaggerate the desire of air armies to resort to the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian population. The various countries that have already been quoted tend to show a widespread belief in technical circles that the naval, military, and air objectives are sufficiently numerous to attract attack—all the more so because so few stand any chance of adequate anti-aircraft protection. There arises, too, the memory of 1916 in this country, when the German Zeppelin raids so far disorganised the factory routine of England as to impair appreciably their output of war material. The disorder of industry, business, and government can probably be effected without resorting to methods of wholesale massacre. There is, in addition, the possibility which seems to be admitted on all hands—namely, that aeroplanes in future warfare will land 'destruction parties' far behind the hostile frontiers to attack factories, bridges, electric power stations and the like. Such a proposal was actually put forward during the Great War, but was then laughed out of the field of practical politics. Another phenomenon to which the advocates of the new air warfare now point is the growth of overhead electric cables for domestic, industrial, and railroad purposes which stand inviting aerial attack, since such cables and wires can readily be brought down by the blast of even small bombs without the need for registering anything like a direct hit. On every hand there exists a growing desire for a careful study of anti-aircraft defence. What can be the use of the most perfect schemes of defence, if these cannot be put into effect at a few hours' notice? In a short time perhaps Europe will be covered with anti-aircraft works of defence, just as at present there are coast defences and, on the Continent, inland forts. These are not regarded as symbols of militarism run mad; why should they be? Measures of passive defence to mitigate the effects of failure of the active defences are also needed; it is perhaps in this direction that the most impor-

tant work remains to be done in order to combat the possible use of poison gas or bacteriological bombs by a ruthless foe: not that such employment can be regarded as certain, for high-explosive and incendiary missiles are still regarded as highly lucrative weapons, particularly the high-explosive bomb fitted with a delay action fuse which might act many hours after it has fallen. Still, the risk of gas in particular cannot be overlooked—it may even be regarded as probable.

Let us consider how far these new views regarding air warfare apply to British conditions. We can best begin by quoting Douhet's own views concerning the British position which he gave in the Italian *Rivista Aeronautica* for February 1929.

The political position of Britain [he says] has been fundamentally altered by the coming of the aeroplane. She is no longer an island; aviation has riveted her to the Continent; her defence against aerial attack is becoming impossible. Consequently the safety of her Empire demands a policy based on military agreements; for obvious reasons such agreements can only be concluded with France. Such is the crude fact that devolves from the coming of the aeroplane and its modern development; it has robbed Britain of her unquestioned mastery of the sea, it has bound her to the Continent. Britain can no longer hold proudly aloof above her high-water mark; she must now plunge into the rising tide.

Again the French General Armengaud wrote quite recently:

Britain can no longer be certain of defending her territory against aerial attack by the combined efforts of her Navy and Army alone. A line of observation posts formed by ships at sea would be valueless: a line of observation posts stationed along the coast would not permit of an adequate defence of London and East Anglia. The aerial security of England requires a land army, be it British or allied, on the shores of France and Belgium. This necessity will end in bringing Britain into a defensive alliance with France; the two nations thereby becoming guarantors of their third ally, Belgium.

Only a short time ago Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons on the occasion of the debate concerning the increase of the Royal Air Force declared that the frontier of England lay on the Rhine, no longer along the cliffs of Dover. These statements lend much colour and weight to certain conclusions that quite lately have been put forward by the German (Ritter) who has already been quoted. Broadly speaking, his opinions run to the following effect: First, the range, potency and costliness of modern armaments are gradually reducing the number of States that can wage effectual land warfare against each other. Small countries such as Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, and Switzerland could not stand alone in modern war. Their territories, however, will probably be exposed to use by their more powerful neighbours for belligerent purposes—that is, for air bases. Secondly, modern

States, in order to carry on aerial war at all, must be of such extent as to preclude their whole area being subjected to long-range or aerial bombardment. Thirdly, the trend of modern aerial and military developments is such that the complete application of air forces in some future conflict between Germany and France, where both countries fall entirely under the menace of aerial bombardment, is already bordering on insanity; fourthly, the age of aviation may possibly become the age of war of continent against continent.

It seems, therefore, that the new air warfare will compel the States of Europe to form defensive *blocs*, the larger States taking the smaller into their orbit. Should this be the case, then it would appear not improbable that Britain may find herself drawn into the *bloc* forecast by General Armengaud—with perhaps the inclusion of Holland. And then is it a too fanciful vision to forecast some possible future collapse of the third *Reich*?—to be followed by a tidal wave of militant Communism, with its grim 'Osoviakhim,' rolling westward to the eastern frontier of France? Some competent observers would have us think not.

That, however, is a topic which verges on pure speculation: it also depends on how far Britain will be dominated by only one out of the three great defence problems with which she is faced. There is, first of all, the 'Continental' problem, which must draw Britain into contemplating what attitude she proposes to adopt with regard to the new air warfare. Secondly, there is the question of the defence of oversea trade routes. Thirdly, there remains the problem of the oversea possessions. How far an army of the air could as yet fulfil the requirements of these three aspects of Imperial defence needs further and very careful consideration. If the Continental defence problem be regarded as paramount, and if this type of warfare seems to become inevitable, then, indeed, there is but one answer to the question: the air must come first.

H. DE WATTEVILLE.

SEA POWER AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

BEFORE the discovery of the Americas, the Power dominating the Mediterranean controlled the world. With the extension of ocean navigation through the improvement of the sailing-ship and the decline of the galley, the strategic and commercial importance of the Mediterranean diminished. With the invention of the marine steam-engine and the cutting of the Suez Canal, this great inland sea has again increased in relative importance, because through it now passes the main route between the Eastern Atlantic and Western Pacific, between Europe and Asia, between Europe and Australasia. From the beginning of the period when England began to take her place as a world Power, we sought a footing in the Mediterranean, and, having obtained it, we exerted every effort to maintain ourselves there.

In this article I am of necessity dealing with the situation of the English in the Mediterranean in *war-time*. In these days of Briand-Kellogg Pacts and the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is unfashionable to talk about war itself, though very fashionable to discuss armaments and preparations for war. The only reason why we English maintain ourselves in the Mediterranean at all—at any rate, in such bases as Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus—is because of the possible danger of war. In these days the freedom of the seas in peace-time is an actuality: the pirates of the Barbary coast are as extinct as the buccaneers of the West Indies. It is because our strategical and tactical situation in case of a war has been so changed in the Mediterranean that, as I shall explain, a reorientation of policy would appear to be called for. Nor do we know, in case of a war, who would be our allies or our enemies, whether it would be a League of Nations war, or a 'private' war; and, if the former, what combination of Powers would be faced by the League, nor what help from our fellow-League States members we could obtain for guarding our vitally important lines of communication through the Middle Sea. So long as private armies, navies and air forces exist under the control of sovereign Powers, and so long as an international police possessing the only modern weapons is non-existent, we can hope for the best, but should prepare for the worst.

For two and a half centuries we have made our naval power felt in the Middle Sea. Right up to the present time, British statesmanship has considered it imperative to maintain the safety of the Mediterranean trade routes for our commerce, and to enable us to exercise our political influence through naval power along its shores. We now find our old methods of control challenged. Modern weapons have decreased the value of our two principal fortresses, Malta and Gibraltar, by rendering them more vulnerable to attack without the use of naval power at all. Gibraltar, once considered impregnable—as, indeed, it was impregnable to direct assault before the advent of long-range artillery—is now held on the sufferance of a friendly Spain. Malta, congested, and without natural resources, is vulnerable to air attack and, it is no exaggeration to say, is held on the sufferance of a friendly Italy. In the Western Mediterranean, therefore, where our position was unchallenged only a few years ago, we are comparatively weak. We are less open to attack in the Eastern Mediterranean, but have not yet developed a first-class naval station there. Even more serious than the vulnerability of our bases is the fact that our trade routes, especially those portions of them which pass through the western part of the Mediterranean, are dominated by the air weapons in the hands of France and Italy. That, briefly, is the situation; and it certainly merits serious attention. During the last twelve years we have been spending large sums of money on our entry into heavy strategic commitments at Singapore. Yet all the money lavished on this modern fortress, in equipping it with warship docks and workshops, heavy artillery, aeroplanes, aerodromes and flotillas, will have been wrongfully expended, if we become involved in a world war in which certain Powers are ranged on the other side, unless we have taken certain steps to meet the new Mediterranean situation.

It will not be amiss to consider the past history of the English in the Mediterranean, in order to envisage the problem clearly. Our attention, as a growing maritime Power, was drawn to the Mediterranean by the alterations that took place in the trade routes from the East, through the decline of Venice and Genoa, and Vasco da Gama's discovery of the Cape route to Asia. The trade of Asia was then conducted from Europe partly through the use of the long sea route round the Cape of Good Hope, partly by the development of the Levant trade. The caravans brought much of the merchandise of Asia to the Levant ports, whence it was carried by sailing-ship to Western and Middle Europe. In order to assure this trade, then threatened by privateers in war-time and pirates in peace-time, it was necessary to maintain naval power. For this purpose a base was required. We

obtained a first footing through the acquisition of Tangier as part of the dowry of Catharine of Braganza on her marriage to Charles II. in 1662. Efforts and expenditure, in those days considered tremendous, were embarked on in improving and holding the port. We finally abandoned it during an economy wave in 1684. Our fortunate capture of Gibraltar in 1704, by surprise (afterwards secured to Britain by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713), amply compensated for the abandonment of Tangier; and we have held Gibraltar ever since. But though Gibraltar dominates the Atlantic entrance, we needed a naval establishment further 'up the Straits,' as British sailors described their voyaging in the Mediterranean. The occupation of Port Mahon, in the Balearic island of Minorca, was our next venture. We held it from 1708 till 1756, when it fell to the French. For his faulty tactics and his failure to relieve Minorca, when the French were investing it, Admiral Byng was court-martialled, condemned, and executed on his own quarter-deck. In 1802 Minorca was ceded to Spain under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens.

During the Napoleonic Wars we relied on our allies, particularly the friendly Neapolitans, to provide us with naval bases. Under the Treaty of Paris between Britain and France in 1814 we acquired Malta, which, with its excellent harbours and its then powerful fortifications, combined with our superior sea power, enabled us to reach the predominant position which we have held up to the air age. Until the growth of German sea power created a new menace in the North Sea, we maintained our most powerful fleet in the Mediterranean. Thanks to the *entente* with France and the naval and military understandings with France and Russia, we were able to concentrate our main naval force in the North Sea, leaving a cruiser squadron only in the Mediterranean; but after the destruction of German naval power we once more reverted to our older Mediterranean policy, and our strongest force at sea is now once more based on Malta. The creation of a first-class naval base at Singapore is part of an Imperial strategy under which we hope to economise our relatively depleted naval forces by being able to move our Mediterranean fleet to Eastern waters, and back again, as and when required.

To continue the narrative of our growth of influence and power in the Mediterranean. We were not long content to hold Gibraltar and Malta. In 1815 we acquired Corfu, now, as then, one of the keys to the Adriatic. As a gesture to the newly liberated Greece, the Government of Lord Palmerston gave this island and its harbour back to the Greeks in 1864. This was largely owing to the advice of Mr. Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, six years previously, had been High Com-

missioner Extraordinary of the Ionian Islands. Corfu has been to the Adriatic what Gibraltar has been to the Mediterranean. The Venetians held the port and fortress from 1386 to 1797, when it fell to the Turks. Signor Mussolini's bombardment and threat of seizure in 1923 was, to some extent, part of the Italian policy of dominating the Adriatic. More important in English eyes than the control of the entrance to the Adriatic at this time was the rising power of Russia and her threat to become a Mediterranean naval Power. So jealous were we of our naval position in the Mediterranean that, for the better part of the nineteenth century, we tried by every means in our power to curb the Russian naval power in the Black Sea. Victorian statesmen, long before the cutting of the Suez Canal, were apprehensive of a powerful Russian squadron in the Black Sea dominating a Turkey too weak to dispute its passage to the Mediterranean, or of a greater Russia in occupation of Constantinople and controlling the Golden Horn and the Dardanelles. Indeed, throughout most of the reign of Queen Victoria, it was one of the main endeavours of our Foreign Office to bolster up the Turks in order to prevent the Russians being in a position to sally out from the Black Sea and attack our interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose we engaged in the Crimean War. Indeed, the Imperialists of the time would fain have established British power in the Black Sea as well. There was a revival of this forward policy after the war. Russia weakened by revolution, and Turkey beaten, provided a tempting opportunity for us to establish ourselves at Batoum or other suitable Black Sea port—especially as these establishments would carry the control, or so it was hoped, of the Caucasian oilfields.

The cutting of the Suez Canal enhanced the strategic importance of the Mediterranean to the whole British Empire. Ever since then our policy in Egypt has been to establish ourselves in such a position that we could dominate the canal in war-time and secure our line of communication with India. For the same reason we were at pains to increase our political influence in the Red Sea, and to acquire Perim, at its entrance, and the protectorate of Aden. Our opposition to the Russian penetration of Persia at the beginning of this century had exactly the same motive as our fear of Russian naval power in the Black Sea. Our statesmen and our naval and military leaders feared the possibility of the Russians reaching the shores of the Persian Gulf, and establishing a naval station there, on the flank of our route to India. For the same reason, also, we for long resisted the German *Drang Nach Osten* policy, with its Asiatic extension in the shape of the railway to Baghdad and beyond. Right up to the war, in fact, and indeed during it and afterwards, our Imperial

policy was directed to safeguarding the sea route through the Mediterranean and beyond to India.

But if our statesmen of an earlier generation were nervous about the possibility of a Russian or German cruiser base in the Persian Gulf, or of a Russian naval force issuing from the Black Sea, what must be the apprehensions of the present-day Committee of Imperial Defence when it considers the vulnerability of Gibraltar and Malta to air attack, and the dominance of our trade routes in the Western Mediterranean itself by the French and Italian aerodromes? And now there is a new complication. An important oilfield is being developed, partly by British capital, in Northern Mesopotamia. The pipe-line has actually been built across the Arabian desert to Haifa, in Palestine. We may have to rely in time of war on oil supplies from Iraq, and these must, normally, traverse the Mediterranean. Our expansion in the Mediterranean may be considered to have reached its natural limit by our acceptance of the Mandate for Palestine and the responsibilities that go with it. To complete the picture, we acquired Cyprus on a lease from the Sublime Port in 1878 and still hold it, despite a powerful irredentist movement for its reinclusion in the Greek system. Cyprus was annexed in 1914 and became a Crown Colony in 1925.

Now let us fill in some of the details. There is a new Spain, which is a republic, and may become Socialist or 'National Socialist.' A hostile Spain could render Gibraltar useless to us, either as a dockyard or as a place of assembly for our convoys—for which latter purpose it was invaluable during the Great War. Modern mobile artillery in the hills above Algeciras on the other side of the bay could blow the dockyard to pieces. Nor, owing to lack of space, could we concentrate any considerable air force for its defence. This danger was foreseen when the present dockyard was extended on the western side of the Rock, and it was proposed by the Board of Admiralty of the day to build moles and graving docks on the eastern side, where the Rock itself would shelter them from the gunfire of that time. This would have been a more expensive undertaking. It is just as well that it was not carried out; because, to-day, long-range artillery could also dominate anything on the eastern side of the rock, either from the Spanish mainland or from the other side of the straits in Spanish Morocco. We hope to rely on Spanish good-will just as we hope to rely on French and Italian friendship. But the friends and allies of to-day are the enemies of to-morrow—and *vice versa*.

To feel quite comfortable, we should long ago have exchanged Gibraltar for Ceuta. Ceuta, in Spanish Morocco, on the other side of the straits, is just as suitable strategically, and, with the

ground that we could reasonably ask for with it, could be rendered practically impregnable. There would be ample room for aerodromes; and, furthermore, Ceuta could be developed as a commercial port. Except as a coaling station, Gibraltar is not important commercially. It does not draw on the trade of the Spanish hinterland, for easily understood reasons. This proposal has often been examined, and was seriously canvassed during the war, when Spanish intervention on our side was hoped for. We had some fear, also, of Spanish intervention against us. The principal obstacle to the exchange is British sentiment. Every schoolboy is still taught that Gibraltar is impregnable; and I daresay most of our present-day politicians still believe it to be. Every soldier and sailor knows it to be extremely vulnerable, and it would be a death-trap if ever we were involved in a war in which Spain was hostile.

Travelling eastward, the trade route is, as already noted, dominated all the way to Malta and beyond by the aerodromes in French and Italian hands in North Africa or Sardinia. The most easily attacked part of the route is between Sicily and Cape Bon, only 100 miles apart. Air machines, flying from land aerodromes, could play havoc with merchant shipping there. The submarine or cruiser menace would compel us to put our merchant ships into convoy, when they would be a splendid target for aircraft. With the present balance of air power, a hostile France or a hostile Italy could deny us the Western Mediterranean for our merchant ships and would make things extremely uncomfortable for our warships. Malta itself could be made untenable through air attack by a hostile Italy. In addition, there is an Italian nationalist movement in the island, and it is not exactly discouraged in Rome. We English, therefore, with the present balance of naval and aerial power, are in the Western Mediterranean on sufferance. It would be a prudent policy to shape our strategy on the possibility of having to revert to the Cape of Good Hope route to India, and with this end in view our old naval bases at St. Helena, Simonstown, and Mauritius should be renovated and re-equipped. In this connexion it is interesting to note that an increasing use was made of the Cape route by our oil-tankers from Persia during 1932. This is partly because of the high canal dues through Suez imposed by the Canal Company, and partly because during the trade depression it paid the Anglo-Persian Oil Company better to send its tankers on the longer sea voyage so as to spread the work, keep them in commission, and avoid dismissing the crews. The Suez Canal Company, with its predominating French interests, realised that it was killing the goose which laid the golden eggs; for it was not only the oil-tankers, but also other cargo steamers,

which were beginning to prefer the Cape route for reasons of economy. The Canal Company has now reduced the dues.

There would be no real technical difficulty, in case of need, in diverting our trade with India, reinforcements for the Army and so on, round the Cape of Good Hope and abandoning the Western Mediterranean altogether in case of war. The Malta garrison and submarines would hold the fortress as long as possible; but its reduction would not be ruinous for the fleet. This does not, however, solve the problem of the Eastern Mediterranean, where our interests are important. Though we might, in certain circumstances, be forced to abandon the Western Mediterranean basin and route our merchant vessels and troopships, with their convoying men-of-war, round the Cape, we could still maintain ourselves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, under present conditions, we should only abandon the Eastern Mediterranean when at the very last gasp. We could make a naval front there; for behind us would only be Turkey and Russia, with negligible fleets, with Greece, which is not a Great Power, and might well be friendly, on our flank. To abandon the struggle in the Eastern Mediterranean would be to surrender Egypt, the canal, and probably the Sudan and Palestine. We should thus abandon our right and chances of re-entry into the Mediterranean. With our forces holding the eastern basin—and they could easily be reinforced from India—we deny the ocean sea routes to all enemies who are Mediterranean Powers. For they could not hope to live in war-time beyond the Pillars of Hercules in face of our Atlantic forces. Thus, for the sake of our argument, in a war with France the French could not use the Cape of Good Hope route to the East nor the canal. They would not be able to use the Cape route, because all the bases south of the Congo would be in our hands, and they would only be able to reach the Pacific at all by way of Cape Horn or the Panama Canal. Their important Eastern possessions would, therefore, fall to us like ripe plums. So by holding the Eastern Mediterranean we should turn the tables.

As part of this remodelled strategy at sea forced upon us—as I suggest it is—by the growth of air power, the Falkland Islands, off the coast of Patagonia, would become of increased importance. With the Panama Canal closed because of a war, a cruiser squadron based on the Falkland Islands would safeguard the Cape Horn route to the Pacific and deny this route to the merchant shipping of our enemies. And our convoys would be able to refuel with coal and oil in the excellent harbour. Nor need much be spent on improving this base. A few batteries of artillery and anti-aircraft guns, and oil and coal depôts ready for filling, over and above the existing stocks of fuel held there, are all that would be

required. On balance, the expense of a dock for cruisers would not be justified. No Power to-day can be strong everywhere.

The importance of our position in Egypt needs no argument. So long as the institution of private war is recognised as a possibility, we must have some control, by treaty or otherwise, over the Suez Canal, whatever the form of government in Cairo. Palestine is of triple importance. We are committed to the terms of the Mandate under which we are bound to facilitate the re-establishment of the Jewish National Home in the Holy Land. Palestine guards one flank of the Suez Canal and Egypt. The Sahara guards the other. And we have constructed a pipe-line from the Mosul oilfields to the Palestinian port of Haifa.

For these three reasons, therefore, Palestine must be held at all costs, unless the whole fabric of our Imperial strategy in Asia is to be allowed to collapse like a house of cards. In case of our strategic abandonment of the Western Mediterranean basin, we could still obtain our oil from Haifa by bringing the tankers through the canal and round the Cape, and so home, southabouts. This is a no more formidable voyage, and it is actually shorter in distance, than bringing them from Basra. Basra serves the southern Persian oilfield and there is a pipe-line there. In theory the Mosul oil could be carried by railway tank-wagon, or water transport, to Basra and shipped home from there; but in practice it would be cheaper to pipe it to Haifa through the existing pipe-line and ship it through the canal by way of the Cape. Holding the Mediterranean, which we could in any war with France and Italy friendly, we should, of course, bring the tankers from Haifa by way of Malta and Gibraltar.

Haifa has now been made into a splendid commercial port—quite the best in the Levant; and I submit that it would be sound Imperial strategy to create, gradually, at Haifa, our principal *place d'armes* in the Mediterranean, reducing Malta to secondary importance. Docks, repair shops, magazines, and aerodromes are needed. On Haifa we could then base our main fleet; and it would be well placed for reinforcing our Asiatic squadrons in case of need. The port would be partly defended by aircraft; and, owing to its distance from the main Italian or French air stations, we should always have a local superiority. If France were hostile, we could soon remove her from Syria. From Haifa any threat by sea to Egypt could be easily countered. Furthermore, Haifa is bound to develop into one of the most important commercial harbours in the Mediterranean. There is a project to build a railway across the desert, parallel with the pipe-line, and reaching to Baghdad. For many reasons, therefore, it would be well worth while diverting naval effort and expenditure to Haifa.

Wars are not, however, won by standing still. From the Eastern Mediterranean we could move to the attack of any Powers in arms against us. I have envisaged the destruction, or at least the investment, of the fortress of Malta by a hostile Italy. We should require an advanced base for our counter-attacks. This brings me to the question of Cyprus and our relations with Greece. The island of Cyprus is not a possession to be particularly proud of. Our rule has not been conspicuously successful, despite good intentions. It has no good harbour, its population is overwhelmingly Greek, and there is a strong irredentist movement. We have remained there partly because we wished no other Power to obtain possession of the island, especially in the days (up to the end of the last century) when France was looked upon as our probable enemy—partly because of the Turkish minority, which might fare badly under Greek rule, and, in recent years, because we are bound by 'secret' treaty with France to maintain ourselves in Cyprus so long as France is the mandatory in Syria.

I submit that the far-sighted policy here would be to return Cyprus to Greece on terms. One of these would be real safeguards for the Ottoman minority. We should have to negotiate the settlement in co-operation with France—but that should not be impossible—as part of the settlement of far more urgent problems on the mainland of Europe. The Greeks, however, are willing to give us a *quid pro quo*. The following proposal has been made by responsible Greek Ministers to the British Cabinet on more than one occasion: South-east of the entrance to the Adriatic is the thinly-populated Greek island of Cephallonia. It has the magnificent natural harbour of Argostoli, frequently used as a base for exercises and other purposes by our Mediterranean Fleet in peace-time. Argostoli is undeveloped commercially, for the hinterland is small. The Greek suggestion is that Argostoli should be placed at the disposal of the British Navy, in peace or war, as part compensation in the exchange for Cyprus. A strong naval force based on Argostoli could control the Adriatic almost as effectively as from Corfu. True, it is open to air attack, being 120 miles from Otranto, in Italy; but if Argostoli is exposed, how much more seriously is Malta open to air attack, being only a little over 60 miles from Syracuse, in Sicily? And whereas Malta is comparatively flat, the harbour at Argostoli is surrounded by high mountains and is therefore more defensible. We need not establish permanent fortifications there. A good natural harbour can be very rapidly prepared for defence with mine-fields and mobile artillery. With this arrangement, and supposing the strategic position in the Western Mediterranean became impossible, we could, with Haifa as our arsenal and

dockyard and Argostoli as our advanced base, conduct an active naval campaign from the east towards the west and, by so doing, ward off any threat of hostile action against Egypt and the canal.

This then, I suggest, should be the future strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. We should gradually shift our naval and military power from the west to the east, and, at the same time, make certain preparations, not very extensive or expensive, for making greater use of the Cape route. As things are at present, the Western Mediterranean may prove in war-time to be the Achilles heel of the British Empire. We suffered terribly there from submarine attack, especially before the organisation of the convoy system, in the last war; and it must be remembered that all the Mediterranean Powers were neutral or friendly with the exception of Austria and Turkey, who were blockaded. The German and Austrian submarines therefore operated without any advanced bases. Since then the technique of submarine construction has improved, while the air weapon has made enormous advances. We may in some future war find all the northern coast of Africa right up to the Egyptian frontier in hostile hands, with cruiser action against us from the French and Italian ports. It is certainly not sound strategy to maintain our principal fleet in the Mediterranean with our existing bases of the first order held on sufferance. We cannot abandon the Mediterranean altogether, and should therefore concentrate our power in the east; but we are not ready to do that now. Haifa has a good harbour, and that is all. There are no docks there, no permanent fortifications, and insufficient air defence. We have no arrangements for any base between Malta and Alexandria; and as Malta may be rendered untenable in the absence of energetic action in the Mediterranean, the days of the English in that sea may end in the first weeks of a future campaign. On the other hand, by making preparations to hold the eastern basin, carry on the fight there and communicate with India by way of the Cape, we should be ready for all eventualities.

These strategic arguments have nothing to do with an Atlantic war or a Pacific war in which other European nations, except ourselves, are not involved. But if we prepare for war at all, we must make *some* preparations for *all* wars. With the present balance of naval power we cannot expect to fight successfully east of Hongkong or in the Western Atlantic and the Caribbean. In those two distinct areas the Japanese and American fleets are bound to have local control. That does not, however, mean that we cannot fight our battles where we are strong. And there is no reason why we should not prepare for a possible campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean in circumstances in which the Western Mediterranean will have to be evacuated.

When all these new dispositions are made, however, the weakest link in our defence chain will remain—that is, our oil supplies. These supplies would come to us, nominally, from the Middle East (Iraq and Persia), or from the Gulf of Mexico. We might be cut off from both sources of supply. The possibility is germane to the subject of this article. With the best will and the best efforts, it will be many years before more than a small fraction of our oil needs will be satisfied by extracting it from coal by one method or another. To feel really comfortable, we should store 8,000,000 tons of oil fuel in the country, and keep the stores replenished. That would keep us going in our most vital needs for two years with all overseas supplies interrupted. The oil would remain in its tanks in its heavy state and be cracked for petrol and refined as required in the existing plants. The cost of storing heavy oil in tanks is about £1 per ton; so for £8,000,000, the cost of one super-‘Dreadnought’ battleship like the *Rodney*, we should be rendered far less vulnerable to attack on our trade routes. The critics will complain that the storage tanks would be open to air attack. The answer to that criticism is, first, that they would be in scattered groups outside the areas most open to air attack; secondly, an oil-tank is a difficult target to hit; and thirdly, if hit by a bomb, the heavy oil does not explode or burn, and need not be lost. Modern tanks are built with saucer-shaped ramparts surrounding them, and these would retain the fuel escaping through bomb-holes. This question of oil reserves would be urgent in any case. A recognition of our changing fortunes in the Mediterranean makes it more urgent still.

STRABOLGI.

RUSSO-JAPANESE FRICTION

AT frequently recurring intervals during the past two or three years cabled reports from Moscow and from the Far East have given rise to the belief that a clash between Japan and Soviet Russia was imminent. 'Incidents' of various kinds have followed one another in rapid succession; accusations of bad faith and of sins both of omission and commission have been freely levelled by each against the other; and mutual recriminations have been bandied about in a heated exchange of asperities times without number. With the entry of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations on September 18, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the scales have, in effect, been weighted heavily against Japan, and that the prospects of a serious conflagration in the Far East have been increased rather than diminished. The League may be perfectly sincere in believing that the admission of the Soviet into its ranks will serve as a deterrent to armed conflict, but there is at least room for fear that the effect will prove just the reverse. Increased opportunities will be given to Moscow to arouse world apprehensiveness regarding Japan's intentions and to make Japan appear the aggressor, while Japan, on her part, will be made doubly anxious about her own position and increasingly resentful both against the Soviet for spreading propaganda to her detriment and against the League and the world at large for giving ready ear to Soviet misrepresentations. Such reactions will certainly not make for a peaceful settlement. Rather will they serve to aggravate the tension. That the future is far from reassuring must be freely admitted; but even if, as many believe, war between the two countries is inevitable sooner or later, it seems reasonably safe to say that, for at least another year or two, an armed conflict is extremely unlikely. Why? Because neither Japan nor the Soviet is ready. Japan is far too busy consolidating her position in Manchuria to want a full-fledged war on her hands at the present moment. The Soviet, similarly, is too intent on the completion of the second Five-Year Plan. A war *now* would so disrupt the progress of the Soviet programme, and thereby endanger her future to such an extent, that it is hardly conceivable that Moscow would embark willingly on a serious clash with Japan in the immediate future.

If history is anything to go by, it is quite certain that Japan, if ever she does decide to strike, will not do so before she is ready. There is, it is true, a school of thought in Japan that advocates war with the Soviet without delay, before Moscow has had time to complete the execution of her plans. 'Now or never' is the cry, as every year sees an increase in Soviet strength. A similar cry, however, was raised in the years preceding the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, as the following quotation from a despatch to Lord Salisbury well shows; yet then, as now, the party urging patience won the day. 'In China,' wrote the late Sir Ernest Satow in a despatch to Lord Salisbury dated March 22, 1900, 'war between Russia and Japan is believed to be imminent. Japan will not, however, be ready till 1903, though some say "now or never" for her to attack while the Trans-Siberian railway is unfinished.'¹

In 1900 it was the fear of the increased strength and striking power that would be given to Russia by her new railway that gave rise to the cry for immediate action. To-day the cry is due to the fear of the increased strength and striking power given to Moscow if steps are not taken in time to prevent the completion of her second Five-Year Plan. In 1900 Japan was engaged in strengthening her armaments both on land and sea, and her leaders saw clearly the folly of engaging in a war, so vital to her very existence as an independent Power, until her armament programme had been completed. To-day she is in much the same position. To strike now, while still engaged in the execution of her army replenishment programme and in the construction of her strategic roads and railways in Manchuria, would be too great a gamble, as it would lay her open to a serious setback, if not to actual defeat. It will require another couple of years or so before the replenishment programme can be completed. In saying this it is not intended to convey the impression that Japan is definitely planning to strike as soon as her own preparations are complete. The point that it is desired to emphasise is that she is most unlikely to let herself be drawn into war with the Soviet before she feels reasonably confident of winning. The crux of the whole matter has, in fact, been expressed very succinctly by Owen Lattimore, one of the best-informed writers on Mongolian affairs, in an article on Mongolia contributed by him to the March issue of *Pacific Affairs*. In this he wrote:

It is probably absurd to say that either Japan or Russia *wants* a war. The real question is whether war can be avoided. If it cannot be avoided, then either nation may 'want' war in the sense of preferring to fight at a time convenient for itself and awkward for its opponent.

This, of course, is practically a paraphrase of Clausewitz's famous

¹ *Vide Sir Ernest Satow—A Memoir*, by Bernard M. Allen, p. 116.

dictum regarding the admissibility of 'a small State, which is involved in a contest with a very superior Power, and foresees that each year its position will become worse,' attacking 'when the situation is farthest from the worst,' if it deems war to be inevitable.

The most imminent danger, it would seem, is, as Owen Latimore showed very clearly in his article on Mongolia, that Japan and Soviet Russia may be drawn into war, willy-nilly, by the future trend of events in Mongolia, since the unification of Inner Mongolia in association with Manchoukuo—a development which would appear to be the natural outcome of the present Manchoukuo policy—would create a new Mongolian frontier so vulnerable for both Siberia and Manchoukuo that it could not stand long without a test of strength. To fear, then, that war will be precipitated by the squabble over the Chinese Eastern Railway (now renamed by the Japanese the North Manchurian Railway), or by the arrest of Soviet officials of the railway on the charge of sabotage, or by frontier incidents or the firing by Soviet forts on Manchoukuo river vessels, or by any of the other hundred-and-one relatively minor local 'incidents' so frequently reported in the Press, would seem to be unwarranted. Such constant sources of friction and instances of bickering do undoubtedly add to the unfortunate tension existing between Japan and the Soviet, but none of them is of such serious import in itself as to provide a *casus belli* or to precipitate a full-fledged war as matters stand at present. There probably is, in fact, more than a little truth in the contention of those who hold that the temporary outbursts to which these incidents invariably give rise are a welcome sign, as they serve as safety-valves to 'let off steam.' It is the ominous quiet, not the noisy vapourings and fulminations of Soviet orators or Japanese super-patriots, that is to be feared, and it is to the far vaster question of the future of Mongolia, not to the relatively unimportant squabbles over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Fishery Question, and the like, that we should look for the main cause of the trouble, if and when it comes.

At this point it may be asked: 'Why then, if this is so, has there been so much talk and fear of war between the two countries of late?' There are, of course, various reasons; but probably the two most influential are the dissemination of propaganda by interested persons and the sensation-mongering propensities of the so-called 'popular Press' in all parts of the world. Sometimes for internal consumption, sometimes for external, Soviet leaders like Stalin, Molotov, Litvinov, Voroshilov, and Bluecher have indulged in diatribes alleging that Japan is preparing to seize the maritime provinces for herself, that she is helping

'White' Russians who are aiming at the overthrow of the present *régime*, and that she is pouring troops into Manchuria as a preliminary to launching a war of conquest and aggression against the sacred soil of Soviet Russia. Internally these harangues are intended to scare the people into believing that, unless they hang together and show a solid front against the alleged aggressors, they are likely to be hanged separately. They aim at killing two birds with one stone—to scare the people with the bogey of foreign invasion and to divert their minds from their own grievances and from the hardships that they are forced to undergo in order to ensure the proper execution of the Second Five-Year Plan. Externally they are intended for such purposes as influencing the United States into believing that war in the Far East can only be warded off by granting recognition to Moscow or making the League of Nations believe that the best way to prevent such a war is to admit Soviet Russia to membership at Geneva. To encourage the world to continue its belief in Japan's aggressive intentions is but one of the more general objects of these periodic tirades.

To some extent it is probable that Moscow is sincere in expressing these beliefs; but in spreading them in the way she does her sincerity is not above suspicion, for her public expression of them is generally timed with some definitely ulterior motive in view. It is perhaps, in fact, not without interest to note in this connexion that, on more than one occasion, reports of Russo-Japanese tension figuring prominently in the papers have coincided with actual withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria, or at least from the northern areas. In April 1932, for example, foreign correspondents in Tokyo were being instructed by their news organs in England and America to 'watch Russo-Japanese tension closely.' I myself was one of those who received such instructions, and in my private diary of April 19 of that year I find the following entry:

As London asked for a special cable on the matter, I replied emphasising that, despite disquieting reports, the Japanese Government seems to be taking a calm view of the situation and does not anticipate any serious development. The fact that General Tamon is leaving Harbin to-morrow with the 2nd Division for Liaoyang² would appear to indicate that the military authorities, too, are satisfied that there is little danger of a clash with the Soviet at the moment.

My private diaries covering the past two or three years contain many similar entries: 'Serious tension,' 'War believed imminent,' and other such alarmist reports in Europe and America

² Liaoyang is several hundred miles south of Harbin, and south even of Mukden. Eighteen months later another Japanese division, the 6th, was in actual process of withdrawal from Manchuria at a time when Moscow was once more assuring the world that Japan was about to strike.

regarding Japan and the Soviet; but invariably the Japanese Government was found to be 'taking a calm view of the situation,' while the military authorities, too, remained unperturbed.

Probably no better antidote to these frequent alarms could be found than a personal visit to Manchoukuo. Many were the prophets who declared, for example, that the Japanese were preparing to make war on the Soviet in April this year. This was in large part due to the sensational charges made by Litvinov and other high Soviet officials in the closing days of last year and the opening days of 1934, to the effect that Japan was 'feverishly preparing for a war of offence.' These violent denunciations of Japan were, as usual, intended for both internal and external consumption, though it is probable that in this particular instance Russia was honestly convinced that Japan was seriously contemplating armed action in the spring, as she feared that the two Japanese divisions that were to be sent to Manchuria in April were to be sent out as reinforcements and not merely as reliefs, in spite of Japanese assertions to the contrary. I myself, however, happened to be in Manchuria on a visit at the time that these reliefs took place, and not only had an opportunity to see them being carried out, but also to note, by personal observation, that the relieving divisions, though rather stronger in personnel than the normal peace-time formations in Japan, were definitely *not* on a war footing, as the infantry battalions were organised on the peace-time basis of only three companies each.

Apart from helping to dispose of reports that Japanese divisions in Manchuria were at war strength, this and the fact that ordinary peace-time training and routine were in evidence in all the garrison towns that I visited seemed clearly to indicate that, whatever apprehensions might be felt in Europe and America, they were not shared by the competent Japanese military authorities on the spot. What, perhaps, was even more surprising was that, despite the huge concentrations of Soviet troops along or within easy striking distance of the Manchoukuo frontiers—concentrations freely admitted by the Russians themselves—Japanese officers of all ranks with whom I discussed the situation asserted that these concentrations of Soviet troops caused little or no anxiety, in spite of the relatively small force of Japanese troops in Manchoukuo ready to oppose them in case of sudden emergency, as they were satisfied that the Soviet had no desire to precipitate hostilities just then.

The exact strength of the respective forces is, of course, largely a matter of conjecture. Speaking in February this year in Moscow at the 17th All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, Vassili Bluecher, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Special Army in the Far East, asserted that 'fully 130,000

Japanese troops' were then in Manchuria. This, however, was certainly an over-estimate, the actual figures probably being little more than half this number, as the principal formations consist of only three infantry divisions, two independent cavalry brigades, and three 'independent garrisons.' The last named are employed solely for guarding the railways and consist of six infantry battalions each. The usually accepted figure for Soviet forces along or near the Manchurian frontiers is from 200,000 to 250,000, although a Japanese intelligence officer in Tsitsihar gave me, in May this year, an estimate of roughly 500,000 in the whole Eastern Baikal region. According to this officer, this force included fifteen divisions of 20,000 each, five of these divisions, backed by 500 aircraft and 500 tanks, being within striking distance of Manchuli. This officer, like all other senior Japanese officers whom I met on this visit to Manchoukuo, expressed confidence that the Soviet had no immediate intention of attacking; consequently he considered that his own people had no cause for alarm, despite their relative inferiority in military strength on the spot.

Whatever the actual strength of the Soviet military concentrations may be, it is certain that Moscow has, during the past two or three years, taken most vigorous steps to strengthen her position east of Baikal. Reinforcements have been sent in tens of thousands; strong defence works and fortifications have been constructed along hundreds of miles of the River Amur, which forms the northern border-line of Manchoukuo; the Vladivostok defences have been strengthened to an immense degree; air-fields and air-bases have been prepared in large numbers; railways have been doubled-tracked and widely extended; and vast quantities of provisions and munitions of war have been stored in Vladivostok and other towns and cities in Eastern Siberia, so as to make the 'special army of the Far East' as self-supporting as possible in the event of war, lest the long and dangerously exposed line of communication with European Russia be cut.

All this, and much more besides, was freely admitted by Vassili Bluecher in his speech at Moscow in February, when he talked of 'the belting of the borders with iron and concrete, sufficiently solid to withstand the strongest teeth,' and asserted that, in the event of war, 'the Soviet will be able to concentrate so many aeroplanes that they will certainly be more numerous than Japan's.' A somewhat similar assertion had been made to me several months earlier by a Soviet official in Tokyo. Questioned as to the approximate strength of the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, he professed inability to reply, but freely admitted that they had been strongly reinforced of late. Equally frank was his assertion that the Soviet would have been placed in a very serious position if the Japanese had tried conclusions with them

eighteen months previously, but that the intervening period had enabled them to strengthen themselves and make preparations to such an extent that all cause for anxiety had now been removed.

Taking all that has been said above into consideration, one thing that seems clear is that not only do the Russians appear sincere in asserting that their concentration of troops and general preparations east of Baikal are primarily in the nature of defensive precautions, but also that the Japanese military authorities are themselves perfectly satisfied that this is so. On the other hand, the relatively small numbers of Japanese troops and their actual disposition in the 550,000 square miles comprising the territory of Manchoukuo³ seem to afford clear proof that Japan, too, has no intention of precipitating hostilities. Once more, then, we come back to the question, 'Why should so much apprehension be felt in Europe and America?'

In part, as has already been shown, this is undoubtedly due to Soviet propaganda, which is itself partly due to seemingly unfounded fear regarding Japanese intentions and partly to ulterior motives. The Soviet, however, is not the only party to indulge in talk calculated to arouse misgivings abroad. In Japan, too, there are certain elements who delight to make their own countrymen's flesh creep by discoursing on alleged intentions of the Soviet, although—unlike their colleagues in Moscow—these purveyors of evil tidings are mainly irresponsible nonentities. On the whole, the more responsible officials and outstanding personalities in Japan have, in fact, made a praiseworthy effort to decry and discredit the talk of probable war between Japan and Soviet Russia, and to emphasise that, far from desiring war, Japan is bent on pursuing a policy of peace and settling all pending issues with the Soviet by peaceful means. Especially has this been so since September last year, when Mr. Hirota succeeded Count Uchida as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There are, however, others besides the leaders in Moscow and the small irresponsible element in Japan who serve to arouse apprehensions of an armed conflict between the two countries. I know personally, for example, of a foreign correspondent who deliberately cabled alarmist despatches to the paper he was representing, not because he believed in the reports he sent, but because his paper had told him they were not interested in news that indicated an easing of tension, but wanted the alleged tension 'played up' and made as sensational and 'snappy' as possible. It is, unfortunately, well known to all foreign correspondents that certain papers in all countries raise a constant cry for 'sensation' and for news that will provide big headlines. It is papers of this

³ The actual area, according to the 1934 *Report on Progress in Manchuria*, is given as 548,198 square miles.

kind that are the worst mischief-makers and breeders of international ill-will.

One other fomentor of trouble, and consequent apprehension, that calls for special mention is the Russian political refugee, who is to be found in large numbers throughout the Far East. To some extent, in spite of his trouble-making propensities, he is deserving of sympathy, for he has generally suffered much and lost much, and in disseminating canards regarding the alleged imminence of war he is very often a victim of illusion, for the wish with him is father to the thought. He prays and longs for the outbreak of war, believing as he does that war between Japan and Russia will surely bring about the fall of the Soviet *régime*. This fact was very clearly brought home to me following a talk with a Japanese *gendarme* colonel in Harbin a few months ago. Like other senior officers in Manchuria, he seemed confident that the Soviet leaders in Moscow had no desire for war at the present time. Rather did they want to avoid war, he asserted, because they were afraid of the activities and counter-revolutionary work of the Russian *émigrés* in the event of war, as these *émigrés* would certainly take every advantage of a war to bring about the downfall of the present *régime* in Russia. This political refugee element, he indicated, was very embarrassing at times to the Japanese and Manchoukuo authorities in Manchuria, as it was constantly intriguing and making mischief with the object of bringing about war—a fact that lent colour to Soviet accusations of Japanese connivance with counter-revolutionary activities.

Following this talk, I went to dine with a friend whose wife was one of these 'White' Russians of whom the Japanese colonel had spoken. The talk at dinner turned on the subject of possible hostilities between Japan and the Soviet. Both my host and hostess seemed convinced that it was merely a matter of weeks, perhaps only of days, before war would break out, and my hostess made no attempt to hide her disappointment after I had finally argued both herself and her husband out of this belief. She had, she said, been hoping and praying for it, week after week, month after month, as also had so many others among her fellow-exiles in Manchuria, but always, just when her hopes appeared about to be realised, she had had them dashed to the ground, like I had dashed them then.

Enough, however, has now been said to indicate how the hopes and the fears and the propaganda of interested parties have combined with the deliberate distortions and fabrications of sensation-mongers to play upon the nerves of statesmen and general public alike, in countries far removed from the scene of feared hostilities, and to increase the apprehensions aroused by the developments of the past three years. It only remains to be shown how the

developments which first gave rise to these apprehensions were themselves originated. This can best be done by considering briefly the course of Russo-Japanese relations since the close of the war of 1904-5. Following the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, relations between the two countries remained most cordial for so long as the old Tsarist *régime* continued. The Bolshevik revolution put an end to this period of cordiality for the time being, though relations were restored to a reasonably friendly footing as a result of the agreement concluded at Peking in January 1925, whereby diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia were resumed. While, however, the resumption of diplomatic relations served to create an outward air of friendliness, the vast difference between the Soviet creed and the deep reverence accorded to the monarchical system in Japan made true cordiality and friendship an impossibility. Each Government regarded the other with barely concealed suspicion, and it is probably not too much to say that the agreement restoring diplomatic relations was little more than a *mariage de convenance*. It was to Moscow's advantage to obtain recognition by another of the 'Big Powers,' such as Japan had become, while Japan, on her part, was still smarting under the blow dealt by the abrogation of her old alliance with Great Britain in 1922 and felt the advisability of patching up differences with her powerful neighbour now that the safeguard of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance no longer existed.

So matters went on until 1929—reasonable friendship on the surface, mutual suspicion beneath. But because, in so far as Japan was concerned, her suspicions were directed toward subversive propaganda and Communist activities rather than toward Moscow as a military menace, her own counter-measures were directed toward 'thought-control' rather than increase of armaments. She was, in fact, frankly contemptuous of the new Soviet army, lacking as it was at the start in discipline, *moral*, training, and equipment. Then came the Sino-Soviet clash in Northern Manchuria in 1929, and the ease with which the Soviet dealt with the Chinese in these operations opened the eyes of the world, and of Japan in particular, to the immense progress made by the hitherto somewhat despised Soviet army.

One result of this revelation was that the Japanese military authorities began to get restive and to urge the necessity of bringing their own army up to date. With the growth of anti-military sentiment that had sprung up in all countries since the close of the World War, Japan, like others, had reduced her armaments very considerably. Not only had she effected two successive and entirely voluntary cuts in her land forces, but she had persuaded her military leaders to postpone their plans for mechanising and generally modernising the army, which, on account of its

non-participation in any of the main theatres of the World War, had fallen far behind the armies of the more active participants in the matter of weapons, equipment, and training in their use. This was all very well so long as no up-to-date army was within striking distance of Japan or of her possessions on the Asiatic mainland, but the Sino-Soviet operations of 1929 had clearly revealed that this happy state of affairs no longer existed, as the Soviet forces engaged had shown themselves to be thoroughly up to date in their arms and equipment as well as in their methods—and efficient withal.

The Hamaguchi Cabinet, which came into power about this time, was pledged to economy and retrenchment, and could not, therefore, give ear to the urgings of the military. The army, accordingly, contained itself in patience so far as it could; but with the signing of the unpopular London Naval Treaty the following year, army and navy began to make common cause, and it only required the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble in the autumn of 1931 to bring the growing murmurs of discontent to a head. The Army Replenishment Programme was finally sanctioned in March 1933. Meanwhile, however, in addition to the army's anxiety about the continued postponement of their 'replenishment programme,' the evidence of Soviet military efficiency had made them increasingly anxious about their communications on the neighbouring mainland. As far back as 1909 China had agreed to the construction of a railway linking the north-east frontier of Korea, at Kainei, with Kirin 'at an opportune time' with Japanese capital, and nine years later Japanese banks had advanced the necessary money to the Peking Government on the understanding that China would commence construction within six months.⁴ But the agreement was never fulfilled, and by 1931 Japanese patience was becoming exhausted.

The strategic importance of this line in the event of a clash with the Soviet requires no stressing. The evidence of the growth of Soviet military efficiency therefore served to increase Japan's anxiety for the rapid construction of this important link in her communications on the mainland. Resentment against Chang Hsueh-liang for placing obstacles in the way of its completion rose correspondingly, and there can be little doubt that this resentment together with the anxiety which caused it were important contributory factors in the growth of Sino-Japanese friction, which culminated finally in the outbreak of September 18, 1931. In short, it might be said that it was Japan's anxiety regarding the growing power of the Soviet in the Far East, rather than hostility toward China, that was at the root of the Manchurian trouble.

Developments since the autumn of 1931 must still be so fresh

⁴ *Vide the Manchurian Year Book, 1932-3, pp. 258-260.*

in everyone's mind that little more need be added. Wonderfully restrained at the outset lest Japan should take umbrage and strike before the Soviet was ready, the Moscow leaders became increasingly bold and provocative as their own military strength in the Far East increased. Japan's clash with the League and her eventual withdrawal from that body merely served to increase Soviet confidence in herself and made her correspondingly provocative.

What more remains to be added? It is this. It must be evident, by now, to all that Japan will never give up her vast experiment in Manchoukuo voluntarily. On her success or failure she stands or falls, and no Power or combination of Powers is in a position to compel her by force to desist. 'Manchoukuo represents the only strategic dam to resist the Soviet inundation of the Far East.' 'We have no choice but to secure a foothold to stop the Red Terror at the western extremity of the empire.'⁵ Such are the *dicta* of Japan's leaders, and, right or wrong, they and the whole people of Japan are firm in their conviction that this is nothing but the stark, plain truth, and nothing is going to make them change their belief or deter them from defending it, if need be, to the last gasp. Would we ourselves not act similarly in the matter of our own position *vis-à-vis* Egypt?

This being so, the sooner the matter is settled and done with the better. Manchoukuo has come to stay, and by continuing to withhold recognition the Powers are, in effect, far more guilty than Japan of acting in such a way as to maintain and encourage a dangerous state of tension and instability in the Far East. Their attitude merely serves to provoke Japan and to play into the hands of Japanese hotheads. It leads China to continue clinging to the false hope that, in the last resort, she can depend on the armed support of the Powers, and to believe, therefore, that she can safely continue to flout Japan and refuse to enter into direct negotiations for the settlement of the many outstanding issues between herself and Japan. It leads the Soviet to think she can depend on the moral support of the Powers against Japan, and that, therefore, she can safely adopt a more aggressive and provocative attitude toward Japan. It is hardly necessary to add—for it must surely be obvious to all—that the Chinese and Soviet reaction to the Powers' attitude towards Japan and Manchoukuo is one of the main factors compelling Japan to strengthen her own position still further, thereby adding to the tension. Surely a vicious circle if ever there was one?

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⁵ General Araki's contention, for example, is that the Soviet aims at bolshevising China as a step towards world revolution, but that, so long as Manchuria remains independent and, in effect, under Japanese protection, the bolshevisation of China is almost impossible. For the same reason, Japan is apprehensive of Soviet penetration into Inner Mongolia and elsewhere.

A NORTHERN UTOPIA

IN surveying the political and economic trend of the world during these last few years, the student of international affairs must often have felt like a certain pessimist described by that great French wit Chamfort. The gloomy gentleman in question is alleged to have remarked that he was quite prepared to believe there was some really decent fellow living somewhere, but that he must obviously be unknown and hard to find. It is therefore particularly gratifying to record that this 'decent fellow' among the nations not only exists but is beginning to emerge from comparative obscurity and is by way of becoming a vital factor in the world's affairs. This haven of sanity is Scandinavia, and especially Sweden—the largest and most important of the Scandinavian countries.

It is astounding how little is really known about them by the rest of the world and what false ideas people have about them. This ignorance was revealed in a striking manner a few years ago when a Stockholm newspaper had the bright idea of instructing its correspondents in various capitals to interview shop-girls, policemen, hotel-keepers, workmen, as well as educated persons, on what occurred to them when 'Sweden' was mentioned. The results were quite fantastic, and disclosed a very prevalent tendency to mix up Sweden, Denmark, and Norway with each other.

It is true, of course, that these three countries have a great deal in common. Yet the notion that they are identical is entirely false. There are striking differences of scenery, national character, appearance, mentality, and language. The soft coastline of Denmark almost melts into the surrounding water; that little country is just one large garden, farm narrowly adjoining farm. Norway, on the other hand, is a country of rocks dropping sharply into the sea below, deep fjords, hidden little fishermen's villages, and enormous open spaces. Finally, Sweden, where the distance from Malmö to the North Pole is about as great as that from Malmö to Southern Italy, is a country of endless forests, wide rivers, huge lakes, and stormy waterfalls and torrents. Villages, lonely farms, and small towns are scattered over this vast terri-

tory, separated by almost endless stretches of uninhabited land. But, with all these differences in landscape, the three Scandinavian countries have the same incredibly beautiful blend of colours, in which blue, grey, and yellow seem to dominate.

Although educated people in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway do understand each other's speech and can read each other's books and papers, both vocabulary and pronunciation (especially the latter) are in each case quite different. The melody of these languages is not a bit alike. Perhaps it may be said that the Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians are rather like the three grown-up sons of the same father, each with an individuality and a business of his own, but originating in the old paternal firm. And, to carry this analogy still further, each brother takes the other two for granted, feels friendly towards them—there is no family without occasional rows or mutual irritations, of course: each conducts his affairs according to his own ideas, and rejoices that he is close—yet not too close—to the rest of the family. The fact that they are separated from each other by mountains or the sea is a great advantage: here again, as in so many families, relations are improved by a certain distance. In spite of Sweden's vast territory, she only has a population of about 6,500,000; Denmark has 3,500,000 and Norway 2,500,000. Thus they have the important characteristic in common that they are all three of them small countries, with just one really large city each. Copenhagen is heading for 1,000,000 inhabitants in the not too distant future, whereas both Stockholm and Oslo have under 500,000. All this makes it possible for a large number of people in all walks of life, but especially men of business, in each country to know their 'opposite numbers' in the other two. At the same time trade relations between these three countries are not particularly active, although it is worth mentioning that a large part of Denmark gets its electric power from a Swedish plant across the water.

England is the great centre of attraction for the foreign trade of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark alike, and it is to this country that it flows. In the past they used to sell most of their goods to England and buy most of the things they wanted in Germany. Now both political and economic considerations have strongly prejudiced Germany in their eyes. They thoroughly disapprove of the Hitler régime, and they do not like the way Germany treats her foreign creditors; it is costing them a lot of money. Simultaneously with this process of estrangement toward Germany, a political, cultural, and economic *rapprochement* with Great Britain is in process. They all realise that if they wish to go on selling to this country they must also buy more from it, and the proportion of imports from England is rapidly rising in the case of all three of them. The British tariff policy, the fact that their

currencies are based on sterling and not on gold, but more particularly the new trade agreements, have given this expansion a strong stimulus. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark see in this country, not only their best customer, but they genuinely admire and respect it. It is no exaggeration to say that if England's prestige in the East has been gradually sinking, in Northern Europe it is at the present moment higher than it ever has been. The good-will possessed by the British in the Scandinavian countries is almost unlimited; it is something that deserves attention, appreciation, and careful handling. Here is an enormous chance for England; it would be a thousand pities if she let it slip by being too casual or too stand-offish.

In this connexion the following two extracts from the latest publication of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in London are interesting:

... the way British manufacturers frequently handle their Scandinavian agencies is detrimental to the promotion of interest in Sweden for British goods ... it is to be strongly recommended that British exporters should learn to count in metres, or in any other metric units, instead of in yards and inches or other British measurement units ... the same recommendation applies to price quotations, at least in some cases. As an instance British dog biscuits are mostly quoted in cwts., even though the selling price must be fixed per piece or per packet. ...

These legitimate remonstrances to the British exporters could be quoted at considerably greater length, because they are extremely abundant. Suffice it, however, to point to another aspect of the same problem, where the British have obviously a lesson to learn from their more successful competitors. In an article called 'A British Business Man Looks at the Swedish Market,' Mr. D. E. Kidd, representative of the F.B.I. in Stockholm, makes, among others, the following observations:

British indolence so far as Sweden is concerned has left this lengthy peninsula to the energetic efforts of the German traders, and the latter have certainly made the best of their opportunities. Sweden has been neglected and underestimated. ... The present writer strongly advises British manufacturers to study the possibilities of trading with Sweden. ... I beg him not to send an underling or immature representative, but some person with authority, who can make decisions on the spot, should occasion arise. ... Woe unto the concern which sends over a junior member of the staff with no personality, and not even a well-pressed suit.

These quotations can be applied to the cases of Denmark and Norway just as well. It is true England made a grand gesture by sending the finest and most popular of her ambassadors. There can be no doubt that the visit of the Prince of Wales to Scandinavia in 1932 gave the pro-British feelings of these countries a new impetus. But what Sweden, Denmark, and Norway are

anxiously waiting for is that this friendly gesture should be followed by action. They have not seen much of it yet.

The close family and marriage ties between the houses of Bernadotte (Sweden) and Glücksburg-Sonderburg (Denmark and Norway), both of which are also intimately related to the British Royal Family, are another strong link between these countries themselves, and also between Scandinavia and England. Like England, they are all of them constitutional and democratic countries. Sweden and Denmark are at the present moment ruled by a coalition between a powerful trade unionist social democracy and radical liberalism. In both countries the trade unions are very conservative, mindful of the interests of the State, cautious, practical and efficient. They are true pillars of the State, to which they have rendered conspicuous services, especially during the crisis. In Denmark, incidentally, the burden of health and unemployment insurance is carried practically by the trade unions alone, the State being only a contributor and a sort of supervisor. The Norwegian trade unionists and Social Democrats are far less aware of their responsibilities towards the State; their experience of office is but scant, and they are still rather rabid. At the present moment a *bourgeois* Cabinet is endeavouring to circumvent the fact of the Socialists' success at the last elections.

Under the stress of practical considerations the three Scandinavian countries have drawn at the present moment closer to each other than they have been for many years. Gone are the days when, in the words of a famous German humorist, the only occasion on which a Swede and a Norwegian could be seen not to curse each other was when they were jointly cursing a Dane! They have of late become a very harmonious trio, which, since Finland is by way of definitely joining their ranks, looks like turning into a quartette. It is no mere coincidence that in their trade negotiations with England the three Scandinavian countries—though in a sense competitors—kept in close consultation with each other. In various other fields, too, the desirability of more intimate co-operation has been stressed by responsible statesmen and also by the Press. Special emphasis was laid on the fact that all three countries suffer from the same effects of the world crisis, have to fight against the same difficulties, and have to resort to the same measures, to protect their interests and their cultural and economic standards. As the result of this campaign, in which the Swedish Foreign Minister, Rickard Sandler, and the well-known economist, Professor Bertil Ohlin, have played a conspicuous part, there have been many important conferences and consultations between the representatives of the Scandinavian countries, who have repeatedly visited each other in their respec-

tive capitals. While the old, and somewhat resented, romantic idea of 'Scandinavism' is dead, and while certain irritants—such as the Swedish language question in Finland, for instance—still remain, it can none the less be said that the States of Northern Europe, including Finland, are to-day, not a political *entente*, but a moral union with specific economic interests.

Sweden seems to be nowadays the acknowledged leader of the Scandinavian countries. It is at any rate significant that her Foreign Minister, Rickard Sandler, took upon himself the initiative of convening to Stockholm early last month his colleagues from Denmark, Norway, and also Finland. The purpose of this conference was not only an exchange of views in connexion with various League of Nations problems, but also very largely a consultation about economic and general co-operation between the various countries concerned. The same Swedish statesman, who, like the rest of his Cabinet, is a Social Democrat, was the spokesman of the Scandinavian countries (as also Switzerland, Holland, and Spain) in the Disarmament imbroglio at Geneva last June. In the name of the six neutral countries he then stressed the need for a reduction and limitation of armaments, and, judging by recent statements, he has not altered his views. More recently he has once again represented in Geneva, where he has also been honoured with election to the presidential chair, a united front of the Scandinavian countries. Presumably the question of Soviet Russia's admission was also discussed at the Stockholm Conference and a joint decision taken. Sandler, personally, has more than once expressed favourable opinions on Litvinov's work and the Soviets' co-operation at Geneva. Furthermore, the Swedish Government obviously desires closer relations with Soviet Russia, as the offer of a 100,000,000 kronor loan last March, which however fell through, clearly demonstrates.

Sweden's efforts in pursuing, and endeavouring to get the rest of the world to pursue, an international peace policy deserve the highest praise and appreciation. As a small country she realises it would be sheer folly for her to trust to national armaments as a guarantee against war. From the very outset, therefore, Sweden has followed the policy initiated by her great Socialist statesman, Branting, by urging the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations to which the members of the League of Nations had originally subscribed. It may be said that no country, with the exception of Denmark and Norway, has so consistently and so sincerely worked for a disarmament convention.

In the expectation that other countries would follow her example, Sweden in 1925 took the important step of reducing her own armaments to a very considerable extent. This momentous

decision responded to a widespread abhorrence of war and militarism (Sweden enjoys the rare privilege of not having been involved in any war for over a century), this anti-militarist feeling having grown very largely together with the expansion of the Labour movement and the consolidation of democracy. It is, however, significant that Sweden's Socialist Premier, Per Albin Hansson, an ex-Minister of Defence, is very popular in army circles. These, by the way, seem to have considerably emancipated themselves from the former domination of Prussianism in their methods and ideas, and a better understanding seems to prevail between them and the democratic masses.

A staunch supporter of the League of Nations as an instrument of peace, Sweden is strong, not through her material but her moral influence. She is a disinterested party and has no axe to grind, since she is not concerned in the political quarrels over frontiers and similar squabbles. She is able to take a detached view and speak in the name of a policy that is truly international. And she considers it her duty to do so, and to point out to the Great Powers that they are, after all, responsible for the conduct of the world's affairs. She cannot influence their decisions, yet the effect of these decisions is of the utmost importance to her, as to every other nation.

At the same time, she has a very good answer to those who say that it is all very well for a small country to call on the Great Powers to do their duty while herself remaining more of a critic than an actor. Sweden thinks that it is her right to champion a policy of international conciliation, to support the League of Nations, and to call on the Great Powers to make sacrifices because she herself has done so on many occasions—over the Åland question, for instance, when it would have been quite easy for Sweden, with her superior military forces, to annex these islands, whose population, after all, was 95 per cent. Swedish. Or again during the crisis that arose over the admission of Germany to the League, a step that seemed of the greatest importance at the time. On that occasion Sweden firmly opposed the demands of Poland, Spain, and Brazil for permanent seats on the Council, and did not yield to the threats of commercial retaliation from one of them were she to remain faithful to one of the essential principles of the League. It was then, too, that, in order to preserve the fruits of the Locarno Treaty from being ruined, Sweden offered to surrender her own seat to provide a peaceful solution.

In addition to purely moral considerations, which the Swedes feel quite instinctively, there are also other reasons that make it imperative for them—as, indeed, for all the Scandinavian countries—to contribute by every means available to the improvement

of the world's political and economic situation. Sweden's exports are not only raw materials, such as timber, pulp, iron ore, and agricultural products, but also a number of important industrial high-quality articles—namely, machines, telephones, separators, ball-bearings, and all kinds of equipment. Thus her export trade is very largely affected by the general international trend, and the return of prosperity, or at least of a certain equilibrium, is of vital importance.

The very nature of these exports, however, has partly facilitated Sweden's amazing economic recovery from the effects of both the world crisis in general and the Kreuger crash in particular. For, limited though the improvement in international trade may be, it resulted in the immediate increase of demand for the very goods and commodities Sweden is selling, and brought with it a much desired rise in prices. The causes of this recovery, that has brought with it a great expansion of industrial production and of exports, of excellent bank balance-sheets, an unprecedented monetary liquidity, an imposing accumulation of gold and foreign currency at the Bank of Sweden, and the complete restoration of confidence, are to be found not only in the general world upward trend observable in most countries, but in certain specifically Swedish circumstances. When England suddenly abandoned the gold standard the Scandinavian countries found themselves compelled to follow suit (Sweden's gold reserves had been rapidly sinking), and this eventually proved their salvation. It is true, of course, that the first results of the abandonment of gold created many difficulties, and undoubtedly accelerated Kreuger's collapse. But soon the Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, got Parliament (the Bank of Sweden is under Parliament's jurisdiction) to adopt a cautious policy for raising the prices, aiming at the 1930 price level. Not all the experiments proved successful; but on the whole, thanks to its co-operation with the private banks, industrialists and exporters, as well as through the depreciation of the dollar (which induced American buyers to purchase large quantities of pulp and paper, in the fear that they may rise to higher prices, and thus brought in a lot of dollars), the Bank of Sweden soon found itself in a very favourable position. Sweden's wise monetary policy, favoured as it has been by external circumstances, has greatly helped her foreign trade. The fact that her krona has been both devalued and stable has enabled her not only to compete but also to calculate. Furthermore, since Sweden not only has refrained from putting any impediments in the way of foreign trade, but has always endeavoured to collaborate with the rest of the world in the removal of such obstacles elsewhere, her commercial relations with everybody are most friendly. Only Germany, with her

policy of default, has succeeded in antagonising Sweden, and for that she has only herself to blame.

An illustration of Sweden's improved economic conditions can be found in the following figures: On September 28, 1931, when Sweden abandoned the gold standard, her Central Bank's holding of foreign currency amounted to 38,000,000 kronor; at the end of 1932 it was 214,000,000, at the end of 1933 446,000,000, and at the present moment about 470,000,000. At the same time the gold reserve rose from 206,000,000 in 1932 to the present sum of 372,000,000. And the Bank of Sweden calculates its foreign exchange and gold holdings at the old gold parity! On August 15 the gold cover of a note circulation of 580,000,000 kronor amounted to 64 per cent., and the gold and foreign currency cover combined to 145 per cent.

Although Sweden has deemed it wise to adjust her currency to the sterling rate, it is important to realise that she is a member of the 'sterling club' through her own choice, and that the Bank of Sweden is to-day in an enviably strong and absolutely independent position. According to official figures for the first seven months of 1934, imports have exceeded exports by 31,000,000 kronor, as compared with an excess of imports in the corresponding period of 1933 of 53,000,000—a contraction in the adverse trade balance of no less than 22,000,000 kronor. The number of unemployed has dropped from 138,500 to 86,500. The production index (1925-30 = 100) was, at the end of the first half-year 1934 = 111 (1933 = 87). The price index (1913 = 100) was: production goods, 107 (99); consumption goods, 122 (111); import goods, 96 (95); export goods, 120 (110). The value of securities quoted on the Stockholm Bourse at the end of July 1934 had increased by 254,000,000 kronor (1933 = 151), as compared with a loss of 958,000,000 kronor at the same period of 1932. Deposits with the private banks in Sweden in July 1934 showed an increase of 70,000,000 kronor to the high level of 3,629,000,000 kronor, an interesting feature being that in the single case of the *Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget* they went up by 20,000,000 kronor. The recovery of this bank, which was closely connected with the Kreuger group, is truly wonderful. It has repaid within two years, instead of ten, the rather large loans that were put at its disposal by the State to carry it over its difficult period, and its shares are again well over par. All the big banks have come through the crisis in a most praiseworthy way, and are to-day in the strongest possible position. Their combined claims with the Bank of Sweden on foreign banks amount now to nearly 645,000,000 kronor.

Whether all these figures show that saturation point in the process of recovery has been reached, or whether it will continu-

to develop, depends not so much on Sweden but on world developments in general. For the present, at any rate, that country appears like a flourishing island in an ocean of economic difficulties threatening to submerge many an old continent.

Credit for her strong political and economic position belongs to the present Swedish Government. It is a striking proof of the falsehood of the modern assertion that democracy and parliamentarism are inefficient, corrupt and generally played out. Sweden is both democratic and parliamentary, and the system works very well. The victory of the Social Democrats in 1932 (*Riksdag* elections), which made them the strongest single party, without, however, providing them with an absolute majority, was at least partly the result of the Kreuger crash. A large number of non-Socialists voted for the Labour Party because the Kreuger revelations had destroyed their faith in modern capitalism. The Peasant Party, too, drew a lot of votes from the Conservatives—partly because these were considered as especially compromised by the Kreuger affair, and partly because their repeated and unfulfilled promises of help to agriculture in its plight had disgusted the peasant population. Since the non-Socialists, who together had a majority in the two Chambers, could not agree to form a concentration Government, a Socialist minority Cabinet under Per Albin Hansson came into being, which enjoys the toleration of the Peasant Party and a few 'left-wingers' among the independents. After a series of deadlocks a great national public works scheme was adopted. Only part of this scheme has actually been put into operation, a prolonged conflict in the building industry having very considerably retarded it. The financial burden of the scheme is shared by the State, the municipalities, and private undertakings. After a great deal of debating and bargaining 125,000,000 kronor have been granted by the *Riksdag* for this anti-unemployment drive. Meanwhile, thanks to the general improvement, a large decrease in unemployment has already taken place. Though a minority Government, the Socialist Swedish Cabinet has scored many parliamentary victories—so much so, in fact, that the Conservatives are genuinely worried lest the Socialists should become too popular.

At one time the danger of Fascism appeared to be not inconsiderable. The oldest Swedish Nazi Party (there are three of them now!), under the leadership of a veterinary surgeon by the name of Furugard, after a rapid rise fell into complete disrepute owing to an attempt on the life of one of its members. For it so happens that the police found proof that this attempt had been organised by the Nazis themselves, who obviously wanted to create a Swedish Horst Wessel. They have made themselves the laughing-stock of the country. Events in Germany have further

contributed to making the whole movement unpopular and stimulating the readiness of even the most avowed pacifists to fight for their rights and liberty. All the established parties, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, have denounced Fascism; and its spiritual brother, Communism, is very unpopular too. An interesting illustration of the general feeling about Fascism and Communism is that the Crown Prince himself, a true spokesman of his people, recently made a speech in which he declared: 'We will not suffer any violation of our ancient domestic liberty, from whatever quarter the attempt be made.'

An important test of the Government's popularity will be found in the *Landsting*, or county council, elections. Their result will not, for the moment, affect the position of the Government, but will serve as a fairly clear indication as to the relative popularity of the various parties. These *Landsting* elections take place every four years; since the last ones of 1930, the *Riksdag*, or parliamentary, elections showed a great move to the left. The question is: will this leftward movement be maintained, or even increased, or are the Socialists going to suffer a setback? There are no real political issues in the present *Landsting* elections, and the rival parties are very largely concerned with problems of an economic and social nature. An important aspect of the matter, however, is that members of the *Landsting*, together with the especially elected delegates of Sweden's six largest cities, are electors to the First, or Upper, Chamber of the *Riksdag*. This is re-elected every eight years at the rate of one-eighth of its members per annum, and thus the new members of the *Landsting* will undertake in 1934-38 the task of renewing one-half, or 150, mandates in the First Chamber. In other words, the composition of the *Landsting* will eventually also influence that of the *Riksdag*.

A great deal of political party regrouping has therefore been taking place, for in the long run the question is bound to arise whether the Socialists are going to obtain an absolute majority in the *Riksdag* or not. If they maintain themselves, or even increase their numbers, in the *Landsting*, that will greatly enhance their chances.¹ The slightest setback, on the other hand, would

¹ The preliminary figures for the *Landsting* elections, which have just been published, show a very strong increase of the votes cast in favour of the Social-Democratic Party (Government) and the Peasants, who have been supporting the Cabinet in Parliament. The attitude of the latter in the new *Landsting* remains uncertain, since it is by no means clear whether they will assume the same tactics there as they have hitherto done in the *Riksdag*. The Socialists are once again by far the largest party, but it is not clear yet whether they will have an absolute majority, even in the somewhat doubtful case of the other 'workmen's parties'—namely, the Independent Socialists and the Communists supporting them. What is definitely to be gathered from the *Landsting* elections, however, is that the party responsible for the Government, and the party that has been helping it,

be hailed as a victory by their opponents, especially the Conservatives. All parties are fighting these *Landsting* elections independently, and it is significant that the Peasants, who tolerate or support the Socialists in Parliament, refrain from doing so in the county council. Like the Conservatives, they seem scared of the Socialists' radicalism in case these got a clear majority. Dictatorial intentions are being attributed to the Socialists, and especially to the trade unionist wing of the party. 'Trade unionist tyranny' has often been used as a bogey in Swedish politics, and is once again the battle-cry of the *bourgeois* parties.

The truth of the matter is that whatever happens will not make very much difference. Democracy is a form of political organisation that is not merely congenial to the Swedes, but is actually the very foundation of the Swedish State. About that there can be no doubt, and the only question is the difference of opinion as to the methods of its application. The great strength of democracy in Sweden rests on a historical and traditional basis. The Swedish peasant class—and over 50 per cent. of the population still live in the villages and work on the land—has for centuries imbibed a strong sense of liberty, equality, independence, and responsibility towards the State, in whose affairs it has often taken a prominent part. The Swedish peasants have never been serfs, and there is no illiteracy among them, because since 1842 education in Sweden has been compulsory. The same applies to the industrial workman, who is barely one or two generations removed from the soil.

It is not so much the cities that are characteristic of this delightful country: the soul of Sweden is really in her villages. More than 4,000,000 out of her 6,500,000 inhabitants live in the country. There is hardly a person in town who has not got relations in a village somewhere to whom he goes 'back home' at Christmas and Easter time. This close connexion of village and town, this healthy proximity to the soil, with its able, hard-working and educated peasant class, makes for a continual rejuvenation of the *intelligentsia*, industry and commerce, even bureaucracy. Peasants' sons are prominent at the universities, and later in every conceivable walk of life. At the same time, those who remain in the villages continue their agricultural pursuits, also devoting a great deal of time to their traditional handicraft work. Some of Sweden's village-made textiles, toys, and woodwork enjoy a world-wide reputation.

The structure of Swedish public life is a peculiar one, because

continue to enjoy the full confidence of the people. In fact, their popularity has greatly increased in spite of all the difficulties with which they have had to contend during the last few years.

side by side with the peasant class there is also a fairly strong and very ancient nobility. Aristocrats and peasants do not always blend perfectly well! That there are also certain drawbacks in such a political and social system goes without saying. It would be idle to pretend that, with all her merits, Sweden is a country of perfection. Swedes have their faults and their weaknesses, like everybody else. But the achievements of Sweden so greatly eclipse the failures, wisdom so successfully triumphs over stupidity and folly, that it would be ungenerous to settle down to take stock of her defects. At this juncture of history, when the spectacle of the Old and the New World is so pathetically unedifying, it is pleasant to be able to give credit where credit is due. And it is indeed a grateful task to pay tribute to this country as a haven of sanity and progress in a world badly in need of a good example.

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK.

FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN CANADA

LAST month there was celebrated the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of Canada by Jacques Cartier, an intrepid sailor of St. Malo, who in April 1534 sailed from that port to brave the unknown perils of the North Atlantic, plant the cross upon Canadian soil, and take possession of a vast expanse of territory in the name of the King of France. The three voyages of exploration which Jacques Cartier made paved the way for the work of another famous explorer, Samuel Champlain, and in the year 1608 he brought out a party of French colonists and laid the foundations of the city of Quebec. From this base other trading posts were established, and this year the city of Three Rivers will celebrate the tercentenary of its foundation in 1634. Then in 1641 came the founding of Montreal by Maisonneuve, who was aided in the work by the religious enthusiasm of the Sulpician Order. By the middle of the seventeenth century the little colony had, after surviving desperate trials and hardships and facing the terrors of almost constant warfare with the Indians, been definitely established with a promise of permanence, and the French race had secured in the New World a foothold for its language and institutions which it seems destined never to lose. In its early days the fortunes of the colony were in charge of a private corporation called the Company of One Hundred Associates, but their *régime* was terminated in 1663, when Quebec became a royal province, administered directly under the French Crown, and in this status it remained until Wolfe's famous victory at Quebec in 1759, which ended French supremacy and brought the territory then known as Canada under the British flag.

The whole of the Dominion joined in commemorating the exploits of a founding father like Jacques Cartier, but naturally the chief celebrations were undertaken by the French-Canadian race, of which he was the first pioneer in the New World. Four centuries have elapsed since they first secured through his daring and seamanship their foothold in North America, and during that period they have experienced many vicissitudes and changes of fortune. In many aspects they present one of the most interesting

subjects of study for sociologists available in the whole world, and their persistence as a separate racial *bloc*, with its own language, laws and habits in the midst of the predominantly Anglo-Saxon civilisation of North America, is a remarkable exploit. Equally remarkable is their numerical growth through the generations, for they furnish a striking example of the possibilities of racial fertility; it is estimated that not more than 10,000 emigrants altogether ever came from France before the conquest, and the reinforcements of French blood since that event have been inconsequential, but to-day, at the fourth centennial of Jacques Cartier's landing, the French-Canadian population of North America numbers roughly 4,000,000 people.

