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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

JULY, 1933.

WHITHER?

IN a discussion upon the gold standard, after a lecture an eminent financial authority last month, an irrevere speaker affirmed that economists and financiers who l down the law upon the economic crisis in general, and up the gold standard in particular, unconsciously take the nir teenth-century conditions as the normal standard to which must "get back." Their minds, he averred, are governed a stubborn belief that, "if only they can hang on long enoug the twentieth century will blow over."

The idea of "getting back" to normal conditions and hanging on till troubles "blow over" haunts other min than those of economists and financiers. It helps to expla the paralysis of much of our thought and action. Desp revolutions in the political and social systems of three gre countries, we cannot get used to the fact that we live in revolutionary epoch, or understand that the way out of it not backwards but through. The Prince of Wales is almc the only national leader who, seeing this, has bidden us tre unemployment and cognate phenomena as an opportunity rath than a disaster. Thus we are in some danger of missing su opportunity as may still lie open to us. More than any otl great nation in the world we have it in our power to make or mar our own and others' future. Yet we have more than h a mind to let things slide, to let others fend for themselves wh we make shift for ourselves. This has been the spirit of c social and economic policy and, in our handling of foreign affai it shows itself in the determination not to extend our "obli tions" or even to define those we have incurred.

An example of this determination is to be found in Sir Jo Simon's despatch of June 7th to the British Ambassador Rome upon the Four-Power Pact. It runs: "Your Exceller will clearly understand that His Majesty's Governmen adherence to the new (Four-Power) Agreement does not imp any extension of the obligations of the United Kingdom European affairs." And, as regards affairs outside Euro the same spirit was evident in the Foreign Secretary's spe

of February 27th, on the futile and short-lived arms embargo to China and Japan, when he said: "This is the first time, so far as I know, in which any *neutral* Government, certainly any *neutral* Government which manufactures arms, has taken positive action of this kind with reference to a distant conflict *with which we do not mean in any circumstances to concern ourselves.*" (My italics.)

Notwithstanding our "obligations" and "responsibilities" under the League Covenant, the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, responsibilities which—as Sir John Simon assured the House of Commons on May 26th and repeated in his despatch of June 7th—we take "too seriously to be willing in a light-hearted and speculative fashion to enlarge them," this spirit of "neutrality" is in effect a throw-back to our state of mind in 1913-14. Mr. Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, had warned Germany in July 1911 that Great Britain would not suffer herself to be treated as of no account in the crisis that had been brought on by the sending of the German gunboat *Panther* to Agadir. He gave the warning with the approval of Sir Edward Grey. Germany heard and heeded it. The "Agadir crisis" was settled without war. Then, in a mood of incautious goodwill, which German propaganda helped to foster, we set ourselves to unruffle German feelings. We negotiated the Baghdad railway agreement, and revised the old and unworkable Balfour-Chamberlain Treaty of 1898 for the eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies between the Germans and ourselves. This was done though Lord Salisbury, who was away from home, albeit still Prime Minister, when the 1898 Treaty was concluded, had denounced it as disloyal towards Portugal, our oldest ally—inasmuch as it would have put a premium on German intrigues to force Portugal to dispose of her colonies—and had straightway made with Portugal the Treaty of Windsor which bound England to protect her and her possessions. Thanks to German dislike of the Treaty of Windsor, the revised version of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1898 was merely initialled, not signed, in the spring of 1914. Indeed, the German Ambassador in London only received instructions to sign it on July 31st, 1914, the very day on which Sir Edward Grey addressed to France and to Germany the crucial question whether they would respect the neutrality of Belgium! So it was never signed; but meanwhile the initialled Treaty had played a part, which Sir Edward Grey can hardly have suspected, in deciding the issue of peace or war in Europe.

A document, No. 9966, in the collection of Austro-Hungarian State Papers (1908-14) brings this out. It is a memorandum, marked "Strictly Secret," by Count Alexander Hoyos, principal Private Secretary to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, upon a conversation in Vienna with a German emissary, Dr. Viktor Naumann, on Wednesday, July 1st, 1914. Dr. Naumann, who was connected with the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office, spoke on behalf of Herr von Stumm, the Director of its Political Department. He told Count Hoyos that "people in Berlin" were very anxious about Russian armaments. From personal knowledge he could say that both in German military and naval circles and in the Foreign Office the idea of a "preventive war" against Russia was no longer looked upon with the same aversion as it had been a year earlier. He added: "There had been an agreement with England upon Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and the visit of the British Fleet to Kiel had been arranged to show the improvement in [Anglo-German] relations. Therefore it was thought certain that England would not intervene in a European war."

The Hoyos memorandum goes on:

> I thanked Dr. Naumann for this interesting communication and observed that this state of mind would at any rate not be unwelcome to us should we be obliged to undertake something against Serbia. Dr. Naumann eagerly seized upon my remark and said that this was exactly what he had wanted to propose to me. In his view it was a life and death question for the [Austro-Hungarian] Monarchy, after the Sarajevo outrage, not to let the crime go unpunished but to destroy Serbia. Such an enterprise would, in the eyes of Germany, be the real test whether Russia wanted war or not. . . . Dr. Naumann believed that, if the Emperor William were spoken to in the right way, at this moment when he is horrified by the Sarajevo murders, he would give us every assurance and would stand firm, this time, even to the point of war, since he perceives the danger which is involved for the monarchical principle. In the German Foreign Office his mood would not be opposed because the hour was held to be auspicious for bringing about the great decision.

Dr. Naumann then undertook to discuss Count Hoyos's views with Herr Von Stumm and to let Count Hoyos know the answer.

The "answer" is a matter of history. Count Hoyos's own

visit to Potsdam on July 5th, after the Austrian Emperor's letter of July 2nd to the Emperor William, belongs to it. But a circumstance that lends peculiar savour to Dr. Naumann's Vienna mission is that (as appears from his posthumous papers) it had been arranged *before* the Sarajevo outrage. He arrived in Vienna on June 27th, 1914, to keep an appointment which Count Berchtold had given him for midday on Monday, June 29th. The appointment had to be postponed because the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort were assassinated at Sarajevo on Sunday, June 28th; and Dr. Naumann could only deliver his message to Count Hoyos, in place of Count Berchtold, on Wednesday, July 1st, though Count Berchtold did receive him a day or two later. The interesting points are that the German intention had been to persuade Austria-Hungary of the likelihood of British neutrality in regard to a "preventive" Austro-German war against Russia before, not after, the Sarajevo outrage: and that the revised Anglo-German Treaty for the eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies was cited as proof of this likelihood.

What, it may be asked, has this ancient story of "treaty revision" to do with present conditions? It tends to show that when grounds exist, or are supposed to exist, for believing that this country will "keep out of" attempts to overthrow an existing European order by force, that order is apt to be imperilled—to our own great danger and prospective hurt. Moreover, the question of the Portuguese colonies may not be quite so ancient as it seems. No sooner had Signor Mussolini discussed the first draft of the proposed Four-Power Pact with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon at Rome, last March, than rumours spread that among the Treaties to be revised and brought up to date was the Anglo-German Treaty of 1914 upon the Portuguese colonies. These rumours were promptly denounced as false; but there is good reason to believe that the denial has failed to convince the Portuguese Government. However this may be, and whether Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was merely evading the issue when he declared in the House of Commons on March 23rd that "Tanganyika was never even mentioned," we cannot well overlook the Prime Minister's description of Mussolini's Four-Power Plan as a draft that needed to be worked out "so that the Plan may not merely have as its general purpose peace and its big and almost only detail, revision of Treaties."

Now we have the final text of the Four-Power Pact with its seemingly innocuous provisions. It has been initialled and may presently be signed. Signor Mussolini has extolled it, the Little Entente no longer takes umbrage at it, and only Poland continues to look at it askance. Whether it is anything more than an expedient for "saving the faces" of Signor Mussolini and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, whether it has more substance than last year's "Gentlemen's Agreement" at Lausanne, time may show. In these days of short memories it is, however, worth while to recall the antecedents of the Pact and its somewhat chequered history.

Genealogically the Pact descends from the Paris conversations in July 1931 between the German Chancellor, Dr. Brüning, and his Foreign Secretary, Dr. Curtius, on the one hand, and MM. Laval and Briand on the other. The French Ministers put forward an idea, which had been suggested by their colleague, M. Flandin, Minister of Finance, that France should grant a large loan to Germany upon the conclusion of a political truce for ten years. By this truce Germany would undertake not to raise, for the period of its duration, any territorial question in Europe. The German Ministers rejected the proposal. Then France advocated a Franco-German Pact under which the two countries would undertake to consult each other upon all questions of joint interest. After some hesitation Drs. Brüning and Curtius declined this suggestion also.

A year later, at the Lausanne Conference, Dr. Brüning's successor, Herr von Papen, revived the idea of a Franco-German Pact susceptible of eventual extension to Great Britain and Italy. But Mr. Ramsay MacDonald let him know that the idea of a Franco-German military alliance, which underlay the German proposal, could not be countenanced; as, indeed, the French Prime Minister, M. Herriot, had already given Herr von Papen to understand. Herr von Papen was displeased. He explained that, if his "Four-Power Pact" had been accepted, his position would have been so strengthened that he could have crushed the Hitler movement, of which he pretended to be a determined opponent. In any event, the Four-Power Plan remained in abeyance until Signor Mussolini, after sundry consultations with Hitlerite representatives and, possibly, after sounding Great Britain, thrust it again into the foreground at Rome. Its aim—treaty revision—appealed to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald both in itself and as an embodi-

ment of the " Great Power idea " which he has long favoured. Was it a coincidence that the " security clauses " of the British Draft Disarmament Convention, which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald sprang upon the Geneva Conference last March on the eve of his visit to Rome, should have postulated the backing of a Great Power for any proposal to call a meeting of signatories of the Kellogg Pact, and should have made the validity of decisions reached by such a meeting depend upon the " concurrence " of eight Great Powers?

One reason for these singular provisions—which Sir John Simon has since essayed to redraft—may have been a desire to teach the small Powers a lesson. Had they not impertinently compelled the Great Powers to come into line at Geneva and reluctantly to condemn Japan for her aggression upon China! Clearly, they needed a lesson. Very obstinately, the small Powers declined to learn it. Last April three of them actually sent a special Ambassador to London for the purpose of telling Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon, in so many words, that " Treaty Revision means war." The point of this warning lay not only in its direct reference to the Mussolini-MacDonald Four-Power Pact, but in the circumstance that, for many months and simultaneously with the growth of the " Great Power " idea, a campaign in support of some ill-defined " Treaty Revision " had been carried on in the German, British, American and Italian Press. It was one of those campaigns in which no experienced eye could fail to detect a single purpose if not a single origin.

How far the British Prime Minister, or such British foreign policy as may be said to exist, actively encouraged this campaign there are no means of judging. But had the Prime Minister recognised it for the dangerous thing it was, he would hardly have spoken as he spoke in the House of Commons on March 23rd after his return from Rome. He was obviously unaware that, during his absence, a strong revulsion of feeling against Germany had taken place in this country. Colonel Wedgwood, a pacifist Labour Member, described it vigorously when he said, also on March 23rd, with reference to Mr. Winston Churchill's philippic against the Prime Minister:

> I never thought I should live to hear in this House a frankly pro-French speech made once more, and feel that the sympathy of the House was with that speech.

It is remarkable what a revolution has come about in public opinion in the last fortnight, and it is noteworthy that during the last ten days, at least, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have been out of this country, and absent from that psychological contact and change which has come over public opinion. They have not read the papers. They have not read the *Daily Telegraph, The Times,* the *Evening Standard,* or any of those great organs which have the making of public opinion and, consequently, are a little abashed when they find that their wanderings to Geneva and Rome fall somewhat flat upon a new world. A fortnight ago all our bright young things were passing resolutions that they would never again fight for King and country. Now they are muttering that if these German supermen go much farther then " We shall have to tackle them." That is a change which has come about, and I think it is a tribute to the humane, generous feeling of this country.

What has taken place in Germany has completely converted a pro-German England into a pro-French England, and that change has not yet become obvious to the Prime Minister. I feel certain that, if he had realised what we have been feeling, he would have made in his speech some general reference to his friends who are now hunted from refuge to refuge, from one prison to another—Otto Wels whom we both knew as a Socialist of the milder type, Dr. Breitscheid the austere, von Gerlach who had the superb courage all through the war to publish week by week in Berlin *Die Welt am Montag.* All these people are now being hunted and bludgeoned like rats. I could wish that the Prime Minister had remembered that in his speech, and had indicated, as no one but a Prime Minister can indicate, the decent opinion of British gentlemen about the sort of thing going on in Germany.

Colonel Wedgwood might have been more considerate. How could he expect the Prime Minister to " indicate the decent opinion of British gentlemen about the sort of thing going on in Germany " when Mr. MacDonald was trying to bring Herr Hitler into a Pact for " co-operation " which, he assured the House, would be " the most effective work for peace that has been done since the war "? Mr. MacDonald may have been too shrewd not to suspect that Signor Mussolini was anxious to devise means of putting a brake upon the conquest of Austria by Hitlerism, and also to escape from the dangers inherent in the short-sighted Fascist policy of disrupting Yugoslavia. He may have thought it worth while to allay the Duce's fears by helping him to offer Germany some recompense—possibly at the expense of Poland or Portugal—for behaving

nicely in a Four-Power group with complete equality of status. Responsible statesmen cannot always allow their hearts to run away with their heads or permit indignation at the " beating-up " and internment of a few hundreds or thousands of Jews, Liberals and pacifists in Germany to get the better of calm goodwill. Whatever the Prime Minister may or may not think, his views are certainly not Liberal. If they are tinged with Socialism, have the Socialists ever protested, with a tithe of the vehemence they show on the subject of Hitlerite brutality, against the damnable barbarities of the Russian Bolshevists? And if his outlook be now coloured by Toryism, how many British Tories have stood out against the systematic abominations that have marked the rise and progress of Italian Fascism? Only those are entitled to call the Prime Minister to order who have never bowed the knee to Baal in the Bolshevist, Fascist or Hitlerite temples of violence.

Yet, in a sense, Colonel Wedgwood was right. There has been a revolution in British feeling. Bolshevist technique, shocking in Russia but tolerable, in the eyes of British Conservatives, when utilised to " save Italy from Communism," becomes shocking again when tactlessly copied from Italy and applied with Prussian thoroughness in Hitlerite Germany. The Russians, of course, are only half civilised. The Italians, like most " dagoes," may be all the better for a taste of " discipline." But the Germans are too near, and too like ourselves for their behaviour to leave us altogether unmoved. So when they bow down before Hitler, acclaim him as their saviour, and display—in Sir Austen Chamberlain's phrase—" The worst of the all-Prussian Imperialism, with an added savagery, a racial pride, an exclusiveness which cannot allow to any fellow subject not of ' pure Nordic birth ' equality of rights and citizenship within the nation to which he belongs," we are deeply stirred, we rub our eyes, we ask if such things can really be, and some of us, like Mr. Winston Churchill, even exclaim " Thank God for France! " For beneath all our perturbation lies our national dislike of being compelled to think, to take stock of our position in the world, and to ask whither we are going.

If it is not easy to say whither we are going, it is less hard to see what our position is. We inhabit an island of which the southern shores are within gunshot of the coast of Europe. Upon what happens to this island the fate of the British

Commonwealth of Nations depends. We cannot be indifferent to events on the Continent, for they may affect our own safety. We cannot put our finger into every European pie if only because our interests are world-wide, and we have no right to expect the Dominions always to support us in matters which their peoples do not understand. (The Locarno Treaty, for what it is worth and if it is worth anything at all, may already have gone too far in this direction by pledging us, without the support of the Dominions or of India, to safeguard the demilitarised Rhineland zone against French or German attack.) We live by trade, oversea communications are our " life-line," and peace should therefore be the object of our supreme endeavour. We know how narrowly we escaped destruction in the last Great War. We cannot be sure either of " keeping out of " another great war or of escaping destruction should we be drawn into it.

What have we done to safeguard peace, our supreme interest, during the past fifteen years? In sober truth, our record makes sorry reading. At the Paris Peace Conference we helped to work out, and accepted, the Covenant of the League of Nations, with all its responsibilities, because we wished to make an end of war and believed the United States to be of the same mind. In April 1919 we and the United States signed a Convention which pledged our joint help to France against unprovoked German attack until such time as the League of Nations should be able to organise a greater degree of general security. When the United States turned its back on the League in 1920, we did not say that our future course would be set by Washington, that henceforth our support of the League would be half-hearted and that in no case should we hold ourselves bound by Article 16, the " sanctions " Article, lest it bring us into conflict with the United States over the " freedom of the seas." On the contrary, our responsible Ministers never ceased to affirm that we should stand by the Covenant, the whole Covenant, though we would not go beyond the Covenant. This they said with the mental reservation that we should think twice before standing by the Covenant if we were called upon to keep our promises under Article 16.

After the defection of the United States we repudiated our part of the joint Anglo-American Convention in guarantee of French security. Notwithstanding our nearness to Europe our statesmen felt we ought not to take the responsibility of sup-

porting France single-handed. They threw away the controlling influence which our maintenance of the guarantee would have given us over French policy in Europe, and they destroyed the incentive we should otherwise have felt to lessen our especial risk by insisting that the League should organise a greater degree of general security. We quarrelled persistently with France who, under Nationalist inspiration, and feeling we had " let her down," went into the Ruhr ostensibly in search of reparations, really in the hope of laying hands on territorial pledges of safety. The Ruhr occupation, and German passive resistance to it—which we encouraged—sent the German mark to perdition, enabled Germany to wipe out her whole internal debt, shook the French franc, cost British investors in French funds four-fifths of their holdings, and prepared the way for the European economic crisis that has not left us unscathed.

When, after the Dawes Settlement of August 1924, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot urged the League to organise a greater degree of general security and European disarmament, we rejected offhand the Geneva Protocol for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes which essayed to achieve both of these objects, only to find ourselves, a year later, obliged to " do something " for European security at Locarno. In the summer of 1927 we came near to a dispute with the United States over the limitation of cruiser tonnage; and during the spring of 1928 we attached serious reservations to the Kellogg Pact for the Renunciation of War. From that Pact we hesitated—we still hesitate—to draw and to proclaim the obvious conclusion, a conclusion thoroughly consonant with a main principle of English Common Law, that the renunciation of war necessarily entails the renunciation of neutrality in favour of war-makers. Nay, even when the United States proclaimed this principle in August 1932 as a cardinal doctrine of American policy, we refrained from welcoming it and even from admitting it. Nor have we availed ourselves of the recent American declaration on this subject at Geneva to give international leadership by telling the Disarmament Conference that we, at all events, shall never countenance, aid or abet by any semblance of neutrality countries which, having recourse to armed violence or to war, in violation of their pledges, may imperil our foremost national and imperial interest. We cling to the outworn notion of neutrality, and never reflect how our own past treatment of " contraband " may ruin our neutral overseas trade in the event of another great war.

True, we have urged upon the nations, and have secured from some of them, a renunciation of " force." This pious exercise has not engendered international confidence, partly because we have never said what we shall do if the promise be broken, partly because it looked too much like a phylactery worn broad upon our foreheads to hide our shame at having allowed Japan, without technical declaration of war, to make a mockery at China's expense of League Covenant, Nine-Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact alike, all of which " solemn instruments " bear the signature of Great Britain. And then we wonder that France who—with all her faults (which are many) and with all the blindness to the postulates of her own larger security which she showed during the first year of the Sino-Japanese conflict—has painful reason to know more of the Germans than we like to remember, should decline farther to reduce her armaments unless she is sure that, in the hour of trial, we shall not leave her in the lurch.

We may say: " France is unreasonable; she ought to know that we shall play up when the time comes, as we played up in 1914. We cannot pledge ourselves in advance. By the Locarno Treaty we have promised to go to her help in the Rhineland if and when we have been able to satisfy ourselves that a flagrant violation of the demilitarised zone has been committed, and thereafter to abide by the decisions of the League Council which must be unanimous. We, at any rate, have set a good example by cutting down our armaments to the lowest level compatible with national safety. We have thus shown confidence in the good faith of other nations. Let France do the same. Disarmament and peace will then be assured." Such language strikes other countries as rather like that of the fox which lost its tail. They wonder whether we could, even if we would, carry out our Locarno responsibilities in case of need; and, not disposed to give us the benefit of the doubt, they desire to make assurance doubly sure as regards their own armaments. Thus things go round in a vicious circle, as they always must and will as long as we talk of peace in terms of our own neutrality in another war and do not set ourselves to organise that utter ostracism of any war-maker which can alone create a feeling of collective security by destroying belief in the likelihood of war.

As matters now stand such a policy as this may be past praying for. It may even lie beyond the range of practical politics. We may have " missed the tide " so wofully in the autumn of 1931 (by failing to join the United States and by not urging France to join us both in telling Japan that, whatever her rights or wrongs in Manchuria might be, her methods were incompatible with her international engagements) that our course is henceforth " bound in shallows and in miseries." If, after an open-eyed survey of the world outlook, we reach the conclusion that a constructive policy of general peace is impossible, we must needs face the consequences and ask ourselves whether, even on a basis of " neutrality," the present level of our own armaments is not too low in view of the risks we may have to face in Europe, in Asia and in the Pacific. It would be futile to delude ourselves into believing that the perils from which we would fain escape will " blow over," and that we can safely " get back " to the position in which we thought we stood in 1913 and the first half of 1914. Japan may consolidate her gains in Manchuria, Jehol and Northern China, and fortify her " mandated " islands in the Pacific, as stepping-stones to her mastery over Eastern and Central Asia and eventually over Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand. If so, we may some day have a Hobson's choice between capitulation and war.

In Europe the Hitlerite programme may have unpleasant shocks in store for us. This programme aims deliberately at the union of all the " Germanic " peoples in the " Third Empire " of Hitlerite dreams. It does not necessarily contemplate war in the near future. The secret rearmament of Germany, the arming and drilling of millions of able-bodied men, the multiplication of " commercial " aircraft, the preparation of incendiary bombs and new asphyxiating gases may merely be intended, for the present, to lend weight to German claims for " Treaty Revision " in Europe and Africa, and to serve as a reminder to opponents of such claims that they had better look out for themselves. In its earlier stages Hitlerite policy may seek to avoid recourse to unnecessary international violence. One of its avowed objects is to secure the friendship of Italy and the neutrality of Great Britain—while " Nazi " movements are fomented and organised in Holland and Flanders, Denmark and the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Austria and German Switzerland. Who would dare to intervene if the leaders of these movements should one day " spontaneously " demand a " federal relationship " with the Hitlerite Reich? For the moment Austria, with the backing of Italy, is resisting; but unless Dr. Dollfuss is firmly supported all round, and unless Signor Mussolini finds in the hidden recesses of his versatile heart some memory of the Italian policy in which he appeared to believe at the Rome Congress of Subject Hapsburg Races in April 1918, Austria may " go Nazi " before many months are out.

In the background of the World Economic Conference, over which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is presiding, these and many other things are being anxiously discussed. Through every discussion runs an inquiring undertone: " What will England do, whither is she going? " Something will be gained if our visitors acquire the conviction that the " revolution " in British feeling last March was no transient wave of emotion but expresses our steadfast faith in the liberal principles of Western civilisation and in representative democracy; if they understand that we and the French, as the only two Great Western Powers in Europe which have remained free, mean to stand together in defence of international right and law against racial intolerance and lawless brutality; if they feel that our praise of peace as a priceless boon is not lip-service only, but that we are ready even to take risks for its sake; and that, so far as in us may lie, we shall go forward through our own, and help others to go forward through their difficulties provided that they are of like mind with us. As a nation we can, if we will, still lead the world and, perchance, save it by our example. But it is high time that we, and others, should know whither we are going and that we are not trusting, as we trusted down to the beginning of August 1914, in our ability to maintain an impossible and obsolete neutrality.

We have, in short, to think not how little we can do, how we can " keep out of it," but how much we can do to ensure safety and a reasonable prospect of peaceful development for ourselves and others. Even if we are inclined to wait and mark time till Hitlerism " blows over " or disintegrates, we shall not escape its influence any more than we have escaped the influence of Russian Bolshevism, on the one hand, and that of Italian Fascism, on the other. The mood of Hitlerism is not unlike that of the German Anabaptists of the sixteenth century who, in fanatical exaltation, strove to set up a

fantastic " Kingdom of God " at Münster and came to dreadful grief. It will not pass before it has wrought mighty changes in Germany and outside Germany. In foreign policy the only safeguard against it is firm and declared collective non-neutrality towards the crime of war. In home affairs the only sure antidote to it, and to the Bolshevism from which it, like Italian Fascism, indirectly sprang, is to foster, in this country above all, a progressive spirit inspired by the soundest liberal principles. Many excesses of " capitalism " may need to be curbed, workers by hand and brain will assuredly have to be admitted to real partnership in trade and industry, the " class struggle " to be deliberately replaced by " class co-operation," and the idea of service to others to be given precedence over individual privileges. If we would be immune from Communism and Fascism we must create something better than either, something more liberal, less reactionary, yet equally dynamic. This can and should be done. The twentieth century has come to stay. Our path through it is forward, at home and abroad.

WICKHAM STEED.

THE URGENCY OF TREATY REVISION.

LAUDABLE as were the motives which unquestionably actuated most of the Members who took part in the recent House of Commons discussion on the Nazi excesses in Germany, it is probable that the demonstration would have come with greater grace and force had not earlier, and at least equally justifiable, opportunities for public protest been allowed to pass unimproved. Those of us who, with knowledge of the facts, feel strongly on the subject of minority treatment generally are entitled to ask Sir Austen Chamberlain, who led the discussion, how it happened that he refrained from lifting his voice in condemnation of the pogrom against their Jewish fellow citizens with which the Poles signalised their admission into the circle of European democracies, and has had nothing to say about the oppression which Polish Jews still suffer to-day, as lately narrated in the book *The Cauldron Boils*.

When also did he support by word or sign the *Manchester Guardian*, whose indictment of the Nazis he was ready enough to endorse in the House of Commons, when alone of English newspapers it exposed the Polish attempts to exterminate the German landowners in what was formerly West Prussia by the manipulation of a Land Reform Law, or when it similarly exposed the horrible cruelties inflicted on the Ukrainians of the Polish State? When has he protested against the European scandal that in most of the countries to which the Minority Treaties of 1919 and 1920 apply the provisions made for the welfare of millions of innocent people, forcibly denationalised by the Treaties of Versailles, Saint Germain, and Trianon, have never been loyally observed? Yet not only would formal and earnest censure of these wrongs be in order in the House of Commons, but it is a plain duty, since Great Britain and her late Allies bear a large responsibility in the matter, owing to the fact that they have never yet made a serious attempt to obtain the fulfilment of the pledges of good and equal government which were solemnly given to them by the various succession States.

What to my mind, however, was specially regrettable in the discussion was the way in which some of the speakers—there were, of course, honourable exceptions—seemed to welcome and even to gloat over the prospect that the events which have

recently occurred in Germany might have the effect of shelving or killing the cause of treaty revision after it had, by slow but steady progress, gained in public favour in this country; and it is not unjust to suggest that in more than one case that was the object in view. I submit that such an attitude betrays a very unstatesmanlike mentality. Taking an analogy from pathology, what would be said of the medical practitioner who, confronted by a patient whose condition presented all the appearances of acute and deep-seated disease, advised that the proper thing to do would be to ignore the obvious ill humours, not to trouble about symptoms, causes, or remedies, but simply to allow the mischief to take its own course? Yet that, in effect, is the procedure now urged by practitioners of the august science of statecraft as suited to the case of Germany. Can it be possible that they have never given a thought to the origin of the Nazi movement? As a direct product of the peace settlement, dating from the Treaty of Versailles, the movement has hitherto been less the expression of specific political ideas and aims than a symptom of national discomfort and desperation, due to the crushing territorial and economic penalties enforced on Germany at Versailles in violation of the Fourteen Points, and only justified by the discredited fiction that she alone caused the war; aggravated further by the long, galling, and demoralising military occupation of one of her fairest and most industrial provinces, by the illegal invasion of the Ruhr by France, with all the resulting horrors—the employment of coloured troops, the arbitrary punishments and shootings, the rapings of white women, and the rest—and by the succession of humiliations which the German nation has suffered at the hands of the victorious Powers from 1919 to the present time.

Instead of encouraging and strengthening the democratic elements in the population, and so rallying the forces which would have made for tranquillity and settlement, the Powers preferred to maintain a cynical indifference and a supercilious contumely which were nicely calculated to bring home to a people naturally proud, but doubly proud in defeat, the bitterness of its position, and to increase the consciousness of its position of impotent isolation. That has happened which intelligent foresight might have prevented. Gradually power has passed more and more into the hands of the extremist parties, until the Nazi movement has captured the larger part of the nation, sorely tried and only too ready to clutch at any

hope of relief, and in Germany to-day we see in office a Government which is a practical dictatorship, the republic threatened, the moderate elements in the community for the moment everywhere silenced and overridden, and a national policy avowed which seems oriented in the direction of monarchism and militarism.

Granted that there has been a regrettably free use of "wild and whirling words" in Germany of late, and that disturbing threats of violent measures have been made by influential men determined on breaking down the restraints which hamper their encircled and disarmed country: yet how often was it different in the history of liberation movements? The guilt for these untoward developments does not fall altogether on one side.

The question which now confronts us, however, is whether the recent sinister turn of events, to profess surprise at which is to admit past blindness and incapacity to read signs and warnings of the clearest kind, shall be further encouraged, or the underlying causes be honestly recognised and the logical consequences of such recognition be honestly drawn. The moral of what is happening in Germany and the whole of South-Eastern Europe to-day is not that a rational revision of the peace treaties would be dangerous, but that it is the only hope of safety. Unless the Powers whose signatures were appended to those treaties intend to tamper still more with the pledges which were given to the defeated nations, such action should not be longer delayed.

It is obvious that revision would need to give equal consideration to the grievances and claims of all the countries whose territories suffered mutilation. In order, however, to make any profitable speculation upon possible territorial readjustments it is necessary to call to mind the annexations which were enforced and to know something about their effects. In the case of Germany, upon which the treaty makers first operated, excisions were made on every frontier, chiefly in favour of France (Alsace-Lorraine) and Poland (large parts of the Prussian provinces of West Prussia—including here the so-called Corridor—Posen and Silesia), but also of Czechoslovakia (the compact little region known as the Hultschin Land), of Lithuania (Memel Land), of Belgium (the Eupen and Malmédy districts), and of Denmark (portions of North Schleswig), while in addition the German Colonies were appropriated bodily and divided amongst the victorious Powers.

Altogether nearly one-seventh of Germany's former area of 208,780 square miles, together with a population of 6½ millions, was alienated. Notwithstanding all the promises made on the subject of self-determination, plebiscites were allowed in only four areas, all but one very small, though in a fifth (that assigned to Belgium) a disingenuous open-list form of voting was applied, subject to chicanery and terrorism so scandalous that the great majority of the inhabitants refused to take part.

A few weeks ago an influential London journal allowed a correspondent of the ready-writer type to assure its readers that the revision movement in Germany is artificial and insincere. That statement was exceedingly foolish, and conclusions based upon it would infallibly be dangerous. Here I speak of what I can fairly claim to know. Having lately undertaken the not unarduous task of investigating actual conditions in all the new German frontier districts with the exception of the Danish, mixing with every class of the community, I assert positively that the resentment caused by the material and moral injuries done by the annexations and by the repression and persecution of the denationalised populations, in total disregard of the Minority Treaties, was never so intense as now. Not only so, but all the successive German Governments from 1919 to the present, voicing the sentiment and will of an absolutely united nation, have left the other Great Powers and Geneva in no doubt as to the main territorial changes which are expected from revision, come it sooner or later.

The predominant feeling at present is still opposed to contesting the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, subject only to certain minor frontier rectifications, and if France were willing wisely to co-operate in a generous measure of retrocession in other directions, it is possible and even probable that, in spite of the fact that this old German territory was returned without the plebiscite due under the Fourteen Points, its loss would be accepted by Germany as a final settlement between the two countries. It is in the east that the annexations are felt to be most intolerable. In particular the Polish Corridor, which divides the Reich into two parts, only communicable through what is now foreign territory, and then by sufferance, is a political monstrosity as harmful economically as it is incompatible with national honour and pride. The northern portion of this territory at least would be claimed back, Poland still retaining parts of the province of West Prussia and that of

Posen almost wholly, and having, under international guarantee, free river and rail communication with the sea at Danzig, its own port of Gdynia, and several other Baltic ports—maritime facilities far surpassing those which were deemed sufficient for Czechoslovakia, which was given only the freedom of the rivers Oder and Elbe and the ports at their mouths. Danzig should have the option of reunion with Germany or of retaining its autonomous status on a wider basis, viz. complete independence of Poland in foreign relations, including customs arrangements.

Further, the present impossible situation in Upper Silesia, which was divided contrary to every consideration of reason and justice for the sole purpose of giving to Poland the great bulk of its mineral wealth, and so stiffening the strangle-hold of France, Poland, and Belgium on Germany's iron and steel industries, would have to be alleviated. Traditionally and physically an economic unity, the region should be so reconstituted, subject to the transfer of its great mining and metallurgical undertakings to a purely German-Polish consortium.

In the case of Memel Land, the Hultschin Land, and Eupen and Malmédy, the plebiscites refused in 1919 should be allowed, which is all the populations concerned ask for, while with a spirit of goodwill on both sides the minor differences which still exist between Prussia and Denmark might easily be adjusted. The future of the Saar Territory is provided for by article 49 of the Treaty of Versailles and the complementary Saar Statute, and if the wishes of the inhabitants are honestly ascertained by the plebiscite fixed for 1935 at latest, and above all are duly complied with, there can be no doubt about the full return of this region to Germany; for it cannot be too clearly understood that the cession of so much as a rood of Saar land to France would destroy for ever the hope of reconciliation between the two countries and inevitably reopen the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

That Germany will have to be given back, if not the whole of her colonies, at least an empire in Africa corresponding to her industrial needs and worthy of her past brilliant work as a civilising force in that continent, should be taken for granted. Inasmuch as the colonial question is the only necessary source of difference between this country and Germany I have, in the interest of goodwill and peace, taken a special interest in it from 1914 forward, and there can now be no harm in stating that in a letter written to me the late

Chairman of the East Africa Commission endorsed the opinion of certain other members of that body, that Germany's right to colonial territory was fully justified.

The plight into which the treaties have brought Austria and Hungary excites everywhere keen sympathy. Egged into sedition and revolution late in the war by the promise of political independence, the stronger races under Habsburg rule split up the Dual Monarchy, and formed republics of their own, so that all that remained for the Allied Powers to do in 1919 was to recognise the existence of these States and confirm to each of them its appropriate share of the territorial booty. By the Treaty of Saint Germain Austria was required to recognise the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, as of Hungary; and by the Treaty of Trianon Hungary did the same for the Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czechoslovakian States. Before partition Austria had an area of 116,000 square miles and a population of 28½ millions. Of that area little more than one-fourth and of the population somewhat less remain to it. All the large provinces which surrounded the now mutilated remnant of a great historic empire were partitioned, mainly between Poland, which received Galicia and part of Silesia, and a Czech State, into which, for its greater glory, the Slovaks were forced against their will; while Italy acquired a large slice of long-coveted territory as well as the port of Trieste. All this was done without plebiscites. As if actuated by the wish to make as difficult as possible Austria's existence as an independent unit the treaty makers appropriated her mineral wealth and most of her important industries and great forests. In consequence she has ever since been kept economically alive by loans, which the Allied Powers have had to advance or guarantee.

Austria may have been the "ramshackle State" which the British Prime Minister described it during the war, yet it had long held in wholesome restraint some of the most unruly elements in the political life of South-Eastern Europe. The changes made have worsened racial relations rather than improved them. The Czechs and Slovaks do not and probably never will work harmoniously together, while of the population of Poland one-third consists of disaffected alien races which are only kept quiet by the vigorous measures possible under a dictatorship.

Whatever the future may have in store for the diminished

Habsburg realm, however, little could be done for it by treaty revision at the present time. It is inconceivable that either Poland or Czechoslovakia will be prepared to die in order that Austria may live again in something like its olden extent and fame. The only hope of permanent amelioration seems to lie in federal union with Germany, though the recent developments in that country are bound to discourage for a time further overtures to that end. If union, when it comes, were accompanied by the restoration to Austria of the districts strongly populated by Germans, particularly those of Bohemia, the Czechoslovakian republic would count on a far less precarious career than seems now to await it.

Hungary was treated with a harshness that can only be fitly described as unintelligent. In violation of historical and ethnographical principles alike, two-thirds of its entire area and three-fifths of its population were taken. Of the ten million inhabitants so alienated nearly one-third were Magyars, over one-half of these being transferred to Rumania, while the remaining two-thirds went to Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. Only one plebiscite was allowed, and that related to a single small town. With the same refinement of cruelty which was shown to Austria the Allied Powers assigned to the annexing States not only its seaport, Fiume, but the greater part of its natural resources in iron, coal, and other minerals and forests, and its most important industries. From whatever standpoint it is judged, the dismemberment of Hungary was one of the crudest and clumsiest pieces of mutilation perpetrated in the treaties of peace. Mr. Lloyd George had written in the sagacious memorandum of March 25th, 1919, addressed to his colleagues in discouragement of a policy of excessive severity, "There will never be peace in South-Eastern Europe if every little State now coming into being is to have a large Magyar *Irredenta* within its borders." These *Irredentas* were nevertheless created, and the result predicted has followed. It is a fact almost beyond credence that there should have been added to Czechoslovakia a large part of Upper Hungary with 3½ million inhabitants, hardly any of them Czechs, while over a million are Hungarians. In all cases also the annexed populations were transferred to the rule of peoples of inferior civilisation.

In spite of the callous mutilation of their country, however, the Hungarians have frankly recognised the impossibility of any wholesale restoration of frontiers. All they ask is that,

as far as possible, the regions in which Magyars can be shown to be clearly preponderant shall be retroceded. That reasonable demand should be granted.

Inasmuch as the two remaining treaties, that of Neuilly with Bulgaria and that of Lausanne—superseding the abortive treaty of Sèvres—with Turkey, have aroused no serious protest, they may be passed over. Bulgaria appears to have accepted the new situation philosophically, while all that the Turks ask of the European Powers is that they shall be allowed to work out their salvation in their own way.

It is the treaties which were forced on the two Central Empires which are the real source of anxiety, for they have left Europe in a far more discordant and unsettled condition than existed in 1914. Like a mediæval pest they have spread economic and moral desolation over a large part of the Continent, poisoning the life of its peoples, bringing everywhere untold misery and impoverishment, increasing incalculably the old tension in political relationships, and in some countries throwing back civilisation for decades, if not for generations. To hardly any of the elevated principles which figured so conspicuously in the avowed, as distinguished from the clandestine, war aims of the Allied Powers have the treaties given faithful and unselfish expression. Without finally settling any old problems they have created new ones of the greatest difficulty; instead of allaying racial animosities they have intensified them; and they have given a new and indefinite lease of life to the institution of war and the spirit of conquest, of which the world was to have been freed. Tenuous as were the threads upon which the peace of Europe hung and quivered twenty years ago, who can deny that, as conditions are, it is not more gravely threatened to-day? For what are all the plaintive appeals of France and her allies for "security," which stamp our boasts of a victorious war as hollow mockery, but so many confessions that the vindictive peace was a huge blunder, that in 1919 cupidity overreached itself, and that many of the spoils so injudiciously harvested from a tragic sowing of blood and tears cannot be retained without further resort to the sword?

If the foregoing diagnosis of our present discontents is even approximately correct it follows that no settlement can be conceived of as possible for Europe without important territorial changes. Nevertheless, the disturbing effect and even

the extent of these changes might be greatly reduced by the adoption of a bold scheme of reciprocal expatriation and exchange of population on generous lines; and for this the agreement concluded between Turkey and Greece in 1923 affords an encouraging precedent. Even so, racial minorities in large number would inevitably remain in some if not all of the countries concerned, and it would be unforgivable to allow them to be exposed to the ill-treatment which has stained the post-war annals of most of the countries created or enlarged by the Peace Treaties. What is needed is a complete break from the principles which have hitherto governed the status of minority races, and that means a declaration of war against the present pretensions of our selfish and intolerant nationalisms.

To minorities whose alien position promised to be permanent there should be given, in addition to a general equality with other nationals in civil and political rights, a maximum degree of autonomy in all that concerns culture and ethos in the widest sense, including education, religion, language, and the conservation and development of free personality in the individual and of the traditional characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the group. I would go further and, subject to due safeguards, would allow all minorities to retain the nationality natural to them, just as individuals who settle in foreign countries do already, and even to exercise a certain measure of autonomy where they were sufficiently numerous and concentrated to ensure efficient government. To action on some such lines as these we shall be compelled to come if the minority problem is to be solved on humane and moral lines. Mr. Lloyd George said on one occasion, "When Providence made a man a Scotsman it meant him to be a Scotsman, and when it made a few Welshmen just in the corner of the island it meant it." So it is or should be with Germans and Poles, with Hungarians and Czechs, with Hindus, Cypriots, and South African Bantus. The cruel wrong of forced political proselytism should be relentlessly stamped out.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

AUSTRIA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIFE.

THE modest remnant of the old Hapsburg monarchy left intact by the cruel and short-sighted Treaty of Saint Germain, that now calls itself Austria, is at present waging a desperate fight for its independence and against Hitlerism with an energy and endurance that is surprising and does great credit to the Dollfuss Government. For Austria the question is: to be or not to be. But the fight is also of extraordinary importance for Europe; for the annexation of Austria by Germany would mean a triumph for Pangermanism, an enormous territorial enlargement of Germany, and at the same time the establishment of a terror in the heart of Europe which is already closely approximating to the brutal methods of Bolshevism.

Europe is now witnessing this dangerous quarrel chiefly owing to the unjust and cruel destruction of the old Hapsburg Empire which a clear-sighted Frenchman, the Senator and former Minister de Monzie, has justly branded as the "greatest stupidity of the century." If the victors at Saint Germain had been possessed of greater historical, geographical and ethnographical knowledge, or if they had been endowed with a modicum of psychology, they would have realised that the scanty remnant of the old monarchy must necessarily become an object to be coveted by Germany as compensation for her extensive territorial losses. It needed no special wisdom to foresee this, the less so since the annexation of Austria by Germany had always been one of the most important points of the Pangerman programme, and similarly-minded circles in Austria desired to be annexed. Every clear-sighted person—not only the wise ones at Saint Germain—must have seen what was coming. Immediately on its proclamation the Austrian Republic, then freshly painted red, declared itself as belonging to the German Empire and in its diplomatic ignorance believed that the Entente Powers would say Amen to their plan. To the bitter disappointment, not only of the Pan-Germans but also of the Socialists, who were then in favour of annexation, the Entente Powers decisively vetoed the plan, and from France in particular came a threatening echo.

Nothing had come of the annexation plan for the moment; if, however, it was expected at Versailles and Saint Germain that their veto had put an end to the movement, bitter disappointment was in store. On both sides of the Austrian

frontier a fanatical propaganda set in, causing a standing threat to the peace of Europe. The Powers, particularly France, should have countered this danger by doing everything to win Austria over to their side and alienate her from Germany. Austria's hopeless economic condition provided the most promising opportunity. By putting her on her feet and supporting her, she would have been laid under obligations and her annexationist desires would have been effectively paralysed. The Powers, on the contrary, looked on with folded arms, showed no sympathetic interest in her development, and permitted the Socialists increasingly to terrorise the whole community. It is true that the Powers repeatedly felt called upon to advance money to meet the growing debts of the country; but this was done so unwillingly and hesitatingly, with such humiliating conditions and so inadequately, that instead of being grateful Austria only felt ashamed and embittered, and willingly listened to those who maintained that salvation was only to be looked for from Germany. Credulous and uncritical as the masses always are, especially when they are poor, disappointed, exasperated and weary, they listened to the advice and the promises, and increasingly turned to annexation as their only hope.

In the face of this growing movement the Government also began to falter, and the Schober régime declared for the Customs Union between Germany and Austria which was to make so much bad blood. Though it failed to materialise, the attempt shows the headway made by the idea, thanks to the mistaken policy of the Powers. Instead of regarding this experiment as a warning and making up for lost time by willingly helping Austria, their attitude was anything but friendly. France, in particular, made her financial power felt in an exasperating manner, obviously in order to punish Austria for the attempted Customs Union. But the gentlemen at the Quai d'Orsay overlooked that they were not only damaging Austria, but also harming themselves, for the cry for the Union grew louder and stronger.

In Germany the most was made of the situation and the flames were fanned with a will. With lightning rapidity they spread all over Austria, where they found the best fuel in the misgovernment and weaknesses of former governments, in the general economic crisis, and in the dislike of the Jews. Fresh outbreaks occurred, and the fire appeared beyond control.

"Hail Hitler! Death to Jewry!" This cry echoes to-day throughout the land, more than elsewhere in the provincial capitals where those sections of society set the fashion that have sold themselves to Hitler body and soul. These are the so-called intelligentsia, i.e. the educated bourgeoisie, particularly professors, teachers, judges, officials and also, most regrettably, in no small numbers former Imperial officers. They are not only fanatical disciples of Hitler but also embittered opponents of the present Government, which wants to have nothing to do with the Union and fights for the maintenance of Austria's independence with an energy rare in Austrian Governments. In this combat the rest of the world witnesses the grotesque spectacle of the Civil Servants—naturally not all of them, but the majority—fighting the very Government which they should rightly serve and by whom they are paid. In view of this monstrous state of things the Government has instructed all Civil Servants, the military, the gendarmes and the police solemnly to renew their oath to the Austrian State. The National-Socialists endeavoured to paralyse this measure by telling the Civil Servants that they might well take their oath, since it had been obtained from them by force and was therefore void. It is a significant example of Hitlerite ethics and at the same time an ironical instance of "German faith" which the Germans are always praising as a special virtue of Germanism. No official was forced by the Government to take the oath against his conviction; every one was free to refuse to take it and to leave the service. The future will show whether the Civil Servants keep their promise or whether they have perjured themselves on the advice of their National-Socialist friends.

As the Government in the desperate fight for the independence of Austria failed to obtain the support of its own Civil Servants, it looked for other help and found it in the *Heimwehr*. This force had been created some years previously as a counter-weight to the Socialist *Republicanischer Schutzbund*; it had seen some changes in course of time and very soon regarded the idea of the Union with sympathy. Their leader, the young Prince Starhemberg, always a true Austrian, had considered it advisable to fill his sails with the pan-German breeze in order to popularise the *Heimwehr*. This caused the *Heimwehr* increasingly to follow the Teutonic course and eventually to make straight for the National-Socialist sea. At the

last moment the terrified helmsman succeeded in altering the dangerous course and bringing the *Heimwehr* back into home waters, but only after a great many of his crew had left the ship to join another flying the *Hakenkreuz* standard.

With the assistance of another *Heimwehr* leader, Major Fey, a brave officer who in the war had gained the Cross of Maria Theresa, the highest order for military valour, and who was now Minister for Public Security, he managed to fill the gaps in his ranks and to create for the Government a capable and, it is to be hoped, dependable auxiliary force which may be regarded as its bodyguard. By its aid the Government has begun its difficult fight against the brown Bolshevism after having previously, thanks to its energy, successfully mastered the red Bolshevism. The imposing march of the 40,000 *Heimwehr* men on May 14th at Schönbrunn has shown that, in spite of the destructive Hitler epidemic, there are still enough people in Austria who are true to their country and do not wish to know anything either of the Union or a Hitlerite régime. The question now is: who will be the victor in this bitter fight? The Hitlerites in Austria consider themselves already the victors, and rely on the reserve of power and men which they believe themselves to possess in Germany. They prophesied that Austria would in a few days lie at their feet completely Hitlerised. Meanwhile, the few days have gone by, and it is gratifying to say Austria is still independent. It would, however, be foolish to feel secure in the face of the brown danger.

The admixture of the Jewish problem increases the Austrian Government's difficulty in fighting the forces of Nationalism. Hitler's triumph is to no small extent due to anti-semitism, which permeates every section of the population. The Jews have always played a dominant part in the public life of Austria, especially in the press and commerce and in certain professions —doctors, lawyers, journalists—out of all proportion to their numbers, so that the non-Jewish population felt itself slighted and at a disadvantage. This, of course, has not helped to diminish the already existing dislike of the Jews. Besides, during the war there was a regular invasion of Jews from Galicia who settled in Vienna, acquired citizenship and thus further increased the hard fight of the native population for their daily bread. When Hitler came into power and began to combat not only the parties of the Left but the Jews in particular, and when the brutal battle-cry "Death to the Jews"

resounded throughout Germany, Austria listened attentively, and a large part of the population, the young at their head, enthusiastically took up the slogan and joined the National-Socialist movement which promised to free them from Jewish predominance. Large bands of young people attached themselves to the alluring sign of the Swastika which promised them the longed-for Union.

In these circumstances it was tempting for the Austrian Government to make the most of the anti-semitic wind for its own sails. No doubt, it would have made for popularity, and would have withdrawn from the National-Socialist movement those adherents who had only been led to it by anti-Jewish considerations. The Dollfuss Government withstood the temptation, well aware that by yielding to it it would alienate foreign countries and make an enemy of the powerful world-force of freemasons. This attitude weakened its position in the face of National-Socialism, for it renounced the attraction for the masses of which their opponents are now able to make unlimited use. The Government gave them the welcome opportunity to slander it as a tool of Judaism, an aspersion the untruthfulness of which is evident, seeing that the leading ministers are members of the Christian-Socialist Party; but the blind masses believed it all the same. It has certainly made the position of the Government worse than it was already, and the end of its difficult fight must be regarded with grave concern.

Optimists may console themselves by saying that Germany is unable to seize Austria contrary to the will of the other Powers or even of France alone. But those optimists who believe all danger for Austria to be thus removed are deceiving themselves. On the contrary, it would be better if Hitler were to take this step as he would then be face to face with the veto of the Powers as with an impenetrable wall, and make himself ridiculous in the eyes of the whole world. But he is not a stupid politician, and it is unlikely that he will do his opponents this favour and thus demolish his own prestige. He will probably be satisfied for the present to seize Austria without annexation by a gradual National-Socialist revolt. This revolt is already on foot and he only needs to see to it that it does not die down, but rather grows into an irresistible torrent. The roaring flood of brown shirts would inundate Austria, and the same brutal levelling system which to-day already drags down Germany would to-

morrow terrorise Austria. The sign of the Swastika, this arrogant symbol of pan-German Bolshevism, would defiantly triumph over a naïvely optimistic Europe that indulged the illusion that the mere vetoing of the Union could prevent Austria from being devoured by Hitlerism.

The danger does not lie in the official Union or the political annexation of Austria by Germany but in the unofficial Hitlerisation. This must be prevented in time. To object that Europe must not interfere in the internal affairs of Austria would be hypocrisy. At Saint Germain the victors claimed the right to dismember Austria and to force upon her the yoke of a whole chain of regulations which reduce her to a state of vassalage. She would be unable to defend herself at present if she should be attacked, since she is permitted only a very insufficient army and has had to hand over or destroy almost all war material. As in military, so also in economic matters, she had to submit to foreign control. It is therefore clear that the Powers consider themselves entitled to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria. In view of this attitude it would be only logical if they also exerted their guardianship in non-military or non-financial affairs, when the very existence of the country is at stake.

Even if the Powers do not regard themselves as Austria's trustees, and look upon her as a free and independent State, they are bound to protect her, as she may be too weak to defend herself from her powerful opponent. England took up arms in defence of Belgium's neutrality against German invasion. Here we have before us another German invasion into a neutral country, not a military but none the less a dangerous inundation by National-Socialist agitators who have stirred up Austria to such an extent that the country resembles at present a volcano erupting slightly every day in anticipation of a great outburst of the subterranean forces. These eruptions seriously imperil the peace of Europe and give it the right to protest against such revolutionising and to come to the timely assistance of an embarrassed Government.

Austria does not desire foreign intervention; for she hopes to deal with the National-Socialists herself, and does not want to give them the opportunity to accuse her of "betraying Germany." The question, however, is whether with all her determination she is strong enough to win this unequal fight with an enemy so far superior in numbers and means and with no

qualms of conscience. The longer the fight the greater the danger that the Austrian idea will succumb and National-Socialism triumph, not only because the latter is more powerful, but owing to its power of suggestion. The danger of the situation lies less in the possibility of the fortress being taken by storm than in the opening of a door for the besiegers.

Is Europe aware of this danger? Does it realise what it means if Vienna becomes a branch office of Hitlerism? Apparently not, for until now Europe has looked on with idly folded hands, almost with apathy. Is this the calm before the storm? We Austrians have been taught and warned by decades of sad experience that the Powers are about to commit again the madness of Saint Germain fourteen years ago. If this is so, if no one stays the greedily outstretched hand of Pan-Germanism, it is possible that Austria will go down in the unequal fight, and the Powers will come to regret their sin of omission.

DANUBIUS.

THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.

IT is not easy for anybody to form a detached view of what is going on in Germany to-day, and for those of deep-rooted liberal principles it is perhaps almost impossible. It is necessary to put on one side considerations of humanitarianism, of abstract justice, not to speak of all that is comprised under freedom or the liberty of the subject. The only way to appraise the great changes going on in Germany to-day, changes which for good or evil are profoundly modifying the public and private lives of sixty-five million Germans, is to endeavour to adopt as it were the detached attitude of the historian. The point is not whether thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of people suffer, but what the new Germany is going to be in herself and for her neighbours.

Germany is in the midst of a revolution. True, the word was at first used as an excuse thought of by the Nazis rather late in the day for their excesses. But they were right all the same. It is a revolution, not only political, but economic, social and even moral. The enthusiasm of its exponents has to be seen to be believed. They are convinced of their mission to build a new heaven and a new earth, and they are prepared to use ruthless methods in order to do so. They have much of the fanaticism of the religious enthusiasts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of the Jacobins during the French Revolution, of the Russian Bolshevists. If the German Terror has been mild in comparison with these formidable examples, it is because the German Revolution is, on the whole, meeting with very little resistance, and, indeed, gained power without firing a shot.

The religious persecutors of the past had a religion to defend, indeed to force down other peoples' throats; the Jacobins were fighting for the ideas of liberty and equality formulated during the whole preceding century; the Bolshevists had the Marxian Bible to guide them and were out to instal Communism through the dictatorship of the proletariat. These people knew precisely what they wanted. They had their Bible or their Philosophers or their Marx to refer to. The Nazis, on the other hand, have only a jumble of contradictory literature and pamphlets. Even Hitler's *My Fight* is very disjointed and by no means easy to understand. As for Feder, Rosenberg,

and the rest of them, they are apt to be incomprehensible. When caught out in contradictions, Nazis will tell you that National Socialism is a matter of feeling, not of reason. Is it because, as sceptics maintain, there is nothing whatever behind it all? Is National Socialism a hoax?

It would be unwise to assume as much. Few great movements in history have attained supreme power in so short a time. Fourteen years ago a handful of fanatics, a group among innumerable similar groups, discussed the regeneration of Germany in a Munich cellar. To-day these men, or their successors, rule sixty-five million people. The movement has developed its agitators; it has scarcely had time to produce its philosophers.

One of the best and clearest descriptions of what National Socialism is aiming at is to be found in the work of a man never associated with the party. Oswald Spengler, the author of *The Decline of the West,* produced shortly after the war a pamphlet entitled *Prussianism and Socialism.* The Nazis mention Spengler rarely, but it is astonishing how often they use the very same expressions and sentences which he wrote fourteen years ago. His thesis is, briefly, that the Prussians are the socialistic race *par excellence.* Under Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, Prussia was, in fact, a socialist State. From king to peasant, everybody had his job, did as he was told and served the State. While the English idea, arising out of the Parliamentary Revolution, was that of a society of free men, the interplay of whose actions, dictated by economic self-interest, would in the long run work out to the general benefit, the Prussian idea was that power should belong to the State and the individual should serve it. The Prussian rule of life, writes Spengler, is that " happiness is not the important thing in life. Do your duty by working." The English capitalistic rule is: " get rich; then you will not need to work." And, further, " Democracy means in England the possibility for everybody to get rich; in Prussia the possibility of attaining every existing rank, so that the individual achieves his position in the fixed hierarchy by his capabilities, and not through a tradition."

The return to discipline and to the " principle of leadership " which are, perhaps, the most striking features of the revolutionary movement, thus appears as development of an old tradition which has become an essential part of the German

character. Every observer of the Germans has remarked on their sense of order, their readiness to obey when ruled with a firm hand; indeed, their longing to be governed. The hierarchic principle is inherent in them. When it broke down at the end of the war they were like sheep without a shepherd. They have never been really happy since 1918, and this was not merely due to economic distress and Allied bullying. Their well-ordered world had toppled about their ears, and in the unstable ever-changing conditions which resulted they could not find their level. Under the Weimar Republic they split up into a large number of squabbling parties and groups. The only people who were adaptable and quick-witted enough to fit readily into the new conditions were the Jews, and this fact largely explains their post-war success and the hatred and jealousy with which they were regarded by the less successful " Aryans." It is useless to condemn the Germans for this tendency, to describe them as " unfit to enjoy liberty." They might equally well say that the English are " unfit to enjoy discipline."

The pendulum has swung to the other extreme and the Nazis seem to visualise a Germany resembling nothing so much as a vast army. Not merely, or even necessarily, an army in the purely military sense, but a political, an economic army of sixty-five million people. The " principle of leadership " means that there will be no elections (except to advisory bodies), no free discussions and majority decisions in the Nazi State. For everything that is done some person will give orders and that person will be responsible. That has been the iron rule in the party and is to become the iron rule in the nation. The responsible leader will consult with his subordinates and advisers, but will take his decision off his own bat. This is at any rate the theory. Moreover, the Nazi State will resemble a huge school—an English public school for choice—into whose scholars a definite tradition and view of life will be continually hammered. Dr. Ley, the principal organiser of the Corporate State and the Labour Front, described the Front itself as a " grandiose all-embracing system of schooling." The membership of the Front comprises employers, employees and workers, and is compulsory. There will be continual courses in National Socialism, and apparently the younger men at any rate will be expected to spend their holidays in " schooling camps " where they will be kept free of charge, will be " trained in comradeship

and discipline and will have their *Weltanschauung* (attitude to life) refreshed in stimulating hours of discussion."

In the same article Dr. Ley describes the purpose of the National Socialist Revolution to be the undoing of all the evil left behind by the French Revolution. Liberty, equality, fraternity, he writes, were the catchwords of the French Revolution "born of unreason and chaos." Out of freedom there arose slavery; out of equality came the development of classes; and out of fraternity grew the class war." This antithesis to the French Revolution and most of what it stood for gives a good idea of what National Socialism means. It is certainly the opposite of liberalism in politics and *laisser faire* in economics. Moreover, the French Revolution was built up on rationalism, and National Socialism profoundly distrusts rationalism. It is, above all, an instinctive movement of the people, which is still looking for its intellectual exponents. In the meantime it has the dislike of pure intellect to be found among, say, the typical British public-school rugger enthusiast or the American fraternity man. Miss Enid Bagnold, in a recent article in *The Times*, wrote of "superior person baiting" as being the principal sport in Germany to-day. The highbrow, the man who believes that the intellect has its own laws, who wishes for freedom of "self-expression," has no place in Germany. Professor Alfred Bäumler, a leading exponent of National Socialism and the new Professor of Political Pedagogy at the University of Berlin, declared the object of academic training in the new State to be "the substitution of the type of the soldier for the type of the educated man." The soldier, it is true, should use his brains, but for the good of the State. Let the educated man who believes that education is an end in itself beware; the purpose of education is to produce good servants of the State!

This, perhaps, explains some of the extreme horror with which the good Nazi regards pacifists, internationalists and all their works. To him such people are as dangerous as Communists. And he regards foreign pacifists with equal abhorrence. I shall never forget the tone of shocked amazement with which a friend of mine, a simple storm trooper, asked me whether I had by any chance pacifist tendencies. I hastened to reassure him by saying that, while I regarded war as thoroughly unpleasant, I was ready to fight if necessary against him or anybody else. Had I not done so our friendship would certainly

have been at an end. The Nazi believes that each man should stick up for his own people and fight if necessary. He admires the Englishman who sticks up for England, even the Frenchman who sticks up for France and the Pole who sticks up for Poland. In this he is to be distinguished from the Nationalist pure and simple who merely wants to ride roughshod over everybody else and would, therefore, like other nations to be pacifist and weak. Unlike Mussolini, he is convinced that his creed is an article of export; he wants other nations to be National Socialist and, therefore, by definition, strong. In a sense he wants to substitute racial self-expression for individual self-expression. The idea of a future world as exemplified in the writings of Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells, an internationalised unified mixture of races governed by reason, is utterly abhorrent to him. He regards world development in the manner of Oswald Spengler, as dependent on the rise and fall of races and civilisations. True, he regards the (probably mythical) nordic race as the finest, the most fruitful of all. But he is ready to concede other races their place in the world.

In his recent speech on foreign policy Hitler gave expression to this idea. When he declared the readiness of National-Socialist Germany to respect the national rights of other peoples, when he repudiated the idea of "Germanisation" of Poles or Frenchmen, he was not merely playing up to the world gallery. In *My Fight*, which was certainly not intended as propaganda for foreigners, he uses strong words on the subject. "Germanisation," he writers, "is only possible on land, never on human beings." It only leads to the absorption of the conquerors by the conquered. The race is in the blood, not in the language. This, according to Hitler, is what the pre-war "all-German" expansionists forgot. It is possible that this attitude may prove one of the most significant features of National Socialism, and one which may enable National-Socialist Germany to find at length a real *modus vivendi* with neighbouring peoples. In a subsequent speech von Papen developed the thought in his usual rather vague manner. "The idea of the individuality of peoples," he said, "will be one of the great revolutionary achievements of post-war Germany. It points the way to European co-operation and to the overcoming of a fateful splitting-up and mutual conflict of forces which endanger the position of Europe in the world. We must not stop at a nationalism which separates the peoples, but must achieve a security for racial

individuality (*Volkstümer*) which binds the peoples together. . . . Central Europe must be ordered anew without warlike experiments, for which the thinking in terms of national States provides a great stimulus."

Does all this mean anything? If so, it can only be the substitution of a sort of " racial State " for the national State on a geographical basis which succeeded the dynastic State, largely as a result of the French Revolution, during the last century. Undoubtedly the Nazis are groping towards some such conception. They admit that Europe is racially so split up that it is quite impossible to draw national boundaries without having large minorities of one people in the territory of the other. They feel that the minority protection provisions of Versailles have failed. Perhaps they visualise a solution in which all Germans by descent would belong to the German Peoples' State, all Poles to the Polish Peoples' State, all Hungarians to the Hungarian Peoples' State, and so on, wherever they are resident, a solution which would treat minorities somewhat like colonies of foreigners while giving them fair play and equal treatment by special treaties between the various Peoples' States. A dream, perhaps. The practical difficulties are obviously immense. But, after all, it is a revolution.

National Socialism is just as revolutionary in the legal and moral as in the political and economic sense. Here again there are so many streams and currents of thought, everything is so vague, that it is not easy to form a clear picture of what is intended. In law the Nazis apparently condemn the principle of abstract justice. Law, like everything else, has to be the servant of the people. I am too little of a lawyer to appreciate the full significance of this, but it certainly represents a big change in the whole German conception. I remember discussing the Hatry case with a German lawyer, who was horrified that the judge should have justified the heavy sentence with the necessity of maintaining the honour of the City of London and of making an example. Such an idea, he said, was foreign to the whole German attitude towards abstract justice. It will not be foreign in the future. The real or supposed good of the people, not the abstract degree of guilt in the individual, is already the guiding light of the courts, as the heavy sentences on people whose only crime is to have mentioned an " atrocity story " sufficiently demonstrates.

In morality, sexual and otherwise, it is the same story. A new

Spartan, " Samurai " system of ethics is to be inculcated. The criterion is the good of the people, sacrifice for the community. A large part of Berlin night life has been closed down, pornographic literature is no more, even *La Vie Parisienne,* the delight of all healthy schoolboys, has been prohibited. Back to family life is the cry. I was interested, not to say impressed, to receive a long lecture about sex morality and the virtues of family life from a young storm trooper aged about nineteen. There was to be an end of the rather nauseating promiscuity which characterised post-war Berlin and which he attributed to the evil influence of the Jews, indeed to their express desire to demoralise Aryans. Nazi Germany was to be clean; prostitution was to be done away with; and the main object was to be marriage and the production of healthy Aryan children. One of the reasons for the discipline and sports of the new State was to prevent young men and maidens thinking too much about sex, as they had before. But since they were, after all, healthy young human beings, the trial or " companionate " marriage which has been the rule in Germany for years would, of course, continue, and those couples who got on well would get married.

This view of Nazi morality was confirmed by the leader of a women's organisation of the party. This lady also explained the place of woman in the State. Back to the home! With unemployment so great it was absurd for women to keep men's jobs. She was bitter on the subject of the " Marxist " girl's inability to carry out housewifely duties. The purpose of women's education should, and would, be to fit them for the home. Domestic service was the best training. Hitler had recognised this and had largely reduced the taxes bearing on domestic employment. She was convinced that the next generation of girls would give up smoking. " German girls do not smoke." Another Nazi lady was enthusiastic on eugenics. This is, indeed, a part of the programme. Compulsory sterilisation of criminals and unfit persons is quite practical politics, if not scientific breeding on the lines of the pedigree herd. There are serious suggestions of dividing the population into health classes for breeding purposes and encouraging by special grants marriages between the best classes. I have been waiting to see which nation would have the courage to take eugenics seriously. If the Germans really do so I shall take my hat off to them.

National Socialism, with all its cruelties, its fanaticism, its

that the United Kingdom, which then, of course, included all Ireland, had only some 7,000,000 men, women, boys and girls, including salaried persons, engaged in industrial employment, the number of men so employed, counting as a man all males aged eighteen years and upwards, being only 4,250,000! This figure, moreover, included the million miners. Yet our aggregate population at that time was 44 millions. We also found that this very inadequate number of industrial producers produced so little that if all the material goods made for retail consumption were equally divided among the entire population, the entire population would remain in dire poverty. The means of comfort had not been achieved in a year of so-called boom trade.

Well, then, we may repeat: recovery to what? There had been no great war in the world for long years preceding the days of those official revelations of a pervading poverty. The gold standard was in perfect order; working like a charm. International trade was hailed as enormously successful. There was no wicked United States gathering in the world's gold and demanding the payment of gigantic war debts; indeed, so far from receiving interest the United States was a payer of interest, and the statisticians of John Bull complacently regarded oversea investments, credibly estimated at £3,000,000,000, setting up a stream of "one-way traffic" joyfully flowing towards the British shore. Thus we remind ourselves that so far from mere recovery leading us back to bliss, the deplorable social conditions that existed when the World War broke out were consistent with prolonged peace and all the commercial blessings which are spoken of to-day as though they inevitably produce wealth, prosperity and regular employment. We are really in danger of forgetting that it was in 1911 that Mr. Lloyd George wisely gave us the Unemployment Insurance Act, and that the years immediately preceding the war were marked by what, in the cant of the time, was known as "Labour Unrest."

Upon detailed analysis, the Census of Production of 1907 gave us facts which closely corresponded with the results of social observation. If the whole of the wooden furniture made in that year represented no more than about 20s. for each British family, it was the mere statistical expression of the poverty-stricken character of the average British home. If the building of that year of splendid trade and worshipful prosperity amounted to less than 19s. per head of the population, this was to express the continued existence of many square miles of filthy brickwork; of domestic quarters nearly always inconvenient and uncomfortable and often the direct cause of disease, incapacity and lingering death. If upon the examination of cotton output or woollen output we found the people too poor to buy more than a fraction of what was needed for comfort, we were but compiling the aggregates of denial, the grand totals of almost universal want.

It is necessary to say these things very plainly, for memories are short, and it amazes me to see writings which mean nothing if they do not mean that the mere restoration of what was, the mere recovery of a former economic condition, is all that we need set before us as our aim and endeavour. The fact is that the condition of the masses of our people in post-war "depression" is if anything rather better than it was in that glorious year of trade, 1907 (the date, by the way, of an almost forgotten American financial collapse), or that year of marvels, 1913, when exports were the best on record. The social legislation of 1906-14, as enlarged since the war and combined with the payment of war pensions, has somewhat mitigated the error of distribution to which I directed attention in *Riches and Poverty* in 1905. That is merely to say that the pre-war darkness is a trifle less intense; the social lamps that have been lit remind the observer of the effect of the safety-lamp that one carries in the depths of a coal-mine—they make the darkness visible.

It is well to bring up to date the facts relating to production. The preliminary reports of the Census of Production of 1930 have been lately appearing, and they show in trade after trade an output gravely inadequate, however distributed, to provide comfort for our people. The report, relating to Great Britain only, covered the whole of the industrial work of a population then numbering roundly 45 millions, save and except the output of the very small firms employing fewer than ten persons. The examination embraced industry in its widest sense, from coal to ore, from iron and steel to cotton goods, from leather to earthenware, from paper to brassware, from ships to toys, from locomotives to mousetraps, from electricity to lemonade, from bread to newspapers, from cigarettes to confectionery. Due allowance was made for the fact that industries serve each other, so that output was not counted

twice over. So computed, it is shown that in 1930 the aggregate of British industrial output was valued, at place of production prices, at £1,431,800,000. Let us bear in mind that the year 1930 was one of falling trade consequent upon the collapse in America at the end of 1929. Nevertheless in 1930 trade was much better than it is now, and the unemployed numbered nearly two millions as compared with the nearly three millions of 1933.

To make the output figure complete we may add an estimated sum of £80 millions for the small firms not included in the inquiry, and so arrive at £1,511,800,000 as the aggregate for all firms, large and small. Thus the industrial output of the 45 million people of Great Britain in 1930 amounted to less than £34 per head.

Let us see how many of the British people were actually employed in making things in 1930. The estimated aggregate for the big firms was only 6,784,100. Adding 450,000 for the very small firms excluded, we get an aggregate of 7,234,100 as the number of people engaged in production in 1930. This figure, we do well to remember, was made up of men, women, boys and girls, and included about 800,000 miners. The only other productive industries not included are agriculture and fisheries; these, as we have the misfortune to know, employ a small and diminishing fraction of our population.

Now the number of persons in Great Britain engaged in all sorts of occupations for gain is roundly 21 millions. So we get the astonishing, the accusing fact that little more than one in three of our working people are engaged in productive industries. When every allowance is made for useful services, whether in transport or education, protection or amusement, it is surely matter for very serious consideration that it should occupy two out of three workers to deal in or move the output of the one in three, or to perform other services for the community. The picture of British work is one which may be truthfully described as including far too little of useful production and far too much of useless, ill-directed or perverted service. To this it is unfortunately necessary to add that no small proportion of the material producers merely waste their time upon things that had better not be made, such as manufacturing a sign to deface a countryside, setting up the type of the fiftieth report of a crime to print which is to breed crime, constructing an ill-designed house with soft bricks and sappy

timber, making imitation furniture for the hire-purchase system, making bottles to hold useless or injurious patent medicines, or contributing to that greatest and most extensive of British trades which has so successfully established a branch in every category of endeavour—the rubbish industry.

Let us pass from the melancholy aggregates to some of the details. Furniture is a test case, for nearly the whole of the British output is consumed at home. We find that in 1930 the furniture of every sort and kind made in Great Britain, including wooden furniture, upholstery, bedding, office furniture, theatre furniture, etc., was worth £30,000,000. Relating this to the roundly 11 million homes of Great Britain we get an average of about 54s. a home, but as the aggregate includes not only furniture for private houses but the whole of the equipment made for business premises, places of amusement, etc., the figure for domestic use is much less than this. Yet here we have a trade which is pushed by a thousand special devices, including the free application of the hire-purchase system, worked with the aid of insurance offices and hosts of clerks. And unfortunately the greater part of the furniture included in the official aggregate is rubbish, dear at any price, and representing the cheated expenditure of poor people denied proper opportunity of getting any decent value for their hard-earned money.

We should not put the case too high if we stated that our 11 million homes could readily absorb, each of them, hundreds of pounds' worth of goods. If we put the call no higher than £300 per home, there would be a demand upon the furniture trade for £3,300,000,000 worth of furniture. We have before us the possibility of a gigantic furniture trade contrasted with an actual industry, the output of which is officially shown to be about £30,000,000 in twelve months.

As with furniture, so with houses. The value of the dwellings erected in 1930 is ridiculously small when related to population. The returns made by builders employing more than ten persons show that in the year about £16,000,000 of dwellings were erected with the aid of public funds, while other residential houses, shops, offices and hotels figure for roundly £56,000,000 more. As the small jobbing builders, whose work is not included in these figures, do little new constructional work, we may neglect them. We see that the aggregate new dwelling construction in 1930 cannot be precisely stated, but is

obviously very small. There is unfortunately no doubt whatever that the provision of new homes did not, in 1930, amount to more than about 20s. per head of the population, so very weak is the frontal attack upon the disgraceful conditions of British housing. Yet, as we know so well, the building of little dwellings, like the provision of rubbish furniture, is specially stimulated in our country. Inability to rent houses has forced hundreds of thousands of small home-makers to purchase houses through building societies. This active stimulation of the building trade fails to do more than produce an output trifling in relation to the national need for rehousing. As for the houses actually built by speculative builders, the rise in the price of building materials has given a new and worse interpretation of the term "jerry-building."

To pass from houses to the people who live in them, the woollen and worsted trades give us another revelation of average poverty. In 1930 every sort and kind of British wool manufacture produced goods valued at £112,000,000, of which £37,000,000 was exported. In the same period we imported foreign woollen stuff worth £14,000,000, so that the British home consumption was roundly £89,000,000. This figure duplicates certain forms and therefore exaggerates the consumption, but we may neglect that. We see that the inhabitants of a country which has special need to buy warm woollen clothing can only afford to spend less than 40s. per head a year upon the woollen trades of every sort, including carpets and curtains and blankets and upholstery and what is bought not only for domestic but for all other purposes. Here again is grave indictment of modern production as applied to the preservation of health and life. If 11 million families made each the modest call of £30 a year for woollen goods, we should get an aggregate expenditure of £330,000,000 a year.

Thus also it is if we make the test by china and earthenware. In 1930 the home consumption is shown to be roundly £6,000,000 worth, or less than 11s. per household per year. This, in relation to products of a fragile character, is astonishing. Our potteries receive from British households an average call of only 2½d. a week for every kind of china and earthenware, including both ornamental and utility goods. Thus one of the most ancient and honourable of trades is so little developed among us that it plays a quite insignificant part in our economy. It employed, including managers and clerks,

only 32,000 men and boys and 34,000 women and girls. The glass trade tells much the same story. The 1930 consumption was about 4s. 6d. for each household. Or the test may be made by books. The wholesale value of the printed books we produced in 1930 was just under £7,000,000—roundly little over 12s. a household, or about 3d. a week. This is to speak of all books. The greater part of the output is fiction, and the greater part of the fiction output consists of works which pass into oblivion within a year of their publication.

I must content myself with one further illustration; it is of national importance. Great Britain has magnificent coal resources. If the Fortunate Island is damp, it has in plentiful supply the means of combating damp. It can set its coal against the wet, and make a dwelling-house warm and comfortable in any weather. At the present time we are producing coal at the rate of about 200 million tons a year. Of this we are exporting 30 million tons, together with 13 million tons for ships' bunkers, leaving 158 million tons for home consumption. This serves a host of purposes. It is burned under boilers to produce steam. It is turned into electricity. It is converted into gas and coke and by-products which become the raw materials of many industries. It is burned on the domestic hearth and more rarely it is used to heat a domestic heating-system.

Our 11 million households, adequately warmed, whether by burning coal in grates or stoves, or by coal gas-fires, or by electric heaters using current derived from coal, or by radiators depending for their temperature upon coal-burning, and making proper provision for cooking, would demand at least two tons of coal a month per household. That would mean a call for coal for domestic purposes alone of 264 million tons of coal per annum; yet, as we have seen, the total home demand for all purposes is only 158 million tons. Thus we are revealed as a people without the wit to keep ourselves warm. Rheumatism is so prevalent that dealing with it may be described as a great national industry.

Let it be written, for it is true, that since the war we have reduced coal-mining employment from 1,200,000 men to 750,000 men, that we are paying unemployment benefit to hundreds of thousands of deteriorating and hopeless miners, even while we shiver in a climate which often boasts seven months of winter. The large-scale getting of coal in Great

Britain dates from the middle of the eighteenth century. We have been getting coal with the aid of steam power for nearly two centuries, but still we have not discovered how to liberate coal production by giving consumers the means to buy.

Science has succeeded beyond our imagining. The work of the modern physicist has become miraculous. How read the light emitted long ago from Sirius and from that light deduce the chemical composition of the star? A thing, you would say, beyond human accomplishment, but it is done! How warm a dwelling-house for the comfort of a British family? A simple thing, to be accomplished in many different ways, but it is not done; all that commerce has to offer the majority of our families for the warming of their beds is a supply of absurd hot-water bottles.

The reproach becomes greater when we remember that the great mass of ideas is no longer personal property; it is freely at our disposal. If the engineers and chemists have laboured so largely in vain, it is the fault of a society which denies the producer the power to buy. No sooner do the wheels get to work than they glut a home market which possesses no adequate means of payment. The home market proving so inadequate, commerce turns its eyes abroad and complains that export markets are contracting. There are no eyes for the home market—for the 45 million inhabitants of England, Wales and Scotland. These are by use and custom commonly relegated to an accepted position of inferiority in consumption. So freely is this position recognised and accepted that the masses themselves do not realise what is within their power. They are so accustomed to humility of consumption that they accept it as inevitable that the means to buy freely should be possessed by a very limited class.

We have indeed schooled our people in poverty and taught them their place. The lesson, which is false, has been thoroughly well learned. Until it is unlearned, the machines will be erected in vain, and the few masters of our civilisation, deluding themselves in the belief that at one and the same time they can produce without providing for consumption, will remain insecure, hoping for the "better times" and the "booms" which, when they arrive, represent trifling spurts in a race in which all the runners drag intolerable chains.

LEO CHIOZZA MONEY.

THE BELGIAN MILITARY CONVERSATIONS OF 1912.

THE recent publication of further official information on the military conversations of 1912 makes it possible at last to piece together a succession of events which must hitherto have confused the general public. Since the appearance of the last instalment of the *Documents diplomatiques français* and of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, it has become easier to understand how the French and English military authorities, after consulting with each other, endeavoured to approach the Belgian authorities, and why these consultations—at least with regard to Belgium—failed to achieve any concrete result. Before attempting to record these events, it is essential to remind the reader of certain facts which form the natural background of the 1912 conversations. The first of these facts concerns what might be called the decadence of Belgian neutrality. The success of the policy pursued by Gladstone in 1870 may be attributed to a series of favourable circumstances. Great Britain stood as an arbiter between the two belligerents; the Belgian forces were sufficient to influence the decisions of the military leaders; and none of the Great Powers concerned had then any doubt as to the attitude which the Belgian Government would adopt in case of invasion.

The position in 1912 was entirely different. Great Britain was no longer in a completely independent position. To all intents and purposes, the five guarantors of Belgian neutrality were divided into opposite camps, Germany and Austria on the side of the Triple Alliance, England, France and Russia on the side of the Triple Entente. These developments had led to an enormous increase in armaments and to the erection of powerful fortifications along the Franco-German frontier, which added to the advantages of a surprise attack through Belgium. On the other hand, the successful experience of 1870 lulled the Belgian people into a false state of security, and convinced many political leaders that the country's resources ought not to be wasted on military preparations. It was only with some difficulty that, after the crisis of 1887, Leopold II obtained the necessary credits for the fortification of the line of the Meuse, in Liége and Namur; and the military reform adopted in 1913 had not yet had any appreciable effect

a year later. The result was that, at that time, while the German and French armies were three and four times more powerful than in 1870, the Belgian army had scarcely risen from 70,000 to 120,000. Neutral Belgium was certainly not bound to take part in the race for armaments in which the rest of Europe was engaged; but the fact remains that this military inadequacy diminished her prestige, encouraged those who were inclined to disregard her neutrality, and aroused doubts as to her attitude in case this neutrality should be violated.

The second important factor to be taken into account in the study of the 1912 conversations is the policy pursued by Germany since the adoption of the Schlieffen Plan, according to which her Army was to obtain a decisive victory on the western front by a surprise attack through Belgium, so that she might then be able to throw the bulk of her forces against Russia. There seems little doubt that, in spite of the pacific intentions he may previously have entertained, Wilhelm II was converted to this project when, in January 1904, he tried to persuade King Leopold to join the Central Powers. Von Bülow's account of this visit is, on the whole, confirmed by Belgian sources* and by von der Lancken, who in his recently-published Memoirs explains the part played by Holstein as intermediary between von Schlieffen and the Kaiser. According to M. Paléologue, the new German military plan had been revealed to French headquarters by a spy as early as April 1904, and the letter written on July 30th, 1905, by Wilhelm II to his Chancellor von Bülow, and published in *Die Grosse Politik*, leaves little room for doubt as to the former's intention of ignoring Belgian neutrality: "If England declares war, Your Excellency must immediately send two notes, one to Brussels and the other to Paris, to invite the French and Belgian governments to make known their intentions within six hours. Belgium must be invaded at once after the declaration of war. . . ." In his reply the Chancellor insisted on the advisability of keeping the Belgians in ignorance of Germany's intentions.† This may explain the reassuring declarations on the subject of neutrality made by the German minister von Walwitz, in 1905, by the Kaiser himself, when

* De Ridder: *La Belgique et la Guerre.*

† This scarcely tallies with Prince von Bülow's repeated assertions, in his *Memoirs*, that he was opposed to the violation of Belgian neutrality.

he visited Brussels in 1907, and by German ministers in the Reichstag as late as 1913.

Faced with Germany's intransigent attitude in European affairs, and aware of her military preparations, the British and French army authorities began meanwhile to consider the means of countering a surprise attack on Belgium. The letters of Lord Sanderson to Major-General Grierson, and of Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, are dated January 15th, 1906 (*British Documents*, Vol. III), and the well-known interview between Colonel Barnardiston and General Ducarne, the Belgian Chief of Staff, took place in April. The latter consultations may be considered as the result of the Tangier incident, just as the 1912 conversations were the outcome of the Agadir crisis.* Colonel Barnardiston wished to obtain from the Belgian military authorities some information as to the steps they intended to take to counter a violation of Belgian neutrality, and to discuss with them the best means that British Headquarters might use to support their resistance in that eventuality. There is no essential difference between the *démarche* of the British military attaché in 1906 and that of the German minister in Brussels concerning the closing of the Meuse line in 1887. The Belgian Government's intentions were not questioned, but it was felt, in both cases, that the Belgian forces were not adequate to resist with success a surprise attack. The title of General Ducarne's report, which was found by the Germans in the Belgian archives in 1914, and published with such effect under the guise of a military "convention," accurately describes its contents: "Dispositions to be taken to further the intervention of a British army in case our neutrality should be attacked by Germany." These "conversations" did not affect Belgium's military plans, and the interviews which took place six years later show how grossly their import has been exaggerated.†

The story of these new "pourparlers," to which the Ducarne report serves as a prelude, begins in September 1911, two months after Agadir.‡ It takes a dramatic turn in February

* According to Baron Beyens (*Revue Générale*, April 1933) Colonel Barnardiston's action was prompted by the Foreign Office, informed of the Schlieffen Plan by Delcassé.

† For further information on this first stage of the "Conversations" see Captain Vandaele: *Les Conversations anglo-belges d'avant guerre* (*Revue belge des livres, documents et archives de la guerre*, January-April 1932); and Major-General Sir George Aston in *Quarterly Review*, April 1932.

‡ See particularly Mr. G. Watson's and Lieut.-Colonel Bridges' reports, and M. Davignon's declaration to Mr. Macleay (*British Documents*, VIII, 384-398).

Government was more than doubtful. Would they allow France to exert her right as guarantor of Belgian neutrality? Did not General Michel's suspicious attitude towards the Entente mask pro-German leanings? Had these reports been couched in plainer language, Belgium would have been represented as sitting on the fence ready to jump down on the side of the victor. This idea was confirmed by a discussion which took place in the Belgian Press at the time, between the Liberal *Indépendance* and the Catholic *Vingtième Siècle*, on the subject of neutrality. The former contended that no essential change had occurred in the exercise of the guarantee, since Belgium's powerful neighbours were still bound to respect her frontiers. The latter objected that the formation of the Entente Cordiale had considerably altered the position held by Great Britain, and that a contingency might occur in which Belgium could no longer rely on the British guarantee. The Catholic paper also insisted on the necessity of waiting for a definite territorial violation before addressing any appeal to the guarantors.

For M. Klobukowski and his staff the *Vingtième Siècle* was the official organ of M. de Broqueville, the Catholic Premier, and they interpreted these articles as showing conclusively that the Government were disposed to relinquish their duty and side with the invader, that is to say with Germany. Captain Genie goes so far as to hint at some mysterious Belgo-German agreement. Even after M. de Broqueville had explained in Parliament that the quality of belligerent was consonant with that of guarantor, he insists on the necessity of requesting the Belgian Government to make their intentions known and to oppose the campaign in favour of a "malevolent neutrality." Nothing short of the Belgian answer to the German ultimatum could dispel M. Klobukowski's delusions. Baron de Gaiffier, who brought him this document, on August 3rd, 1914, was greeted by the following words: "Well, so you are allowing the Germans to pass?"

Almost all these military reports and conversations were written or took place between April and December 1912, that is to say during the time when the question raised by General Joffre at the secret conference in February was being discussed by the Powers of the Entente. The answer came on November 27th, when General Wilson warned the French General Staff against any violation of Belgian neutrality. According to

Joffre, General Wilson informed him that, in the opinion of the Foreign Office,

> Belgium was hesitating as to the attitude she would take in the case of war between France and Germany, and that she seemed to incline rather to the German side. If France should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality, the army of Belgium would certainly join the Germans, and the British Government would then be called upon to defend the neutrality of that country. This would place the British Government in a very embarrassing position.

His conclusion was that the French army had no interest whatever in being the first to violate Belgian neutrality. This argument, based as it was on purely practical grounds, was evidently inspired by the British and French military conversations of the previous months. It finally disposed of all idea of a manœuvre *a priori* through Belgium.

That Sir Edward Grey had already made up his mind on the subject is shown by the minute referred to above, but the question was still being discussed in Foreign Office circles. When asked to express an opinion on the future attitude of Belgium, Sir Francis Villiers answered, on December 30th, that, if Great Britain took action before a violation had taken place and an appeal had been addressed to her, she would doubtless be considered as an enemy. He reiterated this conviction in a letter written on January 11th, 1913, to Sir Arthur Nicolson, adding that the Belgian Government showed certain leanings towards Germany. It was no doubt with a view to dispelling suspicions which might alienate Belgian sympathies, that Sir Edward Grey declared emphatically to the Belgian Minister in London, in April 1913: "We should never think of sending our troops to Belgium before the violation of your neutrality."

Belgium's right to decide what constituted a violation and when an appeal ought to be addressed to the guarantors seemed at last to have been recognised. But even in British circles some doubts persisted as to her intention of resisting the invader. Her refusal of the French "offer of help,"* on August 3rd, after the receipt of the German ultimatum, was only prompted by the wish to remain strictly within the law; but, as appears from the *Life of Lord Oxford*, it was inter-

* *British Documents*, XI, No. 551. There seems to have been no concrete offer—merely a declaration on the part of the French Minister in Brussels that help would be readily given if asked for (de Bassompierre: *Souvenirs de la nuit du 2 Août*, 1914.)

preted by some British Cabinet Ministers as a sign that she had no inclination to fight.

This strict observance of international law was considered by King Albert and his advisers to be the best safeguard of the country's independence. They did not recall before August 3rd the Belgian divisions which were protecting the northern and southern frontiers, and they waited until the news of the violation of Belgian territory had reached Brussels, on August 4th, before sending their appeal to England, France and Russia.*

The first conclusion to be drawn from a study of the 1912 conversations is that all idea of a concerted plan between the Franco-British and Belgian military authorities must be definitely discarded. Any doubt which may have been caused by the Barnardiston-Ducarne discussions of 1906 is removed by the reports of the British and French military attachés in Brussels in 1912. It is obvious that if the Minister of War had taken any steps six years earlier, General Michel could not have displayed so much indignation at the mere suggestion that British troops might land before the issue of the Belgian appeal.

In the light of the events of August 1914, the reader may be struck by the inadequacy of the information supplied to their governments in 1912 by some of the experts concerned. The great majority of the Belgian people were convinced at that time that, if war broke out between France and Germany, their neutrality would protect them as efficiently as it had done in 1870. The small minority who showed a certain anxiety were far more concerned about the attitude of Germany than about that of France or England. With regard to the latter, no doubt seems to have been expressed before the interviews of April 1912. As the unanimous agreement at the emergency meeting of August 2nd, 1914, sufficiently shows, the necessity of resisting the violation of Belgian territory from any quarter was never in question; but the faith reposed in the treaty was such that, as late as 1913, the King and his ministers had the greatest difficulty in convincing Parliament and the country that a substantial strengthening of the army had become essential. Their difficulties were increased by the fact that they could not publish the information they possessed as

* No change occurred in the plan of mobilisation devised to protect the country on all sides until an answer had been given to the German ulfimatum. See Lieutenant-General Galet : *King Albert and the Great War.*

regards Germany's intentions without offending that country and providing her with a pretext for disregarding Belgian neutrality.

The views of the French and British military experts are, however, accounted for by the very unpreparedness which the Belgian Government was striving to rectify, but which could be only too easily interpreted as an omen of non-resistance. The misunderstanding was aggravated by the Belgians' insistence on their right to make any French or British action conditional on a formal appeal. This, again, was the natural outcome of the principle of neutrality which, after being for over eighty years the country's strongest safeguard, was now hampering all the measures taken for her defence.

Now that the most important documents have become public property, the development of events in 1912-14 appears almost inevitable. Given Belgian neutrality under a divided guarantee, and Germany's deliberate intention of disregarding it, it is easy to understand why the French and British authorities acted as they did, and why the scrupulously independent attitude of the Belgian Government fostered the very suspicions they wished to prevent.

EMILE CAMMAERTS.

THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL JEW.

I WAS asked some years ago to read a paper on "The International Financial Jew." I said that I was afraid that I could not do so because I really did not know what an "International Financial Jew" was. I had never met one, nor even heard of one, excepting in novels, on the stage, and in the non-financial columns of some unimportant newspapers. From these one would gather that they were a strange class living in gorgeous houses, smoking at all times large and extremely expensive cigars with the bands on; they speak English with a German accent; they wear in summer and winter costly fur coats, and fasten their shirts both at the front and at the wrists with particularly large and brilliant diamonds. They are usually short in stature, stout, and take very full-size collars; they are much given to entertaining, and keep first-class *chefs*. They do not often go to the City, but make their millions in a mysterious manner not unconnected with the Stock Exchange and tape machines. They all have the power to ruin at will any old-fashioned respectable banker to whom they take a dislike, or to provide highly remunerative directorships for particularly unbusiness-like and incompetent members of the aristocracy. They have the *entrée* to all bank parlours both in London and on the Continent, and have limitless powers of unloading worthless shares at highly exaggerated prices on to experienced bank managers who ought to employ their deposits in quite other directions. They are, to a man, in direct telephonic communication with all Cabinet ministers and ambassadors. They generally finish their careers as legislators, either hereditary or elected.

As I have already said, I have never met these people. If they do exist, and one of them were to call at the office of any genuine international financial house, Jewish or non-Jewish, he would not get an audience. A messenger would ask his name—that would be taken in to the parlour, and a message would be sent out to him to ask if he would write on a piece of paper the nature of his business and from whom he had an introduction. As he probably would have found it difficult to get a respectable introduction, it is most likely that no more would be heard of him or his schemes. Should he, however, elect to put them in writing, the chances are a

hundred to one that they would be turned down, politely but unmistakably.

But there are, of course, Jews in this country who are international financiers, and as such, in common with the far greater number of those professing the predominant faith following the same avocations, are of incalculable value to the community. I propose to give a brief account of the part that the Jew has played in the introduction of and the development of international finance in England, by means of which this country has gradually attained and maintained the position of the financial centre of the world. Jews coming here from other countries have also brought to England many trades that formerly did not exist here, and they have thus built up staple industries that have enriched the general community and been of great value in providing employment for hundreds of thousands of artisans. Just as the Huguenot fugitives from the industrial towns of France and Flanders brought to England cloth-weaving and silk-spinning, so have Jewish immigrants been largely responsible for the introduction here of such trades as those of wholesale clothing manufacturing, machine boot-making, machine cabinet-making, etc.

It is a characteristic of the English that they have always proved themselves able, after a time, to hold their own or more than hold their own against foreign settlers in all branches of art, science and commerce introduced in the first instance by them. Take the fine arts as an example: In the eleventh and early twelfth centuries we find our English Cathedrals being built by imported French master builders. During the next three centuries we find springing up all over this country marvellous buildings designed and built by native master builders, rivalling even those of France itself, and far excelling contemporary buildings in other parts of Europe.

An enlightened English King invited Holbein to this country. Holbein was a master of many arts, but he may be said to have been pre-eminent in the painting of miniature portraits, beautiful examples of which can be seen in the Victoria and Albert Museum and elsewhere. Holbein was the first to introduce to this country the practice of painting portraits in miniature. For over two hundred years after his death we find working and flourishing in this country a succession of *English* miniature portrait painters, whose work is the admiration and wonder of the enlightened connoisseur: Hilliard,

Isaac Oliver, Samuel Cooper, Cosway, to mention but a few of very many. So in ordinary portrait painting. Our Stuart Kings invited to come and reside here such men as Rubens, Vandyck, Peter Lely, Godfrey Kneller and others, some good, some mediocre. Result: the English portrait painters, Hogarth, Gainsborough, Reynolds, Romney, Lawrence, and many more. The art of mezzotint, in which the English excelled during the eighteenth century, was brought to England by a foreigner, Prince Rupert. Lithography was brought to England by its inventor, Senefelder—a German—and now our modern English lithographers more than hold their own against all others. It is the same in commerce. I believe I am correct in saying that many of our important trades were introduced and carried on in the first instance by foreign settlers, but slowly yet surely the Englishman has taken a hand in them, and in every instance, sooner or later, he has proved that he can master them.

But, and this is of the greatest possible importance and it appears to me to be incontestable, had not the foreigner been permitted and even encouraged to come to this country with his trade and his art, we should not have developed these arts and trades of our own initiative. It is not, and it never has been in the past (whatever it may be in the future) the habit for Englishmen to go abroad to study the business and trade of foreigners on the spot, as has been done in recent years, to their own great advantage, by our keenest competitors, the Germans. So that really we have had no other means in the past of learning from foreign countries their arts, their business methods and their trades, than through our system of encouraging foreigners to come and settle here, bringing their trades with them. We have in the past taken the fullest advantage of what we have learned through the settlement of foreigners here, so that in commerce, as in art, the native Englishman holds his own in his own country.

In finance, strange as it may appear to some, although the reasons are not identical, precisely the same state of things prevails. It was mainly to the Jew that this country owed its financial knowledge and pre-eminence, but now it is the non-Jew who dominates the field. Contrast the relative positions of the Jewish and non-Jewish financial institutions in England and in countries where Jews have been oppressed and despised. As regards banks, especially our great clearing banks, their business is no more the simple so-called "English Banking"

that it was up to forty or fifty years ago, but includes in its activities foreign exchange, foreign loan issues, acceptance credits both to Governments and merchants, and all the many international ramifications that formerly were considered by them as quite outside their province. These subsidiary branches of their business are conducted with great skill and success, though they are, as I have said, of quite recent growth; not one of these banks happens to have, at the moment, a Jewish manager, and scarcely one a Jewish director. As for our Eastern Banks, who finance the trade of our Indian Empire and practically monopolise that of the Chinese Republic, these are managed exclusively by non-Jews (mostly, by the way, Scotsmen).

It is the same with British and Dominion Banks working in Australia, South Africa and Canada. So it is with those British Banks trading with South America. It is noteworthy that there, where British and Continental banks meet on neutral ground, the British ones hold the highest positions, both as regards credit and the volume of their business. Perhaps it may come as a surprise to many to learn that the foreign exchange business which forty years ago was practically monopolised in this country by Jews, is now almost entirely out of their hands—only one or two Jewish firms taking a leading position in that market.

Bill discounting is almost exclusively in non-Jewish hands. I mean, of course, the discounting of genuine high-class commercial paper, not the accommodation promissory notes dealt in at usurious rates by those who bring such discredit on the Jewish community, the modern money-lenders, some of whom, by the way, have the insolence to miscall themselves "financiers." There is no large Jewish shipowner—but that has never been a Jewish trade in England, at any rate not in modern times. Very few Jewish firms are at the present day actively engaged in the acceptance business, that is, the financing of commercial and finance operations by means of acceptance credits. Even on the Stock Exchange, where Jews held until quite recent times a preponderating position out of proportion to their numbers, we find year by year the relative positions of Jew and non-Jew have been changing, until to-day the Jewish influence is small. Indeed, non-Jewish firms, with a few important exceptions, do most of the high-class profitable business of the "house."

Gold mining, exploited and financed chiefly by Jews, is one of the very few industries in which English Jews still maintain a leading position, but this industry on anything like its present scale is of so recent a birth that it is but natural that it should remain at present largely in the hands of its originators. What does this prove? We are so much in the habit of running down our country and praising foreign countries, that it must be a surprise to us, when we think it out, that in England the Christians, who form of course the great mass of the population in every industrial country, are able successfully to compete with their Jewish fellow countrymen in those trades that used to be considered specially Jewish.

But had the Jews not come to this country, especially during the seventeenth century, it is difficult to imagine where England would have obtained its financial knowledge, or even, if it could have done so in other ways, how Englishmen could have retained their position without the incentive of local competition. For they certainly would not have gone to Holland or to Germany to study Jewish methods there. To me it appears clear that from a monetary point of view it would have paid Jews better to settle in other countries rather than in England. In several other places, as is proved by results, they have less competition from the native, who apparently shows less desire to learn from them. But how can there be any question as to the enormous benefit conferred by Jews on England, when it has been proved beyond a doubt that they have brought here the means of attaining wealth, and permitted their Christian fellow subjects to reap the benefit?

It would occupy too much time were I to attempt to show how the Jews were the first introducers of the modern system of International Trade and International Finance into this country. The fact is accepted. An extremely clear account of this will be found in Sombart's most interesting book *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*: how the Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal went to Holland, and from there to England, bringing with them large amounts of ready cash and a knowledge of how best to employ it. It would, however, be interesting to dwell on the various causes; first, why Jews in former times almost monopolised finance in this country, and secondly, how it is that now they take so small a part in it. The explanation is not so very difficult.

In the Middle Ages, as we all know, the principal business

of Jews was that of money-lending. They did not take to that occupation from preference, but almost all other remunerative occupations were closed to them. Trades were controlled by guilds into which Jews were not permitted to enter. They could not hold land, nor could they become lawyers or legislators, while on the other hand lending money at interest was prohibited to Christians. The early rulers of this country were unable to obtain any considerable direct revenue from the propertied classes, who were a turbulent lot, so they had to seek methods to obtain it indirectly, and the simplest way of doing this was not only to permit but to encourage Jews to lend money to the nobility and others, who were only too eager to borrow, giving the Jews full protection in recovering their debts and interest, and then levying large contributions on them whenever they required money for their pleasure or their wars. In fact, the position of the Jews in those early days was much like that of those persons in recent years who paid the State from 40 per cent. to 80 per cent. of their excess profits. Just as these war profiteers worked for a very much larger margin than usual, in order to compensate themselves for their increased taxation, so the early money-lenders were obliged to charge their customers abnormally high rates of interest in order to be able to retain something for themselves after they had satisfied the royal demands. (It is a regrettable fact, however, that these high rates of interest have long survived the former extortions.) Really it is most unfair and unjust to abuse these old money-lenders as one often does. They were, or rather the vast majority of them were, highly respectable and pious people—many of them philosophers, poets and doctors—a very different class altogether from the modern usurer. History shows that Jews have always availed themselves eagerly of every opportunity granted to them to enter other walks of life, but they were for so long restricted to business in ready money, that they naturally developed their money-lending to a degree that would have been impossible to any race of people whose best brains were devoted to other and more intellectual pursuits. From simple money-lending sprang commercial money-lending, then commercial acceptances, then State lending, then anonymous lending, i.e. the purchase of bonds from States and issuing them to the general public; then stock dealing and finally stock broking and bill broking. We may therefore say with truth that England is indebted to the Jews

to a greater extent than to any other class of immigrant for the whole of modern finance.

I would like to say a few words as to the decline in the relative positions of Jews and non-Jews in international finance that has taken place in this country, to some extent, even, since I have been in business, far more so since the middle of the last century. In my early business days it was generally agreed that the ablest London business men in high finance were to a great extent Jews. To-day that is certainly not the case. Shortly after the war, owing to the great advance in prices of all commodities and the greatly increased demand for foreign goods, coupled with the necessity for paying cash for most of our purchases, the foreign exchange business increased very greatly, and the London branches of the great German and Austrian banks remained closed. Consequently many firms and banks who formerly did not think it worth their while to deal in foreign exchange, became active in that direction. I have already stated that, as far as I know, not one of these firms or banks is managed by Jews—and no Jewish house since the war has established branches abroad, in the way that so many of our large joint-stock banks have done. Lloyds, Barclays, the Westminster Bank, and the National Provincial Bank are examples.

How does one account for this? There is certainly no prejudice against the Jewish business man in this country. I think in two ways. First, it never was the habit of English Jews to establish international houses. Rothschilds, who are a typical example of international financial enterprise, were started by a Frankfurter —Seligmans, who spread over Paris, London, New York, San Francisco and Frankfurt. Sterns of Paris and London came from Germany, so did the Bischoffsheims and the Speyers, both of London and New York, and very many other German firms started branch houses in New York. How is it then that there is no single instance of an English Jewish firm starting an international house? I take it that, from a Jewish point of view, Germany was and unfortunately is now a good place to leave, and England a very good place to stay in. There is no better proof of the patriotism of the British Jew, than in the fact that it is not often that the prospect of extra gain can ever entice him away from a country where he feels himself free and happy.

In my opinion another reason, and a somewhat strange one,

is this: until comparatively recently it was considered derogatory amongst Christians for a member of the upper classes, especially those with a University education, to go into business. They might go into the Church, the Army, the legal professions and the Civil Service. Consequently the best intellects in the country were employed in other directions than in business, whereas amongst the Jews practically every young man as a matter of course made business his career.

Not so long ago cultured Jews and Christians both made important discoveries: the Christians that there was nothing more honourable and very little that was more remunerative than business, and the Jews that all public careers were open to them, with this result; that in almost all branches of banking and finance the Jew to-day occupies a subordinate position, while in the Government service, in law, in medicine, and in art, the British Jew is to-day very well represented. The irony of it all is that Jews are fast losing the advantages that they formerly possessed by their financial position, but still retain the reproach that was brought about by ignorance and jealousy.

I have assumed that those who read this paper know, more or less, what international finance is, also what are the functions of an international financial firm, also that they know the meaning of foreign exchange and how it plays an all-important part in modern business. I will merely say that the chief function of an international financial business is to direct the flow of surplus money from this and other countries to where it can safely be employed either at home or abroad to the best advantage. To succeed in such a business a firm must be possessed of ample means, a high reputation for integrity and ability, and practically unlimited credit.

ERNEST L. FRANKLIN.

IN PRAISE OF THE PRESENT.

THE title of this article may seem a little strange, and certainly unusual. For when everyone is groaning over the present and unmasking its evils, to praise it may seem absurd. Whenever a writer speaks of the present—whoever he be, ancient or modern, Hebrew or Greek, Eastern or Western—he speaks ill of it. Our present of to-day, or that of a thousand, two thousand, three thousand years ago, it is all the same. The praise of any writer, ninety times out of a hundred, goes to his past—*laudator temporis acti se puero*—as Horace has it—or even to a still more distant time, the so-called early ages, or the Middle Ages, or the Renaissance, according to his point of view. And all save the born pessimists, while they speak evil of the present and, after a fashion, praise the past, turn their hopes, whatever these may be, towards the future. Yet when this future becomes the present and the present the past, the rôles are interchanged. The former is then cursed as a most evil present, and the latter receives a discreet meed of praise as a past which was not without its good side.

There are those who hold that this diverse appraisement of past, present and future is determined by the psychology of pain and pleasure; that pain is of the present and pleasure of the past, while the future holds a share of each, but takes its colour more from hope of pleasure than from fear of pain, unless this last is so imminent as to become, by virtue of imagination, almost of the present. But pleasure itself when it is imminent or present in an intense form becomes sheer spasm and pain. This explanation would seem to reveal one aspect of our psychology, but not the whole of time psychology. The past with its coloured memories appearing as good enjoyed or evil overcome; the future with its hopes appearing as good to be enjoyed, evil to be overcome, urge us to action to overcome the obstacles in the present, that is, to labour and to the effort that is pain. And all this creates in us that personal continuity which is our present totality.

What is the present? It seems an instant. It is, and it is no more. And yet it is; for that instant of a little while ago, which with the years vanishes into the gulf of the past, is the same that resolved itself into the instant of the present, and that continues to resolve itself into the successive instants of

the future. The present is all that really exists, and that is nothing else than the complex and total result of the whole of the past.

It is customary to discriminate in the past between that which survives and that which dies, and one thinks that the greater part is dead, only a fragment surviving, it may be for long, it may be only for a brief while. But it is difficult to take a true inventory of what lives and what dies, so closely is all that forms the present bound up with a long historical continuity. If we go back and back into the furthest known centuries, we find indelible traces of the reality living and throbbing to-day. Because of our manner of understanding the past of our brief personal experience, we think that a great part of the past is dead. We forget much, or think we have forgotten, because much of our past is no longer actual to our memory. And yet that past is so transformed into our present, so actual and so intimately belonging to us, that it cannot be distinguished from what we are to-day. Memory is a selective faculty; those impressions that it retains most vividly and on occasion causes to emerge from forgetfulness are those that correspond either to our present needs or to our manner of feeling at a given moment. But not all of the past that constitutes what we are to-day do we re-evoke with memory. To do so would serve no purpose. It is enough that we ourselves should be conscious of our continuity, so as to be able to reknit at any moment our manner of understanding and feeling to-day with that of the past, and though differing in thoughts, feelings and habits, find ourselves the same yesterday as to-day.

This personal identity in the continuity of life is bound up not so much with the detailed memory of the happenings of life itself, as with the continuous process in which the past resolves itself into the present. This resolution of past into present forms the basis not only of the identity of the individual, but of collective or sociological identity also. For ours is not an isolated, narrowly individual life, but an associated life, that is, a life by nature sociological. Our individual continuity is intrinsically social.

The analytical habit of our culture causes us to distinguish between the individual and society, and to make of society an entity apart, as if there could be either an individual outside society or society without individuals. Society is nothing else than concrete and historic individuality, for every concrete

individuality is necessarily relative and associated, that is, existent in a plurality of individuals.

Of this social life the reality—or the present, which is the same thing—is the complex of traditions, habits, ideas, sentiments, which have found concrete expression in such public and private institutions as the family, religion, the State, or in culture, the arts, or economic and material life itself. Consciousness of this processive and living reality is history. It has been said that a people without history is without consciousness of self, and this is true. Inasmuch as history means the effort of associated life, the struggle for the formation of a peculiar existence, the conquest and defence of peculiar autonomy, the predominance of moral forces and culture, the march of progress; hence two things in synthesis: the reality of the past in the present, and actual, present memory of the past. In substance, history is consciousness of one's own being and one's own continuity—a continuity not merely individual but collective, so that we feel ourselves parts of a whole, living elements in a life surpassing the individual, common sharers in something that grew up in a past when we were not, and that will continue even when we are no more.

And what is this projection of ourselves into past and future, beyond the boundaries of our own lives? As though a stronger will bound us to itself in a vaster rhythm, so that we feel participants in a continuity that transcends and absorbs us? We feel that the more our knowledge widens and our feelings deepen, the greater the enrichment of our being with what was not ours and has become ours. And consciousness of our own being transforms itself into consciousness of human solidarity and of spiritual communion. This forms in us a present that may repeat itself indefinitely in our spirit, in an effort towards a continuity that will have no end. If we could enclose within the present moment all our knowledge and all our feelings, as social individuals in the moral and cultural environment in which we have lived, with the spiritual solidarity of mankind that lies at the roots of our existence, with the heights of speculation we feel ourselves able to attain, we, bounded as we are, would enjoy that moment, that is that present, as though it were almost an infinite.

As a rule, one has no clear idea of the infinite. Often the infinite is confused with the indefinite, and since the ideas of infinite and temporal are united, one thinks of the infinite

as a process that has no beginning and will have no end. But this conception is erroneous in its very terms; the infinite cannot be a process, even without beginning or end, for its present would then be bounded and finite; we should have an indefinite succession of instants bounded in themselves. Now the succession of finities may be conceived as indefinite, in accordance with our mathematical habit of counting successive unities, but it will never be a true infinite. A true infinite must needs be such at every instant, that is, it must be a present without limitation or succession, an act without potentiality, the true present.

The mistake of confusing the infinite with the indefinite springs from the abstract analysis of the concept, as apart from the reality that gives the abstraction its concrete value. What really constitutes either the temporal, that is to say succession, or the eternal, that is to say the infinite? Consciousness alone. Consciousness of temporal being produces time as succession, the limited present that realises itself in an uninterrupted series of continuous and successive presents. Consciousness of infinite being produces the infinite, as unvarying coexistence always actual in a single present without limits, and hence embracing absolute totality. Were there no infinite consciousness there would be no infinite, just as were there no limited and processive consciousness there would be no time.

Each is present. But the infinite is a total and simultaneous present, *pure actuality*; while the temporal is a partial and successive present, *pure process*. If in the course of this process nothing of what went before remained in what comes after, it would no longer be a true process, for it would lack continuity. Instead, what went before resolves itself into what comes after, and the present is always enriched by the past. Hence the past may be said to exist after its fashion in the present, forming one with it in a kind of simultaneity.

Does it not sometimes happen that we are so absorbed either by a sense impression or by an idea that we no longer feel the passing of time, our whole selves being so rapt in the sensation or idea that we deem ourselves one with what we feel or think? In that state we may have a picture of eternity. A picture only, for the process is not arrested; yet we might think it arrested as far as we were concerned. For that period of time, whether brief or long, was for us a present, a single

present, a moment prolonged and intensely enjoyed as a single whole.

For a long time when the theories of determinism were predominant, the historical process was conceived as a rigid concatenation of causes and effects, in which man was nothing more than an activity constrained by blind forces and swept along by the relentless current of events. In specifying the nucleus of these determinist causes, recourse was made to abstractions. There was talk of Nature, Chance, Fortune, or Universal Will; or generic formulæ were employed such as those of historical materialism or of the iron laws of economics, and the like. The fundamental error of determinism lay in seeking the unifying force of the historical process outside the makers of history, that is outside men themselves, and in envisaging nature as a purely material force.

It is true that the word nature may apply to both physical nature and human nature. But history is not the product of physical nature. This only becomes history in so far as it conditions human activity. Man could not act were he not physically conditioned: such is his nature. No matter what these conditions be. In the Ice Age or in modern times, in Central Africa or in Imperial England, the material difficulties serve to bring out the potentialities of man. But geographic and physical conditions will reveal themselves as such when man makes them an element in his life, when he transmutes them from something purely material into a spiritual factor, an object of knowledge and action, thus creating his human environment out of the very conditions offered him by the physical world. But man's creative act—and we may call it creative, by analogy, in so far as he makes his life—is nothing other than the continuous activity of his mind and will. It is this only that gives rise to the process we call history.

History is not extraneous to man, but purely human and humanised. The non-human, when it is made human, is "historicised"; it becomes history. The discovery of electricity by the effort of human science transported that natural force into the common life of man; electricity entered the stream of history, that is, it became all that man has been able to make of it. And thus with all discoveries. By reason of this human effort, the ancient epochs have been distinguished as the Stone Age, Iron Age, and so forth.

The Supernatural itself, that is the revealing Word of God,

by contact with man becomes "historicised," in so far as man furthers the action of God and makes it his own. Christ is the Word made Man in Time, that is in history.

All human activity when considered as a past in regard to ourselves who think of it as such, takes shape in events external to us, whatever these may have been, and whether important or of small significance, scientific or moral, imaginary or real. These products of human activity, once produced, acquire a reality distinct from those who brought them into being; they in their turn help to condition subsequent human activity, and so on and so on in an uninterrupted stream. Historians often call such antecedents causes, but they are not true causes at all. There are no determinist causes of our actions outside ourselves; we are the cause of our own activity. Every physical or moral reality in existence at the moment of our action, by the mode of its existence and the mode of its apprehension by ourselves, conditions our activity, helping or hindering it. Even death, for the individual the cessation of earthly activity, is merely a conditioning factor for those that remain alive, while for the person whose life ceases it is a transformation in his mode of existence. The thought of death as bound to overtake each one of us, contributes to direct the trend of our activity. Thus death, too, is "historicised," is of history.

Man alone, therefore, with his mind and will, is the true author of the historical process. He is a self-determining force, albeit contained within the physical, moral and social conditions of his own limited existence. It is this existence and this alone, the personal existence of each one of us, that has value. It alone forms the present, in actual and processive consciousness. The present then is nothing other than consciousness itself. Without this there could be no present and no history, only the materiality of crude facts that in themselves are neither consciousness nor history.

The idea that history and philosophy represent the same knowledge from two different standpoints has yet to become common. This mode of considering them is held to belong only to the Idealists. But there is no reason why such a prejudice should persist, either among Idealists or Transcendentalists.

Our knowledge turns upon reality, whether this reality be physical or human. But to know is nothing else than to

systematise. There can be no knowledge of a fact or datum that cannot be systematised, that is that cannot be referred to definite criteria of appraisement. These criteria may be empirical, technical, scientific, artistic, ethical, metaphysical, mystical, or what you will. Only through finding place in a system does a fact or datum become knowledge. Now all systematising of knowledge is philosophy or is based on philosophy, whether the philosophy be that of common sense, or scientific, ethical, or metaphysical. And systematic knowledge or philosophy is the basic activity of man, it is his reason itself, present in all his activities. By his reason man is aware of outward reality and inward consciousness, both of which are formed out of the accumulation of a past that has realised itself in them. The connection between these two aspects of being, outward reality and inward consciousness, is so close that the more one knows of reality, that reveals itself as the persistence of the past in the present, the deeper one's own inner being, which is as it were rooted in a past living within us and yet so mysteriously remote.

History then is human thought as realised in activity. Philosophy is human activity interpreted by thought. And both represent an actual and present knowledge, for only in the present does man think and act. The past is, and is known, in so far as it is actualised and conceived in the present. Herein is summarised the whole of human life—thought and action.

And the future world? And the after life? For human thought and activity these two constitute a present. The significance of the future for a man depends on just how far he feels the effective reality of that future within himself, that is, on how far he believes, and feels his existence as projected into the future. Thus the young student thinks that one day he will have a profession, a family, a social position; the man of letters thinks of success, of fame; the believer directs his activities towards the attainment of the future life. The future therefore finds realisation in the present as effective beginning. Otherwise it would not exist for man; it exists only in so far as it is transformed into thought and activity, that is, in so far as it becomes for us a present. Only then can we achieve it. The man without faith in himself, the man who does not think, has no future, for the future is in ourselves.

The future therefore resolves itself into the finality of human activity. Without an aim in action men are not men, and in such case present and future are nothing, and nothing remains but pure animality. No human action can lack an aim; the aim is practical thought, and as such it derives from theoretical thought. The two aspects, theoretical and practical, stand roughly for past and future. The past is human knowledge in its theoretical aspect, the future is human knowledge in its practical aspect. United, they form the present, that is, the man who acts using the experience of the past to realise the ends of his action in the future. Past and future are therefore in the present; they stand for reality and process, knowledge and activity, philosophy and history.

The present with the past and future form human temporality, which we call the *historical process*. While the present, without past or future, forms eternity, which for theologians is an attribute of God, that is God Himself. The Idealist philosophers who do not conceive of God as a transcendent and infinite reality, and who feel the logical necessity for a unifying reality, have recourse to an immanent Spirit, of which we would be the phenomenal Ego, in the indefinite actualisation of the Spirit itself. A monistic conception, in which all reality resolves itself into thought present to itself and actualising itself in perennial process.

The other conception, which is our own, is on the contrary dualistic. For we hold that there are two presents, the one actualising itself in process from past to future, the other pure actuality, without process or past or future. There are two realities, the one contingent, relative, and temporal, the other infinite, absolute, and eternal. There are two forms of knowledge, one human, limited, proceeding from potentiality to actuality, the other divine, without limits, and always actual. To admit the monistic conception it would have to be possible to resolve the infinite into the finite, the eternal into the temporal, the pure actuality into the process of potential and actual, that is to say in Idealist terminology, to resolve the Spirit into the phenomenal Ego. To admit the dualistic conception it would on the other hand be necessary to resolve the finite into the infinite, the temporal into the eternal, the process into pure actuality.

The Idealist solution denies the Absolute. All that would subsist in reality would be the contingent forms, that is the

phenomenal Ego, the only one that is conscious thought, and therefore the Spirit would be dissolved into an indefinite number of particular, limited and transient consciousnesses. The Dualist resolution which admits two distinct realities does not deny the contingent, which is the conscious experience of our personal reality, but resolves it into the Absolute, in as much as without the Absolute its reality could neither exist nor be conceived.

Idealism, by uniting the contingent and the Absolute, the phenomenal Ego and the Spirit, in an immanent form, reduces everything to the sheer self-knowledge of the subject without object, thus creating a process of inward dialectics within necessary limitations that destroys all Absolute. Transcendentalism on the contrary, by distinguishing the contingent from the Absolute, objectivates knowledge, leaving the bounded and processive knowledge of man distinct from the infinite and actual knowledge of God, but at the same time it does not sever the former from the latter, which affords it the source of truth and the principle of reality. As a result, Idealism conceives no other present than our indefinitely processive present, while Transcendentalism conceives of two, the indefinitely processive and the purely actual, and it makes the second dependent on the first.

Our processive present may be represented by the three Christian virtues, Faith, Hope and Charity. Faith which is knowledge represents the past that flows into the present. Hope is the present itself, flowing into the future. And the present is Charity, love of God and of one's neighbour, in action and passion.

There is another present that is not charity, the present of egotism, but this implicitly denies the reality of God and one's neighbour, that is it denies faith and denies hope, the past and the future, and reduces all to a transitory present limited to a single ego, impoverished and stripped of all relationship divine and human. Hence the development in the world of the strife and struggle between egotism and charity, between the resolution of the ego into itself and the resolution of the ego into Divinity and Humanity.

And this struggle contains the synthesis of the historical process.

LUIGI STURZO.

MADAME DE GENLIS' TRAVELLERS' COMPANION.

RECORDS of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century travel are fascinating reading. The tourists' aims and outlook are sufficiently like our own to provoke our understanding sympathy, and sufficiently different to offer a piquant interest and suggest complacent comparisons in favour of our own times. Too often, however, we are satiated with descriptions of scenery, pictures and architecture which reflect the prevailing mode of criticism rather than the writer's own sentiments, and we are baulked of our desire for information concerning itineraries, expenses, meals and accommodation, and all those minor happenings which make up the sum of travel experience.

It is because our curiosity as to these commonplace details is satisfied by Madame de Genlis' little *Manuel du Voyageur* that it is worth while to shake the dust of years from its covers. It must have been its authoress' best seller; for though it was boomed by her reputation in fairer literary fields, it is certain that for one Briton or German who studied her serious educational works, or waded through her didactic romances, ten made her phrase-book their *vade mecum* when they started forth upon their "grand tours." No one was more fitted to put words into their mouths and instruct them in every contingency than was Felicité du Crest St. Aubin, married in her sixteenth year to Colonel Brulart de Genlis, afterwards Marquis de Sillery. Untoward circumstances made her a traveller, and nature made her a pedagogue. As a young girl in Burgundy she was wont to assemble the village children to give them instruction; and undoubtedly she was happier as "Governor" to the children of the Duc de Chartres than she had been as his mistress. Society expended many witticisms on the appointment and on the lady's manly title; but Felicité, as directress of a small co-education patrician school in a pavilion in the grounds of Bellechasse, showed a pedagogic ardour and originality never evinced by previous male educators of royalty. She worked her pupils unmercifully, and her outlook and methods were those of the crammer and the Berlitz instructor rather than of the scholar and psychologist. But she was in advance of her time in her notions of personal hygiene and the importance of fresh air and physical exercise,

and she gave her scholars a training which fitted them extraordinarily well for their life as *emigrés*.

She herself was compelled to move from country to country with all the difficulties of the impecunious. She even went as far as Russia, though she does not include Russian in her polyglot phrase book. We note, however, that when she makes her Traveller engage a servant she insists on his inquiring: "Do you understand Danish, Swedish and Low German?" She sojourned long on the shores of the Baltic, and her little *Manuel* was originally published in Berlin, with only French and German Dialogues. Subsequent editions gave them in "the six principal European Languages." In 1819 an Italian named Cignani, resident in England, prepared the book for British readers, giving an English, a French, and an Italian column, and re-christening it *The Travellers' Pocket Companion*. It was published and sold by Samuel Leigh in the Strand, at the price of six shillings and sixpence. What profits its needy authoress reaped from this edition I have been unable to discover.

A vocabulary seems an unlikely vehicle for the revelation of personality. But that of Madame de Genlis does not merely peep from between her phrases, it impregnates the entire book like a powerful clinging perfume. We can picture the ex-governess making sea-captains, coachmen, post-masters toe the line and putting the fear of God into negligent inn-servants. She is always the pedagogue as well as the *cicerone*, and both "bosses" and instructs her Traveller. She gives him the benefit of her own experience, spurs him to her own efficiency, and puts words of command into his mouth, which we doubt whether he ever used with quite her own imperious accent.

Automobilism, bringing back many features of pre-railroad travel, has restored the practical value of many of the Dialogues. Madame de Genlis engages a coachman as the modern motorist, if he is wise, will engage a chauffeur, who knows the road and its most convenient halting-places: one, too, who has a smattering of several languages, and is "conversant with the coinages of the countries through which we shall pass." But even a competent man needs occasional warnings and reprimands, and we should be able to command: "Drive more slowly. Do not go so near the precipice. Stop and see whether our trunks are secure. Light the lamps immediately. Make haste, for I dislike being on the roads at night, especially when there is no moon."

The modern motorist might also benefit by Madame de Genlis' lessons in courtesy, humanity and resourcefulness in emergency. She addresses the peasant from whom she inquires the way as "*mon ami*"; she assures him he will be well paid for any help he renders. She picks up an infirm wayfarer and sees that he does not fall asleep on his seat beside the driver; and she devotes an entire dialogue to the correct way of "giving alms upon the road." She carries with her "everything that is necessary in case of accidents," and when a casualty occurs she brings out her "little case" and administers first aid with cool efficiency.

Again her dialogue on "Conversation in a Public Conveyance" would be as serviceable to-day in one of the fine French P.L.M. char-à-bancs as it was in the springless diligences of the early nineteenth century. We no longer ejaculate: "There is a hill, we must get out and walk to ease the horses," but we need to declare even more emphatically than of yore: "The dust is terribly annoying"; and we still require to bandy firm but courteous phrases as to the opening and closing of windows and the disposition of small baggage. Tariff complications may give ever fresh point to the dialogue "On Speaking to Customs Officers," and surely it would be well to commit to memory, and in as many languages as possible, the impressive sentence: "I know everything that comes under the description of contraband, and I never carry any contraband or dutiable article with me, as I am of the opinion that we ought always to conform to the laws of the countries in which we travel."

The most interesting portions of the *Manuel* are, however, those of the least practical utility—the dialogues dealing with travel-conditions which have long since passed away and are never likely to return. We who are habituated to brief and regular Channel services, who take "Sunshine Cruises" and regard the crossing of the "Herring Pond" as a rest-cure accompanied by hyper-nutrition, find it difficult to recover the outlook of the Traveller of a century ago when he nerved himself for several hours' discomfort in passing to Calais or Dunkirk, or embarked on an eight or nine weeks' voyage to the United States. Madame de Genlis' dialogues "On Sailing on the Water" and "Conversations on Board Ship" certainly help us to realise both his qualms and his preparations. For a long voyage he is recommended to lay in prunes and lemons, vermicelli, barley, preserves, refreshing syrups, beer, wine,

beef jelly—" which can be procured of excellent quality in Hamburg and Berlin "—and even " a few live fowls." Without these private stores he will subsist exclusively on " salt meat, potatoes and cheese."

Even for a Channel crossing he should make inquiries as to " the capacity of the Captain of the packet and the number of the crew," and when seasick he should take " fifteen to twenty drops of ether on a small lump of sugar, or Hoffmann's drops, which are a sovereign remedy against *mal-de-mer*." Was it quite prudent of Felicité de Genlis in respect to the safety of the ship to suggest that her Traveller might like " a cup of tea "? For this implies: " We must have boiling water " and " Let us light a fire." Even the burning of juniper berries seems risky; but Madame de Genlis declares emphatically that " the perfume will relieve the nausea caused by the smell of tar."

" On Arriving at an Inn " Madame de Genlis is at her best, and her Traveller at his worst. In the private houses of her day the absence of many luxuries which we have come to deem necessities was masked by a greater abundance of good service than can now be obtained save at a great price; but few modern motorists (however much they may deplore the dull uniformity of Americanised Grand Hotels) would care to put up at the roadside inns where the hardy travellers of the early nineteenth century were forced to alight. In the principal Swiss and German towns, and in those of Italy into which British colonies and a steady concourse of foreign tourists had introduced new notions of cleanliness and comfort, very tolerable accommodation might be obtained. Elsewhere hardships were expected, and were patiently endured. Cramped and stiff with cold, after long hours spent in draughty springless diligences or post-chaises, the Traveller entered an unwarmed house. A fire was his prime need, and three columns of Dialogue XIII are devoted to his attempts to obtain it. After all has been said and done, it smokes unbearably, windows have to be opened, and: " You see," he exclaims, " we shall either be frozen or suffocated in this room; you must give us another."

We doubt whether many of Madame de Genlis' *Voyageurs* had the physical and moral energy to follow her directions for securing a modicum of comfort. She declines a room on the ground floor because " it is too damp," and one giving on to the front because " it is too noisy "; and doubtless, though

no motor-horn pierced the air, no auto-bus shook the house to its foundations, the spasmodic rattle of wagons and chaises over the cobbled streets was sufficiently distressing to sensitive nerves and made " a quiet room looking on the garden " very desirable. She declares she " cannot sleep without shutters," nor tolerate the tramping of servants over her head; and that she must have a bed with posts, not one with curtains fastened to a ring in the ceiling. Having at last found a chamber to her taste, she discovers that it has " an unpleasant smell "; and forthwith she commands that it shall be swept out and scented with vinegar, adding that " this precaution should always be taken on entering an inn room."

She requires a mattress instead of a feather-bed, and inspects the sheets to assure herself that they are neither damp nor have been already used. " I have my own sheets with me," she explains, " but I always take those of the inn to lay over the mattress. Then I spread my own sheets above them." Her bed must be aired with a warming-pan, and for disinfecting purposes some coarse sugar must be mingled with the charcoal. A stone bottle filled with boiling water, or a hot brick, must then be placed between the sheets. She must be supplied with a candle and snuffers; and since she had, of course, no matches, she must needs have a rush-light, placed for safety " in a basin containing a little water." She next inquires: " What the watchman is saying " and " What hour did the clock strike? " And then, with a command that she should be wakened at daybreak, and that a fire should " *previously* be lighted in the stove," she says, " Good-night." How thankful the chambermaid must have been to close the door upon her!

If adult Travellers had in the expressive Venetian phrase (which does not, however, figure in the Italian column of the *Manuel*) " much to combat " (molto da combatter) in order to spend a night in comfort, *a fortiori* had they to display firmness and ingenuity " On Arrival at an Inn with a Family." Madame de Genlis' dialogue on this subject was surely inspired by recollections of the days when she went to England and journeyed in Switzerland and Belgium with the Princess d'Orléans (sister of Louis Philippe) and Pamela, believed to be her own child, who afterwards married Edward Fitzgerald. Surely, too, she was obsessed by memories of her royal kindergarten, for her imaginary *Mater familias* is made to cater for an immense brood. " There are not beds enough for the

children," is her first phrase; "you must make up some on mattresses." These are placed on chairs, which she prudently insists should be bound together by firmly knotted cords, lest they slip apart. Two cots are needed, but Mine Host can only produce some little beds—we still meet with them in old French farmhouses—"in the form of a chest of drawers or press." They will serve; but there is still one tiny infant to provide for. A servant must be sent into the town to borrow a wooden cradle. When it arrives, it must be examined carefully lest it contain bugs; and then it must be taken into the yard and washed out and dried. The chambermaid is invited to help undress the children and then "to rock the infant," not at that period deprived by faddists of this aid to slumber.

Before the older children sleep they must be given some supper. They require "good new milk" or, failing this, some water gruel, with "vegetables and stale white bread." Madame de Genlis, we know, derived from Rousseau rigid ideas as to simplicity of diet for the young. Louis Philippe and his playmates were allowed but little meat and no sweets. Their Governor, however, never expected them to "be good" if their restless little minds and fingers were unemployed. So her *Mater familias* commands a toy-merchant to wait on her, and to bring among other playthings a doll, a drum, a cart, a hobby-horse, and a miniature set of tin household utensils.

Tourists who leave the over-beaten highways may still light upon inns without a bathroom, or may discover one minus hot water in some strange and inconvenient situation. In such places he will appreciate the energy and resolution with which Madame de Genlis, personified in her *Voyageur*, obtained the means of ablution. The servants must fill a pail with warm water and put bran or salt in it, as "I wish to wash my feet," and she demands a pitcher of hot water and a clean towel before starting off again at daybreak.

When Madame de Genlis' *Voyageur* falls sick in his inn and calls for a doctor, he speedily inquires: "Do you think that baths would be beneficial?" Whereupon the physician prescribes a course of nine, thirteen or twenty-one baths, the time of immersion being from half to three-quarters of an hour.

"But what shall I do for a bathing tub?" queries the patient.

The doctor replies that "it will be difficult to procure one even if you pay high for it."

The landlord then has a bright idea: a cooper could be ordered to make one, and would furnish it within twenty-four hours.

The doctor reappears in another dialogue, where he is called in for a sick child. His query: "Has the young lady been inoculated?" reminds us how greatly the contagion of small-pox was dreaded, and how often it was contracted in the inns of the period. The mother is able to reply: "No; for she has had the natural small-pox." Whereupon the doctor, possibly with some alarm, inquires: "How long ago?" Incomprehensible to us is his anxiety when informed that a child has had chilblains which have suddenly been cured. "So much the worse," he says, "That is dangerous." Do these phrases reveal a contemporary medical theory, or a private crotchet of the authoress?

Dialogues dealing with Restaurants and *Ordinaires* indicate that the early nineteenth-century traveller was better fed than he was lodged. It is noticeable that the list of soups in the English column is abbreviated, the authoress having doubtless found by experience that the various milk, vegetable and farinaceous soups enumerated in the French and Italian lists were not obtainable in our island; while the direction: "Put some fresh butter in the greens," may well have been inspired by a recollection of the yellow, tasteless beans, cabbages and sprouts served to her on our side of the Channel. The luxury of her "petit déjeuner" is surely also of English origin. Her Traveller demands soft-boiled eggs, milk rolls, brown bread, and toast and butter; and he is given a choice of coffee, chocolate and tea.

Felicité had been accustomed to rent houses and settle down for months in foreign towns, and she helps her Traveller to do likewise. She acquires both urban and country properties for him, and furnishes his dwellings from cellar to attic. She also presides over the "Taking of a Furnished Apartment," and the dialogue devoted to this subject is the only one giving us an indication of current prices. The *Voyageur* is shown two bedrooms, a sitting-room and a kitchen in the best quarter of the town. He is pleased to hear that the bedrooms give on to a quiet garden, "for I do not like to sleep in the front on account of the noise," a phrase of perennial and increasing usefulness. He examines the water closet and the beds, declaring that "a good bed is the main point." There is a

little haggling over the price; but the landlord finally accepts three guineas a month, the sum being stated, even in the French and Italian columns, *in English coinage*. He then inquires whether he can be boarded; and he is told that *pension* is given at the rate of thirty pounds a year (trenta lire sterline, trente pièces). We surmise that the *pension* does not include wine, nor the rent heating; for "a part of the wine cellar and a place for keeping my coals and wood" are demanded and accorded. Living at the rate of £69 16s. a year the Traveller could "certainly afford to lay in some good wine and an ample supply of fuel."

We cannot but regret that when the authoress takes her Traveller shopping she should make no mention of the prices he pays, or ought to pay, for a ring, a chain, an "English silver thimble," or "a snuffbox of tortoise-shell" at a jeweller's; for "boots in the English fashion," or for "shoes in morocco, coutil, drugget, skin, or taffeta" at a shoemaker's; for "English lead-pencils"—"others are good for nothing"; or for "English water-colours in dry cakes" at an artists' colourman's; for ribands, blonds, taffetas, satins, cloth and linings at a linen-draper's.

More serious, lengthy and masculine in tone are the dialogues with an armourer, a coachbuilder and a horse-dealer. The latter apparently is also a saddler, providing French and English saddles, and postilion's equipment. From him the Traveller purchases "strong boots for riding post; for without them, riding full speed with French post-horses, one runs the risk every moment of breaking one's legs." The armourer caters for the perils of the road. The early nineteenth-century Traveller must be prepared in certain localities for attacks from bandits: and accordingly he buys pocket revolvers and saddle-bag pistols, and he expresses a preference for "pistols with a double trigger, as less liable to accidents."

Madame de Genlis does not forget that her Traveller must be amused. She provides a card-party for him, sees that he talks intelligently in an artist's studio, and conducts him to a concert and a play. Whether his question: "Is it a tragedy, a comedy or a comic opera?" is asked before, during or after the performance, is left doubtful. She does not leave him without instructing him to write to "A Banker to whom he has been recommended," and to "A Member of the Government to ask for an Audience." She teaches him how to accept

or decline an invitation, how to request or give an introduction; and how to mingle firmness with politeness when demanding the repayment of a debt. One cannot but admire the neat ending of this last model letter: "the bearer of this note will present you with my receipt."

The comprehensive little *Manuel* has two appendices: a list and translation of Italian musical terms, and tables of European currencies. The second must have been extraordinarily useful to the Traveller of the period, and is not without interest for his successors. We learn, for instance, that the pre-revolution Louis d'or was still current and that its value equalled the pound sterling, whereas the Napoleon and the new Louis were worth only twenty francs, or sixteen and eightpence. For the Italian peninsula five tables are necessary, corresponding with its five main political divisions. (Venice, under the heel of Austria, is, of course, excluded.) Even within these divisions there are local currencies. And among the throng of actual *denari, pichili, pauls, piastres, tarins, pistoles, carlins, chequeris* and *florins* are phantom coins, used only as bases of calculation; an imaginary *lira* worth 8½d., a *scudo* equalling 4s. 3d., a pezzo di Ex. exchanging for 4s. 2d.

The Travellers for whom Madame de Genlis catered must have puzzled wearily over these closely printed tables as they descended the southern slopes of the Mont Cenis, the Brenner, or the Simplon passes. What nerve it must have taken to cross a frontier, what arithmetical agility to calculate expenses; what a capacity for taking pains to balance accounts! For those among them of British nationality there was, however, always the consoling certainty that one of the golden sovereigns with which their pockets were lined would exchange for large handfuls of multifarious coins, and would anywhere and everywhere secure them respectful consideration. And not one among them foresaw that miracle of modern history, the Unification of Italy; or dreamed of a day when his descendants might pass through the long length of the Peninsula using a single, new, simple and extremely beautiful coinage. Still less could his imagination have shown a time when the British traveller would produce from his wallet, not golden pieces, but paper pounds of uncertain and decreasing value.

L. M. RAGG.

AMERICAN NATIONALISM: A STUDY.

CONDITIONS were admittedly bad in the Kentucky coal-fields, as most Americans and many Europeans know. Yet when the American Civil Liberties Union announced its intention to dispatch a committee of investigation to the "front," they were met by an open letter from the local attorney of Kentucky's Bell County. Said the letter:

> You are a Godless, self-appointed, nondescript, iconoclastic minority of grandiloquent egotists who arrogate to yourselves the right to meddle . . . to effect your devilish, uncivil, and un-American designs.
>
> As American patriots, we are glad that you have chosen our soil as the battle-ground. We will welcome the opportunity to tear off your whitewash and let the American people, the President, the Congress now in session, and all the reading public understand for once the black, alien, treasonous purposes behind the American Civil Liberties Union and all its allied affiliations.

The Kentucky attorney was an old-fashioned 100 per cent. American. So was Big Bill Thompson of Chicago. Whether Big Bill was sturdily or blatantly so is another matter, depending upon the citizen's point of view. For some years the voters of Lake Michigan must have considered him a traditional heart-of-oak; but on the last mayoralty election there was evidently a change of sentiment, as shown by the triumph of his rival, the late Anton Cermak. Believers in the blatancy of Big Bill had won out.

The real rival of this American mayor—or so he more than hinted—was George V of England. The baleful influence of an insidious foreign potentate was said to have filtered into the City by the Lake; and Big Bill, with the stern eye of Washington upon him, undertook to stamp it out. Text-books which under-stressed the American glories and British horrors of 1776 should be ejected from the public schools, nor must Chicago be reduced to the status of a British Dominion through visiting lecturers and World War sentimentality! To Mayor Thompson, perhaps a demagogue, certainly an old-fashioned patriot, all "George Rexes" (regardless of their eras) were much the same. Big Bill, because of his position and its consequent publicity, achieved an immense notoriety; but he was merely the spokesman for a well-formulated school of American opinion. Other view-points receive a subtler presentation; view-points which are more acceptable to business, to finance, and to fashionable society. They, too, use propaganda of a less brazen type. But the partisans of Americanism *à la* Thompson, with their concentration on home interests and affairs, have played an important part in American history.

In most European countries there are two well-defined trends in political thought: the national and the international. The former is aggressively patriotic and sets great store by tariffs, armies, and navies; the latter is pacific and relies upon the League of Nations or (in the case of Communists) upon the Third International of Moscow. In America, however, exists a weaker international school; and mutually antagonistic sets of nationalists have possessed themselves of rival orientations. These American view-points we shall call for convenience the Historic and the Anglo-Saxon idealogies. The Historic view of American patriotism and particularism, as held by Big Bill Thompson, dates from the Revolution and its sequential war of 1812. It is based upon the principle of isolation, and upon George Washington's famous advice relative to "entangling alliances." From this standpoint all foreign nations are unworthy of much trust; but Great Britain especially is a natural rival to be viewed with constant suspicion and a jaundiced eye. There is some foundation for this. Following two wars with the "Step-Mother Country" came the Oregon controversy of the 'forties; the English attitude toward our Civil War; the Venezulan dispute under President Cleveland; the British blockade during the early stages of the World War; and countless minor disputes.

The Historic view was one embraced by the democratic masses of America, who have traditionally sniffed at English aristocracy, its monocles, and its "maddening" Oxford accent. This feeling has been fostered by certain newspapers, by other powerful organs of opinion, and by Irish organisations everywhere. Its protagonists, probably without realising it, are sturdy Jeffersonians—heirs to the solid citizens who backed the French Jacobins against anything English in 1793. Commercial rivalry, with the odds in England's favour, played a part. Trade, in the final analysis, affects the common people; and the early supremacy of British manufactures, combined with the ascendancy of the British merchant marine, produced an unfavourable early effect upon American opinion. All over the world, Americans at one time found that the energetic English were just ahead of them!

The Anglo-Saxon view of American nationalism has a totally different origin. It is comparatively recent, being based subconsciously on the philosophical race-consciousness which arose during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its slogan has been Anglo-American solidarity *contra mundum*. During the nineteenth century, Germans came to realise that they were Germans and Italians that they were Italians. There followed the unification movements in Germany and Italy, which culminated by 1870. Acute race-consciousness spread everywhere, and the Pan-Slavic, Pan-German, Pan-Turanian, and similar movements gained strength and adherents. A conscious sense of Anglo-Saxon solidarity was the logical sequel to the other "Pan" movements; and active-minded people on both sides of the Atlantic began discovering all sorts of close and binding ties. Often the most determined advocates of this Anglo-Saxon cult were Americans of anything but Anglo-Saxon ancestry. For as such citizens rose higher and higher in business or the professions, they found themselves increasingly dependent on Anglo-Saxon culture, laws, and rules of trade. With increasing wealth came the lure of English country life and customs; and this factor, combined with practical economic principles, turned hybrids into anglophiles with a surprising rapidity.

There was another reason for the new Anglo-Saxon friendship. During the Spanish war in 1898, the Continental Powers of Europe had been almost unanimously anti-American—as the cartoons of the period amply illustrate. American trips to Cuba and the Philippines were not regarded as idealistic, nor yet as humanitarian. But England—perhaps anticipating her coming Boer campaign—was decidedly friendly to America; and a British admiral at Manila tendered tacit support to Dewey against a German flotilla which acted in menacing style. America was surprised and delighted by this unwonted kindliness. Anglo-Saxon solidarity has been largely the property of the American upper classes. Conservative business interests in the United States, with their English bases and affiliations, have been supported in this by Society. The socially registered have long admired the manners, the pronunciation, the slang, the ideals of the British upper class; and the legend of "blood is thicker than water" appeals to them strongly. London tailors, Rhodes scholarships, and New England "Saint" schools have been fashionable. There is the accolade of the English Court, and fox-hunting, and the glamour of landed

estates. As to the Revolutionary War, Anglo-Saxons have labelled the American colonists as liberty-loving Englishmen fighting for their traditional rights against a tyrannical *German* sovereign and his *Hessian* hirelings. This interpretation was in particular favour during the Anglo-Saxon reunion of 1914-18. It was supported by certain university professors, by enthusiasts over English Constitutional history, and by the consciously Anglo-Saxon elements.

The World War of 1914 brought the two American nationalisms into conflict. The Historic school was inclined to be anti-British, anti-Russian, anti-Japanese. They felt (many of them) a mildly philosophical sympathy for invaded France—which, after all, had helped America against England in the Revolution. Lafayette was a happy memory. But the Historic-minded favoured neutrality and isolation. To their support rallied the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans; the former anti-English, the latter naturally pro-*Reich*. Tales of Baron von Steuben, drill-master-extraordinary of the Revolution, were matched against the Lafayette legend; and it was even discovered that the Hessian and Brunswicker mercenaries of 1776 were led by French officers. As to the Irish, the backbone of the Revolution was said to have been Irish—Washington's famous Pennsylvania Line from the western frontiers!

The Anglo-Saxon social register, however, was unanimously pro-English and many of its members favoured immediate intervention on the Allied side. Wall Street had loaned vast sums to Great Britain and France, the munitions works were doing a thriving business, and the newly-discovered race solidarity suddenly became centuries old. Anglo-Saxon patriotism became definitely identified with Old England; and any anti-Britisher became a "hyphenate" of one kind or another. Controversies over the English blockade and the seizures of American mail brought the two schools into altercation. The Anglo-Saxons contended that England was fighting for her life, and that such actions must be overlooked for the common good. The Historic-minded adopted a psychology which had led to the war of 1812, and protested vociferously. Then came German reprisals in the form of unrestricted U-boat warfare; and the Anglo-Saxons were up in arms while the Historicals preached watchful waiting, diplomatic notes, and Wilsonian negotiations. The Historicals were strong enough to help elect Wilson in 1916, on the strength of the motto: "He kept us out of war."

But the *Lusitania* incident and the ruthless resumption of submarine activity were too much for even the anti-English masses. After all, the Germans took American lives while the English were confining themselves to property. America entered Armageddon.

Both American nationalisms united for the prosecution of hostilities, only international-minded pacifists (who were neither Historicals nor Anglo-Saxons) opposing the progress of events. The Anglo-Saxons, however, were inclined towards an unstinted assistance to the Allied cause in all of its aims and phases; while the Historicals favoured a more limited participation. Pacifists and idealists, like Eugene Debs, weak numerically and in influence, were unable to effect any successful sabotage.

The peace conference at Paris, with its Treaty of Versailles, pleased neither school very much. It seemed, quite unwittingly, to reawaken the issues. Anglo-Saxons were inclined to the belief that the terms were too lenient; while the Historicals felt that it was perhaps too punitive an enactment. Representatives of the two elements, from these radically different motives, became anti-Wilsonian; and together they helped to block treaty ratification in the United States Senate. For America there was to be no League of Nations—as the presidential elections of 1920 and 1924 clearly showed. To the Historical school a stay-at-home policy was the panacea; while to the Anglo-Saxons a whole-hearted co-operation with the British Empire was the only foreign connection necessary for American welfare.

An interesting social expression of the Historical school was the famous Ku-Klux-Klan, founded near Atlanta in 1915. It stood for 100 per cent. Americanism, and for white supremacy within the confines of the United States. It borrowed many of the features of the old "Know Nothing" Movement (1844-56), of the original reconstruction-period Ku-Klux, and of the American Protective Association (1887-97); besides bearing a rather striking analogy to the Hitler organisation in Germany. Anti-coloured, anti-Jewish, anti-Japanese, and anti-Catholic, it has opposed foreign and non-Nordic influences everywhere; distrusting the alleged machinations of international Jewish finance and the Pope at Rome, while it stressed racial purity and historical American patriotism. The South and the Middle West, strongholds of the Historicals, have been the Klan's particular localities; and the English and Scotch-Irish pioneer

stock its mainstay. Klan cohorts helped to defeat the candidacy of Al Smith in the Democratic Convention of 1924 (since he was a "tool of Rome"); and during the World War their activities were felt in Liberty Bond campaigns, the hounding of slackers, and spy-hunting. Such leaders as William Joseph Simmons, E. Y. Clarke, and Dr. Hiram Wesley Evans, while preaching the doctrine of Nordic supremacy, have upheld the traditional American nationalism. The wider entanglements of Anglo-Saxon solidarity were apparently beyond their ken. They represented Nordic Americanism, not Anglo-Saxondom. Klan methods, frequently based upon force rather than peaceful propaganda, have brought the Invisible Empire into disrepute however, and since 1928 its influence seems to have decreased. Klan membership, at its peak, is believed to have totalled over 7,000,000 paying members.

The cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon solidarity in its latest manifestation is the English-Speaking Union of the United States, incorporated in 1920. Its purpose is "to draw together in the bond of comradeship the English-speaking people of the world"; and it co-operates with its sister society of London, the English-Speaking Union of the British Empire. John W. Davis, Democratic candidate for President in 1924, has headed the American branch; and such prominent social and business figures as Paul Cravath, Otto Kahn, George Wickersham, and Ivy Lee are among its officers and directors. Cultural rather than political relationship is stressed between the branches; and friendly introductions are furnished to visiting members. Travelling scholarships and the interchange of teachers are arranged for; and there are newspaper fellowships in memory of Walter Hines Page. The American membership, which is a class rather than a mass affair, has grown from 2,500 to 19,000 in the last ten years. Besides its national headquarters in New York, there are forty chapters scattered throughout the United States. Stress is placed, wisely enough, upon linguistic rather than racial affinities.

American sentiment since the war has been slowly changing. The Historical school, with its Big Bills and July Fourth orations, has become a trifle *passé* even in fundamentalist strongholds. Francophile sentiment—long the property of the Historicals—has been diminishing for a variety of reasons not unconnected with debts, reparations, and questions of armament; while the England of to-day, with its democratic leaders

and modest aims, is becoming better liked—or at least better trusted. Anglo-Saxons, on the other hand, find that the labour socialism of post-war England is less romantic than the imperial glories of the pre-war era. The "dole" does not appeal to the leaders of American business, nor to the smart and well-to-do—the bulwarks of the Anglo-Saxon conception. As England becomes less feudal, it loses its attraction for American romantics. If John Bull finds himself losing world markets in India, China, or the Dominions, he forfeits the admiration of many hard-headed American industrialists and men of trade.

Perhaps a studied indifference to both orientations is America's way out. The World War tended to discredit the racial and linguistic movements that had helped to bring it about. Social and economic rather than race problems are now in the forefront. Pan-Germanism was halted at Versailles in 1919; and Lenin checked the Pan-Slavic urge a year earlier. Nationalists are generally conservative, and on this Soviet question the two American schools have finally found themselves in unified agreement. Meanwhile, League of Nations sentiment is growing by friendly co-operation with Geneva, as evinced in the Far Eastern crisis.

ROGER SHAW.

AN EXPEDITION INTO UNKNOWN ASIA.

THE scientific results of an expedition naturally fall into two groups. There is firstly the identification of the actual specimens, botanical, zoological and so on, brought back, a work which may take anything from one to several years to complete, according to the amount of material obtained and the number of experts who can devote time to it. Secondly, there are the deductions to be drawn from the facts discovered, both in the field and in the museum; that is to say, deductions as to the geological and geographical history of the region explored, and to its place in the larger region of which it forms a part, as revealed by the rocks, or by the distribution of plants and animals, the number of endemics, and other data. While, therefore, no final conclusions can be arrived at before the material has been digested—if, indeed, there be any such thing as finality—it is obvious that the explorer will have reached certain general conclusions long before the identification of his specimens is completed; the more so if he set out with some definite idea in his mind. Much is expected of the explorer in these days. If he omits anything, he is bound to fall foul of some expert. He must be able to make a map of the country, collect plants and animals of all kinds, including insects and rock specimens; he must understand the principles of geology, especially ice action, and be something of a meteorologist. Nothing is forgiven him. On the other hand, if he succeeds his reward is great. Nor, in the main biological categories—flowering plants, mammals, birds, insects, and so on—is it easy nowadays to discover new species; and though the writer deprecates the common notion that the number of new species discovered is a measure of the results achieved, yet new species clearly do advance knowledge, in so far as they help to fill up gaps in the long line of descent. Even if they fail in this respect, they may yet teach something. Certainly if the naturalist-explorer is no novice, he will start off with a good working knowledge of the country to be explored, its structure, flora, and fauna; and as a result of further work, he is more likely to widen his knowledge, or perhaps modify his previous conclusions in the light of new evidence, than to formulate new and revolutionary hypotheses. Even exploration has become largely a matter of routine work, though the hazards are different from those encountered in more populous countries.

Lord Cranbrook and the writer have recently returned from thirteen months spent on the Upper Irrawaddy, in far Northern Burma; and although the extensive collections made have as yet been barely unpacked and sorted, it is possible to give now some general account of the country, and even of the results obtained. Leaving Myitkyina, the northern terminus of the Burma railways, we travelled with mule transport to Fort Hertz; thenceforward coolies carried the baggage. From Fort Hertz we went north-eastwards over the mountains to the Nam Tamai, following that river northwards, ten days' journey, to the Tibetan settlement of Lama Ne—literally the last village in Burma. Here, at an altitude of 6,000 feet, we established our base camp; and the bulk of our collections were made in this, the Adung valley, where we spent altogether ten months.

Lama Ne consists of three Tibetan log huts, standing amidst cultivation on the river bank, and half a dozen even poorer Daru huts scattered for half a mile up the valley on the steep wooded slopes. Though we were still twenty-five miles from the source of the Adung river—a hard five days' marching—there is no further cultivation. The climate is very wet, and ten days' fine weather, even in the winter, is exceptional. Snow falls as low as 5,000 feet in February, but does not lie long in the valley. The coldness of the valley in the early months of the year is due to the surrounding mountains, which rise to 15,000 feet immediately overlooking the village. In May the temperature begins to rise rapidly. At 6,000 feet the valley is thickly forested, mainly with evergreen trees. Not till April, when the mountains were richly flecked with the varied tints of spring foliage, did one realise quite how many deciduous trees there really are mixed in with the evergreen species. Every tree seemed to be limned with foliage of a different colour, from acid yellow to smouldering red, though there was a predominance of shrill greens. We had, in fact, already left the typical Burmese hill jungle behind and reached the lower temperate rain forest belt.

Amongst the more conspicuous trees were the blue Himalayan pine (*Pinus excelsa*), *Quercus serrata* and other oaks, a fine willow, birch, poplar, several species of holly and maple, a magnificent cherry with rich carmine flowers, various lauraceae, araliaceae, and, of course, rhododendrons in great variety. These last formed the main floral wealth of the valley between 6,000 and 12,000 feet. By far the most magnificent

was a tree bearing in February great spherical trusses of rosy purple bell-shaped flowers, each two inches across. One such tree, upwards of sixty feet high, and certainly more than a century old, bore five or six hundred trusses, a truly gorgeous spectacle. As *Manglietia dottsopa*, fledged with ivory-white flowers, was in full bloom at the same time, a faint idea may be gained of the appearance of the forest so early in the year. Amongst a host of interesting plants found here may be mentioned a stachyurus, hitherto known only from Central China and Japan, a holly-leafed barberry, allied to the Himalayan *B. insignis*, and also to the new "silver barberry" (*B. hypokerina*), a big-leafed vaccinium with clusters of glaucous fruit-like small bunches of grapes, and an evergreen viburnum bearing small steel-blue berries with an almost lalique gloss. At this altitude many of the rhododendrons are true epiphytes, amongst the commonest being *R. Taggianum*, with marble-white flowers, the curious little box-leafed *R. insculptum*, whose flowers, though small, are a real crocus orange, a new species allied to *R. Boothii*, with bright yellow flowers, and the immense trumpets of the ever-to-be-remembered *R. Nuttallii*.

Throughout the early spring birds were arriving from below in ever-increasing numbers and variety, attracted particularly by the rhododendron blossoms, which they visited freely. Much of the pollination of these flowers is effected by birds. One common babbler was sometimes smeared over the head with so large and bright a coat of pollen that twice I mistook it for another species. On the wooded crags, 2,000 feet above the river, there were gooral, but it needed dogs to drive them out from cover. The Tibetan headman had three yellow hunting-dogs—smooth-coated, prick-eared curs, rather larger than a fox-terrier—and these proved invaluable. The only other large animals we heard of in this part of the valley were serow, which kept to the forest zone, some 2,000 feet above the river, and barking deer. While we were here, the headman shot us a serow, and his dogs chased a barking deer into the river, where it was drowned. Cranbrook himself shot a gooral while out with the headman, and it proved to be a new sub-species. The small panda and a flying squirrel occurred also above an 8,000 feet altitude.

In May we moved some dozen miles up the valley, following a difficult track through the forested gorge. Our next camp was made at 8,000 feet, in a grove of huge conifers, *Pinus excelsa, Picea Morinda*, and *Tsuga Brunoruaria*. Many of these

trees measured from fifteen to eighteen feet in girth five feet from the ground, and were upwards of 180 feet high, unbranched for a hundred feet. Again rhododendrons were a feature of the forest, often forming 75 per cent. of the woody undergrowth. As they were now in full bloom they made marvellous seas of colour, surging up the cliffs. At this altitude most of the species—there were a dozen abundant ones —grow socially, in countless tens of thousands. As the ascent continues the trees grow in ever-increasing numbers till they form an almost impenetrable tanglewood. But gradually the species become fewer. Above 12,000 feet and the tree line, they break out into many more species again, but now they are of the Alpine type. Vast sweeps of mountain are carpeted with a many-coloured fabric of dwarf rhododendron, growing heather-high but ranging in colour from deep Tyrian purple, through shades of rose to daffodil-yellow, carmine and blood-red.

Early in June we moved up the valley again, finally camping in a meadow—evidently a silted-up lake-bed—at 12,000 feet. As fast as the snow melted, the steep slopes became jewelled with flowers, most of which grew in such lavish numbers that they formed sheets of colour spread over the bare gravel scree—frail fairy primulas, pink nomocharis, golden buttons of celandine, anemones, and chubby willows, in early summer, followed by bouncing blue poppies and starry saxifrages, red nomocharis and gaudy louseworts. In the autumn an unexpected revival takes place, even while the berries are ripening on the bushes and the leaves are wilting and blushing on the trees. Suddenly meadow and scree break out into a posy of flowers, under the stimulus of the October sunshine. Incredibly blue larkspurs dazzle the eyes, the beautiful *Cyananthus lobatus*, with periwinkle-blue trumpets, *Aster fuscescens*—best of the wild asters —allium, raining amethyst flower-drops in a perpetual trembling shower sustained on wires, the crude crimson of a dwarf epilobrim, and last, but not least, the vivid heavenly bodies of *Gentiana gilvostriata*, starring the brazen scree. It is a sight to gladden the heart, but, alas, it does not last long. Without warning comes the snow, and the whole flower world is blotted out for six months.

To any naturalist brought up on such works as Hooker's *Himalayan Journals* and Wallace's *Malay Archipelago* (why are not such absorbing travel books written nowadays?) south-eastern Asia, that is the whole broad peninsula from Assam to

Annam, lying between India and China, presents a singularly fascinating study. We know a great deal more about this region to-day than we did in the time of the Victorian naturalists, and certainly we have far larger collections of specimens on which to vent our ingenuity; nevertheless it is in the inferences to be drawn from the facts that we lag conspicuously behind our forebears. To the writer it seems that too much attention has been paid to the description and classification—the mere scaffolding of the naturalist's work—and not enough to the distribution of the species in space and time. We are very much in the position of detectives, to whom the relative positions of objects associated with an investigation may, in the absence of eye-witnesses, if properly noted, furnish an important clue in the reconstruction of what actually happened. For what the naturalist persistently seeks to reconstruct is a true and consecutive history of life on this planet; that is to say, the story of evolution, the fact of which is now universally accepted, whatever disagreement there may be as to means. All else is surely of secondary importance—intensely interesting, no doubt, but important only in so far as it illuminates the story.

In any attempt to explain the present distribution of plants and animals over south-eastern Asia (including the Malay Archipelago), interest must concentrate on that region where the Himalayan ranges impinge most closely upon the Chinese ranges; that is to say, roughly, where China, Tibet, Burma and Assam meet. This is without doubt the key position. It is here that the two biggest mountain systems in the world meet; it is here that the greatest unbroken expanses of jungle occur; it is here that the largest number of species, the most swift and violent contrasts, from forest to meadow, from meadow to alp, from alp to eternal snow, are found; and it is here and here only that five great rivers, whose sources are far apart, and whose mouths are hundreds, nay thousands, of miles apart, for a brief space approach each other so closely that there would be room for all of them, together with their dividing mountain walls, between London and Penzance; yet the mouth of the westernmost—the Brahmaputra—is as far from the mouth of the easternmost—the Yangtze—as London is from Cairo. Indeed, and this is even more remarkable, three of the five rivers could squeeze through between London and Brighton, and this for a distance exceeding a hundred miles—a feature unique on the earth's surface.

The reason why this region must be regarded as the key position in south-eastern Asia is simple. If we look at a physical map of Asia, we see that Burma and Assam together form a sort of wedge, driven in between the eastern end of the Himalaya and the mountains of western China in a north-easterly direction; the apex of this wedge is formed by a mountain range from the east flank of which rises the Irrawaddy. The mountains here form the link not only between east and west, between China and the Himalaya, but also between north and south, between Tibet and the Malay Peninsula, and so on to the East Indian islands. It is at first sight perhaps surprising to find the east and west *liaison*, across the great river gorges and their containing mountains, much more efficient than the north and south connection, parallel to them; the more so because the original flora was clearly driven southwards on a broad front by advancing glaciers, which subsequently retreated. The fact is, mountain systems and river systems in this part of Asia bear little relation to one another. But this lofty mountain wedge is something more than a link between east and west, or north and south; it has also acted as a barrier separating three well-marked floral regions, namely the East Asiatic region embracing most of China and Japan, the Indo-Malayan region to the south, and the Central Asian region to the north. Its flora, without belonging predominantly to any of these regions, shows relationship to them all; and taking into account the high degree of specialisation evinced by the flora, and the proportion of endemics, it might itself be regarded as forming a distinct mountain floral region, for which the obvious name is Sino-Himalaya.

It is a fair assumption that, if we can explain what has happened here during Tertiary time, we shall have gone far towards explaining many difficult problems of distribution; if we can even decipher the sequence of events since the last advance of the ice, say, 50,000 years ago, we shall be able to explain much that has happened in south-eastern Asia.

There is good evidence for the view that the whole of this top end of Burma was formerly a plateau, and presumably part of the Tibetan plateau. The remarkable uniformity in the heights of the mountains points to this. For ages the plateau was protected by an ice sheet, and great glaciers were formed. Their average altitude was in the neighbourhood of 14,000 feet, as shown by the highest visible ice-shelf. Then the ice began

to retreat, and in the shallow saucer-like valleys the surcharged water cut deep v-shaped grooves. The glaciers advanced and retreated, and at one time descended to 5,000, possibly to 4,000, feet. Very few glacier remnants remain to-day, and they are retreating; a few snow beds mark the graves of former glaciers. Moraines were distinct enough in the higher valleys. Not until the year's snow had all gone in September was it possible to distinguish a mere snow bed in a sunless ravine from a dying glacier; but that the whole region had been intensely glaciated was obvious enough. We discovered that the Adung river rose in a true glacier immediately west of the pass.

The survey, which beyond the actual course of the river is by no means accurate, has not been carried over the watershed, the territory on the other side being acknowledged as Tibetan. Nevertheless, the Tibetans annually come over into the Adung valley to dig up the bulbs of a species of Fritillaria, much esteemed in China as a general tonic, and to obtain the skins of wild animals from the Darus. In 1931 the first visitors from Tibet crossed the Namni pass (15,290 feet) on May 21st: hence the snowfall on this range is probably less than it is farther south, where passes 2,000 feet lower are not normally open before the middle of June. Across the pass, the climate is distinctly more Tibetan.

In September we went over the Namni pass and down to a large level meadow where hundreds of yak, sheep, and goats grazed. From this point a good pack-road descended the valley —a sure sign that we were in Tibet. After crossing two large streams from the north we reached the first village, at an altitude of 11,000 feet, called Jite, where we spent a fortnight. The road continues eastward, diverging slightly from the river, and after crossing two or three ranges reaches Ridong, on another southward-flowing stream. This country at the extreme source of the Irrawaddy, beyond the Burma frontier, is unexplored. All these southward-flowing streams join together to make the Taron; and there is good reason now to think that the branch which rises near the Namni pass is the largest, and that when we crossed that pass, finding on this side no less than four glaciers, we were actually at the source of the Taron, and hence of the Irrawaddy.

F. KINGDON-WARD.

COACHING WAYS.

NOWADAYS the horsed coach is an anachronism, an expensive whim suitable only for millionaires. Even in remote districts you will inquire far for a waggonette and pair of trotting horses. The great fairs among the northern mountains, at which stock for the coaching stables was purchased, are dead and forgotten. In the wildest corners of Scotland where roads are narrow, hilly and awkward, the trotting pony is unknown; it is held that a motor car can go on any thoroughfare passable by wheels.

Forty years back the Lake District coach services employed hundreds of horses and men every summer. At the end of each season there was a drafting of surplus horseflesh and workers. Several of the younger drivers I knew well went each autumn to towns and cities, chiefly in Lancashire and Yorkshire, where extra street cars were needed in winter. In those days the streets were used by walkers in summer time. Such men and horses came back—if they came back at all—about the middle of June. I admit that the horses were fully worked all the year, but it had little ill effect on them. They knew how to keep their feet on greasy stone setts, and to dodge the crossing tram-lines in the streets just as they knew how to humour a heavy vehicle down a twisting and steep lane. They loved the day of their return to the fells. I have seen some rare capering when the horses were loosed from the travelling-boxes at Windermere station, and all the staff and loungers were hard put to it to keep a mare or gelding from bolting across the yard and on to the line.

The return of these horses was quite an occasion in the village calendar. Such friends as the saddler, whip-maker, coach-builder, harness-maker might be expected. In the background were the masters and journeymen workers, talking quietly together and forgetting social rank; the lads took share in the capers of horse holding and heel dodging. The hotel folks were well represented in the company. The horses were fresh and excited; the railway journey meant nothing to them. Even young Jim, who had the softest of hands and the toughest of wrists, used to declare that the first day of driving along the Keswick road was a caution. The horses were in such high spirits at seeing green pastures, listening to clear water, that they would forget all harness and fain hop off the road and on

again. He would never use a whip unless some scamp took the bit and determined to be obstinate. Play—well, play he didn't mind, for he, too, had spent some months in the fog and smoke of Lancashire.

