

THE
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CENTURY
AND AFTER



A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXXXIII—JANUARY 1934

THE PURSUIT OF PEACE

THE world is in the throes of a great peace crisis. The fate of the Disarmament Conference hangs in the balance. Doubt is being cast on the capacity to survive of the League of Nations. There is more talk of war, and more apprehension about war, than at any time since the end of the World War. There are many who have given up hope. They dismiss the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations as idle dreams and dangerous futilities. In the name of realism they bid us give up all idea of ever subjecting all nations to a world law that shall pledge them to peace and co-operation. They profess to discover some law of Nature which ordains that human development shall be for ever arrested at the stage of the nation State and Empire. Some even go so far as to affirm that it is by the Divine Will that nations live in a state of anarchy, each sole judge of its own rights as a law unto itself, and ready to defend its view of those rights by force applied at its own discretion. They ask us to go back to the old methods of isolation or military alliances. In both cases they admit, and indeed urge, that this policy implies large armaments and a

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reversion to the ancient doctrine of the balance of power, and the maxim 'If you want peace, prepare for war.'

That doctrine and that maxim have been tried and have failed for centuries. They are, indeed, based on belief in the inevitability of war. Advocates of those methods to-day admit that they lead sooner or later to war, but argue that war is in any case bound to occur, and that their policy is calculated to give us a longer breathing space and a better chance of victory when war does come than any alternative.

Let us for a moment take these self-styled realists at their word and consider what would happen if nations did definitely turn their backs on the policy of endeavouring to achieve disarmament and to make the League of Nations a reality. In international relations this would mean the nations of the European continent splitting up into balancing alliances. This process would sooner or later involve the Far East, for it has been abundantly proved in the last few years that it is impossible to isolate Europe politically, militarily, or economically from the rest of the world. So long as the two rival groups were more or less equally strong this country could seek to hold the balance and practise a policy of isolation, tempered by bargaining first with one side, then with the other. But if either group showed signs of getting the upper hand we should, as before 1914, drift into the opposite camp, in order to redress the balance.

The more the situation is examined, indeed, the more difficult it becomes to see how these pre-war methods, apart from the fact that they admittedly led to the World War, can work, even so long as they did before the war, in the very different conditions that prevail to-day. This consideration is reinforced if we turn to the Imperial aspect of the matter. As has been revealed at several Imperial Conferences, and as was brought out strongly at the recent unofficial Imperial Conference in Toronto, the League of Nations is an indispensable basis for reconciling the desire for independence with the need for a common policy within the British Commonwealth of Nations. If the League were to disappear and the world were to revert to the system of alliances and preparations for war, the problems of neutrality and self-defence within the Empire would become infinitely more complex and might become insoluble. It would, for instance, obviously be difficult for the United Kingdom to prepare for an active rôle in both Europe and the Far East simultaneously, and new problems affecting her Australasian Dominions would inevitably arise. And whereas the Dominions might be prepared to associate in world-wide action on the basis of Article 16 of the Covenant, together with the Mother Country, it is doubtful whether there might not be strong opposition to their being committed to any

private alliances in which we might be interested, and reluctance, if not refusal, to incur the necessary expenditure for defence and the risk of abandoning neutrality in a cause which was felt to be alien and remote. Here, too, the position has changed since 1913, and if we abandon the firm foundation of the League of Nations and the hope of organising world peace by collective effort, it is very difficult to see what to put in its place as a means of holding the Commonwealth together in a common attitude on the issue of peace or war.

International and Imperial difficulties, however, almost pale into insignificance before the internal difficulties that would be aroused by an attempt to abandon the basis of our policy ever since the World War, and to turn our backs officially on the hope of lasting peace. The immediate result undoubtedly would be a heavy increase in our land, sea, and air defence budgets—this at the very time when unemployment and the economic crisis still weigh heavily upon us; and there is a rising demand that those who are workless and have suffered reductions in the standard of living should have the first claim on whatever easing of the present Budget stringency may be possible in the future. When the people ask for bread it is difficult to satisfy them with guns, tanks, and gas bombs. If we are to begin in earnest preparing against the possibility of another great war, the time will inevitably come when we shall have to emulate the example of several other countries and begin training our population on a large scale for air raids and gas attacks. In many cities on the Continent and in the Far East large-scale test raids have been carried out and the whole population ordered to don gas masks and take to the cellars. In some cases a touch of realism has been added by the dropping of tear-gas bombs. Can anyone imagine what would be the effect on public opinion of any such measures in this country? And yet a Government would be guilty of dereliction of duty which failed to train its population in protection and safety measures for air raids and gas attacks if it is to proceed on the assumption that to have peace we must prepare for war. For, as the Secretary-General of the League of Nations pointed out in a striking speech in London in December, in the next war the front will run through every home, and the civilian population will be the first object of attack. How long do the self-styled realists who bid us abandon the League believe that the people of this country would stand the financial drain and the moral frightfulness of such a policy?

To-day we still mourn those who fell in the war that was to end war. We have been assured over and over again by the statesmen of every country and every party that another great war would mean the collapse of civilisation. We are pledged to

the hilt by the most solemn treaty obligations to organise the world for peace. It may safely be predicted that were any Government in this country either openly or clandestinely to abandon or to appear to abandon the great enterprise of organising peace and to relapse into preparation for war and international anarchy, it would be regarded by the people as morally and politically bankrupt, and would be swept from power. Sir Edward Grey, as he then was, predicted in 1912 that the race in armaments would end in revolution or war. Two years later his prediction received terrible confirmation. If we begin a new race in armaments it will infallibly end in the same way.

Whatever else we do, then, at any rate there is no way out along the path indicated by the so-called realists. Attempts to go back to pre-war methods and standards in international relations would, if successful, bring on the most appalling catastrophe. But they would never have a chance to go thus far, for a Government that made the attempt would not long survive. The only policy, in fact, open to us is, therefore, to make a reality of the collective peace system, including the obligation drastically to reduce armaments. But how is this to be done?

Before answering this question it is necessary to glance at the background and early years of the League, for accurate knowledge of the relevant facts is essential to sound judgment on questions of policy. It may be safely asserted that nine-tenths of those now writing and speaking so glibly about the necessity for scrapping or reforming the League have never read the Covenant, let alone possess any knowledge of how and why its provisions were framed, or the way in which they have been interpreted and applied. The League of Nations was born in the agony of the World War, at the cost of 10,000,000 dead and 20,000,000 wounded. But it was conceived more than half a century ago in the womb of Time.

The mechanical and industrial revolutions of the last century and a half have brought about a greater increase in the population of the world and bigger changes in man's way of life and attitude to the universe than in the previous 2000 years. It is a truism to-day that coal, water-power and electricity, the steam and petrol engine, railways, steamships, motor cars, telegraph, telephone, wireless and broadcasting have knit the whole world together into one interdependent society, economically and culturally—a society in which war anywhere may become war everywhere, and in which every war is a civil war. The march of science that has brought these things has also made war infinitely more devastating than ever before, for it has become an orgy of mutual hatred and destruction, for which the whole population and the whole moral and material forces of the

belligerent countries are mobilised, and where the front is the whole face of the land. Victors suffer no less than vanquished, and neutrals suffer in almost equal degree with the belligerents.

The growing interdependence of nations led to an increase in international conferences, which roughly doubled in number in every decade between 1840 and the outbreak of war. As conferences increased in numbers they specialised according to the purposes for which they were held. At an early stage conferences for co-operation in matters of common concern on technical issues gave rise to conventions setting up some kind of permanent international machinery. These bits of machinery which were scattered about in various capitals were given the generic name of 'Public International Unions.' The Universal Postal Union, the Telegraph Union, the International Public Health Office, and the International Institute of Agriculture are examples. Even before the war there were disarmament conferences. They led, like the League of Nations' own efforts at disarmament, at an early stage to the realisation that disarmament was impossible so long as States lived in a condition of anarchy, and each was judge of its own rights and entitled to fight or not as it pleased. The two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 made a gallant attempt to set up machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, but got no further than some model conciliation and arbitration conventions and a panel of arbitrators, which was given the somewhat high-sounding name of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Ever since the attempt to set up a small and reactionary League of Nations composed of Great Powers had broken down after the Napoleonic Wars (largely owing to this country's return to a policy of isolation) a vague tradition had persisted of some sort of concert of the Great Powers, known as the Concert of Europe. This tradition assumed more substance towards the end of the century, and was referred to by Lord Salisbury as the 'rudimentary Legislature of Europe.' The idea behind it was that if a quarrel between two States threatened to degenerate into war, the resulting disturbance was so injurious to the interests of the whole international community that countries not parties to the quarrel were entitled to be consulted, and should be given a chance to attempt mediation and good offices, in the hope of averting the threat of war. This system persisted up to the outbreak of the World War. But it had suffered owing to the emergence of certain new small States in South-Eastern Europe (the Balkans), and owing to the fact that, as the balance of power had shifted in favour of Germany, Great Britain was drawn in more and more on the other side, and so was no longer regarded as a neutral and disinterested country by the Central Powers. In the twelve days between the Serajevo incident and the outbreak

of the World War diplomacy spent the time in fruitless endeavours to bring about a conference between the Powers concerned.

There was no obligation on them to meet in conference or to hold their hands in order to give the conference procedure a chance. The military machine in every country—as one statesman explained in despair—was so highly organised that it could start running at the touch of a button, and nothing could stop it. But the peace machinery was non-existent. The nations found that the monstrous paradox of preparing for war to have peace culminated logically in a 'preventive' war. Sir Edward Grey, during those twelve days, urged that if it were possible to weather the crisis without war the ensuing period of relief should be used for setting up some form of league or association of nations which would pledge States to meet in conference before attempting a solution by force, and which would surround this pledge by the most stringent safeguards. This was also the view taken by the Committee presided over by Lord Phillimore, which laid down the main lines of what afterwards became the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The constitution of the League, as has been pointed out above, grew organically out of developments that began far back in the last century. The League of Nations is an attempt to give juridical and political expression to the great and growing interdependence of modern nations. It is a piece of the hardest and most sober realism, an attempt to reckon with facts that are inescapable and of fundamental importance. The men who framed the Covenant were statesmen schooled in the terrible experience of the World War, and they had behind them the irresistible support of the peoples of the world who passionately desired an end of war. The Covenant is almost entirely an Anglo-American production. As is pointed out in Professor Temperley's *History of the Peace Conference*:

The League of Nations as constituted at Paris owed probably less than is generally supposed to its intellectual forerunners, though it owed much to general popular aspirations and idealism. The creative force behind it was the passionate hatred of war. But the practical problem how war could best be avoided or diminished, having in view the inveteracy of nationalist feeling, was presented for solution to men who for four and a half years had been absorbed in crushing administrative tasks. Such men learn mainly, not from books, but from experience. During these years experience had forced three main ideas upon western statesmanship, and these became the foundation of the Covenant. . . .

In the first place, the course of negotiations in the twelve days immediately preceding the outbreak of war drew attention to the need for some settled Council of the Nations responsible for the maintenance of Peace. . . .

In the second place, the violation of Belgium demonstrated the need for a more comprehensive guarantee of the safety of small nations than could be furnished by incidental treaties between a group of Powers.

Finally, the increasing exhaustion of Allied resources during the later stages of the war forced upon the Allies a co-operation not merely in the formulation of broad policies but in the detailed administrative execution of such policies. . . . From the experience thus gained, it began to be realised how great were the possibilities of such co-operation, how meaningless had been many of the economic rivalries which had divided nations in the past and how beneficial in a practical way, apart from any question of conciliation or the settlement of problems of high policy, might be an organised system of international administration in affairs of common interest to all nations.

The fundamental principles of the Covenant are that States are bound to submit any dispute that may lead to a rupture to some form of peaceful settlement (inquiry and report, or arbitration, or judicial settlement) and to refrain from resort to war for a sufficiently long period to give this procedure a fair chance. Either party to a dispute may summon the other before the Council or Assembly and either may secure a meeting of these bodies. The other members of the League are pledged to attend such a meeting, to use their best endeavours to bring the dispute to a peaceful conclusion, and to cut off all relations with a State that resorted to war without observing the period of delay or against a party that had accepted a peaceful award. Those obligations, it must be repeated, were framed by hard-headed statesmen as a result of the bitter experience of the World War, and of a close study of events that culminated in the war. They constitute, as the Secretary-General of the League pointed out in a speech already referred to, the absolute minimum of international obligations necessary to make any collective peace system work, and are the only alternative to a relapse into anarchy and ultimately into another 'inevitable' war.

As regards questions of organisation and detail, the Covenant is extremely flexible. It was deliberately framed so as to allow of the freest development by precedent and experience and avoids any rigid or academic insistence on details. The organisation of the League was conceived in the same realistic spirit and also designed so as to leave plenty of room for modification, development and improvement in the light of experience. The central organ, as originally planned, was a Council of the Great Powers. It was found almost immediately, however, that the smaller States simply would not enter a League in which the Great Powers alone were in the Council. Some compromise had to be made, and was reached by having two bodies—a small Council in which the Great Powers were permanent members and a contingent of smaller Powers were elected from time to time, and a large Conference in which all the members of the League were represented on an equal footing, and which elects the temporary members of the Council. An analogous compromise between the

claims of large and small States, it may be observed, has always had to be made whenever a confederation, federation, or other inter-State organisation has been established. It may further be observed that what the smaller Powers were unwilling to accept in 1919, when the Great Powers were united and at the height of their power and prestige, they are not likely to agree to to-day when the Great Powers are divided and their prestige is at a low ebb (for reasons which will be touched upon below), and when the smaller Powers have had thirteen years' experience of the League and have learnt how to combine (*e.g.*, the Scandinavian and Baltic groups, the Dominions, the Little Entente and the Latin Americans), and to make their influence felt (*e.g.*, the semi-permanent membership of the Council of Poland and of Spain). The idea of dividing the world into 'great' and 'small' Powers is indeed a typical piece of what may be called theoretical or amateur realism. For in practice virtually no question arises in which some great and small Powers are not found in one camp and other great and small Powers in the other.

The charge of theoretical realism may also be brought against the suggestion that the League should not be universal. The Covenant provides for regional agreements and arrangements. But universality was felt to be an essential need, because of the fact that it is not possible to isolate any continent either economically or politically. Great Britain, for instance, is a European State and also part of a world-wide Commonwealth of Nations. Russia is both European and Asiatic. An act of assassination in the Balkans developed into a world conflict. The trade and defence policies of States in any part of the world are governed directly or indirectly by what is being done not only in their own continent but on the other side of the globe. There is a good deal to be said for continuing the attempts that were made under the impulse of M. Briand in the early years of the League to handle various European matters by local groups of States within the League. There is nothing to be said for attempting to chop the League up into a series of regional Leagues, and the thing could not in practice be done.

The third point being discussed to-day is the unanimity rule. It is provided in the Covenant that decisions must be unanimous, in some cases excluding the parties to a dispute. Matters of procedure, including the appointment of committees, may be decided by a majority. Here, too, the Covenant is drafted so as to allow of a certain elasticity by way of interpretation. In establishing precedents it has not always been clear what was a decision as distinguished from a recommendation, nor what was a matter of substance as distinguished from procedure. There might be much to be said—and the view is supported by an advisory opinion of

the Court in connexion with the Mosul dispute—for making it clear that the unanimity rule in the Covenant must be applied subject to the general principle of law that no one can be judge in his own cause. But, as a matter of political fact, the tendency in the last two years has been rather the other way and has taken the form of a strict insistence on unanimity as a safeguard of sovereignty.

The fourth point now being discussed is the question of revision of treaties. A good deal of Treaty revision has, in fact, gone on in one way or another since 1920: reparations, for instance, have virtually ceased to exist, the Rhineland has been evacuated, the Disarmament Convention, it has been recognised, must supersede Chapter V. of the Versailles Treaty and grant equal treatment all round, some minor frontier changes have been effected, etc. Here, too, Article 19 of the Covenant provides a constitutional basis for political developments if and when the States concerned are ready to contemplate a peaceful change of the *status quo*, including Treaty revision. But it must be recognised that peaceful revision is impossible in an atmosphere of fear. So long as States are afraid that attempts will be made to secure change by violence, and that nothing stands between them and this eventuality but their own armed force, peaceful change is psychologically impossible. For the implications of Article 19 to be developed, it is necessary to give States confidence in the Treaty obligations guaranteeing them against attempts to use war as an instrument of national policy.

Much has been made recently of the need for separating the Covenant from the Peace Treaties. In one sense nothing could be easier. States can already sign the Covenant without accepting any obligations under the rest of the Peace Treaties, and can *vice versa* be bound by the remainder of the Peace Treaties without accepting the Covenant. The Covenant and the constitution of the International Labour Organisation were included in the Peace Treaties in the same way as the Peace Treaties included the obligation to ratify the Hague Opium Convention and one or two other instruments, solely as a practical way of securing that these Treaties should come into force. Nothing could be easier than to declare these documents to be separate and independent treaties. But it is difficult to perceive any political significance in such a proceeding. In another sense, separation of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties might mean abolishing the system for the protection of minorities, the Mandates system, the duties of the League in connexion with Danzig, and terminating the present status of the Saar Basin. The latter is a matter that must in any case be settled not later than 1935. But as for the other points, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of any international agreement to bring about these changes or

any advantage from seeking to end these arrangements, which are all in the nature of international compromises in the interests of peace.

In the early years of the League there was a great development of the collective peace system. The membership of the League increased rapidly. In 1924 it was proposed to supplement the Covenant by undertakings to settle all disputes peacefully and to make the obligation to take collective action against a war-maker feasible. This attempt, embodied in the so-called Geneva Protocol, would have started the Disarmament Conference in 1925. It was not ratified, but it did lead to a limited and partial application of the principles of the Covenant to Western Europe, in the shape of the Locarno Treaties, which were originally conceived as the first of a series of agreements on similar lines. Sir Austen Chamberlain has recently set forth what were the reasons which induced the British Government to conclude these Treaties. The obligations to settle disputes peacefully were much developed by the acceptance of the Optional Clause conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the Permanent Court. Forty-two States are now parties to this clause, and a growing number of treaties recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The General Act of Arbitration, signed by nineteen States, was a further development. In 1928 came the Franco-American initiative, leading to the conclusion of the Pact of Paris, which supplements and amplifies the Covenant undertaking in no circumstances to resort to war or to use force in the settlement of disputes. Just as the first Labour Government had taken the lead in framing the Protocol, so the second Labour Government gave an impetus to the signing of the Optional Clause and the General Act, and endeavoured to secure an amendment of the Covenant that would have formally incorporated in it the absolute prohibition of war, to which the signatories of the Paris Pact were committed. It also pushed to completion the Treaty of Financial Assistance, which had had the support of its Conservative predecessor, and the Treaty for Strengthening the Means to Prevent War, which was due to German initiative. Finally, it put in hand preparations for the Disarmament Conference.

During these years, too, the organisation and machinery of the League had greatly developed and gained experience. The mutual relations of the Assembly and Council were adjusted and modified in the light of experience. And the whole feeling was that the collective peace system was a living and growing entity, which no doubt was far from perfect and was liable to make mistakes, but was at the very least a most promising beginning, and gave good hope of developing into a sure guarantee for world peace.

The last two years have in one respect seen a notable development, and that is in the relations between the League and the two great non-League Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States Government has frequently and explicitly declared its friendliness towards the League and its hope of the League's success. It has closely co-operated with the League in every major activity, including the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Economic Conference, and the Disarmament Conference. Secretary of State Stimson, in the summer of 1932, declared that the Paris Pact, because it made war a breach of Treaty obligations, implied that there could no longer be neutrality and that it was necessary for the signatories to meet in conference when peace was threatened. A proposal to adhere to the Permanent Court is before the American Congress. The American Government has expressed at Geneva its willingness to assent to a procedure by which the United States would be able to consult with the Council or Assembly in cases of any threat to peace and would undertake not to raise any objection to the application of League sanctions if convinced, for its part, that the State being proceeded against was really an aggressor. The Soviet Union has also been a most active and valuable member of League Conferences in the last two years, and notably was instrumental in securing an international definition of 'aggression' that promises to be an important contribution to the collective peace system. In the case of the Soviet Union, as well, there seems reason to believe that it would not be difficult to work out some procedure by which that country would not only be represented on the Permanent Disarmament Commission, but would also be able to consult with the members of the League through the Council or Assembly in case of any threat to peace.

But the last two years on the whole have been years in which events and experiences have been used by opponents of the League to deny its value and effectiveness. They have pursued a campaign of disparagement with the object of weakening the influence and lowering its prestige in the eyes of the people. The three main events which have on occasion been cited as justification of this attack are the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Economic Conference, and the Disarmament Conference. Even some of those who hitherto have been loyal adherents to the conception of a collective peace-keeping system have become victims of confusion and doubt and have displayed a willingness to transfer their support to other policies and other methods as the means of realising their desire for peace and security.

All the relevant facts should be borne in mind by anyone attempting to arrive at a balanced judgment as to where we stand with regard to the collective peace system and its corollary—

disarmament and the international control of arms. Two conclusions would appear to emerge: the first that we should not refuse to consider any definite constructive proposals for strengthening the League, and should welcome any suggestions that carried with them the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union, and would be directed to securing close and permanent co-operation between these Powers and the League. The second conclusion is that the success or failure of the League of Nations as an international institution depends upon the policies pursued by the Governments of member States. The creation of any institution is not in itself a solution of the problems it is set up to deal with; it only provides an opportunity for their solution to be worked out. The measure of success in this direction depends upon the spirit, determination and policy of those controlling the institution—whether it be national or international. What is needed, above all, is a clear, bold and consistent policy for making a reality of the existing Treaty obligations under the collective peace system. We have agreed that the policy of scrapping this system is impossible, and that the only alternative is to make the system work. The worst of all policies is to fall between two stools, and by refusing to take the risks of an active policy incurring the far greater dangers of a policy of drift. We must take risks and make sacrifices for peace. If we refuse to do so we are not, as some self-styled realists fondly imagine, practising a policy of safety first. We are, on the contrary, moving towards Armageddon.

The basic risk that we must take in making the collective peace system a reality is to regard national armaments as a matter of world concern. That is the principle on which the World Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments has been concentrating all its efforts. Unless the Conference succeeds in realising its own declared intention of achieving a decisive first step involving a substantial reduction of armaments, a new race in armaments is sooner or later inevitable. One year and a half has gone since the Delegations declared that 'the time has come when all nations must adopt substantial and comprehensive measures of disarmament.' If a new race in armaments were entered upon, it would certainly overshadow and possibly break down the collective peace system.

A world agreement of the character to which I have referred would strengthen national security and become a powerful factor for improving the political relationships of the signatory States. It would be a definite recognition by all the States that their armaments were for the future matters which concerned, not themselves alone, but other nations also. It would be the solemn acceptance of a binding obligation that military preparations

should no longer be determined by any nation's unrestricted will alone, but should be part of the general concern of the world community in which we live.

Failure to secure such an agreement would prove a bitter disappointment to the peoples of almost every nation. For years they have believed that effective means were about to be taken to rid the world of the danger of aggressive militarism, with all its contingent horrors and savagery, and that the old wasteful and costly burden of armaments would soon be in process of being progressively thrown off. The peoples know that in the World War there were no real victors. Some nations were more vanquished than others, and all have suffered the terrible post-war economic consequences. The peoples know that real security can only result from the avoidance of war, and that every diminution of the risks of war assists economic recovery and gives an increase in national security. Failure to obtain such an agreement—whatever reasons might be put forward—would mean the failure of one of the greatest experiments in human history. Failure would mean, after two years of effort, a confession that the reduction and limitation of armaments by world action and the subjection of armaments to effective international control and supervision were not yet possible. Failure would mean another race in armaments, and would expose the world to the danger of another conflict, which if it comes must involve the slaughter of the rising generation. Failure would mean the risk of the Pact of Paris being definitely and perhaps irreparably discredited, for it would freely be asked what reliance could be placed upon a solemn undertaking not to go to war if Governments who gave that undertaking could not agree upon the abolition or reduction of the weapons of war. This Pact was welcomed because it represented a solemn obligation not to resort to war for national ends, but also because it enshrined a new conception—a spiritual conception—in international relations. It implied the acceptance of law and the impartial machinery of reason and justice in place of the elaborate machinery of destruction, and there was a general expectation created that its acceptance by so many Governments would expedite substantial general disarmament.

Now, finally, it may be said that, amid much that is obscure and bewildering in the present international situation, two things are plain and clear: the first is that, should the Conference fail, bigger armaments will not guarantee us national safety; for the more one country arms, the more the others arm too; and the greater the armaments become, the more they breed suspicions, fears and hatreds, out of which war comes. The second point is that the peace-keeping machinery of the world would be endangered, and all attempts to base national security upon the

Covenant of the League would be frustrated. We should be thrown back on international anarchy under conditions where each nation would seek to be the judge of its own rights and prepared to impose its view of those rights by force. Believing that bigger armaments would not give us peace, it is surely sound common sense to make every effort, even at this late hour, to secure a world agreement progressively to reduce and limit armaments.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

HISTORY FROM THE LOOM

A MONTHLY SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

IF to our near gaze, at any rate for most of us on this planet, the year 1933 leaves but a dreary retrospect of continued economic distress only sporadically relieved, in history it will be perceived as vividly memorable. Not in the past fifteen years has the kaleidoscope of the eternal and doubtless bored gods turned so disruptively—to new patterns not yet fixed. Everywhere the post-war foundations of human polity have been broken up, are in flux. Under the rubric of that Year of yet insufficiently effective Grace, the future historian will have four major phenomena to record—the Samson-like flinging off of the restrictions of defeat by a primitively resurgent Teutonism (there is no God but Thor, and Hitler is His prophet!); the second American Revolution; the not less fantastic transformation of the Soviet *régime* from an Ishmaelite and latterly most precarious tyranny of pseudo-ideologist bandits into a world Power on the old model, glorified with the prestige of a multiplicity of treaties, linked hand-in-hand with the American colossus to determine the destiny of Asia; and finally—amid an almost universal indifference that is itself a touch of comedy—the Cheshire Cat fade-out of a League of Nations which should have perpetuated for all time the victory of 1918. An era has come definitely to an end. In the year 1933 Pandora opened a new box. Doubtless it contained also Hope, as previously. The Life-Force has yet a few more æons to endure.

A year ago hardly the most optimistic of illegally drilling, *swastika*-brandishing Nazi youths—and only the most pessimistic of Frenchmen—would have predicted the Germany of to-day. Then she was (and obsessively conscious of it) a degradedly inferior nation, cringingly apologetic before a world of conquerors, surreptitiously and inadequately evading what she could of their prohibitions, stealing back what she could—in a hypocrisy that was humiliating—of her erstwhile iron-fisted sovereignty. And, like a deep-seated cancerous growth bred of her successive miseries, Communism ate into her vitals—6,000,000 Germans,

pervertedly crazed with phantasmic dreams of an international triumph of the internationally disinherited, for whom the *Vaterland* was a mockery and an obstacle, murderously hating (to a degree unimagined by the foreigner) all that stood for the survival of Germany as an entity. The 'non-Aryan' and the gentle-souled 'intellectual' may quite reasonably dislike Hitler and his lieutenants, but no one can deny their achievements. Almost overnight, and ruthlessly, they wiped out the class war, the menace of an uprush from the underworld mouthing Marxian shibboleths; if anyone wants to be a revolutionary, he can amply satisfy himself within the Nazi creed provided he is content to be a German and proud of it. They have made (or released) a new Germany. A Germany that stands erect and is not in the least apologetic. A Germany that is passionately, vehemently, aggressively German. A Germany that believes there are more sublime deaths than dying in bed. A Germany that is preparing swiftly, intensively, in a mystic exaltation of '*Front-Soldat*' comradeship for a struggle every German youth believes to be inevitable. A Germany that challenges France to 'look her in the eyes' and discuss, nation to nation, the conditions of that newly regained but not yet admitted equality.

Dispassionately viewed, the Nazi *Regierung* has used its first nine months of power with considerably more skill than superficial blatancies would suggest or than scoffers anticipated. If it has not yet produced the immediate economic millennium its rank-and-file expected, a very large proportion of its unemployed youth has been absorbed into a nationally constructive effort at minimal cost, and is not subsidised by the State, as in Britain, to listen to street-corner revolutionary orators. Financially, in a period of financial anarchy, it has managed to make the best of both worlds. While retaining the comfortable reassurance of a gold standard for the home public (the German knows no more dreadful word than 'Inflation'), Dr. Schacht, by the twin expedients of a partial suspension of foreign payments and the invention of 'blocked' marks, has endowed German industry with much of the advantages of an abandonment of that anachronistic fetish. If international Jewry would obligingly accept the extinction of its German branch, and desist from a spiteful world-wide boycott, the trade prospect would be—for these times—not so bad. But the foreign-trade surplus, which had jumped from 25,000,000 reichsmarks to 98,500,000 reichsmarks a month, slumped in November to 43,000,000 reichsmarks. This severe drop gave Germany the opportunity of a shrewd counter-attack. At Basle, on December 11, Dr. Schacht somewhat truculently announced that during the next six months Germany would be unable to make even the 50 per cent. foreign payment

under the moratorium. He specifically blamed the Jewish boycott for this state of things. 'For that reason,' he added, 'it is comical to find representatives of the Liberalistic economic system in sympathy with the Jewish boycott movement, and it serves them right if they suffer as a result in the decline of the value of their German interest-paying coupons.' The quotations of the Dawes 7 per cent. bonds and the Young 5½ per cent. bonds, which had been run up from £68½ and £44½ respectively at the end of September to £87½ and £61 respectively on December 11, promptly slumped—incidentally giving Germany a chance to buy back her own obligations at bargain prices. British investors hold nearly £18,000,000 of Dawes Loan and about £11,250,000 of Young Loan, and the British Government cannot be indifferent to their plight and to that of all other British investors in Germany. (American investors are much more hugely involved, but just now the American Government is not a factor on the European scene.) This ingenious move is, of course, no patent of the Nazi régime. It is the old and approved method of every German Government since the morrow of Versailles. The threat of default—backed by an occasional unpleasant reality of default—has repeatedly and invariably split the ranks of Germany's enemies, and ranged some of them on the German side.

On the whole, therefore, the Nazi *Regierung* has been by no means unsuccessful, if doubtfully moral, on the economic side. Not less successful—indeed, successful to a degree incredible to those who believed that the Weimar Republic represented a genuine political aspiration of a fundamentally placid German people—has been the collective inspiration of the previously somewhat *zerstreute* German soul with the Nazi ideals, ideals which are much more than an inferiority-complex craving for a war of revenge, and differ, *toto caelo*, from the Junker dreams of a restored monarchy and a glittering ruling caste. Whereas a year ago, to at least 60 per cent. of Germans, Hitler was merely a vulgar tub-thumper applauded by irresponsible youths of the lower middle class, to-day—and, all deductions made, the November election was proof of it—90 per cent. of the German nation enthusiastically surrenders itself to Hitler for a complete refashioning of the German destiny, a refashioning which demands primarily sacrifice from each in a mystic tribal comradeship that recognises neither privilege nor class. It is not for nothing that Hitler invariably addresses his audiences as '*Meine Volksgenossen!*' He has evoked the nearest thing to a national unanimity known in our time, or indeed in any historical period. The 'non-Aryan' German delegates to the Congress of the Second International in Paris, August 21-26, 1933, apparently failed to recognise that fact. After recommending an intensifica-

tion of the trade boycott and of the propaganda relative to the concentration camps and the Leipzig trial, Herren Wels, Holtermann, and Breitscheid went on to describe optimistically the renewed work of the Social Democratic Party within and without Germany; not only in Holland and Belgium, but in Germany itself, armed Socialist formations were being created to profit by the surely not-distant moment when the Hitler régime would be overthrown. They will have to wait a little longer.

It is precisely in this sphere of international relations—where the only morals are those of the jungle, and manœuvrings to be successful demand a high degree of skill—that Hitler, the novice, has achieved his most spectacular triumph. His advent to power was the signal for the immediate and dangerous isolation of Germany. All that was Jewish or under Jewish influence, all that was of the widely ramifying Second Internationalist affiliation in the personnel of foreign Governments, all that was 'Liberal' by tradition, all that vast and characteristically modern body in every country of amiable yearners for a vaguely beatific ideal, as well as those beneficiaries of the contemporary *Zeitgeist* whose private ideals are not so vague, ranged themselves against this new and brutally disturbing *Drittes Reich*. On the instant Germany was ringed round with enemies, and could look only to Mussolini for a qualified and contingent support. France—with the personnel of its Cartellist Government predominantly Second Internationalist and/or Masonic—had not found herself so popular for years, and much enjoyed the unusual experience. Germany, it seemed to her, was at last fully recognised as the common enemy, the enemy of civilisation. The entire world would combine to keep her down. Never did a régime begin its career more friendless, amid such an all but universal hostility.

It was the urgent, and inherently most difficult, task of the new Germany to break up that combination. From the start Hitler—who had and has no desire for a war with France if German aims can be achieved without it—proposed to have a straight talk with France alone, unshielded by any phalanx of her friends. Last March the mere idea must have seemed fantastic. But it has become the fact. With the not negligible assistance of Italy, the Nazi Government has won a diplomatic victory of the first class. First putting France under the necessity of offending Britain and Italy if she did not subscribe to the Four-Power Pact—whose immediate result was the effective independence of Poland and the temporary semi-severance of the ties between France and an alarmed and disgusted *Petite Entente*—Germany provoked a crisis at the Disarmament Conference with a long-sighted appreciation of the outcome. It was certain that Britain and the United States, whose Governments were acting

under 'internationalist' pressure in a sense precisely contrary to their pro-Germanism of the pre-Hitler period, would make common cause with France and present a triple front. It was equally certain that neither Britain nor America could or would effectively support France if it came to a show-down. Hitler called the bluff and smashed the Conference. The United States vanished to its private world across the Atlantic. Great Britain gave a convincing imitation of a frightened hen fluttering to a fence, and thence agitatedly clucking to both sides. The *Petite Entente* was for the moment busy making an even closer *entente*, one that was concerned not so much with Germany as with Italy and a potential Austria-Hungary, a state of affairs directly provoked by the Nazi drive against Austria. Poland startlingly signalled her new independence by springing an announcement of her own private pact with Germany. Mussolini is hardly the person that France would turn to for sympathy. Britain, having failed to persuade Germany to return to a comfortably voluble Conference which would postpone everything, perceived that after all it was far better that France and Germany should talk out their little differences *tête-à-tête*. She declined even to give a guarantee of French 'security' as a preliminary to possible French concessions. M. Paul-Boncour, dreaming wistfully of a last-moment world-wide anti-Fascist combination—MacDonald, Stalin, Uncle Sam Roosevelt and all—woke to see that dream evanesce, trailing clouds of glory but authentically vanishing. France stood alone, very much alone—save for her grouped offspring of the *Petite Entente*, now glancing alarmedly northward again. For the first time since his accession Hitler personally received the French Ambassador in Berlin. Would France, please, talk? Britain, saying the nicest things to each in the approved MacDonald manner, drew the parties gently together. Would France, please, talk? France, swearing she would ne'er consent, consented.

Those conversations came to an immediate deadlock, but they will certainly continue, and they are of the gravest import. Will France pacifically permit Germany's re-emergence? It is highly probable that Hitler is perfectly sincere in his expressed desire for a completely friendly understanding between France and Germany, their ancient enmity definitely buried, and their common advantages in mutuality consecrated by a pact. It is wildly improbable that France could so far overcome her suspicions as to agree to anything of the sort. In these negotiations, as always, France suffers from the disability that she has no positive policy whatever. She has merely the negative anxiety to hang on to the results of victory as long as possible, and her long series of extorted concessions is without merit and

without bargaining power. Germany has the positive policy implicit since the day she signed the Armistice—of annihilating, successively and prudently, the results of defeat. She has already attained the first stage; she has resumed her place as a full equal among the nations. If for the moment she refrains from the provocation of announcing the full re-establishment of her military strength, she is under no real necessity even to put forward the current formulæ for increasing the *Reichswehr* to 300,000 men, armed in such and such a manner, etc., etc.; no one in the world can prevent her from doing what she likes within her frontiers. These formulæ are merely talking points, to cover the real desideratum. That desideratum is the immediate return of the Saar, without waiting for the 1935 *plébiscite* which will surely give it to her. If Hitler can point to that dramatically accelerated recovery of a part of the *Heimatland*, without having had to fight a war for it, *Führer* worship will approach delirium. Also, he will have made a breach in the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which will much facilitate the next demand, say, for Eupen-Malmédy. Not least, he will have strategically enormously strengthened the western front—by depriving France of the Saar bridgehead across the Rhine.

But the Second Internationalist control of the hitherto existing French Government—personified for foreign affairs by the hitherto irremovable M. Paul-Boncour—is in no accommodating mood. In fact, it is in a very ugly mood, and it desperately wishes it had not made so much 'be kind to Germany' propaganda in the days when its Masonic-Social Democratic brethren were in power at the other side of the Rhine. The French Press, obedient to the *mot d'ordre*, answered the German request for the Saar by a touching solicitude for the economic welfare of the poor Sarrois should they be reunited to the *Reich* (thousands of them, one is given to understand, are rushing to become French citizens), and puritanically remembered that the question is solely within the competence of the League of Nations. The Quai d'Orsay eagerly looked round for allies. Albion, always perfidious, had replied that it could not extend its obligations beyond Locarno, already explained to mean anything or nothing; but there was still the *Petite Entente*, now genuinely alarmed. To what extent could it be effectively counted upon? The latter part of December saw a great scurrying to and fro. Poland had become a somewhat doubtful proposition—the Herriot group optimistically talked of replacing it by Soviet Russia as the principal ally on the eastern front—but M. Paul-Boncour was scheduled to go to Warsaw to talk things over. Also, he was scheduled to report the result in Prague. (Moscow, not at all averse to seeing France plunge into a mess, sent M. Paul-Boncour

a warm invitation to go there*also.) M. Bénès, the brains of Czechoslovakia and the president of the Joint Council of the *Petite Entente*, paid an official visit to Paris to assure M. Paul-Boncour of his 'Everlasting No' to any suggestion of Treaty revision and, doubtless idyllically, 'discussed disarmament.' Just previously M. Titulescu, of Roumania, having completed a busy circular tour to Sofia, Angora, Athens and Belgrade, had journeyed to Kosice, in Slovakia, for an interview with M. Bénès, and had thereafter announced to the world: 'We are united to defend peace, and I declare with force that we are united and prepared for the case of war. For us, revision means war.' That was flat. The Versailles Treaty shall stand unmodified for ever. The League of Nations, where France's adolescent children have an adult vote, shall likewise stand for ever—despite Signor Mussolini's scornful determination to sweep away that home of 'Words, words, words.'

The Succession States naturally do not in the least acquiesce in that proposition. What is resurgence for the vanquished of 1918 is death to them. *Beati possidentes*. Strategically, the *Petite Entente* has just immensely strengthened its position by the liquidation of the twenty-year-old feud between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (*née* Serbia), and the attraction of Bulgaria from the Italian orbit into its own, advertised by the lavishly beflagged visit of King Boris to King Alexander. A vengefully sulky Bulgaria, visited a few months ago by M. Herriot and in acute need of funds apparently unobtainable from Italy, was significantly informed by Paris that the way to a loan lay through Belgrade. Bulgaria achieved a smile and took it, and was offered participation in a Balkan Five-Year pact, by which Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria mutually guarantee their existing frontiers. The elements of that general alliance, which eliminates the influence of any Great Power—and specifically Italy—from the Balkans, already existed in the new pacts between Yugoslavia and Turkey, between Turkey and Greece, and Turkey and Roumania. The immediate effect is to guarantee the rear of the newly close-knit *Petite Entente* at the point where it is most vulnerable—i.e., Yugoslavia. Whatever Poland may do, the Succession States can henceforth be munitioned overseas by France to the Piræus, Salonika, or perhaps Constantinople (but there is also a new Turko-Italian pact), and thence through the Balkans.

Visibly and ominously Europe is gathering into two great hostile camps. The initiative plainly rests with Mussolini. Once again, and more than ever, he is the arbiter of the Continent. *Germany would risk nothing without the assurance of his support, little Austria is his washpot, and over Hungary he has cast his

shoe. Hence Sir John Simon's Christmas trip to Capri, *via* Rome, to implore him to persuade his friend Hitler to be reasonable, and to ask him precisely what he implies by the 'reorganisation' of the League. (Presumably Sir John would also make pained mention of the little matter of Italian quasi-official championship of Italian-speaking dissidents in Malta, which, if it means anything at all, is perhaps a gentle hint to Britain to remember that if there should be trouble she has a very vital possession in the Mediterranean to which imperial Italy stakes a potential claim.) A general war looms hideously nearer than at any time since the Armistice, but it is not yet imminently inevitable. It will become inevitable only if France should presently be faced with the alternative of a flat 'No!' to the German-Italian demands, or an abandonment of her offspring which would annihilate her prestige in Europe. But hitherto Mussolini has built and consolidated his prestigious power by prudently refraining from translating the Fascist potentiality of war into fact; also, he is contemplating an extension of the Italian empire in North Africa, whereof the appointment of General Balbo to the governorship of Libya is the premonitory symbol, and he knows that France has all but decided to evacuate Syria; he has greater gains in prospect than entanglement in a Central European imbroglio could give him—though the menace of his interference in such an *imbroglio* might purchase for him a free hand elsewhere. France, the real France of the people, however the Second Internationalists may rage and imagine a vain thing, would with extreme difficulty be propagandised into a preventive war. Only in Germany would young manhood spring ecstatically to arms, but Hitler waits on the nod of Mussolini, and preferably would look eastward; in the case of a Russo-Japanese war the Ukraine, to be reached in company with Poland over a prostrate Czechoslovakia, is a corridor leading to far horizons. Great Britain is once again in the position of July 1914. A clear indication of a definite policy might—or might not, since now she is plainly impotent for any effective intervention—postpone or avert a Western European conflict.

Domestically, France still suffers under the protean Governments of a gang of Left-Wing politicians who hang together lest they should hang separately. The Chautemps Ministry survived the first debate on its version of the budget only because the deputies were, for the moment, genuinely scared of popular indignation at their factious futility. (In whatever form that unhappy budget is finally passed, it will surely not balance the public finances, and the Treasury proposes to issue another large loan early in the new year.) Parliamentary government in France, with its perpetual reshuffle of the same men to form inept and evanescent Ministries, has become a bad joke that has ceased to

be amusing. M. Flandin, Finance Minister in the Tardieu Government, recently voiced the unpalatable fact which the politicians are beginning to perceive. 'Why conceal from ourselves,' he said in a speech at Rouen, 'that the Republic is menaced to-day—not so much by the attacks of its few adversaries as by the silent disaffection of the masses?' By the Republic he meant, of course, the present corrupt political system closely affiliated with Grand Orient Freemasonry. There is small chance to-day of France becoming either a monarchy or a dictatorship, in the absence of any man visibly fitted to fill either of the necessary rôles. But the disaffection indubitably exists, and it is not so silent. When M. Herriot exhorted the parliamentary factions to pass M. Chautemps' budget he referred significantly to the ubiquitous street posters headed '*A la porte—les députés!*', and admitted that that sentiment is re-echoed throughout the country. Heavily taxed, with its trade disastrously shrinking, the French people is entirely exasperated at the impotence of its Government under the threats, given point by point by short demonstration strikes, of its horde of syndicated *fonctionnaires* determined to accept no cut in their emoluments. Also, it compares nervously its own weak and ephemeral Governments with the menacing dictatorship across the Rhine.

Across the Atlantic the American Revolution gave itself a temporary pause. The Administration, under the necessity of refinancing itself, and therefore of restoring some degree of confidence, halted the forced devaluation of the dollar. The alleged grandiose plan of President Roosevelt—if plan it was—to control the world price of gold, and thereby to revolutionise the world values of commodities, has had no immediate results. The Paris gold market, powerfully supported by the Bank of England, withstood an attack that was not seriously pressed by Washington, although it lost gigantic amounts of gold on private account. Dollar prices failed to rise as the adherents of Professor Warren—who apparently fixes the gold price as he privately thinks fit—expected. They now insist that the policy must be more vigorously pursued. President Roosevelt announced that gold purchases were integral in his programme, while almost simultaneously he was at pains to emphasise that he was not committed to any policy whatever. He still has to face an inflationist Congress in January, already preparing bills for a *mandatory* three-fold expansion of the currency, while a powerful section in that Congress is proposing vehemently to dispute the legality of gold purchases at all. A vast budget deficit is looming ahead, and Congress will consider an ingenious plan for the Treasury to impound all the gold in the banks and return half of it to the owners after the price has been doubled by devaluation. The profit thus

accruing to the Government would balance the budget and pay for all the recovery programmes, while the currency—with a 40 per cent. gold cover—would still be 'sound.' This may happen, but no one knows. What is certain is that there can be no resumption of normal business in the United States until the contracting parties know the value of their medium of exchange. During the recent cessation of forced devaluation, business immediately responded and improved. The forthcoming session of Congress will assuredly be lively. There will certainly be a revolt against the N.R.A. and all its works—attacked on the one hand as being an enforced socialisation of the entire country, and on the other as having served merely the interests of 'big business,' of having extinguished the small manufacturer and the small merchant for the benefit of a gigantic capitalistic cartellisation of the entire industrial machine. Every day the N.R.A. becomes less popular, and it is plausibly reported that General Johnson is about to resign from it and become 'Counsel for National Defence.'

In external affairs the Administration has 'soft-pedalled' on the implications of the Soviet recognition, and on all matters pertaining to the Far East. If the Soviet Government has not yet received the loan which is its perpetual quest, nevertheless the American recognition has transformed its position in the world. The attitude of M. Litvinov, on his triumphal return home *via* Italy, was significant of the change. He had, of course, the interview with Signor Mussolini, without which no statesman's tour would be complete, but it is doubtful if the Duce derived much satisfaction from it. Henceforth, it is to be inferred, Moscow regards itself as the dominant partner in the relations between the two countries, conferring favours rather than receiving them. Italy can never forget the existence of the Straits of Gibraltar, a gate to the Atlantic and the outside world that may inconveniently be shut. It was to liberate itself from that strategic dependence that Fascist Italy made terms with the Sickle and Hammer and is friendly with Turkey. Russian oil from the Black Sea, Russian ores, and in certain eventualities Russian wheat—although Italy has made herself almost self-supporting in foodstuffs—may conceivably become vital necessities. Therefore Italy draws what she may of these commodities from Russia, and—in an always unfavourable balance of trade—partially pays for them by the export of machinery. The new prospect of an unlimited and virtually gratuitous supply of American machinery to Russia is anything but pleasant. M. Litvinov agreed—why not?—to the ratification of the Soviet-Italian pact of friendship negotiated last September, and he agreed to extend the Soviet-Italian trade convention, concluded last May, until December 1934. But in more important

things—and specifically the European situation—the interview would seem to have been barren. M. Litvinov adroitly turned the conversation into lengthy disquisitions on Japan, a matter of the most remote interest to Italy. Mussolini was admittedly anxious to restore good relations between Moscow and Nazi Germany, but Litvinov merely said that the Treaty of Rapallo was still in existence, and that new conversations were not in the least necessary. He underlined this little snub by passing through Berlin without pausing to meet Hitler, who was eager to make personal explanations, and who had just made an almost abject surrender in the matter of Russian Jews in Germany. Ironically, the Vatican avenged the snub by itself delivering one. Mr. Farley, the Catholic Postmaster-General of the United States, had journeyed in the ship with Litvinov apparently to explain to the Holy Father the purity of the American intentions in recognising the Soviets, and to persuade the Vatican to somewhat more friendly relations with America's new friend. (There are some 30,000,000 Catholics in the United States who have to be remembered.) The Holy Father replied, *urbi et orbi*, that the Vicar of Christ on earth could have no dealings with a State that made complete atheism an integral part of its Second Five-Year Plan.

In the Far East, shrouded in mysterious secrecy, the Soviet Government continues to make significant noises. In what the Russian Communist Party ecstatically describes as 'an epoch-making event, designed to strengthen the Soviet Far Eastern frontiers,' Messrs. Molotov and Stalin, representing both the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, on December 12 issued a joint decree exempting the inhabitants of the Far Eastern territories from the usual compulsory grain deliveries to the State. Collectivised peasants are exempted for ten years, and non-collectivised for five. These specially pampered inhabitants of the Soviet paradise are also granted certain exemptions in the matter of handing over meat, potatoes, soya beans, milk and butter, while the pay of industrial workers, transport workers, fishermen, engineers, and teachers in the area is substantially increased. The decree, it is stated, was issued as a result of the report of M. Krutov, chairman of the civil administration of the Far Eastern territory, where of late there have been serious disorders provoked by the believed imminence of war. Simultaneously, the pay of the N.C.O.'s and men of the Far Eastern army is increased by 50 per cent., and that of the officers by 20 per cent. A serious effort to promote colonisation of these sparsely settled lands is allegedly to be made. On December 14, it was announced from Moscow, for the benefit of the American Press, that 'Colonisation of the Soviet province of Sakhalin, on

the Pacific coast of Siberia, will be undertaken immediately. Complications with Tokio may result, it is feared.' It is improbable that there is anything in this other than a naïve Soviet effort to keep the American Government's enthusiasm alive. Midwinter is not exactly the time to commence the colonisation of the semi-arctic island of Sakhalin. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the intensity of the Soviet preparations for war in the Far East. They are being made under the personal supervision of M. Voroshilov, Commissar for War, with General Blücher-Gourov-Gallens—the enigmatic military genius who organised Chiang-Kai-Shek's victorious northward march from Canton in 1926—as his right-hand man. The Trans-Baikal and Amur Railway is being double-tracked. A seaplane base has been established at Oceanskay, 20 miles from Vladivostok. Great accumulations of supplies—in particular, wheat ravished from the starving peasants of the Ukraine—are stored at strategic points in Siberia.

Meanwhile, Japan more or less serenely (there has been a domestic battle over the budget in consequence of the large demands of the navy) goes on her way, wherever that way may lead. There is talk of Japanese military wireless stations in Mongolia, and of a Japanese-backed incursion into Chinese Turkestan, that alleged Eldorado of precious metals which the Soviet Turk-Sib. Railway was designed to exploit. The matter of most immediate interest to her is the revolt in the Chinese province of Fukien, opposite the Japanese island of Formosa. That revolt is the direct reaction of the new accord between Japan and the Chinese Nationalist Government of Nanking, headed by Chiang-Kai-Shek, and an indication of Moscow's ability to make trouble for it. At the end of November Mr. T. V. Soong, Chiang-Kai-Shek's brother-in-law, the financial genius of the Nanking Government and prominently identified with a pro-American and anti-Japanese policy, resigned. Simultaneously, General Tsai Ting-Kai, commander of the 19th Route Army which gained fame against the Japanese at Shanghai and had subsequently been sent by Nanking to protect Fukien against the Communists, declared his independence of the Nationalist Government in a manifesto which violently denounced Chiang-Kai-Shek for treating with the Japanese. This was a little awkward for Chiang-Kai-Shek, who was just about to start a first-class offensive against the Communists in Kiangsi. He was constrained to postpone that offensive and turn his attention to Fukien—so far, without decisive results. Moreover, it distinctly impairs Chiang-Kai-Shek's chance of effectively controlling Canton, whose governor, General Chen Chi-Tang, is alleged to be in secret understanding with Nanking. Chen Chi-Tang has been obliged to send troops against Fukien to oppose an incipient

invasion, with the effect of exposing Canton to capture by an army from Kwangsi, and a consequent set-back to the unification of China under the only Government which has so far shown any efficiency. The rebels in Fukien have set up a Government whose Foreign Minister is our old friend Mr. Eugene Chen, and it is alleged that the fabulously wealthy Mr. T. V. Soong is perhaps not altogether stranger to it. Notoriously, Russian advisers are actively assisting the new State. In this imbroglio the prestige of Japan has become bound up with that of the Nanking Government; and the prestige of Japan in China will be of immense importance in the eventuality of conflict in the Far East.

As perhaps a financial preliminary, the immensely profitable Japanese trade offensive goes on with particular destructiveness to British trade. Already Japan has supplanted Britain as the greatest exporter of cotton textiles, and in a multiplicity of articles her competition is one that cannot be met by any device of tariffs. But it would seem that the British Government is exceedingly chary of any interference at the present delicate juncture of affairs. Lancashire M.P.'s who were agitating for action against Japanese imports were privately but authoritatively informed that they were playing with fire, and that unless they were careful they might start a conflagration in the Far East which would involve Australia and Singapore. (As a corollary to this, the Commanders-in-Chief of the China and East Indies stations and of the Australian Squadron and of the New Zealand Division are to meet for conference in January at Singapore, where the naval base will not be completed until 1939.) The Commonwealth Government of Australia—which of late has sold the greatest portion of its wool-clip to Japan—is evidently of the same opinion as Whitehall. It proposes to send a diplomatic mission to the Far East early in 1934 with the express object of establishing good-will with Japan and China. A few years ago a war between America and Japan would inevitably have drawn in the British Empire, either as a whole or piecemeal. The action of the Australian Government is significant of a great change in the Dominion attitude. Both in Europe and in the Pacific the policy of Britain just now is reminiscent of the story of the small boy who, being asked what he wanted to be when he grew up, replied, 'Well, I'm going to try to be a bachelor.' Britain is going to try to be a neutral.

F. BRITTEN AUSTIN.

THE PROSPECTS OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

I WAS standing on the steps of the Carlton Club after the announcement of the results of the poll at the last General Election. Two women were standing behind me. 'My dear,' said one to the other, 'it means the beginning of a New England.'

Two of the most powerful motives which appeal to democracy are avarice and fear. The Conservative Party can seldom effectively appeal to avarice, for there it is outbid. Those who desire capital appreciation discover inevitably that a gold mine presents greater attractions than a trustee security. But what it loses upon the electoral swings Toryism makes up upon the roundabouts. Avarice may be the most powerful motive to which the Labour Party appeals; fear is the trump card of the Conservatives. That this is so is proved by the elections of 1924 and 1931, and the outcome of the same transactions, when compared with those of 1923 and 1929, sufficiently indicates that democracy, like the cat in the adage, is usually more susceptible to apprehension than to greed. Whilst it may be safely assumed that an alteration in this distribution of political weapons would produce cataclysmic results, for the moment it must be regarded as static.

Three successive problems face the author of a sketch of Conservative prospects and opportunities. In the immediate foreground looms the present National Coalition. How long will it last? In the middle distance (political landscapes are greatly foreshortened) is the next General Election, probably taking place in 1935-36. How will the party fare in that? In the more distant future there is a large blank space (to be filled in, one may piously hope). What should occupy it?

The present 'National Government' is unlikely to break up through internal weakness. It is fairly clear that no important body of Conservatives desires to substitute Mr. Baldwin as Prime Minister in place of Mr. MacDonald. (It is seldom an appreciable advantage to replace Tweedledum by Tweedledee.) Moreover, it is by no means certain that Mr. Baldwin, for his part, greatly desires to add to the difficulties of leadership the weight of

primary responsibility for the affairs of the nation. It is also apparent that the enemies of the Government are not sufficiently strong to overthrow it. With the Labour Party it will be convenient to deal at a later stage, as their opportunity will not arise until the dissolution of the present Parliament. The Liberal Party can safely be left out of consideration, as their opportunity will never arise at all. Here it is sufficient to observe that the Conservative opposition is manifestly impotent. The circumstances of 1922 (to suggest a parallel) are wholly absent. The would-be Tory rebels, although they espouse a cause which creates a good deal of enthusiasm in the local associations, are almost without support in the country and carry very little weight in the House. Moreover, vitally important, they have as yet no Mr. Bonar Law. Mr. Churchill, unfortunately, has all his future some thirty years behind him, and can never well become again a genuine hope of the stern, unbending type of Tory, and, while the name of Lloyd commands the respect and devotion of an initiated few, by the many it is not so much disliked as almost entirely unknown.

The truth is that the Conservatives could not get rid of Mr. MacDonald if they wished. With him would go the trusted leaders of the party, and the rest simply have not the personnel with which to fill the vacant places. Mr. A. L. Rowse, in a recent article,¹ suggests Mr. Neville Chamberlain as an alternative leader. Assume for a moment—a big assumption—that he was prepared to break with his colleagues. Mr. Chamberlain, although an admirable lieutenant, was never seriously suggested as leader except as a *pis aller*. The younger men—Duff Cooper, Donald Somervell, Walter Elliot, Oliver Stanley, Anthony Eden—represent precisely the type of Conservative that is most enthusiastic for the Government. The dissident Tories are as incompetent to form an Administration as the Independent Labour Party. Moreover, many of these most promising youngsters have been caught by the more vigorous appeal of the English *Führer*.

While, however, the National Government is unlikely to fall from internal weakness or external assault, it is hardly likely to survive without considerable changes of personnel. The reign of Ramsay, at least, is clearly drawing to a close. He is neither young nor well, and it seems unlikely that he will be able to sustain his present office for another five years. After this, if he survives, he might well continue to exercise an influence in politics after the manner of Grey or Balfour (*si parva licet componere magnis*), but it is not probable that he would be able to lead a Government. What is true of the Prime Minister is likely

¹ 'The Labour Party from Within,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, December 1933, p. 641.

to be true of his main supporters. They are all getting on in years. Even if we assume, however, these changes of personnel, it is still likely that the Conservative Party will remain in association with other elements when it next faces the country, and will still be supporting a Government at least nominally national. In the absence of circumstances analogous to those of 1922, the Conservatives are unlikely to desire to dissociate themselves from former allies who are still considerable electoral assets. These allies, in their turn, are hardly strong enough to do without Conservative aid, and at the same time would lose their very *raison d'être* if they formally merged with the Tory Party. It is difficult, for instance, after what has happened, to imagine Mr. Runciman or Sir John Simon as anything but allies of the Conservatives. It is equally difficult to imagine them as Conservatives. The same is true of the National Labour adherents. These will find natural friends among the younger supporters of the Government, and with their aid should be able to influence party policy in such a way as to prevent a breach. It should also be remembered that as electoral assets these elements are far more valuable under their existing denominations.

I propose, therefore, to assume that the Conservative Party will go to the country as supporters of a 'National Government' and with a moderately progressive policy devised by the younger men very much to the fore. How will it fare?

The recent municipal and parliamentary bye-elections certainly do not encourage Conservative hopes, and, from a Conservative, an explanation must necessarily seem like an excuse. Nevertheless, at least an analysis is desirable. The most noticeable fact about the recent bye-elections, at any rate, has been that the Labour Party for the first time for years has been able successfully to exploit the emotion of fear. East Fulham can, I think, be admittedly explained as the result of the fear of war. It was there successfully suggested that the continuance of Conservative government ultimately involved the participation by this country in another war. A contributory cause has been the identification of Fascism with the entire policy of the Right, and a widespread belief that it is an imminent possibility in this kingdom. This latter statement may seem to require some justification. One need not look further than Mr. Rowse's illuminating article (already referred to) in the previous number of this Review. Referring (on p. 647) to the members of the Socialist League, he says that they

are determined that, if they can help it, Fascism shall not triumph in this country through any such obtuseness of the Liberal mentality within the Labour movement. In order that democracy may continue [etc.].

The entire Socialist Press, and almost every responsible Socialist leader, has attempted to make, and to some extent has succeeded in making, fear of Fascism one of the most popular planks in the Labour platform. Lord Trenchard's attempts to stem the rising tide of corruption in the police force, the experimental adoption of camps for the able-bodied unemployed (one of the few really constructive measures to deal with an urgent problem which the Government has to its credit), anything which can be shown to present even a passing analogy to the Italian or, better, the German system, has been pressed into service to support this at first sight fantastic suggestion. I have even heard the failure of Oxford authorities to prevent ardent opponents of Fascism from attempting to break up a Mosley meeting cited as an example of the essential Fascism of the Right in England. There is no doubt that the Socialist Party is endeavouring to associate Hitlerism with the Conservatives in the popular mind in precisely the same way in which Conservatives have to some measure succeeded in associating the Labour Party with the principles of the Russian Revolution.

There can be no doubt that the fear of war and of Fascism combined with the ever-present, and to some extent justified, fear of a capitalist threat to wages, represent a very formidable attempt on the part of the Labour Party to capture the Conservative portion of the electorate. Will the attack succeed?

Criticism of the Government has been rendered more effective by the fact that, although hardly susceptible to the charge of supineness levelled at earlier Conservative Administrations, its chiefs have apparently not yet understood that, now that the crisis as a result of which they were elected is gradually passing away, the country would appreciate a more forward policy in financing schemes for social betterment (such as slum clearance) than the Government has yet shown an intention to carry out. It is, however, not safe to assume that this situation will prove of lasting duration. The failure of the Labour attack is rendered certain, however, by the absence of both of the two conditions necessary to its success. Before a Socialist victory is possible it will be necessary for the Labour Party to continue to control the appeal to the fear of Fascism and of war, which it has recently successfully employed. It will also be a *conditio sine qua non* that the National Government should be able to appeal to no counteracting considerations, either by way of a more forward policy or of a counter-threat to the safety of the electors. Even assuming—an assumption which will require separate attention—that the National Government initiates no forward policy, the bad tactics of Labour leaders have rendered the fulfilment of these conditions impossible.

Genuine pacifism is inconsistent with an adherence to the League Covenant or to Locarno, and Labour inconsistency in this respect is accentuated the more by the extreme hostility of the party to the Nazi régime in Germany. The cry of 'No Fascismo' is rendered idle by the policy of Sir Stafford Cripps—not yet officially adopted, but already dangerously associated in the minds of the electorate with the official party. It is true that Sir Stafford's adherents have an answer to this, but the retort is too easy. It is urged that the mandate of the electorate is a condition precedent to the adoption of the policy, and that the scheme, therefore, is 'democratic to the point of political naïveté'.² This position is, however, obviously untenable, since it is part of the scheme to prolong the life of Parliament by a Septennial Act if bye-elections are unfavourable. Democracy knows of no indissoluble unions between governors and governed, and the excuse of the tyrant who will not abdicate that 'You chose me' is never an answer which finds favour with the people.

It is also quite clear that now Free Trade is out of fashion it has been a cardinal mistake upon the part of the Labour Party to maintain its equivocal attitude towards Protection. It is obvious that Socialism is inconsistent with Free Trade principles, but Labour leaders consistently refuse to countenance the protective duties of the Tories. This is an error which may very well prove fatal. Whatever the merits or demerits of Protection, it binds the employees of protected industries to the Protectionist party with hoops of steel. That this is so has been proved at Cowley and in other places.

It is therefore probable that, even if no forward policy is adopted, the Conservative Party will be able to face the next General Election with at least three good cries—the fear of dictatorship, the threat to Protection, and last, but not least, the confused and chaotic state of the world outside. Continued trouble abroad nearly always leads to nationalist leanings, and even if the conclusion above reached, that the Labour Party will be unable to pose as pacifist for long, is incorrect, it is probable that public opinion will be less self-consciously pacific than in the past. Perhaps it should be added that up to the present Tories have done less to identify themselves with Fascism than have the Socialists with Bolshevism in recent years.

Politics, however, is more than a study of electoral odds, and interests others than the party boss, and if, as we have indicated, the Tories are to have the government of the country for another eight years at least, it is of some importance to inquire what use they are likely to make of their opportunities. Here the prospect is far less rosy. The heart of a political party lies in its local

² Rowse, *loc. cit.*, p. 648.

organisations, and the local Tory associations are rotten to the core. There is little prospect of improvement, and what there is is rendered more remote by the fact that Press criticism of the party is directed rather against the Central Office than the localities. This is most unjust. Central Office is an uninspired and pedestrian organisation, but it is thoroughly painstaking, and sincerely attempts to check the favouritism and extravagance of the local associations. It is important to realise the vital significance of these bodies in the practical operation of the machinery of government. The free choice of the democracy in a parliamentary election is free only as, philosophers assure us, all our choices are free—that is to say, free only as between predetermined alternatives, or candidates. No one has a chance of being elected to Parliament (generally speaking) unless he has first been selected as a candidate by a local party association. The principles of selection which these bodies employ are often far from satisfactory—still more frequently the reverse of democratic. I append three examples of this phase of our parliamentary system in working so far as it affects the Conservative Party:

The first case is a London constituency—a safe Tory seat. Selection of candidates (unless the rules have been altered very recently) is by the executive committee, the general body of the association having no power of suggestion, but only a right of veto. Membership of the executive committee can be obtained by a subscription of £5 annually, which gives the subscriber a right to a seat upon this body and to the title and style of vice-president of the association.

The second case is an agricultural constituency in the Eastern Counties. Again the seat may be regarded as safe for Conservatism. Until recently it was held by an extremely wealthy man. Prospective Conservative candidates have been informed that they need not apply unless they subscribe to the local association the fantastic sum of £3000 per annum.

The third example is of a safe Conservative seat in the residential area of a northern industrial city. Prospective candidates for Parliament have been informed that £600 a year is the least annual subscription which the association will consider.

It is really surprising, in view of facts like these, that the parliamentary representation of the party is not worse than it is. It remains true, nevertheless, that the amazing decline in the National vote at recent bye-elections has been due to the unsuitability of the Conservative candidates. Put an effective young National Labour candidate (like Mr. Kenneth Lindsay) in the field, and he is brilliantly successful. Tory candidates more and more tend to run to one of three types. There is the successful local figure who knows nothing of wider issues. There is the

sprig of the aristocracy who knows nothing of any issues at all, and there is the retired but distinguished gentleman who knows nothing of politics except what he learns from Central Office. It is not with men like these that a country seething with discontent at poverty and labour conditions can be guided to better times. To describe this curious group of people, as, for instance, Mr. Rowse benevolently does, as 'highly gifted, highly trained, young members of the governing class'³ is really to understate the Labour case. It is comparatively cold comfort to reflect that conditions in the Labour Party, although different, are really just as bad, yet every attempt at reform is described as 'washing dirty linen in public' (politically an unpardonable offence, and far worse than not washing it at all).

Fortunately, however unsatisfactory its internal condition, there are two good points about the Conservative Party. Unlike the Labour Party, which dictates its policy to its leaders, the Tory Party has a tradition of loyalty to its best men, and, once they secure election to Parliament, the best men certainly tend to come to the top. Both these tendencies continue, and herein lies the real hope for the future. If the whole of the 'Old Gang' were swept away to-morrow (*quod deus avortat*), Oliver Stanley, Walter Elliot, Donald Somervell, Anthony Eden, Duff Cooper, with a few others, are perfectly capable of forming a competent Government, and if we remember that in all probability they would be assisted by other 'National elements'—by Leslie Hore-Belisha, for instance, and Malcolm MacDonald—there is no reason at all to suppose that such a Government would be any weaker than the present. Would it be stronger? What would it achieve? These questions are of more than academic interest, for we should remember that even if the 'Old Gang' is not swept away to-morrow, the days of the men of sixty are clearly numbered. These others are the men who will be governing the country in six years' time.

Such a Government, when it comes, will certainly mark a new development in English policy. Unlike their elders, younger Conservatives have no fear of being charged with Socialism. They have been brought up to regard without aversion an England in which, to use a Socialist leader's phrase, there is 'a little less poverty and a little less riches.' They regard as of axiomatic validity the claim of the working class, and especially of the skilled labourers, to security and comfort. Nor, in accepting this, are they the less good Conservatives. Three points of fundamental importance (apart, one hopes, from a certain Conservative prudence) divide them from the Socialist Party. In the first place, they regard Marxism as exploded, whether it is regarded as

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 652.

a philosophy of society, as an explanation of history, as a policy, or as a prediction of the future. In the second place, they believe that there are claims other than those of poverty which it would be unjust to ignore. In the third place, they have little faith in the various expedients, financial, social, or industrial, proposed by the Socialist Party, and believe that their adoption would be nothing but a disaster to the working class, which, having less to lose than any other, is naturally the most affected by any error in administration.

It follows that the policy of such a Government as I have indicated will never be susceptible of such charges of supineness as have, with some justification, been levelled at some of its predecessors. The ground for more deliberate planning in the industrial sphere was already broken in the early twenties of this century by the Electricity Scheme (a purely Conservative measure), and in the thirties Mr. Morrison's Transport Board (the measure of a Socialist, which is, however, very self-consciously Conservative) is an experiment which cannot fail to be watched sympathetically and closely. It is a mistake to suppose that Conservative Administrations will in the future refuse to use Government credit for expenditure of a commercial or a quasi-commercial kind. The objections raised to such expedients at the moment, when employed by younger men, are either directed to the occasion (the financial crisis) or the object upon which the money is to be spent. Even if the Conservative Party were rightly regarded as an appanage of the financiers, there are many indications even now that a Housing Loan (to give an example) would be welcomed in the City. With a National Government led by the younger men I have indicated, it would be safe to predict the initiation of several measures upon the analogy of the Electricity Scheme (assuming, of course, favourable financial conditions). It would be safe also to assume that slum clearance would be one of the objects upon which money thus raised would be expended.

It is also possible that such a Government would find it necessary to institute at least one constitutional reform of far-reaching importance. Modern parliamentary democracy is clearly unworkable, or at least unsatisfactory, in its present form. It is incredibly cumbrous at one moment, at another disastrously swift. It leads in England to the selection of candidates by all parties who are ignorant of, and ignore, the best expert opinion. In the Conservative Party, as we have seen, members of Parliament are almost wholly unrepresentative of the working-class votes supporting them. Labour M.P.'s are for the most part old, incredibly stupid, almost illiterate, and wholly unrepresentative men of their educated supporters. Parliaments are elected which do not, even at the time of election, represent the real feeling in

the country (*cf.* the present Parliament); on the other hand, real strength of government is often impossible owing to the direct influence of electors upon their representatives. These defects are almost universally recognised, and various suggestions have been made to solve the problems which they raise. Liberals have supported various schemes of electoral reform, and usually favour proportional representation. Sir Stafford Cripps suggests government by Order in Council and the abolition of the House of Lords. Conservatives have hitherto occupied themselves with unworkable proposals for House of Lords reform.

These proposals are hardly likely to commend themselves to modernist Conservative opinion. Proportional representation is based upon a fallacious theory, and is usually found unworkable in practice. At best, it serves to preserve in unnatural life political interests which would be better dead. The Socialist proposal is, of course, not merely to abolish the Lords, but practically to abolish both Houses of Parliament and to substitute legislation by the Executive. It is difficult to see that this would be an improvement upon the existing arrangement. On the other hand, every scheme of House of Lords reform has been caught upon the horns first of one and then another ineluctable dilemma. A Second Chamber must either be popularly elected (as suggested in the Parliament Act) or chosen upon some other basis. If it is popularly elected, it is open to objection whether it agrees in political complexion with the Lower House or not. If it agrees it is superfluous, and if it disagrees, as it is popularly elected, there is no reason why either House should give way to the other, and deadlock is the inevitable result, unless resort is had to improvident experiments like a referendum. Upon the other hand, if the House is not popularly elected, the only terms upon which the House of Commons would admit it into the Constitution would be those upon which the existing House of Lords is allowed to remain. Moreover, either a method of election ensuring that the Second Chamber is conservative (with a small *c*) in opinion is employed or it is not. If it is, such a body would have little chance of survival against a democratic Assembly; and if it is not, the whole object of bicameral government is defeated. The Socialist proposal of abolition with 'open-mindedness' (!) * upon the question of what is to replace it merely intensifies existing evils and removes the only place where informed (although one-sided) opinion can effectively be heard.

There are some grounds for thinking that Mr. Elliot at least has considered the adoption of an almost entirely novel principle in English politics. Quite recently he referred in terms of praise to the corporative principle. Once give to informed opinion in

* *Cf.* Rowse, *loc. cit.*, p. 648.

industry and the professions (whether trade union or otherwise) a certain power of legislative self-expression as such, and your constitutional problem is largely solved without abandoning the essential principles of democracy. As far as the old terminology is concerned, the corporations are to some extent a new Lower House with probouleutic functions; the Legislature proper (the House of Commons) is the Upper House. This relationship is well illustrated by the history of the Prayer Book Measure introduced under the (essentially corporative) Church Assembly Powers Act.

To such a solution it would of course be objected that it confirms all the worst suspicions of the Left regarding the Fascist tendencies of the Right. But such an objection is not necessarily sound. It is true that the corporative principle has, in fact, been mainly utilised by the Fascist States. There is, however, no reason in principle why this should be so. In a Fascist State elections to the corporations are naturally dominated by the Fascist Party. There is no reason in principle why they should not be carried out on democratic or, indeed, any other lines. The corporative principle itself is a great new political invention, and it would be as unwarranted to refuse to consider it solely on the ground that it has been utilised by the Fascists as it would be to refuse to consider the introduction of a new mechanical invention because it was devised by an atheist.

To some extent this solution would be a great liberation to the Conservative Party. As against mere wealth it would give technical ability a tremendous advantage. To the public at large it would provide a new machinery for carrying out schemes of industrial planning and insurance, and would reduce the power of the agitator to precisely that which it ought to be, that of a creature whose main function it is to prevent the abuse of the liberties of the people. Whether this is likely to be put into effect I do not know. But there must be many besides myself who regard a solution along these lines as the only alternative to chaos.

QUINTIN HOGG.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT BILL

THE Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, appointed in December 1930, took nearly two years to master its subject, reporting finally in October 1932. The Government has spent another year in reaching its decisions and drafting its Bill. Impatient as the public rightly was of the robberies that ingenious people continued to perpetrate under shelter of the law until the Anomalies Act, founded on the Commission's first Report, was passed in 1931, and later of the inequalities between different areas that marked the unco-ordinated local application of the means test, it cannot be said that the three years have been ill spent. A large measure of general agreement has been attained about the Insurance scheme (Part I. of the Bill), though irreconcilable advocates of parasitic socialism, like fanatical teetotallers in their opposition to temperance reform, may prefer the existing order of things to remain unimproved, to strengthen the cry for its total destruction. Part II., dealing with the treatment of those who have no longer, or never had, claims to insurance benefit, is more open to question.

A year ago, reviewing in *The Nineteenth Century* the final Report of the Royal Commission,¹ I welcomed the proposed Statutory Commission to supervise the working of unemployment finance, as the central feature of the Report and potentially the most fruitful of its recommendations. It is highly satisfactory to find this feature embodied in the Bill, though with a difference. The Royal Commission would have given the Statutory Commission oversight not only of insurance proper, but also of its scheme of unemployment assistance, intermediate between insurance benefit and public assistance (Poor Law relief). The Bill provides for this intermediate class, but (as explained later) creates a second body, the Unemployment Assistance Board, to administer it, so confining the Statutory Commission to the sphere of the Insurance Fund. This is the most important departure of Part I. from the Royal Commission's Report.

The creation of the Statutory Commission has two aims.

¹ 'The State and the Unemployed,' December 1932.

The very costly delays experienced under the reign of law in stopping obvious holes in the insurance scheme will be avoided by frank acceptance of the fact that it is impossible for Parliament to find time to keep the complex details of such schemes flexible enough to meet changing industrial and financial conditions; and it is futile to allege subversive aims of permanent officials, greedy of power, as a reason for denying to the Executive the necessary powers (under due safeguard) to do what Parliament cannot. The convincing answer to *The New Despotism* is contained in the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932), and in this respect the parrot-cry, still heard in Parliament and out, against Bureaucracy has about as much relation to the realities of modern government as has the bill 'for the more effectual preventing of Clandestine Outlawries' which the House still reads a first time on the first day of every session, to preserve its right (unchallenged for centuries) to talk at large. Further, sad experience has proved only too conclusively that under the guidance of Ministers, of whatever party, the House of Commons is peculiarly prone, when it does get to work on unemployment, to make changes 'determined less by the need for the careful balancing of income and expenditure than by a desire to attract, or do as little as possible to repel, electoral support' (Royal Commission's Report, par. 288). Ever since 1920 the Minister of Labour had had statutory power to alter scales of insurance contributions and benefits, to keep the fund solvent, 'if the Treasury so direct.' The significant fact is that the Treasury never so directed, but let the fund run up a debt of £115 millions. The Treasury officials could do no more than tender advice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer confidentially—and Chancellors are just as sensitive about electoral support as their colleagues.

Against this very human failing in the politically great, it has now been decided to unsheathe the last weapon of democracy—publicity. Nobody outside Government circles knows, or can with propriety seek to know, what advice a Minister receives from his permanent officials: whether timely warning was given of coming events, or how far estimates of this and that were deliberately tinged with optimism. Though the Minister must be held responsible whatever the outcome, such responsibility is only technical. But the Bill provides him with other advisers, not departmental officials; and they will have such powers of initiative, and the Minister such rights to their responsible advice and such obligations to publish it with his own decision thereon, that there will be real responsibility if any future failure occurs. Members of Parliament, as the appointed watch-dogs of the taxpayer, will have every opportunity of giving tongue before the damage is done, and will share the responsibility if they remain

silent. In one respect, indeed, the Bill improves upon the Royal Commission's proposals. If the Statutory Commission finds the fund in danger of insolvency and makes proposals which the Minister does not approve, the latter may submit his own proposals, for the approval of Parliament by resolution; but these must be such as to produce substantially the same effect on the fund as those he has rejected. How many French Ministries might have escaped destruction if a similar obligation lay on the Finance Committees of the Chamber and Senate when tearing a budget to bits!

While the Royal Commission was sitting the least of its anxieties must have been how to dispose of surpluses on the Insurance Fund; but things have so far improved that the Bill assigns to the Statutory Commission the duty of advising (after hearing interested parties) whether an accruing surplus should be got rid of by altering rates of contribution or benefit, or should be used to pay off debt in addition to the fixed amortisation charge dealt with further on. A surplus of over £12 millions having been indicated in October last, from the falling numbers unemployed, the Treasury took a first charge of £4 millions for accelerating amortisation of debt, and the Minister, as he frankly stated in debate, looked round for ways of spending the remainder. The Royal Commission had proposed (as explained below) to vary the periods for which benefit might be drawn, in favour of men with a good employment record, but so as to reduce total expenditure. The Bill goes far beyond this modest proposal, with an extra cost of £8½ millions. A Unionist supporter, in debate, urged that the money would be better spent in extended exemption of private income under the means test. The one idea that occurred to nobody was to refrain from spending it. A surplus, now *rarissima avis*—though formerly these islands were its favourite breeding haunt—having appeared, all the long-shore gunners are out at once; to try to reacclimatise the species is unthinkable, and the only question is whose mantelpiece the trophy shall adorn. The Royal Commission proposed a normal limit of thirteen weeks' benefit with extra weeks in proportion to contributions paid, and deductions for benefit drawn, in the last five years; the effect being that anyone employed for more than two-thirds of his last five years might get extra benefit, and the person with a 'clean' record might draw for thirty-nine weeks. This, with 3,000,000 unemployed, would have saved £4 millions a year as compared with the present limit of twenty-six weeks for everybody qualified for benefit, provisionally adopted in 1931 to kill the permanent pension idea that grew out of the Blanesburgh Report. The Bill adopts the Royal Commission's formula, but tacks it on to the twenty-six weeks instead of thirteen, so giving the person with a

clean record a whole year on benefit, at an extra cost of £8½ millions over the present rule. But this is for a total of 2,500,000 unemployed; for 3,000,000 the extra cost would be nearly £10 millions, so that the comparison between the Royal Commission's rule and the Bill is that between a saving of £4 millions and an increase of £10 millions. A magnificent splash! But there is this to be said. By extending periods of benefit people are kept on the Insurance Fund, to which the Government's contribution is reckoned, not on the numbers unemployed, but on those employed; and do not come on the Exchequer for 'assistance,' almost the whole cost of which falls on the taxpayer. It is true that, for reasons explained later, this saving is only £6½ millions for the extra cost of £8½ millions—a loss of £2 millions in transferring the credit from benefit to assistance; but the taxpayer as such has reason to rejoice. Had the money been spent on restoring the cuts or otherwise raising benefit rates, there would have been no saving, but an increase, because rates of assistance would have been forced up to their former parity with benefit; while to make the money available for 'means test' exemptions it must first be transferred from insurance to assistance, by some method that the proposer omitted to explain. As for the clamour about the cuts, the answer is that prosperity is still far off and that the real value of the rates of benefit set up in 1928 has since risen by 13 per cent., while the cut of 1931 was limited to 10 per cent.

In carrying the age for entry into insurance back to the school-leaving age, and in other proposals relating to juveniles, the Bill follows generally the lines of the Royal Commission; where it diverges, it is in the direction of higher cost. Thus, the under-sixteen rates of contribution in the Royal Commission's Report (boys, 4d.; girls, 3½d.) are reduced to 2d. for all. The Royal Commission's benefit of 3s. a week up to sixteen is struck out, but *per contra* an unemployed insured parent draws dependant's allowance for an unemployed child, without the condition requiring continuation of full-time education; and the contributions paid before sixteen will count towards the thirty contributions required for benefit, so that the latter may begin from age sixteen instead of (as now) thirty weeks later. There are further grants from the fund for courses of instruction (£425,000), with an equal sum from the Exchequer. The total new charge on the fund being £825,000 (in addition to the Exchequer grant) and the contribution income £760,000, charges of exploiting the young to enable the Government to shirk its duty to their elders are wide of the mark.

On the vexed question of unemployment insurance for agriculture the Bill again follows the Royal Commission in requiring the Statutory Commission to make proposals as quickly

as possible, the Royal Commission after much study having confessed itself beaten. The difficulties are very real. The provisions of 1911 for the return of contributions in no-claim cases having been dropped, inclusion in the general insurance scheme is no unmixed blessing where there is very little unemployment, the contributions becoming not so much a premium as a tax; and such ingenuous proposals as that of the May Committee, to bring special 'industries' like banking and insurance into the main scheme for that very reason, are a net spread in vain in the sight of the birds concerned. At the present levels of profits and wages in agriculture weekly contributions of 10d. are altogether excessive and the benefits too high for the wage level; on the other hand, there are great administrative difficulties in running different schemes abreast, with people changing over from one industry to another. Unemployment in agriculture is less rare than formerly, but there are no reliable statistics of it, and it is certain that the starting of an insurance scheme would itself increase unemployment to an unknown extent, the farmer considering that his own compulsory contributions would justify him in standing his men off, whenever he could spare them, to be supported by the fund. The finance of Part I. includes no provision for the risk of loss on an agricultural scheme.

The provision in the Bill for repayment of the old debt on the fund has been a favourite target for the critics. The Royal Commission proposed to make a fresh start, charging the new scheme with £1½ millions of the sixty-five years' annuity of £4½ millions necessary to amortise the debt of £115 millions with which political handling had bogged the old scheme. The Bill not only leaves the whole charge on the fund, but, by shortening the period to forty years, increases the annuity payments to two of £2½ millions each. This has been roundly denounced by members of all parties as mere Treasury pedantry. But, looking comprehensively at the whole finance of Part I., there is more in it than that. The Royal Commission, assuming 3,000,000 unemployed, gave the fund an income of £59 millions and outgoings of £55½ millions (beside £1½ millions for the debt), but against this £2 million surplus a growth of unknown amount was foreseen in 'assistance.' The actuarial member of the Commission proposed economies reducing both income and expenditure (excluding debt) of the fund to £53 millions, thus leaving only a nominal surplus but bringing down the total Exchequer charge from £85 millions to £67 millions, in spite of raising the Exchequer share of assistance to 95 per cent. The Bill shows, for 2,500,000 unemployed, expenditure (exclusive of debt) of £56 millions, or £½ million above the Royal Commission's scheme for 3,000,000 unemployed. In other words, not only are Mr. Trouncer's quite

practicable proposals entirely ignored, but the whole saving to the fund by the application to smaller numbers of unemployed of present rates of contribution and benefit is dissipated, leaving no reserve for the ugly possibility that unemployment may again increase. It might indeed be thought that the Government, in the act of tying its own hands against future angling for 'electoral support,' had taken full advantage of a last opportunity—a treat all round before signing the pledge. The outcry against the larger debt annuities overlooks the fact that if the whole (or two-thirds) of the £115 millions² were thrown into the National Debt, the interest would have to be found on the Budget. By leaving it on the fund the Chancellor *pro tanto* increases his power to give the taxpayer, or industry, or both, a first instalment of the long overdue relief to the overtaxed; and for this reason gratitude is due to the Treasury for having secured for debt reduction a substantial slice of the doomed surplus on the fund. The real faults in Part I. as a whole are that it is a gamble on the by no means assured chance of steady progress in employment, that it does nothing towards reducing the crisis rate of the 'equal thirds' contributions to the fund, which the Royal Commission declared justifiable only so long as the finances of the fund were precarious—indeed, it does its best to keep them so—and that it shows no trace of economy. To see what chance there is of that, we must follow up under Part II. the fate of the £6½ millions.

With Part II. we sail a perilous sea: soundings few and unreliable, visibility poor to bad. Yet sail we must, as we have drifted into a position where we can neither stand fast nor go back. We paid out relief, without reference to needs or time limit, at full-benefit rates, pretending that it was insurance and borrowing the money until we could neither maintain the pretence nor balance the Budget. The Royal Commission's intermediate class is in fact already in existence: a rough colt, Transitional Payments, by Means Test out of Transitional Benefit; and there is no doubt whatever about his staying. He is to be rechristened Unemployment Allowance; and how he will finally shape depends on four major points: the scope of the intermediate class, the standard of the allowances in relation to those of insurance and Poor Law relief respectively, the machinery of administration and the financial results.

As regards scope, the Royal Commission saw clearly that, once something better than relief of destitution had been granted to persons who had exhausted insured benefit, the same treatment must be extended to able-bodied unemployed of trades outside unemployment insurance. Why, for instance, should a docker • who once paid contributions—and, incidentally, got them back

² Recently reduced to £112 millions.

in an actuarial sense not three times over (the developed form of 9d. for 4d.), but eleven times—be treated better, for all time, than a farm hand or railwayman? It did not, however, define in terms the limits of this extension. The Bill does this by adopting the limits of the Contributory Pensions scheme. This, of course, does not satisfy those whose enthusiasm for (public) benevolence blinds them to financial limitations, but it is clearly sound. The limits of the pension scheme have been hammered out by experience and, by adopting them, fresh questions will be avoided and the two schemes will in future move together, if at all, without the see-saw that would be set up if one or other could be represented as unfairly excluding this or that section of the population. Such 'self-employing' classes as owner-drivers of taxis, hawkers, etc., whom it is sought by some to include, belong to a quite separate field which is nowhere fenced off from that 'voluntary unemployment' against which Mrs. Sidney Webb warned the Royal Commission. If A. offers B. a contract of service for stated work on stated terms, the materials exist for determining whether B.'s refusal disqualifies him for an allowance; but where there is no A. and no contract, how shall the point be defined at which B. is entitled to fold his hands and fall back on maintenance at public expense? Self-employment is a contradiction in terms.

Normally, only those capable of and available for work between ages sixteen and sixty-five, are eligible for unemployment allowances. Cases of voluntary unemployment, called plainly 'work-shyness,' but in the Bill (more politely) 'cases of special difficulty,' are specially provided against. The unemployment assistance officer, subject to appeal by an aggrieved applicant to the appeal tribunal, may issue the allowance to some other member of the household, or issue it in kind, or require attendance at a work centre run by either the Board or the public assistance authority, or may arrange with that authority that the applicant should enter a workhouse, the allowance being then divided between the household and the authority. If in defiance of such measures he shows himself an incurable loafer, he may be reported to the tribunal, which may disqualify him temporarily or permanently for unemployment assistance, subject to any representations by the authority on whose hands he is then thrown as a case of wilful destitution. No reasonable person will attempt to represent these measures as uncalled for, or as bringing the honest worker back to the workhouse door; but it is evident that they would work more smoothly if the allowances were administered as a local service.

The standard of allowances is a dangerous question, round which the Royal Commission walked somewhat delicately. It

saw the necessity of a rule that allowances must fall short of the wage level, lest applicants should prefer them to wages; and declared it impossible to make exceptions to this rule, though hard cases would occur. But whether allowances should also be less than insurance benefit they considered more doubtful in theory, though 'as a matter of practical policy, there should be some advantage in insurance benefit'—perhaps to avoid the question 'Why do I get no more, or even less, when I pay contributions towards my benefit, than those who pay nothing?' But it went on to say that the insurance scheme should be framed to give benefits higher than the allowance standard; subject to which, that standard should be as high as financial limitations will allow. Later in its Report, when the point cropped up again, it added nothing more definite, but seems to have relied, for thrift in practice, on its plan under which needs would continue to be assessed by a staff familiar with Poor Law standards, though not in this connexion bound by them. The Bill leaves the standard to be determined by regulations to be made by the Minister with the advice of the Board, to 'determine the need' (*sing.*) of an applicant and to 'assess his needs' (*plur.*). As explained below, the Bill gives the assessment of needs to a new staff, and the oversight of the scheme (for assigning which to the Statutory Commission the Royal Commission gave good reasons) to a separate Board. Much will depend on the choice of persons; but we are left with an uncomfortable possibility, under certain conditions, of the Statutory Commission's benefits and the new Board's allowances chasing one another up the scale. Meanwhile, Ministers have already announced that, in suitable cases, allowances may exceed benefits.

The great 'Means Test' question also arises here—*i.e.*, the extent to which in each case other income should be deducted from the recognised standard in calculating the amount of the allowance. The Bill follows the Royal Commission in laying down that the household is the unit; the personal requirements of all its members, as well as their resources, must be taken into account; certain sources of income are to be disregarded in whole or part; and generally, where there are capital investments (money) exceeding a certain amount, there should be a deduction of 1s. a week for each £25 of the excess up to a capital total of £300, beyond which there should be no allowance. The Royal Commission exempted the first £50, the Bill only the first £25, making a difference of 1s. a week between £25 and £50. On the other hand, the Bill is more liberal in its treatment of workmen's compensation payments. Taking the treatment of invested moneys as a good guide to the general standard of severity enforced, it appears that a man with £250 invested at 3½ per cent. would be called upon to

reduce his capital by less than £15 in his first whole year of assistance, which (as we have already seen) might well be his second year of continuous unemployment. Could anything well be gentler? Official statistics show that, taking initial applications and revisions together, in recent determinations there are means liable to contribute in about two-fifths of the cases. The agitation for total abolition of the test is purely factitious, and poor frank Mr. Lansbury has confessed that he was driven into it by the crack of the whip—a foretaste of the tyranny of the caucus over Labour Cabinets to come.

As regards machinery of administration, the Bill completely throws over the Royal Commission's plan, under which unemployment assistance was to remain a local government service, allowances being assessed by the experienced local staffs while the Minister, with the help of the Statutory Commission, was to improve the working of the present improvised machinery of transitional payments, by prescribing general standards and rules to remove the inequalities now complained of between different areas, except in so far as they are justified by differences in local economic conditions and customs. A new Board, under conditions of publicity like those of the Statutory Commission, is to administer the system by its own officers, with help from local advisory committees and subject to appeal to local Tribunals. There are permissive provisions (probably intended to be temporary) for the Board to use the services of officers of local authorities and labour exchanges in the investigation of circumstances, but allowances must be determined by the Board's officers only. The emphasis on this suggests that the reason for this departure may be the difficulty experienced recently in securing that certain local authorities should administer assistance in accordance with the expressed intentions of Parliament; but do the objections to superseding a sprinkling of recalcitrants in the last resort by special commissioners (notably successful in practice) altogether outweigh the reasons by which the Royal Commission supported its proposals? By keeping the service local and putting it under the eye of the Statutory Commission, duplication would be minimised (for there must always be a Poor Law sediment of the aged, the infirm, the unemployables and those outside the scope of the Bill); administrative economy and better co-ordination (without invoking the Minister) secured between insurance and assistance; and there could be no tendency for either Statutory Commission or Board so to frame rules and regulations as to relieve one fund at the expense of the other: one knows how much precious energy is dissipated in 'demarcation' squabbles, in public offices as well as in trade unions. If all this be regarded as secondary, there remains a fundamental principle best expressed

in the Royal Commission's own words: 'it is impossible by any system of statutory rules, judicially administered, to effect a proper discrimination between different individual cases. . . . Such discrimination can be made only by an individual judgment of the particular circumstances in each case. In other words, it is a matter for the discretion of an administrative authority and not one for judicial determination.' But 'a local official or local committee appointed by the Minister to administer discretionary payments cannot, and should not, be expected to exercise discretion in any real sense . . . it must be provided for by assigning to some authoritative local body an effective part in the scheme.' Does the interposition of a London board between the Minister and the local staffs destroy the force of these considerations? Hardly, especially in view of the very important administrative functions assigned to 'appeal tribunals.' The very title has a strong flavour of the legalism which, necessary as it is in its proper place, it is essential to avoid here. Not as bearing directly on unemployment allowances, but as an indication of the kind of judicial spirit to avoid, take the ruling relating to allowances to soldiers' households during the war: that if a couple making a comfortable income from (*e.g.*) a shop had a son who gave his mother part of his wages towards the family mess, the father and mother thereby became 'dependants partially dependent' on the boy, in a legal sense carrying with it a weekly payment from public funds when he joined up, and a pension if he died. Such a result would not accord with plain common sense or with the live administrative discretion for which the Royal Commission contended. Lawyers, as Lord Haldane used to say, are not generally good administrators; and no hat cramps the head like a full-bottomed wig trimmed with red tape. This question of direct central administration *versus* local administration under central direction has not so far been really debated. The reasons for throwing over the Royal Commission should be laid open for critical examination, as a matter of crucial importance. On the other hand, the attack on the ground that the Bill kills parliamentary control is entirely misconceived. Full control is reserved to the House of everything but the right to interfere in individual cases under such forms as motions to reduce the salaries of the Board, which are for that reason borne on the Consolidated Fund.

Though the finance of Part II. is fairly well covered in the memorandum issued with the second edition of the Bill, there are still large liabilities of which not even a rough outside estimate is attempted. Like Insurance, Assistance is to have its own fund, but in a totally different sense; it is merely a book-keeping device for collecting from many sources into one account all the varied expenditure on allowances and their administration,

crediting the (fixed) contributions to be paid by local authorities and charging off the balance to the Exchequer. This is better than our classical public accountancy that so successfully prevents anyone from finding out what any service really costs; but there is no limit to the Exchequer contribution (as there is with insurance) and no carrying forward of balances from year to year such as makes the Insurance fund a significant reality.

The changes in expenditure as compared with present practice, so far as they are estimated, are mainly four. The saving of £6½ millions on allowances, purchased by the increase of £8½ millions on insurance benefit, has already been mentioned. The £2 millions difference goes principally into the pockets of persons who by being kept on benefit escape the means test—those without means liable to contribute profiting only by the higher level of benefit over assistance. To him that hath shall be given. The new arrangements between the Exchequer and local revenues are stated to result in an extra subvention to rates of over £2½ millions,³ which is so distributed as to reach the distressed areas, the effect over the whole country being that the Exchequer bears 95 per cent. of assistance and the rates only 5, as Mr. Trouncer had proposed on the Royal Commission. The calculations are complex, but the result is true to form. Whenever the question of rates *versus* taxes comes up, the taxpayer always loses, because he has forgotten even how to bleat before shearing time; while the local authorities make the Chancellor's life a burden to him by the fight they put up; and the member of Parliament, the taxpayer's watch-dog, wags his tail at the raiders.

Three-quarters of a million more is to be spent—and no doubt well spent—on training to recondition the unemployed, with a further sum (not estimated) to be repaid to local authorities who, to their own immediate loss, employ trainees for a limited time on 'production' work, at full standard wages which they can only partly earn, as a sort of finishing course. This attractive proposal may prove open to abuse unless very carefully watched. Administrative costs of all kinds are expected to exceed substantially the present, £3½ millions. The increase (it is explained) cannot be estimated, because the Board is not yet in being, but it 'may well be of the order of £1 million.' It will be almost unprecedented if this modest first shot is not soon exceeded.

Taking the figures as they stand, our £6½ millions has now dwindled to £2 millions. The Financial Memorandum, starting from a figure of £54½ millions (including administration) as the recorded expenditure on transitional payments for the year ending with October last, shows a final total of £52½ millions accordingly; but this last figure is difficult to interpret precisely,

³ Since the above was written, a further £300,000 has been conceded.

because the £54½ millions relates to an average of about 2,750,000 unemployed, while the changes are based on 2,500,000. But looking only at the changes, they mean that the last chance of economy lies in this residuum of £2 millions—and this is purely illusory. For nothing has been allowed for any net levelling up (as compared with the actual experience of last year) of the standard of assistance under the new Board. Yet there have been local authorities who, like John Gilpin, had a frugal mind, as well as prodigals: a London board will not in practice get anything like full economy out of the variations in local modes of life; and the risk of a net rise in the standard is a real one. Further (and more serious), to quote the memorandum: 'there will be applicants who at present do not seek relief from the public assistance authorities, whose circumstances upon investigation will be found to show little or no difference from the circumstances of those now obtaining assistance. . . . Having regard to the size of the field covered by this part of the Bill, any increase in the average amount paid to a claimant by way of allowances or any substantial increase in the number of persons who establish the need of an allowance would result in a *large increase* [*italics mine*] in the cost of the scheme.' There seems every reason to fear, in the absence of any estimate, that the increase under these two heads will far exceed £2 millions. Yet something might easily be done by postponing some of the projected largesse until the unknown factors have sufficiently declared themselves to reveal the probable position, instructing the Statutory Commission and the Board then to bring up reports in their several spheres as a foundation for further measures. It is characteristic of our complacent prodigality that no Minister has yet said a word in debate in favour of economy (except as to the incidence of the debt charge) or about the serious threat of the unplumbed liabilities, while practically every critic of the Bill has called, directly or indirectly, for more expenditure; and nobody has made any reference to the fact that much of our unemployment⁴ is still caused by the pegging of wages in particular trades too far above the general level, or to the continuous rise of the real standards of benefit and assistance which is concealed behind the fixed figures of the scales.

In sum, the whole Bill shows a lamentable disregard of our still threatening financial position; but, apart from that, Part I. is excellent, while Part II. calls for much more penetrating criticism of its machinery provisions.

C. HARRIS.

⁴ A calculation in the *Economist* of December 9 shows that the building trades still retain purchasing power 40 per cent. above 1914 level, so levying a tribute of over 1s. a week from every £400 house built.

THE 'CRISIS' IN THE IRISH FREE STATE

THOSE who have forecast a general election as being imminent for some months past have based their conviction on the belief that Mr. de Valera can still count upon obtaining a new lease of power, and a 'mandate' for the suppression of his opponents' political organisation. They have assumed that each month will add to the volume of growing discontent at the result of his policies, and that he will hold an election very soon, in order to tide over the period during which he must expect a violent revulsion of popular feeling against him. But Mr. de Valera and his party organisers have shown great cleverness in electioneering; and there are many reasons for thinking that they do not believe there is any need as yet for seeking a new lease of power.

What, in fact, was the recent 'crisis' which has filled so much of the London newspapers? A really acute crisis arose in Ireland during August, when the National Guard was formed under General O'Duffy and Mr. de Valera revived the Public Safety Act, with its military tribunals and its extraordinary powers of searchings and arrests, in order to declare the new Blueshirt movement an illegal organisation. He took great risks in enforcing such an Act when there was no genuine pretext for it. He exposed himself to the charge of unjust administration of the law against his opponents. The immediate result was to consolidate the various parties which had opposed him. General O'Duffy, who has been personally extremely popular throughout Ireland, a most energetic organiser and a man of great courage though of little political judgment, became leader of the united Opposition groups, which were renamed the United Ireland Party. Mr. Cosgrave retained its chairmanship in the Dail, with Mr. MacDermot, who is much the ablest of the younger recruits to Irish public life, as vice-chairman. An anxious period for Mr. de Valera followed. He did not know what use to make of the enormous powers he had taken. He proceeded to employ the Public Safety Act, on a charge of conspiracy, against a group of farmers who were unable to pay their rates; while he did not invoke the Act against members of the Irish Republican Army who were in illegal possession of arms and were brought before

the courts on extremely serious charges of violence. His prestige suffered severely when even the military tribunal acquitted the farmers of any conspiracy, while juries refused to convict in many cases where the I.R.A. succeeded in local intimidation.

The tension, however, had gradually relaxed. The Public Safety Act was not being employed in a vexatious way, but Mr. de Valera still kept it in force in case of emergency. The only serious embarrassment in recent months had been the necessity of meeting criticisms from his own Left Wing at the annual congress of the Fianna Fail Party in November. But even there Mr. de Valera secured a considerable triumph. The proceedings showed that he had the great majority of Republicans solidly supporting him, while the extremists were unable to shake his authority. He took the opportunity of renewing his old allegiance to the Republican ideal, and he announced to the party congress that, although he was growing old, he believed he was still young enough to have every confidence of living to see an Irish Republic established. Just after the Fianna Fail congress a question was asked in the House of Commons which tempted Mr. J. H. Thomas to make one of his solemn statements in regard to Irish relations. His reply to the question gave Mr. de Valera an opening which was immediately exploited. Mr. Thomas gave Mr. de Valera the opportunity of raising the question of whether the Irish Free State was free to secede from the British Commonwealth or not. The Irish sub-committee of the Cabinet in London was hurriedly summoned; anxious discussions took place; and before long the newspapers were full of rumours and speculations as to what Mr. de Valera would do next.

All that has happened, however, is that Mr. Thomas declined to accept the challenge which he had provoked. Mr. de Valera has once more demonstrated to his own extremists his eagerness to establish an Irish Republic; and he can once more claim that the British Government stands between him (or, as he would say, 'the Irish people') and the fulfilment of his desires. The mere fact of his having raised the question again when opportunity offered certainly need not imply that he intends to take any immediate action. Sooner or later he may have a general election to obtain a mandate for declaring a Republic. But his avowed policy has been to work towards that end by stages, and it is very doubtful whether he believes that the time is yet opportune. His chief difficulty, of course, is that his conception of an Irish Republic includes all Ireland. 'Southern Ireland,' embracing twenty-six of the thirty-two Irish counties, is a quite modern creation which Mr. Lloyd George brought into being by establishing the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1920. So long as the partition of Ireland endures, the Republican ideal can never be accomplished. In

the meantime Mr. de Valera is steadily converting the Free State into a virtual Republic, while he hopes in due time to achieve some sort of reunion with East Ulster. The past month has given him yet another success, in his election as one of the representatives for County Down. Henceforward he can claim not only that he speaks for the Nationalist minority in East Ulster, but that they have themselves chosen him as their spokesman, notwithstanding all that has been said of his widening the gulf between East Ulster and the rest of Ireland.

In estimating the prospects of his success or failure, the economic aspect of his programme is much more important than any question of his intentions regarding a Republic. In a previous article¹ I have discussed the profound difference of interests between the large farmers and graziers on the one hand, and the small farmers and the labouring class on the other. His policy has been directed throughout to winning the support of the small farmers, who lead an almost self-contained existence in great poverty, and of the labourers, whom he has encouraged by many forms of subsidised relief and by the promise of providing increased employment. The small farmers and the labourers together are far more numerous than the more prosperous farmers of the Midlands and the South; and their interests are by no means the same. The whole brunt of the special import duties which have been imposed by the British Government to make good the loss of the land annuities has fallen upon the more prosperous farmers, who depend upon their exports to the English market. But the small farmers have gained by the reduction of their rents and have lost practically nothing. And this crushing burden upon the large farmers and the graziers is all the more unjust because they had almost always been punctual in paying the land annuities, and they had resolutely opposed Mr. de Valera's policy of repudiation. They have been Mr. de Valera's political opponents always; and it has helped him greatly that his own followers have gained by his policy while his opponents have had to bear all the loss imposed by British action.

Nor is it only because they have opposed the Republican Party that Mr. de Valera need be little perturbed by their misfortunes. He has always intended to break up the cattle ranches of the Midlands in order to provide more employment through tillage. If the cattle are not being replaced, and if less labour is being employed on the grazing lands, there is all the more reason for legislating to make tillage compulsory, and all the more hope among the badly paid labourers that they may even get land themselves, through sub-division of the large farms when they are either bankrupt or forced to sell. In that sense Mr. de Valera is

¹ 'Mr. de Valera's Next Move,' September 1933.

steadily strengthening his position among his own followers. At the same time he is able to show real progress with his plans for industrial development on a big scale. Within the past few months there have been impressive ceremonies in various places where a beginning has been made with the great factories which are to be built. There will be two more sugar factories, and the country is to become almost self-supporting for sugar, through an increased cultivation of beet. The cement industry likewise is to be established on a national scale, and several factory sites have been chosen where work is now to begin. Industrial alcohol is another new industry, for which capital is being raised abroad. Paper-making is another. Home-grown tobacco is a very easy crop to produce, and the subsidies given for it have produced a rapid increase in acreage. The sites for these various factories have been distributed shrewdly through the country, so that evidence of the new industrial policy shall be manifest in all parts of Ireland. Meanwhile road construction to relieve unemployment, the reclamation of land, and housing schemes, all subsidised by the State, are being pushed forward energetically; and there is more sign of activity than under any former Government.

It may well be that Mr. de Valera counts upon strengthening his position in the country during the coming months, when work is actually started on these ambitious schemes. They will unquestionably provide employment; and much of the capital which is required is forthcoming from foreign contractors who subscribe it in consideration of trading concessions. A total of at least £6,000,000 is needed for the principal industrial schemes which are already planned, and the Government has just floated its first loan to raise that amount. An Industrial Credit Bill was passed this year which authorises the Finance Minister to underwrite loans up to £6,000,000, with provision for an extension to double that figure. Few people imagined that the Government would dare to issue its new loan for such purposes at a rate of no more than 3½ per cent. The two previous Free State loans were issued at 5 per cent.; and as the second loan is supported by substantial sinking fund arrangements, it has been quoted for some time past at over 111. The first loan, which also has sinking fund arrangements, has been constantly quoted round about 102. But in those conditions it seems almost incredible that the Government should hope to raise £6,000,000 now at only 3½ per cent., issuing the new stock at 98. The first day's subscriptions included £250,000 from the Bank of Ireland and a total of £200,000 from certain foreign concerns. But the other subscriptions have been very much smaller; and it seems likely that the Government itself will have to take up most of it under the Industrial

Credit Act, in view of the admitted failure to raise the full amount. Even so, however, there are large possibilities of raising money from abroad in consideration of trading concessions, when the industrial development programme is being pushed forward so fast. Reckless finance has become less alarming to the public mind in Ireland, in view of the enormous expenditure which Mr. Roosevelt is undertaking with general approval in America. The State may be handed over to the domination of foreign money-lenders; but few people are concerned about that, if employment can be ensured and if industrial progress is obtained.

One aspect of this programme of industrial development deserves particular attention. The British 'blockade' duties have not only played into Mr. de Valera's hands by penalising his opponents and enabling him to transform the country's economic life. They are unquestionably producing many new direct links between Ireland and other countries, which must make Ireland less disposed in future to renew the former close economic connexion with Great Britain. The utter dependence of Ireland upon the English market has for generations been deplored by every Irish Nationalist who has considered that Ireland ought to retain a more independent cultural and economic existence. The traditional commercial connexion between Ireland and France and Spain and the Low Countries, which lasted until the Victorian era, had been killed by unrestricted free trade with Great Britain. To break this modern connexion with the English market to any serious extent would have been the work of many years if the 'blockade' duties had not been imposed. But they have enabled Mr. de Valera to seek everywhere outside Britain for trading connexions, and to make trading agreements on almost any terms, with general approval, so long as the duties are in force. Mr. Thomas, in his latest 'warning' to the Free State, points out that Ireland's former market in England may be permanently lost, which is quite true. But he ignores the fact that many Irishmen have wanted for years to develop alternative markets, and that such markets are in fact being developed now. The political effects of such a prolonged estrangement may yet produce extremely awkward problems in international relations, even if the Free State remains merely one of the independent Dominions. But the economic effect also deserves attention. The 'blockade' has had grave repercussions upon English trade. A recent letter from a colliery director to *The Times* points out that 'coal exports from Great Britain have been reduced to little more than half the figures for 1931, and the Free State is now importing heavily from Poland and Germany.'

A settlement of the dispute over the land annuities is in fact even more desirable from the British than from the Irish

point of view. The 'blockade' duties have injured chiefly the people who desired to uphold the British connexion, who had always paid their land annuities, and who had opposed any repudiation. According to Mr. Hore-Belisha's figures, they are now producing rather more than the equivalent of the land annuities. But this revenue from special import duties is being obtained at the cost of losing the Irish market, which has in the past been one of the most important and most secure of all markets for British exports. The duties were presumably imposed in the belief that Mr. de Valera would become so unpopular through the sufferings which he had caused that he would be overthrown and a new Government would soon settle the dispute. But the elections a year ago showed how vain such expectations were. Subsequent developments have not only reduced the probability of his being thrown over. They have shown the helplessness of the Opposition and its inability to formulate any alternative policy.

When the Opposition forces were merged in August, the new United Ireland Party had still to define its programme. Its main object was to insist upon an immediate settlement of the dispute with the British Government; but in other respects there was no clear indication of whether it would even attempt to undo the achievements of the de Valera Government within the past two years. To settle the dispute could only mean either to resume payment of the land annuities to London, or at best to seek some bargain with London which would leave the small farmers no worse off than they have become through the reliefs which Mr. de Valera has given them. The prospect of formulating any constructive alternative is less hopeful now than it was even in August. Protective tariffs have been imposed on a scale which must tend to kill the previous Anglo-Irish trade; and trading agreements have been concluded with other countries as the basis for creating new industries of the first importance. It is almost unthinkable that the United Ireland Party should propose to cancel such agreements, or to reverse the policy of intensive industrial development behind tariff walls. Equally unpopular, at any rate for some years to come, would be any campaign to reduce the extravagant public expenditure, which is providing considerable employment and raising wages for the unskilled workers especially. The one new feature of policy which the Opposition has announced is its determination to work for reunion with Ulster. But in that respect Mr. de Valera has been just as active in his zeal for national reunion. He has even been elected for an Ulster constituency, whereas none of his opponents were even invited to stand.

Leadership of the Opposition has, in fact, passed definitely out of Mr. Cosgrave's hands. His shrewdness and personal

courage are still an asset to the party ; but it is Mr. MacDermot, rather than he, who speaks for the large farmers and who is leading the campaign against the enforced payment of rates by farmers who have been ruined by the ' blockade ' duties. Meanwhile the Opposition has been concentrating chiefly upon asserting the right to hold public meetings. But the Blueshirt agitation has developed on such unparliamentary lines that Mr. de Valera finds it increasingly easy to justify the suppression of what he denounces as a military organisation, formed to oppose the decisions of the Dail. With the Public Safety Act in force he can at any moment apply it to cripple the Opposition in its efforts to arouse public opinion. Its public meetings have assumed the character of military parades to such an extent that parliamentary agitation is being largely abandoned. The Blueshirt leaders have eclipsed Mr. Cosgrave, and have identified opposition to the Government with extra-parliamentary action. In recent months this tendency has increased ; and internal politics have become mainly a fierce fight for the right of free speech and freedom to organise. In such conditions constructive programmes are not likely to evolve. When the United Ireland Party has to face the next election it may well be that the differences between the political and economic programmes of General O'Duffy and Mr. de Valera will be very slight. General O'Duffy had never been an active politician until he was dismissed, for no apparent reason, from the commissionership of the police. His early record was that of a daring leader of the I.R.A. in the Sinn Fein days. He sided with Collins and those who accepted the Treaty, but his outlook is in all probability very little different to that of Mr. de Valera, desiring the fullest measure of Irish independence for a united Ireland. He is an Ulster Catholic, and for that reason his leadership is likely to commit the Opposition to much more active agitation in regard to Ulster. Mr. Blythe, who has been the chief promoter of the Blueshirt movement under General O'Duffy, is also an Ulster Nationalist, and he will certainly not let Mr. de Valera surpass him in zeal for the abolition of partition.

For the present it seems inevitable that the issue between Mr. de Valera and the Opposition will be concentrated on the question of fair play and freedom of public meetings, and that the programmes of both parties will become increasingly similar. So long as a settlement with the British Government can be reached only by agreement to resume paying the land annuities, Mr. de Valera is in a very strong position. His chief opponents, the landowners, the exporters, the graziers and the more prosperous farmers, are becoming weakened and impoverished ; while the economic transformation which he has undertaken is constantly hardening and taking shape. There is no sign yet that he will be

unable to raise the necessary funds to pay for his ambitious plans, so long as the country can live upon its capital. Prices have already begun to rise, and many firms and enterprises have been suffering severely by the loss of their export trade. The middle class may have to face heavier burdens ; and the dwindling remnant of the wealthy class can see little hope in the future. But if his nerve and his determination do not fail, and if his health can stand the strain of directing almost single-handed the economic revolution which he has undertaken, there would seem to be little reason to expect that he will be defeated in any election for several years to come. He has made such headway in many directions, he has got to work so rapidly in starting the new industrial programme from which the labouring class and the small farmers hope for much, that it will be almost impossible to reverse the policies which he has introduced. He has aimed deliberately at benefiting the poorer classes at the expense of the rich ; and with universal suffrage that programme is likely to retain the confidence of the majority. Incidentally, the standard of living can scarcely fail to decline, wherever it had been raised substantially above the level of pre-war years. But Mr. de Valera has always said openly that it might be necessary to do without certain things, and that he personally would rather see the country poor and self-sufficient than dependent upon the English market.

A well-known publicist said recently that agreement is apparently impossible with Mr. de Valera because he lives in the past, and not in the future. The criticism is scarcely sound. He has shown himself a most clear-headed realist since he assumed office, and no politician could be more explicit in stating what he wants at any stage, and in proceeding to achieve his purpose. The future which he is striving to create is indeed a revival of the past—a self-contained Ireland, speaking its own language, making its own laws, recognising only its own courts, and trading with other countries besides England, if it is to have any substantial export trade at all. It may be doubted whether Mr. de Valera is as much occupied with immediate intentions concerning a Republic as is generally believed. He has more than enough to cope with, in the economic and social revolution which he is carrying through. Full Republican status for ' Southern Ireland ' would in practice give him no more freedom than he already possesses, and he is not concerned with a Republic for only twenty-six counties. The ' blockade ' has assisted much rather than hampered his general programme ; and if his internal policy can retain him his majority in the Dail, he has little reason to desire a settlement of the dispute with London. He has boldly repudiated the annual payment of £5,000,000 a year to the British

Government, and the relief he has thus gained outweighs any advantage he could now obtain by a compromise which would compel him to resume even a partial payment. The real crisis for his Government will come when the creeping paralysis which has already crippled the large farmers begins to affect the small farmers also; and when the temporary employment which he is creating by lavish expenditure on public works has come to an end. If and when the country has to choose between general impoverishment and a settlement with Great Britain on terms of partnership in the British Commonwealth, the revulsion of popular feeling may be overwhelming. But for the present Mr. de Valera's followers have gained something and hope to gain more; while his opponents are helpless in their misfortunes.

In the meantime it is surely worth while considering, from the British point of view, whether a settlement should not be reached somehow before the Irish markets are lost to other competing countries, and before Irish purchasing power has dwindled disastrously. So long as the 'blockade' of Irish exports remains in force a settlement is most unlikely, and any resumption of paying the land annuities is already practically out of the question. Neither Mr. Cosgrave nor General O'Duffy could attempt to restore the former scale of payments. A settlement of all outstanding disputes, however, would certainly involve raising the question of the partition of Ireland. General O'Duffy, as an Ulster Nationalist, is no more likely than is Mr. de Valera to agree that that question should be ignored. Is the partition of Ireland, which Mr. Lloyd George first introduced in 1920, in fact so sacrosanct that the present dispute must continue indefinitely rather than allow it to be reconsidered? There were provisions in earlier Home Rule Bills, and in various stages of the Home Rule controversy, for some degree of joint consultation on common interests between East Ulster and the rest of Ireland. Any official suggestion for the creation of such a common legislative body, no matter how nebulous were its powers, would be an immense contribution towards the creation of a better atmosphere for negotiation. The restoration of Irish unity in principle, with the fullest measure of local autonomy in East Ulster, might even now become the basis of a real partnership of all Ireland in the British Commonwealth.

DENIS GWYNN.

TRUTH AND MR. GANDHI

MR. GANDHI is happy in his biographers. They are all laudatory. An offset to the gross inflation of phrase and praise that mars some of their books is his extremely frank Autobiography, from which, perhaps, the truest picture of him emerges. Mr. Gandhi, however, takes some unwarrantable liberties with his readers. There seems to be no earthly reason why he should relate offensive details that point no apposite moral; and in doing so he has transgressed the Hindu rules of *Navagophyani*, which forbid such unseemly exposures. However sympathetically one may read the Autobiography, the dominant impression it leaves on one's mind is that of intense egotism. Even as a schoolboy Mr. Gandhi was fully conscious of his many virtues. 'I do not remember,' he tells us, 'ever having told a lie during this short period of my life. . . . I very jealously regarded my character. The least blemish drew tears from my eyes. When I merited (or seemed to merit) a rebuke it was quite unbearable for me.' One thing took deep root in him at this period—the conviction that morality is the basis of all things and that Truth is the substance of all morality. Truth now became my sole objective.' But there were some lapses: surreptitious smoking, stealing to buy cigarettes, and others less respectable.

England received Mr. Gandhi when he was twenty, and England he 'could not bear.' He says: 'Daily I would pray for God's protection and would get it.' Nevertheless, 'I did not hesitate to pass myself off as a bachelor, though I was married and the father of a son.' He adds that he was 'none the happier for being a dissembler.' He returned to India after being called to the Bar and two years later went to Natal. In South Africa Mr. Gandhi invented his special technique of passive resistance. He called it *Satyagraha*, 'the force that is born of love and truth.' It leads logically to *Ahimsa*, or non-injury to living beings. *Ahimsa*, *Satyavachana* (speaking the truth), and *Bhutahitava* (seeking the good of creatures) are some of the generic or *Samanya* duties; but *Ahimsa* is a duty, not merely in the negative sense of mere cessation from harm or injury, but also in the positive sense of a definite resolve not to hurt a living thing. Mr. Gandhi's

success in South Africa is common knowledge. It was the most disinterested part of his career, because then he was urged to service rather than self-expression. When he returned to India, with a considerable reputation, he began stirring up unrest and preaching the virtues of the *charka*, or spinning-wheel. It was probably at this period that he acquired the title of 'Mahatma,' for it is certain that while his disciples were inciting the coolies on the indigo plantations in Bihar to revolt, they spread the legend of a new *Mahatma* with supernatural powers who would rescue the peasants from British oppression. In Mr. Gandhi's case the title is purely complimentary, yet it enlists the reverence of the Hindu mind. No true *Mahatma* would ever deign to use a spiritual appeal to attain a purely temporal end. To him Mr. Gandhi's objectives are *maya*, illusion.

Mr. Gandhi came into the limelight when he launched his *Satyagraha* campaign in 1919 and, a little later, introduced non-co-operation, which, he explained, was 'a movement intended to invite the English to co-operate with us on honourable terms or retire from our land.' He did not, or would not, realise that *Satyagraha* requires a religious background and is a weapon either for saints or disciplined legions. Within the first three months there were thirty-nine major acts of violence arising out of the frenzied movement, and Mr. Gandhi laid the blame on British law, which he described as 'unfit for willing and passive obedience.' This anti-Government campaign was inaugurated as a protest against the repression of terrorism. The ostensible cause was the Rowlatt Act, which was forced into existence by anarchy and was operative only against anarchists. Mr. Gandhi asserted that he started it 'in order to check the rising tide of terrorism on the part of the impatient youths of the country.' One is reminded of Chicot, the jester, who induced Frère Gorenflot to eat a fowl on Friday by making him christen it a carp!

After the horrors of the Moplah rebellion Mr. Gandhi took his vow of ascetic discipline, and adopted the *dhoti* as the symbol of his identity with the poorest of the poor. But in the West his loin-cloth has come to be regarded as expressing the arrogance of his humility. Life for large sections of the Indian population is an unlovely struggle against unfair odds, and needs to be dealt with in a warm and profoundly human manner, not in the cold and austere manner of a Government Blue-book. Mr. Gandhi does not sympathise with erring humanity as an equal, but as an immensely superior person. From 1922 to 1928 he remained out of politics; then he persuaded the National Congress to resolve that if the Nehru Constitution—which was rejected by all Indian parties and later by Congress itself—was not accepted by the British Parliament before the end of 1929, civil disobedience

would be revived. There followed three years of hectic effort to get the Government of India into a cleft stick.

When he left the Congress session at Lahore in December 1929, Mr. Gandhi declared, in a message to the Press, that India was not yet ripe for civil disobedience; yet two months later he informed the Viceroy that he held British rule to be a curse and would inaugurate a campaign of civil disobedience by breaking the Salt Law. In between, there was no development in Indian politics that could be held to justify Mr. Gandhi's action. It did, however, provide a rival to the forthcoming Round Table Conference, which had strengthened its hold on the popular imagination. He invested himself with regent powers, issued absurd and insolent ultimatums, and tried to set up Congress as a parallel Government with himself as dictator. But there could not be 'two Kings of Brentford.' Mr. Gandhi acted in opposition to large and important sections of Indian opinion when he set out on his march to the sea coast, to manufacture salt in deliberate defiance of the law. He invited his followers to break the law: they obeyed, and committed murder, assault, arson. He paid them to do it, yet he repudiated all who perpetrated deeds of violence. It is true that he exhorted them not to be violent; and it is difficult to believe that he did not know that the psychological effect of an appeal to a mob not to do a thing generally has the reverse effect.

Strong measures were necessary to suppress Mr. Gandhi's 1930 programme, with its landmarks of carnage. He was imprisoned, but was released in 1931 and concluded the Delhi Pact with Lord Irwin. Lord Irwin observed it as a Treaty; Mr. Gandhi labelled it a Truce. Those were Mr. Gandhi's famous days. The stupendous vanity of his own importance and his insatiable craving for prestige and power were at least reasonably satisfied. All the legends gathered there and shone brightly. The *Darshan*, or Showing, was a daily ritual, when Mr. Gandhi appeared on a balcony in the dusk of evening and showed himself to the reverent crowds assembled below. It has been likened to the mystic High Mass in a Continental cathedral.

In September 1931 Mr. Gandhi took a significant seat at the second session of the Round Table Conference, as sole representative of the Congress. He was entirely out of his depth, and his collapse was pathetic. He ascribed his dismal failure to anything but its real cause. He talked of the ultra-communalists who exaggerate their 'petty differences'; but actually the differences between Moslems and Hindus are so vital and deep that no Hindu can understand them, much less harmonise them.

The threat to start civil disobedience when he returned to India led to Mr. Gandhi's internment as a State prisoner—in January 1932. In the following September he began a 'fast unto

death' in gaol as a protest against the representation of the Depressed Classes by separate electorates, whereby they were allowed, under the Government's Communal Award, 71 seats in the provincial Legislatures. A few days later a conference of Hindus and Depressed Classes reached an agreement, known as the Poona Pact, for 148 seats in joint, instead of 71 seats in separate, electorates. Mr. Gandhi broke his fast on the sixth day.

In May 1933, while still a prisoner, he experienced a psychological crisis. It was an instance of the remarkable manner in which he combines the functions of saint and politician. On May 1, the Government of India received a telegram from Mr. Gandhi announcing his intention to fast for twenty-one days, 'for reasons wholly unconnected with Government and solely connected with Harijan movement and obedience of peremptory call from within received about midnight.' Apparently the ordeal was intended to bring about a change of heart in the Sanatanists, or orthodox Hindu party, but the announcement of it gave rise to grave misgivings in Nationalist circles, where it was thought that the unpopular anti-untouchability campaign might alienate from the Congress the powerful Mahasabha interests, which had been such a source of strength to it. In the *Harijan* (the Untouchables' newspaper) of May 6 Mr. Gandhi explained the position as it appeared to him.

Many are the causes too sacred to mention that must have precipitated the fast [he declared]. But they are all concerned with the great Harijan cause. The fast is against nobody in particular and against everybody who wants to perpetuate in the joy of it, without for the first time having to fast himself or herself. But it is particularly against myself. It is a heart-prayer for the purification of self and associates, for greater vigilance and watchfulness. But nobody who appreciates the step is to join me. Any such fast will be a torture of themselves and of me.

Between the announcement of the mysterious fast and its actual beginning there was a good deal of adverse criticism in the Indian Press. Mr. Kelkar, a prominent Maharashtra leader, voiced the general view when he described Mr. Gandhi's conduct as 'irrational and not fair' and 'amounting practically to coercion.' The fast began on May 8, and, 'in view of the nature and objects of the fast . . . and the attitude of mind it discloses,' the Government released Mr. Gandhi unconditionally. Immediately he belied all expectations of his conduct. He had been released on a non-political issue, but he plunged at once into political controversy. It was an astute political move—*chhalaki*, Indians would call it.

On being given his liberty Mr. Gandhi made a statement to the Press. He began by saying that his release put upon him, 'as a seeker after Truth and a man of honour,' a tremendous

burden and strain. The whole purpose of the fast would be frustrated if he allowed his brain to be occupied by any matter outside Harijan work, but, he added, 'having been released, I should be bound to give a little of my energies to a study of the civil disobedience problem.' He intimated that his views about civil disobedience had not changed, and advised the president of the Congress to suspend civil disobedience for a month or six weeks, on the ground that while he was fasting his followers would be 'in a state of terrible suspense.' Then came an appeal to the Government to take advantage of the suspension and release all civil disobedience prisoners unconditionally. He offered, if he survived his fast, to 'tender advice' both to Congress leaders and to the Government, and would 'like to take up the thread at the point where I was interrupted on my return from England.' If no understanding were reached Congress would resume civil disobedience, which could not be withdrawn while so many civil resisters were 'buried alive.'

Mr. Gandhi alone can say how this statement can be reconciled with his telegram to the Government. He proclaims that *Satya*, Truth, is his god. Now, *Satya* means more than verbal veracity: it implies rigid restraint of the self's tendency to exaggeration and misrepresentation in the interests of momentary self-advantage. Yet he did not hesitate to advise the meaningless suspension of a moribund movement and in return demand that the Government should liberate unrepentant law-breakers, who would infuse fresh vigour into the movement and would be directed by Mr. Gandhi himself, released for social service, in case of a revival. Perhaps the most significant item in the statement was his hope that he would be able to tender advice to the Government and take up the thread where they had broken it. Obviously he was angling to recover his lost prestige and power. Altogether, it was an odd attitude for 'a seeker after truth and a man of honour.'

The actual fast was a purposeless exhibition of asceticism in sumptuous surroundings—purposeless, that is, so far as its proclaimed intention was concerned. Three places were open to Mr. Gandhi: the Harijan hostel, his own *ashram*, and Lady Thackersay's palatial residence, 'Parnakuti.' He chose the palace. The fast was carried out with much outward show. Sun baths, nourishing oil baths, daily bulletins, a large staff of doctors and nurses, an expert masseuse—these impressed the public mind, and the purpose of the ordeal, as it should have been, was forgotten. Far from creating an impression of penance in the cause of the lowly Untouchables, the fast was presented to the world as a feat of saintly endurance—'Saint Sustained on Soul-Force,' according to some pro-Congress newspapers. But a *Frontier paper*, after praising Mr. Gandhi's 'unparalleled skill as

a bluffer,' went on to suggest that after his fast he should retire from political work and try to live as *sadhus* and *sanyasis* ought to live, in self-imposed and unpretentious obscurity. As a good Hindu and a student of the *Bhagavadgita* Mr. Gandhi must be aware that fasts that are undertaken with pride and ostentation to gain a worldly object, however exalted it may be, are condemned.

Mr. Gandhi broke his fast on May 29. As the result of his slow recovery the suspension of civil disobedience was extended to the end of July. While Mr. Gandhi regained his health there were definite indications that his mind was occupied entirely with politics. He had forgotten all about the Untouchables, the Government that had treated him so considerately, and the followers he had led into affliction, whose sacrifices had ended in failure. There were 10,950 men and women in prison at the end of April. They went to gaol willingly at his bidding. It was becoming increasingly clear that there was a strong body of opinion in favour of abandoning civil disobedience without attempting to open 'negotiations' with the Government, and so marked was the volume of criticism against Mr. Gandhi that a meeting of Congress leaders at Poona, fixed for June 12, had to be expanded into a conference of about 160 delegates. Mr. Gandhi determined to avert personal and party disaster by a startling performance. He evolved an ingenious plan of 'individual' instead of 'mass' disobedience: he would choose 100 of his best followers and embark on a campaign to land them all in gaol, thus drawing, by sentimental reaction, world sympathy to himself and India. There was, of course, another aspect. Individual disobedience might put congressmen out of the reach of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908: it would allow individuals to make their own choice in law-breaking; and it would relieve the leaders of responsibility for the actions of young hotheads.

At the conference Mr. Gandhi manoeuvred the delegates into accepting a policy to which most of them were opposed. He set himself resolutely against the withdrawal of civil disobedience without an 'honourable settlement.' He asked Congress to reaffirm his dictatorship and give him full powers to decide what the terms of an honourable settlement should be. Three resolutions were put to the meeting: (1) withdrawing civil disobedience, (2) adopting individual civil disobedience, (3) authorising Mr. Gandhi to seek an interview with the Viceroy. The first two were lost. The day after the conference ended Mr. Gandhi telegraphed to Lord Willingdon for an interview 'with a view to exploring possibilities of peace.' Later he boasted that if the interview had been granted he would have propounded a settlement acceptable to both the Government and Congress. When

he was asked what it was, he replied: 'I cannot tell you, not because it is a secret, but because I do not know. . . . I relied on my resourcefulness, which has up to now not failed me.'

Mr. Gandhi began his farewells to his friends in expectation of a refusal from Simla and a prompt return to gaol, and his wife got together his gaol kit—spinning-wheel, a supply of cotton, and vow-mat. Yet when the refusal came he informed the Government that it was 'a painful surprise.' He had not expected, he said, that the Government would take notice of the unauthorised publication of confidential proceedings; he believed Congress activities to be in pursuance of 'an inherent right belonging to the human family,' and he repeated his request for an interview. This was nothing short of quibbling. Several Congress journalists had been delegates to the conference, and the newspaper reports tallied remarkably. And in interviews and speeches outside the conference Mr. Gandhi had declared himself against the withdrawal of civil disobedience, which, he insisted, would be absolute surrender and the end of all Congress ambitions. The Government's statements of policy have always been unequivocal. Mr. Gandhi's request for an interview was again refused.

A searching criticism of the Gandhi theory appeared in an open letter from Mr. Asaf Ali, who has attended Mr. Gandhi since 1919. He declared that his master's programme had been before the country for fourteen years, and, so far as immediate political ends were concerned, was 'a virtual failure.' Mr. Jamnadas Mehta, a prominent Indian politician, complained that the fast system and a single individual's 'monopoly of God' produced 'total suspension of judgment, paralysis of reason and the emergence of abject credulity.' He also declared that Mr. Gandhi's political leadership had failed, 'and he must now be requested to retire as he is a great impediment in the way of democracy.' He cited thirteen instances where the faulty leadership and innate individualism of Mr. Gandhi had frustrated the sacrifices Indians had borne.

Federated India (Madras) said:

If a statue is to be erected to the greatest son of India in recent times, we would suggest the figure of the Congress with a noose round its neck kneeling at Mr. Gandhi's feet, and Gandhi holding the rope—becoming the spirit of self-immolation of the Orient at the feet of a saviour.

The Leader (Allahabad) remarked:

Mr. Gandhi has cared more for the prestige of his own position than for the interests of his country. Congressmen should call no further conferences; they should wait on Mr. Gandhi's 'inner voice'; that will spare them the trouble of expressing their opinions and then being told that they were all wrong and he alone was right and could be right.

The *Servant of India* (Poona) declared that

the continuance of Mahatma Gandhi's dictatorship cannot be regarded as healthy, inasmuch as it indicates that vitality of counsel and intelligence of thought have been stifled.

When Mr. Gandhi returned to Ahmedabad in July he decided to abandon his *ashram* at Sabarmati on August 1 and march out with its inmates as rebels. It appears from a newspaper report that he was approached there by a deputation of Untouchables, who requested that he would devote the whole of his time to their problem. He made it clear that while he would continue to work for them there were 'far more important things to do' in other spheres.

The next stage in this game of comedy-politics was the promulgation, on July 23, of instructions regarding Congress work by Mr. Aney, the acting president, who was known to favour the unconditional abandonment of civil disobedience. Mass disobedience was to be suspended indefinitely and individual disobedience would be adopted in its place. All Congress organisations would cease to function: only the All-India and provincial 'dictators' would remain. The first two items were directly contrary to the resolutions passed four days before at the Poona conference, and the third appeared to have no reference to any of the discussions at the conference. The statement when it appeared was almost unanimously condemned in the Congress Press. Obviously there is no democracy in the 'democratic' Congress Party: it has become absolutely and unreservedly dependent upon the whim of one man. Truly, Mr. Gandhi's State is Roman and Imperial.

On August 1 Mr. Gandhi started out on his march of individual disobedience and was immediately arrested, with his wife and thirty companions, and sent to Yeravda Gaol, in Poona. He was released on August 4, but was rearrested a few minutes later because he refused to comply with the conditions of his release—that he should stay in Poona and not engage in political activities. He was brought to trial before the Poona magistrate and was sentenced to a year's simple imprisonment. He described himself to the magistrate as a 'spinner, weaver and farmer,' and added: 'I have no desire whatsoever to enjoy special comforts to which other persons might not be entitled. I would like to be classed among those whom Government might consider to be the lowest.' He was put in class C. Has Mr. Gandhi ever earned a meal as a 'spinner, weaver and farmer'?

When he was first arrested he asked for facilities to carry on Harijan work. The Government of India informed him that they would (and did) release him if he would abandon civil

disobedience activities and incitement. He repeated his request when he was re-arrested, and again ten days later, asking for privileges greatly in excess of those enjoyed by the highest category of prisoners. He asserted that 'the strain of deprivation of this work is becoming unbearable. . . . Life ceases to interest me if I may not do Harijan service without let or hindrance,' and threatened to hunger-strike, or fast as he termed it, a threat that was quite contrary to the principles of *Satyagraha*.

Mr. Gandhi was allowed the following facilities to work for the Untouchables: (1) books, newspapers and publications, but not interviews to the Press; (2) two visitors a day; (3) to send contributions and instructions to the editor of the *Harijan* three times a week and a limited number of letters to other correspondents; and (4) a convict typist. As Mr. Gandhi considered that the concessions were 'so far short of my requirements' and were 'grudgingly given,' he decided to go on hunger-strike. He missed 'Government's response to meticulous care with which I am endeavouring to observe jail discipline and as a prisoner tender co-operation which as a citizen outside prison walls I consider it a religious duty to withhold.' He grieved that the Government could not 'appreciate the desperate need there is for me to do Harijan work without let or hindrance.' The intelligent faculty becomes superfluous in dealing with statements like these. Surely it is a perverse sprite that urges Mr. Gandhi to work so desperately for the Untouchables only when he is behind prison walls.

The Government refused to add to their offer and Mr. Gandhi began his hunger-strike. He was removed from gaol to hospital and was released a few days later, purely for medical reasons. On September 14 he informed the public that he would not court arrest before August 3, 1934, when the term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced would expire. If the Government leaves him free he proposes to occupy the interval in the cause of the Untouchables; but this in no way affects the advice he gave his followers to carry on the struggle by practising individual disobedience.

Early in September Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru met in conclave to consider the future policy of Congress. According to the explanatory statements they issued, the former adheres to civil disobedience; the latter does not believe in it and attaches no importance to Harijan work. The Pandit has ideas of an advanced economic policy that amounts to Communism. Both statements have had an astonishingly bad Press.

Mr. Gandhi's championship of the Harijans, or Untouchables, has played a very useful part in his publicity campaign. It has not, however, brought them any appreciable relief from their

deplorable position. As he comes to grips with the problem he finds himself pitted against an inveterate enemy, the Dharmic consciousness and will of the Hindus, for Hindu society is founded on the *Dharma Shastras*, and they do not condemn untouchability. The use of the word 'Harijan' in this connexion is an act of profanation to the orthodox Hindu: in the literature of the *Sadhus* it means 'the exalted of God.' Mr. Gandhi's standpoint in this matter, as in many others, is illogical. While he very rightly condemns untouchability, he proclaims his belief in caste, apparently using the word in its occupational sense. For centuries, however, caste has ceased to be a matter of trade guilds. It is a religious institution. Even in the *Bhagavadgita*, the source of much of Mr. Gandhi's spiritual consolation, the central conception is that each caste has its own ethics.

From the Hindu point of view untouchability is based primarily on hygienic grounds. It is not so much a question of caste as of *Saucha*, cleanliness—purity in person, habits and food. Sanitary education and uplifting social service, not the right to worship in the temples of the orthodox, are needed to eradicate the evil. It will be a long and expensive process. The Temple Entry Bill is being circulated for opinion till June 1934. Rajah Bahadur G. Krishnamachariar, a member of the Legislative Assembly, writes as follows in an Indian newspaper:

I hope that the country will now awake to the necessity of organising public opinion and marshalling it so that Government may be convinced as I have been repeatedly impressing on them that the opposition to this Bill is very strong, and that if it gets through a very undesirable condition will be created in the country.

Early in November Mr. Gandhi set out on a tour to win support for the Bill. It will be interesting to see whether he will, or can, dissociate his propaganda from civil disobedience; already his wife has been imprisoned for attempting to revive the movement in the Kaira district, where once it flourished. Mr. Gandhi sees no incongruity in his Temple Entry campaign. Reforms must be thrust down unwilling throats, but that is not violence; the aid of the Central Legislature, which he set his heart on boycotting, must be sought to admit the Untouchables to the temples of orthodox Hindus, but that does not clash with the principle of non-co-operation! The tour is 'designed to bring about repentance among *savarna* Hindus in their treatment of the Untouchables.' It 'has been undertaken in the name of religion and as a step in the process of purification.' It has got to go through, of course, under the direst of threats. There is no persuasion about it, although that is a method Mr. Gandhi professes to follow. At the beginning of his tour he was reported as saying: 'Either untouchability must go or I shall perish in the

attempt. This is my firm resolve, and I am bound to carry it out.'

The All-India Varnashram Swarajya Sangh has been busy countering Mr. Gandhi's efforts in the Central Provinces. At Nagpur the orthodox Hindus turned his own weapon, *Satyagraha*, against him by lying down in front of his motor car. According to Press reports, the Untouchables in the United Provinces have decided to boycott his meetings and otherwise demonstrate their opposition, because they believe they are being used as a pawn in a political game. It is difficult to see what good can come of this campaign. It will certainly cause much bitterness of feeling in various sections of the Indian community, and as the tour progresses clashes between the Sanatanists and the reformers are sure to increase in frequency and intensity. In his drive against the Sanatanists Mr. Gandhi is again misusing his influence. The multitude will misunderstand the significance of the tour and regard it as another campaign for *Swaraj*, a term that has become very complicated through his innumerable definitions of it. At Nagpur Mr. Gandhi said, in a Press interview, that 'if a nation gets more and more a consciousness of the fundamental rights of the millions, then they are certainly progressing towards *Swaraj*.' Surely fundamental rights include freedom of the practice of religion and worship, and Mr. Gandhi is now engaged in taking away this freedom from the many millions of orthodox Hindus, who carry their faith back to the *Shastras*.

In a letter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Mr. Gandhi mentions communal unity, the removal of untouchability, the universalisation of the spinning-wheel and *khaddar* as 'constructive activities.' He omitted two very important ones: the suppression of terrorism and the emancipation of the agriculturist from the clutches of the *bania*. His attitude towards terrorism is well known. At no time has he attempted to use his influence openly against it. The apostle of the gentle doctrine of *Ahimsa* has nothing but praise for the 'selfless purity of motive' of criminals who are assassins before the eyes of God and man.

His attitude towards the *banias*, or moneylenders, is not so well known. They are a part of the broad caste of *Vaishyas*, into which Mr. Gandhi was born. Numerically they form less than 1 per cent. of the population, but they hold about 80 per cent. in their ruinous grip. A common rate of interest, according to the Labour Commission's Report, is 75 per cent. per annum, without allowing for the effects of compound interest; and on small sums as much as 375 per cent. has been charged. The interest paid to *banias* is approximately equal to the whole burden of Indian taxation, but Mr. Gandhi has never raised his voice against the *bania*, although he has violently denounced the taxes of 'the

satanic British Government,' which, in fact, are extremely low, and every anna of them is spent in India. The Government's proposals to curb the rapacity of these leeches have been opposed most strenuously by those who are avowedly inspired by Congress policy. The records of the Legislative Assembly and the provincial Legislatures, particularly Bombay and the Punjab, stand as witnesses to this fact.

Mr. Gandhi has given us a charming picture of the India he set out to create. It was to be

an India in which there shall be no high-class and low-class people, an India in which all communities shall live in perfect harmony. There shall be no room in such an India for the curse of untouchability or the curse of intoxicating drinks and drugs. Women shall have the same rights as men. Since we shall be at peace with the world, neither exploiting nor being exploited, we shall have the smallest army possible.

He was unafraid of the immensity of his canvas because he thought he had complete control over his palette. His palette-knife was 'non-violent non-co-operation'; but there is a wide difference of philosophy between the adjective and the noun.

Where does India stand at the end of thirteen years of intense Gandhism? Does she stand higher in honour, is she a step nearer to the happy state of internal peace and reasonable prosperity? At the bidding of the new Mahatma, or Great Soul, Indians have struggled faithfully for a superficial *Swaraj*; and for that they are to lose the higher culture which taught their forefathers to seek through self-control, steady endeavour and faith, not worldly power, but the bliss of divinity 'deep-seated in the heart of all things.' Mr. Gandhi has created a deep schism in his party. Seth Jamanlal Bajaj and Dr. Muhammad Alam, two prominent officials of the Working Committee, have resigned, and congressmen are breaking away and forming their own organisations. The Maharashtra Party of Bombay has brought into existence the Democratic *Swaraj* Party, to attain India's freedom 'by all legitimate means'; the Independent Congress Party has been established in Bengal in the belief that the country requires a more practical and constructive policy than the one Mr. Gandhi follows. Swami Govindanand, a left-wing Congress leader, accuses him of disloyalty to the Congress mandate. He maintains that no responsible body has authorised Mr. Gandhi to dismiss or suspend the president, dictators and committees, and urges that the All-India Congress Committee should be convened to consider the present position.

When a man, however pure his character and lofty his aims, arrogates the right to be a law unto himself, he ceases to have a place in civilised society. Mr. Gandhi has followed, with a persistency worthy of greater achievements, the delusive light from

heaven which he claims as his monopoly and regards as infallible; but there is at least the chance that it may review its facts in terms of its own desires. He will never admit that he is wrong; and the greatest of all our errors is denying that we have ever erred.

Mr. Gandhi's character seems to have developed under the sway of two cardinal demerits—vanity and obstinacy. His personal prestige he regards as a matter of national importance; the reason is obscure. He is too busy being a celebrity to be a great leader of the people and a faithful servant of their best interests; and to stand forth as the saviour of his countrymen he has tried to create a situation worthy of salvation. But practical problems appear to him only as questions of abstract rights, and nothing matters but the passion of the idea. His policy is destruction, and destruction is the negation of all progress, of life. Destruction is death.

His fame is not due to sterling qualities so much as to spectacular observances, natural shrewdness, mastery of evasion and implication, skill in creating suspense, and political strategy in which Truth is paraded as a fetish. Behind and above all is Publicity. As the apostle of Liberty, Mr. Gandhi has coerced the most defenceless of Indians in regard to their occupations, their business, even in the choice of their wearing apparel. As the apostle of Love, he has stirred up hatred and suspicion among the different sections of the population and has created an inferno which no amount of heroism can justify. As the apostle of Truth, he does not expound or practise it as a perfect agreement between the representation of ideas and the presentation of realities—the conformity of words to thoughts.

The suffering and pain of the last thirteen years appear to have no meaning for Mr. Gandhi. He has not been made richer by his bitter experiences, but he has become poorer by many shattered hopes. It is only when our mistakes are educative and our sufferings leaven our pride that we can be helpful to others. Fasting unto death as a vicarious sin-bearer is of no avail: legally it is a crime—suicide; morally it is coercion; and socially it is merely spectacular. There is, indeed, no place on earth from which a man may not step into death, just as there is no point in character or action from which he may not escape into life.

Mr. Gandhi has stood on the summit. He could have pointed the way had he realised that every mountain-top of privilege is girdled by vales of humble and honest duty.

DUNCAN McCLOY.

IMPRESSIONS OF GERMANY

A YEAR at a German university which saw the revolution and the beginning of Hitler's Chancellorship tempts me to record some aspects of my experience and to make an estimate of the attitude of the new Germany towards its neighbours.

In order to avoid all misunderstanding I may be permitted, perhaps, in the first place to make a personal statement. I have earnestly and persistently put forward the view to Germans in responsible positions and to Nazi leaders, that good relations with England are scarcely possible without certain changes. These would include: (1) the rehabilitation in some form of the Jews as a race. This is not to ignore the fact that Germany has a Jewish problem, but the apparent condemnation of the Jews as a race, implicit in the regrettable non-Aryan law, appears to British opinion to be equivalent to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. (2) The restoration of the *Rechts-Staat*. This implies obviously the re-establishment of conditions which assure to each citizen constitutional rights and liberties and protect him from arbitrary detention in concentration camps: these ought sooner rather than later to be abolished. (3) The combing out of third-rate leaders, high and low, throughout the land, who have proved themselves incapable, and who place party interests before the country, and their replacement by first-class men. One cannot overestimate this danger threatening the development of Germany—a danger which arises from the crude application of the leadership principle (*Führer-Prinzip*).

A word as to the atrocities, of which so much has been written in the English newspapers. Although I have not come in contact with any of the regrettable happenings, I have no grounds for denying that much cruelty has occurred. The emphasis, however, daily given to incidents in this or that town—street brawls, beatings, and so forth—leads the reader to imagine that the entire Nazi movement is bad and vicious. The fact is, of course, that only a very small minority of roughs bring the movement into disgrace in these ways. The vast majority are animated by idealism and a desire for sacrifice and service on behalf of the community. The cumulative effect of the daily description of

violent deeds has, in my view, created terribly exaggerated ideas of the conditions. In saying this, I do not wish to condone outrage.

When Englishmen give way to righteous indignation, they should remember what England inflicted on the Germans in 1918-19. The blockade was continued for four months after the Armistice, in order partly to force upon Germany the unjust Treaty of Versailles—a blockade which in its entirety was responsible for the death from starvation of at least 750,000 men, women, and children. As I read *The Times* every day in Königsberg, I knew how roused English opinion was, but I had no idea that it had gone to such passionate lengths until I returned to England. Righteous indignation, when it exceeds certain bounds, becomes dangerously negative and destructive and produces an almost war-like mentality.

Before one embarks on general questions, it may be advisable to give a picture of life at Königsberg, where I have been engaged in teaching in the historical faculty of the university for the academic year 1932-33. Königsberg is, of course, the capital of East Prussia, a town of 300,000 inhabitants. Its university was founded in 1544 by the last High Master of the Teutonic Order. It was made famous by Kant, who taught there all his life. Since the war its importance has vastly increased. Students from all parts of the German *Reich* attend it; there are in all about 5000. It is, I suppose, in some respects more interesting than any other university in Germany because of its geographical position. Its proximity to Poland and the Baltic States ensures a great deal of interest in foreign affairs, and I need hardly say that interest in the German-Polish question is very intense. Contrary to the general belief in England, I have found the East Prussians in general a kindly folk, and one feels that the liberal traditions of the Kant period have left their mark here, so that East Prussia must be distinguished perhaps in this respect from the other parts of eastern Germany—namely, Pomerania and Silesia.

In the historical section of the university we have been discussing the foreign policy of Gladstone and Disraeli. I showed myself to be a champion of Gladstone, whose views in favour of an international order based on public law were in advance of his time. I also took the opportunity, as provided by the consideration of the Gladstonian period, of throwing light on the character of English public opinion, its humanitarian reactions and so on. The students, many of whom were members of the Brown Shirts ('S.A.') and *Schutzstaffel* ('S.S.'), showed great interest. Discussions, held often in the presence of the Professor of Modern History, were objective. Students showed a greater readiness to understand Disraeli than Gladstone. On my asking them out of

class why it was so difficult to make them understand the liberal ideals of a Gladstone, the answer given was that under cover of such language the Treaty of Versailles was imposed upon them and they doubted the *bona fides* of such ideas in the light of their harsh experience. However, as the weeks went by and our discussions continued, the students finally understood and showed appreciation of the sincerity of British opinion in many of its aspects. Since I have been in England I have received a card from the Nazi leader of the historical seminar, who was a member of my class, expressing warm thanks for my efforts to explain English liberalism and hoping that I would return.

I very often have tea with the students of the historical faculty. They have no junior common-room, owing to lack of money, but this difficulty they overcome very characteristically in an admirable way. They sit round a table in the corridor at four o'clock every day, and here we have vigorous discussions on current events. Although 99 per cent. of the students are members of the Nazi Party, they willingly hear criticism—one hears very sound, healthy criticism of governmental action—and make very sound comments thereon. In these gatherings I have myself made no secret of my views in regard to the handling of the Jewish problem and in favour of abolishing the concentration camps. I often read *The Times* here, and the students look at it with great interest. In the reading-room of the university *The Times* is taken daily, as a matter of fact. My relations with the students are most cordial. I have seldom come across a group which shows such courtesy, appreciation and gratitude. Their friendliness is very striking. When the historical students had their annual outing in the country I was interested to notice that on the return journey, as we marched a five-mile tramp to the station, no Nazi songs were sung. I asked one of the students why. He replied that there were some Jews amongst us and that they did not want to hurt their feelings.

I was an interested witness of the burning of the books by the university students. They marched into a large square in front of the great barracks of the city, and stood shoulder to shoulder looking very grim and earnest as the torch was applied to the heap of books—works by Marx and other writers of a less respectable character. On being asked whether the English students could perform such a ceremony, I replied 'No,' as they had too great a sense of humour. Some weeks later I noticed in the historical seminar in the library two rows of books containing the complete works of Marx, Engels, and other standard Socialist writers. I turned to the students who were reading in the room and said, 'Ha, ha! what are these doing here?' Whereupon they replied that the books were there for purposes of research. Burn-

ing books seems to be a tradition in Germany started by Luther and followed by the supporters of Fichte and now by the Hitlerites. It is, of course, more symbolic than comprehensive.

Mr. Montefiore, joint chairman of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, gave an address in London some time ago in the course of which he declared:

He would not assert that the Nazi movement was only composed of hatred and prejudice and all that was evil. If it were only evil it would disappear more quickly than he thought was likely to be the case. There were certain good elements among the Nazis; a certain austerity and readiness for self-sacrifice, a spirit of patriotism, and a desire to see Germany take her place once more among the nations. That was one of the most tragic things, for were it not for the anti-Semitic plank in the Nazi programme there was no doubt that a large proportion of young German Jews would be enthusiastic followers of the movement, and would contribute what they could to the rebirth of the country. They were shut out, and the spiritual misery which had been so caused was almost equal to, if not greater than, the economic misery and misfortune which had overtaken them.

I can endorse the statement, and would single out the phrase 'the desire to see Germany take her place once more among the nations.' Those who have not lived in Germany have no idea what it has meant to the Germans to be treated as pariahs. The English in general are more ready to realise, perhaps, than Continental people what Versailles has meant to Germany. It has been brought home to me during my stay in Germany that the 'War Guilt' clause is more than a phrase, more than a judgment. It is brought home to every German in the shape of penalties, from which those who took part in the war have suffered and from which the new generation of to-day is suffering, and which, unless they are removed, the coming generation will have to bear. For it is a settlement avowedly justified by the assumption that Germany was solely responsible for the war. On the tearing away of Germany's territories, including all her colonies, there is no need to dwell, nor upon the so-called Reparation tribute. The terrible consequences of the inflation will take generations to remove. Scars were also left by the French invasion of the Ruhr, the attempt by the French to separate the Rhine from the rest of the country, the conquest of part of Upper Silesia by the Poles in defiance of the League, the occupation of the Rhineland by black troops until 1930, and, finally, the German nation, outlawed like a criminal people, has been left comparatively defenceless, surrounded by a ring of armed States with the most modern mechanised equipment—aeroplanes, tanks, big guns, etc. All this is vividly felt by the new generation of Germans, who had nothing to do with the war. They are sick and tired of the policy

of 'fulfilment,' a policy so impracticable that it never can be fulfilled. One of the strongest elements in the National Socialists' attitude lies here. Why promise to fulfil something which is impracticable? Why go on with the pretence? Why, in so doing, assent to assumptions in regard to Germany which are not true? 'Enough of all this,' they passionately say. 'Let us meet the rest of the world on equal terms. We will not make dishonest promises to fulfil things which we cannot fulfil. We will stand erect and refuse to carry out unjust policies. The rest of the world can oppress us, but we shall never assent to that oppression again.'

That was the prevailing emotion when Hitler became Chancellor, and a feeling of relief and thanksgiving went through the country, as if the burden of 'war guilt' had been thrown off. Germany had now courage to speak her mind and demonstrate against Versailles—which she had been forbidden to do for the last twelve or fourteen years in Prussia under the Braun-Severing Government. In 1929, for instance, the students of Königsberg, and also of Berlin, attempted to hold demonstrations against the Treaty, and they were attacked by the police and dispersed by baton charges. The revolution marked the end of a period of preaching at, lecturing and patronising of, Germany on the part of the Allied Powers. The offensive treatment, which, for instance, is clearly evident when we distinguish the tone of criticism levelled against America and against Germany in the British Press, has been deeply felt by the Germans.

People rejoiced also because, at last, hopes for a long, stable Government were provided, and because an end was to be made to the constant changes of Government occurring every six months in a Reichstag elected from thirty-eight political parties. They were glad to put an end to chronic disunion, which occurred at a time when Germany had been struggling for a decade or more to regain her place against a hostile world. I had a feeling that Germans seemed to be voluntarily surrendering their freedom for the time being as individual citizens, in order to free their nation from its humiliation *vis-à-vis* foreign Powers.

There was also an enemy within the gates. Although there was no immediate danger of a Communist revolution, the rise and spread of the party had gone to dangerous lengths. It hindered the recovery and interfered with the development of German life in every sphere. It was undermining the morale of the Germans at a time of great economic distress and also threatening to disintegrate the national character. It had already made the Reichstag proceedings a farce. In the last five Reichstags no single party or combination of two parties was able to command a majority. In five months up to the end of July 31, 1932,

there had been four elections. Brüning led the way to a dictatorship. He found himself compelled to govern by emergency decree, but, unlike the British National Government of 1931, Brüning unfortunately had not the backing of the nation. Herr Schwarz, a writer of *Vorwärts*, stated in the *Contemporary Review* in 1932:

Brüning had not built up a genuine dictatorship on the broad masses of the people, but a fictitious one on the sentimental basis of being 'a servant of a historical personality.' . . . Thus Bismarck's fate revealed itself in some respects; he had enhanced the Hohenzollern idea of a State and in the end it turned against him.

One Government followed another, it will be remembered, before finally Hitler, with his popular backing, took the reins.

Again, the revolution appeared to put an end to the disunion due to the particularism of some of the States. In some cases this question had become urgent. In 1932 Bavaria, it is said, was intriguing for the return of the Wittelsbach dynasty. I remember in the spring, when I was in Königsberg, observing a symptom of this unrest. When the great gas explosion occurred in the Saar and telegrams of condolence were sent by President Hindenburg and other Reich Ministers to the German mayor of the town, Dr. Held, the Prime Minister of Bavaria, sent a telegram of condolence to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Both in Württemberg and in Baden particularist movements began to look serious.

Germany, it is clear, has not yet completely acquired a sense of nationhood. The National Socialist movement appears to symbolise the birth of this sense. Germans have had in the past a sense of being members of an empire, of the *Reich*; the sense of being a Bavarian or a Württemberger was felt more strongly than the sense of being a German. This can readily be appreciated when one remembers that in the eighteenth century Germany consisted of 300 independent States. After the Congress of Vienna these were reduced to about forty. After the founding of the empire by Bismarck the States were still further reduced in number. It is very difficult for Englishmen to realise what the Germans mean when they talk of the 'birth or rebirth of a nation.' The sense of our nationhood, which has grown up with us through the centuries under a firm, centralised Government, is very strong, but we are scarcely conscious of it and we do not talk about it. It is nevertheless there, and at a time of crisis it comes to the surface and shows itself, as in 1931, in the form of a disciplined, unified front. In Germany I believe this

sense of nationhood is in process of creation, and the result is quite different from what is ordinarily supposed in England. It makes the Germans respect the achievement of other nations, especially young peoples like the Poles, who have successfully re-emerged in recent times. I have again and again come across this attitude amongst the students at Königsberg. Again and again have they told me that they, as National Socialists, are different from the German Nationalists, whose imperialistic ideas they condemn. When Hitler made his speech in May and expressed this idea of respect for the Polish people, he was evidently not speaking in the air, but was expressing the view held by many thinking Nazis.

This idea I have seen put into practice in Danzig under the new Nazi régime. At Easter I visited the Free State and spoke to Poles and Germans separately. I visited the State again in August under the new régime, and was able for the first time to meet Poles and Germans together. German and Polish officials with whom I dined met as the greatest friends and congratulated one another on organising a camp in Poland where Danzig German youth, wearing the *swastika*, spent a holiday with the Pilsudski youth. In this camp the Polish boys sang German national songs, and the German youth sang Polish airs in turn. I need not here dwell on the extremely generous policy of Dr. Rauschning, the head of the Danzig Government, who has offered large cultural concessions to the Poles—not, as he told me, in order to make a bargain, but in order to improve general conditions between Germany and Poland. He added that it was only by such a policy that one could live together in Eastern Europe, where populations were so mixed. His policy, he also stated, was approved by Hitler.

I do not find among the students any form of Chauvinistic temper. They reject with indignation charges that Germany wants war. While they support the policy directed against the Jews and the Communists, and defend the Government from foreign attacks in regard to these questions, they reject charges to the effect that they are nationally aggressive as completely false and based on a complete misunderstanding of their aims. At the university they endeavour to learn the Polish language and to understand the Polish problem in its entirety. They try to work out together with their professors constructive solutions for the vexed question of the Corridor. The German is objective, and can make a good case for his opponent's side as well as for his own.

The students enthusiastically approve the Nazi policy in foreign affairs of turning away from the west and looking eastwards. I have found no one who would claim the return of

Alsace-Lorraine. They feel that their future lies in the east. I have often questioned them about the eastern policy. 'What is this policy?' I have asked. 'You cannot mean, I think, repetition of the mediæval achievements, when German peasants crossed the Elbe in large numbers and settled as far as the Oder and beyond, and finally Germanised these countries? You were then invited into the eastern lands by Slav princes. To-day you are faced with the existence of independent national States in Eastern Europe.' The reply is that the policy aims at relieving the congestion in the west of Germany and populating Pomerania or East Prussia. I heard a local Nazi leader address a voluntary works camp of Germans and tell them something of this transfer scheme. In the course of his speech he condemned the German Nationalists, who in the days before the war looked upon East Prussia as a country mainly of strategic value and neglected its economic development. He also said that the policy of attracting people from western Germany would make relations between France and Germany easier and promote peace.

The eastern policy has, of course, a bearing on the countries east of Germany. The policy has not been fully worked out, but its aims are by no means aggressive. I was told in the University of Königsberg that they definitely reject the plan of Friedrich Naumann, whose book *Mittel Europa* caused a great stir in 1917. This proposed a loose federal union of States, of which the central Power would control the military and economic resources of its members. Beginning with Germany and Austria, it would attach other States. This goes too far, in the opinion of the Nazis at the university. German dominance of this kind is rejected by them. They urge, rather, closer commercial relations with the eastern States, which would provide Germany with agricultural produce, Germany in turn selling them manufactured goods. Closer political relations would naturally follow, and Germany's influence, as a nation of 65,000,000, would inevitably be preponderant in view of the millions of Germans who are nationals of these eastern States. They are careful to add, however, that they do not wish to interfere with the integrity of these States, but instead of a constitution modelled on the French principle of a centralised single national State they would prefer to see in each case the development of a federal State or a State in which every race enjoys full liberty in regard to culture. In this respect National Socialism differs fundamentally from Italian Fascism, which, e.g. in the Tyrol, is pursuing a ruthless policy of assimilation.

An exception must be made in regard to German Austria. It is generally held that the union of the Germans in Austria and those of Germany will inevitably take place sooner or later. Since the break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the relations of

German Austria and Germany have been regarded as forming a domestic question. This would apply to all parties in Germany. One may here recall Dr. Brüning's attempt to promote the *Anschluss* very soon after he became Chancellor.

So much for the positive aspect of the nationalism of the new Germany as I have found it. The Nazis are not aggressively national in the sense that they desire to interfere with the independence of neighbouring countries. I am convinced that they are far less imperialistic than the members of the German National Party. They do wish, however, to be able to defend their country. It is not sufficiently realised in England that the Germans suffer just as much as the French from a fear of insecurity. Anyone who has lived in East Prussia for a time will have realised how justified this feeling is. At any time the Poles, without a general mobilisation, can overrun the province. No fortifications are allowed on the frontier. The province is completely cut off and surrounded by heavy armed forces, equipped with aeroplanes, tanks and big guns. Looking at Silesia, one may readily see how the Czechs could sweep it up. The French could advance into the demilitarised zone on the western frontier without firing a gun along a length of 250 miles and a depth of 50 miles. The Germans are constantly disturbed by talks of defensive wars in France, although I am convinced that the French people generally are pacific. One never hears in England of the aggressive propaganda which goes on in Poland, nor of the inflammatory speeches of Polish politicians. Last October all the schools and universities of Poland in a certain week devoted their activities to considering the alleged Polish character of East Prussia, the intention being obviously to work up a conviction that sooner or later East Prussia must be conquered by Poland.

When Lord Hailsham made his speech last May in favour of military sanctions against Germany a state of feeling not far short of panic occurred in East Prussia. Hardly any work was done at the university that week. Fear that war was imminent, and that Poles and the French would invade Germany with Great Britain's approval, was prevalent. The nervousness was so great that the students of the university hurriedly sought to get some rifle instruction, but only a minority could receive instruction as there were not enough rifles to go round. I could not refrain from sympathising with this attitude, and I found that the misunderstanding in England which could give rise to such a speech as Lord Hailsham had made had placed Germany in a most dangerous and unjust position.

It is not to be wondered at that under these conditions a certain eagerness is displayed by the youth of the country to

equip themselves for defence. It is a fact that many sections of the S.A. and S.S. of the university take part in what they call *Wehrsport*. This consists of long marches, cross-country runs and so forth, and in throwing wooden balls. I would suggest, however, that such instruction falls short of the training of the O.T.C. which goes on in every public school in England, and also in very many secondary schools, where instruction in the use of the rifle and so on is given. One may ask what would be the attitude of English boys and young men if the O.T.C. had been prohibited by the French. What is regarded as a virtue and serving the needs of legitimate defence in England should not be denounced as militarism in Germany. It is not true that militarism is inculcated in the schools and universities of Germany.

While the S.A. and S.S. are disciplined formations, they are, however, not troops, as every military attaché knows. No Brown Shirts have rifles. The purposes of these organisations are primarily to uphold the revolution and the new *régime*. They serve an essential purpose in stiffening up the morale of young men who have been unemployed for several years. The salutary effect of this discipline I have seen in parts of the country where crime and loose morals were becoming prevalent. Also the uniform gives the unemployed man a feeling that he belongs to something which is building up the future of the country. Another aspect of the uniform, I have been so frequently told, is its democratic character. Men of all classes wear the 'shirt'—sons of great landowners and sons of working men. The 'shirt' represents the spirit of community, which is so excellent a feature of the voluntary works camps, where young men of all classes are engaged in work of reclamation and drainage under very hard conditions. As for the constant processions, one should not be led astray. Seen from afar in England, they seem to be the quintessence of militarism. Seeing them on the spot, I feel nothing of the kind; such a view, then, seems ridiculous. The German is very gregarious and has a special liking for processions. Where three Englishmen make a football club, three Germans will form a procession. A liking for processions, flags and colour is a marked characteristic of the South German, who is so strongly represented in the Nazi movement and Government. But already the tastes of the North German are making themselves felt.

In passing, may one raise an objection to the rendering in English newspapers of 'S.A. Männer' (S.A. men) as 'storm troopers'? This term must create in the English mind the sense of 'picked fighters ready to go over the top.' It is most misleading. In the first place, they are not 'picked'; they form the common body of Brown Shirts open to everyone. In the second place, they are not troopers. 'S.A.' it is true, stands for

Sturm Abteilung, i.e., 'storm section.' These were originally groups of Brown Shirts who tried to maintain order at meetings which so often broke up in free fights in the early period. 'Sturm' has now merely a quantitative meaning; it is a squad of a hundred men forming part of a larger formation. Finally, no one in Germany refers to S.A. men as 'storm troopers.' They are called simply 'S.A. men.'

That these formations could be used for defence after some months' professional training is probable, though *Reichswehr* officers have a poor opinion of their value as a preparation for military training. Whether or not their activities will be turned into aggressive channels depends upon Great Britain and France. Every military attaché would agree that Germany is at present completely at the mercy of her neighbours. This is an intolerable position, and, moreover, dangerous to peace, particularly in the east, where irresponsible violent action leading to *faits accomplis* have been governing considerations among the less experienced eastern States since the war. Germany is attempting legally and through co-operation with other Governments to put an end to this dangerous state of affairs. If we give them a square deal in the field of disarmament, the organisations of German youth will retain the characteristics which they now have. One should not assume that the German attempt to put an end to this state of affairs implies a war-like attitude. One of the essential elements in the attitude of the new Germany, it must be repeated, lies in this: she will never again promise to carry out a policy which she considers to be unjust and which seems to be a continuation of the penalties imposed on the assumption that Germany was solely responsible for the war, for on this ground is equality in armament refused her. In no circumstances will Germany ever sign a second Treaty of Versailles. For this reason she refused the proposal at Geneva to extend Treaty impositions virtually for another eight years. I am convinced of the underlying pacific aims of the new Germany. We can win her confidence and ready co-operation if we treat her as a trusted equal.

T. P. CONWELL-EVANS.

NATIONAL EFFICIENCY .

A PLEA FOR THE ORGANISATION OF WOMEN

THE Great War effectually freed women in the belligerent countries from the last bond which kept them economically dependent upon the male section of the community. During that terrible conflict they were entrusted with duties and responsibilities which had never before been undertaken by them in the mass, and the most prejudiced misogynist is bound to admit that as a whole they were not found wanting in their charges. In fact they surpassed universal male expectations by the variety and difficulty of the tasks which they were able to perform, such tasks frequently involving highly specialised training which they underwent with the most successful results. Women served in large numbers as nurses, pharmacists, dispensers, masseuses, cooks, signallers, munition manufacturers, despatch riders, motor drivers and mechanics; many of them gained decorations for their meritorious services; and after the conclusion of hostilities the different organisations in which they were employed received the thanks of the King and Queen. The training which was given to so many of the women of this country at that time has left its mark. British women are now more businesslike and self-reliant than they have ever been in the past. They have also become mechanically and aurally minded. Above all, they have, largely in consequence of the spirit of mutual co-operation engendered by their war-time activities, succeeded in developing the priceless asset of comradeship, which in its different forms is perhaps the most civilising factor known to the world.

Since the war, women have been acknowledged as exceedingly capable and far-seeing organisers. They have displayed ample proof of their abilities in every deliberative body in which they have sat, from Parliament to the smallest village committee. In politics they excel with regard to all the details necessary for success—first as hostesses and social entertainers, and also, especially during elections, as canvassers and public speakers, as well as in other kinds of voluntary work. As mayors and on

municipal and borough corporations they are undoubtedly popular—a sure tribute to their efficiency and industry. But not only in politics have they achieved distinction. The many professions and other vocations thrown open to them by the legislative removal of sex disqualifications have benefited by their admission. They now fill executive positions in banking and insurance institutions; they have become architects, lawyers and doctors; they serve in the ranks of the police force and Government administration; and they work on the staffs of our great newspapers. Women such as Lady Bailey, Mrs. Mollison, and Mrs. Cleaver have given mankind a lead in aviation. Miss Margery Foster, who normally manages a chicken farm, showed unexpected talents by winning the King's Prize at Bisley in the face of 'crack' male 'shots.' Mrs. Helena Normanton, the first woman to be briefed in our High Court of Justice, possesses an extensive practice as a barrister, and has found, furthermore, that professional interests do not injuriously affect a happy marriage. On the magisterial bench women have proved both painstaking and just, particularly in the juvenile courts, where they have made themselves indispensable by their gifts of sympathy and understanding. Also as 'visiting justices,' whose duty it is to inquire into the welfare and treatment of female prisoners and inmates of Borstal institutions, they have rendered the greatest assistance to the State.

All these fresh responsibilities conferred on women by post-war developments have not made them lose their heads, as it was thought they would in certain 'die-hard' quarters. On the contrary, they have imbued the 'fair sex' with a new sense of civic obligation, and, so far as one can judge, to-day women are facing the problems which their work reveals in a spirit of sobriety and quiet determination. Their shrewd eye for practicalities and unerring instinct for common sense and sound judgment go far to outweigh those physical disadvantages under which they labour as compared with men. Of course, none of the foregoing remarks are to be understood as tending to prejudice the future of the race which the discharge of extra-domestic functions by women on a large scale might seemingly infer. I for one would never counsel women to forsake lightly the duties of the home, nor, in fact, do I think it possible that they will ever shirk such obligations. In these days, however, only a limited number of women can hope to secure a husband and a home; and those who have the opportunity and good fortune to do so will, I feel sure, follow their higher calling and that in which they can best and most truly fulfil their destiny—as mothers of the rising generation. But at the same time it should be borne in mind that even the discharge of marital obligations affords no excuse

for social self-isolation, nor are those obligations, generally speaking, incompatible with the many other duties of citizenship which serve to enrich the commonweal.

Although, as I am well aware, the military training, with its disciplinary lessons, which women underwent during the war has been of the greatest benefit to them in civilian occupations, I cannot cease to regret that the personnel enrolled was disbanded by the authorities so soon after the Armistice without any further use being found for their services. At least, with a little foresight on the part of the authorities concerned, opportunities might have been provided for many women who had served their country to keep up their training, so as to be able to offer their services again as efficient units immediately on the occurrence of any sudden national emergency. At the present time we cannot afford to disregard the significance of certain signs on the international horizon. In many ways the European prospect resembles that at the beginning of the fateful year 1914. There exists an unmistakable feeling of tension among the nations, in spite of the well-meaning efforts of the League at Geneva. Commercial rivalries caused by the international struggle for markets have led to political jealousies, and this unpleasant development is rendered more serious by the increased output which has been going on for some time in the production of armaments. To the best of my knowledge, large sections of the civilian population in various foreign countries are at present being taught how to employ gas masks and other defences against chemical warfare. Friends of mine who have lately visited Germany and Soviet Russia, the two most militant States in Europe to-day, have actually watched gas-mask drill taking place. In both these countries large quantities of synthetic ammonia and nitric acid are being produced ostensibly for agricultural purposes; but it is quite clear that on the outbreak of hostilities involving either of these countries such products would be immediately utilised for explosives and poison gases, particularly of the lachrymatory and vesicant type. The Bolsheviks make constant use of their aircraft for the purpose of scattering various fertilising liquids, but it is not difficult to see how easily this aircraft could be employed for a much more deadly purpose. Though I earnestly hope and pray that I shall never live to see Great Britain again at war, I think at the same time it would be folly to blind our eyes to the fact that this country is virtually no longer an island, nor is she at the moment particularly beloved by any of her Continental neighbours. In the deplorable but yet by no means inconceivable event of hostilities being directed against her, it is well for us to remember that such a densely populated area is open on all sides to attack, particularly from the air. On account,

therefore, of the recent and not unalarming features in the situation of Europe, and indeed of world affairs, it seems to me to be a matter of paramount importance that the women of this country should be prepared to undertake extraordinary and special duties in defence of their homes and children just as much as their men-folk, though these duties lie along different lines.

Before considering any scheme for the future organisation of women in the interests of national defence, one should examine the corporate women's bodies at present in existence. There are two principal organisations which deserve attention, and which will undoubtedly command it in the event of such a project materialising as I have indicated. The one exists for exclusively medical and therapeutic purposes, but the other possesses, and is capable of possessing in a much greater degree than at present, considerably wider social uses and ramifications. The first is the system of Voluntary Aid Detachments drawn from such bodies as the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John. The second is the Women's Legion, of which I have the honour to be president.

The so-called 'Scheme for the Organization of Voluntary Aid in England and Wales' was promulgated by the War Office in 1909. It was originally designed to supplement the Territorial medical service in the event of war in the home territory only, but was later extended so as to enable its personnel to volunteer as auxiliaries to the medical services of the naval, military and air forces in any part of the world on general mobilisation. Just before the declaration of war in 1914 the women's detachments raised by the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John numbered about 2000, with a total individual strength of about 70,000. During the war these figures increased by over 50 per cent., and at the same time the term 'V.A.D.' became a household word of honourable significance. In 1923 the original scheme was extended, and now includes the following trained personnel: nurses, pharmacists, dispensers, radiographers, masseuses, laboratory assistants, and opticians. In the untrained sphere there are general cooks, clerks, and nursing members. The female V.A.D.'s are further divided into two classes—mobile and immobile. Mobile women must be between the ages of twenty-one and forty, and must be prepared to undertake work at home or abroad with the medical services of the Crown in the event of the active embodiment of the Territorial Army. Members are trained in first aid and home nursing as compulsory subjects, and they are further encouraged to take additional courses with certificates of examination in such subjects as first aid in chemical defence, hygiene and sanitation, tropical hygiene, cookery (plain,

camp and invalid), and child welfare. At the present time the importance of first aid in chemical defence is being much stressed, and, in view of what has been written above, with good reason. Moreover, a scheme of Air Ambulance Detachments has recently been formulated. Their object is 'To train and provide personnel, and when possible to provide air transport for sick and injured persons and to supply a reserve if required in times of emergency.' There are now three such Air Ambulance Detachments in operation. Finally, there is a considerable body of women belonging to such Orders as the Red Cross, St. John, and St. Andrew who, though they have undertaken no obligation as regards the forces, would presumably be available to assist in any great emergency such as attacks from the air endangering the lives of the civil population.

The Women's Legion was founded by me early in the year 1915 'to provide a capable and efficient body of women whose services can be offered to the State as may be required to take the place of men needed in the firing line and other capacities.' A khaki uniform was worn, and the women were subject to regulations and discipline. Ultimately over 40,000 were enrolled. When I suggested that amongst other duties they should offer their services on the land and that the farmers should be induced to accept them, I well remember the mass of insulting anonymous letters which reached me saying how ridiculous the whole project was. 'Women masquerading as men,' 'Women parading the streets in breeches,' and all forms of abuse. One letter in particular was to the effect that before anyone like myself should suggest such a thing it would 'do the blue blood of Park Lane (which contained a large proportion of uric acid) a lot of good to go and plough some land belonging to a rich Jew near Acton.' Of course, nothing was further from my mind than that we should endeavour to raise a body of Amazons. I wished the women to do their duty as women, and not as make-shift men. It was just because women are different from men and have their own special duties to fulfil that I thought it was so necessary that they should be able to help to the best of their ability—not by 'apeing men,' but by showing that they were capable of doing yeoman service as women. I chose the name Women's Legion because the word 'Legion' recalled the ancient Roman attributes—efficiency and discipline. And this not only from the military point of view, but in the manner in which these qualities formed and laid the foundation of much of what we prize in our national life to-day. We had in our minds a legion of trained and capable women enrolled for service and distributed in every county. From the outset I was opposed to the prevalent idea that all women's services should be voluntary.

Consequently, in the end there never was any intention of using voluntary workers except as organisers and in necessary committee and propaganda activities. It was always our intention to replace working men by working women. In this we were perhaps the first to realise the extent to which in the near future men would be replaced by women, and how important it was to have paid workers in order to be able to enforce the necessary control and maintain the work at a high standard. That we were justified by events was conclusively proved by the finding of a Committee instituted by the Ministry of Munitions in November 1916. *Before the war was over eighty per cent. of the work in this country was being carried on by female labour.*

With the exception of the Forage Corps, which was also formed in 1915, the Women's Legion was the parent of the magnificent departmental bodies which did such wonderful service during the war. These offspring were the Women's Land Army, the Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps (at first the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, or familiarly the 'Waacs'), the Women's Royal Naval Service (the 'Wrens'), and the Women's Royal Air Force. The Women's Legion dealt with transport and canteen organisation, including cooking on a large scale, but the latter was eventually taken over by the Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps for the duration of the war. Besides these two military branches the Legion had many civilian sections which covered agriculture and all forms of activity in which women could be of assistance for an emergency at home. The most important services rendered by the Legion, however, were in the sphere of transport, since they included not only lorry, car and ambulance driving, but despatch riding and Army remount work. At the conclusion of the war Sir John Cowans, the Quarter-Master-General to the Forces, paid the transport section of the Women's Legion a glowing tribute when he told its members that 'there have been times when it would have been almost impossible to carry on without your valued and ungrudging service,' adding that 'to-day you form an important and for the present an indispensable part of the military organisation at home.' The Women's Legion Motor Drivers still exists as a voluntary reserve transport unit and is recognised as such by the Army Council (A. O. 180, 1927).

Besides the Women's Legion Motor Drivers and the V.A.D.'s the only other women's reserve unit officially recognised to-day is the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (Ambulance Car Corps: A. O. 94, 1927). *These organisations are capable of extension if it is found necessary.* I wish to emphasise this point, as my attention has recently been called to certain articles and photographs in various newspapers referring to the formation by a so-called 'Commandant' Allen of an entirely new organisation for women

to be known as the 'Women's Reserve.' It is stated that in this new reserve there will be 'military rank for officers.' Among the purposes for which 'Commandant' Allen demands recruits are first aid and life-saving; anti-gas instruction and treatment of casualties; canteen organisation, including cookery, transport, car and lorry driving; as well as drill and physical exercises. Now all these objects, in themselves most praiseworthy, are covered by existing organisations, and the formation of a new organisation by independent exertion would be bound to produce regrettable friction and overlapping. In fact, I do not consider it necessary, or even desirable, that these objects should become the concern of an extraneous body avowedly tending towards militarism which has gained no recognition from the authorities. 'Commandant' Allen also asks for an 'air service of messengers,' and stresses its 'utility in an emergency.' As I pointed out in a letter to *The Times* some weeks ago¹ on the subject of 'Women in an Emergency,'

it would be more logical if the authorized unit for transport were to get into touch with women pilots and private owners of machines with the object of enrolling them in the existing recognized branch of the Women's Legion for transport and messenger work. This new field of women's activities since the war should certainly be included in the same category as other members of the Transport section. Failing something on these lines women pilots and owners of private machines could join together as members of a flying club or unit, whose services could be used as thought best in cases of emergency and who would endeavour to promote the best interests of flying in this country to the best of their ability.

The proposed formation of any fresh body of women on a militarist foundation is therefore to be deprecated. What seems to me to be required at the present time is not the formation of a new body whose legality is doubtful, and which would be run practically on Fascist lines, but rather a scheme whereby the existing bodies might be galvanised into life, co-ordinated and drawn into a compact whole, and then organised in divisions according to the nature of the duties to be performed. As president of the Women's Legion I consider it my duty to urge upon the authorities and the public generally the need of a national reserve of women for emergency purposes, properly sanctioned and organised in co-operation with the recognised representatives of the women's associations which are still in existence. It must not be supposed, however, that I am advocating the formation of a mass of trained militant women. I merely think that serious consideration should be given to the question whether the time is not ripe to resuscitate the old Women's Legion in order to be able to provide a capable and efficient body of women whose

¹ December 8, 1933.

services could be offered to the State in an emergency. Particularly would I like to see cookery classes attended in all parts of the country, and more general instruction than is at present given in first aid, anti-gas and chemical defence, signalling, engineering and mechanics, in specialised mechanical trades, and in all forms of transport by land, sea and air. The scheme would thus deal with the training of women for certain specific purposes. The services of a large body of women would be required in the metropolis and in the provinces and the reserve would be conducted on territorial lines. Of course, such a scheme as this would in no way conflict with the work which is at present being done by the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John and the Voluntary Aid Detachments drawn from these bodies. From what I have already written, it will be realised that there are many channels in which such a body as the Women's Legion, numerically strengthened, could supplement and assist the services mentioned in the performance of duties which at present fall outside the scope of such organisations. The formation, extent and duties of such a reserve as is contemplated could well be investigated by the authorities, and, if the project meets with sufficient support from the female portion of the public, details could be published as soon as they have received the mark of official approbation.

Had we possessed a thoroughly organised system at the time the war broke out in 1914 there would not have been the frenzied rush that I remember for home nursing and first aid, with ladies hurrying in all directions to attend cookery classes. All this should have been part of the regular training of every woman in the land. During the period of hostilities women performed great work, but they were properly organised and guided by recognised and responsible heads. The lessons of the war have been invaluable to women. Do not let us forget them. In the interests of national safety it is imperative that women should be provided with opportunities to continue the training which they received during the war years, and these experiences should now be passed on to their younger sisters who were too young to benefit by them then. Personally, I am whole-heartedly in favour of women being prepared to give their services individually and collectively in the manner in which they can best do so to the country in case of emergency. I therefore advance this plea for the organisation of women in the shape of a reserve body duly approved by authority, since I for one realise that without the assistance of its women-folk no country can hope to be efficient in times of crisis and grave national peril and be able to encounter bravely the difficulties and dangers of the situation with a reasonable chance of overcoming them.

E. LONDONDERRY.

AN UNKNOWN VICTORIAN

UNTIL a few years ago there might have been seen on the south side of the Thames, across Westminster Bridge, the extensive workshops and galleries of an English firm of 'sculptors, carvers and marble workers'—Farmer and Brindley—one of the unknown sights of London. There, if anywhere, in those stone-strewn yards, you might hope to see the rarest marbles in the world—a vast fragment of porphyry, for instance, part of a column from Constantine's Basilica in the Forum, or from the Temple of Diana at Ephesus, the loot of Lord Elgin; fine columns of Greek *cipollino* from some ancient portico, a block of rarest *africano* or glowing *rosso antico*.

The head of that firm, in those days, was a man of truly Victorian character and of very remarkable enterprise, the late William Brindley, born in Derbyshire in 1832, died February 10, 1919, aged eighty-six. Educated privately, he was to become a considerable traveller, visiting Japan three times, and journeying through Canada and the United States, both north and south. He knew Europe well, and there is said scarcely to have been a library or museum which he did not know and in which he had not studied. He was something of a connoisseur of works of art and a lover of books, and all his life long was an enthusiastic collector of ancient marbles. But, what is of more importance, he made a hobby of the discovery of ancient and forgotten quarries. It was thus he came to be the discoverer of the ancient Greek quarries of *cipollino*, on the island of Eubœa; of the ancient Egyptian quarries of porphyry on the Egyptian side of the Red Sea; and of the great Byzantine quarries of *verde antico*, in which the mighty columns which uphold Sancta Sophia were hewn by Justinian's quarrymen, some few miles north-east of Larissa, in Thessaly. In the course of his researches Brindley visited and examined most of the islands of the Ægean, the coasts of Thessaly and Asia Minor, large parts of North Africa and the Egyptian desert; and all this while carrying on a successful and important business in London. An amazing person.

* His first discovery of major importance was the quarries of *cipollino* on the island of Eubœa, where at Styra in the abandoned

Roman works he found a broken *cipollino* column, 7 feet in diameter, probably the largest in existence. It must have been some 56 feet in length. It would certainly seem that the Greeks only cared for white marble in architecture—at least, they neglected their coloured marbles; and that they knew and discarded *cipollino* is certain. Anyone may see on Pentelicus to this day the ancient marble-pitched way or slide from the quarries. The beds of white and statuary marbles of these, the most glorious quarries in the world, are overlaid with large figured red and green *cipollino* marble. This has nearly all been extracted and was used by the Romans, who loved coloured marbles and especially *cipollino*, its pale green colour and onion-like markings, which when the block is sawn across appear as a lovely wave-like design not dissimilar from the grain of a tree. This Pentelic *cipollino* overlies the white diagonally, and, like the richly coloured marbles, rose, red, brown and grey intermixed and often brecciated of the base rocks of the Acropolis and Areopagus of Athens, was discarded by the Greeks, who, even on the spot, as in the case of the Theatre of Dionysos, hewed it away or covered it with white marble cut out of the solid. It is probable, therefore, that the *cipollino* quarries which Brindley discovered at Styra, in Eubœa, were first worked by the Romans, who loved it exceedingly. Over 500 columns of this marble may still be seen in Rome; it is very abundant throughout Italy and was used everywhere with *pavonazzo* for pavements and wall linings, as well as for columns, throughout the Roman world, and not least in Carthage, where innumerable fragments of it lie along the shore cast up by the waves, and in the cities of the Province of Africa. In Rome the Romans used more of this marble than all others added together.

How and when exactly Brindley discovered these Eubœan quarries I have not been able to ascertain, but he reports to the Royal Institute of British Architects in 1887 that 'good *cipollino* is now again obtainable.' Other old quarries of this marble he seems to have discovered at Styra in 1894, for, writing in 1899,¹ he says:

There are dozens of old quarries . . . but in all cases it was found that the Romans had taken all the good stuff away. About four years ago a mountain that slopes down to the sea far away from any mule track was found, on its face, to have a large number of old quarries. These contained an almost inexhaustible quantity of first-class marble which can be got in large sizes. These quarries I am now working and those interested can see the monoliths made of it, some 14 feet long, in the new Roman Catholic Cathedral at Westminster. . . . In the old Carystian quarries of *cipollino*, there are many examples of both finished and unfinished work *in situ*. In one quarry some 2000 feet up the very steep mountain side of Ocha, on a shelving mass of rock overhanging an awful precipice are eight columns

¹ See *Quarry*, vol. iv. (1899), article on 'Marble' by W. Brindley, F.R.M.S.

39 feet long, beautifully wrought with *entasis* and top and bottom members quite finished and ready to be fixed, probably in a portico of a temple like that of Antoninus and Faustina in the Forum of Rome; one of them is only a few feet off the sloping edge of the precipice. How they contemplated getting them away is, and must I fear remain, a mystery. In addition to these finished columns there are several of similar size, partially wrought, engaged in the horizontal face of the rock; other immense masses were stepped and partly worked for various purposes.*

In regard to Brindley's next discovery we are happily in possession of much fuller information. He had determined to devote the spring of 1887 to an exhaustive search for the lost quarries of the Imperial Porphyry of Egypt. This marble, so precious to the ancients, and, indeed, of the most magnificent purple known to mankind, had been lost since the decline of the Empire. So precious was it that the Dark and Middle Ages cut up the broken fragments of the vast columns of Egypt and of Rome into great circular discs for the pavements of their churches and palaces, using even the smallest fragments there, as in the pavements of S. Giovanni in Laterano, and S. Maria Maggiore. It appears, also, in some of the royal tombs in Westminster Abbey.

Brindley arrived in Cairo early in 1887 and in March was at Kenh (Cænopolis), on the bend of the Nile eastward below Thebes, where a caravan of nine camels, which ultimately grew to fifteen, and nineteen attendants was formed. His intended journey was such that all food, water, tents and bedding, with provender for the camels for not less than three weeks, had to be carried. On March 10 he set out with his devoted wife across the eastern desert, a level plain stretching almost as far as the eye could see, to far-away, flat-topped mountains. On the second day at evening they arrived at Kasr-el-Jin, 30 miles from Kenh, the first fortified station on the ancient Roman road to Myos Hormos, on the Red Sea. This fortification is high above the plain, perched castle-like on the western extremity of a ridge. 'The old path up the mountain,' Brindley tells us, 'is still well marked, and here I found my first splinter chips of real porphyry, proving to me that it had at one time, at least to some extent, been a workshop.' Those chips confirmed him in his belief that he was on the track of the great quarries, which thus, like a detective, he

* In the seventies of the last century a Swiss *cipollino* was found with colourings very similar to the Eubœan, but with very different markings, as it does not produce, when opened out, grand patterns, although it stands well in detached monoliths, some of which may be seen in Westminster Cathedral. Greek *cipollino* columns are to be found in the chapels there of St. Paul, St. Patrick and St. Joseph, and in the north transept (2) and in the south transept (1). Swiss *cipollino* columns occur in the chapels of St. Gregory (2), St. George and St. Andrew. The apse and some of the great piers of the cathedral have been lined with slabs of the opened-out Greek *cipollino*, and very lovely this marble is thus used, as can be seen also in S. Vitale of Ravenna.

was to search out and to find. At noon on the following day, the third of his journey, he arrived at the second Roman station, named Saghee. Being in the plain, it is fortified with earthworks, and it was here he had his first experience of the mirage, the desert on all sides appearing like a sheet of water with reflections. After the midday break the caravan crossed an open plain, making for a gap in the distant rocks of the horizon. At these rocks, of a beautiful rose-coloured granite, they pitched their tents on the third evening, 50 miles from the Nile and 800 feet above it.

The next, the fourth day, proved they were on the right track.

At 9.45 we got our first peep, in the extreme distance, of Djebel Duchan, showing delicate blue-grey against the sky, and at 11 o'clock I saw lying in the sand, to the right of the road, something that looked like a block of porphyry, which on examination proved to be a portion of a broken porphyry column roughly tooled over. It was 3 feet in diameter, in length 2 feet 9 inches, and had been evidently left here on account of the breaking down of a truck. This gave me great pleasure, for it indicated that I was on the right track, and my convictions were further strengthened at midday on our arrival at the third station, where I found a number of porphyry blocks, partly buried, and lying about in various directions.

Here at Deir, or the monastery, he found, too, chips of porphyry and of a rich green serpentine which is known as 'Green of Augustus' and very rare, being found at Rome only in small objects. It is described by Pliny, who says it is found in Egypt, and in fact it was quarried in the mountain hard by Deir.

That night they encamped at Wadi Gatta, a delightful spot in a green valley, surrounded on three sides by bare rocky mountains 5000 or 6000 feet high. Here they rested the whole of the fifth day, having found an oasis of palms, watering the camels at a dripping well covered with figs and ferns. On the sixth day they crossed the watershed at 2400 feet, 70 miles from the Nile and some 30 from the sea. At noon they reached the fifth station and encamped at the foot of an ancient pass over Djebel Duchan, on which range, if anywhere, Brindley hoped to find the Imperial quarries.

On March 16, at 5.30 in the morning, I began my ascent in company with a Luxor Arab who could speak a little English and a Bedouin sheik, who knew the mountains through tracking the ibex. The Bedouin carried his gun and a skin of water on his back, and a cake of doora bread in the folds of his loose dress. The Luxor man had my sketch satchels, a bottle of cold tea and some luncheon.

From the back of my tent, making straight for the saddle-pass of the mountain was an ancient Roman road, about 18 feet wide, off which all the stones had been cleared and banked up on either side with occasional piers built of large loose stones, to mark the way more distinctly. This road is still in capital preservation, except where the torrents have cut through it,

although it cannot possibly have been used for 1700 years. . . . After climbing 1000 feet we came to an old station. . . . Here we rested about ten minutes, but it was so intensely cold from the night air and chilliness of the rocks that we were glad to move on. The saddle-pass for which we were making was straight over our heads, the road became still narrower, and the zig-zags very sharp and short. All the way up I had been diligently looking for porphyry but was very dispirited, through not finding a fragment in any ravine. . . . At 8.30 we arrived at the summit of the pass, the altitude being 3100 feet. Here I found a square watchtower, some 15 feet across, built of loose stones, the view from which over the other side showed me that the mountain I had ascended was part of one side of an immense amphitheatre of rocks of long horse-shoe form, giving the impression of a large crater of an extinct volcano, the part where I was being the commencement of the bend. Down below, at the bottom of the amphitheatre, was the ancient town of Medina and a temple, of which the Bedouins thought I was in search. Not having found any porphyry I was almost in despair; so sitting down, and with a good field-glass, I began to examine the rocks on the opposite side of the amphitheatre (the sun being then on them). I espied a rosy-tinted porphyry-looking mass standing out from the slope of the mountain, which elsewhere was of a different colour, being of a heavy brown. Further observations revealed a path, which led from where I was standing to this mass of rock, and which I could trace up the face of the opposite mountain. I therefore pointed and explained to my companions that I wanted to ascend the mountain opposite, to which they emphatically said 'No,' and kept on exclaiming, 'Medina, Medina.' So after half an hour's rest, we again started, when arriving at a junction of paths, I sat down, took another look, and became more convinced that I saw porphyry opposite.