The census of 1931 found that there were in the province of Quebec 2,270,059 people of French stock and 657,466 in the other provinces of Canada, making a total of just short of 3,000,000. But in addition the last American census revealed that there were in the United States 370,835 people of French blood who had been born in Canada, and it was estimated that there were also between 700,000 and 800,000 other American citizens of French-Canadian blood. So it is a reasonable estimate to suggest that 75,000 French-Canadians who were living in North America in 1760 have increased in 174 years to not less than 4,000,000. They have remained for more than a century a minority of less than one-third of the total population of Canada, and, until a few years ago, they seemed doomed to occupy the rôle in perpetuity, because the annual inflow of British and other racial stocks into Canada promised to more than counterbalance the results of the notoriously high fertility of the French-Canadian race. But now that immigration into Canada has declined to a mere trickle each year, the situation has completely changed, and the time seems apposite for some appraisal of the effect of the changed conditions upon the racial question, which remains a permanent factor in Canadian politics.

Canada enjoys the distinction of being among one of the first countries to take a complete census as it is known in modern times, for in 1666 Colbert instructed Talon, '*Intendant au Canada*,' to annex to his annual report a '*rolle*' of all inhabitants of the colony, and there exists to-day in the archives of the French Government a manuscript of 154 pages containing full details of the census of 1666. It showed a total population (not including over 1000 royal troops) of 3215, of whom 2034 were males and 1181 females; the number of families by localities is given, as well as full particulars of sex, age, and conjugal condition. In the next fifteen years emigration from France was at its largest volume, and when another census was taken in 1681 the colonial population had grown to 9677, of whom 5375 were males and

4302 females. Censuses were taken thereafter at regular intervals, and analyses of their records reveal that, despite the heavy casualties in wars with the Indians and the British colonists in New England, the population of the colony from the beginning of the eighteenth century until the conquest enjoyed an average annual growth of almost 40 per 1000. At any rate, when Canada passed into the possession of the British in 1760 as the result of Wolfe's famous victory the French-Canadian population of Canada is calculated to have been about 75,000, of whom 60,000 lived in the territory now comprised within the boundaries of the present province of Quebec and the balance in the region now divided between the three maritime provinces. This estimate is mainly based upon a census taken by the British authorities in 1765, which gave Quebec a total population of 69,610, a figure which included a contingent of British immigrants and the natural increase of the French population from 1760 onwards. So for the latter year 75,000 is probably an outside estimate for the numbers of the French.

In the next eighty years its growth is difficult to trace, because the two races were not distinguished in the census returns until 1844, when the population of Lower Canada, as the province was then called, was found to be 697,034, of whom 524,244 were French. On this basis it was plain that the rate of increase of nearly 4 per cent. per annum had been maintained and that the French-Canadian element had been doubling itself every twenty-five years. During this period, however, thanks to a heavy annual inflow of immigration, the English-speaking population of Lower Canada increased much faster. From 1844 to 1851 the rate of the French increase was 39 per 1000, paralleled by an equivalent British increase, but in the decade 1851-1861 the French rate of increment turned definitely downward and averaged only 26.5 per 1000. About this time a variety of factors came into play to check the rate of increase of the French population of Quebec. The free land of good quality in the province had become exhausted, and there had begun an outflow of immigration, partly to Ontario and other Canadian provinces and partly to the New England area of the United States. This drain of population from Quebec continued till the end of the century, with the result that in the forty years between 1861 and 1901 the average annual rate of increase for the French-Canadians of Quebec was only 11.6 per 1000, which meant that they would only double their numbers in about eighty-five years. But even at this rate they were keeping pace with the rate of increase for the non-French population of the adjacent province of Ontario, which from 1861 to 1901 gained, with the help of considerable immigration, only at the rate of 12 per 1000.

But with the opening of the new century there came another change in conditions as the result of the industrial development of Quebec which began to gather momentum about that time, largely under the stimulation of American capital. Employment became more and more available for French-Canadians in industrial plants, with the result that in the period 1901-21 the average annual rate of increase for the French-Canadians all over Canada was 22 per 1000, the rate in Quebec being virtually identical with that for the rest of the country. But these two decades were a boom period of progressive expansion for the whole Dominion, for the prairie country was being opened up for settlement and immigration was heavier than at any time in Canada's history. Consequently during that period the average annual rate of increase for the non-French population, 36 per 1000, was much heavier than that of the French, and the census of 1921 revealed that the proportion of French-Canadians to the total population, which had been 30.7 per cent. in 1901, had fallen to 27.91 per cent.

At this date it seemed as if the relative strength of the French-Canadian element had passed its peak and it was fated to occupy permanently a position of serious numerical inferiority. But once more circumstances have changed in favour of the French, and during the decade 1921-31 they regained some of the ground which they had lost in the previous two decades.

The following table shows the figures of the three censuses of 1911, 1921 and 1931 for (a) the total population of Canada, and (b) the French population :

	Total population	French population	Percentage of French
1911 . .	7,206,643	2,054,890	28.5
1921 . .	8,788,483	2,452,751	27.91
1931 . .	10,376,786	2,927,990	28.22

These data reveal that in the decade 1921-31 the French population increased from 2,452,751 to 2,927,990, a gain of 19.38 per cent., which was approximately at the same rate as in the previous decade. Meanwhile in the same period the British stock rose in numbers from 4,868,738 to 5,381,071, but this gain of 10.52 per cent. was achieved with the help of about 500,000 immigrants from Britain, and it compared very unfavourably with the gain of 25 per cent. recorded in the decade 1911-21. Undoubtedly, however, the heavy southward exodus of British-Canadians during the years 1921-29 was in a large measure responsible for

the relatively small gain in their numbers, and while there was also some emigration of French-Canadians, their loss from this cause was much smaller. But now that there has befallen a drastic curtailment of British immigration, whose figure for the last two years had only totalled 10,605 as compared with an average annual figure of over 50,000 for the period 1920-31, the superior fertility of the French-Canadians is beginning to assert itself steadily.

The vital statistics confirm the evidence of the population figures about the superior fertility of the French-Canadians. In the last annual report of the Bureau of Statistics covering up to the end of 1931 the following figures are given about the natural increase of the population of the whole of Canada from 1926 to 1931 :

	MALE			FEMALE			BOTH SEXES	
	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Natural increase	Rate of natural increase per 1000 population
Canada :								
Average 1926-30	121,552	58,351	63,201	114,968	50,573	64,395	127,596	13.0
1926	119,863	56,979	62,884	112,887	50,475	62,412	125,296	13.3
1927	120,655	56,205	64,390	113,533	49,027	64,506	128,896	13.4
1928	121,505	58,480	63,025	115,252	50,577	64,675	127,700	13.0
1929	120,891	60,920	59,971	114,524	52,595	61,929	121,900	12.2
1930	124,852	59,109	65,743	118,643	50,197	68,446	134,189	13.2
1931	123,622	56,529	67,093	116,851	47,988	68,863	135,956	13.1

They reveal that there has been an average increase of 13 per 1000 in these six years. But another table shows that the increase for the province of Quebec has been 17 per 1000, which is about 30 per cent. higher :

	MALE			FEMALE			BOTH SEXES	
	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Natural increase	Rate of natural increase per 1000 population
Quebec :								
Average 1926-30	42,644	19,031	23,613	40,127	17,614	22,513	46,126	17.0
1926	42,475	19,232	23,243	39,690	18,019	21,671	44,914	17.3
1927	42,813	18,827	23,986	40,251	17,348	22,903	46,889	17.7
1928	43,049	19,036	24,013	40,572	17,596	22,976	46,989	17.3
1929	41,893	19,235	22,658	39,487	17,986	21,501	44,159	16.0
1930	42,992	18,824	24,168	40,633	17,121	23,512	47,680	16.9
1931	43,051	18,067	24,984	40,555	16,420	24,135	49,119	17.1

Moreover, it can be taken for granted that the natural increase of the non-French inhabitants of Quebec, who numbered in 1931 604,196 out of a total provincial population of 2,874,255, was not materially higher than the 10.8 per 1000 annual gain recorded for a predominantly English-speaking province like Nova Scotia.

It is true that the prairie province of Saskatchewan, with an annual gain of 17.4 per 1000 for the six-year period referred to above, surpasses the record of Quebec, and its neighbour, Alberta, with an annual gain of 15 per 1000, does not lag far behind. But

account must be taken of two factors which affect their vital statistics considerably. For one thing, since their close settlement only began about 1900, and the great majority of the immigrants who were attracted to them after that date were young people, they have still a much larger proportion of people of child-bearing age than the other provinces, and for another they contain within their bounds extensive settlements of the peasant stocks of continental Europe—Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Finns, etc.—who are just as prolific as the French-Canadians, and in a country where their land holdings are much larger in area than the average European peasant's farm have no motive to impose artificial checks upon their birth rate. The third prairie province of Manitoba, which is an older community and has a smaller proportion of Continental stocks, shows only an average annual increase of 18.2 per 1000 recorded in 1921–25. The census of 1931 gave the three prairie provinces an aggregate population of 2,353,529, but of this total only 1,195,054, or almost exactly half, was classified of British stock, and their vital statistics cannot be taken as a fair index of the fortunes of the British stocks in Canada. On the other hand, the fourth western province, British Columbia, of whose total population of 694,263 roughly seven-tenths are classified as of British origin, has a notoriously low rate of natural increase, only averaging 6.9 per 1000 in the period 1926–30, and, as the rate of increase of the Japanese elements is much higher than 6.9 per cent., the rate of the increase for the British stocks is probably only about 6 per cent. But the lowness of this figure is attributed partly to the large proportion of unmarried males—workers in the lumbering and mining industries—over twenty years of age found in this province and to the presence of a substantial element of upper-class British *émigrés*, who are zealous practitioners of birth control.

So the other great central province of Ontario provides a more suitable basis for comparison with Quebec, and the following are the figures of population increase as compiled by the Bureau of Statistics:

	MALE			FEMALE			BOTH SEXES	
	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Natural increase	Rate of natural increase per 1000 population
Ontario:								
Average 1921–25	36,725	17,795	18,930	34,729	16,457	18,272	37,202	12.4
Average 1926–30	35,268	19,318	15,950	33,435	17,332	16,103	32,053	9.8
1926	34,742	18,721	16,021	32,875	17,188	15,687	31,708	10.1
1927	34,755	18,305	16,450	32,916	16,470	16,446	32,896	10.2
1928	35,299	19,457	15,842	33,211	17,671	15,540	31,382	9.6
1929	35,154	20,281	14,873	33,304	17,842	15,462	30,335	9.1
1930	36,392	19,827	16,565	34,871	17,486	17,385	33,950	10.9
1931	35,609	19,137	16,472	33,600	16,568	17,032	33,504	9.8

They reveal that, while Quebec in the period 1926–31 actually brought up her annual rate of increase to 17.3 per 1000 from the figure of 17 per 1000 recorded for 1921–25, the Ontario rate of increase sunk to 9.8 per 1000 from 12.4, a shrinkage of roughly 20 per cent. Moreover, there are in Ontario roughly 300,000 French-Canadians who have just as high a rate of annual increase as their compatriots living in Quebec, and if their natural increase was segregated it would probably be found that the rate of increase of the non-French population of Ontario in the six-year period was only about 9 per cent. Now, it is a fair inference that the rate of annual increase for the French-Canadian population of the two provinces which are the core of Canada is about 18 per 1000, or virtually double the British increase, and certain deductions can be drawn from this situation.

The total population of these two provinces by the census of 1931 was 6,205,938, of which 2,963,497 were also classified as of British stock and 2,569,791 as of French-Canadian stock. If there is no resumption of immigration on a reasonable scale from the British Isles and racial birth rates remain at the same level, inevitably the British stock must at no distant date lose its numerical supremacy in these two provinces. In fifty years' time the French-Canadian element will have almost doubled itself and be roughly 5,000,000 strong, and in the same period the British stock will only be about 4,500,000. And, granted a continuance of the same conditions for another half-century, the French-Canadian population of Central Canada will 100 years hence be roughly 10,000,000, as compared with a British population of, say, 6,500,000. The latter will be a powerful minority, but they will still be a decided minority and be subject to the social and educational disabilities imposed by such a status. The racial situation in the province of New Brunswick also deserves some attention. Accurate records are only available since Confederation, and the first Dominion census taken in 1871 showed that of the total population of 285,294, 15.72 per cent. was of French stock, practically all of them descendants of the Acadians, whose tragic expulsion from their homes in Nova Scotia has been immortalised in literature by Longfellow's *Evangeline*. But in the 'eighties there began to flow into the northern regions of the province a steady stream of immigration of French-Canadians from Quebec, with the result that by 1921 the French-Canadian element had become 31.24 per cent. of the total population. In the next decade it continued to increase its proportionate strength, with the result that the census of 1933 showed 136,999 French inhabitants of New Brunswick, or almost exactly one-third of the total population of 408,219. The gains of the French have been consistent, and since 1891 their average annual rate of increase

has been 40 per 1000. So, if this rate is maintained and there is no immigration to reinforce the British stock, it is calculated that by the end of the present century the racial proportions of the province's population will have been reversed and the French will constitute roughly two-thirds of the population and the British one-third. How the presence of a large French element affects the rate of population increase can be discerned from a comparison of the statistics of New Brunswick with those of Nova Scotia, the adjacent maritime province, whose economic condition presents many points of similarity, but which has only 56,629 French inhabitants out of a total population of 512,846, or about 11 per cent. of the whole. In the period 1926-30 the average annual increase of the population of Nova Scotia was only 9 per 1000, while during the same period New Brunswick showed an average annual increase of 13.3 per 1000, or almost 50 per cent. greater. A project for the merger of the maritime provinces of Canada, which at present maintain three separate administrations for a total population of about 1,000,000 souls, has been intermittently discussed, and undoubtedly substantial economies in the cost of administration would result from it; but two of the fundamental obstacles to the consummation are the disinclination of the French elements in New Brunswick to abandon their prospect of racial domination in their own province and the equal disinclination of the British elements in Nova Scotia to see their present local superiority qualified in any way.

In other provinces the French-Canadian contingent is relatively small, but in each of them, as the subjoined table, compiled from the census of 1931, shows, there is a small but steadily increasing French-Canadian garrison, which by voting solidly together can and does exercise considerable influence with Governments whenever questions of racial rights arise:

	Total population	French-Canadian population
Prince Edward Island .	88,038	12,962
Manitoba	700,139	47,039
Saskatchewan . . .	921,785	50,700
Alberta	731,605	38,377
British Columbia . .	694,263	15,028

Only in British Columbia is this influence completely negligible. It is true that in recent years the birth rate of the French-Canadian race shows a tendency to decline; the rate for Quebec, which averaged 30.5 per 1000 in the period 1925-30, had fallen in

1931 to 29.1. But this decline was smaller than the fall in most of the other provinces, as the figures for Ontario revealed a shrinkage from 23.7 to 20.2 per 1000 for Manitoba from 26.8 to 20.5, and for British Columbia from 18.4 to 15.

It is difficult to determine with meticulous accuracy the exact birth rate of the French-Canadians, but a competent authority has fixed it at an average of 31.4 per 1000 for the three years 1929-31 as compared with an average birth rate for the whole population of Canada of 23.4 per 1000 during the same period. The size of French-Canadian families remains a byword, and the census returns for 1931 contain an interesting table, which shows the order of birth of the 239,294 children born in Canada in that year. And the following figures, extracted from this table, show how the province of Quebec contributed almost two-thirds of the families containing twelve or more children:

Child	Total for Canada	Born in Quebec
12th	3022	1803
13th	1978	1280
14th	1356	874
15th	834	589
16th	483	333
17th	267	207
18th	172	137
19th	82	67
20th and over .	100	76

Moreover, French-Canadians are responsible for a very substantial proportion of the large families born outside Quebec, and probably the race provides three-fourths of the families of this class. And twenty is by no means the highest limit, for some years ago an account was given in a Montreal paper of the baptism of the thirty-sixth child of a local baker who had thirteen children by his first wife and twenty-three by his second. Nor is this philo-progenitive spirit confined to the lower classes, for not long ago one of the members for Quebec City in the Dominion Parliament was the proud father of twenty-one offspring, most of whom were alive.

Under the tithe system in operation in Quebec, farmers were bound to give every twenty-sixth bushel of grain which they harvested to the *curé*, and at one time it was a well-established custom for the *curé* to adopt the twenty-sixth child of any family in his parish and make himself responsible for its education. One such ward of a *curé* was the Hon. Gideon Ouimet; he was

the twenty-sixth child of poor parents, and in accordance with this custom was put through college and educated for the legal profession by his *curé*, and ultimately rose to be Premier of Quebec. The provincial Government of Quebec also at one time deliberately encouraged large families by legislation passed in 1820 which provided for the payment of a cash gratuity or the grant of a tract of land to fathers residing in the province of Quebec who had twelve or more living children. In 1904 a report was issued by the Quebec Government giving in alphabetical order a sort of roll of honour of such fathers containing 3395 names with their addresses, and in 1905 a supplementary report was published which gave an additional 2018 names and brought the total number of beneficiaries of the bounty up to 5413. The legislation was repealed in 1905, and it was stated at the time that the list was by no means complete, as numerous upper-class families, who were eligible for the grant, had abstained from putting in applications for the grant.

In the past a very heavy infantile mortality has operated to offset the effects of the abnormally high birth rate of the French-Canadians, but in recent years the influence of this factor has been greatly modified by the successful efforts of the public health authorities and medical profession of Quebec to lower the rate of infantile mortality. Their work has borne such good fruit that the province's infantile mortality figure of 142 per 1000 in 1926 had fallen by 1931 to 112.9. Even at that figure it remains considerably higher than the average infantile mortality rate for the whole of Canada, which in 1931 was 84.7; but the disparity between the figures for Quebec and the rest of the Dominion had been greatly reduced. Undoubtedly the French-Canadians are now alive to the serious wastage involved in a high rate of infantile mortality, and further progress in the task of bringing it down to the average Canadian level can be predicted for the coming years. And if this goal were achieved, the pace of augmentation of the French-Canadian population would be so much accelerated.

At present economic conditions in Canada are more favourable to the expansion of the French-Canadian population than of the British stock. To-day, even with the improvement in business visible during the past twelve months, there are still estimated to be 400,000 workers either unemployed or getting only irregular work, and obviously, in such circumstances, schemes for the promotion of immigration from Britain arouse strong opposition. Moreover, the view now prevails that Canada has acquired for herself too large a physical equipment and an excess of industrial establishments beyond the Dominion's capacity for absorbing their products. So the conviction spreads that land settlement

offers the best hope for a large body of unemployed people who have no immediate prospect of getting work in the towns and cities, and the Federal Government has been co-operating with provincial authorities in land settlement projects. Now it happens that most of the public land still open for settlement—at least, in Eastern Canada—demands for its transformation into farms all the qualities possessed by the original pioneers, who hewed down the vast forests on the banks of the St. Lawrence and the Ottawa. Pioneering in the northern hinterland of Quebec and Ontario entails a willingness to lead lives of constant and arduous toil in isolated self-sufficient communities, and not only British immigrants but native-born Canadians of British stock have little enthusiasm for such an existence. But families of French-Canadian habitants will cheerfully fare forth into the northern wilderness and form the sort of little frontier settlements whose life was admirably portrayed by Louis Hémon in his novel *Marie Chapdelaine*, now in the course of being adapted for the 'movies.' They get some cash income by cutting and selling timber and pulpwood, but for their main subsistence they depend upon their little patches of cultivation, their live-stock, and the skill of their menfolk in hunting and fishing. For such pioneer families children are regarded as a valuable asset, and in them birth control is an unknown art. So such settlements increase rapidly, and their surplus population usually pushes further afield into the wilderness. To-day the Government of Quebec is busily promoting such settlements in the northern areas of the province, and it is largely French-Canadians who are taking up land in the agricultural areas of Northern Ontario. In the parliamentary constituency of Sudbury, in Northern Ontario, for example, French-Canadians, according to the census of 1931, constituted 23,896 out of a total population of 58,251, and in the adjacent constituency of Cochrane they showed virtually the same proportion of two-fifths of the whole. It may be that the Government of Ontario will make a resolute effort to plant settlements of British people in its northern territory, and the expanding development of the mining industry in that region promises to furnish both employment and markets for farm produce; but, in default of such efforts, all the portents indicate that the French-Canadian race will find an outlet for a steady expansion of its numbers in this area, and that to it will go from Quebec the surplus quota of young people which used to migrate southward and seek employment in the factories of New England, but no longer finds any attractive prospects there.

The sum of the matter is that under present conditions the French-Canadian stock of the Dominion is rapidly overhauling the British in point of numbers, and, in the absence of a revival

of immigration, is bound to exceed it within a century. It may still at the end of that period remain a minority of the total population, but it will be the increase of the European Continental stocks in the West which will have kept it in that position. It is not within the province of this article to attempt any appraisal of the political, social, and other consequences of such a development as is forecasted in regard to Canada's population, but obviously they cannot fail to be of far-reaching importance both for Canada and the British Commonwealth.

J. A. STEVENSON.

ROME AND THE NEW PAGANISM

A CATHOLIC priest recently said to me: 'The future of world Christianity will be decided on German soil.' I had to confess that, in present circumstances, this assertion did not sound very promising, but he answered that he was not worried about the future, however bad the situation seemed. For the very persecutions to which Christianity is now exposed would, he thought, serve to increase its powers and inspire it with a new and universal impetus. Here I felt compelled to tell my friend that this depended not so much on the Christian masses as on the central authorities of the Church—that is to say, on the attitude of the Vatican.

'I knew you would say that,' he answered, 'so I will anticipate any other objections of that kind. I have the right to do so, because while in Rome I was doing my utmost to communicate to the Vatican what is in the hearts of 20,000,000 German Catholics to-day. There is no doubt that their constancy is being put to a particularly grim test. After all, everyone remembers the pastoral letter of the German bishops, in which, only a few weeks before January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor, National-Socialism was condemned as a false doctrine and Catholics were forbidden to have any dealings with it. Many of them will therefore have failed to understand why the same bishops were able, so soon afterwards, to recommend National-Socialism as a State structure embodying "positive Christianity," although it had not changed in any way either in its ideology or its methods. I have done my best to inform the Holy Father about this conflict, which was more serious since the Concordat was signed, when the first great wave of terrorism was at its height, and when Catholics were being indiscriminately tortured and killed or else vanishing for ever into concentration camps. I can understand only too well if in their souls they begin to doubt the loyalty to eternal standards of a Church which seems to accommodate itself to the dictates of force like any ordinary temporal State. There was actually a rumour current in Rome that Herr von Papen had succeeded in representing Herr Hitler to the Pope as the man appointed by Providence to annihilate godless Communism. I

must say that I, who came from Germany, find it impossible to believe that anyone could really have been so deluded. We knew perfectly well that National-Socialism can never be trusted, that by its very nature it is faithless and false, and that it always seeks exclusively and by any means to advance its own interests and those of its leaders. And so we understood at once what must have been the attitude of the National-Socialists when they entered on the Concordat negotiations.'

'Then why does not Rome do something decisive about it?' I interrupted. 'Why, for instance, does not the Holy Father put under an interdict all those responsible for the sterilisation laws and the imprisonment of Catholic priests—all the criminal murderers of Catholic leaders and the destroyers of religious freedom?'

'Because the Holy See does not yet wish to have recourse to its last expedient,' my friend replied. 'But if you keep your eyes and ears open, you will soon see that a definite opposition is already in progress. For instance, note the attitude of the Vatican in the two countries, Austria and the Saar, that are so dangerous to National-Socialism, and you will admit that Rome has clearly recognised the pest that the "Brown Neo-Paganism" constitutes for Christianity.'

Then I could argue no longer, and I simply expressed the hope that the German bishops would soon receive direct instructions from the Holy Father, if only to deprive the Church's enemies of their cheap arguments.

I have thought a good deal about this conversation, and from the impression which it left on me I succeeded in gaining a clear understanding of the conditions. Those responsible for the Papal diplomacy—that is to say, the section of the Church whose duty it is to deal with material opportunities—really seem to believe, in respect of what is happening in Germany, that there will always be time to break off relations. Every peaceable method must be tried before the signal is given to fight. It is true that the Concordat has been broken on many occasions; but since it has been made once, there is nothing to prevent it being restored, and it will thus be better for the Church and the faithful if the door is left open for negotiations.

I do not believe that this point of view is altogether the right one. I admit, of course, that it is possible to negotiate with a downright enemy; but why should this enemy yield or respect treaties if he is not faced by concrete force? As we know, ethical considerations simply do not exist for National-Socialism, and one comes to terms with it if one is the better armed. Therefore—and especially in view of the possibility of further Concordat negotiations—I think the Vatican would be well advised to

pillory as severely as possible, in the very immediate future, all those phenomena in the 'Third Reich' that it has recognised as un-Christian. And not only that: there should be a clear definition of the measures to be taken for the protection of the faithful, for their reinforcement and for the punishment of the guilty. National-Socialism, which already seems to have entered into its last phase (which may, of course, last a long time), could not possibly sustain a struggle of that sort. It would have to yield, and the Church would receive her rightful dues.

Actually, however, I am not in the least concerned about any new Concordat negotiations, since, in my opinion, it would not be to the credit of the Church to receive tokens of friendship from National-Socialism. The cause of Christianity would be better served if the Church became outwardly as well as inwardly the irreconcilable opponent of the 'Third Reich': God knows she has cause enough. Perhaps, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, this has really been recognised by the Vatican from the very beginning. If this were the case, it would mean that the signing of the Concordat, and at least the continuance of negotiations with Hitler's Government, took place in full knowledge of the nature of National-Socialism. The Vatican must have known perfectly well that National-Socialism never keeps its word and can never overcome the essentially non-Christian nature of its character; it can never have been assumed in Rome that in the course of its development something good might arise—in accordance with the old proverb '*Quod ab initio vitiosum est, tractu temporis convalescere nequit.*' But what sense then would the whole business have had? Why negotiate, if one is convinced of the uselessness of treaties? And why plunge millions of Catholics into the tortures of disturbed conscience, if there is no chance of success? The solution is not so difficult as it seems at first, for, if these assertions are correct, the first object of the Vatican would be to help to unmask National-Socialism to the world. This it did by taking the dishonesty of the Nazis for perfect honesty—it showed its own good-will and thus made it quite clear which was the guilty party. In addition to this, it would be important for the Vatican to prepare a sound legal foundation for its ensuing actions. If this is so, it was right to ignore the arguments based on the spiritual anguish brought upon the faithful by its 'pact-making' with the Government. And, finally, the Church has to think, not in terms of months, but of centuries, and the disappointment that many may have felt may perhaps soon turn into a triumphant vindication of the Church's wisdom.

I will not discuss the question whether this conception is the right one or not. It seems to me more probable that at the beginning the Papal diplomacy was simply not well-informed:

they may have thought in Rome that once National-Socialism had attained power it would give up its programme of pure propaganda and demogogy in favour of reasonable and practical politics, and that, once it had full control of the State, it would no longer consider it necessary to interfere arbitrarily in the spiritual sphere. The Church would therefore again receive what is hers. In addition, what my friend the priest hinted at may have played a part. It is possible that for a time the Holy Father really did regard Adolf Hitler as the man appointed by Providence to annihilate anti-Christian Communism. That is a question of earthly judgment and has nothing to do with infallibility in matters of belief or morals. It is also well known how magnificently the propaganda apparatus of the 'Third Reich' did its work, and non-Catholics have no right to attack the Vatican even if it did fall into this error. I have myself spoken to several professional politicians in London who even by July 1934 had failed to realise that National-Socialism is the quickest way to Bolshevism, if, indeed, it is not a perverted form of Bolshevism itself. There is, therefore, not much sense in continuing to debate what things looked like in Rome during the early summer of 1933. To-day the only issue is the recognition of the existing state of affairs, for on this the future policy of the Vatican must necessarily depend. And the state of affairs is surely obvious enough.

The dissolution of the Catholic Centre Party alone—which took place against the Pope's will—in the summer of 1933 must have been sufficiently revealing. This Centre Party represented the strongest material force of German Catholicism, which was henceforth helplessly exposed to political terrorism. There is some justification for the point of view that the National-Socialists would never have started the Concordat negotiations if they had first succeeded in destroying the Centre. The restrictions on the work of the Catholic Youth and the arrests of priests, both of which soon followed, had a further sobering effect. It is true that von Papen, by means of a second visit to Rome, temporarily improved the situation, but, since everything went on as before, he was not received on his third visit. The rule of terrorism had become more evident every month. At the Federation Day of the Catholic unions in Munich hundreds were attacked and brutally mishandled by the S.A. Although the ceremony had been officially permitted and all the regulations were observed, the Catholics had their uniforms torn from their bodies; their flags were destroyed and their meetings broken up. The S.A. did not refrain from attacking old and respected champions of Catholicism. Many former Ministers of the Centre were flung into prison and concentration camps. The Catholic Press then ceased to exist as an independent organ of Catholicism; it

was *gleichgeschaltet*, and so were all other Catholic publications. Even the unpolitical ecclesiastical papers were put under a sort of 'preliminary censorship' without their readers being aware of it. The existence of the Catholic Press was even more seriously endangered by the banning of many of those Church papers which had criticised National-Socialism on purely religious grounds, and the public was openly incited to boycott them.

It should also be remembered that the last pastoral letter of the German bishops has only appeared abroad. Its reading and publication were forbidden in Germany. The Church can therefore have no doubt that the war against her is being waged with every method possible, and that in all decisive questions National-Socialism is in blatant opposition to the Catholic teaching. Perhaps the most significant example of this are the sterilisation laws, by which under the 'Third Reich' such people as, in the official view, offer no guarantee for a racially and hygienically sound progeny are robbed of the power of reproduction. On this matter the present Pope, Pius XI., has clearly shown his attitude in his Encyclical '*Casti Conubii*' of December 31, 1930, which was an elaboration of the Encyclical letter '*Arcanum*' of Pope Leo XIII. In the Encyclical '*Casti Conubii*' every sort of sterilisation is most strictly forbidden. The Pope therein condemns the right of the individual, even if affected by hereditary disease, to interfere with natural marriage. In particular, Government bans on marriage based on eugenic grounds are described as an ethically indefensible violation of the human body. And if sterilisation, as introduced into Germany, conflicts with the Catholic teaching, what is one to say of castration, now also officially authorised in Germany, which is a far more violent attack on the human body? This anti-Christian denial of the divine life-principle is expressed in a thousand different ways. It is apparent in the invitation to suicide, which, according to the latest proposals, is to be added to the German penal code, in order, in certain cases, to replace execution. Catholic doctrine, of course, condemns suicide as a crime, and those guilty of it may not be buried in consecrated ground. This invitation was first publicly admitted when, at Hitler's orders, a revolver was placed in Captain Roehm's room on June 30, 1934. No one who understands the implications of these things will feel any surprise that on the same day the leader of the Catholic Action, Minister-Director Klausener, and Herr Probst, the leader of the 'German Youth Forces,' were murdered by the S.A., as well as the Catholic Bavarian Minister for the Interior (Stuetzel) and many other Catholics. It was rumoured that even Cardinal Faulhaber, the valiant opponent of racial madness and anti-Christian pseudo-Germanism, had been threatened with imprisonment by the S.S.

It is said that the Vatican is preparing a sort of 'Brown Book' on this subject. As a mere detail, but one to which I shall return on account of its importance, let me mention that the man appointed as successor to von Papen as Commissioner for the Saar, a certain Herr Buerckel, who is also the district leader for the palatinate, is said to stand first on the Pope's black list. It should also be stated that the Holy Father is again making a study of the Jewish question, and that here, too, developments may soon be expected. Last spring he defined his attitude by branding anti-Semitism as a relapse into barbarism and paganism. The ideal (if one can use the word in this connexion) construction of National-Socialism, however, depends essentially upon the defamation of the Jewish race and the pathological glorification of a fictitious 'Nordic' blood, while in the eyes of the Church any such distinctions are impossible, just as there can be no racial distinctions in the eyes of Him Who commanded St. Paul to write: 'Here are no Jews and no Greeks; we are all one in Christ Jesus.' A conclusive and binding pronouncement on the part of the Holy Father, either in the form of an Encyclical or a pronouncement *ex cathedra*, would be of the greatest importance, not only with regard to present conditions in Germany, and not only for Catholics. To-day there are millions of Jews and Protestants in all countries who, looking confidently towards the Pope, hope for a speedy decision from him. No doubt this will be given before long. One need only consider what has been happening on the other two fronts, where it is still possible openly to oppose National-Socialism and its betrayal of divine and human justice—that is, in Austria and the Saar. These countries are, apparently, not of immediate importance to the Catholics in Germany. Actually the fate of the latter will be decided there.

Let us begin with Austria. At the beginning of this year the whole Austrian episcopate published a pastoral letter in which National-Socialism was again attacked as heresy, incompatible with Catholic dogma. In addition to this, we should bear in mind the sermon of Dr. Innitzer, the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna, after the murder of Dr. Dollfuss. The cardinal condemned with the utmost severity those who were behind this horrible crime, and left no doubt that a movement that employed such methods must be unconditionally rejected. This is true not only of Austria, since, after all, the whole world knows that the murder of Dr. Dollfuss was decided and assisted by party officers in Germany. Similar sermons were preached from every pulpit in Austria, and certainly not without the Vatican's knowledge. It is not necessary to insist that the failure to win Austria was a serious blow for National-Socialism. But if it is possible to main-

tain the independence of Austria, it is to the Vatican and the Catholic clergy in Austria that the thanks of all Germans, above all, will be due.

What is now the position in Austria is beginning to arise in the Saar as well. This little country of 820,000 inhabitants might easily become the chief trump in the Vatican's policy. For with the help of the Saar, even more perhaps than with the help of Austria, the spiritual and cultural situation of the Catholics within the narrower confines of the German *Reich* can most vitally be influenced. Let us mention a few facts: 72 per cent. of the Saar population is Catholic, and the result of the *plébiscite* of January 13, 1935, will depend on them. The question is, of course, whether the Saar will go to Hitler-Germany, or whether—for the very reason that it is 99 per cent. German—it will remain independent till freedom and justice rule once again in Germany. A majority in favour of France is out of the question. It is said that certain industries in France would very much like to retain parts of the Saar, since the result of the *plébiscite* in each constituency will be considered separately. It is possible that in a few frontier villages and in places where there is a large percentage of mining labourers and officials there will be an apparent majority for France. But any division of the Saar would be in opposition to the spirit if not to the letter of the Versailles Treaty. It is therefore to be hoped that in France foresight and wisdom will prevail over parochialism and short-sighted considerations of prestige. Anything French business might gain by the possession of a few districts in the Saar would be outweighed by the loss the Germany of the future, and the whole of Europe, would suffer by the division of this province, which is of such vital importance.

I have just said that the Vatican is specially conscious of the importance of the Saar. Months ago a special observer, Monsignor Testa, was sent to Saarbruecken in order to collect information in all quarters, and quite impartially, and to transmit it to Rome. He therefore cannot have failed to realise that the problem, of which the Saar presents the most concentrated and intense example, is also a problem for the whole of Germany, and hence for the universal policy of the Church—that is, the tension between the lower clergy and the bishops. It is to be explained by the fact that the former are continually in touch with the mass of the people, while the latter are in contact with the National-Socialist authorities. The Bishops of Speyer and Trier are of decisive importance for the Saar, and they are particularly exposed to pressure from the 'Third Reich.' We will mention one example very well fitted to illustrate the Church in Germany. Herr Buerckel, of whom I have spoken, extracted

from the Bishop of Speyer a sort of special Concordat in which he was forced to make wider concessions in the Catholic Youth question than those contained in the *Reich* Concordat. Since in the palatinate the opposition of the Catholic population and the clergy is steadily increasing, the National-Socialists, true to their principles and with the usual methods of the 'Third Reich,' were forced to 'reconvert' the priests to the *régime*. At the same time the bishop was compelled to forbid the public celebration of divine service to those of the clergy on whom the marks of their conversion—in the shape of head wounds and bandages—were too apparent. This step is explained by the campaign of the National-Socialists against the so-called 'atrocity propaganda,' of which they will tolerate no living witnesses.

The Bishops of Speyer and Trier, moreover, are continually pressed to order the priests of their dioceses in the Saar territory to support National-Socialism, and all cases of disobedience are suitably avenged—on the clergy in the *Reich*—in German parts of the dioceses. Hence it comes about that to-day the bishops are still working in the Saar for immediate reincorporation into Germany. Nevertheless, the Catholic opposition is continually growing in strength: for instance, it is a fact that, in spite of direct attacks from the bishops, the Saar newspaper the *Neue Saar Post* is rapidly increasing its circulation. It is also symptomatic that a Catholic priest of a religious order publicly took part in the liberty demonstration of the Saar population on August 25th—the same day, that is, as the Hitler demonstration at Coblenz. More than that, he spoke against the reincorporation into the anti-religious 'Third Reich.'

A successor has already been appointed to Monsignor Testa—who has returned to Rome to deliver his report—in the person of the Papal Nuncio in Prague. The Catholic population of the Saar hopes that his office as observer will soon be changed into one of Papal administrator, for, after what I have said, it is obvious that the liberation of the Saar from the Bishops of Speyer and Trier is an urgent necessity for the liberty of conscience of the Saar clergy. It is also a necessity for the Church as such, in order to prevent the authority of the two bishops from being further undermined. The decision of the Vatican should be rendered easier by its knowledge of the following facts: It is only a certain consideration for the Saar Catholics, who have it in their power to deal National-Socialism its death-blow, that temporarily holds the Hitler *régime* back from an inexorable cultural war against the Church, with all its extreme consequences. In fact, Herr Buerckel is said recently to have spoken, with remarkable frankness, of the 'black swine in the Saar,' without whom the remains of the Concordat would long since have been dead and buried.

After the *plébiscite*, however, he looked forward to a thorough house-cleaning! The Vatican knows, therefore, that after January 13 the position of the Catholics in the German *Reich* will be infinitely worse than it is now, for there will then be no single province in which National-Socialism can be called to order. So we should not be deceived by official assurances that if the clergy supports Hitler-Germany it will improve the situation for the Catholics and their position in the State. National-Socialism has never kept any of its promises: it has always laughed at the fools who trusted it.

Now the question may be asked why the Church will have to reckon in any circumstances with new National-Socialist persecutions. Is it so entirely impossible for there to be a lasting peace between Rome and Germany's Brown Houses? It is unthinkable, since National-Socialism, which cannot abandon its 'totalitarian' standpoint, is by its very nature hostile to religion. It can tolerate no object of worship besides itself. It will always endeavour to impose the same system of uniformity on the kingdom of the spirit as it has on politics. For even the smallest degree of spiritual freedom threatens its whole structure, which is built up on the elimination of all criticism and every possibility of individual thought. Therefore the expression used in this article, 'New Paganism,' is to be understood literally. It was coined by Cardinal Faulhaber, and indicates not only the negative contradiction between National-Socialism and the Christian gospel, but also the positive efforts of the former to create a sort of new religion. In this connexion we can observe the tactics with which we are already familiar in the National-Socialist foreign policy—that is, always to go a little further than one wants to, and then to withdraw. By this means one can survey the country and discover how far it is possible to go at the moment, and by withdrawing one gives proof of a sincere desire for a policy of 'reconciliation' and 'understanding.' These tactics were most obvious in the *Putsch* organised by National-Socialism against Dr. Dollfuss, which was at first jubilantly acclaimed on the German wireless and, after the failure, most severely condemned. And we have the same experience every day in the religious sphere. For instance, a paper called *Nordland* was recently allowed to print the most frightful blasphemies about 'the repulsive corpse of the crucified Jew,' and after the monstrosities had had the desired effect the paper was 'banned.' Anyone desirous of obtaining further information on the 'New Paganism' should read *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, by Alfred Rosenberg, who is not altogether unknown in England. The Holy Father has placed it on the Index of books forbidden to Catholics.

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This 'New Paganism' forms the essential kernel of the 'Third Reich.' This is proved by yet further facts—for instance, by the so-called 'Black Front' of Herr Otto Strasser, who is at present in Prague. This 'Black Front' enjoys a steadily increasing influence in Germany among the disappointed National-Socialists, since it claims to be the defender of the original ideology of the party, which, it asserts, has been falsified by Hitler. This, the 'only true form' of National-Socialism, is, however, very close to the 'New Paganism,' which it welcomes as the hope of the future. These 'genuine' National-Socialists will be very happy about the latest developments in Germany, where a certain Herr Hauer has already been busy trying to create a 'dogmatic' foundation for the 'New Paganism,' by opposing an Aryan 'Nine Commandments' to the universal moral law contained in the Decalogue of Moses.

There is, therefore, no choice for the Catholic Church between fighting and making peace, for the fight is in full swing, and it will shake Christianity to its foundations. The question is only what measures the Church intends to take—outside Austria and the Saar. Up to a certain point, of course, a sort of co-operation with the Protestant Churches has already begun. It started in December 1933, when Cardinal Faulhaber and the evangelical minister agreed to preach on the same text. And it is not surprising that there has been a spontaneous *rapprochement*, which is continually growing in intensity, between the Protestant and Catholic Christians. After all, the same hurricane of godlessness and idol worship is sweeping over them both.

The National-Socialists are attacking this increasing Catholic opposition with the greatest alarm. All observers are unanimous in saying that in the Catholic parts of Germany the greeting 'Heil, Hitler!' and the wearing of *swastikas* is gradually dying out. And no amount of terrorism or manipulation at elections can conceal the fact that on August 19 of this year it was the Catholic districts that gave the highest percentage of 'No' votes. Officially it was stated that 'the former Centre Party had been pursuing a policy of sabotage.' A naïve person might well ask: 'Why sabotage? After all, it was a general election in which everyone was at liberty to express his opinion!' No doubt there are still such naïve people, though their objection would not apply in this case, since for the Catholics it was not so much political objects as a deep religious instinct that made them vote 'No.' But however important forces of this sort are, they can have no genuinely productive results unless they are concentrated in a positive policy, which will be directed towards the fulfilment of concrete political duties. That is the reason why I

have spoken here so exhaustively of the Saar, although my subject is really the religious question.

What further can the Church do? It would be absurd to expect from her incitements to revolution. It will be her duty only to show Catholics the limits beyond which they do not owe human obedience and calmly leave the political forces to infer the consequences. And let us mention one more point. The policy of the Church, in order to achieve complete success, which means the victory of justice, needs a clearly defined social programme. In the Papal Encyclical '*Quadragesimo Anno*,' it is true, there are several elements which give rise to great hopes, but it is all still too vague and capable of too many interpretations. It needs a clear formulation—above all at a time when in Germany the workers' rights are all being destroyed and the masses converted into starving slaves of the *régime*. This shameful state of affairs contains horrible dangers, and silence on the part of the Church would only serve to increase them. It may be taken for granted that the Vatican is aware that from the ruins of the 'Third Reich' there will arise a Soviet Germany—unless the Rock of Peter provides the life-giving streams for which millions are to-day thirsting.

It was not without reason that I started from the assumption that in Germany the whole future of Christianity will be decided. For all the problems are concentrated there in their most intense form, and from within—from National-Socialism itself, that is to say—there can be no hope of any positive solution. There is only one way out for Nazidom—namely, war, for which it is to-day so blatantly preparing. This war would of course mean the destruction of Germany and of Europe—the end of Western civilisation and Western Christianity. It is the duty of all Western statesmen, therefore, to support the Church wherever she is fighting for freedom and justice, and especially where she is fighting the most vital battle of all: the battle for the peace of the world. For the anti-Christian and anti-human policy of the present rulers of Germany can only survive as long as war remains a possibility in the background. Take away from them this criminal hope, and their complete impotence will immediately become apparent. Christians all over the world, therefore, and not only Christians, but all who feel any sense of responsibility for earthly justice, would be well advised to watch more closely than ever the Church's struggle in Germany, since it is also their cause that is being decided there, where the primeval forest is contending with Golgotha and the 'New Paganism' with Eternal Rome.

HUBERTUS PRINZ ZU LÖWENSTEIN.

THE PLANNING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION¹

FROM 1846 until the last year or two British farmers had to maintain themselves in open competition with the produce of the world. The earlier part of this period coincided with the development of industrialism and an unprecedented growth of the population, and on the demand for food thus created agriculture flourished and progressed like other industries. By the eighties of the last century the balance became disturbed because of the opening up of the new lands, particularly of America, upon which wheat could be grown cheaply. By that time, also, both inland and ocean transport had developed so greatly that distance became a relatively small factor in the cost of the grain delivered in Great Britain. Other causes, such as the position of Britain as an industrial and creditor nation, payment for whose loans and manufactures had to be made in agricultural produce, contributed to render the position of the British farmer more difficult.

In this century up to the outbreak of the war farming had succeeded in readjusting itself to the situation by turning from corn to milk and meat, vegetables and fruit, and reducing the number of men required for production. But with the post-war years British farmers had to face new forms of competition. Intensive nationalism not only endeavoured to close foreign markets to our wares, but adopted various measures for pushing the entry of agricultural produce into the British, the one open market of any consequence. Finally, the world slump of 1929 completed the disintegration of the prices of all primary, and most particularly of agricultural, products, and British agriculture was faced with destruction from which it could never hope to recover. The nation became convinced that protective measures, however indefensible in a world-wide economy, had become the only immediate means of safety, and a system of duties, general and special, has been adopted in the endeavour to raise prices for the British farmer. World trade has been replaced by economic war and the methods of war-time defence had to be resumed. But these measures, and the subsidies that have been accorded to the

producers of wheat, sugar-beet, milk and meat, are not merely gifts to help farming, but are to be regarded as the necessary preliminaries to a progressive reorganisation of the agricultural industry.

Our situation is essentially different from that of most of the countries with high tariffs against the importation of foodstuffs. In Europe generally farming is mainly in the hands of peasants and the land available is nearly, if not wholly, capable of supporting the population; the country can live on itself. The concern of the Governments of these countries is to preserve the peasants in their existing mode of life, since they constitute the largest element, and often indeed the majority, of the population. Consequently these Governments attach less value to the cheapness at which the consuming public might obtain its food than to the maintenance of a level of prices at which the peasants are able to live. But this situation does not prevail in Great Britain, where the interests of the vast consuming population cannot be subordinated to that of an agricultural community numbering little more than 7 per cent. of the whole. We shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that the British public will for long agree to tax itself or to pay dearly for its food merely out of good-will towards the farmers. It will want to see some return of value to the nation as the price of its continued support.

Consequently a scheme of planning becomes necessary, in order to build up an organisation which will add to the efficiency of farming by affording opportunities for the full utilisation of the resources that modern science and machinery has put at the disposal of agriculture. To this end, in the first place, a market must be assured. However much our farmers have felt the stress of foreign importations, internal competition has been equally destructive of prices and enterprise. Milk and potatoes, where the British farmer practically has the market to himself, afford instances of how internal competition and seasonal surpluses reduce prices below the average return due to the producer. Consequently the farmer is constrained to play for safety, enterprise becomes dangerous, and the gross output from the land is below that which the wider community, the nation itself, ought to obtain from its greatest estate. Neither protection nor subsidies can alone bring about the necessary intensification of production; in return for his security the farmer must accept a certain measure of subordination and work upon lines laid down for him in the general interest.

Pigs afford a notable example of the manner in which unrestrained competition, internal or external, may check development. The pig population of the country remained comparatively constant round about 2,500,000 from 1872 to 1914; and though

¹ A paper read to the British Association at Aberdeen, September 1934.

there were spurts in post-war years which raised the numbers to over 3,000,000 in 1924 and 1928, in 1930 they had dropped again to below 2,500,000. But during the same period the numbers in Denmark, almost wholly intended for the British market, grew from about 500,000 to over 5,000,000. Intrinsically, the Danish farmer had no particular advantages over British farmers and curers in the production of bacon. Pigs are in a sense articles manufactured from cereals, as raw materials, which have been equally cheap in the world market that is open to both Great Britain and Denmark. If the Danish farmer had some advantage in getting milk residues cheap because of the dairying industry of the country, that was offset by cheaper milling offals here and the cost of carriage. But to the British farmer pigs were a dangerous product upon which to embark too freely. Even with the pork market as an alternative, prices have always fluctuated enormously and irrespectively of the chief factor of cost—the price of barley and offals—so that for long periods the returns for pigs would be below any normal costs of production. The farmer summed it up in his maxim that ‘pigs are either muck or money,’ and he did not increase his number of breeding sows beyond the point to which he could face the loss they might bring in any year. Over an average of years pigs paid, but there was an element of risk which prevented farmers from committing themselves too deeply. I need not go into the question of how greatly this fluctuation militated against good breeding, nor of the detrimental effects of the method of trading between producers and curers, but, as is clearly set out in the Report of the Reorganisation Commission on Pig Marketing, the net result was that the bulk of the bacon consumed in Great Britain was of foreign origin, wholly owing to removable defects in organisation. The Pig Marketing Board has now been set up to remove these disabilities and to reclaim the trade for British farmers. To ensure success a certain measure of control will have to be exercised over both the producing and the curing and distributing businesses.

To take another concrete example, the Milk Marketing Board is now possessed of a monopoly of the sale of milk to the public and can in effect fix the price. Like any other great corporation with a monopoly, it can take a long view, improving the gross demand for its wares by reducing the price and improving the quality. One of the great *desiderata* of the consuming public, the elimination of the danger of bovine tuberculosis, however costly at first, will in the end reduce the costs of production. To such measures the Marketing Board must address itself, as also to the great task of reducing costs of distribution. Particular interests must suffer; in the past the pressure of competition

has practically displaced town dairies, so the Marketing Board will have to shepherd farmers in the direction of the most economical forms of production and cannot ‘freeze’ the industry in its present mixture of more and less efficient businesses.

In some cases the reorganisation required is less in the farmers’ than in the distributors’ share of the business. The farmer’s method of producing meat can be altered relatively little, but his ultimate share in the feeding of the people depends upon the creation of a system of centralised collection, slaughter, preparation, and marketing that will present the public with British meat as efficiently as the Argentine *frigoríficos*. No branch of agricultural business carries so large a deadweight of markets, dealers of all grades and other intermediaries. Farmers are always complaining of the disadvantages they suffer in selling their stock in small local markets; again, the dealers’ methods of bunching stock from various sources and passing them on from market to market is a serious source of the distribution of epidemic diseases.

During the last year or two we have been told that only the best joints of British cattle, other than those of prime quality, have been saleable at all, but that a large proportion of the carcase has had to go for rendering down into meat extract, fat and manure. It is perhaps comparatively easy to plan for centralised slaughter and distribution where the large centres of population are concerned. This side of the question is fully discussed in the Report of the Committee on the Slaughtering of Live Stock and of the Committee on Abattoir Design which follow the Report of the Reorganisation Committee, though, as that Report indicates, there are crucial points of administration to be settled. The Report insists on the complete control of the operations of the abattoir, but it leaves open the question of whether the organisation shall operate on behalf of the owners of the livestock, handing back to them the meat, the saleable offals and the hides, or whether it will buy outright the cattle on the hoof. But the still more difficult question is the delimitation of the areas which shall not be subject to centralisation of supply and slaughter. Obviously there are many country districts in which it would be wasteful to attempt any replacement of the present local methods of doing business.

The task of reorganising the meat trade is immense, if only because of the number and diversity of the producing units—perhaps 150,000 to 200,000 in all. Here, too, will be experienced the greatest of all the difficulties attaching to planning—that is, to find the men of experience capable of organising and planning so complicated a business. It is not to be expected that either the farming community or the meat trade can provide many men

fit to step into the control of a great business. It has often been said that a big business must grow, raising its own managers and selecting them by degrees, trying out its methods in a small way while mistakes are not too costly—learning, in fact, to walk before it attempts to run. But planning involves that a single authority has to take control of each section of the industry as a whole and create for it *de novo* an all-embracing organisation. So, with the best of intentions, big mistakes are inevitable until experience, both of men and methods, accumulates; we have to proceed by trial and error.

Nor can a national plan for agriculture be content with setting up a Marketing Board or its equivalent for each of the major commodities the farmer produces. To some extent in all farming there is a choice as to the products to which the farmer will devote his land and his energies, and he will be drawn to one or other by the prospects it offers. Of course, there are limitations of soil and climate which render particular areas inappropriate to certain cultures; no one, for example, would set about growing fruit on the high chalk downs. On the other hand, much of the best land will grow anything in reason; to what product should it be directed? A national plan for agriculture must exercise some option in the general interests of the community, because we are unable to grow all the food we require. The calculation is uncertain, but the current estimate is that we are producing in Great Britain about 38 per cent. of our consumption.

But assuming that planning will add to the efficiency of production, as it ought to do, and that some additions can be made to the present cultivated area, we are still very far short of the extent of land required to render us self-supporting in the matter of food. Even if we allow for some decline in the general standard of living as a consequence of the restrictions on imports involved by the current world policies of national self-sufficiency, we in Great Britain will do well if within a generation we can raise our production by one-half to 60 per cent. of our requirements. This being the case, a planned agriculture can select which of the products of our soil it will foster as best suited to the climate and soil and to the general well-being of the community.

To take a concrete example: a great many people regard wheat as the mainstay of arable farming and urge the extension of the wheat area as a means of increasing our margin of safety in case of war. On the other hand, wheat is of all crops the one most adaptable to rough conditions of cultivation, one that calls for a minimum of labour when it can be grown by machinery on the great areas of newly-broken land in America and Australia. It is, again, one of the easiest to transport; consequently it has become about the cheapest source of food in the world. Why,

then, should England strive to compete in this field? It is true that wheat is an appropriate crop for much of the second-class land in the Midlands and East of England, land, too, which is not suitable for stock-raising or for more intensive crops. On these areas wheat can be grown cheaply—where mechanisation has been adopted, possibly as cheaply as anywhere else in the world. Our national wheat-growing should not be encouraged to develop beyond these natural boundaries; the occupier of the rich silt lands of Lincolnshire ought not to be tempted by artificial prices to put under wheat land that can grow vegetables and other intensive crops, nor should the West Country grazier be tempted to plough up grass—which, with his rainfall and cheap fertilisers, can be made productive as grass—in order to obtain a precarious crop of grain.

In general, we should concentrate our efforts on products that employ labour, that demand skill, that are costly to transport, confining our imports to things that can more cheaply be grown elsewhere. In effect this means that we should specialise on meat, milk, and all the range of livestock products, fruit and vegetables, leaving the cheap sources of energy, like cereals and sugar, to be imported. From this point of view the fostering of sugar production from beet has become of doubtful expediency. The subsidies upon which it has been based have been the means of salvation to farmers in the most distressed part of England, but since the policy was launched the sugar situation of the world has greatly changed. Scientific research has so greatly increased the output of sugar from the sugar-cane that it is difficult to see how beet can ever compete on equal terms unless some entirely unpredictable break occurs either in the sugar-beet itself or in the methods of manufacture, both of which have been the subject of intensive research and seem to be near the limits of improvement. Since both wheat and cane sugar are Empire products, there is the more reason to regard them in our planning mainly as imports rather than as subjects for home production.

Considerations of another character also urge our planning in the direction indicated. It is represented by those scientific men who can speak with most authority on matters of diet that the defects of physique and general health in our population are to a very large extent the direct result of malnutrition, particularly in childhood and youth. It is not that food has been insufficient, but that it has been deficient in vitamins and mineral food accessories that are requisite for healthy growth and the proper functioning of the body. Our national diet has been directed too exclusively to cereals and potatoes, to sugar, to cooked and preserved meats, and modern habits of housekeeping and the congregation of the population into cities increases the dependency

upon tinned and pre-cooked foods with a low vitamin content. While the young are chiefly affected, mature people experience a lower standard of health and of resistance to disease from these deficiencies in their normal diet. There is need for a national campaign of enlightenment and instruction amongst all classes as a potent means of raising the standard of health and efficiency of the nation. Of course, this applies most to young children and to expectant mothers, but there is ample experience to show that most adults would benefit by alterations in their customary diet. What is significant is that the dietetic reform calls for just those products from the land that scientific planning from a purely economic point of view would encourage—that is, milk and milk products, meat and eggs, green vegetables and fruit,² with a lesser dependence upon mere energy suppliers like cereals and sugar. Many people habitually eat too much of the latter classes of food from an instinctive desire to obtain a sufficiency of the food accessories. So from both points of view a similar planning of the national agriculture is desirable.

For a national plan, then, a higher authority is necessary to hold the balance between the different interests and to decide which of the products of the land should be encouraged and which may be left to importation. The question cannot be left to the play of rival interests and to the ability of particular groups to exercise pressure upon the Government of the day. Of course, this co-ordinating authority resides in the Ministry of Agriculture in England and Wales and the Department of Agriculture in Scotland, ultimately in the Cabinet itself. But Ministers and Governments come and go rapidly in these days, and the history of agricultural legislation during the last twenty years bears all too strong witness to the manner in which measures can be adopted or reversed by Governments with insufficient consideration of their effects upon agriculture as a whole or the needs of the nation. Agriculturists themselves are not the only people concerned—wider interests are involved; and the national plan must be based, also, upon fundamental scientific and economic considerations. It may be that there should be a select advisory body behind the administration and the Governments to formulate the guiding principles and to advise upon their application. Planning involves a plan, and agriculture, in particular, demands a long-period plan extending far beyond the life of any one Government. Indeed, the danger one has to apprehend is that the revolution in dealing with the methods of food production that the present plan tacitly effects—the limitations of private trading, the control exercised over the extent of production, the

² Fish is also a highly valuable element of diet, though outside the immediate argument.

ing of prices—may induce a revolt among the consumers so long that the whole policy gets reversed before it has had time to realise the advantages that organisation can attain. It needs to be accompanied by planning outside the immediate ambit of agriculture, planning that will ensure the goods reach the consumers at prices commensurate with those realised by the producers. The increase in prices the farmers need in order to make the business reasonably profitable is small relative to the margin which exists between the wholesaler's prices and those which the public pay. Control and organisation must extend to the zone of retailing if the whole policy is to be effective.

If the plan is worked merely in the interests of the farmers, ensuring better returns to them by restriction of supplies, the result will be a lower standard of living and restricted consumption, that will react upon the total returns to the agricultural community. The consumer can always substitute foods of lower quality but equal sustenance value—more cereals and less meat and milk. When bacon prices jumped a year or so ago the careful housewives on limited incomes took to corned beef instead. The aim of the planning policy as opposed to *laissez-faire* and orderly competition is to increase and cheapen the supplies to the people by guiding farmers into the better methods. The increased capacity for production that we can realise through the applications of science, machinery, and organisation cannot be allowed to go to waste because the distributive part of the cycle from producer to consumer—is still left to the old go-as-you-please methods. The fact before all men's minds to-day is that the powers of production have been immensely extended, but so far we have only brought disaster to the general run of producers, and it is the belief that this potential wealth can accrue to the public at large that has led the people, here and in other countries, to resort to measures of control that were hitherto regarded as dangerous interferences with the freedom of the individual.

The difficulties inherent in carrying through such a national planning scheme are obvious; experience alone will decide whether human nature will put up with it, or is, indeed, equal to carrying it out. Personally, I have still some faith that men will eventually learn to manage their affairs by the light of reason, even though the events of the last twenty years increasingly suggest that they will continue to be moved only by irresponsible passions and will insist on gratifying their emotions to their own undoing. But even so that the idea of national efficiency has seized upon the minds of men it will never be quietened; it will always be troubling the leaders and bringing about change after change in the desired action.

A. DANIEL HALL.

A MODERN PYTHAGORAS

No presidential address before the British Association has for years roused so much interest as that delivered at Aberdeen last month by Sir James Jeans. There can be no one in the international scientific world whose writings are so widely read. Sir Arthur Eddington has sold his thousands, but Sir James Jeans has sold his tens, and even hundreds, of thousands. The stars in their courses fought against Sisera; but they have combined to make Sir James Jeans the most-read author of the day. He has not achieved this fame without adequate reason. The basis of his success is a gift of lucid exposition to a degree equalled among his colleagues only by Sir Arthur Eddington. Moreover, he is a master of the arresting phrase; he has an unexcelled command of happy similes, and, in brief, all those literary gifts which are the product of a rich imagination working through a flexible pen. He may write many a misleading paragraph, but never a dull sentence. Only one more factor is needed to account for his astonishing popular success. He commands the public confidence because he is known previously to have won a high reputation in scientific circles for his power of systematising, and advancing, electrical and cosmological speculation. Here, the public consider, is a man who can be relied on to present the facts correctly, and withal in a highly attractive manner.

The wide, and almost universal, reputation of Sir James Jeans, combined with the great publicity given to addresses from the presidential chair of the British Association, makes it desirable to examine a little closely the paper he read at Aberdeen. For he there gave utterances to opinions which, if they were inevitably deductions from assured results of science, or even if they were merely sure of a respectable scientific following, would be of the greatest philosophical importance. After mentioning the rather surprising fact that the presidential chair had not been occupied by a theoretical physicist for fifty years, Sir James observed that in the interval

the main edifice of science has grown almost beyond recognition, increasing in extent, dignity and beauty, as whole armies of labourers have patiently

added wing after wing, story upon story, and pinnacle to pinnacle. Yet the theoretical physicist must admit that his own department looks like nothing so much as a building which has been brought down in ruins by a succession of earthquake shocks.

This is characteristic of Sir James Jeans's happiest manner, which so endears him to the public. He complains of the 'crisp, snappy sentences beloved of scientific journalism,' but he could give any journalist writing on science half Fleet Street for a start and beat him to Temple Bar. The truth is that his picture is greatly overdrawn. As a matter of fact, Sir James Jeans's edifice of science is beautifully fitted to house the theoretical physicist no less than any other man of science. What, for instance, is macroscopic physics to-day but an enlargement of the old physics? The theory of relativity includes Newtonian mechanics as a particular case. The building has increased in size, but, far from being in ruins, the older parts are as sure as ever. Nor is Sir James Jeans doing himself real service by speaking so picturesquely but so carelessly of the physics of the past; that he did not really mean to disparage was shown by a touching reference to Clerk Maxwell. For if the old physics is in ruins, what guarantee is there that Sir James Jeans's own speculations will better survive the shocks of time? No scientific generalisation valid over a particular field becomes discredited with the advance of science; it is conserved in some bigger generalisation.

More worthy of study, however, is the chief characteristic, as recorded by Sir James Jeans, of the new physics which has risen on the ruins of the old. In one of the happiest illustrations he has ever devised, he pictures a psychologist shooting the word 'wave' at a number of hearers and asking for the ideas it evokes in their uncontrolled minds. Curiously, he omits the response 'permanent' which will come from nearly every young woman, but he notes that the boy scout will probably say 'flag,' the sailor 'sea,' the musician 'sound,' the engineer 'compression,' and the mathematician 'sine' or 'cosine.' The number who will give the last response is small, and the reason is that

our remote ancestors did not survive in the struggle for existence by pondering over sines and cosines, but by devising ways of killing other animals without being killed themselves. As a consequence, the brains we have inherited from them take more kindly to the concrete facts of everyday life than to abstract concepts; to particular rather than to universals.

That is true enough, and so is Sir James Jeans's further observation that the old-fashioned physicist, like the child at school, is never satisfied with x , y and z , but always wants to know what they represent. But here comes the rub. Sir James Jeans

believes that 'a simple argument will show that he can never get beyond x , y and z .'

Will it? The argument, since it is the core of all Sir James Jeans's philosophical speculation, and is here much more clearly expressed than anywhere else, is worth reproducing in full. It is :

Physical science obtains its knowledge of the external world by a series of exact measurements, or more precisely, by comparisons of measurements. Typical of its knowledge is the statement that the line H in the hydrogen spectrum has a wave-length of so many centimetres. This is meaningless until we know what a centimetre is. The moment we are told that it is a certain fraction of the earth's radius, or of the length of a bar of platinum, or a certain multiple of the wave-length of a line in the cadmium spectrum, our knowledge becomes real, but at that same moment it also becomes purely numerical. Our minds can only be acquainted with things inside themselves—never with things outside. Thus we can never know the essential nature of anything, such as a centimetre or a wave-length, which exists in that mysterious world outside ourselves to which our minds can never penetrate; but we can know the numerical ratio of two quantities of similar nature, no matter how incomprehensible they may both be individually.

For this reason, our knowledge of the external world must always consist of numbers, and our picture of the universe—the synthesis of our knowledge—must necessarily be mathematical in form. All the concrete details of the picture, the apples and pears and bananas, in the case of a child learning algebra, the ether and atoms and electrons, are mere clothing that we ourselves drape over our mathematical symbols—they do not belong to Nature, but to the parables by which we try to make Nature comprehensible. It was, I think, Kronecker who said that in arithmetic God made the integers and man made the rest; in the same spirit, we may add that in physics God made the mathematics and man made the rest.

The bulk of the passage is an apotheosis of mathematics. It also contains a statement of Sir James Jeans's idealism, or mentalism, as it would be more strictly termed. To the student with a long memory the passage will have a familiar ring. The exaltation of mathematics is an ancient heresy, a very plausible and very attractive one, not least to the present writer. Its plausibility is its danger. Not once but many times it has been refuted, no less by the logic of experience than by the logic of thought. Its original begetter was Pythagoras, whose school, in opposition to current Ionian theories that the all was water, earth, fire or air, held that the all was number. The Pythagoreans were intoxicated by their success in correlating the notes of the musical scale with a set of numbers, and their *dictum* doubtless meant that it was much more profitable to seek the numerical relations between natural phenomena than to attempt to explain them as different forms of one material element—the phenomena were better 'saved' by this method. L. Brunschvicg has seen,

with some plausibility, the origin of the theory in a realisation that each heavenly constellation has two main characteristics—the number of stars in it and the geometrical figure formed by them; but the discovery of the musical scale would certainly have greatly increased the Pythagorean respect for numbers. In its purest form the theory was doubtless as expressed above; but it became debased in the hands of the later Pythagoreans, one of whom, by name Eurytus, settled the number of a living object, such as a horse or man, by putting together pebbles in the form of the object and adding them up. Plato himself had no small pythagorean element in his constitution. He makes the Pythagorean, Timæus of Locri, construct the universe out of elementary triangles, *viâ* the so-called Platonic figures, and Plutarch attributes to him the saying 'ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ' ('God is for ever geometrising'). Tsetzes records that over the door of the Academy was written, 'ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ ΜΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΣΤΕΓΗΝ' ('Let no one unversed in geometry come under my roof'), which accords well with the story about the master's lecture on the Good, of which Aristotle was so fond. A large audience came, expecting to be told how to acquire the things usually accounted good, such as riches, health and strength; but, to the dismay of some and amusement of others, Plato talked about arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, and finally declared the One to be the Good. Is not this like a certain audience who came to Aberdeen to hear about the world-picture of modern physics, and were hopeful of seeing kinks in space and time swallowing itself, but were told that knowledge consists of the numerical ratios of quantities? Aristotle grumbled that in his day mathematics had become philosophy; and the gibe would not be amiss to-day.

Now what is the validity of this attitude? Is it true that all knowledge is expressible in mathematical symbols, that nothing can be known beyond what is so expressible, and, furthermore, that the knowledge is the symbolism? Undoubtedly the plausibility of such views comes from the immense power of the mathematical instrument. As stated above, the Pythagorean discovery that the notes of the musical octave could be represented by numbers gave a great impetus to the mathematisation of all knowledge. In the same way, the contemporary revival of Pythagoreanism is undoubtedly due to the stupendous triumphs of the mathematical method in our own generation. Consider, for instance, how Professor Einstein, sitting at his desk, welded together mechanics and gravitation into one beautifully coherent scheme, and predicted three crucial tests, of extraordinary delicacy, by which its superiority over the old physics could be confirmed. Sure enough, the experiments, when made, produced

confirmation. Or, in the field of atomic physics, consider how Professor Dirac on the basis of a new algebra made daring assertions which were verified years later in the discovery of the positive electron. There is something uncanny in the process. In the elegance, symmetry, and power of modern mathematical physics there is something that first produces a feeling of terror in the beholder, but on fuller understanding a sense of ineffable peace. The mathematician does not frame the mathematics; rather the mathematics controls him. He flounders about in a welter of meaningless symbols until he falls in with the current and is then borne swiftly and irresistibly to his goal. The mysterious operations of modern mathematical physics, so silent and so awe-inspiring, produce in those who watch them a feeling which may not inaptly be called religious.¹ It is not surprising that to Sir James Jeans 'the Great Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician.'

But the fact that Sir James Jeans's belief is understandable does not mean that it is true. His mind has been captivated by the success of the mathematical method. But on a cold analysis there is nothing surprising in this. It is the *métier* of mathematics to be successful, completely successful—within its domain. Those last three words are critical. Nothing which Sir James Jeans or anyone else has yet brought forward has upset the old conviction that mathematics can explain its particular field with absolute precision, but that field is only a small portion of reality, and not the most important. The Pythagoreans, for instance, correlated the notes of the musical scale with a set of numbers, but that would not help them one whit to appreciate the beauty of musical tone, which is inexpressible in symbols. In the same way, all the varied hues of Nature are now catalogued by numbers; but to know the number of a colour is quite another matter from experiencing it as a sensation.

The pure mathematician has been defined by Mr. Bertrand Russell as a man who doesn't know what he is talking about and doesn't care. This is presumably Mr. Russell's way of describing what Dr. Wittgenstein means by the tautology of mathematics. Pure mathematics begins with a set of definitions, axioms and postulates and derives certain consequences from them. Never at any moment does the pure mathematician step outside his symbolism. That is where applied mathematics differs. At points in the demonstration symbols are identified with physical objects, or events. In the intervals the demonstration proceeds smoothly like a piece of pure mathematics. Nothing that Sir

¹ Cf. Professor Einstein's saying: 'I am of opinion that all the finer speculations in the realm of science spring from a deep religious feeling, and that without such feeling they would be utterly barren.'

James Jeans has said gives any ground for believing that in this respect the new physics differs fundamentally from the old. The only difference is that the points of contact with the physical world are now fewer, and the demonstration looks more like a piece of pure mathematics. But there cannot be fewer than two points of contact. There must be a stage at which the symbols are identified with physical objects, or events; and there must be a second stage at which the symbols are once more referred to these objects, or events, so that conclusions of physical value (possibly a prediction) can be drawn about them.

There is an important difference in the processes of pure and applied mathematics. Pure mathematics is absolutely certain and absolutely precise because the mathematician is dealing with objects which he has himself defined. But in applied mathematics, at every stage when symbols are referred to the physical world an element of doubt enters. In the older physics (which is still the elementary physics) the inadequacy of the reference was often glaringly obvious. The earth, for instance, would be treated as a mathematical point; or rather, a point in the demonstration would be identified with the earth. The justification for the identity is that it gives verifiable results; but the physical verification, not the mathematical process, is the justification. Although the old physics showed the characteristics of symbolism glaringly, the new physics is not essentially different, as when, for example, a point or a set of waves is identified with an electron.

The crux of the matter has now become, How far can the symbols of pure mathematics be applied to the objects, or events, which compose the physical world? It may be thought sufficient to say that the symbolism shall be judged by the success with which it accounts for physical happenings, and in particular allows true predictions to be made. That is the line taken by Sir James Jeans in *The New Background of Science*, where he says:

Twentieth-century science, projecting the ideas of pure mathematics on to nature, finds that they fit as perfectly, and as uniquely, as Cinderella's slipper fitted her foot. We can hardly explain this away by saying that we have merely shaped the foot to fit the slipper, for so many other slippers were tried first and no amount of ingenuity could get the foot into them.

The simile is perhaps apter than Sir James Jeans imagined. For Cinderella was more than foot, and needed more than a mathematical slipper to be fully dressed. Mathematics can explain a small portion of the world—that which is measurable. Within that portion of the universe its success is complete. Unfortunately this success has dazzled many to the self-denying ordinance by which it was obtained. The outfitter who sets out to provide Cinderella with a shoe can do so with absolute precision.

His success comes by limiting himself to that small portion of her anatomy. Were he to try dressing her, his task would be much more complicated. In contrast, for example, with the defined lines of the foot he would be puzzled to know where to put the waist, and could never be certain that he had done so correctly. The result is that the animistic, mechanical or even philosophical dressmaker is blamed for bungling, and the mathematical shoemaker praised for his competence. Such at least appears to have been the case when Boyle declared mathematics to be the alphabet in which God wrote the world; when Kant laid down that in any discipline there was as much science as there was pure mathematics; when Goethe announced that, whether or not numbers rule the world, they certainly show how it is ruled; when Dr. Whitehead proclaims that 'all science as it grows towards perfection becomes mathematical in its ideas'; and when Sir James Jeans asserts the resemblance of the Great Architect of the Universe to a pure mathematician. For certain purposes God may so be conceived. There is more ultimate significance, however, in the Christian dogmas that God is a Father and that God is Love. But whereas the operations of a pure mathematician can be rigorously demonstrated, the workings of a loving Father are inscrutable. In the clarity and simplicity of mathematics is a great snare. Ultimately the idea of God as Love is much more valuable than that of God as a mathematician; but it is not so easily comprehended. That, in fact, is the most satisfactory way in which God has been so far pictured. But of great value also is the picture of God as an artist, whether as a potter moulding his clay or as some other creative artist. T. K. Oesterreich gives expression to this feeling in his words:

The world must be understood, not merely by the way, but quite seriously, as the work of art of a divine creative spirit. . . . It is written, as it were, on the forehead of the world that it was created by a God who felt and acted artistically.

It may be, as Van Gogh thought, that God is an artist who bungled—that is a question of æsthetic judgment. But undoubtedly the picture of God as an artist can explain a great deal in the world, much more than mathematics can explain. Of what use, for example, is mathematics in explaining the problem of evil? The theory of God as an artist does attempt to explain this problem—not wholly satisfactorily, for only the idea of God as a loving and wise Father can do that—by regarding the world as a combination of light and shade, disappointing when dissected, but harmonious and beautiful when taken as a whole. Every man makes God after his own image—the philosopher as pure thought, the painter as an artist, the warrior as the God of Battles,

the Red Indian as the Great Hunter, even the inebriate as the Supreme Drunkard. Some of the pictures are worse than worthless. Others must all be incorporated in any comprehensive picture of God. But what is certain is that when Sir James Jeans refers to the Great Architect of the Universe as a pure mathematician he tells us something about God but a great deal more about himself.

One further use may be made of Sir James Jeans's simile of Cinderella's slipper. Its purpose was to show that twentieth-century science, projecting the ideas of pure mathematics on to Nature, found they fitted perfectly. That is sound enough, if by Nature is meant the measurable aspects of the universe. But at Aberdeen Sir James Jeans took a startlingly opposite course. He said our knowledge of the external world must always consist of numbers, and all concrete details—apples, pears, bananas, ether, atoms, electrons—are mere clothing draped over the mathematical symbols. This is a complete inversion of the usual belief, and Sir James Jeans gives no reason at all for the inversion. Hitherto it has been supposed that the apples, pears, bananas, ether, atoms, and electrons were the real objects, and the mathematical symbolism an attempt at representing them. Now Sir James Jeans inverts this belief by insisting that the atoms and electrons are the fictions. Let him not tell this in the Cavendish, nor publish it in the Clarendon. For good reasons, no one in these laboratories has seen an electron, but workers who are regularly hearing the patter of electrons on their targets, or photographing their tracks in a Wilson chamber, or studying their collisions find it difficult to believe they are merely dealing with figments of their imagination. The only fact which seems to support Sir James Jeans's view is the present necessity, with which he fully deals in the address, for treating the electron sometimes as a particle, sometimes as a set of waves. But what does this indicate except a defect in the contemporary mathematical theory? Observation shows that an electron has both particle and wave aspects. These seem contradictory, but cannot really be so, and experimenters have a right to demand of mathematicians that they produce an explanation which will cover both.

Sir James Jeans, then, has given no reason for doubting that mathematical physics is a convenient way of representing abstractly the measurable aspects of the world. That it does with amazing success, but only by limiting itself to that narrow field within which amazing success is possible. Sir James Jeans has given not the slightest reason for doubting the real existence of atoms and electrons. These entities are postulated by the physicist because they are the simplest way of accounting for all

the natural phenomena of which he is aware, and until some simpler theory capable of accounting for at least as many facts is produced there is no reason to treat them as fictions—mere drapings over mathematical formulæ. To suggest, as Sir James Jeans seems to do, that because scientific models useful in the past, such as billiards balls, jellies and spinning tops, have been discarded, therefore atoms and electrons are equally fictitious, is quite unwarranted. Those models were discarded because they failed to agree with new observations. Only observation can upset the belief in the real existence of atoms and electrons. Sir James Jeans at times says so much, but immediately, with what a writer in *Nature* has happily called his 'inhomogeneity of thought,' he asserts that the sole content of ascertained fact is mathematical; all else is pictorial detail.