In my early years the dales depended on horses for every traffic, for all supplies. The railways came no nearer than a dozen miles, and boat piers were about as convenient. I don't forget the sounds of those old days. There was the rattle of hooves in the grey dawn or the brisk starlight when the mails came down the ice-covered road past Rydal; there was a merry jingle as in summer the morning or afternoon coach found its way to Langdale or Hawkshead. There was a quieter, more careful rattle on a foggy morning when the leaders could not be seen, and the road to Lowood was packed with grey-white. "Drive them, man, they know the road for themselves," said old Tommie; "I might just as well drop the reins at once for I can see nowt. They know where the water is and the walls, and I've never scraped a coach side yet by depending on my horses in the dark."

As the last coach of the season came through the village, the yard of tin was produced, and everybody came out to wave and to cheer. There was the parting glass at every inn, and any coachee who cared was filled with liquor on the drive. I have seen the blacksmith and his lads leave the wheel they were hooping, the anvil at which they were striking blows to shape out a horseshoe, to watch old Jack pass. The school bairns took truant at the sound, knowing that their error would meet with little correction. And down through the glowing autumn tints by the lake, through the gap in the rocks, the last coach plunged and rattled.

Some of the elders remained at home in the dales, rather ill at ease in their honorary stable-yard jobs. How they rejoiced when, in December, somebody called for even a trap, so that they could drive out along the road. One old chap confessed to me that he would even drive an old lady's brougham rather than go a week without touching the reins at all. He had a sad tongue, but as he had no teeth his objurgations did not matter much on the road, whatever they might have done in a confined space like a village street. Autumn marked a great change for these old lads. One day they were knights of the road, the next mere hangers-on at the public-house, doing a job here and there, but mostly longing, waiting for the next

season to open. There was old Wullie, who broke away regularly every Christmas, and spent a few days as guest at the tram stables at Salford or wherever his team of horses had been drafted. He always came back, somewhat sore at the mishandling his favourites were getting, and vocal about their sorrows. "Them horses looked me in the eyes as though they was humans, and asking me to take them home. I nearly did it, however; but the foreman says, 'Bill, you can't feed them until June; let me have 'em a bit longer,' and so he pays my fare home again. Not that I wanted his brass." Old Wullie always had a whip-thong fastened to his button-hole, and was thus marked as ready for service.

There was old Ike of Keswick, who could be found walking along the miles of road which he had to drive in summer time. He was never tired of looking at its steep bits and awkward corners, but he was bad of his feet, and as age crept on his journey was reduced to ten, then seven, five and finally a mile up the Chestnut hill track, and just a bit more, lad, so that he could look along the waving country towards Thirlmere. Ike had a wonderful, perhaps a little savoury, idea to save men from taking colds. He would steep a bit of string in paraffin, and wear it round his neck. In summer he alleged that no rain could pass that barrier, no matter what the weather, and if he had to go into the storm it was to be a warm-line round and protecting his throat. He was rather puzzled that he could not convert either coach folk or his friends to try out the idea for themselves, and offered me a prepared thong for the purpose. I did not try it.

Ike had other remedies: he would anoint his face with bacon fat on a cold day to prevent it freezing and peeling. "The skin should be supple, lad, and kept supple; the frost can't touch it then." I don't say that Ike's nose was not red and shining at all times, but it was wonderful after that. And with Christmas gone he would be in and out of his two-roomed cottage, looking for bits of whip-lashes, splicing them together, going over the harness for the least trace of dirt or wear, and he was never still after the thrushes and starlings began to sing. They formed his winter choir, and he loved them well. "Them stormcocks mark the middle of winter to me; they yell 'It's coming' from the tree tops, and sure enough spring is on the way. And after them come the starlings, chittering and whistling like humans; they smell the end of winter. And

after that come the swallows—it's the swallows as counts, let me tell you. It's them as bring back the horses to the roads."

During the driving season the old coachees handled a lot of money. The clerk might book the places and settle with some passengers, but scores of people were given short lifts, and they paid the coachman. There was no ticket system; you were seen on and off the coach by the responsible person. Except for the mail-coach we never aspired to a guard or assistant driver in the dales. With the small firms the coachman was his own accountant throughout; he paid out small things like hay and corn used in the day's travel. Weird were the methods of reckoning. On the whole they were fair, for masters and men went on to the half-century of joint service without change or trouble, and the coachmen never bankrupted their employers. Indeed, they often prevented them from making bad bargains. You can hear a lot from the box-seat which passengers wished to believe was private information and secret between themselves. Here's the story of an old coachee making up his accounts. After the day's work he went into a loose box furnished with a bench and table, and piled the coins from every pocket, and then sorted them into pairs, one of which went into his pocket, and the other into his hat. "That's for Jim (the boss); and that's for me," and at the end he tumbled the coins out of the big old hat on to the boss's kitchen table, pocketing the rest to meet disbursements and tips. I don't think that old coachee could read, write or figure at all, but he had the method of convenient accountancy. There would be trouble, dire and swift, if coachee or any other fellow had to try the game to-day.

Yet fortunes were made on the coach road. Most of them were kept and invested either in hotels or in land. Competition was keen, but the business was not overcrowded, and there was always a happy smile when stables were overhauled, harness was examined, and coach painting finished off in the spring. After Easter the paint shops were always active, and sometimes so busy that a mixing pot on the open fire was forgotten, and a burst of flame and a roar came through the doorway. Ginger, Taylor's coach-painter, was supposed to lose his eyebrows alternate years with accidents of this sort. "It don't matter, but the boss hates a mucky mess, and that's what it will be."

Among the coachees of my acquaintance was one who might have been the subject of Leigh Hunt's wonderful sketch, just

toning down a few adjectives, and making the proviso that our coachiee was not a man of many coats. So we read :

> His face is red, and his voice rough, by the same process of drink and catarrh. He has a silver watch with a steel chain, and plenty of loose silver in his pocket, mixed with half-pence. He serves the houses he goes by for a clock. He takes a glass at every alehouse; for thirst, when it is dry, and for warmth when it is wet. . . . He tells you that his off-hand horse is as pretty a goer as ever there was, but that Kitty—" Yeah, now there, Kitty, can't you be still?—Kitty's a devil, sir, for all you wouldn't think it." He knows that all the boys on the road admire him, and gives the horses an indifferent lash with the whip as they go by. If you wish to know what rain and dust can do, you should look at his old hat. There is an indescribably placid and paternal look in the position of his corduroy knees and old top-boots on the footboard, with their pointed toes and never cleaned soles. His beau-ideal of appearance is a frock-coat, with mother-o'-pearl buttons, a striped yellow waistcoat, and a flower in his mouth.

In the outer world, the coach services came to an end when the railways came; there was in the Lake District one nook of English ground secure from rash assault for which Wordsworth pleaded successfully, and here the coaches remained working every summer until the motor car came into prominence.

There was a good deal of beauty on the old coach road. I contend there is nothing in the motor-travel of to-day which compares with the sight and sound of a team trotting along the old road, with the coach swaying and rumbling at their heels, with the swingletrees dancing, with harness polished, traces bright as leather can be. The sounds, too, were glorious, and they cling —yes, they cling—the clamour of the horn, the rumble of wheels, the rattle of hooves, and then the creaking of harness as the coach draws near, the pleasant red face and uplifted finger of coachee as he passes an old or young acquaintance, and the elaborate bow and leer he has for the pretty lasses at the corner cottage. " I wadn't like to be their lads," he says many a time; " they're too bonnie to be comfortable." Yet they married well and happily, and I have seen them joking with the old man, after the last coach had rolled over Dunmail Raise.

W. T. PALMER.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE CLIMAX OF DIPLOMATIC FINANCE.

ON June 14th, 1933, the British Government announced its virtual default on the debt that had been incurred to the United States during the war. The announcement was made in the House of Commons by Mr. Neville Chamberlain at 10 p.m. on the eve of the day when the half-yearly payment became due. It had been delayed to so late an hour because the British Government had hoped that Mr. Roosevelt would help them to solve the difficult problem that faced them.

Six months earlier the British Government had paid the instalment then due in full because the new American administration had not yet taken office, and the United States Congress had taken no step towards completing the work of the Lausanne Conference. The payment made on December 15th, 1932, was described as a capital payment, and was subjected to the specific proviso that it was not to be regarded as a resumption of the annual payments, but as an exceptional and abnormal measure designed to bridge the interval before the debt settlement with the United States could be negotiated. At the same time the United States was urged to see that such a settlement be reached before June 15th " in order to obviate the risk of a general breakdown of existing inter-governmental agreements." (British Note of December 11th, 1932.) The months passed, and no progress was made towards a settlement, although Mr. MacDonald went to see Mr. Roosevelt in Washington (April 21st-25th) for the purpose. Not only was no progress made towards a settlement, but on June 9th the United States Government laconically notified Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador in Washington, that " 75,950,000 dollars interest is due and payable on June 15th, 1933, on account of your Government to the United States pursuant to the debt agreement of June 19th, 1923." (Document No. 1, British White Paper, Cmd. 4353, published on June 15th, 1933.) On June 13th Sir John Simon answered that the payment of the June instalment " could not be made at this juncture without gravely imperilling the success of the conference [the Economic Conference], and involving widespread political consequences of the most serious character." He therefore informed the United States Government that " in the meantime, in order to make it perfectly clear that they do not regard the suspension of the June payment

as in any way prejudicing the ultimate settlement, His Majesty's Government propose to make an immediate payment of 10 million dollars as an acknowledgment of the debt pending a final settlement," and urged the United States Government to name the time and place for negotiating a settlement (*Loc. cit.* No. 2). The answer of the United States Government, dated June 14th, was an entirely non-committal acknowledgment of the British Note and a reminder that the President could not alter the schedule of payments. "Such power rests with Congress." The Note contained a suggestion that negotiations about the debt should take place in Washington "as soon as convenient" (*Loc. cit.* No. 3). Concurrently, however, Mr. Roosevelt issued a domestic statement in Washington in which he gave it as his "personal" view that Great Britain had not defaulted. "In a spirit of co-operation I have, as executive, noted the representations of the British Government with respect to the payment of June 15th instalment, inasmuch as the payment made is accompanied by a clear acknowledgment of the debt itself. In view of those representations and of the payment, I have no personal hesitation in saying that I do not characterise the resultant situation as a default. Beyond this the law and the Constitution do not permit me to go" (*Loc. cit.* No. 4). The British "token" payment of 10,000,000 dollars was duly made on June 15th. It was made in silver, which the United States Government consented to accept at 50 cents. to the fine ounce. The silver had been acquired by the British Government from the Government of India and cost £1,600,000.

Finland alone paid the debt in full. Italy, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Latvia followed the British example and made a "token" payment of 10 per cent. France, Belgium, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Jugoslavia frankly defaulted.

Apart, therefore, from the remaining fiction of the "token payment"—a somewhat pleasant device for evading the form, while committing the reality, of default—the British Government took its place with the other war debtors and repudiated its obligation. It would not be easy to calculate precisely how much money was borrowed by governments from governments and wasted in the Great War. The total probably approximated to the equivalent of £4,000,000,000. The encouraging aspect of what has since happened is that, if experience ever can teach a lesson, there is no security in a foreign political

debt. No lesson could be more salutary. There could be no better safeguard against future war than the complete bankruptcy of governmental foreign credit throughout the world. In the later years of the Great War the British Government squandered £7,000,000 a day. No government has any business to do anything of the kind, because no government can afford to do it. The British Government borrowed some £1,000,000,000 from the United States Government. If the United States Government had refused to lend that money, it could not have been added to the sum of waste. In private life most men cannot spend more money than they possess, because they cannot get credit except against security, and the security must normally be greater than the loan. That is the safeguard against unsound personal finance. The few persons who do contrive to obtain credit on false security are soon trapped in their own mesh, are exposed as bankrupt, and thereafter find it difficult to repeat the fraud. Governments, by contrast, are not subject to any super-national sanction. The German Government in 1919 signed a certain obligation for war reparation to other governments. The obligation was never honoured. It is no defence to argue that the obligation was signed under force, or that it was absurdly impossible to pay it. The German delegates in Paris could have refused to sign. They obviously ought to have refused, and taken the consequences. The French, Italian and other governments borrowed large sums from the British Government, and, with the exception of certain small Powers, never even attempted to repay the debt. The British Government has attempted to repay the United States, has indeed regularly met the service of the debt during the first ten years since it was funded; but, caught at last between the repudiated foreign liability to herself and her own continuing liability to her creditor, that government in its turn cannot now pay. The answer is that the British Government in 1917 ought never to have incurred a liability which it could not meet unless its own political debtors honoured their debts. It was an easy guess that those political debtors would not honour their debts.

The dilemma is that whereas the whole system of war political debt has broken down, and the British Government has been smothered under the débris, the United States Congress sees no reason why it should not continue to be paid by as many debtors as will continue to pay, and cares nothing for the circumstantial facts. The argument which differentiates inter-

national debts from debts incurred between parties of the same country has so far made no impression on the United States Congress. If one said to the average member of that Congress: "Foreign debts must be paid in goods or services, just as they are originally incurred in goods or services; and inasmuch as the American debts to Europe took the form of goods, America must either be repaid in goods or not at all," he would probably answer: "If I go to my tailor for a suit of clothes, he rightly expects to be paid in cash, not in kind." He would, in short, refuse to recognise the difference between an obligation which can be satisfied by the debtor in the same currency as that which is used by the creditor, and an obligation which cuts across an exchange. Such ignorance is no worse than the ignorance shown by the British Government in 1917, when, having exhausted its own resources, it borrowed from the United States in order to go on lending to other nations. What would one say of a man who, having no money of his own, and wanting to lend money to a friend, not for a constructive, but for a destructive, purpose, borrowed the necessary sum from a third party, passed it on to his friend and endorsed the liability himself? Such a man would be regarded, rightly, as a danger to society. The conception itself is so extravagant that in practice it would not be possible. Before the man could borrow from the third party, that party would want to know the purpose for which the loan was to be used, and if he were satisfied that the purpose was good and likely to yield a profit, would next ask for a lien on tangible assets against the loan. The American Government, by contrast, lent nearly £1,000,000,000 to the British Government without security, and knowing that the recipient would pass on the money to the European battlefield to be "blown to pieces" (as the British Note to the United States of December 1st, 1932, innocently put it). The United States Government, therefore, must accept a measure of blame for having made so imprudent an "investment."

On the other hand it stands to the honour of the United States that she did less damage to the world during the Great War than any other belligerent Great Power, because she did not begin her share of the damage till the war was nearly over. There is even something to be said for the almost immovable obduracy of the United States Congress, which traditionally rejects all suggestions that the United States should collaborate

with other nations. Such obduracy makes it difficult for the United States to commit the grosser blunders such as the British Government is wont to commit in plunging immediately into European wars and financing them, although, on the other hand, it does harm both to the United States and to the rest of the world when it prevents the United States from acting upon the economic principle that nations either swim together or drown separately. Has any political *gaffe* in history been more disastrous to its authors than the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, which, in effect, forbade America's debtors to pay their debts to America by the only means available for payment; or than the subsidies with which the American legislature bolstered up American agriculture with the like (and equally unintentional) effect?

From Genoa to London.

When the representatives of the sixty-seven governments met in the new Geological Museum, South Kensington, on June 12th they started the second post-war political attempt to liberate commerce from its entanglements. The Genoa Conference of April 10th-May 19th, 1922, which made the first attempt, was attended only by the several British governments and by twenty-nine European governments, including the Russian. It wholly failed to do direct good to commerce. That is to say, the participant governments agreed upon certain good resolutions which thereafter they ignored. Yet commerce began to improve. Either the politicians had had no effect at all, or by their failure had stirred private enterprise to act in spite of them. The Genoa Conference, indeed, could not in the nature of things have succeeded. Commerce is international on the widest scale, and a combined initiative of the British Empire and the European countries was too local to be business-like. By contrast the Monetary and Economic Conference that met in London on June 12th really was world-wide in its competence.

The spectacle that met one's eyes when the King and the Prime Minister made the opening speeches could not fail to stir one's imaginative sense. One felt the irony of it, yet one could not suppress a hope that those men would do something reasonable before they dispersed. Sitting in their rows of

green-painted wooden benches, like an enlarged class of schoolboys, were the governments of the world: American, European, Asiatic; Western and Eastern; all "civilised," in varying degrees. They were in the same room. They had been forced there by a common adversity, which began in 1929 and continued with increasing intensity through 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933. By 1933 the world's trade had fallen in value by more than one-half. Measured by volume the fall was not so great: but the practical criterion was the price paid for the commercial products. As the world's delegates sat by each other, they knew that there were 30,000,000 unemployed in the world, although one half of the world could produce but could not sell what the other half wanted, but could not buy. "The markets are there," said Mr. MacDonald on June 12th, "the labour to supply them is there, but the labour is not employed and the markets are not filled." It had all been said before, many times. The disturbing reflection was that the politicians there assembled were not free agents. Mr. Cordell Hull, for instance, the United States Secretary of State and chief United States delegate at the Conference, had to be guided, not by his own opinion whether it was good for nations to prevent each other from doing trade, but by what he imagined would be the "reaction" of Congress to what he said or did. The machinery of international politics is difficult because its constituent parts are made by separate agents working on unco-ordinated and even irreconcilable principles. The crude fact that in our time the nations of the world have for twenty years been engaged first in a physical and then in an economic war suggests that there is something singularly bad in what we know as "civilisation."

On June 12th Mr. MacDonald also said: "When we had a less efficient equipment for the making of wealth, our national incomes were greater." What presumably he meant was that in the old days, when fifty carpenters took a week to do what one carpenter and one machine can now do in a day, the world was better off; but why in that case describe the old method as "a less efficient equipment for the making of wealth"? Clearly it was more efficient. The criterion of general prosperity is that money should pass uninterruptedly from one person to another and thence to still another. That happens in the maximum degree when everybody can be given work which somebody else needs him to do. The combined effect of

socialism and science is to damage the equipment for the making of wealth, for the one interferes between those who want work to be done and those who can do it, and the other tends to reduce the necessity for unskilled work. Masses of people need unskilled work, if they are to have any work at all. When instead they are left unemployed, the demand for other people's work is also lessened by the spreading inability to buy it, and a vicious circle is started.

We seem to have reached a time in the world's history when governments are destroying the reserves of wealth by engaging in both physical and economic war on a devastating scale; are crippling commercial enterprise by the resultant political obstacles of too high taxation, tariffs and the rest; are attempting to substitute State regulation in industry for the more elemental and direct play of supply and demand; and when science is adding to the disservices of politics by reducing the absolute sum of human work that needs to be done. Yet all history teaches that changed economic conditions produce their own redress, for man's invention is born of man's necessity. In the present instance, for example, it is possible to diagnose in many countries a growing distrust of the political method in all its aspects. In the spacious corridors of the new Geological Museum in Exhibition Road delegates and commentators in June 1933 were more openly sceptical of the chances of success by diplomatic conference than one ever before remembers in comparable circumstances; and the credit of governments as foreign borrowers had been torn to bits, or "blown to pieces," to recall again the famous phrase. The effect of that scepticism was to suggest that the initiative in commerce must again revert to private enterprise; and the effect of that discredit was to suggest that money is not likely soon again to be diverted from commercial use to political waste.

"The State and Economic Life."

The essential problem of politics—that is the dilemma between the almost inevitable muddle of mass activity and the inevitability of such activity itself—causes increasing anxiety among ordinary sensible people. The very bigness of the problem, however, as often happens in such cases, has stirred

a will to solve it. It is one of its attributes that redress must logically come from the outside, not from the politicians themselves. Wars, tariffs, exchange hold-ups are political work, the result of chaotic political forces that have no traditions or principles of common interest.

An illustration of the general desire for redress was given on May 29th, when there met in London an academic kind of international conference, composed of non-political delegates—scholars, economists, financiers, scientists, professional men and intellectuals of nearly every kind—who for several years had been engaged upon an attempt to rid diplomacy of its terrors. Their axiom is that diplomacy, being an element of general human welfare comparable in its importance to the physical sciences, needs in its turn a scientific treatment; that the study of diplomacy needs to be organised, and a knowledge of its facts and problems to be given an established standard of values.

Since 1918 sporadic attempts have been made by various groups of people in various countries to develop educational institutes for the single study of diplomacy. In Great Britain, for instance, there is the Royal Institute of International Affairs, an institution directly inspired by the Great War and its aftermath. There are now three University Chairs wholly concerned with the study of international affairs: the Montague Burton Chair at Oxford, the Stevenson Chair at London University (School of Economics) and the Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth. There is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the United States, and an increasing number of similar institutions in several other countries.

To be of real use, however, it is clearly necessary (according to the generally prevalent view of such pioneers) that educational bodies whose object it is to study international problems should themselves be international in the sense that they should not only co-ordinate their work with each other, but should make contact with each other. One of the problems of diplomacy itself is that differing languages, standards of conduct, traditions, legal and moral principles make common action, and even common views, difficult to obtain. It would be odd if the separate national institutions studying diplomacy were to allow a similar obstacle to hamper their own work. That is why in 1928 the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations summoned a general

meeting of the various institutes from different countries. The meeting—the first Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations—took place in Berlin. It was followed by further annual meetings in London (1929), in Paris (1930), in Copenhagen (1931), in Milan (1932). The chronicle of the Milan session has been published by the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. It was the sixth of the series that took place in London this year. The earlier sessions were occupied with the business of organising an international service of information, an exchange of professors and speakers, the publication of handbooks such as the *Handbook of Reference Centres on International Affairs* (1931) and a projected *Lexicon of Political Terms* to be published in English, French, German and Italian.

The preparatory work was finished in 1931, and the decision taken to start the substantive work. The Milan session last year therefore began a general study of the economic consequences of politics: that is of the effects produced in economic life by the actual political legislation of various States. At a time when such consequences were already a matter of everyday concern throughout the world, the evidence at the disposal of the conference was too large for one session, and became this year's agenda as well. The subject this year was described as "The State and Economic Life." One part of the work was to investigate the course of post-war international trade and international finance, another was to estimate the nature, extent and results of State intervention in private economic enterprise (industry, commerce, agriculture, finance) in various countries and its effects on international relations.

The conference was composed of delegates from international institutions in thirteen countries: Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Roumania, Spain and the United States. Representatives from the League of Nations, the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Paris), the Rockefeller Foundation, and from the following international institutions also attended: the Academy of International Law (The Hague), the Geneva Institute of International Relations, the Postgraduate Institute of Higher International Studies (Geneva), and the Institute of Pacific Relations (Honolulu), It was presided over by Sir Arthur Salter.

It is not easy to estimate the value of the work that was done. The session lasted from May 29th to June 3rd, being essentially concerned with the formal presentation of the results of research work carried out in the twelve months' interval since the previous session. Most business-like people who are interested in the effect of politics upon commerce will apply to the London academic conference this criterion: did the delegates show any appreciation of the part played by political debt and by political economics in producing the great depression? The decisive thing in international commerce is the movement and the "velocity" of money. As a motor-car engine needs a constant circulation of oil if it is to function smoothly, so international trade cannot function without a constant circulation of credits. One of the subjects discussed at the academic conference therefore was "the Regulation of International Capital Movements." The word "regulation" is itself formidable enough to cause a shiver to all experienced people, for too many of the world's misfortunes are due to political regulation. It therefore is a source of satisfaction that the First Committee of the Conference, which considered this matter, recorded its view that "there had since the war been unwise, indiscriminate and excessive lending abroad, which is in some measure responsible for the present position," and went on to specify as the chief form of such transaction the practice of inter-governmental borrowing to bridge budget deficits, to balance international payments and to meet war debts: all of them wholly indefensible expedients.

On the other hand the committee did not seem fully to appreciate the essential distinction between governmental and commercial borrowing. In an attempt to formulate sound principles of foreign lending, it was suggested that there should be set up some kind of international body invested with an acknowledged competence to express a view upon the soundness of any proposed international loan. Nowadays, however, the feeling that has been provoked against any kind of "international" control is so intense that such a body can hardly hope to attract general confidence. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* And how could the custodians themselves even be appointed except by the politicians, to whom therefore they would owe allegiance? To be fair, however, to the members of the first committee, one must record that in exploring the expedient of "extraneous intervention" they qualified their suggestion

by "the fear that such intervention, practised in the area of national and international politics under the influence of political partisanship and nationalistic bias, might increase and not overcome the present disorders." The net result of the committee's tendencies was to advocate the establishment of impartial and expert international bodies competent to recommend a code of soundness in international finance.

It is a difficult conception. It seems not to have occurred to any member of the conference to argue that all foreign borrowing by governments is mischievous. It is because governments can and do borrow from each other that they plunge themselves into egregious muddles. Political debts are almost inevitably unproductive. The politicians who incur them are as ships that pass. The betrayed electorate has no defence nor redress, for the substitution of another government cannot undo the harm except by the still greater harm of repudiation.

How difficult it is to reach an agreement on any subject was illustrated by one of the general principles enunciated by the conference. It read thus: "To advocate absolute free trade in goods and capital and unconditional fidelity to the gold standard, in a world in which private monopolies and public intervention of all kinds have very appreciably narrowed the field of free competition, would be to betray a lack of realism and of logic, which the earlier economists would be the first to condemn. It is, therefore, not in a spirit of revolt against the best traditions of economic thought, but in deference to deplorable but inescapable facts, that the members of the Committee were led to advocate remedial action on the part of national States and of the international community." What does that mean? On the face of it, it looks like a meaningless muddle and a confusion of thought. What it apparently was intended to convey was the notion that it is nowadays impossible to expect that the free operation of commercial finance and of the economic machinery of supply and demand can ever again be restored, because political interference has already gone too far, and therefore the only remaining hope is that the quality of such interference be improved. Such counsel, emanating from such a body, is a little disappointing. The clear deduction from all the premises is that commerce cannot prosper until it is freed from political interference: from wars, war debts, tariffs, exchange restrictions and the rest. To prescribe that the

politicians should be invited to indulge in less disastrous wars, smaller war debts, lower tariffs, fewer exchange restrictions is surely a form of pussyfooting. The obvious only cure is that wars, war debts, tariffs, exchange restrictions be made totally impracticable. Is that impossible? It is impossible so long as it is generally thought to be impossible. The congress that met in London between May 29th and June 3rd, and will meet elsewhere a year hence, could surely help, not to consolidate an existing evil, but to remove it, difficult as the enterprise might be?

GEORGE GLASGOW.

June 15th, 1933.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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CHAMBERLAIN AND GLADSTONE.*

The second volume of Mr. Garvin's work confirms the impressions of the first. It is beyond doubt one of the greatest biographies in our language. The theme is dramatic from beginning to end, and nobody but the author could have done it justice. He has a kindling sense of great issues which he communicates to his readers without apparent effort. His hero lives again in these thrilling pages, trenchant, resolute, incomparable in attack, yet at bottom happier in construction than in conflict, far more human than the public realised, at times wearying of the ceaseless friction, and then girding himself once again for the fray. He ranks with Randolph Churchill and Lloyd George among the most effective political gladiators of the last half-century, surpassing the former in staying power and the latter in administrative capacity. It is a superb portrait,

* *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain.* By J. L. Garvin. Vol. II. 1885-1895. Macmillan. 21s.

full of life and colour, admiring and applauding to the full, yet never concealing the spots on the sun.

While the first volume covered half a century and surveyed business and municipal administration as well as national politics, the second is concerned with a single decade and is dominated by a single theme. Mr. Garvin strives to recall for the benefit of his younger readers the unique character of the Home Rule fight, the elemental passions that were unloosed, the parties that were shattered, the friendships that were severed with a cruel knife. It was, indeed, more like a convulsion of nature than an ordinary political disagreement, and the fierce light of history beats on the protagonists. In such a struggle two questions arise in regard to each of the chief actors: was he sincere and was he right? "Sincerity, not consistency, is the real issue," observes Mr. Garvin, but he claims both virtues for his hero. The first will hardly be disputed by the careful student of this volume, for Chamberlain sacrificed his reversion of the leadership of a great party to his convictions. No man less deserved the name of Judas flung at him from the infuriated Irish benches. Nor can his consistency be successfully impugned, for it was his party which changed its Irish policy, not he. Before Gladstone's conversion at the end of 1885 Chamberlain, with his plan of provincial councils, was ahead of his chief. After the conversion he found himself in the rear. If he is to be censured, it is not for deserting a cause but for fearing to advance. He had precisely the same moral and political right to oppose the plan of an Irish Parliament as had Gladstone to propose it; and it is one of the outstanding merits of this work that Mr. Garvin fully realises that both men were swayed by the highest motives.

A second question arises: which was right? Each reader must answer for himself, and Mr. Garvin's eloquent pleading for his hero is unlikely to change the opinions that most of us formed long ago. That Chamberlain had a larger share than anybody in killing the two Home Rule Bills is as clear as it was to Gladstone himself. But to kill the Bills of 1886 and 1893 was not to kill Irish nationalism, as the Unionists were to discover after Chamberlain had passed away. He had a vision of social reform which was utterly beyond the imaginative reach of his old chief. But equally the veteran Liberal understood that the Irish problem was a much deeper matter than administrative change, and that its only tolerable solution was to be sought in

a union of hearts. In other words Chamberlain could understand the aspirations of the working classes for a minimum standard of life, but not the aspirations of a little people for a government of their own. Mr. Garvin admits that his hero became for a time the loneliest figure on the stage, that his Federalist policy was too bold for the Conservatives, and that it only appealed to about 5 per cent. of the voters. He believed that if the land question was solved, Home Rule would be unnecessary. It was the fundamental error of the Unionists to underestimate the strength of the nationalist sentiment, and to believe that either "twenty years of resolute government" or "killing Home Rule by kindness" would do the trick. If the antics of de Valera are laid to the charge of the Gladstonians, we reply that that exasperating doctrinaire is the outcome of the decades of Unionist antagonism to the adoption of liberal ideas.

If Gladstone be thus adjudged the more far-sighted of the two statesmen in regard to the Irish question, his tactical handling of a very difficult situation is open to the gravest criticism. His temperament, background and outlook differed so widely from that of Chamberlain that he never realised his power in the country till it was too late. Mr. Garvin says that it was the mistake of his life. Had the Liberal leader taken the ablest of his lieutenants into his confidence, the history of England might have been different. Who knows? He had to think of Parnell as well as of Chamberlain, and it was no use offering Ireland something that she would refuse. It is satisfactory to discover that even in the heat of the conflict Chamberlain and Gladstone respected one another, and Mr. Garvin's portrait of "the magnificent old man" is a triumph for which Gladstonians owe him abiding gratitude. Whatever we may think of Home Rule, it remains a tragedy that a man of such force and originality as Chamberlain should have severed his connection with his best friends, such as Dilke, Morley and Harcourt, and have been compelled to leave a good deal of his luggage behind him. That he succeeded in leavening the Conservative party to some small extent we may read in the present volume, and we shall learn at greater length in the next. But he ceased in 1886 to be the Radical leader for which his earlier career had destined him, and left the post vacant till it was temporarily filled twenty years later by Lloyd George.

G. P. Gooch.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.*

These very timely volumes on the history of Australia and New Zealand will be read and closely studied with warm interest (*inter alios*) by the many English families who have links with these great Dominions. So familiar are their names as the home of great social, geographical and constitutional developments that it is difficult to realise, in the words of the learned Editors, that

> The origins of Australia belong to the England of the Younger Pitt; those of New Zealand to the early days of Queen Victoria. The planting of the Anglo-Saxon stock in the Southern Pacific and the rise of two young English nations have taken place almost within living memory. Here are no offshoots of Stuart and early Hanoverian England, but of that Victorian England now just passing from our sight. Living men may well remember the squatter aristocracy of Australia in its pioneer days and the small bands of settlers who occupied the fertile valleys of New Zealand and struggled for the land with the Maori tribes. In these youngest Dominions English colonisation did not flow in channels opened by other European peoples, as in Canada and South Africa, but chose its own path, and created and solved its own problems in an isolation that remained for long almost unique in history.

When Mr. Robert Dawson, "late Chief Agent of the Australian Agricultural Company" (the engineer who first brought water into Sydney), published in 1830 his stout book entitled *The Present State of Australia; a description of the Country, its advantages and prospects, with reference to Emigration: and a particular account of the manners, customs, and condition of its Aboriginal Inhabitants* we obtain the first reasoned account of a vast region, and that was only a hundred years ago. In the elaborate bibliography of the Cambridge History this remarkable work is stated to have been published in Sydney in 1831. This must have been a second edition, since the first edition was published by Smith Elder in London from their Cornhill office in 1830 and was dedicated to Viscount Barrington. At that date the interior of Australia was quite unknown.

Dreams of Terra Australis were dreamt at a very early date, and it was thought in the sixteenth century that Marco Polo in the thirteenth had located Australia, and the actual position

* *The Cambridge History of the British Empire.* General Editors: J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton, E. A. Benians. Vol. VII, Part I, Australia. Advisor for the Dominion of Australia, Ernest Scott. Part II, Advisor for the Dominion of New Zealand, J. Hight. Cambridge: at the University Press. Part I, 30s. net; Part II, 15s. net.

of the island-continent had been guessed in various speculations about the Pacific Ocean, as Magellan called it. Jean Rotz's map of 1542, presented to King Henry VIII, almost certainly includes Australia, and Dr. J. A. Williamson, in his chapter on the Exploration of the Pacific, says that if these early "cartographers merely guessed the existence of Australia, they made an extraordinarily correct guess; and Rotz at least indulged in no guesswork in dealing with any other part of the world which appears in his atlas." Hawkins, Grenville and other men of Devon believed in a "beautiful Terra Australis, a continent stretching through thirty degrees of latitude," and Drake set sail to find it in 1577, but the wind in the Pacific proved impossible and he contented himself with sacking the treasures of Peru. In 1606 the Spanish explorer Fernandez de Quiros discovered the New Hebrides, which he named Austrialia del Espiritu Santo in the belief that the quest was ended. On the way back one of his ships traversed the Torres Straits and may have sighted Australia. In 1616 Hartog, a Dutch explorer, sighted the west coast, and in 1627 another Dutchman sighted the southern coast of Australia. In 1642 Abel Janszoon Tasman rounded Van Dieman's Land and discovered New Zealand. His great voyage "revealed New Zealand and Tasmania and had definitely proved the insularity of Australia" and in 1644 he coasted the whole of the Gulf of Carpentaria and proved that Australia was one land mass. In 1688 and again in 1699 William Dampier, the English voyager, visited the west coast, and in 1744-8 John Campbell urged the examination of the unvisited east coast. British and French discoveries in the Pacific are recorded in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, and in 1768 a British expedition was formed not only to observe the transit of Venus, since the Admiralty "desired a definite answer to the question of the existence of a southern continent." James Cook, sailing under "secret instructions," which only came to light in 1928, gave them the information. On April 20th, 1770, he was in Bass Strait and passed northward along a new coast which he named New South Wales. The *Endeavour* arrived back in England in May 1771. His second voyage—"a feat of navigation such as no man before him had approached"—lasted from 1772 to 1775, in which he visited New Zealand three times.

On January 21st, 1788, the first penal fleet arrived at the finest harbour in the world in command of the first Governor,

Captain Arthur Phillip, R.N. The harbour was named Sydney after Lord Sydney. Phillip declared before he sailed, " as I do not wish convicts to lay the foundations of an Empire, I think that they should ever remain separated from the garrison and other settlers that may come from Europe." This use of New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land was indeed a sad beginning, but in fact the practice of transportation ceased in 1840, except to West Australia.

In 1820 the total number of the inhabitants of New South Wales was 23,939, the majority of whom were convicts or ex-convicts, but in the next decade there was a free newspaper press. An Act of 1823 created a Legislative Council, and there was a demand for local self-government. The Amending Act in 1828 was in force till 1842. The coming of Sir George Gipps, who had had great experience in Lower Canada, had effects on the constitutional position, and the scheme of local government of 1842 showed the growth of the colony and of free ideas. After Gipps left in 1846 Lord Grey proposed to revive transportation, but the proposal gave rise to such a storm that Grey yielded in 1849. At that date elected members were admitted to the Legislative Assembly in New South Wales, and then the discovery of gold in 1851—gold had been known of long before—created an entirely new situation. It was a turning-point in the history of Australia.

In the years 1840-50 the increase of population was nearly 215,000. From 1850 to 1860 the increase exceeded 740,000. By 1857-8 the population of Victoria alone exceeded the population of the whole continent in 1853. Railway building had begun in 1848 and rapidly increased. The Constitution was growing. In 1842 administration was placed on a sound basis and the Constitution Act of 1850 " gave to the Australian Colonies a common starting-point for constitutional development," for local government as the forerunner of modern responsible government. The colony of Queensland was created in 1859, and six years before this the entire colony of New South Wales had received responsible government, but the time for central government of the whole continent was not yet, though in fact Sir Charles Fitzroy was appointed Governor-General of Her Majesty's Australian possessions. That office lapsed. Yet the final step was taken in the reign of Queen Victoria and the Federal Commonwealth of Australia was established as from January 1st, 1901. The famous Queen died on January 22nd, 1901, after the longest reign in the history of Great Britain. Her grandson, then Duke of York, now King George V, opened the first Federal Parliament on May 9th, 1901, in the reign of King Edward VII.

The economic and constitutional history of Australia is fully dealt with in these pages by specialists, and is of profound interest as showing that England was intent on making no mistakes in the processes of vital growth. The Empire had learnt its lessons, and the particularly difficult problems of Australia were dealt with by a series of masterly hands. The part played by Australia in the World War, its post-war economic and cultural problems and its position in the British Imperial system of free nations is well dealt with and makes fascinating reading. The same can be said of New Zealand, a Commonwealth with a great and a deserved future. In these few notes special weight has been laid on the beginnings of things, since both Australia and New Zealand are examples—with perhaps the exception of certain mistakes in the Maori wars, now so forgotten that there is an utter absence of race discrimination—of wise statesmanship in successive generations of English statesmen in dealing with abnormal problems. The process was completed just in time and these two great Dominions are safe, with the whole force of the British Empire behind them, in the confusion and danger of eastern and south-eastern Asiatic problems that might have affected their future.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

THE FAITH OF ANCIENT ROME.*

Mr. Cyril Bailey in these learned and delightful pages gives the reader the substance of his lectures delivered as Sather Professor of Classical Literature in the University of California. This volume is in fact the tenth volume of Sather Classical Lectures. It deals successively with various aspects of Magic, with the belief in and worship of spirits and thereby peers into the origins of Roman worship that emerge in historic classical time. We see in these times foreign influences and the worship of strange and sometimes non-Aryan gods, though the influence of Greece was in a large measure Aryan and so could be grafted

* *Phases in the Religion of Ancient Rome.* By Cyril Bailey. Oxford University Press. 15s. net.

easily by the other. This has actually happened in various Continental judicial systems. The Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems of legal administration are, however, fundamentally different, and to borrow a single idea must virtually involve the incorporation of large blocks of the foreign system. In attempting to alter the English system by this comparative method, it is not, therefore, unnatural that Mr. Ensor should wish to establish in this country most of the system at work in France and Germany. The author suggests, amongst other things, the creation of a Ministry of Justice, the localisation of courts, and the combination of trained judges and lay justices in the petty sessional courts on the German model.

It is difficult to appreciate what real benefits such changes involve. Indeed the establishment of a Ministry of Justice would encourage the growth of political appointments and illicit influence so common upon the Continent. The confidence of the public in the independence of the Bench and the Bar would be gravely impaired if the judiciary were dominated by a Government Department. The Continental citizen naturally accepts, as consistent with his traditions of government, a highly bureaucratic system. He regards, rightly, the judiciary as an organ of the executive government. Among the Anglo-Saxon nations, on the other hand, the judiciary has always been regarded as quite distinct and even opposed to the executive government. Montesquieu lays special stress upon this fact. The Englishman still regards the judiciary as a constitutional safeguard against bureaucratic encroachment. To incorporate the judicial system within this very bureaucracy is not merely a legal change but would involve a fundamental violation of the British Constitution.

Mr. Ensor is anxious to increase the localisation of courts. He declares, quite rightly, that the services of the judicature "should be sufficiently localised for the public, which wishes to utilise them, to be spared avoidable inconvenience and cost." But it cannot be lightly assumed that "here . . . it is plain that the English judicial system lags very far behind those of France and Germany." In his enthusiasm for separate hierarchies of local courts, Mr. Ensor has greatly underestimated the working of the English circuit system. His contention that the High Court litigant is put to enormous inconvenience and expense is wide of the mark. The author refers to "the old-fashioned King's Bench circuit, with its solemn

visitations twice or, at most, thrice in the year." In actual fact Liverpool and Manchester each have four assizes annually and enjoy two High Court judges for the greater part of the legal year. In the other great centres of population there is adequate provision for local trials. It is true that with a few exceptions "all the Chancery Courts . . . sit in London." The cases which come before them "include disputes over not a few classes of subjects which are part of the daily life of every commercial community in England and Wales." But it is equally true that the Chancery Division to a large extent dispenses with oral evidence and does not require the presence of the parties. For these reasons also the centralisation of the Appellate Courts in London involves no hardship. Indeed the complaint to-day is that a local trial at *nisi prius* is more rapidly disposed of than a similar trial in London.

Mr. Ensor's objection to the system of lay and unpaid magistrates has greater weight. The appointment to the local Bench as a reward for political services is notorious. Cases have not infrequently occurred where the decision of the Justices has been influenced by their political or social outlook. But in the vast majority of cases they administer the law conscientiously and without bias. The author maintains that the rough and ready knowledge of human nature possessed by the average magistrate is insufficient.

> The march of psychological and criminal study has rendered the whole system an anachronism. Modern research and reflection show the trial and sentencing of criminals (especially of incipient offenders) to be a much less simple affair than our ancestors supposed. We are coming to see it as a task for special people with a special training.

Mr. Ensor proposes that a trained judge should sit with the lay justices on the model of the German *Schöffen*. There is much to be said for this view. It is indeed an anachronism that London and a few of the great towns should alone enjoy the services of an expert magistrature.

Uncertainty and the cost of litigation may be, as Mr. Ensor says, "the factors which chiefly deter litigants under the English system." But the remedy does not lie in reorganising the judicial system of courts and judges. The root of the matter is cumbersome procedure and high costs. Reform in those fields will enable every potential litigant to enjoy the justice which our Courts provide.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY STUDIES.*

This interesting and, in parts, technical book was not needed to remind the public that Cambridge is alive. The very names of persons such as the Master of Trinity College and Professor Eddington show that the University is very much alive and up to date. Mr. Harold Wright, the able editor of these nine studies by younger men, claims that they "leave the impression that Cambridge is not a repository of dead learning, but a living centre of intense mental activity from which the world of thought must be continually enriched." These studies are not needed for that purpose, but must be judged on their own merits. These merits are substantial, though one or two of the essays do not err on the side of modesty. But that perhaps is a good fault, since it shows that the authors know, at any rate, their own minds.

The essays deal with Philosophy (the aim of which Mr. R. B. Braithwaite defines as the clarification of thought), Mathematics (in which Mr. M. H. A. Newman dwells on the *Principia Mathematica* of Mr. Whitehead and Earl Russell, and declares that in the hands of Professors Einstein and Dirac physics has become axiomatic and not merely constructive), the Craft of Experimental Physics by Mr. P. M. S. Blackett (one of the best essays in the book), Chemistry by Dr. C. P. Snow (which runs Mr. Blackett's essay very close), Physiological Research by R. K. Matthews and B. H. C. Matthews (a modest and very able paper which realises in practice the great difficulty or impossibility of understanding the performance of brain-functions), Biology by Mr. C. H. Waddington (in which a valuable discussion is given as to the problem of the preservation of mutations), History by Mr. R. E. Balfour (in which it is declared with truth that a historian must be both an artist and a scientist), the Study of Classics at Cambridge by Mr. B. L. Hallward and lastly English Literature by Mr. F. L. Lucas.

The omissions of subjects are somewhat curious. The study of modern languages, one of the great activities at Cambridge, is not thought worthy of inclusion; no Cambridge economists could be found to explain their varying and various views to the world when Economics is the subject of the greatest Inter-

* *University Studies: Cambridge 1933.* Edited by Harold Wright. Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 10s. 6d. net.

national Congress that the weary world has ever seen; while the Cambridge theologians (always famous all the world over) were not even invited. The great modernist theologians, such as the Bishop of Birmingham, like the great modern physicists, such as Professor Eddington and Sir James Jeans, do not hold views on the nature of things that quite fit in with that philosophy of clarity—which to some minds may not seem very clear—preached in the essay on Philosophy.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's *Looking Forward** is a revised selection from articles and speeches before his entry into the White House, with the fine Inaugural Address of March 4th as a pendant. This vigorous little book will remind many readers of Woodrow Wilson's *The New Freedom,* published twenty years ago, for there is much in common between the two Democratic Presidents. Each of them has a clear-cut system of thought and an enviable power of articulate expression. Both are Liberals, with a lofty view of the capacities of human nature and a remarkable grip of concrete issues. Both are born leaders of men, speaking with authority, proud of American traditions, yet conscious of the unity of the world. The first two chapters, entitled "Reappraisal of Values" and "Need for Economic Planning," strike the key-notes of his appeal. We then proceed to the discussion of particular problems such as land utilisation, agriculture, taxation, power, railways, tariffs, the judiciary, crime and banking. The chapter on "National and International Unity" is of particular interest at a moment when the World Economic Conference is in session. "The League has not developed along the course contemplated by its founder," he complains, "nor have the principal members shown a disposition to divert the huge loans spent on armaments into the channels of legitimate trade, balanced budgets and payments of obligations." But though he no longer desires the entry of his country into the League as he did in 1920, he is ready for co-operation along other lines. It is a bracing little book, full of faith, courage and goodwill.

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Dr. W. Nembhard Hibbert's volume on *Jurisprudence*† is "the result of more than thirty years of teaching this subject for the University of London." Dr. Hibbert is perhaps one

* Heinemann. 7s. 6d.
† Sweet and Maxwell. 12s. 6d. net.

of the last of the disciples of John Austin, but he says frankly that "though an Austinian by training the author is not a bigot, as will appear from his many criticisms of Austin's views," and adds with great truth, "We ought not to lose sight of the value of Austin's teaching as to the necessity of accuracy of terminology and of a true appreciation of the actual nature and value of National law." Maine pays a tribute to Austin in his first publication, and indeed there can be no doubt that Austin, like Maine, was a master of method. The trouble with Austin is that he relies ultimately upon force as the sanction of law, and the history of jurisprudence, still unknown in his time, shows that to be untrue. Dr. Hibbert deals (inter alia) with the nature and history of jurisprudence, sovereignty, the development and methods of national law, the classification of rights—some thinkers hold that in pure jurisprudence there are no such things as Rights but only Duties—and codification. As a teacher the author is direct and to the point, but is not fully concerned with the philosophy of law, and there are many foreign writers whom he neglects in his analysis. Dr. Hibbert's use of the words "Jurisprudence being the science of National Law" must be to many thinkers misleading. Jurisprudence has a much wider scope.

* * *

So This Is Poland,* by F. W. von Oertzen (translated by R. T. Clark) is the most sensational book on its subject yet published in English. The author is a German whose duties took him to Poland as a soldier during the war and as a journalist in the following years. He presents us, not with a history of the new republic, but with a series of vivid snapshots of leading events, beginning with the defeat of the Bolshevist armies outside the gates of Warsaw in 1920. We are told of the seizure of Vilna by Zeligowski, of Korfanty's activities in Upper Silesia in 1921, of Pilsudski's coup in 1926, of the brutal persecution of the Ruthene peasants in Eastern Galicia, of the crusade against German schools, of the horrors inflicted on the Opposition in the fortress of Brest-Litovsk. It is sickening to read of such savagery in a State which owes its existence in great measure to the success of British arms. Poland is in the grip of a ruthless despotism which sticks at nothing. It is a sad disappointment to Englishmen who welcomed the resurrection of an independent Poland to watch the abuse of its new-found liberty. This darkly tinted volume is, of course, only one aspect of the story, and a very different picture is given in the recent work of Machray. Much has been achieved, and there are plenty of civilised Poles. We must hope that ordered liberty and equality before the law will return some day, and that the Polish Republic will regain the sympathies and respect which have been so largely forfeited by the misdeeds of its rulers.

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

*Jack Sheppard** is a new volume in the Notable British Trials Series, edited by the late Mr. Horace Bleackley and Mr. S. M. Ellis. In 1724, Jack Sheppard was hanged at the age of twenty-two for the commission of a number of comparatively small thefts spread over a period of less than eighteen months. Upon four occasions by the use of extraordinary skill and courage he escaped from prison. For a century he was regarded, in Mr. Bleackley's words, as "a savage and unscrupulous marauder. It was imagined that the man who could make such havoc with the bolts and bars and manacles of strong prisons must be the superman of crime, an ogre among cracksmen." This viewpoint, however, began to change when Harrison Ainsworth published his famous *Jack Sheppard* in 1839. In the mass of literature and the innumerable plays which followed, Jack Sheppard was treated sympathetically, if not heroically, as the victim of a crude and barbarous system. Reformation played no part in a scheme designed only to punish and repress. "It was his ill fortune," as Mr. Ellis points out, "to be born out of time, when his abilities, pluck, endurance, agility, strength, humour, and happy disposition that could overcome all difficulties never found their right use but were diverted to a wrong course. There was no one to counsel and direct him after his first step on the broad road which led to destruction." To-day Jack Sheppard would have gone to Borstal and have been given at least the chance to reform, denied him when he lived. In addition to a comprehensive account of the life of Jack Sheppard and the literature which centres round his name, this volume includes a short biography, reprinted from the *Bloody Register* of 1764, of the notorious Jonathan Wild, who was both thief and detective at once.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Mr. R. G. Howarth has edited "Letters and the Second Diary of Samuel Pepys."† The first and some later editions of the *Diary* contained a selection of letters, more appeared in the *Life* published in 1841, and still more were printed in the late Dr. J. R. Tanner's *Pepys Cockerell Papers* in 1926. The historical importance of the letters is undoubted, and this selection will be welcomed by students of the famous *Diary* commenced on January 1st, 1660, and continued till May 31st, 1669. On July 30th, 1683, Pepys was sent, as secretary to Lord Dartmouth, to Tangier, and he also visited Spain. He returned to England in March 1684 "having kept, throughout his travels, a journal in shorthand which has a claim to be styled his *Second Diary*.

* William Hodge & Co. Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.
† J. M. Dent. 7s. 6d. net.

. . . The difference between the earlier and later Pepys is well illustrated in the *Second Diary*." Samuel Pepys is not an edifying character despite his love of learning and learned men; but Mrs. Skinner seems to have a sobering effect on what Mr. Howarth calls his " undiscriminating amorousness."

* * *

" A Century of Emancipation,"* by Sir John Harris, is an admirable blend of expert knowledge and skilful popularisation. The author's services to one of the greatest causes in the world are well known, and his latest contribution to the welfare of the slaves is exceptionally timely. For the centenary of abolition in the British Empire compels us to ask not only what has been done, but how much remains to be done. Sir John is equally successful in reviving the heroic figures of the humanitarian movement and in focusing attention on the dark spots of the world of to-day. Many of his readers are old enough to remember the atrocities of the Congo, the Putumayo and the Portuguese islands, and it is inspiring to recall the efforts to expose and eradicate the abuses. The closing chapter, which surveys the world from China to Abyssinia, should leave the reader with a tingling sense of compassion and responsibility.

* * *

Mr. A. C. Horth in "Design and Handicraft"† has produced a book full of excellent suggestions which give a fuller meaning to the word " design " to students not only of art but of handicraft. He says with truth that " there is a considerable amount of misconception as to what design really means. It is not the making of patterns or a pleasing arrangement of colour, but the whole and complete plan of a piece of work." Purposefulness is at the root of design. It is creative and uses decoration, ornamentation, patterns in the course of a thorough understanding of appropriate tools, of materials and their constructive use. In the case of handicraft pure art is indispensable. " Art and craft are inseparable." The old workers in glass, for instance, knew this and made the union immortal. Design primarily is a matter of deep thought, and Mr. Horth in his fully illustrated book realises its fundamental educational importance.

* Dent. 5s.
† Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd. 4s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

AUGUST, 1933.

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE: THE RESULT.

NO less than sixty-six nations were represented at the World Monetary and Economic Conference convened in the Geological Museum, South Kensington, on June 12th, 1933. There should have been sixty-seven, but Panama " had not yet decided to send a delegation to London." So, in spite of all temptations to confer with other nations, Panama remained away.

Writing for this REVIEW an article entitled " The World Economic Conference," and published in its issue of February, 1933, I indicated that six great problems presented themselves for solution, if the economics of the world were to be put right. These were not all, in themselves, economic, but were all economic in their incidence. Disarmament, for example. Hence, four of them, not being technically economic, would not come before the Conference in prospect. It followed that the Conference would not, and could not, fulfil the general expectation. It could, however, tackle two out of the six problems in question. And then, on the analogy of the World Economic Conference of 1927, it would disperse, leaving behind it, say, an Economic Council, whether to save its face or to complete its business, as the case might be. Having said so much in February I now propose in this article to take stock of the new situation.

As regards the first of the six problems above mentioned, that of restrictions on world trade, the prospects of the World Conference were clouded by the fact that, by the date of its assembly, the work in this respect of its predecessor, the World Economic Conference of 1927, had wholly failed. That Conference had been attended at Geneva by the representatives of fifty nations, and its Final Report was unanimously approved. In announcing it to the world the President of the Conference hailed the attainment of " a real and permanent result : it goes far beyond the hopes which were cherished when you began your labours." The President added that the Conference " marked the beginning of a new era." For the Report declared that " the

time has come to put an end to the increases in tariffs, and move in the opposite direction." It thus only remained for the delegates to disperse, in order to "disseminate and secure the triumph of the truths which we have formally proclaimed." Unhappily, so far as the United States was concerned, the Hawley-Smoot tariff presently extinguished this illusion. So far as Europe was concerned, the upward movement of tariffs was, indeed, checked momentarily in 1928 and 1929, and the network of commercial treaties, commencing with the Franco-German Treaty, then negotiated, seemed to stabilise the existing level of tariffs. But soon, as in the United States, the tide turned the other way. The commercial negotiations of Germany and Poland, when ruptured, started the new confusion. The Tariff Truce sponsored by our Labour Government failed, and finally the economic crisis of 1931 administered a fatal blow to the policy of 1927. The world turned definitely to the policy of trade restrictions of every sort. This, then, was the first problem confronting the Conference of June, 1933, which, except for the announcement of a futile tariff truce to be observed during the session of the Conference, the delegates failed to surmount.

In the second place, the Disarmament problem overshadowed the Conference. This was a matter not economic in itself, yet so economic in its incidence that, for years, it had been assumed and asserted that no Economic Conference could assemble, still less be successful, unless the Disarmament Conference had more or less achieved its purpose. Yet at this very moment a disappointed public was informed that "there are fifteen or sixteen major points upon which no agreement has been reached at Geneva." The fact was that the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference had nearly given up its task in despair. A British draft had been submitted to it. This, however, had aroused acute dissensions. Then let us give it, was the cry, a non-committal "first reading" and then let us adjourn. But, during the abeyance of the General Commission, let a Bureau endeavour to smooth things out, draft something else, and propound a revised convention, if any such thing can be patched up. Such was the bewildering chaos reigning in June, 1933, in the region of disarmament.

It is true that, in this same week of June, 1933, five days before the meeting of the World Conference, a document which claimed to be of vital importance to the peace of the world, and

which in happier days might have secured some measure of disarmament, was initialled in Rome. It is no less than an Agreement of Understanding and Co-operation between France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. These four great Powers disclaim, so our Foreign Secretary stated, the policy of instituting "a species of hegemony in the affairs of Europe," or forming "a kind of Directory." These Powers declare that "over many years to come" they will pursue a peaceful policy "in Europe." But are not these same Powers already members of the Council of the League of Nations, and signatories to the Covenant, to the Kellogg Pact, and to Locarno? We may be fairly sure that, quite regardless of all such instruments, armament, and not disarmament, goes on undisturbed. The nations of Europe are spending annually £520,000,000, or 60 per cent. of the total world expenditure, on that object. As we have seen, the Disarmament Conference is *in extremis*, with its President a forlorn wanderer in the European capitals. This was the second great economic, or quasi-economic, fact which, in June, 1933, proved too much for the Conference.

There was yet a third, and all-important, element in the economic situation as it stood in June, 1933, which invalidated the work of the World Conference. This was the problem, still unsolved, of War Debts and Reparations. As the Preparatory Commission of the Conference had most truly remarked in its Annotated Agenda, though War Debts and Reparations were outside the scope of reference, yet "until there is a settlement . . . the debts will remain an insuperable barrier to economic and financial reconstruction." In fact, a settlement here was "a condition precedent" to the success of the Conference. Now, the Lausanne Conference, which had been convened to deal with this problem, had met on June 16th, 1932, and had arrived at an agreement on July 9th of that year. In its final Instrument, No. V, the Conference had invited the League of Nations to convoke a Conference on Monetary and Economic Questions, in order to concert "the measures necessary to solve the other economic and financial difficulties which are responsible for, and may prolong, the world crisis." Notice, from the use of the words "the other," that the Lausanne Conference assumed that it had settled the question of War Debts and Reparations. Arising out of this assumption representatives from the chief nations of the League, from the

United States, and from the League itself, were to form a Preparatory Commission, which Commission in its turn was to deal partly with economic and partly with financial questions, so as to make the way plain for the World Conference of 1933. Thus the latter has actually arisen out of the assumed success of the Lausanne Conference. But please to observe that, in hard fact, the Lausanne Conference had not settled the question of War Debts and Reparations at all. For, to put the matter roughly, it had, indeed, arranged to let off Germany *quâ* Europe, but not Europe *quâ* the United States. Yet the problem of Europe *quâ* the United States constituted the core and crux of the whole problem, and this was untouched, as it is to-day.

The conclusion to be drawn, so far, from the above recital has an important bearing upon my argument. Let us realise, in fairness to the Conference of 1933, that it has met under the shadow of at least three international economic failures of the most commanding importance. First, the failure of the World Conference of 1927 *quâ* the barriers to trade. For at the date when the World Conference of 1933 met, the world was apparently bent as never before on throttling its own trade by tariffs, restrictions, priorities, controls, licenses, prohibitions, preferences, price fixations, embargoes, moratoria, exchange vetoes, quotas, anti-dumping legislation, and so forth. All this in defiance of the policy of 1927. And next, it was bleeding itself weak with budgetary outlays on armaments, in disregard of the Disarmament Conference. And lastly, it had lulled itself into acting as if the question of War Debts and Reparations had been settled, though nothing of the sort had occurred. Such was the triple Cerberus that yawned before the sixty-six delegations as they entered the Geological Museum. Ill-starred delegates, not even armed, as we shall see presently, with the Golden Bough of a settled monetary policy!

The fourth problem which confronted, and confounded, the Conference was the monetary one, and here we touch the crux of the matter. A study of the utterances of the delegates shows that, in this matter, two aims possessed them; one was the stabilisation of currencies, and the other was the raising of the world's price level. They were evidently much fortified in favour of this twofold policy by the message which the President of the United States sent on May 16th to the Sovereigns and Presidents of the fifty-four nations then participating in

the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The President then said that:

> the Conference must establish order out of the present chaos by stabilisation of currencies, by freeing the flow of world trade, and by international action to raise price levels.

No one could have more clearly interpreted or anticipated the views of the delegates to the World Economic Conference. It was, therefore, with complete consternation and indeed, if the truth be told, with intense indignation that the Conference read another message from the President of the United States dated July 3rd. It was a message denouncing "the specious fallacy of achieving a temporary and probably an artificial stability in foreign exchange." This pronouncement was accompanied by some rather strident comments which it is not necessary to reproduce. It was asserted freely that this change of front had wrecked the Conference, or at any rate had seriously compromised its operations. Yet another blow, dealt this time, it was felt, at a vital spot!

Nevertheless, if we reflect calmly, we must take another view of this important matter. For the fact was that the stabilisation of currencies and the raising of price levels are two policies which you cannot pursue at the same time. For when you raise the price level by monetary methods, you *ipso facto* depreciate your currency, which is the opposite to stabilisation. Now this was what President Roosevelt evidently did not appreciate in his message of May 16th, and was what he did appreciate in his message of July 3rd. And the reason that he did appreciate it was that he was forced to do so, for he himself was now becoming actively engaged in raising prices and, therefore, in destabilising his own currency. Moreover, Congress had assigned to the President powers (*a*) to devalue the dollar by 50 per cent.; (*b*) to arrange with the Federal Reserve System a vigorous policy of inflation, and (*c*) to issue three thousand million "Greenbacks" in discharge of the public debt. A statesman embarked upon such a course of depreciating the most stable of currencies, as the dollar had proved to be up to the early months of 1933, could not conceivably press upon the world a policy of stabilisation of its currencies. For every currency in the world stood in some sort of relation with that of the United States.

It was thus under the irresistible pressure of facts that the President dropped his policy of stabilisation of currencies, and

told the world so. We may venture to think the Conference should not have been so upset by this pronouncement. Up till then it had been heading both towards the stabilisation of currencies and also, at the same time, towards the raising of the price level, an impracticable dual plan. Now, at least, the way was clear for it to readjust its views and to adopt at any rate one of the two policies in question. It was in this crisis that the ever-suggestive President, from his yacht the *Amberjack,* issued a further recommendation to the Conference on July 5th. "The first task," he said, "is to restore prices to a level at which industry, and above all agriculture, can function profitably and efficiently." And he indicated in addition that it would be very desirable if other nations would take similar steps. This was a clear lead at any rate that the Conference should drop stabilisation, and should adopt the policy of higher prices, that policy for which the President himself was doing such strenuous battle at home in the United States.

A response to his proposal was forthcoming from Great Britain. For as the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in the House of Commons on July 11th, as regards this particular matter of prices:

> The British policy remains what it has been from the beginning. We have made it clear that, in our view, and I may say this is also very strongly the view of the British Dominions and India, the raising of the prices of wholesale commodities still remains the primary objective.

But he also added the following significant words:

> We still believe that it is not possible to effect the raising of the price level by monetary action alone. . . . At the bottom of the whole trouble lies the lack of confidence.

So, in the view of the British Government, "it is only the restoration of confidence" which will really enable the work in question to be accomplished, and this, said the Chancellor, is "the central fact."

It is of crucial importance that we should understand correctly the monetary significance of this very guarded utterance. In the first place, the British Government favours, it seems, not the raising of all prices, but the raising only of the prices of "wholesale commodities." It is clear from this that, as any monetary policy must inevitably apply to prices all round, it is not monetary policy which can engineer this raising of selected prices. Further, it appears to be the view of the

British Government that "monetary action alone" cannot raise prices, and that the real indispensable agency here is "confidence," a mental attitude as distinguished from a monetary action. Now this position of the British Government has its precise counterpart and, we may infer, its correct commentary in the Annotated Agenda unanimously approved by the Preparatory Commission of experts. These experts considered evidently that, though it would be a good thing that prices should be raised, it should be by reliance on miscellaneous methods such as a revival of "sound international lending," or by money market manipulations, and, above all, by the growth of "general confidence." Such a policy as this latter is evidently much the same as the non-monetary attitude, if such a phrase may be coined, of the British Government. Is "confidence," then, an indispensable preliminary to monetary action? But how could such a thing be created at Kensington? How many of the Budgets of the sixty-six nations there assembled can inspire "confidence" in the simplest bosom? Have not thirteen of the major governments of the Continent of Europe played "ducks and drakes" with their currencies during the last few years? And does the sudden abandonment by the United States of its standard inspire "confidence" at the present time? We may venture, then, to conclude that it is just to say that the British Government elected not to unfold any defined world monetary policy to the World Monetary and Economic Conference. To say this is not to criticise such an attitude. Nor need we infer that the British Government had no monetary policy to reveal. But surely we are on unassailable ground in stating that the British Government, whether or no it had a monetary policy, did not disclose it. We must believe that, as it regarded "confidence" as an indispensable preliminary to the institution of any such policy, and as "confidence" has been a fugitive from economic circles since 1931, at any rate, our Government had settled that the time was not ripe, in regard to the monetary question, to expose its hand. So the World Conference, bewildered by such uncertainties, found itself at a loss between a Britain which said too little, and an America which said too much.

So far I have analysed the four great obstacles that arose to invalidate the success of the World Economic Conference. They concerned Trade Restrictions, War Debts and Reparations, Disarmament and the Monetary Question. But if the reader by

chance recalls my article of February, 1933, he will realise that, according to it, two problems, or six altogether, presented themselves for solution, not perhaps by this particular Conference, but at any rate by statesmen generally, if the economic situation of the world were to be healed. The first one of the two in question I named the Balancing of Budgets by individual nations. For, after all, it is the unbalanced budgets of the world that are really at the root of the bad economics of the world. Be it added at once that, as national policy controls budgets, it is not for a moment suggested that the nations at Kensington should have considered rearrangements in their individual budgets. Nevertheless, there is a wide field of technical methods, a science almost, evolved in this country and perhaps elsewhere for the conduct of financial administration on modern lines. It would have been of considerable value if the assembled delegates, finding their path stopped in so many other directions, could have pooled their experiences in this matter and thus could have laid the unostentatious foundation of better things.

So far as I am aware, this consideration was not entertained by anyone except by one statesman, albeit of the first importance, President Roosevelt. For in his much-criticised message of July 3rd, he announced his opinion that it is only " when the world works out concerted policies in the majority of nations to produce balanced budgets and living within their means, that we can properly discuss a better distribution of the world's gold and silver supply to act as a reserve base of national currencies." To work out " concerted policies " for the production of " balanced budgets " was a line of action unfortunately not entertained amid the more sensational topics of the hour.

The sixth and last problem which, I ventured to indicate, would have to be considered at some time, was the co-ordination of the productive energies of the world. This matter did, indeed, come before the attention of the Conference, so far as its Preparatory Commission could secure. Those experts in their Annotated Agenda wrote :

> The question requires to be considered whether, particularly in the case of certain primary commodities when large stocks are overhanging the markets, a better level of prices could not be obtained by the regulation of exports or production. Such an arrangement could be of special importance in the case of wheat, the cultivation of which represents the livelihood of a large proportion of mankind.

Unfortunately, the world has recently adopted schemes, in Canada the Wheat Pool and in the United States the Federal Farm Board, which have proved unsuccessful. Indeed, President Roosevelt himself, in his recent book entitled *Looking Forward,* describes the operations of the latter Board as " futile and costly." Here again, and lastly, recent facts such as these, and hostile verdicts, such as that just quoted, though assuredly not final, seemed to rise up to bewilder the Conference, already shaken by so many adverse events.

The space allotted to me by a generous editor is exhausted. Since the Peace of Versailles I believe that no less than fifty-four International Conferences have been held. How many of them have succeeded? Before this last one met, its Preparatory Commission, composed of experts of the very highest qualifications, unanimously announced in the most solemn language that :

> The necessary programme is one of Economic Disarmament . . . the London Conference must draft the Treaty of Peace. Failure in this critical undertaking threatens a world-wide adoption of ideals of national self-sufficiency which cuts unmistakably across the lines of economic development. Such a choice would shake the whole system of international finance to its foundations, standards of living would be lower, and the social system, as we know it, could hardly survive.

Such a warning is, indeed, impressive, all the more when we meditate on two central facts. Some idea of the misery which the breakdown of the economic system has inflicted on the world may be gathered from the estimates of the International Labour Office at Geneva. That body considers that the total number of unemployed in the world to-day is not less than 30,000,000 persons. Next, and parallel to this calculation, are the estimates of the League of Nations in regard to the decline of world trade, starting from the datum line of the year 1929 taken as 100. The imports of the world, 100 in 1929, are now 34 only. The exports, 100 in 1929, are now 32 only. This stupendous fall in the trade of the forty-nine principal countries of the earth is due not to deficiency in productive capacity, but to that economic nationalism, war's parent and war's progeny, which has made more victims than war itself.

GEORGE PEEL.

July 12th, 1933.

THE SESSION.

A SUPPORTER of the Government might well feel satisfied with their position to-day, as probably they are stronger than at any time since the first fine careless rapture of the General Election passed. This is not because they inspire enthusiasm anywhere and have not disappointed many hopes; indeed there is antagonism and indifference over a wide area. The Government's strength lies in the absence of any alternative, and in a tendency, once the reactionary programme of protection had been put into force, to pursue, however weakly and tardily, a moderate course.

The Labour opposition has done its best in discouraging circumstances, but there is little life, vigour, or originality in its methods and arguments. From the front bench Mr. Lansbury, Major Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps, actively supported by Messrs. Grenfell and Tom Williams, work as hard as conditions permit; a few shafts of light break through from behind them at intervals, but it is a depressing scene. Owing to the refusal of local Labour party organisations to select as candidates at bye-elections their leaders in the last Parliament, the continued return of trade union officials, however admirable, fails to suggest to any mind the possibility of the emergence of a Labour Government for a long time to come, certainly not after the next election. The party has not shown any sign so far of recovering from its political and moral collapse in 1931.

On the other hand, the Liberal party is not at present offering itself as an alternative government, though the moment when it will openly do so by crossing the floor is ardently to be desired both in the national and party interest. The matter is one of strategy and tactics, and will be resolved in that sphere at the right moment. The views of the Liberal party in the country were made known at Scarborough recently with courteous and helpful plainness. Various considerations must be weighed, the issue must be definite and capable of being clearly grasped by the man in the street. No such clear-cut issue has recently emerged. It must also be of such a nature as to convince reasonable-minded Conservative supporters of Liberal members at the last election that faith has been kept. Pledges to support the National Government must be observed according to the conditions laid down at the time. Furthermore, the change of direction must take place at a moment when the political mind of

the electorate is alive and interested. Just now there is no such interest either in the House of Commons or in the country. Bye-elections and experiences of speakers show that the latter is true, small audiences, no questions, few interruptions, no fire, no feeling, apathy, and a distrust of politicians; all these demonstrating themselves in totals of votes that bring small satisfaction to any party. In the House, too, torpor and empty benches except when the great, and they are few, are speaking, indicate truly that it is in museums that one must search for the centre of the world's political activities to-day and there too often in vain.

None the less, the position of the Liberal Parliamentary Party is not happy. It gets the worst of both worlds. It receives no gratitude or credit for being in support of the Government, nor is it taken seriously as an opponent. This is for the time being inevitable and must be borne patiently in the knowledge that it is the course dictated by the hand of circumstance. That there is little scope for party fighting is supported by the attitude during recent months of Mr. Lloyd George and those who act with him. Their appearances in debate have been few and far between. Eloquence is checked if the hills are obscured by clouds.

Nothing perhaps indicates the lack of interest more than question time. In the normal Parliament this fascinating period after prayers, from 2.50 to 3.45, is full of incident and feeling, with many oral interrogations left over to receive a written reply. Last Session the full time was usually just about taken up. This Session so greatly has interest lapsed, that questions are generally over between 3.15 and 3.30. Business goes forward rapidly by arrangement "through the usual channels," the whips, and anything in the nature of obstruction is rare, though there was one notable effort by the Opposition in connection with the Russian Embargo Bill.

Sir Herbert Samuel is supreme in his particular sphere, speaking frequently at moderate length with great clarity and coherence of argument, and he has been supported in some wholly admirable orations by Sir Archibald Sinclair and Mr. Isaac Foot. I may perhaps be excused for personal reasons from reference to the many able performances of my friends and colleagues on the Liberal back benches.

The same diffidence does not afflict me in assessing the fortunes of Ministers and personalities in other parties. The Prime Minister has rarely been seen in the House, and then not

to advantage. It is, however, very comforting to know that he has been seen to great advantage in Geneva, Rome, Washington, and elsewhere. These visits of his abroad are wholly to be commended in principle—our affairs are the world's affairs, and no minister of the Crown is more fitted by his personal gifts and charm to create the human conditions for effective co-operation. His submission at Geneva of the British Draft Disarmament Convention containing definite figures, though far too long delayed, was of capital importance. It is the chief characteristic of the Government's policy, indeed, to do the right thing at a moment so remote from actuality as to be almost useless, and in any case far more difficult to carry through.

The Lord President of the Council is the real ruler of the House. He can completely command it whenever he cares to, for there is an essential decency in his outlook and sincerity in his appeal that strikes a chord in all but diehards, of whom he is the despair. The Government has often been timid and hesitating, but whenever it has summoned up courage to face opposition openly an incipient revolt has instantly been quelled, and so it will be to the end if the Baldwin view prevails.

The next figure in importance is the Chancellor of the Exchequer who, in spite of a cold and unsympathetic manner, has conducted the affairs of his office with great ability. The American debt token payment was a real triumph, and much as one may dislike his protectionist outlook and policy, his conduct of the Budget and exposition of the Government economic policy have been efficient and clear. If by some process of transfusion some of Mr. MacDonald's grace of personality could be replaced by some of Mr. Neville Chamberlain's clarity of mind and *vice versa* a useful public service would have been performed.

The most striking development of parliamentary life is the position created for himself by Sir Austen Chamberlain. He occupies a dominating rôle in the House to-day and intervenes with extraordinary effect from the corner of the third bench below the gangway on the ministerial side. Speaking in the grand manner, almost the only survivor in these slipshod days, with careful choice of word, phrase and quotation, immaculately dressed, distinguished and impressive in appearance, with all the weight of an ex-Foreign Secretary, outdistanced only by Mr. Lloyd George in length of service, this voice from Olympus

causes Ministers to reconsider and to surrender and reverberates in Germany with astonishing effect. Two examples of this are on the use of the Russian embargo and on the bombing reservation. His intervention in defence of local tariffs was less fruitful. The League of Nations has no more genuine and convinced friend, and the tale of his service may not be yet all told.

An excellent example of the responsiveness of the House to firm handling was Mr. Runciman's defence of the trade agreements. The President of the Board of Trade is conducting his office with great skill, but this incident and other events have depreciated his stock as a possible holder of the highest office.

Major Elliot is, of course, the most outstanding success as a new power in the Cabinet; with great driving force, originality of outlook, agreeable personality and persuasive eloquence he is rapidly putting the Socialist programme on the statute book with carefully adjusted language and machinery. With much of the planning Liberals must have every sympathy, but it is the association with control of imports, imposition of quotas, and lack of any adequate safeguards for the consumer that causes the greatest concern.

The Foreign Secretary, under the immense strain of his office combined with his own concentration on duties whether in London or over the seas has, it is to be hoped temporarily only, been forced to seek in holiday restoration from ill-health. He is fortunate in being able to rely on a very able Under-Secretary. Mr. Eden, whether at Geneva or in the House, has won golden opinions, and clearly has a great future before him. His management of the British case at the Disarmament Conference has been singularly happy, gifts of personality and mind admirably supporting each other.

Sir Samuel Hoare has made a first-rate impression in his firm, wise, moderate conduct of Indian affairs, approaching as they now do a critical stage in the fortunes of India and of the National Government. I believe that a courageous persistence in the present path will bring a happy issue to both. Mr. Churchill's worst enemy is himself; but for his advocacy the revolt would be much more menacing. He has been, however, from the beginning such an obvious fomentor of discord towards the Government and so anxious to break it up that his every act is suspect. Furthermore, the House does not like his attitude towards it. He never attends except to speak, and his asperity towards certain Ministers is resented.

Sir Hilton Young and Sir Henry Betterton both conduct their offices with zeal and sympathy, and both have the advantage of being supported by very effective under-secretaries in the persons of Mr. R. Hudson and Mr. Shakespeare. A word must be said about the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, who has shown remarkable ability in the exposition of the business of his department. There are few parts he would not adorn with faultless phrase and varied invective. A cultivated stumble in manner occasionally might actually be an enhancement of a growing reputation.

Of the women in the House, those who came in at the last election are an excellent band of capable speakers, some of whom might well speak more. They more than hold their own when compared with the average male member swept in in 1931, though these contain many young men of first-rate qualifications who, given wider opportunity than being one of a majority of five hundred others, would make their mark. As interesting a group as any is that of which Mr. Vyvyan Adams is the most active member. Keenly interested in disarmament and a League of Nations foreign policy, they intervene regularly in debates on the subject, and emphasise Conservative support for such topics. Whenever the diehards come out, or are likely to come out, with a motion, question or letter to *The Times* of a reactionary nature, they are either forestalled or immediately answered by this section. In this manner the prosecution of a more advanced foreign policy is much assisted. It is unfortunately little that Liberals or Labour can do in this Parliament to influence the Government, so that any movement of progressive opinion in the Tory ranks is to be encouraged and supported, particularly as in matters of peace and disarmament there is a wide measure of agreement in all parties as to what should be done. The extremists of right and left are some times found united, though for different reasons, in support of an impracticable policy of inaction inconsistent with our international obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Whatever final concession, whether in respect of military aircraft, tanks, mobile guns, or in the realm of security the Government finds it necessary to make in order to obtain a satisfactory Disarmament Convention, I am sure the House of Commons and the country will assent to. In this problem the stage has now really been reached when the process of conciliation must be carried to its last stage by a mutual surrender of non-essential positions

in the common interest. One such in England's case is undoubtedly that of the bombing reservation. Only the heads of Governments, as at Locarno or Lausanne, can see this through. Lengthy debate and solemn resolution can serve no useful purpose.

The main case against the Government is that having the power and opportunity they have failed to give the world leadership. They have been willing to listen to others and talk things over, and in the end to go a considerable way in the right direction in the wake of bolder spirits. Above all they hate being bold themselves, and are very sensitive to or fearful of criticism that often does not matter. No doubt there are ultra-Conservative elements in the Cabinet that require the treatment of time to bring round.

It must be acknowledged that however slow and painful may be the process, there has been a steady change leftwards of the Government's orientation. They haltingly feel their way, and finding the ground firm beneath them take a few steps at a time in a forward direction or retrieve a blunder. The most notable case of this was the Russian prisoners. This was very badly handled and probably resulted in two of them remaining in prison for two and a half months quite unnecessarily. No doubt the strongest diplomatic representations in suitable language were justified, but actually to impose the embargo before the final stage of the proceedings had been reached was a grave error. Sir John Simon used language of exacerbation in the House which would have been capable of inciting a great majority to declare war with alacrity. Fortunately, reason has prevailed in the end. The Liberal party were able to play a decisive part during the debates on the Prohibition of Russian Imports Bill and to assist in obtaining an undertaking that the measure would be used only for the purpose of helping the prisoners, and not for a trade objective.

The World Economic Conference has dominated recent weeks to such an extent that the House of Commons has largely been left to minor ministers and under-secretaries. As many of these are at least the equal of their nominal superiors this does not perhaps much matter, but it has caused the House to assert itself and to endeavour to insist on the attendance of Cabinet Ministers affected by the business before it.

Nothing can disguise the fact that one country can do little alone for long to bring prosperity. The technique of world

co-operation has manifestly a long way to go before its necessity is accepted. There is nothing to make one think that the American experiment can succeed unless co-ordinated action is taken elsewhere. Our Government, uninspiring as their programme was, has escaped the reproach of responsibility for a breakdown of the Conference. It would appear as if the nations would have to live for a long time to come in an atmosphere of crisis, through a series of Conferences and adjournments of conferences. In this case, however much one might wish the contrary, the condition of bewilderment will persist in the minds of the electors, scant interest will continue to be taken in politicians and the people will simply hope for the best in a dark and lowering scene. I predict the Government will continue till 1936, and face the electors again as a so-called National Government. This is assuming their general trend of policy remains unchanged. If it moves to the right this forecast may well be wrong.

The Liberal Party has a difficult task in this position. It must free itself at the first eligible opportunity from any appearance of general support for a Government so little inclined to govern firmly or courageously and so committed to a futile policy of tariffs and restrictions. This opportunity may come before the House resumes in the autumn. Our leaders will speak, I submit, with not less but more authority from the shades of official opposition. It will be known where we are, and that Liberals are definitely submitting their case and conduct to the country for consideration at the next election. All that is in our view wise in the Government's programme we shall continue to support. The party will not in the long run lose credit because it exercised patience through these critical years and turned with reluctance from all association with a national effort that at the beginning held out the hope of fruitful co-operation. Bewildering as the position must be to keen Liberals in the country, the Liberal leaders are entitled to ask for their continued trust and confidence. No one can clearly foresee the future even for a few months ahead. We may be heading for the angry rocks of nationalism and the break-up of civilisation as we know it. The Liberal crew must be there ready to take over when called upon to navigate into the calmer seas of a planned order where world peace, freedom of trade and personal liberty are assured.

GEOFFREY LE M. MANDER.

REVOLUTIONARY GERMANY AND ITS FOREIGN RELATIONS.

LIKE Russia and Italy, Germany is now dominated by the thought and will of a single political party. It is true that the Revolution is in the first instance an internal event. But it is conditioned in all its thinking by the character of the external world—by the existence of the Versailles Treaty, by the operation of Reparations and other instruments of international life, by the League of Nations, by the general European setting of republican Germany, with the "Republic" itself as an imported and enforced product, as it emerged from defeat in a world war. Its dynamic was a protest against contemporary Europe and world conditions. Directly and indirectly, the propaganda which has made Hitler Chancellor is crowded with statements of the new Germany's attitude towards Europe and the world. There is forecast of a changed world. There is prophecy of a new status for the Germany which for long had been condemned to feed on the husks of which the swine did eat.

The Revolution is essentially authoritarian. There are two who speak with the greatest authority of all: Hitler and Rosenberg. The Chancellor's autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, is revolutionary Germany's Bible. To say that it has displaced *Das Kapital* is a small and negative side of the reckoning. Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in the knapsacks of Prussian officers in 1914 is a small incident compared with the spiritual significance and the awakening produced by Hitler's book. For years this modern Luther has been gaining authority as a man sent by God to save the nation. His book has lain and lies on the professor's table in pride of place and is pointed to as the "message." It contains no systematic exposition of new Germany's foreign policy. But no one can read it without crystallising a conception of what Nazi Germany is to mean to the world. Dr. Rosenberg has been for years the leading editor of the party's chief and amazingly successful daily paper, the *Voelkische Beobachter*. He is the specialist on foreign affairs, as was Mr. MacDonald for the British Labour Party. But whereas the latter was never more than an amateur, the former prided himself on the profundity of his European knowledge. Mr. MacDonald, as amateur, could be made a fool of by the British Foreign Office. Dr. Rosenberg has taken charge of the German Foreign Office.

What are the main features of the programme which these two leaders have been advocating to the point of their accession to power? Take Dr. Rosenberg first, author of *The Future Path of German Foreign Policy*, written in 1927. His formula may be thus expressed: "Over the head of William the Timid and back to Bismarck."

(*a*) The Meaning of Versailles.—Although the World War has ended, a world struggle continues. Struggle is the father of all things. The significant fact in the struggle of our age is that parliamentary democracy, as an expression of the individualist economics of the nineteenth century, no longer corresponds to the belief of this generation. In fact, the much-vaunted democracy began to die at the very moment when it was celebrating its greatest political victory, namely at Versailles on June 28th, 1919. In the war Germany was defeated because Germany had no objective. The Entente peoples had. Germany's problem is how to make a People (*Volk*) out of a conglomerate of 63 millions and, having done this, how to create more space and territory for a German race of 100,000,000. The first is a problem of internal politics. The second is a problem of foreign policy. But each solution is bound up with the other. Internally the problem is one of building up a new will to power. The Nazi Party is that will. The ultimate internal victory is not possible unless external freedom follows.

(*b*) General Character of the New Policy. Since the days of Bethmann-Hollweg and Lichnowsky, German foreign policy has followed some sort of internationalism. It has played up to the stock markets, or to the Church, or to the Second and Third Internationals. The one thing that can be said about it is that it was not a German policy. One can only speak with bated breath about foreign policy. This, however, can be said plainly: There must be an awakening of the German nation. The unspoken longings which remained unrealised in 1914 must be resumed, and alliances with Powers must be sought which are wholly or partly favourable to these interests. Germany must win in the next round of the world struggle. Then her two millions will not have died in vain.

(*c*) The Dynamic Forces of History. The political destiny of a people is determined primarily by race, number, geographical situation, racial surroundings and by its philosophy. In the German case the great tribal wanderings

of the nordic race began in prehistoric time. They played their part in shaping ancient India, Persia, Greece and Rome. In the Year One a new nordic bloodstream began to flow, which reached its zenith in the period of the Germanic tribal wanderings. This second flood created the Germanised states and the morality (*Sittlichkeit*) of Western civilisation, as the governing class (*Herrscherschicht*) of other races and peoples. Clearly this nordic bloodstream is the *homo sapiens* of a Europe not yet human. In the modern age the Social Democratic Party has given a poisonous and vicious meaning to the word imperialism. It has broadcast the view that every form of domination of one group by another is, in principle, immoral. The awakening Germany will reject this view, and decisively.

It has to be made plain that there are many forms of imperialism. There is a purely military imperialism, which does not rest on and grow out of the vital needs of a people. It is inspired by adventure and robbery. French imperialism belongs to this category. There is an economic imperialism, which was an outstanding phenomenon of the nineteenth century, when it was dominated by the supposed needs of powerful industrial and financial groups. In this false imperialism Germany was involved down to 1914, and was deflected from her true destiny. There is also an imperialism which is rooted in the true and vital needs of a people. Examples of this positive and creative variety are the wanderings of the Germanic peoples in the East, the entry of the Anglo-Saxons into America, and the present expansion of Japan. This form, necessary and inevitable, has its sanction in blood and is justified by blood. It can sometimes happen that two blood groups come into conflict. There is then hardly a question of objective Right or Wrong. It is a case of a tragic destiny which belongs to the process of life.

The secret of all victories lies in the steady maintenance of a will to power, in an eternal imperialist impulse, which no other movement, even the pacifist, can escape. The "Wilhelm" period had the entirely correct idea of stopping German blood from being wasted, as, for example, by withdrawing it from the building of an American alien state, and by seeking a German empire which would preserve it. The error lay in yielding to economic imperialism, as, for example, in the Bagdad scheme, and in not realising that the consequence

of this would be armed conflict with England. It is no use reproaching England. We should reproach ourselves. We ought to have sought adequate allies for such a policy. We ought to have struck earlier. Or, we ought to have abandoned the idea of an African Empire and have strengthened our forces on land, so that we could have conquered territory in Europe. This latter way would have been the organic one, rooted in the processes of German life, and belonging to destiny. It would have meant the abandonment of romantic crusades and the resumption of the movement of the Germanic peoples to which the Germans owe their being. East of the Elbe is German colonial country. The ambit is indicated in the wanderings of the Swabians and of the Knights in the days of the Holy Roman Empire.

(*d*) Future Policy. Germany has to choose between two aspects of German history: between crusading and territorial politics; between world imperialism and the state arising from a people's necessity; between Bismarck and Wilhelm II; between Stresemann's League of Nations and the People's National Socialist Germanic State in Mid-Europe. The German awakening must be based on the imperialism of the German People, in so far as territory is necessary in order to live, and in order to guarantee to the German people a healthy and a strong existence. Geographically it must be made certain that this territory is bound to the Fatherland, and so avoid the German calamity of the Middle Ages and the later period of emigration. It is a condition of existence that this territory be obtained. It must be conquered in Europe, not in Africa, and primarily in the East. This conception gives the basis of a German foreign policy for centuries to come.

(*e*) The Need for Alliances. This destiny of Germany requires alliances. If they can be brought to understand the meaning of history the two allies will be Italy and England. France is impossible and can be written off. She has taken over the leadership of the Black race, in order to Africanise Europe. This involves the racial decay of Europe. She is no longer a European state, but an outpost of Africa, in principle a mulatto state. In no circumstances can Germany make alliance with France; for her character makes this impossible. It would close the door of the East, and she is the support of the Black race against Europe.

Italy is New Germany's primary ally. In the struggle against decadent parliamentary democracy, the rôle of leadership in Europe has fallen to Italy. In territorial policies Germany and Italy look in different directions and do not conflict. The Italian direction lies south, south-west and south-east. The German direction is east and north-east. Nor does German union with Austria present any danger to Italy. On the contrary: it would guarantee Northern Italy against bolshevism, and Yugo-Slavia would be definitely encircled.

So far as England is concerned, the supreme lesson of the war is that England and the U.S.A. fought on the wrong side, and Germany, through false alliances, brought about the fall of Bismarck's Germany. But history goes on. Old problems are unsolved and demand an answer. What is wanted is an alliance with a People's Germany and an England liberated from the "City" and pursuing her true imperial policy. Germany would abandon her crusading politics of the Wilhelm II period. But she would require unconditional support, even against France, in her policy of expansion in the East, so far as may be necessary to feed 100 million Germans.

After Rosenberg's analysis of Germany's future foreign policy, no useful purpose would be served in elaborating the ideas of his chief. It is enough to assert that the two volumes of *Mein Kampf* underpin and confirm the outlines and the details of this policy. Of the large number of possible quotations, I select what is representative with the greatest brevity.

> The National Movement has to be, not the advocate of other peoples, but the champion of its own. In particular, we are not the defenders of the well-known "poor, small peoples," but soldiers for our own." (Page 741.)
>
> . . . In this way we National Socialists consciously oppose the method in which we conducted our foreign policy before the war. We start where one stopped 600 years ago. We terminate the eternal Germanic march to the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes to the land of the East. . . . If, however, we talk in the Europe of to-day of new ground, we can, in the first line, only think of Russia and its subject Border States. (Page 742.)
>
> An alliance whose aim does not include the design of war is meaningless and useless. (Page 747.)
>
> The aim of our policy must be an Eastern aim in the sense of the acquisition of the necessary soil for the German people. . . . We must accept every sacrifice asked of us that is likely to lead to a destruction of the French hegemony in Europe. Every Power to-day which, like us, finds France's

> ambition intolerable, is our natural ally. No approach to such a Power must be too hard for us, no sacrifice must seem impossible if it offers the final possibility of the overthrow of our deadliest foe. (Page 755.)

On the showing of its leaders the foreign policy of the New Germany does not fail in being explicit. The age of Stresemann, which we had construed to be an age of reconciliation with France, an age of the redress by mutual consent of acknowledged injustices arising out of the Treaty of Versailles, an age of the building up of European solidarity and international society through the League of Nations and other agencies—the age of Stresemann, so far as Germany is concerned, is dead. This age had struck deep roots in British policy and opinion. Since before the invasion of the Ruhr weighty British opinion was always exposed to the taunt of being pro-German. The way to a new and consolidated Europe was seen through a redress of German grievances, the common detestation of war, and the growing conception of European citizenship.

Two things emerge with perfect clarity from this analysis. The new foreign policy is not the negative one of redress of grievances, for it rests on the right to expand, on a historic conception of Germany's mission in the world. Secondly it is, in principle, a declaration of war on Europe. There is no peace machinery in existence, nor ever will be, competent to meet Germany's new demands. The Border States are in peril. The independent State of Poland becomes an open question. Czecho-Slovakia is exposed to profound transformation. Austria is to be absorbed. Russia in Europe is to be disintegrated. It will be said that these declarations are but the thinking aloud and the ravings of fanatical partisans who are now to be taken in hand by the responsibility of power. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Good! We will put our ears to the ground. We will wait and see.

Meanwhile, the re-armament of Germany has begun. Herr Nadolny has had his round of obstruction at the Disarmament Conference. Baron von Neurath has given official notice about re-armament. Papen, from a Prussian watch-tower, has released again the War-*Kultur* beast of evil reputation. Hitler, under the shock of Germany's complete isolation, whether tested in London, Washington or Rome, delivered a masterly speech, which created a pacifist impression and released a

temporary tension throughout the world. Most people will be inclined to the view that the bellicose Papen is less to be feared than the pacifist Hitler. We shall wait and see. But we shall not wait passively. For the life of Europe, not alone in its political and economic aspects, is threatened to its foundations. In a revolutionary age, foreign policy must be energetic and deliberate, capable of renunciation and of new beginnings if it is not again to be handed over to the folly of war.

The only adequate answer to the extravagance of German nationalism is a Federation of Europe. The French have failed once in a federal effort. We cannot afford to fail a second time. But success is only possible when Britain wills it and takes the initiative in creating the Federation. That is a positive policy for future British politics. The negative aspect of this policy is that the price which Germany shall pay for any help, at any time, from Britain, is the abandonment of war as an instrument of national policy.

RENNIE SMITH.

THE UNTOUCHABLE PROBLEM.

WE are able to trace out in India one of the most determined and prolonged racial experiments ever attempted in the history of mankind. It was carried through over a vast period of years and became more and more complex as each generation passed on. Even under modern conditions some of its main features still persist, though successive blows have been dealt at its foundations which have shaken the whole fabric.

At the outset the experiment was a very simple one. The Aryan tribes, which entered the Punjab through the Khyber Pass, instinctively segregated themselves from the original dark inhabitants, endeavouring to maintain the integrity of their own stock amid those of another race. The process was not unlike that which is happening before our eyes in South Africa to-day and has led on to the Colour Bar. Marriage with the darker inhabitants was forbidden by strict religious tabus. So effective were these restraints that the two races remained continuously apart. After more than three thousand years, the original Aryan features can still be easily recognised among the high-caste Hindus. Other explanations have been given of this complex caste system of India, but what I have outlined still appears to me in the simplest manner to fit the facts. The very word for " caste " in ancient India (varna) may be translated " colour," and the religious system evolved is still called by orthodox Hindus " Sanātana Varnāshrama Dharma," the Eternal Religion of Caste. The Aryans brought with them into India a magnificent intellectual equipment. It is a fascinating study to compare them with the early Hellenic stock which passed on into Europe. The parallel Sanskrit and Greek forms of grammar and speech denote a close kinship. The classical face in Greek sculpture can be traced in the highest types of Northern India. At least we may say, with some confidence, that in the ancient history of mankind no other areas were so fertile in sheer intellectual greatness as ancient Greece in the West and India in the East.

We find, then, this caste instinct seeking to work out, to the extreme limit, the most rigid conditions of racial and religious exclusion. Caste was marriage, and marriage was caste. To marry out of caste was to be outcaste. To be outcaste meant social degradation even to the length of becoming " untouchable." While other later conquests of an alien people in a new country—such as those of the sixteenth century in the New World—were usually accompanied by ruthless slaughter, these Aryan conquerors were willing from the first to assign a place in the social structure, however inferior to their own, to those whom they had subdued. Though, in this manner, they avoided the final tragedy of wholesale massacre, nevertheless, by accepting the rigid principle of religious and racial exclusion, they brought about evils which in the long run were hardly less pernicious. For inevitably a petrifying of human society began to appear owing to segregation. Life tended to become static rather than dynamic.

The four original castes branched out in a thousand directions. Subdivisions multiplied. Even among the outcastes, or untouchables, the same ramifying tendency soon became apparent. Furthermore, occupational groups, such as goldsmiths and iron workers, began to separate themselves off into castes of their own; and among the lower castes the occupation of tanning and other means of livelihood, which involved the touching of dead animals, were regarded as unclean. Those who were engaged in these things tended to form new segregated groups. Thus occupation, and not merely racial origin, divided men off from one another. A whole theory of " pollution " grew up which went far beyond difference of racial origin. It may be noticed, in a parenthesis, that an analogy to this stratification of society, on a caste basis, can be traced in mediæval Europe at the end of the Dark Ages. This resulted in the hard divisions of the feudal system. Moreover, the mediæval Jewish quarter in different townships, called Jewry, corresponded in some measure to the segregated areas assigned to the depressed classes in Indian villages. But this analogy cannot be pressed too far. A much closer parallel to Indian conditions may be found in the colour bar of modern times, especially in South Africa, which has already been noticed. Thus Hindu religion, in spite of its universal outlook and philosophic basis of unity, by a strange doctrinal aberration became a powerful supporter of Caste. The religious dogma of Karma or Retribution was employed to justify these very social inequalities which had thus been made permanent. For the man who was born a Sudra, or an Untouchable, was assumed to have committed some offence in a previous incarnation, which had reduced him to this lower level. Only by fulfilling his function in society faithfully, in the status

wherein he was born, could he hope to obtain his release and rise to a higher caste in a new birth.

Certain facts which stand out as prominent landmarks in Indian history need to be carefully studied before considering what is happening to-day. For it is only by a survey of the past that the future can be duly estimated. The constant irruption of war-like tribes through the mountain passes, following in the wake of the Aryan invaders, served in the long run to strengthen Caste. These inroads of nomad humanity, on trek from Central Asia, continued over a period of more than five hundred years. Each new warrior clan pierced its way either southward or eastward, and at first remained as a corporate group, detached from the Hindu religious life around it. But in the end these different tribes became thoroughly absorbed in the flexible Brahminical system. They formed new castes of their own and accepted the Brahmin supremacy. This accommodation of new groups within the Hindu social structure has not yet come to an end; for the same process is being repeated even to-day with respect to some of the aboriginal tribes, and it may form the key to the ultimate solution of the Untouchable problem itself. All careful investigators are agreed that new castes are still being formed at the bottom of the social scale, and that a levelling up is going on side by side with the breaking down of some of the more rigid barriers of Caste.

At one crucial epoch it appeared as though a change of religious outlook had come which might break through the whole trend of events and undermine the intricate caste organisation. For Gautama, the Buddha, though born in the rank of the Kshattriyas, or warrior caste, showed in his teaching a marked indifference to such social distinctions. His religious movement owed much of its driving force to the universal nature of its main principles, which tended to weaken Caste. The monastic life of early Buddhism was open to all classes. There was also a place in the new order for women as well as men. But the Brahmin priesthood, which had continually preserved the religious boundaries of Caste, rallied again after this attack. For a time, indeed, the fresh and living impulse of the Buddhist teaching prevailed in the North and West of India. It penetrated even to the South and crossed the Southern Seas. Then slowly and almost imperceptibly Caste resumed its sway in India, and Buddhism made its permanent home beyond the Indian borders.

A later and more forceful attack upon the caste system was made by the powerful encroachment of Islam. The Muhammadan conquest cleansed away much of the grossness of idolatrous superstition which the North of India at that time had still retained. It also helped to remove some of the worst abuses which had grown up under the overpowering shadow of Caste. Multitudes of outcaste Hindus were prepared to embrace this virile, proselytising creed of Islam. Those who became Muslims were accepted immediately as equals. The eighty million Musalmans in India to-day represent, in the main, the descendants of these converts from Hinduism.

But in the South of India, where Islam had never penetrated very deeply into the village life, the evils inherent in Caste continued unchanged. The misery of the outcastes in the Madras Presidency can hardly be imagined by those who have not witnessed with their own eyes its demoralising effects. In Malabar, especially, the daily lot of the Untouchables has sunk so low that it has brought them almost to a sub-human level.

Yet from earliest times, religious leaders from within Hinduism have arisen, like prophets and seers of old, to protest against the social and religious segregation which Caste implies. These saintly and devoted men and women have done everything spiritually possible to break down the impassable barriers. They have embraced the Untouchables and admitted them freely into their own religious fellowship. They have sought, by their own examples, to abolish the worst forms of the caste system. Nevertheless, the closely knitted fibrous roots still remain below the surface, and like a spreading weed the rank growth of Untouchability springs up again and again to cover the land.

Other religious influences, outside orthodox Hinduism, have also left their reforming marks both in the North and in the South. The Sikh Khalsa, the Brahmo Samaj, and the Arya Samaj, have each in turn carried on with success the noblest redeeming and rescuing work. Furthermore thousands of outcastes, through different mass movements, have been carried forward on the strong current of a new and living hope till they have found shelter in the Christian Church. Yet it must be sadly confessed that hitherto, in spite of all these attempts to pierce through the walls of evil tradition, only the outworks have been demolished. The citadel of Untouchability has not yet been stormed.

Rabindranath Tagore, in addition to his vast literary fame, will go down to posterity in India on account of his fearless life-long championship of the cause of the Untouchables. Throughout the whole of his literary career, in his most famous novels, in his social satires, in his short stories, and in his immortal verse, he has taken up their cause undauntedly. No Indian writer has ever done more, with burning words of indignation, to bring home to his fellow countrymen man's inhumanity to man. Thus he has been in a marked manner the Prophet of their emancipation. By his own pure life and daily conduct he has carried out into practice his faith in the unity of Man. One brief poem, embodying his thoughts, may be quoted here as revealing his inner spirit. It is a free translation from a young Bengali poet, Satyendra Nath Datta. It needs to be remembered that the work of " sweeper " or " scavenger " has been allotted in India to the Untouchables. This will explain the symbolism of the poem. Tagore writes :

Why do they shun your touch, my friend?
Why do they call you " unclean,"
Whom cleanliness follows at every step,
Making the earth meet for our dwelling,
And ever luring us back from return to the wild?
You help us, like a mother her child, into freshness,
And uphold the truth that disgust is never for man.
The holy stream of your ministry carries all pollution away,
And ever remains pure.
Once the Lord Siva Himself saved the world from a deluge of poison
By drinking the draught with His own lips:
And you save the world from filth, every day,
With the same divine sufferance.
Come, friend! Come my hero!
Give me the courage to serve man,
Even while bearing the brand of infamy from him.

It would be hard to find a more delicately beautiful tribute to lowly, unrequited service than this. This song is widely known, and it has had its influence upon the course of the outcastes' struggle for freedom.

One event, still more recent, remains to be chronicled. Mahatma Gandhi has brought to a sudden climax his own supreme devotion to the cause of the Untouchables, offering his life as a ransom for the removal of the curse that has lain upon them for centuries past. He has been able, by his commanding

personality, to bring to bear the whole power of the Indian National Movement against this deep-seated and appalling wrong done to our fellow men. He has also most intimately bound up its removal and the winning of full independence for India in the same bundle of national hopes, declaring that Swaraj cannot possibly be obtained so long as millions in India remain degraded and enslaved. The story is well known all over India how he has, in the past, not only preached this as a doctrine, but also practised it in the inner circle of his own home, by adopting as his daughter a child born of untouchable parents. Thus, like Tagore, he has shown his faith in action. Furthermore, he has performed daily with his own hands every form of scavenger work. In his personal life and in his Ashram, both by word and deed, he has made what was before considered unclean to be clean and pure. His wife, Kasturbai, who was at first bitterly opposed to this innovation, has in the end become one of the most enthusiastic and successful workers for the removal of Untouchability.

Will, then, this age-long evil yield at last to the commanding influence of Mahatma Gandhi? Probably no single greater spiritual force has ever attacked it at its centre. For in an extraordinary manner Mahatma Gandhi has won, even during his own life-time, a universal moral supremacy among the multitudes in the Indian villages. His spiritual pre-eminence is acknowledged on every side throughout the length and breadth of the land. Above all, the Untouchables themselves have come to look upon him as their redeemer and saviour. His startling determination, even while in prison, to " fast unto death " rather than allow the Untouchables to be separated from the Caste Hindus in the new Constitution, has shown to the whole world what a desperate remedy was required if the evil was to be kept within bounds. Though weak and thin in his physical frame and advanced in age, he had felt that only such a final act of sacrifice could avail to set them free. In this act of fasting on their behalf he had the enthusiastic support and sympathy of Tagore. Again, by his more recent fast of twenty-one days, undertaken in order to purify the whole movement, he has deeply stirred the hearts of the masses of the Indian people.

A new hope of national unity in India has begun to dawn. It involves the final removal of this curse. Just as when the warmth of sunshine penetrates at last to the very centre of some vast mass of mountain snow, its icy hold gives way and the

avalanche comes toppling down, so it is the ardent hope in countless human hearts that the great mountain load of misery within the wretched homes of the Untouchables may at length relax its hold and melt away beneath the sunshine of a happier and brighter world. Sooner or later these passionate longings are bound to be fulfilled. For we can now unhesitatingly assert that never has there been such a combination of forces allied together in battle line against this crowning human wrong. Thus, looking back in outline only from the first days of the Aryan invasion to the present time, it can be seen all along that the major problem of India, which has clamoured insistently for solution, has been that of a free intermingling of races, castes and creeds, within a common civilisation. The fundamental question has always been raised by saints and sages alike : how can a truly harmonious social organisation be formed out of elements so incorrigibly discordant?

By the very fact of India's own unique geographical position (as the one fertile monsoon land into which the tribes from rainless Central Asia instinctively overflowed), her rich plains had formed a meeting place where all races and religions met. Only a feeble resistance was ever raised against this influx from without. At no time did it appear difficult for the more hardy races from the North to pierce though the mountain passes. But this abundant freedom of access raised from the very first the whole question of social intermingling in its acutest form. If, therefore, after many centuries of effort the racial issue of India still remains waiting for solution, this should not be surprising to us in the West. Least of all can the Western peoples afford either to criticise or to condemn. For no problem of mankind has proved more difficult to solve than this; and whenever the European nations, especially the Anglo-Saxon peoples, have had to face it in their own history they have lamentably failed. Our sympathy, therefore, ought to go out in full to a country like India which has struggled so bravely forward into the light and has accumulated such valuable experience for the whole world.

The racial problem of the Western Hemisphere may be seen most markedly in the colour question in South Africa, which I have already mentioned. It can also be witnessed in the Negro question of the United States and in other lands. If we are honest with ourselves we shall acknowledge quite frankly that the evil of Untouchability is by no means confined to India.

The exclusiveness of the White Race is just as strong to-day as it was in Aryan times. What is still more lamentable is the fact that the Christian religion in the West has hitherto shown no signs of gaining a complete victory over this inveterate evil as it did over slavery a century ago. Racial prejudice in East and West alike has continued to run its course in spite of the highest dictates of the Christian Faith.

These considerations bring us back quite naturally to the profoundest of all modern racial issues which distracts Indian life to-day, namely the White Race complex. For the Western rulers, not only in India but throughout the world, have repeatedly refused to accord racial equality to Indians within the British Commonwealth of Nations. They have raised the colour bar instead. In its most glaring form, this fact has been made apparent in South Africa by unjust discrimination and segregation. Other Dominions, also, have protected themselves by a " White Race " policy, which has made Indian immigration impossible. Australians may enter freely into India, but not *vice versa*. The same is true of Canada and New Zealand. Herein are revealed in an acute form grave issues between Indian and British statesmen, which no Round Table Conference has been able to remove.

This White Race complex, which has so deeply infected the British people in India and elsewhere, though parallel to the old caste evil, is in certain practical effects a wholly new portent in human affairs. For while the Caste system, with its Untouchability, attacked only a single country, the new caste prejudice has deeply infected every continent. It tends more and more to treat the whole of mankind, outside the European racial area, with half-veiled patronage bordering on contempt, as an inferior stock. Humanity, in such a theory, is divided up into two separate compartments. In one category are placed the White European Races, with their overflow in America and Australasia : in the other are massed together practically all the remaining peoples and races of the world. This unnatural division of the human race according to colour and complexion is as irrational as it must be disastrous in its final issues.

For the effect of these continually increasing discriminations has been to close up the avenue of friendship and to open the door of bitter resentment. In earlier days, under the East India Company, there were frequent opportunities for close companionships between Eastern and Western individuals. These

led on to great mutual respect. In such an atmosphere of goodwill it was possible on the one hand for the West to help the East, as it emerged into a stirring period of renaissance, and, on the other hand, help came back in full measure to the West; for the philosophy and culture of the East were eagerly studied and appreciated in Europe as a new gift bestowed on the human race. But in the present atmosphere of mutual distrust owing to colour prejudice, nothing great or noble can flourish. The meanest side of human nature comes to the fore.

What is to be the end? As long as the two peoples—the Indians and the British, the East and the West—are forced to live closely together, with bitterness continually increasing, the racial evil cannot be overcome. For the very foundations of mutual trust and goodwill are obviously lacking. Therefore, only as educated and enlightened Indians are released from what has become an intolerable bondage will any possibility of friendship return. The responsibility for their own self-governance has now become not only an abstract right but an immediate and pressing necessity; indeed it is long overdue. Without this, racial dislike will increase and the world will become still more divided into two hostile camps.

Whether equal partnership between the two countries will become possible in the future depends more on the conduct of the West, which has power in its own hand, than on anything else. If the West is ready to accept racial equality in every sphere of life as the ideal to be aimed at and achieved, an equal partnership between East and West is still open; but if the West insists on racial superiority being recognised in India, China, and Japan, there can be no peace at all for the world. For on one thing above all others modern India is bent. She is determined to solve, from within, her own racial problems, including that of untouchability, on lines of equality and justice.

C. F. ANDREWS.

"ANTHONY HOPE."

MY knowledge of Anthony Hope Hawkins began in the autumn of 1881, when as a freshman just arrived from Marlborough he won a scholarship at Balliol, and took possession of a large room over the archway between the two quadrangles, which has since, I believe, been annexed by the dons. From his window he looked over the Fellows' Garden to the cottage where George Curzon, already a resplendent figure, lived in rooms soon to be occupied by Cosmo Lang. Jowitt's house was within a stone's throw; there were idle traditions of undergraduates throwing stones at its windows to make the master appear. Strachan-Davidson and R. L. Nettleship, the tutors whom Hawkins most regarded, were not far away. W. E. Bowen, bearing a name well known at Harrow and at Balliol, had a room and a piano which Hawkins did not appreciate underneath. F. S. Boas, Ludovic Grant, J. A. Spender, were Exhibitioners of the same year. Charles Eliot and Frank Pember, famous already as scholars—though Eliot had not yet written the Finnish grammar which hardly anyone could review—and Edward Grey, destined to be very famous as a Commoner, had come up the year before. Cosmo Lang, "Tab" Brassey, Charles Roberts and Godfrey Benson, followed soon after. It is tempting to linger on the names of many others who shared in the companionship of those delightful years.

Anthony Hawkins was then a grave and handsome undergraduate, with a touch of boyish austerity about him, a steady reader, a runner and football-player, a ready debater, an undaunted talker, never garrulous, but when in the mood for conversation excelling in argument and repartee. He always had abundant humour, but he was far more serious at eighteen than at thirty-eight. They were days when young Oxford busied itself with social reform, when Ruskin came back to lecture, when Arnold Toynbee died and the Hall which commemorates him was founded, when Arthur Acland gathered the Inner Ring, as we half-mockingly called ourselves, about him, when Spender and other unregenerate spirits brought up firebrands like Henry George or John Dillon to speak on land nationalisation or Home Rule, when the *Bitter Cry of Outcast London* moved the Union to enthusiasms of which no boy need feel ashamed. Hawkins, like many of us, was a devoted follower of Mr. Gladstone. But he affected a great admiration

for Mr. Henry Labouchere, and he presided gaily over the Club of dangerous young Radicals which, incongruously enough, had appropriated to itself the name of the most typical and venerable of Whigs. Lord Russell's grandson, if I mistake not, was a member of the Club. Hawkins presided also for one term over the Union, where J. A. Hamilton, Michael Sadler, Robert Cecil, and above all, Cosmo Lang, held sway. At one time there was rather a set made against the Radicals from Balliol. But Lang, a great Conservative orator, whom without originality we nicknamed Demosthenes, restored the respectability of the College.

Hawkins was a keen debater: we all probably spent too much time in making speeches. He was no mean athlete. He was a lover of whist and of tobacco: more frivolous games, I think, he eschewed. He professed to disdain music. But the stage always had for him an irresistible attraction, and Miss Ellen Terry in particular—one Balliol Exhibitioner of our year, Alfred Kalisch, lived providentially next door to her in London—an irresistible appeal. In his fourth year Hawkins joined a company of six undergraduates in an old house in the High Street nearly opposite St. Mary's, which became a rallying-point for many friends. Edward Coghlan of University, dear to us all and perhaps Anthony's closest and dearest companion, had the courage to associate himself with five Balliol men. But Corpus men dropped in there freely—Henry Newbolt, R. F. Cholmeley, J. H. F. Peile, Quiller-Couch came over from Trinity, Hogarth from Magdalen, Bussell from Brasenose, Reggie Farrar from Keble, and many another, well remembered still.

Most of Anthony Hawkins' College contemporaries marked him down for a successful career at the Bar—was not his cousin a celebrated judge? And there is no doubt that he had in a high degree the qualities which go to make great advocates, an unusual power of close and lucid argument and an invincible capacity for steady work. After a first in "Mods" and a first in "Greats"—All Souls refusing him a Fellowship and Prize Fellowships being at the moment hard to find—he came to London to live with his father at St. Bride's Vicarage, a father touchingly proud of his son. There he settled down in chambers to wait patiently for briefs which were very slow to arrive. It was then, perhaps, that his character showed its strength. For some seven years he got little work. He used to read law

steadily every day till about five o'clock—lunching for fourpence in the Middle Temple Common Room with a few old friends as assiduous and frugal. But after tea he allowed himself to "scribble," took to writing novels with a perseverance quite undaunted by their small success. His first story, *A Man of Mark*, I remember discussing a title for it as we sat together in Hyde Park—he published at his own expense. His second, *Father Stafford*, Wemyss Reid at my instigation persuaded Cassell to publish. It was almost still-born. His third, I think, *Mr. Witt's Widow*, received at last a notice by Mr. Andrew Lang in *The Times*. These early books were reprinted later but, characteristically perhaps, their author left them unmentioned in the brief autobiography which, like the rest of us, he compiled for *Who's Who*. It was not till he had been writing for six years that success suddenly came. Then almost at the same time Arrowsmith asked him for a Christmas story and *The Prisoner of Zenda* took the world by storm, and the new *Westminster Gazette*, with which Spender was prominently connected, began to publish *The Dolly Dialogues*. Within a short time their fortunate author found himself able to command the income of a judge.

Hawkins was then on the point of making good at the Bar. While writing stories for his own enjoyment he had been devilling very competently for R. S. Wright and H. H. Asquith. More than one distinguished lawyer had begun to recognise his quality, and the way was opening for success in his career. For politics he had already shown an aptitude as a Liberal candidate in the election of 1892. The decision was far from easy. But the temptation was too strong. He turned his back upon the Woolsack and dedicated his gifts to the amusement of mankind. He soon became a popular favourite. *The Dolly Dialogues* roused the admiration of George Meredith. But the Ruritanian romances won a larger public. Their heroines, some thought, were touched with a delicacy not always found in their creator's portraits of contemporary English life. Anthony Hope possessed not only rich gifts of humour and imagination. He had gifts less often found in English authors, a scholar's sense of style, a philosopher's ironic observation, and wit both fine and rare. In one or two books, *The King's Mirror* and *Quisanté*, these gifts found almost adequate expression. In others they may seem to have been a little wasted on the subjects chosen for the tale. It is even arguable that his novels

of contemporary life did not, for the most part, do full justice to the remarkable powers which their author possessed.

It was inevitable that a strong lover of the theatre and a master of dialogue almost unequalled should sooner or later write for the stage. Somewhere among my papers there is still a type-written farce or comedy, in which at an early date we collaborated together, much to the amusement of ourselves if of nobody else. We unanimously decided not to offer it to the world. But Anthony Hope went on. The red-haired Princess of Ruritania had her counterpart in the theatre, and even possibly in his own home. *The Prisoner of Zenda* and *Rupert of Hentzau* were dramatised and held the stage for months together. Royalties from films of *The Prisoner of Zenda* must, I imagine, be flowing in still. George Alexander and Marie Tempest found themselves playing in parts which Anthony Hope had created. *Simon Dale* suggested a fresh setting for Nell Gwyn. *Pilkerton's Peerage,* a comedy or farce, had a background over which politicians chuckled. Hawkins, a lifelong Liberal and an old friend of Mr. Asquith, had a place in that list of potential peers prepared for the Prime Minister in the political crisis of 1911. *The Adventure of Lady Ursula,* delicately written and delicately played, proved to be a substantial theatrical success. Among actors and actresses Anthony Hope claimed a large company of friends. His marriage brought him into close touch with others. There were moments perhaps when his daughter may have dreamed of acting in her father's plays. To would-be writers for the stage he proved a shrewd and kindly counsellor. Indeed to literary aspirants of all kinds his own experience and his mellowing wisdom made him again and again an invaluable guide.

Anthony Hawkins worked hard all his life. He paid largely for his own education. He earned his own fortune. At Oxford he lived frugally, though he enjoyed the best that the University could give. In his early days at the Bar he lived laboriously and simply. He used to say, laughingly, that he had inherited a passion for economy from a Scottish ancestor who had been Provost of Glasgow in days gone by. But he could spend and did spend generously and freely when his means made it possible, as many a friend and relative, many a member of his own craft, will know. At literary gatherings he often showed himself an admirable chairman. He was a witty and distinguished speaker: he had not many superiors at meetings

of this kind. He once at least saved a banquet from disaster. And he would take the opportunity sometimes to offer valuable counsel to younger men who loved to hear of his adventures, and who hoped to qualify for his success.

As his fame increased, friends of all kinds gathered round him, not on one side of the Atlantic only. His powers of talk and of enjoyment made him very popular—a certain crisp authority of speech, great readiness in repartee and argument, a laugh which lightened any company that he was in. He never lost his love of reading. History, literature, politics, anthropology, nothing came amiss. One of his father's old friends always insisted that he ought to have given himself up to writing history. One or two of his own friends insisted that he ought to have given himself up to law—like Rufus Isaacs, his contemporary at the Bar, or John Simon and F. E. Smith, juniors whose powers he could well appreciate. There was a light side and a serious side in him: it was perhaps often a question which would come to the top. His love of work never left him, though in later years he was quick to declare that his vein was worked out. He never lost his judgment or his sense of values. He remained to the last probably the least satisfied critic that he had.

The truth is that Anthony Hope was a bigger man than his books showed him. There were depths which he did not easily reveal. His early friends were not wrong in discovering certain elements of greatness, strength of character, judgment and maturity, in the handsome boy they knew. It may be that the chances of his life, with all its happy circumstance of fame and of enjoyment, never gave the fullest opportunity to the powers which he possessed. But those who knew him best found in him a quality not given to many, and keep a memory of him which they will not readily let die.

CHARLES MALLET.

PALMERSTON, GARIBALDI AND ITALY.

ITALY and England have nearly always been good friends. One reason often quoted is that England rendered such great services to Italy during the period of the *Risorgimento*, and particularly in connection with Garibaldi's famous conquest of Naples. But these services were not very evident, and even Professor Trevelyan did not suggest much more than that England showed hearty goodwill and defied diplomatic conventions to help Piedmont and Garibaldi. But the publication by Dr. Gooch of the *Russell Correspondence* has led to something more being known, and some more details from that source and other records are here given.

They show that three specific services were rendered by England to Italy during the Garibaldi period. The first, already pretty well known, is the diplomatic intervention in favour of Piedmont. The next—not known at all—is Palmerston's resolve to prevent Spain interfering by force in Italy in favour of the Pope or King of Naples. The third, only slightly known hitherto, is the attempt either to buy Venetia for Piedmont or to induce Austria to exchange it for Moldavia and Wallachia. All of these measures were favoured by Lord John Russell, the notorious champion of Italy. The new evidence shows that Palmerston was not only little behind him in enthusiasm, but that he definitely suggested the intervention by force in favour of Piedmont against Spain. As will be abundantly illustrated, the actions and utterances of neither were on conventional lines.

I

There is no need here to tell the epic story of Garibaldi. Landing in Sicily in sight of French and British ships Garibaldi and his intrepid Red Shirts began their attack on a kingdom. After a series of marvellous successes first Palermo and then all Sicily fell beneath his sway. After a brief interval, during which he visited his island home in Caprera and tended his cows, Garibaldi embarked on the still greater enterprise of landing on the mainland and attacking Francisco, King of Naples, and his capital. His success was again marvellous. Garibaldi rode beneath the guns of Naples fearless, unarmed and almost unattended. The garrison refused to fire on him and surrendered the city. On October 26th, 1860, he rode out

to a village near Teano, and there met Victor Emmanuel approaching with the Piedmontese army. "King of Italy," was his greeting. A few days later a British ship bore the hero to Caprera.* He came back to his home poorer than when he left it. Just after Garibaldi had saluted Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy, two events of great importance occurred. The Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of the French had expressed their displeasure at Victor Emmanuel's proceedings by withdrawing their Ministers from his Court. The Prince Regent of Prussia had expressed strong disapproval of his actions. At this critical moment Lord Russell came out with a famous dispatch of October 27th. This, in effect, justified the proceedings both of Garibaldi and of Victor Emmanuel in language so bold and on principles apparently so revolutionary as to stagger the world of diplomacy. The dispatch was published at once so that the whole world saw the discomfiture of the pundits of reaction. They saw also that England intended to recognise Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy at the earliest possible moment.

The authorship is undoubtedly that of Russell. The arguments about the Revolution of 1688 and the quotations from Vattel had been employed by Lord John in his correspondence with the Queen, ten months before.† But the principle that the Neapolitans had won the right to choose their own King, and that the British Government supported them, was fully concurred in by Palmerston. The consequences to international diplomacy of Lord Russell's famous dispatch are worth studying. Its popular success was immediate and resounding. Russell's dispatch was published everywhere, his name was blessed by millions of Italians. It made it possible for Italy to be one and powerful. But the ultimate question is whether this immense gain was effected by a loss of too much. England approved the dissolution of the bonds between monarch and subject, sanctioned the force exercised by a revolutionary dictator against a sovereign at peace with all other powers, and disregarded all the Great Powers of Europe. All of them viewed it with horror and amazement.

The despots of Europe, Alexander II of Russia, Francis

* Lord Fisher says that, in 1860, when "he heard that he [Garibaldi] was coming, he taught the men in his ship the Italian National Anthem. Garibaldi wept when the men (1,200) greeted him by singing it." Lord Riddell's *War Diary* p. 62. I do not know if this is the occasion referred to.

† *Vide*, two letters of Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria, January 11th, 1860 and her reply; and two of April 30th and her reply. *Queen Victoria's Letters*, III, 397-8.

Joseph of Austria, the Prince Regent of Prussia met in conclave in October. The latter informed the Prince Consort of his views. "He seems very unhappy about Lord Russell's last published dispatches, which he calls a tough morsel to digest, in which he sees a disruption of the Law of Nations as hitherto recognised, and of the holy ties which bound people and sovereigns, and a declaration on the part of England that, wheresoever there exists any dissatisfaction among a people, they have the privilege to expel their sovereign, with the assured certainty of England's sympathy. The Prince sees great difficulty in the way of future agreement with England if that is to be the basis of her policy."* The saying went abroad: "Any Emperor or President who maintained an inconvenient sympathy for Canada, for Ireland, for India, or for the Channel Isles, will remember that Vattel and Lord John Russell approve of foreign intervention against oppressive and unpopular governments."

The real objection of rulers to Russell's action was to a foreign power applauding the deposition of a ruler by his subjects. Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort were evidently affected by this argument, though far from believing in the divinity of Kings. Russell had been, in fact, compelled to rely on Vattel and general principles, because Victoria had asked him to quote precedents for his action in applauding a breach of international law. He had therefore to justify himself in her eyes and in those of the world. He would have done much better to repeat the views he expressed to Granville on general principles of foreign policy. "There is no rule which may not be broke through."

Vattel, as Russell said, considered it permissible to succour a people oppressed by its sovereign, other jurists like Wheaton and Bluntschli defend the right of aiding an oppressed race.† But the particular case in point was stronger than the general principle. The oppression exercised by King Bomba of Naples had been unspeakable, but Francisco the new ruler had promised reforms after the loss of Palermo and appointed a constitutionalist Ministry. Russell took the view that Francisco could not be trusted, and that Garibaldi and his thousand could not have overthrown a kingdom of 90,000 soldiers, unless the people had supported him. From this point of view the argu-

* Martin, *Life of Prince Consort*, IV, 226-7.
† *Vide*, Hall, *International Law*, Part II, chap. viii (1904), p. 291.

ment was fairly good. It might be argued, in fact, that Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia and ruler of Piedmont, who had established the rule of Constitution and law in his own country, would establish it in Naples and in Sicily if he ruled there. Russell could therefore justly claim that he was disavowing a royal system of disorder and lawlessness and recognising a royal system of order and law. His oft-repeated analogy of William III's descent upon England had a basis of fact. "I come among you," said William, as he landed in England, "to secure your liberties." He received a very old man, who said to him: "But for your Highness, I could have survived the Law." With these professions William, though not an English prince, invaded England. With the same profession Victor Emmanuel, who was an Italian, invaded Naples.

Other justifications can be found, the best based on the model of the Treaty of Vienna. The argument is thus put by Lord Acton: "In 1815 the Germans wanted territory (from France). Alexander (Emperor of Russia) decided that a better security would be (the adoption by France of) a popular constitution. It was imposed on France as an alternative for territory [restored to her]. It [the constitution] was the security of European peace. By how much more popular founded on general opinion, by so much more valuable in the eyes of Europe."* The inclusion of Naples and Sicily within Piedmont meant to Palmerston and Russell the extension of constitutionalism and therefore of peace, order and legality.

But this way of looking at it was not wholly sound. Canning believed that a nation had a right to depose its ruler; or that a portion of it, like one of the Spanish colonies, had a right to throw off the sovereignty of a parent State like Spain. In such case, when the rebels had acquired a certain degree of force and consistency, England would recognise the State as a republic or as independent. But he never admitted that this could be done against treaty rights, and the Treaty of Vienna was undoubtedly infringed and the balance of power disturbed, by the addition of Naples and Sicily to Piedmont. It was a strong step to assume that the will of Naples and Sicily overrode those treaty rights when that will was aided to success by Piedmont from without. Against this might be put this proposition. "Burke says the nation must be able to do its will. Yes, but not its criminal will. In that case it loses its right to inde-

* *Acton MSS. 5443*, Cambridge University Library.

pendence." Again the ideal of unity of Italy meant revolution. Were Palmerston and Russell justified in promoting it? "Revolution is the right to make one's own government, who has the right? Not every part of (the) country. Not (La) Vendée, for instance, but Ireland."* It is therefore a fair question if Naples and Sicily, being merely a part of the Italian peninsula, had the right to disturb the whole of it.

To these questions no direct answer can be given. Palmerston later stated, in connection with Schleswig Holstein, "if the Duchies had forced themselves from Denmark by their own exertions, they would have acquired a right to dispose of themselves" (September 19th, 1865).† This was good Canningite doctrine. But Naples and Sicily had only done this with the armed aid of King Victor Emmanuel, and their action disturbed the whole Peninsula. Palmerston and Russell argued that, as the return of King Francisco to Naples was "impossible," the absorption of that Kingdom in Piedmont would lead to peace. But they defended this proposal as a special case, not as a general principle.

Whatever philosophical conclusions we may draw as to Russell's famous dispatch of October 27th, there can be no doubt as to its practical effect in stabilising the new situation and particularly in recognising the King of Sardinia as ruler of a whole country. The first Italian Parliament opened at the end of March 1861. On the 30th, Lord John Russell formally recognised Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy. Napoleon III did not recognise him till June 25th, and no other Power till much later. Russell's action was clearly a *beau geste*.

II

In the famous dispatch of October 27th, 1860, Palmerston and Russell had started a paper war with dispatches and protocols for weapons. But these were not the only arms they were prepared to use. The very same week they took steps to protect Piedmont by force from the consequences of its support of Garibaldi, and thus definitely to protect the movement for Italian unity against unprovoked aggression. Here the initiative came from Palmerston. The matter is rather obscure, but much can be gleaned by a study of the private letters of Palmerston

* *Acton MSS. 5462*, Cambridge University Library.
† Gooch, *Russell Correspondence*, II, 316.

to Russell. Palmerston's letters of October 26th and 28th show that Napoleon III had suggested to England that Spain was preparing to intervene by force in favour of Francisco, King of Naples, or the Pope. Palmerston proposed to stop Spain by force from intervening. He appears to have encountered opposition from Queen Victoria. At any rate he wrote thus to Russell (October 29th, 1860):*

> There is no force in the Queen's argument. It does not in the least follow that because we prevent Spain from invading Italy we are therefore bound to assist or countenance France in invading Austria or any other part of Germany. I think it is quite impossible for us with a powerful Fleet in the Mediterranean to stand by and see Spain crush by force of arms the nascent Liberties of Italy; our preventing such an outrage would in no fair sense of the word be deemed Interference in the affairs of Italy; and I am confident from the little which I have seen in those parts of the public feeling on the Italian qustion that if we were to shrink from taking our Line on such a question if it should arise we should be deemed to be betraying our own Principles and abdicating the Position which this country ought to hold among the Nations of the world.

Queen Victoria was not allowed to prevent the dispatch of a telegram the same day to Spain:

> Monday, 7 p.m. There is a rumour that the Queen of Spain wishes to assist the Pope by force of arms. Ascertain whether any truth. It would be of very serious consequence. —J. RUSSELL.†

The British Minister at Madrid replied thus:

> My last dispatch and Prime Minister's declarations in [the Spanish] Parliament refute rumours mentioned in Your Lordship's message of this day. Postcript.—Whatever the Queen of Spain may wish, the Prime Minister declared yesterday that Spain will not abandon her neutrality, except to protect the independence and integrity and honour of the country.—A. BUCHANAN.

In fact it was a false alarm, due to insidious suggestions from Napoleon. O'Donnell, the Prime Minister, had declared on October 27th in the Parliament that Spain would not intervene by arms to protect the Pope. The Papal Legate in Spain had declared Queen Isabella "unable or unwilling" to help the Pope. So Palmerston had not to bring England's thunders

* Public Record Office, G.D.22/21 Pte., *Russell Papers*, Palmerston to Russell, October 29th, 1860.
† The telegram is in F.O.185/365, No. 136 of October 29th.

into play. But it seems to be the one occasion in the whole Italian crisis, when England was prepared to fight to protect Piedmont in her adventurous courses. And the fact is also apparently unknown.

III

Palmerston's view of Austrian rule in Venetia may be deduced from the letter that follows. He had just received notice of Austrian repressive measures in Venetia. One Austrian Edict sequestrated the property of 500 Italians, who had left Venetia, unless they returned immediately. Another punished men for wearing tiepins of three colours (i.e. the Italian tricolour). A third punished women for wearing rings with white marks in them which were termed " the tears of Italy."

> " Pray observe," wrote Palmerston, September 21st, 1860, " what Perry says of the state of Venetia and of the system of Austrian government in his Dispatch No. 8 of the 14th of this month. What a picture he gives. People arrested and to be kept in Prison some without trial, others including a lady of Rank and Family after acquittal. The whole Population ripe for revolt; the Garrison who are to defend the place against attack on the Point of melting and spiking the guns they are expected to fire off! All this in addition to the wholesale sequestration of Property as a Punishment for evading arrest and imprisonment by leaving the country and the minute interference with the shirt-pins of men and the finger-rings of women.
>
> " Can any man believe that the occupation of a country on these conditions can be a source of strength to any government or Empire; and can any man believe that an occupation on these conditions can be lasting? . . . every liberal-minded man will rejoice when the day of its overthrow arrives. It is an act of political infatuation in Austria to cling to the possession of a country which it cannot hold without crushing it and treading with her Iron Heel on the necks of a resentful population. . . . Austria as long as she holds Venice will have every Italian her bitter foe. . . . Cavour and Victor Emmanuel may say and promise what they will, but when Italy shall have been well-organised as one and undivided, which it soon will have been, barring Rome and its immediate neighbourhood, they will be forced into a quarrel with Austria about Venice, and the sympathies of Europe will go with them, and military success will crown their efforts."*

* G.D.22/21 Pte., *Russell Papers*, Palmerston to Russell, September 21st, 1860.

Though he did not believe that Venetia could remain permanently part of Austria, Palmerston was ready with a practical suggestion. He, therefore, proposed to her the commonsense expedient of selling Venetia to the enlarged Piedmont for money. He actually contemplated sending Clarendon to Vienna on a special mission for that purpose at the end of 1860. In mid-July, 1862, Palmerston told Apponyi: " There were only two ways: to sell it (Venetia) or govern it in a conciliatory way. You (Austria) did neither." Russell also indulged in plain speaking: " In case of an attack on Venetia no English minister could ever take part and lot with us, in face of so pronounced a public opinion in his country."*

This proposed bargain was endlessly discussed during the coming years. The following account of an interview with Lord J. Russell on November 18th, 1863, reported by the Austrian Minister, is not without some humour:

> Not without visible embarrassment Lord Russell tried to introduce the second question . . . as one which might be treated in the [European] Congress. He called to his help a letter of the King of the Belgians which he had just received and which, mentioning the difficulties raised by Napoleon III's project, contained among others the following passage: " If there was question of an abandonment by Austria of her Italian provinces, it is clear that this could only be effected for ample compensations [elsewhere]."
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> This was the point to which Lord Russell wished to come, and I resolved to settle this question once and for all . . . [so I said]: " We are often slow . . . in deciding, but on this point we have not had a moment's hesitation, and I have been charged by the Emperor and his Government not to leave a shadow of doubt on a resolution which is irrevocable, whatever may happen. We might lose a province as the result of an unfortunate war, we have a sad instance of this, but to sacrifice one lightheartedly, while sitting round a green table, to satisfy caprices and I do not know what imaginary need for reshaping of the map of Europe. Never! We prefer to run the risks of war." . . . " That is very plain language," my interlocutor contented himself with saying. He had heard me with attention mixed with surprise. " I rather expected this point of view " [he said], " but it is another question if it is a wise one."
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> " It is the language England would undoubtedly hold," replied I unconcernedly, " if a Congress arrogated to itself the right of disposing of one of its possessions. Do you agree? " The minister remained silent.

* *W[iener] S[taats] A[rchiv]*, VIII, 64, from Apponyi Nos. 52 A and B of July 16th and 17th, 1862.

"As for compensations," replied I, "allow me to tell you, Austria recognises no one (not even a European Areopagus) who has the right to offer them. It could only be at the expense of its neighbours, and I repeat to you we do not wish to despoil others, in order to be despoiled ourselves."

"Yet," said Lord Russell, "there are examples. The House of Lorraine renounced its Duchy to obtain Tuscany."

"And now," cried I, "its successors [i.e. the Grand Duke of Tuscany] possess neither the one nor the other. If that is what you call compensations, your historical quotation is not a happy one. . . . Do you not see that the Danubian provinces [Moldavia and Wallachia] are the only compensation that could be offered to us for Venetia, and would not [the cession of] these provinces imply the Eastern question and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire?"

This observation made Lord Russell think, and after some moments of silence he said, "If for one reason or another we decline to enter the Congress, can we reckon on Austria following our example?" "I believe I can say so," said I, and these words seemed somewhat to impress him.*

The failure of this attempt to persuade Austria to sell or exchange Venetia did not end matters. But Austria was too proud to sell or even cede territory. It all came to nothing. As Lord Russell plays the principal part here I may perhaps end with two anecdotes about him.

Lord Russell remained throughout his period at the Foreign Office a warm friend of Italy. His friendship took unconventional ways of expressing itself. On one occasion Count Apponyi, the Austrian Minister, admired a handsome stick that Lord John carried.† "I am glad you like it," said Lord John, with a quick, upward look, "it belonged once to Garibaldi." On another occasion the whole diplomatic *corps* were entertained by Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford, at Woburn Place. Apponyi's son, who was in attendance, could not find his hat as he was leaving. Russell said, "I'll give you one." He brought out one of his own, fitted it on to the young man's head, crushing it down. "There," said he, "I hope it will get some good liberal ideas into your head."

HAROLD TEMPERLEY.

* *W.S.A.*, VIII, 67, from Apponyi No. 86 B of November 18th, 1863.

† These two anecdotes were told to me by Count Alexander Apponyi, who was at that time *Chargé d'Affaires* to his father in London.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

OPINION with regard to American foreign policy ha been fluctuating as wildly from one extreme to anothe as any speculative stock during the exciting months whicl have followed Mr. Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration. Th initial tendency was one of great optimism. It was thought tha the new Democratic President might prove himself in externa matters as much of an internationalist as he was proving him self a radical in domestic ones. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald wa almost ecstatic in his greeting of Mr. Norman Davis' speecl at the Disarmament Conference. America, he said, had boldly openly, cut her moorings in the quays of the New World, an had launched herself under full sail, with high courage an with very fine determination, on to new waters. Prominen American advocates of an advanced international policy wer almost equally enthusiastic, a man like Mr. Raymond Fosdick for example, writing in glowing terms of "The End of Isola tion." Though there were sceptics in both continents wh doubted the reality of the advance, most liberals in Europe an America were obviously hopeful that the change from Mr Hoover to Mr. Roosevelt was going to make as much differenc in the international as in the domestic sphere.

And then suddenly, with growing volume since the openin of the Monetary and Economic Conference, the current of opinio turned. The United States would not agree to even a temporar and *de facto* stabilisation of currencies. There began to be tall in and out of America of an increase rather than of a reductio of tariffs. The prospects of a period of intensified economi nationalism became greater and the prestige of advocates of contrary policy, such as the present Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull, began to decline. Public opinion, which early i May was largely acclaiming Mr. Roosevelt and the Unite States as the hopes of the world, was by the middle of Jun becoming more than inclined to regard them as the chie obstacle to advance, at least in connection with currency ques tions, which were thought to be an imperative first line of attac in connection with the economic depression.

There are several causes for this sudden and complete chang of front. In the first place it is due to a double miscalculatio on the part of the public. Enthusiasm with regard to Americar foreign policy as foreshadowed up to the middle of May wa

exaggerated. The new moves which Mr. Roosevelt had announced, though valuable, were hardly sufficient to justify such descriptions of them as that which we have quoted of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's. They went very little further than Mr. Hoover and Mr. Stimson had been willing to go last year and they were necessarily hedged about with restrictions. On the other hand criticisms of the new policy as one of economic nationalism pure and simple are equally misplaced. All that the United States has done so far has been to proceed with her own domestic policy of inflation and industrial control, and to reserve the right to take such steps as may be necessary to protect her while doing so, i.e. by adjusting her foreign exchange rate and her tariff to the new ratio between American and foreign price levels and costs of production. She is still as eager as she ever was both to convert other nations to a domestic policy similar to her own and to work out an international policy of saner, lower tariffs, of restored price levels, of stable exchanges and a stable international standard of money, and other measures which may make possible a revival of world trade. She has neither declared nor shown any intention of resorting to currency depreciation or higher tariffs as competitive weapons or in preference to measures of international regulation.

What has really changed, in so far as there has been an actual change in American policy, and not merely a changed public attitude with regard to it, has been the situation to which it was adjusted. To begin with Mr. Roosevelt hoped that other nations would follow a policy of price lifting by monetary and other action and of creating employment by public works financed out of borrowed money similar to that to which he was committed in America. He had reason to believe that many of them would do so, since their representatives in Washington in April and May had seemed to be sympathetic to such ideas of his and had joined him in his statements endorsing such a policy If they had done so, and if world prices had followed American prices upwards, there would have been no necessity for the depreciation of the dollar or for any thought of tariff increases no need to oppose proposals for the stabilisation of currencies no need to choose between domestic and foreign policies. It has been a change abroad rather than a change in America which has made the domestic and the foreign policies of the United States appear incompatible. It has been the growing certainty that the chief European States would not pursue any policy of

inflation or any ambitious programme of state-aided public works.

In the absence of such a common policy abroad Mr. Roosevelt has been forced, as he never expected to be, to choose between his domestic and his foreign policies, at least so far as immediate action is concerned. He has chosen, as was really inevitable, to follow his domestic plans, even where they cut across his foreign ones. He has not felt entitled to surrender all hope of conquering unemployment and the depression generally by heroic measures, similar to, though more drastic than, those suggested by British Liberals, as well as by economists like Mr. Maynard Keynes, in England a year or so ago, for the sake of doubtful, moderate international agreements.

He is still, however, a convinced internationalist and is unwilling to admit any permanent or basic incompatibility between his domestic and foreign policies. He is as eager to achieve currency stabilisation and to restore the gold standard, as well as to lift the world price of silver, as he ever was. He only wishes to delay the bringing into operation of such measures until his policy of domestic price lifting has been tried out. He is as determined as he ever was to effect a reduction of tariffs, of his own as well as of those of other countries, so as to clear the channels of world trade of as many as possible of the new barriers that have recently been erected to obstruct them. He only wishes to reserve to himself the right to adjust the American tariff, if necessary, to the new ratio between domestic and foreign prices and costs, which would really be, not a new barrier to trade, but a maintenance of a *status quo* which would otherwise be overturned by the conflict between American inflation and foreign deflation. He is very eager to effect international agreements to raise prices and to limit production, and is under no obligation with regard to these matters even to delay or to qualify his support of them. Action in such spheres is indeed an essential part of his domestic policy, which cannot fully succeed unless it is co-ordinated with that of other countries. He is perfectly sincere in all the measures which his London delegation has been putting forward. He has by no means retreated from any of his former positions, except in so far as he has been compelled to do so temporarily, as in the matter of currency stabilisation, by the failure of foreign countries to follow him in his domestic experiments. And even in such matters he remains devoted to his former proposals as

" ultimate " (by which he does not mean distant) objectives of his policy.

There has, of course, been some evidence that the influence of his more nationalistic advisers, who regard the problems of the depression, so far as they affect America, as being largely domestic, and who think that the international measures which might be taken are relatively few and minor, of men like Mr. Bernard Baruch and Professor Raymond Moley, has been growing, while that of his internationalist and low tariff advisers, who pin their main hopes to international action, of men like his Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, has been declining.

The progress of the purely domestic measures so far taken, and the optimism that they, and the speculative boomlet which has accompanied them, have caused, have undoubtedly strengthened the hands of those many Americans, including a powerful section of Mr. Roosevelt's following, who believe that the United States can make a considerable measure of recovery by itself and without regard to the rest of the world. On the other hand the pessimism which is generally current, perhaps more even abroad than in America, with regard to the prospects of really effective progress at Geneva in relation to Disarmament, or at London in relation to economic matters, has greatly weakened the case of the internationalists, who can hardly ask the United States to surrender her domestic experiment for the sake of very moderate international agreements, and whose hope of getting far-reaching agreements has been declining.

The pull between these two sections of American opinion, between whom the President whose internationalism, like his liberalism, is perhaps more of the heart than of the head, and therefore not of a kind to stand a great strain, is uneasily poised, will be continual. It is impossible to say which way the result will go, now probably to one section, now to the other. If progress is made at Geneva and London, Mr. Hull will win and many, if not all, of the hopes of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the other optimists with regard to American foreign policy will be realised. If little or no progress is made abroad, and if the domestic experiment continues to give hopes of success, then Mr. Baruch and the other nationalists will win, and many, though not all, of the fears of the pessimists that the United States may revert to her nationalistic ways will be justified. The issue at the moment is uncertain. And the result depends at least as much on foreign action, and on the backing that the internationalists thus get, as on any purely American developments.

Even if all the fears of the pessimists are realised, if the Economic Conference breaks down, and if the United States reverts to a policy of extreme economic nationalism, it must not, however, be thought that the whole of Mr. Roosevelt's liberal foreign policy will have been sacrificed. His political measures, which are those which Mr. MacDonald had most in mind when he made his encouraging speech in May, may stand even if his economic measures have to be thrown aside. Further progress in that direction, which would have been probable had an internationalist economic policy been adopted, may be difficult if a nationalistic economic policy has to be pursued instead. The atmosphere, which is an important factor in such matters, will be unfriendly instead of favourable to further advances. But the progress already realised, of which sight may be lost because of later developments, will stand.

That progress, whether it be as great as Mr. MacDonald suggested or not, is at least considerable, and should be carefully studied. The United States has now accepted four important new principles of policy. She is willing formally to accept that obligation to consult with the other signatories to the Pact of Paris whenever any breach of that Pact is threatened which she has already honoured in practice ever since the Pact was signed. She is willing to enter into a new Pact of Non-Aggression, and is inclined to favour a simple new definition of aggression (the presence of the armed forces of one State on the territory of another in violation of some treaty or treaty right). She is willing, if after consultation, she agrees with other States as to their verdict against an aggressor, to promise not to stand in the way of any international action those other States may take against that aggressor. And she is willing to enter into a far-reaching Disarmament Convention including, something to which the United States has always previously been opposed, the most drastic system of international supervision. Although these new policies, which are very similar to those which Mr. Stimson outlined last year, have not yet been formally adopted by Congress, and cannot therefore be finally counted upon, they are already in a very real sense the policy of the United States. They are the proposals of the most powerful President of modern times. They are virtually in accordance with the proposals of his Republican predecessor. They are in

sympathy with the declarations of the two great American parties in their election platforms last year. They have been greeted favourably by the American public and by most of the important Congressional and other leaders. They are unlikely seriously to be gone back upon even in the event of a serious set-back to the rest of Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy.

These proposals taken together do make the United States in form, what she has been in fact ever since the Pact of Paris was signed, an integral part of the world's system of pacific international settlement of disputes. They do justify Mr. MacDonald in saying, "Henceforth America, by her own declaration, is to be indifferent to nothing that concerns the peace of the world." They do remove all practical danger of a conflict between the League and the United States. They do remove all obstacles, so far as America is concerned, to other powers proceeding with a more water-tight system of mutual guarantee, including armed and other sanctions. They do all that America can now do to make possible a real advance in the connected spheres of security, arbitration and disarmament.

America's neutral rights will no longer be an obstacle to any system of mutual international guarantee. America will no longer complicate the other Powers in their task of deciding upon, and taking measures against, an aggressor. The United States, by withdrawing her neutral rights as against such international action, and by taking power to herself to declare an embargo upon shipments of arms to all belligerents, will, as it were, insulate herself against outside wars, thus leaving other Powers free to take what steps they think fit to prevent war or to punish a peace-breaker.

So far as Disarmament is concerned the United States has shown herself willing to go as far as any other Power (her new naval building programme is only apparently a contradiction of this policy, since it is being undertaken purely for the sake of the employment involved and will be kept well within treaty limits). She will accept the present British draft; will make no destructive amendments; will help, by accepting international supervision, to placate any possible French opposition; will try to buy reductions in armaments by her security proposals (i.e. the Consultative Pact). She has also declared her intention of pressing for further disarmament by stages, of which the treaty resulting from the present Conference will only be the first, until a level of armaments proportionate to that imposed upon

Germany, and therefore equal to the needs of legitimate self defence, is reached.

The restrictions that have been attached to these proposals, though weighty in theory, need not be regarded as dangerous in fact. Mr. Roosevelt was bound to reserve the decision of the United States, to say in each case, "If we concur" the United States will do thus and thus. This is not to be taken as a loop-hole whereby the United States may avoid her obligations. There is, if one may judge by past experience, no real danger of the United States differing from the verdict of the rest of the world as to which of any two warring States was in fact the aggressor, or as to the justice of taking measures against it. Foreign opinion should realise it can trust American opinion in this matter, which is no less sincere in that it is determined to retain the final decision in its own hands and not to remit it to any outside body. The veto power thus given to the United States outside the League is only the same veto that the members of the League Council themselves possess in fact under the League's unanimity provisions.

These new principles of American policy are surely enough of themselves to make the new administration's record a notable one. When they are taken in conjunction with Mr. Roosevelt's personal qualities and sympathies and with the greatly increased recognition in the United States of the interdependence of nations, they do constitute a "new deal" for foreign powers almost as complete as that "new deal" which the Democratic victory has brought to America. Whichever way the balance between the nationalists and the internationalists turns, and thus affects future American economic policy, the world can at any rate congratulate itself that it is free as it never was before to go ahead with its political arrangements without fear of American interference. And it can count also, more than it could before, on a friendly and sympathetic attitude on the part of the American Government, whose desire to play the part of a "good neighbour" cannot be doubted.

FRANK DARVALL.

TEN YEARS OF KEMALISM.

THE Kemalists have now been ruling Turkey for ten years and the occasion is, therefore, opportune to review what has been done during that period. The internal situation of the young Republic is good. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, governing through Ismet Pasha, his Prime Minister since 1925, has given the Turks what they require : that is to say, an autocratic form of Government. It is true that the Grand National Assembly in Angora is in session during six months of the year, but it is Kemal and his lieutenants who rule the country. Their discipline has been severe and strong measures have been taken whenever necessary. The result has been that, apart from two unsuccessful rebellions by the Kurds, the nation has enjoyed ten years of peace and stability. When one remembers that from 1911 to 1922 the Turks were almost continually at war, at first with the Italians, then with the Balkan States, afterwards with the Allies, and finally with the Greeks, it will be realised how greatly the country needed peace.

When Mustapha Kemal Pasha raised the flag of Independence in Asia Minor in 1919 the Ottoman Empire was on its last legs. It took the Ghazi four years to drive the Greeks out of Anatolia, expel the Sultan, and undermine the influence of the " old Turks " congregated in Constantinople. It was only when these things had been accomplished that he was free to pursue his modernising policy. The principal reforms undertaken by Mustapha Kemal are too well known to require recapitulation here. It will suffice to say that in an astonishingly short space of time Kemal emancipated women (in the towns), made Turkey into a laic State, changed the alphabet, forbade men to wear the fez and carried out a host of other reforms.

The main point of interest to the foreign observer is how the Turks have reacted to these reforms. The women in the towns are delighted at having gained their liberty. To most of them liberty spells pleasure and what woman does not like pleasure? Turkish women also welcome the abolition of polygamy and the introduction of equitable divorce laws. The fact that, if they are so inclined, they can go out and earn their own living also appeals to certain amongst them. The position of women in the villages has, however, been little affected by Kemal's emancipation movement. Life still consists of hard toil in the fields or in the home. In few places has the peasant woman changed either

her dress or her habits. The law forbidding a man to have more than one wife does not weigh very much with country people, with whom monogamy was always more prevalent than polygamy.

Religious elements are, of course, discontented with the present régime. In the days of the sultans the *hojas* (priests) and all those connected with them had many powers and privileges. Priesthood was, indeed, a much sought after profession ; to-day there are comparatively few young Turkish men who are candidates for the mosque. Although the majority of the *hojas* have bowed to the inevitable, some of the extreme fanatical and reactionary elements have allowed their sense of grievance to outrun their discretion. Religious risings occurred at Menemen, near Smyrna, in 1931, and again this year at Brusa. Both movements were rapidly quelled and at Menemen the Government took the strongest possible measures, hanging several reactionaries and condemning others to long terms of imprisonment. There were no repercussions in other parts of the country and it is clear that religious elements stand little chance of successfully coping with the authorities.

In the educational sphere there has been a tremendous upheaval. The suppression of the Arabic characters and the introduction of a new alphabet derived from Latin was in itself a revolution. Mustapha Kemal sprang this reform on Turkey by surprise and he earned the nickname of " Schoolmaster-in-Chief " because he himself taught his Ministers and Deputies how to write the new script. He followed up this reform by intensive research work into the origin of the Turkish language and he has now ordained that all Persian and Arabic words shall be expunged from the Turkish dictionary. The introduction of the new alphabet has caused education to advance by leaps and bounds. For the first time in their lives many Turks have learnt how to read and write. The Government has spent considerable sums on education ; many new schools have been built in Anatolia while a higher standard is required of school teachers. The necessity of impressing on Turkish youth what the Kemalist régime has done for Turkey has not been lost sight of and the curriculum in all schools includes glorification of Nationalistic ideals. It is, perhaps, regrettable that foreign schools have not prospered under the Kemalists as they did under the Sultans, but this was only to be expected when one considers the unduly privileged position which foreign institutions enjoyed under the Capitulations.

In so far as Turkish men and the new reforms are concerned, it can, in the opinion of the writer, be definitely stated that they are not dissatisfied. When the fez was forbidden the older generations were displeased and even to-day some men still persist in twisting their hats and caps into shapes resembling a fez. But the overwhelming majority have taken kindly to the European form of headdress and are glad that the fez has been abolished. Furthermore, men in both towns and villages are grateful to Mustapha Kemal for having expelled the Greeks and Armenians who, in the past, had most of Turkey's trade in their hands. Since 1923 Turks have begun to take business and finance very seriously and although at first they naturally made many mistakes, they are slowly learning how to trade. Another benefit which the Kemalists have conferred on Turkey is the maintenance of internal law and order. Brigandage has been almost entirely stamped out and the Anatolian roads are, for the first time for centuries, safe for the pedestrian and the horseman. The Kurds gave serious trouble in 1925 and 1930 and the resources of the Turkish Army were heavily taxed in the neighbourhood of Lake Van. Possibly the Kurds will give trouble again, but the friendly relations now existing between Turkey on one hand, and Persia and Iraq on the other, should prevent Kurdish insurgents from being able to take refuge across the frontier when pursued by Turkish troops.

Domestic politics are dull. The Turks, in contrast to the Greeks and Bulgarians, are not very interested in politics. Mustapha Kemal knows this and he has arranged Turkish politics so that they shall provide the minimum of interest. The Kemalist Party, of which he is the President, possesses a monopoly in the Angora Parliament. Three years ago Fethy Bey, a former Premier and distinguished diplomatist, formed a second party in opposition to the Kemalists. But its career was brief and inglorious. Kemal, who was then credited with wishing to institute the two-party system, soon realised that Turkey was not ripe for a system which is to-day in almost general disuse.

Mustapha Kemal was never rash enough to believe that he could do everything himself. He waited some time before he chose his advisers and, on the whole, he has been lucky in his choices. In Ismet Pasha he found the ideal Prime Minister. Kemal and Ismet are a strong pair; the former is daring, magnetic and has plenty of *flair*; the latter is hard working, conscientious, and loyal to his master. Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff, looks after military matters and does not hesitate to speak his mind if he considers that Kemal and Ismet are making a mistake. Close to the President and his Prime Minister are a number of other men all of whom are devoted to their leaders and imbued with the same principles and ideals. Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Foreign Minister, is one; Redjeb Bey, the Secretary-General of the Kemalist Party, is another. In the Cabinet there are such stalwarts as Abdulhalik Bey, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Refik Bey, the Minister of Health, and Jelal Bey, the young Minister of National Economy.

The main ideal of the Kemalists is " Turkey for the Turks." Mustapha Kemal has preached a nationalistic doctrine which has spread throughout the party. But the Turkish President has been careful to make it clear that he does not want such a dogma applied in any narrow spirit. Over and over again he has emphasised the need for toleration and the record of Turkish foreign policy during the past decade is proof that Kemalism does not stand for extreme Nationalism.

There is, however, one criticism which any conscientious foreign observer in Turkey is bound to make. This concerns the economic policy pursued by Turkey. For years the Turks have been searching for an economic formula best suited to their needs. In the course of this search they have been guilty of a narrow-minded attitude towards foreigners trading with the Republic. Many foreigners have, indeed, given up the unequal struggle and left the country. Those who have remained have only been able to carry on with the greatest difficulty. Latterly there have been signs that the Government realises that it has pursued a mistaken policy and there has been some welcome collaboration between Turks and foreigners in finance and in business. Import trade is, unfortunately, subjected to all kinds of irksome restrictions and regulations, with the result that Constantinople and Smyrna, Turkey's largest towns, are in a sorry plight. The case of Constantinople is a curious one. When the Kemalists made the capital in Angora they were jealous and distrustful of Constantinople and wished to divert the Anatolian trade to other ports. Now they have realised that this was unwise, being besides impossible. Rather late in the day, they are trying to restore the fortunes of the former capital. The collapse of Russia and the creation of a modern port at the Piræus are two factors which greatly militate against the

recovery of Constantinople. The population has shrunk to about 750,000; there is much poverty and there are signs of unemployment. The situation in Smyrna is much the same, despite the vast riches of a Vilayet where tobacco, dried fruits and other produce flourish in abundance.

In the provinces the economic situation is also not very encouraging. Grain and other agricultural produce have not fetched good prices on account of the world crisis. Fierce competition from Greece and Bulgaria has forced tobacco merchants to cut prices until there is a bare margin of profit. Nevertheless, the Turkish peasant is probably as well off to-day as he has been in the past, and, accustomed as he is to a very low standard of living, does not unduly feel the pinch. The imposition of heavy taxes, and the efficient collecting thereof has, however, angered the peasant in some localities. For the first time in centuries taxes are being levied all over Turkey and the Kemalists are really to be congratulated on having had the courage to make their citizens pay.

It is difficult to write authoritatively about Turkish financial affairs as little reliable information is available. According to official statements the Turkish Budget is balanced—but at a very low figure. This year, for instance, it totals about £24,000,000. Of this sum, National Defence, which includes expenditure on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie, amounts to about 28 per cent., a considerable reduction over previous years. A large sum has also been set aside for railway construction. Revenue is chiefly obtained from direct taxation and the receipts of Government monopolies. Customs receipts show a big decline because of the "Quota" system now in vogue. Monopolies, especially that for tobacco, still yield a large revenue but they contribute to the dearness of living.

Apart from the Ottoman Debt the Turkish Republic has no foreign financial obligations of importance. This Debt was contracted by the Ottoman Empire and threatened to constitute a serious strain on the Republican exchequer. It was obvious that Turkey could not fulfil the conditions of the 1928 agreement and at one time it appeared that total default was probable. But now, after lengthy negotiations in Paris, the Turkish share of the debt has been reduced to a fraction of the original amount. Turkey will henceforth only have to pay about £670,000 gold annually, the capital of the Debt having been fixed at £7,000,000 gold. The desire of France, who is Turkey's chief creditor, to

resume friendly financial relations with the Republic is largely responsible for this favourable settlement. Meanwhile the Turkish exchange remains steady. When Great Britain went off the gold standard the Turkish pound was "pegged" to the French franc, the rate being 12·12 francs to the Turkish paper pound. Before the war the Turkish gold pound was worth 25 francs.

The most important internal economic development has been that of railway construction. On railways the Kemalists have spent lavishly. Ismet Pasha is a convinced exponent of the theory that "If you build a railway, people will come and live near it and use it." Under his administration many new lines have been built in Anatolia and in a few years Turkey in Asia will have an extensive network of railways linking up Angora with the Black Sea, the Aegean, the Eastern Vilayets, and Constantinople. These railways have been built by Germans, Swedes, and Danes. Turkey has supplied the money and the manual labour. The railways have been built out of revenue and, therefore, the charge has fallen on the present generation instead, as is usually the case, of the cost being spread over a long period. At present these new railways work at a loss and it will be some time before they can become profit-earning concerns. The programme is not yet complete and this year the Government has floated an internal loan of nearly £2,000,000, so that a line may be built to Arghana where there are rich copper mines.

In foreign affairs Republican Turkey has been singularly adroit and it can be stated that she possesses no enemies and several good friends. Undoubtedly the most remarkable feature about her foreign policy has been the *rapprochement* which has taken place with her hereditary enemy, Greece. The two neighbours now live on terms of the utmost amity and it will not be surprising if an alliance is concluded between Angora and Athens before the year is out. Ismet Pasha, Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and M. Venizelos prepared the ground for this friendship, which was encouraged by Fascist diplomacy. The general lines of Turkish foreign policy were well summed up by Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey a few years ago. The Foreign Minister said: "Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what she holds." Apart from this declaration it has already been made abundantly clear that Turkey desires peace. The first act of the Foreign Minister, when the Republic was

firmly established, was to enter into negotiations with neighbouring countries with a view to concluding treaties of non-aggression and friendship. Treaties of this nature have now been signed with the majority of the European nations as well as with several Asiatic and American States.

The Great Power with whom Turkey has maintained the most friendly relations is Soviet Russia—her ally during the war against the Greeks. Despite this friendship, the Turks have made it clear to the Russians that they will not tolerate any propaganda by Communist agents in Turkey. The friendship between these two countries may consequently seem unreal to the casual observer, especially as a revival of imperialistic foreign policy on the part of the Bolsheviks is by no means improbable. The Kemalists, who are not blind to the dangers of such a possibility, have wisely decided to cultivate good relations with a powerful neighbour. By so doing they have strengthened their own position in the Middle East and they have obtained certain concrete advantages, such as a large commercial credit, a Black Sea Naval Pact, and other agreements. Then, until last year, Turkey and Russia had a further bond in common in that neither of them belonged to the League of Nations. Turkey is now represented at Geneva, but this has not impaired the good relations between Angora and Moscow.

Anglo-Turkish relations are cordial; that is all that can be said about them for the time being. They have certainly undergone a vast improvement since 1925 when the Mosul oilfields question threatened to cause hostilities. But the Kemalists are still inclined to distrust British foreign policy. Tewfik Rushdi Bey is at present in London attending the World Economic Conference. British trade with Turkey has not flourished as it should have done. No large Government contracts have gone England's way; one reason for this may be that English firms have failed to interest themselves sufficiently in Turkey, but the Turkish fear that British commercial and financial interests may march hand in hand with political considerations is probably the principal factor. It is to be regretted that Anglo-Turkish relations have not become closer especially as the men on the spot have done all in their power to bring about a better understanding. Sir George Clerk, the British Ambassador to Turkey, is shortly due to proceed to Brussels, and his departure will be mourned by the Kemalists from the Ghazi downwards as he has certainly done all in his power to improve relations.

With Italy and France, Turkey is friendly, but she neither wishes, nor dares, to be too friendly with one in case the other may be offended. Signor Mussolini took great pains to cultivate Turkish friendship some years ago, and it was owing to the efforts of his Ambassador, Signor Orsini Barone, that Greece and Turkey were brought together. But during the last eighteen months a slight coolness can be detected in Turko-Italian relations. This may be partly due to the seeming unwillingness of the Italians to grant Turkey a financial credit which was arranged when Ismet Pasha visited Rome last year. This coolness, however, is likely to be only of a temporary nature and it is of interest to note that Italy now does a thriving trade with Turkey. Recently the atmosphere between Paris and Angora has grown warmer. Various questions concerning Syria (which is under French mandate) and Turkey have been amicably settled; an agreement has been reached on the Ottoman Debt; and, according to very recent reports, the French are considering the possibility of entering the Turkish industrial market. Such a step would entail a loan and the Paris bankers, who have hitherto been somewhat Turkophobe, are understood to have been won over by the Quai D'Orsay which desires to re-establish French influence in a country where French culture was formerly predominant.

In Asia the Kemalists have been disappointed by their efforts to reach a close understanding with Persia and Afghanistan, and it may be hazarded, with a fair measure of certainty, that Turkish foreign policy is now much more concerned with events in South Eastern Europe than with happenings in the Middle East. In fact, Turkey is aiming at becoming a European Power instead of an Asiatic one. Now that a practical entente has been established with Greece, the Turks are trying to create a " bloc " which will include Bulgaria. Conversations have taken place in Athens, Sofia, and Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of the three interested countries, while much play has been made with the idea of a Balkan Federation, presided over by Turkey. So far this plan has not been successful for the simple reason that the Bulgarians still—and not unnaturally—insist on obtaining satisfaction from the Greeks in so far as " Minority " questions are concerned. In addition, the vexed question of the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean, which was provided for under Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, has remained unfulfilled.

Turkey does not, however, despair of reconciling Greece and Bulgaria and she has the wholehearted support of Italy, which sees in the creation of such a "bloc" the possibility of offsetting the activities of the Little Entente. In the spring of this year Turkish Ministers spent several weeks in Athens ostensibly discussing commercial problems, but also ascertaining the views of Greek statesmen as to the concessions they would be willing to make to Bulgaria. It is understood that useful progress was made and the result is that Turkey and Greece may conclude some sort of preparatory alliance when M. Tsaldaris, the Greek Premier, visits Turkey later on in the year. Once this alliance is concluded, Bulgaria, it is thought, will be more amenable to persuasion and it is hoped that means will be found to satisfy at least one of her legitimate aspirations. It must, in passing, be emphasised that a Greco-Turkish alliance will not be directed against any other Power, the avowed purpose thereof being the maintenance of peace in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

In so far as the major European questions of the day are concerned—disarmament, economic problems, and war debts—Turkey has adopted a cautious attitude. The question of war debts does not interest her directly as she has no war indemnities to pay or to receive. Concerning economic problems she is likely to follow the lead of America with whom she has done her best to cultivate good relations during the past few years. Regarding disarmament Turkey has declared that she will, with certain reservations, support the British plan. But Turkey, as long as she is ruled by the Kemalists, will not consent to any extreme form of disarmament. The Turks have suffered too much to risk the chance of being attacked by a neighbour, or other country, better armed than themselves. Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey has attended most of the important meetings of the Disarmament Conference, and he has made one interesting request with regard to the freedom of the Straits. When the Treaty of Lausanne was signed it was agreed that the Straits (which comprise the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosporus) should not be fortified. Turkey also undertook not to maintain any armed forces within a certain distance of the sea. The aim pursued was that the Straits should always be "open" in times of peace or war. An International Commission, with headquarters in Constantinople, was appointed to see that the provisions of the Treaty were carried out. Great

Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece and Turkey signed the Straits Convention, but Russia has refused to appoint a member to the Commission.

At Geneva the Turkish Delegate demanded the right to fortify the Straits. He explained that if this request was granted Turkey would be better able to ensure the freedom of the Straits in time of war. He also stated that it was unfair that Turkey should not enjoy full sovereign rights over her own territory. A Turkish publicist has since pointed out that Great Britain commands the Westerly entrance to the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and that Turkey should command the Easterly entrance at the Dardanelles. The Russian Delegate supported the Turkish claim which has, however, not been pressed. The attitude of the other Powers towards this claim has not yet been defined, but it is probable that opposition will be forthcoming from Rumania and Bulgaria who fear that the Straits might be closed against them at any moment the Turks chose. It is pointed out, on the other hand, that actually—despite the terms of the Treaty—Turkey can always move troops or artillery from the interior to the Dardanelles thus effectively closing the Straits. Future developments will be watched with interest throughout the world as the question of the Straits is of vital importance to many nations.