Determined to go in spite of my attendants—who were very obstinate, their cry still being, 'Medina, Medina'—I took my sketch-bag and luncheon and went off alone. But after I had proceeded about seven minutes, I heard a cry and found the Arab following me.

The path soon became interesting, being built up on solid masonry, to a considerable height in some places, where ravines had to be crossed. After an hour's descent we arrived at the foot of the opposite mountain, when my delight knew no bounds, for I found the ground strewn with pieces of the most sumptuous porphyry, and, pushing on a little further, I arrived at the actual pitched road or slide down which the blocks were delivered. Here also were remains of workmen's sheds, and a number of broken blocks, some of which were 8 feet long.

My troubles now appeared at an end, and with renewed energy, though under a blazing sun, I commenced the ascent of this second mountain. The road for a short distance was very good—winding round the crags—with piers constructed at intervals at each side for lowering the blocks. . . . But after a while it became strewn with irregular masses of rock and . . . so bad that we were compelled to leave it . . . when nearing the top the block road again became good.

It was now noon, and I was completely prostrate and compelled to lie down under the shade of a ledge of rock. Some cold tea and an orange seemed to put new life into me, so once more I continued the ascent, thinking that the road was taking me straight into the quarry, but alas! I found on arriving at the top that it began to descend on the other side,

and I could see a splendid road winding round to the valley below. The road unnerved me, so retracing my steps I looked about with the glass, in search of veins of porphyry in the rock, or veins that the Romans had worked, or mines; but all to no purpose, so I decided to rest awhile and eat my lunch.

Finding a comfortable spot and looking straight out before me I saw the whole of the desert mapped out down to the Red Sea, with the entire range of mountains of Sinai in the distance. After luncheon I made a colour sketch, and being rested I started again in search of the quarry.

After some more climbing I came across a number of ruined workmen's sheds but no porphyry was to be seen. Sitting down and staring at a mass of rock I noticed large holes all over it, similar to what I had seen in the granite quarries of Assouan. My wonder now was what the Romans had been working here, for it looked much like a mass of broken felspar. Scaling off a chip with the hammer I immediately discovered that the entire mass of rock was porphyry, and everything under my feet, and all the blocks about, were the same precious material, the ochre colouring being only a film on the surface. I now examined the quarries, and found that they produced, not only the choicest spotted varieties, but every sort—even to the brecciated ones, which are very uncommon, and also the rare green greys. I now saw distinctly where the Romans had extracted their grandest monoliths, one square column or mass being half wedged off by a series of holes up the vertical face of the rock. Looking down into a ravine I noticed a great number of blocks that had been hurled below, as the easiest way of getting them down, although a very rough one. . . .

I reached the valley about 3.30 and found the old town (el Medina) on a slight elevation, so as to be above the torrents . . . further up the valley was a temple of small dimensions with an altar, all in wrought granite. . . . A dedicatory inscription in Greek of the time of Hadrian was cut in the frieze: 'For the safety and perpetual success of our Lord the Emperor Hadrian and his whole house, this Temple and its precincts (were dedicated) to the Sun God Great Serapis and the Gods associated with him by Epaphroditus Sigerianus, a slave of the Emperor, when Rhammius Martialis was Prefect of Egypt, and Rufus Proculeianus (Superintendent of the Marble Works).' . . . As evening was coming on I had no time to examine these interesting archaeological remains. . . . We now made the best of our way back, arriving at the summit of the pass a little before sunset. The descent, owing to the dusk, was difficult. . . . Our progress was slow and fortunately so, for suddenly the Bedouin gave a scream and disappeared over the edge of a deep ravine; but he escaped with a cut leg, which he doctored with a plaster of sand. At length, after about another hour's groping, we saw lights from the men of our camp, whom the dragoman had posted on the heights to look for us. The next day was spent in rest. Delightful views of the Red Sea and the sloping desert plains, with Sinai in the distance were obtained from the small hills near the camp. Our return journey was by the same road as that by which we had come, and I am thankful to say that we reached the Nile in safety after thirteen days spent in the desert and about 170 miles of camel riding.

The precious stuff thus discovered by Brindley was never worked. It had been his intention to open up these quarries, which had been lost for 1500 years and probably lain dormant for

1700. The Romans had carried the blocks 96 miles to the Nile, but Brindley proposed to carry them to the sea, to the ancient port of Myos Hormos, not much more than 20 miles distant. He thought the cost of working would be reduced to nearly that of working granite, but he never succeeded in putting his theories into practice. What porphyry is to be found in commerce to-day is the *débris* of ancient works of art. There are said to be not less than 300 monolith porphyry columns still preserved in Europe, and it is still found at Baalbec and Palmyra. But the eight grand monolith columns, the glory of Sancta Sophia, are the finest in the world. It appears also in the Hohenstaufen tombs in the Cathedral of Palermo. St. Mark's, Venice, boasts of columns cut from others, the Venetian loot of the SS. Apostoli in Constantinople. The pavements of St. John Lateran, St. Peter's, S. Maria Maggiore, S. Clemente and other Roman churches are filled with slabs and fragments. It was often used for sarcophagi: Hadrian's was of porphyry and the lid of the porphyry sarcophagus of Otho II. is now the font of St. Peter's. Others are in the Vatican. The steps to the tribune of St. Peter's, extending the entire width of the nave, are all of solid imperial porphyry. In England we have slabs in the royal tombs at Westminster Abbey and the pavement under 'Becket's Crown' at Canterbury. Some few slabs appear in the walls of Westminster Cathedral—e.g., in the chapels of St. Andrew and St. Patrick; but a very important block, once in the possession of Lord Elgin and probably part of one of the columns of the Basilica of Constantine, was a few years ago for sale in London and was foolishly missed by the cathedral authorities. It should have been cut into circular slabs for use in the pavement of the church; a circular slab thus used in St. Peter's measures 8 feet 6 inches across. It will probably now be impossible to find fragments of this beautiful purple for use at Westminster. Unfortunately, no other stone has anything approaching the colour and texture of this Imperial marble. Nor can any marble from a modern quarry compete with it in tradition. It would have meant something in addition to its beauty to have had in this great Catholic cathedral vast slabs of the purple stone that had once stood in the Basilica of Constantine. Tradition surely goes for something, especially in a Catholic church, and one, moreover, that set out to be a Byzantine building. The *verde antico* columns, hewn by Cardinal Vaughan's wish from the very quarries which had last given its mighty columns to Sancta Sophia, seem to call for the companionship of porphyry.

It is again to Brindley that we owe those precious and beautiful columns of *verde antico* at Westminster. It was his last, and perhaps his greatest, discovery. For years he had been curious

about *verde antico*. None had been quarried since the time of Justinian; no one knew where the great columns in Sancta Sophia had come from, for the quarries had been completely lost to sight and knowledge. It was not even known whether they were in the islands of the Ægean—in Tenos, for instance, where the French had thought to find them—or on the mainland of Thessaly or Asia Minor. Brindley, however, was the last man in the world to be satisfied with ignorance; difficulties simply spurred him on. He accordingly set out to find Justinian's quarries.

There is a long poem in Homeric hexameters in the Greek language, written by one Paul the Silentiary in the sixth century of our era, which is a full and enthusiastic description and panegyric of Justinian's great church on the Bosphorus. Now, it happened that at this time (1894) the late Professor W. R. Lethaby, who was an inspiration to so many, published with Harold Swainson a book on Sancta Sophia, where much of this poem is given translated into English. This book William Brindley read, and therein found this passage translated from the poem:

The marble that the land of Atrax yields, not from some upland glen, but from the level plains; in parts fresh green as the sea or emerald stone, or again like blue cornflowers in grass, with here and there a drift of fallen snow, a sweet mingled contrast on the dark shining surface.

This passage seems to have supplied Brindley with the key he had long sought for; ever since about 1886 he had visited Constantinople to study the marbles of Sancta Sophia. It was there in Constantinople he first saw the real beauty and great variety of this marble, for nowhere else can it be really seen; not only Sancta Sophia but all the other Byzantine churches and the mosques being full of columns and slabs of this stone, while in the streets are huge sarcophagi.

Brindley, therefore, with his enthusiasm renewed set out to find Justinian's quarries and determined to examine the land of Atrax, which, according to the ancient writers, was Thessaly. Not being able to go himself, he commissioned a Greek guide in Constantinople, who was used to going to Salonika and Tempe, to examine the rocks of that region for him. Nothing came of this, and in the spring Brindley himself went out, but after a fatiguing voyage returned in continuous rain to Larissa, disappointed and unsuccessful. In Larissa he noticed that the boulder 'pitchings' of that dirty old Turkish city were mostly boulders of *verde antico*. It was an old resident Turk who told him these stones were not quarried but gathered in the ploughed fields of the plain. Now the watershed of this alluvial district

is the Ossa range, and Brindley determined to examine the foothills, distinctly visible from Larissa. Unable to go himself, he instructed a French engineer of the roads to employ practical quarrymen to search. Failure was again the result, till, again inspired and instructed by Brindley, they found an old quarry that proved to be of *verde antico*. Brindley himself then went out (1892) and visited the rocks, when, to his astonishment, he came upon no less than ten ancient quarries under some 60 feet of rubbish, all varying in character, but containing every shade and variety of *verde antico* which may be seen in the buildings of ancient Rome and Constantinople.

Not less interesting [says Brindley] were the quarries themselves, as showing the ancient methods of working. One large quarry face consists of a series of vertical, almost semicircular hollows, of varying large diameter a mass in front of this shows smaller hollows. Here no doubt were extracted the monolith columns of Sancta Sophia, the rough columnar form being rounded as quarried. The hollows were the matrices allowing room for the workmen to axe round the column, less at the back and more at the sides, where the quarryman would stand to work. The shafts would thus be produced standing free from the rocks; they would then be severed at the base and lowered over by ropes and wedges, while the projection between the hollows would produce the next row of shafts. The dimensions of the monoliths in Sancta Sophia are—the eight on the ground floor—25 feet 6 inches long and 3 feet 7 inches in diameter; the forty on the gallery floor are about 22 feet long and 2 feet 6 inches in diameter. . . .

Another quarry contains a block of large dimensions squared up for a sarcophagus. This is still attached by the bottom bed to the solid rock, a passage being cut all round it: this block would make a sarcophagus similar to the three famous ones in Constantinople, one of which is in front of the Pantocrator Church, the other two near the Seraglio. Two or three of the workings have sawn faces, and sawn blocks and scantlings for slabs have the saw-cuts remaining below where they were wedged off. Everything seen in their methods of working points to the minimising of weight for transit.

These quarries situated at Casambala, about 7 miles north-east of Larissa, near the road leading to the Vale of Tempe, Brindley bought and proceeded to work. And so it is that from the very quarries which had produced the columns of Sancta Sophia were hewn the glorious columns of *verde antico* which to-day stand in Westminster Cathedral, four on either side the nave—and these are the loveliest, as lovely as any in Sancta Sophia, though not much more than half the size (14 feet long to Sancta Sophia's 25 feet)—and three less lovely in the transepts. Thus is the great church in London the daughter, part, indeed, of the very flesh, of that far greater church in Constantinople, which is older than ours by more than 1500 years.

But his amazing discoveries by no means induced Brindley

to recommend a general use of marble for the purposes of building in this country. This fine old scholar and craftsman did not lose his head or his sense of fitness. Far from it. 'You can put up whatever marble buildings you like in London,' he said, 'but you will never make a St. Paul's.' Without sharing his enthusiasm for this Anglo-Italian building, we may well echo his conviction that nothing is more depressing, nothing more unsuited to our atmosphere and climate than these marbles, which are only at home in the sunlight, under the serene skies of the dayspring and the south. Our churchyards are now in danger of being filled with this foreign material, which has nothing to do with us, with England, or our dead, which is entirely foreign to us, and our landscape and our homes, and is at once pretentious and cheap.

It is no doubt the latter quality which has, alas, tempted the builders of modern churches to forsake the material and so the manner of our forefathers, which are natural to us, and to erect churches even in our villages bedizened and gaudy with marbles which could nowhere be more out of place or more vulgarly used. There comes to my mind the village of Heavitree, outside Exeter, where the most amazing church of red brick, adorned with a garish marble portico, not of monoliths, but of the merest commercial drums, has been recently erected. And it is as bad within as without, as out of place and as pretentious as anything could be in this world. What English man, woman or child, above all in our villages, could ever feel at home in such a foreign, such an inharmonious, place?

Brindley, though he loved marbles and was the discoverer of the most famous of the ancient quarries, would never consent to such misuse of a material, the most beautiful imaginable in its right place and environment.

I am sorry to say this country imports annually thousands of tons of ready-made monuments in marble and granite for cemeteries and churchyards. . . . There are probably not more than five in a hundred [? as many as that] worth looking at. They are void of artistic character of any sort. I would put a tax on them, if only to prevent them contaminating public taste. They get into churchyards destroying the individuality of the old local monuments and the old village mason.

And again he deplored 'the foreign competition, the cheap labour and low freights against our high railway rate,' that made it cheaper and easier to use foreign marbles, quite unsuited to our climate, instead of English material from our own quarries and countryside. In England—when shall we grasp this fact?—stone is more beautiful than marble.

Such, then, was the achievement of this mystical and indomitable man whose eyes beheld the very cavities from which the

precious columns of Sancta Sophia had been hewn, whose perseverance and great technical knowledge are not less astonishing than the obscurity of his fame. He was a great Englishman with all the characteristic qualities of the English, a great Victorian typical of that period, yet his life was passed without the fame that was its due; no notice of his achievement appeared even in *The Times* when he died, his name never figured in any book of reference, and, most unfortunately, no record of him appears in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. A very slight and inadequate obituary notice was printed in the *Builder* for March 14, 1919, from the hand of his friend W. S. Weatherley, and a still slighter notice was printed in the *Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society*, vol. lxxvi. (1920), p. lvii. No biographical or obituary notice seems to have been printed in the *Journals of the Royal Institute of British Architects*, before whom he read most of the papers from which I have quoted.


The following is a list of these—I fear, still incomplete:

- 1887. 'Marble: Its Uses as suggested by the Past.' (*R.I.B.A. Transactions*, vol. iii., N.S., 1887.)
- 1888. 'The Ancient Quarries of Egypt.' (*R.I.B.A. Transactions*, vol. iv., N.S., 1888.)
- 1895. 'The Use and Abuse of Marble for Decorative Purposes.' (*R.I.B.A. Journal*, vol. ii., Third Series, April, 1895.)
- 1896. 'Marble Verde Antico and the Old Quarries.' (*R.I.B.A. Journal*, vol. iii., Third Series, February, 1896.)
- 1905. 'Sancta Sophia, Constantinople, and St. Mark's, Venice.' (*R.I.B.A. Journal*, vol. xiii., Third Series, December, 1905.)
- 1907. 'The Modern Aspect of Marble-work in Architecture.' (*R.I.B.A. Journal*, vol. xiv., Third Series, January, 1907.)

Beside these papers William Brindley also printed:

- 1890. 'On the Marbles and other Ornamental Rocks of the Mediterranean.' (*Brit. Ass. Rep.*, 1890, pp. 809-810.)
- 1891. *Antique Egyptian Imperial Porphyry* (4to, London, 891.)
- 1899. 'Marble.' (*Quarry*, vol. iv. (1899), pp. 526-528.)

I have not succeeded in finding anything else from his pen.



PROJECTED ADDRESSES

It would be interesting to know what, if any, effects present world conditions are having upon that long-established institution the matrimonial agency. It may be that business, always brisk, has increased. Anyhow, if we may judge from the quantity and clamour of the advertisements to be found in those modern organs which devote themselves to match-making, it has not fallen off. There would seem to be as many lonely people of both sexes as ever there were, who have no relish for their loneliness yet lack the power to relieve it. The wireless does not yet introduce men to women, and *vice versa* (if it did it would immediately treble the number of its listeners), and so long as men and women earn a bare livelihood or are in receipt of a scanty unearned income, so long will it occur to them to fancy a double benefit in the married state.

About a year ago I acquired by chance the originals of some 200 letters written nearly 100 years ago to a 'Matrimonial Alliance' which advertised itself in the *Age* and the *Chronicle* and had its premises alternately in Vigo Street, Great Castle Street and 'Charles Street, leading to the Soho Bazaar.' At first, under a Mr. Young, the 'Alliance' offered access only to a monthly *Gentlemen's Portfolio* obtainable for two guineas (this seems to include a copy of the rules) and publishing the needs of male advertisers. Ladies, for a small deposit, might procure the loan of this for themselves, and might write directly to Mr. Young making inquiries of any advertisement which attracted them and setting forth their own needs. It was not until the business passed into the hands of a Mr. and Mrs. Hayward that it ventured upon the addition of a *Ladies' Portfolio*. It opened a 'Parisian Establishment' and, possibly, a small depot in 'the County of Norfolk,' which seems to have been unusually rich in 'Bachelors and Maiden Ladies who would be happy to avail themselves of the mode of proceeding.' A pamphlet which went with the rules was 'from the pen of a Clergyman connected by Family to the first Nobility in the kingdom.' This was 'printed large with a very wide margin so as to make as much of it as possible in point of size and appearance,' and the cover 'must be very neat as it

will go into the hands of most of the *Nobility in Town*; . . . therefore it must be well done and striking.' (This we gather from Mr. Young's letter to his printer, Mr. Crisp, at Yarmouth.) If ordered by itself it cost 10s., as did the rules by themselves, which means that the portfolio by itself cost only one guinea, but each was represented as being absolutely necessary to the others. A form was provided by which any gentleman might guarantee a further payment for an introduction to a lady, while at the same time he signed a 'Promissory Note to be deposited in some third person's hands until the solemnization of his anticipated Marriage with Miss,' when it would convey to the 'matrimonial conductors' 5 per cent. 'on the amount of the Lady's fortune.' 'In case the Marriage does not take place the Agreements and Promissory Note to be returned and destroyed.' While wondering just how many marriages did take place, one can see the lucrative points in such a venture. In addition to the charges already mentioned, it was pointed out that 'Conductors might be required to attend Ladies at distances, frequently 50 and an hundred Miles, which must be attended with considerable expences, such being the case, I beg leave to explain that when it so occur we charge our expences, or we risque the chances by charging Ten Guineas a Quarter, which includes jounies, the Monthly publications, attendances, and also for conducting all correspondence, between the Gentleman and Lady until the time is fixed for an interview.' We are further informed that 'from the delicate manner in which they are brought into operation, all difficulties or fears, are at once removed, at the same time that every facility (*sic*) is afforded them, for correctly ascertaining the wishes and views of the correspondents.'

The letters themselves come from addresses all over the United Kingdom and are written by men and women from the ages of eighteen to eighty. It is interesting to compare them with similar letters written to-day in the form of advertisements to one or other of the several matrimonial newspapers. The chief—or what seems to be the chief—of these announces monthly on its front page that it 'has been running for the last 73 years,' that it 'is not published for a joke,' and that 'in many instances it is the only means some people have of meeting a likely "life partner".' Every advertisement is guaranteed as '*absolutely bona fide* and inserted by the advertiser *in all seriousness*.' In a single number issued this year there are 439 advertisements at 5s. each (205 spinsters, 125 bachelors, 69 widowers and 40 widows), and these 'only represent a *small proportion* of the clients on my books, the majority of whom prefer not to advertise but leave the matter in my [the editor's] hands to arrange suitable introductions

for them.' 'Ladies and Gentlemen desiring to answer advertisements must first become clients.' There is a fee for this. The editor 'will not entertain enquiries for "Friendship";' and he 'possesses a numerous and influential clientele in every domestic circle into which the unmarried community is divided—from the home of the *cottager* to the wealthiest and most fashionable mansion that society can boast.' Offered is 'well-defined evidence of practical, well-trained, and lengthened experience, together with full and adequate security for the absolute inviolability of all confidences.' An earnest request is made to 'the marrying public to avoid being led away by irresponsible imitators,' a cordial invitation is given to '*consult the editor at once*.' Upon inspection the male advertisers range from bricklayers to bankers and from chauffeurs to colonels and clergymen, and the female ones from ladies of good family and small means to governesses, civil servants, and proprietresses of small businesses. But most of them possess in common 'happy natures' and a particular literary style which makes them seem like one large, jolly family. They are almost all 'home-loving' and 'fond of music,' while the women especially desire to find in a mate a slim figure, refinement, quiet tastes, cheerfulness and 'a keen sense of humour.'

These things are not surprising. What does make one pause to think and question is the condition which compels persons so appreciative of these things to have to advertise for them. Take, for example, this:

Widower, age 40, height 5 ft. 6 in., Nonconformist, dark hair, average build. Assistant master in London School, £500 per annum, own house and car. Varsity man, travelled, fond of home and music, intellectual conversation, gardening, etc., fluent French, German and Italian, wishes to meet healthy, homeloving and refined woman, age up to 49, not more than 5 ft. 6 in., dark hair, studious, interested in current problems, art, literature, foreign languages, politics, travel, etc.

What can this advertiser be keeping back that makes it impossible for him, a man who has already been married once, from finding a suitable mate for himself? Whatever the difficulty may be, he will be obliged to disclose it in any forthcoming correspondence or personal interview. And from the nature of the ladies' advertisements we perceive that this gentleman is destined to deal with a long queue of applicants. He does not even ask for a wife with a private income and he makes no mention of having the incumbrance of children. Has he some deformity of face or impediment of speech against which he trusts that his advertisement, with its declaration of good-will, may act as a make-weight? None can know. In the printed form enclosed with each copy of the newspaper we find no space allowed for the recording of

drawbacks other than a shortage of funds or a superfluity of children by a prior marriage. The applicant is asked, if musical, to state what instrument he or she plays. His or her age, height, religion, complexion, hair, figure and income are also asked for, as are the nature of his or her business or occupation, extent of capital ('if any'), total income 'from all sources,' and home address. But not more than half an inch is provided for 'general remarks.' A diagnosis of the whole affair might be aided by an extended examination of these half inches as filled in by the applicants, male and female; but we can only guess at their contents from statements that come through in the advertisements themselves, as, for example, that of the spinster who wants a man 'educated but not too high brow,' or of the bachelor of 'still presentable personality' (although aged 46) who 'seeks wife not wearing glasses, slim, not noisy or talkative, kind honourable and intelligent but not necessarily learned or accomplished (though she must have a university and professional education and must be essentially a lady' besides having 'a young mind' and, 'if over 30, some income'). That is, in the case of the modern agency we can only guess.

In the agency, however, that was conducted 100 years ago we have the guidance of the original, confidential letters. Here, at random, we find a widower who is elderly ('age above 60'), 'without children,' and 'the Proprietor of a landed estate of several thousands per annum,' who 'is desirous of connecting himself by marriage with a Gentlewoman aged 18 to 28, healthy . . . and in all other respects unexceptionable,' upon whom he will settle with his demise an annuity of £800 payable half-yearly, so long as she has brought him children.

For I will be candid in saying one of my principal objects in marrying immediately is my anxiety to have an *heir* for my property, which would otherwise go to my mother no great favourite bye-the-bye.

The old gentleman cannot have been feeling very robust just then thus to foresee the precedence of his own demise to that of his mother. Or was it pure spite that he was in a hurry to inflict upon her before she could die and give him the slip? The letter, which is written from Ireland, suggests a story by Maria Edgeworth.

Another man whose need is specific and frank writes:

I have an invention of great value and wish to obtain a partner to assist me to take out a patent to protect it and to share its benefits.

You will by this perceive the nature of the application is to obtain a companion and friend in some amicable female who has the means and only wants a man of mind capable of using those means to his and her advantage.

Again there are some who want chiefly money, but not all are equally clear in expressing their wish.

If you can successfully introduce me to a Lady of *good moral character and respectability, not exceeding 35 years of age, and not less than £10,000* for her fortune I will remunerate you for your trouble. Though I am of good family myself I shall not object to a citizen's daughter provided in addition to the above qualifications she possesses a good education and manners.

I am rather more than thirty—have between 300 and 400 a year, and have taken a degree at Cambridge.

I shall be guarded against any *trick*; but if it is in your power to comply with my request in an honourable way, I will engage to pay you handsomely as soon as it is completed.

If the Irish widower has stepped out of Miss Edgeworth, this young man with his unspoken embarrassments has his counterpart in the pages of Mrs. Opie, Mrs. Inchbald, Lady Lindsay or Fanny Burney. We recall in *Cecilia* the young Mr. Monkton, 'younger son of a noble family,' who 'to great natural strength of mind, added a penetrating knowledge of the world,' but 'in the bloom of his youth . . . had tied himself to a rich dowager of quality,' with sad results. Would our Cambridge graduate have refused anything in the shape of a lady so long as she possessed the requisite £10,000? Not that we can believe in the success of his advertisement even to such a degree. We are indeed less curious regarding his fate than that of the Irish advertiser.

It is with a sense of relief that we turn from all such mundane considerations to enter a warm bath of sentiment.

The prospect of a relief from my long-endured yoke of misfortune, so cheers my spirits and also excites my gratification to the benevolent ingenuity, which has placed within my delicate reach, the most possible means of remedy, that I cannot defer the expression of my feelings, which already teem with thanks, in the hopes gleaming through my past interview for the attention my *peculiar* case has received—To have and to hold, in the most honorable, respectful and affectionate ties of a friendship all but conjugal, a gentler being with

'Thoughts, feelings, taste, harmonious with our own'

and the circumstances of whose previous lot may have trained to resemblance, supplies an object of contemplation, which has created a transport in the coldest dispositions, how much more in those to whom nature has been bounteous in her sunny influences, and these rather increased than annihilated by unjust disappointments. Whether I shall be left to pine away in devouring solitude, ever seeking but never attaining the haven of domestic rest and the solaces which are naturally demanded by reason, or by the virtue of a fostering congenial companionship and full reciprocation of tender interchange I shall rise again into life, strength and usefulness, this and a no less issue seems to myself depending upon the result of present expectations and the assistance which may be rendered to me by your confidence.

It seems a good deal to ask of a matrimonial agent, but no doubt Mr. Young regarded the applicant as promising, if also perhaps mad. The letter—for those who would learn something of the writer and his circumstances—continues:

I am a Beneficed Clergyman, whose living yields *after* paying *several* curates *consequent* on absence from 7 to 800 per annum. Of course the income would be more on my returning to residence. I have a licence of absence which has upwards of a year to run. My health tho somewhat delicate, is not considered to be afflicted with any positive disease. My connexions are highly respectable. My education has been liberal in every degree. My age is between 30 and 40.

And he begs to remain, dear sir, 'in my arithmetical name indeed, but not only in name, Your most faithful son.' Inevitably, the percentage of mental cases on the books of such an institution must be high. When one considers the possible consequences, and the general ignorance where insanity is concerned, the reflection terrifies.

Sanity, of a familiar kind, presides over the letter of another prospective husband who gives a full personal sketch of his career.

Having received a liberal Education at a respectable Grammar School in an English City, I entered upon a situation as Classical Master in a Grammar School of high repute, in another English City, which vocation I continued to the age of 22; I then left my situation and commenced a Classical and Commercial Establishment on my own account, in one of the largest towns in England, which I have successfully conducted up to the present moment, a period of nine years.

When I undertook my first situation as Usher, I was entirely without money, though my friends were highly respectable, and by my own individual exertion and perseverance, I have succeeded in realizing a clear and steady income of £200 per annum; about one half of which amount is sufficient for my present expenses, consequently my property is progressively increasing, and at the present time amounts to from £400 to £500.

I am a house-keeper upon a small scale consisting only of myself and an elderly female servant.

After an assurance that he does not 'take this step in order to secure an income, but absolutely from a desire to enter the marriage state with a view to future domestic comfort and happiness,' he proceeds to make something else even clearer. ' . . . any lady applying must possess property to the amount of £200 at least.' For himself:

I am a bachelor 31 years of age 5 feet 7 inches in height disposed to be rather stout and robust, but very active, rather good looking, perhaps beyond the average, of lively disposition and good temper, never visiting smoke rooms or taverns, am a perfectly sober and correct moral character and a member of the Church of England.

•While perhaps hesitating to select him, were we compelled to choose a husband from among the pretendants, we yet feel that

he might make some woman happy, and we wish that some 'Lady . . . not exceeding 30 years of age, of good person and not in either extreme as to stature, and whose character will bear as strict an investigation as my own,' fell to the lot of this industrious schoolmaster.

Similar but warmer feelings of good-will go out to the next lonely bachelor of good character :

I am a native of Germany, 31 years of age ; having been brought up at one of our principal colleges (*sic*) I afterwards visited two of our Universities, where I took the degree of a Doctor of Philosophy. My name is not unknown in our literature, as my time was chiefly occupied in literary pursuits, untill about five years ago I made the acquaintance of an english noble man, with whom I travelled over the greatest part of the Continent and in whose family I am still living. It is however my intention to settle in my country and to resume my former occupations and I should be most happy if I could through the medium of your valuable institution find a companion for life.

It is not great personal beauty or fortune, I look for, but for a young lady, from 25 to 30 years of age, of a good disposition and kind hearted, who in the company of a true husband and in a domestic life would find her happiness. But as I have devoted a great deal of my time to music, I should wish her either to play or to sing. . . .

Can it be that this Dr. Hermann Franz (his name is given) was other than a gentle soul and that he played any other instrument than the flute ?

We are less clear regarding the next gentleman on our selected list. Subscribing himself 'Yours faithfully and truly Blank 501,' and addressing Mr. Young as 'Dear Worthy Sir,' he starts off thus :

On my arrival at my dovecote it is so completely . . . that it wants enough Doves to fill it, inspired I suppose by associations proper to a love bower as it is, I grasped my pen and wrote anon to my valued Leamington friend but in the following strain best adapted as I thought for a pioneer epistle of so unexpected a character viz. to ask her permission to communicate on a subject of a private and confidential nature in which when disclosed would only trace . . . desire to promote . . . happiness with another not myself and many things all bearing that way and encouraging her confidence love being very liquescent will drop on cold paper, so I must needs give some gentle hints of the nature of the topic on which I asked her leave to address her more freely.—The letter written and put into the post will not leave Town until tomorrow evening so I shall anxiously await the reply and gladly report progress when made—leaving the higher destinies to gods and goddesses, I have at least essayed to establish my claim to a good underpetticoat.

All we can confidently say is that the writer might give points to Mr. James Joyce, who on his side might well consider a development in which a word here and there will be illegible to the reader (as we have here indicated by dots to be the case).

Clearer, if not less confiding, is the Scotsman who writes :

I am forty eight years of age, in good health, I have lived abroad for upwards of 20 years, it is now my wish to take unto myself a Partner for life, if I can meet with one to my wish, I have built a fine house in my Native Country and mix with the best Society of the place. I keep a horse and gig, a man Servant and two Maid Servants. I have a few hundred Pounds, per annum to live upon which is barely sufficient in consequence of keeping Company with the first class Society of the Town in whose neighbourhood I live, therefore the Lady would require to be in possession of some Property.

I am of opinion that a great disparity of age is not the best way to live happy together, a Lady where age is from thirty-five to forty or thereabouts would best suit mine. I am a Bachelor, therefore I would prefer a Lady that never was married or a Widow without children, her Temper must be good as mine is very good.

I can give references to the Earl of — or Branches of his family, and to — M.P. and many respectable families. I will also require respectable references.

If any Lady will condescend to notice the Above plain blunt statement I flatter myself that she will live happy with me.

We feel that there are possibilities here of a successful marriage. No doubt the matrimonial conductor felt the same, and it needed all the Scotsman's native shrewdness to keep the bill from mounting with undue rapidity.

Pathetic, as throwing a light on the condition of soldiers at that time, is the following brief application :

I must inform you that I am a subaltern officer on halfpay, am fifty years of age, and do not aspire to the honour of receiving the hand of a lady of high rank and fortune, but would content myself with a respectable female of about forty years. Of course a little money would be acceptable. In a few days I intend to forward money for the Rules and Portfolio. Whether a widow or a spinster is immaterial.

Few of the gentlemen hesitate to commend their own good qualities as prospective husbands. One, who is 'in the neighbourhood of Croyden for some hunting,' and is 'a candidate for the Holy State of Matrimonial Felicity,' has 'a temper and disposition to render a wife happy,' and desires in a wife 'many qualifications both personal and mental,' besides one who can put £10,000 into his business on her marriage. Another gives the assurance that 'should any lady feel disposed to meet his views she will not only find him an excellent husband, but one of steady and active business habits with references of unquestionable and high respectability in London and Edinburgh.' Yet another playfully observes that 'if being something above the ordinary height and possessing muscular strength should be an objection I am possessed of it.' Others are 'of a liberal disposition and manly appearance,' 'with connexions rich and even noble,' 'naturally kind and good

natured . . . wholly incapable of acting ungenerously by any female' and confident that if the lady 'possesses the domestic qualities and the virtuous manners which in general characterise the English ladies will find in me a constant and affectionate husband.' It is indeed uncommon to find one who professes the '*wish to aggrandize myself*,'

and consequently there is *ambition* with me so that even now I should wave almost everything *almost everything* that did not tend to *gratify that ambition* consequently even beauty and youth will weigh but little with me *unless accompanied with wealth* and as *these seldom go 'hand in hand'* from the *numerous* applicants you have, you need at no time hesitate to confer with me if anyone should apply to you who is wealthy and not youthful or well-looking or what many persons do not even consider desirable. For such a person *I* am a candidate. For wealth will hide many imperfections.

We have kept the women's letters to the last. They date only from 1836, when presumably the *Ladies' Portfolio* was initiated, and there are not many of them. There are enough, however, to show the different tone adopted by the female pretendant. Here is one. 'Sarah' writes :

Presuming that my attempt to explain is not more than numbers of ladies are doing induces me to show my age is Twenty-four. My Father was eminent corn Merchant, now dead, leaving myself with several Brothers and Sisters, some of whom are married but all of whom are in affluent circumstances. My Fortune is small in consequence of our being a large Family but who always have moved in a respectable sphere.

My Education has been good and domestic habits are my greatest pleasure. I should not object to settle in life provided on explanation I find Gentleman of benevolent and kind heart who could support his Establishment respectably and of pious disposition.

Amelia also is 'a young Lady 24 years of age the Daughter of a late Officer in the Army (Decd.),' with 'only one Sister and a present Fortune of only £1500.'

I am tall, and of good and kind disposition. I understand Music and sing and play well on the Piano my habits are of a domestic kind my Family connexions are limited but highly respectable. I live with my Mother.

I should have no objection to become the Wife of any Gentn. whose character is irreproachable and who might be capable of supporting a respectable home with certainty.

I have candidly shown my situation and shod. a Gentn. possessing honorable feelings and of easy circumstances be disposed to address a letter to Amelia I shall feel happy to reply to it.

Dr. Hermann Franz might have been happy with Amelia, or with this other, 'the Daughter of a Tradesman of high respectability and also well connected.'

I am eighteen years of age, tall with fine dark hair, my complexion is healthy and generally have been admitted to possess great personal beauty.

My education has been scrupulously studied. My accomplishments are Drawing and my performance on the Piano is but by few excelled. On the Guitar, singing Dancing and the French Language my proficiency is generally acknowledged. I think my explanation may not be considered rude or indiscreet.

Yet another dark beauty is 'Mary,' who has 'a desire to settle in life being 21 years of age, black hair, black eyes and considered handsome possessing excellent spirits as also having had a good education.' Her father is a naval officer of long standing, and she 'flatters herself that her disposition is such as to afford every endeavour for to promote the happiness of a Husband.'

No details of personal appearance are given by a Frenchwoman aged 36, who has no fortune but has received a finished education.

I am the Widow of a Professional Englishman, who had besides a situation in Whitehall Chapel.

I have been 18 years in this country employed as a Governess, speak 4 languages, and can give the highest references as to character, ability and respectability of my husband's family.

It is not from any frivolous idea that I have answered this, but through the wish of finding again a Companion congenial to my happiness.

I have two children, one little boy 7 years of age, and a dear little girl 6 months old, but my dear boy is well provided for, and never will cost me anything, his Uncle who keeps one of the first schools, near London, having the entire charge of the child.

The Frenchwoman, being practical, has already seen a likely husband in number 408.

One odd letter, though written by a gentleman (from Dublin), concerns a lady :

I lose not a moment on my arrival here . . . to beg you will mention to Mr Browne immediately on receipt of this, that having hinted to my daughter my sentiments on the subject of matrimony she declared at once unhesitatingly that she is not at all disposed to make *any* matrimonial engagement at present, that she considers herself too young and too happy to wish for any change at least for another year, so of course I would not think of urging her any further on the subject.

I propose being in London again in August [he writes in April] and if she should happen to alter her resolution before then I shall apprise you.

So we have another short story almost ready made from Ireland. One hopes that Mr. Browne was otherwise suited.

CATHERINE CARSWELL.

VIRGINIA WOOLF

'WHAT kind of book does one write after *Orlando*?' asked one of Mrs. Woolf's reviewers at the outset of an article on *The Waves*. And during the two years that have passed since then the great question has been, What kind of book does one write after *The Waves*? Each of Mrs. Woolf's works has been a literary career in itself. Each has been something perfect, but at the same time so original that her readers, if they are successful in following one of her adventures, must needs preoccupy themselves with the further question of what it is leading to next. *The Waves*, one might be thinking, was the limit of her development. There her early experiments are carried to their logical conclusion—so extremely that it is hard to see what will follow unless it is to be repetition. True, the method is so beautiful, so fitting a medium for the expression of Mrs. Woolf's thought, that she might well remain content with it. But she has never led us to expect anything but surprises, and there is probably still something new ahead. Meanwhile, *Flush* calls a halt. The whole process of writing so complicated a work as *The Waves* must have been exhausting, and in her new book Mrs. Woolf allows herself a deliberate simplification of narrative by telling a story through the figure of one who cannot be expected to experience streams of mental consciousness, nor to interpret the significance of events philosophically, or psychologically—namely, Mrs. Browning's cocker-spaniel, Flush.

Flush, like *Orlando*, is called 'A Biography,' but is almost as much more than that as *Orlando* was. As biography it is an excellently full character-study, supplying all available details from all available sources (such as Flush's dislike of the smell of eau-de-Cologne, implied in Mrs. Browning's poem) and giving dates for all the principal incidents. But the story of the dog—so beautifully and lovingly told—is perhaps to be taken only as the frame, the convention for the telling of another story which is greater than itself. It so happens that the years of Flush's life coincide with the meeting, the elopement, and the early married years of Elizabeth Barrett and Robert Browning. Flush and Wilson, the maid, were the only witnesses of the whole story.

Mrs. Woolf might almost as well have chosen Wilson to write a biography of, but, 'since Miss Barrett never wrote a poem about her,' she says in a charming note 'her appearance is far less familiar than his' (the dog's), and Flush's life has the advantage of being shorter and confining itself to the relevant years; and above all, Flush was a dog. For Flush, the convention, like Mrs. Woolf's earlier conventions, permits the omission of all the tiresome details and irrelevancies which in 'materialist' fiction annoy her so much. Flush sees and understands only as much of the story as Mrs. Woolf wishes to tell. He may also think and feel as much or as little as is convenient, since, though an animal, he is capable of some simple human emotions, as all dogs are, which in his case were strengthened through years spent on the bed of an invalid. 'His flesh was veined with human passions.' He is the chorus, the commentary on the story, the observer whose detachment from it makes its significance sharper. Yet he is more than that. Mrs. Woolf uses him almost as Swift used the Houyhnhnms, but quite without anger, rather with the gentlest irony, weaving together the lives of beast and man.

Flush is entirely beautiful; but it is a necessary pause, it is not a *tour de force* as its predecessor was. We are asking again already, what will come next? Mrs. Woolf is now the most distinguished living figure in English letters, and it is a fitting time to consider her work up to date.

Every secret of a writer's soul—[Mrs. Woolf says in *Orlando*, that fantasy of enchanting mockeries] every experience of his life, every quality of his mind is written large in his works, yet we require critics to explain the one and biographers to expound the other. That time hangs heavy on people's hands is the only explanation of this monstrous growth.

Yet it is certain that if, more than any other writer we know of, Mrs. Woolf has put the whole of her mind into her books, of few other writers, for all that, does the common reader so stand in need of a well-equipped interpreter. And, since Mrs. Woolf is herself the most subtle critic, the best thing we can do is to turn to her essay on *Modern Fiction*, where, in fact, so much is so lucidly written as to render the rest of this essay more or less superfluous.

Examine for a moment, [she says, after dismissing the crowd of 'materialist' novelists] examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old; the moment of importance came not here but there; so that if a writer were a free man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must, if he could base his work upon his

own feeling and not upon convention, there would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe in the accepted style, and perhaps not a single button sewn on as the Bond Street tailors would have it. Life is not a series of lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope, surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as possible?

That is the sum of the thing, and it could not be put more comprehensively or more convincingly. Her own labours have been the accomplishment of the task; they have proved triumphantly the value of what she proposed. It is clear, though, that something so new cannot be readily or widely understood, and guides are needed—many perhaps. We must have critics—through sheer necessity, not for the heaviness of time—to show the way of approach, offer the light of some guiding idea, put the threads collected into our hands.

In *A Room of One's Own* Mrs. Woolf suggests that the modern woman writer will probably try to provide 'some new vehicle, not necessarily in verse, for the poetry in her.' Rejecting the 'materialist' writers, pleading for a 'spiritual' seriousness of mind, she had already put herself on the side of the poets, and in the later novels has probably intended to contribute as much to the development of the form of poetry as to that of fiction. The skilful complication of a plot, its intrigues, its excitements, its graceful incidents and ironies, have been the admired matter of art now for hundreds of years; and there is no reason to suppose that, in spite of its slightly primitive appearance, the 'story' will not have its constant uses for centuries to come. For Mrs. Woolf, though, the 'story' is an invented 'order' imposed by the novelist with naïf sentiment on to the confusion of life. Even allowing for the process of selection, it is a falsity, a 'pretence'; and poetry instantly detects as much—just as Percival, lying in the grass, was always the first to detect Bernard's insincerities. So Mrs. Woolf, who is, by almost any definition, a poet, has eliminated plot, and perhaps it would be as well not to apply the word 'novelist' to her at all. If, on the other hand, she disdains to peg out her characters on a story, like a washerwoman pinning out her linen, piece by piece, along the stretched line tied from one limit to another, yet enough of the novel is left to deserve the name, and even perhaps the semblance of a story will be found; only it is not the tight line from which incidents are suspended, but the last phenomenon to which we come, when moving slowly out from the darkness of men's minds we break at last through the rim and come to the sight of appearances.

Other things, then, must be the framework of her books, and

we need to know what they are.* In brief—the life of everyday, and the spirit of time; and these two—though one is a 'particular' and the other a 'universal' standpoint—are so interchangeable and so often identified that it scarcely matters by which name you call them. If there is any hero in Mrs. Woolf's novels, it is the idea of Time. Every one of her books is filled with the refrain of phrases or symbols that denote the constancy and the mystery of Time. Life is the hours of the day, and the days of the week, and the months of the years. Night falls upon day; 'how fast the stream flows from January to December'; 'After Monday comes Tuesday, and Wednesday follows.' Every book has its own refrain, which is sometimes also the title. Of the many symbols which she uses to convey the idea, by far the most common is that of the 'waves.'

It is curious how many of these images are taken from the sea. Except for *Mrs. Dalloway*, every single novel is located, in some part, either on or by the side of the sea. Its existence is implied in three of her titles; and the sound of the waves is a background for most of her stories. This image, combined with that of the 'lighthouse,' haunts her to such a degree that although one book, *Jacob's Room*, has the advantage of playing in Cornwall, Scarborough, the Scilly Islands, the Mediterranean, yet even Cambridge must be raised to an upper region where 'at night, far out at sea over the tumbling waves,' it is visible as a 'burning light.' It is not surprising that in the course of much use these images take on a meaning independent of their face value and become significant as symbols—the lighthouse of unattained perfection, and the waves of moving Time. The waves seem to have this significance as early as *The Voyage Out*, and, since they have recurred in every subsequent book in this way, their natural conclusion is the form which they take in the novel to which they have given their name. The regular flashing of the lighthouse, too, has a time-significance attached to it in the passage, *Time Passes*, of the book to which it gives its name. Another common symbol of Time—it is the framework of *Mrs. Dalloway*—is the striking of a clock, which is often followed by the vivid image, 'the leaden circles dissolved in the air.' The striking of a clock—the very speech of Time—always has a tremendous and terrible effect on all who hear it. Only the Yorkshire moors and furze bushes can accept it without stirring. At the end of *Orlando* the 'present moment' goes off with a terrific explosion and seems to strike the heroine violently on the head.

Time is the frame of the life of everyday. Regarding the life of everyday, Mrs. Woolf's interpreter will have some difficulties. What theories about life has she to offer, and how does she answer the questions? If she is so preoccupied with the events which

make up Monday or Tuesday, what significance does she see in them? What—someone is bound to ask this—is her religion? ¹ On this latter point it is enough to recall the studious endeavours of Mrs. Ambrose and Mrs. Ramsay ² to bring up their children in unorthodoxy. But for the rest, the safest course is to invoke Shakespeare. It is not known what Shakespeare believed. Nevertheless, the critic will have to give more satisfaction than this—catch hold of one or two threads, at least; and, at the risk of misinterpreting her completely, one or two points might be singled out. Rachel, the most subtly conceived heroine of *The Voyage Out*, when she has at last woken out of thoughtlessness, has an experience which is so beautiful and so characteristic of Mrs. Woolf's method that it must be quoted at length:

The morning was hot, and the exercise of reading left her mind contracting and expanding like the mainspring of a clock. The sounds in the garden outside joined with the clock, and the small noises of midday, which one can ascribe to no definite cause, in a regular rhythm. It was all very real, very big, very impersonal, and after a moment or two she began to raise her first finger and to let it fall on the arm of her chair so as to bring back to herself some consciousness of her own existence. She was next overcome by the unspeakable queerness of the fact that she should be sitting in an arm-chair, in the morning, in the middle of the world. Who were the people moving in the house—moving things from one place to another? *And life, what was that? It was only a light passing over the surface and vanishing, as in Time she would vanish, though the furniture in the room would remain.* Her dissolution became so complete that she could not raise her finger any more, and sat perfectly still, listening and looking always at the same spot. It became stranger and stranger. She was overcome with awe that things should exist at all. . . . She forgot that she had any fingers to raise . . . the things that existed were so immense and so desolate. . . . She continued to be conscious of these vast masses of substance for a long stretch of time, the clock still ticking in the midst of the universal silence.

Mrs. Woolf, it is clear from this, is not concerned with rational processes of academic thought, but with sudden impressions and fleeting, but intensely valuable, 'states of mind.' The only conclusion ever reached—and a triumph, the mark of a desire attained—is 'Ecstasy'; an ecstatic joy in living in an achievement which needs no theories, and there are few characters in Mrs. Woolf's books who do not enjoy some moment of ecstasy.

Rachel, though, while her mind wanders, hits on the—possibly tragic—idea that life is 'only a light passing over the surface and vanishing,' and—granting the risk of misinterpretation—we might take hold of this as a clue. *Jacob's Room*, the

¹ The *Zionist Record* complained that 'Monday or Tuesday' 'is not of specific Jewish interest.'

² Who, Miss Winifred Holtby (in her excellent study of Virginia Woolf) notes, are identical people.

most elusive of the novels, is perhaps an essay on the passing light. Jacob is a young man who plays so large a part in the lives of other people, and in whose own life other people's are so inextricably involved, that to make a separate, isolated 'character-study' of him would be both tedious and false—we are told simply no more of him than that he read Byron and Greek, and collected butterflies, and was good-looking and sensual and admirable, we could not recognise him after an hour's conversation—yet he lives so completely in his setting, the scene of all-England selected with amazing skill and balance, that we have the whole panoply of life before us. At the same time, how lonely he is, how utterly detached everyone else is!—so Jacob felt with 'profound conviction'—and at the end of the book he is dead; and what is left? Nothing but a pair of slippers and an empty room. An empty room, to which drift back memories and refrains—never was there such a musician as this writer!—of earlier pages and past days coming to a close of infinite pathos. The light has passed brilliantly over the surface and has utterly vanished. *Flush* is brought to an end in the same way. 'He had been alive; he was now dead. That was all.'

The knowledge of Death rules the whole conduct of life. Quite apart from their 'religious beliefs,' the mere knowledge of the fact of death is something to which all Mrs. Woolf's characters react in various ways. No wisdom of explanation is offered; there it simply is. Clarissa Dalloway resenting the mention of suicide in her party, yet mystically feeling that it was an 'attempt to communicate'; Lily Briscoe remembering Mrs. Ramsay; Louis and Rhoda foreseeing Percival's death, Rhoda desiring it; Neville with the tree which he was unable to pass—a memory of childhood; Bernard challenging Death the Enemy and comforted with the thought of children—'My daughters shall come here, in other summers; my sons shall turn new fields. Hence we are not raindrops soon dried by the wind.' Each one has a different thought, but the thing is still there. It is part of the life of Monday or Tuesday, part of one mystery.

For Mrs. Woolf is a mystic, contemplating the whole phenomenon of consciousness and the material upon which it works. 'Everything is the proper stuff of fiction, every feeling, every thought; every quality of brain and spirit is drawn upon; no perception comes amiss.' There is the mystery of the significance of detail—to give it a label. We are told how Rachel, sitting with Hewet in the hot afternoon sun on the top of the mountain, 'bent a blade of grass and set an insect on the utmost tassel of it and wondered if the insect realised its strange adventure, and thought how strange it was that she should have bent that tassel rather than any other of the million tassels'; and indulging that

wonderment, knowing that even the choice of a blade of grass is significant, and that the whole life of Monday or Tuesday is made up of such minute details, she makes out of them the fabric of her sentences, giving us constantly the supreme pleasure of 'recognition,' and amazing us for ever with the closeness of her observation, the immensity of her knowledge, and, above all, her unerring taste.

Life is made up of Mondays and Tuesday, of bent blades of grass and strangely significant details; it is a succession of infinitely profound moments, the end of the dinner-party with Percival, for example—'Happiness is in it, and the quiet of ordinary things. A table, a chair, a book with a paper-knife stuck between the pages. And the petal falling from the rose, and the light flickering as we sit silent, or perhaps, bethinking us of some trifle, suddenly speak'; of such moments, of such quiet, ordinary things it is made, and out of them we may or may not make a 'globe, round, whole and entire,' find the perfection of Percival, reach the Lighthouse and complete our vision. We feel that we are single men living in the present time, that our personal life is a light passing over the surface and vanishing; but Mrs. Woolf does not forget that the sum of all passing lights is a 'luminous halo' that endures for ever, which was before us and will be after us, that, 'talking of the common life which is the real life, and not of the little separate lives which we live as individuals,' it is possible to begin a sentence quite soberly with the words 'If we live another century or so,' and to write such a book as *Orlando*. Mondays piled upon Tuesdays make the pyramid of Time, and Time is something like a hero.

Meanwhile, the particular moment which it shows us is known by our separate selves. We are utterly involved with one another, yet utterly separate. This is the greatest mystery of all; this is the problem which is at the heart of everything which Mrs. Woolf has written. What do we know of 'other people'? What, first of all, of the unrecorded lives of the 'infinitely obscure'? What of the people whom we see vividly for a moment and can never expect to see again? There is the old lady in the corner of the railway carriage opposite, Mrs. Woolf's favourite symbol, theorised upon in *Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown*, charmingly experimented with in *An Unwritten Novel*—Minnie Marsh, Mrs. Norman, the stranger travelling with Bernard all night. It is impossible just to accept without a thought the phenomenon of the existence of someone sitting in the opposite corner of a carriage. One craves passionately to know the whole train of circumstances which brought her there; one builds up a whole fabric to explain the thing ('one must invent,' said Peter Walsh, following behind a pretty woman in the street, 'must allow oneself a little diversion',

'one must follow hints,' says the authoress herself of Jacob—it is the only thing to do), and it scarcely matters whether what one invents is true or false, if it is the beginning of a novel. 'Minnie Marsh' was quite a mistake. If it is impossible to know the truth, it is also impossible not to wonder. 'It's you, unknown figures, you I adore; if I open my arms it's you I embrace, you I draw to me—adorable world!' One travels in trains—it is a constant occupation of Mrs. Woolf's characters, one of the loveliest themes in *The Waves*—and, looking out of the window, wonders at the remoteness and yet the reality of the scenes that flash past: tennis parties in back gardens, women hanging out washing. The most explicit statement of the mystery, perhaps the most often quoted passage from Mrs. Woolf's books, is in *Mrs. Dalloway*, where Clarissa from her window sees the old lady in the house opposite.

Big Ben struck the half-hour.

How extraordinary it was, strange, yes, touching to see the old lady (they had been neighbours ever so many years) move away from the window, as if she were attached to that sound, that string. Gigantic as it was, it had something to do with her. Down, down, into the midst of ordinary things the finger fell making the moment solemn. She was forced, so Clarissa imagined, by that sound, to move, to go—but where? Clarissa tried to follow her as she turned and disappeared, and could still just see her white cap moving at the back of the bedroom. She was still there moving about at the other end of the room. Why creeds and prayers and mackintoshes? when, thought Clarissa, that's the miracle, that's the mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could see going from chest of drawers to dressing-table. She could still see her. And the supreme mystery which Kilman might say she had solved, or Peter might say he had solved, but Clarissa didn't believe either of them had a ghost of solving, was simply this: here was one room; there another. Did religion solve that, or love?

In truth, the fact of our own existence is of such supreme and central importance to ourselves that it is hard to believe that other people have any personal existence that is quite independent of us. Such belief is an act of faith, the beginning of living and the origin of fiction. Even so, how is it possible to establish communication with those 'other people,' what can we know even of our most intimate friends and of our lovers? All the novels of Virginia Woolf are built round the struggle of men and women to know each other, and her knowledge of human nature and the subtleties of psychology is so immense that it is hard to make any plain statement of her conclusions. Certainly no woman writer has ever had such a knowledge of men, not only of their habits, the way they cut their toe-nails and open and shut their pocket-knives, but of their deepest passions and motives, and especially of their intimacy with each other, and her know-

ledge of the passions of women and of their intimacies is presumably even greater.

Admitting, then, the hugeness of our task, we cannot do more than collect together a few quotations to indicate the general trend of her thoughts. 'How little,' says Richard Dalloway to Rachel on the voyage out, 'one can tell anybody about one's life! Here I sit; there you sit; both I doubt not chock-full of the most interesting experiences, ideas, emotions; yet how communicate? I've told you what every second person you meet might tell you.' 'What solitary icebergs we are,' he says a little later, 'how little we can communicate! . . . this reticence—this isolation—that's what's the matter with modern life!' How pitiful is the contrast between the things which one says and the things which one thinks while one is saying them! With what trivial speech does one mask the truth within! It is unnecessary to quote from the later books where the idea occurs as frequently as the waves, but it is interesting to turn to another passage in *The Voyage Out*, where Rachel and Terence are sitting high up on a rock above the sea itself and watching the movement of the water below. 'I want to write a novel about Silence,' Terence says, 'the things people don't say.' Here already, writing eighteen years ago, Mrs. Woolf was contemplating the possibility of *The Waves*. Her first two novels, *The Voyage Out* (1915) and *Night and Day* (1919), were masterpieces in a traditional form, but already showed signs of dissatisfaction with that form. *Jacob's Room* (1922) was the first full-length novel in a new manner, and from then onward each novel developed this manner by stressing more and more the contrast between thoughts and words, and making as much use of the direct stuff of the mind as of surface appearances. The delicacy of perception in the meeting, for example, between Clarissa and Peter Walsh in *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925) and in Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay's walk round the garden in *To the Lighthouse* (1927) is more subtle and beautiful than anything which had been written in English before. Finally, in *The Waves* (1931) it is assumed that nothing can be said; or at any rate, that the things which manage to get said are too trite to be worth recording—there is some amusing satire by Bernard on the conventional biography³—and the six people of the book tell in soliloquy and utter solitude the secrets of the heart.

³ *Orlando* (1928), which falls rather outside this list, is evidently another of the books which Terence wanted to write. 'My idea is that there's a certain quality of beauty in the past, which the ordinary historical novelist completely ruins by his absurd conventions. . . . I'm going to treat people as though they were exactly the same as we are. The advantage is that, detached from modern conditions, one can make them more intense and more abstract than people who live as we do.' Mrs. Woolf has always inclined to detach her characters from their normal surroundings. The fantasy of *Orlando* serves a similar purpose to

Although one craves with such passion to gain an intimate knowledge of other people, the matter is further complicated by one's own reluctance to show any part of oneself to them. Thus Lily Briscoe was afraid of letting her picture be seen, and refused to sympathise with Mr. Ramsay setting off to the Lighthouse; thus Neville on the bank of the river shrank from the approach of Bernard, and in later years at Hampton Court the coming together of friends was like the 'clash of antlers.' So terrible is this spiritual solitude.

If this were the whole of Mrs. Woolf's thought on the matter, her books would be a great deal simpler than they are, but a still further complication is involved by the transverse idea that, in spite of this mutual isolation, people are so much part of each other that separate character distinction is impossible.

'I do not believe in separation; [Bernard says when a stranger enters the railway-carriage] we are not single . . . we are not single, we are one.' 'How curiously one is changed [says Neville] by the addition, even at a distance, of a friend. How useful an office one's friends perform when they recall us. Yet how painful to be recalled, to be mitigated, to have one's self adulterated, mixed up, become part of another. As he approaches I become not myself but Neville mixed with somebody—with whom?—with Bernard? Yes, it is Bernard, and it is to Bernard that I shall put the question, who am I?'

Much of *The Waves* is taken up with the attempt of the six characters to realise their own identity, and in indulging, or refraining from, the pretence that they are something other than themselves—a famous author or some part of Nature.

For one's first instinct from childhood is to pretend, and to see things (including oneself) in the likeness of other things. Hence the imagery and the poetry of which these soliloquies are made. And one's foremost labour is to resist that instinct, and to see, with Shakespeare's eyes, man stripped even of his clothing, to seize, like Lily Briscoe—surely remembering Shakespeare!—'the thing itself before it has been made any'ing,' to call a daisy, with the knowledge of Wordsworth, a daisy, and to share the wisdom of Socrates in knowing nothing. 'I am the foam,' says Rhoda, 'that sweeps and fills the uttermost of the souls with whiteness; I am also a girl, here in this room.'

'"Like" and "like" and "like";' says Rhoda at the end of a long train of similes; 'but what is the thing that lies beneath

the exotic setting of *The Voyage Out* and the super-consciousness of *The Waves*. *Orlando* is also an essay on the continuance of literary tradition; and in the *Letter to a Young Poet* (1932) Mrs. Woolf repeats the idea that the present is the sum of all the past. She bids the poet look on himself, not as a single being, but as 'a poet in whom live all the poets of the past, from whom all poets in time to come will spring . . . in short, an immensely ancient, complex, and continuous character'; as an Orlando, in fact.

the semblance of the thing?' 'In this particular case the answer is that the players—she is at a concert—have taken a square and placed it upon an oblong, which is austere enough but still a figure. What is Reality? All Mrs. Woolf's ideas are qualified by one other—Relativity. It is impossible to make any judgment of absolute value about anything. The thing is different looked at from different angles. Thus

from a distance the *Euphrosyne* [which for a hundred pages has been the centre of the scene of *The Voyage Out*] looked very small. Glasses were turned upon her from the decks of great liners, and she was pronounced a tramp, a cargo-boat, or one of those wretched little passenger steamers where people rolled about among the cattle on deck. The insect-like figures of Dalloways, Ambroses, and Vinraces were also derided, both from the extreme smallness of their persons and the doubt which only strong glasses could dispel as to whether they were really live creatures or only lumps on the rigging.

Thus the whole world looked different from the top of the mountain; thus from the hotel window Rachel looked down into the garden and saw the people below her as aimless masses of matter. Thus the Lighthouse is taken as a symbol, when James, in the boat, sees it more closely than he used to as a child from the shore, as they come nearer.

He could see the white-washed rocks; the tower, stark and straight; he could see that it was barred with black and white; he could see windows in it; he could even see washing spread on the rocks to dry. So that was the Lighthouse, was it?

No, the other was also the Lighthouse. For nothing was simply one thing, the other was the Lighthouse too. It was sometimes hardly to be seen across the bay. In the evening one looked up and saw the eye opening and shutting and the light seemed to reach them in that airy sunny garden where they sat.

Nothing was simply one thing. So it is vain perhaps, for all our attempts, to resist those poetic images, and certainly fruitless to put our friends into catalogues, and to say whether one is Bernard or Byron, another Neville or Catullus, another Rhoda or the foam.

We strive passionately for certainties, but in vain. They are covered up in images. 'Illusions are to the soul what atmosphere is to the earth'—so Mrs. Woolf writes with the charming extravagance which she permits herself in *Orlando*. 'Roll up that tender air and the plant dies, the colour fades. . . . By the truth we are undone. Life is a dream. . . .' This was the theme of her second novel, *Night and Day*. Katharine Hilbery and Ralph Denham wish to love each other and yet to remain starkly realistic about each other, distrusting every moment of romance. At last Mrs. Hilbery—one of the supreme comic characters of

fiction, but absolutely whole and human—persuades them 'We have to have faith in our vision,' and Ralph comes to the conclusion 'that although human beings are woefully ill-adapted for communication, still, such communion is the best we know.' In sum, all appearances may be false; we can pass no absolute judgment on anyone, knowing nothing about him, but we must do our best with the romance of images and illusions and visions, for, if they are shattered, 'what an airless, shallow, bald, prominent world it becomes! A world not to be lived in.'

Is that, then, all? Mrs. Woolf has something more. For how weary, she knows, the men of thought are, whose life is one long, wondering, and secret soliloquy! How unsatisfied they are with their condition! How jealous and envious—if they are truly wise—of another sort of men! So she places, in constant and vivid contrast with the six characters of *The Waves*, a seventh, Percival, who never speaks because he has no such figures or fantasies. He is the symbol of unattained perfection, even as the Lighthouse was the symbol of uncompleted vision—by which they make their judgments. Of all the true things which Mrs. Woolf tells, this is the most supremely true. Percival was the athletic friend whom the boys met at school, and, being their complete opposite, became the centre of all their lives. 'He is remote from us all in a pagan universe. But look—he flicks his hand to the back of his neck. For such gestures one falls hopelessly in love for a lifetime.' He was not clever or refined, but beautiful and athletic and magnificent. So Neville loved him, and needed him, 'for it is Percival who inspires poetry.' Further—and here lies the profoundest truth—he was the first to detect insincerities, being a man of natural honesty, the incarnation of Shakespearean 'plainness,' who with an animal instinct knew at once the falsity of Bernard's 'stories' when others were deceived. His very presence made one aware of falsity, vanity, fear. Without culture, he had natural taste and understanding. He was perfectly happy; he stood where the others could never stand; he was loved by everybody. Their love of him brings them together in the middle of the book at a farewell dinner-party on the night before he sails for India. That dinner-party is, perhaps, the triumph of Mrs. Woolf's art, fused with emotion and ecstasy. He is killed in India, thrown from his horse. The memory of him rules every moment of their lives afterwards. Neville is too anguished to explain much, but Bernard, the man of words, says everything:

Now through my own infirmity I recover what he was to me: my opposite. Being naturally truthful, he did not see the point of these exaggerations, and was borne on by a natural sense of the fitting, was indeed a great master of the art of living, so that he seems to have lived

long, and to have spread calm round him, indifference one might almost say, certainly to his own advancement; save that he had also great compassion. A child playing—a summer evening—doors will open and shut, will keep opening and shutting, through which I see sights that make me weep. For they cannot be imparted. Hence our loneliness; hence our desolation. I turn to that spot in my mind and find it empty. My own infirmities oppress me. There is no longer him to oppose them.

We strive to make perfect the globe of our lives, to reach the Lighthouse, to complete our vision, to waste nothing, to be Percival. 'We saw for a moment,' says Bernard, summing up, 'laid out among us the body of the complete human being whom we have failed to be, but, at the same time, cannot forget.' The contemplation of such perfection alone makes endurable the pain that lies quiescent beneath the life of everyday.

Mrs. Woolf's art is that of the psychologist. She does not direct our steps into new ways of life, but suddenly reveals to us in the piercing light of her poetic imagination things which have long been latent in the dark places of consciousness, hitherto unrealised by any power of explicit speech. She has, in fact, assimilated into her art all that modern psychology has to offer, and this poetry, these fictions of loveliness, have a firm basis in the latest discoveries of science. Rachel's *angst* dream, for example, James Ramsay's behaviour with his father and mother, the retention by the people of *The Waves* of their childhood's impressions into old age, are direct expositions of what we have learned from Freud. The whole of her books are constructed round such knowledge, which accounts largely for the amazing strength of her writing and the sureness of her touch on life.

One other important point she seems to have taken deliberately from psychology—the use of 'substitution-symbols.' Orlando, for example, knew that 'girls were roses, and their seasons were short as the flowers! Plucked they must be before nightfall.' Yet it scarcely matters whether this imagery, this poetry, this inevitable tendency to see 'everything as something else,' comes to us when we sleep or when we are awake. It is the fabric of Mrs. Woolf's writing. She is a poet. And for this reason her books cannot be hurriedly read for the story's sake, like many novels, but must be treated with as much care as is given to poetry, so that the symbols and refrains—which are never casual, but planned with the utmost care and interrelations—can be remembered and recognised. Some of these symbols are of universal application—for example, Laurels for Triumph, Violets for Death, Snails for Self-seclusion. Others, which are harder to follow, are personal ones for certain characters, generally due to some experience in childhood, such as the 'immitigable tree' which Neville could not pass, since as a child he had overheard

he cook speaking of a man whose throat had been cut, while he was looking at an apple tree, and the tree became a symbol in his mind of objects which he could not surmount. Mrs. Woolf never explains or reminds us of these symbols, but leaves them to recur and to be recognised exactly like the Wagnerian *leit-motif*. And in his absence of explanation and our joy of recognition lies one of the secrets of her charm for us. Nor does she employ this austerity only with direct symbols. When Cam, sitting alone in the bow of the boat, looks back to their house on the island just before they reach the Lighthouse, this passage occurs:

But as, just before sleep, things simplify themselves so that only one of all the myriad details has power to assert itself, so, she felt, looking down at the island, all those paths and terraces and bedrooms were fading and disappearing, and nothing was left but a pale blue censer swinging rhythmically this way and that across her mind. It was a hanging garden; it was a valley, full of birds, and flowers, and antelopes. . . . She was falling sleep.

Where, for a moment we wonder, have we heard those words before? Then slowly we remember; they are the very words which Mrs. Ramsay had used to send her to sleep in the nursery, that night years before, when they had been disappointed in their wish to go to the Lighthouse. Just because Mrs. Woolf does not remind us directly of that scene, but leaves it to us to recognise like a returning tune, we are enchanted.

Of such art, finally, is composed the prose in which she writes. Mrs. Woolf has used prose as few or none have ever used it before. She has successfully used it as a vehicle for poetry. It is the style of music rather than of reason. She has finally emancipated English from the unnatural yoke of classical construction and yet replaced that yoke with something which is as strong as it is beautiful. But our last consideration of her should be as of one who has enriched our ideas about life. She has disdained to give us a gallery of infinitely various characters as the novelists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did, though her first two books prove that she could have done so had she wished. But to her such characterisation is little more than a display of virtuosity. And yet we feel that she is one whose imagination has known all men in all places; that she has felt intensely the significance of our life as it moves inevitably towards death, and knows how while we live we long for things which we cannot touch, striving passionately to become 'the complete human being whom we have failed to be, but at the same time cannot forget.'

PETER BURRA.

CORRESPONDENCE

'MORALS AND THE GROUP MOVEMENT'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

DEAR SIR,—You have asked whether I would care to make any observations on Mr. F. B. Bourdillon's 'Reply' to my article on 'Morals and the Group Movement.'

The difficulty is that Mr. Bourdillon does not, in fact, reply to my arguments. I obtained my knowledge of the ideals and principles of the Group Movement from the writings of its supporters. Mr. Bourdillon does not suggest that this literature is unrepresentative or unworthy of the movement. He does not, and I venture to think cannot, say that I have misinterpreted this literature or have been guilty of the least jot or tittle of misquotation.¹ Nor does he even attempt to counter the arguments by which I tried to show that the moral implications of the ideals and principles in question are bad. Public confession as it is described and advocated by Mr. Allen he simply ignores: one would suppose from his account that 'sharing' merely meant telling one's troubles to a friend and that subsequently a man should be ready to keep the rest of his 'group, family or team'—to use Mr. Bourdillon's words—'informed of any factors in his own position which seriously concerns them.' It is the same with 'guidance.' Mr. Bourdillon does not face the issue. To make a deliberate effort to clear the mind of prejudice and passion in order that reason and conscience may show one what is the right cause of action is admirable. To clear one's mind of everything *including reason* so that it may receive as commands impulses to make certain choices between alternatives that are morally indifferent is, in my opinion, wicked. The two things are as different from one another as astronomy is different from astrology. Now the 'guidance' with which I dealt in my article was demonstrably the latter of these two, and that this is the 'guidance' by which the Groups would have us direct our lives is made clear by the literature from which I quoted—a literature whose claim to speak for the Groups has not to my knowledge been disputed. Mr. Bourdillon's remarks about 'guidance,' however, are so phrased that a reader might readily take them to refer to quiet unprejudiced reasoning of the kind which I have described as admirable. Really, if the advocates of the Groups wish us to believe that they have not dethroned reason, they must show us that they can appreciate the difference between these two things. And surely 'absolute honesty'

¹ I plead guilty to having overlooked one misprint (on page 595)—'passing the luck' instead of 'passing the buck.' But I imagine no supporter of the Groups will think I have done them any injustice by this inadvertent misrepresentation of a slang expression with which I was unfamiliar.

requires that they should tell us whether they do or do not adhere to their belief in the kind of guidance which bade Mr. Allen buy a new dressing-gown, brought Professor Grensted the message: 'Don't be a fool, go by car,' and decided Dr. Buchman to speak to the 'well-dressed' stranger because he 'stopped at the next lamp-post.' In regard to the matter of 'guidance' Mr. Bourdillon describes me as 'arguing from one or two anecdotes recorded in print.' I can only ask my readers to judge for themselves whether this is an adequate description of my method, or whether it is fair to make such a statement without a word to show that the 'anecdotes' referred to were 'recorded' by supporters of the Group Movement with the object of showing us the nature of guidance and what they believe to be its merits. A casual reader of Mr. Bourdillon's 'Reply' would, I think, suppose that I had been collecting stories of perhaps doubtful authenticity from the writings of opponents of the movement. I feel sure Mr. Bourdillon will agree with me that honesty, whether 'absolute' or common, requires it to be made quite clear that this was not the case.

Mr. Bourdillon seems somewhat to have misunderstood my attitude. He says of me: 'he leaves the impression that had he proceeded to make a personal acquaintance with the movement, like others who came to curse, he would have stayed to bless.' I am at a loss to know how any careful reader of my article can have received such an impression from it. Further, Mr. Bourdillon describes my attitude to the movement as 'critical and perhaps somewhat depreciatory.' Actually I said that of all the movements I had known in Oxford this seemed to me to be 'almost if not quite the most depraving in its ultimate tendency, and the most insidiously inimical to the formation of fine character.' Of the ethical implications of the theory of guidance I said: 'It is difficult to conceive anything more degrading.' How violent, I wonder, has my language got to be in order to convince Mr. Bourdillon that I really do think that the moral ideals of the Group Movement are low ideals and really do consider their methods harmful? But perhaps I ought not to complain, for, from what others tell me, I gather it is not an uncommon feature of the enthusiasm which the Groups generate among their supporters that it makes them see their opponents through rose-coloured spectacles, so that they imagine opponents to be at least potential supporters and even allow their wishes rather than the sober fact to determine what they say about them. I would, however, venture to draw a moral from Mr. Bourdillon's misunderstanding of my attitude. If, with my article in black and white before him, he can thus unintentionally misrepresent me, can we feel sure that he received a quite exact and accurate impression from his conversation with 'the master of an Oxford college,' who, he tells us, expressed the opinion in regard to the movement that 'of the many persons he has known to be influenced by it there were none who had not been influenced for good'?

For the rest, Mr. Bourdillon's 'Reply' consists largely of undocumented assertions, and I see no reason to withdraw or modify anything that I wrote in my former article. I would, however, like to add a further complaint—that the literature put forth by the supporters of the movement is lavish in undocumented and unproved assertions, even when the things asserted are extremely improbable. Having had some practice in the investigation of social phenomena, I have learnt to distrust generalisations which are unsupported by verifiable evidence. May we take a test

case—an opportunity for those devoted to 'absolute honesty' to show that at least this complaint of mine is unfounded? In a little book called *What is the Oxford Group?*—a book commended by Mr. Bourdillon (page 714) and sponsored with a preface by Professor Grensted—I find this statement about the house-parties which are such a feature of the Groups' activities: 'it is not unusual for a thousand clergy of various denominations and a score of bishops to travel long distances to attend them' (page 11).

I choose this statement because, being statistical and precise and not a statement involving a value-judgment, it should be capable of verification.

Not unusual' implies a considerable number of occasions. But we must be modest in our demands. May we have the place and date of just *three* house-parties which were attended by a thousand clergy and *twenty* bishops *with the names of the bishops?* To save trouble I will not press for the names of the other clergy, or ask for evidence about the number of miles that the twenty bishops travelled.

I must not, however, raise false hopes among the adherents of the Groups. If this information is produced, and can be checked, I will frankly admit that the statements of the Groups' supporters are not always as loose as they sound. But it would require more than twenty bishops to make me believe that two and two make five, or that wrong is right, or that the abnegation of human reason before the impulses of 'guidance,' so that reason becomes, in Mr. Allen's phrase, the 'servant' of what he improperly calls 'the intuitional conscience,' can be anything but immoral and degrading.

Yours truly,

REGINALD LENNARD.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXXXIV—FEBRUARY 1934

DIVORCE LAW REFORM

THE laws of England generally lag behind the onward march of custom and practice, and for good reasons, for to legislate in advance of current standards brings the law into disrepute. Yet it is equally true that failure to harmonise legal practice with the accepted conventions of the vast majority of a society has the same result. The law can be changed only by the Legislature, under the pressure of opinion, tutored by some progressive and percipient lawyer, such as Lord Buckmaster, who in 1921 piloted through the Lords a Matrimonial Causes Bill similar in scope to that which is to be brought before the House of Commons this month.

Such a measure has long been demanded by public opinion and has the support of the great majority of women's organisations. It follows the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1912, a most conservative body, and seeks to extend the grounds of divorce to—

- (1) Wilful desertion for at least three years;
- (2) Cruelty¹;

¹ The expression 'cruelty' means such conduct by one married person to another as makes it unsafe, having regard to the risk to life, limb, or health.

- (3) Incurable insanity (extending over at least five years);
- (4) Incurable habitual drunkenness (after at least three years' separation);
- (5) Imprisonment under a commuted death sentence.

It further extends the grounds of judicial separation by adding the foregoing grounds, and of nullity by adding—

- (1) Wilful refusal to consummate within a year;
- (2) Unsoundness of mind at the time or within six months of marriage;
- (3) Contagious venereal disease at the time of marriage;
- (4) Pregnancy of the wife by another man at the time of marriage.

Whatever else the Bill may accomplish, if passed into law it will not 'make divorce easier' for normal persons; rather will it defend and strengthen the institution of marriage by making it possible to terminate unions the maintenance of which under the existing law makes 'the sacrament of marriage' an abiding blasphemy, and family life a hell.

There is virtually nothing in the Bill which was not advocated by the Royal Commission of 1912, which, after a most detailed inquiry, urged, by a majority of 9 to 3, these very reforms in the interests of morality and justice, of society and the State. To no greater principles could appeal be made. The broad lines of the Bill have the almost unanimous support of the judges and of the great majority of lawyers, and only last year Sir R. Poole, speaking with unrivalled experience as President of the Law Society, proclaimed his conviction that 'the right of the Divorce Court to dissolve a marriage should be extended.' Divorce is easy for those who have money, and are prepared to use, or feign, adultery as a pretext for the dissolution of a legal bond which has ceased to have spiritual or moral validity. But it is denied to those who need it most—to the wife whose husband has deserted her and cannot be found, or compelled to maintain her; to a husband or wife subject to cruelty as defined in the footnote below; to the working man whose wife is incurably insane and is left with his own children to care for; and to the spouse whose mate is an incurable drunkard and as such judicially separated. And there are other and worse cases. Yet the Bill is permissive to the extent that spouses who hold themselves morally bound not to bodily or mental, for the latter to continue to live with the former, and the following facts:

- (a) That one party to a marriage has knowingly or negligently infected the other with venereal disease; and
- (b) That a husband has compelled his wife to submit herself to prostitution, shall, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing definition of cruelty, be treated as equivalent to cruelty.

seek dissolution of marriage in such circumstances are under no obligation to act against their own consciences.

The opponents of the Bill may be placed in two categories:

- (1) Those who regard marriage as a bond, which can be annulled by an ecclesiastical decree, but cannot be dissolved, whether by adultery or by any other act or state of affairs save the death of one of the spouses;
- (2) Those who regard adultery as the sole permissible ground of divorce.

The first category include practising Roman Catholics who hold themselves bound by the decree *Tametsi* of the post-Reformation Council of Trent of 1563, in which, for the first time, the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage was declared. This decree, however, was not operative except where it was promulgated: it was not so promulgated in many Western countries, and the Acts of that Council have never bound the Church of England. Before and since that date the Eastern Church has always allowed divorce, and up to the thirteenth century at least eight Provincial Councils of the Christian Church on various grounds allowed it in practice. We may admire, and we should certainly respect, the constancy of those who hold these views, long rendered obsolete by the common consent of the vast majority of mankind, but we cannot admit their right to exercise a controlling influence on the discussion of this question.

The second category, who regard marriage as a bond dissoluble only by adultery of either party (though under section 27 of the Act of 1857 there are, in fact, other legal grounds of a grosser nature than the physical aberration called adultery), base their views upon an interpretation of our Lord's teaching, as set forth in certain passages in the New Testament. When the Act of 1857 was under discussion (it did not extend the grounds of divorce, but gave judicial form to what had hitherto been accomplished by private Acts of Parliament) the debates turned almost wholly upon the views of the early Fathers and of the meaning of certain verses of Scripture. Textual criticism was in its infancy, and the question was not dispassionately considered then, nor in 1910 when the Royal Commission took evidence. No attempt was made to reconcile the obvious contradictions involved, though St. Augustine (speaking, as we know, from personal experience) had declared that 'divine directions in this matter are so obscure that it is pardonable to err in carrying them out.'

The voluminous evidence of clerical opponents of 'facilities for divorce' tendered before the Royal Commission makes curious

¹ *De Fide et Opp.*, § 19, cited by the Ven. Archdeacon R. H. Charles, D.D. (*Divorce and Nullity*, T. and T. Clark, 1927.)

reading to-day. These witnesses contradicted each other, and themselves, in their scriptural exegesis. In their estimates of the social effects of a change in the law they disagreed with each other, and with every lawyer and social worker who gave evidence. Their fears have been disproved by the experience of the last twenty years in this country, by testimony of clerical witnesses from Australia, where the law is in substantial accord with the present Bill, and by all experience in Scotland, where wilful desertion has always been a good ground for divorce and where the writ of the King's Proctor does not run. The great majority of the Commissioners, men and women of great distinction, listened patiently, and sought higher and firmer ground.

Ten years later, in 1920, the bishops, in conference at Lambeth, were content to beg the question and 'to re-affirm, as our Lord's principle and standard of marriage, a life-long and indissoluble union, for better, for worse, of one man with one woman.' The Lambeth Conference of 1930 repeated this resolution, adding a recommendation that 'the marriage of one whose former partner is still living should not be celebrated according to the rites of the Church,' though an Act of Parliament had specifically provided that such a marriage might be celebrated in the parish church to which the party belonged.

They further expressed the view that 'where an innocent person has remarried under civil sanction, and desires to receive the Holy Communion, the case should be referred for consideration to the bishop, subject to provincial regulations,' thus, by inference, stigmatising both the 'innocent' and 'guilty' parties (a status to which the decision of the court affords no clue) as 'open and notorious evil livers' under the Rubric. The present Archbishop of Canterbury begged the Conference 'to humanise religion, if we would commend it to our generation,' but the bishops have had no mercy on clergy who were willing to celebrate the marriages of divorced persons: so far as may be, they are excluded from benefices or preferment of any sort. In questioning the right of divorced persons to receive Holy Communion, however, they went a step too far. The clergy as a whole refused to follow them, and probably every bishop knew that their recommendation would never have been upheld in any Ecclesiastical Court.³ Traditions, however erroneous, die hard, and there are, as Milton put it, not a few who 'do not shame to reject the ordinance of him that is eternal, for the perverse iniquity of sixteen hundred years; choosing rather to think truth itself a liar, than that sixteen ages should be taxed with error.'

There is in this country as great a number of men and women as ever who seek guidance from the teachings of our Lord, rather

³ Cf. *Thompson v. Dibdin*, (1912) A. C. p. 533.

than what is taught about His teachings. What was His intention? Can we say with certainty what views He held? Upon the answer to this will depend the final decision of a great number of men and women whose loyalty to the highest standard they know is the greatest of national assets. Let us therefore study the leading passages in the Gospels, beginning with the narrative as it stands in Matt. xix. 3-9:

And there came unto him Pharisees, tempting him, and saying, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?

And he answered and said, Have ye not read, that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh? So that they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

They say unto him, Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement and to put her away?

He saith unto them, Moses for the hardness of your heart suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it hath not been so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for unchastity,⁴ and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth a woman so put away committeth adultery.

These verses record an open controversy between Christ and the Pharisees upon a great question which divided the two great schools of Hillel and Shammai, both of which, according to the Mosaic law, recognised the right of a man to divorce his wife but differed as to what constituted legal grounds: Philo and Josephus and the vast majority of Jews followed Hillel in holding that 'any cause' was legitimate, and a minority held, with Shammai, that unchastity in a wife alone justified divorce. The controversy was based on conflicting interpretations, among other passages of the Old Testament, of Deut. xxiv. 1-2, which reads as follows:

When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her; then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house.

And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife.

and of Malachi ii. 16: 'Let him who hateth put away (his wife).'

Shammai's exegesis is now universally rejected by scholars; yet the views of Hillel and his school are dangerous in the extreme and were so recognised in our Lord's day by thinking men. Hence the seriousness of the controversy which lay behind the passage quoted above from Matthew, and the fragmentary narrative, in slightly different words, in Matt. v. 31-32:

⁴ This, not 'fornication,' is the correct translation of *porneia*.

It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement :

But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of unchastity,⁸ causeth her to commit adultery : and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.

Let us turn next to the narrative as given in Mark x. :

And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away *his* wife ? tempting him.

And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you ?

And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put *her* away.

And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife ; And they twain shall be one flesh : so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same *matter*.

And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery.

The question put by the Pharisees, as stated by Mark, is thus : 'Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife (*at all*) ?' Such a question is at variance with the whole history of the Jewish controversy at the time : it was, in the words of the late Archdeacon R. H. Charles, D.D., one which no sane or loyal Pharisee could put, for the Mosaic law made it impossible to ask such a question.

Equally unhistorical and impossible are the words, ascribed to our Lord, referring to a woman putting away her husband. No Jewish woman had ever claimed or enjoyed such a right. St. Paul, writing five years before Mark (1 Cor. vii. 10-11), reproduces faithfully our Lord's words :

And unto the married I command, *yet* not I, but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from *her* husband ; But and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to *her* husband : and let not the husband put away *his* wife.

The Jewish wife could desert but not divorce her husband. Mark wrote in Rome, and probably for this reason unconsciously misrepresented our Lord's words and teaching, as in Rome wives could divorce their husbands.

Let us turn now to Luke xvi. 18 :

Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery : and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from *her* husband committeth adultery.

⁸ See footnote to preceding page. Here and elsewhere I have followed *Divorce and Nullity*, by the late Archdeacon R. H. Charles, D.D. (T. and T. Clark, 1s. 6d. 1927) and his *Teaching of the N. T. on Divorce* (Williams and Norgate, 1921).

Matthew is known to have had the text of Mark before him : he rejected the narrative in Mark and sought to replace it ⁶ by a true record. Mark's aim was to prove marriage to be indissoluble ; Matthew's to show that this was not the teaching of Christ. Luke, a pupil of St. Paul, agrees with Matthew, and he was writing for the whole Roman world.

Finally, we have the narrative of St. John, 'the disciple whom Jesus loved,' of all Gospels the most spiritual and most in accord with the best thought of our and of every age :

And the scribes and Pharisees brought unto him a woman taken in adultery ; and when they had set her in the midst,

They say unto him, Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act. Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned : but what sayest thou ?

This they said, tempting him, that they might have to accuse him. But Jesus stooped down, and with *his* finger wrote on the ground, *as though he heard them not*.

So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her.

And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground.

And they which heard *it*, being convicted by *their own* conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, *even* unto the last : and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst.

When Jesus had lifted up himself, and saw none but the woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers ? hath no man condemned thee ?

She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee : go, and sin no more.

This deals with a quite different controversy, as to the penalty of adultery. The object was to place our Lord in a dilemma. If He affirmed the severe Mosaic law, He would have defied Roman law ; if He set it aside, He would have injured his Messianic claims in the eyes of the people. He makes no reference to and does not question the sentence of divorce, which under contemporary Jewish law was inevitable. In fact, He recognised it as in certain cases inevitable.

I conclude therefore, following Archdeacon Charles and others who have critically studied the matter, that our Lord distinguished between sins of unchastity and lesser offences.

St. Paul, following the example of his Master, takes the same line (1 Cor. vi. 16). By illicit unions marriage is dissolved, not by Church or State, but by the act of one of the parties ; and here we may remind ourselves that in the Great Bible of 1549 the seventh commandment reads :

Thou shalt not breake wedlocke.

⁶ Note, for example, the corrected (and correct) use in Matt. xix. 7-8 of the words 'command' and 'suffer' as compared with their use by Mark in x. 3-4.

Our Lord dealt with ideals, not with legislation. His ideals inspire us, and inform our laws, however imperfectly, and are the most precious heritage of the human race. But He was concerned with inward motives, rather than with outward acts, and never sought a universal jurisdiction for the Church in such matters. Literalism, the bane of the early Church, has given to our Lord's sayings in this as in other directions an interpretation which is inconsistent with His whole life and teaching. We no longer seek to justify self-mutilation by the text 'If thine eye offend thee pluck it out,' nor to refuse to take an oath by the words 'Swear not at all.' The bishops lament, at intervals, the modern attitude of mind towards the most precious of all human relationships. Let us rather, with Milton, 'praise this pious forwardness among men, to reassume the ill-deputed care of their religion into their own hands again . . . in one general and brotherly search after truth.'

The Church, as stated by Lord Davidson in his seat in the House of Lords, 'that is, the bishops, together with the clergy and laity, must, in the last resort, when its mind has been fully ascertained, retain its inalienable right to . . . formulate its faith. . . . But who will claim that the mind of the Church, as defined by Lord Davidson, has been fully ascertained, or that any attempt has been made to do so. Have the bishops ever summoned the clergy and laity to examine the matter with them? And who will claim that, when ascertained, the will thus formulated should be binding on all those who live in these islands, any more than the rule of 'the Bishop of Rome,' to use the phraseology of the Thirty-Nine Articles. In such matters Parliament alone must judge, and the Church should accept its decision, provided always that it compels no man to act against the promptings of his conscience and the rule of his Church.'

There is to-day in every walk of life a wide feeling that the laws of marriage and divorce are at variance with what most people consider to be the finer spirit of the age. On the one hand it is urged that the physical side of marriage—the satisfaction of crude instinct—is secondary to the spiritual, æsthetic, emotional aspects. Most of us, indeed, agree that the true foundation of real marriage is the 'mystical many-sided factor of love.' Yet, in law, the spiritual and moral side of marriage is of no account; breach of the lesser obligation alone is a ground of divorce, and no consideration other than physical, and that only in one aspect, is admissible, and then only if one party, not both parties, be guilty.

Against this view, which is repugnant to the better feelings of mankind, and wholly inimical to the interests of the children of unfortunate unions, the public mind is to-day rightly in revolt. The laws of marriage centre round the child and are a matter of

public concern. It is thus the duty, and therefore the right, of Parliament definitely to reject the ecclesiastical view, a relic of times long past. We are entitled to claim, and to express in terms of law, the conviction that the present ecclesiastical law falls far short of the best expression of the Christian religion. Ours is a Christian Parliament, entitled, and indeed bound, to modify its laws so as to accord with the best opinion of the day in regard to such questions of status and contract as are involved in the matter of marriage, not disregarding religious principles, but seeking to apply them in practice.

Episcopal influences, fortified by Canon Law (which is not binding on the laity), opposed the Divorce Act of 1857, and the legalisation of marriage with a deceased wife's sister. The worst results were predicted; but the world goes on, and is a better and sweeter place in consequence. The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. To insist on the indissolubility of marriage in order to keep in existence unions which are but the empty shells and dry bones of what was once a living and growing unity is clearly contrary to the spirit of Christianity. 'The letter killeth but the Spirit giveth life.' We are concerned to-day to interpret Christ rather in the spirit of the Fourth Gospel than of Mark and his commentators. The poorer classes in England—and the term has, where legal proceedings are involved, a very wide application—have benefited somewhat by recent revisions of the Poor Persons Rules, which have given them access to the Divorce Courts. But the relief is small: the main expense of legal proceedings is the cost of investigation and the production of evidence, and it is too often prohibitive.

If adultery destroys mutual confidence, what is to be said of wilful and continuous desertion, which renders impossible the very objects of the union? I myself know a poor woman who was deserted ten years ago by her husband, who went abroad; he has never sent her a penny, and is known not to intend to return. He is believed to be living with another woman. To prove it would cost hundreds of pounds. She can have no relief: she has a suitor, and desires to marry, but the law forbids. What claim has such a man on his wife even if, at his pleasure, he should return to plague her? Can we be surprised that thousands of persons prefer to live together in unions which are technically irregular, but are in reality true marriages.

'Divorces,' it is objected, 'have increased; this Bill may lead to a further increase.' Let us rid ourselves of the idea that divorce is a dangerous form of crime, the 'prevalence' of which is to be statistically estimated. We know it is untrue: we know that it is but the final Act of State which gives relief to one of the worst forms of misery, and opens fresh vistas of happiness and

peace to those who have long been strangers to both. Holy Writ lays down the formal principle that it is not good for man to live alone. Judicial separation is no remedy, not even a palliative. A man or woman with children to care for must often form another union, as pure as the first in intention. On this point all social workers, judges, and magistrates are unanimous.

The present state of the law is an affront to public decency and to the Christian conscience. 'Lawyers are continually faced with quasi-collusive acts done by couples who are determined on divorce.' 'Even the most respectable lawyers have to be parties to this stage management of adultery. A number of women exist whose occupation is to spend nights in hotels with intending respondents, so that legal evidence of adultery shall be available, and sometimes their names and addresses are even supplied through their legal advisers to intending respondents.' On this ground alone the case for modifying the law is strong. Any amendment should provide that a marriage should not be dissolved for, say, four years, though temporary relief by separation should, as now, be available at judicial discretion.

Social movements usually begin 'at the top' and work 'downwards.' Unless the law is changed the poorer classes will follow the example of the more fortunate, and faked adultery, now rare among them, will become prevalent. Because adultery is practically the only ground for divorce it has become in this country, above any other, an obsession. It is the theme of hundreds of plays and thousands of novels, though in countries where divorce can be obtained for desertion, cruelty, and adultery only 9 per cent. of the divorces are on the latter ground.⁹

Divorce can at present be obtained as of right only if one party (not both) have been guilty of adultery, though in practice relief is refused only in flagrant cases. For six months after the grant of a decree *nisi* the King's Proctor is required by law to spy on the petitioner to ensure that he is abstaining from adultery. This espionage is unknown in Scotland, and public morals are not the worse for its absence. It should be abolished, and with it the affidavit now exacted from all petitioners that there has been no collusion nor connivance—a requirement which has led to wholesale perjury. There should be added, as an integral part of the Divorce Court, some official machinery of conciliation such as has proved so successful in other spheres of human conduct.

On the other hand, the State should abandon its present

insistence, by statute, on the obligation of clergy to remarry, or open their churches to the marriage of, divorced persons. That is a matter for the Church. The Church has the right to maintain its own standards, and, in so doing, to bring society nearer to the Christian ideal without imposing, as at present, cruel hardships on many thousands, especially among the poor, by throwing its weight, largely in ignorance and without due thought, into the scales against legal changes. 'Hard cases,' it is said, 'make bad law.' Rather is it true that the true test of a law is whether thereunder justice may be done to all, and not to a few; and justice is not a static thing, but the reasonable expectation of the average man and woman at a given period and in a given country.

We hear on all sides—and it can scarcely be denied—that the nation is losing confidence in the House of Commons, and that the House itself is losing touch with the vital needs of life. To those who urge lack of parliamentary time as a ground of inaction (and to my knowledge this excuse has been made half a dozen times in the last three months by responsible Ministers in connexion with other matters), there is but one reply. If the parliamentary machine cannot be so modified as to permit the passage of necessary legislation, we have no right to oppose those who would supersede it. Behind this Bill is a weight of informed opinion, in every party, so great that the Government of the day would do well to give the Bill special facilities and to remove at last the reproach upon Parliament that it is afraid to deal with contentious matters, and that through fear of the voting power of dissident minorities it is content indefinitely to suffer injustices and disabilities, especially to poor persons, which collectively constitute a canker in the national life.

May we not rightly reply to them in the spirit of our Lord's rebuke to those who would hold Him to the letter of the law?

Thou hypocrite, doth not each of you on the Sabbath loosen his ox or his ass from the stall and lead him away to watering, and ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day. . . .

And when He had said these things, all His adversaries were ashamed; and all the people rejoiced.

A. T. WILSON.

⁹ *Law and Practice in Divorce*. (Brown and Latey, 1931, p. viii.)

¹⁰ *Marriage, Children and God*, p. 56. (Mr. Claud Mullins, a metropolitan magistrate.)

¹¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vii., p. 459.

HISTORY FROM THE LOOM

A MONTHLY SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

LAST month in these pages it was lightly written that the Left-Wing politicians of France hang together lest they should hang separately. January provided a sensational verification of that hoary witticism. The politico-financial scandal which came to a climax with the 'suicide' of Stavisky (only a very few French newspapers referred to it other than thus derisively, and almost no Frenchman believes the official story) closed—at any rate, in its first phase—with the Socialists saving the otherwise doomed Radical Government of M. Chautemps, while an overwhelming force of police and *Gardes Républicaines* protected them from that militant section of French opinion which clamoured to pitch the deputies into the Seine. But it is by no means certain that that hasty alliance of pots and kettles, mutually assuring the unimpeachability of each other's whiteness, is the end of an affair which may yet become as gigantically disruptive as that of Panama. The French people has been stirred to a quite unusual indignation, and may refuse to let the matter be buried, as previous scandals have been buried, under a mountain of juridical *dossiers*. Cynically accustomed though it is to corruption in political life, in these alarmingly difficult times it would prefer to have a Government not quite so intimately associated with the underworld as the Stavisky affair has revealed the present régime to be. Not for the first time since 1871, the fabric of the Third Republic has been very seriously shaken. But, now as previously, the alternative is not evident. Despite the vitriolic genius of Messrs. Léon Daudet and Charles Maurras, the country remains obstinately non-interested in the monarchist candidature of the Duc de Guise and his Dauphin the Comte de Paris, unreal and remote in exile; only a defiant return and a spectacular arrest—on the model of the young Louis Napoléon at Boulogne and Strasbourg—could vivify them. As for a dictatorship, at the height of the political crisis there was a Palais-Bourbon distribution of pamphlets advocating a 'dictature' but leaving the potential dictator coyly anonymous. When it became known, or believed, that the implied dictator was M. Daladier there was

merely a shrug of the shoulders and not even a smile. There are those, however, who wistfully murmur the name of General Wéygand.

From all points of view the Stavisky affair is unfortunate. Only too often a similar disintegrating scandal explodes just when it is important for France to have a strong Government, solidly backed by the confidence of the nation. The Caillaux affair, on the eve of the war, is a conspicuous example. At this moment France has particularly urgent need of a strong Government. The emergence of Germany from defeat, certainly to be continued throughout 1934, is inevitably going to supply a succession of difficult problems. The first, already arisen, is that of the Saar, under the immediate competence of a League of Nations which Germany finally shattered by dramatic departure. France is making desperate efforts to reintegrate and revitalise that hitherto so convenient institution. M. Herriot, currently the 'back-seat driver' of French foreign policy (did Stavisky, or did he not, donate liberally to the campaign funds of M. Herriot's party?), urgently endeavours to persuade Soviet Russia to take Germany's place in the League, and thus reinforce what has become—with Italy throwing bricks, and Great Britain declining to do more than utter amiable platitudes—too visibly a merely French and fatally damaged instrument for the retention of the fruits of victory. In view of the virtual but unacknowledged fusion of the Second International with the Comintern, the enthusiasm for Russia of the French Left Wing is understandable, if imperfectly shared by the French people. Apart from M. Herriot's personal admiration for the Soviets, he was from the beginning the chief artisan of the Franco-Soviet accord which in theory should reconstitute an eastern front against Germany, and recall a recently ultra-independent Poland, geographically between the hammer and the anvil, to a sense of its obligations. It is extremely probable that Moscow may oblige M. Herriot. Membership of the League under present conditions would not entail any very great liability, and would even confer considerable diplomatic advantage for the tenebrous future. Protesting its revolutionary virtue, the Soviet Government might not improbably extort a tangible *quid pro quo* as the price of its shame at entering that temple of bourgeois capitalism. The advantage to France of any derivative of the Franco-Soviet *liaison* is much more problematical. The inherently nominal adhesion of the U.S.S.R. to the League can hardly do much to resuscitate it. And anyone who imagines that Stalin & Co. would in any present circumstances voluntarily go to war with Germany imagines a vain thing. Moscow looks anxiously to the Orient. It will take all it can get from France, and give as little as may be in return.

Another of M. Herriot's ideas has, however, to a certain extent materialised, but hitherto abortively. Moscow recently made *sub rosa* an official proposal that the U.S.S.R. and Poland should jointly guarantee Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia against a possible German aggression. Finland, having had historic experience of Russian protection, promptly declined. Estonia prudently gave its approval, 'in principle,' while reserving a definite answer which would endeavour to associate a somewhat less dangerous custodian with these volunteers. Poland sees in such a pact a liquidation of the ten-year-old feud with Lithuania resulting from the rape of Vilna, which might prove a serious danger in the event of war. Moscow remembers only too vividly the German advance from Riga towards Petrograd in 1918 which so terribly endangered the new Bolshevik *régime* and resulted in the surrender of Brest-Litovsk. Should Germany be tempted to repeat that *coup* while the U.S.S.R. was militarily engaged in the Far East, the proposed pact would ensure that a united *bloc* of the little Baltic States, together with Poland, would bar the road and assume the main burden of the Russian defence. After the affair was over, Russia and Poland—the 'protectors'—could swallow those foolish little fellows, exhausted by their effort, and divide the coast-line between them. From the French point of view the main thing is to keep the awakening Gulliver tied down. Even Lilliputian threads may be efficacious if sufficiently multiplied. Why not, indeed, another pact of mutual guarantee between Holland and Denmark, linked with the Baltic Pact, and the whole under the League of Nations again made to look vital and important to Anglo-Saxon idealism? Then this unpleasant Germany, so brutally hostile to non-Aryans and to the Second International, and invidiously self-outlawed by her withdrawal from the moral jurisdiction of the League, would be completely encircled.

That policy of encirclement very nearly had a bad accident at the opposite sector of the periphery—in Roumania. The fanatically anti-Semitic 'Iron Front,' modelled on and to some extent supported by German Nazism, assassinated the Premier, M. Duca, as a preliminary to a *coup d'état* which should sweep away the parliamentary dynasty of M. Bratianu, and behind it the hated 'non-Aryan' financiers Messrs. Vider and Malaxa, the Jewish Pompadour Mme. Lupescu, and indeed the entire unsavoury 'Palace clique' around King Carol. Some of the royal entourage apparently had a foot in each camp. The army and the police were filled with adherents of the Iron Front, and the police who were escorting M. Duca on the railway station at Sinaia were themselves the accomplices of the men who shot him down. Only a long romantic novel could do justice to the Ruritanian

politics of Roumania. The essential point, so far as international relations are concerned, is that the Bratianu 'dynasty,' with M. Titulescu as its brilliant Foreign Minister, stood for that recently established close solidarity of the *Petite Entente* which would give the Danubian States, backed by France, a fighting chance against Italy and/or Germany. *Per contra*, the Iron Front put up portraits of Herr Hitler in its meeting-places. Terrified by the murder of M. Duca, the King declined to call M. Bratianu to the premiership, but appointed a dummy, M. Tatarescu, with instructions to be gentle with the nominally dissolved Iron Front lest worse things occurred. At the same time the King requested M. Titulescu, who happened to be winter-sporting at St. Moritz, to return and give the Tatarescu Ministry the validity of his high prestige. M. Titulescu, aware that he also was on the Iron Front death-list, at first preferred the climate of St. Moritz. However, reassured, he returned for long and distinctly stormy interviews with his royal master, where he demanded that M. Bratianu should be Premier, that some of the 'Palace clique' should be thrown overboard, and that the Minister for War, the Chief of the Secret Police, the Chief of the Bucharest Police, and the King's private secretary should be dismissed. It was almost more than the King dared do. For some days it seemed as if M. Titulescu, driven perhaps into exile, would be utterly eliminated from Roumanian politics and that with him would vanish the new solidarity of the *Petite Entente*, with a consequent complete victory for Germany. However, powerful pressure was applied and a compromise was at last effected. M. Tatarescu was to remain in office until February 1, when he would gracefully retire in favour of M. Bratianu, the dismissals in the 'Palace clique' occurred, Mme. Lupescu once more went on her travels, and M. Titulescu once more reigned as Foreign Minister, the French policy saved. The Quai d'Orsay could practise those '*mouvements respiratoires*' which the French Press recently caricatured M. Chaumets as commanding after the news of Stavisky's decease.

M. Titulescu's other diplomatic ambition, the establishment of a Balkan *bloc* auxiliary to the *Petite Entente*, which should liquidate Bulgarian hostility to its surrounding ex-enemies and also eliminate Italian influence from the peninsula, met with a little hitch not yet quite surmounted. Bulgaria demanded from Greece an access to the *Ægean* which Greece refused. Nevertheless, the pact is almost an accomplished fact. M. Maximos, Foreign Minister of Greece, having visited Paris, returned to Rome to explain to Mussolini the general beneficence of a pact between Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania and Yugoslavia, which would perpetuate precisely those territorial provisions of

the Peace Treaties which Mussolini is understood to desire to revise. Somewhat disconcertingly, the *Duce* apparently shrugged his shoulders and offered no objection. Indeed, his official organ declared, with perhaps a subtle irony, that the participation of Greece and Turkey with Yugoslavia and Roumania would guarantee that no one side would establish a hegemony in the Balkans, and that such a pact would usefully complete the system of Mediterranean pacts in this 'unstable and dangerous zone.' With which, M. Maximos went on to London 'to complete my calls on three Great Powers traditionally friendly to Greece' in sweetly smiling farewell to Italy, which, having simultaneously signed bilateral commercial treaties with Yugoslavia and with Roumania (the latter exactly at the moment when it seemed that M. Titulescu might be permanently excluded from power), is not yet quite disinterested in the Balkans.

But Italy is also interested, and at the moment perhaps more interested, elsewhere. The departure of General Balbo for his governorship of Libya signifies the beginning of a new era of Italian expansion in North Africa, southward beyond the old vague frontiers of Turkish Tripoli towards Lake Chad and those equatorial regions now occupied by France and England. Italy, indeed, is definitely indicating her interest in Africa. She is granting further subsidies to Italian shipping engaged in the South African trade, and on the east she is apparently contemplating the use of her grievance at Japanese concessions in Abyssinia as a means of regaining her influence in that country which terminated so disastrously in 1896 at Adowa. Nevertheless, her greatest interest just now is still the problem of Austria and Hungary, once more becoming acute with the constantly growing strength of the Austrian Nazis and the equal dislike of the Austrian Socialists for Dr. Dollfuss's somewhat precarious and Jewish-financed Anti-Nazi Corporate State. In his desire to bar Nazi Germany from Austria, Mussolini is at one with France. He parts company with France in his endeavour to establish a close accord between Austria and Hungary, and to revive an Austro-Hungarian federation whereof Trieste, at present derelict, shall be the once more flourishing port. The essence of that plan is that a Nazi Austria shall *not* annex itself to Nazi Germany. Dr. Dollfuss is in somewhat of a dilemma. If he should, in the Hitler fashion, dissolve all political parties save his own 'Patriotic Front' and thus affirm his absolute dictatorship, the Socialists threaten a general strike which the Austrian Nazis would certainly exploit to effect a probably successful *coup d'état*. If he does not do this, but allies himself with the Socialists, his own party will abandon him. If he does neither, but sits still in passivity, the aggressive advance of the Nazis, with more and

more adherents in every walk of life, and particularly in official circles, threatens him equally with a not-distant extinction. It was presumably to assist him in this dilemma that Signor Suvich, Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, paid his quasi-State visit to Vienna on January 18, emerging from the railway station into an immense crowd of Nazis vociferating 'Heil Hitler!' Symptomatically, on the previous night, Count Alberti, former leader of the *Heimatschutz*, who had been plotting for the fusion of that body with the Nazis, was arrested and sent to a concentration camp. It remains to be seen to what extent Mussolini's somewhat ostentatious moral support of Dr. Dollfuss will prove effective.

Germany of late has been following the prudent policy of Brer Rabbit. The Nazi Government declined to come to Geneva and discuss the League's proposals for the eventual *plébiscite* in the Saar—a *plébiscite* which anti-Nazi influences in other countries are now suggesting should be postponed on account of Nazi tyrannisation. It has also declined to discuss ('until after sufficient examination') the new French disarmament proposals, more or less sincerely offering to scrap 50 per cent. of the French air-bombers, and thereby rendered futile the Geneva gathering of Mr. Henderson, Sir John Simon, M. Paul-Boncour, and M. Bénès. Just now Germany has little or nothing to gain from talk with her neighbours. A policy of baffling silence is more remunerative. Her intention is fixed and simple—to reconstitute her military strength with a minimum of fuss, and in the meantime to consolidate the Nazi State in every possible direction. Freemasonry, stronghold of Jews and Social Democrats, is to disappear. If control of the Protestant Church has been imperfectly successful, at least that Church has been rent with dissension and has no real following among German youth. The newly promulgated 'Law for the Regulation of National Labour' brings nearer the State Socialism inherent in the National-Socialist programme. From May 1 trades unions and employers' associations are equally abolished. Industry will be under 'Confidential Councils' in every concern, such councils to be chosen from the employees by the employer in co-operation with the local Nazi cells. Above them will be 'Labour Trustees,' appointed by the Government for areas and not for specific industries, to whose dictatorial powers the councils may appeal, or before whom they may be arraigned. In addition, there are to be 'Courts of Social Honour,' before which the Labour Trustee may hale employers who exploit their workers, or workers who endanger social peace by undue interference with the business. Special care is taken to prevent, as far as possible, dismissals of workmen. The measure at least approximates to the Nazi ideal of substituting a 'Front-Soldat'

comradeship of leaders and led for the internecine class-war obsessions of the precedent dispensation. The one really glaring mistake made by the Nazi Government is the proposed 'indefinite arrest' of Dimitrov, whose acquittal by the judges of the Reichstag trial had momentarily rehabilitated a prestige much damaged by the wild ravings of General Goering. However, the German public does not know much about this. It is only the outside anti-Nazi world which seizes with glee upon this German 'Sacco and Vanzetti' case.

Across the Atlantic President Roosevelt carried the drama of the Second American Revolution into its next act, and incidentally convulsed the markets of the world. Forestalling the possible factiousness of Congress, and indeed serenely dominating it from the outset, he asked for legislation to revalue the dollar at between 50 cents minimum and 60 cents maximum, and to establish the Government as sole legal owner of all gold in the country, such gold to be taken over at the old rate. The estimated profits to the Government of that operation (which old-fashioned Americans bluntly term robbery) will be between three and four thousand million dollars, according to the figure at which stabilisation may eventually be fixed. This move, unique in the history of Government control of currency, was not entirely unexpected. What was unexpected was the use to which that vast profit is to be put. It is not to be used to finance the gigantic public works and other items of the recovery programme, or to meet the impending immense budget deficit. Two thousand million dollars is to be put into a 'stabilisation fund,' and the remainder is to be held in the Treasury 'in case it is needed to meet international payments.' It is not clear what international payments the United States, with a permanently favourable balance of trade, can have to make which will necessitate so vast a sum. But it has been made quite clear for what purpose the two thousand million dollars of the stabilisation fund is intended. It is in pursuance of the President's reported grandiose plan, described in these pages two months ago, to 'do what the British have done for so long—control the price of gold.' It is war, or perhaps hopefully an equally effective threat of war, on the London monopoly of the gold market, with its concomitant control—as the Americans see it—of the world prices of commodities. As Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Junior, Secretary of the Treasury, explained to the Press, *more Americano*, 'the American Stabilisation Fund is virtually the same as the British Equalisation Fund' (actually, it is £100,000,000 more); 'we just wanted to have as many blue chips as anyone else in the game.' The United States is convinced that the stability of prices in sterling, compared with their decline as measured in gold or their fluctuation in terms of

dollars, is the result of Machiavellian manipulations by the managers of the British Equalisation Fund. As a matter of fact, the stability of sterling prices results automatically from the circumstance that the British Empire is the greatest purchasing unit, and that outside sellers to it (sellers being everywhere at a disadvantage to-day) must sell in terms of sterling or not at all, with the resultant automatic formation of the 'sterling area' so much resented in America. The use of the American Stabilisation Fund to disturb the London gold market, or to transfer it to the United States, may provoke chaotic exchanges, but it cannot annihilate the 'sterling area' until such time as the United States becomes predominantly a world buyer instead of a world seller.

Paradoxically, the first reaction of the exchanges to the new 60-cent-maximum dollar was a rise in the obstinately buoyant American currency, partly because of repatriation now that the worst was known, partly because of speculative British purchases of American industrial securities, and partly perhaps because of 'control' operations on the British side—again the wicked Equalisation Fund, which a banker on the 'Committee of the Nation' declared had created as much havoc in the United States as any invading army could have done. The President has armed himself for an uncompromising fight with that fund, if it be necessary. But the Federal Reserve authorities, who have taken over the business of exchange manipulation from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, hope for 'co-operation and joint action' between the two funds. In other words, they hope for a peaceful surrender by the Bank of England to a policy which will put the dollar at a steep discount to the pound, with all the resultant American advantage in the export markets.

Not the least remarkable feature of these immense events—almost coincidentally it had been quietly announced that within the past four months the Government had become a partner in 30 per cent. of the 14,500 American banks, with an investment of nine hundred million dollars and a controlling interest in some of them—has been their uncritical and even enthusiastic acceptance by the great mass of the American people. It was universally expected that Mr. Roosevelt would have to face a storm when Congress met. The contrary happened. Congress was a flock of lambs. It was true that the President had completely outmanœuvred all the factions. To the inflationists, clamouring for three billion dollars new currency, he exhibited that amount or more of new Government-held funds produced by the seizure of gold and the definite devaluation of the dollar. To those in terror of a vast unbacked 'greenback' issue he presented the reassurance of a currency completely backed by gold at the new

ratio. To the silver interests he proffered soothing words and a great hope. And, *en fin de compte*, having magically created thousands of millions of dollars out of nothing, he retained fully—thanks to the reserved margin of 10 cents on the not yet stabilised dollar—his always disconcerting liberty of action. But his unique ascendancy is based on more than mere deft politics. If he has won the confidence of the American people as no other President has won it, it is because the average citizen is convinced that he is an honest man who claims no infallibility, but who is uncompromisingly determined, by one means or another, to give the average citizen a fair deal. To achieve that square deal the ordinary American is prepared to accept the controls of the N.R.A. and all the other alphabetic organisations of the new era. The catastrophic collapse of the old era of grab-what-you-can financial and industrial brigandage, the revelations of the amazingly cynical dishonesty of the presidents of two of the greatest banks, coming as the climax to other unsavoury revelations, have convinced him of the necessity for control. The average middle-class American feels that he has been plundered by a bunch of silk-hatted gangsters, against whom only the State can protect him. The American masses, in large part of recent immigrant origin, whether small farmers or industrial workers, have always been bitterly resentful of their ruthless exploitation by big 'interests' against which it was impossible to combine. Both classes have revealed themselves as ready to accept a revolutionary 'controlled economy' to a degree almost incredible to those who knew only the individualist America of the days of unlimited opportunity, but which President Roosevelt apparently from the first divined. Not yet is the Second American Revolution terminated.

In foreign affairs Mr. Cordell Hull, tightly ligatured by the President's specific instructions, could not cut any great figure at the Pan-American Conference. But, on the occasion of Woodrow Wilson's birthday anniversary, Mr. Roosevelt made his anticipated pronouncement, directly addressed to Cuba and Latin America, that the new policy of the United States 'from now on was one opposed to armed intervention,' and recalled President Wilson's speech of 1913 that 'the United States would never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.' At the Pan-American Conference the Cuban delegate expressed himself as very happy to hear this. Nevertheless, in his stressedly pacific Wilsonian speech, Mr. Roosevelt took the occasion to give a scarcely veiled hint to Japan. He declared that the threat to world peace was the possibility of 10 per cent. of the world's population 'following the leadership that seeks territorial expansion at the expense of neighbors. . . . If this 10 per cent. can

be persuaded by the other 90 per cent. to do its own thinking and not be led, we will have practical and permanent peace, real peace throughout the world.' There is much virtue in that 'If.' Underlining it is the intense American effort to build warships up to the Treaty limits, and the American recognition of the Soviet Government. The Administration has discreetly soft-pedalled on all the implications of the Soviet-American accord. Moscow has, indeed, not officially received a loan, but the very large credit recently unobtrusively given by the Chase National Bank, in which the American Government now holds a large preferred stock interest, is virtually a Government subsidy. Absorbed in the internal struggle to restore Prosperity, the American public is left in blissful ignorance of the significance of the vast events rapidly maturing in the Orient.

Simultaneously with Mr. Roosevelt's 'Woodrow Wilson' speech, M. Litvinov was bluntly informing the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union that 'Japan is preparing an attack on us.' Soviet Russia is equally preparing to resist that attack, and even perhaps to counter-attack in North Manchuria. More than 20 per cent. of the entire Soviet military power is now concentrated on or near that frontier, and M. Voroshilov, Commissar for War, has demanded an immediate urgent increase in the Red army which has been approved. At the moment Japan has approximately equal forces in Manchukuo and Korea, and is moving them to a better strategical distribution. So far as may be deduced, the Japanese plan is not to attack—if, indeed, an attack is so imminent as Moscow believes—the Soviet forces in their positions along the frontier of Manchukuo, but, profiting by their superior mobility, to strike more westerly at the Russian line of communications and, themselves concentrated, to defeat in detail the Red units hastening back more or less confusedly to retrieve the situation. In this connexion the alleged Japanese designs in Mongolia have a special importance. A strong Japanese force operating from Northern Mongolia can cut off the whole of the Soviet Far Eastern territory at the bottle-neck of Lake Baikal. Inner Mongolia is now in completely successful revolt against the shadowy Chinese domination, and is controlled by the autonomous movement headed by Prince Teh. It is improbable that that autonomous movement could or would arrest the Japanese military advance into Inner Mongolia alleged to be imminent. According to Chinese reports, indeed, the ex-Mr. Pu-Yi, now Emperor of Manchukuo, is to assert likewise his ancestral rule over Mongolia, Manchukuo and Mongolia becoming a federated autonomous empire divided into five States, and the whole supported by Japanese military force. That act, should it materialise, would be a sufficient *casus belli* for Soviet Russia,

deprived at one blow of her influence in Mongolia (which was to be her jumping-off position for the eventual domination of a Red China), strategically menaced with the loss of the Far Eastern territory, and equally menaced with being shut out from the coveted Chinese Turkestan, now since September also a precariously autonomous republic under the presidency of the Moslem Hodja Nyaz Hadji. This new republic hopes for British sympathy, but certainly could not resist even a very small Japanese invading column from Mongolia.

War in the Far East is, as has been repeatedly said in these pages, ultimately inevitable. The only question is the date. At the moment Japan possesses the advantage of the initiative. How long will she retain it? If she waits another twelve months, the American naval programme will be completed, the vast amount of military and transportation equipment which America proposes to pour into Russia will have been delivered, the Trans-Siberian Railway will have been double-tracked throughout, the great concentration of aircraft at Blagovestchensk and at Vladivostok—the latter air base is already making Tokyo nervous—will have become yet greater. Twelve months hence Soviet Russia and the United States might be in a position to issue an extremely formidable joint ultimatum, requesting Japan to desist from its support of 'autonomous' Manchukuo.

In another respect, also, the Japanese position may be less favourable a year hence. In these last four years Japanese naval and military expenditure has increased from 455,000,000 yen in 1931 to 819,000,000 yen in 1933, and an estimated requirement of 1,242,000,000 yen in 1934. The new revised budget totals over 2,106,000,000 yen, causing Mr. Takahashi, Minister of Finance, to resign, with a visible deficit of 880,000,000 yen. These are stupendous figures for so small an empire to raise, and they cannot indefinitely be maintained. In these last years, and particularly during 1933, the depreciation of the yen, reinforced by cheap labour, has enabled Japan to capture an enormous share of world trade, with sensational profits. There is every prospect that during 1934 Japan's share of the export markets will be considerably restricted by quotas and other protective measures. Almost certainly, a year hence there will not be so much cash in the till. All these considerations, doubtless weighed also by the Soviet Government, suggest that if Japan is going to strike—and Japan has hitherto struck at the nicely calculated correct moment—the blow will not be long postponed.

What would be the American policy should a Russo-Japanese war break out? At the present time the ordinary American citizen does not in the least contemplate a war with Japan or with anyone else, and would be most reluctant to fight one. He is

solely and exclusively interested in getting out of his domestic mess. It is even probable that the Administration counts much more on Soviet Russia, with American technical assistance, fighting Japan and limiting an expansion which *pari passu* cuts down American markets in Asia, than on America taking an immediate active part. From the American point of view, the time for America to intervene would be when the belligerents were exhausted, as in 1905. Such intervention might then be efficacious without having to undertake military action. From the Japanese point of view, if America is to come into the picture at all, it would be better to provoke a simultaneous conflict with both adversaries and contemporaneously wear down the American strength at sea. The Japanese are entirely confident of beating any American fleet that might be sent across to the Western Pacific; and most American naval officers agree with them. If American direction of such a war were left to the professional strategists, it is safe to say that no American fleet would be so sent except coincidentally with the progressive establishment of American bases, for the development of the potentially colossal American air power, from point to point across the Pacific, *via* the bridge of the Aleutian Islands. For the United States the danger is that a 'Maine incident' might sweep the American people into a war frenzy and a consequent clamour for immediate naval action that the Administration could not resist.

To an American or a European it is certain that an American-Japanese war must result in an American victory, however long it might take to achieve it. The Japanese mentality does not accept this. It believes that Japan can win such smashing victories at the beginning of a war that America would accept defeat. The collapse of American prosperity, the universal disaster to European economy, have completely cured the Japanese of their old-time awe and admiration for Western methods and Western efficiency. It is largely this new slant to their ideas which has made possible the indubitable accord, incomplete but growing, between Japan and Nationalist China. Tacitly, the Nanking Government recognises that Manchukuo is lost to China; for months past it has never in any way referred to that new empire and insists on ignoring it to treat directly with Japan. For months past the once noisy anti-Japanese associations have ceased to speak of recovering that lost province, and the Chinese newspapers no longer refer, as not long back they invariably did, to the Japanese as 'enemies.' Moreover, Chinese capital is freely flowing into Manchukuo, which the Japanese have organised with a swiftness and efficiency few people anticipated. Four thousand kilometres of railroad are in process of construction. In practical realisation of the National-Socialistic

ideals characteristic of the new Japan, a State-controlled company, with limited dividends, has been formed jointly by the Japanese and Manchukuo Governments to link into a single system the telephones, telegraphs, and radio services. Similarly, the South Manchurian Company and the Japanese Government are jointly developing industry in an immense consortium with a capital of 800,000,000 yen; metallurgical works, chemical works, collieries, oil refineries, and an electric power system are already coming into existence and in part functioning. The new State has already cleared up the appalling financial chaos which existed prior to its institution; by last July 60 per cent. of all the medley of arbitrary paper issues had been redeemed, and by July 1934 it is anticipated that a sound silver-standard money will be the only currency. Bandits, indeed, still exist, but the perhaps somewhat optimistic Japanese allege that they have been reduced from 250,000 to 60,000. All this, which is in striking contrast to the anarchy of most of China, has been accomplished in an incredibly short period by an Oriental nation *in defiance of the West*.

Here the Japanese achievement coincides with the aspirations of young China, which proposes to spurn the demonstrably futile West and return to Confucius, and has laid the foundations of a 'Pan-Asiatic Society' not without importance. The Chinese are perhaps more subtle and more long-sighted than the Japanese, and may privately propose to exploit that currently superior efficiency as the Nationalists exploited the Russians in 1926-27, but ultimately the ideals of young China and young Japan are the same.

The sources of Japanese national culture are of course identical with the Chinese culture which was its parent. To Japanese youth imbued with these ideals the great spaces of Mongolia and the almost empty Eldorado of Chinese Turkestan look more tempting than pseudo-Europeanisation in contact with the West. To Chinese youth it is perhaps beginning to appear wisest to allow the Japanese to show the way, and thus to recover those vast ancestral heritages over which Chinese rule is now not even nominal. A mutual contempt has divided the Chinese and the Japanese. A mutual respect, the unison of their diverse qualities in a common revolt against the West, would produce a new force in the world, singularly more formidable than that of Japan alone, formidable though Japan is.

Whether Japanese expansion into the scorched pasture-lands of Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan could afford room for the perpetually expanding Japanese population is another matter; immigrant Chinese could always under-live them, as in Manchukuo. The natural increase of the Japanese people averages 1,000,000 a year, congested in a little country which is mostly

non-cultivable mountains. Even should birth control and food scarcity diminish that fecundity in the future, it does not solve the actual problem, as Professor Teijiro Uedo told the Pacific Relations Conference. The workers for the next twenty years are already born. There is no room for them on the tiny overcrowded farms. They can be more closely crowded into the cities as industrial workers only if Japan's cheap industry, already so dangerous to the standards of the Western world, is permitted proportionately increased access to foreign markets. There is Australia, vast and empty. But before Japan could fight the war which must precede the acquisition of Australia, she must first ensure her Asiatic hinterland for the necessary supply of food, metals and fuel. That almost necessarily entails war with Russia. Before she can move overseas she must settle with the American fleet, improbably permitting such an increase of Japanese maritime power without attempting to thwart it. But a Russo-American-Japanese war would not settle the persistent problem of the Japanese population. Whatever Power or Powers be the victor in such a war, the problem would remain—becoming more and more acute for the next twenty years. Whatever be the great drama preparing in the Pacific, Great Britain is impotent to be more than an idle, if possibly heart-wrung, spectator. She is equally impotent; as has been stressed in these articles, to exert the slightest influence for the maintenance of peace in Europe. From the premier nation in the world in 1919, she has descended to a powerlessness which has no parallel since the days of Charles II., when with impunity the Dutch sailed up the Thames to burn shipping in the Medway, and even poor little, lone Tangier could not be held.

With this article, the last of the series, I make my farewell bow. If there be any readers who have appreciated my attempt, month by month, to survey without prejudice and without humbug the great forces at flow in a world which must, so long as it is human, be for ever mutable, from my gratitude I make them a valedictory suggestion. It is that they should procure and read Brigadier-General Groves' *Behind the Smoke Screen*—a book whose title does not do it justice. If there be in contemporary literature a more acute, dispassionate and immensely enlightening analysis of the entire European situation, and of the realities at work to shape a future not to be contemplated without apprehension by any of us, I do not know it. And so, gentles—
• rewell !

F. BRITTEN AUSTIN.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE

IN June of last year I wrote an article in this Review,¹ emphasising the fact that the present crisis was a possible means of compelling European statesmen to give up political theory in the face of hard political facts, and drawing attention to the probability that the way to peace and prosperity lay through a period of acute tension, danger and difficulty, such as that through which we are still passing. While a recent visit to the Continent has gone far to confirm this view, and there has been some progress towards an appreciation of reality, I have returned fully convinced that British foreign policy *vis-à-vis* continental Europe is a question of vital importance, not only to the peace of Europe, but also to the future welfare of the British people. In this article I therefore hope to impart some information on European reactions to events, and policies arising therefrom, together with some definite indication of the foreign policy which in the circumstances I believe to be the best for this country and for Europe in the interests of peace.

Before, however, attempting to deal with the flexible and rather fragile network of international relations, it is necessary to examine some of the more striking features of the general situation in Europe as it appears to a British observer. Uncertainty and lack of confidence are among the graver symptoms of the complex disease from which Europe is now suffering, and these symptoms are to be found in a most marked degree throughout the length and breadth of the whole Continent. Not only do these negative qualities torment the minds of those responsible for affairs of State in their respective countries, but they are also ever present in the homes of the humble peasants and artisans, who are either unemployed or struggling against great odds to make ends meet, with the prospect of a most uncertain future for themselves and their families. If this lamentable state were confined to a single aspect of national activities it would be a much simpler matter; but, as things are to-day, these destructive influences are paramount in the political, economic and social life of Europe, and people are at a loss to know which way

¹ 'Crisis and Peace.'

to turn. On the political side, fear of aggression from without or revolution from within, or even of something quite indefinable, plays a significant part in the general suspicion and mental confusion, while the whole system of international relations is so fluid that there is no saying what groupings of Powers may result from any particular event. With a rapidly changing transformation scene no one knows what the next few days have in store. When in this atmosphere of bewilderment there supervenes an economic depression almost unprecedented in the world's history, is it to be wondered that nations resort to extravagant political and economic systems out of sheer desperation? With the wheels of international trade clogged with grit, with millions of unemployed clamouring for a livelihood in the depth of winter, and with only a faint glimmer of light on the horizon, is it surprising that men and women talk of war, and fantastic war scares find place even in the most casual conversations?

Perhaps the most detrimental features of the present prolonged crisis lies in the extent to which social demoralisation has set in. I do not go so far as to say that the low standard in certain aspects of Western civilisation is entirely due to present political or economic causes, but there is no doubt that by them demoralisation has been encouraged to a considerable degree. It is not within the scope of this article to emphasise the dangers with which our civilisation is beset, but it is emphatically necessary to draw attention to the fact that something has got to be done to arrest in time this insidious poison by making courageous and determined efforts to lay a permanent foundation for political peace and economic prosperity. Meanwhile, armaments are being piled up on all sides where this is in any way possible—in some cases for the defence of national security, in others in order to attain a status of equality. The disarmament question has been transformed into a rearmament question, and the greatest issue in Europe to-day is that between French security and German equality. Yet peace is the goal at which Europe is aiming. Such is the strange and stormy European picture, full of contrast, packed with contradiction and dimmed with mist, which hangs in the world's picture gallery at the opening of 1934.

Let us now turn to the respective attitudes of the three great Continental Powers—France, Germany, and Italy. France wants, and rightly intends to have, two things. One is peace, and the other is security. On these practical ideas is based the whole of France's foreign policy, direct and indirect, and this policy has the whole-hearted support of the entire French people. France is a peace-loving nation which has worked untiringly for peace ever since she withdrew her forces from the field in 1918; and she is determined that there must be no repetition of 1870

and 1914, but her safeguarding policy needs some explanation in view of her attitude to many European questions. Ever since the war France has been deprived of her complete freedom to exert her natural and unfettered influence on European affairs owing to her fear of aggression. For this reason the French attitude towards European questions has been overshadowed by a natural, but predominant, demand for security above all other considerations. This being so, France's beneficial influence on post-war Europe has been severely limited by security arrangements with lesser Powers and safeguarding measures in other directions. While France's relations with Poland and the Little Entente strengthen her security *vis-à-vis* the discontented nations urging treaty revision, they have deprived her of a free hand in her peace efforts generally. In present circumstances France's relations with Germany cannot but be influenced to a considerable extent by Polish and Czechoslovak interests, nor can her relations with Italy and Hungary ignore the attitudes of Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. Similarly, the more or less recent increase in the strength of the French navy, especially in submarines, is a measure calculated to influence the British attitude to France in the event of war. By threatening our vital sea communications in the Channel, France hopes to guarantee our neutrality if not our active support. Although the necessity for such a measure is very open to question, France is perfectly correct in taking no chances. Hence, it is impossible to restore European equilibrium, to achieve any substantial degree of disarmament, or to secure peace, until France is relieved of this security burden, and the solution of this question lies with Great Britain. At present France is a firm supporter of the *status quo*, partly because she believes that treaty revision would disturb the peace of Europe, and partly owing to her close relations with nations which are inclined still to regard the Peace Treaties as the charters for their existence. For this reason, among others, France forms the backbone of the League of Nations, whose Covenant forms an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles; and it is most unlikely that she will depart from her present methods of striving for peace and security unless she finds an alternative policy which is definitely better than that which she is now advocating.

Meanwhile, Germany is passing through an acute revolutionary phase, largely due to the reaction of the German character to the establishment and maintenance of the very conditions which France seems determined to uphold. The German people have long made up their minds to retrieve their territorial losses arising out of the Great War, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine, which Herr von Papen assured me was a closed question. Furthermore, they are equally determined to rearm if the *status quo*

Powers do not disarm in accordance with their moral obligations originally assumed in the Peace Treaties. Although legally Germany has not a leg on which to stand, morally she has a strong case. Yet, in view of the now indisputable fact that she is already rearming as fast as she can, the armaments policy of France and the other *status quo* Powers seems to have been more than justified. As things are at present, German rearmament is an unpleasant fact which not only has to be faced, but has to be met by certain changes of national policies; and it has to be decided whether this rearmament is to take place with or without Europe's consent and control. With a view to the future, the former seems to be by far the wiser course.

Since the war Germany has come through a long period of national repression, in which many of her natural instincts have been 'bottled up' as a result of the conditions imposed upon her. As time passed, the conditions of life of the people became worse and worse, owing partly to the world economic depression and partly to the difficult position in which she found herself in other respects. As national deterioration progressed Herr Hitler clearly saw an opportunity of appealing to one of the most receptive features of the German national character with his demagogic and almost hypnotic influence. He believed that the people would rapidly react to his appeal to discipline on military lines, a most cherished form of activity which had long been denied them. With the occasion carefully prepared, Herr Hitler shot his bolt, and for the time at any rate he has completely captivated the German people. Realising, however, the European reactions to what certainly has all the appearance and much of the substance of a militaristic and aggressive policy, the German Chancellor has made several strongly-worded peace pronouncements. But, unfortunately, these occasional bursts of pacific rhetoric seem to be in contradiction to the apparently obvious policy of his *régime*. At the same time, it is important to realise the possibility that Herr Hitler's mind is at present solely concentrated on internal affairs, and that he has to use methods most upsetting to Europe in order to carry out his intentions in Germany. Yet it is only by a German foreign policy, proved by action to be of peaceful character, that other nations will be convinced of Germany's good intentions. At present everything points the other way. Hence we have on one side of the Rhine a nation in an apparently aggressive mood, determined at all costs to obtain equality of armaments, and on the other a country equally determined to retain her armaments in the interests of peace.

The position of Italy, on the other hand, is more complex for several reasons. As a Fascist and rather dissatisfied State, she

has a good deal in common with Nazi Germany, and strongly favours treaty revision, although her geographical position, the mentality of her people, and her present and future national needs differ much from those of the German *Reich*. Furthermore, Italian interests at present are best served by a peaceful atmosphere for internal progress and development. While Italian policy must always be opportunist, and therefore of rather a flexible nature, it has quite definite objects in view—favourable conditions for internal development and external expansion, in order to provide for a rapidly increasing population, as well as a considerable degree of national strength for bargaining purposes when occasion demands. Hence Italy wants peace, openings abroad for her surplus population, and sufficient armed forces for her actual needs and for supporting such claims as the future may have in store; and the flexible means which she employs to attain these objects has been manifest in her ever-changing attitude towards France and Germany respectively, as well as in the part she has played at Geneva. Owing to her special position in Europe, her policy must be adaptable to changing circumstances, and yet fully consistent with the objects for which she is striving. To fulfil a rôle such as this calls for the greatest diplomatic skill. Fortunately for the Italians, Signor Mussolini is an arch-diplomatist who is handling the affairs of Europe as well as those of his own country, and this makes Italy's position easier in some ways. In any case, Italian foreign policy in all parts of Europe is carried out with the greatest skill and intelligence; and if other nations dislike the continuous uncertainty of Italy's choice of direction, it must be admitted that such a course is the wisest from the Italian point of view. Yet possibly the time will come when Italy will have to choose which of two roads she is going to take. On the other hand, she may be able to help to bring about a happy situation in which these two roads run parallel. Italy in general, and Signor Mussolini in particular, can do a great deal towards bringing France and Germany together, and in doing so British support would be fully assured, while Italy's own future interests would receive sympathy and support in advance. If the Italians have not got all they want, they certainly have a degree of security enjoyed by few countries. Neither France nor Yugoslavia has any aggressive designs, while in the north Austria still acts as a buffer State. The Italians, however, give no pause to their policy of peaceful penetration in the Balkan countries, which is not without danger in an inflammable area where mere incidents may have far-reaching results. Yet, excluding possible frontier incidents in the north of the Adriatic, Italy is a country from which we have reason to hope that good influence will come; for Signor Mussolini realises to the fullest

extent the merits and defects in the position of his country, which has everything to gain by peace and everything to lose by war.

There remains the fundamental issue of Franco-German relations. The chief differences between the two countries are of two kinds, those of race and psychology and those of national interests. While those under the former heading cannot, as far as we can see, be overcome in our time, those in the latter category can possibly be brought within the margin of safety, and it is only with them that I propose to deal. France supports the *status quo* and the retention of strong armaments for the purpose of security, while Germany urges treaty revision and equality of armaments. While France supports the *status quo* character of the League of Nations, whose birth certificate is embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, Germany left Geneva with the conviction that treaty revision could not be extracted from the League any more than equality of armaments could be expected from the Disarmament Conference. As these two questions of treaty revision and armaments are very closely interrelated, it is impossible to consider one without the other. Although it is difficult to criticise Germany's action in scuttling out of Geneva, as we do not yet know what the full consequences may be, we strongly suspect the Germans of an intention eventually to use armaments to force the treaty issue. Throughout the disturbing events of recent months public opinion in France has maintained an attitude of admirable calm but of increasing anxiety, being always careful to avoid any word or action that might even for a short space of time weaken the prospects of better relations with Germany. Herr Hitler, on the German side, has declared that when the Saar has been returned to Germany no territorial dispute between France and Germany will remain. Although the German Chancellor can make no concession in his claim to parity of rights in armaments, he has definitely stated his willingness to arrange by discussion the methods and stages by which practical parity may be reached. 'On that condition,' he has stated, 'I am ready to listen to everything, to understand everything, and to undertake everything.' Hence one of the first, and perhaps one of the most important, results of the German break with Geneva has been the resort to ordinary diplomatic channels for negotiations between France and Germany. While in some cases there may be much to be said in favour of the Geneva method of settling disputes, there is no doubt that in this fundamental issue between France and Germany there is more chance of success in private negotiations between the countries concerned. Whereas at Geneva issues become confused by subjection to outside influences, and there is a general atmosphere of hesitation and delay, in direct negotiation ques-

tions are dealt with before they become stale, with a desire on both sides to reach some definite conclusion as soon as is reasonably possible. Yet it is a mistake to imagine for one moment that negotiations between Paris and Berlin will have an easy passage. They will need all the friendly assistance they can get from Great Britain and Italy. Assured peace between France and Germany is the best medicine for Europe to-day, but the making up of the prescription will need all the skill and resource of French and German diplomacy, as well as the assistance of consulting specialists.

Franco-German relations cannot, however, be regarded as an isolated issue, owing to the fact that they influence, and are influenced by, German-Polish relations on the one side and by Franco-Italian relations on the other, while Italo-German relations play a similar part in the international complex. Although German-Polish relations are undermined by a formidable dispute which is quite incapable of settlement under present conditions, it is satisfactory to note that there has recently been a distinct improvement in the attitude of the two countries towards one another, and credit is due on both sides. Examples of this change of mood have been manifest in Herr Hitler's assurances to the Polish Minister in Berlin last spring, and in the Polish attitude to recent events in the Free State of Danzig. The Germans, in their present state of weakness, are afraid lest the Poles should think the present a suitable opportunity for a preventive war to safeguard the Polish Corridor in the future, while the Poles know that they can expect no help from France if they indulge in hot-headed military experiments. Poland's strength and France's calming influence have therefore been useful to Franco-German relations. As far as Franco-Italian relations are concerned, there has recently been a considerable improvement, partly owing to the stimulus given to mutual friendship by Germany's aggressive policy, the influence of which has extended to within a few miles of the Italian frontier, and partly because of the good work in this direction performed by Signor Mussolini and M. de Jouvenel, recently French Ambassador to the Quirinal. In this situation the differences are more psychological than real, and there is good reason to believe that, if the French and Italians could only reach a sufficient degree of psychological equality, most of the questions in dispute could be settled with comparatively little difficulty. On the French side a determined effort is being made to come to a *rapprochement* with Italy for reasons already indicated, and I have the assurances of the Quai d'Orsay and of Count de Chambrun, now French Ambassador in Rome, that France will do everything possible to bring about the object in view. Indeed,

my suggestion to French high official quarters that France would do well to give something to Italy was received with an almost surprising degree of favour. On the Italian side the sensitive fingers of Signor Mussolini are for ever on the pulse of Italy. He knows exactly what Italy can do, and what she cannot do; and what is more, he knows in all its aspects the great and comprehensive power of the French nation. Furthermore, he sees his neighbours to east and west of one political orientation, and he has been told in no uncertain way that Great Britain will not support Italy against France. Yet the Italian dictator prefers to wait before committing himself, in the hope that he may not have to commit himself at all. It is here that Italo-German relations come in. Whereas for some time there had been very good relations between Fascist Rome and Nazi Berlin, partly owing to a considerable measure of agreement on the question of treaty revision of which Germany is the champion, and partly as an offset to Italy's relations with France, Germany's aggressive policy with regard to Austria produced a distinct cooling off on the Italian side. Indeed, the situation is now such that Austria forms the lynch-pin on which Franco-Italian and Italo-German relations are hinged. In other words, the German absorption of Austria by an *Anschluss* or by any other means would give a great stimulus to a Franco-Italian *rapprochement*, while the assured continuance of Austrian independence might well lead to closer relations between Germany and Italy on a treaty-revision basis, at the expense of Franco-Italian and even of Franco-German relations. On this turning-point the situation in Central Europe also largely depends. I was in Rome at the time when Germany made her dramatic departure from Geneva, and it was clear that Signor Mussolini had exerted his influence with Germany to the fullest possible extent during the period preceding these events. Moreover, the Italian dictator has expressed his strong disapproval of the German treatment of the Jews, and is inclined to regard such action as a disgrace to the form of *régime* of which he himself was founder. Yet interests come before sentiment in the relations between one nation and another.

Meanwhile, Russia, fearing trouble with Japan in the Far East, and apprehensive of German intentions in an eastward direction, has concluded an elaborate series of non-aggression pacts with her neighbours in the west, in order to safeguard herself from back-stabbing on the European side if engaged in dealing with a situation in Siberia or beyond. While these pacts may or may not safeguard the nations with whom they have been concluded, the pact with Poland has for the present put an end to an understanding between Germany and Russia, and thereby strengthened considerably Poland's position *vis-à-vis* Germany.

Moreover, Russia is now trying to amplify this system of safeguards to cover attack by a third Power. At the same time, France has greatly improved her relations with Russia at the expense of Germany, while Signor Mussolini and M. Litvinoff have reached an agreement of mutual benefit. In view of these important events with regard to Russia, it is possible that Russia may henceforth play a much more important part in European affairs than she has done hitherto, especially now that ordinary diplomatic negotiations tend to replace general discussions at Geneva. This brings us to the Italian decision that 'the continued collaboration of Italy with the League of Nations shall be conditional upon the radical reform of the League in its Constitution, organisation, and objectives within the shortest possible time.' Whatever the Italian proposals may prove to be, there will undoubtedly be an attempt to separate, or even to divorce, the League from the Treaty of Versailles, thereby clearing out to some extent a *status quo* stronghold and making room for the consideration of treaty revision. It is also anticipated that there will be an effort to introduce into the League the original principles of the Four-Power Pact. Needless to say, such proposals would receive strong opposition from France and the smaller *status quo* nations, and the clash of interests would be in some degree intensified. All this seems futile, as this is not the time to reorganise the League, which in any case must be principally concerned with European affairs. Indeed, it is incomprehensible that any sane person should have expected a country like Japan, whose interests lie on the shores of the Yellow Sea, to pay any attention to resolutions passed by the side of the Lake of Geneva. Let the League, if or when it is reorganised—and it should be reorganised at the right time and in the right way—direct its attention to European peace. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for strong and courageous action in the interests of peace before, not after, a serious position becomes dangerous. There is only one nation in Europe to-day that is in a position to guarantee peace, and that nation is Great Britain.

Since the war British foreign policy has been of an indefinite and half-hearted nature. On the one hand, Britain is definitely committed to European intervention in certain circumstances by the League Covenant and the Locarno Treaties. Although there are possible loopholes of escape in both these instruments, resort to such dishonourable methods of wriggling out of definite obligations is not in accordance with the character of the British people, who are in the habit of fulfilling their engagements in the spirit as well as in the letter. Great Britain has also signed the Kellogg Pact and the Four-Power Pact, neither of which impose any material commitments beyond the possible inference that

the Kellogg Pact rules out neutrality in the event of war. On the other hand, British policy has been directed towards the fostering of European co-operation in the interests of peace both at Geneva and elsewhere, while refusing to consider any further European commitments. As long as European co-operation seemed possible, and there seemed some reason to take the multitudinous expressions of Continental good-will at their face value, such a policy was justified. But now that European co-operation is out of the question under present conditions, and good-will between nations is a pure myth, British policy has to be readjusted to meet changed conditions. In their own vital interests, as well as those of the world in general, the British people demand the preservation of peace for reasons which are unnecessary to enumerate; but their primary interest is that Great Britain should in no circumstances be involved in war. Although opinion is almost unanimous as far as the object in view is concerned, there are considerable differences of view regarding the policy most likely to achieve this end.

First, there are those who support a policy of complete detachment from European affairs, and strongly urge that, whatever catastrophe may take place on the Continent, it will be no affair of Britain, who must keep out of it at all costs. Secondly, there is the opinion that the only way to keep out of war is to prevent it taking place at all—an opinion based on the sound conviction that, if war breaks out on the Continent, Britain must sooner or later be dragged in as she was in 1914. Those who hold this opinion call for further British commitments, especially with regard to France, or urge a definite statement of policy strengthening our present obligations beyond any question of doubt. Thirdly, there is the time-honoured policy of drift, based on the idea that it is better for us to hold our hand and see what happens, with the hope that nothing will happen.

Let us consider these three views and see which is most likely to assure peace for the British people. A policy of detachment would be merely a dishonourable attempt to shirk our responsibilities to the society of nations to which we belong; it would be eternally damaging to British influence and prestige throughout the world; and, in the event of war, we would be compelled, whether we like it or not, to defend our interests by force of arms. We cannot be indifferent to what happens on the other side of our narrow sea frontier. To say that Britain can keep out of a general European war under modern conditions is not only sheer folly, but almost a criminal act against the British public. A policy of drift comes much under the same category, and we only have to look back to the weeks immediately preceding August 1914 to see what result we can expect from hesitation to declare

our intentions. On the other hand, a policy of British guarantees to prevent war would not only reduce to a minimum the chance of our being involved in a European conflict, but would give stability to Europe and save the world from unprecedented suffering, from which we ourselves would have no escape. But, in advocating this line of policy, I would penetrate a good deal further inside the province of safety. In order to assure peace in Europe, it is in present circumstances insufficient merely to guarantee French security and thereby to enable that country to have a free hand in European affairs. It is further necessary, and even essential in view of other danger zones, that British commitments should be co-ordinated and extended so as to cover all possible sources of danger. This means that Great Britain should solemnly pledge herself to support any European victim of aggression with armed force and other resources. In exchange for this 'all in' policy, France and the other *status quo* Powers should undertake gradually to disarm to meet some increase of armaments on the part of the disarmed nations, and should agree to negotiations at an appropriate time for a just and moderate degree of treaty revision. Such a policy is, of course, dependent on certain conditions. It would be essential that our Navy, Army, and Air Force should be sufficiently strong to give substance to British diplomacy. This is necessary in any case. As far as cost is concerned, it is surely wiser to spend even a considerable amount in preventing war than to risk losing all in a stupendous conflagration. Moreover, it is possible that this country could obtain certain valuable economic concessions from nations whose financial position would derive material benefit from security and confidence. In any case, peace has its price, and that price has to be paid in advance. I do not believe that the price I propose is too high for a practical assurance of peace, considering what another war would mean to our civilisation and very existence. It is surely not too much to ask the British people to be courageous and to follow a tradition of their forefathers throughout the centuries. Nothing worth having is to be had without some risk, and in the policy which I have outlined that risk is small. Compared with guarantees of the foregoing nature, all weak peace policies of hesitation, of half-hearted commitments, or of imaginary isolation are delusions, like shadows flitting across a wall. Indeed, they are a positive danger to peace. Twenty years ago, when all efforts for peace had failed, Mr. Lloyd George declared to the British people that 'our interests and our honour go hand in hand.' This is equally true to-day, but let us act this time before the cloud bursts, and not after the deluge has begun.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

SPAIN AS A REPUBLIC

'THE revolution is over.' Those were the first words I read in a Madrid newspaper on a recent visit to Spain after an interval of two years. It was the exclamation of Señor Juan de la Cierva, returning to his fief in Murcia, after Señor Lerroux's so-called Cabinet of Republican Concentration had failed to obtain a majority in the *Cortes*, and all the signs pointed to a dissolution and new elections. I remembered Señor de la Cierva as the best-hated of those king's men who rallied to the 'national' Government that made the feckless attempt to save the Monarchy in the spring of 1931. He was the only one of those old *políticos*, be it said, who had the courage of his convictions, and had the King followed his counsel instead of that of the veteran Liberal, Count Romanones, he might not be now in permanent residence at Fontainebleau. Coming from this typical representative of a political system which, parliamentary in name, was in fact pure feudalism, it was a clear case of wish-fulfilment.

The present generation of Spaniards has inherited a dual task: that of liquidating seven and a half years of arbitrary rule—the Dictatorship and its fat kine of plutocracy—and of constituting a genuine body politic which may blend with the deepest needs of the national soul. The trouble about the old Spain was not merely the survival of forces and customs from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which elsewhere had been swept away in the aftermath of the French Revolution, but chiefly that, like Italy (and Germany) it had taken over political and constitutional garments ready-made from England together with an administrative cloak which, until the federalising trend of the last two years, had been of a conspicuously French cut. The Republic must be judged primarily by its success in fashioning clothes that will really fit the Spain of the twentieth century, where, perhaps more than in any other country, mediæval and modern jostle one another in every sphere of life.

The Azaña Government, after the tailors and cutters had done their work and produced an admirable paper Constitution, did in fact pilot the nation through the stormy post-revolutionary waters with remarkable skill. Judged by standards of doctrinal liberalism, indeed, there have been innumerable blemishes.

But discrepancies between precept and practice are part of the national tradition—and not only in Spain. In every country to-day 'democracy' is going through the hard school of experience in its efforts to work out the appropriate political forms and institutions. The main interest of the Republican adventure in Spain lies in the fact that solutions appear to be emerging along the middle road between Rome and Moscow on which we in England have made up our minds to travel. The *coup d'état* of 1923 released the forces of revolution, and the most that could be hoped for was to divert it into parliamentary and legal channels. As Señor Jimenez de Asua, the president of the parliamentary commission which drafted the Constitution, remarked,

In our work we had at the back of our minds the aim of preventing the possibility that the Spanish people should have to invade the streets again in order to gain the substance of the Republic. If there was no violent revolution, it was because the people expected that we would make the revolution from the benches of Parliament.

Unless one has in mind this background, one can scarcely appreciate the reason why Señor Azaña, strong in the strength of a parliamentary majority of some 200 deputies, stuck to his guns and forced through the *Cortes* those indispensable complementary laws, after the Constitution itself had been long since approved. That ferment has, it is true, gradually subsided, and the result of the elections of November 19 and December 3 goes to prove, indeed, that the revolution is over, but not quite in the sense that Señor de la Cierva meant it.

Not the least interesting feature of the recent elections was the fact that the party '*Renovación Española*'—which supports the restoration of ex-King Alfonso—succeeded in obtaining only fourteen deputies in the new *Cortes* out of a total of 473. Such authentic Monarchist sentiment as subsists in Spain is directed rather to the Traditionalist or Carlist branch of the dynasty, which still, of course, maintains its strongholds in the Basque provinces.

If there is general agreement, among Spaniards of every class, that almost anything would be preferable to a Restoration, the same may be said of the general attitude to the measures of the Azaña-Socialist coalition to deprive the Church of its political and economic power. Anti-clericalism is a plant with deep roots in Spain. On each occasion during the nineteenth century, when for a time the Liberals, with the help of the army, came into power, there were regrettable scenes of arson and destruction of Church property, such as marred the proud record of the Republic in May 1931. But after each Liberal régime the Church returned with more power than ever. Apart from the Church's control of the agricultural credit banks, the working capital of enterprises belonging to the Jesuits alone at the time

of the Revolution is estimated to have amounted to £60,000,000. The clergy enjoyed a considerable subsidy, the fruits of which were usually diverted into the coffers of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and scarcely ever percolated through to the poverty-ridden parish priests. By their strangle-hold over education they had made enemies of all the university and professional classes who have been caught up in the remarkable educational renaissance which was the yeast in the revolutionary ferment. When the Republic came, therefore, the Church was destined to bear the resentment of the commercial classes, no less than of organised Labour trained in the Marxian faith, as well as the full force of intellectual republicanism, 'made in France.' Either repression of the religious orders or at least restriction in numbers had been one of the planks of the revolutionary programme of liberal and radical parties for over a century. Señor Alcalá Zamora, the head of the Provisional Government, and as good a Catholic as any man in Spain, knew perfectly well, therefore, that the revolution would require its pound of ecclesiastical flesh. All he could hope to do was to moderate the sectarianism of his colleagues.

The principles of the new relationship between Church and State as set forth in article 26 of the Constitution are in fact a minimum of what the 'revolution' demanded: disestablishment, suppression of the subsidy to the clergy, and of every form of State assistance to religious associations, regulation (but not suppression) of the religious orders, and, finally, the inhibition on clerics from teaching or engaging in trade and commerce. The special treatment of the Jesuits' Order, which has been disbanded, cannot, of course, be justified by liberal theory. That it is justified on grounds of expediency those who know Spain will readily admit.

The Law of Congregations was passed through the *Cortes* last May by Señor Azaña, who succeeded to the Premiership, when Señor Alcalá Zamora, who found himself unable to approve of the measure, assumed the vacant Presidency of the Republic. A manifesto issued at the time by the Spanish bishops stated that those responsible for the law would be excommunicated, and forbade Catholic parents to allow their children into State schools except with special permission from the parish priest. The effect of this 'thunder on the Right' was precisely the same as that of the supposed monarchist inspiration of the Sanjurjo rising in August 1932—namely, to strengthen the Azaña-Socialist coalition. In its purely religious aspect the position of the Church is no different under the Republic from what it was under the Monarchy. Its charitable work has taken on a new lease of life. Even in the educational field, where Spanish Catholics have a just grievance, the position is not nearly so bad as it sounds. There is nothing in the law to stop monks and nuns from teaching

as individuals. And in practice, as happened in France, the Orders have in many cases continued to give instruction by the simple process of unfrocking their younger and teaching members.

Even more successfully than the Church has the army been put in its place. By the expedient of the disarmament 'dole'—voluntary retirement within thirty days on full pay and allowances—Señor Azaña disposed in the best possible way of an overgrown service with nothing to do, and at the same time got rid of numbers of potential Monarchist rebels with a minimum of friction. Some 10,000 officers (about 50 per cent.) availed themselves of the dole. This provided the Minister of War (Señor Azaña) with an opportunity for reorganising the army—thirty-seven infantry regiments and seventeen cavalry regiments, among others, being abolished, and the efficiency of the force increased to a point which, the experts tell you, has never before been reached in Spain. Military service is still the law of the land, but the unpopular quota system, which had replaced the old custom of buying exemption, seems likely to be eliminated altogether and a militia system on the Swiss model substituted for it. Señor Azaña has been able to do with the army what no other civilian could have done, because he happens to have made a special study of army organisation. There has been only one fall from grace on the part of old stalwarts of the Monarchy—namely, the luckless *pronunciamiento* at Seville, led by General Sanjurjo, in August 1932. The rebellion was such a dismal failure that disgruntled army officers have never meddled in politics again, although in the agitation of the last ten months they have had ample opportunity.

With the elimination of the factors of Monarchy, Church and Army, the Republic may be said to have fulfilled the first part of the promise invoked by Señor Ortega y Gasset: 'to demolish the evil in order to construct the good' (*derribar lo malo para construir lo bueno*). There was one other feudal abuse, as it was generally regarded, which Republicans of every hue were determined to remove. The *latifundia* of the great landlords, worked by labourers receiving a weekly wage, constituted in the main that evil of absentee landlordism which we have seen nearer home in Ireland. There were exceptions, of course, but on the whole the great estates had been allowed to fall into neglect. As, moreover, the Republic required to obtain lands for its ambitious agrarian reform, it was taken for granted that the big landowners would get short shrift. As a matter of fact, the original clause of the parliamentary commission entrusted with the task of framing the Constitution, which would have definitely laid down a principle vesting landownership in the State, was modified in order to preserve the liberal and non-Socialist character of the Consti-

tution, so that expropriation is made conditional on the public interest, and requires an absolute majority vote. This has not prevented, of course, expropriation without compensation of royal domains, or of estates based on royal grants, such as those of the *grandees*. Moreover, another precious slice of land was obtained for the Government's agrarian reform, by confiscation, without indemnity, of the estates of any landowners implicated in the rising of August 1932. It was inevitable, of course, that the State should hold the fee simple in any land ceded *qua* political penalty; but it was expressly stated that the intention was to redistribute the land, in some districts with a view to developing a system of peasant holdings, in other districts through collective groups, a solution akin to the Russian—not from any communist theory, but because it does happen to suit the peculiar conditions of some of the vast rural areas in the south of Spain, and in Extremadura. As a remedy for agricultural unemployment, too, an interesting plan for land settlement was devised, and, following the example of the Austrian land reform, there was to be a 'probation period' during which the landholder should prove his capacity before entering into actual ownership. The preliminary work of registration and investigation of the existing landholding system has naturally necessitated a deal of legal and administrative labour which has given a handle to the Right to affirm that the only result of the great land reform so far has been to add to the bureaucracy.

Politically speaking, the purpose of the proposed land reform cannot be described as socialistic. It was, however, a deliberate attempt on the part of the powerful trade union organisation (the General Union of Workers) to extend its scope into the rural areas of what is still, after all, mainly an agricultural country. Of the 1,000,000 workers now enrolled under the banner of the U.G.T. (Union General de Trabajadores) some 400,000 belong, it is said, to the Socialist Land Workers' Association. They have to contend not merely with the Union of Associations of Rural Proprietors, the bulwark of the Agrarian Party which has come to the front with the elections, but also with an at present somewhat ineffective attempt to build up Catholic landworkers' associations, and above all with the driving force of syndicalism, the centre of gravity of which has now shifted appreciably from Catalonia to Andalusia. Nearly all the riots and revolts recorded so faithfully in our Press have been inspired by the syndicalist and anarchist forces fighting a losing battle against the constitutional Socialist-trade unions element. It is not necessary for a moment, however, to see in this effervescence on the Left the hand of Moscow. No responsible Spaniard sees Bolshevism thriving in such an individualistic country as Spain.

One must realise that Señor Azaña has been fighting on the two fronts, dealing faithfully on the one hand with the Church, the army, the landowners, and egregious profiteers like Señor Juan March, and on the other hand stemming the revolutionary tide on the Left, in order to appreciate his services in consolidating the Republic. For this purpose he needed the active support of the Socialist Party, which in Spain, although it only numbers some 75,000, does happen to contain the ablest and most intelligent Spaniards of a somewhat benighted middle class. Sir George Young, in his recent book, goes so far as to say that 'the Socialist Republic saved Spain from a social revolution.' And he also points out that while railways have been brought under national control and the public works of the dictatorship—roads, development of water power, electrification, etc.—are being eagerly resumed, there is actually less social control of commerce and industry than has been acquired by the National Government in Great Britain.

Señor Azaña had the difficult task of striking a balance between government in the sense of directive action and government by consent, which is the supreme problem of every democracy. The great thing is that the Constitution and the fundamental laws ancillary to it have been passed by Parliament, after lively and lengthy debates. It is only in the last year or so that the struggle has been diverted from the Parliament to the country. Here, again, the party agitation, the massing of a conservative opposition to the Left tendencies of the Azaña Government, is only a sign that the people are being awakened from their lethargy, and that democracy is functioning.

If, then, the Republic is in no real sense socialistic, how comes it that the gravamen of the charge against the Government was its Socialism? We have to remember that the Socialist Party, because it was comparatively new, had not incurred the odium of all the established political parties, and there was at first a general disposition to give it a chance of showing its mettle. Now in many cases leaders of the Socialist Party have compromised shockingly with their high principles, and their stock has gone down accordingly. But the real reason for the outcry—the organisers of the Right coalition for the elections talked a great deal of nonsense about forming an 'anti-Marxist' front—was the steadily increasing strength of *Labour*. As in this country, very few people stop to consider the difference. *Labour* in Spain—i.e., the trade union organisations—really had greatness thrust upon it by the dictator, General Primo de Rivera, who was naturally drawn to the idea of organising the State on a corporative basis. Above all, he recognised that the trade union organisation was a highly disciplined force wedded to constitutional and

legal methods. It was the dictator who established a Labour code with clear regulations as to labour contracts and provisions for arbitration and conciliation—i.e., the parity committees, rechristened 'mixed juries.' It has happened in many cases that, when employers and employed have reached a deadlock in the arbitration of an industrial dispute, the State nominee called in as umpire has given a ruling in favour of the workers. At the same time, with a Government depending so much on the support of the Labour-Socialist element, there has been a general tendency to increase wages, a serious attempt to establish a minimum-wage rate, and, in fact, all the usual encroachments upon individualistic capitalism which the business classes dislike, though most of them realise them to be inevitable.

During the year after the Constitution was voted, and while Parliament was still working very well, the Radical leader, Señor Lerroux, sensed the incipient reaction against Labour, and let it be known that he was the man on whom the business classes might rely to check the socialising trend. Obstructionist methods by the Radicals in the *Cortes*, reminiscent of the old *régime*, did not commend Señor Lerroux particularly to public opinion in general. Though a veteran Republican, he is accused, rightly or wrongly, of being a typical old *politico*. And indeed, in his brief tenure of office after the Cabinet crisis of September 8, he distributed, in the good old style, the spoils of office to his party liege-men by replacing the civil governors of all the fifty provinces, and dozens of high officials and civil servants of all classes. Still more ominous was his reinstatement of certain disgraced army officers, who, though Republicans, had not resisted the temptation to meddle in politics, and had therefore been punished accordingly by Señor Azaña.

The manifest sail-trimming of Señor Lerroux, by itself, would probably have left the ascendancy of Señor Azaña unshaken. In the summer of 1933, however, when the bulk of the revolutionary programme had been accomplished, the President of the Republic began to take a hand. His position under the Constitution is clearly defined. During his six years' tenure of office he may exercise his prerogative of dissolution twice and no more, and when doing so he must expound the reasons for such action in his declaration summoning a new *Cortes*. Otherwise his function is more or less to countersign the measures of the Cabinet. But an able man moving within these limits can supply just that check on parliamentary irresponsibility which, under a single-Chamber *régime*, may urgently be required. Señor Alcalá Zamora made his first move, discreetly, in June, with the object of testing the constitutional waters. By that time the disaffection in the country, real and fomented, against the 'Socialism' of the constituent *Cortes* had found expression in municipal elections.

Out of some 13,000 seats in rural areas—about a fourth of the wards—two-thirds had been won by parties in opposition to the Republican-Socialist coalition. On the other hand, only twenty-eight persons were returned as Monarchists; much the same number as Communists. Señor Azaña had let it be known that no political consequences would follow from this adverse vote; but the barometric significance of the polls was undeniable, and, through the virtual extinction of the Monarchist issue, on the whole reassuring.

When Señor Azaña made representations to the President as to the urgency of completing the work of the constituent *Cortes* by voting the new electoral law and the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees which was to be the coping-stone on the Republican edifice, Señor Alcalá Zamora did not press the point. A third Azaña Government, still with Socialist Ministers in it, obtained an overwhelming vote of confidence. But after June 6 Radicals as well as Conservative Republicans (the Maura group) abandoned the parliamentary arena and the *Cortes* became simply a machine for registering the Cabinet's decrees, and the 'constitutional dictatorship,' so to speak, similar to that of Dr. Brüning in the Germany of 1930-32, was left naked and unashamed.

With the passage of the electoral law in July the *raison d'être* of the constituent *Cortes* disappeared. The Opposition was considerably heartened, too, by the results of the election to the magistracy of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees. This novel kind of Second Chamber owed its origin to the ingenuity of Conservatives of the agrarian group, who had been foiled in their attempts during the debate on the Constitution to obtain recognition for an elective Chamber with representation by technical and functional groups. A president and twenty-four members compose the Tribunal. Only two other members besides the president were to be elected by the *Cortes*, the remainder by the Colleges of Lawyers, existing in every sizeable city, and by municipal councillors suitably grouped in the natural regions of the country. The latter were still, of course, mainly persons elected in the first flush of Republican enthusiasm or actually appointed by the Government to take the place of the numerous Monarchist councillors 'elbowed out on account of 'political unreliability.' When, nevertheless, they elected, almost to a man, opponents of the Azaña-Socialist coalition, the *Cortes* could no longer ignore the rebuff.

The elections to the Tribunal finally convinced the President that he must act. Following a solemn warning in the *Cortes* by Señor Lerroux that continuance of the Azaña-Socialist coalition in office would endanger the Republic itself at the next elections (municipal), scheduled for November, the President tipped the

scales. Discounting the fact that Señor Azaña had just obtained a fresh vote of confidence, he called upon Señor Lerroux to form a Cabinet of Republican concentration, without the Socialists. Señor Lerroux's demand for an immediate dissolution was refused. He formed a ramshackle collection of party leaders, sent the *Cortes* away until October 1, and made a typical clean sweep of administrative officials, in the interests of the Radical Party—a procedure which rallied not a little support to the Socialists. When Señor Lerroux presented himself and his Cabinet to the *Cortes* on October 1, he perceived the overwhelming antagonism and, without further ado, made a public avowal of impotence: *Morituri vos salutamus*. A vote of no confidence was passed, and the disaccord between *Cortes* and President could no longer be veiled. After fruitless efforts to patch up the rents, the President felt justified in issuing the decree of dissolution and in appointing a Cabinet under Radical leadership, but without Señor Lerroux himself, who had been discredited by the 'no confidence' motion, to hold elections. The deadlock between the mutually exclusive Radicals and Socialists was resolved, as a matter of fact, only by the good offices of Señor Azaña himself and his colleague, Señor Marcelino Domingo, leader of the Radical-Socialists, who obtained a promise of benevolent neutrality from the Socialist leaders. The Socialist Party was, on the whole, relieved to be out of office. But certain sections of it, represented by the ex-Minister of Labour, Señor Largo Caballero, were suspicious of the President and sought to obtain guarantees that the social legislation of the Republic should be undisturbed.

I have dwelt at length on this delicate parliamentary situation because it indicates the peculiar danger of *στάσις*, with an elected Parliament completely divorced from changed opinion in the country, which exists wherever there is no constitutional factor such as the monarchy to take the strain. Señor Alcalá Zamora played his cards with consummate skill, and the result has justified his deliberate caution. The elections have faithfully reflected the swing towards the Right. But they have also demonstrated the very real strength of the Socialist-Trade Union Party, which, fighting on its own programme, independently, returned fifty-eight deputies instead of the 110 in the constituent *Cortes*. The parliamentary strength of the Socialists is a solid guarantee against any drastic reversal of what has been accomplished in the first two and a half years of the Republic.

The Radical Party which has furnished the new Cabinet, and has received public assurances of support from representatives of the Agrarian Party, has undertaken to repeal, or at least to modify considerably, the unpopular social legislation. It has pledged itself to an amnesty for all the principal political offenders,

particularly General Sanjurjo, formerly a popular hero. The Agrarian Reform will no doubt suffer a sea-change by the incorporation of ideas borrowed from the Fascist models of the corporative State. But, otherwise, we may look forward to a Parliament whose main business will be consolidation of the Republic. How precious the general support of the Socialist-Trade Union Party, which is assured so long as there is no putting back the clock, can be to the Republic we have seen in the outbreak of anarchist and syndicalist violence which followed the elections. Socialists and syndicalists continue to represent opposite poles, and only an almost inconceivable Monarchist or pseudo-Fascist *coup* could bring them to an alliance.

Fascism proper has as little chance of taking root in Spanish soil as Russian Communism. On the other hand, the younger generation has had its emotions stirred by the happenings in Germany, and there are those who echo the cry of young Nazis that democracy and Parliament, by their associations with the French Revolution, are *ipso facto* 'anachronistic and futile.' 'The alternatives to-day are Berlin or Moscow,' writes Señor Valdivielso in a somewhat flamboyant letter to the Press in resigning the editorship of the *Heraldo de Madrid*, a paper of the Left. There are many on the Right who will be tempted to play on this theme, as may be guessed from the ironical comment of *El Debate*, the admirable Catholic daily, on the proceedings of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference which was meeting in Madrid at the beginning of October. But, so long as the new Government is as diligent to maintain law and order as its predecessors, the parliamentary régime should be safe. Certainly the President, Señor Alcalá Zamora, will never let it down. Moreover, we in England should never forget that the Cortes is as much a fetish to Spaniards as Parliament is to us. Sir George Young¹ has well summed up the position :

Constitutionalism is almost as much a religion in Spain as Communism in Russia. In the old days the 'stones of the Constitution' were local idols as much as is the bust in the Lenin corner . . . the present Constitution of 1931 is a live child of the Revolution . . . it has sprung fully armed from the head of the old idol, and it has at once shaken off the guardianship of the *Cuerpos Armados*.¹

Señor Lerroux was the obvious candidate for the Premiership of the new Cabinet ; but he does not hold the allegiance either of the Right or Left. In fact representatives of both wings in the new Cortes united to insist that the Prime Minister of the Cabinet which held the elections, Señor Martínez Barrios, should be Minister of War, as a safeguard against any tampering with Señor Azaña's thoroughgoing army reform. Six members of the

¹ *The New Spain* (Methuen, 7s. 6d. net).

retiring Cabinet remain, among them Señor Cirilo del Río, Minister of Agriculture, whose expert knowledge will be invaluable in the new orientation of the land reform. The moderate Right groups have now ostentatiously severed their connexion with the Monarchists and publicly proclaimed allegiance to the Republic. This has given Señor Lerroux's Cabinet a chance of steering the middle course which the result of the elections indicated. For instance, the prohibition of the religious Orders from any teaching in primary schools has been suspended in favour of the more practical arrangement of replacement as and when possible. Another concession to Catholic sentiment is the establishment of clergy pensions.

This right-incline movement has evoked a certain amount of Crippsian talk from a section of the Socialists. It has also rallied the Left elements in Catalonia, who in the municipal elections of January 14 united against the Right-Centre Cambó group and avenged their defeat at the general election. The passing of Colonel Macia was also the occasion for impressive demonstrations of loyalty to the democratic ideals of the Revolution. And Señor Azaña is hard at work, behind the scenes, cooling tempers on the Left ; Señor Gil Robles, the young leader of *Acción Popular*, inspires confidence in the same rôle on the Right.

I am conscious that I have given a picture of the new Spain which differs in perspective from what most people imagine to be the conditions as a result of reading newspaper headlines. The bombs of Barcelona are, indeed, always with us. But the continued effervescence there should not blind us to the fact that the occasion for bombs and bombast has been removed. As long as the Catalan question lay in the way, progress towards constitutional stability was impossible. It is Señor Azaña's greatest title to fame that he realised this fact and moved heaven and earth to get parliamentary sanction, in Madrid, for the Catalans' Statute of Autonomy. The recognition in the Constitution of Spain's 'federative tendencies' is the best guarantee that the parliamentary system may be adapted to modern economic and social conditions. The Basques, (*minus* Navarre) have recently voted their statute and should have no difficulty in obtaining the necessary parliamentary endorsement : there is a clause to admit Navarre if and when the Catholic zealots of that province shall have made their peace with the Republic.

Devolution of local affairs to local assemblies, in Spain as in England, is the path marked out for parliamentary progress. This was the answer given me by Señor Azaña himself when I asked him how Spain would remove contemporary reproaches against parliamentary methods. And I am sure he is right.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

AUSTRIA AND THE VATICAN

A CHECK TO NATIONAL SOCIALISM?

NATIONAL Socialism is a revolt against all the conceptions of Liberalism. Yet, as an instrument of constructive policy, Liberalism has no place in the world to-day. The derisive smile of Voltaire will break idols in the future as it has in the past, but Liberalism cannot defend humanity against the *soi disant* New Barbarism; and perhaps the barbarians, like Xerxes, can only lash the waters of Liberalism. Broadly speaking, there now exist only two substantial enemies to National Socialism: on the one hand, Socialism, and on the other, Roman Catholicism. Socialism, except in the shape of Russian Communism, seems at the moment unable to stand alone, and it has therefore become true to say that the most important *motif* in the affairs of Central Europe is to be found in the relations of the Vatican with Berlin. The history of at least the German race will be fundamentally affected by Catholic activities in Austria in 1934, and perhaps in the Saar in 1935.

The English public appears to be singularly ill-informed about a number of peculiarly interesting and important developments which have recently occurred in Austria; I believe I am right in saying that *The Times*, for instance, ignored the Pastoral Letter published by the Austrian bishops immediately before Christmas. Our Press, apparently, prefers to report Nazi outrages, for this was only the most conspicuous of various steps taken during December towards the construction of the new corporate State in Austria.

The parliamentary democracy of post-war Austria may be said to have been mortally wounded by the slump. In its place Dr. Dollfuss has since March put his own dictatorship, to be regarded as a transitional expedient, while his colleague, Dr. Ender, worked out a new Constitution upon a different basis. While Dr. Ender was at work, the shape of the new Austria was at first difficult to guess; of Ender himself it was only known that, sensitive to the proximity of Switzerland—for he is provincial governor of the Vorarlberg—he favoured the Swiss

democratic model. Meanwhile the various political factions hastened to exert what pressure they could. The Socialists collected signatures during the summer to a petition in favour of a frank return to the democratic principles of the Constitution for which their leaders had originally been responsible; their considerable success indicated that at least one-third of the adult population was with them. A handful of Liberal intellectuals, no doubt, supported them. Beyond that, it is possible that a few members, both of the Christian Social Party and of the *Landbund*, did the same. The *Landbund* is a comparatively small peasants' party, to which Dr. Dollfuss stands close; its leader, Herr Winkler, was Vice-Chancellor until September, and, as such, he made frequent public declarations in support of the old parliamentary Constitution.

The Nazis and *Gross Deutschen* hoped, of course, that Hitler would absorb Austria before Dr. Ender's labours were completed, or, failing that, that Austria should have become a Nazi dependency, by whose nominal autonomy Europe should be placated. The *Heimwehr* clamoured for the immediate introduction of Fascism on the Italian model, and, with the Cabinet changes of September, when Major Fey, of the *Heimwehr*, succeeded Herr Winkler as Vice-Chancellor, it appeared as if the *Heimwehr* would have its way. Its members were already employed as the auxiliary forces of the Government; its patron Mussolini still seemed, until October 14, to be the arbiter of Europe. Since that time, however, brave words have been unable to conceal that the *Heimwehr* has no solid backing in Austria itself. While, on the one hand, Italian funds have dwindled (and it has no others), on the other, it has been attacked and derided for its dependence upon Italy. As a matter of fact, a good deal of feeling developed in Austria during last autumn against Italian influence, which at one time almost justified those who spoke of Austria as a new Italian colony, and the Chancellor himself has not escaped sharp criticism. It is perhaps worth referring to a session of the *Bundesrat*, or Second Chamber, on November 17 (some of the members of this body, chiefly Socialists, have continued to meet, despite the disappearance of the *National Rat*), when Dr. Dollfuss, *qua* Foreign Minister, was questioned over the last-moment substitution of a wireless talk on Rome from Dr. Morreale for a broadcast about the last great victory of the old Austrian army over the Italians at Flitsch-Tolmein. The Chancellor's compliments to Mussolini in his New Year speech were nevertheless emphatic.

The *Heimwehr* plan for the new Austria has hitherto remained abortive, and the Social Democratic Party, whose immediate suppression it demanded, still survives. In the middle of December the exasperated *Heimwehr* threatened, in so many words, to

join their deadly enemies, the Nazis. There was a panic among the Socialists, but Dollfuss probably knew that the threat was a confession of failure; as usual, he succeeded in soothing the excited *Heimwehr* with a smiling plea for 'patience and all will be well.'

As a peasant Dollfuss has strong *Landbund* sympathies, but he belongs to the Clerical Christian Social Party, and before everything-else he is devout. He himself has made a number of perfectly consistent declarations about Austria's future; while the other parties flirted conditionally with the 'patriotic front' launched by the Christian Socials in May of last year, Dollfuss and the Clericals have not wavered. The Christian State, they have declared, is to be realised in Austria. This will not mean plagiarisms stolen from Hitler or Mussolini, but a social re-organisation based upon the Papal Encyclical of 1931, usually known by its opening words, *Quadragesimo Anno*.¹ This great Papal declaration on social organisation condemns the unbridled greed and wild competition of modern capitalism, and deplors the class war which these have made inevitable. Further, it regrets the exaggerated power of the modern State, which has been acquired at the expense of smaller corporations. It would like to see these revived by a return to something like the mediæval guild system within a series of vocationally organised States. Between these a close international co-operation should function. And the whole should be based upon justice and Christian love. It will be seen that the Papal doctrine has something in common with modern Fascism, but certain fundamental differences are clear and inevitable. In Catholic eyes, only the authority of the Church derives from God, and is therefore infallible; the State is man's work, and is hedged by no divinity. The Church has none but spiritual weapons; she eyes askance the physical *vis et potentia* of the unhallowed State. 'Rough force cannot give one man power over another, but God's authority alone,'² and the Church will recognise no *Führerprinzip* if it be not founded in the Apostolic Succession.

Many people affirm that a new political form, be it Fascist, Communist or Socialist, must be preceded by a violent revolution, or it will not survive. But it will be seen that the Vatican denies and damns this view, and Dollfuss's perplexing coquetry with the political factions which surround him becomes intelligible as part of his obedience to the Holy Father, for the Christian State must be built up upon loving consent, not upon civil strife. To have accepted the *Heimwehr* demands would have driven the

¹ This Encyclical appeared as a sequel to Leo XIII.'s *Rerum Novarum* of 1891.

² Austrian Pastoral, December 21, 1933.

Socialists to an immediate general strike; moreover, the Nazis, though they have been suppressed in Austria since last June, could best have exploited the resulting civil war.

At the time of the Encyclical there seemed no need to take Hitler's racialism very seriously. During 1933, however, the *Osservatore Romano* has made the Pope's attitude in this matter quite clear, and just before Christmas a Pastoral Letter from the Austrian bishops, while re-emphasising the *Quadragesimo Anno*, completed the Church's condemnation of Nazi theories. The importance of this publication cannot be exaggerated. The attempted compromise between the Vatican and Berlin has obviously been breaking down in Germany throughout the autumn; a new *Kulturkampf* has now been brought nearer by the German Sterilisation Law. The Saar Catholics have been regretting their entry into the German front, and a Vatican observer, Monsignor Testa, spent most of December in the Saar. On December 21 the Austrian episcopate, after blessing the reconstruction of an independent and Catholic Austria, declared:

Humanity is one family bound by justice and love; we therefore condemn the racial madness of the National Socialists, which leads, and must lead, to inter-racial hatred and conflict. . . . Religion stands above all nationalism, for it is not national but super-national. . . . Religion cannot be confined to a single race, but on the contrary is called to bring the Good News to all peoples, and with it to help with the furtherance of their earthly welfare. . . . We know very well that not all followers of National Socialism share its religious errors . . . but the logic of ideas and facts, together with external influences, will finally lead to a result which all convinced Catholics must join us in rejecting.

These are excerpts from a throughout unmistakably anti-Nazi declaration for all Germany, and all the world, to see. But the effect of this declaration in damming up the Nazi torrent depends rather upon the solidity of the new social structure in Austria than upon the bravery of its words. What, more exactly, is the corporate State in Austria to mean? Can it be realised?

At the New Year Dr. Ender made one of those ambiguous and emptily agreeable statements in which Austrian statesmen excel. One gathered that the outline of his Constitution was complete, that the powers of the federal President would be greater in future, but that that of the federated provinces and their municipalities not materially different. With regard to vocational representation, the Minister only vouchsafed the announcement that the people, vocationally represented, will have, not only advisory rights, but also a share in legislation. All the details of corporate organisation, he said, must first be practically worked out. This was, no doubt, a reference to the arrangement made in December by which Herr Schmitz, the

Minister for Social Affairs—or, as we should say, Minister for Health—was placed at the head of a commission to set about the practical realisation of the corporate State.

This task involves a number of important practical decisions. Catholic direction prescribes the destruction of class rivalries by bringing together the employers and employees in each profession into one corporation.³ It also advocates a strong authoritarian Executive in the State.⁴ But after that the programme becomes vaguer, at a point where several important questions arise. Will government in future be primarily an affair of commands, or will it still be based upon consent? Will the various members of the new corporations, for instance, be elected from beneath or, as Herr Schmitz desires, nominated from above? Will the corporations have, as Dr. Ender suggests, more than advisory rights? This issue, whether government shall still be based upon consent, is the real one in Austria to-day; upon the solution of this problem depends the whole future. It will be seen that Dr. Ender and Herr Schmitz are on opposite sides in the matter, for the former belongs to the Left Wing, and the latter to the Right Wing, of the Christian Social Party, which is grievously divided about this point; the Chancellor's position is not yet clear.

The Right Wing Christian Socials stand close to the reactionary industrialists, and even to the bankrupt landowners of the *Heimwehr*; all these, like the Nazis, are in favour of an out-and-out authoritarian solution. Schmitz has already taken a number of significant steps. In place of the democratically elected *Betriebsräte*⁵ he has substituted nominees to represent both the postal employees and those of the State hospitals. In each case an equal number of places have been allotted to the members of the Free—i.e., Socialist—trade unions, and to those of the Catholic and *Heimwehr* trade unions. As the Free trade unions have nearly five times the membership of the Catholic unions,⁶ and as the *Heimwehr* has virtually no trade union membership at all, it is intelligible that the Socialist workers are outraged by being expected to accept a mere third of the representation in future. They have refused to agree to it in the case of the Labour chambers,⁷ which have hitherto been democratically elected for the purpose of watching over Labour interests. Experts are less interested in this dispute, since the Labour chambers will in any case be incorporated with an employers' organisation,⁸

³ See the *Quadragesimo Anno*.

⁴ See the Pastoral Letter.

⁵ Employees' representatives.

⁶ Free trade unions, 500,000; Catholic unions, 108,000.

⁷ *Arbeiterkammer*.

⁸ Probably the *Handelskammer*.

unless the principle of destroying bodies which represent only one class is forgotten in their favour. Agricultural chambers representing both classes are already in operation.

Now the Catholic Church believes, as we have seen, in authority from above only within its own structure where that authority claims to come from God. In earthly society it sides with the democrats in approving the principle of consent.⁹ The *Reichspost*, the chief newspaper of the Christian Socials; some days before Christmas deplored a Labour code which should be based upon dictation rather than agreement. About the same time other declarations against any sort of despotism came from Christian Social speakers in the debates of the Lower Austrian Diet; it has become clear that most of the peasants, whether supporters of the Christian Socials or of the *Landbund*, take the democratic side. While the Left Wing Socialists are against any compromise with the Catholic Church, it was extraordinarily interesting to see the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, the official Socialist paper, making advances to the peasants on the basis of falling into the new step, if consent, not dictation, could indeed become the tune.

The question now becomes: Can the Catholics and the Socialists in Austria really work together? The *Quadragesimo Anno* declares that Socialism is incompatible with Catholicism, chiefly because Socialism concerns itself only with this world, not the next. At the moment one of the most serious barriers between the Catholics and the Socialists is the *Doppelverdienstgesetz* (double-earning) law promulgated by the Dollfuss Cabinet early in December. To the economically dubious decrees for the exclusion of married women from federal employment a wholly irrelevant clause was attached, which will expel from Government service any man who lives with a woman not legally (and in Austria this presumes religious marriage) married to him. It is obvious that most liberally-minded persons are indignant at clericalism stealing this march, especially in a country where the Catholic Church makes divorce all but impossible.

Nevertheless, there are various groups of optimists in the matter of Catholic-Socialist co-operation. Of the most interesting Left Wing Catholics in Austria next to nothing is known abroad. A century ago, of course, their position would have been even more hopeless than that of Lamennais in France. But the most reactionary period of Papal history seems to have ended with the death of Pio Nono in 1878; it appears with Leo XIII. and Pius XI. that all that has been changed. Some of these young Catholics in Austria have formed the *Christlich-Demokratische Vereinigung*,

⁹ 'No one has the power to fetter the free will of another,' said Leo XIII. 'God alone has this power.'

whose aims are defined as political freedom, social justice, and the destruction of class distinctions, with opposition to every form of reaction, of militarism, Fascism or dictatorship. Two of its leading figures are Richard Redler and Michael Pfliegler; the latter is the author of an important pamphlet called 'The Church and Socialism in the Light of the *Quadragesimo Anno*,' which appeared about a year ago. Pfliegler points out the remarkable emphasis laid in the Encyclical upon the rift between Communism and Socialism; the Pope denounces the Communists as incorrigible enemies whose power rests on unscrupulous violence, but he observes that modern Socialism has moved back towards some of the traditional truths of Christianity. Pfliegler goes on to show how much the Linz Programme (1926) of the Austrian Social Democrats has in common with the Catholicism of Pius XI., for both condemn huge properties while respecting the private possessions of peasants and workers, both advocate a discriminating State interference against unprincipled capitalism, and so on. Even the dogmatic difference does not, to Pfliegler, seem insuperable. He observes that English Socialism escaped the Holy Father's ban because, unlike its Continental allies, it works without declaring war upon the Churches. Let the Continental Socialists stick to the view that religion is the private affair of each individual, and they need not clash with the Church when it urges men to think in terms of the next world. If Pfliegler here seems dangerously optimistic, there is no denying his final point that Social Democracy in Austria depends to a considerable extent upon members who are still Mass-going; since it knows that it has no prospect of winning support from a majority of the Austrians, it is now in a position to cherish its Catholic members, and, indeed, to co-operate with all Catholics who show a leftward inclination. The Catholic Church, Pfliegler holds, should make the most of this situation. The Pfliegler group are, of course, in close sympathy with some of the leaders of the Catholic trade unions, among whom a metal-worker, Otto Bauer—not to be confused with the Socialist leader—is prominent. It is important, too, that the Primate, Cardinal Innitzer, is an enlightened and socially-minded man who commands a very general respect.

Whether the Vatican is, or indeed can be, as socially enlightened as Pfliegler desires is extremely doubtful. And for the Austrian Socialists, compromise with the Vatican would be even more bitter; they would risk the loss of their youngest and keenest members, and they would risk the birth of a malignant underground Communism in Austria, where until now Communism has scarcely existed. They would lose to the anti-clerical Nazis, too. But the alternative for the Social Demo-

cratic Party is death, whether they perish in a fight, or allow themselves to be bled to death through the federal confiscation of Vienna's money, and the gradual supersession of all the organisations where their influence was strong. The *Arbeiter-Zeitung* continues to convey suggestions (e.g., on January 13) that the Right Wing Socialists will lead the party into alliance with the Left Wing Catholics. On December 29 the newspaper appeared with an exceedingly long review of a book called *Aufbau, Bausteine zur sozialen Verständigung*,¹⁰ by Dr. Oskar Katann, a member of another of these benevolent Catholic groups within the Leo Society. The reviewer hopes that the decision of the Austrian bishops' conference at the beginning of December, by which all priests were forced to withdraw from political activity in the Christian Social Party, will mean that the bishops and the spirit of the Encyclical will be strengthened at the expense of the reactionary elements in the party. He points out with satisfaction that Katann justifies the class war, if it be pursued without hatred, since, in the words of Dollfuss himself (April 1, 1933), it came from above, and the class-consciousness of the exploited workers was only the result. Finally, Katann slurs over the Papal words '*nemo potest simul catholicus probus esse et verus nominis socialista*.' Rather he holds that Socialism and Christianity are morally linked together, and that the Church should long ago have fostered the Socialist movement and upheld its economic message. Now, in the interests of European civilisation, Christianity and Socialism must find one another.

So we are back at the theme that Catholicism can save Austria's integrity, if it can work with Socialism; there is no serious alternative but absorption into Nazi Germany. The danger of this, though it has now been warded off for nearly a year, remains at least as acute. Berlin has not slackened its campaign, and spends vast sums in drenching Austria with National Socialist propaganda; Germany, moreover, is the most powerful foreigner in Austrian industry.¹¹ A few months ago I tried to show in the *Nineteenth Century and After*¹² how fundamental is the conflict between the interests of town and country in Austria. If the bitterness of this clash has been faintly softened by the slight economic improvement of the last few months, an enormous problem remains. The peasants in Germany are probably less pleased than the industrial workers with the fruits of a year's National Socialism, but the appeal of its prophets to the peasant mentality remains tremendously potent. It can scarcely

¹⁰ 'Construction, Materials for Social Agreement.'

¹¹ The biggest iron concern in Austria, for instance, the Alpine Montan, is closely linked to Thyssen and German heavy industry.

¹² 'The Problem of Austria,' September 1933.

be too often repeated that the peasant origin of the Chancellor himself explains a certain evident susceptibility. There are nearly always rumours in Vienna that Dollfuss has been intriguing with the Nazis, and they are not always groundless rumours. The fresh wave of Nazi demonstrations and outrages, of which news comes in daily as I write, is said to be the answer to the breakdown of the last attempt at negotiation. So admirably is the Nazi propaganda done that the members of the *Landbund*, which is pledged to resist dictators and preserve the principle of democratic consent, are persuaded to believe that concessions to Germany would not belie the pledge. The *Landbund* disapproves of Dollfuss, for it has been persuaded to believe the quarrel with Germany unnecessary. Through the *Landbund*, the Nazis push a demand for Dr. Rintelen as the Chancellor who would make an end of this quarrel. Rintelen, the ex-governor of Styria, is at the moment Austrian Ambassador in Rome, where one cannot but suppose the Nazis are glad to have him in touch with one of Hitler's most trusted ambassadors, Herr von Hassell. Though Rintelen did not openly go Nazi with the Styrian *Heimwehr*, it is interesting to find that none but Nazis and *Landbundler* trust him; it is obvious that Austria's independence, with Rintelen as Chancellor, would cease to be anything but nominal.

If the *Landbund* is in many ways little but an instrument for the Nazis, recent developments in the *Heimwehr* are even more dangerous for the survival of Austria. It appears that on January 12 the *Heimwehr* leader, Count Alberti, was found by the police in company with the Nazi leader, Frauenfeld, and two of his confederates.¹² The real meaning of this is that, in spite of the bitter fighting and the unpleasant reprisals between *Heimwehr* and Nazi youths (in Innsbruck, for instance) the *Heimwehr* rank and file have been melting away to the Nazis. Some of the *Heimwehr* recruits, it is true, are Socialists who were hard up for something to do. These little confusions occur so easily in Austria, and the *Heimwehr* man Schwaninger, who was killed by the Germans on the Kufstein frontier and received a State funeral, was the loyal son of a local Socialist leader. But this was incidental, and even Socialists sometimes go Nazi. The *Heimwehr* chief, Prince Stahremberg, is notoriously unstable, and while men like Minister Fey are probably staunch in their enmity to Hitler, they cannot give the *Heimwehr* movement the solidity it lacks. At bottom, both Nazis and *Heimwehr* in Austria are the mortal enemies of the Socialist workers of the city of Vienna.

The integrity of Austria and all it implies, the stemming of the Nazi tide, depends, then, upon how clearly both Pius XI. and

¹² An official of the German Foreign Office, Prince Josias of Waldeck-Pyrmont, was also surprised at Herr Frauenfeld's.

Chancellor Dollfuss see the necessity for Catholic-Socialist co-operation. To harp on this is not to harp back to the old Red-Black coalition of Weimar-Germany, where the Catholics were in a minority. In Catholic Austria, where Protestantism scarcely exists, the conflict, in the mind of the ordinary peasant or factory hand, between the religion of his fathers and the interests of his class could be ended, and a positive coherence of impulses take its place. If Dollfuss does not grasp this need, may he not yet be driven out with mockery and scorn? Nor must it be supposed that Austria can feel secure even if a wise and constructive conciliation be achieved by Cardinal Innitzer and the bishops. There is danger for Austria if Germany's economic recovery—not in terms of Dr. Goebbels' propaganda figures, but in fact—goes faster than that of Austria. And again, if a rearmed Germany answers the call of the Austrian Nazis, will Rome, or Paris, or Geneva really act?

There are 6,000,000 Austrians with a long tradition of exquisite achievement behind them. Many of us are susceptible when they cry for help in order that the fire of German civilisation may be kept alight. There are less than 1,000,000 Saarländer, and they live, not among the towers of Fischer von Erlach, but in a network of factory chimneys. Yet here in many ways is the Austrian problem in miniature. There are voices here raised in appeal for the retention of these square miles from the menace of the concentration camp. And in a way the Saar, though the vast majority of Englishmen are probably oblivious of the matter, is a more definite responsibility to us. The Saar has been handed over to the League for the League to ascertain its real wishes next year. At the moment of writing the members of the Governing Commission for the year from April 1, 1934, are being nominated and the organisation of the *plébiscite* in 1935 being discussed. In the *plébiscite* the Saarländer are to declare whether they wish to become German, or French, or retain the *status quo* under a Commission of the League of Nations. The French can do little, because they have a direct interest, not in a possible French vote—for that is impossible—but in the retention of the *status quo*. But the Saarländer who dread the rule of the Nazis look to England, who should be disinterested, for help. The English president of the League Commission in the Saar, Mr. Knox, is, at the moment, being violently attacked in Germany for his attempts to withstand the Nazi terrorisation of the Saar; it is to be hoped that English public opinion will show some signs of appreciating his action.

• The relationship between the Austrian question and that of the Saar lies in the fact that the Saarländer, too, are confessionally Catholic; 70 per cent. are officially Catholic, and nearly 50 per

cent. voted for the Centre Party in the election of November 1932. The visitor from the Vatican, Monsignor Testa, is due to return to Saarbrücken soon; it seems that he is the Curia's expert in *plébiscites*, and has Upper Silesian experience: it should be noted that Pius XI. himself was Nuncio in Poland at the time of the Upper Silesian *plébiscite*. It was thought, at one point, that the Pope might remove the Saar territory from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the two German Bishops of Trier and Speyer, but, though that proposal has been shelved, it is certain that Testa took much news to Rome at Christmas. For many of the Saar Catholics are bitterly regretting their absorption in the Saar German front. It is clear that if the Vatican exerts its influence on behalf of the League, and if the Catholic inhabitants of the Saar believe in the secrecy of the *plébiscite*, they will vote for the maintenance of the *status quo*.