Sir James Jeans's disbelief in the real existence of atoms, electrons and such-like objects is therefore purely an individual opinion finding no support from science itself. And since the ladder by which he hopes to make his ascent has been kicked away, there is little need to fear that he will clamber in at the window of mentalism. He asserts categorically that 'Our minds can only be acquainted with things inside themselves—never with things outside.' Sir James Jeans would find, on closer examination, that all he means is the harmless statement that our minds can only be acquainted with things as they are present to our minds; our minds cannot be acquainted with things unrepresented to them. But nothing he brings forward gives any support for his view that 'the electron exists only in our minds—what exists beyond, and where, to put the idea of an electron into our minds we do not know.' He goes on to say:

The Nature we study does not consist so much of something we perceive as of our perceptions; it is not the object of the subject-object relation, but the relation itself. There is, in fact, no clear-cut division between the subject and object; they form an indivisible whole which now becomes Nature.'

Now Sir James Jeans would be hard put to describe how the electron waves, for example, which he has already defined as 'Nature itself,' can be a relation. But, apart from questions of wording, what he says in the above paragraph may be true enough. Unfortunately for him, however, it gets no support from the new physics which he has been describing. Some form of idealism may be true, but neither the old nor the new physics is of very much help in deciding. The old and the new physics are alike consistent with idealism or realism, and the decision between the two must still be settled on general philosophical grounds. The idealist must therefore sorrowfully shake his head at Sir

James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington and say, '*Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.*'

There are many other things in Sir James Jeans's address on which the pen would love to linger. But space in reviews, unlike that of the new physics, is limited without being expansive; and it will be found that once Sir James Jeans's undue emphasis on mathematics is corrected, all else follows naturally. Only two more things are necessary. One is to recall a temperate and wise opinion on science also delivered before the British Association by another great Trinity mathematician, Sir Horace Lamb: 'Its province, as I have tried to define it, is vast, but has its limits.' The second, since the above account has necessarily been critical in tone, is to express appreciation to Sir James Jeans for one of the most thought-provoking addresses ever given before the British Association, and to beg him to continue his speculations so as one day to present them as an ordered and coherent whole which will win the approval of all thinkers.

IVOR THOMAS.

far beyond anything we can realise. This is just as well, for bats have poor powers of vision, and their senses of sound and smell are by no means good. But their sense of touch is amazing. An experiment was conducted once in which the senses of sound, smell, and sight were removed from a number of bats, which were then placed in a room across which innumerable objects had been strung. The bats flew up and down without coming into collision with anything. I have entered a disused shed in midwinter in which a large number of bats were hibernating. There was movement among them as soon as I entered. They did not see me, or hear me, or smell me. They just felt me. I think this tactile sense, far beyond human appreciation, is the most wonderful thing in Nature.

The powers of flight in birds are not so great as those in bats. This will seem, no doubt, to be an outrageous statement. I believe it to be true. Bats fly fast and can perform amazing aerial evolutions quite beyond the powers of any bird. To realise this to the full one must watch the Noctule (our largest bat) hawking moths in the company of swifts. The bat can keep up with the bird easily enough, and when it comes to a quick turn, or bank or swoop, the bat has the bird beaten hollow. Again, to see some bats turn a neat somersault in the air so as to arrive at their roosting-place head downwards is to realise what marvellous control of flight and what perfect judgment of distance these little creatures possess. There are people who maintain that bats are unable to rise from the ground. This is not so. I have watched every single one of the twelve British species—and one other, which I believe to be a separate species—rise from the ground without effort. The Pipistrelle and the Long-eared bat do so regularly. Two vigorous flaps are all that is needed to put a bat into flight from perfectly level ground.

One other thing seems to need explanation—the horror with which bats are regarded by all women and most men. There is a belief that bats like long hair and make a point of getting tangled up in it. How often do you hear women say 'If it should get into my hair'! Once in, apparently, the hair would have to be removed before the bat could be got rid of. This I can well believe, for bats are extraordinarily tenacious of grip. But I cannot believe that a bat ever gets caught up in anyone's hair. Its wonderful sense of touch would prevent any such occurrence. And bats are not by nature malicious creatures. Why men should have such a loathing for a quite harmless and very tiny creature is beyond my comprehension. It must, however, be admitted that bats have an unpleasant smell—some a very unpleasant one, indeed—and a bats' dormitory is a thing to make the sensitive shudder. Bats also have a large number of parasites

—so, incidentally, have all mammals—but they are not horrible. It is time that these senseless inhibitions were killed and the bat recognised for what it is—one of the most wonderful creatures in the world.

It may perhaps be convenient to enumerate here shortly each of our twelve different species of bats. First in the order of size comes the Noctule. The wing span is but little short of 15 inches, and I believe that careful investigation would show many specimens of considerably greater span. The body measures some 5 inches—no more—from tip of nose to end of tail. The fur, which is thick, as it is in all our bats, is reddish-brown with the under parts rather lighter. The ears are short and not very wide apart. Some authorities say that this bat is not nocturnal, but flies only from dusk to dark. My own experience is that it is on the wing throughout the night on such nights as are warm and fairly light; particularly have I found it so during June. On the other nights it flies from dusk to dark and again just before dawn. The normal period of activity is from the end of April until the middle of October. It roosts in hollow trees, under roofs, old farm implements, thatch of haystacks, and is not hard to find. Hibernation is passed in colonies, and the sexes hibernate separately. There appear to be more males than females. This bat has a most offensive smell, but in point of cleanliness it easily outdoes all other bats. The fur is always in beautiful condition, but the smell from the roosting-places is most disagreeable, and, where a great number have gathered together, almost insupportable. The Noctule is a great aerial acrobat, but not, I think, the best. It is particularly fond of cockchafer beetles, and I have seen one hunting them over a tarmac road and between cottages.

The other British member of the same genus is Leister's bat. This resembles the Noctule, but is slightly smaller. The fur is dark chestnut in colour, and the under parts are greyish or greyish-brown. There is also a fringe of hair growing along the underside of the forearm, and because of this the bat is sometimes called the 'hairy-armed' bat. Like the Noctule, this bat as a rule flies high, but its flight is slower and more zig-zag. It is, indeed, the easiest of our bats to recognise on the wing. I have never seen this bat at night. It flies from dusk to dark and again just before dawn. The usual period of activity is from the end of April until the end of September. It roosts in holes in trees and in cavities in old buildings—usually high up. Hibernation is most frequently solitary, but I have found it in company with the Noctule and also with others of its own kind. The smell is not so offensive as that of its larger relative. While it is by no means common, and is certainly not nearly so common as the Noctule, it may be found if looked for, and I have handled quite a number.

Following the Noctule in point of size is the Serotine, which is very easily confused with our largest bat. Indeed, I feel certain that I have frequently confused the two when in flight, though the Serotine does not frequent the heights favoured by the Noctule. In the hand the two are easily separated. The fur of the Serotine is darker, a very dark brown, and the ears are a different shape: the face is somewhat swollen, with little hair, but a distinct moustache on the upper lip, and the skin is altogether darker. In flight I think it may be distinguished because it is slower and more powerful, but I should hesitate to pronounce on it with any certainty, although I can easily recognise the Noctule. The Serotine has, in comparison with its body, the largest wing span of any British bat, measuring some $14\frac{1}{2}$ inches from tip to tip, whereas the head and body total some 3 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches. It, too, is an aerial acrobat. The period of activity is from May to September, but the Serotine hates cold or windy weather, and will not leave its roosting-place unless conditions are absolutely favourable. It rests and hibernates in the hollows of trees, though I have also found it below the thatch of haystacks, and it is not, in my opinion (contrary, I believe, to the general opinion), a sociable species. I have found more males than females.

Of the same family is the Pipistrelle, or common bat. In contrast to the Serotine, this is the smallest of our bats, and has some claim to being the smallest British mammal. The Pipistrelle may be seen everywhere, even in the streets of large cities, but in certain parts of Hampshire at least it has no claim to be considered the most common. In spite of its small size, the Pipistrelle is very sturdily built, and, though the head and body measure no more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches, the wing span is over 8 inches. The fur, which is silky in texture, is a reddish-brown in colour on the upper parts, very much paler below; while the ears and wings are blackish. It is very active, flying all through the night, and frequently by day. It ceases hibernation in March and returns to it in October or November; but any warm day in winter will bring it out again. Last winter it might be seen almost daily flying over a farmyard in my neighbourhood. It is by no means particular as to where it roosts, or as to its personal cleanliness. I have found it in almost every conceivable situation, and I have yet to find a clean one. The smell is pronounced, but by no means as unpleasant as that of the Noctule. The Pipistrelle is sociable and hibernates in colonies, whether of its own kin or any other. I find females outnumber males.

The genus *Myotis* predominates among British bats, having four members represented. Of these the Whiskered bat is the most common—at least, in this part of the country. It is slightly

larger than the Pipistrelle, has long silky fur, sandy brown above, light grey below, and on the face several long hairs. In flight it resembles the Pipistrelle; but whereas the latter is noisy, I have never yet heard the former utter a sound. This bat shows a marked preference for the neighbourhood of water, skimming low over the surface, and I have never found it far from woodland. It roosts in the daytime in hollow trees, but may also be found clinging to the bark and to the lower side of thick branches. The period of activity is from the middle of April to the end of September, and the species is a very close hibernator. As a rule it hibernates singly, but I have found a colony of twenty in the hollow trunk of an old oak. In this case the sexes were together, and there were fourteen males. Also noticeable for its liking for water is Daubenton's, or the water, bat. This, too, is not a large bat, but may be easily distinguished from the Whiskered bat by the fact that below it is dirty white in colour. The flight, too, is distinctive, being a flutter with frequent periods of gliding, and there are few acrobatics. The upper fur is very thick and reddish and the wing span about 10 inches. The animal is never to be found far from water, over which it spends most of its time, and the period of activity, which begins in early May, continuing until September, is not confined solely to dusk and dawn. The bat may be seen on the wing at all hours of the night, and frequently during the day. Roosting anywhere in the daytime, it hibernates in colonies under the eaves of old buildings and in crevices, and males seem to predominate. The smell is unpleasant.

The largest of the genus *Myotis* is Natterer's bat. This may be distinguished by its lazy flight and white under parts. The whole body is much lighter than is usual in bats. The wing span is 11 to 12 inches, and the wings are very broad, giving the creature a 'cobby' appearance. In flight it is noisy—even more so than the Pipistrelle—and squeaks continually. It has a preference for woods and the vicinity of water. This bat is the rarest in Hampshire—at least, in my own experience; and, though it is said to be most sociable, I have found only eight all told, and these were roosting singly. There were six females and two males, but, as the species is said to be very local, it may be that the ground I have covered is not favoured by them. There is not so much smell as in the other species I have handled.

The last of the genus *Myotis* included in the list of British bats is Bechstein's bat. This is said to be the rarest of our bats, but I must say that I have not found it so. In a wood some two miles north of my cottage it may be seen regularly late in the evening. I have found twelve (the sexes evenly divided), and I would expect to find it far more common than is generally supposed were

sufficient trouble taken to search for it. The fur is thick and woolly—grey above and buff beneath. The bat flies very low and is silent. It has no liking for buildings, and roosts in trees. I have never found it hibernating, nor have I seen it on the wing before June.

The Barbastelle appears to have defeated the scientists, who can give it no better name than *Barbastella Barbastellus*, which seems to indicate a lack of imagination. The fur is a very dark brown, though some of the hairs seem to have a pinkish tinge. The wing expanse is about 10 inches, and the body slender. This bat is solitary in its flight, which is high, and appears to be silent. I have found one colony of twenty-seven individuals under the thatch of a disused barn. Those that I examined were all females and very filthy. The period of activity seems to be April to September. I have not found this bat hibernating.

The Long-eared bat has, like the former species, the ears joined. But, since the ears are very much broader and longer, confusion with the Barbastelle is impossible. The fur is soft and long—brown above and yellow below. The wing span is about 10 inches, but the wings are broad. Flight is begun about sunset and continues through the night. I have often found this bat on the ground—even roosting at midday beneath a discarded plough—and it has no difficulty in rising. Hibernation is passed beneath the eaves of old buildings, sometimes alone, but more usually in company, and occasionally in company with the Pipistrelle. The sexes appear to be evenly divided.

The ten species briefly mentioned above belong to the sub-order *Vespertilionidæ*. The two remaining British bats belong to the sub-order *Rhinolophidæ*, or 'leaf-nosed' bats. The important characteristic of this sub-order is the presence of a curious leaf-like process about the nose. The Greater Horseshoe bat is, as its name implies, the larger of the two species represented in Britain. The wing span is more than 13 inches. The animal is a very light hibernator and is quick to detect intrusion. It is then difficult to handle. Old buildings provide it with hibernation quarters; but I am told that it prefers caves, and perhaps it is the lack of caves in this district that makes this bat an uncommon sight. One deserted building near here has a small colony. The sexes hibernate in separate colonies, and appear to be evenly distributed. The general colour is grey tinged with red; the under parts are grey. Flight takes place late in the evening, the bats in this neighbourhood flying round and round trees. The Lesser Horseshoe bat is in no danger of confusion with its larger relative. The wing span is about 8 inches. The colour is rather darker than that of the Greater Horseshoe, being brown above and yellowish below. Habits are similar, but the Lesser Horseshoe appears to be more

common in this particular neighbourhood, and is not, perhaps, quite so particular about its hibernation quarters.

The twelve bats mentioned above are accepted as British. Five other species are, I believe, mentioned as being found occasionally in England, but I know none of them. I have, however, on three occasions come across another bat, which I do not believe to belong to any of our normal residents. This bat is large, having a wing span of about 14 inches, and has a distinctive colouring. The fur, which is thick and rather more wiry than usual, is dark brown above, speckled freely with yellow, and the under parts are a dirty white. In general appearance this bat resembles the Serotine, though the face has not the same swollen appearance and there is no absence of hair, so that at first I thought I had found a variation. But I have found three, and I think it improbable that there would be three variations conforming exactly to one type. I make this suggestion with great diffidence, since I have no specimen to produce for scientific inspection. I am not a scientist, nor a collector: I have no wish either to amass scientific data or a collection of specimens. Moreover, I could not kill anything, even in the cause of science.

I believe that I have found a thirteenth British bat. I would go further than that. I believe that the list of British bats would be considerably enlarged were as much trouble taken over them as over birds. We are told—with, I believe, no truth at all—that bats do not migrate. Birds and butterflies, creatures of very limited powers, migrate, so why should we deny such ability to bats, whose powers of flight are well developed? It is my belief that Bechstein's bat is a migrant, and I would not be surprised to find that all our bats, and such others as are not admittedly British, are regular migrants—at least, in some proportion.

Bats have one—or at the most two young, and then but rarely. The babies are born blind and almost naked, and at once cling to their mother's fur with their claws, and to her nipple with their teeth. Birth in all British bats occurs in June or July. Nursing mothers seem to form separate colonies. The young bat grows very rapidly and is soon fully clothed. After about a fortnight it is able to leave its mother, but it does not seem to be quite independent for about two months. Coition takes place at any time after the beginning of May, and while night is no doubt the more usual time, the hours of light are not ignored. There appears to be no courtship or display, and I have seen one female visited in turn by four males. I have no knowledge of the period of gestation.

Bats are quite easy to find. There is no need to climb perilously to roof edges nor to scale steeples. Hibernation, it is true, favours such resorts, but during the period of activity almost

any sheltered spot, where interruption is unlikely, may lead to the discovery of bats. I have found them in haystacks, barns, cowsheds, pigstyes, and hollow trees; behind water-tubs, pipes, and old sacks; under ploughs, carts, and fallen trees; behind shutters and in small crevices in walls; indeed, anywhere. During hibernation they are easy to handle, for, though they are not unaware of one's presence, they are very sluggish. While resting in the daytime during the summer months they are not so easy of approach; but approach and capture is by no means impossible, and bats, like all other animals, soon get used to your presence if your methods are slow and quiet. When handled most species squeak, and all try to bite. On the wing they are impossible to catch. So wonderful is the sense of touch—or rather, awareness—that the most skilful handling of any contrivance, such as a net (I admit I have not tried), would be futile. No doubt it would be possible to shoot them, though very difficult. I have not tried. I have no gun, and if I had I would not want to take the life of a harmless and very useful creature. Useful they certainly are. Bats are voracious feeders. They fill themselves to overflowing, and their diet comprises moths, insects, beetles, and all the innumerable little winged creatures that make our hot nights a torment, and no doubt damage our crops. It has been calculated that a single bat will devour 250 mosquitoes in a night. Truly a benefactor!

Two other points seem to me to be of interest. Sight in bats is poor, but the sense of hearing is in some ways acute. Low sounds, or loud sounds of a deep nature, have no effect on them, but any high-pitched sound startles them into instant action. A shrill whistle will frighten every bat within hearing. The other point concerns Daubenton's bat. I have been told, and I have read, that this bat drinks on the wing by dipping its mouth into water. All bats eat on the wing: I have no proof that any drink in that manner, and I fear it is beyond my belief. Daubenton's bat certainly dips into the water, but not to drink. The bat is collecting surface insects. The same theory—drinking on the wing—is applied to swallows, and is, I believe, equally fallacious. Swallows drink normally, in the same manner as other birds, and when they dip over water they are picking up surface insects.

Only a short while ago we knew nothing about the life-histories of our bats. We now know something. There is room for any amount of knowledge yet, and every novice—I am no more—can perhaps add something to our store.

BRIAN VESEY-FITZGERALD.

THE PROMENADE CONCERTS AND PUBLIC TASTE

SEVEN years ago Sir Henry Wood made this public statement:

With the whole-hearted support of the wonderful medium of broadcasting I feel that I am at last on the threshold of realising my life-long ambition of truly democratising the message of music and making its beneficent effect universal. . . . I am quite convinced that not only in music, but generally, the medium of broadcasting, as utilised and developed in this country, is one of the few elements ordinarily associated with the progress of civilisation which I can heartily endorse.

At that time many of us shared Sir Henry's optimism. Even those who did not believe that music's message could ever be 'truly' democratised were ready to regard the alliance of the 'Proms.' and broadcasting as an encouragement. When the B.B.C. first undertook the management of these concerts, public support made three things clear: first, that broadcast music was welcome; second, that good, average orchestral playing always found an audience in London; third, that Sir Henry Wood remained one of the most influential personalities in our world of music. The season which is now ending has discovered no great change in these matters. The first night is still the outstanding event of the ordinary music-lover's calendar. The familiar ritual was carried out with as much spontaneity as if this had been the opening of the tenth instead of the fortieth season. This unique institution is now forty years old, and throughout that time Sir Henry Wood has been the very life of it. After nearly half a century this is still peculiarly his public. The B.B.C. was as wise in recognising that fact as he was in acknowledging the power radio could bring to his arm. Hardly another conductor in this country could carry out eight weeks of nightly and abnormally long programmes (and rehearsals) with so broad a sympathy for all schools, periods and styles, and maintaining so even a level of performance.

There are those who hold that the ever-ready enthusiasm of this public is a manifestation of summer-time high spirits accentuated by the presence of holiday-makers from the provinces. 'Where do the promenaders go in the winter?' they ask, con-

fidant that no answer will be forthcoming. It is true that the concerts of the normal London season receive little support from these zealots. Nor will they, so long as managements refuse to put the cheapest tickets within their reach. But that their zeal is not dependent upon the temperate air of summer and early autumn evenings was revealed at the end of 1932, when the B.B.C. began a new series of Winter Promenade Concerts. They were there again, those loyal ones, filling all available space on the ground floor, so that promenading was out of the question. Incidentally, these 'Winter Proms.,' which were dropped last year, will be revived on December 31.

It is the informality of these occasions that appeals to so many people. Not only do they find the average concert too expensive but also too formal and oppressive in atmosphere. At the 'Proms.' they can listen to music in an unbuttoned mood. They represent all sorts and conditions and callings, from pioneers of dress reform who have come on from a Chinese restaurant, to dusty hikers who call in on their way home from a ramble; from the self-conscious young man who follows a Brandenburg concerto with a miniature score, to the girl who follows it with a large ice-cream soda. Most of them belong to that group which, perhaps a little condescendingly, we have agreed to call ordinary listeners. Their numbers have been increased beyond calculation since the development of broadcasting. To such the Promenade season is an inestimable benefit. At what other time of year does a week of music-making provide such rich opportunity to those who are beginning to find in music a way of escape from present discontents? During any of the last few weeks, for example, they have been able to strengthen the foundations of experience by listening to generous stretches of Beethoven, Wagner, Bach (or Brahms, who has become his alternative), Haydn and Mozart, and at the same time to test the superstructure of more recent years, sometimes with confidence, thanks to the comforting counsels of the professional Masters of Appreciation, always with curiosity. The 'Proms.,' indeed, can be said to be helping thousands of average people to make themselves at home with music.

In his light way Jean Cocteau once said that music is designed for a variety of functions; not always is it a tight-rope, not always a race-horse; sometimes it is a chair. To that we may add that many people expect to find that music is a sanctuary, a safe retreat. In some instances that is a necessary stage before it can become an adventure. Then follows the stage of forming taste, of asserting predilection, which to some extent is a factor in the creation of vogues. The Bach, Beethoven, Wagner, and, more recently, the Brahms vogues have been the most constant

features of the 'Proms.' of late years. This year the enthusiasm of audiences and (as I understand from the B.B.C.) the box-office receipts show no waning of any of the fashions. This is not to say that the same audiences have been supporting the one-composer nights for seven or eight years. If there were a way of registering those assemblies, it would probably be discovered that many of the early enthusiasts have since acquired discrimination with experience, while their places have been filled by recruits no less raw and eager than they themselves were at the outset. Doubtless, too, the audiences for the various composers have interchanged in some measure. It is not unlikely that some who began with Beethoven have discovered a continuity in Sibelius, and so made possible the recent Sibelius night; and not improbable that the Brahms supporters have been drawn in part from those who have had a surfeit of Bach; and almost certain that many who have a nose for first performances have, at an earlier time, indulged too freely in Wagnerian orgy.

Saturday night audiences I am inclined to rate as the least musical of all, and, according to information from the B.B.C., they have never been larger than this year. (This, I think, must be an aggregate estimate, for on some of these occasions I have seen the hall but three-quarters full.) How unformed judgment and taste are on popular nights can be observed in the applause which breaks like a stormy sea alike for *The Planets* or *Largo al factotum*, for *Tapiola* or *Bolero*, for *Hary Janos* or *The Three Bears*. And I suspect that, with the promenaders at least, *The Rosary* and *Down the Vale* would be no less evocative. Popular programmes, it is true, represent a state of grace compared with those of twenty years ago. But the fundamental principle is the same: the average member of the audience is regarded as being constitutionally incapable of giving his mind to anything for more than two minutes at a time. So it comes about that certain types of composition are labelled as 'light' (as if music could be referred to *avoirdufois*), and we are given, in the name of programmes, those miscellanies of music in which the worth (if any there be) of one item is cancelled out by the next. Here are a need and an opportunity for improvement.

Since one possibility of improvement has been pointed out, the opportunity of indicating others suggests itself here. Except for the Delius commemoration and the Vaughan Williams concert, the policy of segregating British music has been wisely dropped. That such obvious special pleading can only damage the cause was made evident by the B.B.C.'s Festival of British Music at the beginning of the year. And the same criticism applies to the Liszt programme of September 20, which was a far too premature attempt to bring public opinion into line with literary fashion.

A full appreciation of the distinctive qualities of the *Faust Symphony* can only be obtained by setting it in a programme of sharp contrast. As for the novelties of the season, instead of a policy of well-planned adventure they have revealed only an unintelligible wish to give a few stray minor composers a hearing. Lastly, the almost total neglect of Schubert and Schumann is hard to understand in a sequence of forty-nine concerts.

Whether the present length and plan of a promenade concert will continue in favour may be questioned. Both have been handed down from the old, leisurely days when Sir Henry Wood and Mr. Robert Newman arranged an annual season of sixty-one programmes and held a licence for the retailing of ballads. Now that the ballad—that particular type, at least—is dead, there is really no reason for the arrangement which allots ninety minutes to the first part of a concert and half an hour or so to the second, and every reason for the adoption of the plan followed in American cities—namely, one hour for the first part, an interval of fifteen minutes, and three-quarters of an hour for the second part. Moreover, a public consisting largely of ordinary listeners must be even more carefully nursed than that of the normal concert season. If music is still to be the food of love and of action, of temporal accomplishment and spiritual attainment, of the business man and the poet, if, in brief, Sir Henry Wood's ideal is to be reached, diet must be more closely studied in arranging the 'Proms.' of the future.

The same disregard of human powers of assimilation is apparent in the programmes of the more important music festivals in the provinces. Where these events are triennial, as at Leeds and Norwich, there is perhaps excuse for making the festival a feast. Even so, the art of creating and satisfying appetite, especially by providing contrast and by carefully timing the length of each session, is singularly neglected. To listen with benefit to music morning, afternoon and evening for four or five consecutive days is hardly less arduous than to perform it. Yet, in the building of these festival programmes, it is rare to find that the audience has been considered any more than the chorus and orchestra. Perhaps those who are responsible for the 1936 schedule of the revived Norfolk and Norwich Festival will at least take care that both listeners and performers are fresh and alert for any first performance or comparatively new experience in music. The unfortunate production of Vaughan Williams' *Job* at the end of a very long morning at the last Norwich Festival should be a warning to those who conceive a programme in terms of length rather than intensity, of minutes rather than moments. At the recent Three Choirs' Festival at Gloucester one of the programmes was so long and ill-assorted that the conductor,

apprehensive of boredom, suggested to the audience that the last item should be omitted. It is true that he was not allowed to have his way, but to quote that as evidence of a provincial audience's receptive powers is a misunderstanding. No average music-lover, having bought a ticket and having had the programme set before his eyes, would consent to any last-minute curtailment of the bargain he has made. If the performers find themselves losing interest before the bargain has been carried out, what is that to him? He would rather hear the programme finished half-heartedly than abbreviated. Half a loaf is better than none. It is, of course, where listening to music is concerned, a false argument; but the public is not to blame for accepting it as true. Concert and festival committees in this country encourage the notion that, given a certain level standard, a long programme is value for money. They have not realised—and this is strange—that it would be to their own advantage to emphasise how rapid is the decline in a concert's value after saturation-point in an audience has been reached.

These instances in festival programmes have been cited here because the promenade concerts undoubtedly are watched by committees in the provinces and often give a lead in this or that direction. It is to be hoped that in future years the lead will be towards shorter, more shapely, and better balanced programmes. The art of programme-building, with a few exceptions, is neglected by concert societies in this country. As the most important of all our concert-giving organisations, the B.B.C. has a unique opportunity of calling attention to this neglect—by example, certainly, and perhaps by instruction too. Yet among the programmes announced for the B.B.C. Symphony Concerts of the coming season there are but few where the opportunity has been taken.

What are the general principles underlying the construction of a satisfactory programme? Allowing the widest possible margin, let us suggest some answers to that question and apply them to a few of the forthcoming Symphony Concerts, and also to some of the recent 'Proms.' In the first place, at this stage of its development, dullness in a public concert is the unforgivable sin; and that, as we have a right to expect, has been successfully avoided in the new series. Secondly, a programme which has obviously been drawn up to educate the public may be very far from being dull in itself and still suggest the prospect of heavy-going. The programme which promises first performances in England of works by Malipiero and Alban Berg (March 20, 1935) has all the air of earnest education. The public must at all costs be kept aware of the various tastes in European music, and so, with a Mozart concerto to sweeten it, a large dose is administered in a single pill. The misunderstanding of an English audience

which this concert reveals is made more serious by the faulty tactics of introducing an unknown opera (it is Berg's *Lulu*) by means of concert-hall excerpts. *Wozzeck* was similarly introduced here, but, for all the public's seeming enthusiasm, the procedure was plainly a case of putting the cart before the horse. The educating mind is again at work behind the all-Stravinsky concert which has been arranged for November 28, although, it must be confessed, this composer has been enough of a chameleon to provide material, at least on paper, for a dozen presentable programmes. Clearly, the opening concert of the series, which will be a performance of Delius's *Eine Messe des Lebens*, is saved from the charge of being 'educating,' by the spirit of homage which is its motive. Yet that same spirit did not prevent the Delius night at the 'Proms.' from falling into the pit of monotony. The very beauty of his music makes an entire programme almost unthinkable, except when the excuse is to give a single full-scale work. At that promenade concert the *Idyll* coming after the *Concerto for Violin and Violoncello* was unbearably poignant and overpowering, especially with such singers as Miss Dora Labbette and Mr. Roy Henderson in the one and such players as Miss May and Miss Beatrice Harrison in the other.

Thirdly, the peculiar problem of contriving contrast in a programme must always be carefully considered. The handling of this difficulty, more than anything else, distinguishes between good and bad programme-making. Nothing resembling a rule can be set down. The most that can be said is that, for a true musician, one style of composition can clash with another with the same effect of ghastliness that clashing colours can produce. The programme arranged for April 10, 1935, has for its central point of interest a new symphony by Vaughan Williams. We have yet to learn what the music will be, but surely we know enough of this composer to sense what a clash the Overture to *Tannhäuser* would make with any symphony of his. This is the work, however, which has been chosen as one of the items for that important concert. Because it illustrates another common error in building up an evening's experience of music, the whole programme is given here as it has been announced: R. Vaughan Williams, *New Symphony*; Mozart, *Concerto in A for Pianoforte and Orchestra*; Elgar, *Symphonic Study, Falstaff*; Wagner, Overture to *Tannhäuser*. The failing here is the erratic jerking from period to period and from style to style. Strict chronology in a concert is by no means always, is, indeed, rarely desirable. The Master of Appreciation is at once suspected of having his pointing finger in the pie, and, however welcome he may be to those who habitually listen to music by wireless, he must never be allowed to invade the concert-hall. Even so, an evening of

seventeenth-century music rigidly ordered according to date of composition (such as I heard Stokowski give at Philadelphia not long ago) is preferable to an evening of kaleidoscopic impressions. The symphonic thought of Vaughan Williams and Elgar form an admirable and enlightening contrast which could be at once heightened and, from one aspect at least, made logical by bringing Purcell into their company. But *Tannhäuser*! As well include *William Tell* or *Poet and Peasant*! Another example of contrast so violent as to defeat its ends was encountered at the 'Prom.' of September 13, when the effect of Sinigaglia's light and graceful *Rondo for Violin and Orchestra* was neutralised by Honegger's *Pacific 231* which followed. Equally unhappy was the insertion on the following evening of Schönberg's *Five Orchestral Pieces* into a Beethoven programme. As a salute to our contemporary on his sixtieth birthday it was an uncommonly clumsy gesture. Incidentally, Sinigaglia's *Rondo* was being given for the first time in England, and, like some other first performances this season, it was relegated to the second half of the concert. These works were not heard by the radio public—the concerts are broadcast only up to the interval—and, in the Queen's Hall, were heard by an audience of ordinary capacity which had already received the full experience of a normal concert. These and other incidents leave the impression that to the programme-makers the fetish of 'first performance' is more important than finding ways of putting the audience on good terms with the programme.

The more technical ways of obtaining contrast—variety of tone-colour, of form, of mood, of tonality (how well I remember the nightmare of a pianoforte recital entirely in C sharp minor!)—are outside the present purpose of this article. All these factors, however, must be taken into consideration before an average audience can enjoy the experience of good reception. Another factor is physical comfort. With the exception of a few ascetics and inverted snobs, the promenaders would be happier, and better listeners too, if they were not compelled to accept the conditions of a swarming bank holiday. In this matter, especially, reform is urgently needed. No one who cares for the future of music in this country will deny the importance of the new public which broadcasting has brought into the concert-halls and its representation at the Promenade Concerts. Sir Henry Wood's ambition is no less than to make the beneficent effect of music universal. Proclaimed by one who has done so much towards its realisation, that ambition does not appear fanciful. But much more remains to be done, and its successful accomplishment will depend upon the more progressive, enlightened and, above all, the larger-minded co-operation of Broadcasting House.

BASIL MAINE.

ENGLISH POETRY SINCE BROOKE

A MOVEMENT in poetry lasts as a rule anything from fifteen to thirty years. Of these, the first are years of revolution, chaos, and wild experiment. Then the wave sweeps to a peak, and the genius or the greatest talents of the movement do their best work. After that, the movement declines. It becomes conventional and respectable, till it in turn is rebelled against by a new movement. That the faltering course of English poetry from 1914 to 1930 has followed no such definite lines is due to the war. Besides taking toll of actual poets, such as Owen, Sorley, Mackintosh, and of heaven knows how many potential poets, it laid its mark heavily upon those whom it left alive. The natural lyric impulse of youth was dammed up, or distorted into the channels of satire or prose. The war may have made an Owen, but we might as well argue that it marred a Sassoon. Brooke was almost the only poet to react in the traditional way, with results that have made it difficult to estimate his real significance.

In spite of the title of this short survey, a few words about Brooke will not be out of place. The war poems and the circumstances of his death combined to give him an extraordinary fame with people who as a rule read no poetry. His name in consequence became a battle-cry, and the young poets were led automatically to decry him as a kind of poetic best-seller, in the tradition of Tennyson. Yet in actual fact Brooke was a pioneer, without whom much of the freedom enjoyed by modern poets would have been impossible. He once observed acutely that the importance of Browning to English poetry was that he made colloquialism respectable. Brooke's importance was that he carried on, in his different idiom, the same good work.

And I shall find some girl perhaps,
And a better one than you,
With eyes as wise, but kindlier,
And lips as soft, but true,
And I daresay she will do.

This struck a new note. Its debt to Housman may be guessed, but it has a shirt-sleeved, open-at-the-neck quality which was

entirely missing from the poetry of the time. Brooke was a ready experimenter, and many a subsequent poet who contemns him is profiting by freedom borrowed from an unsuspected creditor.

At Brooke's death there is no doubt what poetic party was uppermost. Since the first of Edward Marsh's anthologies, the Georgians had been the fashion. The term Georgian is vague, and it may seem meaningless to use one label for a group of poets so dissimilar; Ralph Hodgson and W. H. Davies would upset any collective apple-cart. Yet the phrase 'Georgian poetry' does mean something, and, when the necessary exceptions have been made, the poets gathered under this somewhat refined banner shared certain qualities. Their verse had at its worst a gentlemanly quality. It expressed the entirely praiseworthy reactions of the cultured and sensitive man of letters. It was soothing, reassuring. Its outbursts of indignation were directed against precisely the right objects, and were timed for precisely the right moment. The verses were neat, and expressed with many a pretty turn of fancy. The ordinary things of life were observed anew, and celebrated with a somewhat finical vocabulary. Above all, the Georgians discovered the English countryside. In this they probably took the lead from a genuine and highly original poet, Edward Thomas. At any rate, they set out, an orderly band, by footpath and spinney, and occasionally even ventured a few yards by themselves into the thickets. A robust little journal, the *Countryman*, edited and published in the heart of Oxfordshire, includes among its list of editorial requirements the warning 'Townee sentimentalising about the country barred.' This blunt phrase could have been inspired by an experience of Georgian Nature poetry. Though the Georgians numbered among them at least one genuine Nature poet, a great deal of their verse is of the

Oh to be in Mympington
Where maids are brown as beer

order—the fancy-bred rhapsodies of gentlemen who would be exceedingly ill at ease in Mympington or any other rustic spot for longer than a week-end in summer, with a car to run them safely back to asphalt and to indoor sanitation. Such sap as flowed in Georgian poetry was failing by the death of Brooke; but, since dissatisfaction with the Georgians provoked the Sitwells, the sceptical school of Eliot, and the real revolt that has just begun, the movement kept its importance, even in decline.

The central figure of the party was probably Walter de la Mare. De la Mare is a scholarly and cultured poet with an astonishing streak of imagination. In his early work he retreated from the

harshness of contemporary life to a simple vocabulary and an awareness, sharp as a child's, of a dream world. This worked well while his imagination was content with it; but the imagination was powerful. It had a macabre quality, and soon de la Mare had recourse to prose in order to satisfy it. Its sinister discoveries would have burst the bottom out of those delicate verses, would have convulsed and agonised the light, supple muscles of that vocabulary. To keep his poetry exquisite, he had, unconsciously, to exclude from it the full force of his imagination. The result has been disharmony, and, latterly, silence.

This is a cursory and probably an unfair account of a fine poet, but it suggests a certain unsoundness in the Georgian attitude; a suggestion which finds support from the even longer silence of another Georgian poet, Ralph Hodgson. Hodgson is a poet of the utmost integrity, with a streak of real genius, but the sympathetic reader will suspect that often he is working at cross purposes with his muse. The disharmony, in his case also, seems to lie between imagination and vocabulary. He is a baffling poet, and should be the subject of a long study. His first book, *The Last Blackbird*, showed originality and excited interest, but it was the *Poems*, published in 1920, which won him immediate fame, and still keep their hold upon the market. This was one of the most striking single volumes of the century. The poems offer difficulties to the critic, because the weakness of one is the strength of another. A too arbitrary vocabulary which spoils one poem will be the very essence of the next, and give it its power. Hodgson's difficulty has been that humanitarianism and an intense love of animals is not easy to express in poetry, and that for the later ferocity and directness of his mind his verse technique has proved an inadequate vehicle. Yeats bridged the gap between youth and age, and made a new sinewy verse to express his mind's current. If Hodgson has made the attempt, we have as yet no evidence of it.

The third poet of simple vocabulary, W. H. Davies, is in a different case. His technique, modelled on the Caroline poets, remains adequate because of the innocence and simplicity of his vision. Now and then, in his later work, he gets out of his depth; but as a rule he persuades us easily that what he records is what he has seen, and that there has been no leakage or overflow. Each of these poets has a streak of genius—Hodgson's possibly being the strongest—and no movement to which they belong could be negligible. There were other genuine poets among the Georgians. To mention one makes the omission of the rest unfair. Since, however, unfairness cannot be avoided in any brief survey, mention must be made of the sombre and self-controlled talent of Harold Monro, whose Poetry Bookshop did

so much for poetry in England, and of the North Country poems of Wilfrid Wilson Gibson.

The first revolt against the Georgian ascendancy was made by the three Sitwells—Edith, Osbert, and Sacheverell. *Sitwellism*, to use a term more often in the mouths of enemies than of friends, infused into English poetry a welcome draught of freshness and courage. The attacks upon it were very much like those which are made upon birds of bright and unfamiliar plumage when they are unfortunate enough to get loose in the countryside. Such attacks made *Sitwellism* into a militant creed, and as such it had its extravagances and its absurdities; but its courage was as undeniable as its vigour, it was fresh and young, and it produced some lovely work. In so far as it has a common character (for Osbert was a satirist), it was concerned with the refining of sensation, and the loosening up of vocabulary by an interchange of sense images. Often a lyric ingenuousness swept aside the poets' own theories, and kept them from becoming pedantic. It had more immediate affinities with music than with any other branch of contemporary art, and to both poetry and criticism it brought a happy impertinence which was soon seen to rest on common sense. Edith Sitwell will always have an honourable place in the history of English criticism, if only for tirelessly pointing out that the inability of the man in the street to comprehend new poetry might after all give us information about nothing but the man in the street. From the first Sitwellism was abhorrent to the reigning school, and a strong feud developed between it and the *London Mercury*, which had become the reigning school's chief organ. The warfare continued in a desultory manner for several years, all the challenges coming from the one side, while the *Mercury* pursued its dignified path unperturbed.

Once the war was over, there was something of a boom in English poetry. Hitherto, Cambridge had been the nest of singing birds, but now, by way of compensation, there gathered together at Oxford a remarkable collection of new poets. Almost all of them had seen service in the war, and were therefore older than the normal undergraduate. Of these, Robert Graves had without doubt the greatest allowance of raw genius. A highly original writer, owing nothing to his contemporaries and immediate forbears (the gospel of all these poets was *A Shropshire Lad*, but they were too conscious of it directly to show its influence), Graves particularly admired the harsh and ingenious Skelton, whose lessons he adapted with great skill to the time. A series of books, each stronger and surer than the last, put him in a commanding position. Then he turned philosophical, lost something of the directness of his utterance, and with it his hold upon the public attention. A recent volume shows, if anything, increased power,

and suggests that he is secure from contemporary attention or inattention. Robert Nichols, another war poet, worked upon more traditional lines, and at first seemed likely to add a new note to the iambic line. His best work has an Elizabethan quality; but latterly he has turned away from poetry. A third, Edmund Blunden, takes his place at once in the great pastoral tradition of English poetry. He collaborated early in an edition of Clare, whose simple and direct outlook upon Nature his own, though more intellectual, follows. Blunden and another poet, V. Sackville West, between them rescued English Nature poetry from the Georgians, and restored it to its place. It had already been strengthened by a long poem, Masefield's *Reynard the Fox*, which proved that it was still possible for a man of vision to see Chaucer's England. This poem definitely earned Masefield the laureateship, and will justify him, whatever else he may write or leave unwritten.

These poets all write of what they know. I have heard farmers discussing Miss Sackville West's long poem *The Land*, not as poetry, but as a manual of country matters. This in itself would be no commendation—the works of Erasmus Darwin might in their day have been so discussed for the information they conveyed; but, taken in conjunction with the fact that *The Land* was immediately acclaimed by poets, it means a great deal. No one would have discussed Georgian Nature poetry for the rustic information it conveyed. Both Blunden and Miss Sackville West are still, happily, writing. They are developing, and there is no sign that either is likely to stop. Nor are they by any means only 'Nature poets.'

Beautiful it is to see
On London Bridge the bold-eyed seabirds wheel,
And hear them cry, and all for a light-flung crust
Fling us their wealth, their freedom, speed and gleam.
And beautiful to see
Them that pass by lured by these birds to stay,
And smile and say 'how tame they are'—how tame!
Friendly as stars to steersmen in mid seas,
And as remote as midnight's darling stars,
Pleasant as voices heard from days long done,
As nigh the hand as windflowers in the woods,
And inaccessible as Dido's phantom.

This, of Blunden, is the work of a poet with more than one string to his lyre.

The greatest single influence in modern English poetry came, not from within, but from America. The appearance of *The Waste Land* was a milestone, and T. S. Eliot became the idol both of the metropolitan *intelligentsia* and of the universities. His

influence upon English poetry has been for the most part disastrous; but that was not his fault. The trouble was that it was easy to ape his methods without in the least understanding them, or entering into the spiritual pain which underlay his work. Every intelligent young man felt himself encouraged to write long semi-private poems requiring liberal annotation, to state his conflicts without resolving them, and to make a virtue of unintelligibility. Why these errors should result from Eliot's work is not apparent to anyone who reads it carefully; but it was not read carefully. Like that of Lawrence, the name of Eliot became a battle-cry, familiar and abhorrent to people who knew nothing of either except through their disciples. It has taken most of ten years for Eliot's influence to be digested and understood, and to inform a new poetry. This is not to say that there were no other distinguished sojourners in the waste land. A mood of disillusion so widespread must, by the nature of things, have had more than one exponent. But the mass of bad poetry provoked was written, as it were, in the name of Eliot, and the poets were approved only in so far as they seemed to accord with the prevailing fashion. Upon seniors *The Waste Land* produced scant effect, beyond their personal reactions to it. Many of them understood it pretty well, but their admiration was no more heeded than their detraction. Even to-day, many of Eliot's admirers cannot get it into their heads that the older generation of poets, the fifty- and sixty- and seventy-year-olds, have many of them sympathetically read and studied Eliot, and come to definite, if temperate, conclusions. His young disciples insist on believing that his work must be anathema to older poets, who could not possibly understand it. This is a remarkable error.

Eliot's influence, however, has been far from valueless. Criticism it has stimulated from the first, since he is not only a fine critic himself, but a cause of criticism in others. It will probably be held that English poetic criticism has made great strides during the past ten years; and much of this must be laid to Eliot's credit. And, now that there is a genuine new movement in English poetry, a rebellion which is not merely a knocking over of 'Aunt Sallies,' it is clear that those responsible for it could not be writing as they are if Eliot had never been. They are not in any direct sense disciples, but they have at command a poetic equipment which has assimilated Eliot. The three chief poets of the movement—W. H. Auden, Cecil Day Lewis, and Stephen Spender—produce very dissimilar work, and have little in common. Their names are bracketed, simply, as one of them has suggested, because there is so little competition. They share a nucleus of political philosophy and a dislike of the Georgians. They differ in outlook, temperament, manner, and technique.

Auden, whose first poems ran on traditional lines, is a satirist. He is immensely talented, and his work, though difficult—unnecessarily difficult—demands and rewards close study. His abilities entitle him to be allowed to know his own course best, but it is fair to say that some of his achievement hitherto is semi-private, in the sense that those who know him personally have a better chance of understanding it than those who do not. One of the most interesting figures in contemporary English literature, he has not yet found his length. In complete contrast to him is Spender, a lyric poet, perceptive, quick, emotional. Spender is at his best when strongly moved. When he thinks, he is less satisfactory. His achievement is very unequal, but he is one of those who have an immediate right to be judged by their best work; and in half a dozen poems, and isolated stanzas from other poems, Spender is very impressive indeed. His vocabulary works in more than the usual dimensions, in that it can unite physical and psychological images in a single act of perception. His swiftest images have an instant and compelling appeal to the eye and to the mind:

And left the vivid air signed with their honour.

What distinguishes him and the third poet, Cecil Day Lewis, from the poets of the Eliot school is the warmth of their response to the emotions of ordinary life. They work with the intellect, but not in terms of the intellect. This is particularly the case with Day Lewis, whose emotions, though as strong, are under firmer control than Spender's. Day Lewis began preciously, and heavily annotated an early poem. Then, with an extraordinary opening out of his powers, he took the ordinary experiences of love, of expectant and actual fatherhood, and wrought from them a poetry which, the work of Yeats excepted, blends thought and feeling more satisfactorily than anything written in recent years.

The theoretic Communism at the back of these writers (it is noteworthy, by the way, that Day Lewis is essentially a poet of the aristocratic type) is of importance only in so far as it informs their work. They and a great many other younger poets insist that, to be alive, poetry must take note of the difficulties and social chaos of the time. They incline to deride the Georgians and most modern Nature poets as refugees from reality, escapers who are dodging their responsibilities. This attitude seems, on the surface, highly questionable. First of all, it begs the question whether in contemplating Nature a man is not living as intensely as when he is contesting an election on the Socialist ticket. It also rules out the contemplative life, an exclusion which history has always shown to be disastrous. Even so, to make the theory a basis for an attack upon the poetry is a serious error. Over a

hundred years ago Coleridge was advocating a communistic theory of life as fiercely as does any modern poet. His Pantisocracy is to-day a mere memory, as are Shelley's political theories and the revolutionary ardours of the young Wordsworth: yet these things fed the minds that harboured them. That is the real point. What a poet believes is of no importance except for the result it has upon his poetry. The political theory from which a new movement in English poetry is rising may be sound or unsound, but it is in itself no ground for attacking or defending that poetry, and its final importance must lie in the work which it inspires.

Auden, Day Lewis, and Spender are all Oxford poets. At Cambridge, the tendency has been for literary energy to flow into critical channels. One poet, however, Ronald Bottrall, has attracted considerable attention. The others show more promise than achievement. It is too early yet to guess what John Lehmann will do, and we shall never, alas! be able to do more than guess what would have been done by Michael McKenna, who died in 1931. This poet, whose works are privately printed, was very unequal, but at his best seemed close to genius.

How long beholding the sweet early skies,
How long hath been thy face upturned to God,
That so blue sapphires sparkle in thine eyes
And angel's gravity hangs in thy nod?

Was it the wavelets on the eternal sea
Or the thin cloudy sails that steal the wind
Or just yon boundlessness transforméd thee,
Dawn of my night, whom I shall never find?

I saw thee once amid the mountain grass,
Once looked I in the deepness of thy dream,
But then, my dawn, there was a gulf to pass,
For thine was love, and mine did only seem.

There has been no room here in which to take account of the many poets who have been working away steadily on their own, poets who cannot be covered by the wing of any movement or school. Verse drama has been safe in the hands of T. Sturge Moore and Gordon Bottomley. Bridges went his noble way respected, achieving just before his death a great public success with his *Testament of Beauty*. Roy Campbell, the South African poet, startled attention with his *Flaming Terrapin*, which he followed up with some fierce satire. The quietist Richard Church and the bellicose Herbert Palmer went each his characteristic road.

Ireland falls outside this survey, yet cannot be left wholly outside, since for many years English poets have united in acknowledging W. B. Yeats as their leader. He commands to-day

the respect of all, old and new. Eliot has blessed him ; and he influences at three score and ten a fresh generation as powerfully as he did the young poets he met when he was young. Irish poetic history during this period has been, in brief, the rise to dominance of Yeats, and the fall to comparative silence of other poets of the Celtic revival. There have been few new figures. By the death of Brooke, O'Sullivan, Joseph Campbell, and James Cousins had mostly said their say. The serene, broad river of A. E. flowed smoothly on ; Colum's candid, innocent stream is still running ; Stephens, though he has sung magically once or twice, is latterly silent. Two younger men, Austin Clarke and F. R. Higgins, have done interesting and beautiful work. The only Irish poet caught by the intellectual school would seem to be Lyle Donaghy. The strong nationalist movement which is springing up in Scotland at present finds more expression in the novel than in verse, but it has produced at least one authentic poet, ' Hugh McDiarmid,' who writes powerfully in the vernacular.

As will be seen from this, there is little definite to report of English poetry since Brooke died. Except for the Sitwell revolt, till about 1930 it lay in a backwater. The new revolt has only just begun, but its roots lie deep, and we may prophesy with some confidence that the increased interest in the short story, and in novels of a certain type, will be paralleled by an increased poetic activity. Unless distracted by political convulsion, the next fifteen years should have a different story to tell.

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NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street,
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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCIII—NOVEMBER 1934

PARTIES IN CONFERENCE

I. CONSERVATIVES AT BRISTOL

As all horses in a race are required to carry a certain weight, so all political parties in this country are obliged to carry the electoral handicap of a party conference. Those who work in the constituencies year in and year out naturally demand an opportunity every year of expressing their views on the policy of their leaders, but just as the Labour Party Conference is eagerly awaited by Conservative propagandists, and seldom disappoints them, so it may be assumed the Conservative Conference affords invaluable material for Socialist propaganda. The meeting-place chosen has a considerable effect upon the atmosphere of a Conservative Conference ; if it is held in the North, delegates from the industrial areas are present in strength with their preoccupation with industrial and employment problems ; if it is held in the South, Imperial and defence questions loom more largely, and are approached from the ' die-hard ' angle.

This year at Bristol the agenda was headed by a resolution expressing confidence in the National Government. On a general

issue of this kind there was no division of opinion, for all Conservatives recognise the great achievements of the Government, and none says openly that he desires at once to return to party controversy. Nevertheless, the other resolutions passed by the Conference show plainly enough that among the local Conservative Associations there has been, to put it mildly, some straining at the leash. But the desire, natural enough in its way, of the keen local Conservative worker for a full-blooded 'Tory' policy could not fail to cause some misgivings in the minds of the more far-sighted delegates like Sir Edward Grigg, who realised clearly how much the success of many Conservative candidates at the next election will depend on their ability to retain the suffrages of the masses of non-Conservative voters who supported them in 1931 in all constituencies, and secured their return in many. Mere lip-service to the idea of a National Government will scarcely satisfy the quondam Liberal voter, for example, whose tender conscience must have been more than a little disturbed by some of the subsequent proceedings of the Conference. The carrying of a resolution in favour of State lotteries, for instance, was almost a frivolous and wanton affront to those who regard the task of the National Government as one of national reconstruction.

The Constitutional question, owing to the recent activities of Sir Stafford Cripps and his adherents, attracted more than the usual interest. A demand for a reform of the House of Lords is a hardy annual at Conservative Conferences, but this year the programme of the Socialist League for its abolition caused three resolutions to be put down instead of one, all pressing for an increase in the powers of the Upper House. It is clear that the party leaders are definitely unwilling to raise this matter, and the Conservative members of the House of Commons are too much divided to be anxious to deal with it; but the Annual Conference annually ignores these difficulties. It does, however, undoubtedly express the feeling of a large body of people in the country, not by any means entirely confined to members of the Conservative Party, that the Constitution now lacks ballast. The official Opposition stands for single-chamber government, and if they obtained a majority because the country was tired of the existing Government—and no Administration since the war has after a period of office survived a General Election—they would regard that as a mandate to abolish the Second Chamber. It is no wonder that people are looking for some safeguard against revolutionary changes not really considered or endorsed by the country, but it may be doubted whether a barrier created *ad hoc* would be able to withstand a Socialist majority elected to the House of Commons. It might, indeed, have the effect of provoking the electorate into a hostile demonstration against a

manceuvre obviously calculated to curb its power. These considerations, however, weighed little at Bristol, and the resolution, vaguely worded but very significant, was passed by a large majority.

The question of Armaments, as might have been expected, occupied a prominent position in the deliberations of the Conference. Lord Lloyd moved a resolution expressing 'grave anxiety at the inadequacy of the provisions made for Imperial Defence.' Lord Lloyd is one of the most effective platform speakers in addressing Conservative audiences on what may be called the old Imperialist lines. He carried a similar resolution last year at Birmingham, when the Conference declined to express approval of the Government's disarmament policy. Events on the continent of Europe during the last twelve months and the apparently hopeless position of the Disarmament Conference have undoubtedly caused a new and anxious interest to be taken in the defence of the country. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland moved an amendment approving the increase in our Air Force announced by the Government, but connecting it with the idea of collective security. This amendment, unfortunately, was withdrawn. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, to whose lot fell the task of explaining the Government's policy, pointed out that recently the Government had made a careful investigation with their expert advisers into the defence, not only of Great Britain, but of the Empire as a whole. Successive Governments for the last eight and a half years had deliberately allowed the defence forces to fall to a low level because they felt at that time that there was no danger of war breaking out, and also because they wished to set an example of disarmament to other nations. In the changed circumstances of to-day the Government felt it their duty to make fuller provision for defence. That, however, would cost money, and Mr. Chamberlain suggested that the Conference should pledge itself to accept that burden willingly by appending the words 'and assures the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, heavy as are its burdens, it prefers the security and safety of our native land above all other benefits.' These flowery words had been used last year by Mr. Winston Churchill in supporting a similar resolution, and Mr. Chamberlain was 'sure that Lord Lloyd would gladly . . . pay that little compliment to his absent colleague.' The resolution was passed with only two dissentients, but the addendum served to remind delegates that a rearmament policy will postpone the day of tax reduction.

Here, again, the Conference sounded what to all non-Conservatives, and even to many Conservatives, must appear as a reactionary note. Had Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland's amendment been passed, the justifiable anxiety felt by the party for the

defences of the Empire might have been revealed in its true proportions. As it was, there was no word of sympathy for the Government on the failure of its long and patient attempts to secure a Disarmament Convention at Geneva, no word of hope that the principles of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 will be maintained and extended. On the contrary, the Conference gave the impression, no doubt false, of liking armaments for their own sakes, and the bigger the better. Moreover, the withdrawal of the reference to collective security is doubly unfortunate, because it coincided so closely with the very realistic change of front by the Labour Party in modifying its policy of ostrich-like pacifism.

It might have been expected that the Government's vigorous policy of slum clearance would arouse enthusiasm—at any rate, among those who have imbibed Disraeli's policy; but the Conference, on the contrary, only showed itself ready to damn this great effort for the improvement of social conditions with the faintest praise. Alderman Davies, from Leeds, moved a resolution which, after giving perfunctory approval to the Government's slum-clearance policy, called for an amendment in the law 'to secure an equitable basis of compensation for dispossessed owners of property which has been maintained in a state of habitable repair.' The large number of clearance schemes now being carried out has naturally caused loss, and therefore resentment, amongst slum property owners; every member of Parliament receives complaints, and it was obvious that many of the delegates felt strongly on the matter. They were therefore not in a mood to listen to Mr. Paul Springman, a prospective candidate, who moved an uncompromising amendment urging the Government 'to press forward with its policy, regardless of vested interests in slum property.' He argued that the law does not permit the demolition of habitable property without compensation, and that if that had occurred in some cases it was due to faulty administration. The Minister of Health developed the same argument in greater detail, but admitted two injustices, which, he indicated, he meant to rectify. Sir Hilton Young's administrative record at the Ministry of Health has been abundantly justified in its results, and his speeches invariably show mastery of his case and a great power of lucid exposition. Unfortunately, the impression he gives of intellectual detachment affects his power of influencing even the House of Commons. His still, small voice of reason received no attention at Bristol, especially as it followed a lachrymatory appeal for compensation to widowed slum landladies, and the resolution was passed by a large majority. There may be cases of injustice, and there certainly are cases of hardship, but neither they nor the speeches

made justify the resolution passed by the Conference, which certainly did not display that interest in the condition of the people to which the Tory Party has laid claim since the time of Disraeli.

But even worse was to follow. Notice had been given of a resolution to be moved by Sir Henry Page-Croft expressing anxiety at the Government's India policy. It was not generally expected that it would obtain much support outside the ranks of the irreconcilable, as a similar resolution moved by Lord Wolmer, M.P., last year at Birmingham had been rejected because the Conference wished to reserve judgment until the Joint Select Committee had reported. This year's resolution had been drafted in a curiously vague and yet tendentious form. The atmosphere had been electrically charged by the publication of correspondence in which Sir Henry Page-Croft asked Mr. Baldwin for an undertaking that the Report of the Joint Select Committee would be laid before the Conference as well as before the council, with which he has already promised to 'take counsel' as soon as the Report is issued. The Conference has 5000 nominal members and the council 2000. Mr. Baldwin contented himself with pointing out that the council had power, if it thought necessary, to summon a special Conference, and also that such a special meeting had to be called on a requisition from fifty constituencies or five provincial areas. The supporters of the White Paper policy had overlooked two things: first, the venue of the Conference caused the South to be more strongly represented than the North; secondly, the opponents of the Government had made special efforts to score a success. The *Morning Post* excelled itself with an article called 'The Hitlers of Downing Street,' where the party leaders are accused of aiming at dictatorship in their handling of this question: 'Here is the unmistakable Hitlerian touch of coercion, almost of political blackmail—an ingenious bluff that needs to be called.'

Sir Henry Page-Croft, an extremely persuasive platform speaker and more effective with a Conservative audience than Mr. Churchill, was enthusiastically received by his supporters and made a rousing appeal to Imperialist sentiment. Alderman John Inskip was not very effective in moving an amendment declining to pass judgment on the White Paper until the Report of the Joint Select Committee had been published and considered by the council. The party leaders would probably have been wiser at an early stage to have demanded of both the council and the Conference that they should recognise their own unsuitability to decide the details of an Indian policy and to accept in advance the expert opinion of the Joint Select Committee. They have, however, admitted the National Union's claim to express an

opinion while asking it to refrain from forming it till the Joint Select Committee's Report is so issued. This has been so long delayed that the National Union's patience has worn thin. There is therefore a feeling of irritation against the leaders not connected with the merits of the Indian controversy.

The Duchess of Atholl argued with much learning that the Joint Select Committee in its eighteen months of labour has not heard enough evidence to make a fully informed report on the White Paper; from this she appeared to draw the conclusion that the Conference, after no inquiry, was qualified to condemn the White Paper forthwith. It was typical of the Conference to vote the Duchess an extra five minutes to speak, to refuse to listen to her, and to carry a motion that the question be now put. This was carried, presumably because those who thought the whole discussion premature united with those who did not want the Government's case further developed; in any case, it was not creditable to the Conference to proceed to so important a division after so little discussion. The amendment was only carried with a very narrow margin by 543 votes to 520.

It is clear that this small majority foretells a keen fight before the Government's Indian policy is finally approved. The Report of the Joint Select Committee may recommend certain modifications in the White Paper, particularly in regard to the powers of Governors to safeguard the administration of the police in the Provinces and the method of electing the Central Legislature; this would disarm some opposition, but there is no likelihood that the Committee will accept the views of the India Defence League. Mr. Baldwin, in 'taking counsel' with the council of the National Union, has not, of course, undertaken to be guided by its decision—to do so would be for a Minister of the Crown to accept dictation from an extra-constitutional body, as the Socialist Government did in 1931; but for the sake of party unity it is most desirable that his policy should obtain the endorsement of the rank and file of his party. When the members of the Joint Select Committee are free from their vow of silence, there should be no doubt of this result. The India Defence League have despaired of persuading the majority, or even a large proportion, of Conservative members of Parliament to adopt their views, but their propaganda in the country has been surprisingly successful. The danger which is worrying many Conservatives is, not that the Government policy will be defeated, but that the party may be disrupted over India as the Liberal Party was over Ireland in the 'eighties.

In the sphere of economic policy the principal topics discussed were agricultural protection and industrial reorganisation. On the first of these topics a resolution was passed which, after expressing appreciation of what had been done, asked for 'tariffs

on foreign livestock products in addition to import restrictions.' The Conservative Party is torn between satisfaction at what has been done to revive agriculture during the last three years and regret that its own nostrum of tariffs has not figured in the programme more largely. Mr. Walter Elliot, whose activity arouses the enthusiasm of those who clamour for 'something to be done' without quite knowing what, expressed his hope that the Conference would pass the resolution because it did not run counter to the declared policy of the Government or to many of the schemes that the Government had brought forward, and he interpreted it 'as wishing more power to their elbow.' He was careful, however, to emphasise that the Wheat Quota Act did not provide for a tariff and had been accepted by agriculture as preferable to any tariff that could be devised.

More important was the resolution moved by Mr. Ker Lindsey, and seconded by Captain Harold Macmillan, urging the Government to introduce a Bill at an early date 'to give statutory sanction to schemes of reorganisation which have the support of a substantial majority of an industry, subject to proper safeguards for the public interest, for all those engaged in the industry and for consumers of its products.' It was explained that the resolution recommended that industry should be given the same powers of self-government that agriculture already possesses under the Marketing Acts. Tariffs had benefited industry by protecting it from undercutting from without; organisation was now needed in many cases to provide against undercutting from within. Tariffs, therefore, were not in themselves enough, and they should be supplemented by organisation and concentration of production in the most efficient units. Individualism had failed, and it was in the Tory tradition to regulate the activities of individuals for the public benefit. The Socialists wished the State to govern industry; the Tories believed that industry should be given power to govern itself. This resolution was of special interest as showing how far the Left Wing of the Tory Party has moved from the orthodoxy of ten years ago. If carried to its logical conclusion, it implies acceptance of the principle of the Corporate State. Colonel Colville, speaking for the Government, took the line with which the House of Commons is familiar. While agreeing that in several individual cases, and quite generally in agriculture, the Government had worked on the lines advocated in the resolution, they were not as yet prepared to accept it as a general policy for industry. The resolution was carried, indicating that the Conference was in a mood to defeat the Government, whether the lead came from the Right or the Left.

The most remarkable feature of the Conference was the readiness with which it carried resolutions nullifying in spirit

those it had already passed. It began by expressing confidence in the National Government and then proceeded to criticise important items in the Government's policy. It demanded amendment in slum-clearance legislation, which, Sir Hilton Young argued, was unnecessary; it refused to censure the Government's India policy by a mere twenty-three votes. It passed Sir Edward Grigg's resolution with acclamation when he pleaded, in a broad-minded and eloquent speech, for a policy which would consolidate the non-Conservative supporters of the National Government; later it passed by a small majority a resolution in favour of a narrow party loyalty, and acclaimed a speaker who demanded that the word 'Conservative' should not be omitted from propaganda in support of the National Government issued by the Central Office. It would be true to say that the Conference showed a bias towards a reactionary policy, but it was too fickle and irresponsible to hold consistently any rational attitude.

Although the deliberations of the Conference must be regarded as almost entirely lamentable, the Bristol meeting may well have a notable place in political history on account of the great speech from Mr. Baldwin which concluded it. No statesman has the same capacity for discovering under current political events the continuity of national development, and no orator has the same power of expressing his political philosophy in a noble English, yet one understood of the people. While making no direct reference to the divergences of opinion which the Conference showed were existing within the party, he gave the clearest expression of the Tory outlook that the party has had for a generation and an uncompromising indication of his own resolve not to accept dictation from the rank and file.

Mr. Baldwin asked what Tory principles really were, and he propounded a number of the historical problems that such a question suggests.

For 200 years the Tories had been a protectionist party; was Pitt the Younger untrue to Tory principles when he lowered the tariff? At the time of the Canada Bill . . . the Duke of Wellington said it would mean the disruption of the Empire. Sir Robert Peel did not like it, but said the dangers of not passing it were greater than the dangers of passing it. Was it the true Tory policy to give self-government to the Dominions, or not? In 1874 Disraeli gave a charter of liberty to the trade unions, and twenty years later a Tory Government refused to remodel that Act to meet modern needs. Which was the true Tory policy?

Disraeli laid down Tory principles at the Crystal Palace many years ago—'the maintenance of our institutions and of our religion; the preservation of our Empire, and the improvement of the condition of our people.' But Disraeli does not tell you how you are to adapt your policy to changed circumstances and changed ages. That is the duty of the leader. The responsibility that rests with the leader is to interpret, according to

the deep-laid foundations of the party principles, the policy to meet whatever may come. It is the right of the party, if they think fit, to challenge his interpretation. If they challenge it in sufficient numbers, it inevitably leads to the choice of a new leader. That is democratic, and that is how we do things. I want to say once more that I am at present leader of this party; and as long as I lead it, I am going to lead it.

There are many observant and unattached voters in the country who are watching the Conservative Party with anxiety to see whether it is going to broaden its outlook and become a national party deserving their allegiance, or whether it is going to narrow itself and seek to solve new problems by the application of old prejudices. To such the Conference must have been profoundly disquieting. They may take heart from Mr. Baldwin's speech, which shows that the broader policy will prevail in action so long as he is leader. Lord Lloyd and Sir Henry Page-Croft may be the idols of the Party Conference, but it is the Conservative members of Parliament who choose the party leader, and the great majority of them share Mr. Baldwin's conception of the true nature and right policy of the Conservative Party in the years to come.

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ultimate control of credit and financial policy should rest with the Government, along with the Treasury and the Bank of England. It is clearly laid down in the Labour policy reports¹ that the technical day-to-day business of the banks will be in the hands of the bank staff; only, the ultimate decisions as to the general line of policy must be in the hands of Government—as they are coming to be more and more, in any case. The really relevant question to ask is, since there is so little difference between what obtains now and what is proposed, why make any change? To which the answer is that it is desirable to make it perfectly clear in the formal constitution of the banking system that the Government, which represents the interests of the community, shall have the final word in credit policy which affects us all; and that the relations between the Government and the banks shall be such as to make the latter more amenable to the decisions of the former. And that is the way round it should be.

Having submitted these separate reports to Conference, it remained for the executive to bring them all together into a general statement of the party's aims, to form a programme which might take the place of *Labour and the Nation*, upon which Labour appealed to the country in 1929. The new programme submitted at Southport—and this was the importance of the Conference—was presented under the significant title '*For Socialism and Peace*.' The difference between the old programme (which Mr. Snowden once boasted, probably with some exaggeration, that he had never read) and the new, is immense. *Labour and the Nation* was a hotch-potch of all kinds of proposals—mostly good, some immediate, others remote—brought together under one not very rain-worthy umbrella; it was not infused with one single purpose, nor did it make clear what it meant by Socialism or the stages by which socialisation might be brought about. It reflected the mind of a leadership which has now been taken over, to its questionable advantage, by the National Government.

The new programme of action, *For Socialism and Peace*, marks a great advance—it is altogether more concrete, quite definite in its aims, and reflects the mentality of a younger and more constructive leadership: the influence of Mr. Herbert Morrison and Dr. Dalton is unmistakable. What is even more significant is that the statement is a programme for the achievement of Socialism. In the years since 1931 the Labour Party has not become less Socialist, but more Socialist; everything that has happened in Europe and the world at large has reinforced its belief that there can be no satisfactory or secure social order at

¹ Cf. *Currency, Banking and Finance*, and *Socialism and the Condition of the People*.

home until the existing economic and political system has been brought under public control, and no secure international order or world peace until there are Socialist States that can co-operate in establishing and maintaining it. But the programme of the new leadership is more concrete and definite in its conception of the end to be attained, while being more cautious in its language, precisely because it has a clearer and bolder conception of the means of attaining it.

It is this that made the general attack of the Socialist League upon the executive's policy the less justified, and the less well grounded. The Socialist League brought forward a whole series of amendments, some seventy-five in all, forming what amounted to an alternative programme. Some few of these, when they were improvements in clarification, the executive accepted. But with regard to most of them, the official programme *For Socialism and Peace* was actually more definite as to the ways and means of bringing about socialisation than the much-heralded Socialist League scheme of things. This was particularly noticeable with regard to the long statement of the Socialist League on *War and Peace*,² a document as vague, self-contradictory, delusory and doctrinaire as could be well conceived. 'Ignorance leads to suspicion, suspicion to fear, and fear to war,' it says profoundly: one wonders what Marx would say of such idealistic rubbish, finding the origins of war in such psychological factors, when the whole Socialist case is that modern war springs from the very nature of the capitalist economic and political system. 'A Labour Government would use the league as a meeting-place with other countries in council, where it would urge upon them the folly and waste of heavy expenditure upon armaments': what wisdom! what hopes! Imagine the success we should have in urging disarmament upon France, face to face with the Nazi danger to Europe. 'It [*i.e.*, the Socialist League] warns the present Government that it will use all its power to strengthen and make effective the determination of the workers not to participate in any war in which this Government may involve this country, for under the capitalist system it is impossible to allocate the blame for war,' etc.: what a confession of despair, what a failure to discriminate! It is possible to say—in fact, the whole of the historical knowledge we have accumulated since as to the events leading up to 1914 substantiates the view—that, taking things as they were, the blame for the outbreak of the war must rest much more upon the shoulders of the German governing class than upon the French or ourselves. It is a darkening of counsel not to discriminate in these matters. And to argue for mass resistance, including a general strike, to a war in which this

² Cf. pp. 12-14 of *For Socialism and Peace*.

country happened to be involved in defence of the collective peace system in Europe against an attempt of a Nazi Germany to break through it is the worst disservice to the causes of Socialism and democracy in Europe.

As one delegate at least listened to speeches in defence of so crazy a point of view, the contempt that Napoleon had for '*les idéalogues*' came uppermost again and again in his mind: how Napoleon hated them, he remembered, for their volubility, their attachment to mere words and phrases without any content, meaning nothing, without any sense of the real world of action or of what can or cannot be done in it. As I sat there, there came into my mind the words of Abélard, summing up the whole issue with all the grasp of that astonishing intellect:

*Est in re veritas
Et non in schemate.*

But not all the Socialist League's amendments were as fantastic as their statement on foreign policy; indeed, what was worth taking seriously, and would have been useful if they had made more of it, was the demand implicit in their position that the party as a whole should go to the country with a short and concrete statement of its programme, rather than leave it for people to discover for themselves embedded in the numerous and leafy official reports. Further, one should testify that without the show put up by the Socialist League, and the debates that were made possible by their amendments, the Conference would have probably been dull. There is, of course, a very useful part to be played by a 'ginger-group' in a party, provided that the group does not so far forget its sense of proportion as to insist that the party shall subsist exclusively upon ginger! One should therefore pay a tribute to the speakers of the Socialist League, particularly to Mr. William Mellor, who at this Conference took the old place of Mr. E. F. Wise as the gadfly of the executive, always up and at it—whom, though he spoke in practically every debate, the Conference good-humouredly insisted on hearing, and, having heard, as good-humouredly always voted down.

The challenge of the Socialist League was taken up in the three main debates of the Conference. Old hands at Labour Conferences declared that never had the debates been at such a high level, both for debating power and the thoroughness with which the issues were discussed. Indeed, at moments, an almost high-brow strain came to the top: it was a Conference which quoted Milton (three times in one debate!), and once I heard a couplet of Dryden, but never a word from Karl Marx or Keir Hardie. The first important debate was taken on the general question of 'Labour's Aims,' the Socialist League putting forward

its alternative statement which would commit the party to asking for a mandate to proceed at once to ⁴:

1. Abolish the House of Lords, reform and speed up procedure in the Commons and utilise all constitutional powers to meet any emergency;
2. To socialise the Bank of England, the joint-stock banks, and vest in the State the ownership of land;
3. 'To change the whole basis of production and distribution . . . in accordance with a planned economy,' by socialising the basic industries and services, State control of imports and exports, the social re-organisation of Agriculture, etc., etc.

Sir Stafford Cripps moved this, the main Socialist League amendment, in a speech which, though lucid and attractive as ever in form, did not catch the ear of the Conference; and the exposition of the Socialist League case fell in this, as in succeeding debates, much more effectively to Mr. Mellor. The Conference heard their case with attention—indeed, nothing was more remarkable than the way in which it was determined to hear both sides put—and was obviously influenced by rational argument and fairly made up its mind on the evidence. The view that is so frequently heard, and which was given some substance to by the editor of the *New Statesman* in his article on the Conference,⁵ to the effect that, no matter what is said, it is the pre-disposed *bloc* of the trade unions which decides everything, is patently unfair. As a delegate, I sat among a number of representatives of the smaller trade unions, and it was perfectly evident how they were influenced by good arguments on both sides of the case and made up their minds on the evidence. Moreover, the view that it was the constituency Labour parties who supported the Socialist League, while the *bloc* vote of the trade unions alone voted them down, was definitely disproved in a subsequent letter to the *New Statesman*, which one recognises to be from the pen of a brilliant young Socialist statistician. He shows that there were some of the unions which voted for Socialist League amendments, though the majority of them, together with the vast majority of ordinary divisional Labour parties, voted with the executive. The fact was that the Conference was overwhelmingly united behind the executive.

This was perfectly evident from every one of the main divisions taken. On the second main debate, which took place on Labour's policy on war and peace, the league mustered a larger vote; but that was because the Miners' Federation, with their 400,000 votes, is committed to the weapon of a general strike. On the third debate, which concerned the issue of compensation on bringing an industry under public control, the Socialist League

⁴ Vide pp. 7 and 8, *For Socialism and Peace*.

⁵ *The New Statesman*, October 6.

vote for terminable annuities as opposed to compensation fell to just over 100,000 against 2,200,000 for the official policy.

In this debate on Compensation, as in that on the general objective and methods of socialisation, Mr. Herbert Morrison was the chief official spokesman for the executive, and wound up the debates. He was in this Conference at the top of his form. He had been previously regarded as the first-rate organiser and administrator that he is—an ordered and convincing, but not inspired, speaker. But this year he revealed altogether new potentialities; it was exciting to watch so well-known and so well-formed a political figure at this stage adding a cubit to his stature. His speeches in reply to Sir Stafford Cripps were masterly; they were a complete and final reply to the Socialist League case—good-humoured though devastating. They won the ear of the Conference in a way Mr. Morrison never has before; they dominated it. Southport was Mr. Morrison's Conference, and he undoubtedly emerged from it the intellectual and practical leader of the Labour Party.

No less important than the adoption of the new and completed programme was the reconsideration of the attitude taken up at Hastings on the 'war and peace' issue. The Hastings Conference had passed a resolution committing the Labour Party to resist any war that might break out and to concert measures of resistance, including a general strike. But the complete change in the European situation, with the capture of power in Germany by the Nazis, and the danger that they constitute to the maintenance of the collective peace system, brought about not so much a new orientation of policy on the part of the Labour movement as a change of heart. It now realises that it is impossible to talk about war resistance in all circumstances; the adherence to pacifism on the part of the English Labour movement, or still more an attempt to paralyse the action of this country at a time of a Nazi attempt to break through, would provide the best chance of a Nazi victory on the Continent. The leaders of the party realise—and in this they have the movement solidly behind them, whatever the *frondeurs* may think—that the only chance of preserving the peace in Europe is to back up the collective system of security and to make it clear that we intend to honour the obligations it involves.

The decisive speech was made on this question by Mr. Ernest Bevin, who made it clear that the brunt of the responsibility in this matter would rest upon the trade unions. On the question of the general strike, he stated the position which the unions had expressed at Weymouth this year—that the leaders of the unions could not order a strike; they could not command; they had to interpret the will of their members. That the ultimate decision

on this matter was one to be arrived at, therefore, by the whole party. He declared that the peace system organised through the league was the best safeguard of peace there was, and that it was their business to strengthen it all they could. The position of those who accepted the League, without meaning to carry out the obligations it involved, he likened, in a striking phrase, to that of a man who joined a union on condition that he was never called upon to strike. It was a restrained and responsible statement, made by one who bears as great an authority in the Labour movement as any other single figure—the utterance of a statesman.