In the various humanitarian questions which occupy the attention of the League of Nations, Turkey has always taken a close interest. Thanks to the energetic measures taken by the Kemalists the illegal drug traffic, of which Constantinople was formerly a centre, has been almost entirely stamped out. The three large drug-producing factories have been shut and the traffickers have now transferred their activities to Bulgaria. Turkey has adhered to the International Conventions designed to thwart drug traffickers and has announced her intention of monopolising the production and sale of opium.

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to summarise the principal events of the past decade. The first ten years of Kemalism have been a decided success, and Turkey is now a country whose opinion is listened to with respect and whose international prestige stands high. The Kemalists may well be proud of their leader, who has laid the foundations of a strong, compact State which should enjoy relative prosperity and security from all the dangers to-day threatening the world.

J. WALTER COLLINS.

TWO TALES OF FRANCE.

I HAD been asked by Mr. Asquith to make some inquiries for him in France during the second year of the war, and having some days of waiting before me I arranged to meet my friends, M. and Madame " de St. Biez," in Paris. He had, though well over fifty years of age, rejoined his former regiment of cavalry at the beginning of the war, and been given his first ten days of "permission" from the staff of the French forces near Soissons. He picked me up first at his house in Paris, and then his wife, who was working as a nurse at the hospital and house of the Duchesse de Rohan. As the Duchesse has since died there is no harm in mentioning her name. She was a brave, devoted, and very intelligent French woman who, knowing and loving England well, was not ashamed to declare this lesser love during times when the majority of the French people showed little affection for, or appreciation of, the efforts of their Allies. We three started then for St. Biez one midday in September 1915 to motor through a country which showed but little trace of war. Women have always worked in the fields of France. There were more women perhaps than usual—and fewer men—hardly any except the old. A sentry on each bridge and at level crossings, his long bayonet betraying his territorial status, alone reminded one of war, though it was difficult to know what military purpose he was serving. Perhaps he allayed the fears and suspicions of the people, but, as I shall presently show, these were not nearly so responsive to the atmosphere of war as in regions nearer the front, or even in England. St. Biez is a country of pines and hemp—mile after mile of Scotch firs, with some larch—flat as the palm of the hand, with little farms of grassland cut up into paddocks and pastures of coarse nutritive grass which any scientific British agriculturist would laugh at, but which produces a cattle justly famous for size and quality. As for the hemp, it betrayed itself from every ditch and pond to the neighbourhood with a sour odour to which a lifetime of familiarity cannot reconcile its cultivators.

We reached our house about three hours after leaving Paris, and after an ample meal, such as certainly neither London nor Paris could offer, we started off for a round of sightseeing and overseeing. Our first objective was the " Allée des Dames " where a few months previously a fire had burnt out some hun-

dred acres of fir. A contractor from Paris had undertaken to get out the stumps of the burnt trees and for the work had been given the services of a dozen or two unwounded German prisoners. As these stumps were too reminiscent of the front, and were only a few hundred yards away from their home, my friends were anxious to see what progress had been made with the clearance. On the near side of the burnt area was a lake of fifteen or twenty acres of those reeds and water so familiar to lovers of Harpigny, and so attractive in nature with their low-toned reflections of silver grey asperns. As we came up we caught sight of what seemed to be pike floats bobbing up and down in the water, but of man or his work not a sight could be seen, though Sunday in those times was a full working day. It took us a little time to realise how matters stood. Flung down in the shade of an old boathouse was a heap of stained and blackened German uniforms—their owners had taken to the water to wash off the fire black of the burnt stumps—and the supposed pike floats were the heads of the prisoners bobbing up and down as they swam or scrambled in the shallow lake. They had seen us before we spotted them, and the sight of my friend's staff uniform had driven them into the reeds. His word of command brought them as quickly back across to the shore, where they drew themselves up in line, stark naked as they all were, without waiting for orders or with any appearance of the unusual. With mutual gravity a brief explanation was required and given. It appeared that the *entrepreneur* had urgent business in Paris, that the guard of French territorials were concentrated at their post half a mile away, that there was a local fête, and that the occasion seemed to offer for a combination of leisure and cleanliness. It was impossible to be severe, or even not to laugh, and the only thing my friend could do was to leave them to dress, and go in search of the guard. This was not so easy to find, but at length their depot was run to earth in an old mill. It was only occupied, however, by two of the German prisoners left by the French territorial *sous-officier* in charge of the arms and ammunition, while the guard shared in the revels of the fête. Everything was contrary to the regulations of all wars and armies. The prisoners should have seized the chance of escape; the guard should have been tried for deserting their posts, their arms, and their trust. But human nature whether above or below the salt is stronger than regulations. Both guard and guarded knew that the alternatives for the

latter were: a return to the dangers of the battlefield, confinement in prison, or remaining where they were with such maximum of liberty and comfort as prisoners of war could expect. I may add that a very sensible General when the case was, rather reluctantly, reported to him, merely remarked, "What would you have me do—they are all fathers of families."

On the following day we walked over to our nearest neighbour, Mme. "de la Roche." She lived with the smallest of households in a chateau beautifully situated on the swelling breast of a hill dominating the valley of the Sarthe. It stood back from the main road at the head of a beech avenue perhaps one-third of a mile long. Contrary to custom neither gate nor lodge separated highway from private road. The old fortified Manor House had been pulled down by an improving ancestor, and of it only two detached towers remained. Her husband's family was one of the oldest in France. An ancestor had been given by his own feudal over-lord, Edward III of England, the royal sword after the battle of Crecy, and it still hangs on the wall of the dining-room in its sheath of white velvet ornamented with gold fleur-de-lis. Some historical portraits were on the walls. Charles VI by François Clouet, a contemporaneous portrait of Cardinal Richelieu, and a François I by Holbein. The walls of the entrance hall were hung with really priceless tapestries presented by Louis XV to an ancestor who had been one of that King's successful Maréchals. I give these details to explain the story we were now to hear from our friend.

It appeared that she was left after mobilisation with but one old manservant in the house (women house servants are the exception in France) besides her cook and her own elderly maid. This old retainer died unexpectedly, and as no successor was to be found in the neighbourhood she set off with her maid to find, if they could, in Paris some substitute for the one who had been friend as well as servant for forty years. Doubtless, they thought, the occupied territory would have sent back to Paris some servitor of a chateau looted or destroyed by the enemy, only too glad to find a livelihood in safe and comfortable circumstances. Three days of anxious inquiries by mistress and maid yielded no result. There were indeed only too many refugees, but none suitable for the particular place. Finally, Madame made up her mind to abandon the search, and to go home by the afternoon train. Having arranged to lunch with

a friend she went out to do a little shopping. When she returned at midday on her way to lunch, the old maid met her, all smiles and satisfaction. Just after Madame had gone out a man had appeared, old enough to be safe, young enough to be still agreeable. His references were unexceptionable—his experience was sufficient. He had been delighted to find an opening in a region where all would be so quiet, and where nerves racked by destruction and danger from the *Boche* could recover their calm and certitude. She had been so impressed by the respectability and personality of the applicant that she had permitted herself to tell him to come and meet Madame with his credentials and effects at the station. So if Madame approved he could return with them that afternoon.

The proposed domestic turned up. Madame cross-questioned him, examined his papers and references, and approved. He got into the train forthwith and the trio went homewards. On her return she found a new situation. The eldest son, an aviator, had unexpectedly received leave. He had at once collected his wife and child from Paris, and with his batman and a large trench dog had arrived by automobile from Paris, not knowing that his mother had been in that city. With the family thus increased they all settled down to enjoy themselves. The weather was kind. The new servant more than fulfilled hopes. The news from the front chanced to be good and the harvest promised well. Then came the inevitable break. The son's ten days of leave was up, and he with his batman went back to duty, leaving, however, behind him his wife and child, as well as the dog, to whom the child had become devoted. A few weeks passed away. Everything ran on oiled wheels. The daughter-in-law and the grandchild were glad to be in the country, where danger and privation were unknown. Madame was no longer solitary. The little household under the direction of the new *maître d'hôtel* exceeded expectation.

One morning the Curé came up to discuss parish difficulties. There was a chapel attached to the chateau, built at the time when the chateau itself was reconstructed and I may add spoilt in the time and at the instigation of Louis Philippe himself. While they were in conversation Madame de la Roche heard a step, looked round and saw another old friend, the local brigadier of police. He saluted and explained that the Government at Paris had just issued an order that the police were to

report upon all persons and passports in their districts—that all Governments were foolish but dictatorial, and he regretted to trouble Madame and her household. He could not even excuse M. le Curé. Perhaps it would save time if Madame would just call them out as they were—no one troubled in these days about ceremony. So Madame just called them out: the cook, the old gardener, and his older wife, the new manservant, the Curé and herself. One by one they presented their papers to authority, beginning with Madame and ending with the newly joined member of the household. As this last put his hand into his breast pocket to pull out his papers the brigadier seized him by the throat. A fierce struggle followed —the others looked on amazed for a moment or two, and then began to cry out. No one seems to have thought of helping the brigadier. However, in a few seconds a couple of gendarmes ran out of the bushes to the help of their comrade, and eventually the three of them secured their prisoner. Madame demanded an explanation, and after a short breathing space this was given.

The prisoner was a *recidiviste* of the worst type and record. He had escaped from prison two years previously and the police had combed the country for him in vain. It was thought he might have found refuge in Germany. But he had, like all his class, a mistress, and on her movements and correspondence close watch was kept. She was found to post two letters to the same address. The second letter carefully was left untouched, but was specially noted at its place of arrival. By some mischance the addressee secured it without being noticed. Anxious to atone for their laxity, and to avert what they feared might be the fatal consequences of their carelessness, the police, knowing their man's methods and habits, scoured the neighbourhood. Every chateau of sufficient size and importance had been visited, but in vain. It chanced that "La Roche" was on the edge of the district, a long way from police headquarters, and a few weeks had passed before they reached it. Yet the authorities were as anxious as they were perplexed, for the criminal worked alone, had no accomplices to betray or reveal his identity, and his methods were wholesale and unsparing. Eventually they had chanced to hear that Madame de la Roche had lost her old, and found a new, manservant. Such was the opportunity their criminal always sought, and had several times, it was believed, utilised. So the day following the receipt

of the news they had hurried over to La Roche. The Curé's visit had given them the excuse they needed, and had certainly saved bloodshed and probably life. "But what are these methods you speak of—so barbaric—so destructive?" asked Madame. "We can but guess," replied the gendarme, "we know that he has been in service in at least two chateaux where the house was burnt to the ground and the occupiers perished with it. No one survived, and certainly no one was intended to escape or permitted to do so. In each case the house was isolated, was a museum of treasures, and the family was wealthy, small and elderly. It is so here, is it not?" Madame had to agree that here it was all like that. "But how long has he been here? Four weeks, you say. Why has he waited—why did he delay to strike—for him delay was dangerous, very dangerous, and most unusual. I do not understand. Let us leave him in charge of my men, and examine his room. We shall beyond certainty find something."

Directed by Madame they started upstairs for the mansard where the servant had been lodged. On the way they had to pass the suite where the daughter-in-law slept with her child. Said Madame, "you had better enter, it is there that" (as in many French country houses) "I keep my plate." "I am the more intrigued," said the brigadier, "murder and arson seem to have been made so easy, yet nothing has happened." And he threw open the door. As he did so, and crossed the threshold, something hurled itself at him. He jumped back in alarm and slammed the door, against which fell a heavy blow. "Don't be afraid" said the girl, "it is my husband's dog which is always like that with strangers, but it is quite quiet once he sees me or recognises a friend." "And does he always sleep here?" "You may say, Monsieur, that he always lives here. Not once has he left the child alone since my husband went back to the front." "And that rascal, does he always pass this way to his room?" "Always, Monsieur, and now I think of him I recall that I have heard him speaking to the dog who refused to respond." "And I, Monsieur," said the cook, "can testify that I have seen the dog refuse food from his hand when he offered it." "To the dog, then," said the brigadier, "do you beyond question owe your lives; let us hasten to examine the sleeping chamber." There in a bag were found the latest kinds of housebreaking tools, and hidden in his bed was a petrol sprinkler. The plan was complete. The remoteness of the

house from road and village, the age of the lady and the scanty household gave every possibility for the crime. Familiarity with similar happenings would have enabled the murderer to disappear unsuspected of crime or even of life. The excitements of war would have absorbed even local interest after a few days of unsuspicious gossip, and have rendered at least as easy as in other cases the disposal of tapestries, pictures and *bibelots*. A notable villainy indeed, foiled by a hound's unappeasable instincts.

It only remains to say that the *recidiviste* was taken off to the local jail, and that night—so at least the gendarme reported—he hung himself in his cell. It is at least certain that he died. When last year I returned to La Roche I had great difficulty in inducing my hostess to recall the story. But for M. le Brigadier I doubt whether I should have done so, but this year she told me afresh the story at tea.

One more incident of the Roche is worth setting down. During the Franco-German war of 1870, when Chanzy's Army of the Loire had been defeated and dispersed, news came to the Roche that a detachment of German cavalry were to be billeted on the chateau. The then " M. de la Roche " was an old man well over eighty. He had actually served as an officer of Napoleon Bonaparte's army, and had been in attendance on the Emperor after Jena as one of the military pages. To meet the invaders he dressed himself in his old uniform of the Chasseurs of the Guard (I did not venture to ask how he got into it) and as the Prussian colonel rode up he gave him a stiff salute. " I imagine, Sir," said he, " that you have come to return the call that I had the honour to pay at your War Office in Berlin in 1807. I trust I may not be so long in returning your visit as you have been in acknowledging mine." His descendant added that the Germans treated the old soldier with the greatest courtesy. Of his adventurous childhood, beginning on the very steps of the guillotine and of a life prolonged to cover both the Empires and two out of the three Republics of modern France, I may perhaps be permitted to say something on another occasion.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

THE LIQUIDATION OF PROHIBITION.*

THE Wets have it. So far their victory is limited, but they are being carried forward on a brown and flowing tide. The days of the speak-easy are numbered. It is the final lap of the rum-runner. The boot-legger is on his last legs. Their approaching extinction is due not to a realisation of their wickedness, but rather to a realisation of their respectability. The boot-legger is found to be a tradesman like any other, but in receipt of disproportionate profits. The rum-runner has become an expensive nuisance. The speak-easy—but here I can give my own experience.

The place was a quiet and staid street in a residential quarter of New York: the date the twenty-second of February of this year. My friend, a white-haired lady of old-world dignity, and her son, a rising and respected citizen, had invited me to the theatre. " We are dining first at a speak-easy," my hostess said as the car stopped. I followed her, dazed with surprise. The chauffeur was told to come back in an hour; he, for his part, evinced no surprise. There was rather an elaborate unlocking, first of an outer, and then of an inner door. But that was the end of the formalities. My friend's son was well known there, as he himself explained with obvious pride. One's first visit, that was a different matter; an introduction was necessary, almost a certificate of good character. The parlour on the ground floor seemed innocent enough, save for a rather laboured conviviality represented in the pictures on the walls. Cocktails appeared. Perhaps I showed a certain hesitation, for in the United States such drinks are apt to be of disconcerting potency. " You are not obliged to take one, even if it is a speak-easy," my host assured me kindly. Upstairs we found the dining-room; here there was nothing to mar a perfect decorum. Rather the atmosphere of hushed respectability put one in mind of a mission hall. Once a burst of somewhat noisy laughter came from a neighbouring table; it was immediately silenced by the shocked stares of the other diners. Did sipping half a glass of hock warrant my proud consciousness of vice, I asked myself uneasily?

I do not, of course, imagine that all New York's speak-easies are of this innocuous nature. There are thirty thousand of them, I was told, in the place of twelve thousand pre-prohibi-

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tion " saloons." This was a " Wet " statistic; the figures are doubtless reversed in the mouth of a " Dry." But, whatever the number, one is prepared to learn that in many speak-easies both behaviour and liquor leave much to be desired. Only does such a fact form an argument for prohibition or against it?

And here I should explain my own rather anomalous position. Talking to a " Wet " I instinctively find bone-dry arguments upon my lips, while with a " Dry " my outlook becomes almost sodden. The fact is that I belong to those damp, amphibious creatures, half-fish, half-man, who are uneasy in either element. Or, in more self-gratifying language, I might be described as a pragmatic prohibitionist. Surely we must all realise the terrible evils that have followed on man's discovery of alcohol. It is another high explosive in connection with which humanity's intellectual development has outstripped its spiritual. Angels alone should be permitted the use of whisky and gin. America's attempt to do away with the degradation resulting from drink by cutting off the supply at the fountain-head has been both gallant and exciting. But prohibition can only be justified by success. Has it succeeded? Did turning off the tap really drain the land? Or was the flow merely driven underground and the pernicious quagmire extended? This was the information which I tried to acquire during my two months in the States. It was not easy to get a reply to such questioning, for the extremist, on either side, considers it irrelevant. To the zealous abstainer, " liquor " even in moderation is sin. A country that permits this traffic, that derives a revenue from it, is in his eyes on a par with the mediæval Papal State which had a tax on prostitutes. He feels that prohibition, however unsuccessful, is better than no prohibition. It is an end in itself, almost a religion. Again, the more conscientious " Wet " approximates to the same standpoint—reversed. According to him an unrestricted flow of intoxicating liquor carries with it other and greater issues. It represents liberty, freedom of conscience, culture, tolerance. Repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, and the " Wet " feels that the gravest problems troubling America to-day are solved. However divergent, both these attitudes are comprehensible. What is harder to understand is why extreme dryness on the one hand, or extreme wetness on the other, produces a failure in arithmetic. I have already hinted at the bewildering variation in statistics. A " Dry " will motor the length and breadth of the United States and hardly see a drunken man. A

" Wet " finds that intoxication was never so general or so flagrant. Which is to be believed?

As much as possible, therefore, I tried to get my information from the Merely Moist. Among these, on one point there was unanimity; indeed, even to me the fact was patent. The well-to-do class, and especially the young people of this class, have been harmed by prohibition. Thirty years ago when I went to parties in America, " nice girls " would refuse to dance with men whose breaths smelt of drink. Now the nice girls come home from parties drunk themselves. The hip-pockets even of boys of fifteen and sixteen show the familiar bulge. On Christmas morning to be " lit up " seems regarded almost as a religious observance. " The trouble is the way one feels the next day," a young man said to me with a rueful martyred air as he gulped his *n*th brandy.

Again, in the hotels—and of these I had a large experience from San Antonio to Boston—every room had its private " bath," and nearly every " bath " had its private corkscrew; it would be found just inside on the jamb of the door. Nor are these corkscrews idle ornaments. This fact was indelibly printed on my consciousness at a vast hotel in a town of the Middle West. My room was numbered 2583, and it seemed to my heated imagination that each of the other 2582 rooms must be occupied by a youngish, stoutish man with a brown bowler hat worn rather too far back on his head, and a corkscrew in his bathroom which had seen rather too assiduous service. I should mention, perhaps, that I am not quoting the denizens of this hotel as typical Americans. Uncle Sam still tends, I should say, to be lean and temperate.

But, however abstemious the American, one thing remains certain; as a nation he is drinking about the same to-day as he was before prohibition. It cannot be mere coincidence when a well-known French champagne manufacturer and an equally well-known Scotch whisky distiller both tell you that the drop in their exports to the United States since prohibition is almost exactly balanced by the rise in their exports to the countries nearest to the United States—Canada, Mexico, Cuba. No, to the well-to-do class prohibition has merely meant paying more, not drinking less. But, after all, even in the United States, even before the slump, the immense majority of the population has not belonged to the well-to-do class. In America, as in every other country, the people of the country are the workers

on the land, the workers in the factory, the miners, the builders, the little store-keepers. How has prohibition affected them? That is the vital question.

As regards the first years of prohibition, I found general agreement in the answer to this question. The " Drys "—but this was natural—the " Moists," even a certain number of the " Wets," all told me that during the early twenties the working people had profited by prohibition. Their children were healthier; the bank balances were healthier. Money that had previously slipped away in the saloons which had ringed every works and speckled every street was brought home to the family instead. This money bought a sufficiency of milk for the baby; it bought more fruit and fuel, better boots and bedcoverings; it paid the weekly instalments on the sewing machine, the washing machine, the little Ford. Monday represented a full day's work instead of a headache. The working man's wife blessed prohibition. That was during those earlier years. But what was happening now? By this I mean, what was happening four months ago when I was in America? Here opinion was more various. Many of my informants felt that in the villages, despite the illicit stills, despite the rum-running, prohibition was still doing good. As regards the cities, there was doubt. Not only all the " Wets," but practically all the " Moists," assured me that in its effect on the town population prohibition had broken down. The urban working man was now drinking as much as he did before prohibition and he was drinking poorer liquor at a higher price. The working man's wife was no longer blessing prohibition, but demanding the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The working man's wife felt that it would be better for the Government to receive part of the profits on liquor, and thus be able to reduce the other taxes, than for the boot-legger to receive them all. This she told me herself.

My conversations with the working man's wife took place just before the reintroduction of beer. The gain that has resulted in the National Exchequer seems to prove her contention. Moreover, report has it, and I have seen no contradiction, that the free sale of beer has brought a great drop in the convictions for drunkenness. Indeed such a result was only to be expected. I imagine it would need Baron Münchausen's horse to drink sufficient of the mild liquor circulating in the States to-day to have much effect upon sobriety. But it remains to be seen whether America will permanently remain satisfied with this

mild liquor. Prohibition has taught the nation to drink spirits, because prohibition necessitated the maximum alcohol in the minimum space. After the excitement of legal beer has worn off, will it be found to supply the accustomed " kick "?

However this may be, it seems as though prohibition in the United States must be set down as a failure. Or is it only the prohibitionist who has failed? He, or more correctly she, felt that it was sufficient to make a law. He, or more correctly she, did not make the necessary enthusiasm behind that law. A decade ago in New York I was conscious of young America feeling a certain resentment against prohibition. The country had been tricked into it, I was told. The Eighteenth Amendment had been " put over " on them when a million men were still in France. There was an implication that it was up to every self-respecting boy and girl to break a tyrannous decree. The augury did not seem hopeful. Had different methods been employed, might the " Drys " have succeeded? Suppose they had held drink not as a crime in itself, but as an innocent pleasure. Suppose prohibition had been put forward as a high adventure, a sacrifice for the country. What then would young America have replied? One cannot tell, but one thing seems certain. In the United States you have the most generous, the most enthusiastic, perhaps the most patriotic people in the world. If prohibition fails in the United States, it fails everywhere.

EDITH ZANGWILL.

WHOSE KINGDOM SHALL HAVE NO END.

THERE is no room for doubt that Western civilisation, and the societies which compose it, are in serious and possibly fatal decline. It is always difficult for people to discern the enduring tendencies of their own age. The Roman citizens of the early fifth century A.D. did not realise that their empire and the magnificent civilisation of the ancient world were declining irretrievably to their doom. Those individuals, however, whose privilege and duty it is to spend their life in the study of the past, and to familiarise themselves with the events and processes of two thousand years, cannot fail, if they seriously exercise their powers of judgment, to read the signs of their own time. All the marks are present of the slow but sure decline of an age. Civilisations do not perish easily. According as they are more elaborate and complex, the more numerous and powerful are the interests engaged in maintaining them, the greater the inherited stores of capital and experience on which they can rely. A rich and highly complex society runs down slowly; the powerful body disintegrates gently at first, but more quickly as it approaches dissolution; resistance to external onslaught steadily grows weaker.

The present age has been disintegrating for some twenty or thirty years. This process, slow, and capable of correction without great difficulty at first, was enormously accelerated by that great catastrophe of modern history, the world war, from whose gigantic and evil effects mankind has made no real effort to free itself. It is as if the war, besides its unparalleled losses and dislocations, destroyed man's optimism, shattered his ideals, paralysed his will. The fruitful effort at general co-operation, so clearly evident in the nineteenth century, ended in that devouring chasm of blood and hate; and the feeble efforts made to renew co-operation since the war issue in hopeless, though always trivial, oppositions, and break up in the silent shame of blind and dumb despair.

The signs of decline and disintegration are perfectly clear. The first and greatest was the shocking internecine struggle, known as the World War, waged between the most civilised, the most progressive, the most moral and physically sound races of mankind. The lamp-bearers of culture, followers of the purest and loftiest religion and ethic that the world has known,

tore each other to pieces year after year in a struggle which Pope Benedict XV called a useless massacre. The incomparable heroism, selflessness and endurance of the men who bore the burden of that intolerable disaster only prove the magnificence of the great Western civilisation which lack of statesmanship was blindly and recklessly throwing to the winds.

Since then the marks of decline have simply accumulated. The Western peoples, shorn of nearly all that was brightest and best in a whole generation of young men, have lived through fifteen years of political sterility and ineptitude. The few great men surviving, faced by the ineluctable forces of national greed, spite, selfishness and stupidity, either broke down prematurely or were thrust aside by an arrogant and callous generation. Wilson, the creator of the League of Nations, when his dreams and actions would have saved a world, was thrown over by his own people, who preferred the second-rate leadership of the way of isolated and apparent safety to the leadership and salvation of the world. Stresemann died, still young, at fifty-two; Briand at sixty-nine. Smuts, perhaps the clearest visioned and strongest-willed of all, was denied a field in the vast and destituted arena which demanded statesmanship on every side.

The temptation, as in all decadent ages, to seek wealth and to enjoy the good things of the world while they lasted, was almost irresistible. A few statesmen (two or three, beset by opposition around and below) stood out above the welter of commonplace politics and egoism, and sought the public good. It is not physical courage that is lacking, but intellectual courage and discipline, the desire to see the truth, and fearlessly to state and pursue it. Most people take little trouble over public affairs, engage in pleasures which in any other age would be reasonable but are now merely anodynes to minds that should be earnest; and calculate that somehow the world will go on or at any rate last their time. The appalling callousness of the present age to the future well-being of the young people who are growing up, to their children and their children's children, passes belief if it were not obvious to any observer. It is not, of course, this or that social service, that is any reasonable provision for those young people who are wholly within our responsibility. The schooling and medical services, the insurances and the pensions, which profess to provide for them, are not even decent sops to our conscience for not providing them with a world order in which only they can live. We, the inept and egoistic

nations of this age, have the incredible selfishness to enjoy the brightness and the charm, the wholesome spirits and activities, of our young people, and yet we will not move a hand to prepare for them a decent place in a world where we ourselves live so softly and which we then leave to ruin.

There is a way of salvation, and it is known to everyone; only sufficient degree of will-power is lacking. It is the way of co-operation and freedom. These two things, active, spiritual substances, healing forces of mankind as a whole, as of men individually, have been broken down, absolutely discarded by the nations of the world. There is no international co-operation now, no freedom of intercourse between the nations. Conferences meet and dissipate, meet and dissipate. They accomplish absolutely nothing, because of this or that local national interest. Of course every national interest is imperious, vital, impossible to forgo, if the nation is the only unit envisaged; and the result is that every effort at sane world-co-operation fails; the world stagnates; next, disintegrates, and the insurgent forces of barbarism flow in. Everybody knows perfectly well that the Western races have sufficient brain-power, experience, physical strength and wealth to guide the economy of the world to the prosperity which nature and science so bountifully offer, if only they will work together, be sane, cease putting their national egotism first. But how is this to be done? Will the nations do it, the ordinary man, the confused, untrained, misled electorates? Naturally they cannot be expected to originate steps of high statesmanship; but if their statesmen take the steps, they will follow. Nations have never failed to follow a united call from their leaders; if any nation stands out of an international concert that is united and firm to act, let that nation wait; it will soon come asking for admission, and generosity and good sense will admit it.

But international co-operation or concert is only a means, a means for achieving international freedom. At the present time, in the universal economic panic, every wholesome economic activity is checked. Trade ceases to flow between nations. Here and there a particular trade is bolstered up for a little. It is always to somebody's individual or temporary advantage to keep out a competitor. Nobody denies that tariffs and protection can achieve this. Exchange controls and quotas can equate imports and exports, though there is absolutely no advantage to anybody in that. Nobody pretends that the innumerable controls

and prohibitions upon output and transfer are anything but palliatives, "until trade begins to recover"; but it can never recover so long as it is checked and finally stopped on every side. For every control stabilises trade, "corners" a share of what is left of trade—but always at a lower level than before. And one control requires another, for human ingenuity is almost infinite, and where it is blocked in one direction, it patiently finds an outlet by another. So tariff leads to quota, and quota to prohibition. Exchange control brings moratorium, moratorium default, default bankruptcy; bankruptcy makes the State shoulder impossible debts; debts lead to State deficits; deficits to more taxes; more taxes to national currency inflation; currency inflation to additional bureaucratic controls. The process seems endless, but it is by no means so; for every control succeeds only in narrowing the channels of trade and transfer until finally (and the process is now not far off) transfer breaks down completely and there is no international trade except what is carried on by barter; and this means the return of the stone age, the sacrifice of all that wonderful civilisation, of a thousand years of good and fruitful effort, since another great civilisation, that of the Ancient World, passed away in the welter of the Dark Ages.

Intellectual co-operation and international freedom are the way of life for the world. Modern civilisation has been poisoned by national egotism, by a curious and wholly barbarous ethic which teaches that a nation has a duty to be perfectly selfish. Long ago the great prophet of humanity who created the religion and ethic of the West discovered that no individual had a right to regard his own interest, that his imperative and undeniable duty was to be other-regarding, and to love his neighbour as himself. This hard doctrine is, naturally, only imperfectly practised; but the grand achievement of Western ethic, the pillar of Western civilisation, is that the doctrine is never denied. The commonplace people admit it; and the great souls practise it. "This has made the power of the saints of East and West, who have led the religion of great nations. Self-sacrifice is the real miracle, out of which all the reported miracles grew."*

Yet by a curious and barbarous inversion of the whole spirit of the West, the same society which has taught that every individual should be other-regarding, has taught that a nation

* Emerson, Essay on "Courage," *ad init.*

should be wholly selfish. This is the lesson of our history books, our Press, our political platforms, and sometimes (when they, rarely, consider national questions) of our pulpits. The doctrine passes absolutely unchallenged; and every boy and girl, and as they grow up every man and woman, is fed with the pernicious food of national egotism. From every side persuasive influences are brought to bear on them. They are told that it is good that a nation should be great, should conquer, extend. The superiority of a nation is still assumed implicitly in practically every historical text-book. The public Press openly says "Britain first," or "Canada first," or France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the rest. Nobody denies the doctrine; no politician dare stand up and say that "it is false, destructive, sinful, poisonous." The nation which in its individual statesmen and educated class is perhaps the most kindly, idealistic, humanitarian in the world, the American, is in its national policy the most adamant in its adhesion to State sovereignty and State interest. Only the French Government, in spite of all that is said about hegemony and dominance, has made any approach to a public offer of the surrender of some of its State sovereignty; and the next, in spite of *sacro egoismo*, to point to possibility of such a sacrifice for the public good is the Italian Fascist Government. The rest have made not the slightest step towards even hinting at regulating the blind, futile and destructive chaos of State sovereignties by a system of genuine international co-operation.

Yet it is patently obvious, on a moment's thought, that only through international co-operation can international freedom be attained. The lesson was long ago learned inside the State. There was once a time when every individual, however much the slave of taboo and custom, exercised an absolute sovereignty, and claimed to do as he willed; in those circumstances everybody was uncontrolled and nobody was free.

> In such a condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and what is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.*

* Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. xiii.

Only through the surrender or curtailment of their "unlimited right to everything" (which in effect meant a right to misery, only limited by death) did the individuals inside the State, under the rule of law and of social co-operation become free and relatively prosperous.

Nations can learn this lesson: that the way to freedom, through which alone the channels of trade and the less perceptible channels of goodwill and harmony will flow again, is through freedom; and that this freedom exists through co-operation. But the co-operation requires a mutual sacrifice of State-sovereignty. The crude and barbarous ethic which two thousand years ago was banished from individual morality—that one must live only to oneself—must with equal insistence be banished from the State ethic. It is amazing that the doctrine of State-egotism has been tolerated for a moment, or that the glaring inconsistency between the inculcation of private unselfishness and national selfishness has not been patently realised. The reason for this extraordinary fact is probably that in former times national egotism, "my country first and only," seemed to be, and perhaps may have been, the means of national survival for the time being, perhaps for centuries; just as individual selfishness may sometimes enable a man to survive and live his life for a few years longer. But if national selfishness was ever a means of survival in the past, it is assuredly not so now. It is the broad and open way to universal destruction, and already the nations are on the edge of the abyss. Yet the Leader of the West has pointed the other way, and has given the means of life. In religion it is called the gospel of Love; international co-operation, in the prosaic political phrase. This to the weary, worn-out continent would give the buoyancy of a new hope. To the nerve-wracked nations of the modern world it offers, by the practical efforts of international statesmanship, the saving and endurance of the finest civilisation in history. Only one thing is definitely lacking at the present time: not knowledge; not the realisation (even if unexpressed) of the futility and ignominy of national egotism; but the *will* to achieve agreement. Must the nations of the West, the fortunate, responsible possessors of a kingdom which should have no end, fail now, before the bar of history, because they cannot rise to the effort of will to save it?

R. B. MOWAT.

BRINGING THE OCEAN TO THE PRAIRIES.

THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY.

VIEWED on a map, the seaward end of the St. Lawrence River rises from Lake Ontario like a giant cornucopia. Potentially, indeed, it is a cornucopia. It reaches deep between two opulent nations. It promises their wares an excellent way to market. It lets sea-going ships come a thousand miles into the land. Yet here and there it is obstructed and, before the full stream of its wealth can flow, it must be freed. If only sea-going ships could penetrate 1,100 miles farther, they could tap the very heart of the continent. If only a seaway twenty-seven feet deep were built from the Gulf to Fort William, it would permit this penetration, accommodating 90 per cent. of all the ocean-shipping thus far constructed. This shipping would take in tea and crude rubber from the colonies, and—if the results of Ottawa may be accepted—fabrics, coal, steel and metal wares from Britain. It would drain from Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario some 115,220,000 bushels of wheat yearly. From the mills of Quebec it would carry westward at least 250,000 tons of newsprint and pulp to satisfy existing inland markets which American producers have surrendered to Canada. Hydro-electric installations along the route would generate, when equipped to give but 50 per cent. of their capacity, some 2,619,000 horsepower, which surpasses the total estimated horsepower of the Punjab streams and is equivalent to the use of 15,000,000 tons of coal a year.

A St. Lawrence seaway cannot be built without complete co-operation between the Dominion of Canada and the United States. Herein lies its political significance. Since 1919 International Joint Commissions have been planning canals and dams and power works. On July 18th, 1932, a treaty based upon their work and calling for the construction of a St. Lawrence seaway was signed. Since the sums involved are enormous, and since the tonnage diverted must surpass 4,000,000 yearly, vitally affecting many vested interests, ratification is by no means certain. Neither Senate nor Parliament has as yet expressed itself clearly. Some portent may have been seen, however, in a statement by President Hoover that the proposed work is "the greatest internal improvement yet undertaken on the North American continent."

The St. Lawrence is unique. Two thousand one hundred miles in length, it is not only one of the fifteen longest rivers in the world, it is the only river except the Rhine which touches in its course two of the greatest exporting and importing countries of modern commerce. Its ultimate source, the tiny St. Louis river discharging into Lake Superior, rises in the Minnesota lake country and at one spot flows within eighteen miles of the Mississippi. Then for more than 1,100 miles St. Lawrence water forms the boundary between the United States and Canada. Besides boasting the five great fresh lakes of Superior, Michigan, Huron, Erie and Ontario, it includes the wonder of Niagara, the pleasure ground of the Thousand Islands, and several series of important rapids. Yet exactly because of these picturesque idiosyncrasies it has never been able to perform all the work of which it is capable. Its falls give it grandeur, yet make it useless for navigation. Canadian pilots and seamen insist that it is no more difficult to bring an ocean steamer up to Montreal than to take her into any coastal port, and that fog and ice on the St. Lawrence are no worse hazards than the fog and ice met off New York and Boston. The five Great Lakes form natural "impounding" reservoirs and act naturally for flood regulation like the five partly artificial lakes of the upper Mississippi. For ships which sail the great circle course the St. Lawrence should be the shortest possible route from the Great Lakes to Europe. Yet these ships cannot pick up their cargo at its port of origin and the St. Lawrence cannot be used efficiently till it is canalised and its bed made deep enough for sea traffic.

Canalising the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence does not call for 2,100 miles of digging. In order to drive through a seaway from the Atlantic to Lake Superior there are only three points where locks must be built. Immensely strategic, these three points have played decisive rôles in North American history. Long before the white men came Indians had already appropriated them and established famous portages to avoid the "Soo" Rapids between Lake Superior and Lake Huron, the Niagara Falls between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, and the Lachine Rapid between Lake Ontario and the site of Montreal. To-day canals have been built round all these hazards, yet at the time when colonial history was in the making and when North America was being partitioned there were no canals. Chippewa held the "Soo" portage against all comers. Senecas held one

portage round to the right of Niagara on what is now the American side, while Hurons held another far over to the left, meeting the Grand River in what is now Canadian territory. Algonquins held the Lachine. In 1536 Cartier, searching for the mythical kingdom of Saguenay, " rich and wealthy in precious stones," was halted by them. In 1603 Samuel de Champlain, in order to win their good-will, took up their quarrel with the Iroquois. Thus " the Five Nations " were forced to turn first to the Dutch and then to the English for allies, and thus, through Champlain's desire to gain a vital portage, the St. Lawrence which had separated hostile Indian tribes from time immemorial came at length to separate hostile white men—the Indians' successors. After a hundred years of desultory warfare Great Britain established herself on both sides of the river, yet within a decade the Thirteen Colonies had rebelled, and once again the St. Lawrence flowed between antagonists.

The struggle to control its strategic rapids and portages continued. The first Soulange Canal came to mark the trace of the crucial old Algonquin portage, the first Welland Canal followed approximately upon the traces of the Huron, and rival " Soo " canals disputed the succession of the Chippewas. The St. Lawrence seemed destined to become as fateful a frontier river as the Rhine. The first locked canal ever built in America, the original Soulange, was finished in 1783, too late to serve in bringing up arms and ammunition against the Revolutionaries. The Rideau Canal, constructed after the war of 1812 to link the Ottawa river with Lake Ontario, was primarily a military canal. It was built to allow Canadians to bring up warships, gunboats, and supplies from the Atlantic without exposure to whatever batteries might stand above Lake St. Francis along the American bank of the river. It was built, however, for a " next war " which never came.

The frontier between Canada and the United States was demilitarised. On the St. Lawrence economic law has forced both neighbours to collaborate. They have been slow, yet they have come to it because in the end separate action has proved ridiculous and costly. Acting as rivals the two governments treated the " Soo " precisely as Senecas and Hurons had once treated Niagara portages. Each built its own canal at great expense, constructing locks on its own side at double the outlay which would have been necessary had both collaborated in one superb work. Perhaps this blundering has taught its lessons. The St.

Lawrence has not become a river of contention. A St. Lawrence seaway, built by co-operation, would seem the fitting monument to nearly 120 years of peace between the English-speaking nations of America.

Canada is America's largest customer and America buys nearly as much from Canada as does the whole British Empire put together. It is logical that they should try to make the waters which at first divided them now bear their commerce. The cost of building the St. Lawrence Seaway was estimated by a joint board of engineers in 1926 to be $543,429,000. Canada has led the way by remodelling the Welland Canal so that it is now already equipped to serve as a link in the St. Lawrence Seaway, accommodating ocean-going vessels in its locks, which are thirty feet over the sills. There remains the re-modelling of works at the Lachine Rapid and those at the Sault Ste. Marie, and there remains a certain amount of dredging and canalisation where existing channels are shallow, yet the Seaway would repay these efforts by its economies in transportation charges.

The St. Lawrence Seaway represents Canada's second major transportation victory within the past two years. Last season, with the inauguration of the first wheat shipment from The Pas to Churchill over the Hudson Bay Railway, a first breach was made to drain northward Manitoban and Saskatchewan wheat which had hitherto been dammed by excessive haulage costs in the mid-continent. Now the St. Lawrence project promises wheat-growers new and even greater relief, promises newsprint and wood-pulp exporters in Quebec and New Brunswick a cheaper way to American markets, and promises Ontario mining interests a cheaper way for their metals to Europe.

Like Canada, America is to-day developing canal transportation at a rate unprecedented since the coming of the railroads. In time of peace she has turned her army engineers to the task of directing the inland waterways until to-day, with nearly 25,000 miles of navigable rivers and canals, she controls the most extensive system in the world. She continues to invest in upkeep alone about $6,000,000 a year. Fresh projects are always afoot. In 1913 the Keokuk Lock was built to defeat the Des Moines Rapids of the Mississippi and to carry on the work of the old canal first dug in 1877. The proposed St. Lawrence Seaway will connect with America's most important inland waterways, with the Mississippi-Missouri by way of the Illinois Waterway for which $20,000,000 was originally provided, with

the Ohio, " the longest piece of river canalisation in the world," which has to date cost the Federal Government $100,000,000, and with the New York State Barge Canal, which has been built where the old Erie ran, at a total cost of $175,000,000. It will therefore make possible the most complete distribution by cheap water-haulage of whatever Canadian or Empire products enter it.

The potential service of the St. Lawrence Seaway can already be predicted. With Yankee ingenuity, the United States Department of Commerce has reached definite conclusions regarding the wheat, meat products, flour, machinery, metals, and automobiles which should be shipped out from the lakes, and the wood pulp, newsprint, tea, coffee, and raw rubber which should be brought in by return. In order not to be over-optimistic the department experts have used the most conservative figures available, those for United States exports and imports during the comparatively slow years of 1921-4. From these they have taken only statistics which touch the American States most directly affected by the St. Lawrence Seaway, and from these only that fraction falling between the months of May and November, when the proposed route is certain not to be blocked by ice. Eighteen American States and five Canadian provinces may be said to be most directly affected, yet the Department of Commerce figures, save in the case of wheat, deal with the United States only.

To consider first what is poured in, rather than what comes out of the cornucopia: 8,721 tons of tea and 115,872 tons of coffee may be regarded as imports destined for consumption between May and November in the fifteen most directly affected American States—and therefore as potential imports *via* the St. Lawrence Seaway. The rubber industry of Ohio and nine neighbouring States demands during the seven months when the new route may be used 131,405 tons of crude rubber. Furthermore, 142,463 tons of newsprint and 108,532 tons of wood pulp, imported directly from Canada, must inevitably follow the St. Lawrence once the way is open. By the most conservative estimate, and considering but the American demand for five typical products, while omitting the Canadian traffic in them altogether, imports by the proposed canals should total at their absolutely minimal figure, 506,993 tons. These figures are dwarfed when we compute the St. Lawrence Seaway exports.

About 42 per cent. of the agricultural machinery annually exported from America should take advantage of the St. Lawrence Seaway, and about 40 per cent. of the exports of the automobile industry. The most impressive figures relate to agriculture. Meat coming from Chicago and the central western States would presumably total 304,732 tons. In this product, since Ottawa, Canadian figures should at least compare favourably. Wheat flour would amount to 3,044,825 barrels, or 266,422 tons. Of wheat itself, over 52 per cent. of the American exports would be affected. Grain would be drained from North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, part of Montana, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, large portions of Kansas and Missouri, a small part of Oklahoma, and parts of other middle western States. Wheat is a crop the bulk of which is shipped in the months when the St. Lawrence is open, and thus its movement is in no wise held up by the river's seasonal idiosyncrasies. Ninety-six million bushels of American wheat would be available. Add to this some 115,220,300 Canadian bushels, and it may indeed be said that the Seaway when completed will have been built primarily for the farmer.

The wheat farmer of Saskatchewan and Manitoba and the wheat farmers of Nebraska and of some other middle western States find themselves menaced by a common danger. Railroad rates have risen until it no longer pays them to ship off their grain to market. Wheat brought from Australia on the windjammers and wheat brought from the Argentine on cheap freighters undersell them. When it costs the man in Wray, Colorado, eighteen cents more to ship out a hundred pounds of wheat than it did in 1914, and when it costs the man in Scobey, Montana, nearly twenty cents more, neither can compete. Both would be at an impossible disadvantage even had all other factors remained unchanged . . . which is not the case.

In 1914 the Panama Canal was opened. Measured in terms of mileage cost, it brought the two edges of the North-American continent nearer to each other than either is to the middle. It brought Vancouver and Portland, the two chief wheat ports of the Pacific, far nearer to eastern markets than are Wray, Winnipeg or Scobey. The export of wheat from Vancouver has risen from nothing at all in 1912 to some 50,000,000 bushels in a normally good year. Portland's commerce has tripled since the war. In other words, the far western wheat growers have been given an advantage in transportation rates, and the middle

westerner has been further handicapped. From the prairie farmers' point of view, the St. Lawrence Seaway should be built if only to right the wrong done them by Panama.

A St. Lawrence Seaway would divert traffic from the rails. Sniped at by 'bus and barge, undermined by the Panama Canal and now threatened by the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty, the railroads of North America are not happy. Economically their future may lie in further amalgamations such as that which saved the Canadian National and the old Grand Trunk in 1923, or that which on July 21st, 1932, consolidated into four great systems all the railroads of the Eastern United States except those of New England. Morally their discomfiture seems almost nemesis. For four generations they have bullied and bludgeoned the waterways. Under the policy of *laissez-faire* American governments have, if anything, encouraged them. The first rounds of the fight started before the Civil War, at a time when the political and financial arena was more noted for its blood-letting than for its finesse and decorum. By 1874 a railroad which carried wheat from Chicago to New York, paralleling and competing with the Great Lakes route, raised its rates by nearly 50 per cent. as soon as the canals froze over, and then later, as soon as the ice broke and navigation resumed, cut them again. To rate-cutting was added downright restraint of trade. By 1886 a certain powerful New York railway was playing the haughty suitor with all its tributary lines. " You cannot have me and the canals as well," it told them, and they had to abandon all connection with old and formerly profitable barge routes under threat of being themselves abandoned if they did not do so. One by one, even the small railways broke with the canal. The great trunk lines, controlling nearly all important water terminals, refused to handle either freight or bulk commodities brought in by canal boats. Where no other method would succeed they operated rival barge lines, or bought canals in order to ruin them.

The return of the canal to favour nowadays when its old enemy, the railway, is being badgered by automobile competition, industrial depression and government interference, is a *dénouement* as spectacular and as satisfying as the final vindication of the heroine in a melodrama.

The railway's loss is the farmer's gain. Dedicated to cheaper haulage, the Seaway will fulfil an essential economic function and help American wheat to hold its own against the Argentine,

Australia and Russia. Yet the railroads, which have been unable or unwilling to help, must not be allowed to perish. Three great cities, Quebec, Montreal and Chicago, support rail traffic and typify that regional opinion which, both in the United States and in Canada, opposes the St. Lawrence project most bitterly. A few weeks after the signature of the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty I had occasion to speak of it with the late Mayor Czermak of Chicago in Vienna :

> " The railroads which serve Chicago," he told me, " are in a bad way. 'Buses cut down their passenger traffic. Trucks cut down their freight. Logic seems to be on the side of the man who deserts them, for if a truck can do a short point-to-point haul in one operation it's cheaper than to run a truck from factory to station, transfer a load to the freight-car, let rails carry it to the city of destination, and then truck it off once more.
>
> " How does all this relate to the St. Lawrence Seaway? Why, the St. Lawrence Seaway is just another rival institution threatening to cut just another chunk out of our carriers' receipts. Yet certain industries and certain cities like Chicago depend absolutely on the railroads, their prosperity and their efficient service. They must not be so handicapped as to suffer curtailment. People who want to give them a fair chance are scared of the St. Lawrence competition for no other reason."

As a matter of fact, the pattern which is beginning to take shape along the middle waterways should benefit Chicago immensely. Within the past ten years Canada has deepened and improved the Welland Canal, dug its own Sault Ste. Marie, and done more than its share in developing the St. Lawrence project. Within the last ten years the State of New York has completed its reconstruction of the Erie Canal, and the United States Government has developed its wartime canalisation of the Tombigbee, Alabama and lower Mississippi Rivers, has begun the opening of the Missouri, and has improved the Ohio from Pittsburg almost to Louisville. Keokuk and the Illinois Canal complete the picture. Chicago soon should dominate a system of canals as magnificent as its present railroad net, and stand at the junction of the whole vast Mississippi system with that of the St. Lawrence. Since 1892 its harbour has declined. By 1899 it had been excluded from the grain trade beyond the Mississippi. Any project which might tend to bring back its former contact *via* water traffic should be supported rather than declined.

Canadian opposition to the St. Lawrence project is more stubborn and deep-seated than that which exists in America because it follows old-established divisions. On the subjects of imperial defence, participation in the World War, conscription, votes for women, prohibition, and relations with America, Quebec has often stood apart from the other provinces. It stands apart on the St. Lawrence issue, for in Quebec are the two principal Atlantic ports of Canada, through which flow most of the grain shipments that come in by rail from the West and go out by ship to Europe. In the single year of 1928 Montreal received 217,316,874 bushels of this wheat. This trade would largely cease if a water route superseded the overland haul.

Yet through its geographical position Montreal enjoys other advantages which the St. Lawrence Seaway, far from destroying, should develop. By calling world attention to the St. Lawrence River, the project emphasises its possibilities as a passenger route. Montreal is five hundred miles nearer the English ports than is New York. From Montreal ships bound for Europe steam fully a third of the way on a broad river instead of on the open sea. In those seasons when the iceberg menace is absent, the St. Lawrence way to Europe, for passengers who, while pressed for time, still eschew airplanes, is safer, shorter and swifter than any other. It could be made a major, if not the major, North-Atlantic road. It could speed the mail.

Furthermore, a large part of Canada's $250,000,000 pulp and paper industry is in Quebec, and certain sections here, like Three Rivers, where the most modern mills in the world produce 3,000 tons weekly, would profit by a seaway for bringing newsprint to the American middle west so cheaply. Since Ontario opposed the St. Lawrence Seaway project until it obtained first rights to the Canadian share of the power to be generated, perhaps some similar bargain may be made with Quebec. If Three Rivers cannot swing the province into line, the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty will probably be ratified in spite of Quebec's opposition. It is economical, costing the Federal Government but $40,000,000, payment of which may be spread over a decade. As for all the rest of Canada's share in the expenses of the project, Ontario has promised $67,000,000 for the power, while America has allowed credit for $163,000,000 for building the Welland Canal, Beauharnois,

and other existing works. As Professor Innis of Toronto University has written in the *Britannica*:

> Canada is primarily a new country with a small population, exporting such bulky raw materials as wheat, lumber, pulp and paper, and minerals to densely populated industrial countries. Cheap water transportation is fundamental.

The Canadian wheat ports of Fort William and Port Arthur may be expected to grow apace, and remain, with Vancouver and Churchill, the great wheat shipment centres of the Dominion. Duluth, Minnesota, which occupies on Lake Superior a strategical position akin to that of Chicago on Lake Michigan, may be expected to experience some such boom as that of the period 1880 to 1890, when its population increased tenfold in a single decade. Beside these three great grain ports, every other harbour on the Great Lakes should be stimulated by the St. Lawrence venture. But in the last analysis such results will seem but secondary. The farmer, who has experienced much adversity in recent years, will be the principal beneficiary when —and if—sea-going ships begin to climb the St. Lawrence to fetch his products. And the people as a whole—the Anglo-American people of Canada and the United States—will also be beneficiaries. Trade between them will be stimulated, while at the same time imperial wares and colonial products will be given an open way to the very centre of North America, and profit accordingly. Not least significant should be, indeed, these new exchanges between still kindred countries.

WILLIAM LEON SMYSER.

THE POETRY OF EXILE.

MANY a one has tried to discover and to reveal in a sentence the secret of poetry, and has failed. I do not propose to add to these attempts. I do not claim that the sense of exile holds in it the sole secret of all poetic inspiration. I know that the poet has a range of music far wider than can be encompassed within such limits. He may pipe upon a penny whistle or he may use the organ of Abt Vogler. "*Quicquid agunt homines*"—everything that touches human life in its infinite variety is transmutable into what we call poetry. It may take the form of a nursery rhyme or it may take the form of an epic. Who will say what wandering wind among the reeds will awaken the eternal harmonies? Poetry cannot be confined within the four corners of any formula and it is only a German professor who would attempt to do so. But it is permissible to one to make use of a single aspect of life as a clue to the variety of poetical expression, and that is the use that I propose to make of the sense of exile. It seems to me that the desires that centre round this feeling have expressed themselves with extraordinary richness and beauty in the poetry of every race. No one who thinks and feels can fail to be aware—in all ages and in all lands men have been aware—that there is a harsh and distressing dissonance in the universe from which it is man's deepest desire to escape to some region of harmony. In this lies the impulse that sets men seeking beauty, "the divine Beauty," as Plato calls it, "pure, clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality." And poetry leads man to the land of desire where Beauty has its home.

Poetry is thus, to use the imaginative language of another poet,

> The hand that wrings,
> Bruised albeit at the strings,
> Music from the soul of things.

"It is the pang of separation," says Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, "that spreads throughout the world and gives birth to shapes innumerable in the infinite sky. It is this sorrow of separation that gazes in silence from star to star and becomes lyric among rustling leaves in rainy darkness of July. It is this overspreading pain that deepens into loves and desires, into sufferings and joys in human homes; and it is this that ever melts in song through my poet's heart." To overcome the discords, to reveal

the harmony, to travel back on the long trail from exile to the land of heart's desire—that is one of the deepest motives that inspire poetry and music. "Man," says G. K. Chesterton, "has not only lost his way; he has lost his address." It is this man, so lost, seeking his way home from a strange land whose track I wish to follow here and there in the poetry of the world.

The simplest of these tracks and the plainest to see is that which has been trodden by the literal exiles and wanderers, by Ulysses, far away from Ithaca and "for ever climbing up the climbing wave," by Ruth when, "sick for home, she stood in tears amid the alien corn," by Dante, when he had proof "how savoureth of salt the bread of others and how hard a road the going down and up another's stairs," by Robert Louis Stevenson in Samoa, remembering Edinburgh street lamps and longing for the time when it could be said of him: "Home is the sailor, home from the sea, And the hunter home from the hill." There is no country I know of—unless, perhaps, India—that has not awakened passionate sentiments of affection in its children, especially when they are far away from it. No country except India, for in the case of India there is, as far as I know, in her literature no such expression of devotion to the soil of the land. It is a land too vast, too harsh perhaps and terrible, to win this love, and its place has been taken in the case of this people by the longing, deeper in them than in almost any other people, for a remoter *patria*. England, and still more Scotland, is small enough for one to love, but even so it is most commonly some particular place, some specially remembered scene, that binds the heart.

> Four ducks on a pond,
> A grass bank beyond,
> A blue sky in spring,
> White clouds on the wing,—
> What a little thing,
> To remember for years,
> To remember with tears.

It is not *Rule Britannia* or *Scots Wha Hae* that expresses the secret of England or of Scotland, as that secret is hid in the hearts of the exiles beyond the seven seas. It is often something that stirs a personal memory or carries a private symbolism within it and wakens an unforgotten music. It may

be " a shieling on a misty island " that does this for us; or it may be

> Gray, recumbent tombs of the dead in desert places,
> Standing-stones on the vacant, wine-red moor,
> Hills of sheep and the howes of the silent, vanished races;

or it may be some " dim, green, well-remembered isle," but whatever it be it opens windows for us and unseals fountains. " Our nation," says Quiller Couch, " ever cuts down through the strata for its well-springs, and intensifies upon that which is comprised for us in a single, easy word, Home." It is the minor poets, I think, that we must resort to to express for us this local and intimate patriotism. Shakespeare had no local habitation, though—for there was nothing he could not do—he could rant of England with the best. Milton's soul needed the whole land for its dwelling-place and even so overflowed to Paradise. Browning was not so much of a citizen of the world as to forget the call of the thrush's song in an English spring; Edmund Spenser looking across the Irish Sea from his exile felt his own land, as he says, to be " dearly dear "; and all Florence's offences could not quench the desire of Dante to return and rest again upon her " most sweet bosom." But after all it is, perhaps, as I have said, to the lesser poets that we must turn for the full savour of this longing, to Sheriff Nicholson, thinking of his own isle of Skye and its people:

> Blessings upon you both now and aye,
> Dear human creatures!
> Yours is the love that no gold can buy,
> Nor time can wither.
> Peace be with thee and thy children, O Skye,
> Dearest of islands;

or Neil Munro dreaming of the heather hills of Inveraray:

> If I were king of France, that noble, fine land,
> And the gold were elbow deep within my chests,
> And my castles stood in rows along the wine land,
> With towers as high as where the eagle nests;
> If harpers sweet and swordsmen, stout and vaunting,
> My history sung, my stainless tartan wore,
> Were not my fortune poor with one thing wanting,
> The heather at my door?

or T. E. Brown of his native Isle of Man:

> I'm here at Clifton grinding at the mill
> My feet for thrice three weary years have trod,
> But there are rocks and waves in Scarlett still,
> And gorse runs riot in Clen Chass, thank God;

or (if indeed he be a minor poet) Rupert Brooke remembering Grantchester:

> God! I will pack and take a train
> And get me to England once again!
> For England's the one land I know
> Where men with splendid hearts may go.
> For Grantchester! ah Grantchester!
> There's peace and holy quiet there,
> Great clouds along pacific skies,
> And men and women with straight eyes,
> Little children, lovelier than a dream,
> A bosky wood, a slumberous stream,
> And little, kindly winds that creep
> Round twilight corners, half asleep.
> Ah, God! to see the branches stir
> Across the moon at Grantchester!

There are passages enough—and memorable passages—of that kind in English literature to enable us to go on quoting for many pages. But I want rather to ask in regard to all such passages what the real spring of the poetry in them is. What makes it a moving thing to hear—

> O Brignall banks are wild and fair,
> And Greta woods are green?

What is it that makes some streams, say the Tummel or the Garry, bring healing to our souls rather than Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus? Surely it is because heaven and home are always kindred points. It is because certain places come down the long road of memory from our childhood, trailing clouds of glory. The place may be called Jerusalem or " the banks and braes o' bonnie Doon," or Innisfree or merely Tipperary, but whatever its earthly name may be it is always in reality the Celestial City. It suggests to us without our knowing it hopes that travel far beyond it; it awakens unuttered longings that cannot be satisfied except upon the breast of God. Just because these desires are buried deep within us the names of places that we love awaken echoes that reach far beyond them in our unfathomed hearts. The poet of all poets who held the secret of these longings was Virgil and his works are full of cries that wander through eternity. The picture of hands stretched out in unavailing petition and appeal may be taken as peculiarly his symbol of the significance of human life. There is Eurydice, swept back into darkness from the threshold of light and love, and crying—" I am snatched away engulfed in

the vast night, and stretching out to thee—I, alas, no longer thine —unavailing hands." These helpless, outstretched hands make their appeal again when the disembodied souls beg to be borne across the Styx; "*Tendebantque manus ripae ulterioris amore.*" It is these sorrowful desires, this sense of the world's incompleteness and unrest, that make Virgil so worthy to lead Dante to the very threshold of Paradise, but to lead him no further. He knows "the heartache at the heart of things." "*Sunt lachrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt.*" For what touches the heart and calls forth tears as one contemplates the lot of man is his unquenched thirst. "Thou hast set eternity in his heart."

The desire of the moth for the star,
Of the night for the morrow,
The devotion to something afar
From the sphere of our sorrow.

No one since Virgil felt this as Shelley felt it. No one was so completely as he was an exile in what Blake calls "this vegetable world." He has lost his way in what he himself describes as "this wide, grey, lampless, deep, unpeopled world." If we turn to one whom we may call a modern Virgilian, Matthew Arnold, we find that he, similarly, views man as "enisled," in the midst of "the unplumbed, salt, estranging sea." They are all aware of the need that humanity feels of a home, some known haven in an inhospitable universe, and it is that instinct that causes them to turn back to some place of early memory and affection.

This same mood of exile and desire reveals itself in the form of another poetical *motif*—the coming together of two hearts. The desire for unity, for the breaking down of the barriers of mortality till the One alone remains, has been throughout all its history the supreme thirst of India and the same desire, consciously or unconsciously, allures men's hearts in every land.

If any two hearts grew into one
They would do more than the world has done.

A rhyme from an old Journal of Philosophy comes back to memory describing this ultimate goal that is so hard to reach:

For only where the one is twain
And where the two are one again
Will truth no more be sought in vain.

But not only is this the way to the attainment of truth, but also to the attainment of blessedness. "The lowing herd winding slowly o'er the lea," the homing swallow, the swan of Kabir:

(Tell me, O swan, your ancient tale.
From what land do you come, O swan? to what shore will you fly?
Where could you take your rest, O swan, and what do you seek?)—

these have their beauty and draw forth the poet in us just because they symbolise to us the long pilgrimage which we are all making to "the place of fulfilment of craving," to the land of attainment and of peace. And there is no rapture in life or in literature greater than that which comes from some momentary glimpse of such attainment. One of the supreme representations in art of this joyous consummation is Blake's picture which he calls the coming together of soul and body. When the walls of isolation fall and lover and beloved mingle into one, then all human striving has attained at last its crown.

There is no need to illustrate this statement with any fulness for we are at the head waters of all poetry. The despairs and hopes that gather here, the gnawing ardour of desire and the rapture of possession, form the very material out of which are woven "the heaven's embroidered cloths," "the blue and the dim and the dark cloths." Shelley is, of all English poets, the one who expresses most frequently and most poignantly this sense of exile of the heart. This is for him the secret of the whole universe and its utterance is the burden of every song he sings. "We are born into this world," he says, expounding his own doctrine, "and there is something within us which, from the instant we live and move, thirsts after its likeness. . . . Hence in solitude or in that deserted state when we are surrounded by human beings and yet they sympathise not with us, we love the flowers and the grass and the waters and the sky. In the motions of the very leaves of spring, in the blue air, there is found a secret correspondence with our heart which awakens our spirits to a dance of breathless rapture and brings tears of mysterious tenderness to the eyes, like the enthusiasm of patriotic success or the voice of one beloved singing to you alone. Sterne says if he were in a desert he would love some cypress. So soon as this want or power is dead, man becomes the living sepulchre of himself and what still survives is the mere wreck of what he was." Shelley chooses as a motto to express this thirst the words of St. Augustine, "*Quaerebam quid amarem, amans amare.*"

But the poetry of the heart in exile does not always express itself in these unsatisfied and despairing longings. Sometimes in a golden hour the goal is reached. I know no single line which expresses the joy of this attainment with more satisfying completeness than one in Shakespeare's *Cymbeline,* when Imogen, lost and found again, casts herself upon the breast of her husband, and he cries, " Hang there like fruit, my soul, till the tree dies." Or shall we choose instead that simple sentence of the *Vita Nuova* where Dante says of Beatrice, " Whensoever she appeared before me I had no enemy left on earth "? Or again we might select as symbolising this experience of the fruition of joy Clough's picture of the meeting and binding together of the two halves of a bridge, representing the union of two human hearts—

> Sometimes I dream of a great, invisible hand coming down and
> Dropping the great key stone in the middle, . . .

so that . . . all the other stones of the archway

> Joined into mine with a strange, happy sense of completeness.

Or, to take a final example, we have Browning coming forth on the unseen side of his " moon of poets," amid the

> Silent, silver lights and darks undreamed of,
> Where I hush and bless myself with silence.

These are all attempts to describe this great attainment and there is no end to the number of them that we might choose from poets new and old, for there is no joy of earth to compare with this homecoming from exile. In this even more articulately than in the first group of our selections sounds what Kabir calls the " unstruck music," that which Lorenzo and Jessica heard as they sat in the moonlight listening to the " young-eyed cherubim." We have travelled on a winding road, perhaps, but it winds uphill all the way. From Tipperary or from that remembered duck-pond the road leads by many a thorp and town and through some dark and desert places till it brings us at last, or may bring us, " to God's bosom, a land unknown."

I have said that India does not seem to have felt the local patriotism of those who love some spot of earth with a love that transforms it into a symbol of the celestial city. But no people have followed so straight a path or one so bare of earthly beauty to so remote a goal as the seers from among the people of that land. The Indian world-renouncers are compelled for the most part to renounce poetry, as they turn away from the colour and

the joy of life. Their music is for the most part played, as one of them says, on a stringless lute. Yet it has its own beauty and its own appeal, and their poet-saints, fallen upon the world's great altar stairs, are, if we could only see them through the Indian shadows, among the most austere and passionate of all those climbing spirits.

But there are many others for whom heaven is a less dim and silent land and who have climbed towards it with less heavy hearts. From Dante to Francis Thompson the list is long and splendid of those who have not only travelled but arrived, who in one language or another testify with the Hebrew poet, " I shall be satisfied when I awake with Thy likeness." Perhaps the deepest sentence ever written outside of Holy Scripture, and that which describes the widest range of human experience is that familiar one of St. Augustine—" Thou has made us, O Lord, for Thyself and our hearts are ever restless till they rest in Thee." It holds in it the secret of every religion and of most poetry. Dante has described for all time its triumphant realisation in the closing lines of his *Paradiso,*

> Then like a wheel that neither stops nor swerves
> My will revolved about the will of God,
> The will that moves the sun and every star.

Wordsworth was more continually aware than most poets of the desired Presence " whose dwelling is the light of setting suns." Emily Brontë at the close of her brief life of tragedy could say :

> No coward soul is mine,
> No trembler in the world's storm-troubled sphere;
> I see Heaven's glories shine,
> And faith shines equal, arming me from fear.

William Blake, too, in his amazing imaginative course, " amid the stars of God and the abysses of the accuser," had, we know, many visions opening into eternity. He was one to whom " heaven opens on all sides her golden gates." Two verses by him may be taken as summing up this long travail of the *homo desideriorum,* aspiring, striving, ever unsatisfied :

> Ah Sunflower, weary of time,
> Who countest the steps of the sun,
> Seeking after that sweet, golden clime,
> Where the traveller's journey is done;
>
> Where the youth, pined away with desire,
> And the pale virgin shrouded in snow,
> Arise from their graves and aspire,
> Where my Sunflower wishes to go!

Thus the poet in all times and lands is the pilot that sets the course for us common men who have no skill in that navigation, across what Plato calls the wide sea of Beauty. He is the interpreter and mediator between God and man. And the exile longing for his native land and the lad for his lass are "moved by thoughts beyond the reaches of their souls." He who is not moved by such thoughts is "tame in earth's paddock as her prize." It is a poor, narrow life that has no such vistas. By this alchemy that the poets use loss becomes gain, the shutting of doors becomes the opening of windows. What happens in such circumstances may be indicated by these lines of Mrs. Meynell:

Although my life is left so dim
The morning crowns the mountain rim;
Joy is not gone from summer skies,
Nor innocence from children's eyes,
And all these things are part of him;

or by these more mystical lines of Emerson:

If thou love her as thyself,
As a self of purer clay;
If her parting dim the day,
Stealing grace from all alive;
Heartily know, when half gods go,
The gods arrive.

Man is a wanderer from his birth, a voyager on the great deep. There is no more moving passage that I know of in recent literature than the closing chapter of Morley's *Recollections*. It shows us the aged statesman and man of letters, rich as few men have been in the wisdom of experience and reflection, standing baffled and still questioning at the close of a long life that had been full of questioning. It is evening and the distant bells waken in him vague yearnings, till, as he says, "visions rise and change that kill us with desire." No door opens to him. The secret a secret remains, "impossible for human faculty to find out." "So," he says, "to my home in the falling daylight." But no, not to his home; he remains an exile. Is that where we must be content to leave man, asking sorrowful and unanswered questions, stretching out his hands in vain longing for the further bank? Or is there, though he may have missed it, a way home?

NICOL MACNICOL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN COMEDY.

ON July 1st Mr. Thornton and Mr. Macdonald left their prison in Moscow and crossed the frontier for home. The unpleasant aspect of this latest Anglo-Russian episode being thus disposed of, it became possible to consider it as still another of a long series of absurd incidents produced by the incompatible temperament of the Russian and the British people.

It was on March 11th that British public opinion was diverted to Moscow, where four engineers belonging to the firm of Messrs. Metropolitan-Vickers were arrested. Two more members of the same firm were arrested three days later. On that day (March 14th) a decree was issued in Moscow to announce that saboteurs of Government establishments would be severely punished. The Ogpu, which by a former decree of November 15th, 1923, had been empowered at its discretion to punish such offenders, was now ordered to pay special attention to any case of sabotage. Excitement began to run high in London and in Moscow. On March 15th Mr. Baldwin announced to the House of Commons that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed vigorously to protest against the retention in prison of British subjects against whom no charge had been made. On the same day the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. declared a state of emergency and invested the Ogpu with powers of summary punishment without trial. Mr. Litvinov saw Sir Esmond Ovey on March 17th, and with his typical taste for dialectical quibble informed him that British browbeating could not save British subjects from compliance with Russian law, adding the observation that if Sir Esmond were so certain of the innocence of the prisoners, what was he afraid of? It happened that the existing Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was due to expire on April 17th, and negotiations were in progress for a new treaty to take its place. That circumstance suggested to the British Government that the trade agreement might be used as a lever for forcing Moscow to release the prisoners. On April 3rd Mr. MacDonald announced in the House of Commons that on April 5th the Government proposed to pass through all its stages an enabling bill to give the Government power

to issue Orders in Council prohibiting all Russian imports except under licence. The bill duly passed its second reading on April 5th and its third on April 6th, both Sir John Simon and Mr. Runciman having emphasised the point that its only purpose was to safeguard the " life and liberty " of British subjects in Russia, and having given an undertaking that it would not be used for any other purpose. The bill was to be valid for only three months in the first instance. In the meantime Mr. Monkhouse, manager of Metropolitan-Vickers, had on April 1st been formally charged with economic sabotage, military and economic espionage, and bribery. Mr. Litvinov has said and done so many things that have betrayed in him a certain light-hearted contempt for consistency that one hardly any longer notices new examples: but he has seldom contradicted himself so gaily as when on March 28th he told Sir Esmond Ovey that the operation of Russian law in Moscow was no concern of the British Government, and then within a week (on April 3rd) himself formally protested to the German Ambassador against the arrest of Russian subjects in Berlin.

The trial of the engineers began on April 12th and ended on April 19th. To British eyes it was a curious spectacle that was thereby presented. The proceedings were " talky-filmed." The judge undisguisedly acted as a sort of second prosecutor, and showed his hostility against the prisoners by a stream of flippant insults. He knew, of course, that what he said was being recorded and would in due course be relayed throughout the provinces. Moreover, it was proved that during the trial the prisoners were subjected to something like mental torture. At one point, when one of the prisoners refused to confess his guilt, the court was suddenly adjourned. When it reassembled some hours later the said prisoner, looking physically distressed, at once confessed. During the adjournment he had been confined in his cell with officers of the Ogpu. The result of the trial was that one of the British engineers was acquitted, the other five sentenced. Three of them were sentenced to expulsion from Russia—a sentence which was to lead to some rather delicate diplomacy between Sir John Simon and Mr. Litvinov three months later—and the two others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, Mr. Thornton to three, Mr. Macdonald (who had confessed his guilt) to two, years. In effect Mr. Macdonald was rewarded with a remission of one year's sentence for having confessed. What indeed the Russian

politicians most valued was a confession: for the deepest impression would thereby be made on the simple peasants to whom the talkie film would be shown. On the very morning of the day when those sentences were promulgated a meeting of the British Privy Council was held at Windsor Castle " for the purpose " (in the words of the Foreign Office statement) " of authorising a proclamation under the Russian Goods Import Prohibition Act." Later in the same day, when the result of the trial was known, the King signed a proclamation prohibiting the import as from April 26th of about 80 per cent. of the goods normally imported from Russia, among them wheat, barley, maize, butter, timber, cotton and oil. The diplomatic immunity enjoyed by the members of the Russian Trade Delegation in London was withdrawn. The three men who had been sentenced to expulsion from Russia were received by Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office as soon as they reached London (April 24th). They were lionised by large crowds. On April 21st (this also at a later stage became a point of diplomatic importance) the counsel for the defence lodged a formal petition with the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. requesting either that Mr. Thornton and Mr. Macdonald be " pardoned " or that their sentences be " commuted " to deportation. On April 22nd the Russian Government made its rejoinder to the 80 per cent. British embargo by declaring a 100 per cent. embargo of all British goods and of the use of all British ships, the restriction to remain in force as long as the British restriction remained in force. In addition British ships that visited Russian ports were subjected to higher dues and Russian ships were instructed to avoid British ports.

Two months passed. On June 24th Mr. Baldwin, in a speech at Glasgow, made the triple point that the British embargo would be maintained until the prisoners were released, that the embargo was not greatly against British interests because the old trade agreement had been based upon the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment for Russia but not for Great Britain, and that if and when a new treaty came to be negotiated a more equal basis of trading would have to be discovered.

It happened that Mr. Litvinov had come to London as a delegate to the World Economic and Financial Conference. He there perforce met Mr. MacDonald, Sir John Simon, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Runciman. Perforce also the British

Government had to extend its hospitality to him as to all other delegates at the conference. On June 23rd he was invited to luncheon at Chequers. Immediately thereafter it was made known that he would visit Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office on June 26th. After that meeting it was officially announced that " an exchange of views took place in which they made clear to one another the position of their respective governments on the present obstacles to the renewal of Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations." By July 1st, that is after a week's diplomacy, the problem was solved, the prisoners were released, the embargoes lifted, and arrangements made for a prompt resumption of the negotiations for a new trade agreement.

The whole incident had been marked by the sort of pantomimic solemnity that is hardly possible in any sphere of life except politics. It had taken three months for Sir John Simon and Mr. Litvinov to consent to do what both of them had wanted to do from the beginning; and when finally they did agree to do it, it took them several more hours to discover the precise formula which would satisfy them both.

What was the problem? The chief charge against the engineers was that of " sabotage." Sabotage of what? Of their own work. The charge was absurd, although "sabotage" in Russia is a course of conduct that really is committed on a considerable scale and from childish motives by Russians themselves. But that was hardly the point. It happens that these Russian trials are part of the regular policy of the Russian Government. They take place periodically, and it is generally understood abroad (except in Great Britain) that their object is to encourage the Russian peasant to believe that Russia has many enemies, and that the failures of the Russian Government at home are all due to those enemies. That is the only reason why the trials are filmed and shown throughout Russia. In all past cases the foreign prisoners have been quickly released because their purpose was served as soon as the trial ended in a verdict of " guilty." In this case the fact that the British Foreign Office had taken the matter seriously made it difficult for the Russian Government to release Mr. Thornton and Mr. Macdonald. Diplomatic prestige on both sides had become engaged.

When, therefore, on June 26th Mr. Litvinov went to see Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office, he at first suggested that in return for an immediate release of the two men, the British

Government should undertake to make trade concessions to Russia and to embody them in the negotiations that would now have to be renewed. Sir John refused to consider any such bargain and insisted simply that there was no issue between them except the release of the prisoners on the Russian side and the lifting of the embargo on the British side. By June 28th Mr. Litvinov, having in the meantime communicated with Moscow, agreed " in principle " to Sir John's proposal. It remained to carry that agreement into practice.

The final stage of the negotiation was reached on July 1st. It was at that stage that the full comedy was enacted. Sir John Simon, who is a lawyer, suggested to Mr. Litvinov that the two prisoners should be granted a " free pardon." Now the expression a " free pardon " is a curiosity of English law. It means that a man who has been wrongfully imprisoned is allowed to go free without a stain upon his character. The word " pardon " therefore is a misnomer. If a man has not committed an offence against the law, he cannot logically be " pardoned." In any case Russian law has no such formula. There arose the further difficulty that if the Russian Government released the two men and sent them across the frontier, they would be applying to them precisely what happened to three of the other prisoners. In the case of the other three, however, what happened was that they were " sentenced " to leave the country. The same thing could not, from the Russian point of view, be represented as a " penalty " and as a " free pardon." To meet that difficulty it was agreed in the morning of July 1st that the official formula should read thus: ". . . the sentences have been commuted so that both men are free to leave Soviet territory immediately." That formula was telegraphed for approval to Moscow, who objected to it, and the formula was emended, so that in the version finally published on the following morning it read thus: ". . . the sentences have been commuted so that both men are to leave Soviet territory immediately." The omission of the word " free " had the effect of changing the nature of the same operation from that of a benefit conferred to that of a penalty inflicted. The morning version was never published. It was shown to me by Sir John Simon as a draft agreement " in principle " at 12 noon on July 1st. It took till 8 p.m. on that day for Moscow and London to agree on the extrusion of the word " free."

Another difficulty that arose was that Sir John Simon wanted

to make sure that the British proclamation raising the embargo should not be issued until the prisoners *had been* released from prison. In other words he wanted to obviate the possibility that Mr. Litvinov might be prevented, either by a break-down in the telephone or by other accident, from making contact with Moscow that day. It was fortunate for Sir John that the clock in Moscow is two hours ahead of the clock in London. That gave him time to ensure that the Moscow part of the arrangement had been carried out before the British proclamation about the embargo was signed. Even so, however, Mr. Litvinov failed to inform Sir John Simon that the men *had been* released. All he told him was that the order for release had been signed, and Sir John had to be satisfied with that assurance. In fact, however, the two engineers did leave the prison that night.

One of the difficulties in the case is that, while it is absurd to imagine that the six men ever engaged in " sabotage " of their own work, yet it is the case that mysterious damage has been done to some of the machinery that has been put up in Russia by British firms. It is explained on this side by the fact that British firms have to employ a good deal of Russian labour. The Russian labourer is far from skilled, and often does stupid things from sheer incapacity. Other Russian workmen, as is well known by British firms, deliberately wreck the machinery they are supposed to be installing, for no other reason apparently than that they just like to break things. The mere sight of a brand-new piece of complicated machinery induces in them an irresistible desire to hit it with a hammer, just to see what will happen.

Mr. Roosevelt's Inflation.

The United States remains true to her reputation for hypertrophe. Her booms are higher, her slumps deeper than elsewhere. American despair in the early part of 1933 was no worse than American despair in the early months of 1897. America started a big boom (which lasted ten years) in the summer of 1897. She has now started another boom.

Whether Mr. Roosevelt's new boom will last or not, his enterprise is a curious matter for study. The United States is so chaotic a mixture of personal and institutional factors that politics of the sombre British type have little chance of survival. It is probably because organisation by political means is so

difficult in the United States that the citizens of the United States are saved from the sort of bolshevism that nowadays afflicts most " civilised " countries. By bolshevism one means the harassing of the individual by the State. In Great Britain, for example, the Government, theoretically elected by the people to safeguard the people's interests, takes 5s. in the pound from everybody's income for unprofitable purposes. Yet the United States, ostensibly freer from socialism than most contemporary countries, has suddenly plunged into a sort of *de facto* socialism of almost unlimited scope. The reason why nobody in or out of the United States is thereby alarmed probably is that it rests upon emergency conditions, is not recognised in the United States as socialism, and when the time comes can be dropped as suddenly as it was adopted. Under the stress of emergency, real or imagined, there are few limits beyond which people may not be driven by socialist fanaticism. From 1914 to 1918 the men of Great Britain, scared by their politicians, willingly consented to the socialisation of their very lives to no other end than that they be promptly killed in the fighting line.

The American emergency has been created by the financial slump. In the three years 1930-32 no fewer than 4,383 " banks " in the United States collapsed, closed their doors and stopped payment. When on March 4th last Mr. Roosevelt became President, the whole financial system had broken down. In such circumstances a people will follow almost any lead. The fact that a new President was afoot made it inevitable that everybody looked to him for a lead. That fact in its turn left Mr. Roosevelt with no alternative but to attempt what everybody expected him to attempt. He at once thought out and announced a policy. He began by declaring a four days' bank holiday (not a difficult thing to enforce in the circumstances) in order that a good new start be made by everybody on the fifth day. At the same time he announced the lines on which that start should be made : item, that there must be a sound and adequate supply of currency ; that the price of agricultural products must be raised and small farmers protected against foreclosure on their mortgages ; that banking be subjected to national supervision to protect the public. Could any socialist want more than that, as a first instalment of his practices? Mr. Roosevelt announced that if Congress did not promptly support him in his adventure he would seek extraordinary powers which would enable him to dispense with Congress.

His real power was enormous. He was invested by popular confidence with something like autocratic power. He acted quickly. On March 16th his Economy Bill was introduced, designed to save 800,000,000 dollars of budget expenditure, mainly at the expense of " veterans' " (ex-soldiers') pensions. On March 21st his Beer Bill authorised the sale of " near-beer," that is of beer supposed to be non-alcoholic, and calculated to add 150,000,000 dollars to the budget revenue. On the other hand he appropriated 500,000,000 dollars for unemployment relief (Bill passed by Senate on May 1st). His first big measure was the Farm Relief Bill (introduced on March 16th and passed by the Senate on April 28th), of which the main object was to guarantee the price of such products as wheat, maize, rice, milk, pigs, cattle, sheep, tobacco, cotton at the average price level of 1909-14; in other words to double the existing price. The method propounded was to put a 100 per cent. tax on the sale of such products, the proceeds of the tax to be used by the Government either in buying leases of land from farmers (so as to leave it uncultivated) or in compensating farmers who restricted their production. In addition the so-called Smith cotton plan, which had been vetoed by President Hoover, was incorporated in the bill, its object being the restriction of production by an elaborate machinery of control involving the Secretary of Agriculture, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Farm Board. Another section provided for Government credits to the amount of 2,000,000,000 dollars to farmers for the replacement of mortgages so that the Government could in effect become the creditor; still another provided for a purely inflationary issue of 3,000,000,000 dollars of Federal bonds with the proviso that a like amount of legal-tender notes could be issued if need be.

Such were the chief items of Mr. Roosevelt's original programme. It was so big and the pace was so fast that neither in the United States nor outside could any reasonable expectation be formed of what it might lead to, or what even was its main purpose. Mr. Roosevelt himself, two months after assuming office (on May 7th), revealed the fact that he himself was clear in his mind about his main purpose. In a broadcast statement made on that day he declared that " The Administration has the definite object of raising commodity prices to such an extent that those who have borrowed money will, on the average, be able to repay that money in the same kind of dollar

which they borrowed. We do not seek to let them get such a cheap dollar that they will be able to pay back a great deal less than they borrowed."

The evidence soon began to appear that he was driving at his central purpose with well-sustained energy. Moreover, he was not too busy at home to say some good things abroad. One of them ought to be put prominently on record. He addressed a message on May 16th to the nations which were taking part in the disarmament conference at Geneva. In it he made this excellent observation: "It is high time for us and for every nation to understand the simple fact that the invasion of any nation or the destruction of a national sovereignty can be prevented only by the complete elimination of the weapons which make such a course possible to-day." He more than once announced that real recovery must be international, and that disarmament was an indispensable element in international recovery; but at the same time he made it clear that if international co-operation could not be secured, he would push ahead with isolationist American schemes. For instance, on May 29th a statement of the American attitude towards the impending world conference was published in the American Press. The interesting point it made was that if the world refused to co-operate, then America would put up even higher tariff barriers to maintain her economic isolation. The tariff bill, not yet introduced, would, it was explained, be phrased in such a way that it would authorise the Executive either to lower or to raise the existing tariffs according as the one or the other contingency arose.

His general plan was prosecuted with little opposition. Congress, it is true, became restive over its virtual suppression and decided at one point to try its strength with the President. As a result the passage of the President's proposals about veterans' pensions was delayed till June 16th, and then passed the Senate only after the proposed reduction had been substantially restricted. On that same day both Houses adjourned *sine die,* for the President's essential legislation had been passed. Mr. Roosevelt at once signed the Industrial Recovery Bill and authorised a capital expenditure of 400,000,000 dollars for highway construction and of 238,000,000 dollars for the navy's new programme, which involved the building of thirty-two new ships. Had he forgotten his own statement of May 16th to the disarmament conference? After signing the Industrial Recovery

Bill, Mr. Roosevelt described it in a public statement as " the most important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress," and explained its purpose as " a supreme effort to stabilise for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity of the nation and the preservation of American standards." He estimated that a million men would be restored to work by October 1st, and several millions later. He elaborated the principle that the gap between costs and prices must be bridged, not by the lowering, but by the raising, of wages, so that the cardinal principle should be the increase in the consuming capacity of the people at large. " The aim," he said, " of the whole effort is to restore our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity. The idea is simply for employers to hire more men to do existing work by reducing the working hours of each man's week, and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter week . . . if we now inflate prices as fast and as far as we increase wages the whole project will be set at naught."

He was presumably so engaged in his own enterprise that he hardly even noticed what was happening at the London conference. When on June 17th his own delegation transmitted to him a draft of the proposals that had been tentatively agreed at the conference for currency stabilisation, his answer was that of a man who is surprised that so uncomfortable a proposal should be put to him. He rejected it. The conference then drafted an alternative agreement, a mere declaration that they should all do what they could to check speculation in the exchanges. In its turn the new draft was rejected to Mr. Roosevelt in a published statement which read perilously like a lecture to the conference on how to conduct its business. By that time the dollar was falling majestically and was playing its part in the inflationary process upon which he had set his heart. The effect of Mr. Roosevelt's lecture upon the delegations assembled in London was expressed by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on July 10th when he said: " I do not think it will serve any useful purpose for me to make any comment either on the manner or the matter of that statement. But there is no doubt its effect, not only on the delegations of the gold countries but upon public opinion in those countries, was very profound and very disturbed. Coming from such a quarter it seemed to their representatives to make it impossible for them usefully to discuss any longer those questions which had been referred to the Monetary and Financial Commission or those questions which dealt with tariffs, prohibitions, and other weapons which could be used as a means of defence."

The curious position was thereby reached that on the one hand an international conference was sitting in London, at which the United States was represented, for the purpose of concerting international action to help an economic recovery, and on the other hand the President of the United States was already so deeply engaged in a scheme of his own for helping a separate economic recovery in the United States that he not only in effect withheld his co-operation from the conference, but exuberantly told the conference that it was working on unpromising lines. The really obscure thing in that situation was to discover what exactly was the issue between Mr. Roosevelt and the London Conference. The very word inflation is used in several different senses by different people. The political fraud, practised, for example, by the Russian and German Governments just after the war, of issuing paper imitations of currency notes and representing them as money led to so terrible a retribution that many people in Europe permanently think that inflation means the unlimited use of the printing press as a means of fraudulently creating " money." Inflation in its generally accepted sense refers to credit. It means simply that process of expanding confidence which induces people to lend their money to other people who can make a profitable use of it. It is the same feeling of general confidence that enables the borrower to make profitable use of the loan and thus to reward the lender. Brokers' loans and bank overdrafts are merely stages in the movement of capital which constitute an inflation. Now the governments represented at the conference in London, if they were trying to do anything at all, were trying to foster that spirit of confidence which leads to the movement of money and to the inflation of credit. Mr. Roosevelt's lone hand was attempting the same thing. He also is a politician. What is the difference? Mr. Roosevelt was riding the American reaction away from the mentality of depression or deflation. The United States hardly ever follows precedent, and just because American mentality is insensitive to precedent, it can achieve its purpose by unorthodox methods. Mr. Roosevelt is in effect trying to close the gap between costs and prices by inoculating everybody with a feeling that the slump is over and the boom is at hand. If he does really persuade people that

the boom is at hand, then the boom will be at hand. The main reason why Washington was at loggerheads with the London conference probably was that Washington was engaged in a practical experiment and London was discussing hypothetical experiments in an academic way. There was no essential conflict of principle. To drive an issue between temporary and permanent stabilisation of currencies, for instance, was absurd on both sides. The chief danger to Mr. Roosevelt's "inflation" comes from the European gold countries who vaguely imagine that being on gold demands a permanently stabilised slump mentality.

The fact that Mr. Roosevelt and the World Economic and Monetary Conference disagreed on paper about a matter on which essentially they were agreed is still another illustration of the muddle that results from human controversy. The conference was an arena of political emotions which obscured the work in hand, as politics normally obscure the work in hand. Mr. Roosevelt by contrast was working as an individual invested with authority to pursue a single object. Whether he succeeds or not in that object will depend, not upon the intrinsic "soundness," as judged by academic economic criteria, of his measures, but upon the psychological spread to other countries of his inflationary or boom mentality. It was at least interesting to observe in the middle of July that not only was American popular opinion enthusiastically supporting him, but that British opinion, including that of every country in the British Empire, and the Scandinavian countries were increasingly disposed to follow his lead. It might almost be said that the whole world, apart from the European gold countries, were in a mood to "try it on" in the Roosevelt sense. Nor can one forget that the boom mentality which in the summer of 1897 followed the Baring period of depression also started in the United States, and that although it lacked a sound economic basis it led to a prolonged period of commercial prosperity throughout the world.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

July 15th, 1933.

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A CENTURY OF EDUCATION IN ENGLAND.*

The excuse, if any be needed, for noticing three technical books on the subject of British education is to be found in the fact that it is almost exactly a hundred years since the State in England began to interfere with English education. It is true that the first actual grant took place on June 28th, 1821, but that was an annual grant to defray, to the extent of about £1,200, the expenses of salaries and allowances to certain professors at Oxford and Cambridge. But the education of the people at large was first approached by the House of Commons on Saturday, August 17th, 1833, when they voted the sum of £20,000 "in aid of private subscriptions for the erection of school houses for the education of children of the poorer classes." This annual vote for education (in an ever-increasing sense) steadily rose till in the opening years of the twentieth century it exceeded the annual sum of £11,000,000, and in the year 1930-1 it exceeded the annual sum of

* (1) *The Training of Teachers in England and Wales During the Nineteenth Century.* By R. W. Rich. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.
(2) *The Methods and Technique of Teaching.* By Percival R. Cole. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. Australian published price.
(3) *Education in 1932, Being the Report of the Board of Education and the Statistics of Public Education for England and Wales.* H.M. Stationery Office. 3s. 6d. net.

£45,000,000. Nor did this sum of £45,000,000 in any way represent the total expenditure on education, since most of it was paid as a grant to the local education authorities (created in 1902-3) in return, so to speak, for expenditure by those authorities. In 1932 the total expenditure of those authorities on education was £79,000,000 (including the Government grants), and even to-day (1933), when the total expenditure of the local authorities has been reduced to £77,620,000, the total cost of education to the State and the local authorities, including grants to the Universities, is not less than £80,000,000 annually.

This tremendous sum is expended on the upkeep of 21,631 public elementary and special schools (with 5,630,722 children on the school registers), manned by 172,978 teachers, and 1,379 secondary schools dealing with 432,061 pupils by means of 22,293 full-time teachers. We must add to these figures about 5,500 schools and colleges and evening institutes for technical and further education which cater for about one million pupils or students, in the main in part-time attendance. We must also include about 26,000 students attending courses under the Adult Education Regulations issued by the Board of Education; the 3,000 or more pupils having a preliminary education and training for the teaching profession and the 19,000 men and women in training colleges for teachers. The annual sum of £80,000,000 includes also a small part of the cost of the 37,000 full-time and 5,500 part-time students attending universities and colleges in England and Wales. In all over 7,000,000 children and adults are attending State-aided schools, institutions, colleges and universities in England and Wales, apart from the work done by the Public Schools and private schools. If the total population of England and Wales be taken as 40,000,000 persons, almost one in six of the whole population are under some form of trained instruction, while something approaching one-half of the population under twenty-one years are in the same happy or unhappy state.

We are certainly taking education in England and Wales very seriously to-day. The great annual cost in national education is necessarily the cost of teaching. Nearly two-thirds of the cost per pupil in the elementary schools is attributable to the cost of teachers' salaries. There are 128,126 certificated teachers and 29,766 uncertificated, more than 7,000 supplementary teachers and more than 5,000 special-subject teachers, in all nearly 170,000 teachers in the public elementary schools,

of whom more than 125,000 are women. Teachers' pensions alone in the current year will cost over £6,500,000 and in thirty-five years' time they will cost annually £13,000,000. In these circumstances it is almost a duty to read Professor Rich's very valuable book, in which he traces the training of this extraordinarily important and costly class of Civil Servant from days when the subject of popular education had not attacked the consciences of educated Englishmen to the days at the end of the nineteenth century when the Board of Education replaced the series of departments—the Treasury (1833-9), the Committee of the Privy Council (1839) and the Education Department (1856)—which had been striving for seventy years to create a class of trained teachers for the purpose of popular education.

Apart from the necessary framework of administration which Professor Rich traces in coherent fashion, especially after the great Parliamentary debates of 1839, the main purpose of the book is concerned "with the evolution of the technique of training from the first experiments in the early monitorial training centres to the work of the Training Colleges and Universities at the close of the century." We have an account of Kay-Shuttleworth's famous experiment at Battersea, opened in February 1840. The first batch of students consisted of eight pupil teachers, aged about thirteen, indentured for seven years.

> They were to receive at least three years' instruction in the training school, and for two years they were to act as pupil teachers in the village school for three hours a day. At the end of their apprenticeship they were to be subject to examination, and if satisfactory were to receive certificates and be given employment as teachers in schools of industry for pauper children. During the period of apprenticeship they were to receive remuneration with annual increments.

This pupil teacher system was destined to control the system of training for at least three decades, and some forty training colleges were founded upon the Battersea principle. Even in 1933 there are no less than 800 pupil teachers in training, of whom 563 are rural pupil teachers. To-day a pupil teacher receives training in teaching together with instruction between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. The Revised Code of 1861 made many changes, but the pupil teacher system was not abandoned. The numbers in the training colleges fell after 1862, and the quality of the students did not improve after

the set-back consequent on the Revised Code. The average intellectual standard was low till long after the introduction of the Education Act of 1870, but a revival came after the Cross Commission of 1886, while the Departmental Committee on the Pupil Teacher System in 1898 deplored the lack of adequate college accommodation. The Day Training Colleges in connection with universities and university colleges sanctioned by the Education Department in 1890 were an immediate success, and Professor Rich regards their institution as "one of the most important points in the history of teachers' training in England." But the university atmosphere did and does not suit weak students. "The student who needed to be learnt, instead of teaching himself, was better off in the ordinary training college." A very useful chapter in this very useful book is the account of the efforts at training teachers for secondary school work. It is essential that all teachers should be trained.

Dr. Percival Cole's book on the method and technique of teaching is an excellent work written and printed—and very excellently printed—in Melbourne. It aims first at teaching teachers "to achieve a degree of practical skill that shall be worthy of their craft," and secondly "to subordinate the wealth of illustrative detail to an ordered array of pedagogic principles." It is a practical book and contains an "analysis of lesson types . . . the result of many years' experience and planning." The philosophy of teaching is at the heart of the whole of Dr. Cole's book and he presents skilfully the different forms of thought that must lie behind the different forms of teaching. He lays special stress on thoroughness. The old English Public Schools, whatever were their faults in times past, succeeded in driving into their pupils the sense of thoroughness. Subjects might have been scanty, but they were known to the core when the pupils arrived at Oxford or Cambridge. The weakness of the teaching of to-day is lack of thoroughness in many of the secondary schools. English teachers would do well to read and re-read Dr. Cole's wise chapter on Thoroughness. It goes to the very root of the philosophy, the technique and the practice of teaching. A teacher, however learned, however well trained, who is not thorough should give up his work. Perhaps that is the reason that some of the old Public Schools object to trained teachers: very often they have not learned to be thorough, and thoroughness is an essential of national and imperial well-being. J. E. G. DE M.

THE FIRST EARL STANHOPE.*

Professor Basil Williams has written an excellent life of a remarkable example of the English governing class at its classical period. In the sphere of foreign policy only Castlereagh after Vienna achieved a position comparable to Stanhope's, though no two men offer a stranger contrast than the Irishman, who cut his throat in a fit of depression, and the Englishman, who died of a fit of rage. For four years this excitable, bad-tempered, shrill-voiced Whig general domineered over Europe. As Professor Williams says, abroad no other Englishman has wielded such power. But he lived too fully, and at the age of forty-seven, after a party at which the guests are said to have drunk "new Tokay, Champagne, Visney, and Barba Water" continuously for thirteen hours, he succumbed in the middle of a heated speech in the House of Lords to a stroke brought on by the violence of his reactions to a personal attack on him by the young Duke of Wharton, who had compared him to Sejanus.

Apart from its biographical interest, this book is the best and indeed the only up-to-date account in English of domestic and foreign politics in the early part of the reign of George I. It is largely based on Dr. Michael's *Englische Geschichte im 18ten Jahrhundert*, to which Professor Williams pays a high and well-deserved tribute. On certain points connected with the Ministry of 1717-20, he disagrees with Dr. Michael, whom he regards as overrating the value of reports of foreign ambassadors on English politics. The specific questions at issue, however, suggest rather an unconscious biographical bias on his own part than an error in technique against which a historian of Dr. Michael's standing might be expected to be on his guard. Thus Professor Williams considers that, though there was, strictly, no Prime Minister, his hero was so much the leading figure in the Government that it may be called "Stanhope's ministry." As against this, contemporaries always refer to it as "Lord Sunderland's administration," and a high authority, Lord Hardwicke, who uses this expression, goes so far as to say that Lord Sunderland enjoyed so assured a position of primacy that he was able to "remove from one office to another, still retaining the character and office of Prime Minister."

* *Stanhope*. By Basil Williams. Oxford University Press. 18s.

Again, Professor Williams is reluctant to believe that Stanhope and his colleagues were politically dependent on Bernstorff, the Hanoverian Minister in London, and tied to his policy. On the other hand he himself admits that they were originally subject to Bernstorff's influence, which in 1717 was " too strong to be resisted," and that their emancipation from Bernstorff was only achieved at the cost of the reconstruction of the Government in 1720.

Incidentally it is not quite correct to say that after this Bernstorff never again interfered in English politics. In 1722 and 1723, " the old man " is to be found as one of Carteret's chief cards in his struggle against Townshend and Walpole, who on their side held " the Duchess." Finally the reconstruction of the Ministry in 1720, which Dr. Michael regards as a victory for Townshend and Walpole, is called by Professor Williams a " cheap victory " for Sunderland and Stanhope, on the ground that the posts in the Government which they were obliged to surrender to the leaders of the Opposition were " of little account." This description is hardly applicable to Townshend's post of Lord President, one of the five offices which invariably carried with them membership of the "inner" or " efficient " cabinet, and it seems misleading to treat Walpole as merely Paymaster. Some forty years later Lord Hardwicke cited, as precedents for a similar arrangement under contemplation for George Grenville, the cases of " Mr. Walpole, Paymaster, *at the head of the House of Commons,* and Mr. Pelham, the like, both for a short time." R. R. S.

* * *

LITERATURE AND THE PULPIT IN MEDIÆVAL ENGLAND.*

Dr. G. R. Owst has followed up his very stimulating volume entitled *Preaching in Mediæval England*—dealing with sermon manuscripts (of which thousands exist) from the period of 1350 to 1450—by a treatise, not less stimulating, on the influence of sermons on English mediæval literature. This is designed to be followed by a volume dealing with the theological and ecclesiastical aspects of the subject. The complete trilogy will

* *Literature and Pulpit in Mediæval England: A Neglected Chapter in the History of English Letters and of the English People.* By G. R. Owst. Cambridge: at the University Press. 30s. net.

be a substantial contribution, achieved as the result of many years of valuable labours, to the knowledge of the wonderful century that succeeded the Black Death.

Some words of criticism may be allowed in respect to the present volume. Dr. Owst is too apt to be scornful of those who happen, sometimes wrongly, to disagree with this and that view which he puts forward. Very eminent historians and critics, foreign and English, who have ventured to express considered opinions on some of the great social problems of the Middle Ages in England are treated with something like scorn. This drastic method does not strengthen a book, or strengthen the case that Dr. Owst has to plead. One instance, important historically, will suffice. Dr. Owst holds, and he is probably broadly right, that the regular medium of popular preaching was English before the Black Death. But he proceeds to say that the evidence for this thesis is sufficient

> to give the lie to Professor Fawtier's absurd deduction from the slipshod phrase of a chronicler, that the peasantry (!) of England, prior to the Black Death, habitually spoke in French, and that that language was therefore the regular medium of popular preaching.

The present writer holds no brief for Professor Fawtier and the point can only be decided by the manuscript sermons preached before the period of the Black Death. But the deduction which Professor Fawtier makes does not deserve this very strong language since all grammar-school education throughout England was before the Black Death conducted in Anglo-Norman. Higden in his *Polychronicon* (written about 1327) says—John de Trevisa's translation of 1385 is used:

> This apayrynge of the burthe of the tunge is because of tweie things; oon is for children in scole agenst the usage and manere of alle othere nacionns beeth compelled for to leve hire owne langage, and for to construe hir lessouns and here thynges in Frensche, and so they haueth seth the Normans come first to Engelond. Also gentil men children beeth i-taught to speke Frensche from the tyme that they beeth i-rokked in here cradel, and kunneth speke and playe with a childes broche; and uplondisshe men will likne hym self to gentil men, and fondeth with great besynesse for to speke Frensche, for to be i-tolde of.

Now this is not a " slipshod phrase of a chronicler," but an edition of a work that a very distinguished fellow of two Oxford Colleges translated in 1385, adding priceless notes about the

change in English education after the Black Death. Trevisa says that:

> this manere was moche i-used to for firste deth, and is siththe sumdel i-chaunged; for John Cornwaile, a maister of grammer chaunged the lore in gramer scole and construccion of Frensche in to Englische; and Richard Pencriche lerned the manere techynge of hym and of othere men of Pencrich; so that now, the yere of oure Lorde, a thowsand thre hundred and foure score and fyve, and of the secounde Richard after the conquest nyne, in alle the gramere scoles of Engelond, children leveth Frensche and construeth and lerneth an Englische.

Cornwaile was apparently at Merton College in 1347, and Pencrich at the same college in 1367, a contemporary of Wycklif and John de Trevisa. This is an important question apart from any matter of criticism. In remote rural districts the sermons must have been preached in English and an English-speaking priest must have been appointed, but in a small country town, with a vicar or rector who was probably also the schoolmaster, the sermons may have been deliberately preached in Anglo-Norman, the priest may well have been of French origin and the tongue must have been understood at any rate by the school children. John Bromyard speaks of caged birds in modest dwellings learning to speak English or French. This whole question of the use of Anglo-Norman before the Black Death in the pulpit needs further investigation and perhaps Dr. Owst may make time for it. A certain bitterness and combativeness of tone is observable all through this useful and interesting book.

Dr. Owst uses continuously the *Summa Predicantium* of the English Dominican John Bromyard, who flourished at some time in the fourteenth century. The bulk of the material contained in this vast work is drawn from thirteenth-century sources and at first sight it may seem not just to quote him so extensively in a book dealing with the century after the Black Death. There were many changes in social life after 1350, but Dr. Owst also quotes many contemporary writers, such as Rypon of Durham, who confirms, as Chaucer confirms, the bad tradition of many of the clergy. But the very violence of Bromyard and of the contemporary writers shows quite clearly that there was another side to the scene; that many churchmen and many priests were up in arms at the looseness of life not only of the clergy but of all classes of the community from

the highest to the lowest. Moreover, Chaucer's Poor Person of the toun or village gives as vivid a picture of a really devout priest as the picture of the very perfect knight or of the good ploughman. It seems to the present writer that invaluable as the material collected by Dr. Owst is, the picture of late fourteenth-century society as presented by Geoffrey Chaucer (who presumably knew all the facts at first hand) is more balanced and more hopeful than the picture presented by this useful volume. Dr. Owst makes the point that "the pulpit leads where poets follow and reiterate. The output of the former is like a vast, surging flood against the tiny trickle of the latter." But that does not apply to a great contemporary genius like Chaucer who, in the Poor Person's Tale, recites a sermon which for ever links the pulpit and literature.

It must not be thought that these views in any way depreciate the value of Dr. Owst's work. The pulpit undoubtedly affected, almost wholly for good, the literary outlook of a century of transition and may indirectly have affected the amazing outburst of literary genius in England in the second half of the sixteenth century as it undoubtedly made possible the English Reformation. The temper of the country was being formed in the century after the Black Death, and King Henry VIII when he broke with the Pope correctly estimated that new temper. But according to Bromyard chivalry had vanished at the end of the thirteenth century. Dr. Owst says of Bromyard's "carpet knights"

> like retired commanders or half-pay colonels, sitting at their ease with their fellow clubmen amid the luxuries of Pall Mall, they love to rattle off armchair reminiscences by the hour, boasting of the deeds they never did, or could do.

Yet Bromyard and Dr. Owst are answered by Chaucer in the one case, and in the other by the amazing heroism of modern times. In both centuries men did in fact things which to the student in the study seemed impossible. Chaucer knew this. John Bromyard did not know it.

Dr. Owst attacks the administration of the English Courts of Justice on the authority of Bromyard (dealing with the thirteenth century) and others. Broadly the charge is untrue, as Dr. Owst would admit if he had read the Year Books, and Dr. Bolland's admirable summary of the evidence. From the time that King Henry II established the Circuit system justice was meted out to all free classes and especially to the poor,

as the detailed records of the Early Chancery Proceedings show. That there were grumblings and unproved charges of corruption in certain cases is true enough, but Bromyard's general charges were extraordinarily unjust and represent Continental ignorance and jealousy of our centralised system of law and order. To be critical on salient points is the duty of a critic, but it is also his duty and pleasure to admire the untiring labours of an author who shows clearly that the mediæval pulpit had an influence on English literature which has never been fully recognised before. J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

CHARLES LAMB.*

Mr. Blunden has written an extremely good and interesting life of Charles Lamb, his aim being to construe the mind of his subject, the age in which he lived, the contemporaries with whom he was familiar, and the odds against which he fought. Mr. Blunden shows him greater than he knew, for "nobody has been more ingenious in professing unimportance than Lamb, except Lear's Fool," and of a certainty Lamb's was no pose.

Charles Lamb was born in 1775. His father, John Lamb, was "a steady clerk," producing verses for the amusement of a Friendly Society to which he belonged, and taking his pleasure at the theatre, watching Garrick and comparing his various performances. Charles' earliest home was the Temple, his parents being housekeepers to one of the Benchers, Samuel Salt, under whose roof the Lambs lived. Charles had free access to Salt's library in Crown Office Row, and in later life he often expressed his gratitude for an education of "Good old English reading," all of which fostered his imagination and the note of romance with which he was endowed. Mr. Blunden traces Lamb's many preparatory schools, ending in his entrance to Christ's Hospital in 1782. His brother John, twelve years his senior, was also educated at Christ's Hospital (which at that date was situated in Newgate Street), and Coleridge was a contemporary. Mr. Blunden has given a most interesting account of that famous school.

> What, it will be asked, did a boy learn in the Grammar School of Christ's Hospital? Lamb's writings supply an answer. . . . He acquired a very useful knowledge of Latin, and an intelligent notion of Greek—alike the languages and the literatures. He was accustomed to the clear statement of his thoughts in English, prose and verse. . . . He became a practical arithmetician. . . . The Blue Coat boys heard the Testaments read and re-read, and perhaps some of the iron entered into their soul; but did they not insensibly gain a strength of judgment, of illustration, of vocabulary and of prose impact which could hardly be won from other sources?

* *Charles Lamb and His Contemporaries.* By Edmund Blunden. Being the Clark Lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, 1932. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

In 1789 Lamb, now fourteen years old, left Christ's Hospital and joined his brother John in the South Sea House under the auspices of Samuel Salt, and eventually, after a probation of three years without salary, in 1792 he became a clerk in the India House.

Prior to the French Revolution new ideas as to the true source of poetry were being considered, and Mr. Blunden sketches its advent very fully in his chapter on "The New Poetry." Dr. Johnson in 1777 disparaged it, but he failed to suppress it, and in 1789 William Lisle Bowles persuaded a printer named Cruttwell to publish some sonnets, fourteen in number, for five pounds. Surprise followed this publication, since a new edition was asked for, and edition succeeded edition. Wordsworth, Coleridge and Southey were caught by the sonnets, and Lamb, the young clerk at the India House, then only nineteen, attempted the same metre and endowed it with "a spirit of finer tone than the meditative Bowles." Specimens of Lamb's sonnets appeared along with Coleridge's "Effusions," signed C. L., but Lamb, much as he felt his friend's superiority, objected to his touching up his verse. "I charge you, Col., spare my ewe lambs."

In 1796 Lamb, labouring under a personal sorrow, felt that poetry must be laid aside, and he "burnt his books." The shock, from which he never fully recovered, prevented for a while his advance in the art which he loved and which had given signs in its earlier stage of a ripe development. After a time, he awakened to a fresh interest in the outpouring of others, and himself composed "A Vision of Repentance," which was immediately followed by "Old Familiar Faces," the poem which has become a household word. Mr. Blunden gives an account of his falling out, and in again, with Coleridge, and also of his real appreciation of that great poem "The Ancient Mariner."

Mr. Blunden devotes a chapter to "Charles and Mary." All the world knows their story, but perhaps we do not yet

appreciate the genius of Mary, who was her brother's counterpart in literary achievement. They thought and wrote together. Early in 1800 Lamb and William Godwin had become friends, and it was due to the latter that the names of Charles and Mary Lamb were united in the province of literature by their joint production of books for children. Then the suggestion was made that the Lambs should make tales for children from twenty of Shakespeare's plays. Charles undertook to paraphrase six of the tragedies, Mary fourteen of the comedies. This was in 1806, and when the first edition came out in the following January it was regarded as a classic, and has never lost its hold on young or old from that date till now.

Mr. Blunden tells succinctly "the splendid failure" of Taylor and Hessey's *London Magazine*. John Taylor was the principal partner, a man of great intellectual gifts, especially in estimating literary genius. Thus he became the publisher of many of the great writers of his day, including Keats, Coleridge, Lamb and De Quincey, but, too conscious of his own abilities, he alienated his contributors by his fussy and obstinate methods. After a while the partners separated and the *London Magazine* died an unnatural death: "The most valuable literary periodical while it flourished that has ever appeared in this country. Lamb's contributions as "Elia" to the *London Magazine* were first published in August 1820, "and at the end of 1822 the first of the two 'Elia' volumes was issued . . . it was not until 1833 that 'The Last Essays of Elia. Being a Sequel to Essays published under that Name' were gathered into one of Moxon's typographically flawless volumes." The Essays, upon which Lamb's fame principally rests, are too well known to discuss here, but all readers of Mr. Blunden's *Charles Lamb* will be grateful to him for his delightful study of a genius and his period. Lamb died in 1834 aged fifty-nine years, and is buried in Edmonton Churchyard. S. DE M.

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MONEY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE.*

In *Money: Gold, Silver and Paper,* Mr. Francis W. Hirst has provided a very valuable historical background to the pressing problem of monetary reform. "What I set out to accomplish," he writes, "within modest compass was a critical history of

* Scribners. 7s. 6d. net.

money from the earliest times down to the present year, using language intelligible to all who know English, without resort to mathematical formulæ, or to the technical vocabulary of the lecture-room." In his final chapter, Mr. Hirst draws his conclusions from the experience of history. He will have nothing to do with an inconvertible paper currency. Its theoretical qualities are always upset by the frailty and machinations of governments.

> I can discover hardly any example in modern history of an inconvertible paper currency which has not suffered serious depreciation in the course of twenty years; and in the majority of cases such currencies have declined, after a brief space of time, at a disastrous rate, bringing ruin upon multitudes of innocent people. . . . The only satisfactory method of regulating the amount of currency, on which its value depends, is to leave it free to regulate itself.

The difficulty to-day is to find such an automatic system. At one time it was thought that the gold standard could cope with any eventualities. During the last few years we have discovered this fallacy. The flight from gold during this period was due to its inability to comply with modern political and economic conditions. It seems inevitable, in the future, that currency whether backed by metal or not will receive some measure of human control. Unilateral management by a single nation may well lead to mismanagement, with disastrous results. International supervision, by a central body, will go far to provide a monetary system both stable and elastic to the needs of the time. Mr. Hirst is a strong advocate of a currency concurrently based on gold and silver. Assuming that

> an international currency of notes convertible into gold, or into gold and silver, should be the aim of currency reformers, and on the further assumption, which is also generally accepted, that gold prices ought to be raised to something like their 1925 level, I regard silver as the best instrument by which these objects can be achieved, in conjunction with measures for the redistribution of gold and a more economical use of it by some of the central banks.

The great value of such a symmetallic system is that it functions automatically. No doubt the addition of silver will increase the issue of convertible notes and help to counteract the present shortage of money. But while it has the virtues of a gold-backed currency it also possesses ultimately the same failings. There is much to be said for the maintenance of a

modified metallic standard enabled through international supervision to fulfil the demands of the modern world. But monetary reform is only one step towards recovery. The revival of confidence, the writing down of uneconomic debts both commercial and political and the multilateral reduction of artificial trade barriers are among the further necessary steps in the upward march. In the Middle Ages and later private war and private hindrances upon trade in the way of local taxes upon extramural products were very usual. Humanity has been able to destroy private war and local tariffs, and is now faced with the problem of destroying public war and national tariffs.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

*The Challenge of Europe,** by Sherwood Eddy, offers a thoughtful and up-to-date survey of Germany, France, Italy, Russia, the British Empire, and the Minor Powers. Few people know so much of the larger life of the world as the American publicist, who already has a dozen volumes to his credit, and whose latest work is based on the most recent observation. The chapter on Germany, written before the Hitler dictatorship changed the face of Europe, is supplemented by a Note which expresses the feelings of the civilised world. "His early acts of terror against labour, the Catholics and the Jews, and his policy of openly arming and abrogating the Treaty of Versailles now threatens Germany with revolution and Europe with war." Dr. Eddy, however, fully realises how the great tragedy has come about. "The reason is found in the poverty, the hunger, the chaos of despair into which Germany had been plunged. Hitler was the inevitable product of the Versailles Treaty and impossible reparations, which had left Germany a seething mass of political unrest. The Hitler movement was an antitoxin to the poison of defeatism and despair. It was a mass protest, a collective mania." The chapter on France is notable for a warm tribute to Léon Blum, the Socialist leader, "the finest intellect in the Chamber of Deputies." The chapter on Italy balances the achievements and the evils of the Fascist dictatorship, in which the latter, needless to say, heavily predominate. The survey of Russia, after the author's ninth visit in 1932, pronounces times harder, yet the total experiment more significant than ever. As a good Liberal he deeply deplores the denial of liberty, but he is impressed by the passion for social justice and thinks the Bolshevist Government at any rate better than its Tsarist predecessor. The chapter on Great Britain declares that the National Government must bear a heavy responsibility for the present international situation. In the discussion of minor States the Polish dictatorship receives just censure, and in the chapter on Europe and her Problems the author foretells economic ruin for Japan as the ultimate result of her rape of Manchuria. Dr. Eddy will not expect all his readers to accept all his verdicts; but the opinions of such an experienced student of the world's affairs are not to be put lightly aside.

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

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During recent years, it has become not uncommon for members of European Royal Families to write their memoirs. *Through Four Revolutions** contains extracts from the pleasant and instructive diary and private correspondence of Princess Ludwig Ferdinand of Bavaria, Infanta of Spain, set forth by her son Prince Adalbert of Bavaria. The Infanta Paz is the daughter of the famous Ysabel II of Spain and was born in 1862. As the editor, Major Desmond Chapman-Huston, says in his Introduction, "there can hardly be a person alive who combines personal experience of the Spanish Revolution of 1868, the French Revolution of 1870, the German Revolution of 1918, and the Spanish Revolution of 1931; and not only personal experience of them in their historic aspect, but intimate, inside knowledge of what they meant to the chief actors, not only as Royal personages, but as suffering human beings." The greater part of this book, indeed, deals less with political convulsions than with the domestic lives of the Spanish and Bavarian Royal families. It is mainly a very interesting chronicle of births, marriages and deaths. The correspondence of the Infanta Paz with her mother and also with Ludwig II is of historical value, throwing fresh light as it does on the private personality of Ysabel II. The period covered by the last thirty years is sketchy and full of gaps. Doubtless the Infanta Paz and her son desire to maintain a strict reserve upon such comparatively recent events.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

"The German Revolution: its Meaning and Menace,"† by Mr. Joseph King, contains a brief account of the political and economic state of Germany since the Treaty of Versailles, leading up to the revolution of this year. Mr. King deals in some detail with the events of the last six months and describes the various manifestations of Nazi despotism. The author, who knows Germany well and is a keen student of German affairs, has written a very forceful and assertive description which conforms in the main with the dispatches in the British Press. His very dogmatism, however, must make the reader cautious in his own conclusions.

* John Murray. 18s. net.
† Williams & Norgate. 3s. 6d. boards, 2s. 6d. paper.

In the Preface Lord Snowden writes: "If, as the Revolutionary Government gains confidence in its stability, it allows reasonable freedom for all parties and classes, and stops racial persecution, the world will watch with sympathy its experiments in social and economic reconstruction, and especially if it adheres to the foreign policy laid down in Hitler's recent speech." Hitler's justification lies in his use of his power in the immediate future. Up to the present he has failed to produce any constructive practical policy.

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For all those who propose to spend their holidays in Norway and the thousands who take a lively interest in that great country, "This is Norway,"* by Miss Freda Lingstrom, is an invaluable volume. "The book," as she writes in the Foreword, "aims . . . at presenting a true account of the impression made on me by Norwegian tradition, climate, scenery and people." To the traveller she unveils the manifold attractions of a Norwegian holiday and provides much practical information. But this delightful book is essentially more than a mere handbook. It is a symposium, embracing all the elements of Norwegian life and culture. The little volume necessarily contains only an outline, but it whets the reader's appetite for a greater knowledge of Norway and her people. Sir Karl F. Knudson has contributed a short Preface.

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Mr. Thomas Burke's "The Beauty of England"† is a prose-poem, excellently done, with adequate instructions to see the poem in being, the Sweet South, the Spine of England, A Midland Holiday, the North Country, A North-West Passage. Mr. Burke realises in prose what most English men, women and children realise in fact without knowing it, the charm of a country which reflects as no other country does the age-long labours expressed in landscape terms of a whole people. England has made the English race and the English race is making England. With all our faults the England of to-day is more beautiful than the England of the eighteenth or even the thirteenth century. Mr. Burke writes: "This feeling for the soil is almost an essential in the make-up of the true Englishman, and I wish it were possible for every child to spend its first ten years close to the soil." That dream has its part fulfilment in school-journeys. Despite other means of transit the children of England now tramp every part of England and in their tramps sit close to "the Beauty of England" disclosed in Mr. Burke's delightful book.

* Howe. 5s. net.
† George G. Harrap. 7s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER, 1933.

FRANCE'S NEW CHEERFULNESS.

IN a heaving and plunging world, France is comparatively unperturbed. She looks on the scene of struggle and is thankful for such advantages as she enjoys. In her present mood they appear to be considerable. France has almost forgotten to send up the customary cry for security. It may be that professions of misgiving were always more tactical than real. At this time, despite the general menace, France is tranquil and even proud.

Nor is she without good reason for thinking that, bad as things are, France is better off than her neighbours, and has proved to be right about a number of matters on which they were wrong. The attitude she took up in the two great international conferences—the last, it is hoped, of these unwieldy machines for squeezing her into acquiescence with the nebulous ideology of Anglo-Saxon countries—has justified itself. Is it not now obvious to the most obtuse that this is no moment to abandon French defences? Other countries, which had preached but not practised disarmament, seemed to the French to be in a conspiracy to weaken French forces. Now it is difficult to contend that Europe is pacified, that there is no risk of war, and that vigilance is an offence. Again, in the question of currency, it looked as though a resolute attempt was being made to batter the franc into submission to deliberately debased moneys. At London the French representatives were obliged to protect the franc against the onslaught of new-fangled theories—an onslaught which was made in a spirit of moral indignation, and with loud protests against French obstinacy in sticking to positions which were the positions of their assailants a few months before. If other countries choose to enter on a great gamble, it is surely to the good that some nation should endeavour to keep a point of stability in the tossing seas of experimental economics. France is pleased with her rôle of moderator in a mad world. She is pleased that she is recognised as the leader—since Great Britain refused the leadership—of the gold-standard nations. In short, if such a country as France had not existed, conservative in politics and in finances, it would now have been necessary to invent it.

France is fundamentally conservative—or at least is less capricious and less liable to be caught by glittering new doctrines than most countries. Abroad, a good deal of difference is discerned between the Right and the Left. But the real difference is merely that the Left made more electoral use (electoral should have an international as well as a national sense) of the current popular ideas, though the Right, in fact, yielded to them. This is not to say that France wished to appear stubborn. Her eventual acceptance of the Four-Power Pact—coming after the evacuation of the Rhineland, the relinquishing of reparations, the granting of conditional military equality to Germany—sufficiently shows France's willingness to fit herself, as far as possible, into the general scheme.

France does not believe that a revision of the treaties is possible without peril in an excited Europe. If everybody would only be calm and content, then indeed concessions might be made. Some of us hold that the denial of territorial concessions must keep Europe in a ferment. While there is a feeling of injustice, peace must be precarious. But whatever we think, the French have certainly a good case in declining to advocate surrender under threats.

Now if the Four-Power Pact means anything, it means, as Signor Mussolini and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald have frankly admitted, that an examination of treaties with a view to equitable changes has become necessary, and that it is the business of the Great Powers to try to come to an accord on this and on other subjects. France could not hold out, but she did her best to emasculate the Pact of Rome. How far she has succeeded is open to debate. She assured, and apparently convinced, the members of the Little Entente that no alterations could be effected except under the provisions of the Covenant, which are probably useless for this purpose. She did not succeed in persuading Poland that the Pact is innocuous.

If one were to define French policy in the international sphere, one would have to lay some stress on its temporising character. France is not prepared to resist to the end any political movement that is really strong; but she gives way slowly, obtains such modifications as are feasible, and trusts to time and circumstance to blunt the edge of the movement. She practises a sort of political jiu-jitsu. Time and circumstance have not been unfavourable to this French method. The advent of Herr Hitler was not altogether unwelcome to France. She had been

ready to be conciliatory to Germany, though she disliked being pushed farther than she wished to go, and the systematic reproaches of Great Britain and the United States, sympathetic to Germany, were altogether injudicious. Now the flamboyant speeches and the vicious actions of the Nazis are a vindication (I am writing from the French angle) of the French view. They do not unduly disturb France; France has become less nervous, less apprehensive, as the situation becomes more obviously dangerous. But they aroused in Great Britain considerable indignation, and France had the satisfaction of discreetly reminding Great Britain of her clearer pre-vision. It was excellent that her neighbours across the Channel should be shocked into an appreciation of the realities. As for the United States, with her sudden laudation of autarchy, she has presumably withdrawn for a time from European diplomacy.

Nor is it only the British complacency which has been shaken. Italy herself, who was more audaciously anti-French, has been compelled to think again. Signor Mussolini had, as it were, made the pace for Germany. He had clamoured for disarmament, which implied Italian parity and German equality. He had called for revision, which would be at the expense of the French group of nations. He may even be said to have raised up a disciple in Herr Hitler. But when there was, to employ an expressive Americanism, a show-down, Italy was moved to caution. The Nazi excesses were embarrassing, and were not to be confounded with Fascism. Besides, German foreign policy developed on lines which were by no means pleasing to Italy.

There was the problem of the *Anschluss*. France has been regarded as the principal obstacle to the union of Austria and Germany, though, in fact, French interest is somewhat indirect and partly sentimental. The Little Entente is more directly concerned and has expressed itself in unambiguous terms. Yet Italy, more acutely than France, more acutely even than the Little Entente, would be affected by the extension of Germany to the Brenner, and the hegemony of Germany along the Danube. Here then is a breach between Italy and Germany; and the Italian reaction is to turn towards France.

It would be easy to find other aspects of European diplomacy which are advantageous to France. There is the rebellion of Austria; there are Central European negotiations; there is the fresh *rapprochement* of France and Russia, of Poland and Russia, and the pledges of non-aggression from the Baltic to the Black

Sea and beyond, which, among other things, tend to unite the Slavs. And while European diplomacy, almost without effort, is serving France, the French military preparations of a purely defensive nature are progressing. The unfortunate result of a series of utterances by French politicians was to alarm the French people. The present Prime Minister, M. Daladier, is far more sparing of his words, and when he speaks it is to reassure the country. Nothing has more helped to restore French composure than the declaration that the frontier fortifications are virtually impregnable. There have been many descriptions of the steel and concrete constructions which are designed to repel any conceivable attack. They are certainly formidable works. Whether they are really impassable depends, of course, to some degree on the character of a possible attack. I am no expert in these matters and I do not pronounce. But from the purely political viewpoint, I consider the statement of the Prime Minister to be timely. Far too much has been made of the assumed vulnerability of France; far too much has been said about the need of international aid. It is well that the French should feel themselves secure, for fear is an evil counsellor.

On the financial and economic strength of France there is a wide difference of opinion. The Ministers, M. Bonnet in particular, have firmly stated their intention of remaining on the gold standard, whatever happens to the pound and dollar. The foolish and ill-fated London Conference will not be altogether valueless if it fortifies France and her continental associates in their resolve to stand faithful to the old system until it is proved that the new systems are better. Possibly the old system of fixed values has no future. It may be that the new systems of manipulated values have much to commend them. But even those who are most dogmatic as to the superiority of elastic currencies should be glad that some measuring-wand is preserved somewhere in the world until their theories are put to the test.

That is, at any rate, what the French feel. They are opposed to voluntary devaluation. They do not wish to participate in a race of depreciation. It must be remembered that the franc has already lost four-fifths of its value. There has already been inflation on an immense scale. France has had her experience and she does not wish to repeat it. She is a thrifty nation, containing a large percentage of *rentiers*, who saw their

savings largely swept away from 1924 to 1926. The Governments which were in power were partly to blame, but not wholly. No one after the war had the courage to take the drastic measures which were necessary. The franc fell from twenty sous to four, and would have fallen still lower had not M. Poincaré called a halt. Whatever slight benefits there seemed to be in the period of inflation have long since disappeared. The cost of living has risen far beyond the coefficient of five, so that to-day France is one of the most expensive countries in the world. The impetus to exportation was short-lived; and the invisible exports in the shape of tourist trade have vastly declined.

To maintain the franc will, however, be a difficult task. There are, as in every country, inflationists who are willing to adopt facile courses. It is so easy to let the franc fall; it is so hard to stop it from falling. If the rest of the world is out to destroy acquired riches, there are plenty of people ready to abandon the effort to defend them in France. The trade deficit is serious. As for the budget, despite many promises to balance it, it is on paper acknowledged to be in deficit, and in reality the receipts are far from coming up to the estimates.

Can the screw be tightened? France has reached the point where further taxation will not only be unpopular, but will probably be ineffective. Everybody agrees that there must be retrenchment. But in practice a drastic diminution of Government expenditure meets with vigorous opposition. The public officials decline to be the victims. Deputies, who depend for their election on strongly organised bodies of beneficiaries of the public funds, are inclined to vote against any proposal to curtail public services. Inflation of credit by borrowing is probably as bad as inflation of currency. When Parliament meets again in the autumn it is possible that an adequate project will be brought forward. If it is not, then the franc will be in danger. If it is, then the Government will be in danger.

When M. Daladier took office at the beginning of the year no political prophet would have given him a long lease of life. He has succeeded beyond expectation. He has shown remarkable Parliamentary ability, and while retaining the confidence of the Left has not indisposed the Right. He has won a reputation for firmness without actually achieving anything. Something much more positive is now due. It is not sufficient to be an expert in the art of keeping alive. The conviction that

Parliamentary methods have failed is growing in France, where Parliament is notoriously extravagant and dominates the Executive. Few governments last even as long as the Daladier Government has lasted; and while they last their principal energies are devoted to the struggle for existence. They have to face a multitude of commissions which are always in some degree hostile. They have to battle in the Chamber and the Senate. They have to encounter outside syndicates which they have unwisely encouraged. They have to wait until this and that party congress has decided on its policy. And they have to contend with the impatience of those who—not in opposition, but ostensibly on their side—would take their places.

In normal times the system has little to commend it; but in times of strain and stress it is a tremendous handicap for the nation. That is why France, which has fulminated against Fascism, is now beginning to condemn Parliamentarism as practised. The signs are numerous and unmistakable. They are to be seen in all quarters. The Radical *Quotidien,* controlled by Senator Jean Hennessy, persistently demands a reform of the Constitution. The Bonapartist *Figaro,* run by M. François Coty, has its loudly-advertised scheme. M. Daladier himself is praised for his real or imaginary Jacobin qualities, and it has been made known that he may ask for exceptional powers such as M. Poincaré possessed, but used very timidly. M. André Tardieu, in the *Illustration,* has written a highly important series of articles pointing out the defects of French Governmental methods. The two glaring faults are that the deputies are constantly obliged to refer all questions to clubs—some of them open, some of them occult—and are the agents of an electoral oligarchy; and that they, in their turn, perpetually thwart the executive power. All governments are on the defensive; they walk on a tightrope and keep their balance by leaning to Right or to Left, with the certainty of falling at an early date.

The most interesting of the various demands for a stronger Executive comes from the Socialist party. It is amusing that, after belabouring Fascism for years, and throwing the word as a missile at M. Tardieu and others who are strictly constitutional even in pleading for a reform of the Constitution, the Socialists should become the champions of Fascism. I am, like everybody else, using the term loosely; it would take us too far to examine the doctrines of the authentic Fascism of Italy,

and the German version of Fascism, and the thing that it becomes in a French translation. But I am entitled to catch up the phrase that M. Blum, the leader of the Socialists, has applied to the dissidents who may well constitute the majority of the Parliamentary group, though not of the party. Needless to say, the dissidents repudiate the description. Yet they have suddenly discovered the French nation; they have observed the need for authority; they lay stress on order. They have become National Socialists—like the Hitlerites.

The fact is that Socialism of the pre-war type has collapsed. In Italy it has been swept away; in Germany it withstood neither the test of the war nor the test of Hitlerism; in England it transformed itself into the relatively orthodox Labour Party. France stuck to the Second International, but the Socialists, while remaining doctrinaire, properly incurred the reproach of being revolutionaries without revolution. Now the dissidents are weary of the old respectable Parliamentary species of Socialism which vaguely cherishes a romantic notion of deferred action. They want something more modern than Marxism, something less violent than Leninism. They want realism, action, authority, within the national framework. Personally, though I think the phenomenon significant, I am sceptical of its practical outcome. For Fascism, however it may be defined, depends on personality more than on doctrine, and it is not yet apparent that in this French neo-Socialism, or neo-Fascism, there is a striking leader. The movement, were it extensive enough, might improve the Parliamentary position of M. Daladier; if, as is likely, it is not extensive enough, it will weaken his position.

It is nevertheless clear, on a larger survey, that there must be, within the next few years, far-reaching changes in France. The whole world is changing, and France, despite her conservatism, must keep in step. More than most countries she could safely adopt the prevalent mood of autarchy; her agriculture balances her industry; she can obtain a great part of her supplies from her overseas territories; she counts her unemployed in hundreds of thousands where others count them in millions, and even now she can absorb foreign workers. In the last resort, she is militarily competent to defend herself against aggressors. So, in the midst of universal turmoil, she keeps her equanimity.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

OURSELVES AND THE NEW GERMANY.

IT is in the nature of our people to be surprised by revolutions, and to make serious mistakes in their judgment of them. This has been true of English statesmen and public opinion since 1789, and a collation of speeches by leading English public men during the present year would seem to imply that we are in danger of similar misjudgments in respect of the Nazi triumph in Germany and the creation of the Third Reich by Adolf Hitler. Here is undoubtedly a revolution. Its completeness as regards the structure of government and the organisation of the country is already beyond challenge, while the evidence of public support is certainly impressive. The spectacle of Germany at the end of the first half-year appears to show that the new system will establish itself; and further, I think, one is impelled to the view that National Socialism is the form which revolution has taken in Germany, a form that may be strikingly developed through the coming age. But whether this should prove to be so or not, the main fact of the hour is undeniable. Hitler stands as the head-centre of a renascent Germany, of momentous importance for Europe, and perhaps especially significant for England.

In the present article I am not directly concerned with the Brown Terror or with any of those aspects of Nazi rule which have—rightly and inevitably—filled the Press of the world with sensational news and brought upon the present rulers of Germany a weight of reprobation heavier and more unanimous than any similar judgment in the court of humanity against a government of Western Europe. Germans of high standing, whose character and intelligence no one would impugn, meet the foreign inquirer nowadays with an explanation and defence of the Nazi policy. It is always earnestly given and it should, of course, be listened to with respect. Upon one or two important points in the situation I shall have something to say before coming to the end. At this stage I will make only two comments upon the Terror as reported since January last. First, that even if all possible allowance be made for exaggeration, the sum total of proved and acknowledged cruelty in the Nazi raids, in the prisons and Brown Houses, makes a formidable accumulation of fact, which is illuminated in appalling fashion by the language of the Government orders, and particularly by that of Captain Goering's ferocious decrees. And,

secondly, that the concentration camps, with their hosts of political prisoners, the crusade upon Liberals and Socialists, involving forms of barbarous maltreatment for thousands of Germany's best citizens, and the "cold pogrom" to which the Jewish community is being subjected, all stand against the new Germany in a black account, the shame of which is felt most deeply by those English and Americans who, ever since the Paris Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, have striven on behalf of full justice for the German people. The remark most frequently heard in Germany whenever the dark sides of Nazi rule are being discussed is, "This is our business; we must be allowed to settle it for ourselves." To that we have to reply, in the words used by a widely-known American friend of Germany's, Dr. Sherwood Eddy, when speaking lately in Berlin, "Not so; it is, and must be, humanity's business," if for two reasons alone, namely, that the future relations of Germany with the Western Powers cannot fail to be gravely affected by it, and that by the drive against Jewry, in the name of the pure race, Germany has made an indelible mark on Europe.

The transformation of Germany under the Nazi Government has been startling in its swiftness, but it is important to note that the Nazi storm itself was not nearly so sudden as many foreign observers have assumed. During at least three years before Hitler was invited into the Government the warnings had been insistent. The elections of September 1930, with the capture by the National Socialists of 107 seats in the Reichstag, marked a political change which many Germans understood, while the fall of Brüning as Chancellor, after his desperate resort to government by emergency decree, may well be regarded as the virtual end of the Republic. In the light of events since 1931 it is easy to recognise in Schleicher, Papen, and Hugenberg a trio of adventurers carrying more than their share of political ineptitude. They appear to have been agreed in nothing save their poor estimate of Hitler, though that mistake would not distinguish them from their fellows. In the autumn of 1932 Hitler was believed to be a declining force, but we now know that the figures of the November election did not mean what they were supposed to mean. In the unlimited confusion of German parties and politics, which makes the story of the Republic's undoing one of the most bewildering in modern history, almost the only indis-

putable feature is the advance of Hitler in popularity, coupled with the revelation of his political skill. His opponents invariably underrated him. They made the common blunder of assuming that a man who for so many years had been known as an agitator and rhetorician, given to promising everything and capable of holding any number of mutually destructive opinions, could not be endowed also with the politician's gifts. But Hitler has shown himself to be remarkably astute as a politician, while it is certainly true that if the building up of the National Socialist Party is not his own work, it proves him to be capable of selecting and using his organisers with a degree of success that few modern leaders have equalled. No sensible person would hazard the opinion that Hitler can command his lieutenants or hold together the 17,000,000 who voted for him in March. But it has to be recognised that the massing of that host, after the leader had held office as Chancellor for five weeks, was a most amazing event.

At a distance of only six months from the electoral triumph it is not possible to attempt an estimate of the National Socialist strength in the country, or even to judge whether the Chancellor's popularity is what it was. The external evidences appear to be nearly all in favour of the Nazis. No revolutionary government of our time has equalled the German in the speed and thoroughness with which it has destroyed party organisations, stamped all minorities out of existence, annihilated provincial governments, and reconstructed the institutions of the spiritual power. Imperial and Republican Germany were alike in this, that they provided a rich variety of partial sovereignties, of sectional autonomies and voluntary organisations —not a few of them being impressive in membership and in apparent democratic strength. The swiftness of their disappearance is, for the English political theorist especially, a disconcerting event. Had it been less violent and painful, one would have been tempted to wish that Leonard Hobhouse and Graham Wallas might have been spared to witness and annotate it. Germany is not Britain, and no one in this country could be induced to believe that any analogy exists between the German trade unions and ours, or between the German Evangelical Church and the English Free Churches. And yet it is not to be denied that Hitler's astounding series of strokes at midsummer contain a searching moral for all surviving believers in democratic self-government. The accepted British

view is that in the number and variety of voluntary units one may discover a criterion of the social health and efficiency of a national community. The experience of Italy and Germany would seem to show that these may offer almost no resistance to a ruthless architect of the corporative or totalitarian State. Given a favourable atmosphere, he can eat them up in a week. Herr Hitler could claim that in relation to all such bodies as these the processes of *Gleichschaltung*—the Nazi word for complete identification with the State—have been shown to move with extraordinary smoothness. And if the external spectacle of Germany at this time is to be taken as the proof of an accomplished harmony, then indeed is the Nazi leader to be acclaimed as more fortunate even than Mussolini.

Twelve months hence it may be possible to say as much as this concerning Adolf Hitler. In our surprising world all things are possible, and in our day, more than ever before, the political prophet looks like the rashest of men. But the difficulties confronting the Nazi Government are enormous. The first of these, which may prove to involve the greatest dangers for Hitler, are within the Party itself and lie close to the centre. After his short experience of responsibility Hitler has ceased to be an agitator and is doing his utmost to put the curb on all subversive activities. Two months ago he declared the revolution to be at an end: the Nazi task now was to be consolidation and construction. Speaking in sentences that sounded like a paraphrase of Mussolini's later statements in the Press, he reminded his followers that revolutions were often effective in the first stage, or in what the Duce specifically styles the insurrection—that is, the deliberate use of violence for overturning the old system and installing the new; but that examples of continuing success in revolution are rare. Hitler deduced from this the necessity of unremitting effort and sacrifice, of absolute surrender to the cause, and of "work, work, and work." His purpose was transparent. He is resolved, if possible, to prevent the further revolution of which his hothead followers, by no means all of one mind, are continually dreaming and talking. A second—or more properly, third—revolution could be precipitated, as Hitler knows, either from above or from below. It could come from the left of the Nazi movement, or from the right.

The contradictions of his position defy analysis. National Socialism cannot be described as a system or a creed: it is an

emotional state. It has a printed programme of twenty-five points. Some of the clauses indicate the ideal of a Distributive Society and would come appropriately from Mr. G. K. Chesterton; others coincide with familiar principles of the British Labour Party—for instance, the nationalisation of great businesses, of the monopolist trusts and the banking system, and the abolition of incomes unearned by work; while others, again, give downright expression to the peculiar racial tenets of the Nazis. These points have been declared to be unalterable, and they are published along with an elaborate exposition by Gottfried Feder, the leader's instructor in economics and the authority from whom he has taken the inspiring slogan of liberation from "the thraldom of interest." The programme, being unalterable, is presumably being put into the hands of all members of the party. It is an embarrassing document for the head of a despotic government, though certainly not more embarrassing than the Federian commentary. Hitler can hardly begin to translate its more important provisions into acts of policy. He could not, for all his hostility to chain stores and large retail establishments, start an attack upon the trusts or attempt to formulate a National Socialist banking policy. His movement is indebted to the greatest German industrialists for financial backing; his Government is upheld by the same powers, and he is known to be deeply involved with the Thyssen group. He has pledged himself against the agrarian policy which, deemed by large numbers of Nazis to be essential, would necessitate a breaking-up for land-settlement schemes of the East Prussian great estates, and in August he permitted or enjoined several men in high office to give a specific assurance that private enterprise would continue to be respected. And yet the "second revolution" can hardly be eliminated from the hopes of the Nazi rank and file. How far the Brown Shirt forces have been invaded by crypto-communists and socialists it is, of course, impossible to conjecture; but it cannot be forgotten that the backbone of the Nazi movement is an impoverished middle-class—a proletarian bourgeoisie—for a large percentage of whom the emphasis lies upon the second word in the National Socialist label. Hitler must soon begin to deliver the goods. It will be demanded of him, as it is demanded of President Roosevelt, that the ideal of a self-sufficing national economy shall be made at once to produce trade, work and wages.

The immediate aim of the Nazi Government, we are at present being told, will be attained if the gains of the summer are held through the winter; but obviously this could not be satisfactory to the multitude. The Government states that its efforts so far have resulted in a reduction of the unemployed total by not less than two millions. We may doubt whether this covers a genuine reduction of the unemployed from over six millions to roughly four and a half, which is the official claim, and we must take account of the fact that Nazi statistics do not conform to the standards formerly applied. But let it be granted that employment, or at least labour, has been found for two millions. The figure is not excessive, but what does it include? Certainly a large number of men drafted into the irregular Brown armies; an indefinite number of refugees and inmates of the concentration camps; a contingent, probably of many thousands, distributed throughout the labour training camps; and another contingent of male workers who have replaced the thousands of girls and women taken out of industry and commerce by the increasing pressure of Nazi anti-feminism. The majority of these last-mentioned have been sent home because their fathers or husbands are in work and are assumed to be capable of supporting their womenkind. A certain number, which is likely to increase, have been induced by means of a modest State dowry to leave work and expedite marriage. And a further number—essentially, perhaps, non-recurring—have consented to removal from gainful occupations in order that their places may be taken by their own menfolk in the same jobs.

The inadequacy of such measures as these need not be emphasised. In the election campaign, and earlier, Hitler promised everything, including jobs and wages. Those promises will not be forgotten, nor, as the economic stringency increases, with the steady decline of foreign trade and the alarming conditions of German shipping, will it be possible for the Nazi Government to hide the consequences of their economic and foreign policy. It is in respect of this policy that the Germany of Adolf Hitler stands conspicuously alone. It has adopted and pursued a line of action which produces the maximum of resentment, at home and abroad. The dictatorship of the Nazis, manifestly, is Germany's own affair. Outsiders can have little to say as to the rights and wrongs of the suppression of parties and the organisation of the totalitarian State. Nations deter-

mine their own internal economy. But the Nazi Government has reversed the international aims and practices of the German Republic; it has, for instance, applied to Austria a method of pressure and offence that is extraordinarily menacing, and in asserting its position elsewhere it has aroused an unprecedented combination of hostilities. From the year of the Treaty to the fateful date which marked the ascent of Hitler to supreme authority, Germany counted her active friends in all the democratic countries by millions. Those friends are disturbed on her account to-day as they have not been at any time in the past. Let me try to state the central issue as we see it.

The indoctrination of the German people with a set of rigid beliefs concerning the War and the Treaty has been an unremitting task since 1919, and it has probably been more successful than any similar effort of intensive nationalism. An invincible combination of instructors went to work upon it—politicians and the Press, the schools and universities, and nationalist missioners of every shade. To these influences must be added Hugenberg's propaganda films, made powerful by his control of the Ufa organisation, and, one may note, far more effective than the later Nazi films which, so far as my knowledge goes, are boring and therefore calculated to defeat their purpose. The creed of nationalist self-justification comprises a few simple tenets, expressed in phrases that do not vary. The masses have accepted the doctrine and they repeat the phrases. For example: (1) the "war-guilt lie" of Versailles (as most of us now admit, a piece of ruinous infantilism on the part of the men who wrote the Treaty); (2) the "stab in the back" from the revolution of 1918—that is, the simple legend that Germany, unbeaten in the field, was destroyed at home by socialists and pacifists, financiers and Jews; (3) the deep disgrace of the Republic, upon which was fixed the odium of every German humiliation—the signing of the Treaty, the loss of world power, the disbanding of the army, the occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr, the agonies of inflation, the Dawes and Young Plans, the failure to achieve any revision of the "shameful" frontiers, and the repeated worsting of German delegates at international conferences by the French and their satellites, culminating in the Disarmament policy which gained merely an empty concession of "equal rights" from the Powers who are clearly resolved to maintain their swollen armaments while keeping Germany forcibly disarmed.

This body of doctrine was designed by the German enemies of the Republic to make an end of the Weimar Constitution, as also of the parties and political leaders who had served it; and most effectively was that design carried out. The German people, including that large class which in every modern country may be called the educated proletariat, had swallowed the nationalist "dope" before the Nazi victory. Not only were they fully prepared for Nazi leadership, but before Hitler came to power the last hope of saving the Weimar Constitution had disappeared. The friends of the Republic were reduced to a remnant. Hitler's great force of 17,000,000 voters had an almost equal number of allies. To the Communists, of course, the Weimar Constitution was poisonous, and they followed their usual line in treating the Social Democrats as more dangerous enemies than the nationalist reactionaries. The Catholic Centre was bound up with the Constitution, but its leader, Brüning, had, as Chancellor, forsaken democracy and sought to govern by decree. Where amid these circumstances could be the hope of salving representative democracy? As one prominent public man had remarked, "We made a republic, but there were no republicans." Hence, inevitably, National Socialism and dictatorship. The dictator, it is still believed by many, need not, and should not, have been Adolf Hitler. Until the Schleicher-Papen chapter it was still possible, one is told in Germany, for the imperative national reorganisation to have been undertaken by a constitutional ruler. That is a point upon which an outside observer's opinion has no value; but upon one most important matter he feels driven to ask his question and to press his argument.

In every city that he visits the friendly foreigner finds himself in the company of able and informed Germans who tell him that they do not belong to the Party, that they despise its doctrines, have been outraged by Brown Shirt practices, and are appalled by the dangers of a Nazi régime; but that they voted for Hitler on March 5th, or—almost the equivalent of a vote after the election—that they support the Government in power, and are convinced that it is best for Germany in existing circumstances for Hitler to have his chance. He is far better, they usually intimate, than his associates. He is in earnest; the country trusts him, and he, unlike any other Chancellor within sight, may be able to lead Germany out of her intolerable situation.

To this statement of the case, presented with many variations in Germany to-day, the friendly foreigner has his reply. Germany, he points out, shows a record of national recovery and positive achievement which has no parallel in history. No great country of the modern world has been brought as near to national extinction as Germany was in 1918. (The disaster, by the way, had little to do with revolution at home. There could be no stab in the back. The Allies had mobilised the world against the Reich, and the stranglehold of the Anglo-American blockade was inexorable.) The Treaty of Versailles was the register of an unexampled defeat; and at the same time, as the best of England and America proclaimed and insisted, it was a monument of vengeance and folly. The Treaty could not be fulfilled; and its enforcement was not within the scope of any power known to the world. But the new German Republic accepted the Treaty—it could do no other. Under the leadership of a line of statesmen, as clear-sighted and disinterested as any in the modern age, Germany adopted the policy of fulfilment, submitting even to the Reparations policy until the end of the Dawes period. It would obviously have been better if, after the successes of Stresemann, Germany had refused to go farther, standing out against the Young Plan with its manifest injustice and fantastic economics, in which by 1929 no serious politician or economist pretended to believe.

We know that this policy (the friendly foreigner would continue) is now recalled in Germany with anger and shame, and that Young Germany has been taught to spit upon the men who pursued it on behalf of the Republic. But we would point to its results, to the impression made upon world opinion by the continuous evidences of Germany's economic and cultural restoration, and to the demonstrable successes of German international policy, culminating at Lausanne in 1932. Ordinary people gave little attention to the so-called gentleman's agreement which vitiated the Lausanne settlement. They knew that the reparations account was closed, and the world believed that Germany was right in closing it. The British public had become friendly to Germany; the American public, for certain well-known reasons, was overwhelmingly so. And with the failure of the Disarmament Conference, there was a widespread feeling that Germany was justified in demanding the right to equal armament when the Powers made it so entirely clear that they could not recognise the obligation to disarm by progressive

agreement. In a word, Germany was winning the world. But to-day, after a short year of Papen and Hitler, Germany is without a friend among the nations and their governments, unless perchance Hitler is justified in counting still upon his candid mentor in Rome.

I cannot say that a statement of the international case such as the foregoing makes any evident impression upon the German mind. It does not. On the contrary, one must always be prepared to hear in return a fervid amplification of the nationalist indictment. The Republic, it is asserted, was bankrupt and dishonoured. There was no loyal service for it to command; the Reichstag's two dozen parties were contemptible; the alternative had become dictatorship or chaos. Moreover, in reply to the assurance that pre-Nazi Germany was winning the world, the good German of to-day contends that this can mean nothing to him and his compatriots. It may be true that the nations were friendly, but what did that amount to? The Powers, he points out, could afford to seem conciliatory; that was because Germany was helpless. There was not the smallest intention on their part to approach even the least of Germany's territorial grievances. The British Prime Minister, in an unguarded moment, might utter the word "revision," but it was as much as his office was worth for him to repeat it. And, in any case, the epoch of conferences was ended: Germany had been nothing but a suppliant, and her representatives had always returned with empty hands. Henceforward Germany, united, would show herself strong; and the Powers which had humiliated her at every turn since Versailles would learn the reality of the change.

There, as nearly as I can give it in brief, is the retort of the many millions of Germans who, without being Nazis, are clinging to the hopes inspired by Hitler. And it is this new and as yet almost wholly unknown Germany that we have now to deal with.

It is a land of exaltation and of startling rebirth. Hitler has made an unprecedented appeal to Young Germany. He has given them new hope and an evangelical belief in Germany and its mission. So recently as one year ago these young people were a lost generation, frustrated and bitterly despairing. They are now rehabilitated: ardently in pursuit of health, and convinced that their leader can fulfil the promise of his liturgical perorations, giving them freedom and bread. They embrace a

discipline that would be imaginable in no country save Germany, and—most unhappily—they are swallowing a gospel of race and destiny which, it is possible, may make for their complete undoing. They have grown up in a country which has overthrown a feudal system and seen the last of the vulgar display of wealth. One has heard it stated that National Socialism, with its fanatic remilitarising of the national life, is bringing back to Germany the titles and snobbery of the Empire. There could not be a more grotesque misreading of the facts. Revolution, whatever its form, involves an overturn of the existing order, and Germany is moving towards a classless society. What its economic basis may be a quarter of a century hence no one can tell, but as to the general egalitarian tendency there can be no serious doubt.

But is this aroused, exalted, and freshly disciplined nation a danger to Europe, a menace to the peace of the world? It is. You cannot go through Germany to-day without being certain of the fact. You cannot cross a frontier of Central Europe and remain unaware of the peril. But Germany cannot make war. Outside the ranks of such Nazis as are beyond the mental age of ten, there is no German who is ignorant of the military situation, or of the ruin that must overwhelm his country if hostilities should be provoked. As for Hitler himself, we may accept the more recent intimations that he is sincere in his protestations of peace. But what then?

In England the public feeling aroused by the Nazi revolution and the Brown Terror has been expressed mainly under two heads: first, in repeated declarations by leading statesmen to the effect that no international concessions can be made to Hitlerite Germany, so long as its policy and practices remain unaltered; and, secondly, in the almost universal assumption that the German people themselves must be held accountable for the Terror under which half the nation is groaning. This assumption arises from an imperfect realisation of dictatorship. A despotic government of the present day commands all the instruments of power and coercion. Freedom can be destroyed and the country be converted into a prison within a few hours. The absolute control of Press, radio and films means that the nation is kept in the dark. The German people do not know what is happening in their own land, and they cannot believe what they hear. With regard to the attitude of the Western Powers towards Germany under its present rulers, Sir Austen

Chamberlain has been accepted as spokesman of the British people. His oft-quoted remark of April 13th touched a crucial point and gave voice to a unanimous British feeling, as to the impossibility of concessions to any German Government embodying the Nazi policy and spirit as hitherto revealed. But it is manifest that this is one aspect only of a grave matter. Our world can be preserved by keeping the peace, now, and by ensuring an interval for the accomplishment of two imperative tasks: a full realisation by the nations of the New Germany, and an agreement among their Governments as to the price that can, or must, be paid for the salving of that European structure upon which Britain and France alike depend.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN LONDON EDUCATION.

IN April 1908 the London County Council, the London Education Authority, obtained the sanction of the Board of Education, under the Education Acts, 1902-3, for a new scheme for the constitution of its Education Committee, which exercised the power of co-option of members contained in the statute. As the writer, who became a co-opted member under this scheme, has served upon the Education Committee ever since, he can describe from personal experience the extraordinary developments in London education during the past quarter of a century, despite catastrophic difficulties encountered, including the four terrible war years, the breakdown of the 1918 Act, and the war aftermath of enhanced prices and chronic financial crises, the last of which, dating from September 1931, still endures.

To deal fully with the developments during the period under review would require a large volume extending into several hundred pages. They can be stated briefly under the following categories, the comprehensive and varied character of which will show why London easily takes first place in achievement among education authorities throughout the country:

(1) Complete co-operation with voluntary effort in all forms of educational work.
(2) The fulfilment of the scheme for reduction in the size of classes in the elementary schools, known as the "40 and 48" scheme, involving the rebuilding or remodelling of a large number of schools.
(3) The initiation and extension of the system of selective central schools, together with in more recent years the reorganisation of ordinary elementary schools under the Hadow scheme.
(4) The development of secondary schools, Council and voluntary, with advanced courses providing for pupils of post-matriculation standard.
(5) The extension and development of the scholarship scheme.
(6) Provision for defective children under every disability.
(7) The foundation and remarkable growth of the scheme for medical inspection and treatment of school children.
(8) The advance of technical education—trade schools, technical institutes, polytechnics, vocational monotechnics, and the like.
(9) The reconstitution of evening continuation education and the establishment of day continuation schools.

(10) The co-ordination of all forms of educational effort within the County area.
(11) The organisation of various and varied forms of school social services, open-air schools and classes, industrial and reformatory schools (renamed under the Children and Young Persons Act "approved" schools), care committees, after-care committees, school journeys, children's country holidays, the school in the playing field, past pupils' associations and the like.
(12) The introduction of the programme system, recommended by the Board of Education from London's example to the whole country.
(13) The settlement of friendly relations, based on practical co-operation, between the Education Authority and the University of London following the new constitution for the latter under the University of London Act, 1927.
(14) Working arrangements with neighbouring authorities, including Middlesex, Kent, Surrey, Essex and Hertfordshire.
(15) The transfer of Poor Law educational institutions to the care of the Education Committee as part of London's educational system.
(16) The financial arrangement with the Board of Education as fixed by Section 118 of the Education Act, 1921, but suspended in 1931.

These sixteen categories, even if briefly explained, would demonstrate the remarkable advances which have completely transformed the character and standard of the London schools, changing almost beyond recognition the scope and value of the educational opportunities available both for ordinary and selected pupils. Within the limits at our disposal, however, a few only can be dealt with.

Apart from extensions and developments, two outstanding features have been the serious reduction in the school population and the largely increased cost of London's education service. In the first estimates prepared after April 1908 the cost of elementary education was based upon a school population of 646,900 in average attendance; the estimates for 1933-4 provide for an average attendance of 497,000, a decrease of nearly 150,000, practically 25 per cent. Whilst this can be partially explained by the industrialisation of certain districts and migration from slum areas to new housing estates just beyond the County boundary, it has undoubtedly been influenced considerably by the fall in the birth rate. Again, the Council maintenance estimates for 1909-10 amounted to £5,635,003, whereas those for 1933-4 reach the huge sum of £12,717,354, notwith-

standing a decrease of £1,550,929 during the previous year, an impressive increase certainly, even taking into account the change in the value of money, and teachers' superannuation charges and the transfer of Poor Law educational services, not included in the estimates until recently.

Fundamental changes in the school children themselves testify eloquently to the marked improvements in London's educational system. Twenty-five years ago a large proportion of children, especially in the poorer districts, went unwilling to school: to-day, owing to excellent efforts of teachers and school attendance officers, the children really like going to school, and indeed welcome the approach of the end of the school holidays. Furthermore, the children are cleaner, better fed, more satisfactorily clothed, and far more physically fit, than in 1908. They are also more alert mentally, more soundly equipped educationally, possessed of greater *savoir faire*, more courteous and more ready to " play the game " when they leave school, than they were when the writer first joined the Education Committee.

So far-reaching in their influence have been the many categories mentioned above, that it is not easy to select some for more detailed consideration. Perhaps the greatest change amongst the children themselves, on the physical and indirectly on the mental side, has been effected, as already intimated, by the scheme of medical inspection and treatment of children, together with its ancillaries—the feeding of necessitous school children and the cleanliness scheme. Twenty-five years ago practically no inspection or treatment was provided, and in certain schools in poor districts the Council paid a " difficult service " allowance to teachers employed. To-day nearly 350,000 ordinary medical inspections and 250,000 dental inspections take place annually in the schools, whilst 300,000 cases receive treatment. The school nurse, whom in 1908 parents regarded with considerable suspicion, is now welcomed as a friend. The " difficult school " allowance, too, has disappeared years ago. The physical improvement in children in the elementary schools as evidenced by comparison between photographs of groups of children in the same school taken twenty-five years ago and at the present time, convinces beyond words. The medical officer of health of the Board of Education in his latest annual report pays eloquent tribute to the standard of London's school health work.

On the purely educational side London's outstanding achievement has been the reduction in the size of classes in the elementary schools, now practically completed. At the initiation of the scheme in 1912 many educationists acclaimed it as the greatest educational reform since 1870. In 1908 classes of 60 and 70 pupils or over existed in the London schools. Indeed, the thick-walled square sixty-room, the pre-1900 ideal, proved one of the chief obstacles to progress with the " 40 and 48 " scheme. In 1908 the average number of pupils per class-teacher reached 45·4 in Council schools and 38 in voluntary schools: to-day, the corresponding figures are 34·7 and 33·3. These figures are more eloquent than words. They are really better in their effect than they would seem to indicate, as, a quarter of a century ago an appreciable number of uncertificated and supplementary teachers worked in the schools, whereas at the present time practically all teachers are trained and/or certificated.

The developments in all forms of post-primary education, too, have been remarkable. The organisation of selective central schools, according to the estimates 87 schools with accommodation for 31,500 pupils, providing a four to five years course, beginning at 11 years, to selected children, in selected buildings, with selected teachers, and following a special syllabus with a commercial or industrial bias, has secured for the more intelligent pupils in the ordinary elementary schools, unable for various reasons to undertake a full secondary school course, advanced instruction which has led them to beneficial employment on leaving. Trade schools and junior technical schools have also contributed to similar satisfactory results. It is only necessary to mention the School of Building, the School of Printing, the School for Cooks, the School for Waiters, the Trade School for Girls, with classes in domestic subjects of every kind, hairdressing and photography, all based upon a sound cultural foundation, to show the vocational opportunities now within reach of London's brighter children. In the secondary schools, too, to-day a far larger number of suitable pupils remain for advanced courses leading to the University, evidence of which the increasing admissions to the University of London year by year provide.

That the Council does not overlook the position of the necessitous pupils in this respect may be gathered from the provision for scholarships and exhibitions of diverse types in the esti-

mates for 1933-4, which include about 3,000 junior county exhibitions (allowances for children over 14 years in selective central schools); 9,000 junior county scholarships: 1,480 supplementary junior county scholarships; 2,600 intermediate county scholarships; 630 senior county scholarships; 900 senior teachers' scholarships; 350 students in Council training colleges; 2,435 trade and junior art scholarships; 184 home training and infant welfare scholarships; 12 cookery scholarships; 100 senior scholarships in art, science, commerce and technology; 75 scholarships for physically defective children; 550 evening exhibitions; and 180 grants to blind persons in training—a total of more than 21,000 scholarships and exhibitions actually being held during the year, rightly described as a highway from the elementary school to the university.

Equally impressive has been the marked progress in all forms of continuation education. Last year in various institutions more than 250,000 pupils were enrolled, who made more than 27,000,000 student hours. With due allowance for the decrease in the school population in the elementary schools, this would probably represent an improvement of 50 per cent. in number of students and 150 per cent. in student hours upon the results achieved in 1908. Moreover, the scheme of instruction to-day is far more varied and better planned—technical, commercial, literary, for seniors and juniors, with specialised institutes for men and women. In connection with the programme system, it should be added, every polytechnic in London has been substantially enlarged in recent years.

The reduction in expenditure in connection with the present financial crisis, about £1,500,000 on estimates just exceeding £14,000,000, however, provides the best proof of the value of the programme system, which has been at work in London since 1925, inasmuch as the saving has been effected without interfering with the fabric of London's education system and without causing any deterioration of the work accomplished in the schools. London's achievement in this respect was certainly facilitated by the excellent relations with all voluntary bodies built up within the past twenty-five years.

Further space scarcely remains for considering other categories. Brief reference, however, should be accorded to the improved relations with the University of London. Before the University of London Act, 1927, the Council had proved itself the practical friend of both sides of the University by

strengthening its governing body with the power of the purse and by its efforts to conserve the external side in the interests of those students to whom for many reasons the internal side was not available. Since the new constitution the Council has endeavoured to render the University the apex of London's educational system by increasing its maintenance grant, voting adequate capital grants both for the extension of individual institutions and for the development of the Bloomsbury site, which latter will mean so much to the adequate presentation of what the University stands for in educational advance to London, the whole country and indeed the English-speaking world. In this respect the transfer of the London Day Training College to the University for the initiation of an Institute of Education indicates clearly the generous measure of thoughtful co-operation existing between the two bodies.

Finally the efforts of the authority for years to secure appropriate financial arrangements between taxes and rates for London education, as settled by the pound for pound principle in the Education Act, 1918, and contained in Section 118 of the Consolidation Act of 1921, must be mentioned. Education in the imperial city should be an equal charge between the State and the locality. It is against the interests of education that a niggardly authority, neglecting its duties and its powers, should receive a much larger proportion of its expenditure from the State than the capital of the Empire, which because of its central imperial position has necessarily to develop upon a much larger scale and provide central services not available elsewhere. On this account, the authority definitely intimated to the Government when Section 118 was suspended in 1931, as a result of the financial crisis, that it would reopen the question of grants at the earliest suitable moment.

A similar examination of the remaining categories would but emphasise the striking contrast already presented. London, therefore, may be intensely gratified at the remarkable developments effected during the past quarter of a century in all forms of educational work, from the nursery class to the university, on both the cultural and practical sides; in buildings, equipment and general amenities; in the distinction and achievement of its staff, both teaching and administrative; in standard of organisation and syllabus; in the outstanding successes of its scholars; in social effort of every description; and in particular in the far-reaching after-influence of its schools. *Si quereris monumentum circumspice!*

JOHN GILBERT.

FRANÇOIS BERNIER: THE NEW MEMOIR.

THE Royal Asiatic Society has earned our gratitude by publishing, in its quarterly *Journal*, an English translation of a hitherto unknown memoir from the pen of François Bernier. Two small volumes published in 1670 and 1671 contain all that he was hitherto known to have written about India, but these little books revealed such accurate observation and such intimacy with the Court of the Great Mughal that Bernier has long been accounted pre-eminent among the European travellers who visited India in the seventeenth century. Both as a writer and as an observer he had singular advantages. He was a very well educated man; he had obtained the degree of doctor in the Faculty of Medicine of Montpellier and later in Paris had attended the lectures of the philosopher Gassendi whom he tended in his last illness and for whom he always entertained a deep veneration. Arriving in India in 1658 or the beginning of 1659 Bernier succeeded in obtaining an appointment in the household of a great nobleman, Daneshmand Khan, who was an important Minister in the Mughal Government and a highly educated man. It is probable that Bernier was engaged in the first instance as the private physician of Daneshmand Khan, but he and his employer had tastes in common and they seem to have lived upon terms of intellectual equality. Writing to Jean Chapelain in 1667 Bernier describes his duties as "explaining to my Agah the recent discoveries of Harveus and Pecquet in anatomy and discoursing on the philosophy of Gassendi and Descartes which I translated to him in Persian (for this was my principal employment for five or six years)." He gives much the same account to M. de Merveilles: "I know that my Nawab or Agah, Daneshmand Khan, awaits me in camp with impatience; he can no more go without philosophising all the afternoon upon the books of Gassendi and Descartes, on the Globe and on the Sphere or upon Anatomy than devoting the morning to the great affairs of State in virtue of being Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Grand Master of the Cavalry." It is obvious that the *protégé* of a great nobleman, having a mastery of Persian, the language of polite society, and the advantage of a handsome person (St. Evremond was to nickname him later "*le joli philosophe*") had access to the best company of Delhi,

and this it is which gives such particular value to his observations upon the Court of Aurangzeb.