The Nazis in the Saar, heavily subsidised from Berlin, have succeeded in establishing a Reign of Terror which the Governing Commission can only modify to a small degree. Their chief weapon is the implication that the *plébiscite* will not be secret, and that a terrible punishment awaits those who do not vote for Germany. In November 1932 36 per cent. of the population voted Socialist or Communist, and only 16 per cent. Nazi and Nationalist. That was a bad moment for the Nazis, who lost 2,000,000 votes at the *Reich* election at the time, and it may be safely presumed that some of the Red 36 per cent. have since that time gone over to the Brown Shirts. For the Socialists and Communists, like the Austrian Socialists, were the enthusiasts for 'Back to Germany,' and have had to achieve a reorientation. The Communists, who far outnumber the Socialists, are not very reliable material, but the Socialists in Max Braun have an admirable leader, and a constant stream of refugees from the *Reich* defeats the dangers of apathy, and counters the propaganda of the Nazis. It remains true, however, that neither the Second International, nor yet the Third, can save the Saar alone; when all is said and done, it will be the Vatican which decides, if the Nazis cannot shake its hold upon the Saar.

It is only necessary to glance at the ecclesiastical struggles now going on within Germany itself to realise the fundamental nature of the clash between Christianity and National Socialism. Of late, and especially in England, the struggle of the Lutheran pastors against German Christian influences has monopolised the limelight. But the resistance of Rome is something vastly more important than that of a small national Church, and it has been just as determined. Both sides know perfectly well that the Concordat has broken down¹⁴; the bitterest conflict of all has

¹⁴ 'All the world knows how strained relations are between State and Church in the German *Reich*.' (Austrian Pastoral Letter, December 21, 1933.)

arisen over the educational clauses. Cardinal Faulhaber, of Munich, has preached against anti-Semitism more bravely than any Lutheran. Many Catholics, who at first hoped they could work with the Nazi *régime*, have entirely abandoned that hope; of these, one is Dr. Bornewasser, Bishop of Trier, in whose diocese most of the Saar territory lies. For the National Socialist, moreover, Austria is only a regimental area in the Third *Reich*; the Catholic Congress in Vienna in September and the bishops' Pastoral were therefore no mere external events. The Catholic Church encircles the Nazis; it can thwart them in Austria and the Saar, but it is strong along their eastern frontier too, in Poland and in Czecho-Slovakia. Just recently, too, the Vatican has scored a success in the heart of the enemy country, for Hitler has accepted the nomination, as Catholic Bishop of Berlin, of an outspoken enemy to his principles. It is also extremely significant that Herr Kossmann, the native representative on the Saar Commission and a Catholic, who has hitherto put his German loyalty first, has now joined with his four colleagues in signing a report which goes far to expose Nazi methods in the Saar. It will take more than Herr von Papen's speech at Gleiwitz (January 13) to heal the breach.

However much they conflict in matters of belief, it is common to Socialists and to Christians to value the quality of the individual, and at the same time—indeed, for that very reason—to feel sympathy and respect for the unfortunate. If this be fully considered, together with the Catholic stand against racial fanaticism, have not the Young Catholics of Austria, who cry for co-operation with Socialism, acquired a new importance since the German Revolution? The Catholic-Socialist alliance need only be made for this life; the allies can still disagree about the next. Even the Marxist view that religion is the people's opium, which Pfliegler finds difficult, could be expressed in terms which many a cardinal must have used. One has only to turn to Lord Acton's essays to learn of the provision the Catholic Church can make for its intellectuals. Do not the last Liberals, therefore, belong to the alliance, too? The children in the National Socialist schools of Germany to-day are taught to banish sympathy from their hearts. Erich Kästner was once a Social Democrat, but he has to live in Hitler's Germany; *Das Fliegende Klassenzimmer*, his last book for children, is a tragic reflection of the compulsory brutality around him. Is it not the eleventh hour for Christians, Socialists, and the last Liberals to ally to defend, as Katann pleads, the civilisation of Europe?

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

THE RESTRICTION OF PRODUCTION

IN the dust of battle between 'stabilisationists' and 'reflationists' (or, as one would say, but for the American habit of gathering syllables, stabilisers and reflaters), the doctrine of the restriction of production seems to gain the day by wearing the emblems of both armies, and uttering indifferently their rival war cries—'adjustment' and 'higher prices.' The British Government, under the influence of Mr. Elliot and other professors of the 'economics of glut,' vies with Mr. Roosevelt in paying allegiance to this doctrine. It must be taken seriously, for it is already at grips with our daily lives.

Unfortunately, its exponents rarely make clear whether they favour restriction as a means of escape from the slump, or as a permanent policy to meet a perpetual tendency of primary production to increase faster than demand. Do they want to attack low prices as such, or do they want to establish a better balance between industry and agriculture, by preventing the latter's periodical surfeits? Since the emphasis, however, is usually on the hardness of the times, and on the need for inflating the *general* price level, we may fairly begin by examining the theoretical soundness of restricting the supply of primary products with a view to raising average prices. There are plenty of historical cases to guide us, but the historical argument is not in itself conclusive. History does not always repeat itself. It revolves in its discouraging cycle only when the gravitational field of some general fact draws it back to its starting-point.

The problem must be approached from two angles—first, that of production, and, second, that of demand. In any industry, needless to say, there is no such thing as a single 'cost of production.' There are low-cost and high-cost producers, according to their ability, situation or other relative advantages; moreover, for every producer there may be a considerable variation of costs between one part of his output and another. This field—or mine, or plant—is more or less economic than that, as a unit of production. At any given moment, with a determinate market price for the product, there will be some producers (or, to be more accurate, some units of production) selling at cost price, some

selling below and some above cost price. We can represent the different units of production by a series of notches along a scale of output costs, divided into two broad groups by the market price of the moment. The make-up of these categories, of course, is constantly changing: first, because the market price shifts, for reasons either of demand or of supply; second, because the efforts of the less efficient producers to cut their costs, coupled with the uneven introduction of new ideas and inventions, alters the relative positions of the different producers along the scale; third, because some high-cost producers are driven off the market altogether, and are replaced by new entrants into the industry or by more fortunate competitors who expand their production.

The system of production costs, to which the policy of restriction has to be applied, is therefore not uniform, but unstable, not static, but dynamic. One result of any restriction scheme, which must perforce be based on the existing distribution of output among the different producers, is a temporary freezing of that normally fluid system. The low-cost producer is forbidden to expand his output, while for the high-cost producer the obligation to produce no more than a certain quota implies the right to produce no less. He acquires, in fact, an artificial nuisance value. Thus the normal process of cost reduction, through the gradual replacement of high-cost by low-cost producers, is forcibly arrested. We need scarcely wonder, therefore, that proposals for restriction of production are commonly greeted much more favourably by high-cost producers, who are losing anyway, and whose only hope is a rise of prices, than by low-cost producers, who see in the scheme the defeat of their prospects of expanding both output and profits at the expense of their competitors. Sooner or later, unless the scheme is highly flexible, the low-cost producers, and those whose superior enterprise or resources enable them to take prior advantage of new inventions, are bound to revolt against such restrictions.

This, however, is to jump one stage of the argument. What chance has the restriction scheme of securing at least a temporary rise of prices? The answer, of course, is simple. If the scheme is effective, and is recognised by operators on speculative markets as likely to remain effective, then (subject always to the liquidation of existing stocks) it is bound to secure some rise of prices for the time being. How great a rise will largely depend on what economists call the elasticity of demand for the commodity in question. The demand for primary products is generally inelastic; that is to say, just as a large fall of prices has little effect in stimulating demand, so even a considerable rise of prices will not greatly diminish consumption. On that count alone, therefore, the prospects of a restriction scheme are good—perhaps too

good, since the resultant advance of price might be so sharp and sudden that the scheme would explode like an over-inflated balloon.

There is another aspect of the demand side which is not so favourable. Let us suppose, for instance, that wheat is the commodity to be restricted, and that the price rises from 6s. to 8s. a bushel, while demand falls only from 500,000,000 bushels to 450,000,000 bushels. Production, we will imagine, has been restricted to the latter figure. Then the total sum paid for the wheat has risen from £150,000,000 to £180,000,000. Purchasers of wheat, having thus paid £30,000,000 extra for their wheat, are left with £30,000,000 less to spend on other commodities. Of course the wheat producers have precisely that amount more to spend, but it is now clear that what has been accomplished is a redistribution of money-incomes, not the creation of new money-income. The vaunted 'increased purchasing power of the farming community' merely replaces purchasing power lost by the rest of the population.

Indeed, in the circumstances commonly held to justify restrictive policies—namely, the existence of a surplus stock of primary products in the slough of a business slump—it is doubtful whether the transferred purchasing power fully replaces that which is lost. The very load of debt that demands a policy of price-raising tends to bring about a net loss of purchasing power. Some part at least—perhaps a large part—of the farmer's extra 2s. a bushel goes towards paying his debts, and is thereupon soaked up by the thirsty sponge of a credit system which either has no opportunities of reinvesting the money, or is forced to concentrate on increasing the ratio of its own liquid resources. Hence, while the prices of the restricted commodities rise, the average price of other commodities tends to fall, in accordance with the loss of purchasing power available for spending upon them. Restriction of production is certainly not an inflationary policy, and its effects may include some measure of further deflation.

This argument is reinforced by another, more abstruse but no less convincing. If we assume a constant total of savings (*i.e.*, income not spent for consumption, whether hoarded or invested), then the average level of prices tends to move upwards or downwards with the volume of 'real investment.' A curtailment of investment, for instance, drives down prices because it reduces the flow of purchasing power. Now real investment, as defined for the purpose of the above monetary proposition, takes two main forms: on the one hand, the building of factories, the construction of roads, the purchase of new machinery, and other kinds of capital construction; and on the other, the accumulation of stocks of commodities, which is just as much investment as accumulating stocks of bricks and calling them houses, offices or

factories. If stocks of commodities diminish in aggregate value, that constitutes negative investment. Precisely such a reduction of stocks commonly forms the leading object of restriction schemes; hence, unless the thawing of the capital invested in those stocks is balanced by an equivalent increase of investment of the other kind, the very success of the scheme in achieving its immediate object implies its failure to arrest a general fall of prices.

However valuable, therefore, policies of restricting supply may be in readjusting the distribution of income between one section of a community and another, they are not calculated to restore the activity of business in general, or to enlarge the aggregate volume of employment. Indeed, in so far as they involve a reduction of the labour force in the industries directly affected, they are likely to aggravate the unemployment problem. To this conclusion must be appended one main qualification. In the monetary equation, the most variable factor, and the one most directly associated with the volume of business turnover, is the so-called 'velocity of circulation' of money and credit. If, then, the mass of people expect the restriction schemes to raise prices, and if in anticipation of higher prices generally they accelerate their buying by depleting their hoards, then business may be launched on a self-stimulating revival.

The fundamental fallacy of arguments in favour of restriction as a cure for a slump is that they treat the low level of prices, which is a symptom of depression, as if it were the disease itself. Some exponents, avoiding this error, contend that the slump is caused by over-production of primary commodities, and that until that process can be checked no inflationary or other expedient can be permanently successful. This is no place to air the whole theory of business cycles, but whether or not over-production is a cause of slumps, primary production certainly does tend to increase faster than effective demand, and this lends an element of instability to the whole business system. The reason is that primary production increases in efficiency, with the aid of mechanical and chemical science, at least as rapidly as the total wealth of the world. On the other hand, as real income increases a diminishing proportion of it is devoted to primary products and a rising proportion to the higher stages of manufacture, and to services of all kinds. Thus, until the least efficient producers are squeezed out, primary prices have a perpetual tendency to fall, periodically to quite unremunerative levels. This might not be of serious consequence for the rest of the world were it not for two facts. First, creditor countries or communities, generally speaking, are engaged mainly in secondary production, while debtor communities are engaged mainly in agriculture and other primary industries. The whole debt system, which is

expressed in constant money figures, tends to get out of gear as primary prices fall. The second fact is that the creditor countries themselves possess minor primary industries, which they defend against the falling prices, thus accentuating the over-production and the difficulties of the primary-producing countries proper.

If restriction of supply is to meet these circumstances, then it must be adjustable to changing demand, and it must provide for the elimination of the least efficient elements of production, not merely at the start of its career, but continuously as the productivity of the remainder increases. Furthermore, it should be associated in some way with the regulation of international capital movements and debt payments, since it is in that connexion that its principal justification is to be found. Its purpose, in fact, would be to enable the debtors to pay their debts. At present, unhappily, many restriction schemes seem designed to make it more difficult for them to do so.

For instance, the restriction of production of beef and mutton, or of dairy products, must aim at helping Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and the rest to pay their debts to this country. If the result of restriction is not that creditor countries like ourselves pay more for their imports of the restricted commodities from the debtor countries, then the scheme has defeated its own end. Attention to that principle shows how easy it is for purely nationalistic policies to masquerade in the insignia of the 'economics of glut.' Further, even if (thanks to the inelasticity of demand) the creditor countries do pay more in money for a smaller volume of products, the released labour and capital in the debtor countries must find some employment; and where are they to find it save in the secondary industries that compete with the exports of the creditors? If New Zealand produces less mutton and less butter and cheese, she must produce more manufactures, unless she is to lose population. Of course, this is only to say that we cannot at once be paid our debts and have a favourable balance of trade (except by dint of large exports of capital); but it does lend additional point to the warning against pursuing restrictive policies in creditor countries for reasons of economic nationalism.

These criticisms, of course, apply to the question of restriction in general, without reference to the needs of any particular industry. It may well be, not merely that primary production as a whole tends secularly towards a condition of over-supply, but also that individual primary industries have special troubles of this kind. Against the organisation of industries by their own action for their own ends there is only the general objection that the consumer may be mulcted by extortionate monopoly. On the other hand, as soon as we consider individual cases we come

up against practical difficulties even more formidable than the theoretical fallacies that have been enumerated. First among them is the difficulty of inclusiveness, which is primarily a geographical problem. Where (as, for instance, with diamonds) the sources of supply are almost all contained within a restricted area, regulation of output is a simple enough matter, especially if official compulsion can be invoked. By contrast, the Stevenson rubber scheme is a notorious example of failure through the omission of an important area—in this case the Netherlands East Indies. The proportion of world output produced in the controlled (*i.e.*, British) areas fell from 67 per cent. to 49 per cent. during the currency of the scheme. The Canadian wheat pools were unable to control the market, among other reasons, because the other great wheat-growing countries were not pursuing a similar policy to theirs. The copper export ring in the United States was baffled in its attempt to hold up the world price by the existence of important outside sources of supply. This, it may be remarked, is not merely an inaugural difficulty of restriction schemes, it is a lasting threat. Any area which sees its advantage in so doing is liable to denounce the agreement, nor is there any international Government to compel conformity.

The second difficulty is the competition of alternative products. The Stevenson rubber scheme suffered the further handicap that the high price which it procured for rubber turned the attention of users and merchants to the possibilities of reclamation. During its currency the annual output of reclaimed rubber in the United States rose from 69,000 tons to 174,000 tons. Again, wheat and maize are alternative feeding-stuffs, according to their relative prices, in many agricultural areas. Different base metals are in some of their uses interchangeable. The plans of 'Cosach' to control the production of Chile nitrate simply collapsed before the competition of the synthetic product.

These facts bring to mind another complication. Many primary products are produced in definite association with one another (under what economic theorists call conditions of 'joint supply'). Wool and mutton, for instance, are inexorably connected, and silver is now very largely produced as a by-product of base-metal smelting. A restrictive programme which suited one commodity might not suit its mate. Why, for example, should Australian pastoralists submit to restriction of the supply of mutton and lamb if wool is for them the chief money-making product of the sheep and meat is only a side-line? Again, the organiser of restriction is constantly up against the difficulty that what is generally classifiable under a single head and is bought and sold in a single market may include a number of different articles distinguished by their uses and by the tastes of consumers.

Thus 'wheat' includes, among other categories, the soft English wheat, which is used mainly for cakes and biscuits, and the hard Manitoba grades essential for making bread. The regulation of the bacon market in this country has drawn attention to the fact that, as far as the housewife is concerned, Danish bacon is a quite different article from English bacon, and worth an appreciably higher price. The meat quota has likewise exposed the difference in the sources and the markets for chilled, frozen and fresh beef, yet the economic interdependence of them all. It is a very convoluted and nicely adjusted mechanism that the restricter seeks to curb and amend to his own purposes.

Finally and critically, there is the difficulty of enforcing the restriction on the individual producer. This may not be a troublesome matter where the number of producers is few, or where they are capitalistically organised so that financial restraints can be applied. Tin and tea, for instance, are in this respect favourable subjects for restriction; this is no doubt one of the principal reasons why such policies have been notably more successful with them than with other commodities. But it is far otherwise with most primary products. For instance, apart from any views the European planters may hold, the grave practical difficulty of controlling the native rubber-grower has so far prevented the inclusion of the Netherlands East Indies in any rubber restriction scheme.

It is useless to evade the difficulty by first applying the restriction to exports and leaving the control of the individual producer to the future. The natural result is the accumulation of stocks withheld from export, stocks which someone—presumably the Government if the scheme is an official one—has to purchase or finance at great cost. This has been one of the causes of the break-down of successive schemes for coffee revalorisation in Brazil. It is a satisfactory method only when the surplus is a temporary one, the result of abnormally favourable weather conditions, and when the purpose is to prevent shippers from spoiling the price by throwing the whole crop on the market in one season. As a permanent expedient it merely aggravates the problem, by awarding producers a higher world price without the detraction of any curtailment of their output; and it thus renders all the harder the eventual task of cutting down the acreage, or the tapping or the picking or the milling, or whatever it may be.

That is a task which the advocates of wheat restriction have not yet properly faced. Briefly, the international agreement negotiated at the time of the World Economic Conference provides for a 15 per cent. reduction of exports from the principal wheat-producing countries of the world, on the assumption that as prices

rise the importing countries will relax the restraints imposed, by tariffs and quotas, on imports of wheat. But what indication is there that the limitation on the production of wheat will conform to this limitation on the trade in it? We may be sure that if production is not correspondingly limited the scheme will smash like a dam holding back an ever-rising head of water. Russia is a seller of wheat only when she cannot sell enough of other things to procure the foreign exchange she needs, and she prefers, if she can, to keep her cereals for home consumption; as a Communist State, moreover, she is the best fitted of all to participate in such regulation as the international agreement prescribes. On the other hand, Argentina's capacity to compel output restriction is, to say the least, doubtful, and she possesses few physical facilities for holding back from export any large stock of wheat. Already she is in difficulty because her prospective surplus available from the latest harvest, at 18,000,000 quarters, is 4,000,000 in excess of her exportable quota under the agreement. Australia, who likewise has comparatively little storage capacity, gave her consent to the international scheme only with great reluctance, the bulk of her producers being opposed to it. She has not yet organised machinery for controlling the acreage. Nor, for that matter, has Canada, though her representatives under Mr. Bennett's leadership took a prominent part in negotiating the agreement. Many wheat farmers and most of the grain trading interests of the Canadian West are dubious about the scheme. One important factor on the Canadian prairies is the northward shift of wheat farming, thanks to successive droughts in the southern districts and to the development of frost-resisting wheats of early maturity. When such a movement is afoot it is difficult indeed to stabilise production on the basis of the present acreage distribution.

It is, however, the United States, perhaps the most confident believer in the restriction plan, who has shown most plainly the troubles that its enforcement must encounter. The American Government has paid out millions of dollars in compensation for cuts in wheat acreage, yet the total acreage sown for 1934 is actually higher than last year. What has happened is that producers not so compensated, especially outside the principal wheat areas, have taken the opportunity to increase their acreage. Moreover, even those who have reduced their sowings will doubtless seek to outwit their neighbours by growing the same or even a larger crop on less land. It is well to remember that in this country, which is far from ideally adapted to wheat-growing, the yield per acre is over double that obtained in most of the principal exporting areas of the world—so great a scope have they still for the improvement of their output. The combined application of

fertilisers and mechanical farming is capable of enormously increasing the productivity of the prairies. How is restriction to cope with this? A Government can, if it is willing, induce a farmer by threats or bribes to reduce his acreage under a given crop, but it cannot prevent him from tilling the soil better than he tilled before. Even if there were no such improvement in method, a cut of, say, 15 per cent. in acreage would not necessarily imply a drop of 15 per cent. in average production, since the farmer would naturally sacrifice his poorest acres first.

The Governments of the United States and other primary producing countries cannot have it both ways. When the farming community as a whole went bankrupt, and the natural result would have been the readjustment of the market by means of foreclosures and the abandonment of farms, they interfered to prevent it, with their mortgage moratoria and similar measures. We need not blame them for this (they had social as well as economic duties to perform), but they must expect difficulty if with one hand they intercept the very reduction of acreage which with the other they seek to promote. The danger is that in this equilibrist act they will fix their eyes on the least economic producer, assessing by his standards the price required to remunerate the farmer, and penalising his more efficient or better situated competitors in order to save him from bankruptcy. As between different individuals and as between different countries, that is perhaps the prime error of restrictionists, one which is bound in the end to effect the ruin of their plans.

All this, it may be said, is special pleading. It would, indeed, be captious and cowardly to seek to deduce merely from the difficulties in the way of any policy that the policy should never be attempted, were its purposes and principles themselves commendable. But in this case it is wholly otherwise. Restriction policies, as means to world recovery, are ill-founded in theory as well as hazardous in practice. As part of the reorganisation of individual industries which have fallen into disorder they are more admirable in purpose, but they are equally hedged about with difficulties, which accumulate rather than diminish with the passage of years. By great consuming countries like ourselves they should be regarded with sharp suspicion, save when they are designed deliberately to improve the paying capacity of our debtors; and even then the partial forgiveness of the debts might be more to our national advantage. As a nostrum for the world's economic ills they rest on the profound fallacy that the paradox of poverty in the midst of abundance has its sole solution in perpetuating the poverty by abolishing the abundance.

H. V. HODSON.

DEATH ON THE ROADS

LAST month the Home Office published the preliminary figures for road accidents during 1933. The total casualty list of 7125 killed and 216,401 injured shows a disquieting increase of over 450 in the former and nearly 10,000 in the latter category over the already sufficiently appalling figures for 1932. The heaviest increase was recorded, as might have been expected, in the Metropolitan District, where the number of persons killed (1409) rose by 11.3 per cent. and the number of persons injured (56,967) by 8.6 per cent. as compared with the previous year.

These figures have evoked a flood of comment, and some excuse is needed for adding to it. My excuse is partly that most of the comments are obviously inspired by a partisan spirit and show a failure to appreciate all the facts, and partly that my own experience is somewhat exceptional. I entertain no hostility either to motorists or pedestrians. I have owned three motor cars, and have been involved in three accidents in cars of which I was not the driver. As a pedestrian, I walk about 2000 miles a year, mainly about the streets of London, and my experience in this capacity is probably five times as great as that of the ordinary pedestrian. I am a very careful, some would say an absurdly careful, walker. In crossing a street I always use a refuge where a refuge is available, and where there is a subway I habitually burrow underground. In 2000 miles of walking in London I have crossed some 60,000 streets, and have found myself in serious peril of my life on at least ten occasions. On no occasion could I attach any serious blame either to the motorist or myself. I am convinced that, if I continue on my evil courses, it is merely a question of time before I become a casualty, and if an inquest follows, I have little doubt that a jury ignorant of all the perils I have surmounted with success will attribute my death to my own foolishness. In my opinion, the vast majority of motorists are careful, skilful, and considerate. I would award the first prize to the driver of the public vehicle. His skill is quite extraordinary. The second goes to the driver of the private motor car. There are a few offenders, mostly among the young and wealthy, but the proportion is small. The driver of the motor

van or lorry is apt to be more reckless, mainly, I fear, because, owing to the weight and size of his vehicle, he is seldom the victim of any accident which he causes. The motor cycle is frequently driven in a reckless manner, and is even a greater danger to the driver than to the public. As for the pedal cyclist, my experience is that he is far the wildest driver of all.

I gladly pass from this personal note to consider the detailed analysis of road accidents during the first six months of last year, issued recently by the Ministry of Transport. On matters of fact it gives a mass of much-needed information; on matters of opinion it is necessarily less trustworthy. The information is derived from returns made by chief constables, who in turn derive their information mainly from constables and the proceedings at inquests. Anyone who has been charged with the duty of preparing a tabular statement based on the opinions of a large number of persons with regard to a matter of controversy knows to how large an extent the personal element enters into the matter. Often there is no eye-witness of a fatal accident, and accidents occur so suddenly that it is difficult to determine the exact sequence of events. There is room for the widest difference of opinion as to the cause of an accident, and as to what causes are the main causes and what are merely contributory in a greater or less degree.

The return itself is perhaps necessarily ambiguous. It relates to fatal road accidents and includes some which may have no connexion with motor vehicles. Out of the 2963 fatal accidents analysed, forty-two were mainly or partly due to animals, but it is not stated in how many of these cases a motor car was involved. Five hundred and twenty pedal cyclists were killed, but we do not know how many of them were killed by motor cars. Many of the tables are based on the number of vehicles or drivers 'involved in fatal accidents,' but it is not known how many of these vehicles are free from any responsibility. Sixty-seven of them were stationary, and of these a considerable proportion must have been blameless. There is no similar table of pedestrians 'involved in fatal accidents,' merely a table of pedestrians killed and of pedestrians who were a cause of fatal accidents. In spite of these uncertainties, it is probably safe to assume that the number of fatal accidents in which motor vehicles were not involved is so small as to be negligible.

The report deals with 2963 accidents in which 3025 persons were killed within a space of six months. Particulars of thirty-five other fatal accidents in which thirty-six persons were killed are not yet available. Four thousand three hundred and forty causes, main or contributory, are assigned to the 2963 accidents, or roughly a cause and a half for each accident; 3575 causes, or 82 per cent.,

were human and due to the action of a driver, a cyclist, a pedestrian, or, in rare cases, a passenger; 765, or 18 per cent., were wholly or partly due to other causes, such as weather (131), the condition of the roads (237), defects in vehicles (221), animals (forty-two). In reality, however, a very large proportion even of these 765 cases must have been due to the human element—*e.g.*, insufficient lights on vehicles or careless driving round a blind corner. The driver of a vehicle other than a pedal cyclist was held to be the main or contributory cause of 1367 accidents, a pedal cyclist of 504, a pedestrian of 1664. The corresponding percentages are roughly 31, 12, and 38. The number of motor vehicles involved in fatal accidents was 3349, or rather more than one and a tenth vehicle for each accident. This figure shows that a collision between two motor vehicles is a comparatively uncommon cause of a fatal accident.

Out of 3349 drivers of motor vehicles involved in fatal accidents 604, or 18 per cent., were killed. The distribution of these deaths between various types of vehicles is very remarkable and is shown in the following table:

	Number of vehicles involved in fatal accidents.	Percentage of vehicles involved in fatal accidents.	Number of drivers killed.	Percentage of drivers killed to vehicles involved.	Percentage of total number of drivers killed.
Private motors . . .	1227	30·36	64	5·22	5·58
Motor cycles . . .	773	19·13	514	66·49	44·86
Public conveyances . .	446	11·00	3	·67	·26
Motor vans, lorries, etc. .	869	21·50	22	2·53	1·92
Pedal cycles . . .	623	15·42	520	83·47	45·30
Miscellaneous vehicles, including 61 horse-drawn	103	2·52	25	24·27	2·18
Total . . .	4041		1148		

The table illustrates most vividly the relative risks run by drivers. The pedal cycle represents only about 15 per cent. of the vehicles involved and is responsible for nearly half the total fatalities to drivers, while more than four-fifths of the drivers involved are killed. The motor cycle is only a little less deadly; and cycles and motor cycles together, while representing about 35 per cent. of the vehicles involved, are responsible for 90 per cent. of the deaths. At the other end of the scale the immunity of drivers of public conveyances and motor lorries is very remarkable.

Unfortunately we do not know the proportions in which the various classes of vehicles use the roads and how far those proportions correspond to the proportions of vehicles involved in accidents. Consequently it is impossible to say what type of vehicle is especially dangerous. It is, however, possible to say

with some certainty that motor lorries, vans and public conveyances, and to a less degree private cars, are more dangerous to the public than to their drivers, while motor and pedal cycles are deadly to their drivers and far more so than they are to the general public.

It is not possible to attribute any considerable proportion of the accidents to the condition of the drivers. Of 4041 drivers involved only thirty-seven suffered from any personal disability, such as illness or drink, and only seventy-two suffered from any physical disability (twenty-one deaf, twelve blind, etc.). Only 145, or about 3½ per cent., had previously been convicted either for driving under the influence of drink or for careless driving. Only about 200 drivers were inexperienced. In many of these cases there is no evidence that the defect was the cause of the accident, and only forty-two accidents are attributed wholly or partly to these causes.

It is more difficult to estimate the contribution made by speed. Only 278 accidents are directly attributed to speed; and of the 3449 motor vehicles involved it is claimed that 605, or about 18 per cent., were travelling under ten miles an hour; 1245, or about 36 per cent., were travelling between ten and twenty miles an hour; 961, or about 28 per cent., were travelling between twenty and forty miles an hour; and only 75, or about 2 per cent., were travelling over that speed. In the remaining cases the speed could not be estimated or the vehicle was stationary. The Ministry of Transport point out that these figures must be received with the greatest caution. A precise estimate of speed by an onlooker is almost impossible, and the driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal accident very often does not know his speed and is certain to underestimate it. To anyone familiar with the conditions it is almost incredible that out of the 3449 vehicles involved 1850, or 54 per cent., were travelling less than twenty miles an hour.

If the matter is regarded from another angle it is true to say that practically all road accidents are due to speed, though not to a speed which a careful motorist would call excessive. If motors were limited to a speed of one mile an hour, fatal accidents would be almost entirely eliminated, and the danger arising from cars advances in almost exact proportion to their speed. Nearly all disasters which befall cars, of whatever nature, either would not occur or would be reduced to minor proportions but for the speed at which the car was travelling. A car travelling at ten miles an hour covers five yards in a second, and at that pace it is both able to pull up quickly and to give an unwary pedestrian time to escape. Both margins of safety are reduced as the speed is increased. This is not saying that a great speed is dangerous

when the conditions are known. Most accidents are due to the fact that the conditions are not known; and where the conditions are not known, the greater the speed, the greater the danger.

It is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the youth of the driver is responsible for many fatalities. Out of 623 riders of pedal cycles who were involved in fatal accidents 201, or nearly a third, were under eighteen, 278 under twenty-one, and 366, or considerably more than half, under twenty-six. Out of 773 drivers of motor cycles 135 were under twenty-one and 140, or nearly 57 per cent., were under twenty-six. For private motor cars the equivalent figure is 23 per cent. The comparison is somewhat vitiated by the fact that cycles are pre-eminently the vehicles of youth, but not sufficiently to displace the conclusion that cyclists are a danger to themselves and others.

It is not known how many pedestrians were involved in fatal accidents, but 1581 were killed, and a rather greater number (1664) were regarded as the main or contributory cause of a fatal accident. If the figures are correct, pedestrians represent 38 per cent. of the causes of accident and 54 per cent. of the total fatalities. On the strength of these figures there has been an outcry against the jay walker and an insistent demand that his liberty should be restricted. Nobody could complain of action in this direction if it involved any considerable diminution in the appalling death roll of pedestrians and of motorists endeavouring to avoid pedestrians. A closer scrutiny of the figures, however, renders it extremely doubtful whether legal restrictions on pedestrians would have any appreciable effect in diminishing the death roll. Out of the 1581 pedestrians who were killed 491, or 31 per cent., were children under ten years of age, and 557, or about 35 per cent., were under fifteen years of age. It is, of course, important to teach children the principles of safety; and probably much has been done in this direction to limit the number of casualties, but so long as children are children they cannot be expected to show the prudence of adults. It is impossible to keep the children off the streets, since they are legally required to go to school, and it would be contrary to all experience to expect them always to exercise due care and attention when they cross the roads. In the face of this slaughter at the rate of over 1100 a year the public will not be prepared to accept the motorists' plea that it was the child's fault that he was killed. The massacre is really intolerable.

At the other end of the scale seventy-six pedestrians over eighty-one, 240 between seventy-one and eighty-one, 271 between sixty-one and seventy-one, and 178 between fifty-one and sixty-one have been killed. This makes a total of 765, or 48·4 per cent., over fifty-one, 587, or 37 per cent., over sixty-one, and

316, or 20 per cent., over seventy-one. No one can suggest that persons over fifty-one are exceptionally imprudent or reckless, and, since motor cars have been in existence in large numbers for a quarter of a century, it is difficult to accept the Ministry of Transport's plea that the swollen list of fatalities to the elderly is partly due to the fact that the killed were not accustomed to present-day road conditions in their impressionable years. The facts seem to point unquestionably to the conclusion that after the age of fifty, and still more after the age of sixty-one, there is a decline in alertness and physical power, even among those apparently normal, which renders them unequal to the dangers of the roads. It is, of course, impossible to forbid elderly people to go out of doors. Their deaths are due in the main, not to any fault of their own, but to the disabilities of advancing years. Here again the motorist must realise that one of the conditions he must encounter on the roads is the presence of a large number of persons whose powers are impaired. The case is without remedy, and the motorist must adjust his driving to the facts.

After deducting the young and the old we are left with 259 fatalities (or 16.5 of the total) which befall pedestrians between fifteen and fifty-one years of age, and the immunity of pedestrians between these ages is noteworthy. It is greatest between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one. Only six pedestrians in a million are killed in six months between these ages, whereas among males over eighty-one the rate is 372 a million, or sixty-two times as much. The attack on the pedestrian, in so far as he is a responsible cause of accidents, completely breaks down. It represents an attempt on the part of motorists to divert attention from the true facts.

The situation, then, which it is necessary to face is that if we exclude a small proportion of 'scorchers,' 'road hogs,' and entirely reckless persons, the vast majority of motorists consists of kindly, careful, courteous and considerate people, experienced in driving, moving with due care and attention, travelling at no unreasonable speed, and, in spite of all their virtues, causing (if that is the right word), or perhaps we should say the helpless and unwitting instruments of, over 7000 deaths and 200,000 injuries a year. It is the general rectitude of motorists which makes their case so desperate. If the fatalities were caused entirely or in the main by 'scorchers,' 'road hogs,' drunkards or incompetents, it would be comparatively easy to deal with the problem; but what is to be done with a body of men concerned with 7000 deaths a year who proclaim loudly, and with a great measure of truth, that the deaths are no fault of theirs?

Remedial suggestions are by no means wanting, both from motorists and pedestrians, and a large proportion of them make

up in fatuity for what they lack in disinterestedness. The motorist is genuinely distressed at the death roll and is anxious to alleviate it. The motor trade, with its vast financial interests and enormous influence, is distressed at anything which damages the motor trade, and feels that unless the agitation is diverted the trade will be damaged. The pedestrian represents in the main the poorer part of the community. He is badly organised and destitute of finance. His suggestions are apt to be more violent than useful.

The first suggestion on the motorist side is that there should be an intensive and extensive inquiry into the causes of accidents. Such an inquiry, together with the legislation (if any) which might result from it, would probably occupy five years, during which 35,000 further deaths would occur. Needless to say, the proposal of further investigation is welcomed by the Ministry of Transport, which is still studying hard, but is nevertheless determined 'to grapple with the problem,' though it 'refuses to be rushed into panic action' or 'legislation' (statement in the House of Lords on December 5). It has done a lot of grappling already, and has refused in every case except one to impose a local speed limit, even where the persons who knew best the locality involved were convinced of its necessity. The value of extended inquiry is almost microscopic. Accidents are due to the fact that persons are hit by a heavy body moving at a speed sufficient to make the blow deadly, and years of inquiry would add little to this simple explanation.

An ingenuous and widely supported proposal that all roads should be provided with a non-skid surface is eloquent of the inability of humanity to appreciate the significance of simple facts when their personal convenience is involved. Skidding was a cause, main or contributory, of 127 accidents, and if it were entirely eliminated it would reduce the death roll from 7000 a year to 6746. The reduction is scarcely sufficient.

A very popular suggestion is that pedestrians should be liable to pains and penalties for careless walking, and that where special parts of the road are assigned to them they should be punished if they walk on any other. This embodies a view of the law which is comparatively novel. The old doctrine was that all the King's subjects had an equal right on the King's highway, and that a vehicle was as much bound to make way for a pedestrian as a pedestrian for a vehicle. The novelty of the theory would, however, constitute no objection to its adoption if it did serve to reduce mortality. The first part of the suggestion appears to be due to a belief that pedestrians are careless of their own lives, but object to being fined in a police court. This is a psychological delusion. There are no pedestrians, except those of

suicidal tendencies, who are consciously careless of their own lives. It would be almost impossible to obtain convictions. The slaughtered pedestrian could not be summoned, and children who run about the roads are more proper subjects for parental chastisement than police court proceedings. The elderly could plead infirmity, and the able-bodied could plead that the mere fact of their escape negated the idea that they were reckless. Finally, it may be asked how many motorists proceeding on their lawful occasions and compelled to pull up sharply to avoid a pedestrian would be prepared to go to the trouble and expense involved in collecting witnesses and summoning the pedestrian on a doubtful issue in a possibly remote police court.

The assignment of special crossing-places to pedestrians and their punishment if they use any other could only be effective in a small proportion of the main streets of large towns. It is not known whether the majority of accidents occur in crowded streets and at recognised points of danger. If they do, the precaution would be of some value in preventing accidents. But the impression one gets is that the greater danger lies, not in those places where danger is obvious, such as Piccadilly Circus, but in lesser streets in which danger is least to be expected. The galaxy of red, green, and yellow lights in Oxford Street, the one-way thoroughfares which one is constantly encountering in unexpected places, and the roundabouts in the squares, which require intensive study before they are intelligible to the flustered motorist or pedestrian, may do much to relieve the police and a little to help the pedestrian, but their net effect in reducing the death roll is probably inconsiderable. In fact, these devices are pregnant with their own peculiar perils. A green light which says 'Go' ought to mean 'Go in safety,' and not as it does at present, 'Go if you are not afraid of a car coming up behind you and turning to run you down.' A one-way street may be a beneficial device to those who know that it is a one-way street; but its contradiction of all traffic rules constitutes a death trap to strangers and foreigners, numerous in London, who are not aware of its peculiarity. By all means confine the pedestrian to recognised crossing-places, if it is likely to do any good, though it is often safer to cross elsewhere; but it may be anticipated that the business of questioning errant pedestrians and obtaining evidence of their wickedness is likely to cause far more traffic confusion than their punishment is likely to alleviate. One of the major objections to the illumination of crossing-places is that it causes so much delay (often unnecessary) that motorists deviate into side streets in which there is no protection for the pedestrian and render unsafe streets which would normally be safe. Motorists put forward three other suggestions, which are excellent—

namely, that refuges should be provided for pedestrians, though there is no scarcity of such refuges in London; that footpaths should be provided on country roads (they are at present uncommon, and frequently in such bad repair that it is difficult to walk on them); and that trams should be abolished. Trams represent an obsolete mode of conveyance and are equally dangerous to their users and the public.

Pedestrians are not wanting in suggestions, but many of them are concerned rather with vengeance for the dead than with the preservation of the living. A group of members of Parliament concerned at the fact that juries refuse to convict motorists of manslaughter think that matters would be improved by calling manslaughter by another name—*i.e.*, 'driving a car with negligence so that a fatality is caused.' It is a large assumption that the change would make juries more amenable. If the 7000 deaths a year could be eliminated by sentencing every motorist who caused a death to a year's imprisonment, irrespective of all considerations of justice, the remedy would be cheap at the price. They have extinguished probably at least 70,000 years of life, and a forfeiture of 7000 years of liberty is not an excessive penalty to pay. But does any motorist when driving say to himself, 'I will drive carelessly and not hesitate to kill, because even if I kill no jury will convict me of manslaughter'? Unless this is the psychology, the proposed action will simply increase the misery caused by these fatalities without reducing their number. It is, of course, quite right that the violent transgressor should be severely punished, but he is a comparatively rare phenomenon. The vast majority of accidents are caused by respectable citizens who are convinced that they are skilful drivers driving with due care. Their only fault is vanity, and they are not so skilful as they think; but the prisons are not large enough to admit of vanity being a penal offence. The juries are quite right. Convictions cannot bring the dead to life, and it would be an ill thing to add to the sorrow caused by death the sorrow occasioned by imprisoning a perfectly well-meaning citizen.

The proposal that the speed limit of twenty miles an hour should be reimposed either generally or in urban areas or at dangerous places in urban areas is superficially more attractive; and Lord Cecil adds the useful suggestion that a speedometer should be attached to cars in a conspicuous position so that the public could see when a limit was being exceeded. If such a device were adopted, it would remove one of the major objections to speed limits—namely, that it is impossible to secure accurate evidence as to the speed of a car except in fairly open roads in which speed is not a serious danger. The objection to speed limits is that if they were so low as to eliminate danger, they

would extinguish motoring altogether. Above that limit the speed of a car has very little relation to the danger it causes. In places a speed of forty miles an hour is quite safe; in others a speed of ten miles an hour highly dangerous. Accidents occur because motorists do not know when a speed, high or low, is dangerous. Another difficulty of the speed limit is that it would increase the already formidable congestion on the roads. If a twenty-mile limit were imposed in London the probability is that a man who at present averages twenty miles an hour could only average ten. His journeys would take him twice as long, and the number of cars on the streets would be multiplied by two. Nevertheless, it is probable that speed limits of some kind and in some places will be reimposed, because they represent the only obvious means of reducing mortality to any considerable extent. They will be a great nuisance and a considerable hardship on the motorist; but it is inevitable that, if anything is done at all, some hardship must be imposed on him.

The suggestion that motorists should be subjected to some test of their ability has received considerable support. Unfortunately there is little evidence that fatalities are caused by inexperienced motorists. Most of them are expert, but either not quite so expert as they think they are, or so expert that they think they are justified in running risks. A test could be of two kinds. It might be a test merely of ability to handle a vehicle. Such a test would be a nuisance; it could be readily satisfied by almost any motorist and it would do little good. The alternative would be a test of the ability of a motorist to deal with a sudden emergency, of his alertness and resource in a moment of danger, and of the rapidity of his reactions. Some such test is imposed on many drivers of public vehicles, and it is certainly one which many drivers of long standing would be unable to pass. It would be a hardship to impose it on existing drivers, especially those whose livelihood depended on their driving. It might, however, be imposed with advantage on all future professional drivers of public vehicles, motor lorries and private cars, whether in town or country. It would be merely a test that they were fit for the calling which they had adopted. With regard to private owners, a distinction might well be made between driving in the large towns and driving in the country. The latter might be permitted without any severe test of skill and perhaps without any test at all.

These suggestions would no doubt involve a mitigation of the problem, not its entire removal. For a complete comprehension of the situation it is necessary to realise that a motor car is a danger in itself. Roads and streets were not built to accommodate vast numbers of vehicles travelling at a rate of speed unknown

when the roads were established. Probably the number of road accidents will always have a direct relation to the number of vehicles on the roads—so many vehicles, so many accidents. Precautionary measures may reduce considerably the proportion of accidents to vehicles, but so long as these vehicles are on the road the proportion is bound to be substantial; and a greater degree of safety can only be insured by reducing the number of vehicles or else reducing their use of the roads. There are some obvious measures which can be taken in that direction. The appalling death roll of pedal cyclists, especially among the young, suggests that no one should be allowed to ride a pedal cycle—at any rate, in London—who is under twenty-one years of age. It might be better if pedal cycles were forbidden in London altogether. Every year they become more and more unsuitable as vehicles to be used in the London streets. Similar considerations apply to motor cycles. Out of the 773 accidents in which they were involved 440 would be eliminated if the age limit for a licence were raised to twenty-six. Motor vans and lorries are cumbersome, often beyond any real necessity, and obstructive on the roads. They carry a mass of traffic which Acts of Parliament designed to be carried by rail. Their immense size seems often designed rather to advertise the name of the proprietor than to satisfy any legitimate business need. Licences could be confined to cases of real necessity, and the size and weight of the vehicles could be restricted accordingly.

The streets of London are so crowded with private cars that progress is often impossible. The vast majority of them represent a luxury and not a necessity, and they occupy an amount of street space completely out of proportion to the number of passengers they serve. They obstruct the poorer man going about his business in omnibus or on foot. They are used in large numbers to convey daily to London persons who without any serious inconvenience could travel as easily by train; and London itself is so amply provided with public means of conveyance that there is no real need of private cars except for the professional man and the invalid. Much could be done to discourage the use of cars in London, partly by providing adequate parking-places on its boundaries and partly by making the use of the London streets by private motorists more expensive. Such suggestions may seem drastic, but any suggestions to meet the serious situation which has arisen must necessarily be drastic. It is to be hoped that the Minister of Transport will soon complete his studies and get ahead with his 'grapplings,' and that he will not, in 'panic' fear of powerful interests, present us with remedies which prove to be no remedies at all.

W. ROSS BARKER.

NEW PARTICLES

AMERICA is taking a full share in the present unsurpassed activity in scientific research. Heavy hydrogen or diplogen was discovered by a series of researches which demonstrate the high quality of her scientific technique. It is the most important American achievement in physical science since Michelson and Morley made the experiment upon which the theory of relativity is founded, and Willard Gibbs made his researches in thermodynamics. The researches of Giauque and Johnston are a convenient starting-point for a description of the discovery of diplogen. They discovered by the technique of band-spectroscopy that isotopes of oxygen exist. The word 'isotope' was invented by Professor Soddy to describe an atom which has the same chemical properties as atoms of some element, but has a different mass. For instance, an isotope of chlorine consists of atoms whose chemical properties are indistinguishable from those of ordinary chlorine, but whose mass is different. The existence of isotopes first became evident through the investigation of radioactivity. Some of the products of radioactivity have chemical properties indistinguishable from those of well-known substances and yet differ in atomic mass. Metallic lead, for example, obtained as a product of radioactive disintegration, is chemically indistinguishable from ordinary lead, but has a different mass. The discovery that ordinary non-radioactive substances may consist of mixtures of isotopes is due to Sir J. J. Thomson. In his studies of the conduction of electricity through gases he had occasion to examine the properties of electrified particles that appear in the gas neon when it is subjected to an electric discharge. Neon gas is now known to the world as the producer of the brilliant orange-red light of the advertisement signs. Thomson submitted the electrified particles in his neon tubes to magnetic and electric forces. The magnitudes of the deflections of the particles provide data from which the mass and speed of the particles may be calculated. It will be noticed that the mass of the particles is determined directly. Each particle is deflected according to its mass. Hence the mass of each individual particle is being measured.

This method of measuring the mass of atoms is quite different from the methods of chemistry. It does not depend on the chemical properties of the atoms, but directly on their mass. The old chemical method of deriving the mass of atoms was statistical. The mass of a small quantity of substance was measured and then the number of atoms in it was estimated. The mass of the atoms was calculated by dividing the mass of the quantity of substance by the number of atoms it contained. This gave an average value of the mass of the constituent atoms. Chemistry never gave other than average values for the masses of atoms because it could not deal with less than millions at a time. The masses of atoms, as determined by chemistry were average values. Hence substances such as oxygen, chlorine, tin, neon, might each be mixtures of atoms of various masses. As long as the proportions of the mixture remained constant, the average mass of the atom would always come to the same figure. Sir J. J. Thomson's method showed that neon contains at least two sorts of atoms—one of mass 20 units, and the other of mass 22 units. The mass of atoms of neon as determined by the old methods gave 20.2 units. Evidently neon consisted of a mixture of at least two sorts of atom, in which the lighter predominated, so that the average mass was nearer to 20 than 22 units.

Thomson's method was greatly developed by Dr. F. W. Aston, who devised a mass-spectrograph of remarkable resolving power. With this instrument he showed that many of the elements, such as chlorine, tin, mercury, and nickel, consist of mixtures of atoms of various masses. Further, he showed that all of the isotopes had masses expressed in whole numbers. The masses of the basic atoms of Nature were all expressed as whole numbers. Thus the isotopic atoms of chlorine are of mass 35.0 units and 37.0 units; those of neon are 20.0 and 22.0 units, etc. Hence Aston's work gave final confirmation that all matter is made of multiples of some primordial units. What are these primordial units? Until a year ago they were believed to be the electron and the proton. The electron is the unit of negative electricity and the proton was believed to be the unit of positive electricity. All the matter in the universe is built of protons and electrons. But within the last few months the belief that the proton itself is complex has been strengthened. It is now believed that the proton consists of a neutron and that new particle, the positive electron, whose existence was suspected on experimental grounds by Dr. C. D. Anderson, of Pasadena, in 1932, and confirmed by Professor P. M. S. Blackett and Dr. G. P. S. Occhialini in England last year. As the neutron is 2000 times heavier than either the negative or positive electron, the mass of the material of the

universe may be due almost entirely to neutrons. Neutrons were discovered in 1932. They are relatively heavy particles without electric charge. In 1934 there is evidence that 999 out of every 1000 parts of the mass of matter in the universe is due to neutrons. The material universe is a drama in the medium of neutrons, in which electrons, positrons and photons provide the action and the lighting.

The mass-spectrographic method of Thomson and Aston is not the only method of detecting isotopes. Another ingenious method is optical and depends on the spectroscopical analysis of light emitted by excited molecules. The principle is easily understood. Molecules often consist of combinations of two or more atoms. For instance, a molecule of hydrogen chloride (the gas which produces hydrochloric acid when dissolved in water) consists of one atom of hydrogen bound to one atom of chlorine, in a sort of dumb-bell formation. As there are two isotopes of chlorine, a hydrogen chloride molecule may contain an atom of one isotope or the other. Clearly the balance of the molecule which contains one of the isotopes will be different from the balance of the molecule which contains the other isotope. Hence excited molecules of hydrogen chloride will vibrate slightly differently, according to the nature of the isotope they contain. The difference in the two modes of vibration will cause a slight difference in the wave-lengths of the light emitted during excitation. Hence a careful examination of the light emitted by excited molecules may lead to the detection of isotopes in the molecules. The light emitted by molecules consists of complicated beams which appear as bands of lines in the spectroscope; hence its study is named band-spectroscopy. Many gases, such as oxygen, consist of molecules containing two atoms. If two oxygen isotopes exist the molecules of oxygen may have three constitutions, and hence the band-spectroscopy of oxygen may appear in three varieties. Common oxygen atoms are of mass 16 units. Suppose an isotope of mass 18 units should exist. Then a molecule of oxygen may contain two atoms of mass 16, two of mass 18, or one of mass 16 and the other of mass 18.

Giauque and Johnston, armed with the splendid technique of the American schools of band-spectroscopy, succeeded in detecting the existence of oxygen isotopes of masses 17 and 18. Further, they discovered, from comparison of the intensity of the lines, that the heavy isotope of oxygen was surprisingly common; apparently about one oxygen atom out of every 1000 was of mass 18 units. This led to remarkable calculations. The mass of oxygen atoms is usually fixed at exactly 16 units. On this scale the mass of the hydrogen atom is 1.008 units. The slight departure from a whole number was explained on the assumption that

when a number of hydrogen atoms are condensed to form an oxygen atom, a quantity of mass is converted into the energy which holds the oxygen atom together. The convertibility of mass and energy follows from the theory of relativity, as Einstein has explained. Hence the peculiar relative masses of atoms of oxygen and hydrogen appeared to be explained beautifully. There was no reason to suspect that oxygen atoms of mass other than 16, or hydrogen atoms of mass other than 1.008, existed; and the peculiar difference of 8 parts in 1000 was very plausibly explained. What happened when Giauque and Johnston discovered that ordinary oxygen contains atoms of mass 18 in relatively large numbers? It followed at once that hydrogen atoms must have a mass of greater than 1.008, or hydrogen must consist of a mixture of isotopes. Birge and Menzel calculated that hydrogen might contain an isotope of mass 2 to the extent of 1 part in about 5000.

F. G. Brickwedde, of the Bureau of Standards at Washington, and H. C. Urey and G. M. Murphy, of Columbia University, began a search for this isotope of mass 2. Ordinary hydrogen did not exhibit observable isotopic effects in the mass-spectrograph or in band-spectroscopy. Some method of partially separating the isotopes was needed, so that preparations containing them in stronger concentrations could be examined. Brickwedde allowed a large quantity of liquid hydrogen to boil until a small quantity was left. As the ordinary light hydrogen atoms of mass 1 might reasonably evaporate more quickly than the heavy atoms of mass 2, the gas from the liquid hydrogen residue might reasonably contain a higher percentage of the heavier isotope, if it existed. Urey and Murphy examined the spectra of the hydrogen gas from the residues. They exposed the photographic plates in the spectroscope for a period about 5000 times as long as is necessary to obtain good photographs of the lines due to ordinary light hydrogen. They found faint but definite lines corresponding to those due to an atom of mass 2. Their brilliant discovery stimulated the search for more effective methods of separating the hydrogen isotopes.

Washburn and Urey investigated the possibilities of electrolysis. The decomposition by electricity of a solution such as common salt in water is due to the movement of electrified atoms through the water under an electric field. The atoms move at various speeds according to their mass and electric charge. It would be reasonable to suppose that a hydrogen atom of mass 2 would travel more slowly through the liquid than a hydrogen atom of mass 1. Hence hydrogen produced by electrolysis ought to be more than normally rich in atoms of mass 1, while the residual liquid ought to be more than normally rich in atoms of

mass 2. There are also more recondite reasons why the residue of water decomposed by electricity should accumulate a higher concentration of heavy hydrogen atoms. Besides searching for heavy hydrogen by direct electrolysis of water, Washburn and Urey examined the contents of the cells used in commercial electrolytic plants. The contents of these cells are often not changed for years. They discovered liquor from cells in the plant of the Southern Oxygen Company of Virginia, which had been used continuously for two years. The plant of the Ohio Chemical Company of New York provided them with liquor three years old. Urey, Brickwedde and Murphy showed that both of these liquors gave water of an abnormally high specific gravity and contained an excess of heavy hydrogen atoms. This discovery led to a curious commercial development, as the chemical companies who happened to possess suitable old electrolytic liquors were able to put them on the market at a high price. The quantity of electricity needed to increase appreciably the percentage of heavy hydrogen in ordinary water is great, and in districts such as Cambridge, where the cost of electricity is relatively high, the expenditure on current would be prohibitive. Hence it pays to import tins of old electrolytic liquor from the American electrolytic works and complete the concentration in England.

The eminent American chemist Professor G. N. Lewis was one of the first to investigate heavy hydrogen. He happened to have an electrolytic cell containing liquor four years old. He found that the specific gravity of the water from this liquor was 1.000034 compared with ordinary water. It is interesting that water of abnormal density had never been noticed before by accident, though it must have been available in many chemical factories for decades. By a series of electrolytic concentrations Lewis was able to prepare a water whose hydrogen was almost entirely of the heavy sort. This heavy water was 99.99 per cent. pure. Its specific gravity was 1.1056. Its freezing-point was 3.8°C . and boiling-point 101.42°C . Its maximum density is at 11.6°C ., while that of ordinary water is at 4°C .

The unit quantity of water, the molecule, consists of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. It has been mentioned that three isotopes of oxygen, three sorts of oxygen atom, are now known. As there are two sorts of hydrogen, there must be nine possible sorts of water. For instance, a water molecule may contain one oxygen atom of mass 16, or of mass 17, or of mass 18. Its two hydrogen atoms may be both of mass 1 or of mass 2, or one of mass 1 and one of mass 2. Thus the number of waters known to science has been multiplied by a factor of 9 in the last few years. The rôles of all these waters in natural phenomena

remain to be determined. They may, or may not, be very important, but as time passes the finer points in the structure of Nature are generally found to have some fundamental significance. The importance of heavy hydrogen or diplogen in organic chemistry promises to be great. Hydrogen is the most reactive substance in Nature. It occurs in more compounds than any other element. The possibilities of the exploration of the structure of molecules by the exchange of light by heavy hydrogen atoms are suggestive. It has already been discovered that not all light hydrogen atoms in complicated molecules may be replaced by heavy ones. The explanation of this phenomenon will help to reveal the peculiarities of the environment of hydrogen atoms in molecules. The differences in function between hydrogen atoms in different positions may be elucidated.

The biological properties of heavy water are already receiving widespread investigation. Professor Lewis found that tobacco seeds which germinate easily in ordinary water will not germinate in heavy water. Professor H. S. Taylor and his colleagues Professors Swingle, Eyring, and Frost found that tadpoles of the green frog could not live in heavy water for more than one hour. The common aquarium fish *Lebistes reticulatus* is killed in two hours. The protozoon *Paramecium caudatum* survived for two days. The flat-worm *Planaria maculata* died in three hours. While fairly pure heavy water gave these remarkable effects, water containing only 30 per cent. of the heavy variety was very much less abnormal in its biological effects.

The discoverers of heavy hydrogen have suggested 'deuterium' as its name. Then the nucleus of the deuterium atom would be named 'deuton.' Unfortunately, 'deuton' sounds very much like 'neutron,' and some academic discussions have already been upset through inability to distinguish easily by ear which word is being used. Consequently, Lord Rutherford and others have pleaded for the adoption of the names 'diplogen' and 'diploon.'

Heavy hydrogen or diplogen has already provided new physical knowledge of great interest. The significance of the discovery of diplogen is seen particularly clearly in physical research. As already explained, most isotopes differ in mass by one or two units. For example, the masses of the oxygen isotopes are 16, 17, and 18 respectively. The isotope of mass 17 is one unit heavier than the isotope of mass 16, which represents an increase in mass of only about 6 per cent. The hydrogen isotope of mass 2 is also only one unit heavier than the common hydrogen isotope of mass 1, but it is 100 per cent. heavier. Thus the physical difference between the two sorts of hydrogen atom is of an order quite different from that between any other pair of isotopes. In experiments depending on the mass of the hydrogen

atom the effect of this order of difference is very important. The modern theory of the structure of the atom has been derived mainly from atomic bombardment experiments. Atoms are shot at each other by radioactive or electric contrivances, and the experimenter observes how the bombarding atoms are deflected, and how the bombarded atoms may be disintegrated. Experiments of this sort have provided the data for the present conceptions of the size and structure of atoms.

While Professor G. N. Lewis was preparing diplogen it happened that another professor in California, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, of Berkeley, had succeeded in making a remarkable new type of atom-disintegrating machine. Professor E. O. Lawrence's achievement has raised high expectations of his future. He is only thirty-two years old, and has accomplished a most ingenious and very difficult task. He is endowed with a strong and energetic personality, and may become the creator of another great school of experimental physics. His machine is quite different in design from the famous apparatus with which Dr. J. D. Cockcroft and Dr. E. T. S. Walton first disintegrated atoms by machinery. It is a sort of atomic motor. The artificial disintegration of atoms was first done by Lord Rutherford with the assistance of radioactive substances that emit particles of enormous energy. These natural atomic projectiles do the disintegrating when they strike a suitable atom. The aim of much research since 1919, when Rutherford made these experiments, has been to produce such atomic projectiles artificially. This may be done by submitting atoms to the pressure of a powerful electric field. If a pressure of a few hundred thousand volts is applied to the terminals of a suitable discharge tube, some of the atoms in the tube will fly down it with energies comparable to those of the particles emitted by radioactive substances. This method depends on the application of very high voltages to particles as they pass through a distance of a few feet. It is an impulse method. As each charged atom comes into the electric field it receives a tremendous push. Lawrence's method is quite different.

When Cockcroft started his research years ago on the problem of the design of electrical machines for disintegrating atoms he attempted the method that Lawrence has adopted. Cockcroft found the technical difficulties excessive, and decided to use the more straightforward method with which he was subsequently so successful. Lawrence's machine is a sort of atomic motor. Atoms are constrained to move in a circle by a magnetic field. They are then urged round this circle by the application of an electric field. They receive two pushes during every revolution, like the armature of a simple ordinary electric motor. The

volving atoms are given a push of a few thousand volts twice in each journey round the circle. When they have been round the circle 100 times they are moving with an energy of hundreds of thousands of volts. This method of building up great energies that of all revolving machinery. It depends on the cumulative effect of small impulses frequently repeated. It does not require high initial voltages. The production of swift particles by repetition of small impulses satisfies the engineering sense better than the shock method of producing them by giving one big electric blow. But the mechanical difficulties in making such an atomic motor work are obvious. The particle is whirling round a circle 100 or 1000 times at a speed of, say, thousands of miles a second. Who could believe that it could be found after these many gyrations? The swift particles in Lawrence's apparatus must travel a distance of half a mile or so while they are being urged round the circle. One could scarcely have expected that they would not have been lost on the way. In Cockcroft's apparatus the particles are accelerated only a few feet. It is indeed surprising that Lawrence's particles do appear after their gyrations. He has accelerated them up to energies of a few million volts. There are hopes that he may be able to produce particles of an electron-energy of twenty or thirty million volts. He only needs a few thousand volts to start the accelerating and merely has to apply it repeatedly, these hopes seem comparatively reasonable. He has no need to produce a voltage of twenty or thirty million, as would be necessary to obtain twenty million electron-volt particles out of a Cockcroft apparatus. But it is still not easy to believe that unavoidable stray electric charges inside the machine would deflect and lose the particles on their miles of revolution while they were working up to their twenty million-volt speed. Lawrence has disproved the critics, so perhaps he will do it again. Everyone hopes he will be able to produce thirty million-volt particles.

Professor Lewis provided Professor Lawrence with some diplogen for disintegration experiments. The diplogen, or nucleus of the diplogen atom, is twice as heavy as the proton, which is the nucleus of the ordinary hydrogen atom. Lawrence produced diplogens at various sorts of nuclei. He found evidence that diplogens when projected against atoms of gold or platinum do not disintegrate these atoms, but disintegrate themselves. He believes the diplogens split into a proton and a neutron. When diplogens were projected against carbon atoms the carbon atom appeared to seize a neutron out of the diplogen and allow the remains of the diplogen—i.e., a proton—to fly on. Professor Lewis also provided Lord Rutherford and Dr. Oliphant with diplogen. They have found that disintegrations caused by

diplogens are in many features different from those caused by protons.

In many branches of physical science and in many laboratories in all parts of the world research into the properties of diplogen is being industriously conducted. A number of peculiar phenomena previously unexplained are becoming explicable. As with many important discoveries, that of diplogen was preceded by a number of significant but not completely understood hints. In 1923 Dr. A. C. Grubb, of the University of Saskatchewan, showed that a small amount of a peculiarly active hydrogen may be obtained from sulphuric acid by electrolysis. In 1931 Binder, Filby, Grubb and Van Cleave found that this active hydrogen seems to form about 1 part in 4000 of ordinary hydrogen. It is now known that about 1 part in 5000 of ordinary hydrogen is diplogen. Van Cleave showed that this active hydrogen also had some special chemical properties. The results of these workers look very much like a prevision of diplogen. A remarkable example of misfortune in interpreting results is offered by the work of Professor Bothe on beryllium rays. He experimented with these rays for four years under the impression that they were a wave-radiation. Then Dr. J. Chadwick showed they were really neutrons. But the most remarkable modern unconscious discovery is that of the positive electron, or positron. The discovery of the positron is one of the greatest stories in the history of science.

In 1930 Professor P. A. M. Dirac, of Cambridge, who received a Nobel Prize for Physics for 1933 at the early age of thirty-one years, published a paper in which he discussed certain implications he had discovered in the equation concerning the state of energy of an electron. The theory of quantum mechanics gives a certain mathematical equation the roots of which furnish the values of the states of energy which an electron can have. This equation has negative besides positive roots. The negative roots refer to negative states of energy. Like the negative roots that appear in the quadratic equations which plague every schoolboy, the negative roots in the more distinguished electron equation were as politely ignored. They were left as meaningless. Dirac was not satisfied with this. The universe contains positive and negative electricity. The positive roots of the electron equation referred to negative electricity; could the negative roots of the electron equation refer to positive electricity, he wondered? At that time the proton was the smallest known unit of electricity. The proton has an electric charge of one unit of positive electricity. In this respect it is the contrary of the electron, which has an electric charge of one unit of negative electricity. But the proton, which is also the nucleus of the

hydrogen atom, is nearly 2000 times as heavy as the electron. Dirac naturally hoped that the discarded roots of the electron equation really referred to the proton. Further research showed that these roots could only refer to a particle of the same mass as the electron—i.e., of a particle nearly 2000 times lighter than a proton. Dirac's brilliant speculation seemed to be wrong, but it was so remarkable that many felt that it must contain some truth. Dirac not only discussed the possibility of the roots referring to protons; he made calculations concerning the properties of an entity having the values of these roots. He conceived the roots to apply to what he called 'holes' in the universe. He supposed the universe is almost full of electrons except for a few holes. These holes would then be the places of negative energy to which the roots referred. He showed that these 'holes,' as they moved, would have the properties of a unit charge of positive electricity. Unfortunately, the 'holes' also had to behave like particles of the same mass as the electron. The theory seemed to have broken down, for the 'holes' could not be protons.

In the autumn of 1932 Dr. Carl D. Anderson published a short letter in the American journal *Science* in which he described experimental evidence for the existence of a positively charged particle whose mass was less than that of a proton. He gave a concise but very reserved statement of his results, and did not publish the photographs upon which he based his arguments. He had been engaged in photographing the tracks of the very swift particles connected with cosmic rays, which appear as fine trails of cloud in a Wilson chamber. In 1927 Dr. D. Skobelzyn, of Leningrad, had discovered in his photographs of tracks of electrons deflected in a magnetic field certain tracks which remained straight under powerful magnetic forces. These tracks were evidently due to very swift particles. He thought they might be made by the very swift particles which Professor C. T. R. Wilson believes may be generated by thunder clouds. Anderson, like others, was following the path discovered by Skobelzyn. He bent the tracks of the swift particles. The magnetic field bends the positively charged particles to one side and the negatively charged particles to the other side. Hence the photographs of the fine streaks of cloud made by these very swift cosmic-ray particles show a variety of white curved tracks. The tracks bent to the positive side were assumed to be due to protons. Now the appearance of the cloud track is related to the mass of the particle which makes the track.

Anderson noticed that some of the tracks probably due to positive particles were more like the tracks of an electron than of the heavier proton. But there was a difficulty. These appa-

rently positive tracks might just possibly be due to negative electrons going backwards. Anderson proved this was not so, by a beautiful experiment. He put a lead plate across the chamber, and succeeded in photographing one of the light positive particles as it passed through the plate. Its track was more bent when it emerged from the plate than when it entered. This was a conclusive proof that the particle really was moving in the direction it appeared to be moving, and was not an electron going backwards. However, Anderson did not publish his data in full. In 1933 Professor Blackett and Dr. G. P. S. Occhialini, who at that time were at Cambridge, published the first documented account of positive electrons. They described in detail to the Royal Society, and showed beautiful photographs, of experiments that conclusively proved the existence of the positive electron or positron. Blackett had devised and constructed a camera which makes cosmic rays take photographs of themselves, or rather of the tracks of particles associated with them. This remarkable apparatus only works when something interesting is happening, and effected a great economy in cosmic-ray photography. Previously, photographs were taken at random, and only one out of fifty or so showed any cosmic-ray track. Eighty per cent. of Blackett's photographs showed tracks.

So Dirac was right! He had discovered the fundamental unit of positive electricity by calculation, but neither he nor any other person had dared to assert it. It is the most important constant of Nature ever discovered by calculation without experimental suggestion. No wonder Dirac thought it was something else! He has also given the reason why the positive electron was not discovered sooner. For twenty years scientists have found the fundamental units of the universe uncomfortably lop-sided. Why should the proton, which appeared to be the positive unit of electricity, be 2000 times heavier than the electron? The universe seemed to be constructed out of an ill-assorted pair of units. A world in which the units were of equal but opposite dimensions would have been so much more satisfying to the scientist's sense of elegance. But no equal but opposite unit to the electron could be found. Dirac has shown that the average life of the positive electron is only about one thousand millionth of a second. After it has been free for that period the 'hole,' the form in which it masquerades, is filled by an electron. The positive electron is filled, or neutralised, by a negative electron. The two combine to produce two photons, or units of wave-radiation. Professor Blackett, the Curie-Joliot, and others, have already detected evidence of this transmutation of matter into waves, and waves into matter. There is strong evidence that positive and negative electrons are born in pairs.

When wave-radiations of high energy interact with the nuclei of atoms they may be transmuted into pairs of particles, into positive and negative electrons. The positive electron flies off in its short life of a thousand millionth of a second before it is neutralised again by a negative electron.

The success of the physicists in detecting the presence and photographing the tracks of particles that exist only for one thousand millionth of a second seems almost incredible. It is due to the enormous speed at which the positive electrons travel, and their enormous energy. They are able to travel a yard or so during their independent existence, and their tracks may be snap-shotted by the marvellous apparatus invented by Professor C. T. R. Wilson. Recently, evidence has been found that the cosmic rays consist mainly of positive particles. As a considerable part of all the energy in the universe—at least 1 per cent.—is possessed by the cosmic rays, and hence the cosmic rays are one of the major cosmical phenomena, the positron as an independent entity is one of the major phenomena in the universe. As a constituent of matter it is, of course, also a major phenomenon. The remarkable part of cosmic rays must be surprising to many. One would not imagine that rays so difficult to detect, and whose intensity of energy is comparable to that of star-light, could nevertheless challenge all the stars in the universe as the chief custodian of energy. The explanation is simple. Though each star, such as the sun, represents an unimaginably enormous reservoir of energy, and the cold matter of the earth and all other material bodies an immense congealment of atomic energy, the bulk of all the stars and matter in the universe is exceedingly small compared with the indescribably vast stretches of empty space. While energy in the form of matter is congealed in lumps, energy in the form of cosmic rays is tenuously spread through all the volume of space. Hence in the total the energy of the cosmic rays is comparable with the energy of all the suns and stars in all the nebulae.

Those who have an interest in the enviroing universe are fortunate to live in a period when new knowledge of natural phenomena is being discovered with such rich success. It is permissible to contend that the intellectual achievements of contemporary man may inspire him to resist the temptation to acquiesce in retrograde methods of government, momentarily plausible because his social difficulties seem to be too much for him. A relapse into barbaric forms of social organisation while the light of scientific discovery is blazing with unsurpassed splendour would be an unpardonable episode in the history of humanity.

J. G. CROWTHER.

SEA SERPENTS AND MONSTERS

IN the cocksure days of the last generation it was customary to pour ridicule upon the tales of the ancients, upon anything which did not fit into the four walls of officially recorded knowledge. The pygmies, ogres, the unicorn, the roc, the fire-bird of the Russians, and, of course, the sea serpent, were classed among the myths. With the increase of knowledge a reasonable basis has been found or suggested for most of these 'fabulous monsters now extinct.' The war between the Cranes and the Pygmies, which made our forefathers laugh at Herodotus, is now recognised as an account of bushmen hunting ostriches: Wells has suggested that the ogres of our childhood are lingering memories of our cousin *Homo neanderthalensis*, whom our early ancestors defeated in the battle for survival: the oryx or the gemsbok, with their long straight horns upon a horse-like body, when seen in profile, are enough to account for the unicorn; and there are too, I believe, authentic accounts of battles between lion and gemsbok, which may well fight for the crown of the region where both live. The roc of *The Arabian Nights* is probably a memory of the *Aepyornis*, the subfossil gigantic flightless birds of Madagascar. To my friend P. S. Nazaroff I owe the ingenious suggestion that the gorgeous fire-bird, the *Zhar Ptitsa* of Russian folklore and ballet, pursued by Ivan Tsarevich through nine and twenty kingdoms, is not a myth, but the resplendent Impeyan pheasant of Kashmir. Probably most geologists will agree that the legend of the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah is a reminiscence of the earth movement which produced the great rift of Africa and extended through Palestine. So it would not be so unusual if we were now to account for a monster which has become almost synonymous with fable, the Great Sea Serpent himself.

It has certainly been believed for ages by the credulous that there exists in the ocean a monster of such enormous size that it can seize men off the decks of ships and devour them. There was some truth even in this idea, before the evolution of the immense modern steamship; for gigantic squids, which have become accepted zoological facts only during the last fifty years, are even to-day a serious danger to fishermen in small boats. That vivid

writer of the sea, the late F. T. Bullen, in *The Cruise of the Cachalot*, gives a thrilling description of a battle between a sperm-whale and a giant squid, which offers an explanation of the remarkable story brought home by the crew of the *Pauline* in 1875. They claimed to have watched an immense serpent coil round a sperm-whale and drag it to the bottom. Here we clearly have a case of actual observation wrongly interpreted, as there can be little doubt that what they saw was not a serpent attacking a whale, but a sperm-whale having his usual dinner, a squid. It happened to be tackling a big specimen of *Architeuthis*, the tentacular arms of which are known commonly to reach 40 or even over 50 feet in length. These, whipped round the whale, would give the appearance of a monstrous snake, and when the diner had finished and sounded of his own accord they concluded that the sea serpent himself had dragged him down. Thus, by reversing the rôle, they produced a record of a monster indeed. The sheer improbability of the story was its own undoing, and instead of applying the proper correction the public mind preferred to reject the whole thing absolutely. Thus still more discredit was thrown on the Great Sea Serpent.

It is to be noted that it has long been customary in the Press to refer, not to sea serpents, but to *the* sea serpent, even the Great Sea Serpent, as though there were in existence a single colossal monster, apparently immortal as well as of incredible size. But, even if the Great Sea Serpent is a myth, it is still legitimate to admit belief in sea serpents, if by that we mean the creatures which have been described by some 200 witnesses, mostly men of education and responsibility. It was probably this confusion of thought that shocked the credulity of the average man, and when stories of such monsters came from America the strain was too great: travellers' tales, of course, and Yankee yarns; so it hardly required the acid scepticism of Sir Richard Owen finally to scotch the monster.

Though the Hunterian Professor in the Royal College of Surgeons (superintendent of the Natural History Museum from 1856 till 1883) enjoyed immense prestige as anatomist and palæontologist, he was neither a field worker nor a philosopher, and it has been written of him that to the discussion of the deeper problems of biological philosophy he made scarcely any direct and definite contribution, and that it never became clear how much of the modern doctrines of organic evolution he admitted. But what is clear is his attitude to the sea serpent. In an elaborate and crushing argument that the creature reported by Captain M'Quhae, of the *Dædalus*, was a sea elephant, he wrote: 'A larger body of evidence might be got together in proof of ghosts than of the sea serpent.' But the sailor sturdily stuck to his

guns, and, to a modern reader, his dignified reply gave him the better of the discussion. Still, the authority of Owen was enough for the man in the street, and the Great Sea Serpent went to join the Giant Gooseberry. There were, however, a few men of more independent and open mind who reserved their opinions, such as the late R. A. Procter (a very able writer quoted by Commander Gould), P. H. Gosse, F.R.S., and A. D. Bartlett, for many years superintendent of the Zoological Gardens. In spite of the lofty scepticism of Owen, there is abundant evidence that cannot be so easily refuted, and after everything possible has been explained away there still remains an insoluble residue.

A Dutch writer, Dr. A. C. Oudemans, in 1892 published an account of no less than 187 appearances. The literature has been substantially increased since, and the entire subject has of recent years been dealt with in detail by Commander Gould in his very readable work, *The Case for the Sea Serpent*,¹ where he examines each serious case critically. It is worth considering some of the more noteworthy instances.

The earliest, and one of the most famous, is the record by an old Norwegian missionary, Hans Egede, known as 'the Apostle of Greenland.' He was an experienced traveller, a serious, educated man whose word and opinions command respect; besides, he certainly knew a whale or a walrus when he saw one. Yet he described a 'very terrible sea monster' quite new to him. The illustration to the account, though highly exaggerated, shows a reptilian-looking creature of huge size, with *flappers*, leaping from the water and *blowing*. In a well-known drawing published by Erik Pontoppidan, Bishop of Bergen, 1747-64, there is clearly shown a *frill on the neck*, like a *bunch of seaweed*. Between the years 1751 and 1890 there is a whole string of records from the coast of New England, most numerous in 1817 and 1819. Commander Gould, after careful examination of all the recorded evidence, finds that the reports result in an unknown marine animal approaching 100 feet in length. There are no allusions to any frill on the neck, but there are to a series of 'bunches' along the back. Between 1810 and 1845 there are over two dozen well-authenticated cases off the Norwegian coast. It is to be noted that most of these allude to the existence on the neck of a kind of *mane* or *frill*. The size reported varies considerably. Among them is the circumstantial report of an encounter by four Norwegians—a bookseller, a merchant, an apprentice, and a labourer—with a monster in the Romsdal Fjord in 1845. They shot at it, so to them it must have been quite real. They state that there was no mane on the throat, and that about 40 to 50 feet were exposed.

¹ Phillip Allen, 1930.

In 1838 Captain the Hon. George Hope, in H.M.S. *Fly* in the Gulf of California, saw a strange sea monster under water, feeding on the bottom. A later, non-authorised, figure published in the *Pall Mall Magazine* for October 1901, to illustrate this occurrence (on I know not what authority), provides the creature with *four flappers* and a *fringe like seaweed* on the neck. In 1845 no less a man than Sir Charles Lyell, in his *Second Visit to the United States*, transmits accounts which he had received of a sea monster seen off the Nova Scotian coast in 1845, about 100 feet long, which had on its back a number of *bumps* or *protuberances*—true *humps*, not produced by flexure of the body. In the previous year another observer had estimated the length at 60 feet, with the remark that the humps on the back were too small and too close to be bends of the body. In the *Zoologist* for 1847 there is an account of a creature near Halifax, in Nova Scotia, judged to be about 80 feet in length, without allusion either to frill or humps. Commander Gould points out that there is nothing contradictory in the accounts of the North Atlantic occurrences.

We now come to the most discussed case of all—in 1848, when Captain Peter M'Quhae, commanding H.M. corvette *Dædalus*, gave a very circumstantial description of the sea serpent as he saw it. This was the subject of the controversy with Sir Richard Owen, in which that great man did no good to his reputation. Here again there is a clear statement of the existence on the neck of something like a *mane* or *seaweed*. In 1872 two clergymen, the Rev. John Macrae, minister of Glenelg, Inverness-shire, and the Rev. David Twopeny, vicar of Stockbury, in Kent, saw a monster in the Sound of Sleat, which divides Skye from the mainland, of which several accounts have been preserved. Its length was estimated at 60 to 70 feet, and there is no allusion to *frills*. In 1877 Commander H. L. Pearson, R.N., commanding the royal yacht *Osborne*, reported to the Admiralty the view of a 'sea monster off the north coast of Sicily.' The commander of Queen Victoria's yacht was certainly a responsible person. Frank Buckland, the well-known naturalist, wrote an article on it in *Land and Water* in the same year, and his sketch shows a row of triangular points protruding from the water like a *toothed crest*. In 1891 Mr. A. F. Matthews, a surveyor, saw one off New Zealand, and noted its white belly and *two armlet appendages* dangling. In 1893 Dr. Farquhar Matheson, a medical man in practice in Soho, together with Mrs. Matheson, saw one in Loch Alsh, between the island of Skye and the mainland. He alludes to a *sort of ruffle* round the neck and suggested a *lizard-like form*. In the same year Captain Cringle, of the steamship *Umfali*, of the Natal Line, saw one off the West Coast of Africa. He considered it about 80 feet long, and noted *short fins on the back*.

In 1905 Mr. E. G. B. Meade-Waldo and Mr. M. J. Nicholl saw an enormous creature off the Brazilian coast from the deck of Lord Crawford's yacht *Valhalla*. They described their experience in the *Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London*, of which society both were fellows. They allude to a *crinkled frill* like a fin, which recalled a *gigantic piece of seaweed*.² In 1917 Captain F. W. Dean, commanding H.M.S. *Hilary*, an armed cruiser, with his officers, met a 'sea serpent.' He alludes to the *black triangular dorsal fin, very thin and flabby*. The officers estimated the length at about 60 feet. In 1919 Mr. F. Mackintosh Bell, writer to the signet, saw a small one, about 18 to 20 feet long, in the Pentland Firth, where his friends often saw it. His sketch suggests a *lizard-like* creature with *flappers*. In 1923 Captain Haselfoot, R.N., commanding H.M. survey-ship *Kellett*, caught sight of a monster in the Black Deep, a secluded portion of the Thames Estuary, where there had been no shipping for eight years.

In August 1932 Mr. F. W. Kemp, an officer of the Provincial Archives, with his wife and son, and in September 1933 Major W. H. Langley, barrister, clerk of the British Columbia Legislature, together with Mrs. Langley, saw an immense sea monster near Chatham Island, Vancouver. When their observations were published, nearly a hundred other witnesses came forward, including three ship's captains and a pilot, who had kept back from fear of ridicule. The accounts, with Mr. Kemp's sketch, were published in the *Illustrated London News* of January 6, 1934. It is to be noted that the creature was over 60 feet in length, it had either *legs* or *flappers*, the *back* was *serrated* near the tail, as well shown in the sketch; the general colour was greenish-brown and it thrashed the water with its tail. Mr. Kemp saw round the head a sort of *mane*, which drifted round the body like kelp.

So much for the evidence. The objections are four in number. First, it is maintained that the fauna of the sea has been so thoroughly studied that there is very little chance of any new big creatures being discovered; that in Great Britain in particular so artificialised, so densely populated, and so closely worked for so many years, the discovery of so remarkable a novelty is unthinkable.

Many readers will be surprised to learn that new creatures are constantly being discovered even in this country. In entomology, which has been systematically studied in England for about two centuries, not only are species new to Britain added to our list every season, but hardly a year goes by without the discovery even of species new to science. Entomology, it is true, deals with obscure, minute and extremely numerous creatures, but

² *Proceedings of the Zoological Society*, 1906, pp. 719-721.

even among the mammals, where the scope is so much less, the discovery of novelties is by no means unknown. It is only about six or seven years since there was revealed in the Scilly Isles a small insectivorous mammal related to the shrews, *Crocidura*, hitherto unknown in this country. It is an African genus, ranging into France, but its presence in Great Britain was quite unexpected. The Scilly specimens are slightly different from the French form and have been described as a distinct species.

There are bigger things still. There is a whale, relatively small compared with rorquals, but immense compared with shrews, *Pseudorca crassidens*, which was known from Tasmania and from Kiel Bay, but in this country only from fossil bones found in the fens. Yet about six or seven years ago a whole school of them was thrown up on the coast of Scotland. This was, indeed, an addition to the British list. There is no question about it, for they were studied officially by the specialist of the British Museum, and the local folk are not likely to forget the stench. In the wider world there have been numerous discoveries of big animals within living memory. I was present at a meeting of the Zoological Society in 1901 when the late Sir Harry Johnston exhibited a piece of skin, half chestnut red, half striped black and white, which clearly came from an animal the size of a horse. Yet it belonged to no known creature. Sir Harry told us that the pygmies of the Ituri Forest call it the okapi. It was thought that the gorilla was confined to the district of the Gaboon until a slightly different form was discovered in the bamboo forests of the eastern Congo a few years ago. The dragons of Komodo met credit only when living, though immature, specimens were brought to the Zoo. So why should there not be still one kind, or even more, of great marine animal in the ocean awaiting recognition of naturalists?

The second objection, that it is too monstrous, is not serious. While the fantastic old tales of ancient writers must be heavily discounted, mere size is no objection. People who had never heard of elephants would hesitate to believe in Jumbo. While Nature's experiments in big reptiles and mammals on dry land have been abandoned as a failure—for on land it does not pay to be big, so to speak, and the elephant and the rhinoceros are the lingering survivors of a past epoch—in the water things are different. In the sea there is practically no limit to the size a creature can attain. There is abundance of food, unlimited space in which to move, and the buoyancy of the water to relieve the tremendous weight; so that the three practical objections to great size are eliminated. It is to be noted, too, that there are plenty of instances of great difference in size between closely related creatures. Thus, the little cuttle-fish so common on our

coasts is closely related to the huge *Architeuthis* referred to above, which may weight up to 1000 lb., and probably more, and have tentacular arms 60 feet long. The little skates of our fishmongers' slabs are related to the monstrous devil fishes, whose weight may be counted in tons. The walrus and the sea elephant are both monstrous creatures; and as for whales, Sibbald's rorqual has been recorded at 85 feet, so what is there improbable in 100 feet?

The third objection is the extreme rarity of the creature. This is really no obstacle, for it is far less scarce than supposed. In spite of the reluctance of witnesses to come forward for fear of ridicule, by 1930 we had nearly 200 reports. The sea is a big place and the chance of any creature being seen from the relatively insignificant number of ships that travel on it are very remote. Of those who have crossed the Atlantic often, or been to the Cape or Australia and back, how often have they seen a sperm-whale? There are plenty of fish of such remarkable appearance that they at once attract notice, yet remain extremely rare. Such, for instance, is the ribbon-fish, only a few inches high and very thin, yet up to 20 feet in length. Zoologists are quite accustomed to the rarity even of big, conspicuous animals, which may be verging on extinction, like the great white rhinoceros of East Africa, or extremely localised, like the bongo of the bamboo forests of Kenya or the gorilla and okapi referred to already. For years a single horn, nearly straight, 5 feet long, was preserved in the Florence Museum, a puzzle to naturalists. It resembled the horn of a sable antelope, but far exceeded the record size. The mystery was not cleared till a few years ago Captain Varian revealed that splendid creature the giant sable, confined to a restricted area in Angola. In spite of the commercial importance of the whale fisheries—concerning which, incidentally, I have never come across any recognition of the appalling cruelties inflicted on these warm-blooded, sociable mammals—whales remain the least known group of vertebrates to-day. So why should there not be left in the ocean some other great creatures still less known?

The last objection is the most serious, that no tangible evidence has been secured, that no parts have yet been recovered for study. To this the reply is that remains of common marine creatures are seldom cast ashore, and the chances of an admittedly rare animal being thrown up are still more remote. Whales are numerous, yet how often do we hear of their being left stranded or their bones found? It must be remembered that whales ashore are helpless and cannot wriggle back, but an animal with legs or flappers is able to do so, and is therefore in no danger. And when a creature dies in the sea the meat must be stripped from the bones in a very short time, and the latter

sink to the bottom. The chances of their being dredged up are too remote to be considered. Even on land, where a carcass may lie and rot and the bones remain, dead bodies are very scarce. I believe there is but a single record of a dead elephant being found in Africa; and has anyone ever come across the remains of a crocodile even by the rivers where they swarm? In England a dead donkey is almost a synonym for rarity.

So much for objections: now for the explanations. Commander Gould has tabulated twenty-seven suggested explanations put forward by the anti-sea serpent party, which he discusses critically and dismisses. All unprejudiced readers must agree with him. The notion of a string of deliberate hoaxes, or even of mass hallucination, may be dismissed at once. The evidence has been given by serious men, educated and responsible, and, as the commander notes, with no 'expectant attention.' They were not *looking* for sea serpents. Inanimate objects may account for some isolated cases, but they do not move except with the stream. A tree in the water may deceive a landsman, but a sailor never. The 'school of porpoises' and 'flight of bird' theories can be dismissed for the same reason; they are applicable only to landmen.

The following single animals have been suggested, and may be rejected, for in no case do the particulars fit, nor are they likely to deceive such observers as naval officers: rorqual, sperm-whale, basking-shark, tunny, sea elephant, manatee, sea snake, ribbon-fish, black snake, boa, monstrous super-conger, beluga, giant turtle, or some giant pinniped or member of the seal family. The only reasonable suggestion is the giant squid (*Architeuthis*), referred to previously. The commander might have included another, which does, in fact, account for some reported monsters. It is suggested in the article on the Sea Serpent in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1911 ed.) that the legendary sea monster of the Arab geographers, the *tinnin*, the Hebrew *tannin* (Ps. cxlviii. 7), 'whale' or 'dragon,' might be appropriately rendered *waterspout*. There is a curious confirmation of this in a recent book, the *Inland Waters of Africa*, by S. and E. B. Worthington, where the authors describe the 'monstrous and terrible sea serpent of the Victoria Nyanza . . . which 'announces its arrival with a terrible roar . . . and swallows up human beings, canoes and everything in its path.' This, the authors explain, is beyond doubt the waterspouts to which the lake is subject. Some writers have seriously suggested a *Plesiosaurus* or other survivor from the Age of Reptiles. I refuse to swallow an explanation far less digestible than the sea serpent itself.

So much for destruction: now for construction. Certain striking points stand out of the evidence.

(1) Pontoppidan's drawing, Captain M'Quhae, of the *Dædalus*, Dr. Matheson, and most of the Norwegian reports, but not all, allude to the existence of a *mane*, *frill* or *ruffle* on the neck, recalling a *bunch of seaweed*.

(2) Captain Pearson, of the *Osborne*, saw a row of *triangular points like a toothed crest on the back*. Captain Cringle saw *short fins on the back*. Captain Dean saw a *triangular dorsal fin*. Messrs. Meade-Waldo and Nicholls saw an enormous *crinkled fin, flabby like rubber*. The Nova Scotian cases report *small lumps on the back*. Some of the New England reports also allude to *humps on the back*. These allusions to a sort of dorsal fin are always on the biggest specimens. The fin is not kept rigid with rays like that of a fish, but is soft and flabby.

(3) Egede's specimen had *flappers*. Matthews saw *two armlet appendages*, dangling. Bell saw *flappers*, and he and Matheson refer to a *lizard-like body*.

(4) The smallest are described as from 18 to 20 feet in length, but many accounts give 60 feet, and some run to 100 feet. The difficulty in estimating size at sea is notorious. Even a sea serpent is young once.

(5) The presence of a fin on the back seldom coincides with the fringe on the neck, nor is it recorded for the smallest specimens.

(6) Egede's specimen, which *blew like a whale*, had no fringe.

(7) They often occur near the coast, as would be expected with lizard-like creatures with legs or flappers.

(8) Most agree in giving the creature a dark brown or blackish back with paler under-surface, with white markings, the skin not scaly, but sometimes rough.

(9) The big ones, 60 to 70 feet long, from the Sound of Sleat, have neither fin nor crest.

(10) Most agree in giving the animal a very flexible body, with a long neck, small head and big eye.

Now, is there any known creature which fulfils all these conditions? Is there any animal of reptilian appearance with four flappers or feet which lives in the water, yet sometimes blows like an air-breather, which *sometimes* has a frill or mane round the neck and *sometimes* a notched crest on the back? All agree that it has a reptilian appearance; but have any known reptiles those strange plume-like fringes round the neck which have struck so many observers? Now, these are the key to the problem.

Have you ever seen a tadpole? Tadpoles are the larvæ, or young, of frogs and toads. They live in the water and breathe by external gills, which appear as paired fringes like plumes at the back of the head. Frogs and toads are not reptiles, but belong to the class known as *Batrachia*, sometimes as *Amphibia*, which is characterised in particular by the gills of the larvæ,

which are replaced by lungs in the adult. Furthermore, normally they have four feet, each with five toes. I do not suggest that the sea serpent is a frog, but there are other *Batrachia*, a tailed group, which includes the salamanders, the curious axolotl of Mexico, the blind *Proteus*, and the efts or newts of our ponds. With the exception of the marine habitat and the great size, the general description of the sea serpent does not differ fundamentally from that of the newts. I see no real reason why our sea serpent should not be a hitherto unrecognised relative of the newts, adapted to life in the sea, developed to a relatively great size, timid and nocturnal in habit, and consequently seldom seen. This brilliant suggestion was put forward by Commander Gould in an article on the Loch Ness Monster in *The Times* of December 9, 1933, but he had no space to develop his argument, though his line of reasoning is clear.

Newts are lizard-like creatures with four legs, of which the fore pair develop first; the feet have five toes, which in one British species at least are webbed. The feet are pressed against the side when swimming to reduce resistance, which would give a big one a serpent-like appearance. Propulsion is by the tail, which gives the steady forward motion, such as described by many observers. The larvæ have three pairs of long, fringed, plume-like external gills, which are not lost till the very last stage of growth, in some cases being retained even into the adult stage. The colour of newts is greenish or chocolate-brown as a rule, with pale under-side, though the coloration, especially of the belly, is often very brilliant in the males when breeding. The texture of the skin is often rough, but not scaly. Finally, the adult male is provided with a notched crest along the back, which attains its greatest development during the breeding season, dying almost or completely away after the summer. In the winter our pond newts creep ashore, and hide under stones and logs or in holes in damp earth. They are carnivorous, and destroy great quantities of tadpoles, crustaceans, and insect larvæ.

So our sea serpents with fringes may be immature, the serpent-like ones adult, and those with fins or crest upon the back full-grown males in breeding kit. There is nothing incongruous with this description in any account of the sea serpent. *Magnificatis magnificandis*, the difference between the *Triton* and *Molge* of our ponds and the sea serpent consists only in the marine habitat and longer neck. So we may hope to be privileged to see the myth exposed, the truth established, reputations restored, and hypothesis yield to fact.

Does this reasoning apply to the Loch Ness Monster and give us a solution of that riddle? If we examine the evidence, we find the familiar expressions. The photographers who made the

film reported in *The Times* of January 4 saw 'seven or eight humps on the monster's back,' and it is reported that some of these humps are discernible on the film. One witness who saw it ashore said that it seemed to have something like a sheep on its back, presumably one of the humps seen vaguely in the dark. The latest witness, Mr. Grant, who saw it ashore (*The Times*, January 6) gives the fullest description. He saw two fore flappers, as well as two others which seemed webbed; he describes the tail as rounded off, and the total length he estimates at the very reasonable figure of 15 to 20 feet. He, too, reports two slight rounded ridges on the back. In the long neck and big eyes of this obviously nocturnal creature his description agrees with that of several early witnesses. The style of swimming as with paddles is described by the photographers, who stated that 'the most clearly evident movements are those of a tail or flukes,' as of a newt swimming with its tail. And it must be remembered that it is by no means the first recorded from Scotland. There is only one flaw in the modern evidence. Mr. Wetherall, who states that he found the spoor, describes it as having four toes. If this is accurate, the creature is an exception in its class, for all *Batrachia* which have limbs are five-toed. Even their very-great-uncle of the distant Permian period, the *Labyrinthodon*, who left his tracks upon the New Red Sandstone, had five; so that before the skeletal remains were identified, while this Permian monster was known only by his tracks, he was called the *Cheirotherium* (the Beast with a Hand).

This explanation, that the sea serpent, including the Loch Ness Monster, is a hitherto unrecognised large marine form of tailed batrachian related to the newts, must not be regarded as fantastic. The *Batrachia* are extraordinary creatures, highly adaptable, adopting all sorts of manœuvres to ensure themselves an existence. In one group, the Cæcilians, all the limbs, including the tail, have degenerated, so that they appear like fat, blunt worms. Another kind, *Proteus*, is blind, living in pools in the recesses of great caverns. Some kinds have even lost their lungs as well as gills, and actually breathe through the skin and mucous membrane of the mouth—salamanders of the sub-families *Desmognathinae* and *Plethodontidae*. *Ils sont capables de tout*.

The matter is of such interest to science that it is to be hoped that the zoological authorities of the British Museum will take action effectively, secure a specimen at all costs, and then replace the *jeux d'esprit* of correspondents of *The Times* by a scientific name and arrange 'MacNess' or the 'Nescio Squid' in his proper place in the scheme of living things.

MALCOLM BURR.

THE EXHIBITION OF BRITISH PAINTING¹

A MISSIONARY said to me, 'The first word to learn in any language is "Thanks",' and for this magnificent banquet we all owe gratitude to the labours which have collected so wonderful an array—unequalled since the Italian Exhibition. The joy and glory of these treasures fills the painter who now essays to comment on them with the conviction that, whether or no 'All great art is praise,' assuredly here all true criticism is praise. He will not need Goethe's rebuke, 'If you must criticise, do it on your knees.'

English craftsmen were for centuries famous: in illumination and in embroidery (actually called '*Opus Anglicanum*') they led Europe; their furniture has never been equalled. In painting our portraiture can stand with any; our landscape has never by any been approached. Critics have hoodwinked the humble English into the notion that painting is a minor *parergon* of their glory: *excudent alii*. But here are the facts. Yet hardly anyone went to the incomparable Exhibition of English Mediæval Art at the Victoria and Albert Museum; and too few of these magnificent works have reappeared here. One word of warning to a foreign visitor would be needed—it was not possible to make the collection absolutely representative. For one thing, the gallery is not nearly large enough: even so, he may wonder to find eleven portraits by Lawrence, only three by Watts; thirteen Boningtons; nine Ettys; rows of sporting pictures; only four Madox Browns; four Holman Hunts; eight Rowlandsons; no Cruikshanks; seven Townes; one Ruskin; so many Conversation painters; so few Blakes; and above all, so few Turners. I refer to these

¹ *British Painting*, by C. H. Collins-Baker and M. R. James (Medici Society, 30s. net); *English Painting*, by Charles Johnson (G. Bell & Sons, 15s. net); *A Short Account of British Painting*, by Charles Johnson (G. Bell & Sons, 3s. 6d. net); *A Short History of Painting in England*, by Miles F. de Montmorency (Dent, 6s. net); *English Watercolours*, by Laurence Binyon (Black, 7s. 6d. net); *Painters of England*, by D. C. Kaines Smith (Medici Society, 7s. 6d. net); *A Short History of English Painting*, by Eric Underwood (Faber and Faber, 7s. 6d. net); *The British Masters*, by Horace Shipp (Sampson, Low, 6s. net); *English Painting*, by R. H. Wilenski (Faber and Faber, 30s. net); *An Outline of English Painting*, by R. H. Wilenski (Faber and Faber, 2s. net); *An Introduction to English Painting*, by John Rothenstein (Cassell, 10s. 6d.); *A Brief Guide to English Painting*, by Nigel de Grey (Medici Society, 1s. net).

disproportions, not to indulge, but to forestall, cavil. First, with few exceptions, no pictures could come from the national galleries; and at the National Portrait Gallery remain Reynolds' great men, at Millbank remain the 20,000 Turners. Secondly, the date, 1860 (prudently chosen as the limit), cuts out the maturest work of Watts, Hunt, Madox Brown, Ruskin, Burne-Jones. Thirdly, though only immaturity follows, or frets at, Fashion, the committee is unborn that can exorcise her. One fashion now is the forcing of minor artists to undue prominence. The whirligig of Time brings round her revenges. Meanwhile, cherish an historical sense.²

English art has renewed its youth many times. When mediæval art died Holbein's matchless drawing created a new style, clear and observant, and lit by the beauty of the Renaissance. *Captain Lee*, *Anne Vavasour* or *Sir Howard Hoby* show a fine craftsmanship, and *Sir John Luttrell* an Elizabethan glory. Why should not our heroes be so painted? Vandyck, our second regenerator, taught a good style to Dobson and to Kneller, as *Sir Charles Lucas* and the *Countess of Mar* can show. But Hogarth was the first original British painter. Every living revival is a return to Nature. All art is rooted in experience and cannot live on abstractions. Abstract art is a contradiction. Nature was the teacher of Hogarth's art, memory the mother of his invention, moral instruction his aim. True, as Thackeray says, 'not one of his tales but is as easy as *Goody Two Shoes*; it is the moral of Tommy was a naughty boy and the master flogged him, and Jacky was a good boy and had plum cake.' Nor is it subtilised by sensibility. It is Hogarth's maxim (as Fielding's Dr. Harrison has it) that it is plain duty 'to protect an innocent person, and to bring a rogue to the gallows.' His limitations are too obvious to be important. England has two patron saints, St. George and John Bull. Hogarth was the Bull of painters. We can understand the disgust of Keats, yet surely enjoy Hogarth's never-failing life. He is not dull, however prosaic; and dulness is the first deadly sin of art. The second, vulgarity, he escapes by sincerity. Truth is never vulgar, though imitation always is. Granted, his characters are (as Lord Chesterfield said

² For the reader of English Art History, there are well-known monographs, few summaries. Mr. Percival Gaskell, the doyen and pioneer of lecturers, is unluckily not at the moment giving his admirable course on the English. His pupil, Mr. Charles Johnson, has written a very good book, the historical chapters of which are reverent, sound, catholic, and entertaining: Mr. de Montmorency has the advantage of being a painter, and his excellent book is recommended by Professor Gleadowe. These are the best I know. Semitic offers of mediation, of course, have not been wanting; one is simply a *Historia contra Paganos*—i.e., propaganda against the lovers of Nature; the other is more objective. Both fall into the fallacy of the 'progress' of art; and both are anti-Hellenic. *Sed magna est Veritas, et prevalebit.*

of Homer's heroes) 'frequently low,' but not his own zealous mind. His portrait of *Captain Coram*, of the Foundling Hospital, has great life. Nor is he without grace. Coleridge says his satire 'never extinguished his love of beauty.' *Wanstead Assembly* shows subtlety of colour with vigour of form. Yet it is true, as Lamb said, that 'other pictures we look at, his we read'; they are first, what Hazlett called them, 'historical,' and, he truly adds, 'equally remote from caricature and from mere still life.' If he had had only the still-life eye of some *genre* painters, his lack of the design and touch of Chardin, Vermeer, or Daupmier would be fatal. But he was too alive, and too truly popular.

He expressed new interests and energies. A whole generation of 'conversation-pieces' imaged the age. Stubbs painted not only horses, but people, with excellent truth, colour, and air, with enough composition to centre interest and to please; witness *The Salstontall Family* and *Col. Pocklington* and the beautiful *Reapers*. Devis shows less harmony but some vivacity. Zoffany sticks details together instead of designing; but he interests. The picnic party on the river is congested; but is it more crowded than Hogarth's *March to Finchley*, which we all enjoy? We have met every man, and especially every woman, on that boat. Could people be more English? And in that family is Granville Sharpe, one of the greatest philanthropists of his age, pioneer in anti-slavery. Such pictures speak for themselves and contain no mysteries. Such also is Frith's railway station—not a picture at all, and yet interesting. They lack that indefinable something which raises such pictures as Hogarth's *The Cholmondeley Family* and *High Life* above them; but let us remember that their craft is sounder than the second-class average of any other age of English painting. This good craft is typical of pre-mechanised England.

But its finest qualities are due to Reynolds, whose achievement and influence are (as is so rare) of equal magnitude. He had 'thrown himself at the feet of the great masters, and rose to share their throne.' Little men tremble to lose the originality they never had, and perish in their conceit. 'A wise man,' said Cato, 'can learn more from a fool than a fool can learn from a wise man.' The essence of a creative mind is its receptivity. It is this which raises Reynolds, Gainsborough, Turner, to supremacy. And of these Reynolds is perhaps the most original. All can see that Sir Joshua could be florid, vague in anatomy, careless with material; that, in fact, he had defects. But they were the defects of his qualities—above all, of his passion for experiment. 'Damn him!—how various he is,' says Gainsborough. A painter, who sees those 'peculiar marks which are generally defects' most clearly, sees far more his nobility, even in falling short, and his

perfection with every noble subject. When he painted Johnson, Keppel, Goldsmith, Burke, he reached 'the senatorial dignity' of Titian, the truth of Velasquez. His intellectual grasp is shown in his portraits of great men; here all too few. Sterne, Wharton, and the self portrait attest the great historian. 'Sitting in the chair of Rabelais,' (the words are Thackeray's) 'only more elegant and upholstered,' the philandering Shandy is before us: Reynolds has not glozed; though Sterne tells us the portrait was painted 'as a tribute to my genius.' The shape of the cheek cast by the hand draws the unmaskable satyr; and were ever eyes more consummately painted? The self portraits must all have been done as technical studies, and show that dominant interest in technique which is the hall-mark of the true painter. The richly modelled face, the set off to modelling by the flat atmospheric darks (a device in which Reynolds is unique), the painting of the D.C.L. gown (the most difficult of colour schemes to treat, as I have found) are all superb. His simplicity and breadth, his stress on the essential, his 'dilated eye,' are all worthy of long thought. Of course, only by copying can such things be really understood. No description can convey what I saw when I copied Reynolds' *Johnson* and *Burke*. The relation of all parts to the whole, the subtlety and power co-operant, are the work of supreme art. And what of the quality of his paint, unsurpassed even by Titian or Giorgione? This redeems some portraits of women, on whom the dear old bachelor has put a somewhat conventional sprightliness, a rather heavy coyness; these swathed and swaying, billowing and feeling fair ones, full-length and a foot longer, who topple as near absurdity as the misalliance of the grand style with their feathery heads can bring them, are yet painted with a creamy touch, as lovely as is lavished on *Nelly O'Brien*, or on the beautifully seen heads (here shown) of *Lavinia Countess Spencer* and *Georgiana Countess Spencer*, a touch as lovely as the complexions which they owed to England's country air. Every great quality is shown in the enchanting pictures of *Master Crewe* and of *Miss Crewe*, of the *Parker Children* (Theresa's face especially rich and subtle); still more perhaps in the painting of *Georgiana Countess Spencer* with her child *Georgiana*—the child's head unsurpassable; and above all in the famous portrait of the same child, herself a mother, then Duchess of Devonshire, playing with her baby. The monumental square design united with such life and movement, the strong painting of the woman's arm and hand and the delicate relief of the baby's against the sky; the treatment of the red curtain (no other painter has ever painted vermilion so beautifully), the lovely modelling of the heads, and breadth of the white drapery, all are worthy of long enjoyment.

Fortunately, his only peer among English portrait painters

needs at the moment no defence. Why make them rivals? If men would give half the zeal to enlarging their minds that they give to narrowing them, if they would open their eyes instead of their lips—but 'much virtue in "if".' Each is supreme in his own style—Reynolds in portraits of men and in rich paint, Gainsborough in portraits of women and in suggestive paint. 'How the devil does he get his effects?' said Reynolds. There is a 'kind of felicity' which carries him to his luminous colour, air and transparency, gracious and moving form. He had not the *dexterity* of Reynolds—his touch is strange and peculiar; he feels his way at times, then suddenly soars. He can fail more—even in colour (as in his vermilions—learnt from Rubens, not the Venetians). There is a haunting spirit about his works at their best which make all but the very finest look cheap beside them. It is unwise to hang Romneys or Raeburns beside either Gainsborough or Reynolds. Indeed, so exquisite is he, so persuasively does he penetrate the feeling heart, that comment seems cheap. But none can look too long at such pictures as *Captain Wade*, with its wonderful air, in spite of its colour; or the still greater *Lord Kilmorey*, a monumental pose and design vivified by feeling. Very fine, too, is the head of *Lord Chesterfield*. He is never so emphatic and sure in accent as Reynolds, but though this weakens his lesser works it only makes his finest the more wonderful. The self portraits, especially the one in which the eyes face us, are interesting. Still more is the head of his wife, in which the painting of the mouth and eyes is truly marvellous.

Everyone sees how individual Gainsborough is, and knows that, unlike Reynolds, he left no school. But, fully as much as Reynolds, he learnt from the old masters. He had not the unteachable egotism of small men. He may never have removed the layers from a 'Titian' and found a daub of George II. underneath, as Sir Joshua did. But he copied and studied—at Ipswich, Kneller and the Dutch; in Bath, Vandyck and Rubens. Without Rubens we should not have had Gainsborough's landscapes. Long may many linger before *The Harvest Waggon*, overflowing with living and exquisite drawing, magically lovely. And it is only the most beautiful of many. When Constable saw these things he could not withhold his tears.

Beside Gainsborough and Reynolds, who enhance each other but eclipse all lesser artists, the 'gentlemanly flimsiness' of the inconstant Romney looks pretty thin. Compare any face of his with theirs, and its empty form will be apparent. But there is permanent grace of line and colour in the *Leveson-Gower Children*, charm in the pose of *Miss Ramus*, *Miss Clive* and many others. There are some solid and monumental Opies, and a sensitive portrait by Allan Ramsay of his wife. All will welcome for the

subject Abbot's appreciation of *Nelson*. The infinitely sensitive and gentle genius, the angelic heart, Abbot has felt; the dæmonic and epic greatness his art could not seize. In his own day, and in ours, Fashion claimed Lawrence. When Reynolds said to him, 'You should study the old masters less and Nature more,' he spoke perhaps already too late. I would rather remember that it was for two works of Lawrence that Turner covered with lampblack one of his own which had outshone them, and that it was Lawrence who was one of the only men of his day who saw the greatness of Blake. It is not to belittle anyone, but to pay tribute of justice to truly great art, that I would ask for a comparison between Lawrence's high lights and flourishes or Raeburn's flat conventions with the painting of such things as hair, or metal, or velvet, or leather by such men as Reynolds, Gainsborough, or Watts—of such things, and of backgrounds. 'Any man,' said Titian, 'can paint a head; only a master can paint a background.' No man *need* paint still life at all; but if he does (and in a portrait he usually must), it must be done well. But Lawrence's *3rd Marquess of Londonderry* and *Lord Bathurst* are finely seen. Geddes will be a surprise to many. Hoppner's fine qualities and achievements are plentifully represented; though few have the breadth of *Mrs. Williams*. If Reynolds had painted *Admiral Hood* the shadow on the left leg would not have obliterated its stability in the design. Raeburn also should never be hung beside the giants; the ugly colour and flat form of *The Macdonald Children* is thrust on us by the exquisite art of Gainsborough's *Lady Sussex* beside it, just as *Col. Alastair Macdonald* would stand as a great work if our eyes were not drawn away by a Turner. Yet how good Raeburn is! Why could not all his works have been together? Indeed, why could not every painter have been hung by himself? *Lord Newton*, *Isabella Hall*, *Mrs. Campbell*, *Win Ferguson*, and, above all, *Dr. Spens* are great portraits. Look well into the technique of *Mrs. Campbell's* head; the variation of accent, edges, full and flat planes, all are masterly. With that generation the school of Reynolds died. The Victorians evolved a new technique, though if Watts' lovely *Lady Mary Fox as a Child* (of 1858) had come, as it should, we would have seen the transition. Partially we can see it in his large *Lady Margaret Beaumont*, the dress of which is most artistically treated—in paint as thin as Gainsborough's, and worthy of him. *Joachim* is a grand portrait in Watts' mature manner. And Stevens' famous and perfect *Mrs. Collman* is here too.

Landscape is the unique province of England, and, except for the deficiency of Turners, is splendidly represented. Wilson was its father, and his simple design has come again into vogue. The excess of large works by him here will, I fear, damage his reputa-

tion; and even the fine *Summit of Cader Idris* suffers when the 'paintiness' of its 'rocks' can be contrasted with the work of greater men, and cause us to forget what an achievement it was historically in attempting, with real power, a subject never touched either before or (strange it may seem) since. *The Welsh Valley* can hold its own in its impressive emotion; and *Shrewsbury Bridge*, richly painted and finely seen, is a worthy reflection of his mind. Needless to say, he was neglected all his life, and would have starved had not Reynolds got him the librarianship of the Academy. Even Gainsborough's landscapes hung unnoticed on his studio walls.

J. R. Cosens was the father of our water-colour school; and many may be surprised by the fine space and design of his best works. 'Cosens is all poetry,' said Constable. Crome has long been taken to our hearts—of the soil, solid; of the earth, English. His plainness is not prosaic, but truly poetical. He was helped by Opie and Beechey; he studied Hobbema, Cuyp, Wilson, Morland, and copied Gainsborough's *Cottage Door* (here shown); yet he was still painting sign-boards at £2 each when thirty-five, and had to support his family by teaching to the end. One of his pupils was no less a man than Borrow. Here *Carrow Abbey*, *Lime Kiln*, *Mousehold Heath*, attest his two virtues—truth and breadth. That he grew in feeling for design is shown by *St. Martin's Gate*. We know that he aimed at dignity—'John, my boy, if your subject is but a pig-sty, dignify it.' Yet a brother painter met him with his class far away in the Norfolk country, and exclaimed, 'I thought I left you in your school'; and Crome replied, 'I am in my school.' He created the Norwich tradition, whose fruits can here be seen in many works, in oil and water-colour. Cotman's pattern is perfect, and obtains the 'willing suspension of disbelief' for his tone and colour, but at his best truth is the more gladly received because so directly given. Directness has been rather a fetish of water-colourists: a good aim, but not one to which all else should be sacrificed. Some of the most beautiful effects both in Nature and art cannot be had, as Titian said, *alla prima*. Cotman's design is, however, so good that it needs a Girtin to draw us away by a greater depth and a creative power for which design is too cold a word. Let no one think he has entered into the grand and spacious spiritual world of Girtin's northern landscapes until he has gazed at them long. No one else has painted Durham in a manner so truly worthy, and the breadth of his open landscapes, the depth of his skies, the solemn stillness which the air holds, are an experience not only artistic, but religious. Whether if he had lived England would have acknowledged him is not answered by Turner's large-hearted words: 'If Tom Girtin had lived, I should have starved.'

English patronage (save for portraits) being what it is, it is likely both would have starved. Certainly one of our greatest men, Constable, is known and loved now only because his works were not sold in his lifetime and so passed to the nation; and only the goodness of Archdeacon Fisher kept him going. André Maurois tells of an old man who saw *Salisbury with the Rainbow*, and thenceforth daily stopped at the place where Constable saw it, in order to see it too. He tells it as evidence of the unique English love of natural beauty. Men who cannot see the sunsets of Turner (even if they 'wish they could') love to feel they see England as Constable saw her. Up to a point they do. To be a 'natural painter'—and the first in history—was his aim. But his emotional soul approached Nature with religious ecstasy—assuredly the true approach; and his pictures are therefore visions as much as are Turner's, Blake's, or Holman Hunt's.

It was this which changed into an immortal master a fumbling miller-boy who obeyed the call only at twenty-five. But it was by submission, not only to direct experience, but to the discipline of tradition, that his heat became our light. He copied and studied Reynolds, Hoppner, Gainsborough, Girtin, and the Dutch. Therefore it is that, although—nay because—to translate Nature was his aim, his achievement was also to translate himself. Here are early works, full of the unquiet strivings, artistic and human, of his celibacy. But in his forty-first year a lucky legacy put in his reach marriage, that greatest of earthly blessings, and at once he flowered into the triumphs of his prime. *The Leaping Horse* is perhaps his masterpiece; and would that the disastrous blunder of hanging apart the sketch and the picture could be retrieved, for hung side by side we could see in them the creative mind of the artist in the act. The later mannerism of excessive flicker is, it is true, apparent, but not yet as a fault. After the death of his wife in 1829, darkness descends again.

Darkness descended at last even upon Turner. An industry without parallel and an ascetic frugality saved the greatest of our painters from starvation, but did not save him from bitter solitude and neglect in his last and most prophetic years—relieved only by the love and understanding of Ruskin, whose great writings can open our eyes both to the riches of Turner's art and to the riches of Nature, but have been as misunderstood by pygmy envy as were the pictures they interpreted. Justice will be done him one day; it is not yet paid to the pictures. They have been scattered all over this Exhibition. They should always be 'kept together' as Turner asked. Some have been 'skied.' Of the water-colours, there may perhaps be about half the fair number of the late period, but a scarcity of the earlier. Of the oils, could

not *The Slave Ship* have come from America?—the picture which Ruskin translated in the most famous and splendid page he ever wrote, and of which he said that he would rather Turner were judged by that than by any other work.

It is perhaps especially the sea pieces which reveal his full might, and would most fittingly abound in an English exhibition. Love of the sea was his strongest passion—as became the painter who was almost the eponym of the English genius. We all know the *Vessel in Distress off Yarmouth* (now skied). He could have expressed the oncoming breakers with yet greater force, but with the restraint of real power lets the eye rest only on the essentials of the picture, the women on the shore, the poignant rocket in the dark sky. A fine expression of the weight and yet restless movement of the deep sea is *The Wreck Buoy* (skied): and another which shows his unique power to paint structure with surface—the surge with its foam is another picture in Gallery III. (skied)—'Van Tromp, going about to please his masters, ships a sea, getting a good wetting.' But this belongs to 1844, the *Yarmouth* to 1831, *The Wreck Buoy*, finally, to 1849. No one can follow Turner's mind into these wonders, still less into the last scenes in Venice, without a long study of his earlier works. *Conway Castle* is more understandable; yet its sea is already far beyond the reach of any other painter. The water-colour of the *Longships Lighthouse* is so marvellous that the time it deserves would leave the rest of the room unseen (though there are a dozen Turners neighbouring it which are almost as great). Calm and inland water, though demanding less mastery, has yet never been so wonderfully painted as by Turner—in *Linlithgow*, for instance, or *Whalley Bridge*—nor calm sea, as in many visions of Venice. Nor has any artist approached him in the painting of waterfalls. *The Falls of the Reichenbach* is as magnificent in the drawing of the rocks as in that of the water; someone said to me, 'It ought to be in a cathedral.' Turner is the Pheidias of the forms of Nature; he is the Titian of her colour. Nor is his form and colour less (but perhaps more) extraordinary in pictures of Alpine snowstorms, like one in the last room (skied), than in his richest spendours. Everyone will remember Ruskin's chapters on 'The Turnerian Picturesque,' in which the 'imagination penetrative' of his drawing of the Pass of Faido (here shown) is contrasted with a mere literal transcription of the scene. The English lakes he evidently saw in one of those rare moments when their weather is imperfect; *Derwentwater* not only omits Glaramara and Scawfell, but even the *silva superimpedentes* of Borrowdale, which Keats remembered and described:

Far, far around shall those dark clustered trees,
Fledge the wild mountain-ridges steep by steep.

And thus Turner saw them on the Alps, and painted them as no man has ever done.

There is one aspect of Turner's genius which is the crown of any artist's achievement, and will surely strike home here—his architectural design. Ruskin was concerned to prove his truth against those who doubted him and dubbed him *Splendide mendax*, and truth is the foundation of art; but Ruskin it was who said that it is design that proves the finished artist: if a picture is designed, it is art; if it is not, it is not worth looking at. And Turner was one of the world's half-dozen supreme and unfailingly creative designers. The strength of his mighty structure is missed by those who see design only when it is crude and obvious. Turner's is carried into the minutest touch, so that his paint, whether in oil or water, is in its quality the most beautiful the world has ever seen. Lastly, a majority of his pictures are poems not only of natural but of human life, and his art reveals a sympathy and humanity which place him with Rembrandt.

It was not foreseen by Reynolds that it would be in landscape that England would not only equal but lead mankind. But it is not true that his conscious hopes of founding a school of 'historical' art were frustrated—even if the pompous puerilities of the first attempts are the chief comedy in the history of art. Fuseli said of Lawrence's *Beelzebub*, 'It is a tanned ting, but it is not te tevil.' Compositions 'sententious, elevated, and dry' (as Fanny Burney said of Mrs. Siddons) alternated with the magnifications 'awefull and artificall' of Haydon and Martin, whose motto might have been, '*Ce qui est trop bête pour le dire, on le chante.*' Yet the hope of Reynolds was fulfilled by Blake, by Stevens, the Pre-Raphaelites, and Watts. And Michelangelo, the master of Reynolds, was the master of Blake, though he is in the English tradition in designing by line. His real and spontaneous inspiration I am the last to doubt. He was of all our artists, save Turner, the most dæmonic—the most obvious answer to any who still suppose that the century of Wesley and Mozart was an age of mere reason. Sublimity and Blake are (to all but the blind) synonyms; though to the most admiring—even if not on this side idolatry, the one step more into the not-sublime must have appeared sometimes, as in Milton and Tintoretto and Wordsworth. Whether he was even always in his right mind does not now matter. Nor does it matter that he claimed divine inspiration for a figure which was 'copied' from Michelangelo. I believe him. That is how inspiration works. I have no doubt at all that the Eternal Spirit of the Living God did inspire his mind, and the mind of Turner, and the minds of unnumbered, unremembered multitudes. Guidance can be indirect, and very

simple. There are plates in the *Book of Job* which are not only sublime, but also snug; the married co-operation which gave them birth is the union of the snug and the sublime. There are other designs which are visions of pure joy, or beauty, or peace, such as *The River of Life*. Others are an interpretation of the minds of poets—that is, illustrations—such are the Dante drawings and the *Pity*. Of what could man say more than can be said of *Pity*—that it adds light even to Shakespeare's light. Before the might, majesty, dominion and power which has freighted with prophetic awe the *Elijah about to Ascend in the Chariot of Fire* and *Elohim creating Adam*—before these we are dumb. But such a burden art could not sustain without a fresh technical impetus; and those who value Blake for his meaning may undervalue Stevens for his means. Stevens attempts no great subjects. His style is its own subject. To me his drawings give a quality of joy—which is a spiritual experience of reality—as high as almost any works in this Exhibition. To convey both the natural miracle of the human body and the intellectual power of the art which grasps it, as Stevens does, is as fine a work as art need do for us. He has emerged from the obscurity in which the vulgar taste of the Victorians left him for reasons partly negative; he is neither sentimental nor didactic—as many, even of those 'who waged contention with their time's decay,' were goaded by Victorian vulgarity into becoming. But his merits are positive and will live for ever.

Watts has passed into a cloud because he does consent to be—like Hogarth, Giotto, Botticelli, and many more—didactic; and his didactic allegories are not on the height of his real experiences. But his style is so great, his design and colour so grand and expressive, his mastery so indisputable, that he will find his high place in another twenty years. Here he is only represented by two portraits, one other head, the noble *Esau and Isaac*, and *Orlando and the Witch*. Equally little understood are the immortal Pre-Raphaelites. When I wrote the centenary article on Holman Hunt in *The Nineteenth Century*³ I admitted the excesses of those revolutionaries; and Mrs. Holman Hunt told me how fully she admitted them too. But only prejudice can let them weigh against their greatness. As with Reynolds, all the 'peculiar marks' were the price paid for experiment. Do people pause to reflect on the revolt that these young men attempted? Even at Burlington House, where both the Pre-Raphaelites and their predecessors have been selected, can we resist the growing oppression of frowsiness and dowdiness among the lesser classics? Even the great—save only Reynolds and, of course, Turner—are daily subsiding into the brown canvases on

³ 'Holman Hunt and Pre-Raphaelitism,' October 1927.

which they so unwisely painted. And then into the sunlight of summer suddenly we burst. But if only we had had room after room full of the bitumen and bombast and the pettiness and prettiness which stuffed the Academy of the 'thirties and 'forties, we would see the necessity of the revolt. Constable said in 1821, 'In thirty years English art will be dead.' These men revived it. They determined to jettison all theories and paint what they saw and loved. They loved Nature in every detail; so they painted her, 'rejecting nothing, selecting nothing, scorning nothing.' They loved also religion, and their religious works should have been here—*The Light of the World*, at least. No one defended them save Ruskin; and society nearly destroyed them. But they have left a group of intense pictures which are among the world's immortal treasures. The closure is applied at 1860, so the further glories of the illustrators and painters, now at length claiming for art the freedom of all experience, are omitted. The ignorant present will be succeeded by a future, blind perhaps to our own minor though necessary revolt, but seeing again the greatness of that most rebellious of all human generations, the Victorian. And by that time the claim of one of the rebels, Ruskin, may be conceded, that all the greatest qualities of English art are summed up in the name of Turner; and that Turner is at least very near to being the greatest painter of all time. With his pictures the last room is graced. 'Painting's a rum thing' (this was Turner's best speech). Appreciation is a rummer, if we do not go our ways feeling that if we had only one of these great painters—above all, if that one were Turner—we should be rich enough; but we have a great company, and the end is not yet.

DELMAR HARMOOD BANNER.

ECHOES IN THE POETRY OF A. E. HOUSMAN

IN a lecture last year delivered at Cambridge Professor Housman told of the way in which his poetry was composed. Many of his verses, he declared, came to him with little or no conscious effort on his part: they welled up, as it were, from the depths of his subconscious self; not a few verses, on the other hand, were the result of months of laborious polishing. He said, too, that much of his life had been devoted to reading the best literature of several languages.

In view of these avowals, the following list of echoes from other writers which may be detected by an attentive reader of his poetry may interest his admirers, for it indicates some of the influences to which he has been consciously or unconsciously subjected, and some of the poems which are so much a part of his mind that echoes of them have entered into that unconscious process of composition that he has described. With its aid, it is possible to point with some confidence to certain stanzas as the product of unconscious rather than of conscious thought. Moreover, the variety of these parallels is itself interesting, and their number, in view of the small quantity of Housman's published verse, surprising. Though they are many and various, and in some cases strikingly exact, it is possible to know well both Housman's poetry and the poems in which they are to be found, without recognising their existence; nor need recognition of them in the least impair the reader's sense of the strong individuality of every line that he has written.

The 'echoes' here recorded may be, roughly, divided into mere resemblances, not due to recollection of any specific passage; deliberate allusions to the work of earlier writers; and unconscious recollections.

To begin with resemblances to the writings of poets belonging to an age to which in his recent lecture Housman did not accord the highest praise: the eighteenth century. It is perhaps not surprising to find parallels in Housman's work to the poetry of Gray, a man with whom he has not a little in common.

The likeness comes out with especial force in the following pairs of stanzas:

Ah, happy hills ! ah pleasing shade ! That is the land of lost content,
 Ah, fields beloved in vain ! I see it shining plain,
 Where once my careless childhood The happy highways where I went
 strayed, And cannot come again.

A stranger yet to pain ! (HOUSMAN : *A Shropshire Lad*, XL.)
 (GRAY : *Ode on a distant prospect of*
Eton College.)

See the wretch that long has tossed Now the scorned unlucky lad
 On the thorny bed of pain Rousing from his pillow gnawn
 At length repair his vigour lost Mans his heart and deep and glad
 And breathe and walk again. Drinks the valiant air of dawn.
 (GRAY : *Ode on the Pleasure arising* (HOUSMAN : *Last Poems*, XVI.)
from Vicissitude.)

No better example could be found of how close a parallel may be without any approach to being a plagiarism.

More striking, and less to be expected, is the similarity to some of Dr. Johnson's work. Johnson's satirical advice to a young man who has just come of age is very much in Housman's vein :

Loosen'd from the minor's tether,
 Free to mortgage and to sell,
 Wild as wind, and light as feather,
 Bid the sons of thrift farewell . . .
 Wealth, my lad, was made to wander,
 Let it wander as it will ;
 Call the jockey, call the pander,
 Bid them come and take their fill.¹

Besides this, Johnson has left a poem which might almost have been evoked by reading *A Shropshire Lad* :

Hermit hoar in solemn cell
 Wearing out life's evening gray,
 Strike thy bosom, sage, and tell
 What is bliss, and which the way.
 Thus I spoke, and speaking sigh'd,
 Scarce repress'd the starting tear,
 When the hoary sage replied,
 Come, my lad, and drink some beer.

Those already quoted belong to the first class of echoes above defined : general resemblances ; the 'echoes' that follow are allusions to literature with which everybody is familiar—Shakespeare, Milton, the Bible, the Classics. Housman often takes a well-known phrase or line from these sources and places it in a context where it is unexpected, or has a different meaning from that with which it was originally used. He takes the familiar lines which tell us that

¹ Attention is called to the resemblance of Johnson's poem to the work of Housman in *Words and Poetry*, by G. H. W. Rylands, Hogarth Press, 1928, p. 44.

He who fights and runs away
 Lives to fight another day

changes a single word, and uses them to point a very different moral :

. . . the man that runs away
 Lives to die another day.

(*A Shropshire Lad*, LVI., stanza 3.)

So, in an often-quoted couplet, he recalls Milton's purpose almost in Milton's words (*Paradise Lost*, I., 26) only to tell us that something else fulfils it better (*A Shropshire Lad*, LXII., 22) :

And malt does more than Milton can
 To justify God's ways to man.

Not all his quotations have this ironical twist. Sometimes a well-known phrase is simply turned to verse and elaborated, as when 'the primrose way to the everlasting bonfire' (*Macbeth*, II., iii.) becomes (*Last Poems*, XXXI., 30)

. . . the lovely way that led
 To the slime pit and the mire
 And the everlasting fire.

'Food for powder, food for powder,' says Falstaff (*Henry IV*. Pt. I., IV. ii.) ; 'they'll fill the pit as well as better' ; and so the soldiers on the march in *A Shropshire Lad*, XXXV., are 'Dear to friends and food for powder.'

It is, however, with Shakespeare's songs rather than with the rest of his work that Housman's poems are to be compared ; one of these, the Dirge in *Cymbeline* ('Fear no more the heat o' the sun'), seems to have exercised an especial influence on the poet's mind ; apparent reminiscences of it occur in no less than three separate poems : 'Fear the heat o' the sun no more' (*A Shropshire Lad*, XLIII., stanza 8) is a direct allusion, and the 'golden friends' of *A Shropshire Lad*, LIV.—the 'rose-lipt maidens' and 'lightfoot lads'—like the 'golden lads' of *Last Poems* (II., stanza 2), are reincarnations of the 'golden lads and girls' of Shakespeare. Of Imogen it was said,

Thou thy worldly task hast done,
 Home art gone, and ta'en thy wages ;

so the army of mercenaries (*Last Poems*, XXXVII.) 'took their wages and are dead' : the words are almost the same, but 'wages' has gained an ironical implication which it lacked in its original context.

Several other resemblances of Shakespeare's songs may be noted : the country wooing described in *A Shropshire Lad*, V., might be that of the 'lover and his lass' in *As You Like It*

(V., iii.), and the talk of Shakespeare's pair of lovers ('How that life was but a flower') is echoed by Housman's ('Ah, life, what is it but a flower?'). The line (*A Shropshire Lad*, XLI., 16) 'Lady smocks a-bleaching lay' unites ideas from two lines in a song in *Love's Labour's Lost* (V., ii.), 'Lady smocks all silver-white' and 'maidens bleach their summer smocks.'

Few of Shakespeare's songs, however, are such careful works of art as are Housman's poems. It is rather to Milton that Housman owes the perfection of his technique, and there are in his poems several indications of his familiarity with Milton's work. Here we step into the field of apparently unconscious recollection. Two lines, far apart in his poems, both recall the same couplet from *Comus* (139-140): the image, both in *A Shropshire Lad*, LV., stanza 4, 'Day looks down the eastern steep,' and in *Last Poems*, XXI., stanza 1, 'Up from India glances The silver sail of dawn,' may be due to unconscious recollection of

The nice Morn, on th' Indian steep
From her cabin'd loop hole peep.

and another line from *Comus* may have been in the poet's mind when he wrote (*Last Poems*, XIX., stanza 4):

Oh, to the bed of ocean,
To Africk and to Ind,
I will arise and follow . . .

for in *Comus* (606) we find the same continents thus united in a similar context: 'Twixt *Africa* and *Inde*, I'll find him out.' More obvious than either of these parallels is the likeness of the ending of Housman's *Epithalamion* (*Last Poems*, XXIV.)—

And in silent circle round
The thoughts of friends keep watch and ward,
Harnessed angels, hand on sword—

to that of Milton's *Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity*:

And all about the courtly stable
Bright harness angels sit in order serviceable.

In view of these parallels, it is interesting to refer to Housman's opinion of 'our two greatest poets,' Shakespeare and Milton, given in a lecture delivered many years ago.

We have only to read them [he says] to see what the classics did for one, and what the lack of the classics did for the other. The dignity, the sanity, the unfaltering elevation of style, the just subordination of detail, the due adaptation of means to ends, the high respect of the craftsman for his craft and for himself, which ennoble Virgil and the great Greeks, are all to be found in Milton, and nowhere else in English literature.

And he concludes that 'Virgil and the Greeks would have made Shakespeare, not merely a great genius, which he was already, but, like Milton, a great artist, which he is not.' *A Shropshire Lad* and *Last Poems* are clearly the work of a writer who learned his art in the same school as Milton—the school of Virgil and the Greeks.

One, indeed, of Housman's poems recalls at once both Virgil and Milton: this is the strange poem *Hell Gate*. It is impossible to resist comparing this poem with two of the most famous descriptions of Hell in literature—those contained in the sixth book of the *Aeneid* and the second book of *Paradise Lost*. With the description of the walls of Hell as seen upon approach:

Wall and rampart risen to sight
Cast a shadow not of night,
And beyond them seemed to glow
Bonfires lighted long ago . . .
And against a smoulder dun
And a dawn without a sun
Did the nearing bastion loom . . .
Ever darker hell on high
Reared its strength upon the sky—

may be compared the description in Virgil (*Aeneid*, VI., 549-554):

Moenia lata videt triplici circumdata muro,
quae rapidus flammis ambit torrentibus amnis . . .
porta adversa ingens solidoque adamante columnae,
vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi excindere bello
caelicolae valeant; stat ferrea turris ad auras . . .

Milton's description (*Paradise Lost*, II., 643-8) is closer still to Virgil, and with Milton Housman has in common the guardian figures of Sin and Death, the former of whom, like Milton, he calls the 'portress,' and the key left in the guardian's charge. No enumeration of particulars, however, will explain the relation of these three descriptions, and, closely though in many respects they resemble each other, not one of the three depends for its effect on anything that it has in common with the others.

A lifetime spent in the study of classical literature can hardly fail to affect a writer's style. On Housman its deepest effect has perhaps been negative, by way of restraint rather than by way of inspiration; the example of the best writers in Latin and Greek may have helped him to his economy of words and directness of expression. Direct evidences of classical reading are few; in one poem, however, classical influence extends to detail: that is the *Epithalamion* in *Last Poems* (XXIV.), in which there are clear echoes both of Catullus and of Sappho. The opening

He is here, Urania's son,
Hymen come from Helicon

is practically the same as that of Catullus LXI.:

Collis o Heliconei
cultor, Uraniae genus

and the lines (17-20)

All whom morning sends to roam,
Hesper loves to lead them home.
Home return who him behold,
Child to mother, sheep to fold . . .

are almost a translation of Sappho's fragmentary Epithalamion (ed. Lobel, p. 46):

* Ἐσπερι πάντα φέρων δσα φαίνολις ἐσκίδας' ἄδωε,
φέρεις διν, φέρεις αἶγα, φέρεις ἄπυ μᾶτερι παῖδα.

One other classical parallel deserves quotation: in *Last Poems*, XXV., stanza 2, the lines

I took my question to the shrine that has not ceased from speaking,
The heart within, that tells the truth and tells it twice as plain;

seem to be a recollection of Lucretius, I., 737-739 (= V., III-III2):

multa bene ac divinitus invenientes
ex adyto tamquam cordis responsa dedere
sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripode ex Phoebi lauroque profatur.

More frequent than classical parallels are allusions to the Bible, and here again the allusions themselves reinforce a similarity which is apparent in poems from which no exact parallel can be quoted. In *A Shropshire Lad*, XLV. ('If it chance your eye offend you, Pluck it out . . . And if your hand or foot offend you, Cut it off'), the quotation is almost word for word: elsewhere it is thinly veiled; the thought in *A Shropshire Lad*, XII., stanza 2:

If the heats of hate and lust
In the house of flesh are strong,
Let me mind the house of dust
Where my sojourn shall be long.

is to be found, with a difference, in Ecclesiastes xi. 8: 'If a man live many years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember the days of darkness, for they shall be many,' and to understand *Last Poems*, V., stanza 5:

. . . in the grave, they say,
Is neither knowledge nor device
Nor thirteen pence a day.

we must look again to Ecclesiastes (ix. 10): 'for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave.'

On other occasions a quotation is introduced almost unawares: in the first poem in *A Shropshire Lad* it is possible to appreciate the irony of the couplet

The saviours come not home to-night:
Themselves they could not save.

before recalling 'He saved others, himself he cannot save'; and in *Last Poems*, XXIX., is a couplet—

Times enough you bled your best;
Sleep on now, and take your rest—

—with which a reader may become perfectly familiar before he remembers that the second line occurs word for word in the New Testament (Matthew xxvi. 45, Mark xiv. 41).²

The next field of reminiscence is very different from those discussed already, from the poetry of the eighteenth century, from the Classics, and from the Bible. Certain of Housman's poems recall the English and the Scottish ballads.

Some of these poems are written in an assumed character—usually the character who provides a title for *A Shropshire Lad*, and some of them (particularly those which deal with suicide or with death in battle or at the hands of the executioner) have attained a celebrity out of proportion to their merit and out of proportion to the space they occupy in the books where they occur. Examples of poems in this style are *A Shropshire Lad*, VIII., IX., XXIII., XXV., XXVI., XXVII., XXXIV., LIII.; *Last Poems*, V., VI., XIII., XIV. Several of these poems have an obvious prototype (in spirit rather than in subject) in the ballad; of these the two best examples are *A Shropshire Lad*, VIII., the farewell of a boy who has killed his brother in the hay-field, and LIII., the story of a suicide's visit to his love.

Another poem also recalls *The Queen's Marie*; in both, the speakers, on the eve of death, revert (though in a different spirit) to the day of their birth and the feelings of their parents—

The night my father got me	O little did my mother ken,
His mind was not on me;	The day she cradled me,
He did not plague his fancy	The lands I was to travel in
To muse if I should be	Or the death I was to dee!
The son you see.	<i>The Queen's Marie.</i>

The day my mother bore me
She was a fool and glad . . .
(*Last Poems*, XIV).

² It has been pointed out to me, by Mr. Faucett, of New College, that the words 'A dead man out of mind,' which occur in the last poem in *A Shropshire Lad*, are also to be found in *Psalms* xxxi, 12, an interesting example of how an echo from the Bible can fit its new context so well as to escape the notice of most readers.

The True Lover is perhaps more like a ballad than any other poem in *A Shropshire Lad* or *Last Poems*, both in the story it tells and in the straightforward dialogue in which that story is told. The language is not quite that of the ballad; there are a prefatory and a concluding stanza which are alien to the ballad form, but by reason of its spontaneity the poem is far more like a ballad than poems written by authors who have deliberately taken the ballad for their model and formed according to that model their diction and their manner of narration. Comparison of two pairs of stanzas will show at once the similarity and the difference:

' Oh lad, what is it, lad, that drips Wet from your neck on mine ? What is it falling on my lips, My lad, that tastes of brine ?' ' Oh like enough 'tis blood, my dear, For when the knife has slit The throat across from ear to ear 'Twill bleed because of it.' (<i>A Shropshire Lad</i>, LIII., stanzas 7, 9.)	' What ails thee now ? ' Lord Thomasine said, ' Methinks you look wondrous wan ; You used to have as fair a colour As ever the sun shone on.' ' Now, are you blind, Lord Thomas,' she said, ' Or can't you very well see, My own heart's blood, so clear and red, Runs trickling down to my knee ?' (<i>Lord Thomasine and Fair Ellinor</i>.)
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The similarity of the situations—the simplicity and vividness with which they are depicted, the absence from either description of any ornament or comment, an irony which is perhaps the result of the foregoing characteristics—all bring these pairs of stanzas closer together than would any trick of diction or refrain, any of that affection of simplicity with which some writers have tried to ape the poetry of an earlier age.

There are in Housman's work resemblances not only to ballads, but to the work of a writer who himself owed something to the influence of ballads. Between Housman and Scott the actual parallels are few. But the likeness of the following lines (from a *Song* in *The Betrothed*) to such poems as *Reveille* (*A Shropshire Lad*, IV.) is unmistakable:

Soldier, wake—the day is peeping,
Honour ne'er was won in sleeping,
Never when the sunbeams still
Lay unreflected on the hill . . .
Arm and up—the morning beam *
Hath called the rustic to his team.

One song in *The Lady of the Lake* recalls in particular a

* Cf. ' When I meet the morning beam ' : *A Shropshire Lad*, XLIII.

poem in *Last Poems* both in idea and, at one or two points, in expression:

Soldier, rest ! thy warfare o'er,
Sleep the sleep that knows not breaking :
Dream of battled fields no more,
Days of danger, nights of waking.
In our isle's enchanted hall,
Hands unseen thy couch are strewing.
Fairy strains of music fall,
Every sense in slumber dewing.
Soldier, rest ! thy warfare o'er,
Dream of fighting-fields no more :
Sleep the sleep that knows not breaking,
Morn of toil, nor night of waking.
(Canto II., xxxi.)

With this may be compared, as a whole, *Last Poems*, VIII., and especially the opening,

Soldier from the wars returning,
Spoiler of the taken town,
Here is ease that asks not earning ;
Turn you in and sit you down.

and two couplets from the concluding stanzas

Now no more of winters biting,
Filth in trench from fall to spring . . .
Soldier, sit you down and idle
At the inn of night for aye.

One more example may be given. Housman uses with marked effect the device of *double entendre*—a sort of tragic irony. Nowhere is it more successful than in *Bredon Hill*; the bells call the lovers to church, and one of them answers that, on their wedding day, they will ' hear the chime, And come to church in time.'

But when the snows at Christmas
On Bredon top were strown,
My love rose up so early
And stole out unbeknown
And went to church alone.

They tolled the one bell only,
Groom there was none to see,
The mourners followed after,
And so to church went she
And would not wait for me.

In the last verse of the poem the phrase ' come to church ' has gained a meaning, never explicitly stated, which in the beginning

it lacked; the whole poem is an elaborate and moving play upon these words. The same sort of *double entendre*⁴ on the same subject occurs in Scott's *Proud Maisie*:

'Tell me, thou bonny bird,
When shall I marry me?'
'When six braw gentlemen
Kirkward shall carry ye.'

Parallels with the work of nineteenth-century poets do not seem to occur often in Housman's work. Matthew Arnold is an exception. Nor is this surprising. Matthew Arnold, though not a classical scholar, was, like Housman, thoroughly familiar with classical literature. He extolled it as a model to others, he used it as a model himself. Like Housman, he took a melancholy view of human life and had not a very high opinion of the nature of most human beings. It is true that he felt what he calls 'a longing to enquire into the mystery of this heart,' not, like Housman, a desire to turn his eyes away from the mystery towards what can best be enjoyed by the unreflecting. It is true that he liked to end on a note of hope: Empedocles' song ends with the reflection that if we may not dream, at least we need not despair; *The Last Word* ends with the assertion that the forts of folly will fall, even if we perish in attacking them. Housman does not seem to entertain such a hope; but with the predominant tone of these two poems he seems to be in sympathy.

The thought behind the lines

Once read thy own breast right
And thou hast done with fears!
Man gets no other light,
Search he a thousand years.

is exactly that which underlies *The Oracles* (*Last Poems*, XXV.):

I took my question to the shrine that has not ceased from speaking,
The heart within, that tells the truth, and tells it twice as plain;

If this kindred outlook attracted Housman to the poems of Matthew Arnold, the following parallels may be accounted for as actual recollections of the earlier poet by the later:

All Etna heaves fiercely	His forest fleece the Wrekin
Her forest clothed frame	heaves;
(<i>Empedocles on Etna.</i>)	(<i>A Shropshire Lad</i> , XXXI.)

⁴ Cf., too, *Romeo and Juliet*, IV., v., 33, after the discovery of Juliet's supposed death:

FRIAR LAURENCE. Come, is the bride ready to go to church?
CAPULET. Ready to go, but never to return.

Some bondage of the flesh or mind	When shall this slough of sense be
Some slough of sense.	cast,
(<i>Empedocles on Etna.</i>)	This dust of thoughts be laid at last,
	The man of flesh and soul be slain.

(*A Shropshire Lad*, XLIII.)

In the last example there is a thought in common, but little other resemblance; in Arnold's *The Last Word* both thought and form resemble Housman's work:

Creep into thy narrow bed,
Creep, and let no more be said.
Vain thy onset! all stands fast!
Thou thyself must break at last.

Let the long contention cease!
Geese are swans, and swans are geese.
Let them have it how they will!
Thou art tired; best be still.

They out-talked thee, hiss'd thee, tore thee?
Better men fared thus before thee!
Fired their ringing shot and pass'd,
Hotly charged—and broke at last.

Charge once more, then, and be dumb!
Let the victors, when they come,
When the forts of folly fall,
Find thy body by the wall!

Side by side with Matthew Arnold, as a poet who may subterraneously, so to speak, have exercised an influence on Housman's mind, may be mentioned Robert Louis Stevenson; both were authors, it is not rash to conjecture, who formed a large part of Housman's early reading.

The resemblance between Housman and Stevenson may well be shown by comparing the following stanzas:

Farewell fair day and fading light:
The clay-born here, with westward sight,
Marks the huge sun now downward soar.
Farewell. We twain shall meet no more.
(*Songs of Travel*, XXIV.)

The son of woman turns his brow
West from forty counties now,
And, as the edge of heaven he eyes,
Thinks eternal thoughts, and sighs.
(*Last Poems*, I.)

Cf. *Last Poems*, II., stanza 3:

'Tis sure much finer fellows
Have fared much worse before.

'The clay-born here, with westward sight' is the very diction of Housman, and the following stanza, from *Underwoods*, II., might almost be Housman's work :

On every hand the roads begin,
And people walk with zeal therein ;
But wheresoe'er the highways tend,
Be sure there's nothing in the end . . .

In their reflective poems both poets reveal much the same attitude of mind * ; both show a predilection for the same simple metres, both write as lovers of the countryside, and the admiration of the one writer for the other appears in a poem written by Housman on the death of Stevenson, into which phrases and thoughts from Stevenson's own *Requiem* are introduced.

Finally, one or two of Housman's poems recall particular poems by other authors. Kingsley's *Airly Beacon* has obvious similarities to *Bredon Hill* : in each, one of a pair of lovers reverts to days spent in the company of the other, who now is dead, on a hill which gives its name to the poem ; the differences are that one is written from the point of view of a woman, the other from that of a man—the one after, the other before, marriage.

More striking is the likeness between *A Shropshire Lad*, XIII. ('When I was one-and-twenty'), and W. B. Yeats's poem '*Down by the Salley Gardens*.' Both have the same theme—advice neglected in youth recalled, a little later, with regret—and both are constructed on the same model : two stanzas, the second stanza answering the first, the end of each stanza being in both cases a sort of refrain varied on its second occurrence :

{	But I, being young and foolish, with her would not agree.	
	But I was young and foolish, and now am full of tears.	(Stanza 1.)
{	But I was one-and-twenty, No use to talk to me.	(Stanza 2.)
	And I am two-and-twenty, And oh, 'tis true, 'tis true.	(Stanza 1.)
		(Stanza 2.)

Again, the prefatory verses ('We'll to the woods no more') to *Last Poems* are an obvious echo—almost a paraphrase—of Banville's *Nous n'irons plus aux bois*, and *Last Poems*, XXX. (*Sinner's Rue*), may well have been suggested by Heine's *Lyrisches Intermezzo*, LXII. :

Am Kreuzweg wird begraben
Wer selber sich brachte um ;
Dort wächst eine blaue Blume,
Die Armesünderblum.

* Compare, for instance, allowing for differences not only in language, Nos. VII.-IX. in the Scots poems in *Underwoods* with No. XII. of *Last Poems* ('The laws of God, the laws of man').

Am Kreuzweg stand ich und seufzte ;
Die Nacht war kalt und stumm.
In Mondschein bewegte sich langsam
Die Armesünderblum.

In this is contained all the setting of *Sinner's Rue* :

I walked alone and thinking,
And faint the night wind blew
And stirred on mounds at crossways
The flower of sinner's rue.

Where the roads part they bury
Him that his own hand slays . . .

but the personal application with which the poem continues is Housman's own.

Another parallel between these two writers is worth recording :

<i>Die Ilse</i> , stanza 5 :	<i>Last Poems</i> , XIX., stanza 6 :
Es bleiben tot die Toten,	The living are the living
Und nur der Lebendige lebt ;	And dead the dead will stay. . .

There are in different parts of *A Shropshire Lad* two apparent reminiscences of a poem by Andrew Lang, *Valentine in Form of a Ballade*. With the opening line of this poem, 'The soft wind from the south land sped,' compare the opening line of *A Shropshire Lad*, XXXVIII., 'The winds out of the west land blow,' and with stanza 5 of *A Shropshire Lad*, I. :—

And the Nile spills his overflow
Beside the Severn's dead

this couplet from Lang's *Ballade* :

In places of the princely dead
By the Nile's overflow.

If these parallels are due to anything more than coincidence they may be explained by the fact that the poem in question was printed in 1881 in a collection of Oxford poems entitled *Waifs and Strays*, with which Housman must have been familiar. No doubt the stanza stayed in the poet's mind longer than he was aware, and fragments of it reappeared mechanically when he came to write his own poem. Perhaps the same explanation may be given of two other isolated parallels from authors as different from each other as either is from Andrew Lang : 'Oh who would not sleep with the brave ?' is the refrain of *Last Poems*, VI. ; 'O who would not rest with the brave' is the last line of Burns's *Song of Death* : and 'In summertime on Bredon'—the opening of *A Shropshire Lad*, XXI.—is an echo of George Wither's

In summer time to Medley
My love and I would go.

Or it may be, as with almost any one of the resemblances in this list, that these parallels are due, not to conscious or unconscious recollection, but simply to coincidence.

This catalogue of echoes must not be taken as an attempt to suggest that 'sources' for Housman's poetry are to be looked for, or that he is an imitator of other writers, least of all that he is a plagiarist; nor does their existence in the least detract from his originality. Rather it proves how the mind, and so the work, of a great poet may be enriched by his familiarity with the poetry of others.

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THE MASQUE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

THE mystery which enshrouds the proceedings of our councils of defence has long been an anachronism, and is fast becoming a danger.' So wrote Colonel Repington in 1903. At that time we had just emerged from the South African War and were feeling far from exhilarated over the conduct of the campaign. So much so, indeed, that it became possible to awaken general interest in Army reform. And there took place not only the formation of a Defence Committee for the better co-ordination of the work of the two services, which exists to-day under the name of the Committee of Imperial Defence, but also a whole series of reforms so fundamental in character as to change the military organisation. These included, between 1906 and 1912, the formation of a General Staff for the Army, the creation of an Expeditionary Force, the reorganisation of the Reserves, the establishment of the Officers' Training Corps, and, finally, the formation of rough machinery for the co-operation of the Dominions. Had it not been for the standard of preparation which these reforms ensured, the sad story of the Great War would have been an even sadder one for this country.

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ever-growing justification as each succeeding war diary and history unfolds the true story of the war. In 1913 Lord Roberts was referred to by a responsible member of the Liberal Government as being in a state of senile decay and merely a foolish old man! Yet Mr. Lloyd George can write of the War Office: 'Had I not been a witness of their deplorable lack of prevision I should not have thought it possible that men so responsibly placed could have so little forethought.' Such quotations could be quoted *ad indefinitum* about every phase of the conduct of our services. Not only do they not tell the whole story—for political lack of foresight was just as great—but they tell it in a way that no Briton will yet accept as being true of the present, for he still has faith in his public men and will never believe that they would deliberately fail to fulfil their responsibility. It remains, then, to show that it is well-nigh impossible for them, with the best will in the world, to do so in present circumstances.

The greatest weakness which the last war exposed was the absence of any organisation which would co-ordinate the national effort as a whole. The War Cabinet was finally evolved and, while not perfect as an institution, was a great improvement. Another weakness was a similar absence of a co-ordinating organ for the fighting services. Thus the efforts produced were like those of an engine which constantly misses on a cylinder. Antwerp, Gallipoli and the munitions scandals will recall to most minds exactly what the 'misses' involved. The situation to-day is considerably more complicated than it was in those days, because war has become more highly developed and more all-embracing, and because there has been added to the Navy and the Army, as independent fighting forces, the Air Force. Yet there is still no organ to ensure concerted action. The Committee of Imperial Defence is alleged to be able to do so, but is incapacitated completely by its composition, and it has a bad record of past failure, for it has existed since 1904—that is, before any of the staffs of the fighting services. That it must fail again is equally certain when its defects are examined.

It will be readily admitted that it would be madness to attempt to use the Army, the Navy or the Air Force individually without a directing staff consisting of general, administrative and other branches. Yet the Committee of Imperial Defence claims to be able to direct all these forces in combination without any staff at all. It would be considered equal madness to attempt to direct the operations of one service by a committee having no executive power, and therefore being able only to advise, and consisting of completely untrained civilians and, to them, almost unintelligible departmental chiefs, each not fully conversant with the other departments and therefore thinking chiefly in terms of

his own. Yet this is how this Committee is composed, and this is how it proposes to direct the operations of the three services.

This is the root of all our troubles and the explanation of our present defencelessness. For this Committee is responsible for what it cannot do, and certainly does not do. From it the Government is supposed to receive a comprehensive view on national defence and a specification of the requirements to enable it to be carried out. This would involve the maintenance of naval, military and air forces in certain proportions, and therefore the allocation of Government grants in corresponding proportions. It would also involve the working out of these proportions in accordance with combined plans, and these plans must of course be based on the results of practical experience. But, since there is no central or combined staff, there is no body to prepare these plans. There is, for the same reason, no body to act as arbiter in the only alternative course possible—the submission of three plans prepared in the individual Ministries—or to direct the combined training from which practical experience must be gained. Only last year there took place the first exercise in which the Navy and the Air Force combined as one defence force. Therefore there can be no scientific allotment of strength. The three Chiefs of Staff have spent all their lives in their own service and have adopted its mode of thought. It is not humanly possible for them suddenly on being appointed to this Committee to change the attitude of a lifetime at the advanced age at which they reach their posts, or to achieve strategic omniscience at will. Their strategic conception, therefore, remains military, naval or air, whereas it should be a combination of the three. As regards the Ministers who complete the Committee, it is only necessary to quote one fact. The chairman, who is the Prime Minister, when asked recently in the House of Commons whether the Committee co-ordinated the Estimates, replied that he did not know.

This organisation is, then, incomplete, in that it has not a staff which can and should co-ordinate the technical claims and plans for presentation to political authority, and which can direct the combined forces of the country. This staff is the missing link in the present chain which should connect the politician with the services. Without it, even if armed to the teeth, we shall be relatively defenceless. Its creation to-day is as necessary as was that of the General Staff after the South African War. It may seem astonishing that the matter is not remedied. It is obvious, however, that the establishment of a central authority would render unnecessary two of the three existing Ministries. While this would appeal to the public, the response of those who would lose their posts is not likely to be hearty.

It will be clear, then, that under the present organisation there must of necessity be much triplication and overlapping in the services themselves and in the tasks allotted to them, a direct result of which is the enormous and largely sterile expenditure on defence. Another and a still graver result is that the country itself is not being organised. It may be impossible to predict the nature of a future war; but that only increases, it does not remove, the necessity for preparation. No plan exists for mobilising the industry of this country or for turning it over quickly for production of those things which defence requires, and requires quickly. A similar improvidence marks every phase of national preparation shown by painfully recent experience to be vital.

One particular example will show more clearly than much theory what lack of foresight means. London, it is agreed, is so vital a target that if it can be sufficiently disorganised the effect may be decisive to the country, and consequently to the Empire. Rightly or wrongly, it is claimed that air power can do this, even at its present stage of development, and the speed of that development is such that the prophecy of one year is the reality of the next. Other nations have assumed that air power can do what it claims, and there is not now a country in Europe which has not tested practically its plans for the defence of the civil population in its capital or large towns. The reason is that the co-operation of all sections of the community is required and that practice can therefore not be dispensed with. Yet we, with the most vulnerable city in the world, admitted to be defenceless by the Government, have not only had no practice, but have not even completed a plan, and have allowed our defences to degenerate to such an extent that they are useless. The inadequate units have not even been recruited up to 50 per cent. of their strength. The Government, when asked what is being or has been done, returns only evasive answers which, it is clearly hoped, may be construed favourably. From one source, sufficiently authoritative, it has been learned that the Home Office is now engaged on the preparation of a plan. Thus the absence of a co-ordinating unit for defence has kept London defenceless ever since the war, and now places its defence in the hands of the 'Jack of all trades' of Whitehall—the Home Secretary.

The same baneful effects of lack of central organisation and control are evident in the services themselves. For, being kept in separate Ministries, they tend to become, and do become, competitors and even rivals. They are forced to compete for money from the Exchequer, and are even on occasions asked for competitive 'quotations' for certain operations. In 1928 the War Office estimate to punish the Imam of the Yemén for encroachment was £6,000,000 to £10,000,000. This was con-

sidered high, and the Air Ministry was asked what it could do. Its estimate reached only the same number of thousands. The contract was awarded to the Air Ministry, but the fact that the operations were successful and cost only £8,500 is not likely to improve the relations between these two Ministries. It is, therefore, only natural that such rivalry should border on hostility and prevent, to a very large extent, that judicial approach to the subject of defence which the national interest demands. But for putting the services into this position the Government must be held primarily, if not entirely, responsible. The practical results are that, while we are spending £10,000,000 a month on our services alone, neither in the opinion of any of the services nor in that of the Government have they reached a satisfactory standard individually or collectively.

As regards the Navy, General Groves claims that 'there are four rôles of sea power which have been modified or seriously compromised by the evolution of the new Arm, namely home defence, protection of mercantile shipping, blockade and naval bombardment,' but that on the fifth rôle of the Navy, co-operation in Imperial defence and policing of the seas, air power has not yet seriously encroached. The arguments he deduces can be briefly stated. The Navy cannot defend us from air attack or from defeat if it can be achieved in that way; it is therefore no longer our sure shield. It cannot even defend itself from air attack, which can take three forms—the bomb, the mine, and the torpedo. To the usual argument that ships have got means of defence in guns, bulges, and speed, General Groves gives very full replies, which are that the air attack may be invisible, that bulges do not protect many vital parts, such as the screws and the rudders, and that all ships must come to rest some time. And he quotes distinguished admirals like von Scheer, who commanded at Jutland, and a naval architect in support of his contentions.

But even if ships can protect themselves, they cannot protect their auxiliaries such as tankers and other supply ships, nor can they protect commerce. And he shows that a bomb need not hit a ship to disable it, and that a mere 10-lb. bomb dropped in the vicinity will damage the outer bottom of a ship and send it into dry dock. Since these forms of attack are directed against a ship equally above and below water, and since they can be invisible, it would appear that they are well-nigh impossible to meet even for ships carrying all-round armour, since certain vital parts must always remain exposed. The main argument advanced by the Navy is a refutation of bombing accuracy. But even if at present insufficiently accurate, methods are daily improving, and the latest—the diving method—shows a decided advance. And ships can hardly defend themselves against invisible attackers.

Policing the seas and guarding the great oceans over which our commerce passes may still be a function of the Navy, as General Groves suggests, but it is an incomplete one, since that commerce is no use unless it can reach harbour. The rôle of the Navy in this, too, depends on the existence of secure bases, of which there are none beyond the reach of air attack, and of which we possess none which have been rendered immune. A naval blockade is no longer effective, nor yet an attack on the coast of an air Power. For the blockading ships would have to remain further off than they did in the last war, in accordance with the ever-increasing range of aircraft, and the blockading country would be exposed to reprisals by aircraft. For the same reasons, coast-wise attacks by ships would be prevented and the small number of aircraft which they carry for their protection easily overcome. These arguments, even if not accepted as conclusive, will satisfy most people that the naval situation has altered. Yet naval grants to-day still amount, as before, to roughly 50 per cent. of the total voted for defence. Our policy has not changed! Only last year the Admiralty representative used a comparison with our strength in 1914 to justify this expenditure at the present day. What has 1914 got to do with to-day or to-morrow?

General Groves doubts very much whether, on account of the vulnerability of ships, our Army could ever cross the Channel. It would not, then, be immune from air attack; nor, of course, would its communications, which necessarily include shipping, and without air supremacy on our side he sees the wholesale sinking of troopships. It is very doubtful whether our Army, organised as at present, could ever mobilise, as the concentrations involved by mobilisation provide such vulnerable targets. In any case—and this should be made quite clear—any attempt to use it would be doomed to disaster. It is still organised on the principle that a man can advance against machine-guns protected by barbed wire, as in 1914. But so little has been learned from the war that he is now supposed to be able to do this almost without artillery support. The Army thus depends for effect and continuity on 'mass.' Apart from its other defects, a 'mass' army requires the co-operation of the whole community, and is therefore vulnerable, more than anything else, by the general strike. It also requires at least ten days for mobilisation; and in that time the next war may be fought and won. For modern theory is that victory is achieved by overcoming the will of the civil population, thus inducing it to make its Government sue for peace. As far as the Army is concerned, then, the enemy will be immune for at least ten days, and, as this is true of the Navy too, neither of these forces can achieve victory in that period. The alternative is a long war.

Lest what has been said seem an exaggeration as regards the organisation of the Army, it may be as well to quote its present House of Commons representative and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Mr. Duff Cooper, speaking in 1932 on Army Estimates, said 'It [the Army] has never been designed to take part in great Continental wars. It has been designed for the purpose which it has fulfilled for so long, the purpose of maintaining order in the British Empire.' As, however, the 'design' of the Territorial Army is the same, we have no Army suitable for Continental warfare. Yet Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, presiding at the Haldane Memorial Lecture in May last, said that any organisation for war would be entirely based on the Territorial organisation. Certain critics, he continued, said they should organise for war in Europe, but he did not think the Army would be used for a big war in Europe for many years to come.

So here is an Army, admittedly unfit for modern war—for that is what European war is—and therefore unable to fulfil our solemn engagements under Locarno and other treaties, claiming that the only rôle which it can fulfil is the maintenance of order in the Empire. No threat to our existence is likely to come from the Empire, though minor troubles may. It is just as important to us to-day, if not more so, that the Channel ports should be in the hands of a friendly Power. Our strategic frontier is still the Rhine, but we are not prepared to defend it. The Army, nevertheless, absorbs nearly £40,000,000 a year, which is two-thirds of what the Navy leaves. Does the policing of the Empire justify such an expenditure? And is the public aware that we have no Army, but only a police force, for this is what these statements mean?

The remainder, 14 per cent. of the total expenditure, goes to the Air Force, which, General Groves claims, can provide us with complete security from navies or armies if sufficiently strong, which it is not at present. It can also, he claims, maintain order in the Empire. It cannot, however, protect London. It is clear that the Air Force has succeeded to many functions of the old Army and Navy, though not yet to all of them. The older services are suitable in their present state only for a protracted war, which no country (which remembers the last) will ever stand again—if only because there is now an alternative method. Like the older services, the Air Force will require to operate from protected bases. These will require garrisons, and ground forces will still be necessary. Protected bases will similarly be necessary in the oceans in the form of carriers, and these will require the protection of certain types of naval craft.

Attacking forces of the future are likely to be only such as
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can be flown to carry out certain missions of sabotage or occupation. The design of these formations will depend entirely on the nature of their task, and so there will be endless types, mechanised and otherwise. We ourselves have flown a battalion from Egypt to Iraq, and the Americans have shown that it is possible to fly light artillery. These are events which certainly cast their shadows before and warn us against too close adherence to tradition. There is a case for continuing to have all three services, but there is none for keeping them separate, disproportionate and unco-ordinated, or for the continued haphazard allotment and consequent waste of money. There are no great problems of strategy or defence, and very few minor ones, which can be solved without taking into consideration the interplay of the three services.

It is a terrible indictment of statesmanship that, while some £2,000,000,000 have been spent on defence since the war, we should to-day be destitute of power and without our old influence in the councils of Europe. It is a sad reflection that, in the process, by shortsightedness, we have failed to capture what was a possibility, according to General Groves—a world aircraft industry. German, Dutch, French and Russian air lines now operate over those countries where our influence was once so great and is still so necessary. And it is still a fact that trade tends to follow the flag!

While no Minister will make a statement to help the public mind towards a balanced decision of the rival claims of the three services, our disarmament proposals represent the view of the Government, and reflect, therefore, the official attitude. A White Paper has just been published showing the very latest proposals. Its purpose is to adjust as far as necessary the suggestions put forward in our Draft Convention last year, which I described in an article published in *The Nineteenth Century*,^a where its unsuitability for acceptance by other Powers was accurately forecast. The present adjustments show no modernisation of thought. Naval questions are practically excluded by the approach in 1935 of the Naval Conference. But in land forces our Government shows a desire to permit an increase both in effectives, in the duration of training, and in the size of weapons. And, allowing Germany to define the meaning of 'defensive' when applied to armaments, it proposes to allow her, and other ex-enemy countries, to have tanks and heavy artillery. It is clear, then, that there is no visible change in the official attitude on Army or Navy matters, except that the admission that tanks are a necessary part of modern equipment is a slight concession to mechanisation. The official view still supports the mass armies of yesterday.

^a 'Disarmament and the British Plan,' May 1933.

It is where the air is concerned that there is, in the White Paper, a vital change. For the ex-enemy countries are now to be allowed military aircraft. And Germany, with no colonial empire, is to have as many as France, or Italy, or Russia, or ourselves—namely, 500, which is 250 less than we possess at the moment, but represents only a fraction of what other Powers have. It is quite clear, therefore, that our official attitude has not changed so far as the importance of the air to ourselves is concerned, except that it tries to stifle development still further than it has so effectively done up till the present. It is also clear that it is the determination of the Government to maintain the older services in their present form and at their present size.

It seems necessary to add one word of warning as to what will happen should our proposals be accepted. The 'numerical' equality which the Government has accepted as a method of achieving parity—for what reason they alone can guess—involves considerable disarmament of France and no less than a triplication of the existing permitted German forces. When France and Germany face each other on terms of 'British' equality our commitments under existing treaties will have even greater moral weight and will be such as to require an alteration in our present military outlook. It will then be no longer possible to limit it to the maintenance of order in the Empire.

By voluntary reduction in the air to the proposed standard we renounce all power to protect our shipping through the Mediterranean or even the North Atlantic routes, except in so far as that can be provided by the Navy. Since this is a doubtful quantity, we are renouncing a guiding principle of our strategy in the past. Has the spirit of this race fallen so low that it will neither defend itself nor honour its commitments? Have we so lost faith in ourselves that we are prepared to seek equality with minor Powers and abandon our influence for peace? Have we become so indifferent to the value of the Empire as to leave it exposed to adventure? Has our reason become so clouded that we cannot distinguish between war and armaments, as we do between fires and fire brigades? Do we really think that we can carry out with safety an experiment with the British Empire which we would not dare to try even with London: for who would sleep safe without the police? If not, then we must at once realise that the disarmament proposals, the organisation of our Fighting Services, and the whole defensive policy of the Government must be fundamentally altered.

J. R. KENNEDY.

CRISIS IN FRANCE

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that most people must have found the recent events in Paris profoundly puzzling. What was it the rioters wanted, and what exactly were they fighting about? To the enemies of France (who are neither few nor insignificant) this sudden fratricidal outbreak—whatever its deeper causes—must have proved immensely gratifying. But to all those who are concerned about international peace, and especially to those who have been brought up in a tradition of love and admiration of France, the tragedy of February 6 is doubly painful: first, because it has revealed a situation far more serious than could ever be expected, and this at the very moment when the fate, not only of France herself, but of peace and civilisation, depends so largely on the stability and strength of French democracy; and, secondly, because an analysis of the events both preceding and following the actual explosion cannot but force certain very unpleasant conclusions even upon the most friendly observer.

The immediate happenings were roughly as follows: It had been discovered that a very shady person called Stavisky had committed a series of financial swindles, resulting in the loss of several hundred million francs to those individuals and institutions (some of them Government-controlled) that had trusted him. Furthermore, it had become apparent that this man—in spite of his record as a forger, a card-sharper, and a gaol-bird—had enjoyed the help, friendship, and protection of Ministers, deputies, high civil servants, the police, important members of the Bar, the Press, and Paris society. Moreover, this man had been previously convicted on several criminal charges and was only out on bail, the trial of the last case having been postponed no less than nineteen times, obviously as the result of influential interference from above.

Now, rightly or wrongly, it seemed that the liberal groups of the Left Cartel, who had won a majority at the 1932 elections and were responsible for the Government, since that date were incapable or unwilling to go to the root of the Stavisky affair and to punish those that were really responsible. Furthermore, whether by pure coincidence or owing to some deeper causes, the Radical-Socialist Party—the principal member of the *bourgeois* Radical

group then ruling France—seemed more closely identified with the scandal than any other party. The Chautemps Cabinet was overthrown because it did not appear to display sufficient zeal in shedding light on the Stavisky affair and because several of its members seemed definitely involved in it. But the successors of this Government fared even worse; they accumulated in the brief space of nine days the general hostility of Paris and became the victims of their own as well as their enemies' machinations. It must be realised that the composition of that Cabinet could not fail to make it unpopular at the particular moment. To start with, the new Premier, M. Daladier, belonged to the same majority group as his predecessor, though he definitely promised energetic sanctions and a ruthless overhauling of the French governmental machine. He had the reputation of being a man of strong will power, courage and patriotism, with an excellent past record, both as a Minister and as Premier. In attempting to form his new Cabinet M. Daladier first incurred considerable discredit by somewhat opportunistically trying to get the parties of the Right to participate; then, having failed to achieve that, the parties of the Centre; and, having met with a rebuff from them too, he ended by forming just another Left Cartel Government with the addition of two or three outsiders.

The next step that brought him even greater distrust and discredit was the nature of certain measures he proceeded to take against several leading civil servants who in the public mind were not identified with the Stavisky case. These were not simply removed from office, but promoted to other positions in a manner that definitely reflected on their personal honour. And the real victims of this administrative reshuffling were entirely innocent civil servants who were neither directly nor indirectly involved, but whose jobs were wanted. The most striking illustration of that was that sudden and absolutely unwarranted dismissal of the Director of the *Comédie Française* and the nomination as his successor of a prominent police official. Thus the Government made itself not merely unpopular, but also ridiculous. At the very moment when it most needed the police it dismissed M. Chiappe, the Prefect, in a brutal and clumsy way which won him sympathy in almost every quarter and made the Government still more odious. The impression that the removal of M. Chiappe from the Prefecture was the price to be paid for potential Socialist support—the Prefect's dislike of the Left and his affinities with the Right were no secret—made M. Daladier appear just a tool in the hands of the hated and much-maligned Socialist leader, M. Léon Blum. Having once embarked upon this extremely unwise course, the Daladier Cabinet could not very well withdraw. The really spontaneous indignation its actions provoked among

the population of Paris was seized upon by the Right to organise a popular movement against the Government. And the quite unprecedented campaign of abuse, libel and vilification in which the Right had for some time past been indulging was now given a new impetus. The conflict was carried into the streets, where processions and manifestations against the Government were organised. But the Government did not interpret these manifestations as being directed against itself, its policy, and its majority in the Chamber: it took the view that the Right was openly threatening the whole *régime*, the Republic, democracy, parliamentarism, the Constitution.

For the first time since the days of the Commune the French Government gave instructions to shoot at the rioters. A few score people were killed and several hundred wounded. The next day the Daladier Cabinet was labelled throughout France as a Cabinet of murderers. The Premier had to make up his mind whether he would resign or carry on the fight. It was clear that he would now have to face an onslaught compared to which the first shooting would appear child's play. He decided not to continue the struggle. Moreover, it has been whispered that the President of the Republic threatened him with his own resignation if the Cabinet remained in office. M. Daladier resigned, having in the short space of nine days committed more errors of judgment than could have been conceived possible, yet having obtained repeated votes of confidence from a discredited and futile Chamber. He has been replaced by a coalition of 'National Union,' the political combination that invariably takes over the government of France when there is a real national emergency.¹ The distinguishing mark of this latest Government is that it is presided over by M. Doumergue, formerly President of the Republic, an elder statesman of unique moral and political integrity, who seemed to have left public life for good when his turn at the Elysée came to an end three years ago. Thus a prognostication I ventured to make in these columns over a year ago has come true.² Having explained why the year 1933 would be a year of political and economic difficulties for France, I suggested that one day a National Government under this popular ex-President of the Republic would be formed, with various former Prime-Ministers participating in it.

With the exception of the extreme Right and the extreme Left, all parties are represented in the present Cabinet, and the new team includes Ministers who only yesterday were engaged in a bitter fight against each other. The Ministry has four-fifths of

¹ This process is explained in detail in my article 'France after the Elections,' the *Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1932.

² 'Reflections on France,' the *Nineteenth Century and After*, February 1932.

the Chamber behind it, commands the confidence that the Left Cartel no longer possessed, and enjoys the qualified support of the popular Press. Thus it can tackle the Stavisky affair and attempt to liquidate the internal political difficulties of the moment—at least, in their present acute state. Without a dissolution or new elections the old majority has been swept aside and a new one created. A basis for continuing the government of France on the old-established lines seems to have been found.

Yet it is perfectly obvious that all this is only one aspect of a very much deeper problem and that the present solution can only be a temporary one. The riots that culminated in the shooting of February 6 have revealed in the most brutal way the hold which moral and political dislocation has obtained over the souls of most Frenchmen, and the ever-widening breach between those who exercise authority and the rest of the country. It has become evident that there is something inherently wrong with the whole political and financial system of modern France, and no political party can claim to have come with any credit out of the long era of scandals and incompetence that has resulted in the present *dénouement*. Thus the job of the new Cabinet is not only to re-establish social peace, but also to pave the way for the realisation of most far-reaching reforms. Never was the alternative of evolution or revolution more clearly emphasised than in the recent occurrences in France.

Subsequent political developments have completely overshadowed the Stavisky affair, but since it was in a way the starting-point, although by no means the cause, of these developments, some observations on the scandal are essential. Every country since the war has had its full share of financial crooks and swindlers of all kinds. To see something specifically French in a big swindle of this sort is therefore both stupid and unfair. But whether one takes Hatry or Kreuger (who operated on an international scale), or whether one studies the long list of scandals in France from the Panama affair to the Oustric case, everywhere one sees great gamblers who corrupted the politicians and others, yet who were men of considerable calibre and in some cases of constructive genius. Suffice it to mention that the Panama Canal is a great asset to the modern world, and that all the Kreuger industrial interests have survived and are doing quite well again. What certainly distinguishes the Stavisky case from others, and reflects particular discredit on all those who associated with him, is this. How could a vulgar, petty thief and a card-sharper, a swindler, forger and crook, who was known to have been to prison, who was known to have been kicked out of clubs and casinos, was known to have been a procurer and strongly suspected of being a

spy in the service of a foreign Government—how could a fellow like that parade about France unmolested, transact business with the Government and with public bodies, and associate freely with people of importance, breeding and influence? How could he enjoy the protection that he did, which regularly got his trial postponed, supplied him with the police *passe-partout*, a false passport, and generally watched over him and helped him in his multifarious activities? That is surely unique. Never were politicians, civil servants and journalists shown up to such an extent. Small wonder, therefore, that the public, nervous and embittered by the internal political (to say nothing of the international) situation of France, reacted rather more strongly than usual.

It must not be forgotten that a whole series of other scandals—financial, moral and administrative—had preceded the Stavisky affair. Only a short while before that there was the dreadful railway disaster at Lagny, with its hundreds of dead and wounded passengers, admittedly the result of criminal negligence in high quarters. The arrest and release of the engine-driver had not added to the popularity of the Administration. There were also proceedings against various prominent public figures, among them a former Conservative Prime Minister, accused of financial malpractices. Finally, a number of sensational murders were waiting for elucidation. That of the notorious pleasure merchant and municipal councillor Dufresne, found killed at his theatre in a most compromising position; that of a high Government official shot by a lady who turned out to be singularly well connected in high political circles; that of the young English girl found dead in the apartment of a man whose father was a person of influence. Taken by themselves, these *faits divers* of Paris life, together with many similar ones of lesser importance, would not have meant anything out of the ordinary. But the accumulation of them and the manner in which they were all hushed up could not fail to make a most detrimental impression. It seemed that gangster methods had taken a firm footing in France and that any criminal could get away with anything, provided that he had enough money to purchase the silence of the authorities or the support of powerful influences outside the Government.

This poisonous atmosphere of scandal and corruption, and the feeling of uneasiness and suspicion it had produced even in the most sober minds, was eagerly seized upon by the Right in that perfectly unscrupulous way which characterises Reaction in its fight against Liberalism in practically every country. And, as usual, the Liberals played straight into the hands of their sworn enemies. M. Chautemps, the Prime Minister, was certainly showing courage and sincerity, but not enough energy in his

attempts to deal with the tidal wave of malodorous mud that was rapidly rising as a consequence of the Stavisky revelations, and was threatening to sweep everything away. He seemed anxious not to victimise any innocent people, and thus conveyed the impression that he was quite incapable of dealing with the turpitude both of his opponents and of his subordinates. Distrust of everybody and everything, except those who come and rob them, is a very prevalent French characteristic. Whipped up to a state of frenzy by the gutter Press and the Right, the public became more than usually suspicious of politicians or civil servants and saw in them the cause of all evil. These very professions became terms of abuse, and nothing was done to show the people that cases of dishonesty and corruption are, after all, exceptional, and that the vast majority of deputies and Government officials are as honest, as hardworking, and as law-abiding as the average citizen himself. Meanwhile, the Stavisky case was being more than clumsily tackled by the Government, and the public refused to believe that the swindler shot himself. Even responsible journalists like the venerable M. Léon Bailby openly maintained that the police had engineered his death. The whole thing was a typical illustration of the 'police drama' to be found so frequently in connexion with the scandals of the Third Republic. The sigh of relief with which many politicians met the news of Stavisky's alleged suicide was suspicious. It seemed that in certain circles they were positively awaiting it with undisguised anxiety.

Three inquiries were started simultaneously: one at Bayonne, in connexion with the local *Crédit Municipal*, whose bonds Stavisky had forged and sold to some of the leading French insurance companies; another inquiry at Bonneville, the scene of the actual death; and, finally, a third was being conducted in Paris jointly by the judge in charge of the case and the *Sûreté Générale*, although what they were inquiring about was not quite clear. And it appears peculiar that the *Sûreté*, gravely compromised as it is in this affair, should be allowed to cross-examine witnesses *in camera*, take possession of important documents, and generally to behave as an instrument of justice when it has not yet explained why it showered its own favours on Stavisky for a number of years. After all, the public still accuses it of being responsible for the 'suicide' of the crook! It will be seen that all these events could hardly be expected to placate or to reassure the population in its quite legitimate wrath against those to whose hands the government of France is entrusted. While this was going on, the Chamber of Deputies was surpassing itself in petty squabbles. Instead of facilitating the elucidation of the truth in the Stavisky affair, rival parties and rival deputies were merely

seeking to compromise each other, daily discrediting their own Parliament more and more, and quite unaware of, or deliberately ignoring, the public feeling around them.

Nobody knew Stavisky; nobody had ever seen him, or lunched with him, or done business with him; nobody had ever given him important introductions, or acted as an intermediary for him, or been legal adviser to him. No adequate explanation was offered how the insurance companies, usually so cautious and so conservative, had agreed to invest millions in his forged bonds, or why Ministers had taken the trouble to recommend these particular bonds and not those of some other establishment unconnected with Stavisky. No adequate explanation was offered of the intended fraudulent transaction with the Hungarian bonds, which would have been his biggest financial scoop and would have enabled him to swindle both the Hungarians and the French. What did Stavisky do in Budapest, or by whom and to whom was he introduced there? Or with what passport did he travel? Who were his accomplices in Hungary and France, or who were they to be? All this remains a mystery, just as the details of certain transactions with stolen jewellery on a big scale and various other crimes. His activities abroad in connexion with foreign Governments have led to the suggestion that he was a spy. This is not unlikely, for he was admittedly a secret collaborator of the French police, and probably served more than one master. His rôle as a distributor of bribes to the Press is not quite clear, either. He controlled certain newspapers and sought to influence certain others through the peculiar system of purchasing from them the monopoly of all their publicity—a not unusual practice in France. But how did he obtain that publicity, and who were his supporters in this particular racket? His own papers were strongly pro-Nazi. It is hardly believable that Stavisky indulged in Hitler propaganda out of love for Germany's dictator. Was he a German agent? Did he receive any money from Germany? In fact, what were his real resources, and where did all the money go? It is rumoured that there is a bank in Switzerland where he deposited 150,000,000 francs. Whether this is true or not, it is obvious that he did not gamble his money away at the clubs and casinos he was so fond of visiting, since he was frequently ejected from such places for winning in a dishonest way! Either the money has been paid out by Stavisky or tucked away in a safe place. He was profligate, of course, and generous in the extreme, but all that cannot account for 600 million francs. Nobody yet knows the exact figure. Nor does anybody know where and when he started and how he first made the money that enabled him to acquire the influential connexions which facilitated his subsequent transactions. All these questions and many others—

e.g., the mysterious disappearance of hundreds of cheques and hundreds of documents from the files of his case—have not yet been answered. But it will be seen that here is enough material to create a campaign of calumny and suspicion among the public even in normal times, and among a nation less ready to respond to that sort of thing than the French. The peculiar circumstances in France greatly facilitated this task for those elements who claim the monopoly of patriotism and statesmanship and yet never miss a chance of dealing the State as many blows as they can, if this happens to suit their party politics or their personal ambitions—*i.e.*, the Right.

At the 1932 elections France put her confidence in the groups of the Left—the Radicals and the Socialists. The twenty months that have elapsed since have proved that the Left did not carry out its promises and has failed to justify the people's confidence. According to an established precedent the Radicals did not really want the Socialists to participate in the Government, nor did it suit the Socialists to be manoeuvred into participation. Party tried to bluff party, while within them rival leaders and rival factions tried to bluff each other. The largest individual group in the Chamber, the Radicals, had no absolute majority to govern alone. Their election pledges tied them to the Left. Practical considerations dictated agreement with the Centre. They made the mistake Liberal parties have made in most European countries of late; they tried to pretend that the things they wanted were really there, and failed. For they had neither the courage to break their election promises and to share the Government with the Centre, nor the loyalty to keep them and to share the Government with the Socialists. Manipulations and political wire-pulling replaced a firm Government, such as the country wanted and would have supported.

As a result, the ever-latent contempt of the nation for its chosen legislators began to grow. In the matter of both foreign and domestic affairs the rift between the Chamber and the country was becoming daily more obvious and acute. The Chamber seemed blind. Hundreds of deputies were wasting their own and everybody else's time in futile discussion, while the unbalanced budget required immediate attention, while the Hitlerisation of Germany was threatening France's most vital interests, while the end of Austria's independence was approaching; while the relations with Mussolini were critical, while Poland was breaking away, and the attitude of the Little Entente was ambiguous, that of Great Britain was even more so—in fact, while internal and external complications of the first magnitude demanded a strong and level-headed Government, enjoying the full support of the Chamber, the Press, and the country in general.

These foreign problems were not new ; they were steadily growing in scope, continuously getting nearer home, even in the case of those who take little or no interest in foreign politics. Yet France had no foreign policy, and in the face of growing danger still failed to pull herself together or make up her mind and act accordingly. There is no doubt that the absence of a definite and vigorous foreign policy contributed to the unpopularity of professional politicians, and especially of the Government. How little the deputies realised the true position of things can be seen from the fact that even on the day of the shooting, when a furious mob was assembled in the Place de la Concorde, ready to smash the Chamber, they were still arguing about the precedence of their respective speeches ! And even if M. Daladier had no other achievement to his name, he would still deserve thanks for telling the deputies that he would not have all their speeches and that four interpellations were enough for him. Perhaps he was unnecessarily brusque and clumsy ; his nerves were certainly on edge that day, and later on he had a complete breakdown. But, although the Chamber took his request for fewer speeches very badly, he was certainly right—at least, in that respect.

To the gulf of misunderstanding and misapprehension separating the Chamber of Deputies from the country must be added that which separates young France from the older generation. Not only are many young people followers of the Monarchist *Action Française* ; in the Centre and on the Left there are strong youth movements, too. They are embittered and disappointed by the 'old gang' of politicians. After all, these have been unable to give them either prosperity or security—not to speak of any political lead. And here was M. Daladier's chance. He was a comparatively new man and well under fifty. M. Frot, his Minister for the Interior, was under forty. Had they turned their backs on Parliament and appealed to the youth of France to make a clean sweep of things, they would have attracted millions of supporters. Instead, they showed such contradictions between words and actions that they destroyed the last sympathies on which they could count. There remained dictatorial measures. But nothing is more devastating than an irresolute dictator. That was M. Daladier's undoing. No doubt he meant well ; he could not have done worse.

Yet, in justice to him and to M. Frot, it must be said that, whatever mistakes had been previously committed by them, they were in a truly terrible position on that tragic Tuesday, February 6. That there should have been shooting is, of course, a dreadful thing. But what would have happened if the Government had allowed an infuriated mob to take the Chamber by storm ? The number of deaths and the political consequences

of such an eventuality would have been immeasurably greater if such a thing had been allowed to happen. It may be argued that the crowd should never have been allowed to assemble in such a way ; but who brought it there ? The very people who accused the Government of shooting. And those who to-day are exhausting the fantastically rich French vocabulary of abuse and invective because the Government took action are the very people who for years have demanded action and have lamented its absence. The action may have been wrong and the Government may have been criminally stupid, clumsy and provocative. None the less, surely it was the duty of all law-abiding and responsible citizens to support the Government against the mob. This included demonstrators belonging to all shades of political opinion, from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, Monarchists and Communists, war veterans, students and various other groups, and also gangs of ordinary rowdies, who are glad of any opportunity to create a disturbance, and who started looting shops at the first possible moment. They can thank the 'patriots' and the apostles of 'order' for having provided them with such a unique treat. Furthermore, the Right did an abominably wicked thing by using the war veterans as a shield. Nothing could have been more diabolically calculated than to set these war veterans to be charged or even shot down by the police. These poor, unsuspecting people, who had merely come to protest against corruption and demand honesty from their Government, were used as a political instrument by the Right against the Left—a truly shameful manoeuvre.

I have little or no sympathy with the French Left. Like the democrats in every other country, they have talked *ad nauseam* and have done nothing ; in fact, they have played into the hands of Reaction with blind stupidity and grim determination. For that they are paying to-day in Berlin, in Vienna and in Paris. Their latest and most futile action in France was the declaration of a general strike after the fight was actually over and when M. Doumergue's Cabinet was already formed. Thus they have gratuitously provided the country, and especially the Right, with one more grievance and one more thing to reproach them with. The French Left was incompetent and corrupt. No one can deny that. The point is, was the Right any better ? Did the Right have no financial or political scandals, no corruption, no deficit in the budget, friendly relations with foreign Powers, or greater guarantees of peace and security ? The truth of the matter is that the Right had all the same faults that the Left has, only in an even greater measure. This is also undeniable. And it verges on the indecent when the Municipal Council, that Tammany of Paris, suddenly poses as a protector of the public

or of national morality. Let them re-read that great play *Topaze*, and let them remember that they were not ashamed of giving a man like M. Dufresne a public funeral! Again, how many politicians, civil servants and others were mixed up in the Oustric affair, or that of Madame Hanau, or the crash of the *Banque Nationale de Crédit*?—to mention only the most striking cases, all of which, incidentally, were hushed up. The Right has no claim that it is more honest or more patriotic than the Left; if anything, the reverse is true. But the Right is certainly more efficient, though also more unscrupulous. Influence in France is not confined to politicians alone. There are, for instance, the political lawyers, to be found in both camps, who are Ministers to-day and counsel for big business or for a man like Stavisky to-morrow; and the gutter Press, that has sold its support to everybody in turn, and sometimes to everybody at once; and the Masonic Lodges, and the *Comité des Forges*, and the police and the financiers. The sinister influence of all these bodies is too well known to require any comment. They all have their place in the French political system; and far be it from me to trespass on their grounds. But it does appear a bit of a paradox when those of them who happen to belong to the Right suddenly assume the rôle of virtuous victims of the corrupt Left.

Another paradox is this: these people claim order and wish the Government to display its authority. Yet they invariably do all they can to prevent it from maintaining order or asserting its authority. I am not speaking of M. Léon Daudet, a brilliant but quite irresponsible man, who has a peculiar talent for the selection of invective. He is a Monarchist and deliberately attacks the Republican régime. Incidentally, in these days of crisis there was little difference in tone or substance between his paper and the Communist *Humanité*. But the Republican Conservatives—the bourgeois Left? These people seem prepared to impute quite unimaginable things to each other, and jointly to their Government or their Civil Service. As to the *Sûreté Générale*, nothing is so vile that they would not be prepared to attribute it to them. No friend of France can avoid feeling that, if they believe such things of each other, how can they expect foreigners to respect them? It is an unedifying and painful spectacle.

The task of bringing appeasement into this maelstrom of outraged feelings and general excitement has been reluctantly undertaken by M. Gaston Doumergue. Yet the aged and popular ex-President has had only the qualified support of the Press. It is agreed that there is no one else in France who possesses the moral prestige and the confidence of the people that he does. He can placate; but can he lead? It is hardly surprising that a man of his age should have chosen to surround himself with

collaborators he knows and can trust. To have expected a young Cabinet from him would have been stupid. And, from an international point of view, the presence of M. Barthou at the Foreign Office, or of Marshal Pétain at the War Office, is to be highly welcomed. They are a much better match for Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia than any of their peripatetic predecessors. But even if this Cabinet does solve France's immediate requirements, what will be the next step? It is not enough to have a Chamber so scared of popular wrath that it will accept almost anything to save itself. It is not enough to reinstate M. Chiappe—this is rumoured to be pending—whose dismissal, incidentally, would hardly have met with the same popular indignation if it had not been done in such an insulting way and at such a wrong psychological moment. Nor is it enough to balance the budget or to maintain the value of the franc—its stability throughout the crisis was a remarkable proof of its inherent strength—or to take up a firm attitude in foreign relations. These things are essential, of course, and so also is the elucidation of the Stavisky affair, which seems temporarily to have been forgotten.

This affair, however, which was merely a straw that broke the proverbial camel's back, has raised issues of the widest political importance. Few if any of the rioters knew what they were fighting for, but they all knew what they were fighting against. And that was parliamentarism and the 'old gang,' and corruption and liberal Socialism, and the *République des Camarades*, with jobs and favours for those who have influence; in fact, against the old order of things which has produced a ring of vested political as well as financial interests. Furthermore, those of the Left thought they were fighting against the Fascism of the Right, and those of the Right thought they were fighting against the Fascism of the Left. But they were jointly fighting against a system that has lasted since the creation of the Third Republic, and that is held responsible for the pass to which things have now come. What form this new France they all wish for is to take they could hardly be expected to know or to imagine. But one thing is clear: the present situation is only an *intermezzo*.

If it is a prelude to Fascism, no prognostications are possible, except that it will be as typically French as Hitlerism is typically German, or Mussolini's system typically Italian. As yet no embryo of Fascism is discernible in France. There is no party, and consequently no leader, that aspires to a political monopoly. In fact, the very word is still a term of abuse in Right as well as in Left circles. But modern political developments often upset all calculations, and no analogies are ever quite correct. Socialism is repeating all the mistakes of its spiritual brothers in Germany and Austria; one day it may meet with a not dissimilar fate.

The liberal *bourgeoisie* has for the time being surrendered to Reaction. This defeat is painful, but it may be a blessing in disguise. Perhaps the liberals of France, and not only of France, will at last have learnt their lesson. Perhaps they will realise before it is too late that abdicating all initiative and all responsibility to the reactionaries (Fascists or Communists), who are only too keen to take the initiative and have no scruples about responsibility, is a suicidal game. Perhaps they will realise that it is in their power to save France from Fascism, and that the triumph of Fascism would be the result of their own stupidity or indolence. And Fascism in France would mean its victory all over Europe.

That is a thing civilisation cannot afford. A far greater issue is involved than mere political or economic differences, which may be irritating at the time, but which weigh little in the scales of history. The modern world is badly in need of a rejuvenated and consolidated democracy in France—with a proper modern Constitution; with a Parliament that works instead of obstructing; with a Press that is clean and not the paid satellite of the darkest national and international forces; with a Civil Service that is adequately paid and therefore in no need of extra income; with a Bar and law courts that are there to administer justice and not political favours or vendettas; with a police that devotes its activities to maintaining order and decency instead of black-mailing politicians, public men and private citizens; with a banking system and a bourse that are the servants of the nation and not just a pump that annually sucks up millions from the thrifty people of France to put this money in their own pockets; with a capital cleared of its undesirable elements, and teaching foreign visitors to admire and love France with that great and wonderful culture of hers, instead of inducing them to buy pleasures and despise those who sell them. In a word, a France that her own people as well as her friends could be proud of, and that would be worthy of her historical mission in the modern world.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND JAPAN

No one any longer even pretends that the system of collective security established after the war has replaced secret diplomacy; indeed, it might be argued that regular meetings of European statesmen at Geneva have provided additional opportunities, a centralised machinery, for carrying on the sort of intrigues that were formerly directed from embassies. The most that can be claimed is that a convention of internationalist behaviour has become generally accepted, and that countries gain in respectability by ostensibly observing it. In the Chamber itself they are all honourable or right honourable; in the corridors they make their bargains, take advantage of one another's difficulties, form and un-form treacherous combinations. Each change in the European situation produces a Chamber reaction and a corridor reaction. Of these, unhappily, the latter is the more significant. As shock follows shock and upheaval follows upheaval, the Chamber tends to become more and more funereal, ghostly, and the corridors more and more frenzied with excitement and activity.