It is as well to underline that fact, since something too much has been made of Mr. Bevin's castigation of the 'intellectuals' on the question of their membership of bodies disallowed by the party because of their Communist associations. It is a mistake to interpret this, as the *New Statesman* has done, to any bias on Mr. Bevin's part against the intellectuals of the party: he understands, better perhaps than they, the essential contribution both sides have to make. And in point of fact there is no man in the Labour movement whose whole approach to politics, and grasp of its problems, is more intellectual in the best sense than Mr. Bevin's: it is very little emotional; he thinks the whole thing out in terms of long-range policy. But what brought him and Mr. Morrison together in calling the leftward fringe to order was the determination that the discipline of the party shall be adhered to, and the fatal and insidious influence of the Communists, rancorous and impossible as they mostly are, rigorously shut out.

Mr. Bevin and Mr. Morrison are quite right. The moment has come when the Labour Party is tightening the ranks for action, and, if it is to be successful, it needs not less but more discipline. It was obvious at Southport that they had the rank and file of the movement with them: what was remarkable was the unity of feeling and purpose which prevailed there, and to which the Socialist League was no exception. The adoption of the new programme *For Socialism and Peace* puts the coping-stone on the structure of policy which has been built up in these last years; and it is to be expected that the new leadership which is making itself felt should demand that the party move forward unitedly behind it. Southport, therefore, marks an important stage in the evolution of the Labour Party; it has a coherent and impressive policy to put before the country and a new and vigorous leadership, of which the outstanding personality and the driving force is Mr. Herbert Morrison. Those who saw him in action at Southport will be surprised if he is not the next Labour Prime Minister.

A. L. ROWSE

ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA

WHEN King Alexander was struck down by the hand of an assassin in Marseilles he was about to make a notable contribution to the work of European pacification. For the Yugoslav monarch had come to discuss with the French Government a basis for reconciliation between Yugoslavia and Italy, and M. Barthou was to have continued the negotiations with Signor Mussolini in Rome. Great store had been set—especially in Paris and London—upon the successful outcome of these negotiations, because by removing the conflict of Italian and Yugoslav interests in the Danube the way would be prepared for a general agreement between the different Danubian States within the framework of which it would be possible to secure the political independence and economic stability of Austria. By these means the French Government, with the moral support of British diplomacy, hoped to prevent another attempt on the part of Germany to absorb Austria into the Third *Reich*, with all the dire consequences to European peace that such an attempt might entail. Italy, fearing the threat of a greater Germany on the Brenner, had already substituted a policy of friendship with France for her erstwhile Germanophil policy, and, in consequence, was ready to consider an improvement in her relations with Yugoslavia. For Yugoslavia was the connecting link in the Franco-Italian plan for Danubian collaboration, without which it would not be possible to bring into co-operation the States in the Italian group (*i.e.*, Austria and Hungary) and the States in the French group (*i.e.*, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia).

Thus Yugoslavia found herself in a pivotal position. King Alexander undoubtedly held a strong bargaining hand when he set out on the journey which was to end so fatally at Marseilles. There is every reason to believe that he would have used it to obtain good terms for his country's association with the Franco-Italian combination. From what is known of his intentions at the time, he would have bargained hard, but he was prepared to arrive at a compromise in the general interests of European peace. To understand how it happened that Yugoslavia came to occupy this pivotal position it is necessary to consider the remarkable

new developments in Yugoslav foreign policy which had been taking place during the past year. These developments marked the emergence of Yugoslavia from the narrower traditions of Balkan politics into the wider sphere of general European interests. They also marked the progression of King Alexander towards a high quality of statesmanship, for the royal inspiration was to be seen in most of the later moves in Yugoslav foreign relations. The late King had, indeed, travelled a long road psychologically since his early days as a young Serbian soldier-prince. His arduous and difficult task of unifying his own kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into a composite Yugoslav State had brought him slowly but surely to the conception of an even wider unity, which embraced the idea of a close, co-operation between all the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

The ideal informing his work for inter-Balkan co-operation was that of 'the Balkans for the Balkan peoples,' and the creation of a sense of common interests between the different Balkan States such as would render impossible ever again the exploitation of local Balkan troubles by outside Great Powers. With this end in view he set out on a number of visits to neighbouring capitals in order to create the necessary 'atmosphere.' These visits, followed by meetings between the Foreign Ministers of the various countries concerned, led to the series of inter-Balkan agreements which culminated in the signing a few months ago of the Balkan Pact. This was a considerable achievement, including as it did the adherence of the one-time enemy Turkey. But if the Balkan Pact was a step in the right direction, it had one obvious weakness in the non-inclusion of Bulgaria; for Bulgaria, an ex-enemy State which, unlike Turkey, still harboured 'treaty' grievances, did not feel that she could adhere unconditionally to a grouping of essentially 'treaty' neighbours. This was understood nowhere better than in Belgrade, for although Serb and Bulgar had fought on opposite sides in the European War, and their post-war relations had often been strained almost to breaking-point, they were both conscious of their blood kinsmanship, and their long years of mutual animosity had not entirely obscured the dream of an eventual reconciliation. The signing of the Balkan Pact without Bulgaria had been rushed through at the instance of M. Titulescu, the Roumanian Foreign Minister; and M. Yevtitch, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, out of regard to Little Entente solidarity, had acquiesced; but he was careful to leave the door open to Bulgaria, and made it clear that individual negotiations between Belgrade and Sofia would follow. Throughout this period King Alexander was actively at work. He had already received King Boris in Belgrade and returned the visit at a port on the Black Sea, and these royal exchanges bore such good fruit that shortly

before his journey to Marseilles he was able to pay a State visit to King Boris in the Bulgarian capital, where his reception was marked by scenes of the greatest enthusiasm and cordiality.

The result of these activities was the laying of the foundations of a genuine *rapprochement* between the two Balkan neighbours. King Alexander's task had, of course, been greatly facilitated by the sincere way in which his good-will was reciprocated by King Boris and the Bulgarian Government, especially by the latter's courageous action in suppressing the notorious Macædo-Bulgarian terrorist organisation, the M.I.R.O., whose outrages in Yugoslav Macedonia had for long years been the cause of bad blood between the two countries. This was appreciated on the Yugoslav side, and during the course of the royal visit to Sofia the two Governments were able to work out the preliminaries of a series of agreements for opening the frontiers, facilitating commercial exchange and improving transport. Agreements were made for cultural co-operation on an extensive scale. And, finally, hopes were held out for administrative modifications which would tend to remove the friction caused by Serbo-Bulgarian differences in regard to the population in Yugoslav Macedonia. King Alexander carefully avoided the mistake of rushing into anything spectacular. He felt, for instance, that much patient clearing of the ground would be necessary before a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of amity and non-aggression would be advisable, though the eventual conclusion of such a pact was clearly an end in view. He was content—and history will assuredly acclaim his wisdom—that the work of reconciliation should pass through three stages: the psychological, the economic, and the political. At the time of his death the first was already an accomplished fact, the second was in being, and the third was on the way.

Parallel with this work of consolidating Balkan unity was the inception of an independent policy in regard to the problems of Central Europe. The Yugoslav policy towards the Austrian problem does not seem to have been fully understood in Western Europe, although in actual fact its underlying principles were simple enough. This policy, in brief, was that Yugoslavia stood by the principle of Austrian independence, but insisted that this was an international question, and not the preserve of any one Power. This attitude was necessarily in conflict with the Italian standpoint that the maintenance of Austrian independence was a specifically Italian interest. For Italy had for many years declined to admit Yugoslavia's equal interest in Danubian problems, and had, moreover, consistently pursued a policy calculated to encircle Yugoslavia from without and weaken her from within. Yugoslavia, therefore, saw in the Italian predominance in Austria and Hungary a political threat to her own

security. Owing to these circumstances Yugoslavia adopted the attitude that, although she adhered to the principle of Austrian independence, if she had to choose between Austro-German union or the establishment of a virtual Italian protectorate in Austria, she would regard the *Anschluss* as the lesser of the two evils.

Thus a certain community of interests was established between Belgrade and Berlin, and Germany lost no time in making advances to Yugoslavia, including a commercial treaty very advantageous to Yugoslav economic interests. Yugoslavia, therefore, saw no reason to quarrel with Germany. To interpret this, as it was interpreted in some quarters, as Yugoslavia's desertion of France in favour of a new friendship with Germany, was but a superficial reading of the situation. It was, moreover, but a poor tribute to the political astuteness of King Alexander. In reality he had not thrown over old friends for new. What he had done was to adopt an independent policy which necessitated Berlin, Paris, and Rome recognising Yugoslavia as a first-class factor in the situation. Thus, when as a result of Herr Hitler's broken pledges to Signor Mussolini in regard to Austria the Italo-German friendship gave place to a *rapprochement* between France and Italy, and Paris and Rome came together to oppose Germany's ambitions in Austria, the 'Western' Powers were obliged to seek the co-operation of Yugoslavia. And there can be little doubt that with his old contacts with France and his new ones with Germany, and with his local position strengthened by the reconciliation with Bulgaria, King Alexander, had he lived to complete his work, would have been in the position to exert a positive and beneficent influence on the situation.

However much opinions may differ as to the wisdom or otherwise displayed by King Alexander's personal dictatorship in the sphere of Yugoslav internal affairs, there can hardly be any question of the great improvements it brought about in the conduct of Yugoslav foreign policy. It is almost inconceivable that any Yugoslav politician in the old days of the parliamentary régime would have had the courage, the freedom or the authority to carry through the reconciliation with Bulgaria, or the imagination to conduct the independent policy in regard to the Austrian problem. The dictatorship made possible these innovations in foreign policy, because the King was able to take the full responsibility on his own shoulders; and he was, moreover, the only personality in the country with the requisite strength and authority to carry these proposals through. Similarly, it was due to the dictatorship that M. Yevtitch came to take charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Formerly Minister of the Court, he was the friend and confidant of the King, and was able to work

in close understanding with him. Never a party man, M. Yevtitch was free from those hampering considerations of party tactics which, in Balkan affairs particularly, so often obstruct the prosecution of a positive policy. The incidence of the dictatorship, which brought the King into direct contact with Yugoslav foreign policy, and which placed M. Yevtitch in charge of its execution, resulted in the one-time static nature of that policy giving place to a new *dynamism*.

The King, as I have said, had evolved considerably during recent years. Traces of the effects of his early associations with the grim struggle of the Serbian people for national survival—of those war years when the exercise of the military virtues of authority, discipline, courage and tenacity, rather than the practice of the more subtle arts of political compromise, were called for—did, indeed, remain with him until the last. They explain both that single-minded devotion to duty which all admired and that fixity of purpose, scorning compromise, which many criticised. But as time went by, while the fixity of purpose remained, it tended more and more to the service of broader conceptions of policy, inspired by an ever-widening vision. Thus it was that the Balkan warrior King became in the fulness of time a statesman of European stature. If the success which attended his ventures in foreign policy was not equally recognisable in his handling of home affairs, the reason was that in the latter sphere the difficulties were definitely greater. In his foreign policy he had practically the whole nation solidly behind him. The Croat political opposition, amongst his most formidable opponents at home, for instance, were more than favourable to a reconciliation with Bulgaria, and their traditional differences with Italy left them no option but to approve of his uncompromising objections to Italian ambitions to dominate the Danube. But in the matter of the future internal structure of the State, and the methods of the dictatorship, there was much bitter opposition to his ideas.

There is no need to recapitulate in detail here how the dictatorship came into being. The growing bitterness of the struggle between Serbian Centralism and Croatian Federalism, and the bickering disputes and ambitions of the party leaders, together with a growing measure of political jobbery and corruption, converged to the point of explosion when the Croat leader Stefan Raditch was shot dead in the Parliament by the Montenegrin Punitza Rachitch. It was then that the King, who had tried every conceivable political expedient under the old system without avail, decided, after many hesitations and with much reluctance, to cut the Gordian knot himself. He did so by abolishing the parliamentary institution and setting up a personal dictatorship.

At first the dictatorship was hailed with relief, even in Croatia. During its first months it set to work, with much energy and considerable success, to carry out administrative reforms, which had long been blocked by parliamentary incompetence, and to clear out the corruption from the public services. This was the first phase. The second phase caused a growing disappointment. It became static. It produced nothing new. And the old party animosities began to raise their heads again in a new way. During this period the King, faced with the growing opposition to his great experiment, upon which he had hazarded so much, was determined not to be deflected from his course. His good intentions are not to be doubted, but there can be no denying that, in the carrying out of the royal dictates, over-zealous and narrow-minded officials exceeded the limit, and the country became the prey to repressive police methods on the one hand and subterranean political agitation on the other.

This period undoubtedly resulted in a great strain being put upon the King. But he refused to diverge from the task he had set himself to accomplish—the supplanting of the old tribal conception of Serb, Croat, and Slovene by the conception of a composite and unified Yugoslavia. In pursuance of this policy he embarked on his next step, the abolition of the old historic divisions of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and the rest, and the subdivision of the country into new administrative districts to be known as Banovines. This step caused much heartbreaking amongst all sections of the community—amongst the Serbs no less than amongst the Croats and Slovenes. For it must be clearly borne in mind that by this time the situation was no longer just a matter of Serbo-Croat rivalry. The Serbs, no less than the one-time Austro-Hungarian provinces, had been stripped of a great deal of their particularised traditions. The King, who had changed the name of his country from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to that of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was as determined to brook no opposition from Serbian particularism as he was set against the separatist (if such they may be called) tendencies of the Croatian federalists. He was determined, above all, to make his people 'think Yugoslav'—a fact which demonstrates the inaccuracy of the charge frequently brought against him by critics that he was promoting Serbian interests as against the interests of Croats and Slovenes. Although a Serb of the Serbs, he was prepared to sink Serbianism in the bigger cause of a united Yugoslavia. Many Croats and Slovenes, not hitherto connected with the old political parties, did, in fact, rally to the dictatorship, and their number in the Administration, especially in the case of the Slovenes, steadily increased. The King was in favour of the greater participation of the Croats and

Slovenes—as Yugoslavs, and not as sectional interests—in the Administration. For his essential aim was to reconcile sectional differences whilst resisting disintegrating tendencies.

The next, or third, period of the dictatorship showed, however, that, having carried through the main unifying ordinances, the King was prepared to consider a gradual return to less autocratic methods of government. This does not mean that he envisaged a return to the unrestricted parliamentarism of the pre-dictatorial epoch; for that had proved itself to be unworkable. But the granting of a modified parliamentary Constitution which duly took place, in which the executive power rested with the Government while the Parliament exercised consultative functions, was undoubtedly a step in the direction of a new form of parliamentarism based upon the idea of the authoritarian State.

It is easy to talk in principle of reforming the structure of the State on a federalist basis, so as to satisfy the local aspirations and historic traditions of the various sections of the South Slav people. It is quite another matter in practice. No Croat leader with whom I have ever discussed the matter was ever able to tell me exactly what he wanted. Some, indeed, confessed that it was easier to explain what they did not want. In a word, they had a clearer sense of their grievances than their desires. The federalist issue was, moreover, by no means plain sailing. In the federalist camp itself there was a whole series of federal projects, ranging from a mild conception of administrative devolution, through various schemes for local autonomies, to definitely separatist plans. Had the King thrown in his hand and called all the party leaders into conference, and left it to them to hammer out a system of federalist administration accompanied by free parliamentary and political institutions, they would not have been able to agree amongst themselves. The old political dog-fight would undoubtedly have started all over again. The political leaders, apart from those who put personal ambition before the good of their country, of whom there were not a few, included also men of high integrity and considerable intelligence. One has but to mention a few—Mr. Marinkovitch and M. Davidovitch, of Serbia; Dr. Koroshetz, leader of the Slovene Clericals; Dr. Spaho, leader of the Bosnian Moslems; and Dr. Trumbitch and M. Matcheck, of Croatia. All these men—with the exception of M. Marinkovitch, who co-operated with the dictatorship—drifted into opposition. They were all persons of singular intelligence and experience. But this would not by itself give them the capacity to agree on such a complicated issue as the future structure of the State. For the truth about Yugoslavia is that, although the standard of individual intelligence is high, there is a lack of national corporative experience. And this is hardly to be

wondered at, when one considers that Yugoslavia was faced with the task of accomplishing in twelve years a work of unification such as had taken Britain, Germany, and Italy centuries to achieve! The King realised this. He realised, also, that it would be necessary for a new generation, one which would be free from the old divisional memories and imbued only with the conception of Yugoslavia, to arise; and it was to prepare the way for this generation to carry on the work of unification that King Alexander felt himself obliged to fight against time and lay the foundations in his own life of a national unity upon which his successors could build.

This brings me to a consideration of another kind of difficulty with which the King was faced, and which contributed to the necessity of strong measures when occasion demanded. Certain extreme elements in the Croatian Opposition—which, by the way, had no connexion with and were denounced by the main Croatian Opposition group—were working definitely for a separatist movement, and in this received the help, financial and political, of certain countries which might have something to gain from the break-up of Yugoslavia. One of these groups, composed of Croatian one-time Austrian officers, stood for a Hapsburg restoration, and worked from Vienna. Much more dangerous was the group of which Ante Pavelitch was the head, which operated at one time from Berlin, and later, when expelled by the Hitler Government, from Geneva and Budapest. I remember seeing the manifesto of this group when it was trying to establish contacts in Britain. Its definitely separatist programme—which again, it must be reiterated, was not shared by the main Croat body, led by Dr. Matcheck—coincided almost in detail with the plans evolved from time to time in Italy and Hungary for an internal disruption of Yugoslavia. This group, which had relations with other terrorist groups, including the remnant of the Macedonian revolutionary organisations, was, it is believed, the directing hand in the plot which resulted in the assassination of King Alexander. The existence of Croat *émigré* camps in Italy and Hungary where training in terrorist activity took place, had long been known to the Yugoslav Government, and it was this knowledge which made difficult the moves, initiated by France, for reconciling Yugoslavia with neighbours who harboured these terrorists. The record of these Yugoslav revolutionaries is a black one. But it at least adds additional proof that the assassination of King Alexander was not the work of the regular Croat Opposition; for, indeed, the death of the King was as great a blow to the Croats at large as to the Serbs.

As to the future, it is as yet too early to hazard a prophecy. At the moment, and probably for some time to come, the dominant

emotion will be one of national sorrow, which will necessarily keep politics in the background. After a few months, however, political problems will again make themselves felt. It is probably symptomatic of the way the late King's mind had been working that the regents and deputy-regents associated with Prince Paul, in accordance with the royal will, are mainly Croats. At the time of writing it is expected that a Government of national concentration will be formed, accompanied by some form of political amnesty, as this also seems to have been the dead monarch's desire.

A good deal will depend upon the personality and capacity for leadership of Prince Paul. Certainly no man would have wanted the position of Regent less than the Prince. But this does not mean that he will not acquit himself well in his exalted and difficult task. Though of a more conciliatory turn of mind than his royal cousin, he is nevertheless credited with the possession of a determined will. This augurs well for Yugoslavia, as does also the evident desire of politicians of all shades of opinion to let bygones be bygones and co-operate with the regency. Difficult times may be ahead, but there is every reason to presume that they will be successfully negotiated. In the realm of foreign relations, it is reassuring that Italy seems to be desirous of maintaining a strictly correct attitude towards Yugoslavia in her present difficulties, and that therefore the French attempts, supported by Britain, to take up again the threads of the negotiations so tragically interrupted at Marseilles have a fair chance of success; although, at the same time, signs are not wanting that Germany will continue her efforts to win Yugoslavia's friendship, in the hope that by these means she may be able to drive a wedge between France and Italy. Yugoslav relations with Hungary are likely to become more difficult, owing to the Yugoslav resentment at the asylum given to the Croatian terrorists by that country. On the whole, however, the situation might have been much more dangerous. At least there is no imminence of any widespread international crisis. This, I think, leads one to view the future with a certain measured degree of confidence.

C. F. MELVILLE.

M. BARTHOU AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

M. LOUIS BARTHOU's last tenure of office lasted exactly eight months—from the first half of February 1934 till the first half of October. Eight months is in France precisely the average duration of those Governments which their brief life condemns to impotence. In that short space of time, however, M. Barthou succeeded in achieving something; for it is universally recognised that he left an inheritance behind him and that his short stay at the Quai d'Orsay left its mark on the history of French diplomacy. It was a rare and surprising success. And yet when one looks beneath the surface, one finds that the surprise is not as warranted as might at first sight appear; for, unlike Delcassé or Briand, Barthou did not create a policy, but carried on an existing one. He ranks among the classics, but his originality lay not in conception so much as in execution. What distinguishes him from his predecessors is his firmness of clear-cut choice, his resolute promptness of action. There was something virile and young, something courageous and enterprising, about his methods. He enriched old purposes with new forms and a new vitality, and, so doing, he was able to command success because on the one hand he utilised the achievements of his predecessors, and on the other he knew how to secure the approval of the French people for his programme, with the possible exception of one item of it—his Russian enterprise. He gave back to the people of France confidence in their foreign policy. On the whole, it may be said that he not only acted rightly, but that he also appeared to act rightly, which is a totally different thing, and one sometimes more difficult to achieve.

The ruling principle of what has been called the Barthou system was the same idea that inspired the Briand policy: the maintenance of peace. For France no other policy is even conceivable. In this respect France is to-day where Germany was in 1871; she wants to enjoy the fruits of her victory, and for that enjoyment peace is imperative. German propagandists have sought to convey the impression that Barthou was an enemy to the *Reich*, and have gone the length of ascribing to this alleged hostility a purely personal cause—namely, the fact that his son was killed in the war. All those who were privileged to

number themselves among Barthou's friends know that, however keen his personal sorrow may have been, he never allowed it to influence his actions as a responsible Minister. Far from hating Germany, he had a liberal understanding of her greatness. As a humanist, as a music-lover, he could not but appreciate and render homage to the practical achievements of Germanic genius. Barthou preferred Athens to Sparta, and so it was natural that the Germany of his choice should have been rather that of Leibnitz or Goethe rather than that of Hitler or General Goering. But he had no prejudice even against this latter Germany, a fact of which his private conversations with Herr von Ribbentrop afford abundant evidence.

Peace, the lode-star of French statesmanship, may be sought in a variety of different ways. Briand, whose eyes were always fixed more upon the future than upon the present, sought to ensure peace by creating an atmosphere of moral disarmament and to combat the excesses of nationalism by developing a European conscience. Just before Barthou took over the Foreign Office there were statesmen in France—and among them exalted ones—who saw the best chance of peace in a direct Franco-German understanding that would have established practically a condominium of these two Powers in Europe. Classical French diplomacy—that of the permanent officials—takes a different course; it is untiring in its efforts to find a possible basis for agreement with Germany, but it does not build on the prospects of early German compliance; it does not take its hopes for actual facts, and it realises that, pending the day when Germany shall have come to the conclusion that her dreams of European hegemony are futile or impossible of achievement, it is necessary to keep a sharp watch, and not to keep that watch alone.

This last formula was that of M. Barthou, and candour compels the admission that this choice was imposed upon him by certain manifestations of the Hitlerite *régime*—by its preparations for mobilisation, by its intense efforts to militarise the minds of the German people. Faced with a Stresemann, the Briand policy was natural; faced with Brüning, Laval's 'conversations' were admissible. Faced with Hitler, Barthou could adopt no other attitude than that which will remain associated with his name. Having once chosen his course, he remained faithful to it, and he set his whole political plan accordingly. That plan may be summed up as follows: to subordinate disarmament to a *régime* of security, and to seek that security in a collective organisation of Europe through a system of guarantee and pacts of mutual assistance open to Germany as well as to all other Powers. Thus did Barthou hope to cast over the whole of Europe a net the strong meshes of which should be works of peace.

This League of the Peaceful could not be created in a day, and it was important that in the meantime France should preserve her strength. That is the central idea that dominated Barthou's mind during the negotiations regarding Disarmament. His point of view was well set out in his Note of April 17, which is public property. It may truly be called his Note, for it was not only the expression of his thought, but he drafted it himself from end to end. This document pointed out that the manifest violations by Germany of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles rendered impossible a prolongation of *pourparlers* the very basis of which had been wrecked by Germany's action.

Before even trying to establish whether an agreement could be reached on a system of guarantees of execution efficacious enough to permit of the signature of a convention legalising the considerable rearmament of Germany, France [M. Barthou declared] must give foremost place in her thoughts to the conditions of her own security, which she does not divorce from the conditions of security of the other Powers affected.

France thus subordinated the continuation of negotiations regarding disarmament to a clear proof of German sincerity. She indicated that the first such clear proof would be Germany's return to Geneva.

It is well known that M. Barthou's exposition of this point of view gave rise to differences of opinion between the British and French delegates at Geneva. M. Barthou had used language that, in the sharpness and acidity of its tone, was an innovation at Geneva. Wrongly perhaps, French public opinion relished this departure. Barthou's eloquence was more of the brilliant than of the nicely graded order. He was more used to speaking in the French Chamber than to addressing international assemblies. After surviving their first unpleasant impression and their first misunderstanding, his partners appear to have come to the conclusion that his outspokenness had at least one advantage—that of dispelling all doubt regarding his meaning and intentions.

M. Barthou thus insisted on the necessity of maintaining French armaments, but no man could have worked harder than he did to seek French security in the development of a new organisation of Europe within the Geneva framework. M. Barthou's faith in the League of Nations may have been of old standing or of recent growth, a matter of spontaneous generation of the fruit of logical reasoning; be that as it may, he revealed himself as a zealous defender of the Geneva Assembly. He was above all else a parliamentarian; he loved assemblies and speaking in them. He realised, furthermore, that Geneva gave him an excellent manœuvring ground in his efforts to constitute a League of Peace without being compelled to have recourse to

building up alliances that would tend to divide Europe into two hostile camps and thus to create opportunities for conflicts. He believed that since the League of Nations was a creation of the Treaty of Versailles, the defence of that Treaty could be entrusted to no surer organism. France owed it to herself to have recourse to that institution. As for him, he looked upon Geneva as, potentially at least, a kind of permanent conference for the safeguarding of peace.

The framework having thus been made, there remained to fill in the picture. In the first place, M. Barthou tried to maintain what has now become a fundamental tradition of French policy—the friendship of the British Empire, France's ally in the Great War. In workaday negotiations the personality of M. Barthou did not evoke among British statesmen the same degree of warm sympathy as did that of M. Briand; this was due to the fact that there was a certain contrast between the temperament of M. Barthou and that of the British. But at heart his sentiments towards Britain were exactly the same as those of Briand. He had the same attachment to the *Entente Cordiale*, the same appreciation of its capital rôle in the defence of peace, the same care not to ask for more than would probably be granted, the same confidence in the ever-closer solidarity of interests of the two peoples. The advance of aviation had made of France a bastion, an outwork of the defence of Britain. Of his journey to London Barthou preserved to the last the deepest and friendliest impression.

French diplomatic tradition imposed on Barthou, next in importance to British friendship, adherence to the Powers of the East. If Barthou was content to safeguard existing relations with England, he was able to improve relations with the East. This Eastern system comprised, when he came into office, two main parts: Poland and the Little Entente. France has been Poland's ally since 1921. For a long time it was a political alliance born of a common apprehension of German designs and of sentimental attachment due to France's services to Polish independence. M. Briand's attempt at a Franco-German *rapprochement* made the Poles somewhat nervous. They feared they would be left in the lurch. The '*Pacte à Quatre*' (Four-Power Pact), originally proposed by Signor Mussolini, by seeming to ignore Poland's claims to being a Great Power, wounded the pride of Warsaw. So much so that when one day Hitler, in an attempt at a diversion, tendered his hand, they did not refuse to take it. Does this mark a definite option for Germany—against France? The probability is that it does not go so far as that. It is perhaps a simple matter of reinsurance—to some extent perhaps also inspired by an after-thought of expansion in the Ukraine, should

some day some event occur to shake the solidity of the Soviet fabric.

However that may be, the fact remains that, though the Franco-Polish alliance, which aims at a mutual guarantee of existing frontiers of both Powers, still exists, its range of application and degree of efficiency have been curtailed. M. Barthou did not hide from himself the new difficulties of the situation of Poland, torn between an old French alliance and new German sympathies. He determined to see for himself on the spot how matters stood and to attempt to restore the old ties in their pristine fulness. Hence his journey to Warsaw, the first of his diplomatic trips. Frankly, it was a failure. M. Barthou, indeed, brought back with him very clear affirmations regarding the need of maintaining the French alliance from Marshal Pilsudski. Very wisely, he did not try to obtain more. Poland's little excursion in German byways was undoubtedly awkward for France, but M. Barthou felt very strongly that in the long run Poland would return to the French fold because her original French orientation corresponded with an absolute political necessity. For this reason he determined to let the Polish matter lie for a time. Matters would right themselves in due course.

The second pillar of the Eastern—or, perhaps more accurately, of the South-Eastern—system is the French understanding with the Little Entente. It is sufficiently well known that this group of States, composed of Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia, has, under the influence of M. Titulescu and of the late King Alexander I., been drawn into an ever-closer union of purpose and developed into a sort of political *entente* of which M. Benesh was the thinker, M. Titulescu the diplomat, and King Alexander the soldier. It is a *bloc* of some 60,000,000 people. France's relations with the Powers of the Little Entente have grown more and more intimate ever since the Versailles Treaty. It is based on a similarity of interests and on a common desire to maintain the territorial order fixed by the pacts of Versailles and Trianon. M. Barthou had no need here to forge a new instrument, but to improve and strengthen an existing one. In Prague it was necessary to reassure M. Benesh regarding the legendary sympathies France was supposed to entertain for a Hapsburg restoration; in Bucarest Fascist manoeuvres inspired by Hitlerism threatened to sap the foundations of Titulescu's position; in Belgrade Germany had started just such an enterprise of permeation as had succeeded so well in Warsaw. The *Reich* was trying to rouse certain territorial ambitions and at the same time to play up superficial resemblances of *régime* in order to capture the confidence of military circles.

On all these points it was necessary to intervene with decision;

on all of them M. Barthou's success was complete. In Prague he had a fairly easy task, for he found new and solid friendships there; in Belgrade he won over the King. But in Bucarest the game was of a more difficult order, and it is there that he obtained his greatest triumph. He was aided by his brilliant qualities as an orator, for Roumania is a country in which French is a universal second language with all educated people, and where love of France is deeply rooted. M. Barthou was able to profit by these assets, not only to tighten up the ties linking France with the Little Entente, but to contribute powerfully towards giving cohesion to the Danubian group, towards bringing about a *rapprochement* with Bulgaria and laying the bases of a close understanding with the other Powers of the Balkan Pact—Greece and Turkey. There was thus constituted, from Angora to Belgrade, with a bastion at Prague, a powerful *bloc* of States animated by a common desire to avert revision of the treaties and to defend the *status quo*. M. Barthou had, with consummate skill, done good work for peace.

In the course of his trip round the Balkans, M. Barthou had acquired the firm conviction that this *bloc* of Eastern Powers would never attain full security so long as a possible hostility on the part of Moscow threatened their flanks and rear. Moreover, should the defence of the permanent interests of peace prove to be only possible through recourse to arms, the inadequate industrial development of the Balkan States would render Russian assistance in raw materials and in manufactured goods highly desirable. Czechoslovakia had a long time ago recognised the Soviet Government, but neither Roumania owing to her Bessarabian problem, nor Yugoslavia owing to her close associations with Tsarism, had established diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. To bridge over this gulf was not altogether easy. France, however, was singularly well placed to make the attempt.

The mutations of Soviet policy are well known. From the time of the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty till the day Hitler came into power it had been revisionist, but the persecutions inflicted on German Communists and the rebirth of Germany's ambitions to extend her territory eastwards had signed the death warrant of the Russo-German alliance and inspired in Moscow the fear lest Russia might become the battleground of invading Polish and German hosts. The Russians, who but yesterday had been potential aggressors, felt themselves threatened and were looking around for support against aggression. This similarity of political trend led to overtures to France. The trip of M. Herriot to Russia, the presence of a Left Cabinet in office in Paris, ensured that these overtures were not disregarded.

Such was the situation as M. Barthou found it on taking over

the Quai d'Orsay. He judged that a *rapprochement* with Russia would offer manifest advantages, for it would bar the way to a renewal of the Rapallo experiment, it would afford the Balkan Powers liberty of movement, and it held out hopes of military assistance, at least so far as aviation is concerned. On the other hand, a renewal of the former Franco-Russian alliance presented grave obstacles—partly because of French public opinion, partly because this would be interpreted as an attempt to form a ring round Germany. M. Barthou sought and found a formula that would at one and the same time associate Russia with the work of maintaining peace and avoid the disadvantages that might accrue from a Franco-Russian *tête-à-tête*.

This is the genesis of the idea of an Eastern pact which Barthou communicated to the British Government in the course of his visit to London, and he succeeded in enlisting British and Italian support so far that these Powers decided to recommend acceptance of such a pact. Its main provisions were that it should be open to all States, that it should be directed against none, and it would have constituted a sort of Eastern guarantee of territorial integrity and of mutual assistance between those countries that share the basins of the Oder and the Vistula—namely, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (the Baltic group of States), Russia and Czechoslovakia. France was to be a guarantor of this Eastern super-Locarno. Russia was to become a guarantor of the Western Locarno. All pacts were to be assimilated to the Geneva model and the Soviet Union was to pledge itself to apply for membership of the League of Nations.

M. Barthou had pinned great hopes to this project, which was, perhaps, a trifle too ingenious. He looked upon it as destined to become one of the main pillars of peace. If Germany were guaranteed on both sides, east and west, by these pacts, she would have no further reason to feel herself threatened and would thus be deprived of her excuse for arming. There was to be no new aggressive group, but a general union for peace. For a time at least it would have rendered frontiers intangible and thus averted the main danger of war. In practice, however, it proved to be just this wealth of advantages that was its undoing. Precisely because it would have set up an insuperable obstacle to territorial revision and to rearmament, it met with a formal refusal on the part of Germany, and with a modified refusal on the part of Poland. For neither of these Powers appears to be disposed to give up definitely the idea of modifications of the territorial *status quo*.

So far, then, all that was realised of the Barthou plan was the admission into the League of Nations of the Soviet Union, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia on the

one hand, Roumania and Bulgaria on the other. Yugoslavia, for reasons of a dynastic order, could not be brought to recognise the Soviet Government. But these checks encountered in Berlin and in Warsaw had by no means discouraged M. Barthou, and it was his firm intention to renew the conversations. As it is, what has been achieved is the main thing: Soviet Russia has been pinned down to the support of peace and to the rejection of territorial revision. This linking up of Russia and the Western Powers in a common purpose of peace is a *fait accompli*. This M. Barthou was well aware of, and he did not hide his opinion that it would prove the most fruitful of his works.

The maintenance of the *Entente Cordiale*, its close co-operation with the Little Entente widened by the support of the Balkan States, eventual Russian assistance in defending European peace (stress must here be laid on Europe, for Asiatic Russia remains outside these and eventual other arrangements)—such are the bases of the edifice of peace M. Barthou had patiently sought to erect. Ever since taking office he had hoped to put the crown on this edifice by improving Franco-Italian relations and (as a necessary corollary) by bringing about a *rapprochement* between the two Adriatic neighbours, Italy and Yugoslavia. M. Barthou was very Latin both in temperament and in culture; he was a fervent admirer of the Rome of the Renaissance and of the Rome of to-day; he had been impressed by the compound of realism and romanticism in the character of Mussolini, whose acquaintance he had made at a conference in Rome. He knew that the obstacles in the way of a Franco-Italian understanding are many and formidable, extending as they do to questions of general policy, of prestige, of divergences of connexions, of regional North African interests. In spite of all this, he believed that the importance of the results to be hoped for from a *rapprochement* more than compensated for the risks entailed. From the start this was his great ambition. He spoke of it but seldom, but he was thinking of it all the time.

He was fortified in his resolve by the tragic death of Chancellor Dollfuss, which revealed on one concrete point at least an identity of French and Italian interests so far as Austria was concerned. This episode showed him, not only the need for an *entente*, but its difficulties. The Vienna tragedy revealed a perfect unity of views between Paris and Rome regarding Austrian independence and the necessity for checking German expansion, but it also showed up the dangers of friction between Italy and Yugoslavia. It showed that for France the road to Rome is *viâ* Belgrade. M. Barthou set immediately to work. The Council and League meetings gave him a suitable opportunity to try his hand. He succeeded in inducing Italy and Great Britain to renew the

declaration of January 1934 concerning Austrian independence; but he failed to persuade Italy to accept the thesis that this independence should be placed under international, or mainly international, protection. M. Barthou did not abandon hope. He thought it might be possible—and the hope was probably not vain—to induce King Alexander to offer Italy some concessions. He was of the opinion that this evidence of good-will, combined with fear of German designs and care for Italian general interests, would bring the Duce round to a more conciliatory frame of mind. The impending visit of King Alexander to Paris and his own forthcoming visit to Rome appeared to him to offer a good chance to adjust these thorny matters. Alas! death came upon him at the very moment when he was about to carry out these great intentions.

Such, in its broad lines, was the work of Barthou. The criminal bullet that struck down the man also struck down the work in process of being done. Will that work go on? Will it prove to be of durable character?

Barthou's political conception was marked by three characteristics. It was, in the first place, humane and liberal. It never sought to divide; it sought to unite. He was of a generation animated by faith in European solidarity, and the dogma of 'sacred selfishness' inspired him with disgust. His methods were different from those of Briand, but his doctrine was close akin to those of his great predecessor. Had Germany been disposed to enter into the European family in real sincerity, Barthou would have warmly welcomed her.

The second characteristic of the Barthou policy is its traditionalism. He followed out the path laid out before him, but he brought to the work new methods and a virile spirit. All the attempts we have reviewed here, successful or unsuccessful, finished or unfinished, followed out lines of policy that, on the whole, have been those of French diplomacy ever since 1918. Some of these ends—for instance, a *détente* between Paris and Rome—were not persevered in by some French Foreign Ministers; but this was not due to lack of desire, but to lack of readiness to face the risk of failure. The merit of Barthou is that he was prepared to take risks when he thought the stake warranted them.

Finally, Barthou's policy was not—as that of Delcassé had been, for instance—a policy of the future, but rather a policy of the moment. The furious speed at which world events develop nowadays scarcely gave him an opportunity to draw up schemes the fruition of which lay a long time ahead. These events nowadays are often of so grave a character, so laden with tragedy and fate, that immediate action is called for. The Hitlerite threat, for instance, appeared to Barthou to be an immediate danger, and he

was penetrated with the need to build a dam to contain it. That dam was the League of the Peaceful.

Some critics have said that the weakness of the Barthou policy was that there was too much friendship in it—friendship in every direction, with everybody. It has been hinted that to seek to induce Russia and Poland, Italy and Yugoslavia, Poland and Lithuania, to walk hand in hand was a Utopian dream as impossible of achievement as a marriage between fire and water. To conceive such a dream certainly called for courage. To carry it out called for even more courage—for that quality which the French call '*audace*.' '*Audace*' is born of the heart, and Barthou's policy was a policy of the heart—a heart that beat to the rhythm of a world-wide reconciliation for the maintenance of peace.

FRÉDÉRIC SABATIER.

CRISIS IN SPAIN

ANYONE who, in common-room, club and railway-carriage, has the opportunity of listening frequently to conversations on Spanish affairs will agree that opinion on that subject has never been more perplexed and confused than in the days which have passed since the events of the 6th and 7th of October. Partly this is due to newspaper placards, which continually proclaim that Spain has passed a 'night of chaos' or a 'day of terror,' or, with that affection for the concatenation of substantives which distinguishes the modern headline, announce a 'revolution fear' or a 'civil war threat crisis.' For the last eighteen months constant reports of general strikes (which sound alarming in England, but in Spain are frequently no more than general holidays observed by popular consent) have accustomed the newspaper reader to the idea that the whole of Spain is seething with discontent and is likely periodically to boil over. The promptly repressed rising of last month is generally interpreted as one of these inevitable ebullitions, and interest seems to be chiefly centred in an examination of the interior of the cauldron. 'Barcelona is at the bottom of it,' says one critic, and the descriptions given in many papers of the proclamation of an 'independent Catalanian republic' would appear to confirm that view. 'The Church is at the bottom of it,' say others, though how this is possible is far from clear. Others, again, hold that 'the Fascists are at the bottom of it': here one apparently finds the influence of newspapers which describe Señor Gil Robles as a 'Fascist leader,' and label all the Conservative parties in the Cortes as Fascist, which is far from being the case.

This article, the aim of which is to attempt to outline the present position in Spain and the causes which have led up to it, is written essentially for the non-specialist, and from as unbiassed a standpoint as is possible. Because I believe that by so doing one can render a real service to Spain, and because, incidentally, one of my duties is to write a weekly summary of Spanish happenings for English readers,¹ I do my utmost to look at Peninsular politics objectively. This is not a popular attitude in Spain itself,

¹ 'Spain Week by Week,' in the *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*.

where the politician, as Sir Charles Petrie in his latest book says of Primo de Rivera, recognises 'only two colours, black and white,' and any attempt to dress in grey is apt to cause doubts to be cast upon one's sincerity. But it is an attitude which I believe history will eventually justify, for I cannot think that Spain's salvation will come from the extremists. The reader must not look in this article, therefore, for the exaggerations of the Conservative writer who recently described the first Republican Government as 'a collection of mediocre clerks . . . whose rise is due to their success in misleading ignorant masses,' nor for the exaggerations of the intellectualist Left, who visualise a 'modern Spain' which casts away all Spain's cherished and inbred traditions and models itself upon the theories of foreign writers. It is possible to appreciate much that is good in the work of a well-known group of Spanish intellectuals and yet to deplore their intolerance, which is as great as that of any group within the Clerical party. It is possible to disagree with the ridiculous statement of Señor Azaña that 'Spain was a Catholic country in the sixteenth century, but Spain is no longer Catholic,'² and at the same time to dissent from the view broadcast in 1931 by Cardinal Segura that over 90 per cent. of Spaniards are practising Catholics. One can rejoice that the advent of the Republic gave an opportunity of self-expression to Spanish liberals, while regretting the illiberal acts which stained the first two years of its existence.

The true cause of Spain's present troubles is the pendulum. It is difficult to realise in England how violent the pendulum-swing can be in a country which by tradition goes to extremes, in whatever direction. The history of the nineteenth century in Spain shows the pendulum in continuous and violent oscillation. The measure of the failure of the Dictatorship, in the twentieth century, was the acceptance of the Republic, which at once proceeded to persecute the chief living supporters of the Dictatorship. García Hernández and Galán, shot for insurrection in December 1930, were execrated, until the following April, as traitors; ever since they have been venerated as martyrs, to such a degree that, three and a half years after their execution, a Cabinet Minister had to resign his portfolio for speaking deprecatingly of them. The members of the Provisional Government were tried and imprisoned by those whom, when once they succeeded to power, they tried and imprisoned in their turn. Now the pendulum has swung back once more and a number of those who were imprisoned under the Monarchy are about to be tried under the Republic for insurrection.

The Republic, then, came in on the crest of a reaction and for

² *El Sol*, October 14, 1931.

two years subjected Spain to a *régime* of repression which few of those who helped to bring it in had visualised. Primo de Rivera had not infrequently suspended a refractory newspaper for a day or two; but Señor Azaña's Governments broke their own Constitution in suspending for weeks, and at times even for months, scores of newspapers to the views of which they took exception. They arrested political suspects, imprisoned them for long periods without trial, deported them to unhealthy regions and detained them there under conditions of the utmost severity.

As a result of this and of much more, the counter-reaction came more quickly than might have been expected, and it says much for the strength of republicanism in Spain that the pendulum in its fresh swing did not overturn the Republic. Señor Azaña clung to office for as long as he could, postponing, early in 1933, the municipal elections, which would certainly have brought his downfall, and consenting only to hold 'partial' elections in what (after his defeat) he stigmatised as 'rotten boroughs.' After it was announced that some 65 per cent. of the candidates elected were hostile to Señor Azaña, the new reaction gathered force, and in November 1933 general elections demolished the Socialist combination in the Cortes, returning 207 members belonging to the parties of the Right, 167 members of the Centre parties (chiefly Radicals), and 99 belonging to the Left, only 58 of whom were Socialists.

As soon as it became clear last November that opinion all over Spain had taken a very determined right incline, all eyes were directed to the young traditionalist leader, Señor Gil Robles, whose group was the largest in the new Cortes and whom many expected to be the new Prime Minister. He is undoubtedly one of the men who will shape Spain's future history. Only thirty-seven years of age, he has the immense advantage of counting youth in vast numbers among his supporters. The enthusiasm of the *Juventud*, or Youth Movement, of his party, *Acción Popular*, would put heart into any cause, as 50,000 of its delegates who faced the snow and rain of a treacherous Sunday last April to demonstrate at El Escorial were able to testify.

Combining, however, with youth the patience of maturity, Señor Gil Robles decided, not to share the government of the country with the Centre, as he might have done, under the Radical leader Señor Lerroux, who now took power, but to wait, as he himself put it, 'until the great mass of people which at present has no political views comes out on our side.' Accordingly the Centre group has governed for the eleven months since the general elections. During the period since the final resignation of Señor Azaña in September 1933 there have been no less than six Radical,

or largely Radical, Cabinets, four of them under the leadership of Señor Lerroux, and one each under Señor Martínez Barrio and Señor Samper. Their task has been easy neither in the Cortes nor in the country, and it has been made infinitely more difficult by the attitude of the extreme Left, notably of Señor Azaña, who, after his rout at the polls, first played the part of a disgruntled Achilles, threatening parliamentary obstruction, and, more recently, has come out into the open in the more dangerous rôle of a revolutionary.³ Obstructionism he might claim to have learned from his parliamentary opponents, who, during the last months he was in power, determinedly blocked one important measure after another until he should resign. But it was not the policy of either Conservatives or Radicals to declare that, if they could not get their own way by parliamentary representation, they would get it by revolution, and it is not, therefore, surprising that even the parties of the extreme Right offered their co-operation to Señor Lerroux's most recent Government when the Socialist rising of October 1934 showed signs of becoming effective.

It will be unnecessary to detail the events of early October, which were broadcast so dramatically by the B.B.C. and fully reported by all sections of the Press. It is clear that the Socialists have played for a high stake and lost heavily. In going to Barcelona, where he was captured, Señor Azaña was going to his spiritual home, for, though he is now discredited in most parts of Spain, his popularity in Catalonia has never waned, owing to his stalwart and unflinching championship of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. At the time of writing, the exact part which he played in the abortive rising is still not clear, but whereas Señor Companys, unlike his great predecessor Señor Macià, is a poor leader, with little presence and personality, somewhat temperamental and easily worked upon by superior minds, Señor Azaña has a powerful, dominating and even domineering temperament, is effective when engaged in constructive activity, and to my personal knowledge was being freely spoken of in Barcelona last spring as Spain's future dictator. It must be confessed that he cuts a somewhat pitiable figure. Whatever one may think of his views and methods, all will admit that, while in office, he showed every sign of being the strong man of the Republic. His own friends have told me that they had not realised the extent of his energy and determination before he climbed into power, and many had looked to him to become the able, constitutional leader of a strong opposition instead of the disintegrating force into which he has degenerated. He can use of himself, never-

³ Cf. his *En el Poder y en la Oposición* (Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1934), a display of frankness for which history, at least, will be grateful.

theless, words once attributed to Primo de Rivera. 'I came to govern,' that statesman is reported to have exclaimed, 'and I did govern.' Will Señor Azaña, we may still ask, govern again?

There remains to be discussed the Catalonian side of the recently quelled rising. Three and a half years ago 50,000 Catalonians stood in the great central square opposite the town-hall of Barcelona and heard Señor Macià proclaim Catalonia's independence of the Monarchy and the establishment of what he described as the Catalan State (*Estat Català*) within a 'union of the Iberian peoples' designated the 'Federal Spanish Republic.' Days of frenzied excitement followed, during which everything was carried through with almost perfect order, and, when the Provisional Government of the Catalan State had conferred with representatives of the Provisional Government of the newly-born Spanish Republic, the Catalonians were persuaded to abjure their federalist aspirations and to accept for their 'State' the historic title of '*Generalitat*,' pending the presentation to the Spanish Cortes *Constituyentes* of a Statute of Catalan Autonomy.

Federalism was expressly ruled out of the Spanish Constitution of 1931, and the vast majority of Catalonians, recognising that the country as a whole was not yet ready for it, accepted the situation with a good grace. But now, three years later, we again find the great square of the capital city of the *Generalitat* thronged with Catalonians cheering a new proclamation. That great veteran Señor Macià has been dead just over nine months, and his successor in the Presidency, who in 1931 was Mayor of Barcelona, has attempted to set up, not, as was so commonly stated in the English Press of early October, an independent Catalan Republic, but exactly the same thing as before, the *Estat Català* within a new federal Republic—a Third Republic from which the extreme autonomists expected a greater degree of freedom and to which Syndicalists and Communists also looked hopefully as bringing them one step nearer to a very different goal which they no less ardently desired.

After fierce fighting and grievous bloodshed, during which the forces of law and order in Catalonia remained splendidly loyal to Spain, Señor Companys' insensate proclamation passed, in only ten hours, into history. It is to be feared that Catalonia will lose prestige, both in Spain and abroad, as a result of his foolhardiness, as she may also lose hard-won and greatly valued privileges. In Madrid, where for the last year any stick has been good enough to beat her with, there will doubtless be widespread agitations for reprisals. Abroad, Barcelona has never lost an unfortunate reputation, gained, deservedly enough, in the dark days of 1909, for being the 'storm-centre of Spain.' But in actual fact Catalonia has every reason to be proud of her relations with the

Central Government since the establishment of the Republic. The Pact of San Sebastián, signed secretly in August 1930, by which the Catalan leaders promised their help in the overthrow of the Monarchy to the Republicans (who afterwards formed the Provisional Government) in return for the assurance of support, when that end was reached, towards their long-desired autonomy, was honoured to the letter by both parties. The *Generalitat*, as has been said, modified its pretensions at the first request of the Provisional Government of the Spanish Republic—the entire negotiations took only two days and the decision was accepted everywhere. The Statute of Autonomy was drafted in Catalonia, approved by the Catalonian authorities, and finally submitted to the people and voted, in a referendum held in August 1931, by a majority of nearly 200 to 1. The statute was then debated by the Cortes over a period during which there was carried on in the country a campaign against it of an intensity and bitterness which surprised most Spaniards. The Right parties, who at this time were still overwhelmed by the reaction which brought in the Republic, saw an opportunity of recovering ground by raising a 'patriotic' agitation against the 'dismemberment of Spain.' There was so strong a majority in the Cortes for meeting Catalonia's reasonable claims, which the Monarchy had alternately played with and disregarded, that the passing of the statute was never seriously in doubt. But the agitation throughout the country, and the stubborn opposition of a minority within the Cortes, resulted in a drastic revision, amounting to mutilation, of terms which had been so nearly unanimously approved in Catalonia. Despite this, Señor Macià and his people accepted the decisions of the Cortes without demur. 'I warmly appreciate the admirable example of discipline which you have set,' said the veteran soldier-President to his people, 'and I have every confidence that you will receive this statute with all good-will, *though it is not the statute for which we voted.*' In judging the Catalonians, the truth of the last phrase must not be forgotten. Since it was uttered, two years ago, their patience has been sorely tried by long delays in giving effect to parts of the statute; the Radicals, a defeated and discredited party in Barcelona, have come into power in Madrid; and, finally, Catalan feelings have been exacerbated by a recent conflict, of five months' duration, with this same Radical Government. Yet there has been less discontent and disorder during the last three years under the Republic in Catalonia than in many other parts of Spain which have less reason for discontent. Great material progress has been accomplished: if the Catalonians asked the Central Government for ten talents, they have made excellent use of the five which alone were given them. To this, in one aspect at least, I

can personally testify, for I have been in close touch with the Catalan educational authorities, especially with the now autonomous University of Barcelona, where the complete absence of student riots contrasts markedly with the continual disturbances in the universities of the rest of Spain. In each successive visit to Catalonia I have been struck with the growing cordiality of opinion as between Barcelona and Madrid. Furthermore, it may be doubted how far the cheers which greeted Señor Companys on October 6 represented the true opinion of Catalonia, for the *Esquerra*, or Left, of which he is the leader, has for some time been losing popularity. On the last occasion when feeling was fairly tested—the Catalan municipal elections of January 14, 1934—the *Esquerra*, which had formerly been almost supreme in the region, gained in Barcelona City no more than sixteen votes to every thirteen of the moderate party (*Lliga Catalana*) and to every two votes of the Radicals.

This leads us to a consideration of some importance not always taken into account by writers on Spain who are not interested in Catalonian politics. The really disturbing element in the Spanish-Catalonian situation during the last eleven months has been the incompatibility of character between the Government of Catalonia and that of Madrid. Normally, one might expect political opinion in the *Generalitat* to run along parallel lines with those of Republican Spain as a whole. This, indeed, it did until the last Spanish general elections, when the Spanish electors reacted in favour of Conservatism, whereas the Catalonian Parliament continued to be dominated by the Left. As Catalonian deputies also sit in the Republican Cortes, an anomalous position was thus created, which caused a good deal of feeling.

But, unless some unexpected development takes place (and I am writing these lines only a few days after the failure of the rising and the arrest of Señor Companys and his colleagues), the result of this abortive movement should be to bring the *Lliga Catalana* into power in Catalonia, under Señor Cambó, one of the ablest men in the whole of Spain, who, on merit alone, should have succeeded Señor Macià last January as President of the *Generalitat*, and who stands a head and shoulders above all his fellow-politicians. Unhappily for Catalonia, Señor Cambó became unpopular in 1931, and though during the Monarchy he had done more than most of his countrymen for Catalan autonomy, he found himself exiled by popular opinion at what should have been the moment of a great personal triumph. The *Lliga*, unlike a considerable section of the *Esquerra*, is opposed to separatism in any shape or form, and, if the Central Government can resist the temptation to indulge in reprisals, Señor Cambó

should be successful in completing the material progress of Catalonia as an autonomous State.

And the future in Spain as a whole? He would be a bold man who would prophesy it in any detail so shortly after an upheaval which, though suppressed with commendable promptness, is the most serious by far that the Republic has yet had to face. But to me at least it seems clear that the régime is not weakened, but rather greatly strengthened, by what has happened both in Barcelona and elsewhere. Those newspaper readers who at every Spanish crisis remark 'Now for the Restoration!' will once more be disappointed; I am convinced that if the Bourbons ever return to the throne of Spain it can only be on the rebound from some unsuccessful and unpopular form of government by the extreme Left. Political uncertainty in Spain, needless to say, gives cause for great anxiety, and if much depends on the maintenance of a calm and prudent attitude to recent events by those now in power, much more hangs upon the time and method of their abandoning office, as they must surely soon do, and the composition and policy of the Government which will immediately succeed them. But, since I have spoken throughout for myself alone, let me end by saying this: Through the dark days and the bright days of the Dictatorship, and through the bright days and the dark days of the Second Republic, I have had the utmost confidence that Spain is firmly set on the high road to a great future. I have not only a warm affection for her people, but a deep respect and admiration for their capabilities, and I am convinced that the pendulum of her changing fortunes will come at last to rest, and that, through a democratically elected Government, the Spanish people will give effect to principles combining traditionalism and progress, which for Spain at least spells prosperity.

E. ALLISON PEERS.

MOSCOW AT GENEVA

'THE League of Nations,' M. Stalin told the fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1928, 'is an organisation designed to mask preparations for war. If we were to enter it, we should have the choice between the hammer and the anvil. We wish to be neither the hammer of the weak nations nor an anvil for the strong.' It was not the first, nor the last, time that M. Stalin spoke thus. Nor was he expressing a purely personal distaste for the ways of Geneva. The League has been a favourite subject of Soviet criticism since its foundation. Lenin called it an 'instrument of brigandage' before M. Stalin; M. Molotoff, present chairman of the Union Council of People's Commissars, has enlarged on the theme of the 'robber League' after him. Even M. Litvinoff, Foreign Commissar and by comparison with these three a fine diplomatist, has expressed similar opinions without periphrasis. Yet in 1934 the Soviet Union is offered, and accepts, League membership. In 1935 M. Litvinoff is to preside over a meeting of the League Council. In his speech acknowledging his country's election, M. Litvinoff told the League Assembly that the Soviet Union had 'common aims' with the other League members 'in the preservation of peace.'

The contrast appears sharp. The sharpness is due in part to a change in the international position of the Soviet Union; in part it is the effect of British ignorance of some intervening stages of Soviet development. Had Japan not occupied Manchuria in 1931, the Soviet Union might not have been a member of the League yet; she would have been a member eventually. That is the natural culmination of a trend apparent long before M. Stalin attained his present eminence. Present entry into the League heralds no drastic change in Soviet foreign policy. (Still less does it presage, as some critics have suggested, a coming 'bolshevisation' of Western Europe. During the drafting of the League Covenant—at a time, that is, when 'Bolshevism' as the term has come to be understood was much more of a reality than it is now—Lord Cecil proposed an amendment of Article IV. to allow eventual Soviet representation on the League Council.) The consistent aim of Soviet foreign policy has been the consistent

aim of every State with long and vulnerable land frontiers—namely, security. Propagandist speeches by Soviet leaders have at times disguised that fact; Soviet acts have displayed it. Attempts to reach working non-aggression agreements with her neighbours were made by the Soviet Union before Lenin's death. And while the official *Izvestia* was assuring good Russian Communists that 'we have no intention of placing our head under the League of Nations axe,' the former Admiral Berens was being sent in 1924 to a Naval Conference which was held in London under League auspices.

After Lenin's death attempts to secure the Soviet frontiers by co-operation with other nations were accelerated. As early as October 1925 Chicherin was favourably considering the idea of appointing an official Soviet 'observer' at Geneva. The idea never progressed beyond the stage of consideration, partly because of intransigent Swiss opposition to the admission of Soviet citizens to Swiss territory. But when Swiss opposition had been modified, Soviet delegates attended conferences of an indubitably 'League' complexion, such as the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927. In the meantime the Soviet Union, while building up her army to war strength and officially professing the creed of world revolution, could not be accused of neglecting the advantages provided by pacific means of settlement of international dispute. In 1925 she signed her first non-aggression treaty—with Turkey. In 1926 she signed non-aggression treaties with Afghanistan and Lithuania; in 1927 with Persia. In 1928, although M. Litvinoff's own amendments were rejected, she hastened to be among the first to sign the Kellogg Peace Pact.

The decidedly non-Communist nature of Kemalist Turkey is sufficient proof that even at this early date Soviet revolutionary idealism was tempered with realism. But in truth the British supposition that the ideas of world revolution in general, and of international co-operation in the particular, are incompatible is not as self-evident as it appears to be. Members of the same British Government have been known to pursue divergent paths in foreign policy. Why, then, should we assume that it is impossible for M. Stalin's right hand—which is the Communist International—to preach the subversion of foreign Governments, while his left hand—which is the Soviet Foreign Commissariat—makes treaties which depend for their value on the permanence of those very foreign Governments? In international affairs, perhaps even more than in national, mankind is ruled by shibboleths. The shibboleth that in this instance has held sway over British minds is the Soviet-made shibboleth of 'Soviet isolation.' Though there may be a difference of aim between the Soviet

Union and capitalist nations, the Soviet Union has in fact been among the most active nations of the world in international co-operation. M. Litvinoff himself has probably made more pacts than even Mr. Kellogg, and, in the last two years, paid more official visits to foreign capitals than any other Foreign Minister.

That is true of the whole history of the Soviet Union. It is especially true of the Soviet Union since 1928. The reasons for Soviet eagerness to legalise her security since 1928 are also the reasons for Soviet eagerness to enter the League of Nations. 'Foreign policy,' said M. Karl Radek in an article in *Izvestia* early this year, 'is a function of domestic policy.' In 1928 the Soviet Union began its first Five-Year Plan. The Five-Year Plan was an intensification of Soviet domestic policy in industry and agriculture. More industrial plants were erected; more and more formerly individualist peasants were driven into collective farms. The immediate result of the first move was to make the Soviet Union more than ever dependent on the technical resources of the capitalist nations in men and machinery; of the second to create a formidable body of discontent within the Soviet borders. M. Voroschiloff, Soviet Commissar for War, recently admitted that the proportion of peasants in the Red army had been reduced from 60 per cent. in 1929 to just over 40 per cent. The admission is significant. Peasant soldiers have peasant relatives.

Collectivisation and industrialisation made internal Soviet difficulties more probable and peace with its neighbours more than ever a Soviet necessity. At the same time the threat of war, hitherto in the main a bogey-man used to spur on the Soviet workers, had become a practical possibility. In 1931 Japanese troops occupied Manchuria. A traditional enemy was thus brought near, not only to the frontiers of maritime provinces which have detached themselves from the Russian Empire before, but to a route into the heart of Siberia through Mongolia. In 1933 came the Nazi *régime* in Germany. There is no 'natural' opposition between Bolshevism, which is the Russian form of Communism, and Nazism, which is the German. (In spite of Nazi identification of Jewry and Bolshevism and its own professed hatred of both, there are Jews in the Nazi Government and non-Jews in the Soviet.) But if there is no 'natural' opposition between Bolshevism and Nazism, there was enough historical 'urge to the East' behind Herr Hugenberg's repudiated memorandum to the World Economic Conference on the 'colonisation of Russia' to give the idea, if not the document, some reality. Herr Hugenberg's dismissal from office was not a dismissal of this reality, for the Baltic-born Herr Rosenberg and his schemes remained. Soviet plans for ensuring national security were pushed forward.

Their first form was the old familiar form of bilateral treaties. In 1933 M. Litvinoff, on behalf of the Soviet Union, signed non-aggression treaties with all the Soviet Union's immediate neighbours except Rumania; and agreements defining 'aggression' with all of them, including Rumania. He ratified, or concluded, new pacts with Czechoslovakia, France and Italy. Later in the year the Soviet Government was recognised by Holland and Spain, and, thanks to an adventitious change in the occupancy of the White House, by the United States of America. Early this year, thanks to an adventitious realignment of Europe in face of a (real or supposed) threat from Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union has been recognised by members of the Little Entente and Hungary. But, however much protection this circle of alliances and pacts might give the Soviet Union against a militarily efficient nation which had once ignominiously defeated Russia in the West, in the East the Soviet door remained open to another militarily efficient nation which had also once inflicted on Russia an ignominious defeat. Mr. Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister, had decisively rejected the proposal made by M. Litvinoff in January 1933 for a Soviet-Japanese treaty of non-aggression. M. Litvinoff began to think of yet other means of co-operation with the capitalist nations.

The first-fruits of his thought were given in December 1933 to the All-Union Central Executive Committee.

Not every capitalist State [he told that body] has an equal desire for war at all times. . . . I am not going to assess motives, but am merely stating a fact which is highly valuable to us. . . . Not being doctrinaires, [he rather surprisingly added] we do not refuse to make use of any amalgamations and organisations, either existing or possible of formation, if we have now or in the future reason to believe that they serve the cause of peace.

Some hint of what M. Litvinoff meant by 'the cause of peace' was given by M. Stalin to a correspondent of the *New York Times* a month later. 'In spite of the German and Japanese withdrawals from the League,' M. Stalin said then, 'or perhaps because of it, the League may well become a brake to restrict or hamper military action.' M. Stalin's hint was broadened into a vivid and somewhat exaggerated picture by M. Motta when he told the League Assembly that the reason for Soviet willingness to enter the League was 'written in letters of fire in the Far Eastern sky.'

If one reason for Soviet willingness to enter the League is obvious, however, the reasons for the League's willingness to welcome the Soviet Union to membership are less so. On the contrary, presumed friends of international co-operation (and some who have no faith in international co-operation) have seen many reasons why the Soviet Union should not have been

admitted to Geneva. Thirty-nine States voted for Soviet admission to League membership; seven—Argentina, Belgium, Cuba, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela—abstained from voting; three—Holland, Portugal, and Switzerland—voted against it. The lack of unanimity is sufficient evidence of the necessity for what Mr. De Valera called the 'hotel room intrigues' which preceded the Soviet application for membership; in view of the rebuff administered to Germany on her first application for League membership in 1927, it would have been folly for the Soviet Union's sponsors not to take all possible steps to guard against too heavy an adverse vote.

The composition of the adverse vote is a tempting invitation to cynical comparison. It would be interesting, for example, to compare the grounds of the Paraguayan delegate's abstention with his country's performance of League obligations. Such cynical comparisons would, however, be unjust to the States which definitely opposed Soviet entry. So is the facile explanation which puts down their opposition to the count of Nazi influence. In the matter of what is commonly called civilisation some of the small States have a much better record than the big; it is a not unreasonable assumption that M. Motta, the representative of Switzerland, was moved by genuine feeling when he expressed his country's doubts as to whether the Soviet Union was, in the Swiss meaning of the term, a civilised nation. The doubts were the more reasonable in that the League had exacted from some of its members, such as Liberia, concrete proofs of their civilisation. What was not so reasonable was what M. Motta himself called Switzerland's 'negative and expectant attitude.' In the case of Liberia, the League is—whether rightly or wrongly—able to enforce its own standards. In the case of the Soviet Union, it cannot. An admittedly negative attitude therefore seems, seventeen years after the Bolshevik Revolution, somewhat impractical.

M. Motta's attitude was, however, strictly logical. So were the arguments with which some British politicians, of several shades, opposed their Government's policy. Typical of them was Lord Charnwood. The League, he pointed out, was founded in expression of humanitarian spirit. The Soviet Government, on its own admission, was waging 'war' on its own people within a territory greater than the combined territory of all the other European States members of the League. Sir Francis Lindley, formerly British Ambassador in Tokyo, added that the League's willingness to admit any country, irrespective of whether it paid its subscription or of the manner in which it treated its subjects, was damaging to the League's objects. Dr. Edwyn Bevan suggested that it was 'exceedingly doubtful, to say the least, whether the contact of a few representatives of Russia with Geneva is

likely so to charge them with the virtue of peace that they will be able to carry that virtue back to Moscow and produce a change of heart there.' (Incidentally, Dr. Bevan's view is in contrast with that of a Labour commentator who recently lamented in the official Labour organ that 'the Russians, who used to know better, have been corrupted by the evil communication of the other Powers'.)

All three, and many others, were united in agreement that Soviet entry into Geneva would cause an increase of Soviet subversive propaganda. In this they might have found support in *Izvestia*, which, commenting on M. Litvinoff's speech of acceptance, wrote that 'the fight for peace which the Soviet Union will carry on within the League of Nations will show the workers of the world that only the proletariat, *freed of all capitalist influence*, can become a great force for world peace' (my italics). But *Izvestia's* propagandist articles no more deserve to be taken at face value than do the pacific speeches of M. Litvinoff. Both are no more and no less true now than was M. Rakovsky's assurance to the British public in 1925 that 'the Third International is not the Soviet Government.' The Soviet Union may present two faces. But in the long run it is neither the Soviet official nor the Soviet unofficial face which counts most; it is the extent of the funds available for propaganda and the prospect of their being used to some profit. Funds are low now, and in the not very distant past have been used—in China, for example—to no ultimate profit. The Soviet Union was content at Geneva in September to give guarantees of good conduct.

Every member of the League subscribes to the League Covenant. Article I. of the Covenant says that 'any fully self-governing State may become a member of the League . . . provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its intention to observe its international obligations.' These guarantees M. Litvinoff implicitly gave when he said that the first condition of Soviet co-operation with capitalist States was 'mutual non-interference.' He added—a point which is likely to be emphasised in the future—that the articles of the Covenant should not be applied to questions arising before Soviet admission to League membership.

In the course of the negotiations for Soviet admission to the League there are many more temptations to cynicism than that described above. One lies in comparison between the guarantees asked of the Soviet Union and the manner in which the other Great Powers have themselves fulfilled the guarantees they gave in the Peace Treaties; another in comparison of the relevant criticisms of Soviet domestic policy with the general desire for re-entry into the League of a Nazi Germany which denies common

human rights to a great proportion of its citizens. Putting these temptations behind, it may be observed that Soviet entry into the League is unlikely of itself to intensify Soviet propaganda, and that there will, at any rate, now be a clear breach of faith in all cases where it is flagrant. In the meantime the Congress of the Communist International has been postponed indefinitely and it is announced that the date and manner of *Comintern* activities are to be determined by the Foreign Commissariat.

That is one gain for the League. There are others. Apart from its political work, the League has become—and will probably in all circumstances remain—a great economic, intellectual and moral clearing-house. Though nothing but a change of the human heart could kill what is called 'the old diplomacy,' the provision by which treaties made by members of the League are invalid until registered at the League Secretariat gives 'the new diplomacy' at least a chance of survival. In these minor matters there is obvious gain in the membership of a country which, stretching across two continents, has a population greater than that of Britain, France, and Germany together. Besides these minor gains, Soviet adhesion to the League, when added to President Roosevelt's pledge to consult with the other Great Powers, makes something nearer a world parliament than seemed possible two years ago. Moreover, with Soviet delegates at Geneva, Germany and Japan may find it inconvenient to be the only Great Powers outside the world concert.

There are corresponding dangers. Some have already become apparent. No sooner had Soviet admission to the League become certain than Poland denounced the Minorities Treaties. Poland's action may, as has been alleged, have been her price for the ultimate surrender of her temporary seat on the League Council. It is in any case a blow to the Versailles system of which the Minorities Treaties are an integral part. Another and greater danger is on the horizon. Unsuccessful League intervention in the Manchurian crisis threatened for a time to cause the League's downfall. In the event of a serious Soviet-Japanese dispute there would certainly be a Soviet appeal to the League. Unsuccessful League intervention might then make the downfall of the League as a political force a certainty. But if there is to be a serious Soviet-Japanese dispute, Soviet absence from Geneva would not prevent it. And if the League Covenant has any meaning, it is one of its major functions to attempt a peaceful solution in just such crises. Soviet membership of the League is unlikely to bring the world nearer salvation. It cannot well bring it nearer chaos.

WILFRID HINDLE.

THE ARMAMENTS RACKET

The Paraguay and Bolivia fracas appears to be coming to a termination, so business from that end is probably finished. We certainly are in one hell of a business, where a fellow has to wish for trouble so as to make a living; the only consolation being, however, that if we don't get the business someone else will. It would be a terrible state of affairs if my conscience started to bother me now.

In these words Mr. Frank S. Jonas, of the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation of America, wrote to a colleague on the corporation's South American staff, in December 1927, in a letter produced in the American Arms Traffic Enquiry. Mr. Jonas's fears were not realised. The 'fracas' in question, afterwards described by the League's Commission as a 'singularly pitiless and horrible' war, made possible by the importation of arms from abroad, broke out, died down, broke out again, in spite of the efforts of the American Government and the League to stop it. In 1933 the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was still busy supplying both sides with aeroplanes for blowing each other to bits, carefully concealing from each customer the fact that it was simultaneously dealing with the enemy; and when the Bolivians were reported last summer to have bombed unfortified Paraguayan settlements on the upper Paraguay River, Mr. Webster, another agent of the corporation, wrote to his colleague: 'I'm glad to see the Bolivians are getting some good out of the planes they have bought.'

'Some good out of the planes they have bought'! How difficult it is here in a quiet England, reading *The Nineteenth Century*, to vivify in imagination those complacent salesman's words. 'If suffering were a communicable experience,' Duhamel wrote, 'another war would be impossible.' But the Gran Chaco is far away; the respectable shareholders in British and American firms exporting war supplies do not actually overhear their agents persuading the bankrupt Bolivians and the bankrupt Paraguayans that they could 'get some good' out of buying some more killing-power from their firm; and, in the absence of any concerted control of the trade, everyone can console himself, like Mr. Jonas, with the thought that 'if we don't get the business, someone else will.' And so the trade goes on and on,

still unregulated after all the past exposures that it is indeed 'one hell of a business.' Our own Government, though belatedly sponsoring a much-needed embargo on arms exports to Bolivia and Paraguay, has been more than unhelpful as regards any attempt to deal drastically with the whole system which allows of the manufacture, sale, and boosting of armaments for private profit. The business in arms has been treated as if it were no different in its social consequences from business in butter or bicycles. 'Business is business.' And the blame for that lies, not at the door of the Jonases and Websters, the Commander Cravens and Sir Basil Zaharoffs, but at our own door and our Government's, in so far as we have shared in the indifference which allows the present anarchy to continue. The real lesson of the American Arms Enquiry, and the point of the present article, is not that individual manufacturers and traders are enemies of society, or even that grave offences, evasions of the rules of the game, brutal callousness, have been exposed, but that society cannot afford to allow itself to remain any longer unprotected against the uncontrolled trade in armaments and their manufacture and sale for private profit.

The case is no new one. Fifteen years ago, when the Covenant of the League was drafted, it was already so painfully clear a case in its broad outlines that it was emphasised in the text of Article VIII.:

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

There was already ample evidence at that time for such a charge; and the Mulliner case in England, the Mitsui-Vickers case in Japan, the Brandt case in Germany, the Putiloff story, and others, were only the accidental and occasional disclosures of a malady that was continuing all the time.

In 1921 a sub-Committee of the League's Temporary Mixed Commission summarised the 'evil effects' referred to in the Covenant; but, unfortunately, it does not appear to have based its charges upon any body of sifted evidence—at any rate, no such body of evidence was published. The six charges made by the Committee may fairly be described as a just summary of the general case as then known; and no attempt has been made to rebut them. Since that time a good deal of evidence has leaked out which justifies particular charges. For instance, the appalling Seletzki case in Roumania afforded clear evidence that, as the Committee had said, 'armament firms have been active in fomenting

war-scares and in persuading their own countries' (in this case a foreign country) 'to adopt warlike policies and to increase their armaments.' The Shearer case afforded proof of the efforts of armament firms to wreck disarmament projects and embitter Anglo-American relations. Disclosures about the control of some of the greatest French newspapers by the armament ring, and about the control of newspapers in Delaware by Duponts, have reinforced the Committee's charge that 'armament firms have sought to influence public opinion through the control of newspapers. . . .' The story of the war-profiteering by armament firms during the war has become better known since the Committee reported, and has lent new point to charges as to the formation of armament rings to force up the price of armaments against the Governments. In short, those who, like the French Government in 1933, have pressed for strong concerted action to deal with the 'evil effects' of the unregulated arms trade have had plenty of material to go upon, even before the American Enquiry.

But that Enquiry has already done more, in its first stage, to give the needed stimulus to public opinion than any of the earlier disclosures. Not that it has elicited anything very different in kind from what was already known to those who have followed the subject; but it has added enormously to the battery of argument and fact, just at a time when millions of people, here and in America and in France and elsewhere, are anxious about the whole business and ready to support a courageous effort to master its anarchy. Anyone who has tried addressing meetings in many parts of the country on peace and disarmament during the past year or two will bear witness to the intense interest which this subject arouses; even in munitions centres and places hard hit by unemployment there is a striking support for the suppression of all manufacture of armaments for private profit. If this issue were put to the vote to-day in practicable shape, there would, I am convinced, be an overwhelming majority for a policy involving suppression.

President Roosevelt, Senator Nye and his colleagues, and the American peace movement which urged that such an Enquiry should be held, deserve the gratitude of the world. It may well be that the exposures have the effect, for the moment, of causing substantial damage to the American arms trade; and at least one English newspaper (the *Evening Standard*, in its 'Londoner's Diary') has exulted over the consequent benefit to British arms traders. But the major interests of the United States and of the whole world will reap great benefit from the Enquiry if it has the sequel which is called for. Enormous vested interests will be at work to prevent that sequel; but there has been such a shake-up already that the situation can hardly be restored to what

it was. Now let us look at some of the chief episodes dealt with in the Enquiry up till September 22, with the help of the texts of documents printed in the *New York Times*.

Take first the story of the great business in submarines that is shared, it is alleged, between Vickers-Armstrong in this country and the Electric Boat Company in America. The Committee of Enquiry was informed that the American company, possessing important patents for submarine construction, divided the world with Vickers, and afterwards with Vickers-Armstrong, for the sale of submarines. Vickers has the use of the American firm's patents and pays a percentage of profits to them on this account. (The percentage appears in one context as 3 per cent., in another context as 5 per cent.) According to the *Daily Telegraph*, the figure of £444,000 was mentioned as representing payments from Vickers to the Electric Boat Company in respect of royalties. In addition, a Spanish firm, two Dutch firms, and an Australian firm paid tribute to the American company; and that company in turn paid large sums to Sir Basil Zaharoff, who was alleged as acknowledging, amongst other receipts from the company, a 'cheque for 391,497 pesetas on Madrid, with which I'm doing the needful.' (The American company also had an agreement before the war with the Whitehead Company of Fiume, then in Austria-Hungary; and this firm, violating the agreement, supplied designs of submarines to Germany. Thus the German U-boats, which did so much to bring America into the war, were built with the help of American patents. The American company afterwards claimed 17,000,000 dollars from Germany for infringement of their patents.)