The original of the Memoir now published by the Royal Asiatic Society is in the Archives of the Ministère des Colonies in Paris. It is a document of about 7,000 words, written in a large and easily legible hand. On the first page of the MS. is a marginal note, attributed by the office to Colbert, which begins as follows: "I have read the whole of this Memoir and have found it very sensible and full of good and useful instructions for the establishment of commerce in the Indies." The occasion was, of course, the foundation of the French East India Company upon which Colbert had been busy since 1664. The *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, to give it its official title, owed its origin entirely to the influence of Louis XIV and his Finance Minister. Of the nominal capital of 15,000,000 francs the King himself had subscribed 3,000,000; the rest had been contributed by the Court, by certain large towns and by trading corporations, under stringent official pressure. By 1668 the first representatives of the Company had arrived in India, and Bernier wrote this minute in order to advise the Directors and above all Colbert upon the line of conduct which they should follow, to lay bare the many pitfalls of the Indian Court and to make known the personages from whom they might expect support and a friendly reception in India. The Moslems of India (as of Persia) were by then beginning to take an interest in the arts and learning of the Christian West. European paintings were much admired and even copied; Europeans were in request as doctors and artillery men; scholars like Daneshmand Khan were beginning to inquire what the Franks had to say about science and philosophy. Clearly there was, if not a party, at least a group of individuals at the Court of Delhi who were openly friendly to Europeans and prepared to learn what they could teach. But I confess that I was not prepared for the revelation which Bernier makes in this memoir; it is contained in a casual reference to an individual, viz. "Rustam Khan, a great friend of mine, speaks Portuguese and Latin, the same is very influential with the King, very ready to oblige (*très serviable*) and a great friend of the Franks." This surely is remarkable; nothing but a very serious determination to understand European thought could have induced a Moslem of India to master Latin. Another learned Moslem is mentioned as likely to help the Company, Mullah

Saleh, of the household of Jafar Khan, the Prime Minister, "who has much power and who is even rather well disposed to the Franks, at least he was a great friend of Father Buzée, Jesuit, and was very useful to him."

We should certainly have expected that Daneshmand Khan, who studied Harvey's treatise, *de circulatione sanguinis*, and discussed Gassendi and Descartes every afternoon would have thrown the weight of his influence upon the side of the Europeans. But exactly the opposite was the case. Bernier expressly warns Colbert against expecting any help from him. These are the terms in which he speaks of his former employer: "I will mention further Daneshmand Khan, who is very influential with the King, from being able to speak with him when he thinks good and from being his master and teacher and counsellor; but Jafar Khan (the Prime Minister) and he are not very good friends because Daneshmand Khan carries it high, being the learned man of India and besides the mortal enemy of this other doctor, Mullah Saleh, who is on the side of Jafar Khan. Moreover, as he professes to be a great Muhamadan he is always apprehensive, I have observed, of mixing himself up with the affairs of the Franks. Nevertheless as I have served him for so many years and as I know that he thinks very well of me, as can easily be ascertained over there, and as I have promised him, as also Dianat Khan, that I would send him some books and some *touffa* from Europe, certainly out of regard for me he might do much." This is a flashlight which suddenly illuminates the whole position. Daneshmand Khan posed as the champion of Moslem orthodoxy at the Court of Aurangzeb and he feared to compromise his position by showing any sympathy with infidels. Good men at Delhi, as much as at Versailles, were compelled often to conceal their most reasonable opinions to preserve their foothold among the currents of Court intrigue. So Daneshmand Khan kept those daily readings of Descartes secret. But in spite of his precautions some suspicion of his liberal opinions seems to have got abroad and to have disturbed the stricter Moslems of his time. The account of Daneshmand Khan in the Maasir ul Umara ends with these words: "As to what they say that in the end of his life he became inclined to the learning of the Franks and repeated many of the paradoxes of that set, it is improbable when we consider his learning and excellence."

The English reader will have been puzzled by the word *touffa*

in the extract above, and so, I have no doubt, was Colbert. It is the Persian word *tuhfa*, a small present, a trifle or curiosity. In his published works Bernier tells us that he had become "Indianised" by his long stay in the East; this no doubt accounts for his habit of using, from time to time, Indian words—as did an earlier generation of Anglo-Indians—without realising that they were unintelligible to most European readers. There is another example of this trick in the Memoir at a critical place. Bernier was very anxious that the representatives of the *Compagnie* should make plain to all Indian officials and governors that France needed raw materials because she was a great manufacturing country, and that was why her merchants were now coming to India. These are his words: "We must try to make them thoroughly understand these points; that of all the *Frangis* (Europeans) the most industrious and the greatest workers are the French, that it is to France that go almost all the commodities" (or, as we should now say, "raw materials") "from foreign countries there to be worked up, that France is, as it were, the general Karkane of Frangistan (*que le France est comme le Karkane général du Frangistan*). I wonder what Colbert made of this last sentence. It means that France is the general workshop of Europe; Karkhanah being a word still in common use in India for a workshop or factory. Frangistan is, of course, the land of the *Feringis* or *Frangis*, i.e. Europeans.

What is the reason that Bernier's memoir has remained buried so long in the Archives of the *Ministère des Colonies*, where it was classed until recently as confidential? I think that the explanation is to be found in the nature of the advice that Bernier gave to the Directors of the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* and therefore to Colbert. That advice was plain good sense based upon local knowledge, but it was advice that could not have been palatable to Louis XIV. It may be summarised as follows: The Mughals, Bernier says in effect, are watching with apprehension the growing power of the Europeans in Indian waters; they already resent the insolent superiority at sea of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English. If they learn that another European nation proposes to obtain a foothold on the coasts of India and that that nation is even more powerful and warlike than those of whom they have experience already they will take fright and will assuredly refuse to concede to them any special privileges. But the

privilege to trade and to establish factories is exactly what the French want, and therefore they must, at least in the beginning, say as little as possible about the military resources of their country. These are Bernier's words: "This being so, it will be enough, in my opinion, for the present to speak little of the power and greatness of our King, contenting ourselves with saying simply that he is one of the great ones of Frangistan, and not to insist as much as to say that he is greater than the King of England or of Portugal or of Denmark or of Holland, for these are the only ones they know; God helping they will in time learn well enough how matters stand. The time is not yet. Furthermore, it seems to me that it would be expedient not to reveal and perhaps even to deny that our king has a share in the capital of the Company. Further it seems to me expedient to make but a moderate show in the embassy to Delhi. . . . Indeed I am of opinion that twelve to fifteen persons, well made, well mannered and of good understanding, would be enough. The Dutch in their last embassy had not half the number. One Palleky (*palki*), two handsome carriages and some horses would, it seems to me, be enough, without at the same time pretending to such a mob of servants of this country; it is not this sort of thing which shows what we are. There would be no harm if everything at all times gave the impression of the merchant (*il n'y aura poinct de mal que tout sont toujours le marchand*), of the stranger newly arrived who has not got all his equipment." This was admirable advice, but what chance had it of securing the approbation of Louis XIV? He was the last king in Europe who would consent to creep into the gorgeous East in the humble guise of a trader. He was no longer the shy youth whom Bernier knew when he left Europe, the youth who waited every morning on Mazarin and received instructions from his Minister. He was now *le Roi Soleil*; he had just marched in triumph over Flanders and had sent an army to overrun the Franche-Comté; he was on the point of dictating peace at Aix-la-Chapelle. And it was to this warrior king that Bernier suggested that his ambassadors should appear in Delhi with a meagre train as humble merchants.

Even this was not the climax of Bernier's error. He actually dared to suggest that the French at their first audience should make the Indian obeisance to the Great Mughal. The Europeans in India were incredibly stiff-necked upon this punctilio of

national dignity. They would accept money and even wives from the Indian Emperor, but they would not for any consideration salute him in the same manner as his own subjects. But Bernier had grown so familiar with the ceremonial of the Court of Delhi that he advises the subjects of the greatest and proudest king in Europe to waive the point. This is what he says: "As for the *salam* they will not prevent us from making it when entering and leaving the King's presence after our own fashion; nevertheless, if after having received the *serapahs* or dresses (of honour) we went so far, as is the custom, that is to say, to make the *salam* in the Indian way, putting the hand three times on the head and stooping to the ground, I see no harm in doing it."

At about the same time Louis received very different and far more congenial advice from La Boullaye le Goût, an agent of the Company in India. "The right thing to do," he wrote, "would be to despatch some of the King's vessels so as to show them on the coasts and above all to have plenty of powder and cannon balls; . . . when once the Company is established it would depend only upon the King to be master of the Indies, none of these monarchs having any maritime power, and it is advisable in the first place to get possession of some islands . . . and further to buy Chaoul from the Portuguese if possible or Bombay from the English in order to maintain control over the Gulf of Cambay and the Gulf of Ormuz."

These warlike measures were far more to Louis's taste than Bernier's prosaic policy. Instead of taking steps for the immediate establishment of trade with India—as the Syndics of the Company wanted—he squandered their resources upon the costly and fruitless occupation of Madagascar. When too late he condescended to turn his attention to the sordid interests of trade, the merchants had lost hope and refused, with some bluntness, to find any more money for his ill-managed Company. But what became of Bernier's Memoir? Did Colbert ever show it, did he dare to commend it, to his royal master? We do not know. I suspect that Louis, who was a model of industry, read it through with muttered disapproval and straightway ordered that it should be filed among Confidential Documents. This, at least, is the way in which it has been regarded for more than two hundred years by the Ministère des Colonies.

THEODORE MORISON.

PROGRESS IN PORTUGAL.

CONSIDERING the extent to which the Portuguese have in past centuries contributed towards the construction and progress of European civilisation, and in view of the time-honoured alliance between Portugal and Great Britain, it is strange that so little is known in this country about the contemporary history of an ancient maritime race with whom we have much in common. Before, however, endeavouring to convey a general impression of Portugal's political and economic bill of health, as I saw it in Lisbon not many months ago, it is necessary to give some idea of the Portuguese people and the conditions which influence their outlook. There are also a good number of false impressions of Portugal, prevalent in England, which call for explanation. I shall begin by trying to clear away some of these false impressions.

It is often taken for granted that, because Portugal shares with Spain the geographical unit of the Iberian peninsula, the natural characteristics of the two nations are very closely allied. This is far from being the case, as in many ways the one is the very opposite of the other. Although the Spanish and Portuguese languages are both Latin in character and in some respects similar, there are many ways in which they are quite different; and the respective characters of the two peoples differ more widely than their languages. While the Spaniards are aggressively excitable and mentally active, the Portuguese are physically restful and mentally passive. They are sentimental and very humane. The Portuguese, having a distinct nationality of their own, dislike being "mixed up" with the Spaniards, chiefly owing to the fact that, as much the smaller of the two nations, they suffer from a psychological, though unjustified, fear of absorption. Perhaps a more unfortunate aspect of British impressions has its origin in the part played by the Portuguese troops in the Great War, which has long been a subject of serious misunderstanding. The truth is that the unfavourable impression created by the Portuguese divisions in France was due to the poor quality of the officers, and to the fact that these troops were called upon to carry out tasks for which they were entirely unsuited. The blame largely rests on the shoulders of those whose ignorance led them to take such a course. In any case, there has since that time been a marked improvement in the corps of officers,

while the standard of smartness and efficiency of the men has been considerably raised, their natural quality being in every way equal to that of most other armies recruited from peasant populations. It should not be forgotten that in the Peninsular War, as well as in more recent Colonial campaigns, the Portuguese have shown good fighting qualities. There is, therefore, no reason why the military misfortunes of the Portuguese at one period of their history should be taken as an indication of their national qualities in general, especially in view of the fact that their sole reason for coming into the war as our allies was in order to honour their long-standing treaty obligation. There is also a tendency in these islands of political tranquillity to regard Portugal as a stage on which revolutions are held one after the other, and at least twice yearly. It is unnecessary to explain to the readers of this REVIEW the character of such so-called revolutions, but it is perhaps as well to point out that the best cure for this attitude towards Portugal is to spend some time in a South American republic. I well remember the veneration and respect with which I regarded European Portugal when in Brazil some years ago.

In Lisbon there is complete absence of that modern vulgarity so prevalent much nearer home. The Portuguese are a dignified race of ancient culture, possessing no aggressive or vulgar characteristics, but this, together with their humane quality, leads to excessive tolerance. While the foreigner strongly resents—and shows it—the pesterings of professional beggars, the Portuguese are always polite and generous to their advances. In few European countries are the manners of all classes so good as they are in Portugal, which is due to the fact that Portuguese hospitality, generosity and kindliness are natural products of the heart, and not mere slavery to convention. The full honours given by the Republican Government at the funeral of the late King Manoel represented the chivalrous spirit of the nation. Indeed, the heart governs everything they do, and the head is rather a poor second. Not only are the people exceptionally fond of children but, for a southern race, are also kind to animals. While I have on occasions heard English people complain of the treatment of beasts of burden in Portuguese cities, the complaints have almost invariably come from those who have had little experience of the South.

Meanwhile these very qualities, showing a general practice of the Christian virtues, have led to certain serious defects in

the national character. The very fact that the Portuguese cultivate in all things the fullest development of the human factor makes them regard as inhuman anything possessing the qualities of consistency and method. They see no merit in cultivating such qualities, and nothing will induce them to do so. This defect is manifest in many of their public works, where perfection and bad workmanship exist side by side. Instead of consistently constructing a second-class road, they prefer to have a poor road with a " luxury " mile or so out of all proportion. Moreover, this complete disregard, and almost contempt, of consistency combines with natural languor to produce a sense of unreliability. In Portugal the spoken word is not regarded as representing an obligation, and a business man is surprised, and even shocked, if a foreigner places upon it a serious interpretation. Hence there is to him nothing discreditable in not carrying out what he has promised to do. Indeed, shame is not very conspicuous in the Portuguese mentality, as shown by the indifference to squalor and certain unhygienic practices. Yet in Lisbon and many other southern towns much is now done to maintain cleanliness and tidiness, while effective measures are being taken by the Government to eliminate beggars from the capital. But to return to the inconsistency of the Portuguese, it is interesting to note that, like the Russians, they are even inconsistent in this very quality; for through some perverse attitude towards it they seem to derive satisfaction from complexity. They like complicated administrative systems, in which real utility is obscured by " red tape," with a bad influence on the initiative of junior officials.

Whether the qualities peculiar to the Portuguese, and the fundamental differences between them and the Spaniards, are chiefly due to racial or climatic causes, and to what extent, is a subject outside the scope of this article, but the following points are worth consideration. As there is little Roman and much Celtic blood in Portugal, some observers attribute to this a national characteristic of the Portuguese, which cannot be better described than in the words of Aubrey Bell, who has spent many years in the country studying such questions. His definition of the Portuguese quality, *Saudade,* is " a vague and constant desire for something that does not and probably cannot exist, for something other than the present, a turning towards the past or towards the future, not an active discontent, but an indolent, dreaming wistfulness." This quality

represents a combination of the indefinite hankerings of the Celt for the unattainable with the Latin sense of reality, so that the object of desire is recognised as unattainable with consequent disappointment but resignation. If this definition is involved, it is not more so than a quality which forms a basic feature of the Portuguese mentality. As far as the climatic influence is concerned, Spain differs from Portugal in that the scorching sun and biting winds of the former induce violent fanaticism and excitability, while the softer and more humid conditions of the latter produce a more restful and human temperament. Dr. Salazar has stated that in Portugal no one acts with systematic violence, which would be foreign to the national temperament, but he readily admits general " mediocrity " to be the great defect with which he has to contend. By " mediocrity " the Prime Minister means an instinctive languor giving rise to " *laisser-faire.*" Although the Portuguese are easy going, good natured, lethargic, and governed by the heart rather than the head, they are a proud nation with noble traditions and many attractive as well as admirable qualities. If I have devoted much space to a description of the national character, it is for two reasons. First, because these considerations are so little known in England, and secondly, because a knowledge of them is essential in order to appreciate the national transformation now being undertaken by Dr. Salazar with singular success up to the present.

The background of the present spasm of Portuguese progress can be summed up in a few words. The political history of Portugal since the revolution of 1910, when the monarchy was overthrown, is a record of short-lived ministries and of revolutionary outbreaks during which the only stable periods were those associated with the control exercised by President Paes, assassinated in 1918, and with the Ministry of Senhor da Silva, which endured for twenty-one months. Indeed, from the latter years of the reign of King Carlos until Dr. Salazar first became Minister of Finance, the Portuguese political pendulum was on a constant swing between some kind of dictatorial government and parliamentary chaos resulting from a large number of political groups. Moreover, governmental authority during this period was very precarious owing to royalist invasions, activities of the *Carbonarios,* mutinies, strikes and miscellaneous outrages in Lisbon and other towns; while the situation

was rendered even more difficult by conflicts between Church and State, the rise in prices, and the general unrest caused by the Great War. The turning point in Portuguese internal affairs was in April, 1928, when Dr. Salazar returned from the mediæval university of Coimbra to the Ministry of Finance and assumed considerable administrative power over the Government, under the Presidency of General Carmona. From that time forward, first as Finance Minister, and then as Prime Minister, this remarkable statesman has had the destiny of Portugal practically in his own hands; and the result has been an ever-increasing improvement in all directions.

Of the strong men in Europe to-day Dr. Salazar is probably the least known, as he dislikes publicity and almost lives the life of a recluse. Slender in build, and with the eyes and features of a scholar, he is a tremendous worker. As he is fully aware of what he believes to be the needs of his country, he is inclined to regard meeting people as a confusing factor and a waste of time. He prefers to adopt the rôle of a solitary statesman, and it is almost impossible to induce him to attend social functions. It is even said that he has resorted to printed cards for refusing invitations, space being left for filling in the function in question. Intellectually honest and very religious, the Prime Minister believes in leading the people at a pace in accordance with their progressive capacity, and for this reason he favours extensive power in the hands of a few men of exceptional ability. From the time that he became Prime Minister and even before, Dr. Salazar has focused his whole intellectual power on thinking out the basis of his *Estado Novo*, which has taken shape in the form of the new Constitution of this year. Yet, as a brilliant financier, he fully realised that the first step towards national regeneration was to place the finances of Portugal on a sound footing. At the end of his first year of office as Finance Minister he had balanced his budget, and he has succeeded in doing so ever since, during a period when nations with much greater financial reputations have had the gravest difficulty in this respect. Moreover, the budgets of the Portuguese Colonies all balance or show a surplus, and the *escudo* has been stabilised. This is a matter of the greatest importance to Portugal, and one which is enabling the country successfully to weather the storm of economic depression. Indeed, there are few countries less affected by world economic conditions, partly due, however, to the absence of foreign loans

since 1891, foreign commitments being met out of the country's own resources, including large sums remitted by Portuguese in Brazil and North America and the interest on investments in Brazilian securities. It is also on this state of financial equilibrium that the whole programme of economic reconstruction depends. As industry is not unduly developed and exists primarily to serve the home market, there is little danger of over-production, and serious unemployment; while increased preferences in the Colonial markets provide an outlet for surplus stocks. Moreover, as manufacturers seem to prefer to make use of tariff protection to raise prices rather than to increase consumption, internal development is encouraged with a view to reducing certain imports. While much is being done to make the country self-supporting in the matter of wheat, hydro-electric schemes are being undertaken to reduce the import of foreign coal, and the import of raw materials from the Colonies instead of from abroad is being fostered. Owing to low wages (the standard of living is low) and a high tariff, agriculture is prosperous in spite of antiquated methods, the wooden plough and the bullock being still in general use in a farming system where rotation of crops has been little practised. In order, however, to encourage the use of modern methods, the Government instituted the *Campanha de Trigo* (Wheat Campaign), which in turn led to a more ambitious project to increase the general crop production of the country.

In other directions the same process of regeneration has been at work. All forms of communication and public works have been considerably improved; buildings of historic interest have been restored to attract tourists and to stimulate pride in national traditions; provision has been made for unemployment relief; and there has been a substantial advance in social services of all kinds. Although the republican régime has always regarded illiteracy as one of the greatest evils in Portugal, little was done to improve conditions prior to 1926, when the proportion of illiterates was well over 50 per cent. of the total population. As soon, however, as the present Government had settled down, a serious effort was made to remedy matters, and this effort has been maintained. Since 1926 the number of elementary schools has been increased by over a thousand, with accommodation for 30,000 pupils, and evening classes for a further 15,000 have been provided. Also in the secondary schools, which have long been the most efficient branch of

Portuguese education, deficiencies have been so much rectified that many of the *luceus* in the larger towns are now exemplary institutions. These are merely a few casual examples of the manner in which the whole standard of Portuguese national life has been raised during recent years.

It is, however, important to realise that progress of this nature has only been possible as a result of continuity of policy unhampered by changes of government. As the Government have been singularly successful during the last six or seven years in preserving public order, Dr. Salazar has been able to introduce reforms conducive to the well-being and prosperity of the people; and this he has accomplished without external assistance and at a time of the most serious world depression. It is a remarkable achievement.

On the political side, Dr. Salazar has long appreciated the need of a civil administration, as opposed to any form of military government, and has replaced the old political parties by a civil organisation in which monarchists and republicans work side by side. The new Constitution, approved by plebiscite in March of this year, forms a type of its own suited to the needs of the nation for which it was drawn up. Portugal is now a united and corporative Republic based on equality of her citizens. The State assumes obligations (*a*) to promote the moral unity and juridical order of the nation, enforcing the rights emanating from nature or law in the interests of individuals, families, local governments and corporations; (*b*) to co-ordinate all social activities, making harmony of interests prevail, and subordinating the interests of the individual to those of the community; (*c*) to promote amelioration of conditions for the lower classes, rendering impossible any reduction in their standard of living. The family has a definite obligation to the State, as constituting the primary political unit, and only educated heads of families are electors for local government and for the National Assembly, which sits only for three months in the year and cannot overthrow the Cabinet. The corporations include all activities of the State, which assumes the obligation and right to maintain equilibrium between the professions, capital and labour; to defend the national economy from agricultural, industrial and commercial exploitation of a parasitical character, or of a nature incompatible with the best interests of human life; to lower prices and raise wages, compatible with other factors of production, by the perfection of

services, technique and credit. Land, capital and labour have social functions, regulated by law, in the régime of economic co-operation and solidarity. The Corporative Chamber is elected by Districts, Municipalities and Corporations. The political organisation of the State consists of the President, National Assembly, Government and Courts of Justice, forming the four means by which sovereignty is exercised. The President, elected for seven years by all individual electors, is responsible for all governmental action, and is assisted by an advisory Council of State, composed of the Prime Minister, Solicitor-General, Presidents of the National Assembly, Corporative Chamber and High Court of Justice, and five members of outstanding ability.

This new Constitution, representing a practical compromise between autocracy and an uncontrolled parliamentary system, under which Portugal suffered so much between 1910 and 1926, has as its objective the encouragement of a sense of responsibility and steadiness among electors and elected, while leaving the chief executive powers in the hands of General Carmona and Dr. Salazar. It has been with this Constitution in view that the Prime Minister has been endeavouring by miscellaneous means to raise the whole political and moral standard of the Portuguese people. Only the future will show whether he can really transform the more subtle traits in the national character.

E. W. Polson Newman.

MISSIONARIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SLAVERY.

IT was a long and wearisome campaign which, in 1833, led to the Act by which slavery was abolished in the British Possessions. It was not till August 1st, 1838, that the slaves were finally set free; but 1833 is a royal moment in the struggle. In this centenary year the little company of enthusiasts who fought on year after year will receive due honour. Much may be said in criticism of them, but readers who are more concerned to discover what they did than what they failed to do will find much to reward them. They will discover themselves in a society in which, while all allies were welcomed, the fight against slavery was chiefly regarded as a Christian duty, and a necessary application of the Christian belief that man has a right to salvation. There were men among them who would not have claimed more than that they were philanthropists. But most of the leaders in the liberation of the slaves were also missionary enthusiasts.

In the Evangelical Community of that age the reader comes across the same names when he is tracing back the story of Missions, and the story of the Anti-Slavery Movement. The same faces are seen on their platforms; the same serious persons sit on their boards. In every age, when some reform is being advocated, there is such an army, reappearing under different titles. So it was in the great agitation for the release of the slaves within the British Empire. It is necessary, for a complete picture, to see what part the missionaries played in that company.

In a delightful introduction to *Smith of Demerara*, Lord Olivier gives some traditions of the group which was accustomed to meet in Hatcham House, where lived his great-great-grandfather, Joseph Hardcastle, a London merchant who is a representative figure among the Evangelical laymen of the age of Wilberforce. His house became so famous a place among the Evangelical leaders that in the memoirs of the period it is a "place of august notoriety like Blenheim, or Buckingham Palace." There the conspirators who plotted death to slavery foregathered. In the parlour of that house Thomas Clarkson saw the hideous shackles and other instruments of slavery, which made him an ardent abolitionist. But it must be remembered that this same Hardcastle was one of the founders and the first treasurer of the Missionary Society, which afterwards took the name which it still bears of *The London Missionary Society*. In his office at Swan Wharf, near to London Bridge, Hardcastle was to be found alike by missionary enthusiasts and abolitionists. He was one of the practical men of affairs who were not afraid of putting their beliefs into action. In 1791 he and his friends established a mercantile company "for the purpose of promoting civilisation and protecting the inhabitants of Africa from the sordid cupidity of slave traders." In 1795, he helped to found The Missionary Society. These undertakings he regarded as part of the same charge which was entrusted to him.

It would be easy to find many another link like this. When, for example, Henry Martyn came to London to make arrangements for his departure to India, he found himself admitted at once to the company of the abolitionists. He met with Wilberforce, "a wiry, bright-eyed figure," as Miss Padwick described him, "with powdered hair, a diamond brooch in his linen and an eyeglass which he fingered while he talked his unforgettable talk, swift-wheeling as a swallow's flight." Martyn dined with Wilberforce alone at Palace Yard, and the young recruit for the East was so affected by Wilberforce's talk upon slavery that "he could with difficulty refrain from tears." These Evangelicals who lived round Clapham Common were far from being the smug and sombre crowd of which Sydney Smith spoke. Wilberforce was a man of wit as well as saintliness; and John Newton, with whom Martyn breakfasted, was a scholar and a man of no little humour. Martyn is another witness, if such were needed, of the fellowship which was to be found between the missionary enthusiasts and the abolitionists. Both had the spring of their devotion in the Gospel as it had been rediscovered in the Evangelical Revival.

There were others indeed among them, and they welcomed all support that was given, but the main body of the faithful were among those called variously in popular language "Methodists" or "The Saints," or the "Clapham Sect," or indeed by other names less reputable. They went back to the same origins; and there was a family likeness among them. There was a Cornishman, of whom Mr. Birrell writes, who was asked why the people thereabouts were such godly people. He answered, "There came a man amongst us whose name was John." Missionary enthusiasts and anti-slavery agitators could also have said these words.

The part which missionaries played may be illustrated by three episodes.

> "Everybody who has ever read," Lord Morley wrote, "one of the most honourable and glorious chapters in our English history knows the case of the missionary, John Smith. . . . The death of the Demerara missionary, it has been truly said, was an event as fatal to slavery in the West Indies as the execution of John Brown was its death-blow in the United States."

This story of John Smith may be taken as the first of three episodes which illustrate how missionaries overseas played a significant part in the struggle for the slaves. The controversy had been prolonged at home; the arguments which had been expounded for a generation were repeated in books and in the Press, and in particular upon the platform. Then there came news from Demerara in 1823, which seemed to throw a new and fierce and searching light upon the crime of slavery. John Smith, a missionary of the London Missionary Society, died in prison in British Guiana, convicted by a court martial, and sentenced to death; the sentence was accompanied by a recommendation to mercy, and had to be confirmed in London; but three days before news arrived that he was to be sent home to England, the missionary, a gentle and heroic spirit, was dead. He had been charged, on the flimsiest of evidence, with stirring up rebellion and fomenting the outbreak of a negro rising. But his main offence was that he had given to the negroes, along with the Gospel, the key of knowledge. "No man," said Brougham, "can cast his eye upon this trial without perceiving that it was intended to bring on an issue between the slave-law and the instruction of the negroes."*

The institution of slavery was suddenly revealed in the light of all that its defenders, far from the checks which might hold them back in Britain, would and could do in the West Indies. The story of Smith was one to move deeply the hearts of Englishmen. The abolitionists knew how to use this story. For six months the case of John Smith was hotly debated in England. Wilberforce and his friends had watchful critics who condemned them, not without reason, for their comparative indifference to the wrongs suffered by the dispossessed victims of selfishness and greed in England. Cobbett, who loved the

* *Smith of Demerara.* By David Chamberlin (L.M.S.). An authoritative record in a small compass.

English countryside and its yeomen and peasants, was angry with Wilberforce, and declared indeed "not only that slavery cannot be abolished, but that it cannot be other than it is now without the overthrow of the Colonies." Such writers poohpoohed the agitation concerning the death of Smith; but the abolitionists were right in their belief that it would prove in the end a master fact, since it would stir not only the intellect but the emotions of the electorate. At once the news kindled a new fervour among the serious people who cared for missions. In one sitting of the House of Commons petitions on this subject were presented from Plymouth, Devonport, Sidmouth, Kingsbridge, Biddeford [*sic*], Romford, Thetford, York, Bath, Uxbridge, Southampton and other places. Public meetings were held of what would seem to-day portentous length. Like a fiery cross the story of the martyred missionary went through England and Scotland and Wales. If there had been any slackening of interest in the long struggle, the death of Smith came as a fresh challenge to end the institution which stood exposed in its naked brutality in that Demerara prison. This agitation marked the beginning of the last struggle.

Two of the demonstrations may be recalled. On June 25th, 1824, under the chairmanship of the Duke of Gloucester, the king's brother, at Freemasons' Tavern, the annual meeting was held of "the Society for mitigating and gradually abolishing the state of slavery throughout the British Dominions." His Royal Highness was accompanied by Wilberforce, Stephen, Master in Chancery, Baptist Noel, and John Randolph from the North American Congress, but Buxton, the most powerful of all the group in the latest stages of the agitation, was unavoidably absent. "The speaking," reported *The New Times,* "was largely given to the case of Smith. Mr. Stephen, the Hon. Baptist Noel and Mr. Wilberforce spoke with eloquence, but no one excelled young Mr. T. Macaulay." The historian made then his first speech on any great occasion, and showed all the eloquence which was to mark his later works. He looked forward to the time when:

> the peasant of the Antilles will no longer crawl in listless and trembling dejection round a plantation from whose fruits he must derive no advantage and a hut whose door yields him no protection; but when his cheerful and voluntary labour is performed, he will return with the firm step and erect brow of a British citizen from the field which is his freehold, to the house which is his castle.

Over against this picture the young orator set the scene in Demerara where "deep cunning and rancorous hatred regulated every proceeding." Out of the mouths of their adversaries the abolitionists could prove their case. It was late in the afternoon, nearly 4.30, and the meeting began at noon, before Wilberforce rose to express the thanks of the assembly to their illustrious chairman. The hon. gentleman, Mr. W. Wilberforce, was pronounced almost inaudible, but enough was heard to show that he still pleaded for the slave "as for a soul formed for eternity."

But it was in Parliament on June 1st, 1824, that the advocates of emancipation pressed home the moral of the death of Smith. Brougham and Washington and Wilberforce spoke, and though they did not carry their motion, they won a victory in argument, and put the supporters of the slave system upon the defensive. Brougham, who could never be called a "Methodist," defended most warmly the Missionary Society which sent out Smith, a "numerous, conscientious and much venerated body"; he made out a convincing indictment of the planters, who had been moved by a fierce hatred of the man who had given the slaves knowledge. Wilberforce, too, added this in his last speech delivered in the House of Commons:

> The instance of Jamaica and of those of many others of the colonies went to prove that the real offence for which the missionaries were persecuted was the offence of Christianity, and the real mischief, so anxiously attempted to be guarded against, was that of instructing the slaves in religious knowledge.

It was a long debate, but nothing in it is more noteworthy than the words of Canning, who had done his best from the Government benches to defend the court martial.

> In the person of that individual [Smith] the spirit of religious instruction is not extinguished. The Colony will find enough to be convinced that theirs was not a triumph over the individual as a missionary; and that many such triumphs (if triumphs they should be called) will only hasten the final triumph over all attempts to shut out instruction.

The second episode in this story is the passing of the Fiftieth Ordinance in July 1823. It was not in the West Indies only that the problem of slavery arose. The Fiftieth Ordinance had to do with the Hottentots of Cape Colony; by it they were saved from many abuses. When it was promulgated at the

Cape, and the King's seal was put to it in London, John Philip won the greatest victory in his stormy life, and a step forward was taken in the movement for emancipation. But who was John Philip? His letters were burnt in the recent disastrous fire in the University Library at Johannesburg; but happily not before a scholar of distinction, Professor Macmillan, had studied them closely and used them. Philip, till lately, lived in the annals of South Africa as the villain of the piece; his native policy was condemned and he was dubbed a negrophil, a sentimentalist, a man for whom the Dutch and British alike had no use. In recent years he has been vindicated by Professor Macmillan in his book *The Cape Colour Question*. Professor Eric A. Walker, of Capetown, has said: "Dr. Philip needs no whitewashing; he needs only to have the mud scraped off." This missionary appears in the story of liberation in one crowded hour in 1828.

John Philip was a Scots minister who was sent to South Africa by the London Missionary Society in 1819, and remained there till 1851, acting as the agent of that Society; he was a bonny fighter who feared no man, and was always prepared to stand out against the Colonists, Dutch and British alike. He had need of courage; at one stage the Governor described him "as formerly a journeyman weaver, now head of a missionary society, and calling himself Doctor Philip," and therefore presumably of no account. His chief offence was that he took the side of the Hottentots. Slavery had not yet been abolished in the Cape; the Hottentots indeed were not slaves; but by a system of what were called "passes" they had virtually become slaves. To check vagrancy it was laid down that no Hottentot should move about the country without a pass from the *landdrost* or field-cornet. This led to a system of enforced labour. After 1807 no new slaves had been allowed to enter the Colony; labour was scarce; hence the attempt had been made by such regulations to turn the Hottentots into hewers of wood and drawers of water, without rights or charter. It was on their behalf Philip fought, and to round off his work he came to England where, if anywhere, a charter for the Hottentots must be secured.

At once on arriving in England he set to work to write his *Researches in South Africa*, a book written at lightning speed, with some inaccuracies in it, but a book which did things. Hot from the press it was sent to statesmen and all who led public

opinion. Philip, with Wilberforce and Buxton to help him, stumped the country. The anti-slavery leaders were matchless in propaganda; they knew how to take occasion by the hand. It was easy to raise a laugh by referring to the Exeter Hall people, but those serious men and women among whom John Philip moved saved not only Africa but Europe; and in their long fight the passing of the Fiftieth Ordinance was more than a skirmish. It raises fundamental matters, as Mr. Huskisson at the Colonial Office learned from John Philip himself. Mr. Huskisson: "Tell me in one sentence what you want for the Hottentots?" John Philip: "I require nothing for the Hottentots but the power of bringing their labour to a fair market." Mr. Huskisson: "That is all that you require. It includes everything else."

In such direct ways Philip went about his business; and to such effect that on July 15th, 1828, the House of Commons resolved on the publication of certain reports upon the evidence given them by Dr. Philip and by the London Missionary Society. They begged His Majesty "that directions be given for effectually securing to all the natives of South Africa the same freedom and protection as are enjoyed by other free persons residing at the Cape, whether they be English or Dutch." On July 17th Ordinance 50 was promulgated at the Cape. It ended the "pass" system, and any special obligations of forced labour; it enabled the Hottentots to buy and possess land. It is now maintained by Professor Macmillan that the policy adopted at that time was not only right then, but is a clue to the right policy to be adopted in all dealings with the Bantu peoples. "Philip's work was not in vain," Mr. Macmillan writes; and "While he sleeps on in peace in a rather lonely grave over against the fire-blackened ruins of the old Mission House at Hankey, South Africa may yet be brought to make amends for the grievous wrong it has done to his memory." In the annals of the great anti-slavery agitation, there is certainly a place for the whirlwind campaign which Philip fought on behalf of the Hottentots in 1828.

The third and last of the episodes was the campaign waged by William Knibb in 1832.* There had been an insurrection in Jamaica; and almost exactly as Smith had been treated in Demerara, Knibb and his fellow missionaries of the Baptist

* The story is briefly and well told in *Freedom in Jamaica*, by Ernest A. Payne (Carey Press).

Missionary Society were treated in Jamaica. They were accused of having incited their converts to rebellion. They were treated with the utmost indignity. There was an outbreak of vandalism. Methodist chapels were destroyed; a Moravian missionary was most cruelly handled. At the Assizes held at Montego Bay, the missionaries were acquitted; but since garbled versions of the events were circulating in Britain, it was decided that Knibb should return home to lay the facts before the Committee and the British public.

In the story of the anti-slavery agitation, the missionary boards at home must not be credited with the enthusiasm and audacity of the missionaries themselves. The boards of the London Missionary Society and the Baptist Missionary Society, and others of the same kind, were discreet and cautious. They thought that they would do their own distinctive job best if they kept strictly to it and did not champion other causes, however much they might believe in them. They had sent out both to Demerara and Jamaica counsels of caution. When Knibb met his Committee and "urged the members to range themselves definitely against slavery as the real cause of the recent disturbances," many of them enjoined caution and compromise. Knibb's declaration, however, was unequivocal: "Myself, my wife and my children are entirely dependent on the Baptist Mission; we have landed without a shilling, and may at once be reduced to penury. But, if it be necessary, I will take them by the hand and walk barefoot through the kingdom, but I will make known to the Christians of England what their brethren in Jamaica are suffering." His appeal was heard; Knibb was allowed to speak at the annual meeting of the Society. The secretary is said, on that occasion, to have pulled his coat-tails to caution him, but Knibb paid no heed. There began a great campaign in which Knibb and Burchell, who also had suffered with him in Jamaica, roused the country. Knibb appeared before the House of Commons Committee, and three times before the Lords. His evidence was found to be unassailable. Then he and his friends betook themselves to the platform. In Exeter Hall, Knibb, in the course of a dramatic speech, threw upon the platform a pair of slave shackles. Then from one city to another he carried the fiery cross. Owing in a large measure to this campaign, the first reformed House of Commons which assembled in February 1833 was elected on the question of slavery. With him in purpose but on other

lines of advocacy was the Agency Committee with Joseph Sturge as their leader, which must not be overlooked when the Act is recalled which was passed by that Parliament on August 28th. William Knibb will always have a place of signal honour. His fiery eloquence clinched the matter. But it must not be forgotten that men of the same spirit as he had been busy upon this task for very many years. In the last stages of the fight, he is their representative. "For twenty years," it is written of Carey in India, "in his every prayer he has been pleading for the destruction of slavery."

There is place for an additional note to this story. When the Act of 1833 was passed, there was still much to do before slavery was ended. It is not ended now. After 1833 there was, as Buxton showed in his masterly history, published in 1839, an actual increase in the range of the slave traffic. Buxton wrote with a complete survey of the facts, and in a spirit of serious concern called for someone who would be able to enlighten the world from experience of those lands in which the slave traffic was still working its horrors. In that very year a young Scots doctor, David Livingstone, was proceeding to Africa. More than any other man, he exposed the horrors of the traffic in slaves, and his public speeches in Cambridge and Glasgow are the true sequels to the speeches with which the country rang a hundred years ago. And Livingstone, no less than those other abolitionists, was moved by the master fact that the African was entitled to freedom because he was an "object of divine redemption."

EDWARD SHILLITO.

LAND VALUE TAXATION.

THE *raison d'être* and gist of this article can be summarised under a few brief heads:

(*a*) The complete breakdown of civilisation throughout the world exonerates us from any undue reverence for the methods of the past and entitles us to investigate any plausible remedy, however widely it may differ from our conventions, traditions, and prejudices.

(*b*) The problem is one of distribution, not supply. There never has been any real over-production, except geographically or (temporarily) in special articles. Legitimate human demands are illimitable, and have consequently never been fully satisfied. We are suffering from the unendurable paradox of want in the midst of plenty. Our problem is the distribution of plenty.

(*c*) It seems evident that those who enjoy a comfort obviously in excess of the average must resign themselves to the conclusion that something has to be jettisoned to redress the balance.

(*d*) The remedy which seems to hold the field at present is some form of socialism; but to many of us this cure seems worse than the disease.

(*e*) Without any dogmatic assertion that the taxation of land values would be a panacea for all our ills, and with a clear recognition of the view that its sudden introduction at this period of the world's history might conceivably cause so much dislocation as to defeat its own end, I have sufficient belief in the doctrine so eloquently preached by Henry George as to plead for a much fuller and less prejudiced investigation than it has hitherto been vouchsafed by our statesmen and economists. Even if it is not a panacea, it offers a plausible basis for other desirable reforms.

(*f*) Henry George considered himself an opponent of what he called "the fatal defect of socialism," and would, in my view, be much amazed to find himself ranked with socialists and communists. My strongest reason for the advocacy of some practicable adaptation of his gospel is that it seems to me the most hopeful line of resistance to the unsound and dangerous doctrine of thorough-going socialism. Neither conservatism, nor liberalism, nor labour has a monopoly of good ideas, but there is no logical reason why they should not all contribute to the superstructure erected on a taxation-of-land-values basis.*

It is unfortunate that most of Henry George's disciples in this country have needlessly become identified with the socialist wing of Labour and with the doctrine of free trade, and have prac-

* It should be noted that, in the opinion of many followers of Henry George, the doctrine of Land Value Taxation was not satisfactorily represented by the schemes of Mr. Lloyd George in 1909 or Lord Snowden in 1931.

tically cried "*procul, o procul, este profani*" to all conservatives, protectionists, and imperialists. No objection can be made to their espousing the side of free trade in a still unsettled controversy; their mistake is in the assumption that a taxer of land values *must* be a free trader. Henry George was fully alive to the benefits of co-operation, and he certainly envisaged a world of universal and reciprocal free exchange of commodities as the economic ideal. It is, however, clear that he considered free trade as a consequence rather than a compeer of the abolition of private monopoly of land surface. Even in the volume he wrote in defence of free trade, he tells us that "the abolition of protection . . . can accomplish no permanent benefit for the labouring class, so long as the land on which all must live is made the property of some, (for) increase of productive power can only increase the tribute which those who own the land can demand for its use" (*Protection and Free Trade*, chapter xxvi); and in *Progress and Poverty* (Book IV, chapter iii) occurs the significant sentence: "Free Trade has enormously increased the wealth of Great Britain without lessening pauperism."

By socialism I understand a system which brings practically all civil life under government regulation and vests land and industrial capital in the community for the general benefit. It would thus do away with much that is now regarded as personal property and greatly restrict the rights of the individual *vis-à-vis* the social solidarity. In Henry George's words Socialism is "an attempt to carry conscious regulation and direction beyond the narrow sphere of social life in which it is necessary." It is not socialistic, but simply self-protection, to assert that the state has a right to interfere with any individual enterprise that is harmful to the community as a whole. But the individualist has no more right than the socialist to be a bigot. We already own the wisdom of entrusting certain services to the hands of the community; and we must leave it to the future to decide how far this principle may be justifiably extended.

Henry George (differing in this point from land nationalisers)* did not advocate universal state control. He did not believe that co-operation, working through government regulation, is the wisest way of managing the world. He believed that, in the main, individual effort is the best method of stimulating progress. So long as no injury is thereby done to the community, the more private enterprise the better. In its essence his scheme really means nothing more than a change in the basis of taxation. It is, in Colonel Wedgwood's phrase, the State Appropriation of Monopoly Rent. Taxation is unavoidable. The problem is to find the fairest, the most equable, and the most convenient form of taxation. This Henry George believed he had discovered in taxation in the shape of an equitable rent paid for the unearned increment in site-value. His doctrine might equally well be called a change in the basis on which we pay rates. In return for the State's permission to exploit a given piece of land, we should pay an annual rate for this among other state (and municipal) services.

* The adherents of the taxation of land values are too often confused with the land nationalisers, who wish "to treat the land as one great national estate, with large areas under one administration."

This principle does not involve any denial of the right of private property, for which, if correctly defined, Henry George had as sincere a respect as the most bigoted backwoodsman. It is a little difficult to give a definition of property (as, e.g., distinct from possession or occupation) that will please all parties, especially as regards the line between the individual and the community. Few, however, will deny that the original title to property arises from production or creation, from the result of human labour. Production, in this sense, includes everything, from the poet's ballad to his mistress's eyebrow down to the club made by the cave-man. The man who finds an object of human utility in a desert and brings it to a place where it will be of service is *pro hoc vice* a producer. His labour has produced a value in exchange which had hitherto been dormant. The property-right may pass through innumerable hands, by sale or gift or inheritance; but its inherent existence lies in the making. The George position is simply that land, or extension in space, was not created by man but preceded him and would continue unchanged if the human race were exterminated. The varying value of equal areas of space *quâ* space (the "site-value") does not depend on any individual man but arises from its relative situation; it is determined (other things being equal) by the nature of the community in which it lies. The community, therefore, is the rightful owner, inasmuch as it is the creator or producer of this value. During a long period of the world's history land was accordingly treated as common, joint, tribal, or communal property. The idea of the *absolute* ownership of land by individuals is one of comparatively late development and, indeed, is theoretically unknown to law. The legal fiction

in England still views the land as belonging to the Crown—that is, to the representative of the state or community.* The right of absolute private property in chattels and the denial of that right in land are not contradictory but correlative. Property in land is a mere juridical relation, not a physical fact like the holding of movable chattels. What law has made, law can unmake. The history of human slavery is a striking illustration of this; and the cases are closely analogous. In denying the right of private monopoly of site-value, there is no infringement of private property as such. The position is that site-value cannot be attributed to individual action.

It must, of course, be recognised that any increased value of site due to improvements by human labour can be rightfully claimed by the producer. This covers the house built on the land, the improved quality due to drainage and fertilisers, that part of the value of coal and other minerals due to the bringin[illegible] of them to the surface, and all manufactured articles. Th[illegible] below and behind them all, which would have no value bu[illegible] the population in general, cannot be justly treated as private property or private monopoly.

The objection that it is impossible to distinguish between prairie value and improvements has been effectually countered both in the writings of Henry George and other land-value taxers and by the common experience of us all.† Of course, some reasonable date must be fixed from which to calculate the value of improvements. It would (for example) be unreasonable to hark back to the Roman roads of England! The objection that the assessment of land values would involve a larger army of government officials seems fairly met by Henry George's explanation of the simplicity of his system in contrast to the present "immense and complicated network of governmental machinery."

Henry George's attitude towards capitalism is so fully stated in his works that there is no need to labour the point here. Capital is for him " the third factor of production," is " essentially labour raised to a higher power," and is " stored labour, necessary and important to civilised life." He would, doubtless, agree with many of the present-day strictures on the defects of the capitalistic system, but he would say that these are not

* *Tenancy-in-Fee* is the nearest approach to absolute ownership of land as recognised by English law.

† Sir Edgar Harper, long Chief Valuer of the Valuation Office (Board of Inland Revenue), may be named as one of the many expert valuers who agree to this.

inherent in the principle and are mainly due to the monopoly of land. Free access to land would checkmate most of them. Though interest and money-getting are perfectly legitimate, he would agree with Walther Rathenau that they should not have the first place in our minds. The transference of ground rents from a multiplicity of owners to one owner (the State) does not interfere with the relations of Capital and Labour, except in so far as it would tend to make them less one-sided. Henry George would, if I understand him aright, disapprove of the onerous burden of the present death duties, and certainly of a levy on capital as such.

The main stimulus of civilisation has been the desire of each individual to do the best he can for himself and his family. To abandon this principle and to fly to a purely socialistic gospel is surely to reverse the curve of progress instead of inclining it a little more to the right. The attractiveness of an exclusively altruistic principle may be allowed; but facts seem to show that we are still a long way from a moral standard that would make this possible. Moreover, the best good of the community depends in the last resort on the health, character, and competence of the individual. Such actual legislation as we have had from socialistic governments seems to bear, directly or indirectly, the brand of " class "; and surely the acceptance of this dichotomy is an abandonment of a higher ideal. The George view is that it is possible to improve matters without beginning all over again. Competition in itself is a sane and healthy function, and it is only its abuse that is undesirable. The next step should not be the substitution of socialism for competition, but the substitution of fair and unprivileged competition for the chaotic, privileged, and unfair brand we have at present.

The taxation of land values does not offend our sense of justice. This seems to demand that everyone should have an (at least relatively) fair start and that reward should be as far as possible commensurate with the value of service rendered to the community. The idea, held by some socialists, that remuneration should be equal for all seems benevolent rather than just. Equality is a chimera, and must remain so until every child is born with the same capacity as others. Our motto then is not " Equality " but " Equal Opportunity," so far as that is attainable. The prosperity of a country depends upon the distribution as well as the amount of its wealth; and the present disproportion between incomes and services insults

our sense of justice. Attempts to overcome this should not be hampered by privileged monopolies, of which the monopoly of site-value is the chief.

Another way in which taxation of land values appeals to our sense of justice crops up in our relation to posterity. Since we can neither increase nor decrease the size of the earth, and since future generations will be in the same case, it is obvious that the inhabitants of the earth at any one moment are merely tenants for life, entitled only to usufruct. If so, we are not justified in tying up any portion of the terrestrial surface by entail or otherwise. The compensation due to present land-owners, on the score of the tacit connivance of the community as a whole in the creation of the present situation, need not be extended to their unborn " heirs." There will be no injustice in taking measures to let all future members of the community inherit their property on equal terms. Babies must be relieved of their present function of adding to the wealth of the existing landlords. Brazil, in her treatment of slavery, compromised with abstract justice by decreeing that all children born after a certain date should be born free. There would be no injustice in decreeing that after (say) 1980 no little absolute landowners should be born in England's green and pleasant land. This does not mean that no land-*holders* should be born. Fixity of tenure, in all reasonable cases, is quite compatible with land-value taxation. The actual holder has merely to make over to the State the annual rental or ratable value of his holding. We agree with Arthur Young that secure tenure (our equivalent for " ownership ") turns waste land into a garden. The principle involved is merely an extension of the right of Eminent Domain.

The position of the taxer of land value is by no means a mere outcry of the poor, anxious to lay their hands on a share of the wealth of the rich; it rests on the belief that all will ultimately gain by the abolition of private monopoly of land. In the words of Henry George:

> When labour yields the largest result to the labourer, when the production of wealth is greatest and the distribution most equitable, when the man who has nothing but his labour is surest of making the most comfortable living and best provision for those whom nature has made dependent on him, then will be the best conditions of life for all—there will the general standard of intelligence and virtue be highest, and there will all that makes a nation truly great and strong and glorious most abound.

A frequent misconception in regard to land-value taxation is the idea that it is mainly concerned with " country " or agricultural land. As a matter of fact at least seventy-five per cent. of the land value of England is urban (London alone accounting for fifteen per cent.). The pages of *Progress and Poverty* in which Henry George tries to prove that the farmer will be one of the chief beneficiaries under his system are among the most important in the book. The gist of them is to show that he would be a gainer by the institution of an annual land value tax instead of the rates, interest on mortgages, and rent he now pays. It seems fairly clear that in modern conditions agricultural land cannot support the three classes of landlord, farmer, and agricultural labourer. Under George's scheme there would be practically only two classes: the farmer (including owners who farm their own land) and his employees. The site-value rental, paid to the community, would probably be less than that now paid to the landlord, not to speak of the relief from other burdens.

Henry George gives us also good reason to believe that the landlord need not suffer in the long run (see *Progress and Poverty*, Book IX, chapter iii, and compare the quotation given above). Indeed it might help the ideal " Squire " to regain some of the prestige he has lost of late. The important and beneficial side of the country gentleman owner may be freely recognised; and it is hoped that many of the best features of this may be quite compatible with the new arrangement for agricultural rent. Mere rent-receivers might suffer at first, but they have been receiving for generations what (*ex hypothesi*) they should not have received. So far as they have invested in improvements on land, in industry, or in trade, they will share the general advantages of the reform. Landlords will gain as producers, even if they lose as speculators. No landlord need be dispossessed of any of his holding provided he pays over the annual rental value to the State. This might interfere with the holding of land as a mere hobby. Then, as now, this would be one of the luxuries of wealth. But those who exploited their land economically would be as untrammelled as all other farmers. Minor owners of small homesteads, suburban gardens, and the like, would gain. The selling value of their lot would disappear, in the same ratio as all similar lots; but they would be losers only in the sense that " the man who has bought himself a pair of boots may be said to be a loser by a subsequent fall in the

price of boots. His boots will be just as useful to him, and the next pair of boots will cost him less." (*Progress and Poverty*, Book IX, chapter iii.)

Those who feel that the revival of British agriculture is a paramount necessity may rest assured that the taxation of land values, encouraging, as it does, free access to land, and discouraging the holding of unused land for a future rise in price, can be no other than helpful to all reasonable measures to attain this end. Unemployment begins in the village; and farmers, who cannot close down in bad times like the manufacturers, will achieve the security they need.

Planned society is not socialistic. There is nothing in land-taxation that militates against careful planning and desirable co-operation. In industry it aims at the smooth and correlative working of the two operative factors—Capital and Labour. Socialism is really a defeatist solution. It presupposes an eternal antinomy between two great divisions of mankind, which can be met only by a complete abandonment of any policy of conciliation. If the machinery of progress can be so improved that present handicaps and injustices are done away with, this should make a stronger appeal to common sense than a complete scrapping of the whole outfit.

As already noted, the single taxers of to-day are practically all free traders, so there is no need to doubt that these two doctrines are quite compatible. The relation of land value to protection is not so obvious, but perhaps the situation might be presented as follows: Under normal conditions free access to land would naturally be accompanied by free exchange of commodities produced by using the land. This might be agreed to as the ideal *in vacuo*. But we are not in a vacuum; we are living in a world in which protection is the creed of the great majority of white men. To the Protectionists in our own country it seems unfortunate for a nation to be practically the only important upholder of free trade in a world of protection. Be this as it may, the first nation that abolished land monopoly would not thereby be bound to adopt free trade. Land-value taxers might argue that free trade and the single tax together would make any kind of protection needless, but the position of the protectionist would still be analogous to that of the man who says: "I have insured against death, sickness, fire, and burglars; to make my position still more secure, I'll take out policies against earthquakes and the birth of twins." He might fairly

put protection ahead of free land, just as the single taxers put free land ahead of free trade. The protectionist might argue that in a bad storm it may for a time be more urgent to work the pumps than to keep the ship on its correct course. It may be significant that important steps involving the Henry George principle have been taken in protectionist States like the United States of America (Pittsburg Plan) and New Zealand. Recent land policy in Italy is, at least, not inconsistent with Henry George's doctrine.

Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour Members may all be invited to look carefully at the points in which they might find Henry Georgeism useful in the furtherance of the best features of their policies. The Liberals and Socialists have already shown that they do not object to the principle, though the latter do not seem to realise the essential individualism of the Georgean gospel. The Conservatives might remember with Tennyson that "He is the best Conservative who lops the mouldered branch away," and welcome a doctrine that would take the wind out of the sails of socialism and communism. More than one Conservative leader has made statements consistent with site-value taxation.

The recognition that land value taxation will produce greater prosperity in one's own country is not inconsistent with international policies, which might remain as widely divergent as they now are. The same remark applies to internal matters of non-political complexion, such as religion, education, the drink question, and so on. The only thing that really clashes with the taxation of land values is artificially or legally created privilege or monopoly. Mr. Bernard Shaw would retain the monopoly of his brains, Carnera the monopoly of his muscles. This is a natural, unavoidable, and unobjectionable monopoly. It would be a very different thing if Mr. Shaw were put in a position to levy a small tribute on all his fellow-authors, or Carnera on all his fellow-pugilists, though even that would be preferable to the unearned increment accruing to a *fainéant* site-owner who does nothing but continue to live. It would be more of the nature of a financial O.M., awarded by natural suffrage to superman ability.

JAMES F. MUIRHEAD.

WHO IS JOHN BULL?

IN the year 1712 appeared in London a pamphlet dealing in the satirical manner of the time with political events and personalities. It was followed at short intervals by four others. The first was entitled *Law is a Bottomless Pit, exemplified in the case of the Lord Strutt, John Bull, Nicholas Frog and Lewis Baboon.* The second followed, and was called *John Bull in his Senses*; the third *John Bull still in his Senses,* then an Appendix to this; and finally *Lewis Baboon turned honest and John Bull, Politician.* The pieces were repeatedly reprinted, and eventually were published together and entitled *The History of John Bull.* For a long time Swift was taken to be the author, and the surmise was plausible enough. In the previous November Swift's celebrated *Conduct of the Allies,* in which he had defended the foreign policy of the Tories, had appeared. Henry St. John (Bolingbroke) had to some extent acted as godfather at the birth of this pamphlet. For hours on end the two might have been seen walking up and down the long avenue at Windsor, sometimes extending these talks far into the night, and the *Conduct of the Allies* was the result, one of the most effective political Tracts of all time. And then, a few months later, when the *John Bull* pamphlets appeared, and developed the case against the war, the connection seemed obvious. They were included in Scott's edition of the works of Swift, but have been omitted by later editors. The authorship belongs to a Scotchman, John Arbuthnot, and to him and no other is due the honour of having given to the world the popular embodiment of the English national character in the person of John Bull.

In the *Journal to Stella* Swift writes of the pamphlet, "You must buy a small twopenny pamphlet called *Law is a Bottomless Pit.* It is very prettily written and there will be a second part." When the second part appeared Swift wrote, "It is better, I think, than the first." Then in May he says, "The appendix to the third part of *John Bull* was published yesterday, it is equal to the rest. I hope you read *John Bull.* Do you understand it all?" And in August again, "Have you seen the fourth part of *John Bull*? It is equal to the rest and extremely good." And again he writes, "It was a Scotch gentleman, a friend of mine, who wrote it, but they put it upon me." There is also the authority of Pope for Arbuthnot's

authorship. He is quoted in Spence's Anecdotes as saying, "Dr. Arbuthnot was the sole writer of *John Bull.*"

Although, however, Arbuthnot wrote *John Bull,* it is likely enough that Swift, his intimate friend, participated in the production. Swift's regard for Arbuthnot was such that he was able to write in the *Journal to Stella,* "If there were a further dozen Arbuthnots in the world I would burn *Gulliver's Travels.*" Arbuthnot used many of the arguments of Swift in *The Conduct of the Allies* and there seems proof that Swift exerted a certain intellectual influence, not to say more, on the *John Bull* treatises. But still more certain is another influence which worked on Arbuthnot, and that is the one we have already seen at work in *The Conduct of the Allies.* Arbuthnot as the Queen's physician was in close touch with ministerial circles. He belonged—as did Swift—to the Brothers Club which had been founded by Bolingbroke for the deepening of friendship and the furtherance of knowledge. This club came to a sudden end with the death of the Queen and the fall of the Tory Ministry, but the friendship between Arbuthnot and Bolingbroke survived it, and Arbuthnot remained faithful when Bolingbroke came home from his exile; and in the latter's illness remained constantly and steadfastly at his bedside. The cordiality of their relations is indeed amply demonstrated and it is clear that our writer had every opportunity of watching at close quarters Bolingbroke's striving for peace, and his importance in the achievement of it.

The purpose of this essay is to solve the question, "Who is John Bull?" Leslie Stephen in his article about Arbuthnot in the *Dictionary of National Biography* says that it does not appear to be known whether Arbuthnot invented the nickname or whether he had taken it over. Where, then, does it come from? Did the author, in fact, create it? Or did he have a well-known personality in his eye? In discussing the question we must turn to the pamphlets themselves, and keep in mind the general conditions of the times. Macaulay considered *The History of John Bull* without a doubt the most ingenious and witty satire in the English language. It is in some respects an imitation of Swift's *Tale of a Tub,* though inferior to it in style. Judged by its contents, however, the *History of John Bull* is far more important, for the very highest problems of world politics become the subject of the satirical narrative. The great impression which the publication made

is illustrated most forcibly by the fact that its hero became the classic personification of the English national character, and as such he has gone on up to this day.

The story is a partisan one. We find ourselves at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, in which England with her Allies had been victorious over Louis XIV and his grandson, Philip V of Spain. The Whigs had been at the helm throughout the greater part of the campaigns, and Marlborough had been their strong supporter. But part of the nation had grown weary of the war, and when the Tories took office in 1710 it was to be expected that peace negotiations would be opened. Their publicists, the pamphleteers, had argued that England's commercial interests had nothing further to gain and much to lose by a continuance of hostilities. What did it matter to England if a grandson of Louis XIV did sit on the Spanish throne?

This point of view found ready response from the English public, and it is in this spirit that Arbuthnot's story is written. Lord Strutt (who is Charles II of Spain) has died, and a quarrel over his rich estate ensues between John Bull, the clothier, and Nicholas Frog, the Linen Draper, on the one hand, and Lewis Baboon on the other. The Bulls and the Frogs have supplied the Lords Strutt with drapery ware from time immemorial. But now since Philip, the heir, has come into his estate, they find suddenly the custom withdrawn from them, and transferred to Lewis Baboon, grandson to the new Lord. They therefore begin a complicated and lengthy lawsuit (as much in their own interest as in that of Esquire South who claims a better right than Philip Baboon to the Strutt estate) which drags on for years and drains their resources. John Bull has sold or pawned most of his property, he has to borrow again and again to find money for the lawyers, witnesses, jurymen, gaolers, and other servants of the Law—and after ten years the end is still not in sight. Worst of all is Hocus, John Bull's crafty advocate, who by egging his clients on is chiefly responsible for the suit, from which he himself is drawing such rich spoils, not coming to an end. Still the result is brilliant. Decision after decision is made against Lord Strutt. John Bull is pleased. He has acquired such a taste for lawsuits, and has had so much experience of them, that he has decided to give up commerce altogether and become a lawyer himself. Thus does Arbuthnot tell the tale of the war in an intelligible, though disguised, form.

A key to the persons in the story appeared in 1712. They are, in addition to those already mentioned: Nicholas Frog, for Holland; Mrs. Bull, for the English Parliament or the Cabinet; Ned, the Chimney Sweep, for the Duke of Savoy; Tom, the Dustman, for King of Portugal; Signior Cavallo, for Duke of Shrewsbury; Sir Roger Bold, for Robert Harley (Lord Oxford); Don Diego, for Daniel Finch (Lord Nottingham); The Parson (or the Doctor), for Sacheverell; Signior Benenato, for Prince Eugene. Arbuthnot, using these pseudonyms, tells the story of the events leading up to the Peace of Utrecht, makes shrewd attacks on Marlborough and the Whigs and on the Allied Princes, to all of whom he gives very derogatory nicknames. In the figure of John Bull the author has drawn with a deft hand the English character and its genius for common sense. He is depicted as a man of simple nature, straight and honest, he likes to speak as he thinks, and takes other people to be as candid and upright as himself. If he is irritated he becomes violent. When he cannot get on with unmanageable menials he takes a thick cane and uses it with such effect that they scramble to get away and end by falling head over heels downstairs. There is no question with him of Higher Education, and he is well aware of this. He says he is simple, and that his heart is in the right place. Though he does not know Plato, Aristotle or Machiavelli, still he does not let himself be duped. He knows on which side his bread is buttered, and he has no time for high ideals or lengthy speeches. He cherishes his freedom. He tells Frog that so long as he carries his sword at his side and has cloth to sell he will bide no interference.

John Bull has not changed his attitude. He still appears in English comic papers as the stout, practical, prosaic figure whom Arbuthnot drew in 1712. He embodies the instinct of the English for the maintenance of their advantages, which he always remembers after every mistake. He incorporates a kind of sovereignty of healthy public opinion, or in other words, the nation itself as the highest judge over Ministers and Parliaments. The characters in the *History of John Bull* were used by the Whigs in a number of subsequent pamphlets, attempting to carry on the story after the signing of the Treaty. Their Whig bias, however, destroys their value as sequels, and

their connection with the original pamphlets is merely external and their appearance a testimony to the success of Arbuthnot.

Before we look for an explanation of the name "John Bull," let us glance at some of the other names employed. Nicholas Frog, a small amphibious creature, seems to refer to the Dutch terrain. Esquire South seems a reference to the southerly position of the Archduke's domains and perhaps, too, to his claims to Spain and Italy. Baboon is a corruption of Bourbon. Strutt is obviously a tilt at the national Spanish character as popularly conceived. Hocus for Marlborough needs no explanation, nor does the allusion to Sacheverell. Harley is, of course, given a good name, and the soubriquet for Nottingham was in use before Arbuthnot's publication. The Church of England is referred to as John Bull's mother, and Peg stands for Scotland with particular reference to its church (references to the latter confirm Arbuthnot's authorship, for his father was a Scotch divine).

There remains the title name: John Bull. How is it to be explained? In the *History of the White Staff* by Defoe (1714) Bolingbroke is referred to throughout as "Lord John Bull," and also in two other broadsides of the same year and in a pamphlet in his defence published in the form of a letter in the following year. In other broadsides Bolingbroke appears as Bull. In particular there is one entitled *Ox and Bull*, an obvious play on the names of Oxford and Bolingbroke. Bullingbroke (as it was spelt) was easily abbreviated into Bull in contemporary letters. It is certain that he was well known to his contemporaries as Bull, that in a number of broadsides he is John Bull, and that the *History of the White Staff* referred to was inspired by Harley (Oxford) who must have known the origin of the name.

Why did Arbuthnot make him his hero? Before we answer the question we must look at Bolingbroke's personal and family history. Henry St. John had become the dominant figure in the Commons. Friend and foe testify to the splendour of his rhetorical powers, the fame of which extended far into the eighteenth century. Peers were created in December 1711 to overcome a hostile majority in the Lords, and it might have been expected that he would be promoted. He had a special claim, it seemed, as by the death of a relative the Earldom of Bolingbroke had become extinct. Swift mentions this in his *Journal to Stella* at the time, saying that St. John would be Bolingbroke when the session was over but that he was still

needed in the Commons. There was a hitch, for the Queen did not appear anxious to give him higher rank than Viscount, and his name was not included in the batch, but was given the greater honour of special selection by itself, though St. John himself would have preferred to remain as he was rather than accept the lower rank. His elevation was announced on July 7th, 1712.

Now Arbuthnot's Tracts appeared in the middle of the session when St. John's intimate friends fully expected that he was about to be raised to the peerage as Lord Bolingbroke, and it is as Bullin(g)brook or Bullinbroke that he is referred to. It is not until after the actual creation is announced that Swift uses the more ordinary spelling. It may, then, be confidently assumed that the name was frequently mentioned by the friends, and with the English habit of drastic abbreviation of long proper names in colloquial speech it is not difficult to see how St. John Bullingbrook may have become John Bull. At any rate contemporaries, who knew the facts, could hardly have failed to recognise the play on the names. That they did so has already been shown. The *History of John Bull* is indeed a defence of Bolingbroke's policy. It is not that Arbuthnot is giving a portrait of Bolingbroke in the leading figure, nor is it that John Bull bore a physical resemblance to the famous Minister of State. On the contrary, the latter was a man of refinement and education who knew his Plato and his Machiavelli. What the author wishes to convey is that the genuine national policy might be symbolised by the name of Bolingbroke.

And yet another remark should not be omitted. Bolingbroke does not appear in the satire. Would it not be natural to expect to find his figure also under some sort of disguise amongst the circle of John Bull? Beside Marlborough, Oxford and Nottingham, the true author of the Peace of Utrecht might well claim a prominent place. This he did not obtain, however. In other words, the principal actor in the great historical scene, on which the satire is based, is not represented—or rather John Bull himself is Bolingbroke.

WOLFGANG MICHAEL.

[N.B.—The subject of this essay is here brought for the first time before English readers. It has been treated more fully by the author in the *Historische Zeitschrift* 100 (3rd. ser.: 4), and has now been translated into English and abridged by Leonard and Helen Hyman.]

AN AMERICAN COMMUNIST EXPERIMENT.

THE greatest of the nineteenth-century American experiments in Communism is moving rapidly to its end. In the great Shaker settlement of Mount Lebanon in New York only three "brethren" now remain. The great barns (the Shakers were always very proud of their barns) still stand, with some of the other buildings, the centre, not so very many years ago, of the quiet industrious life of a community of two thousand. But the two thousand have shrunk to three individuals only, the last of the Shakers. Very soon there will be no Shakers left.

They were by far the most successful among these communist settlement movements. At one time there were no less than fifty-seven Shaker communes scattered over the Eastern United States: and their total membership exceeded 5,000. None of the other communities was ever anything like so numerous: and the Shakers have survived nearly all. The French Icarian colony broke up in anarchy years ago. The Perfectionists of Oneida were forced by their indignant neighbours to abandon their "peculiar institutions," a rather repulsive form of promiscuity: and Oneida for more than a generation now has been an ordinary American manufacturing town. The Rappists, a German form of Shaker, and like them celibate, were never so numerous: and they, too, have now dwindled away. The smaller colonies have shared the same fate: and Bethel and Aurora, Ebenezer and Amana are nothing now but names known only in this connection to the student of these curious movements.

The marvel is that the Shakers should have endured so long. It is nearly 160 years since "Mother" Ann, the Lancashire blacksmith's daughter who founded the community, landed in America with her six followers. He would have been a bold prophet then who had asserted that 160 years later spiritual descendants of these rather forlorn adventurers would still be discoverable in the land of their adoption. Even now it is not easy to explain their survival. Always celibate, the Shakers had no means of recruiting their numbers from their community: there were no "birth right" Shakers. The foundlings whom, with admirable benevolence, they brought up and educated rarely remained with them: the tramps, to whom

their cool philanthropy gave shelter in the hard Kentucky winter, never. "They come with empty bellies and trunks," the Shaker elder told Nordholdt, the historian of the movement in the eighties, "and go away again with both full when the roses begin to bloom." Even the slaves whom they freed and treated absolutely as their equals—"brethren in the Lord"—did not all remain. The Shakers were therefore dependent from the first upon the outside world for the maintenance of their numbers: yet after the death of Ann they seem rarely to have attempted to proselytise on any great scale themselves: and it is a little hard to see what could have induced the ordinary man to join this strange austere sect. To any man of education the barren emptiness of life in a Shaker settlement, without books, without pictures, without music (unless hymn singing be so accounted) and without amusement (other than that which the petty incidents of simple village life may afford) must have been at all times intolerable. The rigid Shaker morality can never have been the lure to the mere libertine and profligate which the Perfectionist system was. One would have supposed that the stern discipline and industry of a Shaker settlement would have frightened away the simple idler.

Not that the Shaker overworked. Their experiment is an interesting confutation of the old notion that mere human laziness must be a formidable difficulty in a communist society. It is not so. The Shaker difficulty was to prevent their members working too hard and upsetting the balance of the elaborately organised division of work. The lesson may become valuable to a world dreaming of organising world production on the same principle of dividing and restricting labour. The Shakers' hired men (they were admirable employers) worked, on the Shakers' own admission, far harder than they did: and even the poor tramps refused aggrievedly to sit quite idle among their busy hosts, and insisted on doing something themselves for their living.

The Shaker numbers seem actually to have been maintained and swelled by the waves of religious revival which swept Kentucky and other parts of America in the beginning and middle of the nineteenth century. Large numbers of these enthusiasts drifted at one time or another into the colonies. Yet to the real fanatic zealous for some point of doctrine the cool air of Shakerdom can hardly have been congenial. For the Shakers, intensely practical and exaggeratedly contemptuous of all theory in mun-

dane affairs do not seem ever to have cared much about even religious doctrine, intensely religious as they were in spirit and temper. Nobody now probably knows, and few have any reason to desire to know, what "Mother" Ann's theological doctrines were. They seem to have been a jumble of disconnected extravagant speculations, nor is there much evidence that the Shakers themselves paid much attention to them. Perhaps her curious speculation on the bi-sexuality of the Deity may have influenced them to accept the principle of the absolute equality of the sexes. But it seems more probable that Ann, a champion of women's rights before the time, invented the doctrine to strengthen the principle. The principle at any rate survived, rigidly observed. The celibate sect which scorned sternly all fashion and ornament, which rejected utterly courtship and marriage and the romance which attaches to them and refused uncompromisingly to make any sort of concession to the refinements and conventions which are supposed to constitute so large a part of a civilised woman's life was always strongly under feminine influence. A woman founded it. After her death a man held sway for a short time: but then another nameless woman arose and ruled, "a leading character," another "Mother" in this curious Israel for many long years. In all the colonies there were "eldresses" by the side of "elders" among the "leading characters"; and very often the "eldress" was the more leading character of the two.

"Mother" Ann was evidently one of those characters whose personality while they yet live is much more impressive and much more attractive than the records of it at all suggest. The records (based doubtless on hostile evidence) present simply a typical eighteenth-century fanatic of the type which arose at intervals all over Europe in protest against the dull lifeless conventionality of the orthodox religion of the period. Yet she must have been a vigorous character to have borne up so undauntedly against the sea of her troubles: and she must have had some degree of attractiveness to command and retain the allegiance of her little band of followers amid every kind of discouragement. The most remarkable fact about her is that she should have founded the Shakers. Religious sects have a tendency to move sometimes rapidly and sometimes very completely away from the tenets of their founders. But the Shakers are an extreme example of this process. The founder of the celibate

sect was a married woman with four children. The high priestess of quietism was herself a most noisy person. When she was in prison in Manchester she addressed the perplexed divines who sought to interrogate her (according to her own account) in seventy-two distinct languages. It was after this exploit that Ann assumed, with surely extravagant modesty, the title of "Ann: The Word." The characteristics of the later Shakers were a cool toleration, a certain shrewd common sense and a faint homely humour. The qualities most conspicuously absent from the traditional portrait of Ann are tolerance, humour and common sense. In quietness and sitting still was the Shakers' strength all the days of their prosperity. But Ann's life was a perpetual flight before the face of her enemies. Harried out of Manchester, she emigrated to America only to be promptly imprisoned by the suspicious young American Republic with all her elders and "eldresses." The Republic let them go after a few months, convinced apparently that they were merely harmless lunatics. But they escaped from official tormentors only to fall into the more ruthless hands of the unofficial persecutors. The rough colonists of Massachusetts and Connecticut manhandled the unfortunate sectaries most brutally: and these sufferings may possibly have served to shorten "Mother" Ann's stormy life: for she was only forty-eight when she died at Watervliet, a year before the founding of the great Mount Lebanon colony.

It is curious to compare her fate with that of Noyes, the leader of the Oneida Perfectionists. No one can read even a summary of Noyes's life without realising that he was a most remarkable man, of tremendous force of character, wide culture, deep insight and a constructive ability which, less erratically applied, would have made him one of the most distinguished men of his day. Yet the brilliant man, before the end of his very long life, saw the eccentric enterprise on which he had lavished in vain all his splendid talents, wither and disappear before his eyes. And the grossly ignorant, childishly superstitious, rather coarse woman, dying before she was fifty, left behind a movement so powerful that it is only now, 150 years afterwards, finally vanishing from the earth.

To "Mother" Ann's courage, faith and indomitable perseverance the Shakers undoubtedly owed their establishment as a community. Whether they really owed much else is doubtful. It seems clear that many of the most fundamental characteris-

tics of the sect were the product, at any rate to a large extent, of their surroundings and circumstances. Thus the practice of Confession of Sins, rigidly insisted upon among them, must have been in origin religious. But to an administration like that of the Shakers which rested on the theory that the elder knew what every one of the brethren was doing at any moment of the day, confession was extraordinarily useful. It was so useful that it was almost indispensable. If it had not been ordained, it would have had to have been invented. Shaker Communism again, while doubtless based theoretically upon a strict interpretation of the famous passage in the Acts, was in practice a growth of their circumstances. Ann and her companions were financed in their voyage to America by a wealthy supporter of Ann's. But a Shaker community, granting its accepted way of life, could not be other than communist. Of what use was money to a Shaker woman, forbidden to adorn either her person or the bare little room which she shared with others? What could the Shaker man do with it, seeing that his simple wants were all supplied already and he was not allowed to have others? It is true that in their middle period the Shakers grew very rich: but this, whatever the cynics may say, was largely the accident of their qualities. Honesty, efficiency, industry and an economy in production with which no individual could hope to compete will, in reasonably favourable circumstances, result inevitably in an accumulation of wealth. But there is no evidence that money making was ever their object.

There was nothing miraculous nor particularly meritorious about their finance. It was very simple. Anything resembling speculation was forbidden: apart from this the elder or eldress who ruled the colony at the time could do much as they liked with its money: subject to a casual yearly audit. That it was so casual is a proof of how little the orderly people concerned themselves about the matter at all: but indeed there can have been little to audit. The accounts were simplicity itself: and an account does not cease to be simple because the items in it may be large. The system seems to be an invitation to fraud: and there were a few cases of defalcations in Shaker colonies, as there were a very few cases of sexual misconduct: but they were promptly discovered and the culprits expelled. In the conditions of nineteenth-century America, the simple, even then rather old-fashioned, Shaker financial methods worked well

enough: but the moment they came in conflict with modern mass production with its scientific costing and elaborately organised selling end, the unequal conquest was never in doubt. Union, the last colony sent out from Mount Lebanon, collapsed at once. It went bankrupt.

The gospel of celibacy seems to have been practised by "Mother" Ann originally as a result of her own private matrimonial sorrows. The fragments of her violent, rather coarse tirades on this delicate subject suggest faintly the more outrageous explosions of the extreme wing of the militant suffragists at the height of the sex war. The tyranny of man, the victimisation of poor women, the horrors of childbirth, described with the lurid eloquence with which preachers before and after her time portrayed the torments of hell, were the constant theme of these outbursts. Reading them one ceases to wonder that her husband (whose very name is doubtful, though it was probably Stanley) deserted her. Constantly repeated, such exhibitions would be dispiriting: and Ann was nothing if not persistent. But the Shakers, in this as in other directions, were far removed from the doctrine of their founder. They did not hold marriage wrong: they merely said coolly that celibacy was the better way. They did not say that it was easy: and the extraordinary precautions they took to maintain it in their colonies showed that they realised the difficulties. In some colonies men and women were forbidden to pass each other on the stairs: in some they had separate entrances: in some they were forbidden even to speak to each other without the elder's express authority. In all they ate at different tables, sat on opposite sides in the meeting house, and had, of course, different quarters. One of the main arguments advanced by the Shakers for celibacy was that it was healthy. They were slightly morbid on the subject of health, and were always doctoring each other in their "nurse shops." Ann herself had been something of a faith healer in her day. They said further that communism was impossible without celibacy. In this they were quite wrong. Large communes have existed and flourished for long periods which were certainly not celibate. But they were right in thinking that the sex problem is one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest of all, problems in the way of a communal life. Their own answer was successful so far as it went: but their success was a kind of failure and their victory an admission of defeat. A celibate society which has no automatic means of recruiting

its numbers from without is obviously foredoomed to extinction: and the ultimate fate of the Shakers merely proves the obvious.

In their withdrawal from the world, the Shakers never showed the morose secretiveness of some of these sectaries. Some of the smaller colonies withdrew so very completely that it was difficult to find out anything at all about them. But though the Shakers were not propagandists and writers to the Press like the Perfectionists and even at times the Icarians, they were always perfectly ready to give an account of themselves and their systems. They did not visit, except rarely and among themselves: but visitors from the outside world who came to them were received with grave hospitality and simple courtesy. They did not go into the highways and hedges relieving distress: but the distressed who came to their doors were relieved with a generous and quite uncalculating benevolence. But it was their trade which brought them most constantly and most intimately into touch with the outside world. It is a mistake to think of them only as farmers and gardeners, though they were famous in both these capacities. From the first many of their communes were diligent and successful manufacturers. They made mangles wholesale: some of them were skilled in leather work. Some, with rather unexpected enterprise, struck out a new line in making hoops for molasses barrels: and the three survivors are still making a particular kind of basket for which their forerunners were noted. The Shakers' goods were always excellent: they were true and just in all their dealings. The accusations against them seem either untrue or founded in ignorance. They were accused of land grabbing: but Nordholdt, who investigated this charge, came to the conclusion that in their palmiest days the Shakers occupied no more land than was reasonable, having regard to their numbers and the vast amount of land available in nineteenth-century America. They were disliked because they bought wholesale from New York instead of retail in the neighbouring villages: but a modern economist will smile or frown according to his temperament at this accusation. Their real offence was that they were peculiar: and ordinary people dislike peculiar people, especially when they suspect them to be in certain respects decisively their superiors.

The parallel with mediæval monasticism suggests itself at once: and the two movements really had a good deal in common. The Shaker virtues were the sort of virtues associated with the better type of monastic order: simple honesty and industry, an

austere purity of life, a real, if rather limited, benevolence, and an intense and quite sincere religious feeling. What seem to the outside world their defects were also the sort of defect commonly imputed to the poorer types of friar and monk. In their hatred of the pomps and vanities of this wicked world the Shakers never indeed imitated the deliberate slovenliness and filth of the begging friars. Like all these American communists they were most scrupulously clean. But it was rather a repellent, workhouse cleanliness. It seemed as if their distrust of Art had betrayed them into a positive dislike for the beauty which inspires Art: for they did not like flowers: and as if their contempt for Science had led them to despise the very truth which is the aim of Science: for they tolerated no learning but the most purely utilitarian at one end of the scale and a narrowly prescribed circle of religious illumination at the other. It might have been supposed that if books were taboo, the observation of Nature might at least have been permitted. But these zealots for order were deaf and blind to the miraculous order which determines with so gentle and yet so absolute a precision the growth of the giant tree in the forest, and the flight of the bird above its topmost branches and the slightest movement of the smallest insect creeping in the fallen leaves about its bole. The Shaker cared for none of these things.

There is another more fundamental parallel between the Shaker colony and the monastery. Both were "escapes"—the latter from the brutal anarchy of the Middle Ages, the former from the scarcely less brutal organisation of early industrialism. A silly attempt has been made lately to represent the sufferings of the poorer class of labourer and peasant in the nineteenth century as the fantasy of literary sentimentalists. The historical records are, of course, quite decisive on the fact. In the grossness of their ignorance, in the extraordinary limitation of their outlook and interests, in the miserable squalor of their conditions and in the dull apathy with which they pursued the dreary round of their unending toil there was not a great deal to choose between the "hands" in factory and field and the "cretins" and pathological cases who, then as now, composed the absolute sediment of society. It was to these "hands" that the Shaker colony offered itself as a City of Refuge. It offered them food, rough indeed, but no rougher than that to which they were accustomed, and far more plentiful. It offered them housing, again rough, but a palace compared with the

town slums and the country hovels which were their only alternative. It required of them work indeed, but so admirably organised, so lightened by ingenious labour-saving devices, that it was "a playing holiday" by comparison with the old grim round of their task work. Most tempting perhaps of all, it offered them a secure, honourable, and (by their standard) comfortable old age in exchange for the squalid horrors of the aged paupers' end. The price demanded for these things, high as it seems to us, was not high to the landless peasant or the illiterate factory hand of the nineteenth century. Why should he lament the loss of the books which he could not read, the pictures which he would never see, or the liberty which in his old life was simply the liberty to exist in squalor on the edge of starvation? The demand for celibacy was no doubt more acutely felt: but it was balanced by the religious consolations offered—very real consolations to the simple, ardent minds of the converts.

But now all is changed. The vast class from which the Shakers drew their recruits has almost ceased to exist. To the sophisticated class which has replaced them, what used to be the attractions of Shakerdom have become almost themselves deterrents. Popular education, the cheap newspaper, the cinema, the public library and cheap travel facilities have done their work. The modern workman, even the modern agricultural labourer, would no more think of joining a Shaker colony than he would think of going voluntarily to prison. The City of Refuge has become uninviting at the same time that the evil from which it provided sanctuary are ceasing to exist. The enormous change in the conditions of the labouring classes in the last thirty or forty years has produced many results, not all of them immediately visible. Among them, insignificant perhaps, but not quite uninteresting, is the doom of Shakerdom

STUART HODGSON.

HANNAH MORE: 1745-1833.

IN the childhood of the writer there was a very pleasant Old Georgian dining-room in a house in an English county-town. It looked out into a walled, green garden, and was furnished with old mahogany; the mantelpiece was decorated with Nankeen vases, and in the centre was a little statuette of an ancient lady clad in a flowing gown and close-fitting frilled cap, ensconced in an upright armchair. This effigy, one was told, represented Mrs. Hannah More, and a difficulty was presented to the mind by the dignified prefix before the name of this excellent lady, who, it appeared, had done nothing to deserve it!

Mature views of life have revealed the fact that there was much else existent in the society of the little town which stood for Mrs. Hannah More's posthumous presence in it. It was another *Cranford,* where traditions of past generations lingered, overlaying, rather than annihilating, one another. You had only to scratch the surface a little, and you were back in the world of Queen Anne! But *on* the surface the monumental institutions, among which the life of two younger generations eddied, were those of the period just after the Napoleonic Wars. Our *Cranford,* like Mrs. Gaskell's, was the home of many old maiden ladies of the middle class, the lives of some of whom were ruled by a strict etiquette of manners and by equally austere canons of moral and religious obligation. These, it seems to me, were the outcome of the system of adolescent training formulated by Hannah More, who presided on more than one mantelpiece, and whose influence on the education of Englishwomen was greater than is generally recollected.

She herself belonged to a much earlier age, and her long life was a bridge that spanned a whole flood of rapid development in English life and thought. She was born in the year of the last Jacobite rising; the nurse of her childhood had cared for Dryden in his last illness; two of her great-great-uncles had been captains in Cromwell's army: and she died in the year* after the passing of the Reform Bill, having enjoyed the friendship of the abolitionists of West Indian slavery and having been herself a pioneer in the education of the poor, and a reformer of the education of well-to-do middle-class girls, as well as the real protagonist, though quite unconsciously, in the

* September 1833.

movement towards the liberation of women from the tradition that restricted their activities to the household.

Her strong strain of austerity was hereditary; for her father belonged to a Presbyterian family in one of the eastern counties, though he himself was a High Churchman of Atterbury's type and his daughter always held a little aloof from "dissenters." The father was the master of the Free School at Fishponds, near Bristol, and his wife was the daughter of a farmer of that neighbourhood. Hannah was the fourth of five sisters, who were all talented girls and all had what was considered a good education; but Hannah far outshone the others, learning not only French from a Frenchman but also Latin and mathematics from her father. In 1757 the eldest sister, aged not quite twenty-one, opened a "ladies' school" in Bristol, in which she was subsequently joined by all the others; Bristol, which at that time commanded a great part of the West Indian trade, was a very prosperous city, and the school was soon flourishing.

Even before she had a share in it, Hannah had begun to write —chiefly verse. She was an ardent reader of poetry; the contemporary output of verse was of that school of English poetry which historians of literature described as *frigid,* and Mark Akenside was her favourite poet; but Pope's works constituted her school of poetic virtue, and later she read Cowper with pleasure, his metre conforming largely to the "Augustan" tradition. Dr. Johnson was her great master in methodical reasoning and prose style.

She seems to have been an attractive girl; Opie's portrait of her shows her large expressive eyes and lively air, and she had a vivacious mind, which was probably the source of her social power. At any rate she "received attentions" from a landed gentleman of the neighbourhood of Bristol, a Mr. Turner, and was engaged to him for six years; but he was at heart a confirmed bachelor (unless it was Hannah's Latin and mathematics that proved in the end an insuperable barrier to marriage) and finally the engagement was broken off. With much difficulty he persuaded her to accept a sum of money which made her independent. Hannah was now determined that she would never marry; but she seems to have resolved to enjoy life in her own way. She was a lady of means at the age of twenty-eight, and in the same year published her first dramatic verse, a pastoral drama entitled *The Search after*

Happiness; and in the next year, 1774, she went to London accompanied by one of her sisters. There she wrote a verse tragedy, *Regulus*; and through the medium of her work made the acquaintance of Garrick and his wife, who introduced her to a very congenial circle of acquaintances.

Garrick was still in touch with his old tutor, Dr. Johnson, and it was the friendship of Dr. Johnson that was the summit of Hannah More's earthly bliss. She knew, also, Edmund Burke, Sir Joshua Reynolds and Horace Walpole, and was admitted to the coterie of literary ladies who formed the Blue-stocking Club; but it was Dr. Johnson's attentions to the prodigious young lady that nearly turned her head. She wrote two other tragedies, and then made an attempt to popularise sacred drama in *Moses in the Bulrushes*. This proved a failure and Miss More ceased to write plays, and, after Garrick's death in 1779, renounced all theatre-going.

The "sacred drama" seems to have been the first indication of a religious development in her views of life; and, when Garrick's magnetic influence was gone, an austerity derived from her Puritan ancestry came into its own. She held fast to Mrs. Garrick's friendship, but made new and ambitious friendships—three with bishops—in the sphere into which her new impulse was urging her. The climax of what one may call her conversion was reached, however, through the influence of a man who had no social distinction—except his intimacy with Cowper—Newton of Olney, the representative of the early "Evangelical revival" within the Church of England. There was, of course, a strongly emotional side to this movement; but there is no evidence that Hannah More underwent any emotional experience; what is obvious is that she accepted the doctrine and discipline of the Evangelical school of thought as a rule of life. She was soon admitted to the society of the "Clapham Sect," and became intimate with the Wilberforces and Macaulays; but she did not live among them, for she had by this time resolved to settle in Somerset, and had built herself a cottage near Blagdon, on the outlying slopes of the Mendips. She called it by the pleasant name of Cowslip Green, and here she lived with her sister, Patty, and her Clapham friends visited her.

It was Mr. Wilberforce who suggested to the Misses More the enterprise which became the absorbing practical work of their life. It was nothing less than the attempt to civilise

the conditions of the labouring population of Cheddar and the neighbouring villages by means of the establishment of Sunday Schools. The Sunday School was then, within the Church of England, a quite novel method of philanthropy, and, as organised by the Misses More, only the nucleus of much other educative work among the neglected, half-barbarous country-people. Its initiation and supervision were very hard work for two middle-aged women, whose health was not very good; and it involved a great deal of contention with boorish squires and their families, and painful controversy with neighbouring clergy who suspected that Miss More was trying to introduce "dissent" in an insidious fashion.

It was in connection with the Sunday School work that Hannah began to write her Village Tracts and Tales. The latter, which are terribly moral little narratives of cottagers, strike one as altogether artificial; but they may, perhaps, have suggested to labouring folk that they were capable of a hitherto undreamt-of range of life. The Tracts were written in a purely didactic strain and in Johnsonian periods. Anyhow, the voluminous sale of these writings proves to us that they met some need of the time. And no one could grudge to Hannah More the pecuniary success that made it possible for her to move to a larger house, called Barley Wood (near Wrington), where all her sisters lived with her in repose and comfort. There they entertained the various members of the "Clapham Sect," including young Tom Macaulay, who was Mrs. Hannah More's pet, much as she had been Dr. Johnson's. That fact illustrates the fashion in which her life bridged the transitional period between two ages; for Macaulay was representative of the age ushered in by the French Revolution, an age of war between political ideals and of clamorous controversy about the fundamental things of life; while his old friend had been born too early to be accessible to the changes in the atmosphere of thought, and looked with abhorrence on the new spirit of revolt and doubt.

Notwithstanding, she was anxious for reform in one direction, that of girls' education, a subject on which she was qualified to speak. She expressed her views in a serious volume entitled *Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education,* and, again, in her curious novel, half didactic and half satirical, which was written in 1809 and has the merit of reflecting very clearly some phases of the English society of the era

of the Napoleonic Wars, when her mind was still extremely alert. Probably her true sphere in literature was satire; and *Coelebs in Search of a Wife* has a considerable degree of living interest. The book purports to be the autobiography of a young, a very young and very ingenuous, gentleman of the name of Charles; who, after the death of his parents, sets out on a tour among the houses of their acquaintance, the unavowed object of which is to find a wife. Charles has been bred up by his father's injunctions concerning matrimony, aided by his mother's pithy comments on her own sex, to require a paragon; and in the end he finds her, and her name is Lucilla.

The war meets us on the threshold of the adventure, and anticipates us when we pass from London to the country. During our own Great War it became habitual to us to conclude that, because we meet with few allusions to them in contemporary fiction, the Napoleonic Wars engrossed the public mind very little. But Hannah More's writings give a different impression. Not only were her plans for her Sunday School enterprise, described in a letter of 1792, crossed by the reflection: "If I live and have health and money, and the French do not come," but her novel leaves us with the feeling that, seventeen years later, the European situation had become only more engrossing to her and her neighbours. We could fancy that it was a "morning paper" of 1918 that Charles' host "explored," if it were not for the clear proof that our young gentleman had never heard of a *ration-card*:

> To a speculative stranger a London day presents every variety of circumstance in every conceivable shape of which human life is susceptible. When you trace the solicitude of the morning countenance, the anxious exploring of the morning paper, the eager interrogation of the morning guest; when you hear the dismal enumeration of losses by land, and perils by sea, taxes trebling, dangers multiplying, commerce annihilating, war protracted; invasion threatening, destruction impending; your mind catches and communicates the terror, and you feel yourself "falling with a falling state."
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> But when, in the course of the very same day, you meet these gloomy prognosticators at the sumptuous, not "dinner," but hecatomb, at the gorgeous fête, the splendid spectacle; when you hear the frivolous discourse, witness the luxurious dissipation, contemplate the boundless indulgence, and observe the ruinous gaming; you would be ready to exclaim, "Am I not supping in the Antipodes of that land in which I breakfasted?"

> If you observed the overflowing subscriptions raised, the innumerable societies formed . . . the palace-like structures erected; and all this to alleviate, to cure and even to prevent every calamity which the indigent can suffer, or the affluent conceive . . . would you not exclaim with Hamlet, " What a piece of work is man !"

In the country, among the acquaintance of Lucilla's family, we encounter a Squire of the John Bull breed, boisterous, unpolished, and lacking in high sentiment, but actuated by a plain, practical motive of patriotism, in virtue of which he declines to indulge his daughter with the Season in Town, insisting that while taxes are so high the welfare of his farms and his tenantry demands that he shall keep his private expenses down.

There is one touch in which we can still perceive the underlying poignancy : Lucilla's father relates of certain ladies whose conduct he holds up as a warning against the instability of the ill-trained feminine mind, that he had actually heard them interrupt (with muttered requests to each other for scissors and thread) the reading of the first news of the battle of Trafalgar, and Nelson's death.

It is Lucilla's father and mother who are the principal characters of the book. They are the pattern Gentleman and Lady because they have educated their daughters aright. Hannah More had a very lucid idea of what should be the exact object and scope of every young lady's education, and brought a surprising—if uneven—amount of psychological insight to bear on them, in elaborating her system. The sole object of education was the development of Christian character. But there was some recognition of utilitarian values in the assumption that its secondary purpose was the production of such a type of Christian character as would fit a young person to fill adequately an appropriate sphere of life. Miss More thus shows the influence of John Locke's principles, which held the field in English education till the theories of Kant and Pestalozzi began to make themselves felt. A young lady was to be educated to become an excellent wife, mother, mistress of the household, and lady bountiful. For this vocation certain attainments were necessary : a knowledge of Christian doctrine in the special form advocated by our authoress, which was more philosophical than evangelical doctrine as we know it ; a sound understanding of other people's dispositions ; a knowledge of household management ; the acquirement of elegant manners and deportment (including the art of dressing) ; and the cultivation of the habit of employing time to advantage.

But beyond all this, and of far more importance, was the development and discipline of the native powers of the child, especially from what we should call the psychological point of view. Of course the exemplary parent spoke far too many words of exhortation, out of season, and the child was taught to practise a too perpetual and minute self-analysis ; but there was something to be said for a method that inhibited self-satisfaction. Moreover, Hannah More had a firm grasp of two important principles of education ; she realised the part played by indirect influence in the formation of character, not the influence only of daily habits and example, but of moral assumptions implied in the stimulus of certain rewards and punishments ; and again she insisted that mental development was as essential to the development of character as moral training.

The general prejudice of the time against the thorough intellectual development of women is illustrated by the apology offered by Lucilla's father for having taught Latin to this one daughter, in recognition of her unusual ability. But for all, reading was to be constant and varied though not voluminous. *Non multa sed multum legere.* She did not altogether underrate the need for amusement ; but that also was to be subject to discipline and was much restricted in quality. All theatres, private theatricals, dancing and cards were to be eschewed, as definitely wrong ; and music and painting, which were regarded more as pastimes than study, were not to absorb much time. Children and young ladies were to have plenty of outdoor occupations ; they are pictured as having access to spacious gardens and meadows and country lanes. They were to ride in the lanes, to study the form of the flowers in the fields, and tend those growing in the garden. Their walks and rides were, also, to be guided by an altruistic aim ; they were to make friends with the cottagers who were their fathers' dependants, and especially with the children in the village school, whom, as they grew older, they were to help to instruct. In the garden they were to entertain their grown-up relations and friends at occasional *al fresco* " feasts," which were to be entirely their own affair, affording a pleasant surprise to their guests. Thus to some extent they were allowed initiative ; but on the whole

Hannah More's system lacked an outlet for spontaneous mental energy, particularly of the imaginative kind.

Notwithstanding, she had generated a force which was to revolutionise the lives of Englishwomen, and their opportunities. For when she died at Clifton in September 1833 her influence on the education of girls of the leisured classes had become immense, and she had not only exalted the function of household administration and the care of children to the level of a vocation, if not of a fine art, but had popularised philanthropy as a distinct calling; she had instilled into the mind of a weighty section of English society the idea that no character can be formed, nor work achieved, without systematic thinking. She was thus the forerunner of Ruskin, of Miss Octavia Hill, of Miss A. J. Clough and Miss Emily Davies.

And she did all her own work in an atmosphere of national unrest and apprehension; for she had that rare power, detachment of mind. It was another philosophically-minded lady whose attitude to the world of circumstance inspired the Elizabethan poet, Samuel Daniel, with his panegyric* on "the concord of the well-tun'd mind," in which he immortalised her as

> "Knowing the heart of man is set to be
> The centre of the world . . .
> . . . . .
> And that, unless above himself he can
> Erect himself, how poor a thing is man!"

Hannah More would have frowned on the poet's management of his rhymed couplets; but she, too, not merely endorsed his doctrine, but embodied it.

M. C. MALIM.

* *To the Lady Margaret, Countess of Cumberland.*

JAPANESE EDUCATION.

THE modern system of education in Japan is of mushroom growth and amazing efficiency. In less than fifty years the Japanese have created a complete machinery for educating the ever-increasing millions of boys and girls between the ages of six to twelve and twelve to seventeen. The outward shell of this system consists of lofty stone buildings, earthquake-proof and fire-proof, simple in design but æsthetically satisfying. The form rooms are light and airy, with numerous large windows, while much care is given to the grounds in which the buildings stand, and to the roof-gardens and roof-playgrounds which are universal in congested areas. These schools are equipped with up-to-date Western appliances on a generous scale.

Elementary education lasts from five or six years of age up to twelve years. It is free, compulsory and co-educational. In their thirteenth year all pupils must enter for a State examination, and only if they pass this are they allowed to attend the schools which correspond to our Secondary Schools. Middle Schools for boys and High Schools for girls provide a five-year course of study, covering the years twelve to seventeen. Attendance at these schools is not compulsory. On the contrary a fee of two hundred yen per annum, equivalent to about twenty pounds at normal exchange rates, must be paid by all pupils. There are no exhibitions or scholarships of any sort, and means must be found privately for meeting the expenses of these years. Even in the Elementary Schools pupils must buy their own text-books, but the cost of them is kept very low, for they are all published by the State Publishing Department both attractively and cheaply.

The efforts made to find the money for education are heroic. Parents consider no sacrifice too great if thereby they can obtain the means to send their children to the Secondary Schools. The whole family club together to help: grandparents, uncles, aunts and older brothers and sisters, while some of the boys and girls earn what they can by working in their spare hours. The Japanese value education above everything. They believe that only by giving all their young people the best education that they can devise for them can Japan expect to fulfil her enormously high ambitions and purposes.

And what is this education which they value so highly? First and foremost it is practical, based on the following principle. They regard a young child as a stranger in this world who needs introductions to his physical and human surroundings, and to the resources at his disposal for making the best of his life. The subjects taught in the schools are chosen to effect these introductions. To enable a child to find his place among his fellows, a mastery of spoken and written language is considered to be of first importance. Thus, much of the first three years at school is spent in learning to read and write Japanese, both in the ancient and very difficult ideographic form, and in the newer simplified script, which is suited to the introduction of foreign words and ideas. During the next three years, which are for many the closing period of school education, children are introduced to their own country and empire, first through geography, literature and history lessons, and then by frequent and extensive school journeys. Importance is also attached to the study of science and Western mathematics. It was strange to come upon a boy working equations from Godfrey and Siddons' Algebra, while he was acting as gate-keeper to a sacred enclosure in the centre of Japan.

In the last year at the Elementary School a start is made with English. Only by trying to learn Japanese can one begin to realise how difficult children of the Orient must find a European language. They have clever, attractive text-books. A boy studying English in a tram was learning Lesson X: *The English Policeman.* The page was headed with a well-drawn and coloured illustration of a London street, and a policeman directing the traffic. Underneath were given the items of his clothing and equipment, and an imaginary conversation. In ten minutes or so the boy shut his book and wrote the page from memory. The Japanese have tremendous power of work and excellent memories. A cabin steward on a Pacific liner displayed these gifts to a high degree in a few English lessons given to him.

Musical appreciation and singing are taught in both Elementary and Secondary Schools, but of Western not Japanese music. So attractive has this teaching proved that some of the young people of to-day dislike their own Oriental scale, and find Japanese music and the twang twang of the samisen nearly as trying as foreigners do. Drilling, drawing

and painting are also included in the Elementary School programme. One constantly meets large classes out sketching, equipped with portfolios, crayons, brushes, paint-boxes and easels, adequate for an advanced artist. And how they get at it! Thirty or forty boys sat themselves down before Nagoya Castle, a many-storeyed ancient feudal building, with fantastic twisting roofs. In an hour they had produced highly coloured, but quite recognisable, pictures which they were pleased to display. The same subjects are continued in the Middle and High Schools, with particular stress on English. By the time pupils leave they have gained a large vocabulary, and write and speak well, especially those who are content to speak slowly. But the over-ambitious who talk rapidly fall into Japanese accentuation and pronunciation, completely disguising the English words.

Physical training is not neglected. About a hundred girls of sixteen or so were being drilled in the garden of a High School, in two squads, one of beginners and one much more advanced. Their gymnastic dress was becoming—white middy jumpers and short, full, blue knickers. One wondered however they managed to keep up their heavy, abundant hair, which was coiled in large buns. Their instructors, two young officers, were most patient and human, especially the instructor of the clumsy beginners, who laughed with his raw and awkward squad and they with him. In most schools European dress is used, the boys wearing a military uniform of black cotton, and the girls navy blue tunics. Bright coloured, pull-on felt hats incline to spoil the girls' otherwise neat appearance.

To the foreigner the school journeys are the most striking feature of the educational scheme. In October and November the trains are packed with boys and girls every day. They are not taught to offer their seats to older people, although courtesy is highly valued. This omission, as it seems to a Westerner, well indicates the national attitude to youth. One of the most important rulings of the educational system is that boys and girls, during their years at an Elementary School, shall see the most famous and beautiful sights of Japan. Most of the journeys are made in the fifth and sixth years of the course. The children travel at very reduced rates on the State railways and steamships. Parents begin saving up for these journeys even before a child starts school. Sometimes parties will be away for as long as a week, putting up at the very

simple inns. Tens of thousands travel in the autumn. They go about in parties of two or three hundred, with not more than two or three teachers in charge. All are supplied with knapsacks, water bottles, drinking cups and huge umbrellas. Sometimes they look rather bored, but they brighten up when they come to a shrine, or a special beauty spot, and they listen to their instructor, or share earnestly in the prayers, especially in the clapping of hands, which is considered necessary at some shrines in order to attract the attention of the presiding deity. There are wonderful picnic grounds reserved for children. In the great deer park of ancient Nara one may come on thousands of children at their dinner, seated on a brilliant green slope, backed by dark foliaged cryptomerias and fringed with shining blue gentians. With chop-sticks they scoop up hash and rice from little boxes, and swill it down with bitter green tea which is provided at all picnic grounds, even for children. A deafening hubbub arises from the throng, the boys shouting and the girls screaming, just as they do in England. The higher schools, which are none of them co-educational, take their pupils farther afield. Parties travel on the liners that make calls at the chief ports of Japan. Often the museums are crowded with boys and girls absorbed in their note-books and catalogues. Older pupils are allowed much freedom, and may be seen shopping and exploring independently.

Japanese education gives the impression of extreme efficiency. One naturally asks oneself: "Can it be too efficient, ruling out something even more precious, and endeavouring to reduce all boys and girls to a dead sameness?" If one looks closely one finds something more than efficiency—the something that redeems. Executive competence is leavened with imaginative humanness. Administrators and teachers recognise the need to combine *Giri* (abstract justice or discipline) with *Ninjo* (*nin*, human; *jo*, feeling). "You must travel from *Giri* to *Ninjo*," is a cherished saying in Japan. Home education combines the elements of human feeling and discipline. For though so much is done to make children happy, they are taught to sacrifice personal wishes to the interests of the family, and the family's good to the advancement of Japan. Smiling good temper, energy, vitality, alertness of mind and an extraordinary readiness to seize opportunities to learn, especially from foreigners, characterise the young men and women who are the product of Japan's educational system.

Coming of a pure strong race, in no way played out intellectually, having abundant *joie de vivre*, self-confidence, power of work and ability to attend to detail, these young people constitute an extraordinarily strong driving force. They are Japan's greatest wealth, and she recognises it.

Were the young people of Japan only efficient and clever, it would be hard to love them. But they have a charm which is irresistible. Perchance it is the *Ninjo* which they show so delightfully to foreigners, combined with a disarming confidence in response, that makes them so attractive.

LYDIA S. GRAHAM.

LITTELL PRITTIE TOBIE MATTHEW.

THE problem of friendship is by no means so simple as it appears on the surface. How many times has it been stated that friendship is among the greatest blessings of life? Poems, treatises, essays, romances, anthologies have gathered round the golden theme like gems of dew in the cup of a flower. All climes, all ages hymn its praise. For friendship, regarded in its ideal aspect, is as the sun that warms and the breeze that brings refreshment. But when we have sung the praises of friendship in general terms it is good to pause and look at the matter a little more in detail. "It being," as Bacon observes, "the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champain region." Friendship is what we make of it; no more and no less. And in his attitude to his friends a man's inner nature stands revealed. Thus it sometimes happens that a long friendship comes to sudden wreck, to the great dismay and astonishment of the parties. Not knowing themselves sufficiently well they were not aware of the rocks that lay under the surface of consciousness. But the storm came and the rocks were sufficient to dash the good ship to pieces.

Tobie Matthew is one of those figures of history—not quite large enough to stand forward by themselves in full-length portrait—but sufficiently noteworthy to appear in the background of the portraits of their more conspicuous contemporaries. He was a man of many friends and thus it is possible, looking through their eyes, to see him from many angles. Certainly history owes a debt of gratitude to him, for he spoke in no uncertain voice of his greatest friend, Sir Francis Bacon:

> And I can truly say (having had the honour to know him for many years as well when he was in his lesser fortunes as now that he stands at the top and in the full flower of his greatness) that I never yet saw any trace in him of a vindictive mind, whatever injury were done him, nor ever heard him utter a word to any man's disadvantage which seemed to proceed from personal feeling against the man, but only (and that, too, very seldom) from judgment made of him in cold blood. It is not his greatness that I admire, but his virtue: it is not the favours I have received from him (infinite though they be) that have thus enthralled and enchained my heart, but his whole life and character; which are such that, if he were of an inferior condition I could not honour him the less, and if he were my enemy I should not the less love and endeavour to serve him.*

For many, the supreme interest of Sir Tobie Matthew's career is that, in June 1617, on a day of thunder and lightning, he was received into the Catholic Church at Rome. "Neither," he wrote, "can I forget an accident which happened at the instant of my reconciliation, for that fair day did suddenly change itself into such a dark tempest of rain and thunder, as the eldest of us had not seen a greater, whereat the Inquisitor, smiling, said that the Devil was angry to see a soul return to God." The fact that Sir Tobie's reception into the Catholic Church did not in any degree lessen Bacon's affection for him or disturb their friendship is eloquent of the deep regard for honesty and sincerity upon which the characters of the two men were firmly established. Sir Tobie entered with enthusiasm into the ambitions of the philosopher, lawyer and man of letters who had "taken all knowledge for his province." As members of Gray's Inn together the two young law students became intimate, and when Bacon wrote a Mask for the Gray's Inn revels, held in the Christmas of 1594, it was Tobie Matthew who played the part of the Squire.

For the course that he was destined to run Tobie was born with a severe handicap. He was the eldest son of that vigorous Protestant controversialist, Dr. Tobie Matthew, Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, and later Archbishop of York. His mother came of an ecclesiastical family and her epitaph in York Minster proudly records that "a Bishop was her Father, and an Archbishop was her Father-in-law: she had four Bishops her Brethren; and an Archbishop her husband." Everything therefore seemed against the likelihood of Tobie Matthew's return to the Church of his ancestors. The penalties against Catholics were severe, and Elizabeth and her ministers lived in constant fear of insurrection aimed at a change of religion.

Perhaps the youthful Tobie suffered from too many ecclesiastical relatives. He and his father did not agree well together. Tobie certainly appears to have had "a good time" at Gray's Inn. He does not seem to have applied himself too strenuously to the study of law; he got into debt; he spent a good deal of time at the theatre. His father took the severest possible view of his naughtiness, writing of him: "He is a reprobate, a castaway, an example above example of an irreverent and

* Dedication to Saggi Morali Del Signore Francesco Bacon.

disobedient child," words hard to reconcile with Bacon's opinion of him. To Francis Bacon he was a man of fine literary taste and judgment, a scholar, an intelligent man of affairs and a loyal friend. That Bacon found in Matthew a useful critic we know from his correspondence:

> Sir,—Because you shall not lose your labour this afternoon, which now I must needs spend with my Lord Chancellor, I send my desire to you, in this letter, that you will take care not to leave the writing which I left with you last, with any man so long that he may be able to take a copy of it; because, first, it must be censored by you, and then considered again by me. The thing which I expect from you is that you will read it over carefully by yourself, and then to make some little note in writing, where you think (to speak like a critic) that I do perhaps *indormiscere*; or where I do *indulgere genio*; or where, in fine, I give any manner of disadvantage to myself. . . .

Tobie's parents certainly did not understand the necessity of allowing fledglings to try their wings occasionally. When he had reached the age of twenty-seven they still required him to give strict account of his thoughts and actions. Perhaps it was partly for this reason that Tobie began to feel a longing for foreign travel.

> "When," he wrote to a friend, "I came to almost seven and twenty years of age, I determined to put in execution a purpose which I had long entertained, of seeing and spending some years in Italy, a country whereof I had heard and read so much, and knew to be so remarkable for the delicacy of its situation, the fertility of its soil, and the beauty of its cities, and the polity and civility of its people. Between me and this design there had formerly interposed themselves many impediments, sometimes of studies, sometimes business at the Court, sometimes suits in law, and sometimes other and idler entertainments, which then were diminished in my estimation, if not wholly removed, and I found them to be resolved into that only difficulty of obtaining the consent of my parents. . . ."

The longed-for leave was at last obtained and Tobie departed for Paris, en route for Florence, "a town," he wrote many years later, "which I can never think of without tenderness, since God, in His good time, did there vouchsafe to call me to the communion of His Church, and to open the eyes of my dark soul. . . ." But that came later. On his first arrival in Florence his thoughts were mainly of this world.

"Florence," he writes, "is an excellent cool *terreno*," where one can "eate good melons, drinke wholesome wines, looke upon excellent pictures and heer choyse musicque." Yet already his thoughts were moving towards deeper things, for in an earlier letter he had written to Bacon: "I beseech our merciful God to bless us both with as much happiness as your selfe desires, and me with so much love of Him, that for His sake I may be content to forego all worldly happiness."

It was at Naples that the great change in his life came. Perhaps without his realising it, his mood had deepened. The circumstance of his returning to the Church of his fathers is simply and beautifully described:

> Every day under my windows, and sometimes oftener, there passed a procession of children, singing the litanies of our Blessed Lady, and I know not by what chance, or rather providence of Almighty God, the tone of that sweet verse, "*Sancta Maria, Ora pro nobis*," came so often into my ears, and did so extraordinarily delight me, that at last my tongue took it up, not as a prayer (such was my misfortune, for it is a misery to have been, at a time, any other than Our Lady's humble servant), but as a song, whose ditty fell sweetly to the ear; and so, when I found myself alone, my ordinary entertainment was to sing "*Sancta Maria, Ora pro nobis*," in the tune of those babes and sucklings who showed forth her praise.

Reading his words, one longs to know what "the tune of those babes" was. In Rome, at the hands of Father Lelio Ptolomei, S.J., he was received into the Church.

On Matthew's return to England, the persecution which pursued him all his life began. On refusing to take the oath of allegiance he was committed to the Fleet prison. His family turned from him in horror. Bacon was one of the few friends who came to his aid in this time of trouble. In the words of Hepworth Dixon (*Personal History of Lord Bacon*):

> When Tobie Matthew comes from Italy to London, having given up his old delights—cards, wenches, wine and oaths—some, who are not themselves saints, would fling him into the Tower and leave him there to die. . . . James I is bitterly incensed against him, looking on his fall as that of a column of his Church; his father drives him from his heart with a curse; yet when his whole kin spit on him and cast him forth, Bacon, strong in his sympathy for a scholar and a man who has lost his way, takes this outcast and regenerate pervert to his house. Though he fights against his friend's

> new doctrines, he never will consent, with the less tolerant world, to hunt him down for a change in his speculative views, which every eye can see has made him a better and a happier man. The philosopher may not be always able, by any sacrifice of name and credit, to shield this enthusiast from the rage of sects, but he comforts him when in gaol, procures leave for him to return from exile, softens towards him the heart of his father, and obtains for him indulgences which probably save his life.

Matthew was certainly blessed with a capacity for friendship. Notwithstanding his religion, men of letters and men of the Court were attracted to him. While in France he met George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, and they became friends. This connection led to his being employed in the negotiations for the projected Spanish match. In the spring of 1623 the Duke of Buckingham and the Prince of Wales went incognito to Madrid. The incognito was soon dropped, and the Prince and the Duke had such a warm welcome in Madrid that King James wrote to his son: "The newis of your gloriouse reception thaire makes me afraid that ye will both miskenne youre olde Dadde hereafter."

The match, however, met with opposition from a political faction and proceedings hung fire. At this juncture Tobie Matthew was sent out to lend his assistance. It was a great event. Was Sir Tobie just a little intoxicated with the sweet wine of success? He went out with high hopes and a discreet sense of his own importance. Small in stature, neat and dapper, he was very well aware of his good parts. He spoke the language and knew all the important people at the Spanish Court. In the eyes of the historian he would have cut a graceful and imposing figure had it not been for the puckish humour of the Prince. To Buckingham's letter to the King he added a naughty postcript:

> In the midst of our serious business, littell prittie Tobie Matthew comes to intreat us to deliver this letter to your M., which is, as he calls it, a pictur of the Infanta's drawen in blake and whyte. We pray you let none lafe at it, but yourself and honest Kate*. . . . He thinks he hath hitt the naille on the head, but you will find it foolishest thing that ever you saw.

Sir Tobie's picture "in blake and whyte" is certainly an example of zeal outrunning discretion. It is too long to quote

* The Duchess of Buckingham.

in full, but the first paragraph serves as an example of its soaring eulogy:

> The Infanta Dona Maria will have 19 years of age, the 11th of August, as shee seems but low of stature, for shee useth no hope (hoop) at all. The women of this country are not generally tall; but the Infanta is much of the same stature which those Ladyes have, which live in the Court of Spayn and are of the same years with her. She is fayr in all p'fection; her favour (face) is very good and fayr; far from having any ill feature in it, her countenance is sweet, in an extraordinary manner, and shows how to bee both kingly born, and with all that she placeth no great felicity in it, for there seems to shine from her soule, through her body, as great goodness and sweetness as can be desired in a creature. Her Close, Ruff and Cuffs are said by them, who know it best, to be greatly to her disadvantage, for that both her head is rarely set on to her neck, and so are her excellent hands to her arms, and they say that before she is dressed she is incomparably better than afterward. . . .

Mr. Thomas Seccombe (in his *Age of Shakespeare*) was somewhat scandalised at the last sentence. He need not have been. In penning it Tobie was entirely innocent of any indelicacy. He merely meant that the Lady's beauty was such that it could not be improved by full Court attire.

No doubt that visit to Madrid on business of such high importance was one of the great memories of Sir Tobie's life. With ardour he flung himself into it. He saw, as he believed, the chance of a better age for England with the Spanish marriage a *fait accompli*. But his activities in Madrid and his eloquent eulogy of the Infanta written for the eye of his sovereign, were destined to come to naught. The Infanta Maria married Ferdinand, King of the Romans. And all of that expedition to Spain that remains vividly in the memory is the sudden irruption of Sir Tobie Matthew, as he bustles with much importance into the Prince's chamber, bringing his long and detailed description of the Princess penned with such infinite care and patience. And after he has left, the Prince's laughter suddenly breaks the tension as he reads the eloquent, the ridiculously eloquent, account of the Lady he is required to marry—"the foolishest thing that ever you saw."

RICHARD INCE.

ANIMAL ECCENTRICITIES.

EXPLORERS and naturalists have long ago given tangible proof that in nature there is no such thing as an instinctive fear of man. In rarely visited regions the traveller finds himself an object of the greatest curiosity to the creatures of the earth and air whose territory he has invaded. Before man discovered in killing for pleasure a sport fit for kings, and in the pursuance of this sport spread pain and fear into the far corners of the earth, a wild animal was as likely to approach anything strange or unknown with wide-eyed curiosity as to flee from it in terror. What it actually did on any given occasion depended often as much on its individual temperament as on the character of the species to which it belonged. Naturally the most curious of each species were the first to come within range of man's lethal activities, and the shyest or least curious were the most likely to survive and propagate their kind. There can indeed be little doubt that man has carried on a process of selection or elimination among the creatures of the wild as real as that which has resulted in the innumerable breeds of domesticated animals. In one case through undiscriminating slaughter he has unwittingly made wild animals truly "wild," and in the other he has, often purposely, bred out wildness. The young of many animals, unapproachable as adults, still show no sign of fear and frequently exhibit a lively curiosity at our appearance. In others the process may have gone farther, for the young animals rush off as if indeed possessed of an instinctive dread of man. Is it not significant that when we refer to animals which are not domesticated, we call them wild? Why *wild*? Why not free, natural, normal, or some such word? The reason is self-evident, and, of course, they are wild only because we have driven them wild.

Occasionally, even in England, one comes across delightful links with the past, some of which, if only joint action be taken in time, might equally well be described as glimpses into the future. We refer to those individuals which from time to time meet our gaze without fear. As often as not it will be a hedgehog, stoat, weasel or robin. These exceptional creatures are seen occasionally by many country lovers and surely by few indeed without a thrill of pleasure. They fall into several natural groups. A large number that attract attention by their apparently fearless behaviour seem to come under the heading

"bold individuals of bold species." Others may be "animals preoccupied" or of "low mentality." The latter, though a large group, arouses little interest, simply because the actions of its members are taken for granted. Everyone has seen insects which not only take no trouble to get out of our path, but actually appear to continue the even tenor of their way when taken in the hand. Large slow-moving ground beetles afford many examples. When, however, an insect is almost as unapproachable as a bird, taking wing long before one is in range and not alighting until it is almost out of sight, one tends to think that if caught it would be wild indeed. That this need not be the case struck us forcibly one year in Africa. Along the north coast a stretch of rough sandy ground, overgrown with dwarf palms and a prickly scrub oak, provided shelter for a large locust, which occurred in some numbers. Perched on a point of vantage these insects were safe from capture, for before we got very near there would be a whirr of wings and at express speed the object of our desire would vanish into the distance, not unlike a tiny bird in size, speed and inaccessibility. Being unversed in entomological subterfuge, we spent some time in chasing these insects in vain, but eventually caught several, for unless in an exposed position on a plant they were unable to take wing.

Whether caught after a prolonged chase, or taken gently in the hand from the heart of a bush, they showed no further inclination to fly when placed on the back of one's hand. One in particular clung to my wife's hand, making vigorous efforts to prevent itself being shaken off and always, whichever way she held her hand, climbed actively on top so as to be the right way up to bask in the full warmth of the sun. The swinging of one's arm, as in ordinary walking, did not trouble them. When placed on clothing they remained only a very short while before jumping off into the surrounding vegetation. This shows that they were "free to choose," that they stayed on our hands probably for the sake of the warmth we provided, and that there was no sort of nervous collapse following on capture such as often renders men and other animals almost incapable of feeling or moving when held down by a large carnivorous animal. It also throws a sidelight on the fleeing of animals from what we know is to them approaching danger. Is there any reason to suppose that these insects have even the dimmest consciousness of the real state of affairs when we loom up on

their horizon, or of danger when a large bird approaches them? None, yet they beat a hasty retreat. It seems that this retreat is as purely instinctive and as wholly independent of volition and of even the dimmest recognition of its aim and object as, for example, is the flying of bees and wasps towards the light when lost in a human habitation. If in capture they found nothing terrifying, it would be almost incredible if at the approach of a bird or beast they knew why the sudden urge to fly possessed them. Many animals are sufficiently intelligent to resent capture, but how can we decide at exactly which rung in the ladder of mental evolution an animal is capable of understanding that it is from danger that it is fleeing, that is to say from injury which it may never have itself experienced or known to exist?

Besides giving us a glimpse into insect mentality, these locusts once again demonstrated the necessity of examining the lowest grade of mentality that will account for behaviour observed before attributing this behaviour to the higher processes of the mind. " You usually find the idea that animals are a simple type of reflex machine, or more usually the idea that they are little human beings with just the same thoughts and emotions as ourselves, which they are, for some reason, unable to express. Both these attitudes are completely wrong, and lead one into serious error " (Julian Huxley). If in every case one remembers that " modification of pre-existing tendencies is the essence of intelligent activity " (McDougall), one is less likely on the one hand to overlook the part played by instinct and on the other to over-emphasise the importance of intelligence.

A few days before our meeting with the insects I picked up a little lizard, four or five inches long, and not more than three-quarters grown. On opening my hand I expected it to dash away, but instead it remained to bask. Presently, owing to a movement on my part, the lizard ran up my sleeve on to my shoulder, and here again settled down to enjoy the sun's warmth. Sometimes, when it turned its head, it licked its chops with a tiny black tongue. This is very pretty to see in so dainty a creature. Another delightful performance was the warming of the soles of its feet in the sun! When basking, neither its front nor its hind legs were used to support the body, which lay flat along my coat. It was therefore easy for the lizard to raise its hind limbs on either side of its back and turn its feet sole upwards. This it did several times while

using me as a basking place. Eventually it began to return to lower altitudes, climbing down my left trouser-leg. When still some eighteen inches from the ground, it stopped for several minutes, seeming quite happy to bask on me as long as it could. Presently it leaped down about a foot on to the ground and slipped away into the nooks and crannies of its home.

It had been difficult to catch, running quickly away as soon as it caught sight of us. Why then did it not leap to safety directly I opened the hand that held it? Simply and solely, we believe, because it had not the brains to realise that it was caught! Moreover, it found itself, in my hand, enveloped in warmth, which daily brings it into the open and without which it is too cold to feed. Human hands felt to it nothing unusual. They were warm and did not move, and were therefore desirable. We had often noticed a similar desire in English lizards to stay and bask on our persons after capture instead of making good their escape at the earliest opportunity, so this little African gave us a link with the creatures of our own country rather than a new experience. English lizards, however, differ widely, partly according to the individual captured and partly, no doubt, according to such factors as the time of the year and the warmth of one's hand at the moment. The rule is for the common lizard to get away as quickly as it can, but sometimes, indeed not infrequently, an individual is willing to flatten its little body on one's hands, so as to present the maximum area and least possible thickness to the sun in an effort to get warm as quickly as possible. Especially is this the case when the small captive is held in one's hands for a minute or two, during which, perhaps, its recent very strong urge to run away subsides, and its body becomes gradually unable to resist the effect of the warmth and to react to it in a normal manner. Still less than in the case of the insect does there seem here to be any chance of a nervous paralysis on capture, as anyone can testify who has taken a lizard from its home.

Fear, as we know it, was no more responsible for the headlong flight of the two creatures just described than was a sudden contempt of danger the reason for their singular change of behaviour on capture. The true state of affairs has already been suggested.

In the case of " animals preoccupied," by which is meant animals unusually absorbed in the interests of the moment, it

is generally quite easy to account for apparent lack of fear or exceptional boldness. When a stoat or weasel is trailing some unfortunate creature, or a bird joins in the uproar occasioned by an owl's appearance in the day-time, it is not surprising that the human intruder often passes unnoticed. Were this not so, animals would be automata indeed. The fact that the emotion accompanying instinctive acts such as these is strong enough to preclude for the moment the reception of all but the strongest stimuli should induce a certain wariness in the interpretation of animal behaviour in terms of instinct. Though instinctive activities mould the destiny of a living creature, we cannot say, at any given moment, how much or how little consciousness of purpose enters into the situation. In man, many instinctive acts have become so "rationalised" that their true nature is often unsuspected. Though this "explaining" in terms of reason actions fundamentally instinctive can scarcely occur in animals other than man, the very fact that we do "rationalise" should put us on our guard in discussing the blind impulse of animals—they may very well not be blind. Anticipation was the first step upwards towards rationalisation as now practised by man.

Returning to our preoccupied animals, we wrote that as a rule the preoccupation easily accounts for any exceptional boldness on the animal's part or any slowness in the recognition of approaching danger. Sometimes, while realising that the creature's intense absorption is giving us an exceptionally near view, we do not know the reason for the absorption. This was my experience one afternoon with a multitude of common shrews. These little creatures are usually bold and are often not difficult to watch if one remains still, but on this occasion their fearlessness, or more likely inability to recognise danger, can only have been due to their deep preoccupation. I was attracted by a number running about amongst the loose tangle of bramble and undergrowth in a wood, and managed to get amongst them without causing a disturbance. I then saw that unless they were running in circles their number must be legion, for from a small opening under a stump they came in fairly rapid succession. The ground in every direction seemed alive with them. The noise made by each individual was amazing and the distance at which its movements were still seen remarkable. It was impossible to keep one's eye on any one animal for more than a moment, for despite their small size

these little creatures cover the ground at a great pace. The unbroken stream issuing from the hole ran down a small path of its own making, but apart from this nothing was clear, except that eventually each individual must of necessity have returned to the farther side of the stump to reappear on my side once more. After watching for a little while, in complete bewilderment, I put one foot across their path. They did not know what to make of it, but on the whole it scarcely interrupted the procession, for while some climbed over, an almost equal number went round and a few underneath. Next I tried a handkerchief, but this had little more effect than the boot. The last test of shrewish preoccupation was my hand, placed palm upwards on the ground. Imagine my feelings when the fairy feet of several of these minute creatures pattered unconcernedly over this last obstacle! It was almost too good to be true and obviously too good to last. Whether my crouching form was more visible to them than it had been when erect, or whether my hand drove them away, I do not know. In any case, fewer and fewer came through the hole and down the run to climb or skirt my hand, until the small round hole under the mossy stump seemed strangely still and the rustling of little bodies died away in the distance. I never saw them there again, but the next day, not far away and in the direction they had taken, a dead shrew lay on its back in the middle of a neat garden path. A funny little mite when dead! Had it been one of those that the day before ran so lightly over my hand? Had I perhaps been present at a farewell banquet, a meeting of old friends for a last few hours of fun and feasting before the Great Event which leaves those innumerable little corpses about our paths and woodlands that so often puzzle human beings?

In his *Birds and Man* Hudson wrote that it was his "ambition and principal delight to see and hear every bird at its best," an ambition which he has managed to implant in others anxious to follow the trail which he so recently helped to blaze towards a fuller appreciation and deeper understanding of living creatures. It is relatively easy to see, for instance, a cock blackbird at its best. The bird is common and not shy, but the case is very different with, say, a curlew or a kestrel. It often happens that one's first really near view of a bird or a beast is a revelation, to be treasured in the mind for ever and included amongst the memories of those rare occasions on which all circumstances combine to show us a given species to fullest

perfection. Just when an animal is seen at its best depends upon the emotions of the observer. Though I am reasonably well acquainted with goldfinches, especially in flocks, I have only one vivid memory of an individual seen at its best. This was one winter in North Africa when the most brilliantly coloured goldfinch I had ever seen flashed past in bright sunshine. I was on a steep hill with the bird a few yards below me, its colour no doubt intensified by a background of exceptionally green grass of great length. Perhaps anyone seeing this bird at that moment would have been thrilled in the same way that I was; but that this would have been so is less certain in the case of a hedgesparrow late one autumn, whose sudden appearance and sweet song are for ever in mind when I think of this species.

The bird had been singing close to our windows at a time when other bird songs were few and far between, and we had grown to love its little voice and look forward to it, for it did not sing every day. Then during one whole week of drenching rain it was silent. Darkness enveloped our world and the landscape was blotted out as each day the clouds became more lowering. At last the rain turned to mist, moors and valley reappeared, and a gleam of sunshine struggled through. As it gained strength a rainbow rose, only one hundred and fifty yards from the house, and in our garden. It chose as its place of birth a clump of beeches in the full glory of their autumn foliage, and stretched up to disappear into the mist above. While we gazed spellbound at this sudden miracle of colour, a little bird flew to the topmost twig of a hazel close by the window and sang. It was our hedgesparrow. Its small brown form seemed an emblem of joy. Never before had its song sounded so sweet in our ears. What a joyful ending to a week of gloom! Through our minds flashed the words:

> Sudden there sang a little bird.
> His notes, like silver rain,
> Washed all my bitter wrath away,
> And I was clean again.

Though appreciating to the full those occasional glimpses of wild life at its best that come to every wanderer in the fields and woods, my "ambition and principal delight" has always been to watch the creatures of the wild at the closest possible range. Sometimes this amounts to very much the same thing, for to have any chance of seeing an animal at its best, one must

be within a certain maximum distance. In the case of the diminutive fur-, scale- and chitin-covered creatures, it is usually true to say that the nearer one approaches them the greater is the chance of all circumstances combining to give one an impression never to be forgotten and almost impossible to surpass in exquisite perfection of detail. Unless you have lain in the woods and watched a grass snake glide slowly towards you, passing unconscious of your presence within arm's length, the chances are more than a hundred to one that you have never seen this creature at its best, for you can really hardly claim to have seen it at all. So it is with mice and voles. One's chances of seeing these fairy creatures at their best are small, simply because they are so diminutive and are rarely seen at sufficiently close quarters. Perhaps one day we may return to the conditions described by Darwin in the Galapagos in 1835, when with the muzzle of a gun he pushed a hawk off a tree and sometimes managed to catch a bird in his hat! In the meantime, when an animal in England behaves to-day as though it were in the Antipodes a hundred years ago, we must look for a reason, for it is surely abnormal. If it is a diminutive creature, it may give us an opportunity of seeing it at its best, though this is unlikely when one remembers how rarely these abnormal individuals are seen.

Sometimes, of course, a near view is amusing rather than enchanting, as was the case when we returned home one afternoon to find a long-tailed field-mouse feeding in bright sunshine in the middle of a gravel path outside the front door. A little grain left over by some tame pigeons had attracted its attention. There, surrounded by food, it sat, with apparently never a thought of the danger it ran at a time when all properly constituted mice were tucked safely underground. It never showed even the slightest inclination to carry some of the grain under the shelter of a neighbouring tree, which so bold a daylight feeder as the rat would almost certainly have done. We approached within seven or eight feet on either side of it, but were, apparently, neither seen nor heard. It simply kept on feeding, occasionally moving an inch or two as the supplies within its reach ran out. From the appearance of its fur we thought that it was an adult in good condition. Its eyes were bright and did not seem to differ from those of a normal mouse. Indeed, they were occasionally slightly closed for a moment or two which, if not due to the time of day, suggested that the

mouse was concentrating its body and soul on the miracle of compression going on within, for it fed steadily for half an hour while we were present, and, of course, we do not know for how long before our arrival. A tame rat will close its eyes very slightly, sometimes almost wholly, when given something to eat that it is particularly fond of, hence our deduction in the case of this extraordinary mouse. During its half-hour of concentrated enjoyment, we ourselves had tea within four yards of the little creature. This did not seem to attract its attention, so we flicked crumbs at it, but in vain. Eventually, when I suppose it could hold no more, for it looked very fat, it wandered off down the path, keeping to the middle. For twenty yards it continued in this way, with an unhurried and slightly rolling gait, such as one expects from a person who has dined not wisely but too well. Once only it left the most conspicuous part of the path, and then but for a moment during which it investigated a large tub of tulips. That was the last we saw of our little alderman.

Here was preoccupation indeed, yet this cannot entirely account for the mouse's strange behaviour. A deep preoccupation coupled with an unusually greedy disposition may have prevented it from seeing or hearing us, but these circumstances can scarcely be responsible for its flagrant disregard of all the rules and regulations regarding the deportment of mice not bent on suicide. While following the mouse's example—in the highly modified form of afternoon tea—we could not help assuming that our tiny guest was lacking in many of the instincts common to its species. If our assumption was correct, this brings us to the final group of " bold " or " fearless " animals to find mention here—that in which the specific " pattern of reactions " is to a varying extent incomplete. Quite possibly this group contains more unfortunates than we imagine, but unless one of the defaulting instincts is that concerned with the sudden appearance of large moving objects, the chances are that we shall not discover the others. Though our " little alderman " belongs to a species occasionally seen above ground by day, the fact that it fed for so long in full sunshine without once showing even the slightest intention of taking cover can only mean that it had not got all its senses about it, especially those concerned with actions one normally expects to see when a mouse feeds.

G. B. GOOCH.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MR. ROOSEVELT AS SOCIALIST.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S attempt to bring back prosperity to the United States by regulations politically imposed upon industry and finance is one of the oddities of our time. The cotton textile code, one of the " codes of fair competition " prescribed by the National Industrial Recovery Act, was typical of his method. It simply decreed that cotton operatives should be given a forty-hour week with a minimum wage of twelve dollars. Employers of labour were to pay wages for an amount of work arbitrarily decided by somebody else. Mr. Roosevelt has been President of the United States for more than five months. What precisely emerges about his object? In its simplest essential, as all economists agree, the problem of the slump, in the United States, as elsewhere, was to bridge the gap between prices and costs of production. On May 7th Mr. Roosevelt announced that his definite object was " the raising of commodity prices to such an extent that those who have borrowed money will, on the average, be able to repay that money in the same kind of dollar which they borrowed." On June 16th, when he signed the National Industrial Recovery Bill, he announced that his aim was " to restore our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity." He added that the chosen way was to reduce hours and to increase wages. " The idea," he explained, " is simply for employers to hire more men to do existing work by reducing the working hours of each man's week, and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter week." He issued a warning that " if we now inflate prices as fast and as far as we increase wages the whole project will be set at naught."

One clear thing emerges from such dogma. It emerges that Mr. Roosevelt's central motive is to raise wages (that is, costs) faster than to raise prices. How can that device close the gap? His theory apparently is that a stabilised production and increased consuming capacity will result in (and must, therefore, precede) an increase in prices. Now increased prices mean increased profits. The distinction between diverting profits to an increase of wages or to an increase in dividends is largely unreal. It is really a differentiation between the interests of different classes of consumers. But, on Mr. Roosevelt's own

ground, how can he keep down the cost of living, so as to ensure that the real value of wages be increased? He has not yet given his view on that aspect of his plans. There are those who think that increased prices should come first: that the true cycle is expanding profits, expanding production, expanding employment, expanding consumption. The boom that started in the United States in the summer of 1897, after the comparable Baring depression, followed that cycle. It is even arguable that all booms follow that cycle. The sudden set-back that befell Wall Street in July was a set-back to confidence; for speculation is the normal symptom of confidence. It was said to have suggested to Washington the possible expediency of a political " control " of speculation. The disquiet in some minds thereby engendered was due to the thought that speculation can be controlled only by killing its motive; and its motive is confidence. In one sense the Wall Street boom itself had resulted from Mr. Roosevelt's initial success in inflating the national sense of confidence. The Wall Street tremor of financial fear resulted from the economists' doubts of Mr. Roosevelt's ultimate success. By attempting to " control," that is to kill, speculation, he would in effect be attempting to " control " his own success as an inflationary agent. Yet even that paradox did not encourage anybody to take a view about Mr. Roosevelt's further prospects. Human fortunes cannot be predicted by economic formulæ. In the United States the most unorthodox, as well as the most unexpected, things may happen. Mr. Roosevelt is attempting to counter the effects of a slump largely produced by political interference with commerce—by wars, war debts, exchange restrictions, tariffs, quotas and the like political works—and he is attempting it by means of an almost total political control of trade and finance. Yet such is the United States that nobody can foretell what his effect may be.

The New Central Europe.

A major change in the relationships of the Central European countries is a matter of concern to people throughout the world. Serajevo in 1914 was a symbol of something that is peculiar to Europe; and Europe has the further peculiarity that its wars are potentially world-wide. Great Britain may be drawn into them; even the United States, and Japan. That stretch of European territory which embraces Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Jugoslavia and Rumania plays a more cardinal part in the decision between peace and war on the big scale than any other territory in the world. Before the last big war the absurd conduct of the German and Magyar politicians who controlled Austria-Hungary and of the German politicians who controlled Germany set in motion a series of diplomatic forces which in the end drew the whole world into war. After the war it was a first consideration of those who were mainly responsible for the Treaty of Versailles that the subject Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes and Serbs be freed from the Austro-Hungarian politicians, that the Austrian Germans be separated from the Hungarian Magyars, and that the Germans of Germany be confined within German territory in such conditions that they could no longer be led into the temptation to adventure their political schemes in South Eastern Europe.

Fourteen years have passed since those major changes were made. Up to January 30th, 1933, the Versailles Central Europe pursued its course without much deviation from the new conditions deriving from Versailles. That is to say, the new Jugoslavia, unconvincing as it might be as a political experiment, was an independent, if uncomfortably tripartite, organisation. The new Czechoslovakia abundantly justified the like experiment in her own case. The Little Entente in some degree countered the effects of a too " Balkanised " disintegration of the old Central Europe. Germany never abandoned her ambition to counter the isolating effects of the Versailles ordinances by means of an *Anschluss* with Austria. Budapest maintained a vigorous revisionist propaganda for the recapture of Slovaks, whom the Magyars always covet. Apart, however, from the determined German bid (thinly disguised) for an *Anschluss* with Austria in 1931, the Versailles states in Central Europe seemed stable enough, mainly because Czechoslovakia had proved so successful in economics and in finance, and so steadying an influence in politics.

In 1932, however, and in the winter of 1932-3, largely because German economic distress was taken by German politicians out of its context and represented to be the result of political injustices suffered by Germany, there arose in Germany an increasing fever of indignation against the Versailles inequalities. It was chiefly expressed at Geneva in the Disarmament Conference. The manifest inequality accorded to Germany at

that conference gave power to the elbow of the German politicians at home. In Great Britain the view strengthened that the cause of disarmament itself was being jeopardised by the French attempt to keep Germany in a condition of permanently inferior fighting strength, in other words to apply disarmament to Germany, but not to France. The feeling that the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty were a danger to the peace gave a fillip to the feeling that general revision of the treaty would lead, via a contented Germany, to a more settled prospect of peace in Europe. That speculation was the real origin of the Turin speech of Signor Mussolini (October 23rd, 1932) and of the resultant Four-Power Pact.

Such, however, is the irony of high politics, such the inevitability that a decided tendency in one direction excites a neutralising tendency in an opposite direction, that the whole cause of treaty revision was suddenly killed by none other than by Germany herself. Herr Hitler and his men were so outrageous in their bluster, so defiant of the world at large, so unlimited, not so much in what they demanded, as in what they announced they were going to take, that those who had espoused Germany's cause were silenced, and those who had opposed it were filled with glee. Revision was dead. The Austro-German *Anschluss* was dead. Austrian feeling, indeed, was so antagonised that in Austria Austrian nationality came to weigh more in the balance than German race. The Nazi terror that reigned in Germany did not encourage even Germans outside Germany to covet the like experience in their own case. Dr. Dollfuss, faced with the danger of Nazi contagion, became a national leader supported by a new kind of Austrian nationalism. I had a conversation with him on June 10th last, when he said, for example: "The most striking effect in Austria of German Hitlerism is that it has produced an intense feeling of patriotism in Austria. We are a German country, but we want more than ever now to decide our own destiny." The European diplomatists, in fact, were faced with a new kind of Austro-German problem; for German diplomacy had lost its natural ally in South Eastern Europe. Germany retaliated by the puerile device of imposing a prohibitive tax on German visitors to Austria, the effect of which was still further to enfeeble an already feeble country. Where would Austria turn? The obvious speculation arose about a possible Austro-Hungarian *Anschluss,* with or without a returned Otto at its head. But

Budapest proved to be too traditionally sympathetic to Berlin to lend an ear to such suggestions, which equally roused the opposition of Prague and of Rome.

What would become of Central Europe now that German influence was weakened and Italian influence was proportionally strengthened? It was clearly of immense importance that Franco-Italian *rapprochement*—another of Herr Hitler's left-handed achievements—should not disturb the balance of Central Europe in a too anti-German sense. In such uncertain circumstances the views of Dr. Benesh are always useful. He generally is ready with a plan to meet uncertain circumstances. He is always in close touch with the leading persons concerned. He has a continuous background as Czechoslovak Foreign Minister since 1919. I therefore asked him (June 19th) what was the solution he had to suggest of the Central European problem in its new form. Without hesitation he outlined a plan for an economic federation of the small States of Central Europe, exclusive of any great Power. "The Austro-German problem," he said, "is now one of those to which the dominant attention of European diplomacy is turned. But the general situation in Europe and in the whole world is undoubtedly serious. We do not know what is to issue from the Disarmament Conference. We do not know what developments there may be in Germany, and upon them may depend the whole situation in Europe. The Little Entente countries have arrived at the deliberate opinion that only a new economic system of co-operation between Austria, Hungary, and the Little Entente countries can help Europe in any large degree to overcome the present crisis. European trouble has mainly resulted from the rivalry of the Great Powers in their designs upon the small Powers of Central Europe. The essential need is that the Great Powers should accept the fact that the Danubian countries are no more available for their expansion or colonisation than are the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Belgium, or Holland. Our independence must be respected. It then becomes our duty as good Europeans to eliminate all the animosities that in the past have tempted the interference of the Great Powers. We must cultivate the closest friendship with both Hungary and Austria. After the so-called 'balkanisation' of Central Europe we must reconstruct."

"You imply," I suggested, "that Hungary and Austria should remain independent units?"

" Certainly. It is my view that an Austro-Hungarian would be as undesirable as an Austro-German *Anschluss*. It could not help Austria either politically or economically. It would merely mean that if Germany succeeded in absorbing Austria she would automatically also absorb Hungary. But especially it would provoke a new economic fight between those two countries and the Little Entente instead of encouraging their collaboration. The only sound policy is for the Central European countries, including Austria and Hungary, to retain their separate entities while developing real economic collaboration among themselves. For this reason I do not take seriously the current talk about an Austro-Hungarian political union."

" You do not want, then," I asked, " to extend your system of economic or political collaboration to Germany or to Italy?"

" A form of economic collaboration with the Great Powers will always be necessary for us. The question is what form it will take. Intimate economic ' collaboration ' with Great Powers must not become economic servitude. A healthy Central Europe would, by the indirect method, contribute far more to the prosperity of Germany and Italy than would the submission of Central Europe to the rivalries of those two or other countries in the future."

" You fear such rivalry?"

" Such rivalry would be waged over the ruins of Central Europe. Why ruin Central Europe? The Little Entente is strong enough to defend its interests. Austria is strong enough to maintain her independence. A strong and peaceful Hungary would complete the consolidation of the new, independent Central Europe, which is the best safeguard of European peace. I think that such an independent Central Europe can be organised with the collaboration of Italy and France, Germany and Great Britain. The Four-Power Pact gives us the chance for it, and if there is the goodwill to do it in the spirit I have just explained, the cause of peace will make great progress in Europe. And because Italy initiated that pact, I believe that with Italy's help this new plan for Central Europe would succeed."

The interesting thing that follows from Dr. Benesh's statement is that one of the chief factors of opinion among the peoples of the small States of Central Europe is working on the principle that an equal independence of Germany, Italy and France is the best hope of breaking what may be called the Serajevo tradition in Europe. It is not likely that the Central

European States will ever achieve the immunity of the Scandinavian countries, for that immunity is largely geographical in its origin: but a combined motive of independence in Central Europe could clearly go far to make unlikely a repetition of the sort of Great Power rivalry that helped to produce the catastrophe of 1914. The fact that on June 15th last Czechoslovakia did not follow the French lead of total default on the American debt, but made a token payment, as did Great Britain, of 10 per cent., was a small but interesting straw in the wind.

The Two Conferences and a Moral.

The really interesting aspect of the diplomatic climax which was reached on July 27th was that it caused little concern in any quarter. The most sombre warnings had been given by the experts against a " failure " of the Monetary and Economic Conference. The Geneva Preparatory Commission had written, for instance: " The crisis has caused national measures, defensively intended, to breed virtual economic warfare. Failure to resolve this conflict of national economies will shake the system of international finance to its foundations, standards of living will be lowered, and the social system as we know it can hardly survive." The conference duly met and duly registered its failure: if one can regard as a failure the inability of the conference to do what it set out to do. Yet no foundations were apparently shaken. The world went about its business and hardly showed any interest in the conference. Business even appeared to be improving. The similar " failure " of the Genoa Conference of 1922 was similarly followed by a general improvement in business. Yet the climax of diplomacy by conference reached in the summer of 1933 was a much bigger event than that of 1922. No doubt the people of the world had passed through too many recent crises directly affecting their interests to care much about any big political event, no matter how interesting it was or how world-shaking it ought to have been. The completeness of the diplomatic wreckage was almost exciting in itself, in the same sort of way as a thoroughly disastrous fire is exciting. Mr. Arthur Henderson was unconsciously symbolising the wreckage of the Disarmament Conference by undertaking a round tour of Rome, Berlin, Prague, Paris and London in an attempt to revive a willingness to go on discussing disarmament. It was eighteen

months since the conference had been opened. No progress had been made towards disarmament.

While Mr. Henderson was in Rome (July 15th) the Four-Power Pact was signed, whereby still another curious light was thrown on contemporary diplomacy. Nine months had passed since Signor Mussolini virtually proposed such a pact. Speaking at Turin on October 23rd, 1932, he said that if "the collaboration of the four great Western Powers" could be assured, Europe would be assured of political tranquillity and "the end would be in sight of the economic crisis by which we are gripped." The next stage was reached in March 1933, when Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon visited Signor Mussolini in Rome (March 18th-20th) and agreed to a tentative first draft of a Pact. It was an essential motive both of Signor Mussolini and of Mr. MacDonald that the Versailles frontiers must be peacefully modified if they were not to be modified by war. But the proposed Pact was as unwelcome in Paris and in Prague as it was welcome in Berlin: in Paris because *ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*, and because French opinion was afraid—with some justification—that if the German politicians were given an inch they would take an ell; in Prague because her frontiers wholly derived from the Treaty of Versailles, and because it was not clear who was to guarantee that the revisionists would make a distinction between good frontiers and bad. A four-Power Pact, that is a pact between Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, was manifestly impossible without France. The first draft was therefore revised to the end that France might accept it. But France was not disposed to accept it unless it was revised beyond recognition.

Two months passed. The draft was revised bit by bit, German enthusiasm cooling as French willingness warmed. The new draft was initialled on June 8th. France initialled it. The Little Entente formally decided that it had no objection to it. In its final form it added precisely nothing to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties. The whole relevant part of the Covenant was transferred to it, sanctions and all. Signor Mussolini having launched it, there seemed no reason why he should not accept it in its new form. Mr. MacDonald having sponsored it, there was no reason why he should not accept it. French opinion accepted it for the frank reason that there was nothing left in it. German opinion accepted it in a spirit of boredom. The tacit withdrawal of

the original pact had been made easy, almost inevitable, by the advent of Herr Hitler to power in Germany. When Signor Mussolini first contemplated a revision of the Versailles frontiers—his motives being neither wholly pure nor wholly Machiavellian—his background was that of a disgruntled Germany which threatened to pass from a Brüning to a Nazi temper. Signor Mussolini in one of his motives hoped to stave off that danger. By the time Mr. MacDonald reached Rome, the change in Germany had taken place. Herr Hitler had won. He talked without restraint of tearing up the whole treaty, of doing something or other in the grand Prussian manner. He disturbed the whole face of European diplomacy. He killed revision as a cause. He demanded provocatively, and without success, for Germany what otherwise Germany had stood a good chance of now receiving as a gift of goodwill. When the Pact was signed on July 15th it was as much a ritual of bankrupt diplomacy as was Mr. Henderson's presence in Rome. At that very same moment the Bureau of the World Monetary and Economic Conference in London had decided to "adjourn" the conference. That conference also was spent, and had achieved precisely nothing.

The cup seemed full. The main sources of political anxiety in the world had come from armaments, financial difficulty, economic stagnation. With armaments was indissolubly bound up the relationships of the four Western European Powers, who traditionally initiate the wars that demand the armaments. The general anxiety was such that the politicians of the whole civilised world, sixty-odd nations of them, assembled in Geneva and in London, in the one place to try and agree to disarm physically (by a common reduction of fighting strength), in the other place to disarm economically (by reducing tariffs, etc.) and financially (by reducing exchange embargoes and the like). They wholly failed, although they all knew—they had all said—that such disarmament would serve their common interests. July 1933 must surely be counted an historic landmark in the world's history. It marked not merely the climax of post-war diplomacy. It was a really decisive occasion in the sense that diplomacy had proved itself, despite the strongest common inducement, unable to do constructive work. It is an event that deserves, and will no doubt receive, the prolonged study of political philosophers. There is no doubt by contrast about diplomacy's effectiveness in destructive causes. It was easy

for the politicians of the world to start the Great War. It was not easy to stop it. In every participant country the politicians preached a gospel of holy duty to all their citizens: the duty at all costs of carrying on that war.

Is it possible for intelligent people who have such an experience behind them not to recognise the moral? Diplomacy gives direction to the mass emotions of "civilised" people: that is of people who are politically organised. When the direction it gives is towards wholesale destruction of life and property, the work of diplomacy is terribly easy. When it attempts to give a constructive turn to political activity it wholly fails. When one thinks simply about it, the difficulty of understanding that apparent perversity vanishes. The pre-war Turk as an individual was a charming person. Organised and armed, the pre-war Turks collectively behaved with devilish cruelty, as their Greek and Armenian victims knew. The private soldier of any army individually sees no sense in sticking a bayonet through someone's stomach. On parade, where he ceases to be an individual and becomes a unit in an organisation he feels a mixture of humour and of efficiency in his ability to stick his bayonet through the stomachs of "the enemy," which in its turn has then become an impersonal conception. A man in a crowd will behave in a way that would be repugnant to him if he were acting alone. Conscience and common sense alike seem to be individual attributes, lost in the mob. Diplomacy is a form of mob activity. The historical text-books therefore are largely chronicles of war. The history of our time differs from the history of a hundred years ago only in the intensity of its diplomatic unrest. The very achievements of scientists working as individuals add to the unrest of "civilisation." War in the air is added to war on land and on the sea. Bacteriology, a science originating as a means of combating physical disease and of saving human life, is turned by politics into a means of creating physical disease and destroying human life on the biggest scale.

Yet it does not satisfy thinking men merely to point the obvious fact that politics are a destructive agency. Negative criticism of such a kind is itself destructive, for the fact remains that the world is organised politically, and will no doubt continue so to be organised. It is the duty of thinking men to help in the search for a solution to a human problem which in our time has reached a climax.

Many people now take the view that the very progress of scientific research has its drawbacks from the political point of view. Science has made it easy for the peoples of different countries to make contact with each other. It is proved by the history of our time that in so far as political societies make contact with each other they disagree. They disagree on the slightest provocation, and they find it impossible, as we have seen, to agree on the strongest inducement about matters even of clear common interest. In the days when no other means were available of exchanging opinions between nations than the sending of messages by slow trains and slower boats, the factor of time was on the side of the angels. Nowadays the spoken word can be broadcast round the world with the speed of light, and human contact can be made by air travel at the rate of over a hundred miles an hour. London, Berlin, Paris and Rome are now within a few hours' journey of each other.

It has in the past been an axiom, hardly called in doubt, among many students of international affairs that a greater knowledge of one people by another is a necessarily good thing. Yet is it? It is almost universally taken for granted, for instance, especially in Great Britain, that the League of Nations is a good thing, if only because it regularly brings together the politicians of many countries for consultation. Is it not possible that such a view may be mistaken? Is it not at least arguable that peace would be better assured if the politicians of the several countries were kept apart, and the peoples of the several countries were kept in ignorance of each other?

The intellect plays many tricks upon those who rely upon it for guidance in life. Its worst trick is that it destroys the simplicity of one's outlook. One of the simple facts seems to be that the world is divided into different types of people, differentiated by the colour of their skin, some being black, some white, some yellow, some red; by differing conditions of life, some living in hot, some in cold, some in mixed climates; by different systems of communal organisation, law, traditions, morality; by different languages, springing from the different, separate origins of the different peoples. In its original circumstance life on this earth is cast in separate communities, kept apart by those multiple barriers. It is the mind of man, his intellect, that breaks down the barriers, with the result that people travel from one racial enclosure to another, learn each other's languages, observe their customs. Is that necessarily a good

thing? It is an interesting thing to do, even exciting. But all exciting things are not necessarily good in their effects. It may be hard to believe that it would be better, not to bring the nations closer together, but to keep them farther apart, for the sake of peace. Yet many serious people nowadays are tempted to believe it.

In its origin, political civilisation was the attempt to safeguard common interests by common sanction. It is well, for instance, to discourage murder or theft. It is necessary for peoples to have a means of regulating common interests, commercial and other, with other peoples. The disease of politics consists in its hypertrophe, in its going beyond its original function and becoming an end in itself. The fact that governments attempt to dictate on matters of morality or personal taste to the people who elect them, is merely a symptom that politics have got beyond themselves. Similarly the League of Nations, instead of confining itself to its only real purpose, namely the discouragement of war, attempts to discourage the traffic in opium, prostitution, slavery: human problems not relevant to politics. The dilemma is that the greater grows the power of the politicians, the more people obtain a stake in its further growth, the more numerous, for instance, become the people who, as "permanent officials," get their living thereby. How can it be restrained? The fascist suppression of the ordinary political machinery in Italy and in Germany is symptomatic of a prevailing apprehension of the dangers of politics. But in those cases the remedy itself is political, the form only being different. It is doubtful if it is even a better form. The great need of our time seems to be that we should edge away from politics and revert to individualist ideals. How to do so is a puzzler: unless the politicians themselves, by the demonstration they gave in the summer of 1933 of their inability to serve human interests when they attempt to go beyond their original purpose of safeguarding life and property, have made it inevitable that the individual shall in the future more and more ignore the politicians. The fact that the failure of the two world conferences did not depress or even surprise many people was an indication that the absurd heights to which political competence has been driven since 1914 are no longer tenable, and that the descent has started.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 15th, 1933.

No. 384. *September, 1933.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE HERSCHEL CHRONICLE.*

Mrs. Lubbock has composed a vivid and almost perfect picture of the lives of the great Herschel and his sister by the skilful use of letters and autobiographic notes. She claims only to be an editor, but, in fact, she is a composer who, possessing the material and the inherited appreciation of the inner lives of two most wonderful personalities, makes these persons, and those with whom they were in constant contact, speak for themselves. In this setting the lives of William and Caroline Herschel form a drama, a drama which at one point verges on tragedy, but a drama which begins and ends with love:

L'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle.

Mrs. Lubbock writes:

> William Herschel's discoveries and theories have also been presented in his own words, quoted either from the Papers which he communicated to the Royal Society or from his letters. Letters also are given from contemporary men of science to show how these discoveries and theories were regarded in his own time; their ultimate value must be decided by the wider knowledge of later generations. It was as an intrepid pioneer, breaking a way to new fields of discovery and to new trains of thought, that William Herschel appeared in his lifetime and as such it is sought to represent him in this *Chronicle*.

* *The Herschel Chronicle: The Life Story of William Herschel and his sister, Caroline Herschel.* Edited by his grand-daughter, Constance A. Lubbock. Cambridge: at the University Press. 21s. net.

Indeed his epitaph in the little churchyard at Upton contains the exquisite phrase invented by Dr. Goodall, Provost of Eton, *Coelorum perrupit claustra,* which, as Mrs. Lubbock says, "might well stand alone as sufficient epitome of William Herschel's life work."

Caroline Herschel was not a mere "fag" to William (though both she and William were "fags" to their elder brother, Jacob). She was a wonderful woman in her character and in her love for her relations, a person whom George Eliot might have created, a woman who stands alive in these pages for almost a century: but she was not only an almost perfect character. Her gifts as an independent astronomical observer will never be forgotten. Frail in physical form she had a spiritual strength which literally supplied the place of physical strength. She was born on March 16th, 1750, near Hanover. She survived till January 9th, 1848, at the beginning of the year of revolutions when our present discontents began. She had lived long enough to receive the news from the widow of her brother of the mathematical discovery of a new planet beyond Uranus by Adams and Leverrier; "I might almost say in consequence of the discovery of Uranus," writes Lady Herschel to Caroline on October 7th, 1846. What memories the very phrase must have brought to Caroline, since William Herschel established his name by the discovery of Uranus in 1781, sixty-five years before. A new world had come since William had revolutionised astronomy by his wonderful telescopes and his more wonderful thought which broke through the confines of time and space.

The emergence to fame of the "immortal brother" of Caroline (to use the phrase of the King of Prussia in 1846) is an extraordinary story. Friedrich William Herschel was born on November 15th, 1738, at Hanover, the third of the surviving six children of Isaac Herschel, an oboist in the Prussian Foot Guards. The earlier history of the family shows that there was great musical and practical talent, which was inherited by Isaac's children. The family were comparatively poor, but they were all given a sound education, developing all their powers of mind and body, and the influence of Isaac Herschel in endless evening talks on science, astronomy and philosophy was destined to bear great fruit. At the age of fifteen William was engaged as a hautboy player in the Hanoverian Guards, while Jacob became organist at the Garrison

Chapel, and this addition to the family income enabled Isaac to engage a teacher for his two boys in languages and mathematics. Isaac had great hopes of these boys, but in 1756 the war between England and France necessitated the dispatch of Hanoverian troops to England and these included Isaac and his two elder sons. They were quartered at Maidstone and William says "here I applied myself to learn the English language and soon was enabled to read Locke on the *Human Understanding.*" In the autumn they returned from England and were enthusiastically welcomed by poor Mrs. Herschel and by Caroline, now aged seven. In the spring, Isaac and William saw the disastrous field of Hastenbeck. Hanover was occupied by the French and the Hanoverian Army was impounded. William was a non-combatant and was at liberty to leave the forces. He did this without formal dismissal, but, in fact, he obtained later his formal discharge. The brothers went to England in the autumn, but Isaac was obliged to stay and did not get his discharge from the band for two years after the victory of Minden in 1759.

Jacob then returned to Hanover, but William felt that a career had become possible in England. He had made a living by music-copying and concerts together with his brother, and when Jacob left him, having borrowed all his savings, he started afresh as a bandmaster for a regiment of Militia in Yorkshire, where he made friends and set his heart on being a composer. But he did not neglect his study of languages and was soon also plunged into higher mathematics springing out of the theory of music and harmonics. He was then about twenty-two, very lonely but full of intellectual and physical energy. In 1762 he was engaged as the Director of Concerts at Leeds. In May 1764 he visited Hanover and had the joy of seeing his devoted father again. Caroline was then fourteen. It was the briefest of visits for he had to do much musical work in the North of England. But after his return his leisure was more and more devoted to the study of advanced mathematics, and he records on February 19th, 1766, his observation of Venus. In this year he was appointed organist at the Parish Church of Halifax and he worked hard at sacred music and had many scholars. In December he moved to Bath and became the organist of the Octagon Chapel, a fashionable teacher of music and the leader of musical thought in that famous city, working fourteen to sixteen hours a day. Until 1776 Herschel con

ducted the famous Winter Concerts organised by Lady Lothian, one of his many enthusiastic patrons. He was earning a quite substantial income and he helped all the members of his family. His father had died in 1767. Caroline was the little drudge of the family, William had been always intensely attached to her, and in 1772 he went to Hanover and fetched the rather unhappy girl, now twenty-three years old. His mother was content to part with her so long as William paid for another servant. She was at first miserable and homesick. The artificiality of Bath did not suit her, but she threw herself into music and made some mark, and she acquired that knowledge of mathematics which the new life of her brother William necessitated.

The new life, the life of an amateur astronomer, began in the spring of 1773. William Herschel was now thirty-five and almost, or quite, in the zenith of his physical and intellectual powers. Music did not satisfy him and he was a skilled mathematician. He was a practical man, a mechanic of rare power and ingenuity and his mind had been on the problems of astronomy for many years. Leibnitz, Newton and Euler had been discussed with his beloved father almost from childhood, and Isaac loved astronomy. William had from early days equal command over his hand and brain and now, in his thirty-fifth year, he began to make telescopes that would reveal secrets hitherto veiled from man. The work at Bath went on but his other vocation and his new labours also went on at an increasing rate. He records, in 1774, "*July*. I observed Saturn with a new twenty-feet reflector I had erected in my garden." He joined the Bath Philosophical Society and contributed thirty-one papers on various scientific subjects between January 1780 and March 1781. Here he met Maskelyne, the Astronomer Royal, and Dr. Hornsby, the Director of the Oxford Observatory. The telescopes were becoming famous.

On the night of March 13th, 1781, Herschel discovered Uranus and announced it at once to Dr. Hornsby and Dr. Maskelyne. The latter accepted it at once as a planet. The astronomical world could not believe that such magnifying power was possible, but in fact Herschel's telescopes were vastly superior to anything at Greenwich. The news of the discovery and of the existence of a musician who proposed to disclose the music of the spheres ran through England and Europe. The Copley Medal was conferred in November 1781

and he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society on December 6th, 1781. From this point of time the career of William Herschel becomes clear, and Mrs. Lubbock illustrates the successive phases in a fashion that brooks no delay in reading. The world of science realised, at first with some doubt, that a new thinker had appeared quite comparable with the great Laplace and having instruments at his disposal which could confirm, or possibly enlarge, the conceptions of the author of the *Mécanique Céleste*.

One of the most interesting incidents in the book is the meeting of the First Consul, Laplace and Herschel, on a grilling Sunday, August 8th, 1802, at Malmaison. Bonaparte alone was seated, though he invited Herschel (and no one else) to join him. The heat was terrific (Bonaparte said it was 95° in the shade and, in fact, it was more), but the First Consul entered upon a philosophic discussion with Laplace and "rather opposed" him when, in an answer to his question, "Who is the author of all this?" Laplace attributed it not to God, but to a series of natural causes. Herschel in his diary has this comment: "Much may be said on the subject; by joining the arguments of both we shall be led to 'Nature and Nature's God'." The period was the brief interval introduced by the Peace of Amiens. There is not a word against Napoleon in the diary, but in September 1813, according to Thomas Campbell,—a poetical witness—Herschel, while admitting Napoleon's quickness and versatility, said, "I remarked his hypocrisy in concluding the conversation on astronomy by observing how all these glorious views gave proofs of an Almighty wisdom." Germany had suffered much from Napoleon in the interval of eleven years and perhaps that accounts for the discrepant accounts. In 1802 three of the greatest men of that age met in Paris and were obviously pleased with one another.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

LORD BIRKENHEAD.*

For an affectionate and devoted son to write a successful life of a brilliant and distinguished father is obviously difficult; and

* *Frederick Edwin Earl of Birkenhead.* By his son, the Earl of Birkenhead. Thornton Butterworth Ltd. Vol. I. 21s.

in this case the task which young Lord Birkenhead set himself might well have seemed foredoomed to failure. For F. E. Smith, or "F. E.," as we always called him, was certainly not a perfect character. Those of us who knew him well and enjoyed his friendship, delighting in his brilliant talk and wonderful powers of entertainment, were well aware that he did not possess, or for that matter, lay claim to, all the Christian virtues. That of humility, for example, was conspicuously absent. But his son has succeeded, quite wonderfully, I think, in combining filial piety with a truthful delineation of his father's character. This first volume is not a bowdlerised edition of F. E. Smith's early career—of his doings and sayings, his exploits and adventures in Wadham and at the Oxford Union, at the Bar, as a platform orator, and in the House of Commons. There is an unaffected admiration for the brilliant qualities which achieved success, and a tenderness for faults, more or less glaring, which the most friendly critic cannot ignore. But a real life-letter portrait emerges; and the hero-worship does not spoil it.