It is not easy to estimate the direction and significance of this corridor activity. The pattern is confused, and the pieces that make it up indefinite. We know that Japan is preparing to go to war and that Germany is arming. We know that Russia and France are afraid of war, and that England is anxious, as far as possible, to extricate herself from European entanglements. We know that Italy is fishing in troubled waters, and that Austria's position is precarious, and that America is preoccupied. Such separate facts are obvious enough; but how to bring them together? how to arrange them and envisage their combined possibilities? One conceivable arrangement it is proposed to outline here—not as a thing which will happen, or which should be encouraged to happen or prevented from happening, but as a pattern into which the pieces will fit, and that has been, and is being, much whispered about, if not openly discussed.

The arrangement is, briefly, that when Japan occupies part of Siberia, Poland and Germany will take advantage of the Soviet Government's preoccupations in the Far East to settle

their differences at the expense of Russia, Poland giving up the Corridor in return for Soviet territory and a Baltic port, and pressure on Germany's western frontier being relieved by expansion eastwards. In this way, it is argued, Germany will be able to make good what she lost as a result of the last war without having to embark on another large-scale war, and without the Allied Powers and their satellites having to disgorge or the Versailles settlement being seriously disturbed; Poland will realise a long-cherished ambition, and Western Europe be relieved of much anxiety and one of the basic causes of its present instability. Some such project has long been in the minds of Pilsudski and Rosenberg, for instance. It figures prominently in Nazi literature, was put forward by Hugenberg during his meteoric appearance at the World Economic Conference, and is taken so seriously in Moscow that the first reaction there to Hitler's becoming German Chancellor was, not concern for Communists in Germany, but fear as to the consequences to Russia of a German-Polish alliance. This fear has been intensified by the recently concluded German-Polish non-aggression pact, with its rumoured secret clauses, and by the knowledge that large numbers of Ukrainian separatists, notably Skoropatsky, have their headquarters in Berlin, and that their propaganda has undergone a startling revival everywhere.

As far as the first step in carrying out the project—a Japanese attack on Russia in the Far East—is concerned, the facts are well enough known. The enormous sums voted in Japan for military expenditure; the steady development of the puppet State of Manchukuo as a base for future operations; the series of 'incidents' in connexion with the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the reluctance of Japan to buy Russia's share in the railway even at a nominal price; Japan's refusal to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Government; the marked tendency for Sino-Japanese differences to be adjusted and a working compromise found; the epidemic of insurrection in Outer Mongolia and Chinese provinces on the Soviet border, all show that Japan is preparing for war, and for war against Russia. When exactly it will come no one can say, but the probability is sooner rather than later, since the present preoccupations of the rest of the world may not endure indefinitely, nor Russia always have such hostile neighbours in Europe. Indeed, assuming that Japan had planned to occupy the port of Vladivostok and Eastern Siberia up to, say, Lake Baikal, it would be difficult to imagine a more propitious moment for doing so, especially if, as seems probable, Outer Mongolia falls under her control, thus providing another entry into Siberia and a means of cutting Soviet communications.

What resistance is she likely to meet with? It is possible,

none. In spite of the ever more hysterically arrogant speeches made in Moscow, the weaknesses of the Soviet Government, in the event of a war with Japan, are only too obvious, and may lead to a repetition of the tactics adopted at Brest-Litovsk—that is to say, to a policy of infinite yielding. The Soviet Government's rôle in the Far East in recent years has been that of a—to use Mr. Churchill's delightful expression—'boneless wonder,' and there is no immediate reason for supposing that the rôle will not be sustained even if Japan occupies Russian territory. If the Soviet Government does fight, it will be at an enormous disadvantage. The Red army is large and well equipped; but it has never been in action, and, more serious, is needed at home, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, to deal with a starving, turbulent peasantry. If the troops now occupying these regions were withdrawn and sent to the Far East they would have behind them millions of enraged fellow-countrymen—more bitter enemies than the Japanese, and many of whom, as they will openly admit, would welcome even a foreign invasion if it relieved them of their present masters. Nor does valour on the 'class war' front, much heralded victories over famished peasants and terrorised priests, presuppose valour on other fronts and against real enemies. Rather the reverse. The class war has been won so often and so easily that its veterans are unlikely to make a very brave showing in more difficult kinds of combat.

Apart from the question of the Red army, communications are miserably inadequate and food supplies short. The Trans-Siberian Railway is only a single-track line, and though roads have been, and are being, feverishly constructed, road transport would not make good its deficiencies. Japan's only serious danger would be the aerial bombardment of her home towns; and this could be effectively countered by an encircling movement through Outer Mongolia, which would isolate Soviet air bases, at the same time as a direct attack from Manchuria. No one who has been for any length of time in Russia can suppose her to be, in her present state, capable of going to war; and the chances of sympathetic popular movements breaking out in enemy countries are as slight as the Comintern's insistence on their imminence is strong. Least of all are they likely to break out in territory adjoining the Soviet Union, where the population has a clearer idea than, for instance, the 'Intourist' school of Communists in England about what being governed by a dictatorship of the proletariat is really like. Manchurian peasants are as likely to rise up in favour of a Power which, at one stage, was ready to be foremost amongst European Powers in recognising Japan's ill-gotten gains in the Far East as the Salvation Army is likely to conduct a holy war for Islam; and the population of the Polish Ukraine know that, bad as their

present plight may be, they are better off in every respect than the population of the Soviet Ukraine.

It may be taken, then, that if Japan attacks (and everything suggests that she will attack, and soon), the Soviet Government will either not resist or resist inadequately. Russia's position, weak in any case, will be immensely weaker if Poland and Germany invade the Ukraine at the same time as Japan invades Siberia; especially since the Ukraine is the part of Russia worst hit by collectivisation, and where the peasants are most rebellious, and where there has been, even in normal times (still more now with starvation to foster it), a strong separatist movement. In fact, there can be little doubt that Germany would be able to occupy the Ukraine more easily to-morrow than she occupied it in 1918, and that her invading army would be welcomed by large numbers of Ukrainian peasants as a heaven-sent blessing. This being so, the temptation to the Nazi rulers is obvious. They make Germany a first-class Power again—their most persistent refrain—without embroiling themselves with France. Their *régime* justifies itself in the only way it can justify itself—by foreign conquest, without submitting Germany to the ordeal of another costly and bloody war. They acquire rich resources to exploit, make their peace with Poland, cease to threaten France and the system whose guarantor she is, and thus break down their present isolation, just by opening their lap and letting ripe fruit tumble into it. They can even translate their conquest into terms of a crusade, march into the Ukraine as an army of liberation, undertake, as they love to do, the championship of European civilisation (without being nominated thereto), and, having saved Germany, save yet another land from Marxist subnormality.

As for Poland, apart from the fact that she herself has long looked covetously over the Soviet frontier, how can she be expected to do otherwise than co-operate with Germany? She knows that Germany is arming furiously, and that France, to whose skirts she has been attached for fifteen years, may easily prove, when the test comes, a broken reed, and that nothing is to be expected from England, and less than nothing from the League. She has to envisage the possibility of finding herself, alone and unaided, face to face with her dangerous neighbour, and to consider the alternatives of an anti-Soviet alliance with or a war against Germany. Is she likely to hesitate if such alternatives present themselves? Will a non-aggression pact and cordial relations with the genial Litvinov count for much when she comes to make her decision? Is it conceivable that Pilsudski would reject overtures from Hitler—overtures that embody long-standing hopes and plans of his own—for love of the Soviet Government or out of loyalty to arrangements he has made with it? Whatever

else may impede the carrying out of Nazi plans for expansion eastwards, it will not, we may be sure, be Polish intransigence.

After living for years on the myth of a world crusade against Bolshevism, after pouring out an unceasing flow of unreal defiance at a war-weary world, after staging mimic conspiracies and trying and executing mimic conspirators for plotting to bring about another intervention, it looks as though at last the Soviet Government really is in danger and surrounded by enemies.* In this predicament it turns, not to the toiling masses, not to that world proletariat which has always been, since Lenin first came into power, on the point of rising up with Moscow's slogans on its lips, but to the Brain Trust, and—oh, rare irony!—to the League of Nations in its decrepitude. Litvinov was ready to forego all hope of America's redemption through the Comintern, even to allow Americans resident in Russia to go to church, for the sake of American recognition; and nowadays the League receives respectful mention even in the fiery utterances of Stalin and Kaganovitch.

American recognition has always been, in the eyes of the Soviet Government, a prize of great worth; developments in the Far East made it doubly desirable. It has come, from this point of view, just when it was most needed. The gesture of recognition was intended to mean, and taken as meaning, American support for the Soviet Government against Japan; and the only question is what this support would, in practice, be worth. If declarations of good-will spiced with moral indignation, then it will be as useless as it is likely to be abundant. America never has been niggardly in such matters. If financial assistance, then it will be helpful—even necessary, but not decisive. If military assistance, men and munitions and battleships, then it may make all the difference in the world. But will it be military assistance? President Roosevelt is very busy; and it is difficult to imagine him, even were the issues at stake of much more immediate importance to the United States, pausing to carry on a foreign war. When the reluctance with which America came into the last war is considered, and the fact that most Americans now regret her ever having taken the step, it seems, to say the least, highly improbable that she will venture more than money, and that cautiously, to aid her new ally against Japan.

America is not the only friend Litvinov has picked up in the course of his wanderings. He has whispered amiably against the rumble of the Comintern, and reaped a great harvest of protestations of friendliness and of non-aggression pacts. Indeed, it is one of the curious ironies of the times that as Russia, abandoning one by one her revolutionary principles, and making use of all the diplomatic wiles she at first so ardently condemned, has

accumulated paper security, her actual position has grown more and more precarious, until now, encased in non-aggression pacts, she is threatened with war on every side; ready, belatedly, to pin her hopes in the preservation of the *status quo*, she is likely to be the chief victim of forces as ruthlessly intolerant of the existing political order in Europe as she once prided herself on being. Litvinov's diplomatic laurels, whatever credit they may reflect on his ingenuity and perseverance and capacity for realist compromise, will be of small service to his country in the event of a real crisis such as a foreign invasion from two quarters at the same time.

Take, for instance, the recent Franco-Soviet *rapprochement*. From being one of the arch-villains in the capitalist-imperialist piece France became overnight angelic; and the French Press, with the same suddenness and with characteristic thoroughness, began to sing the praises of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The admirable Mayor of Lyons travelled ecstatically, and with all found, through the Soviet Union; and Moscow and Paris tossed bouquets to one another to the orderly approval of inspired leading articles. From the point of view of France the move was obvious enough. It cost nothing, risked nothing, and might some time have a certain usefulness if things came to an alignment of Powers against Germany. On the Soviet side the gains were negligible. It was not even accompanied by extended credit facilities in order that, as generally happens with such arrangements where the Soviet Government is concerned, good-will might be realised immediately in the form of a little ready cash. As for supposing that it would involve France's exerting pressure on, let alone opposing, Poland, if she arranged to compose her differences with Germany at the expense of Russia, the idea is utterly fantastic. We may be certain that whatever secret clauses the German-Polish Pact contains, France is privy to them, and if not favourably disposed towards their general purport, at least tolerant of it. France might not fight in defence of the Corridor; it is inconceivable that she should stir herself at all in defence of the Ukraine.

Take, again, the cordiality that has existed for several years between Italy and the Soviet Government. There have been mutual courtesies. Italian is, or was until recently, the only language in which the Comintern does not broadcast propaganda: the *Duce* has from time to time made flattering remarks about the Soviet *régime*, including it in what he calls 'Young' or 'New Europe,' and generally implying that, although there may be certain—to use the Moscow jargon—'ideological' differences between himself and Stalin, they are essentially of the same kidney: Litvinov received a most enthusiastic welcome when

recently he visited Rome. But does all this, any more than ingeniously framed pacts with Poland and recognition by the United States and the overnight conversion of the *Temps* to Bolshevism, mean that the Soviet Government can count on getting support if and when Russia's territorial integrity is threatened? Just as France will see in Germany's eastern preoccupations so much the greater security for Alsace-Lorraine, Italy will see so much the greater security for Austria. The breaking down of Germany's present isolation by the Nazi *régime's* being able to justify itself otherwise than at the expense of France and the Little Entente would be entirely to Mussolini's taste. He may find admirable qualities in the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the Nazis acknowledge him as a prophet. Their success means the entrenchment of Fascism, in one form or another, from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean.

The truth is that the very factors which have most contributed to Litvinov's success as a diplomat are amongst the chief causes of Russia's present weakness. He has succeeded because he has worked in terms of abstractions; and his achievements, when it comes to a real test, will be seen to have no substance because they are abstract. In an age in which treaties have been generalised and multiplied into becoming meaningless he has based his whole policy on treaties. Representing the first Communist State in the history of the world, he is the only old-fashioned diplomat extant. Like old-fashioned diplomats, particularly like old-fashioned Russian diplomats, he has treated foreign affairs like a game of chess, working out openings and gambits, concentrating his pieces now here and now there, ordering Moscow processions to shout anti-Japanese slogans and then not to shout anti-Japanese slogans, inspiring newspaper articles in this sense and in that. Given the circumstances of the Soviet Government, it was an easy game to play; given the circumstances in the world outside, it was a game that, as long as it continued to be a game, had to succeed. If ever it ceases to be a game, if ever, instead of moves on a board, it is a question of soldiers marching, and, instead of calling a tune for Moscow to dance to, a question of defending Russia against invading armies, then its essential weakness, unreality, will be apparent.

Litvinov is not burdened, like most of his fellow-diplomats, with the necessity of even having to seem to be consistent. He can be as fickle as he likes, since he knows that, as the journalists put it, 'Soviet circles' will faithfully echo his changing sentiments. In the beginning he allied himself with the defeated or revisionist Powers; now he seeks sanctuary with the others, and, it is probable, will be seeking it soon in their ancient but somewhat decrepit citadel, the League of Nations. The League has been a

standing dish with Soviet humorists for many a long year. It was the abomination of desolation, the ultimate hypocrisy of capitalist-imperialist war mongers, the headquarters of anti-Soviet machinations, whose thin coating of cant did not for one moment deceive the realist eyes of Moscow. Soviet humorists have nowadays to find other subjects for the exercise of their wit. The League has to be treated as respectfully as the Brain Trust, since the dictatorship of the proletariat is seriously considering becoming a member of it. Nor is the reason for this change of heart far to seek. Japan and Germany have withdrawn from Geneva, and therefore the League may be expected to afford a certain protection against them. Not much protection. It would be unjust to suppose the Soviet Government's conversion so thorough that, just when the League's most ardent supporters have become tepid in their allegiance to it, disillusioned as to its possibilities, it will start on its Genevese career with a beginner's enthusiasm. The most it will hope for will be the gaining of a little time and some outside sympathy if it decides to come, a belated prodigal, and fill one of the Assembly's empty places. There would be great joy in the League of Nations Union over the repentance of such a sinner, and the event might make America a little more disposed to return to the nest she built and then abandoned; otherwise its significance would be small, except, indeed, for the lovers of bizarre situations who would find something very much to their taste in the proletarian lion roaring as gently as any sucking-dove, as it were any nightingale, in Geneva's emptying council-halls.

It has been pointed out that Ukrainian separatists outside Russia are inclined to look to Germany to champion their cause; and to feel that German-Polish intervention in the Ukraine would be to their interest. No doubt certain promises contingent on the intervention actually taking place have been, or will be, given to the effect that the occupied Soviet territory will be allowed a certain autonomy, that Germany and Poland will content themselves with spheres of interest and economic privileges, and that otherwise Ukrainians will be left to manage their own affairs as they like. The worth of such promises is questionable; and Skoropatsky may find himself in as shadowy authority as Mr. Pu-yi, or, for that matter, as he was during the last German occupation of the Ukraine. At the same time, he and his fellow-Ukrainian exiles have no alternative hopes. As they see the situation, it is foreign intervention or a continuance of Bolshevik rule. Dreams of an internal collapse of the Soviet *régime* have grown faint with the passage of time (though, in actual fact, there is more to justify them now than ever before), and, believing any change to be for the better, telling themselves that to be back in

their country on whatever terms is worth the sacrifices they have to make to get there—hoping, perhaps, that concessions they agree to now may be won back hereafter, feeling, in any case, that a foreign intervention will at least mean that the future will be uncertain, whereas now it is hopeless—many of them are prepared to make common cause with Germany and Poland against Russia.

The position of the non-Ukrainian Russian *émigrés* is more complicated. To them the dismemberment of Russia would be as great an ill as Bolshevism, and a Japanese occupation of Russian territory perhaps a worse one. They are torn between the disagreeable alternatives of hoping for the continuance of a *régime* they hate and seeing its collapse taken advantage of by Russia's enemies to the detriment of their country. They have either to rejoice at Litvinov's diplomatic successes, and at each rumoured strengthening of the Soviet Government's forces, or to envisage the possibility of the partition by foreign Powers of the richest parts of Russia. 'Qu'on y réfléchisse bien,' Joseph de Maistre wrote in 1797,

on verra que le mouvement révolutionnaire une fois établi, la France et la monarchie ne pouvaient être sauvés que par le jacobinisme. Par quelle moyen surnaturel briser l'effort de l'Europe conjurée? Le génie infernal de Robespierre pouvait seul opérer ce prodige. Toutes les vies, toutes les richesses; tous les pouvoirs étaient dans les mains du pouvoir révolutionnaire; et ce monstre de puissance, ivre de sang et de succès . . . était tout à la fois un châtement épouvantable pour les Français et le seul moyen de sauver la France;

the same kind of reasoning must bitterly occur to Russian *émigrés* whose feelings of patriotism towards Russia as a whole are greater than their feelings of patriotism towards any particular part of Russia. Even in a world that is full of exiles, their lot is especially hard. Whether the Soviet *régime* collapses from within, thus making Russia able to be invaded even more easily than at present; whether it goes on, and the Soviet Government is able to buy off or out-manoeuvre its enemies; whether foreign invasion brings it down or knits it together or leaves it existing in a restricted space, they see only continued suffering for their fellow-countrymen and a wretched future for their country, not having even the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that, however wretched the future may be, they will at least share in it.

From the point of view of Europe as a whole, however, the dismemberment of Russia and the sharing of the spoil between Germany, Poland, and Japan would have certain advantages. Forces of conquest have been let loose in Germany and Japan,

as they were once let loose in England ; and, however much we may deplore the fact, since we are not prepared to resist them ourselves—that is, go to war with Germany and Japan—and since we are not prepared to satisfy them with territory of our own, there is nothing for it but to hope that the forces will be spent in the direction and manner least harmful to us in particular and to Western Europe in general. It would be safe to say that, unless something very unexpected happens, if no vent is found for the pressure accumulating in Germany, another large-scale European war must break out within the next few years whose consequences will be even more ruinous than the last. The structure of post-war Europe is crazy, but not elastic. It will not bend into a more reasonable shape, and attempts to make it secure—notably the League of Nations—have only served to increase its dangerous rigidity. So rigid a structure cracks explosively. Who would dare to prophesy the possibility of its continuing to withstand the strain of an arming, and soon armed, Germany ? It must crack some time. The question is, where ? If in the West, then we shall all have to fight again, and, in fighting, destroy what remains of European civilisation, leaving its *débris*, as they have always calculated, to the Bolsheviks. If in the East, then there will be, at the least, a respite, and perhaps a chance of settling into one of those periods of unstable equilibrium in which ambitious Powers are sufficiently occupied and established Powers sufficiently satisfied not to be at one another's throats, and which represent the nearest approximation to a state of peace that has so far been realised in the world.

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE.

OVERCROWDED ASIA

THE present rapid increase of population in Asiatic countries is beginning to create a problem that may very soon gravely affect not only Asia, but also Europe and America. Already Japan has shown by her attack on Manchuria how a growth of population stimulates the desire to acquire new territory. She is also showing how the growth of population, accompanied by increased industrialisation, necessitates the acquisition of new markets in other countries, with resulting injury to some of the industries already established in those countries. When population grows in a limited area new outlets must be found, either for the people themselves or for the products of their industries. The gravity of the resulting social and international problems is being fully recognised by the Japanese themselves. Last August I received a circular letter from the Bureau of Social Affairs attached to the Home Office in Tokyo calling my attention to the fact that an 'Institute for Research in Population Problems' had been established in Japan, and enclosing a statement of the objects of the Institute. From that statement the following sentences are worth quoting :

One of the most pressing problems connected with the well-being of a nation is that of population. . . . The tendency towards over-population, if left to itself, must inevitably result in a crisis with a deplorable issue. . . . If we are to consider possibilities of transplanting our surplus population abroad it is important for us to envisage the problem from an international standpoint and to associate ourselves with world conferences on population and emigration.

That is an excellent statement of general principles, and it is to be hoped that some good conclusions may result from the proposed investigation of detailed problems.

How rapidly the population of Japan is growing at the present time can be gathered from the official statement that the increase in the year 1932 by excess of births over deaths was 1,007,868 persons.¹ By last autumn the population of Japan had reached

¹ Much valuable information with regard to Japan and other Asiatic countries is to be found in a book called *Asia's Teeming Millions* by Étienne Dénery. (Published in English by Jonathan Cape, 1931.)

the figure of 66,238,000. Yet Japan is not a big country. Already many of the agricultural districts are palpably overcrowded, and the only way of making room for the rapidly on-coming new population is to cut up the holdings and divide and redivide them. At the same time there is a big increase of the population of the towns owing to the development of urban industries. Indeed, Japan in the twentieth century is going through an experience closely similar to that of England in the early nineteenth. Up till near the end of the eighteenth century the population of England increased very slowly. Then came what is known as the Industrial Revolution—namely, the development of manufacturing industries by the use of steam-driven machinery; and our population increased with a rush because we were able to find markets all over the world for our machine-made goods and the factories were constantly demanding more and more juvenile workers. Japan has had an exactly similar experience, coming about a hundred years later than ours. Up till the last quarter of the nineteenth century the population of Japan seems to have been almost stationary; then as the result of the establishment of European industries, and the importation of machinery, largely from Great Britain, an industrial revolution began, with an ensuing rapid increase in population. The birth rate rose from 25 per 1000 in 1872 to 34 per 1000 in 1926, and the figures for the total population of Japan, which were roundly 34,000,000 in 1875, rose to nearly 60,000,000 in 1925.

As a contrast with these Japanese figures, it is worth while to quote the figures for Scotland for almost the same period. According to the Report of the Department of Health for Scotland, the Scottish birth rate, which was 35.6 per 1000 in 1876, fell to 18.86 per 1000 in 1932. Thus, while the birth rate in Japan has been rapidly rising, the birth rate in Scotland has been even more rapidly declining. This contrast is largely due to the dates of the industrial revolution in the respective countries. When the industrial revolution was in progress in Great Britain, the British population went ahead as rapidly as the Japanese is going ahead now, and at that time we had an advantage in Great Britain which Japan now lacks—namely, facilities for finding room by means of emigration for any increase of population that exceeded the opportunities for finding employment at home. The large volume of British emigration at that time helped greatly to build up the British Empire abroad. That outlet for surplus population has ceased. There is practically no demand to-day in the British Dominions for emigrants from the British Isles. Indeed, the movement of population now tends to be in the other direction, and unsuccessful settlers in Australia are returning to Great Britain in hopes of finding jobs at home. In the case of Japan

in the twentieth century there has been no opportunity for the large-scale emigration that was a feature of British history in the nineteenth century. Most of the former vacant spaces of the world have now been occupied either physically by actual settlement, or politically by annexation, with the result that the entry of Japanese and other Asiatics into important areas is now forbidden. As a matter of fact, the Japanese appear to be racially disinclined to emigrate in large numbers. They will go abroad to establish commercial connexions for the benefit of their home industries, but there does not seem to be any marked desire to settle abroad as agricultural workers or as factory hands.

In this matter there is a marked contrast between the Chinese and the Japanese. It is estimated that only about 600,000 Japanese are living outside their own country, whereas the number of Chinese settled in foreign lands is put at about 8,000,000. This active movement of the Chinese creates in many regions immediate trouble, and several countries—notably Australia, South Africa, and the United States of America—have taken steps to prohibit Chinese immigration. But there are parts of the world still left open to the Chinese. They are continuing to move in masses into the Malay Peninsula, into Burma and Java. In spite, however, of this big outflow of her population, China still remains horribly over-populated. Many parts of the Chinese Empire are packed to the brim with people compelled to live at a miserable standard of comfort because they are too thick on the ground. To quote M. Étienne Dennerly :

In the valleys and river mouths, on the little rice-fields pieced out of mere patches, swarm such a mass of human beings as can scarcely breathe. It is an affecting and heart-rending sight to see whole families on their tiny farms, passing their days in exacting toil, in cultivating, with endless efforts, a small patch of rice, peas, beans or potatoes which a single peasant could quite easily raise by himself.

It must be added that there are still parts of China which are not over-full. And close to the north of China is the huge region of Southern Manchuria, which at present is very thinly populated and into which many Chinese are beginning to move. Now that Southern Manchuria has been conquered by Japan the Japanese are taking steps to develop trade with that area; but the Chinese are providing the population. At the same time the population of China itself continues to increase even in districts already over-populated, and there is evidence that China greatly resents the action of white men's countries which forbid Chinese immigration. This action, indeed, inevitably creates bitter hostility, for it implies that the white man looks upon the

Chinese and other non-white races as inferiors whose companionship cannot be tolerated. The result is a steadily growing feeling among Asiatic races that the European races are their enemies.

This feeling during the past few decades has become greatly marked in India, where the importance of the problem of emigration to relieve the pressure of population has for a long time been realised. A striking example is to be found in the life-history of the famous Indian revolutionary leader, the Mahatma Gandhi. Rather more than twenty-five years ago Gandhi was working as a barrister in the British Colony of Natal. That Colony—now part of the Dominion of South Africa—made a law restricting the liberties of Indian immigrants. Gandhi came to England to protest against these restrictions and to ask the British Government to take action in the matter. The present writer was then a member of the House of Commons, and had expressed in public the opinion that the Natal Government was violating the conditions embodied in the Constitution of the Colony that all races and creeds were to be treated on an equality. Gandhi came to see me and asked me to represent his case to the then Prime Minister, the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. I did so, and the only answer I got was that, as Natal was a self-governing Colony, the Government of the United Kingdom could not interfere with its legislation. Gandhi, thus finding it impossible to get any redress, left Natal and returned to India, where he became, in a few years, the world-famous leader of a bitterly anti-British movement.

As contrasted with the general overcrowding of India, there are vast empty spaces in Australia and South Africa and other British territories, and in earlier years there was a considerable exodus of Indians to take jobs as labourers in other parts of the British Empire, especially the West Indies. This migration of labour was organised under a system of indentures which made the labourers more or less the slaves of their employers—at any rate, for several years. Naturally such a system led to protests in England, which were backed up by protests from the Indian Government and by attempts to stop the practice. It took many years, however, to secure the abolition of indentured labour. Meanwhile, there was constant friction. Many of the indentured Indian labourers, especially in the West Indies, succeeded in working out their indentures and used their savings to buy holdings of their own, thus becoming competitors instead of servants of the white settlers. Also, many Indian traders migrated from India of their own free will and did good business for themselves, both as petty shopkeepers and as moneylenders. The response of the white people was to pass restrictive regu-

lations on these free Indian immigrants, but the indentured immigrants were still welcomed. These restrictions on the free movement of Indians within the Empire have naturally led to bitter protests from English-educated Indians, on the ground that such restrictions imply that the white man is claiming a racial superiority to the Indian. Frequent articles appear in the Indian Press, and at public conferences the question is constantly raised. The matter is also being taken up by the Indian Government. At New Delhi on December 7 last year there was a debate in the Assembly on the hostile treatment of Indians by the Dominions and a demand that India should have full rights of retaliation. The European members of the Legislative Assembly entirely supported the attitude of the Indian members, and the Government members expressed their sympathy and promised that the debate would be communicated to His Majesty's Government in England. There can be little doubt that the attitude of the British Dominions to Indian immigration is one of the causes of the desire of the leaders of Indian thought to break away from the British Empire.

In addition to racial irritation, there is the practical question that—largely as the result of over-population—the conditions of life in India are so bad that emigration is almost the only available means of securing a higher standard of living for the manual workers. The position appears to be worst in the Madras Presidency, and there is constant migration of the lower castes from that region to Ceylon, where Indian labourers are tolerated but not exactly welcomed. There are, no doubt, parts of India where there is still room for a larger population, and the big irrigation works undertaken by the Indian Government have greatly increased the capacity of the country; but these developments do not provide a remedy for the fundamental difficulty that the population of India, like the populations of China and Japan, goes on increasing year by year without any regard to the opportunities available for a reasonable standard of living.

The figures of the population of India contained in the India Census Report for 1931 show with what dangerous rapidity the Indian population is now growing. In the ten years between 1921 and 1931 the population of India increased by very nearly 34,000,000 persons, a figure which is not far short of the total present population of France or of Italy. The total population of India in 1931 was 352,837,778, which is considerably more than the estimated population of China. Most of the inhabitants of India are still dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, and the population is most dense where the land is most fertile, which bears out the doctrine on which Malthus insisted, that there is a constant tendency for population to increase up to the limits of

subsistence. Primitive methods of cultivation are still used by Indian peasants, and the products of the soil have to be divided among so many cultivators that even on the richest land the population remains miserably poor.

In recent years there has been a considerable development of urban industries in India—largely with the aid of British capital and brains. Often, however, this growth of urban industries has not meant such a complete breach with agriculture as has accompanied the industrialisation of Europe. For example, the Indian worker in a Bombay cotton mill often retains his little farm holding in the country, and at repeated intervals leaves the mill—much to the annoyance of his employer—to get back to the land which is his home. But, whether it be on the land or in the mill, the excessive population of India means widespread poverty. Incidentally, the development of machine industries now taking place in Asia has led there, as it notoriously has in Europe, to keen international rivalries. At the present moment the Indian and Japanese Governments are trying to reach some agreement with one another, so that each may in the main preserve its home market for its own manufactured goods, while still leaving the other country a chance to do a little bit of export trade. There are similar discussions in progress between India and Great Britain in regard to tariffs on imports. The question of international trade is indeed one of the inevitable difficulties that follow upon over-production, either of people or of goods, and with the expanding power of the machine it is impossible to see any way of solving this world-wide problem except by reducing the numbers of the poorer section of the population so that there may be fewer work-seekers.

To this proposition one frequently hears the reply that if population increases there will be more people demanding the goods that are produced and consequently more employment for the work-seekers. This argument completely overlooks the fairly obvious fact that the increasing population consists largely of very poor people, and their demand for goods has very little money behind it, and consequently will be of little use to the producers of goods seeking a market. Nor can the problem be solved, as some people suggest, by inducing the State to subsidise the poorer classes so as to enable them to be actual instead of merely would-be buyers. The State has no money of its own. Its revenues are obtained by taking the money of the taxpayer, and so far as the taxpayer's money is taken from him by the State, he has less to spend himself, and to that extent ceases to be a good customer for the producer. By no sophistications can we get over the hard fact that if the poorer classes increase their numbers there will be more people seeking employment in order

to get a living, and if simultaneously the use of machinery is being extended, as it is to-day all over the world, there will be a reduced demand for human labour.

Alternatively, if the poorer classes reduce their rate of increase, there will be a decline in the number of work-seekers. Consequently wages will tend to rise, and the wage worker, becoming a richer man, will be able to spend more on the pleasures of life and also to enjoy more real leisure due to shorter working hours. Under such conditions the increased use of machinery becomes a boon, and not a curse, to the poorer classes.

The obvious and the only way by which this result can be achieved is for the poorer classes all over the world to adopt the prudential practice of birth control, which in European countries has become almost universal among the middle and upper classes. So far as Asiatic countries are concerned, there is at present not very much evidence of any inclination on the part of the East to imitate the wisdom of the West. Last autumn there was a conference in London on birth control in Asia, presided over by Lord Horder, and several distinguished visitors from Japan, China, and India gave their opinions with great frankness. The general opinion expressed was that, though little was yet being done, the East could by no means escape the necessity for birth control. The alternatives were infantile mortality, disease and famine, and also such barbarous practices as child murder. The attitude taken by these spokesmen and spokeswomen coming from the East showed that, happily, there is in Eastern countries some appreciation of the facts of the problem by the educated classes. Evidence to this effect comes also from other quarters. In India stress has been laid on the necessity for birth control by the Census Commissioner, Dr. H. J. Hutton, who states in his Report on the Census of 1931 that there appears to be in India a definite move towards birth control, especially in Madras and Mysore. His Report goes on to urge that every opportunity should be seized for giving instruction in birth control.² A similar line has been taken by the Director-General of the Indian Medical Service, Major-General Sir John Megaw, who states that only 39 per cent. of the Indian population is well-nourished.

In China there is talk of founding birth-control clinics in one or two of the big cities. In Japan very little has yet been done. It remains to see what may be the results of the work of the Japanese Institute for Research in Population Problems, above referred to. Meanwhile the Japanese Government seems to be looking at the matter mainly from the militarist point of view, and arguing that a decline in the birth rate will mean a loss of

² See *Daily Telegraph*, September 21, 1933.

military power. A similar argument against birth control is frequently used in some of the principal European countries. In effect, the argument means that it is the duty of the women of one country to give birth to as many children as possible, preferably males, in order that they may be numerous enough when they grow up to kill the males of another country. Beyond question, that is a common militarist doctrine. It means a poor outlook for the progress of the human race.

HAROLD COX.

FARMING FACTS AND FARMING FANCIES

AMONG the quainter conceits of the English is the belief that everything British is best. Our bloodstock, our beef and butter, our motor cars, even our climate and our system of laws, almost everything we possess or produce, we like to speak of as 'the best in the world.' And so it came about that, when we were forced, three years ago, to examine the nation's trading account more critically than for several generations, it seemed the simplest thing imaginable to adjust the balance of falling exports by replacing imported foodstuffs with the super-excellent products of our own land. People in country mansions and Fleet Street offices worked out marvellous sums which showed that we merely had to keep out imported foodstuffs to increase production at home by £200,000,000 a year and so balance our profit and loss account. The farmer, who had for long believed that he was only kept out of his own markets because foreigners were content to work for next to nothing, suddenly found himself the spearhead of this new effort in national reconstruction. Not only was he granted the taxes upon imported food that he had almost despaired of ever seeing, but he was given a new device also, the Quota, which completely prohibits any imports above a certain quantity, and which is admitted to be the most potent weapon ever forged in the history of international trade warfare. Another new weapon, almost as powerful, was also placed in his hands in the shape of Dr. Addison's Marketing Act and Mr. Elliot's 1933 Marketing Act. These not only enforced a minority of producers to abide by the decisions of a majority, but gave farmers complete control of their products, even including control of the price at which they might be sold. To the uninitiated, nothing but the reproductive limitations of Nature now seemed to stand between the farming industry and that £200,000,000.

Certainly the farmers seemed to believe this. Freed from the inferiority complex of feeling themselves the dupes of the cheap-food industrialists and the one class forbidden the protection of tariffs granted to other industries, they responded with a will. It is to their credit that the pigs they offered to the newly constituted Bacon Board last November exceeded the most optimistic

expectations by 50 per cent. It was after this that the first doubts began to arise in the minds of the more impulsive who thought that the expansion of British agriculture would be such a comparatively simple affair. For the bacon curers found every kind of pig rained down upon them from the best to the worst. Soon from every part of the country, excepting perhaps the North, came complaints from retailers of English bacon that was too fat, or its sides too short. Hardly yet do we realise that the British farmer cannot be expected to pick up in a few weeks what the industrious Danes took twenty years to find out. We are only beginning to realise that, so far as agricultural products are concerned, a thing has not merely to be British to be necessarily best.

It is perfectly true that we can and do breed some of the world's finest bloodstock. We are so blessed by Nature in soil and climate that all the things we grow, with the possible exception of wheat, need fear comparison with the produce of no other country. But alas! One thousand-pound bull so'd to the Argentine does not make a home beef industry, and the small quantities of good English butter that come from Devon and Cornish farmhouses are a poor substitute for the thousands of tons of level-quality butter that reach our shores from abroad. Our pedigree flocks and herds, of which we are so justly proud, exist side by side with an under-flow of fourth-rate commercial beasts that are a disgrace to our markets. While our best growers of fruit and vegetables are turning out stuff that is as good as anyone's, their efforts are being vitiated by badly grown and worse marketed supplies that fill salesmen and consumers alike with prejudice against British produce. The careful milk producer has to suffer for his slap-dash fellow who sells milk reeking with dirt and disease, and the whole range of our agricultural products is a kaleidoscope of variation that is the salesman's nightmare.

It is foolish and unfair to blame the farmer for all this. For generation upon generation he has been sacrificed to the industrialist who wants cheap food to pay low wages and to the foreign investor who must take his dividends chiefly in food imports. We had come to look upon the countryside as a playground and farming as a game, or at least as the cheapest way of buying the life of a country gentleman. The pedigree breeders were much more interested in seeing that their pigs' noses turned up in the particular way approved for the breed than in turning out an animal that would be of the most service to the commercial farmer. It was all rather fun, too. Pedigree sales were jolly affairs, with a good luncheon where friends met. You paid £100 for a pig worth £20 because then, when your turn came to hold a sale, someone returned the compliment. Thanks to our wonderful

natural advantages, the ordinary farmer, until a few years ago, was able to rub along living a life he loved, wiser than many in his generation who led lives they hated in order to make money. It was a good life, lived out of doors, with a sufficiency of good food, independence, a little rough shooting and hunting, and the weekly market as a sort of agricultural *casino* to prevent things becoming too monotonous. Now all that has changed. Research and invention have made agricultural production so much easier and cheaper in the countries that export food to us that their farmers (strange irony!) have had to increase their labours in order to meet the interest demands of the moneylenders. Where 100 sacks of wheat paid a debt five years ago, 200 are now required to meet it. So competition in our food markets has increased, and there is no longer the same margin for the home farmer to rub along in his old, happy way. Moreover, our falling exports have made it essential—at any rate, so long as the world is bent on economic nationalism—for us to produce more food at home and really take agriculture seriously.

For long everyone had talked about it. The prophets of agricultural expansion were chiefly divided into two schools, one of which believed that better marketing was the best way to success, while the other pinned its simple faith to tariffs. It is interesting to note that it is already apparent that neither was right. For now that so much undergrowth has been cleared away, with the farmer granted his tariffs and the cause of his inferiority complex removed, with all the machinery for better marketing provided and the Marketing Acts to enforce a loyalty of minorities that exceeds the wildest dreams of the protagonists of co-operation, it is quite clear that the real success of this colossal undertaking turns on the British farmer's ability to produce the right goods at the right price. The home consumer is prejudiced in favour of home produce, and he expresses his favour by being willing to pay, in most cases, a little more for British stuff. But he will not pay unless it is good, and he will not pay exorbitantly. No tariff or quota or Marketing Act in the world will permanently make him pay more for a worse article. He will either pay less or eat less. As most people know, our overseas food supplies have won their place in our market and maintain it rather by the uniformity of their product than by its super-excellence. Exporters abroad have spent years in studying our markets, and they have not overlooked the psychology of salesmanship. They realise that one bad egg or one rasher of tainted bacon will be remembered in bitterness by the housewife long after the ninety-and-nine that gave satisfaction have been forgotten. They have concentrated on not letting the consumer and the distributor down; hence their firm foothold. Therefore it is not good

enough that our best producers should be doing all and more than is required of them. Our job now is to organise the producing side of the farming industry so that the rank and file may turn out at least as sound a product as the imported they hope to replace, and a product at a comparable price.

We have not done so, and we are not seriously attempting it even yet. The swift action taken to limit imports and improve marketing has caught unawares those who should have been preparing the organisation of quality production. For at least five years the Markets Division of the Ministry of Agriculture has stumped the country in a campaign to inspire better marketing methods. They have achieved excellent results. But what is the use of better marketing if the stuff is not there to market? Five years that should have been spent in organising also better production have been wasted, and now marketing and production organisation are out of joint, although the two are really inseparable. A case that illustrates this well is that of cider. The introduction of the National Mark for cider and the consequent facilities for advertising it helped considerably to increase the consumption of British cider. But nothing had been done in the meantime to renovate our cider orchards or to ensure additional supplies of apples to meet the new demand, which outran the available supplies. Now the cider-apple growing end of the industry is being speeded up to make up the leeway, but time has been wasted.

The same need for organising quality production exists in nearly every branch of farming. The quality of the cattle that have been coming in to many commercial markets has, if anything, been deteriorating in recent years. Scotland and Ireland introduced Acts to eliminate the 'scrub' bull, largely responsible for this unfortunate state of affairs. In England and Wales the necessary legislation was passed three years ago, but action has been deferred until next August at the instance of the farmers. If ever there was an industry which could not afford such delays, it is the beef industry, where, on account of the processes of Nature, it needs two years to do anything. It is not so much the individual farmers who are to blame, for, in districts where schemes to improve beef cattle have been started, they have responded well. In some parts they have even applied for such schemes to be introduced. The fault lies with those who could have given a lead but did not. On the processing side of beef production things are as bad. Our obsolete system of 16,000 private slaughter-houses means that there is no uniformity in the product turned out; that valuable fats and by-products are thrown down the drain because it does not pay to manufacture them on such a small scale, and hides are

spoiled by inept flaying; nor can labour be organised efficiently in back-door premises of this description. The lowest estimate of the waste under our abattoir system as opposed to the meat factory is £1 per beast. This is paid for either by the farmer, in the lower price he receives, or by the consumer in the higher price demanded of him. What applies to cattle applies broadly to sheep also.

In the case of milk, one of the chief causes of our absurdly low milk consumption of one-third of a pint per head is the opposition of the medical profession and the public's distrust of this product. An alarmingly high proportion of our dairy cattle suffer from some form or another of tuberculosis, and although it may be true that only a fraction of these suffer from forms of it that can be transmitted to the consumer, this does not really allay the consumer's fears. The Hannah Dairy Research Institute has shown that tuberculosis can be eradicated from herds within a comparatively short period and at a trifling expense. But no one seems to bother. The United Dairies, in their tests held last year, also demonstrated that observances of the simplest rules, in anything but up-to-date cowsheds, would enable milk to be produced clean enough to pass any reasonable test. Again no one seemed really interested. Yet if we could but increase our milk consumption to half the average of comparable countries in Europe, the 'surplus milk' problem would cease to exist. It is true we have our special grades of guaranteed milk, but they are too complicated to mean much to the ordinary man, and they are expensive. Rather than place a premium upon decent milk, we should surely put milk that fails to reach a reasonable standard at a discount. It seems quite wrong that the man who takes pains to produce clean milk should be paid by the Milk Board at the same rate as he whose milk is just undirty enough to keep him out of trouble. The Board is equipped with the means to put this right. It may compile a list of 'accredited producers' whose milk may be relied upon by any consumer who is not too finicky, but, in the interests of the public and the dairying industry alike, the 'accredited producer' should be the rule and not the exception. To achieve this, however, again organisation and education is required on the production side of the industry.

The Bacon Pig Scheme shows almost more clearly than any other branch of agriculture the need for an improved standard of quality. Here the quantitative restriction of imports has had time to take effect upon prices. But unless British bacon as good as the prohibited Danish can be supplied, the home consumers will either eat something else or rise in their wrath against the whole principle of tampering with their food supplies. Bacon carers of experience and integrity have said that, in the first

two months of the scheme, 30 per cent. of the pigs supplied were not in the class contracted for and 50 per cent. were unsuitable for that production of first-class bacon. The curers also record, however, a new spirit among the farmers. Where a complaint to a farmer a year ago about the quality of the pigs he supplied would only have brought an insulting reply, now it usually elicits a request for advice and to be told how to do better. The time is ripe for the creation of the Pig Development Board recommended by the Pig Reorganisation Commission and described in the Report as 'the corner-stone' of the marketing plan. This Board, composed of representatives of the producers and curers, would organise efficiency of production. They would presumably begin with breeding, for many farmers are trying to produce bacon pigs from breeding stock that make the proposition hopeless from the start. Yet we have the stock, and have exported it freely to our rivals abroad who have so successfully captured our markets. But the scrub boar must go the way of the scrub bull, and pig-recording centres and litter-testing stations must be established if the small or inexperienced farmer is to fill his place in the industry. It must be made possible for every pig producer to obtain the services of a boar of the right type and to become conversant with feeding methods that are economical and will produce the right kind of carcase. Nor is it likely that the large numbers of small curing factories are all producing on the most efficient lines; and surely we shall have to pay more attention to the 'tank cure' system which the Danes have exploited so successfully. All this is work for the Development Board, and it will not mean interference by Government inspectors, for it will be manned and financed by the industry itself. But now is the time for it to get to work, while farmers are in the mood to co-operate and are genuinely anxious to produce a better article, while the bulk of industrial consumers are looking upon agriculture with more favour than for many a long day. If we wait until the necessary knowledge has percolated through to the remotest farms and the most bucolic intelligences, or till premiums paid for right carcasses have stabilised production at a satisfactory standard, we shall find we have exhausted the consumers' patience long before these Fabian methods have taken effect.

The poultry industry has grown more rapidly in size in recent years than any other. It is now the third most valuable of our farming industries in terms of output. As might be expected from such a rapid advance, it needs a good deal of consolidation and organising. There seems almost as much lack of liaison between pedigree breeder and commercial producer as in the beef industry. Our poultry flocks are far too prone to disease, too lacking in vigour, as compared, say, with the Dutch. This springs

in part from the tendency to regard a hen as a mere machine for turning out the greatest possible number of eggs or for growing fat in the cheapest and quickest way. It is a problem of which the beginning of the solution lies with the breeder. The poultryman may rear or feed never so wisely, but he cannot get the best results from strains of bad or enfeebled type. There are table-poultry producers of the highest ability, and our prime Sussex fowls need fear no competition. On the other hand, there are many who regard the table-poultry market simply as an outlet for surplus cockerels and inflict upon it breastless birds that make the salesmen shudder. It is said that, in spite of the tariffs upon imports, British supplies of birds around 3 lb. in weight, for which a new and increasing demand has arisen, are non-existent in commercial quantities, and salesmen have no option but to continue to turn to the Continental producer.

It would appear that greater specialisation of the component parts of the poultry industry is required. To improve production, there seems to be a need for hatcheries in the producing areas supplied with their stock by the pedigree breeders. The hatchery could then distribute day-old sex-linked chicks to both egg farmers and table-poultry farmers with a guarantee of the soundness of the strain. The pullets would go to the egg farms, the cockerels to the table-poultry producers. It might even be desirable to insist that the table birds be returned to the hatchery after, say, ten weeks for finishing off, with the object of obtaining a well-finished and uniform product. There is still so much to learn. They are only beginning to experiment at Wye to find the best crossbreds for certain lines of poultry production, and we are far behind the Dutch in discovering a cross that produces good layers and good cockerels for the table also. Such a bird would inevitably mean fewer eggs in a year, but much of the loss would be made up by larger eggs, and the cockerels would be of greater value. Our increasing poultry population is making the problem of surplus cockerels a very pressing one. It looks as if concentration upon prolific egg production is extorting too heavy a toll in useless cockerels, small eggs, disease and debility. All these are problems in production and not in the organisation of marketing, but they have a vital bearing upon any marketing scheme.

Fruit is another branch of agricultural production where there is a vast amount of work awaiting the pioneer. Our 200 odd varieties of apples might well be reduced to a score for a start, for the remainder have names that mean nothing to the public and only complicate the task of the salesman. There is so much we do not know. Mr. Lloyd George has had to experiment at his own expense at Churt to see what varieties are suited to that soil, and a recent soil survey undertaken by the East Malling

Research Station in Kent showed that fruit was being grown in the most unpromising places, while first-class fruit land was being wasted as useless woodland. Governor Lafayette once caused every square yard of the State of Wisconsin to be surveyed. Of the many useful things he has done in his life, he likes to say that that was the most valuable. Yet Britain is both smaller and richer than Wisconsin. In apple production the all-important question of the organisation of labour is almost an unknown quantity. Should the minimum staff be based upon pruning, spraying or harvesting? We simply do not know. Yet we cannot begin upon economic apple production until we do know. Just as the pig or poultry producer needs supplies of suitable stock to draw upon for breeding, so the fruit grower needs to know where he can turn to buy trees of good stock that will suit his soil. A beginning has been made by the Devon Cider Manufacturers' Federation, who supply a tree for every ton of apples purchased in the county; but that barely scratches the problem of equipping all our orchards and fruit gardens with suitable stock.

But where organisation on the production side of the fruit industry is most needed is, perhaps, in the processing industries of jam-making and canning. Economists have always quite rightly regarded processing as part of production. The farmer has not so regarded it hitherto, but he is beginning to realise that he is very closely concerned indeed with what happens to his produce between the farm and the kitchen. It is permissible, and by no means uncommon, for the most revolting glucose concoctions to be sold as English jam. It may be called 'English strawberry' or 'English damson,' although 90 per cent. of it is composed of something far inferior and quite different. Manufacturers who are anxious to offer the public jam with the guarantee of the National Mark find themselves handicapped in their good intentions by those who prefer to sell rubbish at a large profit. The canning industry is producing, on the whole, a better product than the jam industry, and the official examination of a large number of samples last year showed a very gratifying improvement in quality compared with imported canned foods. The National Mark has been of very great assistance in this instance. But home-canned produce is finding its way on to the market in forms that are not a good advertisement for the industry. We cannot afford to let this happen. The English consumer has learnt from the importers to expect a very high standard in canned goods, and a few bad samples of British stuff prejudices him against the rest. In both canning and jam-making those manufacturers who are supporting the National Mark are 'holding the baby' for the considerable proportion who stand outside. Under the Mark they submit to the irksomeness

of inspection, the trouble and expense of observing various regulations, the loss of occasionally having the whole of a day's pack turned down through not being up to standard, because they realise that it is in the general interest to produce a high-quality article. It is wrong that their efforts should be invalidated by others who will trouble themselves with none of these things. The 1933 Marketing Act was expressly designed to bring the processing industries within its scope. It would empower a majority of enlightened processors to compel a minority to keep the rules of a duly authorised scheme for safeguarding the 'standard of production.' If the National Mark standards are considered too high and applicable only to the cream of our production, there is no reason why minimum standards should not be introduced, with the proviso that all goods sold below these standards be marked clearly 'not up to grade.' This is being done quite successfully in America, particularly with American goods destined for foreign markets. In Scandinavia and in Ireland regulations are in force that have virtually the same effect with the goods they send to us. The bad producer finds the English market closed to him. Can we afford our easy-going methods in the face of such competition? We as a nation have always been willing to pay for what is good. The English housewife is one of the most discriminating purchasers of quality in the world, for she has been accustomed to take her choice from the finest agricultural products of many nations. There is a belief, very popular at the moment, that any fool can produce a thing, but it needs a clever man to sell it. There was never a greater fallacy. Good stuff sells itself, and the cleverest man living will not for long sell a really bad article. The days of that are over. We are living in a new era when the consumer looks for service, based upon quality and cheapness, in what he buys. 'Truth In Meat' is the rather striking heading of an American decree intended to guarantee a more dependable article to the consumers of meat in that country. It no longer pays to deceive the public in what it buys. It is better business, in the long run, to win its confidence with genuine, high-quality goods. Quality, therefore, is not merely an act of justice to the consumer; it is the best hope of the farmer for profitable business, and in nearly every commodity that we can produce Nature has blessed us with the conditions for producing it in quality second to none.

The foregoing are merely indications of some of the work in organising production that lies ahead of us. In an industry of which almost every branch is a lifetime's study the instances cited cannot pretend to be comprehensive, nor are they set down in any captious spirit. The fact that so much remains to be done does not mean that nothing is being done, nor that there are no

longer men farming in England who would give a lead in agriculture to the world. But we have opened a new chapter now in which we must concern ourselves not so much with brilliant exceptions as with the setting of uniform standards for all engaged upon a branch of the industry to supply a regular product at least as good in quality as the foreign article it hopes to supersede. Only in that way can the newly gained sympathy of the public for agriculture be preserved. Motor cars, furniture, tooth-paste and a thousand other articles of daily use are being turned out with perfect uniformity because, with the industrial revolution, we began to group production under the factory roof instead of in the worker's cottage. That has made the consumer demand uniformity in his food supplies. We cannot pick up the land and put it in a factory, so we must devise other means. The industrial revolution in British agriculture is just beginning, after several generations of neglect, and one cannot blame the farmer if he does not automatically produce farming industries ready-made on modern lines at the first wave of the magic wand of Quota or Marketing Act. Indeed, it is stupid to think about blaming anyone. There is too much to be done that is more interesting to think about. Much greater demands will be made, for instance, upon our research stations and experimental farms. We are already well served by these, but they will need organising also. They should be left with as much autonomy as they now possess, with plenty of scope to make what experiments they fancy, for science flourishes best in a free soil, and many of its most valuable discoveries have come from experiments that might have appeared a waste of time. But we need a better service for disseminating the fruits of this research among all those concerned, and some co-ordinating influence is required to see that all branches of research are covered by a network of centres all over Britain. It would be easy under the present rather haphazard arrangement for investigations that were very necessary to be completely omitted because they were not assigned to any particular centre.

All this organising will need men and money. Who is to do it, and whence will the money come? The State, some will answer, or the Ministry of Agriculture. But would this be wise or just? It is difficult to have State assistance without having rather too much State control also, and the Ministry has not the staff to undertake such a gigantic task. You cannot organise the British market-gardening industry with a man and a boy, which are about all the Ministry could spare for such a job at the moment. Other industries do not ask the taxpayer to provide the funds for their works managers' or efficiency experts' salaries, nor even to run their research departments. It would be better in every way

if both money and men were provided by the agricultural industries. The marketing boards have made this possible by bringing each industry under some unity of control, and by enabling the board to raise levies to which every producer contributes in fair proportion. One-eighth of a penny per gallon contributed equally by the producers and distributors of liquid milk would provide a fund of nearly £1,000,000, a sum which would more than suffice to make us one of the cleanest milk-producing countries in the world within a very short time. It would ensure, also, that what was done was done on the advice of expert and practical men who thoroughly understood the industry. To place the onus upon Government officials is to place them in a most invidious position. Much as we hate the idea of 'farming from Whitehall,' we do not hate it as much as those in Whitehall who would be called upon to do it. In our short experience of the marketing schemes it has been invaluable to be able to say: 'This is a producers' scheme, accepted by the industry, and run by producers' representatives.' If the agricultural producing industries wish to maintain their vitality, their self-respect and their independence, they will administer, staff and finance these schemes themselves.

But they will need to cast their net widely. They cannot, in modern conditions, dispense with the scientist, the publicist and the expert salesman. These they must make their allies in breeding and producing the most economically those things best suited to particular localities. Having produced an article sufficiently homogeneous to be advertised, they must advertise it, and salesmen must be employed to find where there are 'points of sales resistance' to the home product, and refer them back to the producers. Incredible as it may seem, there is not a single person now employed by the producers in discovering where the bacon we are producing under the new scheme falls short of the retailers' or consumers' requirements or how it might be improved. Even in the production of certain articles ancillary to agriculture there is wide scope for men of ingenious minds: such things as egg-boxes, for instance, or containers for honey, or cartons for milk or cream. For years we accept what we have without question, and then one day someone finds that a very simple modification halves the cost. Similarly we discover by accident that if apples are packed in their containers diagonally they exert an even pressure always against the sides and lid. In a few years this has saved hundreds of thousands of pounds in bruised or damaged apples. Now we have just found out that the right way to pack eggs is with the rounder ends uppermost. If the more pointed ends are placed uppermost, three times as many eggs are spoiled on a long journey. These seem small points, but in the aggregate they represent a very large sum that can be saved to

the producer, and it would pay us to set up a research station to experiment along these lines alone.

Quality production and uniformity of output—these are the objectives that British agriculture must attain if it is to rank as a modern industry and stand on a solid foundation. It is no longer a vocation for the care-free country gentleman or the moneyed stock fancier. It is not even enough that the best home producers should be the best in the world. We have to aim at a democracy of enlightened producers rather than an aristocracy of spectacular agriculturists. There are some who say that all this is making Britons into slaves and stealing their individual freedom. But this is not a question of Rule Britannia and Magna Carta—it is a matter of business; and, when one comes down to hard facts, the only freedom left under the old, undisciplined ways was the freedom to go bankrupt. The farmer has experienced this rather more intensively than most people of late, and he has shown how much he values his so-called freedom by the huge majorities of votes cast in favour of compulsory marketing schemes. Most of the pseudo-champions of the farmers' 'liberty' are men who have never tilled an acre of land or produced a gallon of milk in their lives.

Now is the time to make the effort to improve the quality of our production, for farmers are in a progressive mood, and the agricultural planning already achieved (the one constructive contribution of the National Government) has caught the imagination of the public. We are rebuilding agriculture on the threefold base of better production, better processing and better marketing, and while the new structure rises we are sheltering it from the blasts of insensate dumping with the shield of tariffs and quotas. But it is upon better production that the safety of the whole structure ultimately depends. Unless we can give the consumer the service of quality and cheapness that is due to him, all our marketing schemes will come to naught, the best intentions of the processors will be frustrated, and neither tariff nor quota will give the home producer the benefits he has not earned. If, on the other hand, we take time by the forelock and use both our genius and our natural advantages to the full, the task of marketing will be made easy, the processing industries will leap forward when they have such good supplies of suitable material poured into their hands, and we may well find that neither tariffs nor quotas are any longer matters of primary importance.

L. F. EASTERBROOK.

THE REVOLT AGAINST TITHES

'YE have robbed me in tithes and offerings.' In the name of the Deity the prophet Malachi cursed all who failed to bring their tithes into the store-house in order that there might be meat in his house. In return for prompt payment the prophet pledged the word of the Lord to bring manifold blessings and abundance to the husbandman. If arrears in tithe were paid, the vine crops would be preserved and the devouring locusts driven away. So, too, the prophet Amos prescribed sacrifices every morning and tithes every three years, or God would withhold the rain and blast the crops. Tithes are a Divine Institution, and from the earliest times, when the Lord hated Esau, they have been connected with the pastoralist and with the soil. Esau was a man of the field and a cunning hunter, and the Lord laid his heritage waste. And Esau sold his birthright unto Jacob for a pottage of lentils. He was condemned, very properly, to be his more urban-minded brother's bondsman and to work for his brother's support, having clearly shown himself to be the stupider of the two and easily imposed upon. From the first the system became a means whereby the husbandman contributed in kind to the regular support of the priests as ministers of the public ritual. Christianity derived the system from the Jews, and tithes were looked upon as belonging to God.

From belonging to God they were next looked upon as belonging to the priests, who appropriated them, and in return ensured and guaranteed that the Lord would fertilise the crops, send rain and make them fruitful. That was, in fact, the contractual as well as the religious basis of the system. In spite of the gradual usurpation whereby secular law-makers turned the oblations of the devout into forced payments imposed alike on faithful and impious tillers of the soil, the idea has survived in England to this day. In this strain rhymed Tusser (c. 1524-1580), the farmer poet whose 'music hath been the plough':

For lambe, pig and calf, and for other the like,
Tithe so as thy cattle the Lord do not strike.

In some parishes of rural England the sacerdotal function of blessing the crops is enacted annually to remind us of the service

for which tithes are—or at any rate, once were—paid. This picturesque ceremony was re-enacted, and duly recorded by an attendant Press photographer, at Sonning, in Berkshire, on Sunday, May 21, 1933. Since then over 6000 distraint orders are reported to have been made on farmers for arrears of tithe rent-charge they cannot, or will not, pay.

The origin of the tithe system is still invoked to defend its present incidence in twentieth-century England. Romantic little pamphlets published by the 'Central Church Committee for Defence and Instruction' are regularly distributed to rural incumbents, and often accompany tithe rent-charge demands. A favourite is headed 'Origin of Tithe in England,' and concludes an eloquent, though highly imaginative, appeal with the homily 'It is unjust to deprive any Institution of what has been given for the work of that Institution.' Can we, therefore, forget the implications of a service rendered to the husbandman in return for the ripe corn he gave? Or is he to be blamed for asking why he *alone* should pay for a service he may no longer supplicate or receive?

The ancient history of tithe is more than an academic diversion; its neglected study is essential for a proper understanding of the laws relating to its incidence and recovery, the politics which have framed the laws and the propaganda by which they are supported. Most of this propaganda is well described by John Selden, whose famous *History of Tithes* was suppressed by the Court of Star Chamber as 'excellent instruments for the advancement of ignorance and laziness.' By the Tithe Act of 1925 ecclesiastical tithe in England became vested in the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty. In their Report dated April 6, 1933, we are informed:

The severe agricultural depression which continued during 1932 had the effect of further retarding the payment of tithe, especially in the Eastern and South-Eastern counties—areas in which the agricultural depression was acute, and where land is heavily tithed.

A further statement emanating from the Bounty office is to the effect that 'in the North there is practically no difficulty in collecting tithe at all.' Since comparatively little land in the North of England is tithed, or else only lightly tithed, the explanation is obvious. In short, the more heavily land is tithed, the harder it is to collect one of the most onerous and inequitable of the overhead charges on agriculture, which is one of the active causes of agricultural depression, felt most acutely in those districts where it is levied. The North is relatively free of the tithe burden, because it remained agriculturally undeveloped and largely unenclosed until after the Reformation. Tithes were

placed on English land by ecclesiastical authority, while Canons passed by various synods of the Papal Church alone determined what was titheable. Until the Reformation it had been a principle that barren or waste lands were exempted from tithe. By a statute of Edward VI. (243, cap. 13) the exception was extended for seven years after they had been reclaimed.

In the course of time ecclesiastical appropriations became transferable to laymen, and saleable like ordinary property. Until the Reformation such a view was not endorsed by the Church, and was expressly denounced by the Third Lateran Council in 1180 especially directed against the growing power of the lay orders (Knights Templar and the Hospitallers). After the Reformation the Crown resumed the Papal Church's appropriations, and more tithe taxes began to pass into secular hands. Between the Reformation and the Commutation Act of 1836 tithe could only be collected in kind on land which was tithed; the amount collected was at any rate limited to a tenth of what the land itself actually produced in stocks and crops titheable in the parish.

By the Commutation Act of 1836 tithed land was made to bear a charge based on the money value of the corn, or other titheable produce it grew during and after the Napoleonic Wars, when more land was down to arable than at any other time in our history. Since 1836, while thousands of acres of arable land were rapidly reverting to grass, it remained, and still remains, tithed on the value of corn it may long have ceased to grow. The Commutation Act was undoubtedly introduced because tithes in kind, particularly mixed tithes on calves, milk, eggs, etc., had become increasingly impossible to collect. The gross economic injustice of the principle of commutation is beginning to be more fully appreciated. The only machinery for the recovery of tithes between Henry VIII. and William III. was provided by the statutes of Henry VIII. and Edward VI., whereby recovery could be sought in the civil courts, or in the ecclesiastical courts with the additional penalty of excommunication.

In order to secure the ecclesiastical or the lay tithe-owners' share immune from the adversity that followed the neglect of farming interests, tithe has had less and less relation to the profits of the industry it taxed, or to its capacity to pay it, until now it has none at all. The peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars left England exhausted, oppressed by heavy taxation and debt. While the rapid development of industry for a time ran ahead of the world's demand, markets at home were glutted with unsaleable goods. The general distress was reflected in the rural areas, and intensified by a series of bad harvests. The Corn Act of 1815 prohibited the introduction of foreign corn until wheat

soon reached famine prices. While the value of tithes went up accordingly and rose until about 1827, the high price of corn and the value of tithes (in corn as distinguished from mixed tithes) were, of course, no indication of the farmers' profits or of prosperity. As an instance, during the year 1821 the average price of wheat stood as high as 86s. 1d. a quarter, a rise of 20s. per quarter over the previous year, although the crop was inferior and it was a year of great agricultural depression. Sheep during that year fetched very low prices, and good beef was sold at 2d. a pound. Land-owners suffered with farmers, and Boyle reported that Coke of Holkham, a wealthy East Anglian land-owner, lost £20,000 that year by the fall in his rents; yet the year was the high peak of predial or corn tithe value.

Even the tithe-collector's share eventually dwindled in value, and the task of collecting it became more and more difficult. That was the reason for the 1836 Commutation Act, whereby tithe as such (with a few unimportant local exceptions) was abolished and commuted into money payments based on the average value of the three corn crops of the seven previous years, and collected per acre of tithed land. Henceforth, tithe bore no relation to the crops grown, the stock kept, the rate of wages, the cost of working the land or the taxes on it—irrespective of what William Cobbett, in his forgotten plea for cheap government, called 'the vermin who live upon the taxes, not those who work to raise them.' Tithes have remained a monopoly tax without regard to the function of the land, the function and responsibility of the owner, or the livelihood of the husbandman.

After the greater anomaly of the anachronistic survival of tithe, the anomaly and injustice of basing it on corn prices ranks second in absurdity; and that absurdity is inherent in the principle of commutation. In the 'eighties, when agriculture reached a new low ebb and many farmers became bankrupt, the difficulties of collecting tithe rent-charge from the occupying farmer again increased. By the Act of 1891 owners of land were made responsible for the payment of tithe rent-charge. Any contract between owner and tenant for payment by the occupying tenant became void. The method of collection was thereby better hidden from the large class of tenant farmers, except where distress was levied for non-payment on the tenant. Further amending Acts favoured the ecclesiastical tithe-owners, who by the Act of 1898 were exempted from the payment of half their rates, amounting to £396,000 per annum, which became payable by the general rate-payer, including, of course, the farmer once again. Further concessions to the ecclesiastical tithe-owner from rates followed in 1918 and 1920.

By the 1918 Act, when tithe rent-charge was rising abnor-

mally with the rise in corn prices, as it rose 100 years before, through causes arising out of the war, the septennial system was abolished and tithe was stabilised at £109 3s. 11d. per £100 at par for seven years. After that period quinquennial averages were to be introduced. It should, of course, have been obvious that it would have been impossible to collect tithe at £172, which, by the septennial system, it would have reached in 1922, when all farm produce values, including corn, had slumped, and were still falling rapidly. The stabilised rate introduced in 1918 was, as a matter of fact, just below the previous high peak reached after the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars; but with a cynical casuistry seldom surpassed in the history of political dialectic, Mr. Baldwin, of course supported by the Cecils and the Church party, proclaimed the uncollected peak curve of the septennial averages as representing a very handsome and generous present of £14,000,000 (up to the end of 1931) from tithe-owners to tithe-payers, for which they should be abundantly grateful. The Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty have handsomely acknowledged this dialectical gift in their propaganda statements ever since.

In 1923 the clergy again took alarm at the rapid fall in corn prices and agricultural values. The matter was discussed at a conference of bishops in June. The Act of 1925 followed. By it, commuted tithe was stabilised for eighty-four years at £105—an arbitrary £5 above par value, because, apparently, Mr. Wood, afterwards Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax), the Minister responsible, thought this was a good 'perpetuity' figure. In addition, a compulsory redemption clause was added, imposing a further 4½ per cent. per annum, to bring the figure up to the level of £109 10s. for ecclesiastical tithe. This represents a *forty-four and a half per cent. increase above the pre-war, or 1914, rate*. By comparison the average annual rate over the eighty-two years' period between 1836 and 1918 is £91 15s. 6d.

Politics, τὰ πολιτικά, by origin the art of urban government, has in England become increasingly remote from rural and agricultural economy. Its present residual meaning is best expressed in Isaac D'Israeli's *Curiosities of Literature* as 'the art of governing mankind by deceiving them.' The debates on the second reading of the 1918 Tithe Act were profusely bespattered with protestations that the clergy were to be acquitted in anticipation of the accusation that they were profiteering by the Act—a suspicion that was reflected in the previous discussions that had taken place in the Lower House of Convocation. The 'so-called 'agreement,' alleged to have preceded it, 'was carried out,' in the words of Lord Buckmaster, 'chiefly with the representatives of the beneficed clergy,' and well advertised at the

time and subsequently, in the words of the Archbishop of Canterbury (House of Lords, December 3, 1925), as a generous gift from, and 'a very considerable sacrifice by tithe-owners.' Mr. Edward Wood frankly admitted, in introducing the 1925 Act, that the Stabilisation Act of 1918 was carried through at the instance of the Church.¹ Lest there should be any uncertainty about the *intention* of this legislation—and, what is of greater significance, *whose* intention—we may refer to the President of the Board of Agriculture in 1918. Mr. Prothero said: 'When tithe rent-charge rises, even if it rises to £182 11s., the tithe-owner gets only what the Tithe Commutation Act *intended* him to get . . . and that which the Act was *designed* to give him.' That is why nothing short of the repeal of the 1836 Tithe Commutation Act can possibly be of the slightest use to save English agriculture from an impossible and inequitable burden.

A question often asked is, 'Upon what are the beneficed clergy to rely if tithe is abolished?' For the year ending December 1931 Queen Anne's Bounty received (less agents' commission) £1,785,893 in tithe rent-charge. In addition, they received in the year over £115,800 of capital in respect of redemption and merger, as well as nearly 4000 annuities amounting to over £103,000 for interest and sinking fund in respect of redemptions by annuity. They claim to have vested in them for the year 1932 £2,165,346 of tithe of *par* value, excluding tithe on glebe. Their Balance Sheet for 1932 show assets at £16,146,776 4s. 1d. Their office expenses and charges of management alone amount to over £60,000 a year, apart from the administration expenses of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, which account for approximately another £100,000 a year. Queen Anne's Bounty is also partly financed out of funds advanced by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, whose trust accounts show holdings of over £32,000,000 in Government and other securities; a further £7,500,000 in mortgages account; a further investment account showing over £34,000,000 in securities; a further £2,000,000 in annual rents, ground rents, etc., from land and house property, besides revenues from the Bishoprick Estates, upon which no estate duties are payable as in the case of secular land-owners.

The vast wealth and landed estates of the Church, of which the tithe taxed on agricultural land she does not own is a fraction, serve the spiritual needs of less than 10 per cent. of the adult population over eighteen years of age registered in the Church rolls, the great majority of whom contribute nothing in tithes for their own spiritual sustenance. Yet the Governors of the Bounty confidently report: 'The present Government, like the Government which preceded it, have stated definitely that they

¹ *Hansard*, June 18, 1925.

have no intention of introducing legislation affecting the liability to the payment of tithe.'

During the debates on the 1918 Act there was one notable protest by Sir Charles Hobhouse against the lay tithe-owner, as distinguished from the clerical tithe-owner, profiting at the expense of agriculturists.

There was nothing whatever to be said for tithe-owners who have rendered no service to the community, but who take away from the land-owning and cultivating classes an increased income at a time when every other class has been under the necessity of facing a diminished income and an increased expenditure, tithe-owners who have rendered no service to the people from whom they extract a considerable portion of the income of the locality.

That eminent divine, Dr. William Paley, whose logic is so scrupulously studied by entrants to that great tithe-owning corporation the University of Cambridge, made no distinction between the lay and ecclesiastical collector of tithe when he wrote:

Of all institutions which are adverse to cultivation and improvement, none is so noxious as that of Tithes. A claimant here enters into the produce, who contributed no assistance whatever to the production. Tithes are a tax not only upon industry, but upon that industry which feeds mankind.

During the debates on the second reading of the 1925 Tithe Act Captain Henderson repeated the familiar plea that 'One of the main objects of the Act is to afford very considerable relief to agriculture.' He thereby earned the eulogies of the member for the Wells Division of Somerset, subsequently Minister for Agriculture (now Lord Bayford), for this 'helpful suggestion.' But the greatest measure of enthusiasm was evinced by Mr. Edward Wood, the Minister responsible, for what was to be a final and equitable settlement of a difficult problem. No one, at any rate, appears to have challenged his venturesome *obiter dictum*, that 'tithe is a legal obligation on land in no way differing from any other charge, a charge which has no doubt for many generations past been discounted in the value of the land when it has passed from hand to hand.' This elementary and fundamental inaccuracy has been, and is being, constantly repeated. Tithe differs from every other charge or burden on the land in every possible way.

Tithe was created by canon law under Papal jurisdiction, and abolished as such in 1836. Commuted tithe rent-charge became a tax exclusively levied on agricultural land, in violation of the common law principle exemplified in the *Confirmatio Cartarum* (Edward I., 1297), which asserted that 'no aids, tasks and prises' should be taken by the Crown, but

by the assent of the Realm, and for the common profit thereof. Forasmuch as diverse people of our Realm are in fear that the aids and tasks which

they have given to us beforetime of their own grant and goodwill might be turned to a bondage to them and their heirs.

During the fourteenth century merchants were compelled to pay a tithe on their profits to the Church, and labourers paid in tithe a tenth of their wages. If the Church ventured to reassert the claim she once made and demanded a tithe of the profits of any other industry except farming, or sought, for instance, to impose a tax of a tenth of the wages of coal-miners, the suggestion would be scouted as preposterous. Yet the claim to perpetuate the so-called tithe on the profits of farming—representing often, not a tenth of anything, but several hundreds per cent. of its profits—is in equity and in its economic effects no whit less preposterous.

The idea is assiduously fostered by the champions of lay and ecclesiastical tithe-owning corporations that any protest against the anomalies and injustices of the tithe system is an attack on the 'sacred rights of property.' Concurrently, strenuous efforts are made to suggest that land was once charged, in some unspecified and ancient time, by former land-owners, thereby creating a legal title to tithe 'in the nature of rent or a mortgage on the land.' *The Times*^a has given great prominence to this type of argument, elaborated in its pages, notably by Mr. G. T. Hutchinson, a barrister-at-law and treasurer of Christ Church College, Oxford, which is one of the largest and wealthiest lay tithe-owning corporations in England. This type of propaganda has been found so effectual in silencing or intimidating land-owners of the more trusting and 'Conservative' type that it has been repeated at every opportunity by Mr. Middleton, the active tithe chief of Queen Anne's Bounty, and by Government partisans committed to defending their part in the 1925 Act. Probably the most noted legal champion of the view of the 'sacred right of property in tithe' is Lord Justice Slesser, former Solicitor-General in the Labour Government, who fought valiantly in the House of Commons to raise the stabilisation rate of tithe to as high a figure as possible.

The view that tithe is property was, as a matter of fact, challenged in the House of Commons when the 1925 Bill was discussed in standing committee, but, the Speaker having ruled it out of order to raise that question, it was never debated. In this question, however, we should be careful, perhaps, of the dicta of even the most eminent of lawyers. 'The lawyer's vision is bounded by his books: the historian goes behind his books, and studies the facts for himself. What is "authority" for the one is absolutely none for the other,' was well said by the very scholarly Dr. Horace Round. The purely verbal controversy of

'tithe as property' is singularly sterile beside the fact that an original ecclesiastical tax has by recent legislation become, in effect, property alienated from the productive industry of farming, and treated as though it were the property of 'tithe-owners'—a fact which calls for the most immediate redress. Yet tithe is not, and never has been, a personal debt or a contractual obligation. Tithe issues out of the land and belongs to the land. Its restoration, therefore, would be no *gift to the land-owner* of that of which he has been expropriated, though it would help to enable him to cultivate his land at a profit and, consequently, to employ more labour. Rights of lay patronage and property in advowsons have, by recent Acts of Parliament—particularly by the Benefices Measures of 1931 and 1933—been curtailed or arbitrarily abolished without any regard for 'sacred rights of property'; the same power has arbitrarily fixed and stabilised the rate at which tithe is claimed.

It is often claimed that heavily tithed land is thereby reduced in value and is purchasable for less money on that account. Both tithed and tithe-free land has been sold in 1933 in Suffolk at a little more than double its annual rental value in 1923. At this rate, similar land, tithed, should be worth *minus what?* Land is, in fact, devaluated by the overheads in taxation and tithe, increasing costs of working it, by glutted markets, and by the sequestration of its capital resources in estate duties.

Consider, for example, the economic and functional distinction between property in land and tithe taxed upon land—between the responsibilities attached to ownership in land to maintain, improve and cultivate it—and property in tithe which reduces its capacity for profitable cultivation and for employing labour at a fair standard of wages. Such a distinction is well illustrated in the case of the land-owner who sold an estate in East Anglia during the boom years between 1921 and 1923. Tenant farmers may then have bought their farms at about twenty-five years' purchase, paying 5 per cent. on a mortgage to do so. They now find themselves paying far more in interest on the capital than they would be paying in rent. In addition, they themselves have to pay the cost of maintenance and repairs which the landlord paid for them. They may find that their land has depreciated in value until it is profitless to own. Their market has almost vanished; their wages bill has doubled since 1914 and their profits, if any, are negligible, but they still have to pay tithe at the 1918-1925 rates.

By contrast, compare the position of the tithe-owner who may have been the lay tithe-owner owning rectorial tithe on the land he sold in 1921. From the land he sold and the capital invested he should be receiving in interest many times the


^a November 20, 1925, and July 20, 1931.

equivalent profits out of rent. *In addition*, if, say, he retained the rectorial tithe averaging 4s. an acre, he may be receiving in tithe rent-charge alone considerably more than he would be receiving out of rents if he were still owning the land and had to bear the costs of maintaining it. Some land-owners who extinguished lay tithes on their land, by merging it before they sold it have, on the other hand, made the land tithe-free, unless it was also charged with ecclesiastical tithe. In almost every case it has been far more profitable to own the tithe than the land. What further compensation should lay tithe-owners receive for the redemption of their claims? In effect, the value of the original tithe has been many times redeemed already.

Queen Anne's Bounty has claimed to adjust the burden of tithe to the ability to pay. If this were true, the Bounty would generally have to offer a voluntary remission of no less than 100 per cent. No such case has yet been reported. By the Tithe Act of 1891, section 8, remission may be recovered where tithe exceeds two-thirds of the rental value assessed for income tax purposes under Schedule B. Contrary to the supposition of some tithe-owning controversialists whose views have appeared in the Press, the annual value does not represent net profits, since overheads in taxation, maintenance, rates, insurance, etc., as well as tithe, come out of the annual or rental value. Consequently, the remission clauses do not operate, even when no profit at all is shown, and tithe often remains legally recoverable when there are no profits at all. Proceedings under the provisions of this section are consequently very seldom taken. Suggestions for amending the remission clauses of the 1891 Act, put forward in the supposed interests of tithe-payers, are not likely to receive any support from them, if they fully understand the position.

The diagram on page 321 illustrates the burden represented by tithe rent-charge on a single farm in Dorset where the tithe at 2s. 5d. an acre is well below the average over the whole titheable land of the country, which is 3s. 6d. The farm is typical downland, carrying stock and sheep, well watered; it has good buildings, and is about two-fifths arable. In this fairly typical instance, for every £1 representing proceeds of the land received by the land-owner the ecclesiastical tithe-owner receives over £4, subject to minor deductions for rates and taxes at privileged rates, or over four-fifths of the total net proceeds. If the tithe in this instance represented one-tenth of the annual profits, as some people still appear to imagine, the tithe would be one-half of 1 per cent., not 21 per cent., of the rental value (see diagram). In Kent and Norfolk a typical case would show a greater contrast. If the farm were occupied by an owner who had bought his farm soon after the war, he would be paying 38 per cent. more in

TITHE BURDEN ON A FARM IN DORSET, 1932. PROPORTION OF TITHE PAYMENTS TO ACTUAL OVERHEADS AND RENTAL



Total Rental, £148.				Proportion of Rental Value.
	£	s.	d.	
Taxes				21 per cent.
Total tithe payments	31	4	0	
Land tax	5	11	0	
Income tax and surtax	4	10	0	7 "
Insurance	4	2	0	
	(3 per cent.)			
Over-head costs				67 "
Management	7	8	0	
	(5 per cent.)			
Repairs, maintenance and im-	87	15	0	
provements	(59 per cent.)			
Net profits	7	10	0	5 "

'overheads' than does the tenant farmer, but he would be entitled to no relief under the remission clauses of the Act of 1891.

The organised protest against excessive tithe has, by a logical and inevitable development, become a protest against the whole anachronistic system of tithing land and tithe collection. With the breaking up of large estates after the war, a great number of tenant farmers were forced to buy their farms with borrowed capital as an alternative to 'quitting.' The number of owner occupiers liable to pay tithe has consequently increased, until

they have become almost as large a class as the tenant farmers. Any chance of an amicable settlement between the conflicting interests of tithe-paying agriculturists and tithe claimants has become increasingly remote as a true understanding of the situation gradually spreads to the general public; while feeling has become embittered by the action of lay and ecclesiastical tithe-owners in levying distress upon thousands of farmers on the verge of bankruptcy, often disregarding the legal formalities and requirements of the very laws they invoked, as has been shown by recent decisions in the courts. Soon after 1925 the National Tithe-payers' Association put forward a Tithe Remission Bill. While its provisions might have afforded some measure of immediate relief in a minority of cases, they have now become quite inadequate to deal with a situation which nothing less than repeal can solve. No remission, calculated on the proportion of tithe to rental value, rather than tithe in relation to profits, can relate to ability to make cultivation profitable. In the example shown in the diagram tithe and taxes together represent over 500 per cent. of the net profits—a burden that no other industry is asked to bear, or could bear.

The Central Land-owners' Association, an influential body representing tithe-owners as well as land-owners, since its representation includes also tithe-owning corporations such as the land-owning colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, as well as the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and individual lay tithe-owners, supports the resolution of Sir Joseph Lamb's Committee—appointed by the Conservative Agricultural Committee in 1932. Its policy is at present confined to urging: (1) an amendment of section 8 of the Act of 1891 to modify the amount of remission obtainable under that Act; and (2) an inquiry into grievances under the Act of 1925. It is becoming increasingly clear that no revision short of repeal of the Tithe Acts from 1836 to 1925 can ultimately benefit or can have the support of the general body of tithe-paying agriculturists and farmers, or secure any lasting settlement.

The effect of alienating the capital resources of land at one end and of adding to the cost of cultivation by taxation at the other has progressively reduced the industry's capacity to employ labour and work the land at a profit. When a tithe-payer redeems his tithe voluntarily, unless he has other resources, he has withdrawn capital from the land, and to that extent reduced his ability to maintain or improve it. When a lay or ecclesiastical tithe-owner extinguishes his tithe by merging it in the land out of which it issues, he has equally made his land tithe-free without withdrawing capital from it, as he may have done under the Tithe Acts of 1836, section 71; 1839, section 6; 1842, section 20

and the Law of Property Act, 1925, sections 1 and 130. Under the Tithe Act, 1925, section 10 (1), (3), Queen Anne's Bounty has similar powers to merge tithe in the glebe. It is therefore illogical to say that a man who has paid money to redeem his tithe is penalised as compared with one who has not. The true distinction is between the man who has penalised his land by withdrawing the capital necessary to work it and the man who restores to his land that which properly belongs to it.

Many farms throughout the country are no longer able to show any profits at all. Tithe can only come out of profits or rents, though in recent years it has often been paid out of other capital resources now exhausted. Tithe, which was meant to represent a tenth of the annual increase of farm produce, has now reached the stage where it more often represents an annual capital levy out of depleted and diminishing capital resources.

The chairman of the Tithe Committee of Queen Anne's Bounty has reported that the Governors' offers of voluntary remission in cases of hardship 'are increasingly appreciated.'

And Jacob increased exceedingly, and had much cattle, and maid-servants and camels, and asses. And Jacob sent messengers before him to Esau his brother. And the messengers returned to Jacob saying, thy brother Esau cometh to meet thee. Then Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed. And Jacob said, O God, deliver me, I pray Thee, from the hand of Esau. And he took of that which came to his hand a present for Esau his brother. For he said, I will appease him with a present.

GEORGE PITT-RIVERS.

MR. ROOSEVELT AND THE DOLLAR

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S monetary policies have never had the virtues either of precision or of consistency. Within the space of less than twelve months he has proclaimed the necessity of balancing the budget and of unbalancing it; he has condemned gold as a 'fetish of so-called international bankers,' and announced his intention of buying vast quantities of it at fancy prices; he has accepted an 'Inflation Amendment' and decried inflation. It is therefore not remarkable that his Message to Congress on January 15 should have been a vague and contradictory document. From the political point of view the multitude of interpretations that could be put upon it was its chief virtue, for every faction of opinion could find in it some satisfaction. For the inflationists there was a promise that the rise of prices will continue until the dollar buys only 60 per cent. of what it bought a year ago. For the would-be exporter there was the prospect that the dollar will be under-valued at least for some time to come. For the sound-money party there was the assurance that at the end of all these adventures some measure of stability, some variety of gold standard, will be restored.

Mr. Roosevelt's ideas on the proper part for currency to play in the economic organisation of the State have changed considerably since he came into office. In his first phase, he appeared to be 'orthodox'—that is, deflationary. The budget was balanced by reducing expenditures; a tight control was exercised over the reopening of the banks after the 'holiday' at the beginning of March. But the effects of such a policy in a country which had already deflated to excess were too obviously disastrous; Mr. Roosevelt realised that his only chance to break out of the vicious circle which had ruined his predecessor was to reverse by some striking act the whole psychology of the country. The suddenness and the extent of his apparent conversion to inflation performed the miracle. Under the surface the change was already prepared. In most countries the transition from contraction to expansion, from falling prices to rising prices, had already occurred from six to twelve months previously, and it was probably only the severity of the banking crisis which had postponed the change in

America. The President's espousal of a Bill which gave him power to inflate currency and credit and to devalue the dollar released pent-up forces. Prices bounded upwards, the dollar fell, speculative commerce revived rapidly, a boom developed in Wall Street. For three months, from the middle of April to the middle of July, the United States enjoyed this astonishing recovery. What was the most remarkable, and for the President doubtless the most sobering, aspect of this period was that the recovery was based, not upon any action by the President, but upon the mere possession by him of certain powers. It was a psychological reaction, an economic soap bubble. The speculation collapsed in July, and a period of decline and disappointment succeeded to one of rapid revival. It is probable that this episode is responsible for the strong dislike the President still feels for actual currency inflation, the printing of paper money—in the economic sphere the only inhibition he appears to have. In any case, his efforts since July have been directed towards discovering some means of raising prices which would not involve inducing in the public a desire to flee from the dollar into commodities. If this is so, the inflationary period of the New Deal has provided a useful experience, since it has turned the President's mind towards securing a rise of prices through an expansion of genuine spending rather than through discrediting the currency.

During the early autumn months monetary policy was in the background while the energies of the Administration were concentrated on the N.R.A. But when it became evident that higher wages and shorter hours were accentuating rather than checking the decline in production, monetary devices were once more resorted to. This time the governing idea was that by forcing down the foreign exchange value of the dollar the level of domestic commodity prices could be raised. This was not, it is true, the origin of the theory on which the gold-purchase plan was based. Professor Warren's ideas start from a mystical belief in the magic permanence of a given mathematical ratio between the valuation put upon the gold stock of the country and the level of commodity prices—all that was necessary, according to him, was to revalue the existing stock of gold without troubling to alter its volume—and this explains the extraordinarily half-hearted way in which an official price was declared but was never made effective in the market. But, in fact, the only possible virtue of the Warren policy was that it forced the dollar down in the foreign exchange markets of the world. From the point of view of affecting domestic prices the policy was not a success; from the point of view of stimulating a revival of confidence and an industrial recovery it was a downright failure; and after four or five weeks' trial it was tacitly suspended.

Towards the end of the year several factors combined to persuade the President to place his monetary policy upon a more settled basis, while at the same time it became politically more possible for him to choose, and stick to, a moderate policy. The most important of these factors was the gradual improvement of the economic situation from the beginning of December. The public works programme was beginning to spread the refreshing showers of public money across the country, while the budget estimates, presented on January 4, showed that for the next six months public spending was to be on a scale gigantic enough to satisfy any inflationist. The guns of the 'Greenback' party were thus largely spiked, at the same time that the manifest failure of the gold-purchase plan revealed the limited possibilities of currency tinkering. The fact that for six months the deficit would be at the rate of more than \$1,000,000,000 a month—nearly a sixth of the whole national income in normal times and the equivalent of £50,000,000 a month for the United Kingdom—made it seem more than ever desirable to provide the dollar with some sure anchorage.

The plan actually announced by the President in his Message of January 15 was a brilliant compost of ideas. It will be remembered that one of the powers conferred upon him by the Inflation Amendment was that of devaluing the dollar (*i.e.*, lowering its gold content) by not more than 50 per cent. Mr. Roosevelt now proposed that this power should be further restricted by enacting that the devaluation was to be not *less* than 60 per cent. This had three objects. First of all, it permitted the President to revalue the gold stocks of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks, since, if the dollar was to be worth at the most 60 per cent. of its former gold value, gold would be worth in dollars at least ten-sixths of its former price. This provided a 'profit' of some \$2,700,000,000, out of which a Stabilisation Fund could be set up to match the British Exchange Equalisation Account. In the second place, to set an upper limit of 60 per cent. for the new dollar implied a considerable further inflation of prices. The dollar had not depreciated on the foreign exchanges by as much as 40 per cent., and the decline in its domestic purchasing power, as measured by price index numbers, had been much smaller. To fix an upper limit of 60 per cent. and to give the substantial hostage of a \$2,700,000,000 profit on the gold stocks was a pledge that the Government intended that the depreciation of the dollar and the rise of prices should continue. Lastly, although the proposal set an *upper* limit on the dollar's value and left unchanged the *lower* limit which was set last May, it was in fact interpreted by informed American opinion as meaning that the gold value of the dollar would not be forced lower than 60 per cent., at least

until American prices had risen very much higher than at present. In other words, the foreign exchange value of the dollar was no longer to be used as a primary instrument in securing a rise of prices; it was to be kept fixed until prices, impelled by other factors, caught up. This interpretation was admittedly based more upon inference from the references in the President's Message to the desirability of exchange stability than upon an explicit statement of intention; but it has been borne out by events. The new parity of the dollar has been fixed, not at precisely 60 per cent., but at 59.06 per cent. of the old—this figure having been chosen so that the new price of gold would work out at exactly \$35 an ounce. At this price the American Government has declared its willingness to buy an unlimited amount of gold, and in response to this declaration gold has been shipped from Europe in enormous quantities by every available liner. Although the question is not likely to arise in practice for some time to come, the Secretary of the Treasury has stated his willingness to sell gold at \$35 an ounce if the dollar declines to the gold export point.

These events appear to justify the assumption that the United States has returned to the gold standard. The dollar is not, it is true, convertible into gold at the option of the holder, but so long as the Secretary of the Treasury fulfils his promise to buy and sell unlimited amounts of gold at the fixed price, the legal technicality can be overlooked. It is also true that the President has reserved the right to lower the gold parity of the dollar at any time; but until he does so the dollar appears to be as fixed in relation to gold as ever it was. This decision presents the other major currencies of the world with an entirely new situation. For the moment attention is naturally concentrated on the immediate reactions of the new move, which are perplexing and provoking enough. But the President was clearly thinking beyond the next few months; he expressed the hope 'that, despite the present world confusion, events are leading to some future form of general agreement,' and he described his proposals as contributing to an ultimate world-wide solution. It is incumbent upon the other nations, and primarily upon Great Britain and France, to make up their minds whether they too can find in the prospect of a variable gold dollar any basis for ultimate agreement upon a new international system to take the place of the shattered gold standard.

It is convenient to discuss the immediate outlook first. One of the major causes of the disruption of the post-war gold standard is admitted to have been the persistent strength of the dollar, leading to the accumulation of gold in the United States. There is consequently some excuse for regarding a policy which so

under-values the dollar that the demand for it is stronger than ever as mere sabotage. The swallowing by America of £45,000,000 of gold in a fortnight is poor proof that the new policy is any better than the old. The crux of the matter is that a devaluation of 41 per cent. makes the dollar far too cheap. When a currency is too cheap, the demand for it exceeds the supply, just as with anything else. And when the demand cannot be satisfied out of the supply offered, the balance is covered by movements of gold. But though it is easy to say that the dollar is too cheap, it is very difficult to say just how much too cheap it is. In default of any more exact measure, we can only obtain a rough approximation by comparing the movement of prices in the different countries. The theory behind this comparison is that the movements of the rate of exchange between two currencies should reflect the changes in their domestic purchasing powers. Now, in recent years the purchasing power of every currency has increased—which is another way of saying that prices have fallen all over the world. But prices have fallen less in Great Britain than in America, and less in America than in France. It follows that the domestic purchasing power of the pound has increased least, that of the franc most, and that of the dollar to an intermediate extent. To lend some degree of precision to these conceptions, we can say that a fair value for the dollar would be about 15 per cent. below its old parity with the franc, while the pound should be some 10 to 15 per cent. below the dollar and 25 to 30 per cent. below the franc.

President Roosevelt, however, has ignored such considerations of fairness. He has restabilised the dollar, not 15 per cent., but 41 per cent. below the franc. This imposes a severe strain upon the franc and the other gold currencies, which are left high and dry as the most over-valued currencies in the world; the gold standard countries are now suffering, in an intensified form, from the same maladies which afflicted Great Britain between 1925 and 1931, and they face the same dilemma: either they must deflate their costs and prices or they must let their currencies fall. If the dollar were the only source of disturbance the strain would not be excessive, for, in spite of the industrial predominance of the United States, the dollar is not a very important currency so far as the commerce of the world is concerned. But the dislocation is not a purely local one between the dollar and the franc. The under-valuation of the dollar places the pound sterling and all the currencies which move with it in a position of grave embarrassment. The pound cannot be in a position of equilibrium in relation to both the dollar and the franc at the same time. If it falls with the dollar, it will be far too low in terms of the franc; if it remains stable with the franc, it will be far

too high in terms of the dollar; if it pursues a middle course, it will be both too low relatively to the franc and too high relatively to the dollar.

The declared policy of the British Government is to allow the pound to find its own level, to eliminate temporary fluctuations without affecting the underlying trend. If this policy continues to be adhered to, there can be no question of the pound 'choosing' between the dollar and the franc; its course will be determined by the comparative importance of the two currencies in influencing the total demand for and supply of sterling. The under-valuation of the dollar, by stimulating American exports and encouraging speculators to buy dollars for the rise, will occasion an increase in the supply of and a diminution in the demand for sterling. The over-valuation of the franc will for the opposite reason produce the opposite result. The final effect will depend upon which set of influences is the stronger. For the present, the pound appears to be fairly strong: the nervousness about the franc has outweighed in effect the competition of the cheap dollar. This is also the time of the year when the pound is seasonally strongest. But in the course of time the importance of the dollar will grow; the full effect of an under-valued currency in stimulating exports is not felt at first, but with every month that the under-valuation continues it will be greater. The points of competitive contact between Great Britain and the United States are not as many as is sometimes alleged, but some of the other sterling countries might be considerably affected by lessened American buying power and by a flood of artificially cheap American exports. There is consequently reason to believe that the natural course of the pound-dollar exchange, if it were left to itself, would be to lower the value of the pound. But any such movement would greatly accentuate the difficulties of the gold *bloc*, for whom the course of the pound and its associated currencies is much more important than that of the dollar. The present struggle is fundamentally a fight between the dollar and the franc, but the pound is caught in the line of fire, and it cannot go over to either side without receiving the bullets of the other.

From these embarrassments there are several ways of escape. It must not be forgotten that the restabilisation of the dollar is part of a policy which aims at raising American prices. If those prices rise in the next few months so fast and so far that a dollar will purchase only as much as 59 cents would purchase when Mr. Roosevelt took office—if, that is to say, the dollar becomes a 59-cent dollar in the only sense which is ultimately of significance—the cause of disequilibrium is removed. Mr. Roosevelt clearly hopes that this will happen. But it is not likely to happen immediately; after eleven months of Mr. Roosevelt's experiments

the internal value of the dollar is still nearly 85 cents, and it may take a year or eighteen months to complete the process. Moreover, a rise of American prices will restore equilibrium only if there is no rise in prices in the gold-standard countries. In other words, a rise of prices in America will cure the under-valuation of the dollar only to the extent that it does not spread to other countries. The rest of the world is to postpone for a year or two longer the readjustment of prices to costs in order that America's readjustment may have the added stimulus of an under-valued dollar. A second way in which the strain could be relieved would be by a fall in prices in the gold-standard countries. But after four years of severe deflation, any further reductions in costs and prices would probably prove intolerable. If deflation in the gold countries is unthinkable, and if inflation in the United States will be too halting, only one remedy is left: a depreciation of the franc and the other gold currencies. The French not unnaturally resent being thus placed upon the horns of a particularly awkward dilemma. The stability of the franc has become since 1926 the supreme desire of the *rentier*, and no Government is consequently willing to broach the question of devaluation. The prospect is that French policy will be unable to make a choice between energetic deflation and a resolute reduction of the gold content of the franc, with the result that the position of the franc, like that of the pound in the years before 1931, will grow technically weaker and weaker until it succumbs to a temporary panic. The weakness of the pound before 1931 was due to our own foolhardiness in restabilising in 1925 at too high a level. The French have now been forced into the same position, not by their own action, but by the egotism of American policy. There is little cause for wonder that feelings in Paris are bitter.

These are some of the consequences that flow from the fixation of the dollar at too low a level. Until that under-valuation is corrected the exchanges will be strained, and what gold there is to spare in the world will go to swell the already excessive hoards of the American Government. Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that any attempt to correct the under-valuation of the dollar will meet with strenuous opposition from Washington. The dominant opinion in America appears to be that the dollar, far from being too low, is too high. This is one of the by-products of the secrecy with which the operations of the British Exchange Equalisation Account have been surrounded. It is apparently believed in America that that Account has been used deliberately to depress the value of sterling, and in so doing has forced up the value of the dollar. American opinion, always prone to dramatise international relations, has clamoured for a Stabilisation Fund in order to engage in the currency war which the British Account is

alleged to have been waging ever since the spring of 1932. As has been indicated above, the nearest approach to scientific estimation which is possible would indicate an exchange rate of about \$4.15 or \$4.30 to the pound as fairly expressing the level of prices in the two countries. It follows that at the prevailing rate of about \$5.00 it is the dollar rather than the pound which has been forced below its natural level. Nevertheless, influential American opinion is demanding that the new Stabilisation Fund shall be used to drive the rate to \$6.00, or even more, to the pound. In short, in the currency war that threatens us, the aggressor is loudly, and without doubt sincerely, protesting that he acts in self-defence! Mistaken notions on one side and obstinate silence on the other have already produced so high a degree of misunderstanding that if the conflict is avoided it will be due to recognition on both sides of its wastefulness and futility and not to perception by either of the other's point of view. The official version of British policy is that the Exchange Equalisation Account has not been used either to raise or depress the pound, but merely to even out the fluctuations which speculation would otherwise produce. But the only remaining chance of convincing American opinion that there has not been any 'dumping' of the pound is to make a specific statement of the Account's operations. The general declarations to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has hitherto confined himself have entirely failed to carry conviction across the Atlantic.

From this sorry tale of selfishness, misunderstanding and barren dispute it is a relief to turn to the wider and more permanent aspects of the new American policy. The under-valuation of the dollar and its consequences will in time disappear, and it may then prove to be possible to reach that ultimate agreement for a new international system of which the President spoke. His sudden rediscovery of the virtues of stability and of the uses of gold does not mean that he is looking forward to restoring the pre-depression gold standard. It is true that in one passage of his Message he speaks of international uncertainties making a permanent devaluation of the dollar inadvisable *at present*, and thereby implies that a diminution of those uncertainties would enable him to proclaim a fixed gold parity for the dollar. But elsewhere in the Message he emphasises the paramount necessity for ensuring stability of the purchasing and debt-paying power of the currency, and it must be obvious to anyone familiar with the evolution of his thought that price stabilisation will always take precedence of the gold standard. The new international system to which the President looks forward will therefore be one whose prime object will be to obviate price fluctuations, and exchange stability will only be possible to the extent that it does not conflict with it.

Mr. Roosevelt's proposal is that the new gold standard shall be a flexible one, the parity of each currency being variable within certain limits but being altered within that range in accordance with the necessity of maintaining price stability.

There is much that is attractive in such a conception. The last few years have been disillusioning for the advocates of any monetary system; in the contest between the gold standard and a managed currency, where the protagonists of each used to cry the virtues of their own system, both have now been reduced to decrying the weaknesses of the other. The gold standard is naturally in the worse odour of the two, especially in the countries which have had to abandon it. But the grounds for objection to it have largely altered. The old argument, that if the gold standard worked it would prevent any one country from adopting an independent price policy, is largely irrelevant to the present situation, for the difficulty of the post-war gold standard was that it never worked. The difficulty of staying on the gold standard has been familiar to many countries at different periods; but the last ten years have revealed the even more formidable difficulties of getting back on to the gold standard once it has been suspended. The pound returned at too high a ratio, and the results were such that the experiment is unlikely to be repeated. The franc returned at too low a parity, and the immediate advantages were such that Mr. Roosevelt is now imitating the process; and it may well be that the consequences to other currencies will be as disturbing in the second case as in the first. On the other hand, the case for a managed currency is no longer as plausible as it was; for unless the managed currency can assure reasonable control over prices it has little or nothing to recommend it. Its strongest practical argument used to be the alleged success of the Federal Reserve Board in stabilising prices between 1923 and 1929; but the course of events in America since the latter year has clearly not been so strong a recommendation. In view of the blind strength which economic forces have exerted in the last five years, he would be a bold economist who would confidently affirm the ability to ensure stability of prices. Furthermore, it is no longer easy for any but the most unworldly idealist to believe in the possibility of a Government managing currency matters in a coldly scientific manner. Has there been a Government in the world since 1929 which, faced with a conflict between economic common-sense and vested interest, has preferred economics to votes? But a managed currency would demand the most stony-hearted impartiality.

In these circumstances, Mr. Roosevelt's compromise has much to recommend it. The limits fixed for the variation of each currency would at least do something to quieten the fears of

the nervous *rentier*, while the stability of the exchanges during the short period would remove most of the objections raised by the international trader to constant instability. At the same time, temporary divergences of monetary policy could be recognised by changes of the parities within the limits fixed. The range within which Mr. Roosevelt can alter the gold value of the dollar is about 16½ per cent. of its present value, and, provided the limits are well chosen, this margin should provide enough room for any currency to manoeuvre; even in the present depression there are very few instances of a divergence of 33 per cent. between the price levels of any two countries. It is thus not impossible that a Rooseveltian 'movable gold standard' may be the only practicable method of salvaging the vestiges of an international currency system.

This conclusion, however, is subject to two conditions. The pre-depression gold standard broke down because it was an attempt to have the form of an international economic system without the substance, and any similar piece of economic hypocrisy is likewise doomed to failure. Our first condition, consequently, must be that the movable gold standard shall not assume a greater degree of economic internationalism than can reasonably be expected to exist during the next decade or two. No international system, however loose and flexible, could cope with an outburst of crazy nationalism such as we have been experiencing during the last few years, and some greater sense of co-operation and cohesion is vital before an international monetary system can be contemplated. Tariffs must be reduced, quotas abolished, and the quest for self-sufficiency abandoned: the catalogue is too familiar to need emphasis. One form of nationalism, however, is peculiarly relevant to the present discussion: the tendency of nations to alter the value of their currencies without consulting their neighbours. Some of the consequences of the arbitrary American action have already been discussed, and if a new gold standard—movable or fixed—were instituted by each currency choosing the parity it thought best, the result would inevitably be chaos. This need for consultation does not lessen the difficulties of the task. Indeed, if fixed parities were to be chosen, it would probably be impossible to obtain agreement between the chief countries concerned. But it should not be wholly impossible to agree upon the limits within which the parity of each currency should be fixed.

The second condition concerns the purpose which such a system would be intended to serve. By common consent the virtue of a movable parity is that it facilitates the pursuit of a price stabilisation policy, but it is important to distinguish in what way it does so. There is a difference between lowering

the exchange value of a currency because prices in that currency *have* risen, and lowering it because they *ought* to rise. The former involves moving the external value of the currency *into* adjustment with its internal value; the latter involves deliberately moving it *out of* adjustment in the hope that the internal value will follow. If an international movable gold standard is to be run on the latter principle, currencies will always, *ex hypothesi*, be either too high or too low relative to each other, and the conditions of strain which now subsist between the franc and the dollar will be not exceptional, but usual. Such a system would clearly be chaotic: in the common desire to raise prices every country would fix its own parity at the lowest limit permitted, and the element of flexibility would be gone. It is consequently essential that agreement should be reached between the chief countries on the reasons which would justify changes of parity within the limits fixed. Price control is an infinitely difficult and complex task involving the most delicate mechanism of credit control; it is a dangerous delusion to think that it can be secured by the easy method of manipulating the foreign exchanges.

Evidence is gradually accumulating that the forces of economic recovery, thanks to anything but the efforts of Governments, are slowly gaining the upper hand. The time is coming for an effort of international economic reconstruction even more difficult than that of the post-Armistice period. In that reconstruction currency matters should not play the largest part. Their importance is exaggerated both by those who seek through depreciation to secure their particular advantage and by those who cry that without fixity of the exchanges recovery is impossible. But, both in the political and in the economic sphere, arbitrary intervention in the foreign exchanges is an irritant, and the sooner it can be removed the better. In these pages an attempt has been made to show that, in spite of its immediate egotism, President Roosevelt's declaration contains the possible germ of a new international monetary system, less ambitious, but by the same token more workable, than the former gold standard.

GEOFFREY CROWTHER.

LONDON SQUARES AND A TRAFFIC TYRANNY

AMONG the fragments of design to be found in the chaos we call London none are more peculiar and delightful than the Squares. This plan of houses built uniformly round a fenced plot of grass and trees, private within to the inhabitants, seems to be unknown in foreign capitals and rare anywhere else. The word 'square,' it is true, has been borrowed by the French, but what it means is a species of public place, with seats and flower-beds round a fountain or monument. Leicester Square, in London, is of that type. Squares, in the other sense, date their beginning from the late seventeenth century, and multiplied till the mid-nineteenth, with some later additions. There must be fifty of them within the bounds of inner London, and in the whole area squares and other enclosures of greenery for communal use, great or petty, number no less than 461.

I do not know whether the Place Royale in Paris of 1604 (now Place des Vosges) was the noble progenitor of them all. There, on a large scale, is the uniform building round a fenced enclosure with trees. Inigo Jones's Piazzas of 1630 at Covent Garden recall its arcading. From Inns of Court and gardens of town mansions, as in Bloomsbury Square, based on Southampton House, would come the lawns. St. James's Square was the earliest built to take on the characteristic London constitution. The lay-out and building date from 1663, but the central space remained 'rude, waste, uncleanly and in great disorder' till in 1726 the inhabitants obtained powers by Act of Parliament 'to clean, repair, adorn and beautify the same,' and to maintain and manage from a rate levied on themselves. This English committee form of trusteeship and management is the model which has in large part prevailed. Its value was proved in the great fight for Edwardes Square, ending in 1912, when a project for building over the enclosure was defeated by the tenants in a suit finally decided by the House of Lords. On the other hand, a danger remained that where a landlord had reserved his rights or a purchaser obtained them as leases fell in, the owner had the square at his mercy. The obliteration of Endsleigh Gardens and Morningside Crescent by building and the case of Kensington

Square 'fighting for its life' against the encroachments of business brought this home, and in 1928 a Royal Commission recommended legislation to secure the preservation of squares and other enclosures. An Act promoted by the London County Council gave effect to its recommendations in 1931.

How much those squares meant of pleasant life for their inhabitants it is still possible to measure by what of it persists: the quiet and space, the green prospect, the garden for old people and children on summer days, for busy people on summer evenings; nor were the inhabitants only benefited. The squares afforded, and still afford, breathing-places in the continuity of streets, variety in their monotony, and the frequent surprise of trees which is so notable a charm of London. I can remember, as a boy in Glasgow, how my father had been struck by this on his visits south, by those lesser plots spilled out, as it were, from the great verdure of the parks.

The brave days of the squares, as they were built to be, are past or threatened. The enclosures are saved, but with a change of use the fabric of their old buildings, part stately, part homely, has broken or is breaking up. The flight to flats from spacious houses with basements and many stairs, a result of restricted families, unrestricted taxation, paucity and cost of service, combines with the westward movement of business to reduce or transform the old occupancy. Some, like Brunswick and Mecklenburgh Squares, so happily and so hardly saved along with the Foundling site, have preserved their outer form by a good deal of internal division. But there are few of the better period that retain the old sober symmetry. Its destruction has been hastened by the growing fever of traffic. Thus, in Portman Square, through which runs a thoroughfare for omnibuses and cars, a second side is being rebuilt on a new incongruous scale. At least, in that instance, the design has treated each side as a unit. In others, like Cavendish Square, individual huffer-mugger reigns; and in St. James's Square itself a many-storeyed slip of a building has shot up, like an overgrown, weedy hobble-dehoy, among mates of various stature. That building is a portent, for it marks what will take place in the squares generally if no control is assumed over height and grouping in the transformation of mansions into offices and flats which is inevitably taking place. The only regulation at present affecting height is that of the London Building Act, which permits a maximum of 80 feet to the cornice, with two more storeys in the roof, say another 20 feet, stepped back, but bringing the total to 100 feet.

Now the pressure of ground and other rents (the Commissioners for the Crown Estates are particularly rapacious) tends to convert the maximum from an exception into a rule. If is no


use, by the way, to blame the architects when solitary outbreaks of the new scale take place. To carry out his client's requirements is the architect's bread and butter; and the taller the building, the thicker the butter. If one architect in a hundred were to decline the job, there would be ninety-nine eager to take it on. Unless, then, action is taken to preserve a tolerable proportion between the area of the open space and the height of its surrounding architecture we shall have one kind of uniformity applied with a vengeance to smaller as well as larger squares—namely, a height of 100 feet, which will dwarf them into well-like 'courts.' The legislation of 1931 secured those spaces, but did nothing to control the building, a more pressing question. The more recent Town and Country Planning Act does give power to the County Council and local bodies to act, but various snags render them dilatory, and the havoc proceeds.

From these social and economic pressures upon the fabric of the squares let us now return to the attacks of traffic. One of these is insidiously destructive of their character—namely, the use made of them for parking cars. A community whose new devices for speedy transport threaten to choke themselves has descended on these refuges, ringing round the green enclosure with a make-shift garage, and this frowsy perversion is a fresh element of decay. There has been talk of constructing waiting-places under the gardens; but nothing so far has been done, and the mischief of a provisional arrangement continues. There is, presumably, no defence for owner or garden committees against an unforeseen invasion of the roadways.

But this degrading innovation is a minor one compared with what is now threatened. In a Bill promoted by the London Passenger Transport Board, which has actually been given an unopposed second reading in the House of Commons, the hitherto unspoiled Bedford Square is marked down for immediate invasion by trolley omnibuses, and the whole of the squares placed at the mercy of Lord Ashfield's combine for the like treatment. The Bill, of course, covers a wider ground. Its general scope is 'to provide certain services of trolley vehicles' and 'to confer further powers on the Board.' Under section 5 (a), trolleys are to be substituted for trams on twenty routes. Under section 5 (b), trolleys are to be introduced on nine new routes, including the stretch which affects Bedford Square. Under section 6, the Minister may make a provisional order for the use of trolleys on further routes. Various specious safeguards are laid down, but the Minister is to decide whether objections to the order are reasonable, and in practice any control of the demands made on him would be illusory. But there is no pretence of such control under section 7, which would allow, as a turning-point for trolley

lines thus laid down, the use of any square by simple fiat of the Minister. Local bodies and Parliament are alike out of the picture. No wonder that seventy-eight councils and others interested are petitioning against so bald an autocracy!

Of the scheme generally it may be said that, while the suppression of trams is to the good, the introduction of trolleys instead of motor omnibuses is a retrograde step, and that their 'form, construction, weight and dimensions' (these last being



the temptation to their use) are left to the shadowy discretion of the Minister (section 15). But let us see what is involved in the case of the first square to be attacked.

The plan annexed will make this plain. Picking up what is at present a tramway route which passes along the Hampstead Road to its junction with the Euston Road, the trolleys would run down the Tottenham Court Road as far as Bedford Avenue, turn along that, run along the west side of Bedford Square, return by Bayley Street into the Tottenham Court Road,

cross their own track with the apparatus of standards and overhead wires, and return along the west side of that thoroughfare.

The motives for letting loose a new fleet of vehicles on an already omnibus-congested route may be conjectured. Lord Ashfield's able subordinate, Mr. Frank Pick, who is probably the active spirit in this matter, must be at his wits' end to provide for the overflow of passengers at rush hours on the Tube to and from Tottenham Court Road Station. The Hampstead Tube has pushed gaily out from Golders Green through Hendon to Edgware. Houses have multiplied along its line, and would-be passengers find even standing-room with difficulty at busy times. The Tube is choking itself. The radical remedy would be to double it; but the cost would be immense. A measure of relief would be to extend the existing platforms and correspondingly lengthen the trains. This also would cost something in time and money. Hence the attempt to relieve the Tube at the expense of the street. But why involve the Square? For this reason: the lower section of Tottenham Court Road is already so congested as a stopping-place for omnibuses that the police authorities would resist the addition of another line not only stopping but turning at the Oxford Street junction. The trolleys, therefore, are baulked of their full objective, and are to set up, instead, the crazy constant obstruction of their crossing over the thronged traffic at the Bayley Street point.

And now what are the consequences for Bedford Square? Does anyone believe that they will be limited to the grind, sizzle, and vibration of those lumbering vehicles? No: having obtained this easement for a difficult section, Tottenham Court Road will press for more, and Bedford Square will become a one-way passage for a stream of traffic. The quiet of the houses will be at an end and their stability shaken; they will be rebuilt on the monster scale.

Some people and some newspapers will shrug their shoulders at this prospect, and even short-sightedly applaud. Any fresh 'facility' for traffic appears to them a progressive step; any check upon it, reactionary. They do not realise that with every local increase in monster building, the demand for wheeled transport swells in a greater ratio to serve the additional occupants. Building and transport in cities not laid out for future expansion checkmate and cancel one another. Since London cannot be suddenly remade, it must either stop expanding laterally or be literally driven to a standstill by expanding vertically. But to that general crux must be added another consideration. The myopic are not aware that long-sighted students of the subject recognise the necessity in any balanced planning of traffic for the existence of reserved areas, and give their blessing to such

'bottle-necks' and blind alleys as still ensure patches of quiet for living and working. The low cliffs upon which Carlton House Terrace and Adelphi Terrace are built and the *cul-de-sac* that isolates Savile Row are not awkwardnesses to be smoothed away, but good luck to be jealously preserved.

This consideration applies with peculiar force to the district bounded by Tottenham Court Road, Euston Road, Gray's Inn Road, Oxford Street and Holborn—what, for convenience, may be called 'Bloomsbury.' Its heart is the great institution of the British Museum and Library. To this the public spirit of the Duke of Bedford made it possible for another great institution to be added—the University of London. These, with University College, will be for the future the intellectual centre of London, and the district I have defined should be regarded as its precinct—a home for many lesser institutions such as already occupy it, and also a living quarter for professional workers and students. By intense effort and notable benefaction an essential part of this heritage was saved from the spoiler, the greater part of the Foundling site, doomed at the time to be a new Covent Garden, and with it the two adjacent and delightful squares. With these must be reckoned twelve other squares and open spaces which give the quarter so enviable a character. The largest of these enclosures, Russell Square, has suffered, by a lapse in the husbandry of the Bedford Estate, a dreadful rebuilding or titivation of house fronts in terra-cotta, and in others there has been piecemeal rebuilding, but much of the fabric survives.

Bedford Square, by a miracle, remains practically untouched since the last decade of the eighteenth century, except where the nineteenth has mutilated its windows with plate-glass. Its architect seems to have been Thomas Leverton (1743–1824), who competed with John Nash for the plan of Regent's Park, and built for his own use No. 13 in 1775. There is nothing spectacular about the architecture; only the virtues of pleasant proportion, the dignity of pilastered centre-pieces, and some enrichment of ample doorways with graceful fanlights. The interiors are rich with ceilings, mantelpieces and other features in the Adam style. They are illustrated in vol. v., pt. ii., of the London County Council Survey. Here is a monument of Georgian London not lightly to be endangered. The British Museum has secured the Gower Street side for eventual use, but the whole square is at present admirably serving a purpose partly changed. A number of houses are still occupied in the old fashion; but the greater part are given over to office use for learned and artistic societies and workers in various professions, predominantly architects.

Such is the place it is proposed to use for the convenience of a loop line in a route of trolley omnibuses. Surely the tyranny

which would proceed from this precedent to maltreat any square or resort of quiet 'adjacent' to such routes as a roundabout should be checked at its inception. If a line of trolleys must run in the Tottenham Court Road and must be given a turning-point, the diversion obviously should be, not to the east, but to the west of its course, where it would do incalculably less damage. Mr. Pick has won himself a name for a liberal attitude to art in the treatment of stations and offices belonging to the Underground Railways, and on the strength of it has been appointed chief celebrant to officiate at the so often deferred nuptials of Art and Industry. It will cast an ironic shade over that union if simultaneously he carries through the divorce of Bedford and other squares from their old amenities. In any case, it is the duty of Parliament during the further stages of the Bill to put a restraining hand on the wrecking activities of our new dictators.

D. S. MACCOLL.

SOCIETY AND THE MACHINE

FEAR of the Machine and of its possible influence upon cherished institutions is acute. The relationship of Man to his Machine depends, and must always depend, on current social conditions, which constantly change. Hence it is in a sense a problem from which we can never be entirely free; nor one which can ever be solved in any final way. In the last century the problem was brought before a wide public by Samuel Butler, and in the present century of rapid change many have written upon it. Let us begin with a typical quotation from Butler:

It was decided to destroy all the inventions that had been discovered in the preceding 271 years, a period which was agreed upon by all parties after several years of wrangling as to whether a certain kind of mangle which was much in use among washer-women should be saved or no. It was at last ruled to be dangerous, and was just excluded by the limit of 271 years.

In their wisdom, or otherwise, Samuel Butler's Erewhonians thus decided to deal with the problem. Were they perhaps right? The fear of the machine is certainly still intense to-day. It has on occasion led to action almost as violent as that of the Erewhonians. Many spinning-machines were savagely destroyed in this country before their acceptance in industry became inevitable.

In the conditions of life to-day—differing in so many ways from those of last century—must mankind still fear the machine? And would we if we had fuller knowledge be more or less afraid than we are? Dare we comfort ourselves by looking upon all mechanism as merely extensions—very marvellous extensions—of our very own limbs and therefore as good friends as they are? And if they are, ought we to fear the power given to our own right hand? Listen again to Samuel Butler in another mood:

Observe a man digging with a spade; his right forearm has become artificially lengthened, and his hand has become a joint. . . . Having thus modified himself not as other animals are modified, by circumstances over which they have not even the appearance of control, but having, as it were, taken forethought and added a cubit to his stature, civilisation began

to dawn upon the race, the social good offices, the genial companionship of friends, the art of unreason, and all those habits of mind which most elevate man above the lower animals, in the course of time ensued.

And if, as some think, it is only in these days of mechanisation that our good right hand has become matched to the warlike instincts of its owner, our fears should be directed, not to the right hand, however overwhelming its powers, but to the adequacy of the regulating conscience behind it. To this as the real direction for our anxieties Sir Arthur Salter clearly points in his recently delivered Massey Lecture:

The pace set by progress in scientific invention and improved industrial technique is too hot for man's regulative control to overtake. And when it lags behind, every new progress in specialised activity is a new danger; every new access of power threatens destruction to what we have more than it promises increase. That is why mechanisation is compelling, and will compel, profound changes in the whole structure of our Society. . . . Let us throughout remember, and remember equally, that mechanisation offers a conditional promise to man of all the material elements of happiness and civilisation for the whole of the world's population: that the condition is that man should reform the organisation he has himself created and learn to control his own human relationships.

With these thoughts in our minds it is convenient to discuss the effect of the machine, first on human organisation as a whole, and then upon the detailed pattern of our lives. Those who, like the writer, have spent most of their lives in close association with machines of one sort or another, commonly regard their work with the greater pleasure when they think of themselves as craftsmen (scientist, engineer, or inventor); and since the craftsman's point of view is much less brought to our notice than that of the politician or the economist, it is well that an opportunity should be taken to express it.

What peculiar ability or discovery first distinguished our early ancestors from their fellow-creatures is lost in the mists of the past. It may have been the discovery of fire, but more likely it was the use of the tool. The first tool was probably a piece of rock or the bough of a tree, and its first use was probably attack—by which, of course, is meant defence. In either case the reach of the fighter was increased, and with experience of so happy a result man's armament proceeded apace. The skill that produced this primitive armament was soon found to have another outlet in the construction of a home: tools increased in number and effectiveness, but they acquired but slowly anything that might be termed complexity. Man has such marvellous control over his limbs, and especially over his hands, that beautifully and delicately designed work can be made with most

primitive tools. This, indeed, is the justification for the rough creed of the ancient Guild of Hammermen :

By hammer in hand
All Arts do stand.

All this time the physical power behind the tool was simply the force in its owner's right arm, but gradually other powers were brought to its aid—first, of course, the treadle, and then someone else to do the treading. This development marks an epoch ; it means the bringing of more power to the tool than its wielder could himself exert. It does not, however, imply in the very least degree that any less skill was needed. Indeed, the craftsman's own hands were by this means the better freed for the real task before him. The matter was well put recently in a presidential address to one of the engineering societies ; the speaker, a splendid craftsman ¹ in the production of the finest optical lenses, said :

Improved machinery for lens-making has not killed a noble art ; it has elevated practice based on tradition and habit and rather inexact knowledge into practice based on the conscious application of principles of science. These are the everlasting ways of Nature herself, and in them the operative may find a new delight and reverence. It is common to cite weaving in particular as an art which has been killed by machinery. But what machinery has done is in the main to relieve the operator of the monotonous physical labour of working pedals with his feet and shuttles with his hands. The art of weaving is still there, together with the same or a greater need of inventiveness, imagination, and taste in devising patterns and setting those out on the looms.

A calculating machine [he went on] is an example of mechanism which saves mental labour. But it cannot do original thinking, and it in no way replaces the imaginative thought of the mathematician. All that it does, or can do, is to relieve him of the monotonous labour and mental strain of doing mere arithmetic without error ; so that, instead of destroying his art, it gives him the great freedom and fitness to exercise it.

The use of the machine in saving mental labour in what would otherwise be tedious tasks is also described by Dr. Comrie, the superintendent of the *Nautical Almanac*, in the *Nautical Magazine* of July last.

Up till about 1926 [he says] the work of computing was done, with slight exceptions, by hand. Highly skilled computers, who lived on seven-figure logarithms, were the order of the day. In that year the work of mechanising the calculations was begun, and to-day no logarithms are used. . . . This mechanisation has resulted in great economy, and has rendered the routine portions of the work much less fatiguing.

It can fairly be claimed that the bringing of power to the tool held in the craftsman's hand carries with it no æsthetic dis-

¹ Mr. W. Taylor, President of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers.

advantage—indeed, the contrary. In freeing the craftsman from fatigue it maintains the freshness of his skill and deprives weariness of its incentive to hurried work. A new situation has to be faced, however, when the type of work, or the output required, needs so large an increase of power that a man's strength can no longer handle it directly. Then we are led to massive guiding mechanisms, with their smooth regulated surfaces—so much more geometrical in their parts than a man's limbs can ever be : hand-controlled at first, but after a while almost automatic (the craftsman a mere watcher), and then in the end (though, for certain limited classes of work only) entirely automatic. This march of events is illustrated by the fact that, as we are told ² in pig-iron production, a man now accomplishes in one hour what it required 650 hours to accomplish in 1882. One man to-day can produce 9000 times as many incandescent lamps as in 1914. A New Jersey rayon factory is reported to be nearing completion which will work twenty-four hours a day with only robots on the pay roll—no human beings.

In the ship-building and ship-repairing trades [states Mr. Sherwood, the President of the Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades Federation] we have recently seen the appearance of a totally new craft. A body of craftsmen, to be known as ship-welders, is to displace the riveters, black-smiths, caulkers, holders-up, heaters and catcher-men ; one man with a blow-lamp will replace ten men engaged in the operation of cutting out old rivets ; one welder will do the work of three squads of riveters . . . three welders will do the work of thirty to forty angle-iron smiths.

How, it may well be asked, can there fail to be a big effect on unemployment figures when changes such as this take place ? The answer may seem simple ; but it is not really quite so easy as it seems. For, if the price per unit and the output be maintained, the total income to the industry concerned is not decreased, and the purchasing power, and therefore employing power, of the distributed profits remains as before. All that happens is a redistribution of employment. Now, there is, in principle, no harm in this provided it happens slowly. But when rapid changes take place—as has occurred recently—intense personal hardship may arise. A mechanic's son can be trained, let us say, as a miner, a mason, or a footman, but the father cannot suddenly convert himself from being a mechanic into being one of these. It would be a poor solution, in any case, to lower the number of craftsmen and heighten the number of personal servants ; such a solution would not add to the dignity of the community, nor, it seems likely, to its stability. Rapid changes must bring unhappiness to some ; but the community will naturally wish to minimise the discomfort to those so suddenly

² *Round Table*, March 1933.

displaced. Sir Josiah Stamp pointed out at the Leicester meeting of the British Association that the basic economic reason for social unemployment relief is not so much the humanitarian argument of social obligation against distress, nor the argument against revolution, but the plain argument that 'the gainers by innovation should bear the losses of innovation.' The community of to-day needs to be fashioned, it seems, with as much care as any of the mechanisms which minister to its comfort.

How can these powerful influences upon the life of the community be turned to advantage in the life of the individual? It is both the duty and pride of engineers that they aim continually at the improvement of what they term the efficiency of their plant. If it produces electric ice-making machines, for instance, their effort is to get a larger output for a given number of man-hours. In so far as they succeed they will diminish the number of manual workers needed, or alternatively—and this is important—will diminish the number of hours those workers need put in per week. Figures published in 1933 by *The Times Engineering Supplement* show that the average number of hours per week required to maintain the then rate of production in a large variety of trades in this country was about thirty-five for each insured person. Hence, if everyone in England were in employment a thirty-five-hour week would suffice to keep all at the present standard of living. Much has been lately attempted in the direction of shortened hours of work in the United States. An American physicist³ claims that

for the first time in the world's history, man has gained, in America, at least, through the advance of science and its application, the capacity both to produce and to distribute more food than he can possibly eat, more clothes than he can possibly wear, more dwellings than he can possibly occupy, more automobiles than he can possibly ride in. . . . Modern science, and precisely such applications as we are herein making, has shown us how to load a large part of the grinding labour upon the backs of soulless, feelingless machines, to such an extent, at least, that though routine things will still have to be done by us, yet the productivity of that labour is so great that leisure for the higher things is now a possibility for everyone.

What use is to be made of this abundant leisure which mechanisation offers? Some writers—surely quite wrongly—have felt gloomy about the value to the community of this increase of leisure. Thus S. P. B. Mais, writing in the *New Statesman*, concludes that although for generations industrial workers have fought for more leisure, in their fight to get it they forgot to make plans for using it; that they have now far more leisure

³ Dr. A. R. Millikan in his dedication address in June 1932 at the Daniel Guggenheim Airship Institute.

than they expected, and instead of turning this priceless asset to advantage they have allowed it to be frittered away. Again, Sir Alfred Ewing,⁴ whilst agreeing that the gifts of the engineer to mankind are good gifts if they are used with wisdom, utters the warning that they carry the danger of excessive leisure through the mechanisation of industrial life.

These fears of the coming of greater leisure are surely quite unwarranted. The work of the world may be divided into the day-to-day effort first to supply food and shelter, and then, and only then, the provision of those amenities that make life pleasant and comely, together with the means of refreshment and relaxation. Of these kinds of work, the first—the bread-and-butter work—has for most of mankind dominated life till to-day. Now, thanks to the machine, its call on human labour has decreased rapidly, and is still decreasing. Those who fear this result evidently think of Satan's proverbial interest in providing mischief for all idle hands. But need the hands, and brains, be idle when we think of all that needs to be done under the second heading—the provision of those amenities which make life gracious? For the first time in human history we have the power ideally to build our cities and our homes. Modifications to the social organism are indeed necessary to give free play to those ideals, but the thought of working for service rather than for profit is not now so strange as it once seemed.

If the question be asked whether, with all these considerations in view, society is justified in fearing the machine, what is the answer? The answer is that the coming of the machine can be a glorious blessing to society if only society will exercise at least as much intelligence in fashioning itself as engineers have given to the conception of their mechanisms.

There is, of course, the fear that the actual things made by the machine may themselves diminish rather than add to the beauty of daily life. It is agreed that, apart from books, the mass product to-day is but rarely a thing of beauty. At its best it is inoffensive, but at its worst (and some will have seen the mass-produced plated tea-trays of Birmingham!) it can be truly terrible. And even when it is not terrible it is very likely to be aimless or stupid; for example, there exists to-day exquisitely ingenious machinery for knitting cheap silk stockings so designed as to knit at the back a 'mock seam'—merely to produce the appearance of the costly stocking that, for the sake of its shape, must needs have a seam! But since the youthful machine has naturally been set at first the task of producing something resembling as closely as may be some existing hand-made product known to be in great demand, and has very naturally been built

⁴ *An Engineer's Outlook*, by Sir Alfred Ewing.

with a geometry of design in its internal parts vastly more precise than that of the human body, its product sometimes—all too often—has a devastating uniformity. Even with an inherently good design a modification has sometimes been made in order to adapt it better to the exigencies of the mechanism or of the fashion plate, with the consequence that beauty of line and texture is lost. This, however, is but a youthful trouble. With the increasing thought and skill going to the building of such machines, and with, it is to be hoped, more intelligence in the public demand, these errors need not be made; indeed, provision can be made to provide the requisite variety in sheen, patina, or gloss so charming in the hand-made work. Hence the full beauty of the task can be preserved; but we must ask that the trained artist shall give his help in this important sphere and not stand aloof. The artist must regard himself less as the decorator of the palace or the church than as the bringer of beauty into every home. It is timely here to cite the following editorial comment in *Nature* on the Gorell Report of 1932:

Valuable as are the results already attending what is generally known as the 'arts and crafts movement,' in the main the products of this movement have scarcely been within the regular purchasing power of consumers of moderate means. The movement has largely been concerned with the encouragement of handicraft and has not penetrated the processes of modern industry. A reversion to handicraft could not solve the problem of beautifying articles of common use within the purchasing power of the ordinary consumers, and the technique of handicraft differs fundamentally from that of industrial manufactures. It is this field which has now to be captured for art.

More artists are wanted and more craftsmen, professional and private. And it may not be inappropriate to suggest that for the brain worker, for the office dweller, no relaxation compares with skilful working with one's own hands. We now know that in the future there can be time for this delightful alternative to the necessary labour of the workaday world.

This is no fantastic dream. The very thing seems to have happened in the eighteenth century in Japan. Laurence Binyon tells us that the lovely colour prints by which Japanese art is best known were the work of artisans and small shopkeepers. They were produced for the happiness of a public of the same class—though perhaps thought little of by the aristocracy of painting of that day. With the rich fulfilment of this happy blend of imagination and craftsmanship as the result of even one of its lesser consequences, I think society will have reason to bless the machine and the abundant leisure which it offers as its gift.

H. E. WIMPERIS.

THE CONFLICT IN THE GERMAN CHURCH

THE crisis in the German Church, which has aroused so much interest in other countries for the last six months, is one of the most significant happenings since the war. It may be viewed from many angles—as a struggle for freedom of thought, as a fresh manifestation of the age-long conflict between Church and State, as a controversy between types of theology or philosophy, or as an incident in a vast change of thought that seems to be taking place in regard to the whole ordering of human society. There is something to be said along all these lines, and the utmost that can be attempted at present, especially by one who stands outside, is to try to disentangle certain strands or elements that seem to have a bearing on wider issues.

Ostensibly the first and clearest issue involved is the question whether the Church can maintain itself as a separate entity with its own outlook and standards in the omniscient State. This is a question that during the last 150 years has grown increasingly insistent. Broadly speaking, until the French Revolution there was a general presumption in Europe that there must be a Church of some kind in every State. After the wars of religion confessional ardour cooled. The Church, whether Catholic or Protestant, was content to adopt a quiescent attitude. The State came to have more and more importance, but a Church was thought to be a useful element in national life, making, on the whole, for order and decency. As such its existence was tolerated, with more or less of patronage, so long as its demands were not too exorbitant. The French Revolution wrote a great question mark against the need for religion at all. The threat to the foundations aroused a new enthusiasm. New positive movements sprang up, making claims for the spiritual nature of man, which in England in the Oxford Movement took a definitely ecclesiastical form. Pietist movements swept over the Lutheran countries. The Papacy acquired a fresh sense of universal mission which culminated in the Vatican Council, and was supported by a neo-Catholicism. At the same time the monarchs and ruling classes attempted to harness the Church to the support of their authority. There were many cross-currents, so that movements for Church

revival and the growth of a more definite Erastianism were intermingled. On top of these developments came the rediscovery of history, followed by an even more drastic review of the Christian dogmas and ecclesiastical institutions, and the growth of natural science, which caused radical questions to be asked, not only about many statements in the Bible, but the whole philosophical conceptions on which it was based. It was especially in Germany that many of these problems came to a head. In the nineteenth century Germany became supremely the home of the philosopher, the scholar and the laborious scientific student. Two factors need specially to be borne in mind. In the first place, ecclesiastically Germany was the home of Erastianism—of the idea, that is, that organised religion is primarily a State affair. The principle *Cujus regio ejus religio*, which emerged from the exhaustion of the wars of religion, found its principal exemplification in the great number of princedoms and dukedoms among whom the allegiance of the German people was divided. In the second place, Luther's respect for the *Obrigkeits* left an indelible mark on the States that looked to him as their prophet. A firm believer in authority, when he abolished the power of the Popes he was not happy till he had replaced that power by another. The godly prince became Lord of the Church, *Summus Episcopus*. And so it came about in German Protestant lands that the Church, as a pastoral organisation, became more and more a department of the State. All appointments to office were ultimately State-made—the clergy were part of the bureaucracy. They supported the *régime*, and in their turn had an assured income and position. They had very little freedom to express opinions on anything except the narrowest theological problems. There was one place where thought was free, and that was in the universities. But as the university teachers tended to take a purely academic view of theology, and on the whole were drawn to radical views, the divorce between the professor and the clergyman became most marked. Each tended to regard the other with suspicion and even contempt. It cannot be denied that the combination of State control and radical theology in the universities sapped much of the life of the Protestant Church in Germany. Before the war it was a respectable, but hardly a powerful, institution.

The cataclysm of the war and its aftermath produced revolutionary changes. The Church was disestablished, though the Government continued to collect a Church contribution from those who inscribed themselves as members of the Evangelical Church. The consequences were twofold. In the sphere of organisation the leaders of the Church, accustomed to the backing of the State, felt like mariners who had lost their anchor. In the sphere of doctrine the secularisation of the State was also bound

to have an effect. Some new basis for authority had to be discovered to replace that which had formerly been taken by the conception of the Christian State. The terrible *débâcle* that immediately followed the war left masses of the German people eager for guidance and passionately longing for some star to which to hitch their waggon. The world that they knew and revered was in ruin all round them. The most respected names were cast in the mire. The bodily and mental suffering of the terrible four years of war, which affected the whole population more than in any other country, left a mass of jangled nerves. A very eminent and wise German, a Catholic of profound religious conviction, said to me last year that at that time Germany was hungry for religion. But, unfortunately, the Protestant Church was too much stunned to deal adequately with the seething mass of emotion, longing for something to put its faith in, that surrounded it.

For a time it seemed as though the Catholic Church would be the residuary legatee. Undoubtedly its greater powers as a shock-absorber, owing to its international position and age-long order, had their effect, and Catholicism achieved in the post-war years an influence in the lands of the former German Empire that it had not had since the Counter-Reformation. But new forces were stirring in the Protestant Church. If it was to be in any way adequate, the clearest heads among its members saw that it must be at unity in itself. An effort must be made to rise above the old principle of *Cujus regio ejus religio*. German history has been a history of dissidence. Germany had achieved a kind of unity by the blood and iron policy of Bismarck. The Weimar Constitution in some ways carried it further. So far as the German Church is concerned, one great measure of unification had taken place 100 years before. Frederick William III., after great opposition, by devious ways had compelled a unity of the Lutheran and Calvinist (Reformed) Churches—outwardly, at any rate. But there were still twenty-eight *Landeskirchen* in 1919, corresponding to the twenty-eight States of the German federation. Gradually an organisation was built up. A liaison body connecting all the Churches together was formed, called a *Kirchen-nausschuss*, which was assisted by a *Kirchenbund*. It had purely advisory functions. At its head was a lay president and a clerical vice-president. It was making for unity; but local jealousies and doctrinal differences were hard to overcome. At the head of each separate Church was a general superintendent, who in some cases bore the title of bishop. In the doctrinal sphere many new movements began to appear, all searching for a secure basis for the spiritual life. Broadly, they tended in one of two directions. On the one hand, a profounder sense of the importance of Christian dogma made increasing headway. This might take one

of two forms. Among some there was a strong drawing towards Catholicism. In 1919 the magazine *Hochkirche* appeared as the organ of the Evangelical Catholic movement, with which is associated the name of Professor Heiler, of Marburg. Some of his pupils passed over to Old Catholicism, others to the Orthodox Church. Among a larger number, especially of the younger men, the movement towards definite dogma took the form of entering more earnestly into the original thought of Luther, taking seriously the deep religious apprehension of a God supreme in His demands on the human soul and the redemptive work of Christ, that lies at the heart of the doctrine of Justification by Faith. It was this tendency that was so greatly influenced by Karl Barth, the Swiss Calvinist prophet who summoned Continental Protestantism to a revived supernaturalism and transcendence towering above the weakness and helplessness of a world that had lost its way. The trials of the war and the hopelessness of the peace had prepared many minds to accept an apocalyptic and catastrophic view of human history.

The other attempt to satisfy the mysticism innate in the German soul went in quite a different direction. It made the German soul the centre of its faith and found in the myths of the Nordic races a world of imaginative impulse, which set mere intellectualism and human schemes at defiance. The significance of both these tendencies lies in their common assumption that human reason by itself is inadequate to grapple with the problems of the world. Faith of some kind alone suffices to exact the devotion without which no great achievement is possible. When things are bad, only those who are ready for supreme sacrifices are of any use. Both these tendencies mingled in a strange way in the National Socialism that found its voice in Adolf Hitler. That movement was a reaction against the long attempt to found a new human society on reason, common sense and technical efficiency. 'We are the counter-movement against the French Revolution,' said Gregor Strasser, one of the more intelligible prophets of National Socialism. They regarded the French Revolution as the triumph of the *bourgeoisie*, who placed all their hope in political economy and a purely this-worldly philosophy. This is Liberalism, whose brother is Materialism, and its logical consequence along one line Bolshevistic Communism. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity mean the blurring of all the distinctions of race, nation and creed that have made human history rich and noble. Above all, they overthrow authority, without which man cannot arrive at his full stature. Along another line Liberalism issues in Americanism, whose symbol is Gold, and its typical product the disinterested man freed from all prejudices except his own selfishness. Of this disinterested, unrooted man the Jew

was accepted as the symbol. Thus National Socialism proclaimed a gospel which was to deliver man from the tyranny of the machine and an existence without ulterior aims, by uniting him once more with the roots of Folk and Race, from which God has willed he draws his vital forces. It was inevitable that the triumph of National Socialism should at once appeal to, and also challenge, the Churches, and particularly the German Protestant Church. It appealed because it was a demand for faith and a denial of Godlessness. It challenged because it was rooted in race. There was from the first a tension at the centre, which was quick in making itself felt. A *régime* that claimed to be restoring Christendom must demand the support of the Churches. Especially must it summon the Protestant Church to its assistance, because it was a movement for the unification of all Germans in a common task befitting their genius and history. Protestantism, so it was held, was, *par excellence*, a German creation. Its titanic prophet, himself *Der Deutsche der Deutschen*, was the Martin Luther whose statue, side by side with that of Bismarck, bestrode so many German market-places. The unity of the people demanded a faith in God who created it and made it what it is. Without God there will be no *Volksgemeinschaft* and *Volksgenossenschaft*. God and nation are the two poles. The triumph of the Nazi movement is a proof that God and nation both live still.

The first step was to bring about at last the unification of the Protestant Churches of the different lands into one German Evangelical Church. This demand of the Chancellor was conveyed to the leaders of the German Churches by Dr. Ludwig Müller, an army chaplain of Königsberg, who in Hitler's early struggles had befriended him and given him a home. They eagerly set to work on the new constitution. The task was assigned to three representatives of the *Kirchenbund*—Dr. Kapler (the lay President), Dr. Marahrens and Dr. Hesse—and they worked in concert with Dr. Müller. It was agreed that at the head of the future Church there should be a *Reichsbischof* who should belong to the Lutheran confession, as that confession was numerically much larger than the Reformed or Calvinist section. The latter were, however, working in full concord. Dr. Müller pressed his own claims to the office of *Reichsbischof*, on the ground that he was the trusted representative of the Chancellor. But, not wishing to accept any self-recommended person, the Church representatives chose Dr. Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, the youngest son of the famous social worker who had founded a remarkable colony at Bethel, near Bielefeld, for caring for destitute and unfortunate people. Dr. von Bodelschwingh had succeeded his father in this work, and was an excellent choice; he is in the prime of life and stands outside ordinary ecclesiastical politics.

He did not hold his office for long. Before he had been elected the 'German Christians,' the group in the Church—comparatively small in numbers, so far as pastors were concerned—who were most enthusiastic in favour of the Nazi doctrines, had already been demanding the *Gleichschaltung* (co-ordination) of the Church, and the appointment of von Bodelschwingh was a rejection of their claims and a quiet assertion that those in charge of the Church were determined to preserve its autonomy. Thus the appointment became the signal for the outbreak of a fierce conflict which came to a head when, on June 21, the Church Synod at Eisenach appointed a successor to Dr. Kapler, who had resigned his office as president. The Chancellor appointed Dr. Müller as his personal representative to take over the affairs of the Church, and Dr. Jaeger was appointed commissar for the Church in Prussia. Everything was in confusion. Dr. von Bodelschwingh did not lay down his office. But he publicly declared that the appointment of a State commissar made it impossible to exercise it.

President von Hindenburg, a devout Lutheran of the old-fashioned kind, intervened to express his concern that peace should be restored in the Evangelical Church. The first Sunday in July was a day of great tension. Dr. von Bodelschwingh had ordered a day of penitence in the Churches. Dr. Hossenfelder, a young and comparatively unknown pastor, who had leapt into notoriety as a leader of the German Christians and became the spiritual adjutant of Dr. Jaeger, ordered a day of thanksgiving. The cleavage became an open one. Herr Hitler gave assurances on the following Tuesday to a representative of the Church of England, who had come to watch the situation, that he did not wish to interfere in the affairs of the Protestant Church, in which as a Catholic he had no place. In the following days representatives of the two main parties in the Church met under the presidency of Dr. L. Müller to draw up a new constitution. This was apparently a very innocuous document. It did not, for example, contain the now notorious Aryan paragraph, which excluded from the ministry any German of Jewish blood. Its chief aim was to provide a scheme for election of a *Reichsbischof* by a system of Church councils leading up to a national synod. Unfortunately, as subsequent events showed, it provided no way for getting rid of a *Reichsbischof* once elected. During the summer the elections were held to the parish councils. But they were held under conditions which placed the regular church-goer and those who cared first about the purity of the faith at a grave disadvantage. These latter had by this time seen the necessity of organising their forces. A party of strict Lutheran outlook was formed under the title 'Gospel and Church.' But they were not allowed to hold meetings, to put up notices, or to write in

the papers. Above all, they were excluded from the radio. All these advantages were open to the German Christians. The night before the election the Chancellor broadcast an appeal which, though it was ostensibly an appeal for unity, must have conveyed to many of his hearers the thought that he wished them to vote for the German Christians. When it is remembered that large numbers of Germans, who had up till that point had nothing to do with the Church, inscribed themselves on the voting list in order to bring it into closer union with the Nazi movement, the result may be guessed. Almost everywhere, except in Westphalia, a majority of German Christians were elected to the parish councils. It followed, inevitably, that a similar majority ruled the *Landessynoden*. The Synod of Prussia is much the largest, and what happened there showed which way things were going. The *Landessynode* met, created the title of bishop, and divided the Church of Prussia into ten dioceses. Dr. Ludwig Müller was elected Bishop of Prussia, and Pastor Hossenfelder Bishop of Brandenburg. A still more serious step was taken. The Aryan paragraph was made part of the constitution of the Church of Prussia.

This provoked violent dissent on the part of the 'Church and Gospel' group, who left the synod as a protest. The other *Landessynoden* did not accept the Aryan paragraph. But from them an overwhelming majority of German Christians was elected to the National Synod, whose duty it would be to choose the *Reichsbischof*. The disturbance among the pastors had now become acute. They felt that Christianity was at stake. An appeal was addressed to the synod, which met at Wittenberg on September 27 in the name of 2000 pastors, among the signatories being Dr. Niemöller (the courageous submarine commander, who played a leading part in the opposition) and Herr Jacobi (the highly respected preacher at the Kaiser Wilhelmgedächtniskirche in Berlin). They protested strongly against the way in which the new orders had been introduced into the Church. For months, they said, the Church had been subjected to violence by an ecclesiastical group, in a way that was clean contrary to the Kingdom of Christ. Laws, particularly the Aryan paragraph, had been introduced which were contrary to Scripture. The pastoral office was degraded because pastors who would not obey the dominant group were being persecuted. They appealed to the synod to give full freedom to the proclamation of the Gospel and to those who proclaimed it. The synod met, and Dr. Müller was elected without a dissentient voice. He appointed, as the constitution required, his spiritual cabinet (*Geistliches Ministerium*), and made Herr Hossenfelder chairman. It looked as though the German Christians had achieved a complete triumph. But on November 12 an event took place which gave an entirely new turn

to events by throwing a flashlight on the real situation. The *Deutsche Christen* held a great meeting in the Sportpalast in Berlin. In the chair was Dr. Krause, their leader. Bishop Hossenfelder made a speech and left the meeting. Then Dr. Krause got up and made certain stringent demands. The Aryan paragraph was to be universally applied. The Old Testament was to be jettisoned, and large parts of the New, while the crucifix was to be removed from the churches. The stir that followed was immense. At last many who knew but little of what was going forward discovered where they stood. It could not be kept out even of the Nazi Press, because, after all, many Nazis agreed.

The only complaint was that Dr. Krause had not gone far enough. Dr. Ludwig Müller, who was no doubt genuinely shocked, came out with a strong statement. Such demands were an intolerable attack on the faith of the Church. 'I will never permit such heresy to be spread in the Evangelical Church.' He removed Dr. Krause from office. The Emergency League saw their opportunity. Its numbers rapidly grew. They pressed for the resignation of Dr. Hossenfelder, and he had to go to avoid an open schism. He was followed gradually by every one of Dr. Müller's spiritual cabinet. The *Reichsbischof* was left quite alone by the end of last year. He should have been solemnly installed in the cathedral in Berlin on the first Sunday in Advent with much waving of flags and great processions. The ceremony had to be abandoned. The *Reichsbischof's* own position began to look precarious. The emergency League, now grown to 6000, pressed for the appointment of a spiritual cabinet to work with Dr. Müller whose members would be acceptable to them. Meanwhile, a new cause of controversy had arisen. By a stroke of the pen Dr. Müller co-ordinated the Evangelical Youth Movement with the Hitler Youth. He dismissed Dr. Erich Stange, their leader, and brought them under the control of Herr Baldur von Schirach. This struck a blow at a vital element in religious training of the young. Parents began to protest, and they were not much relieved when, on December 19, an order restricted the time to be given to the Hitler Youth to two days a week and two Sundays a month. Protests flowed in. But *Pfarrer Zahn* of Aachen, whom Baldur von Schirach had summoned to assist him, called on Evangelical boys and girls to give clear German answers to an appeal to bring all their inner questions and unrest into that German people of whom it had been said 'I am come that I might kindle a fire upon earth, and what will I, if it be already kindled.' This was January 4. Before the month was out an interview had been arranged between the bishops and the *Reichsbischof* in the presence of Herr Hitler. It was thought that Herr Hitler would throw his influence on the side of moderation. For some

time there had been signs that seemed to show that the Chancellor was less enthusiastic in his support of Herr Müller. Just when things looked as though they were going well, General Goering intervened, and threw on the table what was supposed to be evidence of treasonable conversations over the telephone between pastors of the Emergency League—information derived by police tapping the telephone. This, it is said, produced a great change. The meeting broke up in confusion, and the bishops surrendered. Since then they have declared themselves to stand solidly behind Dr. Müller and ready to carry out his commands.

This is very serious, because Dr. Müller has issued a decree taking to himself the power to place any pastor in Germany in retirement, and to dock him of a third or half of his pay. On all hands news comes of pastors, general superintendents, and other Church officials being removed from their office. What will be the end it is hazardous for any outsider to prophesy. It depends upon so many incalculable factors. But it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the capitulation of the bishops. After all, many of them and others holding high positions in the Evangelical Church are still the products of the election last summer that was so heavily weighted in favour of the German Christians. All the time one of the things most dreaded by those who were fighting for the traditional faith of the Lutheran confession was the success of the attempt to fix to them the title of 'reactionary,' by which is meant opposition to the National Socialist régime. The charge is an unjust aspersion. It is difficult for people in England, who have brought under their constant notice the many repulsive, and unfortunately true, by-products of the Hitler régime, to understand how any decent people can support it. But the facts are otherwise. Many decent people in Germany do support it, if only on the ground that many sensible people support all sorts of governments in various countries—namely, that the alternative would be worse. It is certain that the vast majority of Lutheran pastors who are definitely and strongly opposed to the régime that has been forced upon the Church definitely, and even enthusiastically, support Herr Hitler. Those who try to put their action in any other light are doing them a poor service. They support Herr Hitler because they believe that he has given their countrymen a new courage and a new hope. What they cannot do is to give to this, or any other State régime, that first allegiance of the conscience that must be given elsewhere. They love their country passionately; they sympathise deeply with the exalted mood that has succeeded to the wave of depression that took hold of their fellow-countrymen for years in a way in which it could only possess Germans, who have a strange

instinct for luxuriating in depression. The Sorrows of Werther are the expression of a permanent characteristic. But they retain the spirit of Luther where the ultimate things of the soul are concerned. 'Here I stand; I can no other.' They recognise that the prevailing atmosphere is favourable in some ways to a rebirth of faith. They feel that Church and nation are in the same position. Both have been wounded in their essence by 'Liberalism' and Materialism. Both have been shaken and crushed. But as Christians they affirm that the Christian message demands a recognition that the hard times out of which the new life has been born were due to the judgment of God on their faults. If the people are rent, the State torn, economic life destroyed, it is because God has let them go their own ways when they would not go His. A new vision of the Cross and vicarious sacrifice is appearing to them. The value of martyrdom appears in a fresh light. This, of course, does not fit in well with orthodox National Socialism. But it is the kind of faith that may be driven underground but cannot be destroyed. As the days go by, even among the German Christian section reshaping of thought is taking place. The Emergency League may be broken up as an organ of ecclesiastical politics. It is hard to think that the pastors' brotherhoods can be so easily disposed of.

There has been no room to speak of the parallel developments in the Roman Catholic Church. But there are signs of a new sympathy for a faith that is seen to be in the last analysis the same that may spell much for the future. Cardinal Faulhaber has publicly saluted the protesting pastors as brethren. His own Advent Sermon on *Germanenthum und Christenthum* was a brilliant piece of irony, that lacked nothing in precision.

A. S. DUNCAN-JONES.

CRITICS AND CRITICISM¹

'AN opera, *Four Saints in Three Acts*, of which Miss Gertrude Stein wrote the libretto and Mr. Virgil Thomson the music, was given its dress rehearsal at Hartford, Connecticut, last night by the Friends and Enemies of Modern Music, who are producing it publicly to-night to open the Avery Memorial Theatre there.' This, which neither Sinclair Lewis nor John Dos Passos could improve, appeared in *The Times* of February 9.

It is an opera [our own correspondent continues] the like of which no one has ever seen before, for while the words were generally incomprehensible or devoid of sense in logic, they were nearly always audible. The critics seemed to be uncertain about its meaning either for themselves or its composers, but they found in it wit and beauty as well as ridiculousness and only an occasional taint of mere smartness. A carefully selected audience of 300 persons were delighted with it.

This is wonderful! What shades of Mrs. Leo Hunter it evokes! The carefully selected 300, one hopes already richly dined, doing justice to so remarkable an entertainment! Remarkable indeed! And one cannot be too grateful to 'our own correspondent' for completing the picture with a sentence or two from those conscientious but certainly perplexed critics from whom in the circumstances so much was expected. 'Miss Stein's words,' one of them wrote, 'so long uncomprehended by most of the world, at last stood out with their true meaning. They made no sense, yet sung they were lovely.' And the settings were 'like music, and like the dancing of an all-negro cast of saints,' 'baroquely witty and handsome in one breath.'

I looked in vain the next morning, and I imagined Mr. Leavis and Mr. Sparrow also looking (for so relevant an occasion for their whips, surely, neither of these two writers can have missed) for an account of the public reception of the *Four Saints*. The account did not appear. And now, of course, having read Mr. Leavis's last book, I realise that he at least would not have been looking for it. Mr. Leavis knows too much about the relation of what

¹ For *Continuity*, by F. R. Leavis (Minority Press, Cambridge, 1933); *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*, by T. S. Eliot (Faber and Faber, 1933); *Sense and Poetry*, by John Sparrow (Constable, 1934).

he calls Mass Civilisation, the public at the Avery Memorial Theatre, and Minority Culture, the carefully selected 300, to have expected that there would be anything to report—any divided house, any uproar, on the second evening. And the event confirms him. The critics had done their work at the closed session. The minority culture blinked 'sage lids' and swallowed, and, after them, one may be sure, the public did its best to swallow too.

This, since we have no Molière, is a sad story. It happened in America. But Miss Gertrude Stein and no doubt Mr. Virgil Thomsón have their admirers and their followers in this country. Has not Mr. James Joyce been allowed to publish here recently instalment after incredible instalment of utterly incomprehensible prose under the title *Work in Progress*, and have not our eclectics now entirely accepted the extremist views of the French Symbolistes? It is difficult after reading Mr. Sparrow's book to avoid this opinion. He quotes the following, which is, it appears, a letter from Joyce: 'Who is this that advances in maresblood caftan, like Hiesons in Finisterre, his eyeholes phyllistained, his jawbones of a crossbacked? A little child shall lead him. Why it's Strongman Simpson, Timothy Nathan, now of Simpson's on the Grill! Say, Tim Nat, bald winepresser, hast not one air left? But yett he hath. Regard! Auscult!'; and so on, and with it the comment of the *New Statesman* and *Nation* which preserved and printed it, 'one knows of no other similar documents, no letters in a tone of intense admiration and sardonic banter sent by, say, Manzoni to Rubini, or by Flaubert to Gilbert Duprez, or by Ibsen to the Swedish Nightingale.' And this is admiration and not satire! We have, I suppose, only to wait for the production of the *Four Saints* in London. The audience here, one hopes, is likely to be less carefully selected, but its white ties are sure to be a sufficient guarantee of its (forgive the word!) 'good taste,' a guarantee, that is, that it will be polite to anything which it is assured is highbrow.

There has not been in England, at least since Restoration days, a riotous critical tradition comparable to the Continental. It is no use expecting to see Londoners carrying Epstein's, or any other's, statuary through the streets as the Florentines carried Cimabué's, or a house gloriously divided like Paris on the first night of *Hernani*. But must we be expected to swallow everything, even nonsense, with applause? I myself saw a man in danger of scragging because he dared to laugh at the quite idiotic acclamations of one American professor and two Hollywood 'stars' with which *Thunder over Mexico*, that quite futile film, was foisted on the London public. It is evident that to laugh openly is becoming increasingly dangerous. How else can our advertise-

ments keep their places on the walls, or the decorations their niches on the walls of our buildings? We need, therefore, to be the more grateful to a man like Mr. Sparrow who laughs, and men like Mr. Leavis and Mr. Eliot who scourge.

From a crowd of reviewers whose writings only increase the passivity of the contemporary public towards literary art these three stand out as genuinely active. Mr. Leavis and Mr. Eliot especially seem to keep appropriate company. Both are editors of journals (*Scrutiny* and *The Criterion*) which exist to house characteristic criticism and independent appraisal in the place of the conventional reputation and the passive review. Both have published separate books besides and argued continuously on behalf of the study and development of our underlying artistic and critical tradition. What they say applies to all art, but they are themselves concerned with literature, which, through its medium of language, they rightly regard as the most sensitive index of the state of society in general. They regard the *corpus* of literary art as dangerously anæmic at the present, by reason, chiefly, of the large number of parasites who, ousting the true critics, are stealing the nourishment of the body and fast gaining control of its powers of expression. These parasites are the influences, born of industrial organisation, against which Matthew Arnold contended. Neither Mr. Eliot nor Mr. Leavis wholly endorse Arnold's view of the function of criticism, from which, indeed, they are rather elaborately careful to distinguish their own. But they both, none the less, like most of our critics—like Mr. Richards, for instance, and Mr. Empson—share Arnold's conviction that criticism is an integral part of all true culture. Read in the history of his art the critic needs to be both a stimulant and a scourge.

In the hands of Mr. Leavis the scourge is effective. It is difficult to believe that Mr. Leavis's readers will continue to trust the opinions of those organisations, literary columns of the 'dailies,' our 'more elegant weeklies,' book clubs and societies, and such which exist to increase their own profits with the sale of what they patronise. But did anyone who reads Mr. Leavis ever trust these opinions? The danger is that Mr. Leavis is himself going to be the victim of the isolation of the minority culture which he so much distrusts. The strength of the weapons of mass civilisation, the Press, the cinema, the advertisement, is that while they drench the public ear with their own loud acclamations they prevent its hearing either the praise or the blame of the educated voice; and the end is that not only the ear but the voice also loses its education and becomes at last fit only to pipe in undiscerning judgment through the throats of carefully chosen 300's. Who suffers most, the uneducated who have no one to

educate them, or the educator who has no one to educate? Both travel, supposedly, by their different routes full circle and end by being indistinguishably ignorant, ignorant of their own ignorance and, to use the prevalent antithesis, possessing civilisation without culture.

Thus far we are not yet travelled. The threatening separation between the learned and the unlearned is, after all, of recent date. It began with the discovery, which the late Earle Welby used to call the most significant and the most disastrous discovery of modern times, that a popular notion does not have to spring from the people. The majority of the so-called 'popular' ideas now current are actually the ideas of single men. One man conceiving anything capable of being distributed through the Press, through the cinema, or through advertisement can persuade the people. And this is as good as to say in the long run that such a man can kill the people. It looks as if democracy will have taught us this at least, that people without ideas of their own are not a people.

The discontinuity of culture which Mr. Leavis believes to be imminent will have come about through the separation of the educated from the uneducated by a class of manufacturers, travellers and shopkeepers of 'taste' who profit by their separation. The method of production and sale of this class is ingenious and apparently irresistible. It puts its goods forward to the public as a cheaper alternative to the best. If the alternative is bought in large quantities, like poorer currency it drives the better out. There are few who will strive after that which is difficult of attainment when the easy is made standard. What has happened in industry with the expansion of the market is happening in art—the slogan in both cases being much the same, a sort of 'Sell yours to the millions of India!'

Mr. Leavis uses the figure of the 'common reader' to make his point.

... before the last century, in, say, Johnson's time, [he writes] it never occurred to anyone to question that there were, in all things, standards above the level of the ordinary man. That this was so, and the advantage the ordinary man derived, might be brought home by a study [one is in fact being written—may we hope by Mr. Leavis?] of the memoirs and autobiographies, which exist in considerable numbers, of persons of the humblest origin who raised themselves to intellectual distinction and culture. Johnson's own appeal to the 'common reader' which is sometimes invoked in support of the democratic principle in criticism has ... an opposite force. It testifies how far Johnson was from suspecting that there could ever be a state of affairs like that existing now. He could rejoice to concur with the 'common reader' because taste was then in the keeping of the educated, who, sharing a homogeneous culture, maintained in tradition a surer taste than any that is merely individual can be, and he could not have imagined such an authority being seriously challenged. To-day ... there is no such common reader.

Mr. Leavis makes the existence or non-existence of the common reader a criterion of the state of society because he depends upon a close relation between its lower and its upper strata. This in turn Mr. Leavis makes the condition of society's health. The common reader is a respecter of men better educated than himself who address themselves to him. But to-day the forum is in the possession of the strong and the educated and the uneducated have no access to each other.

It might be thought that in these liberal days the femyd lay in education itself. But education is now, alas, hardly less tightly organised than industry itself, and ministers most successfully to the needs of the philistines. Education is the system from which men expect to learn, not how to form, but how to manipulate values, not how to test or change conditions, but how to succeed by taking conditions for granted. In order to set the few who win from education an individual taste out of the shadow of the colossus, upon some summit where they may yet be seen, Mr. Leavis surveys the case for Academies. It is inevitable that in this country at any rate he should find little hope in them. Of those that are already in existence the best that can be said is that, like the Royal Society of Literature, they are innocent enough for the public to look right through them without knowing they are there at all. The fact is, of course, that our condition can be mended, not by operation, but only by revival of function or by organic change. Suppose literature to afford a summary of the state of society, you cannot by improving the state of literature improve society. The change must take place in society. Language, fortunately, is a sensitive pulse and not its own heart, so that a bad literature can no more than fever be the first cause of death; and the body is apt to survive its distempers. This is not to say that the literary critic is powerless, but his activities must be twofold. He must, to maintain our image, localise infections, but he must also stimulate and keep the heart alive. The showing up of the badness of so much of what, thanks to the organising ability of the general caterers, passes for good is a comparatively unimportant, though in Mr. Leavis's hands a diverting, discipline. But it is no more radical than a sterilisation of the tumours. It is when the critic tends the creative centres of his art that he does his chief work.

Everyone is by now accustomed to the idea that art is an expression of the time and the artist the product of his generation. But if it is to be useful, the idea needs a closer interpretation than it is usually given. We are accustomed to thinking loosely of the pre-Raphaelites, for instance, as typically Victorian, or of the Classical Age as typically Georgian, and we usually fail to observe that at least outside the history of art there is nothing typically

Georgian about the one or Victorian about the other. Other eras besides these might perfectly well have produced and may perfectly well produce them, since in order to produce classical or 'pre-Raphaelite' art, it is not necessary to be a Georgian or a Victorian, or anything, indeed, except a 'classic' or a 'pre-Raphaelite.' These arts included their topical indices, but it would be absurd to suppose that the elegancies of Richmond Hill and the engines of Ford Madox Brown are relevant to their style. Given the Victorians and the pre-Raphaelites we can relate them, but given either alone we can by no means arrive at the other. The political and economic epochs of society have no more to do with the production of the work of art than the chrysalis has to do with the production of the butterfly: they are the circumstances or residences within which art and the butterfly grow up. This is important. Were it otherwise it would be possible to look complacently upon efforts, such as are very prevalent at present, to construct a 'period' art out of local representations which it is supposed can symbolise the time to which they belong. Of this the critic needs to be acutely conscious; he cannot by the most attentive study of manners reach the productive centres of his day. The real causes of the work of art lie in the closed history of the art itself. The artist must be set, as Mr. Eliot is continually suggesting, not among the living, but among the dead. The genetic account of the picture, the symphony, the poem, leads directly to previous symphonies, pictures and poems, and only contingently to society. The artist is unique with regard to his art, and exceptional even as a citizen. Comparatively free from the limiting flux in which his fellows have to sink or swim, he stretches out towards that which is permanent; and pays a heavy enough price, we know, for the privilege.

There are dangers in underestimating the importance of the artist's environment, and these also the critic must avoid, but the danger of assuming the cultural fertility of an age which happens to be industrially active is one which deserves more notice. Our own age is rapidly changing the material aspect of the world. Its dynamism is in respect of the physical prodigious. It is inaugurating whole processes of change. But change is not creation. In itself it leads only to further change and is included in the temporal flux. Creation, on the other hand, has to escape from change. There is nothing necessarily discrepant between political change and the permanence of art, and there may be no reason for supposing, although there are no adequate examples of it, that an industrially involved age like our own may not provide good soil for abiding art, but that can only be if the art escapes entanglement with the industrial

change. And there is at present little evidence of art's emancipation, and much of its depending on an altogether ephemeral appeal. What else, indeed, do we commonly call the modern in art?

The great misfortune of contemporary art is that our effective economic organisations, busy providing the artists with spurious motives, are competent to persuade the public to take what is produced under these motives for art itself. There is no doubt that the public takes pride in its entertainment, and little doubt that it is convinced that it lives at present in an unusually 'artistic' age. A market for works of art is of course an excellent condition for the production of art and one which has all too often been lacking. But the art must be produced in the love of art standards and by no means according to the entirely different standards of the market. Work produced by market standards is not art, and its distribution quickly suppresses the market for what is. Never until the modern era have there been alternative standards, because until now, although the artist was not always able to sell his work if it was good, at least he could not sell it because it was bad. But now, thanks to the shadow of the colossus, the position is different. The uneducated, nowadays, of course, the largest buyers, have lost sight of the intrinsic ideals and stand gaping before the standard of that which is sold. They can no longer compare that which is offered them with that which was once withheld, and they make haste to accept without more ado the loud verdict of their purveyors.

The worst is that many of those who provide the purveyors with the works they sell are those who under other conditions would have been producing art. The making of the popular article in colour, sound or words is even in a vulgar form by no means easy, and the man who can make it most successfully is the potential artist. All successful marketing depends upon comparison, and in this lies the real malice of open competition. One virtue of the conservative academy which Mr. Leavis does not notice is its maintenance of all standards within what it defines as the noble. Outside the limits which it sets it allows no better or worse, but only bad. If, let us say, a play does not observe the unities, it is simply not a play and cannot be estimated. Now, it is perfectly obvious, and we may assume that it has always been perfectly obvious, to the French Academy, for instance, in its strictest period, that the limits of the conventions do not correspond with the limits of the actually beautiful. The Academy bases its canon, not on fact, but on expediency, because it knows the danger of permitting unlicensed distinctions. The 'Romantic,' disregarding the convention, may very well make

something genuinely beautiful outside it, but he is apt to appear to the academician less of an innovator than of a vulgarian. Once allow art to shake hands without any ceremony with a public which has money in its pocket and you are in danger of selling the artist to the shopkeeper. This is not because the public but because the middleman is vicious. The middleman knows very well that so long as the public is allowed its distinctions of merit among the ignoble it will be content to purchase the ignoble. And once the middleman harnesses the potential artist to the task of defining distinctions in the market-place and making the improvements on what is there the widely sold, society has lost its regenerators and entered into a period of artistic decadence the end of which is hard to foresee.

What, then, is to be done? And what, particularly, in the face of the organisations of mass civilisation, are our critics to do? Mr. Eliot has for some years been occupied in supplying the answer. The critic must become once again what the good critic has always been—namely, the exponent of art-history—and by making us conscious and appreciative of our traditions provide us, in the first place, with the means, which we have largely lost, of criticising spurious art, and, in the second, with an atmosphere in which we shall both demand, and be able to nourish, the genuine artist. Our conversion can be but slow. Not only, to take the case of literature, is it difficult for criticism of this kind to find its way into a print usurped by popular reviewing, but the training of the critic himself is tedious and difficult. He has, as Mr. Eliot says in one of his earlier essays, to de-personalise himself in order to steep himself in tradition. But how far is the critic likely to be from this!

The critic, one would suppose, [says Mr. Eliot] should endeavour to discipline his personal prejudices and cranks—tares to which we are all subject—and compose his differences with as many of his fellows as possible, in the common pursuit of true judgment. When we find that quite the contrary prevails, we begin to suspect that the critic owes his livelihood to the violence and extremity of his opposition to other critics, or else to some trifling oddities of his own with which he contrives to season the opinions which men already hold, and which out of vanity or sloth they prefer to maintain. We are tempted to expel the lot.

The true critic, then, like the artist—and it must be remembered that one man, like Mr. Eliot, is often both—must feed, not upon any strictly contemporary appreciation nor upon any mere sensitiveness to his own generation, but upon a deep appreciation of the history of his art. This alone can give him the criteria of judgment which he needs. His task is not to feel the pulse of the times or discover the merits in virtue of which his public like this or that, but to be aware of his art's continuity and acclaim or

discredit works which he estimates only in their relation to this. He must work, further, to make the public aware of his criteria. He has not merely to endorse books and pass them to a public which will buy them, but he must make the public sufficiently conscious of his grounds to approve the same books upon their own initiative. For it is not any circle of critics, but eventually society itself, 'a society of cultivated men and women . . . wherein ideas are current and the perceptions quick,' which provides atmosphere to maintain the artist.

The trouble is, though, that society must also maintain the critic. Steep himself as he may in the traditions of his art, the critic remains the child of society, and not its parent. It is not a question of the purchase of what the critic writes, but of the origin of his ideas. It is far truer to say of the critic than of the artist that he is the expression of his age. The conceptions of the artist, one might say, are born and made within his head, but the critic expresses the ideas which belong to society. The artist is a child who escapes from his parent young enough to be prodigal. He inherits its characteristics, but is free from its influence. But the critic is a stay-at-home son who learns to be filial. When society is healthy nothing could be better. A society that is highly conscious of its taste has excellent critics. Indeed, this direct expression of the social taste is the ideal condition for art, and has engendered criticism which cannot in its form be differentiated from pure art. But the critic is no less dependent on society when the parent ails and he would most wish to be free. He is by profession the expression of the social taste, and he is limited for better or for worse to the quality of the social mind. This does not tie him, of course, to the influences of mass civilisation, since these are not social and do not originate in the people but in the organising ability of the individual. To know the social mind he must be free of these. But, though he know his parent's history, he is the mouthpiece of her present, not her past, and cannot go beyond the integration of her present thought. The good literary critic is not to be found except at periods when the social literary consciousness is well developed.

The balance of good critical writing is always, after all, on the side of approval. What the critic appreciates is art produced to satisfy the demands of society which he has made explicit, and he cannot, except rarely, condemn without witnessing to his own poverty and the poverty of the society he represents. Almost all depreciation is lost with the art it depreciates. A highly integrated society enjoying rich measure of social consciousness never lacks either critics or artists, but when that consciousness deteriorates the state of criticism suffers before the state of art. Art often survives a lack of recognition, but criticism is the recognition

itself. Criticism is the voice of a people welcoming what it wants : but when it does not know what it wants it becomes many-tongued and discrepant. Approval gives way to disapproval, when your good critic can only become a prophet who, like Voltaire, to take the supreme example, destroys that good may come after. The paradox and the pity of the critic's position is that he cannot educate society. The critic is Saturday's child. With society's loss of consciousness he suffers decline and, except at the initial stages, has no remedial power. Unwelcome though this position is, it must be granted. The substance of criticism grows poorer with the decadence of public taste, and as much of it as does not merge with the prophetic fire becomes more and more eclectic and insignificant. The critic is the flag flying, and in retreat he is, not warrior, but herald.

This, after all, is only to extend Mr. Leavis's picture of mass civilisation and minority culture to include, what no one has a right to expect either Mr. Leavis or Mr. Eliot to include, the plight of the critic himself. And perhaps it is in the end the most convincing evidence of the accuracy of the situation which these critics draw that their own taste operating upon contemporary production shows itself, in the field which both hold to be the most important, barren and misleading. Mr. Leavis and Mr. Eliot seem to shut themselves here within the limits of the minority culture they decry. It would be unkind in this place to spoil a predominant gratitude with a review of the poetry upon which, for instance, *Scrutiny* and *The Criterion*, have set the seal of their approval. It is, fortunately, unnecessary to do more in this respect than refer the reader to Mr. Sparrow's refreshing little book. Mr. Sparrow himself acknowledges a debt to Edmund Wilson, but more at his own hands than at Wilson's do the idols of the modern alembicate 'Symbolism' meet with unbiassed treatment. That the poet has to communicate with his readers, that he cannot successfully, therefore, be more than a little obscure, be indefinitely incoherent, that to see these things asserted should be so pleasurable, is itself, surely, a sad sign of the need in which we stand. No one, least of all Mr. Sparrow, wishes to lay rude fingers on what is new, but it is high time for us to look dispassionately, and even possibly with a little initial resentment, at those horribly obscure gospels which, like the *Waste Land*, Hugh Selwyn Mauberley and the *Orators* are influencing the younger poets. And it turns out that one does not laugh any louder at what Mr. Sparrow says about them, who is mostly content to let them speak for themselves, than at what Mr. Sparrow quotes from their admirers.

We find Mrs. G. R. Mitchison recommending the public to read Mr. Auden's poem 'as passively as possible, just as a 'body

sensitised to words, without letting intellect interfere,' and we feel, then, surely, that we must be nearly ready for the English production of the *Four Saints*. What memorial theatre will it open?

CHRISTOPHER V. SALMON.

THE 'PEACE LETTER' OF 1917

I HAVE adopted for this article the title by which the late Lord Lansdowne's letter of November 29, 1917, to the *Daily Telegraph* has become generally known; it should, however, be noted at the outset that it was not a title of his choosing. The letter was published under the heading 'Co-ordination of Allies' War Aims,' which correctly described its subject-matter. The caption 'Peace Letter' was, I believe, invented by the Northcliffe Press, in order to stultify my father's argument in advance by representing it as a demand for 'peace at any price' with the Central Powers. It was a gloss too readily accepted, with comments conceived in a similar spirit, by the general public at the time.

The sensation produced by the letter and the storm of contumely of which its author became the victim must be well remembered. Lord Lansdowne had had a long record as a tried servant of the State. When Foreign Secretary in 1904 he had concluded the *Entente* which prepared the ground for our subsequent alliance with France, while his action in conjunction with Mr. Bonar Law in the early days of August 1914 had enabled Mr. Asquith to declare war, in spite of notorious divisions in his Cabinet. All this was forgotten. At a meeting of the Conservative Party held the day after the letter appeared he was, as he himself described it, 'officially excommunicated,'¹ and it is no exaggeration to say that among the unthinking multitude the stigma of the *Peace Letter* clung to him until the end. But as the years have passed and the disastrous aftermath of the war has continued to make itself felt among all nations, the question has often been asked whether, after all, something might not have been done to shorten the struggle, and whether the attempt, even if unsuccessful, should not have been made.

My present object is not, however, to re-examine this question, on which there is, and always has been, room for a difference of opinion, but to place on record certain facts which have only recently emerged in connexion with the genesis of the letter itself. To the general public, with which must be included Lord Lansdowne's friends and family, it came as a 'bolt from the blue.'

¹ Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Bonar Law, November 30, 1917.

No one, it seemed, had been consulted or had had the slightest intimation that it was in preparation. It was, moreover, categorically stated in a *communiqué* printed by *The Times* on December 1, 1917, that before writing the letter Lord Lansdowne had not consulted or been in communication with any member of the Government, and this statement, which purported to be authoritative, was repeated in the leading article of the same date. The version it gave of the transaction, wide though it was of the truth, has held the field ever since and was accepted with slight modification by Lord Newton when writing Lord Lansdowne's official *Biography*.² Of all the criticisms which the letter called forth, those directed against its author (himself an ex-Minister) for publishing it without previous communication with any Minister of the day were the most difficult to meet.

It was not until the appearance of Lord Oxford's *Memories and Reflections* (1928), a year after Lord Lansdowne's death, that we learnt that this was not the first occasion on which Lord Lansdowne had propounded his views. It transpired that twelve months before he had circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet³ in precisely the same strain as the *Peace Letter*. His memorandum had remained unchallenged amongst his colleagues, and, when Mr. Asquith's Government broke up a few weeks later, the Foreign Secretary (Lord Grey) was about to ask for a secret session of the House of Lords for the purpose of its discussion.⁴ It was curious that no reference to this memorandum should ever have been made, more especially as several of Lord Lansdowne's Ministerial colleagues were still in office when the letter appeared in the year following.

But it was Lord Riddell's *War Diary* which first made it known that in November 1917 my father had not acted, as was generally thought, alone. Lord Riddell related⁵ a conversation with Lord Burnham at the time, from which it appeared that Lord Lansdowne had informed Mr. Balfour (then Foreign Secretary) of his intention to publish the letter, and that the latter had referred him to Lord Hardinge (then Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), who had approved the communication before it was sent to the Press. Lord Burnham (who in a private letter had characterised the letter as 'able and temperate,' and one from which 'nothing but good could come'⁶) was, according to

² Lord Lansdowne: *A Biography*, by Lord Newton (Macmillan & Co., 1929), p. 463.

³ This memorandum, dated November 13, 1916, was printed in Lord Oxford's book (ch. xiv.); it has recently been reprinted in Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memories*.

⁴ Lord Grey to Lord Lansdowne, December 6, 1916.

⁵ Lord Riddell's *War Diary*, 1933, p. 297.

⁶ Lord Burnham to Lord Lansdowne, November 30, 1917.

Lord Riddell, much annoyed by the condemnation of his paper for publishing it, and was with difficulty restrained by Mr. Bonar Law from making the circumstances public. It seemed, indeed, that he had only consented to keep silence because it was represented to him as in the national interest that they should not be divulged.⁷

In view of the general ignorance on the subject, as well as in justice to my father's memory, I wrote a letter to *The Times* calling attention to Lord Riddell's story.⁸ My letter was published in August last with an editorial in which it was suggested that all the evidence went to show that Mr. Balfour had been 'altogether opposed to the Lansdowne Movement.' There followed a communication from Mr. Balfour's relative, Mrs. Dugdale,⁹ who was in a position to assert that he had not seen the letter before publication, and that he had not even read it on December 11—nearly a fortnight after it had appeared in print. [This seeming lapse on the part of a Foreign Secretary in relation to a highly controversial document may be explained by what follows, for it is sufficiently clear that Mr. Balfour was completely acquainted with my father's argument in advance.] Lord Hardinge also wrote¹⁰ explaining that he had considered the decision to send the letter to the Press as '*chose jugée*' between Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour, and that his own assistance had been invoked 'simply as a technical expert.' The correspondence ended with a second letter from myself,¹¹ in which I gave a note of a few lines left by my father (the only one concerning the matter, as I then believed, in existence), which, so far as it went, seemed to confirm the implications of the story as told by Lord Riddell and repeated by me.

It was not long after this took place that I discovered the papers printed below, which, with a number of letters pertaining to the same subject, had somehow been overlooked by the writer of Lord Lansdowne's *Biography*. The documents may be briefly summarised:

No. 1 is a memorandum setting forth my father's views at length. It was left by him with Mr. Balfour, after a conversation which took place between them in the first half of November 1917. It seems that at this conversation Mr. Balfour had agreed that my father should formulate for his opinion the kind of questions he would like to ask in Parliament. These were accordingly sent to him on November 16 with a covering letter from Lord Lansdowne (No. 2).

⁷ Lord Riddell's *War Diary*, p. 298.

⁸ *The Times*, August 1, 1933.

⁹ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1933.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1933.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, August 6, 1933.

No. 3 is Mr. Balfour's reply. The version printed in the *Biography* omitted the note at its commencement as well as the final paragraph, while the questions (already referred to) were interpolated, although they do not appear in the manuscript of Mr. Balfour's letter. I have therefore reprinted the whole communication in its original form. It may be observed that Mr. Balfour was so far in sympathy with the 'Lansdowne Movement' that in the Mansion House speech, to which he refers in this final paragraph, he had already subscribed to three of the five 'points' which Lord Lansdowne afterwards stressed in the *Peace Letter*, while in this letter he states that 'of course we are all in favour of' the fifth 'point' (*infra*, p. 379; see also p. 384).

No. 4 is Lord Lansdowne's own account of the whole transaction, evidently a well-considered statement, for, besides the fair copy which I have printed, two drafts survive, one wholly in Lord Lansdowne's hand and the other in type with the addition of his own corrections. As the only relation left by the principal actor in this affair, it is worthy of close attention.

To the above mentioned papers I have added *The Times* statement of December 1, 1917, to which I have already referred, and finally I have reprinted the *Peace Letter* itself. Its terms are by now almost wholly forgotten, and, perhaps, were not very carefully scrutinised at the time, for it is notorious that much was read into it which was not there. A cooler and perhaps saner judgment of its contents may now be possible.

I put these documents on record in no spirit of controversy, but as a contribution to the history of an episode in the Great War about which no relevant facts should be withheld; for the inception of the *Peace Letter* as well as its possibilities must always remain questions of public interest.

My father was, especially in official matters, the most reticent of men; he never breathed a word even to members of his own family about the *Peace Letter*, still less of the communications which had passed between him and the representatives of the Foreign Office previous to its publication. He would have been the last man in the world knowingly to do anything to embarrass the Government in their difficult task, more especially in the Department of Foreign Affairs, over which an old friend and colleague was then presiding, and where he himself had presided in former days with conspicuous success. When the storm broke he was studiously careful that no one should be even remotely incriminated. He stated publicly on more than one occasion that he, and he alone, was responsible. His full responsibility none will deny. I must leave it to those who read the evidence

which is now available to judge whether morally the responsibility for the transaction was his alone.

LANSDOWNE.

January 1934.

(No. 1)

MEMORANDUM

*Endorsed by Lord Lansdowne. 'Sent by L. to A. J. B.
Nov. 1917'*

We must all realise that the war has lasted too long, and that in the interests of civilisation and humanity no pains should be spared to bring it to an end. I am not impressed by the confident talk as to our prospects. It does not seem to fit in with the facts. One of our Allies has completely collapsed; another is apparently collapsing.¹⁸ We hear disquieting rumours as to the economic outlook in France, where fuel is scarce, and the harvest—as was to be expected—disappointing.

In this country our resources are severely strained. Labour is restless—one cannot exclude the possibility of serious strikes which might completely paralyse our naval or military activity. A section of the working classes probably believes that the war is being protracted because certain people have an interest in protracting it. The situation in Ireland is precarious and full of danger. Can we look forward with confidence to the coming winter? Meanwhile every month brings us nearer to financial disaster. I am no financier, but I should like to know whether anyone who can speak with authority about finance regards our position as anything but calamitous.

And all the time the country is losing the flower of its population. We may be able to replace ships and guns, but we cannot replace the men who have lost life or limb during the past three years. I say nothing of the human suffering which is being undergone in every theatre of war by millions of brave and blameless men. But behind all our courage and tenacity—and I do not question them—there lies, it cannot be doubted, a deep-seated feeling of war weariness, and if such a feeling exists here, it is certainly not less widespread among our Allies.

It is said that all these sacrifices are worth making, and that we must go on making them because an honourable and lasting peace is not yet within sight. The terms of such a peace have been sketched out for us. There are several editions. These vary a good deal, but in all of them the conditions seem—and are indeed intended to be—such as a triumphantly victorious Power might impose upon a conquered and prostrate enemy.

Are we at all likely to find ourselves in a position to impose such terms this year or even next? I can scarcely believe it. I cannot conceive that any further success achieved on the Western front should bring Germany

¹⁸ Writing on the 20th November 1916, Sir Rennell Rodd used the following language:—'What was most to be apprehended here [at Rome] was the effect that a grave military insuccess might have on public opinion. There was a good deal to alarm such opinion. There was the difficulty of the grain supply . . . and what disturbed him even more was the financial situation. Do what they would, he did not see how they were going to raise money to carry on after next June.' We are now in November, and the 'grave military insuccess' has taken place. [Original note.]

to her knees, or that our success in any theatre or theatres of war will be such that, within any period which we can prudently anticipate, the Central Powers will accept, as a preliminary to an armistice, the whole of the conditions specified in the Allies' Note of January 10.

On the other hand there can be no doubt that there is as much war weariness in Austria and Germany as there is among the Allies. They too are exhausting their resources of men and money, and the economic pressure to which the civil population is subject is much more severe in their case than in ours. That they would grasp with avidity at any decent offer of peace can scarcely be questioned. My impression indeed is that the people of Germany and Austria would put irresistible pressure upon their Governments, and compel them to offer us decent terms, but for the success of those Governments in convincing them that decent terms are unobtainable, and that England is the sole obstacle in the way. They are told that their countries are to be crushed and humiliated, that their military spirit is to be broken, that some new form of government is to be imposed upon them, that they are to be shorn of all their colonial outlets, and that after the war they are to be commercially boycotted.

I do not suggest that these things have been said in so many words by Ministers of the Crown, but I do suggest that these are the kind of sentiments by which many ministerial speeches, and many articles in leading newspapers, have been inspired, and that it has been made easy for the German Government, by quotation from such statements, to persuade their people that it is these sentiments, and these alone, which hold the field in this country. If we could find some means of disabusing the German people of these ideas, we should, in my belief, greatly diminish the doggedness of their resistance, and greatly encourage the party which is now striving for peace in Germany.

Can anything be done? Can we indicate in the fewest possible words both what we aim at and what we do not aim at? A disclaimer as to the latter might do immense good.

Approaching the question from these points of view, I note here certain propositions which might perhaps be publicly affirmed with advantage:

- (1) We do not desire to crush either of the Central Powers, or to dismember them in order that they may be the more effectually crushed.
- (2) We do not desire to impose upon them Rulers other than Rulers of their own choice. We regard the Hohenzollern regime as responsible for this war, and we believe that with its disappearance would disappear the principal obstacle to peace; but this matter must be for the decision of the German people.
- (3) We do not desire, by any kind of commercial boycott, to destroy or paralyse the German nation as a trading community. We believe, on the contrary, that commercial intercourse with a great industrial community like Germany will, when the economic conditions of the world again become normal, be as advantageous to us as to it, but we shall take measures to protect our own trade, and to secure to ourselves, from sources on which we can depend, an adequate supply of the essential commodities.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cf. President Wilson's speech to Congress on April 2: 'We have not quarrelled with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but

- (4) We shall require the adhesion of our enemies to international arrangements designed to afford ample opportunities for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, of such a nature that they will make it impossible for any Power to provoke a sudden war until an attempt has been made to bring about a settlement by arbitration.
- (5) We note that both the Central Powers and the Government of the United States, urge that among the terms of peace a prominent place should be given to a recognition of the 'freedom of the seas': The expression is ambiguous and misleading. We are prepared to vindicate the action taken by this country in the past, but we are ready to examine in concert with other nations the great group of international problems, some of recent origin, which are connected with the issue thus raised.
- (6) Our general aims in regard to territorial readjustments have been stated (*vide* the Allies' Note of January 10, 1917).

This enumeration is a broad outline, and comprises proposals which vary in their importance. Many of them might form the subject of international discussion, but some are comparatively easy of definition and so essential in their character that no room must be left for doubt with regard to them. These are:—

- A. The complete restoration of Belgium, with adequate reparation.
- B. The restoration to France of so much of the territory taken from her in Alsace and Lorraine as she considers indispensable.
- C. The restoration of Serbia and Rumania.

It may be urged that, in fairness to our Allies, we cannot divide our demands into classes, of which some would rank before the rest. Our Allies will have to be consulted, but the reply is, I think, that events have proved that such a distinction has become inevitable. Can we, *e.g.*, contend that the Russian claims, now that Russia has apparently neither a government nor an army, are entitled to the same consideration as in 1914? The pretensions of Italy were always exorbitant, and the Italian Government would probably welcome a peace under which she might obtain only a part of the concessions upon which they insisted as the price of their adhesion to the Allied cause.

To sum up, what seems to me most necessary is that we should endeavour to convince moderate public opinion in Germany and Austria that all the moderation is not on their side. This could best be done if we could find some means of making known, not the precise terms for which we may have to press when we come to deal with the complicated territorial rearrangements which must result from the war, but, in broad outline, the kind of international settlement, economic and political, at which we aim, distinguishing between the demands which we do not regard as open to discussion (*e.g.* Belgium), and those which require further examination, probably by the light of the wishes, not yet clearly ascertained, of the populations immediately concerned [*e.g.* such demands as one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. . . . We are, let me say again, sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as an early re-establishment of intimate relations to our mutual advantage.] [*Original note.*]

that for the 'liberation of the Slavs, Rumanes and Czecho Slovaks from foreign domination' (Note of January 10, 1917)].

A diligent study of the numerous speeches which have from time to time been made by members of H.M. Government would probably show that they have in fact indicated that such a distinction is already admitted, and also that their policy in regard to the 'annihilation' of Germany does not really differ from President Wilson's, but if we are to produce a decided effect on Continental opinion it is surely desirable to focus our policy in a few concise sentences which could be textually reproduced throughout the civilised world.

It is not for me to suggest the mode in which such a statement should be made. An answer to a question in Parliament, or to a *députation*, would probably be convenient for such a purpose.

(No. 2)

LORD LANSDOWNE TO MR. BALFOUR

16th November, 1917.

Private.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

You told me I might send you a sketch of the kind of question which I thought might be put to H.M.G. in either House. Here it is.

The wording could no doubt be improved, and I am afraid you will think the moment inopportune.

You will see that I have left No. 6 (territorial aims) quite vague. This because I realise the force of your objection to singling out the claims of any particular country as ranking in front of the rest.

If a Parliamentary question is inadmissible, could you not make an opportunity of saying something of the same sort in reply to pacifist misrepresentations of our war aims?

You are, it seems to me, sure to receive another peace overture before long, and I should be greatly reassured if I knew that you would at any rate seize *that* opportunity for making clear your attitude as to the points with which I have dealt.

Yours &c.

L.

(Enclosure to No. 2)

To ask H.M. Government

Whether in order to meet the misleading statements which are constantly made as to the objects with which this country is waging war, H.M.G. are prepared to state—

(1) that they do not seek to bring about the destruction or dismemberment of either of the Central Powers;

(2) that they do not desire to impose upon those Powers any form of government other than that of their own choice;

(3) that they do not desire to destroy or paralyse those Powers as trading communities, but that they are determined to secure for this country, from sources upon which it can depend, an adequate supply of the essential commodities;

(4) that they are prepared to examine, in concert with other nations, the great group of international problems, some of recent origin, connected with the question of 'the freedom of the sea';

(5) that they will insist upon the adhesion of our enemies to an international arrangement under which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and of such a nature as to make it hereafter impossible for any Power to provoke a sudden war until an attempt has been made to bring about a peaceful solution ;

(6) that our general aims in regard to territorial questions have been stated in broad outline, that we recognise that no complete settlement of these questions can be reached without full discussion, but that such a discussion has been rendered impossible by the refusal of the Central Powers to put forward a corresponding statement of the aims which they have in view.

(No. 3)

MR. BALFOUR TO LORD LANSDOWNE

FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.1.

Thursday, 22 November 1917.

Private.

[To this is added, in Mr. Balfour's hand,
'Dictated 3 days ago but unhappily delayed.']

MY DEAR LANSDOWNE,

I do not know that this is a very suitable time for discussing peace matters. I rather think not. But I send you the following observations, for what they are worth, on the various statements which you propose to elicit from His Majesty's Government by Question in the House of Lords or by some other method.

(1) I certainly do not desire the destruction or dismemberment of Germany, if by 'Germany' is meant that part of Central Europe which properly belongs to the German people. I do not think, therefore, that the transference of Alsace-Lorraine to France, or the re-creation of so much of the historic Poland as is really Polish, constitutes dismemberment. But the Germans think differently, and this introduces the inevitable ambiguity into the proposed answer to your first question.

(2) A similar ambiguity attaches to the proposed answer to your second question. I certainly do not, for example, desire to *compel* Germany to adopt full-blown Parliamentary institutions ; but I do want to see a form of Government established in, say (German) Poland to which Germany would strongly object.

These observations, which are true of Germany, may surely be applied, 'mutatis mutandis,' to Austria also.

(3) I quite agree that we do not wish to destroy Austria and Germany as 'trading communities' ; but nothing ought to be said which hampers the attack on German commerce as a *war* measure, or (if it should prove necessary) the threat of post-war action in case Germany shows herself to be utterly unreasonable.

(4) As regards sea-power, it has to be observed : (a) that the phrase 'freedom of the sea' is extremely vague and is differently interpreted by different Powers ; (b) that the abuse of sea-power should not be distinguished, either in logic or in law, from the abuse of land-power ; and (c) that it is a subject which concerns neutrals as much, or almost as much,

as belligerents, and cannot therefore be decided at any Conference where belligerents alone are represented.

(5) This last criticism applies also to this, but of course we are all in favour of it.

(6) I am in general agreement with this, though perhaps I might be inclined to make some changes in the wording.