To return to the relations between the American company and Vickers: it appears almost certain, from the papers published in the Enquiry, that both the British and the American firms kept their agreement secret from their respective Admiralties. Commander Sir Charles Craven, formerly a naval officer, who has been managing director of Vickers since 1923, is alleged to have written a letter, produced in the Enquiry, to Mr. Spear, of the Electric Boat Company (date not reported), from which it appears that he was disturbed at the possibility of his clients learning of the agreement.

May I suggest that even in code it is better not to mention any names of ships, as I am rather afraid that such telegrams might get into the hands of our clients and it would be awkward if they asked me about any agreement with you. I am sure you will appreciate what I mean.

Mr. Spear was asked at the Enquiry whether the clients referred to in this letter were the British Government. He replied that he could not give a positive answer; but it seems probable that the

British Admiralty were the clients most likely to be in a position to get hold of the company's telegrams and ask awkward questions about them. As for the American company, Mr. Spear asserted that he told the American naval authorities about the agreement with Vickers; but Senator Swanson, Secretary of the Navy, has himself denied this statement. Presumably, if a similar enquiry is held in this country, questions will be asked as to whether the British company has, in fact, concealed from the Admiralty, over a period of years, its connexion with, and financial liability to, a foreign firm.

In November 1927 the notable amalgamation between Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth took place. Before that time the two firms were ostensibly competitors in tendering for Admiralty contracts. A letter purporting to be from Commander Craven, written at some date in 1927 (the month is not reported), was read at the Enquiry:

We have received invitations from the Admiralty for one, two, or three submarines. Armstrong-Whitworth has too. Armstrong will put in their bid whatever the price. I shall tell Armstrong to put the price slightly above ours so that whatever is built will be built at Barrow [*i.e.*, a Vickers']. My friend at the Admiralty will help us, as he tried to get all five submarines for us last year.

If an enquiry in this country is held, questions will presumably be asked not only as to the identity and behaviour of Commander Craven's alleged 'friend at the Admiralty,' but also as to the existence of the alleged camouflaged agreement between the two firms, Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth, for the purpose of forcing up prices at the taxpayer's expense.

In that same year, 1927, the British Government was urging at the Coolidge Conference the total abolition of submarines, or, failing that, their limitation in tonnage, under two categories, and possibly their limitation by numbers. Naturally, this policy did not suit Vickers any more than it suited the American armament firms which employed Mr. Shearer to wreck the Coolidge Conference. But the British Government continued to advocate this policy—*e.g.*, at the Disarmament Conference in 1932. On September 30, 1932, Commander Craven is alleged to have described to the Electric Boat Company the contracts he expected to get from the British Government, provided that large submarines were not outlawed by 'Geneva or some other fancy Convention.' On January 6, 1933, Commander Craven is alleged to have written again:

The [British] Admiralty promised us the order for the H.M.S. *Clyde*, but in this latter case they will not give us a contract until after the end of March. In other words, they will have the right to withdraw their promised order for the second ship if Geneva or any other troublesome pleasure organisation upsets the large submarine.

Now look at some of the documents, produced in the Enquiry, which suggest that questions are desirable as to whether bribery has played a part in the business of Vickers after the war, as it certainly did in the Mitsui-Vickers case before the war, and as it apparently does in the business of many of the other firms whose dealings were examined at Washington. Here is a letter alleged to have been written from Barrow by Commander Craven on September 10, 1930, to Mr. Spear, of the Electric Boat Company:

MY DEAR SPEAR,—Just a line to let you know that we have received the order for the special vessel, after most difficult negotiations. I still hope your company will meet me regarding the amount due to you, because there was certain action I had to take which involved expenditure and which I am sure you would have agreed with. I cannot possibly say any more in writing, but when the long-promised visit takes place we will have a talk.

What was that action involving expenditure about which Commander Craven is alleged to have been so very secretive that he could not even mention it in writing, though he was prepared to report it verbally to the American firm?

Happily for the private submarine builders, the British (and American) Government's policy of abolishing the submarine has had no success. Nor have the British and American Governments, in collaboration with the League of Nations, been successful in preventing or stopping a succession of wars in South America. The secret arrangement between Vickers and the Boat Company (it is alleged) enabled the two to divide the business of selling killing-power to the disputants. In 1927, when the Tacna-Arica controversy between Chile and Peru was raging, the Boat Company was supplying submarines to Peru and helping to dispose of Peruvian bonds on the American market. The Boat Company was asked whether it could sell to Chile two submarines of more than 900 tons displacement. The company thought it would not look quite nice for it to be supplying both Chile and Peru at the same time; so it turned over the business to Vickers, its British licensee. Writing to Vickers, it is alleged to have said:

For reasons with which you are already familiar, I think that as the cards now lie it will be best, for the time being at least, to continue to talk of nothing but British construction [for Chile]. . . . This is an appropriate time for me to tell you that none of us here have ever met our Chilean representative, and consequently we cannot in any way vouch for his reliability. We all know however that the real foundation of all South American business is graft, and it may very well be that he knows the proper people to pay in Santiago. At any rate, I am passing the thing along to you for such action as you may think it proper to take, having in

view your own separate negotiations. . . . In conclusion, I would like to add a little unsolicited and perhaps superfluous advice, which is, that I would not be too modest about the price and would cover into a substantial amount in excess of the 10 per cent. above referred to, [namely 5 per cent. commission plus 5 per cent. royalty to be paid by Vickers to the Boat Company] my own experience being that at the last minute something extra is always needed to grease the ways. Very sincerely yours
L. Y. SPEAR.

Much of the Enquiry has, of course, been concerned with sales of arms, and the touting for such sales, to the quarrelling States in South America. In reading the published papers about this, it is important to remember that, though the sales business has many repellent features, the States in question are at present just as much entitled to have national armaments, and to compete against each other in killing-power, as any other States. Indeed countries such as Peru are free to import many kinds of weapons which may not be imported into the countries whose armaments were restricted by the Peace Treaties. Countries such as Chile are free to order naval armaments without regard to the restrictions self-imposed by the chief naval Powers. The fact that Bolivia and Paraguay are dependent on imports for their armament supply affords an opportunity of giving some practical effect to the world's judgment, if the world should judge that their belligerence is indefensible; but in truth, whatever case there may be for restricting the armaments of South American States which cannot manufacture the latest scientific devices for destroying their neighbours applies, theoretically, with equal force to the restriction of the armaments of North American, European, and other States. So long as there is no General Disarmament Treaty, no regulation of arms manufacture, and no co-ordinated control of the arms traffic, arms competition between two South American Republics is not in itself more anarchic than that between, say, Italy and France. The anarchy is general.

But the Enquiry has plainly shown—what, indeed, was pretty plain before—that in the absence of a Disarmament Treaty, and in the absence of any effective control of the trade in arms for private profit, the trade in arms *must* lead to abuses which (to quote President Roosevelt) 'may have disastrous results for the entire world if permitted to be continued unchecked.' No evidence is needed to show that firms selling armaments for profit *must* desire the continuance of conditions in which there is a demand for their products. Mr. Monahan, representative of the Remington Company, was a witness at the Enquiry into a proposed arms embargo, held in Washington before Mr. Hoover left office. He was asked whether his firm, in its manufacture of ammunition required 'trouble' to be going on in certain parts of the world in

order to keep the firm happy and busy without cost to the Government of the United States. He replied with candour, 'Yes, Sir.' Sir Herbert Lawrence, chairman of Vickers, explained to the annual meeting of his company in 1932 that 'reductions in armaments, under the influence of public opinion, both in this and other countries, have affected adversely your company's trading result.' Naturally, the company must regret the growth of such injurious public opinion. Sir Robert Hadfield, at the annual meeting of Hadfields, Limited, in March 1934, was happy to be able to describe the production by his firm of a new armour-piercing shell which, it seems, will make nonsense of the armoured protection of the British Fleet (as well as other fleets): he claimed that it 'removes the last outstanding difficulty of attack against armour under modern conditions.' The shell has been patented in eight countries. Naturally, Sir Robert was glad to predict a bright time coming, after the depression of 1932 (the year in which the Disarmament Conference started, when there was, to a certain extent, an armament truce).

We are indeed devoutly thankful for present mercies, but may I add that for what I hope we are about to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful. And this I say in no irreverent spirit.

Now look at some of the practical consequences of this desire to sell armaments in as large a quantity to as many countries at as high a price as possible. In November 1932 there was trouble between Peru and Colombia. Mr. Driggs, president of Driggs Ordnance and Engineering Company, in the United States, reported to his representative in Colombia that the Colombian Consulate in New York was being deluged with offers of war material.

To safeguard the interests of the Colombian Government, [Mr. Driggs added] and to save the time of the Colombian Consulate and the War Ministry, the United States Government has 'loaned' to the Colombian Consulate one of its naval officers to act as an adviser on the merit of the materials offered. The officer in question is Commander James P. Strong.

Mr. Driggs was not simply reporting a disinterested act of benevolence by the American Government towards Colombia; he was, of course, looking for business. Commander Strong, it seems, remained an officer of the United States navy till 1934, when he became head of the air forces of Colombia. Meanwhile, he had been responsible for a series of reports on the defence of Colombia against Peruvian attack, and these reports (according to the account in *The Times*) 'strongly recommended considerable purchases of such military equipment as the firm of Driggs could provide. . . . Mr. Driggs admitted that they were drawn up in his office.' Commander Strong's reports, made in these circum-

stances to the Colombian authorities, painted an alarming picture of the country's danger and its need of more armaments; he emphasised the peril of attack by Peruvian submarines and other warships. This he could do because Peru had by this time been fitted out with something of a navy, by the help of an American naval mission and American money.

The Enquiry showed (as we have already seen) the Electric Boat Company selling submarines to Peru, whilst encouraging Vickers to supply them to Chile. The sales to Peru were effected with the aid of an agent, Commander Aubry, an officer of the Peruvian navy; the Bethlehem Steel Company was shown as combining with the Boat Company to pay this officer's expenses, whilst he is reported as paying the commissions necessary for procuring contracts. About 326,000 dollars was paid to him for his activities on behalf of the Boat Company in South America. One of the letters produced recorded payment of 50,000 dollars to Juan Leguia, son of the President of Peru. The Enquiry also elicited particulars about the negotiations with President Leguia in regard to a loan from Mr. Harriman in the United States for financing a Peruvian naval programme; an American naval mission, under Admiral Woodward, advised about this, and the correspondence showed Commander Aubry reporting to the Boat Company his fight to secure the allocation of a sufficiently large part of the Harriman loan for the purchase of their submarines and of torpedoes. A letter from the Commander to the company said:

I am planning to be appointed by the Government, if you permit Delegate for Peru in the Disarmament Conference that is going to take place in Geneva in June 1925. I feel that I can do something good for Peru there, as well as for the cause for the submarines in South America. My flag will be 'no quotas in submarine construction in South America,' and classify it as a 'defensive weapon.'

It appears, however, that the company refused to pay the Peruvian officer's expenses, and he did not go to Geneva as 'Delegate for Peru.' The Conference in question did not come off.

The American Arms Corporation of New York appears to have been one of the principal sources of supply for armaments to Bolivia. In addition, the company supplied arms to Colombia and continued to negotiate secretly with that country during the armistice between it and Peru. 'We have chosen Colombia,' wrote one of the Corporation's agents, 'because they have money and Peru has very little. A big time is expected by all.' 'A big time'!

The competition to make blood-money out of these 'big times' was shown as involving lots of 'grease and palm oil.' According to the *New York Times*,

specific charges of graft disclosed to-day [September 10] included 'fifty grand' which it was said would have to be set aside for the 'chef de cabinet' of Brazil, and an extra 15 per cent. to be added to a Cuban contract for certain 'interested parties.'

The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, which was shown as negotiating the sale of aircraft to Bolivia and to Paraguay simultaneously, evidently found the corruption to be a large factor in their business. Writing from Santiago on February 15, 1933, the corporation's agent had to report that

Neither Chile or the Argentine would lend any assistance to either country [Bolivia or Paraguay] with arms or munitions. So, in a nutshell, we can see why it has been so difficult to dispose of the *Falcon* and *Hawk* to Bolivia or Paraguay. The whole trouble in trying to make deals of this nature is that there is excessive graft to contend with. The Bolivian and Paraguayan Ministers know of our offer and yet they prefer dealing through agents. They both know our figure and the agents' figure, so you can imagine who has to take a share between sale and purchase prices. Jim has been working the deal for Bolivia and Paraguay through the Argentine. . . . If he could make a thousand dollars on each plane for himself, I think he would be lucky: the other two thousand dollars would be paid to the other intermediaries.

Shortly afterwards we find the Corporation's agent being advised to take a trip to Paraguay, where he was cautioned 'to work quietly for Bolivia. It would naturally raise hell if she found out that we were dealing with their enemy.'

The corporation's South American representative, Mr. C. W. Webster, expressed great anxiety that this business should be kept secret.

Conditions are becoming very acute and I do not wish our files to contain anything with a bearing on this business. You can always send any necessary letters to my home. . . .

The anxiety is not surprising in view of the efforts which were being made to stop the Bolivian and Paraguayan war. Naturally, Mr. Webster wanted to dodge any restrictions upon his business. In the same letter (March 30, 1933) he wrote:

Another matter I wish you would take up immediately . . . is the question involving the possible manufacture in the Santiago plant of airplanes intended for other South American countries [*i.e.*, presumably countries other than Chile]. This is in view of a possible embargo on the part of the League of Nations and the United States Government.

There is no space for a review here of the specially important evidence about the supply of war material to Germany or the supply of munitions to revolutionary factions in Germany and in Cuba: but something must be said about the evidences of Governmental support for the traffic in arms by private firms. Why is it that American War Departments have apparently taken a

paternal interest in the sale of armaments to many countries—to Peru as well as to its rival Colombia? Why is it that Sir Basil Zaharoff could be alleged to write with confidence to the Electric Boat Company telling them to get the American Government to instruct its Ambassador at Madrid to intervene with the Spanish Government in favour of the Electric Boat Company and their colleague Vickers; and why could he be alleged to add that

the English Government would be difficult to move in the same direction, but when you inform me that your Government has given the necessary instructions to their Ambassador in Madrid, I will have no difficulty in persuading the British to do it too, ditto, ditto.?

Why is it that, as Senator Nye emphasised in a broadcast speech in America, arms manufacturers have the active co-operation of their Governments in the sale of war material to foreign countries? Why is it, in short, that the War Departments in the arms-producing countries are obstacles in the way of suppression of the manufacture and sale of arms for private profit?

The answer is, of course, that the War Departments, with their attention concentrated always on national victory rather than on prevention of war, desire to expand their national war-potential: in particular, they want to be able quickly to increase their national production of such perishable and quickly out-dated weapons as aircraft and tanks. Their object being to make the most powerful war machine possible, and their budgets being limited, the war services like to keep down their stocks of completed weapons in peace-time if they can have everything ready, with the help of private industry, for the mass production of the latest types on the word 'Go!'. Hence the obstructive policy of the British Government at Geneva in regard to proposals which might cripple or destroy the British manufacture of arms for private profit. Hence the extraordinary answer made by the British Government to the League, when asked to state how many private firms in the country were wholly or largely engaged in the manufacture of armaments: the Government's answer was 'None,' although Britain is the largest exporter of armaments in the world. Hence, too, the support given by the American War Department to the boosting of sales of armaments abroad by American firms, even when those sales carry with them the disclosure of important secrets. Here is a letter, produced in the Enquiry, written on May 8, 1928, by Mr. C. B. Robbins, the Assistant-Secretary of War, to Mr. Driggs, president of Driggs Ordnance and Engineering Company, about the sale of anti-aircraft material to European countries:

It is the desire of the War Department to encourage the manufacture of munitions in the United States by commercial manufacturers. The War Department would be willing to release for your Company the designs

of our latest anti-aircraft material with the exception of certain secret portions, provided you had a contract with a foreign Government for a production quantity of anti-aircraft material, which you would agree to manufacture in the United States. You can readily appreciate that an order from a foreign source for only two or three of these new anti-aircraft materials would only serve to disclose to the foreign Power the latest United States developments in anti-aircraft artillery and would not develop any munitions-manufacturing capacity in your plant. The size of the order will therefore have to receive the approval of the War Department before any design information is released to your Company.

After listing the items, such as guns and sights, which would be released by the War Department to the company, and after telling the company of an article by an officer in the Ordnance Department which 'should serve as very good sales literature in convincing foreign Governments of the efficiency of U.S. Army anti-aircraft artillery material,' Mr. Robbins concluded:

The War Department hopes that your Company may be successful in obtaining an order for the manufacture of a considerable number of these new anti-aircraft materials of the latest U.S. Army design.

The Driggs Company thereupon negotiated for the sale of this anti-aircraft material to Turkey, representing that it was offering 'the world's latest and best designs in anti-aircraft material, upon the development of which the United States has spent over two million dollars.' The American navy was authorised to help in advertising the Driggs Company's products: the cruiser *Raleigh* went to Stamboul to demonstrate to the Turkish customers of the company the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft guns carried in her batteries.

Another correspondence produced in the Enquiry showed that the American Armament Corporation had been able to send to its agent in Brazil, for use in obtaining orders there, an 'extremely confidential' report of flying tests made by the United States Army Air Service. The president of this corporation, in another letter, written from Rio in May 1933, said that 'Jackson, the Commercial Attaché, and Major Sackville, the Military Attaché, have been 100 per cent. helpful.' As for his expenses in Rio, the president had to take into account 'this officer for lunch, that one for dinner, and Sackville for cocktails, etc.'

It is to be hoped that, if an Enquiry is held in this country, special attention will be paid to the question whether or not the British Diplomatic Service has been used to further sales of armaments by British firms in foreign countries. It is easy to see that such business might have far-reaching political consequences, and a direct bearing upon policy at the Disarmament Conference. For instance, British military aircraft are being exported to very many countries—in Europe and elsewhere; the

licensing system does not apply to aircraft, so that these do not figure in the returns made to the League. Special efforts, it will be remembered, have been made, by means of exhibition in Copenhagen, to sell them in Denmark, a country which has, from the very beginning of the Disarmament Conference, pressed for 'the total abolition of military aviation and of the manufacture and preparation of military aircraft or training with a view to its use.' Enquiry might well be made as to whether, in such a case as this, the British Legation has been used as an assistant selling agency for British military aircraft. It is one thing for a British commercial attaché to help to advertise the slogan 'British Bicycles are Best'; it is quite another thing if a British Minister intervenes, say, at the Foreign Office of the country to which he is accredited and indicates that he would esteem it a favour if the Government would buy some war material from England which he can highly recommend.

The American Enquiry has brought out the alleged fact that the British War Office has been saving money by selling huge quantities of war material which it does not need to the Soley Armament Company, which has been watching the world for signs of welcome trouble, with a view to export business. It is evident that in these circumstances the War Office is not likely, apart from any other reasons, to be a supporter of the demand that the activities of private traders should be rigidly controlled. The magnitude of the business and the character of the firm employed were indicated in the correspondence from Mr. John Ball, manager of the company, to his American agency, the American Armament Corporation. Mr. Ball boasted that

War stocks which we control are of such magnitude that the sale of a big block of them would alter the political balance of smaller States, involving corresponding complications from the point of view of finance and industry. We are really the sole selling agents for small arms, etc., which belong to the British War Office.

Mr. Ball claimed that his surplus British war stock available for sale included 1,000,000 rifles, 120,000,000 rounds of ammunition for rifles and machine-guns, 34,000 Hotchkiss machine-guns, 20,000 Lewis machine-guns, 8000 Lewis aeroplane machine-guns, 15,000 Vickers machine-guns, and 15,000 revolvers.

The Soley Company was alleged in Mr. Ball's own statement to the American Corporation, to have been selling huge quantities of arms formerly belonging to the War Office, both to China and Japan. He wrote expressing the conviction that

Japan is going to take a still larger slice of China, and comparatively shortly, while the getting is good. To place herself in a favourable position, Japan must either buy over the Soviet or fight them—and Japan will do one or the other before attending to some more of China.

In cheerful anticipation, Mr. Ball suggested that the United States' interests in China would be seriously affected, and that in such an eventuality, 'something might be done with the big stocks of rifles here, also M.G.'s [machine-guns].'

Mr. Ball's general attitude to his business may be inferred from a later passage in the same letter, dated March 24, 1934. The Japanese Naval Department, he said, has lately bought large quantities of Lewis guns 'in our calibre, '303'; he explained that the Japanese bought Lewis guns as the 6.5 bullet of their Hotchkiss and similar guns has not 'as much effect as the '303 armour-piercing type or the incendiary or "tracer" type. As you know, "incendiary" bullets are prohibited, so they have become "tracers"—what is in a name?'

Mr. Ball referred to the British licence system, which does apply to such arms as those his firm deals in, though not to such major arms as aircraft or tanks. The licences are, generally speaking, granted as a matter of course; but Mr. Ball apprehended that they would be refused for direct shipment to Bolivia when at war. That did not trouble him.

If however an American armament firm of some standing bought the guns, for eventual resale, things might be easier, or if the Colombian Government, who are not at war, bought the guns, they could no doubt have them.

In other words, the agency to which the War Office sells its surplus stock meant, if possible, to dodge the embargo which the Foreign Office was expected to maintain. It will be interesting to see whether the Government Departments concerned have anything to say to Mr. Ball's firm about this; and whether the War Office has been selling off stocks of prohibited 'incendiary' bullets.

Already the Enquiry has disclosed all this and much besides. It has begun to deal with the enormous ramifications of the Dupont Company, which is associated with Imperial Chemical Industries. Already it has been shown that these two great enterprises have divided the world between them for the sale of high explosives for military purposes. More will presumably be disclosed, when the Enquiry is resumed, about this, the greatest of all the monopolies of killing-power.

No attempt can be made here to discuss the remedies for the perilous and dishonouring state of affairs which we have tolerated so long and on which the Enquiry has already thrown so much additional light. But of this I am convinced. Any Government which appreciates public feeling about this matter will respond to the probable demand for an Enquiry at least as frank and thorough as that based on the Nye Resolution which was passed by the United States Senate on April 12, 1934. If the Government

were to oppose that demand, or were to leave the slightest suspicion that the Enquiry to be held would be a whitewashing Commission or would be inadequately empowered to get at the facts, it would arouse passionate and justified opposition throughout the country—not least in the munition centres.

Furthermore, I am convinced that means will have to be found for suppressing the manufacture of casualty-producing weapons for private profit. The demand of the American Legion, cited at the head of the Nye Resolution, was that legislation should be passed 'to take the profit out of war.' That demand has been formulated at Geneva, with impressive testimony, by the ex-service men of the world, and it has been championed by the Government of France. Our own Government has hitherto returned a wholly negative reply to that demand. It will make a great mistake, in internal politics as well as in foreign policy, if it does not quickly change that attitude.

Lastly, I am convinced that there will have to be a thorough scheme of control of the armament traffic, by national and international means.¹ This is an indispensable corollary to any scheme of general limitation and reduction of armaments and to the mastery of international anarchy. Mr. Jonas remarked that 'it would be a terrible state of affairs if my conscience started to bother me now.' It certainly would be a terrible state of affairs if our conscience and our political judgment did not start to bother us now about this 'hell of a business.'

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

¹ The existing British licence system is incomplete and no adequate model. The Enquiry has shown that the American embargo is at present farcically inadequate.

WANTED: A ROAD TRAFFIC POLICY

AFTER a sunny holiday, spent to an extent greater than usual on the roads, a new view of the much-tortured subject of Road Traffic may help. Let us have a cynic who has no scruples about imputing motives (whether or not he fully believes the worst of what he says). He observes that a Transport Minister on taking his strange office is ostensibly responsible for road transport, but has no direct authority over either roads, lay-out, or traffic control. He has, however, unlimited opportunity to tinker with them. He is, as it were, the managing director of a great factory of which the sub-managers or shop foremen, other than in his own secretariat, are appointed and removed by someone else. They have the power to spend money, to the extent of what they have, on factory alterations, when they like and as they like. He may disapprove, but cannot remove them. Our director is not, however, quite a dummy. He may, and sometimes does, induce them to change their minds and collaborate in some particulars with his ideas, if he has any, by purchasing their consent. The more they hold out unreasonably, the more they may get. There is a limit to the squeeze, however, since he can apply for and may obtain, though tardily, compulsory powers from a meeting of shareholders¹—if *per impossible* there is any chance of this meeting understanding this problem.

In these circumstances, shareholders would not be surprised to find that such a factory or mill was mismanaged. Casualties in industry are quite an effective mark of mismanagement, and this mill brandishes the mark aloft. In an ill-run factory whose operations are on so great a scale as to be measured by an expenditure on upkeep of plant and constructions of £64,000,000 a year, and whose operatives number 2,000,000 of one class and 6,000,000 of another, plus yet others, the occurrence of some thousands of fatalities among the operatives would not astonish. Nor, indeed, would it impel any well-minded observer to call for yet stricter punishments of operatives, who themselves are also one-half of the sufferers. Under a management as above described, the

¹ As a third alternative, the director does nothing. He saves face by issuing recommendations, just as he expressed his views about and against ribbon development—with zero result. Ribbons continue to develop.

7000 fatalities are no surprise, and, despite the daily adjurations, the weekly repetitions of the weekly death roll, and awesome comparisons between the deaths in a year of peace with those in a day of war, the world has refused to be excited or abashed. It is pained, but not pained enough to uproot the evil—bad management.

The organism herein being symbolised by an ill-ordered 'factory,' is called on to perform the greatest wealth-producing act in all industry—to wit, the act of distribution. The cost of most things that are sold retail contains so many items for 'distribution' that the initial production cost is commonly outweighed thereby—*e.g.*, the world's production cost of the corn in a loaf is less than the cost of distributing the loaf²—and a large part of this distribution cost is for a service that is rendered (and in England can only be rendered) by road vehicles. Our British 'factory' for the manufacture of transport has a capital equipment variously estimated at £1,600,000,000 (for our 180,000 miles of roads, etc.). The 'factory's' 2,000,000 operatives (the motorists) have none of them amassed a fortune by attending to this service. On the contrary, like the waiters at the 'Swank' Hotel, they pay for the right to serve. They pay many million pounds a year, and some of them recoup themselves as best they may by charging the public for transport. The charge is not very much (indeed, the lowness of this charge is a very sore point with their competitors), nor do we see any phalanx of enriched profit-makers from road transport such as formerly adorned the beer, cotton, or ship-building enterprises.

The shareholders' meeting (*i.e.*, Parliament) assumes that the duty and function of their managing director in this enterprise is: 'To facilitate the safe, free and noiseless movement of all road traffic units on their lawful occasions, with due regard to economy and amenity.' Nevertheless, one is inclined to ask if such an agendum has ever occurred to him as expressing his job. Excepting only the removal of the speed limit in 1930, no action taken or suggested by him has ever been followed by any check to the ever-increasing total of yearly deaths on the roads. Under thirty-six years' trial of the speed-limit *régime* the evil grew to 7600 deaths per year. The removal of that limit was notably and at once followed not only by a check of the rising curve but by a big diminution of the totals. So great was the improvement that not with all the increase of drivers, not with all the increased performance of cars, not with all the increase in the amount of 'road exposure' due to two abnormally dry fine years, has the total yet returned to the old maximum of 1929-30. We may, however, confidently expect the 7600 mark to be attained once

² See also H. G. Selfridge, *The Times*, September 29, 1934.

more as from the time the new 30 miles per hour speed limit begins its fell work.³

It may be remarked that, in spite of this deplorable prospect, a powerless Minister ought not to be blamed, save in that he has never complained of the inadequacy of his authority over his ostensibly subordinate highway authorities, or over the quite obviously independent controller of traffic movement—the Home Secretary, with his police. Perhaps he has not complained because he has not realised the true character of his job and its technical implications; besides, he can always quit it after launching a bombshell, as his predecessor did, amid the plaudits of those who do not yet know who will be hit by the bomb. If he had been aware of the intricacy and technical character of the problem—'What is the *causa causans* of fatal and other road accidents?'—he would years ago have called in the assistance of scientific researchers (such as investigate the aircraft accidents for another Minister who *is* aware), and years ago he would have obtained the answer. In his moments of plain thought (thought untinted by the desire to make popular copy) he must be convinced that an Englishman—the least excitable of nationals, does not, in fact, become brutish, selfish, lustful of speed, bullying, unsporting, or reckless of life on the moment of taking his place behind a steering-wheel. His own investigations have shown that it is *this average* Englishman who is involved in these accidents. They have shown that fatal accidents are *not* concentrated upon a small class of 'road hogs,' nor upon the class of the inexperienced, or drunken, or 'smash-and-grab' criminals. They are distributed. It has pleased, and perhaps profited, some individuals to accuse special classes, and it has been believed, but if the Minister is fit for his place he *must* know better.

It is noteworthy that the public (whose vote it is second nature for a Minister to cultivate) assumes without hesitation the site on which the blame must be centred, and the Minister daily addresses his censures, his regulations, his punishments, his signals and the rest, to that assumed cause—the driver of motor cars. This attitude is popular; but it would in the long run be more popular still to cure the disease, though there is no prospect of that till assumptions and guesses are put aside in favour of research. This particular guess he might abandon the more readily that the only statistics vouchsafed us establish its incorrectness. The responsible causers of the major number of fatal accidents were *not* the million motor car drivers. Nor were they the million motor cyclists, nor even the two together. The sum of their misbehaviour was exceeded as 'responsible causers' of fatal

³ Oxford has tried this limit for some years. This area has now secured the highest casualty list of any area of similar population.

road accidents by the pedal cyclists and pedestrians, and the Minister knows this. His own paper (88-29)⁴ shows it. It is no doubt as misleading to group these latter two together as to lump the motor cyclists with the motor car drivers, as the Minister does, nor is it advocated here.

The example is taken to show the sad influence of courting votes on the direction given to political speech and thought—a direction fatal to the spirit of dispassionate inquiry in the scientific sense. It is perhaps for the same reason that the Minister's public statements about this summer's fatalities consistently omit reference to what may be called 'exposure on the road' (a matter which is dominated in the holiday months by sunny and dry weather *versus* rain and fog) and refer not at all to the augmentation by perhaps 100 per cent. of the number of hours during which pedestrians, cyclists and hikers have been lured into the open by the sun. He does, however, refer to the almost irrelevant datum—the number of motor vehicles registered! The implied blame to drivers, who themselves also had an increased exposure, in this period is unjust. It is astounding to have to draw attention to such facts; but the remark is called for by the official persistence in taking no steps to initiate an independent scientific inquiry on the effect of road lay-out, road traffic control, weather, crowds, popular habits (such as walking to the right of a footway, or using very low driver's seat), ribbon development, etc., on accident causation, and traffic flow.

One would surmise that where there is less road space to accommodate a given traffic movement collisions would be more frequent than when the road supply is sufficient. This is but a surmise. In the absence of measurements, no one knows. That knowledge could be obtained for a given area, by relating the increment of traffic flow—which might be photographically recorded—to the corresponding increment (or decrement) of collisions. It is a matter of daily observation that an increased density of vehicles makes traffic slower, that the total flow of tonnage at certain high traffic densities becomes less, and that simultaneously the act of driving becomes more difficult and arduous; to that extent dense traffic increases risks. This greater risk when drivers are crowded together may be an explanation of the paradox that fifteen times more fatalities were found to occur at slow speed of approach (below 15 miles per hour) than at all higher speeds together (20 miles per hour and upwards). In any case, the paradox is not one to be dismissed merely because it makes uncomfortable the ground of those committed to a speed limit. It calls for investigation: it does not get it.

⁴ The Official Report on Road Accidents during 1933, issued by the Ministry of Transport.

The first step in grace of the Transport Minister would be that he should recognise his duty to keep down the accident *ratio*—that is, to seek to diminish the number of accidents in any district in relation to the amount of traffic. Another way of stating this is to say that he should so provide roads, and should induce the Home Office to provide such traffic control, etc., that the greatest possible amount of traffic flow is got through before one accident occurs—always having paid due regard to the amenities, etc., as outlined in the statement of the Minister's duty given above. The word *ratio* is accented here because the citizen (except in the matter of his dividends, which are commonly thought of as so much per cent.—*i.e.*, a ratio on his capital) abhors a ratio and will not think about a ratio. That is a pity, for a ratio is at the root of the road problem. If there existed a person who wanted to diminish his income from his investments, he would know how to proceed. He could either reduce the total sum invested, or seek for a stock giving a lower rate of interest while leaving intact the capital sum invested. Similarly, a Transport Minister who wanted to diminish the accidents in road traffic could either reduce the total amount of road traffic, or, if that be bad economics, diminish the rate of accident occurrence, leaving the total amount of traffic unaltered.

It so happens that a concatenation of circumstances has made it far easier for a Transport Minister to prefer the bad economic plan of hampering and limiting the total traffic. He appears to have a simple syllogism: 'If the traffic cannot move, traffic accidents cannot occur.' So he proceeds to prevent it from moving, by introducing *ad hoc* various ingenious devices or by cleverly overlooking such slackness of his 'authorities' as will conduce thereto. The highest deterrent to motoring is taxation. (The British motorist has the highest taxation in the world.) The next is to keep down the amount of roads and arteries. England has far less mileage of roads per vehicle than any country in the world. France has three times more; Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United States, all have several times the amount of road space per vehicle that we have, and this matters the more to us because our population is massed in dense knots (one fourth of it is in London, another fourth is within 25 miles of Manchester). Hence the impediments arising from the inadequacy of our road accommodation are intensified by the impediments due to the tortuousness of our town streets, where most of the traffic circulates. If one were minded still further to incommode the movements of street traffic, no better device could be evolved than is instanced in London by the inefficiency of street name-plating and house or shop numbering. (It is by means of these that visitors from outside can alone find their way.) If they cannot find their way,

they stop and block others. (Is this blocking an element in the plan to hamper road transport?) If a Minister were determined to facilitate flow, no one can doubt but that the remedy for this deficient name-plating, which involves a relatively trivial cost, would, with English orderliness and efficiency, be better done here than anywhere. As this neglect cannot be due to lack of funds, it would seem that the will to facilitate traffic flow is lacking. Some imp is repeating to the Minister: 'If the traffic cannot flow, traffic accidents cannot occur.' To-day, when France, Italy, Germany, the United States, all with several hundred per cent. more road space per vehicle than we have, are all voting millions for increase of their roads, England alone diminishes her road fund by £4,000,000 a year. The contrast of policies is noteworthy.

Perhaps it is only a coincidence, but it falls in uncommonly well with the cynic's implication that there is a policy to strangle road transport. If this policy cannot abolish existing roads, like Regent Street, it can at least make movement along them very arduous and slow. The Minister could and did refrain, although Nash's Regent Street was knocked down from end to end, from pressing for the adequate widening of it. He has also arranged for or approved of light signals and stops galore. He has, moreover, announced and accentuated the pedestrian's rights to saunter across at his leisure at selected crossing lanes in addition to retaining, uncurbed, his right to walk diagonally over the carriage-way anywhere. In general he is succeeding in making the use of road vehicles so inconvenient, so punishable, and of so little time-saving value, that the number will fall off for lack of inducement to use them. The Regent Street fiasco can be found repeated in various parts of London. If vehicles were to be allowed on the odd and even days of a month to stand only on the side of the odd or even house numbers (as in Paris), much freedom of movement would be gained. One notices that he abstains from pressing for such an order or for the requisite renumbering of irregularly numbered streets.

At small cost the pedal cyclists (who by their wobbly gait absorb more road width than their share) could be provided with safe and not expensive tracks at the side of most highways. The obstruction caused by one pedal cyclist to other vehicles is approximately as great as that due to a car, and the nervous tension and anxiety he spreads around his path is far greater. Were the cyclist given what their *confrères* find most useful on the Continent, a '*banquino*,' the road traffic would be eased *pro tanto* of the 6,000,000 impediments. That, however, would not be compatible with a policy of incommoding all movement by motor car. It is to be observed that we do not have cycle tracks.

Then we have the red, yellow, and green light signals at crossings. They are most ingenious. They economise the wages of the policeman, who used to adjust the time allowed to the traffic from each of several confluent roads according to the number of vehicles he saw to be present. By no chance did he ever keep that middle area of carriage-way (which is crossed by two roads, and which is therefore doubly valuable) compulsorily idle—i.e., open to that road which has no vehicles while others are stopped from using it. With the ever-extending use of light signals in improper sites this happens daily. As all the various time wastes in a journey are additive, a large enough number of light signals and pedestrian lanes (individually almost innocuous) will successfully discourage road traffic to the desired extent. These, with other impediments, may realise the apparent *desideratum* of the Minister: 'less road traffic, less road accidents'; 'less road accidents—cheers for the Minister of Transport.' This thoroughly bad way of obtaining road safety is an instance of the wide difference between successful politics and sound policy.

When casting round for devices (which preferably should be defensible) to impede vehicular traffic (since that seems to be his policy), it may have occurred to the Minister that the obligatory use of existing subways for pedestrians would prevent accidents. Are the subways allowed to remain in disuse because their use would assist vehicular traffic? If, however, 10,000 surface crossing lanes (wherein walkers are given prior right to stop the vehicles by an order, *à la française*, throwing all responsibility regardless of qualifying circumstances on the vehicles) were freely scattered all over the town, the desired strangling of vehicular movement would perhaps be achieved. Should any residue of motor vehicles chance to escape this net, they will still be kept in check by the tangle of jay walkers to whom he has publicly confirmed their absolute right to wander lawlessly over all parts of the carriage-way. As the Minister has everything of safety to gain by limiting their irregular ways to the crossing lanes, one wonders whether safety has a first place in his mind.

Lest the vehicles blocked by day should turn to using the night, all hooting has been recently forbidden. As a serious impediment to traffic flow this has failed. Motorists took the rule as a compliment, not as a discouragement. They have always known that the law which made hooting compulsory in effect was a bad law. They recognise that the Royal Automobile Club members had advised the 'no hooting at night' rule years ago, and they observe that this rule tacitly admits the inherent reluctance of drivers to hurt anyone. It will operate, as indeed it has operated, to reduce the risk of collisions in conditions when there is and can be no other supervision of drivers' actions. As

was also foreseen, no appreciable difference, save in exceptional situations, has been made to the total of noise in any street where there is heavy night traffic. What is required for these streets is to enforce a low noise level by bringing into use a noise-measuring instrument and imposing a standard of sound that shall not on a road of average character be exceeded, whether by gears, exhaust noises, or bad loading, etc.

One notices that the Minister has not thought well to provide the funds necessary for the experimental research which is needed to work out the method of application (*e.g.*, avoidance of sound reflections, etc.) of such an instrument (not an easy task), nor for the perfecting of the instrument itself, all of which must be done before the legalisation for this obvious procedure can even be applied for. As the impediment to road traffic has not proved very great, the matter seems to have lost interest for the Minister. A similar absence of action, noticeable in respect of obtaining other scientific knowledge which his functions and duties would seem to require of him, is possibly due to a similar cause. Does he know the effect of the eye level of the driver on his ability to negotiate a tangle of vehicles such as we find in town, or is he sure that a worm's-eye view of the bottom of an omnibus is as adequate for safety as a 'plan-form' view of the moving traffic from a higher platform such as the omnibus driver obtains? (Be it noted that the seat cushion of the omnibus driver is at the level of the head of the chauffeur of the ordinary limousine; and the omnibus driver has a less accident ratio.) There is no well-wisher to road traffic whose hopes of improvement are not centred on the idea of getting orderliness of movement among all road units. There is no additional orderliness more important than the consistent adherence of all traffic to a 'keep to the left' rule, with a brief tolerance for overtaking. The Royal Automobile Club has recommended that. As such orderliness would greatly facilitate safe traffic flow, it is unnecessary to remark that no action is taken or is proposed to secure this behaviour. That would tend to assist vehicular movement. The pedestrian should be induced to keep to the left of the footwalks so as to avoid walking with his back turned to the nearest line of vehicles, as he now does. The gain is obvious. It is well tried on the Continent. The difficulty to the pedestrian of preferring the left to the right side is *nil*. No action has been taken or is proposed. The local authorities still continue to create new blind corners—to gain large unearned monetary advantage from ribbon development along roads which they did not pay for. No action is taken. On the contrary, the greatest filip that could be given to 'ribbon building' is the special invention of the Minister, the imposition of a speed limit in all lighted roads—*i.e.*, wherever these monstrous and universally

condemned ribbon constructions have been made, or are to be made.

This brings us to the policy of the 30 miles per hour speed limit, which deserves a special discussion to itself. In view of the 30 miles per hour speed limit proposal, a person of good-will—no more or no less intelligent than a Transport Minister—decided that he must make a test *in propria persona* of the safe and useful speed in a built-up area, much as the Minister no doubt had done. He ordered a trusted minion to drive him as rapidly across London as he could—with strict regard for safety. He himself noted the speed-indicator throughout the trip. It showed him that only on two occasions was the speedometer needle kept beyond the 30 miles per hour figure on the dial for more than half a minute. He concluded: 'That's good enough for me; we had no approach to an accident, no hazard, no appreciable loss of time. Not a loss of two minutes in the whole 7 miles would have arisen if the longer spells in excess of 30 miles per hour had been limited to 30 miles per hour. Such a sacrifice is as nothing compared to the safety of the 1000 persons killed in a year in London traffic. I plump for a 30-mile speed limit in built-up areas. It is only fair and it is logic.'

Perhaps it is, but, being based on wrong premises, the conclusion has no warranty. That is logic, too. The average driver sets out every day in somewhat the same mood as that indicated (though his average mileage is, of course, greater). If the Transport Minister were to do the same drive five times each day and continue the course for twelve years, he would imitate the average driver more perfectly, and he would assuredly also acquire the average experience of one accident. The statistical average per driver is one casualty in twelve years, in the course of his average of 12,000 miles per annum. What is more, the Minister would unquestionably secure this precious experience of being involved in one non-fatal casualty whether or not the two short periods in excess of 30 miles per hour had been reduced by his obedient chauffeur to 30 miles per hour. Indeed, if during the speedy parts of his trial run he had not been so busy reading the speedometer, he would have been looking out of the windows of his car, and he would have observed that these two stretches were in fact the easiest part of the driver's task, the part involving the least hazard to him, and the least hesitation, whether to pedestrians or other vehicles. He might recall that those were precisely the two sections of the run during which, as a careful observer, he had felt that he might, without missing the chance of something interesting, take out his pipe and light it while leaving his driver in full confidence to carry on! If he were a frank and truthful person, he might even add: 'When I come to think of it, the

reason why the driver exceeded the 30 miles per hour just then was *because*, unlike the other parts of the journey, there was no difficult pass to negotiate and less risk than anywhere else at those two moments.' If, in spite of being frank and truthful, he were a politician, he would add: 'But, since the total loss of time by keeping under 30 miles per hour was small, the motorists will have no complaint of a big loss of time; so why should I not give evidence of the zeal—which I genuinely feel—in a good cause? I will impose a 30 miles per hour limit in built-up areas. It might do some good—who knows?'

A person of substance like a Minister would no doubt make his experimental drive in a car of substance and power. Should he, however, continue in the good path of personal verification, he might repeat the trip in a 7-horse power baby saloon, also in a 12-horse power sports car lying flat on his spine, with a worm's-eye view of the road. He should try on a motor cycle and just one trip on the high driver's seat of one of those energetic and active vans which distribute newspapers so punctually and at such a lively rate to the suburbs. He would learn a lot. He would find that some vehicles require a greater distance than others to accumulate a speed of 30 miles per hour; he would observe that, the smaller powers (relative to weight) having once got to 30 miles per hour in town conditions, their drivers were reluctant to part with it. Other vehicles like his own 20-horse power car, or the newspaper vans, he would find achieved an excess over 30 miles per hour much more promptly, as and when it was useful for safe overtaking, and then resigned that speed without a pang—when occasion called for it. Long before his twelve years' observation were out he would acquire a glimmering about road traffic, and then I think he might say as follows: 'To expect to reduce accidents by a legalised limit of speed (say 30 miles per hour) within built-up areas (*i.e.*, defined, say, by lighted roads) is to ignore every lesson of my experience. There is no proof that it offers a prospect of less fatalities. This speed-limit fad does nothing to give us more amenity or to develop more courtesy among road users, or more docility towards the police, or a better suppression of ill-behaviour, or more orderly (*i.e.*, better regimented) driving. *Per contra*, it ensures less attention to other traffic by drivers, and suggests less attention to drivers by walkers. It provides an excuse for and authenticates ribbon development. The fiction of the efficacy of a speed limit will be accepted by local authorities, and this will augment their reluctance to the clearing of blind corners, bends and humped bridges, and to the reduction of excessive camber. It does nothing to instigate the provision of footways; on the contrary, it creates a false standard for drivers by which all speeds up to

30 miles per hour, being legal, become ostensibly permissible. It creates and accentuates the evil of 'convoys' (queues of following vehicles are so called) by protracting the difficulty and adding to the risk of overtaking them. It impedes the distribution of goods and persons—it abstracts the police from supervision of dangerous conduct and sets them watching for technical speed offences.'

These wise remarks of the experienced Minister on the ill-effects—psychological, economic, and practical—of a speed limit are worthy of further examination. The history of speed-limit legislation—including both a general limit and limits special to built-up areas—is one of failure, persisted in and steadily getting worse for thirty-three years. It failed both when initially supported by public opinion and after that opinion was undeceived. The fatalities grew at an increasing rate yearly, until the speed limit was removed in 1930, when, for the first time, the total of road deaths suddenly decreased, chiefly owing to the initiation of a new and sounder policy invented, as I believe, by myself and adopted by the Royal Automobile Club—*i.e.*, the Road Code and the mobile police.

Past experience shows that a legal limit causes many to drive up to that limit when they otherwise would not and should not. Not even thirty-three years of previous speed limits extinguished this deplorable reaction. The same result is the more to be anticipated with the motor vehicles of to-day, because in circumstances and at times of frequent occurrence 30 miles per hour within the areas defined as 'built-up' is indubitably a proper, useful, safe, and desirable speed to the certain knowledge of the drivers of a large group of vehicles, especially the more 'lively' cars and trade vans. Their drivers will before long resent the unnecessary and useless delays imposed on them by the law. It will seem unwarrantable to have been prevented—as will often occur—from overtaking an idle lorry, a crawling cab or an omnibus. To appreciate the driver's reluctance to accept such a limit as reasonable, it is important to realise that the average driver can have been involved in a fatal accident only once per 300 years of driving! He has not even been involved in a non-fatal casualty oftener than once per twelve years of driving under the present no-speed limit. Even then, in the majority of these cases, the motor driver has been proved not to be the responsible cause. Accordingly, each driver holds (being conscious of the good and kindly intentions of the average Englishman that he, in fact, is) that the speed limit is a penalisation of the just (himself) for the unjust (some unknown 'road hogs'), and the unknown 'inexperienced.' If it were true—which it is not—that the large majority of fatalities are due to the ill-conduct of a few brutish motorists, then the average driver of all the other drivers instead of being involved in a casualty

'once in twelve years' is involved far less frequently still. This misfortune would have occurred to him once in thirty, forty, or fifty years, thus justifying still further his sense of being a very safe person without speed limits, for whom the speed limit is not an equitable restraint, and to whom it ought not, therefore, to be applied.

It is not here suggested (nor has it, so far as I know, ever been suggested by those who consider, as I do, that speed-limit legislation is an ill-judged way of seeking safety) that speed is not a factor in road accidents. It is a factor, but the question is whether the legalisation of a limit is the way to keep that factor down when and where alone it must be kept down. Safety would not be got even if that limit were, in fact, observed. As people are constituted, experience as well as a common-sense knowledge of difficult traffic conditions show that no such limit can be enforced by traps or by threats in those very places, times, and conditions of traffic movement (notably in built-up areas) where alone an excess of speed over 30 miles per hour is undesirable, and where, according to ever-varying circumstances, a much less speed ought to be practised. At such places and times orderly and safe traffic movement could, in my opinion, be induced by other means; but in the present discussion I am solely envisaging the probable outcome of the speed-limit method. I believe it will be bad and will increase fatalities.

The speed limit of 30 miles per hour ignores that speed of transport and transit is in itself a good to be sought and a convenience to be put at our disposition when needed, and whenever and wherever it can be got with safety, amenity, noiselessness, etc. On the other hand, the speed limit, though it corresponds with many preconceptions and may gratify those who have a legitimate grievance which ought to be directed against the bad administration of road transport, neither ensures, nor induces, amenity, noiselessness, courtesy or safety to compensate the State or the individual for the loss of this economic advantage and general convenience. It is customary to assume that a speed limit has only failed to give safety because it has never been universally enforced or obeyed. The assumption is not warranted. There are many times when obedience to a speed limit (supposing there is, naturally, a common utilisation of as much of the permitted speeds as is reasonably possible) introduces new dangers of its own. Take the very frequent act of overtaking (a manoeuvre which must be regarded as frequent and welcomed unless the whole stream on every road is to be slowed to the level of the slowest vehicle that happens to be there). Overtaking, especially on our abnormally tortuous and criss-crossed roads, should be short, sharp, and decisive. That shortness is the way of safety. That

short way is advantageous to the overtaker, to the overtaken, and to the oncoming vehicle in the opposite direction, as well as to the pedestrian waiting to cross, if there be one. To obey the speed limit in countless of such cases is to be debarred from that advantageous and safe way of overtaking. To rely on speed-limit legislation is to disregard almost every vital factor which really decides whether any particular speed is safe. The safeness of a speed is a function of the place, time, traffic density, visibility, road surface, road inclination, weather, brake efficiency, controllability of vehicle (and its power of acceleration especially), drivers' experience and forethought, rapidity of drivers' responses, etc.

Speed-limit legislation may or may not be supplemented by other compulsions, but of itself it entirely overlooks that the avoidance of collision depends essentially and fundamentally on that form of orderly behaviour on the roads by all vehicles and all pedestrians which will result from a particular and important habit. That is the habit of revealing continuously, not spasmodically, to all near-by road-users one's next intended movement—always and in all places. Such a habit has been instilled and now exists on the sea, in the air, on the railways—everywhere where moving, self-willed entities travel. The only exception is the road. Hence the crashes. The road usages and traffic legislation that will form such a habit universally can be and have been elsewhere enumerated. In conditions frequently recurring in large towns, suburbs, etc., and for certain not uncommon motor cars and motor cycles (depending appreciably upon their power of retardation and acceleration), 30 miles per hour is an unreasonable maximum. For such cyclists and vehicles to exceed it at times involves no risk, no inconvenience, and no damage to anything or person. Unfortunately, the attempt which the police will be making to enforce an indiscriminating law will tend (as in the past it did tend) to introduce odious relations between the public and police. This odium in the long run tends to deprive the police of one of the essentials for the efficiency of an unarmed force like ours—the general and willing support of the citizens. This is a serious loss. Soon the idea and practice of thwarting the police trap will once more come to be regarded as a sporting and friendly act. So much did this spirit grow in the past that this friendly service was for years efficiently performed by public organisations openly set up for the purpose, and it was paid for by prospective intentional offenders. Moreover, these operations were actually adjudged in court to be legal! Such an atmosphere, antagonistic to authority, among large sections of the community is a thoroughly bad one, and detrimental to public polity. It was unique and uniquely created by speed limits.

Turning now to statistics. In the expectation of proving the correctness of the plausible theory that speeds in excess of some such limit as 30 miles per hour are the dominant trouble, illuminating evidence has been collected. But the ardent advocates of a legalised speed limit did not find what they hoped. Every vestige of factual evidence points against the value of this speed limit. The official Report of the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee published in 1928 (61434-12) gives the best, and indeed the only, obtainable record of the speed of approach of every vehicle which was involved in a fatality. These records were collected and analysed by the Metropolitan Police every year throughout a series of seven years, and the numbers of deaths were tabulated year by year in relation to each of the speeds of approach: 5, 10, 15, 20, and over 20 miles per hour. The evidence was remarkably concordant for each step of speed and for each of those seven years. In other words, the records for any one year are a check on the general correctness of those for any other year. Collusion to make concordant statements among all the thousands of drivers involved at different times was utterly out of the question. It is fantastically improbable that such a number of independent and unrelated statements of speed, whoever made them, should give concordant indications item by item year after year, either by coincidence or by luckily selected lies; moreover, bad faith or negligence among the numerous policemen, the frequent independent witnesses, and the collectors of the data at distinct dates and places was out of the question. On this view the evidence is worthy of regard by any seeker for the truth. Accordingly, it was accepted year after year by the Advisory Committee and in due course published officially. These data, then, lead to the reasonable inference that within the metropolitan area 78 per cent. of the road fatalities occurred in connexion with approach speeds by the motor vehicles involved at under 15 miles per hour. Indeed, a substantial majority (56 per cent.) were related to approach speeds of under 10 miles per hour, while only 4.5 per cent. were related to speeds over 20 miles per hour, in spite of the immense amount of driving usual above that speed. Since the police necessarily knew the likely and possible speeds on their beats and had no conceivable reason to minimise them, and since the temptation to fast drivers would be to declare their speed at 20 miles per hour, we need not be surprised that the London and Home Counties Advisory Committee accepted the evidence and made no demur to any of these records for seven years. Let it be noted that at the time and for five years after no suggestion was made by the police that the data were 'merely drivers' statements.' That came later, when I raised the question before the 'Boscawen' Royal Commission. It is proved to have little

significance by the concordance of the figures year by year. Frankly, it is incredible that the police who collected the data had allowed themselves to be biased either by the onlookers who tend to exaggerate their speed estimate in sympathy for the victim, or by drivers' attempts to exculpate themselves. On the contrary, our experience of the police shows them to be sane average men. They have no compunction about refusing to accept statements and they certainly would not publish without qualification statements of speed that they disbelieved at the time. In fact, they published these data for seven years up to 1927.

The latest evidence (1933) as to approach speeds before a fatality leads to the same conclusion generally. It was collected for the official Report (88-29), but in this case the text ignores the tendency of the witnesses and police to exaggerate speeds, and mentions the tendency of drivers 'not to err on the side of excess.' The tone of the observations on the data show that the facts collected did not conform with the pre-existent suppositions as to the speed of fatal accidents favoured by the compilers of the Report. If the 1933 figures were really thought unreliable, their publication was unwarrantable. There is no alternative. The procedure of discounting data that do not conform with the experimenter's preconceptions is a well-known phenomenon among all amateur scientific observers, and has retarded many scientific advances—*e.g.*, the discovery of the recalescence of iron. It is tantamount to 'cooking' the evidence (albeit without moral dishonesty). However well intentioned, this selective discounting in one direction has no weight, save to prove that all this class of work requires the impartial scientific supervision which has for years been advocated by the present writer.

The lesson from the 'uncooked' evidence is of no effect of any kind to exculpate or incriminate drivers or others. It suggests merely that the major incidence of road fatalities occurs, not at those places and times when the conditions induced the upper speeds, but when the conditions of driving were for some reason sufficiently anxious, difficult or risky to cause the speeds to be slow. In support of this view we find that as many as 20 per cent. of the total of fatalities are recorded in regard to a speed which is quite unmistakable to every onlooker, a speed under 5 miles per hour (walking speed). For what little it is worth I add that the only two road fatalities that I have witnessed in thirty-six years occurred at walking speed (of the vehicles involved), and both were taxis.

The imposition of a 30 miles per hour limit fails to encourage, but on the contrary discourages, the attitude of mind essential to safe driving—namely, a firm decision in the driver that speed must be controlled always to suit the occasion. Far from operating

to increase the driver's attentiveness to every minute indication of the near-by traffic, it deflects his attention to his speedometer and preoccupies it with a search for trapping police, or, what is just as bad, with searching for the warnings of scouts, who may be thwarting the police. Such a preoccupation may well be felt by the driver to be increasing his risks, and, if so, will induce a sense of petty persecution. It forces into the mind of the most innocent drivers that the Government's objective is, not safety, but vote-catching, and that the policeman's preoccupation is for his own promotion, not preventing danger. It will be forced upon him that road administrators generally are not so much in quest of the low accident ratio as yielding to ill-informed clamour.

In such a case as the present no law can be effective without the general consent of the governed. Such consent may be obtained temporarily from the drivers because the present state of helplessness of the Administration may evoke in motorists a wish to support any scheme that purports to lead us out of an *impasse*. It is too unreasonable to endure and survive its defects, among which may be counted the former experience that speed-limit enforcement opens the way to bribery and is reputed to have done so widely in the past.

Lastly, be it noted the speed limit was deemed inadvisable by the last Royal Commission, which was a body completely independent of both the motor interest and of the vote catching influences which may affect other bodies. In its report (Cmd. 3365) the names of a large number of responsible authorities and bodies are given who opposed the speed limit method after its protracted trial. No increase of fatalities beyond the number which occurred under the speed limit *régime* has been recorded since, and no reason for their changing that opinion has arisen.

MERVYN O'GORMAN.

NORTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING

EVERY British subject may feel pride in the splendid achievements which resulted in the successful launching last month of the liner *Queen Mary* at Clydebank, the largest British merchant ship that has ever been built. Everyone will give credit to the concerted work of the leaders and the technical staffs of the owners and builders who conceived the idea of the ship, gave practical shape to the theory, and had the immense satisfaction of seeing the vast hull slip down the ways, without any kind of hitch, into her natural element, and will wish the new ship very great success and the best of luck. But, however justified these gratifying sentiments, it seems desirable to keep a sense of perspective and to remember that the continued success of the British shipping and shipbuilding industries will depend, not merely on one great ship, but on the construction and work of many and on their suitability to the particular services for which they are designed.

At the present time, without taking into account various cargo liners under construction for different owners, very distinctive vessels are being built for the Orient Line and the P. & O. Company, and I suggest that in their own routes these ships should confer quite as much lustre on the British mercantile marine as a single ship in the North Atlantic. Nautical writers have been accustomed to refer to the services between Europe and New York as the 'North Atlantic Ferry'; presumably the idea underlying this picturesque expression is that there are, at most, two or three ports on this side of the 'Herring Pond' (at one time this phrase was very popular) and only one port on the other side of the water. The term 'ferry' will certainly not lose in significance if and when the ideal of Cunard White Star, Limited, is consummated of maintaining the service for the greater part of the year with two ships alone. No one has been quite so foolish as to apply the term 'ferry' to the services between Europe, the East, and Australia. In this route vessels, following each other at short intervals, enter many ports, they proceed along numerous coasts, they round capes, they pass through waters subject to many tides and currents and seasonable changes (notably the monsoon). Each voyage is a long adventure, and

so-called cabin class. This appeared to be a case of discretion being the better part of valour. As the keel plates of the great ship were laid in the summer of 1928 and the construction would have required three or four years, the vessel would normally have been ready for service in 1931 or 1932. Events showed that the decision not to proceed with the building of the monster ship was wise and fortunate. She would have entered the service at a time of severe depression and could have scarcely been other than a maritime white elephant. The principal ships were sailing with exceedingly poor passenger lists—sometimes with fewer passengers than fifty in the first class—and the results of employing a still larger vessel representing a new and immense outlay of capital would inevitably have been disastrous.

The new *Britannic* proved herself to be well fitted to the prevailing circumstances, and so confident were the White Star Line that the ship was well adapted to the conditions that they contracted for a sister vessel, which was completed in 1931 and named the *Georgic*. These two ships were designed for carrying passengers in the cabin, tourist, and third classes. The accommodation in the cabin class would seem to fulfil the requirements of many passengers for comfortable travel. The ships were not intended for the highest speed. They are described as 17½-knot vessels, and they customarily make the passage between Liverpool and New York, including a call at Queenstown, in seven or eight days. Their moderate speed and moderate size are taken into account by the Atlantic Conference, which is responsible for the rating for passage purposes of all the ships, and so they rank as cabin class and fares can be quoted which are below the rates specified for the first class in the express liners based on Southampton. They are economical vessels, and during the quiet times they are known to have been very well supported by the travelling public and often to have carried large complements of passengers. Although their managers have not professed that these ships were the greyhounds of the Atlantic, they have proved very suitable units in the trying times of the last few years, and undoubtedly they have been, and are, credits to British shipbuilding and British shipping. They have been worthy successors to some of the most famous vessels of the White Star Line.

A personal liking for particular ships has always been a feature of the North Atlantic passenger traffic. Two of the most successful vessels were the *Baltic* and the *Adriatic*, of about 24,000 tons each, which were built in 1904 and 1907 respectively. The latter is still in service. At first they were 'crack' ships, but when their places were taken by other and larger vessels many discriminating travellers still supported their old friends. They had a reputation for steadiness and comfort. They were of a size

that appealed to many persons who liked the sea and to whom a day or two longer on the ocean was not regarded as a drawback but rather as a happy extension of the enjoyment of the voyage. To experienced travellers every ship has her distinctive peculiarities. Two vessels may be built which, according to plan, are identical. Yet those who have sailed in each are accustomed to note differences or idiosyncrasies. One of the two may even enjoy a reputation for being luckier than the other. To account for such fancies may be beyond human explanation, but such variations among ships always have existed.

While the White Star Line was planning and changing its plans and proceeding with the revised programme the Cunard Line was also thinking hard. No special knowledge of the North Atlantic route was required to appreciate that the *Mauretania*, a magnificent vessel, would need, in due course, to be replaced. It is sufficient to recall that the famous liner was built as long ago as 1907. Since the war the Cunard express mail service between Southampton, Cherbourg, and New York has been maintained by this vessel, the *Aquitania*, built in 1914, and the *Berengaria* (constructed in 1912 as the *Imperator*, and transferred to this country under the Treaty of Versailles). The Cunard Line could have decided to replace each of these three ships in turn. Instead, the management resolved that the time had come when, during the passenger season at any rate, the service could be maintained by two vessels of higher speed. It is entitled to claim credit for knowledge and judgment based on the experience of many years, and the question whether the service can be best provided by two or three vessels seems one which only the management is qualified to determine. Ordinary members of the public are hardly fitted to adjudicate on such an issue. The employment of only two vessels in the express service—and in this connexion Southampton has an advantage over the German ports which are about 400 miles further away from New York—involves higher speed, and Sir Percy Bates, the present chairman of the Cunard Line, who is also chairman of Cunard White Star Limited, has insisted more than once that the size of the *Queen Mary* is the smallest practicable in order that the required speed may be obtained without ignoring commercial considerations. Of course, it would be possible to build ships capable of crossing the North Atlantic at much higher speeds than any now contemplated, provided no heed had to be paid to the question of cost. But it goes without saying that the managers of a shipping company in planning particular speeds must always have in mind the necessity for making the venture a 'commercial proposition.'

The circumstances of the contracting at the end of 1930 for the great vessel long known as *No. 534*, and the decision to suspend

construction at the end of 1931, are too well known to need detailed description here. From the end of 1931 until May last, during a period of intense depression, the vast hull lay uncompleted on the stocks at Clydebank. Work had proceeded on the mammoth vessel far in advance of that which had taken place on the projected White Star liner at Belfast when a cessation was ordered. But its completion was only made possible by the promise of help from the Government, subject to the elimination of competition between the Cunard and White Star Lines. A scheme was formulated whereby the North Atlantic liners of the two companies were transferred to a new operating company called Cunard White Star Limited, and work was restarted on the vessel, which was launched and christened by the Queen on September 26 last in the presence of the King and the Prince of Wales.

In order to understand fully the implications of this story, account must be taken of certain developments on the Continent, which illustrate the severe international competition which has long characterised North Atlantic shipping—a competition in which Governments have in recent years tended to become ever more deeply involved. It was, as already stated, in 1930 that the Cunard Company contracted for the ship now christened the *Queen Mary*. On June 22 of that year announcement was made that the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* (French Line) had placed an order for a ship which was to be 1000 feet long and, it was then stated, would be designed for a speed of 28 knots. She was to be ready for service in April 1933. This ship, which was launched in October 1932, is to make her maiden trip between Havre and New York next summer. Work on this vessel was not expedited; in fact, the conditions in the North Atlantic trade were such that the owners could hardly be expected to be anxious to take delivery of her until they improved. Large financial advances had, moreover, been made by the French Government for the completion of the ship. Shortly before the launching of this vessel a statement was issued by the French Line which was instructive as indicating the motives prompting the building of vessels of this size. The largest ship then in service, it was pointed out, was the *Majestic*, which had a speed of between 25 and 26 knots, and the two fastest liners were the German vessels *Bremen* and *Europa*, the speed of which was between 26 and 27 knots. Italy had just ordered two ships—one of 47,000 tons and the other of 51,000 tons and a speed of 27 knots. Actually one of these Italian ships—the *Rex*, which was completed last year—has made the crossing between Gibraltar and New York at an average speed of 28.92 knots, and the *Bremen* last year made the passage between Ambrose Lightvessel and Cherbourg at an average of 28.51 knots.

The French statement went on to remark that 'finally a British line had ordered a ship of about 73,000 tons and probably of 28 to 30 knots, with the idea of ordering a similar one at a brief interval.' The statement continued:

To reply suitably to this competition, therefore, it was necessary to foresee a ship that would be sufficiently big and fast so as not to be out-classed as soon as she made her appearance. It was also necessary to see that this new ship should be sufficiently in advance in design on her newest arrivals so as not to be soon eliminated by the advent of a new competitor. Finally, to give the traveller his due, the ship to be built should embody all the results of the latest studies in construction and research as regards size, stability and comfort.

There were already in service on the Atlantic five ships of over 50,000 tons. To have built yet another would have simply been to have it out-classed by the two projected Cunarders already referred to at the start of its career. It was therefore necessary to look farther ahead and to build as big as technically possible, while keeping strictly to the usual economic methods of commercial construction, carefully excluding the use of costly special metals which would have made the cost of the job prohibitive.

The statement proceeded to argue that much of the tonnage, owing to age, must before long be withdrawn and that the advent of the new French ship would coincide with a considerable decrease of tonnage, and so she would enter the service at the very best moment to profit by the fact and to provide connexion between Europe and America under the very best conditions. At that time the ship was expected to be ready in 1934. So far, there has not been the withdrawal of the tonnage that was anticipated. The White Star liner *Homeric*, of 34,300 tons, is now mainly employed in pleasure cruising, and it would seem that, thanks to the placing of all the vessels of the Cunard and White Star Lines under a single control, there will not be the same need for the services of the *Mauretania* in the regular Transatlantic route.

The French Line, in accordance with its agreement with the French Government by which it receives a substantial operating subsidy, quite apart from loans for construction, has definite obligations governing the maintenance of its fleet. Its mail contract stipulates that each successive ship shall be superior to, or at least equal to, foreign ships either in running or under construction. It is also required to lay down a new vessel within five years from the maiden voyage of the latest vessel. This means that, unless the contract be varied, within five years from the maiden voyage of the *Normandie* next summer the company will be required to lay down another ship. The *Normandie* is the French reply to the *Queen Mary*, but it is not to be assumed that the new ship to be built five years hence will necessarily be of the largest size. A statement was recently attributed to a high official of the French company which suggested that another

ship of over 70,000 tons would not be needed, and already arrangements are said to have been discussed whereby British and French mammoth ships will not sail in the same week from the same port. The principal French vessel at present in service is the *Ile de France*, of 43,150 tons, which was built in 1927 and has proved a very successful ship. Since then the French line has placed in service the *Lafayette*, of 25,000 tons gross, built in 1929, and the *Champlain*, of 28,000 tons gross, built in 1931. These vessels were designed in view of the construction of competing cabin-class ships.

Since the *Normandie* was laid down her gross tonnage has somewhat increased. Originally the figure mentioned was 60,000 tons; then rather over 70,000 tons was spoken of; last year a figure of about 76,000 tons was cited; and lately the figure of 79,280 tons has been officially quoted. Gross tonnage is a measurement of capacity and is calculated on the cubic capacity of the ship on the basis of 100 cubic feet to the ton. It has not been uncommon for the gross tonnage of vessels to be revised during construction and even during service, for the closing of spaces which were previously open may have the effect of increasing gross tonnage. When the *Normandie* was launched her length over all was given as 1027 feet and her beam as 117 feet 9 inches. These measurements were the result of converting metres roughly into feet and inches. The length has since been officially stated to be 313.75 metres, which, as a metre equals 39.37 inches, represents a length over all of 1029 feet 5 inches. Similarly, a beam of 36.4 metres equals 119 feet 5 inches. The dimensions compare with a length for the *Queen Mary* of 1018 feet and a beam of 118 feet. The gross tonnage of the *Queen Mary* is not likely to be precisely known until the vessel reaches an advanced stage of construction. There is bound to be great interest taken in the performances of the *Normandie* when she enters the service next year—at least twelve months in advance of the *Queen Mary*. The fastest ship to date is the Italian *Rex*. The *Conte di Savoia*, of 48,500 tons, has not equalled the performances of the *Rex*. At one time a sister vessel to the *Rex*, to be named the *Dux*, was spoken of, but nothing has lately been heard of plans for such a vessel. Very large sums were advanced by the Italian Government for the building of the *Rex* and the *Conte di Savoia*, and assistance was also given in the provision of insurance.

Each nation continues to watch the shipping plans of every other closely, for the Governments now stand behind most of the companies in the North Atlantic route. The largest vessels will be judged by the results; much will depend on the course of commerce in the United States and the degree of prosperity achieved there. Hitherto, at any rate, the United States Lines

have favoured vessels of the cabin class, and have two fine units in the *Manhattan* and the *Washington*, each of about 25,000 tons gross, which were built in 1932 and 1933 respectively. The creation of monster liners provides a large amount of work during the period of building, but it seems doubtful if even the construction of two mammoth vessels would provide more work than the building of three ships of moderate size. The shipyards of the country need a steady flow of work which will keep them employed year in and year out, and that is why the building of ships of moderate size for the Eastern, Australian and New Zealand, and South African routes may be regarded with such satisfaction. We have yet to learn how the building of the greatest vessels affects employment at sea. The largest ship will require a bigger crew than a vessel of moderate size, but it still remains to be seen how the complement of a single great ship will compare with those of two vessels of less tonnage.

One of the arguments against the mammoth ships is that if they prove successful—and there is always an attraction for North Atlantic travellers in the largest and newest vessels—other ships will no longer be wanted, unless such an expansion of passenger traffic takes place as far exceeds any development at present envisaged. There are, indeed, many uncertainties in the future. Another commercial race has been started with the Governments backing the competitors, and precisely what the end of it all will be no one can foresee.

In these circumstances all who wish well to the British mercantile marine must be thankful that its traditions of service are very high indeed, and that, whether passengers travel in ships of the largest or more moderate tonnages, no effort will be spared to make the adventure safe, comfortable, and enjoyable. When everything has been said, man is master of the machine, and it is the human element that counts most in safe navigation.

CUTHBERT MAUGHAN.

'THE GOLDEN BOUGH' IN PORTUGAL

IN his monumental work *The Golden Bough*, Sir James Frazer draws scarcely if at all on ethnographical material from Portugal. This is hardly surprising, for no general survey of Portuguese folklore has yet appeared in any language, and such material as has been collected is scattered among local monographs and periodicals, many of them scarce and difficult of access. It would nevertheless be hard to find in Europe a richer repository of traditional belief and custom than the Lusitanian seaboard, and recent researches into Portuguese peasant traditions, particularly those associated with the Calendar, enable some of the general theories advanced in *The Golden Bough* to be considerably developed and extended.

At first sight the Spring rite in Portugal is little different from that of other European countries. Customs representing the carrying out or killing of Winter, Death or the Old Year, so familiar to Frazer's readers, are associated with the earlier part of the year, notably at carnival time. On May Day the no less familiar bringing in of Spring and reawakening of Nature are enacted in various fashions. A May queen is chosen and enthroned upon a chair; a yearling ram, adorned with flowers and ribbons, is conducted in procession; maypoles are set up, to the top of which are affixed puppets called *Maio* or *Maia* (the May); and in a few remote spots *Maio Moço* (the May Boy) still dances through the village, enveloped, like our 'Jack-in-the-Green,' in leafy branches. These usually take the form of broom, a detail which, as we shall shortly see, is of considerable significance. These customs represent the May as something to be welcomed, almost, indeed, to be worshipped. Side by side with this tradition, however, runs another in which the May is conceived as an indefinable evil influence akin to the evil eye, which must be warded off. A common precaution is to hang bunches of broom decorated with ribbons and flowers on the doors of house and stall, with the avowed intention of 'keeping the May out.' These, on the homœopathic principle, are themselves called *maios*. In some districts where their original purpose has been forgotten, an ætiological legend explains them by the story that broom was

placed at night on the house where Christ was sleeping, as a sign to betray him, but that the following morning every house bore a similar branch. The May is sometimes identified with hunger or with a mysterious wasting disease, and conceived (as in other parts of Europe is the corn spirit) as a wolf, stag or donkey. In the village of Santo Tirso, near Oporto, the people believe that he comes mounted upon an ass, to smash the pottery and lame the cattle. Elsewhere he is thought to cause a discoloration of the face by entering into the human body, which, however, may be prevented by eating chestnuts before dawn on May morning.

This dual conception of the May may appear puzzling, but a chance clue furnishes the probable explanation. In the neighbourhood of Oporto the broom placed upon a house on May Eve is intended to protect it, not against the May, but against witches. Now in Portugal the broom as a domestic implement, one of the principal insignia of witchcraft, is always made of *giesta* (flowering broom). Thus broom, the symbol of witchcraft, wards off witches, and bunches of broom called *maios* ward off *O Maio*. The evil aspect of *O Maio* may therefore be equated to the evil power of witchcraft. All now becomes clear, for it is generally recognised that, as Miss M. A. Murray was the first to show in *The Witch Cult in Western Europe* and *The God of the Witches*, witchcraft is no more than the survival in a disguised and underground form of that pre-Christian fertility cult from which the Spring rite in all its forms is derived.¹ The pagan god has become the devil of the Christians, and the practitioners of witchcraft were worshippers, not of evil, but of that natural power which to them was the principle of all good. In some parts of Portugal, therefore, the outward forms of this cult have been preserved intact in the innocent May Day diversions, and their influence is regarded as beneficent. In other regions the belief has been implanted that its manifestations are essentially malefic, and they are feared and avoided accordingly. So narrow is the gulf between worship and abhorrence.

Before proceeding further, the association of chestnuts with

¹ Miss Murray's theory is conveniently summarised in the following passage from the introduction to *The Witch Cult in Western Europe* (p. 12):

'The evidence proves that underlying the Christian religion was a cult practised by many classes of the community, chiefly, however, by the more ignorant or those in the less thickly inhabited parts of the country. It can be traced back to pre-Christian times, and appears to be the ancient religion of Western Europe. The god, anthropomorphic or theriomorphic, was worshipped in well-defined rites; the organisation was highly developed; and the ritual is analogous to many other ancient rituals. The dates of the chief festivals suggest that the religion belonged to a race which had not reached the agricultural stage; and the evidence shows that various modifications were introduced, probably by invading peoples who brought in their own beliefs.' Cf. also Rodney Gallop, *A Book of the Basques*, pp. 257-267.

May Day, of which an example has been quoted above, may justify a short digression. In Portugal a connexion may be discerned between chestnuts and the May festival for which it is impossible to account by coincidence alone. In one village, on May morning the priest scatters chestnuts to the children from the church tower. In others, the 'May boys' are pelted with chestnuts for which they beg in their song. In others, again, dried or shelled chestnuts are called *maias* (mays) and swallowed on May morning 'to keep out the May.' Can it be that in this relationship, so clearly associated with ancient superstitious beliefs, we may find the long-sought explanation of our own childish song 'Nuts-in-May'?

A duality similar to that recorded in the May rites is to be observed in the traditions of St. John's Eve, the principal date in the agricultural, as May Day is in the pastoral, calendar. In Portugal, perhaps more even than elsewhere, St. John's is a great festival of fire, of water, and of lovers. Lack of space precludes a full account of the beliefs and customs associated with this occasion, some of which do not differ essentially from those recorded in other countries. All alike reflect the conviction that there resides in the dark hours of St. John's night some mysterious virtue which, though it vanishes with the dawn, may be retained in ashes burnt, in water drawn, or in herbs plucked during the hours of darkness. One example may be quoted to show the nature of this virtue. In North Portugal a woman who wants her hair to grow longer cuts off the ends on St. John's night and ties them to a bramble-shoot. As the shoot grows into a bush, so will her hair grow by a current of magic sympathy so strong that should the bush chance to be cut down the hair will wither at the roots. In this practice may clearly be discerned the attempt, on the principles of sympathetic magic, to harness the powers of Nature for reproduction and growth.