This book takes us down to the Great War, which interrupted the Ulster movement against Home Rule and put an end to Smith's career at the Bar. It is a faithful record of his origins, of his career at Oxford, of his rapid rise at the Bar, of his achievements on the platform and as a dashing debater in the House of Commons. How deeply rooted his Tory principles were, we need not inquire. He was not a political idealist, nor was he deeply concerned with principles, though at my instigation he wrote, soon after we left Oxford, quite a good book on Toryism. I remember also when the Tariff Reform movement began that he asked me to send him some literature on the subject; but he soon threw in his lot with the main body of his Party, though he never showed any profound acquaintance with the economics of the fiscal controversy.

By far the most entertaining and delightful chapters in Lord Birkenhead's first volume are concerned with Oxford. F. E.'s contemporaries at Wadham remember with what zest and spirit he threw himself into the life of the College. He provided us with every kind of entertainment. His practical jokes and improvisations, his riotous adventures, his scathing repartees and, above all, the marvellous stories which he circulated, often to the discredit of prominent members of the College, made him an ideal "sodalis." As an athlete, of course, he yielded to C. B. Fry, the Senior Scholar of his year; but he was a fine Rugby

football player and a good long-distance runner. He had any amount of courage and endurance. When he had turned fifty he could still play vigorous sets of tennis. At forty-eight, when Lord Chancellor, after a dinner at Christchurch, he wagered Milligan, a famous Oxford runner, that he would run round Tom Quad four times before Milligan could run eight. They ran in dinner jackets and evening shoes; Birkenhead won easily.

Extravagance was one of his besetting sins; his earnings at the Bar, we are told, rose in one year to thirty thousand pounds; yet he seems always to have been in the habit of spending more than his income. But he was hospitable and generous, and hosts of friends shared in the enjoyment of an expenditure which he could not afford. In later public life he was at times arrogant and even truculent. Perhaps he was a little too fond of recounting his own successes; but he rejoiced in those of his friends. He detested bores and was no respecter of persons. At Oxford he sharpened his wit in College and Union debates. Afterwards in public life pompous fools who crossed his path often writhed under his sarcasms. When he was at his best, there was no better, no more amusing companion. His originality and fertility in the invention of stories were amazing. The characters were recognisable caricatures; the incidents, usually based upon some substratum of fact, were recited with a solemn air of plausibility which captivated the attention. Some of the best grew out of adventures in the Levant with his friend L. S. Amery in the spring of 1898; and several of these are re-told by his son in Chapter VI.

In conclusion I may perhaps repeat one (not translated in this volume) which belongs to the days of Tariff Reform. Bonar Law had to receive a deputation of Hop Growers and asked F. E. to sit with him. All the talk was of "'Ops." After listening for a time Smith perceived that there had been a good hop harvest, but it had been too good. There was a glut, and "'Ops" were ruinously cheap. Suddenly F. E. bethought him of a line in Horace and whispered to Bonar Law *Magnas inter opes inops*, which might be translated "'Opeless amid abundance of 'Ops." Bonar Law was mystified. He knew no Latin; and afterwards, when his colleague laboriously translated and explained the joke, the Scot could not see it. F. E. said it was the very best, as well as the most unsuccessful, pun he had ever perpetrated.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE NAME AND NATURE OF POETRY.*

Professor A. E. Housman, the eminent scholar, poet and critic, has, in his delightful Leslie Stephen lectures, delivered at Cambridge last May, let himself go on Poetry: Its Name and Nature. He admits that there are many "legitimate meanings of the word poetry." The word may signify an inspired composition of the simplest kind and, ascending what he calls "the stair of poetry," it may signify an inspiration of the heights and depths of human nature. Professor Housman says, "and I think that to transfuse emotion—not to transmit thought but to set up in the reader's sense a vibration corresponding to what was felt by the writer—is the peculiar function of poetry." J. H. Newman, while still a Fellow of Oriel, writing in the *London Review* in 1829 on "Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics," remarks that it is "a common fault to mistake a mere knowledge of the heart for poetical talent," and that "a talent for composition . . . is no essential part of poetry, though indispensable to its exhibition. Hence it would seem that attention to the language, for its own sake, evidences not the true poet, but the mere artist," though in some of the greatest poets "the harmony of the verse is but the echo of the inward music which the thoughts of the poet breathe." With these views of 1829 Professor Housman may or may not agree, but when Newman himself criticises his own essay as late as 1871 his views and the views of the Leslie Stephen lecturer of 1933 seem to have much in common. Newman says that his essay of more than forty years before "certainly omits one of the essential conditions of the idea of Poetry, its relation to the affections. . . . Poetry may be considered to be the gift of moving the affections through the imagination, and its object to be the beautiful." Such a definition serenely defines both the name and the nature of Poetry. Certainly it is truer than Poe's statement in 1848, "With me poetry has been not a purpose, but a passion." Purpose is essential to true poetry and in fact it appears in Poe's poetry.

It is both difficult and dangerous to criticise in any way the critical views of Professor Housman since every sentence and

* *The Name and Nature of Poetry.* By A. E. Housman, Kennedy Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge. The Leslie Stephen Lecture delivered at Cambridge, May 9th, 1933. Cambridge: at the University Press. 2s. net.

indeed every word contains a matured judgment. Yet there is a temptation to question the statement that "the majority of civilised mankind notoriously and indisputably" do not "possess the organ by which poetry is perceived." The word "civilised" is evidently introduced with a purpose. The "uncivilised" races, it may be argued with some force, possess this organ in at any rate a high degree. The early history of poetry, the very form of early literature, is evidence of this view. Now who are "civilised mankind"? For the most part men, women and children who in a particular course of education, a very doubtful education, have been compelled to neglect the innate faculty which perceives poetry when it is presented to them. In learning to read and write and think they have neglected the power to sing with their soul. That power has become latent, but it still exists and may be cultivated again into more than its natural splendour. It is a matter of education. We are the victims of what may be called dis-education in the cult of the beautiful and the moving of the heart through the imagination: "Poetry is not the thing said but a way of saying it." For the present we have almost lost the way of saying it, but we shall recover it when we have de-urbanised modern life. We must go back to Nature in the true sense (not the eighteenth-century sense, yet in Blake's sense) and become "uncivilised" in the best sense again.

One other comment on this remarkable and socially helpful lecture may be allowed. Professor Housman asks: "Is there such a thing as pure unmingled poetry, poetry independent of meaning?" and shows that there are poems, many of Blake's and some of Shakespeare's, that are "ravishing poetry" but are practically meaningless, at any rate in the intellectual sense. He adds that "Poetry indeed seems to me more physical than intellectual." But is there not another explanation? There are certain passages of "ravishing poetry" which over-stretch the line between music (in the technical sense) and poetry. Great music has the same or almost the same effect of a physical character as great poetry. But it is submitted that these effects are not physical at all, though they have physical reactions. They are psychic forces—to use the term recently used by Dr. Barnes and Sir James Jeans—in contradistinction to physical forces. They affect the imagination, the affection, the sense of tragedy, the sense of spiritual incompleteness—Thomas à Kempis, in a mystical

passage replete with pure poetry, cries suddenly "Without sorrow there is no living in love"—the sense of immortal things. These forces are psychic, and whether in music or poetry they seem to supplement mind and body.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

CHILDREN'S BOOKS.*

Mr. Harvey Darton was obviously the right man to compile that neglected section of social, and indeed educational, history which consists of a record of books designed to give amusement or (to use Mr. Darton's phrase) "spontaneous pleasure" to children, since apart from his notable contribution on the subject to the *Cambridge History of English Literature* he, as a former publisher, has an hereditary interest in the subject. His great-grandfather, William Darton, the publisher in Gracechurch Street, introduced Ann and Jane Taylor to English children. His grandfather issued from Holborn Hill "The Juvenile Library," and most of the later works of Mrs. Sherwood and of William and Mary Howitt. The family indeed were publishing children's books for some 140 years and remained in the trade till 1928. It was only about forty years before the Darton family entered upon their charming labours that John Newbery, "the most authentic founder of this traffic in minor literature," published his first children's book. That was in 1744. A new educational principle emerged in Newbery's little book entitled *A Little Pretty Pocket Book*. The new principle was "Delectando Monemus: Instruction with Delight"—a sound principle developed on all sides in modern education. The Newbery firm rivalled in length of existence the Darton firm, since they were publishing in St. Paul's Churchyard as late as the present reign.

These commercial and bibliographical details are very valuable. No doubt the early publishers, like their present successors, had to win a market and indeed Mr. Darton says boldly that 90 per cent. of the children's books "were written to pay their way, and the author's and publisher's ways." But the point is that publishers and authors realised that the way that paid in an ethical as well as a financial sense was the way to a child's heart. Lewis Carroll (Dr. C. L. Dodgson) from the home of lost causes trod that enchanting way, but it had been trodden a century before.

* *Children's Books in England: Five Centuries of Social Life.* By F. J. Harvey Darton. Cambridge: at the University Press. 15s. net.

The invaluable book lists and bibliographies curiously enough do not include (as a second edition should include) the late Miss Bedford's delightful book *English Children in the Olden Times*, published in 1907 by Methuen under the name of Elizabeth Godfrey, a book which inasmuch as it traces the course of English childhood through many centuries and successive literary influences of those centuries upon children is worthy of great note and is, though a quarter of a century old, a good supplement to Mr. Darton's book.

Miss Bedford and Mr. Darton have especially one thing in common: they do not deal in "a collection of queer facts or antiquarian scraps," but tell a continuous story, in one case the story of English childhood illustrated by literature, in the other the story of books illustrated by the lives of English children. In both cases they run to the beginnings of English social life. Mr. Darton tells, as in duty bound, of the legacy of the Middle Ages in the field of fables, of romance and the good godly books of Puritanic times, as well as of the chapmen of the second half of the seventeenth century to our time. Mr. Darton states the truth when he writes that "Bunyan, in respect of children's books, as in adult literature, is alone." He indeed began a new phase in children's literature. But his *Pilgrim's Progress* is not alone. He wrote a book especially for children, *Divine Emblems*, which has a strange bibliographic history. But in the evolution of real books for real children we must not forget the influence of fairy tales and nursery rhymes, rhymes which, so far as actual books are concerned, have a French origin though the things themselves are English enough, as Gower, Chaucer, Spenser and Shakespeare knew. But the French influence in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is undeniable, and we get the "Sleeping Beauty," "Red Riding Hood," "Cinderella" and other well-known tales for children from French books. This magic interlude carries us on to the days of John Newbery and William Darton.

That new age was adorned by the Edgeworths—to whom a deserved tribute is paid—the moral tale didactive and persuasive, an age interesting as a new though not very attractive educational influence. It was known to fame (apart from Maria Edgeworth) perhaps mostly from the influence of the excellent Mrs. Trimmer (Mr. Darton's account of her is delightful and true) and Mrs. Sherwood, the famous author of *The Fairchild Family* (a story which teems "with personal force

and vitality " and is still alive enough to be parodied in *Punch* in the year 1933), rather than from the nobler influence of Goldsmith, Blake and Lamb. The reaction from the dreadful days of the didactive tale (saved from sheer forgetfulness by the genius of Miss Edgeworth) to the sheer wonderfulness of the period of *Alice in Wonderland* is a theme that requires adequate telling, and Mr. Darton has done it. The whole book is full of enlightenment as to the growth of true realism, which means to the child true idealism, and there is a certainty that we can never go back to times in which the life of childhood is tormented by unreal things. We have learnt, so far as children's literature is concerned, that the ideal and real are necessarily one.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

THE ARMY AND THE CONSTITUTION.*

The constitutional history of the British Army is of exceptional interest. It illustrates in striking fashion the gradual limitation of the Royal Prerogative in favour of Parliamentary control through responsible ministers. In *Parliament and the Army* Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Omond has set out " to describe the various phases through which the problem of the political control of the army in this country has passed from the middle of the seventeenth to the beginning of the present century." The conception of a standing army as an agent of oppression rather than as a means of defence has dominated the history of the British army. The arbitrary exercise of force by the Stuarts and the military coercion of the Commonwealth threatened and at times deprived the people of their personal rights long enjoyed under the Common Law.

The command of the army for long remained a personal Prerogative of the Sovereign and outside the sphere of Parliament. The latter could only restrain its activities by the withdrawal of financial support. Colonel Omond fails to appreciate the natural and very real suspicion of an irresponsible standing army. It was much more than mere " political claptrap." He complains that the people

> did not see that the growth of commerce entailed the expansion of the military forces, for trading communities required protection, which the army alone could supply.

* Cambridge. 10s. 6d. net.

In the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth centuries, while the great colonising Powers were still centred in Europe, command of the sea was the best protection against attacks upon our trade and against the invasion of this country and our colonies. The army was at best a second, and very suspicious, string. There was much to be said for the view of Dean Swift (contained in his pamphlet *Of Public Absurdities in England*) :

> A standing army in England, whether in time of Peace or War, is a direct absurdity. For, it is no part of our business to be a warlike nation, otherwise than by our fleets. In foreign wars we have no concern, further than in conjunction with allies, whom we may either assist by sea, or by foreign troops paid with our money.

The King still possessed great personal executive authority. The theory of ministerial responsibility took a century or more to evolve and longer to be applied in all matters of government. The personal Prerogative over the command of the army was more tenaciously maintained than in any other sphere. George III, with a large army under his control, might well have tried to overthrow Parliament and resume the personal rule of the Stuarts. Upon the Continent military autocracy as a form of government prevailed and England remained almost alone the home of liberty of speech and action. Fear of an army in time of peace was well grounded until at least such time as Parliament itself acquired control.

When, after the Napoleonic wars, the existence of a regular army became inevitable, we witness the struggle for Parliamentary control over the actual administration and command of the army through a responsible minister. The old positions of Secretary-at-War and Commander-in-Chief were constitutionally opposed to each other. The former was responsible to Parliament and the latter direct to the Sovereign. The Crimean War demonstrated, what had long been apparent, that two such antagonistic officials could not provide the strong, united action essential to success in a military campaign. Sole control by the Commander-in-Chief was clearly impossible. The only alternative was his subordination to a Secretary of State. This was Cardwell's primary reform. " I contend," he wrote, " for the principle of plenary responsibility to Parliament on the part of the Parliamentary head of the Department." The substitution of a Military Adviser for the post of Commander-in-Chief, which was the logical outcome of Cardwell's work, was delayed

for thirty years by the determined opposition of the Queen and the Commander-in-Chief, her cousin, the Duke of Cambridge. A compromise provided that the administrative departments of the War Office should be responsible in the first place to the Commander-in-Chief, and ultimately to the Secretary of State. Lord Wolseley, who was Commander-in-Chief from 1895-1900, pointed out that he had no effective control and no responsibilities, and that his post should be abolished or given real power. Finally, after the Esher Committee had reported in 1904, the post was abolished and the Army Council was formed upon the lines of the Board of Admiralty. Henceforth the Secretary of State "was answerable to Parliament . . . for the discipline of the army, its relations to the civil populations, its cost and efficiency, in fact, for everything connected with it."

Colonel Omond goes on to make the curious and inconsistent statement that:

> It is important to note that no attempt was made to interfere with the powers of the King as head of the army. The issue of whether the King could regulate the army as he pleased was not raised. To have done so, would have involved a discussion of the controversy which has centred round the question of the possession by the Sovereign of some power which cannot be abolished or controlled by Act of Parliament.

Constitutionally it is true that the Prerogative has not been curtailed, though it is equally untrue to state that Parliament has no such power. The law on this point is quite clear. Parliament has continually abrogated or limited the Prerogative power. A simple example is the limitation of the King's power to dismiss the judges. The constitutional effect of these military reforms has been to transfer the exercise of the Prerogative from irresponsible to responsible ministers, so that its exercise is now subject to Parliamentary approval. While, therefore, the King's Prerogative continues to exist his personal authority has disappeared.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

War Unless—, by Sisley Huddleston,* is described as a pamphlet warning us of the imminent danger of war. The author has published many books on France and Europe, but never one so alarming, so arresting, so impossible to ignore.

* Gollancz. 5s.

From his observation post near Paris he has watched the dark clouds gathering over the world until he feels it his imperative duty to tell the truth as he sees it. The challenge comes with all the greater force from one who is not only a journalist of long experience but a man of cool and critical temperament. The little book is written with a welcome simplicity of phrasing and a rare cogency of argument. Peace, he tells us, has not returned to the world because it has not returned to men's hearts. Europe is divided sharply into two camps—the victors, who want to keep what they have won, and the vanquished, who want to regain at any rate part of what they have lost. All the pacts, new and old, all the Conferences, successful or unsuccessful, cannot hide or bridge the yawning gulf between revisionists and anti-revisionists. The League of Nations, a noble ideal, is powerless in the major issues, for each of its members thinks wholly or mainly of itself. Unregenerate nationalism is rampant in an interdependent world. Disarmament is impossible till the fears which produce armaments are removed. It is for the Great Powers, not in open Conference but in the peace of the Chancelleries, to save us from our doom. If revision is dangerous, its indefinite postponement is more dangerous still. "A territorial and political revision of treaties which were framed in impossible conditions, which were a betrayal of the terms on which the Armistice was made, which placed minorities under hostile alien rule, which are indefensible on economic, historic and racial grounds, which were unilaterally imposed on defeated countries, which have never been accepted and cannot receive the assent of proud and increasingly powerful nations, must be undertaken." It is a tragedy that the German revolution, which is the child of humiliation and suffering, is at the same time a fresh and formidable obstacle to revision.

* * *

The discovery of television ranks among the great achievements of science, and it is fitting that the public should know something of the man who made such progress possible. In *Baird of Television** Mr. Ronald F. Tiltman has written a short sketch of the life of Mr. J. L. Baird. The author is a journalist and a close friend of the inventor. This book does not attempt to discuss scientifically the various aspects of Mr. Baird's work. It tells simply the story of great objectives attained after years of perseverance, amid ill health, poverty and continual discouragement. "Mr. Tiltman's excellent biography," writes Lord Angus Kennedy in his Foreword, "will be of supreme interest to all, faithfully chronicling, as it does, the history of a man of great personality who set himself out to probe the mysteries of the ether, who struggled and attained, learning to regard both disaster and triumph with equanimity, who has become a world-famous inventor, and is, like ourselves, a human being." Mr. Baird made his most fundamental discovery in 1925 when he transmitted images in perspective containing light and shade in place of the

* Seeley Service & Co. 12s. 6d. net

flat silhouette. Since then he has laboured to perfect his work. Less than two years ago, Mr. Baird declared that " our work now is to simplify and cheapen our present laboratory apparatus, so that it can be made available to the man in the street. The problem of television is solved. What remains to be done is entirely a matter of technical and commercial development." Television is at last becoming a commercial proposition. The British Broadcasting Corporation regularly transmit television programmes and, writes Mr. Tiltman in his Preface, " it is now estimated that there are something like ten thousand to twelve thousand British enthusiasts equipped with television receivers."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

" The O'Dwyers of Kilnamanagh,"* by a prominent member of the Clan, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, contains " an attempt to elucidate some of the leading facts in the history of a typical Irish sept " from the seventh to the seventeenth centuries. Until the Cromwellian Confiscation, confirmed in large measure by the Restoration Settlement, the sept or clan played a dominating part in Irish politics. The O'Dwyers, though not one of the great Irish clans, actively participated in the almost continuous succession of uprisings and civil war. This book contains, therefore, all the general features of Irish history with the added interest of being written from the outlook of an active and closely affected Tipperary sept. In a work of this kind historical material is difficult to obtain and digest. Sir Michael is handicapped by his ignorance of Irish and by the destruction of many documents in the Dublin Four Courts explosion in 1922. To some extent, however, he has been able to make good this loss by research elsewhere. There are several chapters dealing with the O'Dwyers who fought in foreign service and those who remained in Ireland after the Restoration.

* * *

Dr. H. C. E. Zacharias, in his very interesting volume entitled " Renascent India from Ram Mohan Roy to Mohandas Gandhi "† gives a very living account of the processes which during the last century have led to the present position in India. The account of Ram Mohan Roy (who died at Bristol when on a visit to England a century ago) is particularly good, and Dr. Zacharias traces from his influence and the influence of the Brahmo Samaj, which he founded, the movements for reform and the social and political leaven which move native India to-day. " The women's movement in India . . . has succeeded with a swiftness and to a degree that would have seemed fantastic even a few years earlier." The picture of Mr. Gandhi is a perfectly fair one and lays stress on his faults as well as his virtues. The book is well worth reading and studying.

* John Murray. 10s. 6d. net.
† Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

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LORD GREY.

THE passing of Viscount Grey of Fallodon has taken from us the Elder Statesman, who, more than any other public man in English life, enjoyed the esteem and confidence of all those who value character and integrity in international relations and in national affairs. The very concentration of his activities and the limitation of his interests in the sphere of political life conduced to the weight of his influence, whenever exerted, and to the appreciation both of the loftiness of his aims and the value of his services.

This is not the occasion for surveying and estimating his diplomacy as Foreign Secretary in the pages of this REVIEW. Opportunity for making this endeavour will arise later on. In this number we are concerned to pay our homage to Lord Grey for a character and career which exemplified the highest qualities which Englishmen reverence, and which, taken as a whole, seasoned with the salt of sincerity, disinterestedness, and unsparing devotion a disturbed and eventually catastrophic period of our political and national history.

The life of Lord Grey will be an abiding witness to the essential value of character in public life. He neither enjoyed the possibilities, nor was exposed to the dangers, of genius. His total freedom from personal ambition, combined with the fact that his deepest interests lay in Nature and country life, prevented him from throwing himself into the excitements and turmoil in which ordinary politicians live and move and have their being. Aloofness was an ingredient of his character, and the claims of his great office at a time of unexampled anxiety increased, and largely exacted, this aloofness, in the case of a man so heavily weighted with ceaseless responsibilities and so inadequately equipped with physical strength. But his very detachment from the prevailing interests, passions, and combinations of Parliamentary life added to the impressiveness of his rare presence and speeches, for the very reason that his detachment and austerity made him the unequalled mouthpiece of moral integrity, calm reason and English common sense. Of this authority, his tragic presence, and his convinc-

ing speech on August 3rd, 1914, will be an imperishable historic monument.

Great abilities are, for the most part, expressed in and measured by success. High character is often most impressively revealed in and through failure and reverse. This was the case with Lord Grey. Steadfastly loyal to the *entente* with France, and accepting its responsibility, he was continuously striving for world peace and ceaselessly obsessed by the dangers that beset it. He did his best to smooth away difficulties and to reconcile conflicting interests. But the prevailing forces were too strong for him. He strove for peace to the last moment, but when he failed he gravely and manfully took his stand for international rights, for solemn obligations, and for the paramount interests of the Empire and the world. Hence he accepted war, with much searching of heart, and led the nation into war. During the remainder of his period of office, he showed himself to be a great war Minister in his dealings with our Allies, and with Neutrals, especially the United States.

It is easy to be wise after the event and to suggest that had greater courage and outspokenness dominated Lord Grey's caution, prudence, and circumspection, the war might have been avoided. Such a contention regards too lightly the forces which Lord Grey had to confront abroad and the conflicts and confusions of opinion with which he had to deal at home. Some of the loudest critics at present were outstanding difficulties at that time. The issue is problematic and cannot be decided. It was the world situation and its psychology that were wrong, rather than the man that was at fault. Whatever discoveries may be made, and judgments eventually passed upon the conduct of affairs, at home and abroad, in 1914 and afterwards, it may safely be said that no such discoveries can tarnish the character of Lord Grey, or lessen the tribute that posterity, as well as the present generation, will pay to a lofty character, distinguished by its high aims and its noble patriotism. Nor should mankind forget to give heed to his prophetic warning, " Learn or perish."

THE EDITORS.

THE ECLIPSE OF DEMOCRATIC CIVILISATION*:

THE PRIMARY CAUSE.

I.

WESTERN Liberal and democratic civilisation is the peculiar child of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The ultimate metaphysical root of Liberalism—and all great human movements are ultimately based on metaphysics—is the conviction of the supreme value of the individuality of man, that it is the right and responsibility of every individual to think for himself rather than to accept his thinking from any human authority, however august, whether in Church or State. I think the purpose of life is progress in this world and not merely happiness in the next. From this primary root Western civilisation has inexorably developed after a thousand years of relative inertia and preoccupation into other-worldliness. Liberalism began by substituting the reign of law for the rule of arbitrary force. That law secured to the individual personal and religious liberty and the right to think, to propound his political opinions, and to take economic initiative on his own, within the limits laid down by the law. Then both law and government were progressively made amenable to the control of the adult citizens themselves both male and female, under the Parliamentary system. The Bill of Rights, the abolition of slavery, the long tale of social reform, the idea of progress, the capitalist system, democracy, have all sprung from the basic principle of individual liberty within law which is itself amenable to the control of public opinion, which was reborn in Europe from ancient Athens in the sixteenth century. To most of us the war of 1914 was, at bottom, fought to preserve a system of civilisation based on liberty and right which was challenged by a system based upon despotism, represented by dynastic militarism in Germany, Austria and Russia.

Western Liberal civilisation manifestly is not perfect. It is only a beginning and a very faint beginning. The first effect of liberty is often confusion, if not licence. Ultimately a free system of society depends upon the quality of the members who compose it and that quality will only rise if the citizens are well educated, scientifically minded, have the selflessness and

* Part of an address to the Liberal Summer School, Cambridge, August 1933.

public spirit which comes from religion, and develop character by taking the ultimate responsibility for government and business on their own shoulders. The defects of liberty are all about us to-day; the ignorance and frivolity and gullibility of much of the electorate, and the perversity, short-sightedness, and cynical selfishness of many politicians and journalists and business men. There is also a great decline in the power of institutional religion. None the less, Liberals are convinced that a society based on freedom is fundamentally more healthy and more nearly on the true road of progress than one which has surrendered the freedom of its citizens to think and act on their own responsibility in return for the promise of order or conquest or plenty imposed by authority. That idea is the central article of the Liberal creed, and has been the main driving force behind modern civilisation.

II.

If this be true, what is the explanation of the extraordinary slump which has overtaken not only Liberalism, but individual liberty, democracy and capitalism, the characteristic institutions of the pre-war age? And why have they been replaced over a large part of the world by the very essence of barbarism —the doctrine that the individual has no rights as against the State, that justice and right can be brushed aside in the interest of class or race, that dictatorship is the road to human and natural greatness, and that government can be permanently based upon the lawless bludgeoning into insensibility of all who express opinions contrary to those of the dominant party?

Liberalism as a political party has declined, no doubt, partly because, until recently, its major programme had actually been realised, and partly because people have come to feel that more democracy, more social reform, more free trade, more self-determination, were impracticable or were not in themselves the answer to the problems of the present. But that does not explain the violent reaction of the present. Nor does it explain the sense of frustration which has come over the still Liberal and democratic world at the very moment of liberty's greatest victory.

The ultimate cause of these things, I venture to think, is just one thing—international anarchy. It is not that the principles of liberty are wrong or out of date, that mankind has outgrown them, that they are not the best foundation for human

progress, but that at present it is impossible to develop or even to apply them either in politics or in economics, because of anarchy among the nations. Most people, no doubt, will give a formal assent to the thesis that our troubles are largely caused by the anarchy of the modern world and by the excessive nationalism, political and economic, to which it gives rise. But I am not sure that everybody realises how far-reaching are its effects and that it is impossible to get rid of our troubles until it is overcome. Liberty and anarchy have always been incompatibles. Anarchy has always meant the temporary triumph of violence or dictatorship. We see it in the rise of violence and dictatorship on every side to-day. Liberty has only flourished as anarchy has been replaced by the reign of law.

But why, it may be asked, has international anarchy suddenly become so much more fatal to a free civilisation than it was in the nineteenth century? It is partly, of course, because of the prodigious shrinking of the globe since the beginning of this century, through the motor-car and the aeroplane and wireless, so that the consequences of anarchy for the world as a whole are as fatal to-day as were the consequences of anarchy for America between 1781-1789, for the British Isles before the Unions, and for Germany before Bismarck. But it is mainly because during the Victorian era there was a peculiar combination of circumstances, which temporarily obscured the effect of the underlying anarchy and gave the post-Reformation world a temporary respite from war. These circumstances were exhaustion after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the extraordinary predominance of Great Britain as a world power, and world free trade—circumstances which made both for international peace and for unprecedented world economic expansion. But this condition was an inherently unstable equilibrium. It has been gradually undermined by the rise of rival world powers, by new methods of transportation and communication and by the growth of national protection. It crashed in ruins in 1914, as every system, ultimately based on anarchy, is bound to crash in ruins.

The Great War was the inevitable consequence of international anarchy, and it is that war which has been the immediate cause of the intensification of nationalism both in politics and economics, the excessive burden of debt, the decline of democracy and liberty, the rise of the dictatorships, the nightmare of fear and resentment which broods over the world. And it must be

perfectly obvious to every thinking person to-day that if the present anarchy continues the competition in armaments will revive, military alliances will replace covenants to renounce war, democracies will increasingly give place to dictatorships, domestic freedom will more and more disappear under the pressure to be prepared and powerful in case of war, the international obstructions to trade and intercourse will multiply, and that war, made far more terrible by aeroplane and gas, will eventually break out both in Europe and the Far East, and gradually engulf the whole world.

But, you will say, all this was foreseen by far-seeing statesmen and you have the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaties, the General Act of Arbitration, and now the Four-Power Pact. Perfectly true. Let us sustain these instruments and institutions by every means in our power. As a moderating force, an educational power, an instrument of international inquiry, the League is excellent. But let us also face reality. Neither the League nor any of the other treaties has solved, or can, in its present form, solve, the problem of international anarchy or end nationalist war, either in its military or its economic form. For the essence of the League of Nations, as of all the other instruments, is the sovereignty of its members. Armaments or frontier impediments to trade are the essential attributes of sovereignty, and the League will never be able to deal effectively with these until it is able to challenge the principle of national sovereignty itself. All political theory and all history proves that the only way of ending military or economic war is the pooling of sovereignty—the creation of a common sovereignty capable of commanding the loyalty of every individual citizen for certain common purposes, to which is entrusted control of all military and naval and aerial power and which treats the component partners as a single community for economic and fiscal purposes.

The only times when there have been long periods of peace and prosperity on earth have been when great areas have been under a common sovereignty as in the case of the Empire of Rome. Every attempt which has ever been made to create a barrier against military or economic war or to maintain a stable peace by voluntary co-operation or by what is called confederation has proved a failure. It failed in ancient Greece, in the early history of the United States, in pre-Bismarckian Germany, and in almost every dominion of the British Commonwealth.

We have had a conspicuous example just lately of the impracticability—I use the word advisedly—of co-operation as a permanent basis for international right and peace, in the history of the attempt of the League to deal with the case of Manchuria. The difficulties of securing simultaneous action among the number of nations, each thinking first of itself, of different size, situated in different parts of the world, faced by unequal risks, unequally interested, are simply insuperable. They will not, and cannot, keep in step, and if one drops out others begin to drop out also. The plain truth is that if nations are ready for effective co-operation they are really ready for political and economic union, to form themselves into a single people for common purposes, for that is the only effective method of co-operation. And if they are not ready for union they are not really ready to make co-operation work as a system for ending anarchy and preserving permanent peace.

This is not said in any spirit of pessimism. Quite the reverse. We are slowly being driven, by suffering, disaster and frustration, as well as by foresight and wisdom, to see that the only way in which nations can avoid constant and recurrent war and preserve a free civilisation is by ending international anarchy, and that means bridging nationalism with some new form of federation. Nothing short of the principle of federation—the creation of a common government for common purposes—will end anarchy. Nothing short of it will end that malaise which exists to-day in the conflict of loyalties which finds expression, for instance, in the famous pacifist resolution of the Oxford Union—a conflict which will only be resolved when pacifism is seen to mean, not a mere negative opposition to the bloody and senseless destruction of war, but positive loyalty to world law and world government, complementary to, and not conflicting with, loyalty to national law and national government.

I do not mean by this that world federation is in sight to-day. What I mean is that we shall only begin to escape from the paralysis in which we stand when we face the fact that the League of Nations, good as it may be as an interim step, is not and cannot be enough, and that the essential and vital step out of anarchy is that progressive and democratic nations should be prepared to federate with other like-minded civilised nations, pool their armaments, and create a common economic system within the union. Then our thinking will become really constructive once more. M. Briand, and many others, have thought

that a federation of Europe was the only cure for Europe's ills. It may be that the free nations may be forced to some form of federation as the only method of resisting a continuation of dictatorships. It may be that the British Commonwealth or the English-speaking world may point the way. It may start large or small and grow by accretion. The vital condition is that the union should not be based on religion or race, but should include nations which have been sovereign and diverse races and peoples. I do not want to attempt to prophesy where the great experiment will begin. The difficulties of language, culture, tradition are immense. I only want to try to bring home that so long as international anarchy lasts so long will competitive armaments and war and the manœuvres of armament firms stay with us, so long will dictatorship and violence challenge democracy and freedom both for individuals and nations, and so long will it be almost impossible for a free civilisation to recover its authority and its power, or be extended to cover the whole world in permanent peace.

III.

So much for the political side of the case. Let me now deal with the economic, where the lesson is not less clear. Most people will agree that it has been economic distress which, in the main, has given the forces of reaction and dictatorship their chance. If it had not been for unemployment and poverty the forces of violence and reaction might not have been able to overthrow the democracies which came into being in 1919. It is often said that these economic distresses are due to the fact that capitalism has broken down and that we shall not recover until a new economic order on fundamentally different lines has taken its place. I think this argument to be demonstrably fallacious. Whether you think capitalism good or bad it has not broken down, as an economic system. What has happened is that international anarchy is making it almost impossible for capitalism to work. It is anarchy, not capitalism, which is the main cause of poverty and unemployment, just as it is the cause of armaments, political discord and war.

Let me state briefly the case for capitalism, for capitalism, combined with democracy, is the product of the individualism which sprang from the Renaissance and the Reformation and is an essential element in Western Liberal civilisation. When I

say capitalism I do not mean *laissez faire,* but the system whereby the main initiative in economic as in political life is left to the individual or to groups of individuals and the democratic State confines its economic activities to running monopolies, laying down the legal conditions to which private enterprise must conform, and to taxing the superfluity of the rich for the common good.

Capitalism raised the standard of living of the people of this country fourfold during the nineteenth century. It transferred 100,000,000 people, mostly poverty-stricken Europeans, across the Atlantic and gave them in the United States and Canada full employment and the highest standard of living ever known in history till a year or two ago. It did much the same in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and parts of South America. Before the war private enterprise was rapidly raising the standard of living in all parts of Europe, especially in France, Germany and the Northern States. It was beginning to do the same for Asia and Africa. Admittedly capitalism combined with *laissez faire* produced in its early phases glaring evils—exploitation of the worker, inhuman treatment of women and children, the painful contrast between rich and poor. But the rise of democracy before the war was rapidly remedying these evils. Trade unionism was securing for the organised worker a very fair share of the proceeds of industry. Factory Acts and trade boards were protecting life and limb and obtaining better wages for the unorganised. Social insurance and old age pensions were providing for the three most serious menaces to the workers' peace and happiness, namely, unemployment, ill health, and old age. Income taxes and death duties were tending to level wealth and to secure increasing education and amenities in which all could share. There was still much to be done along similar lines, as the Liberal Yellow and Green Books and *Coal and Power* have shown. Article XXII of the Covenant established the principles upon which capitalism should be controlled when dealing with backward races.

What then impaired the working of this capitalism tempered by democracy which held such promise only a few years ago? Monkey-wrenches thrown into the system by international anarchy. The basic merit of capitalism, as I see it, is that it is the only system which has ever kept supply and demand in reasonably close adjustment in a changing and progressive world. To accomplish this is obviously one of the supreme difficulties

in an era in which scientific invention and the restless creative energy of millions of men are changing hour by hour the character of commodities and services and the cost of producing, transporting, and advertising them over the face of the whole earth, and in which human demand is also changing every moment as new satisfactions are available and as fashion makes her fitful moves. Yet capitalism, so frequently denounced, had evolved a system whereby the working man and his wife, if in employment, were able to obtain in their own kitchen, delivered several times a day, the products of every corner of the globe, at a reasonable price. Moreover, capitalism was making it possible for the poorer sections of the community to enjoy most of the pleasures once only open to the rich, though not always of the same quality—books, news, amusement, travel, sport.

But, incredibly efficient as the modern capitalist system had become in its service and flexibility, increasingly as it was being humanised by democracy, its successful working depended almost entirely on maintaining freedom for competitive enterprise, within the steadily rising standards set by the law. If there is not sufficient freedom everything goes wrong, the ruthless self-adjusting mechanism of price in the market, whereby supply and demand are kept in adjustment, ceases to operate, enterprise and investment languish, employment falls and with it the bargaining power and the consuming power of the employé, and rigidity begins to replace flexibility in every part of the system.

Capitalism, in fact, to be a success requires a rising market and it is the essence of capitalism that, saving for the trade cycle, it does, if left reasonably free, produce a continuously rising market. I believe that over a long period the capitalist system increased the wealth of the world and the general standard of living by about 4 per cent. a year.

It is international anarchy which has undermined the working of the capitalist system at the very moment when democracy was learning how to overcome its more obvious defects. Before the war the self-adjusting mechanism of the market was already being impaired by nationalist protection blindly and anarchically imposed. For the effect of protection is to encourage production of certain articles within the protected area at the cost of dislocating the world adjustment of supply and demand outside. Protection, and its correlative, subsidies, have the inevitable consequence of over-developing the machinery for producing certain things, for instance, iron and steel, textiles, wheat, or

ships, while reducing the consuming power of the world market as a whole by creating unemployment elsewhere. They further divert capital and enterprise from finding how to meet human needs in some new way, as soon as demand is satisfied, into duplicating the means for making the old things. Measures of a protectionist character designed to mould in some measure the course of national development need not destroy the working of the capitalist system any more than social reform destroys it, provided they are imposed with moderation and with due regard to the external as well as the internal effect, for such is the inherent flexibility of capitalism that it can adjust itself to great variations in condition without disaster.

But the Great War—itself the classic and extreme manifestation of international anarchy—has created a maladjustment of supply and demand so acute as almost to stop the functioning of the capitalist system—as a system. The war had two fundamental effects. On the one hand it caused such unbalanced or maladjusted production by means of war-time over-development of certain industries, and of reckless nationalist tariffs, subsidies, embargoes, quotas, exchange restrictions and other similar devices imposed since the war, largely in self-defence, that economic intercourse has become almost impossible. These obstructions thrown into the mechanism of free exchange have now reduced world trade to 33 per cent. of its 1929 level. On the other hand it has left a burden of indebtedness which it is quite impossible to meet under present-day conditions. Under normal conditions interest on international governmental loans and private investments involves an annual payment from debtor to creditor countries of about £500,000,000 per annum. War debts and reparations added some £200,000,000 a year to that. All these payments involve in practice a one-way movement of trade. Australia and the Argentine, for instance, meet their obligations by selling wool and meat and other primary products in the English market and using the proceeds to meet their sterling obligations. Before the war and up to 1929 after the war this one-way inward-moving traffic was balanced by an equivalent one-way outward movement of capital goods which represents the stream of foreign loans and investment. There was no reason inherent in the capitalist system why this balancing of interest payments on old investment and new foreign investment should not have continued indefinitely, as it did before the war, with immense benefit to the development of the backward portions

of the earth, if it had not been for nationalist restrictions on trade and for the overloading of the system by uneconomic charges for war debts and reparations. But these two factors proved to be the burdens which broke the camel's back, the stream of foreign investment—and especially of American lending—abruptly ceased in 1929, the underlying dislocation became manifest and the great slump began. And the slump will continue until, by allowing price in the market to do its work of adjusting supply and demand throughout the world without undue interference by anarchic governments, people are once more making goods and services which are exchangeable with one another and international lending begins again.

The world, at this moment, is going through a tremendous double process. On the one hand its economic organism is gradually and painfully trying to adapt itself from a condition of comparative freedom of international trade in which nations bought and sold a considerable proportion of their products from one another, to one in which most nations are trying to make themselves as self-supporting as they can and only buy from others what they cannot produce, except at quite excessive cost, for themselves. On the other hand, a gigantic liquidation is taking place of the debts incurred both private and governmental, and of the businesses and industries established on the assumption that international trade on the old scale was going to continue. When the liquidation has taken place, when excessive stocks have been destroyed or used, when enough debts have been cancelled, repudiated, or adjusted, when Governments have no more wrenches to throw into the system, the matchless flexibility of capitalism, and the incredible activity of private initiative and enterprise operating in a million obscure ways, if given a chance, will begin to restore a balance between supply and demand once more, to recreate a stable international monetary system, to revive international trade, and so lift the world out of the unemployment and the greatly lowered standard of living to which anarchy has reduced it, and to which anarchy will reduce it again unless the lesson is learned in time.

I know that many people will contest this view. It is sometimes said that modern invention and especially mass production has made the old system impossible. It seems to me that this thesis, which is the slender intellectual foundation for the economics of Sir Oswald Mosley's B.U.F. Party, is the sheerest

nonsense. Mass production produces no more dislocation of older methods than did the discovery of the steam engine or electricity in an earlier age. On the contrary, Henry Ford has proved that if it lessens labour engaged in the actual production of a particular article it immensely increases the number of people who are employed in producing the raw materials which are used in making it and in distributing, advertising and selling it all over the world. The plain fact is that the standard of living of the whole world and especially of Asia and Africa and South America is pitifully low—1,000,000,000 people are still living at the starvation level. There was no reason why the capitalist system, tempered by democracy and speeded up by mass production, should not have gone on raising the standard of living of the whole world in this century as it did in the last, if it had been allowed to work with reasonable freedom. And the reason why it has not been allowed to work is, in the main, just one thing—international anarchy.

On the other hand it is sometimes said that the growing rigidity of the structure of capitalism, caused on the one hand by trades unionism, social insurance and old age pensions, and on the other hand by the increase in cartels and other price-fixing and production-regulating arrangements, has destroyed the effectiveness of the old self-regulating system of free competition in the market. I venture to dissent from this view. The present rigidity is largely the consequence of the depression—it is self-defence. While in the modern world organisation on the side both of Capital and Labour will become larger in scale and more international in character, I doubt if these changes will fundamentally alter the system, provided there is no State intervention to secure monopoly or prevent competition. In the future, as in the past, new invention and new enterprise will break every attempt to corner markets or to prevent competition from securing to the consumer a major share of improvement in science or technique. Cartels, indeed, may even help to even out the trade cycle.

It all depends on whether capitalism and democracy are given a reasonable chance to function. The essence of capitalism is that it produces a rising market and that it only functions properly in a rising market. If there is a rising market the rigidities created to establish a certain standard constantly tend to disappear, because the standard itself is rising. In a rising market wage levels tend to rise and condi-

tions to improve, businesses, large or small, can only survive if their service is first class, and loan and debt charges, which capitalism is always creating (and losing), grow less, instead of more, burdensome. But directly the rising market disappears the debt and wage structure begins to collapse, as it is doing to-day. What prevents the return of a rising market to-day is not any inherent change in capitalism, but difficulties created in its working by international anarchy.

Western Liberal economic civilisation depends for its success on freedom and law. Democracy may erect ever higher safeguards for the worker and against the exploiter and the crook within which the system of private enterprise must function. But in the modern world of invention and of division of labour the constant infinitesimal adjustments whereby individuals and firms and corporations are engaged in making the things and rendering the services which others actually need and so will buy, and are therefore themselves employed and so can also buy the products of others, can only be effectively made by the ruthless operation of price in a free market. Once you begin to interfere with the operation of competition and price, by protection, subsidies, embargoes, quotas, and other similar devices and try to control supply and demand you throw the mechanism out of gear and force people to make things of which there is already a glut, thereby producing unemployment and a lessening of consuming power somewhere instead of allowing price and competition to drive enterprise to employing Capital and Labour in making new things and services which they can exchange with the makers of the old. At any one moment it looks as if new machinery must throw the whole process out of gear. But a century of experience has shown that if you allow free play in the market the adjustment between supply and demand does continuously take place, though with painful consequences to many, and the whole population in general is kept employed on a rising standard of living all the time. No government can possibly plan the infinite variety of future progress. Universal government control can only end in a drab and low standard of uniformity for all.

Finally, there are those who contend that whether capitalism has failed, as a system, or not, it ought to be replaced by socialism or communism. In a future article I may counter this argument and show that socialism as preached by the Labour Party is quite unworkable and that the only real alternatives are between communism, which the West will not have, and a planned social reform, which still uses, while guiding, the tremendous creative energy of private enterprise as the main spring of national and international economic life.

Meanwhile, I am only concerned to-day to try to establish one conclusion, from a consideration of present-day conditions. It is this: Democracy, private enterprise and the whole edifice of Western Liberal civilisation as it existed up to 1920, is not out of date or a failure. Its apparent decline is almost wholly due to the international anarchy which produced the war and has since intensified nationalism, both political and economic. If a Liberal and progressive civilisation for ourselves, or for the world, is to survive and develop the primary task of the Liberal nations is to overcome this anarchy by beginning to apply the federal principle, at least among themselves, for unless they do, free civilisation itself will be reconquered by resurgent barbarism, militarism and dictatorship.

LOTHIAN.

IN GERMANY TO-DAY.

VISITORS to Germany who attempt to estimate correctly the state of affairs in that country are met by a fact which is not so clear when viewed from England, namely, that the situation changes from day to day. To generalise is therefore unsafe, and perhaps the fairest way to make any comment at all is to report statements made by Germans. The foreigner has not sufficient knowledge to check them, but he can record them accurately.

The defect of this method is that a vast number of Germans are voiceless. The enemies, or supposed enemies, of the State are not heard because they are either in concentration camps or in danger of being put there. There are also the victims of violence, of whose case readers of the English Press are only too sadly reminded, but of whose existence the Germans not in contact with the circles personally affected are ignorant. In England we hear only of the seamy side; in Germany one sees nothing of the ugly aspect, but much that is interesting and that makes a good impression. Each view is misleading unless one can keep the other in mind. It would be, in the same way, misleading if I were to give the statements of Nazis on one side, and of their Nationalist and kindred critics on the other, unless the reader remembers the section of German society whose lot is most unhappy and which has attracted most attention throughout the world. With that premise, let me attempt to render the talk of friends of the régime.

I

When I questioned on one occasion the need of violent repression on the part of a Government which appears to be in no danger, the reply was: "It is a fight for the German soul." My companion's argument might be paraphrased somewhat as follows:

"You naturally question the necessity of shutting up suspects in camps. But the Government is not established, as you suppose. There are movements against it on the Left, and even on the Right, which endanger it. Many Nationalists are actually under arrest; Herbert Bismarck, himself till yesterday actually in the government, has had his house searched and may soon be in jail. The Communists are still organised and working.

Their newspapers are secretly printed and circulated. The Socialists naturally excite the sympathy of their British colleagues and foreigners wonder why we fear them, but English Socialists would not really sympathise with an attitude to the State such as that which made a revolution in the moment of impending defeat in 1918, or which prompted a prominent Socialist leader to say that the Polish Corridor was 'a valuable sanitary cordon' against the East Prussian conservatives. The sentiment of the German soul must be guarded from the propaganda of disloyalty. The forces of disorder would continue to influence people if speakers and writers remained free in time of revolution. You do not yourselves give them freedom in India. You ask why Socialists should be treated like Communists. The reason is that some of them stand for violence, and that in 1918 their policy betrayed our soldiers. Socialists promised response from other countries, and a just settlement. English Socialism did its best, but French Socialism broke its word.

"You English cannot be expected to understand that we are in the mentality of civil war. We have been so long in conditions of physical strife, that the humane outlook of people in tranquillity like yours has been obscured. Hitler says himself how simple it would be to deal with conditions of national war, compared with the internal conditions which have produced intense hatred. Whichever party was on top would treat its enemies without much gentleness. Probably the Communists, if they had the chance, would do worse than the Nazis.

"You may say that it showed a disposition to violence, that difference of political opinion took a ruffianly form. But what was the origin of that? It would never have occurred if the Allies had not adopted the French policy of spoliation followed by pinpricks. It provided the maximum of material to the sections inclined to chauvinistic violence. The return to discipline would be natural to our traditions, and would be all to our advantage. But it remains impossible while the attitude of the Allies seems no different from the policy which left the infuriating memories of the Ruhr, of the black troops on the Rhine, and of the broken promise of disarmament, while the Corridor itself would be enough to prevent a return to a normal mind. The best hope of bringing repression and outrage to an end lies in making a normal outlook possible to Germans.

"The English charge us with brutality, and we understand your hatred of bullying and your love of fair play. But we see

that, when it suits you that a State should be strong, you cease to criticise it. You have begun to like Mussolini. If you wanted Germany strong, we should not hear much of German outrages. Even about Russia, your Socialists hardly made a protest. You admit that Communist violence is dangerous. Communist success in Germany would have given Communism a position for gaining success in the West, so you ought to support and admire us.

"As to the Jews, we had a difficulty that you don't experience. Your leading professions are not monopolised by Jews. Our action was too hasty, but civil war conditions prevailed.

" Outrages have not ceased, but the revolution did not cost heavy loss of life, like other revolutions. If it had been bloody, perhaps hatreds would have died down sooner than they have. Outrages have been punished. The police lost power in recent civil strife, yet the Government prevented the widespread killing that would have occurred but for its discipline. You English are shocked at violence, and think the police should keep order. But consider what would happen, even in England, if, instead of generations of tranquillity, you had our desperate situation of defeat and humiliation, blockade and starvation of children, the black troops, and Scotland cut off by a band of alien territory. Exasperation turned our differences of opinion into civil war, so that the police lost authority. Moreover, the revolution stopped street war. Give us credit for avoiding the bloodshed that other revolutions involved. Both Nazis and Communists taught self-sacrifice, and life was freely offered. You cannot expect a delicate sense of humanity in this atmosphere.

" You English don't realise the moral side of the Nazi movement. We had a plague of licentious literature and practice, which was associated with a great propaganda of atheism, with two million organised adherents, a teaching which disgusted our sense of decency. Against it the Nazi movement, however crude, offered a doctrine of strenuousness, public service, readiness for self-sacrifice, desire to suffer, and Spartan simplicity. Our sense of order and social unity was offended by the class war, and the party spirit in politics. They weakened our position in the world just when we were in the grip of States which imposed unjust conditions and did not carry out the treaty forced on us.

" The Government is carrying the identification of Church and State too far, but we want the State to be Christian. As

to State control we are Lutherans, and the doctrine of Luther is good enough for us. A free church might rival the Government, and we want a government which is stable. You condemn our insistence on national unity, but England does not need to foster national feeling. In countries where our people are scattered they are easily forced to lose their nationality. Look at the Trentino, where German children are growing up Italian.

" The Nazi party has a special concern for a kind of humanity which prevails in England, a concern for children and for animals. We stiffened the law on these points. We enacted humane slaughter of animals for food. You English ought to approve of our social aims. We are Socialist in our desire to give the worker a footing on the land. You see our workmen's suburban settlements, where each cottage belongs to the occupant, and the family grows some food in the garden. The community spirit, which you laugh at, is a genuine thing; it leads the sons of Junkers and plutocrats to spend their holidays with the workers, doing manual work. You despise uniforms, but to us they symbolise comradeship. You judge us by militarist phrases, and forget that we use them metaphorically. You also forget that we like to make a drastic order without intending to carry it out, just as we love a theory which has no practical meaning.

" We ought specially to have the sympathy of British Socialists. The official programme is on Labour Party lines. Our Left Wing wants national ownership of coal, iron, shipping and land. Conservatism in the Nazi party is giving way, as events are showing. You observe that in Austria Prince Stahremberg says he objects to German Nazi-ism because it is too Socialistic. And Socialists ought to like our campaign against luxury. As to peace, we agree with English, though not with Marxist Socialism, if you will make it possible for us by treating Germany with justice."

II

There is a body of opinion, Nationalist and other, both in Germany and without it, who take quite another view, and who condemn the Government unsparingly. Their views may be summarised as follows:

" The movement is suffering from the nature of its leaders, some of them pathological cases. Although it attracts masses of

young men of the best sort, the chiefs are unworthy of their followers. Though Hitler is intensely popular and his genuine enthusiasm is not doubted, his choice of colleagues is a misfortune. There is not even a moderate section to balance the extremists, since Strasser left the party. The disposition of Göring is shown by his appointment of Heines to a high post in police administration, from which position he will have an ugly influence on the concentration camps. The rivalry between Göring and Goebbels for the post of Chancellor, when Hitler becomes President, leads these two to play up to the fanatical elements in the party. We realise the impression that must be made abroad by such a proclamation as Göring's announcement that anyone who talks in a pessimistic manner of the future will be imprisoned.

" We know how inefficient also is the machinery of Government, with the head committee of the party in the background at Munich (like the Young Turk movement, when it was run from Salonika), so that not even the heads of the Government at the capital are quite their own masters, and the public departments, like the Foreign Office, are duplicated by Nazi departments, with different offices, and undefined but final authority.

" We know that Hitler has reason for his talk about a possible second revolution, and in Nazi circles the fate of the first revolutionaries in other revolutions of the past has been recalled. We know quite well the disastrous effect in England of the non-suppression of private outrages. Although the continuance of outrage is condemned on grounds of decent humanity in high quarters (that is why some Nationalists are under a cloud), unauthorised arrests are not a thing of the past, but are even intensified in many districts. It does not require to be English to be revolted at the beating-up and flogging of old men, and the terrorising of women whose husbands are in the camps, so that, for instance, the other day a woman committed suicide with all her children by turning on the gas. Though the past years of strife have encouraged a state of mind which is naturally callous to suffering, and indeed goes with the Nazi enthusiasm for sacrificing oneself in the national cause, there might be much greater courage shown by the leaders in facing unpopularity among the extremists, especially when they had the Prussian tradition of discipline to work upon.

" We who admire the Prussian idea of order are revolted by

the new theory that Government should be above the law, and should remove judges at will. We are ashamed at the want of sense (as well as humour), which leads to the expulsion of presidents of athletic clubs to make room for young Nazis.

" You must not imagine that we agreed with the national mourning, with flags at half-mast, for the two Nazis killed while arresting a Communist at Koepenick. We distinguish between authorised arrest and the action of Nazi hooligans, no better than gangsters. Responsibility lies with the high authorities. It is deplorable to us that foreigners should judge of our people in general from brutality which originates in the crudity of a few leaders.

" Moreover, while we welcome the prevention of street war, which has vitiated our life for years, we can see that discontent in the Nazi ranks is very serious. A threatened demonstration was only stopped by Hitler's intervention. The promises of better times, which are economically impossible, are coming home to roost. It is being said that you can govern by 'bread and circuses,' but not by circuses without bread. We are told to believe that, now that the first phase is over, the phase of Socialist action is to begin. But we should have more confidence in the Government's readiness to face the Conservative classes if we did not know of the intimate relations which have sprung up between Nazi leaders and aristocratic reactionaries.

" The attempt to use the Lutheran Church as a Government agency is rousing vehement feeling, and there are large numbers of Nazis who are ready to resign from the party if it is persisted in. They would be torn between admiration for Hitler, whom they believe to have saved the country from Bolshevism, and their resentment at the prostitution of religion. Many of us do not even think that the Communists were a real danger to the State. We believe the repression of free speech by incarcerating Socialist leaders is defeating its ends, and is only a proof of the inexperience of our leaders, since prohibition of meetings and newspapers would be more than adequate. In fact, while we admire the movement for its professed ideals of service and simplicity, we think that it is not making good."

III

One hears such views, both favourable and hostile, from the most varied classes of people. Whether one is impressed or

otherwise must be a matter of one's own temperament. But it cannot be questioned that views of both kinds are held by people of honesty and a desire for service. There is a consensus of opinion, even among the critics, that the Nazis have a tremendous asset in the amazing fervour of the worship of their leader. It is so great that, for example, old landowners whose life-long faith had been conservative, came up to Berlin to write their names in the Chancellor's book on his birthday. On the other hand, in trying to abolish hostility, the Government must be making enemies where there is no need to do so. And they are in a predicament not unknown to politicians elsewhere, viz. their inability to deliver the goods which they have promised. Their economic theories seem to be evidence of a quality which philosophical Germans attribute to their countrymen—the love of mystical vagueness, such that " the German is not happy if he can understand the object he is pursuing."

The problem of the leadership is particularly interesting, because of the great age of the President. If Hindenburg dies or retires, and if Herr Hitler succeeds him, the active government must be in the hands either of Göring or Goebbels, and Herr Hitler will lose the prestige of the Chancellorship. It is possible that a change of policy might follow the disappearance from active leadership of Herr Hitler, whose peculiar hatreds have given rise to the fervour of governmental action against Jews, Communists and Austria. On the other hand, if he becomes President he will gain the loyalty of the Reichswehr, which is expected to be loyal to the President whoever he be, while, if Hitler should disappear before Hindenburg, the attitude of the army towards the Nazi régime is a matter of speculation.

It is difficult in England to realise the instability of the Government, but undoubtedly its members have cause for anxiety. Masses of men supported the movement in hopes of better wages or better conditions for the peasant. In the factories a system of Nazi cells or committees has been established, which already resembles the Russian system of Soviets. While these are highly inconvenient to the director of a firm, or the owner of a large estate, they are also potential centres of disaffection. This has caused such alarm that Hitler has threatened condign punishment, and Göring has published an order so amazing that it deserves quotation. He says: " Officials and workers who talk to others and create mistrust will be treated as Marxists. It is a question of pessimism. Those who observe

such cases are to report them. Failure to do so is a declaration of solidarity with agitators and will lead to arrest. This is a decree to all."

The persistent claim of every Nazi that the country is in revolution contains a truth that we must recognise. Conditions are so abnormal that order in the usual sense is not possible, and a degree of callousness results. Even so, one hears doubts expressed as to the necessity for the wholesale incarceration of suspected persons in concentration camps. The conditions in these camps are hard indeed for men detained pending examination, against whom no charge has even been formulated. The camp near Königsberg is a fort some fifty years old, in which we found the inmates confined under lock and key in vaulted chambers reached by dark, damp passages. They were not forced to work but, except for two hours exercise, the only comforts were a table and stools (fewer in number than the inmates), and a game of chess. Some of the men volunteer for work, for example in cooking for the two hundred inmates. The others we saw at physical exercises in the yard, with armed guards on the ramparts above them. It appeared that health is not injured by camp life but undoubtedly the inmates, as a member of the Government remarked to us, are not there to be comfortable.

There are some features of the régime, apart from its repressive and brutal aspects, which are highly distasteful to the English mind. For example, students and boys in schools are encouraged to spy on their teachers and report to the Commissar. Moreover, Nazi-ism cannot dissociate itself from its manifestations in Austria, where it carries on propaganda by bombs.

With regard to the Church there is probably trouble ahead for the Government. An interesting reflection was expressed to me by a church member, critical of the régime. It was held that the churches had been in a high degree lifeless, and young Nazis expressed to me the view that, while the Church did not stimulate them to work, the idea of State service did so. But following on this newly-aroused enthusiasm, the treatment of the Church by the Government had alienated many from loyalty to the Nazi movement, and enthusiasm had been transferred to the life of the Church, a fortuitous stroke of luck for the Church which its earnest members cordially welcomed.

Viewing the situation as a whole, we can but feel the most profound concern. While it is only fair to hear the case for the

Nazi leaders we must remember their outrageous treatment of other parties. But when political action is in question, the moral to be drawn is surely not that Germany as a whole proves after all to be militarist and must be refused both revision and general disarmament, but that statesmanship should aim at producing conditions in which the outlook of Germans can become normal. The sense that Germany is treated as a pariah state is the natural result of events since the war. To reverse our policy of carrying out the Versailles Treaty in regard to disarmament would be fatal not only to international order, but to the recovery of Germany from internal strife.

NOEL-BUXTON.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE HOUSING PROBLEM.*

THERE is always a housing problem, but it changes in character from year to year. When we solve the problem of poverty, we shall solve the housing problem, too, for the one arises directly from the other. There is no real housing problem for the well-to-do, among whom I may here include all those who, with the aid of a building society, can build a house of adequate size in a healthy environment. The number of people to whom the building societies now make advances is astonishing: within the last three years, such loans amounted to no less than 269 million pounds. At the end of 1932, there were nearly 900,000 mortgages outstanding. The problem in connection with these houses is not how to get them built, but how to get them built with proper regard to regional planning. All the necessary legislation to provide for regional planning has been passed; it only remains for local authorities to put it into operation, and whether they do this depends largely on public opinion.

I wish that the general architectural standard could be raised. The great majority of our smaller houses are lacking in beauty of design, while a considerable number are definitely ugly. Can the Royal Institute of British Architects do anything in connection with this aspect of housing? Or must we rely on the Royal Horticultural Society to cover unattractive dwellings with ivy or ampelopsis?

That, however, is by the way. The real crux of the housing problem is twofold—first, to provide houses for the low-paid workers in town and country, and second, to do away with slum areas, and with all dwellings that are definitely unfit for human habitation.

First, let us get some idea of the magnitude of the problem. Taking all kinds of houses into consideration, and assuming a standard of one structurally separate dwelling for every family, there was in 1931 a shortage of 830,000 dwellings in England and Wales. This compares with a shortage of 710,000 houses in 1921 and 250,000 in 1911. In view of the fact that nearly two million houses have been built since the Armistice, these figures may seem astonishing, but the increasing shortage

* This article is based on an address given at the Liberal Summer School, Cambridge, August, 1933.

is mainly due to the decreasing size of families. In 1931 there were 48 more families per thousand of the population than in 1911. The above figures take no account of overcrowding or insanitary dwellings. If these are included, it is a conservative estimate that one and a half million houses are needed to-day, if every family is to have a structurally separate and sanitary dwelling. Even when these have been built, there will remain hundreds of thousands of houses with only two bedrooms, where proper separation of the sexes is impossible.

Now, what is being done to meet this pressing need? Obviously, it will not be met by the ordinary unaided operations of the market. If it could, 175,000 builders, costing the country about £180,000 a week in "dole," would not be unemployed. Government subsidies for housing have ceased, apart from the rehousing of slum dwellers, so has the guarantee to share with building societies any losses they may incur by lending up to 90 per cent. of the value of a house, instead of 75 per cent. or 80 per cent., which was their previous limit. Until December 7th, 1932, substantial housing subsidies were paid, and the building of houses was actively encouraged, but on that day the subsidies ceased without an hour's notice, and the building of houses by Local Authorities ceased, too. In the first six months of 1933, 1,206 houses were built by Local Authorities, as compared with 69,600 in the whole of 1932.

Now, on what sources is the Minister of Health relying to supply houses, built without subsidy, which can be let at rentals within the means of low-paid workers? He is relying on speculating builders and on building societies. Building societies to-day will provide 90 per cent. of the value of a house, at 4 per cent. in the provinces, or 4½ per cent. in and around London. But the amount borrowed must be paid off in thirty years—and this adds 1¾ per cent. to the annual charge—making it 5¾ per cent. in the provinces and 6¼ per cent. in London. Moreover, the builders must procure 10 per cent. of the cost from other sources. If we assume that this is forthcoming at the same rate as the rest, the rent of a house with three bedrooms, and no parlour, will be 12s. 4½d. to 13s. a week. I assume £350 as the cost of a house, land, roads, and sewers; £5 a year for repairs, management, empties and insurance,* and £7 0s. 3d. for rates, at 12s. 9d. in the £, on a rateable value of £11.

* The National Housing Council allow £6 in their estimates, but I am inclined to think this a little high.

It is thus clear that the sources on which the Government is relying must inevitably fail—as they are doing. It may be said without exaggeration that practically nothing is being done to provide houses for low-paid workers. Houses built in connection with the slum-clearance scheme only replace houses which are demolished, and their erection does nothing to lessen the existing shortage.

Now, what rent can the low-paid worker afford? On two occasions I have made detailed investigations into the cost of living. I cannot here describe my methods, and only give my results. At to-day's prices it takes 36s. 4d. to provide a family of two adults and three children with the requisites for mere physical efficiency, exclusive of rent. This assumes an economical dietary, and careful spending on other necessaries. If in addition we allow 5s. a week for everything other than bare physical needs (e.g. bus fares, insurance, Trade Union subscriptions, beer, tobacco, newspapers, or an occasional cinema) we get a total of 41s. 4d.* The great majority of low-paid industrial workers in full work are receiving a few shillings more or less than 45s. a week. Some are receiving about 50s., and some between 35s. and 40s. How much can they spare for rent? Here it must be remembered that the ability of families to pay rent does not depend solely upon the earnings of the main breadwinner. It is affected by the number of dependent children, and by the presence or absence of other wage-earners in the household. A man whose only source of income is 45s. a week, who has to keep a wife and three dependent children, may only be able to afford a small sum for weekly rent. But many low-paid workers, with children earning, are in a different position. In my opinion, there is no doubt whatever that if attractive houses could be let at a sum not exceeding 10s. for rent and rates, numbers of the low-paid workers could and would afford to take them. Many of these at present are occupying inferior houses which they would gladly leave for something better, if it could be provided at a rental within their means. As they left the cheaper houses, these would become available for workers who cannot possibly afford a 10s. rent. But it may, I think, be taken as axiomatic that if rents are charged in excess of 10s. a week, no significant impression will be made on the problem of housing for this class of workers. The 12s. 6d. or 13s. house is quite definitely out of their reach.

* *The Human Needs of Labour* (1918), B. S. Rowntree.

Now, could houses to let at rentals not exceeding 10s. be built without a subsidy? My answer is: "Yes, under certain conditions."

1. Money must be provided at the lowest possible rate of interest.
2. The houses must be built as economically as possible.
3. The management must be efficient and economical.
4. Full advantage must be taken of modern knowledge of lay-out.

If these conditions are to be observed, the houses must be provided by agencies which can secure money at the minimum cost, and this in practice means the State, Local Authorities, or a great housing or super-utility society, such as was advocated by Sir Raymond Unwin and others in their evidence before Lord Moyne's Committee on Housing. The State is obviously not the right body; and there are distinct advantages in placing the onus on the Local Authorities, which are specifically made responsible by Section 25 of the 1930 Housing Act for making good any housing shortage. Of course, if a super-utility society could help, well and good.

Now, let us see at what rent these houses could be let. The Public Works Loan Commissioners are lending money at 4·1 per cent., including a 60 years' Sinking Fund. If the Government forbore from charging the ⅛ per cent. now charged for "management," which under the circumstances they could quite suitably bear themselves, the rate of interest would be just under 4 per cent. There is no reason why the whole of the capital required should not be lent on these terms, with the security of the rates, and if that security is considered inadequate, a Government guarantee as well. With money at this price—again assuming £350 as the all-in cost of a house, it could be let at 10s. without any subsidy.

But if the State is to provide capital at the minimum cost, it must make sure that the money is spent to the best advantage; and therefore in the lay-out of building estates, full advantage should be taken of modern knowledge. Very briefly, the underlying principle of economical lay-out is to reduce to a minimum the mileage of costly main roads made for heavy traffic, with deep sewers, and wide enough to allow for an unknown demand upon them. This is accomplished by providing, at right angles to the main roads, a number of lesser roads, each ending in a

square. Houses are erected along these side-roads, and round the squares; and such roads need only be narrow and light in construction, because they can never be called on to serve more than a given number of houses—perhaps a dozen. Similarly, the drains, which empty into the main arterial sewer—can be comparatively small and cheap. In this way, enormous economies can be made. Moreover, the method of lay-out is less monotonous, and it meets the objection that the limitation of the number of houses per acre involves covering a great deal of extra travelling.

Had the best methods of site-planning been adopted on the various building estates developed since the war, many hundreds of thousands—probably millions—of pounds could have been saved. But the Government made no effort to ensure economical site-planning before agreeing to building schemes. If houses are to be built to let at the lowest possible rents it is essential that the Government should provide expert advice on the subject, free of charge, to Local Authorities, and see that such advice is acted upon. I would also suggest that with a view to improving the appearance of the houses, and ensuring internal planning of the best type, the Government should provide a Manual, giving a number of alternative plans with elevations, and emphasising the most important points to be observed.

It is of fundamental importance that, with few exceptions, every house should have a garden, and there should be no relaxation of the limit of twelve houses to the acre. Instead of wasting money on useless roads, let it be spent on gardens. With proper planning the difference in cost between a house standing on a site of 353 square yards and one on 186 square yards is less than twopence a week—assuming land at £400 an acre.

It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of gardens, and they will become increasingly important as working hours are shortened, as they assuredly will be. What are men going to do with their increased leisure? For men who have gardens, and care for them, this problem is already largely solved. Moreover, the economic value of a garden is by no means negligible. Three hundred square yards of garden will produce vegetables which, taking the average, it would cost over 2s. a week to buy. But it would be wrong to stop at gardens of 200 or 300 square yards. Great numbers of men would gladly cultivate more than this.

In a carefully devised building scheme, there should be different zones. In the zone nearest to the centre of the town houses might be built twelve to the acre. As one went further out, the sizes of gardens might be increased to a quarter of an acre, half an acre, and even more, till we come to the actual small-holding. The fundamental importance of small-holdings, in relation to the fact that we can never hope to reabsorb all our unemployed in industry must never be forgotten. There is only one stage between the man who works partly in the town and partly on his bit of land, and the small-holder who relies for a living entirely on his holding; and no proposals for dealing with the housing problem will be complete which do not take into account the possibility of providing small-holdings on a far more extensive scale. Evidence from different parts of the country shows that in many cases they can be made to pay a commercial rate of interest; and they should be provided without delay, though not upon an elaborate and costly scale. We should encourage the pioneering spirit in their development.

To come back, however, to the garden, it is an inestimable boon to a man whose work may be irregular, or from time to time may cease altogether, to have a piece of land large enough to grow potatoes and other vegetables that he requires for his family, and where he can keep hens and pigs, and perhaps a goat. Then if he is out of work, there will always be potatoes, green vegetables, bacon, and milk available; and moreover, he has one invaluable asset—something to do.

But what about the many thousands of low-paid workers who cannot afford to pay 10s. a week in rent and rates for adequate housing accommodation? Before discussing details, we should fully appreciate the ground covered by the proposal to reduce their rentals by means of subsidies. Up to now, the community has subsidised housing, because its cost was abnormal. This was justified. We cannot expect tenants to pay exorbitant rents for sixty years because the exigencies of the State made it necessary to build when building costs were exceptionally high. But to-day, probably, the cost of building is more or less fixed, and, therefore, subsidies paid for housing would be neither more nor less than subsidies in relief of low wages. This brings us back to the policy of the Speenhamland system of poor relief, with its economic danger.

In all our social legislation, with the comparatively small, and from this point of view unimportant, exception of the

feeding of necessitous school children, we have never departed from the principle that low wages should not be subsidised by the State. I believe that any proposal to share the cost of rent with wage-earners whose wages fall below a certain level, is fraught with far-reaching dangers, and its adoption in the long run would tend to depress the general wage-level, and would militate seriously against the welfare of the working class. What encouragement, for instance, would an employer have to give an advance in wages to his workers if he knew that their rent subsidy would be reduced accordingly? What encouragement, again, would a worker have to make himself worth a higher wage if he knew that his family would not benefit, but the increase would go to the State?

On the other hand, it is justly urged that even if a family cannot afford to purchase food and clothing adequate both as to quality and quantity, they can buy as much as they can afford, and meanwhile, the State endeavours to increase their purchasing power by Trade Boards. But if the State allowed families to build or rent just such houses as they could afford at the moment, the whole country would be sprinkled with shacks! The effect on the public health of a general *carte blanche* in this respect would be too serious to contemplate! So the State insists on a certain standard of accommodation, at the risk of being requested to bridge the gulf between its standard and the workers' earning capacity. Such an argument is not illogical, but it is dangerous.

I think that at present the right policy is to mobilise all the resources of the community to produce houses which can be let, without subsidy, at the lowest possible rents. The rate of interest, cost of management and the cost of building must be reduced to the lowest possible figures, always remembering that it is a tactical error to erect a badly built house, or one so restricted in size and amenities that it will be out-of-date in a few years.

There is no doubt that if houses could be erected and let at inclusive figures from 8s. 6d. to 10s. a week, there would be an enormous demand for them—indeed, it would tax the capacity of the whole building industry for some years to come to supply the numbers needed. If, after the demand for such houses has been fully met, there are still large numbers of low-paid workers who are unable to rent houses without a subsidy in some form, then let the matter be considered afresh.

But first let us provide for those who can afford non-subsidised houses. When we see how many working-class families elect to pay higher rents for more modern houses, leaving their present houses vacant for poorer families, we shall know where we are. Certainly, we ought to erect not only adequate numbers of three-bedroomed houses, but a proportion of houses with only two bedrooms, or even two-roomed houses, with the stipulation that this must not lead to overcrowding. If a three-bedroomed house could be let at 10s. a week, a two-bedroomed one could be let at 9s., and a two-roomed house at 5s. 3d.

I pass to the problem of the slums. I do not propose to discuss it in detail, because this is the one part of the housing problem which is being vigorously dealt with by the State. Broadly speaking, the Government's proposals should prove effective, if they are wholeheartedly supported by public opinion, and if, where necessary, adequate pressure is brought to bear upon Local Authorities.

Under the Act, houses must be provided for families whose houses are demolished, and in their provision, very liberal subsidies may be paid. Now, as regards the wisdom of subsidies, I am inclined to think there is a fundamental difference between a subsidy offered to all low-paid wage-earners and a subsidy to dispossessed slum dwellers. In the latter case, the community has taken the drastic step of demolishing the homes of the people, and these people have a right to say: "If you pull down my home, you must find me another one!" But if the community accepts this obvious responsibility, it must provide a decent house, which will not constitute a fresh slum problem within a few years. And if the ex-slum dweller simply cannot afford to pay a commercial rent for the new house, the difference between a commercial rent and what he can afford must be paid by those who dispossess him.

Undoubtedly, such action will be accompanied by a certain amount of the danger inherent in all subsidies, but, first, the number of people to be dealt with is definitely limited: and, second, only a proportion of the slum dwellers are regular workers, and, therefore, we need not contemplate such reactions on the general scale of wages as might follow a much more extensive subsidy. In my opinion, any risk attendant on the policy of subsidies should not be allowed to weigh against the definite and serious evil of leaving the people in unhealthy slums.

I now come to the question of the agricultural workers. Such facts as are available point to the conclusion that the shortage of houses for rural workers amounts to between 75,000 and 100,000. With the cessation of Government subsidies, the erection of rural houses has practically ceased. Now the provision of these houses presents a fresh set of problems. One matter of great importance is that under the present orders fixed by many of the Wages Boards, farmers are not allowed to deduct more than 3s. a week for rent and rates; and in many districts there are scarcely any houses let at more than 1s. 6d. a week. The whole of our rural economy has been built up on the assumption that workers could obtain houses at very low figures. When cottages were erected by landowners for the workers necessary on a farm, a rent was charged for the farm as a whole, without having particular regard to the exact return upon the cottages.

The shortage of houses in the country has increased considerably of late, because, before the days of Old Age Pensions, when a rural labourer was too old to work, he was soon forced to go into the workhouse with his wife, and if he died, his widow was forced to go into the workhouse. But now both can afford to live on their pensions, so long as they can obtain cheap cottages, and houses which in the old days would have been vacated for the use of active workers are occupied by old people whom landlords don't care to turn out. Throughout the countryside, moreover, the whole attitude to the problem of rent and housing differs from the urban attitude. Personal considerations, and the public opinion of the village, play a far more important part. In towns, the landlord has often no personal relations with the tenant, and rents are determined by the law of supply and demand. But it would need a revolution in thought to deal with the rural housing problem on a strictly commercial basis.

Of course, houses could be built in rural districts to let at much less than 10s. a week. The charges for land sewers and roads would be very small, and rates a mere fraction of what they are in towns, while the cost of management need not be so high. In many districts it would be possible, without a subsidy, to provide houses with three bedrooms and a bathroom, to let at 6s. a week. But the majority of rural workers who want houses to-day could not pay even this figure, and in the present conditions of agriculture substantial wage increases are

impracticable, so if they are to be adequately housed, some subsidy will be necessary. Will this be as dangerous as in the towns? I think not. Agricultural wages are fixed by wage-boards, and the rate is not determined by the same considerations as in the case of a single employer. The final word rests with the impartial members appointed by the Government department, and as soon as the state of agriculture warrants it, wages will be raised, whether subsidies are being paid or not.

My proposal, therefore, is that in the country the deficiency of houses must be made good by the erection of houses as cheaply as possible, and the payment of a subsidy where necessary. Of course, subsidised houses should only be let to bona-fide rural workers. In addition to this, the fullest possible use should promptly be made of the existing legislation for reconditioning houses, as provided by the Rural Workers (Housing) Acts 1926 and 1931. It is also desirable that rural authorities should be encouraged to build houses on the same financial terms as in urban districts, to be let to all, whether rural or urban workers, who are able to pay an economic rent without a subsidy.

The whole housing problem, to-day, constitutes a grave and direct challenge to the Government, and especially to the Minister of Health. Will it be accepted or ignored?

The country needs houses. Their provision, on a scale equal to the labour power of the building trade, will involve no new legislation, and so far from costing the country anything, it will save the taxpayers many millions a year. At present we are spending nearly £200,000 a week on doles to unemployed builders, and the great bulk of this would be saved if the Government would only take the initiative and supply the driving force. Here, if ever, is work of national importance, which raises no controversial questions, and would be warmly supported by all political parties.

Of course, I recognise the magnitude of the responsibility which would fall on the Minister of Health in creating the machinery and in setting every local authority at work. But I do not think him the man to quail before a great responsibility.

B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE.

JAPAN AND THE LEAGUE SYSTEM.

ON the night of September 18th, 1931, an incident occurred on the South Manchurian railway, which is leased to and operated by the Japanese. The Japanese said that the Chinese had blown up the line and were going to do worse things still. In self-defence, so they said, they seized Mukden and other principal towns the same night. Subsequently they extended their occupation to the whole of Manchuria, but, stage by stage, with a pause between each to see what the reaction of the League of Nations would be, and with repeated declarations by their government which were at variance with the action of their army.

Although the Assembly of the League was in session at the time, it had no sources of information of its own with which to check the claims and counter-claims of each side: the confidential information supplied to various Governments by their diplomatic representatives was not communicated to the League! It could do no more therefore than call upon both sides to refrain from any aggravation of the conflict. But it obtained from Japan a promise to withdraw her troops to the railway zone, subject to the safety of Japanese nationals. Although the Japanese troops were not withdrawn, the League proceeded with its task of mediation, and sent a strong Commission (with American, French, German and Italian representatives and an Englishman, Lord Lytton, as chairman) to study the situation and to advise what should be done. It is fair to remember that, had the League not existed, the Great Powers of the West might, as often in the past, have behaved like competitive burglars, seizing bits of Chinese territory for themselves and perhaps fighting each other for the best bits. Instead, they have acted collectively, if not very effectively, as mediators. Moreover, the course of events has led to closer co-operation between the League and the United States than seemed possible two years ago—an indispensable development if the League is to keep order not only in Europe but throughout the world.

Lord Lytton's Commission found that the interests of China and Japan were not irreconcilable. The Chinese had done much to irritate the Japanese and had not fulfilled their treaty obligations. But they had neither made nor threatened an attack on the Japanese, whose seizure of Manchuria could not

therefore be called a defensive measure. The Commission said that Manchuria should remain under Chinese sovereignty, while the government should be so modified as to satisfy all reasonable Japanese interests.

On February 24th, 1933, the League's Assembly unanimously adopted the findings of Lord Lytton's Commission as regards the facts of the dispute between China and Japan, and set up a new Advisory Committee of Twenty-one (which, by the addition of the United States a few days later, was increased to Twenty-two) to follow the situation and to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action. At the same time the Members of the League resolved, according to the Assembly's report, not to recognise the existing régime in Manchuria and to abstain from any isolated action in regard to the Far East. Three days later the British Government, acting independently, imposed an embargo upon the export of arms to Japan—and to China. This embargo was withdrawn within a fortnight.

Since that time little or nothing has been done to secure Japan's compliance with the Assembly's recommendations. Meanwhile the Japanese army has added another territory the size of England and Wales to those already forcibly severed from China in violation of three international treaties: the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922. Finally, the Japanese army has actually crossed the Great Wall and is now established in China proper.

These operations have involved the destruction of much Chinese property and the killing and wounding of many thousands of Chinese subjects, the Japanese themselves having also suffered casualties. The responsibilities are no longer in question; by the unanimous decision of the Assembly of the League, including the vote of Great Britain, China has been declared the victim of aggression. Throughout the discussion the Japanese as well as certain sections of opinion in Britain have confused the issue. The question as it concerns the world is not whether Japan has received provocation from China but whether Japan was justified, instead of seeking redress through the League as she might have done, in attempting to settle her dispute by her own force and defying League intervention, thus becoming her own judge in her own cause and challenging

the fundamental principle upon which any system of organised peace must rest.

Lord Lytton has himself again and again insisted upon this distortion of the point at issue. He says of the Japanese attitude:

> Throughout the discussions which have taken place at Geneva, the arguments used by the representatives of Japan have been irrelevant to the issue which was under discussion. The Japanese speeches have all dwelt upon the chaotic condition of China, upon the provocative nature of the anti-foreign propaganda of the Chinese Government, or of the faults of the Chinese administration in Manchuria; but, beyond the bare assertion that everything that Japan has said is true and everything that Japan has done is right, there has been no attempt to answer the charge that whatever the grievances of Japan might have been they did not justify the occupation by force of Chinese territory. That is why the efforts to arrive at an agreed basis for the starting-point of the negotiations were doomed to failure from the outset. The parties were never discussing the same issue.*

And Japan persists in her claim to be arbiter in her own quarrel and remains in occupation of the Chinese provinces in defiance of the unanimous decision of the League.

Lord Lytton's Commission stated in its Report:

> The interests of peace are the same the world over. Any loss of confidence in the application of the principles of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris in any part of the world diminishes the value and efficacy of those principles everywhere.

Failure to effect a settlement of the Far Eastern dispute and acquiescence in a situation which has been brought about by force would seriously damage the whole League system and the international solidarity on which it is based. Already "disarmament" (the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement) has been rendered far more difficult by the possibility that the result of Japan's action may be treated as a *fait accompli*.

France and other nations demand security no less insistently than Germany demands equality of status in the matter of armaments, and unless these demands are reasonably met there is very little prospect that the Conference, now about to

* Cf. *The Lytton Report—and After*, by the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Lytton, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., published by the League of Nations Union.

reassemble in Geneva, will secure the general acceptance of a Disarmament Treaty in the near future. But how can France or any other nation lose its fear of invasion while States which have promised to " preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League " including China, hesitate to join in such collective action as would restore to China sovereign rights over all her territories? The surest way to " disarmament " is by keeping faith and so restoring confidence. Moreover, the Disarmament Conference has during recent months experienced more opposition from Japan than from any other country, as, for example, in the debate on naval material on May 25th and 26th. The suggestion has even been made that she might build a fleet for her puppet State of Manchukuo, these new warships being, of course, additional to those permitted to Japan by the Treaties of Washington (1922) and London (1930).

Thus the present situation in the Far East is retarding the progress of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. It is therefore menacing the cause of peace; and any threat to peace is a danger to British interests. The danger in the present case is very grave; for the weakening of collective guarantees of peace in the East and submission to the military dictatorship of Japan must have disastrous repercussions in India and would have, in the long run, the most serious consequences for Australia and Canada. If we in Britain do not now do all in our power to secure joint action with other countries in honouring our common engagements and employing the system of pooled security at a time when we may have the co-operation of practically the whole world to restrain Japanese aggression, we must not hope to benefit from this system in a case where British imperial interests are directly threatened: for example, if Japan demanded a free entry for Japanese colonists into Australia.

What, then, should now be done? Efforts should, of course, be continued to secure agreement between the parties on the lines suggested by the Lytton Commission, and to enlist international co-operation in Chinese reconstruction. But that will not suffice to liquidate the present dangerous situation. There is, however, little doubt that at the earliest appropriate moment the Chinese Government will direct the attention of the League's Assembly to Japan's failure to comply with the

unanimous recommendations of February 24th, 1933. When that happens the first step should be to ascertain officially what view the United States Government takes on this subject, because action in the Far East without America is impracticable. The questions to which an answer should be sought are these:

(1) Would the United States of America be prepared to join with the League in recommending to both parties in the dispute the procedure of settlement outlined in Chapter 10 of the Lytton Report?

(2) If China accepted and Japan refused an invitation to participate in such a procedure of settlement, would the United States of America join with the League in putting concerted pressure upon Japan?

A favourable answer to these questions would make it much easier for the League to take effective action; and it is by no means certain that the American reply would not be favourable. Throughout the whole crisis the United States has shown a disposition to follow a resolute policy, and to co-operate most fully with the League.

As early as September 1931, on the occasion of the adoption of the resolution of September 30th, the League Council had forwarded the minutes of its meeting to Washington, together with all the documents relating to the dispute, and the U.S. Government "had affirmed its wholehearted sympathy with the attitude of the League." The Report states that, on October 16th, " it was determined to continue to co-operate with the Government of the U.S.A., which was invited to send a representative to sit at the Council table. The representative of the United States was authorised by his Government to consider with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria and, at the same time, to follow the deliberations of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now confronted." And when, on the next day, a number of Governments represented on the Council sent an identical Note to the Governments of China and Japan, calling their attention to the provisions of the Kellogg Treaty, the U.S. Government despatched a similar Note to the two disputants.

In the following March when the hostilities at Shanghai broke out, the United States Government intimated to the League that the American military authorities had been

instructed to co-operate in the measures which were to be taken to open negotiations on the spot, in accordance with a resolution passed by the Assembly on March 4th, 1932, and a few days later the United States Government declared that it "was especially gratified that the nations of the world were united on a policy not to recognise the validity of results attained in violation of the treaties."

Again in his speech of August 8th before the Council of Foreign Relations, Mr. Stimson reminded his hearers that there is to be no recognition either by the United States (the reference is to Mr. Stimson's Note of January 7th, 1932) or by any League Member (according to the Assembly's decision on March 11th, 1932) of any situation or agreement resulting from illegal war; and Mr. Stimson declared American "readiness to co-operate for peace and justice in the world." If Mr. Stimson's doctrine, like that of President Munroe, determines American policy, the United States will, for the future, co-operate with the League under Article 11 of the Covenant; and any war or threat of war will henceforth be a matter of concern to America as well as to the whole League.

Thus the record of the immediate past in American policy gives no justification for supposing that America would adopt a *non-possumus* attitude in this matter. Moreover a large section of American opinion is under the impression that the United States has gone ahead of League action in the attempted restraint of Japan and that American efforts to that end have secured only tardy and hesitating response. Her co-operation in the application of pressure to Japan would almost certainly be decisive.

What forms of pressure are best calculated to secure compliance with the League's recommendations for a just settlement and for the restoration of good relations between China and Japan? The Assembly's Report already provides that:

> (*a*) Members of the League will continue not to recognise the existing régime in Manchuria either *de jure* or *de facto*.
>
> (*b*) They intend to abstain from taking any isolated action in regard to Manchuria and to continue to concert their action among themselves as well as with interested States not Members of the League;
>
> (*c*) The Assembly hopes that the States non-Members of the League and who are signatories of the Pact of Paris or of the Nine-Power Treaty (particularly the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) will associate themselves with the views expressed in the Assembly's Report and will, if necessary, concert their action and attitude with that of the Members of the League; and this hope has been realised so far as the U.S.A. is concerned.

The further steps which might be taken by the States Members of the League in co-operation with the United States of America to give effect to the Assembly's recommendations are:

> (1) Withdrawal of the chiefs of the diplomatic missions from Tokyo;
> (2) Prohibition of the export of arms to Japan;
> (3) Prohibition of financial assistance to Japan; and
> (4) Refusal to accept imports from Japan.

Evidence of the determination of all the States which accepted the League's resolution of last February to take any or all of these steps would convince Japan that the League was in earnest and would probably suffice to secure the end in view. Such evidence is not, however, a condition precedent to effective action.

The States which have most to lose in any quarrel with Japan are Great Britain and the United States of America. But they are also in a position to exercise the strongest economic pressure. If they alone, together with China, refused to accept imports from Japan, the effect would be irresistible.

Japan supports a population of sixty-five and a half millions largely upon industry and commerce. She is short of raw materials, especially food-stuffs, coal, oil, metals and cotton. Since she is already a debtor country and cannot for the present increase her indebtedness abroad, she is obliged to pay for these raw materials by exporting manufactured goods. And 68·3 per cent. of Japan's exports go to the British Empire, the United States and China, while 76·9 per cent. go to this group together with France, Germany and the Netherlands.* A refusal on the part of the British Empire and the United States and China to accept imports from Japan would thus deprive her of 68 per cent. of her export trade. If France,

* Japan's principal customer is the United States of America which takes 31·6 per cent. of her exports, including almost all her silk. Next comes British India which takes 13·6 per cent. of Japan's exports, principally in the form of cotton goods. Then comes China which now takes 11 per cent. of the exports of Japan, but before the boycott took more than British India.

Germany and the Netherlands joined, it would involve 77 per cent.

Because of her indebtedness abroad Japan needs a balance of exports over imports. In the last three years that balance has been 15 per cent., 26 per cent., and 7 per cent. If, therefore, the British Empire and the United States, in addition to China, were to refuse to take imports from Japan, that country would be prevented from buying most of her raw materials; and the effect would be a little greater still if France, Germany and the Netherlands followed the Anglo-American lead.

It is obvious, therefore, that the lead must come from Great Britain and America, and there is no doubt that any action jointly recommended by these two countries would be accepted by all other States. In order that such action should fully comply with international law, the League would first invite China and Japan to agree to the procedure of settlement outlined in Chapter 10 of the Lytton Report. If Japan refused, the League would point out that, in view of the terms of Article 10 of the Covenant, there was no alternative but to require Japan to withdraw her troops from all the Chinese territory which she has occupied outside the railway zone, and thus to restore the territorial integrity and political independence of China.

It is said that if Great Britain were to join in excluding imports from Japan, the Japanese Government, in its present frame of mind, might attack Hong Kong or even Singapore. There is, however, nothing in recent Japanese history to suggest that Japan would be guilty of a policy so utterly suicidal as an attack upon the British Empire plus the world at large. The diplomatic situation which would be created if America co-operated, or even acquiesced in, the League policy outlined above, would be such as to deprive Japan of any possibility of receiving effective military, political, economic, or financial assistance. It is also said that there would be great practical difficulties about excluding imports from Japan. That these difficulties are by no means insuperable has been proved by the recent British embargo against goods from Soviet Russia.

Some risks of course remain. World coercion of Japan is not precisely a picnic. But the dangers involved are vastly less than those which must result unless Japanese policy can

be checked or modified. If that cannot be done, countries with interests in the Far East must expect to hold them in future at the mercy of the one dominant Power. The American people, in particular, will seldom have such strong reason for joining in collective pressure upon a country which has broken collective engagements. The British nation has still more to fear from the weakening of the whole League system. A reversion to competition in armaments and to rival military alliances, would jeopardise the security of the British Empire —and, indeed, of the whole world.

Conclusion.

It is therefore suggested that all who are able to influence public opinion ought to insist upon:

(1) The moral obligation of every State Member of the League to preserve China against external aggression; and
(2) The grave consequences of allowing Japanese troops to remain in occupation of Chinese territory.

It is of the first importance that the Members of the League should make clear to Japan, through ordinary diplomatic channels as well as by formal resolutions from Geneva, the seriousness with which they view the situation. The Members of the League should be prepared, so soon as the Far Eastern situation again reaches an acute stage (as, for example, when China brings it once more before the Assembly) to withdraw the chiefs of their diplomatic missions from Tokyo and to exert concerted economic pressure by refusing to accept imports from Japan; and, once the American Administration has promised its co-operation, the British Government should be ready to initiate action on these lines. Thus would our national Government both uphold our national honour and serve our vital interests.

Maxwell Garnett.

THE CHURCHES AND WORLD PEACE.

THERE are two opposed attitudes to the Churches in regard to their efforts for the world peace. On the one hand there are many who are quite content to be ignorant of what the Churches have done, and are still doing, and who nevertheless, with the confidence which ignorance often inspires, denounce the Churches for their indifference and indolence in regard to this vital human issue. On the other hand there are some who, as they do not adequately recognise the necessary limitations of the influence and authority which the Churches can command in the world as it now is, and the regrettable hindrances within themselves to the full exercise of such influence and authority as they do possess, make demands and cherish expectations which are bound to be disappointed. As one who is intensely interested in this matter, and has for many years been as constantly active as his opportunities allowed, I think it is well worth while to survey the situation as widely as possible, and to come to as unprejudiced and balanced a conclusion as on such a question can be reached.

(1) It is unjust to charge the Churches with caring and doing nothing for the cause of world peace, or to depreciate the value of such efforts as it is admitted that they are making. Throughout the history of the Christian Church there has always been a witness, even if often only by a few, to Christ as Prince of Peace. The Society of Friends has been honourably conspicuous by its consistent opposition to war; and that opposition has never been entirely confined to that community. It may be admitted that only since the world-wide calamity of the Great War has the interest and activity become more general in the Christian Churches. But before the war, when the relations of Great Britain and Germany became strained, the Churches made an effort by an interchange of visits of representative and influential men to promote amity instead of hostility. On the very eve of the war a Conference was begun in Constance; and although its meetings were brought to a sudden close by the outbreak of hostilities, and some of the members found it difficult to get back to their homes, the World Alliance for promoting International Friendship through the Christian Churches was formed, was kept in being, so far as the conditions made possible, during the tragic four years, and resumed activity as soon as the cessation of hostilities allowed. In consequence of

the appeal made by Dr. Jowett, the voluntary British Committee of the Alliance became a representative Council, the members of which are appointed by the Churches, and which has authority to act on their behalf for this its object. The League of Nations Union has also its Christian Organisation Committee, in which the Churches are represented by influential persons, although not officially appointed. Between these two movements there has been increasingly close co-operation: and a working arrangement has been reached for a joint appeal for the support of local congregations.

(2) The World Alliance by its tri-annual conference, at which many nations are represented, and which is held in different countries, has been exercising a really effective influence on public opinion and popular sentiment. Through some thirty national Committees it is constantly carrying on this educative process. One of the most valuable bits of work which it has done has been the calling together of regional conferences to deal with the thorny question of the national minorities placed by the peace treaties under alien rule. Although provision was made by treaties with the nations under whose rule they were brought for securing for them the rights to use their own language, to have their children educated in that language, and to exercise their religious liberty, the League of Nations has failed to give adequate protection against the disregard of these rights. Hence the Churches, of the majority and of the minority, have by influential representatives been brought together to secure not only mutual tolerance between them, but also a recognition by the majority Churches of their obligation to the minority Churches to use their influence to the utmost with their respective governments to preserve these rights. It is impossible to estimate how great has been this contribution to lessen the prejudices and the animosities which have resulted from the changes in frontiers consequent on these treaties. Youth has not been neglected, and by a frequent interchange of visits young people from nations estranged from one another have been brought into Christian comradeship.

It cannot be doubted that the Christian Churches through various organisations have exercised, and still exercise a potent influence on the British Government in regard to the problem of Disarmament. There are members of the Government who welcome that influence as counteracting such opposi-

tion to a progressive policy as exists among the supporters of the Government in Parliament and party organisations. The Fellowship of Reconciliation has also been doing valuable work from the standpoint of a pronounced pacifism. In view of all the efforts being made by Christian people individually or corporately in the Churches there is no excuse for the taunt that the Churches are caring and doing nothing for peace.

(3) I must now turn to the unwelcome task of discussing the causes of the failure of the Churches to attempt and to achieve more than they have done.

(*a*) While the Orthodox Oriental Churches are represented in these interdenominational peace movements, the Roman Catholic Church holds aloof. The claim it makes to be the Church, the sole Church of Christ on earth, prevents its recognition of other Churches, or any co-operation with them. There are peace-movements within that Church, and there are individual Romans who are sympathetic to outside movements; yet officially the influence of that Church is withheld from any united effort of the Churches.

(*b*) It cannot be said that the whole of each Church represented in these movements is interested and active. Many of the leaders have cordially identified themselves with the cause of world-peace, and are using the influence or the authority they possess on its behalf; but the rank-and-file still largely hold aloof, and refuse to be stirred up to give any thought to, or help in dealing with, these matters. Even in Great Britain, in which the support of the peace-movement is probably more widely spread than in any other country, except possibly the United States of America, the World Alliance and other peace organisations do not get adequate support in money or personal service. The Committees of the World Alliance are not officially representative of the Churches in other lands as is the British Council; and they are mostly a little leaven which only to a slight degree is changing the whole lump. In their efforts they have to contend with prejudice and suspicion, as the British Council has not. The organisation and their leaders must not be blamed, if all these efforts have had less manifest result than, ignoring the hindrances, one might be led to expect. A journalist, who condemned the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order as a fiasco because in three weeks it did not harmonise the differences which have persisted through the

centuries, has expressed a similar impatience regarding all these peace-organisations. But no one who has been constantly engaged in the hard, and sometimes even seemingly hopeless, task of dispelling ignorance and overcoming indifference will thus foolishly "throw up the sponge" (if so vulgar a metaphor may be pardoned in such a connection).

(*c*) Great as were the losses in money and in men due directly to the war, incalculable as are the evil consequences indirectly following it for us, we in this country can find it comparatively easy to approve and support this cause. But if we lived on the Continent, and shared the fears and the wrongs of many of the peoples there, we should better understand why the advocacy of peace proves so difficult. Age-long national antagonisms have been intensified by the recent course of international relations. I must add, although with hesitation, for I feel so keen a sympathy with the Continental Churches in their present precarious and perilous situation, that in my judgment most of these Churches have become too nationalised even in their Christian thought and life, and have lost the vision of a universal, a super-national Church of Christ, the one body on earth, membership in which should lift above all national differences, and in the fellowship of which loyalty to Christ should come before even patriotism. This result of centuries of history must be fully recognised as a formidable obstacle to be overcome in securing the united support of all the Christian Churches for the cause of peace.

(4) In view of these facts it is evident that even if all the Churches, including the Roman Catholic Church, could be induced to come together in a common witness to Christ as the Prince of Peace, in a common call to all Christendom to abandon the ways of war, and pursue the paths of peace, it would be, no doubt, a magnificent gesture, "to which the world would give some attention," but the problem would remain to be solved by less spectacular, and much more difficult, methods of an inevitably much more gradual effect. The causes that provoke war must be removed; the conditions for peace must be established, before we can rejoice in a permanent victory for peace over war. By all means let every effort be made to secure as large a measure of disarmament as possible, since the possession of armaments of a kind and an amount that hold out a prospect of victory is one of the provocations of war, one of the inducements to settle differences by force. But in passing, let

me say, that in my judgment the unilateral disarmament by Great Britain which some are advocating would be a fatal mistake. We have international obligations under the Covenant of the League, and the Locarno Pact, which we cannot simply tear up as "a scrap of paper": were we thus to repudiate our pledges, the effect would be that other nations would for their security increase their armaments. For me there is something theatrical in these demands for this or that gesture in the interests of peace. Again, let us do everything to strengthen the League of Nations in regard to conciliation or arbitration in disputes that may arise, in condemnation of and such resistance as may be possible in any disregard of these international obligations in aggressive warfare; as by such means war may be made more difficult and dangerous, and less profitable to the victors, and thus the resort to war may in the great majority of cases be avoided.

(5) The prevention of war, however, without the removal of the conditions which lead to war is not enough. What the Churches need is to think more deeply and [illegible] to the *objectives* which they are to set before themselves [illegible] advocates of peace.

(*a*) I have a very high regard for many pacifists, although some of them are too pugnacious in their advocacy for my peace-loving disposition; but after long, careful and painful study of the Christian teaching on this subject, I have come to the conclusion that I cannot commit myself unreservedly to the judgment that there are no circumstances in which the resistance to aggression might not be a tragic necessity for a sensitive Christian conscience; but I do not dare to regard their convictions as false or wrong, for the mistake of judgment may be mine. What I do regret is that again and again in my experience has united action been hampered by the insistence of pacifists on their own point of view. It is certain that the Churches in conference could not be brought to make a declaration of pacifism, and it is painful to find pacifists speaking as if that were the only effective thing that the Churches could do. But I have another objection to this attitude; it is beginning at the wrong end; it is throwing the emphasis on the wrong place; it is an inadequate, superficial moral judgment, which does not take into account the whole situation. I am far less concerned about the question whether a Christian may or may not fight, than about the question of how we can prevent

the occasions on which a Christian might have to come to some moral decision on this issue.

(*b*) As one of the Vice-Presidents of the World Alliance I am entirely in favour of its objects, the promotion of international friendship through the Churches, and gratefully recognise all it has been able to achieve; but I am not content with that object as the objective of the peace-movement. The promotion of friendship by the means the World Alliance uses wisely and rightly itself suggests that there is more to be done. That friendship needs thus to be promoted shows that there are enmities, suspicions, prejudices, rivalries, which hinder friendship, to be held in check or overcome. War is evil; so also are the motives of international strife, the conditions in the relations of nations which lead them to quarrel. I hate war, but I also hate injustice, oppression, cruelty, and the miseries and sufferings these bring. And the Churches do wrong by too exclusively concentrating on war, as if that were the only evil to be combated in international relations. It is being insisted, and rightly, that nations must be given security against invasion of their territory on the one hand, and on the other hand that this demand for security must not cover the preservation of the *status quo*, but that there must be a revision of treaties, so that the frontiers may be drawn, if possible, without injury or wrong to any. The advocates of peace must take due account of these considerations.

(*c*) What I want to call attention to in closing is not what may be called the political conditions of peace, but rather the economic. I do not believe that animals have the instinct of pugnacity which will assert itself without adequate provocation; but they will fight for safety or for food or for sex. So man is not naturally pugnacious, but he will fight for self-protection and self-preservation. So of a nation; it will fight for food for its growing population, for raw material for its expanding industries, for markets for its increasing productivity of goods, for homes for its surplus population, if peaceful means to meet these needs are not devised. It is poverty which is preventing war in Europe, for the economic policy of all nations contains all these provocations of war. This country which as long as its policy was Free Trade had the right to be regarded as the leader in world-peace, has fallen from its high estate; and all pleas of securing by Protection an opportunity for bargaining with other nations to produce a lowering of their tariffs against

us cannot remove this " blot from our scutcheon." It is sheer hypocrisy to advocate world-peace, and to follow a fiscal policy that is contributing to the distress and the despair of the nations in regard to these economic conditions.

(*d*) The Churches must be bold enough to say to the nations that, even in what are regarded as domestic concerns, no nation should pursue a policy in its own interest which involves injury to another. As in economics an acquisitive society is a competitive, and we are at present reaping the harvest that a false doctrine and practice in industry and commerce have been sowing, so inevitably national selfishness leads to international strife. In both economics and politics the world must retrace its steps, and the Churches must show it the Christian way of deliverance, safety, and prosperity. No man, and no nation liveth unto itself; all men and all nations are members one of another. The way of mutual service is the only way of mutual satisfaction. Hence the work which is, for instance, being done by the World Alliance must be complemented by such work as the Life and Work (Stockholm Conference) movement is attempting, namely to discover and to describe a Christian order of society, national and international. That alone will be the adequate and final objective of a peace-movement, which thinks deeply and widely enough for the world's danger and need, as it now is.

(6) It has been maintained that a peace demonstration to the world by all the Churches would have such an effect upon the world as had the demonstration of the love of God upon the Cross. Is that not a profound misunderstanding of Calvary? As an appeal to the Jewish people the Cross failed! As an appeal to mankind has it yet gained success? The effect of the divine sacrifice is not so immediate; man's sin and unbelief are too resistant; of its ultimate triumph we may be sure; but slowly is the Crucified seeing of " the travail of His soul." The state of Christendom as shown in the international relations with which we have been concerned proves that the Cross was not an instantly successful spectacle, as some persons, who know not the hardness of the heart of man, believe that a peace demonstration of the Churches would be. It is only by patient, constant, sacrificial labour to change the heart of man that the cause of peace will finally triumph in a world in which the occasions of war have ceased.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

KARL BARTH AND HITLERISM.

A VAST number of ministers and members of the Protestant Churches in Germany having embraced the Nazi movement politically and ecclesiastically, the attitude likely to be adopted by the eminent theologian, Professor Karl Barth, has been a matter of speculation both on the Continent and in Great Britain. A pamphlet of forty pages from his pen, dated June 25th, 1933,* and dealing with the national situation from a religious point of view, has been rapidly sold in Germany to the number of 20,000 copies, and is deserving of speedy publication in English.

The ministers and members of the German Churches who have identified themselves with Hitler's revolution call themselves as churchmen " German Christians "—i.e. Christians of German race who approve the national ideals of the new dictator and who desire in ecclesiastical polity and Church life to give expression to the new national spirit. But to not a few ministers and earnest Church members Hitlerism seems to traverse evangelical principles in some important respects. What then should be the attitude of a Reformed theologian to-day? That is the question with which Barth deals in his pamphlet entitled *Theologische Existenz heute,* which we may translate as " The Theological Position To-day," or " The Situation of a Theologian To-day."

The brochure may be described as a vigorous attack upon Erastianism and a bold assertion of the Church's spiritual independence in the face of Hitlerism as applied to the Church. The politics of Hitler in the secular sphere are not impugned: they are indeed hardly referred to—except in their bearing on ecclesiastical or spiritual interests. The pamphleteer, however, does not scruple to introduce Hitler's name in oppositious fashion.

At a time when institutions in Germany are in the melting-pot Barth is prepared for proposals of reform in Church life and organisation. But he strongly objects to changes or regulations imposed on the Church by secular authorities in contrariety to the Christianity of the New Testament. He recalls how " the new State has, on March 23rd, 1933, pointedly declared that the rights of the Church will not be diminished, her position towards the State not altered." But in the present

* *Theologische Existenz heute,* Munich.

proposals Barth plainly sees diminution and alteration. The new ideals, he thinks, are being sought not so much in the Holy Scriptures as " in the events of the day." For Barth the *Zeitgeist* is by no means the Holy Spirit! By merely yielding to the spirit of the times the Church will be untrue to herself. No political judgment must be allowed to override the spiritual.

With the prospects of the " Bishop-question " Barth is extremely dissatisfied. The " German Christians " declare that they " need and desire spiritual and authoritative leaders [in the Church] and, above all, a spiritual and authoritative Leader." For this position of Leader the Churchmen's nominee has been Bodelschwingh, and the Hitlerite nominee has been Müller. As between these two men in point of personal character Barth makes no invidious distinctions. Müller, like Bodelschwingh, may be an excellent man. But Barth cannot tolerate that a leader should be imposed on the Church by Hitler or his Government. Not only have the " German Christians " failed to think out clearly what kind of leading bishop, superintendent or chief prelate they want, but they are giving grounds for suspicion that the official contemplated is of a decidedly " State " species (*staatliche Form*). The Leader principle, Barth considers, " in the form of Adolf Hitler and his subordinates " is unacceptable to a pure Church. So far as the Reformed Church is in the Holy Catholic Church her only Leader is " Jesus Christ, the Word of God " ; and the cry for a Leader of the Hitlerite order is to be likened to the cry of the priests of Baal—" Baal, hear us!"

The cry that the " German Church must serve the German people," while true in the best Christian sense, is not to be tolerated in any worldly or opportunist sense. The cry " Peasants, conquer the Church," is obnoxious to Barth's mind. That cry means (as the writer of this article understands it) that the populace, actuated by Nazi doctrines, is to mould the Church for political purposes. Rather than see the Church conclude a peace with such sinister tendencies Barth would prefer to see the Church become " a little flock and descend into the catacombs." In some of these tendencies he scents the presence of " The Prince of the power of the air "—the Prince of Darkness—and Barth calls upon theologians and Church members to awake to the " acute danger " of the religious situation. Anti-Semitism must not be allowed to vitiate the non-racial character of the Church of Jesus Christ Whose gospel is for

both Jew and Gentile. A Church excluding non-Aryans would cease to be Christian. In nine pointed paragraphs Barth compresses the views and feelings uttered in this manifesto, which is marked throughout by great force and often by intense passion.

The tension between Church and State in the Third Reich affords a fresh modern instance of the age-long and too familiar problem of how to effect right relationships between the civil and the spiritual powers. Barth is, to a large extent, a neo-Calvinist, and it would have been strange if in the present crisis in Germany he had been false to the principles of Calvin, who had to wage so stern a battle with the Geneva magistrates in the matter of spiritual freedom. Scotland has known in Covenanting times what it has been to fight to the death for " the Crown Rights of the Redeemer." Men of the Secessions and of the Disruption have known how to make sacrifices for the Church's freedom *in spiritualibus*. What sacrifices are faithful Christians in Germany to-day to make on behalf of fidelity to the Divine Leader of the Church? Are they capable of martyrdom for the sake of fidelity to the principles so uncompromisingly set forth by Karl Barth? Some ministers in Germany have, indeed, sacrificed their pastorates rather than bow the knee to Hitlerite control of their Church. The laity of the Church have been more weak-kneed, and the great majority of the clergy seem prepared to compromise. In justice to German Christians, however, it must be admitted that the issue for them is not so simple as it was for our Scottish defenders of spiritual independence. The " German Christians " in general hail Hitler as a political saviour from Bolshevism and from the provocations of Jewish ascendancy. Moreover, the hero of the German Reformation, Luther, was not so clear and consistent a thinker as Calvin, and his policy was not so free from Erastianism as that of the great Genevan. Yet one would fain see in the Germany of to-day a deeper and braver concern regarding the situation as it is viewed by Barth.

Meanwhile the Church of Rome has emerged more successfully from the Nazi domination. Hitler has agreed that there will be no interference with the Roman Catholic Church, provided her clergy refrain from political activities in the nature of opposition to the Nazi programme. The promise so to refrain has been given by Rome. To that extent Rome, too, has been compelled to concede to Hitlerism.

On the whole, the die seems for the moment to have been cast. But if there were still opportunity for reconsideration, the "German Christians" might do well to study the recent Articles of Constitution of the Church of Scotland and endeavour even yet to obtain some such ecclesiastical freedom as therein has been declared lawful in the eye of the State.

Professor Barth's pamphlet is a courageous one. It may lay him open to severe Nazi censure and may result in his expulsion from Germany. Happily it would not be difficult for so eminent a theologian, so widely read in Switzerland, Holland, Britain, France, and America, to find a post in one of these countries. It is, however, to be hoped that he will be permitted to remain in Germany, and to exercise a salutary influence in the re-shaping of the Protestant Churches there, and to continue to strengthen those Germans who are jealous of the spiritual freedom of the Christian Church.

R. M. ADAMSON.

RAM MOHAN ROY: THE FATHER AND FOUNDER OF MODERN INDIA.

OF all the centenaries which are being celebrated this year to commemorate the passing away of great men who have tried to emancipate humanity, there is none that affects and concerns India more than that of Ram Mohan Roy, who lies buried in Bristol where he breathed his last on September 27th, 1833. It is not without significance that this man, who had been a great champion of the Indo-British *rapprochement*—a cause for which he laboured incessantly—should be buried on English soil. The fact should be a great impetus to those who are straining every nerve to see Modern India come to an understanding with Modern Britain, and vice versa.

The year 1772 is the recognised date of Ram Mohan's birth. The Bengal of his day was very rapidly coming under the control of the East India Company. The Mogul Emperors of Delhi were puppets on the throne, very different from their ancestors Akbar, Jehangir, Shah Jehan and Aurangzebe. Degeneration due to careless living and bigotry had cracked the edifice built by Akbar the Great. The doubtful, aggressive and grasping methods of the East India Company had hastened the downfall of Moghul authority. It was evident that the future lay in the hands of this trading concern whose main objective was financial gain by fair means or foul. While bribery and corruption were rampant amongst the petty Hindu and Moslem officials, the British were not immune from the evil. There were, of course, some noble men amongst them, and Ram Mohan Roy was able later on to distinguish between the desirables and the undesirables, the men who would be the means of uplifting India and those who would be a hindrance in her moral struggles.

The customs and etiquette of the Mohammadans had found a place in the households of those who owed allegiance to the great Moghuls. Persian was the official language and Ram Mohan was so well versed in it as to rise to a high administrative post. In 1796 he began to learn English, in view of the fact that the civil and revenue administration of Bengal was coming into the hands of the Company and English would be the official language of the future. He was a great Arabic

scholar as well, as it was necessary to understand the Islamic scriptures at first hand in order to appreciate the Moslem standpoint. The centuries of Moslem domination had produced varied effects upon Hindu society. While on the one hand the contact of the mystical elements in Islam and Hinduism had given rise to such men as Tuka Ram and Nanak, and great saints had tried to see the fundamental unity behind outward differences, yet on the other hand the Brahmins, the guardians of Hindu culture and tradition, had made caste rules more stringent and introduced customs which became almost inhuman in order to safeguard themselves and their flock from alien influence. No one knew the power of Brahmin orthodoxy better than Ram Mohan, for he was a Kulian Brahmin himself. His progressive spirit revolted against the practices of his co-religionists.

The Christian influence from the West was struggling hard to make its impact upon the Indian mind. The great Henry Martyn, Marshman and William Carey were carrying on their labours at Serampore and did not seem to make much headway. The politics of Europe, the Hundred Years War, the coming of the French Revolution, the exploits of Napoleon, were events which had their influence on the outlook of Ram Mohan.

The most important event for which Ram Mohan is known is his fight against the cruel practice of suttee. In spite of the fact that the Hindu Sastras do not sanction it, the Brahmins of his day had somehow managed to introduce this custom of " self sacrifice." Born and bred a Brahmin himself, well versed in the Vedas, he carried on a great controversy against the orthodoxy of his period. The iron entered into his soul when in 1811 he witnessed the burning of his sister-in-law. She had finished the ceremonial task of setting fire to her dead husband's funeral pyre, and was coming away when her path was blocked by the Brahmin priests. With spiked sticks they pushed her back. Ram Mohan, hearing her shrieks, went to her aid, but was repulsed by the same spikes. His sister-in-law was thrown into the rising flames and held down; she died struggling against her murderers who in the name of religion carried out such an inhuman custom. This event led Ram Mohan to burn his boats, and declaring his attitude he began to rouse public opinion.

The only way to let the Hindus of his day realise that the burning of widows was not a part of their religion was to

make the scriptures available to them. With this in view he did what Luther and Erasmus did; he translated the Vedas into Bengali. Let the people themselves judge whether such a brutal custom was permitted by the Rishis of old. It is necessary to point out that, even in the darkest days of Hinduism this custom was not universally observed in India, but was practised in various localities and amongst certain people. Earlier Europeans and the Moslem Kings tried to put a stop to it, but failed. There were occasions, even in the early days when Alexander the Great came to India, when a widow voluntarily mounted the funeral pyre of her husband and showed her faithfulness to him by crossing the ocean of life in his company. This sign of virtue and faithfulness was exploited to the full by a crafty priesthood. Ram Mohan found it no easy task to break through this stone wall. By means of pamphlets and articles and public discussions he tried to show the folly and inhumanity of the custom. He sought the aid of the State in suppressing it. It took him nearly twenty years to have it abolished. The British attitude of neutrality was responsible for the delay in putting a stop to it. In 1819 in Bengal alone the number of suttees which were officially reported came to 650; whereas between the years 1815 and 1818 the total number of widows known to be burnt in this part of India was 2,365. No one knows how many others had gone through the same fate unknown and unreported.

Ram Mohan Roy appealed to the Governors-General, to judges, collectors, magistrates, missionaries, and members of Parliament to put an end to this custom. It was in 1830 that Lord William Bentinck, after making sure that the army could be depended upon in case of a rising, which might occur when the male populace were deprived of these great spectacles, took his courage in both hands and declared the custom illegal and punishable by law. While the British Government can rightly claim credit for this law, we must not forget that it would never have been possible but for the spade work done by the Indian reformer, and the moral support which the Governor-General had from the small but growing number of followers of a reformed Hinduism. The Government had to face some opposition, but, sure of its ground on a moral and just basis, it soon overcame all criticism and suttee passed away into the realm of oblivion.

While suttee has gone, we may well wonder if the orthodox elements have been crushed. Ram Mohan was the pioneer of women's emancipation in India, and from his day to the present men and women have risen to the idea of Indian womanhood free from the shackles of tradition and a selfish priesthood. The struggle is not over yet. Public opinion for reform has been gaining strength, and when we see Indian women to-day coming to London and presenting what has been recognised as the best and ablest memorandum and giving the finest evidence before the Joint Select Committee regarding their place in the future constitution of India, we must pay our tribute to one who a hundred years ago died fighting on their behalf. Side by side with this vigorous presentation of their rights by the women, comes the heart-breaking and humiliating evidence of the Hindu orthodox elements who, in spite of their education and progress in thought, are opposed to measures which would endanger their traditions. Thank God that Ram Mohan Roy lighted a torch which young India is determined to keep alight. If left to the mercies of orthodoxy India would soon slip back into her mixture of culture and brutality, mysticism and cruelty, where human lives would count less than those of animals. Some of these honourable gentlemen are still talking in 1933 in such high-sounding phrases as " self immolation " and " sacrifice " for the widow, whereas for themselves not one of them would suggest the same practice if their wives died. They have seen to it that the flames consume the bodies of the widows, but the widower a few months afterwards gets another dowry to the music of wedding marches and canopied processions. A foreign Government is slow to move in these matters, and may even under the guise of a benevolent neutrality allow the continuation of customs which are a positive hindrance to progress and political emancipation. If young India to-day wants self-government, it is that it may deal with the orthodox in the proper way. Such ordinary legislation as the raising of the age of marriage for girls should not be held up by a foreign power out of deference to the opinions of the orthodox. That human beings created by God in His own image should be prevented from using wells, or roads or schools because the orthodox oppose it, should not be tolerated by the State. Ram Mohan Roy proved that a bold action in the name of justice and humanity would be supported by enlightened

opinion, and that opinion to-day is a thousand times stronger than in the days of Bentinck. This should be a clear challenge to the administrators of 1933 to sweep aside the man-made barriers which are imprisoning the body and soul of India.

It is in the deeper elements of life that we see Ram Mohan Roy as a great pioneer. In him the three cultures of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity met in a remarkable way. This combination gave rise to the present cult of Theism, or the Brahmo Samaj Society, which has attracted such well-known families as those of the Tagores, the Mozumdars and the Sens. While turning for a national expression of religion to the Hindu Vedas in their purest form, Ram Mohan was a keen student of the Islamic and Christian scriptures in their original. He was not only a Sanskrit scholar, but mastered the Latin, Greek, Persian, and Arabic languages for the sake of getting at the truth which the Founders of the great religions taught. He felt that through tradition and historic circumstances religion was apt to be misinterpreted, and that unnecessary customs and practices hid the essence of a faith from its adherents. The search after truth was his passion, and no particular religion could claim a monopoly of truth. He avoided the dogmas and creeds of religions, and tried to understand their ethical values. He was attracted towards Christ more than towards any other Teacher, and pleaded with the missionaries of his time not to lay stress upon the miraculous and the dogmatic side of the Gospels but upon the precepts and teachings of Jesus. He held that stress upon the former gave priests and clergy a handle over the masses, and encouraged superstition, and because of his emphasis upon the contribution which Christianity could make to the India of his day by the practice of a social, personal and ethical gospel, he was called by the Serampore School of Baptists an " intelligent heathen." The Brahmo Samaj has therefore since his day been a Unitarian Society, giving shelter to Hindus who while clinging to the Vedas as their religious background have been broad-minded enough to recognise truth everywhere, to give freedom to their women and to abandon the tyranny of caste.

Ram Mohan was a pronounced opponent of idolatry, which he considered to be demoralising in its effects upon those who practised it. His followers of the Brahmo Samaj have faithfully kept all graven images out of their places of worship. He was the father of such modern movements in India as have

tried to break through old traditions, ancient nonsensical customs, and limitations cramping to human personality.

The last three years of the life of Ram Mohan Roy, who had been given the title of Raja by the Moghul King of Delhi, were spent in England. He was the first Indian to come to this land, and his example has since 1834 been followed by thousands of his countrymen. While he brought his own servants and his cows in order to keep in the good books of the orthodox, he had a free mind and did not strictly observe all rules which his Brahminical traditions demanded of him. The Indian of to-day, thanks to the courage and example of the great Raja, has no scruples of caste as he comes to these shores. He takes things for granted, and if he tries to observe any of his caste prejudices he is looked upon as a crank. Times have changed, and Young India in Britain must pay its tribute to the man who first crossed the Seven Seas.

During the last three years scores of Indians of all castes and creeds have come to England to discuss the question of constitutional reform. And they have forgotten, and many in Britain do not realise, that a century ago the first Indian publicist in the person of Ram Mohan Roy came here on a similar mission. He saw the time coming when Indians and British must work together for the good of India. He was a firm believer in the value of the British connection. The events in France had brought out his admiration for democratic movements. They were a signpost to him for his own country. He wished India to come into line with these liberal ideas, and he was convinced that with the help of Britain this could be achieved. The Radical schools of Liverpool and Manchester gave him a great welcome. He appealed to the highest minds of England to give India of their best. He was the first one to point out that the grasping policy of the East India Company might lead to unpleasant results. He expected of those who went out into the Indian Civil Service high ideals and a conception of duty towards the people. His own countrymen, he felt, had a great deal to learn from England; the closer the intercourse between the two the better for all concerned. He appealed to Englishmen not to be arrogant in their behaviour towards Indians, and in his wisdom he foresaw how the danger to Indo-British relationships would come from an arrogant pride on the one hand, and a servile mind on the other. It was in mutual respectfulness and appreciation that the best results would be produced.

The Indians of to-day, journalists, teachers, reformers, publicists, owe him a great debt, for he was the first one to open the path of modern progress to India, and Britain on her side must cherish the memory of one who expected her to carry on her work in India in the spirit of a friend and co-worker.

The place that the great reformer has in India's life can best be described from the words written on his tombstone in Bristol by his great friend Dwarka Nath Tagore.

> Beneath This Stone rest the Remains of
>
> Raja Rammohun Roy Bahadoor
>
> a conscientious and steadfast believer in the Unity of the Godhead; He consecrated his life with entire devotion to the worship of the Divine Spirit Alone. To great natural talents he united a thorough mastery of many languages, and early distinguished himself as one of the greatest scholars of his day. His unwearied labours to promote the social, moral and physical condition of the PEOPLE OF INDIA, his earnest endeavours to suppress Idolatry and the Rite of Suttee, and his constant zealous advocacy of whatever tended to advance the Glory of God and the welfare of man, live in the grateful remembrance of his countrymen.

SHORAN S. SINGHA.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA IN 1917.

THE revolution of 1917 was not a spontaneous outbreak of explosive elementary forces like that of 1905 or the French Revolution. Many observers felt a hidden hand behind the revolutionary scenery. The war-weary Russian soldiery listened to enemy propaganda in 1917, as their German foes listened in 1918 to the Entente propaganda. In March 1917 the old authority was overthrown in Petrograd in a few hours by a few soldiers led by some new anonymous power. Petrograd was suddenly overrun by armed cars driving at a mad speed with armed soldiers and civilians adorned with red bows and waving red flags. Nobody resisted them, everybody helped or obeyed them. What struck me at once was some strange inner order and discipline amidst disorderly scenes. Someone gave orders and all accepted them.

Crowds headed by soldiers were running after every armed officer they met. The officers resisted or ran away, but the crowd organised a regular hunt. I asked the soldiers who had permitted them to disarm officers. The answer was always the same: "We have received orders." "From whom?" The answer was always more or less polite: "Mind your business as we do ours." Civilians were throwing imperial scutcheons in the mud. "What are you doing?" "We have received orders." "From whom?" "Mind your business as we do ours." This was not an outbreak of elementary forces. A Soviet had appointed itself. The Committee of the Duma elected a Provisional Government. Baron Meyendorff, former vice-president of the third Duma, asked me whether it was anarchy or revolution. I replied: "Not anarchy, but I cannot yet see who is behind the revolution." "But where is the Government?" "There are two Governments: the Soviet and the Provisional Government of Prince Lvow." "This is dualism," remarked Meyendorff. I said: "One of them must arrest the other." Meyendorff replied in a truly prophetic way: "I don't think so, they will hate each other, but they will be unable to do without each other." "Then," I retorted, "a third power will come; it will destroy these two and then will lead the revolution."

On March 16th, 1917, my friend, the much regretted Vladimir Nabokov, who was appointed General Secretary to

the Cabinet of Prince Lvow, offered me the post of his official assistant. I accepted and began my new work on March 20th. I continued it till July 23rd without any interruption, with the exception of three nights of shooting in July. I resigned on July 23rd, after a violent discussion with Nekrassov, Deputy Premier to Kerensky. I refused to work with a Government whose weakness seemed dangerous. Perhaps I was wrong. Perhaps the "weakness" to which I objected was not the cause but the result of the hopeless position of Russia amid the throes of a horrible war and an awful revolution. But as I give my impression, not an historical verdict, I will describe things as I saw them.

The general impression was weakness. The chairman was the weak Prince Lvow, a religious and liberal Utopian, a mixture of Tolstoyan internationalism with slavophil patriotism. He applied non-resistance even in the way he conducted the discussion. He sat with his notebook and wrote down the names of those willing to speak, kept strictly to this order, and never stopped those who could not finish their speech, repeating the same thing in endless variations. It was terribly dull and took precious time. The Ministers sat without interruption every day from 3 to 8 p.m. and from 9 p.m. to 2, 3, or even 4 a.m. next day. When could these talking leaders work or act? Prince Lvow was a marvel of passive tenacity. Sometimes he had no sleep, but he was awake at 8 in the morning and patiently received his very loquacious visitors. Incredible as it sounds, the Bolshevik paper *New Life*, the first Bolshevik paper of Gorki, was printed at the State printing press. Nabokov discovered it and vainly implored Lvow to put an end to this scandal. I also never missed an opportunity to complain about it, but he was deaf or dumb on the subject, or too busy.

The only strong men in the first Ministry were Kerensky and Milyoukov, who hated each other. The most active was Kerensky. But he spent most of his enormous nervous force in addressing meetings of soldiers, sailors and workmen. Sometimes he had no sleep at all. In the first period he sometimes found the best, if not the only, place for his sleep in the sittings of the Ministers under Lvow. His sleep was very short. He had the capacity to grasp the essence of the discussion subconsciously while half asleep. Then he suddenly awoke and asked: "What is the matter?" and

victoriously intervened in the discussion. He was a democrat with utopian tendencies. He united a socialism free from class hatred with patriotism. His revolution was idealistic and mild. He was against any harsh action of authority. He believed in the magic of words and the method of persuasion, which was to take the place of the old method of giving orders and supporting them by menace. The future Persuader-in-Chief of the Russian army had a great talent for negotiating but not for organising. He was a first-rate man for a Parliament, a Gambetta, a Gladstone, not a Danton and still less a Cromwell. Russia needed in 1917 a Cromwell, a man who would stop a revolution or a war, as war and revolution were practically impossible to carry on in the conditions of 1917.

Kerensky sincerely believed, like Prince Lvow, that the Russian revolution would be bloodless, stainless, mild and pure. The religious Lvow called it a miracle. The agnostic Kerensky called it a new era opened by Russia to mankind.

> "We must not give orders," he cried very often with enthusiasm, "we must *persuade* the citizen, the soldier, the workman, the peasant to keep quiet, not to be drunk with liberty, not to be revolted slaves. We must end the war in close connection with our Allies, make a peace of good-will and brotherhood. The Russian revolution will be the exact opposite of the French Revolution. The aims are the same, not the methods; no Terror, no guillotine. The Russian revolution will have clean hands, no murders, no arrests, very little violence. It will abolish arbitrary arrests and exile. It will liberate the Tsar, his son, his family, and will conduct them into safety in England to English friends, pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly, which will decide for a republic."

The same man who openly advocated regicide in the Duma became sympathetic to his prisoner the Tsar and to the proud Empress. I heard him shouting:

> "We must guarantee to our prisoners at least the same conditions as those which were granted to us, when we were revolutionaries, by the government of the Tsar. We must do more: the revolution must be generous."

The Russian Revolution must have clean hands!

Kerensky was violently opposed in the first Ministry to Milyoukov and Gouchkov, whom we, rightly or wrongly, considered as imperialists, even reactionaries. He attacked them bitterly. He tried to find a compromise between the pacifism

of the soviet and the attitude of Russia's allies. Milyoukov strongly supported the continuation of war to the bitter end, and tried to make it popular by raising the question of Constantinople.

Russia was at that time in the throes of complete anarchy, very much like the *anarchie spontanée* in France in 1789. Different towns and provinces officially broke their allegiance to Russia; even the fortress of Cronstadt declared itself a separate state. Some lepers put their warders to flight and marched towards Petrograd in order to bring their complaints and state their allegiance to the revolution. A complete political amnesty was decreed for political offenders. Robbers and thieves decided to liberate themselves, broke out of their prisons, disarmed their warders and killed those who resisted. Kerensky, then Minister of Justice, burst breathlessly into the ministerial council about 10 p.m., declaring that all prisons were ablaze, all offenders set free and requesting to be included in the amnesty. He confessed it was very sad, but there remained nothing else to do than "to legalise what has been done independently of our will." One of the Cadets objected that all thieves, pickpockets and robbers would be set free. Kerensky replied impatiently: "They are free. We legalise the existing order." A Cadet: "Say disorder and you make it impossible to rearrest them." Kerensky: "My ministry has drafted a list of articles of criminal law which are involved. Please sign it quick. The house is burning. We have no time to spare." He had excluded from the amnesty only violence of all kinds, robbery with violence and several disgusting crimes. A Cadet asked that the draft should be read at least. Kerensky shouted: "We have no time to spare; you are not a court of lawyers, you are the ministry of revolution. You cannot study law when the house burns. Sign, gentlemen, or I resign." Unanimous protests: "No, no, Alexander Fedorovich, do not leave us; you are our only hope." Meanwhile Nabokov took the draft and read it with visible marks of indignation. He was a first-rate criminal lawyer, and his very numerous amendments were accepted.

On the night of May 25th Kerensky again appeared in the ministerial council like a tempest. He brought a project abolishing capital punishment to be signed at once. Milyoukov interrupted: "Even in time of war? even at the front?" Kerensky reminded him sarcastically that he was reviving the

bill of the first Duma, proposed by the Cadets. Milyoukov replied that there was no war then, but the other Cadets, particularly Shingareff, supported him by loud acclaim. Kerensky, very happy, ran towards Nabokov and asked for his opinion as a member of the first Duma. Nabokov replied that he entirely approved the text. "I will say more—this is one of the happiest days of my life." So the death penalty was abolished. I followed Nabokov to his study and loudly expressed my disapproval of this fateful decision. The liberal Nabokov was very religious, a faithful son of the Orthodox Church. When I spoke about the necessity to maintain capital punishment, he answered: "You judge according to the French Revolution, but I try to follow the teachings of Christ." While I was putting the papers in order, he went to the window. It was about 4 a.m. The beautiful white northern night shed a pale blue light on the handsome silhouette of Nabokov, and a crown of light was round his head—he was like an angel on an ikon. Suddenly I saw him praying and crossing himself according to the Orthodox rite. He was praying that the Russian revolution should follow the teachings of Christ. Nabokov was an ardent yet tolerant Orthodox Christian. He was a true gentleman, a true knight, full of generosity, strong, fearless and good. He used his influence in 1917 to help the Grand Duchess Xenia and many friends and foes. Appointed chief of the ministerial staff of the Council of Ministers, which worked under Plehve and other ministers of the *ancien régime,* he was requested to destroy this "nest of reaction." He refused to do so, saying he would rather resign. Though sharing the ideas of Kerensky on capital punishment, he condemned the weakness of the Government and all concessions to pacifist tendencies.

Two fateful events were provoked by the weakness of the utopian Provisional Government. The worst was its passive attitude towards the arrival of Lenin through Germany on April 16th in more than suspicious circumstances. The second was the passive attitude towards the Soviet, where Lenin entered as a member, whereas Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, was admitted only with consultative power, because he was a patriot like Hervé and Noske. From the beginning of April we heard Milyoukov constantly warning his colleagues about the movements of Lenin and the money transferred for him to Stockholm. The Ministers decided on non-resistance.

Meanwhile Lenin did not lose time. Two weeks after his arrival he arranged the first Bolshevik demonstration of May 3rd. A battalion of Finland Guards appeared on the Marie Palace Square, and requested the resignation of two Ministers who stood in the way, Milyoukov and Gouchkov. The soldiers came armed, menacing the Palace with their guns, waving red flags, displaying inscriptions: "Down with Milyoukov, resign!" Enormous crowds, cheering the International, cursing war and the ministry, stopped the traffic on the Nevsky and adjacent streets. The Ministers could not work in the Palace in these conditions. They left with Nabokov for the flat of Gouchkov, while I remained with the staff in the Marie Palace. Our very difficult position was saved by Plekhanov and his patriotic crowd, which forced the Bolshevik crowd to retire across the Neva. Plekhanov himself, suffering from heart disease, was carried in front of the patriotic crowd by students. But nobody thanked him, and the Government never tried to form this group as a civic guard for the defence of the Government. Why? It was afraid to displease the Soviet, which sometimes took the Government under its protection. The Petrograd Soviet on May 4th had forbidden any demonstration for two days, and the Government had time meanwhile to decide on the resignation of the two Ministers who stood in the way. The night when the Government discussed with the executive committee of the Soviet was terrible, and we passed it without sleep. Gouchkov fainted, did not recognise me when I came to help him, and exclaimed: "Russia is finished, Russia is finished!" and fainted again. Milyoukov, on the contrary, showed a great force of resistance and great personal courage. Plekhanov came again after midnight with a patriotic crowd to defend the Government, but nobody asked him to remain.

On May 10th the former members of the four Dumas had a general meeting in favour of the continuation of the war. The foreign diplomats were all present, Lenin also. The soldiers constantly interrupted and insulted the War Minister Gouchkov, who described the terrible position of Russia and its army. The noise near the diplomatic box was so awful that I tried to stop it, but two giant soldiers of the Guard seized me and dragged me out of the building. Two Cadet ladies with green bows took my side and hung on to the soldiers, shouting: "Go to the front—do not dare to touch civilians."

Gouchkov resigned on May 12th, Milyoukov on May 18th. Nabokov, disgusted with all this, resigned also. A coalition government was formed with many socialists. But Plekhanov was not one of them, as he was hated for his patriotism by the semi-Leninite socialists of the Soviet. Kerensky took the War Office and Admiralty, Tereschenko the Foreign Office. Tzeretelly — a utopian socialist — was sincere but very inexperienced; Skobeleff, the other socialist, was not dangerous. We had a dramatic object-lesson in the arrival of Admiral Kolchak and his cruel indictment of the policy of the Persuader-in-Chief.

The second attempt to seize power or to rehearse the seizure was made by Lenin on June 21st. They decided to prepare a demonstration against "Capitalist ministers" on June 23rd. Poor Tzeretelly was indignant that he was included in the number. He had passed several years in Siberia with hard labour, and now he was called a capitalist because he did not obey Lenin. We passed the night without sleep. General Polovtzev, commanding the Petrograd garrison, described the position as hopeless. The Government asked again for the protection of the Soviet. Tzeretelly and Skobeleff were sent as negotiators, and the Government was waiting for their return, when the demagogic Minister of Agriculture, Chernov, suddenly proposed to give notice to the Allies that Russia was prepared for a separate peace. Prince Lvow stopped him and made the strongest speech in his career. He was noble-minded and splendid on this tragic night, strong and firm at last. "Let the Bolsheviks seize us and arrest us! We must never yield!" But he remained passive to the end. He was, as he stated, prepared to be arrested but not to try to arrest others. He was afraid to provoke civil war, like Louis XVI. Anyhow the Government escaped arrest. The Soviet "ordered" abstinence from demonstrations for three days from June 23rd. Tzeretelly persuaded the Soviet to persuade Lenin to persuade his followers not to try to seize power. Lenin was not persuaded at all, but decided to postpone action until the Government became quite rotten. To accelerate the decay of the fleet Chernov proposed to replace the flag of St. Andrew with the red flag. Kerensky, very pale, sprang to his feet and said he would not permit the Minister of Agriculture to deprive the Russian sailor of his historical flag till the Constituent Assembly could decide. But Kerensky had to cope also with

the growing opposition from the right. The Cadets now turned resolutely to the right. One night in the middle of June Shingareff was criticising the weakness of the Government. Kerensky interrupted him, asking when he was going to abandon his systematic opposition. Shingareff, raising his voice: "When you arrest Lenin." Kerensky, striking his fist on the table: "I will not arrest Lenin until you give me a direct proof of his guilt!" Shingareff: "There are quite enough indirect proofs." Kerensky: "And if the Court gives a verdict—not guilty—what will be our position?" Shingareff: "Do your duty." Kerensky: "It is not my duty. I am Minister of War; ask the Home Minister." Shingareff: "You are the only man who can arrest Lenin." Kerensky, striking the table again: "I will not arrest Lenin."

A month later Lenin tried to seize power by violence. He began civil war on July 16th, and disorderly shooting continued till the 18th. He was defeated by the Cossacks and part of the guard under the impression of indirect proofs of his guilt which were brought to the soldiers by the Minister of Justice, Pereverzev. Order was re-established, Lenin fled to Finland, Kerensky made an eloquent speech at the funeral of Cossacks killed in action. And then? Non-resistance again. Instead of taking advantage of the defeat of the Bolshevik conspiracy he began friendly negotiations with the Soviet. This move was so clear and so significant that even the patient Prince Lvow, not only the Cadet Ministers, tendered their resignation.

Kerensky now tries to argue in favour of his attitude, which ended the utopian period of the Russian revolution without resistance. I will remind him only that Prince Lvow is dead, the socialist patriot Plekhanov dead also, the Cadet Shingareff murdered by a Bolshevik. Many witnesses are unable to contradict him. All these men and many others strongly objected to his non-resistance to Bolsheviks. I share their opinion, for which I also resigned on July 23rd.

Born and educated in the hatred of reaction, Kerensky did not completely realise in 1917 that Bolshevism is the most reactionary of all reactions, since it introduces slavery in order to get socialism. He was afraid of the ghost of reaction from the right at the moment when the abyss of reaction opened itself under his feet from the left. He was brave enough, but he was timid towards Lenin—the attitude of a moderate before an extremist, whom he "respected" as a socialist, and he

feared to pass in history as a reactionary. Instead of violently extinguishing the fire, like Cromwell, he played with it till it burned his fingers and the wings of Russia.

The clearest, strongest, most amazing foresight was shown by the dying socialist Plekhanov, whom I met in Tsarskoye Selo at the end of August 1917. The father of Russian Marxism had a broken heart from illness and remorse. He repented of having introduced "this serpent Lenin" as his secretary into the Russian socialist party. "Marxism is a method, not a dogma. Lenin has accepted it wrongly, without the patriotic and moral corrective." Plekhanov predicted that Russia would be the "slave" of Lenin owing to the weakness of Kerensky. "Russia will not kiss the stirrup of William II," he said, suffocating in despair, "but it will kiss, like a slave, the feet of Lenin. Russia will be enslaved for the sake of socialism! Russia must stand above revolution and socialism and Marxism. Russia above all," shouted the heart-broken patriot. Amen.

ALEXANDER ONOU.

THOMAS MANN: HIS PROSE AND POLITICS.

IBSEN'S words: "To write is to hold judgment over oneself," would be a good motto for the works of Thomas Mann, who, in his *Betrachtungen,* with subtle irony calls himself a chronicler, commentator of decadence, lover of the pathological and of death, an æsthete heading for the abyss. His critical mind forces him to justify his attitude towards art and life. We therefore can divine his personality from a study of his own essays, especially from the *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (meditations of a non-political mind), which he wrote during the Great War, and which appeared in 1922.

As an artist he seeks to realise life as a totality. He is repelled by the catchwords such as *égalité, fraternité* and *liberté* which are worn like a monocle by the modern intellectual. With keen sensibility Thomas Mann compares our twentieth century to the eighteenth, whilst he reckons himself a child of the waning nineteenth century, which is essentially pessimistic, unpathetic (in contrast to his brother Heinrich) and takes things for what they are—without pathos or social idealism. Hence he cannot believe in the idea of progress and regeneration of mankind. Schopenhauer's philosophy and Nietzsche's psychology of decadence influenced his thought. Thomas Mann not only opposes the radical democratic spirit of modern men of letters, but also criticises false patriotism. Only the most cultured and just people should hold sovereignty over the world.

On the other hand, the author of the *Betrachtungen* disdains the would-be pacifist Esperanto cult. His artist's mind is revolted by extremes. Even though he calls himself *bürgerlich-konservativ,* he nevertheless acknowledges the republican constitution of Germany, but so-called international progress leads only to disillusionment. Mechanised civilisation is the slave of money. The national spirit must not die. Personal culture can only develop through it. We are now in danger of being swamped by the mass spirit which is bred by democratic panaceas. The utilitarian principle aims at securing the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible majority. But happiness is a relative term. For most people this means no more than materialistic desire for comfort in life. Belief in God is quite different from belief in progress.

Politics can never satisfy the human mind. Social contracts,

or franchise, are no guarantee for real freedom. Therefore education should not only be a social affair, it must allow for the development of the individual. A purely political education would destroy the essence of romanticism which lives in the heart of every German and finds expression in works such as Eichendorff's dreamy *Taugenichts,* Kleist's immortal *Kätchen von Heilbronn,* Gottfried Keller's *Der grüne Heinrich,* Gerhart Hauptmann's *Und Pippa tanzt.* We can draw these and similar conclusions from the above-mentioned meditations. Above all the artist must stand above politics. Thomas Mann has no rigid criterion of what is good or bad. Even war as an instigation of national individuality can, according to Thomas Mann, have metaphysical significance. Here we are reminded of Arnim's introductory note to *Des Knaben Wunderhorn.* Thomas Mann believes that as long as human passions live there will and must be war. We are all the playthings of fate and must die. Children are born in travail. Death that seeks one out in bed is often more brutal than death in the trenches. Intellectual warfare can wither the spirit more than physical battle can destroy the body.

From this point of view he arrives at a justification of the State. Schopenhauer already said in his *Ungekrönte Preisschrift* that men live like tiger and wolf in a menagerie. Only tradition, discipline and civilisation, as also pointed out by Vernon Lee in her delightful romance *Ariadne in Mantua,* keep them at bay. The State is indispensable. But Thomas Mann finds in the latter a metaphysical value. Religion, philosophy and art spring from the common ground which constitutes the treasure of each nation. Hence we may call Thomas Mann, like Goethe, a moderate liberal who is attached to the idea of a national community, but whose mind expands beyond these limits to the spheres of humanity. In nearly all his works it is the relationship of the artist to the world which occupies him as the chief problem. There is a certain icy detachment in his writings, a great self-control. It seems as if his words were sifted through a sieve. Cool irony chills his emotional impressions. His distrust of the artist as a human being is shown by the autobiographical sketch *Im Spiegel* (1907) in which he ironically depicts himself as a good-for-nothing who, in spite of childish caprices and vices, is honoured as a respectable author by the public at home and abroad. And indeed Thomas Mann may rank as a classic writer of to-day.

He is one of the most distinguished representatives of modern German prose. In 1929 he was awarded the Nobel Prize.

Already at the age of twenty-five, in his first novel, *Buddenbrooks,* he develops his favourite theme, the struggle between the artist and the Philistine in man. Here with fine observation and realistic style the external and internal decay of a middle-class family in Lübeck is traced through four generations. There is old Buddenbrooks, still in full possession of his strength. His son's mentality is already refined and weakened by metaphysical speculation. The third generation still maintains the good reputation of the firm, but its energy is undermined by Schopenhauer's pessimistic outlook. The youngest generation is embodied in Hanno, fragile in body, a lover of music and a romantic dreamer. The dawn of every morning brings him a new burden which he is too weak to overcome. Already in this book Thomas Mann proves a great epic writer who from Richard Wagner learned the use of the *leitmotif.* Certain characteristics, often seemingly very irrelevant features, occur again and again in order to accentuate personality. The writer develops this style later more and more, until he overdoes it, especially in his *Magic Mountain.* The manner in which he wallows in decadence is characteristic of the time.

Like his brother Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann is a poet of the *Décadence,* but his work is of a much more passionate nature. As an enthusiastic advocate of the democratic claims of liberty, equality and fraternity he stands in sharp contrast to him. The over-emphasis of the political element, his war against the ambitious strivings of the individual, frequently result in inartistic distortions of modern life. Heinrich's style, grotesque, fervent in character, is clearly shown in the novel *Professor Unrat,* which was put on the screen under the title *Blue Angel.* His *Kleine Stadt* becomes a symbol of the world in which adultery, the humdrum of daily existence, and flagrant vanity are apparent on all sides. D'Annunzio's influence seems to be very strong here. In his trilogy, *Das Kaiserreich,* the author gives a critical representation of German society in the age of William II. All these and other stories are both in style and subject-matter alien to those of Thomas Mann, an exception being *Pippo Spano.* This story deals with the theme, so favoured by Thomas, of the artist Malvolto, who, in order to give form to life, must not surrender

himself to it. Women are the plaything of his vanity. Only Gemma seems to be able to pierce the mask and touch his heart. They are resolved to die. When, however, he sees the girl dead, killed by his dagger, the spell is broken. He remains the actor of life that he was before she entered his sphere.

The contrast between life and art is still more strongly emphasised in the works of Thomas Mann, e.g. *Tonio Kroeger* (1903). Tonio stands between the bourgeois and the artistic existence, full of longing for life and yet far removed from its inartistic banality. After an unstable life, torn between cold intellectuality and ardent sensuality, he at last acknowledges that it is not the intellect which brings salvation, but life with its seductive commonplaces, to which Tonio wistfully rather than gladly ultimately surrenders himself. Whilst in *Buddenbrooks* the author fell more under the influence of Schopenhauer, he now arrives at Nietzsche's affirmation of life. Yet the hero's joy in existence cannot be compared to the lust of a Cesare Borgia or the eccentric Satanism of modern decadence. It is love of the simple commonplaces of everyday life that attracts him, but from which he, in his chaste serenity, abstains. The novel is to a great extent autobiographical. When Thomas Mann speaks of the gulf between art and life he writes more from his epic point of view, whilst a lyric writer, such as Heine or Lenau, would assert his subjectivity and thus not achieve such objective detachment. It is usually forgotten that Thomas Mann is one of the greatest masters of the modern German prose epic. He must be judged from this angle, and not only as an exponent of morbid decadence. His epic world grew out of renunciation and discipline. In the drama *Fiorenza* (1905) the optimistic Lorenzo is contrasted with the ascetic Savonarola. Not life and art but beauty and intellect are the antagonistic powers here. Between these Fiore, the symbol of Florence, vacillates. There is great dramatic tension in the work, but Thomas Mann is predominantly an epic writer. He sets his characters before the foil of cultural and historical descriptions.

Der Tod in Venedig (1912), a jewel as regards form, deals with the collapse of the conscientious northern character in its struggle with instinctive forces. Again we find the conflict between morality and beauty. The ageing hero, Aschenbach, feels himself drawn towards a beautiful boy with whom he, however, never speaks. He realises that the emotion of the

lover transcends that of the beloved. Just as Ganymede, the Trojan shepherd, was carried by the eagle into the ether, so the beloved is lifted on the wings of the lover. These reflections remind one of Socrates' imaginary dialogue with his pupil Phaedo. Here Thomas Mann gives expression to his deepest thought. Beauty is a passage towards spiritual perfection. Beauty is the only intellectual form which the senses can bear. But this sensuousness also leads to destruction. The hero dies in a cholera plague to which Venice is doomed.

These and other ideas found expression once more in the *Zauberberg* (the *Magic Mountain*) (1924). The inner transformation of the young engineer Castorp, brought about by a seven years' sojourn at the Swiss sanatorium Berghof, forms the main theme of the novel. In the opinion of the medical specialists it is an irreproachable psycho-analysis of the tubercular patient. Disease as the dominant interest in life leads to over-emphasis of the physical side and to degeneracy. The writer not only describes this transformation of Castorp, but fills his work with the great problems of modern culture. We are drawn into political discussions concerning internationalism and individualism, progress and religion, life and the humanities. In the seclusion of the sanatorium Castorp becomes more and more estranged from life, until as a result of his experience of death and the outbreak of the Great War he is at last freed from the spell. Thomas Mann's short story *Tristan* seems to be the germ of the study of *Zauberberg*. It is interesting to note that Klabund, in his story *Die Krankheit* (1917) also deals with the ethic degeneration of man brought about by illness.

Thomas Mann's novel ripened slowly through years to a *Bildungsroman* which in the wide range of its intellectual and cultural background can only be compared to Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*. There is not much action. Castorp plunges himself into introspection concerning the ills of his body. Knowledge of its organic functions becomes of greater importance to him than active life. In the meanwhile he is drawn into discussions on the cultural significance of democratic and conservative ideas which are represented by Settembrini and Naphta. The former is the exponent of enlightened civilisation, the latter of an ascetic fanaticism which denies progress. Culture to him moves ever in a circle. Belief in natural history leads modern man into chaos. Overrated love for democracy ends in lust for possession. Not effeminate philanthropy, but fear

and terror lead erring man back to God. These are ideas which we have already met with in the *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*. In contrast to the simultaneously revolutionary and aristocratic view of Naphta, his opponent, Settembrini, upholds the creed of international tolerance which shall bring with it a regeneration of mankind. In the chapter entitled: "Of the City of God, and Deliverance by Evil," the characters are placed in sharp antithesis to one another:

> There is no such thing as pure knowledge. The validity of the Church's teaching on the subject of science, which can be summed up in the phrase of Saint Augustine: *Credo, ut intellegam*: (I believe, in order that I may understand) is absolutely incontrovertible. Faith is the vehicle of knowledge, intellect secondary. Your pure science is a myth. A belief, a given conception of the universe, an idea—in short, a will, is always in existence; which it is the task of the intellect to expound and demonstrate. . . . The great schoolmen of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were agreed that what is false in theology cannot be true in philosophy. . . . Liberation and development of the individual are not the key to our age, they are not what our age demands. What it needs, what it wrestles after, what it will create—is Terror.

Settembrini protests against Naphta's ideas:

> I protest against the imputation that the modern State means the subjugation of the individual to evil ends! I protest against the dilemma in which you seek to place us, between Prussianism and Gothic reaction! Democracy has no meaning whatever if not that of an individualistic corrective to State absolutism of every kind. Truth and justice are the immediate jewels of personal morality.*

Settembrini does not believe in the horrors of modern industrialism and speculation, but has unshakable faith in the democratic state. The minds of these two combatants are, as the hero rightly observes, in themselves inconsequent. Their feud ends in a duel in which Naphta kills himself in disgust at his assailant's cowardice. Castorp himself is deeply moved. Already in the mountains, when the snowstorm brings him face to face with death, his mental stagnation is stirred. The key is turned, but the door to life is not opened until war breaks out, and he is carried into the swirl of activity.

A few years before the war, Thomas Mann's novel *Königliche Hoheit* (1909) showed the crisis of individualism. The non-

* Translated by H. T. Lowe-Porter. Second Edition. 1928. London. Secker.

social, merely representative existence of a prince is transformed by love into active social service. The allusion to historical persons (the hero has a withered arm) seems undisguised. Also in the *Zauberberg,* love loosens the bonds of intellectualism, but whereas *Königliche Hoheit* is built on a distinct formula in what we usually call the classic French manner, the *Magic Mountain* abandons itself to the true German love of infinite form. The latter novel is, doubtless, the outstanding work in German literature of our time as regards intellectual sensitiveness and pathological analysis. A real understanding of its problems is helped by a knowledge of Thomas Mann's brilliant essays, such as *Friedrich und die grosse Koalition* (1914), since published in the volume *Rede und Antwort* (1922), *Goethe und Tolstoi* (1922). During the Great War he attempted with that conscientiousness which is peculiar to him to elucidate his attitude towards our era. As an artist he stands between life and radicalism, *Volksgeist und Zeitgeist.* In the discourse *Von deutscher Republik* (1923) composed in honour of Gerhart Hauptmann, he speaks of the "aristocratic social state" which protects the interests both of the individual and of the community.

On the occasion of the Goethe centenary, Thomas Mann gave an address at the Preussische Akademie der Künste in Berlin. In this speech: *Goethe as the representative of the age of the bourgeois* (1932), he gives a reflection of his own character. In contrast to those who see in Goethe the exponent of classicism, or to Carlyle who looks upon him as a divinity, Goethe is to Thomas Mann the summit of a bourgeois culture that flourished for five hundred years. In the mind of Goethe he recognises a synthesis of the revolutionary spirit of Luther and of the aristocratic mind of Erasmus. Thomas Mann's address justifies us in saying that the author of *Faust* and the author of the *Magic Mountain* are conservatives in the best sense of the word. Life is to both the rhythm of day and night, of blossom and fruit, birth and death, of an eternal dawning and setting. As in his *Betrachtungen,* Thomas Mann refutes the abstract idea of "progress." Life cannot be guided by reason alone. It is both *logos* and *eros,* intellect and heart. Only this attempt at a final reconciliation of the two polarities causes us to draw a comparison between Goethe and Thomas Mann. Without doubt, Goethe is the greatest personality of modern time. But we now live in an age of transition in which

the individual no longer counts for so much and can only find his fulfilment in close relationship to the community. Technical science revolutionised the world materially and spiritually. We must keep pace with life. Mann, who is himself deeply rooted in Goethe's culture but lacks his harmony, fully realises this necessity.

Once again as " the third empire " dawned in Germany the artist and politician, Thomas Mann, analysed his reactions to the spirit of the day. It is in an appreciation of Richard Wagner occasioned by the festival held in commemoration of the composer, and published in the *Neue Rundschau* (April 1933) that we meet with such thoughts. Mann sees in Wagner's art the consummate expression of the nineteenth century. Burdened by an intellectual zeal that seeks to plumb the mysteries of the universe, afflicted with the melancholy of a relativistic attitude to life, yet fired by the hopes of rationalism and liberalism, it cannot escape that insuperable craving for the monumental which characterises the art of the time, nor that predilection for the mystery of night and death :

> Ertrinken—versinken—
> Unbewusst—höchste Lust!—(*Tristan.*)

According to Thomas Mann, Wagner's nationalism is of an intellectual rather than a political nature. The creator of *Siegfried* is indifferent to State affairs (like the " non-patriotic " Goethe). Yet Wagner did not altogether lack political interests, for no man of culture can ignore the problems of his day with bourgeois phlegm. The political vein in Wagner asserts itself in the dream of a socialist Utopia. In Bismarck's foundation of the *Reich* he beheld fulfilment for German art. Yet Thomas Mann sees insurmountable barriers between them in that the *Machtstaat* and international art as understood by him are irreconcilable. The Swede Peterson-Berger, has subtly interpreted this antithesis as the cause of foreigners looking upon Wagner's work as essentially German whilst it actually also relies on effects that must appeal to a cosmopolitan audience. This dualism is characteristic of Wagner's art. His music betrays volcanic genius, indefatigable craftsmanship, the sublime and the infantile, dæmonic force, æstheticism and brutal sensuality. Siegfried is Hans Wurst, God of light and socialist anarchist in one person. This tragic antinomy: German-*mondän*, art-effect is inexhaustible. Thomas Mann

chooses the term " Romantic " which might apply best to Wagner's *Tristan*. Yet this work is no less modern. It is borne on that giant ethic tide which sweeps through the writing of Zola whose naturalism in *Nana* aspires to the symbolic, whilst Ibsen's protest against the *fin de siècle* is akin to Wagner's musical drama of salvation. Music became the instrument of psycho-analysis : the soul's yearning for release mingles with the body's desire in *Der fliegende Holländer*. In Siegfried's day-dream beneath the lime tree thoughts of his mother merge with the erotic. Schopenhauer's theory of " Will " and Freud's analysis are but expressions of the nineteenth-century tendency towards "psychological naturalism." Thomas Mann's reference to the *Edelhysterie* of Wagner's heroines and Kundry's dual personality must be understood in this connection.

Yet the vast myth of *Rheingold, Siegfried, Walküre, Götterdämmerung* lifts Wagner's work beyond the plane of modern naturalism. Certain elements, as, for instance, his Makart-like ostentation, his misconceived theory of a compound art (*Gesamtkunstwerk*), a forlorn path later to be followed once again by Arno Holz, and his baroque intensity may often appear grotesque. Yet Richard Wagner remains unequalled as the discoverer of immortal Mythos in opera. This was recognised by Thomas Mann although he refuses to see in him the exponent of a nationalism upheld by the new generation and thus as critic asserts himself in conscious antithesis to the German romantic ideals of to-day. Therefore, and as an interpreter of decadence, Thomas Mann is not considered a leader of New Germany, which in its desperate struggle for regeneration opposes the ideal of the *Griechendeutschtum*.

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EARLY EDUCATION SIXTY YEARS AGO.

SIXTY years ago education in the broad sense of the word was a very Spartan affair. Child study was unknown, kindergartens were non-existent; the ancient régime of governesses and dames' schools was still flourishing. The child himself was looked on as a sort of *homunculus,* a pocket edition of the grown-up human being. Older people did not seem to suspect that he was radically different, much less did they attempt to understand him. The general run of fathers were of the Barrett of Wimpole Street type, with no use for or no idea of the small child, whose only friend and harbour of refuge was his mother or some kindly maiden aunt. If ever the Œdipus complex was true, it was in those early days. As for the religion in whose shadow the child was reared, it was a kind of harsh Hebraism, reinforced by Calvinism, which treated him as a fallen creature to be dragooned and bullied into the path of virtue. On one side of this narrow road stood a choleric Divinity—ready to pounce down on the slightest slip, and on the other a very real Devil who might swoop down and carry you off to eternal torment. And if this were not sufficiently terrifying, you were told that at any moment the end of the earth might come, the zero hour being most probably in the middle of the night, when you might be suddenly aroused by the awful sound of the last trump. One lived under a veritable reign of terror, carefully cultivated and maintained, specially by nurses, as the easiest means of securing obedience. No more ingenious system was ever devised for implanting a permanent inferiority complex in the young. It is, or at least was, the nurse who makes or mars the earliest years of childhood. At that time parents usually only spent an hour or two a day with their offspring. The rest of the day they were left to the tender mercies of the nurse, and if she was, as many were, of the ignorant Sairey Gamp variety, the children had a terrible time. On more than one occasion I was shut up in a dark closet and told the devil would come and take me if I cried aloud or even stirred.

As I grew older, I stayed away with relations from time to time and was sent to dames' schools in which I picked up a smattering of the multiplication table, a little simple addition and subtraction (as children then loved to call it) and multiplication, manipulating mere figures that conveyed nothing to the mind, the whole having been preceded by exercises in what was

called notation and numeration which ran into equally meaningless millions and billions. At the end of the week we received a small merit card exchangeable at home into coin of the realm to the value of a penny. One practised pot-hooks, sometimes on slates, sometimes on paper, which were in the latter case punctuated with many involuntary smudges, or else one grappled with what was known as large text hand, which in spite of expert opinion I found to be a much more unmanageable script than the smaller writing which came later.

But nothing in my case exceeded the difficulty of learning to read. All sorts of methods were tried on me, including Sonnenschein's *Reading Without Tears*—the pupil was apparently supposed to supply the tears! At least I did, and in abundance. As far as I can remember, it was an admirably logical system entirely devoid of interest or meaning to the learner. Endless columns of similar words like c-a-t=cat, m-a-t=mat succeeded one another until one's brain reeled with this abracadabra of apparent nonsense. The result of all these unsuccessful experiences was that I was not able to read without spelling every other word until I was nearly nine.

Gradually the nurse epoch passed, and a governess arrived on the scene, who was at least a human being, though I fancy her attainments were small. We started on *Little Arthur's History,* a sort of " biltong " history of England, a thoroughly dull and indigestible book. Mrs. Markham's *History* seemed after that a delightful alternative. That good lady had at least an eye for the picturesque with her excursions into whipping-posts, ducking-stools and the like. But what most abides in my memory is the Bible reading. Every day we read a chapter, starting with Genesis and ploughing right through the book, including all the anthropological curiosities it contained, on which one naturally questioned the governess and received the usual unsatisfactory answers. Nowadays there are very sensible editions of the Bible for children. The method was continued through Exodus and even the earlier part of Leviticus, but finally even the governess' determination to omit nothing boggled and broke down at the endless sanitary regulations of the Israelites, and we skipped a good part of the rest of the book and also of Numbers and Deuteronomy. But when we came to the Kings and Chronicles we waded through all the genealogies, taking " Huz and Buz his brother " in our stride. The lists of the Kings of Israel and Judah who did evil in the

sight of the Lord exercised on me a sort of unholy fascination which culminated with the youthful Jehoachim who began those malpractices at my own age of eight. I often wondered what his besetting sin could be. Reading through the Bible at this age was doubtless often above my mind, but from many points of view, to mention only the literary, it has proved of immense advantage. One can only deplore, in this connection, the wide spread of ignorance of the Bible to-day among the younger generation. The Bible and Shakespeare are our two great classics.

In addition to this Bible reading, one learnt a large number of texts and the Church catechism; the latter, in default of any explanations except for the commandments, was more or less incomprehensible—the only impression being that as far as religion went, the world was a very wicked place, and that I was probably a lost soul, my only consolation, and it was a very real one, being that no doubt there were many others beside myself. These gloomy views were reinforced by the sermons which I listened to at one or other of the churches we attended on Sundays. At one the preacher had two themes, the morning sermon, preached in a Geneva gown, was devoted to hell, and the afternoon one to the Pope of Rome who was always mentioned in connection with the Scarlet Woman. Incidentally, I would say that for years after, just as people connect black with mourning so I connected scarlet with wickedness. The horror then inspired for the Pope of Rome lasted long into life, and I well remember in my "teens" the not altogether unpleasant sensation of awful sin experienced during a surreptitious visit to an Anglican Church at which incense was used and the priest wore violet vestments. The sermons on hell, in spite of a very lively dread of the Devil, did not have so much effect, specially during the winter months owing to the unimaginable cold of the unwarmed churches, where, with one's legs too short to reach the ground, dangling in an aching void, one experienced a sort of subconscious feeling that a little breath of hot air from the lower regions would not be unwelcome. I understand that a similar state of mind has been observed among the Eskimos, when the missionaries have dealt with the subject.

The founder of Christianity occupied a very subordinate position in this childish cosmos. His self-sacrifice only threw into greater relief the sombre wickedness of the world. Moreover, all that was said about him seemed remote, unreal or even goody-goody. There was no doubt the insipid picture presented to us

bore too great a resemblance to the "good child" by whose impossible standard our daily conduct was ruthlessly judged and condemned. The live characters were the protagonists of the Old Testament, because they appeared to be people of like passions as ourselves. The difference between the Old Testament and the New was the difference between the first and second part of *Tom Brown's Schooldays,* and yet one believes there is an infinite attractiveness about the character of Christ, for when all is said and done Christianity is the most human and humane of all world religions and, if one may say so, it is the apotheosis of friendship. It has, indeed, always seemed to me that its unwavering insistence on the comradeship of Christ has been Nonconformity's chief contribution to religion.

Yet none of this was ever indicated except in the hymns, which formed a welcome contrast to the awful atmosphere of sin, wrath and retribution. Even the ordinary books one read were of the same ultra-didactic, edifying type—*Little Henry and His Bearer, The Fairchild Family, Sandford and Merton,* in all of which the moral was rubbed in like an embrocation.

The most curious result of this bringing up was, despite the teachings of the catechism, the belief that when people grew up they grew out of being bad, with a corresponding childlike conviction in the goodness of one's elders, which is certainly non-existent to-day, when the old people are regarded by the young as the villains of the piece. Probably this belief was fostered by the idea that people who talked so much of child depravity must themselves be far above the child in morality. Nor is the belief so devoid of reason as one might think. Has not Bergson insisted that we always believe the rest of the world are at bottom better than ourselves? We really run them down therefore in order to keep up our belief in ourselves!

Perhaps the most repulsive side of this repressive form of education was the prevalence of the saying, "little children must be seen but not heard." Questions of any kind were discouraged, even if the questioner was not directly snubbed. I think those in authority probably felt subconsciously that their reputation for omniscience was tacitly threatened, quite apart from the worry and bother of having to try to satisfy the curiosity of an inquisitive child whose appetite grows with eating. On the contrary any information that was occasionally volunteered was usually conveyed with a galling air of condescension or else thrust down the throat of the questioner.

No one likes forcible feeding, and least of all when told it is for one's good. Probably the most effective way of discouraging questions was to make fun of the awkwardness or simplicity of the question, yet education largely consists in untying the knots in a pupil's mind and one should be only too grateful when the pupil himself propounds his difficulties by formulating them in a question. One might define the child who asks questions as a self-educator. Some children no doubt ask questions for the sake of asking, but the wise teacher can always distinguish between the questions asked for information and the questions called by the Romans rhetorical, which need no answer!