Did you notice something that I said at the Mansion House last Friday in my speech on Venizelos, with regard to Germany and Peace Terms ?¹⁴ I am not sure whether it was reported, but in saying it I had our conversation in mind.

Yours ever,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

(No. 4)

COPY OF MANUSCRIPT NOTE MADE BY LORD LANSDOWNE AFTER
PUBLICATION OF HIS LETTER IN THE 'DAILY TELEGRAPH'
OF NOVEMBER 29, 1917.

I had for some time been anxious to give prominence to my five points I had more than once pressed on Balfour the desirability of doing this. I had left with him a memo. [document No. 1] which we had discussed. I urged necessity of finding some means of focussing matter in a few concise sentences. I sent him my draft questions [see No. 2] as a proposal for giving effect to this. His reply [No. 3] dated 22 November, was adverse ; he dwelt on inevitable ambiguity of answers, and difficulty of an official explanation.

Our interview took place on the eve of his departure after the Primrose service on Monday.¹⁵ I agreed to abandon action in Parliament, and admitted that it might be undesirable to press the Government. I therefore proposed to put my own view before the public in the form of a letter. He did not dissuade me.¹⁶ I said that I was anxious not to publish anything misleading or which might seem unfair to the F.O., that I would gladly have shown him my draft, but that was impossible as he was to leave at 8.30 that evening. Did he object to my showing the draft to Hardinge, in order that he might tell me if the letter contained any inaccuracies ? He assented, adding 'Hardinge knows my thoughts.' I showed my letter to Hardinge.¹⁷ He made one or two suggestions not touching questions of principle. He observed that it was 'statesmanlike' and would 'do good.'

On the 28th I saw Mr. Geoffrey Robinson and told him what had passed. He refused to publish the letter in *The Times*. That evening I met Burnham in the House of Lords, told him the history of the letter, and asked him to publish it in the *Daily Telegraph*. He at once agreed. He remarked that it was 'a good letter' and that he would give it 'prominence.'

¹⁴ *Infra*, p. 384.

¹⁵ November 26.

¹⁶ In the first draft of the letter this sentence reads : 'He offered no opposition to this plan, which was mine.'

¹⁷ This was on November 27 (*vide* Lord Hardinge's letter to *The Times* of August 3, 1933).

EXTRACT FROM 'THE TIMES,' DECEMBER 1, 1917

It is authoritatively stated that the following is the view of His Majesty's Government with regard to Lord Lansdowne's letter:—

Lord Lansdowne in his letter spoke only for himself. Before writing it he did not consult, nor indeed has he been in communication with any member of the Government, His Majesty's Ministers reading it with as much surprise as did everyone else . .

EXTRACT FROM THE 'DAILY TELEGRAPH' OF NOVEMBER 29, 1917

CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIES' WAR AIMS

Letter from Lord Lansdowne

To the Editor of THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

SIR,—We are now in the fourth year of the most dreadful war the world has ever known; a war in which, as Sir W. Robertson has lately informed us, 'the killed alone can be counted by the million, while the total number of men engaged amounts to nearly 24 millions.' Ministers continue to tell us that they scan the horizon in vain for the prospect of a lasting peace. And without a lasting peace we all feel that the task we have set ourselves will remain unaccomplished.

But those who look forward with horror to the prolongation of the war, who believe that its wanton prolongation would be a crime, differing only in degree from that of the criminals who provoked it, may be excused if they too scan the horizon anxiously in the hope of discovering there indications that the outlook may not after all be so hopeless as is supposed.

The obstacles are indeed formidable enough. We are constantly reminded of one of them. It is pointed out with force that while we have not hesitated to put forward a general description of our war aims, the enemy have, though repeatedly challenged, refused to formulate theirs, and have limited themselves to vague and apparently insincere professions of readiness to negotiate with us.

The force of the argument cannot be gainsaid, but it is directed mainly to show that we are still far from agreement as to the territorial questions which must come up for settlement in connection with the terms of peace. These are, however, by no means the only questions which will arise, and it is worth while to consider whether there are not others, also of first-rate importance, with regard to which the prospects of agreement are less remote.

Let me examine one or two of these. What are we fighting for? To beat the Germans? Certainly. But that is not an end in itself. We want to inflict signal defeat upon the Central Powers, not out of mere vindictiveness, but in the hope of saving the world from a recurrence of the calamity which has befallen this generation.

What, then, is it we want when the war is over? I know of no better formula than that more than once made use of, with universal approval, by Mr. Asquith in the speeches which he has from time to time delivered. He has repeatedly told his hearers that we are waging war in order to obtain reparation and security. Both are essential, but of the two security is perhaps the more indispensable. In the way of reparation much can

no doubt be accomplished, but the utmost effort to make good all the ravages of this war must fall short of completeness, and will fail to undo the grievous wrong which has been done to humanity. It may, however, be possible to make some amends for the inevitable incompleteness of the reparation if the security afforded is, humanly speaking, complete. To end the war honourably would be a great achievement; to prevent the same curse falling upon our children would be a greater achievement still.

This is our avowed aim, and the magnitude of the issue cannot be exaggerated. For, just as this war has been more dreadful than any war in history, so we may be sure would the next war be more dreadful than this. The prostitution of science for purposes of pure destruction is not likely to stop short. Most of us, however, believe that it should be possible to secure posterity against the repetition of such an outrage as that of 1914. If the powers will, under a solemn pact, bind themselves to submit future disputes to arbitration, if they will undertake to outlaw, politically and economically, any one of their number which refuses to enter into such a pact, or to use their joint military and naval forces for the purpose of coercing a power which breaks away from the rest, they will, indeed, have travelled far along the road which leads to security.

We are, at any rate, right to put security in the front line of our peace demands, and it is not unsatisfactory to note that in principle there seems to be complete unanimity upon this point.

In his speech at the banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, on May 28, 1916, President Wilson spoke strongly in favour of

'A universal association of nations . . . to prevent any war from being begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the cause to the opinion of the world.'

Later in the same year the German Chancellor, at the sitting of the Main Committee of the Reichstag, used the following language:

'When, as after the termination of the war, the world will fully realise its horrible devastation of blood and treasure, then through all mankind will go the cry for peaceful agreements and understandings which will prevent, so far as is humanly possible, the return of such an immense catastrophe. This cry will be so strong and so justified that it must lead to a result. Germany will honourably co-operate in investigating every attempt to find a practical solution and collaborate towards its possible realisation.'

The Papal Note communicated to the Powers in August last places in the front rank:

'The establishment of arbitration on lines to be concerted and with the sanction to be settled against any State that refuses either to submit international disputes to arbitration or to accept its awards.'

This suggestion was immediately welcomed by the Austrian Government, which declared that it was conscious of the importance for the promotion of peace of the method proposed by His Holiness, viz., 'to submit international disputes to compulsory arbitration,' and that it was prepared to enter into negotiations regarding this proposal. Similar language was used by Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in his declaration on foreign policy made at Budapest in October, when he mentioned as one of the 'fundamental bases' of peace that of 'obligatory international arbitration.'

In his despatch covering the Allied Note of Jan. 10, 1917, Mr. Balfour

mentions as one of the three conditions essential to a durable peace the condition that

'Behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction might be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor.'

Such sanction would probably take the form of coercion applied in one of two modes. The 'aggressor' would be disciplined either by the pressure of naval and military strength, or by the denial of commercial access and facilities.

The proceedings of the Paris Conference show that we should not shrink from such a denial, if we were compelled to use the weapon for purposes of self-defence. But while a commercial 'boycott' would be justifiable as a war measure, and while the threat of a 'boycott,' in case Germany should show herself utterly unreasonable, would be a legitimate threat, no reasonable man would, surely, desire to destroy the trade of the Central Powers, if they will, so to speak, enter into recognizances to keep the peace, and do not force us into a conflict by a hostile combination. Commercial war is less ghastly in its immediate results than the war of armed forces, but it would certainly be deplorable after three or four years of sanguinary conflict in the field, a conflict which has destroyed a great part of the wealth of the world, and permanently crippled its resources, the Powers were to embark upon commercial hostilities certain to retard the economic recovery of all the nations involved.

That we shall have to secure ourselves against the fiscal hostility of others, that we shall have to prevent the recurrence of the conditions under which, when the war broke out, we found ourselves short of essential commodities, because we had allowed certain industries, and certain sources of supply, to pass entirely under the control of our enemies, no one will doubt, subject however to this reservation, that it will surely be for our interest that the stream of trade should, so far as our own fiscal interests permit, be allowed to flow strong and uninterrupted in its natural channels.

There remains the question of territorial claims. The most authoritative statement of these is to be found in the Allies' Note of Jan. 10, 1917. This statement must obviously be regarded as a broad outline of the desiderata of the Allies, but is anyone prepared to argue that the sketch is incomplete, or that it may not become necessary to re-examine it?

Mr. Asquith, speaking at Liverpool in October last, used the following language:

'No one pretends that it would be right or opportune for either side to formulate an ultimatum, detailed, exhaustive, precise, with clauses and sub-clauses, which is to be accepted *verbatim et literatim*, chapter and verse, as the indispensable preliminary and condition of peace.

'There are many things,' he added, 'in a world-wide conflict such as this, which must of necessity be left over for discussion and negotiation, for accommodation and adjustment, at a later stage.'

It is surely most important that this wise counsel should be kept in mind. Some of our original desiderata have probably become unattainable. Others would probably now be given a less prominent place than when they were first put forward. Others again, notably the reparation due to Belgium, remain, and must always remain, in the front rank, but when it comes to the wholesale re-arrangement of the map of South-

Eastern Europe we may well ask for a suspension of judgment and for the elucidation which a frank exchange of views between the Allied Powers can alone afford.

For all these questions concern our Allies as well as ourselves, and if we are to have an Allied Council for the purpose of adapting our strategy in the field to the ever shifting developments of the war it is fair to assume that, in the matter of peace terms also, the Allies will make it their business to examine, and if necessary to revise, the territorial requirements.

Let me end by explaining why I attach so much importance to these considerations. We are not going to lose this war, but its prolongation will spell ruin to the civilized world, and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world that has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them?

In my belief, if the war is to be brought to a close in time to avert a world-wide catastrophe it will be brought to a close because on both sides the peoples of the countries involved realise that it has already lasted too long.

There can be no question that this feeling prevails extensively in Germany, Austria and Turkey. We know beyond doubt that the economic pressure in those countries far exceeds any to which we are subject here. Ministers inform us in their speeches of 'constant efforts' on the part of the Central Powers 'to initiate peace talk.' (Sir E. Geddes at the Mansion House, Nov. 9.)

If the peace talk is not more articulate, and has not been so precise as to enable His Majesty's Government to treat it seriously, the explanation is probably to be found in the fact, first, that German despotism does not tolerate independent expressions of opinion, and second, that the German Government has contrived, probably with success, to misrepresent the aims of the Allies, which were supposed to include the destruction of Germany, the imposition upon her of a form of government decided by her enemies, her destruction as a great commercial community, and her exclusion from the free use of the seas.

An immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany if it were understood:

(1) That we do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a Great Power;

(2) That we do not seek to impose upon her people any form of government other than that of their own choice;

(3) That, except as a legitimate war measure, we have no desire to deny to Germany her place among the great commercial communities of the world;

(4) That we are prepared, when the war is over, to examine in concert with other powers the group of international problems, some of them of recent origin, which are connected with the question of 'the freedom of the seas';

(5) That we are prepared to enter into an international pact under which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

I am under the impression that authority could be found for most of these propositions in Ministerial speeches. Since the above lines were

written, (1), (2) and (3) have been dealt with by our own Foreign Minister at the public meeting held in honour of M. Venizelos at the Mansion House.¹⁸ The question of 'the freedom of the seas' was amongst those raised at the outset by our American Allies. The formula is an ambiguous one, capable of many inconsistent interpretations, and I doubt whether it will be seriously contended that there is no room for profitable discussion.

That an attempt should be made to bring about the kind of pact suggested in (5) is, I believe, common ground to all the belligerents, and probably to all the neutral Powers.

If it be once established that there are no insurmountable difficulties in the way of agreement upon these points, the political horizon might perhaps be scanned with better hope by those who pray, but can at this moment hardly venture to expect, that the new year may bring us a lasting and honourable peace.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
LANSDOWNE.

Lansdowne House,
Nov. 28.

¹⁸ The meeting in question had taken place on November 16. Mr. Balfour was reported as saying: 'The destruction of the German Empire has never been a war aim of the Entente Powers. The destruction or injuring of German trade is not a war end; it is a war measure, and a most legitimate war measure. We recognize fully that each nation should be allowed to make for itself the government which suits its history, its character and its ideals' (*The Times*, November 17, 1917).

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXXXVI—APRIL 1934

REFLECTIONS ON FASCISM

REACTIONS are often salutary, but they are liable to abuse, and the reaction against nineteenth-century complacency is surely being carried too far. Admittedly it was a humorous, and perhaps remunerative, idea to gull a credulous public into believing that West African negroes are exponents of the highest ideals in sculpture and painting. But the jest is now stale, and irrationality, as exemplified by sundry modern cults in literature and the Group Movement in religion, is becoming somewhat boring. Indeed, the high-priests of decadence are finding it more and more difficult to persuade the rising generation to show enthusiasm for negroid culture, and in due course Nature, as Montesquieu remarked about an unpleasant feature of contemporary society, will reassert her sway.

The reaction against democracy is, however, a more serious matter, since it touches closely the future development of the whole human race, and may well reverse the process whereby the status of humanity has been attained. Biologists of the present day, though far from accepting all the extensions of Darwin's

theory which were popular in the last century, are at least agreed that evolution must be the raw material of their work, and there is among them an increasing readiness to believe that the process is purposive in some way not yet fully appreciated. Many of us laymen, who have not a scientific reputation to uphold, have long been prepared to venture much further in this matter, and to believe that the human race has already begun to take the first steps in an evolution which transcends the biological. Hitherto we have not dared to state that belief openly, since we feared that it would be roughly torn to pieces by the scientists. The new physics, however, seems to imply that our faith may be held without incurring ridicule from the latter, and we are thus emboldened to confess it in a world which is dying for want of a faith. I am old enough to remember the days when one had to profess mechanistic determinism or be written down a fool. But to read Ernst Haeckel to-day is like taking a plunge into the Middle Ages, and we can now almost imagine the Royal Society refusing to confer its Fellowship upon a physicist on the ground that he does not appreciate poetry and the synoptic gospels.

The reader will, I trust, understand that, in what has been set down above, I have not been making crude and unjustifiable deductions from quantum theory and the principle of indeterminacy in atomic physics, both of which must withstand a generation of criticism before they can be regarded as fully and correctly formulated. We are not here concerned with the shape and colour of individual tesserae of the new physics, but rather with the complete picture, of which each forms an infinitesimal though essential part, and which is already beginning to appear as the skilful craftsmen piece together its components.

Before the days of Copernicus man was the spoilt child of the Creator. His earth was the centre of the whole universe, the sun was hung overhead for the sole purpose of giving him warmth and light, and the stars were spangled over the sky to amuse him. Unfortunate angels were condemned to perpetual toil in moving these heavenly bodies about the firmament for his edification, and he was in every way lord of creation. But, before Isaac Newton died, man had fallen from his high estate. He had become an entirely insignificant speck of dust upon a speck of dust, so ephemeral that a single instant covers the time between his first appearance and his final extinction. And now once more the scientists have broken up the mosaic in order to construct a new picture in which, although man's physical existence dwindles to a thing of less and less importance, his mind begins to play a larger and larger part in deciding the lines and colours of the universe. From relativity physics a new gnosticism is emerging,

and already it has become not entirely foolish to suggest tentatively that man may ultimately deprive the physical universe of its objectivity and become its overlord by knowing it as entirely subject. To our non-human ancestors the world was purely object. To us it has become partly subject, and, if there be one end to which the whole creation moves, it cannot be other than the apotheosis of man, who, when his world has lost all trace of objectivity, necessarily has eternal life.

I do not put forward these suggestions dogmatically or as formulated by myself unaided. For they appear to be implied in much of what has been written by physicists and philosophers of the present day. It would, indeed, be no great exaggeration if one were to say that ideas of this nature are becoming the foundation of faith for many thinking men and women of our time. Certainly, in a universe which, if known only as object, will ultimately drag us down with its own dissolution into a state of maximum entropy, there would appear to be no other meaning and no other hope.

Evolution, in its biological aspect, appears to derive its motive power from material desire, and tends to the production of a race of beings in whom acquisitive efficiency reaches higher and higher development, till it culminates in the true Nietzschean superman who is the proprietor of all the wealth, and the husband of all the women, in the world, the rest of humanity existing merely to be ordered about by him. The morbid wish to become a superman of this type is, of course, common among those who suffer from some physical defect, or who realise that, deservedly or undeservedly, they are regarded with strong distaste by their fellow-men. It never affects those who feel sure of themselves, who are well occupied with useful and interesting work, and who are blessed with many and candid friends. It is extremely rare among pure-bred Englishmen, but common among Semites and Celts, who are prone to imagine that others despise them when, as a matter of fact, those others are not thinking about them at all.

Under the conditions of the present day the Nietzschean superman, to establish and maintain his position, must persuade his victims, first, that man lives by bread alone, and, secondly, that bread will not be forthcoming unless he is implicitly obeyed, and his Five-Year Plan (or corporate State, or whatever he chooses to call it) worshipped with quasi-religious fervour. Success in this policy necessitates the ruthless destruction of any man who raises objection to its gross materialism, and gradually all freedom and all originality are eliminated from the human race. At the best, we reach the stagnant perfection of the bee-hive. At the worst, we slip back to the jungle and begin to grow tails. This, at the least is certain—Bolshevism and Fascism are essen-

tially reversionary. In other words, they are what our ancestors were accustomed to call the Devil.

An evolutionary process, therefore, which is based upon self-assertion must ultimately reach a point where it doubles back upon itself, thus leading to a meaningless recurrence which continues to repeat itself until cosmic degradation makes an end of the sorry farce. And I would suggest to the reader that humanity has now reached the point at which it must make its choice. For more than 2000 years grave warnings have been issued, first in India, then in Athens, thereafter in Palestine, and again in Assisi. Indeed, the time seems to be ripe for a new revelation and a new prophet. For my part I do not expect anything so spectacular, but rather a growing consciousness among our young people that they must act at once, or they will be too late. An evolutionary process has raised us from the animal to the human. But, unless its motive power is completely changed, we shall return to the beast, although we might now advance from the human to the divine if, as the prophets of the past have told us, we were to substitute self-suppression for self-assertion in all material matters.

It would appear, then, that the issue will shortly be joined between those who look forward to a future for mankind which is full of hope and those who, being pagan, have no hope and admit no reality in any except material values. The latter class is in the ascendant to-day over great areas of the world, where the idea is sedulously inculcated that material security can be attained only by establishing a mass-mind and destroying individual minds, thus definitely putting a stop to all that we regard as progress. I am not one who attributes to the late war the sudden accentuation of the struggle between the herd and the individual. Indeed, I have an inclination to regard that incident of history as little more than a preliminary skirmish. It is just possible that the main campaign may be fought by the pitting of mind against mind; but the present condition of the world would appear to render a physical contest more probable. And I think that the reader will agree that, if it comes to fighting, England must take the lead. Certainly, if the challenge is not taken up, we must regard the present human race as no longer in the main current of evolution, but rather doomed to be superseded by some other stock, and ultimately to perish or degenerate as so many species have done in the past.

That England must be the leader in this struggle to keep humanity from reverting or becoming extinct is obvious. Until recently our country has been almost entirely resistant to the infection of Bolshevism and Fascism. The former has for years endeavoured to impose itself upon our people without success. Our stock is fairly sound, and Oriental diabolism fails to attract

our fellow-countrymen. Indeed, it is more than doubtful whether they could understand the philosophy of Bolshevism if it were presented to them. Sir S. Cripps appears to be the only prominent Englishman who wishes to pay allegiance to the Vicar of Satan seated on the throne of Peter the Great. And the trade unions are obviously becoming weary of acting the rôle of the cat's-paw of Socialism and of supplying the funds and the energy required to establish successful lawyers as their Marxian task-masters.

But though Bolshevism seems to wither away in the fresh air of England, one must admit with shame that our country has of late been slightly infected with another foreign disease of a somewhat similar nature, though masquerading as its antithesis. Fascism and Bolshevism are, of course, essentially the same in their ultimate development, and both have their origin in the minds of men who, rightly or wrongly, have had to endure the contempt and dislike of the society into which they have been born. Heaven knows that the code of the English gentleman is none too high; but at least he does draw the line somewhere and deprives of their caste those who, refusing to play the game themselves, take advantage of the fact that most of us try to observe the rules. Civilised life is impossible without the voluntary suppression of innate selfishness, and men who pursue their ambitions in an utterly selfish manner are regarded as pariahs. These men who have lost their caste are dangerous, particularly where they have enough intelligence to recognise how just is the public opinion which has put them beyond the pale. They are consumed with a mad lust to dominate. Unable to gain either the respect or affection of their fellows, they are determined to destroy the code against which they have offended. Hence they find it necessary to introduce ideas from foreign countries. For the general idea of what constitutes a gentleman is in England common to marquis and miner, and the latter, no less than the former, despises what is theatrical, boastful, selfish, cruel, and dishonest.

Fascism is, then, the modern reaction against the code of conduct which has hitherto tacitly been accepted by Englishmen. It involves a complete break with all our most cherished traditions, and the surrender of every liberty for which our ancestors fought and died. It is of alien origin and suited only to those who have lost faith, not only in the future of humanity as a whole, but particularly in that form of civilisation which has hitherto been our pride as a nation. It is based upon the grovelling subservience of little bullies to the arch-bully. Briefly, it is the apotheosis of the cad.

That it constitutes a danger to the nation at the present juncture is obvious. For it is now becoming evident that, despite

the success of the Government in relieving the country from a considerable part of the burden of the war debts, and its partial success in sundry other matters, a General Election held at the present time would almost certainly be followed by a Socialist Administration. And, unless some critical and manifest danger confronts the nation in the early part of 1936, the same disaster probably awaits us after an election held at that date. The word 'disaster' is not used lightly in this connexion. For it must be borne in mind that those of us who are responsible for providing security of occupation and a living wage for our fellow-citizens were well aware in 1929 that the national finances would ultimately and inevitably be reduced to a state of ruin by a Government manned by persons utterly incapable of handling the affairs of the nation. But no one attempted to forestall or to discount the coming ruin. We all waited for the crash, hoping that some unforeseen event might enable us to avoid it, or that the logical outcome of Socialist administration might by some miracle be averted. In the fulness of time, however, the crash came, and it is hardly to be expected that the re-establishment of the conditions which made ruin certain will not produce an immediate panic, particularly in view of the openly expressed intention of Sir S. Cripps and others who have lost their caste to introduce the 'spoils' system into our political life in full measure.

It is, therefore, not impossible that the complete breakdown of civilised life, which, as the recent history of Italy, Germany, Russia, and Austria has shown, follows upon the destruction of national capital by Socialism, will make starvation a very present danger for the workers. Men and women will, as in the countries named above, be in doubt as to whether to-morrow's dinner will be forthcoming, and will gladly exchange personal and political liberty for anything approaching material security. Thus any ambitious man, who can make them believe in his power to give them food, has an opportunity of enslaving the whole nation. This, of course, is what the Fascists count upon, and if the coming General Election is followed by a Socialist Administration, civil war is almost inevitable. For, although the people of England have, ever since 1906, been subjected to political influences designed to destroy their manhood and their love of liberty, I am convinced that there are still enough of them who will not tamely submit to the domination of men whose whole outlook is utterly un-English and far more in accord with Semitic or other Oriental ideals.

In this connexion we may note, in passing, the amusing fact that our local Black-Shirts are said to owe much to the support of a wealthy old woman who is conspicuous for the extremes to which she carries that flag-waving hysteria which, to the un-

educated, is patriotism. We see an immense fortune lavishly dispensed by the right hand of its owner to exalt everything English, until we, who have fought for England, hide our heads in shame, and by her left hand to foster the spread of alien ideas loathsome to every real English man and woman. There are, indeed, many people who, in their terror and hatred of Communism, give their support to Fascism without realising that it is exactly the same thing under another name. I have given careful and prolonged consideration to the matter, but I still fail to perceive that submitting to Sir O. Mosley would be any less a degradation than submitting to Sir S. Cripps, or *vice versa*. For my part I may say, if I am for once permitted to use the vernacular, that I would see them both in hell first. Indeed, if all goes well, I may.

The policy of the present Government does not seem likely to avert these dangers. Its much-advertised Slum Clearance Scheme will certainly not help it at the coming General Election. The principle of that scheme is that people who inhabit slums are necessarily in some way of peculiar merit deserving reward. They are to be rewarded by being given houses largely at the expense of those who, by their own efforts, have hitherto avoided becoming slum-dwellers and who now, as a result of the added burden, will be depressed just a little below the level of modest comfort to which they have attained. But the Conservative Party must, indeed, be unsophisticated if it imagines that, by this policy, it will be able to purchase a single vote from the quondam slum-dweller. For, naturally, the Socialists will make a higher bid. The Conservatives will not even get the votes of the building-trade workers, who, as experience of State housing schemes has repeatedly shown, get away with the lion's share of the plunder. For they will never forget that it was Conservative influence which put an end to the glorious era of Dr. Addison, when Great Britain was handed over to the building trade to be sacked. Though Mr. Chamberlain's housing subsidies restored to some extent the right to loot, yet even those reduced sources of unearned increment were cut off within a few years. The half-hearted attempts at political corruption made from time to time by the Conservatives are simply ludicrous when compared with the full-blooded bribery of the Socialists, and it is doubtful whether the former have ever gained a single vote by deliberate dishonesty.

Mr. Elliot's agricultural policy, of course, prepares the ground equally well for either Fascism or Communism. It must, however, be admitted that the Government's Unemployment Bill undoubtedly tends to restore political stability, since it seeks to a certain extent to draw a distinction between the deserving and the undeserving. But, taking a broad view of the matter, one is

forced to the unwelcome conclusion that a Socialist Government will possibly be in office within two years, and that we shall then have to fight the Fascists within a few months, since an attempt by Socialists to use the armed forces of the Crown to suppress Fascism would result in chaos.

In considering this question of civil war against the Fascists in this country, one is at the outset confronted with the question whether there is really any valid reason for wishing to preserve political liberty. Democracy has certainly failed to prove itself an efficient or dignified method of government, and is undoubtedly an extremely difficult system to preserve, since it continuously engenders the microbes which are most fatal to it. It is likely to be but a memory within the next few years everywhere except in England.

In the earlier part of this essay I endeavoured to show reason for preserving individual liberty in order to render possible further evolutionary progress. And, in the narrower and national aspect of the case, there is much to be said for the policy of maintaining a democratic Constitution. Many arguments in favour of doing so will occur to the reader. But I would add one which, though of doubtful logical cogency, has in actual practice some validity. Engrained in our nation is the love of sport. And sport may be defined as the endeavour to do superlatively well something which is extremely difficult, offers no hope of ulterior gain, and is beyond the capacity of other people. If this definition is accepted, our reputation as sportsmen would be seriously lowered by our failure to preserve political liberty in England when it has vanished from every other country in the world.

But whether logic and reason pronounce in favour of fighting for freedom or condemn such action as irrational, the fact remains that we are going to fight for it. The most patient among us have a conception of a point beyond which we will not endure the aggressive insolence of any man, and the Fascist appears to be approaching very near to that limit. So long as the law deals effectively with such persons, peace will be maintained. But if the law fails to do so, there will be war.

It would appear, then, that a very grave responsibility rests upon the Government of the country in this matter. There must be unceasing vigilance on the part of the Home Office, so that not even the slightest infraction of the law escapes punishment. It may be necessary to put the law into motion against Communists and others, who have not hitherto been deemed worth powder and shot, merely in order to maintain the principle of impartiality. The faintest sign of weakness or hesitation on the part of the constituted authorities would precipitate a conflict which would quickly get beyond their control. If existing

powers are inadequate, new powers must be obtained from Parliament without delay. Even if the Government, where the necessity arises, acts promptly and fearlessly, it is by no means certain that its utmost efforts will succeed in averting civic strife. For, in some instances, it will be dealing with persons whose moral skins are of impenetrable coarseness and thickness, and who can only be brought to reason by punctures in their physical hides. Young professional boxers from Whitechapel are extremely fearless when hammering Communists ignorant of the art of boxing. But it is by no means certain that they would face fire with equal gallantry. Indeed, recollection of certain instances which came under my notice, when serving in the ranks of the Army during the war, leads me to doubt it.

To sum up the whole matter, it is unfortunately true that the situation presents certain dangers which may become critically acute if the Socialists gain a majority at the next General Election, as may well be the case, since the Conservative Party is a past-master of the art of swinging the pendulum. But it is useless to go out to meet trouble, and for the present it is clearly the duty, no less than the interest, of every Englishman, who wishes to keep his country free from alien influences, to support and encourage the Government in its task of administering the law firmly and perhaps ruthlessly. The danger may then pass, the septic infection being absorbed and neutralised in the great healthy body of tradition and common-sense which constitutes our England. At the same time, it would clearly be unwise to neglect to have the risk underwritten. In the case of a ship which, it is anticipated, may be scuttled, I am inclined to think that the insured risk would be considerably reduced if the underwriters were to let it be understood that the man who opens the sea-cocks will have to face something more than cross-examination in the court.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

WAR AND WESTERN CIVILISATION

NEVER in the whole course of modern history—that is, during the last 150 years—has peace been more desirable than to-day ; and yet never during this tremendous period has the word 'War' been so constantly upon our lips. Wherever we turn we hear the whisper of war ; it hisses in our ears as once did the name of 'Satan.' It is the obsession under which we live, the incubus which inhabits our minds. A nightmare world surrounds us, in which we are too terrified to awake, lest the phantasms of darkness should take upon themselves tangible forms and strangle us in their insanity. Being a soldier, it may be considered that I am not an impartial witness. That, having been trained for war, educated for it, girt round and about with its idea, I am of all people the least likely to cast out this devil. If so, I disagree, for as a physician is best qualified to discuss medicine, and a surgeon surgery, so should a soldier be able to talk with authority upon his life's work.

First, I want the reader to realise that war in itself is a force which is neither good nor evil ; it is a human activity which, like all other such activities, depends for its goodness or its wickedness upon the goal set before it by the mind of man. To anathematise war is to sink back into witchcraft ; to outlaw, to exorcise, or to lay it under interdict is to delude ourselves with spells and rely upon the barbaric invocations of the sorcerers. We cannot exorcise a human activity unless we first exorcise ourselves, our minds. Burnings, drownings and rackings, carried on for centuries, through their insanity stimulated the insanity of witchcraft, and it was not until the human mind could think sanely about this moral pestilence that sorcery grew thin and ultimately faded away. It was the light of reason, and not the magic of ignorance, which accomplished this miracle.

Love is a human force, and, like war, it can create and it can destroy. It is the foundation of our lives, yet also, like an earthquake, it can shatter them. It is not in itself good or evil, but powerful, full of energy. It can make the happy home or the degraded courtesan. Can love be exorcised and laid under interdict ? It has been often attempted, and has invariably led

to misery and vice. And so with war—we can outlaw it ; but if we attempt to do so we shall outlaw our reason, and shall become magicians in a black art, and in the end our spells will recoil upon our own heads.

Better abandon this easy and phantasmal way ; better strike out on that narrow and more difficult path of self-control. It is civil workers, and not I and my like, who make wars, and though wars are fought with weapons they are generated by ideas. As long as we are not masters of our thoughts, as long as we are controlled by our emotions, as long as we are swayed by the herd spirit, as long as we refuse to be free individuals, self-controlled, creative men and women, so long will wars continue, whether soldiers are armed with rifles or with broomsticks. It is human lack of sanity which engenders wars, which creates lust and which evolves witchcraft. The mob is always latently insane if not actually so. The panacea for war is self-knowledge and self-control. When the individual once again emerges from out the amorphous mass of greeds, wonders, fears, strugglings and hypocrisies, which we so often mistake for civilisation, then will a new ideal be born and with it the civilisation for which we all yearn.

There have been righteous wars as well as evil ones, because this world is inhabited by both the righteous and the wicked. There have been wars of creation as well as of destruction, and wars of liberation as well as of subjugation. Ruskin, a great individualist, a man whose ideas flamed into millions of brains, a peace-lover and an artist, once said before a gathering of young soldiers :

We talk of peace and learning, and peace and plenty, and of peace and civilisation ; but I found that those were not the words which the Muse of History coupled together : that, on her lips, the words were—peace, and sensuality—peace, and selfishness—peace, and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned the truth of word, and strength of thought, in war ; that they were nourished in war ; and wasted by peace ; taught by war, and deceived by peace ; trained by war, and betrayed by peace ; in a word, that they were born in war, and expired in peace.

Again he said :

You may imagine that your work is wholly foreign to and separate from mine. So far from that, all the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war ; no great art ever yet rose on earth but among a nation of soldiers. There is no art among a shepherd people, if it remains at peace. There is no art among an agricultural people, if it remains at peace. Commerce is barely consistent with fine art ; but cannot produce it. Manufacture not only is unable to produce it ; but invariably destroys whatever seeds of it exist. There is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based on battle.

These may seem to us strange words, for they glorify war. But what kind of war ? This is the question we should ask ourselves.

Certainly not a war like the last one; and this is definitely answered by the peace which has followed the war, the age in which we live. Here we can see no art, only a bastardisation of art: mechanised negro noises; sculptures which bring out all that is bestial in men and women; pictures which only appeal to the intellect by perplexing the imagination, and a literature largely written round a diseased psychology: a dissolution of art, a sinking into the mud of the macabre, the grotesque and the animal.

The war which Ruskin is referring to is the war of the hero and of the heroic. He pours out his wrath upon what he calls 'the rage of a barbarian wolf-flock,' the herd or mass struggle. The surgings of conscripted labour just as much as of conscript soldiers horrify him, because they crush out freedom and heroism—the individual is obliterated in the mob. To him a noble war is a war of individual self-sacrifice as well as of national self-defence. His soldiers are men of faith who are willing to sacrifice their lives for an ideal and not merely risk them for a better living: who fight for God, or for reason, or for freedom, or for what they believe to be righteous; not men who buy the masses with gold, and by promising them more gold seek to gain yet more gold for themselves.

We see, therefore, that war is not only a product but a reflection of what we call civilisation. If a civilisation is sensual, greedy and selfish—that is to say, if it is diseased—there are but two alternatives: either each individual man or woman who is girt round by it must cease to be greedy, sensual and selfish—that is, must war against the diseases which inhibit him or her, and which through the individual pollute the mass—or else, that corrupted civilisation must be wiped out by war itself. Let us remember this: civilisations are always crashing, yet civilisation goes on seeking to establish the freedom of the individual, spiritual, intellectual, moral and economic, in an ordered, cultural whole which we call the State. Freedom does not mean doing what we like or living how we like, but doing what we believe to be right, and living in the faith that before us rolls a better world to be conquered.

War, using this word in its common meaning, is not a disease, but the climax of a disease—the fever begotten by a poison. As a friend of mine well puts it: 'Moral disunion produces discontent, discontent equals potential war; therefore the degree of moral disunion within any society will equal the potential of war within that society.' There we have the whole matter in a nutshell. Discontent, in some form or another, is the cause of war, and if discontent is noble in nature so will war be noble; and if ignoble, war will follow suit.

If we wish to eliminate war we must turn to discontent, which at bottom is a moral problem. A hundred years ago Thomas Carlyle, one of our greatest prophets, wrote:

Call ye that a Society . . . where there is no longer any Social idea extant; not so much as the Idea of a common Home, but only of a common overcrowded Lodging-house? Where each, isolated, regardless of his neighbours, clutches what he can get, and cries 'Mine!' and calls it Peace, because in the cut-purse and cut-throat scramble, no steel knives, but only a far cunninger sort, can be employed?

And after this hundred years has elapsed, I turn to an American historian, Mr. Hoffman Nickerson, the friend I have just quoted from; he says:

Far from being able to prevent future wars, Europe cannot even put an end to the last one; the Franco-German clash is as definite as ever, the only difference is that for the moment it is waged with intrigue and gold instead of bayonets and high explosives.

Between these two quotations, the first published in 1833 and the second in 1933, lurks the period which we still call 'Western Civilisation'—an age of coal and steam, amazing power, fear, greed, strife and hypocrisy: an age in which faith foundered and gave way to law, in which religion was replaced by nationalism, worth by wealth, and in which law has led to chaos.

Materially, this age was and still is an awe-inspiring one: an age of titanic strugglings in a spiritually blind night. It is the age of Darwin, of Marx, of Nietzsche and of Bismarck: an age of great demoniacal men followed by chaotic multitudes which, lacking faith in God and in themselves, can for a time only be kept in leash by fanaticism and emotionalism. For the millions life is sterile, uncomfortable and dangerous, and so, to consolidate nations, hate between nations is introduced as the all-compelling Satanic force. Because of foreign terror a nation is kept in a pseudo-peace at home, and when war eventually comes, as in these circumstances it must, under the hypnotic power of orator and Press, massed millions fed on fanaticism sink into the lowest depths of animalism, and for no individual reason tear each other to pieces.

From 1871 onwards we enter the World War epoch, for no sooner had France surrendered to Germany than potentially the World War began. Nationalism was now in the greater part consolidated, and to it was added a general industrialisation. For just a hundred years these islands of ours had been the workshop of Europe. Until 1815 our markets were insignificant, but, thanks to the ravages of the Napoleonic Wars, they soon commanded Europe. Then we set about to scour the world for raw materials. Our industrial progress was amazing, and, though

it carried with it many benefits, it was unbalanced, creating a soulless type of feudalism, for the baron and his serf were replaced by the manufacturer and what has been called his wage-slave—that is to say, a worker nominally free, though in actuality bound hand and foot by an economic system which offered him no alternative between mass-work (loss of individuality) and starvation (loss of life). In these years social discontent, with its inevitable resultant political agitation, was sown like dragon's teeth in our civilisation.

After 1871 there came a change. German coal, fertilised by French gold, just as the gold of Bengal seized by Clive had fertilised our coal a hundred years earlier, started Germany off on the path of industrialisation, and soon brought her into competition with ourselves and other countries. A period of intense activity is now entered. To protect her infant manufactures Germany entrenched them firmly behind tariff walls, and then from her economic castles she sallied forth to capture the markets of the world. In their turn these economic strongholds demanded armies to protect them, armies which without firing a shot can become formidable instruments of diplomatic aggression. To shoot a man and then go through his pockets may be called war and plunder; but is not it equally an act of war to achieve this same end by holding him up with an unloaded pistol? Yet one is called 'barbaric' and the other 'civilised'; such is the hypocrisy upon which the generation which preceded the World War was fed.

Meanwhile, competition between European nations forced them to seek foreign sources of supply; and so it happens that between 1875 and 1900 we see one of the most extraordinary movements since the days of the Crusades. Africa is overrun and becomes a satrapy of Europe; the Pacific Islands are swallowed up and the tentacles of the European octopus creep over eastern, western, and southern Asia. In these few years we acquired 4,754,000 square miles of territory inhabited by 88,000,000 people; France 3,584,000 square miles and 37,000,000 people; Germany 1,026,000 square miles and 17,000,000 people whilst Belgium, 11,000 square miles in extent, annexed the Congo territory—seventy-seven times her size!

We may call this 'brigandage' if we like; but if we do, do not let us be obsessed by this word, and do not let us use it as we would an anathema, for if we do we shall be swept off our reason and fall back upon witchcraft, with its spells and incantations. As Prometheus stole the divine flame from heaven and brought it down to mankind, a flame which could create, transform or destroy, so did we Europeans carry into Africa and Asia the power of industrialisation which was far from being solely

a Pandora box. If any of us imagine that in this life it is possible to accomplish good without any evil resulting, then, in my opinion, our proper place is not in this world, but the next. We are told that Christ died for us; yet how many innocent people have died horrible deaths because He did so? To such of us as are Christians, do we wish that He had renounced His sacrifice so that these evils might have been avoided? To all of us, whatever be our faith, surely it should be apparent that to us finite and imperfect beings there can be no right without wrong, and no wrong without some right. This is not only one of the mysteries of life, but one of the profoundest problems in war.

When the war came in 1914, what manner of war was it? Before answering this question, let us remember what form of peacefulness preceded it. Since 1871 it had been a peace of gigantic construction. Based on science, which in its turn springs from the rational faculty in man, industry had transformed the world and was daily transforming it. It had girdled the world with invisible chains and was fast consolidating it into an economic unit, commercially an interdependent whole. Out of this evolution a new form of democracy emerged—a democracy based on the ignorance and emotions of the masses. As the franchise was extended, as trade unionism and socialism arose, the *bourgeois* oligarchy, which had replaced the aristocratic Governments of the eighteenth century, began to crumble, power passing from the industrialists to the workers and thinkers, many of whom had suffered under their rule. The result was an outburst of humanitarianism, of unbalanced emotionalism, of hysteria, which, in place of flowing into the new and as yet shallow channels of economic internationalism, rushed into the deep gullies and ravines which a hundred years of nationalism had cut here, there, and everywhere on the continent of Europe.

The result was a twofold one: a pseudo-internationalism which set class against class—the poor against the wealthy—and an excessive nationalism which set nations against each other. As the world was constituted in 1913, two courses only seem to have been open to its civilised nations—namely, internal revolutions or external wars. To those in power, obviously the first meant extermination; consequently, in actual fact, war—that is, international conflict—was inevitable. When this conflict came the whole of the internal discontents of each nation solidified round its self-preservation and, like a projectile, was fired against its enemies. Everything was turned upside down. The rational faculty, which had built up the new industrial age, was, as it were, by the wand of some black magician transformed into a howling, emotional, irrational beast whose one purpose was to

destroy what science and industry had built up. It was no longer a question of defeating armies and fleets—the aristocratic conception of war—but of annihilating nations, of attacking man, woman and child, of destroying manufactories and of devastating entire regions. It was typically a war of the 'barbarian wolf-flock.'

The war was never won; it collapsed through exhaustion. This is one reason why it has not yet ended. The period which separates us from it is no more than a pause in hostilities. No sooner was the Armistice signed, than the delirium of the war was carried into the Peace Treaties, the inner object of which was to ruin the world, not on the haphazard system improvised during the war, but on a planned system in which the victors set out systematically to destroy the vanquished by strangling them economically. One thing which the war had shown beyond doubt was that the civilised world and much of the so-called barbaric were economically interdependent. This meant that world recovery was impossible unless all parts of the world were economically strong and healthy. To maintain a starving Germany was to inoculate every other nation with the microbe of starvation. Everywhere were the veins and arteries of the world blocked by tariffs. There could be no flow of trade, yet interdependence demands a free flow. As the blood of distribution became congealed the whole economic body of the world began to rot.

At the head of this system of world destruction stands the League of Nations, founded on the ideal of national self-determination, when the one problem it should have been created to solve was international economic interdependence. And what does self-determination mean in this economic age? It means that each nation, however puny and weak, must become self-contained and self-sufficient—a baron in a well-stocked castle—so that it may be able to withstand the stresses and strains of war. And what does this lead to? To garrison its economic bastions and ravelins it must raise as powerful an army as it is possible to raise. Thus we see that this search after complete national independence—self-determination—is but another name for the war complex, the complex which led to the World War and which, unless it is checked, must inevitably lead to yet another world conflict. Obscurely the League sees this. It sees that it cannot continue to exist if there is another war. But it does not see—or rather, its members refuse to see—that if war is to be avoided the supreme problem is to eliminate its causes. Obviously these causes are to be sought in the present economic discontent and not in armaments, which are but the outward expressions of it. To abolish weapons and leave the causes of war as

they are is about as sensible as to abolish fire brigades and leave the causes of conflagrations, or to abolish surgical instruments and leave the causes of physical disease. Do these people really think that inanimate weapons can cause wars? No; consequently diplomacy has been elaborated into the art of undisguised hypocrisy.

A war is not a war unless it is declared: an aggressor is a nation which walks over its neighbour's threshold like a burglar; but if, like some crook company promoter, one nation ruins another, it has not aggressed. Weapons are to be catalogued as aggressive and non-aggressive and such like humbug. Why all this hypocrisy and hair-splitting scholasticism? Because it forms an admirable smoke cloud under cover of which the nations can manœuvre into strategic positions for the next war. True, the Geneva Disarmament Conference has much to do with weapons, but until it ceases talking about them it will never see the causes of war, and what is so appalling is that it does not want to see them. As it stands to-day it is nothing more than a vast chaotic General Staff preparing for the next war.

What should this League do? It should get back to sanity. It should cease in its attempt to turn the whole world into a limited liability company, and in place it should get down to a job which is possible—the consolidation of Europe. West of the Vistula Europe has to a very large extent a common culture. It is in this area that what we call Western civilisation was born, and it is in this area that its existence is now threatened. Until the days of the Reformation the bulk of this area was a spiritual whole—a unity; and the problem to-day is to reconstruct this area as a moral unity—that is, an area free from friction, free from fear, and free from the begetters of friction and fear: greed, jealousy, and hypocrisy.

What does this mean? Does it mean that we must establish a new theocracy? No. It does not even mean that we must set out to establish a new morality, but that we must first fashion a new economic body in which a new morality can flourish—in fact, in a new body the new morality will create itself. We must emulate the Almighty. When He fashioned the first human being, so the legend tells us, 'the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.' He first took dust, the material, as His foundation; so must we start at the material end, for to breathe a new spirit into the present economic system would produce chaos, and not a new life.

So it happens that if the League, in the form of a league of European nations, is to prove more than an organ of disruption, it must tackle the European problem at its economic end. First,

it must square out the economic difficulties so that economic interdependence may gain freedom; secondly, it must leave it to this freedom to breathe into the dust of material things the spirit of a new European culture. Europe as an economic federation—that is, a Europe in which nations are politically autonomous, controlling their own affairs, and economically interdependent (that is, working for the common good of the continent)—has a stupendous future before it. If, since the Reformation; divided as she has been, Europe has been able to accomplish what she has accomplished, what then cannot a united Europe do? We have behind us a vitality and an energy which no other quarter of the world possesses. We can look back upon Greece and Rome, Alexander and Cæsar, the magnificence of the Papal Church, the wonder of Gothic culture, the expansiveness of the Renaissance, the energy of the Reformation, and lastly the titanic force of this present industrial age. We do not lack power, but what we do lack is direction. Our power is squandering itself in internecine feuds, just as the power of Greece, and then of Rome, squandered itself. It is like a mighty river which has burst its banks and is devastating the valleys and the flat lands. It needs a new channel with stronger banks to contain it; then its immense pent-up energy can be turned to creative work. In place of devastating it will fertilise, and in the lands irrigated by it will sprout forth a new civilisation, not divorced from the old, but begotten by it.

This economic reorientation is, I believe, the fundamental European problem of to-day. There are other problems, but, so it seems to me, they all revolve around this one. If this one is solved, the greatest cause of present-day warfare will be eliminated; for when the nations learn how to co-operate commercially a far more contented state of peacefulness will be established, and though fighting forces will be maintained, their object will be to protect Europe and her civilisation in place of protecting each European nation against its neighbours. This problem is in no sense a novel one, for in another form it is the old European problem of the Middle Ages. Then religion was international and industry, agriculture, and trade almost purely national activities. When the Papacy mixed these two incompatibles, discontent was created, and this discontent led to the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years' War. This war period lasted for over a hundred years. It devastated Europe; yet in the end economics were divorced from religion and the disease was thrown out. The period which followed—approximately, from 1650 to 1750—saw several wars, but all of a limited nature, their causes being purely political and focussed upon dynastic changes. Whole countries were not devastated, as they had been

in the Thirty Years' War, and, generally speaking, the civil populations were not molested. Then comes a change with industrialisation. Steam power begins—very slowly at first—to unite nations economically, when into the embryo of the present age is thrust the Napoleonic ideal of the nation in arms, which is a national and political ideal.

During the nineteenth century more and more is trade mixed with politics, as religion had once been mixed with economics; and, trade becoming more and more international and politics remaining national, once again do two incompatibles come into contact and refuse to mix. Discontent becomes virile, and as it grows war becomes inevitable, and so we find that soon after the middle of the last century Europe slips into a new war period. Economic wars now replace religious wars, and these wars will last just as long as national politics and international trade are mixed together. Separate these, and a new period of freedom will be established. In 1648 the theory of the political freedom of nations from Papal control became a fact; and not until the theory of a free economic internationalism also becomes a fact will another period of limited warfare, or possibly of complete peacefulness, be established in Europe, and such a peace will make her once again the pivot of the world.

J. F. C. FULLER.

NAZI OR JUNKER?

ON February 27, 1933, precisely at 9.45 p.m.—he was careful to note the time—a young member of the Centre Party hurried to the Reichstag. He had heard a rumour that the German Parliament House was on fire. When he reached the square which the great building overlooks, he saw assembled a crowd of several hundred Storm Troopers. They were standing there expectant and alert, not for any recognisable purpose, but clearly with the knowledge that an important event was taking place. The chance observer of their presence there failed completely to understand the significance of it, and later, when he had read the official account of the fire, offered to give evidence at the Reichstag fire trial in Leipzig. But the court showed no desire to hear him. The evidence which he offered to give was not the only evidence that would have thrown light on a mysterious incident, but the court showed no disposition to avail itself of any of it.

In that trial the question whether Dimitroff, Torgler, Popoff, and Taneff should be sentenced to death was really of secondary importance. The most important matter for the court to decide was whether or not that act of arson was an integral part of a great Communist conspiracy against the State. German lawyers could not but read with amazement the comments of the foreign Press which paid high tribute to the court because for 'lack of proof' it had acquitted four innocent men, whose innocence had been proved. German criminal law procedure is not, as many foreign critics apparently think, so fundamentally different from the procedure of other countries. What filled those who were familiar with that procedure with horrified resentment was to see the daily scandalous violation at the trial of the spirit, and even of the letter, of the law. Any German with legal training could scarcely be less resentful of such open violation of the law, such public disregard of correct procedure, than of an unjust condemnation. Besides, was not one of the accused actually sentenced to death? The death penalty inflicted on van der Lubbe—*pæna sine lege*—was nothing else than a judicial murder.

Those who have intelligently studied Prusso-German history

can, at any rate, have scarcely been astonished that German justice should have bowed before the Fascist dictatorship, at once more swiftly and more submissively than those other pillars of the State—the army, the great landowning class, and the Protestant Church. The origin and development of the German State was never such as to make of the German lawyer a social element with pride in itself and the capacity to resist authority.

Friedrich Wilhelm I., the father of Frederick the Great, but of much more significance in the history of his country than his more famous son, and the real founder of Prussia as a great Power, had a particular affection for the army. Parsimonious to the verge of miserliness as he was, he used up three-quarters of the income of his soundly administered State on his beloved soldiers, and was a positive spendthrift when it was a matter of obtaining 'tall lads' for his Guards from every quarter of the kingdom. 'Never,' says the economist Gustav von Schmoeller, 'was the expenditure on the army—reckoned per head of the population—so great as in his reign.' When Friedrich Wilhelm I. died the gigantic Russian Empire possessed 180,000 soldiers, the Holy Roman Empire 100,000, and the tiny, scattered Prussia 80,000. In extent the tenth, in population the thirteenth, Prussia was third of the European States in the size of its army.

Friedrich Wilhelm I. was also the greatest landed proprietor and the greatest agricultural producer in his realm, and at that time the price of agricultural produce was in most cases very much higher in Prussia than in the neighbouring countries. Yet this monarch, at once such a miser and such a spendthrift, never had any money for cultural purposes. He could afford just as little for the academy as for the university or for justice. Of the last of these he asked only that it should be 'national,' and with that conception of justice combined all the hate that the neurotic has for the progress of judicial ideas.

His son Frederick—called 'the Great' because of his successful campaigns—followed his father's example much more closely than popular accounts of him permit one to realise. He was equally his imitator in his most brutal treatment of courts which did not take into account his constantly changing humours. Judges who provoked his anger appeared 'on the square'—that is, were condemned to forced labour on the fortifications. One of the most persistent lies of world history is the famous tale of the miller of Sans Souci; it was proved long ago that that gentleman had not the slightest warrant for making the legendary statement attributed to him. 'There are still judges in Berlin.' The truth is very different. The court had given a just and well-founded decision; the 'great' king, because the decision dis-

pleased him, had the judges arrested out of hand and flung into gaol as if they were criminals. One must never forget these fundamental facts of Prussian history if one is to see the events of to-day in their proper light. Prusso-German justice never got over its humble beginnings. Even under the Empire a judge never attained the dignity of anything more than an ordinary magistrate, and was the object of much less respect than an officer or a Government official.

In August last the 'Leader,' *Reichs* Chancellor Adolf Hitler, told an American newspaper correspondent that the firing of the Reichstag building had been only one of the many horrible outrages planned by the Marxist conspiracy in its campaign of destruction against the State. He was able to support that statement by quoting the *communiqués* issued by the investigating tribunal. Here let us leave no possibility of mistake. The German Supreme Court is not a Bolshevist Supreme Court, and it has neither the cynical adroitness nor the powerful imagination of a revolutionary tribunal. That was why the drama that was played in Leipzig and in Berlin was so dull and matter-of-fact and disappointing. The false witnesses were unmasked as common gaol-birds; the evidence given by the National Socialist leaders (given under oath) was unmistakably mere propagandist rhetoric, and a police functionary had to admit, under pressure, that nothing whatever had been known to him of any sort of Communist conspiracy to commit outrages. The decision whether or not the four Communists should lose their heads depended on the answer to a political question—would condemnation to death be at the actual moment advantageous or the reverse? But the reasoned statement made by the court setting forth the grounds for its verdict amounted to what the German sense of order demanded—the condemnation of the Communist Party.

With the decision delivered by the Supreme Court all that was desired was accomplished. It was the guilt of the Marxists in the matter of the Reichstag fire that had given Hitler and his most active collaborator, Captain Goering, the foundation necessary for the erection of a terroristic dictatorship. On the morning after the fire and on the following days arrests were made which, as was intended, filled Germany with terror. That of the persons arrested a great many had never belonged to a Marxist party was a very trifling error. The Communist, Social Democrat, and pacifist Press was suppressed. For the first time Storm Troopers were allowed to exercise police power in full measure and with accompanying brutality of the most impressive type. In the Cabinet the National Socialists had only three members to make head against a strong majority of Nationalists and non-party 'experts.' In addition, the Vice-Chancellor

Papen, as Government commissary for Prussia, was the direct superior officer of Captain Goering, who had merely been appointed commissary for the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. But it was precisely the occupant of that Ministry who controlled the police, and so could incorporate in it the chosen members of the Storm Troopers and other Fascist formations. The high-handed action taken in the early morning of February 28 made it impossible for anyone to doubt that the National Socialist Party was in deadly earnest and would show unsurpassable energy in seizing and maintaining hold of power in Germany.

In point of fact, the situation was such that even at that early date the struggle against the Marxists had become a work of supererogation. Both parties, the Communists and the Social Democrats, were impotent. They never showed any real intention to resist, much less to rise in insurrection. The efforts of the revolutionary section of the working class in the first years of the Republic had led only to unnecessary bloodshed. Later on the Communist Party had secured more than sufficient seats in the Reichstag to let it seriously damage the reputation of the parliamentary system. The mere negation which it returned to every request or need of a republican Government equally condemned it to parliamentary impotence. Yet it was the Communists themselves who were least conscious of that impotence. To the very end they dreamed of their fabulous '*M-Apparat*,' a phrase meant to indicate some sort of military organisation. But as what organisation they did possess was honeycombed with police spies and had been rendered entirely harmless by the agents of the republican Government months before Hitler came into power, it was perfectly helpless to influence the course of events.

The Social Democratic Party had exhausted all its energies in loyal correctitude towards the State. Brüning used the bogey of a Nazi terror to induce it to consent to measures which were against the interests of the workers. The policy of 'the lesser evil'—to quote a popular phrase—at once enervated and discredited it. When von Papen, as *Reichs* Chancellor, on July 20, 1933, expelled from their offices the Social Democratic Ministers and chiefs of police in Prussia no attempt at self-defence was made by the victims. In vain a couple of Democrats sought to meet force with force. They wished to call out the police and, if necessary, to arrest the President of the Republic, who had given his authority for this violation of the law. The Prussian Government appealed to the Supreme Court—which was nothing else than a Government commission in a somewhat unusual setting—and the Supreme Court delivered itself of a Delphic oracle which did not appear to give the President, the executive officer of the court, any grounds for interference. The Marxist parties had over

200 seats in the Reichstag, but of what use were they? There was no possibility of constructing a parliamentary Cabinet which possessed a majority. There was then no alternative but to make use of article 48 of the Constitution—the 'dictatorship article'—and to quarrel over the question to whom Hindenburg should entrust the power of making use of it. Parliament was silent; the Press was terrorised, and only those who had the *entrée* to the palace of the President could make their opinions heard.

Hindenburg comes of an old Junker family. He is an officer and a landowner. But he only became the latter because 'the German nation' presented him on his eightieth birthday with the title deeds of Neudeck, the estate which in earlier days his family had possessed. The 'nation' was too poor, of course, to make so splendid a gift, and so a Junker friend of the President, Herr von Oldenburg-Januschau, gave a broad hint to industry, which subscribed the necessary funds. By tradition the President was closely connected with the great landowning families east of the Elbe; this magnificent gift could not fail to make him in every way still more one of themselves, a true colleague, and a great agricultural producer. True, his son, Colonel von Hindenburg, is the titular owner. That was the result of the extreme cleverness of the organisers of the presentation; in order to avoid payment of death duties the gift of 'the nation' to the father was conveyed to the son who would be his heir.

The economic position of the East Elbian landowners is not a particularly enviable one, but it has been unfavourable for a very long time. It is more than a century since economists realised that, from the economic point of view, the system of production in force in East Elbia could not be defended. That did not prevent it from being maintained, and apparently very successfully. Political circumstances were too much for economic sense. Ever since Friedrich Wilhelm I. adopted the policy of taking the officers for his army from the landed aristocracy the position of the Junkers has been impregnable. Frederick the Great was still more exclusive than his father in his choice of officers. The tremendous losses in the Seven Years' War compelled him to give commissions to non-commissioned officers and to members of the middle class, but in the years of peace that followed he used at those reviews of his which were so much dreaded to drag middle-class officers out of the ranks with the famous crutch-cane, and thus expel them from the army. After the disasters of 1806 the so-called 'Reformers,' Scharnhorst and his friends, broke with the principle of having only aristocrats as officers. They had freed the peasantry from serfdom, and by the creation of the *Landwehr* had introduced universal military service. The aristocracy deeply resented these measures and pursued them with

hatred and execration. But after the victories of 1813 and 1814 the 'Reformers' were forgotten. With the loss of their chains the small peasants had lost their protection, and the Junkers used the emancipation of the peasants to enrich themselves. Never were so many peasants ruined as in the years following the Wars of Independence. But the King of Prussia refused to grant the Parliament that he had promised to his people, and there was nothing to prevent the Junkers recovering all their power. Only one thing remained of Scharnhorst's work of emancipation—the *Landwehr*, the citizen army whose prowess had made victory possible. It took nearly fifty years to get rid of this single democratic institution which old Prussia possessed, and during those fifty years the Junker class made every effort to do so. Every conceivable argument—financial, political and military—was pressed into service. It was the *coup d'état* carried out by Wilhelm I. which first enabled them, with the help of Bismarck, to get this legacy of Scharnhorst into their power. The 'Conflict,' the long years of the *Landtag* crises which resulted from the breach of the Constitution, ended in the patriotic jubilation over the victory which Prussia gained over Austria. The fact that parliamentary government was restored should not, however, blind one to the fact that thereby the power of the Junkers was once more established. The class which possessed that power could defy even the facts of economics. When the great expansion of American agriculture threatened to reduce the agricultural system in East Elbia to a farce, Bismarck became a convert to tariffs, which up to then he had contemptuously refused to grant to developing industry. He, too, was a landed proprietor; Kniephof and Varzin were then what Neudeck is to-day. From that period, too, may be dated the alliance between the heavy industries and the landowning class.

The so-called 'revolution' of 1918 did not in any real way shake the position of what had been the ruling power in old Prussia. The young Republic entrusted the creation of the new army to the General Staff of the old. It subsidised coal and iron and, when the world crisis came to threaten the landed proprietors with disaster, it used its last financial resources to stave off disaster. From the beginning the patriotic catchword, completely overshadowed the necessity for strengthening the Republican *régime*. The alleged threat to the frontiers was the keynote of the ever-repeated appeal to the Republican leaders. Who was best fitted to train the new army? The Kaiser's officers. Who could best forge its weapons? The steel industry. And who could best produce bread for the nation in war-time? The East Elbian landowners. One does not know whether it ever became clear to the Republican parties that, by the policy

they were pursuing, they were playing straight into the hands of those classes which had been omnipotent in imperial Germany. Yet, even if they had been conscious of it, they could hardly have acted otherwise. The democratisation of the officers' corps, the nationalisation of the mines and blast furnaces, the breaking up of the large estates—these three measures alone could have given the Republic a sure foundation. The maintenance of these three forces in power, forces which could not be anything else but the arch-enemies of the Republic, became indeed the very kernel of Republican policy.

The moment that there came a crisis in the political field it could not but become evident what forces were in reality ruling behind the governmental *façade*. The reality had been long concealed, thanks to the policy pursued by Stresemann. Even if it was built on an illusion—that policy of 'as if,' that effort to make it possible for Germany, through the spiritual and productive force she possessed, to win her due place in a united and peaceful Europe—the illusion was one conceived by a creative imagination, an illusion which had the very appearance of reality and which its creator defended with diplomatic skill of the most brilliant kind. Brüning fully maintained the outward forms of friendly intercourse in his international discussions. But behind the governmental *façade* there was now only emptiness. His Cabinet called itself 'the war veterans' Cabinet' (*Frontkämpferkabinett*), and took its military name with all seriousness. It really did wish to lead the nation in the crisis, and it realised—it did not need to have a military imagination to realise it—that in a crisis it could take a strong stand only if its position were strongly founded and consolidated. Its policy was to make the Cabinet independent of Parliament, and for that policy the co-operation of the President of the Republic was necessary—the President who was a field-marshal and a great landowner. But it underestimated the strength and ambition of the old forces. The crisis which was threatening the position of the landed proprietors made them still more radical, still more intransigent. Brüning exerted every ounce of his moral and nervous strength in the Presidential election. When Hindenburg was re-elected, Brüning thought his position was secure. He believed in the strength of the personal ties that bound him to the aged marshal. He deceived himself sadly.

The weeks which Hindenburg spent at Neudeck were always a cause of anxiety. When he returned from his estates, as his official secretary, Meissner, knew so well, 'nothing could be done with him.' While he was there the influence of his agrarian and feudal neighbours was overpowering. After the President had returned from a visit to his estates in the autumn of 1931,

Brüning asked that still further powers might be granted the Cabinet. In the programme which he submitted there were certain proposals for land settlement; he wished to sequester part of the landed estates which were hopelessly burdened with debt. All that was known at Neudeck, and the landowners roused Hindenburg against his most faithful Chancellor. The fellow wanted land settlement, did he? And on the land of the Junkers, historic holy of holies? He was a Bolshevik. Actually that was the word used in Neudeck, and the President adopted it. While Brüning was under the impression that he could demand still further trust in himself, the ground had already been cut from under his feet. Instead of receiving the additional powers he asked, he received his dismissal.

From that date politics in Germany became a mere battleground between forces that were completely out of any State control. Of democracy, of the reconciliation of conflicting social interests, of the compromise between the views and convictions of the different classes, there was no more talk. General von Schleicher, who, as Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defence, had secured direct access to the President, pulled the strings. He had put Brüning in power. He now put forward Papen, the hapless military *attaché* who during the war had organised sabotage in America and by his carelessness had given away his agents. Outside the 'Herrenklub' hardly anyone in Germany knew of him. In the Prussian Parliament, in which he sat as a deputy of the Centre Party, he was considered a comic figure. In spite of the success of his *attaque brusquée* of July 20, 1932, his rôle was soon played out. Schleicher, who in the meantime had become Minister of Defence, openly called him a buffoon, and his own Cabinet speedily lost all confidence in him.

That was the last episode which can really be included in a history of the German Republic. Every other possibility having now been exhausted, a general had to take over the government. In the tradition of any State the representative of the army is considered as the man with the strong hand. Schleicher regarded himself as a great politician because he was a clever intriguer, but, although he belonged to the Junker class, he was completely wrong in his estimate of its power. His ship foundered on the same rock as had Brüning's. It is true that he aroused the enmity of the industrialists as well. He called himself the 'social general,' and, by his romantic attempt to secure an alliance with the trade unions and with the radical wing of the National Socialists, he roused the suspicion of the employers of labour. Papen saw a chance to revenge himself; he brought Hitler into alliance with the heavy industries. The Cologne banker, Baron von Schroeder, saw to the paying off of the mass of debt which

was threatening to overwhelm the National Socialist Party. But this little plot alone would not have caused Schleicher's downfall; something more powerful was needed. That something was soon found. Schleicher, too, dreamed of land settlement. The democratic land policy had been steadily whittled down, but it was none the less the general opinion in Germany that the great landed properties could no longer be maintained in their historical entirety. The agricultural production on bad land, on the out-of-date system to which the East Elbian landowners still clung, had become so ridiculous that no reasonable person really dreamed of trying to preserve it as it was. For a long time the landowners had had the protection of the 'Security Law,' by which they were relieved from the burden of paying the debt on their land, the State granting them a moratorium. For a long time the last available resources which could be spared in a budget which could only be balanced by infinite ingenuity had gone in subsidies to them. For a long time the prices of agricultural produce in Germany had greatly exceeded those ruling on the world market. In spite of all that, it seemed as if nothing could save some of the estates. That was clear to every sensible person in Germany except the landowner himself. He would make no surrender, accept no compromise. Whoever touched the sacred soil, even if he wore a general's uniform, was a traitor to his country.

The leaders of the Agricultural League (*Landbund*) were being received by the President. An hour before the reception they issued a manifesto against the Government. 'The spoliation of the nation's agricultural interests in favour of the money-grubbing interests of an internationalised export industry,' the manifesto declared, 'never, even under a Marxist Government, reached such a height as now.' This was the violent, reckless language which the agrarians had been wont to use with impunity against the Republic, and one might well have believed that a Social Democrat was at the head of the Government, and not the chief of the *Reichswehr*. They were received by the President, and greeted the Chancellor as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred; it was only during the evening that Schleicher first heard of the manifesto. Next morning he demanded that Hindenburg should abandon his fellow-Junkers. He mistook his own position entirely. He had been of the opinion that the landowners would not fight him. He felt that they could not fight the author of the subsidies granted them. 'I have found millions for them,' he said; 'they can't go against me.' Light-heartedly he accepted the challenge. He had a weapon in reserve which he thought would be invincible. The weapon was indeed strong enough to cause his destruction.

The 'Eastern Subsidies' (*Osthilfe*) scandal burst on the German public. The subsidies granted the landowners had been

most scandalously misused. There were proprietors who had been bankrupt through their own incapacity and had thrice had their properties cleared, and then after a fourth collapse the *Osthilfe* authorities handed the estate over to a daughter who was a minor. There were others who used the subsidies to buy motor cars and stay on the Riviera, while the credit agencies and the tradespeople who had confidently allowed them to get in debt went into bankruptcy. There were others of whom official reports said that they had wasted their share of the subsidies on gambling and dissipation, and who none the less went on receiving public money. The cause of it all was, of course, that the proprietors themselves had the management of the funds. One cleared the other and the other repaid the favour. The scandal crept even into very high places. Schleicher was master of the Press, which he controlled completely through the censorship. If all those stories of fraud and scandal got into the newspapers, the only explanation was that the general had either authorised or—what was very much the same thing—winked at publication. He had thought that he would be able to crush his enemies. He was wrong. He brought them to a state of despair indeed, but also to the point of making a last supreme effort. The President's neighbours, his fellow-proprietors, his comrades, and people who were 'quite disinterested' hurried to the palace. Their most powerful advocate was the President's own son, Colonel Oskar von Hindenburg. It had been he who, the year before, had negotiated the first interview between Hindenburg and Hitler. The visitors to the Presidential palace demanded that Hitler be entrusted with the government.

The National Socialist Government had no difficulty at all in expelling the Jews or exterminating the Marxists. Once Goering had set his party police to work with savage energy, once the wave of terror had submerged the whole country and Storm Troopers' barracks and concentration camps had begun to play their part, there was no more resistance from the 'outsiders.' The Socialist movement in Germany is dead. Not only in the colonies of the *émigrés*, but even in the scattered 'cells' which still exist in factories and workshops, the Socialist sects rend each other in pieces. Justice, as has already been said, hastened to pay humble homage to the jackboot of the dictator. Its sense of honour was only keen where Social Democratic Ministers were concerned.

Besides the National Socialist Party there is nothing else left alive in Germany but the three old pillars of the Prussian State which actually brought Hitler to power. Against them, too, the terror has begun to rage. Against them the dictator has naturally begun to wage his campaign—sometimes openly, sometimes secretly, sometimes publicly advertised, sometimes cunningly

concealed. These pillars are not so easy to break as were the idealist propagators of Liberal and Socialist ideals. Hugenberg has been ejected from the Government. The German Nationalist Party has been suppressed. For a certain time the resistance of the Conservatives concentrated in the Protestant Church. For years the Protestant religion has seemed to be nothing but a mere annex of nationalism; it long ago lost its spiritual force and, with that, masses of its lay adherents. The Church dispute was nothing more than a skirmish in the war between the National Socialists and the old historic forces of Prussia.

The 'reform of the *Reich*' is part of the National Socialists' programme. In their view it means a new division of Germany by tribes or by counties (*Gauen*). The reform was to be formally proclaimed on January 18, the anniversary of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles. The proclamation was postponed to January 31, the last session of the Reichstag; but even then no formal announcement was made. The law to which the deputies were asked to assent is a mere succession of words, a frame without a picture. In this sphere the old historic forces which will not endure that Prussia be partitioned have so far maintained the upper hand. Nor has Hitler so far been able to enforce the 'Aryan clause' as regards the *Reichswehr*. There are not a few 'non-Aryans' among its officers. The Ministry of Defence has been able to prevent any impertinent investigations into their ancestry.

Above all, one bulwark stands fast against the storm; not a finger has been laid so far on the great estates. No execution warrant has ever been served on a great landowner; no bailiff dare approach his property. The price of agricultural produce is again soaring to proud heights far above those ruling on the world market. A couple of progressive landowners, indeed, declared some time ago that agricultural production in Germany must change its present system, if it is to become even partially profitable and serve capably the needs of the nation and the preparation for war. The Minister of Agriculture, Darré, has no illusions on that point, and yet so far no hand has been raised against the landed interests.

I do not pretend to play the prophet. To do what is necessary, to carry out the sentence which was passed on the landed interests over a century ago by the economists, to destroy the historic forces of Prussia—there was no force strong enough for that under the Empire, and the Republic was very far from being able to begin to tackle so formidable a task. If there is ever to be anyone strong enough to do so, it must be Hitler. If so far bounds have been set to his power, that does not prove that he will never be strong enough to break the resistance of those forces opposed to

him. The overthrow of the workers' parties, the destruction of a free Press, the expulsion of the Jews from civic life, the murder-feud of extermination with the pacifists, the manifold energy expended on rearmament—all that, in spite of the brutality with which it is accomplished, does not constitute revolutionary action. But to put peasants, forests and agricultural enterprises in the place of the big estates, and so destroy the very foundations of old Prussia, that would indeed be a revolutionary act.

It would be of very great advantage to those who wish to understand what is happening in Germany if they would study with more than usual care the results of the peculiar manner in which Prusso-Germany historically developed. It would then be possible for them to distinguish between events which are superficial and movements which go very deep into the heart of Prusso-German history. Whether the Protestant dogma changes to this or remains at that is a matter of indifference to 'God's envoy,' Hitler. Whether anti-Semitism will drive hundreds of thousands more from their professions and their country is of no moment to the party in power. Whether Prussia preserves her present historic frontiers may be of some importance to General Goering—of Rosenheim in Bavaria—for he has made out of it a satrapy for himself. But, in any case, change here would be only symptomatic. The old Prussian forces which to-day are opposing Hitler, on whatever secondary theatre they may fight their battle, have taken a false course. For it is clear that the dictatorship can tolerate no resistance, and it will not tolerate theirs. That is why the Reichstag had to burn.

But the Junkers, who are hardened fighters, class-conscious and cunning, will not, one can be sure, lose themselves on the wrong road. There is only one primary theatre of war in Germany, and that is in the one party left. Is it not to some extent open to the Junkers? Many of them have long been members of it. In the party the real battle will be fought out quietly and secretly. Till it is decided we shall read very little about the course of it in the newspapers. But on its issue depends whether Germany will continue to exist or not.

RUDOLF OLDEN.

INFELIX AUSTRIA

DURING the last few months I have done all in my power to win over English public opinion to support the Dollfuss Government; that must be my defence for now writing in England an article on Austria. I quickly found that the mere mention of Austria was sufficient to open every door in London to me, and I have seldom seen so enthusiastic an audience as when in October last I lectured before the Royal Institute of International Affairs on 'Austria and National Socialism.' The opinion was generally expressed that Austria was the last stronghold of freedom, and that it was one of the most important guarantees of European peace. The way to so excellent a judgment had been paved very successfully by the visit of Dr. Dollfuss to London last summer, and the more the National Socialist terror sought to destroy Austrian independence, the more bombs were imported into Austria from Germany, the more seriously the menace grew, the more did the respect of the nations increase for the tiny country that resisted so stoutly. In circumstances of extreme economic difficulty—difficulty rendered yet more serious by the thousand-mark tax placed by the German Government on a *visa* for Austria—and face to face with a much superior enemy, that country waged a war which was rightly regarded as one of the most gallant in world history. There was no one in England from the extreme Right in politics to the extreme Left who did not then believe that the cause of Austria was the cause of liberty and of justice. Wherever I went I met only understanding, friendliness, and readiness to help.

But the events of February of this year radically altered British opinion. Many of my friends in all the parties expressed to me their feeling that after such a disillusionment nothing more could be expected of them, that they would not now raise a finger to help Austria, for—so they declared—Dollfuss had shown himself in his true colours; he was as blood-guilty as Hitler, and there really was no difference in kind between the horrors of the German concentration camps and the horrors of the bombardment which had been directed against workers' homes, against women and children in Vienna. Some of them went so far as to

abandon Austria altogether and to say that the right and proper sequel to that bombardment would be the defeat of the Dollfuss Government by National Socialism. Thanks to the clever propaganda of the National Socialists, who believed that now their hour had indeed come, their partisans, who had once been considered brown-shirted bullies, now appeared to be the brave and humane defenders of a righteous cause, for—as the National Socialist Press asserted—'the German revolution' had at the most cost fifty lives. Naturally no mention was made of the thousands brutally murdered and the tens of thousands savagely maltreated. The omission passed unnoticed in those hectic days, and many Englishmen must have asked themselves how they could ever have been so deluded as to have, for the sake of a Dollfuss, judged so harshly an honourable gentleman like Adolf Hitler.

I need hardly emphasise the fact that this sort of attitude to the Austrian problem is very dangerous, and that those who adopt it are merely playing the game of the National Socialists, in which no clear-sighted observer can fail to see to-day a direct menace to the peace of Europe. I determined, therefore, to return to Vienna for a few days and see for myself exactly how things stood. It is not worth while now to inquire whether or not bloodshed could have been avoided. What happened in Vienna is now an accomplished fact, and all that one can do is to accept the situation as it is and so control it that Europe will take no hurt. Only later will it possibly be important for the historian to investigate the causes of the February troubles in Vienna, and then particular attention will have to be paid to the great speech which Leopold Kunschack, the old and trusted leader of the Christian Social Party of Vienna, delivered shortly before the outbreak. Kunschack, himself of working-class origin, had, as is well known, done his utmost to ensure a peaceful solution of the crisis and to save Austria from the bloodshed which he saw was likely to happen in a few days. Yet, if the crisis ended in fighting, he was prepared to place at the disposal of the Government the bands of the 'League of Freedom' (*Freiheitsbund*) which he had founded—an association to which I shall return—for he recognised that it was more fatal than to remain passive and so to contribute to the defeat of the Chancellor. Now, as formerly, Dollfuss meant the maintenance of Austrian independence and the avoidance of National Socialist domination. That was and is the one paramount consideration. The fall of Dollfuss would have meant the end of an independent Austria, the conquest by Hitler of Vienna, and that conquest would have meant that the *Swastika* flag would have flown over Budapest and Prague. A glance at the map will show the situation in the Danube area

more clearly than any exposition. The encirclement of Czechoslovakia, the consolidation of a hostile front against Yugoslavia (and these two countries are the last eastern allies of the democratic Powers of the West), and direct contact with Hungary and the sphere of influence in the Balkans, that is what National Socialist control of Austria would mean. And, further, the Peace Treaties which guarantee the independence of Austria would, in fact, be reduced to the scraps of paper which many to-day believe them to be, and there would be no more obstacles to National Socialist militarism ridding itself of the last fetters which still hold it back from armed attack on the other nations of Europe. Those of us who are fighting for the coming *Reich*—the *Reich* of peace, justice and freedom—are, therefore, particularly interested in keeping in check the aggressive intentions of National Socialism, intentions in which even now foolish pacifists refuse to believe, for the weapon with which National Socialism can finally be brought low is that iron will to peace against which the present *régime* in Germany must one day be broken.

Too many doctors have been busy with Austria already ; too often have they sought to heal her sickness with their own particular nostrums. I may recall the debate in the French Chamber last year when the question of a loan to Austria was being discussed—a loan to make her continuance to exist economically possible. What is the point in obstinately saying ' Dollfuss, too, is just a Fascist,' when far greater issues are at stake ? It is unfortunately true that Liberal and even Conservative circles let themselves be too much influenced along Marxist lines, and adopt a purely doctrinaire standpoint such as in any other case they would angrily reject in regard to a situation to which it is least of all suited. The fact is that it is only from the Marxist standpoint—I do not know whether Marx himself would have adopted it—that no distinction can be drawn between the National Socialist *régime* in Germany, whose aim and basis is war, and the Dollfuss Government, which, as I can personally testify, has done everything in its power to heal the wounds suffered by the working class in the February troubles. When I was in Vienna I was able to have several conversations with Cardinal-Archbishop Innitzer, who, in my opinion, is one of the greatest figures in the Church of Rome, and I could not but be impressed by the way in which he regards the purple which he has only lately donned as the symbol of positive social justice. It is due to his influence, above all, that the Dollfuss Government is now already trying to win back the confidence of the workers, and it is very significant that a voice like his has found ready listeners.

From what I had read in the English newspapers, I thought I should find something like utter chaos in Vienna. I found

nothing of the sort. Vienna is quiet, but it is not the quiet of the mortuary. There is to-day every possibility of consolidating the *régime* in Austria, which, because it is a bulwark against National Socialism, must necessarily become once again a guarantor of personal and social liberty. Here, as in so many other spheres, the decision on the fate of this country lies with England. It will depend on whether those in England in whose hands decision lies understand or fail to understand the issue. It is from them that the Dollfuss Government seeks support, and without such support it cannot maintain itself, not because of any inherent weakness with which it can be legitimately reproached, but simply because of the pressure of existing circumstances. The Dollfuss Government, to-day as formerly, is exposed to the political and economic pressure of National Socialist Germany ; its relations with that Government are, to say the least of it, disturbed. It can expect no help from Hungary, for Hungary must first be able to help herself, and even the friendship of Italy is not an unmixed blessing. The population of Tirol, for instance, has been brought up for several generations to regard Italy as ' the arch-enemy,' and such deep-rooted feelings do not disappear in a night. What, then, can Dollfuss do ? What is the right policy for his unhappy country ? Should the Government, for the sake of platonic admiration of its liberal attitude, surrender its only defence ? Should it dismiss those auxiliaries of whose services it has availed itself, and should it permit National Socialism, reinforced by the thousands from the dissolved Social Democratic Party, to drive it finally to ruin ? And do the Western Powers wish to hasten this process when they demand the taking of such action as the price of their political and economic support of the Dollfuss Government ? The only possible course is to strengthen every force in Austria which is a *real* force, a force capable of resistance, and which is fundamentally opposed to German National Socialism. Such a force I see to-day in the League of Freedom, of which I have already spoken. It is part of the patriotic front ; it supports Dollfuss ; it stands for the independence of Austria ; and it affords the most powerful means of creating a *détente* in the hostile relations which cannot but still exist between the Dollfuss Government and certain sections of the working class. The League, therefore, deserves to attract in the highest degree general and personal sympathy in England. From it there can be constructed a bulwark which will be security against the compromise, so often prophesied, with National Socialism, a bulwark whose defenders (as I saw when I was in Vienna) are determined to throw their whole weight into the defence of a national and a social cause.

I cannot but think that in all the lands where German is spoken democracy will have in the future to take a course different to that which it has hitherto taken. I hope no one will accuse me of having fallen into a National Socialist authoritarian heresy if I say that in the future democracy can only be based on some sort of strong personal and social leadership. The more we stand for peace and disarmament, the more we must recognise that, in face of the National Socialist menace, the legal possession of adequate means of defence is far more important than the finest argument in favour of the fundamental rights of the parliamentary system. Once again attention must be drawn to a peculiar characteristic of National Socialism. Though it boasts itself so courageous and uses violent language, it is fundamentally cowardly and ready to yield if it encounters a stout determination to resist. It is not in its nature to carry positions by assault. In its timidity and lack of self-confidence it prefers to use cunning and treachery, and only when it has thus broken down opposition does it resort to violence. That is how it acted in Germany; that is how it acted in Austria.

It is simply untrue to say, 'as many seem to think, that Austria is already in a state similar to that in which Germany now is. Only those who have no idea how utterly freedom has been destroyed in Germany can say such a thing. Who in the National Socialist State can take a step, utter a word, write a letter, without exposing himself to espionage and arrest? Anyone who has experienced what it is to live in Germany, and who receives regular reports of what is happening there, cannot but recognise that conditions in Austria are very different. In Vienna I talked for a long time with a very able Austrian who was an old friend of the late Chancellor Seipel. All his life he has been on the Right and has been hostile to all democratic, and particularly socialist experiments, and yet it was he who gave me this opinion on the situation. An authoritarian *régime*, he declared, should be tolerated and supported if it permits freedom of criticism, and he added that he thought that both were necessary for the existence of a State—the authoritarian *régime* because there is abundant evidence that the positive will to rule is much less general than the passive consent to be ruled; freedom of criticism because such freedom actually creates a reserve of strength, since thereby the Government, though it gives no signs of having done so, learns of its faults and weaknesses. Those who have no intimate knowledge of Austria should carefully ponder these words; they would not then seek so lightly to take the Marxist view and represent the effort at reconciliation made by the Dollfuss Government as trickery of the workers and deception of the masses. There was, for instance, in Vienna a Social Democratic

newspaper—the so-called 'Little Newspaper' (*Das Kleine Blatt*)—which had a big circulation. The *Little Newspaper* stood for the rights of the working class in general without laying too much stress on party; it published notices of situations vacant and situations wanted, gave information with regard to employment, told working-class women how to look after their children and so forth. A few days ago this paper reappeared with a new staff as a Government organ—perhaps, if you like, '*gleichgeschaltet*,' in the Dollfuss sense—and yet overnight its circulation went up from 50,000 to 200,000 copies, thanks to the support of the workers, who thus showed a sound instinct on the question of social policy.

It must not be forgotten that the movement towards a non-political united social front had begun long before the events of February. Thus, one of the men who is now playing a particularly important part in the rebuilding on a new basis of the Austrian trade unions (Dr. Zeinitzer, of Klagenfurt) had sought to create a non-political Workers' League, and he had even obtained the permission of the Social Democratic Party leaders to do so, a permission that was withdrawn by telegram twenty-four hours before fighting broke out in Vienna. Dr. Zeinitzer, who cannot be described as a renegade, has now been brought into prominence by the Dollfuss Government, and I shall be very much mistaken if, in the future, we do not hear a great deal about him.

These are facts which are not important for Austria alone. In a land in which Parliament has been eliminated or made negligible by the existence of a huge Government majority, the political struggle, which up to then had been conducted by the trade unions, loses its meaning if it is not deliberately intended to apply the solution of force to the problem of social antagonisms. But to apply that solution as a last resort is not a question for just anybody to decide, and especially is not one for the Second International to decide. Even from the Socialist point of view, it may be doubted whether it is wise in the present circumstances to make an armed struggle inevitable. Nothing further is needed to show how completely bankrupt the Second International is—the International of the Socialist parties and the Trade Union International; and in the end it was this bankruptcy that hastened on the catastrophe in Austria. That bankruptcy can no longer be denied. There is, then, here a warning to the Social Democratic parties in those lands in which the old conditions seem still to exist and electoral successes can still be won. Even in Austria it is not so long ago since, in a general election, the Social Democrats polled 43 per cent. of the total votes cast and 66 per cent. of those cast in Vienna. These successes were fatal

to the party, for it gave it the impression that all who had voted for it would be prepared to take up arms to defend the cause of Social Democracy. What actually happened was that a few thousands fought and hundreds of thousands, at the very moment when the battle was raging, were arranging a ballot on the question to strike or not to strike. Further, it is certainly fatal to allow the enemy to dictate one's tactics. For years the cry of the Social Democratic parties in every land has been, 'As the Fascists did, so will we'; and so the creation was decreed of special fighting forces (a sort of 'Red Storm Troopers') and armed Socialist militias, a creation which, for easily understood psychological reasons, has now been proved disastrous. The Social Democratic parties by their constitution are pacifist—on their own assertion, they fight only with 'spiritual weapons'; they are therefore involved in a fatal contradiction if they suddenly turn militarist. Vienna affords an elementary example of that truth. So clearly visible was the rise of a fighting caste among the workers that the masses on which it depended in a very real sense held fundamentally aloof during the days of the bitterest fighting. They considered that fighting was simply a matter for the Socialist Defence Force, and they left it at that. In addition, there was a certain—and quite intelligible—ill-feeling against the force, for these fighting troops of the party were its most-favoured children. The troops wore blue tunics and possessed titles and insignia of rank; they were intended to look and to be different; they became almost an upper class, and upper classes are never popular even if they honestly believe that they are only representatives of the whole community. The new path which Austria has to tread seems to me to lie in a direction entirely opposite to this type of action, and that must first and foremost be made clear to the working class. If that class seeks to protect its rights fully, it must—would that Marx had been faithfully followed where it was right that he should be followed—become the nation. And, if it does so, then it needs not to use force, for then it has real existence and cannot be destroyed, as the experience of Herr von Papen in Germany showed. Papen's Government, although parliamentary government had completely collapsed, was shattered by the pressure of the nation in December 1932.

In Austria things are still in process of evolution, and months yet will have to elapse before they take definite shape. It is often said jestingly that Austria has one precious possession—the tourist traffic. For its sake the most-cherished convictions have been sacrificed, and even National Socialism has obeyed its behests rather than those of its grey eminences in Berlin. It will depend a good deal on the tourist traffic what Austria becomes.

There is a point at which all purely political argument becomes invalid, and that is the point where the primitive question is posed—to be or not to be. So far I have spoken only of Vienna; in the provinces there is a very different situation. Why has the inhabitant of Tirol, the citizen of Salzburg, become so enthusiastic for National Socialism? Is it because in Tirol people have for the first time forgotten that for a century Bavaria, too, was described in every school as an 'arch-enemy'? Is it no longer symbolic that the old fortifications and cannon of Kufstein point to the north? I remember that when, before the war, my father painted the wooden gates giving entrance to our estate in the north of Tirol in the colours of our house, blue and white, which happened to be also the colours of Bavaria, there was nearly a revolution among the peasantry. The feeling in favour of National Socialism is due simply to the loss suffered by the absence of the tourists from Germany. Let me give some examples. A market gardener who in normal years made about 1500 Austrian schillings out of his strawberries made only 30 schillings in the summer of 1933. The fisheries in the frontier districts, the purveyors of meat, milk, butter and eggs, the letters of rooms, have all been catastrophically hit, and the few wealthy tourists who came from Holland or England could not compensate for the loss of the German tourists, quite apart from the fact that they go exclusively to the big hotels and not to the small ones, and it is the owners of the latter who are politically important. The working-class organisations in the West ought, therefore, to take this fact into consideration, and, if they can, to send thousands of their members next summer to Austria, despite what has happened there. That is the only practical way in which they can exercise political influence. Any other method merely strengthens the position of National Socialism. Happily, the Austrian still maintains his proverbial sense of humour; he is still able to jest, when things are at their worst, at his own misfortunes; if he were not, the situation would indeed be quite hopeless.

This tiny country, which has taken over the succession to a world empire, with all its internal weariness, confusion and what, if you like, you may call its cynicism, has still a great mission to fulfil in Europe. But if it is allowed literally to starve, if all that is given to it is friendly words of sympathy, then no one need be surprised if something unpleasant happens. The world must understand that with Austria there can be no bargaining or haggling on trade treaties as may be possible with other nations. The world must give to Austria, and give again, without expecting any economic return. What Austria means to Europe is not something that can be expressed in terms of a favourable trade balance; it is something far more and far greater. If, as we can

confidently hope, the Dollfuss Government has gained one clear benefit from the events of February in that it has struck terror into the hearts of the National Socialists, who are most certainly not superior in courage to the Social Democratic workers, and in that, as a result of that terror, Austria has been saved from Herr Habicht or his eventual successor, then something of immeasurable importance has happened—Hitler has suffered his first clear, undeniable defeat. And in time that defeat will have its effects in Germany. I am convinced that the *Reich* which is coming will have to transfer its centre of gravity southward—that is to say, that a reconstruction of Germany is possible only if the power of the East Elbian aristocracy is broken. The victory of Austria over National Socialism implies in itself a clear gain in prestige to the South German and his Catholic culture, the culture which most plainly distinguishes South Germany from those somewhat barbaric lands which were Germanised considerably later.

For those who in face of all these arguments cannot yet bring themselves to support Dollfuss, attention has already been called in this article to the forces which are concentrated in the League of Freedom. It should be the business of the democratic Powers so to allocate their sympathies that it will be possible for those men in Austria to gain influence who stand for an authoritarian national State—which is really something quite different from any sort of arbitrary dictatorship—and who justify the present *régime* by the special circumstance in which their country is placed by the rivalries of all its neighbours. Perhaps it is the business of English Catholics generally, and not merely of English Roman Catholics, to take a stronger stand. Only those who feel that they are supported by the conscience of the world will be able to retain power in Austria. There is still time to work to that end, and, above all, there is still time to forget all the bitterness which so many in England have felt since the events of February. It may help to create new confidence if I state that I have received the assurance in most responsible quarters that the Dollfuss Government will never adopt an anti-Semitic policy. On the contrary, it desires to work in strictest harmony with the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, which assured equal rights to all races, confessions and peoples in Austria, and which excludes any prejudice against any particular group or sect. The Jews in Austria have complete confidence in the assurances given by the Government, and it is worth noting that Jews—and among them unbaptised Jews—hold high, and even some of the highest, offices in the Austrian State.

I gave to this article the title '*Infelix Austria*,' parodying the saying which represented Austria as '*felix*' for so many cen-

turies, because she was able to consolidate and strengthen her position by peaceful alliances while other States had to wage wars. I meant it, too, as a warning, for *infelix Austria* must be supported by all true friends of peace so that it will not be on its territory that the coming war will break out—the war for which night and day every Storm Trooper prays. From that territory, and only from that territory, from the valleys of the Danube and the Inn, can and must the reconstruction of Germany begin. If Chancellor Dollfuss and his Government are sacrificed, the future of Germany is sacrificed, and so, too, is the recovery of Europe.

That is the most important of the impressions I received in Vienna. I think it would be most useful if these impressions were carefully studied by all those who concern themselves with Central European politics. In that case other considerations may begin to seem less important, although they are not without significance. There are still in Austria thousands of people who are still indirectly the victims of the terrible events of February. Women and children have lost their breadwinners and hundreds are still lying more or less seriously injured. The relief of suffering which was begun by England ought to be continued, but continued only in such ways as will not cause embarrassment to the Dollfuss Government. No party capital must be made out of Austria's present plight. Only one motive can be admitted—the desire to help a sufferer. Perhaps it would be well if England sent out a non-party committee to Vienna to administer the funds which all parties and all classes are subscribing, and to take its part in completing the work of reconciliation, which is the aim of Cardinal-Archbishop Innitzer. What Austria needs above all is peace. The tension must relax and a stage be reached at which hostile camps no longer exist, for it is their existence which makes reconciliation impossible. The mission of England—that England which has done so much to help the Jews driven from Germany and to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine—is to be the champion of the liberty of other peoples. In Austria she can find a new field of activity.

HUBERTUS PRINZ ZU LÖWENSTEIN.

THE TRUTH ABOUT MANCHURIA

ON March 1, in the cold, brilliant dawn of mid-Manchuria, the former Emperor of China ascended the altar of Heaven, specially erected for the great occasion, and became once more Emperor over the lands of his ancestors. Graphic accounts of the ceremony were cabled throughout the world—of the offerings to Heaven of jade, silk, grain, wine and wood, each a symbol of different sides of the life of a nation which, it will be recalled, once used silk for money; of a secret personal communication from the Emperor to the divine spirits burnt by His Majesty on the altar; of a snow-white bull sacrificed by the priests; of the reappearance of old-style Chinese costumes amongst the crowds who thronged the streets to watch the Emperor pass; of the strange mingling of rites that date from many centuries before Christ with aeroplanes circling overhead; of men and women 'kowtowing' outside the palace gates, although the Emperor has abolished this form of saluting. And lastly, one may specially note the title adopted by the Emperor, and by which he is henceforward to be known, 'Kang Teh' ('Tranquillity and Virtue')—an aspiration, certainly, but already, one may believe, having some basis of reality.

The comments of the English Press on the enthronement reveal a regrettably poor understanding of the circumstances. One leading paper remarked sourly that it was merely to force that the Emperor owed his throne; another could see no better hope in Manchuria as an empire than that it might put an end to Japanese thoughts of annexation. Was it not force which originally drove the Emperor off the throne that was lawfully his, and has ever since shockingly abused the authority it tore from him? And as for annexation, unless we are to accuse Japanese statesmen of deliberate falsehood, we cannot ignore their repeated declarations that Japan does not and never has dreamed of annexing Manchuria. That she has put 'a steel frame' into its government she does not for a moment deny; but, she replies, this is only what England has done in India, Egypt and elsewhere, or America in the Philippines, and with the same ultimate object—namely, that of enabling Manchukuo

to stand on its own feet as a well-managed, self-responsible State. For those who sneer at these assertions there is, the practical thought that the costliness of Korea to Japan should be quite enough to dissuade her from the vastly more expensive game of trying to annex Manchuria, apart from the practical certainty of its landing her in a war with America or Russia—perhaps both.

Of the reality of the 'steel frame' there is certainly no doubt. But what, if any, is the reality of the native organism which depends upon it? The 'puppet State of Japan' is an easy taunt, the common acceptance of which is scarcely surprising considering the circumstances in which Manchukuo's independence was declared only two short years ago. Those two years, however, have been long enough and full of enough actual accomplishment to dim recollections of the passion excited by the Sino-Japanese conflict, and to set men asking whether, after all, Mr. P'u Yi's new throne may be something more than a convenient cloak for Japan's gleaning in other people's cornfields. And, to anticipate briefly what will be explained later, it is very certain that the Emperor Kang Teh and his Chinese environment do not look upon themselves as puppets.

It will be convenient, before dealing with the monarchical movement, to survey briefly what Japan has accomplished in Manchuria. Whatever view one may take of her right to be there at all, the magnitude of her achievement is really astounding. Manchuria, be it remembered, is as big as France and Germany put together; a third of it is covered with dense forests; of the remainder, not above half is under cultivation. The climate is terribly cold in winter, 50 and 60 degrees of frost being by no means uncommon in some parts, accompanied by winds that threaten to flay the very flesh from one's bones; it is correspondingly hot in summer; and the endless fields of kaoliang or millet (the food of North China, as rice is of the Centre and South), growing six and seven feet high, afford admirable cover for Chinese guerrillas and outlaws. Obviously the Chinese Nationalists would do all they could to prevent Japan from demonstrating that her government was better than theirs, and the Japanese measures of pacification thus had to go hand in hand with the most difficult and toilsome military operations. From the time of the final conquest of Jehol, only twelve months ago, the Japanese military authorities admitted frankly that the suppression of outlaws and guerrillas would occupy at least two years. Actually it looks as if that limit would not nearly be reached.

Not many months ago a railway journey throughout Manchuria was a risky undertaking. Bandit attacks on trains

were frequent; there were regions in which passengers were advised to lie down on the floor, owing to the danger of sniping by outlaws; and even on the South Manchuria Railway, the pride of Japan and one of the best managed railways in the world, which extends from Dairen to Changchun (or Hsinking, as it is now called, Emperor Kang Teh's capital), there was a time when trains could only run by day. Now in the southern and central provinces of Fengtien and Kirin travelling is perfectly safe, and although Heilungkiang, the northern province, is still overrun with outlaws, systematic sweeping by the Japanese promises to clean up this district too by the year's end.

Equally if not more remarkable has been the currency reform. The former Chinese officials had a pleasing habit of buying the peasants' produce with unsecured paper and selling it abroad for good silver which went into their own banking accounts, with the result that, when the Government of Chang Hsueh-liang was ousted, the peasants were left with fifteen different sorts of worthless notes aggregating 150,000,000 dollars. In addition, there was an enormous and quite unascertainable mass of official and private bills. These were entirely beyond redemption, and no attempt at it could be made. But for the remainder, the Central Bank of Manchukuo, which began business on July 1, 1932, has already redeemed some four-fifths of the notes and expects to have redeemed the entire amount by next June. The notes it has issued instead have a 70 per cent. metallic backing, and are actually quoted a little above par on the Shanghai market owing to the slightly larger silver content of the Manchurian dollar, while a subsidiary coinage in four or five denominations is particularly popular with the peasants.

Taxation, also, is being reformed. The time-honoured Chinese system under which a provincial magistrate is required to pay so much into the treasury and makes as much more out of his province as he can—in a word, the lucrative practice of 'squeeze,' which so permeates all strata of Chinese society that it hardly can be called dishonesty—has been a terrible stumbling-block; and it is admitted frankly by Japanese writers that the young Japanese bureaucrats sent down into the provinces to superintend tax collection have often aggravated matters by their arrogant, over-bearing ways. But at any rate, taxes now are levied in accordance with Government regulations and every effort is made to eliminate squeeze. Military expenditure has been cut down from 80 to 30 per cent. of the revenue. Manchukuo's army, not, of course, including Japanese troops, now numbers 110,000 men, who by all accounts are well drilled and far more dependable than formerly.

Railway development is being pushed forward with great

energy; 250 miles of new line have already been built since the Japanese occupation, and the whole new system contemplated amounts to some 3700 miles. In addition, civil aviation is being expanded far and wide. There is a regular weekly service from Tokyo through Japan and Korea, by Mukden, Hsinking and Harbin, north-westwards through Tsitsihar to Manchuli, on the Siberian border, besides numerous radiating lines. It is not, perhaps, without significance that two of these lead to the Russian border, one due north to Taheiho, the other north-east to Fuchin. A railway is also being built from Harbin to Heiho, on the Amur, close to the Russian town of Blagovestchensk. The Japanese are taking no chances.

There have, of course, been disappointments, though these are more on the Japanese than the Chinese side. The occupation of Manchuria was followed by a wave of what might really be called a crusading spirit in Japan, which has been little recognised abroad, accompanied by a widespread cry that 'the capitalist shall not seize and exploit Manchuria.' One of the most interesting phenomena in Japan is what may be called the Youth Movement, whose members, disgusted with the rapacity of capitalists and the politicians' ineptitude and venality, are bound together by a sort of general aspiration to leave the world a better place than they found it. To this class the notion of creating a genuinely new State in Manchuria, compounded of all that was best in China and Japan, appealed vividly. When Manchukuo declared her independence, numbers of these youths flocked to offer their services for little or no reward; some of them actually threw up good posts in Japan to do so. They also evolved a scheme for bringing in Japanese peasants to help in Manchuria's development, subsidies being given them on condition that they ceased to look backwards to Japan (as all Japanese emigrants invariably do) and looked forward to the welfare of the new State of which henceforward they must count themselves citizens.

The experiment does not seem to have been a success. Many immigrants are said to have returned to Japan disillusioned and disheartened. But the fact is that Manchuria is not a cistern for the surplus Japanese population. The climate is too cold for their taste, and they cannot compete with Chinese peasants, whose standard of living is even lower than their own. There have never been more than a few hundred thousand Japanese in all Manchuria, the Japanese leased territory of Kwantung included, and it is unlikely that there ever will be. It is as a source of raw materials, a market for Japan's manufactures, and, no doubt, as a buffer against Russia and the disorders in China, that Japan pins her hopes on Manchuria. The fact is of importance when we

come to estimate the meaning and possibilities of the Manchurian monarchical restoration.

In considering this restoration it must, at the outset, be emphasised that Hsüan T'ung, as he was formerly known (Kang Teh as he is now), has never ceased to be Emperor since he ascended the throne of China in October 1908. The *Daily Telegraph* correspondent at Hsinking opened his graphic account of the enthronement on March 1 by saying that P'u Yi 'is the only man who has been made Emperor three times'—the attempted restoration by General Chang Hsün in 1917 (the famous 'Empire of a Fortnight') being the second occasion. But this, technically, is inaccurate, as the 'Articles for the Favourable Treatment of the Ta Ch'ing Emperor after His Abdication,' signed with the Republicans in 1912, clearly show. Hsüan T'ung lost the power to rule, but the spiritual quality of emperor was carefully preserved to him, his title, dignities, retinue, palaces and a pension from the republic, which also charged itself with the perpetual upkeep of the imperial tombs, a fact of much significance in Chinese eyes. It is true that after a little time the pension languished and expired, as also that when the 'Christian General' Feng Yu-hsiang executed his *coup d'état* in 1924, seized Peking and brutally drove the young Emperor out of the Forbidden City, he tore up the 'Articles for Favourable Treatment.' But there is no question that this ruthless act excited deep disgust among the vast majority of Chinese, including Chang Tso-lin, the famous dictator of Manchuria, who arrived in time to take the control of Peking out of Feng's hands and set the Emperor at liberty. Subsequently, in face of the imminent danger of Feng's return, Mr. (now Sir) Reginald Johnston, who had been the Emperor's tutor for five years, hurried the young man for safety into the Legation Quarter, whence in due course he left for Tientsin, ultimately to go to Manchuria. But for this, Chang Tso-lin would undoubtedly have restored him his honours and emoluments.¹

To the world at large the fact of the Emperor's having abdicated was conclusive. But to the Chinese mind the importance of the Articles was overwhelming. In these days, when it is fashionable to pretend that most of Asia has become converted, not merely to a desire for, but to a lively understanding of, democracy on Western lines, it is dangerous to state the plain truth—namely, that ninety-nine hundredths of the Chinese people never have had, and have not now, the faintest conception

¹ The course of these events was related in an extremely interesting speech in the House of Commons on February 27, 1933, by Mr. W. Nunn, M.P. for Whitehaven; and the whole story is minutely told in Sir Reginald Johnston's new and fascinating book, *Twilight in the Forbidden City*.

of what a republic means, and what they have seen of the pretence of it in the past twenty years has certainly given them no taste for further acquaintance. This is particularly true of Northern Chinese, whose normal antipathy for the Southerners would intensify their distaste for everything for which the latter stood. The Chinese system of government, closely intertwined with the social customs and philosophies which are the warp and woof of their whole nature, took definite shape some centuries before Christ and continued unvaried down to the revolution in 1911. All that has since happened is, for the average Chinese, merely a repetition of what has happened several times before on the collapse of a dynasty: and the 'Articles for Favourable Treatment' meant only to them that the Son of Heaven had, for reasons best known to himself, withdrawn for a while into a retirement from which, as year by year the oppressions of despoilers multiplied and became more grievous, they increasingly prayed that he would emerge. When President Yuan Shih-k'ai's attempt to make himself Emperor at the close of 1915—even to the extent of sacrificing at the Temple of Heaven and choosing a dynastic title—broke down under the mere weight of public opinion, it was regarded by the world as proof of China's marvellous strides towards democracy. The real cause of failure was that Yuan was universally distrusted, as, with his record, is not surprising, and that, suffering from an internal disease which killed him a few months later, he was not the man he had once been.

Chang Hsün's attempt to reinstate the Emperor in 1917 failed, as Sir Reginald Johnston tells us, partly because he took too few troops to Peking, but chiefly because he tried to do the whole thing himself instead of calling in the aid of Tuan Chi-jui and other Northern generals. About the sympathies of the latter Sir Reginald may, of course, be mistaken, though no one has better knowledge of the things he describes. But it is certainly significant that when the 'Empire of a Fortnight' fell, the Emperor was pointedly exonerated from all blame by a Presidential mandate, and not the slightest punishment was ever suggested for Chang Hsün, K'ang Yu-wei, or other participants in the attempted restoration. One other interesting fact must be quoted from Sir Reginald Johnston's book. He tells us that he had it from Chang Tso-lin's own lips that if the imperial family had retired in 1912 to Manchuria, they would have been assured of a cordial reception. Later on, of course, Chang Tso-lin had tasted of the pleasures of dictatorship and the opportunity passed. But it is very improbable that the Republicans would have made any difficulty in 1912 about the Manchus retiring to Manchuria, which the dynasty had always kept very much as a private

appanage, and about which there was then no Chinese national feeling whatever.

Of the genesis of the movement which culminated in Manchukuo's declaration of independence, probably no one now could write a full and authentic history; it goes too far back, some of the participants are dead, and its roots are hidden in the murky recesses of the Forbidden City. Early in 1923 there were lively manifestations of it, as several references in the Peking papers of that time bear witness, and it is specially interesting to note that the direct aim of the Monarchists was backwards to Manchuria. The Lytton Report says that the independence movement had never been heard of in Manchuria before September 1931. The only conclusion is that the people who could have told the Commissioners did not choose to give them evidence on the subject. The 1923 adventure failed, of course; next year the Emperor was driven from his home by Feng Yu-hsiang, and during the drab years of his stay in Tientsin no further opportunity offered itself. But a revival of the throne in Manchuria had none the less become a definite ideal for the loyalists.

In the final *dénouement* a very significant fact may be mentioned. After the Japanese occupation of Mukden on September 18, 1931, the man who became chairman of the Chinese Control Committee which was formed to administer the city was a Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, an official for many years under the Manchus, a noted scholar of high personal repute, who had been living for a considerable time in retirement. Later on the Japanese are said to have desired him to become governor of Fengtien province, but this he refused. His Committee continued to function until the declaration of independence, when it was dissolved and Mr. Yuan became a member of the Privy Council. It is more than probable that he knew what was coming and consented to emerge from his retirement to undertake a most difficult and seemingly invidious task, in order to hold out, as it were, a Chinese rope for the autonomists. The projected declaration of autonomy was first bruited abroad in November 1931. In the last stages there were four main factors: first, the men who had been dreaming of a monarchical restoration in Manchuria for the previous eight or ten years; secondly, a number of young Manchu princes who had been taken to Japan after the abdication in 1912 and are described as being more Japanese than the Japanese; thirdly, some of the old Manchurian generals of Chang Tso-lin, who had never had the slightest sympathy with his son's nationalistic tendencies and wanted to get back to their homes from which the retreat of the former Governor, Chang Hsueh-liang, had exiled them; lastly, the Emperor himself.

In October and November 1931 there were violent anti-Japanese riots in Tientsin, and the Emperor's friends were afraid for his life if he stayed on there. Other motives, however, besides personal safety finally induced him to leave Tientsin secretly for Manchuria. The report spread by Nanking that he had been kidnapped by the Japanese to mask their designs in the declaration movement has not a particle of truth in it. In a most interesting account, published in the January number of *Oriental Affairs* (Shanghai), of a conversation with the Emperor at Hsinking in September 1932, Mr. H. G. Woodhead, who had known the Emperor well during most of the seven years that he spent in Tientsin, says that, when asked about the kidnapping, 'Mr. P'u Yi threw back his head and roared with laughter, repeating in English, "Kidnapped! Kidnapped! No! No!"' Mr. Woodhead says that the Emperor most positively rebutted the idea that he had not been a free agent in leaving Tientsin:

He not only strongly denied this, but added that he would like to tell me why he had assumed his new office. He had been actuated by two motives—political and personal. First as to the political. When the Manchu Dynasty abdicated it had been with the avowed intention of restoring the sovereignty to the people. But in the twenty years that had elapsed, what had happened? Political power had passed into the hands, not of the people, but of ambitious and grasping militarists. The welfare of the population had been entirely disregarded; they had been tyrannized over and oppressed. China's relations with the Foreign Powers had grown steadily worse. And the pledge that absolute equality would be maintained between China's five races had been flagrantly violated.

Secondly, he was prompted by personal motives. Manchuria was his ancestral home, and it was only natural that he should be specially interested in what was happening in this region. Moreover, every undertaking given to the Manchu Imperial Family in the Abdication Agreement had been wantonly violated. The pension to be paid to him by the Republic had been cancelled. His private property had been confiscated. He had been treated with studied insolence by the Kuomintang. And the ancestral tombs had been violated and rifled, without any attempt to bring the perpetrators to book, or to secure the recovery of the stolen treasures.

It was only natural, then, that when trouble occurred in Manchuria he should follow developments with great attention, and wonder whether he was not destined to play some part in an attempt to improve the condition of his ancestral Provinces. Emissaries of the separatist movement called upon him at Tientsin and urged him to proceed to Manchuria. And at last he felt that if he was ever to go, he must do so forthwith, or he might find it impossible to leave.

It may be added that the accusations in the second paragraph above are no whit exaggerated.

The actual declaration of independence was postponed until March 1932. At the last moment some of the autonomists were

doubtful whether it might not be best to proclaim a republic with P'u Yi as President. In the end, a compromise was reached, P'u Yi taking office as Chih Chêng, or Chief Executive: the new State was for the time to be something between monarchy and republic; the future was to be left to decide what it should finally become.

To many minds the best proof that the independence of Manchukuo is not a Japanese creation (except in so far as the Japanese had opened the way for it and are admittedly helping it to maintain itself) lies in the character of the Emperor's Chinese Ministers. The Premier, Mr. Chêng Hsiao-hsü (not even a Northerner, by the way, but born in Fukien), now well over seventy years old, is one of the most distinguished scholars and poets in China and of unsurpassed personal honour. The Republicans have repeatedly tried to attach him to their Governments for the sake of his great prestige among his fellow-countrymen; but, having served the empire for many years, he always refused. He might, like other ex-officials, have been a wealthy man by now; actually he has never sought to enrich himself, always preferring the Confucian ideal of the Superior Man to worldly emoluments. It is quite impossible to believe that such a man would sell himself or his country to Japan. The same may assuredly be said of Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, mentioned above. Another fine type is the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hsieh Chieh-shih, now fifty-five years old, who took part in General Chang Hsün's attempted restoration.

One interesting inclusion in the Ministry is Mr. Chi-mo-tai-sai-mu-pei-lo, the Mongol. The autonomy movement in Inner Mongolia, embracing all the Mongol princes and nobles, headed by a commanding personality, Prince Teh, a well-educated, energetic man of about thirty-five, is too long to describe fully here. The gist of it is that the Mongols never owed allegiance to China, but only to the Manchus, with whom they were always friendly, while they are decidedly dissatisfied with the Chinese Republicans, whom they accuse of breaking all their agreements with Mongolia. There are already about 1,000,000 Mongols in Manchuria. There will soon be many more. Undoubtedly Inner Mongolia will before long link up with Manchukuo. Sentiment and policy alike dictate it. The combination will be an excellent safeguard for both against Russian infiltration from Outer Mongolia.

The scare of a war between Russia and Japan can only be dealt with very briefly. On the most careful investigation possible, I cannot persuade myself that there is any serious danger of it. That last summer the younger Japanese militarists were deliberately trailing their coats at Russia is certain. They

had visions of seizing the Russian maritime provinces; between Manchuria and the sea, and Saghalien, and thus nicely rounding off the Japanese Empire's sphere of control, with all the seas between her islands and the mainland. But since then two important things have happened—the recognition of the Soviet by America, and the renascence of the civilian element in Japanese counsels. The appointment as Foreign Minister of Mr. Hirota, formerly Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, was extremely important. I do not pretend to know why MM. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov thundered against Japan at the beginning of this year as they did—possibly for obscure purposes of internal propaganda. But it is a fact that, even then, Russo-Japanese relationships had for some weeks been growing calmer, and informal conversations about the vexed question of the Chinese Eastern Railway sale had recommenced between Mr. Hirota and the Russian Ambassador. With the recent release of the Russian officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway arrested by Manchukuo, one may venture to expect the solution of a controversy in which all parties have everything to lose and nothing to gain by quarrelling.²

And what of the young Emperor himself? Two years ago, at the time of his installation as Chief Executive, correspondents described him as a dreamy, poetic-looking youth, giving no evidence of strength of purpose. Yet nine years earlier than that he had been extolled by all Peking for dismissing the palace eunuchs, those proverbial 'rats and foxes' of every dynasty; indeed, no mean achievement on his part. Nor does the interview with Mr. Woodhead quoted above suggest lack of purpose. It is the common opinion of many dispassionate critics who have been brought into touch with His Majesty that the Emperor has developed enormously during the past two years, that he is an ardent worker, insists on being fully informed of all that happens, and is not easily won to any course unless convinced of its reason and justice.

One picturesque touch deserves special mention. Shortly before his enthronement the Emperor received *The Times* correspondent and made a statement on the aims of Manchukuo, which ended thus:

Our primary efforts are directed to make this country a land of contentment, tranquillity and happiness, under the benevolent principles of *Wangtao*.

Now, the doctrine of *Wangtao* (the Way of the King) dates from

² Only the day after these lines had been written, a long and thoughtful survey of Russo-Japanese relations by *The Times* Tokyo correspondent ended with the conclusion that 'experienced foreign observers in Japan do not believe that war is inevitable.'

the time of the Emperors Yao and Shun, who reigned about B.C. 2300-2200—Yao, the democratic emperor, so intent on his people's business that he could not spare time to see his new-born eldest son; Shun, the ploughman emperor, the *beau idéal* of filial duty and self-sacrifice. According to Confucian teaching, the king is the embodiment of love for his fellow-man, so that if one of his subjects hungered it is as if the king had personally deprived him of sustenance; nor can the king have any thought or perform any action which is not directed to the welfare of his subjects. Such, very crudely, is the ideal of *Wangtao*, which has been profoundly discussed in recent times by the scholars of the Manchukuo Government, and is now proclaimed as the fixed rule and purpose of the new State: an impossibly high ideal, no doubt, at any time. But 'a man's reach must exceed his grasp; or what's a heaven for?'

Of the relations between China and Manchuria one can only write speculatively. Not the least distressing part of the events of the past two years and a half is that one must have so much respect for the best members of the Nationalist Party in China, so much sympathy with the terrible 'loss of face' they have suffered in the breaking away of Manchuria, and yet find it impossible to acquit Nationalist China of a large responsibility for the misfortunes she has met.

That many Nationalist leaders are well aware of the fact is undoubted. More than once General Chiang Kai-shek has exclaimed that it is idle for China to think of resisting external aggression until she has set her internal affairs in order. He has earned great unpopularity for his supposed lukewarmness towards Japan, because he was too clear-sighted to attempt by force of arms a resistance which he knew to be equally impossible and disastrous. In recent months there have been distinct signs of approach towards an understanding between Nanking and Tokyo, and there is no doubt that a sort of unofficial *modus vivendi* has been reached in North China, particularly for dealing with marauding Chinese generals south of the Great Wall.

One thing one may venture to predict with certainty—namely, that sooner or later Manchuria and China will reunite. Every step that Japan takes in restoring order and stimulating prosperity in Manchuria will swell the influx of Chinese and increase the confidence and ability of Manchukuo to take its own line. How the reunion will be effected no one can foresee. China has still to hammer out some form of government suitable to the new age which has brought her so many changes and acceptable to her own ancient and unchanging instincts.

O. M. GREEN.

BALKAN IMPRESSIONS

I. BULGARIA

THE city of Sofia has to-day a population of 250,000 and covers an area which could easily house a million. New suburbs are springing up, and are likely before long to extend as far as the slopes of Mount Vitosha. The admirable town planning which is so outstanding a feature of the centre of the city is perhaps less noticeable in recent developments, owing partly to the indifference to the matter shown during the Stambulitsky *régime*, and also to the continuing need of housing refugees as quickly and as cheaply as possible. There is little in many of the shops, and the roads outside the centre still leave much to be desired; but fine business premises and apartment houses, such as are to be seen in the great cities of Central Europe, have lately been erected. There are taxi-cabs for hire, and a visitor returning after ten years is bound to notice a considerable increase of traffic. The historic Church of Sveti Nedelia, which was blown up some years ago, has been rebuilt, and forms a dignified centre for many of the chief commercial streets. The main building of the University is at last completed, and on the outskirts of the city the Faculty of Agriculture is housed under conditions which would do credit to any country in the world. Bulgaria is still to the extent of 80 per cent. of its population agricultural, and the importance of having this department of its University activities well staffed and well equipped cannot be over-estimated.

Sofia, then, has not stood still; and though times are difficult, and the country remains poor and resentful of the burdens and losses imposed by the Peace Treaties, it is yet possible to mark a distinct advance in political stability. To this many statesmen have made their contribution, not least M. André Liaptcheff, whose death in the late autumn was justly regarded as a national misfortune. His Administration had brought a new atmosphere of tolerance and appeasement into Bulgarian politics; and it was his successors in office, who had defeated him at a general election after some years of honest and efficient government, who accorded to him the tribute of a national funeral. M. Malinoff,

though he has retired from the Ministry, remains to-day the outstanding figure in public life, for he first became Prime Minister as long ago as 1908, and enjoys a deservedly high reputation as a man of long experience and high character. His successor, M. Mushanoff, a genial and attractive personality, was during many years M. Malinoff's colleague. During the comparatively short time he has acted as Prime Minister and head of the Foreign Office he has visited Geneva and various foreign capitals, and he has welcomed many official visitors in Sofia. His Cabinet is composed of the representatives of four parties or groups, which has called for no little dexterity in leadership. Good evidence of this is to be found in the Bill, which has recently become law, for the relief of debtors who are unable to pay owing to the national economic crisis. This law sets up a liquidation commission in each town, and debtors are divided into different categories according to the amount of their debt and according to whether they belong to the professional classes, tradesmen, town workers, or agricultural workers. Repayment may be made at periods extending up to fifteen years at rates varying between 6 and 8 per cent. The annuities are to be paid into an amortisation department, which will issue Government bonds for the amounts due to the creditors.

This very complicated scheme aroused criticism both from those who thought it went too far and from those who thought it did not go far enough, but it was no doubt rendered necessary by the gravity of the financial situation. Bulgaria's deficit is 40,000,000 gold francs: 24,000,000 are owing to functionaries for arrears of salary and 11,000,000 to those who were disabled in the war. The public debt is 886,000,000 gold francs, of which 632,000,000 is external and 254,000,000 internal. Cereal prices have fallen 65 per cent. and the prices of cattle and their derivatives 50 per cent. All this, though beyond the Government's control, is bound to react on its popularity. There is growing activity among those who consider that the policy of the Government is too much influenced by its agrarian members. Although no whisper or suggestion attaches to the leading Ministers, there is talk about the corruption which has come into the public life of Bulgaria. When, in hard times like the present, a small administrative post can save a man and his family from starvation, it is not surprising that certain of the Ministries are besieged by needy office seekers. M. Mushanoff can at least retort on his critics that by taking leaders from the Left into his Cabinet he has turned the agrarians, who are now split into five mutually hostile sections, from attacking the social and political structure of the kingdom. And the new phase in Serbo-Bulgar relations, which seems likely to transform the whole Balkan situation (in

which his own part has been distinguished and successful), may well confirm him in power for some time to come.

The position of Bulgaria had become one of complete isolation. To have joined the Little Entente would have appeared to mean acquiescence in the Serbian thesis that the Macedo-Bulgars were in fact not Bulgars at all, and therefore not entitled to minority rights. To the Bulgars themselves it would have seemed a betrayal of their fellow-citizens, separated from them by the mere fortune of war. To have joined the Turks and Greeks, on the other hand, would have been once for all to surrender the right to an *Ægean* outlet reserved for them under the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly. Italian friendship, though welcome, had never been expected in official circles to render any very substantial service. As to France, her whole policy continued to be based on close collaboration with the Little Entente. The isolation of Bulgaria could not continue indefinitely; and she was indeed fortunate to possess at such a moment a capable and single-minded sovereign who was ready and anxious, strictly within the limits of the Constitution and in close harmony with his Ministers, to play his part in the evolution of Bulgaria's foreign policy. The visits he continues to exchange with King Alexander of Yugoslavia and with King Carol of Roumania are laying the foundations upon which their respective statesmen can proceed to build.

Foundations have also been laid in an entirely different direction. Last autumn, under the auspices of the League of Peace through the Churches, a deputation of Yugoslav ecclesiastics, which was headed by Bishop Nikolai of Ochrida, visited Bulgaria at the invitation of the Bulgarian committee of the same league. The chairman is Archbishop Stefan of Sofia—a man still in the prime of life, of great energy and courage. His initiative has met with disapproval in many quarters; but the names of the Exarch Joseph and of Bishop Clement sufficiently attest the tradition of politically active prelates in Bulgaria as elsewhere in the Near East, and the effect certainly appears to have so far been successful. Bishop Nikolai has offered to welcome in his diocese any who may wish to visit friends or relatives there, and, in common with other Macedonian bishops, is content henceforth—so it is stated—to allow the preaching of the sermon and the reading of the Bible in the Macedonian tongue, to recognise the Macedonian form of surname, and to ordain only Macedonian-born priests. Many Macedonians in Bulgaria are sceptical of the power or the willingness of the Yugoslav bishops to implement their promise, but I was informed from the most authoritative source that the undertakings were given with the knowledge and approval of Government. It is also pointed out that the results of the royal visit to Belgrade are meagre—the foundations of a commercial

treaty, a veterinary convention, and an agreement to simplify passport formalities.

As to this, it must be remembered that the new phase has come as unexpectedly to the Yugoslavs as to the Bulgars. If M. Mushanoff risks offending important sections of opinion, so does M. Jevtić. If friendly relations between the two countries may mean that certain hopes which some of the Macedonians had continued to cherish may have to be abandoned, it also means that a state of affairs will have to be recognised and accepted by the Pan-Serbs which they have hitherto obstinately and bitterly contested. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to expect any very startling changes straight-away. But as it is, the changes proposed are highly important. A commercial treaty and veterinary convention would at once throw the Yugoslav railways open to Bulgarian live-stock and farm produce. Even to-day one third of the Bulgarian export trade passes through Yugoslavia—much of it perishable and destined for elsewhere. The treaty will benefit the Yugoslav railways, and Yugoslavia would find a market for furniture, wood for furniture making, and chemical products, taking in exchange seeds, oil, and fodder. Simplification of passport formalities would continue and develop the work which the ecclesiastics have initiated. There is also under consideration a new line from Kustendil which will bring Bulgaria into direct railway communication with Macedonia and would meet the Belgrade-Nish-Salonica line at Koumanovo.

To-day, as for so many years past, the Macedonian question remains behind every other. No agreement would be worth anything that was made over the heads and behind the backs of the Macedonians. Reports from Macedonian sources appear to show, it must be admitted, that the *régime* remains as harsh and oppressive as ever. The Macedonian case is put forward by responsible men of high standing, some of them professional men of international reputation: doctors of law, of medicine, of philosophy, of science; poets, musicians, actors, artists, sculptors, critics. These men, though anxious and apprehensive, are prepared to wait. Even the *comitaji* bands have undertaken that there shall be no further revolutionary action against Serbia before April next. They, too, realise that Governments must carry along with them that public opinion upon which their own authority is based. A generous gesture towards the Macedonian Bulgars to start with—it need be no more than that—will transform the whole situation. An experience of the Balkans which goes back for more than a generation and close personal association with both the Serbian and the Bulgarian people induce a feeling of hopefulness that what has been well begun will be well continued, and that the Serbs will have the courage to be wise,

and the wisdom to be just. If so, that which seemed a Utopian dream only a few short weeks ago may lie immediately ahead in South-Eastern Europe. It depends upon Belgrade.

II. ALBANIA

The changes which ten years have wrought in Tirana render it almost unrecognisable. The traveller of to-day can reach the excellent harbour of Durazzo in a comfortable Italian boat which makes the passage from Bari in nine hours, or he can avail himself of the regular services provided to all the Albanian ports by Greek and Yugoslav lines. From Durazzo, near which a cluster of summer villas has grown up along the bathing beach, it is an hour's motor run to the capital. Tirana, the creation of King Zog, has been laid out on modern lines. Half-way down its course the main boulevard is interrupted by a large circular area in which, around a central space which still awaits development, are grouped half a dozen administrative buildings which house the Government offices as well as the prefecture and the town-hall. The boulevard which crosses this almost at right angles is destined for the hotels, banks and chief commercial houses, and bears the name of Edith Durham Street. At present it is a strange medley of old and new, but the place is taking shape, and if ever prosperity comes to Albania her citizens will have reason to be proud of Tirana. Graceful evidence of the gratitude felt towards, not merely Miss Durham (whose name in years to come is likely to remain closely bound up with the story of the foundation of the State), but towards other friends in this country, Lady Carnarvon, Lord Cecil, Lord Grey, Colonel Aubrey Herbert, is apparent everywhere. Much money has no doubt been needlessly spent in Tirana: the lines on which it is laid out are too grandiose. The Italians are blamed for this. It is asserted, not merely that the money loaned from Italy was spent on Italian material and that a large proportion of the money earned went to Italians, but that Italy deliberately encouraged extravagance in order the more easily to get the country under her control. Such talk is no doubt very exaggerated; but nobody can visit Albania without realising that throughout all classes there is a strong anti-Italian spirit.

The story of Italy's relations with Albania since the Peace Conference (to go back no further) may be summarised shortly as follows: The Conference decided at the end of 1919 to recognise the independence of Albania under an Italian mandate. This was resented throughout the country, and in the following spring Italy reduced her forces and concentrated in the coastal towns. There was fighting in Valona, in which the Albanians

had the advantage. The representative Congress of Lushnja definitely refused to recognise the mandate, and moved the capital from Durazzo to Tirana. Italy finally evacuated the whole country except the island of Sasseno, which she still retains. In December, largely owing to the insistent activities of Colonel Herbert, Lord Cecil, Miss Durham and others, Albania became a member of the League of Nations. In the summer of 1921 there was a rising in the north, and Serbian troops entered Albanian territory in its support. There followed a Conference of Ambassadors in Paris in November, which appointed a Frontier Delimitation Commission and made the important declaration that the violation of Albania's frontiers or of her independence might constitute a danger for the strategic security of Italy. In the event of Albania's territorial security being infringed, and subject to the authorisation of the Council of the League, the restoration of Albania's territorial frontiers was to be entrusted to Italy. Serbian troops thereupon left Albania, and a Government was formed which included Ahmed Bey Zogu, the present King, and Mgr. Fan Noli.

Three years later intrigues, this time on the part of Italy, led to a rising. Ahmed Bey, who took a leading part in it, fled the country and took refuge in Serbia, while Fan Noli formed a Government which was considered pro-Italian. Six months later, however, Ahmed Bey returned with Serbian connivance, overthrew Fan Noli, and was proclaimed President. He showed himself ready to work in touch with Yugoslavia or Italy, or any other country which would show itself prepared to help Albania to develop its economic resources, and only when he had failed with the Serbs did he turn to the Italians. In May 1925 an agreement was signed with the Society for the Economic Development of Albania (S.V.E.A) for a public works loan of 50,000,000 gold francs. This loan financed the town planning and building of Tirana, the harbour of Durazzo, as well as numerous roads and bridges. Under the Pact of Tirana of November 27, 1926, Italy undertook to maintain for a period of five years the political and territorial status of Albania, and in November 1927 a treaty of defensive alliance was made between the two countries. Ahmed Bey was offered the crown in September of the following year as 'King of the Albanians,' thus indicating a claim to the allegiance of some 800,000 Albanians in the Kossovo area of Yugoslavia and 120,000 in Greece.¹ Finally, in this sequence of events a loan agreement was concluded with the Italian Government in June 1931, under terms of which the Italians engaged to advance a sum not exceeding 100,000,000 gold francs free of interest, in

¹ The numbers to-day are, it is claimed, 600,000 to 700,000 and 30,000 to 40,000 respectively.

annual instalments not to exceed 10,000,000, for cultural and economic purposes.

It is impossible to read the short summary given above without realising that Albania was completely in the hands of Italy. Perhaps no other course was feasible. Economic development was necessary if the country was to live, and only from Italy could the money be obtained. It was after the conclusion of the second loan that the Albanians appear to have woken up to the reality of the situation. They refused to renew the Pact of Tirana, and Italy thereupon began to turn the screw. In 1932 she drew attention to the fact that no interest had been paid on the S.V.E.A. loan and offered to consent to a moratorium on terms. The terms were that she should take over the sugar, electrical and telegraph monopolies, that she should exercise the right to colonise Albania, that there should be Italian organisers in the Ministries, that the French schools should be shut, that the teaching of Italian should be compulsory. Another demand was that the English officers in charge of the gendarmerie should be sent away. This force of 3000 young men, which has been developed by General Percy on foundations laid by Colonel Sterling, has always been an offence to certain (though not to all) of the Italian officers who have trained the Albanian army; but the service it renders by inculcating pride in a uniform which typifies an entirely new tradition, and by developing a national as distinct from a merely local patriotism, is of enormous value. The Italian terms roused intense indignation in all quarters. Italy at once withheld the instalment of money due under the terms of the second loan, and Albania retaliated by taking over all the schools, a step which involved hardship to many long-established institutions, such as the Jesuit School in Scutari and the American School run by Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy in Korcha. The Albanians responded to the crisis, and it is claimed that there are to-day over 46,000 pupils in the State primary schools, 4700 in the secondary schools, and many hundreds studying in foreign universities. The contracts of Italian officials employed in Government offices are not likely to be renewed, and from this certain departments of the Administration will no doubt suffer. Most important of all, a great and continuing effort is being made to balance the budget, which has been reduced from 32,000,000 gold francs in 1932 to 23,000,000 in 1933. Of the 32,000,000 francs 14,000,000 represented expenditure on the army, which for the current year has been reduced to 6,500,000 francs. Official salaries are cut down 30 per cent., and an ambitious scheme is in hand for calling up arrears of taxation. It is proposed to collect 10 per cent. of arrears up to 1924, 70 per cent. between 1924 and 1931, and all arrears since that

date, which is clear evidence of an entirely new spirit in fiscal administration.

There is, of course, opposition to the Government, though it is not openly expressed. Apart from the charge that it is pro-Italian (which may be disregarded), it is pointed out that taxation has doubled during its term of office. The deficit to-day is 13,000,000 gold francs, which with an expenditure of 23,000,000 francs amounts to 36,000,000 francs. Revenue amounts to 18,000,000 francs. Apart altogether from loan interest, there is a deficit of some 18,000,000 francs. Whatever the extravagance of the past, to-day rigid economy and the lightening of fiscal burdens is the aim of the Administration. Thirdly, there are charges of favouritism, of corruption and of graft. Old traditions die hard, and the type of pasha who was a power in Turkish times is not yet extinct. But it is fair to say that Ministers for the most part make a favourable impression. M. Evangjeli, the Prime Minister, is a patriotic and high-minded veteran who has behind him a life's service to Albania. M. Xhafer Vila, the Foreign Minister, is the typical efficient official who has attained his position by merit and character, and is only too conscious of the weight of his responsibilities. The strong man of the Government is M. Musa Juka, Minister of the Interior. His enemies assert that he is ruthless in his methods of obtaining information and in dealing with opponents; but he is a likeable personality who lives for his work and does not spare himself. In Tirana to-day the visitor meets the new generation side by side with the old: M. Mehdi Frasheri, President of the Council of State (governor of Palestine before the war), and M. Nepravishta, the still youthful-looking mayor of the city, grave and saturnine, determined to make his mark in Tirana as he has already done elsewhere. The many difficulties with which these men are faced are enhanced by the refugees who have come, entirely without means of subsistence, from Kossovo. Prices are often farcical. A horse sometimes sells for 20 to 40 francs and a sheep for 6 francs.

In Tirana there is little chance of hearing the Italian case, but it is easy to imagine what it would be. The Italians would no doubt point out that they have lent large sums, sometimes without interest. They have advised, organised, instructed, developed and guided. They have received no return in interest; they have not even received thanks. They would say that whatever is worth anything in Albania to-day—buildings, bridges, harbours, roads, drainage—is Italian work done with Italian money. To this the Albanians reply that the money spent was not Italian money, but their own money which they loaned and for which they will have to pay 13 per cent. interest. The rela-

tionship with Italy was an ordinary commercial relationship which would not in any circumstance call for thanks; but, in fact, the money, they have come to realise, was under Italian guidance to a large extent spent unwisely and sometimes uselessly. The Italian Press trumpets with such stridency the successes of Signor Mussolini that his mistakes are apt to be overlooked; and Fascist Italy, which has failed to conciliate her German or Slav minorities, has badly bungled her opportunities in Albania. There were officials—and they are gratefully remembered—who came in a helpful spirit to collaborate in an important constructive effort; but for the most part the Italians gave the impression that their only purposes in the country were to serve Italy's strategic or commercial interests.

Here, then, is the situation: a little country at cross purposes with its most important neighbour. Albania, it is clear, must, consistently with her just pride as an independent State, a member of the League, use all endeavours to put her relations with Italy on a sound foundation of co-operation and good-will. To economise rigidly is her first task, and if the programme envisaged by the Government is carried out and the budget is balanced, a few years of balanced budgets will put Albania's credit on a new footing. If a serious attempt can be made to develop the tobacco industry, to grow cotton, to increase production of dairy and agricultural produce, and to encourage tourist traffic, it may be possible before long to begin to pay off the Italians. Many impartial observers have thought that Albania would be stronger without any army at all, and that the present force of 6000 to 10,000 men might merely provide a hostile neighbour with an excuse for invasion. The Albanians, however, are unwilling to dispense with it, and consider that to do so would be inconsistent with the dignity of the kingdom. The personality of the sovereign is outstanding. Though little seen in public, it is he who controls the Government and directs policy. Nothing could be more unlike the popular idea of the leader of the warlike Mati tribe than this handsome, rather delicate-looking man, with his soft voice and evidences of high breeding. It has recently been reported that Mgr. Fan Noli, in distress, has applied to King Zog and that King Zog has responded with good will. If this is so, it provides striking evidence of the King's good sense and magnanimity. The time for parliamentary government as understood in this country has not yet arrived in Albania. An energetic and patriotic king, as is the case to-day, guiding the policy of honest and capable Ministers, is probably best for the country; but a still more pronounced break with the past must be made before it can truthfully be said that this ideal has been fully attained.

Competent judges have asserted that Albania is not *viable*, and it is true that the experiment of erecting a little Moslem State in the heart of Europe has still to justify itself. Yet the Romans, the Byzantines, the Venetians, and the Turks have all ruled, but never dominated, the Albanians. The constructive service they can supply finds its equal among the members of no other Near Eastern race. Perhaps the most hopeful feature is the attitude of the younger generation—men and women with a post-war outlook. The difficult situation with Italy has pulled the country together. Moslem and Christian, Tosk and Gheg, mountain and plain, these old distinctions mean little to the Albania of to-day. If this new mentality persists and grows, and if it can show itself in balanced budgets and honest government, a hopeful view can still be taken of the future. It will be possible to apply to Albania the proud motto of the city of Paris: '*Fluctuat nec mergitur.*'

EDWARD BOYLE.

CENTRES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED

It is now just over two years since the Prince of Wales launched his appeal at the Albert Hall for a national effort to 'split up the problem of unemployment into little pieces,' and in that time some progress has been made with the centres on the need for which he laid stress. Speaking again this year on the anniversary of the Albert Hall meeting, the Prince was able to claim that there were now in existence throughout the country some 2000 schemes of one kind and another. It is difficult to get exact figures, but, working on an average of fifty active members per centre, which is probably a conservative figure, this gives a total of 100,000 men. In the area of Greater London there are some 250 centres with a total active membership of about 12,500. Thus throughout the country something rather less than 5 per cent. of the unemployed are attending the centres, although it is probably safe to say that as many more again have passed through them and returned to the ranks of the employed, either permanently or temporarily. The National Council of Social Service, the London Council for Voluntary Occupation during Unemployment, the various regional and local committees, and the centres themselves, have all acquired some practical experience of the problem with which they are dealing. The essential machinery has been called into existence, the good-will of subscribers and voluntary workers has been enlisted, and the movement is fairly launched.

It is obviously undesirable at this, and probably at any, stage to attempt to lay down hard-and-fast rules for a voluntary movement of this kind. Conditions vary immensely in different parts of the country, and there is everything to be said for encouraging each locality to cope with its own problem in its own way. In his recent talk on the wireless the Prince outlined certain general lines of development, with which most people who have any experience of this work will be in full agreement:

The so-called 'occupational' centres should develop into proper clubs, each with its own management committee and duly elected membership; each with its own canteen, its workshops, its rooms for educational and social activities. Standing behind the clubs of a town, and represented on the committee of each, there is needed the town's committee, or local

Council of Social Service, for the clubs cannot develop as they should without the backing of the whole community. I hope that the membership of these clubs will not be confined to people who are unemployed. Provision for the needs of members during periods of unemployment will, of course, be a characteristic feature, but we must determine not to let unemployed people feel that they need separate clubs.

The Prince concluded with the words:

A great deal has been done. There has been a wide and generous response to my appeal. New interests have been awakened and fresh heart kindled in tens of thousands. But we must not be content until we have good clubs everywhere. Let self-help go hand in hand with mutual service.

It may be of interest at this stage to give some personal impressions of a centre which is typical of many in London. Last year I gave a certain amount of time to the afternoon classes for the unemployed that had been started at the Working Men's College.¹ These classes constituted an 'educational' centre, and there is no doubt that they met a considerable demand. This year I have devoted the greater part of such time as I could spare to a centre of a different type. The Mary Ward Settlement in St. Pancras had contrived to sandwich in an 'occupational' centre for unemployed men, amongst the numerous other social activities for which they were responsible. At the Working Men's College the principal weight had been laid on languages, history, economics, science and such subjects, and the course was extended to include current events, music, and a few commercial subjects, such as shorthand, typing, book-keeping and so forth. At the Mary Ward Settlement centre we started from the more utilitarian end. The following is a list of the various classes that are now being run at this centre (the figures are for average attendances):

Physical training (15)	One class in Swedish drill, and an advanced class doing apparatus work—horse, parallel bars, etc.
Football	We have tried to get this going without much success. Many of our members get regular football at the week-ends, and there is a tendency for men to join for football only, which is discouraged.
Carpentering (20)	This has been extremely successful, and we are starting an advanced class in cabinet making.
Theory of motors (14)	A demonstration chassis and engine are available, and we are splitting the class into two parts—elementary and advanced.

¹ See my article, 'Classes for the Unemployed,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1933.

Wireless, theoretical and practical. (12)	This class also is being divided into elementary and advanced.
Metal work	Just starting, in answer to an insistent demand on the part of members. It will be rather circumscribed, owing to premises being unsuitable for installing lathes or forges.
Boot repairing	This started as a class under an instructor. Members now have sufficient skill to carry on with repairing their own and their families' boots by themselves, as and when required, and to give necessary instruction to new members.
Musical-pipe making. (7)	
Play reading (10)	Members performed a short sketch at a party given before Christmas.
Discussion on current events.	I lectured on this subject at the Working Men's College last year and had a regular attendance. Lectures have not been popular at the Mary Ward centre, and discussion was tried instead. Attendance varies widely, depending largely on what is 'news' at the moment; but good value is sometimes obtained.
Concert party	It was hoped to get a regular concert party going from amongst members. A certain amount of talent is available and a performance was given before Christmas, but attendance is desultory. Success will be dependent on getting the right voluntary helpers to run it.
*Poster and sign writing class.	Being started.

The classes are held from 2.30 to 4.30 p.m., after which time the premises are required for a boys' club. The average daily attendance in the afternoons is about fifty men. Lately it has been found possible to open the carpenters' shop in the mornings from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., and the average attendance is ten men. There is an obvious need for at least another hour in the afternoons and for the use of premises in the evenings. Several members have asked about the possibility of evening classes, but have been unwilling to attend the existing evening classes at the settlement or elsewhere. This seems to spring partly from a sort of club feeling and partly from a sense of shyness on the part of unemployed men, which makes many of them unwilling to associate with their more fortunate fellows who are in work. The solution of the difficulty lies in our ability to secure the use of premises in the evenings, where our unemployed members can associate with those of their number who have succeeded in

getting back into work. The total number of men who have enrolled amounts to some 200, all of whom have paid or are paying their entrance fee of 6*d.*, which we accept in instalments of 1*d.* per week. The active membership at the moment amounts to just under 100, the majority of whom attend two or three times a week. The great bulk of the men are more or less unskilled manual workers of one kind or another. We have recruited some forty new members since Christmas, partly through personal visits of the superintendent to the local labour exchanges and partly through the good offices of our existing members.

We have laid stress on the need for interesting the men themselves in the running and management of the centre. A committee of the men's representatives sits once a week, with myself or the superintendent in the chair, and deals with all current matters. This committee brings forward suggestions for new classes, appoints stewards, runs the teas—we provide members with a cup of tea and a piece of cake for 1*d.*, both in the morning and the afternoon—and even administers a small petty cash account held by the superintendent. Recently a case arose where a member was offered work, his acceptance of which was conditional on his being able to get his tools out of pawn. The sum involved was 16*s.*, which he was quite unable to raise. He brought the matter before the committee, which went into it and decided to redeem the tools for him, after assuring itself of the *bona fides* of the offer of employment and after extracting adequate guarantees for the refund of the sum by weekly instalments. The case was dealt with in a thoroughly businesslike fashion. Our experience is that it is quite possible to find men who are capable of taking responsibility if properly backed.

There is much less suspicion on the part of the men than there was last year. But it is still difficult to keep any detailed statistics of their goings and comings, their jobs and so forth, which would be very interesting and would help one to form an accurate picture of their situation. Nevertheless, from one's own observation and from what one hears, it is possible to form a general idea. The great bulk of the men with whom we are dealing are normally in casual or seasonal employment. They are mostly under thirty, and few of them have any record of continuous work. It is doubtful if half of the jobs that they get are obtained through the labour exchanges, although, of course, they are all registered there. In many cases there appears to be not the slightest relation between one job and the next. For instance, one of our men told me that during the same year he had obtained employment as a delivery-van driver, a railway dining-car attendant, and as groom to a Territorial colonel. Another man told me that within twelve months he had been motor driver,

assistant to a photographer, and fish-frier. Both of these were good men, rather above the average. But this tendency towards being a Jack of all trades is very general amongst them. Many have a smattering of more than three trades; very few are confined to one. The widely differing choice of activities would appear to be due to a conscious attempt on the part of men, who recognise that they are more or less condemned to a life of casual or seasonal work, to fit themselves for as many jobs as there are seasons and thus to contrive to insure continuous work. But this very dispersion of their energies prevents them from acquiring sufficient skill in any one line to be able to hope for permanent work. Just before Christmas and in the summer months there is a general exodus of men from the centre. The plucking of geese and turkeys is a common Christmas job; the driving of an ice-cream outfit gives many of them a few weeks' work in the summer. From time to time, but all too rarely, one of them gets on to work that offers more chance of permanence. When this occurs he often contrives to hold it down; but, of course, this kind of good fortune more frequently comes the way of the younger men.

One still all too commonly hears the opinion expressed that the majority of those who are unemployed are unemployable. Of course, nobody who has had any experience of this kind of work would deny that there are men who come into this category. The longer a man continues to lead this sort of life, the less likely is he to be fit for permanent and regular work. Some of the older men may even come to like constant change, though they hate the uncertainty involved; and a man does not grow fat on the dole. But the great bulk of the younger men whom we get, particularly the married ones, have only one ambition—to find regular work and be quit for ever of the sickening sense of uncertainty, the attendance at labour exchanges, and the demoralising round of calling on possible employers. I do not think that our men are an unrepresentative sample. They are keen on what they take up, and the only trouble that we have ever had with them has been due to the overdeveloped sense of humour of one or two individuals, and has been very easily dealt with. Perhaps it is true to say that one finds them to be more or less what one goes out expecting to meet. If one starts on the assumption that they are good fellows, and treats them as such, on the whole they seem to fit the picture. If one starts with the opposite premise, one is also unlikely to be disappointed. If an employer describes them as unemployable, it is probable that, in most cases, what he really means is that they are unskilled or untrained, and he is unable or unwilling to give them the necessary skill or training that would fit them to do the work he requires.

Under existing conditions this is a perfectly comprehensible point of view.

It is perhaps worth while at this stage summing up a rough idea of what we have been able to do for these men. We have started a centre with a club atmosphere; they have paid their entrance subscriptions and feel that they have a voice in the management. They can come in and find some way of turning their enforced leisure to good account when they are out of work. There are a few papers about, we have started a lending library, and they get their teas and meet their friends, but what they really want is something solid to do. After all, any man is dependent for his self-respect on being able to feel that he has done something that he recognises as being worth-while doing and that he has done it to the best of his ability. Many of them have acquired more skill at some craft of which they already had a smattering; many of them have been introduced to a craft for the first time in their lives. We have also gone some way towards earning their confidence, and there is a demand for advice on questions relating to unemployment insurance benefit and many other matters. Many of them harbour the most extraordinary prejudices on every subject under the sun, including, of course, the employment exchanges and their functions, which is perhaps not surprising, all things considered.

A man I know told me that not long ago he struck a bad patch and was unemployed for ten months on end. He spent the first three or four weeks in feverish activity, writing letters to all manner of addresses and making personal applications for work. When nothing happened he gradually became apathetic, until, finally, he spent a large portion of each day lying on his bed. In the end a job turned up, curiously enough as a result of one of the letters he had written in the first days of his spell of unemployment. He took it on, and within a week of starting work he collapsed and was removed to hospital. His trouble was solely due to the nervous strain he had undergone. Fortunately he was up again within a few days and his employer had kept the job open for him. A man attending a centre is, at any rate, spared the worst ordeal—that of facing his trouble alone.

Our ambition is to enlarge our scope and membership by obtaining the use of some suitable premises, such as a disused factory. The men themselves would fit this up as required and make the essential furniture, which they are quite capable of doing. It might even be possible to find room to construct some quarters where single men could live in. We have several single members who are living in furnished lodgings, sometimes three in a room, and where they are paying as much as 7s. a week each, without food. We could certainly provide them with better

accommodation at a lower cost. We should like to have our own canteen, providing meals to such of our members as required them. The whole place could be run by the men themselves under the supervision of the superintendent, who might also live on the premises. Classes would be held in the evenings as well as the afternoons, and we should hope that a number of our members would attend the former whilst in work and thus follow up what they had begun during their spell of unemployment. We should also fit in some social activities from time to time, such as concerts, popular lectures, and the like, to which their wives and families might come. Such a place might form a sort of community centre, and, if the premises were large enough, we might amalgamate with other local centres. There is very little doubt that this would meet a real need and that it could be developed on sound lines without overlapping or interfering with the work of other institutions in the St. Pancras district of a more orthodox educational nature, such as the Working Men's College. Indeed, we would hope to establish a liaison with these other institutions so that our members could attend such of their classes as they required, whilst their members could come to us for any of the subjects in which we specialised. The realisation of this ambition is dependent on further finance in the form of voluntary contributions.

So far, so good. Such a scheme in itself would be no small contribution to our most pressing social problem. It would deal as adequately as possible with the 'meantime' problem. But one's mind inevitably turns to the main question—the fact that these men are unemployed, or, at best, underemployed. Even a material increase of business activity in this country would merely alleviate the hardships of most of them; it would not solve their problem, that of obtaining continuous employment. When one considers the main question of unemployment, one finds oneself up against all manner of difficulties. We are teaching many of these men the rudiments of a craft. The knowledge thus acquired is undoubtedly invaluable to them as a hobby, but it might also, in the case of many of them, form the groundwork for a training that would enable them to exchange the precarious prospects of an unskilled worker for the relatively greater security of a craftsman. But in that case we should probably find ourselves up against the formidable opposition of the trades union movement, whose members are naturally jealous of the prospect of any considerable addition to the number of competitors for the jobs that are available. Comparatively few of the men who attend the centres for the unemployed are trades union members, though they are more strongly represented at educational institutions like the Working Men's College and Morley College. Then again,

it is impossible for a centre to sell the products of the labour of its members. We are confined to making things for personal use and for institutions, such as hospitals, that are dependent on voluntary contributions.

At a recent meeting² of the Royal Statistical Society a very interesting paper, called 'The Interpretation of the Statistics of Unemployment,' was read by Mr. J. A. Dale, C.B.E., which concluded with the words:

... The spectacle is not that of a body of industrial workers, two million strong, who are wholly unemployed and surplus to industry. Indeed, if two million workers were suddenly removed from industry there would be a serious shortage of labour. The spectacle is rather one of six million workers, the half of the insured population, who are unemployed for longer or shorter periods during a year, some of them suffering little and others of them severely. What the remedial measures should be is another story, but one does feel tempted to say two things. The first is that it is just as wrong to assume that the whole of the country is depressed as to overlook the problem of the depressed areas. The second is that before any large scheme of public relief works is started it is well to ask how many of the unemployed both could and would work on it. It must be clear from what has been said that it would be a surprisingly small number.

Our experience at the Mary Ward Settlement centre, and the experience of many other centres in London, tends to bear out these conclusions. The depressed areas are a problem apart—we are not considering them for the moment. But in London the picture is roughly this: about one half of the insured population consists of men who are in more or less continuous work, whereas the other half are constantly circulating in and out of work of any and every description and expending a vast deal of energy in chasing round after jobs which, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, can never be anything but temporary. The employment exchanges are the agencies officially responsible for administering this pool of labour, and they struggle manfully with their task. But they are handicapped by the fact that they are dealing principally with unskilled men, who, in the nature of things, must represent to them little more than numbers in a book. This is borne out by the complaint that one constantly hears from the men—that the exchanges are 'soulless machines.' In the same way, when dealing with men in these categories, it is not unnatural that the employer of labour will, in most cases, prefer to choose his men himself from the numbers who present themselves to him every day for his inspection. The result of this state of affairs must be a tremendous waste of time and energy and involve the constant fitting of round pegs into square holes.

² December 19, 1933.

Everyone will admit that the only sovereign remedy for unemployment is an increase in the total amount of work available, but, in the last resort, any really substantial increase must depend on foreign trade, a factor over which we can never hope to have complete control. The organisation of this pool of labour is admittedly a colossal task, and there are obvious difficulties involved; but here, at any rate, we are dealing with factors that are under our potential control. The fact that our population has now ceased to expand makes the problem at once easier and more urgent. It is fairly plain that much could be done in this direction, and that, whatever the future holds in store, work done in this field would materially increase our national efficiency.

In this connexion it is interesting to note that the few training and reconditioning schemes that are being run by the Ministry of Labour and by some local authorities have been generally successful. So far, these have chiefly been confined to volunteers from the distressed areas. Nevertheless, a high percentage of men have been placed in permanent jobs after undergoing a six months' course. It would, of course, obviously be useless to train men and place them if this were to result in other men being thrown out of employment. But there is no reason to suppose that this is occurring. There are industries, particularly in the south of England, that are far more likely to expand than to contract in the future, such as wireless, motor cars and aircraft, all of which require a high percentage of skilled workers whom they find it difficult to get. Owing to the decay of the system of apprenticeship this question of training for industry is of great importance, and it would appear to be a natural development of the future that industry itself should take an active interest in the work.

One of the most interesting features of the new Unemployment Bill is that (for the first time) it makes training a condition of benefit for juveniles who fall out of work. This would appear to be an important step, and it may well be that it foreshadows the extension of the principle of industrial training to some of the adult unemployed who have exhausted their insurance and are drawing benefit, though in the case of adults there is everything to be said for keeping training on a voluntary basis. It is unfortunate that the whole of this question of unemployment is befogged by political controversy, because the problem would appear to remain essentially the same under any political system that can be envisaged. The 'pool of labour' has got to be sorted out and administered with the maximum efficiency—in the interests of the men themselves, of industry, of the taxpayer, and of the finances of the country.

It is precisely this 'pool of labour' that is being touched by the unemployed centres and analogous schemes. Their work at

the present moment is best described as cultural, in the broadest sense of that overworked word, and, as far as I know, there has been no conscious thought that it might have any wider utility. But, in the nature of things, the work that is being done involves a measure of organisation, probably about the only widespread form of organisation in existence amongst the class of men concerned. Of course, much of the work and the organisation is very rudimentary as yet, but it is improving all the time, and everything must have a beginning. The social history of this country abounds in instances where voluntary effort has stepped into the breach and undertaken pioneer work, which is later recognised officially and finds a permanent place in the national scheme of things. Two outstanding examples are the employment exchanges themselves and unemployment and health insurance. Nor is there any particular reason why such work should in every case lose its voluntary character. In this particular case the voluntary aspect of the work is of great importance.³ One cannot help wondering whether this movement may not ultimately prove to be of at least as great utility as the two examples quoted.

Two possibilities spring to one's mind: First, might not the centres materially assist the employment exchanges in their very difficult task by providing what they lack—personal knowledge of the individual men, their capacities and capabilities? Secondly, might they not assist in any scheme that may later materialise for the training of such men as are likely to benefit by it? The actual training in the voluntary centres would probably have to be confined to the elementary, but they would provide an ideal recruiting agency, and it would be a great incentive to effort if vacancies in properly constituted training centres could be allotted to men who were recommended by, and had passed a certain standard in, the unemployed centres.

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³ I would make an exception here in the case of men who should properly be described as 'unemployable.' Obviously, voluntary schemes can do little to assist them.

THE BREEDING OF MEN

OF all the variety of possible human relationships there is one which we all experience at least from one side—the relationship of parent and child. While this relationship has in literature been treated for a considerable period in terms of sentimentality or disgust according to the intimate circumstances of the writer, it is only rather lately that it has been treated in a numerical way. It may be of interest, therefore, to consider in quite general terms some of the notions which come to people who think about this relation in this way. People thus engaged are in a particularly happy situation if they enjoy trouble, as they can be practically certain of offending somebody's ideas of propriety every time they open their mouths. For genetics, whatever may be its shortcomings, at least makes two suggestions about men and women. It inevitably irritates the more sloppy of theorists by remarking that all men are not equal, and proceeds to enrage people of the opposite turn of mind by suggesting that their inequalities are perhaps in kind, and certainly in distribution, by no means all that their ideal could wish. One of the inequalities which engages the attention of the inquiring geneticist when contemplating mankind is an inequality in fertility. It is difficult to observe the generation of living things without noticing that, on the whole, the relation between parent and child is one of similarity. Not least among the achievements of the last fifty years has been the perception that while this similarity is often masked it is none the less real; that such things as the colour of one's hair behave through a series of generations as genetic particulars whose identity may be hidden but whose persistence is the persistence of life.

It is this conception of genetic particulars, this particulate theory of heredity, which has superseded the older idea of an heredity whose mechanism permitted the blending of the inherited factors as the mechanism of environment permits a blending of their expression in an animal, a plant, or a man. When pink flowers are produced by crossing red and white strains, the blend is the result of the modified expression of two factors, red and white, which keep their integrity and which can

be recovered as good as new to give successive generations of flowers as red and as white as their ancestors. The degree of our fertility can be profitably considered as a characteristic dependent upon genetic particulars just as can the colour of our eyes or the colour of a flower. The number of children which each of us will have before we die depends at this moment upon many things, but one of these things is the set of genetic peculiarities which we have physically received from our parents. Time and chance happeneth to all men, but all men do not present time and chance with the same stuff to fashion.

This fact of the heritable nature of fertility has most curious and interesting consequences among us, because man has adopted one of at least two possible methods of forming a closely-knit society. There are in Nature two chief kinds of community, two great plans upon which a society of individuals can work. One large and very successful group of animals (the insects) have adopted one plan and we have adopted the other. The difference between these two plans is a difference between the kinds of provision they make for the relation between parent and child. In the insects—for instance, among the bees and ants—parenthood has been commonly divorced from other activities and concentrated in a few individuals while the rest of the work of the community is done by the remainder. In most other gregarious animals—for instance, in man—this has not been done, and everybody has a chance of both jobs. It is just this distinction which seems to have escaped the sociologist who addressed to people of a less objectionable metabolic *tempo* than his own the advice: 'Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise.' He does not seem to have realised that a great many of the activities of an ant in a society where sexual processes are concentrated in a special caste are quite inappropriate to a reformed sluggard in a society where they are not. In the case of the ant the amount of work she does or the amount of luck she has, and the resulting respect or detestation in which she is held in the community, will have no effect whatever on the contribution she will make to the genetic composition of future generations of the community. Whatever happens she will make none. In man, on the contrary, the more reformed the sluggard, the more sterile he becomes.

The civilisation of the bees, therefore, so long as the reproductive caste remains sufficiently fertile to replace wastage, is potentially stable. The civilisation of man, so long as what that civilisation holds up as virtues are accompanied by infertility, is not. While it is by no means clear that the stability of man's civilisation is the greatest possible good on any cosmic sort of scale, yet as we are all men and rather civilised it may be of

interest to inquire further about the nature of this instability. In a society where individual effort is rewarded by individual gain, and which has the institution of hereditary wealth, successful persons very soon find that they can have a better time themselves and give their children a better time and a better start in life if those children are few than if they are many. This will be less pressing a matter in a world which is rapidly expanding, as was the world of the last century, than in a world which is rapidly shutting up, as is our world to-day. It is perfectly obvious that infertility is at this moment in England very closely associated indeed with a safe position and a high degree of comfort. In cold fact, people from the skilled artisan classes upward have fewer children than the quite unskilled. This may easily be seen by looking at such figures, for instance, as those given by Carr Saunders at the World Population Conference at Geneva in 1927. He cites the position in the railway community. Here, within this single industry, is a microcosm showing just this tendency. If a standard of fertility be taken as 100, then it is found that officials and clerks have a fertility of 78; engine-drivers, guards and signalmen, 91 to 98; pointsmen, 98; gangers, labourers and porters, 101 to 109.

These figures show very clearly the relation between a good position and low fertility. They are not nearly such good evidence that a poorer social position is always related so closely with a very high degree of fertility. This is very important to remember. It was usual not so long ago to suggest that humanity, or at least Western civilisation, was sliding headlong to destruction and was being swallowed up in a mass of physical and mental inferiority. These mournful prognostications should be taken with reserve. Some of them, at least, were based upon statistics whose significance was not properly understood. Having avoided the pitfalls which beset the path of the scaremonger, we are, however, left with the inescapable conclusion that a good position is linked with low fertility.

Now this seems to come about in two distinct modes: either as an immediate concomitant of these people's physiological make-up or by the design of normally fertile people. For the geneticist the difference between these two alternative modes is much less important than might be thought at first glance. As an example of the first mode we may remark on what happens when a man marries an heiress. This is one of the quickest and safest ways up the social ladder in western Europe and America. But what are its biological consequences? Simply that this man (and incidentally the sense that made him marry the girl) is removed from large-scale parenthood. The heiress comes of an infertile family. If she had brothers and sisters she would not be

an heiress. She will have few children, and any she has will tend to be infertile. This strikingly simple point was first made by Francis Galton in 1892. He noticed that though the average age at which the judges in England married was very late, yet they had quite large families. From this he concluded that their potential fertility must be very high. Nevertheless, it could easily be shown that those judges who attained to the peerage did not confer any degree of immortality on the lines they founded. It was here that the heiress appeared. As the judge's daughter-in-law, she brought money to support the title and sterility to bring it to an end.

In the second mode a man may deliberately avoid children from fear, from dislike of the inconveniences entailed, from a lack of faith in the future, or because he is unwilling to sacrifice his motor car or the pictures on Saturday night. It is fashionable to call this selfishness; the idea, apparently, being that the unselfish man would consider the desire of the unborn to be born before the desire of the born to be removed from reality in cinemas or from life in collisions. People of this turn of mind will have few children, and any that they do have will be, on the whole, like them. This is what is meant by saying that society is always dying away at the top.

Since the continuance of any society depends upon a constant supply of recruits to replace the wastage of death, it is obvious that the character of the population of the future depends upon the character of that part of the present population which will be the parents of the future. In the case of man the future population is not produced by a small insulated caste as it is in bees, and neither is it produced by that section of the community which displays those peculiarities which the community, rightly or wrongly, holds out as admirable. It will be produced by the great mass of wholly undistinguished people—by 'the unassuming cuss in the corner of the 'bus'—and not by you and me. It is because of this inconsistency between those peculiarities which society holds out as admirable, and those which genetically it encourages, that society is unstable. It cannot indefinitely survive unchanged the constant procession through itself of the peculiarities which it rewards, up to the top and out into oblivion.

Having seen, then, that the future lies with the children of the great mass at present young, let us examine their character. Now, the character of this mass has changed. It has changed very perceptibly indeed during the last century or so—an exceedingly short time to the geneticist. To understand the nature and extent and meaning of these changes it may be well to glance for a moment at the kind of mechanism which seems to keep many animal populations more or less stable.

Animal populations are often kept to a reasonable size, and within their food supply, not by the direct action of starvation, but by the operation of disease and enemies. Suppose you put two healthy rabbits on a small island and let them breed, they will go on increasing until one morning one rabbit eats the last blade of grass, and then they will all die. If, on the other hand, the original pair were infected with tape-worm (as nearly all rabbits are), as the rabbit population goes up, so will go up the chances of any tape-worm egg finding itself on a blade of grass eaten by a rabbit. Therefore the tape-worm population will go up too. When the rabbit population gets very thick, but not so thick that there is no grass for either rabbit or tape-worm, the tape-worm population will be so large that older rabbits will be so heavily infected that they will begin to die. As the rabbit population thus falls, the chances of any tape-worm egg surviving will fall with it, and the tape-worms will get fewer. This will send the rabbit population up, so equilibrium will be reached. A population depends upon its enemies, its diseases, and its parasites to keep it within its food supply. While there is free competition for mates and food these factors will ensure that the population consists of individuals adequate to deal with them—reasonably immune to disease and reasonably good at evading enemies or beating them.

During the last century competition has not been free within man's society. To an ever-increasing extent the operation of disease and the efforts of enemies have been diverted. The automatic check on the reproduction of types not able to fend for themselves has been removed. The mechanism which keeps a society stable has been thrown completely out of gear. The result seems certain: a period of change will follow. While this much seems clear, it is by no means so easy to be sure of the nature of that change. Human breeding is so slow that many years must elapse before the full results of any experiment such as Western civilisation can be read. However, a few general tendencies can be seen even now.

Of the undesirable characteristics which have been thought likely to rise in incidence as a result of the removal of the checks perhaps mental deficiency has been the most thoroughly canvassed. At various times it has been suggested that the rise in this set of conditions might be so great as to threaten our very existence. A Committee has recently reported upon this, and their Report provides material for a great deal of sobering reflection. Incidentally, it may serve very well as an example to show how careful it is necessary to be in interpreting statistics. Various investigators have reported that of mental defectives only perhaps about 5 per cent. have defective parents. The opponents

of all forms of sterilisation at once took this as proof that mental deficiency was not inherited to any considerable degree. Not so the Committee. On attacking the problem from the other end, and determining the proportion of the children of defectives who were themselves defective (much more easily done, as the parents were known and the children too young to escape), the following important observations were made :

Excluding the cases classified as 'unascertained,' i.e. about whom no definite information was available, there were 1802 children between seven and thirteen, of whom 305, or 16.9 per cent., were classified as defective and 423, or 23.5 per cent., as retarded. Only 21, or 1.2 per cent., were superior. In the second group, children over thirteen, out of a total of 1848 the number of defectives were 599, or 32.4 per cent., and of retarded, 240, or 13 per cent. Only 10, or .5 per cent., were superior. The higher proportion of defectives as compared with retarded children in this group suggests that many of the children in the group seven to thirteen who were classed as retarded will later be found to be defective. Taking the two classes together, we find that in the first group 40.4 per cent. of the children still living were mentally subnormal, and in the over thirteen group the percentage had risen to 45.5 per cent. When it is remembered that 22.5 per cent. had already died and that these percentages apply to the survivors, the figures indicate that here we have a social problem calling urgently for some practical preventive measure.

This is the reasoned, careful conclusion of a Committee of competent people who had studied the whole question. They have succeeded in bringing some measure of clarity into a situation clouded by every kind of prejudice. They received reports and memoranda from all the sources likely to be of help, and heard in evidence everybody who had knowledge to place before them. The difficulties they met with are well shown by their statement that four local authorities reported to them that they had no record of any mental defective having had a child ! It is to be hoped that the publicity given to this will have its effect. The Committee, as is well known, recommended that, with all possible precautions, sterilisation should be carried out by consent upon certain classes of mental deficients, upon sufferers from certain diseases, and upon those persons, normal themselves, whose children were extremely likely to show these conditions.

This recommendation is of the greatest importance. It recognises that from the point of view of the race the evil of a social disability resides largely in its heritability. Mental deficiency is a social disability, and some forms of it are certainly inherited. Racially this disability can be robbed of its evil power if its inheritance can be checked. Mental deficiency without fertility ceases to be a racial evil. And intelligence and a sense of responsibility without fertility cease to be a racial good. Fertility can be separated from mental deficiency by sterilisation.

It remains to restore fertility to intelligence. While selection can be dodged within a community, selection is not mocked. It simply changes the unit on which it operates. Within a community all the virtues can be practised, but if their practice changes the character of the future members of the community in such a way as to destroy their power of combating the common enemies, then that civilisation is doomed in competition with rival structures. The golden rule 'Do as you would be done by' can only be practised within a ring kept by its non-observance.

The tragedy of our civilisation, then, seems to lie in this—that as at present constituted it allows Nature to take vengeance on it in the future for those acts of its members in the present which it thinks worthy of reward. One may perhaps ask if this must be so. It has been so in the past, it is so now ; but must it be so in the future ? Very little can be said about this, for very little is known. Our interest in it is purely academic—we are going to die before it matters. As an academic subject it may perhaps be worth while trying to imagine a society which would not contain the inherent instability of ours. The problem resolves itself into this : Can inadequacy and fertility be separated, and can adequacy and infertility be separated ? The fatalistic view that they cannot seems to rest on one doubtful assumption and to overlook one possibility.

The possibility is that we may gain a degree of conscious control over the consequences of our sexual processes which would completely change the situation. It is probable that within the next ten years, and nearly certain that within the next hundred years, the production of children will be almost at will, and that the exercise of that will will not be at the cost, in money, in convenience, or in happiness which is its price to-day. Real knowledge of the physiology of the menstrual cycle will almost certainly bring with it a degree of possible control which will make the realisation of pregnancy voluntary. This knowledge is being gained in the face of great opposition. This branch of biology has been held back for years by the conscious and unconscious acts of organisations which see their monopoly threatened and their position endangered. When the knowledge is won its application will be bitterly opposed by the same interests, and only then will the real battle between superstition and knowledge begin. Unlike the conflict between the knowledge of Galileo and the superstition of his world, this battle will be fought, not in the remote spheres of astronomy, but in the intimate things of human conduct. It will be fought, not by priests and schoolmen, but by men and women fighting for their children.

This is the possibility which perhaps the pessimists sometimes

overlook. The doubtful assumption is this—that the poorest, living in misery, have many children because they want to, and that, even if pregnancy is made really voluntary, the successful will remain sterile and the unsuccessful fertile. This is not a necessary belief. It is incredible that any considerable number of people who know that if they have children those children will be unhappy, through hereditary defect or through the conditions into which they will be born, will deliberately produce them. The mentally defective are perhaps to be considered separately in this from all other groups to the community. Whatever methods science may provide in the future for the control by the individual of his own fertility will hardly be applicable to these. The very characteristics which ought to be divorced from fertility make the mentally afflicted unfitted to use them. For them sterilisation as an adjunct to segregation seems the only way of preventing fertility. But apart from these there remain all the great mass of ordinary men and women, neither very good, nor very bad. It is to these that science may be able to give the power of control.

How this power is to be used science cannot say. It will be fought over, but it will come, and its coming could bring security and tranquillity to replace the endless tortures of doubt and fear which to-day wreck the homes of so many. It is difficult for securely established middle-class citizens to remember the strain put on the human relations of a husband and wife whose unemployment pay will not allow them even the clumsy contraceptives which they can use. These methods will in all probability be superseded before very many years by a real control; but will this knowledge when won be given freely to the people who want it? It will if enlightened thoughtful men and women, prepared to put humanity before prejudice, and equipped with knowledge of the real conditions of the world, will stand firm in support of this freedom.

The ordinary men and women of England are good enough to be trusted. To say otherwise is to say that our civilisation, our family life, and our homes are founded upon the misery of ignorance. If they are, they can go. They are not. Freedom to control fertility will not bring destruction. It will not bring the end of the race. Is it likely that one of the strongest of all human instincts, the instinct to have children who shall be happy, is suddenly going to be killed by the power to avoid having children who are not? The power to control fertility is not going to destroy the family, because people like the family as a unit, and will continue to do so. But the control of fertility is going to destroy the power of the family to degrade and kill women.

The present instability of society caused by the differential

fertility can be robbed of much of its danger by the simplest of means. For less will be heard of the differential birth rate when all classes really have an equal chance to exercise a conscious control of fertility. One who has faith in our race need ask for nothing more than freedom for all sections of our society, to replace the quack and the unskilled abortionist who rule over the greater part of it to-day.

Freedom of this kind will probably produce quite a new type of society. That is why the secure are afraid of it. The drift upwards to death will be changed. Humanity need hardly be despaired of if for it there should be substituted a drift upwards to life. Perhaps a society will arise in which fertility shall be a prize, instead of a pitfall. Perhaps that world would seem strange to us, but we shall not be called upon to live in it. We might, however, let our children try it. They would form a society which would differ from ours in its ideals, in its kinetics, and in its structure. It seems likely that one of two things will happen. Either there will grow a classless society with perfect fluidity enabling any child to earn its living in any way for which it finds itself suited, or else there will arise a society sharply divided into classes, whose classes will be based upon the kind of differences between men about which biologists can talk. Which of these two possibilities will be realised appears to be a subject for pure speculation.

PAUL G. 'ESPINASSE.

ELGAR: AN APPRAISEMENT

TRIBUTES have been paid in every shape and form to the life and work of Sir Edward Elgar. Some have come from unexpected regions. About a week after his death I received from America a number of appreciations, cut from newspapers, and also letters of sympathy, a few from people I hardly know. Mr. Walter Kramer, the editor of *Musical America*, has written a remarkable and warm-hearted eulogy in a recent issue of his journal, and other leading writers in that country have rendered homage. I call attention to these incidents because I see in them a sign that Elgar's compositions are beginning to make headway among American music-lovers; and, because musical life in that country is cosmopolitan, this may reasonably be expected to lead to wider appreciation, even in those European countries where at present Elgar is least understood.

It is but natural that many of these tributes should refer with satisfaction to Elgar's full and complete life; but, with the fragments of his unfinished symphony in mind, musicians will ever remember his death as a calamity. The otherwise admirable appreciation which appeared in *The Times* contained one misleading sentence:

It may be said with certainty, however, that the Third Symphony will not now be forthcoming. We shall never know what was the music which he found lying all about him in this strange and disjointed world, so different from that of his youth. Perhaps the effort to piece it together into a consistent whole was too much for him.

The last words imply that Elgar's creative power had weakened towards the end. That, I am sure, was not the case. When the symphony was first commissioned by the B.B.C. (through the ambassadorial influence of Sir Landon Ronald), Elgar made good progress in his work upon it. The oppressive heat waves of last summer brought the first interruption. He fell back upon Torquemada's cross-word puzzles as being the nearest approach to the difficulties of symphonic construction. Nothing easier than those monstrous Sabbath Day problems was sufficient to occupy his leisure, unless to foretell a future happening upon a race-course be deemed a simpler matter. When the heat had

passed, there came the Hereford Meeting of the Three Choirs and the rehearsing and conducting which he always willingly undertook at festival time. Soon after came the blow. Only then was coherent musical thought, especially symphonic thought, made impossible, although, even during that last painful illness, he refused to let go the idea of his symphony.

Last summer I was staying with Sir Edward Elgar at his home in Worcester and had good reason to believe that the new work was growing fast. He was full of it. On one occasion he brought out several sheets of manuscript, sat down at the pianoforte, and, playing, reconstructed what was already existing of the symphony. He warned me that I should get no proper idea of its sound if I listened to it as pianoforte music, and I recalled with what scorn he used to refer to the mere 'keyboard composer.' As he played the themes of the first movement and their development, and described the instrumentation, he appeared to be regarding the music as something not of his own creation—something he had discovered by chance and now must tend like a watchful gardener for the promise of flowering it held. It was always so with him. 'It is my idea,' he once confessed, 'that music is in the air all around us, and that, at any given time, you just take as much as you want.' That confession helps us to understand the contempt he had for the kind of composer who could never create except in a house filled with stained-glass windows (or with lilies or Wedgwood china or incense or any other atmospheric thing). The keyboard mind and the stained-glass window mind—in music, I think, Elgar had no stronger aversions. There was another almost as strong—the mind that delights in frightfulness. He could never be accused of lacking interest in younger composers. The post-war history of the Three Choirs Festival reveals that he took great pains to further the claims of the oncoming men; but never indiscriminately. Not long ago I heard from him some first-rate invective after the performance of a young man's concerto. I will not go too far in my disclosure, but the fact that the solo part was for a stringed instrument doubtless accounted for his wrath, for the string family was nearest his heart, as all who know the *Introduction and Allegro* will admit.

Elgar took his music from the air. A mystery though that must appear to ordinary people, let us allow that he did so. But a further mystery confronts us, one that is suggested in the passage from *The Times* which I have already quoted. What kind of music was he finding in the air which lately has been so full of harsh conflict? Would the baneful influence have made any fundamental change in his symphonic expression? I can only answer that certain harmonic passages in that unfinished symphony seemed to me to be a fresh revelation of Elgar's mind.

That they were not born of theory it is hardly necessary for me to assert, for no theory was ever the forerunner of any of Elgar's major compositions. Nor could those passages be in any way linked up with the feverishly cerebral experiments of the 'new music.' As I heard them they were simply a reminder of the fact that Elgar had always been a pioneer in harmonic invention. Did we not know it as soon as we heard the Prelude to *Gerontius* and those startling chords which punctuate the pleadings of the Angel of the Agony? How much the younger British composers owe to his enriching of harmonic resources (to that alone) is not always fully recognised. And it is my belief that the creative force in him was continually developing, even if there had been no striking manifestation of it since the death of his wife. In what I heard of that last great adventure, the Third Symphony, I thought I saw the glimmering of new light breaking through his harmonic imagery. Something was there, I vow, which had never before been expressed in quite the same way.

It was during a visit to him in the nursing home that I first realised that, except through a miracle, the symphony could never come into being. Yet on that occasion I was not altogether unhappy, for, in spite of great pain, his spirit was almost cheerful. Soon after I had entered his room he began to describe a piece of country he himself had discovered and had shown to a few privileged friends. 'You won't find it in any guide-book,' he said. 'Those fellows who write as guides to the English countryside don't know the real England. I'll take you to this place when I'm well again.' Then for about twenty minutes he gave me a lucid account of this secret place. It was part of the Teme valley, and some of it, he hinted, had found its way into one of his compositions. I have recalled that occasion here to remind myself how often the English scene has found its way into Elgar's music. In the Pianoforte Quintet it is there; and in the String Quartet, and the Sonata for Violin and Pianoforte, in the symphonies, in *Falstaff*, in the Violoncello Concerto. In the slow movement of the Violin Concerto it is there again, transcended in a way which is entirely Elgar's own and yet in spirit is comparable to the Pastoral Symphony of Vaughan Williams and to much of Delius.

Elgar was never happier than when he was in his own part of the country, at his home on Rainbow Hill, or on a visit to Hereford or Gloucester. He knew every mile of that pleasant land. Along many of the roads he could have walked sleeping without losing his way. Sometimes in fancy he liked to think of himself in the years after death, moving leisurely along those green ways, perchance to surprise an old friend there who had accustomed himself to think of him as being eternally absent. There is one

road in particular to which he intended to return, a secluded stretch of about a quarter of a mile which even at summer's noon is darkened by tall trees, so that its shadows and its silence are one in their depth. It is not far from Drake's Broughton. He was taking me for a motor ride one day, and when we came to this road he told me of his intention as if he were convinced that he would be able to carry it out.

But, of course, Elgar was not only the countryman. In London he moved among friends. Brooks's Club and the Langham Hotel received him as their own, whether it was Buckingham Palace or Queen's Hall or merely a new play that had summoned him to town. His election to the Athenæum at the beginning of the century was regarded by some of his friends as scarcely less an honour than a doctorate or a knighthood. I once saw a letter which A. J. Jaeger (his friend at Novello's) sent at the time. 'Well done you!' he wrote. 'I mean the A. Club. You *are* getting on! What more do you want?' Here and in other clubs Elgar met distinguished and undistinguished men of all professions and continually exercised his critical interest in human nature. During the years when he was at last building up a secure reputation he also met many who by way of Fleet Street or Prince Consort Road had found an entry into his own profession—although so deliberate a term was, in his opinion, inapt for music—and he began to realise that he had more natural sympathy with the genuine amateurs of music than with those who had stuck themselves on to the circumference of the circle by virtue of journalistic or academic claims.

Edward Elgar's understanding of English life and character was as great as his love for the English landscape. People and incidents were the unfailing inspiration of a musical train of thought. I am not thinking so much of *Froissart* (where, in the clarinet's little song, the voice was unmistakably heard almost for the first time), of *King Olaf* (there it was again, clearly ringing, in Olaf's bold approach to Sigrid), of *Caractacus*, of the Enigma Variations, or even of *Cockaigne*—not so much of these as of the symphonic compositions. In the First Symphony the greatness of an era is eloquently proclaimed. The farewell to that greatness is the Second Symphony, with its episodes of splendour, ecstasy, foreboding, spiritual conflict, grief and resignation. In the Violoncello Concerto we are mourning for departed greatness. As much as any other music, Elgar's symphonic creations must be set against a background of life if they are to be wholly comprehended. The Englishry of Elgar's music is an inescapable quality.

This, however, is not to say that Elgar was merely a national composer in the sense that Grieg and Smetana were. It is often

overlooked that almost all those who frankly recognised the worth of Elgar's first big works and gave him practical encouragement were men of foreign birth or extraction. Richter is one of the first names that come to mind, and with it a letter which the composer wrote, thanking him for a sympathetic and masterly performance of *Cockaigne* at Liverpool. Richter's playing of the overture had the effect of making Elgar dissatisfied with his own music, and he added: 'I hope the symphony I am trying to write will answer to these higher ideals, and if I find I am more satisfied with it than my present compositions I shall hope to be allowed to dedicate it to my honoured friend, Hans Richter.' Next to Richter we think of Strauss. After the success of *Gerontius* at the Lower Rhine Festival it was Strauss's tribute to our master composer that called the English public to attention. Then there were Jaeger (who, in the Nimrod Variation, inspired one of the finest memorials in music), Julius Butts, Rodewald, and Frank Schuster.

At that time England's little world of music was unprepared for Elgar's coming. There was too sharp a division between institutional and non-institutional groups. Even at the Norfolk and Norwich Festival of 1899 Elgar's repute was by no means commensurate with his achievement. That this was first acknowledged by foreign musicians is surely sufficient to show that Elgar was in the main stream of European music; for no foreigner, least of all a German, could have been expected at the beginning of the century to praise or even to be aware of any music that was unrelated to the holy German dynasty. But even this virtue can be turned against an artist by his detractors, for he can be too closely related; and they begin to hunt for 'influences.' They can be as easily discovered in Elgar, of course, as in other great composers who have used the traditional forms, but often they have been wrongly interpreted. Do we think of disqualifying Schubert or Mahler or Sibelius or Busoni, or, indeed, any neo-classical composer, because he has been influenced by Beethoven? Then there is Wagner. Critics have fallen into the too easy habit of detecting Wagner's footsteps in the work of every composer who had the misfortune to enter the field just after him. As if those footsteps could have been silenced! They are to be heard in *Gerontius*; that is natural enough. But have we not heard too much of that oratorio being a protraction of *Parsifal*, and too little of its pioneering harmonic thought? And the detectives have sometimes been wide of the mark. Elgar told me last winter that they were quite wrong in finding that the device of thematic diminution in *Cockaigne* had come from *Meistersinger*, and then showed me the passage by which it *had* been suggested. With whom had he served as apprentice this

time? Not with Wagner, but with Delibes! The work was *Sylvia*.

Hardly less ubiquitous than Wagner's influence is that of Brahms. At the time when Elgar was entering his phase of symphonic thought he had accepted a professorship at Birmingham University and had taken Brahms's symphonies as the subject of his lectures. When his own symphonies and concertos appeared there was, therefore, room for busy speculation. The differences between the composers, however, are important. Compare the general enunciations, for example. Brahms works from bare, sometimes lean, statements towards complexity, while Elgar opens with a profusion of ideas and then moves towards their reconciliation. Brahms's method is easier for the ordinary listener to follow. The galvanic beginnings of Elgar's symphonies tend to bewilder him on first acquaintance, so many threads is he required to take up and immediately pursue. To become familiar with the thematic features as such is a simple matter, for Elgar never fails to give them point and character both in the melodic outline and in the equally important harmony; but familiarity with the treatment of the features, with the organic processes, demands a degree and kind of attention which must needs lift the listener out of his ordinariness.

To insist too much upon the later influences in Elgar's career and to forget those of his boyhood is to approach his art from a wrong angle. During his most impressionable years there came his way the music of Emanuel Bach and of those almost forgotten composers Schobert and Kozeluch; and among the influences of adolescence can be counted Tudor Church music, Mozart's and Haydn's Masses, Meyerbeer, the operas of a travelling company's repertory, together with Shakespeare and Voltaire. Then, as always in his development, such experiences were assimilated only to give his individuality a keener edge; for, since those early instances which have been cited above, no composer's voice has been so immediately recognisable as Elgar's. There is, moreover, no insularity in his art. The liberal distribution of tastes and attractions during youth was evidence of his mind's range. Not that his music is unconditioned by national environment. In that respect he is in the company of Beethoven, Brahms and Sibelius. But, like these, he is nationalist by grace, not by adoption of folk-song. Melodies that were once folk-music but are no longer—these he eschews; especially in compositions which are deliberately patriotic in motive. Instead, we find him writing melodies of his own, one of which became a folk-song in his own lifetime. If folk-song means anything at all, it is that once upon a time it was popular song. But let a composer of our own age write such a melody, and see how the folk-song

enthusiasts knit their brows! 'Land of Hope and Glory' and Sibelius's tune in *Finlandia* are regarded as crimes which the authors must expiate. So confused and contradictory are our judgments!

We have mentioned a few of the more common disparagements. They appear even more insignificant when we think of Elgar's stature as a symphonic writer. He stands with the greatest. To say that the symphonies, concertos, overtures, and *Falstaff* are the intense co-ordination of emotional experience is not to reduce their attainment. Nor need we fear to admit that each carries a programme of some kind. There is Beethoven's example. In the *Pastoral* he took liberties, and even if we think that it is therefore so much the weaker as a symphony, there is still the *Choral Symphony*. To all who think of symphonic form as being a vessel divinely set apart to hold only pure music, that work is the final rebuke. Was the symphony made for man, or man for the symphony? We know that it was made for Elgar no less than for Bruckner, Brahms, and Tchaikovsky before him and for Vaughan Williams and Arnold Bax after him. Elgar's name shines among these and others because of his peculiar genius for orchestral writing, which, incidentally, helped to raise the standard of playing in this country. Elgar was loved by English orchestral players. The memory of early days when he was a humble bandsman filled him with sympathetic appreciation of their work. He was one of them. Unsparingly he devoted himself to making his music understood by them. They have proved themselves worthy. English orchestras do indeed know their Elgar, know the idiom of his phrase, the curve of his eloquence, the secret of bowing his ecstatic melody and of breathing his rich harmony. Not only was Elgar the first composer to bring England to the front rank as a producer of instrumental music; he also helped to lay the foundations upon which we have built at least two of the best orchestras in Europe. We are entitled to think as highly of our present-day composers. There is good reason to believe that no finer music than theirs is being written in any other country. If that belief prove true, historians of the future will see in Elgar's major works the flowing of the main stream from Germany to England.

That the stream flows as deep and wide in English as in German environment is witnessed by *Falstaff*. And this work can also be cited as an answer to those who, perhaps with *Caractacus* in mind, assert that Elgar missed the better part of his vocation in refusing to write an opera. It is true that with a more amenable libretto *Caractacus* might well have been Elgar's opera. As it stands, the Eigen-Orbin episodes are unconvincing. These lovers are merely conventional appendages to a theme

which, because of its inherent nobility, had no need of such an attachment. But, even if Elgar had met with a good enough libretto to persuade him to write an opera on this or another theme, we may be sure that his development would still have been along symphonic lines. He had opportunities to enter the opera field. At one time Ricordi's wanted to commission three operas from his pen. His answer was that his knowledge of Italian was too small and that nobody wanted to hear an opera in the English language. A request from Covent Garden found him equally diffident.

We need not take the reasons for his refusal too seriously. The real reason was that there was a stronger pull in another direction. Elgar's was always a symphonic way of thinking. The spontaneity and nervous energy of his most characteristic music would have been impeded by the imposition of non-musical conditions. Of course it can be argued that such conditions are, in fact, imposed by an oratorio or cantata text, and it is true that there are passages in Elgar's oratorios and cantatas where the purely musical part of his mind, with its continual aspiration towards the larger freedom of symphonic thought, appears to be fretting under the burden of the text. But the conditions of cantata and oratorio are more or less amenable to music's demands, and Elgar relieved the tension by making use of the *leit-motive* method; and, as in Wagner's use of the method, the themes, since they are musical ideas and not merely labels or visiting-cards, serve for generation as well as for association. Opera's conditions are less tractable. Wagner solved the problem of uniting drama and a symphonic style by becoming his own librettist. That was his only possible way. So could he subject the design of his dramas to the exigencies of symphonic thought. Elgar, not attracted by the idea of writing his own librettos, turned to Shakespeare. But there are no opera librettos in Shakespeare's works. (The uncommon skill of a Boito is wanted if Shakespearean proportions are to be reduced for opera's purpose and with the essence of the drama retained.) Avoiding the pitfalls into which some other English composers have fallen, Elgar renounced the text altogether and conceived the character, life and death of Falstaff in the form of a symphonic study. In this he was able to let loose the fulness of his individuality and imaginative force, and succeeded in capturing a quality which by analogy can be called Shakespearean.

The symphonic nature of Elgar's *Falstaff* cannot be too much emphasised. The music's behaviour is guided by an inner logic of its own rather than by a series of scenes and events. (Yet the agreement between the inner logic and the development of the drama is no less marked here than in Alban Berg's *Wozzeck*.)

The general plan of the work can be regarded as a combination of suite and symphony. The first movement of the A flat Symphony is an example of Elgar's use of a theme-group instead of a first subject. The same predilection is to be observed in the opening episode of *Falstaff*, which is in effect a 'first movement' developed from the opposition of a three-fold theme-group and, as second subject, the Prince Henry motive. The tavern scene and the exploit at Gadshill together introduce the scherzo element. After so much breathless activity the music, no less than Sir John himself, is now in need of rest. The quiet regularity of a gavotte measure lulls him to sleep to dream of his boyhood. The next episode (*Allegro*) is a combination of march and song; and, after the Gloucestershire Interlude, the underlying rhythm of which is that of the Cigue (remembered in tranquillity), there comes a finale of true symphonic splendour based on a transformation of earlier themes.

On the other hand, those who prefer to stress the continuity of *Falstaff* will find that its plan has much in common with rondo form. True, the features do not appear as clearly as in Strauss's *Till Eulenspiegel*, but the recurrence of the main Falstaff theme (with or without one of the subsidiary themes) leaves the general impression of a rondo, if allowance is made for the latitude of the intervening adventures. But whether it is regarded as a continuous texture or as a succession of movements, whether it is judged according to its general plan or according to the generative power of its themes, it is the symphonic nature of this study which provides its distinctive quality.

However wide a view we take of the range of music written for a modern orchestra, *Falstaff* will appear as one of the peaks. With that attainment in mind we can but wonder what heights Elgar would have reached in the Ben Jonson opera which he was planning and had partly written. Even after hearing passages from this work, I still found there was room to speculate as to the nature of the whole conception. Which would have been preponderant, the symphonic or the dramatic element? Of one thing we may be certain: that opera would have been so much the greater achievement for the vantage-ground gained in *Falstaff*.

BASIL MAINE.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

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THE GREAT ADVENTURE

A History of Exploration, from the earliest times to the present day. By Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G. Routledge, 1934.—35s. net.

T. E. Lawrence: In Arabia and After. By Liddell Hart. Cape.—15s. net.

WHEN the primitive man in search of food first crept from the spot where he was born he opened the Book of Exploration. Though the economists may insist that the urge was always materialist, ambition, religious fervour, and mere love of adventure have perhaps more often been the source of inspiration. True, in the Middle Ages, when food was monotonous, it was the need for pepper that led to the discovery of the Cape route to India, of the Cape Horn route to the Pacific, and to the persistent hammering at the Arctic, where for many years men hoped to find the North-West Passage to the Spice Islands. But it was no material motive that sent Mungo Park to his grave in the Niger, or Watkins in the frozen sea, while Livingstone, Ippolito de Desideri, and Hsuang-tsang were inspired by zeal for religion or humanity.

We Europeans are very ego-centric. We 'discover' lands that were never lost, ignoring the existence of the mighty travellers of ancient days—Arabs, Greeks, and Chinese. For centuries we were left in ignorance of the outside world, from which we were cut off when the northern barbarians destroyed Rome.

Those northerners, although mainly destructive, were very doughty explorers and bold traders. Through them obscure Baltic islands became an important link for introducing into north-western Europe the wares of the Orient.

They were the first great rovers of the colder seas, and, by the colonisation of Iceland in 870, of Greenland in 982, and a survey of the east coast of America, anticipated modern Arctic exploration by nearly 1000 years.

While the greater part of England was still pagan, a Chinese monk, Hsuang-tsang, wished to visit the lands of Buddha. Although the emperor forbade him, he left in 629 A.D., to return sixteen years later, no longer an obscure monk, but a master, whose reports show an accuracy and critical mind that are almost modern. In the second century of our era Ptolemy knew more of the sources of the Nile than we did till the middle of Queen Victoria's reign. What wonderful men those old explorers were! Ibn Battuta, a respected citizen of Tangier, set forth at the age of twenty in 1325 to visit all the Moslem lands of the world, and his records give us a surprisingly accurate account of the lands he saw—from Timbuktu to Canton.

While the Arab was exploring the lands of his faith, Marco Polo was astonishing Europe with the extravagant world of Cathay, visiting Tibet, Burma and Yunnan; but the modern epoch in the world's history was inaugurated by a grandson of John of Gaunt, Prince Henry of Portugal, surnamed the Navigator, who patronised and in 1415 initiated that amazing burst of travel by the Portuguese, with the Cross in one hand, the sword in the other. Thus it came that Diaz circumnavigated Africa in 1488, Vasco de Gama made the first ocean voyage to India in 1498, and a little later Magellan passed Cape Horn and returned to Europe in 1523, having circumnavigated the globe.

In 1492 Columbus mistook the Bahamas for Japan and Cuba for

Cathay, while a year or two later the man who gave his name to the continent, Amerigo Vespucci, explored the coast from Honduras to Brazil, and in 1497 an English sailor, John Cabot, who had already penetrated to Mecca, landed in North America, probably at Cape Breton. Thus it was that the Other World was rediscovered.