Nevertheless, at this season when, in the saint's name, the peasants still perform originally pagan rites to promote fertility, whether animal, vegetable or human, they walk in mortal fear of a variety of supernatural beings, phantoms of the human imagination, in whom the pre-Christian Nature cults have been personified. Enchanted serpents and Moorish princesses, werewolves, and, above all, witches are abroad and their power is doubled on this night of nights. In regard to the *Mouras Encantadas* (enchanted Moorish princesses) it is interesting to note that all over Portugal relics of prehistoric races and religions are connected in the peasant mind with the much later Moorish invaders. To ward off these creatures of evil, amulets are hung on doors and windows, and in the remote village of Cortiças the streets are barricaded with hurdles, ploughs, and similar objects.

Of the purpose of the midsummer ceremonies there is no doubt. Their aim is to stimulate the growth of crops and the welfare of man and beast. The manner in which they achieve this object is more open to question. On this point Sir James Frazer does not commit himself to any final view. He quotes Mannhardt's 'positive' interpretation of the fires as intended to preserve the sun by imitative magic from the decline into which he enters after the day of his greatest splendour, and so to ensure a plentiful supply of sunshine. He goes on to suggest that the fertilising influence which they exert may alternatively be due to their having originally been the means of the destruction meted out to that god (or his human or animal representative or effigy) whose death and resurrection have been regarded in so many religions as essential to human welfare. He is then impressed by Westermarck's 'negative' theory that the fires promote the growth of vegetation by cleansing it of all baneful influences. Between the 'positive' and 'negative' poles Frazer halts undecided; nor does the water ritual, which he does not discuss from this point of view, afford a solution of the problem, for water is widely conceived both as a fertilising and as a cleansing element.

It is to be noted, however, that the evils against which the fire and water of St. John, considered as 'negative' agents, afford protection (*i.e.*, thunder and lightning, conflagration, blight, mildew, vermin, sterility and disease) are all prerogatives of witchcraft, which itself is only a transformation of that cult of fertility which the fire and water, considered as 'positive' agents, are held to promote. In the last resort, therefore, it does not seem to matter greatly whether they are to be regarded as stimulants or as disinfectants. They may well be both. The important thing is that, in all its three aspects of fire, water and lovers, the midsummer festival aims at promoting fertility and growth, the prime needs of mankind. It is well known that throughout Europe the festivals of Halloween and Christmas correspond in the second half of the year to those of May Day and St. John's Day in the first. Not only do they fall exactly six months apart, but a connexion may be established between the traditions which have grown up round them. It does not appear, however, that the implications of this fact have been worked out as far as is possible, and on this point the Portuguese material throws valuable light. Halloween, called in Portuguese *o dia dos finados* (the day of the departed), is a Christian festival of the dead celebrated with visits or processions to the cemetery, and grafted, no doubt, on to a pre-Christian festival of death. None but a pagan interpretation can account for the *magusto*, an open-air meal consumed originally on the graves and un-

doubtedly connected with funeral offerings, the principal components of which are wine and chestnuts, the latter emphasising the link with May Day.

Just as St. John's Day marks the sun's apogee, so does Christmas mark the end of his long decline, and there is no intrinsic difference between the festivals of midsummer and mid-winter except that the first is a communal festival held in the open air, while the second is, as befits the season, domestic and held indoors. In Portugal the yule-log (of oak wherever possible) blazes on the hearth, or more rarely in the churchyard. As many members of the family as possible gather round it for the *consoada*, or Christmas banquet, eaten in the small hours of Christmas Day. The ashes and charred remains of the log or of pine cones burnt in the same fire are preserved and thrown on the fire later in the year when there are thunderstorms. Where their smoke goes no thunderbolt will fall.

If the analogy with May Day and St. John's Eve is to be pursued we shall expect to find that the beneficent ceremonies inherited from the old pagan festivals of autumn and winter will be accompanied by a belief that certain malign influences have special power at Halloween and Christmas. It is not witches and were-wolves who are abroad on this night, however, but the spirits of the dead—*alminhas a penar* (souls in torment). In Portugal, at the present day, the spirits appear to be less feared than welcomed. Crumbs are scattered for them on the hearth, or the table is left laid after the Christmas meal in order that they may share in its plenty. If they are seen, it is in the innocent form of little flickering lights. But this is probably only a recent development. In most primitive communities the dead are feared little less than witches, and the customs in which fear and avoidance are tempered by affection and combined with a ritual aiming at ensuring the return of the dead to their ancestral homes on one special day in the year are the exception rather than the rule.

In the Minho province of Portugal the souls come at Christmas only if no prayers are offered for their peace, and in these prayers it is easy to discern the intention of warding them off. In so far as they are feared, therefore, the souls of the departed may be equated with the malign beings in which popular superstition has incarnated Nature cults. This parallel may be carried further. In all ages a relation has been thought to exist between the dead and the buried seed from which presently the crops will spring. The fact that both are buried beneath the earth would alone suffice to account for this notion, which is reflected in the myths of Ancient Greece and Rome and in the Greek festival of the *Anthesteria*. At this festival, called 'the more ancient

Dionysia' and celebrated at the turn of our February and March, the ghosts of the dead rose up, and every householder anointed his door with pitch so that any intruding spirit should be caught, much as Brer Fox was caught by the Tar Baby in *Uncle Remus*. These ghosts bore the name of *keres*. On the third day of the festival they returned to the realm of the dead, taking with them a *panspermia*, or pot-of-all-seeds, which the people prepared and entrusted to them that they might tend it and bring it back in autumn as a *pankarpia*, or pot-of-all-fruits. It is worth asking, therefore, whether in Portugal the dead are similarly associated with seed, flour or bread. As has been stated, crumbs are left for the souls at Christmas, and in the mountains of Barroso it is customary for anyone who drops a crust on the floor to exclaim '*Para as alminhas*' ('For the souls'). It is, moreover, difficult not to see representatives of the dead in the young men with blackened faces and wrapped in white sheets who run about the countryside howling dismally on St. John's night; and in the figures who, with faces hidden and disguised voices, break in upon the *desfolhada*, the communal stripping of the maize in autumn, and are rewarded (or placated?) with apples by the girls.

Even more striking is the custom called *aumentar as almas*. During Lent, in the remote province of Tras-os-Montes, groups of men and women go to the threshing-floor late at night and entone curious dirges calling upon all good Christians to awake and pray for the souls of the dead. If, therefore, the dead are thus associated with the buried seed and are to be regarded in some sense as its guardians, their cult may be interpreted as an agricultural fertility cult, and the distinction between them and the whole brood of witches, were-wolves and dispossessed Nature divinities appears to dissolve into thin air. If not identical in outward form, malign beings and ghosts are equivalent to the extent that both are misty personifications formed in timorous peasant minds by the old rites and their protagonists, divinities once, who have paled to-day into these shadowy creatures of evil.

RODNEY GALLOP.

verses had inspired. Both poems were duly inserted in the miscellany. Again, the letters show that in the preceding year Cromwell had promised to send Pope some translations from Ovid; they are mentioned several times, and one of them (*Amor.*, eleg. 16, lib. ii.) Pope criticises at some length in his letter of July 20, 1710. Pope apparently kept these poems by him, for we find that elegy and another included in the miscellany. Yet again, a letter from John Caryll (dated May 23, 1712, but written before he had heard that the miscellany was published) proves that Pope had previously told him of the intention to include Betterton's poems in it, and then goes on to inquire if *The Rape of the Lock* would also 'come out' in it, or not. Both Betterton's poems and *The Rape* appear in the first edition.

But any doubt that Pope was implicated in the preparation of the miscellany is settled by Addison, who, when speaking of the 'rising genius' of Pope in the *Spectator* (October 30, 1712), definitely calls our collection 'the late Miscellany published by Mr. Pope.' Addison, if anyone, was in a position to know the truth of the matter. Then at the height of his influence and producing with Steele the most celebrated journal of the period, he was situated at the very focus of literary news, and was, by character, utterly unlikely to make such a statement on inadequate grounds. Furthermore, Pope had been known personally both to him and Steele for some time; he contributed to their paper before the miscellany was published, and again after Addison had made that statement; yet he left it undisputed.

In the miscellany—as in the thirty or more newspaper advertisements of it—no mention is made of editorship; yet Addison's attribution of it to Pope is confirmed by internal evidence which reveals the characteristic imprint of his personality in a number of ways. Parallels can be perceived between this and his later miscellany, *Poems on Several Occasions*, above mentioned. In both most, if not all, of the living contributors were his friends or personal acquaintances. In both he appropriated to himself the largest share of the volume, amounting to nearly one-third of its pages. In both he disguised the preponderance of his poems by partial or complete anonymity. And in both he included work which he subsequently reprinted as his own, and work which throughout his life he would never acknowledge.

A glance at the 'Contents' of our miscellany, Pope's maiden essay at editorship, shows that he ascribed to himself only five poems, the same number as given to Broome; Fenton has four, Prior three, and the remaining contributors one or two each. The rest of the pieces are anonymous; but of the eight which cannot be attributed to other hands, Pope himself later acknowledged two, two or three others have enough of his mannerisms

to suggest the possibility of his authorship; and yet another, *The Story of Arethusa*, can be assigned to him (on evidence presently to be adduced) with a certainty that lacks only the final warrant of his signature. For, even at the date of our miscellany, anonymity was not a new policy of Pope's: he had withheld his name from the *Messiah* which had appeared in the *Spectator* in the preceding week, and also from the *Essay on Criticism* in 1711.

Further evidence pointing to Pope's manipulation of the miscellany is to be found in the differences between the first and second editions. In the first edition of 'Lintot's Miscellany' there is an omission of thirty-two pages; and, as this gap occurs in every known copy without any trace of mutilation or hiatus in the text, it is certain that the miscellany was published in this condition. The book is an octavo; the 'signature letters' run consecutively from B to X (pp. 1-320); Y and Z (pp. 321-352) are missing; and a new series starts with Aa, Bb (pp. 353-376, plus eight pages of book advertisements). Thus, as a poem ends on the last page of signature X (p. 320) and another begins on the first page of Aa (p. 353), it is obvious that the signatures Y and Z could have been, and were, withdrawn before the book was made up, but apparently after the sheets had been printed, for the page numbers following the gap are left unaltered. The second edition, dated 1714, is a reissue of the unsold sheets of 1712 with certain clearly defined additions, among which are the signatures Y and Z now inserted in their proper place. These restored pages are entirely occupied by Pope's *Windsor Forest* and *Ode for Musick*, but a close examination shows that they are not uniform with the rest of the book; they are overcrowded, having three more lines to the page, and the title-headings set in a smaller type and more closely spaced.

In 1736 Pope first revealed the fact that *Windsor Forest* had been composed at two different periods. The poem was originally about two-thirds its present length and was written 'in the year 1704, at the same time with the Pastorals,' the concluding portion celebrating the Peace having been added long afterwards. Further, we know from Pope's letter to Caryll (December 5, 1712) that his friend had seen the original version, and, from a later letter, that he 'had more lines than one of that poem by heart.' There can be no doubt, therefore, of the once separate existence of the earlier composition.

Calculations of lines and space show that if the original version of *Windsor Forest* and the *Ode for Musick* (written, so Pope said, in 1708) were set up like the rest of the miscellany, they would together exactly fill our missing thirty-two pages. I suggest, therefore, that the 'copy' supplied by Pope to Lintot for the

first edition included the original version of *Windsor Forest* and the *Ode for Musick*, and the whole book was duly set up in type. Before going to press, or, more probably, after the sheets were printed, Pope withdrew these two poems, occupying the Y-Z signatures, for separate publication in folio, and the book was issued with the gap found in all copies. A little later, when the prospect of peace (consummated by the Treaty of Utrecht, March 30, 1713) began to fill all minds, Pope, seeing the possibility of adapting *Windsor Forest* to celebrate the occasion, commenced to work on it; and, as is shown by his letter to Caryll written in November, he was well advanced with his additions when Tickell's poem *On the Prospect of Peace* was published on October 28.³ To judge from Pope's correspondence, it was about this time that Caryll was first allowed to read the original version of *Windsor Forest*, not improbably in a copy of the discarded Y-Z signatures; for Pope was then actively employed on the manuscript itself, and we do not know that any duplicate of it existed. From November to January he was still at work on it. It was published in folio on March 7, 1713, and not long after was followed by the folio edition of the *Ode for Musick* on July 16. Five months later, in the second edition of our miscellany (dated 1714, but actually published on December 4, 1713), these two poems, despite an addition of some 140 lines to *Windsor Forest*, are crowded back into the gap which, it would seem, their removal had made.

The only accessions to the second edition are five poems by Pope: three of these are attributed to him—namely, the two in the replaced signatures, and the *Essay on Criticism* at the end; but from the other two, here printed for the first time, he withheld his name, though he afterwards acknowledged one of them. (In some copies these two poems, which occupy one leaf with duplicate page numbers, have been cancelled.) The second edition was provided with a new title page on which the words 'By Mr. Pope' now figure, framed between two rules, but figure so ambiguously as to imply either that he was responsible for the entire compilation, or that he was the author only of the nine poems whose titles are displayed there at length. The newspaper advertisements likewise show that Pope's active connexion with the miscellany was still maintained. In those announcements of the first edition which had mentioned any names at all, Pope's name was placed fourth in a list of eight contributors, whereas every advertisement of the second edition cites the titles of eight of his poems, and his is the only name to appear.

Six years elapsed before the third edition was issued; but

³ This fact alone disposes of the conjecture (*A Pope Library*: T. J. Wise, 1931, p. 8) that the Y-Z signatures of 1714 were the identical pages set up in 1712 removed and replaced.

midway in this interval Pope secretly compiled and Lintot published the miscellany, *Poems on Several Occasions*, 1717, previously mentioned. With its third edition, published August 15, 1720, 'Lintot's Miscellany' becomes two volumes in duodecimo. Pope's acknowledged poems, which in 1714 amounted to nine, are now increased to no less than twenty; and, in spite of the fact that he has excluded his fifty-page translation from Statius, they take up approximately the first two-thirds of vol. i. But these are not all; five, if not six, others of his appear without his name elsewhere in the volumes, all except one being new to the miscellany. Nearly half the poems in the former editions have been discarded, among them most of the anonymous pieces, the few still remaining being now ascribed to their several authors. Among the new contributors, of whom some half-dozen appear in this edition, are Rowe and James Ward, who were brought in by the transference of poems from Pope's other collection, *Poems on Several Occasions*, 1717, which had apparently met with little success, to help to fill out the second volume. This procedure, in which fifteen pieces were taken over (three of his anonymous poems among them), points especially to Pope's active connexion with the third edition. His hand is similarly betrayed by the inclusion of Buckingham's panegyric, *On Mr. Pope and his Poems* (reprinted from the commendatory poems of *The Works*, 1717); for this was the introduction of a new feature in the miscellany which he was later to exploit to its uttermost; and we may note that his portrait from now onwards figures as a frontispiece to the first volume.

The fourth edition, published November 13, 1722, shows comparatively few alterations, although it has been wholly reset. What changes there are, however, imply that Pope still directed its destinies; for two former contributors have been entirely squeezed out and another shorn of a couple of pieces to make room for two new poems bearing Pope's name.

Between the publication of the fourth and fifth editions other evidences of Pope's control of the miscellany are to be found in his correspondence. On October 31, 1724, he wrote to Broome: 'As to my Miscellany, I hear of nothing like it at present [*i.e.*, no new edition]. . . . But whenever times and seasons are so composed as to relish the old and polite arts, no opportunity shall be missed to place your verse in the best lustre I can'; again, on May 25, 1725, after Broome's decision to withdraw his poems from the next edition in order to print them in a volume of his own works, Pope writes: 'I only could be glad one copy of yours, that which you design to me, as a memorial of our friendship, may appear not only among your own, but attend also upon mine, in the new edition of my things which Lintot is printing, together

with the testimonies of some other of my friends'; again, on November 22, 1725: 'I am going to print your verses [*i.e.*, the complimentary poem above alluded to] in a Miscellany'; and yet again, on December 30, 1725: 'I have put your verses to me into a Miscellany, which will come out in two or three months.'

The fifth edition, to which Pope was referring, was published at some date before June 14, 1726, and reprinted in 1727. The title of the collection is changed, and now reads: *Miscellany Poems, Vol. I. By Mr. Pope. The Fifth Edition;—Vol. II. By Several Hands.* And both volumes alike are provided with a half-title stating without any ambiguity: 'Mr. Pope's Miscellany.' The first volume opens with forty pages of complimentary poems to him (twelve pieces in all, the last being Broome's eulogy which we have just seen him soliciting for inclusion here); then follow twenty-seven poems by Pope, filling upwards of 200 pages, eight short poems by three other people, two more pieces by Pope, both anonymous; and, to end with, another flattering poem now signed by Broome, and now entitled *To Mr. Pope, On his correcting my Verses*, which had appeared anonymously in the previous editions with the less gratifying title: *To a Gentleman who Corrected some Verses for me.* Moreover, in the second volume four or five other poems by Pope are included without his name. But that is by no means the full account of his exploitation of the miscellany for his own ends. Among the dozen commendatory poems, proffered or solicited, and marshalled so impressively in the forefront of this edition, he has reprinted from his other miscellany, *Poems on Several Occasions*, 1717, an anonymous panegyric, *To Mr. Pope*, which there is a considerable amount of evidence to prove—and nothing to disprove—was written by himself (as I have shown in the reprint of that miscellany previously mentioned). He has also inserted for the first time, as a prelude to *Eloisa to Abelard*, an excerpt of eighteen lines from Prior's *Alma* in praise of 'Dan Pope' and his poem; and has included in the second volume yet another poem addressed to himself, *Occasional Verses to Mr. Pope*, the author of which is unknown. Eulogies of each other by the poets of this period are a normal feature of the contemporary miscellanies; and even these tributes of praise might have been passed over without remark, had any other living poet been commended in these volumes. As it is, however, the jealous supervision which has permitted the inclusion of encomiums of Pope only, adds a final proof of his editorship as convincing as it is characteristic.

Shortly after this edition had appeared, some question of editorial responsibility seems to have been raised by one of the contributors. The matter is first alluded to at the end of a letter from Christopher Pitt, the poet, to Spence (dated July 18, 1726):

'This is enough in conscience for this time; besides I am desired by Mr. Pope or Mr. Lintot, I do not know which, to write to Mr. Pope on a certain affair.' Pitt's letter to Pope is lost, but, judging from Pope's reply, it seems to have been concerned with the unauthorised inclusion of his poems in the miscellany. Whatever it was, Pope evidently found himself in an awkward position and began as usual to prevaricate. His letter (dated July 23), after some smooth compliments on his correspondent's verse, goes on to say:

As to my being the publisher, or any way concerned in reviewing or recommending of Lintot's Miscellany, it is what I never did in my life, though he (like the rest of his tribe) makes a very free use of my name. He has often reprinted my things, and so scurvily, that, finding he was doing so again, I corrected the sheets as far as they went, of my own only. And, being told by him that he had two or three copies of yours, which you also had formerly sent me (as he said) through his hands, I obliged him to write for your consent before he made use of them. This was all.

One of Pitt's poems figures among the eulogies of Pope with which the first volume opens, four others appearing in vol. ii.

This disclaimer of Pope's, for whatever reason made, has generally been taken at its face value to mean that his connexion with 'Lintot's Miscellany' was as temporary and slight as it suggests. But on examination it is seen actually to deny only irrelevant things like reviewing, recommending, and some proof-correcting; and the word 'publisher' having several meanings, even at that date, a repudiation of that office in its connotation of bookseller would, if carefully left undefined, seem to cover any or all of the others—editor, author, owner of copyright, or what not. Hence, after writing this letter, Pope could have repeated his private confession on a not unsimilar occasion ten years earlier: 'I have not told a lie (which we both abominate), but equivocated pretty genteelly.' Such an equivocation might serve Pope's immediate purpose with a comparative stranger like Pitt; but it can avail little in face of the foregoing evidence, all of which testifies that Pope spoke no more and no less than the truth in his letter to his old friend Broome when, referring to the collection known as 'Lintot's Miscellany,' he called it simply 'my Miscellany.'

Spence, in his *Anecdotes*, reports that Pope when talking about his juvenile verses once said to him: 'In the scattered lessons I used to set myself . . . I translated above a quarter of the *Metamorphoses*, and that part of Statius which was afterwards printed with the corrections of Walsh.' Now one of the strangest of Pope's many idiosyncrasies, as I have recently been able to show (*op. cit.*), was his profound reluctance both to destroy

his early poems and to acknowledge them; of which the effect, hitherto unsuspected, was that he actually published a considerable number of these pieces without his name before he was thirty, and thereafter, while often alluding to them in such general terms as we have seen, carefully suppressed (with one or two exceptions) the fact of their publication and all particulars by which they might be identified.

Among Pope's acknowledged poems in the first edition of 'Lintot's Miscellany,' 1712, are two translations—*Statius his Thebias, Book i.*, and *The Fable of Vertumnus and Pomona* (Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, book xiv.), which he subsequently stated 'were selected from many others done by the Author in his Youth.' When, therefore, in this miscellany of which he was the concealed editor his acknowledged translation of *Vertumnus and Pomona* is found placed next to another translation from the *Metamorphoses*, which, though unasccribed, has much in common with it, and, moreover, has never been claimed by or for any of his contemporaries, the possibility that it is likewise by Pope's hand becomes apparent enough to demand further examination. The poem, now reprinted for the first time, runs exactly as follows:

THE STORY OF ARETHUSA,

TRANSLATED

From the Fifth Book of OVID'S METAMORPHOSIS.

Ceres desires to know the wondrous Cause
Why *Arethusa* now a Fountain flows.

The Streams their Murmurs hush'd and silent stood,
Whose Goddess strait appear'd above the Flood;
And dry'd the Sea-green Tresses of her Head,
And told *Alpheus'* ancient Love, and said.

A Nymph I was, and of th' *Achaian* Train,
That ne'er drew Bow, nor darted Spear in vain:
None bent more eagerly the Toils to set,
To chase the Boar, or pathless Woods to beat.
And tho' no Toys, no Dress I made my Care,
Tho' bold; yet was I still reputed Fair.
Our Female Arts I scorn'd, preventing Praise,
And simple, thought it ev'n a Crime to please.

One Day as from *Stymphalus'* Wood I came,
Hot with the Chace, the Sun encreas'd my Flame;
Unruffled in its Course a Flood I spy'd,
So calm, so smooth, it scarcely seem'd to glide;
So deep, and yet so clear, that ev'ry Stone,
With borrow'd Lustre, from the bottom shone.
The pendent Banks with hoary Willows crown'd
Diffus'd a sweet, refreshing Shade around.
I came, and in the Brink my Foot I dipp'd;
Then to the Knee in dimpling Curls I slipp'd;

Nor cool'd, upon a Bough my Veil I hung:
And, on the Bank my airy Garments flung,
Into the bounding Tyde I naked leap;
And as I frisk'd and wanton'd in the Deep,
Amidst the bubbling Flood surpriz'd I hear
A hollow gurgling Noise, and struck with Fear
I shriek'd, and rushing made the nearer side,
When rising from his Waves *Alpheus* cry'd,
Oh! whither, *Arethusa!* dost thou fly?
Whither! he shouted with an eager Cry.

Just as I was, without my Cloaths I fled;
(Upon the other Bank my Cloaths were laid)
The more did he with raging Passion burn,
Naked he thought me fitter for his Turn.
As the Dove trembling from the Falcon flies,
As his fleet Wings th' approaching Falcon plies:
So hasten'd I, so he pursu'd his Prize.
Thro' the *Menalian* Groves I sped my Flight,
And gain'd with weary Steps *Cyllene's* Height.
Nor swifter he, but of superior Force
To lengthen out the long, laborious Course.
Yet over shaggy Hills with Brakes o'erspread,
And craggy Rocks and desert Wilds I fled.
Before my Feet I saw a monstrous Shade,
Unless my Fear that frightful Phantom made.
Howe'er his sounding Steps and puffing Breath,
That fann'd my Tresses, frighted me to Death.
Spent with the Labour of the Flight, (I said)
I'm caught! *Diana!* oh! thy Huntress aid.
Help in Distress the Nymph that us'd to bear
Thy Bow, thy Quiver, and thy pointed Spear.

The Goddess heard my Pray'r, and deign'd to shroud
My panting Body in a pitchy Cloud.

Here tho' I vanish'd from *Alpheus'* sight,
Yet still impatient to pursue the Flight,
Twice he surveys the Cloud with searching Eyes,
And *Arethusa!* *Arethusa!* cries.

To me what Strength! what Life did then remain?
No more, than to the Lamb, that hears with Pain
The howling Wolf around th' Enclosure rove,
Yet from its helpless Mother dares not move.
Nor went he on, but kept the Cloud and Place;
For he my Footsteps cou'd no further trace.
O'er all my Limbs an oozing Sweat appears,
My weeping Eyes pour out a Flow of Tears.
Big azure Drops my dewy Hairs distil,
From every Pore descends a trickling Rill.
My whole dissolving Body liquid grows,
And where I mov'd my Foot a Current flows.
Nay, sooner than I now the Change relate,
I'm all afloat. Yet conscious of my Fate,

The River-God dissolv'd his Form Divine,
 And reassum'd his Streams to mix with mine.
Diana cleft the Ground. Through winding Caves
 Long time I stray'd unmix'd with Briny Waves.
 At length, to kind *Ortygia's* Shore convey'd,
 In silver Streams I rear'd my watry Head.

Before proceeding with our examination of the poem, a word should be said about Pope's extraordinarily retentive memory. Spence and others testify to it on several occasions, and Pope himself, speaking of the earlier period of his life, once remarked, 'I had a vast memory.' This capacity explains in great measure the appearance in his own poems of phrases, and sometimes whole lines, from the older poets. Their frequency is very marked in his earlier work, and especially so in the translations, where occasionally the parallels are so long and so close as almost to suggest an actual transcription from his exemplar. Talking once about the favourite books of his youth, Pope told Spence that Ogilby's translation of Homer 'led me on to Sandy's Ovid, which I liked extremely.' It is not surprising, therefore, to find that his two acknowledged translations from the *Metamorphoses* contain very definite echoes of Sandys. Half a dozen or more approximations could be quoted from each poem, but the following will suffice to prove the point. First from *Vertumnus and Pomona* :

A goad now in his hardned hands he bears,
 And newly seems to have un-yok'd his Steers.

SANDYS.

Oft in his harden'd Hand a Goad he bears,
 Like one who late unyok'd the sweating Steers.

POPE.

And from *The Fable of Dryope* (first published in *The Works*, 1717) :

A Lake there is, which shelving borders bound,
 Much like a shoar ; with fragrant Myrtles crown'd.

SANDYS.

A Lake there was, with shelving banks around,
 Whose verdant summit fragrant myrtles crown'd.

POPE.

But not only phrases from the older poets lingered in Pope's inordinate memory and flowed from his pen ; he had a life-long habit of repeating his own lines in different poems. Many of these parallels are the result of a deliberate reworking of old material ; many, again, seem to be due to the prompting of subconscious memory ; but, whatever the cause, the habit is indisputable, and of the utmost importance for the identification of his unsigned poems.

Former editors of Pope's works have recognised that in the

episode of *Lodona* in *Windsor Forest* he has transmuted the *Arethusa* fable as told in the *Metamorphoses*, and incidentally adapted two passages from Sandys. But our new-found poem, if Pope's, was apparently written before *Windsor Forest*, for he dated these early translations about 1702. And, on that assumption, *The Story of Arethusa* is immediately perceived to fill an intermediate stage between *Windsor Forest* and Sandys' translation, being at the same time nearer to both of them than they are to each other. In other words, Pope seems, when writing the *Lodona* episode, to have recalled and re-used the *Arethusa* poem rather than Sandys' Ovid. This becomes clear if typical passages are read in their chronological order, remembering always that the *Lodona* story does not profess to follow Ovid, but is supposed to be Pope's creation. First, of the maiden's flight from the pursuing god :

As trembling Doves the eager Hawks eschew ;
 As eager Hawks the trembling Doves pursue ;
 I fled, He followed.

SANDYS.

As the Dove trembling from the Faulcon flies,
 As his fleet Wings th' approaching Falcon plies ;
 So hasten'd I, so he pursu'd his Prize.

Arethusa.

Not half so swift the trembling Doves can fly,
 When the fierce Eagle cleaves the liquid Sky ;
 Not half so swiftly the fierce Eagle moves,
 When thro' the Clouds he drives the trembling Doves ;
 As from the God with fearful Speed she flew,
 As did the God with equal Speed pursue.

Windsor Forest.

Pope subsequently revised the last couplet of the *Windsor Forest* quotation, diverging still more widely from Sandys :

As from the god she flew with furious pace,
 Or as the god, more furious urg'd the chase.

It will be convenient here to note that he returned again and again to this image :

Not half so swift the sailing Falcon flies,
 That drives a Turtle thro' the liquid Skies.

Iliad, xv., 266-7.

So fast, and with such Fears the Trojan flew ;
 So close, so constant, the bold Greeks pursue.

Iliad, x., 431-2.

Another incident from the end of the chase may be similarly compared :

How-ere his sounding steps, and thick-drawn breath
That fann'd my hair, afrighted me to death.

SANDYS.

Howe'er his sounding Steps and puffing Breath,
That fann'd my Tresses, frighted me to death.

Arethusa.

Now close behind his sounding Steps she hears; . . .
And now his shorter Breath with sultry Air
Pants on her Neck, and fans her parting Hair.

Windsor Forest.

Again, in passing, we should note a later parallel in Pope's description of the chariot-race in the funeral games at the close of the *Iliad* (xxiii., 457, 459):

Close on Eumelus' Back they puff the Wind . . .
Full on his Neck he feels the sultry Breeze.

And one more approximation in the three versions may be cited:

As from Stymphalian woods I made retreat
(Twas hot, and labour had increas'd the heat).

SANDYS.

One Day as from Stymphalus' Wood I came,
Hot with the Chace, the Sun encreas'd my Flame.

Arethusa.

It chanc'd, as eager of the Chace the Maid
Beyond the Forest's verdant Limits stray'd.

Windsor Forest.

Regarding for the moment only the first two quotations in each set, it is apparent that exactly the same use of Sandys' translation has been made by the author of *Arethusa* as by the author of *Vertumnus and Pomona* (which accompanies *Arethusa* in our miscellany) and *Dryope*. And again some half-dozen other parallels could have been quoted to the same effect. But over and above the similar debt to the older translation, these groups of quotations reveal affinities between Pope and the anonymous poet which can hardly be explained by their separate recourse to Sandys, and which seem to point to their being one and the same person. Abundant corroboration of their identity is found in the numerous parallel passages existing in *Arethusa* and Pope's acknowledged work, of which the more striking are as follows (*Arethusa* being quoted first in each case):

(a)

The Goddess heard my Pray'r, and deign'd to shroud
My panting Body in a pitchy Cloud.

The Queen of Love her favour'd Champion shrouds
(For Gods can all things) in a Veil of Clouds.
Rais'd from the Field the panting Youth . . .

Iliad, iii., 467-9.

But present to his Aid, Apollo shrouds
The favour'd Hero in a Veil of Clouds.

Iliad, xx., 513-4.

Pope has at least three other couplets on this model; one of them, in *Statius his Thebias*, actually appeared in our miscellany with *Arethusa*.

(b)

And tho' no Toys, no Dress I made my Care . . .
Our Female Arts I scorn'd, preventing Praise.

She scorn'd the Praise of Beauty, and the Care.

Windsor Forest, 177.

No Arts essay'd, but not to be admir'd.

On Mrs. Corbet, 4.

(c)

. . . thought it ev'n a Crime to please.

. . . whose Crime it was to please.

Iliad, iii., 234.

(d)

To lengthen out the long, laborious Course.

With oars to cut the long laborious way.

Odyssey, v., 181.

Spent as thou art with long laborious Fight.

Iliad, vi., 327.

(e)

The Streams their Murmurs hush'd . . .

. . . the Streams their Murmurs shall forbear.

Pastoral, iv., 57.

(f)

So deep, and yet so clear . . .

. . . so loud, and yet so clear

Temple of Fame, 374.

(g)

Big azure Drops my dewy Hairs distil

. . . big Drops of Sweat distill

Iliad, xvii., 835.

(h)

From every Pore descends a trickling Rill.

The humid Sweat from ev'ry Pore descends.

Iliad, xxiii., 830.

It is hardly worth while, perhaps, to make a full list of the shorter phrases in *Arethusa*, any of which may have been used by any other poet of the period, but all of which, in fact, find their parallels in Pope's works—phrases such as 'superior force,' 'searching eyes,' 'pathless woods,' 'craggy rocks,' 'silver streams,' 'winding caves,' 'briny waves,' and the rest. Nevertheless, their testimony, while of the slightest if each is regarded alone, has a cumulative effect of some weight. A little more unusual, however, is 'th' Achaian Train' of the seventh line, which appears again in the *Iliad* (xv., 262). Furthermore, the vocabulary of *Arethusa*, though for the most part not very distinctive, is everywhere consonant with Pope's usage. An interesting example of this appears in the passage 'that hears with Pain | The howling Wolf around th' Enclosure rove,' which in Sandys' translation reads: 'When howling Wolves about the Fold she hears.' Why—one can but wonder—did the writer, who certainly had no compunction about taking over words from Sandys, refuse the lovely old word 'fold,' with its definite meaning, which lay ready to his hand, and choose instead the generalised and colourless 'enclosure'? The only explanation seems to lie in Pope's idiosyncrasy; for 'enclosure' was a favourite word of his to signify any fenced area, large or small (usually employed, too, with the elided article, e.g., 'th' inclosure grace,' 'near th' inclosure drew,' 'thro' th' inclosure past'), whereas the substantive 'fold' in this sense was never, I believe, used once by him throughout the whole of his verse.

Thus all the verifiable facts and all the probabilities point more or less directly to Pope as the author of the poem; and, as there is no evidence of any kind to suggest even the possibility of its being by another hand, it would seem that *The Story of Arethusa* must henceforward be accepted in the canon of Pope's poems—among the recent discoveries of 'many others done by the Author in his Youth.'

NORMAN AULT.

THE NOVELS OF E. M. FORSTER¹

PERHAPS it is chance, more than any peculiar devotion, that determines a man in his choice of medium, when he finds himself possessed by the obscure impulse towards creation. The distinction between the functions of one art and another is not clear; they have a tendency to overlap, to merge, even to identify themselves, in a manner which prevents definition. They have one common subject for discussion—the life that is lived and known by men; and since it is not at once apparent why men who are intimately involved in living that life should desire to contemplate so immediate an experience in any remoter way, another activity (criticism), as old as themselves, has attended upon the arts from their beginning, which has constantly and variedly, but never quite satisfactorily, attempted to explain the reasons for their being. In the advanced state of everything—of life, that is, and our ideas about life—that we have achieved to-day, people, including Mr. Forster, have set themselves to define the difference between the real life which we live and the life which the arts present to us. That such a difference exists is in itself sufficient indication of how advanced we are. Various processes have led to the existence of these conditions, and the most important is the artist's practice of 'selection.' 'Most of life,' says Mr. Forster, for example, 'is so dull that there is nothing to be said about it'; and even if you disagree with that—Mrs. Woolf, for her part, seems to suggest that the whole of life is so significant that not one fleeting impression should be missed—the fact remains that the real life is chaotic and formless, and the artist is faced with the problem of confining his impressions of that life into a space which is infinitely smaller than itself and with at least one of the dimensions removed. He has no other alternative, therefore, than to select what seem to him its most significant parts, and to arrange the chaos into some sort of an order. Inevitably the life he presents is something much neater and tidier than the diffuse reality. It is probable that most people take the impressions afforded by art

¹ Mr. Forster's five novels, and *Aspects of the Novel*, are published by Edward Arnold & Co.; the two volumes of short stories by Sidgwick & Jackson; the essay on *Anonymity*, and various other works, by the Hogarth Press.

—especially the novel—so much for granted that they sincerely believe life itself to be quite a neat and tidy event and suffer from shock or melancholy if something occurs to disturb their belief. Paradoxically, the more actually 'like' life a work of art is, the more nonsensical it appears to them. One of the most interesting aims of modern writers and artists has been the attempt to dispel this illusion of life's tidiness.

How far this selection may be carried, and upon what judgment the selected items depend, are questions which have been insufficiently considered, seeing that from the exercise of them the finished work of art results. Selection is in itself an increasing tendency—that is to say, the artist tends to cut away more and more of the matter of immediate life, until he achieves the logical conclusion of the tendency, which is Abstraction. He is urged on to this by his passion to come at the very core of all truth, to perceive the vital spirit of very life, and he can only convey this spirit by cutting away as much as possible, in Mrs. Woolf's phrase, of the 'alien and external.'

Now of all art-forms the novel is the least abstract, the one which has depended more than any other on the dress and decoration of life, and the one which has pretended most of all that life is a neat, well-patterned affair. This is the form in which Mr. E. M. Forster has chosen to put the thoughts of his rich mind into the world, but though he has shown both in theory and practice a marvellous understanding of it, yet it has constantly called from him expressions of dissatisfaction and irritation. 'Yes—oh dear yes,' he confesses with the greatest reluctance and distaste, 'the novel tells a story . . . and I wish that it was not so, that it could be something different—melody, or perception of the truth, not this low atavistic form.' All we can do is to echo his regret, and with still greater reluctance; for the *Aspects of the Novel* was written in 1927, and now it is 1934, and it seems—oh dear yes—as if the novel will tell a story till the end of time. Why, then, did Mr. Forster, who has felt so oppressively the attractions of abstract presentation, ever adopt the novel at all?

In the first place, he did attempt a compromise. Contemporary with his pre-war novels he wrote a number of short stories, some of which were collected, in 1911, in *The Celestial Omnibus*; others not till 1928 in *The Eternal Moment*. With the exception of the name-story in the second volume, these are all symbolic fantasies or fables. Most of them appear to be the sort of stories which Rickie was writing, or trying to write, in *The Longest Journey* (1907), Forster's second novel; and incidentally a peculiarly personal sympathy seems to have gone to the making of this character. Rickie's comments on his stories are perhaps

Mr. Forster's own. 'What nonsense! Where real things are so wonderful, what is the point of pretending?' But fantasy could never be more than half a solution. There is still too much the semblance of story about it. Rickie, like Mr. Forster, envied the musician. 'Music has wings. . . . I can't soar; I can only indicate.' Why did he not think of progressing from symbolic fantasy to pure fantasy, abstraction, music?

It is that he has ideas which need a more distinct articulation than music or abstraction can make. He is an artist on the fringe of social reform. He is interested in causes. He has never cut himself off, as most artists sooner or later do, from the political and economic questions of the outer world. 'Some closing of the gates is inevitable after thirty,' he writes, 'if the mind itself is to become a creative power.' Mr. Forster has never quite closed the gates. While he has never deliberately written, like Dickens, a novel with a 'purpose'—an irrelevancy to the dangers of which this art-form is particularly exposed—the fact nevertheless remains that *A Passage to India* (1924) is 'a book which no student of the Indian question can disregard.' His less-read works include *A History and Guide of Alexandria*, and some *Notes on the State of Egypt* published in 1921 with Recommendations by a Committee of the International Section of the Labour Research Department. Probably the writing of novels has not been the most important element in his life. We are constantly given the impression that there are better things in the world to do. Nevertheless, if, in passing, we may allow the æsthetic side of us to predominate, we must lament the extraordinary fact that between *Howards End* (1910) and the present day, *A Passage to India*, ten years ago, is the only novel that has appeared.

With some reluctance, then, he acknowledged that the novel tells a story, and decided, while wishing it were music instead, on the use of 'this low atavistic form.' Now one might reasonably suppose that a writer who had shown this distaste for it would try to reduce to a minimum its function in his work, would eliminate all complication of plot and put as little stress as possible on so disturbing a factor as incident. In point of fact, the exact opposite is true. We must quote in full a paragraph from *A Passage to India* to which we have already referred:

Most of life is so dull that there is nothing to be said about it and the books and talk that would describe it as interesting are obliged to exaggerate, in the hope of justifying their own existence. Inside its cocoon of work or social obligation, the human spirit slumbers for the most part, registering the distinction between pleasure and pain, but not nearly as alert as we pretend. There are periods in the most thrilling day during which nothing happens, and though we continue to exclaim, 'I do enjoy myself,' or, 'I am horrified,' we are insincere. 'As far as I feel anything,

it is enjoyment, horror'—it's no more than that really, and a perfectly adjusted organism would be silent.

The most profound phrase there is the last one, and it bears on an important aspect of Mr. Forster's philosophy, but it is the paragraph as a whole which concerns us now, seeming, as it does, to stress incident, at the expense of that ceaselessly experiencing sensibility which for Mrs. Woolf is the proper stuff of fiction. And that, indeed, is what happens. Mr. Forster's novels tell stories. But what stories! What monstrous improbabilities they are! What fearful, sensational things they are made of! Man-slaughter, bribery and blackmail, slander and false witness, violent sex episodes, illegitimate offspring, village idiocy, public school intrigue, far-fetched coincidence, a mysterious housekeeper who has stepped straight from the pages of Gothic romance, death in carriage accidents, at level-crossings, by drowning, on the football field. Inevitably one's first impression of his books is concerned with the violence of the plots. When we are least prepared we receive an electric shock. It is the author's deliberate plan; the writing is gradually keyed down to its gentlest mood, and suddenly a plain, terrible fact explodes. 'Gerald died that afternoon. He was broken up in the football match.' 'By the time they arrived Robert had been drowned.' In these and countless other cases—the deaths of Mrs. Wilcox, Leonard Bast, Rickie, and the arrest of Dr. Aziz—the critical event is so entirely unexpected that we read on, wondering for the moment whether it is not intended as metaphorical speech. Eventually we grow used to the trick. Often on a second reading we find that the shock has been prepared for, or its probability justified by slight indications, but so slight are they that we cannot be blamed for having failed to note their significance at the time. Nothing of the story in the four early novels can be believed in; little of it even seems to claim credibility. Yet this apparent artlessness must be more than a fine disregard for a 'low atavistic form' only put up with as a convenient framework for his ideas about people. It is rather a planned violence, an assault on our sobriety, to incapacitate us from making untimely criticisms, to 'bounce us' (in his own phrase), by fair means or foul, into accepting what he says. And it succeeds. It carries the sort of declamatory conviction that good opera carries. His stories are, in relation to themselves, true enough; the incidents, inside the books in which they occur, are relevant parts of a whole. And for the æsthetic compactness of a work of art, that is all that matters. It is only when we consider the possibility of such events in relation to ourselves that we feel doubtful. There is that scene, for example, in which Ansell, Rickie's undergraduate friend, denounces him—he is an

under-housemaster—in front of all the boys at lunch, and passionately makes known, while the loyal prefects prepare to do battle, that their teacher has an illegitimate brother whom he refuses to acknowledge. What house, what school possessing such a house, would survive such a scene? Such things simply do not happen to ourselves. They are not true.

Yet in the book even that scene is true. It is written with such intensity that it carries a ringing conviction with it. It possesses that operatic truth.² Apart from which, its actual probability is almost prepared for in the previous exposition of Ansell's character. The scene is shocking, intentionally, but it is not surprising. It is consistent with everybody and with everything that has happened. One might still feel inclined to blame an author who chooses to mix together such characters and such incidents which develop into such a scene, but the feeling would be an irrelevant one. The fact is that, though the materials out of which they are made seem to belong more properly to sensational fiction, Mr. Forster's stories are the most distinguished pieces of craftsmanship. In his *Aspects of the Novel* he has analysed with great insight the novel's component factors, and the various sacrifices which one factor may have to make to another—character to plot, or *vice versâ*. Mr. Forster contrives his plot only for the purpose of developing his characters, and makes it serve them, at whatever cost to probability. (We refer to the four early novels. In *A Passage to India* he has achieved as absolute a co-ordination of the component parts as has ever been made.)

And yet his books are beautiful; they are eminently works of art, the reason lying in the close attention he has given to the qualities which he describes as Pattern and Rhythm. By that he means the various devices by which the different parts of the novel can be linked up with one another. Their effectiveness depends, he points out, on the memory of the reader, and his power to recognise the significance of incidental detail; and

the final sense (if the plot has been a fine one) will not be of clues and chains, but of something æsthetically compact, something which might have been shown by the novelist straight away, only if he had shown it straight away it would never have become beautiful.

Mr. Forster has developed the art of clues and chains to an unusual extent. In its simplest form it consists of throwing in hints that are a preparation for events that follow probably much later. They are generally so casually introduced that we hardly observe them; hence a full appreciation of his novels depends

² Other examples of this are the fight between Gino and Philip at the end of *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, and the death of Leonard Bast in *Howards End*.

absolutely on a second reading. For example, the deaths of Mrs. Wilcox, Leonard Bast, and Mrs. Moore appear when we come upon them to be too sudden for credibility—the author had finished with them, so they died. In point of fact, they are quite deliberately prepared for by earlier remarks on the state of their healths which at the time were too commonplace for us to see their significance. Another good instance occurs in *Where Angels Fear to Tread*. Philip is asking Caroline about her conversation with Gino. 'And of what did you talk?' 'The weather—there will be rain, he says, by tomorrow evening . . .,' etc. The torrential storm which results in the carriage accident in which Gino's child dies is thus prepared for seventy pages before it occurs.

This simple ruse, whose purpose is to give tightness to the plot itself, develops into another ruse which Mr. Forster rather curiously calls rhythm, but which might more aptly be termed *leit-motif*. The example which he gives is the little tune of Vinteuil in Proust, and its significant reappearances. The *leit-motif* need not in itself be peculiarly significant, but by association with its previous appearance accumulates meaning each time it recurs. In *The Longest Journey* there are several examples—the star Orion is one of them, and recurs somewhat like Violets in *A Room with a View*. A more structural *motif* in the former book is the level-crossing near Cadover. When Rickie and Agnes arrive at Mrs. Failing's, Stephen tells them accusingly that their train ran over a child at the crossing. There follows some futile bandinage as to what has happened to the child's soul, which Stephen cannot endure. "There wants a bridge," he exploded. "A bridge instead of all this rotten talk and the level-crossing." It appears later that a second child had been rescued by Stephen himself. The crossing is passed and repassed by Rickie later in the book, each time with the memory of death. At the end he is killed there himself, wearily saving Stephen, whom he finds drunk across the line. And in the concluding chapter we learn in a casual remark from Stephen that the railway has been bridged. A train is heard passing across the final darkness. The sense of completion is extraordinary.³ The images which are used as *leit-motifs* fall very little short of becoming symbols. Mr. Forster nowhere uses symbols as Mrs. Woolf does, translating an inarticulate idea into an image; but he constantly uses images to suggest, by association, more than they themselves signify.

In *A Passage to India*, one of the most 'aesthetically compact' books ever written, whose thought, like music's, cannot be fixed,

³ One is reminded of *Anna Karenina*. But there the accident at her first entrance suggests to her mind the way of her suicide at the end. Here it is a purely chance circumstance—an aesthetic irony such as Hardy delighted in.

nor its meaning defined, there is an extreme instance of one passage calling back to another. Mrs. Moore returns home to bed at the end of the first day in the book. She is alone.

Going to hang up her cloak, she found that the tip of the peg was occupied by a small wasp. . . . 'Pretty dear,' said Mrs. Moore to the wasp. He did not wake, but her voice floated out, to swell the night's uneasiness.

The scene is simply a beautiful detail, and connects, apparently, on to nothing. But pages and years later, after her death, old Professor Godbole, who had once sung to her at a tea-party, hits on an image in his wandering thoughts which, with extraordinary suggestiveness, calls us back to that scene.

Covered with grease and dust, Professor Godbole had once more developed the life of his spirit. He had, with increasing vividness, again seen Mrs. Moore, and round her faintly clinging forms of trouble. He was a Brahman, she Christian, but it made no difference, it made no difference whether she was a trick of his memory or a telepathic appeal. It was his duty, as it was his desire, to place himself in the position of the God and to love her, and to place himself in her position and to say to the God, 'Come, come, come, come.' This was all he could do. How inadequate! But each according to his own capacities, and he knew that his own were small. 'One old Englishwoman and one little, little wasp,' he thought, as he stepped out of the temple into the grey of a pouring wet morning. 'It does not seem much, still it is more than I am myself.'

Such beauty is not to be reckoned.

Most important of all, he uses buildings and places and the names of places—such places as can be appropriately associated with a recurring idea and thus take on significance as symbols—to be the framework of his books. The Room with a View and Howards End represent thoughts which stamp their pattern on the story. *The Longest Journey* and *A Passage to India*, with their three parts—'Cambridge, Sawston, Wiltshire'; 'Mosque, Caves, Temple'—are planned like symphonies in three movements that are given their shape and their inter-connexions by related and contrasted localities. In the later book the 'Marabar caves' are the basis of a *tour de force* in literary planning. They are the keynote in the symphony to which the strange melody always returns. During the first half of the book constant reference to them directs attention forward to the catastrophe. After this, every reference to them directs our attention back to the centre, to the mystery which is never solved. The three structures, Mosque, Caves, Temple, are outward shapes of a man's spiritual adventures, but only by actual association in the story; pure symbolism would involve an unwanted unreality.

This, then, is what gives to the raw material of his stories such distinction—the quality which he comprehensively calls Rhythm,

which means the use of *leit-motif* phrases and images to link up separated parts, with the additional function of dramatic irony and symbolism. This it is which gives pattern to the most diffuse of all forms. This device—of *motifs*, irony, and symbols—is, in fact, the modern equivalent of the classical unities, an invention of the greatest value, having all the classical advantages and none of their so severe limitations.

Mr. Forster, we said, was a musician who chose the novel because he had ideas to utter which needed a more distinct articulation than music could make. He is interested passionately in human beings; not only in the idea of them—which is presumably what most novelists mean when they lay claim to that passion—but in their actual living selves. His observation is so close, his power to describe so exact, that although we can see into their secret lives—which, as he says, it is the novelist's unique privilege to discover—his characters are as elusive, as incompletely realised, as our own living friends. He describes with extraordinary insight personal experience in relation to social; the social setting is for him an item which cannot be omitted in the analysis of a whole man. Hence the novel of social comedy, instead of a purer, more musical form.

'A proper mixture of characters,' he tells us, is one of the most important ingredients of the novel. As a vehicle for conveying ideas everything depends on that. It is the nature of the mixture that distinguishes Mr. Forster's work; which is built invariably round the—generally violent—clash of opposites. In *Where Angels Fear to Tread* the clash is between the world of conventional morality and a world more akin to Nature. To heighten the contrast the conflicting elements are vested in England and Italy. 'More than personalities were engaged; . . . the struggle was national.' It is a fight between North and South, between Culture and the Beast. Culture and the Beast are again the conflicting opposites in *The Longest Journey*. Here the clash is between Rickie and Stephen, who eventually find that they are children of one mother—the one educated at Cambridge, the other brought up among shepherds in the Wiltshire downs. In both these books the violence of the plots, which we have already noticed, derives directly from the violence of this clash of opposites. In the next, *A Room with a View*, the clash is more quietly, more subtly presented, and the plot is at the same time a subtle one. Again a contrast is made between England and Italy, but, except in so far as the carriage-driver 'Phaethon' and his lover 'Persephone' bear on the story, the countries do not coincide with the opposites. The conflict is less externalised and takes place inside Lucy, in her struggle to choose between Cecil Vyse and George Emerson, between the 'mediæval' self-

conscious life of culture and emancipated athletic honesty; between pretended feelings and true feelings.

Howards End is as violent as the earlier books. It is an extremely complicated piece of work, but (to state the conflict for the moment as simply as possible) it can be described as the clash between the business life and the cultured life; between 'Wilcoxes' and 'Schlegels' (the names come to be used almost as symbols of the two ways of living); between 'the outer life of telegrams and anger' and the life of 'personal relations.' Again the author adds a deliberate detail for the sake of heightening the contrast—the Wilcoxes are English to the backbone, the Schlegels are of German origin.

In *A Passage to India*, which did not appear till fourteen years later, the clash seems at first sight to be a purely racial one. The distinction between types is less prominent, the political passion that describes the disastrous anomaly of the British in India is more obvious. The propagandist element in the book is undeniable, but one can hardly conclude that it was written with that for its final purpose. For one thing, in the last part of the book—'Temple'—the problem is a different one. 'For here the cleavage was between Brahman and non-Brahman; Moslems and English were quite out of the running, and sometimes not mentioned for days.' The intrusion of the English at Mau is incidental and designed only to reintroduce what is the real theme of the book—the friendship of Fielding and Dr. Aziz. The rocks that rise between them on their last ride together, the horses that swerve apart—they symbolise Indian differences, it is true, but differences that are not more great, only more particular, than the differences that exist between any two men, between Philip and Gino, Rickie and Stephen, Schlegels and Wilcoxes. Once again, therefore, the author's interest is in the clash of human beings, the struggle which any one individual must endure if he is to achieve intimacy with any one other. The fundamental personal difference is again deliberately heightened by an external circumstance—the difference of race.

Before we proceed to reject these analyses as being too bare to convey even a half-true impression, another aspect of the clash, which is common to them all, must be referred to. Mr. Forster introduces into each of these five books what one can only describe as an elemental character; one who sees straight through perplexities and complications, who is utterly percipient of the reality behind appearances, both in matters of general truth and of incidents in the story. Their greater wisdom, their particular knowledge, put into ironic contrast the errors and illusions of the rest. They are Gino, Stephen, George (together with his father), Mrs. Wilcox, and Mrs. Moore. In the case of

the men the stress is laid on the athletic, of the women on the intuitive. The latter, Mrs. Wilcox and Mrs. Moore, play a distinctly minor part in their stories. It is curious to find vested in middle-aged women the elemental quality which is more obviously associated with the athletic, but we find it also in some of Shakespeare's heroines. Both discover on particular complicated occasions an unquestioning certainty about the truth of an event. Of Helen Schlegel's secret love of Paul 'Mrs. Wilcox knew . . . though we neither of us told her a word, and had known all along.' So of Dr. Aziz, 'Of course he is innocent,' says Mrs. Moore. Very few words are spoken by either of them. They both seem to have withdrawn from a world whose little stupidities and illusions have ceased to affect them except as they distract their inner life. They are both curiously mysterious, their personalities conveying with an astonishing force far more than there is actual evidence for. Mrs. Wilcox

was not intellectual, not even alert, and it was odd that, all the same, she should give the idea of greatness. Margaret, zigzagging with her friends over Thought and Art, was conscious of a personality that transcended their own and dwarfed their activities.

One rather strange accident attaches to both of them: they belong to the enemy's camp—that is to say, to the side of the clash with which we are least likely to sympathise. In fact, Mrs. Moore's Anglo-Indian setting does not call for our sympathy at all. They thus prepare the way for the merge of opposites to which we return later. Some of the mystery attaches as well to the three men. They are strange because in the middle of a social comedy they prefer to dispense with the disguises which the rest wear. As the Rev. Arthur Beebe remarks: 'It is so difficult—at least I find it difficult—to understand people who speak the truth.'

By the very nature of the conflict which he arranges it is clear how much store Mr. Forster sets by the athletic. The one chance which puts the deformed Rickie in the way of salvation is that 'he had escaped the sin of despising the physically strong—a sin against which the physically weak must guard.' In the person of Stephen physical strength is exalted into the most exciting beauty and the whole novel reminds one constantly of the work which Lawrence produced a few years later. When he makes his first appearance, a third of the way through the book, the writing is lifted up like music to herald his approach. He is the product of an intensely passionate imagination working upon closely recorded detail of behaviour and conduct. He is life, at the centre and at the circumference—he is the world's essential simplicity, transformed by the author's vision. His significance is clear to the reader at once; no other character—except Mrs. Failing

when the mood is on her—perceives it, until Ansell, the articulate philosopher, sums him up:

A silence, akin to Poetry, invaded Ansell. Was it only a pose to like this man, or was he really wonderful? He was not romantic, for Romance is a figure with outstretched hands, yearning for the unattainable. Certain figures of the Greeks, to whom we continually return, suggested him a little. One expected nothing of him—no purity of phrase nor swift-edged thought. Yet the conviction grew that he had been back somewhere—back to some table of the gods, spread in a field where there is no noise, and that he belonged for ever to the guests with whom he had eaten.

Gino and George Emerson are very different people, but they represent the same athletic honesty. Gino was 'majestic; he was a part of nature.' 'Centuries of aspiration and culture' were defenceless against the impulses he aroused. The quality in George is contrasted with its absence in Cecil, whom Lucy is engaged to marry. At the beginning of the book it is latent but undeveloped in George, but each of his rare meetings with Lucy draws it out. Lucy comes to connect Cecil with a drawing-room that has no view, George is associated with a room with a view that looks out over life. Lucy and George meet from time to time, but always appear to be looking at each other 'across something'—across 'the rubbish that cumbers the world,' across the little bundles of clothes which they strip for bathing, and which break into speech (the fancy reminds one of Daudet) 'proclaiming: "No. We are what matters. Without us shall no enterprise begin. To us shall all flesh turn in the end"' And George, to whom physical nakedness has given a new certainty, greets her 'with the shout of the morning star'; and eventually beseeches her to turn from the pretence of Cecil to his own manhood. Lucy cannot admit to herself that he is right, till a few minutes later Cecil is asked to make up a four at tennis.

Cecil's voice came: 'My dear Freddy, I am no athlete. As you well remarked this very morning, "There are some chaps who are no good for anything but books"; I plead guilty to being such a chap, and will not inflict myself on you.'

The scales fell from Lucy's eyes. How had she stood Cecil for a moment? He was absolutely intolerable, and the same evening she broke her engagement off.

The athletic fitness of Gino, Stephen, and George is stressed in another significant way. Each realises—exceptionally, we are given to understand—that physical and spiritual life may stream out of him for ever. Stephen 'would have children: he, not Rickie, would contribute to the stream; he, through his remote posterity, might be mingled with the unknown sea.' 'Ah, but how beautiful he is!' says Gino, bathing his baby. 'And he is

be a convinced rebel—but do not pretend that you can resist empire-builders. You may be a pacifist—but you are laying a false emphasis on consistency if you allow that to affect your appreciation of soldiers. What a man thinks and the way of life he goes will inevitably clash with other thoughts and different ways. But the man himself is more than his opinions or the accidents that attach to him. It is possible for Schlegels to accept Wilcoxes, it is possible for Englishmen to ride with Indians. And the final wisdom is to grant that 'nothing has been done wrong.'

The words have—to use a phrase of Mrs. Woolf's—the weight of the whole book behind them. They ring with that prophetic 'tone of voice' which sounds right through his masterpiece *A Passage to India*—the tone in which the great writers of tragedy have spoken their last words of reconciliation. They rise up—as he says of great poetry—from that anonymous part of a man which 'cannot be labelled with his name. It has something in common with all other deeper personalities, and the mystic will assert that the common quality is God.'

So that in the end it will be more true to say that, after all, if Mr. Forster's novels 'tell a story' as they do, they are these more desirable things as well—'melody' and 'perception of the truth.' No words can describe them; the melody cannot be heard through any medium but its own. All I have attempted here is some indication of the shape and the mode. Much that is most remarkable in his writing has scarcely been commented upon: his dazzling humour, acute and delicate satire that never misses its mark, his vivid characterisation, whether in the 'flat' or the 'round'; his faultless sense of the style appropriate to individuals, especially in regard to their tricks of speech—these and other arts give the actual texture of his work its distinction. But these are stamped with his name. It is the Anonymous Prophecy that will remain with us, the transcendent beauty of the Mosque and Temple, and the athletic body of Stephen. It would be perhaps merely stupid to ask, in conclusion, for more. It is possible that the mind which saw so visionarily the significance of Stephen, and which could tell the Wilcoxes that 'nothing has been done wrong,' has achieved their own wisdom; that the organism, being perfectly adjusted, is silent.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXCIV—DECEMBER 1934

A FOREIGNER LOOKS AT THE EMPIRE

SOME of the problems of the British Empire concern the foreigner too. It makes a great difference to him whether the solution of those problems follows 'little England' or imperialistic lines; whether centralisation or independence characterises the relations between the various parts of the system; whether the Empire is a super-State or a loose commonwealth of nations. It is likewise important for the foreigner to know where the centre of gravity of the Empire will ultimately be—whether the Empire will be European, extra-European or even anti-European. Last, but not least: if the centre of gravity were to be shifted far away from Europe, what would the intellectual and social culture of the Empire be like? Would it, in the long run, remain British? For a Frenchman like myself, or indeed for any European, such questions are not of merely academic interest. In the future of the British Empire is at stake the future of the whole world, and especially the future of the old continent. I shall deal with these problems as a foreigner and a critic, but as a friend, and less as a Frenchman than as a citizen of Europe. The Imperial problem

does not seem to me merely Imperial ; it is a world problem and essentially a European one.

My first contact with the Empire beyond the seas dates back to 1898, when in a trip round the world I visited Canada and the United States, New Zealand, Australia, the Far East and India, returning home by Egypt and the Mediterranean. I have since crossed the Atlantic several times, and seen Australasia a second time. I am thus able to speak of the evolution of the Empire with an experience of some thirty-five years behind me. What was the British Empire like when I saw it for the first time? It was still what Professor Zimmern has called 'the second British Empire,' as contrasted with the first, which was based on the Colonial pact. The essential characteristic of the second Empire was the autonomy granted to the white settled Colonies. It was autonomy, not independence. The foreign policy of the whole system was decided by the Foreign Office in London. This conception of the Empire continued, not only in the last years of the nineteenth century, but even during the first years of the twentieth.

But it was easy to see then that two contradictory tendencies were at work among the big Colonies, which were not yet usually called Dominions. There was, on their part, a pressing and growing desire for independence. Colonial susceptibilities could be observed everywhere. The Colonies felt a sort of jealousy of the Colonial Office, and public opinion appeared to be very touchy concerning any supposed interference by the Governors in the internal affairs of these autonomous societies. When Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, during the first years of the new century, 'Canada is a nation,' he simply expressed the wish and conviction of every one of his countrymen ; but in those days the utterance appeared, if not paradoxical, at least somewhat bold. There was, on the other hand, and at the same time, a growing sentiment of the unity of the Empire. The Boer War had revealed the possibilities of co-operation between these new States. I remember seeing Goldwin Smith, in Toronto, at the end of the year 1904. He was known as the traditional champion of the annexation of Canada by the United States, but already at that date he appeared to be a man of the past and his annexationist programme out of date. England was wise enough, at this turning-point, to realise that the two tendencies were not, at bottom, contradictory, but that a new conception of the Empire might cover and include them both. It was a statesmanlike view, based not only on a long experience, but on that deep liberalism which we French consider one of the greatest qualities of the British. It was by allowing the Dominions to become independent in a more than ever united Empire that the British Government prepared for the birth of the 'third British Empire,' now in existence. But this new conception

corresponds to a change of the place which Great Britain occupies in the system, and we must now try to see what this place is, and what it may be in the future.

The change during the last twenty years in the character of the Empire appears to the foreign observer to be nothing less than fundamental. There is no longer a 'Motherland' with its 'Colonies'—a State or Empire in the old and traditional sense—but a 'Commonwealth of Nations,' as it has chosen to call itself officially. Let me recall the definition in the Balfour Report : 'autonomous communities within the Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another, in any respect of their domestic or external affairs.' The change of name does correspond to an intrinsic change. What is the reaction of this change on the strength and on the unity of the Empire?

The first question is whether the Empire is now stronger than before. I have no hesitation in saying that, from a sentimental point of view, there is a greater sense of moral unity. In fact, with the doubtful exception of the Irish Republicans, there are no secessionists ; and the main reason of this is that Great Britain has openly abandoned any claim to domination by force or intrigue. Experience shows that when you say to people 'Go away if you like,' they generally do not do so. The next question is : What does the Empire now represent in the world? As a looker-on, my impression is that it is the perfect political expression of the Anglo-Saxon civilisation. The fine liberal tradition of the nineteenth century has given birth, within the limits of this Empire, to a common conception of life, of business and credit, and also of government. Wherever the British have founded societies these societies are based on fair play and self-government. This means a good deal when you think of the times in which we are living.

But then comes another question : In what measure has the political unity of the Empire followed the progress of its moral unity? I feel tempted, when I think of the Empire as it is now, to quote Pascal's definition of the universe. It is, he says, a sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. The logical development of a principle—the principle of autonomy—has indeed deprived the Empire of any definite political centre. This result flows not only from the Balfour Report, but also, and perhaps even more, from the Statute of Westminster. The perfect 'equality in status' of the various parts of the system means the parallel existence of several sovereignties. Is this compatible with the persistence of an Empire in the strict political sense of the expression? No doubt it was because the supporters of the new conception felt that it was something fundamentally different that they proposed the

new word 'Commonwealth,' which is in no way synonymous with 'Empire.'

These are powerful factors which contribute to the maintenance of the political unity of the Commonwealth. First of all there is the Crown, a most effective symbol, the full potentialities of which may not yet be fully known. Hardly less important is the common tradition of all Britons. It was to me a matter of surprise, and at the same time of admiration, when I heard Australians who had never left Australia speak of England as 'home.' As long as such a word is used in such a sense, the unity of the Empire remains stronger than if it were guaranteed by treaty. There is also—and I am not afraid of exaggerating the importance of the fact—the persistent financing of the Empire by the City of London. King, sentiment, and finance make a triple and an extraordinarily strong tie.

But I cannot fail to observe that there are other factors working against political unity. Since there are several sovereignties, there are also several foreign policies within the Empire, and also several diplomacies, although these are not so numerous as the sovereignties. There is, practically speaking, no unity in treaty-making or in legislation. A common foreign policy has become merely optional. You may, of course, come to an Imperial foreign policy shared by all the members of the Empire, and such a thing happens frequently, but it is necessary to negotiate such a common political attitude every time; and even then the result is always precarious.

I think the description I have given is accurate. At any rate, it corresponds exactly with what foreigners see of the British Empire from outside. We are thus led, as foreigners, to make a distinction between Great Britain and its Colonies on the one hand, and the Empire at large on the other. In the first case England is master of her own domain; in the second she is not. When we sign a treaty we always have to know whether it is with the Empire or with Great Britain. The Balfour Report seemed to admit such a distinction when it considered separately 'Great Britain and North Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate members of the League of Nations.' This is clear, and Great Britain seems to us a clear proposition; but I must say that the Empire does not. Yet Great Britain is in the Empire, and this fact leads me to ask where the centre of gravity of the Empire is, and where it is likely to be in the future. To put the problem in another way, what is the position of Great Britain in relation to Europe, and what relations exist now, or are likely to exist in the future, between the Empire and the world at large?

In a famous series of lectures about England delivered at the

Collège de France in the middle of the last century, Michelet, the great French historian, is reported to have begun as follows: '*Messieurs, l'Angleterre est une île; maintenant vous en savez autant que moi sur son histoire.*' That point of view undoubtedly was true, and it remains true, but it is no longer sufficient. Nowadays we must propound another question: Is England European or not? The point is crucial, both for Europe and for Great Britain herself. In the world at large Britain seems to feel a double and contradictory attraction. She is European by her geographical position, and she is so even if one takes account of the Channel. She is also European by the tradition of her history, which has been, and remains, closely linked with the destiny of the old continent. Not less is she European by her culture, which is a perfect example of the intellectual and social achievements of the Occident, and certainly belongs to the Old World's cultural family. At the same time, she is undoubtedly extra-European through her interests abroad and her family connexions beyond the seas. Roughly two-thirds of British exports go to the continents outside Europe, and even a greater proportion of her investments are in those continents; from that point of view England is looking across the oceans rather than across the North Sea or the Channel. This is true also if one considers the family ties of the British. Very few of them have a brother, a son or a cousin in Europe, but nearly every family in Great Britain has a brother, a son or a cousin in India, the Dominions, or the United States.

How, then, should we classify Britain? We French are tempted to consider that she is European, and few of us would admit that she is less so than we are ourselves. But England herself and the peoples of the Empire do not seem to think so. Some years ago a Canadian to whom I was speaking of Britain as being part of Europe protested, as if it was a matter beyond argument: 'But Britain is not in Europe!' The famous English economist, Mr. Keynes, writes in a similar mood: 'England still stands outside Europe. Europe's voiceless tremors do not reach her. Europe is apart and England is not her flesh and body' (*The Economic Consequence of Peace*). Thus England, whatever she may be, does not consider herself fully a part of the Old World. As Keynes says, she stands aside. One might say that she is not completely European, nor completely extra-European, but is para-European. She is a ship, anchored in European waters, but always tempted to seek the open seas.

British policies are caught between these two contradictory attractions, neither of which can be completely resisted. Such is the destiny of Britain, and there is tragedy in this destiny. It is impossible that England should detach herself completely from

the continent. She sends there one-third of her exports, and more than two-thirds of her re-exports. Moreover, there is the proximity of the continent, with the military danger which arises from this proximity. That danger was already pressing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it has become even more pressing in the twentieth. I think one can say that the dream of England to be freed from any solidarity with Europe remains and will remain a dream. At the same time, Britain, on account of her Empire, is a world Power, and the Empire belongs to the world at large very much more than to Europe. The dilemma of the main partner being European (or at least closely connected with Europe) while the Empire at large is extra-European seems, in some respects, impossible to solve.

There is, as a consequence, a double peril which Britain must face, whatever be the lines which her foreign policy follows. If she adopts an attitude which may be considered too European, she runs the risk of being entangled in continental responsibilities and even in the wars of Europe. In such a case she is in danger of displeasing the Dominions, who in a crisis might not follow her; the case of Chanak is not old and might only too easily repeat itself. Another peril arises at the same time, and from the same source. By acting in a way that would alienate the Dominions, she risks alienating also the United States. A break with the Government of Washington on such a question as the enforcement of a blockade would be exceedingly dangerous, not only in itself, but because the Dominions, who consciously or unconsciously might be tempted, if not to act, at least to feel, like the United States. One must never forget that the Dominions, no less than the United States, are extra-European Powers, and that they react spontaneously in an extra-European manner. A common atmosphere of distrust concerning any commitment in Europe might easily draw together all the white countries outside Europe, and this would be a tragic ordeal for the Empire. Britain would only face it most reluctantly, and will endeavour to avoid it at nearly any price. The conclusion is that the Empire, in the present state of affairs, tends to draw England away from the continent.

But another and hardly less dangerous peril awaits Great Britain, if, giving way to Dominion prejudice, she indulges in a policy which is not sufficiently European or is too much extra-European. Quite apart from the military danger which might thus arise, she would run the risk of no longer remaining the real political centre of the Empire. Since the war British policy has often appeared to us more an Imperial than a purely British policy. It seems always to be conceived and drafted from the angle of the Empire. Canada, Australia, and even (in an indirect way) the United States, hold a part in its determination which

they certainly did not have before 1914. London to-day remains, as ever before, the political centre of the Empire, but the centre of gravity of British politics has, to a certain extent, shifted. I know some people in England who are aware of such a tendency and hardly disapprove of it. Mr. Lionel Curtis has suggested that the Government of the Empire should be concentrated in a ship, which would move from one place to another within the Empire—one year in England, another in Canada or Australia. That may be a good idea; but would not that ship go some day to New York?

It seems a joke, but the possibility of the centre of gravity of the Empire being shifted away from Europe is in no way unthinkable. The Empire would not then become American, of course, but the future of British culture, taking that expression in its stricter sense, would undoubtedly be endangered. There has been in the past, and there still is, a distinctly British culture; but in the nineteenth century an Anglo-Colonial culture has arisen. Any traveller through the Dominions can observe this, and he will probably love and admire it as the remarkable offspring of the mother country. Yet I cannot fail to see that this Anglo-Colonial culture is only half British and largely extra-European; it has to be so, just like American culture. Now American prestige has become so great (and it remains so even after the American crisis) that the new white communities outside Europe cannot resist the attraction of America. They are, from a political point of view, a hundred per cent. loyal to the King, but this does not prevent them from living, breathing and feeling in a new social, moral and economic atmosphere which is more like that of America than that of England. History ties them to Britain, but geography ties them rather to the New World than to the Old. If the centre of gravity of the Empire is, in some subtle way (of which we cannot even detect the beginning), drawn away from this part of the world, it is in a certain sense the destiny of British culture which is at stake. If Great Britain, deserting her place in Europe, consented to be only a partner in the huge concern of the Anglo-Saxon races outside the Old World, she would then be in danger of losing the first place in that concern. Among the English-speaking nations it is impossible that the purely British culture should not feel the pressing influence, I might even say the weight, of the American culture. If Algeria had 100,000,000 inhabitants I should feel afraid, I think, for the integrity of our French culture, which is purely European and continental in its tradition.

On this matter I express the point of view not so much of a Frenchman as of a European. We know very consciously and clearly what has been the rôle of Britain in the past, and especially during the nineteenth century, in respect of continental interests.

First of all, Britain is a necessary link between Europe and the other continents, a necessary element of the European order. Secondly, it is an *entrepôt* through which the produce of the world is drawn towards the old continent. Without England as a link and clearing-house, we, as Europeans, could not have been and certainly could not remain the economic centre of the world. And there is a third service which Britain has been rendering to Europe. She is a centre of political and economical gravitation for the Dominions, and it is thanks to her that the latter have, up to now, been attracted towards Europe. During the nineteenth century, and until after the war, we have enjoyed, thanks to the fair play extended by Britain to everyone, the benefit of something like an international mercantile republic under the peaceful leadership of the British. The adoption of a nationalistic economic attitude might, of course, put an end to these advantages, but the worst danger is elsewhere. If Great Britain were seriously defeated in some great world war, the gravitation of the Dominions towards Europe might be brought to an end, and this would mean the decay not only of England but of the continent of Europe, which needs a strong British Power. The peril, for Europe, would hardly be less marked if England, and with her the British culture, were to be merged in a larger union of English-speaking countries, whose centre of gravity (even if the political capital remained in England) would no longer be in the old country. In that case the spread of European culture generally would, sooner or later, be curtailed.

My conclusion, both as a Frenchman and even more as a European, is that I wish to see a strong Britain in a strong Empire, with the head of that Empire remaining in the British Isles. Although I admire the American civilisation, and hardly less the brilliant results obtained in the Dominions, I am prompted to feel as I do not only by my legitimate interest as an inhabitant of the old continent, but by a sentimental attraction towards the old English tradition, a sentimental attraction which, I know, the people of the Dominions feel as much as, and even more than, myself.

I do not, however, ignore that there are grave mistakes which we are apt to make and which we should seriously endeavour to avoid when we, as Frenchmen or as continentals, have to deal with the British. We too easily forget that the English are not so completely European as we are ourselves. Nor do we always remember that when deciding the trend of their foreign policy they must take into account the Dominions' point of view, which cannot be a European point of view since the Dominions do not belong to Europe. The consequence is that certain commitments cannot reasonably be expected from Britain, and simple good

sense should prompt us not to request such commitments. On the other hand, the Dominions should understand that as Great Britain is a European Power they should not expect from her a complete secession from the old continent. They understood it in 1914 and would probably be inclined to understand it again. This intermediary position of Britain is, after all, a condition of British greatness. She would not be true to her destiny if she agreed to be drawn into a closed continental system or if she entered into a closed Imperial community, parted from the continent of Europe. Neither course would be to the benefit of the world or of the Empire.

ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED.

THE CRISIS IN FRANCE

INTERNAL politics in France have moved fast in the last few weeks ; and it may appear to a superficial observer that since the resignation of M. Doumergue's coalition Government and the successful formation of that of M. Flandin, the constitutional reform proposals which were the occasion, if not the whole cause, of M. Doumergue's fall have disappeared from the horizon, and the waters have closed over them. This is not really true. It is generally recognised that the political machine still remains liable to be clogged by the defects with which M. Doumergue declared his intention of dealing. These defects are not only those which produce the instability of Governments, to cure which M. Doumergue suggested an amendment of the existing conditions under which the Chamber of Deputies can be dissolved. As this was the only one of his proposals upon which he failed to come to terms with the Radical members of his Government, and as it brought about his resignation, attention has been drawn to it rather than to the others.

These others were four. The first was the strengthening of the authority of the Prime Minister by naming him in the Constitution—which is not done at present—and by laying it down that he must not hold any portfolio which would place him in charge of a particular department. The second was a further strengthening of the authority, not specifically of the Prime Minister, but of the Executive in general, by giving the President of the Republic the right to extend the existing year's budget by decree, if the Chamber neglected or refused to pass the next year's budget before the end of the year. The object of this provision was not only to prevent the continuance of the financially wasteful expedient, which has so often been adopted, of granting provisional monthly credits, one by one, to the Government, while the interminable discussion of the budget continued into the New Year, but to make it impossible for this expedient to be used as a means of obstruction by those who would seek to prevent a dissolution by withholding the necessary credits for carrying on the administration of the country during the time necessary for the new elections to take place. The third of M. Doumergue's

proposals was also financial. It limited the existing right of the Chamber—that is to say, of private members—to initiate and vote new expenditure by providing that the necessary additional receipts must be voted beforehand for any expenditure not initiated by the Government. The fourth proposal was directed towards securing the control of the executive authority over the machinery of administration ; for it laid down that the guarantee of stability of employment and normal opportunities of promotion which the civil servant receives must be accompanied by a clear understanding that he has no right, individually or collectively, to abandon that employment, and that his doing so cancels his contract with the State. The civil servant is, in fact, to have no right to strike.