My first truancy dates from the age of eight. One fine morning the call of the sunshine proved irresistible and I slipped away to join my friend, the estate carpenter. I spent a delightful hour with him but unfortunately he had to leave his bench and fetch some wood, which entailed passing in front of the house. He was a hefty fellow and I trotted along what I could call the shady side of him and hoped for the best, but it was not to be. Suddenly the front door was flung open and my father appeared. He swooped down on me and, carrying me indoors, spanked me soundly. Then for no apparent reason he meted out the same treatment to my two sisters who had been doing their lessons, which instantly dried my tears. I felt I had at least something to show for the spanking. Moreover, a punishment shared is only half a punishment. It may even assume the heroic aspect of an ordeal, a point on which wise educators may well meditate.

As I grew older I was allowed to mix with the village boys, and we played cricket and other games together. This, I think, was a very great gain. One got an insight into the countryman's mind, which I hope I have never entirely lost. I feel sure that sixty years ago the intercourse between the squire's son and the village boys was much closer than it is to-day. Even when the squire's son went off to the little local grammar school, his connection with all things local still persisted. Most of his fellow pupils were farmers' sons who spoke the local idiom and thought "locally." To-day the squire's son is very carefully shepherded from the start by highly trained nurses and governesses. At nine at the latest he is packed off to a preparatory school, often a hundred miles away, he goes on to one of the big public schools, non-local as the Board of Education calls them, and then to Oxford and Cambridge.

Whatever ties he had with the locality are broken early and other interests take their place. He is probably far more polished, better educated, and wider-minded than his forbears of sixty years ago, but he is not in the same close personal touch with the village folk. There is one other advantage I derived from this intercourse with the country boys. In spite of all my mother's efforts I persisted in talking the broad Norfolk of the village and even gloried in it. Years later when I came to study modern languages seriously, I discovered its value. I found that I was already master not of one language but two—Standard English and Broad Norfolk. My ear, therefore, had been trained to differences in pronunciation of the same word and having learnt two intonations, a third, i.e. French, did not seem so difficult. Moreover, some of the Norfolk sounds helped me towards the pronunciation of otherwise unknown sounds in French and German, notably in the pronunciation of the foreign "u."

There were, of course, no board schools as yet in existence. The only educational establishment in the neighbourhood for those who could afford a penny a week was a dame's school kept by a Mrs. Margesson. We children visited it occasionally with our nurse. These visits were looked forward to with pleasure, as we were generally presented with a "co-shie" in the form of a bull's eye—a form of reward otherwise reserved for the industriously-minded scholars. I can just remember the bits of slate for writing and ciphering, and the reading books in large print, and I can still see dimly through the vista of years a boy standing in the corner, his head surmounted with a full, shovel-shaped dunce's cap. The old lady had also a stick with which she freely distributed chastisement. There were, of course, Sunday Schools. One of my great-uncles, whom I still remember, had been a pioneer in the movement with Robert Raikes. The Sunday School pupils in our parish had to attend both morning and afternoon service. They sat in the middle of the aisle on a long form facing my grandfather's butler. He was armed with a long stick with which from time to time he lunged across the gap at some unruly boy. To outsiders like myself it was as exciting as watching a man fishing, wondering when he would strike. I would add, there were always full congregations as anyone who failed to attend two Sundays running was liable to receive notice to give up his cottage.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

THE RELIGION OF LIBERTY AS THE SPIRIT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SIGNOR BENEDETTO CROCE is mainly known to the world as the greatest living renewer of the philosophy of Art and as the latest exponent of an idealistic interpretation of the universe and of human life derived from an immanent criticism of Hegelian philosophy. But his two last volumes, on the history of Italy (1870-1915) and on the history of Europe, are here to remind us that he began his career as an historian and an historian he remains.* It is needless to say that for a mind which has passed through philosophy, history cannot any longer be a mere narration of events, and it cannot but appear absurd to think of the possibility of a narration of events which is not an interpretation of them. A history of the nineteenth century by such a philosopher is, to his mind, not merely an individual, a personal work, but an attempt to formulate the self-analysis of the present historical situation by the universal spirit at its present degree of self-consciousness as human in Europe. Now the peculiar significance of the latest volume by Signor Croce is that, just at a moment when the spirit of freedom seems flagging in all Europe and almost dead in Italy, the philosopher's own native land, one of the greatest living minds reaffirms the Hegelian faith that Spirit is freedom and that to freedom belongs not merely the future but eternity itself. Hence the necessity for a critical examination of this work, which has already raised fierce controversy in Italy and which has already been put on the Index by the Roman Catholic Church.

First of all a concise summary. Immediately after the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire we find Liberalism affirming itself as a non-jacobin doctrine of liberty and as a non-despotic doctrine of monarchy; and not merely as a political doctrine, but as a religion, for which people suffer and fight and die on scaffolds and battlefields, viz. as a synthetic conception of reality and an ethic founded upon it. Against this Religion, the religion of freedom, the characteristic religion of the nineteenth century, stand the opposite religious faiths: Catholic theocracy, Divine Right Absolutist Monarchism, Jacobin

* Benedetto Croce: *Storia d'Europa nel Secolo XIX.* Laterra, Bari, 1932.

Democracy, Communism. The history of the nineteenth century is characterised by the gradual disappearance of Divine Right Absolutism, by modifications or radical changes in the Catholic attitude, and by the increasing influence of democratic and communistic tendencies in proportion to the victories of Liberalism over the two first, its traditional opponents; while from the morbid romanticism, at once anarchical and authoritarian, of the first half of the century, little by little emerges through the *Décadentisme* of several forms of Art and Literature, the instinctive, reactionary, irrationalist *Activisme*, the latest manifestation of which is the nationalistic imperialism now triumphant.

The French Revolution of 1830 marks the defeat of Absolutism by its own weapons, those of material force. Even though in Italy and Poland the echoes of this revolution are unsuccessful, the work of their leaders, exiles in France, Belgium and England, results in ever deeper and broader views of the bearing of liberal ideas and methods on the solution of national and international problems. While in these countries the cause of liberty becomes one with that of national independence, in the countries in which Liberalism triumphs the struggle begins to rage between Liberalism and Democracy and between moderate democracy and socialism. Liberalism succeeded in triumphing from 1870 to the Great War. But already the form in which German national unification is being achieved cannot be considered a victory for the religion of liberty, whose real masterpiece had been the Italian *Risorgimento*. Nor is this all. From 1870 onwards, not merely in Italy and France, but even in England, Liberalism seems to cease to be able to exert a predominant influence on events and on thought; and the political equilibrium which it had created is more and more disturbed by the waves of racial nationalism. Still, neither the world war nor the nationalist and communist religions succeed in establishing any new equilibrium and the religion of "freedom conceived as the one *raison d'être* of man on earth" (page 355) remains the only path to the solution of the problems which make our days so anxious and so pregnant at once with grand and with terrible possibilities.

No summary can adequately convey the beauty of very many pages of this work or the richness of thought explicit and implicit, for instance, in the description of the consequences of the French Revolution of 1830, in the analysis of the origins

and weaknesses of the German liberal movement or in the differentiation of the idealistic from the morbid and sentimental form of Romanticism or in the origins and evolution of modern activism. The whole work has an undoubted intrinsic and therefore permanent value; and though it is a book *à thèse* in the sense of being an implicit criticism of the tendencies now prevailing in Italy, it is also most certainly a book which aims at being objective in the sense that even such criticism proceeds from a standpoint which, according to the author, is the most comprehensive so far attainable. Yet we think that even many undoubted and undoubting Liberals will feel deeply uneasy concerning this implicit apology for or even apotheosis of Liberalism.

We shall pass by the obvious fact, inherent in the author's philosophy and mental constitution, that this interpretation of the nineteenth century is too exclusively intellectualist, with obviously inadequate appreciation of subconscious social and economic factors. Similarly, we shall not waste time in discussing whether the characteristic of the nineteenth century was the struggle between liberty and authority, or rather for the recognition in all, as a right, of the worth of human personality, hitherto recognised only in the case of minorities; or whether this recognition was the result only of Liberalism. We shall instead contest the value of the fundamental idea controlling the whole interpretation, viz. the very possibility of a religion of liberty, of liberty as the one *raison d'être* of man on earth; and of this religion having controlled the nineteenth-century historical process. Liberalism, or the religion of freedom, which asserted itself on the morrow of the collapse of the Napoleonic empire, is defined by Signor Croce as the attitude of the spirit which denies any duality between what is and what ought to be, between the real and the ideal (page 16), and which, as against all philosophies of transcendence, asserts that life is its own end and that duty consists in the growth and uplifting of this life according to a method of free initiative and individual creativity (page 27). Now, if so, this is already a more or less Hegelian definition of the religion of liberty, in which very, very many of those who suffered or fought for freedom in Germany, Italy and France in the early nineteenth century would not have recognised their own religion. Neither Pellico, nor Santarosa, nor Tazzoli, nor Tito Speri, nor Mazzini would have admitted that to suffer and to die for liberty means in the

last instance, whether you know it or not, that life is an end in itself and that already on earth, in history, the real and the ideal are identical and are only two moments in the same process. Mazzini explicitly refuted this view in his last essay, that on the *Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France,* by Renan. None of the above-mentioned writers and martyrs would have in the least admitted that to believe in transcendence, to trust in God, is incompatible with believing in human moral, civil or political liberty.

The sheer fact is that it is just the contrast between what is and what ought to be that urges them to struggle and to martyrdom and that the real and the ideal are not for them two successive moments in a single process of self-realisation, but the factual present experienced and read in the light of a contrasting already externally realised perfection urging men to appropriate it and to express it in the human order. The immense influence of Kant, Fichte and Hegel on German history is just due to the fact that while they helped their contemporaries and countrymen to feel the indwelling of the Divine, they allowed room for the recognition that such indwelling was the very indwelling of the Transcendent. To the causes of the growing weakness of Liberalism in the last third of the nineteenth century (decadentism, naturalism, etc.), we would therefore add the very philosophy of Signor Croce, viz. immomental idealism, as denying any ontological duality between real and ideal, what is and what ought to be. If there be no other reality but Spirit, and if Spirit is intrinsically freedom and becoming, there is no significant difference between liberty and despotism; at any given moment it is only a question of difference in standpoint; and there is no sense in speaking of a religion of liberty rather than of its opposite. Or if we assert that freedom and not its opposite is that for which it is our duty to fight and die, we thereby assert that historical becoming does not exhaust reality and that through history something beckons which transcends and therefore can hallow history itself. We fully understand that a sense of reality and a gentlemanly loathing for moral sophistry may lead Signor Croce to protest against Professor Gentile—once his friend and co-worker and now the philosopher of Fascism—proclaiming the identity of sermon and cudgel as both effective instruments in influencing the will; but such shrinking does not prevent Gentile being the more logical

exponent of the common system. In Croce as well as in Epicurus the man is better than his creed.

The fact that the above-mentioned writers and martyrs were unconscious of the identity of their own religion with that of Signor Croce and that Signor Croce is unable to understand how one can at once be really a Liberal and believe in transcendence, should at least be a document of the inability of Idealism to explain how the same mind may have in itself not only more than it is aware of, but also be the opposite of that which it believes, and loves to be! This is most remarkable, since Signor Croce seems unaware of the contradiction inherent in his admission that, for instance, the Roman Catholic Church, in her greatest epoch, was a paladin of freedom of conscience; for if she could do that in the name of transcendence, obviously the principle of transcendence cannot be held intrinsically inimical to freedom (page 28).

Nor is this all. We read: "Liberty needs ideas and ideals and the infinite heaven and the background of the universe, not as alien to man, but as the very spirit thinking and working within him" (page 259); and (page 362): "Let divine providence accomplish her work, who is *wiser* than each of us and works *within* us and *above* us." Now, either these expressions and especially those we have italicised are needlessly and ambiguously metaphorical, or we have in them an admission that not only the principle of transcendence is not intrinsically hostile to that of liberty, but is required by it (*La libertà richiede*), and that there is some difference between divine providence and ourselves. Nor does it avail to contrast the principle of transcendence with that of a spirit not alien to man, but the very spirit thinking and working within him. For, on the one hand, it is just characteristic of the highest and deepest religious experience, in which we are invited to pray to God as a "Father" and to "love Him because He first loved us," to deny that God is alien to man and to affirm that man is created "partaker of the divine nature"; and on the other hand if there were identity between God and the spirit thinking within us and not merely kinship and likeness, we could never be aware of the difference between Him and ourselves, allowed by the above-mentioned sentences.

The fact is that we cannot help coming to the conclusion that in this and in all his previous work Signor Croce—who was brought up in an intellectual atmosphere permeated by

Left-Hegelian philosophy, and in an age in which this philosophy seemed the fittest very soon to supersede Catholic Christianity—shows himself, as Professor C. C. Clement Webb of Oxford already said, indifferently qualified to theorise about religion and to evaluate its historical influence; and that the present situation in Italy is not calculated to lead his spirit towards a more sympathetically comprehensive outlook. If he cared to reconsider historically his philosophical views, it is not unlikely that he might come to recognise that, whatever the faults of Roman Catholicism and its crimes against cultural, civic and political freedom, they are due not to the principle of transcendence, which is the very essence of religion, but to Christianity having allowed itself to become permeated by the spirit of Roman imperialism. It is also not unlikely that he would at least consider worth some reflection the idea of Troeltsch that the Beyond is, in very truth, our source of power in our *Here* and *Now*; and the possibility that the Christian Church, with her faith in the immanence of the Transcendent, may yet be the only force capable of extracting our civilisation from the ruins under which our lost or collapsing sense of common values in life, combined with our amazingly increasing control of nature, threaten to bury it.

It may yet be possible that the Christian Church, which grew into a citadel of liberty from within and against Roman imperial despotism and barbaric and feudal violence, may have to learn and will learn again to become not only the last bulwark of liberty against modern despotisms, nationalistic as well as communistic, but also the valley of soul-making, the spiritual furnace, from which, on the track of new legions of missionaries and saints, spiritual freedom inwardly reborn will re-emerge and expand in new civilisations and in yet unborn and undreamed-of forms of civic, political and social liberties. That spirit of liberty, of creative initiative, which, we cannot help but fearing, will never be able to draw any sustained and widely shareable inspiration from any dialectical notion of history in which there is no room for real and fertile contrasts between the real and the ideal, may yet be discovered to have its greatest inexhaustible spring in a renewed—*mutatis mutandis*—notion of history as a process through which the Eternal reveals itself to and inspires Humanity.

There is a famous and extremely suggestive spatial image by Aquinas which seems to the writer to adumbrate a philosophy

of history far more satisfactory and inspiring than the one we have been discussing. If God be pictured as the unmoved centre of an ever-moving sphere of finite beings turning in all directions and at all distances round Him, all warmed and lighted by the energy radiating from Him, we shall have in the relations among such beings the equivalents of the relations between human beings and human events, which it is the historian's task to interpret; while at any moment the distance between any such being and the centre of the sphere will represent his direct relation with God and his degree of likeness or unlikeness to Him and of warmth, life and light he receives from Him to be irradiated all around himself. In such a context, on the one hand at any moment the relations between human beings and events accessible to the historians are effects and functions of the distance of each of us from God, viz. of factors inaccessible to the historian; and on the other hand the historical process, the result of choices by each of us between different ways of altering the historical situation in which we find ourselves, is the opportunity given us of increasing or decreasing our distance and that of our fellow men from God; and, incidentally, of creating new historical situations in which other individuals and generations will have to make the same choice between nearness and distance from God; and thus of creating other historical situations mirroring the Divine in the proportion in which men will have resolved to become such living mirrors. Thus would the historic process at any moment, for and through each of its agents, at once always be fed from and lead beyond itself; and just and only because of this, just because each of us is not simply the result of the process itself, but also of God, can each of us be free in respect of it and assert himself against and above it and shape it.

The immanentist and idealistic notion of history is of immense value in redeeming us from any purely naturalistic notion of it; but naturalistic determinism is not the only foe to real liberty, moral, social, political, economical. We need to be free also from many things within ourselves. There is a determinism that is not less a chain to the soul for its being spiritual; and it is from this determinism that immanental idealism is unable to deliver us and that so far only religion, to the extent in which it is Love of God, has been able to do so. It is just the consciousness that historical

reality is not the whole of reality and that directly or through others we can commune with what transcends it, that can tune us up against historical reality itself and forbid us to yield to it. The spirit of liberty as the sense of the infinite worth of each personality, however humble, is not historically the product either of Greek or Latin civilisation and of their mainly immanental impulses; it is a product of Christianity and of its teaching that individuality is of infinite worth not in itself but because God is Love and loves it; and we are unable to see how such spirit can fare safely except on these transcendent foundations.

ANGELO CRESPI.

KAROLINE VON WOLZOGEN:

A SENTIMENTAL LADY.

SCHILLER was happily married, so happily as to be on the brink of the absurd, the philistine. Possibly it was this unromantically happy home-life which enabled the sick man, racked by untold physical pain, to accomplish what he did in those fifteen years of peace. One cannot but wonder what effect it would have had upon his work if instead of sweet, pliable, good-natured and efficient Lotte, that self-willed and imperious firebrand, her sister Karoline, had lived by his side —as indeed might very easily have happened. It is common knowledge that Schiller, when he made the acquaintance of the sisters in the winter of 1788, could not make up his mind as to which of the two he was more in love with, and he always kept a soft spot in his heart for Karoline, even after he had married Lotte. What Karoline was really like, however, is not so well known, in spite of the fact that she became a successful novelist, and the reason is not far to seek. In her old age she wrote a *Life of Schiller,* incidentally telling a good deal about herself in a seemingly ingenuous and sincere way. These autobiographical notes have been repeated parrot-wise by every one of her biographers, and yet they are pure fiction as regards motivation of her actions. Most of these biographers, it is true, wrote before the publication of the correspondence between Schiller and the Lengefeld family; and some were her personal friends besides, afraid of being indiscreet and anxious to exonerate her; none have gone very deep or have tried to test references.

Yet Karoline would be well worth a fuller study, she is such a very characteristic type of her period, when noble sentiment was the order of the day, the Richardsonian ideal ruled, and spirits who unhappily were not modelled according to it had almost no choice but to try and appear what they were not.

Karoline was born in 1763 in Rudolstadt, Thuringia, where her father was Inspector of Forests to the Duke. She was only thirteen when he died, but both she and her sister Lotte, three years younger than herself, seem to have felt his loss very deeply. Karoline erected a monument to him later, in the figure of the high-minded parson in her great novel, *Agnes von Lilien.* The girls certainly idealised him, and Karoline deliberately

used his memory to counteract her mother, an excellent woman with an incorruptible sense of justice, rather matter-of-fact, very devout and at the same time worldly-wise, not to say worldly. Neither of the girls, not even gentle Lotte, got on very well with her, she was so very contrary to the sentimental spirit of the youth of those days, an odd contrast to our times, when it is only the old who dare have ideals, and are very properly laughed at by the young. We may well imagine the sparks flying between the three women when the precocious and brilliant Karoline pitted her strong will against that of either mother or sister. In spite of some bickering and perhaps a little tyranny of the elder against the younger, the two girls were devoted friends. Lotte admired her brilliant sister, and Karoline mothered the shy and diffident girl with real warmth.

When Karoline was only sixteen her mother got a proposal for her from Herr von Beulwitz, an official at the little court, and Karoline was prevailed upon to accept him. He was violently in love, while Karoline regarded the affair simply from the angle of convenience, draping her acquiescence as that of the dutiful daughter, smiling bravely in face of her sacrifice. She may have had some twinges of conscience, however, for the marriage was constantly put off and only took place five years later, in 1784. Beulwitz was a bluff and hearty person, neither very well-read (though not without literary tastes) nor in the least highbrow, if I may be permitted this anachronism. But there is no indication anywhere that he has ever behaved otherwise than a gentleman should; and Karoline's letters are quite frank—she would have made the most of a lapse on his part. He worshipped her too obviously and that was his worst fault. Poor man, one cannot help being sorry for him. After serving faithfully for five years, all he got for his pains was a pettish, always ostensibly ailing wife who with her airs and graces made him feel far more of a boor than he actually was; and after two years of married life she managed to absent herself from home for the better part of the year, in the end actually leaving him.

But I have charged ahead. Lotte, the sweet and submissive, who seemed well suited for an arduous post of the kind, was chosen to be lady-in-waiting by the Duchess of Weimar, and sent to Vevey with her family, there to learn French. Beulwitz went with them. Karoline, who had known no other landscape but her gently sloping Thuringian woods, was beside herself

at sight of the Swiss scenery. At that time, the Alps were an experience at least equal to a Polar expedition of to-day. Karoline did not disemburden herself to her swain, however, but wrote very charming, if Rousseauesque, letters to a friend at home, Sophie La Roche. They are extant, because Sophie later became a novelist and printed these fresh and well-written letters in her *Pomona*, without editing them. The family also made friends with Lavater; and Karoline, like Goethe before her, became an enthusiastic disciple of the physiognomist.

On their return from Switzerland, the marriage took place at last, and as the wife of a high official Karoline could not avoid taking part in the social life of the little court. Full of Richardson and Rousseau, fresh from Switzerland, she rebelled against the empty, narrow, breathlessly restricted life. She has voiced her censure in *Agnes*, where she rails bitterly against small courts. In these discontented and restless years, she began strenuously to look for her dream prince, and she found him in some sort in her young cousin, Wilhelm von Wolzogen, son of that generous and motherly woman who befriended Schiller on his flight from his regiment. The two corresponded frequently, and Karoline soon found reason to keep the letters secret from her husband. In one of Wilhelm's letters we find the first allusion to a literary effusion of Karoline's—he thanks her for a poem in which "she roams through melancholy twilight with her great thoughts." In 1788 the young cousin came on a visit, but he brought with him a friend whose brilliancy extinguished his own feeble light for the time being —a young military surgeon who had fled his native land, the author of revolutionary plays over whose exalted speeches young Germany was weeping tears of enthusiasm—Friedrich Schiller.

The wanderer and exile was charmed with the gracious household of Frau von Lengefeld and with the personalities of both the pretty sisters, so different that each served to offset the other to her best advantage. Karoline at that time spent most of her day at her mother's, both to escape from her husband and to meet Schiller; besides, her house was close by; and one of the extravagant friendships of that age of sentiment was soon formed. Schiller was made a confidant of Karoline's unhappiness in marriage, and seeing poor Beulwitz—who was a fanatic admirer of his!—through her eyes, he sympathised wholeheartedly with the delicate, high-thinking, sensitive, fastidious

sprite chained to the gross and clumsy boor—beauty and the beast complete. In fact we have here the first example of the "misunderstood wife" who for the next hundred years swooned and languished through life and fiction, flaunting her weaknesses, demanding and getting compassion of all and sundry, until the keen winds blowing at the turn of the centuries swept away her hysterics.

That Karoline herself, in spite of a life-size husband and a handy little flirt, saw nothing derogatory in this friendship is not to be wondered at. She had been withdrawing more and more from Beulwitz even before Schiller appeared on the scene; Wolzogen was a boy then, compared to her twenty-five years and experience; and the fiery figure of Schiller, with his poetic exterior that matched his spirit so well, was the very delegate of fate needed to round off the situation. Of the bond of marriage Karoline thought nothing whatever. She had absolutely no scruples in deceiving Beulwitz, as her correspondence with Schiller and her friend Karoline von Dachröden (later Humboldt) shows beyond a doubt.

In the end, Schiller wisely chose the younger sister, though in a certain sense he meant to have Karoline, too, as the extraordinary correspondence between the three shows quite plainly. A marriage of souls, at least, was intended with both sisters. Part of this correspondence, that is, most of Karoline's letters, was destroyed later by Schiller's daughter Emily (Frau von Gleichen), because she was desperately shocked by it. Lotte's and Schiller's letters are extant, however, and make the matter perfectly plain. Not that poor little Lotte was not racked by anguish at this abnormal state of affairs. Her sound sense and simple, unperverted feeling showed her the grotesqueness and danger of the situation. But she wept in secret, at most complaining a very little to the Dachröden. She dared not voice her fears either to her lover or to her sister, because she dreaded losing him completely by such an act. As we all know, the end was as happy as one could wish: Schiller's passion for Karoline abated once he was actually married to Lotte, and though, when the young couple were settled in Jena, Karoline spent much of her time on visits there, all was peace and tranquillity between the three. Karoline now began to write in good earnest, and Schiller sponsored her work, correcting and suggesting. Her first story appeared in Cotta's *Taschenbuch für Frauen* in 1790, a somewhat sloppy thing in Richard-

sonian vein, *The Gipsy*. In 1792 Schiller in his review, *Neue Thalia*, published a fragmentary play of hers, *Der leukadische Fels*, which has great beauty of expression and thought.

Meanwhile, poor Beulwitz is becoming a more and more ludicrous figure. He is treated by the three with a certain condescending pity as a necessary evil—the breadwinner. Only his mother-in-law takes up the cudgels for him! Moreover, a new passion has now taken hold of Karoline—for Karl von Dalberg, the handsome and fascinating coadjutor and presumable successor of the Elector of Mayence. Dalberg was a Catholic priest, but Karoline would not have hesitated to enter into a more or less public, if irregular, alliance with him; and in the hope of landing this big fish more securely as a *divorcée*, she left Beulwitz for good and demanded a separation. Officially—as later in her *Life of Schiller*—she gave as a reason that, being sickly and childless, she wished to disemburden poor Beulwitz of his tiresome wife and so nobly gave him his freedom! One feels like spanking her!

At the same time that she was exchanging flaming vows with her "Goldschatz" Dalberg, she skilfully kept the little fish dangling, too. In her letters to Wolzogen we find her dissuading him from a projected marriage with another, and significantly insisting on her excellent health. Dalberg, for reasons unknown to us—Karoline speaks of his fickleness in love in her letters, but she kept up her friendship with him to his death—backed out of the affair. Karoline, once having begun negotiations for her separation, continued them and went travelling meanwhile. After some time she was joined by Wolzogen in Switzerland.

Beulwitz behaved in an exemplary way, as is attested by Frau von Lengefeld. Schiller thought he might have done more in the way of alimony, and in a very characteristic letter the mother-in-law scolds him for this injustice, saying that no doubt he, Schiller, would have treated Lotte differently were it thinkable that such a predicament could have arisen between them. But what a wife did Lotte make, and what had Karoline been to Beulwitz? The deserted husband sent his own sister to accompany Karoline on some of her travels, he remained a good friend to her even after he himself had also married for the second time (a literary lady again, Fräulein von Bibra, who made him a model wife); and both he and his wife were enthusiastic readers of Karoline's works, all of which surely speaks for the man.

Schiller and all Karoline's relatives and friends had been against the separation; and they were still more strongly opposed to her marriage with Wilhelm von Wolzogen. Schiller had known him in his adolescence, and, as is often the case, still saw in him the somewhat untrustworthy and windbaggy youth he had been then. Karoline married him in the face of all this opposition—an estrangement resulted between her and the Schillers which lasted for more than a year—and the wholly unforeseen happened; it was an ideal marriage. The letters exchanged between the two are the most refreshing and delightful documents of marital understanding imaginable.

The next decade in Karoline's life was one of happiness and fulfilment in every respect. She travelled for some time with her husband, who as a diplomatist held posts in various towns. During this time she wrote the first part of her novel *Agnes von Lilien*, and when the coolness between herself and the Schillers had passed she stayed with them to go through it carefully with him. It was published anonymously in Schiller's *Horen* for 1796 and raised a veritable storm of enthusiasm. The brothers Schlegel, for instance, were beside themselves with delight; they were foolish enough—like many other people who, however, were not critics by profession—to take it for a novel of Goethe's, misled by the superficial analogies in plot and characters with *Wilhelm Meister*. In truth, *Agnes* is purely in the sentimental tradition of Rousseau and Richardson, the greatest contrast imaginable to Goethe's romantic novels. Schiller's friend Körner was discerning enough to guess at a female and a beginner, but he also was charmed, as indeed was all literary Germany. It was an event, there can be no doubt of it. If we look at the book to-day and dispassionately, we must say that it is a cleverly written story with many really beautiful passages, but insignificant and amateurish in plot and characters; its great success is explained by the faithful expression of the spirit of the time, and in this lies also what permanent value it possesses.

Apart from this dazzling literary success Karoline at thirty-two had become the proud mother of a son, and, crowning delight, Schiller (through Goethe) procured a post for her husband in Weimar, the Mekka of the highbrows of the day. The companionship of the Schillers, who lived quite near and later moved to Weimar, was an added boon.

The second part of her life was very sad, but she retained her

invincible spirit to the last. No trace of the languishing flower or the bundle of nerves was left. Schiller, her literary adviser and closest friend, died in 1805, her beloved husband four years later, after a long and torturing illness, during which she had fought death with real heroism and indefatigable patience. Her son, a brilliant boy, who was fifteen at the time of his father's death, was spoiled by the widow and "went to the dogs." He became a notorious rake, even before he was twenty, and died by a shot in his twenty-sixth year, probably from his own hand. Karoline's sister Lotte, her close friend and companion in these dark days, became blind and died in 1826. In her growing solitude Karoline began to write again and published short stories, the *Life of Schiller*, and in 1840 a long novel from the Napoleonic wars, *Cordelia*. It is not a masterpiece, but a remarkable achievement for a lonely and disappointed old lady nearing eighty. She died seven years later.

PAULA ARNOLD.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE IRAQI AND THE ASSYRIANS.

THE death of Feisal, King of Iraq, which took place on September 8th, and the fact that the Assyrian minority in Iraq, or at any rate one of its chief spokesmen, had just induced the League of Nations' Secretariat to regard as a matter of urgency a statement of Assyrian grievances, attracted some interest to the prevailing phase of the political experiment which has been made in Mesopotamia since the war. The difficulties, passions and present circumstances of Iraqi politics are worth studying, if only because they seem to symbolise, as in a microcosm, the sort of unnecessary imbroglio that politics normally produce the world over. The Assyrian people, for instance, have certainly had a bad time since the war. But their hardships have given work to political agitators who, after the manner of such agitators, are more interested in their own conduct of the case than in the welfare of those whose cause they pretend to espouse. The Nestorian Assyrian Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, has fanned Assyrian grievances, real and imagined, and has been sending petitions about them, mostly of a preposterous kind, to the League of Nations. When, on August 18th, the Iraqi Government deported him and deprived him of Iraqi nationality, there was something of poetic justice in the punishment, for the burden of nearly all he had said and written in the cause aforesaid was that the Assyrian people (of whom he was one) wanted above all to escape alike from the stigma of Iraqi nationality and from the control of the Iraqi Government. Nor is there much doubt that the Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Nestorian faith, had willingly landed his spiritual protégés into war in pursuit of his political interests. There seems to be no limit to the muddle brought into human affairs by politics. In this case a professional philosopher and religious leader might have been expected to find something more satisfactory to preach than war, especially as his creed was Christian. The Church of England has been traditionally friendly to the Assyrian Christians for the reason mainly that they are not Roman Christians; and that if they ever lost their independence they would no doubt go to swell the Roman

Church. Professional philosophers of most churches have their more lowly human prejudices.

King Feisal himself was one of the really interesting figures of our time. He was born on May 20th, 1883, a scion of the royal family of the Hejas. In his early manhood he hardened himself to the Beduin life of a desert tent. He scored some personal success as a Beduin chief, but the hard life did no good to his health. His later career, indeed, was hampered by a delicate physique. At the age of twenty-seven, he commanded a Turkish force sent to quell a rebellion in Asir, and thereafter entered the Ottoman parliament as deputy for Jeddah. He there became the leader of the Arab Home Rule group. He took the opportunity of the Great War openly to bid for Arab independence, in which cause he made his first contact with Great Britain. He commanded an Arab army under the higher direction of General Allenby, and entered Damascus on October 3rd, 1918, with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. He then, early in 1919, paid his first visit to England and Scotland, and in the same year took an active part in the unpeaceful struggles of the Paris Peace Conference, where he competed with the French for a hold over Syria. He lost, and the country was duly occupied by the French under a League Mandate ; but the Arab military extremists, on March 8th, 1920, defiantly proclaimed Feisal King of Syria. The French High Commissioner, General Gouraud, resorted to armed force, crushed the Arab opposition, and summarily dismissed Feisal from his throne : his first throne. Feisal's next adventure was staged in London, where, in the winter 1920-1, he acted as the diplomatic representative of Husein, King of the Hejas. In the meantime the British Government had formed a friendly view of his qualities, and at its suggestion he turned his attention to Iraq as his final goal. At that time Iraq was a vaguely defined political home for the Arab people, its nucleus being the former Turkish vilayets of Mosul in the north, Bagdad in the midland, and Basra in the south. Feisal landed at Basra on June 24th, 1921, and assumed, on the sponsorship of the British High Commissioner, the title of Emir of Iraq. The British authority had stipulated that a plebiscite be taken before that measure could be confirmed. The voting, which took place on August 23rd of that year, went in his favour to the decisive extent of 96 per cent. ; and he was thereupon renamed King of Iraq.

Iraq was thereby launched on the troubled course. A Government had been formed and provided with a machinery consisting of a Senate of twenty nominated members and a Lower House of eighty-eight elected members. In other words, all the mass emotions were let loose. Cabinet crisis followed Cabinet crisis. When they were not quarrelling among themselves the Iraqi were quarrelling with Sir Percy Cox. Their bone of contention in that field was the very presence of Sir Percy Cox himself. How could Feisal, they asked, be King of Iraq, if the country was subject to a British mandate? The tension at one point was relaxed by the fortuitous circumstance of an operation for appendicitis that was performed on Feisal. The lines on which the Iraqi-British issue was ultimately to be solved were laid down in October 1922, when the two countries signed the first of a series of treaties. British rights and British responsibilities in Iraq were therein defined as those of a mandatory Power, and were to cease after twenty years, or when Iraq became a member of the League of Nations, whichever event came first. But the political storm went on. The French in Syria made trouble for Feisal on his western frontier, the Turks made trouble for him among the Kurds in the north, the Persians, who had wanted Bagdad for themselves, refused to recognise the new Iraqi State and started intriguing among the Shiah tribes. Every frontier was disturbed by unneighbourly neighbours. The relations between Bagdad and London meanwhile presented the further, peculiar difficulty that the mandatory relationship was as unpopular on the one side as on the other, yet several treaties had to be negotiated before it could be abandoned satisfactorily to both sides. The mandate became less irksome to British opinion when, in 1927, oil was discovered in large quantities in northern Iraq. It was formally abandoned on October 3rd, 1932, when Iraq was admitted to membership of the League of Nations. By an ironic perversity one of the chief difficulties Geneva had to overcome in admitting Iraq was that Iraq was a backward country in a military sense : a difficulty that looked odd at a time when a League of Nations Disarmament Conference was in being. One of the qualifications prescribed by the Covenant for a mandated territory that wishes to be free is that it shall be capable of defending its territory. When the Mandates Commission considered the British Government's proposal

that Iraq be emancipated, it reported that the existing military strength of Iraq was not such that the country could be regarded as capable by her own forces of maintaining her territorial integrity and political independence against a foreign aggressor. On the other hand the Commission observed that if Iraq were admitted to the League of Nations she would enjoy the guarantees of security which all States Members of the League derive from the Covenant ; and that, moreover, in the event of such an admission, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of June 30th, 1930, would automatically come into force. By Article IV of that treaty Great Britain and Iraq undertook to provide " mutual and immediate " help in the event of war. The Commission therefore gave it as its opinion that Iraq could be deemed to be militarily strong enough in the event of war to qualify for independence, provided she became a member of the League of Nations, the argument being that such membership would eke out her existing deficiency in military strength and bring it up to Covenant standard.

No sooner had Iraq been unanimously elected to membership by fifty-two nations than the Assyrian minority became more active as a thorn in her side. King Feisal himself was destined not long to enjoy the condition of equality among equals that he had won (it was he mainly who won it) for his country. He lived only ten months more. In May of this year his health showed such signs of strain that he set out on what he intended should be four months' holiday, during which he paid a State visit to Great Britain. He was received by King George on June 20th. It was early in August that an Assyrian revolt cut short his holiday and sent him hurriedly back to Iraq. The revolt was quelled, by methods against which the British Ambassador in Bagdad protested, and King Feisal went to Switzerland to continue his holiday. The new strain, however, had seriously weakened him, and he died suddenly on September 8th.

What, then, are the grievances of the Assyrians, and what redress do they claim? Their chief grievance in essence derives from the disappointment they had to undergo at the end of the war, when they suddenly developed a large territorial appetite, liberally whetted by No. 4 of Mr. Wilson's " Four Principles "—the second of the famous series of Fourteen Points, Four Principles and Five Particulars enun-

ciated by Mr. Wilson in 1918—which postulated " that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction . . ." No aspiration could have been better defined than that which sent Mr. Saïd A. Namik and Mr. Rustem Nedjib to Paris in 1919. Those two men went to the Conference to advocate the joint claims of the Assyrians and the Chaldeans. They called themselves the Assyro-Chaldean delegates to the Peace Conference. No delegates at that Conference were more charming. The miracle was that they did not get all they wanted. The people they represented are the direct descendants of the ancient Assyrians and Chaldeans, whose story goes back as far as 4500 B.C. I remember interviewing those two men in April 1920 (their case had not then been decided by the Conference), when they said : " The descendants of the Assyrians and the Chaldeans, people of the same race, who for forty centuries, under one denomination or another, have constituted two great empires, are to-day united again for the purpose of reviving their glorious past, and they have decided, as a symbol of their ethnical unity, to assume the name of Assyro-Chaldeans."

This people was mainly to be found in a large tract of country midway between the Mediterranean, Black and Caspian Seas, in the east of Turkey, the west of Persia and the north of Mesopotamia. They had mapped out this district, in which the chief cities were Mosul, Diarbekir, and Urmia, and their delegates claimed it as their own—not, as they modestly explained, as an immediately independent State, but one to be administered by a mandatory power for several years.

A point which they wanted especially to emphasise was the great importance that attached to the fact of there being a vigorous Christian nation sandwiched between Turks, Arabs, and Persians. Experience suggests that this position is by no means an enviable one for the Assyro-Chaldeans themselves ; but the two delegates proudly pointed to the fact that through all these centuries their people had maintained both their nationality and their religion intact, in the face of bitter persecution. They were, in fact, the first nation to embrace Christianity. Medes, Persians, Parthians, Arabs, Mogols, Turks, have subjected them to constant persecution throughout their history, and they had their share of the Turkish visitations during the war.

The Assyro-Chaldeans fought throughout the war on the side of the Allies. In presenting their case to the Peace Conference, therefore, the Assyro-Chaldean delegates asked for a territory bounded on the west by the Euphrates, on the east by the Persian frontier (although in the north taking in a portion of Persia), on the north by a line Kharput-Bitlis-Salmas ; on the south by a line Calat-Haroli-Tekrit-Kifri. They maintained that among the twenty nationalities represented in that territory, their own had a substantial majority. They further asked for sea-outlets by Alexandretta to the Mediterranean and by the Tigris to the Persian Gulf ; and finally desired that their autonomy should be guaranteed by " the powers of the Entente and by the League of Nations " —a subtle combination which suggested the accumulated finesse of the ages.

They did not get all they asked for, nor indeed any part of it. Instead, the more elementary problem arose, how the Assyrian people—who numbered some 35,000 all told—were to be saved from starvation. The British authorities organised a refugee camp for them near Bagdad, and for several years the whole Assyrian population was fed, housed and clothed at the expense of the British Treasury. In 1919 a plan was considered by the British authorities for providing the Assyrians with land in the Amadiyeh territory so that they could settle down and provide for themselves. The plan failed, partly because the presence of the Assyrians led to anti-Christian riots. A second plan was launched in 1921 for settling them in the north of Iraq, which was nearer their traditional home. Most of them were, in fact, thus settled in the summer of that year ; but the diplomatic circumstances were such that they were never able to settle in peace. The northern frontier of Iraq had not been delimited, the Turks raided the Assyrian settlements, and the League Council in 1925 allotted to Turkey most of the territory on which the Assyrians had been settled. The League Commission, on whose findings that decision rested, formed the odd opinion that the Assyrians would finally settle in Turkish territory, although the Turks had made it clear that they would not allow any Assyrian within their borders. In this matter the League's work was bad. The new frontier fixed by the League cut the Assyrians in two, and deprived about 20,000 of them of their homes. The British authorities and

the Iraqi Government promptly set about the task of finding them new homes, but it was not an easy task, and by 1927 the Assyrians themselves had become demoralised by prolonged hardship and uncertainty. They not only did not appreciate what was being done for them, but aimlessly obstructed the work by refusing land offered to them and generally by making unnecessary difficulties. By the end of 1929 most of the Assyrians had been settled in Iraq, but the political agitators on both sides refused to let go the congenial opportunity for mischief. The Assyrian agitators encouraged discontent among the Assyrians on the argument that the Assyrians ought to have a home of their own, freed from Iraqi sovereignty. The Iraqi agitators encouraged Iraqi discontent by the argument that Iraqi land was being taken from Iraqi subjects in order to provide a living for foreigners, namely for Assyrians. Three such agitators, Captain Rassam, Mr. Mathew Cope and the Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, successively preached an Assyrian aspiration which demanded the allocation of ample territory to the Assyrians, together with some form of political independence from Bagdad. The agitation was absurd, because the amount of land demanded simply was not available (this was the consistent view both of the British authorities and of the League of Nations experts), and even if it were, it was monstrous to imagine that a handful of Assyrians could be given sovereignty over a portion of Iraqi territory. The last two agitators were deported by the Iraqi Government : Captain Rassam in April 1931 and the Mar Shimun in August 1933. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 30th, 1930, which foreshadowed Iraqi independence and membership of the League of Nations, had the effect of increasing Assyrian agitation. Several Assyrian petitions were sent to Geneva, some of them from self-styled Assyrian leaders who demanded Assyrian independence from Iraq, others from rival Assyrians who maintained that the Assyrians wanted nothing of the kind. In October 1931, for example, two petitions were received which asserted that the Assyrian people could not remain in Iraq and demanded that they be bodily transferred to another country, any other country, provided it be controlled by a Western nation. In June 1932 the Mar Shimun sent in a petition demanding that the Assyrians be given the status of a nation (*millet*) within Iraqi territory, that additional territory be extracted from

Turkey and handed over to them, and that the Nestorian Patriarch, bishops, churches and schools be handsomely subsidised (to the amount of 500,000 rupees, say £42,500) by the Iraqi Government, or alternatively by the League of Nations. To demand in one and the same document that the Assyrians be freed from Bagdad and that Bagdad should foot the bill for Assyrian institutions showed a lack of subtlety and even of elementary reason that would have shocked such shrewd diplomatists as Messrs. Saïd A. Namik and Rustem Nedjib. The Mar Shimun was indeed promptly repudiated in a fourth Assyrian petition to Geneva, of which the single object was to refute everything that he had written. It stated that the Mar Shimun did not represent the Assyrian people, that his motive was his own and his relations' interests and that the Assyrians wanted to live peacefully as loyal citizens of Iraq. The Mar Shimun, determined to have the last word, thereupon sent in another petition to Geneva, the fifth of the series. This time, wholly forgetting or ignoring what he had written in the third of the series, he made the simple point, which happened to be a reasonable point, that it was the duty of the League of Nations to see that the Assyrians' legitimate rights were protected, because the original trouble had been caused by the League of Nations in assigning to Turkey the Hakkiari territory, where the Assyrians were at first settled.

The various petitions were duly considered by a League Committee of five members, who formed the view that the demand for wide administrative autonomy was unpractical, and that there was no adequate ground for criticising the Iraqi's treatment of the Assyrians. Indeed, the Iraqi Government appointed a foreign expert, to wit Major Douglas Thomson, to begin the work of settling the remaining Assyrian families who had not yet been allotted land for cultivation (May 1933). That work was proceeding satisfactorily (in spite of the Mar Shimun's obstruction) when, at the beginning of August, certain Assyrian forces became involved in sundry disorders, and in the course thereof attacked an Iraqi camp. The Iraqi Irregular Police crushed the rioters with unfortunate harshness, which resulted in the sending of petitions from Assyrian spokesmen to Bagdad and from Iraqi spokesmen to Geneva. The Geneva Secretariat decided to treat this matter as one of urgency and put it on the agenda of the Council meeting due to be held on September 22nd. One of the

Assyrian petitions was signed by fourteen Assyrian leaders, who claimed to be a majority of such leaders, and was addressed to King Feisal, who by now had returned to Bagdad (August 24th). In it they defended the Iraqi police for the way in which they had suppressed the Assyrian riot : " We deem ourselves bound by a sacred duty to express our gratification at the splendid punitive action undertaken by the forces of the State in purging the country of faithless elements set upon undermining the edifice of Iraqi unity " ; and further castigated that " rebellious section of our race which has proved forgetful of the continued kindness shown them by our King, the Iraqi Government and people." That message, probably the last State document read by King Feisal (who was within a fortnight of his death), must have given him a measure of consolation in the troubles that beset him.

Germany and Austria.

One of the political curiosities of our time has been the process by which Herr Hitler has, in 1933, estranged the Germans of Austria from the Germans of the Reich, although his achievement was probably the last thing he wanted. In the foreign field, Herr Hitler's record has so far been consistently perverse from his own point of view. He has had the dual effect of stopping a movement for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in Germany's favour and of enabling the Treaty of St. Germain to be revised in Austria's favour, as a measure of Austrian protection against Germany.

No sooner had the Hitler Government been formed, at the end of January, than Nazi disturbances both from without and from within began to distract the Austrian Government. During April the disturbances increased, and were given an unpleasanter turn by an atrocity committed at Kufstein, where Dr. Georg Bell, a German refugee, was murdered by Bavarian Nazis who had pursued him. On May 12th the German Reich and Bavarian Ministers of the Interior, Herren Kerrl and Frank, arrived by air in Vienna to take part in a demonstration with the Austrian Nazis, who were led by Herr Frauenfeld. Dr. Frank had prefaced his visit by an offensive speech against Dr. Dollfuss and his Government, with the result that he was virtually turned out of Austria. The further results were the organisation by Dr. Frank of an

anti-Austrian demonstration on the part of the Berlin University Nazi students (May 20th), and a fantastic measure taken by the Reich Government against Austria on May 28th. That measure imposed a visa charge of 1,000 Mk. (say £50), to take effect on June 1st, on all German visitors to Austria. Austria's economic straits were thus made much worse, because the tourist traffic was one of the country's best assets. An indication of what that virtual embargo was to effect was given on August 10th, when an Austrian statement was issued (the truth of which there is no reason to doubt) that throughout July of this year there were only eight Germans from the Reich who paid the 1,000 Mk. visa tax and visited Austria, whereas in July 1932 there were 98,000 such visitors. When Dr. Dollfuss came to London in July for the World Conference he found that he was one of the most popular men at the Conference : which was another of Herr Hitler's left-handed achievements. Instead of cowing the Austrian Government, Berlin created precisely the sort of national indignation which is any Government's best ally, and Dr. Dollfuss found himself buoyed on a wave of Austrian patriotism characterised by strong anti-Berlin feeling. There followed a series of senseless bomb outrages committed by both German and Austrian Nazis in Austria, to which the Government replied by seizing Nazi offices and Brown Houses—about 170 of them—and by arresting Nazi leaders in Austria. German politicians were by now openly abusing the Austrian Government, and trying to dragoon Austrian opinion in a manner which suggested that they hardly appreciated the fact that Austria was an independent sovereign State. Dr. Rosenberg, for instance, who has a well-known and well-exercised gift for making Germany look ridiculous, wrote in the *Völkischer Beobachter* about "our Austrian brethren," who, as he said he knew, would soon assert their "German character" against the "corrupt system" of the Austrian Government. The truth, by contrast, was that the Austrian Government found itself, thanks to the Nazis, supported by a new type of Austrian patriotism in which the consideration of the German race played no part.

Among those who had been arrested by Dr. Dollfuss in June was Herr Habicht, a Reichstag Deputy who had been sent to Vienna as Press Attaché at the German Legation, and as "Nazi State Inspector for Austria." He was put across the Bavarian frontier without ceremony. Berlin retaliated by

deporting the Austrian Press Attaché in Berlin, Dr. Wasserbäck, who was promptly posted by Dr. Dollfuss to the Austrian Legation in London : a doubly shrewd, even delightful, move. At the beginning of July, Herr Habicht began broadcasting from Munich, with the approval of the Bavarian authorities, those manifestoes to the Austrian Nazis which not unreasonably were regarded by Dr. Dollfuss as an outrage upon international usages. Dr. Dollfuss was not encouraged to take a more lenient view by being himself described therein as a traitor, financed by French and Czechoslovak money. At the same time German aeroplanes flew over Austrian territory dropping manifestoes of which the object was to seduce the Austrians from loyalty to their Government, and German Nazi demonstrations were made against the Dollfuss Government on the Austro-German frontier. Handbills were dropped over Salzburg on July 14th and July 30th (the latter containing an appeal to those Austrians who agreed with Nazi aims to refuse to pay taxes and to withdraw their deposits from the banks). On July 25th a German aeroplane dropped copies of Herr Habicht's broadcast speech over the Vorarlberg. The situation really was astonishing. German Nazis, without any restraint from the German Government, rather with the open encouragement of that Government, were engaged in hostile acts on the territory of another country. The German mentality, which under the stress of emotion has before proved itself capable of uncontrolled extravagance, in this case seemed to have excited itself into such a fury that it did not even recognise the existence of frontiers.

It was natural that Dr. Dollfuss should take a serious view of the disturbances, because he could never be sure how far the Austrian Nazis might rely upon German Nazi help in the prosecution of their own domestic object (which they shared with all political parties in all countries when not in office), of ousting the existing Government from power and putting themselves in its place. As long ago as August 10th it was reported that the Austrian Government was about to approach the French, British, Italian and Little Entente countries with a view to obtaining their consent to a modification of the Treaty of St. Germain so that a special Austrian force could be raised to meet this special danger. On August 28th the Minister of Defence announced that the Austrian Government intended to raise the armed forces to a strength

of 30,000 men, and hinted that the new men to be enrolled would be a special force, not a part of the regular army. Dr. Dollfuss at that time, as was later revealed, was drafting a request to the signatories of the Treaty of St. Germain, that he be allowed to raise a temporary short-term army for a provisional period of twelve months. The Austrian Government's request in that sense was received by the British Foreign Office on August 30th. The British Government promptly consulted the French and the Italian Governments, both of whom agreed, and the three Powers thereupon gave the necessary permission : necessary, because the Treaty of St. Germain subjects the Austrian federal army to the condition of long-term service and of a maximum strength of 30,000. The reason given for Austria's request was the danger that threatened the Government from the Austrian and German Nazi outbreaks that had lately been organised both within and without the frontier. The existing strength of the federal army was below the maximum of 30,000, but Dr. Dollfuss had no difficulty in convincing London, Rome and Paris that budgetary considerations precluded any increase of that strength. The details of the conditions under which Austria was to be allowed to do what she asked were published on September 3rd. The new force was to be voluntarily recruited and trained by the regular army. If the present dangers disappear within the twelve months, the new army is to be disbanded at the end of that period. Active service is to be for not fewer than five, and not more than six months, although the period may in exceptional circumstances be extended. No absolute limit is placed upon the size of the new army, but the limit is automatically imposed by the condition that the total forces are not to exceed the St. Germain maximum.

Although the regular type of Hitlerite commentator was thereby excited into something like indignation over the apparent fact that the Allied Powers were not disposed to apply to one treaty the rigid sanctity they applied to another, there was no evidence that German governmental opinion saw the point that this was another of the indirect works of Herr Hitler himself.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

September 15th, 1933.

No. 385. *October, 1933.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY.*

A brief, modern history of vocabularies, word-books, lexicons and dictionaries would be useful and it certainly could be made entertaining by recounting the efforts of scholars for the past two thousand years to cover an uncoverable ground. We should picture the great Porson twice transcribing the only manuscript in the Codex Galeanus of the Lexicon of Photius who, writing in the ninth century of our era, used the vocabularies of Aelius Dionysius and Pausanius of the second century. In the first century Pamphilus of Alexandria was, says Dr. Sandys, "the compiler of a vast work in ninety-five books on rare and difficult words." Pamphila of Epidaurus was perhaps more profitably employed at the same time in collecting literary facts. Her book and his books are lost, but often quoted from. Had these Byzantine heroes been alive to-day they certainly would have been employed by the editors of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, and perhaps that gentle lady, Pamphila, in her cultured home, with her father and husband, as absorbed as she was in the Greek classics, would have been more useful than Pamphilus, the gargantuan swallower of rare words.

* *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles.* Prepared by William Little, H. W. Fowler, J. Coulson. Revised and edited by C. T. Onions. Two volumes. 63s. net.

Yet somebody has to deal with rare words in the course of the education of the human race. That was realised quite early in the place that we call England. About a hundred years before the time of Photius the Byzantine, a late eighth-century Latin-Anglo-Saxon glossary was written at St. Gallen by an Irishman or a South German. The manuscript was elaborately and nobly edited by Dr. J. H. Hessels in 1906 and published by the Cambridge University Press. The fifth index to the published work is a register of all the Anglo-Saxon or other Germanic words which occur in the glossary itself or have been noted in the Latin index to the glossary. It was, indeed, an early beginning for the new tongue. It slowly grew and Aelfric the Grammarian, Abbot of Evesham, early in the eleventh century produced a Latin-Anglo-Saxon grammar and glossary and this grammar glossary and colloquy was apparently the source of the dictionaries or glossaries of the period after the Black Death. Yet the Norman intervention gave another tongue to the grammar schools and the *de utensilibus* of Alexander Neckham, who died in 1217, is a vocabulary in Latin with a gloss of Anglo-Norman and English. Thus the language grew in the formal sense. Scholarship strove to abolish dialects and establish a single central tongue, even as the British Broadcasting Corporation is doing now, but without, happily, success. Yet scholarship did happily succeed in making a literary tongue while the dialects of English survived, becoming the fountain of " new " (that is to say, very old) words, which the literary tongue required and absorbed. So we come to the great Elizabethan period which used all the words that were available in the customary tongues and the literary tongue and made them build up a language—perhaps specially illustrated in the long history of the Authorised Version of the Bible—that the deluge of foreign words, from the time of James I to the present time, cannot take from us. Writers, great and small, have fixed the language in the last three centuries, poets, dramatists, essayists, novelists, technical authors, and it has been possible in the twentieth century to compile a vast dictionary, *The Oxford English Dictionary,* the greatest literary feat of a not particularly literary age.

> This Dictionary was compiled and edited from materials amounting to over five million quotations, derived from English works of literature and records of all kinds, and resulted in 15,000 large quarto pages, in which nearly half a million words are recorded with more than one and a half million illustrative quotations.

It was an astounding achievement considering the origins to which attention has been drawn and the further fact that it is believed that some people in England to-day in rural districts are unable to use more than 250 words, that is to say, only one-two-thousandth of the words which the great *Oxford Dictionary* declares to be English words. Pamphilus of Alexandria was gargantuan in his day, but his ninety-five books of rare and difficult words would make a flea-bite when compared with the whale-like process that has sucked into the English language words from every tribe and race in every part of the man-speaking world in every age of speech.

The glossary of Aelfric or the vocabulary of Neckham could have gone into the waistcoat pocket of William I or Henry I. The waistcoat, we learn from this wonderful abridgement of the *Oxford Dictionary,* was worn in quite early days by the great, and presumably it had a pocket. Probably the Conqueror did not carry the glossary since he could not read, his wife may have done so since she knew Latin, but his grandson certainly carried Neckham's book. The *Oxford Dictionary* could not fit in, even one of its volumes could not fit in, to the pocket of a Communist leader to-day. It is far too big even for these voracious orators. The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* is, perhaps, a different matter, since it contains only 2,475 well-printed pages in two volumes, massive and well bound. This scholarly abridgement presents the quintessence of the greater dictionary and its method is the same.

> It is historical in its representation of the chronological sequence in the development of meaning. It gives the etymologies of words in such a form as to exhibit every significant stage of their history from their place of origin. The meanings are illustrated by quotations either exactly dated or assigned to their authors; the range of the texts used in these illustrations is shown in the list of *Authors and Books Cited,* which is printed in Volume I, pp. xii-xviii. Idiomatic phrases are treated with a fullness that is unusual if not unparalleled in dictionaries of similar compass. Like the original work, this abridgement is not intended to provide a direct commentary on the peculiar vocabulary of any one author, but an attempt has been made to record the special words and meanings and even oddities of important writers. Many provincialisms also that have some currency in standard literature

or are of signal importance historically are treated here, though it may be with extreme brevity. It has been possible in many places to supplement the word-content of the original dictionary and its chronological evidence from the collections gathered by many hands during the last fifty years with a view to a grand supplement or an extensive revision of that work.

It is, of course, impossible here to criticise the word-content of this vast and readable dictionary. A real pleasure, however, is to be derived from browsing on it from a specialist point of view and reaping some of the learning and care which has been bestowed on it without measure. It may be noted that *Seisin* has now a popular, as well as a legal meaning. A word particularly interesting is *gas*, a word actually invented by Van Helmont (1577-1644). Most people know that it was one of the few really invented words, but few know that it was based on the Greek χάος, an early Attic word used by Hesiod as meaning the first state of the universe. The invention was, indeed, a great scientific guess worthy of the late sixteenth century. The omissions from this great dictionary are as significant as the text. An example of omission is the absurd German slang-word *Cartel* or *Kartel*, first used in Germany in 1879 as meaning an industrial combination. It is not English at all, nor is it used in England, though it has drifted to America.

The question of American words that are not English is too large a subject to be entered upon here. Such words ought to be sternly rejected unless, or until, they attain currency. The one thing that England has to fear from the United States is the corruption of the English tongue by the introduction of words that are not in any sense English. The main use of these Oxford Dictionaries is to keep the English tongue as pure as is possible in a corruptible word-world. Slang and argot are one thing: they very often give rise to good and permanent words; dialects are very fruitful in the growth of a language and American survivals of seventeenth-century English are to be welcomed. But the American language is becoming un-English as the result of commerce and the mixing of strange races in a foreign land. If we desire to preserve the English tongue modern American monstrosities in the way of words must be sternly dealt with. The British Broadcasting Corporation ought to bear this matter in mind and not try to destroy local English dialects.

J. E. G. DE M.

GERMANY UNDER THE TREATY.*

Mr. W. H. Dawson's *Germany Under the Treaty* should be read and pondered by every student of international affairs. For he speaks with the authority of a life long acquaintance with the German people and a recent visit to the districts whose fate he describes. "As long as Germany continues unable to settle down, Europe will have no peace." Such is his argument, and it is impossible to deny its validity, however opinions may differ as to the way out. After weighty chapters on the Versailles Conference and the Treaty which it produced, a narrative enriched by his personal experiences, Mr. Dawson passes to the Eastern frontiers, beginning with the Polish Corridor. "There lies the root of the next war," observed Foch. Our author describes it as a foreign body driven into the heart of Prussia, adding that the humiliation and injury caused by this act of mutilation have put iron into the nation's soul. He rejects the contention that the fate of a territory should be determined solely by the nationality of its inhabitants at a given moment, asserting that the justest title to possession is the use that has been made of it. Tried by this test he finds no excuse for the transfer of the Corridor and part of Upper Silesia to Poland, the handing over of lands civilised and developed by Germany to a people living on a lower cultural plane. The main outlines of the dispute are familiar to us all, but he adds a wealth of information illustrating the economic dislocation engendered by the new frontiers and by the severance of Danzig from the Fatherland. The latter half of the volume analyses the situation in the fragment of Upper Silesia allotted to the Czechs, the fate of Memel, the treatment of minorities in Poland, the problem of the Saar, the "Sabotage plebiscite" by which Eupen and Malmedy were joined to Belgium, and finally the German Colonies. Everywhere it is the same story of the errors of the victors aggravated by the infringement of such minority rights as were provided in the treaty.

The closing chapter sets forth the case for revision in Europe and Africa, and drives home the warning of the book. "The issue is now the peace of Europe against the peace of Versailles." Mr. Dawson is aware that he is asking a great deal in inviting the victorious Powers to surrender a portion of their spoils, but he bases his appeal on the double contention that great injustice

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

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has been committed and that the maintenance of the *status quo* involves ultimate disaster to us all. The volume was finished before Hitler's dictatorship began, and it is one of the tragedies of that sinister event that it has thrown back the growing movement for revision. For who would deliberately place a single human being under the yoke of a man who treats millions of his fellow citizens as outlaws in their own country?

* * *

CHURCH AND PEOPLE.*

Two important books have recently been published which will be of great value to all who are interested in the course of English Religious Thought and Life during the past century. The first is entitled *Church and People, 1789-1889,* by the Master of the Temple. Mr. Carpenter presents a very comprehensive and careful account of the History of the Church of England from William Wilberforce to the publication of *Lux Mundi*. Taking as his starting point the French Revolution in its effect upon English public opinion, the author presents an admirable account of the state of the Church of England at the opening of the nineteenth century, omitting in his survey nothing that is important, and extenuating nothing in regard to the neglect, subservience to the State, and abuses which made the Church at that time so ineffective and unpopular. Mr. Carpenter, while giving a fair and sympathetic account of the Evangelical Revival, proceeds to furnish a very full history of the Tractarian Movement and of the subsequent development of Anglo-Catholicism. In the course of his narrative he deals with the causes which led to the movement and pays tribute to its outstanding leaders. At the same time, Mr. Carpenter deals fully with the progress of the Church of England as a whole, including the influence of the Broad Churchmen and the social movements by which the later part of the period was distinguished. In particular, he does justice to Maurice, Kingsley, Samuel Barnett and others whose achievements in the application of Christian ideals and principles to the social conditions of their time were of such momentous importance, not only to the national life, but to the practical

* (1) *Church and People, 1789-1889.* By S. C. Carpenter. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.
(2) *A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850.* By Clement C. J. Webb. 8s. 6d. net.

influence of the Church. Mr. Carpenter has rendered an immense service by furnishing so complete a narrative embodying the fruits of unsparing industry and painstaking research, accompanied at every point by judgments that are invariably sympathetic and dispassionate. The book will have a permanent place as an indispensable handbook to students of Anglican Church History throughout the nineteenth century.

The second book, *A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850* is by Dr. Clement C. J. Webb, who, until recently, was Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion in the University of Oxford. The volume contains the Olans Petrie Lectures delivered in the University of Upsala in 1932, and is dedicated to the memory of the late Archbishop Söderblom. The author does not profess to give a complete history of Religious Thought in England during the period of which he treats, but within the limits of a short course of lectures he deals in an illuminating way with many of the outstanding movements of thought, taking particular account of important thinkers of various tendencies, e.g. the German Transcendentalists, Carlyle, Maurice, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Martineau and others. Thus, Dr. Webb brings out, as is his wont, the close connections between Religious and Philosophic Thought in a way that is only possible for so accomplished and competent a guide. These lectures, while rendering a great service of information and interpretation to those who heard them in Sweden, are of high value to those who will read them in England.

J. S. L.

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THE MANOR OF WYE.*

Dr. Helen Muhlfeld, Assistant Professor of Hunter College of the City of New York, has accomplished a stalwart piece of research into the history of the ancient manor of Wye for which students of legal and economic history in England and elsewhere will be grateful. The mediæval economic history of England is very important at the present time, and Miss Muhlfeld has dealt with difficult aspects of the manorial system in Kent, a county which has many customary historical peculiari-

* *A Survey of the Manor of Wye.* By Helen Elizabeth Muhlfeld. Columbia University Press; London: P. S. King & Son Ltd. 20s. net.

ties which require more research. It is true that we have Dr. W. C. Bolland's brilliant study of the *Eyre of Kent of 1313*, published by the Cambridge University Press in 1922, while "a transcript of the Articles of the Kent Eyre of 1313 is printed in the Selden Society's edition of the Year Books of that Eyre." This famous Eyre throws some light on the economic position in Kent in the early fourteenth century. Miss Muhlfeld, of course, refers to the Selden Society publication, but she does not notice Dr. Bolland's work on the *General Eyre*, which includes the essay on the Eyre of 1313.

She reproduces a document which deals with the mid-fifteenth century in Kent, a survey and rental of the Manor of Wye. She chose the Manor because of its exceptional character in this period, partly because there had already been published some thirteenth-century custumals of Wye, and partly because this survey is exceptionally detailed and complete.

> There was, in fact, a wide divergence in conditions existing upon different manors in various parts of England. Moreover, we realise that conditions were changing between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries. The Wye Survey deals with lands in a county known to be exceptional, and it is one of a long and complete series of records which enable the student to trace conditions from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Several authorities have expressed the opinion that the publication of manorial records and special study of individual manors would be desirable. There are a number of such studies too well known to require specific reference, but until transcriptions of many divergent types of records are abundantly available, accurate generalisation and definite conclusions are scarcely possible. The absence of any large amount of printed material dealing with Kent may be attributed to the wish of most scholars to study and present information on representative manors which might be considered in no way exceptional. This does not mean that the Kentish materials are not of interest or worth study. In fact, for these very differences they are peculiarly important. While the variations are quite commonly recognised, the explanations offered for these divergences differ widely. The generally acknowledged differences are; no villeinage, different units of land measure, the absence of the great common arable fields, gavelkind inheritance. Any or all of these questions offer in themselves interesting fields for investigation; their general bearing on the origins of English customs and institutions is, however, even more important.

It is necessary to give this long and important quotation from Miss Mulhfeld's book as it shows the drift of her whole system of research. She repeats the belief that there was no villeinage in Kent, but notes Dr. Bolland's statements in his *Eyre of Kent* (Vol. I, p. xxxvi), as to "the false tradition" that villeinage never existed in Kent. Dr. Bolland was quite right. Many northern manors in Kent, at any rate, had at the time of the *Domesday Survey* some villeins. The Manor of Lewisham, for instance, had 50 *villani* and three slaves. The whole subject was discussed in Lambert Larking's *Domesday of Kent*, not apparently referred to by Miss Muhlfeld. The Kentish rebellion under Wat Tyler was a protest against serfdom. In that particular some Kentish manors were not different to other manors nor, it may be suspected, were the still more mysterious manors in the Rape of Sussex where the custom of ultimogeniture or Borough-English obtained. But there was certainly a tradition of freedom in Kent which apparently clashed with the customs of the manors. The men of Kent claimed expressly to be not only freemen, but to have the right to lead the van in the armies of the king. Perhaps the discrepancy arises in the distinction of Kentish Men and Men of Kent. The Kentish Men were tribes which were conquered by the Men of Kent. London itself was so conquered and belonged to Kent in the very earliest times, and it may be that it was only in manors populated by Kentish Men—of which Lewisham was one—that villeins and slaves appeared. The question is worth pursuing further and this learned editor should find time for such new research since it has definite economic significance.

The Manor of Wye is very ancient. It was a royal manor and Miss Muhlfeld draws attention to the fact that it was existing in the year 762 A.D. She might have gone further and related it to the administrative divisions of Kent into five *laths*. A royal manor apparently was the seat of administrative government of the *lath* and probably this was true originally of Wye. Mr. C. I. Elton in his *Tenures of Kent* (1867) and his edition of *Robinson on Gavelkind* (1897) throw substantial light on these problems. The Manor of Wye was given to Battle Abbey by William the Conqueror, and it remained in the possession of the Abbey until it was surrendered to King Henry VIII on May 27th, 1538, the year of the dissolution of the monasteries. The Survey chosen for reproduction is from the Record Office, and apart from the first three folios "although the hand is a

careless one, the manuscript is in good condition." In printing the text the rents are grouped at the end of the description of each unit of land. It is useful to have this made plain. The question of land measurement in Kent, so elaborately and carefully discussed by Miss Muhlfeld, is too complex to discuss here. Mr. Elton says that while the Kentish suling contained 160 acres of arable land in certain parts it varies from 180 to 210 acres. But the suling is not an agricultural measure in the Manor of Wye, though it is mentioned in *Domesday Book*. Some difficulties in measurement may be solved by the fact that the English were long accustomed to reckon by "the long hundred of six score." Professor Vinogradoff says that the yoke (the measure used in Wye) was the fourth part of a suling of 180 to 200 acres. The whole question is very difficult and measurements must have varied in different areas, probably in different *laths* or *half-laths* (such as Sutton). The discussion of the *Servile Yokes* at Wye indicate plainly the presence of *villani* at some time. Copyhold tenure is a sign of servitude, as a good many merchants found in the time of Queen Elizabeth when they unfortunately had bought copyholds. The account of the Court Rolls shows clearly that originally Wye was a royal administrative centre, the heart of the lath. Miss Muhlfeld's book is a very valuable and scholarly contribution to the legal, administrative and economic history of Kent, and will take its due place as a text-book. J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.*

The National Society, founded in 1811 for the purposes of religious and elementary education, is about to be become, under a supplementary Royal Charter, the Central Council of the Church of England in the field of education, and will have to deal with religious education in a wider field than training centres, training colleges and elementary schools. This extension of the work of the National Society is greatly due to the administrative gifts and to the great educational knowledge of the secretary, Mr. Richard Holland. One of the problems in

* (1) *Christian Education in the Sunday School and Bible Study in Day Schools*. The National Sunday School Union. (2) The 122nd *Report of the National Society*. (3) The 90th Annual Report of the Church of England Sunday School Institute.

religious education to-day is to make provision for specialised teaching, not only in the public elementary voluntary schools, but in the Hadow senior and junior secondary schools, partly through the erection of new Church of England Schools of that type, and partly through the agency of excellent religious syllabuses, widely adopted by local education authorities. This is beginning to be achieved. Those syllabuses will meet many difficulties in the case of elementary or senior schools provided by the local authority. It is true that the children, when the so-called Anson by-law is in force, can be taken from school during the time of the undenominational religious instruction, but it is difficult to find classrooms and the Church itself is not suitable for class-grading purposes. It is true that some local education authorities, as a favour, can lend a spare room on the school premises for denominational teaching, but that is not in most cases satisfactory. So a particular denomination, especially the Church of England, either builds senior schools or takes part in the religious syllabus approved by the local authority and by the Church of England and other authorities. That work must be supplemented by the Sunday Schools. Under this system grading of the children into different age sections is adopted, and the school has the great advantage of teaching under the same lines of advance as in the case of secular instruction. The Sunday Schools must do the same.

In the remarkable book just published on *Christian Education in the Sunday School and Bible Study in Day Schools*, edited by the Rev. Ernest G. Braham (the learned General Secretary and Director of the Religious Education of the National Sunday School Union), Dr. A. W. Harrison says :

> While it is impossible and, indeed, undesirable to get a complete correlation between the day school and the Sunday School curricula, there is a remarkable amount of agreement between the programme. In spite of the less time available in the Sunday School, it keeps up the pace with the day school throughout. . . . Moreover, it is a national scheme, whereas there are a score of different day school syllabuses in different areas. Some of the pre-War schemes that are still in use are meagre and poverty-stricken programmes of work as compared with the courses provided by the British Lessons Council. They are a disgrace to the authorities that are responsible for them. Half a dozen counties and about sixty other authorities are still using antiquated syllabuses. But where schemes like that of Lancashire and Cambridgeshire are in use and where the Sunday Schools

follow the graded lessons courses, we shall find that the day and Sunday Schools are keeping step wonderfully well, and each supplements the work done by the other with its own peculiar and specialised gift.

It is true that the British Lessons Council represents only the Free Churches, but Dr. Harrison tells us that its lessons have gone everywhere and similar schemes have been used in the schools of the Church of England. Yet the fear is that the graded method is not used universally in the Church of England Sunday Schools, with the result that these schools do not keep in step with the week-day schools.

The National Sunday School Union has a right to speak on these subjects since it was founded not, indeed, before the work of Dr. John Bell started, but in 1803—eight years before the National Society. It was extended from London to the provinces in 1810, and in 1933 there are 322 District Unions throughout England and Wales. The objects of the Society—which is an interdenominational organisation—" are to promote religious education through Sunday Schools and local Sunday School Unions co-operating with denominational Sunday School organisations and other Societies working for the young. To promote and develop the establishment of Sunday Schools at home and abroad by financial grants or otherwise." It has many activities, including a highly organised training college, with a graded study syllabus, certificates, and a graduate diploma. It started the Boys' Life Brigade in 1899 (which, after twenty-five years of success, was amalgamated with the Boys' Brigade in 1927) and the Girls' Life Brigade in 1902, which to-day is a world organisation.

Of course, neither the Sunday School Union nor the National Society started Sunday Schools or the movement for religious education in schools. In 1672 Thomas Gouge, ejected from the living of St. Sepulchre's Church, London, determined, with the permission of the Bishops, to evangelise Wales, and started in South Wales Day Schools of a religious type, and that movement spread rapidly. It was related in some way to the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, which was founded by Dr. Bray in 1698, and in the next year began founding charity schools which taught reading and writing as well as the catechism. In 1729 there were 1,658 schools with 34,000 children. In 1730 Griffith Jones, a clergyman of the Established Church, started his famous Circulatory Schools in Wales, the teachers passing from district to district. In 1737 John Wesley began Sunday classes in Savannah, but they did not come to England until 1763, when Robert Raikes, of Gloucester, consolidated the Sunday School system, which, however, did not come to London till after 1780. The Sunday School Society was founded in London in 1785, and possibly this was a forerunner of the Sunday School Union, founded in 1803. In 1833 there was a total number of Sunday Scholars in England and Wales of 1,500,000 with 100,000 teachers. This takes us up to the first Parliamentary grant for education one hundred years ago. The demand for general education at that date may be estimated from the fact that in Manchester in 1834 the Sunday Schools were open for secular instruction for five and a half hours on Sundays and for two evenings in the week, and that the age of the scholars varied from five to twenty-five years. Mr. Benjamin Braidley's school had 2,700 scholars, taught by 120 unsalaried teachers, practically all of whom were former scholars.

It is a wonderful story, but not more wonderful than Mr. Ernest Braham's account of the fruits of the different movements. Religious education to-day has become very skilled work, as technical as the work in the Day Schools and perhaps more so. Mr. Braham holds up before the reader the highest standard of education. It is, he writes, " the cultivation of the total capacities of human nature, the symmetrical and harmonious development of all the powers of body, mind, and spirit." There is, in fact, no such thing as " secular " education. The task of the religious teacher is to show forth the way of life as revealed by Jesus Christ. This learned and far-seeing essay fitly introduces the whole book with its successive chapters dealing with training for Sunday School work—comparatively few clergy and lay teachers are trained, at any rate, in the way set forth in this excellent book—the form of lessons with the appropriate grading, the relationship of the Church, the Day School, and the Sunday School, worship and music, premises and equipment, and larger world Christian movements. At the present time when the need of attractive and learned religious teaching is paramount, this competent book is indeed welcome. Mr. Braham's ideas on educational questions closely resemble those of the late Mr. W. Hume Campbell, the founder of the very successful Church of England College at Blackheath, St. Christopher's College, which has long been doing such excellent work for religious education at home and abroad under the auspices of the ancient and far-sighted Sunday School Institute.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The *Life of Hahnemann, Founder of Homeopathy,* by Rosa Waugh Hobhouse,* summarises for English readers in compact and attractive form the career and achievements of one of the benefactors of mankind. The narrative is enriched by vivid descriptions of places associated with the Saxon doctor by the author's husband, Stephen Hobhouse. Born in 1755, the son of a Meissen porcelain painter, Hahnemann possessed an inquiring mind which quickly led him beyond the barriers of orthodox medical science. "Through his discovery of the power of cinchona (from which quinine is now derived) to produce the symptoms of malaria as well as to cure that disease, he caught a glimpse of a law of cure, namely that there was probably no agent, no power in nature capable of morbidity affecting a healthy individual, which did not possess the faculty of curing morbid states." Thus cinchona bark, as it has been said, was to Hahnemann what the falling apple was to Newton and the swinging lamp to Galileo. The discovery of the principle *simile similibus curantur* (like is eased by like) was followed by another, namely that the smaller the dose the greater the power of cure. "Poisons, he found, could be reduced to such an extent as not only to be completely redeemed from their noxious character, but so as to be endowed with curative virtues far excelling in some instances those of the more obviously benevolent substances." The story of Hahnemann's cures and growing fame is of interest not to doctors alone but to the general reader, for our liability to illness makes the whole world kin. In a brief Preface Sir John Weir argues that Hahnemann, so far from being out of date, is before his time, for vaccines are but an illustration of his method. No one in the annals of science, indeed, has worked more devotedly and more creatively for the service of his suffering fellow-men.

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The Philosophical Approach to Religion, by Dr. Eric S. Waterhouse,† recently published, was the Fernley-Hartley Lecture for 1933 and was delivered in connection with the recent Methodist Conference. Dr. Waterhouse is a member of the staff of Richmond Theological College, and is a Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of London. He is a well-equipped scholar in the allied subjects of philosophy, psychology and comparative religion. He has a remarkable art of orderly and lucid exposition, so that his work, while thorough and careful, is both interesting and intelligible to ordinary, well-educated readers. The Lecture covers a very wide field, for the author deals successively with the Fact of Religion, the Purpose of Philosophy, the

* The C. W. Daniel Company. 7s. 6d.

† Epworth Press. 5s. net.

Idea of God, of the Universe, of Man, and of the Good. He concludes by discussing the relations of God to the World and to Man, including a chapter on Immortality. In the course of his exposition, Professor Waterhouse reviews the conclusions of outstanding thinkers on all these subjects with careful and good-tempered criticism of those from which he differs. In this way he builds up a clear and able statement of Christian Theism, which will be of great service to theological students and to religious teachers. Of course, so wide a survey does not permit of exhaustive discussions, but the author has a rare gift of presenting the salient positions and of stating his own conclusions in regard to them—a welcome feature of what should prove a very valuable handbook.

J. S. L.

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The persecution of the Jews in Germany has given rise to an apologia contained in a little book entitled *The German Jew: His Share in Modern Culture,** by Professor Abraham Myerson and Mr. Isaac Goldberg. The authors describe the contributions of German Jews in modern times to the culture of Germany and of the world, with especial reference to the fields of medicine, science, mathematics, philosophy, literature, and the fine arts. The achievements of German Jews are so undoubted as to make the authors' enumeration almost superfluous. "The Jew, as an element of culture," they write, "is deeply embedded in every aspect of German thought, not as a separable layer, but as an organic, integrated phase." But though Jews "react with their environment as all living things do" and "are influenced by the criteria of the social structure and social institutions into which they are born," they retain their identity and resist assimilation to a greater extent than any other race. The authors assert that "the great races, amongst whom we proudly number the Jews, are different only in the minutiæ of character. Their general reactions are the same. Transplant the European of whatever stock to America, and in two or three generations he is an American, quite distinguishable from his forbears of whatever European land." History shows that this is not true of the Jewish race. If it were, the Nazi persecution could not have occurred and this book could not have been written. The Zionist Congress is proof of a Jewish national consciousness. Though the Jew contributes to the civilisation of the people among whom he lives, he retains an inner racial culture which is never absorbed. But this outstanding characteristic can provide no ground for persecution. The support given to the Nazi policy by the German National Church is incomprehensible, and quite contrary to the Christian faith.

* Martin Hopkinson. 3s. 6d. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

"Cruising and Ocean Racing,"* which is a recent addition to the Lonsdale Library of Sports, Games, and Pastimes, provides a mass of information and advice on almost every topic relating to a yacht, from the details of design to the maintenance of a medicine chest. "This volume," states the Preface, "had, in fact, to be a veritable dictionary of the 'Do's' and 'Don't's' of yacht cruising; it had to leaven practice with theory, and season it with a survey of the trend of modern thought; it had to cover the needs of the owner-skipper of the handy 5- or 10-tonner, and also the needs of the owner of the large, well-manned, deep-sea cruiser; it had to discuss those aspects of ocean racing which march hand in hand with pure cruising." Each subject is dealt with by an expert. Mr. William McC. Meek, M.I.N.A., for example, writes on construction, Mr. J. R. Barnett, M.I.N.A., discusses design, and Mr. Lyall, M.I.N.A., deals with dinghies. Mr. John Irving, who contributes to the greater part of the book, is responsible for the chapters on navigation, actual sailing, and kindred matters. His chapter dealing with flag etiquette is especially valuable, having been reviewed and accepted by the Admiralty as correct. This volume contains over sixty plates and a mass of diagrams illustrating the text, a bibliography, and a useful glossary of yachting terms.

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Mr. L. Montague Harrod in "Lending Library Methods"† —a thesis accepted by the Library Association for the Honours Diploma—has devised a new subject for a book, although the need for such a book is obvious and has been supplied in the United States. Every librarian presumably has his own methods as to the design and formation of the Lending Library, the staff, book selection, the care of books, registration methods of membership of the library, the charging system to secure accurate records of the issue and return of books on loan. Most of these methods have, in the course of vast experience, been generalised, but Mr. Harrod's work (as that distinguished public librarian, Mr. W. C. Berwick Sayers, notices in his introduction to the book) "is the most detailed on matters of small technique that I know; he seems to have tried to have explored every way of doing our simple business processes to its depth." In other words it is a thorough book and one that every librarian should know.

* Seeley, Service & Co. 21s. net.

† Grafton & Co., Coptic House, W.C. 12s. 6d.

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LORD GREY'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS CRITICS.

EDWARD GREY entered the Foreign Office as Under-Secretary to Lord Rosebery in 1892. He was then just thirty. He had sat for some six years in the House of Commons, and had already shown there signs of independence and distinction. The handsome, vigorous undergraduate whom his Balliol friends remembered, with his strenuous love of sport and games, his devotion to birds, his passion for fishing, his undisguised pleasure in a "rag," had developed quickly since those Oxford days. He had awoken with a sudden rush of interest to the charm of books and other serious things. His zest for life was undiminished, but the graver side of a fine nature, singularly free from self-seeking and ambition, had begun to show. Politics were still a little irksome. He had inherited a Liberal tradition. He had a deep respect for Mr. Gladstone —"the greatest man in whose presence I have ever been." He had been convinced by John Morley's powerful arguments for Home Rule. But though he worked well in his first political office and soon gave proofs of capacity and judgment, his heart and his enjoyment were in other things. He stayed long enough at the Foreign Office then to learn something of "the abrupt and rough peremptoriness" of German methods, and of the "ground-swell of ill-will" which at that time never quite subsided between ourselves and France. He began to understand the dangers always threatening Europe. And even as an Under-Secretary he showed that he had a mind of his own. There was one speech in those years, in which in firm though guarded language he warned the French against intervening in the valley of the Nile, which produced in the Liberal Cabinet some stirrings of alarm. It is characteristic that, when the stir reached him, Grey was found pruning his roses in a Hampshire cottage, and entering in his journal "Pruning Sunday. Disturbed by work." Interesting as the Under-Secretary's work might be, efficiently as he always did it, there could be no doubt that he preferred the

life in the country, to which he stole away on Saturdays at half-past five a.m. When set free in 1895, he left Downing Street quite happily, with the "expectation and intention" of never returning to office again.

But a quiet life in the companionship of Nature does not fall to men of the quality of Edward Grey, although there were moments when, electioneering, he felt "almost with a sense of guilt, that the relief of being set free from Parliament would be an irresistible joy." Ten years after that good-bye to Downing Street he became, still reluctantly, Foreign Secretary in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government. "If we enter," he told Haldane, "it is not for pleasure's sake." In the interval he had taken a line on some important points of Imperial policy which many Liberals, and the present writer among them, viewed with regret. But once in Campbell-Bannerman's Government he put all past differences behind him. He won completely the confidence of his new Chief. And in two respects he won, as he claimed, the character of a good colleague, first, by putting his mind into the common stock and working sincerely in matters of difference or difficulty for Cabinet decisions, and, secondly, by accepting full personal responsibility for such decisions when once agreed to. Any suggestion that he ever failed in loyalty or openness towards the men he worked with would be undoubtedly untrue.

Aloof, on the other hand, the Foreign Secretary sometimes was. It was part of a nature not only lofty but modest and reserved. He never studied the arts of popularity. He had no inclination for self-advertisement or political intrigue. He was much engrossed in the work of his Department. One would see him strolling through the Lobby during divisions, ready enough to exchange a word or answer a question, but intent on getting back to his work as soon as he could. He would appear in the House at times to deal with questions or to speak in a discussion on foreign affairs, always courteous, adequate, fair-minded, with no schemes or secrets to disclose to us—he was the last man to care for either secrecy or scheming—sometimes, it may be, a little baffling because he had no intention of telling the public more than he thought it prudent or necessary to say. He was always listened to with respect and pleasure, on the benches opposite as well as on our own. Indeed it was from critics on our side below the

gangway, critics a little distrustful of the Imperialist traditions which had gathered round the Liberal League, that questions or objections chiefly came. But dignity, knowledge and integrity in combination gave the Minister a strength against which criticism beat in vain. And yet it is probably true that all through those years Grey was pursuing, quietly and almost inevitably, with a single-hearted honesty of purpose which the shrewdest foreign diplomats allowed, a policy entailing possibilities of the most far-reaching nature, while Parliament remained to a large extent unconscious of the grave consequences to which that policy might lead.

This fact is the real foundation of most of the criticisms levelled at his conduct of foreign affairs. It is the most plausible charge contained in a chapter devoted to his disparagement in a volume of memoirs recently issued by one very conspicuous politician. Of the purely personal criticisms which find expression in that volume it is not necessary to speak: few men who knew Grey will be likely to accept them. But when Mr. Lloyd George accuses a colleague, the responsibility for whose policy he shared for ten years, of keeping the Cabinet in the dark about his doings, of weakness and fumbling in difficult situations, of palsied apprehension in time of danger, and of calamitous failure in the end,* it may be well to consider what these charges are worth. Lord Grey unconsciously forestalled them in the book he wrote eight years ago,† explaining with winning and transparent candour the aims and motives of his action at the Foreign Office. The difference between his book and Mr. Lloyd George's is a measure of the difference between the two men. And it is clear from that book that the end which he held steadily before him was as fine and as far-sighted as any that a British Minister could choose, not triumph or prestige for British diplomacy, but simply "good faith and a living desire to keep the peace."

No Minister, least of all a Foreign Minister, in this country starts with a *tabula rasa* when he comes into power. Grey's policy was inevitably influenced by what had gone before. The years from 1892 to 1895 had taught him how difficult in some respects the situation was. And the years of Unionist administration since had not greatly relieved the tension.

* See pages 49 and 93-96 of Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs*, I.
† *Twenty-five Years*, 1892-1916.

Germany, knowing that we wanted her support in Egypt, had been inclined to squeeze us whenever she wanted some concession elsewhere. France had shown herself frequently unfriendly. Powerful voices in the Unionist Party had been heard to declare that a war with France must come. Lord Salisbury had for a time gone farther than the Liberals "on the road of complaisance and advance to Germany." Visions of German friendship had floated before Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes, while the old apprehension of Russia had led to closer relations with Japan. But the overtures to Germany had been followed by an *Entente* with France, and this had caused a recrudescence of uneasiness in Berlin, which, on Grey's accession to office, threatened a serious European crisis. It was a situation full of anxiety, in which existing commitments had to be faced, and of those commitments most Members of the new Parliament knew nothing. Grey could not hope to transform it in a moment. He could only bring to it his cool, impartial judgment, and his resolve to clear away all grounds for unfriendly suspicion of our designs.

Phrases about the Balance of Power and the Old and New Diplomacy are apt to recur in discussions of this subject. For Grey these phrases had no very definite meaning. He never consciously adopted any theory of a Balance of Power. There were places, no doubt, like the Balkan States, where that theory still had an important influence, and there were moments when it seemed difficult to avoid taking sides with one or other of the groups dividing Europe. But he laboured steadily to avoid entanglements: and in that attitude he clearly represented Liberal feeling. The idea that some form of new diplomacy could replace the old seemed to him a mistake. So far as greater openness and frankness were the expression of a new spirit among the nations, so far to his mind they would be welcome. But new methods which consisted in excitable publicity might well rouse public passions to a dangerous extent.

> "Sensation and *éclat*," he wrote later, "provide the atmosphere that is favourable to storms. To avoid creating that atmosphere will be the great difficulty of 'open' diplomacy, if by that phrase is meant daily publicity."

Otherwise Grey's own nature was far more in sympathy with the new ideas than with the old. The traditions of

secrecy and scheming as unavoidable weapons of diplomacy still survived in many European capitals when he came into office. And to many Foreign Ministers it was a perplexing thing to find the new Head of the British Foreign Office meeting them in a spirit of frank simplicity quite out of keeping with some devices of the past.

Grey's single-minded sincerity was at first thought in some quarters to veil the deepest guile. "It is not hard to tell the truth," he said once; "the difficulty is to get it believed." His assumption that, being honest himself, he might count on equal honesty in others, sometimes confounded his opponents. He resented on one occasion the levity with which the French assumed that we should not play the game. He had equal trouble at another time to convince Count Metternich that English policy was not in intention more French than the French. He was not unaware of German manœuvres designed to sow distrust between ourselves and France. He could not be unconscious of the atmosphere of suspicion in Europe, or fail to see that German policy took it for granted that moral scruples must not count in international affairs. But he would never allow these considerations to divert him from his objects or to cloud or embitter his imperturbable goodwill.

On entering office Grey found that Lord Lansdowne's agreement had at last had the happy effect of eliminating friction between ourselves and France. His first important action in January 1906 was to make it clear on the one hand that the new Government stood by that agreement, and to resist on the other hand the strong desire of the French Government to convert the agreement into something more. Immediate decisions of great moment had to be taken in the rush of a General Election, and conveyed in delicate and guarded language to the French Ambassador in London and to the British Ambassadors in Paris and Berlin. It is very difficult, reading that correspondence, not to admire the skill and judgment which the new Foreign Secretary showed, or to maintain that on either point the decision which he took was wrong. It is not immaterial to remember that in the midst of these difficult negotiations, within a few weeks of his taking up his great office, Lady Grey by a tragical accident suddenly died. Grey lost his closest and most faithful counsellor and went forward with his heavy task a lonely man.

In the years which followed there were many critical

occasions when the same judgment and firmness were required. The tension with Germany over the Algeciras Conference of 1906 was followed by tension with Turkey, which involved an ultimatum, over the Gulf of Akaba. There was tension with Russia over Persia and the Dardanelles. There was tension over the changes in the Balkans in 1908-9: it may be that our Foreign Office sometimes underrated Austria's capacity for mischief. There was grave tension with Germany over Agadir in 1911. There was tension in Europe again over the Balkan crisis of 1912-13. Reviewing the circumstances and Grey's account of them, it seems impossible for a fair-minded man to say that at any given point his action showed weakness, fumbling, apprehensiveness, or anything but a cool and wise determination to advance the cause of peace. Grey had none of the methods of a Palmerston. He did not believe in high-handed or sensational coups. But he did believe in countering suspicion and unfriendliness with patient and obstinate goodwill. He knew and understood the prejudice in England against the methods of the Government of the Tsar, but he was not afraid to consider the Russian point of view. Persia, he afterwards confessed, tried his patience more than any other subject. And Russian Ministers, the servants of "a despotism without discipline," were at least as much imbued with the doubtful traditions of the Old Diplomacy as the agents of other Powers. Yet Grey's efforts to break down the exasperating suspicions which had so long separated Russia and England had results. "I believe now what you have told me," the Russian Foreign Minister admitted at last to the Russian Ambassador here; "these people are really friendly." The worst of it was that the better Grey succeeded in securing a good understanding with Russia and France, the more apprehensive grew our German neighbours of an insidious attempt to isolate and encircle them.

How far is there any ground for the assertion that Grey kept his colleagues in the dark? As regards what he told or did not tell Parliament there is this to be said. The *Entente* compelled British Ministers to consider the military situation which they would have to face if Germany provoked a war with France. Grey was repeatedly pressed by the French Government to give an assurance that, if France were attacked by Germany, Great Britain would come to her relief. But to this, the conversion of the *Entente* into a definite

alliance, he felt certain that neither the Liberal Government nor the Parliament of 1906 would consent. He found, however, that Mr. Balfour's Government had already entered into military and naval conversations with France, and precautionary communications of this nature, once begun, he did not think it reasonable to stop. These communications inevitably became more formal. Experts and staff officers met. Preparations for war were considered, though the Foreign Secretary abstained from inquiring about them: and such preparations at least tended to familiarise the idea of war. Campbell-Bannerman showed some apprehensions on the subject. Asquith later thought the conversations rather dangerous. But by that time, 1911, Grey felt obliged to answer that it "would create consternation" if they were forbidden. As time went on, Russia had to be admitted to similar confidential discussions. So in 1914 communications between British and Russian naval authorities were sanctioned, on the understanding that we remained unpledged to take part in a Continental war. In the case of Russia, Grey did not think that they would amount to very much.

Here again, as one follows the story, it is very difficult to say that at any given point the decisions taken were wrong. And yet it is evident that such preparations, if known, were only too likely to increase the suspiciousness of Germany and the risk of war.* The Cabinet as a whole were told about these conversations some two years before the war broke out. Some Ministers felt that they ought to have been told sooner, and Grey afterwards regretted that they had not been. But he thought at the time the less said about the conversations the better, and Parliament was only told that no unpublished agreements existed which would restrict our freedom in the event of a European war. Ought the Foreign Secretary to have made the fact of these communications public, at the risk of any misunderstanding or alarm which might be caused? He found them going on when he came into office. He found that the Government's military advisers regarded them as a necessary precaution. Ought he to have forbidden them then and there? If he allowed them to continue, ought he to have told Parliament and the public about them? Such questions are much less easy to answer than to ask. But it is significant that both Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, who realised the

* The fact of the consultations did become known in Berlin.

elements of danger, refused to take the responsibility of saying that these communications must be published or must stop.

Apart from this incident there seems to be no ground whatever for suggesting that Grey kept his colleagues in the dark. All important telegrams to and from the Foreign Office were circulated to the Cabinet daily, though it is not of course inconceivable that some Ministers failed to read them. Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, Morley, Haldane, Lord Crewe, Lord Ripon, Winston Churchill, were among those whom at different times he specially consulted. Any other Ministers could ask for more information if they desired it. In July 1911, during the Agadir crisis, Mr. Lloyd George came to the Foreign Office to consult Grey and to show him a speech which he wished to make. He was treated with the fullest confidence, and the Foreign Secretary afterwards stoutly defended what Mr. Lloyd George had said. Nothing could be farther from the truth than the idea that Grey failed in dealing fairly by his colleagues. The fact is that they trusted him so much, and were so much immersed in the work of their own Departments, that they were most of them content to leave foreign policy in his hands. When the great crisis came in July 1914, it was not the Foreign Secretary, deeply as he felt its gravity, who was found trembling " in the palsy of apprehension." In those critical hours it was Edward Grey's clear, undaunted judgment which steadied the less sure opinions of some who are too ready to criticise him now.

The most serious complaint made against him is that by showing greater vigour and audacity at some unspecified moment he might have prevented the war. " Had he warned Germany in time," we are told, " of the point at which Britain would declare war," the whole issue would have been different. Had he stated " in sufficient time " that an invasion of Belgium meant war with us, he would have left " the German military authorities without any excuse for not changing their dust-laden plans." Von Tirpitz also has suggested that the same sort of warning should have been given to Germany in 1914 as was given by Mr. Lloyd George in 1911. But this, as Lord Grey reminds us, assumes that we had a steady intention of going to war with Germany, which was not the case.

> "Our attitude, and the attitude of different members of the Cabinet, varied with the various phases of German policy. In 1911 Lloyd George acted on his own initiative; in 1914 he and others were not disposed to take that initiative; they were, indeed, prepared to resist such an initiative being taken at all, until Belgium was invaded. Then they felt differently. Von Tirpitz's suggestion given above is that of one who has learnt nothing about us."

To the last, it must be remembered, the Belgian Government were as reluctant as the French General Staff to believe that an invasion of Belgium would be attempted. At what date before the last days of July 1914 could Grey have warned the Germans of the point at which we should declare war upon them, without raising an indignant protest in this country, without breaking up the Liberal Cabinet and being directly challenged by those who blame him now? It is sometimes forgotten how strong and genuine the feeling of many English people against war with Germany was. It was only the conviction that Grey had done everything which skill and patience could do to avoid it, which finally led his colleagues and his party and the nation as a whole to acquiesce.

One other point of the first importance in Grey's administration of the Foreign Office should be mentioned here. His chief asset was that people trusted him: that was from first to last the secret of his strength: and never was the confidence inspired by his fairness and sincerity of more value to his country than in the early days of war. Difficult and formidable questions arose immediately between ourselves and neutrals, especially between ourselves and the United States. For Americans our alliance with Japan was an embarrassment. Our blockade of Germany was a constant source of friction. Our claims in regard to contraband led repeatedly to dangerous trouble. Had those claims not been governed by scrupulous and watchful fairness, had the Foreign Office been in the hands of politicians of a different type, ready to ride rough-shod over any interests but our own, we should have seen a strong outburst of resentment against us in the United States, an embargo probably placed on the export of munitions to the Allies, a growing antagonism which might well have rendered it impossible for the United States to enter the war upon our side. That such disasters were escaped was due primarily to the character and methods of Lord Grey, to the trust which he inspired in Americans like Mr. Page and Colonel House, as they learned to know him, to their kinship —as he said of Page—of thought, of standards, of ideals.

But the full record of Grey's diplomacy, his difficulties in

those anxious years and his reflections on them later, are set out with absolute candour in the pages of his book. The world has already judged him by that record, and its judgment will not be altered by envy or misunderstanding now. He may have been wrong in slowly forming the conviction that the forces dominating Central Europe twenty years ago were only too likely to land the world in war, and that it was our duty to prepare for that possibility while straining every effort to avert it. He may have been wrong in thinking that —quite apart from our obligations to Belgium—we could not stand by and see France crushed, without having to face afterwards in our isolation a triumphant Germany determined to humiliate us too. Looking back, he believed that our intervention had saved us from a very great danger. But even if he was wrong in these opinions, his fine, untiring work for peace in Europe cannot be denied. And if posterity decides that he judged these serious issues rightly, the grounds for condemning him will altogether disappear.

In retrospect Grey stands as an example of nearly all that Englishmen would wish their representatives before the world to be—a man pursuing no personal ambitions and laying claim to no exceptional gifts, cool in judgment, thoughtful but unfearing in decision, yet always ready to admit the possibility of error in the course he took, giving up his life, as circumstances willed it, without parade or self-advertisement, to the service of the State. He was a man whose powers and character deepened steadily as years went on, so that, when called to meet great issues and anxieties, he was able to face them unperturbed. When he left office, a stricken man, he continued still his service to the public, and the invaluable help which he gave in establishing the League of Nations converted what many at first thought a chimera into a reality which no statesman could ignore. When we lose such men we comfort ourselves by thinking that they are of a breed peculiarly our own. Instead of grudging Lord Grey his greatness, may we not put on record the pride that we all took in him, in his sincerity and simplicity of nature, and in his rare nobility of mind?

CHARLES MALLET.

THE NAZIS AND THE JEWS.

I MAKE no claim to being in a position to give an *ex cathedra* opinion on the position of the Jews in Germany. I am merely giving for what they are worth the results of three weeks' intensive inquiry. I purposely delayed my visit until it was possible to get the situation into some kind of perspective. The favourite argument of the Nazis has always been that it was not a change of Government but a revolution, and that in a revolution there are inevitably excesses. Well, now that revolution is six months away. The din and dust are subsiding and it is possible to estimate which side of the persecution was mere revolutionary excess and which a permanent item of policy.

Physical violence has to a great extent disappeared. I saw Jews in Berlin in quantities down the Kurfürstendamm walking about quite unmolested. This was true of other towns. In Breslau, reputed to be one of the worst places, for instance, I saw the Nazis collecting funds in one of the leading cafés and Jews refusing to contribute without incurring apparently any trouble at all. The beatings are enormously diminished. I did hear of them and indeed met one victim who had only a few days before been given a bad time in the Brown House. But it was not much more than schoolboy bullying. Nazis not out of their teens had made them run races, threatening to shoot the one who was last, and compelled them to do physical jerks, however old and feeble they were. My informant had seen two Communists thrashed. And again it was a schoolboy beating. Half-way through, the Nazi with the cane had said: "I have forgotten how many strokes I have given, I must start again," rather in the manner of a prefect in a bad house at a bad school.

Many of the atrocities were indeed the work of these boys. The crime of the German Government was that it connived at them. The police were forbidden to intervene. The atrocities also were very often due to the settling of some private score. The Jews were often the money-lenders and they were threatened with the alternative of a beating or the forgiveness of the debt—and frequently received the one while having to agree to the other.

But with some exceptions these unauthorised atrocities have ceased. There is also little interference with freedom to

worship. In only one case did I hear of the violation of a Synagogue. Such restrictions as there are have relation to Kosher. The preparation of this meat is forbidden in Germany. It has to be imported from Denmark at 1s. 8d. instead of 10d. per lb. The attack on the Jews has taken a different direction, but I cannot say that it is being conducted with any less severity. The atrocities to-day are more calculated and systematic. Firstly, they are incarceration in a concentration camp. I did not hear of any Jews being imprisoned as such. They were there because they had in some way or another been avowed opponents of the Government and were alleged to have carried on activities against it.

I heard it frequently argued that the Jews owed their lamentable position in the Hitler state to their having invariably, when engaged in political activity, joined the parties of the Left. But what other parties could they have joined? The Nationalists, as representing the old order of Imperialist Germany, would not have them. To the Nazis they were an abomination. Though some of them voted for the Centre Party under Dr. Brüning, the fact that it was the Catholic party made it impossible for any Jew to have any career in it. So there was only left to them the Volkspartei and the Staatspartei, the two wings of the old Liberal Party which was in its death agony, the Social Democratic Party, and the Communists. It was therefore inevitable that the Revolution when it came should find the Jews in the political parties opposed to it, and that in consequence not a few of them would find themselves in the concentration camps.

I cannot exaggerate the feeling of revulsion that I experienced when meeting some of the Nazi leaders. There are in the movement some really fine men, aflame with enthusiasm, full of self-sacrifice, ready to serve with the full measure of devotion the cause of German regeneration. The trouble is that Hitler has to reward those who joined him first, in the days when he was an outlaw.

But the worst atrocities are the actual regulations directly introduced by the Government against the Jews. Their purpose is to deprive the Jews of all means of livelihood. It is an economic drive and it is increasing in severity. A campaign of slow starvation is succeeding the campaign of terror. I do not want to exaggerate. The really rich are enabled to continue their avocations practically unmolested.

Hitler is terrified of a depreciation of the mark. But for how long? It seemed incredible that Hitler would ever dare to attack the Catholics, who represent a third of the German population. But he has done so. Dr. Wassermann has thought it politic to resign from the Board of the Dresdner Bank. It may well be the turn of the great banking interests next for summary expulsion. But for the moment they are safe.

The chief victims of the persecution are the professional classes. Most of them are not merely without jobs, but without any hope of getting them. It was rather pathetic when I rang up Jewish professional men to whom I had been given introductions that I always found them at home and ready to talk at any length, for they had nothing else to do. What is the situation in regard to them? They, after all, form the bulk of the Jewish community, lawyers, doctors, professors, small shopkeepers, students, and minor employees in offices. There are not many Jews in Germany who are working men in the sense that we use the term in this country. All State employment is closed to them. This extends to the medical profession where no panel patient can be attended by a Jewish doctor. As regards lawyers, at first the number of those who were allowed to practise was reduced to the exact proportion of their number to the whole population of Germany—that is 1 per cent. This has since been modified to the extent of admitting those Jews who actually fought in the war and those who were in practice before the war. This exemption from the ban does not apply to their sons.

The position varies in different parts of the country. In Berlin it is the best, for about half the lawyers are allowed to practise. Even then the privilege is not of much account, for no Aryan German will employ them. For instance, if they try and recover money for a client the chances are that he will receive a letter from the debtor—"Do you think that I am going to have any dealings with Jewish lawyers? Employ a German lawyer and then I will talk business." A Jewish lawyer has lost the case before he enters the court. Jewish professors have been dismissed almost *en bloc* from the universities. The only important exception is at Frankfurt, where, owing to the fact that the Jews form such a large proportion of the population, the persecution has been more temperate.

In business there have been wholesale dismissals. The boycott of the shops, though officially confined to one day, still continues. Here again it varies in severity from town to town. In Breslau, down the main street shop after shop has been bankrupted. There were notices up everywhere: "Buy from the German shops." In Cologne it was more positive, for the walls were still plastered with notices: "Don't buy from the Jews." I was told that these dated from the April boycott. More significant was the presence of women pickets outside the Jewish shops, with placards inscribed: "Buy German goods." What saves the Jewish shops from complete collapse is that on the whole they provide goods cheaper than do the others. Thus, at Beuthen, I found that the women of a neighbouring market town came in to buy their week's supplies from Jewish shops, where they would not be known and therefore would not suffer any consequences. The Jewish boycott must not be confused with the general drive against the big shops, which is part of the Nazi unemployment programme. It is the deliberate policy of the Government to restore to the small shopkeeper some of the trade that he has lost to the big stores. It is Chestertonian Distributism—the re-creation of a property-owning bourgeoisie.

The position of the students is lamentable. They are forbidden in most of the universities to take their degrees. They are thus suspended in mid-career. Schoolboys are forbidden to matriculate. With regard to the schools it is impossible to make any very precise statement. The summer term was still in progress, and until the schools meet after the holiday it will be impossible to discover whether the Government intends to stand by its decree that the schools shall be limited to a 1 per cent. flat quota of Jewish pupils. The persecution has been pretty bad there: Jewish children forced to sing Horst Wessel Lied, tormented by the teachers and isolated by the other children. But it all varies very much with the town and the teacher. Only in Breslau and there only in one school did we hear that the Jewish children had been deliberately segregated at the back of the room.

In general I have no doubt that the drive against the Jews is increasing in ferocity. Whole families are being thrown out of employment and everywhere there is a lengthening tale of suicides. Nazi leaders with whom I talked, argued that the Government was slowing up on the Jewish boycott. I

saw no signs of it. How can they? There are anything from two to four million who, if not professing Jews themselves, have parents or even grandparents who were Jews, for the ban only stops at the third generation. The deprivation of their jobs means employment for the Nazis. I can see no hope of a concordat with Hitler. The persecution of the Jews has given Hitler something like half a million jobs with which to reward his followers.

The Jews in Germany are in an intolerable position. They are accused of being non-national, and yet they are forbidden to assimilate themselves with the nationals. They are in a trap. Every way of escape is blocked. They cannot even make employment for themselves. In Frankfurt, the wife of a local lawyer who had lost his practice and was faced with destitution started a fruit stall in the streets. At first she did well, for her neighbours were sympathetic. Then the police stepped in and forbade the stall. Hitler, they said, was not attacking the big shops in order to create small shopkeepers among the Jews.

Hitler talks about suicides before he came into power; they are nothing compared to the suicides that are taking place now. When I was in Frankfurt an old couple of 80 took their lives. They just could not bear the situation any longer. That is typical of what I heard in every town I visited. It is inevitable when the sources of livelihood are suddenly cut off. So far as employment, their plight cannot be exaggerated. It is not a question of one man being out of a job. A whole family is put on the dole. Nor is it a question of a temporary disaster. The ordinary Jews have less chance of employment in Germany than has an habitual criminal in this country.

Is there any excuse for these outrages? Here is a community that has committed no crime, has paid its taxes, has served faithfully in good positions, has fought in the war as gallantly as its neighbours. Why should they be classed with lunatics and criminals, as men debarred from the opportunity of an honourable livelihood? The main contention is, firstly, that the German Jews are fundamentally anti-national, and, secondly, that they are in all the best jobs, and, thirdly, that there was a peculiarly undesirable element that came in from Poland after the war.

This is the burden of the extraordinary mob oratory repeated in every town in Germany and broadcast to every

village which has produced a delirium of hatred against the Jews. It is impossible to discuss the problem with any Nazi on ordinary terms. It is rather like trying to talk to a recent convert on the basis of the Catholic Church. It is a faith which no reason can shake.

But here I speak only of those actually in the Nazi movement. The working classes are largely unaffected by anti-Semitism. The hotel porter in Frankfurt, who described the persecution as "the greatest nonsense; the Jews are men like the rest of us"—was not isolated. In some places we heard of Jews receiving from their neighbours flowers on boycott day as an indication of their sympathy. In no place did we find that the Catholics had any part or lot in the persecution.

I am, however, bound to confess that I think that the German Jews have made little effort to understand the German psychology. They have tended to have rather a mocking, cynical, destructive kind of outlook, wholly at variance with the robust patriotism and simplicity of life of the ordinary German. It has been unfortunate that since the war the best seats at the theatre, the most expensive restaurants, the most luxurious cars have been in the possession of the Jews. There was a night life in Berlin that was peculiarly unsavoury and a series of plays on the stage which, though clever and original, had in some cases better not have been produced. The Jews had an almost complete grip on the entertainment industries.

Undoubtedly they have had a share of the professions out of all proportion to their numbers. At the Berlin Bar, for instance, though the Jews only represented 4 per cent. of the population, they were 60 per cent. of the legal profession. It was the same in the medical profession. Hospitals were often completely staffed by Jews. Admittedly they had won their position by merit. Many non-Jews acknowledged that if they were ill they would go to a Jewish doctor, or in trouble to a Jewish lawyer. Jews swept the board of prizes at the schools and, in consequence, were unpopular with the other boys. The power of patronage was in some cases used very unwisely. The head of a hospital, if he was a Jew, would often only appoint Jews. There is deep down in the German mentality an inferiority complex, allied to it is the vice—detected by Tacitus in his *Germania*—of *invidia*, envy of anyone more fortunate.

These characteristics are not a little responsible for the outrages. They in no way excuse them, but they do to some extent explain them.

The Jews, in my judgment, have accepted the situation very tamely. And in that condemnation I include not merely the Jews, but all the opponents of Hitler: Nationalists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Pacifists, Communists. They have been beaten up and they have not even the satisfaction of saying that they earned their stripes. They have kept quiet and they have suffered for it, just as much as if they had made their protest. This is a revolution without a martyr.

I do not blame the rank and file. Years of suppression have invested them with the slave virtues, though it is strange to recall the militant words of the Social Democrats before Hitler came into power. Death rather than loss of freedom, they shouted—100,000 of them—at an Iron Front demonstration last year in Berlin. Now there is not a kick left in the working classes. Admittedly the Government are too strong. They would just turn on the machine-guns now and slaughter, as horrible as it is useless, would be the result. But the time was when it was not so.

But though one may blame individuals, one cannot ignore the cry that goes up to-day from the persecuted in Germany.

What can England do? Keep up the moral pressure. In contrast to France the voice of Great Britain counts, particularly that of the Christian Churches and non-Jewish public men. The effect of Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech was enormous. Continue the unofficial boycott of German goods and make it official. Let the Jews as a community refuse to deal directly or indirectly in German goods. It is having an effect. Industrialists are warning Hitler that they are losing orders as a result of the persecution, particularly in America. There is a process, for instance, by which yarn exported from Bradford goes through a finishing process in Germany before re-export to U.S.A. I was informed that there is now so little sale for it in America, since it bears the mark "Made in Germany," that plans are already on foot to transfer the factory to France. The Nazis are well aware that the only serious threat to their power is rising unemployment figures.

The relief fund is urgently needed. About a third of the Jewish population already is faced with destitution. At present relief is being provided by the Jewish Community.

At present they are living on their resources. But these are diminishing. It is as when the water coming out of a hose-pipe is turned off at the main—it is a little time before the water ceases to run. The water of employment has been turned off at the main in Germany—it will not be long before the drought comes. The question naturally arises: Cannot the Jews look after their own? For the moment they are doing so. But the problem is of such a size that I do not think it is possible for them to do it indefinitely, or on the scale required.

The greater part of the relief should take the form of assisted emigration to Palestine or any other country that would be willing to receive them. There are tracts in South-West France, depopulated by the war, where there are opportunities for land settlement. It might be a satisfactory way out of the Colonies difficulty to make the old German colony of Tanganyika a place of refuge for the German Jews. Every effort should be made to persuade the High Commissioners of the Dominions to give facilities for Jewish immigration. There is no doubt that it would give their professional classes, lawyers, doctors, and above all university professors, a needed strengthening. Action, swift and searching, is vital. There have been approximately 8,000 Jews a year leaving the universities. To-day there are no possible avenues of employment. Indeed, the worst side of the persecution is this shutting of the doors of hope against youth.

But a world-wide appeal requires a world-wide perspective. It is most important that the German situation should not merely be approached from the point of view of Jewish persecutions, terrible though they are. This is an attack not only on Jewry, but on liberty. It is a denial of the elementary rights of civilisation, not merely to Jews but to all who do not bow the knee to Fascism. It should unite the modern world in effective protest, as the Turkish atrocities in Jerusalem once united the Christendom of the Middle Ages. Such a cry for rescue as is going up from Germany should pierce all frontiers of race and creed.

Perhaps the cruellest aspect of the persecution is the fear that it has inevitably inspired. My most poignant memory is of the terror on the faces of so many with whom we talked—in some cases unreasonable, but horribly real to them all the same—decent kindly folk, starting at sounds, afraid to talk,

suspecting their nearest neighbours, fathers who have pledged themselves to bring up their families in a decent standard of comfort in hopeless and helpless idleness, young men on the threshold of manhood doomed to endless unemployment—and not merely the material losses, but the general affront to human dignity involved in the declaration of a great community as trespassers in the land of their birth and upbringing. It is inhuman. The uncertainty is so agonising. It is impossible for the Jews to know what each day will bring. There they sit, waiting in horrible silence, rather like the inhabitants of a Belgian village in August 1914. A few weeks ago I saw the *Burgomaster of Stilemonde*, Maeterlinck's play, with its picture of the little Belgian village on a summer afternoon, waiting in an agony of suspense for it knew not what. Its happy simple world crashed about it, rumours reaching it every hour of burnings and executions, and nearer and nearer the tramp of the German hordes. My mind went back to the Jews of Germany I had left behind, the shadow that has suddenly come over their lives, the extinction of their hopes and the haunting fear of the morrow. Their plight is not very different from the Belgians. The spirit that produced both these tragedies of human suffering—the elevation of the State into a monster crushing everything that is standing in its path—is precisely the same.

ROBERT BERNAYS.

DOLLFUSS, CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA.

ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS is the youngest Chancellor in Europe. Like Mussolini a decade ago, he came to be dictator in his thirty-ninth year and, again like Mussolini, he assumed his office because possessed of youth's greatest boon, a blind and incurable optimism. It is his mission to pass on this inner glow of hope to his all-too-civilised, all-too-cynical compatriots. Austria in her evil days, like Italy of 1922-3, has need of an optimist. She is threatened by her former ally, Germany, with the loss of her political independence. She is threatened by her former enemies, the Powers, with the loss of her economic independence. Every temporary aid given to tide Vienna over some new economic misery is coupled with new concessions and new securities against the *Anschluss*. At the same time all Austrians, as a German folk, regard with vital interest the Hitler experiment, and many, feeling that they must inevitably be delivered up to some foreign group, would prefer to surrender in Berlin rather than in Paris.

The Lausanne loan, which was floated in September to the amount of 237,400,000 gold schillings, is ridden by a protocol which limits Austria's relations with other states. Leaving aside the question whether in these crucial days any people has an inalienable right to self-determination, or even to self-government, many Austrians doubt the benefits to be derived from this loan. It serves merely to convert short-term credits into long-term loans, and to facilitate the transfer of payments due on other, yet earlier loans, those contracted in 1923 and in 1930. The Austrian Customs Receipts and the profits of the Austrian Tobacco Monopoly have now been mortgaged five times over. Is it worth while, the Austrians ask, to charge themselves with additional debt when other states escape present obligations through a moratorium? Is it worth while to accept the largesse of the Powers when every new protocol works to bind more firmly the hobbles of St. Germain? Inevitably the more impatient elements of the population sympathise with the German Nazis, who have vowed hostility to all the peace treaties. Dollfuss' mission is to stress the necessity of Austrian survival as an independent state.

Last year, talking to me across a five-foot table, the Chancellor listed his immediate objectives in agriculture, bank

reform, railway organisation, budget balancing, and foreign credits. To-day, having first made himself dictator, he has reached them all. He has done much more: after one single year in office he has roused his gentle, easy-going, indolent people to a sudden burst of patriotism such as has not been known in Austria since the Habsburg eagles fell. Dollfuss' accomplishment has grown through the sheer power of his personality, although the man has been handicapped from the start by an unpleasing voice and by a stubby, almost stunted figure. He comes of peasant stock. His brother still farms the family land. His mother, in his favourite portrait of her, still wears a kerchief about her hair. He himself is never so happy as when fighting for the agrarians. It is his work that has flooded the Continent with Austrian Irish potatoes, Austrian Swiss cheeses, and Austrian French wines. It is his work that Austria, since the war, has grown two potatoes where only one grew before.

Dollfuss is not a wizard. He is an organiser. This is the secret of his success. Fourteen years ago, at the higher school in Plankenstein just after the war, he was "discovered" by a representative of the Lower Austrian Farmers' League. He was sent to Berlin, where he studied law and political economy. He caught on swiftly. He was eager to learn. When he came back from Berlin he served a short apprenticeship in the Lower Austrian Farmers' League and then founded the Lower Austrian Agricultural Chamber, becoming its first secretary and later its director. The peasant partisans saw in him their future statesman and heralded him from the start, half in joke, half in earnest, their "Crown Prince."

Before 1931 Dollfuss was not even listed among other Austrian politicians in *The Austrian Yearbook*. Then, within a single year he was appointed director of the Austrian Federal Railways and shortly thereafter Minister of Agriculture. The country had discovered overnight a man who did not shun hard work. When in the summer of 1932 a Chancellor was sought, who could put through the reforms upon which hung the Lausanne Loan, Dollfuss took office. In all the history of Austrian politics his has been the most rapid rise since those days when men rose through favouritism and social position instead of through merit.

If one were to search back behind the man's patriotism, his fine feeling for the land, and his ambition to create an agri-

cultural Austria which can exist apart from tourists and apart from foreign loans, one would find that the very springs of Dollfuss' activity lie in his diminutive stature. His closest associate has confided to me that the Chancellor can never forget that he is only five feet tall. In everything, in negotiating treaties, in meeting strangers, in addressing gatherings, he feels himself to be at a tremendous disadvantage. It has been to conquer this feeling, and also to find for it some compensation, that he has forced himself forward in the one work where he had reason to fear that his height was a disadvantage—that of organising men, that of commanding them. Dollfuss knows that his people, in their affectionate, irreverent manner, are calling him their " milli-Metternich," and discussing a new issue of postage stamps on which he will be reproduced, life-size. His people can joke about his height as much as they like, so long as they let him continue to accomplish for them jobs that heretofore no giant has tackled. When I complimented Dollfuss upon being the youngest dictator in all Europe, he replied with his boyish grin : " And that's not all—I'm also the tiniest." He hesitated for a moment as if to appreciate the jest, and then added, half seriously : " After all, though, I'm still a millimeter taller than Napoleon."

On October 3rd he showed his courage when, wounded in two places by the bullets of an assassin, he went to the microphone and reassured his compatriots as to the state of his health, broadcasting an appeal for them to stand firm behind him. He has found that he can go directly to the people for support. Since March 4th, when the growing Nazi movement was for a time obscured by a socialist demonstration that led to a contested vote of no confidence and to parliamentary *hara-kiri* in Austria, he has ruled without votes and without elective bodies. On March 4th his government, a coalition of Christian Social and Peasants Parties which long had struggled to push through vital legislation with a majority of only one, suddenly found itself outvoted by just that single voice in a question regarding railroad expenditure and the punishment of a recent railway strike. A ridiculous error, however, had been committed : a socialist deputy, in voting against Dollfuss, had used a voting slip from his neighbour's desk, so that in the record it appeared that one man had voted twice while another, although actually in the hall and hostile, had not voted at all. During the

ensuing bedlam, while the opposition roared that the decision of the house was none the less clear, and while the government parties roared back that the vote was illegal, all three speakers of the assembly resigned their offices. Dollfuss, when he realised that there was now no one to call another session, announced that Parliament had done away with itself, and that he would carry on the government of Austria by decree until such time as a new constitution could be drafted and new elections held.

Providence had delivered the country into his hands. Dollfuss never appeared more clearly in his true rôle of cautious, canny, subtle farmer, relying on his native wit to pull him through and falling back upon the sharpest tricks of the market-place when chance, or, as he insists, divine favour, gives the opportunity. Thirty-five days earlier, Hitler had become dictator of Germany. Dollfuss well knew that if he permitted Austria to swing toward Hitlerism he would lose the financial help of England, Italy and France. An undreamed-of good fortune now made it possible for him, too, to play the dictator. As dictator, he might hope to steal Hitler's thunder.

All through the spring of 1933 the vigorous nationalistic policy of Berlin was making many new friends throughout Austria. It was impossible accurately to estimate these gains, yet straws in the wind indicated that National Socialism was growing everywhere in the provinces, and even to a certain extent within Vienna itself. In an indiscreet speech, Carl Vaugoin, former Chancellor and a strong leader of the Christian Social party which helped to put Dollfuss in power, warned his partisans not to heed the insurgents within their own ranks who urged a swing toward Hitler. Significant in itself as an indication of partisan losses, the speech won an additional significance when the government papers suppressed it, printing another text in its place as the Vaugoin speech. The peasants and foresters of many a little hamlet were electing Hitler an honorary citizen of the community. In Tyrol, where the German influence was of course the strongest, the Heimwehr expressed itself as dissatisfied with Dollfuss' measures, energetic though they were. The Styrian Heimwehr actually declared itself for the Nazis. Thus Hitler had touched off that most explosive of Austrian political bodies, the Heimwehr, which in the past had been responsible

for several rash *Putsche*. Although Fuerst Starhemberg, for long the party's leader, remained faithful to Dollfuss and continued to dictate his policy to a rump, for weeks it was not known from day to day whether Dollfuss could remain in power.

To combat this growth of Nazi prestige the Dollfuss government decided to out-Hitler Hitler, taking strict measures to dispose of both religious and political opponents, break the power of the Vienna socialists, and restore the tottering financial structure. Dollfuss to-day is ruling by decree. He can only be overthrown by force, since he has suspended the ordinary parliamentary mechanism of the state. Officially the National Socialist movement in Austria has made no progress during the past months; yet because it must carry on all its present activities in secret one is at a loss to say whether it has held the ground gained in its first spring campaign or whether it has withdrawn to where it stood on January 30th, the date of Hitler's accession to the Chancellorship. Its units have been disbanded. Through the censorship of the Press it has lost its voice and power for propaganda. Through Parliament's disappearance and the Austrian President's refusal to call for new elections, it has lost its chance for political expression. Through the gradual increase in the Austrian army, the Viennese shock police, and the semi-official Heimwehr, it has come to face a sturdier, possibly invincible military power. For the time being Dollfuss has Austria safely in his hands, the Press muzzled, the Parliament discredited, and both Nazi and Socialist forces stalemated.

To take the wind out of Hitler's sails Dollfuss anticipates every reform which the Nazis might propose. He has banned the Communist party; he has disbanded the Socialistic private army, the *Schutzbund*; he has revised the State employees' oath; he has authorised raid after raid on houses suspected of conspiracy; and he has centralised his whole administration by appointing for every Austrian province "Directors of Public Safety" who are responsible to his ministers alone. He has organised funds for helping agriculture and road-building; he has imposed salary cuts and pension cuts upon the Austrian banks so that they may loan money more cheaply to threatened Austrian industries; he has set up a special amortisation fund to take over bad

industrial paper from the banks and to issue more liquid obligations; he has reduced the Federal Railways' expenses; and he has balanced his ordinary budget. He attempts thus both to kill hostile political activity and to remove all causes of popular discontent. He knows no hours. When the bank situation became acute he sat in continuous session drafting his reforms with directors and cabinet ministers for nearly three days. It was from London, where he was attending the first sessions of the World Economic Conference, that he dictated by telephone the decree which established his Directors of Public Safety in every Austrian Province.

His signature of an agreement with the Pope was undoubtedly a decisive stroke in his favour. Austria, whether Habsburg or republican, is a stronghold of catholicism. The Concordat rallied all his catholic countrymen to his side. Moral suasion was brought to bear. Back in the little villages among the mountains, where for long years a single priest had ministered quite satisfactorily, assistant priests and young recruits for the priesthood came to share the parish. Even in the remote hills, herdsmen who had in the spring been visited by Nazi agents were now visited in the early autumn by emissaries who undid the teachings from Berlin and instilled, if not patriotism for Austria, at least revulsion from the doctrines of National Socialism. With the brilliant fêtes and parades of the *Katholikentag*, when peasants from all over Austria came to Vienna to celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of St. Stephen's spire and the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish defeat, the alliance between Dollfuss and Rome bore its full fruit. The world saw the little man's strength among the simple people. It is significant that during these days, on September 11th, he first outlined his proposals for a new constitution.

On this occasion Dollfuss referred with admiration to what he held to be the strength of the Austrian people at the time of the Turkish attack in 1683, their organisation according to estates and professions. Only through the French Revolution, with its excuse for the later doctrines of Marxism and materialism, had the authoritative state been shaken. To-day, Marxism and liberalism together had shot their bolt. Dictatorships on every hand were but a recognition of the failure of party government. The period of the Fascist State had come. Acting upon the spirit of this speech he reorganised his

cabinet ten days later. He abandoned government by coalition. He dropped overboard his Vice-Chancellor, Franz Winkler, of the Agrarian Party, who had recently shown a certain resistance to his plan of adopting the Heimwehr policy . . . "*Austrofascismus.*" He transferred to a good post outside the cabinet General Vaugoin, who, although he had reorganised the Austrian defences, clung too closely to his Christian Social Party ties. The second Dollfuss Cabinet is a cabinet of personalities instead of parties. It marks the elimination of every partisan element, the concentration of power in Dollfuss' hands, and a clarification of issues. To support it, one must desire independence from Germany, the end of parliamentary government, and the organisation of one single Austrian movement, the " Fatherland Front."

Dollfuss has confided the elaboration of his new constitution to Dr. Ender, a former federal chancellor and minister. Dr. Ender projects a Provisional Council of Estates, or *Provisorischer Staenderat*, which will act in an exclusively advisory capacity, serving ministers whose decrees will take the place of parliamentary laws. The *Staenderat* will hear the opinion of experts, digest it, and report upon it, thus taking from the shoulders of the permanent official some share of the responsibility for such legislation. Its members will be nominated from among the provincial governments and permanent officials, chambers of commerce and industry and labour, and private persons. Their political views will be a factor in their choice, although their place in the country's economy will be more significant. Most vital, however, is the selection of men who may work objectively, free from all taint of what Fuerst Starhemberg of the Heimwehr recently characterised as *Korruptionsdemokratie.*

Fuerst Starhemberg has enlisted his Heimwehr in the " Fatherland Front," merging their personality in that of the larger Austrian movement. All over Austria centres have sprung up to encourage similar enlistment. The red-white-and-red banner of Austria is displayed conspicuously for the first time since its adoption. The Austrian cross, the old cross potent or cross baton of heraldry, is appearing where eight months ago the *Hakenkreuz* was everywhere. It is a cross each of whose arms terminates with a cross head (⊞). Lacking the ancient Teutonic associations which surround the Hitler emblem, its practical advantage is great in a city

where pavements, hoardings, walls and factory chimneys are apt to blossom out with swastikas overnight, for only four strokes of the brush are required to transform these German crosses, by adding four half cross heads, into Austrian crosses. *Hakenkreuz* transformations are the work of the hour in Vienna and are truly typical of the way in which Dollfuss re-works the fashions of Berlin. Except for Jew-baiting, he has imported them all, and as we have already seen he has probably taken some wind from Hitler's sails. His unique achievement is the creation of an Austrian patriotism.

Although the German, from 1848, heard much about his fatherland, the Austrian was encouraged to speak only of his *Kaiser*. Under the emperors, Austria was truly nothing more than a geographical expression—a survival of the old " East Mark," or at most a separate political department of the Empire partitioned from the rest for purposes of administration only. Loyalty to Habsburg did not mean loyalty to one's fellow Austrians, but loyalty to an imperial agglomeration of Germans, Hungarians, Southern Slavs, Italians, Czechs, Slovenes and Poles. When the peace treaties dissolved this personal allegiance to a sovereign, this loyalty to a politico-economic unit, the Austrian was left without a patriotism. Dollfuss has given him one. He has awakened a feeling of nationalism in a people which has never been nationalistic before. His *Vaterlaendische Front* is the dramatisation of a new force in Central European policy.

With his " Cabinet Dollfuss II " and his " Fatherland Front " the little Chancellor is already, after but one year and a half in office and but nine months of real power, doing what all dictators desire : he is consolidating his personal régime into a system. Through his new Vice-Chancellor, the forceful Major Fey, and a group of old army men, he has assured the permanence of his defence measures. After persistent efforts, he has cut through a galling strand in the bonds of St. Germain, having won Allied approval for the increase of Austria's army from 22,000 to 30,000 by recruiting a new short-term enlistment force. Italy has agreed to the cession of a free zone in the now sleepy port of Trieste. Austria is returning to the Adriatic, supplementing her present ties with Hamburg. Dollfuss, as a practical economist, is stressing commercial salvation as well as military. He has introduced the mysteries of foreign exchange and the imponderables of

international payments even to the peasant of the Vorarlberg, Styria and Tyrol. His trade agreements with Switzerland, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Hungary are likely to be lasting. August, September and October, the period toward which all lines of his financial policy have been narrowing ever since he took office to execute the Lausanne policy of July 1932, have seen the consolidation of his country's foreign debt and the flotation of an internal loan. The Austrian National Bank, which more than a year ago defined its policy as one of deflation to protect the schilling even at the risk of keeping prices down and delaying industrial recovery, could announce after the third week of September an appreciable result. The total circulation of paper currency and call liabilities fell well below a thousand million, and touched, at 991,000,000 schillings, the lowest point within the last three years. Since the bank's holdings of gold and foreign exchange continue to increase, the percentage of cover is slowly improving, having moved up to 27 per cent. The Austrian schilling has been so well defended and appears so solid that the League of Nations committee has given its permission to use the proceeds of the internal loan, not, as was originally intended, for wiping out a government debt to the National Bank incurred after the Credit Anstalt catastrophe, but for the creation of employment. To make permanent the improvement which should follow large public investment, Dollfuss strives to extend his country's foreign markets. His recent interviews with Benes and Titulescu inaugurate his campaign for a reshuffling of Danubian commerce.

In three years Dollfuss has moved from his early rôle of agrarian politician to that of an Austrofascist dictator. If he survives assassins' bullets, and if his country survives the urge toward *Anschluss*, he may now be expected to play a leading part among Danubian statesmen. He has attempted to escape both horns of the Austrian dilemma, and now proposes, instead of surrendering either in Berlin or in Paris, to establish some form of Danubian federation in which Austria may exploit her geographical advantages. After Sinaia this is a pertinent plea. Perhaps to Dollfuss will fall the task of reconciling the proposals of Benes with those of Suvich. If he succeeds, it is at least conceivable that Austria may come once again to dominate the greatest river in Europe.

WILLIAM L. SMYSER.

THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE WHITE PAPER.

IT is generally admitted that the Government's scheme for constitutional change in India, known as the White Paper, is calculated, if carried into effect, to inaugurate an entirely new era in that country. It has been the subject of varied, and sometimes violent, discussion, but it is common ground among supporters and opponents alike that if the scheme goes through, it will be impossible afterwards to go back on the change made or to restore the system which has hitherto existed. It is, therefore, essential that all aspects of the subject should be fully considered before so momentous a change is embarked upon.

One aspect of the White Paper which has perhaps received less public attention than others, and certainly less than it deserves, is its effects on Indian finance. The reasons for this omission are not far to seek. They are to be found in the great complexity of the subject and in the difficulty of ascertaining with accuracy what the financial consequences of the adoption of the White Paper will be. This difficulty has been admittedly felt even by officials and has been of double weight in the case of those not fully supplied with official figures and information.

An important contribution towards the comprehension of the financial aspects of the Government's proposals has now been made by the publication of a document which has been issued as Paper 1 of the Records of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform. In this paper, which can be obtained from the Stationery Office for the modest sum of sixpence, will be found a memorandum which sheds a good deal of light on the effects the Government's proposals are expected to have on Indian finance. It is written by Sir Malcolm Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., who, as the Secretary of State pointed out to the Joint Committee, possesses unique qualifications for dealing with the matter. Sir Malcolm has not only been Finance Member of the Viceroy's Council, but he has also been Governor of two of the greatest Provinces in India, and thus brings both expert and practical knowledge to bear on the task. His Memorandum is fully accepted by Sir Samuel Hoare as an authoritative statement of the financial position, present and future. It does not shirk awkward facts, but sets out " in all their nakedness," as Sir

Samuel said, the awkward facts concerning the position of the Government of India of to-day as well as the Government of India of to-morrow.

In order to follow Sir Malcolm Hailey's Memorandum, it must be understood that Indian finance is divided into two separate parts or sections. On the one hand there is the Central Government, or Government of India, as it is generally called, whose main sources of revenue are customs, income tax and salt tax, and whose chief objects of expenditure are the army, the service of loans, pensions, and certain administrative charges, such as those of Delhi. On the other hand the Provincial Governments administering the affairs of the several Provinces into which India is divided, such as Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the Punjab, etc., derive their revenues mainly from land tax, from excise and from stamps, while they bear the full burden of provincial administration, including Land Revenue establishments, police, jails, justice, education, medical and civil works, except in so far as some parts of some of these subjects are cared for by purely local bodies, such as municipal corporations, district boards and the like.

Adopting for the present this main line of distinction between the finances of the Central and of the Provincial Governments, we find that in its Budget for 1933-4, the former, that is the Government of India, has succeeded in achieving an equilibrium between revenue and expenditure, and even a small surplus. The receipts of the year are estimated to amount to £58·62 millions sterling and the expenditure to £58·43 millions, thus showing an excess of revenue over expenditure of £·19 million, or £190,000. This surplus, small as it is, has only been achieved by the exercise of the most severe economies and by the imposition of emergency taxation. As evidence of economies it may be mentioned that according to Sir Malcolm Hailey the outlay on the Army has been cut down from £42 millions, at which it stood ten years ago, to £34·65 millions in 1933-4. Only about three-quarters of a million of this decrease can, he says, be put down to the operation of lower prices; the rest is due to retrenchment, involving "the depletion of stocks of supplies and the postponement of building and other programmes." He adds that the military authorities regard the present Budget "as barely satisfying the normal requirements of the Army at its present strength."

On the other side of the account, it has been found necessary to impose extra taxation in respect of income tax, customs, and salt. This has been done by what are called "surcharges," the phrase being apparently adopted in order to mark the temporary character of the enhancement. This cannot, however, disguise the seriousness of the addition to the taxpayer's burden which amounts to no less than £9·75 millions per annum. The Government of India's budget for 1933-4 represents, in fact, an altogether abnormal state of affairs, in which expenses have been cut down and taxation augmented in order to produce the desired equilibrium.

While the Central Government has thus balanced its budget, the Provincial Governments, taken together and considered as a whole, have not been able to achieve a similar result. Sir M. Hailey's Memorandum shows that the total expenditure of the Provinces is estimated at £59·84 millions sterling, and their total revenues at £58·21 millions. There is thus a deficit on the part of the Provincial Governments, considered collectively, of £1·63 millions, a deficit which considerably exceeds the modest surplus presented by the Government of India. This deficit occurs in spite of the exercise of the sternest economies in the Provinces, including a 10 per cent. "cut" on all salaries above a certain level. Nor is Sir Malcolm Hailey hopeful regarding the future prospects of Provincial finance. Even on the present reduced scale of expenditure, he says, the Provinces which already show deficits are likely to remain more or less permanently in that condition, while it would cost over a million pounds sterling a year to restore the "cuts" in salary in all Provinces. Such an increase would evidently turn the slender surpluses which certain Provinces show into a deficiency.

So far, the distinction between Central and Provincial finance has been adhered to. If, however, a view of the finances of India as a whole is to be obtained, it is necessary to consider the budgets of the Government of India and of the Provinces together. The deficits which appear in Provincial budgets are in the nature of over-drafts on the Central Government, and should those overdrafts throw the Central budget into a deficiency, that deficiency can only be met from balances or by borrowing. When the finances of India are considered as a whole, it appears that in the year 1933-4 there is a deficit of £1·44 millions. The total of Central and Pro-

vincial expenditure is estimated at £118·27 millions and the total of Central and Provincial revenues is placed at £116·83 millions. The deficiency which may be taken at £1½ millions is not large, but it acquires a serious aspect when it is remembered how expenditure, military and otherwise, has been cut down and how extra taxation to a large amount has been imposed. "After all, my Lord Chairman," said Sir Samuel Hoare to the Joint Committee, "we are balancing our Budget." This statement appears to be essentially misleading.

Turning to the White Paper and to the effect of its proposals on the finances of India, the first feature to be noticed is that the Government proposes to create two new Provinces, those of Orissa and Sind. While part of the machinery for these new Provinces will be provided by subtraction from existing Provinces, it is obvious that the creation of new Provinces necessarily involves the duplication of many of the higher offices. Thus there must be a separate Governor for each new Province, separate Ministers and Secretariat staff, a separate High Court and separate Heads of Departments. This duplication of appointments costs money, but Sir M. Hailey's Memorandum does not show what the increase due to this cause will be. Paragraph 14 of the Memorandum, however, deals with the provision which will have to be made for deficit and new Provinces in future. This is placed at between £3 and £3¼ millions as compared with £2¼ millions at present, so that an enhanced outlay of £1½ millions is anticipated, of which £·81 million is due to the new Provinces. Part of the increase, however, arises from the proposed transfer of the cost of Accounts and Audit from the Central Government to the Provinces, and this would relieve the former of about £·45 million a year. Thus, looking at the finances of India as a whole, a net increased outlay of about a million per annum seems to be indicated.

The second notable feature of the Government's proposals is the separation of the Province of Burma from British India. So large a change as this naturally involves the investigation of innumerable details before its financial effect can be fully known, and it is not surprising to find that many important points are not yet settled. Sir M. Hailey states, however, that the separation of Burma will occasion a net loss to the Central budget of from £1½ to £3 millions per annum. The exact amount, he adds, cannot at present be stated, and it seems

safer therefore to adopt the higher figure (rather than that entered in Sir M. Hailey's appendix) and to assume that, in addition to the higher outlay of one million shown in the last paragraph, there will be a loss through the separation of Burma of £3 millions sterling. The result of the two above causes will be a worsening of the general financial position of India taken as a whole by £4 millions a year.

Another factor in the future position of India, which is even more difficult to estimate correctly, is the effect which Federation will have on the financial relations of the Central Government to the States. Certain States make to the Government of India annual payments which are variously referred to as "tributes" or "contributions," to an aggregate of about half a million pounds per annum. Again, certain States are in the enjoyment of "immunities" in respect of customs, salt tax, post and telegrams, etc., which involve a certain loss of revenue to the Central Government. It appears to have been decided that there can be no place in a Federal system for such exceptional and unequal contributions and immunities, and both therefore are to disappear. But while it is certain that the Central Government will lose the half million which it at present receives in the shape of contributions, it is by no means clear what benefit, if any, it will derive from the abolition of immunities, for the States which at present enjoy these immunities may claim compensation for their disappearance. The adjustment of this question is to be postponed until the time comes when negotiations for admission to the Federation are undertaken, and it is suggested that admission to the Federation may then be refused to States whose claims for compensation are too high. The whole question is evidently in too fluid a condition to enable any money value to be placed on the proposed abolition of immunities. Meantime the loss of half a million which the Central Government will sustain from the disappearance of the State contributions will raise the estimate of the general worsening of the future financial position of India from £4 millions to £4½ millions.

The Secretary of State for India is reported to have told the House of Commons on February 22nd last that in his opinion the Federal Government proposed to be established in India would not cost substantially more than the existing Central Government. Such a view can hardly have taken into account the substantial increase of expenditure which must be in-

volved in the establishment of a Federal Court and in the higher cost of the contemplated Federal Legislature. It appears from Sir M. Hailey's Memorandum that the Government of India has estimated the increased annual outlay of the Central Government on these and other items at from £·38 to £·56 million, which might possibly be reduced somewhat if the States can be induced to pay their own members of the Federal Legislature. Sir M. Hailey observes that the increase in Provincial expenditure on new constitutional institutions cannot be less than an annual charge of £·38 million, and in the Appendix to his Memorandum he shows that the enhanced cost to Central and Provincial budgets combined will be £·75 million per annum. In the statement which Sir Samuel Hoare made to the Joint Committee he did not attempt to controvert this estimate, but merely pleaded that only "a very small part" of the deficit with which the future finance of India is faced will be due to the Government's scheme for a Federated State. This is something different from what he told the House of Commons on February 22nd, but presumably Sir Malcolm Hailey's Memorandum was not then available. It must now be regarded as an accepted fact that the new scheme of Federation is to cost at the least £·75 million a year, and adding that to the £4½ millions already arrived at, the general worsening of India's future financial position amounts to £5¼ millions sterling per annum.

A further loss of revenue at present received by the Central Government is expected to be caused by the establishment of the Reserve Bank, which is an important feature of the White Paper scheme. Sir Malcolm Hailey states that currency receipts will be reduced by rather more than £·75 million sterling annually in the early days of the proposed Reserve Bank, pending its development of full profit-earning capacity. Adding this to the sum of £5¼ millions above referred to, the total worsening of the financial position of India as a whole to be expected as the result of the Government's scheme amounts to £6 millions per annum. That this estimate of cost is not excessive appears to be beyond question from the statement which the Secretary of State for India made to the Joint Committee. He placed the deficit caused by the Government's proposals at from six to ten crores (one crore = £750,000), that is at from £4½ to £7½ millions. The

above estimate of £6 millions, which lies half-way between these figures, may thus be regarded as a fair forecast of the future situation.

The prospects of the Central Government's finances are in other respects far from favourable. Sir M. Hailey reminds us that after 1935 the receipts from opium, which at present amount to £·47 million a year, may be expected entirely to disappear owing to the policy of restricting exports of the drug. Customs receipts are already being heavily reduced through the operation of the protective tariff in force in India, which is stimulating production (e.g. of white sugar) within the country and so checking both imports and the customs duty received thereon. No estimate of the actual fall in customs revenue is offered, but it is significant that this item is the backbone of the Government of India's budget.

Even if an improvement in the world's economic position occurs, Sir M. Hailey points out that there are some important considerations which tend to check any very optimistic view of India's future prospects. A reduction in the present high rates of taxation, resulting from the "surcharges" on customs, taxes on income and salt, is generally considered desirable. To remove those surcharges would cost £9·75 millions per annum, and this presupposes a very considerable economic recovery if the present yield is to be maintained at lower rates. Again, it will cost just under a million (£·94 million) to restore the cuts that have been made in civil and military salaries coming on the Central Government's budget. This, it will be observed, is additional to the cost of restoring the cuts made in salaries payable from the Provincial budgets, which, as already stated, will amount to over a million sterling per annum (£1·13 million). The railways, too, are in a similar position. Railway receipts have on previous occasions shown great resilience on the occurrence of trade-recovery; but railway reserves are heavily depleted and must be restored, and here, too, there is a large item of nearly a million (£·94 million) to be incurred on the restoration of cuts from the salaries of railway officials. Sir M. Hailey mentions sundry other unfavourable features in the financial position of the Central Government and summarises the situation in the statement that, without a general trade recovery, the position "is not only precarious, but liable to some deterioration."

The general results of this survey of India's financial position may now be summed up. In the current year, 1933-4, there is a deficit on the budgets of the Central Government and Provincial Governments taken together of £1½ millions. This deficit has arisen in spite of the most exacting economy and of the imposition of emergency taxation. If an improvement in world conditions should lead to an amelioration in Indian finance, the first step must be to withdraw the surcharges on taxes at a sacrifice of £9¾ millions and to restore "cuts" in salaries at an aggregate cost of £2 millions sterling. A large additional sum will also be required to replace depleted military stocks and railway reserves, to take the place of the vanishing opium revenue, and to meet decline in customs revenues. It can hardly be an over-statement to assume that an improvement of £16 millions in Indian revenues will be necessary to place the country in a normal position.

Over and above these necessities comes the cost of the Government's scheme which has been shown to amount on a conservative estimate to £6 millions a year. Sir Samuel Hoare might well say to the Joint Committee that all this "looks a very formidable state of affairs." Altogether it seems probable that some £22 millions sterling of additional revenue over that estimated to be received in the current year 1933-4 would be required to restore India to normality, and to provide adequate funds to carry out the Government's scheme of constitutional change.

It will probably occur to the reader to ask how it has come about that the British Government should have launched its Reform scheme at a time when the financial position was so forbidding. An answer to this question may perhaps be found by the simple process of comparing dates. The decision to appoint a Royal Commission on India was arrived at in the summer of 1927, two years or more before the date required by the Government of India Act, 1919. Although England was already suffering from some degree of commercial depression, the United States was then in the full blaze of prosperity, and there was nothing to show that the blizzard which has since overwhelmed the world was approaching. The Simon Commission carried on its long and arduous inquiries throughout the years 1928 and 1929, and its report was published about the middle of 1930. By that time the Labour Government had come into power. Clear signs of the financial débâcle were now apparent, but the politicians neglected the warnings of the coming storm and decided to side-track the report of the Royal Commission and to proceed to examine the Indian problem *de novo* by means of the Round Table Conference. Meantime the economic condition of the world grew steadily worse. The price of primary commodities, on which the prosperity of an agricultural community such as that of India depends, suffered a catastrophic fall, and with this fall the revenues of the Government of India collapsed. The result is to be seen in the *impasse* to which Sir Malcolm Hailey's Memorandum bears witness.

At what stage the threatening financial position should have called a halt in the process of constitutional gerrymandering will doubtless always be a disputed point. Sir Samuel Hoare has advised the Joint Committee that the preparation of plans should even now still go on, irrespective of adverse financial omens, relying on the hope that something will turn up. But the moment must come when this will no longer be practicable. The Government has set out very clearly in the White Paper the necessity of providing the proposed new Federal and Provincial Governments in India at the outset of their careers with the resources necessary to ensure their solvency. "His Majesty's Government," says the Paper, "attach the highest importance to securing to the Federation adequate resources, without which the Federal Government cannot ensure the due fulfilment of liabilities upon which must depend the credit of India as a whole." No safeguards can guard against the operation of inexorable economic laws. Thus the fate of the Government's Indian proposals lies at present on the lap of the god, whether that god be Roosevelt or another.

A. G. CARDEW.

CONTRASTED COSMOLOGIES.

THE increased emphasis laid by both philosophers and theologians in recent times upon spiritual values as supremely real and as explanatory of the end and process of the world raises cosmological problems in a new form. The doctrine of Evolution in philosophy and science, accompanied by that of Divine Immanence in theology, has raised a new problem that is alike religious, theological, and philosophic. The old one-sided stress laid upon the transcendent apartness of God and upon the sovereignty of His Will made the dominant concern of religion to be that of personal attitude to the authority of God. The manifold imperfections of the cosmos were then accounted for as consequences of the human will having gone wrong and come into conflict with the divine. While essential elements of truth are contained in this doctrine of Will, the supremacy of spiritual values, now recognised, makes quality of life—relations to divine perfection—the fundamental concern of religion. The Grace that bestows, rather than the Will that ordains, becomes determinative of religious thought, while the faith that aspires, rather than the will that submits, becomes the highest concern of religious life.

Hence the problem arises as to the relations of these supreme values, by the pursuit of which man comes to God and to himself, to the materiality, the process, and the imperfections of the world. That the world is not only the stage upon which spiritual values are exercised, but that it awakes them, nurtures and fashions them, is a truth equally recognised by evolutionists and by religious thinkers. That the world also appears, at least superficially, to be frequently indifferent and sometimes actually hostile to these values is also obvious. Evil (apart from the bad will) appears to be as inherent in the system and process of the universe as is Good. The problem, therefore, becomes the more searching, in so far as the externality of God to the world and the apartness of man from nature can no longer be held in their bygone exclusive predominance.

In addition to this special problem, the recent transformation of physical science—due to its abandonment of mechanical interpretation, to its emphasis on relativity, and to its substitution of activities measurable and capable of mathematical formulation—necessitates a fresh statement both of the

cosmos as thus conceived and of its relations to God, as the Eternal Source of spiritual values and the end of all who pursue them. The urgency of this problem has been recently illustrated by the appearance of two remarkable books by authors who are at once eminent mathematicians and physicists and are also deeply religious, widely learned, and universally interested in the thought and life of mankind. The first of these two works is entitled *Scientific Theory and Religion*, the world described by Science and its Spiritual Interpretation, being the Gifford Lectures delivered by Dr. E. W. Barnes, the Bishop of Birmingham. The second is *Adventures of Ideas* by Professor A. N. Whitehead, being a collection of lectures delivered recently in America, in which this very distinguished thinker deals successively with sociology, cosmology, philosophy, and civilisation. Both these outstanding books have been published by the Cambridge University Press.

Scientific Theory and Religion was so fully reviewed in a recent number of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW (June 1933) that it is only necessary to deal with it for the particular object of this article. The fundamental presupposition upon which Dr. Barnes proceeds is thus stated by him :

> " Any scheme of theology must to be adequate take account of the way in which God has fashioned and controls the universe and must therefore be permeated by the new knowledge. Moreover, no adequate theology can be limited to human spiritual experience. Man is the outcome of Nature's processes. No one of his faculties is entirely independent of his ancestry and environment. Without exaggeration we can assert that Man's spiritual experience is as unreal as a dream unless the God to whom it leads him is also the God whose nature is shown in the universe as a whole " (p. 5).

Yet the Bishop frankly recognises the existence and admits the mystery of evil in the world. In regard to this he declares in italics that " In the end all attempts to take from God responsibility for the nature of His creatures must fail " (p. 522). Hence " the fact of evil and our freedom alike make it necessary," in the author's belief, " to assume that the world has a certain measure of independence given to it by God " (p. 564). His Creatorship, therefore, " if only because of the measure of freedom in ourselves with which it is associated, implies Self-limitation on the part of God " (p. 565),

and he adds, " If there were no evil in the world we should be in effect, not free Spirits but automata." Dr. Barnes suggests, following Heisenberg, that in the physiological realm there may be " a region of indeterminacy within which some principle at present unknown may operate to produce, when consciousness is present, effects which could not be observed in the organic realm " (p. 584). Dualism is impossible, yet the existent unity is a " duality in unity in which Universal Mind or Consciousness is the subject and the world of our intermittent perception is the object in the fundamental subject-object relation " (p. 588). Human centres of consciousness " are replicas in very limited modes of God Who is Universal Mind." The regular sequence of evolution implies " the Creative Activity of God," if it is to be intelligible. " In the whole process, however we may be able to describe it, there is purpose. Moreover, the sequences only continue to exist by virtue of the Divine Will dominant in creation." The existence of "self-directing purposive activity in man" and in more primitive forms in the lower animals and even perhaps in the vegetable world and in inanimate matter, " is unintelligible," it is urged, " unless the whole scheme, within which they exist and emerge, is itself purposeful " (pp. 592-3). So also, " Moral principles are objective." " Man in his development has merely discovered morality " (pp. 602-3). Thus, in his comprehensive survey and with his scientific predisposition, the Bishop of Birmingham has given a weighty and impressive statement of theistic belief in terms of modern knowledge and modes of thought.

The position taken up by Professor Whitehead in his *Adventures of Ideas*, in conformity with his more systematic treatise *Process and Reality*, is in opposition to the fundamental presupposition of Dr. Barnes. For Professor Whitehead " the ultimate creativity of the Universe " is not " to be ascribed to God's volition." The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action (*Process and Reality*, pp. 317-18). The philosophy thus summed up may be described as dynamic Spinozism. Where Spinoza posited Substance Professor Whitehead assumes " a factor of activity " which he terms " creativity " (*Adventures*, p. 230). For thought and extension, which Spinoza treated as the separate and mutually exclusive attributes of Substance,

Professor Whitehead substitutes God and the World, essential to and interacting upon one another in subordination to the aboriginal creativity, which manifests itself in both. Adopting and emphasising Plato's contrast between persuasion and necessity, Professor Whitehead assigns persuasion to God as His characteristic activity over against necessity with which the World confronts Him. The process of evolution and history is the outcome of the interaction between these as actuated by the creativity which underlies each and conditions their mutual relations. " Metaphysics requires that the relationships of God to the World shall lie beyond the accidents of will, and that they be founded upon the necessities of the nature of God and the nature of the World " (*Adventures*, p. 215). In accordance with this view Professor Whitehead credits the Christian theologians of the Nicene controversy with effecting an improvement upon Plato, for through their doctrine of the Person of Christ and subsequently of the Holy Spirit they decided for the direct immanence of God " in the one Person of Christ " and " for some sort of direct immanence of God in the World generally through the Third Person of the Trinity " (*Adventures*, p. 216).

In accordance with this philosophy Professor Whitehead estimates the Christian religion and its history. " The essence of Christianity," he says, " is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of His agency in the World." This means " the lowly man, homeless and self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love, and sympathy," with his suffering and despair invested " with the authority of supreme victory " (*Adventures*, p. 214). A somewhat one-sided view, be it remarked, which overlooks the authority, the claims, and the power of Christ as portrayed in the Gospels. The tragedy of Christian history, for Professor Whitehead, is that God has been identified with " final coercive forces." Hence " by a metaphysical sublimation of this doctrine of God as the supreme agency of compulsion, He is transformed into the one supreme reality, omnipotently disposing a wholly derivative world " (*Adventures*, p. 213). The consequence has been that for religion God has come to stand " in the same relation to the whole world as early Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to their subject populations," with the result that He is charged with " responsibility for every detail of every happening " (p. 217). Hence Professor Whitehead calls

specially upon "the leaders of the protestant clergy" to effect a new Reformation "by rising superior to the standing danger of dogmatic finality," which is the foe alike of theology, science, and philosophy (pp. 206-8).

That there are serious grounds for this indictment of the course of Christian religion in history and, in a measure, for this appeal, is obvious and should be readily admitted. The diagnosis, however, is imperfect and in some respects gravely misleading. The Idea of God—in Himself and in His relationship to the world—that is uniformly presented in the Gospels and in the Apostolic writings is that of His Fatherhood. The corresponding response of New Testament religion is also uniformly that of Sonship, with its enjoyment of spiritual confidence, freedom, and fellowship, springing out of the sense of kinship between God and man. Those who would judge the Christian religion accurately must give due attention to the Apostolic writers and not leap from an imperfect conception of Jesus to the theological teachers of the fourth and fifth centuries. The essence of the Christian religion is to be found in the primitive experience of it, and in the explanation given to this experience by those who at first received it. For them the Fatherhood of God transcended, yet embraced and directed His sovereignty, while the consciousness of Sonship evoked a self-surrender to Him in Christ, which transfigured servitude by confident trust and aspiring love.

The loss of this dominant experience, or rather its spiritual impoverishment, led by successive stages to the substitution of Sovereignty for Fatherhood in the Idea of God, to the subordination of Sovereign Love to that of Omnipotent Will. First of all came the reduction of the conception of divine Fatherhood to that of beneficent Creatorship. Then the concentration of Christian thinkers, particularly those of Alexandria, upon the unique Sonship of Christ, led them in large measure to cast into the background the real or potential sonship of all men, and to construe their access to God in terms of their relationship to Christ rather, as for them, the End than the Way. Thus the situation was prepared for the Augustinian development of divine sovereignty, to the displacement of the Fatherhood of God, from which Christian theology is only slowly, but surely, recovering. Nor was this transformation due to supposed Egyptian or Mesopotamian analogies, though Roman polity had something to do with it,

for the prevailing form of human relationships always and inevitably reacts upon the current conceptions of the relations between God and men.

But the predominant influence upon the doctrine of St. Augustine lay in the depths of his own spiritual experience and not in merely superficial suggestions. The sudden and decisive nature of his conversion, which he attributed to the direct intervention of the Divine Will in the effective power of Grace, led the way. Thereby he overcame his previous dualism and came to see God as Universal Creator, Universal Sovereign, Supreme and Unchallengeable Will. That the Omnipotent Source of his being should be also the satisfying end of his adoring aspiration is evidence that the truth of the Fatherhood of God, displaced by his formal theology, continued to work within the rigid restrictions imposed by imperfectly Christian thought. Now the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, deeply grounded in and fashioned by Christian experience, enabled the Apostolic writers to explore deeply the problem of suffering in particular, and of evil in general. They stood face to face with it, both in the life of Christ and in the immediate prospect for themselves. They were led to effect a vital reconciliation between persuasion and necessity (even violence) and to see that necessity became a true, and even indispensable, instrument of Fatherly love in the exercise and perfecting of spiritual life. "All things work together for good to them that love God," said St. Paul. "Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth" was the teaching of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews given to those whom he was preparing to resist "unto blood, striving against sin." The depth of this experience and the insight of this vision should not be neglected by those who would probe the mystery of suffering, nor even on religious grounds should they lightly dismiss necessity from the domain of Love.

The main attention, however, must be given to the philosophy which underlies Professor Whitehead's criticism and inadequate interpretation of Christian history.

1. What justification is there for treating the primal Reality as "a factor of activity" which may be termed "creativity"? The concept of creativity is a pure abstraction of human thought. The adoption of such an abstraction is facilitated by the recent practice of physical science to reduce the statement of physical events to mathematical formulas.

These formulas describe, in precise though abstruse terms, the activities and relations for the most part of infinitesimal existences, the nature and behaviour of which owe more to intellectual conceptions and constructions than to observation and induction. The concept of ceaseless, measurable and predictable activity has succeeded that of static substances, the atoms of previous natural science. But activity of what? As to this complete nescience at present prevails, for even electricity, while assumed to be the basal reality of the material universe, is unknown in its nature, though growingly calculable in its activity. Hence the present procedure of physics predisposes those who are engrossed in it to the adoption of abstractions as working hypotheses, without inquiring into their origin and meaning. So also the adoption of evolution, as a habit of thought still more than a description of the universe, leads, especially when coupled with the concept of activity, to the one-sided emphasis on process, to the neglect of the nature of what proceeds and to uncertainty as to the end—if there be any—towards which the process is directed.

Yet both the old-fashioned substance and the new activity are discovered, first of all, within human personality, and are thence projected and subsequently discovered in the universe as apprehended by human thought. Abstract in themselves, they are abstracted from human consciousness and, therefore, suggest the very personality which they cast aside, although they are its offspring. That bare activity should be the Creator, and should create at once an infinitely rich reality, and yet a reality that is divided into a dualism of God and the World—at once antagonistic and mutually complementary—seems to be rather a riot of abstraction than an achievement of reason.

2. Greater justice must be done to personality and purpose than Professor Whitehead accords to them if a satisfactory explanation of reality is to be given. In regard to this the argument of Dr. Barnes appears to be convincingly strong. The problem of the relationship of God to the World is not solved, but shelved, by positing abstract activity behind both. The evolution of the world has culminated in the appearance of personalities. The world is not only relative to personalities in the subject-object relationship, but is interpretable solely by reference to, or abstraction from, the essential contents of personality. The world is both immanent in, and

objective to, human personalities. It is instrumental to their activities and growingly subservient to their wills. Personality is purposive, and as man is a dependent being, the assumption that the Source from which he springs and the Author of the ordered evolution at the head of which he stands, is personal and purposive carries with it a weight of reasonableness—quite apart from the testimony of religion—to which no other assumption can approach. Moreover, the activity of human personality shadows forth creativity in a unique way that strongly suggests that the Personal Source of his being is pre-eminently the Creator. The receptivity of religious and moral experience, the consciousness of grace, gives convincing force to this assumption. Furthermore, the spiritual values which grace bestows and to the pursuit of which God persuades, while transcendently real, are deeply involved in the world which evokes and exercises them. The creative source of spiritual values is revealed by their relationship to the evolution and environment of the world to be the Sovereign who unites them in a whole, to which each factor is immanently related. Creative sovereignty over this whole is essential to the supremacy of the values by which, and for which, man comes to himself in this inter-acting whole. "Necessity" is the basis upon which "Persuasion" can alone proceed.

3. It follows that Professor Whitehead's conclusion that the world is as necessary to God as God is necessary to the world must be spiritually, and not merely metaphysically, understood. The primary doctrine of the Christian faith, the Fatherhood of God, traces the essential relationship between God and the world to the self-giving of His perfection as Love. That this self-giving has been marked by stages and degrees, and that it involves the Self-limitation of God in order to its exercise, is at once the fundamental mystery and the basal fact of reality. The spiritual value of the freedom of dependent creatures is its reasonable explanation and justification, as Dr. Barnes insists. Sonship must be free if Fatherhood, with all that it means, is to be real. Yet the essential condition of the fulfilment of this fatherly-filial relationship lies in the ultimate Sovereignty of God as Father. His "final coerciveness" is the disciplinary instrument of His fatherly love.

The necessary limits of this article will not permit any discussion of the adequacy of human relationships, such as fatherhood and sovereignty, to represent the ultimate mystery

of the relations of God to the universe and man. It should be remarked, however, that if creatorship implies self-giving, then the essential relationships by which human society is constituted must be treated as having their ground in God, and as being trustworthy, though imperfect, revelations of the relationships in which He, as Self-giver, stands to the creation which owes its being to His Self-giving.

4. The mystery of evil is undoubtedly great. Yet it must not be thrown out of its relation to the entire order of reality. Sentiment and sympathy often fasten upon the sufferings and drawbacks of terrestrial life to the exclusion of all else. Yet, taken as a whole, life is happy and the world is beautiful. There is an inner depth of goodness, which actively transmutes evil, leading to the fruitfulness of suffering and to the provocation of energies which, in attacking evil, thereby bring into victorious fulfilment the potentialities of the good. There is truth in the old-fashioned doctrine of " the over-ruling Providence " of God, provided that the immanent nature and the redemptive grace of this over-ruling be sufficiently recognised, and thus seen to be, not merely occasional, but systematic in the constitution and ordering of the world.

To conclude: The " new Reformation " for which Professor Whitehead calls must be brought about, not by dismissing God from Creative Sovereignty over the world but by exploring more deeply and setting forth more fully His Fatherhood, not merely as the sentimental poetry of religion, but as the truth by which the nature and purpose of the universe are to be construed, and by which its end and its methods may be trusted though, at present, they cannot be completely traced.

J. Scott Lidgett.

THE GROWTH AND THE DECAY OF THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION.

GERMAN Democracy evolved from the Reichstag of the World War, in the characteristic form to which it adhered until its end, a number of parties of equal standing, representing the different social and political strata of the population. Already at that time the Catholic, Social-Democrat and Liberal parties of the Reichstag performed the functions of a shadow cabinet. In 1917, when the military situation of Germany did not yet seem hopeless, Erzberger's peace resolution, which unfortunately met with no response abroad, expressed the real opinion of the majority of the population. The organisational basis of this majority, which under the Ludendorff military dictatorship remained without influence, was formed by the mass of the Social-Democrat workers in the trade union, the working class, peasant and middle-class followers of political Catholicism, and the less numerous but culturally important Liberals and intellectuals. The political aims of this majority converged in some ways, and diverged in others. What united them was the mutual enmity against a régime which even towards the end of the war disregarded their political ambitions. They were the natural heirs of the defeated military dictatorship, and it was Ludendorff himself who, after recognising the unavoidable loss of the war, called his former opponents into power. In October 1918 these majority parties transformed the old imperial Constitution into a parliamentary one. They created responsible government but left in his place the Kaiser, who during the war had voluntarily ceased to be an effective factor in political life. Economic understanding between the most important social factors went parallel to the progress of parliamentary democracy. In October 1918, before the outbreak of the November Revolution, Karl Legien, then leader of the German trade unions, concluded the general co-operation agreement with Hugo Stinnes, leader of the employers. This became of paramount importance for the future development of Germany; for while the employers gave way to the inevitable recognition of the power of the trade unions, they obtained from the trade unions the withdrawal of their demand for immediate socialisation. This constituted a concession of immeasurable import and

resulted in grave dangers for the future of German democracy.

The November Revolution, which trailed behind the actual coming into power of the majority parties, had no considerable influence upon the Weimar Constitution. For the fundamentals of parliamentary democratic government were laid down in October, without the question of Monarchy or Republic figuring elsewhere than in popular discussions. The later constitutional development, however, was strongly influenced by the last phase of the revolution, in which workers took up weapons against workers. After this fight the entire working class was split and internally weakened for the next decade. On the other hand, the responsible leaders of that period laid the basis for the perpetuation of military power. Preferential treatment of the military bodies is a well-known feature of German history. A comparison of the experiences of the Third French Republic and of the First German Republic shows conclusively that at a certain point the alternative arises either of safeguarding the Republic and subordinating the army, or of maintaining the privileged position of the army at the risk of the Republic.