From then the great names come thick and fast, and the Anglo-Saxon race has its share. Livingstone, whom Sir Percy Sykes calls the greatest of all time, worked alone, without resources, yet by sheer force of character penetrated across Africa from side to side and again. His services to humanity in the suppression of slavery in Africa were as great as to geography.

The Arctic and the Antarctic have been exposed. In the very heart of Africa to-day tourists' offices pay better than in Europe. Greenland is studied as a station in a flying route. Mount Everest has been flown over. Wireless masts are erected in the deserts of Central Asia. When Thomas and Philby lifted the veil that hid the *Rub' al Khali*, the Book of Exploration, so fascinatingly epitomised by Sir Percy Sykes, which includes the *Odyssey* and the *Arabian Nights*, was closed. The new book has been opened, and its name is Survey.

But if we are to have no more *Odysseys*, it is at least a consolation to read a very recent *Iliad*, the taking, not of Troy, but of Damascus, the hero of which came, not from Thessaly, but from Wales. When a man becomes legendary and a focus of a literature before middle age it is instructive to examine what lessons he offers humanity. Lawrence, by his mystery, divided the opinions of men into two classes—the Demigod school and the Master-Poseur school. A leader of the former is Captain Liddell Hart, who effectively demolishes the latter.

He explains that his hero is much

more than a mere Arabian De Wet. He compares him with the greatest captains, especially Marlborough, and claims that he is 'more steeped in the knowledge of war than any of the generals of the last war': he tells us that his musings, based upon a truly great foundation of reading, evolved a new theory of war in contrast to the 'Killing the Enemy' school, which he vindicated so effectively that his whole Arab revolt cost this country only about one-sixth of what we ourselves spent in two years to suppress another Arab revolt in Iraq. In man power he had detached from the British Army altogether about a hundred men. His results were to paralyse two Turkish army corps, a number of local garrisons, and to isolate in the Hedjaz 12,000 Turkish troops, fray their moral, and break their railway system. What that meant to Allenby's move in Palestine it is easy to see. When we read the story of his dazzling successes and their negligible cost, and of the unusual mental preparations of the man and of his spiritual qualifications, we cannot but ask, was it Destiny? or was it Chance?

Yet it was as a spiritual force that he was more potent among the Arabs, in spite of the very practical miracle he worked in Arabia. And if he could destroy railways, he showed in Damascus that he could build administrations. In some ways akin to Gordon, he was mystic as well as soldier, romantic yet essentially practical, metaphysical yet a mechanic, scholar yet record-breaker among Arabs at their own trials in speed and endurance, an imp, a 'road-hog,' yet above all a crusader, emancipated from personal desire or ambition. He took no profit from his writings and requested the King to relieve him of his decorations. As a philosopher he was apologetic for his victories. He resented the bloodshed, which was contrary to his theory of war. He could speak of the 'tarnish of

achievement' with the philosophy of a Cunninghame Graham. For he found his triumph a Dead Sea fruit. He saw his country on the horns of the cruel dilemma in which the opportunism of her politicians had placed her, compelled to make the choice between shuffling out of her engagements to the Arabs and mortally offending France. He had promised the Arabs their freedom, and England had backed his promise and then betrayed them. Lawrence felt the stain and made atonement.

At last came vindication. Feisal, painted here attractively, thrown out of one kingdom by the French, was offered another by the British, and his brother Abdullah made Emir of Trans-Jordan. Lawrence saw his own ambition achieved, his country's honour saved. Then there came to him the call of the Middle Ages. The mystic came out, and, as men used to go into monasteries, he went into the Air Force. The change in name denoted a change in career. It is noteworthy that as a private he found relief and rest, until someone sold his secret to the Press for the too apt figure of £30.

There is a spiritual sermon in the book, and, too, there is a practical one, in Lawrence's own words, that 'generalship comes, not by instinct, unsought, but by hard study and brain-concentration.' That is a message to us all—if for 'generalship' we read 'life.' And then the author asks us: Is our hero the man who will lead stumbling humanity out of its troubles? He gives no answer, but concludes thus: 'He is the Spirit of Freedom come incarnate to a world in fetters,' and concludes that 'No man has come closer to equal greatness in action and reflection.'

MALCOLM BURN.

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GLORIANA

Queen Elizabeth. By J. E. Neale.
Jonathan Cape.—9s. 6d. net.

THE learned world has for some years been awaiting Professor Neale's *Life of Elizabeth*; and now that it has appeared we may be sure that it will long remain, for what it has been received, the standard *Life*. In short, this history of Elizabeth's life, as history, could hardly be bettered; he tells again, vividly and with full knowledge, the story of that reign, now so familiar, so splendid, so consoling in this age of defeat.

But the book has more to offer; it affords some curious and exciting problems in interpretation. And it is here that there is most ground for divergence from some of Professor Neale's judgments. One need not quarrel with him for placing himself always at the same point of view as Elizabeth; for he writes as a lover, and the best biographies have usually been written by those enamoured of their subject. But it is curious that not a word of criticism of Elizabeth's actions escapes him; and it is all the more noticeable since so much of the book is taken up with her long duel with Mary Queen of Scots. Mary was, of course, no innocent; but neither was all the virtue on the side of Elizabeth. Professor Neale looks at the whole story of their relations through Elizabeth's eyes; he takes it for granted that she was completely sincere in all her dealings with Mary, whereas it is impossible not to feel, at one turn after another in the political game between them, that Elizabeth was the better politician, and none the less so because she was the less sincere. The Spanish Ambassador who came to the conclusion that she was 'full of all subtlety and deceit' was not far wrong; nor does it detract from the quality of her political genius.

Even more curious is the way in

which Professor Neale regards what was the basis of Elizabeth's emotional life—her sex. It is surely clear that something very odd was at the bottom of her nature, that there was some extraordinary tension beneath all the artificiality, the exaggerated femininity, the jealous watchfulness she displayed over the men that attracted her. Professor Neale tones all this down; he makes her too straightforward, too 'normal.' It may be that Lytton Strachey in *Elizabeth and Essex* romanticised this side of her; but he understood better what was subtle, crooked, thwarted in her nature—what was revealed when the barriers were down, as when the news came that Mary Queen of Scots had a son and Elizabeth broke down crying that she was 'but a barren stock'; or again, what Essex laid his finger on, when he said at the end that the Queen's mind was 'as crooked as her carcase.' It was Robert Cecil who summed up, with that philosophical detachment of his, all that was to be said of the Queen: 'I have sometimes thought that the Queen was more than a man, and something less than a woman.'

Professor Neale's attitude to Robert Cecil, however, is no less curious, and utterly unsympathetic. The younger Cecil is, to him, 'a fulsome courtier,' and 'how unexhilarating a personality'; whereas the truth was that Cecil was nothing if not exhilarating. In his youth he was excessively gay, full of quips and antics—witness his letters, among the most amusing in that age of good letter-writers—and so he continued to be, until weighed down by the early responsibilities of his great office and the sickness which he owed to his early gaiety. He alone of all the younger generation at Court had the intellect to understand the Queen. Here, again, Strachey undoubtedly romanticised him, for æsthetic pur-

poses; but it is his judgment of Cecil that is the truer and the more convincing.

Where Professor Neale is at his best is in dealing with comparatively straightforward characters like Burghley and Leicester—his portrait of the elder Cecil is excellent—and in his estimates of general historical questions. Particularly notable is his treatment of Elizabeth's financial policy, which he regards as the root of the reign's success.

For all its drabness and difficulty, finance is the essence of Elizabeth's story. . . . The disparity between Elizabeth's resources and achievements, which impressed Sixtus V., was the miracle of her age.

His pages on this subject could not be bettered, and after years they set right Froude's very serious misreading of Elizabeth on this point—a misreading which has in the course of time become the general view, though it is mistaken; it is good that justice, though tardy, should be done to her. Equally good is Professor Neale's insistence upon the central importance of the person of the monarch—the strength of the monarchy lay in the god-like solitude of the King, which removed his person and power from the jealousy of aspiring noblemen'; a sentence which gives the clue to his conception of the monarchy is the truth about the sixteenth century, and justifies his treatment of the person of Elizabeth as history.

This biography, then, ranks among the most important of recent historical biographies; though one may recommend, for the sake of a subtler appreciation of character and personality, that it be read alongside of Strachey's *Elizabeth and Essex*. The truth as regards these passionate and brilliant figures of that age—the gifted Essex, the superb Raleigh, the Cecils, Mary Queen of Scots, and, above all, Elizabeth herself—may be found to lie somewhere between the two.

A. L. ROWSE.

Vol. CXV—No. 686



THE TARIFF

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THE GUEST OF GUESTS

Creevey's Life and Times. Edited by John Gore. Murray.—18s. net.

It was hardly to be expected that a further selection from the remainder of Thomas Creevey's voluminous correspondence and jottings would have improved upon Sir Herbert Maxwell's famous edition. Thirty years ago the appearance of *The Creevey Papers* was an event of first-class importance to social historians; to-day the torrent of amiable gossip is inclined to appear superficial. Nevertheless, since Mr. Gore has followed his predecessor's method on every point of editing, the new volume may be looked upon as an admirable supplement to the original edition of 1903.

Thomas Creevey enjoyed a position in society that was peculiar. He was in it, but not of it. By birth and upbringing the son of a Liverpool tradesman, the evidence of his having been an illegitimate son of Lord Sefton has little bearing on the subsequent course of his life. What is certain is that his ultimate acceptance by an exclusive and privileged society was entirely due to his individual gifts and personal popularity. He was by no means a favourite wherever he went; his indiscretion and lack of reticence were distasteful to many people. Hobhouse, for one, recorded his verdict after meeting him at a country house in 1824: 'I cannot say that I formed an agreeable opinion of this gentleman from his visit to Lambton. . . . When he had no jest to excite laughter, he tried grimaces. He spared no one, and he fell foul of Lambton's pedigree, which our host had indiscreetly left on the library table.'

It will be seen that properly to appreciate Creevey as a man of fashion it is necessary to watch him as he appeared to his friends and to

take it for granted that he was the benign and agreeable worldling that he would have us believe. Otherwise there appear on the horizon of the reader's mind certain unwelcome suspicions. The word 'snob' looms uncomfortably large. But never 'sycophant' and never 'toady.' In fact, one of Creevey's chief virtues was an independence of behaviour which was altogether admirable. He was a man of no position and no possessions. He made a most happy, and in certain respects advantageous, marriage with a devoted woman considerably his senior in years; and during her long and trying illness he sacrificed himself to her care in a manner which was certainly not that of an opportunist. And when her death left him as penniless as he had been before his marriage it is to his lasting credit that he refused the proposal made to him by his stepchildren that he should make his home with them—in other words, that he should live on them; and it was a fortunate decision. Had he accepted their suggestion the best of his inimitable letters would never have been written, for they are addressed to Bessy Ord, the elder stepdaughter. At the back of Creevey's mind the idea had germinated that a regular correspondence with her would, if preserved, be of immense interest in the future, and he had resolved to be the social historian of his age. Thus his independent manner of living enabled him to spend the greater part of the year in visiting the houses of important Whig families, and the Greys, the Bessboroughs, the Seftons and Lord Durham, better known as 'King Jog' (because he thought a man could 'jog along on £40,000 a year'), are only a few of the constantly hospitable hosts who entertained the affable prattler. Creevey at the

top of his form thought nothing of writing half a dozen eight-page letters between breakfast and dinner. Sometimes he even wrote twice in the same day to Bessy Ord, when something particularly urgent, such as an election or a Ministerial crisis, needed a sympathetic audience. One of the best extracts in the book is actually a letter from Miss Ord herself, written from Brussels to her brother abroad and describing the experiences of the family during the 'Waterloo' campaign. It was only a very few days after the battle itself that Creevey had the good fortune to accompany the Duke of Wellington and his staff over the battlefield, on which occasion he talked with some French soldiers who were still lying there, apparently wounded. In fact, Creevey was very much at the heart of affairs in Brussels just then; and although his letters are few at this period, those that we read are full of a fussy pertinence which compels his editor to wonder that he has escaped descending to posterity as 'Waterloo' Creevey.

However, the social lion was yet to be evolved. As long as his wife was living he had shown little disposition to indulge in this celebrity. It is during the last fifteen years of his lifetime that he is displayed as the guest of guests and the letter-writer of unrivalled gifts, if of unliterary style. For the letters are really strings of half-cut crystals. Their facets give off a reflection which is purely accidental and, for that reason, entirely charming; such, for instance, as the descriptions of Harewood House and Bolton Abbey. However, it was not often that Creevey allowed himself the luxury of describing scenery. In common with Dr. Johnson, he felt that men and women were his subjects of inquiry and generally stuck to the point.

YVONNE FFRENCH.

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THE MARCH OF FASCISM

Oswald Mosley and British Fascism. By James Drennan. John Murray.—7s. 6d. net.

Too True To Be Good; Village Wooing; On the Rocks. By Bernard Shaw. Constable & Co., Ltd.—7s. 6d. net.

Preparing for Power. By J. T. Murphy, with a foreword by Sir Stafford Cripps. Jonathan Cape.—6s. net.

THE theory of Fascism, as expounded by its own prophets, is in general a strange jumble of false history, muddled philosophy, and deplorable logic. Mr. Drennan's book is, unfortunately, no exception to this rule.

Fascism, he assures us, must make for peace; for Fascism only means organisation, and organisation in industry means peace. If he thinks that rival organisations of masters and men in industry make in themselves for peace, he is wrong; and if he really thinks that rival countries will become more peacefully inclined when each is organised on a Fascist model, he is wrong again—as the spectacle, at this moment, of Fascist Germany and Fascist Italy, glaring at each other over the prostrate body of Fascist Austria, conclusively shows.

One could go on almost indefinitely. Fascists, apparently, have only armed to defend the rights of free speech and free assembly for themselves: these rights are sacred until they themselves, having clambered into power by means of them, proceed to abrogate them. They are entirely constitutional in their methods: all they want is to obtain, constitutionally, the power to abolish the Constitution. The *Führer* himself has said that Fascism is a blend of the doctrine of Christianity with the doctrine of Nietzsche—of Christian self-sacrifice and Nietzschean virility. Christian self-sacrifice derives di-

rectly from the Christian idea of God, and becomes meaningless without it. Nietzschean 'virility' is a direct deduction from Nietzsche's idea of man, and cannot be properly understood apart from it. Christianity from its earliest days made perfectly clear its opposition to the claims of the patriotic Fascism of Imperial Rome, and its gentle but firm determination to render to Cæsar only the things that are Cæsar's. Nietzsche would certainly not have accepted the moral autocracy which the Fascist State claims.

We learn, finally, that the aim of Fascism is to secure complete liberty in private life, subject to the always overriding claims of the State in public life. 'In our morality the one single test of any moral question is whether it impedes or destroys in any way the power of the individual to serve the State.' Individuality, Sir Oswald Mosley explains, is not to be 'eliminated': it is to be 'fused.' The distinction is so subtle that it evades my apprehension.

It is an intense relief to escape from this nightmare of nonsense into the clear, cold light of Mr. Shaw's intelligence. Whether Mr. Shaw really knows much about the actual working of Fascism may be doubted. But at least he knows what he wants to say: having said it, he does not promptly contradict himself (unless it be deliberately, for fun), and he says it incomparably well.

By the exercise of a little faith, the two plays *Too True To Be Good* and *On the Rocks* may be held to reveal the serious reason which led Mr. Shaw to startle the world by his unexpected benediction of Fascism. The preface of *Too True To Be Good* expounds the doctrine—which the author, rather curiously, declares to be new—that the exploiting rich are under

the wretched capitalist system as miserable as the exploited poor. This is the moral of the play, a little blunted by the extravagant burlesque of the caricature. The only hope for the idle rich is in social services: unless they become socially serviceable, they must die. This, it will be perceived, is Mr. Drennan's 'one single test' reappearing. The play is only second-rate Shaw. The devout Shavian will detect regretfully in it echoes of old quips and even of old characters. But the moral is plain, and, so far as it goes, it is a good Fascist moral.

In *On the Rocks* it is plainer; in the preface much plainer, for the theme of the preface is the necessity, the common-sense and the justice of exterminating the social misfit. Punishment—retributive punishment—and the whole moral code, as the ordinary police-court knows it, is illogical nonsense. What is wanted is a Secret Office, on the lines of the Russian OGPU, which would enforce quietly the one real crime by exterminating those whom it found guilty of incorrigibly anti-social behaviour. Once again we are back again at Mr. Drennan's test, forced to its logical conclusion with merciless common-sense. The play itself characteristically has almost nothing to do with the preface. It is a far better play than *Too True To Be Good*: it contains some of the most sparkling dialogue that even Mr. Shaw has ever written; and in essence it is simply a brilliant burlesque satire on the folly and incompetence, the mess, the muddle and the make-believe, of democracy in this country to-day.

Mr. Shaw, then, accepts the doctrine that right social behaviour is, for practical purposes, the sum of all virtue; indeed, he says roundly that he does not know what 'self-regarding actions' are. He has no use at all for any private liberty except liberty to serve the

community. His doctrine, and his general outlook, is one which will assure him the benediction, not only of the ghost of Lenin, but of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini as well. Grant then, for the argument's sake, that all action which is of service to the community is to be commended. Is all anti-social action to be condemned? Mr. Shaw meets the challenge with his customary magnificent courage. His answer is 'Yes.' But were not the careers of both Socrates and Christ deliberate challenges to the society in which they lived? Did they not involve in the result the break-up of these societies, with the ruin and suffering which the break-up of any society inevitably involves? Again Mr. Shaw says 'Yes.' In that case their elimination, their extermination, was justified. Their judges were right in the course which they took. And once again Mr. Shaw says 'Yes,' justifying Pilate from Pilate's point of view.

But certain things follow from these affirmations. To begin with, the method of extermination stands condemned. It is no good; or at any rate, it may be worse than useless. For the extermination of Socrates and of Christ, so far from crushing their anti-social activities, crowned them and made them entirely irresistible. Again, everybody, apart from a very few incorrigible admirers of times past, would admit that mankind has undoubtedly gained by these particular anti-social activities. The new world, with all its monstrous imperfections and its hideous suffering, is better than the world these destroyed. Anti-social action, then, may be good. But if that be ever true, what becomes of Mr. Drennan and his one test of moral action? It is not the one test. It is not a test at all.

The recent victories of Fascism have been due in part to the weakness and divisions which have

enfeebled its opponents. An excellent picture of these is furnished by Mr. Murphy's *Preparing for Power*, a very illuminating study of the distracted counsels which have afflicted the British Labour movement almost since its inception. This is a far better book than Mr. Drennan's, and the chapters on the 'Shop Stewards' in it are important. In his main contention Mr. Murphy is wrong. He is persuaded that the real struggle of the future lies, not between democracy and Fascism, but between Socialism and Fascism. His obsession that private property is the root of all evil is the basis of this belief: in reality the struggle which centred upon the rights of property is being completely overshadowed by the far more important struggle over individual liberty. After all, if a Government can determine exactly how a man may or may not use his property, is there any particular meaning in saying that he owns the property at all? Fascism, in the persons of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, may very well meet Mr. Murphy far more than half way so far as his hatred of private property is concerned.

Social efficiency is the glittering prize which Fascism offers to mankind. In the modern world the value of social efficiency has enormously appreciated. The inefficiency of the old democracies mattered relatively little. It meant only that the simple hard life of a small isolated community was rather less secure and rather more uncomfortable than it need have been: and for that there were compensations which to those who valued them seemed adequate. But the prizes of efficiency in the

mechanised civilisation of to-day are dazzling; and the penalties on inefficiency are so appalling that it is not wonderful to find millions to whose eyes social efficiency seems the one thing needful. The democrat, with his back to the wall, is driven in desperation to say defiantly that democratic government can be as efficient as any other.

In this he is almost certainly deceived. There is no reason why democratic government should be the Bedlam of Mr. Shaw's satire. But democracy cannot hope to compete on its own ground with a system like Fascism, which makes efficient administration the end-all and be-all of its existence. For the very kernel of the democrat's creed is that efficiency is not enough and that certain other things, such as free speech and free thought, are of such inestimable intrinsic value that it is worth while for their sake enduring even the terrible evils which may and do often follow from relative inefficiency. To the convinced Fascist this belief is just foolishness.

The final and permanent triumph in this struggle of the Totalitarian State, claiming to regulate the lives of its citizens in their smallest details and to stifle any criticism of itself by elimination or extermination, must mean the end of almost all that is worth calling civilisation. But it will not happen. There will come a day when the burden of its yoke will become intolerable: then the Totalitarian State will disappear with the same surprising suddenness as the great democracies which have in our own time vanished in a night before our eyes.

STUART HODGSON.

MODERN JEWRY

The Jews in the Modern World. By Arthur Rupp, Ph.D., with an Introduction by L. B. Namier. Macmillan.—15s. net.

Twelve Jews. Edited by Hector Bolitho. Rich and Cowan.—5s. net.

THIS is not a dispassionate age; and there is hardly a more intemperate controversy—sometimes in both camps—than the place and future of the Jewish people in the modern world. Between persecution, as in Germany to-day, the closing down of emigration everywhere, birth-control, mixed marriages, the rationalisation of religion and vast economic change, Jews are reaching some of the last cross-roads in their age-long pilgrimage in search of an abiding habitation.

Dr. Rupp, the eminent German-Jewish sociologist and authority on Palestine, has made a comprehensive survey of every aspect of this modern dilemma; and his book should be indispensable to all who desire a right understanding of what is involved in the conflict between Jew and non-Jew and in the final Jewish destiny. The terrible ordeal of the Jews in the Third Reich, under which some of its most cultivated and industrious citizens have been beaten and hunted down, and all reduced to a second-class status, is only a lurid flashlight on a culminating movement in history.

There is double drama in the German situation. For in the Western field Germany has been the nation in which the majority of Jews were, in many respects, among the most influential and loyal assimilated members. Even now they only number some 600,000, or about twice the number of those in England. Nearly all refugees from the Nazi terror still think of Germany as their natural homeland

for which the France of Paris or the England of London—or even Palestine—can never be a satisfactory substitute. They feel uprooted; for they sank deeper into German soil than their Aryan tormentors have ever realised, or than they have had the sensibility to understand. Nietzsche perhaps helped to explain this other side of the tragedy in his remark: 'German intellect is indigestion; it can assimilate nothing.'

No one strove harder to make the reconciliation between Jew and Gentile, and between Jew and German, than the murdered Walther Rathenau, superman, industrial *entrepreneur*, semi-Fascist statesman and romantic mystic. Although a Jew, he declared: 'The Jews are no longer a nation and they will never become one again. . . . The highly intellectual among the Jews have lost all national feeling; they recognise only individuals, in the same way as, in the future, there will be no nations—only individuals.' Here is something of Mr. H. G. Wells' 'Open Conspiracy' of men of universalised good-will. Yet it did not hold back Rathenau from the antithesis: 'But the Germans must remain a nation, and therefore our whole strength must be with them.'

This dual-mindedness must be the most significant expression, by the most significant European-Jewish figure, of the racial complex. As victims of the ill-treatment of minorities, which is a more acute European problem than the revision of frontiers under the Peace Treaties, 16,000,000 Jews in the world are now without the liberty of free movement which enabled mass migration in the eighties of the last century to move westwards till, to-day, there are 4,500,000 of them in the United States. There,

according to Dr. Ruppín, most of them aim, 'not to be good Jews, but good Americans'; and there is a steady drift from the synagogue of Israel to Christian Science and similar cults. Liberal Judaism is dismissed as a kind of half-way house to Christian Unitarianism which it may some day actually meet. 'Religion' or 'Race' is the dividing issue between Jews themselves.

Seven million Jews remain in Eastern Europe, 3,000,000 in Russia, the same number in the new Poland, and 1,000,000 in Rumania. Altogether, however, one-third of world Jewry are English-speaking, and only 40 per cent. now speak Yiddish. A common language no longer acts as the general cement of race, and it is not likely to be recovered in the West; but Hebrew is being revived as the official language in Palestine under Zionism. In Russia, once the bulwark of Judaism, the Soviet Government has succeeded in alienating the majority of youth from the Jewish religion, and the next generation may be almost entirely lost in the technology of Leninism. With the decay of Rabbinical orthodoxy, the old tribal family bond, which was maintained by the ban on mixed marriages, has so weakened that in Prussia, for example, Jewish-German unions have risen to 23.47 per cent., and less than a fourth of the children of these mixed marriages become Jews. The first blow at the family as a fetish was struck in our Victorian age by Samuel Butler's brave novel, *Way of all Flesh*. It is ironic that Sigmund Freud, one of the greatest of living Jews and of men of genius in the world, is responsible for scientific researches in psycho-analysis which are dissolving and reorientating the entire relations between parents and children.

Birth-control, again, it may surprise many of Dr. Ruppín's readers

to learn, is one of the pioneer eugenics of the assimilated Jew; and this is one of several causes operating to turn the Jews into a static population. Here Germany also supplies an illustration. There is a later marriage date as another factor in stabilisation. 'Increase and multiply' is thus no longer a guiding motive to racial survival. The economic sphere, in which so much ignorant anti-Semitism takes its root, is much less favourable to-day to the Jews than in the period of individual capitalism now undergoing rapid transformation. The past success of the Jews in this sphere, represented by 38 per cent. in commerce and 36 per cent. in trade (contrasted with only 4 per cent. in agriculture and 2 per cent. in casual labour and domestic service), was largely due to the flair for speculative opportunity-taking bred under necessity, though there were many traders among Jews in their Oriental days. All these factors, social and economic, are affecting the whole structure of society; but they affect the Jews most as a separate people.

Marxism in Russia, and its reaction in Germany and Italy, has created a European movement towards State capitalism in which the individual commercial organiser, and the single tradesman or craftsman, must diminish, if not disappear. It is therefore surprising that in Mr. Bolitho's mixed bag of twelve Jewish men of mark there is no place for Karl Marx, though it contains room for the late Lord Bearstead (oil), Epstein (sculpture), Proust (novelist), Reinhardt (entertainment), as well as Freud, Rathenau, Ehrlich, Luzzatti, and Dr. Weizmann. Since Trotzky is also included, the omission of Karl Marx cannot be understood, as it was out of Marxism that Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, and Trotzky himself, arose to intensify the Jewish problem. Einstein and Herzl should not have been omitted

from a representative gallery illustrating the individualistic versatility of great Jews.

These two books might never have been written if there had been no outlook that Palestine under the British Mandate would provide a radiating centre as a new focal point for the patriotic racialism and culture peculiar to the Jewish spirit. This return to the ancestral homeland is no longer a Messianic dream; and to-day only a fifth of its population of 230,000 profess the old orthodoxy. Palestine can only be an asylum for tormented Jews to a limited extent, as it is a small country about the size of Wales, and also mountainous. Dr. Ruppín's estimate of ten years ahead is a Jewish population of half a million, which would merely absorb 3 per cent. of present world Jewry and be 30 per cent. of the total population. For the British people, as for the Jews, the Palestinian Mandate is one of the most important developments in twentieth-century nation-making.

George Eliot dreamed of Palestine as a bridge between East and West, and no other such fascinating experiment in the building of a bi-racial State (Jew and Arab) exists. The experiment can only be a success as a world merger of Judaism if the Jews there learn to assimilate each other without Chauvinistic and economic disruptions. Professor Namier, in a brilliant if somewhat pessimistic introduction, regards the support of the Zionist effort as the first duty of Jews of this generation. Dr. Ruppín trusts that, notwithstanding all the disintegrating influences at work in the world, Zionism in Palestine will produce a condition of equilibrium which for a long time will preserve the present position of Jewry. The inspiration of this hope is appropriately derived from the Old Testament proverb that 'where no vision is, the people perisheth.'

J. B. HOBMAN.

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MORE ABOUT RUSSIA

The Crucifixion of Liberty. By Alexander Kerensky. Arthur Barker, Ltd.—15s. net.

First to go Back. By Irina Skariatina. Victor Gollancz, Ltd.—12s. 6d. net.

Moscow, 1917-1933. By Allan Monkhouse. Victor Gollancz, Ltd.—16s. net.

Winter in Moscow. By Malcolm Muggeridge. Eyre and Spottiswoode.—7s. 6d. net.

Modern Russia. By Cicely Hamilton. J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.—7s. 6d. net.

World Revolution and the U.S.S.R. By Michael T. Florinsky, Ph.D. Macmillan & Co., Ltd.—8s. 6d. net.

It is just over seventeen years since Tsarism in Russia 'committed suicide,' as Kerensky so rightly put it in his book, and was succeeded by the Provisional Government, which in its turn was overthrown a few months later by the Bolsheviks. Of all the unpleasant things that have happened to the Russians since that time, one of the worst is that innumerable foreigners have felt called upon to write books about them.

In this huge and daily growing literature of books on Russia the number of those that deserve serious treatment, or will survive, is exceedingly small and could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. New authors who venture in these fields are so much aware of it that nowadays they all start their books on Russia with an apology. That apology is the first thing the books selected for review here have in common. Next to this commendable self-consciousness these six authors also show some other qualities which distinguish them favourably from their fellow-writers. Their seriousness of approach, their genuine sincerity, and their knowledge of, or at least regard for, Russia's past—without which all attempts to understand modern Russia would be futile—deserve the highest praise.

It is especially irritating, therefore, to find in practically all of these books a number of small inexactitudes which could so easily

have been avoided. Mr. Kerensky, for instance, describes the famous 'Kadet' or Liberal leader Shingarev as 'Menshevik' Minister of Agriculture; Miss Cicely Hamilton wrongly captions a splendid photograph of the Alexandrinsky (or Dramatic) Theatre as 'Marinsky Theatre' (the Opera House), and badly mistranslates the mock inscription of a poster caricaturing the Pope as 'The Pope and Mammon,' when the Russian text says 'The Pope and "Momma"', or mother. And why does Madame Skariatina spell Vladimir sometimes with a 'V' and sometimes with a 'W'? I deliberately mention these small things because they spoil the stimulating effect of books which provide the reader with plenty of serious matter to think and argue about. By far the most important of them is *The Crucifixion of Liberty*, by Kerensky. This much-maligned man, whose very name has become a term of abuse both in and out of Russia, claims that his book is not an apologia, not even a literary work, but a political act. Of some of the chapters this is certainly true. But the book is also something more than that; his survey of Russia before the Revolution and the passages dealing with the imperial family are a masterpiece of literary expression. His rehabilitation of pre-revolutionary Russia (although not of Tsarism), coming as it does from a man who fought Tsarism since his

early youth, and his Epilogue on Democracy in general, are brilliantly written, and I commend these passages to the very special attention of all Liberals and Democrats throughout the world. But when it comes to a description of the Revolution and his fall from power, Kerensky cannot resist an attempt at self-justification, even though he does say once, 'But still, the fatal mistake was my own.' He writes with remarkable self-restraint, and jibes like 'Professor Miljukov, a clever historian, though never a statesman,' are rare. Altogether a book that does its author credit, but suggests the painful reflection that if in 1917 Kerensky had been as wise as he appears to be now, Russian and European history might have taken a very different course.

Among the million or more Russians who live in exile since the Bolshevik Revolution there is not one, I suppose, who at some time has not paused to think or dream what it would feel like to be back in Russia. It was therefore with the greatest emotion that I approached *First to go Back*, whose author, Irina Skariatina, is described as 'the first member of the former titled Russian aristocracy to re-enter the Soviet Union.' Here, I thought, is a person who has had that unique opportunity; her book must be different from all others. It is; in spite of the fact that, as a survey of actual conditions in Russia, it is frankly disappointing. The author lacks that ability of distinguishing between the essential and the superfluous which would make a book of this kind really interesting. What she says of modern Russia is commonplace, and many foreign tourists have said the same thing. But where the book grips me, and will probably grip all those who were Russians once, is the description of the effect the present sight of Russia has on her. How well I

understand the reminiscences certain names, places, buildings, noises or smells awake in her.

On and on we went through the moonlight night bound for Orel, the capital of the State which was only 80 versts away from Troitskoe, my home. And as I pressed my face against the cold window pane I seemed to recognise every wood and every river and every village that we passed.

And she describes 'her visits to places which, like herself, I knew and loved; and where I, too, was happy; a railway journey to the south, and a station where, like herself, I have waited for trains. And the Crimea, where once upon a time her Swiss governess, Mademoiselle Lina Meyer, was reading books to her—probably the same ones she used to read to my sisters and myself. For the world is small, and that very lady—a fat, vivacious and singularly omniscient person—was for many years also my governess. And as I put down Irina Skariatina's book, which is dull and yet exciting, I feel a most terrible nostalgia.

Mr. Allan Monkhouse, who figured so largely in the Moscow Trial of 1933, has spent twenty-two years in Russia. He does know the country, and understands it as well as any foreigner can. His observations are therefore especially interesting, although some of his views are, of course, extremely disputable. But throughout the book he displays the greatest sympathy for Russia, both pre- and post-revolutionary, a feeling which even his Moscow misadventure could not destroy. In fact, he is on the whole favourably impressed by the Bolsheviks, and sees Russia's future with somewhat surprising optimism.

Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge, in his witty and terse book, is, on the contrary, sceptical. He has the sense to see that the 'Russian Revolution is one thing, and the Soviet *Régime* another'; and, while Russia and the Russians have

found a friend in him, the Bolsheviks and their 'imbecile foreign admirers' are mercilessly exposed. He writes with refreshing vigour, and what he says about the attitude of the English *intelligentsia* towards Russia fills my heart with delight.

The observant and omniscient Cicely Hamilton, after writing books on Modern Italy, France and Germany, has now 'covered' Modern Russia. Her attempts at excursions into Russia's past are laudable, though her historical analogies are too superficial to be correct. But the opinions of a clever woman are always interesting; she has approached Russia with an open mind and she presents her views in a very readable form. Her judgment is, on the whole, unfavourable, except in the case of the Soviet practice of 'Voluntary Motherhood,' which receives her qualified approval.

Dr. M. T. Florinsky's book comes just at the right moment, for the U.S.S.R. is nowadays a very active member of the Concert of Europe. In his very timely study of Russia's domestic and international position from the point of view of the Soviets' activities in connexion with the promotion of World Revolution, Dr. Florinsky attempts to show that the old parallel policy of fostering world revolution on the one hand and developing Russia on the other has undergone great changes. In fact, he thinks that the former will in due course be entirely supplanted by the latter—a very debatable point, but an interesting subject for speculation. Be this as it may, the student of Russian affairs would do well to read this book immediately after Kerensky's. He would then get a very good idea of the political developments both preceding and following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

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THE GERMAN ENIGMA

I Was a German: An Autobiography. By Ernst Toller. Translated by Edward Crankshaw. John Lane.—5s. net.

Germany, Prepare for War! From the German *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg*. By Professor Ewald Banse. Translated by Alan Harris. Lovat Dickson.—10s. 6d. net.

The Tragedy of a Nation. Germany, 1918-1934. By Prince Hubertus Löwenstein, with an Introduction by Wickham Steed. Faber and Faber.—17s. 6d. net.

BETWEEN these three books there is no organic connexion. Yet, in a way, each supplements the others. Ernst Toller, once a German Jew, poet and playwright, soldier, revolutionary leader, now an exile bereft of German citizenship, tells, in his forty-first year, the tale of his youth and early manhood. His introduction says:

Not only my own youth is portrayed here, but also the youth of a whole generation, and a slice of history into the bargain. This generation followed many different paths, worshipped false gods, and believed in false prophets, but always it strove for enlightenment and tried to hear the voice of reason and truth.

Professor Ewald Banse, first German Professor of Military Science, who fills his chair at the Brunswick High School, has been speaking, and still speaks, to a generation younger than that of Toller. He and his like strive to lead it along other paths, to worship other gods and to close its ears to what Toller and his fellows think the voice of reason and truth.

Prince Hubertus Löwenstein belongs to an intermediate generation, and was one of its leaders. He speaks of the generation that grew up in the first decade after the war and sought to express its yearnings in the 'Youth Movement.' Like Toller, he is in exile. Unlike

him, he believed in the Weimar Republic as a first step on what he held to be Germany's true path. He writes of the 'Tragedy of a Nation' and insists that 'all depends on making preparations now for the spirit that must ultimately prevail if Europe is to be saved from the abyss.' In his eyes Hitlerism and all it may mean constitute the German tragedy, for 'there is nothing else in the Hitler movement than the desire for absolute power for power's sake.'

As literature Toller's *I Was a German* (the English title, though apt, is less descriptive than the original title, *Eine Jugend in Deutschland*) easily holds the first place. Between the lines, too, it reveals another drama of tragic quality—the attempt of 'Aryan' Germanism to cast out Jewry from its midst and to rid itself of Jewish contributions to Germanism. None who care to know of, let alone understand, the passions and forces of which Germany was the theatre during and after the war can afford to overlook Toller's testimony. But it must be read with insight and sympathetic imagination if its full power is to be felt. It is the personal drama of an outstanding dramatist, lived and played amid storms that tore a whole nation from its moorings and sent it adrift on uncharted seas.

Now [Toller writes] barbarism is triumphant. Nationalism, racial hatred, State-idolatry dazzle heart and mind and eye. . . . Now the people look for their salvation, not to reason, work and responsibility, but to a spurious saviour. They rejoice in the fetters they have forged for themselves at a nod from their Dictator. . . . 'What,' they ask, 'has reason done for us in these last years?' So they have put their trust in those who belittle the mind, who teach that reason enervates the will, corrupts the spirit and destroys society's foundations, that the woes of the world are

all the dark fruit of reason. As if reason had ever ruled! As if once already a Germany without plan or reason had not hurled all Europe into the abyss! . . . I see the thousands who celebrate the death of freedom and the overthrow of reason with joy and sounding brass. I see the thousands, betrayed and deluded, who really believe that the kingdom of justice on earth is at hand. I see the thousands who ache to follow in the footsteps of the youth of Flanders and march singing and rejoicing on their way to death.

Are these the outpourings of a fevered brain, or is there in Germany to-day any warrant for Toller's vision of woe? Professor Ewald Banse makes answer. Historically and culturally, he says, we Germans have reached a turning-point in our destiny. The day of discomfort and hard thinking and grim resolve and cold steel has begun. The sword will come into its own again, and the pen, after fourteen years of exaggerated prestige, will be put in its proper place. The pen is good and the sword is good. But the sword is the older weapon, and it is the final, the ultimately decisive one; therefore it should have the first place. We are on the threshold of an iron age. For us it stands under the sign of the Third Reich. Mighty empires grow only out of the clash of swords. The Third Reich, from the Flanders coast to Hungary, from Memel to the Adige and the Rhone, can only be born in blood and iron. Ideas and works and armies must march and fight and die before the vast and splendid

structure of the Third Reich can rise from the ground of the Western world. Henceforth war is a contest, not between armies or even nations, but between countries, philosophies and economic systems. The coming war, the great war that will decide the fate of the German people, will ultimately be fought out deep down in the souls of the belligerent nations.

This is the Banse thesis. It confirms Toller's vision. Yet it substantiates Prince Löwenstein's belief that all depends on making preparations now for the spirit that must ultimately prevail if Europe is to be saved from the abyss. Banse's plans and sketch for the invasion of England are merely incidental to the general 'Drang' or 'urge' which many millions of well-trained, well-armed young Germans feel towards the establishment of the Third Reich by blood and iron. And Toller's vision may well prove prophetic unless Prince Löwenstein's warning be heeded.

Weapons alone cannot suffice. Banse is right. The coming war will ultimately be fought out deep down in the souls of the belligerent nations. Only a mightier and more valiant spirit than that of Nazi Germany can win it; and, if this spirit prevail betimes among the peoples and Governments of the Western world, Nazi barbarism will be worsted without need to fire a shot or to drop a single bomb.

WICKHAM STEED.

RELIGIOUS ESSAYS

Oxford and the Groups. Edited by R. H. S. Crossman. Blackwell.—5s. net.

The Meaning of the Groups. Edited by F. A. M. Spencer. Methuen.—5s. net.

Group Movements of the Past and Experiments in Guidance. By Ray Strachey. With an introduction by the Rt. Rev. H. Hensley Henson. Faber.—5s. net.

Essays in Construction. By W. R. Matthews. Nisbet.—7s. 6d. net.

THERE is general agreement among most people who have the interest of religion at heart that the time for the demise of the Group Movement has come. But there is some haggling over the method of dispatch. The Bishop of Durham would tunnel under Buchmanism and blow it up; and Auckland Castle has shown that it conceals some dangerous explosives. But there is another school of thought which would do the job quietly and unpretentiously. Its members have no objection to drinking at the same party with the Buchmanite, but take the opportunity to drop a little sedative into his cup. To this school belong most of the contributors to *Oxford and the Groups*, a highly important addition to the literature of the subject. They are terribly nice to the Buchmanites, but when the party is over they are found to have said some very deadly things, and if the Groups survive it will be because they are as polybiotic as a cat.

The keynote of the book is struck by Dr. Selbie in his introduction, where he sees in the Groups 'a real and effective work of the Spirit of God,' but questions whether their methods of soul surgery are wisely

entrusted to inexperienced novices and made of universal application, and worries about their intellectual background. First in the list of contributors is the Rev. G. F. Allen, whose task is to give an account of the Groups in Oxford. That he does competently, and his statement of the need to be met in an Oxford left hungering for the bread of religion after the stones of liberalism will evoke much sympathy. Whether the Group Movement is meeting that need is another matter. To judge from the eight essays which follow Mr. Allen's, it is merely offering pumice instead of granite. The most outspoken critic is Miss B. E. Gwyer, Principal of St. Hugh's. She finds the dangers of the movement in its want of a little poverty. Certainly the Groups must value the conversion of the individual soul highly, judging by the amount of money they spend on it. Another outspoken criticism is that of Mr. C. R. Morris, Jowett Lecturer in Philosophy, who finds in the Groups a serious obstacle to all organised social reform.

The best essay in the book, judged as a piece of theological work, is that of Father D'Arcy. He writes on 'The Groups and the Spirit of Worship,' and makes an illuminating contrast between the way of St. Ignatius Loyola and the way of the Groups. The method of the *Spiritual Exercises* relies in the first place on intellectual conviction, and in the second place it ploughs a deep furrow of humility. The Groups must certainly compare unfavourably in these respects. The other writers have further criticism to make. Mr. John Maud notes some divergences between the ideals of Oxford and the Groups. Mr. W. H. Auden thinks the movement irrational and Fascist at

heart. Dr. L. P. Jacks sees danger in the Group treatment of sin, and the Rev. E. R. Micklem in the practice of 'just so' guidance. The Rev. J. W. C. Wand, Archbishop-elect of Brisbane, points out ways in which the Groups may come into conflict with the Church; but he ought, in the fashion of headmasters, to have prefaced his castigation with the words, 'This is going to hurt me more than you.' The essays were meant to have been summed up by the most distinguished adherent of the Groups, Professor Grensted, but circumstances prevented him from reading the whole book, and his independent essay is notable for a confession, rare in Group literature, that the movement has made mistakes. This kind of thing will mean the end of the doctrine of guidance.

Dr. Selbie is himself a contributor to a similar series of essays edited by the Chaplain of Brasenose, and here he rather emphasises the good points of the movement. Clearly he has not yet made up his mind about it, and the same probably applies to Dr. William Brown, who, after a damaging criticism from the psychological point of view, adds a postscript blessing the movement on its religious and social side. Most of the contributors are very kind to the Groups. Four of them—Canon Frank Child (Vicar of St. Helens), Dr. L. W. H. Bertie, Professor W. B. Brash, and the Dean of Caius—are themselves Groupists. Professor C. E. Raven and Dr. Major also write in a kindly way about the movement. Strong criticism comes from a physician, Dr. F. H. Dodd, while Father Ronald Knox, professing all the time that his sole knowledge of the movement comes from table-talk, hits the bull's-eye time and time again. Finally, there is a strictly neutral and wholly admirable essay by Miss Evelyn Underhill, reviewing the manner in which the Church has treated

revivalistic movements in the past. It might profitably be read in conjunction with the extracts from the papers of Hannah Whitall Smith, herself a great revivalist but a very sensible woman, now republished by her grandchild, Mrs. Ray Strachey, with a typical introduction by the Bishop of Durham. They show, with all the solemnity of historical examples, the fantastic ends which the doctrine of divine guidance may be made to serve.

To turn to the Dean of Exeter's *Essays in Construction* is to breathe another air. Although they are based upon a series in the *Guardian*, and although in their altered form they are still intended for the general reader, they bear the marks of an acute intellect searching hard for the truth. Dr. Matthews has read widely, in philosophy as well as in theology, and here proves his capacity to express profound thoughts in simple and engaging language. A moral virtue, that of trying to be fair to all men, has led to the one theological weakness of the book. This weakness comes out in his treatment of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. He makes a distinction between the historic sense and the religious sense of these doctrines, a distinction which is certainly valid, and goes on to suggest that it may be possible to accept them in the religious sense while denying them in the historical sense. This is an echo of Roman Catholic Modernism; but it has antecedents much farther back—in those Renaissance scholars who believed that what is true in theology may be false in philosophy. That way dishonesty lies. The converse of Dr. Matthews' distinction is true—a doctrine may be historically true and religiously without value; but to say one accepts the Virgin Birth or the Resurrection in a religious sense while denying it in the historical sense is a subterfuge, and one which brings the Church into grave dis-

repute. It should be added that Dr. Matthews himself has no need of the distinction, but it is a pity he has elaborated for others a way of saying with the mouth what they do not profess in the heart.

With most of Dr. Matthews' essays, however, hearty agreement is possible. A sketch of current influences, such as Humanism, Roman Catholicism and Barthianism, is excellently done, and so is an attack on the theory of religion as an illusion and a defence of 'the supernatural faith which is the core of Christianity.' In an essay on evolution Dr. Matthews shows that he is able to come to close grips with scientific issues. He has also some excellent remarks on the perennial problem of evil and on the hope of immortality. Most suggestive, also, are some thoughts on the relation of the temporal and eternal scattered in various essays. So many problems are bound up with this perplexing question that one could wish them elaborated.

IVOR THOMAS.

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EUROPEAN LETTERS

A History of European Literature. By Laurie Magnus. Ivor Nicholson and Watson. — 12s. 6d.

THE sudden death of Mr. Laurie Magnus just a year ago, at the age of sixty-one, inflicted a serious loss on literary scholarship, for he was one of the few students in our midst equipped by temperament and training to take a European survey of letters. But our regret at his premature death is softened by the fact that he had found time in a very busy life to achieve one of his ambitions. In 1926 he produced a dictionary of European literature, and he transposed its alphabeticalism into chronological arrangement in this *History of European Literature*, which was his swan-song.

His desire to compass the subject seems to have been inspired by a remark made many years ago by Edward Dowden, who wanted to see the student equipped with a general sketch of European literature on lines similar to Freeman's general sketch of European history—though Mr. Magnus queried the analogy. Since that time several books on the comparative study of literature have appeared, including the twelve-volume *Periods of European Literature*, edited, and partly written, by the encyclopædic Saintsbury. Mr. Magnus himself celebrated the year of the Armistice with *A General Sketch of European Literature in the Centuries of Romance*, as if to remind a war-worn world that Europe had once dreamed dreams.

The present volume, his last, which he left in typescript, to be edited and read in proof by Dr. Boas, takes a broader view of the field, and represents the sum-total of years of patient study. The mere labour of preparation would have made many men muscle-bound,

reducing them to the state of those historical writers whom Leslie Stephen spoke of, not unjustly, as belonging to the school of infinitesimal research; or it might have paralysed them altogether in their fatal desire to be worthy to begin, after the manner of Henry James's artist, who purposed painting the Madonna of the Future. But, inspired with the typically Jewish ideal of 'international union of which literature is the handmaiden,' Mr. Magnus never lost sight of his goal. He took the high ground—the only one really worth occupying in literature—that books are an integral part and expression of life itself, and are not to be measured merely by other books, as critics like Gosse, interested though he was in comparative literature, are apt to believe. The danger is peculiarly tempting to an island people like ourselves, who are so chary of Continental contacts, except under the compulsion of a common danger, while the Englishman's innate dislike of philosophical ideas makes the study of origins in literature difficult for the plain man, who is apt to regard his favourite authors as examples of spontaneous generation.

Mr. Magnus's dominating motive, from first to last, is to trace the 'recovery of the pagan spirit.' That is why he quotes with zest Schiller's praise of Rousseau as 'the man who turned Christians into men.' The recovery did not begin till the thirteenth century, say from the epoch of Dante. It was on a *tabula rasa*—almost incredible to a generation which knows its Chapman as Keats did, its Bohn, or its Loeb—that Dante wrote, for 'the Hebrew and Greek languages through many centuries after the capture of Rome by Alaric the Visigoth in 410 A.D. had been unfamiliar in the west.' The Bible was current in a Latin version, and the Greek classics,

so far as they were known at all, were likewise current in Latin versions, often very much altered from the original texts. The first task of men of letters in the thirteenth century and after was to lift the veil from the background and to recover those hidden works. Out of their strenuous endeavours came the Renaissance and its sequel, the Reformation, which added up to a new civilisation, for Mr. Magnus rejected the Bellocian interpretation of the Reformation as a 'mighty process which destroyed the common culture of Europe.' The founders of the literary Renaissance, he says again in his explanatory way, are 'usually called the Humanists because they turned back to human (or lay) from divine (or sacred) preoccupations.' Therein you get, within the first few pages, the key to the whole book.

Having explained the background in the first of his books, he proceeds to four main sections—Renaissance and Reformation, in which he shows Europe at school; and the age of Shakespeare, in which he adopts Professor Dover Wilson's appraisal of Shakespeare's victory as a 'victory for the whole human race.' The fourth book deals with the French rule and its sequel, from the establishment of the French Academy in 1637 to the Fall of the Bastille in 1789, in which he reiterates his main thesis that the Revolution of the eighteenth century was the sequel to the Reformation of the sixteenth. 'Petrarch died in 1474, Rousseau in 1778: the Reformation followed the one, and the Revolution the other: Rousseau and Kant were wanted to complete what Petrarch and Luther had begun, and even to undo a part

of what had been ill done in four centuries of imperfect experimentation.' He closes with a chapter on Revolutionary Europe, with special emphasis on Goethe, whose Hellenic note is 'nearer that of Keats than Wordsworth,' though there are more references to the latter throughout the entire text than to anybody else except Shakespeare. The epilogue, which covers Victorian literature, is much too skimpy, as if Mr. Magnus 'had become fagged before the end of his encyclopædic task arrived.

As it is, he is clear-eyed, not least in his text-book method of introducing paragraphs with italicised catch lines, and he managed to pack away an enormous number of facts—there are over 900 references in his index—in the 120,000 words at his disposal. Yet in many cases compressions might have been effected, and probably would have been made if he had lived to see his work in type. A case in point is his reference to the illuminating tribute to Scott contributed to *The Times* newspaper on September 21st in that year 1932 by Prof. Trevelyan, O.M., followed by a long extract from the same. Similarly, there is sometimes a lack of balance. For instance, twice as much space is devoted to Ossian Macpherson as to Burns, whom he does not estimate at his full philosophical value, though we are grateful for the description of him as an 'inspired faun.'

Taken all in all, however, Mr. Magnus's is a remarkable effort, ethical rather than æsthetic in its aim, giving the average man a good sense of the 'discipline of comparative literature.'

J. M. BULLOCK.

A POET'S WORKSHOP

Keats' Craftsmanship: A Study in Poetic Development. By M. R. Ridley. Clarendon Press.—15s. net.

Keats. By B. Ifor Evans. ('Great Lives.') Duckworth.—2s. net.

IN fact, though not perhaps in appearance, the craftsmanship of Keats, being concrete, is a more fruitful study than his potentiality, and wise people have grown a little weary of the 'inferences' drawn by too eager admirers from the second version of *Hyperion*. But what do we mean by 'craftsmanship'?

As it happens, two simultaneous answers have appeared. The simpler—and simplicity is a virtue—is admirably sketched by Mr. James Sutherland in *The Medium of Poetry* (Hogarth Press); the more complex and detailed by Mr. M. R. Ridley. To Mr. Ridley, the craftsmanship of Keats falls into three divisions: his sources, or points of attachment; his materials, or the 'stuff of his web'; and his workmanship, or the 'artistry of its spinning.' All three are admissible, but the first, the sources, would be the most easily spared. No artist worthy the name takes (as we all know) more than suggestions; and when, for instance, we learn that Shakespeare added Caliban to his materials for *The Tempest* we learn nothing but reverence: such evidence of artistic creation begs analysis. The fact is an inspiration: the 'how' is a mystery, though from meditation of mystery, as distinguished from attempted analysis, everything, poetically speaking, is to be learned.

Mr. Ridley's excuse is, really, better than analytical. He treats Keats as we treat a wine: the discussion of its colour, its bouquet, its first and second flavours, its *sève*,

deepens enjoyment. It does not pretend to add to knowledge of the sacred secrets of the grape. But, again, analysis has its own pleasures, and these sometimes lead us astray. To meet hypercriticism with hypercriticism seems only good manners, so I will demur to the lover's strictures of 'Isabella' in two points.

Mr. Ridley calls 'awkward inversions' these two lines:

What love Lorenzo for their
sister had
and
And many a jealous conference
had they,

Grammatically, doubtless, he is right; but grammar, though (like a good servant) to be respected, is servant to idiom; both the versions in these two lines are excellent idiom; the latter is frequently met in current speech. We should all read analytically, as Mr. Ridley prompts us, but when analysis and the ear seem to conflict, the ear has the last word every time. I think, too, he is a bit hard on Lemprière, for, with the doubtful exception of Bayle's, Lemprière's is the most delightful dictionary in the world.

The craftsmanship itself is better studied from *The Eve of St. Agnes* onward. This means a detailed study of corrections. They are fascinating, so long as we remember that we can but follow a creative process: we cannot, were a deleted word left with no substitute, supply the word that Keats would have supplied. This is what I mean when I call Mr. Ridley's study a book for amorous connoisseurs. Nobody but a connoisseur would enjoy poring over corrections from which, in the vulgar sense, there is little but wonder to be gleaned. This wonder is the reward of detailed study, and Mr. Ridley communicates his own enjoyment in many a detailed page. He also

throws a useful light upon the form of the Odes by relating the stanza of the *Ode on a Grecian Urn* to the structure of the sonnet, and with this hint (or reminder) the subtleties of the modulation become a more vivid possession. In a very pretty image he says (p. 207):

The couplet jars to a halt with the brakes grinding; the sestet, with the foreseen second recurrence of the third rhyme, swings gently up into the wind and picks up its buoy.

His defence of such analytic study is just, and is worth quoting:

There are readers who feel that any technical analysis of the sound-values of a poem is a kind of desecration, and detracts from the true æsthetic enjoyment of the poem. They regard it as a mechanical process and beneath their notice. I think that it will usually be found that such readers read their poetry with less attention of the ear than any great poem merits. [p. 232]


The fact is that, through excessive eye-reading, the modern ear is in decay, and such a scholarly book as this is the eye's confession, and attempt at atonement.

A more than convenient companion to this detailed study of Keats the craftsman is Mr. Ifor Evans' short *Life*. Necessarily, consideration of the poems has a large place in it; but it is a judicious book. Not only is the development of Keats noted, but also that of critical opinion since Keats's death. Mr. Evans is no cursory student, and, without being colourless, he has contrived to present the questions at issue, whether the place of Fanny Brawne in the poet's life or of the revised *Hyperion*, without surrendering to any of the sects whose pet extravagances seem so important—to themselves.

OSBERT BURDETT.

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'GRACIOUS heaven!' exclaims, in the first of these books, the elder author, Martin Linton, to the aspiring one, Brian Westby. 'A work of imagination isn't the place for airing your views on religion. If you want to write a pamphlet, do so; but don't mix the two things together.' To which Brian replies: 'If the characters in a book happen to have certain views, I don't see why they shouldn't express them. . . . What you want me to write . . . is a kind of poetry. I'm to dump down a poem and pretend it's a short story.' This diversity of purpose, which Mr. Forrest Reid here so aptly and pointedly expresses, is a sadly disintegrating element in the novel. The form has so many functions; a man knows not where to have it, fish or flesh, and the dilemma is especially bewildering to-day when the newly-awoken social conscience of the artist is in danger of destroying his self-respect. It is evident that the great majority of serious writers cannot be satisfied that their trade is worth pursuing, if it does not serve in some part as a comment on the present confusion

of the world. Intimately connected with this is the search for new forms. It is difficult for any narrative now to be merely the telling of a story; only one of this batch is that, *Hide and Seek*, and it achieves this singleness of outlook solely by detaching itself from all human values. It belongs to the Waugh-class of social comedy, but contains no satire, no criticism—is, indeed, devoid of anger or passion in any form, but is simply an excellently devised ebullition of high spirits. The same is almost true of *A Warning to Wantons*, but, although this also lacks any hint of a moral impulse, the story—a lavish piece of rococo work—is also a very charming fable, and there is real beauty in the scenes in which the most exquisitely civilised of heroines achieves her only happiness in the company of a handsome boor. Nevertheless, the book's chief interests seem, after all, to be adventitious ones—good story-telling and continuous verbal wit; but its success as a whole is vitiated by an imperfect mixture of realism and fantasy which is stupidly farcical.

Anthony Adverse, if we discount

its historical aspect as a picture of the Napoleonic world, also comes under the 'story' heading, and is in any case a book the like of which we never thought to see again. It is a panoramic romance made out of the world's decorations and hardly penetrates beneath them, but as such is a remarkable enough achievement, and the procession of incidents and descriptions is unceasingly lively. One cannot help wishing, though, that in so large a space something more permanently valuable could be found.

One novel, we see, is a 'fable'; another the 'study' of a period; others are 'studies' of the 'problems' of unemployment, of race, of adolescence, or of marriage. But the great masterpieces of fiction somehow achieved a purity in themselves, in spite of—it seemed—the existence of a subject-matter or a problem for study. They were a 'kind of poetry.' The measure of success, then, for the works of fiction writers who labour with a social conscience must still be their ability to 'dump down' a poem; otherwise they are not more than pamphleteers, and their work is essentially ephemeral.

Brian Westby is one of the few that can certainly be called 'a kind of poem,' for it describes affections that are profound and eternal. The framework is a situation leading to a climax, and the stress is laid entirely on personal relationships.

Martin Linton, an author of established reputation who has lost all interest in his work and his life, rediscovers those interests through his affection for a boy whom he chances to meet while recovering from an illness by the sea. Their approach to one another is described with the greatest charm and penetration. It appears subsequently that the boy, Brian Westby, is Linton's son, the child of a wife whom he had allowed to divorce him owing to their estrangement on religious grounds. This involves

another element in their approach; but one feels, perhaps, that it is an irrelevancy introduced to excuse, as it were, a relationship which has value in itself independent of fatherhood, the fatherhood being a chance that belongs to a story but is not involved with this particular affection. (It is possible, however, that the memory of Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice*, which recurred several times while reading *Brian Westby*, prompted this criticism.) The book achieves real tragedy—the tension before the end and the final pain are acute and unrelieved; there is no compensation for such a waste of hope and love. Yet its beauty survives, without bitterness, and if, as may well be, we are left wondering how the author has obtained such an effect and what his purpose is in taking the boy away with his mother and leaving Linton to death, we can find some solution in a quotation from Yakovnin prefixed to the book where the claims of the past, the present, and the future are set side by side.

In *De Vriendt Goes Home* a similar relationship is described. De Vriendt is a Dutch Jew living in Jerusalem, a scholar and a rabbi, passionately orthodox in his opposition to the secularisation of Jewry by the Zionists. He is in love with an Arab boy who comes to study with him, and through that contact discovers the profoundest experiences he has known. At the same time there is involved a strange division in his worship of God—the psychology here is admirable—and his expression of this in his poems gives a great shock to his friends and admirers when they are discovered after his murder by a Zionist fanatic. Zweig uses here on a smaller scale the method so elaborately employed in *Grischa*, presenting a mass of minor incidents and characters that bear with pointed irony on to the central theme, and every now and then

introducing some cosmic reference—just as *Grischa* opens with 'Tellus' whirling through space—to put us in our place. It is an original, and yet a curiously flat, imagination, which does not always avoid the pretentious, while the quality of the writing (unless the fault be the translator's) is seldom distinguished. Moreover, he has not quite integrated the fictional and personal element with the historical (the setting is the disturbances in the summer of 1929), and the book seems uncertain whether it should present itself as a comment on a country, a cosmos, a cause, or a single man; but, granting the method, it is cleverly worked out.

Both this and *In a Province* give, at any rate, a surface impression that they are novels with a purpose trying to pretend that they are no such thing; and it is not until the end of the latter book that we come upon a magnificent rejection of that last infirmity of the novelist, the pleading of a political cause. It takes its name from a quotation from Ecclesiastes: 'If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of justice in a province, marvel not at the matter.' And that is what the author actually means. He tells, with some skill and in excellently described settings, the story of a South African Dutch youth who leaves his farm home for a large port town and meets there a native boy who is entering civilisation for the first time. The Dutchman, Van Bredepoel, witnesses the corruption of the native by the town, and interests himself in the relations of the black and white races. He falls in with one Burgess, an eager man of action, a Marxist, the secretary of the 'Union of African Workers.' During some well-arranged discussions the latter tries to persuade him into active participation in the cause. 'We must all decide now, once for all, to commit ourselves either to the past or to the future.' But Van

Bredepoel perceives the danger of that policy. 'You think you're destroying a colour-prejudice, but you're only putting a white-prejudice in its place'; and he sees with a further wisdom than Burgess's that 'The starting and finishing point is in the heart of each man. . . . Each one must take heed for himself, and the system will in the end take heed for itself.' It is the wisdom of sayings such as this which make the book surprising and remarkable. Its diffuseness tends to relax the compactness of the thought. The satire and the drama are alike weak, and it is only in a few isolated incidents that the clash between the races is felt. There is no constant strain, as there certainly should be to make the book effective—as there is in a parallel study, Forster's *A Passage to India*.

Its Silly Face is as complete an integration of comment on particularities and profounder issues as is possible, and yet it achieves this wholeness rather in spite of itself, for the author has made his hero turn, in unemployment, to writing, and a good deal of the book is taken up with notes and sketches for his work, loosely strung together. The fact is that Mr. Gubsky has infinitely more rich and striking ideas than his story had room for: the book is overflowing with utterly true and honest thinking; it is a real spiritual tragedy, consummated in what is perhaps the most convincingly motivated suicide in modern fiction.

In comparison some of the other books here seem trite and trivial. *Backwaters* is, as a comment on the restlessness of human nature, true enough, but it has little literary interest. Mr. Mottram's *Bumphrey's* is interesting as an experiment in form, being written partly through a 'stream of consciousness,' partly in a narrative framework, while memory is constantly led back by association to incidents in the past. It is an admirable

attempt to give an artistic unity and compactness to the diffuse form, and is, as well, one of the only ways of giving depth and roundness to the picture; but in this case the mind is hardly poetic enough, the sensibility not delicate enough, to carry it out successfully. The characters are, besides, too tiresomely ordinary to make imaginative patterns of their feelings.

It's a Battlefield is another interesting attempt at planning a unity, but it is obtained here rather through the conscience (of a police commissioner) than the consciousness. There are some single scenes and points of irony that ring true, but the final effect does not seem to be more than a sophistication of story-telling.

Holy Wednesday is built round the unities of both time and person, and describes the last day in the life of a parish priest in Buenos Aires. In his box he receives one after the other the confessions of numberless sinners, and his spiritual tension, the tremendous sense of responsibility in his own soul, is admirably suggested; but it is not, as it well might be, overwhelming, largely because the sins confessed are monotonously similar, and the incidents are episodic, but not cumulative. In fact, the book is simpler than one would like it to be, but, accepted in its simplicity, it has beauty.

A more subtle and less intense comment on the cure of souls is found in a book which, like *Brian Westby*, is undoubtedly a 'kind of poem'—Martin Boyd's *Scandal of Spring*, which describes, with a marvellously delicate balance between tragedy and comedy, the friendship of two boys John and Dick, the interest of an Anglo-Catholic clergyman in John, and John's love of Dick's cousin Madge. Both this and Ann Stretton's *Camilla* are, as well, unusually charming 'studies of adolescence.'

The former moves one through the suggestion of subtle ironies and wit, presenting the purest feelings of thought and beauty in the flesh of a story. The latter is more deliberately romantic. Both build their characters round a true psychology; both are beautifully complete and compact; both delight in economic detail, and—in *Scandal of Spring* especially—detail which tells unfailingly, which contributes, without getting wasted, to the final effect.

In *God and the Rabbit*, on the other hand, detail is piled up, irrespective of direct significance, and the final result is obtained through sheer accumulation. It is a long, slow narrative, covering some thirty years in the life of an East Anglian poacher's son, and his attempt to deliver himself and his family from the father's influence. The development progresses very well, and the conclusion gives the sense of something accomplished; but the sense of effort in the composition cannot escape the reader. Every point is made, but laboriously. There is almost no humour—though plenty of opportunities for it—yet no ringing poetic tone to excuse its want. To give it its certain due, it is a wonderful picture of a family; but, then, the value of such 'pictures' in fiction is itself a doubtful quantity. In this book its clear sincerity and the character of the theme (which is generally distinguished except when it falters on occasions in the hero himself) save the picture from being merely a virtuoso performance. It is perhaps captious, in any case, to dogmatise on a form which is capable of being put to so many uses. If the novelist cares to use his art for making studies or drawing pictures, there is no reason why we should prevent him. But it is very good sometimes to come across a 'kind of poem.'

PETER BURRA.

THESE MODERNS

Modernismus. By Sir Reginald Blomfield, R.A., etc. Macmillan & Co.—6s. net.

SOME courage is called for in a veteran who stands up for an independent judgment of modern art and opinion; he knows that he will be written off as a reactionary old fogey.

Sir Reginald Blomfield has never been wanting in courage, and as an historical student of his art he has an outlook before as well as after, and a precise knowledge of parts of the field which the half-informed enthusiast dispenses with. In his latest book he scrutinises modernity on a wide front, including chapters on Sculpture, Painting, Letters and Music, as well as Architecture. In spite of some telling work upon the extravagances of Mr. Wilenski under the first of these heads, and at some other points, it might have been better if he had concentrated on the field where he has most authority, defining (and illustrating) the good and bad more fully. In any case, a short notice must be limited to this part of his survey.

It falls into two parts—a review of the belated English interest in baroque, with special reference to the books of Geoffrey Scott and Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell and the claim of the designer for plastic independence from the shackles of commodity and material; on the other hand, an examination of 'functionalism' in the planning and material of the building as the be-all of architecture, sufficient in itself to secure beauty. What of those gospels, both modern, but diametrically opposed?

Sir Reginald deals with the ambiguities of the word 'Humanism' as applied to Italian Renaissance architecture in Scott's interesting book, and the too easy generalisation about its phases and ultimate fling in the baroque. He follows that movement into Germany and Austria,

allowing for its virtues of ingenuity in dealing with daring and difficult plans, and its gay, irresponsible play-acting quality; but he cannot, like Mr. Sitwell, grow lyrical over its frequent orgies of demented vulgarity. He misses, however, its fundamental motive—namely, an emotional straining of proportion—and accordingly is unwilling to recognise its beginnings in Michelangelo's work and one climax in El Greco's, not light-hearted, either of them, but 'terrible' and agonised.

His attack on the modernists is deadly when he comes to close quarters with fallacious pretensions. Thus the claim that a newly applied material, concrete, is the determining factor in the design of a building like Olympia looks rather silly when the company who supplied bricks for it advertise that 'this is not a concrete building'; it is 'a brick and steel building with a thin skin in another material, apparently synthetic stone.' On the side of architectural effect the monotonous horizontalities and curvature of the Mendelsohn school, the rare gift for ungainliness which M. Le Corbusier combines with really big ideas, and the freak imitation of machines at Potsdam and elsewhere are fair game for the satirist.

Our author is less convincing when he handles 'function' and efficiency generally in relation to beauty. Our satisfaction in machinery that fulfils its purpose is, he says, entirely different from the thrill of beauty in any shape, 'beauty of the human form, of the sea and the land, of cloud and sunshine. . . . Vital and natural beauties differ indeed from mechanical, but landscape beauties arise from the play of natural forces with material in rock and river, vapour and wind, and the human form is constituted by function from beginning to end. Whether

or not function issues in beauty depends very much on what the function is and whether it acts visibly.

So with Sir Reginald's old insistence, repeated in the first words of his preface and elsewhere, on 'Traditionalism' as the cure for what is wrong with 'Modernism.' Undoubtedly the man who knows the past has a store of contrivances and beauties it is impoverishing to cast into the dustbin. But it is not because they are old that they are good; they most justify themselves in their use and beauty. Inevitably discussion here returns to the matter of the Orders. In Messrs. Smith and Brewer's shop for Mr. Heal the pilaster strips would still have their binding effect of inevitability if the Greeks had never existed; in Selfridges' and Bush House the columns are a boring and misapplied reminiscence. Nor is English and not-English a clear dividing-line. Our chickens have come to roost. It was the English who started the new industrial architecture, the engineering of glass and iron; it was a Scot, Macintosh, as the Germans admit, who started the new, stripped architecture for houses and institutions; and where, but for lendings from Italy, France and Holland, would our lovely Renaissance tradition have been? What is ugly in the present cosmopolitanism is the huge common inhumanity which springs from the economic roots of over-population and mechanic mass production.

Two or three slips call for correction and my carping is done. Geoffrey Scott borrowed his 'empathy,' not from Croce, but from Lipps; Mr. Herbert Read did not say that Robert de Cotte and Gilles Oppenord were the inventors of Baroque, but of Rococo. Of Ruskin's passage about the crystal sphere Sir Reginald says, 'Nobody had the least idea what he meant.' A reference to *Aratra Pentelici* will make it plain. D. S. MACCOLL.

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ENGLISH RURAL ARTS

Change in the Farm. By T. Hennell. With Illustrations by the author. University Press, Cambridge, 1934.—10s. 6d. net.

The Wheelwright's Shop. By George Sturt. With 8 plates and 24 text-figures. New and cheap edition, 1934; first published 1923. University Press, Cambridge.—7s. 6d. net.

ONE of the most necessary things at the present time is to remember that general readers in our country are mostly town-dwellers, and that they are seldom invited by what they read, in magazines and novels, to understand why an all-round revival of British farming has become essential to the nation's welfare. Town *versus* Country is a very active fact, both political and economic, yet only a few readable books for electors in towns are published on agriculture and rural life brightly and truly illustrated with drawings and pictures. When they do appear, every now and then, their sale prices are usually too high, and we are likely to see them 'remaindered' just when we would welcome them gladly in second and third editions. In eleven years *The Wheelwright's Shop*, by George Sturt, has won a new and a cheap edition: very much too long, for it is a chatty, charming book, as attractive in style as Thomas Bewick's *Memoir*, and as genuine in its qualities of thought, emotion, observation and first-hand experience. I wish it could have been brought out at 5s. net, aided by some active patronage from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Mr. T. Hennell's *Change in the Farm* is a first edition, and, although 10s. 6d. net is not a popular price, the book should win its way into a cheap edition. It pairs very well with *The Wheelwright's Shop*, and its illustrations are even better than those which are given in Mr.

Sturt's masterpiece. The carts and waggons in Mr. Sturt's pages (Plates 2, 4, 5 and 8) are photographs reproduced in half-tone blocks, and, as half-tone illustrations are 'done to death' in daily and weekly journalism, I appreciate all the more the touch of sensitive art in Mr. Hennell's drawings of historic waggons from the counties of Kent, Hereford, Gloucester, Norfolk, and Lincoln, and of reliquary ploughs from Sussex, Wiltshire, Kent, and Somerset. The Herefordshire waggon, like a galleon in shape, carried on noble wheels, is impressive art in workaday handicraft, seemingly strong enough to outlive several centuries; and a hoop-raved waggon from West Littleton, Gloucestershire, has a different sort of mingled grace and durability, with one thing in common with the galleon waggon—no superfluity of good materials. As Thomas Tusser said:

Horse, oxen, plough, tumbrel, cart,
waggon and waine,
The lighter and stronger, the greater
they gain:
The soile and the seed, with the sheafe
and the purse,
The lighter in substance, for profit the
worse.

Mr. Hennell regrets that in many districts the old and local types of waggon are being superseded by trollies, and that in many more the traditional county patterns are altered and debased, and thus deprived of their artistry. In these circumstances, then, what may be called a thoroughbred county design is not always easy to find—except here and there, as in Northamptonshire, where several old kinds are in service, which differ as much from one another as from most of the county waggons which are seen in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Bedfordshire and Herefordshire. In several counties, again, there is a local tradition that governs the use of paint on the wheelwright's handi-

t. Waggons in Lincolnshire are very handsome, and the carts are often carved and decorated, and the farmers there believe that it pays to keep them painted up.'

The name of the painter, as well as that of the owner, is often put on waggons when they are redecorated; the letters being picked out and flourished in black upon a background of orange, which fades in time to terra-cotta. This colour is used also in Cambridgeshire—and not only for waggons, tumbrels and cole-seed carts, but even, for ladders, wheel-barrows and dog-kennels—though some very old waggons, it is said, were painted blue, as in many other counties. . . . In the West Riding of Yorkshire pole-waggons are common, instead of those with shafts, and many different colours are used to adorn them: red, orange, lead-colour, blue and white, brown or black; and in place of curves and flourishes, stringing and lining in a second colour is usual. Kent waggons are often painted cream or stone-colour. Woodstock waggons an ochreous brown; elsewhere they are usually blue above, with red for the wheels and under-carriage, except in Dorset, where blue-black is sometimes used instead of blue, picked out with red on all the curved chamfers.

Mr. Hennell in his entertaining chapters, sixteen in all, reviews so much of the historic work on farms, and shows in his illustrations so much skill, that this book should prepare the way for several more from his pen and pencil. Research and its utility belong to his daily customs, and he offers them to politicians and electors as a guide in difficult questions of current reforms. In farming, as in other necessary arts, the most difficult thing in adaptive progress is to scrap no more of the traditional ways of work than is prudent, and to employ no more of the new aims and methods than can be applied with freedom and with profit for special purposes and subject to known conditions. Mr. Hennell believes that much of the current reform is proving a handicap, for he speaks of 'the practical, unprosperous young farmers of to-day,' and adds: 'When farmers

have laid aside the formidable engines, hooks and harrows of modern agrarian reform, they may return like Cincinnatus to their fireside turnips and consider how things were done when tools were simple and the land was fed upon straw-yard muck.'

Mr. Hennell is thinking here, I assume, of a hearty return to an old system of farming—the grassland and small field holding, to provide maintenance for a family and its servants, outside and indoors, and also a gradual recovery of an inherited passion for the land and its wealth-production. Dr. Johnson said very well: 'Nothing can more truly prove the ingratitude of mankind than the little regard which the disposers of honorary rewards have paid to Agriculture; it is treated as a subject so remote from common life by all those who do not immediately hold the plough or give fodder to the ox, that I think there is room to question whether a great part of mankind has yet been informed that life is sustained by the fruits of the earth.' The land and its farming give us the only industry that produces wealth without diminishing its fitness for continuous new harvests. Dr. Johnson perceived also that a nation dependent mainly on trade could have no stability, because we cannot compel any people to buy from us or to sell to us; and hence a trading country prospers, while it can be said to prosper, by being too dependent on competitor nations, who may vary their demands and their sources of supply. 'By Agriculture alone,' said Johnson, 'can we live in plenty without intercourse with other nations. This, therefore, is the great Art, which every government ought to protect, every proprietor of lands to practise, and every inquirer into nature to improve.'

When Johnson taught this lesson in 1756 there was very much less need for it than there is now, for

the population was comparatively small then, and great efforts were being made to develop the nation's farming and to improve the breeds of livestock. No efforts so national in their scope and in their enthusiasm have been active for a long time, not for a complete hundred years; and that is why there is a sort of obituary regret in these good works by Mr. Hennell and Mr. George Sturt. They remind me of biographies of great artists who are dead, and whose works belong to types of society that have gone. Our country continues to do such an immense amount of her farming away from home, by playing the part of a financial colonist on alien lands, that she cannot possibly renew her strength through her own lungs, through her own agriculture and rural life. There is always land enough for new suburbs, new factories, new collieries, new cemeteries, new golf courses, new grounds for cricket and football, and new by-roads for motor-cars; but as soon as someone mentions the urgent need of employing more and more old land for more and more farm enterprise, listeners frown, and shake their heads, and chatter about the costs of distribution.

WALTER SHAW SPARROW.

NOTE

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FORTHCOMING BOOKS

THERE is no question of the depressed state of the antiquarian book market. But to the outside observer the trade in new books would seem as prosperous as it has ever been. To some extent, no doubt, the same economy accounts for both facts. The buyer whose expenditure on old books ran into thousands or tens of thousands of pounds a year in the 'boom' years has since 1929 drawn in his horns; while new publications have become more popular as presents because they are cheaper than trinkets and fad-lals—cheaper but no less presentable, since a compliment to the intellect is to-day as acceptable as a compliment to the person. Dumb jewels often, but not always, are more quick than words.

There are, to the outside observer, two evidences of this prosperity in the publishing trade: first, that there has been no falling off in the yearly numerical increase of new books; and then, more significantly, not only that the last three years have given birth to an exceptional number of new firms of publishers, but that the Jeremiahs who are never absent from such confinements—*nam nos decebat lugere*—have so often had their fears falsified. It were invidious to name them, but there are two houses certainly, perhaps more, that, for all the inauspicious signs attending their foundation, have taken less than three years to grow in professional and public estimation to the stature of others bearing a hundred-years-old name.

Moreover, it has been asserted in the Press that the record price 'per word' for any written work has been twice broken in the last eighteen months: first by Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs*, of which the third and fourth volumes are announced for the autumn (Ivor Nicholson and Watson); and more recently by Charles Dickens's *Life*

of *Our Lord*, which, after its much-advertised newspaper appearance, will be published in book form next month (*Daily Mail*).

Ivor Nicholson has other memoirs and biographies of statesmen in his list that promise some success. Lord Snowden was not *persona grata* in 'patriotic' war-time England; but his *Autobiography*, where his attitude is vindicated, will show greater consistency of purpose than other politicians' whose wisdom waited on the event. Mr. MacDonald is to be the subject of a study by his one-time parliamentary private secretary, Mr. L. MacNeill Weir (April); and a translation from Herr Emil Ludwig will deal, with characteristic directness, with the career of *Masaryk* (June). The last-mentioned book is based largely on conversations with the Czechoslovak President, recording his own words; and another semi-autobiography, the result of many years' observation and friendship, is Karel Čapek's *President Masaryk Tells His Story* (Allen and Unwin, April). In *Curzon, The Last Phase* (Constable, May) Mr. Harold Nicolson concludes the series begun with *Lord Carnock and Peacemaking*, 1919, with what is at once a general study of post-war diplomacy and a particular portrait of a diplomat with whom the author was in close personal touch in 1919-1925. The second and final volume of Lord Lloyd's *Egypt Since Cromer*, continuing the narrative from the arrival of the Milner Mission at the close of 1919, will come from Macmillan in a week or two.

These are only a few of the promised volumes on the present and immediate past. Nazi Germany has already produced a library of praise and blame—chiefly, in England, of blame—and it is difficult to choose among the score and more of coming commentaries. But one name, best known among less mundane concerns, stands out above the rest:

there can be little doubt of the reception in this country of *The World as I See It*, in which Professor Einstein will discuss, with as much detachment as his recent experiences will permit, pacifism, disarmament, liberty and learning, Germany to-day, the Jewish question, and other pressing topics (John Lane, May).

Going back two centuries to an age which, thanks to Professor Trevelyan and Mr. Winston Churchill, is now very much under reconsideration, Constable announce a rehabilitation of *Anne of England* by Mrs. M. R. Hopkinson (April); while *Mary Queen of Scots* is the subject of a biography by a well-known historical novelist, Miss Marjorie Bowen (John Lane, April). (Another queen, nearer at hand, is *Queen Alexandra*, whose *Life* by Sir George Arthur will come from Chapman and Hall in June.) A book of at once romantic and historical appeal is announced by John Murray for publication in the early summer—*The Cid and his Spain*, by Don Ramón Menéndez Pidal, with an introduction by the Duke of Alba; and the same country is seen in no less turbulent a period in *The Origins of Modern Spain*, by J. B. Trend, recently appointed the first Professor of Spanish at Cambridge (Cambridge University Press, April). The *Cambridge Shorter History of India*, announced by the University Press for the summer, needs no recommendation beyond the names of its three authors—Mr. J. Allan, who is responsible for 'Hindu and Buddhist India'; Sir Wolseley Haig, who has written of 'Muslim India'; and Professor H. H. Dodwell, the editor, to whom has fallen the modern period, 'British India.'

A travel book of an original quality is coming from John Murray at the end of this month. Miss Freya Stark recounts in *The Valleys of the Assassins* her travels in Luristan and Mazanderan alone

with native guides—travels, she confesses, conducted 'for fun,' though in the event they greatly increased her reputation as a serious explorer and an archæologist, and, incidentally, provided the most exciting as well as the most amusing adventures. This month also Duckworth will have ready *The Scarlet Angel*, which is the name of 'the smallest aeroplane in the world,' flown, almost fortuitously, by Mr. Alban Ali in the Viceroy's Cup Air Race. Mr. Ali weaves into his account of the life (and death) of his machine his experiences among the head-hunters of Assam as well as dissertations on tea-planting, the archæology of Ur, and the present state and prospects of flying in the British Empire. A popular illustrated survey of *Archæology up to Now*, in which Mr. Stanley Casson circles the world from Avebury to Ur, Egypt to Zimbabwe, Ankor to Easter Island, Peru to Yucatan, is promised by Bell for publication in May.

A Duckworth book, announced for May, is Lord Derwent's *Rossini*, written after years of assembling material and after visits to nearly all the scenes of Rossini's life. Rossini is also the subject of a biography by Mr. J. F. Toye (Heinemann, April). Mr. William Murdoch, well known as an exponent of Chopin's work, has written in *Chopin, His Life* (Murray, late summer) the first comprehensive biography since that of Niecks in 1887; and the first full-length study of Liszt by an Englishman is one by Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell, which Faber and Faber have in preparation. The latter publishers also announce *Music Ho!*, 'a study of music in decline,' by Mr. Constant Lambert.

Literary studies tend more and more to revolve round centenaries. Most of the year's books on William Morris will be out by the time these notes appear, and a few on Lamb. But Mr. Orlo Williams's volume on *Lamb* in Duckworth's 'Great Lives'

series should be a stimulating re-estimate; and later in the year Methuen will publish in conjunction with Dent the first complete edition of Elia's and Bridget Elia's correspondence that the copyright law has allowed. A life and critical estimate of *Sydney Smith* by Osbert Burdett is announced by Chapman and Hall (late April); it is strange that, after a century or so of neglect, Sydney Smith should have been the subject of two biographies in twelve months—Mr. Hesketh Pearson's having appeared last year.

SIMON NOWELL SMITH.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXXXVII—MAY 1934

BUDGET REFLECTIONS

To look a gift-horse in the mouth is proverbially a piece of bad manners, and Mr. Chamberlain's third Budget, which contains something for everybody, has been so warmly appreciated that a closer inspection of its provisions may appear a little ungracious. But there are certain considerations (that seem as yet to have escaped the notice of the critics) which have so important a bearing on the economic future of the country, that they ought to be stated, however contrary they may appear to the present tide of popular opinion.

To all outward appearances the new Budget represents an agreeable compromise between Victorian orthodoxy and popular indulgence. Revenue and expenditure are made to balance without any resort to Churchillian expedients, but no provision is made for War Debt or for debt redemption, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer is once more authorised to borrow for his statutory Sinking Funds—a feature with which none but the financial purist will feel inclined to quarrel, seeing that, in fact, last year ended with a substantial surplus of £31,000,000, which automatically went to the reduction of the National Debt.

Moreover, the estimates of revenue appear to have been made with great caution, leaving the impression, confirmed by a leading article in *The Times*, that the Chancellor is keeping something up his sleeve for an election Budget next year. There is thus little here for orthodoxy, even in its most Draconian form, to cavil at. Nor can the reduction of 6d. in the standard rate of income tax be anything but welcome to all except a handful of doctrinaire Socialists.

It is rather in the restoration of some of the 'cuts' made in 1931 that there is room for criticism. The restoration in full of the rate of unemployment benefit certainly seems to be justified on social grounds; and any economic objections which might have been raised against it have been largely weakened by the reform in unemployment finance contained in the Unemployment Bill. Unless some quite unexpected and disastrous reversal of the present trend of business recovery takes place, the new self-supporting Unemployment Fund should be able to support the higher rate of benefit without undue strain. And, incidentally, had the Fund been relieved of the charge for amortisation of past debts which is being laid upon it by a singularly inept piece of Treasury pedantry, there might even have been some chance of remitting a part at any rate of the increase in the employers' contribution imposed in the emergency Budget of 1931. But the restoration of half of the other cuts made on that occasion is a very different matter. Defended officially on the specious plea of equality of sacrifice, it is based on a thoroughly vicious principle, because it assumes that before the crisis everything, so far as Government expenditure was concerned, was as it should be, and that therefore all salaries of teachers, Government servants, etc., should be restored to their pre-crisis level as quickly as possible.

Here we are, in fact, approaching the very heart and centre of the economic disequilibrium which this country has suffered during the post-war period. Considered merely by itself, the additional cost to the Treasury of restoring half these 'cuts,' which is estimated at £5,500,000 in a full year, is not perhaps a very large item (even when its prospective doubling in the next Budget is taken into account). It is rather the implications upon the wages structure of industry as a whole which are fraught with such ominous consequences. For if the Government is going to set the example of restoring wage cuts, what other employer will be able to resist the call? Already the railwaymen, cap in hand, are knocking at the door, and before long we may expect to see industry after industry besieged and finally compelled to yield to similar importunacies, with fatal results to trade recovery.

There is room for a large diversity of opinion both on the proper function of taxation and also upon its economic effects. The old-fashioned individualist sees in it nothing but an evil—albeit a necessary evil; the more 'advanced' thinkers in the social field, on the other hand, even when they are not Socialists, look upon it as the ideal instrument for redistributing the national income in such a way as to redress the inequalities and injustices of the so-called 'capitalist' system. Similarly, whereas many economists would be inclined (as was also the Colwyn Committee) to regard the effects of high rates of direct taxation upon industry and employment as comparatively small, the industrialist (especially when times are none too good) is wont to see in them one of the chief causes of his own and his country's woes. While it is true that a great deal of clap-trap has been talked about the burdens of taxation and their hampering effects on industry, it will probably be admitted, by most fair-minded observers, that in times of extreme trade depression, when owing to the fall in prices the real burden upon the producer has been enormously increased, a high income and super-tax do in fact exercise a very strong deterrent effect upon enterprise. A Government that is out to restore industrial prosperity, as an upright and wise physician of the body economic, ought, therefore, to postpone the restoration of what is, after all, a perfectly avoidable form of expenditure until the times really justify such a step. But who, quite apart from the more sinister implications already mentioned, could contend that the reduction of the live register of unemployment from, say, 2,800,000 to 2,200,000 really calls for an increase in the quite adequate rates of pay of policemen, teachers, soldiers and sailors, and civil servants? It is impossible to avoid the suspicion that in this restoration of cuts (and the implied promise of more) there is an element of vote-catching, or, if that be too crude a term, at least a surrender to loose thinking and popular opinion, that is quite unworthy of a national Government brought into power to save the country from an economic crisis.

For, though it may readily be admitted that the particular scales of remuneration offered to this or that profession is largely a matter of convention, there can be no doubt whatever that during the past fifteen years the machinery of government has tended to become unduly costly: the urge towards grading up has proved irresistible. Relatively to the rest of the community, the so-called sheltered occupations—of which Government service is not the least important—have improved their position without any adequate reason except the mere force of superior bargaining power. Moreover, the 'cuts' imposed in 1931 must not be considered as an arbitrary lowering of the standard of living:

they are, in fact, nothing more than the confiscation by the community of an unearned increment due to the continual fall in prices and the drop in the cost of living which has taken place during the past decade. For the cut in money wages which public servants have been forced to undergo hardly compensates for the fall which has taken place in the retail price level; and it is much less severe than the self-administered dose of deflation swallowed by the holder of Government securities in the recent War Loan conversion.

The half-way restoration of the old level of salaries, which has certainly not been justified by the slight rise in the price level which has taken place since last spring, is, in fact, *pessimi exempli*, because it cannot fail to reinforce, to an extent which is still incalculable, that rigidity of money wages in industry which between 1924 and 1929 was unquestionably the chief cause of unemployment in this country. For it was the inability to reduce money wages, more than any other single factor, which made it impossible for industry to adapt itself during that period to the return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity and to the continuous fall in the world price level. And even after the gold price level continued to fall headlong when the world depression broke out in 1929 and prices came tumbling headlong, wages continued to remain more or less inelastic, with the result that the balance of payments became strongly negative, and finally the country was driven off the gold standard after a futile but expensive effort to maintain equilibrium on a gold basis. The abandonment of the gold standard, which relieved industry of the embarrassment of an over-valued currency, did something to lighten the strain, but sterling prices, after a short-lived rise, nevertheless continued to decline. The *Economist* wholesale index, based on 1913 as 100, which averaged 89.3 during 1931, reached its low point of 82.3 in March of last year, and, though during the second half of 1933 prices showed a rising tendency which has continued into the present year, at the end of March the index still stood no higher than 90. Some idea of the fall in wholesale prices which has taken place during the past decade may be gathered from the fact that the wholesale index, based on the monthly average of 1924 as 100, stands to-day at about 56.5. Wages meanwhile have remained throughout this period comparatively stable, having declined on an average little more than 5 per cent. Thus, in spite of the very thorough overhauling of costs, and the cutting away of dead wood which has taken place since 1929, there is every reason to fear that wages are still some way from being in equilibrium: *i.e.*, their present level is only maintained through the balancing factor of unemployment, which, in spite of the distinct signs of trade revival which

have been perceptible for the last eight or nine months, still remains well above the 2,000,000 mark. And it may be taken for granted that, unless a very marked rise, of which there are few signs at the moment, takes place in the level of wholesale prices, any general restoration of wages to the pre-crisis level can only result in the immediate reversal of the trend towards recovery—a lesson which ought surely to have been learned by anyone who has followed the career of President Roosevelt, and marked the sudden set-back to trade last summer caused by the action of the National Recovery Administration directed to increasing what economists call the supply-price of labour.

There are also other reasons for maintaining a cautious attitude in judging the present prospects of a trade revival in this country. The improvement in business which has taken place has been confined, as Mr. Chamberlain remarked in his Budget speech, almost entirely to the home market, and it has been due very largely to the replacement by domestic products of imported manufactures excluded by the tariff and the depreciation of sterling. Foreign trade during the past twelve months has shown only an infinitesimal recovery, and, with the present tendencies towards restriction still in full force all over the world, the prospects of any rapid improvement seem for the moment more or less remote; with a general forcing up of wages they would vanish overnight. There are therefore good grounds for supposing that the revival—which still, fortunately, continues to gather momentum—may be destined to be of limited dimensions. We are still very far from attaining the level of activity reached in 1929—a level which still left us with something like a million and a quarter unemployed. There is little reason to congratulate ourselves that we are out of the wood, and that we have reached such a condition of economic security that we can afford to stabilise wages at the pre-crisis level. The only stabilisation that is likely to be attained on such a basis is a stabilisation of unemployment at an approximate figure of two and a half millions.

Much merit has been claimed by the Government for the success of its financial therapy—indeed, the legend that it alone has saved the country from irretrievable disaster and set its feet upon the path of prosperity has been given such wide credence that it deserves rather critical examination. Now it is perfectly true that at the outbreak of the crisis in 1931 the formation of the National Government did much to restore confidence and, when the inevitable moment came in which the gold standard had finally to be abandoned, to prevent a panic which might easily have been provoked by the fatuous ineptitude of the last Labour Administration. But it is open to doubt whether, after all, the danger from such a panic has not been grossly over-estimated;

indeed, there are quite a number of competent observers who would maintain that the real danger of a disastrous inflation was, even then, wholly imaginary. It may also be readily admitted that the balancing of the Budget (even if it was accomplished in the wrong way) certainly facilitated the conversion of War Loan, which was carried out with admirable skill. But here again the credit attributed to the Government has been grossly exaggerated. For any passman in Political Economy could have perceived that, in the circumstances, a conversion operation was the obvious thing, since its success had been assured by the unprecedented magnitude of the trade depression which had brought down short-term interest rates practically to zero. The real question is whether the financial and monetary policy adopted by the Government was, in fact, such as to hasten the emergence of the country—and incidentally the world in general—from the great depression, or whether, on the contrary, it was calculated to prolong the agony.

In order to understand the issue under discussion, it is necessary to give a brief and therefore over-simplified description of the monetary mechanism of trade depressions in general. A fall in the general level of prices creates unemployment, because costs and prices do not fall *pari passu*. Wages, rents, etc., tend to be relatively inelastic, and it is precisely the viscosity of labour costs which devours profit margins, creates losses, and so leads, under a capitalistic system of production, to a contraction of employment, because the *entrepreneur* cannot be expected to go on producing at a loss. The problem of curing a depression is therefore that of re-creating profits by restoring equilibrium between costs and prices—i.e., that relation which will keep both capital and labour fully employed. Now, it is obvious that, in theory at any rate, this can be accomplished in two ways: either by adjusting costs downwards, reducing wages, rents, interest, taxes, etc., or by adjusting prices upwards by inflation or currency depreciation.

Now, the first of these methods—which has traditionally been regarded as the more respectable, probably because it causes more pain and discomfort—implies certain political conditions which in this country have not been easy to establish during the past twenty years. Ever since the war the trade unions—now powerfully reinforced by a political organ in the shape of the Labour Party—have resisted any reduction in money wages quite irrespective of trade conditions or of the effect of such resistance upon the level of unemployment. And the experience of the country between 1925 and 1929 showed that they were sufficiently powerful to frustrate the attempt to bring wage levels into equilibrium with the restored gold parity of the

pound. That attempt was responsible, among other things, for the General Strike of 1926, and the deflationary measures which it entailed reacted disastrously upon the prosperity of industry and upon employment. And when the calamitous collapse of world prices occurred in 1929, it must have been obvious that the frontal attack on wages would be attended by enormous difficulties. Nevertheless, such was the general alarm created by the incompetence of the Labour Administration in 1931, and such was the momentary prestige of the National Government which succeeded it, that the attempt to regain equilibrium by a National Treaty of all-round reductions of wages, salaries, interest and rents, advocated at the time by Mr. Keynes (and afterwards brilliantly applied by the Australian Government), might very well have been attended with success, especially after the process had been distinctly facilitated by the forcing of sterling off the gold standard. But in fact it was never even attempted. Terrified by the imaginary menace of inflation, the Bank of England acted upon its customary rule of thumb, 'when in doubt deflate,' by maintaining a 6 per cent. Bank rate for several months, which greatly aggravated the fall in commodity prices all the world over, while the Government, with a grim heroism worthy of a better cause, fastened on the shoulders of industry a crippling burden of taxation and balanced the Budget with the aid of a few trifling economies, enormously magnified on paper by a series of bogus estimates, and a frenzied reduction of the only classes of expenditure—i.e., capital investment in public works—which might have assisted the restoration of the price level.

But while it funk'd, not without some reason, the deflationary method of regaining equilibrium, it was even more scared by the only other alternative—namely, the deliberate restoration of the price level by monetary measures. Time and again its spokesmen laid stress on the necessity for a rise in world prices, and their cry was received with echoes of welcome from almost every country on the globe—particularly the Dominions. But when it came to definite action, to a deliberate policy of reflation, our monetary authorities recoiled in horror, and to conceal their fears they invented the convenient doctrine that prices could not be raised by purely monetary means—a doctrine which is sheer nonsense and has been refuted time and again by actual experience, most recently by Japan—to say nothing of the United States. Instead of profiting by the brilliant opportunity afforded by the release of sterling from the crippling chains of gold, or creating a sterling *bloc* pledged to restore a remunerative price level which might have included, besides the various component parts of the British Empire, a steadily increasing number of countries all over the world, they drifted aimlessly, clutching at any temporary

anchorage they could find, still hankering desperately after exchange stability with the gold countries, like a tiger which, suddenly released from its cage after long captivity, creeps back into its familiar lair.

Thus, through its unimaginative adherence to the taboos of text-book orthodoxy, the Government's policy has really fallen between two stools. The abandonment of the gold standard, aided by Protection (the short-run benefits of which none but the doctrinaire would attempt to deny) and cheap money, have enabled trade and industry to recover somewhat from the lowest point reached in 1932, but the fundamental disadjustments remain. Wages are still nearly 50 per cent. above the 1913 level, while prices are some 10 per cent. below it. Meanwhile, in spite of the savings on Sinking Fund and the debt service, which amount to no less than £130,000,000, the total estimates of expenditure for 1934-5 remain just short of £790,000,000, less than £10,000,000 lower than the expenditure, Sinking Fund and all, of Mr. Snowden's first Labour Budget of 1924—when the level of wholesale prices was more than 50 per cent. higher than it is to-day. The optimism with which the Budget has been greeted is therefore, to say the least of it, a little premature; but after the chastisement of scorpions which we have somehow survived, it is perhaps natural that the lashes of the whip should seem a luxurious pleasure, and amid the sighs of relief it is perhaps natural for the moment to forget the 2,200,000 unemployed.

It is easy enough to be wise after the event, and, in fairness, the critic may be asked to state what alternative policy would, in his opinion, have contributed more efficaciously to recovery than the well-tryed orthodoxy of 'sound,' if grim, finance. To those who persist in maintaining that to attempt to raise prices by inflationary measures is wrong, no matter how severe the monetary deflation which has previously brought them tumbling, the answer will, of course, be unconvincing. With dogmatic moralists of this type there is no arguing, nor with those who profess to believe that central banking policy has nothing to do with prices, and little or no effect upon employment or industry, or those who maintain that, *ruat cælum*, budgets must always be balanced to the uttermost farthing. But to the uninhibited intelligence, free from distressing complexes of this nature, it must surely be plain that variations in the quantity (or velocity) of money in circulation do, in fact, bring about alterations in the general level of prices, that these alterations are not epiphenomenal occurrences, but are (more or less) subject to voluntary control. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into two questions: What is the desirable level of prices, and how is it to be attained? The answer to the first question is simple enough in theory: the right

price level is one which will keep industry fully (but not over) employed, without leading to over- or under-investment in capital goods. What exactly the appropriate price level should be at the moment can only be determined by experiment, but it is plain enough that, to restore profits to industry and to produce a normal flow of investment and an absorption of unemployment, it must be a good deal higher than it is to-day. Hence budgetary policy should be directed towards attaining that condition. The rule of thumb that budgets ought always to balance, and if possible to produce a handsome surplus for the redemption of debt, is obviously an inadequate canon, for, especially in periods of extreme depression, heavy taxation exercises a severely depressing effect on industry. The paramount needs of the moment are, on the contrary, the restoration of profits through the lightening of burdens and the encouragement of enterprise. The two principal implications of these needs upon budgetary policy are inescapable. Halve the income tax and damn the consequences, and encourage industrial activity by a generous programme of public investment—financed, not by taxation, but by borrowing, but, above all, resist the temptation to restore 'cuts.' Not that there is any virtue in public investment *as such*; Government spending is not *eo ipso* more beneficial than private expenditure, but in the 'dead' phase of the monetary cycle when the incentive of private profit fails, any spending is better than nothing: idle capital and idle labour should therefore be brought together by the Government and by local authorities to generate the incomes which the dynamo of private enterprise is temporarily unable to do. And there are plenty of worthwhile objects of expenditure: *e.g.*, housing, rural water supply, and a thousand and one miscellaneous objects. The idea that a deficit of fifty (or even a hundred millions, for that matter) would in the present circumstances lead straightway to an uncontrolled orgy of inflation is simply fantastic—as the Roosevelt experiment clearly shows; on the other hand, the reduction of taxation and the absorption of idle capital and labour might very well help to reverse the vicious spiral of deflation, within which we are still, apparently, tied and bound. There is, at any rate, some chance that in this way we might stumble back into equilibrium. Nor need it be feared that a rise in prices will immediately make the restoration of cuts imperative: there is time enough for that when unemployment has been reduced to, say, half a million. The gap between wholesale and retail prices is, in all conscience, wide enough to permit a substantial recovery of wholesale prices without entailing any marked increase in the cost of living. Moreover, the experience of the war inflation seems to suggest strongly that it is easier

that the Navy estimate includes no credits for eighteen out of the twenty-five ships in the naval programme for the year.

The British increase appears as very mild compared with that of some other Powers. Japan's is the most startling. Her defence budget, at £55,000,000,¹ is £7,000,000 more than her previous record of last year, and represents 44 per cent. of her total revenue. Most of the increase is for new ships. The United States voted £45,000,000 in June 1933 for new naval construction; and in February the Senate accepted a Bill for some £125,000,000 to be spent on 102 ships. This will bring the navy up to the full London Treaty limit, and, taken in conjunction with the concentration of the American fleet in the Pacific, it is a sinister portent. Japan and the United States are engaged in an exchange of diplomatic compliments. But it will take more ambassadorial courtesies to undo the effect of all this ship-building.

France is relatively economical; her naval estimates are only up a paltry £670,000. But it is reported that there is to be a credit of some £28,000,000 outside the usual budget, to be spent partly on frontier defence, partly on liquid fuel deposits for the navy, and partly on air force reorganisation. Germany has a much greater relative increase; her estimates are up by nearly a third. At £54,015,000 they show an increase of £17,850,000. Two and a half millions of this goes to the navy; nearly nine to the army, six and a half to the air. Even on Herr Hitler's explanations that the Nazi armies, which are quite unmilitary, account for the extra army expenditure, and that the air estimate is only a subsidy to civil aviation, this is a sensational rise. And, in fact, nobody out of Bedlam believes his explanations. France says flatly and publicly that the money is being spent on armaments forbidden by the Peace Treaties; and Freiherr von Neurath's statement that Germany means to anticipate the expected results of the disarmament negotiations are at least half of an admission that France is right.

It is against this background that the recent disarmament negotiations now brought to a close by the French memorandum of April 17th, have been carried on. Small wonder that *The Times* (which says nothing unadvisedly) has substituted for 'disarmament' the phrase 'regulation of arms.' What can be gathered of the prospect is far from encouraging. Little enough can be gathered, since for far too long the problem has been dealt with by 'private conversations.' During the last phase, after Germany left Geneva, this was inevitable. The nations could hardly discuss disarmament at a conference with Germany

¹ Sums translated from other currencies are given in pounds calculated at gold value.

missing. But the secret negotiations had set in long before, and had their usual results of misunderstanding and retrogression. In October they produced the proposals of Britain, France, Italy and the United States, including the provision that disarmament should be in two stages—the first setting up international supervision while Germany and France equalised their army systems, the second to cover the disarmament of the 'armed Powers' if they judged that all was well. That was a silly suggestion, since it was obvious that Germany would reject it. Moreover, it offered her a pretext for saying that her promised equality was being delayed and for breaking up the Conference. In fact, the pretext was totally insincere. The Germans knew very well that if they had argued their case for immediate reduction before the Conference, they would have won within a week. Their real motive seems to have been to gain a free hand for Germany in bargaining for rearmament.

This procedure of secrecy in a multilateral negotiation deserves serious thought. It is liked by older professional diplomats because they were trained in it, and are too lazy to acquire a new technique. It is liked by politicians who have little to offer, or who want to defend a thesis which will not bear public knowledge. It thus affords cover both for impotence and for recalcitrance. It has, however, disadvantages. Personality counts for far more than reason in such dealings; the man with the strongest will gets his way. Thus the October scheme of the Western Powers and the British memorandum of January were both sponsored by Sir John Simon. The first bore the unmistakable brand of French policy; the second was obviously pro-German. British influence, even if it did not give leadership, might have been expected to hold a true balance. But of leadership there was no trace; of balance very little. Again, the October fiasco was followed by unedifying recriminations between Sir John Simon and Freiherr von Neurath. Their details are best forgotten; they amounted to an impression of misleading statement felt by each Foreign Minister. Such impressions are unfortunately often left by unrecorded meetings. Lastly, secret negotiations never are secret. There is always leakage—often deliberate. In any case, the rumours set about do more damage than open controversy.

Public negotiation is very difficult. It demands enormous skill, patience, and a combination of stiffness in principle with adaptability in detail which are rarely found. But it brings to bear upon the problem discussed any amount of criticism and suggestion. Criticism makes it difficult to maintain a bad policy; and suggestion is invaluable. Every student of international affairs knows that constructive ideas normally spring from unofficial sources; Foreign Offices are too cautious, and Cabinets

too passionate to think. In a world problem like disarmament, too, it is of primary importance to enlist all Governments. Some Great Powers are apt to talk of the smaller States as though they were midges—irritating, but unimportant. Yet the lesser Powers include a far larger number of able men than the Great Powers do at present; and few will deny that any capacity which is available is needed for disarmament. The weaker States, besides, are vitally interested in the collective system; their very existence depends upon its validity. They therefore really want disarmament, whereas the big States suffer the intermittent delusion that they are strong enough to save themselves. The collective support of the lesser nations—which has considerable importance—is thus given to any sincere effort for progress. It was not for nothing that in the early days of the Conference the leaders among the lesser Powers were known as the 'Straight Eight,' and those among the Great Powers as the 'Crooked Five.'

It may be considered as evidential in this examination of method that there has been only one major agreement in the Disarmament Conference so far, and that is the decision to standardise Continental land armies on a basis of short-term conscription. This was won by the persistence of M. Pierre Cot, the brilliant young French delegate, in week after weary week of public debate.

But that was in 1932, and now we are in 1934, with agreement further off than ever. Why is it that the British memorandum has received such perfunctory attention abroad? Why was Mr. Anthony Eden, in spite of the liking and respect inspired by his friendliness and integrity, unable to bring France and Germany into line? Why has the Bureau of the Conference met only to hear a summary of divergencies from Mr. Henderson and to readjourn? The difficulties, as ever, fell into two classes—technical and political. Technical problems are entirely a matter of good-will. The whole of military technique is an artificial creation; man made it, and man can regulate it if he will. It is imbecile to talk as if tanks and bombing planes were acts of God (though they have some outward resemblance to acts of Satan.) The trouble here is that no Great Power, save Italy during Signor Grandi's Foreign Secretaryship, has faced technical disarmament honestly. The Conference could have accepted the Italian's suggestions and ordered the experts to produce a plan by which all States should be deprived of weapons useful for aggression, as Germany was in 1919. Instead, the Powers wet-blanketed that proposal, instructed their experts to block it, and have produced a long string of plans; all their proposers

Condoning sins that they're inclined to
By damning those they have no mind to.

For instance, Britain is responsible for the Draft Convention now before the Conference. Her original proposals of March 1933 are modified by the Memorandum of January 1934. The revised scheme provides for short-service conscript armies for the Continent; a maximum calibre of mobile land guns of 6.1 inches; a maximum size of tanks, eventually, of 16 tons. The Disarmament Commission which is to supervise the fulfilment of the Convention is to inquire into the total abolition of military aviation and control of civil aviation; meantime, bombing from the air should be prohibited and fighting aircraft limited. Naval limitation falls to be reconsidered in 1935 under the London Treaty. Now, this plan contains two advances upon the 1933 draft. The first is the acceptance of regular, automatic international supervision of any agreed limitations. The second is the tacit disappearance of the reservations of the right to bomb from the air for police purposes in 'outlying regions.' Reason, applied by France, produced the first change, and public opinion at home the second.

But it still has astonishing gaps. It is easy and pleasant for Britain to propose immediate scrapping of 20-ton tanks. We only have one, so it seems, and it is a dud. Nor does the Staff crave for 16-ton tanks. But the War Office dotes on light tanks—for the good but transitory reason that at present we make the best ones. So Lord Hailsham asserts in the House of Lords that tanks are purely defensive, and Britain proposes that the Disarmament Commission should examine the problem for three years. Meantime, Germany is to be allowed 6-ton tanks, apparently unlimited in number. Again, the British plan omits any mention of control of arms manufacture, or of budgetary limitation. Yet France has tabled a scheme, which seems entirely practicable, for national limitation and international supervision of arms manufacture. And budgetary limitation is one of the few methods of control which the experts have already reported on as feasible.

Britain is only one of the Powers engaged in this elaborate *contre-danse*: 'Down the middle, Circle back to back, and Up again.' Since January five Powers—Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the United States—have emitted a dozen Notes. It is extremely difficult to unravel them and to discover exactly what those Governments are at; and there is no indication at all of the views of the remaining sixty nations of the world. France and Germany, in particular, have produced a series, whose diplomatic jargon scarcely veils fear and irritation on one side and threat on the other. It is unnecessary to give much technical detail here, for the terms offered vary constantly. France is willing to go far in disarmament, especially in the air; offering

semi-abolition of her aircraft in exchange for international control of civil aviation, and total abolition if a small force of fighting planes is established. But she insists upon supervision—by a permanent Commission sitting at Geneva. It should be noted, however, that the plan that this Commission should consist of one representative of each State party to the Convention is a mistake. Government representatives, whether civil or military, make poor members of political commissions. Everything they say is regarded as official policy, so that they tend to say nothing to any purpose. The Permanent Armaments Commission of the League, appointed on those lines, has set a high standard of dignified nullity. Working League commissions are those which are stiffened by men who are free from governmental control.

France, however, still sticks to the idea of a two-stage convention by which the German conversion of the *Reichswehr* and international supervision are to be effected before the armed Powers begin reducing the weapons which are to be prohibited. To this Germany objects with passion; she has even passed the stage of claiming that reduction should begin simultaneously with her conversion and acquisition of arms for the new army, and has declared that she does not believe that France means to disarm at all, and that she must therefore demand equality by increased arms, beginning with a conscript force of 300,000 men. The British draft had suggested 200,000 for the German and the French home armies.

There are other quarrels. Germany wants the French colonial army, or such portion of it as is available for European service, to count as part of her forces; and also some consideration of trained reserves. France declares that the German 'paramilitary' formations should be reckoned in Germany's resources. Germany retorts that the 'political soldiers of the Third Reich'—that is, the S.A. and S.S. Nazi troops—are not military; but they can be supervised if similar armies elsewhere are too. (Does this mean international control of the *Camelots du Roi*?) The serious gap in the German case is the refusal to talk about air control. One must, indeed, pity poor Herr Hitler in this matter. He may want air disarmament, but how can he fly in the face of General Göring? The most embittered dispute is over supervision. The German repudiation of control, except when they are already acquiring equipment for the new forces, lends confirmation to the French position quoted by Mr. Henderson at the Conference. 'Published documents show [says the French note] that the German army, as regards organisation, effectives, and material, already possesses resources incompatible with the provisions of the Treaties.'

Matters have now been brought to a head by the last French

note, published in the White Paper [Cmd. 4559], which declares that the German Government wishes 'to impose its wish to continue every form of rearmament within limits of which it claims to be the sole judge in contempt of the provisions of the Treaty,' and that it has therefore 'made impossible the negotiations the basis of which it has by its own act destroyed.' Before seeking to discover whether sufficiently efficacious guarantees of execution of the proposed Disarmament Convention can be agreed on—the subject of inquiries addressed to the French Ambassador by Sir John Simon—France 'must place in the forefront of her preoccupations the conditions of her own security, which, moreover, she does not separate from that of other interested Powers,' and she is unable to abandon 'the essential and necessary condition' of Germany's return to the League of Nations as a prerequisite to the signing of a disarmament convention—evidently a direct rejoinder to the memorandum of the German Government dated April 16 stating, that Germany's return to the League can only be dealt with after the solution of the question of disarmament and, above all, of her equality of rights. The French note concludes by declaring that it is the duty of the Disarmament Conference to resume its work 'at the point at which the Conference left it when it invited Governments to proceed to an exchange of views outside the Conference which have not produced a result.' The deadlock for the moment therefore appears to be complete.

It is here that the technical difficulties, which are capable of solution, tiresome as they may be, connect with the political crisis, which is extremely serious. It is three-sided and concerns primarily Germany, France and Britain. The German aspect is rearmament. The moral case of the *Reich* for the abolition of discrimination between victors and vanquished is unanswerable. Even from the angle of pure expediency, it is madness to prolong a condition which embitters a fighting nation. Besides, the question is settled. The Western Powers in December 1932 admitted Germany's right to equality once for all. If, therefore, the armed Powers do not mean to reduce to Germany's level, Germany has an admitted right to arm up to their level—so she claims, while reiterating that she is perfectly prepared to disarm completely, doing without any arm which the other Powers abolish.

The trouble is that Germany's good faith is suspect. All the world knows that she is armed far above the Peace Treaty level. If she were not, she would welcome international supervision, however one-sided, for it could only vindicate her innocence of clandestine arming. More than that, the Governments cannot attach much importance to Herr Hitler's eloquence about his

love for peace. Nobody imagines he wants war now, while Germany is only part-armed. Far better for him to bide his time, till the French alliances disintegrate of themselves. Better still to aid the process, as by the non-aggression Treaty with Poland, which contains nothing that Locarno did not contain, but is no doubt a soothing gesture. But the consistently militarist and aggressive doctrine of the Nazi Party cannot be forgotten, nor its inculcation of intolerance, vainglory, and megalomaniac nationalism—nor the bellicose character of dictatorship itself, demonstrated at this moment by the rivalry of Hitler and Mussolini for control of the Danube Basin. Most of all, German professions fail before the test of the League of Nations. Inside it Germany behaved like a petty backward country, not like a Great Power. She was perpetually seeking her own advantage, and never grasped the rudiments of co-operation for the general good. And when she could have enlisted the vast majority of States in her support in negotiating a fair disarmament plan, she preferred to leave the Conference. If Nazi Germany really wants peace, why has she done her best to smash the League? It has served German interests, when they coincided with those of international justice, again and again, and it is, after all, the only working peace system in existence.

In fact, the German Government is unconvincing when it writes that it 'cannot see how the adjustment of Germany's armaments to the requirements of her security and their partial adjustment to the level of the armaments of neighbouring States could lead to a general increase in armaments, and be the starting-point of an armaments race.' The Germans are well aware that a *Reich* armed to the level of France, and informed by the Nazi spirit, could be justly considered a menace by all its neighbours.

From this follows the French angle of the political triangle—the demand for guarantees. As France puts it, this is justified and moderate. For general purposes of security against aggression she wants a reaffirmation of the Covenant. For a disarmament convention she demands a definite cut-and-dried agreement to apply coercion, by increasing stages, to any State judged by the Disarmament Commission as arming in violation of its pledges. Finally, she insists that Germany should return to the League of Nations as part of the disarmament agreement. But France is not so sensible in saying that she cannot 'legalise' the rearmament of Germany while France disarms. How does she propose to prevent German rearmament? The French and Polish General Staffs are said to have considered, and rejected, a preventive war. In any case, the French people would refuse

to fight one. It is impossible, now, to stop German rearmament—up to equality. The only question is whether equality will be expressed in terms of large or small armaments.

Britain holds the pass where the trails to disarmament and security join. She wants disarmament, and it is largely due to a decade of her work in the League that concrete measures of reduction are being discussed now. She has also championed the right of the defeated Powers to equality. But she has a strong, dull-witted reluctance to pay for the peace which disarmament would bring. This dead patch in the political consciousness of Britain is queer, but it is real. It may be due to a century of easy accidental world power, when nobody interfered with our command of the seas. It certainly is the older men who live in a nineteenth-century dream in which Britain is visioned as great, and safe, and irresponsible. But, after all, this is the twentieth century. Greatness does not consist in the quantity of Imperial acreage, but in the quality of Imperial policy. Safety is gone—for ever. One single incident shows how utterly it has vanished. The Government of Brazil recently asked for tenders for a new cruiser fleet. Firms from twenty-two different countries competed for the order. Not only has Britain's old unrivalled command of the sea gone, but all over the world fleets may be built against her.

The British Government may hate the idea, but the chance of safety must be bought, and the price is international responsibility. To some degree this has been admitted. The January memorandum proposes that in case of a breach, or threat of breach, of the Disarmament Convention, the States parties to it, or the Disarmament Commission, may report it. The Governments are to consult, the object being 'to exchange views as to the steps to be taken for the purpose of restoring the situation' and maintaining the Convention in operation.

To this France has tartly replied: 'General affirmations, however great may be the honesty of those who express them, cannot suffice.' She has asked for agreement that pressure should be brought to bear upon any State breaking the Convention, and that common action should be used to defend any State threatened by the violation. There have been further negotiations between France and Britain to ascertain how France means to frame her proposed guarantees; but the discussion of this question has now been terminated, for the moment at any rate, by the French Note of April 17.

Britain, for all her slowness, has not shown herself ineducable in the politics of disarmament. She realises the consequences of her proposals a year or two after she makes them. There are signs that the Government is thinking about guarantees, perhaps

sufficient signs to justify Mr. Henderson's remark to the Bureau of the Conference :

The president ventures to think it ought to be possible to agree on a comprehensive system of guarantees of execution providing measures to be taken by the Permanent Disarmament Commission after due consultation ; these measures varying in proportion to the gravity of the breaches of the Convention.

The position, therefore, is this : If Britain will not guarantee disarmament ; France will not disarm. If France will not disarm, Germany will rearm to equality, if not to superiority. There is only one end to the tangled skein of disarmament, and Britain holds that end. If we do not unravel it, nobody can.

We have three gifts to give. One is the main contribution to security : guarantee of action against the violation of disarmament. Economic pressure, beginning with cutting off supply of arms, and stiffening up to complete boycott of export to the culprit by all other States, should be amply effective. We have the assurance of the United States that they will not interfere with such a boycott. Secondly, there are minor guarantees of efficiency, which we still withhold—principally the control of private manufacture of arms and budgetary limitation. Thirdly, it still remains true that the bolder the offer of disarmament, the more likely it is to succeed. It would be far easier to abolish military aviation than to limit it ; and far easier to prohibit tanks than to reduce them.

Nothing in this problem is more ludicrous than the attitude of politicians who moan about the ' sacrifices demanded from Britain.' There is no question of sacrifice here ; it is a matter of giving away a non-existent isolation, and arms with which we cannot defend ourselves, and can and probably will be attacked, in exchange for peace and security. For, after all, what are the alternatives before the world to-day ? Chaos is come again. The refusal of the European Powers, and especially of Britain, to carry out their pledges under the Covenant and force Japan to stop attacking China have reduced the international situation to anarchy. It is impossible to exaggerate this ; it is only necessary to look at the Far East, where Japan is preparing for a general war, and Russia has double-tracked the Trans-Siberian Railway, and is massing aeroplanes for the ' 1936 war ' to realise it. The construction of world peace can be abandoned ; in which case it is only necessary to abandon disarmament. Then the nascent arms competition will rapidly swell to bursting point, and we shall all perish in the general ruin. And serve us right ! Or the Governments may try to impose a sort of moratorium in arms. This is the Italian proposal. They declare that it is clear that the armed Powers do not mean to disarm ; ' the capital and practical

question is no longer to prevent German rearmament, but to make sure that it does not take place under no regulation and control.' Italy therefore suggests limitation of the forces of the armed Powers at the present *status quo*, and rearmament of Germany under her right to equality. This plan is slightly better than unregulated competition. Not much, for the world, spending £1,000,000,000 a year on armaments, is monstrously over-armed. The mass of superfluous war material will find its natural use at the latter end.

The third alternative remains : disarmament. It is not easy. It inspires the second-rate with that hateful weariness felt by men for a venture for which they have neither the wits nor the courage.

Oh see ye not that narrow road,
Sae thick beset wi' thorns and briars ?
That is the path of righteousness,
Though after it but few enquires.

Most politicians would rather consign their countries to the flames of destruction than make the mental effort necessary to save them. Disarmament, too, involves for Britain the recognition that world power carries with it the burden of world responsibility. But it would mean a respite from the terror which sickens the peoples—a relaxation of the nerves, a pause in which the recurrent quarrels of the nations could be dealt with by sanity and justice. Most of all, it would enable men to begin again from a firmer foundation the building of world peace. But the sand in the glass of opportunity is running out fast.

FREDA WHITE.

AUSTRALIA—PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT

FOR more than three years Australia has received full publicity in the British Press. Her financial experiments have been watched with close interest, and her attitude to the Ottawa Agreements carefully followed. She has been given full meed of British sympathy and admiration. Therefore the recent publication by Professor Copland (an Australian economist of wide reputation) of his Alfred Marshall Lectures¹ delivered in Cambridge during the autumn of last year are peculiarly topical. With these and other experiences of both past and present it becomes worth while to look ahead. Relieved Australian politicians and careful company chairmen addressing depressed shareholders have so far spoken in cautious outlines. No serious Australian man of affairs, whether in industry or in politics—or in both, as some are—believes that prosperity has yet returned. Indeed, men of this type are bent on working out what place Australia may be able to attain in a new world, and have completely rid themselves of the old belief that their country can maintain standards of life without strict relation to the rest of a very troubled sphere. Even the Australian man in the street has doubts. He is hardly to be blamed, since for a whole generation his politicians have taught him that the State is a universal mother with a bottomless purse to which all may have recourse. *Panis et circenses* are very pleasant, but someone must pay for both. Although cuts and widespread unemployment came as a bitter surprise to most sufferers, the Australian's natural can-niness soon fitted him, albeit grumblingly, to the prevailing depression; and when he realised that sacrifice meant a general knock all round, some of his cheerfulness returned. To-day he remains hithered and suspicious, but willing to listen to any facts which definitely affect his economic position.

Australians fully realise that their country is one of the British nations in strong federal Union under the same Sovereign. Proud as they are of that Union, they realise also the economic necessity which may compel them to look eastwards for a future share of that world commerce they too must get if they are to

¹ *Australia and the World Crisis* (Cambridge University Press).

grow. The dream of Britain as the centre of an Empire with her Dominions providing food and raw materials in return for manufactured goods disappeared the day our overseas Colonies were given fiscal freedom, and can never be revived—at any rate, as far as the Dominions are concerned. Tariff preferences, we hope, will persist, because racial feeling and commercial interests encourage such trading; but for the rest, we cannot grumble where a Dominion, for its own protection, seeks commercial reinsurance, when we ourselves are compelled to follow the same path all over the world.

Examining conditions of life during the last generation, most Australians would agree that, on a long view, the object of their politicians was to give the ordinary Australian workman a definite standard of life involving food and comfort better perhaps than any country in the world, not even excluding the United States when taken on the average. For a time, to some extent, the war checked this progress, but from about 1923 to the depression the politicians freely bid against one another, and as a rule Labour, bidding higher, won. We may, with Professor Copland, stress the period 1925–9. Since raw materials and foodstuffs were fetching very high prices, farmers and pastoralists recked little of their internal costs. The British loan market was as ready to lend as Australia was to borrow, with the result that heavy capital expenditure became the rule and the big cities grew still more overblown. In the end there remained a capital 'overhead,' both State and commercial, far in excess of what the country's population could economically use for many years to come. On the eve of the crisis Australia's income from abroad was £140,000,000 from exports and £30,000,000 from Government long-term borrowing. At the same time, British capital for internal commercial expansion had been coming in very freely. It was clear that the pace had become too fast. As London grew colder, New York was tapped, but not too easily. With the onset of the world depression all prices fell rapidly, and particularly those of primary products. The loan tap dried up completely, and the export tap, which had formerly run with a rush, now slowed down. Australia was doubly hit. To such a financial drought the only answer was drastic economy, unpleasant to all, but eventually accepted as a common sacrifice. There had been meetings of Under-Treasurers, warnings from the Commonwealth and commercial banks. Economists had formed themselves into study groups and published their views. The Press, too, had been full of controversy. The politicians were annoyed and alarmed—the latter particularly. Eventually what came to be known as the Copland Committee was appointed to examine the whole financial and economic position. Its members con-

sisted of four economists and five Under-Treasurers. Their Report, which had the backing of the best business brains in the country, was submitted to the Premiers' Conference which followed. In substance the recommendations made were adopted and became the Premiers' Plan. In June 1931 agreement was signed on behalf of the States and the Commonwealth and the Plan adopted. The Plan is interesting, because it is clearly an extra-constitutional agreement of the six States and the Commonwealth, and shows how the practical political sense of our race is never deterred by legal fictions.

The Plan, as Professor Copland points out in his lectures, was based on a mixture of deflation and controlled inflation. His argument must be carefully followed in his own pages if it is to be appreciated properly, since to most economists the ground is novel and to some possibly unorthodox. The basic intention was to avoid general bankruptcy in the crash of all values, interdependent as such are, throughout the national economy. Drastic deflation would have driven the ship headlong on the rocks; and therefore values had to be sustained until the storm abated. Above all, both on economic as well as on political grounds, the necessary sacrifices must involve every class and all interests and be spread equitably. First internal debt interest was to be reduced by 22½ per cent., and parallel with this all Government expenditure, including salaries, wages and pensions, must suffer substantial cuts. Industrial wages had already suffered some reduction, and the arbitration tribunals were being asked for further cuts. Finally, taxation was to be increased. To complete the circle of contraction in the commercial and industrial areas bank interest was reduced both on new deposits and advances, while the States promised individual legislation to reduce mortgage interest and to establish moratoria against foreclosure. The Budget was to disappear as an annual balance-sheet, and in place of it a three-year period was devised wherein all deficits were to be brought within manageable limits.

The Plan, faithfully followed, has worked well. The Commonwealth Government achieved two surpluses and has been able to reduce taxation in some measure. The total deficits of the States were £8,609,000 at the end of 1932-3 as against the £9,000,000 planned. For 1933-4 it was agreed that the total of the State deficits should not exceed £8,500,000. Actually the estimate now is £7,881,000. For this sustained effort the Australian people, working within and without their Constitution, deserve all possible credit. Two other factors, operating for the most part silently and scarcely seen by the public eye, materially assisted recovery. These were the Commonwealth Bank and the Loan Council. The Commonwealth Bank, from force of economic

circumstances, has quickly grown into all the functions of a Central Bank. It is outside politics, has an independent board, and its policy can be varied only by an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament. Before and during the crisis it has advised the Government on the changing financial position, and during the crisis, together with the Loan Council, has arranged for financing all Government deficits under strict conditions. The Loan Council, to which reference will be made more in detail later, is a body established by inter-State and Commonwealth agreement, and together with the bank has carefully controlled Government borrowing. Australian currency is now linked to sterling, and in effect its notes are not convertible. The bank controls all exchange, and does not seem at present disposed to vary the Australian discount of 125 to 100 sterling. Australia has also taken full advantage of the glut of capital in the London money market and has converted loans into long-term obligations which will save her by way of interest £2,000,000 sterling, or £2,500,000 in Australian currency. This confidence would never have been shown by the British investor but for Australia's plucky and drastic steps to financial recovery. In Australia, as in England, there is a glut of free money, and high prices for her internal loans because of lack of investment opportunities. It must not be forgotten, however, that there is a considerable sum on Australian deposit, which is really accumulated British credits, awaiting repatriation when the exchange position becomes more favourable to London. This removal, since probably it will be gradual, should not affect the Australian money market, because there is certainly no immediate need for the country to embark on new capital expenditure; and trade revival is bound to be gradual.

So Australia faces the world to-day: of good credit and ready to begin again. Some considerable rise there has been in the price of wool, her staple product, but that came on a world market bared of the commodity both in warehouse and factory, and probably has reached its limit. All other prices remain depressed. Wool alone will never again insure prosperity. In any event, the country is entirely dependent on primary production for its basic prosperity, and its eventual standard of life on costs of production which must inevitably take into account world conditions. Not the most sanguine Australian manufacturer has ever suggested that he could, even if he would, compete in world markets. Nor does there seem much hope, at present, of any appreciable increase in population to take up the existing slack in production. Trade union feeling is definitely against immigration, and the present plight of farming hardly encourages new enterprise. The rate of natural increase in the population has so declined that it is becoming stationary. Migration for four years

has been definitely outwards and averaging about 8000 per annum. Nor is this the whole story. While one-third of the 6,600,000 Australians dwell in rural areas, two-thirds are resident in urban districts. In the metropolitan cities there lives half the population of Australia, and in the two great urban centres of Sydney and Melbourne are collected a third of all Australians. Yet the economic props which support the country are the exports of wool, wheat, meat, dairy products, wine and fruit, together with a moderate amount of gold and base metals somewhat expensively mined.

Worked out in terms of simple figures, this means that half the population must raise enough of these primary products and sell them at a profit in international markets to keep themselves and the other half of the population on the Australian town standard of life—to-day, even in times of depression, still the highest in the world. Can this continue, or must there not be some redistribution of the population? The question really presupposes two inquiries: (1) What of future world markets? And (2) can the present monopoly protection of Australian manufactures any longer be justified?

The industry of agriculture naturally springs to the mind for prior examination. Like all new countries, Australia has still to find the right treatment for her specially dry soil, a workable system of manuring and crop rotation, and the establishment of varieties of seed which will best respond to her climatic conditions. So far she has relied on wheat alone, with the result that to-day she is driven to give her wheat farmers a substantial subsidy. The success of wheat-growing depends in Australia principally on sufficient rainfall, but when prices were good farmers increasingly took chances on marginal areas. With lack of rain and a heavy fall in prices they have paid dearly. The State Governments have excellent agricultural institutes, research stations (one at least of international repute), and experimental farms, but, compared with the waste of money on urban amenities, the amount spent on agricultural and pastoral research is ludicrous. The Australian wheat-grower, even when he has successfully solved his climatic difficulties, has to face the competition to-day of Canada, the United States and the Argentine, and in the future certainly of Russia. Each of these countries is at least as fitted climatically as is Australia to grow wheat, with far lower labour costs, and all nearer European markets. It is true that the present price of wheat is abnormal and due to world glut, and that in time prices will once again rise to a better level, but the wheat growing and using countries of the world have come together in conference, and something very like world quotas is definitely in prospect.

In such a computation Australia would receive a graded share in lieu of her present open market. There might be found a new market in Japan, but she would expect easier entry for her manufactures in exchange than she is now getting. Western nations—and Great Britain among them—are determined to keep alive a measure of home production. None, if manufacturing exporters, can be entirely self-supporting—except perhaps Russia—and all have in view the need of local food if ever supplies were cut off by war, and the value on most old soils of a crop rotation in which wheat plays a part. For the grower of wheat only in Australia there seems little prospect, and probably he must, as in many other countries, turn his hand to a developed system of mixed farming, hoping for a better local market and marking such surplus as may come for export. Dairy farming, even in competition with very efficient New Zealand production, grading and marketing, has made considerable progress. There are fine natural grass areas for stock, and if these be preserved, manured and cared for in a rather better fashion than now generally rules, the future should be assured. But here, again, more money for research, experiment and instruction is badly wanted. The Australian farmer shares with his Argentine competitor one great advantage denied to most Europeans in that he is able to keep his stock in the open country throughout the year. His disadvantages are that he is a long way from the European market, and has to meet, with the present exception of Great Britain, heavy protective duties and quotas. He has now in Denmark and Holland, and possibly in Russia in the future, keen competitors on a basis of production costs he can never hope to achieve. Moreover, New Zealand and Canada run him very hard with products at present rather preferred on the British market. He can teach his European competitors nothing in productive skill and marketing.

The pastoral industry is one which has always strongly appealed to British imagination. If the early Australians had never developed wool-growing, the textile trade might have gone to the Continent and left the West Riding mainly groups of mining and country villages. But staple as wool is to Australia, she cannot live on it alone. The war and the years that followed brought a phenomenal demand for wool, and Australia profited mightily. Since then rayon has developed and caught the fancy of millions, many of whom would now be wearing wool or cotton had rayon not been invented. Rayon has come to stay, and its competition cannot be ignored. Moreover, the moment wool goes beyond a certain price the international textile trade, knowing the purses of its customers, at once seeks alternative material. Still, woollen textures will always be sought for cold climates, although, to the detriment of wool-producers, the world

and his wife are certainly learning to get along with much less weight of clothing on their backs and other parts. But, counting all adverse factors, wool should continue to find a ready and general sale the world over, and the finer types, more difficult to produce, always have the luxury markets. But much remains to be done in research work; and if not in breeding—which is, indeed, an Australian fine art—certainly in parasitology and grassland treatment. One can sympathise with the sheepman who said he would have been content if his industry might have had for research one-tenth of what the much-advertised Sydney bridge cost. Even for wool Australia may have to face increasing competition. South Africa already produces a fair clip of fine wool, and after some years of research and cross-breeding, for which Rand gold is available, may become a real competitor. In coarser wools South America is a keen seller, and in all wools New Zealand remains in the offing alert and very efficient. Nor can the question of costs be disregarded. In no sheep country in the world are the labour costs so high as in Australia.

To gain a real hold of the British, and to some extent the European, meat market, Australia has worked hard for years and with a measure of success so far as the frozen meat trade is concerned. But frozen beef is no real competitor with the chilled, and that is where the Argentine has always left Australia behind. It is claimed that there is now a chilling process which will enable beef to survive in perfect condition the longer voyage from Australia. But commercially this has yet to be established, and, even with the British preference, Argentine quality, lower costs of production, and quicker transit will take a lot of beating.

Queensland probably grows some of the best beef in the world, but it seems difficult and expensive to market, and apparently will not pay unless the scale of production is large, the market assured, and the labour costs more comparable. For cheaper meats there may be in future some opening in European markets, since their own production is indifferent and seldom finished, but Australia will never get these markets by trading in one direction alone. That real trade is an exchange of commodities remains as true an economic maxim as ever—even in a world of quotas and restrictions, especially if you desire to make a trade treaty.

What Australia has to face in the future when replanning her agricultural and pastoral economy is that the world no longer offers to her widely open and unlimited markets, except for such raw material as wool, which textile manufacturing nations must have as cheaply as possible. While it is true that the present system of European import and exchange quotas may be excessive and abnormal, there will be no substantial abatement except on a strict basis of give and take. Moreover, so far as

dairy products are concerned, most European nations—and England is now among them—definitely intend to give a limited protection to their agricultural population in order to retain it on the land, and so to establish potential food reserves. Probably that will remain settled policy for many years to come.

Australian primary production has charged upon it far heavier costs than most countries with which it is in competition. Australian Labour insists on an absolute standard of life. Transport, being a Government sheltered industry, takes a heavy toll for any load, and so limits the farmer's cultivation area for export. Road transport may do something to mitigate the existing charges, but in the end accommodation between the two forms of transport is bound to be arranged. In any case, the cost of road repair for heavy lorry transport may well become prohibitive to all but the solid foundations of older communities. Labour charges at the ports are the most costly in the world, and seldom is it that unrest is not deliberately fomented at some port. Inter-port shipping charges are very high because overseas competition is prohibited, and consequently Australia pays through the nose for the privilege of maintaining a small mercantile fleet in her own waters. Added to these charges comes the crushing weight of the tariff.

On tariff questions outside criticism is really unnecessary, since the Tariff Board itself states the case all too definitely. Quoting from Professor Copland's eighth lecture on 'Forms of Control for Economic Recovery,' we have a section of the Annual Report of the Board for 1931-2, given as follows:

The imposition of high rates of duty for the benefit of one industry, resulting in seriously higher costs to other secondary or to primary industries, may cause some additional employment in the one, but resultant unemployment in the others. The maximum employment of our people is largely dependent upon the successful expansion of our export industries. This expansion, though largely affected by the world's demand for our products, is also bound up with the low costs of production. The establishment of new industries or the extension of existing industries which need the application of excessive rates of duty tends to add to costs and retard progress and employment.

Early in the year 1930 there had been a heavy increase of import duties, together with the imposition of tariff embargos on luxury goods and rationing of imports. It was claimed that this would check imports and so restore the balance of trade as well as provide extra employment. The effect was simply to stabilise the already high costs of production and to afford increased protection to a market where demand was already falling through diminution of national income. Devaluation of Australian currency would have limited importation far more effectively.

The Tariff Board was established in 1921 by Act of Parliament, and its duties and procedure have since been several times amended. The length and complexity of the tariff list makes revision detailed and onerous; and, as at present constituted, with the best intentions, it can hardly work at more than snail speed. It reports to Parliament, and it is for Parliament to accept, amend or ignore its recommendations. Parliament remains the tariff-maker, and occasionally acts on its own initiative without any report from the Board. Even so, from the work in progress useful publicity is emerging. People are discovering the comparative costs of local production and imported goods of the same character. Examination is being made into local industrial costs and the capacity, if further protection be granted, for mass production at lower prices. The quality of imports and locally produced goods is being compared. Efficiency is being inquired into and tested by comparison. Finally—which is really the basic challenge to monopoly—the Board will consider the willingness of an industry to guarantee that increased protection will not result in higher prices, and that prices will be reduced if increased production justifies the change. So, in a sense, the battle is already joined, but what the outcome may be in the endeavour to breach so entrenched a position is another and much more difficult question. Some tariff, it is clear, Australia must have, since it is her greater source of revenue, but whether efficient manufacture, with a measure of protection and a general tariff for revenue purposes, or a continuation of the present log-rolling system, with its crushing weight on primary producers, is for the Australians themselves to determine.

In a measure both Sydney and Melbourne are bound up with a continuance of heavy protection, the latter especially, and that is why, perhaps, Melbourne (with suburbs) has a population of over 1,000,000 and the rest of the State of Victoria only 800,000. Gradually as greater protection has been granted new factories have sprung up followed by rows of extra little homes to house the workers from the countryside. As developed the extensive areas of the cities impose very heavy obligations for roads, water and sewerage, all of which are reflected back from the rates on to the costs of production. Every suggestion that the excess of city dwellers should migrate from the two big cities and settle in the country is fiercely resented both by urban capitalists and by urban workmen. The former think of their vested interest in town properties, and the latter of their standard of life, fixed wages and urban amenities. Yet both employer and employed live on and out of the primary producer, against whom to-day the economic balance is heavily weighted. There is another disturbing factor, hidden and therefore not appreciated. Every Australian

loan usually ends in the purchase of a large amount of capital material from outside the country, which when it arrives meets the tariff wall and pays its dues. This adds appreciably to the capital costs of the undertaking in hand. But the revenue so derived from capital taxation is swallowed up in the year's budget and spent as income. The heavier the duty, the worse the evil.

Recent speeches by Mr. Bruce in Australia, and the public comments thereon, clearly indicate that Australian opinion is now well alive to the problem of limited markets for foodstuffs. The Ottawa meat arrangements come up for revision almost at once; dairy products have next year still to run. What must be appreciated is that the basis of Ottawa was reciprocity and first consideration for its own agricultural producers by each country concerned. We may therefore reasonably ask whether Australia has really taken into account Article 10 of these Agreements, whereby she undertook to discontinue the protection of her unsound industries, and to give sound industries protection only to a point which will give the United Kingdom producers full opportunity of reasonable competition. So far, little change of substance has been made; and time is of some essence in the bargain. Australian trade unionists will forgive us for reminding them that our urban dwellers were induced to accept the whole principle of Dominion preferences simply because they believed that in exchange for Australian primary products Australia would admit a reasonable amount of our manufactured goods on a fair competitive basis. Before the Ottawa Agreements run out both Canada and Australia will have had a general election. Canada, who certainly has now given our manufactures concessions of substance, may yet take the free trade line of her Liberal Party and ask for no preferences, or she may suggest a bilateral treaty such as those Great Britain has made with the Scandinavian nations. That is for Canada to decide. It must be remembered that Great Britain will be unable to pay for the imported food needed by her industrial areas unless she can find export markets for her manufactures. This factor Australia cannot ignore, and therefore the problem she has to solve is how to make her preferences to Great Britain really effective. As to foreign countries, Australia also will probably have to face the problem Europe has to solve. Europe has become supernational, and the nations now demand such complete reciprocity in trade as is reasonably obtainable. Australia had some experience of this when her imports of Belgian glass were suddenly cut off to advantage an Australian factory and Belgium replied by blocking Australian meat. New trade is gradually being opened out in the East, wheat has gone to China, and each year Japan buys more wool and even some wheat, but the real current of all successful trade

—and it cannot be repeated too often—can never run along a one-way street. Probably Mr. Latham, on his friendly journey to Eastern markets, has these difficulties in mind. We may yet find Australia among the commercial treaty-makers in world markets. If so, no country would be more pleased than Great Britain, since, strongly Imperial as our feeling is, we shall see nothing to destroy Imperial trade preferences or to imperil Empire interests in the widening of Australian markets.

But there are far-reaching constitutional questions still to be settled in Australia. Will she remain as she is to-day, a Federal Dominion under her existing Constitution, or become possibly a Unitary State? When Federation was first established its authors never foresaw, and certainly did not intend, the present position. The States, if not in the plenitude of their old powers, were to remain self-governing and practically independent, with Federation for certain limited common interests. The Commonwealth, step by step, has cramped the activities of its units and is legislating to-day in directions never intended by its founders. Excise and customs give it a large revenue, and its public services grow with every year. The States, with slowly shrinking sources of taxation, somewhat due to the pressure of increasing Federal levies, are left to carry on the expensive everyday work of government. All are finding the task increasingly difficult and some well-nigh impossible. It was intended that when the Commonwealth Government had a surplus, it should, after its limited needs had been supplied, distribute *pro rata* to the States. On the contrary, the Commonwealth has now become a very national authority, which, even with ever-increasing taxation, finds difficulty in paying its way. Hence the growing irritation in the States. The States of South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania feel, mainly as primary producers, that they have been sacrificed to the strident demands of Sydney and Melbourne, and therefore vigorously claim compensation. Conferences of the States and the Commonwealth Premiers are frequently held, but the deadlock remains. Western Australia says it is impossible to go on, and is preparing a petition to the Crown to be permitted secession from the Commonwealth. South Australia, unless relieved, also sees no other alternative. Tasmania remains an island of the blest mainly dependent on Melbourne for a market. To the States, the Federal Cabinet attitude appears dominating and aggressive. They have refused to agree that wages arbitration shall become purely a Federal matter; they have refused to make broadcasting national; and have demanded to be allowed to impose excise taxes, which, being a Commonwealth reservation, would be unconstitutional. The Commonwealth replies by money doles, grudgingly given.

It is difficult to see how the march of the Commonwealth Government and its Civil Service machine can be stayed. In a measure the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation already fixes wages, because any State which has a rate below that of the Commonwealth is immediately settled on by the interested unions to make up the difference, and, since the Federal courts have decided that the Commonwealth rate is to rule, it seems useless to deny the Commonwealth Government an absolute right in the matter. Irritation has evidently overruled logic.

But it is rather by the steady development of financial checks that the Commonwealth Government has achieved its strongest hold over the States. Towards the end of the year 1927 it had become clear that separate borrowings by the States and the Commonwealth were to the detriment of all. A single responsibility would appeal much more strongly to investors. The Commonwealth and the States then agreed that the former should take over the whole of the debts of the States, in effect guarantee the interest payments with right of recourse,² establish certain sinking funds, and manage the existing debt and undertake all future borrowing. The work was to be carried on by a Loan Council consisting of two representatives of the Commonwealth and one from each State. In case of need, the Commonwealth has a casting vote. Clearly, then, the Commonwealth needs but the support of two States to get its way. This agreement was confirmed by the seven Parliaments concerned and by a Federal referendum, and remains legally binding on each party until all agree to modification.

In practice the Loan Council, which is a statutory body and responsible neither to any Australian Parliament nor to any electorate, has become a regulator of finance. If a deficit occurs, borrowing is obviously the only remedy, and this cannot be achieved except through arrangements agreed both by the Loan Council and by the bank. These two statutory authorities thus control Government finance; and in Australia, as with many other nations, the purse is politics.

The strength of the Commonwealth machine is obvious. Its Treasurer must be in constant communication with both statutory authorities, and policy, as obviously, must be planned ahead. Nevertheless it may be claimed that the final word still rests with the electorate. In theory it does, but, although the Commonwealth Bank may have its constitution altered by any Commonwealth Parliament majority, the Loan Council is not so subject,

² The full extent of these powers was not realised until the New South Wales Parliament, under Mr. Lang, defaulted on its loan interest. The Commonwealth had a great victory and recovered from the recalcitrant State the whole of the loan interest paid on its account. See Professor Copland, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

because the common agreement which created it cannot be varied except by unanimous consent. It may be that some politicians will come to consider the exceptional positions of both bank and Loan Council as a 'challenge to democracy.' The policy of 'conscripting credit' is that proclaimed by the Labour Party, which Mr. Lyons, the present Prime Minister, declares was one of the main factors that decided him in leaving the party. Given a majority returned to the Commonwealth Parliament bent on a revolutionary monetary policy unacceptable to either authority, then a first-class constitutional issue might at once occur. Much, of course, would depend on the tact and management of those concerned, but were the majority determined and the council or bank adamant, there might be serious trouble. On the other hand, the delay might be useful in focussing public opinion throughout the country, and so check hasty action. In their present temper the States will not agree to any form of unitary government, and although many of the 6,600,000 Australians hold the view that seven separate Parliaments are an expensive luxury, individual State interests have become so divergent that, sapped though their position may be from year to year, the States, to preserve their independence, will hold out to the last. They may be right and the Commonwealth encroachment wrong. In many respects their own areas are so large as to be unmanageable even on a State basis. The Commonwealth finds in long-distance management from Canberra the same difficulty.⁸ Considerations such as these have moved some reformers to suggest the splitting of the States into provincial areas with limited local authority, but that would still leave the Commonwealth Parliament supreme, and would in no way placate particularist feeling.

It is impossible to see much hope for Empire migration in existing Australian conditions. With wheat, butter and wine subsidised, internal costs high, and export prices low, there is little to encourage immigration. Two existing failures seem to stand out as warnings, although management in both was not particularly efficient. In Western Australia the Group Settlement scheme, capitalised at £10,000,000, and carrying an interest charge of £400,000 per annum, had 7000 original participants. Only 1600 remain, and of these it is said that not more than 300 are likely to succeed. To the Victorian soldier scheme a bare reference will suffice. That miserable failure is too fresh in the minds of all. Somewhat daring, the lower House of South Australia recently passed a Bill for a closer settlement scheme in their south-west which would have handed over to an English chartered company for agricultural exploitation 700,000 acres of

⁸ The Auditor-General has just reported that 'tens of thousands of persons' are illegally drawing old age and invalidity pensions.

undeveloped land. The upper House, by a majority of one, threw out the Bill, the main reason for opposition being the dislike of semi-independent authority within the borders of the State.

Empire migration may once again be possible if days of better prices and lower costs arrive, and certainly will be probable if Australia decides to choose the land as her chief basis of development, and encourages a measure of internal migration from her overcrowded great cities. Rural resettlement, with large numbers of small urban centres all possessing locally needed secondary industries, might to a large extent be self-supporting and bear a much more numerous population than inhabits Australia to-day. The excess production of a population of this type, nationally and efficiently marketed, would still leave a large buying power for reasonably sized provincial capitals like Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth, and Hobart; and would also be a useful market for the Eastern States producing at a fair price under a reasonable tariff. Small individual farmers and countrymen find life very hard to-day. They have to risk all their small capital, and for the work of themselves and families there is no union restriction of hours. Their profits, if any, may give them something less than half what the town-dweller considers an inalienable right secured by law.

Australia's financial position is now such that for some time she should not need to seek external loans. In some degree it is regrettable that the Loan Council was not given control over municipal as well as over State borrowings. The necessary check would then have been complete. Should money be required to pay for public works devised to abate unemployment, such a charge ought to be met internally by a spread over industry generally. Extension of social services and extra subsidies are clearly items to be balanced in budgets and met by taxation. Railways are well in advance of population. City extension and land reclamation are unnecessary until justified by an increasing population, a change unlikely for some years to come. Public works of an amenity nature cannot be afforded, and, in any event, probably neither the Loan Council nor the Australian investor will look with favour on repetitions of the Sydney bridge or the Adelaide railway station.

What the political future may be even Australians shy at forecasting. There is undoubtedly a strong feeling among the younger people for a real National Party not entirely composed of professional politicians which shall be thoroughly united and ready to work a definite long-term plan for the future. At present there is little reality in any section of politics. Politicians gyrate in groups, and sectional interests seem too divergent to permit of comprehensive unity. So far the Socialist groups

have not composed their differences. Should they do so, their union might beget a forceful Opposition. There is, of course, the definite cleavage of Socialism and independence, but many of the old Labour supporters have learned much from the crisis and are no longer prepared to support a wrecking policy. Moreover, they are by no means satisfied, looking at results, that State management in industrial affairs works either efficiently or economically. It may be that Australia having had a full dose of political paternalism in every detail of life is getting tired of it, and will in future rather back individualism plus a modified co-operation as the better principle, rendering only to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. There is certainly little room for Socialist theory in wresting a living from the soil, and that is the supreme task of Australia.

I have known intimately one of the 'disregarded' States too long to be depressed by existing conditions or to despair of a future I have never doubted. If I see Australia in prospect with many times her present population, the view is of a great countryside covered by a vigorous people living a well-balanced life in such comfort and happiness as overgrown cities can never offer.

GEOFFREY ELLIS.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S DILEMMA

SHORTLY after his fifty-second birthday President Roosevelt celebrated the first anniversary of the 'New Deal.' Probably many people asked themselves a question on the 4th of March: Is it, after all, a revolution? The evidence of the first year does not warrant a definite answer, but it seems not less difficult to answer 'Yes' than to answer 'No.' This is because of the fundamentally democratic character of the American people (notwithstanding the numerical predominance of the possessing element) and the lack of constructive effectiveness in American political institutions on the one hand, and the unbalanced stage of economic and social evolution in the United States on the other.

It lies outside the scope of this article to describe the background and to analyse the spiritual and political elements of the New Deal; but three general remarks should perhaps be made before entering the discussion of the present economic policy and its results. First, it may be taken for granted that the so-called emergency legislation upon which the American experiment is based is strictly transitory and confined to the present emergency so far as the letter of the Acts is concerned, but if *nolens volens* these are perpetuated, their effect will be of a revolutionary character. Secondly, it is to be noted that the decision handed down in January by the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the emergency powers. Thirdly, we see that President Roosevelt has succeeded during his first year of office in balancing the disintegrating elements of the United States and uniting their direction in his own hand. The success of his political genius is apparent. He exercises his dictatorial powers without fascios, concentration camps, or G.P.U.'s—in a manner and with a decorum which secures him the unquestionable support of the overwhelming majority of Congress and of the American people. There were very few people who did not expect a more stormy session of the present Congress, which, despite all forecasts, did not revolt and did not even cause to be invoked the famous *apologia* for the American Legislature, that 'it may behave foolishly but ultimately does not do foolish things.' All the 435 members of the House of Representatives and thirty-two of the ninety-six

senators have to face election this year, and those who have ears for American public opinion say that most of them stand or fall by their attitude towards the New Deal—*i.e.*, the President. But his power has still to be tested and the trial will gradually become more severe, as he is forced to respect the demands of Congress and finds himself unable to carry on with solutions based on compromise.

President Roosevelt is entering the second year equipped with two powerful financial instruments, the \$10,000,000,000 budget and the \$2,000,000,000 Equalisation Fund. What is he going to do with them? It is upon the answer to that question that the future depends.

The activities of the American Administration must be regarded as a series of strategical movements in a warfare on depression. It is contended that the strength—and the weakness, we may add—of the attitude of the Administration is that it is not a preconceived plan worked out in details, not a closed circle either along capitalistic or socialistic lines, but a flexible, adaptable system which acts according to developments, 'discriminates according to economic necessity,' moves its troops and batteries in a long range of separate battles according to losses suffered or victories obtained. The New Deal puts severely to the test a Government's ability to co-ordinate on such a 'baseless basis' political considerations and economic imperatives. Bearing in mind the dangers of such experimentation and discrimination, we have nevertheless to admit that under the present American conditions any other method is difficult to conceive; neither 'free play of economic forces' nor a 'complete, enforced plan' could save the United States, and it is hardly an exaggeration to state that it has to be saved.

It seems as if very slowly a constructive programme is emerging from the chaos of monetary and economic measures which was disturbing and confusing the American picture at the end of last year. The chronological sequence of events in the new year appears to lend some definite lines to the economic policy of the Administration, which up till now seems to have had but one principle, that of inconsistency. On January 1 the bank deposit insurance law came into force. This measure has unquestionable defects, but for the time being, coupled with the action of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, it secures the confidence of the depositor in the American banking system, and should prevent the re-occurrence of the fateful events of the banking crisis of 1933. Thus the first corner-stone has been laid for the financing of the \$16,000,000,000 emergency budgets for 1934 and 1935, which will involve an increase of the public debt by more than \$9,000,000,000, even if the tax receipts will be

sufficient to cover the balance. The budget Message sent to Congress in January contained a pledge to 'spend wisely' the \$11,000,000,000 of emergency expenditure and bring about a balanced budget in 1936. But neither was confidence restored in the monetary system, nor was uncertainty eliminated as to the degree of interference in business life under the N.R.A., A.A.A., P.W.A., C.W.A., and the other thirty or so executive organs of the 'Washington alphabetocracy.' Consent in certain cases to the extension of working hours, and to a cut in the wages of the Civil Works Administration and other gestures mentioned below, seemed to strengthen confidence in this respect. In a rather sudden and unexpected Message, which swept away the 'wild inflationists' in Congress—at least, for the time being—President Roosevelt presented his gold plan of limiting the devaluation of the dollar to between 50 and 60 per cent. of its original gold value. Soon followed the Gold Reserve Act, and on January 31 the 'temporary but definite' devaluation of the dollar at 59.06 per cent. and the revaluation of the gold stock, as well as the taking over of its title from the Federal Reserve Banks by the Treasury, giving a handsome birthday present to the President of \$2,805,512,060. These measures were intended, externally as well as internally, to have the effect of restoring confidence in the monetary system of the United States. Judging from the heavy return of capital to America from abroad and from the substantial rise in the bond market, it seems that this aim has been achieved at least temporarily. The effect of the devaluation rate itself was bound to induce such movements, and whether there will be a flight of capital again after profit-taking is accomplished depends on the ability of the American Administration to maintain the confidence which it gained for the time being.

These measures are apparently intended to form the foundations upon which the Treasury hopes to build up its finances. Broadly speaking, the Treasury's position is the following: The dollar value of the total gold stock possessed by the Treasury was \$7,018,263,925 at the date of the revaluation and was increased by \$670,000,000 by the end of March. Of this stock, in round figures, \$3,400,000,000 are reserved against gold certificates given to the Federal Reserve Banks in exchange for the gold delivered; \$1,110,000,000 constitute the backing for existing gold certificates, while \$2,000,000,000 are reserved for the purposes of the Equalisation Fund. The function of the latter is not merely the steadying of the exchange rates, but the maintenance of the market stability for Government bonds. The remaining \$800,000,000 of the \$2,800,000,000 'gold profit' go to the general fund of the Treasury. The plan of the President's advisers that this last-mentioned sum of \$800,000,000 be applied for the purpose of

repaying maturing Treasury notes and bonds will increase directly the excess reserves of member banks of the Federal Reserve system to a total of about \$1,600,000,000, which will form the basis for a credit pyramid of \$16,000,000,000. This is only a theoretical assumption, and in essence does not differ from the huge open market operations initiated by Ogden Mills, Secretary of the Treasury under President Hoover, in the spring of 1932. Then the Federal Reserve Banks were buying \$100,000,000 of Government securities each week under the first Glass-Steagall Bill, which authorised the Federal Reserve Banks to take in Government securities to cover up to 60 per cent. of the notes issued. But the only result was a decrease in the indebtedness of the member banks with the Federal Reserve system and an upward movement of the stock market but no increase in business activity. The real and central difficulty remains—i.e., to find the missing link: the 'good credit risk,' which cannot be produced by a *Deus ex machina*. The President's advisers answer to this that the *entrepreneurs* who obtain contracts under the public works programme will represent the first set of good credit risks, which will be followed by a long stream of others. This will be so if, as Mr. Thomas Balogh clearly pointed out in *The Nineteenth Century*,¹ the causes and effects of the failure of the first round in the Roosevelt recovery tournament are properly appreciated. The second round has better prospects if the lessons are learned, but the final round is still far removed in which President Roosevelt will be able to claim the title of World Champion in Recovery.

The central problem to be solved is the restoration of purchasing power equilibrium by breaking the vicious circle in which both deflation and inflation are inevitably stranded. As is known, the first attack on the depression was led under the slogan of increasing purchasing power through raising wages under the National Industrial Recovery Act on the one hand, and the salvaging of bank deposits on the other. The ensuing revival broke down partly because of excessive speculation on the markets, partly on account of decreased consumption in consequence of higher prices, but mainly in consequence of speculative production, which shot up in July 1933 and broke down in October. Since American industrial conditions vary widely even in the same branches of industry, the theoretical triangle demonstrating the futility of higher wages cannot be applied to this breakdown without discrimination. It is true that the logical staircase of higher wages *alone* leads downwards instead of upwards, because higher wages cause higher production costs, which lead to higher prices, which, in turn, reduce consumption.

¹ 'Chaos or Recovery? The American Riddle,' November 1933.

But the imposition of higher wages in certain American industries was not only a social but an economic necessity as well. Leaving aside the much-needed elimination of the exploitation of female and child labour on as low wages as \$2 for a sixty to seventy hour week, it should be observed, for instance, that the American textile industries were foregoing the replacement of their machinery on account of cheap labour. American industry consequently suffered a heavy decline in orders, especially the capital goods industries, where unemployment is heaviest. The imposition of higher wages in such cases is economically necessary, and does not lead to increased unemployment, since it does not imply additional mechanisation to decrease labour costs, but rather the quickly revolving replacement of machinery, characteristic of American industries.

It is clear, however, that in other branches the increase in labour costs has had disadvantageous effects, but the vicious circle can be broken by the Administration in giving orders to the capital goods industries without raising wages. This means an increase of purchasing power through more employment in the capital goods industries without increasing production costs in the consumption goods industries. Hence the emphasis which is laid upon the wise spending of the \$11,000,000,000 of emergency expenditure. The remaining and most difficult task is, then, to lead the reviving industry from the 'Government boom' to private recovery; this has to be performed by economic forces themselves. Failing this, the Government would have to 'take over industry,' but the United States are still far from that. There are a few events which seem to indicate that the Administration is intending to break through the vicious circle. The first is the President's definite opposition to the continuation of the Civil Works Administration, which put 4,000,000 men to work, taking them from the relief rolls and paying them wages in some cases as much as \$20 to \$30 a week. Such practices naturally tend to disrupt the whole cost structure. Cuts to a three-day week, with lower relief wages, were ordered, and, incidentally, severe investigations were carried out because of alleged graft and corruption in the Civil and Public Works Administration. But the President will have some difficulty in dissolving the C.W.A., though the recently adopted Relief Bill allotting \$950,000,000 for relief purposes in addition to the \$400,000,000 already spent provides for the demobilisation of the army of 4,000,000. Hopes are running high that business recovery will take up the largest part of the unemployed, whose number is still alarming though still unascertained. It is estimated that of the 12,000,000 unemployed 3,000,000 have received jobs under the 'ordinary recovery,' which still leaves 9,000,000 unemployed.

The first American 'Madam Secretary' of Labour was advising Congress lately to consider at an early date the institution of an unemployed insurance system based on British experience. This move can be interpreted as an indication that the Administration does not intend to finance public works to an unlimited extent to relieve unemployment. Another event which seems to show that the Administration learned some of the lessons of the failure of the first round is the consent of General Johnson, the picturesque head of the National Recovery Administration, who has recently been looked upon as the 'sheep in wolf's garment,' to a forty-eight-hour week in Detroit. General Johnson defended his decision to the labour front with the argument that if he insisted on a thirty-six-hour week there would be an influx of labourers into Detroit, who would have to leave again when the seasonal upturn in the automobile industry ceased. Still another interesting move is the statement of the General Council of the Recovery Administration that the stipulation of the National Industrial Recovery Act by which the employer is bound, under violation of the law, to confer with the union representative of the employees does not mean that he has to agree with such representative, nor that he cannot confer with minority representatives or individual employees. If the significance of these events is correctly interpreted, they mean a considerable lessening of the power of the labour front so much strengthened under the N.R.A.

The National Recovery Administration, whose policies were recently thoroughly discussed in a 'national debate' in Washington, has done a remarkable work in bringing about 90 per cent. of American industries under the codes up to the beginning of March. The codes have been working too short a time to pass judgment upon their merits. They are worked out with considerable flexibility, although the validity of the compromise between producer-labour and consumer-interest which they embody has to be tested by experience. Monopolistic price-fixing tendencies have been noticeable in the oil and some other industries, but no actual case has been brought before the courts as yet. It will be an interesting task for the Federal courts to determine how far the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Anti-Trust Acts, whose provisions relating to trade associations were suspended, establish a boundary for monopolies.

In discussing the application of the modified principles of the Roosevelt Administration we assume that some bridge can be built between the opposite objectives of recovery and reform. The measures outlined above, if properly executed, would lead to a recovery on a firmer basis than a revival of the 'fool's paradise' which would follow inflation. But the New Deal intends to reform the American economic and social system. It

is clear that the reforms are in the direction of 'socialistically minded Liberalism' if not State Socialism. Therefore there is still ground for the apprehension that, if reform measures are taken, recovery will be halted by the opponents of such reforms; while if recovery is achieved, the possibilities of having reforms carried through are diminished. The emergency legislation itself requires already such a large measure of 'regimentation of economic life' that it is difficult to see how the Administration can stop half-way and return to 'normal ways,' as Secretary of Commerce Roper said in his answer to the first constructive attack on the Roosevelt Administration delivered by Ogden Mills at Topeka. Secretary Roper did not qualify what he meant by 'normal ways,' but his speech mentioned more than the mere abandonment of the dictatorial régime—it indicated 'handing back the responsibilities to the business community and the withdrawal of the Government from the present wide range of economic activities.' Bearing in mind that statements of American statesmen need a scrupulous qualification as to their significance in the different dimensions of the political world, nevertheless Secretary Roper's statement reveals the real dilemma of the Administration. Roper represents the school which preaches 'after recovery return to normal ways,' while Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace points out that 'there is no way back.'

Wallace has come to this conclusion, not because of his political creed or because of the influence of the present head of the 'brain trust,' the 'left wing' Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Professor Rexford Tugwell, but in consequence of a very logical conclusion to which he was bound to come after reviewing the agricultural problem in its full complexity and tracing the outlook for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He clearly declared that there are only two ways between which America 'must choose': either to recapture foreign markets so as to sell abroad her surplus production, or to reduce production, which would mean the exclusion of 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 acres of land out of a total of 350,000,000 acres. He sees that the full achievement of the former is impossible, and stresses the necessity for taking in more imports by which agricultural exports can be sustained. Bearing in mind the difficulties in this direction, he advises a middle course which would allow at least \$500,000,000 of additional imports through tariff reductions. He adds, however, that even so it will be still necessary to reduce acreage by at least 25,000,000 acres. In discussing the reduction he comes to the logical conclusion that this means control of production and control of prices, involving regulation of profits, which gives an undue protection to the inefficient producer. He also stresses

the conflict with the aims of the National Recovery Administration, which is to produce a rise in the prices of industrial commodities, thus tending to widen instead of closing the 'agricultural scissors.' This, in turn, can be avoided only if industrial prices are regulated as well. Though he admits that, theoretically, a planned economy implies a complete plan, he abandons 'the luxury of pure abstraction,' and retains his confidence in, and claims success for, regulated individualism, which builds the bridge towards a better balanced economic system upon the pillar of 'social discipline.' This, incidentally, is a particularly difficult task in America, not only because of the heterogeneity of the American people (which considers itself still 'By Grace of God free and independent') and the four horses of the American apocalypse—greed, graft, kidnapping, and corruption—but also because of the conflicting interests of the different economic regions within the United States. 'Much as we dislike them, the new types of social control that we have now in operation are here to stay and to grow on a world or national scale'—so ran his peroration urging the American people to face the necessary adjustments and to take the middle course between sectional isolation and international expansion. This issue seems to be becoming once more a crucial point in American politics, and the greatest skill and strength are needed on the part of President Roosevelt, because there are certain phases of this problem wherein compromises will not help any longer; the time will come when demands cannot be satisfied all round, but will have to be rejected from whatever quarter they may come.

The more immediate problem to discuss is the relation between the resources and the burdens of the nation; and how far can it be expected to be able to carry the charges of the emergency programme? According to the figures presented recently to the United States Senate by the Department of Commerce, the total income distributed to individuals throughout the nation was about \$30,000,000,000 before the war; \$81,000,000,000 in 1929; \$75,400,000,000 in 1930; \$63,300,000,000 in 1931, and \$49,000,000,000 in 1932, thus showing a decline of 40 per cent. between 1929 and 1932. Income produced in the same years amounted to \$83,750,000,000 and \$38,300,000,000 respectively with the decline between 1929 and 1932 of 54 per cent. These figures show the highly changeable character of the American national resources, but it should be mentioned that the income produced in 1929 was achieved with the support of an unprecedented credit inflation, which sustained a level of expenditure and income by mortgaging future incomes for years, and which, when the 'day of reckoning' came, inevitably collapsed. The prosperity period's legacy in the field of industry was a highly

inflated capital structure, the effect of which was, however, mitigated by the fact that the over-capitalisation took place in shares rather than in bonds. This enabled most of the big industrial corporations to avoid bankruptcy, and the most important railway bonds which threatened default were taken care of by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. But the over-capitalisation has still unfavourable effects on the calculations of the new undertakings, and a national campaign should be undertaken to write off watered and overbuilt share structures.

The fixed debt burden remains a more difficult problem, because liquidation had to be prevented, as it would have had catastrophic consequences, and refunding operations could not be carried through on a capital market that was paralysed. It is difficult to ascertain how far the new Securities Act has made refunding operations and new capital issues impossible, but there is no doubt about its retarding effects. This Act, which is framed on the '*caveat venditor*' principle, is based on the British Companies Acts, but the liability is extended over and above provable damages to the buyer. The conservative issuing houses do not object to the principle of the Act, but desire a limit to the liability for provable damages. If we consider, however, that the Securities Act is one of the victories of the 'war on Wall Street and the Money Barons of New York,' it is not likely that any substantial changes can be obtained from Congress during this session. The Banking Act of 1933 dissolved the securities affiliates of the banks and instituted the deposit insurance system, the carrying out of which has been modified so that its temporary character has been extended till July 1935, when further action will depend on experience. It is to be hoped that this opportunity will be used to effect the much-needed reform of the American banking system. The Bill on Stock Exchange regulation recently introduced will possibly be modified, since it has the support of the President only in principle. This Bill is not merely another move in the 'war on Wall Street,' but it is intended to act as the first step in curing the American body economic of its 'cancer'—speculation.

From various official publications and private estimates which vary considerably, the total gross internal debt in the United States is computed at about \$265,000,000,000, including deposits and life insurance reserves. The various items of long-term debts, amounting to about \$144,000,000,000, give an interesting picture: the largest single item is real estate mortgages, amounting to no less than \$51,000,000,000, of which \$21,000,000,000 are urban home mortgages. Farm mortgages represented no more than \$9,500,000,000 at their peak, and their approximate figure is now put at \$8,500,000,000. Farmers'

short-term debts would increase this amount to about \$11,000,000,000, which shows how much the quality of the debt determines its relative importance, especially in politics. The plight of the American farmer is better illustrated, however, if we consider that he represents 22 per cent. of the population and has been receiving only about 7 per cent. of the national income during recent years, while his debts certainly exceed 10 per cent. of the total net debt. The funded debt of railroads and public utilities is about \$30,000,000,000, and the long-term loans of other corporations are computed at \$20,000,000,000. Government debts amount to \$42,000,000,000, States and local Government debts to \$20,000,000,000; and the Federal Government is responsible for the remaining \$22,000,000,000. The interesting and significant development of the Federal debt can be pictured from the following figures: it amounted to \$1,200,000,000 in 1913, increased to the war peak of \$26,000,000,000 in 1919, and was reduced to \$16,000,000,000 in 1930. From this post-war low point the upward trend was very rapid, reaching \$22,500,000,000 in June 1933. The increase during the present fiscal year is to be not less than \$7,300,000,000, and the total Federal debt will amount—if the estimated limits can be kept—to \$31,834,000,000 on June 30, 1935. A comparison with Great Britain, which is frequently made, shows that the situation is not alarming, but, in view of the widely fluctuating national income of the United States, such rapid increase in the national debt is not without danger. The experience with recent Treasury issues has been somewhat equivocal. Though it was feared by responsible circles that the December maturities would have to be met by 'green backs,' this hurdle was taken by the new Treasury note^a issue of \$1,000,000,000, which was 'oversubscribed two times,' while, after a 'highly satisfactory' response to a similar issue in January, the February issue of \$800,000,000 was 'four and a half times oversubscribed.' The conversion of about \$1,900,000,000 Liberty bonds, on the other hand, was a failure, and the cash repayments to be made on April 15 would not be met fully by a new offering of twelve-year bonds. The 'credit corner' described above is nevertheless considered sufficiently strong to absorb the \$6,000,000,000 of new money which have to be borrowed before June 30 of this year and the \$4,000,000,000 which are needed to meet maturities.

Summarising the main lines of the recovery programme, we cannot fail to see that it is heading towards an increased credit supply with the intention of bringing about a credit inflation. The aim of this inflation is, of course, to cause a rise in prices up

^a The United States Treasury note is not a currency note, but a short-dated security corresponding to the British Treasury bond.—Ed.

to a level at which not only the present but all new debts can be carried without disturbances, and to keep the price level under control. It should be pointed out that this is another strategic turn at which President Roosevelt faces a dilemma. If he wants to enable the Administration to exercise an effective credit control he will have to take drastic steps towards establishing Government control over the Federal Reserve and commercial banks, which would lead to the nationalisation of the banking system. Though he has indicated that he is opposed to this, his Administration has gone a long way in this direction; the Treasury has been turned into a Central Bank and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation holds stock in 30 per cent. of all banks in the United States. It will depend on practical expediency rather than on principle how much further the Administration goes towards nationalisation of the credit system.

The problem of raising prices brings us to the famous gold purchase plan, which started on October 25 of last year, and eventually exercised a drain on the gold stocks of foreign Central Banks, which disturbed the international exchange markets to a degree witnessed only in the early post-war years. The domestic gold purchase plan, owing to the uncertainty which it aroused all over the world, was a failure, and the necessity for stabilisation was eventually realised; this led to 'temporary but definite' devaluation. As indicated on various occasions, the sponsors of the gold purchase plan were acting on the assumption that—

(a) A 'devaluation, even without corresponding increase in money circulation, will raise prices, because the psychological effects of the announcement of a gradual devaluation would reverse the downward spiral of the price level.' Such a rise, however, if it occurs at all, leads to a collapse as soon as the speculative wave is ended, as has been shown by subsequent developments in America.

(b) The elasticity of demand of foreign countries, following the cheapening of American goods in gold, would take off the excess of commodities which are depressing American markets. This assumption is also erroneous, because it is almost inconceivable that, under the present low world purchasing power, any substantial increase in demand would follow. Moreover, whatever exports were stimulated by devaluation, they could raise the price level only after a considerable period, in view of the comparatively small part played by foreign trade in the American economy. Import and export articles naturally showed an increase in prices, especially rubber, cotton and tobacco, and shipments were somewhat larger; but other commodities did not show a corresponding rise, and some domestic commodities fell. The present upward tendency can be sustained only if the volume

of purchasing power continues to increase. During the whole period of devaluation the price level steadily rose, but this was due to the interaction of various factors besides depreciation. It is now clear, for instance, that the subsidies paid to the farmers are helping very much to keep the prices of wheat and corn in America above world market prices. But the carry-over still amounts to 324,000,000 bushels, of which 194,000,000 are on the farms. This shows the highly speculative and dangerous situation of the American wheat prices.

To prove the success of the gold purchase plan, however, two 'results' are claimed: first, that the 'windfall profit' on devaluation of \$2,800,000,000 actually represents an increase in purchasing power, and, secondly, that a world-wide devaluation of gold is having the same effect as if new gold mines were discovered by enabling a 'world inflation.' Leaving aside the fact that such 'windfall profits,' if actually spent, are essentially equal to the issue of additional notes, this remedy of 'world inflation' could be achieved only if America would give away her gold instead of hoarding it. If she would take this very improbable step it might give a breathing space, but it would be only effective if it were used to re-establish the international equilibrium of purchasing power between the different countries and continents: otherwise only a few years will elapse before a new world chaos breaks out. The first step towards this goal must be tariff adjustment. The pledges of the President to lower tariffs are well known, but the rebuffs which were given at the World Economic Conference to the tariff reduction proposals of Secretary Cordell Hull, who is an ardent tariff revisionist, must also be remembered. Mr. Roosevelt's position in respect of lowering of tariffs has been greatly facilitated by the passage of the Bill empowering the President to reduce tariffs by 50 per cent. during a period of three years without the consent and approval of the Senate—a notable victory. The primary reasons for tariff revision are export interests and the collection of debts—not so much war debts as private debts, which are at present suspended under transfer moratoria in Central Europe and South America. Incidentally, the war debt problem was recently brought up in Congress by Senator Hiram Johnson, who, after many defeats, succeeded in persuading Congress to pass his Bill making illegal the granting of loans to foreign Governments in full or partial default upon their debts to the United States Government.

The problem of tariffs, export trade, and foreign debts has many controversial aspects, and it is to be hoped that the Committee recently appointed with the approval of the President and the support of the Rockefeller Foundation to advise 'on national policy in international economic relations' will construct a basis

upon which the conflicting interests can be harmoniously co-ordinated. The present international economic position of the United States is influenced by the under-valued dollar, which secures an artificially strong export position to them. With an under-valued dollar even tariff reductions would not mean much, and there is a risk that the pledges of Mr. Roosevelt and the proposals of Mr. Cordell Hull will be realised only on paper. It is a strenuous task to change the American debtor mentality into that of a creditor nation.

The much-discussed controversy whether or not the United States will isolate themselves from the rest of the world and abandon foreign trade is being decided partly by events and partly by the recent measures and pronouncements of the Administration. The events are the following: American exports fell from \$5,241,000,000 in 1929 to \$1,576,000,000 in 1932, and only reached \$1,647,000,000 in 1933 in spite of exchange depreciation. Though these exports represent only about 6 to 9 per cent. of total American output, they include 30 to 70 per cent. of various important branches of American production. The Administration is firmly resolved to promote export trade, and \$100,000,000 has been allocated for this purpose from the funds of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. A policy of regulated and interrelated trade and capital movements will probably be tried by the United States in the shape of reciprocal trade agreements with tariff bargaining—as indicated in the President's tariff Message. These negotiations could lead to an increase in world trade if constructively worked out.

The control of long-term capital movements can be realised under the Securities Act without much difficulty, but that of short-term funds appears to be a task largely beyond the reach of Central Banks and Governments at present, mainly because of lack of effective co-operation between international financial centres. This is a task, however, which should be mastered, in view of the important and dangerous effects of such movements, especially in consequence of their sudden and violent character. These movements undermined the gold standard, and are likely to do so with any other international monetary standard which will be established, if they are not regulated. It would be difficult to prevent them unless complete regulation of international capital movements were undertaken, but Equalisation Funds would be able largely to counteract their injurious effects. This presupposes a close co-operation between these Funds and Central Banks; there is no topic more discussed and less clear in American financial circles than the ways and means by which the British and American Equalisation Funds can and should co-operate. The suspicion with which these rival funds are looked

upon should be eliminated without delay by open declaration as to their respective policies. But as long as price levels do not adapt themselves to the present exchange rates, and tariffs are not adjusted, there seems to be no ground or hope for constructive co-operation or stabilisation, though these are absolutely necessary to build up a better and more permanent basis for world trade.

At this juncture we meet the most dangerous of Mr. Roosevelt's dilemmas which has the widest international significance. If his Administration is heading for an indiscriminate sponsoring of export trade and does not conclude agreements with the leading commercial nations to co-ordinate world trade, we are faced with a sequel of exchange and tariff wars which may easily culminate in a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, in view of the actively defensive attitude of Great Britain, of Japan's expansionist trade policy, and of the German attempt to increase foreign trade, even, if necessary, through a lowering of the standard of living. This would certainly not contribute to the improvement of the international situation, which is already so much disturbed by a series of other factors. The conflict between political considerations and economic imperatives is gradually increasing in intensity; while in the United States, broadly speaking, political considerations are subjected to economic imperatives, the contrary is the case in Europe. Neither internally nor externally can the relations of nations improve unless these elements are harmoniously co-ordinated. It would be within the pledges of the New Deal for President Roosevelt to take effective steps in this direction. He can do it, but there is not much time to lose.

KÁLMÁN DE BUDAY.

EAST AFRICAN KALEIDOSCOPE

Automatic traffic lights have been installed in Zanzibar.—*East Africa*, January 11, 1934.

THE East African kaleidoscope has been turning for some time. Different coloured fragments get together, form patterns and then break apart. It has now been realised that this cannot continue indefinitely. The decision of the Carnegie Corporation to finance a broad and wide angle survey of British Eastern Africa under Sir Malcolm Hailey, to advise the British Government as to the best and most urgent lines for investigation, covering the whole field of African development—political, economic, social, scientific, and, of course, all aspects of the contact of white and black—is the biggest step yet taken towards the scientific study of our responsibilities. The survey naturally will not attempt to solve problems or decide on policies: it is realised that that is an impossibly big proposition, but it will serve as a guidance for such solution, and for policies to be framed over the next few decades. There has been for some time past an undercurrent of movement in these territories that is obviously going to have far-reaching effects. Viewed dispassionately, it is not too much to say that this may result in Africa producing an autochthonous civilisation, hitherto retarded by various causes but now ripening at an unprecedented rate, which will prove a notable contribution to world civilisations.

These are big words, and at present they are not a prophecy. They are, however, a legitimate hope—and something more. They form a goal that is well worth striving for, because the alternative means a terrible future for Africa, which might make future generations regret that we ever opened up the continent; but the hope, now visible, of success is a great inspiration to the men and women who are working for that end—to give proof that we have entered and occupied Africa for Africa's good—and that inspiration will be immensely strengthened by the momentous step that has just been decided upon, for the spadework that has hitherto been done has lacked direction and cohesion. It is to show the reasons for this hope, and to give an outline of some aspects of the coming survey, that these words are written. It is

obviously impossible within the limits of an article to attempt to cope with more than one group of aspects, but it is one on which there has been a great deal of hard thinking lately. I choose what may be called the native-political aspect, leaving untouched the native-economic and the whole field of white development.

The statements made by Dr. H. L. Gordon about the investigations carried out by himself and Dr. F. W. Vint on the brain of some Kenya natives have had read into them by some people implications that the size and shape of the Bantu brain precludes development, except in a small minority of individual cases. That is not what I understood Dr. Gordon to say. What he did emphasise was that before we continued to try to elevate the African, and to assist his evolution, we need to study his brain, together with other factors. He pleaded for co-operative investigation with biologists, physiologists, psychologists and others, and he premised that the African brain differs from ours. Some reasons for Bantu backwardness may be due to nature and some to nurture—that is, some may be hereditary and some environmental; but so far our efforts at developing the African have been concentrated on improving environment. Dr. Gordon warns us that this alone may not suffice. There may be something that, even if we eliminate certain environmental defects, may prevent the African from attaining European standards of proficiency and enlightenment, but these factors will not necessarily prevent him reaching a high standard of his own. It is precisely in such cases, the deciding whether or no such co-operative scientific investigation is needed, that Sir Malcolm Hailey's survey will supply the want. He will be an arbiter to whom Government will pay heed.

Sir Charles Sherrington, writing with no reference to this African problem, has affirmed that it is the outside world which sets the activity of the brain in motion, and I propose to take that as my jumping-off point. For untold ages most of Africa has been comparatively free from permanent outside influences. Waves of migration have swept through and across the continent, but only to be absorbed. Other outside influences, such as Egypt, Phœnicia, the unknown builders of Zimbabwe, have made no permanent impression, nor did the inroads of Arabs and Portuguese. When we first came into the central part of the continent it is my belief that the native definitely thought that we too would but ripple the surface and then depart again as those others did. Two or three generations have passed since then, and our white occupation does but get more firmly implanted. Pioneers have been succeeded by Governments, missions, planters, and more recently by mines. Caravans have given way to wagon roads, and they in turn have been superseded by trains and motor cars,

with airways as an auxiliary. The natives have even seen young white Rhodesians and Kenyans born, grow up and have children amongst them. They see that the present incursion is not passing, as its forerunners did: it is taking root. They are, moreover, growing accustomed to it, for there is practically none who can remember the pre-white days, and they would, mostly, not be without us now if they could. There is so much that they want to learn from us. Thus the outside world has set the activity of the brain in motion; and the outside world at last is alive to the fact, and to something of what it connotes.

We are not ready for this movement that is taking place, but we are by no means as unready as some may think. The evolution of our governance has not kept pace with native thought-development, but there has been marked evolution in it all the same. From the rough-and-ready patriarchal methods of early administration a big gap separates us. There is a system, or rather several systems, based upon ideas—rather jumbled as yet and still groping, but finding shape. Efforts have already been made spasmodically to get at basic facts. Census reports are tabulating the human element, anthropologists and biologists are digging up facts and working at theories. Educational experiments are being made. Non-governmental bodies are likewise developing; the missionary society of to-day is almost unrecognisable compared with what it was fifty or even twenty years ago. One such society (the Church Missionary Society) even claims that, in the literal sense, it is no longer missionary: it has passed that stage, and now calls itself the Native Anglican Church. There is, too, among missionaries a recognition of the imperative need for anthropological study, and a growing sense—*vide* the recent remarkable conference at Dodoma—of the need for unification of Christian effort.

The anthropologist himself has, luckily, also not stood still. He no longer merely studies interesting primitive survivals, but has purposeful ideas, which are all leading us towards acquiring knowledge of the nature of these races. There are as many anthropologists now working on the evolution of native types—'the anthropology of the changing native,' as Professor Malinowski calls it—and on the result of the impact of the outside world as there are investigating the old fabric. Not that the old fabric is to be neglected: it needs to be studied while yet we may, so as to get a true grasp of the impact; but it is recognised that it is passing and will soon only have a relative interest and value. Economic questions, including labour control and migration, the disruptive force of civilisation, and the more recent constructive effect, are being closely watched in many parts of the continent, but rather unsystematically. It is only necessary

to mention such works as Major Orde Browne's *The African Labourer* and Mr. Merle Davis's *Modern Industry and the African*, both published in 1933, to show that Europe is alive to this many-sided problem; and when I say Europe I include the great offshoot America, for much that is being done owes its very existence to the benefactions of the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Institution, and the Phelps-Stokes Fund. Working on different lines, and not unduly overlapping, we have also the International Missionary Council, the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, and older bodies like the African Society and the Royal Anthropological Institute, which last is welcoming this coming summer an International Conference to London when an African section will be prominent. Much work of a technical nature is also being done at a score of centres.

Reference must be made to another important factor in all this which has not always had the attention which it deserves. I have already referred to the fact that a new generation of Africans has arisen, divorced from the old African by centuries that have passed in a decade or two. We need, and, to a certain extent, are getting, an equally new white man to shoulder the responsibility of guidance. The old and rapidly passing generation of pioneer administrators, settlers, missionaries, miners, did its work well, not merely according to its lights, but adequately in most cases to the circumstances. This type of man, or a copy of him, will not do for young Africa. The new man should inherit the general idea of service and the love of Africa that distinguished his predecessor, but he needs much more. The big mining companies pre-eminently, the missionary societies in a marked degree, and some branches of government, are grasping this, but not all the last named, and as yet comparatively few of the settler community. For this last section much depends on the education given locally to the rising generation: this—including the ethics of race relationship—is of supreme importance, and more may hang on this than on anything else. We cannot start afresh with each new generation. Infiltration from outside will be necessary, but with the young African of European descent will rest a heavy responsibility: he will be a power for great good or evil.

Then the next point. We have reached the stage at which we must cut out our old ideas of 'child races.' The African is no fool, and is no longer an infant. Whatever his brain capacity, whatever his present, and possibly permanent, limitations by our standards, he is, on his own lines, a man of considerable shrewdness, and, though his logic is not ours and he has no grasp of our ideas of thoroughness, punctuality, conciseness, he achieves a good deal in his own way. The native path is a wonder-

fully winding one, unlike our straight roads, on which the native even superimposes his own wriggling track, but his path also, reaches its destination.

So let us accept the fact that the African is growing up and has his own standards, and treat him henceforth as a man. We must cease to legislate for him as a child, and to dictate to him as a child. We must also cease to shirk legislation just because the child will not like it and may cause trouble. Tutelage has not ended, but it has grown into a partnership, and the young partner is getting ready to understand the duties of such a position. He is tending to demand things, to claim rights, and is quite old enough to be made to realise that privileges and rights carry with them duties and responsibilities. We lag behind in this way, but it is a line that we need to pursue, and it will meet with a ready response. As I said earlier, we have moved far from the pioneer patriarchal administration, but for all that we have not kept pace with the evolution of the African himself. We need to understand him better, to help him in his aspirations, but also to make him pay for their realisation by genuine co-operation, no longer to give him things as a charity or as an expedient. Properly handled, I have little fear that he will respond to this, and this in itself will prove a big, and indeed an essential, factor in his mental development.

This brings us to the dominant problem of selecting the lines of advance. In Eastern Africa, with the exception of the kingdoms of Buganda, in Uganda and Barotseland, in Northern Rhodesia, we started with direct rule, or autocratic white control. District officers, with natives under them as paid State employees, had absolute charge in most cases: they collected taxes, issued orders, administered justice (or law), and were responsible for seeing that the peace was kept. Although purely autocratic, this rule was wonderfully effective in the times in which it was first imposed. I have chosen the epithet 'wonderful' deliberately because so many of the young men to whom this work was entrusted had hardly emerged from the schoolroom and had had no experience or training, nor, when they reached Africa, was there anyone there to supply the necessary tuition. These young men became in their early twenties the ancestors of the African Civil Service. There is a book, long since out of print, called *Station Studies*, by Lionel Portman, which gives a splendid picture of those early days. Re-reading it to-day shows how far we have moved in thirty years, and it is good to be reminded of this recent but half-forgotten past.

It soon became obvious, however, that this form of government could not continue. Administration became more complex; not only was it obviously impolitic to keep such a detailed

control solely in the hands of the white race, but, as things developed, the cost would prove prohibitive. Across the continent, on the West Coast—or, rather, in its hinterland—Lord Lugard (as he now is) had evolved a system now known as Indirect Rule. It has been well said that he introduced this into the Northern Nigerian emirates because there was no alternative in such populous and highly developed States. In any case, it worked very well, although now modifications are proving necessary. West Africa is outside the scope of this article, but I would call attention to this evolution of indirect rule on that side of the continent because it has a direct bearing on what follows. The present evolution shows that the Lugard model was a means to an end and did not represent finality.

The Colonial Office moves its upper grades from one part of its vast dominions to another: sometimes bewilderingly so, and such transfers seem to go in waves. There came a time when there was a steady flow of officers, Lugard men, from the west to the east of Africa, and among these Sir Donald Cameron's appointment to Tanganyika Territory stands pre-eminent. In his new command he introduced a complete edition of indirect rule into a land which had had, of historical necessity, one of the most pronounced forms of direct rule in Africa. I had the good fortune of being able to study German administration in that country in pre-war days, and had the privilege of discussing it freely with those in charge. (Parenthetically, I first came into direct touch with it in 1901, visited it again in 1905, and made the study referred to while leisurely traversing it in 1910.) Herr Dernburg, it is true, did much in 1909 to reduce the purely military rule, but he did not tamper with the principle of direct government control—he merely started to transfer that into the hands of the civil authorities. Tribal chiefs, or sultans, were deposed whenever possible and government puppets put in their place, while the *wali*, or State headman, a paid employee of the Colonial administration, was the man in actual control. The result was a far more complete disruption of tribal rule than in any of the bordering British territories. Followed the welter of war and ensuing chaos, on which British administration had to start with a very scratch team. It was on this foundation, and largely with this team, that Sir Donald Cameron introduced indirect rule on the West African model, and—despite setbacks and modifications—it has on the whole proved fairly satisfactory, and seems now to embody the elements of steady government. It stood the strain of the great depression remarkably well, as no system inherently bad could have done.

It is very important to note that all the adjacent British territories have, in some degree or other, followed suit. Uganda

has its own forms of indirect rule. The Kabaka of Buganda has for long had an elaborate constitution; the Mukama of Bunyoro now has one too. Kenya has an intricate system of native councils. A modified copy of the Tanganyika model was introduced into Northern Rhodesia by the late Sir James Crawford Maxwell, and Nyasaland has recently adopted something similar. The principle seems, then, to have been universally accepted. Into this atmosphere of unanimous self-satisfaction Captain R. S. Rattray dropped a bomb at the last meeting of the British Association. Sir Donald Cameron, now back in Nigeria, did likewise in his speech to the Legislative Council at Lagos in March 1933, and now Professor W. M. Macmillan joins forces with them. Two of these at least cast grave doubts on the basic soundness of the idea of indirect rule, and Captain Rattray sums up his idea as follows:

It seems certain that the system will very soon have to withstand onslaughts both from within and from without. The assault from the inside will come from the masses of the people themselves, who are likely to become estranged owing to the undoubted tendency of indirect rule, as now applied, to build up centralised African autocracies, disregarding the bases of former African constitutions and States, which were essentially decentralised and democratic. The attack from the outside will be delivered by that ever-growing educated African element who feel aggrieved because they sometimes appear to be excluded by a system where Western civilisation and Western lines of progress seem at a discount. . . . By the majority of educated Africans indirect rule is regarded as a veiled attempt at 'keeping the Africans in their place.' Yet without their co-operation the whole structure of indirect rule must surely crumble.

Professor Macmillan contends that educated Africans look upon indirect rule as a means of putting them back and keeping them under chiefs and tribal conditions from which they are beginning painfully to escape, and he, too, holds that we can by no means build up a new Africa without the help of these men. Sir Richmond Palmer, answering Captain Rattray, makes the point that

the whole problem really is concerned with reconciling the old and the new in building a bridge to suit the exigencies of changing conditions and customs.

I think one can go further, for, as Mr. Merle Davis pointed out in a parable, it is not only a question of building a bridge, but of constantly altering a bridge which we have already built, while permitting the traffic to move over it during alterations. It can be done. I saw the late Colonel Arnold, working for the Rhodesian Railways, raise the quarter-mile-long Kafue Bridge, plus all the approaches, 5 feet, without dislocating the traffic, beyond the fact that the trains crossed each night, while he worked inch by inch raising the bridge in the daytime.

I do not see, therefore, that one need be pessimistic. Indirect rule, as originally conceived, is only the first level of our bridge. It was, I think, Professor Julian Huxley who said recently that in Africa we have to build up practically everything from the foundations, but that does not imply that we need always get down to foundations again and build new bridges. Hitherto there appear to have been two schools, that in favour of autocratic rule by bolstered chiefs and reconstituted tribal councils, and that which favours the democratic rule of natives who have 'definitely chosen the ballot-box and European ways of thought and custom' (Captain Rattray's words). There is, however, a third possibility, and it seems to me, granted one necessary factor, a perfectly feasible one—namely, the rule of the aristocracy (in its original sense) which can be built on to the old tribal council, and yet admit into such councils plebeian educated natives who have demonstrated their worth; and I believe our present bridge will be found suitable for such superstructure provided our education ideas are sound. A real aristocracy such as I have in view proved successful in other emerging communities well known to history.

Education is, of course, the necessary qualification. Briefly, the history of education in Eastern Africa is this. The missions started evangelising, added elementary education, so that converts could read the gospels, and gradually extended it until it grew into something considerable, though localised and always secondary to conversion. Then the State stepped in, gave grants to approved schools, imposing standards, inspections, and some control; after which it started supplementary government schools, and provided institutions for higher education, notably Makerere College, in Uganda, whither go the best pupils from the different Church schools in Uganda and also from outside it. Education is still in its beginnings. The masses are largely untouched; pupils come from, and may return to, uneducated primitive homes; women lag behind men—all of which are factors that act as drags on the slow growth of education. There are all sorts of other problems in this connexion. Some are being solved: for instance, at Makerere there is now no undue predominance of embryo clerks, the medical, veterinary and agricultural sides are well patronised, and that is to the good; but the general leavening must be speeded up, because at present the educated or emerging African is, as Professor Macmillan rightly stresses, 'a very lonely man.' That carries with it a dangerous tendency towards political discontent.