Now, the intention of M. Doumergue was that these reforms be solemnly incorporated in the written charter of the Constitution, which was adopted by the Republic in 1875 and can only be amended by what is called a National Assembly—that is to say, a joint sitting of the members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to be held for this special purpose at Versailles. In normal times the National Assembly is only called together when it is necessary to elect a new President of the Republic for his seven years' term. In order that it should meet for any other purpose, the two Chambers must separately decide in favour of its convocation. This decision has not been made ; for the resignation of the Radical members of the Doumergue Government provoked the resignation of the Government itself. But there are several signs that the constitutional reform proposals are by no means dead. One is that the new Flandin Government has already adopted the spirit of one of them and the Chamber of Deputies has voted another. For M. Flandin has addressed to all the Government departments a circular in which he invites each Minister to contribute to the restoration of the authority of the State by a strict application of the law, by refusing to tolerate any suspension or relaxation of activity and by imposing penalties for any breach of the rules ; and the Chamber has this week voluntarily passed a motion to restrict its own powers of amending the budget. No doubt the effect of this motion is not extensive and can even be destroyed by the passage of a contrary motion at any moment. No doubt it is true that a similar motion was passed in 1889 and remained in effect for hardly a year. No doubt it is also true that the disciplinary measures with regard to the Civil Service at present go no further than a statement of M. Flandin's intentions. It is clear, nevertheless, that these matters have not been forgotten.

As for facilitating the dissolution of the Chamber, there was evidence, even before M. Doumergue's proposal, that all parties

were beginning to recognise that something of this kind must be done to put an end to the fatal facility with which the deputies overthrew one Government after another and remained themselves secure in the knowledge that a Ministerial crisis could not involve their being sent back to face their constituents before the expiry of their full four years' mandate. In April, and again in June, of this year the Radical Party leaders, who have just resigned from M. Doumergue's Government rather than accept his dissolution proposal, committed themselves to reforms of the same kind and at least as severe. Moreover, as M. Doumergue did not hesitate to point out in his last broadcast to the country, the committee of the Chamber which had been appointed to examine the question of the reform of the State and was composed of members of all parties had recommended in April that the consent of the Senate, without which the President of the Republic cannot now dissolve the Chamber, should only be necessary during the first three months of a new Chamber's existence, and had even begun by proposing that it should be abolished altogether.

It may, however, be remarked, incidentally, that one argument used by M. Doumergue and others to recommend his proposed reform is not quite accurately stated. He suggested that it would bring French practice in the matter into conformity with that of Great Britain. In fact, it would give the French Prime Minister power which no British Premier has ever possessed or claimed. He would have the right not only to demand from the President of the Republic, but to obtain, the dissolution of the Chamber. Now, in England, not only has the King the liberty of refusing a dissolution, but, in the opinion of many authorities, he has the duty of doing so if a majority to support an alternative Government can be found in the existing House of Commons. Moreover, although it is no doubt true that on normal occasions the faculty of asking for a dissolution rests with the Prime Minister, it is, strictly speaking, the Cabinet, and not he, which makes the decision, as Gladstone recognised in 1893, when he wanted to dissolve on the House of Lords issue and his Cabinet was not behind him. This distinction is particularly important when a coalition Government is in office, as so often, and to-day almost invariably, happens in France; for an election might suit the party interests of the Prime Minister and run quite contrary to those of many, and even the majority, of his Ministers.

However, it has long been obvious, in France and abroad, that the parliamentary insecurity of Governments, with which the dissolution proposal was designed to deal, is a dangerous element of instability in the State—at least, as far as home politics are concerned. That it really tends to make the foreign policy of the country as unstable as might be expected and as is often believed,

is in point of fact untrue. Delcassé before the war and Briand after it were examples of Foreign Ministers who were able to remain in office and each to pursue a continuous policy through a succession of Governments of many political colours. Moreover, when parliamentary exigences have changed the Foreign Minister, the general line of the policy has been fairly constant. Even the apparently fundamental opposition between what may be called the Briand and the Poincaré schools has been more superficial than complete. The Briand school really rested on a Poincaré foundation.

However, the instability as far as home affairs are concerned is undeniable. The War Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George was the thirteenth Government in England since 1875. The War Ministry of M. Clemenceau was the fifty-seventh in France. Since the war the pace has been increased in both countries; but the National Government in England has only brought the figure thirteen up to nineteen, while M. Flandin's Government brings the French fifty-seven up to eighty-nine (though it must fairly be allowed that the thirty-two Governments which have been in office in France since the Armistice have included six which were reconstructed Governments with the same Premier and one more which was a second reconstruction). During the same period England has had seven Cabinets only. Since the last French general election in 1932 there have been eight French Governments, of which six came into being during the twenty months between the election and the riots of February 6 last. A single Government has remained in power in England. The virtual impossibility for an individual Minister, who remains in office for so short a time, to acquire any real knowledge of the working of his department goes without saying; and it follows that he constantly finds himself sponsoring measures prepared by his predecessor, and is even more in the hands of his permanent officials than he is bound to be in any case. An illuminating concrete example of this is the fact that during the sixteen years that Alsace and Lorraine have once more been French their administration has been under the control of twenty-seven parliamentary chiefs in succession.

This Ministerial instability is both the cause and the result of the fact that the French Chamber of Deputies is at the mercy of the irresponsible private member. In no other Legislature has he such power and in none is he assured for so long of not being called to account for what he has done. The knowledge that the Chamber is practically certain of lasting out its four years means that if a Government falls, a new majority must somehow be formed to support its successor. This means that a parliamentary majority is a far more fluid thing than in England, and may be composed of all sorts of varied combinations of the many parties

and groups, and even of individuals and their personal followers who break away from their groups. This, in turn, means that the private member, whose allegiance to his group may be very loose, is in a position to ask favours of a Minister in return for his eventual support—a state of things which results in Ministers spending half their time in granting or refusing requests made by deputies for constituents (most of whom think that a deputy serves no useful purpose except to obtain preferential treatment for the constituency and its industries and places, promotions, exemptions from penalties and free railway passes for themselves or their relations). The avenues of corruption which such a system opens up in the judiciary alone, where the chances of a junior magistrate ever becoming a senior judge are in the hands of the Minister of Justice, were indicated in the Stavisky case. The powers of the private member are still further increased by French parliamentary procedure, which also tends to weaken those of the Government for the benefit of the important permanent parliamentary committees. These committees—one for Finance, one for Foreign Affairs and so forth—are elected in approximate proportion to the party composition of the Chamber. It is to them that any legislative proposal is submitted before it comes to the Chamber itself, and it is only the proposal as amended by them which the Chamber examines. When it is understood, in addition, that not only can a private member propose legislation involving expenditure, but that there is no such thing as Government limitation of the time allotted to private members' Bills, it will be seen that it is no exaggeration to say that the Chamber of Deputies is the private member's paradise.

The removal of the Senate's right of veto over the dissolution of the Chamber, together with the restrictions upon financial initiative, would clearly have brought the private member to heel. Moreover, I have shown that the principle of facilitating dissolution had been generally accepted. Why, therefore, when M. Doumergue proposed to apply it, did the plan provoke the unanimous protest of the Radical Party Congress, the resignation of the Radical Ministers, and the fall of M. Doumergue; why did his fall provoke none of the violent protests from public opinion which had been so freely predicted, and why has the Government of his successor been welcomed by a larger majority in the Chamber than that which hailed M. Doumergue as the saviour of his country in a moment of panic, and by such evident satisfaction in the country that it was reflected by an immediate rise in Government securities on the Bourse?

I think the feeling of the non-political mass of the country is threefold. Nine months ago, although the provincial part of France was far more sympathetic to M. Doumergue's predecessors

than the almost unanimous denunciation of the successive Radical Governments by the always Conservative Paris newspapers might have given their readers to suppose, it was sufficiently frightened by the apparent possibility that Paris might once more spread revolution over the land to be ready to approve of anything that he might propose. He could at that moment have carried almost anything, for the Chamber was much too over-awed to hold up a finger. But the salvation which M. Doumergue was expected to bring was not merely political. It was economic; and it was the economic part that the country really cared about. It waited the nine months of gestation, and what was produced was an ambitious scheme of constitutional reform, on which M. Doumergue decided to stand or fall without producing any economic programme whatever. That is the main element in the disappointment of the country in him.

The second feeling is that this constitutional reform, upon the necessity of which the ordinary man is more or less prepared to accept the judgment of the politicians, might have been carried through without all the solemnity of altering the text of the Constitution, a solemnity which has an uncomfortably irrevocable look about it. Besides, is it quite certain that it is necessary? The inclusion of M. Mandel, Clemenceau's confidential henchman during the war, in the Flandin Government—it is the first time he has held office in any Ministry—is significant in many ways, and not least because he has for some time made no secret of his opinion that the existing Constitution gives quite sufficient opportunity for a strong man or a strong Government which is prepared to take advantage of it. The Chambers would not be willing to legalise a dictatorship, but they would be quite ready, as they have been before, in practice to submit to one. M. Doumergue wanted to alter the book of the rules before playing his hand, but he could have played it with the rules as they stood. That is to say, he could have played it if it was a hand which he could show in a democratic country; and here comes in the third feeling of the ordinary man, a definitely political feeling, though he is not keenly political. The French peasant farmer, who is France and still outweighs the urban workman, remains fundamentally democratic, as he remains fundamentally individualist. He lost his head over Napoleon III. and he almost lost his head over Boulanger; but he does not cherish either memory, and the mere suggestion that anyone is aiming at a power which is not democratic at once puts him on his guard. That suggestion has been made about M. Doumergue. The words '*pouvoir personnel*' have been thrown into the discussion, and the ordinary man has been disposed to conclude, not only from the actions of M. Doumergue before his resignation, but from his rather petu-

lant statements after it, that there was some ground for using them.

If that is the suspicion of the ordinary man, it is the profound conviction of the rank and file Radical and also of the Socialist; and remember that the Radicals remain the largest single party in the Chamber and the Socialists the second. For the Radical the victory of M. Herriot in the duel between him and M. Doumergue—for it is into this that the crisis resolved itself—represents a victory for the principles of parliamentary government, and is a similar defence of democratic institutions to his motion, in 1924, that the newly elected Chamber should refuse to enter into relations with the François-Marsal Government, which M. Millerand, as President of the Republic, tried to impose upon it—a refusal which led to M. Millerand's resignation. The Radical view is that M. Doumergue was deliberately trying to override both Parliament and his own Ministers. On November 3—over the heads of the Chamber of Deputies but also without consulting the members of his Government, which was much more serious—he addressed a broadcast to the nation, in which he announced that he intended to demand the vote of provisional credits for several months, in order that obstruction by refusing to vote supplies should not prevent his carrying through his constitutional reforms. It was to protest against the demand for these provisional credits instead of pressing for the normal passage of the budget that the Radical Ministers resigned, and not directly on the dissolution proposal.

The dissolution proposal was, however, the real bone of contention, and the friends of M. Doumergue, who naturally deny that he or they had any of the Fascist or anti-parliamentary ambitions attributed to them, accuse not only M. Herriot in person and the Radicals in general, but the members of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, of being opposed to it on far more selfish grounds than a devotion to democratic liberties. The senators, they say, were ready to dig themselves in to defend the most valuable of their prerogatives. They have never, in fact, refused to consent to a dissolution of the Chamber, and only once in the history of the Third Republic have they been asked for their consent, and then they granted it. This was in 1877, when President MacMahon dissolved a Chamber hostile to him, which had just been elected, only to be faced with another, still more hostile, and to be forced to capitulate. But the prerogative and the knowledge that it might be used has tied the hands of every Prime Minister. The friends of M. Doumergue do not add, but they certainly feel, that it unfairly and particularly ties the hands of Prime Ministers of their own way of thinking. For while the senators are perhaps sufficiently conservative on

economic and social questions to refuse a dissolution to a Prime Minister of the Left on certain issues, their old-fashioned but very definitely Radical majority would undoubtedly refuse one to a Prime Minister of the Right. As for M. Herriot, he is accused of having his eye far too much on the possible future services which the Radical senators may render to him for him to take any line which would be displeasing to them.

The members of the Chamber of Deputies, it is now scornfully said by M. Doumergue's friends, may be thrown into one basket, to whatever party they belong. For they were thinking of nothing but the eighteen months' salary which they will continue to receive until the end of their term if there is no dissolution, and of the election expenses which they would have to pay before that time if there is one. No doubt there is some ground for these accusations of selfish motives; but there is also little doubt that the driving force of the opposition to M. Doumergue was the supposed danger of something in the nature of Fascism. That this danger is real as far as the mass of the country is concerned can, I think, safely be denied. Fascism is not a plant which it would be easy to raise in aggressively individualist France. But that a well-drilled movement, whose ideals are not far different from Fascism—including the organisation of trades by corporate associations of employers and employed—exists in middle-class Paris there is no doubt; and if at any time Paris were in a position to rush the rest of France it might assume the command. On Armistice Day two crowds came into the street—one at the West End of the city and the other at the East End. The former consisted of various associations, of which the *Jeunesse Patriotes* and the *Croix de Feu* are the most important. The men marched in military formation. They were well disciplined, and some of them wore what was almost a uniform. The other crowd was composed of Socialists and Communists. Its numbers were about the same—say, 40,000. It marched quietly enough, and it sang the 'Internationale'; but it had no discipline, no order, no self-conscious unity. There is no question that if the two crowds came into the streets against each other, that from the West End would immediately have the upper hand of the other.

It does not follow that the East End crowd might not be dangerous politically. It is probably then, and then only, that the West End crowd would take action, and would come into the conflict as an auxiliary of the army and the police. 'We shall never attack ourselves,' says Colonel de la Rocque, the leader of the *Croix de Feu*—which is where the infinitely less numerically strong but very effervescent *Action Française* join issue with him. But the West End crowd did come out to demonstrate on February 6, though it did not attack, and it cannot be assumed

that all the leaders of the component parts of it will continue to hold Colonel de la Rocque's opinion. Moreover, it might have come out during these last days, at least to demonstrate, if something had happened which has been avoided largely by the wisdom of M. Herriot.

As M. Herriot was the leader of the party mainly responsible for M. Doumergue's fall and was also the leader of the largest single party in the Chamber, the normal constitutional consequence would seem to be that he should have formed the new Government. When it is added that the Socialists not only promised their support, but suddenly expressed their willingness to take office in collaboration with the Radicals, which they had never consented to do before, that consequence might seem to have been more definitely indicated. Perhaps the formation of a Cartel Government, to last three days, to be howled down by the West End crowd, and immediately to be followed by a triumphal return of M. Doumergue, was exactly what he and his friends wanted. But M. Herriot realised at an early stage of the crisis that such a Government could not live, and no doubt he had little desire to repeat his equally short experience of 1926 and prepare for the acclamation once more of M. Doumergue, as he then prepared for the acclamation of M. Poincaré. A study of the history of the recent crisis will show that M. Herriot did not only avoid precipitating it, but did his best to avoid it; that he calmed down the enthusiasts of the Radical Congress who were spoiling for a fight; and that he postponed accepting the repeated invitations of M. Doumergue to withdraw his Radical colleagues until he saw that, not a Cartel Government, but another Ministry of National Union, was ready to follow on. That is why the President of the Republic, who must have seen the danger quite as clearly as M. Herriot, did not even send for him.

There is another reason why many members of the parties of the Left—and not of those parties alone—have been opposed to a hasty commitment of the country to M. Doumergue's constitutional proposals, although they share the general feeling that some sort of constitutional reform is necessary. The trouble, they say, goes far deeper than anything which can be cured by a mere revision of the machinery of the dissolution of the Chamber. What is needed is a reconstruction of the complete fabric of the State, which is at present in danger of being captured by all sorts of self-interested oligarchies—by the oligarchy of the civil servants on the one hand, but also on the other by the oligarchy of the banks, who are at present enabled to exploit the recurrent Treasury difficulties arising from budget postponements in order to hold the State to ransom. It is impossible to expect—so runs this argument—that a reconstruction of such a kind can ever be

carried through by the existing senators and deputies, sitting separately or jointly. Not only can they not be expected to vote away their own prerogatives, but they are too closely connected with one or other of the aforesaid oligarchies to examine the problem impartially. The necessary reform could only be voted by a constituent Assembly, elected specifically for this purpose. It will be seen that the logical French here carries the question a long way; but it is very doubtful whether we shall see such a constituent Assembly in the near future.

M. Flandin's is a National Union Government; but it is National Union with a difference. Although in appearance it is more to the Right than the Government of M. Doumergue, in reality it leans more to the Left. Although it has put M. Louis Marin, who is more to the Right than M. Tardieu, in place of him to counterbalance M. Herriot as Minister without portfolio, although it includes M. Pernot and M. Mandel, who are both very definitely to the Right, it is really in spirit less what is called a Government of National Union than one of Concentration—that is to say, it is less a Government of the Right supported by the Radicals and in definite opposition to the remainder of the Left than a Government of the Radicals and the Centre tolerated and partly supported by the Right. No doubt the opposition remains on the Left. The Socialists could hardly be included without making the co-operation of the Right and perhaps of the Centre impossible—which is what a leading Socialist meant when he said, 'The best service we can do M. Flandin is to vote against him.' But this opposition is not unfriendly. That Radicals and Socialists could look with cordiality on a Government headed by M. Flandin would have seemed incredible as recently as the general election of 1932. What may help to explain the fact is that the two most prominent politicians who were members of the last Government and now remain outside are, in addition to M. Doumergue himself, M. Tardieu and M. Marquet—the one the real author of the constitutional reform proposals, which he produced in a book a year ago, and the other a former Socialist, who has evolved in the direction of authoritative methods.

The chances of the survival of the Flandin Government are not put very high by those who would have preferred to see M. Doumergue's campaign succeed. They describe it as transparent cover for a forthcoming and perhaps imminent assumption of office by the Radical and Socialist cartel, the real victors of the crisis. Here the wish may be, for reasons which I have suggested, father to the thought. It is true that in certain Radical quarters such an eventuality is contemplated with confidence, when 'the task of to-day, which is the consolidation of Republican liberties,' has been accomplished. But these hopes, whether they are

inspired by a desire that the Radicals shall take office for their more complete damnation or for their triumph, may be long postponed by the Flandin Government proving to have more life in it than the pessimists expect.

For the present these pessimists are in the background. The path of the Government is roses all the way. The Premier is only forty-five—a mere boy for a politician—and he is active, calm and businesslike. The comfortable parliamentary tradition has been resumed—‘The Republic will not capitulate to factions,’ says the Ministerial declaration. The Senate is delighted. There is no party in the Chamber which is really hostile. ‘*Il n’y a que le provisoire qui dure*,’ says the French proverb, and there are some who predict that the apparently provisional Government of M. Flandin may last the three years of another Concentration Government, that of Waldeck-Rousseau—the record holder before the war—or the similar period covered by M. Poincaré’s two Governments from 1926 to 1929. Everything really depends upon how it can grapple with the economic crisis. M. Flandin’s present plan would seem to resolve itself principally into a removal of restrictions of all kinds, a tendency to greater freedom of trade, and, in fact, to a policy of *laissez-faire*. His principles are believed to be those of orthodox economic Liberalism, which would condemn him to be passive. At the same time, he has promised vigorous action. His chances of success depend upon how he interprets that promise, for in any case the situation will force him to take action of some kind.

PHILIP CARR.

ROOSEVELT AT MID-TERM

THE result of the American Congressional elections on November 6 has been a resounding triumph for Mr. Roosevelt. For some months past the omens had not seemed over-favourable. A defeat, it is true, was not within the bounds of political possibility; it was clear to even the most jaundiced observer that Mr. Roosevelt is the most popular President since his earlier, and Republican, namesake thirty years ago. But the Democratic Party already had the largest majority that Congress had known since the ‘sixties, and without the cohesive force of a personal contest for the Presidency it was thought by many prophets that the Republicans might be able to make up a few of their losses of two years ago. Though the electors would not vote against Mr. Roosevelt, they might be persuaded to ‘take out’ on some of his Democratic supporters their disappointment at the slow progress of Recovery.

Recovery has, indeed, been making slow progress this year. Since Easter it has been hard to be sure whether it has been making any progress at all. The farmers are in a slightly better position than they were a year ago. The severe drought of this summer, though it brought ruin to some farmers, brought higher prices to all, and in addition they have been paid substantial sums from the Federal Treasury to persuade them (as one wit, presumably Republican, has put it) ‘to refrain from raising corn, hogs and hell.’ As a result the cash income of the farming community will probably show a considerable rise in comparison with either of the last two years. But even with this cause for satisfaction the New Deal did not appear to be gaining the enthusiastic support of the farmers, and in the constant undertone of grumbling which arises from the Farm Belt, as from the country districts of any nation, some observers thought they could still detect the note of political anger which gave rise to the violent ‘farmers’ strikes’ of 1933. Nor was the progress of the New Deal in the cities as confident as it had been in its first flourishing youth. Unemployment, according to the best available statistics, has hardly fluctuated throughout the summer, and is still at the appalling total of about ten millions: a comparable figure for

Great Britain would be nearly three and a half millions. The task of relieving these millions through the coming winter will fall even more heavily on the Treasury than last winter, for the springs of private charity have almost dried up and individual resources are twelve months nearer exhaustion. Mr. Roosevelt had bravely refused in August to contemplate unemployment as a permanent feature of American life, but it was beginning to look as if he would have it with him throughout his term of office. Since the devaluation of the dollar at the end of January he had pulled no further monetary rabbits out of the 'New Deal' hat, and although this abandonment of economic prestidigitation has probably brightened the prospects of sound and lasting recovery, it could reasonably have been expected to disappoint an audience which was expecting a renewal of the entertainment of 1933. Some of the agencies of the New Deal are beginning to look a little tarnished. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration has probably made more urban enemies with its 'processing taxes' (which have been maintained at their pre-drought levels) than rural friends with its restriction payments. The National Recovery Administration is definitely discredited, its creator dismissed, and its operations circumscribed. The price-fixing provisions of the codes have aroused all the latent 'trust-busting' proclivities of the American public. The rise in the prices of finished goods which has followed on shorter hours and higher wages has annoyed the consuming public and is widely blamed for delaying recovery in building and the constructional industries. Labour, in whose interest the N.R.A. was largely conceived, has lost confidence in its mediation of labour disputes. In its revised form N.R.A. will only be a shadow of its original self.

There was consequently ample cause for believing that the New Deal would be on the defensive on November 6, although the earlier stages of the electoral process did little either to confirm or to reject this belief. Elections in the United States cast their shadow a long way before. For every office—and the American electorate filled 10,000 elective offices on November 6—the parties must first select their candidates. Selection is not accomplished, as in England, by a small ring of insiders; it is a public and acrimoniously contested affair. Presidential candidates are selected every four years by *ad hoc* conventions of elected party delegates, and the convention method is still used in several States to select candidates for smaller offices. But in the main, nomination of the party candidates is accomplished by means of so-called 'primary elections.' The primary is a legally-recognised, officially-organised ballot in which any voter is entitled to take part; he may not vote in more than one primary, but his choice of party is unrestricted. The primaries are thus a sort of pre-

liminary election. In some States, such as the 'Solid South,' where to vote Democratic is the mark of a white man, nomination in the Democratic primary is equivalent to election, and the fiercest contests are between the aspirants to the party nomination, rather than between Republican and Democrat when duly nominated. Even in other States, where the balance of parties is more equal, the intra-party contests before the primaries are often as important as the inter-party battle between the primaries and the election. As a test of public opinion they are, indeed, frequently more important than the election, for the nominated candidate of the party is supposed to receive the loyal support of all sections of the party and in return to adopt its full 'platform.' In past years this has frequently meant that the Republican and Democratic candidates who have finally presented themselves to the electors, especially for Federal offices, have had almost indistinguishable policies, the real conflict of opinion having been resolved at the primaries.

This year the primary elections, as they were held on different dates in the forty-eight States, did not tell any very clear story. In Nebraska the 'New Deal' candidate in the Democratic senatorial primary won a decisive vote over Mr. Charles Bryan, brother of William Jennings Bryan and a fierce antagonist of the present Democratic Administration at Washington. But in Ohio the Democratic voters rejected the 'official' candidate, while in Pennsylvania, in the Republican primary for the senatorial contest, Senator David Reed, leader of the Conservative 'Old Guard,' easily defeated Governor Pinchot, who, though a Republican, professed support of the President's policies. It was impossible to draw from these and other similar results any very precise conclusions on the electoral strength of the New Deal. Indeed, the only conclusion that could be clearly drawn was that Radical ideas were beginning to capture the voters in several parts of the country. In the 'Deep South,' Senator Huey Long, the 'boss' and virtual dictator of Louisiana, who professes ideas which make the New Deal look like staid Conservatism, not only strengthened his hold on his own domain, but secured the nomination of candidates pledged to his support in the neighbouring States of Arkansas and Mississippi. This invasion of the politics of one State by a leader from another is almost unknown in the United States, where local particularism is very strong. Senator Long declares that Arkansas and Mississippi have 'annexed themselves to Louisiana,' and the growth of this Radical enclave is a sign of the power which an unscrupulous demagogue, with his talk of 'equal sharing of wealth' and of moratoria for all debtors, can exercise on an ignorant and impoverished electorate. A similar movement in California attracted more attention. Upton Sinclair,

the novelist—well known throughout America for his 'exposures' of capitalism and for his multitudinous socialistic enthusiasms—after many failures to attract any attention as Socialist candidate for a variety of offices, has changed his party and entered the Democratic primary for the governorship of the State. He was, at first, not taken seriously by the professional politicians of the State. But California has always been a fertile breeding-ground of enthusiasms, and there were plenty of orphans of the economic storm in the State to be attracted by his policy of expropriation of idle land, idle factories and idle money and their conversion to the use of the unemployed. Mr. Sinclair ran his campaign on unorthodox lines: he wrote pamphlets with titles as startling as 'I, Governor of California'; he invented for his movement the title 'EPIC' (End Poverty In California); with a self-confidence most uncharacteristic of politicians, he charged for admission to his meetings; and, to the surprise of the country and the horror of the native capitalists of the State, he captured the Democratic nomination by a vote larger than that for all other candidates combined, handsomely defeating the candidate who had the blessing of the Administration of Washington and of the party leaders in the State.

This California primary brought the President more embarrassment than the defeat of his candidates in a dozen other States. For Mr. Sinclair, though the duly nominated candidate of the Democratic Party, preached the purest Socialism and showed that he had no intention of being bound by the party platform. The President could neither own nor disown him. To give him public support would drive every hesitating moderate into the ranks of the Republicans. To disavow him would be to flout the will of the electors. Mr. Sinclair attempted to force the issue by demanding an interview with the President. Mr. Roosevelt granted the request, but on condition that politics were not to be discussed. So the Democratic nominee journeyed 6000 miles in order to chat about the weather with the Democratic President.

The emergence of a strong Radical wing in the Democratic Party had the effect of driving the President to the right. The tactics of this move were obvious. The Radicals might have embarrassing views, but their party loyalty was sound enough. On the other hand, to win the election it was necessary to retain the support of the bewildered masses who have only recently been converted from 'rugged individualism' to the New Deal and still regard it as a means of safeguarding rather than of destroying the institution of private property. The President devoted himself during the weeks before the elections to conciliating these nervous conservatives. He denounced the 'veterans' barns,' which is still an inflationary bogey, though its cost would be

comparatively small in terms of the swollen figures of the present budget. He entered, with some ostentation, upon a series of consultations with leading business men, and for some days the list of visitors to the White House was reminiscent of the days of Mr. Hoover. Even the bankers were called into consultation, and, although Mr. Roosevelt made it clear that Wall Street was no longer an *imperium in imperio*, he contrived to arrive at an 'armed truce' with those whom eighteen months before he had dismissed as 'unscrupulous money-changers.' In spite of all these efforts, the community of business men could not entirely lose its suspicions. A 'straw vote' taken by the *Literary Digest*, which can be taken as representing the opinions of the more substantial citizens, showed a decline in the President's popularity. Sixty-five thousand persons in every State of the Union were asked their opinion of the New Deal in March 1934 and again in September; the percentage approving was 69.03 in the spring, but only 50.97 in the autumn. The first real test came with the election in Maine in September. This State, alone of the forty-eight, holds its elections two months before the rest of the nation, and the saying 'As Maine goes, so goes the nation' has considerable force. The Democratic vote in Maine increased, but not sufficiently to change the representation of the State in the House of Representatives or to unseat the Republican Senator Hale. It revealed nothing in the nature of a landslide, and the prophets were all but unanimous that the Republicans would be able to win back some of the seats they lost in 1932.

The American Constitution gives the President a term of office of four years. Of the two Houses of Congress, the House of Representatives is entirely renewed every two years. Each senator holds office for six years, but one-third of the seats are filled every two years. At this election, then, the Presidency was not at issue. The only Federal offices to be filled were 435 seats in the House of Representatives and thirty-two seats in the Senate. In addition, however, to these Federal elections, there were State officials to be elected: Governors in some States, Legislatures in most States. It has hitherto been the invariable rule that in the 'mid-term' election, halfway between two Presidential elections, the President's party loses seats in Congress. Every four years candidates for Congress can hitch their individual wagons to the Presidential star and the electorate will sweep them into office with the President. But in the 'off-year,' congressmen have to stand on their own feet—and they consequently stand less steadily. Even those Presidents who have later been most triumphantly re-elected to office have lost ground halfway through their first term of office. Theodore Roosevelt lost seats both in 1902 and in 1906, but he had no difficulty in being

were defeated, while in Illinois, where there was no senatorial contest, the Democrats won several Congressional seats, including that of Mr. Britten, the veteran Big Navy supporter and Anglophobe. Chicago sent to Congress that *rarissima avis* a negro Democrat.

In the Far West the position was confused by the eruption of Radicalism. Before the day of the polls Mr. Upton Sinclair had been openly disowned by the Democratic leaders of California and tacitly disavowed from Washington. The embarrassment of the moderate Democrats was not lessened by the fact that his Republican opponent, Mr. Merriam, the incumbent Governor of the State, was a hardened conservative. It would be more accurate to say that he had previously been a hardened conservative, for in the course of the campaign he adopted every Radical proposal that had not hitherto been annexed by Mr. Sinclair, including even the so-called Townsend plan, which calls for State pensions of \$40 a month to all citizens over the age of sixty. The campaign against Mr. Sinclair was energetic and unscrupulous, and it succeeded in turning against him the small capitalists and the religious sects, both of which are more than usually numerous in California. In the result he was soundly beaten, Mr. Merriam being elected by some 1,000,000 votes to 700,000 for Mr. Sinclair. This victory did not, however, help the other Republican candidates of the State, as two Congressional seats were won by the Democrats. In the State of Washington, in the extreme north-west corner of the country, Radicalism fared somewhat better. This State has had a Radical reputation ever since the days of the I.W.W. immediately after the war, and Seattle, its chief city, is one of the strongholds of organised Labour. This year the Democratic Party of the State has been captured by the Left wing, and their candidate for the Senate, Mr. Schwollenbach, has been described as 'Lefter than Left.' This did not, however, prevent his election.

There is little in all this to cheer the Republicans. The little mountain State of Vermont, which clung to Taft in 1912 and to Mr. Hoover in 1932, is still entirely faithful. In some of the States of the Farm Belt, such as Kansas and Iowa, they have held their own, though they have failed to recapture any of the seats lost in 1932. Their only real gain was in Michigan, where Senator Vandenberg secured re-election and the Republicans won back four seats in the House of Representatives. Michigan is a large and important State; but one success amid such an array of failures is very cold comfort indeed.

The interpretation of these results is more difficult than their description. There is a temptation to conclude that they reveal an overwhelming ratification of the New Deal, to predict the

triumphant re-election of Mr. Roosevelt in 1936, to pronounce an epitaph on the Republican Party, and to leave it at that. But the matter is not quite as simple as the first glance would suggest. The Republicans have been reduced to less than a third of the Senate and less than a quarter of the House of Representatives. But their real strength in the country is far larger than these figures would indicate. The American electoral system, like the British, is that of single-member constituencies. A small majority, scattered evenly over the country, could in theory secure every seat in Congress. This has not hitherto happened because the Democrats, the minority party, had their stronghold in the 'Solid South,' which could be counted on at all times to give them nearly a quarter of each House of Congress, even if they failed to win a single seat in the rest of the country. But this year the theoretically possible has almost happened. The Democratic majority has been widespread, but comparatively small. When the votes are totalled up it will be found that there were very few States where the Republican vote exceeded the Democratic, and equally few, outside the 'Solid South,' where the Democrats were more than 55 per cent. of the voters. The Republican National Committee claims that the Republicans polled about 13,000,000 votes and the Democrats between 14,500,000 and 15,000,000. If these figures are correct—and there is no reason to doubt them—the Democrats actually lost more votes than the Republicans in comparison with 1932, when the vote for Mr. Hoover was about 16,000,000 and that for Mr. Roosevelt about 22,500,000. Precedent, then, has not been so completely broken; the 'off-year swing of the pendulum' has occurred, and, even though it has not swung far enough to affect the composition of Congress, a very few more degrees of swing might have made a great deal of difference. In view of these facts it would be as risky to assume that the Republican Party is finished as to have predicted the same of the Labour Party in Great Britain in 1931. The single-member constituency system penalises minorities; but it also has the effect of tempting temporary majorities to believe themselves permanent.

None of these qualifications of the victory detracts in the slightest from the fact that it is a striking personal triumph for the President. It is indeed something to have persuaded a majority of the American people to vote for the Democrats for the first time since the Civil War; and in saying 'for the first time' we are not forgetting the Presidential election of 1932, for the electorate did not then vote *for* Mr. Roosevelt so much as *against* Mr. Hoover. The New Deal was then a name but no more, and even his closest friends were inclined to put Mr. Roosevelt down as a pleasant but ineffective man. Indeed, had the details of his

policy been revealed to the voters then, they would probably have turned them down. This was the first opportunity the American people has had of passing judgment on the New Deal, and the affirmative vote is in a large measure the justification and reward of the men who had the political courage to initiate it. But though the President will have no difficulty in interpreting the vote as an endorsement of the New Deal as a whole, he will not find it so easy to determine whether public opinion stands behind the Right wing or the Left wing of his immediate supporters. Conservative Democrats were, in the main, elected in the East, while the Far West very decidedly turned down Mr. Upton Sinclair's Radicalism. On the other hand, both at the head and at the mouth of the great Mississippi valley more extreme views were successful. Senator La Follette, of Wisconsin, and Senator Long, of Louisiana, each in his very different way, is at the head of a Radical movement which extends beyond the borders of his own State.

This obscurity of the popular oracle and the enormous personal prestige of the President put the decision on policy entirely into his hand. Whether he moves to the Left or to the Right, he will probably be able to carry a majority of Congress with him. There will be the irreconcilables of the Left, and some irreconcilables of the Right, in spite of the Republican rout. But the majority of both Houses has been elected to support Roosevelt. Unlike most Presidents in American history, he can afford to be a Prime Minister as well as President. Everything in the next two years will therefore turn on the President's policy. There are already some indications of what that policy will be. It will still be directed towards Relief, Recovery and Reform, but some of the more drastic methods adopted last year are unlikely to be revived. Recovery is apparently to be sought by an intensification of the Public Works programme and its close relation, the Housing programme, and by restoring business confidence. There is little immediate likelihood of a further devaluation of the dollar or of further experiments with currency or credit inflation. So much, at least, is read into the President's firm denial of the recurrent rumours of devaluation and into his appointment of Mr. Marriner S. Eccles—a 'Public Works' protagonist—as governor of the Federal Reserve Board. Relief and Reform are to be advanced together by a programme of social insurance. Committees have been set up to study plans for insurance against unemployment and for old age pensions. Constitutional difficulties are in the way of a system of Federal unemployment insurance, but the Federal Government can draw up a standard scheme and use its taxing powers to persuade the States to enact the necessary legislation. The plan favoured is apparently an entirely contributory scheme, with no assistance from the Treasury

and with both contributions and benefits varying from industry to industry. The public support of old age is a subject of considerable actuality in the United States at present, as is shown by the extraordinary popularity of several quite fantastic proposals of this nature. The widespread nature of the movement is due to the confluence of two streams of thought—one mainly concerned with the social problem of elderly indigence, the other anxious to diminish the competition for employment. Whether the Federal Treasury will be ready to shoulder the burden of universal old age pensions remains to be seen, but action of some sort can be expected next year.

Public works and housing, relief and social insurance are thus likely to be the policies laid before the new Congress by the President. But Congress can be counted on to have plenty of ideas of its own. There will be, for example, the proposal to pay the 'veterans' bonus' in full at once—that perennial disturber of the peace of Presidents. Congress will probably vote this proposal, and the President will almost certainly veto it. Whether the veterans' lobby will be able to muster the two-thirds of each House necessary to override the President's veto remains to be seen; at the moment it appears unlikely. But there will be many other ingenious proposals to turn the Federal Treasury into a Santa Claus for different sectional interests, and it can be predicted with assurance that the most formidable opposition the President will have to meet will be sectional greed masquerading as inflationary economics. His political talents will be fully exercised if he is to retain control. The historical omens are not encouraging, for the only previous President to have a Congress so overwhelmingly of his own party was Andrew Johnson, who was also the only President to be impeached by Congress—led, be it noted, by the Radicals of his own party. But Johnson was elected in the shadow of Lincoln, and Mr. Roosevelt is his own Lincoln.

The Democratic victories of 1932 and 1934, coupled with the revolution which the depression and Mr. Roosevelt between them have effected in the subject-matter of legislation, have entirely changed the aspect of American politics. There is, as we have seen, no reason to believe the Republican Party defunct, but it can clearly never be in the future what it has been in the past. Mr. Roosevelt has succeeded in converting the Democratic Party from an illogical alliance of the defeated Confederate States in the South and the immigrant politicians of the cities in the North into a party of opinion, united in defence of a policy. The Republicans will be forced to undertake a similar change and to emerge as the Conservative Party. The age of opposing gangs with identical policies is past: 'Measures, not Men,' will be the criterion of the

future. How soon this realignment is accomplished depends upon the President. If he stands his ground against the Radicals and the inflationaries, there will be very little room in the immediate future for a Conservative Party. On the contrary, the emergence of a Radical Party will be much more of a threat to Mr. Roosevelt. The 'machines' of the two older parties are so firmly established throughout the country, and so bountifully maintained by Federal, State and municipal patronage, that a third party would be hard to establish. But if the extremer sections of opinion can find no satisfaction in the Democratic Party, they will be tempted to secede. Their task will be as difficult as, but no more difficult than, that of the founders of the Labour Party in Great Britain. On the other hand, if the President surrenders to his wild men, he will inevitably drive many of his more moderate supporters back to the Republicans.

The Democratic Party is thus threatened on either side. Neither threat is likely to materialise against Mr. Roosevelt. Neither of the potential oppositions can put into the field a candidate with one quarter of his popular appeal. In a vast country like the United States the leader of a party must have a name known in every State; there is only one name in American politics at present. But by inflexible tradition each President is limited to eight years of office. The testing time of that newly-born American Liberalism which President Roosevelt personifies will come in 1940, when his successor is to be elected. It is not only in its advocacy of social insurance that the present Democratic Administration resembles the British Liberal Party after its great triumph of 1906. It stands between the conservative elements, the party of property, and the first beginnings of a party of the dispossessed. Mr. Roosevelt has the supremely difficult task of creating a permanently strong centre party. For the moment the luck is with him. But who can tell what will happen in the next six years, what passions may not arise to wreck him, as they wrecked Cleveland and Wilson in his own country or the Liberals in Great Britain? It is a task worthy of a master-politician, and the chief interest in American politics for the next few years will be to watch Mr. Roosevelt walking warily down the middle of the road.

GEOFFREY CROWTHER.

BEFORE THE PLEBISCITE IN THE SAAR

It has become a truism to explain that the triumph of National Socialism in Germany created a Saar question where no question had hitherto existed. In the last few months, however, the tension has become so much greater that no apology need be offered for an attempt to examine the situation in the Saar two months before the plebiscite is to take place. For on January 13, 1935, the Saarlanders have to choose whether they wish to become Hitler's subjects, or whether they prefer to remain under the authority of the League of Nations; there is, of course, the possibility of becoming citizens of France, but little interest attaches to the handful of people who are likely to register this choice. The *Führer* has compelled the young men of Germany to stifle their Corridor demands, and, since Poland has repudiated international control in the matter of minorities, he has abandoned the Germans in Poland with a completeness which must be bitter to contemplate. He appears also to have left the Austrian Nazis to their fate. For the time being the whole impulse of Nazi energy is directed towards the Saar, which has thus for a time become almost the pivot of European affairs.

All this fuss about 830,000 people¹ and a territory no larger than Kent or Suffolk is, for some people, hard to explain. But five great issues are concentrated here. The Saar basin is highly industrialised—who shall control its coal mines and iron foundries? The Saar basin is strategically important—who, then, can win a military advantage here? Both questions have doubled in importance since Germany, under Hitler, has become hungrier and so much more aggressive than she was before. The Saarlanders are predominantly Catholic and 'proletarian,' and unquestionably German. Here the fundamental principles of National Socialism are at stake, its arrogant claims to the allegiance of the Christian Churches and of the working classes, however grossly it defies or cheats them, and to the allegiance of the whole German 'race.' The territory now in question was partially acquired by France, together with Alsace, through Louis XIV.'s *Chambres de Réunion*, and some of it was included

¹ Exactly 828,128 in January 1934.

in France by the 1814 Treaty. In 1815 most of it went to Prussia, and Saarbrücken became a Prussian garrison town. In 1871, with Germany's acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine, it ceased for a time to be frontier country, and its modern industrialisation occurred in close conjunction with the iron mines of Lorraine. This valuable association was maintained by the Peace Treaty of 1919 (when the Saar basin became League of Nations territory until the plebiscite in 1935), but more definitely by the inclusion of the territory in a customs union with France.

Putting iron ore and customs duties aside, no one can be blind to the fact that the Saarlanders are Germans, nor should anyone forget the oppressive period of M. Rault's^a authority. And yet every observer with any claims to open-mindedness will agree that the year 1934 has witnessed an increasing opposition in the Saar to the totalitarian claims of the National Socialist State; signs are not wanting that the confidence of the Nazis themselves has been shaken. Their greatest anxiety is caused by the secession of an important Catholic group from the German Front into which all the old Centre people were hustled by the Nazis in September 1933. These seceders, led by Johann Hoffmann, founded their own newspaper, the *Neue Saar Post*, last May. Some of them represent the political liberalism of the old Bavarian People's Party, others have greater sympathy for the Italian Fascist system, but they are all the enemies of Nazi Neo-Paganism, and their paper has come out in definite support of the retention of the *status quo* under the League of Nations. They claim to be supported by 90 per cent. of the clergy in the Saar; certainly they have the sympathy of the large majority of priests. But the Saar priests are subjected to the authority of two bishops in the *Reich*, and this constitutes perhaps the greatest difficulty the *Neue Saar Post* people, at the moment of writing, have to face. The old Prussian part of the Saar basin comes within the diocese of Trier, the much smaller Bavarian portion within that of Speyer. The Bishop of Speyer is old and weak; both he and his brother of Trier are subject to fairly irresistible threats from the temporal authorities, and they can but condemn pro-*status quo* activities among the clergy of the Saar. The Vatican is well aware of the situation; for some time the Pope has maintained a special observer in the Saar; Monsignor Panico has recently succeeded Monsignor Testa in this rôle. The *status quo* Catholics hope that the Pope may yet free the Saar clergy from their allegiance to the German bishops by appointing a special administrator, as he did in Upper Silesia at the time of the plebiscite there. But this would probably be taken by the Nazis as that

^a President of the Governing Commission of the Saar in the years immediately after the war.

open declaration of war which the Vatican is temperamentally anxious to avoid. Relations between the German authorities and the Catholics in the *Reich* are already so bad that no one any longer takes the Concordat of 1933 seriously, and the Secret Police (the *Gestapo*) have special orders to watch Catholic activities.

Through the Catholic trades unions, Catholicism in the Saar, as in the Rhineland before Hitler, is associated with the Labour cause. The last elections to the representative, but merely advisory, *Landesrat* were held two years ago; at that time the Centre polled 48 per cent. of the votes, the Communists 23 per cent. and the Socialists 13 per cent. Both Marxist parties, in the days of Weimar democracy, had habitually championed the rights of German workers against French capital. When the Saar coal mines were handed over to France by the Peace Treaty,^a the French State became the biggest employer in the territory. In the metallurgical concerns, about two-fifths of the capital is foreign (French, Belgian, and Luxembourgish), and roughly a quarter is French alone. Thus Hitler's victory was at first wholly disconcerting to the Socialists and Communists of the Saar—they seemed only able to exchange bitter recriminations among themselves, and many of their younger supporters undoubtedly accepted the socialistic declarations of the Nazis; the marriage of these assertions with a passionately nationalistic spirit was particularly attractive to the German employees of the French State.

The destruction of the trades unions in Germany, and the publication of the Nazi Labour Law, did something to console the Saar workers for their separation from the *Reich*. Some intellectuals, too, were thankful to find that something which they had always regarded as one of the more unfortunate vagaries of Versailles left them free to read what they chose; they were glad still to be able to go to the left-tending films which can, to this day, be seen at the Socialists' Welfare Centre. In the last six months, however, events within Germany and without have brought about a change which is almost startling. This transformation is best observed at the pro-*status quo* meetings which are now being held in the Saar. Here the Socialist and Communist leaders, who were not on speaking terms last winter, share the platform; it is amusing to hear Socialist veterans whispering tolerantly to each other as the Communist Pfordt takes the platform, 'Well, what's our local Litvinoff got to say to-night?' But the United Marxist Front is by no means the whole of this

^a As compensation for the destruction of the north French mines, and to be bought back by Germany if and when the Saar returned to her; the price is to be fixed by arbitration and paid in gold.

story. It is when a Catholic priest⁴ addresses these meetings that the interest reaches a climax; I have heard a priest win more applause at a workers' meeting than Max Braun (the Socialist leader) or Pfordt themselves. Nor did the priest need to stray into the paths of heresy; he spoke of his recent experiences in Germany, how he had been in prison there, how his friends had been afraid to give him shelter when he came out. The Nazis had made Germany into a land of cowards and traitors, and yet a land thirsting for war. 'Keep out of that, my friends,' he said. 'Vote for the *status quo* and help to save Germany.' More cautious Catholics will hasten to explain that if a priest on a *status quo* platform can help to lead the people back to the Church, this is a praiseworthy mission, while doctrinaire Communists are equally willing to exploit priests if it pays. But all the most scholastic frowns do not destroy the bridge upon which these priestly speakers stand. It is built out of two planks—a common, fundamental longing for human welfare, as I heard a priest point out, and the brave hope that the Saarlanders may yet save Germany. It is this hope which reveals the intense patriotism of the supporters of the *status quo*, and I believe that that is the dominating emotion at a meeting of the kind I have described. There is a passionate desire to help Germany to her senses and a conviction that the Saarlanders are the only Germans who have any immediate chance of doing so: this counts for more than Vatican strategy or Comintern tactics; and it is this which binds German Catholic to German Communist in the Saar.

The new virility of the supporters of the *status quo* has been generously nurtured by Hitler. The travesty which the Concordat has become in the *Reich*, the depressed standard of living, and the blood-stained summer have been recorded with anxiety, despondency, and horror. The international pattern is also reflected in the Saar; this reflexion, too, shakes the certainty of Nazi prediction. Since the Franco-Russian *rapprochement*, the Third International has been ordered to conciliate the Second, and this to some extent explains the emergence of the Saar United Front. There are a thousand rumours about Dimitroff's participation in the business; merely as rumours, they have their significance.

I am convinced of the German patriotism of the partisans of the *status quo*, but I am no less convinced of the fervent patriotism of the Nazis in the Saar. When one of them said to me, 'If Germany doesn't get the Saar back next January, I don't want to go on living,' I believe his feelings were as sincere as the feelings behind such declarations ever can be. The participation on both

⁴ The Bishops of Trier and Speyer are now (mid-November) forbidding all political activities on the part of priests in the Saar.

sides, of corruptionists, gangsters and other hangers-on, does not detract from the genuine emotion which is impelling so many Saarlanders into the plebiscite arena. Many Germans, who are not National Socialists, both in the Saar and in the *Reich*, cannot contemplate the prolonged separation of this German territory from the administration so newly centralised in Berlin. Orthodox Catholics are torn between the claim of country and the claim of a Church which has always emphasised the natural sanctity of patriotism; there are even some who hold that the more their Catholic brothers are persecuted in the *Reich*, the more they feel their own place to be beside them. More nominal Catholics are drawn into the Nazi camp by their desire to 'keep the priest in his place.'

For the 'whole-hog' Nazi the question has an almost indescribable poignancy. The preservation of the *status quo* would mean the preservation of a portion of the Versailles *Diktat* which has been widely denied justification. The preservation of the *status quo* spells everything which Nazi ideology condemns; it vetoes the administrative unity of the German race more plainly than the independence of Austria, whose population is almost as mixed as the Hapsburg empire was multi-racial. The *status quo* prolonged would mean a triumph for all the principles for which poor Geneva stands—internationalism, arbitration, minority rights, as opposed to the unchallenged roughness of the strong. According to the implications of the French *Aide-Mémoire* of September 4, it might even mean concessions to the dreadful notion of democracy. The Saar State would necessarily be small and weak. And to the Nazi mind the pro-*status quo* campaign is, like Rhenish separatism, a French intrigue, and its success would be nothing but a preliminary to French annexation.⁵

The Nazi case in the Saar question, like that of the *status quo* people, is a good one; it is a bitter dilemma indeed with which Hitler has confronted the Saarlanders. The decisive point, for many inhabitants of the territory and for many foreign observers, is the evil identification of Germany's name with the terrorism, the lawlessness, and the trickeries of the Nazi campaign. In the Saar, particularly, the Nazi technique must be seen to be believed; it is almost impossible for an Englishman who stays at home to contemplate such things—indeed, few visitors to the Saar itself are altogether aware of what is going on.

It is embittering enough for its opponents that the German Front in the Saar works with lavish funds supplied from the *Reich* and in alliance with the *Gestapo*, but they could scarcely hope for it to be otherwise. Among other things, Germany causes Saar

⁵ Recently the Nazis have been announcing that support for the *status quo* comes solely from *Reich émigrés* who should therefore be expelled from the Saar.

children to be taken in by families in the *Reich*, from whose homes the children write ecstatic letters to their parents in the Saar. While disclaiming any interest in the material side of the question, the Nazis, by the way, are constantly asserting that the Saar has suffered economically through its divorce from the *Reich*, an assertion which is in direct and unquestionable opposition to the facts.⁶ The co-operation of the Trier *Gestapo* with the German Front in the Saar has been illustrated by some of the papers confiscated by order of the Governing Commission. The following incident is an amusing example of how close the link is: Not long ago a certain X., who takes no interest in politics himself but who is closely related to a man known to be working for the *status quo*, was setting out to drive in his car from Saarbrücken to Trier. 'I'll be back this evening if they don't put me in a concentration camp,' he said to his wife, by way of teasing her. When he got to Trier he was arrested by S.S. men (now more or less incorporated with the Secret Police). It turned out that the only grounds for the arrest were that the whole of this family was kept under the particular observation of spies.⁷ One of these had solemnly telephoned the remark about the concentration camp, which was received by the Trier *Gestapo* as sufficiently suspicious to necessitate arrest. The unfortunate victim did, however, escape the fate he had so frivolously envisaged, and was allowed to return home: he was a Saar citizen and not subject to the *Reich* authorities at all, but the *Reich*, as on other occasions, might have refused to give him up.

The partisans of the *status quo* are lamentably poor and they are not in alliance with any terroristic police system outside the territory. But what made them helpless until recently was the Nazis' control over the local Saar police. This was a force of about 1100 men enrolled locally when the French troops left in 1930, men to whom the Nazis conveyed that if they revealed any 'misunderstanding of the patriotic spirit' by taking steps against Nazi methods, they would be noted as bad Germans to be dismissed and perhaps beaten up in 1935. The success of this threat was almost complete among the police; it was applied with less success to officials and lawyers. For a long time, therefore, Socialists and Communists have been subject to unrestrained threats and occasional violence. The people associated with the *Neue Saar Post*—the *Saarpest*, the Nazis call it—have now

⁶ This is a chapter on its own. The Saar has flourished upon both French and German concessions until now; whatever happens in the plebiscite, it will soon cease to be offered favours from both sides.

⁷ Mr. Knox's recent report made to the Committee of Three in Rome has shown that the whole population of the Saar is kept under the observation of Nazi cell-chiefs. This is denied by the German Front, and the denial has led to litigation between German Front and Governing Commission.

experienced six months' intensive persecution of a similar kind. They have the greatest difficulties in distribution, because anyone who is seen selling their paper is offered some good job by the German Front on condition that he repents of his 'separatism,' while those who buy it are certain to be dismissed by Nazi masters. A week after the first number of the *Neue Saar Post* was issued the Nazis put up forged placards advertising the new publication; the placards were edged with the French colours, and a day or two later it was solemnly broadcast from Frankfurt that the *Neue Saar Post* was frankly advertising itself in the blue-white-red of France. At about the same time there were plans to kidnap Hoffmann and Braun. Policemen were sent to Hoffmann's house to protect it; from them information appears to have reached the German Front, in one of whose papers a head-line promptly appeared, saying 'Hoffmann is afraid.' *Status quo* people have to accustom themselves to personal insults and to their children being bullied at school; a *status quo* shopkeeper is facing a boycott if he shows his hand. Anybody associated with the *status quo* needs to be careful never to get into any kind of car unless he is well acquainted with its other occupants, for, without this precaution, one is apt to find oneself across the *Reich* frontier and under arrest. The terror in the Saar is more intensely felt as one approaches the frontier of Germany. If one examines the facts, it is easy to disprove the theory that only a majority can make itself so powerfully felt.

In view of the pressure upon their police, the Governing Commission, under the presidency of Mr. Knox, compels congratulation upon the preservation of order and of the main substance of civil rights; not long ago I heard a very intelligent observer remark that at present there is oppression rather than terror in the Saar. There is a theory in Whitehall that pro-consuls should be seen and not heard of: it is a pity that it is not better understood that the rise of National Socialism has rendered this notion obsolete; Mr. Knox might then be more accurately appreciated for the good work he has done with the bad instrument of an unreliable executive. Early last June the date of the plebiscite was fixed for January 13, 1935, and it became essential to tackle the problem of the all but *gleichgeschaltet* police: the Governing Commission was empowered by the League Council to recruit men locally as far as possible and then to look abroad. Out of 4000 local applicants Mr. Hemsley, the English Chief of Police appointed in July, has chosen about 210 people whom he considers should be capable of impartiality. Not many complaints have been made against the people he has chosen. The new recruits all have military experience, and are to be kept in barracks in *Bereitschaft*. Meanwhile negotiations have been proceeding, and

although the Swiss refused to allow their nationals to be enrolled, other Governments have been more friendly. The necessity of finding men who can speak German creates a difficulty. There is, of course, fiery indignation among the Nazis over the introduction of an international police force, which they denounce as a foreign occupation. Both Nazis and Socialists find it impossible to understand that their own party people whom 'they are willing to place at Mr. Knox's disposal' will not meet the requirements of the case.

While the Governing Commission will remain responsible for the maintenance of order and for the general administration until after the plebiscite, a Plebiscite Commission of Three appointed by the League arrived in Saarbrücken on July 1 to prepare, in accordance with the Treaty, for the holding of a 'free, secret, and sincere vote' next January. Their chief business has been to compile a valid list of those entitled to vote in the plebiscite. Every man or woman over twenty, regardless of their nationality, is eligible if he or she were resident in the Territory on June 28, 1919. Provisional lists have been made by the 83 communal committees established by the Plebiscite Commission. These committees have a foreign president and two Saarland members. They are supervised by eight '*bureaux de cercle*,' each of which consists of one or more foreigners: these are, of course, all League appointments for which neither Frenchmen nor Germans are eligible. The '*bureaux de cercle*' are connected with the Plebiscite Commission by two foreign liaison officials. The Plebiscite Commission has a Dutch president (M. de Jongh), a Swiss and a Swedish member, and an American expert (Miss Wambaugh) attached to it. There is also an international Plebiscite Tribunal under the presidency of the Italian, Signor Galli, with a subordinate judge in each of the eight circles. Would-be voters' applications were made in July; then from September 26 to October 26 the provisional lists of voters were posted up for objections to be made. From October 26 to December 17 the Plebiscite Commission machinery is working under pressure, for by the latter date all disputes must be settled, the tribunal must have made its decisions on all appeals and the final list be published. Nazi tactics have been to flood the committees with the names of claimants; the number of groundless applications is variously estimated between 40,000 and 100,000. *Westland*, a good anti-Nazi weekly which may usually be regarded as reliable, reported on September 22, as an example of what had been going on, that in Sulzbach, after the president of the communal committee had sealed up the list of claimants, the containing envelope had been opened and about 1000 names of *Reich* Germans added. In this case a Socialist on the committee reported the

case, but on about half these committees the local members are both Nazis.

Mr. Knox's adherence to an English conception of justice has brought him the grossest insults from the German Front in the Saar and from the *Reich* Press and wireless, and the Governing Commission has been denounced as Radetzky and Haynau rolled into one—men incapable of understanding a national spirit. The Plebiscite Commission was at first welcomed by the Nazis as a body of people who would have the sense to put things right. But the Plebiscite Commission has already been thrust into the ranks of the oppressors. On September 15, while thanking the members of the communal committees for the technical work done, it was compelled to point out that many of their members were obviously working in association with 'a certain political organisation,' and that that must stop at once. Soon after this the question of meeting-halls became acute. The threats and wealth of the German Front had caused the people in control of all big meeting-halls to refuse to hire them to the *status quo* parties. The anti-Nazis cannot often afford to organise large-scale meetings, but it is particularly important to them to be able occasionally to do so, since none but the rash are willing to come to small meetings where it is easy for Nazi spies to note them down. The interest taken in the *status quo* meeting at Sulzbach on August 26, the day of Hitler's speech at Coblenz, is based not only upon the first appearance of a Catholic priest on such a platform, but also upon the fact that somewhere about 50,000 people attended it because they felt less conspicuous on a hill-top than in, say, a village hall. It is typical of Nazi methods that the German Front paper, the *Saarbrücker Abendblatt*, at the time reported 20,000 participators at Sulzbach, and that the German Saar propaganda organisation in London issued a statement at the end of September referring to the mere handful of 7000 separatists at the Sulzbach meeting. Apart from its effect on foreign opinion, these tactics keep *status quo* sympathisers in a perpetual state of exaggerated anxiety due to this pseudo-artificial ostracism.

The German Front announced its intention to launch a 'final struggle' (*Endkampf*) campaign on Sunday, September 23, and notified to the authorities open-air meetings in Saarbrücken, Saarlouis, Merzig, Völklingen and Neunkirchen. The Plebiscite Commission caused the local authorities to be asked whether they were equally ready to afford facilities for meetings to be held by the other plebiscite parties, but only the Mayor of Völklingen declared himself willing. The matter was brought before the Council of the League on September 28, and an order was immediately published in Saarbrücken giving the authorities of the eight circles of the plebiscite organisation dictatorial powers to

ensure that each of the parties created by the triple issue of the plebiscite shall be able to hire meeting-places.

No one can predict whether the efforts of the Governing and Plebiscite Commissions will make possible the free vote demanded by the Treaty of Versailles, nor how, if this be achieved, the majority of the Saarlanders will vote. One can only speculate. I know of an Italian now working for the Plebiscite Commission who thinks the Governing Commission too slack in standing up to the Nazis, and I know of a Scandinavian in a similar position who takes exactly the opposite view; from which I deduce that both Commissions are about as impartial as is humanly possible. In order that the voting on January 13 shall be free, the population has to be convinced that it will be secret. The Nazis have a 'we shall know' technique which can be effective without being true. The Plebiscite Commission has already arranged for the setting up of *bureaux de vote* to supervise the actual voting, but it has delayed its decision as to how, where, and when the votes shall be counted and the result announced. The Council of the League has still to meet, and may make decisions which will transform the whole situation. These may be known to the world before this article can appear, but it is impossible to consider them here.

There is another point, which may be the decisive one. Many of the Saarlanders who are not National Socialists feel unable to vote against Germany for an indefinite period of time, where, if it were a question of five or ten years, they would be anxious to do so. The Treaty would scarcely sanction a declared time limit of such a kind, for which the *status quo* people are naturally eager. On September 4 a French *Aide-Mémoire* on the subject of the Saar was presented to the Council of the League of Nations, in which it was suggested that if the *status quo* were continued, as the result of the plebiscite, there should be room for subsequent modifications of the *régime*. This was taken to imply that the Saarlanders should be able later to vote themselves back into Germany. The *Aide-Mémoire* was in many ways a remarkable document. In it the French Government declared

qu'il lui paraît légitime que, dans l'élaboration du statut à instaurer, une large place soit faite à la collaboration de la population de la Sarre dont le traité même a voulu que l'expression soit recueillie. De même, il accepterait qu'il fut tenu compte des vœux d'ores et déjà exprimés au sein de la population et tendant à réserver des possibilités de modification de ce statut, en vue de répondre éventuellement aux leçons de l'expérience, 'aux intérêts permanents du territoire et à l'intérêt général.'

Opinions vary as to the effect of this statement in the Saar. The implication that the Government should in future become less

authoritarian and more democratic was certainly welcome on the left, though the practically-minded must have felt misgivings as to the part the Saar Nazis and Communists might play in more parliamentary circumstances. The *Aide-Mémoire*, while insisting, as the French always have, that if the Saar goes German, Germany must stick to the Treaty and buy back the mines, also stated that, if the *status quo* continues, France will present the mines to the Government of the Saar.⁸ On the whole, that must have appeared too much like a bribe to have helped the *status quo* party; the Nazis, of course, denounced the *Aide-Mémoire* as blatant French propaganda, and renewed their charges of high treason against all their opponents.⁹

An average estimate of the voting now gives Germany 65-70 per cent.; any doubts one may feel about this figure find some justification in the following considerations. On August 19, in the German referendum, the districts which admitted the greatest dissidence were the West German areas, where, as in the Saar, the proportion of Catholics and of industrial workers is high. The pressure to vote 'yes' on August 19 was, of course, stronger than it can possibly be next January. The Saarlanders seem, moreover, to be temperamentally secretive. In *Neue Saar Post* circles one is often reminded of an occasion before the war when Reichstag and Prussian Landtag elections were held within a week of one another. In the Reichstag election, which was by secret ballot, a Centre man was chosen, to everyone's surprise; in the Landtag election, which was open, the Centre did not even risk a candidate. To-day the priests find their churches fuller than they used to be, for it is safer to go to church than to buy the *Neue Saar Post*, and there is plenty a priest can say without using political phrases.

There are many people who are already saying, 'Thank God, the whole thing will be over in January'; in fact, nothing can be less justifiable than this pious assumption. Unless the Marseilles murders bear some terrible fruit, no question in Europe is more pregnant with danger than that of the Saar. But while a false step between now and January might be disastrous, after January 13 a catastrophe may at any moment be born.

There are three possibilities in the plebiscite. It has become clear that the chance of a small majority for the *status quo* now really exists. Herr Spaniol, the young ex-leader of the German Front in the Saar, who was succeeded by Pirro last March, and

⁸ The *Aide-Mémoire* says the French Government 'est disposé à céder au territoire lui-même, à des conditions équitables, une large part des gisements.'

⁹ Herr Pirro, now leader of the German Front, sent a long telegram of protestation to Barthou over the *Aide-Mémoire*, and it is said that Barthou put it aside with a tired smile, deploring that 'so much money should be spent on so much nonsense.'

who holds the position of a Prussian *Staatsrat*, has organised 17,000 young Saarlanders in Labour service in the *Reich*. Labour service is always a soldierly affair, and abundant evidence has accumulated to show that there has been no mistake about it in the case of these 17,000. It is with difficulty that these young people are kept in hand now; if Germany failed to get a majority vote on January 13, Spaniol has openly announced his intention of invading and laying waste the Saar. In the Schaub letter,¹⁰ in which this is perhaps more clearly revealed, it may be observed that men like Spaniol envisage the possible loss of the Saar *durch die heutige Führung*. This is perhaps more remarkable in Spaniol than in Schaub, who pooh-poohs him as a foolish youth. If a Labour Corps eruption followed Germany's defeat, M. Barthou's speech on September 27 made it perfectly clear that French troops, acting on behalf of the League, would be prepared to defend the Saar.

The second possibility is some sort of partition if the voting is close and varies much from district to district, for the League is empowered by the Treaty to distribute the territory in accordance with the wishes of the population. The risk of a Nazi *putsch* would be much the same, for partition would be just as bitterly resented as a profanation of German soil. The chance of a Franco-German clash in the Saar is increased by the Nazi claim that German sovereignty has never lapsed there, while France and the rest of the world regard the territory as under the authority, not of the *Reich*, but of the League. There is probably nothing the French would relish less than to send troops into the Saar, and nothing that would reconcile more Saarlanders with the *Reich*. Even a close vote, on the other hand, would spell such humiliation for the Nazis that doubt has been expressed as to how successfully the Hitler *régime* could stand a moral defeat of this kind. This is why the struggle in the Saar is so desperately important to everyone who is not indifferent to Hitlerism. This is also the reason which makes serious people afraid of a *putsch* before January 13 in order that the Nazis shall 'hold the plebiscite themselves.' There is much less than a 50 per cent. chance of this taking place; nevertheless, the chance exists. It has been said that the French frontier measures at the end of October were occasioned by the discovery of a Nazi plan to assassinate the members of the Governing Commission. It is at any rate no secret that anxiety is felt for Mr. Knox's safety. 'No one would be so mad as to attempt his life,' one hears people say; but someone was mad enough to murder Dollfuss. Confidence in official Germany's intentions has been restored by Herr Bürckel's order of November 2 forbidding

¹⁰ To Pirro, dated July 9, 1934, and included in the material laid before the League Council last August and September.

uniforms, parades, etc., within 40 kilometres of the frontier from January 10 to February 10. In view of Herr Bürckel's pugnacious speech on October 18, and in view of the probability that prospective 'putschists' would prefer to avoid attention by remaining in mufti, it is difficult to see why this order should have aroused so much satisfaction, but it appears that the *Reich* government is making serious efforts to check this exuberance at last.

The third and most actual possibility is that of a not very big majority for Germany, which will immediately create the problem of the future of those who have been rash enough to reveal their dissent. The German Government has agreed that the supreme plebiscite tribunal shall sit in the Saar until January 1936 to settle disputes arising out of the plebiscite, but we have Schaub's word for it that, forty-eight hours after the voting, Hitler will have 'put an end to plenty of illusions'—in the manner of June 30 is pretty clearly implied. As the French *Aide-Mémoire* pointed out,¹¹ the mines will still belong to the French State and a great deal of capital will still belong to foreigners who will need protection from the eager clutches of the Reichsbank. It is almost as fascinating as it is agitating to contemplate the French State as an employer in the National Socialist industrial organisation, a *Führer* of one of the Nazi 'followings.'

The situation is already an *impasse*, for Neurath, in a speech in September, in so many words refused to pay. M. Barthou has been blamed in England for the unyielding attitude of the French, but it seems fairly clear that the best hope for peace in Europe and justice in the Saar is to-day provided by the firmness and clarity of the French. The generals have a good deal to say in Germany to-day. They are not ready for war. If they are really convinced that France means business, they will do all they can to cause Germany to observe her various obligations. They might be able to keep the Spaniels in order and even to induce Dr. Schacht to disgorge an agreed gold price for the mines. Thus those who study the problem of the Saar are logically compelled to hope that the Quai d'Orsay will, as M. Laval has implied, do homage to Jean Louis Barthou by continuing the clear-cut policy associated with his name.

¹¹ 'Faudrait-il donc, soit laisser coexister la souveraineté de l'État allemand sur le Territoire et l'exploitation des Mines par l'État français, soit suspendre, jusqu'à complet paiement des Mines, la réinstallation de la souveraineté allemande? Ces deux solutions seraient, à des degrés divers, difficiles à admettre et comporteraient de sérieux dangers.'

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

NAVAL DISARMAMENT

GENERAL SMUTS, in his profoundly interesting and impressive speech on November 13, pointed out two great dangers to which the world to-day is exposed. One is the rising militaristic spirit of Germany and the other the Japanese demand for an abrogation of the ratio strength to which she agreed at the Washington Conference. While the latter of these must be a subject of discussion at the naval 'conversations,' the former has a very direct bearing upon the future of naval strength and the security of the world. General Smuts propounded the view that this militaristic spirit has among its origins, if indeed it is not its actual origin, the inferiority complex which has taken hold of the minds of the German people. They resent the inequality of status which has been imposed upon them, and their resentment takes shape in those movements which we can see; though we cannot foretell to what new groupings of discontented nations it may in time, and possibly before very long, give rise. It is his view that there is one way, and one way only, of removing this dangerous 'complex,' and that is to recognise Germany's 'complete equality with her fellows, and to do this frankly, freely and unreservedly.'

What connexion is there between this political act and the matters which are occupying the attention of those who are taking part in the naval 'conversations'? There is a very close connexion indeed. The restoration of what is called 'equality of status' carries with it the undoubted right to build any type of vessel, of any size, which is permitted to the other nations of the world. If they possess battleships of 35,000 or 22,000 tons, cruisers of 10,000 tons, aircraft-carriers, large destroyers of from 1500 to 2000 tons, or even larger, submarines and naval aircraft, Germany will have the right to possess them too. That she may not at once avail herself of the right is possible. Her finances are not in a condition, it would appear, to begin an extensive naval programme. But we are not entitled to limit our views to this year, or even to a few years ahead. We have to take longer views and produce a settlement which reaches beyond our own day. That is the only statesmanlike course.

The question, therefore, which immediately presents itself is

what the eventual effect will be of those decisions regarding the sizes of ships, the retention of types, and the various ratios of strength, upon all the nations of the world at that future time—which, in General Smuts's opinion, should not be deferred one day longer than can be helped—when equality of status is resumed by Germany.

Taking first the type known as the battleship. Germany to-day is limited to an armoured vessel of 10,000 tons. The other maritime nations are free to build ships of 35,000 tons. Germany therefore to-day has no battleships, for the meaning of the term is 'a ship fit to lie in the line' against an enemy; and these small vessels are not fit to 'lie in the line' against ships of three and a half times their size. They are, in reality, armoured cruisers. When equality of status is resumed, Germany will be as free as the other nations to provide herself with ships of that tonnage or any other lesser tonnage she may choose to adopt.

While it may appear improbable, and even impossible, that Germany, in her present financial condition, either would or could proceed to furnish herself with ships of the largest size, the time is bound to come when her prosperity comes back, and she will, if it appears to her to be in her interest to possess such ships, proceed to build them. But it is to be observed that it is quite within her power to-day to build ships of a much greater size than those 10,000-ton armoured cruisers without involving herself in a greater expenditure. Those, it is understood, are very expensive vessels; they have cost her something in the neighbourhood of £4,000,000 sterling each. But if the extremely high speed with which they are endowed and the special methods of construction which have been used were abandoned, there is no doubt whatever that a ship of about double the size and greater fighting power could be produced for the same money. We should then witness the introduction of a new class of ship, as revolutionary in her design as the armoured cruiser. A new battle fleet of heavy ships will be added to the battle fleets of the world. The Disarmament Conference will have had the singular result of a marked increase in armaments.

What, again, are we to anticipate as the result of either this immediate appearance of a larger ship or of a possibly later appearance of ships of the largest permissible size of 35,000 tons? What will be the effect upon other Powers? Under the terms of the Washington Treaty France is entitled to a tonnage of capital ships which will give her five of the largest type if 35,000 tons is adopted, or a larger number if she should elect to build smaller ships. With great and natural reluctance France accepted the limitation. It was objectionable to her for two reasons—her relegation to a secondary position in maritime strength after having

been one of the principal naval Powers, and the fact that a battle fleet of five ships involves the locking up of force within a very few hulls, so that the loss of even one ship constitutes a most serious proportional loss. To lose one ship out of twenty is no disaster. To lose one of five is a very different thing. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that it was this latter fact that impelled her to devote her attention to the submarine.

How many of these large ships would Germany expect? Are we to suppose that she would consider it of any use to have a still smaller number? And if she should, not without reason, protest against being invited to put so many eggs in this limited number of baskets, and insist that a larger number was indispensable to meet the hazards and accidents of war, can we imagine that France would not, with equally good reason, insist upon a larger number for herself? And in her turn Italy, who has made it clear that she claims equality in this type with France and was accorded that equality at Washington, must require more. What, then, is the result of this upon this country, upon the United States, and upon Japan? It can only result in an increase in the numbers of each—each reacting upon the other. Is this a situation which any of us can regard with equanimity? And can we regard with any more equanimity, if General Smuts is right, the effects of continuing to refuse equality of status to Germany. Is not the dilemma embarrassing—to call it by the most gentle name?

The dilemma is caused, it will be seen, by the size of the ship. It arises from the acceptance of a theory that great size is essential in the battleship. On this question there has been a long controversy ever since this maximum size was adopted at Washington. The intrinsic need for ships of 35,000 tons has been insisted upon by one school of thought and with equal vigour, but less success, denied by another. In this country the figure has been reconsidered, and we have seen successive reductions made in the irreducible size, which now stands one-third less than it had been originally—namely, 22,000 tons. But the insistence on the absolute necessity for nothing less than 35,000 tons remains as strong as ever across the Atlantic. Is it not essential at this critical time to make the most careful and thorough examination of the question, even if there were no other reasons than that of the future of the fleet of the Germany of 'equalised status'?

Two reasons have been adduced as conclusive in support of impossibility of reduction: first, that only ships of this great size can be preserved from the injuries which the weapons—the torpedoes and bombs—of flotilla craft can inflict; and secondly, that a nation which possesses no bases abroad must have ships of this size in order to furnish them with an endurance which will

compensate for the absence of bases. These reasons need to be considered with the most intense care and sympathy; that is to say, in a really 'scientific' spirit in which the aim is neither to prove oneself right nor to prove oneself wrong, but to discover the real, the fundamental truth. The issue is too grave to be treated as a sport between two sets of experts, and still less to be decided on either the *ipse dixit* or the arguments of one school of thought alone. In the investigation of a problem in which there is a difference of professional opinion the proper place for the 'expert' so-called, whether representative of official or heretic opinion, is the witness-box; and the witnesses of both sides should be heard, not the witnesses of one only. The decision between the differing professionals should be made by persons who, themselves holding no views, starting with no bias but with a determination to sift and to weigh the arguments, possess the capacity and judgment for so doing.

It is not my intention to endeavour to set forth at any length the reasons why some officers, not wholly ignorant of the nature, and not without some experience, of sea warfare, hold the view that these sizes are not necessary; but, taking these two predominant claims to indicate some of the reasons why they are believed to be of a very doubtful validity: so doubtful that when the great political, strategical and financial issues are considered—for sums of money measured in hundreds of millions are concerned—it seems most improper to run the great risks of those three kinds without more inquiry by sagacious men. General Smuts's speech, standing alone, affords justification for this view.

The theory that no lesser size than 35,000 tons is compatible with the safety of the ship proceeds from the assumption that the only method by which a ship-of-war can be preserved from disablement or destruction is by the addition of armour and the adoption of methods of construction which can be embodied only in the design of a ship of this size. It must be observed that the technical experts themselves differ upon this point: some place the necessary size at a figure of 22,000 tons—no inconsiderable difference.