The Weimar Constitution itself embodied the traditional philosophy of democratic Liberalism. It was indebted to the system of thought, at once liberal, national, and democratic, to the great tradition of 1789, which in France displayed such extraordinary efficiency during the World War. Hugo Preuss, entrusted by President Ebert with the task of drafting the Constitution, was the dignified representative of a liberal mind, conscious of the social exigencies of the period. He was also fully conscious of the fact that a steady and progressive democratic development in so great a country demands a unified system of government instead of numerous bureaucratic regional entities. Preuss, however, being a disciple of that great theorist of German *Genossenschafts* (co-operative) law, Otto von Gierke, and a passionate partisan of municipal self-government, was anxious to endow the single member states with a certain amount of responsible autonomous administration. But the regional obstacles he had to face were so strong that he did not even succeed in relaxing the clumsy machinery of Prussian administration. The necessary powers of legislation and to a certain extent also of administration were, however, conceded to the central government.

Based upon these powers legislation and the leading principles of administration were progressively unified. When much later the enlightened civil service despotism of Bruening gave way to Hitler's terroristic party dictatorship, there was nothing left but to choose the legal shape for a development already completed in fact. The foresight of Preuss is shown by his attempt to give democratic colour to a necessary trend which now has to end with political measures of a dictatorial nature, tending not to reconcile the many regional interests but to increase anti-centralistic tendencies.

The fathers of the Weimar Constitution were fully conscious of the fundamental difference which existed between the traditional type of a Liberal nineteenth-century Constitution based upon property and education and a modern twentieth-century constitution entrusted with the task of building a bridge between the two "nations" within the State. The late Friedrich Naumann, a representative leader of middle-class democracy, pointed out that it was one of the main purposes of the Weimar Constitution to compete with the Bolshevist constitutional construction. In order to carry through this "competitive effort" and to harmonise a people of comparatively highly trained individuals with the exigencies of a more and more collectively organised society, Naumann was anxious to create a body of fundamental rights and duties, largely different from the traditional type of rights of man. It was the aim of the second part of the Weimar Constitution, as of many other Constitutions since, to build up in daily life the ideal of a "Social State" as opposed both to extreme liberal individualism and to radical communist collectivism. For this reason individual liberty and property were guaranteed, but at the same time the protection of property had to yield to an enlarged right of the State to eminent domain, and, moreover, the protection of the working class and a scheme of a new social organisation were provided for. The part of the Constitution concerning workers' councils, which has been the object of serious struggles within and without the Constituent Assembly, embodied the postulate of equal participation of employers and employees in deciding conditions of work and production. Socialisation of production and reform of landed property were also provided for, but practical steps in this direction were left for later legislation. The fact that the Reichstag elected in

1920 and 1924 omitted to pass any legislation fulfilling the promise of socialisation and land reform given in the Constitution, is to be regarded as one of the most fatal mistakes made by the Republic. It must be borne in mind, however, that during this period the Republic was burdened with the triple weight of the Treaty of Versailles, the inflation which ruined the middle class, and the embittered enmity of the ever-rebellious Junkers. The Bavarian Government and the Hitler movement were beginning their underhand work. At the same time increasing masses of the working class became disappointed with the Republic and strengthened the communist ranks. The typical parliamentary politicians of this period confined themselves to making it possible for the Government to do its daily routine work.

When at the end of 1924 economic and political conditions became stabilised, the State had undergone a thorough-going alteration of structure. The decisive steps which had to be taken by the coalition of Socialists, Centre and the progressively vanishing group of middle-class democrats, had compelled the members of the coalition to an ever-growing amount of responsibility and sacrifice. Thus every political decision could only be arrived at after increasingly difficult negotiations. It happened quite often during this period that President Ebert anticipated parliamentary action by his own presidential measures, which, however, always received the final sanction of Parliament. At one of the most critical moments in 1923 Parliament availed itself for the first time of the legal means called the Empowering Act. By this Act important parts of legislation were left to administrative bodies, which were, for instance, enabled to alter fundamentally the constitution of the Courts, and to replace the traditional jury by a tribunal composed of professional and lay judges, virtually led by the professional members of the Bench. It is significant for this period that all the legislative alterations initiated by the bureaucracy were strictly within the frame of the Constitution, and therefore quite different from the measures taken after 1930. Psychologically, however, the passivity of Parliament contributed to the increasing disappointment of the population with the Reichstag. This growing disappointment was shared not only by the middle class, but also by the communist and even by a large number of socialist workers. The rigidity of the German party system,

combined with the increasing concentration of economic power in mighty associations like the Federation of German Industries and the German Trades Union Federation, brought about a system of government by agreement between parties and federations representing economic interests. Under this system of government by economic and social agreements and party compromises behind the scenes the public significance of Parliament was bound to diminish. The material provisions of these agreements were decisively influenced by the distribution of social and economic power as it had been effected by the profound changes during the period 1920-4. The relationship between organised capital and organised labour, once fixed by the Legien-Stinnes agreement mentioned above, had been thoroughly modified. State regulation of conditions of production, as far as it had been applied immediately after the revolution, had disappeared in the chaotic post-war period. Inflation had tended to weaken organised labour and to strengthen the owners of industrial plant and big landed properties as they got rid of their mortgages and other debts. When the wave of prosperity started in 1926 organised labour succeeded in securing significant advantages in the field of labour conditions, but no attention was paid to the question of altering the conditions of ownership in big industrial and agricultural enterprises. It was typical that the Workmen's Councils created by a law of 1920, which had to fulfil economic and social functions at the same time, proved a failure as far as their economic tasks were concerned, but worked efficiently in the social field.* They had the support of judicial and administrative bureaucracy, especially in their activities with regard to prevention of arbitrary dismissals. Bureaucracy in this case as in most other questions became more and more adapted to the task of reconciling divergent interests, and so fulfilled one of the original functions of Parliament.

Government action had become the product of various collective economic and social forces struggling one against another; but this struggle could not have yielded any creative action without the powerful intervention of a bureaucracy

* Erik Reger's novel, *Union der festen Hand*, describes in a masterly way the various social groups of the post-war period in the mining district of the Ruhr, their views and actions, and forms one of the most important contributions to the history of post-war Germany. A translation would be welcomed by every student of German political developments.

becoming all the more vigorous as the vitality of Parliament vanished. By and by the central administration of the Reich was able to control the member states' (*Laender*) administrations by issuing executive orders, and by disposing of the necessary funds accumulated with the central government. The army and navy had an even more independent position than any other branch of administration, as from the first days of the Republic they had succeeded in evading substantial parliamentary control and in increasing their political influence, which developed to the same extent as parliamentary action failed. The spirit of bureaucracy was essentially identical with the attitude of the middle class, as they still enjoyed the monopoly of higher education, and as members of the civil service taken by request of Parliament from other classes of the population nearly always underwent a process of adaptation to the dominating atmosphere.

Whereas in the economic and social fields bureaucracy sincerely tried to reconcile opposing interests and to extend the influence of the government into new spheres of action, they remained in all political questions the faithful allies of the middle class. The judiciary, before the war the most liberal, after the war the most reactionary branch of the administration, had become a stronghold of middle-class tendencies, as their members had to a large extent come from small civil-service families. Judges in general viewed with suspicion the growing power of organised labour and of concentrated industrial capital, and with antipathy the political adherents of the Weimar Constitution. Protected by the weapon of judicial independence they falsified honest political strife into the contrast of nationally minded and anti-national citizens, thus preparing the idea of national and social exclusiveness which was to be prevalent in the Nazi régime.

In spite of all these factors, which to a certain extent are not genuine German features but may be found in many responsible governments of our time, until 1928 the majority of the German people were in favour of political and religious liberty and of democratic civilisation as a whole. This is proved by the fact that at the 1928 elections more socialist members were returned than before. But at this moment, before the beginning of the depression, the crucial antagonism between the nation's political wishes and the powerful collective bodies became clear. If elections in Germany had

had any decisive effect at all, the influence of the agrarian and industrial federations could have been overcome and the burning question of landed property could have been solved at this moment. But according to the political practice of government by coalition, which had been followed since 1919, it was regarded as the government's task to maintain the existing distribution of power between the members of the coalition, whatever the number of members of Parliament belonging to the various coalition groups. The existence of numerous parties, and the States being split up not only into social classes but also into various religious denominations, made it difficult to achieve any far-reaching political decisions by popular consent. These facts prevented the loss of prestige incurred by Parliament in almost all countries from being balanced by a clear popular vote for homogeneous democratic government. But for the economic depression it would not have been at all impossible for German democracy to overcome all the checks and the original misconstructions of its party system, and to fulfil a popular demand for clear decisions in the social and economic fields. The economic crisis, however, and the middle-class faith in National-Socialist leadership and its capacity to restore the pre-war middle-class position, brought about the National-Socialist upheaval of 1930. After the elections of 1930 the only possible form of government was the bureaucratic system of Bruening, keeping up such an amount of political liberty as there is in every community which is looking for its master, who is yet to come. But while political liberty was still alive, democracy had gone with Bruening's coming into power. Unable to go on with parliamentary legislation and unable to form any coalition for any positive goal, he availed himself for legislative purposes exclusively of that famous Article 48 of the Constitution which had played its part in the early days of the Republic. But whereas in those days presidential orders had always been made under parliamentary control, Bruening developed Article 48 into a dictatorial system of legislation leaving Parliament entirely out of the game. His government, by its mere existence and by its practice of violating the spirit and the wording of the Constitution, was no longer dependent on Parliament but only on the President. The extent of this dependence became clear when he attempted to tackle the crucial problem of landed property, a measure which would

have encroached upon the power of the big landowners, but which would have commanded almost unanimous popular consent. This led to his dismissal by the Reichspraesident. The very presidential power, by which not only Bruening himself but also jurists had tried to justify the unconstitutional practice of government by orders of emergency, put an end to his liberal-minded dictatorship. The occasion and the form of his dismissal in May 1932 were symptomatic of the transition from democracy to dictatorship, and what followed was only the final struggle of the various competitors for dictatorship.

Political doctrine followed the course of events by constructing a system of political thought, according to which it was the destiny of democratic government to be split up into a number of independent social powers struggling one against another, until finally all those anti-governmental and quasi-governmental forces would be crushed by dictatorship and by the erection of a totalitarian State, which would leave no sphere of human life outside the scope of a central and powerful governmental will. Professor Carl Schmitt, who is the theorist of the Nazi Constitution just as Hugo Preuss was the theorist of the Weimar Constitution, developed the doctrine of the totalitarian State amalgamating the ideas of its being the necessary and the ideal goal of historical evolution. Before the trend of German politics had become quite clear yet, his sympathy with the totalitarian idea was of so formal and general a nature that it equally favoured the Bolshevist and Fascist forms of government. The fact that Carl Schmitt, when he was still nothing but a political theorist and not a Nazi partisan and official framer of Nazi constitutional laws, conceived the totalitarian idea in a way that would justify even the fiercest enemies of his actual party, shows more clearly than anything else that the totalitarian idea does not represent any substantial political conception at all. Every government which lays stress upon its own power, and works for a preponderance of the State over any other social force, may be regarded as totalitarian. That might even be true of a democracy, leaving a reasonable sphere of political freedom to the individual.

So far as the genuine contribution of National-Socialism to German political theory is concerned, it is nothing but the attempt to base all government institutions upon a theory of

race. It is, in other words, the attempt to retrace the history of our civilisation which led from the tribal community of early times to the feudal and religious community of the Middle Ages and finally to modern citizenship, founded upon common participation in a national civilisation, national language and a national destiny. According to the Nazi idea nothing but community of blood is to be the basis of a State and of its Constitution. This vision is connected with the idea of the leader, which is reduced to the primitive conception of giving obedience and receiving protection, and which ignores all the sociological assumptions connected with the phenomenon of political leadership. If primitivity of thought in itself was any guarantee for the constructive power of a political creed, all the problems arising out of the necessity to reserve a sphere of creative liberty to the individual in a powerful community would be solved. The fallacy of this primitive idea has been clearly set out by Lord Acton, who was not only very familiar with the special problems of Germany, but also quite prepared to accept the factor of race as an important contributory element of a nation. Lord Acton wrote sixty years ago :*

> Our connection with the race is merely natural or physical, whilst our duties to the political nation are ethical. One is a community of affections and instincts infinitely important and powerful in savage life, but pertaining more to the animal than to the civilised man. The other is an authority governing by laws, imposing obligations and giving a moral sanction and character to the natural relation of society.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER.

* *History of Freedom, and other Essays*, pp. 292-3

THE BRUSSELS LIFE IN *VILLETTE.*

IT is not intended, in these pages, to speak again of the much-discussed intrigue in *Villette*, or even of the boarding-school in the Rue d'Isabelle (disguised in the novel under the name of the Rue Fossette). All that is of interest on these subjects has already been said, and everything has been identified, even the "allée défendue" and the century-old pear tree in the garden, "the old Methuselah." But high as were the walls which enclosed Madame Beck's boarders, pupils and mistresses emerged at times into the social life of the Belgian capital, and there are chapters in *Villette* which give us vivid pictures of the Brussels of 1842 and 1843. My object in writing this article is to show that these chapters record true facts observed with living eyes and recorded, on the whole, with surprising fidelity.

It will be remembered that, on recovering from an illness, Lucy Snowe is taken by Dr. John Bretton to an art exhibition. There she meets Paul Émanuel, and horrifies the "dark, acerb and caustic little professor" by her "insular audacity." That this episode is founded on a visit paid by Charlotte Brontë to the Brussels Salon of 1842 seems to be proved by a series of instances, such as, for example, her heroine's lively criticism of four pictures entitled *La Vie d'une Femme*, which she describes as follows:

> They were painted in a remarkable style—flat, dead, pale and formal. The first represented a "Jeune Fille," coming out of a church-door . . . the image of a most villainous little she-hypocrite. The second, a "Mariée" . . . kneeling at a prie-dieu in her chamber . . . and showing the whites of her eyes in a most exasperating manner. The third, a "Jeune Mère," hanging disconsolate over a clayey and puffy baby. . . . The fourth, a "Veuve," being a black woman, holding by the hand a black little girl, and the twain studiously surveying an elegant French monument, set up in a corner of some Père la Chaise.

The catalogue of the Salon of 1842 does, in fact, mention a series, not of four but of three pictures, signed by Mme. Fanny Geefs and entitled *La Vie d'une Femme*, which the *Renaissance* review describes indulgently in these words: "The first represents *Piety*, the second *Love* and the third *Pain*, all three showing delightful naïveté and true feeling."* The

* Volume LV, 1842-3, p. 92.

Emancipation takes a similar view, describing the pictures as "full of delicate poetry."* But there is at least one critic whose spirited strictures coincide with those of Lucy Snowe. Victor Joly writes of the same pictures in the *Globe*: "All these heads bear the stamp of that romantic sentimentality which is the deplorable fruit of contemporary literature. They are . . . plucked seraphim, roaming our sad earth in search of the lost half of their souls."†

Another picture is described in detail by Lucy Snowe, with an irony which betrays her puritanical alarm at such a display of corpulent charms:

> It represented a woman, considerably larger, I thought, than the life. . . . She was, indeed, extremely well fed: very much butcher's meat—to say nothing of bread, vegetables, and liquids—must she have consumed to attain that breadth and height, that wealth of muscle, that affluence of flesh. . . . She had no business to lounge away the noon on a sofa. She ought likewise to have worn decent garments; a gown covering her properly, which was not the case. . . . On referring to the catalogue, I found that this notable production bore name "Cleopatra."

Although no *Cleopatra* is mentioned in the catalogue of the Salon of that year, the picture in question can, I believe, be recognised in a work by De Biefve entitled *Une Almée*. This painting, as can be seen from a lithograph published in the *Renaissance*, corresponds in essentials with Charlotte's ironical description. Here is undoubtedly the luxuriant beauty, reclining in flowing garments, but sufficiently naked to appear indecent . . . in 1842. The hieroglyphics woven into the material might have suggested the name of the Egyptian Queen. The effect of the whole to-day seems neither very new nor very daring, but it did, in fact, contrive to shock the critics of the day, who are careful not to praise it unreservedly. "We should have preferred the title *A Slave of the Seraglio*," writes the *Emancipation*. "There is in the form and pose of this woman something of the voluptuous *farniente* of the seraglio, and none of the half-wild ardour . . . of the gold-skinned Almées. . ."‡ Charlotte Brontë wrote *Villette* some ten years after the Salon of 1842, and, with the lapse of time, she has confused certain details, divided one of Mme. Geefs' panels

* Issue of September 8th, 1842. Article signed K. Z.
† Issue of September 8th, 1842.
‡ *Ibid.*

into two, and promoted the Egyptian dancer to the dignity of Egypt's Queen. It seems none the less certain that this chapter records her vivid impression of what was, doubtless, the first art exhibition she had ever visited.

Thanks again to her godmother's kindness, Lucy Snowe was taken one evening to a concert which was, we are told, "a grand affair to be held in the large . . . hall of the principal musical society." It was to be followed by a "lottery 'au bénéfice des pauvres'; and to crown all, the King, Queen and Prince of Labassecour were to be present." These details alone suffice to show that this was the concert given on December 10th, 1843, by the Société de la Grande Harmonie, since, during the whole of Charlotte's stay in Brussels, there was but one entertainment of the kind which was honoured by the presence of the Royal Family as well as ending with a lottery. Let us follow Lucy and the Brettons as they enter the concert-hall:

> Within was disclosed a hall—grand, wide and high, whose sweeping circular walls, and domed hollow ceiling seemed to me all dead gold . . . relieved by cornicing, fluting, and garlandry . . . Pendant from the dome, flamed a mass that dazzled me—a mass, I thought, of rock-crystal, sparkling with facets. . . . It was only the chandelier, reader, but for me it seemed the work of eastern genii.

These are the words of a wondering neophyte, but they were in a measure justified. The actual premises of the Grande Harmonie had been opened in March of the preceding year, and the Press had sung the praises of their "spacious halls" and the "magical effect" of that "immense nave with walls of dazzling whiteness."* The presence of the Royal Family added to the splendours of the evening. "Prolonged cries of 'Long live the King! Long live the Queen!' greeted the arrival and departure of Their Majesties," says the *Emancipation*. "The young Duke of Brabant, accompanied by his tutor, was conducted back to the palace at ten o'clock."†

Charlotte, however, does not confine herself to such dry facts as these, and gives a vivid description of the King and Queen:

> A signal was given, the doors rolled back, the assembly stood up, the orchestra burst out, and, to the welcome of a choral burst, enter the King, the Queen, the Court of Labassecour. . . .

* See *Emancipation*, March 3rd, 1842.
† *Ibid.*, March 15th, 1842.

> Well do I recall that King—a man of fifty, a little bowed, a little grey: there was no face in all that assembly which resembled his. I had never read, never been told anything of his nature or his habits; and at first the strong hieroglyphics graven as with iron stylet on his brow, round his eyes, beside his mouth, puzzled and baffled instinct. Ere long, however, if I did not *know*, at least I *felt*, the meaning of those characters written without hand. There sat a silent sufferer—a nervous, melancholy man. . . .
>
> The Queen, his wife, knew this: it seemed to me, the reflection of her husband's grief lay, a subduing shadow, on her own benignant face. A mild, thoughtful, graceful woman that princess seemed. . . . Her little son . . . the young Duc de Dindonneau, accompanied her: he leaned on his mother's knee; and, ever and anon, in the course of that evening, I saw her observant of the monarch at her side, conscious of his beclouded abstraction, and desirous to rouse him from it by drawing his attention to their son.

Whether Charlotte really did, like Lucy, win a cigar-case in the lottery must remain for ever in doubt. It seems, however, clear enough that the concert given by the Grande Harmonie provides the frame within which are seen John Bretton and his mother, Ginevra Fanshawe and de Hamal, Paul and Joseph Emanuel. . . .

Lucy Snowe was soon beholden to her friends for another pleasure, that of seeing a great actress, whose name "in those days, could thrill Europe." She calls her Vashti, and it cannot be doubted that this biblical name disguises another, that of Rachel. It was during Charlotte's stay in Brussels that the great *tragédienne* gave twelve performances in that city, between July 22nd and August 29th, 1842. It was her first appearance there, and an enthusiastic public took the Monnaie Theatre by storm. Charlotte must have been present on one of these occasions. Certainly none of those evenings ended with the outbreak of fire and the panic in which Dr. John saved the life of Pauline de Bassompierre, but this final incident, necessary to the plot of *Villette*, seems to lack the flavour of reality which characterises the first part of the description.

It is significant, moreover, that the impression made on the audience of the Monnaie, as reflected in the Press, practically coincides with that made by Vashti upon Lucy Snowe, which the latter records in such lurid colours:

> Behold! I found upon her something neither of woman nor of man: in each of her eyes sat a devil. These evil forces bore her

through the tragedy, kept up her feeble strength—for she was but a frail creature ; and as the action rose and the stir deepened, how wildly they shook her with their passions of the pit!

Let us hear what the critics have to say of Rachel. After she had appeared in *Bajazet*, Louis Schoonen wrote : " Once again we have been startled by the poignant tones of that passionate voice, by the sight of that fierce and ardent gaze which Roxane fixes in turn upon her rival and the man she loves. . . . Such power and fury could never be surpassed."* Victor Capellemans, too, wrote after the *Marie-Stuart* of Lebrun : " Everyone was terrified, frozen with fear at the sight of the unhappy Mary rising up, a queen and a jealous woman, before the cold and impetuous Elizabeth. . . ."†

The great artiste played in no less than eight different tragedies at the Monnaie. She was, in turn, Camille in *Horace*, Emilie in *Cinna*, Pauline in *Polyeucte*, Hermione in *Andromaque*, Roxane in *Bajazet* and Aménaïde in Voltaire's *Tancrède* ; she also played Thomas Corneille's *Ariane* and Lebrun's *Marie-Stuart*. Charlotte, however, describes Vashti as " draped in pale antique folds, long and regular like sculpture," which excludes *Bajazet*, *Tancrède* and *Marie-Stuart*. The novel, moreover, records a death scene at the climax of the play :

Towards midnight, when the deepening tragedy blackened to the death scene— . . . when the whole theatre was hushed, when the vision of all eyes centred in one point, when all ears listened towards one quarter—nothing being seen but the white form sunk on a seat, quivering in conflict with her last, her worst-hated, her visibly-conquering foe—nothing heard but her throes, her gaspings, breathing yet of mutiny, panting still defiance. . . .

This heroine who perishes on the stage, who keeps her thirst for vengeance up to her dying hour, who still defies her enemy, who wishes to struggle to the end—would seem indeed to be recognisable as Thomas Corneille's Ariane hurling her anathema at Theseus. Rachel only played this part once in Brussels, on August 5th, 1843, so that it must have been on this evening that Charlotte Brontë was at once moved and horrified by the demoniacal Vashti. Charlotte, however, saw Rachel again in London, nine years later, immediately before writing *Villette*, and this second encounter explains certain

* *Emancipation*, August 25th, 1842.
† *Ibid.*, August 31st, 1842.

phrases in the present chapter—that, for instance, in which she describes the dramatic star as already on the wane :

She could shine yet with pale grandeur and steady might ; but that star verged on its judgment-day. Seen near, it was a chaos—hollow, half-consumed : an orb perished or perishing, half lava, half glow.

Such words scarcely apply to an actress of twenty-two, who was drawing all Brussels in 1842, but they are better suited to the Rachel of 1851, worn out by her own ardour, who had but seven more years to live. It seems, then, that in this case there is a superposition of two images and memories, which makes the author's picture of the great *tragédienne* the more complex and arresting. But the earlier impression was probably the stronger.

The annual festivities commemorating the Belgian Revolution of 1830 serve as a background for the dénouement of Charlotte Brontë's novel. Escaping secretly from the Rue Fossette, Lucy Snowe makes her way to the Park, where a concert is attracting the crowd. There she finds the principal characters of the story, is able to observe them unseen, and discovers hitherto unknown and unsuspected relationships. Charlotte may have assisted at the " September celebrations " of both 1842 and 1843. The first of these, however, seems to have been overshadowed by a recent death in the Royal Family, whereas the details given by the Press of the anniversary of the following year agree well enough with those recorded in *Villette*. But let us follow Lucy Snowe :

My vague aim, as I went, was to find the stone-basin, with its clear depth and green lining. . . . Amidst the glare, and hurry, and throng, and noise, I still secretly and chiefly longed to come on that circular mirror of crystal. . . .

The song, the sweet music, rose afar, but rushing swiftly on fast-strengthening pinions—there swept through these shades so full a storm of harmonies that, had no tree been near against which to lean, I think I must have dropped. Voices were there, it seemed to me, unnumbered ; instruments varied and countless—bugle, horn, and trumpet I knew. The effect was as a sea breaking into song with all its waves.

The swaying tide swept this way, and then it fell back, and I followed its retreat. It led me towards a Byzantine building—a sort of kiosk near the park's centre. Round about stood crowded thousands, gathered to a grand concert in the open air. What I had heard was, I think, a wild Jager chorus ; the night, the

space, the scene, and my own mood, had but enhanced the sounds and their impression.

With greater brevity and less poetry, the newspapers of the day give their account of the great festival whose echoes filled the whole Park. "Nearly 700 artistes," says the *Emancipation*, "sang five impressive numbers. The performers were placed on a platform erected behind the pool: this amphitheatre, which terminated the line of candelabra in the centre alley, was lit *a giorno*, and the water was also illuminated." According to the *Echo de Bruxelles*: "The stage built for the concert was . . . perfectly lighted and made a brilliant effect in the semi-darkness of the park." And the *Observateur* says: "All the items were covered with applause, especially the last, the song of the mountaineers, which was perfectly rendered." Can it be this "mountaineers' song" which Lucy Snowe calls a "wild Jager chorus"? It would seem so, for the *Emancipation* quotes the exact title: *La Chasse aux Isards*. Most of the details given by the Press certainly point to the fact that it was on September 24th, 1843, that Charlotte Brontë brought her passionate melancholy to the Park, among the pleasure-seeking crowd.

When Charlotte arrived in Brussels, she came straight from her native moors. She had only passed through London, and had never before lived in a large town, or out of her own country. Her eyes were newly opened to foreign sights, and it is easy to understand that they missed nothing of what lay before them. It was not only the familiar realities of the house in the Rue d'Isabelle which made so great an impression on her. Even things she saw but once—an exhibition in the Salon, a Grande Harmonie concert, a play at the Monnaie, or a popular fête in the Park—were indelibly inscribed upon her memory. Ten years later, when writing *Villette*, she had only to close her eyes in order to see again the people and the things of Brussels. As to the people, she has necessarily altered their features, distorting them at times to the verge of caricature, according to her prejudices, her mood, and her secret passion. But the things at least have remained almost intact, scarcely altered by small and unavoidable infidelities; and they give to the novel a scene of such exact precision, a background of such minute observation, that what is in great part romantic fiction has for the reader a disturbing flavour of living reality.

GUSTAVE CHARLIER.

A HEROD PLAY FROM AMERICA.

WE have often in these days to regret the migration across the Atlantic of valuable old books and manuscripts. Early plays, in particular, like Henry Medwall's *Fulgens and Lucres*, our first secular drama, have been eagerly sought by American collectors. It may be of interest therefore to call attention to the recent surprising discovery of a dramatic manuscript, which appears to have reversed the too familiar custom of to-day, and to have reached the Old World from the New.

In the first quarter of the eighteenth century Sir Francis Nicholson was Governor successively of several American States, including Virginia. He came back to England in 1725, after forty years of colonial service. On his death in 1728 he left his voluminous papers to the Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. They have lain, unknown to most, since then among the Society's archives, and have only of late been systematically examined. Three articles appeared in *The Times* of December 29th, 30th, and 31st, 1931, dealing with the papers and illustrating the remarkable range and variety of their interest. Even so, one was not prepared to find among them a series of Scenes from a MS. play on Herod the Great and his family.

The manuscript contains about 900 lines and includes eight Scenes. It is written in an early eighteenth-century script, which varies from being easily legible to an almost undecipherable scrawl. Yet it would seem to be one hand, that of the author, for there are many corrections of words and phrases, omissions and insertions, that could scarcely have been made by anyone else. In one of the later Scenes there is a passage of about 400 lines in two slightly different drafts.* It is tempting to think of Sir Francis Nicholson himself as the author. He had an ardent and unrequited passion for a Virginian young lady, Lucy Burwell, daughter of Major Burwell. His courtship had in it a good deal of the extravagance of "heroic" drama. We hear that he "entertained designs of Revenge against his Mistress's father, Brothers, and other Relations, swearing that his suit must end in blood."

* I am indebted to the late Dr. Edmund Hobhouse, one of the custodians of the S.P.G. archives, for bringing the MS. to my notice; and to the Rev. W. F. France, Overseas Secretary of the Society, and Messrs. William H. Robinson, through whose courtesy I have been able to examine it.

But the handwriting of the manuscript is not that of Nicholson's signatures to his letters, and the example of his effusions in verse quoted in *The Times* is far from suggesting that he could have risen to the level of the dialogue in the Herod play.

For the dramatist, whoever he was, handled with vigour and independence a subject that had been a favourite with European playwrights since the middle of the sixteenth century. They had all been indebted, directly or indirectly, to Josephus in Book XV of *The Antiquities of the Jews*. Dolce in Italy, Hans Sachs in Germany, Hardy and Tristan l'Hermite in France, Calderon and Tirso de Molina in Spain had brought upon the stage the tragic fortunes of the House of Herod. In England the subject had attracted Lady Elizabeth Cary; Gervase Markham and William Sampson, in a play performed at "the Red Bull"; Samuel Pordage, and the Earl of Orrery. They had been followed by Elijah Fenton in 1723, and almost at the same time by Voltaire in France. Each dramatist had treated the theme after his own fashion, and Pordage had introduced a new "romantic" element, the love of a Parthian, Tyridates, for Herod's wife Mariamne. This had been suggested by passages in de la Calprenède's novel, *Cléopatre*. The writer of the Herod Scenes in the Nicholson papers may have known the novel, for in "Act 1st, Scene 1st," of which the heading is fortunately preserved, he introduces a Parthian prince, Phraates, whom he makes the lover not of Mariamne, but of Herod's sister Solome, (Salome)—not to be confused with the later princess made familiar by Oscar Wilde's play and Strauss's opera.

When the play opens, Phraates and Hyrcanus, the High Priest and grandfather of Mariamne, are anxious, after the defeat and suicide of Mark Antony, about the future of Herod, whose fortunes had been linked with his. Phraates cries:

> The fall of Antony perhaps may shake
> Our Herod's throne, and one Usurper's ruin
> May crush another, should Cæsar now resent
> The conduct of this Court.*

By Cæsar here is meant Octavius, the future Emperor Augustus, and Hyrcanus informs Phraates that an ambassador has come with "some thundring message from

* In quotations the original spelling is retained, but the punctuation is modernised.

Rome's great Lord," and that Herod is visibly distraught:

> The Princely honours of his awfull eyes
> Seem clouded—horror sits upon his brow
> Where Majesty once reign'd.—He walks alone.

Even Mariamne, the princess of the native Hasmonœan line, whom he had married for policy as well as love, cannot calm his soul, though in the orthodox eyes of Hyrcanus she is debased by her union with him:

> Can Mariamne's soul,
> Excellent Mariamne's heavenly spirit,
> Be sunk to such a baseness—what can corrupt
> Her noble Understanding ev'n to endure
> A thought like this? can sorcery, magick-charms?
> There's more than witchcraft in it.

There is a group of four other Scenes, without any heading, but more or less consecutive, and probably belonging to Acts I or II. In an effective scene Herod takes leave of Mariamne before departing to meet Octavius at Antioch. She pleads with him to consider his safety:

> Will he spare you, who spared not Antony?
> Will he spare you, who spared not Ægypt's Queen?
> In vain did Majesty distressed plead
> To his proud heart; in vain did heav'nly Beauty,
> And Cleopatra's charms sue for grace
> To his relentless spears.

But Herod trusts to his wealth, "I have goold which shall prevail over his Iron," and is deaf to his wife's entreaties. He dismisses her at the entry of Sohemus, his favourite minister, whom he endows during his absence with regal power. He orders Sohemus, as soon as he is gone, to imprison Mariamne and her mother, and in the event of his death or captivity at Cæsar's hands, to "strike both their heads off" and place his brother Pares (Pheroras) on the throne. He has been warned by the fate of Antony:

> Had Antony but followed my advice,
> And struck off Cleopatra's head and seis'd
> The Egyptian empire, and join'd with me
> His Roman soldiers and Egyptian gold,
> We would have whip'd this stripling emperor,
> This boyish Cæsar out of Asia; but blind with love
> He lost himself and perhaps ruin'd me.

When Herod has gone, Sohemus reveals that though " for interest " he has posed as a rival for the love of Solome, it is Mariamne whom his soul adores, and in an interview that follows he addresses her in impassioned words that force her to take flight.

From these Scenes in duologue we pass to one in which Sohemus confronts Phraates and Solome, Hyrcanus, and a court lord, Bagoas. He tells them of Herod's departure and his own appointment as Regent, and announces grandiloquently that he will proceed in solemn state to the palace :

> I shall go in ye King's own coach ;
> Let the Royall Standard be display'd
> From ye Round Tower, and proclaim our March!

The listeners, amazed and alarmed, resolve at once to stir the populace to revolt by exciting their religious feelings. Bagoas cries :

> I'll swear that
> Sohemus is now going to hold a mighty feast
> To Bacchus in ye Temple

Phraates, ignorant of the Regent's passion for Mariamne, is urged by his fear that Sohemus will take possession of Solome. But she assures her lover that this shall never be :

> Wherere thou art is Heav'n, and wanting thee
> Heav'n were not Heav'n. I may forgoe my being
> Before my love ; 'tis rooted in my soul.

Phraates responds in kind :

> When I must bow to Death, ev'n in the dreadfull moment,
> Thou wilt be present to my parting soul ;
> Thy form will glide before my faded eyes ;
> Thy dear remembrance will fill my mind,
> And my heart burst with a long pang for thee.

And then he soars to a pitch of really magnificent hyperbole:

> When Heav'n made Woman,
> And gave her beauty . . .,
> He made a greater Being than himself,
> And gave his own omnipotence away.

Well may Hyrcanus salute the princely pair as " matchless patterns of heroic love," and pray for their happiness.

The part of the play in which Sohemus overcomes his

enemies is missing, and appears to have included Act III. For Act IV, fortunately indicated on the MS., opens in " a Garden before the prison," where Phraates now lies on the ground, guarded by Moorish slaves. In an episode of the dramatist's invention, Solome, with the connivance of Hali, the Keeper of the Prison, disguises herself as one of the slaves to gain access to her lover. Hali, as he gazes on her transformation, breaks forth in cries of strangely mingled horror and admiration :

> Doth it become great Herod's Heir—become
> Th' aspiring blood of Solome to hide
> The Jewish Majesty, and cloud those charms,
> That Heav'n of Beauty with this night of Darkness ?
> O force of Truth and everlasting love!
> O unexampl'd Faith and constancy!
> *Sol.* How like you me, my Hali ?
> *Hal.* Can a Slave's Habit suit the Royall person ?
> Suit mighty Solome ? Yes, yes, it doth.
> Hail, my great slave and Mistress! You become
> Ev'n this and make ev'n Horror amiable.

The Scene then changes to the interior of the dungeon, and Phraates, as he sees another black slave enter, thinks that this is his " Minister of Death." Solome reveals herself to him, and as the pair exchange words of rapture Hali catches the contagion and again breaks into a lyrical outburst :

> You see the force of mighty love!
> The Princess Royal is ye slave, but Love
> Exalts her Nature to ye Gods ; she rivals
> Immortal Beings ; 'tis her least praise to say,
> She took this slavish Habit, she ventur'd Life.
> *Sol.* No more! I would venture Immortality
> To clasp my mighty Joy, my life, my soul, Phraates.
> It seems to me an easy thing to dart
> From heav'n to reach my Love ; without Phraates
> I would not be immortal.
> *Phr.* Now I am in Heav'n!
> The shock, ye Horror of ye place is lost.
> Fool that I was to think this place so dreadful!

These transcendental ecstasies are cut short by Bagoas, who rushes in to warn Solome to fly from the rage of the Regent, who has just given orders for a bowstring to be sent to the Parthian prince as a " last present."

Phraates is followed by a yet more illustrious victim. Another prison scene "discovers Sohemus and Mariamne together." To the Regent's question, "Will you never grant me love?" she answers, after the fashion of Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar:

> My Prince, I am immoveable,
> Like Heav'n's great polar star.

Then crying, "take death or love from me," Sohemus summons the Mutes to be her executioners, and asks in mockery:

> How like you this dumb language?

She answers with proud composure:

> Better than your noisy tong.
> Base villain, I do accept this gift.
> 'Tis better than thy proffer'd love. (*To the Mutes*) Come,
> Despatch your office!

Here the extant MS. ends, but we must suppose that Mariamne meets her fate, and that in a fifth Act, after Herod's return, Sohemus pays the penalty of his misdeeds. Even in its incomplete state the play is an attractive specimen of "heroic drama," and is a welcome addition, from an unexpected quarter, to the long list of tragedies inspired by the fortunes of Herod and his House. It was not till nearly two centuries later that Stephen Phillips again made them the theme of a poetic play, and that Sir Herbert Tree gave them renewed stage-life on the boards of His Majesty's Theatre.

F. S. BOAS.

THE RACIAL INTEGRITY OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO.

IN the year 1619 occurred two of the most important events connected with the English settlement of America. One of these events was the arrival at Jamestown, Virginia, of a ship bearing ninety young English women, soon to become wives of men composing the hitherto womanless colony, and thus to transfer to the wilds of America the English home. The colony founded at Plymouth, Massachusetts, in the year following consisted of men, women, and children—several complete families. Thus early in the English settlement of North America were introduced the saving moral values of the English home. Not the least of these values was the preservation of the racial integrity of the settlers and that of their descendants. The pioneer white woman, throughout the settlement of North America, has rendered most valuable service to her country and to her race.

The second event, as unfortunate as the first was fortunately constructive, is told in the quaint language of John Rolfe, as follows: "About the last of August came a Dutch Man of Warre that sold us twenty Negars."* Thus, in sixteen words, the author tells the story of the introduction of Negro slavery into the stream of English colonisation in North America. Negro slaves had been brought into the Spanish colonies in the year 1501† and by the year 1619 had been diffused throughout Spanish-America.

The story of the slave trade; the history of slavery in North America; the conditions under which slavery was abolished here—these have been told so often and so well that repetition is useless. It is now quite generally conceded that slavery is wrong morally, and that its economic aspects and its social effects are highly unfortunate. Yet there was a time when "Slavery touched no man's conscience." Early advocates of Negro slavery in the Americas advanced many arguments justifying the practice of slavery. It had been practised during the life of Christ and had not been specifically rebuked by him. It was not inconsistent with the standards or with the ideals of that age. Possibly the best concrete illustration of what the attitudes and the practices of the period A.D. 1500

* *Slavery Agitation in Virginia*, Theodore M. Whitfield, p. 1. Johns Hopkins Studeia.
† *History of Slavery*, Blake, p. 96.

to 1850 were in reference to slavery may be gained by a careful study of slavery as it existed among the Moors of North Africa. Here white men, white women, and even white children, citizens of the leading nations of Europe, were enslaved. This state of affairs lasted until 1816! As a result of the wars with the Barbary States, 1801 to 1805, some two hundred citizens of the United States were released from slavery. With their own citizens languishing in slavery, it was hardly to be expected that the African Negro would fare better, or that his rights would be respected by European nations.*

The institution of slavery is now justly condemned because of its influence upon the slave-owner, as well as for its repression of the enslaved person and of the enslaved group. A just appraisal of any situation, present or past, involving servitude calls, however, for an accurate knowledge of the age involved. It further demands an accurate knowledge of both master and slave, and of the ideals and the social conditions obtaining in the geographical area and in the racial groups affected. In the present study no attempt is made to deal with slavery except as it laid the foundation for conditions now obtaining in America. The matter of special interest is the blood-mixture of the two races under slavery and since the emancipation of the Negro. Logically, conditions in Latin America call for discussion, but these will be stated very briefly. The study deals, primarily, with conditions affecting the United States.

In the earlier part of the past century, Alexis de Tocqueville, a brilliant French student of conditions then existing in the United States and of the institutions then established or in process of development in the Republic, had this to say in reference to the Negro and the white races here : " There are two alternatives for the future—the Negroes and the whites must either wholly part or wholly mingle."† In this statement is set forth clearly a proposition of the gravest importance. That the author based his statement, his forecast, upon what he had seen during his travels in America, takes it largely out of the realm of speculation and gives to it the character of a logical conclusion based upon established fact. Nor is he alone in reaching this conclusion. On August 14th, 1862, addressing a committee of free Negroes, President Lincoln said : " Your race suffers greatly, many of them, by living among us, and

* *History of Slavery*, Blake, pp. 80-92.
† *The South's Part in Mongrelising the Nation*, Cox, p. 117.

ours suffers from your presence. In a word, we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason, at least, why we should be separated."* On June 25th, 1857, Mr. Lincoln said : " Colonisation [racial separation] is the only preventive of amalgamation."† Madison Grant, writing nearly one hundred years later than de Tocqueville and more than sixty years after the utterances by Mr. Lincoln, says : " If the purity of the two races is to be maintained they cannot continue to live side by side, and this is a problem from which there can be no escape."‡

There are few problems which in magnitude, in importance, or in complexity, approximate that created by the presence of the Negro in the Americas. As a whole, the problem is bewilderingly complex, so much so that it is best studied through isolating the many vital issues involved. Among these issues racial intermixture deserves to hold the first place, for this is the one aspect which overshadows, in importance, all other features of the Negro problem, whether considered here or elsewhere. As different peoples are involved in this racial contact, there are differences to be noted, chiefly in attitudes and in the resulting extent to which amalgamation has progressed. Nowhere in America has the Negro made any general or any energetic attempt to preserve his racial integrity.

The purpose of this study is to set forth the essential facts in reference to racial intermixture as this has occurred, and is now occurring, between the Negro and the Caucasian races in the United States. The rapid increase of mixed-bloods here, strongly supporting the thesis of de Tocqueville, and of others competent to pass judgment, is a self-evident fact. There may be differences of opinion as to details and even as to the degrees and the extent of this racial intermixture. Designing men may succeed in obscuring the issues involved. Few, if any, of the recognised leaders of either race—leaders in politics, in education, even in religion—have attempted to deal specifically and constructively with the matter of amalgamation. There has been, except upon the part of the United States Census agencies, little or no use made of the recognised methods of securing an accurate and a complete tabulation and analysis of the facts in reference to amalgamation. The Census Bureau

* *The Racial Integrity of the American Negro*, Shannon, p. 61.
† *Ibid*, p. 61.
‡ *Ibid*, p. 61.

makes no effort to indicate the social or the moral significance of the facts secured by its enumerators. Neither does it explain satisfactorily why the enumeration of 1930 completely ignores a matter of such vital importance. The mulatto now has considerable voting strength. The United States Census Reports, while incomplete and distressingly inadequate at this point, furnish by far the most complete and the most dependable information concerning racial intermixture in the area covered. The first enumeration to take account of the mulatto as a distinct element in the Negro population was that of 1850.

The Census of 1870 returned a total Negro population of 4,880,009, of which 4,295,960 were classed as " black " and 584,049 as " mulatto." At this enumeration, 12 per cent. of the Negro population were returned as " mulatto," the term, as used by the Census Bureau, manifestly including all perceptible degree of infusion of white blood. The Census of 1890 returned a total Negro population of 7,488,676, of which 6,337,980 were classed as black and 1,132,060 as mulatto. At this enumeration 15·2 per cent. of the Negro population were classed as mulatto. The discrepancy in these figures is due to the fact that 18,636 Negroes in Indian Territory were not classified as to racial intermixture. The Census of 1910 returned a total Negro population of 9,827,763, of which 7,777,077 were classed as black and 2,050,686, or 20·9 per cent., were classed as mulatto. These figures are quoted here as given in *Census Bulletin No.* 129, page 60. They furnish the only existing basic official statement of the progress of amalgamation for the period covered. As compared with these enumerations there are manifest discrepancies shown in the enumerations for 1850 and 1860, while the Census Bureau recognises the returns of 1920, in so far as the mulatto is concerned, as worthless, if not misleading. The total Negro population for 1930 is given as 11,891,143.

The figures for 1870 cover a period of 251 years of racial contact, 1619 to 1870. This includes the entire slavery period, the Civil War period, and the first five years of freedom. These figures give the most trustworthy, if not the only, dependable information concerning the inter-racial morality existing under slavery. Incidentally, discreditable as this showing is, it is infinitely more creditable to both races—to all concerned—than are the facts shown in the matter of racial intermixture occurring since emancipation. Since 1870 each

succeeding twenty-year period is virtually duplicating the results in racial intermixture of the entire preceding time that the races have been in contact here! 1870 shows 584,049 mulattoes; 1890 shows 1,132,060; 1910 shows 2,050,686! These figures, with their internal consistency and with the Census endorsement and the resulting prestige, must stand as the minimum statement of the actual number of mulattoes in Continental United States, of the percentage these constitute in the total Negro population here up to 1910, and of the rate at which the intermixture of the two races—the absorption of the Negro by the Caucasian—is proceeding.

The Census Bureau wholly discredits the enumeration of 1920 in so far as information relative to racial intermixture is concerned. The three preceding enumerations show a fairly constant and a very rapid rate of increase, both numerically and in the percentage of mulatto to total Negro population. The figures returned in 1920 show an actual decrease in mulattoes of 390,132 as compared with returns for 1910! The percentage of mulatto to total Negro population is given as 15·9 against 20·9 in 1910. This is manifestly erroneous, and the Census Bureau is fully justified in its attitude towards this feature of the enumeration.

The enumeration of 1930 affords no information in reference to racial intermixture. It seems that no effort was made to secure information covering this point. The impartial student of the problem of racial intermixture must ask why the enumeration of 1920 should have been worthless in reference to a matter of such grave import, and why that of 1930 should have ignored this matter altogether? The natural inference is that mulattoes, influential in dominant political circles, do not wish to have such statistics made available to the public. By applying the known rate of increase to mulattoes in the preceding years, the probable number of mulattoes for 1930 is found to be 3,714,744, a total possibly not far wide of the actual number. This number is 31·2 per cent. of the total Negro population as returned for 1930.

Although several other States show a higher percentage of mixed-bloods, conditions are numerically worse in Virginia than in any other State. Here the Census of 1870 returned 72,248 mulattoes; that of 1890, 122,441; and that of 1910, 222,910. This rate of increase of mixed-bloods gives for 1930 in the State of Virginia an expectation of 405,818 mulattoes!

Thus is presented a concrete statement showing how desperate is the situation, especially for the full-blood Virginia Negro. Many thousands of mixed-bloods have left this State, going into the District of Columbia and into the North and the East, especially into the larger cities of these sections. On the whole, the findings of the Census in reference to racial intermixture as between the Negro and the Caucasian in the United States afford no ground for believing, or even for hoping, that, under existing conditions, the purity of either race can be long preserved. All the facts support de Tocqueville, Mr. Lincoln, Madison Grant, and others qualified to speak.

Sources of information in reference to the progress of amalgamation other than the Census are less definite numerically, but involve sidelights highly instructive and suggestive. As a rule investigations covering these sources of information gain their practical value from the fact that they deal with concrete cases and with definite situations, thus giving a sense of reality not likely to be present in dealing with abstract statistics. There is a general agreement in all possible sources of information apart from the Census showing the percentage of mulatto to total Negro population in the United States as being decidedly higher than do the figures furnished by the Census. Competent private investigation also furnishes many essential facts omitted by the Census, such as : Classification of students in higher educational institutions as full-blood or mulatto; classification likewise of the successful business and professional men of the race; and especially such classification of the most prominent educators and clergymen of the race. These groups all show a very high percentage exhibiting clearly the infusion of white blood. Many are " near-white." Very few of the pre-eminently successful are full-blood Negroes.

For an impartial and exhaustive study of this feature of the race problem in the United States, the earlier work of Professor E. B. Reuter should be noted.* He reached the conclusion that the chances of the mulatto achieving leadership are thirty-four times greater than are the chances of the full-blood Negro child. Considering various occupations, he found that every interest of the Negro race in the United States is now dominated, if not monopolised in its more desirable aspects, by the mulatto. The extent of this domination is

* *The Mulatto in the United States*, E. B. Reuter. For this and following references see pages 267 to 309.

indicated by a few well-chosen examples. Of 9,172 students in higher educational institutions he found 7,567—82·5 per cent.—to be mulattoes, with 1,605 classed as " black," not necessarily full-blood Negroes. Tuskegee Institute may be regarded as typical of Negro institutions, and here were found a teaching force of about 200 members. Of this number nine, none of them in high position, were regarded as full-blood Negroes; 184 were recognised as " persons of mixed blood." Of conditions obtaining in the Negro ministry, a single finding may suffice. Of five hundred and eighty Negro ministers sufficiently prominent to merit a place in a group relatively so small, " Ninety-five were considered full-blood Negroes and four hundred and eighty-five were known to be mulattoes." Professor Reuter carried his investigations into the various professions and into several of the more exacting occupations followed by Negroes. In every interest of the race he encountered a dominant mixed-blood leadership, varying in degree only but more complete in those positions affording social opportunity and privilege and the possibility of fuller personal development.

The significance of this situation is not understood generally in either race or, if understood even by the leaders, is habitually ignored. Yet it is a situation calculated to destroy the racial self-respect of the American Negro or, more accurately, to stifle the beginnings of laudable race pride. This lack of racial self-respect and of racial self-sufficiency is, unquestionably, very hurtful to the great majority of the Negroes in the United States, and to those elsewhere. The thoughtful, aspiring element of the race have reason to believe that the easiest, if not the only, road to permanent and worth-while advancement lies not in racial development but in escape from race. It is just here that the most serious aspect of the race problem in the United States is encountered. When Professor Reuter pointed out that the prospects of the child of mixed blood are thirty-four times better than the chances of the full-blood Negro child, he arrived at the explanation of much that is most deplorable in so far as the Negro group is concerned and much that is most reprehensible upon the part of the white group here. The ideals and the sanctions of the Negro group in the United States are largely what the attitudes and the sanctions of the white group have made them. The white group, while holding to the highest for itself, has

strangely overlooked or ignored fundamental moral and social sanction in so far as the Negro is concerned. It is not accidental that 16·5 per cent. of the Negro children born in the District of Columbia are officially reported as illegitimate! While responsibility for existing conditions rests largely with the white group, the Negro cannot escape censure, for he has made no effective effort to protect himself against the wrong he has suffered, nor has he made any effective effort to correct that part of the wrong for which his own group is responsible.

Mr. Lincoln recognised the fact that the Negro suffers because of his relation to the white in America. He suffers from two classes of white people. The first is that class which in various ways exploits him for its immediate pleasure or profit, and without regard for the higher or the ultimate interests of either race. Of all exploiters of the Negro, the white father of an illegitimate mulatto child is most despicable and deserves the utmost contempt from both races. The second class, from which the Negro in the United States has suffered very greatly and still suffers, is that which, under the guise of helpfulness to the race, habitually accepts the mulatto element of the race and assists this element into positions of leadership. The effects of the attitude of this class, direct and indirect, have been in the past and are to-day utterly destructive to the Negro race, both in its ideals and in its racial integrity. The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that virtually every white man and every white woman interested in the race problem in America is included in the second class. In politics, in philanthropy, in education, in religion—everywhere the mulatto is accepted by the white as the representative and as the leader of the Negro group. Thus the race is discredited by those seeking to assist it. Thus the full-blood Negro is brought to ignore the matter of race purity, if not positively to seek to escape from a race doomed to ignominy and to the social disadvantages suffered at the hands of its friends.

Justice requires that the mulatto element in the Negro population be divided into two classes: those who are the product of initial amalgamation and those who represent a subsequent diffusion of white blood through the interbreeding of mulattoes and of Negroes with mulattoes. In the first case one of the parents, almost invariably the father, is white, while the other is either full-blood Negro or mulatto. In cases of

initial amalgamation the child is illegitimate, the number of instances of legal racial intermarriage being almost negligible, even in those States where permitted. No such marriage can be made legally in any Southern State. The great majority of mixed-bloods in the United States belong to the class here described as diffusion mulattoes. In many cases the initial intermixture occurred several generations back and, in many instances, the conventions of society in reference to marriage have since been observed. In other cases there has been a wanton disregard for marriage as the process of "bleaching" has, through repeated instances of biracial illegitimacy, produced the "near-white," now in evidence in such considerable numbers. Many of the mixed-bloods who have gained recognition as leaders of the Negro group here, and elsewhere, have been initial increment mulattoes, a fact usually proving in no way inconvenient, but rather advantageous, to them.

The distinction between initial increment and diffusion mulattoes, important as it is theoretically and morally, has less practical value for the Negro than the facts would lead the student to expect. Racial intermixture cannot be concealed. For the mass of the Negroes little attention is given to the conditions under which initial racial intermixture has occurred. It is the advantageous position of the mulatto which counts. Thus the greater the natural ability of the individual mulatto, the more creditable his achievements, the finer his personality, the graver the stress he puts upon the ideals of the full-blood Negro. This suggests the supreme, the inescapable, tragedy of mulatto leadership.

The increase of the mixed-blood group by diffusion has been very much greater than by initial amalgamation, but the number of cases of initial amalgamation is now unquestionably greater than at any time since the races have been in contact. Yet there seems to be a general assumption that cases of initial racial intermixture are now very rare, and that the present rapid increase in mulattoes is due almost or quite wholly to diffusion rather than to initial intermixture. The methods of dealing with the situation are posited upon this assumption. Careful investigation will reveal, in almost any Negro group, children of Negro mothers but decidedly lighter in colour than are the mothers. Unfortunately no authoritative statistics have been gathered in reference to initial amalgamations. Opinions in reference to this feature of the race

problem may be quoted to uphold any possible view one may wish to support. The investigations made by the writer have revealed many cases of initial amalgamation, sufficient to warrant the opening sentence of this paragraph.

Amalgamation has proceeded much more rapidly in Latin America than has been the case in the United States. The contrast between the two is involved in the earliest settlements made. While Jamestown quickly became a colony of homes and of family life, while Plymouth Colony was such from its inception, Isabella, the first permanent Spanish colony, consisted wholly of men. These came out as adventurers, seeking wealth rather than homes. The first century of Spanish occupation of America was a century of conquest and exploitation rather than of home-building. In this the Spanish woman had little place or part. Indians were captured and allotted to the soldiers and to civilians as slaves and, from the very beginning, began that process of racial intermixture between the Spaniard and the Indian now in evidence throughout Latin America. As Negro slaves were introduced, they formed a third element in the future population. There are still full-blood whites, full-blood Indians, and full-blood Negroes in Latin America, but the bulk of the population is of mixed blood. The conditions under which this racial intermixture has occurred rob the situation of all value as an experiment in race crossing. The absence of moral standards and the demoralising conditions prevailing were not favourable to normal development.

For those who would ignore race, abundant examples may be cited from Latin America showing the unfortunate consequences of such a course. Professor Foerster, of Princeton University, has performed a great service in his study of the moral and social conditions prevailing in Latin America and in the West Indies, as these conditions are reflected in the matter of illegitimacy. His report upon a study made at the instance of the Department of Labour, United States Government, has very high value.* He found 25 per cent. of the population of Cuba to be of illegitimate birth. Other of these countries show a much higher illegitimacy rate. The *Encyclopædia Britannica*, under the word "illegitimacy," states that 70 per cent. of the children born in Jamaica are illegitimate. Doubtless the political instability so much in evidence in

* *Racial Problems Involved in Immigration from Latin America and the West Indies to the United States*, Robert H. Foerster. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Latin America is due, in large part, to this confusion of race through lack of race pride and through lack of adequate family organisation. For those who hold race cheaply and who, without thought, imperil a heritage which, once impaired, can never be restored, a careful study of Latin America is earnestly commended.

In any consideration of the mulatto problem in the United States, or elsewhere, religion and its influence must be evaluated. This force has singularly failed to protect the Negro either in his ideals or in his race. The religious forces of America have done much for the Negro, but it has been accomplished indirectly rather than by definitely sought objective. Upon the question of the protection, the perpetuation, of his race there has been the silence of indifference and of failure to realise vital issues. Directly, there has been universal acceptance of racial intermixture. The proof of this is the present-day position of the mulatto as the recognised representative and leader of the Negro group, especially in its religious interests and activities. It is this failure to protect his race which has made the Christian religion painfully near non-moral for the Negro in the United States. This seems to be true of the Negro everywhere and constitutes a situation demanding most careful consideration.

Brotherhood, especially Christian brotherhood, does not approve moral wrongs, nor does it imperil ethical standards. When intelligently comprehended it rather strengthens and energises morality. When permitted to degenerate into indifference toward fundamental moral sanctions, it is no longer brotherhood or Christianity. That the Negro in the United States is yet a Negro, with racial possibilities and with the ability to assist his race here and elsewhere, is very largely due to those attitudes upon the part of the white against which the Negro sometimes complains most bitterly. It must be recognised that, along with religion, race prejudice has served to protect the Negro in his racial interests, in many instances proving doubtless the stronger of the two. Certainly race prejudice has been an active force, conserving race in circles from which Christianity was absent or in which Christianity, as administered, has been neutral or has, through practical endorsement of individual mulattoes, thrown its influence upon the side of illicit racial intermixture. The Latin American has largely lacked the race prejudice, or more

accurately the racial pride and self-respect prompting racial self-preservation, which has so largely characterised, and has protected measurably, the citizens of the United States.

No one can, however, after a reasonably thorough examination of the evidence, question the fact that the amalgamation of the Negro and the white in the United States is progressing very rapidly. Yet, in common with the people of the entire Western hemisphere, both races here show a strangely complacent indifference to this racial intermixture. Even outstanding students of the Negro problem usually place the completion of this process so far in the future as to possess little interest for the present generation. Efforts to arouse popular interest by placing the facts before both races, thus protecting each alike, have met with but little success. The reaction produced when this situation is forced upon the notice of even the more intelligent leaders of either race ranges from utter indifference to the whole matter to open hostility toward the person or the agency responsible for forcing attention to race amalgamation and its consequences.

It is impossible to gain an accurate knowledge of the status of amalgamation of the Negro and the white in America, especially in the United States, without a realisation of the distressing fact that all our boasted institutions—our social customs and practices, our political parties and institutions, our educational interests and programmes, even Christianity in all its organised groups and their activities—have failed largely in the past and are largely failing at the present time in the protection of the purity of either race. This is due partly, if not largely, to the fact that no specific effort has been made to bring about a better state of affairs. A dependent race is being destroyed by the baser element of the more fortunately situated race, with little endeavour by anyone to bring the character or the intelligence of either race to bear, directly and energetically, upon the situation. The more fortunate race is largely indifferent to its own peril. The outstanding fact in reference to the American situation is that no intelligent and adequately persistent effort to preserve either race has yet been made by other than a few individuals.

A. H. SHANNON.

THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE.

AT the beginning of the Quartenary Geological Era, about 125,000 years ago, man was definitely differentiated from the beasts. He differed from his simian ancestor in possessing an eye capable of discerning perspective ; hands that were non-specialising, that is to say, were not developed for the sole purpose of climbing or swimming ; a brain capable of reasonable logical thought, and something more, which for the want of a better word we still describe as " soul."

Biologically speaking, man was, and still is, a polygamous herd animal. The development of modern religion, culture, and ethics has forced us into a state of monogamy, with varying results and effects which are not part of the present subject, but our primitive ancestor was troubled by no such niceties of feeling. He lived in a group consisting of many consanguineous members—in short, a highly inbred and collateralised family. The oldest, most artful, or strongest man took for himself the bulk of, and certainly the pick of, the women, irrespective of blood relationship, leaving the younger or weaker men to fare as best they might. No doubt, on occasions, one or more of the young men, together with a group of women, would become detached from the parent stock, and found a herd of their own. At such divisions there would be no quarrel or dispute concerning the sharing of property, or the inheritance of land, for man was settled in no fixed spot. The earth was at his feet, he had but to wander forth and find food. He was what is technically known as a " food-gatherer " pure and simple.

Perhaps the earliest implement, or tool, was the branch broken down by the gale, or a stone that could be picked up and hurled at a food-animal ; but flints flung about indiscriminately have a way of becoming chipped, and this fact prehistoric man observed, and soon turned to his own advantage.

The earliest and most primitive of all discovered Paleolithic stone implements is the Chellean " hand-axe," called by the French *coup de poing*, i.e. " blow of the fist." It consists of a nodule of flint between four and five inches long, roughly chipped to a point at one end. Despite the shattering name bestowed upon it by the French excavators, this implement is definitely a tool, and not a weapon. It would prove more of

an encumbrance than an assistance in any individual hand-to-hand combat. It is by no means so handy and so deadly as the hastily broken bottle or beer-glass of the public-house brawl in " civilised " cities to-day. As a tool it was efficient for crude cutting, such as in severing a branch, or cracking a bone to extract marrow.

As man developed his craft of flint knapping, his tendency proved to be not towards larger and more formidable weapons, but towards smaller and more delicate cutting-edges. Bone was pressed into service, not for daggers, but for needles; horn, not as a receptacle for poison-darts, but to split into fish-harpoons; and decades later, when the marvellously delicate flint arrow-head appeared, it was suitable for killing nothing larger than a rabbit.

It seems then that, since battle furniture will not come to light, primitive man, who lived much closer to his instincts than we do, was lacking in that which most of us imagine is essential to existence, in accordance with the law of the " survival of the fittest," namely, " the fighting instinct." To primitive man, living as he did in close contact with tremendous forces of untamed Nature, face to face with immense cave-bears and lions, a " natural inborn instinct " to fight would very soon have made itself manifest, and the primitive Chellean hand-axe would soon have developed into a really destructive lethal weapon.

If the foregoing is true, it should be possible to check its accuracy by observing the habits and customs of modern savages, for it is generally believed that these people represent prehistoric man. A survey of primitive peoples throughout the world reveals, alas, that far from being peaceful, they are for the most part armed with highly ornate and deadly weapons, in the use of which they prove fatally expert. A boy on reaching the age of puberty is sequestered from the tribe, passed through an initiation ceremony, and instructed in the arts of war; and until he has taken part in at least one engagement he is not considered to have reached man's estate, nor is he allowed to take a wife, nor participate in the business of the tribe. Such customs vary with ethnographic position but, generally speaking, all primitive people have an organisation of this kind.

Disappointed in our quest for peace among these lowly folk, it may be instructive to seek what motivates their warfare, for

we are still assuming that they are nearer to the mental status of prehistoric man than ourselves. No doubt we shall find that a primary offence, such as a young man of one tribe carrying off a girl from another, leads to endless reprisals of slaughter and head-hunting. To this end let us quote actual cases from no less an authority than Dr. W. H. Rivers.

> Melanesia provides abundant examples of the difficulty in explaining the response to social injury as actuated by revenge. . . . The people fight (after an offence) till one or more men have been killed on either side; in some islands it is necessary that an equal number shall have been killed on each side. As soon as it is seen that each side has lost a man or men, the fight comes to an end automatically; there is no parleying or arrangement of terms. Some time after, the two opponent people exchange presents which are of equal value on both sides. There is no question of the offenders giving a larger amount in compensation. . . . Moreover . . . the party which takes the initiative in the exchange is not that of the offenders. . . . The side which first kills, first gives.

Here, then, we find no revengeful spirit. The whole business seems to be transacted in a more fair and " sportsmanlike " manner than any war engaged in by " civilised " man. So much for savages at war. Now let us glance at the custom of head-hunting, in which two organised armed bands are not pitted one against another. From the same authority we learn:

> In Indonesia and Melanesia heads are used in rites connected with such essential crafts as house-building and canoe-making. In the head-hunting districts of Melanesia no house could be inhabited, no canoe be launched if heads were not at hand to be used as the offering which forms part of an organised cult of the dead. The motive for head-hunting . . . depends on a religious need so great that many of the chief acts of life cannot be performed without it.

Despite the fact that ceremonies are performed, and sacrifices made to propitiate the spirit of the dead man who originally owned the severed head, it seems that we are rather off the track of the essentially peaceful nature of the human being. This wandering from the path is due to the presupposition of a misconception. Actually, modern savages are no nearer, mentally or psychologically, to prehistoric man than we are ourselves. This very general blunder is due to the fact that as soon as Darwin propounded his theory of Evolu-

tion, it was seized upon and applied to every subject whether it would fit or not, with the result that anthropologists have been led sadly astray. A system contrary to Evolution holds sway over the progress of culture. Without a constant urge forward from without people soon grow decadent, lose such useful and almost essential arts as canoe-building and pottery-making, but possibly continue their head-hunting, without knowing why they do so. There are very few modern savages that are not civilised in their own way. If they have houses to live in, a system of marriage-customs, a ceremonial method of interment of the dead, some form of chieftainship, and even a most rudimentary science of agriculture, then they have civilisation. The very few people who have none of these things, who have remained food-gatherers, have no conception of warfare, head-hunting, or other violent modes of behaviour. War, therefore, is inherent in civilisation, not in man. Let us now attempt to trace the rise and growth of this apparently very questionable blessing.

Had prehistoric man remained a simple food-gatherer, wandering at will upon the face of the earth, it is very doubtful whether he would have survived the rigours of climate, the ravages of wild beasts, and, above all, famine—when neither food-plant nor animal was available. The fundamental problem was for man to change his habits, cease being a food-gatherer and become a food-producer; but this tremendous step forward could not easily be made. He could not watch the acorn develop into the hundred-years oak, nor yet the grain of seed into the food-plant of a season. He did not connect the two—the burial of the seed with the resurrection of his food. His best endeavour was to wander into a land of plenty, and thereabout intelligently remain.

The world's most fertile valley is, and always was, that of the Nile. In this region Mother Nature gave her great lesson. That lesson was in the perfect irrigation cycle of the Nile. How long man sat and watched the life-bearing inundation without applying the knowledge so to be obtained is impossible to judge. It was at most but ten thousand years ago that man made the first step in civilisation—the instigation of the science of agriculture based upon irrigation.

After this events could move with comparative rapidity. Man was now free from his serfdom to the caprices of the

virgin soil. His vital mind forces could be used for something other than food finding. In the Nile valley the first calendar was devised, the first building erected in stone, the first pottery fashioned, the first cattle were domesticated, the first marriage laws lain down, and the first rules of inheritance instigated. It was there that the first kingdom was established, the first State religious system founded, and people were for the first time divided into social classes. The earliest religious cult in Egypt was the worship of a vegetation god through his earthly son—the king. Later, the god became a sun-god and customs were changed accordingly, but the fundamental belief that the king was himself a part of the god remained the same. These early royal families were closely inbred, for the system of inheritance was matrilineal, and in exogamous unions the throne and attendant power would soon have gone beyond the bounds of the family.

The king, as a god upon earth, held the life and fate of all men in his hand. Due to his divine presence the Nile overflowed its banks and fertilised the fields: to him was due the thanks and praise that his father the sun deigned to rise again next morning after having laid down to sleep at night. The king could not grow old and weak as ordinary mortals did, or surely there would be an end to all things beneficial upon earth; so the king obligingly did not grow old and weak, but disappeared from earth and life into the waters and immortality. He sacrificed his life in the Nile that he might rejoin his father the sun.

So much for the beginnings of national life. We must now don the seven-league boots of proto-historic research, stride vigorously on—not necessarily in a straight line—but each footstep must be planted upon a vital point. We must for brevity's sake ignore the existence of such growing cultures as the Sumerian and Babylonian; and, without even hinting at their origin and development, class these, with Egypt, and all other early cultures in one category, so aptly named by Dr. W. J. Perry "the archaic civilisation."

Metals were discovered. The ruling families grew more rich and powerful. Magico-religious ideas took at once a more practical and a more mystic form. Gold grew to be valued, together with other gems to be mentioned later, and kings grew less obliging when the time of their ceremonial demise approached. If the king could represent his father the sun,

then someone could represent the king, and suffer death in his stead. Here was the toxin that brought about the fall of the archaic civilisation, and here, too, was the toxin that even to-day threatens to bring about the extermination of the *homo sapiens* race.

In the early days of human sacrifice no doubt a willing slave would volunteer for the service, glad to benefit humanity, and as a reward enter the bright sky-world of immortality in place of the dismal underworld. But later, when no volunteers were forthcoming, slaves were conscripted, and not *one* representative of the king perished, but whole hosts were yearly drowned in the flood-waters of the Nile. Thus man learned what could be accomplished by violent behaviour.

Closely allied to the use of gold was the appreciation of pearls and pearl-shell, of amber, jade, jet, amethyst, coral and other precious and semi-precious stones. The enormously powerful ruling families owed a great deal of their prestige to the possession of these objects, hence expeditions were sent out to prospect for them. The course of these expeditions may be traced from the site of the archaic civilisation eastward, through Indonesia and Melanesia, out into the Pacific, down to Australia, and across to Central America, by the ponderous megolithic monuments they have left in their wake, the arts and laws taught by these travellers to aboriginal inhabitants, and the myths of these people. Not one wave but many passed outward, always led by descendants of the ruling House—the Sun-worshipping theocracy. The remains left behind by early civilised settlers are always on the site of ancient metal or jewel workings.

The organisation of the archaic civilisation, I have always pointed out, was matrilineal. Here then, was another great flaw. Younger members of the ruling house, cheated as they felt of their inheritance, broke away with friends and followers, settled upon adjacent sites and established themselves as rulers. Knowing the vital principle of government to consist of a ruling theocracy, and knowing, too, from having witnessed wholesale human sacrifice, how defenceless a thing was man, they changed the sun-gods into incarnate war-gods, established a patrilineal inheritance, and descended with force and arms upon the peaceful, rich parent settlements.

The origin centres of the earliest military atrocities are always adjacent to, but never in the centres of, earliest civilisation. The Bantu people of Africa flooded southward from somewhere near Egypt. Egypt herself was conquered and dominated by the warlike Hyksos. The Maya civilisation of Central America was broken up by the Aztecs, and wherever through the world there are megolithic monuments, the resident people have stories of the wonderful sun-gods, who descended and taught the people the arts of peace, and the dreaded war-gods, who later came and overthrew them and trained the people for war.

In the far north and the far south of the great land masses there exist lowly folk who have never been influenced by the great civilising waves that have passed round the world. These people have remained in the prehistoric, food-gathering state, invented for themselves no articles of material culture nor elaborated any cults of the dead. A pound of meat is more valuable to them than a pound of gold ; jewels mean nothing, whilst warfare, and even individual combat, is unknown. They are despised by their nearest neighbours, regarded as lower animals, and not considered worthy to receive death from the hand of a warrior. Nevertheless, these food-gatherers possess all the instincts of their prehistoric forebears. They eat, drink and sleep, reproduce their kind, protect themselves from wild animals, and tenaciously cling to life.

It is only people with culture, be they either the aeroplane-building, wireless-telephone-listening, whisky-drinking, pepsin-gum-chewing whites of Europe and America, or the canoe-building, ceremonial-dance-watching, kava-drinking, betel-chewing blacks of the South Seas, who indulge in killing each other, be it either to satisfy honour, or to get a head for a canoe-launch ; and if there is no fighting instinct inherent in man, then the League of Nations has not an insurmountable task before it. It has not to re-create, but only re-educate the race. If the first Empires of the world, notably the Egyptian with its very advanced arts and sciences and its wealth of material culture, could rest unarmed and immune from attack, as they did for thousands of years, there seems no very real reason why our modern Empires cannot rest likewise safely unarmed. The savage beast never did lurk in the breast of man. Warfare is a cult, not an instinct.

JULIAN E. FRANKLYN.

RURAL HUNAN: OLD AND NEW IN CENTRAL CHINA.

THE Finance sub-committee of the Board of Trustees of the British Boxer Indemnity Fund recently decided in principle to allow a loan of £2,400,000 sterling for the purpose of completing the Canton-Hankow Railway. More recently it has discussed a loan of £1,200,000 sterling, being the London half of the loan. It is reasonable to assume that very soon British lines, locomotives and rolling stock will be under construction for service in Hunan, the famous Chinese Province known until thirty years ago as "the Iron Gate," beyond which no foreign influence might go.

To-day the line stops at Chuchow, and for all practical purposes ends just inside the Province at the Capital, Changsha. Beyond there roll the hills of blue, wrapped still in the rural quietude of immemorial years. As these large orders for railway equipment are placed, and the reports appear in the Press stating the improvement in employment figures which they are bound to produce, only those who have lived in and loved old Hunan will know enough to spare a sigh over the passing of a civilisation and the spreading conquest of Western method. The time is come to record the faces, voices, thoughts and ways of a people on the verge of a new era. To-morrow there will be the railway, the traffic of a nation, the tourist; there is still to-day.

"Hunan, half mountain and half stream," runs the old description. From the T'ung T'ing Lake due south for twenty days' travel by river and road the mountains pile themselves together about the winding, rapid-strewn rivers till they culminate in the mighty mountain borders of the Kuangtung Province. In their valleys, clustered in countless hamlets and market towns, are sixty million people who to-day feel the spring breeze of modernisation and rise to greet it, little dreaming of the winter gales which it promises—sure at the last to drive before them customs, homes, trades loved through centuries.

"Everywhere there is red earth in which a man may sleep at last," the old saw runs, but nowhere is it redder than in Hunan. Travelling south and crossing the Hunanese border the eye is caught at once by the conical hills, barely covered with scrub, through which red earth gleams in the sun. There are few places in which God has made the very soil itself lend colour and beauty to the landscape as in Hunan. Bordering the rivers rise range on range of red hills, many of them ingeniously terraced with tiny rice fields which grow smaller and smaller as they climb to the summit, on which, in delightful tracery against the sky, stands a grove of young bamboo. The green of young rice and virginal bamboo against the rosy flushed face of Mother Earth, set in a frame of tinkling mountain streams, this is Hunan.

The traveller follows one of the great rivers which drain the Province, the Hsiang or the Tzu—rivers, indeed, often more than a mile wide—and watches the ceaseless traffic pass up and down. Junks go by carrying rice, antimony, pig's bristles, coal and bamboo down to the outside world. Each boat carries a heavy dress of patched sail and its crew, labouring with the sweeps, sings an old boating song. As rapids are reached by upbound junks the crew will jump ashore, almost naked, to sing as they tow their craft through the roaring waters. Lumbering rafts of timber—often twenty feet deep—splurge by, propelled by three sweeps rough-hewn from the timber itself. Here and there the air is filled with the roar made by a seventy feet high water-wheel which is lifting water to irrigate the fields. Cormorants and wild duck dot the river, stretching their wings to catch the sun.

Leaving the river, the "road" strikes inland through the hills, a thin ribbon of yard-wide paving blocks which follows the contour of the hills and sometimes lifts itself laboriously step by step over a high pass. At every "li" there is a tiny shrine by the roadside wherein sit Father and Mother Earth in deathless wedlock. Every third "li" finds a roof stretched across the road, and shelter, rest and tea are offered to the traveller as he sits in brotherly talk with others who are "eating drought"—travelling on foot, while sedan chairs go swaying by, their bearers panting and wiping the sweat from their faces with their tattered jackets.

Sometimes the hills recede, leaving a wide valley where the earth bares her bosom to the sky. Such a valley is a scene of simple content. Mud farms, circled with trees, stand in the midst of wet fields. Centremost of all is the curving roof of the Ancestral Hall, repeating in stone the green of the hill bamboo. Ploughmen, clad only in the scantiest trousers, plunge knee-deep in wet mud behind the water buffalo and the barking of dogs, or the boom of a gong drifts in the air.

It is in such surroundings that the Hunanese reaches his sturdy maturity most readily. " In times of revolution, seek out the Hunanese," is a much-quoted saying in political circles, but to meet him on his own ground is to think of ageless ways rather than new political theories. Sitting over a brushwood fire in the middle of the farmhouse floor he is rusticity at its noble best. His head is swathed in a blue cotton turban, his skin a rich, russet brown rather than yellow. From his whipcord neck to his hard feet every muscle may be seen playing silkily beneath his skin, and in spite of his all but naked body he does the honours of his simple home with a courtesy which was old when chivalry was young. He is a freeman, lifting his head to heaven as undaunted as his native hills.

His wife and daughters, too, have an air of open freedom which the West finds it hard to allow to the East. In a neat jacket and trousers the lady of the house will totter in and out of the visitor's presence, ministering to his wants, wash-bowl for tired feet, ginger tea for a roadside thirst, the water-pipe to promote conversation ; one by one, with a stream of chatter, she will produce them all. As her husband's stories proceed she will fearlessly interrupt with corrections, or even take the story from him for her own telling, this " down-trodden Eastern woman with the bound feet." The daughters work in a corner of the main room at a wooden hand-loom, making towels, turbans, belts, and piece-cloth. Those who are still young wear their hair in two plaits down the back and a tuft of hair, like a horse's " topping " on a Show Day, is trained over the forehead on a wooden comb. Their feet are unbound, for the breeze of new days has reached even here.

Yet in these remote villages life is still village-centred. Tea, rice, cloth, tailoring, shoes, oil are all made in the community by the community and money does not mean much. The Western ideal of making money is still strange enough to be curious. To stand well with the village, to live a happy community life, to leave at death sons, and land well tilled—these are life's ambitions. Nevertheless, the seeds of change are there. Beside and within the rural mind there is springing up a new, " modern " mind, creating baffling contradictions. From time to time members of these villages go out to Changsha, Hankow, even Shanghai, and change returns with them.

As is pointed out in *Rethinking Missions*, the monumental

survey of Eastern life recently published in the United States, in times of unemployment these wanderers are re-absorbed by their villages ; a good thing for the employers, but with what effects on the village! The worker goes out a dignified rustic ; he returns with the proletariat mind. He goes with a mind content in simple things ; he returns with a mind awakened to so many unattainable things that it can never be happy again. Such a person becomes a fever in the village blood. He has lost the love of nature. The roads are bad, the houses worse, the people sickeningly ignorant. He has ceased to love the land ; he would even sell it for paltry dollars, which every true man knows have no relation to it. He cannot see that the roads are well suited to coolie-borne traffic, the houses made out of the earth they stand on and good for farm life, and the minds of his untravelled brothers filled with a soil-lore which the machine-sick West would revive to know. He prefers a Sun Yat Sen uniform made of Japanese cotton, which lets the wind through to his bones, to the Manchu gown, homespun, of his brothers, because he is modern and it is old-fashioned.

This relative from the world beyond is the first harbinger of change, laden with the little things that rouse the money sense. He brings back a thermos bottle which replaces with its insanitariness the simple earthen pot dug out from Nature's womb. He brings the English cigarette, and the water pipe and tobacco grown at the door are known no more. He brings a gaudy Japanese hat for his wife and her native beauty is changed into a shuddering nightmare. He introduces leather shoes—which slip dreadfully on the muddy roads—and a home industry sickens for death ; a German alarm clock and old Brother Sun is one step further from his little brothers.

Above all he brings new thought. He laughs at Father and Mother Earth. He scorns She who is " Great in Mercy, Great in Pity, Kuan Yin, all beautiful, Hearer of Prayers." Unless, indeed, he has returned home to die of the disease born of his city folly, then he seeks her aid grovelling at her feet with passionate supplications. He sneers at the native herbalist's potions and cries up the capsules and pills he has seen in the city, little knowing that wise men are trying to co-ordinate and master the wisdom which he despises. He is the harbinger of change, but other forces press hard on the old life. Down the east side of the Province, where its borders march with those of Kianghsi, Hunan meets

Communism in its most militant form. There broad territories are governed by the Chinese Communist Party under the direction of students returned from abroad.

At times strong raiding parties leap through the mountain passes into Hunanese territory to prosecute a vigorous campaign of compulsory conversion. Those who join the Party are allowed to live, those who do not are driven off or killed. The old clan registers are destroyed and the land is re-parcelled among those who have joined the Party. The temples are razed to the ground, the County Law Courts and prisons are burned, and a flood of propaganda is released over the countryside. The old village gentry, guardians of the old system, fly broken, and the people, leaderless, stare at this new way of life. Believing that China is over-populated and that respect for age is the bulwark of Chinese conservatism, the cry "Too old at forty" has gone up more than once and the elders have fallen in an orgy of ultra-modernism. The villager looks on and wonders whether this can possibly be the same world in which he has lived so long; a world of settled ways in which a white beard has been the symbol of the blessings of Heaven, wisdom, and the right to respect.

The Communist reign does not last long. Soon long columns of Government infantry wind down through the Western hills. Aeroplanes zoom overhead, bombing the Communist army and the villages alike. The Red forces retreat with their booty, the Government troops take control, and the process of "pacification" begins. Now those who joined the Communist Party are hunted out and their homesteads burned. "That which the locust hath left hath the canker-worm eaten." The country lies charred and desolate between the two forces, and the farmer, blasted out of his rustic happiness, looks up to silent heaven from his cave refuge in the hills, asking—why? Have the gods died? Was the old way so sinful that Heaven must wreak its vengeance so? It seemed so simple and fair in its peacefully unfolding years. The proverb says, "Virtue has a good reward"; there must have been evil in it somewhere. But the Communist speakers said the proverbs were opium. May be they are right.

The old life is doomed and millions of little boys and girls, who at this moment are sitting astride buffalo, whistling their way homeward to rice and bed, are doomed to grow up in a period of misery, when the old good is gone and the new not yet come. Already a network of wide motor roads is searching out the corners of the Province. Tearing up graves, demolishing villages, cutting through ancient roads, it spreads across the land. The Chevrolet hurtles past the door of the once isolated farm and the farmer earns dollars repairing the road, while yesterday he earned happiness tilling the steaming earth. Men who are in no hurry and have always ridden leisurely in sedan chairs, when they took their rare journeys, now climb into the decrepit motor car. As it bumps and sways along the arrow-straight road at thirty miles an hour they taste the thrill of modernity. Soon, however, sickness grips them and they sink into abject misery. Climbing down from the car at the journey's end they have no use for the time they have saved, are sick and weary in every bone. They have spent enough shining dollars to keep the family for a month; but—they have allayed the itch for new things which has gripped their minds.

So change follows change. Political theories are becoming the topic of village conversation. Doctor Sun Yat Sen's portrait hangs where once hung the "Kitchen God." Confucius' works are forbidden in the primary schools, and the old village private schools where the rustic life received its first impetus are suppressed. In some places the red earth has been rent open and modern mining machinery heaps up slag to the indignant sky. Steam launches hoot their sooty way through the river traffic. Cotton mills line the river banks and put the home looms permanently out of action. Side by side with the herbalist's shop in the little market town stands the patent medicine shop run by a young hospital nurse who, too impatient to stay long enough to graduate as a registered nurse in his hospital, has set up as a "Doctor, Western style."

And now civilisation brings up its heavy guns. We are to have the railway. The iron gate is forced indeed. Up from Canton will roll the traffic of the West, making a convenient short cut to Central China. With it will come prosperity, money, industry; but what will depart? Red-earthed hills, patient oxen, simple sturdy minds. I stood on a hill overlooking a new motor road. By my side stood a Hunanese farmer. In Western enthusiasm I pointed out a car just about to start. "That car will cover a day's journey in an hour," I said. "Why?" he replied.

Why?

DOUGLAS W. THOMPSON.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN CREATIVE ARTISTS.

I MUST ask pardon for prefacing these observations with a piece of man-in-the-streetish logic: "All Russians are slightly mad. All painters, poets and musicians are slightly mad. Therefore, all Russian painters, poets and musicians are more than slightly mad." For there is just enough truth in that to make it worth thinking about. The psychological make-up of any creative artist is not only likely to be more unusual and more puzzling than that of the "average, sensual man"—that is, more interesting for its own sake—but is valuable for any light it may throw on his work. And when the problem is complicated through the subject belonging to a nation with more marked psychological peculiarities than any other in Europe, it becomes extraordinarily fascinating. For while the specifically Latin or Teutonic or Keltic peculiarities can be distinguished and grouped and related to each other, those of the Slavs are inexplicable even (I think) to themselves, unconnected and, as we say for want of a better word, illogical. We can understand the Russian "tendency to pity," Russian pessimism, Russian optimism, and that peculiarly Russian form of laziness which Goncharov satirised in his *Oblomov*, thereby giving a new word to the Russian language. These are only universal traits seen in the distorting mirror of a peculiar national temperament. But this temperament also produces phenomena which cannot be explained by anything in our own experience or that of other Western peoples. And I suggest that since these phenomena are not uncommon or noticeable only in minor artists, but occur frequently in the cases of writers and musicians of the first rank, they are worth comparing and studying simply as phenomena even if we cannot venture here to probe very deeply into their origins.

By far the most extraordinary of these phenomena is the tendency to stop and change direction in mid-career. The case most familiar to the average English reader is probably Tolstoy's. But his, if the most famous, is by no means the most remarkable. These crises vary, of course, in intensity. In their most violent forms the artist abandons his work altogether; with colder, less spiritual natures, for instance Rimsky-Korsakov, the crisis causes only a temporary cessation of work and a radical change of style in the work itself. The crisis is usually marked by dislike for the artist's own previous productions—a different matter from the passing self-doubts that afflict most artists from time to time—and there is usually a resumption of activity on the old lines after a more or less prolonged period of wandering in the wilderness.

The most tragic of all these cases is that of Gogol, for death overtook him at a time when his artistic convalescence may have been just beginning. Gogol's collapse after the single decade of activity (1831-42) into which he crowded practically the whole of his life-work is usually attributed to his religious mania, but there is quite as much evidence for the assumption that the religious mania was the result of this early and inexplicable decay of his creative faculty. (He was still in his early thirties.) We may put it that both were equally symptoms of the same mysterious malady of the spirit. At any rate, it is clear from Gogol's correspondence that his religious preoccupation was not a spontaneous passion, but an impotent longing to experience such a passion—of which he was completely incapable. He began to apologise for his masterpieces, writing in 1846 an epilogue to his *Revisor* of ten years earlier, in which that delightful comedy is "explained" as a piece of ethical symbolism. In 1848 he again began to interest himself in artistic matters, particularly in the folk-songs and ballads which were his original literary roots, and worked at the second part of *Dead Souls*, producing writing which seems to have delighted everyone to whom he read it. But a year or so later he had to write to Vassily Zhoukovsky that he was overcome by "old age or temporary paralysis of my powers. . . . I do my best not to waste a minute . . . but work drags." Then, early in 1852, the death of a near friend seems to have induced a sudden intensification of his hypochondria; in a fit of religio-maniacal frenzy he burned all but a few fragments of the manuscript second part of *Dead Souls*—and died ten days later.

Many features of this case naturally remind one of Tolstoy's, but there is an even closer parallel in that of the composer Balakirev (1837-1910), the leader of the Borodin-Moussorgsky-Rimsky-Korsakov group. Here again we find an intensely egotistic, domineering personality almost feverishly active during his twenties and early thirties—active not only as composer but as conductor, pianist, teacher and concert-

entrepreneur; and again a rapid collapse of the creative faculty, accompanied by a mania, superstitious rather than genuinely religious. As early as 1861, ten years before the crisis, Balakirev had written to the critic Stassov, "Very strange wishes arise in me; you would call them wild. I should like to burn all my compositions before I die. It is not worth while that people should be amused by my compositions." (Though, fortunately, he never carried out this intention as Gogol did on more than one occasion.) In other respects Gogol's and Balakirev's symptoms were remarkably similar. Both avoided society, even that of their friends. Both concealed beneath an outward display of ultra-orthodoxy, an almost incredibly atavistic superstitiousness. Gogol actually confesses to "superstition" in his more intimate letters, and seems to have been terrified by thoughts and visions of the devil. And the originally suppressed passages of Rimsky-Korsakov's memoirs, only recently published, reveal that in the early 'seventies Balakirev began to pay mysterious visits to a "witch" who professed to divine the success of his undertakings, the designs of his enemies in the Petersburg musical world, and so on. It is significant that Rimsky-Korsakov thought his friend "believed not in God, but in the devil." But Balakirev weathered his spiritual storm with more success than Gogol. After a curious hegira of three years, spent as a minor official on the Warsaw railway, he gradually drifted back into the musical world and later, after a quarter of a century's silence, even began to compose again with unweakened powers, the last decade of his life being remarkably productive.

The case of Tolstoy is too well known to call for much comment; its special interest lies in its enlightening differences. Tolstoy was one of the least neurotic of Russian artists; he enjoyed exceptional physical health and his intellect was far more positive and vigorous than Gogol's, for instance. Gogol was a great artist, but no thinker. So we find that Tolstoy's crisis is predominantly intellectual in character. Like Gogol, he condemns his own masterpieces on the ground that they are shallow and therefore "immoral." But the conviction which compels him to condemn them works through his conscious mind, along a path of relentless logic, instead of through the depths of the subconsciousness as with Gogol. Here again there was a resumption of genuine artistic creation

after an interval of ten years (1876-86), in *The Death of Ivan Ilitch*, *The Kreutzer Sonata*, and other works. Even Tolstoy's religious ideas were essentially intellectual. Spiritually, he was probably in precisely the same position as Gogol and Balakirev; that is, he was possessed by a very strong will-to-religion, but had very little genuine religiosity.

Still more enlightening is the case of Rimsky-Korsakov, who never pretended to be anything but a rationalist all his life, though some of his operas betray an inclination to pantheistic ideology. Rimsky-Korsakov was one of the most intellectual of Russian musicians—sane, temperamentally rather cold, and, for a Russian, curiously unspiritual. The account of his case is therefore of special interest for, considering its general parallelism with the others discussed here, it casts doubt on any theory that these psycho-physical disturbances in the careers of Russian artists are religious *in origin* and suggests that the religious symptoms are only results produced by the disturbances in certain natures. In a man constituted like Rimsky-Korsakov the crisis, as one would expect, took a less serious form. The first signs of trouble (he tells us in his very precisely and objectively written memoirs) occurred in the summer of 1892, when he was about forty-eight. The symptoms were weariness and a distaste for musical work, coupled with a desire to embark on voluminous philosophical dissertations (cf. Gogol's didactic *Correspondence with my Friends* and Tolstoy's numerous tracts in the period following the publication of *Anna Karenina*). In Korsakov's case "the persistent thought of writing a self-criticism" suggested a book on Russian music; but this in turn led him into the wider field of musical æsthetics and history; and thence through æsthetics in general to philosophy—a sudden feverish and unnatural desire to get to the bottom of all things. All his studies seem to have been wild and unsystematic, betraying a serious slackening of mental discipline. "For whole days long I pondered over these matters, turning my own disconnected ideas hither and thither. Then one morning, at the end of August or in September, I felt great fatigue, in conjunction with a violent rush of blood to the head and complete confusion of all my thoughts." Alarmed, he gave up his reading and spent much time in the open air. "Directly I was alone my thoughts persecuted me like delusive phantoms. I also

pondered over religion and meditated a humble reconciliation with Balakirev."

After a time he seemed to have recovered. " But my love for music had cooled off and I thought of nothing but my philosophical education." He read Spinoza and Herbert Spencer, and various æsthetic writings and histories of philosophy, buying new books nearly every day (" dashing from one to the other "), making marginal notes, and so on. Again he set to work on a book on musical æsthetics, and again this led him into the wilderness of metaphysics in general—and brought on a renewal of the old physical symptoms, " with giddiness and a sense of weight and pressure. I suffered greatly from these phenomena, which were also generally attended by certain tyrannising ideas." The production of one of his operas at the Petersburg Imperial Theatre brought distraction but did not revive the composer's impulse to create. A whole year elapsed before he even touched a piano seriously and felt for a few days " in a musical frame of mind." He began to think of writing musical text-books, and again these grew into " philosophical dissertations." Not till the spring of 1894 did Rimsky-Korsakov feel any impulse to compose again ; then for about a year he produced some of his best work. But in the middle of his work on *Sadko* he was quite suddenly overwhelmed by " unbearable weariness and indifference . . . even disgust for work," though this condition, he adds, had nothing in common with his previous experience. *Sadko*, one of his best and most characteristic works, was suddenly followed by a complete change and serious deterioration in Korsakov's musical style. Only in his last two operas, *Kitczh* and *The Golden Cockerel*, did he return to the manner and qualitative level of his earlier music. And by way of footnote to Rimsky-Korsakov's case, we must observe that his pupil Stravinsky has changed *his* musical style just as completely and suddenly in mid-career, though we naturally know nothing as yet of Stravinsky's inner life.

In addition, there are certain peculiarities of the Russian mind which seem to affect Russian creative art more directly, peculiarities of artistic technique rather than of artistic temperament. One is a very strong tendency to repetition with or without slight differences, instead of development of a subject, both in a single work and in a series of works. Everyone will be able to think of constantly recurrent types

and ideas in the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoïevsky. We can see the same trait in Moussorgsky's and Rimsky-Korsakov's tendency to modify, instead of genuinely developing, their musical material in any single work, as well as in the latter's constant harking back to similar musical ideas and dramatic situations in one opera after another. Borodin's persistent hammering away at his chief theme in the first movement of his B minor Symphony and Tolstoy's driving home of his theory of history toward the end of *War and Peace* betray precisely the same cast of mind working in totally different mediums. Again : Russian composers and novelists alike are generally weak *architecturally*. Their wholes consist of separate, intensely felt episodes, brilliantly juxtaposed rather than organically growing from each other.

One trait, above all, marks out the typical Russian creative artist from those of other nations—his relationship to his subject-matter, to whatever inspires him. The most superficial student of Russian literature knows that its predominant note is realism : the tendency, that is, to start from a basis of given facts and, broadly speaking, to portray them closely and accurately. The artistic faculty is employed in the selection and vivid presentation of the facts rather than in imaginative invention. And we find among Russian musicians the same need of a " given fact " as a nucleus for creative activity. In the musician's case this *donnée* may be either musical or extra-musical—a subjective emotion, a poem, a visual impression. It may be straining the point to adduce Tchaïkovsky's immediate expression of " raw " emotion, in his last two symphonies, in contrast with the Western musical tradition of mediate, sublimated expression. But there can be no question of the innate realism of opera-reformers like Dargomijsky and Moussorgsky. Even Rimsky-Korsakov turned in this direction at times. " I want the note to be the direct expression of the word," said Dargomijsky. And Moussorgsky again and again stated his aims in almost precisely the same words. Their musical ideal, which had next to nothing in common with Wagner's, was a sort of literal translation of words and even gestures into tones, a type of music very " close " to its verbal or pantomimic *donnée*.

But the predominantly lyrical, non-dramatic type of Russian composer seems in equal need of some " given " basis ; it must be a purely musical one—and he finds it in

folk-song. We see Glinka, Balakirev, Moussorgsky, in his lyrical moods, Rimsky-Korsakov and the rest continually borrowing from and imitating and leaning on folk-song, not by way of relaxation or patriotic gesture or simple, unconscious instinct as Western composers have always done, but as the very foundation of their art—and not getting very far away from folk-music without seriously weakening the quality of their production. They cannot *invent* with much success, but given an "external" subject they can work miracles. In this respect also there is a curious parallelism between Gogol and Balakirev, perhaps partly due to the fact that neither was a Great Russian. Gogol was a Ukrainian, of Cossack stock, and Balakirev had Tartar blood. At any rate, both showed a strong *penchant* for the romantic and heroic; and both, dependent on "given" subjects, worked on these foundations with extraordinary exuberance. The realistic basis of *Dead Souls* is obvious; but it is not so well known that the themes of Gogol's early fantastic stories are all borrowed from folk-lore, and are marvellously modified and decorated by his artistic imagination. As Janko Lavrin has put it, "his imagination is not inventive at all, but intensifying." Is not that largely true of Dostoïevsky as well? And that phrase also exactly defines the nature of Balakirev's musical imagination. He seldom invented themes of his own; his admitted borrowings are wholesale; but his creative fancy so decorated and intensified the most insignificant scraps of borrowed folk-music that his compositions are as completely the products of his own unique mind as the *Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka* are entirely Gogolian. Whereas Gogol and Balakirev, the most romantic of Russian prose-writers and composers respectively, thus embroidered and intensified their themes, the predominant Russian tendency has been toward classic, apparently objective treatment of data. But the existence of fundamental data seems to be equally necessary in all cases. To say that is not to disparage the Russian creative faculty, but to help to define its peculiar nature. It is no doubt true that all art depends to some extent on such data, but none so closely and obviously as that of the Russians.

GERALD ABRAHAM.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE "LOCARNO SPIRIT."

AS the time approached for the October resumption of the Disarmament Conference, the diplomatic politicians of Paris, London and Berlin—those of Rome standing apparently aloof—began perversely to speculate not upon the possibility of achieving disarmament, but upon the danger of war. The climax was reached on October 14th, when the German Government announced its decision to secede both from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations.

In the first half of October there had been something near a war scare. The Disarmament Conference itself had been adjourned on June 27th, what time the other conference was sitting in London, preparing the conditions which would make its own adjournment in turn inevitable. On June 27th it had been decided that the Disarmament Conference should reassemble on October 16th. While the politicians and their conferences thus stood adjourned, during August and most of September, the world pursued its peaceful tenor. By the beginning of October the world was plunged into a ferment of nervous apprehension so disturbingly realistic that Mr. Baldwin, leader of the Conservative party in Great Britain, could in simple and solemn sincerity declare that the British people now, as in 1914, were prepared to honour their pledges. He was speaking to a mass meeting of Conservatives in the Birmingham Town Hall on October 6th. Three passages of that speech at once assumed an international importance, and had some effect on the subsequent diplomacy of the three Powers. The first was a veiled warning to Germany that the British Government would not tolerate her demand for "sample" or "token" or "prototype" armaments of the classes forbidden her by the Treaty of Versailles. He said: "If that [disarmament] convention be signed the nation that breaks it will have no friend in this civilised world, and I would add this, the same is true of any nation which deliberately prevents such an agreement being reached by putting forward demands which might be acceptable after a time, but which would not be acceptable to-day to the other co-signatories." He next gave to France a reaffirmation of the

Locarno pledge: "What Great Britain has signed she will adhere to. She adhered to her signature with regard to Belgium; her signature to these agreements is sacred." In the third passage he forecast the hypothetical horrors of the next war and submitted the thesis that Great Britain could not stand out of it. "There are many people who say, 'Cut away from Europe, cut out of Europe.' It always strikes me that before the invention of the internal combustion engine that may have been an arguable proposition. To-day I think it is both crude and childish. Traffic in the air is only beginning."

The interesting question is: By what process had a situation developed in which the politicians of Great Britain found it necessary to consider whether, in the event of another Franco-German war, Great Britain would again fight, and if so on which side? There was nothing spectacular in the process, nor, before the German defection from Geneva above alluded to, were any definite events enacted. It was rather a result of nerves reacting from each of the three capitals upon the others. On September 3rd, for instance, M. Paul-Boncour, Foreign Minister of France, made a speech at Trébeurden, on the coast of Brittany, where he unveiled a memorial to the late M. Briand. The association of M. Briand's name with the treaties of Locarno no doubt suggested a theme; but M. Paul-Boncour went so far as to speak of "agitations which surge to the very confines of our territory"; of the French "strength to resist violence"; of the fortunate security given to France by the Covenant of the League of Nations and by the Locarno Treaty. It was M. Briand, he said, who had won for France the one real positive guarantee of security against "certain threats"; and it was M. Briand they should thank for the circumstance that Great Britain and Italy had signed that guarantee.

Now what precisely was M. Paul-Boncour afraid of? It is difficult to discuss this matter with any French politician or journalist and to doubt the sincerity of what they feel. In the south of France the people are perhaps less actively afraid; but those who live in the north-eastern districts that were devastated in the last war are most of them subdued, almost scared, by the thought that the thing may happen again, and happen soon. No doubt the explanation is that all classes of the French people instinctively feel that the

present temper of German politics, dating from January 30th last, is that of the hard, arrogant, efficient, cunning, militarist Germany that held the world at bay for four and a half years.

Yet it is not incontrovertibly clear that the present German politicians, or the majority of them, are deliberately encompassing a war, although they too often talk in a way that suggests that such, and no less, is their object. Quotations have been made in these pages before from some of Herr Hitler's bewildering speeches in which at one moment he extols peace and at another moment extols war. The publicly spoken words of Dr. Goebbels, who on September 2nd, for example, claimed that the measures taken against the Jews were a "defensive action," are nearly always the words of a man who either genuinely thinks in a muddle or who regards muddle as an excellent means to the favour of the German people. The conception of what one can only call "defensive aggression" seems, moreover, to be a fairly general contortion of Nazi political thought. On September 19th, for example, Herr Habicht, in a speech he delivered in Berlin, said that the measures Germany had taken against Austria were "protective measures in favour of the German people." One of Herr Hitler's latest speeches (September 3rd) declared that present-day Germany did not want to win new laurels on the battlefield, for the reason (of all the surprising reasons he could have hit upon) that no new war could bring to Germany any greater military glory, prestige or honour than she had won on the battlefields of the last war. On September 6th the Minister of Defence, at the end of certain Reichswehr exercises carried out at Ulm, spoke in a spirit that suggested a sort of transcendental wonder, love and praise about the German army, revivified and ennobled as he said it had been by Herr Hitler. He said that the army now deserved and received their "fullest confidence, unconditional trust, and unshakable devotion," and that they [the German people *en masse*] were determined "to live, to work and, if need be, to die in this new reformed and reanimated Reich." If the death they covet could only be consummated literally in the Reich, not involving anybody outside the Reich, one could wish them all good luck and peace ever after. But the tiresome thing about them is that they apparently need a war in order to live, work and die for the Fatherland. To plough one's way through the welter of

public statements made in recent weeks by German politicians is to involve oneself in much confusion without much satisfaction. What, for instance, did General Göring mean on September 15th, when he said, at the opening of the new Prussian State Council in Berlin, that the Nazi revolution had destroyed in Germany "the system of parliamentarism and pacifism"? Did he mean that Germany was not now pacifist? And if not pacifist, what else could she be but militarist? On the very same day Freiherr von Neurath received in audience the representatives in Berlin of the foreign Press. He said to them that it was only in countries outside of Germany that anybody spoke of war; that in Germany nobody even contemplated war, because they all knew that even victory in war was of no value. At the very same moment, therefore, that one member of the German Cabinet was announcing to domestic opinion that Germany was not pacifist, another member of that Cabinet was announcing to foreign opinion that Germany was indeed pacifist. Freiherr von Neurath, however, somewhat inconsistently also said Germany claimed the right to defend herself with all her strength against "the spirit of Versailles"; that she demanded "equal defensive strength" with the Versailles Powers, and that she had no objection, on such a basis, to a system of international control and supervision of armaments. Would Freiherr von Neurath at this moment welcome a war with France? On the available evidence one can at least understand the attitude of those who answer that he would probably not be sorry to see the French army crushed and driven to the sea, provided it be clearly understood by the world at large that Germany's motive was the pure motive of self-defence.

It is a present commonplace of the French General Staff that Germany means war, and that the German General Staff has its plans all made for an invasion of France through the plains of north-western Switzerland, the choice of route being dictated by the belief that if France were thus invaded, there would be no little Belgium to attract England into the war on the wrong side. The incidental hypothesis that Geneva itself may become a scene of war and that the new Palace of Peace, when or before it is completed, may become a riddled ruin, is the sort of thing that tickles the humour of the war-mongers.

By the time Mr. Baldwin made the Birmingham speech above quoted, the leading politicians of the three capitals had adopted certain attitudes which they not only did not attempt to disguise but which they apparently wanted to advertise. The main differences thereby revealed were readily recognisable. The chief emphasis in the French case was that the promise given last December of equality of rights was given to a pre-Nazi Germany; that Nazi Germany was a different Germany, and that it was necessary for her to prove her pacific intentions before the like promise could be repeated and fulfilled. Hence the proposal for a four-year period of probation and control. Such control could be applied only to the means of armament production. It would be easy for a Control Commission to see that no plant existed for the manufacture of the heavy guns, tanks, and scouting aeroplanes forbidden by Versailles; but if the new German demand for a few "samples" of such arms, as an earnest of ultimate equality, were now conceded, it would mean that Germany could now set up the plant, and no Commission could possibly control its output.

The second important element in the French case was that during the probationary period there should be a previously agreed and specified "sanction" against the contingency of Germany's being discovered to be secretly rearming. Such a sanction would take the form, for instance, of an "Allied" occupation of a specified area of German territory.

The British Government was inclined to agree with the French in its view of the difference made to the December promise by the emergence of a Nazi Germany, and in postulating a probationary period of control. Mr. Baldwin, in effect, reaffirmed that point on October 6th. Where the British Government joined issue with the French was in doubting the wisdom or the expediency of a rigidly agreed "sanction." The more elastic sanction outlined in the British draft convention of last March was still preferred. Moreover, an occupation of German territory would itself violate the Treaty of Locarno. French official doubts having lately been thrown upon the British Government's present attitude to the Treaty of Locarno, Mr. Baldwin on October 6th gave the categoric assurance that the Treaty was regarded as a binding commitment.

The German position seemed to be equally clear. The

Counsellor of the German Embassy, Prince Otto von Bismarck (successor as such to Count Bernstorff and grandson of the Iron Chancellor), saw Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office in the morning of October 6th, and that afternoon Mr. Eden left London for Birmingham and there informed Mr. Baldwin of what Prince Bismarck had said before Mr. Baldwin delivered his speech. In one sense Prince Bismarck's visit to Sir John Simon was misunderstood. His object was understood to have been, not formally to convey a German official answer to French and British policies, but informally to restate Germany's attitude towards the general problem, in order that the Bureau at Geneva when it met the following week might have some idea what to expect. A similar step was taken by the German authority in Rome. The reason apparently why no corresponding message was delivered in Paris, or to the American delegation in Geneva, was that Berlin regarded London and Rome as the potential mediators between the German and the French points of view. German opinion was anxious to emphasise the point that Germany did not ask for "offensive" sample armaments, nor did she decline any system of control, provided it be generally and equally applied. What, however, Germany did demand was the immediate grant of equality of rights.

Before the Bureau of the conference met on October 9th the main uncertainty in the various capitals had been the extent to which the British Government might be induced to concede the French request for a previously stipulated sanction against Germany's violation of the probationary period. On Sunday, October 1st, Mr. MacDonald flew to France and back. He attended the unveiling at Beauvais of the lost airship R 101, and took the opportunity, so one had reason to believe, of discussing that question with M. Daladier. As always, London official opinion was loth to commit itself to a categoric sanction in advance, but French official opinion was assured that Whitehall regarded itself as already in effect committed to the principle of the sanction. Both the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which the British Government is committed, would be violated by a German rearmament not agreed to by the other signatories. The Treaty of Locarno particularised a British commitment to France in the event of a German "aggression." The Pact of Paris and the Four-Power Pact

had been accepted by Germany. The practical question therefore was: Could a German rearmament be construed as an "aggression" in the Locarno sense? There appeared to be no difficulty in British official quarters against answering "Yes" to that question, for if Germany had been promised ultimate equality of rights contingently upon a clean bill during a probationary period, and then broke the condition by rearming, obviously Germany would have committed the "breach or threat of a breach" provided for in the British Draft Convention of March 16th itself. Part 1 of that draft, entitled "Security," still represented, however, the extent to which the British Government would in practice be prepared to go to meet such a contingency. The relevant articles ran thus: "Article 3. In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, a conference between the High Contracting Parties shall at once meet at the request of any five of them, provided that at least one of the Governments mentioned by name in Article 4 joins in that request. Such request may be addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, whose duty it will then be to make arrangements for the conference and to notify the High Contracting Parties accordingly. The meeting shall take place at Geneva, unless any other meeting-place is agreed upon. Article 4: Any conclusions reached at such meeting shall, to be valid, require the concurrence of the representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of a majority of the representatives of the other Governments participating in the Conference, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute. Article 5: It shall be the object of the said conference, if called in view of a threat of breach of the Pact, to agree upon the steps which could be taken in respect of such threat and, in the event of a breach of the Pact of Paris being found to have occurred, to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible."

When Mr. MacDonald introduced the British draft at Geneva on March 16th he said: "We lay down quite plainly that no nation which has signed the agreement of this Conference, which I hope is going to be signed, can be indifferent to a breach of the Kellogg Pact by any other nation. We couple that with

the provision relating to supervision which will give some security that whatever obligations have been undertaken are being actually carried out." That statement was a little vague in French eyes ; but there appeared at least to be no doubt in Whitehall that the right British policy was to make known in advance its opposition to any German attempt at rearmament. By the time the Disarmament Conference was due to resume its work it seemed clear that France and Great Britain, supported somewhat hesitantly by the United States, were determined neither to allow Germany to rearm during the probationary period nor to allow her to build " sample " prototypes of the arms forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. The views of Rome had not been made known before Herr Hitler made his momentous announcement on October 14th ; but it was assumed in Paris and in London that the Four-Power Pact, to which Signor Mussolini was known to attach some value, and the Locarno Treaty, to which Italy was a signatory, would make unlikely an Italian approval of a policy of German rearmament. What was not known, and could not up to that time be guessed, was how far the Italian Government might go in support of the French thesis of a probationary period conditioned by military sanction.

All such speculations were cut short on October 14th. On that day Freiherr von Neurath telegraphed to Geneva the decision of his Government to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference. Herr Hitler announced that Germany would also resign from the League. Yet Herr Hitler's manifesto and the broadcast address given by him that same evening emphasised his pacific purpose. It was disarmament, he said, that Germany wanted ; and Germany would return to Geneva when the other Powers showed any disposition to disarm. The remarkable historic situation thereby immediately produced was that on the one hand Germany in theory had a case—for it was true that the Versailles and Locarno promises of general disarmament had not been honoured ; but on the other hand she had an almost uniformly bad Press throughout the world. There was not one single government in the world that felt anything but antipathy to Germany : not the Italian, nor the Russian, nor the American, nor the Austrian. Why ? Because the men who now rule Germany are rightly or wrongly regarded as dangerous ; and because it was universally felt that to withdraw in that way from the

Disarmament Conference was either a foolish or a mischievous thing to do. The German character is a curious mixture of naïveté, pathos and brutality. Men like Herr Hitler, General von Hammerstein, General Göring, Dr. Goebbels are perhaps not the best of men to lead such a nation. It is no doubt true that Herr Stresemann and Dr. Brüning, who were the right kind, were stultified by a short-sighted French policy, as stupid in its way as the present German policy. Hence an element of tragedy in the muddle. Fortunately the event of October 14th seemed to produce, not excitement, but a grim calm in the chief capitals concerned. Few people in their hearts really expected war ; and the mere fact that Germany, by the remarkable lack of worldly wisdom shown by her rulers, had robbed herself of all her friends, was itself a left-handed asset for peace.

The " Blue Eagle."

The blue eagle is the insignia of " Nira," the National Industrial Recovery Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives on May 27th and by the Senate on June 13th. For four months the United States, one of the biggest industrial countries in the world, has been submitted to the arbitrary management of a politician, who has had the power and the assurance to attempt no less a thing than the reorganisation of the country's whole commercial life on the basis of his own dogmas. What is courage ? If it be courage for a man to defy the accumulated wisdom of commercial experience and to be so confident of himself that at a stroke of his pen he ordains the conditions on which a hundred million people must depend for their livelihood, then courage is the right word for Mr. Roosevelt. Courage by itself, however, is probably the least valuable and the least constructive of human qualities. Any burglar has courage. Discretion and common sense are the better part. Mr. Roosevelt's own recital of what he aims at is surely the most surprising essay in political exuberance that has been given to the world since, on July 6th, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics passed the text of that country's new constitution. The text of " Nira " is prefaced by a general preamble expressing its purpose, and reading thus : " A national emergency productive of widespread

unemployment and disorganisation of industry, which burdens inter-state commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standard of living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of inter-state commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof, and to promote the organisation of industry for the purpose of co-operative action among state groups, to induce and maintain united action of labour and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve the standards of labour, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources."

The central object, it follows, was the rehabilitation of industry. The central means to be adopted were, on the one hand, that " employees shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing " and, on the other hand, that the employers be bound by certain restrictions upon their freedom to use their own capital as they wished to use it. " Codes of fair competition " were applied to employers in each separate industry, and, in addition, a " blanket code " was applied generally to industry for a first period beginning August 1st and ending December 31st, 1933. By the terms of that code employers were asked " voluntarily " to undertake (with the black-listing implications of the blue eagle to encourage them) the following main obligations: Not to employ employees, other than factory or mechanical workers, for more than forty hours in any one week . . . not to employ factory or mechanical workers or artisans for more than a maximum week of thirty-five hours until December 31st, 1933, but with the right to work a maximum week of forty hours for any six weeks within this period, and not to employ any worker more than eight hours in any one day . . . not to pay the first-mentioned class of workmen less than a maximum varying between fifteen dollars to fourteen dollars a week in different areas . . . not to pay the other class of workmen less than forty cents an hour, unless the hourly rate on July 15th, 1929, was less than forty cents an hour, in which case not to pay less than the hourly rate of July 15th, 1929, and in no event less than thirty cents an hour.

If one is to test the effect of such interference with a business man's conduct of his own business, the case of Mr. Ford seems to be a fair case to take. Who is Mr. Ford? Henry Ford was born on a farm in 1863. At the age of fourteen he was working every evening repairing clocks and watches without charging for his services, because he was insatiably curious to find out about the mechanism of clocks and watches. At the age of sixteen he left his father's farm because he disliked farm work and because his father objected to his working in the evenings for no pay. That was the young Ford's first experience of external interference with his freedom to do his own work on his own terms. He walked to Detroit (where now his gigantic industry is situated) and became a mechanical apprentice at two and a half dollars a week, working ten hours a day. As he could not get lodgings for less than three and a half dollars a week he took on additional work in the evenings in a jeweller's shop, where he worked from 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. for two dollars a week. He therefore worked about eighty hours a week for about seven cents an hour. Throughout his life he has known what hard work means. By the fruit of his own hard work and by the capitalist use of the money he has earned by his work he has established in the United States and in other countries one big central industry and fifty subsidiary industries giving employment directly and indirectly to nearly half a million people, who are paid an average of eight dollars a day. It has been one of his basic principles that profits are the just reward of enterprise, and that profits must be made if a business is to expand; and it has been another of his principles that the highest possible wages should be paid in order to maintain purchasing power (which is necessary for the making of profits) at the highest possible level. But the wages that can be paid are the exclusive province of the employer. Before 1914 Mr. Ford's average wage was less than two and a half dollars a day for a nine-hour day. Since the war he has quadrupled his rates of pay, but only because he has made enormous profits. The profits must come first. Mr. Roosevelt, in 1933, has ordained that in all industries—whether profits are being made or not—high wages must come first, and the employers who pay them must if needs be wait for their profits. One must go to *Alice in Wonderland* for comparable business principles. Mr. Ford, by contrast, is a man who all his life has believed that

business is the result of the unfettered play of the simple business-like principle of supply being made to meet demand. He is the living example of the simple success of an obvious simple principle. The politicians who sit in Moscow, or in Washington, to " plan " supply (provided by somebody else's labour) and to " plan " demand, are the lineally descended disciples of King Canute, who tried to " plan " the sea and its tides. On September 5th, 1933, Mr. Ford made it known that he rejected Mr. Roosevelt's codes. The protest he thereby made was directed against the principle of political interference with business, for the wages he was himself paying were more than the wages prescribed by the codes. He knew, from an abundant competence to judge, that socialism is the death of industry, and that the " blue eagle " slogan of socialism in the cause of industrial recovery became a dangerous form of perversity when it was driven by all the " ballyhoo " of which American popular emotionalism is capable. On September 14th General Johnson, the driver of Nira, announced that no action would be taken against Mr. Ford if he would only recognise the right of collective bargaining on the part of employees, the Nira obligation being a voluntary form of national industrial confusion. By that time there were strikes from coast to coast, for the " collective bargaining " doctrine preached by Mr. Roosevelt had become a nation-wide " racket " among workmen, who now thought that it was necessary only for the toiling masses to strike in order to enforce ever-increasing wages and ever-dwindling hours of work. Even Mr. Ford's employees, formerly the most contented and best paid in the world, had gone on strike. And we witnessed the impressive spectacle of Mr. Ford announcing that he was ready, if need be, to close down his entire plant if he could not get back his workmen on his own terms. If one of the first fruits of " national industrial recovery," as planned by a politician, were to be the closing down of one of America's greatest existing industries, the event would provide fair comment on the facts, but would be neither fair nor cheerful in any other sense.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 15th, 1933.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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A FRENCH ESTIMATE OF JOHN RUSKIN.*

This important and in some senses definitive work on the personality and creative powers of John Ruskin forms a new philosophic link between France and England since, for the first time, the intuitive ideas of M. Bergson are fully grouped with those of Ruskin. Mademoiselle Henriette Gally has considered the work and influence of Ruskin as a whole. He is much more than a great prose writer, a superb critic, a social thinker greatly in advance of his time. His whole life was a growth in the ideas of beauty, religion and the relationship of Man to God, and he lived long enough to complete the synthesis of his idealism into a large conception of the place of man in the universe of God. Ruskin awakened his own generation to a sense not only of beauty and religion, but to the duty of social service, as can be seen in the records of the Ruskin societies which abounded in the mid- and later nineteenth century; and he awakened it not only to this or that aspect of his thoughts, but to the whole body of his conception. Dr. Gally's book stands witness to this fact and perhaps

* *Ruskin et L'esthétique intuitive : thèse presentée à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Grenoble*, par Henriette Gally. J. Vrin, 6 Place de la Sorbonne, Paris.

the only criticism that can justly be made with reference to her monumental treatise is that she does not elaborate the influences, direct and indirect, of George Berkeley, the idealist, sometime Bishop of Cloyne, on M. Henri Bergson—whose mother was English—and Ruskin, born forty years before the great French philosopher, who is still, happily, with us.

Dr. Gally divides her treatise into three parts, the æsthetic intuitions of Ruskin the artist, the social intuitions of Ruskin the economist, and, finally, what is practically a treatise on correct intuition as illustrated by the thought and work of Ruskin and M. Bergson. This threefold treatment is of extraordinary importance to-day. The Ruskin vogue, and his increasing influence, lasted beyond his life, but the personal influence vanished with the Great War of 1914-18. Since that date another phase has begun. Before the War he was mostly realised as a great though eccentric writer and critic with noble social ideals expressed in, among many other works, *Unto this Last*. Ruskin's political economy—the political economy expressed in parable after parable by Our Lord—was ignored or even laughed at by at any rate English professional economists and other clever people, though he was not directly attacked, partly because he was rather a terrible person to attack—his prose, says Dr. Gally with truth, was his sword—and partly because it was convenient to ignore him and his economic views. Ruskin and Newman are, at their best, the greatest of the English nineteenth-century prose writers, and not even a hard-skinned English economist would have welcomed the fate that Charles Kingsley underwent at the hands of Newman. The economists were waiting for, to them, the inevitable disappearance of *Unto this Last* in the decade after Ruskin's death. But after the War English economists found themselves in a sad position and the social ideals and intuitions, based on social facts, of Ruskin were truer to reality than the professional economists, split into many factions, liked. The economics of the Synoptic Gospels were meeting the post-war difficulties in a fashion that was impossible with the new mathematical economists.

Indeed, long before the War it was seen by Parliament that the ideas of *Unto this Last* would have to be adopted, and those who were working with Cardinal Manning on Poor Law Reform were, in fact, working on Ruskin's lines. The present writer, just down from Cambridge, remembers working with

Cardinal Manning in his last two years and boldly advocating the economic principles of *Unto this Last*, to the amazement of all his friends. Ruskin was still alive and inspiration was to be found indirectly at Orpington, where the Allen family lived and were kind to enthusiastic undergraduates. A personal reminiscence is allowable in reviewing a book that puts in such admirable form the two sides, culminating in one great whole, of Ruskin's thought. Twenty-five years before the War Ruskin's economic intuitions began to take political form. After the War the Ruskin economics became formidable, and now, when divorced from religion and beauty, threaten to become dangerous.

That is the reason that Dr. Gally's book is specially important. Ruskin, as a personality affecting a particular generation, is dead. His economics, divorced from his doctrine or religion of beauty and faith, is dangerous because, in the hands of the modern "dictators" who are swaying a large part of Europe, the cause of the individual is lost and a new tyranny threatens, in specious ways, a new society. To separate the economics from the faith and the doctrine of beauty which balances the economic theories of Ruskin is to make his work of none effect. Ruskin realised, every idealist of the Berkeley school must realise, that growth, evolutionary growth, is the source of the whole social as well as the whole organic mystery of things. Darwin and the Abbé Mendel, de Savigny and Maine have made this an intellectual and moral commonplace. Yet a crude form of social reform mixed with a struggle for political power, and aiming at the dictatorship of this or that individual, reflects not the views of John Ruskin, but the views of John Austin, who, living before the days of Darwin, taught that force is at the root of law. The reverse is true. Law governs everything and uses force as an instrument of growth. Ruskin saw this intellectually as well as intuitively, if the two functions of the spirit can be separated. Dr. Gally, in her account of the influences that built up the thinking power and the æsthetic power and the religious power, which combined is the power that we associate with the name of John Ruskin, realises this, and the sections of her book which summarise these influences are most important, influences certainly not confined to English thinkers, painters and poets.

Yet her main point is that the Ruskin force in respect

of our own time cannot be separated. Separation is indeed absurd and dangerous, leading on the one hand to political anarchy and on the other to the anarchical conception of beauty as a thing-in-itself. Individualism must be realised as a force playing on the social mass; the social mass as a force playing on individualism with, as its goals, beauty, faith and social happiness. The whole trend of modern English and Welsh public education, from the infant school to the university, is in this direction. John Ruskin would have been as much delighted with the work of the Board of Education and the local education authorities and the different grades of schools to-day as he would have been horrified with the modern doctrines of political dictatorship. A good translation of Dr. Gally's book into English is urgently needed, and if she could be induced by some enterprising publisher to undertake the task herself so much the better, since her knowledge of English is perfect.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

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SOLOMON J. SOLOMON.*

Solomon J. Solomon, born in the year 1860, was the fourth son and fifth child of Joseph and Helena Solomon. Drawing and music were the outstanding accomplishments of the Joseph Solomon family. Solomon inherited his artistic taste as well as his *joie de vivre* from his mother. For a Jew to be a painter by vocation in those days was very unusual, but Mrs. Joseph Solomon was determined that her son should be the artist which she knew he was capable of being, and he in fact became a distinguished portrait painter.

It was in the Great War that his genius as a *Camoufleur* was recognised. The fact is well illustrated by a remark made by Sir Martin Conway in February 1918: "This is the most important find since the beginning of the war." Miss Phillips' sketch of his career in peace and war is a valuable contribution to the history of modern art. The unpublished war diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Solomon, now printed in this volume, tells the reader for the first time the uses of *camouflage* in the Great

* *Solomon J. Solomon: A Memoir of Peace and War.* By Olga Somech Phillips. Herbert Joseph. 10s. 6d. net.

War. It was in February 1918 that Solomon made the wonderful discovery of the German method of *camouflage* for concealing troops. This section of the book is a remarkable addition to the literature of the war of 1914-18.

After the war Solomon gathered up the threads of his artistic life afresh. He was selected by the members of the Royal Society of British Artists to paint a portrait of the present Lord Harewood: Princess Mary's wedding gift from the Society. He painted many well-known members of Society. In the last period of his career he painted portraits of Earl Haig, Mr. Maurice Moscovitch, Lord and Lady Swaythling, the Dowager Lady Harewood, Sir William Birdwood and many others, including the Archbishop of Wales, and Dr. Pearce, Bishop of Worcester.

Solomon had suffered much mentally during the war, but it was only after 1925 that his strength was visibly declining, though he insisted in carrying on his work until ten days before his death on July 27th, 1927, at his home in Birchington. Solomon understood the inner workings of art. He was one of the most distinguished artists of the decade before the war. As a teacher he was very successful, greatly because of his faculty of exposition and his infinite capacity for taking pains, faculties shown in detail in his treatise on *Oil Painting*.

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CHILDREN AND PURITANISM.*

The new volume of the Yale Studies in Religious Education deals with a sad subject, the relationship of children and puritanism in the New England States between the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620 and the days in 1847 when Horace Bushnell, a Yale man of great distinction, published his *Views of Christian Nurture* and ended the dreadful epoch of the Calvinistic suppression of childhood. Dr. Sandford Fleming describes the two centuries of Calvinistic rule in a perfectly fair way. He is a broadminded educational philosopher as well as a Christian thinker of outstanding distinction. He is as horrified as his readers at the story he has to tell, the

* *Children and Puritanism: the Place of Children in the Life and Thought of the New England Churches*, 1620-1847. By Sandford Fleming. Oxford University Press. 13s. 6d. net.

story of the crushing religious fear which for two centuries was imposed on the New England children.

> It is particularly pathetic to think of children being exposed to the strong appeal to fear which was characteristic of the preaching, with the emphasis on the divine wrath at the violation of the law, and the inevitable punishment that must follow. God and the things of religion must have appeared in anything but attractive guise to children who, from earliest childhood, were terrified with the awful description of hell, and the declaration that they might be sent there. The fertile imagination of children would inevitably intensify the picture that was presented, and it would be more terrible in consequence. The references to the sermons of Shepard and Edwards in which they describe the terrors of the damned have a new significance when one remembers that there were children in the congregations to which these sermons were preached, and that sermons of like character were addressed directly to children.

As late as 1830 the doctrine of the damnation of infants is set forth with rigorous detail by the Rev. Alvan Hyde. The pure misery of the New England sabbath was intensified by the dreary books for children and the awfulness of the sermons. The whole story is a terrible one and must be read to be believed. Calvin was sorry for his logical conclusions, but the ministers of New England were not sorry at all. They seemed to rejoice in the existence of a hell for little children. The preachers made no distinction between adults and children; all are "heirs of hell"; "even little infants, that appear so innocent and pretty, are God's little enemies at heart." Many children died of fear even into the nineteenth century.

The admirable account of the establishment of the New England Churches shows, however, that the founders were men of learning and of faith with great ability. Their views were deliberately adopted for a deliberate purpose, the establishment of an iron faith. Dr. Fleming justly draws attention to their unfaltering fidelity, their thoroughgoing earnestness, their uncompromising zeal.

> In this study the failure of the New England Puritans to recognise the significance and the needs of the child, and their attempts to regiment the religious experience are given prominence. But we must not fail to acknowledge the greatness and the nobility of these men who at all times "put God first."

It would be idle to think that the lapse of less than a hundred years since Bushnell introduced a new epoch has excluded the old Puritan spirit. Many things that are inexplicable to modern English people in the American people are due, it may be thought with justice, to the survival of the Puritan spirit or to fierce reactions from that spirit. But in any event (and this is a point that Dr. Fleming has not touched) this fierce religious faith was very likely due not to Calvin and not indeed to Puritanism proper, but to the fact that many of the early emigrants were descendants of the old English Lollards. Many Lollard congregations from the fourteenth century onwards, after the Black Death, were terrible people out of the control of Wiclif and his followers. They had inherited the fearful notions of the contrast of good and evil that can be traced back to the poems of Cynewulf. Hell was a terrible reality. They had discarded the Roman doctrine of a period of purgation with all other Roman doctrines. There remained Heaven and Hell, the doctrine of Goodness and Badness, the reaction of Devil Worship which Anglo-Saxons and Danes combined to stamp out. The seventeenth century settlers in America were faced with conditions which their Lollard ancestors had faced centuries before, with, as a matter of fact, Devil Worship by the Indians near their borders. May one attempt to explain the harsh faith of the settlers in this way, a faith far older than the times of Calvin, far older, indeed, than the times of Wiclif and Huss? If it is true, then England bears part of the blame for the martyrdom of American childhood during two whole centuries, centuries which Dr. Fleming has described with notable fairness and with a vividness which is both distressing and tragic.

J. E. G. DE M.

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THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER.*

In December 1931 the Statute of Westminster was passed into law almost unheeded by the general public but with some misgivings by many especially interested in the unity of the Empire. The lack of general interest was due doubtless to the fact that the Statute conferred upon the Dominions no

* The Statute of Westminster, 1931. Oxford University Press. 6s. net.

greater autonomy than in practice they already enjoyed. The declaration of equality of status at the Imperial Conference of 1926 had confirmed the already existing convention that the Imperial Parliament should legislate for a Dominion only in such measure as that Dominion might admit or require. In spite of this, several of the Dominions, notably South Africa and the Irish Free State, desired to place their *de facto* sovereignty upon a *de jure* basis. The Statute of Westminster was the result.

In his excellent, though somewhat controversial, book upon the Statute Mr. K. C. Wheare rightly points out that the Statute marks the culmination of the Dominions advance to self-determination.

> It stands at the close of a period in the history of the British Empire which has witnessed the gradual emergence of those overseas possessions of the Crown which now comprise the British Commonwealth of Nations from a state of imperial governance to full responsible self-government.

The Statute, while giving the Dominions the powers of over-riding the Imperial Parliament and of passing extra-territorial legislation, cannot derogate from the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. The latter cannot bind itself.

> If, for example, an Imperial Act were passed to-morrow which in terms applied to, say, the Union of South Africa, then it would be interpreted by the Courts as a repeal *pro tanto* of s. 4 of the Statute because the later Act always prevails.

Section 4 provides that no Act passed by the Imperial Parliament shall affect a Dominion unless the Dominion has requested or consented to its enactment. It is, however, quite clear that no over-riding or repealing legislation can be passed in practice. Mr. Wheare quotes approvingly Mr. McGilligan, of the Irish Free State, when he said that "the moment that repeal was attempted the whole Commonwealth of Nations would be broken up." But it is equally clear that a similar outcome was threatened had the Imperial Parliament exercised its powers before the Statute was passed. Dominion sovereignty still rests upon a convention.

But while in matters of internal government the position of the Dominions remains much the same, the continuance of a common law for matters essentially of an intra-imperial nature is gravely threatened. Merchant shipping, for example,

is regulated throughout the Empire by a single code, the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. The Statute of Westminster has given to each Dominion power to repeal this Act and pass its own sectional legislation. The confusion which would inevitably result was indeed recognised and the United Kingdom and Dominion governments entered into an agreement to alter the law only by concerted action.

> Upon the passing of the Statute of Westminster it came into force throughout the Commonwealth, and in merchant shipping, at least, we have uniformity by voluntary agreement taking the place of uniformity imposed by a single, over-ruling parliament upon subordinate legislatures.

But it is necessary to remember the narrower limits of the agreement. In the words of Professor Keith in his recent work, *The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions*:

> The obligation on the governments is merely to propose legislation to give effect to the principles enumerated, and, if the legislature fails to accept the proposals, the government of the part concerned is not affected to the extent that it can be held to have failed to implement the agreement.

The relations between the various parts of the Commonwealth in intra-imperial matters are not far removed in form though very far removed in spirit from those existing between independent foreign states. The instrument which enables common action to be taken resembles a treaty between foreign powers. If the Empire is to retain the necessary measure of unity and profess a common policy towards the outside world there must exist a central body capable *de facto* of binding the whole Commonwealth in matters of common concern. The Statute of Westminster, entrusting such matters to sectional legislation, tends to endanger the main current of imperial unity; but the existing system of Imperial Conferences may supply a common policy and that measure of unity which external pressure makes necessary for the safety of the Parts as well as the safety of the Imperial Whole. The whole is a British League of Nations.

This little work is full of notes and references, but, unfortunately, Mr. Wheare has failed to provide an index.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE.*

The history of the Foreign Office is a fascinating one, and Sir John Tilley, with his great experience, brings that history vividly before us. It may be that the late Professor Tout's vast history of mediæval administration in England could throw some new light upon the original Secretaryship to the Sovereign. It seems difficult to separate it from the power to use the Privy Seal. But, however that may be, the dealing with "foreign affairs" as a branch of the State administration is definitely mediæval. There were great developments dating from 1640, the Foreign Office as a separate department of the State dates from 1782, while the Foreign Office "with a life, or organism, separate from that of the Secretary of State," only dates from the reforms of 1906.

> The vast change . . . which the reform really effected was that the "Office," as distinct from the Secretary of State, became a body with a highly influential opinion. . . . The real object of our work was, or ought to have been, to help the Secretary of State to get through his day's work; and it was not to help the present-day historian or the historian of the future.

The reform endeavoured, with small effect, to suppress the "private letter," which plays such a notable part in diplomatic history. Of course, the "private letter" was capable of abuse, and Lord Palmerston notoriously abused it by actually carrying on negotiations in that way. On the other hand Lord Salisbury used the "private letter" for keeping in constant personal touch with the most important ambassadors in the service of the Crown. The uses of the "private letter" are so obvious that the effort to abolish the practice is doomed to failure, and that is fully realised by Sir John Tilley, but he states the difficulty very fairly.

> The real point at issue is that private letters, although possibly of great help to the Secretary of State, make things rather more difficult for the Office and eventually for the historian, and the attempt to suppress them was part of the theory, unavowed no doubt, that it is the Institution and not the Minister which is of real importance. Moreover, human nature being what it is, people simply will not put into despatches, or even minutes, their innermost thoughts, if there is a possibility, as according to the latest practice there now is, of seeing them all published within a very few years. The attempt to make everything public and available will either dry up some sources of information or drive that information farther underground.

* *The Foreign Office.* By Sir John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee, with an Introduction by Sir John Simon. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 7s. 6d. net.

There is another difficulty that springs out of the reforms of 1906. Sir John Simon, in his welcome introduction to this book, describes the continuous arrival of telegrams in cipher,

> each presenting some new facet in a many-sided situation, and each recording a stage in the reaction between the advice of the man on the spot and the conclusions of Ministers at home. And while the public concentrates its attention on the leading problem, or the prominent excitement of the moment, and the skilled commentators of the Press direct their searchlight on the centre of the stage, there are almost continuous communications proceeding with many other corners of the world, unheeded by the rest of us, but each presenting its own urgent difficulty and calling for prompt treatment if a dangerous or uncomfortable situation is to be avoided. So vast and varied a range of duties can only be discharged through the collaboration of a staff endowed with the highest qualities of expert knowledge, of discretion, and of loyalty to the country they serve.

But Sir John Tilley calls attention to the possible dangers of expert knowledge that have grown up since 1906. In the old days, despite the severity of the entrance examination, the clerks in the Foreign Office had a certainty for many years of mere routine work as their lot in life. Under the new system expert knowledge can have its chance. But under the old system the Secretary of State was in direct personal touch with the Ambassador or the man on the spot, while under the new system the danger is that the Downing Street experts, being at the side of the Secretary of State, "might speak with as loud a voice as the man on the spot, if not louder, even though their knowledge of the country in question were some years old." That is a real danger and makes, it would seem, the system of private letters between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador or man on the spot essential, even more essential to-day than in the time of Lord Salisbury. The brains at the top of the Foreign Office are perhaps the most acute in England, if examination and foreign service are a test of acuteness, and the Secretary of State of the future may be a man who, despite great natural and political ability, has no knowledge of foreign tongues and manners. He will have to

rely on the combined advice of the men at the Office or "the man on the spot," the Ambassador representing the Crown in Ruritania. It is a very awkward position unless the Secretary of State is a very strong man with a natural gift for weighing evidence. On the other hand the development of acute brains in the permanent staff is essential, and Lord Lansdowne was perfectly right when he maintained that "the result of an examination depending almost entirely on knowledge of foreign languages was to bring in men without proper education," and he raised the minimum age to twenty-two with the object of attracting university candidates who had a proper education. Probably a high degree in classics is the best training. The rejection of Greek as an optional subject in favour of "useful subjects" in 1891 was, from the point of view of education in the true sense, an absurd as well as a retrograde step.

The account of the Foreign Office during the War shows that the new system was working well. Sir John, in his successive chapters, makes delightful reading, since he has managed to illustrate very important issues with most pertinent anecdotes. His services as Chief Clerk ended in 1918, and Mr. Stephen Gaselee—also a great classical specialist and linguist—describes the Foreign Office as it exists to-day: its various political, non-political, and news departments; its famous library and the new system of registering correspondence. To the practitioner engaged in public or private international law work, Mr. Gaselee's chapters will be invaluable, and not only as a supplement to the third edition of Sir Ernest Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. The two sections together form a work of great practical usefulness to the historian and to the student of international law. J. E. G. DE M.

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A CANADIAN SAGA.*

The notable literary gifts of the late Sir John Macdonell have descended on his daughter, Mrs. R. W. Lee, and she uses those gifts for educational purposes of real moment. At

* *The Name on the Rock: A Play in Three Acts, with Prologue and Epilogue.* By Amice Macdonell (Mrs. R. W. Lee). George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1s. 6d. net.

the present time there is an opening for the use of dramatic talent in the innumerable clubs for boys and girls and young people that have sprung up over the British Empire. But there is a lack of drama suitable for young people. It is true there is always Shakespeare, and it is a good thing for young people to strive to act these famous plays, especially those which bring out the inherent patriotism of the British peoples. But something simpler is needed for the younger folk and Mrs. Lee has devised a series of historical and other plays which are exactly suited to intrinsic and budding dramatic talent. At the present time there is a great effort made to teach the rudiments of Art and Music in the primary public schools and the measure of success is most encouraging, but there is practically no provision for the teaching of drama with a purpose. Mrs. Lee's historical plays include the story of Beowulf, Caedmon, Alfred the Great, Magna Carta, Robin Hood, the *Mayflower*, the Armada, and one and all of these are suitable for stimulating dramatic talent in the same way as the elementary teaching of Art and Music has effect in these other great branches of the humanities.

In her latest play, *The Name on the Rock*, Mrs. Lee has gone to a Dominion with which she is very familiar for a theme in which adventure and patriotism and the Scottish tradition of invincible courage play a notable part. One value of the play is that it shows what might be called the British origin of Greater Canada. In some ways we think of Montcalm and of a French origin; in other ways the story of Wolfe brings to mind an English origin; but in the saga of *The Name on the Rock* we get the Scottish origin, the story of the young Highlander, Alexander Mackenzie, and his *voyageurs* who successfully crossed, in 1793, just after the days of Montcalm and Wolfe, the Rockies to the Pacific in the face of intolerable difficulties. Mackenzie, on July 22nd, 1793, wrote his name on a rock facing the Pacific. That is the saga which Mrs. Lee tells with simplicity, but with a dramatic force which should appeal to boys who combine a sense of adventure with an appreciation of the significance of drama. There are many other stories of the same historical and geographical power which might be told, stories of Australia and the South Seas, stories of South Africa, the voyaging of Drake, the adventures of Raleigh. Village drama is an important educational force, something which may be made an imperial instrument of

brotherhood and peace. The dramatic talent is inherent in the British people, and Mrs. Lee is creating material upon which that talent can be worthily spent.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

*Memoirs of a Diplomat** by Dr. Constantin Dumba contains the varied and extremely interesting reminiscences of a man who entered the Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Service in 1880 and who rose to be Ambassador to the United States during the early days of the Great War. Dr. Dumba has seen service in almost all the great European capitals. He was an attaché in London from 1881-6 and gives a vivid account of political and social life. After serving successively in St. Petersburg, Rome and Paris he was appointed Minister in Belgrade in 1903. He graphically describes the ghastly murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga and the accession of King Peter as, for a time, a puppet of the regicides. Dr. Dumba's most important reminiscences, however, relate to the period when he was in Washington. At a considerable length he discusses the personalities of President Wilson, Colonel House, and other prominent men, and the sympathies of the American people towards the Allied cause. He cites President Wilson's manifesto of neutrality "as a particular instance of hypocrisy united with an impractical doctrinaire mentality." He alleges that "towards the Allies he was mild and conciliatory, towards the Germans harsh and threatening," although by the autumn of 1915 "the English had long since destroyed the last remaining rags of international law." It is right to add that Dr. Dumba regards President Wilson's work for the League of Nations as "his imperishable service to humanity." In August 1915 President Wilson returned to Dr. Dumba his letters of credence on account of his admitted purpose "to arrange strikes" among the workers in the American steel and munition factories.

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The second volume issued by the Hakluyt Society of the work *Select Documents illustrating the Four Voyages of Columbus including those contained in R. H. Major's "Select Letters of Christopher Columbus"*† has been sadly affected by the sudden death on February 15th, 1932, of the very learned translator and editor, Mr. Cecil Jane. This volume deals with the third and fourth voyages with the unfinished introduction by Mr. Jane completed by a supplementary introduction by Mr. E. G. R. Taylor. The first volume published in 1929 and edited by Mr. Jane shows the high qualities of the late editor. Mr. Edward Lynam, of the British Museum, in his Prefatory Note, says of Mr. Jane that "the critical knowledge and judgment which he displayed in his introduction and notes to that volume quickly gained for him a high reputation as an authority on Columbus and on the early history of Spanish America." Well known at Oxford and Aberystwyth as a lecturer on history, his special work on Spanish America will always be famous. He was working at the introduction to this volume within two days of his death. Mr. Taylor's excellent supplementary introduction on "Columbus and the World Map," with his notes on the documents and maps, in a sense completes Mr. Jane's unfinished introduction, which deals with the negotiations of Columbus with Ferdinand and Isabella.

* Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

† Bernard Quaritch. £1 11s. 6d. net.

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The common emphasis upon the manufacturing industries of this country is liable to overshadow the fundamental importance of our natural resources which in the last resort constitute a nation's wealth. *The British Isles, a Geographic and Economic Survey*,* will greatly assist in providing a more general appreciation of the position. In the course of a large volume of over 700 pages the authors, Dr. L. Dudley Stamp and Mr. Stanley H. Beaver, have sought to "take stock of the natural resources of the British Isles, and show broadly what use has been made of those resources in the past, and to analyse the present position. In particular, attention has been paid to the natural or geographical factors which influence the utilisation of resources, and thus the point of view is that of the economic geographer." As its title indicates, this volume is essentially a statement of facts, accompanied by innumerable diagrams and illustrations, with conclusions not always appreciated by the public. The widespread belief, for example, "that the coal reserves of the British Isles are becoming exhausted," is quite erroneous. "There is known to be enough coal to last for at least five centuries at the present rate of consumption." Again, in agriculture, "something like eighty-four per cent. of the total land area of England and Wales may be described as land used for agricultural purposes." Yet the land is so under-utilised that "given suitable economic conditions, *the soil of the British Isles could be made to produce fifty per cent. more, possibly* 100 *per cent. more, than it does at the present time*" (the italics are the authors'). Apart from its value to the general public, this volume could be used with great advantage in the higher forms of secondary schools. The high price of this excellent book is, however, a serious limitation upon its usefulness.

* Longmans, Green. 25s. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

A revised and cheaper edition of *The Evolution of World Peace*,* edited by F. S. Marvin, which surveys the growth of international ideas and institutions, is enriched by a thoughtful Epilogue by Professor Gilbert Murray. After reviewing the good and evil forces that are struggling for mastery in our distracted world to-day, he closes on a note of encouragement. "The war has left behind it an infection of violence and the peace an infection of nationalism. But I doubt whether there has ever been so strong a movement for better relations between class and class, between nation and nation, or so much self-sacrificing devotion to the public weal among young and old. And it does seem as if there were still immense reserves of common sense, and even of something higher than common sense, in the masses of the civilised peoples."

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Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. W. Stotherd has written an interesting book, entitled *Sabre and Saddle*,† on his travels all over the world. It consists of memories of service in many countries, descriptions of peoples of varied races and types, and accounts of the places which he lived in or passed through. He took part in the Burmese Campaign of 1888-9, in the Tirāh Expedition, the Boxer Rising, and the final chapter deals with experiences in the Great War. It is a book of reminiscences which whets the appetite for more knowledge of events and places, and stirs memories of other days. In connection with his own visit to Balaclava, and to the ridge "where the 93rd Highlanders received the charge of the Russian cavalry drawn up in line," he publishes a letter which gives a verbatim account of the battle. The writer was a very young subaltern in the 93rd, who took part, escaped injury, and wrote a detailed account of it directly afterwards. The book is full of photographs of the people and places mentioned, as well as valuable plans and maps.

* Oxford University Press. 6s. † Seeley, Service and Co. Ltd. 18s. net.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
DECEMBER, 1933.

PEACE OR WAR: IS THERE A BRITISH POLICY?

IN the House of Commons, on November 7th, Sir John Simon made, by implication, a noteworthy admission. He was discussing the chances of getting an international agreement on disarmament "to which, of course, Germany must be a party." He claimed that "we have given a lead," and went on:

> The point, however, is that what we are seeking to bring about is an agreement between nations—an agreement, and you do not necessarily produce an agreement by striking an attitude, by proclaiming that you are willing to disarm. Still less do you produce an agreement by pointing to the fact that we ourselves have disarmed and that therefore we should like other people to do the same. From some points of view the actual negotiation of an agreement acceptable to other Powers would be rendered simple if we were able to say, "If you will do this or do that, this is what we will do."

It seems to follow—and, indeed, is clear from the record of our so-called disarmament policy—that we have not said, and cannot say, to other Powers, "If you will do this or that, this is what we will do." Short of resistance to attack upon our territory or our "vital interests," there is hardly an aspect of our external relations upon which a British Foreign Secretary could say, with the certainty of being able to keep his word, that we should behave in one way rather than in another.

This lack of knowledge of what Great Britain really stands for is, and has long been, a main cause of European and international unrest. As a people we hate having to make up our minds. We prefer that events, or the action of others, should make up our minds for us. We do not like being committed in advance to any kind of policy or plan. We think we have a shrewd notion that if and when things come to the pinch we shall know what to do. Rarely do we reflect that, if we made up our minds beforehand, and if others knew that our minds were made up, things might not come to the pinch at all.

The withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations on October 14th shocked many of us severely. I heard the news from a well-informed British Member of Parliament soon after midday; and having given it to the editor of a Sunday newspaper, was asked to write some comment upon it. I wrote by 3 p.m. that the German decisions were serious but not surprising, and that they could not "surprise any competent observer who has followed the course of events in Germany during the past few years, especially since the establishment of Hitlerism in power." This was the simple truth. Yet I gather that it was not felt to be such and that, in some quarters which should have known better, it was thought almost shocking that I should not have been shocked.

Why? Because we lack a firm and consistent British peace policy. Some of the principal members of our "National Government" suddenly saw that their excursions into the field of foreign affairs had landed them in a blind alley. They entered the blind alley last December when, without any clear notion of what might be involved, they promised Germany "equality of status" as the price of her return to the Disarmament Conference. No such promise ought ever to have been made without cool-headed perception of what it might imply, or without a binding agreement that it should entail definite obligations as well as rights for Germany, or without a British policy to meet the contingency of any departure from the agreement. Any other course, the course which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald followed, was bound to be equivocal, and to furnish Germany with the appearance if not the reality of a legitimate grievance should effective equality in armaments be withheld from her, as, in view of her steady rearmament, even before the advent of Hitlerism, it was certain to be withheld.

There was little room for doubt on this score last December, when General von Schleicher had just succeeded Herr von Papen as Chancellor, and there was no room at all after General von Schleicher had given place to Herr Hitler on January 30th this year. Up to a point, Mr. Lloyd George was entitled to remind Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in the House of Commons on November 7th, that "It is no use saying that there has been a change in the conditions in Germany. Herr Hitler and his Nazis and Brown Shirts came into power in

January with all their policy. They talked about rearmament and they paraded the streets with their Brown Shirts. The Prime Minister proposed his [disarmament] plan in March, two months later. There has been no change of any sort in the conditions since the right hon. Gentleman proposed his plan." But Mr. Lloyd George went too far in saying that "there has been no change of any sort," for the Nazi persecution of the Jews, Socialists, Pacifists and Liberals, and the suppression of the Catholic Centre and other parties, do constitute a change. And he failed to urge that the draft of the Four-Power Pact which Mr. MacDonald received from Signor Mussolini at Rome a few days later—a draft which the Prime Minister "welcomed" and recommended to the House of Commons on March 23rd as offering a basis for disarmament and as being, potentially, "the most effective work for peace which has been done since the War"—could only be construed as an attempt to undermine the League of Nations and to give Hitlerite Germany an undue share of control over European affairs. If the Mussolini-MacDonald draft was presently turned inside out and prevented from becoming an instrument of war through its advocacy of "Treaty revision," it was thanks to the sturdy resistance offered by some of the smaller Powers of Europe and to their keen sense of the dangers involved.

The plain truth is that the British National Government, like its predecessors, has never had either a foreign policy worthy of the name, or a coherent disarmament policy. None of them has ever said what it would do for "the enforcement of international obligations by common action," in case other countries should fulfil the corresponding proviso of Article 8 of the League Covenant and reduce their "national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." By the mouth of Sir John Simon the National Government claims that "Britain has set the example, has led the way." This is one of those half-truths that may be more perverse than a blunt falsehood. For our own, mainly financial, reasons, and not in order to "set an example," we have reduced our armaments to "the edge of risk," or, rather, below the level of what is, in view of our lack of a sound peace policy, "consistent with national safety." Under these conditions the Disarmament Conference could not succeed, for no British Minister was in a position to say to other

Powers, " if you will do this or do that, this is what we will do."

The substantial failure of the Disarmament Conference was thus a foregone conclusion. This I have the less hesitation in saying now because I wrote in a London weekly journal, on February 19th, 1931, nearly a year before the Disarmament Conference met, that its chances of success were poor and would be hopeless unless there were a change in British policy during the next twelvemonth. I added :

> In my view the only British policy that could make a success of the Disarmament Conference would be to declare that, in renouncing war, this country renounced neutral indifference to the misdeeds of any warmaker ; that it stands firm upon the principle that, whatever international adjustments may be necessary for the sake of peace, war shall not be the means of bringing them about ; and that Great Britain looks upon the security which the general adoption of this principle would create as the only adequate basis for international disarmament.
>
> Such a policy would bring the main issue into the foreground. This main issue, in a world which has renounced war, is to define the function of national armaments as a police function, and, therefore, to decide that they shall not exceed what may be required for the efficient discharge of that function.

And to Mr. Arthur Henderson, then Foreign Secretary—who had just launched a " National Disarmament Campaign " at the Queen's Hall, and had said : " To us the Pact of Paris (or Kellogg Pact) is the renunciation of force in international affairs, and we believe that the renunciation of force should carry with it the renunciation of the means of war "—I put then the question whether he would also say : " To us, as citizens, the renunciation of robbery and murder means the renunciation of force in private affairs, and we believe that this should carry with it the abolition of Scotland Yard " ?

This was in February 1931. In the following autumn any serious hope of disarmament was killed by the failure of the League Council, under the influence of Great Britain and France especially, to call Japan to order at the moment of her aggression in Manchuria, and to insist that, whatever her rights and wrongs might be, her methods were incompatible with her treaty obligations. Not until the summer of 1932 did the French Government begin to understand that the peace of Europe had been at stake in the Far East. In October

1931 the United States had offered officially to support the League in any means of persuasion or of pressure it might employ to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian dispute ; yet so lacking was the British National Government in any semblance of a foreign policy, that it failed to lay hold of this American undertaking, and condemned itself impotently to watch the triumphant course of Japanese aggression. Eighteen months too late, after long tergiversation over the Lytton Report, it did unwillingly join in the unanimous condemnation of Japan by the League Assembly —and had its reward in seeing Japan walk out of the League, as Japan would not have dared to do in September 1931. And it is not too much to say that Hitlerism would have had little chance of coming into power in Germany, and that Germany would never have had a Japanese example to imitate, had Japan not been allowed to prove that a strong military Power is able, notwithstanding its economic vulnerability, to flout the League and the Kellogg Pact with impunity.

These were some of the considerations that moved me to write, on October 14th last, that the German decisions to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and from the League could not surprise any competent observer. After the advent of Hitlerism it was as vain to expect that France and other neighbours of Germany would or could close their eyes to its menace as it was to suppose that Hitler could agree to any diminution, by " probationary period " or otherwise, of the " equality of status " which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had secured for General von Schleicher last December. It had long been obvious that the aim of Germany was not disarmament but rearmament. Mr. MacDonald knew, as his predecessors in office had known, and had kept secret, the truth that Germany was never disarmed to the level fixed by the Peace Treaty, and that the only real question was how far German rearmament should be winked at if not sanctioned. But to have told these truths frankly and openly would have raised, with uncomfortable urgency, the problem of what British policy would and should be. And rather than face that problem squarely, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, to do him justice, will impose upon himself the strictest of self-denying ordinances in the matter of thought.

Now we have Herr Hitler's emphatic declaration that " the

German people cannot continue to live under the shadow of the Treaty of Versailles, which was built on the impossible thesis of 'Woe to the vanquished.' It was built on the impossible idea that for eternity one set of nations were the victors and one nation the conquered. . . . We are ready to enter into any conference, we are ready to be a party to any Treaty, but it must be as equals. We will not be treated as bootblacks or inferiors. No, we must have the same rights as other countries, or the world will never see us again in an international conference."

Though I have read Hitler's *Mein Kampf* too often, and have studied his system of propaganda too thoroughly, to credit any of his statements, public or private, apart from the purpose they may be meant to serve, the logic of his position and the passions which his dynamic catchwords have aroused in the German people suggest that these declarations should be taken literally. Germany is determined to carry her own rearmament to a point at which she will be a military Power at least as formidable as she was in August 1914. Opinions differ upon the time she would need to reach this point. My own information, derived from German Nationalist sources (though not intended for me), is that Germany could be ready for war within six months of placing the necessary orders for war material, and that everything is prepared for the placing of those orders. The General Staffs of some of her neighbours, which have their own intelligence services, are, on the other hand, inclined to doubt whether Germany could be ready in much less than a year. They are, however, convinced that, whenever Germany decides to strike, she will strike hard and without warning, mainly by air.

With all her shortcomings, Germany does not lack a consistent policy. It is outlined with singular unanimity in the writings of Herr Gottfried Feder, Herr Rosenberg, Professor Ewald Banse and in those of Herr Hitler himself. So far is Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* from having been withdrawn or suppressed that, under official command, more than 1,200,000 copies of it have been sold since the spring, and its influence upon German minds is far greater than that of Hitler's peace speeches, which are designed, on his well-known principles, as propaganda for "the lowest intelligence," in this case abroad. None of the omissions from the English version of his book is more significant than his "Political Testament" for

the German nation, which appears on pages 754-755 of *Mein Kampf*. It runs :

> "The Political testament of the German nation in its dealings (with countries) abroad shall and must forever, in accordance with its meaning, be as follows :
>
> Never allow two Continental Powers to arise (*entstehen*) in Europe. Look upon every attempt to organise a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany, even though it be only in the form of a State susceptible of becoming a military power, as an attack upon Germany, and think it not only a right but a duty to prevent such a state from arising, or to smash it if it has arisen, by every means, including armed force. Have a care that the strength of our people should be founded not upon colonies but upon the soil of the European home. Never deem the Reich assured if it cannot give all the offspring of our people, for centuries to come, a bit of land of their own. Never forget that the holiest right in this world is the right to the soil which one may till for oneself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood shed for this soil."

From Hitler's book, and from Nazi literature in general, it is clear that the soil of Germany's neighbours is meant. Herr Gottfried Feder, the official custodian of the Nazi programme, shows in his work, *The German State*, that the political principle of this State is the formation of a homogeneous German Reich, embracing all of German race, whether they now live under French, Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian, Austrian or other sovereignties. And it is in keeping with this principle that not only Austria but German Czechoslovakia, German Switzerland, Danish Slesvig, Holland, Luxemburg and Belgian Flanders, should already have been theatres of a Nazi agitation so extreme that vigorous measures have had to be taken against it.

Save for one allusion in Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech, the whole debate on disarmament in the House of Commons on November 7th ignored this aspect of Nazi policy. Most of the speakers, including Mr. Lloyd George, seemed to be thinking of a possible conflict between Germany and one or more of the Great Powers, and to imagine that, because Germany is supposed to possess no big guns, all talk of such a conflict is moonshine. But the most imminent danger lies in the threat of Nazi policy to the smaller neighbours of Germany. These neighbours believe that *their* "holiest right" is to their own soil, and they are quite unconvinced

that there exists a superior "Aryan" Germanic right to take it from them. If Hitler succeeds, as he may, in embodying Austria in his "Third Empire," this side of Nazi policy will become prominent. Have Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon seriously thought about it? If so, what is their policy to be? Any British Government would doubtless be "severely shocked" were it to find that the independence of Southern Denmark had vanished, or that Nazis—Dutch, Flemish or German—were in effective control of the Dutch and Belgian coasts. Is it proposed to wait until these things happen before we think about them?

Fortunately some of the threatened European nations have not waited for us before making up their own minds. Soviet Russia and her neighbours have concluded pacts of non-aggression which provide against every conceivable form of hostility. The countries of the Little Entente have consolidated themselves into a political unit, and relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland are growing daily closer. Switzerland is strengthening her defences, and Denmark, which is almost totally disarmed, is getting ready to do likewise. Belgium, forewarned, thinks it well to be forearmed. Even Washington and Moscow are coming together. On the other hand, China is steadily making her peace with Japan, that is to say, is falling under effective Japanese control. "Geneva" has lost the struggle for the soul of Eastern Asia—with consequences in India and elsewhere which may one day cause us to curse the memory of the men who "let us down," together with the League, in the autumn of 1931. Trouble in Europe may come, should Great Britain continue to lack a peace policy, by repercussion from a clash in the Far East; and we may take it as an axiom that, just as the Japanese example in first flouting and then withdrawing from the League influenced decisively both the course of affairs in Germany and the German withdrawal from Geneva, so a very close understanding will be maintained between Berlin and Tokio throughout the calculable future.

What, then, should British policy be? Should it be "Yet a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to sleep," or should it at last be wide awake and resolute? The partisans of rearmament are beginning to cry aloud. Others recommend an alliance with France. Others, again, aver that we "stand by Locarno" and shall keep our plighted word—

as though anybody knew exactly how a British Government would, or could, interpret the Locarno Treaty, were it ever to be invoked! The Labour Party which, in its present plight, has a positive genius for combining wrongheadedness with furtive gleams of sense, put into its motion of censure upon the Government demands for "international inspection and control of armaments in all countries," "the creation of an international police force," and "the definition of aggression." Except with the greatest goodwill on the part of the inspected, "the inspection and control of armaments in all countries" cannot be effective. In Germany, at any rate, the goodwill does not exist, and inspection may, therefore, be ruled out as a preventive of rearmament. As for the "definition of aggression," which so many British statesmen have declared to be impossible, the thing has been done in the non-aggression pacts between Russia and her neighbours, and could have been done at any moment since the War if we and the United States had not blocked the way. There remains "the creation of an international police force" which, unless it be much more thoroughly studied in all its bearings than heretofore, may be at once a counsel of perfection and a trap for the unwary.

I have long favoured and advocated the idea of an international police, because I believe it to contain, in germ, the only means of outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. But I have always criticised and opposed the notion that an international police force could be created in readiness for emergencies, kept "in being" and stationed somewhere in somebody's land at the disposal of the League of Nations. Apart from technical difficulties and the rivalries, jealousies and suspicions that would surround the organisation of such a force, no answer has ever been found to the shrewd question which M. Léon Daudet put to M. Tardieu when the latter, as Prime Minister of France, proposed, at Geneva, the creation of such a force: "What is to happen if your police force is beaten?" Beaten it certainly would be by any great country that thought itself able to defy the League victoriously. Then there would be a hurry-scurry among the members of the League and either the total collapse of the League itself or a haphazard general war on a vast scale.

The sanest approach to the police force idea lies through recognition that nations which have renounced war have also

renounced neutrality towards the crime of war-making. By this recognition they would admit that the sole lawful function of all their armed forces is a police function, individual as regards the defence of their own countries against attack, international as regards co-operation with the victim of attack. The co-ordination of the peace forces of non-neutral countries against any threat of war would not present insuperable difficulties; and behind those peace forces, at whatever level they might need to be maintained, would lie all the resources of their respective nations. It is the police principle, based on non-neutrality in the presence of crime, that needs to be clearly stated and firmly upheld. Disarmament, or rearmament to whatever level might be necessary to deter any prospective disturber of the world's peace, would then follow in proportion as security against war was felt to be real or the reverse.

Short of attempting suicidal isolation or of relapsing into specific alliances and international rivalry in armaments, I am persuaded that there can be no British foreign policy worth speaking of, nor security for the British Commonwealth, until this country has made up its mind not to be neutral in favour of any assailant, actual or prospective, of the world's peace, be that assailant strong or weak, and to take the lead in organising the forces of peace on this basis. We cannot police the world alone. As our armaments now stand, and in the absence of a foreign policy, we might not even be able to police the British Commonwealth in the sense of defending it successfully against attack. But in taking the lead of the nations that hate war, and may in time learn to love peace, Great Britain could, and should, save Europe and the world from the threat embodied in the consistent policy of Nazi Germany, and bring that policy to naught. For, at a moment when much is uncertain and few things are plain, two truths stand out. The first is that Germany will not dare to carry out her programme if there is a reasonable prospect that the attempt would fail. The second is that, unless there be a British foreign policy of the sort I have described, publicly stated and nationally supported, we and the other nations of Europe will drift towards disaster only to find, on the morrow, that Western liberal civilisation belongs to the past.

WICKHAM STEED.

LIBERALISM, SOCIALISM AND FASCISM.

IN an article published in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October I set forth the view that the primary cause of the economic depression, of the growing tension about armaments, and of the apparent eclipse of free institutions and liberal civilisation, was international anarchy in a world rapidly shrinking in terms of time and space. I gave reasons for thinking that capitalism, as an economic system, had not failed at all, especially when regulated by Social Reform imposed upon it by democracy, but was merely being prevented from working by anarchy. And I went on to urge that the dictatorships, whether Fascist or Communist, which justified themselves on the ground that we were passing into an "autarchic" era in which the state must plan and direct everybody and everything, were simply the natural reactions to international chaos and that the real remedy was not dictatorship in any form but the ending of anarchy by the development of a collective system both in politics and economics. In this paper I want to consider a second reason for the decline of the authority of Liberal civilisation in the modern world, the challenge of Socialism and Communism and now of Fascism to the basic principles upon which it rests.

The foundation thesis of both Socialism and Communism is the same, that the system of private property in the means of production, distribution and exchange whereby the community lives is fundamentally immoral and unjust because it involves the division of the population into two classes, those who live by owning the instruments of production, the capitalists, and those who live by selling their labour in the market if they can find a capitalist to hire it, the proletariat. They consequently urge that it should be replaced by one in which the land and all the instruments of production, distribution and exchange, are owned by the community as a whole. The Socialist parties and especially the British Labour Party believe that the transition to the Socialist Commonwealth can be made gradually and by democratic and parliamentary means. Communists believe that competitive capitalism is inexorably driving the proletariat towards greater poverty, imperialism and war, and that the only, indeed the inevitable, way in which Communism will be established will be through a revolutionary dictatorship which will forcibly appropriate

all capital without compensation and so "liquidate" for ever the capitalist class by forcing it into the ranks of the proletariat. And they fortify this conviction by accepting the materialist interpretation of history formulated by Karl Marx, whereby all forms of idealism, religion, culture, civilisation, are regarded at bottom as being the resultant of economic conditions, and not of any contact with any truth or spiritual reality outside the reach of the five senses.

The Liberal has a natural sympathy with the Socialist ideal of economic equality and security for all. But he cannot accept the basic Socialist diagnosis that capitalism is a mere system of "exploitation." In his view the fundamental fact of capitalism is that it has liberated an unparalleled flood of individual creative energy all over the world, and that this energy is devoted to satisfying human needs by providing better or cheaper commodities or better or cheaper services to all, with ultimate profit to the entrepreneur or the lender of capital as the reward. In vast numbers of cases these new enterprises fail to yield any profit. Probably at least half the capital invested in new enterprises is eventually lost. Yet every experiment teaches some lesson and gives employment while it lasts. The marvellous rise in the general standard of living, in the ever-increasing variety of commodities and services now available for all who are earning good wages, is the outcome of the liberation under the system of private enterprise, of this enormous individual creative energy and its canalisation into raising the standards of living of mankind.

Nor do Liberals accept the Communist argument of the "inevitability" of the break-down of capitalism. Karl Marx based much of his argument on the conviction that under capitalism the poor must inevitably get poorer and the rich richer. Actually experience up to 1914 proved exactly the contrary, especially in democratic countries. Similarly Lenin and his modern followers like Mr. John Strachey, comfort and fortify their faith by persuading themselves that modern capitalism must become monopoly capitalism, and end in imperialism and world wars, and the creation of a proletariat recruited from the middle class which will have the ability and organising power to seize dictatorial power by revolution. But our present troubles are not the result of capitalism at all, but of an anarchic nationalism which is wrecking capitalism

and which is the outcome of race and culture and history long antedating the capitalist era. Capitalism, as such, dislikes war, and is a unifying factor in the world to-day, for it trades, invests capital and develops industry impartially all over the globe. It is no doubt true that capitalists (like labour) try to capture the machinery of the sovereign state for their own ends, and that commercial rivalries are then added to other sources of international discord. But the remedy is not to abolish capitalism, which is essentially an international system, and is suspected accordingly by all strong nationalists, but to abolish anarchy by creating some sort of political unity in the world, when wars will cease.