This brings us to another vital factor in education—religion. Indigenous native religion is essentially conservative, retarding, and restricting, but it is a living part of the native's life and per-

vades it. Christianity, unless complete, tends to be something outside the native's life; and unfortunately many of the European officials, teachers in State institutions, and lay unofficials generally, however high their social standards, are in many ways pagans. Missionary teachers should be genuine educationists, but, equally, lay teachers should be out-and-out Christians. These are those whom the educated native tends to take as his models, and there is consequently a danger that, weaned from the salutary if limited checks of his old tribal religion, the educated native may face the changing complicated world with no adequate moral check unless he be a 100 per cent. Christian. As Dr. J. H. Oldham has put it, 'If through the absence of any positive teaching the attitude acquired is a self-regarding individualism, the social consequences must be disastrous.' This danger is being emphasised by the fact that Makerere is undenominational and, while not irreligious, is lacking in a real religious background. The pupils come to it keen Christians from their Church schools (Catholic and Protestant), but though there are chaplains attached, these are non-resident and not on the staff, and the corporate life of the college takes precedence of the old loyalties. The idea is comprehensible, but there is grave danger that this corporate ideal may be too dearly purchased. 'Right of entry,' as it is called, is comparatively ineffectual, for it may be unrelated to school life, and to life in the larger world on leaving. The pupils, it should be added, are at the college from the age of sixteen to twenty or twenty-two. The old religions must inevitably pass, as will the tribal ideas of which they form a part; but will these young Africans, by and with whom the new African structure must be erected, be able to fulfil their part if they have no deep-seated and enduring religion to take their place? Will the 'dear old school' idea suffice for these Bantu and Nilotic races? If we are to admit aristocrats to governance, and the alternative is political unrest, they must not be merely cleverly taught, brainy individuals, but men (and women) of high ideals. It is the best who must build New Africa.

These are fascinating problems that will call for still more aristocrats—that is, for the best that our race can give (and other races too, for they are international problems). The coming survey of Sir Malcolm Hailey should prove a big step forward towards our mastery of them, and I hope I have made it clear that if the kaleidoscope is to be so directed that it takes shape as a fine mosaic it is none too soon for such a survey to be undertaken. Preliminary experiments have been made, but the time has come when we can no longer rely on haphazard essays moulded by conflicting views—when some master mind is called for to survey the whole field dispassionately and set the course.

The master of the ship may steer, and must be in sole charge in storm and tempest, but the course is set before he embarks. Sir Malcolm Hailey has been chosen to help us set that course. No more and no less. It is to be hoped, also, that this survey will inspire the youth of Britain. The Prince of Wales, addressing the African Society recently, said that the glamour of the pioneer days has passed, but that there is a greater glamour ahead in the solution of African problems. It might be added that the old Imperialism has also passed, and leaves young England cold to-day; but it, too, has a successor, only, so far, the idea of this has only thrilled the few. Yet there is work for many more in far more spheres under this new post-Imperialism than there ever was in the old days. Those who have the urge to go out into the world and 'do' something, and not merely to 'be' something, will find all the opportunities they need in Africa, and it looks as if this survey would marshal those opportunities so that all can study them for themselves. Africa had a wonderful roll of great men in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of this; in the remaining two-thirds of the twentieth century it will need a still bigger roll. Personally, much as I loved those happy patriarchal days of thirty years ago, I envy those who will take the reins during the next thirty years.

FRANK MELLAND.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since this was written two other notable contributions to this subject have been published besides those mentioned on page 528: Dr. L. P. Mair's *An African People in the Twentieth Century*, and Professor Westermann's *The African To-day*.

EARTHQUAKE IN BIHAR

An earthquake of considerable intensity shook the whole of Northern, Central and Eastern India on January 15th between 2.15 and 2.30 p.m.—REUTER.

MY chief impressions are of *Tragedy* on a scale heretofore unimagined, and in a manner unimagined—the earth itself going back on one; of *Courage*—the dogged, not-to-be-beaten courage of the English and the educated Indian: 'This must be put right at whatever cost'; the hopeless, submissive, child-like, patient, trusting courage of the masses of the illiterate and agricultural population (both types of courage achieving the heroic in individual instances); and of the silent, stubborn *Fact*, not to be gained, like a pulse throbbing: 'We are up against it this time, and it will take the co-operation of the world to extricate us.' Perhaps this last reflection carries the most vital germ of hope. If the disaster should unite a world heading for disruption in a hundred directions—which directions seem, thus refocussed, utterly trivial and unreal—maybe we shall yet live to measure disaster by something truer than 'the world's coarse thumb and finger.'

I travelled from point to point on the ground—not in the air—and had a chance of 'tasting the whole of it.' Slowly one travelled; communications had just been re-established, in parts, by road and rail. Bridges had in places disappeared entirely; in places had sunk, their supports swallowed up; in others merely been rendered unsafe, so that one detoured on the hither side and walked to entrain across the gap. At one spot the bridge was broken, but the railway lines still held, spanning the air. Sometimes it was a road bridge over which horse or motor transport was possible—a bridge that arched and lowered its back alternately in perilous waves.

Rivers have changed their courses, and water has miraculously appeared in unwanted places, gushing upwards in muddy fountains through startling crevices, geysers emitting spouts of mud and sand which smothered houses, gardens, fields—sulphur to the nostrils. The evidence of eye-witnesses in the earliest days reports areas in Muzaffarpur 5 feet deep under this deposit,

fissures 50 feet long and several wide ; and spouts of water from 6 feet in diameter, shooting to heights varying from 5 to 20 feet into the air with loud bursting noises. The people themselves, however, seemed more affected by the behaviour of the rivers than by the muddy geysers : maybe because the sacred Ganges was involved. More than one description was given me of how the Ganges seemed to be sucked into the river bed—here steamers stranded, there waders submerged, the earth heaving up and leaving dry land ; and upon a second shock settling while Mother Ganga flowed back triumphant.

'Jai, Jai Matha Gangaji ki jai'—'The Victory of Mother Ganges.'

The manager of an estate riding towards the river upon an elephant to settle a boundary dispute was met by the ryots and coolies running back to him, barely articulate : 'Dry land—no river !' And even as they looked they were thrown on their faces, and the water was back again. 'A *bhut* [devil] or a god,' they could not decide which was at work. The remark of an English cleric was less imaginative. 'So—that is the explanation of the Red Sea crossing,' said he. He has not been allowed to forget that he spoke aloud, opportunity for chaff being rare these days. There were other people also who cried 'Victory'—the entire population of a gaol whose walls fell flat, releasing the convict inmates. Only one of these men returned later to give himself back to Justice.

The vast *maidan* and polo ground at Muzaffarpur was riven as with fork lightning, the fissures widening in places to several feet. It was not far from here that a man walking to his car saw the earth swallow it up before his eyes. Another was seated in his car when the earth opened its mouth ; but the car stuck between the jaw bones, leaving the roof above ground. It was a sunlight roof and the man climbed out safely. (Is there not here a good advertisement for the makers ? 'Sunlight Roofs and Earthquakes !')

By the time that I got to Bihar the floods had subsided and fierce winds had blown away much of the sand ; there was only sticky, gleaming mud covering the earth in patches. The tall sugar-cane crops were standing, and the paddy crops, having been already reaped, were safe ; but the *rabi* crop is endangered, and, as regards the soil generally, the greatest 'hazard' is to future fertility. That, indeed, is a peril the seriousness of which cannot be minimised. Alluvial soil in the Tirhut districts is only 12 inches deep over sand, and this fresh overlay of sand will make it difficult to get the land back again into good cultivation. It is not a question, as in Bengal after the usual floods, of soil enriched by silt, of one missed crop but successive bumper harvests ; the

deposit here may be entirely maleficent. And this remark applies to all sowings alike.

But what shall be said of the damage to sugar as a trade ? Two hundred thousand acres are under sugar plantation in the area affected by the earthquake in Bihar. With the utter destruction of the factories and their machinery, half the mills are put out of action at a time when the cane is ready for pressing ; and each day's delay means deterioration from a drying crop. A Government estimate registers 150 lakh maunds of cane left idle on the hands of the cultivators. This means a loss to the growers, on the most hopeful calculation, of 30 lakhs of rupees (£225,000), and to the Indian carters (who carry the cane to the factory crushing mills) about 10 lakhs of rupees (£75,000). Government has tried to help the situation by arranging for factories in provinces outside Bihar to take over some of the derelict cane (though in some cases proposals, *e.g.*, from Calcutta, fell through because of the difficulties of transport), and small power mills and 3500 bullock mills have been supplied to deal with the rest, as far as practicable. But here again the slower methods, the drying sap, and the purifying of the *gur* when extracted, create problems which needs must work out to a resultant loss.

It looks as if the planters, mainly English, are likely to be the main sufferers in Bihar—partly because the English sentiment of a British Government is accustomed to the cry 'Family hold back,' partly because of the pride of a community associated throughout the history of Bihar with reckless hospitality, which will not easily unstiffen into stating a case for assistance, and partly because the situation itself is so desperate, the same community only just recovering from earlier bad hits. During the war the Bihar planters tried to revive indigenous indigo to replace the synthetic indigo which had disappeared off the market. The Bihar agrarian riots of 1916 and a political war cry killed this revival. The planters translated their hopes and machinery into sugar plantations, damaged by floods just as success was achieved. And now comes this final disaster—worse than floods and politics. Perhaps the planters' is particularly a case for help from England. Did not individual towns 'adopt' individual areas in France during the post-war period of reconstruction ?

In towns the destruction of buildings is what chiefly impresses. Monghyr was just *débris*—bricks and mortar lying in rubbish heaps, a wall standing here, a doorway there. Sitamarhi and Motihari are equally devastated. In Muzaffarpur only one house was finally left habitable—the Commissioner's. In Darbhanga parts of the bazaar are even as at Monghyr : the hospital, the gaol, the law courts, the Maharajah's palaces, are all pushed down as by a giant joker, tired of playing with his box of bricks. What

he left standing is significant: in one instance a tall lift shaft, cased in masonry with a single steel rod pointing to a heaven of modern construction—'Mark this when rebuilding, with one eye on earthquakes,' which precaution is, of course, in the minds of everyone: 'Earthquakes may become a habit!'

The Maharajah was in tents, but his temporary palaces were almost ready for occupation—walls of lath covered with mud, galvanised roofs covered with thatch. This type of shelter serves king and peasant alike. The Maharajah says he will never rebuild palaces, only houses, when reconstruction is complete. He has, indeed, been badly hit. His palaces, not only at Durbhanga, but at Muzaffarpur and Purnea, utterly ruined. At Purnea the earthquake seemed to specialise in tremors: the town twisted and contorted, roads squeezed out of shape, buildings leaning when not reduced to *débris*, floors pinched into domes, the angles of streets changed, the general effect a crazy zig-zag. At the Maharajah of Darbhanga's palace the earth had opened and let down a wall, as it were—a shutter. When the skylight windows were reached the shutter stuck and the windows stayed leering upon the *débris*—the eyes of the Evil Genius of Destruction.

'It was the second shock which did the damage to life,' said one to me. 'People recovering from surprise rushed out into the open, to be caught in narrow streets by the second shock, which brought down upon them the buildings which the first shock had loosened.' The shocks had followed one another very speedily. This was the cause of death in the streets of Monghyr. The collector's was the one house left standing; and even close on a month after the earthquake, and with relief hard at work all the time, some streets had only just been cleared. Women, chiefly *pardahnashins* (the secluded), show the highest mortality. They could not bring themselves to rush out into an unveiled world, though walls were falling. None, of course, knew what was happening, or how to act. When they ran it was instinct which drove them out of doors. The poor trapped women and children and animals squeezed one's heart. Here was a parrot which had screeched itself hoarse till falling *débris* silenced it. It was found buried under dust in a cage which still hung securely from a transverse beam. Dogs, their backs broken, cowered over outstretched paws; cats, tails erect, backs still arched in fear, dead stiff, caught wedged between bricks. Mothers—their babies clasped to their breasts, powerless to save, sometimes older children clinging to their sarees—were found prone and lifeless, all of them dead, and smashed and broken. A baby was dug out of *débris* alive, after forty hours, lying unhurt, crowing to itself, beside another baby, this one quite dead. Had the mother thrust

both out into the street while she rushed back to rescue other children? No one will ever be able to tell.

One little girl of five was rescued after five days' burial. She was breathing and is still alive, terribly damaged, fractured arms and legs, and a head badly injured, letting dust into wounds which caused tetanus. She was discovered by an end of her white cotton saree sticking out of a heap of rubbish. When I saw her she was in the Red Cross hospital, looking blissfully happy. She was still bandaged and in splints, but she had been given her first English doll, and she lay all day ecstatic, smiling at it and making little noises and gurgles of joy.

Such sights in the hospitals there were all over the stricken area. Women, some quite old, with fractured thighs, sprained backs, arms and legs in splints, crushed feet, heads and faces cut about—some recovering from pneumonia and other ills caused by the intense cold; for this last was an added risk. It had been a severe winter, and, even when they escaped the falling masonry or the yawning earth, exposure did its worst with people clad in nothing but single and thin cotton garments. The cases of burns were explained by the habits of the people who could afford fires. These had open stoves (*sigris*) in their houses, often beside their beds, and when the earth heaved they were thrown upon the *sigris*, and the women's sarees caught fire. The worst agony was surely experienced by these poor souls. Even when unconsciousness supervened, rescue itself (reviving them) must have been torment.

That fires did not break out generally was a mercy for which to give thanks, as was realised from an isolated instance at Jamalpur among the *débris* in the main bazaar. Among the rescues at Jamalpur was that of a child found alive within 3 yards of the blaze—after nearly five hours' digging. A *pardahnashin*, the wife of a well-to-do zemindar, was an acute case of tetanus just recovering a month after rescue. Her husband had built her a hut in the hospital encampment that she might get the care of the staff of doctors and nurses. One good resulting from all this pain will be the recognition of what medical relief can accomplish. That *pardahnashin* seemed to me to be hostage for this.

Till the tents were up—January 23—the work begun on January 16 consisted in digging for patients among the *débris*, treating them on the spot or carrying them to clearing stations, the awful separation of the dead from the living; worst of all, dealing with the bereft when restored consciousness brought realisation. In all these directions the volunteers of the various relief organisations are reported to have fulfilled themselves nobly. An amazing thing was that none of the emergency cases got septic—even though doctors had to operate without sterilised

instruments out in the open, buildings still falling around them, dust flying.

Many acts of heroism will for ever be unrecorded (indeed, the carrying on of routine duty at the moment was in itself heroic). Those of which I heard included every race and rank in life. Here was a simple illiterate woman, the wife of a straw-plaiter, still being treated for a broken back and fractures in arms and legs. She had six children—the eldest eight, the youngest a few weeks old. She had collected and pushed out the older children and returned to get her baby—just too late; the second shock caught her on the threshold of her little brick-and-plaster house. She arched her back as she fell to take the weight of the *débris* and avoid crushing the baby. It was extricated unhurt; she herself was found broken to pieces.

An Indian woman teacher had a class of infants round her when the first shock came. 'Stand, quick march,' said she quite calmly—'out of doors'; and they were saved. No panic—they hardly knew that anything had happened. Her heroism lay in the fact that her old mother, who was on a visit to her, was in her quarters on the third storey, and she had to make her decision in the fraction of a second between her and her children. When the last child was safely outside, the third storey was swaying and the staircase impossible. But a servant, equally courageous, had already sped upstairs and rescued the old woman.

A patient was on the table in the theatre of a women's hospital, being operated upon. Everyone rushed out when the shock came, but the Anglo-Indian nurse stayed quietly beside her case. Another nurse, an English woman, remembered, when she was out of doors, a single patient in the upper storey of a nursing home, who could not move, and ran back to her. Another woman returned to a falling house to save her dog, and did save it, but was caught herself by crumbling masonry. The tales of servants (it was the hour of the afternoon siesta in English houses) who went straight to the rescue of their employers are many. One, of an old sewing-man sitting on a ground-floor verandah, is particularly pathetic. He ran round to the bedrooms, the other side of the house, to rouse and rescue his master and mistress and their small boy, careless of what might happen to himself, although safety for him lay only in one step into the garden. The family had already, however, been alarmed, and were safely encamped on a rocking lawn. It is good to be able to tell that the old man also escaped.

The patience, the trust and gratitude, of the people I saw in hospital was very touching. They had lost everything—many were in agony; but they seemed to accept life moment by moment in a kind of dumb converse with—what was it? Fate? or God? or the Inevitable? Only the earth's tremors could rouse them.

When later shocks came, some patients had been moved to the ground floor of a hospital which was still standing; despite arms and legs in splints, they crawled out into the open and refused to go back. Elsewhere bedridden patients had managed to get downstairs in their panic. What a shock can do, even in cases of real illness, is matter for the psychologist. An English woman patient with a high temperature, not expected to live, got out of bed and managed to be conveyed home, whence she returned to hospital ten days later, with a reduced temperature, to complete her cure!

I have suggested that one happy result of a common anxiety was our wonderful oneness in this time of stress. Calamity can bind even faster than joy. But to this there was one exception. The Congress came into line about January 24 with offers of help. And the propaganda which it immediately set afloat charged the Government with inaction, and claimed that nothing was done till the Congress took the situation in hand. This was not the case. The first shock was felt at about 2.15 p.m. on January 15. Communications were out of action—rail, wire, telephone. And news was with difficulty carried to Government of Bihar headquarters at Patna—from some areas on the evening of the 15th, from others on the 16th and 17th. Yet on the 16th the Government had already arranged for two aeroplanes¹ to be sent from Calcutta to fly over the worst areas in Tirhut and make report. Report was made on the night of the 16th.

By the 16th, Red Cross units were already at work at Monghyr, Bhagalpur, and Patna, extricating the victims, attending to them. Hospital tents, fully equipped and officered by medical units sent from various parts of India, were erected in an amazingly short time; and, till communications by road were established, distribution of necessities and comforts were made by aeroplane. As agents of the Government the police were almost the first to materialise for relief and rescue work (on the evening of the 15th at Monghyr), preventing looting, salving human beings and goods, taking charge of transport. The military were almost as soon on the scene (the East Yorkshire Regiment was at Muzaffarpur on the evening of the 15th), helping in relief work, providing, through the General Eastern Command under orders of the Commander-in-Chief, huts and tents, with sappers and miners to demolish dangerous ruins—work which could have been done by no other body of men.

The Viceroy's Relief Fund was started on January 19, and met

¹ One unforeseen result of the flight of these aeroplanes over villages in North Bihar was the terror of the women, who had never seen the like. They cowered with fright: was this some new danger attacking them overhead to add to the insecurity underfoot? Demons of the air, now that demons of the earth had done their worst? The pilots, seeing their state as they ran wildly to find shelter, when shelter was none, came down to reassure them.

with an immediate response, not only in India, but from overseas. The Red Cross and St. John Ambulance, with other purely Indian societies like that of the Marwari Association, were providing blankets, stores, and medical comforts, as well as units complete with doctors; and offers of work had been accepted from the Salvation Army, the Calcutta Medical Association, the Church Missionary Society and Church of England Zenana Mission, Boy Scouts, and many other bodies. In Monghyr alone thirteen societies were helping in relief work under the direction of the collector, rescuing and treating the wounded, clearing the *débris*—what not!

At Muzaffarpur, by the 16th, troops had taken over the Treasury guard and relieved the police of night duty on the gaols the walls of which had collapsed (and that was a fresh complication everywhere—the guarding of prisoners, set free in this way). In all towns patrols were in request to help in rescue work, make bodyguards for the dead (a terrible problem till disposed of), and prevent looting. On the 17th, Major Mitra was in charge of the public health of the town; by the 18th, twelve relief centres and four sanitation centres were opened, tanks being disinfected for the supply of drinking water distributed by lorries, and arrangements were made (sweepers under municipal jamadars) to clean the thirty-five places at which refugees were encamped. By the 17th, also, Messrs. Tata's had made their generous offer of building material and men to help put up shelters. And all the time communications were gradually being restored, and local surveys were appraising the damage done and reporting specific news to divisional headquarters. Government officers were naturally in control of all departments of work throughout the damaged zone (for co-ordination was important), and it is impossible to convey to those who have not had the privilege of being on the spot the strain put upon these men, and the efficiency and good cheer with which they worked. In some cases they were officers of experience; in two subdivisions, where the shock was perhaps most intense, areas for the time being completely isolated were respectively in the sole control of two junior officers of about two years' service.

Now, all the activities enumerated above were in operation on, January 24, when Jawaharlal Nehru, released from prison, came gallantly to visit devastated Bihar, and offered the help of the Congress, starting a relief fund distinct from the Viceroy's which would be administered by a Congress nominee. Government accepted that offer; but fair-minded persons among the public were not prepared for the immediate charge made in Congress propaganda—that nothing had been done for the relief of earthquake victims till the Congress came on the scene. Facts

deny the charge, which was resented partly because it broke in on the peace and unity of the general co-operation. The only thing that can be said in criticism of the Government is that it has not yet learnt to take a leaf out of the Congress book and trumpet abroad its good works. A survey of the damage in Bihar and a restrained statement of the steps taken by the Government for relief was made by Sir H. Haig in the Assembly in an admirable speech, but not till January 24. And no preliminary inspired propaganda had apparently been done. No big headlines and telling phrases such as would have adorned newspapers in America helped to inform and quiet apprehension.

The Government in India, as in England, seems not to realise that parliamentary speeches are not read by the ordinary citizen. In India conditions are worsened by the fact that the majority cannot read. Viewed from the political angle, maybe one cannot, in these circumstances, blame the Congress for seizing opportunity by the forelock. The pity is that anyone should have sought to make political capital out of even the earthquake. And this was eventually realised by the better-advised. So that the atmosphere has improved, and individual Congressmen, thanks to the trouble taken by individual Government district officers in informing ignorance or malice, have generously acknowledged their mistake. But it is necessary to rap the 'need for propaganda' nail on the head continuously, to break this habit of waiting, in times of stress, for announcements in the Assembly. People qualified to deal with news should be working out with Government officers definite schemes of declaration and quick circulation from the first moment of a crisis.

In one district I found that a collector had done excellent work in this direction. A printing press being among the salvaged buildings, he set it going immediately for the printing of bulletins in the vernacular and in English, giving correct information as to the earthquake; allaying panic; advertising rescues to quiet anxiety and give information to relations at a distance: issuing orders about relief work, distributing centres, and shelters; orders also against profiteering and looting; staying the rumours current in the bazaar about impending shocks, and so forth. The good this did was out of all proportion to the trouble taken, and to the incidental 'trumpeting of good works,' which is apparently, the chronic fear of the hide-bound English official.

In his summary of the earthquake and what it involved the Hon. Baba Nirsa Narayan Sinha (in default of the Hon. Mr. Whitty, Chief Secretary, who was injured in an aeroplane accident while visiting the stricken districts of North Bihar), speaking in the Bihar Council at the end of February, puts the estimate of deaths reported to February 20 at 7057. *Débris* not being all

cleared, this figure cannot be taken as final, while the tale of those victims whom, in the early days, their relations cremated or threw into the Ganges will never be numbered. Moreover, the earthquake happened at a time when Hindu and Moslem holidays had brought a large influx of villagers into the towns. Possibly it will not be till the next census is taken that the loss of life will really be gauged.

To ascertain the damage done in material ways various surveys are already in hand; for this no figure could be given in Council beyond the certainty that it would run to crores. But the area affected was divided by the hon. member into:

- (1) Damage to Government property;
- (2) Damage to the property of local bodies;
- (3) Damage to railway property; and
- (4) Damage to private property—i.e., to houses, land and cultivation.

(1) *Damage to Government property* concerns chiefly public buildings such as courts, gaols, hospitals, schools, official residences, Government offices generally, and embankments. The Dhaka and the Teur Canals in Champaran (North Bihar) and the Gandak Embankments, for instance, have been seriously affected. In some cases district and subdivisional headquarters will have to be entirely rebuilt; in one instance at least, the town abandoned and a new centre found. While temporary accommodation will in all cases have to be provided till the new permanent structures are completed.

(2) *Damage to the property of local bodies* relates to the jurisdiction of municipalities (towns) and district boards (rural areas). Roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries are lying in ruins all over the countryside! And it should be realised that the income of both municipalities and boards has either entirely disappeared or is seriously depleted.

(3) *The railways* have suffered acutely. Nine hundred miles of track are seriously damaged, and several large bridges will have to be rebuilt. In some cases ordinary routes will have to be diverted, and, maybe, new headquarters found and equipped for railway works. The East India Railway works and headquarters at Jamalpur suffered wholesale devastation; and will provide one such instance, whether rebuilt at Jamalpur or moved elsewhere. The loss to the Bengal and North-Western Railway across the river and in North Bihar must be colossal; and it can never be forgotten how generously all railway employees worked, not only to restore their own communications, but to help Government in the temporary arrangements which were essential.

(4) Under *damage to private property* must be included the

destruction of residences (masonry houses), shops, etc., and of thousands of acres of fertile land. Monghyr, Muzaffarpur, Motihari, Sitamarhi, Purnea, Darbhanga, and Jamalpur are reported to have suffered most in this respect. Nor are Patna and Bhagalpur unscathed. The small mud and thatched houses in rural areas happily withstood the shock valiantly; but the brick structures in villages have fared even as in the towns. Apart from the destruction of bricks and mortar, the loss of income must be taken into consideration.

As to *the deterioration of the land*, nothing definite can be said till the surveys, already in hand, have reported. Experts conjecture that the damage will be specific and localised. Where the sand and mud deposit is only a foot deep, damage may not go beyond the year's crops; where it is deeper, there is no certainty. The best that the Government can do is to expedite the survey and to commit the industrial side of the question to the care of the Director of Industries, while the entire question of relief, as a whole, is put under a special Relief Commissioner, Mr. C. R. Brett, lately Finance Secretary in the Bihar Government. The proposals anticipated upon receipt of results are as under:

- (1) Government will offer compensation to the *ryot* (peasant cultivator) in proportion to specific loss;
- (2) A loan to rebuild his house; and
- (3) A loan to re-establish himself, buy seed grain, implements, etc., and restart cultivation.

But it is recommended that the relief should be conditional upon the payment of rents and taxes, and upon the application of relief to the object for which given. It would be disastrous—a sieve, not a plug—if the *ryot* (the proportion of rents and taxes to loans advanced being very small indeed) neglected duties such as those upon which the income of the superior landlord and the revenues of the country are entirely dependent; while everyone who knows India will realise the necessity for safeguarding agricultural loans against inroads for the performance of marriage and other social ceremonies. Yet the Government is already experiencing difficulty from the threats and unsolicited advice of political bodies; the slogans of 'No rent' campaigns, 'Remissions of rent,' 'No interest,' are already heard in the land.

Meanwhile—i.e., till the reports of the surveyors come in—there is plenty to do. Speaking generally, this includes the complete re-establishment of communications, so as to get the cultivators' produce to market, the rebuilding of markets, the revival of trade, the restarting of industries, the definition of boundaries, the setting up of shelters for the homeless. Temporary shelters—lath and plaster with corrugated-iron roofs—are being put up as

fast as possible, since the monsoon is at hand ; and the bazaars are being moved out to these new encampments. The moving of the bazaars from their old sites, now smothered under *débris*, is a difficult task, rendered more difficult by the refusal of the better-to-do, who resent abandoning ancestral dumps if even one wall of the family house has been left standing. These people, as indeed all house or hut holders, haunt the *débris*. Their first impulse as soon as the earth steadied—to grub in the ruins for their abandoned possessions—was, of course, understandable. It is sentiment which takes them back now. Furniture and breakables were unreliable salvage, but in most cases everything left behind in the houses was eventually recovered (and it was to safeguard possessions and to prevent the looting of private property that police patrols were necessary). In some cases the earth had thrown up additional treasure buried by forebears. The most graphic instance of this is related of a Calcutta business man of great wealth, who found not only what he knew that he possessed, but Rs.50,000 (a buried ancestral hoard) which he himself had never deposited in safe or vault. The description given to the inquiring wanderer among the ruins might have been of a biblical Day of Judgment—*e.g.*, Four men sat counting money in an estate office. The earth opened and swallowed them. One man was 'taken,' but the others were dug out intact, though stunned, fallen forward on to a table which had stood erect, money and notes all there.

Indian insurance companies do not seem to have included earthquakes in their lists of hazards. An exception was found in Monghyr, where an American secretary of the local club had insisted on insuring against earthquakes the furniture lately acquired ; and, though the uninsured club building has disappeared, the club rejoices in that it is entitled to £750 for its insured furniture. Rebuilding will give an opportunity for town planning, and, in the hope that this dream may come true, certain district officers are busy over surveys, improvement trust bills, etc. The Maharajah of Darbhanga has generously promised to assist such a scheme in his own territory.

It is good to hear that there has at no time been any serious looting. The order kept from the outset nipped this in the bud ; and arrangements against profiteering have been equally successful. The prices of kerosene oil, salt, petrol, and building materials have been controlled, and official bulletins print lists of prices fixed for different articles and where they may be obtained. Mention cannot be omitted of the brave attempts among Indians themselves—at 'business as usual'—as soon as the earth had steadied. I recall with a smile the amazing sight, for instance, of *dirzies* (sewing-men) sitting among the *débris* busily working at

Singer's sewing-machines. The fact that a people constitutionally accustomed to sit with folded hands in face of disaster are ready thus instantly to take up life again and make the best of it, even in these untried circumstances, was commented upon by Indians, in conversation with myself, as one gift to us, of British influence in India, during the years that have passed.

'There surely were some comic incidents emerging from so great a cataclysm,' says a young English friend. No. None of which one hears, anyhow ; probably because the cataclysm was of so super-human a nature, deadening, stupefying. Again, it must be remembered that Indians are not quick to see the comic side of things, even in everyday circumstances. They treat as a divine visitation what the English man or boy in the street would treat as a joke. But I did hear of one incident which is comic. The earthquake found an English woman in a mud pack, face and shoulders. She rushed out of doors. Her Indian bearer, who had never seen her thus, came face to face with her, and ran shrieking. The mud pack evidently terrified him more than the earthquake—'a *bhut* [devil] materialised, and within capturing distance !' He has not been heard of since !

Records have been found in a Patna library of an earthquake in 1833. Let us hope that at least 100 years will elapse before Bihar has to face a repetition of her ghastly experiences, and that the wisdom which suggests rebuilding designed to face a possible repetition will prevail.

But for the moment, at any rate, we need an epitaph for the 1934 performance. As I travelled through the stricken countryside I found it in the stark, dead, white-limbed cotton trees standing suppliant ; some of the trees were just beginning to be splashed with blood-red blossom—blood-red, yet not life poured out, but life returning, the germ and promise of renewed vitality. Is this not Nature's epitaph in parable—written on the memorial-stone of a devastating experience ?

CORNELIA SORABJI.

THE FUTURE OF THE RAILWAYS

FEW subjects have been so widely discussed within the past few months as the future of the British railways, and it is not difficult to understand why this should be so. For, though they are assailed on all sides, the companies still constitute the one essential portion of the transport system of this country. If they ceased to function, the heavy industries would come to a standstill. Moreover, the loss to the railway stockholder would almost in itself create a serious problem. Precisely how many men and women are dependent for their incomes on the fortunes of the railways we cannot say, but we know that there are more than 830,000 names upon the companies' registers and that many of these names represent a plurality of persons.

Our ideas about the future of the railways are likely to depend to some extent upon the angle at which we approach the topic. If we hold the opinion that the adverse movements of which we are all conscious are likely to continue unchecked, we shall not find very much cause for satisfaction, but if we believe that new methods can be made to furnish a solution to new problems, we can admit that it should be quite possible for the four groups to improve their present position very materially. Taking first the case against improvement, one must notice that road transport has already brought about the closing of a number of branch lines and is cutting into the receipts of lines still open. The Road and Rail Traffic Act will regulate this competition to some extent and will eventually drive out of business a number of small lorry-owners who have managed to make both ends meet only by accepting return loads wherever they can find them and for whatever they can get. Nevertheless, the competition of the motor lorry and of motor passenger vehicles will still remain, and we must take it that if railway revenues are to increase they must increase in spite of this competition. Again, the railways have still to meet the competition of the passenger air liner. In short, time is not working for the railways, but against them.

With all this to the debit side of the account, it is also necessary to remember that the present position of the companies is far from satisfactory. Opinions differ somewhat as to the

precise sum required to enable the four groups to pay a reasonable rate of interest upon their ordinary stocks, but it would appear that between them they will have to increase their net earnings over those of 1933 by as much as £10,780,000 before they can give the ordinary shareholder even 1 per cent. To pay 5 per cent. upon their ordinary or deferred ordinary stocks the four groups would have to increase their net revenues over their 1933 figures somewhat as follows: London Midland and Scottish, £6,960,990; London and North-Eastern, £7,649,672; Great Western, £2,282,434; Southern, £2,108,490. It is important in this connexion that although the Great Western maintained the trustee status of its stock by paying 3 per cent. on its ordinary shares for the past year, it only contrived to do so by taking the full amount required, and some part of the amount needed to meet charges upon preference and guaranteed stocks, from reserves of one sort or another. Looking the situation squarely in the face, therefore, we are probably justified in saying that the companies have a long way to go before some of their ordinary shareholders can feel satisfied.

Fortunately, however, there is another side to the question. The companies have shed what is superfluous and are to that extent well qualified to derive a maximum of advantage from any improvement in trade. Moreover, they are controlled by men of outstanding ability. The will and the power to carve victory out of defeat are probably more in evidence upon the British railways to-day than in any other industry of comparable magnitude. In these circumstances no one can believe that adverse conditions will remain unchallenged. New methods will solve new problems, and the result may well prove surprising to those who have mistaken the fumes of petrol for the writing upon the wall.

As everyone is aware, the main source of revenue of the companies at the present moment is to be found in their goods traffic. The situation in this respect is, however, both complicated and unsatisfactory. Admitting that the Road and Rail Traffic Act will materially improve the position of the companies, it is still true that the Railway Rates Tribunal is in a position to dictate to the railways but has no authority over the roads. The Tribunal officially exists to enforce certain charges which theoretically will produce for the railways the revenue they received in 1913. With this object the classification of goods has been developed into nearly as many classes as there are words in the *Oxford Dictionary*. If a railway quotes more than 5 per cent. above or below the standard rate, it is expected to report the matter to the Tribunal. If it desires to quote a rate more than 40 per cent. below the standard rate, it is supposed to secure the permission

of the Tribunal before doing so. Undoubtedly the Tribunal desires to assist the railways and hampers them as little as possible. But, when everything has been said, there remains an irreducible minimum of control that is applicable to one part of the transport industry and is not to be found in another. We have therefore a quite illogical position in which the railways and the roads are in violent but unequal competition, while the Tribunal necessarily fails to fulfil the purpose for which it was constituted. So illogical a position cannot endure, and in all probability the first step towards a sane national transport system will be found to lie in bringing all merchandise and mineral transport charges, whether on the roads, in the air or on the railway, under the control of a tribunal able to enforce upon all alike a greatly simplified scale of charges. Such a development at the present moment is probably impracticable, since we must admit that with motor transport in its present unorganised state any attempt to enforce a uniform scale of charges would be certain to fail. Control of this description presupposes large and well-regulated concerns with which the Tribunal can keep in touch and over which it can exert a certain authority. The advent of such concerns, however, can only be a matter of time. Little by little road transport will fall into the hands of well-organised companies operating upon a large scale. When that day dawns, competition in goods rates will almost certainly become a thing of the past.

All this suggests the question whether a scale of charges applicable to all forms of transport would necessarily prove advantageous to the railways. The answer to the question would appear to be in the affirmative. The advantages possessed by road transport over the railway is its flexibility. As things stand, a lorry can run over twenty routes in the course of a month and on each route cut a rate in respect of some particular transaction. The railways cannot deal with individual contracts with anything like the same facility. The lorry can think in units; the railway cannot legislate for one contract without taking a hundred others into consideration. Thus any development that tends to stabilise rates must in the long run prove advantageous to the railways. If then, as I anticipate, goods rates are eventually fixed and enforced by the State, the railways should benefit immensely, and this even if the rates so enforced are very considerably lower than the standard charges of the Railway Rates Tribunal.

Even as things stand, however, the position of the companies in respect of goods traffic has greatly improved within the past few months. The advent of so-called 'agreed charges' ushered in a new era, the possibilities of which even now are scarcely recognised. Before 'agreed' charges had made their appearance I suggested that 'the railways should contract with

private firms to carry all their merchandise for a fixed period at an inclusive rate. This is a facility no single road transport company is, at present, in a position to offer.'¹ As yet we have not seen the 'agreed charge' carried to these lengths, but, the principle of an 'all in' rate having been conceded, the rest will almost certainly follow. The 'agreed charge' at present is more or less limited to consignments of a particular commodity—in other words, it is not yet so comprehensive in its scope that a firm participating in the arrangement can no longer find a use for its fleet of motor cars. What is wanted, and what we may yet see, is an arrangement that will substitute the railway companies for the transport departments at present maintained by many great distributing firms as an integral part of their business.

Improvement in passenger traffic will probably be found in what the companies are prepared to do for themselves rather than in any assistance they are likely to get from the State. For the future of the companies in this respect must depend to an ever-increasing extent upon the number of passengers they carry. High-fare traffic is now finding its way about the country in motor cars and, to a much less extent, by aeroplane; thus the trend of events will compel the companies, whether they like it or not, to seek salvation in a large number of passengers carried at a low rate. But this situation is by no means as bad as might be imagined. So-called 'summer tickets' at one penny per mile have not earned for the companies more than a fraction of what they would have earned if they had been introduced before motor passenger transport had established itself on the roads; none the less, they have stemmed the long-continued drop in passenger receipts, and they have definitely established that even at this hour of the day a drop in fares can be made to pay for itself. Again, the cost of running a train is more or less constant, and the gap between running expenses and earning capacity is so large that if the train were filled the companies could afford to cut their fares by another 50 per cent. We can probably look forward, therefore, to a whole-hearted attempt on the part of the companies to increase the volume of passenger traffic rather than the rate at which it is carried. In this connexion we can probably anticipate a great speeding-up of services and considerable working economies by the gradual substitution of oil and electricity for steam. There is something very romantic about the steam engine, which has been developed to a high degree of usefulness by the chief mechanical engineers of our time. But when everything has been said, it still remains the case that the thermal efficiency of the steam locomotive is ridiculously low. Intensive suburban traffic will sooner or later be electrified, and probably,

¹ *The Railway Problem* (Simpkin, Marshall).

except in cases of long-distance expresses, the heavy-oil engine will reign where the steam locomotive was once supreme. On the whole, therefore, even as regards passenger traffic, the outlook is full of possibilities. With passengers as with goods, the railways alone can cope with the enormous volume of business the country can provide, and, because they can do it and their competitors cannot, we must anticipate that when they have discovered how to tap this almost inexhaustible reservoir of traffic they will take on a new lease of life.

The possibilities of the internal combustion engine when applied to the railways are still scarcely understood. The tradition of the railways is a tradition of steam, of heavy and infrequent trains, of time-tables and waiting-rooms. The requirements of to-day demand a rapid and almost continuous service, and this can be given only by units that are inexpensive to operate. There is no reason to suppose that our British railways have been less enterprising than Continental or American lines in this respect. All railways alike are bowed down by the weight of their locomotives and rolling stock. None the less, the heavy-oil engine has made its appearance. It is already responsible for the two fastest scheduled runs in Europe, and its more general use as a light unit for intensive services is only a matter of time. It is more than a possibility that history will repeat itself and that the internal combustion engine will revolutionise passenger traffic upon the railways as it has already done upon the roads.

Whatever the future may hold in store for the steam locomotive, the question whether the companies shall continue to construct their own machines in their own works definitely demands consideration. As everybody knows, scattered about the country there are large and quite reasonably efficient works which for many years have derived a certain revenue from the construction of locomotives for foreign markets and from occasional orders on the part of railways at home. These firms of late have been heavily hit. The foreign market has become more and more difficult of access, whilst at home certain railways which once furnished them with orders have been incorporated in companies that build for themselves. In the circumstances it is scarcely surprising that the movement to compel the railways to purchase their locomotives in the open market has gained strength. 'Give us a steady stream of orders for the home market,' the industry assures us, 'and we shall be able to recapture a considerable proportion of our foreign orders.' But it is by no means certain that the argument is sound. The requirements of foreign railways differ considerably from the requirements of the home market. Except in so far as an order for locomotives on the part,

let us say, of the London Midland and Scottish would permit overhead charges to be spread over a wider basis, it would not materially assist to reduce a tender for locomotives required, let us say, by the South African Railways. In short, the promise of increased export trade is more alluring than convincing.

At this point it may be advisable to state the case for the railway-owned plants. Put briefly, they represent a vast capital expenditure; although they do not all attain to the same standard, they are, speaking generally, more highly specialised and probably better equipped for locomotive construction than outside plants, the cost of every locomotive they build is subjected to constant and searching scrutiny, and finally they furnish their companies with locomotives at cost where an outside firm would require a profit. It may not be unnecessary to add that such works as the Great Western at Swindon are expected to prove economical after meeting overhead charges upon a scale laid down for the company by a leading firm of accountants, a scale so exacting that all Swindon experts consider it unreasonable. None the less, the locomotive constructive capacity of this country, railways and engineering firms together, vastly exceeds the requirements of the market, home and foreign together. In short, certain units are redundant. Which units?

In building locomotives, as is the case with other commodities, given a similar price for raw material and equal efficiency in the factory, victory will eventually fall to the undertaking that can build in the largest numbers to the same pattern and at the most consistent rate. In other words, economy demands as high a degree of standardisation as circumstances will permit, coupled with a large and regular output. The London Midland and Scottish has recently examined production costs at Derby and Crewe with extreme thoroughness, and I believe I am right in saying that their investigations furnish convincing proof of this contention. The best-equipped plant is liable to prove costly if the amount of work to be performed varies considerably both in nature and degree from month to month. A few years ago there was little to show that this fact was appreciated by any railway company other than the Great Western. During the past few years, however, all the railways alike have striven to standardise certain locomotive types of proved efficiency. But such types are in every case necessarily only standard upon their own line, and in any event the lack of any general policy of continuous and consistent construction has rendered it almost impossible for the companies to regulate output in a steady and profitable way. Thus the output of the Southern works at Eastleigh, the London Midland and Scottish works at Derby and Crewe, the London and North-Eastern works at Doncaster, and the Great Western works

at Swindon has varied month by month to an almost incredible extent. At one moment we find a railway plant marking time, the men largely upon the dole; at another the works are in full blast and the assistance of some outside engineering firm is required to complete a new programme in time to meet the anticipated demands of traffic. Taking the railways as units, some such state of things is possibly intelligible, but it is significant that the moments of pressure do not necessarily synchronise. It does not follow that because Derby will be busy Swindon will be on full time. On the contrary, as things stand, the locomotive requirements of one company have no bearing whatever upon the productive capacity of another. From the point of view of a stockholder interested in more than one railway company this situation leaves something to be desired.

What is required, therefore, would appear to be a construction policy, in respect both of locomotives and rolling stock, that will be based, not upon the requirements of each group individually, but upon the requirements of the four groups collectively and the concentration of all new construction upon the best-equipped works. There is no reason why we should not realise this ideal. It is the fashion for non-technical journals to refer to locomotives as though they had to be specially designed to meet the requirements of different railways. This is not the case. A dozen different types of engine would be capable, by the mere process of multiplication, of hauling all the passenger and goods traffic of the country. Yet, in the face of this possibility, the Southern Railway at Eastleigh, the London and North-Eastern at Doncaster, the London Midland and Scottish at Derby and Crewe, and the Great Western at Swindon all turn out a large variety of types of their own. Again, each railway company employs its own chief mechanical engineer and its own drawing staff. In short, although the amalgamations have in some cases concentrated several locomotive works into a single department, it is still open to the railways to carry this process one stage further by placing all locomotive and rolling stock construction in the charge of a single chief mechanical engineer who in one well-equipped set of works could turn out standard types of locomotive capable of meeting every traffic demand from John o'Groats to Land's End.

It is not to be supposed that so revolutionary a proposal will escape criticism or that it will immediately find acceptance by the experts who advise the railway companies in these matters. If, for instance, we were to suggest to an official of the London and North-Eastern the possibility of hauling every train upon that system by a standardised locomotive designed and constructed at Swindon, human nature being what it is, he would

resent it. He would probably say that the suggestion promised certain economies, but that he would prefer to take his standards from Doncaster; the London Midland and Scottish would point with pride to the performances of locomotives recently designed for their company by Mr. Stanier, and no one will suppose that the officials at Eastleigh would be so lacking in *esprit de corps* as to fail to put in a strong claim for the most recent machines of the Southern Railway. Viewing the matter more dispassionately, however, we can say with some show of reason that the Great Western works at Swindon are not merely the best-equipped works of their kind in this country, but will compare very favourably with anything to be found elsewhere in Europe. Again, although all the companies have of late vastly improved their locomotives, it still remains the case that at Swindon there is a wonderful tradition of locomotive efficiency that is not to be found elsewhere in Britain. When we turn from locomotives to rolling stock the case is possibly different, and the voting would, I imagine, be heavily in favour of the London Midland and Scottish with the London and North-Eastern as runner-up. But the principle that would concentrate locomotive construction upon one centre, if conceded, will readily permit of the construction of new rolling stock being concentrated upon another. It matters very little where the rolling stock is built provided the arrangement permits the companies to secure the best carriages and wagons at the lowest cost. Two objections of a more serious nature are to be anticipated in the contention that Swindon alone could not cope with the demands of the four groups and that the Swindon works are the property of one group out of four. As regards locomotive construction, economies in time resulting from the building of large numbers of locomotives to the same design would enable Swindon to increase its output very materially; again, the construction of locomotives would be continuous and would not, as at present, fluctuate between activity and slackness. In other words, Swindon would work throughout the year to a very high monthly output. To whatever extent that output fell short of the demands of the four groups, orders could be placed with outside firms. As regards the second objection, there would appear to be no reason why the Great Western should not sell its locomotive works, and the London Midland and Scottish its carriage works, to a company of which the capital would be subscribed by the four groups.

It may be convenient to sum up this proposal in brief form:

- (a) An independent company would maintain extensive works which, in consequence of an assured and steady demand and the ability to standardise its output, would be able to furnish the companies with locomotives and rolling stock upon the most favourable terms.

(b) The railways would purchase their locomotives and rolling stock from the company and receive in the form of dividends, which would be available for their own shareholders, such profits as the company might make.

(c) Under this arrangement the railway companies would be responsible merely for running repairs to certain standardised types of locomotives and carriages.

(d) All experiments having in view an increase in locomotive and rolling stock efficiency would be centralised, a fact that would permit of experiments upon a larger and more satisfactory scale than is now possible.

In any discussion regarding the future of the railways the question of wages necessarily plays a part. But such discussions are too frequently misleading, and more often than not are based upon the quite unjustifiable assumption that the wages of railway employees are still higher than those of men performing comparable work in other industries. This is not the case. It is, of course, a fact that wages in the railway world have greatly increased since the war, but this statement should not be permitted to stand alone. To understand the question we must recognise that before the war railway wages were lower than wages paid elsewhere. Again, too much use is made in this discussion of the factor of percentages. When, for instance, the president of the London Midland and Scottish tells us that 'The growth in the ratio of wages to net revenue increased from 104 per cent. in 1913 to 355 per cent. in 1932,' it is necessary to remember not merely that wages were low in 1913 but that net earnings were low in 1932. As net revenue declines the percentage of all production costs to revenue necessarily rises.

All such discussions, carried on as they so frequently are in public, tend merely to obscure the issue and to provoke exaggerated hopes in stockholders and unjustifiable fears in Labour. Railway wages cannot be treated as an entity. They form a part of the wage structure of the country. From this it follows that any attempt to reduce railway wages below the general level of wages in other industries would fail, and rightly so. For future economies in this direction the companies must look to the elimination of redundant staff and especially to the possibility of securing a full day's work in return for a full day's pay. It should be possible for the men's unions to co-operate in both directions when the vexed question of rates of pay is finally cleared away.

Possibly too much significance has been attached to the recent demand by the National Union of Railwaymen for the restoration of the percentage cuts made in 1931. But, however that may be, the companies should decline to discuss the matter in this crude form. What is needed by the railway employee quite as greatly as by the stockholder is some kind of stability in labour

questions, and this can be achieved only by an agreement that definitely relates wage increases to net income. It is difficult to see what other solution there can be to a question that has kept the entire railway world in a state of disunion and uncertainty for the past ten years. Stockholders and employees alike would stand to benefit if it were agreed: (a) that there is no intention to reduce existing wages, and (b) that any increase in net revenue over the net revenues of the four groups in 1933 will carry with it a predetermined increase in wages until an agreed maximum has been attained. On this arrangement wages as they are paid at the present moment would constitute a basis, and the extent and duration of any increase in wages would be determined by the extent and duration of an increase in the net revenues of the four groups. Such an agreement would at one stroke eliminate all labour disputes other than those which could be quickly and amicably settled by a Railway Staff National Council.

In conclusion, there are still many people who, forgetting the history of the past few years, pin their hopes to the ability of the companies to carry passengers upon the roads or in the air. Admittedly both forms of transport are of vital interest to the companies as adjuncts to transport by rail, but more than this they cannot be. The capital of the railways—say £1,150,000,000—consists of permanent way, of stations, of signals, of locomotives and trains. It is this investment that must be turned to account if the railways are to pay dividends. The problem before the companies can be stated in simple language: how can they adapt what they have to the changing demands of our time? That the companies will find the answer to this question I have no doubt whatever.

ASHLEY BROWN.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH JOURNALISM?

NEWSPAPERS, since they play a big part in most lives, ought to be criticised, continually, seriously and constructively—which at present they are not. Hardly any good studies of contemporary significance have been made. It is true many books about the profession have been written by journalists, but chiefly to the effect, 'What an exciting life I've had!' or 'Please note all the remarkable persons I've met and advised.' The writers are romantic; they invest everything with glamour. Either that, or they do the opposite—parade a smart cynicism. But of books involving principles and standards in active application there are few or none, which is a matter of regret. If one looks to newspaper readers for criticism, disappointment will follow. For an alert critical attitude has not yet been awakened. The great armies of readers fall mostly into two categories: the 'spoon-fed,' who are null, and the 'disgusted,' who are annoyed. The former repeat in conversation what they read in the paper that morning; the latter are abusive. Yet it is exceedingly important that occasionally journalism should be observed with as much imagination and detachment as possible.

What is its state at the moment? Let us say, at least, that the logical extreme of a certain type of journalism has been reached. Great changes may be expected soon. In the popular Press you may notice old devices being tediously repeated; they are disguised, but they are the same. The old mentality lingers. It is indeed astonishing to see outdone conceptions masquerading as new, aided by elaborately 'made-up' pages. But the fact remains: what might be called the post-Northcliffe period is drawing to a close, even though there are still news editors whose outlook is coloured by the Little Vulgarian, who was this very thing so intensely as to be exalted to the degree of genius. The old so-called 'news-values' remain unrefreshed and parochial and still rather childishly surprised at modern life, yet not critical of it. Mr. A. C. Ward has summed up the existing values as follows: 'Women are news; roguery is news; men are not; honesty is not. War is news; peace is not.' It is very difficult to say what the changes will be, when the time comes. Mean-

while, one may detect in Fleet Street—that jumble of narrow frontages—a lull, a bewilderment, impatience and some expectancy.

One change we may note, before passing to general questions, is a decline in the amount of space devoted to politics. Parliamentary proceedings are more briefly reported than ever before—in itself a comment on that institution, the effect of which may one day astonish some of the members, so ostrich-like at present. Listening to oratorical glows from statesmen was a favourite pastime of respectable families, even up to the beginning of this century. To-day the equivalent is a radio talk, which is quieter, less protracted, and unoratorical. It is just possible that the approach to politics may become one based on knowledge rather than sentiment—partly because many political questions are coming to require the study of such subjects as economics rather than personal prejudice. It is true, of course, that emotional exploitations can be done more effectively by wireless than ever before, but in this country, fortunately, we have been spared that so far. So not improbably a more detached attitude might be taken by the Press—anyhow, a less party and more informative attitude, such as Mr. R. D. Blumenfeld in his recent book, *The Press in My Time*, is disposed to prophesy:

There will be one or two national newspapers which will concentrate entirely on news and magazine features. They will not be organs of opinion: editorially they will be neutral. Instead of leading articles of the traditional kind, they will publish daily commentaries by their correspondents in the chief political camps, giving the news of the different parties on the issues of the day. These will be printed side by side, and readers can form their own opinions.

There will be at the same time a revival, under a somewhat different form, of the old type of newspaper which relied for its circulation on its opinions. These newspapers will be run by groups and sectional interests, political and other. They will be complete newspapers in every sense of the word, but they will not attempt to compete with the circulations of the national newspapers. They will cater for a special public.

That is a matter of speculation. But, to turn to one of fact, it is time grave criticism was made of present-day Press reporting. Axiomatically, you might have supposed, the essence of journalism was the reporting of events in the contemporary world. Yet gradually this chief function, as performed intelligently and without distortion, has become overlaid. Less thought, less money, less good personnel are being spent on proper reporting. This ill-performance of primary function is one reason for the existing febrile state of the Press. Reporting and the men so employed have sunk to the lowest esteem. Reporting, in common parlance, has become a word of shame almost, a word of derogation: it suggests vulgar smart-alecs breaking all rules of good behaviour;

it suggests grimy little men who may be 'got round' with a few drinks; it suggests low mentalities jotting down speeches in dirty note-books; it suggests impudent questioners on painful occasions, who cannot be relied upon not to contort what you say; it suggests hard-boiled nit-wits who are proud of 'seeing through' everything, but who are blind, unobservant, and think in headline *clichés*; it suggests men without standards treated without standards by the public. How long will newspapers, once burdened with wealth, tolerate this state of things? What folly has afflicted owners that they allow this evil to continue? For the newspapers themselves are primarily to blame. First, there is an illusion abroad that only 'hard-boiled' men have 'news sense'; secondly, there is a general failure to secure decent conditions of work, and consequently to employ intelligent and vital men of contemporary sense, men who could move round in and study the modern world, recording events, tendencies and customs with acute minds. Enterprising newspapers to-day would find much cheaper than stunts the employment of a group of men fitted for such work. For one thing, the ideals of reporting must soon change completely. Once, the peak of the profession was to get hold of a 'scoop'—that is, to find out some important event a little while before other people. Modern conditions, including wireless, make that an ambition of rare fulfilment; and, this being so, apparently news editors and reporters have lost heart; for them, there is nothing left to try for in a world teeming with life.

Let us see what mostly happens to-day. The procedure is often this: men of a type more or less despised by their editors produce poorly written accounts of events based on no clear sight. Afterwards this inferior material forms the subject of highly skilled sub-editing; and intellectual comment is made on the events so feebly projected. Thus a fatal dualism is created: inferior matter is made the basis of criticism purporting to be significant. A regiment of out-of-touch commentators come into existence, who always view affairs at second hand—through the dubious lenses of the poor reporting. The result is that in much journalism, as someone once wrote of Governments, 'we are ruled by paid, book-learned, uninterested bureaucrats of no personal status. . . . They draw their pay . . . and they write and write, in the quiet bureau with its well-shut doors, unknown, unobserved, undistinguished.'

The journalist, of all people, should be in the thick of things (admittedly with periods of retirement and reflection). Yet how seldom do his conditions of work permit him, unless a gossip or political gossip writer, to do this thing. Or one might quote from D. H. Lawrence with adaptation: 'How I hate these people

who write books [and newspapers] from their armchairs.' The better journalists nowadays are too often turned into the armchair kind, many of whom take their views from a heap of Press clippings on a desk before them. The journalist at first hand becomes increasingly discredited, being mainly recruited and used with small distinction and judgment. It is not surprising, then, that the word 'reporter' is one of disrepute; and the 'special correspondent' is in almost as bad a plight. The recent public controversy begun by Mr. St. John Ervine on 'Privacy and the Press' brought the matter to light; it emphasised the distasteful errands on which reporters went or were sent, and showed the abhorrence aroused in the public at the very men who wrote what is read with avidity—truly a curious situation. If the public likes a book, it usually esteems the author; the contrary is often true with a newspaper—the authors of the greedily devoured columns are despised. The reporter—this is hardly putting it extremely—is regarded as a pariah. One must again express surprise at the complacency with which editors are disposed to view this state of affairs. It is true that much of the work is inferior and mechanical, and that men of small ability are required for such tasks. But that the greater part of the outside activity of the Press should take its level from such work and such men—the police-court standard, as it were—is an unimaginative convention. Evidence that this is so lies in the unwillingness of good journalists to take part in the outer activities: they lose personal status and are at the mercy of news editors' whims—a condition that may be one of horror on a popular journal. Sensitive and intelligent spirits are the best recorders of the time. It seems short-sighted that they should not be treated with care and consideration, and so made valuable, instead of being ruled out by axiom, and 'tough' creatures used instead. The character of our daily 'view' of modern life is thus coming from the worst quarters, with gradually destructive effect.

Another cleavage in journalism deserves some mention. Now, when the public is supposed to be becoming more adult, one would imagine that obviously the future rested with such newspapers as were both intelligent and entertaining (*i.e.*, not dull). Oddly enough, the suggestion of such a thing would arouse cries of dismay, as though one had suggested the performance of a miracle. Either—so the hardened sons of Fleet Street tell us—either you 'go bright,' in which case you cease to care for accuracy, for good taste, for respecting privacy, for all ethical considerations; or else you 'go serious,' in which case you tolerate bad writing (*because* it is not bright), avoid humour (unless foreign, when it may be regarded as on the level of a quaint animal story and not

'human interest'), and avoid touching on real informal present life apart from those expressions of it in courts, councils and lecture-rooms. One has only to state the two contraries to reveal how ridiculous is the division. Yet the non-professional reader of this article will be surprised to learn that this gulf is regarded by 90 per cent. of journalists as impassable, unbridgeable and eternal. Some are prepared, perhaps, to admit a *rapprochement* in theory. They say: 'Oh, yes. That's all very well. But where (a wide gesture)—where could you find people who are both intelligent and entertaining, both serious and not dull?'

Truly one begins to wonder: is Britain a country where, in spite of millions spent on classical education, the rudiments of the Greek notion of a complete man are regarded as outside the imagination and fantastic? Would not the Elizabethans, Raleigh and the rest, be astonished? They would be amused, for example, to hear that not long ago, at Oxford, a young man was *either* a 'hearty' or an 'æsthete'—i.e., it was impossible to care for the arts without it being assumed that he disliked playing games, and *vice versa*. Forgive a digression; but it is nice to imagine the state of conscience of a 'hearty' who went by error into the National Gallery and felt the horrible temptation of great art about him, like a teetotaler on his first visit to a public-house; or conversely, to imagine the twinges of an 'æsthete' because he was happy during a game of cricket or derived a thrill from driving a fast motor-car. It is a continuation of this split mentality that no doubt afflicts journalism—a mentality that would deprive Shakespeare of his clowns or else make him all slap-stick. The 'bright' and the 'serious' are each afraid of being seen near the other's camp. One fears to be dull, the other to be vulgar. And good journalism suffers in consequence.

When we consider possible changes in newspaper function two important factors may be perceived. One is, as it were, the narrowing down of the world itself; the other is the growth of leisure among all classes of people. The first possibly involves larger conceptions in the journalist. What does it amount to? Here is a quotation from a young Frenchman:

Once infinite, the globe is to-day finite, explored in every direction from one end to the other. The era of expansion, of conquest in the unknown, is at an end. Nowadays we have to deal with statistics, with census returns, with narrower and narrower relationships, more and more interwoven, with the inventory of a planet at last surveyed and subdued. Henceforth the world is a mapped-out and enclosed entity; and progress is impossible except in human relationships.

The journalist of the future will have to possess 'human interest' of a serious and significant kind; his responsibility will

also increase. Another thing: a different sort of curiosity will have to be discovered in place of that attaching to expeditions to far-off corners of the globe; for these will cease to be adventurous, and the geographically unknown will tend to lose glamour. News from far-off will not be regarded as a wonder. Wireless will play a big part in bringing this about. Wireless, in other ways, will have a decided influence on the Press. It has a greater power for dissemination of bare facts than any newspaper can compete with. Accordingly, the bare fact will probably become less and less the main province of the Press; or, as one might express it, *the headline aspect of news will grow more barren*—a thing already taking place for another reason, namely, that sensationalism too quickly supersedes itself with yet further sensation. This affects the public mind in the manner amusingly described by Erich Kästner:

Fabian was sitting in a café, by name Spateholz, reading the headlines of the evening papers: English Airship Disaster near Beauvais, Strychnine Stored with Lentils, Girl of Nine Jumps from Window, Election of Premier—Another Fiasco, Murder in Lainzer Tiergarten, Scandal of Municipal Purchasing Board, Artificial Voice in Waistcoat Pocket, Ruhr Coal—Sale Falling, National Railways—Presentation to Director Neumann, Elephants on Pavement, Coffee Markets Uncertain, Clara Bow Scandal, Expected Strike of 140,000 Metal Workers, Chicago Underworld Drama, Timber Dumping—Negotiations in Moscow, Revolt of Starhemberg Troops. The usual thing. Nothing special. He took a sip of coffee . . .

Evidently, in future, it will be the treatment of the news, *plus* the mentality of the journalists so occupied, that will create the interest in morning papers, in which people will read about events they already know have taken place. The facts being known (as the plot of a Greek play was known), the journalist cannot depend on surprises, but must provide fulness and penetration in his account of events, and must explain and interpret. The increase of 'magazine' features at present may even suggest that already, through them, readers in a crude way are seeking to link present events with permanent things. They are no longer completely uneducated and are beginning to pass from that picture given by Newman of the ignorant on their travels:

They sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in Europe, now in Asia; they see visions of great cities and wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid the islands of the South; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar, or on the Andes; and nothing which meets them carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. Nothing has a drift or relation; nothing has a history or a promise. Everything stands by itself, and comes or goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was.

The journalist must help in pointing the significance of events, not using them like squibs to startle, but setting them in proper relation to the background of his time.

This leads us direct to the question of education, which, in an age of more leisure, becomes vital for civilisation. Mr. Blumenfeld, in his book, discusses this optimistically. He speculates to the farthest limit, and even imagines newspapers playing a 'university' rôle and awarding degrees to their readers. He is probably right to attack the present rulers in Fleet Street for under-estimating the public. We have now had more than one generation of elementary education; and the Northcliffe or 'words of one syllable' attitude is no doubt out-moded. Although there is now danger of a certain conceit, the result of difficult matters being made to appear easy (e.g., the *Daily Express* course in philosophy), yet, on the whole, it would not be over-sanguine to assume that the beginnings of 'intellectual curiosity' are about. The popular Press cannot take very much credit for this. A decade of responsible broadcasting is, at least, a factor in the change. Hence, people will not much longer care for 'tit-bits'; the disconnected impression given by a newspaper will not be liked; and the right kind of instruction on topical questions will be greatly in demand. The tone becomes important. The 'common devaluation of public taste and intelligence' prevalent to-day ought to be suppressed; and something better essayed. Specialists, no doubt, will increasingly be employed to maintain a continuity of thought on various subjects, linking up changing facets from one day to the next; and they will be expected to write both agreeably and knowledgeably. Such men will have a great task and a great responsibility in moulding opinion for the masses of the future.

In discussing possibilities, however, one is up against a difficulty. One is open to the accusation of begging the question. Many people regard 'Fleet Street mentality' as a lasting evil, which has eaten into the spirit of our time, and recovery is doubtful. They say that if one looks at recent tendencies in journalism there is small ground for believing in future improvement; and supposing a better paper were created and published, would there be an enlightened public to read it? Such people would also say: 'Because old methods of spoon-feeding are waning is not evidence that spoon-feeding will go out. Bigger and better spoon-feeding is as likely a development as any other.' There is no argument to oppose to this view. One must merely give it prominence, and yet, having set it down here, we may be permitted to hope to the contrary. At any rate, the advocacy of certain forms of journalism, even if hardly practicable immediately, is not without utility. How strange at such a juncture

to call in a quotation from an editor of the *Daily Express* for thirty years:

When I try to imagine the Press of to-morrow my mind becomes a play of the most optimistic fancies. It is my firm conviction that the journalism of the future will be far superior to anything we have to-day, or have had at any time in the past. Sooner or later the Press will have adjusted itself to the new conditions, and once it has done so, its power and influence will be greater than ever before, by reason of the higher moral and intellectual appeal by which they are conditioned.

Supposing that, following the above, one allowed fancy to play, what sort of paper would you desire to see created, given such a happy turn of events as Mr. Blumenfeld imagines? Would it not be one in which the work of specialists was co-ordinated by, let us say, a group of artists in action? Were such a nucleus collected, it is safe to predict the establishment of much fame and excellence for a paper—a paper at last free from the dualistic system of remote commentator and unintelligent copy-writer. Let us examine the real possibility of this. A quarter from which the Press receives denunciation to-day is from the younger poets and alarmer literary critics. This might appear to be a fact of no special consequence. After all, as most journalists remark, who *are* these persons? They do not count. Further reflection, however, may persuade us to see some significance in the fact. Poets are sensitive barometers of mental climate. Now, we ask, why should they bother about the Press at all? Are they merely annoyed because it seems a bit vulgar? Possibly; but possibly there is more to it than that. Poetry to-day—this statement will cause shock—is approaching to the condition of journalism. This must not be misunderstood. Through most literary criticism to-day the phrase runs: 'awareness of contemporary sensibility.' A poet often stands or falls by the response of his work to this particular criterion. Critics assert that poets should be in the van of their period, discovering and authorising new ways of feeling. The young writers, thus occupied, see then in newspapers a crude failure along a line parallel to this—in the day-to-day description and comment and expression of contemporary sensibility, manners, morals, and spirit of the time. Observing the lack of sensitiveness and delicacy with which the function is discharged, they especially are quick to grow indignant: they see a work with possible affinities done by clumsy and footling vulgarians. Now, it may be asked, will it ever be possible for these finer contemporary observers—the poets—to be actually drawn into the newspaper world and given some outlet there? In a recent leading article on modern art in *The Times Literary Supplement* the author envisaged the linking of plastic artists with the machine.

Until society [he wrote] has digested the machine and readjusted itself industrially and financially to the new conditions created thereby, art was bound to hold off 'in the air.' . . . But there is no reason why the 'values' of the respective arts should not be reattached to their mediums on the larger scale of machine production. To suppose that the values will suffer thereby is to misunderstand the whole nature of art.

May not poets find a link with society once more by using their 'left hand' (as Milton might have put it) in the service of newspapers? Those who will be quickest to condemn this suggestion will be those, first, who hold old-fashioned conceptions of the poet as a semi-comatose idler, romantic, inept and unseeing. The younger poets to-day are the very contrary of that. By poet I do not mean always a writer in verse; I mean a person whose basic outlook can be described best perhaps in the words 'poetic realism.' Call him the artist-journalist, if you would prefer it. How excellent to have in the Press men able to seize the significance and the subtlety of our community life! The poet is the only non-specialist worth listening to. If he and the specialists worked side by side, do not doubt but that a great newspaper would be born. The poet, unlike the 'intellectual,' is not afraid to look life in the face. He is detached and without superficial convictions; he can 'see life clearly and see it whole.' One day an editor will gather six men of this sort together and use them to make a newspaper, vital, serious and entertaining, giving to its readers a bright, clear vision of actuality. It will be rich with human comedy—the least dull of papers—and view high events with the acute understanding which comes from mature minds that have the tragic sense.

GEORGE BUCHANAN.

CHILD EMIGRATION AND THE FAIRBRIDGE SCHOOL

WITHOUT controversy, any movement which can spread the population of our overcrowded homeland into the undeveloped estate of our Dominions is to be welcomed. It will ease *pro tanto* the over-burdened labour market here, and increase real wealth—which, properly speaking, consists of human beings—in our overseas provinces. Not always is it remembered that as trade follows the flag, so do markets thrive according to the number of buyers available for them. Much has been written and devised of late for advancement of marketing: little in comparison has been urged for the multiplication of buyers and producers. It is indisputable that every accretion of 1000 families to our Dominions brings with it larger demand for home industries, and lessened strain upon social services in this island. Could the annual tide of migration to Australia alone (it was 55,000 in 1913) have been maintained, the stress of unemployment at the centre would have been sensibly diminished. Continuation of that outflow was not possible; nor is it within measurable distance at the moment. Economic stringency has made it impossible for Australia or Canada to supply transport for immigrants, or, indeed, to welcome them with open arms, unless with guarantees that they will not fall a charge upon Dominion funds. This being so, self-governing Dominions are not only within their rights, but also very obviously wise in discouraging large inflow. They must protect their own nationals and build according to their means.

One mistake which has queered the pitch very palpably has been indiscriminate planting of untrained, 'unsalted' new blood, into conditions of which they had, and could have, no previous experience. The scandal of migrants to Victoria, who were assured (and foolishly believed it) that no training was needed to make a success of farming on land which they had not seen, has done immense harm. That injury to the cause of Empire settlement may be turned into a blessing if it leads to the conviction that for overseas life, most especially on the land, preliminary training on the spot is above all things essential. To sink capital in an

unknown climate without knowledge of the conditions there obtaining, is clear foolishness which asks for trouble. And trouble enough has come in this particular case. With the shutting down of normal ways of settlement on our vast overseas estate, until world conditions of trade shall be more favourable, until unemployment in the Commonwealth and in Canada are replaced by demand for influx of labour, is there anything that can be done to keep alive the migration sentiment—to show the way for action in the happier times which are coming? Can the necessity of careful choosing, and subsequent thorough training of settlers, be illustrated in any practical way? Can philanthropic generosity be linked up with gradual development of our colossal holdings, which is life or death to our daughter States, and not less to the Motherland? The answer is that an existing scheme, dating from twenty years back but specially successful during the last ten years, fulfils these conditions. The Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra, in Western Australia, has, since its foundation, received and trained 1000 boys and girls from the homeland, and has placed them in situations which secure independence and good prospects for 98 per cent. of those who have been received. The success and 'humanity' of this up-to-date system is such that throughout all the depression of these last years the Farm School has earned financial support and unqualified praise from the Government of the Commonwealth, the State of Western Australia, and of Whitehall. Small wonder is it that those who are concerned for the Empire and the interests of the careerless classes should demand wider recognition of the principles upon which the Fairbridge Farm School is founded, and for the increasing safeguards by which its children are protected. When, in addition, it is remembered that last June the superintendent of the Child Emigration Society reported that he could have placed 1000 children in happy and prosperous situations for work, instead of the 100 who were all he had available, it will be seen that here is a commendable method of migration. Its merits are that it is (1) capable of indefinite expansion, (2) is acceptable to the authorities concerned with contributing to upkeep, (3) provides one of our Dominions with young citizens so well trained that they are a credit and a source of wealth to the community.

The ideal unit for migration is the family. For then children under natural guardians grow insensibly into citizenship of their new State and assimilate novel conditions without shock or difficulty. But the transplanting of a whole family, with the resultant need of providing work for the breadwinner not too far from educational facilities for the children, is expensive and difficult. In piping times of prosperity, when friends invite and undertake the oversight of relations, it is practicable. At the

moment it is well-nigh impossible. But the family wardship must at all costs be preserved, whether it be of boys, who are commended to opposite number committees overseas, or whether it be of girls and young women, who must be provided with a hostel or home from home, which they can use as their secure base. Most of all, of course, is it absolutely essential in the case of young children between the ages of ten and twelve who, being bereft of parents or unhappy in their home life, have a heavy claim on the tender mercies of the community. 'When my father and mother forsake me the Lord taketh me up' is a maxim which inspires sound wisdom. No child can develop properly as a number in an 'institution.' It must have the patient care of parents or foster-parents if it is to grow to full moral and spiritual stature. Anything less than this is defrauding children of their rights. And Fairbridge Farm School, as envisaged by that undaunted Empire-builder Kingsley Fairbridge, has planted itself firmly on the principle that every 'adopted' child must have its mother and its home. For this reason not more than twelve to fourteen boys or girls are housed in their separate cottage, under their own 'house-mother,' on their 5000-acre farm. They are brought up as a family, guarded by maternal love till such time as they are old enough to leave the nest, and are then members of a larger family, which regards the Farm School as its permanent parent and home. Many thousand miles of travel are demanded from superintendent and visiting staff to ensure that Fairbridgians, when they have launched out into work on distant farms, are cared for, guided and protected. For the second plank in the platform of this model is that every child shall have its five years' training, not only in the normal education which every Australian enjoys, but in the higher lore, which is intimate acquaintance with living animals, growing crops and methods of production. It is not enough, thought Fairbridge, that boys should learn the three R's; they must add thereto, knowledge of tools and of husbandry. After school hours, when they are passing their standards, they must learn how to milk a cow and shoe a horse; how to drive a cultivator and how to fell a tree. Very readily do they take to boxing and swimming and cricket; quite as naturally do they develop a love of flowers and tools and trees and animals, which are made part of their regular routine under competent teachers. His wisdom is well proven. There is vast pleasure to a growing boy in being permitted to yoke out and drive a team of Shire horses which for weeks he has been allowed to groom and feed. There is real education in the encouragement to sow seeds for a tiny garden which shall produce flowers for the beautifying of life, or vegetables for its nourishment. If spare hours are spent on an estate which embraces

enterprise and adaptability, chances of independence were, in the Dominions, at least six times as many as in the Old World. They decided to concentrate on St. George's Day as the fitting Empire festival for promulgation of this gospel. The economic slump which soon followed took heart for a time from their efforts. At last the omens are again less unfavourable. And clear-seeing capitalists are waiting to finance something which beyond peradventure will advantage the homeland and our Dependencies. The whole cause of Empire settlement will assuredly be advanced, and put on a stabler footing, by reinforcement of a model which attempts the task of the Child Emigration Society. These attempts have not failed. Nor is there any scheme of social betterment on the present horizon which offers anything more worthy of being championed on behalf of the weak and distressed by admirers of St. George. There is good hope that, within a few years, rich corporations like the Foundling Hospital and Dr. Barnardo's Homes will adopt this pattern in child welfare organisation. It is certain that many orphanages, content at present to launch their wards into pursuits that often prove only dead-ends, will, when they have learned the success of this method, be anxious to learn from it and better it. So shall the Empire be served and the homeland helped.

ARTHUR G. B. WEST.

THE PEDIGREE OF 'ARYANISM'

It was announced in Berlin some months ago that Herr Rosenberg had been appointed to 'supervise the intellectual and philosophic schooling' of the National Socialist Party and of all politically co-ordinated associations. In view of this appointment, it is impossible not to attach great importance to a warning issued last December by Herr Rosenberg in his paper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*. The success of any movement, he averred, was the signal for learned professors, erstwhile liberals, and all manner of glib speakers, to ascribe to it godparents and forefathers of their own choosing: such people continually insisted that everything which the Nazis preached had been said before—that there was nothing new, nor original, in their doctrines, which were only a rehash of current ideas, 'jumbled up together any old how.' It was not for this, Germany's new Socrates declared, that the pioneers of National Socialism had struggled for fourteen years, and Nazis must refuse indignantly the labels their discomfited adversaries might seek to fasten on them. But, whilst refusing to acknowledge any obligations to false prophets, Nazis must admit their indebtedness; they must hold in deep reverence the memory, teachings, and example of the three men whose influence on the movement was undoubtedly most great—Nietzsche, Wagner, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

These three, although Herr Rosenberg neglected to trace their philosophical pedigree, derive each separately from an eclectic French aristocrat, without honour in his own country, but with an enormous reputation in Germany—Arthur de Gobineau, who has influenced, through his political and racial dogmas, not only Herr Rosenberg's three prophets, but men as widely dissimilar as Herr Rosenberg himself, Count Hermann Keyserling and Herr Hitler. Recently both Mr. Garvin, in the *Observer*, and Mr. Wickham Steed, in his new book *Hitler, Whence and Whither*,¹ have stressed Gobineau's importance in the history of German political thought. Both rightly acclaim him as one of the originators: Mr. Steed goes so far as to call him the 'onlie Begetter' of the so-called Nordic Legend, and of what *The Times*, in its review of the English

¹ Nisbet, 3s. 6d.

translation of Herr Hitler's *Mein Kampf*,³ sarcastically called 'the figment of the Aryan race.' In his first chapter—his book is a reprint of lectures given last autumn at King's College, London—Mr. Steed gives a brief account (a *précis* occupying a couple of pages) of Gobineau's most important work, the *Essai sur l'inégalité des Races Humaines*, showing its influence on Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. But he fails to appreciate Gobineau's (why will he christen him 'Alexander,' by the way?) true rôle. For he sees him as the creator of the whole series of what may be termed 'Aryan myths'—using the word 'myth' in the sense George Sorel gave it—and abstracts from his main thesis all its subtlety, making of it a mere apologia for German nationalism and for a white colour prejudice. Nor does Mr. Steed seem to realise the difference in emphasis, and, indeed, in origin, between what may be called 'Germanism,' or 'Teutonism,' and true 'Aryanism.'

For 'Germanism' is as old as the *Germania* (or older), and has been a convenient tag upon which reformers have hung their diatribes against the decadence and immorality of their own time, since the days of Tacitus's satirical pen; whereas Aryanism dates only from the discoveries of the nineteenth-century Orientalists, who, finding in the primitive Sanskrit, Babylonian and Persian writings the 'patents of nobility,' as it were, of the white races, created a new race-consciousness. Yet, psychologically, the instincts which produced both Germanism and Aryanism are much the same. As Rémusat pointed out in his review of de Tocqueville's *Ancien Régime* in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of August 1856, the Germanic invasions, which all European nations suffered at one time or another, being the last of the ethnographical revolutions (the last mutation in the elements of the composition of each European society), resulted in a certain basic inequality: the alien conquerors neither withdrew nor became entirely assimilated after their conquests, but formed 'tout ce qu'il y a eu d'aristocratie durable dans les sociétés du moyen âge,' and this exclusive, easily recognisable, undigested element, most evident in Germany and least preponderant in France, never wholly accepted the Christianity or the Latinity of the peoples it had vanquished, and remained always fundamentally hostile to the cultural influence of Semitic and Mediterranean civilisation. This latent antagonism, which neither the mediæval Church nor the Holy Roman Empire ever succeeded in destroying, flared up at the Reformation (itself the greatest protest ever voiced by the Germanic north against Latin Catholicism and Mediterranean culture as expressed by the Renaissance) and has flourished ever since.

³ *My Struggle*, by Adolf Hitler (Hurst and Blackett, 18s. 3d.)

The appeal to what Count Keyserling calls '*la jeunesse barbare*' and '*le Germanisme brutal*' was used with great effect by such writers as Francis Hotman (in his *Franco-Gallia* of 1574), and at the hands of Montesquieu became transformed into the 'Noble Savage' theory.³ Rousseau, and after him Mably, used it, and since their day it has been made by every individualist, every aristocrat, against the society in which, either because 'a beast or a god,' they are misfits, and has expressed 'the horror of equality felt by demagogues throughout all the ages,' as well as the protest of '*les minorités énergiques*' anxious to seize the power. Thus, as M. Seillères emphasises, 'Aryanism owes much to Jean Jacques'; and the same theory served the *Celtomanes* of Louis XVI.'s court, such as Fabre d'Olivet, with their 'back to Charlemagne' movement, and their '*mâles forts*,' and the aristocrats of the post-revolutionary reaction in France, such as du Maistre, Bonald, and Montlosier.

Originally, in France, a Gallican and nationalist argument, and almost anti-monarchist, 'Germanism' served at length to glorify what Herr Hitler calls 'the eternal privilege of force and strength, the aristocratic principle in Nature' against the 'mass and dead weight of numbers, who are as little conscious of being spiritually terrorised as of the absence of their freedom as human beings.'⁴ It did not make its appearance in Germany until the time of the French revolutionary wars, which mark, as it were, the birth of German national consciousness. Before that time Germany was content to look to France for her culture and her ideas, which she meekly accepted at her hands: there is no doubt about the great influence of Racine and Corneille on Goethe, of Rousseau on Schiller, and of Voltaire on the eighteenth-century German philosophers. But the unexpected, the pathetic, result of the French attempt to spread their democratic evangel of liberty, equality and fraternity, and to carry their revolution to all the nations of Europe, was modern nationalism, modern race-consciousness, and the beginning of that complex of particularism which, in its extremist forms, we call Fascism or Nazism.

As the waves of the French invasions receded, the first 'Germanist' patriot writers began, following hard upon the first 'national' heroes, such as Koerner or Andreas Hofer. Leibniz was perhaps the pioneer of the nationalist writers: then came Herder, with his loathing of Latinity, and his conviction that Rome and the Renaissance were synonyms of degeneration and decadence; Friedrich Jahn, the leader, under Lützow, of the revolt against Napoleon; Fichte, with his vision of an ideally regenerate Germany; and, greatest of them all, Hegel, with his

³ Vide the *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et décadence des Romains*.

⁴ *Mein Kampf*, English edition, page 23.

nation-idea, whose substance is the State, whose accidents the citizens. And in the other countries, also, the reaction against over-victorious democracy took the form of historical nationalism: in England the Anglo-Saxons attained a new popularity; France witnessed the deification of her Merovingians, whilst in Italy and Spain, as soon as the Napoleonic plough had passed, the seeds sprouted *à vue d'œil*. Everywhere new heroes sprang into being, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain can write of Carlyle, in recognition of his services to the memory of Frederick of Prussia, that he was a '*Germanisch-christlicher Prophet*,' and that, as such, he 'belongs to no one epoch, but to the eternal spirit behind all times.'

The researches of *savants* such as Niebuhr, Lassen, and the Orientalists only added fuel to the new flame uprising of Teutonic conceit: the northern races, in a fine furore of historical research, worked off the inferiority complexes which they had acquired during centuries of oppression by southern and Semitic culture. The Aryan heroes were swiftly canonised: Darius set up in place of Leonidas, Zoroaster in place of Moses, Cyrus in place of David, and Renan, after denying in his lecture at the Collège de France that Europe owed anything in the political sciences, in art, in poetry, or in philosophy, to the 'Shemitic races,' dared to lift his pen against the Jew whose spiritual authority had lain heavily across the western hemisphere for nineteen hundred years.

Yet the supreme importance of 'Aryanism' as a theory is not due entirely to the discoveries of Asiatic scholars, nor to the reaction from equalitarian France. With the advent of economic Socialism and the rise of Marxism the 'race-view' of history assumed a new prominence, taking strength and colour from the might of its adversary; for it is possibly the only adequate individualist retort to the Marxist view of mankind, and has certainly been the most effective until now. As such it has been the rallying standard of many divergent writers, thinkers, and politicians, until it has become to-day one of the two major political faiths and a basic tenet of one of the greatest national experiments of all time, now being worked out in Europe.

Thus, from a reformist grumble in the eighteenth century and a scientific historical retort to Marx in the nineteenth century, 'Aryanism' has swollen into a significant, world-important 'plan'; and, although it may creak every now and then a little ominously under the burden of implication that now weighs it down, on the whole it is a formidable enough rival, in spite of its old-world air, to modern socialistic economic theory. And the importance of Arthur de Gobineau lies here. His writings are, as it were, a watershed, in whose 'tangled mass' may be found assembled all the arguments, tendencies, and theories which either

before or since his day have been associated with the 'race-view' of human history. His was in no way a creative mind, but that of an untidy, argumentative historical student, as dogmatic as Stubbs, as impetuous as Thierry, though without the seriousness and thoroughness of the one or the literary and critical gifts of the other. Indeed, both as a thinker and writer, both in matter and in style, he is second-rate, confused, a palpable failure. But he provided a clearing-house for such a number of opinions, views, reactions and conjectures, all of which had important genealogies before he met them, and most of which, after his absorption and re-enunciation of them, have had still more important consequences, and have occupied such increasing spheres of influence, that he has attained a position of far greater importance than any one, even among his greatest admirers, could have foreseen.

Arthur de Gobineau was born in 1816 near Paris, and died in 1882 at Turin. As a child he visited Germany, which he adored, and Switzerland, where he was obliged to learn Latin, Roman history, and mathematics, all of which were entirely uncongenial to him, before settling down with his father, once an officer of Louis XVIII's royal guard, in Brittany. He studied Oriental languages profoundly, and by the time that he came to Paris, aged twenty, to earn his living, was already a competent Orientalist. With a little modesty or patience, Oriental research would doubtless have been his true vocation, but from a small clerkship in the gas company he passed into the post office as a translator, and thence into the Foreign Office, where his friend de Tocqueville had become Foreign Minister. When de Tocqueville resigned Gobineau was appointed to the French legation at Berne, and remained in the diplomatic service until 1877, his last post being that of Minister to Sweden. It was partly in Switzerland and partly in Hanover that he wrote his *Essai sur l'inégalité des Races Humaines*, and there is no doubt that both his loathing for the democratic government of the Swiss and his passion for the childish pomp of the Hanoverian court influenced the book considerably. He wrote many other, less known, works: a fantastic history of Persia, an account of the pretended origins of his own family, a great deal of very indifferent poetry, and several travel books of great charm, besides a valueless study of cuneiform writing, and the romantic *Pleiades*.

During his lifetime, as also after his death, his most fervent friends and admirers were Germans. De Tocqueville, it is true, was always fond of him, although the diametric opposition of their views restricted conversation to trivialities; but it was men like George V. of Hanover (to whom the *Essai* is reverently inscribed), Metternich's disciple, von Prokesch-Osten, and, towards the end of his life, Richard Wagner, who really sympathised with him.

Yet, although he never concealed his dislike of the constitutional government of France, nor missed an opportunity of mocking at the French, he had no great love for Germany. Schemann's dogmatic assertion, '*Er ist Germane, oder er ist nichts*,' is an open contradiction to his own contemptuous declaration, '*Les allemands ne sont pas d'essence Germanique*,' and his avowed disapproval of the modern German language. Nor was his *Essai*, when first published in 1855, any more warmly received in Germany than in France, and it was not until 1894 that Professor Ludwig Schemann founded, in Freiburg-in-Breisgau, the first '*Gobineau Vereinigung*.' Since that date, however, Gobineau has been very widely read in the Fatherland, and Mr. Steed assures us that 'as late as 1925 edition after edition of the German translations of his works continued to pour from the German presses.' He had his disciples in France also: M. Paul Bourget, Count Paul de Leusse, M. Faure Biquet, and M. Vacher de Lapouge, who in 1909 published a Cassandresque warning that Gobineau's theories were becoming part of the foundations of German imperialism, and as such were a menace to world peace.

In 1932, fifty years after his death, the University of Strasbourg organised an exhibition of Gobineau relics, most of which had been bought in 1903 for a few thousand marks from Professor Schemann by the university library. In his address at the opening of the exhibition M. Henri Tronchon, spoke of the *Essai* as

this strange eloquent piece of writing . . . very false . . . yet showing both a strange gift for assimilation, and a great wideness of outlook, an ability to absorb and to handle in their entirety results which many greater scholars only arrived at with difficulty, together with an undeniable brilliance of exposition and of argumentative analysis.

The main thesis of the *Essai* whose 'exposition' M. Tronchon admires is that decadence is caused by racial rather than by moral degeneration. There are in the world three basic, elemental races, created simultaneously, not deriving one from another—Melanesian, Yellow, and White—and each of these three is, by itself, incomplete and savage and incapable of further progress. Were each to remain in its natural state it would remain at a primitive level of development. But from the interplay of the three races one upon the other, from their juxtaposition, a true relationship of one with the other is arrived at; and from this relationship arise all culture, art, and civilisation. This 'right relationship' is one of master and slave; the higher race must reduce the lower to subjection before any progress can be arrived at, and the contact from which all virtue springs is the domination of white upon black, or white upon yellow. Yet there must be no intermarriage, no mingling of bloods—for that way lies corruption,

degeneration, and utter confusion—but rather the imposition of the power of the white race on the coloured, a laying on, not of hands, but of mailed fists: 'in order to found a progressive civilisation'—so run the actual words of the *Essai*—'the presence of the white race and the juxtaposition of conqueror and conquered are the indispensable conditions; the white must reduce the coloured to slavery.'

Thus for Gobineau even the white race, of which the Aryan is the *fine fleur* and the highest natural form evolved, is itself incapable of advance. As for yellow and black, the *racés tertiaires*, they can have no history, 'for they are savages.' His ideal race, therefore, must conquer others in order to attain its own potentialities, and, when he comes to review the history of mankind, he always judges the value of every civilisation by the length of time its institutions have endured, and the area its armies have held in subjection, rather than by any more spiritual triumphs. With Aristotle, he insists on the need for a slave people, yellow or black, for 'the genius of art,' he declares, 'is stranger alike to all three of the great types, and results only from their hymen'; and again, 'the unfailing rule is that every society must be founded on the three primitive races.' He even allows that, after a conquest, a little, very little, mixing of blood is permissible, even advantageous, although he infinitely prefers the black-white mixture to the white-yellow (Slavs and Celts); 'it would be inexact,' he concedes, 'to pretend that all mixtures are evil and noxious.' For whilst 'every civilisation flows from the white race, and none can exist without its aid, yet the source of all the arts is alien to the white, civilising instincts; it is hidden in the blood of the black races,' which is, he admits, '*une bien belle couronne*' for the subject races. Yet, having allowed them so much, he hastily adds that, although he bows low before the majesty of art, he reserves his 'highest' homage for 'more essential virtues': the power which, in every instance, organised and disciplined society, gave laws and governed by them—in a word, made fullest use of its power of reason—was the white, the Aryan, element in every race. History springs only into being at the magic touch of the white races. No determining value can be attached to religion, geography or climate, for 'the question of race is always preponderant: history only exists for the white nations.'

Gobineau, having brought the civilisations of the world into being by the 'magic touch' of white upon black, or yellow, or brown, goes on to describe the inevitable decadence which follows the glorious period of conquest. By intermarriage with the subject peoples the dominant Aryan white blood becomes absorbed and dispersed, and such unsavoury races as Semites, with their slave mentality, and Greeks, with their odious democracy—both

originally black races tempered by two successive waves of white domination—are produced. He abominates monotheism, which narrows the mind of man, and is an essentially 'hard and dry' product of the Semitic genius, and agrees with Renan that it 'closes the mind of man against every fine feeling, every rational research.' Adoration is to him '*un respect trop excessif*,' and his Aryan heroes call their gods 'father' and 'cousin,' not Lord; but worse even than monotheism is such government as prevailed in the Greek cities, for the squalor of whose equalitarianglomeration he can find no words strong enough: '*toute cette bestialité*,' he writes, '*exécrable, honteux, qui ne supposait pas l'existence d'un droit inhérent à la personne du gouverné*.' Not even Herr Hitler's description of parliamentary government as '*Eine Spottgeburt aus Dreck und Feuer*' is more venomous; all Rousseau's intolerance of '*un valet qui rechigne*' is here—all the hatred of a weak man for the liberty he cannot enjoy, the equality he cannot share, the fraternity in which he has no part. Marathon is for him '*une échauffourée et rien de plus*,' and after the fall of the Persian empire there is no virtue in any people until the entry of the Teutonic peoples upon the scene. Only ten nations ever attained—and they for how brief a space!—the 'state of society,' and the whole of the second volume of the *Essai* is an account of the original conquests and purity, followed by the decline and fall, of these chosen races. In his final conclusion he says that since black and yellow have been proved to be 'of no civilising value whatsoever,' and that 'the source of all differentiation remains the prerogative of the white race,' the process of evolution may be adumbrated as follows:

The two inferior types of mankind, the black and the yellow races, provide the coarse foundation, as it were the cotton and the wool, in the immense tapestry that is human history, which the secondary white races render supple by the addition of the silk they provide, whilst the Aryan group, threading their finer weave through warp and woof, execute on the surface their brilliant masterpieces, their arabesques of silver and gold.

With which panegyric he makes an end, lamenting, however, that 'the white race, considered abstractly, has completely disappeared from the face of the world.' Only the Germanic races remain as the world's ultimate aristocracy, until the hour strikes when they in their turn will sink into the slime of '*le celtisme jaunie et la romanité noircie*.' Indeed, already, alas, they are so far gone that of the Teutonic peoples England is 'the only Aryan race,' and England, since Lord Byron's advent, is well on the way to collapse in the Roman mud.

In his later books his Aryan theories suffer many changes; and he even contradicts himself, not once, but many times. In his studies of Persian history he imposes on Iran a system

peculiarly like feudalism, and he makes of the basic dualism of the Arsacides an excuse for modern imperialism. In his genealogical researches—he was consumed, as Boulainvilliers had been before him, by the necessity of proving the age and importance of his own family—he is made utterly wretched by his '*diable de lacune*' of a hundred years, and more than a hundred miles, between the first Goubineau, bourgeois of Bordeaux in 1568, from whom he legitimately can claim descent, and the last de Gournay of Guyenne. And in endeavouring to excuse his own descent from Odin and Ottar Jarl to Bordelais merchants, he makes use of a theory that Nietzsche and Spengler after him were to develop largely—that of the 'eternal return.' For he considered himself to be a throw-back, a sport, a 'hark-back' after centuries of degeneration, to some pure Nordic ancestor, and in his *Pleiades* he claims that all the heroes, all the worth-while people in the world (of which there are, in Europe, a bare three thousand), are such reincarnations appearing, star-clear, in our degenerate civilisation.

In his attitude to Christianity, also, he is very modern. He despises both the 'ascetic negro' (!) and the *metisé* Oriental, always afraid 'of losing God or being lost by Him.' Christianity, as a slave faith, has never influenced any people for good or evil, and, indeed, he would whole-heartedly have endorsed Herr Rosenberg's contention that 'the essential condition of all German instruction is the acknowledgment of the fact that Christianity did not bring us civilisation, but itself owes its enduring values to the Germanic character.'

He seems, by some curious fatality, to have incorporated into his works many ideas that other writers have since made famous: in his attitude to Rome and his affections for Etruria he foreshadows D. H. Lawrence; in his *Amants de Kandahar* he writes of triumph through death in a way which suggests both Psichari and Péguy, as well as Keyserling, who echoes it in his approval of Fascism for its 'principle of heroism,' its throwing overboard of the 'aged and infirm, and its use of death—the Liberals had forgotten the use of death.' In Newfoundland Gobineau found amongst the Celts he had so lately despised his ideal of the *odel* or *vichpati* which he owed to Rousseau, and which has influenced Herr Hitler also.

In his uncompromising respect for personality he agrees with Goethe that

Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
Ist nur die Persönlichkeit

and his heroes, Alexander VI., Cæsar Borgia, and Macchiavelli, are 'Faustian men' of the stamp desired by Herr Rosenberg. 'A people is constantly in need of a man,' he wrote, 'who understands its will, epitomises and explains it, and leads it where it

should go.' If the leader fails them, the people will resist him, and will leave him in order to follow one who neither fails them nor misleads. In order to obtain positive result there must be a continual exchange between the individual and the collective soul—the one must interpret the other. He does not care how brutally the hero behaves: he considers Darius to have been too gentle in having crucified but three thousand souls after the revolt of Babylon. So long as the people are kept in their place: that is the essential. He would have entirely approved Herr Rosenberg's programme for the German Church, which will 'little by little, in the churches handed over to it, put the fiery spirit, the Hero in the highest sense, in the place of the crucifixion,' and also Herr Hitler's assertion that 'a majority can never be a substitute for the man.'

His contempt for majority rule is, indeed, if possible, greater even than that of the present ruler of Germany. 'Do you wish to ruin your project? Have it carried out by a coalition: it requires the whole concentrated will of one single man to produce that most difficult result: an action.' He agreed with von Prokesch-Osten that after the Congress of Vienna 'the conferences ruined everything,' and would have cried 'Amen' to Herr Hitler when he writes:

The democratic control of Parliament . . . has been the principal cause why all our political life has been so unbelievably flooded with all that is most worthless. The National Socialist Party is, in its essence and organisation, anti-parliamentarian; i.e., it regrets, in principle and in its composition, any theory of the majority vote, implying that the leader is degraded to being merely there to carry out the orders and opinions of others.

Both Goethe and Gobineau would have found a restatement of their views in Herr Hitler's further dictum:

The movement should use every means to instil respect for personality. It should bear in mind that all human value lies in personality; that every idea, every accomplishment, is the result of one man's creative work.

It was from von Prokesch-Osten that Gobineau first borrowed the idea that the mortality of any society could only be caused, in the last instance, by corruption from within, never by the external action of foreign conquest. In one of his letters (their extensive and very interesting correspondence was published in France in 1933) von Prokesch-Osten says:

The death of a nation is always caused by ideas which gradually, little by little, kill the conservative principle. Material conquest, subjugation by the sword, is not necessarily death. So long as the religious idea still lives, in a nation or group of nations, it only needs a great man to restore the people and bring them triumphant again on to the scene of action.

This, digested by Gobineau, reappears in the *Essai* as '*le hasard des conquêtes ne saurait limiter la vie d'un peuple*,' and reappears again in Houston Stewart Chamberlain's letter to Hitler of October 1923. 'Germany,' he states, 'was only conquered by herself—by German treachery from within.' Hitler himself repeats the sentiment, if not the very words, on page 130 of the English translation of *Mein Kampf*: 'The defeats on the field of battle of August 1918 might have been borne with the utmost ease. It was not they which overthrew us. What overthrew us was the force which prepared for these defeats by robbing the nation of all political and moral instinct.' 'Never in our history,' he says elsewhere, on page 267, 'have we been conquered by the forces of our enemy, but rather by our own depravity and by the enemy in our own camp.'

Richard Wagner laid the foundations of Gobineau's reputation in Germany. In 1881, not long after their first meeting, he wrote: 'Why have I met so late in life the only original writer I know of?'; and at Wahnfried Gobineau was consoled, a little, for being the failure he was. He never had many friends, and as he grew older he became less pleasant and more sour, having many enemies, and finally, after twenty-six years of married life, leaving his wife for a Countess de la Tour, or della Torre. But Richard and Cosima became true friends, and Cosima wrote to him charmingly of his *Renaissance* and his *Nouvelles Asiatiques*, and told him how Wagner read them aloud to his family, 'whilst pointing out the beauties,' and of how he exclaimed, 'I do not devour the *Nouvelles Asiatiques* because I enjoy slowly tasting them.'

In a very interesting article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for 1896, entitled 'Richard Wagner et le génie français,' Houston Stewart Chamberlain discusses Gobineau's influence on Wagner, and concludes: 'Liszt, Louis II. of Bavaria, Heinrich von Stein and Gobineau are the only men who may be said to have deserved the title of friends of Wagner during the last years of the Master's life.' But Stein was too young to be anything but a disciple, and neither Liszt nor the King of Bavaria had the least influence on Wagner's thought. Gobineau, on the contrary, contributed not a little to the definite shape taken finally by the doctrine and life-long ideal pursued by Wagner—the dream of a possible regeneration for humanity by the fusion of religion and art.' He goes on to point out where that influence ended; how Gobineau affirmed the irremediable decadence of humanity, and was, like Rousseau before him and Keyserling after, a pessimist on principle, whereas Wagner believed in salvation through Christ: 'the blood of Christ can purify the blood even of inferior or degenerate man.'

Chamberlain, for all his admiration for Gobineau, shares

Wagner's optimism. For him, following in Herder's faith, the Germans have a glorious future. 'We still have much to do,' Herder had written in his *Philosophy of History*, 'whilst the other nations, having put forth the utmost of which they are capable, are sinking to their sleep'; and Chamberlain sees in the entrance of the Teutonic races into the history of the world an event of only slightly less importance than the entry of the Jews. For he does not despise the Jews, but rather admires and fears them; from their earliest origins they comprehended the ideal of racial purity, and the salvation of the Germanic nations lies in taking a leaf out of their note-book; the Germans must be no less convinced than were the Jews of their divine calling, of their mission as a race to regenerate mankind, and, taking their stand upon the oral teachings of the Aryan Christ, they must fight continually, as they did in the last war, for morality, right, fidelity, and faith. As Gobineau himself said, 'it is given to no human race to be faithless to its instincts, or to abandon the path upon which Almighty God has set its feet.'

The objectives of Germany's divine mission, dimly sensed by the transcendentalist Chamberlain, are detailed by Hitler:

What we have to fight for is security for our existence and the increase of our race and nation, the nourishment of its children and the purity of its blood: freedom and independence for our Fatherland, and that our nation may be able to ripen to the fulfilment of the mission to which they were appointed by the Creator of the Universe.

For himself, Hitler must 'act in the sense of the Almighty God; by fighting against the Jews I am doing the Lord's work.' Thus Aryanism, at first a scholarly, almost abstract, theory, based on the result of scientific inquiries into the origins of the Germanic peoples, has become a creed as fanatical and as bellicose as that of the Maccabees or of Mahomet. 'Men who are participating in a great social movement,' George Sorel says in his *Principles of Violence*, 'always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph.'

It was Chamberlain who converted the Kaiser—not without difficulty, as their correspondence on the subject of Delitsch shows—to the 'Aryan' view of Christianity now proclaimed *ex cathedra* by Herr Rosenberg; and the Kaiser's famous letter to Hollmann was inspired, if not dictated, by Chamberlain, whose 'mystical imperialism' and faith in the conquering mission of Germany moved Count Keyserling to dedicate his *Gefuge der Welt* to the apostate Englishman as a 'tribute of gratitude and profound veneration.' Through Chamberlain, Keyserling also felt Gobineau's influence: Germany, which for him is the 'conscience and laboratory of the world' and the predestined protagonist of world peace, can only be saved by winning back for herself her

racial purity. She has always produced, and always will produce, the greatest individuals, but her masses, owing to their lack of humour, are destined always to be inferior to those of other peoples. Therefore it is essential for her to 'increase her capital of inheritance' by recruiting her ruling classes, not from the ranks of scholars as heretofore, but from a special and different set of men, quite alien to the masses of the people, and, as in India, bred for their task of dictatorship, for psychologically the Germans, like the Hindoos, are a caste people. The whole future of the world, which Renan declared to lie in the triumph of Indo-European genius, Keyserling places to-day in the power of 'brutal Germanism,' as at the end of the Roman Empire.

Herr Hitler borrows Gobineau's race theories almost verbatim:

There are numberless examples in history, showing with terrible plainness how each time Aryan blood becomes mixed with that of inferior peoples, the result has been the end of the culture-sustaining race.

And again:

All that we admire on this earth—science, art, technical skill and invention—is the creative product of only a small number of nations, and originally, perhaps, of one single race.

Again he emphasises how

the loss of racial purity ruins the fortunes of a race for ever; it continues to sink lower and lower in mankind, and its consequences can never be expelled again from body and mind. It is the duty of the national State to see to it that a history of the world is eventually written in which the question of race occupies the most prominent position.

From the importance of the purity of the German people the secondary theory of the importance of gathering into one nation all German-blooded or German-speaking persons derives inevitably, and is upheld both by Count Keyserling and Herr Hitler. For the former, Austria is primordially German, and the *Anschluss* was consummated before Charlemagne; the three capitals of Germany, representing, as it were, the three faces of the primæval Teutonic Trinity, are 'Weimar, Potsdam and Vienna, which together make up with some exactness the full richness of the German substance as it presents itself to-day.' As for the latter, he insists that

German Austria shall return to the great German motherland—but not for economic reasons. Common blood should belong to a common *Reich*. Not till the confines of the *Reich* include every single German, and are certain of being able to nourish him, can there be a moral right for Germany to acquire territory abroad.

Even the problem of Germany's surplus population—whose rights are the subject of No. 3 of Hitler's twenty-five points, 'We

demand land and territory (colonies) for the nourishment of our people, and for the settling of our superfluous population'—had seriously engaged Gobineau's attention. He wrote a very illuminating article on the subject in *La Revue de Paris* as early as 1845. Since his day the problem has become greatly magnified, for the population of Germany increases by nearly 900,000 annually, and, according to Herr Hitler, 'the sole hope of success for a territorial policy nowadays is to confine it to Europe.'

From this account, sketchy and incomplete as it is, of some of Arthur de Gobineau's more sensational theories, it may be seen that M. Seillère's claim that '*Sa destinée était d'ouvrir les voies sur lesquelles il ne pousse qu'une brève reconnaissance de touriste amateur*' is a valid one, and that to Herr Rosenberg's '*Personlichkeiten, an die der National Sozialismus unmittelbar anknüpfen könne*' must be added the hypersensitive, obstinate, slightly absurd French diplomat, who was perhaps the most passionate individualist of them all, and the most 'original' thinker, using the adjective in its Gallic sense.

But behind Gobineau are tendencies and psychological reactions over which he had no control, and of which he was no more than a canaliser and interpreter. The indignation of the peoples trampled in the name of liberty; the natural antipathy of the northern races, Gallic or German, towards their southern or Semitic conquerors and civilisers; the aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution; the individualist retort to Marxian economics, and the newly awoken race-pride of the Teutons, that was fanned into flame by the researches of Orientalist scholars—all these went to make up the race-view of history which Gobineau expressed so fully, and which may most conveniently be called Aryanism.

Since Gobineau's day nationalism has grown apace, until to-day each nation considers it is holy, elect, chosen, a race apart. But because the Germans are a people of one idea—as Count Keyserling has shown in his *Das Spektrum Europas*—because there is no sacrifice they are not willing to make in order to live 'in Germany, with Germany, through Germany' (Sieburg), no absurdity they will not countenance, now they are assured by their leaders that they are the salt of the earth, there is every chance that, as Herr Teudt's version of the Psalms declares, the seed of Odin will triumph from Volga to Vistula, and carry their 'Aryan evangel' from Thames to Tiber, leaving their harps upon German oaks as they go, and bearing as their totem 'the Pig, the symbolic animal of the Germans, uncomprehended of the Jews.'

ANNE FREMANTLE.

GREY OF FALLODON—NATURALIST

VISCOUNT GREY the statesman is likely to pass into history as one of the greatest Englishmen of his time: Viscount Grey the naturalist is a figure that is less widely known.

It was my privilege to stay at Falldon fairly regularly during recent years. It was always a pleasure to arrive at the small private station on the Northumbrian coast and to see, however early the hour might be, a familiar figure on the platform to greet the arriving guest, at a time when most people were still asleep, or, at all events, still in bed. I remember, too—and could wish to hear again—the cultured, well-modulated voice, with its clear words of friendly greeting. There was no one I knew who had the same quietly confident and measured step as Lord Grey. His poise was so fine that he could, with his sadly failing eyesight, on a winter day run down the ice-coated steps which led from the house to the bird sanctuary while his friends, gifted with full sight, were obliged to pick their way slowly, with extreme caution. That poise enabled him to land unaided on the Farne Islands within a year of his passing and to walk across slippery rocks where young seals lay.

Long years ago St. Cuthbert lived on the Northumbrian coast and tamed the birds and the seals, and it was fitting that at Falldon, within sight of Cuthbert's cell on the Farne Islands, another great lover of wild creatures should have had his home. None who visited Falldon could have failed to be impressed by the atmosphere of the place. It was a sanctuary in the inner meaning of the word. A benison rested upon it; the calm and kindly presence of one who had his home here radiated good-will, and especial good-will towards the living creatures which had trusted themselves to his care. The study window was open throughout the day, summer and winter—open, in order that a squirrel guest should enter whenever it felt inclined to do so and feed on the bowl of nuts that were always ready against its coming. Titmice flew freely about the rooms; in the spring of 1933 a robin was in the habit of singing his full song perched on Lord Grey's head.

I do not know that it has ever been recorded how the sanctuary at Falldon originated. This is the story as Lord Grey told

it to me by the glow of a cheerful wood fire one evening : In the year 1884 he was at Oxford, and as he was doing no work he was 'sent down' for February and March. During those two months he founded the bird sanctuary at Fallodon. I wondered whether anyone else, sent down from Oxford or Cambridge, ever achieved so much during his period of banishment ! These reminiscences of his Oxford days produced others. He said that in his day Lord Rosebery was sent down from Oxford, for the following curious reason. He had entered a horse for the Derby, and when the authorities heard of this they gave him the choice of scratching his horse or of being sent down. Lord Rosebery, said Lord Grey, chose to be sent down, but he did not win the Derby ! Our talk on Oxford took place at the close of 1932, and Lord Grey told me that he had never taken his degree at Oxford. He had passed in every subject except that irreverently called 'Divvers,' and now that 'Divvers' had been abolished he said, half in jest : 'I wonder if it would be in order for me to take my B.A. degree, now that I am Chancellor and a D.C.L. of the university ?' Throughout his life that sanctuary which he had founded in 1884 was to be a never-failing source of happiness to Lord Grey, and it was a joy to him to show his birds to anyone who loved them and understood them. Curious things sometimes happened. During a visit of a well-known field club to the sanctuary heavy rain began to fall, and a member of the club incautiously put up his umbrella with a sudden gesture. On the instant each duck took fright and flew in panic high into the sky ; nor did they return so long as daylight lasted.

The sanctuary at Fallodon is chiefly a waterfowl sanctuary. In the grounds, and surrounded by trees, are two small ponds connected by a modest stream of running water. It was at the margin of the upper of these ponds that Lord Grey, with his friend Mr. Herbert, spent many hours in late spring and early summer taming the young broods of his ducks. It is, indeed, difficult to picture the birds of the place without him ; they were his constant friends and companions, and to the end gave him daily pleasure. My last morning at Fallodon I shall long remember. It was in March 1933, and the sun shone brightly as we walked round to the white seat on the bank of the upper pond. As we walked a robin, flying confidently up to us, alighted on the statesman's head and was fed on mealworms on this unusual perch. The robin then sang his full song, but remained standing on Lord Grey's head. We then walked along the shore of the pond, and from the bank and from the water ducks and waterhens looked at us without fear in their eyes. When we had reached the white seat Lord Grey sat down while I stood on the path beside the pond a few yards from him. I had long wished to see

and to photograph a mandarin drake fly up and alight on his head, but I had never been present at the right moment. It was my last morning at Fallodon, and I had to leave for Scotland after lunch. At first no mandarins were to be seen on the water, but after a period of waiting a mandarin drake swam into our view, climbed out on to the bank, and, after looking intently at Lord Grey for a time and evidently working out the distance from the water's edge to the figure on the seat, flew into the air and made a beautiful landing on Lord Grey's head. Standing on Lord Grey's head the mandarin drake began to 'display,' and a little later a mandarin duck alighted on the seat. In quick succession two more mandarin drakes flew up and alighted on the back of the seat—one on either side of Lord Grey and at an equal distance from him. The picture was a striking one. The spring sun shone full on the rich plumage of the mandarin drakes as they stood motionless as if on guard—one on the statesman's head, one on either side of him. They were free of any fear or uneasiness, and one of the drakes actually closed his eyes and dozed for a brief space. All the time the friendly figure on the seat did not move, and the only moments when the ducks showed uneasiness were when the shutter of my camera clicked.

I said to Lord Grey afterwards that only once had I seen a more beautiful and remarkable sight, and that was when I watched from my hiding-place a golden eagle sheltering her eaglet with her full outstretched wings from the direct rays of the sun. I believe that nowhere but at Fallodon could that example of perfect trust between wild birds and man have been seen.

This unusual and admirable state of affairs had been achieved by months of patient watching in the early summer of each year. It is surprising how difficult it is to induce a wild bird to feed from the hand, and until they fed from the hand they could not be said to be thoroughly free of fear. This process of taming the birds had to be continued each year, for, however tame their parents may be, the ducklings in their youth are full of suspicions of human beings. For several hours each day in early June Lord Grey used to lie quietly on the bank of the upper pond, and the duckling broods would gradually lose their fear of him and in the end (this might need weeks of patient sympathy) would take bread from his hand. Lord Grey told me that once the habit of feeding from the human hand had been acquired it was never lost, but it was necessary that this habit should be acquired while the ducklings were small. The charm of the Fallodon waterfowl is that they are unopinioned or full-winged birds and may come and go at will. Sometimes in the darkness of a winter night the whistle of the mandarins is heard miles from Fallodon, and anyone

watching the fast, graceful flight of these ducks can understand that they probably travel far between the feeding hours. The Fallodon ducks were (and still are) fed each morning and evening. Mr. Welsh, the head gardener, who is a keen naturalist, usually feeds the waterfowl in the morning between seven and eight o'clock, but when he was at home Lord Grey always gave the evening feed, which was at sunset.

I often sat with Lord Grey on the seat beneath the old larch where the waterfowl were fed. It was a unique experience to sit literally surrounded by ducks of many kinds. There was the old eider drake who, after a long life of twenty-one years, would persist in courting the mallard ducks, whose rightful mates looked upon the old fellow's love-making with amused tolerance. There were wild shovellers (this was perhaps Lord Grey's greatest triumph) which had not been reared at Fallodon, but which had flown south at the approach of winter—perhaps from some remote loch in Scotland—to the sanctuary. Each autumn during recent years a varying number of wild shovellers arrived at Fallodon, and in a few days became so tame that they fed fearlessly on the grain thrown to them between Lord Grey's feet. This winter (1933-34) they are present in greater numbers than ever. I noticed that these shovellers paid no heed when a shower of scattered grain fell upon them, and I thought how remarkable it was that a wild-bred bird should permit such a liberty. It was a remarkable tribute to the unique atmosphere of the place.

But perhaps the tamest waterfowl at Fallodon are the tufted ducks. These fought to take bread from Lord Grey's hand, and if he did not give them their bread promptly they would tug at his shoe-laces and stockings to attract his attention. At the evening feed wood ducks sometimes flew on to Lord Grey's head, and I once photographed a wood duck being fed by him as she crouched on his soft hat. Although ideal relations had been established between man and the wild creatures of the Fallodon sanctuary, I recall two incidents which showed that the birds had lost nothing of their fear of possible enemies. One evening Lord Grey and I were seated beneath the larch, and the ducks were feeding fearlessly around us, when a blackbird flew overhead, and as he passed uttered his well-known chuckle of alarm. In a moment every duck flew into the air in panic and settled on the water, where they felt more secure. They believed that the blackbird had warned them of approaching danger, and perhaps the old blackbird chuckled to himself (this time in mirth) as he saw how successful his little trick had been. One morning I was feeding the waterfowl when they scattered and alighted in a small area of ice-free water in the middle of the lower pond. I knew I

had done nothing to alarm them and was at a loss to understand their behaviour, when, looking up, I saw a heron planing down towards the pond. Herons are not often seen on the Fallodon ponds, and the ducks had mistaken this great bird soaring in menacingly upon them for a large hawk or eagle, and had wisely flown on to the friendly water. One evening when Lord Grey and I were on the seat feeding the birds I noticed that the supply of bread in my basket was getting low, and thoughtlessly gave the basket a slight shake the better to expose the remaining pieces of bread. The slight noise I made was sufficient to send all the ducks on the wing in alarm.

Those who have read Lord Grey's books realise his knowledge and love of birds. To the world his *Twenty-five Years* was his most important work, but when he himself spoke of 'my book' he meant *The Charm of Birds*. Shortly before his death he was speaking about people who would talk their own particular 'shop' regardless of the feelings of their listeners, and he said: 'They ought to stop themselves; they should not allow themselves to talk much of their own special interests regardless of the possible feelings of other people. It is hard work for me, but I do deliberately refrain from talking of my special joy in life, unless I know that people share my feelings—I mean birds, of course.' His sister, Mrs. Graves, told me that when her son was killed in the war Lord Grey wrote to a friend of hers: 'It is difficult in these dark days not to become disheartened and discouraged. I find that what helps me most is watching the stability of Nature and the orderly procession of the seasons.'

It was on Lord Grey's advice that Arthur Balfour, who was Prime Minister at the time, gave that distinguished writer and naturalist the late W. H. Hudson a pension from the Civil List, and Lord Grey told me that Hudson was so punctilious that when his circumstances were a trifle easier he wrote to say that he should like the pension discontinued. Lord Grey once said to me: 'I do not know if Hudson would have approved of my ducks. I don't think he would. He would have said I was interfering with wild nature.'

As an angler Lord Grey was unsurpassed. His book *Fly-Fishing* is a classic, and he was equally skilled with a salmon or a trout rod. Of an evening at Fallodon, in the cheerful warmth of a glowing wood fire, Lord Grey would renew his youth as he recalled happy days spent on Highland rivers and on the chalk streams of Hampshire. He told me that a swift twice the same evening picked up his dry-fly after his cast and dropped it a little distance from the large trout the angler had been carefully casting over. He sometimes said he thought of writing another book; 'but to write a book one must feel happy.' The partial loss of

his sight during the last ten years of his life was a greater trial to him than was generally realised. 'I have lived too long,' he said to me when he returned from the memorial service for Lord Balfour at Westminster Abbey. He once said to me that it was a living death to see no longer clearly his beloved birds and the countryside he knew so well.

The great poets were a solace to Lord Grey during the years when his sight became slowly worse. It was while we were walking beside the lower of the two ponds at Fallodon on a sweet-perfumed morning of spring after a night of rain that Lord Grey profoundly impressed me by a few words he spoke on his knowledge of poetry. He had quoted to me some verses of Wordsworth (I think, his favourite poet) on the beauty of a spring morning after rain, and when I remarked on the excellence of his memory he replied: 'My memory is not good. Do you know how I am able to quote those verses so easily? For the last forty years I have made a habit of repeating them to myself at least once a month, and sometimes more often.' The last time I stayed at Fallodon Lord Grey was discussing Wordsworth's *Prelude*. He said he did not think it was generally known that Wordsworth snared woodcock in his youth, and quoted these lines:

Ere I had told
Ten birth-days, when among the mountain slopes
Frost, and the breath of frosty wind, had snapped
The last autumnal crocus, 'twas my joy
With store of springes o'er my shoulder hung
To range the open heights where woodcocks run
Along the smooth green turf.

On a spring afternoon Lord Grey took me over to an old beech tree, and said that one day he intended placing some lines from Gray's *Elegy* on the tree; the lines were:

There at the foot of yonder nodding beech,
That wreaths its old fantastic roots so high,
His listless length at noontide would he stretch
And pore upon the brook that babbles by.

Each day was full of interest at Fallodon. We visited the old-sequoia after dark to see whether we could find (though we were never successful in doing this) tree creepers at home in the small roosting hollows in the rough red bark of that tree. Many robins came to be fed, perching fearlessly on the hand; that early nester the Chile pintail might be seen on her nest amongst the withered fern beneath the trees in mid-March. Blackbirds sang from the bushes beside the ponds, and one day Lord Grey spoke to me of his walk in the New Forest with the late President

Theodore Roosevelt. He said that the President was deeply impressed by the blackbird's song, and said to him: 'You as a nation do not make enough of the song of the blackbird.' Lord Grey said that he was much struck by President Roosevelt's knowledge of British birds, and that once he was told a bird's song he was able to identify it without any further help. Some years ago Lord Grey said to me that he had heard most bird songs, but he had never heard the greenshank sing. Now, the song of the greenshank is one of the most beautiful—perhaps the most beautiful—wild songs I know, and the singer sometimes remains in the air for a full half-hour uttering his flute-like song all that time without ceasing. My wife and I were at that time living near Aviemore, in the heart of greenshank country, and I said that if he came to Aviemore he would have a good opportunity of hearing the greenshank sing. I have always been sorry that this visit did not take place, and that Lord Grey never heard the beautiful and inspiring song of the rare, elusive greenshank high above the pine trees of the old Caledonian forest.

Like his birds, Lord Grey was happy during rain. One March day I arrived at Fallodon on a morning of soft rain following on weeks of dry, hard weather. My host then took me up to the top of the house, to the rainwater cisterns, and Lord Grey stooped down and, after listening long and intently to the rainwater trickling into the tanks, said to me: 'I think I should have lived in the west—perhaps in Skye, where you never suffer from want of rain. There is nothing I hate so much as drought.' Sometimes he would say of late years: 'My quarry pool is six inches (or nine inches or a foot, according to the duration of the dry weather) below its usual level; that is not right.' When his sister half-jokingly replied that they should be thankful for the fine weather he would say: 'No, it is not right; I am never happy when my quarry pool is low.' Between the quarry pool, with its large, fat trout and its banks a delicate pink in spring with the blossom of the flowering currant, and the house of Fallodon, the main London and North-Eastern line to Scotland passes. We used sometimes to watch the north express rush past the level-crossing gates at frightful speed, and Lord Grey told me that his brother and he used to time the expresses over that particular stretch of line going north, and that they regularly travelled at a speed of seventy-five miles an hour.

But even to the end Lord Grey put his work first, and very few people knew what it cost him to prepare one of those speeches, or addresses, which were read all over the English-speaking world. His strength of mind was shown in his reading, almost up to the last, the first 'leader' in *The Times* each morning. He told me (this was, I think, two years before his death)

that his sight was then so impaired that it took him three-quarters of an hour to read the article. Right up to the end of his life his public duties took him much to London, and he told me that on the arrival of his train at King's Cross at about half past six in the morning he had *The Times* brought to him in his sleeping-berth, and very slowly read the leading article before he left the train. How he escaped being run down by London traffic was always a wonder to his friends, for he had no private car in London, and often walked rather than take a taxi.

I believe Lord Grey was one of the very few European statesmen (of whom Lord Curzon was another) who never wrote, or sent, a typewritten letter; during his Foreign Secretaryship his friends received from him letters always written by his own hand, and even when he was almost blind he would sit down at his desk and, bending painfully over his sheet of notepaper, would write a letter. Sometimes he would say: 'Can you read this address?' Once he said a trifle sadly: 'I had a letter returned to me not long ago because the address was illegible.' He did not take readily to new inventions. Up to a comparatively short time before his death he had no motor car, and preferred to ride a push-bicycle. The telephone he mistrusted, and he used to say: 'I never can use it; it is a most unsatisfactory instrument, and is always out of order when you wish to use it.' The wireless set at Fallodon enabled him to keep in touch with public affairs and the news of the world. I recall one night—I think it was in the spring of 1930—when Lord Grey and I heard Lloyd George deliver an important speech, and as the clear, impassioned tones of the great orator sounded in the loud-speaker I could not help glancing from time to time at the motionless figure of Lord Grey as, seated in his chair, he listened to one with whom he had at one time been closely associated. I think that, even after all had passed to estrange them, Lord Grey had a kindly thought for Mr. Lloyd George because of their common interest in the tame Fallodon squirrels.

Lord Grey talked sometimes of the great political figures of the past and the present age. He told me that Balfour had long ago a feeling that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was destined for great things. He was so sparing of his praise that one evening I was surprised when he said: 'The nicest man I ever met in my life was John William Pease, and the bravest man was Howard Pease'; and I thought that this was a fine tribute to two well-known Northumbrians.

The last expedition I made with Lord Grey was on Boxing Day, 1932, when we sailed out to the Farne Islands to see the young seals. His sight was then very bad, and climbing about the seaweed-covered rocks was tiring for him, yet he would not

be helped, and I think that, although he could not see the birds, and could with difficulty see the young seals that lay groaning on the rocks a few yards from him, he was happy to be on the low islands which he remembered in happier days.

There was no one so beloved by the humble folk of Northumberland as Lord Grey, or, as they preferred to call him, 'Sir Edward.' That affection was brought home to me on the day when we crossed to the Farnes. The fisherman who owned the boat told me as we were returning that forty-five years before, when he was a small boy, he and his mother were walking along the hard road towards Sea Houses, the small fishing village where they lived. A dog-cart passed them, then stopped, and they saw that a lady and gentleman were seated in it. The gentleman asked them if they would like a lift. Afterwards he asked his mother who those people were, and she replied: 'Sir Edward and Lady Grey.' The incident had remained in the fisherman's mind all his life, but he had never had an opportunity of speaking to Lord Grey until then. I remember him saying: 'We think a terrible lot of Lord Grey in Northumberland.'

The sanctuary at Fallodon remains. Each morning and evening the birds are fed. Everything is as the beloved owner left it. Robins come to feed from the hand, and now a blackbird has joined them. But he who, like St. Francis of old, was the presiding genius of the place is gone. Surely his spirit has passed unharmed through what we call death, and is happy. During those last sad days when his body lay unconscious upon that quiet bed at Fallodon I pictured his spirit going out across the moonlit sky through the beauty of the heavens. He already knew the great beauty, the splendour of truth and goodness, which we here can grasp but imperfectly, and at long intervals.

SETON GORDON.

AIMS AND OBJECTS. 1849

A PALACE PLAY

In his private apartment at Buckingham Palace, PRINCE ALBERT sits writing : his back is to the door. The QUEEN enters, and, moving softly across the room, stands behind him. Very fondly she feasts her eyes on the top of his head, which is growing prematurely bald. He continues to write, unconscious of her presence.

THE QUEEN. Albert, leave off writing ! I want to talk to you.

ALBERT. [*Laying down his pen.*] Yes, Weibchen ; what is it ?

THE QUEEN. Albert. . . . You do love me, don't you ?

ALBERT. My Dear, have you any doubt ?

THE QUEEN. No ; but say it !

ALBERT. [*Kindly, but without fervour.*] I love you.

THE QUEEN. Say it again—and again !

ALBERT. Certainly, my Dear, if you wish. . . . I love you . . . I love you . . . Isn't that enough ?

THE QUEEN. I was waiting to see how long you would be able to go on.

ALBERT. Saying what is so unnecessary ?

THE QUEEN. Not unnecessary to me, Albert. For I shall never be quite sure that it will always be so.

ALBERT. Why not ?

THE QUEEN. Because you are so much above me—in everything but rank. And *that* I am not allowed to alter. Every time I speak about making you King Consort, my Ministers won't hear of it.

ALBERT. Does it matter ?

THE QUEEN. You know it matters, Albert. It means that to them you are still only just a foreign Prince, who has come to marry me, and give me children.

ALBERT. We must be patient, my Dear.

THE QUEEN. Patient ! Have we not been patient for ten years ? I am sick of being patient ! I would like to go and tell them that, if they do not make you Prince, or King Consort, I shall resign ! That would make them do it, Albert !

ALBERT. Yes, Frauchen, perhaps. But you must not do it.

THE QUEEN. Why not, when I love you so much—when you are everything to me, and so much wiser, that I know it is really you that ought to be King ?

ALBERT. Because, Dearest, when I came here—when I accepted what you offered me—you were not able to offer me *that* ; and I knew it. What they do not want now, I knew that they would never want. I accepted, not only the greatness of the honour, but its limitations. Therefore, Dearest, that is why.

THE QUEEN. But, Albert, so much has happened since then. My children are your children ; some day Bertie will be King. How can they still go on thinking of you as a foreigner, after all that ?

ALBERT. But they will, Weibchen ; and nothing that we can do will change them—nothing !

THE QUEEN. And yet, Albert, now that you are always with me when I see my Ministers—advising, directing, deciding—they must know that it is your reign as much as mine. Yet still they will not let you be even Prince Consort¹—only Prince Albert ! And you—you seem not to mind !

ALBERT. Now, that surprises me. Have I acted my part so well ? I suppose I ought to be glad.

THE QUEEN. You do mind ?

ALBERT. I mind very much. I have your love, your trust ; but here I am still in exile, and shall be—to the day of my death.

THE QUEEN. Oh, don't say it, Dearest ; don't say it ! You mustn't die—before I do.

ALBERT. But I shall, Weibchen ; only—not yet. And listen ! Here is something that shall a little console you. When that happens, they will no longer have to be suspicious, or afraid of me. They will not trouble to think of me as a foreigner when I am dead. Only till then. . . . But no, no, you must not look so sad ! Here is something more practically important which concerns us *now*. I have some plans to show you. See !

[*He takes up, and spreads out for inspection, some large sheets of paper.*]

THE QUEEN. What are these, Albert ?

ALBERT. The designs for the building of the Great Exhibition, which the Royal Commission has accepted—if you agree, Mr. Joseph Paxton, the architect, has had a wonderful idea for it—quite new. It is to be all of glass.

THE QUEEN. Of glass, Albert ? But won't it break ?

ALBERT. Not if it is put into a frame—a metal frame, like a window. But this will be *all* window : not a solid wall any—

¹ The title of 'Prince Consort' was not granted him till 1857.

where. Look at it well; for this, perhaps, is what modern architecture is going to be.

THE QUEEN. Oh, how beautiful, and how wonderful! All glass! How it will light up when the sun shines on it!

ALBERT. Yes. . . . If all goes well, it may become the symbol of your reign, my Dear; and of England leading the world to peace.

THE QUEEN. And when it does, then it will be your doing, Albert. [*Then, as she examines the design.*] Oh, yes; I am beginning to see it now. It will be far more beautiful than St. Paul's Cathedral, I'm sure—glass being so much more beautiful than stone. And so original!

ALBERT. Yes; and so suitable for the purpose. That is what makes it so beautiful. And it will not take so long to build, either.

THE QUEEN. Where is it going to be?

ALBERT. In Hyde Park, if you will agree. To be in a Royal Park, it must first have your permission. You approve?

THE QUEEN. Of course! I think it is going to be the most wonderful building in the world—yes, and the most beautiful: a Crystal Palace! And the Exhibition itself will be one of the most wonderful things in history; and the invention and planning of it all yours! I have always wanted this country to be as great in the Arts as in Industry and Commerce, and now it is going to be—thanks to you! Oh, if only my people could know what you are doing for them, how happy we should be!

ALBERT. We will still be as happy as we can, Weibchen; and perhaps some day more shall come of it. And, talking about Art, my Dear, is it not time that you gave Mr. Edwin Landseer some kind of a title?

THE QUEEN. [*Doubtfully.*] A title?

ALBERT. Yes. He is a great painter—especially of dogs, which you are so fond of. And now that he has also done his great picture of the Duke's visit last year to the Field of Waterloo, would it not be well to make him a Baronet, or a Knight?

THE QUEEN. Oh, not a Baronet, Albert!—that would be too much. Mr. Landseer is not a man of any Family; he only comes from the people.

ALBERT. Well, make him a Knight, then.

THE QUEEN. I don't want to do anything unusual, Albert. Titles mustn't be made too cheap. Till now it is only Presidents of the Academy, or Painters by Royal Appointment, who have received titles; and I don't think Mr. Landseer will ever be President. Mr. Eastlake, I am told, is almost certain to be the next.

ALBERT. But Mr. Landseer is quite as great an artist, my

Dear, as any who have previously received titles. Sir Thomas Lawrence himself was only the son of a village innkeeper. So don't you think that you might?

THE QUEEN. Why, yes; that does make a difference, of course—other artists of less merit having received the same honour.

ALBERT. And, do you not think, my Dear, that we might, at the same time, buy one of his pictures?

THE QUEEN. Oh, yes; but not a large one, for I do not think that we could find room for it.

ALBERT. I think room could be found. And there was one at the Academy this year, which, I remember, you liked. May I buy it for you?

THE QUEEN. Yes, Albert, if you like it also. But remember, when we do a painter the great honour of buying one of his pictures, we only pay a certain price for it—thirty pounds, I think. But General Grey is sure to know; he will tell you. Yes, I am almost sure that it is thirty pounds.

ALBERT. Ah! a very good arrangement. Had I known that before, I might by now have made quite a collection for you of other artists—of Academicians, I mean.

THE QUEEN. Oh, no, Albert, dear, we mustn't make ourselves cheap: that would never do! You see, it is such an advantage to an artist to have a commission from *Us*. When we sat to Winterhalter, it got him quite a lot of other commissions. He stayed in England more than a year.

ALBERT. Ah! very satisfactory—very improving to the English taste!

THE QUEEN. So I don't think we ought to buy from more than one artist at a time. One in four or five years is quite enough, I think—except, of course, when we have to sit for our portraits. But Mr. Landseer is certainly my favourite painter—his subjects so appeal to me.

ALBERT. Yes; what a pity we cannot sit to him as a family group of his favourite species—'Queenie, Prince, and their Six Puppies.'

THE QUEEN. [*Rather shocked.*] Oh, Albert, dear!

ALBERT. I was only laughing, my Love. But, speaking of the family reminds me that I have something now much more serious to talk about. Our son, Bertie, is now eight years old.

THE QUEEN. Oh, not yet, Darling!

ALBERT. He will be in November; and it is quite time for his real education to begin. As some day he will have to be King, we must no longer think of him as a child.

THE QUEEN. Isn't it too soon—too early?

ALBERT. Had you not to be Queen rather sooner than you

might have wished, my Dear? But for it you had been trained. We must not be afraid to face the fact that it might happen to him also. So for that we must be prepared.

THE QUEEN. Oh, yes; of course you are right, Albert—for he has not yet learned nearly as much as I had done when I was his age.

ALBERT. So have I found out. We must make a change; he must not have a governess any more—he must have tutors. He must learn history, and languages, and how to write and spell correctly in all of them; also about politics, and the making of the English laws and Constitution.

THE QUEEN. Yes; of course, that is important.

ALBERT. So I have, this week, been drawing up a scheme—a schedule—of the work he must do. To begin with—till he is ten—his lessons will be only eight hours a day; when he is ten, they must be more.

THE QUEEN. How many tutors ought he to have, do you think, Albert?

ALBERT. He must have an English tutor, of course, so as not to have a foreign accent; also a French and a German master—each of them three times a week. He must learn, also, to dance well, and to draw just a little; and every day he must drill, and he must ride. Also, he must be taught the art of conversation; his manners he will get, let us hope, from us. I do not think he need have a chaplain yet—perhaps not till he is twelve; but he must have religious instruction every day. You see, my Dear, we have to make of him a really good man, with a taste for serious things—what your English kings have so seldom been. The only one in the last five reigns, who was good at all, went mad. It was a pity. Your Uncle George was not at all what he ought to have been—not at all!

THE QUEEN. Poor Uncle George! I can just remember him picking me up and kissing me; and I noticed how fat he was, and how he smelt of brandy. But he was quite nice and kind to me; so, please, don't say anything against him now that he is dead.

ALBERT. No; for it is not necessary. But I am glad, my Dear, that you did not wish to have any of your children named after him.

THE QUEEN. But George is a very popular English name, Albert—St. George being our Patron Saint: you mustn't forget that!

ALBERT. No; and some day perhaps—with our grandchildren—it will be safe for the name to be used again. But not yet. It will not be the name of the next King, at any rate.

THE QUEEN. No; that will be 'Albert Edward.'

ALBERT. Why not Edward the Seventh?

THE QUEEN. Because, Albert, I intend that my people shall some day recognise what they owe to you; and that will do it.

ALBERT. Then why not Albert alone?

THE QUEEN. Oh, no, Dearest; that I could never allow! If he could be called 'Albert the Second'—yes! But Albert alone—just as if no other Albert had come first—would be an act of disrespect to you, not to be thought of!

ALBERT. Perhaps it is a matter we shall not be allowed to decide, Weibchen.

THE QUEEN. But I mean to! Oh, Albert, I do wish Bertie had Vicky's brains! She is going to be so clever; and I'm afraid he is *not* going to be.

ALBERT. We must make his brain to grow like his body. It can be done; it is only a matter of proper education. That is why I have already drawn up this scheme, so as to begin in good time.

THE QUEEN. [*Who is now standing by the window.*] Look, Albert! There he is, in the garden, playing with Vicky. How prettily he moves; and how fond they are of each other! Look!

[*She turns towards the PRINCE, who now also looks out. Suddenly he taps angrily on the glass, then opens the window, and calls.*]

ALBERT. Ah! Do not do that! Come in here, Bertie, at once!

THE QUEEN. What did he do?

ALBERT. What he must be taught not to do. You did not see?

THE QUEEN. No.

ALBERT. Ah! it is quite time that we began to give him a real education, and a real training in how to behave. He must learn discipline.

[*The door opens. Very timidly, fearful of the scolding that awaits him, the little PRINCE OF WALES creeps into the room, and stands holding the door.*]

ALBERT. Come in! Come in! What were you doing?

THE PRINCE. Only playing, Papa.

ALBERT. Playing! I saw you throw a handful of gravel at your sister.

PRINCE. Only for fun. She didn't mind.

ALBERT. You are not to do it! If the gravel had gone into her eyes, it would have blinded her.

PRINCE. [*His voice breaking.*] I didn't throw it at her face, Papa!

ALBERT. It might have hit her face.

PRINCE. [*Weeping.*] But it didn't!

ALBERT. Don't answer! Go up to your room!

[*The culprit retires weeping.*]

ALBERT. [*Loudly.*] And shut the door after you!

[*The door is shut.*]

THE QUEEN. I'm afraid he's going to be difficult, Albert.

ALBERT. Children always are difficult, till you make them understand what you mean them to be, and whom they have to obey. . . . Patience, my Dear, patience! It will take time; and it will not always be easy, or pleasant. But it has to be done.

[*And on those excellent intentions the curtain now falls.*]

LAURENCE HOUSMAN.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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THE PROBLEM OF THE BRITISH ARMY

DURING the last few years the public have been saturated with proposals for the reorganisation of our Fighting Services, propounded by ardent and enthusiastic reformers. These have varied from the temperate to the visionary and fantastic. The Army, with its sexagenarian generals, has been severely criticised. It has also been held up to ridicule as fit only to fight at Waterloo because cavalry and infantry have not been relegated to a museum and their place taken by a wholly 'robot' Army of petrol-driven armoured vehicles filled with automatic weapons: this, too, in defiance of the fact that no nation has, so far, considered such a solution sound or feasible. Other reformers, more irresponsible than the rest, have advocated the abolition of the Army and the Navy, reliance for the defence of the Empire being placed solely on the Air Force. To strengthen this latter proposal harrowing descriptions have been given of the destruction of London by hypothetical hostile aircraft, which do not help to raise the morale of the nation.

Such propaganda, purposely exaggerated though some of it may be to attract attention or to make the nation air-minded,

is not only harmful to the Air Force, but so dangerous to the safety of the Empire that one shudders at the prospect of a future Minister of Defence running amok with this aerated bee in his bonnet. A further danger from this exaggerated criticism and indiscriminate stone-throwing lies in the risk of producing in the mind of the public a sense of doubt as to the sanity of those responsible for the protection of the Empire; particularly is this so when the numerous 'bricks' that are dropped in this process of throwing stones fall unseen by the uninitiated. On the other hand, there has been much thoughtful criticism and helpful suggestion from able and temperate writers, who have been unhampered by the consideration of vested interests or outworn traditions.

In his presentation of the Army Estimates recently in Parliament the Financial Secretary to the War Office, Mr. Duff Cooper, proclaimed that, for the varied and divergent tasks of our Regular Army, cavalry and infantry were still as indispensable as they have been since the dawn of history. In spite of the fact that these essential arms will be supported by every modern invention such as aircraft, tanks, guns and synthetic fog, instead of by elephants, chariots, catapults and other similar auxiliaries of the past, it is probable that the shock to the extremist type of Army reformer of such a retrograde policy will result in a further spate of angry criticism. For, although it has taken the Army fourteen years to cleanse its mind of the mud of Flanders, this mud still remains in the heads of the extremists in its most glutinous consistency.

This article is limited to a consideration of the views of the extremist type of Army reformers. Its object is to expose some of their fallacies by a review of the difficulties inherent in the organisation of a very small regular army for the defence of a great and scattered empire, and by an examination of that unpopular arm, infantry, the abolition of which is so strongly advocated by them. Although it is possible that some of their prognostications may be proved to be correct in the distant future, ardent and unpractical reformers invariably forget that the Army exists to fight under the conditions existing in 1934, and not under those that may exist in 2034. Moreover, in propounding their proposals, they habitually ignore three main facts:

- (a) The policy of the Government;
- (b) The varied tasks of our small Regular Army;
- (c) The research and experiments that have been carried out by the Army and their results.

The policy of all our Governments has been, and still is, to

find some means whereby a world conflagration like the last shall not break out (in Europe, at any rate) for at least a generation; although it must be admitted that, under the existing psychological and economic instability of the world, it might appear somewhat quixotic, at present, to look further ahead than five to ten years. Still, in spite of the many repeated failures so far, there is, as yet, no need to abandon all hope of producing in the near future some stability and sense of security among the nations of Western Europe, though bolder leadership, less visionary ideas, more practicable aims and less ambitious schemes will be necessary before satisfactory results can be achieved. If, however, we continue to act as if human nature had changed and the millennium was with us, fear, distrust and discontent among the nations will continue, with the consequent certain race for armaments and the preparation of the Powers for war.

Should this happen the time will then have arrived to review our national policy and readjust our military responsibilities to suit the new conditions. In fairness to the military critics it must be admitted that our political and military policies up to the present have been somewhat at variance, since the Foreign Office has accepted possible military responsibilities envisaged in Locarno pacts, while, on the other hand, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff has stated that the task of the Army lies mainly within the Empire, and not in Europe. It is to be hoped that a closer union between the Foreign Office and the War Office may soon produce an offspring bearing some common resemblance to the policies of its parents.

The difficulties inherent in the organisation of our small Regular Army have not always been appreciated or understood. The Regular Army exists to meet four most divergent contingencies—namely, to fight:

- (a) A national war;
- (b) A major war;
- (c) A minor war; and
- (d) To act as armed police for the maintenance of internal law and order within the Empire.

As regards these four contingencies, it is a fact of some significance that the Great War of 1914-18 is the only example of contingency (a) during the last 100 years, while those of contingency (d) have been of frequent occurrence since the end of this last great war. Is it too much to hope that a returning sanity on the part of civilised nations and a future determination on the part of the British people to hold what they have and to govern firmly will postpone a repetition of the former to an equally distant period and eliminate the need for the latter altogether? In this connexion a point of further interest is that early in 1914,

when the threatening clouds of war had been hanging low over Europe for the two previous years, our statesmen wrongly told us that war was so far distant that the time for disarmament had arrived, while, during the last few years, when fear of and distaste for war has generated feelings of insecurity in every European nation, our Press has been actively proclaiming the imminent risk of another world war greater than the last.

Some examples from the past fifty years of the three latter contingencies mentioned above may here be quoted. Major wars: Afghanistan, 1879-80, and South Africa, 1899-1902. Minor wars: Indian North-West Frontier rising, 1897-98; Egypt, 1882; Sudan, 1885 and 1898; Afghanistan, 1919. Police operations: Arab rebellion in Iraq, 1920, and a minor Assyrian disturbance more recently, when a British battalion was sent by air from Egypt; the Moplah rebellion in Southern India, 1919; disturbances in Palestine, Shanghai and Cyprus; tribal unrest among the Afridis and Mohmands and Red-shirt activities on the Indian North-West Frontier, 1930 and 1933; the Burma Rebellion, 1931-2; and the existing Terrorist movement in Bengal.

The last contingency (d), armed police, needs explanation. Besides being most distasteful to all soldiers, it is not a type of military operation in which a ruthless destruction of the hostile forces is required or desirable. Its object is more persuasive than destructive, for the attainment of which the minimum of force is applied in the hope that the ignorant and misled enemies of to-day may be the friends of to-morrow, and because we are a powerful, a civilised and a Christian Empire. Armoured and super-armed land forces and aircraft are incapable of such employment, for they are by their very nature, even in self-defence, ruthless. When not so used they have been impotent, and, as has actually happened, have been overpowered.

In a national war our small Regular Army cannot fight except with allies, and even so, by its very weakness, its presence will be mainly a gesture of the national policy, and possibly, as in 1914, a costly and a risky one. A few years before the Great War, in anticipation of the inevitable clash between France and Germany and our probable forced participation in it, it had been possible to organise the home portion of our Regular Army into a small 'expeditionary force' of six divisions. To-day an 'expeditionary force' does not exist, while the Army is considerably smaller because of the necessity of providing, within our limited financial means, a proportion of modern and expensive mechanised auxiliary arms such as aircraft, tanks, etc. As regards the employment of our small Regular Army in Europe, the ardent Army reformer has never considered that, if such military intervention should again be vital to our future safety, it might be a

wiser policy to revert to our past strategy, by retaining our freedom to use the Army at a moment and in a locality suitable to the attainment of quick and decisive results. Such action would in many ways be preferable to tying a small Army to the apron strings of a powerful military ally, with all the attendant disadvantages inherent in our subordination to the necessity of unified command. Immediate assistance to an ally could be afforded by a powerful Navy, which we have, at present, not got, and an efficient Air Force, which we have got.

For a prolonged national war our real national Army is the Territorial Army. All that need be said here about that Army is that, since it cannot be ready until six months after its mobilisation begins, before the expiration of which time the latest tactics and weapons of the enemy will be known, the policy of modelling it so closely and so rigidly on the highly trained and ubiquitous Regular Army seems of doubtful necessity. Its training would be much simplified and its expansion rendered easier if its organisation were made more flexible to future changes by a better distribution of its weapons, particularly in the infantry. Some reorganisation is also desirable to ensure that certain portions of the Territorial Army can be made adaptable for immediate assistance in a major war. For the remaining three contingencies the Regular Army will, except in rare circumstances, act alone and normally not against enemies of the first class. For these it is, under its proposed improved equipment and organisation, fit to play its part.

The organisation and equipment of a small Regular Army, which has to be prepared for such varied tasks, may appear to be an insoluble problem except by the formation of two separate and distinct armies, one for operations in Europe and another for campaigns on the confines of the Empire. The adoption of such a system by us would, however, not only be prohibitive in cost, but most unsuitable to our national characteristics and to our hereditary policy. The alternative and simpler solution lies in the fact that infantry, as will be shown later, is still indispensable for all types of wars. This allows of the retention of the Cardwell system, referred to below, within the framework of which, by certain modifications and improvements to suit modern conditions, it should be possible to provide the necessary proportion of powerful auxiliary supporting arms that are essential against highly organised Continental armies. The theory, much advocated, that a wholly 'robot' Army without infantry is a necessity for a war against a highly civilised Power, and that such an Army would be equally effective against less civilised and poorly organised enemies in undeveloped countries, is a delusion and a snare.

No army and no general staff of any other Great Power has such a difficult problem or such heavy and varied responsibilities as our own. The only other approaching to any similarity is France. The French, however, unlike us, maintain a short-service home army suitable to their Continental military responsibilities and a separate long-service foreign army which, in proportion to the size of the countries and the populations it protects and controls, is greater than our Regular foreign Army and capable not only of guarding and policing French overseas possessions without reinforcement, but of reinforcing the home army. Our foreign service Army in India and elsewhere is, on the contrary, fixed at absolute minimum requirements. Consequently our home service Army has not only to be its feeder, but its immediate reinforcement in emergency.

For the proper maintenance of our foreign service Army the Cardwell system (named after its progenitor, a great Secretary of State for War) has so far served us well for over fifty years. By this system the Regular Army is divided into two equal and similar parts, the foreign service Army and the home service Army, whereby the latter, in *cadre* form, acts as the feeder of the former and also in emergency as its reinforcement by the addition of a large number of reserves composed of ex-soldiers. It will thus be seen that the strength of the home Regular Army is dictated solely by the strength of the foreign service Army it has to feed, and not by any particular strategic policy. It suffices only for small wars, and possibly for some major wars, within or on the confines of the Empire. If used in close co-operation with a powerful ally in a national or European war, it would be, as explained above, merely a gesture of the national policy and the bright and possibly short-lived spearhead of the Territorial or National Armies.

As regards the organisation, equipment and training of the Regular Army to meet modern conditions, these, far from being neglected as some believe, have been studiously and meticulously studied during the last ten years, while research in every direction has been active. Mechanised units and experimental formations of all arms have been created, broken up and recreated on fresh models. Every type of tactical operation, ancient, modern and futurist, has been planned, tried out, examined and criticised: a vast amount of time, thought and energy have been expended both in practical exercises and in theoretical schemes, and their results have been discussed and criticised, amid the hopes of the extremists, the doubts of the moderates, the anger of the reactionaries and the bewilderment of the dull.

Results from these experiments have shown that the hope of the extremists, both inside and outside the Army, could no

be fulfilled, because the discovered limitations of, and the known and unknown antidotes to, a 'robot' Army have thrown up problems difficult of immediate or cheap or safe solution. In fact, so disappointing have been some of the results that serious doubts have been expressed as to whether the strategical mobility of a huge conglomeration of mechanised vehicles under active service conditions would be any greater, in the end, than that of the slow Indian bullock train of the past. All these trials and experiments, which are known in detail only to the military authorities, have provided them with a mass of valuable material on all subjects except one. This exception is the potentialities of the individual human fighter, the modern rifleman on his feet, and his rôle in future war. Up to the present he has, in the home Army, been totally neglected and totally untrained, partly owing to intensive concentration on the tactical training in automatic weapons and partly because, owing to weak *cadre* units at home, he does not exist except as a raw recruit, and then only in few numbers and for a very short period owing to yearly drafting overseas. As, however, it is now beginning to be realised that the man with the rifle is still indispensable in all armies, steps are being taken, both at home and in India, to try and remedy this omission and to discover the tactics, clothing and equipment best suited to him under modern conditions and how many of him are wanted. Given this additional knowledge, it will be possible to bring the pendulum of Army reorganisation to its proper perpendicular position and to model an Army equally balanced between its human and mechanical portions and capable of suitable adjustment to fit its multifarious and eccentric tasks.

It remains now to examine that most controversial subject—infantry and its weapon, the rifle, still, for reasons obscure to the extremists, the main arm of all armies, and to endeavour to show that it is, when brought up to date, as indispensable now as it has been in the past. In every battle against every type of enemy, and in every sort of terrain, the aim of every commander is to obtain the fullest value, in harmonious co-operation, out of every available arm and every available weapon, be it modern, such as the tank, or ancient, such as the foot soldier. At times, under ideal conditions, it will be possible to do this; at other times the type of country or local conditions may cause one or more arms or weapons to be temporarily the predominant factor. In open country it may be tanks, in close or difficult country it may be infantry, but in no type of campaign, and in no type of battle, will it be possible to do without a good proportion of men fighting on their feet.

Briefly the extremists' contention against the man with the rifle is that the last war proved that the retention of infantry

for wholesale slaughter in the next war is sheer murder. They would, instead, have battalions of machine-guns, some fought from the ground, others from armoured fighting vehicles or 'tanks.' They further contend that such an Army, fit to overwhelm a highly organised first-class enemy in a well-developed country, will be equally, if not more, efficacious against a second-class enemy in a totally undeveloped and difficult country. Lastly, they have argued that it is mainly the arrested mentality of the General Staff in India and its consequent failure to recognise this latter contention that has prevented the home Army from being organised on their 'robot' pattern.

The weakness in these contentions lies in the fact that they are based on three fallacies:

(1) That the only alternative to the massacre of thousands of hastily raised and ill-trained infantry, sent in heavy masses against permanent siege defences, is to send masses of armoured fighting vehicles against deep pits, mines and guns provided with armour-piercing projectiles. The first was a holocaust of cheap dead bodies, the second will be a scrap-heap of expensive twisted metal. In other words, these critics would pit a 'land-navy' with its limited armament against possibly semi-permanent defences and heavier ordnance, an operation that a fleet or 'sea-navy' ever seeks to avoid. They have never seen nor contemplated the action of highly trained infantry.

(2) That the next war will begin where the last war left off, and that the armoured fighting vehicle then used will still be a weapon of surprise. They forget that the latter, far from being novelties, will, on the contrary, find their antidotes prepared in plenty. They also fail to see from the great campaigns of the past that victory has not been won so much by surprise in weapons as by superior leadership in peace, which consists in the adoption of newer tactics, flexible formations and higher training in the weapons available.

(3) That a machine-gun has the same qualities as a '12-bore' and is equally suitable for killing partridges, or that a London omnibus-driver is equally expert in the control of a refractory mule on a Himalayan pass. Would any but a lunatic use a heavy piece of furniture to kill a fly when a fly-flap is more efficacious? Consequently they fail to understand that an army wholly encased in armour and glutted with powerful lethal weapons of every description would, for lack of the necessary mobility and man power, be unable to come to grips with an inferior type of enemy in a difficult country mostly inaccessible to anything except skilled riflemen.

To a certain type of ardent Army reformer the infantryman with a rifle is anathema, an accursed thing that is obsolete and

without merit. In this they show much ignorance. The merits of a rifleman with rifle and bayonet lie in the fact that he is ubiquitous; he can go where an animal or any sort of vehicle cannot, and if highly trained and skilfully handled he is not so vulnerable as is thought. Unlike other arms, he can, if necessary, fight alone. He is handy, quick, and the only reliable agent for close reconnaissance and in darkness or in fog. As a marksman, stalker, scout and infiltrator he is indispensable and irreplaceable and he is cheap. Moreover, the British rifleman, in his eight years' service, can be trained to a standard that his short-service Continental prototype cannot approach. For these reasons, and for lack of a better alternative, the infantryman is still, fifteen years after the Great War, the backbone of every army.

A formation of highly skilled rifleman operating stealthily in small numbers, capable of taking full advantage of the ground and of the assistance given by other weapons and other arms, offering few and difficult targets, and followed by other riflemen in equally small numbers, who profit by the information obtained and the progress made by the leading parties, would be a tough proposition to tackle for any enemy, civilised or otherwise. The disadvantages suffered by the rifleman are that he must normally be supported by other weapons, but in this he is no exception to the other arms. He is difficult to train, not as an over-weighted, bewildered infantryman, but as a high-class rifleman. He is not spectacular, decorative, flashy or influential, and consequently has few friends. He belongs to the only arm that has no special inspector or adviser, though it is the most numerous and the hardest to train.

As against a battalion of rifleman the sole merit of a battalion composed only of machine-guns is its enormous fire power. To get the fullest advantage of this requires, however, suitable ground, good visibility and sufficient targets, none of which are always forthcoming. Its defects are that, without riflemen, it has no protective screen. Its control on any wide front is difficult. It is conspicuous in movement. It is blind in wooded or close country, seriously handicapped among steep hills and impotent in fog, smoke and darkness, when it will be at the mercy of active and expert riflemen. It is slow in coming into and out of action—ask any machine-gunner as to the paraphernalia to be carried and the complicated ceremony to be gone through before guns are ready—and consequently it is incapable of taking instant advantage of an immediate success or countering a sudden threat. With such a congestion of guns there is great danger of enormous waste of power and of ammunition being spattered over a countryside mostly devoid of enemy. If fought from armoured fighting

vehicles, as some desire, their conspicuousness would be such as to court heavy casualties.

Although a formation composed of a mixture of skilled riflemen and highly trained machine-gunners is still of such paramount importance, this fact is so little appreciated that a brigade of infantry is considered capable of being trained and commanded by officers of every arm, no matter what their qualifications may be. The ideal commander of a modern infantry formation is one who not only understands the characteristics of infantry, but is also endowed with the qualities required in a cavalry leader, which are quickness in thought, decision and execution. Modern infantry (riflemen and machine-guns), to be of real value, cannot be hesitating, ponderous, slow-moving or sticky.

In addition to the enthusiasts of a wholly 'robot' or 'tank' Army there are others who have advocated battalions consisting wholly of machine-guns. In their contempt for the rifle they have recommended that infantry battalions should consist of 128 machine-guns and no riflemen. This, in a brigade formation of four such battalions, would amount to 512 machine-guns without a single rifleman, compared with the existing infantry brigade, of four battalions, totalling 144 machine-guns (48 heavy and 96 light Lewis guns) and 1800 riflemen. With this conglomeration of 512 machine-guns, and not a single riflemen, in a brigade formation (or even in a proportionately smaller one), the disadvantages described above would be so intensified as to produce absolute chaos, even with every advantage given in suitability of the ground and stupidity of the enemy. Against a second-class enemy and in such ill-developed countries as exist in many parts of our Empire, including the frontiers of India, such a formation would be a colossal waste of money and of weapon power, in that it would never be able to use, in the most favourable circumstances, more than at the most one-quarter of its armament, the remainder lumbering the rear.

The same number of machine-guns carried in armoured fighting vehicles under the above conditions, as advocated by the more extreme type of reformer, would be not only unwieldy, but, for all practical purposes, quite useless. Without riflemen to gain close contact with an enemy showing strong opposition in positions inaccessible to machine-gun teams it is difficult to imagine how any rapid progress can be made. A static occupation of wide, open and undulating plains, to which access has been permitted by the enemy, appears the only rôle for such cumbersome units.

It has, however, always been the peculiarity of enthusiasts to go to extremes. Before the war they neglected the machine-gun and concentrated only on the rifle. Now they condemn the rifle as obsolete and desire to smother the Army with machine-guns.

Surely the middle way of reason would be a better course to follow, since both rifles and machine-guns are indispensable weapons and complementary to, and interdependent on, each other. The problem lies in finding the correct mixture between the two and a suitable organisation for them.

For a small army such as ours what is really required for the infantry is a formation sufficiently elastic in its organisation to enable its component parts to be modified, without undue disturbance, to suit the particular type of enemy and country, and flexible enough to be adjusted quickly to varying tactical situations. The extreme type of Army reformers refuse to consider that such a solution lies in the reorganisation of our existing infantry battalions into battalions of riflemen with a proportion of light machine-guns and mortars for close support and battalions consisting solely of heavy machine-guns and anti-tank guns, the proportion being normally three rifle battalions to one machine-gun battalion. The great advantage of such an organisation would be in the simplification of training, since the personnel of each type of battalion would be whole-timers and experts in their respective weapons and in their particular tactics. This is far from being the case at present, since the infantryman during his service is part of the time a machine-gunner and part of the time a rifleman, and consequently never a real expert at either. The great disadvantage our present infantry organisation suffers from is that a battalion is so overloaded with weapons that an average commanding officer would be quite incapable of efficient control of them all in the heat of battle. As at present proposed, an infantry battalion will consist of rifles, light machine-guns, heavy machine-guns carried in mechanised vehicles or in light tanks, anti-tank guns, mortars and anti-aircraft machine-guns.

Such an organisation practically eliminates the power of the brigade commander to plan and direct a fight in that, except for such artillery or tanks as may be placed at his disposal, he has no personal control of any of the weapons in his own formation, but is solely dependent on his four commanding officers, any of whom may have a superfluity of some type of weapon which may be vitally needed by another of his battalion commanders in another part of the battle. It has been said that the Cardwell system is the obstacle to any reorganisation of the infantry into light infantry (riflemen) and medium infantry (machine-guns); the tanks could be the heavy infantry. There should, however, be no difficulty in the absorption of the machine-gun battalions into the Army in India as machine-gun battalions of the field Army, while they would be equally effective for internal security, for their secondary or auxiliary weapon would be the rifle, a modicum of training in which, sufficient for the purpose, they would have

received. The real difficulty in any reorganisation lies not so much in the Cardwell system as in our existing barrack accommodation at home and in our system of single-unit reliefs. As machine-gun battalions will most probably be formed in war in order to facilitate adequate training of reinforcements, it would appear desirable to effect this organisation in peace, so as to reap its full benefits both in peace and war.

Whatever the reorganisation for infantry may be, certain improvements in weapons are, however, imperative. These are: the provision of a lighter rifle of a self-loading pattern with a bayonet of the *machete* type, that can be used for more useful purposes than a tent-peg; a light machine-gun with simple mechanism in place of the present obsolete Lewis gun; improvement in the clothing of the infantryman; and, lastly, the lightening of the load carried by him, for at present he is a veritable beast of burden and tactically quite immobile.

Finally, there remains to disprove the accusation that the arrested mentality of the General Staff in India and its adherence to the fetish that a highly organised Army is incapable of operating on the frontiers of India is the cause of the alleged antiquated pattern of the home service Army. Although there may still be a few scornful people in England who are under the impression that the Army in India is trained in the tactics of the Moguls and commanded, as in those days, by generals mounted on elephants and accompanied by their concubines, the majority of soldiers who have served there know that, with all its faults, it is a highly efficient fighting machine fully fit, as far as its financial conditions will allow, for its particular task. It is not always realised by critics that the Army in India has at the present day a certain definite task to perform, the defence of India against enemies not of the first class, the maintenance of law and order throughout that sub-continent, and the prevention of mutual slaughter between its divergent peoples.

Further, the General Staff in India, although trained in the same school as the General Staff at home, serve a different Government and see India's needs through Indian eyes. Moreover, since they know and have served or fought on all her frontiers, their views are not to be lightly brushed aside. The days of the old jests such as 'bow and arrow brigades' and 'Sepoy generals' are past. The modernisation and mechanisation of the Army in India is steadily progressing in spite of exacting financial stringency. After further experiments and trials now being carried out, it will be possible to decide on the correct proportion of the various types of arms, weapons and transport that are needed for her strategical and tactical requirements and within her financial resources. Such a decision cannot, however, be

hurriedly or lightly taken, since India is dependent on England for the latest types of mechanical vehicles, both fighting and transport, designs in which have so far not reached finality.

It must also be remembered that a 'tank' or any type of mechanical vehicle, gliding smoothly over the rolling downs of Salisbury Plain in a temperate summer climate, is quite a different proposition to such a vehicle labouring in a boulder-strewn river bed or across a nulla-traversed plain or a mountain, crossed only by goat tracks, in a tropical heat of 120 degrees F. in the shade. Metalled roads on or beyond the North-West Frontier of India are few, considering the size of the countries, and are mainly sufficient only for supply and maintenance purposes. Off these roads, in only a few areas will mechanised fighting and transport vehicles and a heavily armed Army be able to operate, and in such areas it is doubtful if the enemy will be so obliging as to fight. Even Alexander over 2000 years ago in that same difficult country could not use his well-armed shock-trained Macedonians and was forced to rely on his more mobile and lightly armed and therefore more suitable Asiatic mercenaries.

Since, however, the British troops in India are part of the Imperial Regular Army, liable for employment anywhere in the world, it is most desirable, for the sake of homogeneity and to avoid having two types of armies, one at home and one abroad, that British units on foreign service should be organised as far as possible on the home pattern. As regards the organisation of the infantry, around which the controversy rages, India has so far played her part, as a battalion at home and a battalion in India are, in the main, identically organised. Each consists of three rifle companies and one machine-gun company of twelve heavy machine-guns. The minor differences are that a home battalion is to be further loaded with additional close support weapons in anti-tank guns and trench mortars: of these the British battalion in India has, so far, none, while it has twelve light machine-guns (Lewis guns) in the rifle companies as compared with twenty-four at home.

Since there are no foreign armoured fighting vehicles within 1000 miles of India's frontiers, anti-tank guns at present would be a purely decorative weapon. India is considering the provision of trench mortars, but as against these she has already a large proportion of close support weapons in her very efficient light pack howitzer artillery batteries. The lesser number of light machine-guns (Lewis guns) in a British battalion in India is due to practical experience on the frontiers, which proved that a greater number are superfluous and incapable of employment.

If, however, such conditions should arise as to force our home Army organisation to be so drastically changed as to be unsuitable

or too luxurious for the lesser types of campaign to be expected in India, it is not unreasonable to expect the home Government to pay the necessary extra cost, particularly when it is realised that India is the finest and only real training ground now available for the whole British Army (there are none at home fit for modern conditions), and that practically the whole of the 100,000 ex-soldiers who go to make up the home Army on mobilisation are trained in India. It would be quite a different matter if the Indian Government accepted a share of the responsibility of Imperial defence and could be told who the next enemy would be. Under the possible future status of India, and in the present uncertainty of world affairs, either contingency is at present highly problematical.

It is hoped that this article has succeeded in proving that the days of skilful and mobile riflemen are not yet over for any type of war, and that the solution of the problem of organising a modern army lies in discovering the correct balance between the human fighter and the machine; that to rush blindly to the sole aid of machines and automatic weapons is to risk having a cumbersome and over-weaponed Army that may not come up to expectations and be out of date in a few years; that an Army replete with every modern invention and organised solely to fight a highly civilised and powerful enemy is quite unsuitable for a war in ill-developed, difficult country and against an elusive, active and savage enemy; and finally that, though there may be much to criticise in the Army of to-day, neglect of the lessons of the past and apathy on the part of the military authorities are not just criticisms.

The views expressed in this article are the personal views of an individual, based on a close study of the subject, and on his practical experience as a trainer and commander in various parts of the world in each of the four types of campaigns mentioned above. It is a matter for regret, however, that the War Office does not take the public occasionally into their confidence on Army matters. The Army is, alone among the three defence services, capable of holding and maintaining our scattered outposts of Empire. It is also the only service without friends, and the time may not be distant when it may be faced with difficult and unpleasant problems which will need the understanding and the backing of the public and the Press.

Our great lesson in the last war was that von Clausewitz, that great exponent of war, was right in laying down that one of the 'principles of war' was 'the gaining of public opinion.' In spite of the soldier's traditional abhorrence of the limelight, the gaining of public opinion should surely also be a principle of peace, especially in these somewhat vulgar days of publicity, advertisement and propaganda.

H. E. BRAINE.

FRANCE SEES IT THROUGH?

'Is it a riot?' inquired the King of France, one evening during the first turbulent days of 1789.

'No, Sire,' came the reply, 'it is a revolution.'

It would certainly be rash to affirm that this historic epigram, which has been attributed to the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, was, in fact, authentic. So many prophecies are formulated only after the events have actually taken place. But, authentic or not, the event justified the Duke. Louis XVI. was far from being as feeble or as foolish as has been made out, but he was endowed neither with the energy nor with the type of intelligence which the circumstances demanded. He was neither a Henry IV. nor a Louis XI. He did not know how to conjure the menacing clouds, and the storm became an earthquake. It is not only when they misuse their authority that God sends to rulers those 'great and terrible lessons' which Bossuet describes in the most moving of his *Oraisons Funébres*; the punishments earned by their weaknesses are no less severe.

Will the bloody night of February 6, 1934, and the days of rioting which followed it constitute in the eyes of posterity a date to be remembered, a landmark in the history of France? Will their immediate consequences and their distant repercussions be considered of such great importance that the memory of our descendants will enshrine them, like the capture of another Bastille? These are questions to which, no doubt, some of us could hardly have failed to give an affirmative answer if they had been put to us immediately after the tragic hours that we had just experienced. The emotions which we had felt were so compelling that we could hardly have contented ourselves with a moderate or tentative answer. And, sharing as we did the qualities and defects of our race, how could we have refrained from calculating the possible reactions of such a monstrous event and from revolving in our imagination their numerous and far-reaching consequences, and the likelihood of their repetition? Before we had time to reflect further, we vaguely expected some enormous tidal wave big enough to make a clean sweep of everything—all the politicians and their corruption.

The event, however, was destined to prove that this hypothesis, however plausible it might appear at the time, was in fact much too ingenuous. It is only in poetry that one can see the enchanter at his will make palaces and prisons rise from the waves. A variety of causes prevented the stroke of the magic wand from eventuating—at any rate, in the immediate and complete form which so many Frenchmen expected. Of the big political associations in France which form the rallying point for so many loyalties and so diverse spheres of action, like the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, the *Solidarités Françaises*, the *Anciens Combattants*, and the *Croix de Feu*, it may be said that there is not one which constitutes a real political party with its own doctrine, its specific programme, its staff and its chief, able, in consequence, to dominate events, to make them serve its own ends, and to guide their course. Only one of them, the *Ligue d'Action Française*, displays these organic qualities. But it has inherited too firm and sure a political tradition, and the essence of the authority which it has set itself out to restore excludes too completely any adventure of a Fascist or dictatorial character for its leaders to have decided that the moment had come to attempt the passage of the Rubicon without assuring themselves from the outset that the soil of the further bank was firm. One must not forget that it took a thousand years for administrator and warrior kings to make France.

There were other more complicated factors, too, which prevented such an event, factors connected with the defects of the *régime*; indeed, we must admit, with its vices—vices which some believe to be organic while others call them merely functional. For even if here and there the question whether these defects are accidental or congenital is still discussed, there is none the less a fundamental agreement everywhere that it is necessary to purge the country of them, and no one believes that this operation can be accomplished by a wave of the hand. We shall see later how the entangled establishments of the State administration have managed to erect an almost impassable barrier between the two nations which the great royalist writer, Charles Maurras, distinguishes and contrasts, the *pays légal* which they constitute and the *pays réel* of which they are the guardians. The public service thus form a particularly close corporation whose members, whatever part of the machine they belong to, whether it be the executive, the legislative or the judiciary, are bound together by a pragmatic solidarity which is the source of the most irrational and most serious confusion between the 'Three Powers,' whose distinctness and mutual interdependence are indispensable if their proper functioning is to be assured and their validity guaranteed. Thus, for example, the parliamentary element is driven by the

instinct of self-preservation to expand beyond its rational limits, and to encroach upon the Executive. Before delivering the judiciary looks questioningly at Parliament; there are no judicial decisions to which Parliament does not hold the key.

That is how grave incidents like those of February 1934 are brought about, and scandals like those which provoked them burst upon the world. The country suddenly discovers, to its shame, that among its servants there is not a single body which thinks of anything except how first to preserve itself; it seeks in vain for the true shepherds who will separate themselves from the ranks of the hirelings. The same men who have made important laws administer them at their discretion, and if they break them they have nothing to fear, since they have made themselves their own judges. There is nothing to do, therefore, except to throw a veil over the disgraceful corruption for fear of offending the weaker brethren. Weeks and months pass, and in the meantime the tracks are obliterated, the culprits vanish, and the public indignation begins to doubt the righteousness of its cause for lack of a judge who will pronounce it and a power which will proclaim it.

It cannot be denied that Paris when she woke up on that February morning to see the devastation of the Place de la Concorde and the Champs Elysées was aware of a tightening of the heart-strings; yet at the same time she felt her soul stir within her. She experienced in violent succession the emotions of astonishment, humiliation, anger and hope: astonishment, in the first place, at the evidence plain before her eyes, that it needed so little to transform a state of mild discontent and passive disgust into an atmosphere of civil war, such as has not been felt since the Commune; humiliation next, at seeing her 'notables,' her civic representatives, as well as the future guardians of her thought and her intelligence, in the persons of thousands of her students; and finally the immense host of her citizens, great, middling and small, all held for less than nothing, except perhaps as cannon fodder, by obscure politicians elected by distant provinces, half unknown and despised. These Simple Simons, for fear of an imaginary 'Fascism' which might deprive them of their rights, and, above all, for dread of reprisals of which they looked like becoming the first objects, had actually contemplated an attempt at a dictatorship. Finally, anger too—a righteous anger in the face of so much cynicism—stealed her nerves to the most drastic resolve.

Could it really be true? A gang of conspirators in an under-prefect's office had undertaken to avenge the swindlers on those who were threatening to expose them. But were all these people, deputies and officials, also in the game? The list of the guilty whose un-

conscious pen could write, without rebelling, 'My friend Dubarry'¹—words with so many hidden meanings—did it embrace them all? There could be no doubt about it, since in their mad fright they had attempted to forestall inquiries and taken the offensive. On four consecutive Saturdays the students, applauded by an immense crowd, had shrieked their disdain in front of the walls of the Chamber. Then came 'the heavy tramp of legions on the march'—ex-service men who believed they had fought the last war (including civil war), and who thought that their very presence would be sufficient to recall men to their duty. White with fear, 500 parliament-men called in the Executive to avert their evil fate: driven frantic by the wave of public disgust which was submerging them, they did not hesitate to perpetrate the most cowardly massacre. Men who had saved their country, calm and unarmed, displayed their wounds and cried 'Justice'; they received the answer 'Fire.'

One may imagine how dear, decent, generous Paris—the Paris which suffers, sings and works, the Paris which our best friends do not always recognise—felt the foulness of the blow. The descendants of the 100,000 republicans who in 1832 had followed the funeral procession of General Lamarck and of those who in 1871 faced the army of Versailles, the very men whose eyes had filled with tears at the Victory march past in 1919, all of them felt surging in their veins the same blood which once flowed in their streets, on their barricades, and at the front. Republicans? Without doubt the majority of them have not ceased to be so, though it no longer seems that their republicanism is a religion as it was with their ancestors of the three glorious revolutions. But what of that? Whatever their party label, whether royalists stirred by the old tradition which Charles Maurras has awakened, or just simple citizens longing for a thorough-going clean-up of political life, without preoccupying themselves whence such a change of *régime* should come—all of them were unanimous in repudiating the parliament-men as swindlers and assassins.

Having felt their astonishment, undergone their humiliation and exhausted their anger, the people of Paris remained united and their hearts beat to the rhythm of hope. For forty-eight hours—let us say a week, to be generous—the great city placed all her hope in the statesmen to whom she had turned. She considered M. Doumergue to be sufficiently master of himself to direct events instead of being ruled by them; he would not, she felt, hesitate, if his conscience dictated it, 'to step beyond the bounds of legality in order to return to Right.' He alone could do the work of a justiciar. The Presidents of the Republic who

¹ A journalist, editor of *La Volonté* (subsidised by Stavisky), at present in prison.

had succeeded each other at the Champs Elysées had met with varying fortunes. Paris had not held them all equally dear. President Doumergue was, however, an exception: the capital respected him, adopted him, loved him. Well-informed people knew that during his seven years of office he had given proof on many critical occasions of his wide knowledge, sound judgment, and steadfast character. People had got into the habit, when things were going rather badly after his retirement, to turn their eyes toward this fine old gentleman.

So France breathed a sigh of relief when she learned that M. Doumergue, like Cincinnatus, was responding to her call. Nobody, however, was under any illusion as to the difficulties, the urgency, and the exceptional character of the task. By a strange paradox 300,000 citizens who would never have allowed their right of voting to be suppressed or restricted themselves formulate France's *mea culpa*. They confessed their electoral mistakes and affirmed their agreement on one thing, at any rate, by insisting that the new Prime Minister should be free, in making his Cabinet, to extend the choice of his colleagues beyond the parliamentary circle. This dispensation was proof-positive that the body of parliament-men had once and for all 'lost its face.' Names, too, were whispered from ear to ear. The Ministry of Justice was to have a great magistrate (there were still some), one of the kind that does not compromise or let himself be intimidated; the Ministry of Finance was to have one of the celebrated experts from the *Banque de France*; the Ministry of War an admirable soldier of the proconsular breed, a 'prince of Lorraine' who gave France an empire, Marshal Lyautey—Lyautey *Africanus*. The objection may perhaps have been raised that the Marshal did not pass as 'very republican'; but, in the circumstances, why consider such a trifle? It was no longer a matter of making a clever blend of different parties, of working adjustments which could satisfy groups and sub-groups, of compounding combinations and covering up compromises, or of securing one's position at the Radical-Socialist Congress at Clermont-Ferrand. All that seemed for the moment quite senseless—dead as the dodo, drowned in the blood of the 1000 Frenchmen who were beaten to death, hewn down, or shot one fine evening between the Seine, the Elysée, and the Madeleine. What was needed at this hour was to punish the criminals, to restore order in the house, to work, and, if the necessity arose, to be prepared. On that memorable day the 'real' France stood self-revealed, and unveiled her true countenance to the world.

Ascending from examples to definition, it will be easy to picture to oneself what is meant by this expression the 'real' France. It is the living patrimony which honest and healthy

citizens cultivated. But this 'real' France does not recognise itself in the mask which the 'official' France has created for it. The 'real' France is the peasant who tills his field, the labourer who bends over his tools, the artist creative, the soldier who watches and the priest who prays. 'Official' France is the thousand or so parliament-men and the several thousands of electoral agents who live by politics rather than devote themselves to them. Between these two countries there is a great gulf fixed. Always in the background, this antithesis bursts forth in violent crises, which each time become more serious because they betray a malady more deeply entrenched. The double case, Stavisky-Prince, seems to exemplify these crises better than any which preceded it, because of its extent and importance, the number of participants which it has revealed, and the scandalous immunity enjoyed by the large majority of the politicians who betrayed their trust—the kind of crisis which perhaps in other circumstances and in another country might have swept everything away with it.

The events which have occurred since the fatal days of February have proved, on the contrary, that French public opinion was not sufficiently unanimous to create out of the crisis the beginning of a new era of reaction or revolution, of 'Fascism' of the Right or of the Left. The majority of the 'real' France, though not everybody will bring himself to avow it, remained at bottom unconscious of the issue. The parliamentary election held recently at Mantes and the municipal election at Saint-Denis have shown very significantly that under no pretext is the great mass of the suburban and rural population prepared to follow any advocate of the great adventure. However we may choose to arrange the different sections of the French people on the traditional scale of 'Left and Right,' it is clear that all of them are, to repeat the celebrated phrase, 'essentially conservative of the existing order.'

The expressions 'Left' and 'Right' no longer correspond in France to any reality. In actual fact they have never had more than a symbolic meaning. Their original significance is well known. Ever since the first legislatures the royalist parties took up their place at the Right of the President in the order of their 'legitimism' (Bourbonists, Orleanists, Bonapartists), reaching to the Centre where those republicans who were called 'conservative' (the opportunists, the liberals) had taken up their position. The more extreme opposition parties were in the habit of sitting on the Left. But from the very beginning this parliamentary geography never implied a strictly corresponding doctrinal differentiation. Thus, for example, a number of royalist leaders like Comte Albert de Mun (who afterwards rallied to the republican cause) used to propound the social doctrines of their royal masters, which are contained in the letters of the Comte de

Chambord, the Comte de Paris, and the Duc d'Orléans—doctrines whose boldness undoubtedly places their holders to the 'Left' of their colleagues of the Centre or even of those who complacently professed the official tenets of the so-called Left.

But to-day the situation is much less complicated. The representatives of the royalist parties, properly called the 'Rights,' have been reduced to insignificance—almost, in fact, to nothing. On the other hand, Ministries nowadays include in their majorities—especially the majorities that vote the budget—the greater part of the 'Left' benches. In fact, the Centre has now absorbed the wings, with the exception of the extremist parties, who only very rarely describe themselves by the name of 'Left.' By these I mean the United Socialists (affiliated to the Second International), who, though they have often supported Ministries with a Radical-Socialist majority—thus forming the famous Cartel—are, to speak accurately, a revolutionary party calling itself Marxist. There are also the Communists (Third International). Of them we need say little, since no one who is not entirely ignorant of all that France stands for will dare to assert that they count for anything. As far as the Socialist deputies are concerned, it may be said that, though the electorate has sent them to Parliament in considerable numbers (more than 100 strong), it has done so less in consideration of their strictly revolutionary theories than because of their doctrine of nationalisation, which promises a public service which will elevate its appointees into the ranks of the *bourgeoisie*. It should be added that many Socialist voters and even deputies remain good patriots, who, left to themselves, would willingly support a 'Centre' policy.

The purification of our political life desired by so many Frenchmen (and that is the real significance of February 6) which M. Doumergue has undertaken to carry into effect has as its first aim a clearing up of the fatal confusion between the legitimate aspirations of human welfare and the violent doctrines of social upheaval. One could see in the days of the Cartel to what lengths the system of compromise, designed for electoral purposes, could carry matters, when the Radical-Socialists, for all their patriotism, were dragged at the heels of their alliance with the Socialists, with whom they formed a majority without real cohesion, although their real political tendencies ought to have brought them much closer to a common policy with the Centre. The real problem is how to change this state of affairs, which is the origin of the unstable condition of French internal politics under three successive Constitutions. In the first place, the country needs a new electoral law which will enable the popular will to be represented by coherent parties, each independent of the other, in such a way as to create a 'legal' France fashioned in the

image of the 'real.' It can hardly be doubted that in that case a strong majority of the Centre would emerge, which would carry out the traditional French policy of peace and social progress and, in short, maintain the ideal equilibrium of the nation.

The preceding explanation will perhaps make it clear why even the exceptional and painful events of last February have not induced France to crystallise suddenly into a new system. Is it conceivable, otherwise, that 214 deputies could have been found who were ready, while the crisis was at its height, to publish insolent lies on public hoardings and to condemn the victims while acquitting the criminals, unless they had counted on the tacit consent of their constituents? Following the traditional catchword, they rallied to the 'defence of the Republic' and waved before the electors the spectre of reaction now baptised 'Fascism'—a word that has become fashionable since the old danger of Clericalism has become less terrifying to the masses.

The situation is certainly extraordinarily complicated owing to the unequal resistances which the different sections of the 'real' France present to the misfeasances of its 'official' counterpart. Yet one cannot insist too strongly that these partial but frequent disturbances of equilibrium are in direct contradiction to the fundamental character of the great majority of Frenchmen: they are far less natural to it than the return to normality; and they go against the grain even of their supporters, who realise that in some way or other they may furnish the potential spark which will explode the mine of a dictatorial plot. I hope I have accurately determined the limits within which the arterial tension in France is liable to vary. With the exception of a few extreme fits of pressure, its variations are contained within moderate limits. That is why M. Doumergue, when charged with the task of bringing it back to the golden mean, did not feel himself obliged to have recourse to any exceptional remedies.

M. Doumergue is certainly cast in a sufficiently generous mould to be placed in the rank of those who have no need of personal ambition to stimulate their enterprise. But he cannot have assumed the burden of his dangerous duty without some misgiving. Age ripened by experience, philosophy acquired from a long contact with men and things by a spirit which still remains essentially youthful, a complete disregard of the sectarian passions of class or party—all these qualities have given M. Doumergue sufficient subtlety to gauge accurately the exact degree of effort which could be demanded of an organism momentarily enfeebled. As I have tried to explain, a certain section of the 'real' France was inclined to believe that a very extensive surgical operation would be the necessary prelude to

more normal medicinal remedies; they feared that the infection had become too generalised to allow the ordinary treatment to be effective. Indeed, M. Doumergue himself did not refrain from envisaging a more thorough-going policy than that at which he stopped short; as he showed when he promised the ex-service men that *complete justice* would be done and that *all the guilty* would be punished. We must leave to Him who alone knows the depths of the human heart to judge whether M. Doumergue did not deceive himself rather than take the risk of offending others. I am content for my part to assume that, having renewed his contact with affairs and measured accurately the depth to which the malady had pushed its roots, he decided that the operation would involve too many unknown factors. Other dangers against which it was necessary to provide with all urgency were threatening the country. The successful accomplishment of his task needed an atmosphere of calm: in short, since it would not have done to act roughly or hastily, the tacit compliance, at any rate, of the 'official' country was necessary; otherwise the position would become dangerous. The parties of the Left would have been able to pretend that the restoration of order had been invested with a reactionary character. This would have enabled them to close up once more the gaps which were temporarily keeping them apart, and so, in accordance with the old law of reciprocal attraction, to reconstitute the Cartel. France in that case would once and for all have lost the game. M. Doumergue therefore, without in any way prejudicing his future conduct, took a conciliatory line. Judging by the results already obtained in less than three months, it does not appear that he was mistaken in his calculations.

Take for instance, in the first place, the restoration of our finances. Though they had been put in order previously by M. Poincaré directly after the fall of the Cartel, they had lapsed once more into an evil plight, as the result of a socialising policy exaggerated under a succession of Governments by the vagaries of an out-of-date Liberalism—a term which, it must be noted, has not quite the same meaning in France as in England. A ruinous policy of social insurance, and State control of industry run by Government departments with complete disregard of the most elementary business sense; a fiscal system based on 'an inquisition tempered by fraud' (the epigram was coined by one of our most brilliant revenue officials), and therefore not only immoral, but also calculated to distort prices at each of the stages of production, distribution and exchange—much less than this might have been sufficient to ruin the public Treasury and to render illusory every attempt at honest budgeting. The ship was leaking in every part; and to stop the holes was a matter

of extreme urgency: the cargo, too, had to be lightened. The 'real' France understood her saviour and 'official' France followed: it could hardly have taken the heavy responsibility of rebelling against the 'Orders in Council' which 'cut' pensions and salaries and reduced by 80,000 the number of public servants. Moreover, the very small amount of trouble which it succeeded in raising—in spite of public meetings, strikes, and disturbances—proved quite plainly that it had little chance of being followed.

Will this restoration, which must be regarded merely as the necessary preliminary to an organic reconstitution of the social body, offer the assurance of a final relief? M. Doumergue knows better than anyone that it will not. From the political, social, and economic points of view French institutions need to undergo a profound and entire remoulding. The various remedies required are well known. We must find a more judicial and complete expression of universal suffrage by adding to the political representation of the individual a representation of his moral and material interests. We must develop a corporative spirit which will permit production to rationalise itself and escape from the clutch of financial speculators; we must effect a broad decentralisation, based on regional and counter-regional planning, by means of which the State can be relieved of functions it is not fitted to perform; finally, a score of other measures are needed, the relative priority of which varies according to the different schools and platforms, but which are all related to the single end which they envisage. The administrative and legislative functions must be separated, the Executive and the judiciary must be dissociated from each other, and each must be rendered independent of the disturbing influence of parliamentary sessions, which in their turn must be rescued from the management of 'parties' whose inquisitorial domination has the effect of betraying and falsifying the representation of the people. M. Doumergue knows as well as Baron Louis, who restored French finances after the imperial adventure was ended, that the way to assure a sound Treasury is by pursuing a healthy policy. He knows, also, that a healthy policy cannot be pursued without order in the house, and that the safeguarding measures hurriedly taken in an emergency under the pressure of events are not really inconsistent with the long-range work of reconstruction; on the contrary, they really prepare the way for it. And all this he desires to do.

But that is only one of the many aspects of the problem. There were also other difficulties which demanded M. Doumergue's attention, difficulties arising out of our foreign policy, or, if you will, the internal policy of Europe. In the face of her desire for peace and understanding—and it cannot be admitted that France must still be required to plead her cause, in order to demonstrate

her good faith—our country cannot be held responsible for the discordant echoes which have so many times since the Armistice distorted her utterances and betrayed her intentions. Too many concessions never succeed in disarming an enemy or appeasing a rival, or even an ally. The enemy is always tempted to seize his chance by formulating new demands. What does he thereby risk, since he has become accustomed to see everything yielded to him? A rival, an ally, or even a friend is apt to interpret modesty, not as the outward and visible sign of natural moderation, but as the mark of ambition which has been unable to realise all its hopes.

Here too, in his desire to re-establish order and confidence in the sphere of foreign policy, as he has done at home, M. Doumergue has not contemplated any new and extreme policies. He is convinced that the only attitude which France can properly assume is to be herself, without either minimising her or inflating her claims; her hand should be stretched out and held open so that the world may assure itself that it does not tremble. It would have been ridiculous for France to adhere to a disarmament convention to which Germany was not a party. Who could on that account accuse us of bad faith?

M. Doumergue's Government, by its firm attitude, is in effect saying to our friends the English people: 'The times have come when peoples and nations, just like individuals, are called upon to live dangerously, and we do not know what difficulties and dangers the future has in store for us. Let us keep ourselves ready, to face them together, and to overcome them, for it is on our collaboration, perhaps, that the peace of the world depends. From our different points of view our interests, Continental or universal, may, it is true, sometimes be opposed. Our economic equilibrium with Great Britain was broken in 1931 by the closing of her frontiers, and it is undeniable that this was one of the causes of the disturbance of our internal equilibrium. We, too, in certain circumstances of which no one is the master, may be compelled here and there to assume an attitude which may not please you. It is therefore necessary that each of us should have the will to dissipate these clouds when and where they arise: do not let us allow them to darken a sky from which, some day, serious warnings may appear. On that day, dear English friends, in your own interest no less than in ours, you must not repeat the hesitation you showed in 1914: it is not at the end of a week, or even of forty-eight hours, or after a week-end, that you will be obliged in honour to say "No" to the invader; it will be the very instant that we your neighbours, your sentinels upon the Rhine, which is your frontier as much as ours, shall have telegraphed the message "Look out for the gas."'

Was it not an Englishman who defined a Frenchman as 'a gentleman with decorations who keeps on asking for bread and does not know any geography'? But the accusation made against us that we do not know what was happening in the different parts of the globe is no longer quite just. I hope it will be believed beside the banks of the Thames that those who live by the Seine and the Loire follow with attention in their newspapers—or even in their atlas when their knowledge is insufficient—the various stages of the journeys of their Foreign Minister. When they know a little history—which is sometimes the case—they heartily share in the warm reception given by the Poles to their ambassador-extraordinary to confirm an alliance six centuries old.

But Poland is a long way off. Moreover, she is a sufficiently great nation to be contented with her political status. At the same time M. Louis Barthou was a sufficiently good strategist to cull the best advantages, from the point of view of the peace of Europe, from the understandings and pacts concluded recently by Warsaw with Moscow and Berlin, to the great discomfort of malicious observers who were already rejoicing that these agreements proved that Poland was beginning to set less value on her friendship with France. The assurances which Prague, the centre of the Little Entente, has given us are of the same character and equally valuable. At Rome, too, the times and the seasons have worked for us. The *Duce* has remembered that it was a Roman citizen, Tacitus, who 2000 years ago was the first to denounce the *furor Teutonicus*, which has been inspiring Germany ever since she took it upon herself to baptise it with the essentially German name of *Schadenfreude*. In any case, the attitude of Rome assures us that the attempts of Hitlerism to absorb Austria will now remain frustrated.

I do not wish to abuse the patience of my readers, nor the courteous hospitality which the *Nineteenth Century and After* has been so kind as to extend to me. Nevertheless, I believe that this rapid survey, this bird's-eye view of the position in France, in what the old diplomacy used to call the 'Concert of Europe,' should suffice to reassure our friends. I may perhaps be criticised for not having followed a formally deductive plan. But I preferred during the course of this article to reply to questions concerning our real attitude by following out the psychological processes which come most naturally to us. I have laid bare without ambiguity the intensity of a justifiable emotion felt on a memorable occasion, and, further, I have carefully evaluated, with a view to their possible consequences, the facts which evoked it. First and foremost I have attempted to communicate to our friends this conviction, that no mad actions were to be feared in

France from the men or the parties who are preparing our return to order.

Of the constitutional principles which France will choose there is not one which justifies the world in supposing that she has been attacked by the now fashionable maladies. It is true that a Socialist Government inspired by Communist ideas might lend some reason for disquietude, but one would have to be very ill-informed as to our true character not to realise that we are equally repelled by Fascism either of the Right or of the Left. The events of February 6 will furnish the proof in letters of blood. From the point of view of our relations with other nations, as well as from that of our own domestic politics, it should be understood that Imperialism is no element in our character and that it accords neither with our material necessities nor with our spiritual aspirations. 'Nothing too much' was the motto of the Romans, as of the Greeks. This proverb we have truly made our own; the word 'Fascism' cannot even be translated into French, and that is the sole reason why we use it.

What we want, what the real France wants, is simply to live and work (and, if she must, defend herself) perfectly freely and independently. Imagine our good Prime Minister, M. Doumergue, his arms extended and his face contorted, speaking for two hours before 2,000,000 persons born between Lille and Marseilles, all drowsily arrayed in the same brown shirt! Surely, if such a fantastic fit should possess us, we could not look at each other for five minutes without bursting into laughter. We know that is not his style, nor is it ours. Five minutes' talk on the wireless, a little advice simply offered, an order received as it is given, with good humour—that is enough. That is the way in which France is working out her own salvation.

RENÉ JULLIARD.

JAPAN'S 'MONROE DOCTRINE'

THE Tokyo of to-day is an earthquake-proof city of concrete and steel, with skyscrapers and department stores, lavish cinemas and 'Piccadillys' and 'Fifth Avenues' of congested traffic. As for hotels, even the late Arnold Bennett would be impressed by the glow of a Saturday night dance at the (American-built) 'Imperial,' with its lotus-pool and palm-gardens, and a sumptuous ballroom where the native *élite* tango with aliens from many lands.

But is this Japan? It is one of her 'dual' aspects. She can lay all this by with astonishing ease and revert to the primal source which is for ever vital, rooted as it is in the racial past of a *Bushido* code and the two-handed Samurai sword. Japan is a 'family' in the national sense that Edmund Burke was the first political prophet to discern. She has learned much since the 'Enlightened Era' began in 1868, when rulers and people agreed that 'Knowledge shall be sought in all the world'—from religions to armaments and from industry to war.

This dual 'Japanism' is very baffling to foreigners; this amalgam of East and West, a close-woven texture that veils the fervid soul of a people whose patriot flame, devotion to duty (and to the throne), and personal sacrifice form a complex unique in our modern world.

But here we are at the Foreign Office. A roomy un-'Eastern' abode, it formerly housed the eminent guests of a 2000-year Court. The last of these was our own King's son, who bore to the Mikado our supreme Order of Chivalry. After the Duke of Gloucester's visit, the mansion was refitted for its present use as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Now, in view of past and future events, its Japanese name is significant—*Kasumi-ga-seki* (or 'The Misty Barrier'). Its site once overlooked a wide tidal marsh where the sea-fogs swayed and drifted.

The *Kasumi-ga-seki* is to-day a busy hive of bureaux—of roll-top desks and typewriters, of dictaphones and filing-cabinets, with clerks and chiefs of keen ability in control. For sheer efficiency, even Mr. Roosevelt's vast white pile of the Commerce Department has nothing 'on' this Tokyo Foreign Office. Yet who would believe that its European-clad staff can 'go native'

at home? These officials can put off the West with their garments. I have known a Prime Minister to change into archaic robes after the day's work and sink on the matted floor to brush his ideographs upon ivory paper. You will see the millowner doff his lounge suit in the same way to pore upon the early Chinese classics under a distorted pine. A great banker will practise the curious rites of archery, as in the Shoguns' day. Engineers and technicians (quaintly robed for the part) will scatter beans in a 1200-year-old ceremony. To the right is flung one shower with the pious invocation, '*Oni wa sotto!*' ('Avaunt, evil spirits!'); and to the left goes a second handful, '*Fuku wa uchi!*' ('Come and guard us, Angels benign!').