But this is not all. Besides the differences of the technical experts, there are differences between those who approach the subject from the strategical and tactical standpoints. The first thing which they assert is that they dissent from the premise. They decline to accept as an axiom the assertion that increase in static protection is the only measure possible. Doubtless if, when gunpowder first made its ugly appearance in the world, the armourers had been consulted they would have advised that the men-at-arms should be provided with armour and the horsemen and their horses with thicker armour, until mobility was completely destroyed. The tacticians, on the other hand, would have

directed their efforts to manœuvre—as the Romans did when faced with the new Sabine tactics and weapons. The heretic school of thought of to-day takes that view. It refuses to believe that the solution is purely material, and it finds some measure of evidence in support of its views in the experience of the war against the submarine. It points to the undisputed fact that security against that insidious vessel was found to lie in diminution of the target and increase in mobility. It observes that in all the four years of war only eight of the fast light vessels were sunk by submarines, and that the defence of the great ship was not entrusted to her construction, contribute though that did to her security, but to the small light craft which protected her. They find it impossible to accept the theory that it can be assumed as axiomatic that size is necessary. A certain size, they are aware, is essential for mobility—to enable ships to cross ocean spaces, to keep the sea; but that size, they are convinced, is far less than 35,000 tons, and, though the vessel necessary for making ocean passages may be larger than the 'destroyer,' she is considerably smaller as a target, and more mobile, than the great ship.

Apart, however, from what thus appears to them to be clearly indicated by the experience of the war, another consideration arises if the *dicta* of those who insist upon the necessity of great size be true. If it be a fact that these very great ships are the only vessels which can operate with security in those waters in which the various types of flotilla craft—the surface destroyer, the submarine, and the torpedo- and bomb-carrying naval plane—are capable of action, it would seem to follow that any lesser vessels are exposed to certain destruction. The cruiser, for instance, which is obliged to furnish the escort to convoys through waters in which attack by cruisers is to be expected, will, if this opinion is correct, be destroyed by aircraft and submarines. The force of battleships, rendered secure by their armour and their subdivided hulls, may move with safety indeed; but what becomes of the 'eyes of the fleet'—the cruisers, which are its scouts—the need for which is, and properly, so strongly insisted upon? What will happen to those cruisers which have the duty of escorting convoys of trade or troops through these areas? The ultimate object of a navy is the security of sea communications. But if those detachments which provide, and can only provide, this security by the direct means of guarding the ships on their passages are thus liable to be, and indeed certain to be, destroyed, if the theory is correct, of what particular use is the unsinkable and unsunk body of great ships? It would have availed this country and its allies little in the war if they should have possessed an uninjured battle fleet but had been unable to defend the troops and the trade against the submarines.

The battle fleet played an important part. It covered the communications and the detachments defending them from attack by the opposing battle fleet; and there was no other instrument with which the escorts could be attacked. They were secured. What we are now told is that in future these escorts will not be secure, because no vessels of a lesser size than 35,000 tons can survive attack by the weapons of the flotilla.

Thus the hypothesis that vessels of lesser size than 35,000 tons will be sunk involves the conclusion that protection of the line of communications is possible only if the protecting vessels are immune from the form of attack to which they must be exposed, and against which the massed body cannot afford cover. Inasmuch, however, as the number of the great vessels is strictly limited and is wholly insufficient to provide the many and various forces required for the services of escort and other duties which arise in war, it is plain that it would be impossible for this protection to be given. That is the logical conclusion to which this assumption, if it be true, infallibly brings us. The battle fleets will be, by hypothesis, safe enough, but the communications which they exist to defend will disappear, as they very nearly did disappear in the war.

Those who differ do not accept that view. They do not believe that the lesser ships have no security because they lack armour or underwater protection. They believe that their lesser size, their mobility, and their armaments are factors as valuable as the mere static defence of size. They believe in the necessity of a 'mass,' for that is fundamental in warfare whether on land or sea. But they do not believe that the mass would be exposed to those dangers, of which the supporters of the great ship are afraid, if the vessels of which it is composed were smaller and depended for their protection against the new forms of attack upon the lessened target they can present, their mobility, both individual and in formation, and their armaments. They greatly prefer to spread the risks, not to concentrate all their assets in a very few investments. Knowing, too, the influence which great responsibilities exert upon men's minds, they believe that the chances of lucky shots, of accidents, of the errors to which the human mind is liable, will tend to deter commanders from taking risks with their few immense units; and they know that war can never be conducted without risk.

The second assumption upon which the belief in the intrinsic necessity for great size rests is that it is a substitute for bases. It is argued that a nation which possesses no bases abroad requires large ships in compensation for this lack—in other words, that size constitutes an effective substitute.

It is extremely difficult to discover any justification either in

theory or in experience for this view, persuasive as it seems to have proved to many. There never has been a time at which it was possible for a fleet to conduct effective operations without a base within the area in which it has had to act. Even when the endurance of ships greatly exceeded anything which is possible to-day, when the sea-keeping of fleets was measured in weeks instead of in days, they could not do that which they were required to do unless they possessed bases. The Dutch wars of this country provide a great number of examples of occasions on which the English fleet proceeded off the Texel, anxious to force a battle, but was constrained to return to its ports because it could not keep the sea long enough. If the Dutch commanders judged that the enemy fleet was too strong they waited in harbour until circumstances, in the form of expended water and provisions, sent the English home. If they judged themselves strong enough to fight, they fought, and as decisive victory is very rare, so no decision was reached; but the Dutch having inflicted much injury upon the enemy, even when they were in inferior force, obliged it to return to its own ports for repair. During the time in which it was absent Dutch trade proceeded with no serious interruption. Thus the idea, which has found expression, that great size which will enable a fleet to cross an ocean in superior force, fight a battle, and return to its harbour having crushed the enemy, is founded upon a misconception. It will no more happen in the war of the future than it has happened in the wars of the past. The challenging fleet may cross the sea. Whether its desire for battle will be gratified depends upon how its opponent views the situation. If he considers the enemy's superiority so great as to deprive him of any expectation either of avoiding defeat or of victory, he will not accept the challenge, but will wait until the enemy, possessing (by hypothesis) no base, is obliged to return and to leave the seas open. Or, like our friends the Dutch, he may fight, if the prospects appear favourable, with the object of inflicting so much injury that a prolonged absence for repair is necessary; during which time, again, the sea is open and he is subject to no pressure or interruption of his operations.

In another form the same dependence upon bases is illustrated in the Mediterranean campaigns of this country. Until England had a base in or near the Straits she could conduct no effective operations, exert no appreciable or permanent influence. The fleet might make its voyage out from England, spend a short summer in the Mediterranean, and return in the autumn. During that period of its presence on the spot its influence was great; but as its appearance was intermittent, the results were not proportional to its power. During its absence the enemy enjoyed the use of the sea. Not until Lisbon was available in 1703 could we

make any contribution to the operations of our allies in the inland sea; and even Lisbon was not near enough. So we find Marlborough in 1708 insisting on the necessity of the capture of Port Mahon. Endurance, great as it was, was no substitute for bases, for the very simple reason that it was impossible to provide a sufficient endurance. Ships have altered in their construction, in their artillery, in their mode of propulsion and their speed, but this fundamental necessity for bases has remained unchanged. No additions to size will enable fleets to remain permanently in a station at a great distance from their home stations. A vast increase in numbers which should enable a series of reliefs to be arranged, or a new method of propulsion which dispenses with the carriage of a mass of the present forms of fuel, might do so. But neither of these is a practical possibility to-day or in the near future.

This, however, is not the only reason why the 'heretics' dispute the necessity of size. Even if it were true that a superior fleet has merely to cross into the waters of an inferior to bring about an immediate battle and a victory, it is not true that this constitutes an argument that the ships of the line of battle must be of 35,000 tons. The reason given for this size is that it is necessary and essential in order that the ship shall be able to make the prolonged voyages which are enforced by its geographical position and its lack of bases. But if it be a fact that the endurance needed can only be provided by ships of this size, it follows that smaller ships are incapable of making those voyages. But the fleet which it is necessary to send on a campaign is not a body of battleships only. It is a force, as remarked earlier, composed of capital ships, of cruisers to provide it with intelligence, of flotilla craft to operate against the enemy flotilla craft. If the assertion that the greatest ships only can make this voyage, and that this constitutes a reason for their existence, be true, it follows that the fleet of battleships must make its voyage and conduct its campaign without scouts or flotilla. But is it true? Demonstrably it is untrue. As an example, the German armoured cruisers of 10,000 tons have a greater endurance than the largest of the battleships of other Powers.

Let us return to the grave question raised by General Smuts. If the doctrine of the indispensability of great size, for the reasons which have been discussed, though superficially only, above, should be true, it would follow that that restitution of equality of status which he regards as the indispensable preliminary to any advance towards a peaceful world must be accompanied by the building by Germany of these great ships. For if the only means of keeping warships afloat if attacked by the flotilla is by increasing their size to that figure, so it must follow that Germany must

have them. One function which her navy has to perform demands its presence in the Baltic. In that circumscribed area flotilla craft of all three types—surface, submarine, and flying—can operate. All parts of it are within flying range of potential enemies. She, like other nations, must therefore possess these great ships. So too, if great size be the only effective substitute for bases outside the country, Germany, who has no such bases, must possess such ships; for she, like other nations which have no colonies or oversea possessions, may also have, like them, interests abroad which she requires to protect. Is there not, however, some reason to believe that these arguments for size are less valid than they appear at first sight—sufficient reason at least to justify the suggestion that the question should receive unbiased and scientific examination before we plunge into the sea of expense and political friction to which the acceptance of these theories is bound to commit the nations of the world?

Besides these two reasons, which have their origins across the Atlantic, there is another which finds support in our own country. The ship of the line, it is said, must be so much more powerful than the 'cruiser' that it will be impossible for an inferior navy, which is not burdened with the duty of protecting a vital trade, to call in its cruisers, and, by the reinforcement which they bring to the battle line, transform inferiority into superiority. It is argued that a nation whose existence depends upon the maintenance of its foreign trade, all of which must travel by sea, is obliged to keep its cruisers spread in their various duties all over the world, and would be unable to answer this concentration by a counter-concentration; and that therefore the only way to prevent this situation from arising is to make a great and decisive disproportion between the strength of the cruiser and that of the battleship, and that requisite disproportion is possible only if the battleship is a vessel of very great size, though not so great as the maximum to which reference has been made. The requisite proportions are said to be $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, and illustration has been offered in the fact that Nelson's *Victory* was a ship of 3500 tons, while the contemporary frigate was a ship of 1000 tons, and these proportions are said to be confirmed by the adoption at Washington of 35,000 tons for the battleship and 10,000 tons for the cruiser—an exactly similar ratio. The fallacy of this illustration lies in the fact that all battleships were not 'first-rates' of 3500 tons, nor were all frigates and cruising vessels of 1000 tons. The favourite ship of the line was the 74-gun ship of about 1700 to 1900 tons, and while the 30-gun frigate, which is compared with the cruiser of to-day, was a vessel of about 1000 tons, there were intermediate vessels of from 40 to 60 guns which bridged the gap. The historical argument is falsified by the facts.

Nevertheless, there is the modern argument that if ships were smaller it would be possible for such a concentration to be made, with the results that have been stated. As the *Emden* and her like contained a greatly superior number of cruisers in the late war, so a few of the enemy cruisers could do the same while the remainder joining the battle fleet would furnish a reinforcement which might turn inferiority into superiority. Is it, however, a fact that a reduction in size would expose the nation to this strategical danger? We may form some opinion on the question by testing the statement with concrete cases. The German armoured cruisers are vessels of 10,000 tons, their cruisers of 6000 tons. How many of these latter vessels, with their 6-inch armaments and unprotected hulls, could stand up to one of the larger armoured vessels with her 11-inch guns? When it is recollected that four cruisers, each of about 14,000 tons, armed with 7.5-inch and 9.2-inch guns, were not considered a match for the single *Goeben*, armed with 11-inch guns, we can form some sort of an idea of the magnitude of the concentration that would be needed to produce a superiority. The tactical difficulty which would be experienced in bringing all these ships into action would then remain to be solved.

The second disturbing fact to which General Smuts gave expression was that of the prospect of a repudiation of the Washington ratios by Japan. Here, again, that inferiority complex to which he traced the difficulties of the European situation comes into play. The reason for the claim is not strategical but psychological. The ratio was freely accepted by Japan, for she perceived with sound judgment that with the ratio then adopted she would be secure. Her geographical position, the fact that in any attack upon her she would be fighting with her resources of all kinds close at hand, while her opponents would be separated from theirs by many thousands of miles, furnished a complete compensation for their superior numbers. To put the matter in strategical terminology, she would be able to bring at least equal force to the battle, without any lines of communication of her own fleet to defend, and with the advantage of her bases near at hand—that advantage which served the Dutch so well in their struggles and which all the cunning of the British strategists was unable to overcome. As Mr. Samuel Pepys observed, the wideness of the sea is the best part of security.

So it is strictly proper to say that the question is not one of strategy, but of psychology. 'Prestige' is the crux. That great philosopher Mr. Dooley, in one of his conversations with his friend Hennessey, remarked, when discussing the Uitlander vote, that he would give 'them Uitlanders' the vote but do the counting himself. It might be that an adaptation of this principle would clear

the way—the abolition of the ratio on paper accompanied by the expression of a fixed intention on the part of the other two Powers to maintain it in practice. Each would obtain what he desired—the shadow and the substance. The knowledge of the certainty that by no possibility would an alteration be obtainable would appear to have a deterrent effect to competition. But the possibility of a competition is not to be overlooked. If we must be the victims of such a competition—not we alone, but all of us—let us at least have the sense to make it as little injurious as we can. The effect will be the same, in the ultimate strategical results, whether the bidding is in ships of 35,000 or of 10,000 tons; but the cost to the nations will be considerably less if we are playing the game of 'beggar-my-neighbour' with less costly counters.

If, then, General Smuts's diagnosis of the world's illness is correct—and can it be doubted that it is?—it would seem that it has a very direct relation to the problems which the Governments have to solve in their naval discussions, and that an adamant refusal to consider any reductions in the size of ships may lead to evils greater than is commonly supposed. The same can be said of the opposition made by some Powers to the abolition of the submarine. What they gain by its retention on the swings will be seen to be less than what they and everyone else lose on the roundabouts.

H. W. RICHMOND.

TOWARDS THE THIRD LABOUR GOVERNMENT?

THE spectacular victories of the Labour Party in the recent triennial elections of the metropolitan borough councils, following upon its capture of control of the London County Council earlier in the year, offers a favourable opportunity to review the tendencies which are showing themselves in the ranks as well as in the leadership of His Majesty's Opposition both in and out of Parliament. These victories have attracted rather more than the ordinary amount of attention by reason of the fact that they ensued immediately upon the by-elections in Lambeth and in Swindon and happened to be coincident with the resumption of the third session of this present Parliament. Such accompanying circumstances apart, the municipal elections are in themselves important as indices of the movement of political opinion and as furnishing a certain volume of evidence upon which to develop a working hypothesis concerning the next General Election.

The results of borough, county and parliamentary contests in and around London during the twelve months beginning with the sensational loss by the Conservatives of the seat formerly held by Sir K. Vaughan-Morgan in East Fulham have been paralleled by the borough and county council elections in the North of England, in Wales, and in South and Central Scotland. If those have not called forth so much comment, it is because the drift in those parts has been to the Left over a greater number of years and a final transfer of power to the Socialists has not come as so much of a surprise either to those upon the spot or to commentators in the capital. Indeed, if anything, the tardiness of the triumph latterly achieved in the West Riding of Yorkshire and in a city like Glasgow and a burgh like Motherwell has provoked considerable astonishment. The sustained propagandist activity of the Independent Labour Party in the parts of Yorkshire and of Lancashire where a sturdy political nonconformity survived the late disappearance in their midst of the hand-loom weavers led many people to anticipate a majority long before this for men and women sharing the attitude to life of Sir Ben Turner and Viscount Snowden of Ickornshaw. The fact was, of course, that the earlier

and outstanding successes of the I.L.P. in the woollen and worsted region of the West Riding were much less a result of intellectual argument than they were a survival of that dissent of the extreme individualist which had given leadership to the Free Churches and to free thought.

The homogeneous character of the working class in the mining areas and the organisation of the bread-winners into a few strong trade unions, together with the loyalty of the womenfolk formerly to the Nonconformist chapels and latterly to the Women's Co-operative Guilds, produced there a class-consciousness (having little in common with the Continental dogma of the class war) that is now as deep and as sincere as ever was the emotional experience of Puritan East Anglia or of New England. Thus comes it that the enthusiasm that can be generated among these women for the victims of Fascism and of the Nazis as well as for the pioneers of social revolution in Russia, in China, and in India springs from the same wells of humanitarian feeling that has been accustomed through 300 years to show itself ardent for the Albigenses and indignant over the trades in opium and in slaves. It issues out of no intense awareness of suffering among themselves, but owes its vigour and its vehemence to the rooted conviction that such vicarious concern for the tribulations of others is a religious duty of the Nonconformist of Wales and of England. Capable of frequent and unscrupulous exploitation by interested advocates of an altogether irreligious political and social philosophy, it is seldom moved to more than the passing of a resolution, the signing of a petition, the overcrowding of a demonstration of vocal protest.

The inability of Europeans—increasing with the distance that they are from Mow Cop and the proximity they have to Moscow—to understand at all the national essence as well as the historical antiquity of English, Welsh, and Scottish Protestantism makes excusable in them a failure to comprehend the gestures made on their behalf by the masses of our people. Unfamiliarity with the chapel-going element in the population may account, similarly, for an absence of toleration in the South of England towards men and women whose ineradicable nonconformity finds expression to-day less in religious dissent than in political negation and in Communist Utopianism somewhat raucously proclaiming the wrath to come in the inevitability, not of gradualism, but of open class war.

Yet it is quite impossible to arrive at an understanding of the mass psychology motivating the intermittent electoral practice of the working and the lower middle classes in this country without first-hand and appreciative knowledge of their religious background, such as is now neglected, when it is not deliberately

written down as of no account, by the *intelligentsia* who have their spiritual home (or, at any rate, their summer holidays) in the Soviet Union. Those successive extensions of the franchise which brought into politics and in this order the middle classes, the working classes in the towns, and the working classes in the country afforded outlets of a collective and constitutional self-expression to men earnest in membership of the nonconforming Churches and offered opportunities of personal influence on secular affairs to those who felt called upon to inspire, to inform, and to guide their fellows. Already this type of Christian citizen had accepted responsibility for the organisation of men into friendly societies and into clubs for the encouragement of thrift. The first of these had continued fraternal and general in their appeal or had become specialised to serve the interest of those following a particular craft or trade, whilst the thrift clubs developed along novel lines into societies of consumers' co-operatives. Rarely having for their officers men of a pronounced or, at least, a permanent tendency to the propaganda of Radicalism, or even of the Communism of Robert Owen, these characteristic embodiments of the English genius for self-government and for voluntarism were late in the day to contribute organisers, much less agitators, to the tiny groups of theorists and of would-be statesmen coalescing around the figures of H. M. Hyndman, Sidney Webb, and Keir Hardie. Only after the shattering of the Liberal Party by the war did they attach themselves to the Labour Party or let it be known that they were in more than a purely platonic sympathy with Socialism. Occasionally, of course, concern to secure the reversal by legislative enactment of some decision of the courts in restraint of collective bargaining by a trade union, or else a desire to improve the facilities legally available for co-operative trading, would line up the local preacher alongside the secularist who had found in the negation of Christian culture in all its aspects a stimulus to accept the economic theories and the social prejudices of Karl Marx. Otherwise his association with the intellectual leadership of the Labour Party would be nominal and even intermittent.

But, reacting from their support of the war and attracted by a revival of radical thought under new leaders, even when unable to approve of its present-day expression in an international propaganda for the substitution of parliament and popular government by heavy civil war, these essentially idealistic because basically Christian leaders of the working class moved over rapidly and well-nigh *en bloc* from the Liberal to the Labour Party. Himself a prototype of the deeply religious and yet eminently hard-headed labour leader, Mr. Henderson had seized the opportunity presented to him by his clash with the rest of the War Cabinet over

the response to be made to the demands of the new-born Soviets for peace negotiations to return to the headquarters of the Labour Party and to bring about a change in its constitution to facilitate the enrolment of men and women of like mind to himself in a political movement formerly, and otherwise perhaps again to be, dominated by the pioneers of the I.L.P. Such men and women need, if ineligible for membership of an affiliated trade union or occasionally conforming co-operative society, no longer join one of the Socialist societies in order to function as active members of the Labour Party. Local Labour parties were to be set up in the constituencies, and thus a network erected of what would not be strictly Socialist organisations thrown across what had hitherto been the sphere of influence of the I.L.P. More than that, the new rules were indicative of a shift in the balance of power in the Labour Party, and ended the monopoly position of the I.L.P. as the medium by which alone aspirants for political advancement were able to ensure their appearance on the floor of the party conference.

Taking advantage of the minority into which the I.L.P. put itself by its blend of quasi-pacifism and pro-Germanism, Mr. Henderson and his advisers, the Webbs, deprived Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden of just that kind of upper-middle-class recruit who had been willing to join the I.L.P. only because in no other way could he get back into Parliament as a Radical. Tradition availed for a time to bring this type of adherent into the Labour Party *via* the I.L.P., but the connexion was nominal, ambiguous or ephemeral, and, for the future, into that formerly dominant factor in the manipulation of the larger movement went only unpractised men and women who stood for 'Socialism in our Time.' Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden had to choose upon which side they would take their stand, and, being estranged from youth by several decades, elected to separate themselves from Mr. Brockway and Mr. Maxton and to make their submission to Mr. Henderson. With how ill a grace he abandoned his accustomed rôle in pre-Armistice days of blistering critic of Labour Party politics as managed by its head office is visible in the recently published Autobiography of Viscount Snowden.

Mr. Henderson's unceasing endeavours to transform the Labour Party into a latter-day reincarnation of Liberalism were assisted materially by the shift in the allegiance of the erstwhile supporters of the United Irish League. The annihilation of the Irish Nationalist Party everywhere but in Belfast and Liverpool, and the shattering of the old Liberal Party, altered the entire political attitude of the Irish resident in Great Britain. They divided spontaneously into three schools, and, so doing, ceased to have any unifying political organisation and any acknowledged

national leaders. Those who remained true to the Fenian tradition associated themselves with Sinn Féin, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood found its logical expression in the Irish Republican Army. Its adherents did not break avowedly with the authority of the Catholic Church, but they made it evident that they considered the cause of national independence to justify occasional, if eminently vague, liaisons with the Communists. The Catholic clergy in the West of Scotland and other areas in which the population was largely composed of immigrant Irish had been reinforced in their personal influence locally by the enfranchisement of the women of their congregations. These were much less disposed than were the men to vote independently of the guidance of the priests, and contributed a growing proportion of Catholics who considered themselves to be first and foremost loyal sons and daughters of the Church Universal.

Intermediate between these two extremes was another element which continued to keep in two separate compartments of its minds the spiritual and the political. Such a body of men rallied to my call, and, constituting more than four-fifths of the Motherwell branch of the Communist Party, enabled me to poll more than 5000 Catholic votes in the cause of the republican independence of Ireland. Most of the Catholic clergy, being of Irish origin, were content to allow their flocks both to vote for a large measure of self-government for their nation and to become in so doing a fraction of the Labour Party, which its leaders would think a very long time before doing anything to alienate. Genuinely concerned to get public money, not only for larger staffs of teachers and better premises for their schools, but also to demolish the slums and to have their people housed more decently, they endorsed the desire of their congregations both to drive from politics Sir Hamar Greenwood and to bring nearer to the realisation of his agitation for the £8 house that good Catholic Mr. Wheatley. They imposed no veto upon canvass and votes on behalf of Socialism as advocated by Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Maxton. Indeed, on the granite rock of the Catholic electorate of Glasgow was based the defiance which Mr. Wheatley and his imitators were able to hurl not only at the atheists of the Communist Party but also at the Calvinists, who took their national inspiration from Mr. MacDonald and their day-to-day instruction in tactics from the editor of *Forward*, Mr. Johnston.

The substitution for the strictly Socialist propaganda of the national and collective ownership of capital by a restless advocacy of 'the redistribution of the national income' in the form of an increased individual 'purchasing power' by the two Liberal pacifists whom war had brought into the I.L.P.—namely, Mr. Hobson and Mr. Brailsford—dovetailed most logically with the

denunciations of usury which Mr. Wheatley and Mr. Dollan had long been welcome to thunder from the chief pages of *Forward*. From these manifestations of Liberal economics and morals it was but a very short step to the acceptance (as the *sine qua non* of what could be made to look on paper like 'a living wage,' or, better still, 'a living income') of the issue of 'a managed currency' backed by loans to the State of a fictitious 'money' based on the capitalised claims of an immense new *rentier* class to interest payable out of a wealth yet to be produced.

Rounding off completely the Liberal conquest of the one-time Socialist I.L.P., these *nostrums* were not very acceptable to the political realists who had gathered a smattering of Socialist economics from the Fabian Society. They were greeted by Mr. MacDonald with a snort of contempt, which went far to reconcile him to the old-fashioned interpreters of Marxism who had learned their economics from Mr. Hyndman. Mr. Snowden was, if anything, even less sympathetic, though, it would appear, not so much on grounds of principle as a Socialist as in fear and trembling of the effect they would have on a series of Budgets which were to place him in financial history as a humble disciple of Mr. Gladstone.

Not approved by the Webbs, needless to say such extravagances did not recommend themselves to Mr. Henderson. He wanted concrete demands capable of enlisting the cupidity of the individual elector when the Party made an appeal to his (and still more to her) altogether proper concern for the adequate feeding and generous upbringing of little children. Family allowances were favoured by the women's sections, which were most urgent to satisfy because of the immense amount of arduous and unpaid service undertaken by their members in the constituencies, but needed to be regarded with caution because they were held to menace the force of the argument upon which rested the case for membership of a trade union. Thus they found more encouragement from women of the middle classes and of the Women's Co-operative Guilds than from the wives of active and informed trade union officials. Feeling themselves indispensable so long as labour was in demand both for the production and distribution of goods, these latter were equally platonic in their support of the idea of national ownership of industry. Fortified by clauses of the Railways Act of 1921 setting up the National Wages Board and by the system of contracts negotiated by Mr. Bevin with their employers, the railwaymen and the transport workers were much less interested in the early application of the principles of State Socialism than were the members of the Miners' Federation. Even for the latter the threat to transfer the mines from private to public ownership was little more than a political substitute for the

economic power, which they could no longer bring to the business of collective bargaining. They would readily enough have put it away in a pigeon-hole in return for an agreement by the coal-owners to standardise the seven-hour day without any formal concessions by the leaders of the miners in the guise of reduced wage rates. The case for Socialism, therefore, was taken as read, and the working class organised in trade unions, as well as the middle class recruited from the moribund Liberal Party marshalled by Mr. Henderson in the local Labour parties, proceeded to constitute themselves a political instrument for the purpose of extracting from the Chancellor of the Exchequer as much public assistance as possible.

Entry into office on two separate occasions parted by five years in opposition drew some fifty persons away from the main body, and, bringing little satisfaction to any one of them either with their leader or with each other, made them objects of suspicion to the many and of envy to the few. Rather than acknowledge a debt to the Liberals left behind under the leadership of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George, the Labour Governments were content to see foredoomed to certain failure every major item in their programme. Not a single leader had the moral courage to risk his popularity by demanding in the constituencies quarter for those who could have kept the Labour Party in office long enough to have carried their legislation under the Parliament Act.

A purely sentimental desire to express sympathy with the Soviets caused all but a very few of the leaders again and again so far to compromise themselves as to make it seem that there was little to choose between them and the Communists, except the enthusiasm that caused the latter to sacrifice all immediate gain to the ultimate achievement of an ideal. Labour Party head office may have insisted upon the enforcement of a ban upon co-operation in any shape or form with the latter, but it can never explain to the unsophisticated members of the working class why they must do nothing locally to express this admiration for the achievements of the Communists when in power which the leaders of the party make haste during the summer recess, and even when the House of Commons is in session, to see at first hand. That there is a difference between agitation and admiration is obvious, but it is of the character that leads the common people to accompany Harry Pollitt and Tom Mann to Hyde Park rather than to house parties with Soviet celebrities.

The contradictions inherent in capitalism are now as nothing to those which have come to entangle the Labour Party. Twice in ten years, and after having offered to the electorate what it regarded as promises which it would be by no means too difficult to redeem, it has come tumbling out of office in confusion.

Acrimoniously disputing with such Liberals as do not pretend to be other than they are, and muttering the short-lived sympathy of chagrin with a Communism which, on the eve of every poll, they shun like the plague, these pragmatists do not inspire the detached observer with any great faith in the party led by Mr. Henderson and Mr. Morrison. In London, save where a few Scots from the West were gathered together, in the early days the I.L.P. had seldom been able to establish itself. The intellectual range and vital energy of Mr. Hyndman, Mr. Quelch and their circle had revived during the 'eighties the one-time militant survivals in the form of the democratic clubs of Chartism and the Fenians. The Social Democratic Federation had helped to give permanence to the efforts of the dockers and the gas-workers of the East End to form themselves into general labour unions. The Fabian Society had so long been successful in doing its thinking for the Liberal Party when in control of the London County Council as Progressives that it remained reluctant to encourage the formation in the metropolitan boroughs of a movement for independent representation of labour. It needed the loss of the London County Council by the Progressives, and their failure in 1910 to recapture it, to convince the Fabians that if they were again to govern London they must help to forge a new instrument. Meanwhile, the ferment engendered by the Suffragette Movement had been intensified by the dock strike. John Scurr and George Lansbury emerged as 'rebels' to agitate everywhere against the policy of the Labour Party of helping to keep in office the Liberal Government. They waged a pitiless vendetta against C. F. G. Masterman and the Liberals generally in West Ham and throughout the East End. They stirred up the rank and file of the I.L.P. to passionate protest against the subjection of Socialism to 'the Nonconformist Conscience' so effectively as to cause Mr. MacDonald to look around for some means to circumvent a development that menaced his position in Parliament.

The way opened when a young man devoted to himself commenced to establish all over the capital what was called the London Labour Party. Strongly backed from the south of the Thames by the Quaker doctor, Alfred Salter, at Bermondsey and by the trade unionists and co-operators of Woolwich, Mr. Morrison began to rally support for Mr. MacDonald. The decision of the reconstructed Social Democratic Federation to affiliate to the Labour Party just before the war brought Mr. Hyndman and other stalwart critics of Mr. MacDonald to the side of Mr. Henderson, when its actual outbreak was, temporarily, to throw together Mr. Lansbury and Mr. MacDonald. The British Socialist Party split on the question of support to the war, and the majority reinforced Mr. Lansbury. Splitting again on the degree of support

it was to accord to the Bolshevik Revolution, a formal majority took their stand with 'Mr.' Chicherin, 'Mr.' Rothstein, and 'Mr.' Litvinoff.

Pacifists, on religious and on political grounds, were already rallied around Dr. Salter and Mr. Lansbury, or, if men of military age, had gone to prison as members of the 'No Conscription' Fellowship under the leadership of the present Lord Allen of Hurtwood. Mr. Morrison and myself had taken the line of the Scottish I.L.P. and asserted that, whilst refusing to kill, Socialists who did not accept the class war must render alternative service to the State. The Bolshevik Revolution was to separate Mr. Morrison and myself, and I was to be one of those who declared instant and absolute solidarity with Lenin.

Out of such a welter of cross-purposes and conflicting elements the Labour Party in London was gradually pulled together by Mr. Morrison into something free, as it had never and nowhere else before been, of the faction fights which have so often rent it nationally. In that he was assisted very much by the irreconcilable conflict between the old Marxists and the new, and as to enrolments, if not as to anything more, by the incredible futility of the Communists both here and in Moscow. Literally, he welded his local parties together in the fires of battle and, on the whole, brought them out cleansed of those anarchist elements which had hitherto been the curse of Labour in London.

Mr. Morrison is independent of trade union interference and of sectarian obstruction to a degree that Mr. MacDonald never was, and, so long as his middle-class associates do not trespass with schemes of municipal trading upon the trading interest of the Co-operative Movement, there is not visible as yet any expression of working-class activity with which he need come into collision. The training he has had up to now scarcely fits him for the highest office, but its exigences attract so little those who prefer to specialise on national finance and on foreign affairs that he and they have had no occasion as yet to come into conflict. True, the *intelligentsia* is critical and, in certain cases, even contemptuous of him; but, large as it looms in the advertisers' and the reviewers' columns of the more cultivated Press, this fraction of the Labour Movement makes next to no impression on the thinking or the action of the working class.

Negatively, however, these self-conscious exponents of a new order may have a distressing influence upon the fortunes of the Labour Party. Running through their writings all too often is a morality which issues less out of a coherent theory than their own disjointed lives. Toying with ideas which it would be so interesting to apply to the lives of others, they think aloud about everything and turn their destructive minds with gusto to the founda-

tions of human morals and to the idea of God. That is going to bring them increasingly into conflict with those who are the most jealous, though, it may be, not necessarily the most effective, guardians of the Christian religion. They are arousing these to renewed vigilance in defence of the doctrines of the Church Universal.

New phenomena about which to pour off the Press appreciations, which diminish for the intellectuals the nearer they are to these experiments in Bolshevist Communism, have shaken to their foundations the institutions of Eastern and Central Europe. The Catholic Church is again in the frame of mind of the crusader, in the mood of the missionary. Society, reorganised in accordance with the principles of liberty for every individual and of spontaneous equality for all, but with fraternity strictly limited by the inexorable laws of usury, is everywhere seen to be *in extremis*. So the logicians of Authority rise once more to refute the logicians of Rebellion, and, the better to instruct them against what it is they must needs do battle, the Supreme Pontiff has let it be known that :

Whether Socialism is considered as a doctrine, or as a historical fact, or as a movement, if it really remains Socialism, it cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, even after it has yielded to truth and justice in the points we have mentioned ; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way utterly alien to Christian truth.

The Encyclical *Novarum Rerum* is as universal in its message as the teaching of the Church which has sent it forth, and this country can no more remain isolated from the effects of that argument than it can insulate itself against the international implications of the radio and the propaganda which issues over it from Moscow.

The Labour Party has this year as a chairman of its National Executive a warehouse worker who is a Catholic, and it has just handed to him, and to those over whom he presides, a new statement of policy which is entitled 'Socialism and Peace.' In Glasgow, in Liverpool, and in Manchester its leaders in the city councils are Catholics. It is a dangerous position for Professor Laski and for the stalwarts of the Socialist League. The Communists have been expelled and all association with them banned. The I.L.P. has been given the choice of submission or of withdrawal, the better to assert the paramount claims of conscience.

In some borough or some county the question of principle may harder into a definite issue concerning the continuance or otherwise of a grant of public money to some school whose managers do not see eye to eye with the Socialists on the problem of what is the most important part either of the equipment or of the curriculum. Mr. Hannen Swaffer is afraid that it may flare up

once again out of that sectarian feeling which such an old campaigner as he knows to be one of the constants of politics in boroughs and counties all over the country. A nightmare which has haunted the less pedestrian-minded of Labour agents and organisers in areas which have an electorate moved by intermittent waves of sectarian strife commingled with racial antipathies ever since they were enabled to breach the citadels of North of England Conservatism with Irish votes, this minor problem of local government may seem a cloud upon the horizon no bigger than a man's hand, but it is none the less a sign of unsettled weather blowing up into the political atmosphere.

Unemployment and housing deficiencies have long been the pre-eminent grievances of the working class seized upon by all Socialists as those most likely to awaken within the masses a burning sense of social injustice. Upon them, programme and propaganda have fastened. Unhappily for the Labour Party, these are just the two problems which, with the wisdom of old campaigners, the National Government has left to tackle systematically and spectacularly in the last twelve months before it goes to give an account of its stewardship at the next General Election. Education will, therefore, need to figure very conspicuously amid the items culled from its latest lucky-bag and put together on the eve of the poll as the sole constructive alternative which the Labour Party has to offer to the positive achievements of its opponents. Nationalisation of armament manufacture will thrill nobody but the same few hundred extraordinarily articulate enthusiasts who bob up at intervals to demonstrate effusively and to disappear from sight and sound until next the parties of the Left find themselves even more than usually bankrupt of personal idealism and of popular appeal. Work on war material offers too much employment free from inquisitorial officialdom at wages far higher than those hitherto received on relief schemes for the normal member of a trade union to prefer to it the tentative and uncertain promise of what the Liberal and Socialist *intelligentsia* delights to rhapsodise over as 'works of public utility.'

Mr. Henderson would have a programme and underline every disciplinary clause in the constitution of the Labour Party. Mr. MacDonald knew better the lesson of the British Constitution, and in his day made feasible compromise by leaving everything fluid. Committed in writing to Socialism and with a national chairman who is a Catholic, it does not look as if the Labour Party would be able at the next General Election to lead this nation into the paths of peace !

WALTON NEWBOLD.

A UNIVERSAL HISTORIAN¹

'*La vieille Europe m'ennuie*,' observed Napoleon. The old Europe does not bore Professor Toynbee, to whom all things are exciting, but he is not content with it. He finds it altogether too small. The little continent does not present an intelligible field of study, and cannot be understood without taking into account extra-European factors which are becoming steadily more important. Least of all can we now afford to neglect that outer world which 'Europe has succeeded in bringing into her ambit through the radiation of her culture.' Accordingly Professor Toynbee sets out with a high heart and an indefatigable pen, not indeed to describe, but to account for the whole panorama of human life upon the planet. A universal war has set a fashion in universal histories. Spengler has been busy in Germany. Professor Toynbee, who is every bit as learned as Spengler, and a great deal less fanciful, performs a like office in England. In three brimming and bulky volumes he offers a first instalment of his extended meditations on the history of mankind.

To the discharge of this formidable task our English historian brings a range of qualities not often found in combination. He is brilliant as a scholar and a linguist. He has travelled widely. Beginning life as a classic and an historian of ancient Greece, he has for many years been a close student of contemporary politics and in personal association with men of action. Untrammelled by dogma, he is sensitive to the mystical appeal of religion and legend. A strong vein of stoical morality leads him to face with courage the grim chronicle of human violence, and to extract from his survey some considerations of a generally consoling nature. Much study has not quenched the ardour of an enthusiastic temperament. The reader of Professor Toynbee's volumes is not allowed to forget that the author sits at the feet of Plato, Lucretius, and Goethe, and that if he is a scholar he is also a poet and a moralist, who discerns in the records of the past a message of encouragement and inspiration to man.

When we speak of civilisation we are naturally induced to

¹ *A Study of History*, by Arnold J. Toynbee (3 vols.: Oxford University Press, 1934).

dwell upon that form of civilisation which is most familiar to us and now so widely affects human life in every part of the planet. The westernisation of the world is, however, as Professor Toynbee points out, rather political and economic than cultural. Child-marriage, with its manifold social consequences, persists in India, though many an Indian village has the telephone, the motor omnibus, and a wireless installation. Moreover, the scientific knowledge upon which this extraordinary triumph of material civilisation depends is 'perilously esoteric.' Even in the West the ordinary citizen knows little of the delicate and complex intellectual processes which have brought into being the vast apparatus of material comforts and conveniences which is offered for his use. It is not, then, of civilisation that Professor Toynbee writes, but of civilisations. Of these he discovers twenty-one, some of them, like the Mayas, extinct, others, like the Coptic and the Jewish, surviving in a fossilised state; some unrelated to other forms of civilised society, others like our own Western civilisation, which is related, through a universal religion and a wandering of the peoples, to a previous civilisation (the Hellenic) which in many respects is different.

It is not, however, everyone's privilege to belong to a civilised society. There are some 650 primitive societies—small, no doubt and feeble, but still cognisable by ethnologists—which have never succeeded in raising themselves into the civilised category. They remain societies of 'sub-men' rather than of men. Why is this? Not, as Professor Toynbee most earnestly and eloquently contends, from any inherent disability of the blood. 'The capacity for civilisation,' he argues, 'is the universal birthright of mankind.' To this proposition it is, in Professor Toynbee's view, no substantial reply to point out that, so far, the African negro has made no measurable contribution to civilisation. The world is yet young. The history of civilised life upon the planet is only 6000 years old. There is no reason, then, to believe that the African is incapable of organising for himself a civilised existence. Indeed, the religious life of the negro in America opens out the possibility that the revival of the true spirit of Christianity and its diffusion throughout the world may be the distinctive contribution of this oppressed people, and if so, a sublime revenge for centuries of outrageous wrong.

We do not know how far Professor Toynbee would be induced to push his happy doctrine of 'civilisation the universal birthright,' for he admits that some physical environments present so serious a challenge to the human physique as to preclude the emergence of a civilised society. There are also some stocks which have degenerated. Purity of race, however, has very little, if anything, to do with excellence or survival value. Pure

Nordics are to be found only in Sweden, pure Alpines only in Slovakia, the Cevennes, Sicily and Brittany, pure Mediterraneans only in Sardinia and Corsica. The great races of the world, the races which have borne the burden of history (the Greeks, the Romans, the French, the English), are mongrel. Nearly half the civilisations have been created by a mixture of races. There is clearly nothing in colour. Some white men are civilised, but not all, for there are the barbarous Ainus of Japan, and the highlanders of Albania, Mexico, and the Caucasus. It will readily, then, be imagined that our historian deals faithfully with the pestilential nonsense of Houston Chamberlain and the modern German racialists. We are reminded, for the further chastening of our pride, that there are those in Asia who think little of our civilisation and find it difficult to endure the high animal smell of our European carnivores.

But if race is to be eliminated as a dominant factor in the moulding of civilisations, what remains? At somewhat unnecessary length Professor Toynbee makes the obvious point that environment alone does not supply the answer. Environment is, of course, a factor; but so to an even greater degree is man, and it is in man's relation to his environment that we find the key which unlocks the secret of historical development. Primitive societies become civilisations when man responds to the challenge of his environment, and fall into decay as soon as environment offers a challenge to which man is unable to make an adequate response. There is perhaps nothing very novel in this doctrine, which Professor Toynbee elaborates with a great panoply of erudition fetched from the most distant and recondite quarters, except perhaps the stress which he lays on the moral quality of the challenge. It must be a bracing challenge. If it is not bracing, it will not educate a civilisation.

An instance, which might serve to prove the contrary, is the early civilisation of Egypt, which historians, following Herodotus, have been wont to regard as the gift of the Nile. It is, however, contrary to Professor Toynbee's ethical conception of Providence that a great civilisation like that of ancient Egypt should arise out of easy physical conditions. The student of Livy hardly needs to be reminded how completely the moral fibre of Hannibal's army was relaxed by the luxuries of Capua. Sentiments culled from the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus and the *Faust* of Goethe corroborate the moral of the Roman historian. The Nile did not give civilisation to the Egyptians: on the contrary, it was only by grim and obdurate labour that the Egyptians wrested civilisation from the Nile. So far from being easy, the conditions which confronted the early Egyptians are portrayed as having been tragically difficult—'a terrestrial hell,' all jungle swamp and

'howling wilderness.' No doubt we have been tempted in the past to underrate the severity of the challenge presented by the Nile to the makers of ancient Egypt, but, after all, even in those distant days, the Nile had its regular periods of flood and subsidence, and, with the annual contraction of its waters, laid bare a surface of rich soil which, though it may have had to be cleared of reeds and brushwood, afforded, especially on its margins, a remunerative return to labour. It is not, therefore, surprising that the civilisation of the Nile valley developed, while civilisation in the valley of the Jordan (which, as Professor Edouard Meyer has shown, possesses many points of geographical similarity) did not. The challenge of the Nile was bracing, but the turnover was quick and the profits were good.

The doctrine of challenge and response, once decided on, receives a great number of attractive illustrations at Professor Toynbee's hands. Athens and Sparta, for instance, are confronted by the same challenge. Each of these States is called upon to provide for a redundant population, but whereas Sparta meets her challenge by annexing territory, a process which, since it confronts her with the standing menace of a Messenian revolt, converts her into a puritan and highly militarised State, Athens, led by Solon, turns to international trade, specialised industries, and marine empire. A high degree of civilisation was in each of these cases favoured by Nature. She was severe, but not too severe. There is, as Professor Toynbee observes, a golden mean. The Icelanders never flourished in Greenland, and no great thing came out of Ætolia.

Another factor which Professor Toynbee finds to be favourable to human growth is change of scene. The Homeric cycle was the product of migrations. The Norwegians produced their great literature, not in Norway, but in Iceland. The Ottoman and Moghul Empires flourished, not in the central Asiatic homelands, but in distant territories conquered by force of arms. The Orthodox, or Greek, Church finds most of its votaries, not in Greece, but in Russia. It would, I suppose, also be true to say that the African flourishes nowhere so well as in the island of Jamaica. It may, perhaps, be suggested that Professor Toynbee is apt to lay too much stress on the discipline of hardship. It is, no doubt, easy to point out a great number of instances in which geographical difficulties, foreign enmities, and adverse fortunes, or disabling penalties, have evoked human effort and helped to exalt and ennoble the temper of a people. Prussian historians are fond of pointing out the great qualities which were educated by the struggle with the sandy soil of the North German plain and with the numerous enemies who from time to time have invaded a country possessing no frontiers other than the bodies

of its inhabitants. Nor is any chapter in modern history more impressive than that which describes how the Prussians pulled themselves together after the Napoleonic wars and built up the best civil service in Europe. But is there not something to be said for Aristotle's view that the perfect life postulates as its condition that a man should be sufficiently provided with the necessities to have a mind free for intellectual culture? The growth of civilisation surely postulates as one of its conditions the existence of a class of people who are so situated. It postulates an economic surplus, part of which can be spent on the support of a luxurious class, whose new wants are in themselves a condition of the advancement of taste and industry. The mines of Laureion must be worked by slaves that Ictinus may be free to plan the Parthenon. The fact that all through antiquity slavery was regarded as an essential feature of social organisation and that nobody proposed its abolition would seem to point to the fact that there was a stage in human civilisation when without some form of compulsory mechanised man-power cities could not be built, or a cultivated class brought into being. The conditions presented to man by his environment were such as to necessitate, or as to appear to necessitate, this response. Certainly a good deal of forced labour must have gone to the making of the civilisations of Babylon and Egypt.

Professor Toynbee, however, though he is very much concerned to establish certain general principles, rhythms, or patterns in his survey of civilisation, does not fall into the error of under-estimating the influence of creative minds and creative minorities. He even goes so far as to contend that the growth of civilisation depends upon dynamic personalities, and includes in his third volume a series of vigorous sketches of personalities who have exercised this creative influence. We have pictures of St. Paul and of Mahomet, of Peter the Great and Thucydides, and, curiously enough, of Emile Ollivier. The reason for the somewhat surprising inclusion of Emile Ollivier's name in such a list is not, of course, that he was a great originating political force (for he did not even make the Franco-Prussian war, nor could he have averted it), but because he illustrates 'the *leitmotif* of withdrawal and return,' which Professor Toynbee maintains to be, if not an invariable, at least a very general characteristic of great dynamic personalities. They withdraw themselves from the world and then return to it with their gifts and message etherealised. Thus Christ withdrew to the wilderness, thus St. Paul and Mahomet withdrew to the Arabian desert, thus the history of Thucydides, the *Divine Comedy* of Dante, and the immense autobiography of Ollivier are the fruit of enforced retirement from public affairs. No one will contest the value of a spell of real solitude and leisure

for meditation in an active life. Especially is this true in the life of religious teachers. Yet there have been many dynamic personalities, towards the making of whose effective influence we can trace no such period of withdrawal. Napoleon is a case in point. His reflections in exile add little to his renown, and, though they were important in facilitating the return of his nephew to power, were posterior in time to the great achievement which transformed the institutions of France. There is also something to be said for Buffon's view that the note of a great career is 'the dream of youth executed in mature age.' If St. Paul's life was marked by a violent spiritual convulsion followed by a withdrawal, Darwin's was a long harmonious story of steady and continuous labour. The *leitmotif* may be discerned in some, but not in all the creative lives of history.

One of the puzzles which meets the philosophic historian, who is anxious to bring all the facts within certain definite rubrics, is the capricious and apparently unaccountable appearance of men of genius. When a man of genius has arisen, the historian is able to trace the causes which facilitate or obstruct the spread of his influence. What no one has yet succeeded in doing is to account for his emergence at all. Why was Athens favoured and not Corinth, why Miletus and not Ephesus, why Florence and not Genoa, why have certain countries or centuries been barren of individual eminence and others poor? The historian can never wholly satisfy himself that his answer to these conundrums is correct.

Professor Toynbee's work is so rich in knowledge and suggestion that it is impossible to give a fair account of its contents within the space of a brief article. Wherever he ranges—and he goes everywhere—he has something to say which is fresh and arresting. The religion of the European races is a case in point. We know something now, thanks to the labours of Sir Arthur Evans, of the Minoan cult. We know that it was largely monotheistic and that the female form of divinity held the supreme place. We know, also, that the Zeus in Crete is nursed by nymphs, suckled by a beast in the field, and dies. All this leads Professor Toynbee to ask whether the Greek mysteries were not a survival of the religion of that Minoan world of which we have so recently discovered many brilliant monuments.

The Greek mysteries lead us to Christianity. Was there not much in the Christian doctrine as it was preached by St. Paul, or in the story of the life of Christ as it is presented in the Gospels, which responded to those elemental forms in the religious imagination of Mediterranean man which can be traced back to Minoan times? Here is Professor Toynbee's commentary on the Christian story:

In the story of Jesus, the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* perpetually recurs. Jesus is the babe born to a royal heritage—a scion of David or a son of God Himself—who is cast away in infancy. He comes down from Heaven to be born on Earth; he is born in David's own city of Bethlehem yet finds no room in the inn and has to be laid in a manger, like Moses in his ark or Perseus in his chest. In the stable, he is watched over by friendly animals, as Romulus is watched over by the wolf and Cyrus by the hound, and as Bellerophon is befriended by Pegasus; and he also receives the ministrations of shepherds, and is reared by a foster-father of humble birth, like Romulus and Cyrus and Œdipus. Thereafter he is saved from Herod's murderous design by being taken away privily to Egypt, as Moses is saved from Pharaoh's murderous design by being hidden in the bulrushes, and as Jason is placed beyond King Pelias' reach by being hidden in the fastness of Mount Pelion, and Cyrus beyond King Astyages' reach by being banished to the highland marches of Media. And then, at the end of the story, Jesus returns, as the other heroes return, to enter into His Kingdom. He enters into the Kingdom of Judah when, riding into Jerusalem, He is hailed by the multitudes as the Son of David. He enters into the Kingdom of Heaven in the Ascension.

In all this, the story of Jesus conforms to the common pattern of the story of the foundling babe; but in the Gospels the underlying *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return presents itself in other shapes as well. It is present in each one of the successive spiritual experiences in which the divinity of Jesus is progressively revealed. When Jesus becomes conscious of His mission upon His baptism by John, He withdraws into the wilderness for forty days and returns from His Temptation there in the power of the spirit; 'and they were astonished at his doctrine, for his word was with power,' 'for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes.' Thereafter, when Jesus realizes that His mission is to lead to His death, He withdraws again into the 'high mountain apart' which is the scene of His Transfiguration and returns from this experience resigned and resolved to die. Thereafter, again, when He duly suffers the death of mortal man in the Crucifixion He descends into the tomb in order to rise immortal in the Resurrection. And, last of all, in the Ascension, He withdraws from Earth to Heaven in order to 'come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead: whose kingdom shall have no end.'

These crucial recurrences of the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* in the story of Jesus likewise have their parallels. The withdrawal into the wilderness reproduces Moses' flight into Midian; the Transfiguration on the 'high mountain apart' reproduces Moses' transfiguration on Mount Sinai; the death and resurrection of a divine being is anticipated in the Hellenic Mysteries and is derived by the Mysteries themselves from the world-wide agrarian ritual and myth; the tremendous figure who is to appear, and dominate the scene, at the catastrophe which is to bring to an end the present mundane order, is anticipated in the Zoroastrian Mythology in the figure of the Saviour (Saosyant) and in the Jewish Mythology in the figures of the Messiah and 'the Son of Man.' There is, however, one feature in the Christian Mythology which seems to have no precedent; and that is the interpretation of the future coming of the Saviour or Messiah or 'Son of Man' as the future return to Earth of an historical figure who has already lived on Earth the life of a human being. In this flash of intuition,

the timeless past of the Foundling Myth and the timeless present of the Agrarian Ritual are translated into the historical striving of Mankind to reach the goal of human endeavours, or, on a wider than human range, into the unceasing travail of creation. In the concept of the Second Coming, the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return attains its deepest spiritual meaning.

For these doctrines spreading among the Syriac and Greek proletariat of the Roman Empire there was the surer future, because, together with some elements of arresting novelty, they have much that was drawn from the age-long religious experience of the Mediterranean peoples. One reason, then, for the success of Christianity was that it held in solution so much that was ancient and indeed immemorial. Another reason was that the Church was self-governing. The Churches' hold over the affections and the allegiance of 'the internal proletariat' was far greater than the Emperor's hold over either portion of the proletarian underworld, because the Church had been established by the internal proletariat themselves out of their own spiritual and material resources.

The fall of the Roman Empire, in Gibbon's phrase, was 'the triumph of barbarism and religion.' Nobody has ever attempted to belittle the importance of Christianity as a factor of civilisation. What, however, of the barbarians? The German school of historians has not unnaturally exalted the Teutonic contribution, and Guizot himself in his famous book has attributed to the Teuton conquerors of the Roman Empire the introduction of the great and vivifying principle of personal liberty. To this exaltation of the *Volkerswanderung* as a fruitful source of institutions Professor Toynbee, with perhaps some excess of conviction, offers a strong opposition. He points out that, with the exception of Wessex and Austrasia, all the barbaric successor states perished by violence. 'The barbarians,' he writes, 'were not the assassins of the mighty dead. They were merely the vultures feeding on the carrion. Their heroic age was an epilogue to Hellenic history, not a prologue to ours. Their epic is a Swan Song.' Shades of Waitz and Dahn, of Freeman and Stubbs! How far have we not travelled since the days when we crowded to Bayreuth to hear Wagner's *Ring*, and were taught that in the dooms of the Anglo-Saxon kings was to be found the kernel of English liberty.

The triumph of Islam in the East is attributed to the fact that it was a non-Hellenic form of monotheism specially suited to the Syriac civilisation. Mahomet did not work on a *tabula rasa*. He drew his inspiration from Judaism and from Nestorianism, both of which religions were Syriac. Islam, therefore, is 'a universal Church originating in a form that was indigenous, whereas Christianity was a universal Church originating in a form which was alien to the society in which the Church played a part.' The Nestorian and Monophysite heresies were protests against the hellenising of Christianity. They failed

entirely to gain a hold in the West, but were a good deal more popular in the East. Even here, however, their success was limited and partial. Nobody pretends that the Nestorians of Assyria or the Copts of Egypt exercise a powerful religious influence on the world. They are, in Professor Toynbee's phrase, 'fossils.' Both these forms are eclipsed by Islam, 'a totalitarian Syriac religion anti-hellenic *au fond*.' The very fact that Christianity was so largely hellenised helped it in the West and hindered it in the East.

The Syriac civilisation is distinguished for three facts. It gave mankind the Alphabet, it discovered the Atlantic ocean, and it invented monotheism. It is very largely to the Syriac element that Professor Toynbee is inclined to assign the brilliance of the Abbasid Caliphate, that second great Arab empire, with its capital at Bagdad, which made a social unity out of the two areas—one originally conquered from the Romans, and the other from the Sassanids which had been united politically under the Umayyad régime. The Caliphate was successful because it was a reunion of territories primarily united under the Achæmenids, a reintegration or resumption of the Achæmenian Empire. But of the two elements so fused, the Iranian and the Syriac, it was the Syriac which was most important for culture. Was it not the inspiration of the Prophet himself, and the link which cemented Bagdad with the Arab-speaking world of the West?

It is no matter of surprise that a writer of Professor Toynbee's generation should have a very tempered enthusiasm for the doctrine of nationality which inspired our fathers. It is clear that he considers the war of Greek Independence to have been a mistake. His contention is that if it had not been for Greek (and presumably Serbian and Bulgarian) nationalism the Balkans would have settled down quietly under the Turkish régime, which was not only compatible with a great deal of indolent toleration, but actually encouraged the Phanariots (Phanar was the Greek quarter in the north-eastern corner of Stamboul) to carry on the most important tasks of government. While the Phanariots were merchants on a large scale, while they managed the affairs of the Greek Patriarchate, and after 1883 obtained great offices of state, what need was there for a revolution? As a result of the nationalist wars 'an association of occupational castes was cruelly rough-hewn into a congeries of territorial nations.' Of the cruelty there can, unfortunately, be no doubt; but a strong case can be made for the conclusion that as a result of a long and terrible story a higher standard of public life and general security now prevails in the Balkans than could ever have been reached under the Hamidian régime. The idea that there is a necessary religious antagonism between Greeks and Turks is properly

dismissed by Professor Toynbee, who reminds us that the Volga Turks, 'who are distinguished by their sobriety, honesty, thrift and industry,' live on the best of terms with their Russian peasant neighbours. It is also a hopeful sign (unnoted by Professor Toynbee) that fifty Turkish boy scouts actually attended the festivities in celebration of the centenary of Greek Independence.

There is so much that is excellent and stimulating in Professor Toynbee's study that it seems ungrateful to carp. One observation of a critical character, however, may be advanced. The generalisations are sometimes overdriven. It is, for instance, a perfectly sound point to urge that march-land territories, such as Brandenburg and Austria, or the frontier lands of Alexander the Great's empire, having a very special and arduous function to perform, are likely to be strongly organised and maintained. But is it a fair comment upon the course of events to say, 'Poland and Sweden both flourished so long as they fulfilled the function of anti-Russian marches of the Western society; they began to decline towards their fall as soon as Russian Orthodox Christendom had achieved the *tour de force* of filching this function from them'? The causes of the decline of Poland and Sweden in the eighteenth century are familiar—the paralysing feuds of the Polish Diet, the mad adventures of a Swedish king. That the entry of Russia into Western politics exercised a prejudicial effect upon these two countries is true, but not inevitable. Other policies might have produced other results.

Again, we all, I hope, admire the Swiss. We admire their independence, and the way in which they have combined in one unity different races, languages, and religions. But is it not a little excessive to say of Switzerland (Venice and Holland are coupled with it in this connexion) that it has 'stimulated its inhabitants to attain the highest levels of social achievement that have yet been attained by any of the peoples of Western Christendom'?

It is of course possible, again, that Professor Toynbee's account of the fact that Scandinavian civilisation achieved its greatest triumphs in Iceland is correct—*i.e.*, 'transmarine migration across arctic seas, and the exchange of a bleak and barren country-side in Norway for an Icelandic country-side which was bleaker and barrenner.' But a great number of other reasons suggest themselves, some of which seem to be less recondite, such as that a number of families of brilliant ability migrated to Iceland and there found more leisure for literary pursuits. Again, I remember meeting an old lady in Paris who had spent most of her life in Greenland. She thought very little of Paris, but was enthusiastic about Greenland, its tranquillity and emptiness, its great air-washed spaces, its long

quiet winter nights. She talked as if Greenland were a veritable Capua. My venerable friend would not have agreed with Professor Toynbee's suggestion that the challenge of Greenland to the Norsemen might have been too severe.

One of the dangers of 'pattern history,' if it may be so described, is that facts must be woven into the pattern. One of its advantages is that a good and attractive pattern prints itself upon the memory. A pattern, symmetrical, shapeful, repetitive, is easier to carry in the mind than a narrative. The pattern historian is on the look-out for analogies and gathers them from every quarter. Ulstermen and Incas, Prussians and Icelanders, Ainus and Berbers, assemble in their legions under the ample canopy of Professor Toynbee's learning to point the moral and adorn the tale. There is, too, in the past not only pattern but rhythm. Our enthusiastic guide is enchanted by the notion of the rhythmical alternations of stability and movement, repose and turbulence, divine peace and diabolic unrest, which the Chinese designate under the names of Yin and Yang. In the great operatic performance of humanity he detects the recurrence of this *leitmotif* of Yin and Yang. Other ears will be less sensitive to the regularity of the Chinese beat.

There are no dull pages. Though there is a good deal of discursive and pleasant rambling into theology, ethics, and literature, which leads us somewhat wide of the central argument, and a rich miscellany of citations from the Classics, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, German and English, not to speak of many a curious page from modern travellers, and a fine piece of Greek elegiacs from the author's own pen to speed us on our way, there is no remission of intellectual tension and interest. The author has clear-cut convictions on a large number of things. He scolds Seleucus for establishing his capital at Antioch, and Charlemagne for drawing down the Scandinavian avalanche by his stupid resolve to conquer the Saxons, who, if left alone, would have succumbed to the peaceful penetration of the Christian missionaries. Perhaps Seleucus and Charlemagne might have prepared a tolerable defence. Who knows? Meanwhile, it is comfortable to have Professor Toynbee knowing so many things and knowing them so clearly. That he has strong personal convictions adds to the charm and force of his writing. If the Protestant or the modern Greek finds less grace in his eyes than the Turk or the negro, if the Celt is more acceptable than the Teuton, if it gives him special pleasure to rouse the complacent European out of his dogmatic slumbers by the display of the virtues or potentialities of races whom he is accustomed to despise, who will complain? The reader may be disposed to think that our historian underrates the immense psychological

and physical handicap imposed by capricious Nature upon the unfortunate inhabitants of Central Africa, Central Asia, and the Indian plains. What he will not deny is Professor Toynbee's right, founded on a long course of horny-handed toil, to be heard with respect on the many topics contained in his wide-ranging volumes.

In this age of specialised study, when we are so easily tempted to become parochial in our outlook, it is refreshing to meet with an author who brings to the interpretation of universal history, not only the wide learning which is implied by so large a design, but a firm grasp of essentials, a rich profusion of new ideas and suggestions, and a sensitive feeling for forms of civilisation widely differing from his own.

H. A. L. FISHER.

friend, but thank God I am very calm and composed, and able to do the best that remains to do. Write—as religious a letter as possible—but no mention of what is gone and done with.—With me 'the former things are passed away,' and I have something more to do than to feel—

God Almighty have us all in his keeping—

C. LAMB.

Mention nothing of poetry. I have destroyed every vestige of past vanities of that kind. Do as you please, but if you publish, publish mine (I give free leave) without name or initial, and never send me a book, I charge you.

Your own judgment will convince you not to take any notice of this yet to your dear wife.—You look after your family—I have my reason and strength left to take care of mine. I charge you, don't think of coming to see me. Write. I will not see you if you come. God Almighty love you and all of us.

In the development of Lamb the influence of Coleridge was an outstanding feature, and if one is to question anything in Mr. E. V. Lucas's magnificent biography of Lamb it would be that he undervalues Coleridge both as an intellect and as a magnetic power. Coleridge has come back into esteem in the last decade, and he can be seen towering as a mind over all his contemporaries. For most of them to have met Coleridge was an intense and passionate experience which left them changed men. There is little in the centenary literature which helps to set Coleridge in true perspective in Lamb's life, though the recognition did come through in Mr. F. V. Morley's brave and admirable *Lamb Before Elia* (1932) and in Mr. Edmund Blunden's *Clark Lectures on Charles Lamb and His Contemporaries* (1933).

Coleridge and Lamb had been fellow schoolboys, and in *Christ's Hospital Five and Thirty Years Ago* Lamb has included his well-known praise of the learning of Coleridge, 'the inspired charity-boy'; but the years of their most fruitful contacts were from 1794 to 1795, when Lamb, just on the threshold of manhood, was still free, ambitious, excited, ready, like Coleridge, to conquer the world. Those were the days when at the Salutation Tavern, No. 17 Newgate Street, they sat drinking egg-hot, smoking Oronooko, and talking of the poems that they would write. It is typical that Lamb had to pay Coleridge's bill and rescue his clothes from the landlord, but if anyone had asked Lamb he would have said that it was thoroughly worth while. The effect of Coleridge's impact on Lamb can be seen in the letters written after the London companionship. Lamb sets down detailed criticism of verse, not the talkative, appreciative criticism of a poem-fancier, but the minute revisions and prunings of a regular craftsman. Mr. Blunden has hinted the possibility that Lamb, had he continued in the fervour of 1794-95, might have become a

major poet of the period. Such, at least, was his ambition; he hoped that he and his friends would rank with 'Burns and Bowles and Cowper.' Then precipitously came the tragedy of 1796. He turned to Coleridge, but not now to exchange verses, or criticisms of verses, but to seek out a religious faith that would sustain him in his personal affliction. So on October 24, 1796, he writes:

Be not angry with me Coleridge: I wish not to cavil. I know I cannot instruct you; I only wish to remind you of that humility which best becometh the Christian character. God, in the New Testament, (*our best guide*) is represented to us in the kind, condescending, amiable, familiar light of a *parent*; and in my poor mind 'tis best for us so to consider of him, as our *heavenly* father, and our *best friend*, without indulging too bold conceptions of his nature. Let us learn to think humbly of ourselves and rejoice in the appellation of 'dear children,' 'brethren,' and 'co-heirs with Christ of the promises,' seeking to know no further.

That letter was written nearly a quarter of a century before the *Elia* essays began: it differs from them utterly in style and in sentiment. The central problem in the interpretation of Lamb is to conclude how that spirit of *Elia* developed and what it was once it had developed. Mr. J. Lewis May, who writes with great sensitiveness of Lamb's work, is more concerned with the essays themselves than with elucidating their relationship to Lamb; while Mr. A. C. Ward opens his compact account of Lamb's life and literary career with the admission that he does not consider Lamb 'a suitable subject for psychological investigation, philosophical disquisition, or critical ingenuity.' Mr. Blunden in his centenary volume is content to stand aside modestly and record Lamb as he appeared to his own generation, though in his earlier volume on *Charles Lamb and His Contemporaries* he approaches the problem and adds as a warning that he has become aware 'of the peculiar hazard of all dogmatizing on the inwardness of Lamb the mystificator.'

However perilous the quest, and however inadequate the answer, the mind calls for some solution of the problem. It is clear that Lamb in the early months of 1796 looked forward to ambitious endeavour in literature. Equally, it is clear that after the tragedy of 1796 he dreaded the return of the continued excitement of Coleridge's company and the enthusiasm for composition which accompanied it. While the main reason for this withdrawal lies in the tragedy of September 1796, it may be unwise to assign it solely to that cause. Mary Lamb was homicidally insane in 1796, but Charles Lamb had himself spent the last six weeks of 1795 in a madhouse in Hoxton, and Coleridge, as Lamb admits, had played a notable part in his phantasies during his confinement. The inhibition which he had to place upon himself in 1796 was a triple one—routine, the guardianship

of his sister, and a certain watchfulness over himself. He did not keep in any absolute way to the resolutions of 1796: his interest in literature returned, and with it the desire to write. But it was an intermittent, half-hearted writing. In 1797 he began his drama *John Woodvil* and the story of *Rosamund Gray*, and in 1806 his comedy *Mr. H* was damned at Drury Lane. Apart from these compositions, the years between 1796 and the invention of Elia in 1820 show only some journalism, some essays, a number of poems, the children's books and stories, and the *Dramatic Specimens* of 1808.

Some of this work has an unusual quality, but never does it approach the rare and original spirit of Elia. That Elia's individuality has best been described by Mr. E. V. Lucas in an essay on *The Evolution of Whimsicality*, included in the gleanings of his studies on Charles Lamb issued as *At The Shrine of St. Charles*.

I mean broadly, [Mr. Lucas writes] modern humour, as distinguished from that which we find before the end of the eighteenth century. It may comprise all the earlier forms, but it is different, perhaps in its very blending, and it has one ingredient which the older forms lacked, and which, like the onion in the bowl of salad, as celebrated by one of its masters—Sydney Smith—'animates the whole.' I refer to its unreluctant egoism. It is this autobiographical quality that is its most noticeable characteristic—the author's side-long amused canonization of himself; his frankly shameless assumption that if a thing is interesting to the writer it must therefore be of interest to the world. And with the development of whimsicality (as I call it) are bound up also the development of slipped ease in literature and the stages by which we have all become funnier.

Mr. Lucas suggests, further, that Lamb's great discovery was that he himself 'was better worth laying bare than obscuring.'

While Mr. Lucas's definition of the governing quality of the essays can be accepted whole-heartedly, what of this other assertion that Elia is the complete revelation of a mind? In the first place, it is obvious that the essays are not strictly autobiographical from a factual point of view. Mr. Lucas illustrates this in an excellent essay in *Lamb and the Universities*. Lamb, though he had missed a university education, had a number of intimate contacts with Cambridge; Coleridge was a Cambridge man, so were Thomas Manning and George Dyer, and Lamb visited Cambridge on several occasions. He went up in 1820, and while staying at Trumpington Street he wrote one of his Elia essays. But the essay is called 'Oxford in the Vacation'; he alleges that his rooms face the Bodleian, that he has seen Dyer, the Cambridge recluse, in Oriel, and that he examined the Milton manuscripts in Trinity. This departure from fact would lack significance if it did not betoken larger issues. Until Lamb writes as Elia, he has always written 'Cambridge' when he meant

Cambridge, but, as Mr. Lucas writes, 'in 1820, by which time he had taken on the personality of Elia, he was beginning to be mysterious.'

What constitutes that mystery? In his drama of *John Woodvil* Lamb records a speech of old Sir Walter to his son mon:

How quietly we live here,
Unread in the world's business
And take no note of all its slippery changes.
'Twere best we make a world among ourselves,
A little world,
Without the ills and falsehoods of the greater.

One returns from that passage to the letter to Sir Walter Scott and Lamb's plea for a vulpine policy by which he can console himself for his flat destinies. Such is the world of Elia, not Lamb himself, but a 'little world,' constructed between himself and the greater universe, with a strict censor at the door keeping out tragedy and metaphysics and all problematical matter, warding off even depression, to which he was himself so often subject. That his mind was aware of much which this censorship never allowed into the Elia world can be seen in contrasting the range of matter in Elia and in his dramatic criticism. As Mr. Blunden has indicated, Lamb alone in his age wrestled 'with the dark genius of Webster, and in his essay on Shakespeare it is with the tragedies, not the comedies, that he deals, facing out their starkest features, as his well-known passage in *Lear* testifies. Even *Lear's* madness he explores with a sombre and impassioned rhetoric, dwelling upon it as if held incanted.

In the aberrations of his reason, [Lamb writes of *Lear*] we discover a mighty irregular power of reasoning immethodized from the ordinary rhythms of life, but exerting its powers, as 'the wind bloweth where it teth' at will upon the corruptions and abuses of mankind.

The censorship of Elia which admits *Mrs. Battle's Opinions on History* and *A Dissertation upon Roast Pork* will not sanction a passage which penetrates into so closely an autobiographical problem as that of insanity.

It is this quality that while Elia is not Lamb, it has an intimate relation to Lamb, which gives the essays beneath all their humour a subtle poignancy. Though this has gained but little emphasis in the centenary literature, it had been noted long ago by Walter Pater. 'We know,' Pater wrote, 'that beneath this lithe surface there was something of the fateful domestic horror, of the beautiful heroism and devotedness too, of old Greek tragedy.' Mr. Lucas, too, has done well to suggest that

the only genuine predecessor of Elia is to be found in Cowper's letters, and Cowper kept a level interest in every detail and oddity of his life to preserve his sanity. There was a chasm in Lamb's life into which he dared not look, and Elia preserved him from doing so. Often in the essays themselves Lamb approaches the confession that Elia is not autobiography, but a pseudo-reality, a defence from the world's business and all its slippery changes. It is in such a mood that he concludes *The South-Sea House*:

But it is time to close—night's wheels are rattling fast over me—it is proper to have done with this solemn mockery.

Reader, what if I have been playing with thee all this while—peradventure the very *names*, which I have summoned up before thee, are fantastic, insubstantial—like Henry Pimperl, and old John Naps of Greece:—

Be satisfied that something answering to them has had a being. Their importance is from the past.

The prose by which Lamb contrived the Elia essays is as subtle as anything in the period, and criticism has long sought out the range of reading that he employed to bring to his style the graces of allusion and antiquity. To disentangle its essential quality is difficult, yet one young writer—a member of the Cambridge Group Movement in criticism, if we may use the term without undue disrespect to all parties concerned—has contrived to speak of it disrespectfully. It is thus that Mr. Denys Thompson epitomises Lamb's style:

Admirers of Elia have a sapless, inherited respect for literature, conceived as uplift and unrelated to living. This accounts for the respect shown for Lamb's Style, an assumed and easily assimilable bag of tricks, little literary touches which give the illiterate something predigested for toothless gums to mumble and cheat him into believing that he is in contact with great thoughts.¹

Whether the metaphor is confused, or whether, indeed, digestion be a function of the dentures, may be a problem that the layman need not explore; but Hazlitt had teeth, literary teeth, that could worry and fret out all varieties of literary hypocrisy and shallowness, and against that passage one may recall Hazlitt's well-known praise of the genuineness of Lamb's style.

In reading Lamb's letters chronologically one can perceive how he came to modify the straightforward earnestness of the early letters to Coleridge into the elaborately tessellated periods that he later employed. He came to be able to describe even minute incidents, seemingly insignificant, in this Elian way. The material that he sought was, above all, in his own early days long before the tragedy—the boyhood in the Temple, itself a quiet,

¹ 'Our Debt to Lamb' in *Determinations* (Chatto and Windus, 1934).

removed 'little world,' the years at Christ's Hospital, and then, as in *Old China*, idealised moments in his later years.

Above all, he is attracted towards childhood. There lay his *À La Recherche du Temps Perdu*; there, as with Wordsworth, lay his release; and Wordsworth's understanding epitaph on Lamb may result in some similarity in their spiritual crises, however divergent were the motives that precipitated them. That searching back towards childhood appeared already in the autobiographical elements in his story *Rosamund Gray*: it recurs frequently in the essays; it is the theme of his outstandingly best poem, *The Gipsy's Malison*, with its refrain:

Black Manhood comes when riotous guilty living
Hands thee the cup that shall be death in taking.

Of Elia's ultimate quality it is still difficult to make final judgments. If you like it well enough you cannot judge. The artistry of the prose, as conscious as that of Flaubert, can only possess an esoteric appeal. The wider pleasure lies in the humour, the sentimentality, the caressing kindliness, the softening of life's harshnesses. It should be a favoured reading of middle age, and of all who, conquered a little by life, feel a need of that 'vulpine policy.' Yet by educational prescription we give Lamb to the young. If Mr. Denys Thompson may be accepted as authoritative, the young reject him:

If one is offended in reading his essays, it is by the tone; it is often so exacerbating that one wants to shout 'don't breathe in my ear.' . . . In schools, especially, where he is imposed as a classic and pattern of writing by the examination system, Lamb's influence is pernicious. . . . If this is Literature, I'll take Science,' is the reaction of the intelligent young.


This may be condemned as mere author-baiting, and yet it might be allowed fairly to represent the reaction of a young mind, unbroken by life. Lamb in 1795 in the Salutation Tavern, looking over his egg-hot ambitiously into the future, would not have been satisfied with the spirit of Elia. Out of his own life the image that governed the essays gradually emerged, and his craftsmanship gave to it an entity that separates it from all the many endeavours of his imitators. But in admiring the essays and in defining the poignancy from which they arose one need not forget all that is left out, for those excluded elements embrace many of the most ambitious endeavours of both literature and life. The minds that have achieved the greatest things in art could not have accepted Lamb's noble solution in 1796 of his domestic problem. Their *dæmon* would have driven them to do otherwise. It will depend on what system of values one applies whether they are to be condemned or not. Lamb had to pay the price for his altruism right into his very soul. He accepted the problem of his family:

he rejected the problem of his age. Coleridge reversed that position. Something in Lamb closed up, petrified as a result; the interminable card-playing and jokes, and even the drinking sessions, are symptoms of that. He became a character, an oddity, but he was in reality more than that—an acute and original mind with a genius for friendship. His criticism shows something of his potential range; not only his comments on the Elizabethans, but his notes on Wordsworth and Coleridge, made at a time when their work was little understood. Nor did Coleridge, except in a few moments of petulance, ever deny the originality of Lamb. In one of his recently published letters he writes:

[Lamb] has an affectionate heart, a mind *sui generis*; his taste acts so as to appear like the unmechanic simplicity of an instinct—in brief he is worth an hundred men of mere talents. Conversation with the latter tribe is like the use of leaden bells—one warms by exercise—Lamb every now and then *irradiates*, and the beam, though single and fine as a hair is yet rich with colours, and I both see and feel it.

If Lamb, as has been suggested, did not take up the problem of his age, he at least affected it. He wrote as the industrial age was settling its cold damp over the nineteenth century, corrupting beauty and mechanising life, and Lamb, who had rendered human the artificial sentimentalism of the eighteenth-century novel of sensibility, fashioned one of those palliative instruments which strengthened human charity in an age when it was grimly needed. Thus Dickens, and not the essayist imitators, is his true inheritor. Nor is he a name to be revived for a centenary and then forgotten. He will be remembered again next year, if only that then Mr. E. V. Lucas, his most loyal interpreter, will issue the new edition of his letters with so much that is as yet unpublished.

B. IFOR EVANS.



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