Or again, go into the movie-show of a country town. Here Japan's 'duality' is made manifest on the screen. There are no seats, but only mats to squat upon. And two distinct films are billed. First comes a 'death-or-honour' epic of the old *régime*, with the Sword of Vengeance flashed by shaven-pated heroes of 1000 years ago. Costumes; bloodshed, suicide and chivalry. High deeds of *Ronin*-patriots of the past. A little love, but much tragedy, with the ideal of sacrifice as the *leit-motif*, and *Æschylean* sadness over all. The second film presents To-day with wholly different actors. It may be a comedy of the Ginza, played in the modish clothes of Savile Row, with luring girls in Paris frocks and hats, and make-up. To this 'Western' appeal a barefoot audience (their shoes have been left outside, as Moslems do in a mosque) reacts at once, waving tiny pipes with faint approving cries in the semi-darkness. And why not? This aspect of Japan is as familiar as the feudal one, in which posing *daimios* and fierce Samurai chiefs lived the Past over again.

Together, the two scenes suggest the Present. And this, in turn, foreshadows the 'Period of Emergence'—which comes in 1935, when the strangest of all Powers cuts loose from the League of Nations, to demand equality of naval status with more than German race-pride and confidence. 'Determination does much,' as the fiery Sadao Araki (as War Minister) noted in the *Kaikosha* (or Army Club journal). 'We have no need to poke our nose into Europe's affairs,' wrote that 'Back-to-Asia' stalwart Kaku Mori, Chief Secretary of a recent Cabinet. 'We must concentrate our efforts on the stabilisation of Asia. For it is to Asia we belong; and there we can best develop our national mission.' Of this creed the new Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, dotted the i's and crossed the t's in a well-weighed message—not through any shadowy 'spokesman,' be it said, but in a speech made direct to the Imperial Diet, whose white granite castle crowns Tokyo's hill.

First he quoted a rescript of 'our august sovereign' which

declared that the empire was 'embarking on a course of its own.' Japan's Government, the Minister insisted, 'had serious responsibilities in East Asia, and a firm resolve in that regard.' China must co-operate with Japan in her own 'political and economic rehabilitation.' As for the Soviet Union, its recent action and utterance were 'surprising and regrettable.' 'Exaggerated stories' were broadcast 'against Japan . . . for such political and diplomatic purposes as those rumours are calculated to serve.' With the United States, 'far from any thought of picking a quarrel, Japan fervently desires her friendship.' Therefore:

'If only America will clearly perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realise Japan's rôle as the stabilising force in East Asia, whatever emotional tension may yet linger between the two peoples will disappear.'

Hirota followed this with a survey of the world's present 'sorry situation' in its selfish economic mania. For all that—

Our own industries have taken marked strides, with a corresponding expansion in overseas trade. . . . We should not forget for a moment that Japan, serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice of peace in East Asia, bears the entire onus of duty there. It is in this position, and in those vast burdens, that Japan's diplomacy and national defence must be rooted.

It were well that the Western Powers should see this. For

if we all unite to act in accord with our own sovereign's wishes, the world will come to realise the justice and fairness of Japan's aims, and bright will be the future of our empire.

To sum up, the Foreign Minister added a personal note: 'In obedience to the imperial rescript, I am determined to use every ounce of my energy to carry out our national policy.' Yet in spite of all the recent flurries and 'friendly inquiries' of last April, the aims and claims of that policy still hide behind the 'misty barrier' of the *Kasumi-ga-seki*. It was there that Koki Hirota bowed out the ailing and wearied Count Uchida in September last and took his place at the desk as the 'new Bismarck' of Asia, which contains half the human race and its riches in the world's hugest continent of 16,000,000 square miles.

Now, what manner of man is Japan's Foreign Minister? One of singular strength, and of thirty years' experience in the focal points of Seoul, Peking, Washington, London, and Moscow. No living authority equals Hirota in his grasp of China's problems—her multiple psyche, her many languages, resources and sectional bias. This son of a humble stone-hewer of Kyushu is at heart as hot a zealot as any. But he learned self-repression as a Buddhist disciple among monks of the austere Zen sect. His long career in the Foreign service, from an obscure clerkship in Korea to the domination of Soviet commissars in the Kremlin as

ambassador—here is a romance of subtle wits and strenuous study which I must pass over for lack of space.

Hirota's first Foreign Office move—and a wise one in so stormy a time—was to arrange a weekly lunch with his army and navy colleagues, so that these might be kept fully informed. It was high time, also, to curb the demands of the fighting services. These absorbed last year 875,000,000 yen—a sum not exceeded even in 1921 (before the Washington Conference), when Japan was committed to a great naval programme which included sixteen battleships. Now the three 'imperial' Ministers could frame new plans under Hirota's sober lead as they ate *sushi* sandwiches and slices of *ika* or octopus, washed down with warm rice-wine called *saké*. 'Who keeps one end in view, makes all things serve,' wrote Browning; and this may be said of Koki Hirota. He has no enemies; his envoys abroad are picked men, like Hiroshi Saito in Washington. That young ambassador knows America as few Americans do. He is a naval expert, as well as an astute trade emissary of long experience as consul-general in New York. Asked by naïf reporters what his new 'mission' was, Saito gaily replied: 'To drink rye and bourbon [whisky] with good Americans!' This jovial sally was soon followed by a Hirota bombshell over the United States credits in the Far East: 'Japan must act and decide alone what is good for China.' With much else of a like minatory kind, while Saito's colleague in Berlin warned the Powers in the same vein.

Those storms blew over, leaving the resolute assertion of Japan's primacy in Asia. Yet who can forget her solemn adhesion to the Nine-Power Pact of 1922? That was followed by the lopping off of Chinese provinces equal in area to eight Englands, after a merciless 'undeclared' war in which no fewer than 222,000 Chinese officers, soldiers and civilians (Tokyo's own official figures) were killed or wounded! 'Dogs may bark'—as the fateful Oriental maxim has it—'but the Caravan goes on.' No wonder Uchida told his Premier that Hirota was the ideal leader of this fast-moving Caravan. General Araki named Yosuke Matsuoka, the blunt spokesman at Geneva who announced the empire's withdrawal from the League. But Prince Kimmochi Saionji, the last of the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, advised the Emperor to appoint Hirota; it was also that patriarch who chose Admiral Viscount Saito for Prime Minister amid a rising tide of Fascism, due to the clamour of young officers who were responsible for the murders of Hamaguchi in 1930 and Inukai in 1932, as well as of Inouye, the ex-Minister of Finance, and Baron Takuma Dan, the great industrialist.

The authors of these crimes—members of secret societies,

like the dignified Kokuhonsha and the more heady Black Dragon—were in too much of a hurry with Japan's Caravan. It is now felt that Hirota's way is best: to advance in bold, but discreet stages, without any flourish. This Cabinet team is well equipped for the 'predestined event.' All know that their Asiatic march is beyond any European (or American) control; they know, also, that geography, coupled with strategy on the mainland, can render them secure and immune. 'I tell you as a naval man,' Sir Roger Keyes attests, 'that Japan is untouchable!' So to Naval Conferences, as the same expert says, she comes 'with her tongue in her cheek.' Meanwhile, the United States, as a prudent gesture, withdrew her battle and scouting fleets from the Pacific, where they had been stationed for more than two years—a great armada of 113 ships and 300 'planes, the whole manned by 3700 officers and 44,000 seamen. For America dislikes being 'out in front' while this delicate matter of the mastery of Asia is being so starkly canvassed. Australia, too, made haste to send a 'good-will' mission to Japan under Mr. Latham. Whether these deferential moves were wise at this time—or even expedient—is at least open to question.

The peculiar psyche and polity of imperial Japan are not understood, nor yet their reactions in the past ten years since the Siberian adventure withered away and 400 Japanese were killed at Nicolaevsk. Then came the banking collapse of 1927. After that—as a restless army and navy held—Japan's 'inferiority' at sea was reaffirmed in London, because the politicians overruled the supreme command. Hence the cruel assassination of the aged Premier Inukai in his own home by a group of officers of both services. These gave themselves up at once, and explained their hopes of a military dictatorship in the empire. Manchuria (won by the blood of 100,000 soldiers) was now being lost—so these zealots wailed—by spineless 'party' Governments. The American collapse of 1929 made raw silk fall to zero prices, and the farmers—who furnish 80 per cent. of Japan's conscript army—were soon in dire distress. The officers come chiefly from the rural middle class. Tokyo's 'Wall Street,' it was further complained, made millions when the gold standard was abandoned; so that the army's wrath and scorn for politicians and financiers grew to white heat.

I should explain that the military caste here, as in pre-war Germany, is the rock upon which the State is built, and is in no way subservient to the civil power. It is also in some sort the traditional *ensor morum* amid corruption and intrigue. The army upholds the *Bushido* ideals of discipline and courage. It stands close to the people, too, and asserts a right to be heard as armed guardian of the whole Japanese 'family.' All this

feeling found a sudden vent in the Shanghai and Manchuria onslaughts. Thereafter the militarists won their own way in shaping policy. 'Manchukuo' was set up, and the protocol signed by Marshal Muto in Changshün. 'It is sacred,' he declared curtly as 'ambassador' to the new-born State. 'And no nation shall be allowed to violate it!' At home, General Araki took the lead, and in two years of office he restored the army's power within the Constitution. This he ensured in two ways: first, by the proviso that the War and Navy Ministers should be high officers of those services; secondly, that the supreme command should be vested in the general staffs: these were to be responsible to the Emperor alone and not to the Cabinet, thus creating a separate military executive. This revolution—for it was no less—spread throughout the empire. Araki secured with ease the funds for army mechanisation. The crisis, he held, was far from over, in view of the grave events that were looming in 1935-36.

So was the old system of 'party' government overthrown. Never again should the empire suffer humiliations such as go back to 1895, when the fruits of victory were snatched from her by France, Russia and Germany, with a brusque intimation that 'the permanent occupation of the Manchurian littoral by Japan would endanger peace.' What could the Emperor do but 'yield to the dictates of magnanimity and accept the advice of the three Powers'? How much has happened since the Treaty of Shimoneseki was signed!

Between those days and last autumn's naval review by H.I.J.M. Hirohito we see an upsurge of power, political and military, which is without a parallel in human annals. On that day the Emperor was escorted by 10,000-ton cruisers of great sea-range, mounting 8-inch guns of a new type. Moored in serried files from Yokohama to Kazaradzu was a stupendous fleet. Huge battleships and heavy cruisers launched their own aircraft from catapults. Destroyers in swarms, submarines of 2000 tons, cruiser mine-layers and aircraft-carriers, like the new *Ryujo*—here was a homogeneous striking force of 161 vessels, or 847,000 tons in all. It is upon this superb fleet—officered by profound students of sea-power and manned by devotees of throne and empire, together with her magnificent army—that Japan bases her claim to 'all-Asia' hegemony. Let me say here that all three services are about to be greatly enlarged when the 'year of crisis' (1935-6) ushers in a 'period of emergence' from all European trammels of treaties and leagues. Viscount Takahashi's last budget, precariously balanced by large borrowings at 2,106,000,000 yen, included 449,000,000 yen for the army and 487,000,000 for the naval estimates. The Minister of Agriculture pleaded in vain for the

relief of Japan's farmers, who were hit by the fall in raw silk prices due to Mr. Roosevelt's depreciated dollar. So in a noisy and excited Diet the Prime Minister had a trying time. But, once more, the militarists had their way. There could be no disarming of Japan, because, as Viscount Ishii said, 'We dwell between two volcanoes—Russia and China.'

Now I approach the grave question of racial exclusion, which lies at the root of Japan's 'Back-to-Asia' impulse. Strange to say, this deeply wounding slight to a proud and sensitive people first became acute in the United States, whose naval 'big stick' was the first to break open the hermit empire. Having gained his end, America's chief Executive put a toddling Japan in kindly leading-strings. Witness the Treaty of Yedo, in 1858. 'The President of the United States,' we read in this, 'at the request of the Japanese Government, will act as a friendly mediator in such matters of difference as may arise between Japan and any European Power.' Who could foresee the fierce ill-will that was to follow, rising at times to war-cries in Tokyo's Press, to reckless 'incidents' on both sides of the Pacific, even to threats that California would secede from the Federal Union unless Theodore Roosevelt ceased to meddle in a 'yellow' quarrel that was the sole concern of a rich sovereign State (over 3000 miles from Washington), which is twice the United Kingdom's area.

Here is irreconcilable cleavage and rivalry. It is partly rooted in economics, but chiefly in racial antipathy; and Japan can neither forgive this, nor forget it. There are, as she points out, over 12,000,000 negroes in the United States. These—even the illiterate and abject peons of the 'deep South'—are at least nominally rated as American citizens. Yet the Japanese, whose zeal for knowledge is phenomenal, are shut out by a complex of hostile Acts, both Federal and State, which have caused intense irritation in Tokyo for many years, and gravely embarrassed many Washington Administrations.

America is closed. A 'White Australia' is rigidly decreed; there are drastic embargoes upon the yellow men in British Columbia. It is well to remember that the United States, in the words of Nicholas Roosevelt,

has become an Asiatic Power; and in this new Pacific era we must play a preponderant part. . . . We control two-thirds of the trade of the Philippines. From the Dutch East Indies we now import over twenty times more than in 1913. We take half the exports of British Malaysia. We are Japan's principal customer. Briefly, we find that America's trade with Asia and Oceania has risen from \$283,000,000 in 1900 to more than \$2,064,000,000 in 1927. As William H. Seward prophesied generations ago, our interests in Europe have relatively declined, whilst in the Pacific they have steadily increased, until they are now dominant.

To maintain the 'open door' in China and the 'Monroe Doctrine' in her own hemisphere the United States is committed to war if it be necessary. The Far Eastern policy long antedates the declaration of John Hay in 1900. So far back as 1843 we find Daniel Webster instructing his envoy, the able Caleb Cushing, to 'butt in' roughly among the Powers who were scrambling for favours in Peking:

You will signify in decided terms, and with a positive manner, that the Government of the United States will find it impossible to remain on terms of friendship with the Emperor, if greater privileges or commercial facilities are granted to the subjects of other Governments than to citizens of the United States.

A treaty was signed in the following year.

Yet America herself it is who has consistently played into the hands of Japan as her own rival in Asia. Here is a fact I have never seen noted as a cardinal error in United States diplomacy, and one that bears directly upon present and future events in the Far East. The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 greatly disturbed President (Theodore) Roosevelt. That crude, impulsive man—in whom his friendliest biographer could never see a trace of 'statecraft'—was now all for placating the victorious Japanese. His 'Gentlemen's Agreement' of 1908 left the issue of 'yellow' passports for immigrants to the discretion of the Cabinet in Tokyo. Then the Root-Takahira Note of 1908 explicitly admitted Japan's 'special interests' in Asiatic affairs. When State Secretary Knox proposed the 'nationalisation' of Manchuria's railways, Tokyo objected, claiming 'exclusive rights' on the mainland. Into America's attitude thereafter crept something like fear, and that note is continuous down to to-day. This was seen in 1912, when it was rumoured that Mexico was to cede or lease Magdalena Bay to Japanese interests. Meanwhile, California's own Legislature continued to pass 'Exclusion Acts,' and the old 'racial' feud flamed up afresh. In 1915, when the Powers were locked in desperate strife, the Okuma Cabinet saw fit to advance Japan's 'special interests' by a staggering *démarche*. In Peking, Minister Hioki presented Yuan Shi-k'ai with 'Twenty-one Demands and Wishes.' These, if conceded, would have reduced the colossal human hive we call China to the status of a mere Haiti or a Nicaragua, *vis-à-vis* the United States.

That episode passed; but Japan's intent and purpose of Asia's mastery remained, as recent events have plainly shown us. The next milestone is the Ishii-Lansing Agreement of 1917. In this, both parties recognise that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries; therefore, 'Japan has special interests in China.' On America's side, diplomacy was irresolute and loose, with no fixed policy as a guide: Japan's

goal was throughout unfaltering and sure. In 1924, by a vote of 76 to 2, the United States Senate abrogated the so-called 'Gentlemen's Agreement' with Japan over her immigrants. And the Johnson Bill, passed in the Lower House by 376 votes to 71, now made 'exclusion' more drastic than ever. The Tokyo Cabinet entered a 'solemn protest.' Their ambassador in Washington, Masanao Hanihara, went so far as to hint at 'grave consequences.' State Secretary Hughes (a very able man) warned President Coolidge against this new goading. Senator Phelan, of California, spoke of tens of thousands of 'picture-brides,' who had come over from Japan to work in the fields beside their spouses—prolific wives, a factor in Japan's 'colonisation of our Pacific slope, which will quickly spread in the West.'

Popular fury broke loose in Tokyo. Ministers like Kiyoura and Matsui sought to restrain the Press (which called out for boycotts and 'days of humiliation') and to calm the tumult with the fateful word '*Shikata-gani*' ('It cannot be helped!'). Serious riots broke out. A frantic patriot killed himself in protest outside the ruins of the American Embassy. For many dangerous days a 'National Spirit Movement' burned throughout the empire. That Tokyo 'martyr' had a Samurai's funeral in the great Aoyama Cemetery, where so many of Japan's notables rest. A monster meeting of 25,000 persons was held in the huge wrestling-hall at Ryogoku. Members of the Diet were there with university professors and editors, as well as army and navy officers and zealots of the Black Dragon and other 'Blood Brotherhood' clans. The speeches were fiery; they ended with 'We must punish America!'

At once emotional and disciplined, as well as united in 'family' bonds and strongly conscious of 'mission,' these gifted people resent above all else this ostracism put upon them by the white races. Especially does their wrath smoulder against the United States, whose battle fleet was transferred to the Pacific, there to go through manœuvres which had only Japan in mind as a possible adversary. But perhaps the oddest feature in the present Far Eastern surge is that the 'onlie begetter' of Japan's 'Monroe Doctrine' in Asia should have been Theodore Roosevelt himself. This piquant fact was revealed in Tokyo two years ago by Viscount Kaneko, a privy councillor and an ex-Minister of Justice. For it was to him that the President confided his plan in 1905, at a time when California defied all pleas from Washington over 'yellow' migrants into her own 'sovereignty.' California had closed her schools to Japanese children, even the native-born. Politicians and labour leaders of Sacramento and San Francisco carried this 'anti-Jap' crusade into the other two Pacific States, and even as far north as Vancouver. So the

worried Roosevelt cast about him for some means of keeping Japan at home. Here is the substance of what he put to Viscount Kaneko: it was by that Minister reported to his own Government and to the Emperor:

Japan is the only nation in Asia that is westernised, and yet retains her own antique heritage. Her drowsy neighbours are now faced with the need of adjusting themselves to this new age. In that process Japan should be their natural leader and also their protector, too, during the transition period: 'Much as the United States assumed the headship of the American continent many years ago, and, by means of the "Monroe Doctrine," preserved the Latin-American nations from European interference while they were maturing their own independence.' The future policy of Japan in Asia (Roosevelt went on) should proceed on similar lines. Such a 'Monroe Doctrine' for the Far East would be a bar to European encroachment. Japan's primacy would be recognised by her weaker sisters; her own armed might should be the ægis in whose shelter they could reorganise their national systems. As for the territory to be thus brought under Japan's influence, this might embrace 'The entire continent of Asia, from Suez to Kamchatka, excluding only India and Indo-China; the Philippines, Hong-Kong and other European and American possessions.' Of course, this new *Führerprinzip* of Japan must needs respect the United States tenet of an 'open door' and 'equal opportunity' for all in China.

Such was Theodore Roosevelt's prompting to an aggrieved Japan, whom he had persuaded to sign a victor's peace (with Russia) on American soil at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 'If you will proclaim such an Asiatic "Doctrine,"' Roosevelt concluded to Kaneko, 'I will support you with all my power, either during my Presidency, or after its expiration.'

The Franklin Roosevelt of to-day must read this counsel with mixed feelings. His own aircraft concerns are outfitting China with bombers of great power and range, as at the Hangchow aerodrome, where American instructors run a native school for Chinese pilots. Much of the latest United States grain and cotton loan to China has certainly been spent upon munitions, pressed by eager salesmen in Shanghai. To-day's manœuvres of America's fleet in both oceans, as well as in the Canal and the Caribbean, have Far Eastern 'invasion' and pursuit in mind. Then the eight admirals of Washington's Navy Board are more than anxious over the future of Hawaii and the Asiatic archipelago, where the Filipinos have for years urged an 'independence' they are quite helpless to maintain. What if Japan seized those 7000 isles and made of Manila 'another Gibraltar,' such as the United States Navy League has so long advised? Already the Bonin group,

half-way between Japan and the Ladrões, are being prepared as bases for long-range marine aircraft and submarines. Then there are the mandated Carolines, Marianas and Marshall Islands, as to which Mineo Osumi, Japan's Naval Minister, has issued a pamphlet on the empire's 'indomitable will' against their surrender into any other hands. United States officers report 'undue construction' on Saipan Island, with extensive dredging to permit the entrance of ships drawing 25 feet. Another harbour has been developed in the Pelew group south-east of Guam—a United States insular base; and military roads are being constructed. Precisely what all these moves portend, none can as yet say. But if Japan is to carry out Theodore Roosevelt's idea as 'Mistress of Asia,' such paramount power implies her undisputed mastery in the Pacific. And that might well bring her into conflict with the United States, whether the policy be an active one or merely passive—like the gradual closing of the 'open door' and Far Eastern markets of endless potentialities.

Of the Russian 'volcano' mentioned by Viscount Ishii, everyone is aware, by reason of reckless and provocative speech from various members of the Moscow *Politbureau*—to say nothing of military flourishes from the Red army in Siberia under General Vassili Blücher. Moscow makes ready to resist a 'pounce' in Japan's chosen hour. But then Stalin's Russia is not as the lame and vague colossus of 1904; or so it is vaunted. Tomorrow's 'enemy' may be building strategic railways, laying out aerodromes and air bases above Mukden, and massing his yellow legions in vulnerable centres. 'We are prepared: we have barred our frontier with locks of steel and concrete to resist the strongest teeth!' As for the air arm, Moscow describes Japan's new 'forward' policy as *nastagashahi*, or purely self-centred and with no regard for outsiders. Her diplomacy the Kremlin chiefs consider crafty, tenacious and suave: '*shari-kopodshipnok*' (or 'ball-bearing') is the word used to express a silent source of power which is never deflected from its end. In Tokyo the Foreign Office spokesman (Eiji Amau) spoke his mind about Moscow's cocksure challenges. And at the War Office the Chief of the Press Bureau (General Eiko Tojo) fancied that November 1935 would see a crisis so acute that Russo-Japanese hostilities could no longer be avoided.

Meanwhile, the Island Empire ploughs a lonely furrow towards her Asiatic primacy. She is poor; she is overcrowded with nearly 70,000,000 people and has 1,000,000 more to find a living for each year. Where is Japan's surplus to go? Brazil and Peru are far off, although resorted to by hard-working emigrants who are welcomed on both coasts. The wilderness of Northern Australia they could make to blossom, if only they were

allowed. At home Professor Teijiro, of the University of Commerce in Tokyo, sadly mourns the lot of his own folks as compared with California's. In the one case, 959 farm-hands are huddled on each square kilometre of arable land. In the other, a bare 5,000,000 well-fed citizens sprawl over a sunny paradise which is twice the size of Japan! Is it fair or just, this hateful stigma of colour and caste, in a vast realm like the United States, where the decent Japanese stand out as a reproach among white criminals who are numbered in millions, and whose lurid record and immunity amaze the world to-day?

Shame and anger rise in Japan at this studied humiliation. The 'reckoning' of which Colonel House warned President Wilson in 1919 is often discussed by military experts in Europe. Thus, in a recent number of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Henri Casseville forecasts the sea and land course of an 'inevitable' war of the Pacific between Japan and the United States, with the latter worsted in the maritime affair, by reason of her enemy's strategic advantage. The land campaign, as the French writer sees it, is of extraordinary interest, but I cannot follow it here.

Commercially, as we all know, Japan has long waged 'war' upon the white Powers; and her machines, coupled with directive genius and docile skill, have made enormous conquests literally from China to Peru. Taking all the trades, I find that the Japanese worker's average wage is 2½d. an hour. In the textiles men are paid 2d. and the women about 1d. an hour for ingenious tasks done with a deft and disciplined cheerfulness unknown in our own Western shops and factories. What can be done against such an 'enemy' in the economic field? Yet, for all this success, Japan's ruling classes feel a vague *malaise*: a sense of enforced seclusion—even of failure to win that full 'equality' which they insist is their racial due. There is even talk of changing the empire's name, now that her full Asiatic destiny is envisaged. The Ministry of Education suggests 'Ni-pon,' instead of the familiar 'Japan,' which is held to be historically inaccurate. The two ideographs which form the new name ('Sun Origin') were bestowed of old by the Chinese on account of their island neighbour's location.

So bitterness is mixed with triumph in all the fields of war and peace, including South America. Here a combined mission of fifty trades is on tour, with results which have roused even Mr. Roosevelt from the mazy tangles of Recovery and Reform. New Japanese tactics are afoot in Buenos Aires. A chamber of commerce has been opened in Montevideo: twenty republics are being deluged with goods, from pottery and shoes to cosmetics and matches. The United States herself, now crying out for whisky (which she lacks), is glad to welcome a weird brand of

Scotch (the 'Queen George'!) from Osaka's fire-water cauldrons. Japan will supply *any* demand; and before her low-priced offerings every rival must fade away. What wonder, then, that in the past two years her exports have risen by 63 per cent.?

Yet, as I say, melancholy and frustration creep as Japan recedes into Asia with her Rooseveltian 'Monroe Doctrine' as a guerdon which is no complete reward. Mighty in arms she may be, invincible in trade; only in the vital matter of race and 'colour' is her inferiority made apparent. Of all the white Powers, Japan has most in common with Germany, who in past days was her tutor in the arts of war. This sentiment Vice-Admiral Matsushita expressed in Berlin last month, after unusual attention had been shown him by Hindenburg, Hitler, Goering, Von Neurath, and the rest. At a reception given by the German-Japanese Society the admiral deplored the 'difficulties' which beset these two martial and commercial peoples, who were 'as one in their efficiency, their valour and their tenacity.' Were not both seeking 'an equality of rights' with all the vigour at their command?

Meanwhile, we hear little from the *Kasumi-ga-seki* (or 'The Misty Barrier'), which is the Foreign Office in Tokyo. There, in secrecy, Koki Hirota and his three colleagues steer the strangest of all our modern ships of State. To what goal, none can determine—not even those patriot Ministers. For they have to deal with the Japanese 'family,' whose surges are unsure. 'Passions,' as Raleigh wrote, 'are likened best to floods: the shallow murmur, but the deep are dumb!'

WM. GEO. FITZ-GERALD.

CATHOLIC AUSTRIA AND THE HAPSBURGS

THE struggle between the Catholic Church and the 'Nordic' race has reached a new intensity of late. It is a new religious war, in which both sides, as ever, mistake their own folly for divine guidance, and Providence herself seems to have chosen Irony for her disguise. There was a time, after all, when it might have been generally agreed that cities on the scale of Vienna, or even of Munich, should be regarded as administrative units in which the wishes of the big majority of their citizens should not go disregarded. Yet Vienna, where it is certain that two-thirds of the people were recently Socialist in an anti-Catholic sense, has since February been condemned to compulsory Catholicism, while Munich, where the majority of the population is undoubtedly on the Pope's side against the Nazis, is subjected to a Nazi domination which grows sterner every day. It is an interesting experiment for the English traveller who is aware of these things to test his sense of justice by crossing and recrossing the Austro-Bavarian frontier; he will find that it is chiefly in the technique, not the fact, of oppression that he can differentiate between the Austrian and the Bavarian régime.

These assertions will, at first sight, appear incautious, and they require careful justification. It is unlikely that history will ever reveal the detailed truth about the elections in Bavaria on March 5, 1933; it is only certain that the Catholics of Bavaria are convinced that the Nazi victory was won by the employment of many unscrupulous devices. It is also indisputable that Bavarian feeling against the Nazis has grown since that time; the peasants, for instance, who were attracted by Nazi offers in March 1933, were alienated before the end of the year by the Nazi inheritance law (*Erbhofgesetz*). Statistically Bavaria is 80 per cent. Catholic, but this is an unhelpful figure; it tells one only that 80 per cent. of the people are not officially attached to any other Church, and it includes large numbers of enthusiastic Nazis. There can, however, be no serious doubt that the largest compact body of opinion in Bavaria is genuinely Catholic as opposed to Nazi. The Nazis are strong with the Protestants of Franconia—the domain of the notorious Jew-defamer, Streicher

—but in Munich itself the percentage of those who do not adhere to the Catholic Church is only 12. It is inherent in the Bavarian situation that this city was the birthplace of National Socialism, the most virile form of contemporary anti-clericalism. And to-day Munich remains the headquarters of the Nazi Party, and the place where the fanatics evolve the policy which is watered down in the metropolitan atmosphere of Berlin. The position, however, cannot be summed up by the mere contemplation of the moral discomfort in which the Nuncio in Munich was compelled to live until, the other day, he moved from a residence which faced the Brown House. The least Nazi State of Germany has been deliberately handed over to what is probably the most Nazi administration in the *Reich*; and, where both sides are so intensely aware of the importance of coming generations, the situation is summed up in the person of the Nazi and Protestant, Herr Schemm, who has been appointed, of all things, to be Bavarian Minister of Education (or *Kultusminister*). That Schemm, since May 1, has been subordinated to the new *Reich* Ministry of Education under the Prussian Minister, Rust, will not increase his popularity. Another provocative innovation is that the city of Munich has a Protestant Nazi mayor.

Yet, in saying so much, one has scarcely begun to indicate the true state of affairs in Bavaria. A Nazi will point out that the appointment of nationally-minded men cannot be resented, whatever their religious persuasion, and in any case the Catholics are irreproachably protected by the Concordat of last July. The outside world is vaguely aware that the Concordat is not working smoothly, but it has little idea of the complete travesty the agreement has become. Its two most important articles are Nos. 31 and 32. Article 31 guarantees the protection of the State for 'Catholic associations which serve religious, purely cultural and charitable purposes—as well as other Catholic associations which have social objects, so far as a guarantee is given that they carry on their activities outside any political party.' (Although the German bishops and the *Reich* Government were to decide which of the existing associations should be here included, no decision has ever been made, and none are therefore legally ruled out.) Article 32 lays down that priests and members of religious orders may not belong to political parties, or carry on activities on behalf of them; since the only political party which now exists in Germany is that of the Nazis, Catholic priests are not often tempted to break this rule. In fact, the policy of the Catholics has been to pursue a correctness which verges upon concession, though brave words in vindication of Christian morality have been spoken from the pulpits.

The Bavarian Government does not itself contravene these

articles, for it has no need to do so. It simply keeps the field clear for the secret police, with which it quite accurately declares itself unable to interfere. This German *Tcheka*, now centralised throughout the *Reich* under the direction of the notorious Storm Guard leader Himmler, is a body which usurps any powers it needs, and cannot be compelled to accept any legal responsibility. In Bavaria a succession of perfectly arbitrary police orders are issued, varying from town to town; the secret police, to which the rest of the police is perforce subordinate, feigns ignorance of the Concordat, and issues orders in direct contravention of the understanding to which Vice-Chancellor von Papen appended his signature. In Munich an order was issued some months ago forbidding every Catholic association of maid-servants, or whatever it might be, to hold meetings more than once in two months; when these meetings occur, they may not take place where they have habitually done so (*i.e.*, where the rent is paid), but only in some other, and public, place. And three children may be accused of holding a meeting. At the beginning of May the Nazis of Schweinfurt attempted quite frankly to rescind article 31, and to proscribe the Catholic Youth Associations of Lower Franconia. If Berlin has to restrain Munich, this is nothing to the restraint which Munich must bring to bear upon the wild men of Franconia, whether in the matter of arresting foreign journalists or in flouting the Pope. The Schweinfurt order was almost immediately 'limited to the banning of uniforms and badges, and the appearance in public of the said organisations.' This rather ambiguous modification brings one to the subject of 'uniforms and badges,' a matter which has been handled with a very characteristic Nazi technique. Until recently young Catholics might wear their green shirts in Munich, but if they bicycled to a neighbouring town the police orders might be different, and the Hitler youth would probably tear their shirts from off their shoulders. An outburst of this kind of patriotic fervour occurred on April 22 in Munich itself, and 'in the interest of public order' the police forthwith forbade the Green Shirts in Munich too. As for article 32, it depends wholly upon the interpretation of the word 'political,' since the Nazis force 'politics' into every nook and cranny of the individual's life—every action, in their eyes, is potentially political. Many priests have been arrested and some sentenced, but it is impossible to find out how many prisoners at the Bavarian concentration camp of Dachau are guilty of Catholicism; the authorities feign ignorance, and those who could tell stories of the persecution of the Catholics are terrified to do so.

It is just as perplexing to find the Socialist city of Vienna subjected to the Right Wing Clerical, Herr Schmitz, as to find

the Protestant Nazi, Herr Fiehler, Mayor of Catholic Munich. In each case power is in the hands of a man who represents about a quarter of the inhabitants, and a quarter in bitter opposition to a compact political majority of something like two-thirds of the population. This perverse similarity between the circumstances in which the people of Vienna and Munich live is, however, equalled by the technical contrast presented by the professional methods of these little-loved *régimes*. The tyrants of Vienna are, as they used to be, incompetent, undecided, spasmodic, and the victims of sabotage from their own servants; the tyrants of Munich are efficient, for they are consistent and ruthless. Sometimes one is tempted to laugh with the Austrian *régime*; occasionally one cannot escape laughing at the German one. Another apparently contradictory reflection must here be added—Karl Seitz, the Socialist ex-Mayor of Vienna, the leader of the majority of the Viennese, is in prison waiting to be tried for high treason, while Cardinal Faulhaber, the Archbishop of Munich, who has denounced the Nazi creed before God and man, has hitherto escaped arrest. How shall this German hesitation be explained? Partly it is a tactical decision on the part of Berlin—no *Kulturkampf* till the Catholic Saar is returned to the *Reich*. And partly it is a question of international backing. For the Second cannot compete with the Eternal International; the Catholic Church still hangs somewhere between earth and heaven; as the young Gladstone wrote of his own Church, 'Her foundations are on the holy hills. Her charter is legibly divine.'

It is time now to examine more fully the earthly activities of the Catholics when political power is placed in their hands. The Austrian Socialists were destroyed in the Civil War of February at the instigation of Mussolini. People who did not know their Austria expected this to mean an end to ambiguous compromise, and a clear-cut *Heimwehr* solution—an Austrian Constitution on the Fascist model, and no *arrière-pensées*. They appear to have thought that with Wallisch and Weissl hanged, and Seitz and Renner imprisoned, the population would salute the strong hand, and settle down to *Heimwehr* dictation as easily as the Dollfuss Cabinet appears, in its foreign policy, to accept the direction of Italy. No supposition could be very much farther from the truth than this. In the long run the Nazi cause must gain from the events of February, for the normal reaction of an Austrian to Italian dictation is to make him feel infinitely German. And the more Catholic the Austrian *régime* becomes, the more will the middle classes desire the Nazi alternative; in pre-war days they hated the clerical tendencies of the dynasty.

The position in Austria three months after the Civil War will repay a more detailed examination. The first thing that strikes

the observer is how much remains as it was before. The Socialists are still there, though National Socialism has gained, and Communism has grown up, at their expense. The *Heimwehr* is still indignant with the Clericals or Christian Socials, who have taken the majority of the jobs left vacant by evicted Socialists; though the *Heimwehr* men and the *Ostmärkische Sturmsharen* (the Clerical volunteer troops) are united in one national 'Defence Front,' there is still no love lost between them. The Left Wing Christian Socials are still resisting the authoritarian alliance of their own Right Wing people with the *Heimwehr*. Some of them, even, are still working for that Catholic-Socialist co-operation against the Fascist spirit, which, if it could be brought about, would provide the only *régime* a majority of the inhabitants of Austria would be willing to support. Chancellor Dollfuss is still playing the political acrobat, who with the one hand institutes an authoritarian Constitution, and with the other appoints a far-to-the-left Catholic like Dr. Ernst Karl Winter to be one of the vice-mayors of Vienna.

This remarkable appointment has received far too little attention in some parts of the English Press; it is extraordinarily difficult to explain, but for this reason it is characteristic of the Austrian situation. For Winter, who is an impassioned opponent of National Socialism, also openly condemned Dollfuss' dictatorial manipulations of the Austrian Constitution in 1933; more than once the very able *Politische Blätter*, which he edited, was confiscated by the Government. He even went so far as to suggest that protesting Vienna should leave the Austrian Federation of States and seek an internationalised status. He frankly deplores the destruction of the Socialists, and he dislikes the new Constitution. But 'What's done cannot be undone,' he says, and holds meetings in Vienna to implore the workers to come into the single unified trades union (*Einheitsgewerkschaft*) which the Government has created in the place of the old trades unions. These meetings, which would be inconceivable in Italy or Germany, are indispensable illustrations to the Austrian story. Working men crowd to them and receive Dr. Winter's entreaties with kindly derision; at the end the *Internationale* is sung, and on the third of these occasions the police intervened pretty violently and even handled the protesting vice-mayor with some roughness. Here it should be noted that, while the Socialist trades unions have been dissolved, the rights of the Austrian workers with regard to wages and hours have not been infringed. The *Heimwehr* Fascists regard the one official trades union as a temporary expedient until the workers can be drafted into corporations with their employers. But Winter wants the workers to capture its organisation, and use it to build up a new working-

class movement; the Socialists are not yet prepared to take his advice.

The Constitution decreed on May 1 is an obvious disappointment to the Catholics on the Left. It is such a labyrinth of contradictions that the Chancellor can fairly easily placate the liberally-minded (both at home and abroad) by pointing to the guarantees of personal liberty, while reminding their opponents that the Government is free to infringe these guarantees whenever it thinks fit. It should, however, be clear that this Constitution, which professes to embody the Papal Encyclical of 1931, embodies the reactionary modification of the *Quadragesimo Anno* which the rising tide of Fascism has induced the Vatican to make. This modification, in which so many Austrian Catholics, and even bishops, have failed to follow the Curia, reminds one of the haste with which Cardinal Pacelli signed the Concordat with Germany; but if the breakdown of this agreement appears to bring the Vatican perhaps closer to the Quirinal, it does not draw it back to the spirit of the Brüning period when the Encyclical appeared. The new Austrian Constitution is accordingly based upon the principle of nomination from above, to the almost complete exclusion of the principle of election from below. The President will nominate the members of the Council of State; out of three candidates chosen by each provincial diet he will also nominate the governor of each province, and these nine governors, together with their financial colleagues, will compose the Council of Provinces. The Council of Intellect will consist of men who have been appointed to their posts either by the Church or by the State. The constitution of the fourth or Economic Council is not yet decided, but every indication points to the authoritarian nomination of the corporations behind it. Each Council exists primarily to draw up reports *in camera* upon the legislation proposed by the Government. The other day the framer of this constitution, Dr. Ender, besought the foreign Press not to suppose that democracy had departed from Austria; indeed, a writer in the Government newspaper, the *Reichspost*, declares that it has only now arrived, since the functional representation now introduced is more complete and egalitarian than parliamentary representation. It is possible to regard the new Austrian system as a representative one, but it is ridiculous to call its present manifestations democratic. If all the four councils are nominated from above, the right of the Federal Diet (fifty-nine people selected from the members of all the four councils) to accept or reject Government Bills, and even to amend financial measures, is only the right of Government nominees to accept or reject, or occasionally amend, the proposals of their nominators. Should a rejection occur, the President can order a referendum in

which every citizen of twenty-four or over will be consulted. One is closely reminded of the elaborate constitutional devices by which Napoleon imposed his will upon the French.

Some apologists for the new Constitution have emphasised its referendum possibilities,¹ while others praise the retention of local autonomy by the Austrian municipalities. In fact, the power of the central Government is in several ways increased at the expense of the local authorities; the provincial diets, for example, were formerly free to elect their provincial governors independently. The municipal councils are still to elect their mayors subject to the approval of district commissioners, but, as these councils are to be corporatively reconstituted, it is not impossible that the mayors will be more or less nominating their own electors. These mayors are to have an unexpected importance, for they are to choose the President of Austria out of three candidates whom the Federal Assembly (all four Federal councils sitting together) will elect by secret ballot. The President will in future be able to play a very important part in Austria's affairs; in addition to the powers already mentioned, he will of course appoint or dismiss the Ministers forming the Government.

An Austrian commentator² has remarked that the Dollfuss Government will continue to govern in much the same way, only now its decrees will be called laws, whereas since March 1933 they have had to be labelled emergency decrees. Further, the citizen has lost rights while the Church has gained them; this sharing of power with the Church again distinguishes the new Austria from strictly Fascist States. Over a year ago Dollfuss signed a Concordat with the Vatican; this was made public on May 1 of this year, and incorporated in the new Constitution. The most interesting thing about this Concordat is that it increases the influence of the Curia over the nomination of the higher Austrian clergy; this may be intended to put an end to liberal tendencies within the Church. Dollfuss has here, at any rate, made a surrender to which the Hapsburgs would never agree. Cardinal Faulhaber, preaching in Munich during Lent, repudiated at once the notions of a State-Church and of a Church-State, but the new Austria, which has been suggested as a more fitting headquarters than Rome for the Papacy, does something to explain the anti-clericalism of the Nazis. A second Counter-Reformation³ is felt to have begun.

The charge of 'compulsory Catholicism' is not, however,

¹ The Government may also submit a new Bill or a question of legislative principle to the people.

² Dr. Franz Klein in the *Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, May 5, 1934.

³ See Klein again, who speaks of 'eine neuerliche Gegenreformation der habsburgischen Erblande, wiederum veranstaltet von einer Minderheit.'

vindicated by a mere recitation of the chief provisions of the new Constitution. To the foregoing it must be added that, in future, no man who is not considered to be patriotically minded is to be eligible for any post or for any seat in any of the constitutional bodies, and it must be remembered that patriotism has been interpreted, since the Clericals have ousted the Socialists in Vienna and elsewhere, as membership of the Catholic Church. The most irksome thing, for those local or federal officials who are not devout, is subjection to Catholic rules on marriage, and even before Christmas a man and a woman who were living together, but not married in the eyes of the Church, became ineligible for State employment; actors and tobacconists, both State employees in Austria, were specifically included in this prohibition. Since February the public libraries, especially in Vienna, have been 'cleaned up,' and the works of Freud, for example, removed; even a course of what may be termed university extension lectures on the spiritual background of the French Revolution was forbidden in Vienna in March. Many purely administrative members of the (old) Socialist *régime* there, together with many of the medical and educational people they employed, have been imprisoned, for no evident reason but that they were Socialists and not Catholics. All the tramwaymen of Vienna, from whose ranks the Socialist *Schutzbund* formerly drew many recruits, were in March compelled to re-enter the Church or be dismissed; similar pressure was brought to bear in other directions by the new Catholic municipal authorities. The schools of the municipality came under direct Catholic influence, and Socialist children were frequently sent to convents, especially those who were left destitute after the February fighting. The *Czartorisky Kinderschloss*, one of the most important experimental schools run for orphans by Socialist Vienna, was closed and the children all sent to convents; it was with difficulty that the Jewish authorities were able to extract three orthodox Jewish children.

It is perhaps only in Vienna that the present state of affairs is numerically oppressive, but it provokes the young Nazis of Styria, Salzburg and Tyrol, and draws their *Gross-Deutsch* or *Landbund* fathers closer to the Nazi view. The Christian Socials of the provinces tend, like some of the bishops, to be on the Left, and the Nazis, like the *Heimwehr*, accuse them of being corrupt parliamentarians because they are in favour of the retention of government by consent. In their own fashion these Austrian provinces are as volcanic as Vienna. Even in the Tyrol, where there were few Socialists, and no fighting but that at Wörgl, the events of February, in strengthening the Italians, made the general situation even more inflammable than before.

The *Heimwehr* lacks popular roots, and now that some of its young men swagger round Innsbruck in frankly Italian black shirts, the old feuds of the Tyrol are burning up; south of the Brenner, too, resentment is glowing again. Nor is Innsbruck merely the scene of the clash of the Italian and the German idea, for there is a Tyrolese idea as well. The province of the Tyrol is governed by men like the notorious Dr. Gamper, a Catholic, a monarchist, and a democrat. Against the persistent attempts of the *Heimwehr* to evict him from office Gamper has been defended by the provincial Governor Stumpf. He is, perhaps, the Ernst Karl Winter of Innsbruck, with this difference, that he represents a long and a living tradition amongst the mountaineers of the Tyrol. In their name he has demanded and obtained a promise from Dollfuss that the new Constitution, which has been declared to be only transitional, shall later be modified by the substitution of popular election for nomination from above.

When it is remembered that the new Constitution of Austria is admittedly transitional, and that the shape of the most important of its councils is still uncertain, the elasticity of the present arrangement can be fully appreciated. If the whole thing were to become consistently nominational, the death warrant of democracy would indeed have been signed. But if the people on the Left play their hand well, they can insist upon regarding the design of the moment as one which in practice should be worn inside out, and an elective functional society might easily be evolved. If, for instance, people from the Left acquired rights of nomination, they could interpret these rights in an elective way, and this is undoubtedly what Winter and Gamper would wish to do. The new presidential powers are equally ambiguous; with President Miklas in office, they are simply employed by the Chancellor, but potentially they are the powers of a king in more than the English sense.

It is no secret that the Hapsburg cause has become serious this year, and there are many who regard the arrangements for the election of a President as the arrangements for the return of Otto. Here the conventional legitimists are at one with Winter and Gamper. It is significant, too, that Stahrenberg, now Vice-Chancellor in Fey's place, has been pressing for leniency towards the Socialists; while he has no understanding for the ideas of a Winter, he is obviously anxious to lay a soft carpet for royal feet to tread, and ready to quarrel with the sterner ways of Fey and Mussolini. The Vatican, having extended its control of the Austrian hierarchy, is whole-heartedly in favour of a Hapsburg restoration, for the Archduke Otto is docile and devout. A restoration would, moreover, strengthen the Church in Hungary,

where Catholicism is identical with legitimism. A restoration, finally, would be the grandest gesture conceivable against the racialism of Hitler; no reader of *Mein Kampf* will fail to grasp the significance of Hitler's hatred of the Hapsburgs. Apart from the multi-racial character of their régime, it is worth remembering that years ago Joseph II. of Austria tried to acquire Bavaria but was foiled by Frederick the Great. Legitimism stands for the rescue of Bavaria from Hitler's *Reich*, and it is perhaps only in relation to this that the violence of the Brown House and of Habicht, and the tension in Munich, can be fully understood.

The return of the Hapsburgs to Vienna would obviously have many advantages for Austria. But all Austrian problems are unfortunately international problems, and no Austrian issue is so European as this. It calls up every ghost out of the Hapsburg past, and every ambition to control the Danube basin in the future. It arouses every revisionist hope, and even the aversion of the Hungarians for a revived dual monarchy shows signs of softening in hopes of getting back the 'Carpathian' frontier. The Hungarian Premier made a remarkable speech in Budapest on May 7, in which, avowed enemy of the Hapsburgs as he is known to be, he declared that, while he had always stood for an elective monarchy, he would not be opposed to other methods of bestowing the crown of St. Stephen if the interest of the nation required it. Mussolini, through the destruction of the Austrian Socialists and the subsequent Rome Pacts,⁴ has found himself bestriding Danube and Tyrol like a Colossus, playing Cæsar bringing the German hordes to heel. But this heroic attitude is uncomfortable, and he too, it seems, might prefer to shelter behind the majesty of the Hapsburgs in addition to that of the House of Savoy.

To-day Otto's frankest opponent is, not Hitler, but Benesh; the future of Austria thus depends on the policy of Prague, and the integrity of both countries is, in one way or another, at stake in the Europe of to-day. The year began badly for Czecho-Slovakia, for January brought the Polish-German Agreement and February the Austrian Civil War. The defeat of the Austrian Socialists, by order of Italy, expelled Czech influence from Vienna, and prefaced that predominance of Italy in the Danube which Dr. Benesh has always, in any form, found objectionable. The Polish-German Agreement was perhaps even more unfortunate, for it has very conspicuously synchronised with Polish-Czech frontier incidents, and an aggressive Polish attitude about minorities in Czecho-Slovakia. The Czechs have always been on

⁴ The commercial agreements signed on May 14, by which Italy appears to do all the giving, imply the strictest political obedience from Austria and Hungary in return.

the Russian side of the fence, but it is peculiarly disagreeable to have the Germans and Poles joining forces on behalf of their minorities. The situation is particularly exasperating for Benesh since the Poles deserted France for Germany out of pique over the Four-Power Pact, which, in omitting Poland, omitted to recognise the growth in her political stature. Benesh considers that his efforts brought the Four-Power Pact back to a League of Nations basis; instead of thanking him, however, the Poles came to terms with Germany, and are now taking further steps to get recognition as a Great Power. This would mean that Poland's obligations to her minorities would be partially repudiated at a time when she is harassing the Czechs over the very same question. The agreement with Germany was, of course, a Pilsudski move, for the Marshal always preferred the Germans to the Russians, or even to the French, and always despised the methods of Geneva. It does not seem that M. Barthou's recent journey has deflected the Poles from their Pilsudskian path. France and Czecho-Slovakia want to bring Russia into the League with a permanent seat on the Council, but Poland will only agree if she, too, becomes 'Great,' which, as a condition, is almost unacceptable for Czecho-Slovakia. Poland is already so strong that Russia in the new Soviet-Polish Pact has waived her objection to the Polish annexation of the Vilna territory, though Russia is undoubtedly in general sympathy with France and Czecho-Slovakia, not with Poland.

The Czechs, in fact, have been pushed into an extremely tight corner, but if they manoeuvre well it is possible that the new phase of the Hapsburg question may get them out of it. In opposition to the restoration in Austria, the Little Entente is solid, and though at one time pro-Hapsburg influences from St. Germain seemed strong at the Quai d'Orsay, it appears that France will be loyal to Czecho-Slovakia. On March 21 Benesh made a long and careful analysis of 'The Problem of Central Europe and the Austrian Question' in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czech Chamber, in which he made it clear that any Hapsburg restoration would be a grave menace to peace. For National Socialism, both within Austria and without (Austrians, by the way, always refer to Germany as *draussen*, or outside), will never accept it. In this public speech Benesh spoke of Germany in evidently conciliatory tones. In private conversation he has more than once declared that he would prefer the *Anschluss* to the Hapsburgs in Vienna. Such a statement may not merit literal interpretation, but does it not suggest a policy of using the Hapsburg menace to bring about a temporary *rapprochement* with Germany? A Czech-German *détente* would embarrass the Rome signatories, and mitigate the Polish-German Agreement.

Jugo-Slavia welcomes this endorsement from Benesh of her own initiative, for she long ago made gestures towards Germany; the intensity of her Adriatic rivalry with Italy, now that Germany and Italy have been brought face to face in the Tyrol, pushes her further along the path. The Croats, who would hate to return to Magyar rule, have royalist tastes when it comes to a Hapsburg, so that Austrian legitimism is substantiating the coquetry of Belgrade with Berlin. The violent revisionism of Gömbös' speech on May 7, to which he implied Italy to have given her consent, will ensure the loyalty of Rumania to a very anti-Italian phase in Little Entente policy; and the Hungarian-Jugo-Slav frontier dispute supplies fresh emphasis. Both for France and the Little Entente the continued hostility of Italy and Germany has become essential.

When President Masaryk and Mr. Wickham Steed agreed in 1910 that the Hapsburg Monarchy was doomed, Central Europe cannot have been a more brittle affair than it is to-day, with so many frontiers, and not one of them secure. A new Danubian Federation, independent of external influences, seems essential, and it is natural that many people should be asking why not let the Hapsburgs try again in this new setting. Yet their restoration is a *casus belli* in Benesh's eyes, and it is impossible not to share his fear that the Hapsburgs, like other *émigrés*, have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

INDIA AND THE NEW FRANCHISE

IN spite of the exhaustive and continuous examination to which the problems of India's future franchise and electoral system have been submitted during the years that have passed since the appointment of the Simon Commission, very few would venture to assert that the last word has yet been said in regard to them. Both in India and in this country, opinion on the principles involved cuts across party groupings, and the present writer wishes at the outset to make it quite clear that the views expressed in this article are his own personal views and do not embody those of any political party or group with which he has been associated. There are, then, important bodies of opinion here and elsewhere which hold, first, that the restriction of the franchise in India to a portion only of the adult population of the country raises very difficult questions of social justice, and is bound to set up, sooner or later, dangerous strains in the body politic; and, secondly, that direct election to the Provincial and Federal Legislatures will make the electoral system more or less valueless as an instrument for securing the real and effective representation of the popular will.

Naturally, it is the first of the above views which is most widely held in India, whilst the second commends itself more to opinion in this country. Nevertheless, both these views are very closely connected with each other. Indeed, this article will attempt to show that they are inextricably combined, and that consideration of either of them in isolation from the other will lead to invalid conclusions. If we assume that election to the Provincial and Federal Legislatures is to be direct, then adult suffrage is quite out of the question. The discussion of this subject in the Simon Report and its more complete examination in the Lothian Report make this judgment absolutely unassailable. Similarly, an argument in favour of indirect election based on the assumption of a more or less arbitrarily restricted franchise falls to the ground because it removes control over their parliamentary representation yet one stage farther from the competence of the great mass of the adult population of India. In the one case we shall have to reconcile ourselves to the dis-

franchisement of not less than 98,000,000 adults of twenty years of age and over, even for the elections to the Provincial Legislatures. This figure is reached on the assumption that 25 per cent. of the adult population are given the provincial franchise, and this, it must be remembered, is the upper limit of the extensions proposed by the Lothian Committee.

For the Federal Assembly, which will be the 'popular' house of the bicameral Federal Legislature, the Lothian Report proposes that the franchise should be the same as that now in force for the provincial councils, supplemented by an educational qualification both for men and women. At present there are something over 7,100,000 electors for the provincial councils. The Lothian proposals would most probably add ultimately 1,000,000, and perhaps 1,500,000, women voters to the electoral roll, whilst the male voters under the educational test will be a steadily expanding number, particularly in view of the increasing interest now being taken by provincial Governments in adult education. Given the assumption that election to the Federal Assembly is to be direct, the Lothian proposals are eminently reasonable, and, indeed, as the Report claims, they represent the only practical course that can be taken. Still, something over 8,000,000 voters out of an adult population of approximately 131,000,000 adults is a low proportion which challenges a quest for a more equitable solution to an admittedly difficult and many-sided problem. Quite definitely, nobody can advocate indirect election on the basis of such a proportion of voters to the total numbers of adults, and the arguments which have been adduced against it are, granted these premises, perfectly valid. If we must have such a comparatively (though, of course, not absolutely) small electorate, voters and representatives will have to be in as direct contact as possible with each other, right up to the elections for the Federal Assembly. But need we confine ourselves to these proportions; and if we do not, how can we stop anywhere short of adult suffrage? And if we have adult suffrage, how can we escape from the administrative and other difficulties so cogently exposed by the Lothian Report?

Thus we are driven back to the first principles of our problem—namely, to find the means of enfranchising all those citizens who are not debarred by criminality, lunacy, and so on, from partaking of the privileges of their citizenship, without at the same time creating an impossibly unwieldy mass of voters with which no administrative machinery or sound electoral devices could cope. It will be argued in the remainder of this article that this can be done provided we do not attempt to combine adult suffrage with direct election, and, further, provided that we do not necessarily take the attainment of twenty or twenty-

one years of age as conferring the right to vote on a man or a woman.

At the outset we must have quite clearly in mind the political structure and the political problems which our future electoral system is to fit into or is to help to solve. It is necessary to stress the importance of this part of our discussion, because it is still only imperfectly understood by many persons in the United Kingdom and India that we are dealing with a fundamentally different problem from that dealt with by the Simon Commission. A very important—it may even be a growing—body of opinion in this country has taken as its motto, 'Back to the Simon Commission.' It is no disparagement to that valuable State paper to say that it is no longer relevant to the issue which faces us. The task of the Simon Commission was to examine the system of government in British India, and its proposals are, therefore, confined to the future government of that particular political entity. The development of events at the Round Table Conference, which owed its inception to Sir John Simon and was constituted after the publication of his Commission's Report, gave us the project of another political entity, one in which British India should not only be incorporated, but in which it should lose its separate identity. This projected State is, of course, the Federation of All-India which is to be formed by the federal union of the constituent parts of British India and the Indian States.

It is highly necessary that everybody should grasp the all-important fact that the present British India will disappear as an individual corporate entity. Even in Indian political circles this is still all too inadequately understood, and there appears to be still a widespread view that, in the new Federation, British India as an individual, recognisable entity will stand over against the Indian States and will be the mouthpiece and representative of the common economic interests and political aspirations of the totality of the British Indian Provinces. This is a profoundly mistaken view, for things will not work out in that way. The grouping of interests of all sorts will tend inevitably to be regional. Practically every one of the lines—political, economic, and social—which divide British India from 'Princely India' to-day are artificial, the results of historical accidents. United as Provinces and States will be, in the same Commonwealth, many of these artificial barriers will simply melt away. Slowly at first, but irresistibly and with increasing acceleration as time goes on, adjoining Provinces and States will respond to the impact of the same economic forces and will develop affinities in political and social affairs which, within a measurable period, will radically transform the groupings of opinion and the balance of constitu-

tional forces in India. In such a process as is here foreshadowed there need not be the slightest threat to the integrity of any of the Indian States. On the contrary, the Princes and their subjects will gain the benefits, spiritual as well as material, of belonging to the life and progress of a great developing State, to the building up of which their contributions will be fully as essential as those of the people of British India.

We thus visualise a political structure completely different from that of the old British India, one whose legislative and executive organs will have to represent interests and function amid conditions widely and increasingly divergent from anything which any Government of India has known in the past. Moreover, the chief problems which will engage the attention of the Government of the new India in the years immediately ahead of us will also be new both in kind and in scope. What will these main problems be? They will all be internal problems, because, *ex hypothesi*, military and external affairs will still be in the final responsibility of the Imperial Parliament, and, further, they will fall into three inter-influencing and inter-acting groups. In the first place, we shall have the vastly important group of problems connected with the introduction *and the securing and stabilising* of the system of provincial autonomy which is to be one of the corner-stones of the new Indian State. Inside each Province the new Legislatures and Cabinets will have to shoulder their vast new responsibilities and adjust their relations with the Governor, who will continue to represent the final authority vested in the British Crown. Every activity of Government which affects the daily life of the masses will come within the competence of Cabinet Ministers selected and responsible in the way which we know in this country. Tremendous tasks will face them, and the *tempo* of political life in every province will be speeded up. Truly, the danger will be that the horizon even of the leaders of the people will tend to coincide with provincial boundaries.

In this speeding up and enlargement of political life in the Provinces, and in the shifting of immediate responsibility for the present reserved departments to the shoulders of Indian Cabinet Ministers, we have a completely new fact which lies at the very heart of the general question which it is the purpose of this article to discuss. For, in his everyday life, in his present and future welfare, and in the conditions under which his children and their children will live, every citizen in every Province will now depend on the quality and on the successes and on the mistakes of men who derive ultimately their place and power from him and his fellows. The potent political forces released by the new régime in the Provinces will penetrate through to the humblest and remotest units of local self-government, enlarging their powers

also, enhancing their importance, and radically transforming their composition. They also will affect the daily life and welfare of the citizens who live within their limits, and so they, too, will become the objects of a livelier ambition and a keener scrutiny and criticism than ever in the past. We have got to close grips at last with our general subject, for we have reached the ultimate unit in government and administration in which we see some chance of reconciling adult suffrage with the administrative and general conditions to which the Lothian Report drew our attention. In paragraph 51 of that Report the objections to indirect election through local bodies are set forth under two heads. First it is pointed out

that it was the system in operation . . . between 1910 and 1920, and from the evidence before us it is clear that the opposition to its reintroduction is very strong and almost universal. It is alleged that it led to a large amount of intrigue and was very uncertain in its operation. In the second place it is open to the powerful constitutional objection that . . . it must lead either to the local elections being dominated by provincial or federal issues, with consequent loss to good local government, or to the legislatures being elected by people who have been returned on purely local issues, while the mass of the electorate would receive no education and exercise no real influence over provincial or federal policy.

These are weighty objections, and nobody who knows India at first hand would attempt to deny their complete validity hitherto. But the gist of the argument against them lies in the last word. For, as we have seen, conditions in the future will be radically different from the past. The personnel and the activities of local bodies will be subject to a far fiercer light of publicity and be much more open and amenable to public opinion than ever before. They will not become perfect overnight, but they will have perforce to rid themselves of much of what the Lothian Report rightly alleges against them in the past, and the first of the above objections will become increasingly invalid as time goes on. Also, the Federal Government, as we shall see, will be engaged in affairs in which every citizen *ought* to have some say, however slight it may be, for they will be building the Commonwealth which will have to house him and his descendants for all time. Yet they will be affairs which the ordinary man in the field will not be able properly to understand, and so cannot safely be the subject of his direct will and opinion. As far as provincial issues are concerned, whatever the franchise may be and whatever the system of election, in future they will inevitably be bound up with local politics and local issues, and the narrower the franchise, the more likely they are to be the sport of local intrigues and local interests.

So far, the first great group of internal problems mentioned above. The second group to which we referred is that arising

within the Indian States and out of their relations to the Federation. It is well known that some of the more important States have carried out progressive constitutional changes of a far-reaching kind within the past few years. But in none of them have political life and the institutions of democratic and representative government been carried as far as they have in British India. Now it is inevitable that there should be a natural and automatic scaling up of political activities within the States once they become partners with the British Provinces in an All-India Federation. This process will not and ought not to be a rapid or violent one. The political education of the States subjects is a matter for each Prince and his chosen advisers to undertake, and in each case it will follow the lines set by the views of the Ruler and the traditions of the State. Where the institutions of representative government are applied, they will be applied cautiously, and, as seems likely from the expressed opinions of accredited spokesmen, they will be built up largely on the foundations of local units. A clear lead on this point was given in the Memorandum submitted last November to the Joint Select Committee by Sir Akbar Hydari, who represented Hyderabad, the premier Indian State, throughout the whole of the Round Table proceedings :

I propose . . . that for the Federal Legislature the indirect should be substituted for the direct system of election. The direct must lead to an unmanageable and expensive Legislature, and yet in the rural constituencies of British India not ensure that direct contact between the candidate and the electorate which is one of its main justifications. Indirect election . . . will only mean its [*i.e.*, the democratic principle's] adaptation to the problem which the vast size and population of British India provides.

It is impossible not to believe that Sir Akbar was representing the views of other States than Hyderabad, and, in fact, other important representatives of 'Princely India' have made similar statements. The Indian States will, then, support the principle of indirect election. This aspect of the matter has a still deeper significance for us when we consider the eminent desirability of the States and the British Provinces keeping in step with each other as far as possible in the development of their constitutional machinery. In spite of the much more advanced position of the British Provinces as regards constitutional development and the application of democratic institutions to their system of government, the political education of the British Indian agriculturists, who are the overwhelming majority of the population, is not, in fact, very much more advanced than that of their *confrères* in the States. Both in the British Provinces and in the Indian States the masses of the population will have to acquire that education from now onwards, and if, as there is every reason to

believe, local self-governing units, and indirect election coupled with as wide a franchise as circumstances permit, will be the line of development in the States, this constitutes an additional and very weighty reason for the introduction of a similar system in British India. Such a symmetry between all the different constituent units of the Federation should prove invaluable as a help in the building up and successful running of the federal constitutional machinery itself. Consideration of the third and last great group of problems to which reference was made above still further reinforces the general constitutional argument immediately preceding.

It has been shown already that British India as a separate individual political entity is to disappear, leaving the British Provinces and the Indian States face to face, the units out of which the All-India Federation of the future is to be built. That is to say, the interests which will have to be harmonised, the aspirations and opinions which will have to be satisfied, will be those of the peoples of the British Provinces and the Indian States. Now, nothing is more certain than that the retention of the existing system of great territorial electorates, together with direct election for the representatives of the British part of India in the Federal Legislature, will mean the retention also of existing ideas, mentality, aspirations, tactics and political groupings, which will be not only irrelevant to the conditions of the future, but will be harmful, and even fatal, to the conception of the Federation itself. The sheer size of the enormous, amorphous electorates, with the numbers of their voters multiplied several fold as compared with the present, renders, and will continue to render, personal touch between representative and voters quite impossible. Jobbery and local political bosses will be not so much possible as, indeed, necessary in such conditions as these, and we shall find a source of corruption at the very centre of our Federation. In any case, it is obvious that the representatives sent up by direct election from these unwieldy constituencies will not represent primarily provincial opinions and interests. Indeed, the reasonable assumption is that provincial interests and views will be either unrepresented at the centre or will be represented only by a handful of the members from British India. But we have seen that one of the vital conditions of success in the creation of the Federation is that Provinces and States shall be able to stand face to face and together build the new India of the future. From provincial to federal representation and legislature the chain of opinion and influence ought to be as direct and unbroken as possible.

A consideration of India's chief constitutional problems of the future thus reinforces the argument drawn from equity and

ordinary democratic principles, that as many as possible of the body of adult citizens should be given the franchise and should be allowed to exercise it in both Province and Federation in the only way which is at present either administratively practical or appropriate to the level of political and general education attained by the vast majority of potential voters in both Provinces and States. That way is represented by a system of indirect election with the local self-governing bodies as the basic units.

Earlier in this article reference was made to certain objections advanced by the Lothian Report to a system of indirect election through local bodies. At this point the answer to those objections may be expanded and made to include also the criticism which the Lothian Committee regarded as decisive in the case of the 'mukhi' system (to which we shall turn shortly), but which has not the same force against a proposal which contemplates full, or as full as possible, adult suffrage. Against the 'mukhi' system the Lothian Committee urged that under it the local elections would result either in the return of non-political municipal or other representatives, or in the return of representatives on purely political grounds, which will mean that the main battle-ground of the elections will be transferred from the centre or the province to the locality. It is perfectly true that either one or other of these things will take place, and, as a matter of fact, both will happen at the same time in different places. It is more than likely that the municipal elections—at any rate, in most large towns—will become political elections. This may be regarded as an inevitable development anyhow. On the other hand, it is also more than likely that in most rural units the persons elected will be men of standing, reputation, family or personal influence, etc., in the locality itself. In other words, where we already have a fair amount of political education we will get 'political' local contests. Where we have got little or no political education the political interests of the masses will tend to be entrusted to the hands best qualified to receive them—namely, the hands of men who are known and trusted in their own neighbourhood, whose interests and sentiments are those of their humbler neighbours, and who can be watched and brought to account very quickly if necessary. The system as visualised above will, in fact, erect hundreds of barriers all over the country against the working of an organised and boss-controlled political machine. I, at any rate, can imagine no better way of bringing up the masses of India to a safe and rational exercise of their political rights than the scheme of indirect election now under consideration. Further, a very wide extension of the franchise coupled with indirect election would render unnecessary any further

discussion of the 'mukhi' system. The word 'mukhi' means mouthpiece or spokesman, and the 'mukhi' system, which operates in several countries of the Near East to-day, is one by which the whole adult population is divided into groups of an appropriate number, say fifty, from each of which group is chosen, by election, one man (or woman) to vote for the members to be returned to the various legislative bodies. Against this proposed system (which first emerged in the Report of an expert Committee of the Royal Empire Society under the chairmanship of the late Sir John Kerr) the Lothian Committee, after full investigation, brought destructive criticisms of admitted weight. The system may, therefore, be allowed to lapse.

Let us now turn to certain more 'practical' or tangible arguments in favour of indirect election. There are, under the present Constitution, something over seventy rural constituencies returning members to the Legislative Assembly—the 'popular' chamber of the Central Legislature. These rural constituencies vary in size between 6000 and 60,000 square miles—that is, they vary from constituencies the size of Yorkshire to constituencies bigger than England and Wales combined. Under the White Paper proposals the number of seats in the Federal Assembly—the Lower House of the future Federal Legislature—will be 375, but of these, 125 will go to the States, leaving only 250 for the British Provinces. Although this is two and a half times the number of the elected seats in the Legislative Assembly, and rural constituencies will be multiplied *pro rata*, it is obvious that, even under the new Constitution, the rural constituencies will still be of fantastic size from the point of view of a real system of democratic representative government. Even of the constituencies for the provincial councils, many are of quite unwieldy size. Thus, one of the delegates to the Round Table Conference mentioned that there were about 700 villages in his constituency and that one of its three sub-divisions was 300 square miles in area. 'There is no railway or motor road,' he continued, 'and I can only go about by bullock cart.' Incidentally, we must not forget that the same absence of communications and great length of distances to be traversed applies to voters equally with candidates. In these great rural constituencies a journey to the polling-booth is all too often an impossible undertaking for electors. The above is by no means an exceptional case. Indeed, it would be no more than fair to say that it is a typical rural constituency, and, although the number of provincial constituencies will be enlarged under the new proposals, it is quite clear that, even as concerns the Provincial Legislatures, a representative system based on direct election must continue to be very largely unreal. That this is so is clear even if we take

into consideration only the actual facts of geography. When to these is added the widespread illiteracy of the Indian masses, the practically complete absence of all party and other non-official instruments of political activity which play so great a part in the political life of our own country, we discover additional weighty reasons for changing over from direct to indirect election.

It will surely be admitted, in the light of the above arguments, that there is still a case in favour of indirect election based on as wide a franchise as possible, which requires a fuller answer than it has so far received, even in the Lothian Report. In discussing the latter's objections to indirect election based on local bodies, the present writer drew attention to the dynamic aspect of the matter, as he did also when discussing the broad constitutional problems which lie ahead of the Federation and its constituent units. From every point of view the disfranchisement of scores of millions of adult persons is seen to be an arrangement which cannot be retained for more than a very brief period indeed, and, further, one which will hinder and endanger the growth of the new greater India of the future. What is suggested here is that the constituencies for the Provincial Legislatures should be the units of local self-government, down to the *punchayats* of the smallest villages where these bodies are in existence. To these may be added appropriate bodies such as universities, chambers of commerce and the like. For the local bodies the franchise should be manhood and womanhood suffrage, the age at which the voter becomes entitled to the vote to be twenty-five years. In such basic constituencies as the local units the numbers will be quite manageable, and the arrangements necessary to maintain the system of communal electorates will present no difficulty. For the Federal Legislature the constituencies should be the Provincial Legislative Councils.

There is not the slightest derogation from the principles of democracy in these proposals. Indeed, it is maintained that they make the future electoral system of India far more democratic than that proposed in the White Paper, which has been sufficiently criticised above. That important sections of political opinion in India will resent the substitution of indirect for direct election is true. But others will welcome it, and, so long as responsibility for the welfare of India is still in British hands, it is our duty to do what we consider right and just for the masses of the country who are at present disfranchised, politically uneducated, and at the mercy of professional politicians.

JOHN COATMAN.

THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

It would have been much easier to prophesy the future trend of local government in this country five or six years ago than it is to-day. Then it would have been possible to foreshadow with a considerable degree of accuracy many of the important changes in our local government system which have now been brought about by the Rating and Valuation Act, 1928, the Poor Law Act, 1930, and the Local Government Acts of 1929 and 1933. At the present time no such wealth of material is available. The present Minister of Health has described the next few years as a period eminently suitable for 'tidying up.'

The provisions of the Local Government Act, 1933, which follow almost entirely the recommendations of the Chelmsford Committee, have made a valuable contribution towards that process. The consolidation of local government statutes dealing with the constitution and general functions of the various types of local authority was long overdue, and the 1933 Act, which comes into force on June 1, 1934, will provide a framework of general powers which will be of the utmost value to local authorities, and will, at the same time, remove numerous anomalies and a considerable amount of overlapping which has hitherto existed. The next stage in the process of 'tidying up' will be a consolidation of the law relating to public health.

In spite of the numerous improvements which have been brought about during the last decade with respect, for example, to rating, public assistance, town planning, reconstruction of grant assessment, and rearrangement of county districts, there are still many tangled thickets which have grown for long unchecked with an almost tropical luxuriance and in an equally tropical disorder. In fact, one of the chief reasons for the peculiar fascination of local government administration is the fact that it can never be static, that it must continually be reorientating itself to meet ever-changing needs and fresh conditions. For example, in addition to the problems which have been created in the past by rural depopulation, we now have a new set of problems confronting us as a result of urban contraction in some places and unnatural urban expansion in others.

The difficulties connected with this problem have been enhanced by a tendency among our statesmen during the last half-century to accept what is most expedient instead of 'facing up to' the real issues, to utilise existing areas instead of creating new arrangements to satisfy contemporary needs. In determining the areas for the various services, the administration of which has been entrusted to local authorities, there has been a disregard of economic factors such as the development of industry, commerce and agriculture, and also of the migration from one area to another. For example, after 1780 there was a steady migration to the north of England, with the result that urban areas rapidly grew up. From 1880 to 1930 the countryside was heavily depopulated. At the present time there is a steady drift of industry and population to the south of England. The areas of local government have not been readapted quickly enough to keep pace with these altered conditions.

In the first place, it must be determined whether we should continue to entrust all functions to the administration of existing authorities, or whether some of those functions should be transferred to other authorities more fitted to deal with them. The demand for a large-scale organisation of certain services is becoming more and more urgent. As examples of services which can best be dealt with on a regional basis, we may cite water supply, sewerage, refuse disposal, electricity, and town planning. Two main factors affect the consideration of this problem:

(1) The factor of local patriotism and interest, to preserve which it may be desirable even to sacrifice, to some extent, the efficiency of administration;

(2) The efficiency of a particular area for the performance of the functions.

The purpose of regional development would be, not the supplanting of the existing authorities, but the creation of new forms and spheres of publicly organised services in respect of functions which are more suitably administered over a wide area. It is not likely that the large county boroughs will hand over to a regional authority without demur their duties of distributing gas, water, or conducting their omnibus and tramway services. The central departments should, therefore, have the power of compelling such transfer of powers to the regional authority. On the other hand, the existing local authorities might be allowed to retain supervisory functions in relation to a particular service or group of services which are regionally administered by themselves appointing representatives to the regional body.

It seems quite clear that for certain functions, such as

town planning, electricity and gas supply, land drainage, transport, water supply, and main roads, the existing areas of local authorities are entirely unsuitable and that the administration of these services will have to be transferred in the future from local authorities to special regional authorities, which would form a network of suitable areas over the whole country, and might give scope for the representation by advisory committees or otherwise of local authorities concerned. Those services, on the other hand, which are mostly enjoyed by the inhabitants of a particular area and have only a limited effect on others outside it should remain under the control of local authorities, who should enjoy in respect of such services greater responsibility and autonomy than they have done in the past.

Matters of purely local concern ought to be decided according to the wishes of the local inhabitants. Unfortunately, a clear-cut division of functions on the above lines is not possible, because there is a wide range of functions in respect of which there is both room for local human interest on the one hand, and on the other for insistence on a reasonable standard of efficiency. Educational service is a typical example of such an intermediate function. It would clearly be against the interest of the country as a whole to allow an area to exist without any educational facilities at all, and a minimum standard has therefore to be insisted on. This minimum actually postulates some measure of central control. Nevertheless, in educational administration, local knowledge and exact information are of great value, and there is room for some individuality in local control.

There is also room for experiment and expansion of the work of local authorities—in co-operation, possibly, with voluntary associations—for helping people to use their leisure to good purpose. Some movement analogous to the 'after-work' organisation, which has grown up under the Fascist régime in Italy, and which includes the provision, at very reasonable charges, of opera, films, dancing, lectures, playing-fields, and almost every kind of recreation and amusement, might be developed in this country. Our rural community councils have, it is true, already made considerable progress in this direction. But there is much scope for additional experiment and for more direct co-operation with local authorities.

It will be well if local authorities are allowed to 'have their heads' more in connexion with the functions retained by them. In this way the chagrin which they may possibly feel when the administration of the large-scale services are taken from them and transferred to regional authorities may be counterbalanced by a feeling of satisfaction at being entrusted with more complete control of the functions retained by them. The review of county

districts under the Local Government Act, 1929, is resulting in the establishment of local authorities of unquestionable strength and stability where, in some cases, weaknesses prevailed before. It does not appear unreasonable for local authorities to ask to be freed from the meticulous supervision from central departments which exists to-day. This does not imply that the machinery of central control should be completely dismantled. The central departments should retain functions of great importance in hearing and deciding upon appeals against administrative decisions, in setting the seal of independent approval on the soundness of schemes involving a large financial outlay, and in the collection and dissemination of information to local authorities. On the other hand, it is clearly not necessary for the central authority to duplicate the activities of the local authority—in the sphere of education, to take one glaring example—and to exercise the kind of control which would only be permissible if the local authority had no expert advisers of its own.

Central departments are, not unnaturally, loth to exercise their 'default powers.' It may be predicted, however, that, in dealing with lax or recalcitrant authorities, they will exercise such powers more frequently in the next few years—particularly in the sphere of housing and town and country planning. At the present time the first stage of a town-planning scheme—the 'resolution to plan'—has only been reached in respect of 8,000,000 out of the 37,000,000 acres in England and Wales, and the stage of execution under an 'approved scheme' has been reached only in respect of about 80,000 acres. Under section 36 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, the Minister may order the taking of any step which he considers ought to be taken, from the preparation or adoption of a scheme to its enforcement. This section provides the 'big stick' which is invariably inserted in a modern local government statute to enable the central department to control an inefficient or recalcitrant local authority. It may be expected that the central authority will see that this 'big stick' is wielded fearlessly and impartially, so as to ensure that within a reasonable time resolutions to prepare or adopt schemes are passed throughout the whole country and that the stage of execution is reached everywhere without undue delay; and, further, that county councils may be pressed to assist or replace smaller authorities with this end in view and to take over planning functions themselves when there is any default.

Now that character-zoning can be applied to built-up areas, the first thing which planning authorities will have to check is the spread of industry in central areas to land now used for residential purposes. This can be effected with much less resistance than any attempt to re-zone existing factory areas. Local

authorities, however much they may wish to 'boost' the growth of their town or city, will welcome such a policy, partly because it will enable them to prevent further confusion in their districts and partly because the Derating Act has largely destroyed the value of industry to them as a source of revenue. The restriction of the establishment of new factories in over-centralised towns is already in operation in Italy, where by a decree of 1927 no workplace employing more than 100 workmen may be started in a town of over 100,000 inhabitants, except with the consent of the Ministry of National Economy.

One interesting feature in this connexion is the recent growth in certain large cities in this country of development departments. Most of these organisations were set up early in 1932, and owed their conception to the national, financial, and fiscal events of the former year. A large volume of inquiries had begun to flow into this country from manufacturers overseas who were contemplating the establishment of industrial undertakings in Britain. The newly formed bodies were, therefore, commissioned to deal with inquiries for factory premises or sites and to investigate the possibilities of establishing industries in their respective localities. These departments are still virtually in their infancy and are in experimental stages of development. From results which they have achieved, however, there is little doubt that they have come to stay, and it would seem desirable that some measure of co-ordination should exist between them and, if possible, that there should be in London some kind of 'central clearing-house' for the information which they supply.

The need for central co-ordination in other respects is well illustrated in the second Report of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee. After enumerating the kind of problems which cannot be dealt with locally, and which, if they are to be dealt with at all, demand the existence of a Regional Planning Committee, the Report continues:

It is evident that the best solution of these extensive problems, and in many cases even a tolerable solution, cannot be attained by merely piecing together a patchwork of the proposals which each local planning authority would, or indeed could, make for its own area considered as a unit. Such matters require comprehensive study and design, such as can only be secured by some central and impartial body. When, however, the general schemes, the distribution of development, belts of open space, parkways, the zoning of industrial or other areas, etc., have been worked out as a whole by the Regional Committee, it may frequently be quite possible to secure their incorporation by agreement in each of the several local schemes affected. Indeed, this may well prove the course which would normally be followed. For this course to be practicable, however, it is essential that sufficient funds shall be available to back up those proposals which any of the local authorities might not feel justified in undertaking on their own

account or entirely at their own cost. Local authorities are naturally and rightly sensitive as to any encroachment on their proper responsibilities or powers. They are, however, not usually indisposed to consider doing their share to forward desirable projects of large scale, extending beyond the limits of their territory, provided they can be satisfied that the whole scheme will be realised, and that the cost will be fairly distributed among the areas served, approximately according to the degree of benefit.

In his book *Town and Country Planning* Professor Abercrombie has suggested that a survey should be prepared with regard to the agricultural development of the country. If his suggestion were adopted, the assistance of county councils might well be utilised.

It is [he says] an example of the complete urban-mindedness of the English legislator that in discussing a Bill to provide for town and country planning the fallacy was advanced that planning is the concomitant of the urban impact upon the country; that areas in which no extraneous building is taking place are to be described as 'static' or 'sterilized' and may be safely left to take care of themselves. Whereas no part of England is in more vital need of scientific planning and development than the agricultural countryside. Based upon the Ministry of Agriculture's new Atlas a plan should now be prepared in order that the existing conditions of soil, climate, etc., could be related to the best methods of stimulating the productivity of suitable crops, arranging for their sequence so as to avoid interference from outside, such as urban building thrusting itself into and cutting up the shapes of farm land into expensive units for production.

A national survey might well be extended to other fields with a view to co-ordinating public utility services; to the distribution and density of industries and their dependent population; to co-ordination of the various transport systems; and to the extent and location of 'agricultural belts,' of national reserves for recreation and the preservation of landscape beauty. A survey of water resources and drainage needs is particularly necessary. Much of this is, of course, done in regional planning surveys, but such a survey should be carried out on a *national* scale.

It has now been recognised—a little belatedly—that the national housing problem cannot be solved by a continuation of the old systems of subsidies, under which the very poorest slum-dweller contributed towards a subsidy of which the comparatively 'well-to-do' working man reaped the advantage. For the next ten or twenty years (few people are so optimistic as to think that five years will be long enough) we may expect to see local authorities, in co-operation with the Ministry of Health, concentrating on the problem of slum-clearance. If the problem of clearing the slums is to be satisfactorily dealt with, a national slum survey should be carried out, so that the facts may be nationally known

and assessed, and the conditions which lead to the creation of slums may be fully explored.

Possibly a solution of the housing problem may be found on the lines suggested by Lord Eustace Percy—namely, by the creation of public utility bodies, who will take over large areas of property as trustees for the owners. Such public utility bodies might be created by the local authorities themselves, with the consent of the Minister of Health, and could issue shares to the owners interested in the area to be developed for housing purposes in proportion to the assessed value of their properties.¹

In February 1933 Dr. M'Gonigle, the medical officer of health for Stockton-on-Tees, read a paper before the Royal Society of Medicine which should command the closest attention of all authorities concerned with rehousing schemes. Dr. M'Gonigle has shown that an increased death rate among a population transferred from slum houses to a new block of model dwellings is definitely correlated with a diminished expenditure on food, consequent on the increase in rents (by about 4s. 6d. per week) payable by the families moved without any accompanying increase in the family income. It is possible that a better way of dealing with the rehousing problems than the existing system of *per capita* subsidies to house building under the 1930 Act would be, where tenants are unable to pay the economic rent, to make it the business of the public assistance committee to supply the deficiency in subsidies *to the tenant* according to need.

Another urgent problem which must be faced in the early future concerns the future of the voluntary hospitals, nearly all of which are handicapped through lack of funds, and some of which are on the verge of bankruptcy. One solution of that problem may be found in a co-ordination of all hospital resources in a particular area. In the words of Dr. T. W. Hill,

any system, however public-spirited, which is forced to depend on organised begging for its existence is a degrading system and ought to be abolished. Crude necessity demands state finance and local control. I think they [*i.e.*, voluntary hospitals] will find it more expedient to throw in their lot with the local authority than to continue their hopeless struggle against insolvency.

The tradition of voluntary activity is woven into the framework of local government and social service in this country. It appears probable that the co-operation of voluntary enterprise in the field of local government will continue and increase. The help of the unofficial worker is required in connexion with many of the welfare services, particularly those which involve personal contact with the individual citizen. The work, for example, of

¹ See *Government in Transition*, pp. 135 *et seq.*

after-care committees in helping children as they leave school to find suitable occupations which are not of the 'blind alley' type is becoming increasingly useful. And the more recent organisation of Occupational and Recreational Centres for the Unemployed has afforded further evidence of the excellent way in which a local authority may co-operate with voluntary workers and agencies. Co-ordination is just as essential in the sphere of voluntary work. It has been achieved to a considerable extent by the excellent work of the National Council of Social Service, and of rural community councils. But there is still a considerable amount of overlapping in the work of voluntary organisations; and possibly during the next few years the desirability of co-ordinating the various organs of social action in each place and of linking them up with the 'amenity services' of local authorities will receive wider recognition.

The financial changes which may occur in connexion with local government during the next few years are difficult to predict. The problem which faced the Government in 1929 was how to provide a fund of money in such a way as to compensate the local authorities for their losses from derating, and how to make alternative arrangements with regard to percentage grants (except those in respect of police, education, and certain roads). One element in the scheme was to widen the area of administration and charge with regard to poor relief, roads, and certain public health functions. The next thing was to provide for the discontinuance of the assigned revenue system of the percentage grants in aid of the health services, and of certain road grants. These, since the operation of the Local Government Act, 1929, have been assisted through a lump sum distributed to each local authority according to entirely new principles.

Under the system of 'block' grants now in force the local authorities receive a sum of money without detailed specification of the items which the grant is to be used for, and the amount is calculated partly according to a percentage of the expenditure and partly according to a combination of factors designed to show the extent of the need. It is possible that during the next few years all percentage grants may be abolished, and that block grants may be substituted for them, within the limits of which local authorities will have to remain satisfied.

On the other hand, there is considerable dissatisfaction with our present rating system, which is based on such a false criterion of ability to pay as the value of immovable property, and an even more drastic change is envisaged by those who suggest that a local income tax on the lines of the French or German system could be introduced in this country. It must be remembered that the whole burden of local rates falls upon real property, and

it is interesting to note that the Board of Inland Revenue reported to the Departmental Committee on Local Taxation that, subject to two conditions, it would not be impossible, although difficult, to work the combination of local income tax at varying rates with an Imperial income tax at a uniform rate, while maintaining the principle of collection at the source. The two conditions were:

(1) That the local income tax should be assessed and collected, in the first instance, at a maximum rate, subject to the right of the individual taxpayers to repayment of the difference between the tax at that rate and the rate imposed in the area in which they reside.

(2) That the proceeds of the tax be allocated by reference to the place of residence of the individuals who receive and enjoy the income.

It may be said that the first condition would cause considerable trouble and expense in connexion with repayments, and that the second would certainly give rise to inequalities between industrial and residential districts. These may destroy the value of the scheme. Nevertheless, the question of raising funds for local and Imperial purposes is a matter which will have to be considered within the next generation in an effort to arrive at some method of assessing and distribution which will not only spread the burden of local taxation more equitably over the whole country, but will also eliminate many of the difficulties of assessing the liability for local rates and Imperial taxes. So many of the items of local expenditure are determined by regional or national considerations that it is time to investigate whether the dual system of rates and taxes might not more economically and fairly be replaced by a single national fiscal machine based upon capacity to pay.

During the last fifty years a revolutionary change has taken place in the importance of the local authorities in the life of the country. Over a period when the population of the country has increased by 50 per cent. the total expenditure of the local authorities has increased tenfold—from £54,000,000 in 1884-5 to £554,000,000 in 1930-1. This increase of expenditure reflects an enormous growth of functions and responsibilities. As the responsibilities and functions of the local authorities grew it became increasingly evident that they could not be expected to bear the whole burden of the increased expenditure. The relations between local and central government finances have accordingly undergone a profound change. Government grants which in 1884-5 amounted to £3,600,000 had increased to £137,000,000 in 1930-1. Whereas fifty years ago the taxpayer paid about 12 per cent. of the bill for local government (revenue accounts only),

to-day he pays 46 per cent. (In twenty-seven areas he pays over 60 per cent. ; in five areas over 70 per cent.) This increase in grants-in-aid has been accompanied by a steady encroachment on local administrative responsibility at 100 or more points, and a very confused and complicated system of central and local government interrelations has grown up. This encroachment of central government on the functions and responsibilities of the local authorities is not necessarily a bad thing. Central control and direction of important national services, such as health and education, is very desirable. But it cannot be said that the existing relations between central and local authorities reflect any clear conception of the central authority as a planning and directive authority, using the local authorities as its regional agents, though leaving them with a measure of local initiative. The time has already come for a thorough investigation of the relations between local and central government, if only to clear up the waste and anomalies resulting from the confusion of divided financial and administrative responsibilities. If nearly half of the bill for local government is paid by the taxpayer, has he not a right to insist that the services which he subsidises so generously should be administered nationally (or, possibly, regionally) wherever it can be shown that the existing local government areas are inappropriate units for the provision of them? The danger, of course, lies in allowing finance to be the determining factor (witness the present Unemployment Bill). The first task is to discover the most efficient territorial unit (national, regional, or local) to perform a given function. If this is done well, the problem of distributing the burden of finance between one authority and another will be solved very much more easily.

It is difficult, at the present time, to forecast with any degree of precision the effect which the Unemployment Bill, now before Parliament, will have on local authorities, and to measure the benefits and burdens which might accrue to them as a result of the Bill's passing into law. Sir Henry Betterton pointed out at the second reading of the Bill that there is at present a complete divorce between the central authority providing money and the local authority with regard to its disbursement. If the responsibility were to be national, the administration must be centralised. That would help to prevent the lack of uniformity which exists, and which it is impossible to prevent under the present system. Local authorities are not unnaturally opposed to the financial scheme embodied in the Bill, on the grounds (*inter alia*) that the proposed relief to local authorities is inadequate ; that the transfer to the State of 40 per cent. of the cost of relieving able-bodied unemployed will still leave a serious burden on the rates in areas suffering most acutely from unemployment ;

that the areas in which the higher poor rates would remain would be those which are most in need of help, particularly to secure the establishment of new industries which avoid highly rated areas ; and that the scheme generally would still leave disparities between the rates for poor relief in one town, and in another greater than can be justified.

Speaking generally, it may be said that since 1929 there has been team work of the three great social services—health, education, and maintenance—under unified local administration, backed by central government grants and guidance. These three services, which all involve a redistribution of wealth and all deal ultimately with the family, had no sooner been linked than the impact of the depression and of 'national economy' crippled their progress. On political grounds the Government, in the new Unemployment Bill, is now proposing to separate the maintenance of the able-bodied unemployed from other maintenance, education, and health. The effect on local government depends on what form this separation takes. If, as is still possible, the new Unemployment Assistance Board appoints local public assistance authorities as its agents in many or most areas, and confines national control to matters of finance and of policy, co-ordination with the other social services will still be feasible. If, on the other hand, the new Board sets up its own offices in all areas and administers the scheme directly, a fundamental injury will have been inflicted on the traditional structure of local government.

Another sphere in which numerous changes will most certainly take place in the near future is that of the internal organisation of local authorities. The precise form of those changes it is difficult to forecast, but we may assume that, even if some large authorities do not experiment with the 'city manager' form of government which has made such strides during the last twenty years in the United States of America, both committees and councils will be reduced in size and a more scientific division of labour will be made between the elected member and the official. It is undeniable, for example, that a great amount of detailed routine work which is at present performed in committee could be delegated with advantage to the officials.

Central departments have been chary of intervening in any way other than in prescribing systems of accounting in connexion with the internal organisation of local authorities, and, in view of the attitude taken up by many local councils even to helpful and constructive criticism of their activities which emanate from an outside source, it is not surprising that central departments imitate Agag and 'walk delicately.' It may be suggested, however, that the Ministry of Health might, in a purely hortatory

manner, encourage local authorities to subject their internal organisation—their committee system and their standing orders—to periodic 'overhauls' and to see that functions are distributed among their various committees in the most scientific way. In particular, where one authority has made some notable improvement in its administrative technique or internal organisation, some machinery might easily be devised for notifying other authorities.

The publication in January of this year of the Report of the Departmental Committee on Qualifications, Recruitment, Training, and Promotion of Local Government Officers has focussed public attention on the need for creating a trained Local Government Service. Under the present system local authorities are almost entirely free to appoint their staffs in any way they choose. The law requires that certain officers must be appointed by particular types of local authority. For example, every borough is bound by statute to appoint fit persons to be town clerk, treasurer, surveyor, medical officer of health, and so forth. In addition, the Minister of Health has legal control over the appointment and dismissal of Poor Law officers, medical officers and sanitary inspectors, and the Minister of Transport over the appointment of surveyors, where a grant is made towards their salaries. These officers, however, only account for a very small fraction of the municipal service, which numbers approximately 130,000 (excluding teachers, police and manual workers, who do not come within the scope of the Committee's survey). Generally speaking, however, local authorities are entirely unfettered in their appointment of officers. The result is, there is no uniformity in regard to the recruitment, qualifications, training, or promotion of officers. There are no common standards or general principles in operation.

The recommendations of the Committee with regard to recruitment aim at securing suitable standards of education and ability in the service and at eliminating personal favouritism or unfairness. To this end the Report proposes that all vacancies, other than those to be filled by internal promotion, should be widely notified either by advertisement, or alternatively, in the case of junior posts, by announcements in the local schools. The Report further recommends that both members of the council and candidates themselves should be required to disclose any relationship which may exist between them on pain of disqualification or dismissal. With regard to qualifications, the Report recommends that the minimum age of entry of entrants to the clerical side for new recruits should be sixteen years and that all entrants should have obtained a school certificate. A striking innovation is the suggested opening of junior clerical appointments to competitive examination, to be held by regional

groups of local authorities co-operating for the purpose. No one who is familiar with the history of the Civil Service in this country and abroad can have any doubts about the wisdom of the Committee's judgment in this matter.

The Committee emphasises the importance of the chief officers in all departments of local authorities possessing administrative ability. It contrasts the position in the Local Government Service, which is at present rigidly divided between the rank and file of the service on the one hand and the head of the department (nearly all of whom possess technical or professional qualifications in law, medicine, accountancy, and engineering) on the other, with that in the Civil Service, where the chief civil servants belonging to the administrative class and those with professional status are relegated to a restricted sphere dealing with their particular specialised subject. The Committee considers that greater opportunities should be open to promising juniors in the Local Government Service to be transferred from one department to another with a view to broadening their outlook, and advocates an extension of the mobility of officers of different local authorities, which is at present confined for the most part to professional and technical officers. With this end in view it recommends that superannuation should be made universal and compulsory throughout the service. Finally, it advocates that every local authority should have an establishment committee to be responsible for organising the recruitment, training, promotion, salary scales, and conditions of service of all officers under its employ, and further advocates the setting up of a central advisory committee to consider and work out problems relating to the Local Government Service for the whole country.

The functions of this central committee, which would be of an advisory nature only, would be (*inter alia*) to assist in planning the regional groups of local authorities for holding examinations; to act as a clearing-house for information concerning vacancies for university graduates; to observe experiments in training of public servants in this and other countries; to help local authorities to establish comparable grading schemes, and to inquire into the adequacy of existing technical qualifications. In the view of the Committee, the creation of such a central advisory committee would 'provide one of the most effective means of securing an improved service.'

To recapitulate, the most likely future developments in local government may be summarised as follows:

- (1) An integration in central or regional bodies of large-scale functions.
- (2) A greater degree of autonomy for local authorities in connexion with services of a purely local character.

(3) A revision of the grant system—possibly a complete change in the existing system of rating.

(4) The application to local government of scientific principles of planning in the widest sense of the term—planning as to the most suitable division of services; planning as to future needs of development and future financial requirements; planning under the extended powers of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, of land, whether there are or are not buildings thereon, in such a way as to protect existing amenities, to promote traffic efficiency, and to retain open spaces where desirable, so as to meet in the best manner possible the needs of the community.

All this implies a continual creative effort to adapt our existing system of local government in the light of modern needs. So, it may be hoped, people will be enabled to live in towns and villages that are well-planned and designed, free from slums, and equipped with adequate open spaces, parks and playing-fields, and that, in the words of Robert Bridges,

our generation, sickened by the grime
of murky slums, slag heaps and sooty bushes,
will plan garden cities and for her soilure make
redemption to Nature, replanting the fair land
which our industrial grandsires disafforested.

C. KENT WRIGHT.

REGIONAL VARIETIES OF THE ENGLISH GENIUS . . .

EVERYONE knows the expression 'a typical Yorkshireman,' or 'Devonian,' or 'Cockney'; and the phrase clearly implies belief in a definite local type, or series of local types, within the nation—each with its own distinct manners and customs and differences of speech, and possibly thought and ways of looking at life. It is the same, of course, in France, where the Burgundian is proverbially sardonic, the Gascon boastful, and the Breton pious and reactionary; and still more so in Germany, the home of political particularism, where the Brandenburger is always (at least in theory) bluff and hearty, the Rhinelander suave and humane, and the Silesian slow-witted and conservative. How far, at any rate in England, are these local differences real, and how far merely conventional? It seemed worth while to find out, but clearly it was first necessary to discover a way of approach and to define one's terms of reference.

The genius of a nation consists in those exceptional men who add something of knowledge or power or beauty to the existing equipment of civilisation. But those exceptional men are themselves a product of local conditions, and likely to conform in the main to the local types from which they spring; and a study of the differences between these local varieties of national genius seemed therefore the only practicable method of solving the particular problem in hand.

Now, inclusion in the *Dictionary of National Biography* is no doubt a mark of distinction in national life. But a preliminary inspection of that vast cemetery showed that it was altogether too inclusive for my patience, if not for my purpose, and I turned with relief to the smaller but sufficiently comprehensive *Encyclopædia Britannica*. It certainly contains some names that do not really matter, but, what is of more importance, it omits very few that really do matter, and its general range and character make it almost ideal for this particular inquiry. There emerged a list of 1800 men and women¹ who had served Church or State in the

¹ An analysis of the list in terms of sex is of interest in this connexion: 97 of my company of 1800 were women; 1 in 18 is a miserable proportion or dispro-

British Isles or Empire with something more than mere administrative ability, or had achieved more than a local reputation in the arts and sciences, in discovery and invention, or in some other recognised form of action or contemplation. I was mildly surprised to find that the list was so small, for, even as it was, not quite all of my catalogue of national notability was strictly defensible. If it included the noblest and rarest spirits of our race—the splendid poets, the great philosophers, the pilots who weathered the storms of State, and the leaders who saved England in those crises when England saved Europe—it also contained a certain number of second-raters, in addition to a few notorious characters and even down-right rogues.

It is true, of course, that Titus Oates and Jack Sheppard and Palmer, the poisoner, were famous in their own special sphere, and that Talbot, the woman soldier, and Old Parr were probably unique specimens. But a hostile critic might certainly have challenged the inclusion of Dr. Dodd, whose exercises in divinity would long have been forgotten had he not been hanged for forgery in the eighteenth century; and I might have been hard put to it to justify the appearance of Sir John Mandeville, the mediæval traveller whose very existence has been doubted. But a dozen or so oddities of this kind hardly affect the general average, and it can be claimed that my 1800 contain all the best and some of the second-best of the most original and forcible personalities that these islands have produced.

Now for the results. Let us deal first with the factor of distribution.

Of the grand total of 1800, almost exactly two-thirds (1222) were born in England. Scotland totals 326, Ireland 153, Wales 43. Three distinguished men were born in the Isle of Man, and 53 abroad—28 in Europe and 25 in the outer Empire. In quantity, at least, the predominance of England is unchallenged: the major question of quality may come up for assessment later. But, when allowance is made for the paucity of her population, the poverty of her soil, and the lateness of her development, Scotland has produced a relatively larger number of distinguished men than England; while Ireland is considerably below the general average, and Wales still lower. (Against this, however, it must be remembered that several famous men of Welsh ancestry

portion, but it is higher than in most European countries. A further analysis shows that 75 of the 97 famous women came from England, 11 from Scotland, 5 from Ireland, 2 from Wales, and 4 were born abroad. That is to say, the proportion of famous women is 1 in 16 in England, 1 in 21 in Wales, and 1 in 30 in Scotland and Ireland. As I certainly do not propose to maintain the proposition that Scots or Irish women are inferior in character or intellect to their English sisters, it must be that local conditions in Scotland and Ireland have been less favourable to women having careers of their own than in England.

have been born in England; which reduces, though it does not fully account for, the numerical inferiority of the principality in the production of genius.)

One curious point that emerges is that the small islands round the British coasts are on the whole slightly less fertile in distinction than the mainland; and the smaller the island, the less likely it is to produce distinction. (The exceptions are the Orkneys, which have produced 6 famous men to Caithness 2; and the Channel Islands 7 against the Isle of Wight 2. But the Channel Islands are accessible from France as well as England.) This may or may not be coincidence, but I am inclined to suspect that something is due to the factor of a physical barrier narrowing the mental horizon.

Partisans of town or country life will be surprised and disconcerted that genius is produced equally and indifferently in both urban and rural conditions. Approximately half the distinguished men in my lists were born in the great cities, half in small towns or villages; and no particular type derives specially from one or the other—poets, for instance, are often townsmen, politicians and financiers as often countrymen, by origin. A certain level of population and prosperity is, however, necessary before talent is produced, or, rather, before it can make its mark: it is, for example, exceedingly rare in the north and west of Scotland, which has very few inhabitants, and in the west of Ireland, which is exceedingly poor. On the other hand, there is a very marked inequality among towns as towns, and in every case the capital city has an enormous advantage over the provinces.

London, for instance, has produced no fewer than 293 distinguished men out of the English total of 1222—nearly 1 in 4; its nearest rival is Norwich, with 21. The Cockney can therefore afford to laugh at the old lie that the city consumes but does not produce life.² The predominance of Edinburgh in Scotland is not quite so marked, with 61 out of 326 famous Scotsmen; but that is largely because Glasgow has challenged its supremacy in the last century and a half, and produced 35 famous men of its own. Dublin, with 52 out of 153, has produced 1 famous Irishman in every 3; and the lack of a national capital for Wales may be partly responsible for the lack of intellectual distinction in the principality. A capital city not only produces talent, but provides careers for some forms of talent which would remain infertile in the country.

An analysis county by county produced several curious and

² A county capital is usually more fertile in talent than the small country town, but not always. Thus Norwich (21), Canterbury (7), Exeter (7), and Ipswich (5) are definitely above the normal; but Lincoln, Hereford, and Chelmsford are not. And some large industrial centres—Walsall, Warrington, Wigan, Huddersfield, and Middlesbrough—are not represented in the list at all.

interesting results, but an English county is usually too small an area to be of any special significance, and grouping by districts furnishes more definite indications of the variety in local genius. When that is done, the important fact at once emerges that the eastern side of England has been far more fertile in talent than the western. Thus Yorkshire has 102 famous men to Lancashire's 51, although Lancashire has to-day a slightly larger population. East Anglia also totals 102 in comparison with 43 from Wales, though eastern province and western principality have practically the same number of inhabitants. And, by a queer coincidence, the three south-eastern counties of Kent, Surrey, and Sussex have also contributed 102 to the list, whereas the three south-western counties of Dorset, Devon, and Cornwall have only produced 84. It is very much the same in Scotland, where Aberdeen has 20, Angus 19, and Fife 24 in comparison with Argyll's 7; and again in Ireland, where Leinster has 77 to Connaught's 10.

The reason is simple. The movement of population in these islands has always been from the east towards the west, with the result that the older civilisation on the eastern side has begun to flower before it has even struck root in the west. This comes out very clearly on a comparison of the lists. Yorkshire, for example, was already famous for splendid churches and learned scholars while Lancashire was only a mass of moor and mountain that was still administratively part of Cheshire; and 14 out of 102 famous Yorkshiremen—including Alcuin, Caedmon, St. John of Beverley, Wiclif, and Miles Coverdale—were born before 1600, against only 2 Lancastrians. It was much the same with East Anglia, which was prosperous and settled before the Norman Conquest, whereas Wales was still poor and sparsely populated under the Tudors and Stuarts; and the tables show that 27 famous East Anglians were born before 1600, against 5 Welshmen. And again, south of the Thames the three south-eastern counties of Kent, Surrey and Sussex were integral parts of England even before the Norman Conquest, whereas Devon was still a frontier county against the foreigners of Cornwall for many a long year after and 21 of the famous men of the south-east were born before 1600, against 12 in the south-west.

This lopsidedness of distribution is, of course, the direct result of historical development, and it would still have existed though probably in less degree, had the west of these islands been as fertile and as well suited to a large and prosperous population as the east. But geography has strangely seconded history here in allotting an undue proportion of mountain, moor, or morass to the western side in each of the three kingdoms; and these two causes in combination seem sufficient to account for its relative intellectual inferiority.

Another cause will, however, be proposed by those who think in terms of race rather than situation—in other words, of heredity rather than environment. As the east of England and Scotland are predominantly Saxon, whereas the west is to some extent Celtic, it will be suggested that the inferiority of the west of England in comparison with the east is due to the inherent inferiority of the Celtic mind in comparison with the Saxon. It seems worth while to examine this thesis a little. Undoubtedly the Celts were decisively beaten by the Saxons in Britain, and by the Franks and Normans in France. That defeat may have been due either to inferiority of numbers, or to a less efficient political organisation, or to both causes together. Neither necessarily implies a cultural intellectual inferiority, but the result of the defeat was that the Celts were not only driven to occupy a less favourable soil, but that they have lived at a disadvantage ever since. They were isolated from each other in Brittany, Wales, Cornwall, Scotland and Ireland, and the smaller political unit is necessarily handicapped in comparison with the larger. Its language has a more restricted currency, and therefore its thinkers and speakers have a smaller range—only in mathematics and music do they compete culturally on equal terms; and the fact that almost the only chance of a career for an individual of the lesser nationality is by migration to, and probably absorption in, the larger unit is in itself a tacit confession of inferiority. Not only are Wales and the Gaelic west of Scotland inferior in intellectual production to England and the Saxon-Scandinavian east of Scotland; Brittany is also definitely inferior to Normandy, Picardy, and Burgundy in the production of notable Frenchmen.

This double handicap, of unfavourable situation and local isolation, seems more than sufficient in itself to account for the smaller intellectual achievement of the Celt; but I think it is also a relevant point that there seems some difference in quality as well as quantity in the Celtic and Saxon mind. Broadly speaking, Celtic Wales and Gaelic Scotland have produced much verse but little prose (or music), much art but little science, much religion but little philosophy. In other words, the Celtic mind seems swift and impulsive rather than reflective (it feels rather than thinks), with the result that its cultural achievements are emotional rather than intellectual; whereas the common-sense Saxon and logical French mind move to a perhaps slower but ultimately surer rhythm, in which impulse is controlled by intellect, with the result that its major achievements have been in the sphere of thought rather than emotion. But history shows that intellect and thought are on the whole greater factors than impulse and emotion in the struggle for life and its occasional flower—civilisation; and if the contrasted bias of the two racial

types dates back to the early conflict in which Saxons and Franks drove the Celts to their enclaves in Brittany and Wales and Scotland, that may partly account both for the original defeat and the subsequent inferiority of achievement.

Let us turn now to the intellectual products of the east and south coast from Aberdeen and Angus to Devon. I for one was not prepared for the surprising contrasts exhibited by different counties and provinces. There does not seem at first sight, for example, any reason to anticipate much difference in mentality and achievement between Yorkshire and its northern and southern neighbours in Northumberland and East Anglia. From Tweed to Thames the social stock is much the same, and through the centuries there has been a good deal of movement and migration between northern and eastern counties. But the fact remains that Yorkshire has always been politically conservative, whereas Northumberland and East Anglia are both radical. Yorkshire has produced several reformers, but hardly any revolutionaries, and her typical statesmen are Strafford, of the policy of 'thorough,' and Guy Fawkes—both 'die-hard' Tories who failed to stem the tide. East Anglia, on the other hand, has always preferred progress to tradition, and worships the rising rather than the setting sun. The eastern counties have consequently produced pioneers, like Winthrop and John Mason (the founder of New Hampshire), overseas, and reformers or revolutionaries at home. Even Wolsey (an Ipswich man) suppressed monasteries to endow education, Oliver Cromwell suppressed the Crown to establish the Commonwealth, and Tom Paine and Godwin were both East Anglians.

It is the same with the Church as with the State. All along the east coast of England the proportion of great Churchmen is far higher than in the rest of the country. But there is a significant difference between north and east. Yorkshire produces saints and scholars like Bede and Hilda, Wiclif and Miles Coverdale, and the broad, tolerant type like Tillotson. The eastern counties, on the other hand, produce ecclesiastical statesmen and rulers of the Church—Grossetête of Lincoln and the magnificent Wolsey are typical examples—and doctors of theology who define doctrine with almost mathematical precision. The aim of Yorkshire, in short, is charity and comprehension; of East Anglia, clarity and certainty. If ever the Church requires a new creed, or the State a new constitution, the articles will probably be drawn up by an East Anglian authority—and objected to by an East Anglian nonconformist. This is the decisive type, with an instinct for government and order in the Church as well as the State, that decides, directs and dominates, and, if it thinks necessary, persecutes.

On the cultural side of life, the evidence makes it clear that the arts and sciences flourish more than letters along the north and eastern side of England. Yorkshire, with its noble churches, is the county of great architects; it was a Yorkshireman, too, who built the new Westminster Cathedral, and another Yorkshireman who built Eddystone. The county has several famous painters, but East Anglia (which is deficient in building materials, and has therefore few architects) is pre-eminently the country of great artists—Constable and Gainsborough, from Suffolk, and Crome and others of the Norwich school; while Morland and Hogarth, though born in London, were of eastern counties stock. Sculpture, which was probably prejudiced by the puritan objection to the graven image, seems to follow much the same line of distribution as architecture and painting, and can instance Chantry and Flaxman, from Yorkshire, and Woolner, from Suffolk.

Music, on the other hand—an art in which England, and still more Scotland, is lamentably deficient—can claim no more than Sterndale Bennett in Yorkshire (Delius, though born in Bradford, was of foreign parentage), and in East Anglia there is only the forgotten Crotch, of Norwich. London is better represented, with Purcell and Arne from Westminster and Covent Garden, and Sullivan from Southwark; but the deficiency is general, for the only other important name in English music is Elgar from the Midlands. Our poetry does not suggest that we are a nation of visualists rather than auditives, for it shows an exquisite and occasionally excessive sensitiveness to sound, but the long lead which painting has established over music in these islands certainly lends colour to that view.

Science and its practical sister, invention, both have many famous names: engineering and mechanical in the industrial north—Stephenson, the locomotive builder, of Newcastle, is the typical figure here; the improvement of crops and the soil in the agricultural eastern counties. Biology and botany—the sciences of life—have, on the whole, been more fruitful in Yorkshire and East Anglia than physics or chemistry or geology, which are more at home in Lancashire and the Midlands. A list would be long, impressive, and uninteresting³; but the two greatest names of

³ A note may be permitted on the time, instead of the space, factor. There are practically no geologists, and very few botanists and field naturalists, before the eighteenth century. Yet there was no reason whatever why men should not have investigated the stratification and formation of rocks, or the interaction of land and water. These things do not depend on some prior scientific or mechanical invention (as, for instance, astronomy could not develop before the telescope, or aviation before the internal combustion engine); they are simply the result of observation and reason, and there is nothing in Lyell or Darwin that I know of which could not have been ascertained two centuries earlier. The phenomena they dealt with are visible to the naked eye, and if men did not observe them it

all are in mathematics—Napier, of Midlothian, and Isaac Newton, from near Grantham, in Lincolnshire.

All along the east coast, on the other hand, literature is of the serious rather than the imaginative type. There is a definite shortage of poetical ability in the north, and an increasing dearth in the east of England—Tennyson, a Lincolnshire man, is the only great singer in the front rank, with Crabbe, from Aldeburgh, in Suffolk, some way down in the second. Fiction can claim Priestley in the Yorkshire district (the Brontës, though of Yorkshire birth, were from Ireland) and the drama Congreve, a Leeds man; but neither fiction nor drama flourishes in East Anglia, which is interested in principles rather than persons, and which, therefore, misses both the sunlit shallows of human comedy and the sombre depths of human tragedy.

Now cross the Thames, and the difference is astonishing. All along the north and east coast the divines are numerous and important, but as soon as we leave the kingdom of Essex for that of Kent there is a marked change. The saints and scholars and theologians come no longer in battalions, hardly even in single spies; and there is a difference of quality as well as quantity in the product of the south. I looked as confidently to Canterbury, the metropolis of the Church, to produce a few archbishops as to Rome to produce popes and cardinals, but I was mistaken. The only divine born in Canterbury who has made a name for himself was Canon Barham, whose *Ingoldsby Legends* are hardly a classic of theology. The only theologian of Kent is Hoadly, who is remembered as a deist in orders and the originator of the Bangorian controversy. Surrey has produced three anti-clericals—Thomas Cromwell and Edward Gibbon, who by coincidence both came from Putney, and Occam, the famous schoolman, whose logical 'razor' was sharper on the secular than the sacred side—but no Churchman whatever. Sussex has one martyr—Hannington, of Uganda; Hampshire has Liddon, whose once-famous sermons have now lost their savour; and Dorset has only Stillingfleet (significantly of Yorkshire ancestry), whose fame has become a shadow.

Not until we come to Devonshire is the soil more fertile for religion; and the frontier county of the west has produced Boniface, the apostle of Germany; Hooker, of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*; and, by way of contrast, the fanatical Joanna Southcott, of the absurd revelations and the empty bishop's box. But these single swallows do not make a summer, and it is quite impossible to avoid the conclusion that the lack of divines is due to any other cause than indifference. The whole district is infertile, if

simply means that they did not think them worth observing. In other words, their minds were shut to the importance of that particular aspect of things, as ours probably are to other natural and social problems around us.

not definitely sterile, in religious activity: the truth is that the south of England is secular, not sacred, at heart, and its interest is in this world rather than the next.

It follows, naturally, that the south has been both richer and more varied in political achievement. Kent runs Oxfordshire close as the birthplace of statesmen: it has generally been conservative; but the rebel Wat Tyler was probably, and Sir Thomas Wyatt was certainly, a Kentish man. Cobbett the traditionalist and Cobden the reformer both came from within a few miles of each other in Surrey and Sussex. Hampshire's typical statesman was Palmerston, a national hero distrusted by good party men; and Dorset's famous Lord Shaftesbury was a philanthropist rather than a politician. Only when we come to Devonshire again do we find a more definite local type, in soldier-statesmen like Monk and Marlborough and the explorer-administrator like Raleigh; these, like Drake and Hawkins and the other sea-dogs of the county, have the frontiersman's qualities—quickness in action and decision, and readiness to adapt themselves to circumstances as the occasion may demand.

But this remarkable contrast between the north-east and the south of England extends also to the cultural side of life. In the north, the arts and sciences are ahead of letters; in the south, literature flourishes more than the arts and sciences. Yorkshire and East Anglia, for example, have many painters, but few poets; Kent and Sussex, on the other hand, few painters, but many poets. Yorkshire and East Anglia, again, have few novelists and fewer dramatists; whereas Kent and Sussex have several dramatists—Marlowe, Fletcher, Otway; and a little further west, in Hampshire, the small area within a few miles of Portsmouth must be unique for the number of novelists it has produced. Here was the birthplace of Charles Dickens, George Meredith, Walter Besant, Jane Austen, Miss Mitford, and, a little further afield, of Lucas Malet. If there is any place in the world outside London and Paris that has produced so much specialised talent within so short a time I do not know it.

This study is based throughout on the general principle that one swallow does not make a summer, and therefore that the presence of a single talented individual in any one district may be an interesting but is not necessarily a significant fact. But when we find that seven famous writers in one kind were all born within a century of each other we are certainly justified in saying that the period favoured that particular type of composition; and when we find that that particular talent flourishes exceedingly in one district and not at all in another, it seems absurd to ascribe this contrasted efflorescence and sterility to mere coincidence and chance.

The position, as I see it is this. The mental attitude of the south of England differs from that of the north and east in that its outlook is social and human rather than philosophic—that is to say, it tends to think in terms of persons rather than principles. Hence the north produces a Paley, the south only a Liddon, in the impersonal field of theology; the south produces a Gibbon, the north only a Stubbs, in the more personal field of history. Hence, too, the north produces mathematicians and scientists, who are largely concerned with such essentially impersonal studies as chemistry and physics and geology; the south, on the other hand, produces dramatists and novelists, whose business is the contrast and conflict of individual persons. The contrast between the abundance of artists and the shortage of poets in the north and the shortage of artists and abundance of poets in the south is more difficult to fit into this argument. There is no reason that I know of why the visualist type of genius should flourish more in the north and the auditive in the south; nor should the portrait painter be less interested in the personal aspect of life than the poet. This seems simply part of the general rule that the arts flourish more in the north and literature in the south; but it is a relevant fact that of the two great poets of the north Wordsworth is philosophic rather than personal, while Tennyson is deficient in dramatic force; whereas the poets of the south are in the main lyrical and dramatic and human rather than didactic or philosophic.

Taken as a whole, then, the statement holds that the north and east of England think in terms of principles, the south thinks in terms of persons, and that the former are in the main religious, scientific and artistic, whereas the latter is deficient in these interests, but excels in literature, especially in verse, fiction and the drama.

There is not sufficient space here to discuss the extremely complicated and controversial question whether the mental differences between north and south (and also between north and midlands and west) are due to race or soil or climate or, as seems more probable, to a combination of all three factors; but some indications may perhaps be discovered from the minor differences within these provincial categories. For while the north and east of England are, broadly speaking, one in their emphasis on religion and politics, there are significant local differences between them. Yorkshire, for example, is tolerant in religion and conservative in politics, whereas its northern neighbour, Northumberland, is secular and radical, and its south-eastern neighbour, East Anglia, is radical in politics and definite and authoritarian in religious doctrine (with a strong strain of nonconformity in consequence). It is probable that two different causes operate here.

Yorkshire is tolerant and conservative because it was for centuries a land of peace, where religion and scholarship flourished in the atmosphere of great monasteries; but it was only a land of peace because Northumberland bore the brunt of the battle with Scotland, and so became secular. The frontier forays which crossed the Tweed and raged along the Tyne seldom passed the Tees; there would never have been so many churches in Yorkshire had there not been so many castles in Northumberland. In this case it was clearly a difference of political environment which produced the contrasted secular and religious bias in the same stock north and south of the Tyne. But East Anglia has been even more peaceful than Yorkshire, and no such cause can be given as a reason for the contrast between the tolerant conservatism of Yorkshire and the radical intolerance of the eastern counties.

The essential mental interests of the two districts are the same—religion, politics, science, art; and the primary difference between north and east is not so much that they look at different things, but that they look at the same things in a different way. The record of Yorkshire shows that it is conservative in religion and politics, but ready enough for innovation in science and art; the record of East Anglia, on the other hand, shows that it is radical in religion and politics, but less ready for innovation in science and art. This, however, is merely symptomatic of a difference in mental vision. The true key is that the Yorkshire mind is exploratory, and therefore inclusive; the East Anglian mind, on the contrary, is systematic and order-loving, and—since systems have limits and leave things out—is therefore exclusive. Now the exploratory and inclusive mind is necessarily tolerant and slow to come to a conclusion, because it does not know what more it may have to include in its synthesis. But the systematic and exclusive mind is usually intolerant, because when an equation is once apparently solved on the available evidence, the introduction of further factors which may disturb it is naturally resented. The one is an explorer, the other an administrator; the one seeks new knowledge, the other a new order.⁴ How, then, does it come about that an essentially similar stock in not very different physical or climatic conditions should vary like this? The thing is a puzzle.

But I have noticed that on the sunlit East Anglian flats one sees things sharply and clearly in a hard brilliant light which exposes every angle and therefore accentuates every difference;

⁴ It is a curious fact that in medicine the great physicians on my list came from Yorkshire, the great surgeons from East Anglia. This may be merely coincidence, but at least it is a significant coincidence that the famous physicians added to our knowledge of experimental medicine, whereas the surgeons systematised and applied it.

whereas on the Yorkshire heights one sees things normally in a soft grey light that reflects every curve and therefore conceals differences. The former conveys an impression that it has revealed everything there is to be seen; the other hints at illimitable distances in which there is more to be discovered than the eye can see. The one environment favours planning and controlling the known; the other suggests that it is better first to explore the unknown. It may seem fanciful to suggest that a physical contrast of this kind is responsible for the mental variety between north and east. But physical causes do produce mental effects, and the evidence as it stands does not indicate—at least, to me—any better explanation.

Many other points of interest and, I think, of importance arose in the course of this inquiry, which opened up the grave philosophical problem of the possible limitations as well as the actual achievements of the human mind. But there are also limits to the hospitality of editors and the patience of readers which are of more immediate importance, and these must not be transgressed further.

A. WYATT TILBY.

MUSIC AND REVOLUTION

WHEN the history of music in our time comes to be written, an unprecedented occurrence will have to be studied: the deflection of musical art from its natural course of evolution by political upheavals and changes of *régime*. To describe this as unprecedented is no paradox. Music, throughout the Middle Ages and the modern period, had pursued its normal course of evolution, for the simple reason that nobody attempted to divert it. Reasons of statecraft and policy often led to its social scope and purpose being altered, as happened in seventeenth-century England when the Puritans suppressed church music. But nobody ever thought of regulating from outside the forms, style, idiom, or other constituents of the art: the Platonic notion that certain kinds of music might be pernicious in themselves was included in no reformer's scheme.

Naturally, changes, sudden or gradual, of social conditions have always affected the philosophy of musical art, its place and functions in civilisation, and therefore, ultimately, the scope, style, and character of the art itself. But all this happened in the normal course of things. In England, when church music was suppressed, music did not cease to be practised: it was simply diverted into other channels—secularised; and the Puritanic policy 'acted as the greatest incentive to the cultivation of the domestic forms of the art,'¹ music continuing its natural evolution, more speedily maybe, but without sudden change of direction as regarded style and idiom. Even the Revolution of 1789 did not interfere in any appreciable degree with the musical tendencies of the period in France. It brought music nearer to the people, it is true; and the purpose of the art became democratic. Musical performances for the masses, mass-singing, and the diffusion of musical education became part of an all-embracing social programme. Leaders of thought recognised the importance of music for civilisation. Mirabeau, Condorcet, and Daunou, among others, recommended its inclusion in the curriculum of all schools. The social status of composers and performers was considerably improved; and in 1795 the foundation of the *Conservatoire*

¹ *The Oxford History of Music*, vol. iii.

National de Musique marked the opening of a new era by rendering full professional education available to all.

Music itself, however, was not in the least deflected from its natural course. Big changes had taken place long before 1789—some for better and some for worse—under the influence of Rameau, of Gluck's reform of opera, of Diderot, d'Alembert, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. All the latest had been leading straight to the democratisation of music. Nothing could have been more in keeping with the spirit of the Revolution than the ideas that were in the air, the clamours for rational, matter-of-fact æsthetics, for a return to Nature and simplicity, and so on. In fact, the very sane trends of thought which led to the Revolution had given birth to the new artistic tendencies long before the breaking out of the Revolution, during and after which music, just as it was, fell into place quite naturally, and continued its course unaffected and unchallenged. Apart from matters such as choice of words and subjects in song and opera, nothing was altered at first except the designations and destination of musical composition. It never occurred to anyone that a republican march should differ in kind from a royalist march. And a long time was to elapse before the democratisation of music really affected its intrinsic character.

At that time no subtle distinctions of style, or even tone, were the order of the day. Even the styles of opera and church music—as shown, for instance, by Mozart's contributions to the latter genre—were not very much differentiated from one another. Small wonder, then, that in the days of the Revolution, whereas the political activities or reputation of a composer could bring him favour or disfavour, his æsthetic creed or practice were matters to be judged by art critics and public only. Certain orders or styles of music might be regarded as objectionable from the æsthetic or rational point of view (thus had Fontenelle and d'Alembert objected to the sonata and abstract instrumental music in general, and Rousseau to anything approaching harmonic complexity). But, even though a Daunou might recommend that the people's educators should build on 'music's power to get hold of the mind, rouse the imagination, stir up passions, inspire masses with unanimous emotions, turn all wills to a common purpose,' no one ever came forth with the allegation that certain strains could stimulate, and others impede, civic, democratic or national feelings. And so the composers who had grown and worked under the old *régime* carried on very much as before, and the younger generation remained in line with pre-Revolution tradition even when showing genuine originality—Méhul's music is a case in point. One composer only, Jean-François Lesueur (born 1760), dreamt of far-reaching musical

reforms. His *Exposé d'une musique une, imitative, particulière, et propre à chaque cérémonie* (published, let it be noted, in 1787) set forth elaborate theories of expression and tone-painting. Elsewhere he advocated the use of Greek modes. His lack of creative imagination prevented his practising what he preached in a way that could carry conviction; but he exercised a great influence on Berlioz, that musical revolutionist *par excellence*, who went to him for advice and direction in 1823.

In short, we see that the events of the period did not deflect, but sped up, the course of musical evolution. Another point is worth noting; in the words of a French historian:

even the wars of the Revolution and Napoleonic period, by virtue of the formidable turmoil of ideas they stirred, played their part in the growth of an intellectual cosmopolitanism by which the country's artistic horizon was considerably extended.^a

Berlioz has often been described as a child of 1830. But the Paris Revolution of 1830 was a local, purely political affair, followed by no change of social conditions worth mentioning; and again we see that by the time it took place, music, like the other arts, had already reached a new—and this time a really revolutionary—stage of its evolution:

The storm that broke in thunder on the July barricades only gave direction and impetus to an electrical force that had been gathering over the whole field of national life. In art, as in politics, the days of legitimism were over. Géricault had defied tradition with his *Radeau de la Méduse*; Hugo had declared war in the preface to *Cromwell*, and had just emerged victorious from the famous 'forty days' of *Hernani*; Alfred de Vigny... had struck his blow with *Cinq-Mars*.^b

And, what is more important still, Berlioz himself had already asserted his own individuality fully. As early as 1828 he had conducted in Paris a concert of his works, the programme of which included representative works such as the *Waverley Overture*, excerpts from the opera *Les Francs-Juges*, and a *Resurrexit* which on previous occasions had produced a great impression. In 1829 he had outlined his *Huit Scènes de Faust*, containing in germ, and more than in germ, the *Damnation*. His *Symphonie Fantastique* was finished by April 1830 and its performance prepared for the following month—circumstances delaying it, however, until November. So that, in the history of his career, the July Revolution remains a negligible factor.

Having made this point clear, historians will have to consider a curious problem which criticism has not yet solved: why should music so thoroughly democratic in purpose and character, so obviously written for immediate appeal and effect, so sincere

^a L. de la Laurencie, *Le Goût Musical en France*.

^b Hadow, *Studies in Modern Music*, vol. i.

and free from actual complexities or complex undercurrents, and yet original, significant, and prophetic enough to have aroused widespread—although not unanimous—admiration, and to have strongly influenced Liszt, Wagner (perhaps mainly *via* Liszt) and the Russians, never have become really popular in France or any other country? After over a hundred years' trial for the earliest works, and nearly seventy for the latest, it is still, in certain quarters, as much an object of discussion and mistrust as the most innovatory or otherwise egregious music of our own period. It has left its mark on, has exercised and still exercises its sway over many distinguished musicians and a fairly large fraction of the educated public, but never conquered the masses. This problem, obviously, will have to be solved on the strength of æsthetic rather than of evolutionary considerations. But historians would be unwise to overlook it, and equally unwise to come to the conclusion that Berlioz did not in many ways truly embody the spirit of his period, even though he was not 'a child of 1830.'

The effects of the 1848 Revolution can be disposed of briefly. In France, Chopin had already finished his work (he died in 1848). Berlioz continued his chequered career. The *grand-opéra* of Meyerbeer and Halévy was in full vogue before, and continued to be. In Germany, Schumann was tremendously excited by the Revolution. He wrote *Marches of the Barricades* for piano (op. 76), which he considered 'republican in style,' but which strike no new note, and also three 'revolutionary' choral songs (unpublished—manuscripts discovered in Paris in 1932), which are described as 'mildly *gemütlich*.' No change of aims or manner appears in his later works. This Revolution looms large in most biographies of Wagner, mainly on account of the active part he took in the upheaval. But it was not in the least required in order to stimulate, or even liberate, the forces that were in him. It is true that the first draft of what was to become *The Ring* was written in October 1848: but Mr. Ernest Newman⁴ was able to trace the dawning of his German nationalist feelings back to 1837, the date of the first draft of his article on Meyerbeer, emphasising this composer's 'native German virtues,' and that of the spirit of revolution in him back to his years in Dresden. As for his musical evolution, it was continuous and self-governed throughout:

The subjects of all his works, down to *Parsifal*, were settled upon, more or less definitely, at quite an early stage of his career: but for the working-out of them he had to wait almost passively for the right psychological moment. . . . Thus there is really no mystery, in the last resort, in this extraordinarily musical mind refraining altogether from the writing

⁴ *Life of Richard Wagner*, vol. i., chaps. xvii.—xx.

of music for a period of something like ~~six~~ years—from August 1847, when *Lohengrin* was completed, to about October 1853, when he began work upon the music to the *Rheingold*.⁵

Liszt, that greatest, after Berlioz, of the nineteenth-century musical pioneers, was pursuing the normal course of his progress as a composer, had written a number of characteristic piano works, and was planning his first two tone-poems, *Ce qu'on entend sur la montagne* and *Les Préludes*. He had been in Paris in 1830, suffering from the aftermath of a nervous breakdown. The outbreak of the Revolution acted as a tonic and infused new life into him. 'C'est le canon qui l'a guéri,' his mother said. He outlined, on the spur of the moment, a *Revolutionary Symphony*. On the first page of the sketch, preserved at the Weimar Museum, a liberal sprinkling of remarks such as 'indignation, liberté, désordre, cris confus, vague bizzarerie [sic], bataille, marche de la garde nationale, enthousiasme, enthousiasme, enthousiasme, allons enfants de la patrie,' bears testimony to the frame of mind in which he planned it, and gives an inkling of what it might have been had he carried it to completion (the fine tone-poem *Héroïde Funèbre*, of 1850, came out of it). The ideology of 1830 certainly acted upon his mind, and therefore, in a measure, upon his tendencies as an artist. But the direct stimuli to his musical imagination, at that time, were his impressions of Berlioz's *Symphonie Fantastique*, whose first performance he heard; and, shortly afterwards, of Chopin and Paganini.

There is no need to include in this brief survey more than an allusion to the speedy rise of French music from a very low level to a wonderfully high one after the Franco-Prussian war. By 1871 the first artisans of the Renaissance—César Franck, Saint-Saëns, Lalo, Bizet—had long found themselves. And even those writers who lay the greatest stress upon the effects which the new spirit of the nation had upon the regeneration of its musical art acknowledge that one of the strongest, earliest, and most beneficial influences—and maybe the very strongest—which brought the change to pass was that of Wagner.⁶

Leaving aside, for the obvious reason that it is no part of the subject of this essay, the one other efficient cause—the arising of a composer of genius—we may say that nothing outside the natural course of evolution affects music intrinsically, or suddenly determines a new outlook on the art. No abrupt change in style or procedure takes place, as a matter of course, in consequence of social upheavals. Governing bodies, thinkers, musicians, and public expect none, desire none; they do not

⁵ *Life of Richard Wagner*, vol. i., chap. xx.

⁶ Romain Rolland, *Musiciens d'aujourd'hui*; Vincent d'Indy, *Richard Wagner et son influence sur l'art français*.

even conceive the possibility of any. Nor could one take place in the natural order of things, except as a result of some form of coercion. Composers, as before, continue to do what their own minds prompt them to do. Such changes as come later, in unavoidable consequence of changed outlook and philosophy of life and art, are natural, gradual, and determined as much from within (that is, by previous happenings in music itself) as by the new outlook and philosophy. For instance, Wagner, as composer, apart from being Wagner, owes as much to Gluck, Beethoven, and Weber as to the spirit of his age. And besides, the spirit of the age is the cause, not the result, of those social upheavals in which biographers often find convenient explanations of points of artistic individuality or evolution.

But historians dealing with music in our time will have to examine the consequences of an upheaval which was not the outcome of the spirit of the age. It is far too soon to see in their proper proportions and perspective the changes wrought by the World War. We can, of course, discover, define, and quite reasonably explain a number of points, general or particular. We may refer to the hardness, restlessness, matter-of-factness, bitterness and ruthlessness of a badly mauled, shaken, and disenchanted generation, which has neither longing nor time for sentiment, romance, or even leisurely speculation and assimilation—dissatisfied with old standards and discipline, engaged in a hectic quest for new ones at all costs. We may, should we be so minded, adduce the spreading of tendencies to morbid introspection on the one hand, to hurried and shallow excitement on the other. Or, on the contrary, we may speak of a readjustment of values and the birth of a new sense of realities. But, whatever our explanation of the changes may be, it would be unwise to ascribe any of these to the post-war spirit without having carefully investigated the musical situation in 1914.

Most of the so-called post-war tendencies had asserted themselves long before 1914, originating in the processes of action and reaction which are basic factors in the evolution of all the arts. For instance, many of Schönberg's most radical works had been not only composed, but performed and published: the piano pieces opp. 11 and 19 (1909 and 1911), the orchestral pieces op. 16 (1909). *Pierrot Lunaire*, in which criticism has rightly seen 'the romantic spirit satirising itself and scoffing derisively at its own achievement in a last paroxysm of supreme disillusion,'⁷ was performed in 1912. Schönberg's influence, by that time, had already spread. Many young composers—among whom Anton Webern and Alban Berg, the future author of the admirable *Wozzeck*—had gone to him for tuition, because they regarded his

⁷ Mr. Cecil Gray in *A Survey of Contemporary Music*.

work as the very embodiment of that for which they had been longing and more or less consciously groping. A testimony of what he meant to them all is the book *Arnold Schönberg*, by eleven of his pupils and friends, published at Munich that very year. In 1911 one of these eleven, Karl Linke, writing in the *Vienna Merker*, had defined his art as proceeding from

a reaction, a great weariness of nature, imagery, beautiful proportions and virtuous colours [the word *tugendhaft* is actually used]; an effort towards liberation and the striking of a new balance, towards imitating, not outer nature, but the inner nature.

Stravinsky had written, after *The Fire Bird* and *Petrushka*, *The Rite of Spring* and *The Nightingale*, definitely evincing the restless, inquiring turn of mind which was to lead him from the *Symphonies d'instruments à vent* to *Mavra* and from *Œdipus Rex* to the *Symphonie de Psaumes*. Erik Satie had not yet become 'le bon maître d'Arcueil,' but a good deal of the music which induced the 'French Six,' and later comers too, to follow his example and fight, nominally at least, under his banner was already written. The score of his sensational ballet *Parades* (1917) includes part of the *Morceaux en forme de poire*, composed years before.

Bartók had given us many characteristic piano pieces (including the *Esquisses*, *Nénies* and *Burlesques*), the orchestral *Portraits* and *Images*, one string quartet, and the opera *Duke Blue-Beard's Castle*—mature works in which his artistic personality and line of action are clearly defined. During the war, 'cut off from the outer world, living in a country in which desperate conditions prevailed,' his colleague Kodály tells us, 'he became more reserved and ended in complete isolation.' Later, he was practically ostracised in his country for having accepted office, as director of the Musical Academy, during the Socialist revolution, and also for having set to music libretti by the Socialist poet Balasz. But it is not in his post-war output only that the stern, at times defiant, tone is to be found in which critics might incline to see the outcome of these bitter experiences.

Other factors of so-called post-war developments are, of course, not to be ignored. The late nineteenth century and the early twentieth were marked, more than any previous period had been, by inquiry into, and study of, the musical heritage of the past: not only the acknowledged classics and their immediate predecessors, but also far older and lesser known composers of all schools and periods, besides becoming objects of scholarly research on an unprecedented scale, were studied from a professional, æsthetic and technical point of view (the teaching of

musical composition on historical lines, as practised by Vincent d'Indy at the Paris *Schola Cantorum*, is an invention of this age) and also given a place in the current repertory; whence the spreading of a wider culture, a greater versatility and elasticity of outlook, but also more opportunities for indecision and mutability, especially among the second-rate men and the semi-educated fraction (unavoidably a large one) of the public. The musical world became less self-centred, but also more self-conscious; or, one might say, knowledge-conscious. Many composers developed a tendency to work on a basis of knowledge rather than of power, 'in a cultural rather than a creative spirit.' This may be true of Schönberg, as the Italian critic Pannani would have it; it certainly helps us to account for Hindemith, and also for the latest stages of Stravinsky's evolution. But naturally, nothing of the kind could have happened suddenly; and in this respect, again, post-war occurrences are a harvest of which the seed was sown, and had germinated, long before 1914. And the same may be said of another post-war outcrop—that of jazz, whose popularity may certainly be ascribed to post-war frivolity, jadedness, and recklessness (although it has interested composers—Ravel, for instance—who are neither frivolous, reckless, and jaded, nor wishful to cater for a public which is), but whose coming into being was, according to its historians, already an accomplished fact in 1914.

In three countries radical changes of *régime* took place after the war; and in all three the new Government took into account the cultural value of music, and the fact that music may exercise an influence in other domains than that of art. In Fascist Italy no reason could have been found for interfering with the musical situation in the country nor with the tendencies of its composers. Even the least conservative of these had never shown an inclination to experiment in musical extremism, except now and then, tentatively and rather self-consciously. In fact, they had ever been, as one of the foremost, Alfredo Casella, recently remarked, rather too much afraid of taking risks. Their professed ideal was a fusion of tradition and modernity; and so the advent of Fascism simply confirmed a state of things that had existed, unperturbed, for a quarter of a century or so (Pizzetti, Malipiero, and Casella, the leaders of the school, were born in the early 'eighties). Italian music remained just what it was before: really Italian in spirit and quality, devoid of complexities, showing no sign of anxiety or strain, impervious, almost, to outside influences—interest in new developments abroad steadily increasing the while among the music-loving public, without there being any fear that this might contravene the nationalist policy of the Government.

In Germany the situation, before the advent of the Nazi *régime*, was very different. Conflicting tendencies, ranging from the most academic to the most startlingly innovatory, had long joined battle. For over a quarter of a century the country had been, together with Austria, the centre of the movement that began with the coming of Schönberg and his group. After the war came the fights for and against atonality, polytonality, expressionism, anti-romanticism, new classicism, new realism, pure, abstract music, workaday music, twelve-tone music, quarter-tone music—to mention only a few of the preoccupations (not all of them German born) which in turn testified to ever-growing restlessness and diversity of purpose.

These developments aroused (as is bound to happen whenever anything strikingly new takes place in art) anger and opposition in certain quarters, interest and enthusiasm in others; but new theories and works were allowed to establish themselves or die a natural death, and the task of passing judgment on them was left, as is only natural, to the critics and musical public at large. Innovators and revolutionists were not discouraged, but often encouraged officially—by being given professorial chairs or other important posts. Then, with the coming of the Nazi *régime* (January 1933), a sudden convulsion took place, of which the political and ethical aspects do not come within the scope of this article, but which violently diverted German music from the course it happened to be following and forced it into a narrow channel. Not only were a large number of composers, performers, teachers, and critics eliminated, but certain types of music also—all the 'radical' types, in fact—were purely and simply vetoed for national, social, and cultural reasons.

The ideas which led to this change of front had for some time been in the air. A book, *Musik und Rasse*, by Richard Eichenauer, which appeared in the autumn of 1932, is in this respect characteristic. Its main thesis is that European music, based on harmonic and polyphonic part-writing, is entirely a Nordic invention, and that alone the Nordic races have created and maintained its tradition, the 'opposing forces' having been and still being many, from the Italian verists to the Russian nationalists, and, inevitably, the Jews of all countries. But, the author continues, the Jews who preach and practise atonality, quarter-tones, and other destructive methods have at least the excuse of belonging to a race to which the spirit of harmony and polyphony is fundamentally alien (as it is to all Asiatic races); and it behoves the Aryan composers and public to maintain their own tradition and resist the encroachments of musical anarchy and degradation. Last May the German State Secretary for Education, Joseph Goebbels, declared that

the German art of the coming decades would be heroic, hard as steel in its romanticism, non-sentimental, concerned with realities, national, and instinct with strong national pathos. This art shall be binding for all—or shall not be.

The drastic measures taken to react against alleged anti-national and anti-cultural influences included an order that no person of Jewish descent would be allowed to teach music, and the appointment of three leading German musicians (Furtwängler, the conductor; Backhaus, the pianist; and Kulenkampf, the violinist) as State censors of all concert programmes, entrusted with the duty of vetoing all undesirable music.

Throughout the Press antagonists of modern tendencies rejoiced that the time should have come at last to 'wipe off the effects of the nefarious past fourteen years,' to 'do away with all inhuman modern inventions, from atonality to jazz, and bring German music back to purity of feeling and of achievement.'

By a remarkable *volte-face* German criticism, which had almost invariably disparaged national tendencies in music, as compared with the 'universal, purely human' values of German music, started proclaiming that no music which was not genuinely national could be really great, and that German composers should aim at being as truly national as, for instance, Mussorgsky, Stravinsky, Debussy, Bartók, and Malipiero. Touches of comic relief were provided by learned doctors declaring—one, that, 'although "German music for the Germans" was the order of the day, even the most patriotic Germans would not wish to eliminate Verdi, Rossini, Auber, or Puccini from the opera repertory'; another, that Max Bruch and Bizet, whose music he did not consider at all undesirable, were not really Jews; and another, that,

while waging war against all that is infra-human in jazz, Germany should not set its face against syncopation *per se*, because masters such as Beethoven and Schumann had used it to genuine artistic purposes.

But meanwhile all the music against which they were inveighing had been purely and simply wiped off the German slate. The following autumn a critic writing in Vienna recorded that

in 1927-1928, sixty-six new operas had been performed on German stages: last year, only nine were. The modern repertory consists almost exclusively of works by elderly composers. Krenek, Hindemith, Berg have gone overboard. Composers and playwrights run in droves, turning out stuff in keeping with the circumstances of the moment—whose principal characters are, invariably, Armin, or Frederick the Great, or Luther, or Kleist, or Körner. Gaps are filled with revivals of forgotten operas—Siegfried Wagner's, Lortzing's, Flotow's and so on. Remains to see how the public will like it all.

And Professor Albert Einstein (one of the many fine scholars now exiled from Germany) declared in the *Daily Telegraph* that

the great age of mediocrity had arrived, and mediocrities crowded into the limelight, founding their claims on nothing more than 'the ties of a common racial origin.'

Not a few of the critics still working in Germany are aware of the peril.

Let us not waste our time [one of them wrote] over our Lortzings and Draeseikes and Rheinbergers and Nesslers. Our sluggish, unconscious middle-class public is all too prone to believe that the so-called national operas they hear to-day represent true modern art and tendencies. They were always convinced that 'original genius' meant something anti-national, un-German, and destructive. The main task before us is to eradicate the spirit of mediocrity and indolence, to instil in all minds some kind of artistic public spirit.

It is impossible to surmise how long it will take for such warnings to sink in and take effect. Drastic coercion has created entirely artificial conditions, and those who are responsible for the change may soon awaken to the fact that it is easier to destroy than to rebuild. The only music by young, or comparatively young, composers with which Germany is allowed to concern herself just now is of mere local, not to say parochial, value; the works which had aroused interest outside her borders because, in Professor Einstein's words, they bore signs, 'if not of greatness, at least of vitality, of movement, of seeking and finding'—from Schönberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* and Berg's *Wozzeck* to Weill's *Jasager*, that remarkably interesting first example of opera for use in schools—are taboo, their authors silent or exiled. How the unprecedented conditions of the moment, and the education they are now receiving, will affect the budding generation of composers nobody can tell. The next musical genius to crop up will, of course, surmount all obstacles; but who knows how, and at what cost? What can be surmised is that he may have to face conditions as antagonistic as those against which Mussorgsky struggled in the 'sixties and 'seventies in Russia.

Things are very different in Soviet Russia. While the Government was engaged in making a clean sweep of the 'capitalist and bourgeois' heritage, it seemed possible for a time that measures would be taken, not only to eliminate the music associated with the old *régime*, or considered out of keeping with Soviet ideals, but also to lay down laws along which music should be written. There was a period of fluctuation and fumbling, especially with regard to the classics. Articles appeared explaining, for instance, that the music of Beethoven, Schubert, Wagner, and Mussorgsky was in keeping with the Soviet spirit, that of

Chopin, Mendelssohn, Schumann, and Tchaikowsky antagonistic to it. But the implication did not follow that the works of the latter should not be performed and studied. The concluding paragraph of the poster announcing the festival which commemorated in Leningrad the twenty-fifth anniversary of Rimsky-Korsakof's death (this included special performances of many of his works, lectures, debates, and an exhibition of souvenirs, manuscripts, books, etc., relating to him and his activities) are characteristic of the Soviet attitude in such matters:

Rimsky-Korsakof's life and work as a whole embody the ideology of an aristocracy turned bourgeois, which believed that capitalism must unavoidably develop. Considering the way in which he adjusted himself to the evolution of this class, it is important for us all to study his output. The antinomies of this evolution are expressed in his fluctuations between romanticism and realism, life and history, fantasy and reality, love of the past and pungent political satire. To become familiar with his artistic bequest and to achieve a critical comprehension of it is one of the conditions of the establishment of our Socialist musical culture.

It is acknowledged quite frankly that the problem of applying the Marxist standards (stressing the moral and social values of art rather than the purely æsthetic) to music proper is not yet near being solved; as we shall presently see, eager efforts are made to advance matters. Meanwhile, a number of points of principle are agreed upon—a remarkable fact being that these can be summed up in terms textually taken from Goebbels' declaration on the coming German art: Soviet music, too, must be 'hard as steel (but not romantic), non-sentimental, concerned with realities, and national.' It must be the embodiment of active, not contemplative, moods. Introspection, emotionalism, and all 'dissolving' elements are undesirable. Therefore, Russia wants realist artists in the true sense of the word—artists concerned, not with empirical representation of so-called 'realistic' details, but with giving true, objective images of the world and of human feelings, with 'following the natural path of human thought.' Realism is a matter, not of choice of subjects (an old fallacy of which Western criticism remains unable to get rid), but of outlook and treatment. It is significant that Schubert's *Winterreise* song cycle should be given as a perfect example of the realism at which Russian composers should aim.

Music must be national, not for political reasons as in Germany (on the contrary, certain aspects of 'nationalist' nineteenth-century Russian music are denounced as 'chauvinistic' and contrary to the spirit of internationalism), but so that it will express the true nature and spirit of the people and be significant for them. The native music of all the races of the Union is to be collected and studied (much fine work has already been done in

that direction by Professors Uspensky and Belaiev among others), and each race encouraged to promote its own musical culture and activities.

The principle that music, like all the other arts, should be for everybody is to be applied, not by bringing the art down to the level of the masses, but by raising the masses to the level of the art. Apart from that, of course, music for the masses is required—but not only music suitable for mass performance:

The term music for the masses means any form of music capable of working its way deep down into the people's consciousness, influencing their taste, and, in consequence, their minds.

Music for mass performance must needs be (at least, at the start) simple and easy. Hence the risk that composers will be too easily satisfied with commonplaces and turn out music devoid of educational value—a danger against which the 'advice' columns of the musical Press are constantly warning consultants. But, otherwise, no restriction is laid on composers. As after the French Revolution, music is allowed to go its own way while musical education is spreading.

Critics are expected, of course, to take a hand in promoting the ideals of Socialist musical culture. According to an editorial in *Music and Revolution*:

Current analyses of musical works are still written from the merely æsthetic point of view, revealing the taste and intellectual level of their author and nothing more. They are therefore confusing to readers. There exist no scientifically tested Marxist standards for the assessment of music. Hence the anarchy, in which respect the musical columns of our Press are as bad as those of the Western bourgeois Press.

But Soviet critics are working hard to discover these still elusive standards: investigating the relations between musical processes or points of style and their psychological significance, purport, or effects—a formidable problem, not in the least special to Russia, and one which they tackle without prejudice, without axe, political or theoretical, to grind. They are trying to discover, for instance, how far horizontal, contrapuntal writing as practised by Bach, Reger, Mahler, Hindemith, and also by young Russian composers such as Shebalin and Shostakovich, is compatible with the desired realism, and how a balance can be struck between the tendency to imagery and realism, which may lead to empiricism, rhetorics and disorder, and the tendency to 'pure' music, with the attendant danger of sinking into more abstraction and formalism.* They try to single out the processes that make for sentimentality, or for perfunctory *éclat*, and so on. Their conclusions are not always clear and convincing; but critics and

* Cheremukhin, in *Soviet Music*, October 1933.

theorising composers who, in other countries, are in quest of a much-needed new discipline, have done no better so far, and the Russians stand as good a chance as any of seeing light on these baffling matters.

In short, music in Soviet Russia is continuing its course, affected only so far as was to be expected by the changed conditions to which it is adjusting itself, as it had always done before. Nazi Germany is, indeed, the only country which has provided a case of coercive interference with the course of the art for future historians to study.

M. D. CALVOCORESSI.

CHARLES DICKENS: JOURNALIST

'To the wholesome training of severe newspaper work when I was a very young man I constantly refer my first successes,' said Dickens in a speech to the New York editors on the occasion of his farewell banquet in 1868. His first service as a parliamentary reporter was given to the *True Sun*, which did not make its first appearance until March 5, 1832. Dickens was then a month over twenty years of age; and it is most probable he joined that ill-fated newspaper at its inception.

The circumstances which led him to adopt the profession of a reporter are now fairly clearly established, thanks to documents which have come to light since John Forster published his monumental *Life of Dickens* close on sixty years ago. In 1828 this youth of seventeen fell in love with Maria Beadnell, the youngest daughter of the manager of a bank in Lombard Street. A solicitor's clerk, such as Dickens was then, was no match for the daughter of a banker, and so began the fight for the way out from poverty and obscurity, with the one perpetual idea of Maria constantly before him. For four years his infatuation for this young lady excluded every other idea from his head. With a steady and studied determination to improve his position he set out with what he called 'a celestial or diabolical energy' to acquire a 'perfect and entire command of the mystery of shorthand writing and reading,' and to the study of such things as would qualify him to be a first-rate parliamentary reporter.

As a preliminary to this determination Dickens left the solicitor's office in Gray's Inn in November 1828. As soon as he was eighteen years of age he took out a ticket for the reading-room at the British Museum, in order to improve his general reading, and, aided by his growing knowledge of shorthand, obtained a post as a reporter in the courts of Doctors' Commons. The success attained in this new sphere was of no mean degree; he set up as a shorthand-writer in a little office of his own at 5, Bell Yard, Carter Lane, Doctors' Commons, and a specimen of his work is to be seen in St. Bartholomew's Church in the form of a judgment in a case heard at the ecclesiastical courts of Doctors' Commons in November 1830. Apparently the occupa-

tion was sufficiently remunerative to maintain him during that period, and his achievement must therefore be regarded as of no small account in its own particular way.

Parliamentary reporting was undoubtedly the goal on which the eyes of young Charles were centred. In those days newspaper reporters were paid five guineas a week. To the young man who had known the drudgery of a blacking warehouse at the age of twelve, who had only lately been earning less than a pound a week as a junior clerk, this was, indeed, a princely salary and a prize worth winning. So, too, was Maria; and a little success in amateur theatricals suggested to him that the stage might be a better means of attaining his ambition. Therefore, as a corrective to his wrestlings with Gurney's shorthand, he diligently studied the acting of Mathews the elder, and in about March 1832 wrote to the stage manager of Covent Garden Theatre asking for an appointment. Bartley, the manager, who was busy on the production of Sheridan Knowles' *The Hunchback*, promised to fix a day to see Dickens within a fortnight. When that time arrived Dickens was laid up with 'a terrible bad cold and inflammation of the face,' and had perforce to write postponing the appointment until next season. In the interval of this stage fascination Dickens had by no means neglected his aim of becoming a parliamentary reporter. A new daily paper was to be started as a rival to the *Sun*, and if there were as yet no opportunities for him on the reporting staffs of *The Times*, the *Morning Chronicle*, and the *Morning Herald*, here, then, was his chance! The new paper, the *True Sun*, appeared on March 5, 1832. Thoughts of the stage as a profession were all discarded. And so his love for Maria, again to use his own words, 'fairly lifted me up into that newspaper life, and floated me away over a hundred men's heads. I have positively stood amazed at myself ever since.'

The *True Sun* was started in opposition to the *Sun* by Patrick Grant, the moneyed partner in the latter paper, due to a quarrel with Murdo Young. It was run on rather a lavish scale, and swallowed up the whole of Grant's fortune, making him bankrupt in a little over a year. According to Charles Kent, Dickens' position on the *True Sun* was that of a supernumerary, and this no doubt was the case, for we find that whilst still engaged in general reporting work for the *True Sun* in the session commencing August 7, 1832, he occupied a more regular and recognised position in the gallery of the House of Commons as one of the reporting staff of the *Mirror of Parliament*, a record of the full debates in the House, then conducted by Dickens' uncle, John Henry Barrow, a barrister of Gray's Inn, who had given him his first lessons in shorthand.

It was on this paper that the father, John Dickens, was also employed. A King's Bench case reported in *The Times* for February 10, 1831, gives the name of John Dickens as a witness in a case, described as employed at the office of the *Mirror of Parliament*. Forster says that Dickens' father entered the gallery of the House of Commons as a parliamentary reporter for the *Morning Herald* at the time the family was living in Bentinck Street. As recently discovered letters have shown, the Dickens family after living for some time in Fitzroy Street moved to that address in January 1833 and continued to live there until the home was broken up in December 1834 and Charles went into chambers in Furnival's Inn. It is, of course, quite conceivable that John Dickens, after quarrelling with his relation, may have left the *Mirror of Parliament* and obtained a post on the *Morning Herald*, but no confirmation of this has so far come to light.

It is doubtful if Dickens remained with the *True Sun* for more than the one session. Towards the end of the year 1832 we find him writing to his friend Kolle, who was engaged to Maria Beadnell's sister Anne: 'The *Sun* is so obscured that I intend living under the planet no longer than Saturday next week.' From a letter to a fellow journalist, Hartland, dated December 9, 1832, it is made certain that he was then engaged solely on the *Mirror of Parliament*.

His pertinacity had achieved much in these four years. For three sessions, the first beginning on August 7, 1832, the second on February 15, 1833, and the third ending on August 15, 1834—just two months and one day before the Houses of Parliament were destroyed by fire—he held his ground 'fully level with the most experienced of his competitors,' says Charles Kent.

Just as a few years later Dickens was calmly to take his place at the head of all writers of fiction, so as a reporter he was not long in making his presence felt. Forster recalls the occasion of his first hearing the name of Charles Dickens. He, too, was a contributor to the *True Sun*, on the editorial staff of which he had some good friends, and later, in common with all concerned, he became a sharer in its many difficulties. The most formidable of these arrived one day in a general strike of the reporters; and Forster says he remembers on this occasion noticing on the stairs of the office a young man of his own age 'whose keen animation of look would have arrested attention anywhere,' and whose name, upon inquiry, he then heard for the first time. It was coupled with the fact, which gave it interest even then, that 'young Dickens had been a spokesman for the recalcitrant reporters, and conducted their case triumphantly.' It is difficult to believe that Forster was associating with the *True Sun* a strike which occurred

a few years later, on the staff of the *Morning Chronicle*, or that Dickens was concerned with a strike on both papers, yet in one of the recently discovered letters to his journalist friend Thomas Beard we find reference to a strike of reporters on the latter paper. It is addressed from Furnival's Inn on a Tuesday afternoon, but there is no indication of month or year. Count de Suzannet, in whose library at Lausanne the complete series of letters from Dickens to Beard repose, informs me that the envelope which has been preserved with the letter shows that it was written on February 2, 1836. It reads as follows:

Le Maitre called on me this morning about the 'resolution,' and after some consideration I proposed the following course, to which he at once assented. The parties dissenting, are you, I, Le Maitre, Harfield, and Watts. To-morrow afternoon when the preliminaries for the Session have been adjusted, let one of us (I have no objection to do it myself) say that the five wish to speak to Easthope—of course with the fellows who have signed, we have nothing to do. Let us then say that as there is some difference of opinion among us on the subject, we wish to understand distinctly, yes or no, whether a refusal to sign will be followed by dismissal at the termination of the present engagement. If the reply be in the affirmative, then we sign it under protest, and declaring our intention to accept the first annual engagement elsewhere, we can get. If in the negative, then we refuse to sign, but express our readiness to conform to any arrangement (if such a one can be suggested) which while it does not interfere with the tenure of our engagements, will protect them against a recurrence of the annoyance of which they complain. . . .

Thus did Dickens 'make a splash in the gallery,' but he was by no means satisfied with the position he had won by the time he came of age. A good salary such as this work received during the session was all right, but the probable extravagant son of a known extravagant father found there were the off weeks to be provided for, a large family of brothers and sisters at home, and very little coming in from the impecunious prototype of Micawber. He longed for a permanent position on one of the well-established and creditable papers, such as *The Times* or the *Morning Chronicle*. His uncle, John Barrow, was on the staff of the former paper; but there was no vacancy there. So Barrow, who knew John Payne Collier, dramatic critic for the *Morning Chronicle*, who had himself once been on the staff of *The Times* as a parliamentary reporter, told him of his 'clever nephew' and suggested a letter of recommendation from Collier to the proprietor of the *Chronicle*. Barrow proposed a little dinner at his own house. His young nephew was, he said, cheerful company and a good singer of a comic song. And the dinner was accordingly arranged for July 27, 1833. Here is the momentous extract from Collier's Diary:

I dined with C. Dickens, his uncle Barrow, and that uncle's uncle (Culleford), Seymour Huffham, their relation, and one or two more; and had reason to like the first-named so extremely, and to think so very well of his abilities (he was so young that he had no vestige of beard or whiskers), that I had little hesitation in recommending him to the proprietor of the *Morning Chronicle*.

Collier frankly admits that it was not through his intermediary that Dickens obtained a post on the *Morning Chronicle*, but he does not remember the name of the person who was the actual instrument. It was Thomas Beard. The *Morning Chronicle* had, in 1834, come into the hands of new proprietors, among whom the chief was John Easthope, a member of Parliament. A reorganisation of the staff took place, and Beard, as a well-known member of the staff of the *Morning Herald*, was engaged. He in turn was asked to recommend another exceptionally able short-hand-writer; and thus it was that Dickens achieved one of the ideals of his life, and became a reporter on the permanent staff of an important London daily. But before this had come about Dickens had already, under the name of 'Boz,' begun his career as a writer of fiction.

Dickens joined the staff of the *Morning Chronicle* at the close of the session which ended on August 15, 1834, on the introduction of Thomas Beard. After the prorogation of Parliament the Prime Minister, Earl Grey, was due to attend a banquet in his honour at Edinburgh.

In the *Morning Chronicle* of Wednesday, September 17, 1834, will be found the very first piece of descriptive reporting ever penned by Charles Dickens and printed in a public newspaper. It is dated from Edinburgh on the previous Saturday, September 13, and occupies a little less than half a column. It describes a 'promenade' for the benefit of the Blind Asylum, the Deaf and Dumb Institution, and the House of Refuge.

[This promenade] was most respectably attended, but a lamentably dull affair. A marquee was erected in the centre of a parched bit of ground, without a tree or shrub to intercept the rays of a burning sun. Under it was a military band, and around it were the company. The band played and the company walked about; and when the band were tired, a piper played by way of variation, and then the company walked about again; and when the piper was tired, such of the visitors as could find seats sat down, and those who could not looked as if they wished they had not come; and the poor blind-school pupils, who occupied the warmest seats in the enclosure, were very hot and uncomfortable, and appeared very glad to be filed off from a scene in which they could take little interest, and with which their pensive careworn faces painfully contrasted.

The report of the reception of Lord Grey on his arrival in Edinburgh, of the presentation to him of the freedom of the city,

and of the proceedings at the banquet, occupied eleven closely-printed columns of the *Morning Chronicle*. To make that exact and elaborate record the pencils of Beard and his young colleague must have been plied furiously, 'turn and turn about.' A paragraph describing a humorous occurrence due to the late arrival of Earl Grey was undoubtedly the work of the future 'Boz.' It reads as follows :

It had been announced that the dinner would take place at five o'clock precisely ; but Earl Grey, and the other principal visitors, as might have been expected, did not arrive until shortly after six. Previous to their arrival, some slight confusion, and much merriment, was excited by the following circumstance :—A gentleman who, we presume, had entered with one of the first sections, having sat with exemplary patience for some time in the immediate vicinity of cold fowls, roast beef, lobsters, and other tempting delicacies (for the dinner was a cold one), appeared to think that the best thing he could possibly do, would be to eat his dinner, while there was anything to eat. He accordingly laid about him with right goodwill, the example was contagious, and the clatter of knives and forks became general. Hereupon, several gentlemen, who were not hungry, cried out 'Shame !' and looked very indignant ; and several gentlemen who were hungry cried 'Shame !' too, eating, nevertheless, all the while, as fast as they possibly could. In this dilemma, one of the stewards mounted a bench and feelingly represented to the delinquents the enormity of their conduct, imploring them for decency's sake, to defer the process of mastication until the arrival of Earl Grey. This address was loudly cheered, but totally unheeded ; and this is, perhaps, one of the few instances on record of a dinner having been virtually concluded before it began.

Small wonder that Black, the editor of the *Morning Chronicle*, should soon be heard to say : "'Boz" can do better things. Keep him in reserve for great occasions. He will aye be ready for them.'

Before the year 1834 was out Dickens was sent on a reporting journey to Birmingham, a short account of which he gave to his friend Beard in a letter from Bentinck Street dated 'Saturday evening.' This was probably early in December, as it announced his approaching removal to chambers in Furnival's Inn, which we know he occupied from the Christmas quarter of 1834. Early in January 1835 he was off again for the elections in Essex.

I have just been ordered on a journey, the length of which is at present uncertain [he wrote to his brother-in-law, Henry Austin]. I'm going (alone) in a gig ; and to quote the eloquent inducements which the proprietors of Hampstead *chays* hold out to Sunday riders—'the gen'l'm'n drives himself.' I am going into Essex and Suffolk. It strikes me I shall be spilt before I pay a turnpike. I have a presentiment I shall run over an only child before I reach Chelmsford, my first stage.

This letter was written on a 'Wednesday night' ; the sequel is told in a letter to Beard written from the Black Boy Hotel at Chelmsford on 'Sunday evening' (January 9). It is post-marked January 11. He did not give himself a chance to reach Chelmsford otherwise than unblemished.

Owing to the slippery state of the roads on the morning I started, I magnanimously declined the honour of driving myself, and hid my dignity in the inside of a Stage coach. As the election here had not commenced, I went to Colchester (which is a very nice town) and returned here on the following morning.

But a couple of days later he did make a successful trip in a gig, driving from Chelmsford to Braintree and back.

Yesterday I had to start at 8 o'clock for Braintree—a place 12 miles off, and being unable to get a saddle horse, I actually ventured on a gig,—and what is more, I actually did the four and twenty miles without upsetting it. I wish to God you could have seen me tooling in and out of the banners, drums, conservative emblems, horsemen, and go-carts with which every little green was filled as the processions were waiting for Sir John Tyrell and Baring. Every time the horse heard a drum he bounced into the hedge, or the left side of the road, and every time I got him out of that, he bounded into the hedge on the right side. When he *did* go how ever, he went along admirably. The road was clear when I returned, and with the trifling exception of breaking my whip, I flatter myself I did the whole thing in something like style.

His opinion of Chelmsford was far from flattering :

Though only 29 miles from Town, there is not a single shop where they sell Sunday papers. I can't get an *Athenæum*, a *Literary Gazette*—no not even a penny magazine, and here I am on a wet Sunday looking out of a damned large window at the rain as it falls in puddles opposite, wondering when it will be dinner time, and cursing my folly in having put no books into my portmanteau. The only book I have seen here is one which lies upon the sofa. It is entitled *Field Exercises and Evolutions of the Army* by Sir Henry Torrens. I have read it through so often that I am sure I could drill a hundred recruits from memory. There is not even anything to look at in the place, except two immense prisons, large enough to hold all the inhabitants of the county—whom they can have been built for I can't imagine.

In the January (1835) number of the *Monthly Magazine* had appeared the first instalment of a story in two parts, 'A Passage in the Life of Mr. Watkins Tottle.' The *Morning Chronicle* was arranging to publish a new evening paper to be called the *Evening Chronicle*. Accordingly the colleague who had been appointed editor of the new paper was asked to approach young Dickens on the matter. The result was a ready acquiescence on the part of the young writer, followed by a very courteous letter to the editor asking, if he wrote a series for the proprietors, whether its conductors would think he had 'any claim to some' additional

remuneration (of course, of no great amount) for doing so.' His salary was increased by two guineas a week, and the first story, 'Hackney Coach Stands,' appeared in the first number of the *Evening Chronicle* on the last day of January 1835. It is interesting to remember that in a little more than a year from this time Dickens married one of the daughters of his editor, George Hogarth. The sketches appeared practically every week until August. In September there was a break with the special 'writing for the *Chronicle*. Probably a request for a further increase in salary had not been acceded to, and we find the stories were continued in *Bell's Life in London* until January in the following year under a new pen-name of 'Tibbs.' Nearly nine months later came a resumption in the *Chronicle*, both morning and evening editions, during September and October 1836, when 'The Pickwick Papers' had already made a name for him.

Dickens himself gave some details of his adventures as a newspaper reporter when he addressed the dinner at the Newspaper Press Fund in May 1865, and Forster transcribes one of his letters whilst on an election trip; but the recently discovered letters of Dickens to Tom Beard—who often shared his adventures with him—amplify these entertaining descriptions. To Forster he had written further details on an earlier occasion in the following words:

There never was anybody connected with newspapers who, in the same space of time, had so much express and post-chaise experience as I. And what gentlemen they were to serve, in such things, at the old *Morning Chronicle*! Great or small, it did not matter. I have had to charge for half-a-dozen breakdowns in half-a-dozen times as many miles. I have had to charge for the damage of a great-coat from the drippings of a blazing wax-candle, in writing through the smallest hours of the night in a swift-flying carriage and pair. I have had to charge for all sorts of breakages fifty times in a journey without question, such being the ordinary results of the pace we went at. I have charged for broken hats, broken luggage, broken chaises, broken harness—everything but a broken head, which is the only thing they would have grumbled to pay for.

The letters to Beard in May 1835 (from which the following selection is made) respecting the election speeches of Lord John Russell in the West of England testify to the thoroughness with which Dickens carried out his duties, and the reliability of his recollections of such matters thirty years later:

Wincanton
Saturday Morning (May 2 1835)

DEAR TOM,

I arrived here (57 miles from Exeter) at 8 yesterday evening having finished my whack at the previous stage. I arranged with Nielson, whom I occasionally saw in the course of my journey, that I would stop when he did; and finding him housed here, I ordered dinner, beds and breakfast

for two. I am happy to say that our friend Unwin, when on duty, is the most zealous, active, and indefatigable little fellow I ever saw. I have now, not the slightest doubt (God willing) of the success of our Express. On our first stage we had very poor horses. At the continuation of the second, *The Times* and I changed horses together; they had the start two or three minutes, I bribed the post boys tremendously and we came in literally neck and neck—the most beautiful sight I ever saw.

The next stage, your humble caught them before they had changed; and the next, Denison preceded Unwin about two minutes, leaving Neilson here to return to Exeter to-morrow evening and I to get up by the Telegraph at 11. The roads were *extremely heavy*, and as *they* had 4, I ordered the same at every stage and empowered Unwin to do the same until he met his horses, indorsing on the parcel that the rain rendered it a matter of *absolute necessity*.

I have sketched, my dear fellow, in a dozen most hasty words, our progress yester-night which I hope, but can scarcely believe, you will be able to understand. I have only time to add that I trust you will not forget my packages and cream, that I received your bag, your kindness remembered, that I shall hope to hear from you the day of your return, that I shall impress on Powell the necessity of expressing the declaration, that I think Lyons (?) and Mony (?) will fail and that I am (it's an old story but a true one).

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES DICKENS.

Thomas Beard Esquire
Exeter

Favoured by John Neilson Esquire

[Postmarked
May 4, 1835.]

Furnivals Inn
Monday Morning

MY DEAR BEARD,

A part of my adventures you will have heard from Neilson. The remainder is comprised in three words. We were first out, the express arrived at 4 o'clock, we had a much longer account than any other paper and the whole affair is considered one of 'complete and signal success' and has been noticed as a feat by the *Spectator* and another Sunday Paper.

I feel the effects of the rain severely. I came up by the slow coach, left Wincanton at 9 on Saturday evening and reached town at 11 yesterday morning. I have a slight touch of rheumatism and am *perfectly deaf*. I hope to God I shall soon get rid of the latter complaint. What have you done about my bag? It is lying at the Mail Office to be called for, for I have not a clean shirt to put on, and am really in a state of greatest distress.

I am in great haste having scarce time to get this letter to the post. Let me know directly you return.

Believe me

Most sincerely yours

CHARLES DICKENS.

We can now add these two letters to the one from Bristol briefly quoted by Forster in the *Life*, which we are now able to give in full—for, probably, the first time; and a second one, also

to his chief in London, written from Newbury a couple of days earlier, which is not generally known.

George and Pelican
Newbury
Sunday Morning

DEAR FRASER,¹

In conjunction with the *Herald* we have arranged for a Horse Express from Marlborough to London on Tuesday night, to go the whole distance at the rate of thirteen miles an hour, for six guineas; half has been paid, but, to insure despatch, the remainder is withheld until the boy arrives at the office, when he will produce a paper with a copy of the agreement on one side, and an order for three guineas (signed by myself) on the other. Will you take care that it is duly honoured? A Boy from the *Herald* will be in waiting at our office for their copy; and Lyons begs me to remind you most strongly, that it is an indispensable part of our agreement *that he should not be detained one instant*.

We go to Bristol to day, and if we are equally fortunate in laying the chaise-horses, I hope the packet will reach town by seven. As all the papers have arranged to leave Bristol the moment Russell is down, we have determined on adopting the same plan,—one of us will go to Marlborough in the chaise with one *Herald* man, and the other remain at Bristol with the *Herald* man to conclude the account for the next day. The *Times* second has ordered a chaise and four the whole distance, so there is every probability of our beating them hollow. From all we hear, we think the *Herald*, relying on the packet reaching town early, intends publishing their report in the first Edition. This is, however, of course, mere speculation on our parts, as we have no direct means of ascertaining their intention.

I think I have now given you all needful information. I have only in conclusion to impress upon you the necessity of having all the compositors ready, at a very early hour, for if Russell be down by half past eight, we hope to have his speech in town at six.

Believe me (for self and Beard) very truly yours,

CHARLES DICKENS.

Thomas Fraser Esquire
Morning Chronicle Office.

Bush Inn
Bristol.
Tuesday Morning ([May] 1835).

DEAR FRASER,

The conclusion of Russell's dinner will be forwarded by Cooper's Company's coach, which leaves here at half-past six to-morrow morning. The report of the Bath dinner shall be forwarded by the first Bath coach on Thursday morning—what time it starts we have no means of ascertaining till we reach Bath; but you will receive it as early as possible, as we will indorse the parcel 'Pay the porter 2/6 extra for immediate delivery.' Beard will go over to Bath from here to-morrow morning, and I shall come

¹ Fraser succeeded John Payne Collier as sub-editor of the *Morning Chronicle*; he was a son of the Laird of Eskdale.

back by the mail from Marlborough. I need not say that it will be sharp work, and will require two of us; for we shall both be up the whole of the previous night, and shall have to sit up all night again to get it off in time.

As soon as we have had a little sleep, we shall return to town as quickly as we can, for we have (if the express succeeds) to stop at two or three places along the road, to pay money and express satisfaction. You may imagine that we are extremely anxious to know the result of the arrangement. Pray direct to one of us at the 'White Hart,' Bath, and inform us in a parcel sent by the FIRST COACH after you receive this exactly at what hour it arrived. Do not fail on any account.

We joined with the *Herald* (I say this in reference to the first part of your letter) precisely on the principle you at first laid down—economy; not pushed so far, however, as to interfere with the efficiency of the express. As the conclusion of the dinner was to be done, we all thought the best plan we could pursue would be to leave two men behind, and trust Russell to the others. I have no doubt if he makes a speech of any ordinary dimensions it can be done by the time we reach Marlborough; and taking into consideration the immense importance of having the addition of saddle-horses from thence, it is, beyond all doubt, worth an effort.

Believe me

(For self and Beard)

Very sincerely yours

CHARLES DICKENS.

Thomas Fraser Esq.
Morning Chronicle office.

Dickens severed his connexion with the *Morning Chronicle* towards the end of 1836. To Beard he wrote anticipating this step, and the letter is dated from Furnival's Inn on 'Friday morning' (October 28, 1836).

I have not been able to bring that *Sunday Times* affair to bear;—I could not get enough, and I saw no reason for doing it cheap. As matters stand at present, therefore, I think I shall exhibit in the Gallery next session—till Easter at all events, unless I see cause good and sufficient to change my mind between this and then.

'That *Sunday Times* affair' no doubt referred to an effort on the part of Dickens to obtain a position on the editorial staff of that paper, probably as a sub-editor.

'Cause good and sufficient' was soon forthcoming to warrant him changing his mind about returning to the gallery. 'The Pickwick Papers' was increasing in popularity with each monthly issue. Another operetta, *The Village Coquettes*, succeeded *The Strange Gentleman* (produced on September 29) at the St. James's Theatre on December 6. Eleven days later he wrote the preface to the second series of *Sketches by Boz*, which Macrone published almost immediately. Meanwhile he had got in touch with another and better known publisher, Richard Bentley (who had published the libretto of *The Village Coquettes*), and had entered into an agreement to edit a new monthly magazine for him at a

Th' obedient nerves his ripple runs along,
 From foot to knee high, even to where their lips,
 Knit like two rhymes within a poet's song,
 Open and close, till, from their fingers' tips,
 Love's tide begins to ebb; then the wakeful sound
 Of their first word proclaims the Will unbound.

This rider may be added: since the love of a person or of a thing is the perception of her (or its) beauty, it is natural that the lover, the artist, or the mystic enamoured of the divine vision, should alike use the language of desire to describe the same experience whether of a beloved person, of fine art, or of that which the saint and mystic call their supersensual experience. It is also natural that all the trio, including the saint, should suffer the temptations of St. Anthony, and complain of being tormented by devils; and the Church, therefore, has never shown more wisdom than in her principle that the value of the visions alleged by visionaries must be weighed by the conduct and character of the visionary, and *not* by the sights, sounds, or communications, however seemingly exalted, that he professes to have seen, heard, or received. This principle, it will also be noticed, is one disregarded by most mediums, most spiritists, many revivalists, self-appointed prophets, and such enthusiastic preachers as was Edward Irving, who went mad; but, by the aid of the principle, we can distinguish between the unbalanced ranter, however popular (and temporary) his following, and the exceptionally gifted seer, for the latter alone is likely to survive the test of high character approved by enduring good conduct.

It is interesting to add that the late Dr. Charles Mercier, F.R.C.P., F.R.C.S., M.D., an exceptionally capable physician, and also a writer of exceptionally lucid prose, in his *Text-Book of Insanity* (1914) laid it down that 'only by disorder of conduct can we infer the existence of disorder of mind. . . . Conduct, however, is the main thing that is disordered in insanity.' When the man of science and the theologian are at one about a necessary, but difficult, test to be applied to some of the most baffling problems in human experience, we may be pretty sure that this test is conclusive.

3. THE IDOLATRY OF PRINT

In a beautiful book, *The Cruise of the Nona*, a brief discussion of literary genius concluded with the observation that the possession of it by a man was 'nothing to his salvation.'

This set one asking why, then, the possession of genius is so much desired by many who do not suppose themselves to have it; why it is so much honoured nowadays, however ill-rewarded its possessor may be; and whether this honour had been tradi-

tional, or was (in fact) a largely modern fashion. Nowadays few even pretend to be Christians, and the amusing thought arose that perhaps a declining belief in Christianity, and therefore a declining interest in salvation, might have been compensated by a growing cult of Man himself, by a growing belief in artistic pre-eminence, and by, to confine ourselves to letters, a sort of idolatry of Print. Certainly, the printed word, even now, when it has been cheapened (one would have thought) to the price of dirt, occupies an enormously disproportional share of the attention of industrial town-dwellers. Our newspapers with monstrous circulations must appeal to some profound craving for 'reading matter' in their subscribers, and hardly anyone can be seen in a tube, or even in an omnibus, who is not reading something or other. Why has our addiction to Print reached proportions as staggering as this?

In France and Italy the habit is not nearly so pronounced; the newspapers are much smaller; people in the *Métro* are very often seen without anything to read; the printed word is taken much more casually. Is it possible that this addiction, both in England and in America, derives ultimately from the idolatry of the printed text of the Authorised Version? If so, then the printed idol whom our forefathers worshipped has begotten a monstrous progeny, the eldest of which was *Answers*; the younger, journals like the *Rainbow* and *Funny Wonder*; and the youngest will probably be to *Answers* as was *Answers* to, say, *The Times*. This, however, would be a typical example of the progress dear to Grub Street millionaires.

4. OF NEWS

Who would have supposed an odd sequel to have ensued from the following everyday incident? The writer, travelling by a slow train to Baker Street, made room in his third-class carriage for a thin, dark man of middle height who entered the compartment at Swiss Cottage. When the train had run into Baker Street Station the stranger was evidently at a loss, so I asked him if I could be of any help to him. He replied that he was going to a station on the inner circle, but that he did not know which the appropriate platform was. As I happened to be journeying in the same direction, though to a station nearer than his, I offered to conduct him to his train. He thanked me politely, and we fell into talk. When the train had reached my stopping-place, and I rose to get out, the stranger thanked me, and said: 'I am Thomson, who was Air Minister in the late Labour Government.' When, a very few months later, *R.101* crashed, with the stranger on board, in the dreadful disaster near Beauvais, Lord Thomson unexpectedly became a vivid memory.

Sensational mishaps mean nothing but excitement to us when we know nothing but the names of the victims; but even the barest personal acquaintance with any of them alters the implication of such news, and very wholesomely. A few years before, I had spent a charming day in a Sussex house from which another guest was to take his departure for Ireland that same afternoon. A more delightful companion could hardly be imagined. Within a few months, the headlines blazed the news that this gentleman had been executed for high treason. It was Erskine Childers; and one's involuntary groan, for which the circumstances resulting in this horror scarcely mattered, reminded one of the kind of feelings that must have been felt in England when Henry VIII. had become infected with hubris, and when some More, some affectionately regarded acquaintance, was sent to the headsman upon Tower Hill.

5. OF SYNONYMS

The truism that there are no synonyms used to cause me a good deal of trouble. Fond of dictionaries, and always using them for the value of the finer shades of the meanings, and for the interest of the word-roots, the very word 'thesaurus' in English excited misgivings. Yet when wanting a word that had slipped from memory it was to the dictionary that I always turned, to find one reference, and then different pages, succeeding one another with the confusion of a scent that baffles hounds. Sometimes the vagaries of the search were rewarded with the wanted word, more rarely with one better; sometimes the hunt was called off in a mood of irritation and despair.

A man of placid forbearance, who has always wondered what completely inconceivable quality the word 'initiative' can mean, continued in his reliance upon dictionaries and in his apprehension of books of synonyms for twenty years. Then, one day, there stole into his mind an odd thought: the thought that all this while he had been using his dictionary not only for explanation, but as other people use a thesaurus. It seemed absurd; so he went out, and asked rather nervously for Roget's, at the nearest bookshop.

'We sell hundreds of such books now,' said the bookseller with evident amusement. 'It's this craze for crossword puzzles. Do you spend much time on them yourself, sir?'

To this day I have never tried one in my life, but it was convenient to find in this mean street, and so near, a bookshop at all, and a godsend to see it stuffed with reference books. The question was, would my purchase prove of any use to me, or should I prove wiser to have stayed content with my dozen or so of dictionaries?

After five years, I think I have not gained more than a justification, but have gained that. Ten times out of twenty-five the doubtful word I wished to better remains when the thesaurus has done its best to help. But in the other five, especially when an obvious word (instead of a better word) is wanted, the thesaurus supplies it quickly. It is the saving of time and of irritation that is the advantage: the thing for which one uses a machine. Very rarely has the miraculously better word come from it; and this bears out the truism upon synonyms with extraordinary clearness, because, so far from pretending to supply them, a thesaurus hands us, with lavish recklessness, groups of words that have no connexion except as coming under some divisional heading of a very wide, general idea. It is our help when we have no word at all, but only some vague notion. I open now at random: *Expedience*—under this, words range from 'handy' to 'pragmatism'; and, opposite on the same page, *Inexpedience*—under this, from 'hulky' to 'paying-too-dear.' So far from providing synonyms, the whole convenience lies in difference, unlikeness, and variety. As a linguist is to a man with no second language in a foreign country, so is Roget to a man at a complete loss. A friend in need, beyond question; but the staff of ignorance, not the friend of scholarship.

6. THE JOY OF MAKING

Has the joy of creation, or, more prosaically, the pleasure-of-making known to authors and artists, ever been successfully described? De Quincey might have conveyed it, for the peculiar descriptive talent required was certainly his. If so, the reference would be welcome; but if not, the readiest to memory are the comparison to 'an ejaculation' made by Flaubert; some English poet's to 'an orgasm'; and Puccini's lately published letter in which he likens 'emotional art' to 'a kind of malady . . . accompanied by an over-excitation of every nerve and every atom of one's being.'

The first two, being comparisons wholly physical, and the last describing rather a condition than the enjoyment accompanying it, there seems room for further, even if also metaphorical, description, if only to extend the analysis of Intoxication, where these citations may be found, in the present writer's *Art of Living*. What do his recollections tell him of the joy of authorship during one of the intermittent moments when the subsequent reading has not proved, after an interval, to contradict too sadly the pleasure taken in some passage or chapter during the act of composition?

First of all, the mind seems to be simmering with impressions that so crowd upon each other in an impulse to issue into words

that the mind becomes jammed unless the relief of pen and paper can be found at once to release their pressure. The trouble is that writing can release only one idea or image at a time, and so, in the very act of choosing which shall be let out, concentration upon one is apt to sacrifice the others, in exactly the same way as would happen at the pit exit of a theatre if the single-width doorway beside the tally-office became fixed so that only one person at a time could leave the pit during an outbreak of fire in the stalls. The pressing throng of ideas is an excitement like a torment, for what way can be devised to write down more than one idea or sentence at a time? If, say at night in bed, this pressure suddenly sends one wide-awake, and if no pencil and paper can be found without disturbing others, a sense of panicky frustration ensues. The panic arises because of the well-founded dread that these notions or words can only be caught upon the wing, and, if missed as their flight streams by, will have vanished (as they do) by morning.

Suppose, however, a pencil is handy, then the choice of which shall be captured can be agonising. The impossibility of shooting more than one at a time will be familiar to sportsmen confronted on the moors in August or September by the rush of a covey. One wants a score of hands, a score of pencils; but Nature has provided us with only one right hand. From this sort of frustrated pleasure there seems to be no way of escape. When, however, the choice has been made, the pleasure of making begins. Dispersal of attention over a score of notions is overcome by an effort of concentration. The centrifugal tendency is reversed. This discipline, by imposing selection and order, is rewarded by a strange, delightful, trance-like condition of calm, and the reciprocal movement of the imagination and the reason, which like two wings seem to bear the whole being forward, is the essential joy in authorship.

To describe its indescribable union of energy with repose, of desire with content, of movement with peace, we have to fall back upon metaphor and simile. The mind (to use a single short word for that which is really the integration of all the faculties) at this moment of activity resembles, indeed is felt to be, an eagle perched upon an eyrie at the top of a peak in the Alps, and from its coign at this high altitude it sees the horizon stretching away in a circle almost infinite, inviting it to launch itself on any side, whereupon the sensation of that unimpeded range of open air and sky is almost intoxicating. For a moment the mind is filled with the simple pleasure of contemplating this expanse to which it can confide its wings. It rejoices in its freewill. It is content merely with awareness of it. Not for long, however. The call of the air is too great; and then, at last, it yields to that particular impulse

which seems to be an invisible and superior summons to pass over its competitors, gathers itself together for a spring, and is launched upon the free air.

All the 'countries of the mind' then seem to lie below it, and, in the very act of cruising in one direction, of preferring one path to another across the empty sky, it feels itself to be borne in wide, slow circles, banking in huge but leisurely progress, circling rather than soaring, floating rather than flying, on wide wings. This glorious sensation lasts until the work, which may extend itself far beyond the original intention, shall have been accomplished: it may be in one, or at the end of several, hours.

The end is accomplished by the growing threat of exhaustion, which, if the work prove long, may occur much before the task itself has been finished; but, even in this fatigue, when the mind feels like a squeezed orange and the body like a hollowed shell, there is the relief of the record made, the satisfaction of seeing, on the pile of paper beside one, this embodied tissue of imagination or thought in words that now have an independent, an objective, existence beyond oneself. Once this state has been reached, a break, horrible to contemplate before, becomes very welcome, and the work (now fixed) is tossed aside almost carelessly in search of relaxation in the company of somebody else.

With the sensation, or illusion if you will, that one day has not been wasted, the writer returns to earth tired but happy, probably in a mental condition not unlike that of the sportsman with a good bag at the end of a long day upon the moors.

7. OF WAR-TIME

'Can you speak German?' someone asked in August 1914.

'Only three words. I see from the newspapers that the current English for *Krieg ist Krieg* is Business is Business. The religion common to Prussia and to industrialism naturally expresses itself in equivalent terms. Unregulated competition is the frightfulness of Peace, and Calvinism, the root-philosophy of Protestantism, throws up a Frederick the Great or a Jacob Astor with perfect impartiality. The moral atmosphere of Frederick has the same effect on great and small. To breathe this air in a northern backwater, read *The House with the Green Shutters*, by George Douglas. Old Gourlay, in that novel, had many resemblances to the father of Frederick the Great.'

'Who first called him the Great?'

'It is a question, isn't it?'

* * * *

Coming down the steps of a house during the late summer of 1918 in order to fetch some cigarettes for the musicians who were

giving a concert of chamber music within, I passed two men who were lingering on the pavement and had evidently been listening also. Hardly had I passed them when the music restarted; and, before I was out of overhearing them, one of them said: 'Fancy listening to music during the war!'

* * * *

People were asking one another which little incident had most impressed them at the beginning of the war. One was an author. He had felt his thrill when he read in an evening newspaper that 'Admiral Sir John Jellicoe has been placed in Supreme Command of the Home Fleet'—the words were opulent, and the mention of the Home Fleet brought the sense of danger to his ears. Another was a lady, who had felt the very ground to tremble beneath her when she heard that a Moratorium had been declared. She had no idea what this might be, but the heavy syllables of Moratorium had brought a sense of Doom upon her.

* * * *

Writing in images, when it is not overdone, is the prose of all the poets; but images, like irony, should season only. What could be apter than the description found by Yeats for the styles of Butler and his admirer Shaw? The pair, wrote the poet, prefer 'tap-water to any vintage, so much metropolitan lead and solder to any tendril of the vine.'

8. WRINKLES FOR YOUNG WRITERS

A writer's crutch is his pen, and he has to pick his way through the world as well as through his work by the point of it. Yet young writers seldom realise this: while the better sort certainly take essential pride and pains to pen verses, articles, short stories, reviews, or what not, they are very apt to neglect the equally important claim of letter-writing. Yet an interview, the acceptance of an article, the request for (or presentation of) an introductory letter may very easily turn upon the knack of writing notes. The art of writing is the art of persuasiveness by the written word, and no other where than in business letters is some skill in this art more essential.

How utterly forgotten is even the alphabet of this art can be proved, only too easily. Victorian children, to take the most elementary example, were taught by wise governesses never to begin a letter with the personal pronoun *I*. If a present were to be thanked for, the children were taught not to begin with such a phrase as 'I was delighted to receive' the thing; but invariably to start with the word either *You* or *Your*. The advice was sound, because each of us is more interested in himself than in his correspondent: even lovers are no exception: consequently,

when a letter begins with the word *I*, its recipient receives a minute chill, whereas when a letter begins with the pronoun *You* or *Your*, the recipient is correspondingly exalted.

To win attention, the first step in persuasion, he or she that is to be persuaded must be approached from his (or her) most sympathetic side—i.e., his own self. The word *You* does this, with beautiful completeness and simplicity: the pronoun *I*, assertive, horrid thing, defeats itself. Now, once this axiomatic truism shall have been apprehended, the tone and key of the ensuing letter will compose themselves from its objective, dominant note. In truth, the principle could not be displayed by a truism unless it were platitudinously true. The greater the mind, the profounder is its reverence for platitudes, which are, therefore, only heeded by the wise.


The letter thus persuasively begun, not by chance but by grace, should then pass, by easy and swift transition, almost imperceptibly, but simply, from the personal concern of the recipient to that of the signatory. The aim here should be to be (as well as to seem, for there is no hypocrisy in art) beautifully quiet, lucid, and brief. Pith rather than point is wanted, and the thin ice of the letter should be skated over by the employment of a question. Instead of writing 'I propose' (damn the impudence of the fellow!) write: 'If you thought' or 'Would you care to consider?' or 'Would you not agree?' The very fact that these niceties appear risible to young folk in a hurry shows both how little heed is paid to them and how lazily people forget that the successful execution of any plan or policy depends very largely on minute attention to detail.

To conclude with a more important point. Young writers have their share of disappointments: promises made to them are broken, arrangements made with them are forgotten, work that they have done may not be paid for: in fact, they are victimised just as often as—everybody else. But if only they would realise it, if only they would not limit their notion of writing to stuff intended for a printer; if only they would think about style, 'the sanctity of art,' in informal notes no less than in formal columns or pages, then they would discover in themselves a salvation utterly beyond the reach, even the conception, of the entire unliterary world. Persuasion is their profession, their only means of self-support, and persuasion is even more important than good sense to the apprentice in literary business.

We can forgive a person insensitive to words for writing huffy, or would-be wounding, letters. We should not forgive a writer for so repudiating his whole art. Not that he should be weak, be supine, be negligible in a quarrel, but that he should conduct every dispute (let alone any controversy, and writing

would scarcely be an honourable vocation were it not, also, a dangerous trade) as persuasively as possible. He must win by tact, the finest sort of intelligence, by good temper, by diplomacy, since he has neither the training, the force, the time, nor the money, to win by superior power. This by no means excludes hard hitting, nor what the grammars used to call *fortiter in re*. It excludes only vulgar huff, the coarser kinds of temper; for hard hitting, with the skill of an artist, will hold no malice nor poison in its blow. As admirable as its courage was the tact of Dr. Johnson's famous letter to Lord Chesterfield in abuse of the patron: with the consequence that Chesterfield admired it so sincerely that he laid it on the table in his salon for the inspection of all his friends! The onslaught made its noble victim very friendly to Dr. Johnson, who, because of this letter, was as newly respected as he had been long overlooked before: though, by the way, it is a hoary lie that the lexicographer was ever kept waiting in Chesterfield's drawing-room—a fact that Boswell expressly denies.

We scribblers may not be Dr. Johnson. Indeed, our sole excuse for writing is that each of us has, or can self-discover, a way with the reader that no other writer has ever had before. But this does not prevent the principle by which Samuel Johnson acted in this matter (and almost all business verges upon the accommodation of differing points of view) from being valid for every one of us. We should be able to ease difficulties better than any other kind of man; to make the crooked straight and the rough places plain; to insinuate persuasion with the point of a sword but also with the balm of an apothecary. This art, which requires nothing less than the devotion of a life-time, can only be acquired by beginning to master it in small things: for perfection in any art means that nothing, however tiny, has been neglected. In the great words of a poet, the truth, on every level, is that 'gaiety of manner with gravity of matter is the glittering crown of art.' Both postcard and poem can attain this perfection.



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