The only real alternatives before mankind are full-blooded Communism and capitalism tempered by democratic control. Communism, as Russia has proved, can be made to work provided a community is willing to be turned into an economic army, under military discipline and obeying implicitly (under penalty of imprisonment, starvation or death) the orders of the supreme command, as to what it should produce and what it should consume. It is practically certain that even if it could be established in the more complicated and advanced countries of the West, no society that has tasted individual liberty will stand the discipline and dictatorship and terrorism by which alone it can be established and maintained in being.

But whatever the practicability of Communism may be, it is certain that Socialism—as it is preached by non-Communists—will never work. For the root of the modern economic problem is not production but the distribution of consuming power, and that depends entirely on the adjustment of supply and demand in an intensely progressive and rapidly changing world, so that only those are unemployed who are in transition from one industry to another. Under Communism the state settles everything, dictatorially. Under capitalism, through the agency of price in the competitive market, the consumer ultimately decides what is to be produced. Every hour private competitive enterprise is setting something new and better before him—in food, in clothes, in housing, in education, in amusement, for business, for leisure, for recreation. If his choice moves in a certain direction the market for those products or services increases, raising the price and drawing more capital and enterprise and workers

into providing for it, while the market for the superseded products and services contracts, forcing the closing of factories and the cessation of services, and the transfer of labour to meeting the new demand.

Capitalism, indeed, is as inherently democratic on the economic side as it is on the political, for it ensures that it is the choice of the housewife and the ultimate consumer which decides what shall be produced and sold, while Socialism is essentially autocratic, for in economics as in politics it must be the supreme command which will direct both what the individual shall consume and think and what agriculture, industry, and the newspapers shall produce.

Under an individualist economic system price in the market, if allowed to function freely, does succeed (subject to the fluctuations of the trade cycle) in keeping supply and demand in adjustment and the people in employment, however rapidly changes in invention and in public taste may come, as the history of the pre-war era shows. But the adjustment begins to break down if there is undue interference with the free operation of the market. We have already seen the consequence to mankind of upsetting the world balance between supply and demand through the anarchy of economic nationalism in the shape of tariffs, subsidies, embargoes, and quotas, and through war—namely unemployment and loss of capital, and the general decline in standards of living. But the proposals of non-Communist Socialists will have exactly the same effect. The Socialist programme never seems to consider the problem of securing adjustment between supply and demand in the half-Socialist, half-individualist state. Most of his proposals paralyse enterprise or make adjustment more difficult. In a changing world penal taxation and legislation designed to stabilise jobs can only multiply unemployment. What has the nationalisation of the railways or the mines to do with our present-day problems? It will not cheapen transport or increase the sales of coal or put one man back into economic employment. If carried out when proposed in 1922 it would have involved the community in gigantic losses, and have resulted in an immense addition to the numbers of rentiers whose income is guaranteed by taxpayers induced to purchase two industries which are both suffering from new forms of competition instead of leaving shareholders to carry the risk of losing their capital

and interest upon it because their industry is moribund or has not been efficiently run. And what is the use of nationalising the "Big Five" Banks unless the deposits are nationalised also, for it is the depositors and not the banks who ultimately decide whether loans are to be made or credit given? And so with all the other plans for gradual nationalisation. They never face the central problem of a non-Communist world, how unemployment is to be abolished by the balancing of supply and demand in a world of constant progress and change.

It is through the distribution of the ownership of the means of production and exchange, and not their nationalisation, that the Liberal sees the answer to the problem presented by the contrast between the rich and the poor. In the past great numbers of the working-class have not experienced "freedom," because they have had no financial reserves to meet the cost of sickness, unemployment, old age or leisure. It is not enough that these should be provided by bureaucratic means, vital as the whole system of social insurance is. Real "freedom" comes from variety in the possibilities of employment and the possession of adequate savings in the Bank. It is not always realised what a gigantic change has come over the distribution of the yield of national wealth in recent years.

On the one hand, the rich are nothing like as rich as they used to be. They may nominally own great fortunes, but their income is enormously reduced. Large estates pay as much as 50 per cent. of their value in cash to the state on the death of the owner, thus rapidly reducing them to moderate proportions. Of the income from what is left as much as 11s. in the £ may be taken for income tax and surtax, quite apart from indirect taxation and county and municipal rates. The "big houses" of the past, both in town and country, the old basis for social ostentation, are rapidly being closed or turned to institutional purposes, and the old rich are moving into labour-saving houses and flats—thereby narrowing the gulf in the personal standard of living of all classes.

On the other hand the figures recently published by Mr. Walter Runciman to the effect that no less than £3,000,000,000 was owned by between 14,000,000 and 15,000,000 small investors in the Post Office Savings Bank, Savings Certificates, Building Societies, and so on, show how widespread is the

ownership of " property " to-day, and therefore economic as well as political freedom. The vast majority of the nation over thirty now has a substantial " stake " in the country. The immense increase in the use of small cars, the development of suburban and bungalow houses, the spread of the universal small brilliantly lighted shop, in all areas where there is little unemployment, show how far from the truth is the old Marxian diagnosis of the inevitable effect of capitalism. They show, too, how immense has been the increase in economic well-being which private enterprise tempered by Social Reform has produced—an increase which can be indefinitely maintained if only the unemployment caused by international anarchy and ill-conceived and dislocating Socialistic legislation can be ended.

But if the Liberal rejects the Socialist and Communist dogmas he believes stoutly in what, before the war, used to be called Social Reform—that is the imposition by an intelligent democracy of ever-higher standards to which private enterprise must conform, and the use of the taxing power for national development to lessen the contrasts between rich and poor and to heighten the general standard of public amenity in the land. Factory Acts, universal education, trade unionism, insurance against old age, sickness and unemployment, town planning, mainly the result of Liberal thought and impulse, have removed many of the evils of the old age of *laissez-faire*. In fact, if it were not for unemployment and war debt charges due to anarchy and the consequent shortage of money for public purposes, Britain would already be a fair and pleasant land for all, with an increasing distribution of property and therefore of liberty among all classes. Even so, however, there is still an immense field for the development of Social Reform.

It is not enough, I think, to stand by the pre-war methods, successful as they were. There is no doubt that the public mind requires a far greater sense of public responsibility in the conduct of the economic life of the country than was the case in the days of competitive *laissez-faire*. Industry is more and more recognised to be a vital public service, both on the part of capital and labour, as it becomes larger in scale and all citizens become parts of a vast composite process of manufacture and distribution, and the number who, like the old peasants, are almost self-supporting, become negligible. Many

aspects of Social Reform still outstanding will be found in the Report of the Liberal Industrial Enquiry. There are to-day two new major issues.

The first is how far capitalism can be " planned." It all depends on what is meant by planning. If planning means Government interference with the responsibility of business executives, it would be fatal. For politicians and bureaucrats have already proved their utter incompetence to " plan " industry in that sense or to decide how supply and demand are to be adjusted. Almost everything they have done has aggravated dislocation and produced the characteristic disease of the age—unemployment. Moreover, planning, to be effective, must begin with demand, for if demand cannot be controlled or accurately forecast—a most difficult thing—production cannot be adjusted to it. But if planning means requiring business and agriculture to conform to ever-higher public and humanitarian standards, then the more planning the better, but on one essential condition. That condition is that the community must accept private enterprise as the mainspring of the economic system, and that regulation and taxation must not be carried beyond the point at which it begins to contract competitive activity and so create unemployment. The broad division is this. The function of private enterprise is to assure an ever-higher standard of living to the community by giving it, on a competitive basis, better and cheaper goods and services, while employing the whole community and thus assuring labour its real bargaining power. The function of the state is to deal with monopolies and to require that the standards within which private enterprise works should steadily improve. The dividing line between Socialism and Liberalism may well come on the question of the nationalisation of the land—the basis of all economic activity. The old landlord system has been broken down by legislation, and some new system needs to be put in its place. It may be that national management of land would be the best way out. But that is the limit to which Liberalism could go.

It is fashionable to-day to complain against " too much legislation " and " too much interference with business." Some of these criticisms are justified. For instance, whatever the need for money, the taxation of company reserves and improvements only checks enterprise and creates unemployment, and reduces in the long run the yield of taxation. But funda-

mentally it is not Social Reform which has been the trouble, but the consequence of international anarchy. The present scale of taxation, which is certainly destructive of enterprise, is due not to social reform but to the necessity of paying for past wars and preparing for new ones. And most of the present paralysis of business and shipping is due to tariffs, embargoes, quotas, and other nationalist interferences with world trade and the free operation of price in the world market. If the cost of the war could be eliminated, if world trade could be made to flow as freely as it did before the war, and if unemployment disappeared, there would be plenty of room for more expenditure on Social Reform coupled with an adequate reduction in taxation.

The second new question to-day under the head of Social Reform arises from the growing size of trusts and cartels and from the growing divorce between ownership and control of business. A recent American scientific study has shown that a very large and increasing proportion of American business is now controlled by some 200 giant corporations, and that the "control" of these corporations has, in effect, by various devices passed out of the hands of their owners into the hands of holding companies of professional entrepreneurs. Things have not gone as far in England, but they are moving in that direction. The whole tendency opens up an immense field for enquiry and consideration. There is no reason why the management of these great trusts and corporations should not become more and more professional and more and more animated by public standards, thereby keeping the advantages of private as opposed to public or bureaucratic enterprise, and of the distribution as opposed to the nationalisation of ownership.

I was once taken to the top of the Cunard Building in Liverpool by a distinguished leader in industry. He pointed to the vast and thriving city which lies across the Mersey. "Do you see that city," he said. "It is Port Sunlight. It is one of the most successful businesses in the world. It provides the public with cheap and entirely reliable soap. It pays high wages, maintains the highest conditions in its works, and gives the best housing and amenities to its workers. It is, in effect, the creation of one man, who was once an impecunious salesman in this city. The world will never get on unless it allows such men, and there are millions of them, to develop their talents and make fortunes through making better, or

more cheaply, the things the people want. What the state should do is to give them every encouragement, compel them to conform to the highest standards in Factory Acts and shop conditions and housing which it thinks are possible without checking industry and creating unemployment, and take as much money out of their pockets by taxation to spend on public purposes as it dares without weakening their enthusiasm and energy or depriving them of the resources which are necessary to their activities."

In that story is really summed up the alternative economic systems which lie before the world—Communism, nationalisation and dictatorship or capitalism using private property regulated by democracy through the instrument of Social Reform.

The reader may ask, What about Fascism as a third alternative? My reply is that Fascism is not an alternative to capitalism: it is what happens to a community which still believes in private enterprise, when anarchy has so dislocated the system that order can only be maintained and some internal economic balance can only be established by substituting dictatorship for democracy in both politics and economics. But so long as private property and private enterprise is preserved it will overthrow the dictatorship and restore democracy and Social Reform as soon as the effects of international anarchy disappear and price in the market has ended unemployment by restoring a balance between supply and demand. In the West, if Socialists imperil the working of the system of private enterprise by Socialist legislation, the Fascist state will appear long before the Communist, but only as a temporary phenomenon. For, in substance, the measures taken by Signor Mussolini in Italy, and being followed at a long distance by Mr. Walter Elliott in England, except in so far as they represent improved organisation for marketing, are simply the emergency remedies for world dislocation between supply and demand. As that dislocation disappears, as nations begin to realise that instead of all trying to sell the same things at the same time in the world market, they must once more exchange things with one another and modify tariffs and subsidies and quotas accordingly, the need for these emergency internal state controls will also disappear and democracy will return.

Does all this mean that there will be an early restoration

of a Liberal Government? That would only happen quickly if its rivals went over to Diehardism or Communist Socialism. The great weakness of the Liberal Party and the great strength of Liberalism is that, thanks to their own work in the past, two-thirds of the Conservative Party and two-thirds of the Labour Party are in fundamentals still liberally minded. None the less the party future is very uncertain, and the need for activity on the part of thinking Liberals and for a distinctly Liberal Party was never more needed than it is to-day. For their real task is to keep Great Britain itself in the Liberal fold.

On the one hand the Conservative Party is being pressed towards a narrowly nationalist policy, alike in the Empire, in foreign affairs and in economics. In an anarchic world events are strengthening the Diehards' hands. In India they are unwilling to come to terms with the powerful movement for national self-government. In foreign affairs they are pressing for a renewed competition in armaments and for abandonment of the League or collective idea. In economics under their pressure, they not only regard high tariffs, bilateral treaties and quotas as emergency measures, but as a permanent policy, and desire to make the state organise internal production and distribution on Fascist lines, on the ground that autarchy has come to stay. Yet acceptance of nationalism as a sufficient policy can only lead the country to permanent unemployment, imperilled democracy, indefinitely increased expenditure on armaments, lessened Social Reform and eventual dictatorship and war.

On the other hand the Labour Party is equally being drawn towards extreme courses by its revolutionary wing—also assisted by the consequences of anarchy. It is playing with the idea of dictatorship and committing itself to a half-baked programme which will make equally impossible either a Socialist or an individualist economy, and can only intensify poverty and unemployment. Yet, inherently, the Labour Party is hopelessly divided. It is held together to-day by the class feeling of the trade union and the Socialism of its intellectuals, as the Conservative Party is held together by regard for property and nationalist feeling. But directly it approaches power it must break in two, as it did in 1931, when it has to decide between the revolutionary and dictatorial Socialism that its left wing really believes in and the democratic Social Reform which its right wing really wants, though it calls it Socialism.

For Liberals the test is relatively simple. On the international side Liberalism requires that a vigorous nationalism should be balanced by international organisation to settle disputes by reason and justice and not by war, to give security to all through disarmament and mutual guarantees against aggression, and to restore balance to world supply and demand by eliminating the present anarchic obstacles to trade and investment.

On the domestic side, Liberalism is willing to co-operate in formulating by democratic means any programme of Social Reform however far-reaching, provided it recognises that private initiative rather than State control, both in politics and in economics, will remain the basic principle of civilisation, and that the guiding principle of public policy is no longer either merely to protect property rights or to nationalise them, but to see that private enterprise employs the whole population at rising standards, and that the "surplus" is taken for public purposes.

The future of civilisation lies with the fundamental Liberal creed. There is, in truth, no other basis for a civilised life. But that is not to say that it will triumph in the immediate future. The disease of anarchy has gone so deep, so many nations and peoples are committed to political and economic philosophies born of anarchy or the early evils of uncontrolled *laissez-faire*, that bitter experience of the fruits of false gospels, like Communism or Fascism, Racialism or Socialism, may be necessary before mankind, as a whole, returns to those first principles which alone can give it unity, freedom, prosperity and peace. But if Liberals are faithful to the ideas which underlie their faith, in time their truth will prevail, and we shall look back on this age of struggle and confusion as the prelude to the appearance of that World Commonwealth based on free thought and free institutions which has so long been the dream of the far-sighted among men.

LOTHIAN.

WHITHER GERMANY? WHITHER EUROPE?

THE superficial contrast between the Germany of 1932 and the Germany of 1933 is extraordinary. In 1932 there was a sense of almost unrelieved gloom, as if a blight of misery had descended upon the nation. The younger generation, especially, seemed to be without hope. The future held nothing for them: unemployment, want, uselessness; it would have been almost better not to be born. They seemed to have forgotten how to sing. In 1933 they are swinging along the streets to a new music, the music of marching songs. These songs have a curious character. Each line ends off sharply, as with a stamp of defiance; but it is more than that. It is an exultant note. Young Germany is on the march again, and her sons and daughters (sons especially) insist on proclaiming their rebirth to all the world.

The new-born faith seems to owe its inspiration to Wagner, and through Wagner to Siegfried and Odin. Young Germany is worshipping the Lord of Hosts, the old Hebrew God of Joshua, not the God of Jesus. None but the Chosen People are to enter the new Canaan. Only, the chosen people to-day are not Hebrews, but Aryans. Jewish culture is denounced in order that the ancient Hebrew religion may be reinstated. Such is the pagan faith that has brought a new hope to young Germany.

What is in some ways even more remarkable, the light of hope has been rekindled in the eye of the ordinary non-political citizen, and even in the eye of his *hausfrau*. An extraordinary change indeed, not easily to be explained. No one is appreciably better off. But whereas last year every fresh salary cut brought a fresh groan of misery, to-day the typical response seems to be: "Well, these continued cuts make things very difficult; but still, if it is really going to cure unemployment, it is worth it." And to-day there seems to be a widespread belief that unemployment *may* be largely cured: last year I found practically no such hope. So one asks, "Why?"

The best answer seems to be that, for great masses of Germans, the "Third Reich" denotes a new and badly needed sense of unity. At last the paralysing dissensions of recent years have been ended. Germany is one. It is as if a

magic wand, called Hitler, had suddenly been waved in the air, and the colour of the world is changed. Instead of "everyone for himself, and the devil take the hindmost," it is now "Everyone for the community [the community being the nation], and the devil take the individualist and the profiteer." So, everyone is commanded not to eat a Sunday dinner worth more than 6d. Do they obey? Certainly not all, but probably a great many do.

For many Germans the new hope may be nothing more than a passing fit of intoxication. For them the disillusionment is likely to be terrible. But for a number it is far more than this. If, then, we recognise that for many in Germany there has been a revolutionary change in mental outlook, its political significance demands closer analysis. It is common form amongst the Nazis and their friends to denounce or to ridicule the doctrines of the French Revolution and the doctrines of Liberalism. What is the real meaning of this revolt? Is it simply a blind reaction to the old idea of authority? I do not think so.

The danger of over-emphasis on rights, which figure so prominently in the doctrines of the American and French Revolutions, has been pointed out many times. It is nearly a century since Mazzini pleaded with his fellow countrymen to put duty before right. And anyone who recognises duty as paramount—whether to God, to humanity, to his nation or class or any other group or authority—must necessarily submit himself to discipline. Watching a group of "Hitler youth" marching round and round their school playground in leisure hours, under the orders of one of their own number certainly not over fifteen years old, one inclined to the view that these German boys were getting the same satisfaction, the same subconscious sense of *cameraderie* and healthy physical fatigue that English schoolboys find in a game of football.

A group of Englishmen took part for a week this summer in one of the work-camps (*Arbeitslager*) which the National Socialists are now running. Some of the group were pacifists, who were by no means uncritical of the Nazi régime, and their report on the camp is not undiluted praise. Here is one of their "findings." "We did not find that note of bellicose militarism attributed to these camps by certain sections of the foreign Press. It is quite clear to us that the main purpose

of these camps is not military, but educative in the broadest sense." They found the discipline strict, even, perhaps severe at times. This was partly due to the fact that, earlier leaders having been pushed out for political reasons, a good many military officers and sergeants have been brought in to discipline the camps, and their ideas of discipline are stereotyped.

It is extremely easy to misconstrue this German love of discipline and order. Germans, like other people, have seemingly contradictory characteristics. Almost every German seems to have a definite opinion of his own, and a strong individual personality. This has led, in recent years, to deplorable disunity and disharmony. So, to-day, there is a strong reaction to the other extreme: the innate love of discipline, and the love of symbolic acts to symbolise the newly found unity, are given full play. That such a situation might easily develop into a military menace is obvious: that some elements in the new German Government wish to exploit it for that end can hardly be doubted; but it is not essentially military in nature, and it could be and may be turned into a means of splendid creative activity.

Then, there is the popular denunciation of democracy in Germany to-day. What is really meant by this?

Although the Nazis say they have no use for democracy, it seems clear that their real quarrel is not with democracy as such, but with the parliamentary institutions by which democracy to-day is so often thwarted rather than expressed. Having failed to reform the machine that was hampering their progress, they have smashed it. It is idle to inquire whether a clear majority of the electorate really voted for a Nazi régime last February, or even whether, if it did so, it knew what it was doing. Probably no West European Government to-day has such widespread, ardent, enthusiastic support as the present German Government. This is more particularly true of Germany east of the Elbe. In this sense it can certainly claim to be a "democratic" Government. And part, at least, of Hitler's popularity is due to his humble origin and to the fact that he fought in the trenches, in the ranks, through the war. He is a man of the people. He may have embarrassing commitments to Thyssen; but he is certainly not paving the way—intentionally at least—to a Hohenzollern restoration. In the ardent support that it evokes, the Hitler

régime contrasts favourably with the type of Government so common, alas, in modern parliamentary democracies, which remains in office by a system of elaborate jugglery, precariously balancing on various combinations of groups and parties, each of which is itself in a state of unstable equilibrium, and whose programmes, sometimes nebulous, tend to cancel each other out.

A further unreality of modern politics is symbolised in the German revolt. It is in part a revolt against one aspect of the Marxist doctrine of class war. Now it may be true that, so long as the capitalist system subsists, employers and wage-earners cannot become one class, with no diversity of interest. But it is not true that they must at all times regard each other as enemies; nor is it true that present-day class feeling and class conflict are solely, nor perhaps even predominantly, due to the conflict of economic interest as between employers and workers. In the first place it is sufficiently obvious that in recent years the great majority of employers have been suffering acutely as victims of the same circumstances that have brought disaster to many workers. If the capitalist system involves the worker in constant economic insecurity, so it does the employer. In the second place, class conflict and class estrangement are largely due to discrepancies of education and of general outlook. In actual life, in spite of the Marxists, many employers in England at any rate mix freely and happily with their employees, whereas those same employees often find it almost impossible to get on with professional workers. It is surely one of the tragic ironies of the situation that a Social Democratic party, which had for years shown itself so willing to co-operate with the "bourgeois" parties in Germany that it had been regarded with something like contempt by the true Red Socialist or Communist, is to-day branded with the mark of the beast, because in theory it never forswore its adhesion to the Marxist doctrine of the class war; and this branding is done by a party calling itself "Socialist," which has resorted to measures of far greater violence than the average social democrat could ever have stooped to.

But to some extent the National Socialists are really attempting to create a classless society without an economic revolution. An English resident in East Prussia gave me a curious instance of this. The May Day processions this year

were under official control. Everybody was expected to take part in them. Accordingly, many ardent middle-class Nazis, who would never have dreamed of walking in procession with the "proletariat" in earlier years, did take part. And some, at least, of the habitual May Day marchers were so astonished to find them there that they said they would feel quite differently towards the professional classes if those classes were going to come out and join the workers' processions. One can almost hear the scornful comment of an orthodox Socialist on such an incident: "Poor sort of socialists," he would say, "if they could be duped as easily as that." But is such a comment justified? It may seem a small thing for a professional man to walk shoulder to shoulder with a wage-earner through the streets of their native town. But is it? It means breaking the habits of a lifetime. That first march through the streets may lead some middle-class men into a broad highway of revolutionary social thought and action.

Note, too, another section of the Englishmen's report on the East Prussian work camp: "We were very much impressed by the value of the camps as foundations of a new sense of national unity strong enough to transcend divisive loyalties to party and class and smaller territorial units. The isolation of the classes and the over-emphasis on the economic struggle for existence, which are to so great a degree responsible for the embitterment of class war, were evils which no longer existed in the comradeship of the camp. . . . There seemed to us to be good grounds for hope that with this experience behind them, young men would no longer persist in the mental attitudes which divide a nation into hostile camps."

It is not easy to predict where the attempt to break down class barriers will lead the new Germany. The time may soon come when many supporters of the new régime will demand the fulfilment of the Socialist part of the party programme. Such a demand may be especially strong in eastern Germany, where the peasants have almost all voted for the Nazi party. But the landlords have supported it too. Will it dare to defy the landlords and break up their estates to satisfy land hunger? And what will happen if it does? At present the policy seems to be to bring uncultivated lands—heaths and wasteland, marshes and even shallow lakes, into cultivation

by reclamation and other methods. Thousands of men who were unemployed are already working on reclamation schemes in the eastern provinces, and it is claimed that such work can employ hundreds of thousands for years to come, and will give scope for land settlement of many who are to-day leaving the towns. Small holdings and allotments are already a conspicuous feature on the outskirts of many German towns. This development dates, of course, from long before the Nazi revolution; but if the National Socialists foster such activities with energy—and they seem to be doing so—the economic situation in eastern Germany might be eased for some years to come, even if not solved.

This brings us to another notable tendency. The civilisation of the west, for the past century especially, has been increasingly urban. There have been signs for years past that in some of the most highly industrialised countries the tide is turning. "Back to the land" is no longer a vain cry. It is becoming a real social tendency. Figures are given in Germany to-day which show that the population of several of the big cities, Berlin and Munich among them, is actually decreasing. And, as so often happens, as soon as a social tendency becomes manifest, those who see it begin to justify it and philosophise about it. Thus, it is noted that city life has tended towards deepening class barriers and towards social disintegration. Anyone who has lived in both city and country can appreciate the force of this. In a village or country town each inhabitant is aware of the existence of all the others, or at least of his immediate neighbours. This may lead to a great deal of petty gossip, and mean social barriers; but there is at least a certain corporate loyalty, at best a neighbourliness which is the foundation of all healthy social life. In the city men and women hardly know their nearest neighbours by sight. They are content to associate with those of their own profession or those of congenial mind, chosen from a very wide area. This has many advantages, but it has grave disintegrating effects, too. The old question: Who is my neighbour? assumes a new aspect in the modern world. Amongst so many neighbours who may have a claim on one how is a man to decide which claims to recognise? Better, perhaps, thinks many a decent-minded townsman, to cut the claims of social obligation altogether, and live to himself and his family.

Again, it may be argued that city life has become over-intellectual, over-analytical, too far removed from the soil. Man's body has become stunted, so that he is afraid of it. Human beauty is almost forgotten. Men cannot call their souls their own. They have no time for inner communion, perhaps no capacity or desire for it. Better, surely, to have the simple lore of the peasant, whose mind goes round and round considering the crops, the sheep, his neighbours or his women folk, chewing the cud like his cattle, than to be so utterly incapable of browsing at all that without the artificial stimulus of football, cinema, boxing, betting and other aimless activities, life becomes a complete vacuum. In such an environment the soul of man must atrophy. True religion, in contrast to ecclesiastical mummeries, true art, in contrast to decadent artifice, cannot live.

Or again, though the city provides endless drugs to deaden the misery of man's diseased mind and body, it also provides the true means of culture. Here are the great storehouses of human creativeness, works of beauty and wisdom and adoration. These things, as well as all the more seductive " goods " that industrialism has produced, are enjoyed by the town-dweller. He is the lord of the earth. The countryman, who toils to produce the food and clothes and other necessities the townsman takes for granted, is forgotten ; he is regarded as a curious survival of barbarism, slow-witted, clumsy, ill-mannered.

The theme is as ancient as human society itself. Town-life leads to material and intellectual progress, the countryman is exploited to give the townsman his holiday. At last the slow-moving giant of the country revolts. He tears off the ropes with which the puny townsmen have tried to bind him. Rousing himself to action, he blunders on to his feet, and crushes many of his Lilliputian enemies to death. In the name of religion, of the One True God, wholeness of life, he destroys the myriad idols the townsman has set up. He claims his due in the abundance of life.

In some respects the Nazi leaders have been very ready to copy the methods of Soviet Russia ; but in this respect their outlook seems to be exactly opposite to that of the Soviet leaders. Communism is to prove itself in Russia by out-doing America in industrial development and efficiency. Even the village itself must submit to an industrial system. If the

Third Reich justifies itself, on the other hand, it will be by restoring the balance in favour of the countryside, by furthering a new social harmony rising from a universal touch with Nature. Hear the English campers' report again : " The *Arbeitslager* is an attempt to recover joy in physical work, to come to terms once again with the earth, with soil, stone, wood and iron, to try to get back our bodies and thaw a frozen flow of warmth, affection and physical unison." It must be repeated that in following this tendency, as in so many of their constructive activities, the Nazis are stealing some of their opponents' thunder ; but it must at least be recognised that they have caused the thunder to resound to some purpose. Where they have had the imagination to throw their energy into the promotion of good things, still in their early stages, which their predecessors neglected or only encouraged fitfully, they must be given credit for it.

Nazi Germany is a reminder of one other vital factor in human society which Gandhi especially, and perhaps De Valera and other modern revolutionary leaders, should have taught us. Mr. Tawney and others have shown the disease of our society as the sickness of an acquisitive society. Now there are two ways of attacking the evil spirit of acquisitiveness, by changing those parts of the social fabric that encourage acquisitiveness, which is the Socialist way, or by setting an example of complete disinterestedness. It may be, indeed, that both attacks are needed. Europe, hitherto, has tended to regard the second method as mediæval, eccentric and of little practical value. And so we find that, again and again, as soon as Socialist leaders have tasted the sweets of office, the vision of the Socialist Commonwealth has become dim ; self-comfort, ambition, vanity, take control, and the disappointed followers mourn another lost leader.

Ten years ago, just before the unsuccessful Hitler *Putsch* in Munich, a young German, himself in personal danger from the National Socialists, warned me not to overlook their fine characters. " Several of them," he said, " are men of complete disinterestedness and devotion, living ascetic lives of service to the community, like Gandhi." History may conclude that, in an acquisitive age, it was Hitler's proved disinterestedness, more than any other single quality, that opened the way to his success. Let it not be forgotten, however, that Chancellor Brüning, whom the Nazis call

" traitor," was no less ascetic, no less disinterested than Hitler. Such qualities may do much to raise a man in popular estimation. They will not serve alone to keep him in office. Effective leadership requires, too, a capacity for action, for giving results, a courageous and discerning opportunism.

The leaders seem to be directing the enormous volume of emotional enthusiasm they have aroused into some very fruitful channels, such as common action for adding to the country's productiveness ; and into some harmless ones, comparable to the harmless and often useful activities of boy scouts. But there are other activities which are neither fruitful nor harmless. Nazi-ism, whatever may be its virtues, is a movement that has been built on violence and intolerance, and whose leader has openly declared his belief in these things in his published confession of faith. The degree of violence and intolerance varies greatly in different parts of Germany to-day. During the past few months the writer has learnt, for instance, of certain outstanding examples of Jews in prominent positions who are remaining in those positions, with the full consent and approbation of the local authorities. But a few cases of this kind cannot atone for the thousands of Jews and other excellent German citizens who have been and are being punished for crimes they never committed. Anyone living outside Germany to-day, meeting the stream of distinguished and patriotic Germans, men and women of the highest learning who have committed no crime against the State, but who are driven from their beloved Fatherland, is irresistibly reminded of the effects of the Inquisition in Spain and of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France. Will the same blight fall upon German culture, German intelligence, vital religion in Germany, that Spain and France brought upon themselves by those ancient persecutions ?

Sooner or later some new Luther will arise in Germany, to challenge the National Socialist authority, in the name of conscience and truth. I have not been able to discover what the Nazi idealists expect to happen when that day comes. Perhaps it has come already. Does not the blood of Germany's new martyrs of freedom already cry to us from the ground ? " One lesson that the Western nations teach the world in flaming letters, is that violence is not the way to peace and happiness," says Mr. Gandhi in one of his latest pronouncements. A generation that has witnessed the world war, and

that is still being forcibly fed on the bitter fruits of victory, ought to have learnt this truth. Germans, if any people, ought to realise it most of all. Unhappily, just because the Allies forced them into moral isolation, it has been possible for them to believe that they alone are victims of the unjust peace, and that the cause of all their misery was the Allied victory, the Treaty of Versailles, the burden of reparations. Most Germans could not see that the victors were suffering almost as acutely as the vanquished, that justice can come, not by turning the tables on the victors, but by a complete change of outlook on international affairs. Stresemann and others, indeed, did see it, and it is only fair to recognise that even to-day the official German demand is for equality, for the disarmament of the other powers ; it is not a demand for a new German predominance. It is largely because the victorious Powers have proved by their acts that they still believe in force that the Germans have been driven back to force as the only thing that counts in this world. To them it seems that all the Geneva talk of world federation, perpetual peace, international co-operation, is nauseating cant. Actions still speak louder than words. While the victorious governments have spoken of preparing for " Peace, peace," they have gone on preparing for " War, war." I could hardly wonder when a German in a brown shirt uniform, a silent man, of modest demeanour, quietly interjected into a discussion on religion and politics : " If Jesus Christ came to earth again to-day, he would be crucified at Geneva in the name of humanity." No doubt he would also be ejected from Germany on racial grounds. But *tu quoque* retorts do not help the situation.

I do not believe National Socialist Germany can do anything to redeem Europe until its leaders have learnt the necessity of true toleration, that " The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath," and that " free minds make brave men." But it is likely that Britain and other countries may follow the road to dictatorship unless they can learn some of the lessons Germany is plainly teaching. First, we must learn to unite with our fellow-citizens of other classes, parties, faiths and races, in actual work for the common good ; such activities as Pierre Ceresole's international " *Service Çivile* " indicate possible lines of advance. That is the true work camp, where world brotherhood takes root in the soil, and where freedom and discipline have kissed each other.

Then, in our representative institutions, the unreality of party conflict must be replaced by a conviction of the good faith of our political opponents, so that the maximum of effective co-operation can be achieved in tackling the urgent problems of the moment; the Quaker method of "finding the sense of the whole meeting," instead of deciding by vote, might be commended to parliamentary assemblies. And again, if we want to escape from the international anarchy, we must be ready to subordinate national prestige and self-interest, whether in imperialist policy, or in armaments, or in other respects, to international welfare; resurgent nationalism in Germany or elsewhere cannot be successfully fought by reasserting unjust treaties, but only by honest and whole-hearted internationalism. Liberty and toleration are vital principles; but they are not enough. The youth of the nations to-day is ready to respond to a reasoned call to build a new world on the ruins of the old; but they will not respond until they see that those who issue the call are themselves disciplined for the work: not ambitious to dominate others, but humble-minded experimenters with truth.

HORACE G. ALEXANDER.

WAR AND PEACE.

WAR is for the sake of peace. But what is peace for? In practice it seems to be chiefly an opportunity for each man and each "interest" to pursue a separate gain, while the State holds the ring for the general scramble. And even in theory, men are supposed to serve their country in war; but it is assumed that in peace each ought to look after his own advantage and that the common good will be the result, if no one works for it. But if that is the contrast between war and peace, enthusiasm and youthful ardour naturally support war. The suffering and destruction of war seem to be more than excused by the devoted service of a common good. And peace fails to attract, because it is mean.

The evils of war are admitted even by those who believe that heroism and self-sacrifice flourish nowhere more splendidly than on a battlefield. Pain and untimely death, panic fear, madness and the moral degradation of some men and women—even self-seeking and mean trickery—can be found in war: but war is still possible and the preparation for war continues among honest and intelligent men because they believe it to be the pursuit of a common good, in a fellowship more intimate and more inclusive than any outside the comradeship of arms. At the worst, war is regarded as a regrettable necessity: and the trained soldier is often less warlike than the half-educated civilian, because he knows how evil war is. There may be some who have an appetite for inflicting pain, either on others or on themselves: there may be hidden depths of atavism and abnormality even in the civilised. But war is not due to these abnormalities. It is an institution maintained chiefly because of the real good found in it; and the advocates of peace miss their mark if they attempt to prevent war by dwelling on its horrors and its futility.

The idealism of service, traditionally associated with war, is misused by politicians who are reckless in the pursuit of power for themselves and by traders in armaments who make "patriotism" pay. But war would not occur at all if there were not stores of idealism to be so misused. In our day war is not supposed to be waged for glory or loot, as it was under Alexander and Cæsar; and even the other great brigand of history, Napoleon, had to cover with the phrases of national

liberty the barbarism of "glory." But now war and the preparation for war are supposed to aim only at "defence." All armed forces are entirely harmless, unless attacked! And they cannot be attacked except by other armed forces, equally harmless except for defence! This form of mythology had its source in the historical fact that civilisation has spread from several centres. For each centre, the area outside, beyond the reach of its influence, was once a barbarism. The adventurous pushed out into this area "outside the law," extended the boundaries of civilisation and defended the sown lands from the desert and the wild. But after thousands of years, during which only a few ever crossed the areas of barbarism left unsubdued, between the centres of civilisation, each centre has now in fact pushed its borders outward until they meet the frontiers of other sown lands: and what is outside each frontier is not barbarism "outside the law," but only another type of law and civilisation.

But the imagination is slow. Language and the traditional fairy-stories, called "history," preserve the old attitude. The majority in every country still believe that "we" are civilised and "the rest" are dangerous barbarians. Every civilised nation, whose composite culture disproves the very hypothesis upon which the mythology of war is based, is still prepared at any moment to slip backward into the past enshrined in the imagination. In fact, all centres of civilised life now form parts of one system; but in imagination, at crises or when half-educated enthusiasts seize power, each State is struggling for the only civilisation that exists, against barbarians who are capable of any atrocities. The excuse for preparing for future war is that regression to primitive attitudes is always possible; and this regression does in fact support the primitive virtues, because "defence," the modern excuse for the old habits, is not for the sake of rich or poor, strong or weak, but for one community formed of all these—for a common good traditionally understood and deeply felt by simple and honest men. And therefore the elimination of war, like the dissolving of a pathological "complex" by psycho-analysis, requires not merely an exposure of the current mythology but also the provision of another satisfaction for the tendency to serve a common good which has so far had its chief outlet in war. War at any rate has emotional colour.

This is so obvious that two different appeals are now made by the advocates of peace, which seem to promise an escape from the evils of war by accepting its mythology in a revised form. One appeal is made in favour of a "Class War"; the other in favour of a "League War." In both cases all the old myths remain—the outer barbarians against "us" the virtuous, the non-aggressive struggle only for defence against aggressors, the regrettable necessity. Some therefore say that they will not fight in the existing war system, but only in a "Class" war; and it is a great advantage to them if one armed nation can be identified with a Class. The obverse of the same gospel is the fight of one "chosen" nation against Bolshevism. But this is only an appeal for civil war. Victory, not peace, is the end envisaged. The slaughter, destruction and fraud in all war are here excused as necessary for the sake of "the toiling masses" or for the defence of "*kultur*" in the German or the Italian version, against a barbarian rising. But the emotional appeal of the word "war" and the mythology connected with it can be used on either side.

Others say that peace involves being prepared to fight in a "League War." This is a new form of "the war to end war." It preserves the mythology of the "just" war, with the addition of a ready reckoner for discovering justice in the form of a treaty. The advocates of bombing and starvation blockades, in the name of the League, say that "aggressive" nations do not understand anything but force; but this sounds like the argument of some colonial planters, incompetent in any language, that "niggers understand only blows." The alternative to "League War," say its advocates, is international anarchy, as the alternative to "Class War" is said by the advocates of that method to be chaos of one sort or another. The primitive loyalties and the appetite for risks can indeed be mobilised, not for national war, but for "international" war, as Pierre Dubois in the fourteenth century argued for peace in Europe by advocating a crusade against outsiders. But it is war, all the same. In practical politics there never is only one way out of a difficulty; but other policies than a League war may require more imagination and greater administrative and diplomatic skill than is now devoted to peace. It is quite possible to establish methods for the revision of treaties, for the continuous consultation, about issues threatening to peace, between those who are not

directly concerned, and for rapid social amelioration; but to assume that such policies are not practical alternatives to war, national or international, is to accept the old false identification of peace either with inertia or with a general scramble for gain.

It is impossible here to repeat the whole argument of T. H. Green, in his *Lectures on Political Obligation*, to the effect that the State is not characterised by the force at its command, but by the moral authority of the will for peace which it embodies and that, therefore, war between States is a violation of the very nature of the State. But many advocates of the League War seem to accept unconsciously the earlier theories of Hobbes and Hegel: they really believe that force is the distinguishing mark of government and, therefore, propose to confer that distinction upon the League before providing it with that universally recognised moral authority which alone can justify the use of force. They confuse a "police" force, which never assumes its possible opponents to be other police forces, with an army, which is always organised against other armies standing for other moral rights. But the fundamental fact is the survival, even among the advocates of peace, of the attractiveness of service of a common good in war.

Peace, on the other hand, is emotionally and intellectually ineffectual. It suffers from certain historical associations of the word. St. Augustine, for example, in his *City of God*, asserts vigorously that all war, even civil war, is for the sake of peace. But in his attempt to describe peace he confuses it with victory, that is to say "the peace that suits us," which is not peace at all; and he is obsessed by a belief in an "eternal peace," conceived as rest after toil in a complete inertia. But his effort shows the difficulty of conceiving real peace in his day, in the general collapse of the Roman system of government. That system collapsed largely because it had been built upon the loyalties of service in war and could find no alternative loyalty when war became less attractive. When all the outer barbarians were subdued or driven to a distance, it became impossible for the Roman authorities in the third century to raise troops among their best citizens for war service; and there was no alternative basis for service of a common good. The social bonds were loose, long before barbarian raids shook the whole structure into ruins. Indeed, all

through history peace has been treated as a mere opportunity for the pursuit of private happiness. That is the dominant attitude still; and an obsolete theory of democracy, as a mere balance of power between conflicting interests, confirms this attitude. Again, as between nations, peace is treated as an opportunity for each to "capture" trade or to acquire as much wealth as it can, while each Government acts as agent for "national interests" against other Governments even within the League.

Now once again we face the possibility of Dark Ages such as followed the collapse of the Roman war system. We have reached peace and can do nothing with it. War is now generally regarded as barbarous and futile; but to hate and despise war will not save us from it, unless we can establish another basis for civic patriotism—for loyalty in the service of a common good. Failing that, the more civilised may indeed refuse to serve in war, as happened in the third and fourth centuries of our era; but the necessities of the situation, left fundamentally unchanged, will be supplied by simpler and more barbaric types. And the new barbarians, with the noblest faith in themselves as instruments of virtue against decadence, will destroy once again the poor beginnings of civilised life which we have built up since the last great collapse. The world will go back into Dark Ages, to struggle again upwards, perhaps after some centuries, into a new Middle Ages; from which again the same collapse will follow the same incompetence to make peace anything worth having.

Indeed, it would be better to cease advocating peace and to advocate instead that civilised life for which peace is the necessary condition. No one advocates war, except as a means. The alternative, peace, is also a means. But only an end can move men deeply. Peace, therefore, must be made to be, and to be deeply felt to be, an opportunity for action, not an interval nor an eternity of "rest." Such action, as William James argued in his *Moral Equivalent of War*, must be difficult, strenuous and even hazardous. The younger generation in every age for the most part desires not ease of days, but difficulties and dangers to be overcome. For example, when life in the monasteries of the Dark Ages was hard and poverty-stricken, there was no lack of novices: but when monastic life became easy, then it was difficult to find recruits for it. The cynic and the sensualist misrepresent the

facts of history. Indeed, men would not be so easily gullible as they are if they were not generously idealistic. The danger of civilisation does not arise from the difficulty of maintaining it, but from its seeming security at certain times.

But James did not go far enough in his argument. There is no intrinsic value in compulsory work in coal-pits, for example. Not even the most idealistic of men desire compulsory or dangerous work for its own sake. It is the end that matters. Experience shows to the youngest of us that all noble and great things are hard to reach ; and effort is desired as a sign of a noble purpose. Therefore, peace must mean not merely hard service, but service of some purpose that will invigorate the mind and the muscles serving. Success in getting wealth and power may be enough for some. The nature of things, however, decides that only a few in any case can have such success ; and the admiration of the rest for those who have used their abilities for leaving others in the lurch, is not what it was in the age of economic faith, a century or only fifty years ago. Here and there a successful buccaneer of " business " whistles to keep his courage up, in the Press or at shareholders' meetings ; but he is beginning to feel that he is out in the cold. A general scramble for scraps is not good enough to excuse even the sort of peace for the sake of which warriors say that they wage war.

The purpose of peace must be a common good shared by all, as the end of war, called " defence " or " security " or even " victory," is supposed to be shared by all. This does not imply what is usually called " altruism." It is not that " I " work for " others " : but each works for a life that is in him as well as in others—the shared experience of effort, creative work and enjoyment. Our psychologists examine the remnants of the past in us and not the promises of the future ; but within the Nobodies who make the world there are, besides tendencies to relapse into barbarism, also impulses to civilised intercourse at levels higher than any so far reached. For that intercourse peace is essential ; but peace is itself only the bare opportunity for preparing something other than war—only the opening of a road never yet travelled and perhaps not yet built.

It is not necessary, however, to reorganise the whole of any community in order to lay the foundations of a common service in peace. Changed institutions do indeed change

attitudes ; but changed attitudes can also transform even ancient institutions. And at present the dominant attitude in civilised countries, almost as much as any obsolete institution, makes war likely ; for the attitude of the most influential persons even in the Churches to-day still implies admiration for a warrior's rather than any other virtues. In plain terms, it is assumed that a soldier serving in war deserves honour. He is a " hero " : he works not for gain, but for a community which, if he dies in service, he may never see. But the same person, leaving the armed forces and becoming a railwayman, a grocer or a business man, is assumed by himself and others to be seeking only his own gain. He is so far from being a " hero " that he is a danger to any other person who does not keep his eyes open for smart dealing. Women as war nurses or munition workers gain prestige enough to be awarded a vote! But the same women, as textile workers or wives in poor homes, are regarded as predatory hussies or helps to " some good man " on the make. Again, our public ceremonies rightly honour the armed forces. But if the Churches bless arms, why do they not bless hammers and spades ? The flags of old battles are hung in chancels ; but there are no signs of the services of peace. The mental attitude expressed in our dominant habits is natural to that primitive imagination which was described above. We are still in the nursery of civilisation, " playing soldiers "!

The alternative attitude, by which the services of peace could be established, would give honour to all work by which civilisation is secured. Such work would be honoured as service of a common good ; and it would be only a secondary consideration that the worker " gets a living " by it. The railwayman, the clerk, the textile worker and the typist would feel the " honour " in their work as part of a larger life ; and each would pay honour to the other because, however seemingly unimportant, he holds his place in the line. The Spiritual Power, in the Churches, the Universities and the schools, would create the common life, raising it always to some higher level of shared work and intercourse ; and they would express the honour paid to the services of peace in their ceremonies. The Government in the State might even, in time, shake off its inheritance of armed force directed against other States, which it owes to ages before there was a State. It would be worth while to live in such a peace!

But such a peace can begin here and now, in the changed attitudes of Nobodies. These Nobodies have little enough influence upon the platform politicians who use "peace" as a meaningless flourish in a peroration. Even dictators love "peace," when they have suppressed their critics, especially if they cannot pay enough at the moment to the armament traders in order to obtain the only possible means they know how to use, for impressing opponents with their mission from on high. But real peace is based, deep down, in the normal habits and standards of Nobodies. The problem is one of the imagination. The first effort must dismiss from the mind the ancient fears of "demons," called foreigners, and the still more dangerous myth that we are at the end of civilisation and culture. We are still only very little higher than the pre-mediæval civilisation in Europe; and some of our prophets of doom assert that we can reach no higher but must now "decay," as that civilisation did. But this is to make a theory of civilisation out of the first efforts of barbarians. The way upward is still untried: from the level we have reached we can move higher, if the motive force is an operative desire for a common good less primitive than war can be imagined to secure. That common good must be felt in the work we do.

There is a place for such a desire, not only in the daily work of common folk, but also in public policy, if anyone in power politically could give as much attention and skill to the making of peace as General Staffs in all countries give to the preparation for war. Making peace is a whole-time job. It is quite impossible to pay spies in foreign countries, to "do in" foreign traders, to obstruct intercourse across frontiers and at the same time to make peace. It is futile to promise to use one's forces for a common good in a crisis, if we cannot work for a common good in normal times. Peace depends upon what other nations think of each nation; and others always judge by deeds, not words. But perhaps even our "leaders" will come in time to recognise that to postpone the facing of an issue is not the best way of avoiding the danger it may involve. Peace, for example, in Manchuria was lost, not in 1931 or 1932 among the futilities of our representatives on the League Council, but much earlier in the complacent promotion of the armaments trade by all the chief members of the League and one other Great Power. It was lost by the

irresponsible ignorance, among the "Powers that Be," of the sufferings of poor peasants in Japan as well as in China. And peace now is jeopardised much more truly by the indecision of our "leaders" as to which way to lead than by wicked "aggressors" of one sort or another.

But if it be true that nations do not work for a common good above their conflicting interests, who has ever tried to state and to preach that common good even in his own nation? Every politician in power and every dictator trembles in his shoes lest he should be mistaken for a civilised man rather than a barbarian dancing to the good old tune. There is no dominant and enthusiastic conception of the uses of peace. That is why, although we make war with increasing skill, we cannot yet make peace.

C. Delisle Burns.

THE ROMANTIC BACKGROUND OF HITLERISM.

"*The World must be Romanticised.*"—(NOVALIS.)

THE re-awakening of the German national consciousness of which the present régime is the logical and direct consequence is due in no small measure to the preoccupation of post-war Germany with Romanticism. As the most typically German of all literary movements, its revival was the natural reaction to the spirit of internationalism and pacifism fostered by the lost war and represented by the extravagant claims of the Jewish authors of Expressionism to turn literature into socialist and pacifist propaganda. It was history repeating itself, for one hundred years ago the German Romanticists with Wackenroder, Novalis and the brothers Schlegel at their head had similarly turned against the foreign elements in German culture represented by certain aspects of the European movement of Rationalism or Enlightenment. They denounced the "*Aufklärung*" for its blind worship of reason and thought, for its democratic and demagogic tendencies in politics, for its pedantry and artificiality in art, and its dependence on foreign norms in life and manners. Romanticism was a plea for the claims of imagination, of emotion and feeling, of individualism, and above all for a synthetic expression of the national genius in its manifold aspects of literature and art, of religion and philosophy. Its purpose was to create in Friedrich Schlegel's famous words: "*eine progressive Universalpoesie*," which should express all the manifestations of the human spirit, convinced as he was that "man's highest aim was to comprehend the spirit of the Whole." Its counterpart in modern German criticism is the insistence on the philosophic values in literature, represented by the popular term: "*Geisteswissenschaft*," or the "humanities."

In the emphasis on the national aspects of its literature modern Germany has turned away from the great European movement of humanitarian culture of which first Lessing, and then Goethe, were the supreme representatives in Germany. Lessing may have been in Macaulay's phrase "the first critic in Europe," but he was also the friend of the Jewish philosopher Mendelssohn, the champion of religious tolerance and,

as the child of the cosmopolitan eighteenth century, had no use for such "heroic weaknesses" as patriotism. Goethe was also too good a European to be a good German. He was fascinated by the demoniac personality of Napoleon and could not bring himself to hate the invading French "because of their great civilisation." It must be obvious that, in spite of the lip service paid to his memory during last year's centenary, Goethe can mean little or nothing to modern Germany. His humanitarianism and internationalism, his Hellenism can have no appeal to German youth hostile as it is to classical culture, and impatient of the worship of beauty. Its spiritual leader is rather Hölderlin, the singer of "German Youth," and the champion of a national Fatherland. His was the Romantic conception of the Greeks as a national community founded on a common tradition and belief, the cult of ancient gods and heroes, and the cultivation of national games and festivals. It was an ideal with which he longed to infuse his own beloved Germany which should then become "the heart of the nations and the soul of the world." To-day it is Stefan George who is the seer and the teacher, not, indeed, the George of the *Blätter für die Kunst*, who preached the beauty and harmony of form, and whose Hellenism was as remote as Goethe's from the aspirations of his contemporaries; not the George receptive of cosmopolitan influences, but the later George of *Das neue Reich* in which, under the stress of war, the poet turned from the apartness from life which characterised his early work to the realities and problems besetting his people in their need. The message he proclaims in *Das neue Reich* is very close to Hölderlin's: Germany, as the heart of Europe, if it will but draw on the treasures of its glorious past, may yet point the way to the salvation of the world:

> Er (der Sänger) holt aus Büchern
> Der Ahnen die Verheissung, die nicht trügt:
> Dass die erkoren sind zum höchsten Ziel,
> Zuerst durch tiefe Öden ziehn, dass einst
> Des Erdteils Herz die Welt erretten soll.*

"*Aus Büchern der Ahnen*," from the books of our ancestors. Here we have from the poet whom the movement has adopted

* From the book of our ancestors the bard derives the promise which cannot lie, that those are chosen for the highest goal, who first pass through the depths of the wilderness in order that the heart of the Continent may one day save the World.

as its leader the clearest indication of the sources that inspire it. In the year 1799 was written a little book, scarcely more than a pamphlet, *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, which was destined to have the most important consequences for both the religious and political life of Europe during the whole of the nineteenth century, and whose influence is with us yet. Friedrich von Hardenberg, or Novalis, as he is better known since Carlyle introduced him to us just over one hundred years ago, was the real begetter of Romanticism. He was already making a name for himself in Romantic circles as the author of " *Spiritual Songs*," and of a poetical novel, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. Like Herder before him, he had gone back to the Middle Ages in reaction to the glorification of the present. In this pamphlet he definitely opposes the Ages of Faith to the Age of Reason, he lauds their political unity in face of the prevailing discord. He decries the Reformation for its break with the past, and as the forerunner of the French Revolution which, for Novalis, was the " distant but logical conclusion of Protestantism."

This antipathy to the principles of 1789 found a ready ear among his Romantic friends. A. W. Schlegel had, unlike most of his fellow-poets, been inimical to the Revolution from the first. He was confirmed in his opinions by Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (first translated into German in 1791) in which the " extravagant and presumptuous speculations " of the French Jacobins are castigated as inconsistent with an ordered society. The chief civic virtues are for Burke " the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion," religion, in particular, being " the basis of civil society." The state is, in the last instance, a moral community, and by virtue of its social continuity was independent of each succeeding generation. " It is a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." And again : " People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors." Before Novalis, Burke maintained the connection between Reformation, Rationalism and Revolution, and he had sung the praises of the Middle Ages. But though he repeated the Tory slogan of " Church and State," he had no wish to see the supremacy of the former, and would have had no sympathy with Novalis in his championship of the papacy or the Catholic religion.

Novalis became acquainted with Burke's *Reflections* early in 1794, and its influence on him and his fellow Romanticists can scarcely be exaggerated. It was for them " a supremely revolutionary book against the Revolution," and its force is borne out by the constant references to it, or even literal borrowings from it, in the works of all the later political theorists of the movement. Friedrich Schlegel characteristically emphasised the religious arguments of Novalis and Burke, and would have turned the state into an ideal theocracy. He ended by accepting both the organic feudalised political system of the Middle Ages, and the social unity represented by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. He was convinced of the spiritual mission of Germany " to shed the light of religion over other countries." He had, meanwhile, come under the influence of the French theorists Bonald and de Maistre. But to the last Friedrich Schlegel insisted on three fundamental ideas which go back to the essay of Novalis: the conception of the state " as an organic and individual whole," the combination of monarchical and republican principles which he found incorporated in the constitution of the medieval empire, and the necessity of the intimate connection of church and state.

The feudal system of the Middle Ages as advocated by Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel with its sharp distinctions of class, was also the political ideal of the romantic philosopher Adam Müller, as expressed in his *Elemente der Staatskunst*. The state does not consist of an aggregate of masses or a " bundle of egoists," but is an organic community made up of " guilds, corporations, communes, families, cities, which form its living members." They alone are worthy of political representation, and not the individual by any virtue of citizen suffrage. The state is, as it was for Novalis, a marriage between the middle classes and the nobility, each with their own duties and privileges. Freedom consists, not in independence, but in the fullest development of the individual according to his nature, within the framework of a community of citizens mutually interdependent, and so restricted in their several spheres. " Inequality is the fundamental reality of all politics." At the head is a king as the symbol of the spirit of national unity, and as the representative of all past and future generations, and to him his people are bound by ties of love and devotion. All these speculations culminate

in the doctrine of nationality: "that divine harmony, reciprocity and interdependence between private and public interests."

As a consequence of this identity of interests it follows that capitalism and industry are harmful as destructive of individuality. The dispersion of human efforts in the factory is "a sinful division of labour," for a man's joy is the product of his work rather than its reward. Similarly the profits of the employer must be strictly limited, or it will lead to the accumulation of wealth in a few private hands and this, again, is detrimental to the authority of the state. "The exclusive striving for material gain at the expense of human personality is shameful." Hence the hostility to the Jews, whose interests as the representatives of international finance must be, if not opposed, at least indifferent, to those of the common weal. Burke had already expressed similar views of "these usurers, the Jews." They were developed by later Romanticists like Achim von Arnim, who held the Jews responsible for the industrialisation and commercialisation of trade.

The other Romanticists Gentz, Görres, Baader, Eichendorff, Steffens merely develop the political theories of Novalis or Adam Müller: all are united in their loathing of Western democracy, "this English sickness," as Friedrich Schlegel mocks; all are in favour of the organic community as opposed to the individualistic mechanised state of "Rationalism." A political constitution is something that has grown as the individual expression of a definite people. It is a living product of history, not an artificial scheme of universal application. It must be based on the co-ordination and subordination of all classes. "*Volksgemeinschaft*," or community, of the people, and the "*Ständestaat*," or corporative state, were the political ideals of Romanticists, as they are those of present-day Germany. National socialism is nothing more nor less than Romantic socialism.

The notion of "*Das dritte Reich*," with which so much play is made in Germany to-day, is similarly the invention of these same Romanticists, the development of Lessing's prophetic announcement of "the third kingdom." The idea proved particularly attractive to Fichte and Schleiermacher in their *Addresses*, and to Novalis in the *Europa* essay. Friedrich Schlegel, too, was filled with enthusiasm for the golden age which the Romanticists placed, not like the Classicists in the

past, but in the future: "*Es wird das neue Evangelium kommen*," wrote Friedrich Schlegel:

> Es wird das neue Evangelium kommen!
> So sagte Lessing, doch die blöde Rotte
> Gewahrte nicht der aufgeschlossen Pforte.
> Und dennoch, was der Teure vorgenommen,
> Im Denken, Forschen, Streiten, Ernst und Spotte,
> Ist nicht so teuer wie die wen'gen Worte.*

It was again the later Romanticists Arnim and Adam Müller who gave the idea its national, political modern twist: "The great federation of European peoples shall come some day, as I live," wrote Adam Müller in 1809, "and it will fly the German colours; for all that is great, fundamental and eternal in every European institution is German."

In the above-mentioned essay *Die Christenheit oder Europa* Novalis had advocated the foundation of a new church based on the coalescence of Catholicism and Protestantism. Friedrich Schlegel once more improved on his friend's idea and, with his usual enthusiasm, set himself to create an entirely new religion, based on Christianity, it is true, but in which dogmas and traditions were to have the force of a mythology. He determined to write a new Bible and incorporate in it the spirit of the Eleusinian mysteries, Oriental philosophy, Schelling's "*Naturphilosophie*," Jakob Böhme, Romantic poetry, physics and mathematics, an idea which is not more grotesque than its modern counterpart of re-writing the Bible without the Jews! This Romantic mythology was destined to have a more fruitful influence in turning the Germans back to those rich sources of legend and myth in their own past. It resulted in the great collection of *Chap Books* of Göres, the *Fairy Tales* of the brothers Grimm, and the splendid poetry of the *Wunderhorn* of Arnim and Brentano. But the revival of the *Edda* gave a consciously Nordic twist to the movement, which found its culmination in the Romantic belief that the elaborate mythology of Scandinavia could be assumed for the whole of primitive Germany. This fiction was crystallised in the deliberate attempt of Richard Wagner to combine the myths and legends of the Germanic nations into a great

* "There shall come the new gospel," thus Lessing spake, yet the foolish rabble heeded not the opened gate. And yet whate'er the dear one hath undertaken in thought or search, in strife or earnestness or mockery, was not so precious as these few words.

synthesis of religious tradition, which should vie with the mythology of the Greeks. And his friend Nietzsche lent his aid in this glorification of myth as against history, when he developed the consciousness of Germanic race superiority. Into his vision of the " blonde beast lustful of booty and victory," there has entered in distorted form a measure of Carlyle's " hero " and of Emerson's " representative man."

Nietzsche, like his Romantic predecessors, had declared that men were fundamentally unequal ; that equality must come, not by levelling downwards, but by raising them gradually to the heights of the superman. It is this idea which is present in the modern call for leadership : Hitler is " *der Führer*," the leader, the *duce*, the " *Volkskönig*," or to give him his Germanic appellation : the " *druhtin*," the Old German word signifying the relationship of the leader to his loyal thanes or *druht* or " *Gefolgschaft*." It is founded on unswerving loyalty and implicit obedience, on the belief that man is master of his fate, and on the pagan glorification of heroic death on the battlefield against unequal odds.

Such are some of the beliefs of Germany's Romantic past which help to explain the present. To our older, more stable, Western civilisation the mental attitude of modern Germany may savour of arrogance, of megalomania and aggressiveness. To the Germans it is an article of faith, a religious conviction, a spiritual awakening, a return to ideal values after the materialism of the post-war years. The Germans claim to have laid the ghost of Bolshevism which was threatening Europe—they like to think of the " glorious revolution " of April as a second, spiritual Tannenberg against the encroaching Russian enemy. They expect recognition and gratitude, and are frankly amazed at the hostile attitude of the West in the face of their achievements. Their claim is no longer for equality in the comity of nations, but for leadership, a belief deliberately fostered, as we have seen, by a century-old intellectual and spiritual propaganda, and enshrined in some of their noblest poetry. " Our call it is to civilise the earth," Novalis had cried, and the proclamations of their present leaders are not couched in humbler language : " It is our task to be the watchmen upon the threshold of values," are the last words of Moeller van der Bruck's *Das dritte Reich*, and similar pronouncements may be read in every political speech. It is a claim to which neither France nor England can ever

subscribe. The most precious legacy from the Middle Ages, the conception of chivalry, was the invention of the brilliant courtly society of Southern France, and its traditions have lingered longest in England. To the ideal of the " noble savage " (a Romantic fiction of Rousseau) we would oppose that of the " gentleman " who, while taking for granted the pagan values of bravery and loyalty, of fearless endurance of fate, has learned to consider as even greater, if only because they are so much harder to practise, the Christian virtues of charity and humility, of gentleness and tolerance, who rejects force as an answer to conviction, and abhors brutality and cruelty as the basest and most savage of human passions.

L. A. WILLOUGHBY.

IRELAND IN 1933: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

THE last few months have seen the attainment of another stage in the political evolution of the Irish Free State. When that State was established by the Treaty of 1921 it had as its first task the suppression of a rebellion. This it is that has chiefly decided the course of Irish politics in the succeeding years. I remember Major William Redmond saying to me, very shortly before his death at Messines, that there would be no peace in Ireland until every protagonist in the old fight for Home Rule should have passed away. That consummation has now nearly been reached; for all the old chiefs are gone, and of the rank and file three only (Mr. Devlin, Sir Thomas Esmonde and the present Lord Mayor of Dublin) are left in public life. Yet the end of strife seems no nearer; since far more bitter memories of mutual injury stand between the political opponents of to-day than then divided Irish nationalists from Irish unionists. Time has not healed but inflamed the wounds of the Civil War. Nevertheless, there has gone on in other quarters a silent process of appeasement.

Until the other day the Dáil contained, in addition to the two main parties which derived from the Sinn Fein split of 1921-22, a number of separate groups—Labour, Farmer, National League, Independent. Many people have regarded these as the undesired and undesirable offspring of Proportional Representation. It would be far truer to say that they sprang from historical and legitimate variations in Irish thought and sentiment. The special interests of Labour and Agriculture call for no explanation. But there were other sections of the Irish nation which, while loyally accepting the *fait accompli*, were not altogether happy under the new régime. First, and most obviously, there were the Southern Unionists, of whom it would be difficult to determine whether they were men more resentful of their abandonment by Great Britain and by the Ulster Covenanters or apprehensive of ill-usage by those to whom the government of their country had been committed. Hardly more happy were the constitutional Nationalists, supporters for the most part of the old Parliamentary Party. The terms of the Treaty had, indeed, surpassed—save on the sore point of Partition—their highest

expectations. But in Ireland personalities count for even more than in other countries; and they had seen their leaders driven from public life and themselves ousted from local administration. It is not surprising if they were disposed to sulk in their tents, or if relations between Mr. Cosgrave and Captain Redmond, for several years their sole representatives in the Dáil, were far from friendly. Captain Redmond's onslaught upon Cumann na nGaedheal at the first General Election of 1927 and subsequent effort to oust Mr. Cosgrave in favour of Mr. De Valera (though at the last moment defeated by the defection of one of his followers and by the abstention of another) certainly did nothing to heal the breach between the older and younger schools of Irish Nationalism.

Nevertheless, this year (1927) can now be seen to mark the beginning of a united front against republicanism. On the one hand, now that Mr. de Valera and his followers had entered the Dáil, the Government was faced by an Opposition more numerous and more widely assured of popular support than it had hitherto encountered. On the other, many of its former critics were becoming progressively reconciled to a Ministry which, if they did not altogether like some of its tendencies, had shown itself unmistakably desirous of holding the scales even between all classes and creeds. Thus the Farmers' group, while still claiming separate representation in Dáil and Senate, came to a working agreement with Cumann na nGaedheal. So, too, a majority of ex-Unionists, in and out of Parliament, have ever since 1927 given steady support to Mr. Cosgrave's party; one of the ablest of their representatives, the late Major Bryan Cooper, actually exchanging his status as an Independent deputy for that of a pledged member of Cumann na nGaedheal. A year or two later Captain Redmond took a similar step, and on his death the ancient borough of Waterford, the only constituency south of the Boyne to hold out against Sinn Féin in 1918, showed its approval of what he had done by electing his young widow in the same interest. Even so, however, the gap between constitutional Nationalism and the right wing of Sinn Féin had been but partially closed; and in 1931 the effort of Mr. MacDermot and Mr. Dillon to create a new Centre Party (much on the lines of Captain Redmond's National League) threatened not only to re-open the breach,

but to revive a separatist policy among the larger farmers. It has needed the bitter experience of the past two years to teach all three sections the necessity of closing their ranks. Negotiations to that end were, it will be remembered, cut short by the sudden dissolution last January. They have now borne fruit in the new party of United Ireland (or Fine Gael) with General O'Duffy as organising chief and with Mr. Cosgrave, seconded by Mr. MacDermot, as its Parliamentary leader.

This brief retrospect I have thought useful, because of the tendency observable in some English newspapers to treat what has happened as merely a re-shuffling of cards between politicians eager to obtain or recover office; whereas, as I have tried to show, it is something much more honourable and significant: the last stage in a ten-years' progress towards the consolidation of all those forces which stand for maintenance of the Treaty and good fellowship between Ireland, Great Britain and the Commonwealth. To turn now to the future. In the present Dáil, beyond the tactical advantage of a united command, no change is to be looked for. There Mr. de Valera's majority remains intact and even strengthened by closer alliance with Labour. But in the constituencies there is hope for those who, like myself, desire the ending of this silly and disastrous quarrel with Great Britain. If, during the past five or six years, the pro-Treaty groups have lost ground, it is because neither singly nor collectively were they able to gain the ear of the young. We all know how difficult it is, as we grow first middle-aged and then elderly, to realise that the little boys and girls whom—but yesterday, as it seems—we watched trotting to and from the elementary schools, are now grown men and women, with their names on the Parliamentary register. Still more difficult is it to realise that their outlook on the world of politics, whatever it may be, is certainly not that of our own generation or even that of the generation that has just followed ours. To us, conscious of many things with great risk and difficulty accomplished, of many more vainly attempted, time appears to rush past in a flood, threatening what we have so painfully achieved. But to them time seems to stand still. They neither fear nor know the hazards of the game; no more than our former selves are they disposed to let well and ill alone.

Moreover in Ireland there is a factor which augments this inevitable dissonance between the generations. Even those who have now reached the not very great age of forty, though inured to war and revolution, can at least recollect a time when the words security and stability were not without meaning. But what of those—ere long to be a majority of our electors—who were born, say, between 1906 and 1914? Of what political events did they hear when they began to listen to the talk of the grown-ups? Of Ulster's determination to resist Home Rule in arms; of Ulster and National and Sinn Féin volunteers; of gun-running at Larne and Howth; of the Great War; of the Easter Rising; of the Black and Tans; of Civil War following hard on the Treaty of 1921. Little wonder is it that young people formed in such a school should be more than commonly impatient of the tedious processes of Parliamentary democracy or averse from appeals to reason and political common sense. Nor, it must be admitted, was the policy of Mr. Cosgrave's Government of a kind to appeal to the youthful imagination. When your mind is eager for adventure and your head stuffed with romantic stories, it is disappointing to be told that the war is all over and that your job is not to fight, but to till your father's farm or attend to some other of the humdrum duties of a citizen in a civilised state. Reduction of income-tax will not appeal to you, for you are not an income-tax payer; nor abolition of tea duty, however it may please your mother. In theory you will approve the blending of orange and green in the national flag; but you will at the same time lend a credulous ear to anyone who points to the reconciliation of ex-Unionists as proof that the Government is under the thumb of the "Freemasons," or to the good relations with Westminster as evidence that its members are tools of England. Moreover, even if you did not fall a victim to the blandishments of Fianna Fáil or to the threats of the I.R.A., you would find—or would have found until recently—that, except during the few days immediately preceding a Polling day, Cumann na nGaedheal had no special work for you to do, nothing, that is, particularly suited to your age. Henceforth it will not be so.

True: the fusion of Mr. Cosgrave's followers with the Centre Party and with General O'Duffy's "blue-shirts" neither implies nor portends any major change in policy,

though more stress may be laid on social and economic reconstruction, and though something may be done, as General O'Duffy and others desire, to set up some sort of vocational council, side by side with, perhaps partially superseding, our existing Parliamentary institutions. For good or evil, the idea of a state-planned economy is everywhere becoming fashionable; and the examples of Italy, Germany, Great Britain and, above all, of the United States of America, are being watched with interest in this country. For the rest, United Ireland, like Cumann na nGaedheal, stands steadfastly by the Treaty; for the sufficient reason that Ireland's own interests require it. "Ireland is more to us than Republic, Kingdom or Commonwealth" is the motto of the party, as set forth in its official organ. Only such as think forms more important than facts will cavil at this declaration. Quite apart from the implications of the Statute of Westminster, few people anywhere now either expect or desire that any portion of the Commonwealth shall be kept within it by other constraint than its own free will. Elsewhere loyalty to the Crown may suffice; but unhappily, for reasons rooted in remote and recent history, that traditional loyalty cannot, save among a small number of her people, be looked for in Ireland. The more courageously the leaders of United Ireland declare this principle, the more plainly they demonstrate to our people that our own liberty and prosperity are not merely compatible but indissolubly bound up with membership of the Commonwealth, the better it will be in the long run for all concerned.

Nor can Ulster, which yearly celebrates the shutting of the gates of Derry in the face of an anointed King, reasonably quarrel with a policy so closely resembling her own. It is true that Lord Craigavon, like Mr. de Valera, has banned the "blue-shirt" organisation. This action must surely have been based on misconception. To the Northern Government all Nationalists are suspect; and this Government may perhaps have supposed that General O'Duffy was preparing to head a movement for the forcible incorporation of the Six Counties in the Free State. But General O'Duffy has since been at pains to make it perfectly clear that he, like Mr. Cosgrave, looks upon the ending of Partition as only possible or desirable through such wise and prudent ordering of the Free State itself as shall some day convince the people of the North East that it will be to their own advantage to throw in their lot with the rest of their fellow-countrymen.

It is, then, not in the Dáil but in the constituencies, not in policy but in organisation (to which General O'Duffy, being, perhaps fortunately, without a seat in Parliament, is giving all his time), that a notable change may be expected. For the first time since 1922 the young men and women are being invited to play a definite and special part in public life. And what they are asked to do is something more to their taste, as well as very much more dangerous, than listening to political orators or attending occasional meetings of political clubs. It should be remembered that the Army Comrades Association, the precursor of General O'Duffy's National Guard, was reorganised some two years ago by Dr. O'Higgins (brother to the murdered Minister for Justice) for the express purpose of insuring, if necessary by physical means, the right of free speech to members of the Opposition and of a free vote to members of the Electorate. Right well did the young men of the A.C.A. perform this honourable and perilous duty which they have now handed on to their successors. The wearing of a blue shirt is of itself (as has of late been often proved) enough to mark these out for concerted attack when proceeding on their most lawful and innocent occasions. For their very existence is a challenge to those republican and communist bodies which, until lately, were able to spread their doctrines almost without hindrance among the young people of the Free State.

One other thing it is necessary to say, lest the spirit of the organisation be misunderstood: In this Youth Movement, with its flags and uniforms, its insistence on sport and games and physical training for both sexes, we can of course see the influence of continental models. Yet it would be a mistake to think of it as merely an Irish counterpart of Fascism or Hitlerism. It is not from United Ireland or from any of its constituent sections that danger to personal or civic freedom is to be apprehended. It is the leaders of the I.R.A. and their associates who, now as always, pour contempt upon Parliamentary democracy, and who, by over-insistence upon the Gaelic element in the nation, threaten to bring about a racial conflict. Even if General O'Duffy's character did not itself reassure us, his close association with Mr. Cosgrave, who throughout his political career has stood for the plain people

against both casuist and gunman, is a sufficient answer to those who profess to see in the new movement an attempt to establish a dictatorship.

To sum up: In Ireland, as in other countries, the centre of interest has shifted from politics (as commonly understood) to economics. The suffrage has been extended to the utmost limit, unless children and certified lunatics are to be added to the register. Liberty, as nineteenth century reformers conceived it, has been achieved. But neither individual enfranchisement nor national self-government is seen to be enough. We must be prepared to solve new problems, and it may be that, to this end, some modification of our political institutions will be required. But I have no reason to think that such modification need be very considerable, or that there is any widespread desire for fundamental change in our constitution. The recent passage, practically unopposed in Dáil and Seanad, of the three Bills affecting the Governor-Generalship and Privy Council appeals does no more than bring the letter of the law into conformity with already established practice. The first task of United Ireland, when returned to power, will certainly be the conclusion of economic peace with Great Britain. The second and even more important (though without the first it cannot be achieved) is to rebuild the social and economic life of the Free State on stable foundations, so that those forces which make for the reunion of Ireland may again work unhindered. These two objects being attained, the problem of Ireland's relations with the Commonwealth will have solved itself; and this the more easily, since all those features of the Constitution of 1922 which seemed to deny (in word though never in fact) the right of Ireland to choose her own path will have disappeared. Even Mr. de Valera, with his mathematician's love of abstractions, and his quite singular contempt for work-a-day realities, might find it difficult to explain—he has never attempted it, so far as I know—just why a twenty-six county Republic is to be preferred to a reunited Ireland freely associated under the Crown with the other nations of the Commonwealth.

HUGH A. LAW.

THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE.

THE recent disturbances in Palestine have served to call attention again to the problems involved in the administration of the Mandate over that country. The unhappy memories associated with the Arab outbreak of 1929 were being gradually effaced by a steady and gratifying economic development in which all sections of the population have benefited, and hence this latest eruption was all the more astonishing and regrettable. It differed, however, from the outrages of four years ago in one important respect, for it was directed, not against the Jews, but against the Government itself, though the avowed reason for the demonstration was the extent of Jewish immigration and the sale of land to Jews. It is, therefore, desirable to examine whether there was any justification for this outburst of hostility, and also whether it may have any repercussion upon the general development of the country and particularly upon that of the Jewish National Home; for the policy adopted by the Government for some time after the previous riots was so contrary to the letter and spirit of the Mandate, and aroused such world-wide protests, that the question of its reaction to the latest display of Arab opposition is of no little importance.

The disturbances were not the outcome of a sudden ebullition of wrath on the part of the Arab people, but the result of an agitation systematically fostered in the Arab Press for several months past, and for which the "Istaqlal" or Independence Party was largely responsible. They were a violent expression of the feeling that had already been shown in a milder form during the visit of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, to Palestine last spring, for the Arab leaders declined to meet him and absented themselves from all functions held in his honour. Unfortunately, no steps were taken by the Government to stem the growing agitation in the Press, which poisoned the minds of the credulous populace. The demonstration that was arranged to take place in Jerusalem on Friday, October 13th, was decided upon at a meeting of the Arab Executive on October 8th, at which only twenty-one out of the forty-eight members were present—a fact showing that the extremists are in the minority. The meeting resolved to call "a general strike on land, sea, and in air," and to hold a demonstration

through the streets in order to manifest its opposition to Government policy on the two questions of immigration and land sales. The Government announced that it would not permit any such parade, and published notices that any persons who took part in it would be subject to the law. Despite this warning the Arab leaders attempted to carry out their plan, with the result that the police had to intervene in order to disperse a mob of 2,000 people, and in the ensuing clash a number of policemen and civilians were injured. Had the Government immediately arrested and punished the Arab leaders who took part in the illegal assembly, as the warning which it had issued would have justified it in doing, there might have been no further trouble. But its forbearance acted only as a further incentive to the Arab leaders who, smarting under their failure in Jerusalem, met again on October 13th and decided to repeat their efforts on October 27th in Jaffa.

This subsequent demonstration, which was likewise prohibited by the authorities, was a far more serious affair, in which the police had to use their firearms to defend themselves against a mob that fought with stones, clubs, knives, and daggers; and the trouble was aggravated by similar disturbances breaking out, as though in sympathy, at Haifa and Nablus, as well as at Jerusalem again, where revolvers and home-made bombs were also used. Fortunately the police, British and Palestinian, were able to quell the riots without any military assistance, and the courage and discipline displayed by the Arab police were a welcome contrast to their conduct on similar occasions in the past. Only after the Jaffa riots did the authorities arrest some of the Arab leaders and imprison them at Acre, though they released them again pending their trial. In order to ensure the complete restoration of order the Government proclaimed the Palestine Defence Order in Council of 1931, which invested the High Commissioner with the powers of martial law. The troubles immediately died down and the "general strike," which was not at any time extensively observed, ceased on November 2nd, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, which passed off quietly. The Arab leaders who were responsible for the wanton exhibition of violence and the shedding of blood (the casualties including the deaths of twenty-four civilians and one policeman) will be put on trial

in due course, and the punishment meted out to them will, it may be expected, act as a deterrent to further demonstrations of a similar nature. That they were much more concerned about their waning political influence, which they wished to revive, than about the alleged adverse effects of Jewish settlement upon the Arab population will become clear enough from an enquiry into those effects. The motives underlying their policy are the same as those described by the Prime Minister when, after a visit to Palestine in 1922, he wrote in an article in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW:*

> The "Moslem-Christian" deputations that come to state the case against the Jews always, at some point, attack the British Government even more than the Jews. They rally the Arabs in their own sectional self-defence rather than in that of the Arab people or of Moslemism. The winds of Europe are blowing in upon them and they cannot stand the cutting blast. They see the coming shadow of a cultivator protected in his labour and property, they see the end of unjust exactions, they see their power vanishing, and they are fighting for their lives.

The immigration of Jews into Palestine is strictly controlled and regulated by the Government in accordance with the country's capacity to absorb new arrivals. Every six months the Administration decides how many Jews of the working class may be admitted during the ensuing half-year, whilst in addition to this so-called Labour Schedule persons with means, ranging from £250 in the case of a skilled craftsman to £1,000 in the case of a so-called "capitalist," besides persons whose maintenance is assured and dependents of permanent residents, may also be admitted. The Labour Schedule is decided upon after recommendations are submitted to the Government by the Jewish Agency (embodying the Zionist Executive), which, according to the Mandate, has the right "of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home." The recommendations drawn up by the Jewish Agency are based upon a careful investigation of the opportunities of employment that will be available in Jewish agricultural and industrial undertakings during the next half-year, as well as of the Jewish share of prospective employment in public and municipal works, and

* *Contemporary Review*, April 1922.

they are supported in every case with detailed figures. But although the Administration is required by the Mandate to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions," it invariably grants a much smaller Schedule than that submitted by the Jewish Agency. The comparative figures during the last few years have been as follows :

	1929		1930		1931		1932		1933	
	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.
Number of immigration certificates applied for	2,857	5,844	3,143	2,095	1,413	1,721	3,720	6,760	12,750	24,000
Number of certificates granted	2,400	2,300	950	1,480	500	350	2,000	4,500	5,500	5,500

Thus, during the last four years and a half, the number of Jewish immigrant workers admitted has always been less than the number for whom application has been made, the proportion approved having been even as low as 20 per cent. There is no ground, therefore, for the allegation made by some of the Arab leaders that Jewish immigration has been excessive. Heedless of the facts, they seem to have been responsible for the dissemination of fantastic stories about arrangements being made with a shipping company for the landing of many tens of thousands of Jews in Palestine within the next few months, and thus aroused the fears of their gullible followers.

As for the immigrants with means, who are outside the Labour Schedule, they cannot reasonably be said to have given ground for Arab complaints, seeing that they have brought capital with them for the improvement of the country, in which the Arabs are bound to benefit just as well as the Jews. An investigation that was carried out by the Jewish Agency into the means of 553 families (1,741 persons) who entered Palestine in 1926-32 showed that they possessed an aggregate capital of nearly £2,000,000, and it is interesting to add that they included 193 immigrants from the United States with a capital of £696,320, 146 from Poland with £372,210, and 57 from Russia with £108,910.* The money brought by these settlers, as well as by others of the same category, has been invested mainly in agricultural and indus-

* Report of the Zionist Executive to the 18th Zionist Congress at Prague, 1933, p. 262.

trial undertakings, and in building operations, and large sums have also been transferred to Palestine by Jews still living abroad. The total amount of Jewish capital invested in Palestine during 1932 is estimated at £3,252,000, of which 42 per cent. has been sunk in agriculture (mainly citrus plantations), 43 per cent. in building, and 15 per cent. in industry and handicrafts.* It is inevitable that a certain proportion of this money must have found its way into Arab pockets.

The oft-reiterated complaint that the incoming of Jews is ousting the Arabs is disposed of by the fact, revealed by the Government Census of 1931, that whilst the Jewish population, from the year 1922, increased from 83,794 to 175,006, the non-Jewish population rose from 673,388 to 860,148. Thus the increase of the non-Jewish population, who are predominantly Arabs, was twice as great as that of the Jewish population. It is, moreover, important to note that the increase in the Arab population was most marked in those districts where the greatest progress has been made in Jewish settlement. Thus, in three principal centres of Jewish development, Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, the non-Jewish population has increased by 43, 61 and 85 per cent. respectively, whilst in districts unaffected by Jewish development, such as Nablus and Hebron, the non-Jewish population has increased only by 9 and 8 per cent. respectively, and in Gaza there has even been a decrease. Nor has recent Jewish immigration caused the removal of Arab labourers from the Jewish settlements in which they have been employed. In five Jewish settlements there are 551 orange groves employing 753 Jewish labourers and 1,505 Arab labourers, and in the same settlements there are 255 groves employing 602 Arab labourers, but no Jews.†

The Arab complaints about the sale of land to Jews have really less substance than those in regard to immigration, and played a much smaller part in the recent disturbances. For the land that is bought is acquired from Arab owners, and hence if the Arab Executive are anxious to diminish such sales the remedy is surely to bring influence to bear upon their own people and not to organise violent demonstrations in the streets. It is doubtful, however, whether some of the Arab leaders are really serious in their complaint on this score, as they are themselves interested in the sale of land (which

* Report of the Zionist Executive to the 18th Zionist Congress at Prague, 1933, p. 262.
† *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

always means a handsome profit for the vendor). The legend about the " displaced " Arabs, which figured so prominently in the controversy that followed the riots of 1929, seems now to have been given its quietus, since the official investigations have shown that the total number of Arab tenants who have had to leave their holdings in consequence of a transfer to Jewish ownership, and who, despite the compensation they received from the purchaser, have been unable to find a holding elsewhere or some other occupation, is comparatively small. Besides, the amount of land that has passed into Jewish possession in recent years has been on the decrease. In 1925 it was 101,000 dunam (about 25,250 acres), and in 1929 it was 64,500 dunam, whilst since then it has remained below 20,000 dunam in each succeeding year.*

If we now consider the reaction of the Palestine Government to the Arab agitation we find that it betrays a tendency to give way. The Jewish Agency applied for 24,000 immigration certificates under the Labour Schedule for the six months beginning on October 1st, and was granted only 5,500. Of this number 2,000 had already been given in advance for the benefit of Jews anxious to escape from persecution in Germany, and 500 were retained by the Government to be used for tourists who might apply for permission to settle, so that only 3,000 are available for the six months. It was admitted by the Government that, according to its own estimate, there was room for another 6,500 immigrants during this period, but it had deducted 1,000 certificates because of the number of Jews who had entered the country with tourist visas during the past year or so and had settled without the requisite permission. The fact, however, that these tourists had found opportunities of employment or business in the country showed that the Government had repeatedly underrated its absorptive capacity, and thus the best way in which the Government can check the tendency to ignore legal formalities is to provide a schedule large enough to meet the requirements of the labour market.

So far from recognising this situation, however, the Government apparently proposes to penalise many of those who wish to come into the country on account of the transgression of those who are already settled in it, even though the latter may have brought thousands of pounds with them and provided employment for others. It intends going farther, for it has enacted new regulations requiring from all, except first-class travellers, a deposit of £60 or a guarantee from a reputable bank, and introducing a system of surveillance to prevent those who enter as travellers from remaining as settlers without permission. This tightening of the regulations is surprising enough in view of the Mandatory's obligations " to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions," and of the statement in the Churchill White Paper,* that " for the Jewish people . . . it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance." It is all the more surprising that such rigorous vigilance should be exercised against the Jews wishing to enter their National Home when no corresponding concern is shown regarding the large number of Arabs from Syria and Transjordan who are attracted into Palestine by better employment and higher wages (though Jews are not allowed to settle in Transjordan). And it is most surprising that such an illiberal attitude should be adopted at a time when Palestine is passing through a period of unparalleled expansion and prosperity, and when the tragedy of German Jewry imposes a special obligation upon the Power responsible for the Jewish National Home.

The glaring disparity between the latest Labour Schedule recommended by the Jewish Agency and that granted by the Government cannot be explained away merely on the basis of a mathematical miscalculation. Assuming even that the Agency may have erred to the extent of 10, 20, or 30 per cent. in its estimate of opportunities of employment, it is inconceivable that it has erred to the extent of 75 per cent. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the Government has not vouchsafed any explanation of its decision, apart from that relating to the docking of 1,000 certificates. The omission of such an explanation seems to suggest that it could not be made on purely economic grounds, and the suspicion, therefore, arises that the Government has been influenced by political considerations—or, in other words, by the Arab agitation. If such should be the case, then the Government is violating the principle clearly laid down in the Prime Minister's letter of February 13th, 1931, to Dr. Weizmann, that " considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations." That important

* Report of the Zionist Executive to the 18th Zionist Congress at Prague, 1933, p. 262.

* *Command Paper* 1700 (1922).

letter was published in Hansard, it was laid before the League of Nations, and it was embodied in official instructions to the High Commissioner for Palestine. There is the strongest reason, therefore, for demanding a more just, not to say a more generous, attitude, towards Jewish immigration, and the substantial part which the Jews have played in the development of Palestine—apart from the obligations embodied in the Mandate—surely entitle them to such consideration. Although forming only 20 per cent. of the population, they contribute more than 40 per cent. of the public revenue, and to them, therefore, is due in more than a proportionate degree the handsome surplus of over £1,000,000 by which Palestine is distinguished from the States that are burdened with national debts. The rapid growth of the city of Tel-Aviv, the great increase in citrus cultivation, the steady multiplication of industrial enterprises, the extension of the electrification system, the successful exploitation of the mineral resources of the Dead Sea, the improvement in the country's trade, the accumulation of deposits in the banks to the extent of £6,000,000, and the opening of the Haifa harbour with its limitless possibilities—all these point to the desirability, nay, the necessity, of a progressive instead of a reactionary policy in the matter of immigration.

The Prime Minister's letter of nearly three years ago, which was intended to explain away the objectionable passages in the Passfield White Paper of October 1930, foreshadowed the evolution of a land development scheme that "would result in substantial and lasting benefit to both Jews and Arabs." So far that scheme has not materialised nor even emerged into any definite documentary form. But the spirit that prompted its suggestion could now find a fitting outlet for its expression in causing the gates of Palestine to open wider for the Jewish people, who are the victims of persecution—social, economic and political—not only in Germany but in other lands too. The Balfour Declaration came as a ray of hope to millions of Jews enshrouded by the gloom of the War. Its realisation in a liberal-minded spirit, and with due regard to the relevant economic considerations, would once again revive their hopes in a world in which it is their fate to continue battling against injustice and intolerance as they have done for centuries past.

ISRAEL COHEN.

QUO VADIS?

THE words may seem hackneyed, but no others could express so concisely and clearly the question which now demands an answer, and the future may depend on clear thinking and the right spirit in making it. The changes within living memory, economic, social, political, ethical, intellectual and above all in the domain of religion, the conditions of unrest and the new problems which have arisen for solution have been made more difficult and urgent by the Great War and its catastrophes, but many of them were in existence before. Strange as it may appear to the younger generation, there is good ground for thinking that it is the very old, who have been acquainted with people of five or six generations, and have taken a keen interest and possibly some slight active part in the life of their time, who can give the most useful help in answering the question. Even though younger men may possess more intellectual power, there is profound truth in Milton's words:

> "But old experience may attain
> To something like prophetic strain."

The old stand outside of the rushing stream and the currents in which younger people are immersed, and can watch their eddies and judge what their true meaning is, and whither the main streams are really tending. Though for them personal ambition would be absurd, and there is nothing to hope for and little to fear, their sympathies with others are keen as ever, but the range of those sympathies is wider.

It would require a library of volumes rather than a short magazine article to give even the outline of an answer in each of the branches above indicated.

The important subject of currency and international exchange we must leave untouched, not only for want of space but because of a deep ignorance which the majority of those who speak of it fully share, though usually unwilling to confess it. When financial experts themselves agree—if they ever do so—we are ready to accept their guidance. As to politics, our experience does not make us pessimists, though it is impossible to share the sloppy, easy-going optimism which pretends that things will go right without careful thought and vigorous well-directed action. We can remember how, more

than sixty-five years ago, after a large extension of the franchise, Carlyle, who was taken by so many of the generation then young as a prophet, talked of "shooting Niagara," and of the disaster which would follow. Far greater political changes have been made since and sometimes passed almost unnoticed. We could see our country becoming a "gynæcocracy" without wringing our hands in despair. It is, indeed, highly probable that the wholesale admission of women to the franchise will not have an evil effect, in spite of the fact that women are so often far too logical, too ready to regard any person or course of action as either black or white, whereas usually they are grey, and generally the real question is, which of the courses is the least bad. It is a good rule in public life to recognise that what is called logical is almost invariably wrong, and the history of our nation shows the triumph of practical sense over supposed logical consistency. The real mistake was in admitting as voters, when the change was made, either women or men under the age of twenty-five. It is not a question of sex or class. I have rarely known anyone who took a more keen and intelligent interest in politics than a cook of mature years long in the service of one family. At the same time are the wearers of "Oxford bags," if they still exist and have not been replaced by a small group who pose as enlightened because they do not care for their own country or the Empire which their fathers have built up with so much benefit to mankind, more competent to form a sound judgment? Still we may feel assured that the majority of them will by and by render useful service to their country and make sacrifices for it. Some really well-bred dogs suffer from a fit of distemper in early life, from which they emerge later completely cured.

Those who have had the good fortune to enjoy the companionship of the young men and young women of the two generations which have grown up in this century, will refuse altogether to believe that there is not splendid material in existence. They will feel that if there is cause for anxiety as regards the attitude and character of the young, it is due rather to lack of sane and earnest leadership than to any degeneracy in the young people themselves. Those who have known, for example, the students of a University in a great city have learned how loyal and considerate they were, and to-day we see what brave and splendid work is being done by

a still younger generation in all parts of the world: in the troubles in India, cheerful among all the hardships on the disturbed frontier, amid chaotic conditions in the wilds of Central America, or the anxieties which exist in Africa. It would be hard to speak too highly of the influence these young people exercise, especially among those of different race and brought up under different traditions. Day by day, too, as we grow older, we are struck more and more by the essential goodness and wonderful kindness of the ordinary people we meet around us in our daily life. We find it in all classes, and not only in our own country but when we travel abroad. Meanwhile I take off my hat to the patient omnibus driver or conductor who keeps his temper, the constable who so quickly gives his directions and considerate help, the devoted and skilful nurse—and all the crowd of ordinary folk we cannot but admire.

But where are the great leaders? Where is a voice to be heard now like that which thrilled us sixty years ago, when Ruskin gave those inaugural addresses at Oxford which opened to us a wider view of politics, using the term in its broad and original meaning; and of Empire and its obligations and possibilities? We do not deny that there are clever writers whom we will not name, whose habit is to mislead, and there are many artists whom it is the fashion to admire, some of whom could do work of value if they were not obsessed by an unnatural love for what is distorted and ugly. In politics we may accept without serious misgiving the widest extension of a democratic franchise, but we must preserve intact, or rather restore, the great constitutional safeguards against sudden or perhaps irrevocable changes and the "swing of the pendulum" making consistent policy impossible. One of these safeguards must be the maintenance of an effective Second Chamber, the other to secure the independence of the judges or the administration of justice open to all, and not subject to the orders of anyone else, whether of the Crown or of the majority of the popular representatives in Parliament.

Whatever our individual opinions may be, a fair survey of the state of our own country or others to-day leads to the conclusion that by far the most important influence, unless we are to give up hope for the future entirely, is that of religion. It is sometimes alleged that its influence is decaying, but those who watch what is going on with such calmness as they can

command, but with keen interest, are convinced that in all the troubles of the present time, seeing the misery there is in the world, the tortures of disease, the injustices that are done even where goodwill exists, the want and the squalor, the loneliness and hopelessness of many lives, but for the message of Christianity there would be forced upon us the conclusion of the old Roman writer when he said: "*Justis indiciis approbatum est non esse curae deis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem*"* ("The signs prove clearly that the gods have no care for our safety—they have for vengeance").

Happily, the ground has been cleared by the practical disappearance of the old antagonism between science and religion; the materialistic dogmatism which characterised utterances of many scientific men two generations ago has almost disappeared. The view, common amongst scientific men now, was expressed long ago by one whose clear thoughts on such matters were combined with extraordinary practical sagacity in their application. He urged that valued statements as regards the so-called laws of nature simply as working hypotheses be retained so long as they were fruitful and be discarded when they ceased to be so.

At the same time what for want of a better word we may call fundamentalism has also practically disappeared. Not many now regard their whole religion as shaken by doubts as to the actual existence of a sea-monster with a gullet big enough to swallow a man and eject him uninjured. Old people remember how in their childhood, sixty or seventy years ago, it was usual to look on all the works which were gathered together under the name of the Bible as literally and verbally inspired. Now it would probably be difficult to find intelligent children who would regard the stories of Adam and Eve, of Balaam's Ass and Jonah as actual fact. Probably most children are too wise to care much now whether such good stories are or are not literally true, and yet may appreciate their value all the more and understand Schiller's lines:

> "tiefere Bedeutung
> Liegt in dem Märchen meiner Kinderjahre,
> Als in der Wahrheit, die das Leben lehrt."†

One of the best signs of the times is that, as is shown by the record of the Bible Society, the sale of the Bible has increased enormously, and that in spite of much that is hard to understand, at times unintelligible and in places repulsive, the Book as a whole makes its appeal to all mankind now as it did centuries ago to people of all classes, of all ages, and of all countries—"its sound has gone out into all lands and its words into the ends of the world."

* Tacitus. † Wallenstein. Part I, Act II, Sc. 4.

What people to-day, especially the young, are consciously or unconsciously crying out for is truth and reality. They do not want fancy pictures of something which never actually existed, not mythology, nor some compromise with deep-rooted pagan ideas of magic. They want to know and realise as fully as possible what actually occurred in Palestine 2,000 years ago, to have a true picture. From those representations in which we see a feeble figure with some impossible garments and the conventional plate or aureole they turn with pain. They try to realise that cold morning when the coal-fire was kindled by the side of the Lake of Galilee, with food prepared ready for the tired and shivering fishermen, and all that followed. How true is Ruskin's comment on Raphael's cartoon of the charge to Peter—"Is it not a piece of infinite monstrosity and hypocrisy?" Is not the "simple truth that the moment we look at the picture we feel our belief of the whole thing taken away? There is visibly no possibility of that group ever having existed in that place or on any occasion. It is all a mythic absurdity." It is no use to pretend that there will not be intellectual difficulties in fully accepting the Christian position, and still more practical difficulties in giving what J. H. Newman calls "real assent" to it, but does not a candid view of all the evidence lead clearly to the conclusion that the facts of individual life and of history make any other position clearly irrational? Whether we look at the matter as pragmatists, testing everything by what works well or not, or as those who are in the habit of looking at *all* the evidence and seeing what it proves, instead of being dominated by some preconceived theory, can it be denied that the Christian position, frankly and fully perceived and followed, will to-day justify all the claims made for it by St. Paul when he first proclaimed it in the western world?

What really matters is the attitude of mind and the feeling which, whether openly expressed or not, is probably as intense and more general than it has ever been. Let it be frankly recognised that the only approach to a rational way

of accounting for the facts and the only hope for mankind is in the Christian religion, taken not so much as a statement of ethical maxims or as a guide in social progress, but as a stimulating force in every life. A rational belief in a beneficent deity must be based on something substantially equivalent to what is comprised in the old orthodox evangelical faith and expressed in certain words in a creed like the Nicene. On this matter no compromise is possible, having regard to the claims made again and again as reported by the Gospels and recognised by the earliest disciples. The conclusion "*aut deus aut non bonus homo*" is inevitable. The great need is to understand and realise the character and the life as vividly as possible.

For those who are pragmatists the claim of Christianity freed from the shackles of certain Pagan religions and of magic worked by medicine-men is irresistible. It is independent of Institutions, however convenient and practically useful they may be. Such a Christianity is the great hope for India, which is crying out for a religion based on an Incarnation, and not troubled by sectarian differences which really mean little there, though regarded as important here. The appeal is universal and is fundamentally the same, whether made by the Carmelite monk whom one may hear preaching to a score or two of cattle-drovers in some Norman village in Holy Week, or in a barn on a Westmorland hillside, where an itinerant Primitive Methodist preacher, standing among the haystacks, may address a small gathering from the neighbouring farms, or in the quiet of an old Meeting House, where no sound is heard except the stirring of a gentle breeze blowing where it listeth among the leaves outside, until someone feels he has something to say which may help his hearers to go forth to relieve suffering and distress, wherever they may be found, and to do it sanely and as men of business, inspired by enthusiasm.

We are constantly hearing a desire expressed for union amongst Christian bodies, but it may well be doubted whether such a union as is contemplated is at present possible or even desirable. An institution—a church organisation—may be suited to one country or one type of mind and may be the best means of helping some people to do efficient work, but many things helpful to some are repugnant to others. What is wanted is hearty co-operation and goodwill between different bodies rather than a patched-up compromise by which

to secure union, one group giving up something it regards as valuable and useful in exchange for similar surrender by another. It is "unity in spirit," the bond of peace and righteousness of life which secures a real union and useful co-operation. What is the use of calling that a "Catholic" Church which would exclude the heroic Christian work of such a body as the Salvation Army* or the Society of Friends, with their absolute fearless devotion, perhaps at times almost too rigid, to what they believe right, and the sanity and businesslike ability with which they deal with questions such as unemployment? No doubt important steps have been taken towards corporate reunion, as has been seen among the Presbyterians in Scotland and amongst the Methodists. These appear to be entirely good, but there was no really important difference between the various bodies which have just become officially united. Similar developments amongst other bodies where they have common ground may shortly be seen.

There is ample room without corporate union for joint action in social work, from time to time in religious services, and for a training such as has been given in the free theological faculties of universities and in the religious instruction that can be given in schools whether provided or not provided. In some districts a syllabus of such instruction has been introduced which shows how large is the common basis of agreement. Finally, we may call in evidence the prophetic words of one who has sometimes been regarded as an ardent opponent of Christianity.

When faiths and empires gleam
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream.
* * * *
A Power from the unknown God.
A Promethean Conqueror came;
Like a triumphal path he trod
The thorns of death and shame.
* * * *
The star of Mahomet
Arose and it shall set
While blazoned as on Heaven's immortal noon,
The Cross leads generations on.†

ALFRED HOPKINSON.

* So well described recently in a book which should be read by all, *God in the Slums*.
† Shelley. *Hellas*.

THE OBJECTS OF LIFE.

OF a man who has lost his way it is reasonable to ask: Where were you going? A society has lost its way. Where was it going? Where does it want to go? What are the objects of human life? No answer.

As for the objects of life, priests and philosophers have had their definitions in all ages: and these have involved a great deal of intuitive wisdom by which later definitions may very well be checked or justified. But hitherto the formal definitions have been of a kind too other-worldly for present-day purposes, or too vague and abstract for the average man at any time.

And hitherto we have been too deeply absorbed in the means of life, in the mere struggle for existence, to require any exact definition of those ends of life which nevertheless, up till recent times, we have instinctively recognised. We have only been quite sure, on the strength of these instincts, that we should realise the nature of the good life very easily so soon as we were in a position to do so: and now that we are in a position to do so these instincts have decayed, and this assurance has completely left us.

Surely the modern prophets, standing, as they have told us, on the shoulders of Plato and Shakespeare, should be able to help us in this dilemma. But many years ago Chesterton very justly replied to *Mankind in the Making* that the object of a hammer is not merely to make more hammers: and Mr. Wells is not the only social philosopher who was, or should have been, discomfited by this truism. Chesterton himself is a lost leader who may yet in a roundabout way be able to help us; but Shaw, with his Life Force, like Bergson, has made it almost the first article of his faith that man does not know where he is going (which ought to be true only in so far as it is true that Columbus did not know where he was going): and Clutton Brock, whose own solution we shall notice presently, made short work of *Methusaleh*, if that was a laboriously playful attempt to define the goal. Bertrand Russell, who, as a mathematician, philosopher, aristocrat and social reformer, might well speak with greater authority than any other living man, defines the good life as one that is "inspired by love and guided by knowledge": but whether it is, or should be, thus inspired and guided he does not tell us.

For D. H. Lawrence sex looms very large indeed, but he will not let the new sex-psychologists have things all their own way. His alternative to sex is "purposiveness"—again, how vague! "You have got to keep your sexual fulfilment . . . subordinate to the great passion of purpose: subordinate by a hair's-breadth: but still by that hair's-breadth subordinate." And again, very truly, "We have got to get back to the great purpose of mankind, a passionate unison in actively building a world." But what sort of a world? This is Mr. Wells over again, fortified by that other new psychology which finds the meaning of life in co-operation. And here we ask: Co-operation, not only for what, but with whom?—equally important.

It is strange that the moderns, even the most typical of the moderns, should have no clearer answer to these questions: no answer, indeed, except that of the sex-psychologists, which would not have been heartily endorsed by the most Victorian of the older school. For half a century we have been told to leave the world just a little better than we found it, but as to the difference between better and worse we are still not very clear.

And now a well-known artist, Will Dyson, in the *New English Weekly*, enters the arena with two very healthy propositions: that we are living under the régime of an effete Business Philosophy which is falling from world dominance: and that the next step in our progress is the "emergence into dominance of an Artistic Philosophy of life." And he pauses to state that there is "a tragic folly and an irony in the fact that the artists of the world are full of a faintness of heart and a meanness of spirit and all sorts of witty cowardices."

This philosopher uses the word "artist" in a generous sense—hence the loop-hole he has given here to an artist of very low degree. He uses it to include scientists, craftsmen, and all those makers and users of tools who have done their jobs so well and thoroughly as distinct from the mere makers of the Money Machine—of the distributive system that works so badly. This is a very natural distinction at the present juncture, but it encourages a widespread modern tendency to confuse the means with the ends, and the functions of the engineer with those of the artist, which an artistic philosophy should surely correct. If it does not correct this tendency the

artistic philosophy will almost certainly degenerate into a refined sort of hedonism, as it actually proceeds to do in this instance.

This is unfortunate: it reminds us of Chesterton's great comment on modern philosophy, that it is its "outer ring that is obviously artistic and emancipated: its despair is within. And its despair is this, that it does not really believe that there is any meaning in the universe." It is doubly unfortunate, because the business philosophy in its higher flights has already seen the fallacy of hedonism, and laid the foundations of something better.

We are now able to produce all the material good things of life in fabulous abundance, but we are not able to enjoy them. We have taken every step but the last in our material enfranchisement, and we might perhaps have taken this last step had we been content with a hedonistic philosophy; to this extent our artist philosopher is possibly right. But in dismissing hedonism we have also taken every step but the last in the production of a philosophy which shall be worthy of an enfranchised people.

Though it committed intolerable crimes against humanity, it was not a brainless, nor quite a faithless, race that solved our problems of production. Hear a well-known late-Victorian philosopher, and judge of his quality from a single sentence. "Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature, in that sense of nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge?"* This is a subtle question which it is difficult to answer in the affirmative if you have really understood it. And answering it in the negative, we admit a "spiritual principle in nature and knowledge": we admit, that is to say, a meaning in the universe. This meaning may be for ever unintelligible to man, and probably is. We have been taught by relativity and quantum theories to understand more clearly than ever the great saying of Schopenhauer that 'the actual, positive solution of the riddle of the world must be something that the human intellect is incapable of grasping and thinking: so that if a higher kind were to come and take all pains to impart it to us, we should be absolutely unable to understand anything of his expositions." But if we admit the possibility that there is any sort of spiritual principle in the universe, or meaning, however unintelligible, we admit an

* T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 11.

equal possibility that the human race may have objects other than that of self-preservation, and that in that case it presumably has, or has had, natural (or spiritual) instincts to the pursuit of these objects.

Now to ascertain the absolute objects of human life, if there are such, it is only necessary to observe those activities of the human race in which the maximum of enthusiasm combines with the minimum prospect of material gain. As distinct from the useful arts, it is almost the definition of the fine arts that they contribute nothing to the material welfare of society as a whole. They must, therefore, be amongst the absolute ends of life: and pure science, however incidentally useful, is in exactly the same category as fine art. But what about the average man? The nearest approach in modern times to a philosophy at once sound and popular is probably that of Clutton Brock's *Ultimate Belief*. According to this excellent little book, the spirit has three activities, the moral, the intellectual, and the æsthetic: "man lives so that he may exercise these activities of the spirit, and for no other reason": and thus "the problem of civilisation is to give every man the chance of being a saint, a man of science, or an artist."

There is the assumption here that if a man is not qualified to excel in science or art, he is not capable of any enthusiasm or any thrill other than those—alas, how rare!—which are associated with the pursuit of virtue. This assumption, if he could be made to understand it, the average man would at once repudiate. It derives from that business philosophy which, having discovered a spiritual principle in the universe, decides on the pursuit of "moral perfection" as the proper alternative to hedonism. By the late-Victorian philosopher already quoted, an exponent of this philosophy at its best, art and science are very reluctantly ruled out as irrelevant to the moral aim: but the philosopher is uneasy, and expects his reader to be uneasy, at this decision. He promises to return to the subject: and it is a striking testimony to the predicament in which he finds himself that he never does so!*

The fact is, of course, that morality does not run comfortably in triple harness with art and science just because it is not an end in itself, as they are. It is a means to ends which may or may not be of absolute value: the sanctity of the moral law is that of the compass and sextant, which seem

* T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 312.

equally sacred to either the mariner or the buccaneer, wherever he is going, and on whatever errand. To understand the relative nature of many of our so-called virtues it is only necessary to consider how their status will be affected by the solution of the economic problem.

Nevertheless, there is one virtue, that of courage, manliness, the Roman *virtus*, which is of absolute value; which will not, or should not, lose status even with the coming of universal peace. For the third, or rather the first term of the required trinity—that in which the average man comes to his own—is Adventure. The adventure may often, or indeed usually, be a means to some practical end: but it is also, and sometimes purely, an end in itself: it is a spiritual activity: in the born adventurer it inspires an enthusiasm which is out of all proportion to the prospect of material gain. The objects of life are: to do adventurous things, to make or enjoy beautiful things, to understand wonderful things: either directly in your own person, or by proxy: as when a mother rears an adventurous son, or a successful business man helps a struggling artist.

To do adventurous things, to make beautiful things, to understand wonderful things—these are the ultimate aims of human life. Any man who has known that moment of ecstasy which is experienced on the crest of any such achievement, however modest, will admit the validity of this definition: and we all admit its validity in our instinctive homage—still instinctive, though so carefully suppressed by the cynical modern—to the poet, the artist and the scientist, the explorer and the soldier. This definition will appeal to the natural instincts of every unsophisticated person: to just those instincts the satisfaction of which has been the main business of every great religion. It is exactly these instincts to which every great religion has appealed in its authoritative solution of wonders and mysteries else insoluble: in its making of graven or painted images, its building of temples and churches: in its often paradoxical calling to crusades and holy wars, and even in the opportunities it has given for heroic martyrdoms.

Equally, this more comprehensive formula resumes those partial definitions of the objects of life by the new psychologies which we have already noticed. To find the meaning of life in co-operation is vague and not very inspiring: like the altruistic morality of the recent past, it suggests a state of

society in which everybody is helping everybody else to do nothing in particular. But co-operation in the doing of adventurous, the making of beautiful, or the understanding of wonderful, things—this is an ideal which covers the greatest and healthiest activities of mankind in all ages. And to find the object and meaning of life in sex—if there were no other adventures or beauties or wonders or ecstasies under the sun than those of sex, this might be all very well: but the more comprehensive formula is clearly the sounder and the more desirable, since it sufficiently explains the glamour of sex and the violence of the sexual passion without granting to these the too exclusive interest which they so often have for the modern mind.

To find the object and meaning of life in love—that is a more specious proposition. But, whilst morality is a means rather than an end, so love should be regarded as a result rather than an end: it is the sentimentalist who regards love as an end in itself. Love is the inevitable attraction to one another of people who love the same God—who recognise the absolute ends of human life, however unconsciously. And it is doubtless for this reason that "when iniquities abound, love waxes cold."

But it is not every reader who will be convinced by the appeal either to old religions, or new psychologies, or even to the wide prestige of art and science, of the soldier and the sailor. Other activities are so clearly useful, so necessary to the mere maintenance of individual and social life, that nine men out of ten may well be too deeply absorbed in these ever to ask themselves whether their generation has any other aim in life than that of producing another such aimless generation. If they do pause to ask themselves this question, many no doubt will still be content to reply that the ultimate aim of every man should be to serve and to know God, "to enjoy and glorify him for ever": in which case their answer is only an abridged and conventional form of that which I wish to make more articulate. But those who are too sophisticated for this answer will be hard put to it to find an alternative to my definition. They will then perhaps grant a conventional assent to the claims of science and art: but what about those of mere adventure? They will say that the adventures of the soldier and the sailor, the aviator and the explorer, are always means to some particular end: but the adventurers know

better, as does every healthy boy. It is one of the most characteristic mistakes of the practical man similarly to regard science as a mere means to practical ends: but the man of science knows better, and in recent years he has occasionally said so. And it is another of his characteristic mistakes to regard art as a mere superfluity, simply because it can seldom be regarded as a means to any practical end. This, of course, is a reduction to absurdity of all such mistakes. It is just because art is amongst the ends of life that it seldom serves a more immediate purpose—unless it is that of providing incidentally a living for the artist.

In the applied arts and sciences, and in many kinds of adventure, such mistakes may seem to be justified because a means of life is provided, as well as an end fulfilled, say by the slaying of a dangerous animal or the making of a beautiful chair. It is this possibility of simultaneously supplying the means and fulfilling an end of life which is largely responsible for our difficulty in defining the ends: though the wide realisation of this possibility is so characteristic of a healthy society as to be almost the definition of social health. Even to-day it is just as important, and should be just as natural, for the manufacturer, the farmer, the doctor, the teacher, to be an artist or a scientist as it is for the soldier and the sailor to be adventurers: and they sometimes are, and sometimes, alas, they are not! But in such a utilitarian and commercial age as ours we may generally take it for granted that we are most nearly approaching the ends of life whenever we are doing with real enthusiasm just those things for which it is most difficult to assign an ulterior motive: whether it is reading astronomy, planting a flower bed, or merely sailing an open boat. It is, of course, generally possible to justify such recreations on the ground that they are good for our health, with the implication that such health is good for our business: but it is just the typical business which is most purely a means of life rather than an end, and which is, therefore, most effectively justified as a means to such recreations. Let us admit then that reading astronomy is good for our health, but decline to admit that that is our reason for reading astronomy: congratulating ourselves only in a murmured aside that "all things work together for the good of them that love God."

To do adventurous, to make beautiful, to understand wonderful, things—in a true artistic philosophy the first term

of this trinity is no less important than the second, whilst all are essential to the solution of our social problem. Odysseus and the Trojan wars were as truly responsible as Homer for the making of the great poems: the Viking age for the sagas, the adventurous Elizabethans even for Shakespeare. Let our artist philosopher speak for the painters, but, coming to the applied arts, the first term of this trinity is indeed their father. The greatest of human adventures, not even excepting the conquest of the air, has been that of the sea: and the culminating types of canoes and sailing-vessels of various times and races, Maori war canoes, Viking longships, the tea-clippers of yesterday, the fishing boats, yachts and battleships of to-day, are amongst the greatest works of applied art produced by man, not even excepting his temples and churches. Ruskin himself, though he was no sailor, was very certain and very eloquent in according this honour to the "bluff bow of the common beach boat laid aside in its furrow of sea-sand." The stem and stern posts of the Maori war canoes of the stone age, executed only with sharp pieces of flint or shell, are masterpieces of strong and delicate wood-work with which the ribband back of the eighteenth-century chair will very seldom bear comparison. And if to-day the business man is not only a yachtsman but a true sailor, as he so often is, his yacht will be much more truly a work of art than is his American roll-top writing-table or any other piece of his office or even of his drawing-room furniture: and this is because he himself really knows, and the people who make the yacht know that he knows, that his sailing is more important, that it is in a mysterious way more nearly associated with the ends of life, than anything that is likely to happen in his office, or even in his drawing-room.

To go to sea in a small boat is to seek the kingdom of heaven very truly, however unconsciously. And if the artist or the scholar still hesitates to admit, what every man of action knows, that adventure is a spiritual activity on an exact equality with those of art and science, let him remind himself of the proposition of the third great craftsman-philosopher, the grinder of lenses, who assures us that "he who has a body capable of the greatest number of activities has a mind the greatest part of which is eternal."

In the same way the adventures of sailing and flying are responsible for some of the greatest achievements of applied

science : the perfection, for instance, of the nautical almanac and of the internal combustion engine. The weapons of all ages, with their chased or jewelled hilts and handles, their wonderfully welded and tempered blades or barrels, are further testimonies to the stimulating effect of adventure on the applied arts : and even the modern engineer can sometimes produce a beautiful thing, whether a motor car or a battleship, with the adventurer behind him : or when he himself is an adventurer in the building of a Sydney harbour bridge. But the architect and the artist make a great mistake in therefore concluding, as they often do, that decadent arts may be saved by apprenticeship to the engineer, who is incorrigibly concerned with the means of life rather than the ends, and vilifies accordingly any art not his own that he touches : the proper moral is that they should learn from the adventurer, as he does : or, more strictly speaking, that the artist is only at his best when he is working, not for a commercial and comfort-loving, but for an adventurous, people.

This definition of the ends of life is frankly exoteric. But by any one of these three routes a man may be initiated into the great secrets of religion. And one of the most serious mistakes of the last century or two has been the too exclusive preaching of the esoteric doctrine to people who have not been properly initiated. If an able and energetic man is brought up to believe that he sufficiently fulfils the ends of life by being kind to his family and honest in business and going sometimes to church or chapel, he does these things with more or less enthusiasm, and then feels himself at liberty to become completely absorbed in the means of life : perhaps in inventing some wonderful machine which is only used for the production of the ugliest or shoddiest goods, and leads only to a frightful problem of unemployment and poverty instead of to the wide diffusion of wealth and leisure. And thus he and his kind gradually produce a state of society in which most people have lost sight of the ends of life altogether, and have substituted the ideals of money-making and of luxurious living.

Now to tell such a society that its economic problem is immediately soluble—that everyone might be rich to-morrow —is as much as to tell a sporting society that the races are off : that the various groups of competitors will cover their respective courses in motor buses, and that all will be suitably

rewarded with cups and honours. How unpopular this announcement would be with ninety per cent. of the competitors, and with all the spectators from the veteran athletes to the very women and children!

This parable may sound frivolous and far-fetched, but what better apology is it possible to make for a society of men and women, otherwise apparently sane, who continue to believe that grinding economy is the natural and only possible reply to the " problem " of over-production ? He who would save his life shall lose it. Let wealth be regarded by any society as an end in itself, and that society shall be cursed and paralysed alike in its wealth and in its poverty from top to bottom. Our own society is only not cursed so completely as it might be because there are luckily a considerable number of people of all classes in whom the instincts for a better life persist. But these are not sufficiently numerous, nor their instincts sufficiently strong and self-conscious, to form a determining factor in the philosophy and politics of the nation. Let wealth be regarded by some society of the future as a mere means to the proper ends of human life, and whether it is rich or poor on the whole, its wealth will be fairly distributed, and that society in the pursuit of those ends will be happy and healthy.

A. Romney Green.

THE MINORITIES IN ROUMANIA.

THE peculiar emphasis laid by its promoters on the purely economic character of the Danube plan is an unmistakable sign that there are issues between the Danubian States which exercise an unfavourable influence on their good understanding. M. Fontenelle, the President of the Conference summoned by the International Chamber of Commerce to Innsbruck to discuss the plan, had the frankness to declare in his inaugural address that "it would be presumptuous . . . to imagine that such a plan could be stripped of all political preoccupations." Had he used the word "prejudice" instead of "preoccupation" it might be a legitimate demand that such prejudices should be disregarded or that at least an effort should be made to wipe them out. But the political "preoccupations" which still linger on the borders of the Danube are facts, real difficulties waiting for a solution, and no useful purpose is served by either concealing or denying them.

Hungary's demand for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon is to-day a part of European politics, while the continued existence of the Little Entente shows that embarrassing antagonisms exist between Hungary and the States which have succeeded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Take, for example, the question of the racial minorities. It is to mislead European opinion to say and to write that the Minorities in the Succession States are happy and contented when their complaints to the League of Nations, their yearly Conferences in Geneva and Vienna and the publication of a bulky volume filled with their grievances such as that published two years ago,* show how unbearable is their situation, and how legitimate are their complaints.

This is one of the questions which poison the good relations of the States concerned, for it is too much to expect that Germany, Hungary or Bulgaria should complacently look on at the denationalisation of their kinsfolk by the Governments of the Succession States. It is a question which, instead of being shrouded under misleading statements, ought to be treated with frank openness; and every endeavour ought to be made to remove the causes of the present unsatisfactory situation. This should be all the easier since the question has not been without preliminaries in international agreements.

* *Die Nationalitaet in den Staaten Europas.*

During the Peace Conference in Paris M. Clemenceau stated with precision the aims of the victorious Powers in regard to the future situation of the national minorities in the newly established States. "Unluckily," he wrote in the covering letter addressed to M. Paderewsky, then President of Poland, "the races [of those States] are divided by bitter hostilities of past years. We believe that they would the more easily get accustomed to their new situation if they knew from the beginning that they are protected and guaranteed in an efficient manner against every possibility of being oppressed or unjustly treated. The simple fact," he went on, "of their being aware of the existence of such guarantees would, we hope, achieve the reconciliation which we all desire."

In this spirit the so-called Minorities Treaties came into existence, the stipulations of which, in order to become effective, had to be incorporated in the legal system of the States concerned. Article 1 of the Treaties lays on the minority States the obligation that "The stipulations [of the Treaties] . . . shall be recognised as fundamental laws and that no regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations." It would seem that on such strong foundations the rights of the minorities are unassailably safeguarded. But this is far from being the case. At a time when the sanctity and the unconditional execution of the Treaties is a slogan of European politics, none of the Succession States respects or fulfils the provisions of the Minorities Treaties.

Take for example the case of Roumania. We can all remember the attitude taken at the Peace Conference by the late Jon Bratianu, Roumania's leading statesman for forty years and the founder of Greater Roumania. He refused to accept the Minorities Treaty and withdrew from Paris. When later on the Treaty was signed under pressure from the Powers by the Vajda Government, Bratianu declared in Parliament that "Roumania cannot accept a Treaty which establishes a foreign control." The opportunity to fulfil Treaty obligations occurred in 1923 when the new Constitution was framed, but the provisions of the Minorities Treaty were not enacted in it. On the contrary, instead of recognising the fact that Roumania is a country with the largest national and religious minorities in Europe, Article 1 of the new Constitution

declares that: "The Roumanian Kingdom is a national, unitary and indivisible State," and at the end of the debate on the Bill, M. Bratianu, the then Prime Minister, stated that "we regard the minority peoples as Roumanians and only minorities in regard to their numbers."

It is evident that this is not the spirit of M. Clemenceau's letter, but rather that of pre-war nationalism—that nationalism which the Peace Conference wished to combat, since it opens the door to unlimited possibilities for the persecution and denationalisation of the minority peoples, possibilities which have been realised in Roumania. The personal persecutions of the leaders of the Hungarian minority ceased, of course, after the first few years, but only to give place to the systematic destruction of the cultural existence of that minority. There is in Roumania a relentless denationalisation going on by every possible means, the most obvious being an educative system which tends more and more to deprive Hungarian children of the possibility of gaining tuition in their national tongue. Increasingly the Hungarian schools are being swamped by Roumanian, not only as a subject but also as the language of instruction; increasingly Hungarian children are being forced to attend Roumanian schools. Obeying the slogan "the minorities have too many schools" emitted by M. Octavian Pric, former Under-Secretary for Education in Transylvania, the Roumanian Government has seized and turned into Roumanian institutes not only the Hungarian State schools, but also those denominational—mostly Calvinistic—schools which the impoverished Churches had been unable to maintain and had, therefore, handed over to the Hungarian State on the understanding that they should remain Church property and keep their Hungarian character.

In 1918, at the time of the change of régime, there were in the transferred Hungarian territories 1,088 denominational and 1,497 State-maintained Hungarian elementary schools; in 1928 there were 818 denominational schools, a great number of which had been newly founded, and 360 State schools, whose Hungarian character has been extremely dubious. The Roumanian Government seizes every occasion to point triumphantly to these latter schools as Hungarian institutes maintained by the State, the fact being that the great majority of teachers in these schools are Roumanians from

the Regat. This is especially the case in the so-called "cultural zones," i.e. districts with an overwhelmingly large Hungarian, Russian or Bulgarian minority population, in which the teachers, specially selected for their national zeal, receive higher salaries than in other, less precarious, districts; "for," as was frankly stated in Parliament, "there is more cultural and national work [i.e. Roumanisation of the minority children] "to be done in these districts." In the Transylvanian counties of Csik, Udvarhely and Háromszék, in each of which over ninety per cent. of the population is Hungarian, there are more than 500 Regatean teachers who do not understand Hungarian. It may be added that tuition is bi-lingual even in the denominational minority schools, since not only is the teaching of Roumanian obligatory in them, but also the so-called national subjects such as literature, history and geography must be taught in that language, whereby tuition in Hungarian is reduced to a minimum.

It would be impossible to enumerate all the obstacles put in the way of Hungarian children obtaining tuition in their own language. Let one strange and peculiarly arbitrary measure stand for all the rest. A provision of one of the education Acts runs as follows: "Nationals of Roumanian origin who have lost their mother tongue must send their children to schools in which the language of instruction is Roumanian." This provision furnishes a handle to the authorities for prying into the "ethnic origin" of the pupils and for subjecting them to a process termed "name analysis," the purpose of which is the Roumanisation of all minority children who, on however slight a pretext, can be claimed for the Roumanian race. It is enough for a child to bear a Roumanian-sounding name; to be a member of the Orthodox or Uniate Church; or to have had a Roumanian grandmother or great-grandfather, for the authorities to declare it of Roumanian origin. It is not easy to convey to an English reader all that this process implies. There are Transylvanian families with Roumanian- or German-sounding names which regard themselves as Hungarians and can furnish documentary proof that they have been so regarded for centuries. Yet they are not allowed to send their children to a Hungarian denominational school.

Nor, as has been intimated, is it only Roumanian-sounding names which carry with them this danger. In Cluj, the capital

of Transylvania, there is an old patrician family named Straub. One of its members is headmistress of the Presbyterian Girls' *Lycée*, which up till 1928 was attended by her niece Judith. In that year the Roumanian school inspector suddenly declared that, Straub being a German name, Judith Straub could not be a Hungarian and consequently could not attend a Hungarian school. There was no German *Lycée* in the town, so it was decreed that she must be sent to a Roumanian school. The family protested and produced a document signed by the mayor attesting that the Straubs had been Hungarian and Presbyterian* for centuries, and that Mr. Straub, Judith's father, did not even know German. In vain; Judith Straub was declared to be a German and ordered as a natural consequence to attend a Roumanian school.

Take another case. Little George Gyüttö was the only son of a poor Hungarian widow. As he was intelligent and industrious the priest of the parish advised his mother to send him to the Roman Catholic *Lycée* of the nearest town and let the Church train him for a priest. Accordingly George Gyüttö and a little friend, Peter Kádár, were entered in the *Lycée* of Csikszereda. But a few days later the Roumanian school inspector descended upon them, and, armed with the fact that in the boys' certificates *Gyüttö* had been distorted to *Ghitiu*, which has a Roumanian sound, although it means nothing in that language, while *Kádár*, which in Hungarian means *Cooper*, had been translated into the Roumanian *Dogar*, he gave orders that both boys should immediately leave the Hungarian *Lycée* and enter the Roumanian State school. Thus the hope of little George Gyüttö and his mother, that he would one day become a Roman Catholic priest, vanished, together with his honest family name; and instead of becoming a novice he became a shoemaker's apprentice. Not content with this, the Minister of Education ordered an inquiry into the matter, as a result of which the *Lycée* was forced to dismiss its headmaster, Dr. F. Jénáki, for having dared to admit the boys to his school.

In the districts where the majority of the population is Hungarian, no middle schools have been established by the Roumanian State; the Churches, on the other hand, are deprived of the power to maintain their own schools—established, most of them, centuries ago—because the land

* There are no Presbyterian Germans, only Lutheran Saxons, in Transylvania.

destined for their support has been expropriated under the new agrarian law. The Calvinistic Church alone lost over 24,000 acres without any compensation, while the Unitarian Church has been bereft of the Berde-fund, about 1,400 acres, on the income of which 200 middle-school pupils were kept.

The over one and a half million Hungarian inhabitants have no university of their own. The fine university of Kolozsvár, founded eighty years ago by the Hungarian State, was seized and appropriated by the Roumanians, who thus have four universities, while the minorities have none. The Hungarian Churches wished to found an inter-confessional Hungarian University, but were unable to obtain the necessary permission. The result is that in the school-year of 1928-9, for instance, only 610 Hungarian students remained in Transylvania to brave the immense difficulties of acquiring a degree in a foreign language, while over 900 went to Hungary, fully aware that the degree obtained there would not be recognised as valid in their native land.

The process which is swiftly and surely destroying the cultural existence of the minorities is paralleled by that which is bringing about their economic ruin. The legitimate craving of the masses to be supplied with land has been used in Transylvania to seal the doom of the Hungarian landowner class. Over two million acres in all have been expropriated from Hungarian landowners, the compensation tendered being so paltry that the loss of the Hungarian minority has been reckoned at more than 30 milliard lei. That vindictiveness and corruption accompanied the execution of the Land Act cannot with any show of truth be denied. Even the Roumanian paper *Indreptarea* confessed that "there is no end to the scandals connected with the application of the agrarian law." To-day it is generally acknowledged that more harm than good was done by the reform. M. Mihalache and M. Argetoianu, both of them Roumanian ex-Ministers, have declared, one in the *Matin*, the other in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that it has been a failure, and that it could not but be one since its aim was more political than social or economic.

The situation of the minorities in their contacts with the law and with the civil authorities also leaves much to be desired. For what impartiality may be expected of a judge before whom you may not plead in your mother tongue? Or what trust may be placed in a civil administration in

which only members of a hostile race take part? In these circumstances what can the minorities do? The obvious course would be to seek redress through parliamentary action. But this way is barred by Roumanian electioneering methods. In proportion to its numbers, the Hungarian minority is entitled to at least thirty-six representatives in Parliament; it never had more than half that number. At the general elections of 1922, the nomination of thirty-four out of thirty-eight Hungarian candidates was refused by the returning officer, and only two were elected to represent a population of 1,500,000. The other expedient would be to appeal to the League of Nations; but this, too, is unavailing. For one thing, the Roumanian Government, perhaps not unnaturally, regards every application to Geneva as an insult, a hostile act towards the Roumanian State; for another the Council of the League of Nations, being a political body, can never rise to absolute impartiality, and more often than not is led by political motives. This, at least, was the conviction expressed by the representatives of 48 millions of minority people, assembled at the Conferences of Vienna and Berne.

Were it only the Hungarians who are dissatisfied with Roumanian rule, it might be contended that they grumble because, after being members of a powerful majority in Hungary, they have been turned into a minority in Transylvania. But the German-speaking people in Transylvania and the Bukovina; the Russians of Bessarabia and the Bulgarians of Dobrudsa are no less discontented. Nay, the Transylvanian Roumanians themselves resent the domination of Bucharest, so different from what they were accustomed to.

It is a favourite method of propaganda-writers to compare the pre-war Hungarian régime with the post-war minority policy of the Succession States and to declare that the latter is more enlightened and more tolerant than the former—that, in fact, "the Roumanians are returning good for evil." Such writers wisely shut their ears to the clamour of the Transylvanian Roumanians for autonomy, their repeatedly expressed desire to be freed from the influence of Bucharest, in fact, to all the implications of that "regionalism" which has sprung from the discovery, made very soon after the union, that the Hungarian administration was cleaner, honester and more liberal-minded than the present Roumanian rule.

ELIZABETH SÁRVÁRY.

AN ORNITHOLOGIST'S NOTES.

DURING one's observations of British bird-life, scattered over several counties of England, one comes across many experiences out of the general routine habits of birds that one wonders at in passing, and then notes down, along with a heterogeneous collection of other experiences and researches, in one's journals. It is only when an ornithologist comes to review his gleanings from many fields, over the many years he has devoted to his study, that he realises the interest of the collection. One's own bird books are a jumble of facts and little cameos of wild life, which, when strung together, contain some very strange and unusual happenings of English birds.

The habits of birds are often full of mystery. How do birds die? One might almost presume that very few birds die a natural death in the wild. One might almost say it is natural for a wild bird to die as the result of some tragedy, some drama of the wild, some stage in the constant struggle for existence. But occasionally birds do meet their allotted span in life, whether it be the three or four years of the common brown wren, the five or six of the swift, the twenty or thirty of the seagull, or the fifty or more of the eagle and the swan. Have you ever seen a bird die? One afternoon my friend and I had spent the hours carp-fishing with no success, and a sudden downpour necessitated our seeking shelter beneath a spreading oak on the bank. A few minutes later we noticed one of a flock of lapwings in an adjacent field leave the other birds, and flying over the railway embankment that separated them from us, dive down into the damp, marshy land by the pits. Settling down ever so quietly, its head sank back upon its shoulders and remained motionless. It did not move for quite ten minutes, and our curiosity became aroused when its position was seen to be quite different from a sleeping bird. I went forward and picked it up. The bird was dead. It was an old female lapwing, and one could find no trace of disease. One presumed she had died of old age.

In the severe frosts one frequently comes across dead redwings and blackbirds in the country lanes, killed not so much by the frost as by the lack of insect food and open water which a prolonged frost always brings. Observations conducted in a census at our Liverpool Cathedral Wild Birds'

Sanctuary, in the city slums and some eight miles from the open country, have shown that it was a need for water, not food, that drove the flocks of missel-thrushes, chaffinches, and other birds into the sanctuary in a prolonged frost. An albino blackbird found dead in the last great frost had its crop full of manure which it had eaten in its search for food, ere it died from lack of nourishment.

The story of the swan-song is one of the most beautiful that has come down to us through the ages. Does a swan really sing a beautiful song when it dies? If one can approach near enough to a herd of wild swans in winter, one can hear a low, sweet murmuring kept up amongst them, "like the soft humming of women's voices" as one naturalist has described it, quite different from the normal calls of these birds. Few naturalists are inclined to believe in the swan-song, but the late Prof. D. G. Elliot, one of America's most respected scientists, in his *Wildfowl of North America*, relates that he and a friend were shooting in Currituck Sound, North Carolina, when one of a passing flock of swans was hit:

> On receiving his wound the wings became fixed, and he commenced at once his song, which was continued until the water was reached nearly half a mile away. I am perfectly familiar with every note a swan is accustomed to utter, but never before or since have I heard any like those sung by this stricken bird. Most plaintive in character and musical in tone, it sounded at times like the soft running notes in an octave. And as the sound was borne to us, mellowed by the distance, we stood astonished and could only exclaim: "We have heard the song of the dying swan."

Elliot, upon questioning the wild-fowlers of the area, found men who had also heard this song of the dying swan.

I know only one case of such an incident in England, and that occurred quite recently. In April 1933 a drama occurred on the lake at Rivenhall Place, near Witham, Essex, where for twenty years a couple of mute swans had raised their offspring on the waters. Recently, however, a stranger had appeared at the lake and begun to pay court to the wife. There was trouble between the rival suitors, and the usurper drove off the original husband, who retired to a lonely pond in the vicinity and there led a moping existence. One night, when a house-party was assembled at the house, a curious mournful cry penetrated the air. Investigation showed that

the cry came from the old swan, who continued "sobbing" for an hour. In the morning the swan was found dead.

Last winter a wild-fowler, shooting on the coast in the north, came upon a gaggle of wild geese which immediately took wing, but he was lucky enough to shoot one of the birds as the flock arose. The bird fell dying on to the slobland. The gaggle had almost winged its way out of sight when one of the birds was noticed to leave the rest and, after making a wide detour, to return to the shooter and, landing on the shore, walk up to the dying bird which was undoubtedly its mate. The relation of birds to their own dead is often puzzling. An absolutely unparalleled incident occurred in Cheshire last year. A song-thrush was seen with a dead bird on the ground. The thrush was making a hole in the ground with its beak. Suddenly it picked up the dead bird, flew to the stream, washed the feathered corpse, flew back again, and put it in the hole and tried to cover it with earth. It found it could not quite cover the dead bird over, so it took it out again, put it on the ground at the side of the hole, made the hole deeper, flew again to the stream with the bird, washed it, flew back again, put it in the hole and covered it all over this time, and then flew away.

During recent years the toll of feathered victims on the roads has increased at an alarming rate, and in the summer months, particularly during the week-ends and at the Bank Holidays, one comes across numbers of birds dead or dying from collisions with vehicles. They are usually young birds of the year that have not become sufficiently strong on their wings, or roadside-feeding or haunting birds, as swallows, thrushes, flycatchers and wrens, that get up as a car comes along, then sweep low over the road to be struck down without the driver being conscious of the little tragedy. A few years ago a motor-cyclist told me he found his engine would go no further, and on dismantling it he retrieved in odd pieces and feathers the remains of some bird that had become so mixed up inside that it was impossible to recognise it.

Returning home from an early spring ramble on the edge of Liverpool, I came across the pitiable sight of a beautiful cock hawfinch fluttering in the gutter beside the main road. The hawfinch, one of our handsomest and rarest British finches, is usually an inhabitant of the dense woods, and we rarely find him in these parts. He bore every visible sign of collision

with the car that had preceded me. His huge beak, Nature's limit in her seed-crushing devices in British birds, was broken through on the upper mandible, his right wing was broken at the wrist-joints, and his head had been completely scalped. Yet he was alive and had a right to live. He was too beautiful and rare to be killed, nor did his suffering justify such action. Making a temporary ambulance out of my field-glasses case, I brought him home, and after a dose of brandy-and-water, and a night in a warm room, he had recovered sufficiently to feed with comfort ; a few days later he was hopping about in the old cage we discovered in the cellar and fitted up for him. He took nearly two months before he was fit to be released ; but in the meantime he afforded many an interesting sidelight on bird habits. The hawfinch is easily recognised by its huge, bluish-grey beak, and the orange, white, and ruddy browns of its plumage. The huge beak has horny pads inside to add to the powers of the mill that crushes the seeds and kernels of the wild fruits. The throat and lores are jet black which, when the hawfinch faces one, makes it not unlike the waxwing. The primaries and some of the tail feathers are also black, with glossy blue tips. The rest of the tail, which is slightly forked, is white, as is the rump and a broad patch down the wing.

The hawfinch has no song, but an often repeated, sharp, metallic " whit " or whistle, which he uses as a call note. During his stay in convalescence, our hawfinch constantly uttered the " whit " sound, but on many occasions when he was left to himself he uttered another and much queerer sound. Standing on the bottom of the cage—and he would not do this for me if he saw me, I had to hide myself to watch him—he would look to the top of the cage with his bright eyes, and from the very bottom of his throat came a weird, guttural sound, not unlike the distant cawings of a passing flock of rooks, or the harsher " cars " of carrion crows. He would warble this deep note in gushes, and there was no doubt of the fact that at times he could be a ventriloquist and make this noise come from a tree some yards to the left, or as quickly from as many yards to the right. In fact, it was not until he had performed the feat for some time that we noticed it was he who was the culprit.

The harbouring of birds in convalescence until they are able to be released has provided many an interesting, sometimes tragic, experience. A corn-bunting rescued from the bird-sellers in the terrible orgy of the bird-market behind St. John's Market, Liverpool, on a Saturday morning, was fed and released, but within two days was shot and brought back to us. A number of dirty, one-eyed, and other suffering birds, wild birds caught in the English countryside, birds given to all of us in trust for all, and that God never intended to be subject to vandalism when He enriched our green fields and woods with their deliciously beautiful songs and their gorgeous colours, have been retrieved from this dismal alley called Market Street, where they were being offered at three shillings and sixpence or seven shillings and sixpence each ; they have been brought back to strength and beauty and released in the open countryside and pure free air of the Cheshire lanes. There was Bully, as beautiful a cock bullfinch as ever graced an English thicket, snared and bungled into a horribly small cage and offered for twelve shillings and sixpence, because he had only got one leg—the other was torn off by the bird-snarer. Twelve-and-six went over the counter for him, grimy hands dipped his panting beak into a pot of filthy water, pushed the dazed bird into a little brown-paper bag—which was immediately changed for a more roomy cardboard box by the purchaser—and Bully left his prison. A few weeks later he was a different bird. Like a one-legged Israel Hands, this red-waistcoated chappie piped merrily from the top of the mantelpiece, then flew over the picture frame to sing another roundelay of joy, and so on from one piece of furniture to the other. He was not only the pet of the house, free to roam where and when he wished, but he was the bosom friend of the whole neighbourhood. He would fly through the open window to join the birds feeding on the bird-tables in the garden, or even down the lane and into the other houses. His was a different life.

A starling purchased in such a case was given up as lost, but two or three nights spent wrapped in flannel in a warm basket beside the fire, with frequent sips of brandy, soon put him in form. He became an almost impossible friend. He would smother one with kisses and cheeps of delight every time he could perch on one's shoulder or arm, indoors or out, for he had full liberty. Then one day he vanished. Weeks of search failed to find him, and he was given up as lost. Months later two starlings appeared in the adjacent trees. One was

Blackie. He had not forgotten. He was in through the door, and in his excitement seemed to go frantic with his desire to snuggle up against his old friend's cheek, to whistle and chatter with delight, to fly back to tell his wife—for there was no doubt about the other starling's identity—to dance ungainly jigs as of old, and a hundred other things, all at the same time. He was a comic to see.

The intelligence of wild birds is often fascinating. One has known three or four cases, of the great tit or ox-eye tit giving a remarkable example of "putting two and two together." The incidents all occurred on bird-tables where a piece of suet was suspended by a thin cotton for the little blue tits to come and swing on, and feed in all sorts of upside down positions. The less skilful great tits found they could not swing upside down on the suspended suet, so they perched upon the edge of the bird-table, and reaching down with their beaks, took hold of a portion of the thread and pulled it up, fixed it with their feet, bent down for some more, and so on until the suet had been pulled on to the table.

A gamekeeper I knew in Northamptonshire always took his lunch hour at one o'clock each day. One day we kept him talking a little later than usual. It was ten minutes after normal time when he was about to go to his house, and we were in a field full of coops of young pheasant chicks. A kestrel appeared on the scene, seemed disappointed at the sight of the keeper and his gun, "hung on" a few moments, and then retired to a nearby tree, puzzled at the unusual change in curriculum. We thought the incident interesting and set a watch. Next day the bird came again at the same time, and we soon found it was a habit of this bird to visit the chicks at the time the keeper took his lunch. Experience had taught it to visit only in his dinner hour, and it had learned that so well that the keeper was unaware of the visits.

More remarkable have been the examples of intelligence of profiting by experience, shown by the little owls on a certain game farm in Sussex. These little owls were reported by the gamekeeper to be destroying the game chicks, but the owner would hear none of it. Finally, after repeated assertions, a watch was set, and a pair of little owls was seen to attack and kill the chicks and carry them off. Still not fully satisfied, the owner pursued the matter further, and it was found that the alien owls deposited their booty in a gap at the bottom of the

hedge and left them there. They did not return for some time, and in the meanwhile the dead birds began to decompose, and numerous carrion-feeding beetles were attracted by their odour and began devouring them. It was thought the owls had forgotten them. Then, when the beetles were fairly numerous around the dead chicks, and then only, the little owls returned and devoured, not the game-birds, but the beetles.

The human characteristics of birds are always impressing themselves upon one's memory, though the bird student who assumes that birds act under similar impulses and responses to those of human beings, who looks at bird habits and actions from the human point of view with the human mind, instead of trying to look at them from the bird's point of view, to try and put himself in the bird's mind, is apt to get some very misleading ideas. However, human-like characteristics do crop up from time to time. A fine young female goshawk we used for the ancient sport of falconry had a peculiar dislike of nurses and perambulators. This goshawk was, like so many young ladies, very highly temperamental, and always became agitated in strange company, but when she was being used for rabbiting in the fields and a nurse appeared with her charges in the nearby lane, the goshawk became so agitated and annoyed that it was impossible to work her for fear of losing her, despite her bells and jesses.

There are petty thefts and quarrels going on constantly in a bird's life, as in human civilisation. Who has not watched the petty thefts and, on discovery, the punishments of the lazy builders amongst a colony of rooks at nesting time in March? A couple of pairs of long-tailed tits were once building their beautiful mossy nests in a group of furze bushes. One pair was particularly industrious, the other hen bird seemed particularly lazy. On the day that the framework of each nest was completed, and the birds seemed to have some difficulty in finding sufficient feathers to make that cosy bed within, the industrious builder had to travel far in search of her feathers for the lining. This necessitated her and her husband being away from the nest for fairly regular intervals. It presumably gave the idler an idea and a chance to reveal her shady character. When the other nest's owners were away, this bird slipped into the neighbouring nest and stole the hard-earned feathers and tucked them into her own lining. It was

most annoying to see the hard-working pair bring a feather and carefully tuck it in and fly off for another, when no sooner had they vanished from the gorse than the rascally neighbour landed on the nest, gave one or two tugs within, and retreated with the feather to its own nest. Then, when the workers made a sudden change of decision and returned, the idle capitalist was caught in the act and severely punished. But the other birds were not intelligent enough to retrieve all their stolen bedding from the idler's nest!

The question of how the long-tailed tit packs away its very long tail when in its domed nest seems to have puzzled most naturalists. It solves the problem in the same way as does the magpie in its domed nest. The tit enters head first, then turns right round, and in the act its tail folds neatly over its back, so that when it sits down upon its clutch of nearly a dozen wee, pink-spotted eggs, its long tail is folded back as neatly as could be wished for.

The erring wife is no uncommon thing. The courtship of the great crested-grebe on the larger inland waters is a thrilling affair, particularly when the birds dive and bring up long, trailing pieces of water-weeds in their beaks and, bill to bill, face each other. They rise up out of the water, their white breasts gleaming in the sunshine, till they are almost erect, and their feet placed as far back on their body as possible to enable them to make their wonderful dives, make foam of the surface of the water, while meantime, with their tippets expanded, their beaks and the dangling water-weeds are violently agitated up and down till the birds' heads look like animated chrysanthemums. This courtship may go on after the birds have commenced nesting. In one case, however, the male and female birds used to relieve each other after long periods of brooding on the nest. It so happened that when the male bird relieved the female after a long spell, she swam out into the middle of the reservoir and there came across a young bachelor grebe who began displaying to her. She, the flirt, returned the courtship, and this went on periodically when she was relieved off the nest for exercise. At last the male bird saw what was going on. He kept his temper. When her time came to return to her charges he was waiting for her. He waited until she reached the nest, then he gave her the severest thrashing of her life.

ERIC HARDY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE BLUER EAGLE.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S difficulties had not decreased by the middle of November. The strikes had spread. On October 13th there arose the ironic climax of three labour unions—*et tu, Brute!*—sending out strikers to march upon the headquarters of the National Recovery Administration in New York. There was a fight with the police, who arrested sixty of them. On October 20th the National Farmers' Holiday Association, which represents 2,000,000 farmers and more than half the States, decided to call a farmers' strike, to begin on the following day. Agricultural discontent had grown apace because the N.R.A. attempt to raise wages before raising prices, though it could never succeed in its own object, did succeed in maintaining the cost of agricultural produce above its sale value. The farmers, therefore, decided to withhold their products from the market until "farm products bring in the cost of their production," and until the foreclosing of mortgages was stopped. Mr. Roosevelt, having of his own will attempted to do the impossible by means of political impositions upon commerce, was now invited to do something else that was impossible by the same means.

At that moment bad luck was added to bad management. Herr Hitler's action on October 14th had the effect of sending back to New York in a panic American capital which had formerly left New York in a panic. The dollar rose. Wall Street prices and commodity prices therefore fell. Mr. Roosevelt, watching the dollar rise when he wanted it to fall, had the further discomfiture of hearing the views of the Governor of Nebraska, who said that currency inflation was the farmers' only hope. And Mr. Roosevelt had set his face against currency inflation.

In his embarrassment, on October 22nd, he broadcast an address to the nation. Broadcasting is not an unmixed blessing to politicians. On this occasion Mr. Roosevelt announced that he was going to try gold as a factor in his "managed" currency. The only thing he contrived to make clear was that he would buy gold, partly, but not wholly, with the object of raising prices at home. The existing price

of gold mined in the United States at that time was $29·80 an ounce. On October 25th the first purchase of such gold under Mr. Roosevelt's new scheme was made at $31·36. On October 26th the price paid was $31·54; on October 28th, $31·82; on November 1st, $32·26. On October 28th Mr. Roosevelt announced that gold would also be bought abroad. Now why? He said in his broadcast address that prices must be raised before the dollar was stabilised; that the dollar must be stabilised, not on exchange values, but on the internal price level; that internal prices must be raised, not by currency expansion, but by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's buying and selling of gold. He had a bad Press—a striking change in his prestige since March—and was criticised by farmers, Conservatives and inflationists impartially. Did he deserve it? He had been consistent in postulating that prices be raised before the dollar could be stabilised, and in postulating higher costs, that is higher wages, before prices were raised. His new theory was that he could deliberately use the exchanges as a lever to raise prices. Did he really imagine that exchange prices, such as could be "managed" by the R.F.C.'s gold operations, were the same thing as internal prices, based on commodities, in such a country as the United States, whose internal prices are peculiarly independent of imports and exports? For four days the purchase price of home-mined gold was progressively raised. No effect was, or could be, thereby produced, either upon the dollar's exchange value or upon internal prices. The flight from the dollar, occasioned by domestic panic about the future of the United States, did bring down the dollar; and for that achievement Mr. Roosevelt could fairly have claimed some responsibility. But that was hardly his boast. Having failed in the experiment with home-mined gold, he boldly plunged into the world market for gold, with no better effect. Meanwhile the farmers were still on strike, to the number of a round million. On November 2nd the Governors of Iowa, North and South Dakota, Minnesota and Wisconsin and delegates from Indiana, Illinois, Nebraska and Kansas, presented a petition to Mr. Roosevelt demanding that a N.R.A. code should fix minimum prices high enough not only to meet costs but to give a profit, and, secondly, demanding currency inflation. On the next day, November 3rd, the Chamber of Commerce of New York State passed a sweeping

resolution condemning Mr. Roosevelt's whole financial and economic policy, and demanding that prices be not artificially raised, nor currency inflated. *Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin.* When a politician bites off more than he can chew, he has a mouthful.

Caught between the two opposites, sound money and greenbacks, the gold standard and inflation, he tried to have it both ways, and hoped to be rescued by the chance that dollar depreciation abroad would do the trick of inflation at home. Yet Mr. Roosevelt had the presence of mind to tell the Bank of England that he abhorred the possibility of a currency war. He saw no doubt that other currencies were not likely to remain inactive against an unlimited dollar fall.

Seldom has the world seen so odd a spectacle as that of the contemporary United States and of its dollar, backed by the greater part of the world's gold, yet "off" gold, and rapidly sinking, as it sank in the first half of November. It is true that Mr. Roosevelt "planned" such a fall by buying gold at increasing prices. It is not true that he produced the fall. It was produced by the unplanned distrust by Americans of America. The cynical words "No Recovery Allowed" came to be heard more than the original slogan they bitterly parodied. Blood was shed in street fights between the police and strikers, both sides armed. Has any author of imaginative fiction ever conceived anything more absurd than the "cracking down" on Mr. Ford by Mr. Roosevelt and General Johnson? Mr. Ford submitted the lowest tender for the provision of motor trucks wanted by the Government. General Johnson refused the tender, and Mr. Roosevelt approved the refusal, on the ground that Mr. Ford had not signed the Automobile Code. Thereupon the Comptroller-General, who is responsible to Congress for not wasting public money—Congress being supreme over President—overruled N.R.A. on the ground that Mr. Ford was not in practice violating any of the provisions of the code even though he refused to sign it. The eagle and its politics grow bluer.

The War Debt.

Another consultation has taken place between the British and the United States politicians about the war debt prob-

lem. The problem itself is now somewhat mellowed and has lost some of its bitterness. It is constituted by the fact that a British Government, led by Mr. Lloyd George, sixteen years ago, incurred a debt to the United States Government, which a later British Government, led by another Prime Minister, cannot pay. The real difficulty of the problem consists in the fact that what Mr. Lloyd George's Government did sixteen years ago cannot now be undone, nor can the present circumstances be changed, which make the continued service of the debt a nearly unbearable and, in one sense, an unfair burden to the British people. The only alternative solutions so far recognisable are: either that the United States Government should forgive a debtor who has been proved to have been guilty of bad finance and happens in addition—or is not this the normal attribute of bad finance?—to be unlucky; or that the unwise debtor should follow the example of some thirty-odd other contemporary governments who, in the like predicament, have simply defaulted upon their obligations. Neither the one party nor the other is so far willing to take the course that is open to it, although, if one be honest, one must subject that statement to the qualification that the British Government is attempting the gymnastic feat of combining the reality of default with the form of solvency. By making "token" payments each half-year, substantially smaller than the amount that falls due, the British Government is taking refuge in an exercise of finesse such as is not likely to cause much satisfaction to the simple folks who still regard formal obligations as unalterably binding. On the other hand there are few honest people in any country who feel proud of their country's politics. At the present moment nearly every "civilised" country in the world has a government which, either formally or by means of exchange restrictions virtually, is in default. That is another way of saying that the peoples of those countries cannot meet the expenses of government left as a charge upon them by former governments.

The people of Great Britain belong to that category, although in their case there are points peculiar to themselves. At the Lausanne Conference of 1932 the British Government agreed to remit Germany's war debt, and made known its hope that the United States would thereupon act in the like spirit towards Great Britain. That hope seemed to have a

sporting chance, because it was the United States herself who, by proposing the "Hoover" moratorium in 1931, had taken the initiative in the movement for a general cancellation of war debts. But the event revealed the curious circumstance that the United States, while approving and even suggesting that war debts be annulled, so far as other creditors were concerned, was resolutely unwilling to annul them so far as she herself was concerned. The British Government earnestly argued the case for an application to America of the American doctrine, so well expounded by Mr. Hoover in 1931: but Mr. Hoover, on November 23rd, 1932, dismissed that argument with the curt observation that "it does not appear to me to carry much weight." On December 15th, 1932, therefore, the British Government paid the amount that then fell due, but paid it in gold, and stipulated that the payment be not regarded as "a resumption of the annual payments," but as an "exceptional and abnormal" procedure designed to "increase the prospects of a satisfactory approach to the whole problem." At the same time the British Government urged the necessity of reaching a final understanding before June 15th, 1933, "to obviate the risk of a general break-down of existing inter-governmental agreements." The United States Government accepted the payment, but rejected the condition on which it was made. ("The sum so received must be credited to principal and interest, as provided therein [in the schedule of 1923] . . . great importance is attached by our Government and people to the maintenance of the original debt agreement in force." Mr. Stimson, to Sir Ronald Lindsay, December 11th, 1932.) None the less, a basis of hope still remained that another temper might prevail before June 15th, 1933. Mr. Hoover, who was responsible for America's policy in December 1932, had been heavily defeated at the Presidential election (November 8th) and was, therefore, due to be superseded in the following March by Mr. Roosevelt. Now, in the course of the election campaign which brought him to the White House, Mr. Roosevelt had made certain statements about the debt. On July 30th, 1932, he declared that "The Republican position has been the absurd one of demanding payment, and at the same time of making payment impossible." On September 29th, 1932, he said: "Billions of dollars of debts are due to this country from abroad. If the debtor nations

cannot export goods and services, they must try to pay in gold. We started such a drain on the gold reserves of the principal commercial countries as to force practically all of them off the gold standard. . . . I say to you, in all earnestness and sincerity, that unless this process is reversed throughout the world, there is no hope for full economic recovery or for true prosperity in the United States."

Mr. Roosevelt duly became President on March 4th, 1933. With the least possible delay Mr. MacDonald crossed the Atlantic and discussed the matter with him (April 21st-25th.) Maybe he expected that Mr. Roosevelt after his election would say the same sort of thing as he had said before his election. It was not so. On June 9th the United States Government laconically informed Sir Ronald Lindsay that "$ 75,950,000 interest is due and payable on June 15th, 1933, on account of your Government to the United States, pursuant to the debt agreement of June 19th, 1923." It was at that point that the British Government showed a first sign of impatience. Sir John Simon (June 13th) wrote to Washington to express his view that the payment of the June instalment "could not be made at this juncture without gravely imperilling the success of the conference [The World Monetary and Economic Conference], and involving widespread political consequences of the most serious character." What, therefore, the British Government did on June 15th last was to "make an immediate payment of $10,000,000 as an acknowledgment of the debt pending a final settlement." What the United States Government did was to accept that payment, to remind the British Government that the President could not alter the schedule of payments ("Such power rests with Congress") and to suggest that negotiations about the debt should be held in Washington "as soon as convenient."

For that purpose Sir Frederick Leith Ross crossed the Atlantic, and with Sir Ronald Lindsay started such negotiations in Washington on October 5th. The results were chronicled in Command Paper 4448, published in London on November 7th, and containing three short documents. The first was a letter signed by Sir Ronald Lindsay, addressed to the United States Secretary of State and dated November 6th, 1933. It recorded H.M. Government's disappointment "that it has not been possible during recent negotiations

to reach an agreement for a final settlement of the debt question," recognised "the difficulties in the way of reaching a final agreement at the present time by reason of the unsettled economic and financial situations," and made this announcement: ". . . they [His Majesty's Government] are accordingly prepared without prejudice to their position in the future, to make a further payment on December 15th next, as in June last, in acknowledgment of the debt pending a final settlement. His Majesty's Government understand that it is no longer in the power of the President to accept payment in silver at a price of 50 cents an ounce, and they accordingly propose to make a payment of $7,500,000 (£1,500,000 at par) in United States currency on December 15th next." The second document, bearing the same date, was addressed by Mr. Cordell Hull to Sir Ronald Lindsay, its only effect being that the American Government shared the British Government's regrets and "noted" the British disposition to resume negotiations at a later date. At the end of his letter Mr. Cordell Hull again reminded the British Government of the American Note of June 15th, in which was explained the incompetence of the American President "to reduce or cancel the existing debt," such power resting only with Congress. The third document was a statement issued by Mr. Roosevelt on November 7th to record his personal view that a final settlement could hardly be reached "until certain facts in the world—commercial and monetary—become more clarified," and to give his personal testimony to the honesty of British intentions: "I have no personal hesitation in saying that I shall not regard the British Government as in default."

The combined diplomacy of Washington and London, therefore, projected itself six more months into the future, content in the meantime to allow June 15th, 1934, to remain where it was.

The European Uncertainties.

Certain strong currents of propagandist activity have revealed themselves in Europe since the deplorable day, October 14th, when Herr Hitler's Government decided to withdraw from the League of Nations. The real seriousness of such a situation is to be found in the engagement of

intellectual prestige in diagnosing it. Everyone who comes into contact with diplomatists knows that there are men in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, working hard to prove that war is inevitable, not immediately, but, say, in twelve months' time. Many of them are well-informed. What is worse, they are sincere. Whatever be the truth about Herr Hitler and his colleagues, whether they genuinely, although lop-sidedly, want peace or not, there is charged to their account the big responsibility for having started the fear of war, than which there is no more fatal cause of war.

The old bogy of Pangermanism stalks in Europe. It has already made of Austria a political battle-ground in which the fascism of Prince Starhemberg and his Heimwehr is exposed to the temptation of taking, and would probably not be averse from taking, any dependable opportunity of turning Nazi in order merely to oust Dr. Dollfuss. In that event the Pangerman bogy would be substantiated. Already a Panslav movement is afoot in the east of Europe, called into being by the unmistakable motive of organising resistance to Pangermanism. The Little Entente States of Central Europe have begun to show impatience over what they regard as the irrelevance of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon in talking about French fears and German claims, when the real point, in their view, is the danger of German aggression, not against France or Great Britain, but against the small States on the German border. Italian propagandists have not been able to conceal the embarrassment caused to them on the one hand by the opportunity they see of humiliating France by encouraging Germany, on the other hand by the jealousy they feel towards Germany in the field of South-eastern Europe. French propagandists are concerned mainly with the thesis that British interests coincide with the denial of equality to Germany. The Deutsche Club (formerly the Herren Club) in Berlin uses its influence to acclimatise German opinion to the notion that the enemy is not France, but Great Britain, and the pious refrain "Gott strafe England" is again taught to German children.

Those who prophesy war stake their name upon the outcome of war. Looked at from a detached point of view, as one of Lucian's gods might look at it, the scene is senseless. Probably not one single politician in Europe, not excepting General Göring, wants war. Yet collectively, those politicians—in which category, for the present purpose, one includes the commentators who write or speak about politics—have the effect of producing the danger of war.

The one month's history that followed October 14th changed the face of Europe. Those of the British people, and they were many, who since 1919 had sympathised with Germany, especially when German feelings were interpreted by Herr Stresemann or Dr. Brüning, were now driven to wonder if there was not after all something to be said for the destructive people who preached the doctrine that Germany was the incorrigible disturber of European peace. For the behaviour of the German people after October 14th came as a shock to normal healthy people who distrust the mass emotionalism of politics and who retain a taste for personal liberty and the decency of individual life. It looked as if the perverted German quality of stupid discipline had again been mobilised in the cause of nationalist arrogance. The whole people were jerking their arms in an endless Nazi salute, were strutting about in an exalted, uncontrolled frenzy of defiance against the whole world, were willing to submit gladly to the impositions of a ruling clique who refused to allow them even to know the effect they were producing abroad. The journalists all betrayed their trust and became the trained parrots of Dr. Goebbels. Foreign news was distorted before it was published, or was not published at all; and the authority who decided upon distortion or suppression was Dr. Goebbels. One is ashamed for those German journalists one counted as friends, that they could consent, at a politician's bidding, deliberately to falsify foreign news, to write what they knew to be untrue and to see it, unmoved, emerge into print. In all countries politics are a degrading thing. In Germany, where politics are still further vitiated by a traditional quality of nationalist patriotism, they seem to rob their victims of the simple motive of human goodwill. And as for humour, there is no humour in a country which massacres Jews, imprisons foreign journalists for writing, not false, but true news about Germany, and which holds an "election" for no other purpose than to measure the extent to which the German people have been disciplined by their politicians. That election had some incidental value as a political curiosity. It was held on November 12th. The electors were asked to vote yes or no to the silly question,

officially published in these words on October 19th: "Do you, German man, and you, German woman, approve the policy of your Government, and are you ready to recognise it as the expression of your own view and your own will, and solemnly to pledge yourself to it?" A good 93 per cent. obediently voted "ja."

How is one to understand a national mentality which boisterously quits Geneva and a disarmament conference and then proclaims that its only object is peace? There is an odd strain in the German character which makes it sensitive to foreign criticism, even while it gives the ground for it. That peculiarity no doubt is one reason why the German politicians so quickly started their chorus of peace after their other chorus of October 14th.

On November 6th, Freiherr von Neurath addressed the Deutsche Club. He said that "they, the Germans, were making the other Powers an honest and trustful offer, with the demand that they should approach problems from another fundamental conception. . . . Let the foreign Governments, conscious of their responsibility, take the hand Germany stretched out to them."

On that same day General Göring arrived in Rome to begin certain prolonged consultations with Signor Mussolini. The coincidence of the two events perhaps naturally led to some general speculation about the possibility of Germany's being given a method of resuming the disarmament negotiations without resuming her membership of the League of Nations or her membership of the Disarmament Conference. The Four-Power Pact became the obvious focus of such speculation. Thereby was started a seven days' wonder of high diplomacy. Few informed people felt confident that Signor Mussolini would not lend an ear to such suggestions, if they were made. Yet it was probable that there could not be any meeting of the Four Powers, for the simple reason that France would no doubt refuse to take part in it. It was the adamant principle of French policy that Germany could resume the disarmament discussions only by returning to Geneva.

Such, also, had been understood to be the British principle. But on the very day following Freiherr von Neurath's statement, Sir John Simon spoke in the House of Commons in a foreign affairs debate. He said: ". . . the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans were making to the other

Powers an honest and trustful offer . . . We most earnestly trust that these statements may lead, in some form or other, to the renewal of contact, and that this object will be pursued by whatever method is found most useful and appropriate. . . . We have never been sticklers for method if we can help in the result." That part of his speech suggested that Sir John Simon was prepared to encourage Berlin to resume the discussions even if the League of Nations was to be set aside.

In another part, however, he said: "We shall go on using every effort, whether Germany is at Geneva or not. There is the most urgent national reason for doing so, if only because the present inequality in armaments affects not only Germany but ourselves, and the last thing we want to see is a process of rearmament, either here or elsewhere. We stand, as we believe the vast mass of our fellow countrymen stand, for international co-operation with a view to firmly establishing peace, and at a time like this, when the international system set up since the war is in jeopardy, we declare ourselves without any qualifications believers in and upholders of the League of Nations as the best available instrument for international peace."

Whatever was Sir John's purpose, it became quickly clear that his effect was to encourage the Nazi leaders to believe that Great Britain might be induced to support any initiative that might result in a resumption of the discussions, whether at Geneva or elsewhere, whether within the framework of the League of Nations or outside it. French opinion was puzzled and alarmed. The matter became one of general concern, because the question of form might become important.

The Lord Mayor's Banquet was held at the Guildhall on November 9th, two days after Sir John Simon had spoken. The diplomatic interest excited in Berlin, Paris, Rome, Prague, Warsaw, Moscow, by the question of the method to be used in the recapture of German collaboration, was at its height. Nobody knew whether the British Government was disposed to meet the Germans outside Geneva. Mr. MacDonald spoke at the Banquet. The report of his speech was read on the following day in every European capital, with the first objective of seeking in it an answer to the question of method. What did they find? "It is deplorable," said Mr. MacDonald, "that just at the moment when another attempt was to be

made to meet German claims, Germany not only withdrew from the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference, but gave notice of her intention to leave the League of Nations itself. Her act almost amounted to a repudiation of the peace machinery of the world. That almost amounted to a repudiation of peace. . . . The situation needs to be studied in all its aspects. The British Government is not going to commit itself to one course of proceeding, but to study it in all its aspects. . . . What is to hinder Germany, even now, from coming in and putting her case before us? She will address a tribunal of men who want peace, and men who want to be able to meet her in every way." Thus Mr. MacDonald. The uncertainty was hardly thereby lessened; but British, as distinct from French or German, students of British Governmental style could guess what was in the mind, although not on the lips, of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon. It might be paraphrased thus: "Both Freiherr von Neurath and Herr Hitler have lately said that they want peace. If they are sincere, we want to encourage them. That is why we refrain at this point from saying bluntly to them that they must first return to Geneva. Instead we invite them to suggest the method."

In the evening of November 10th an official announcement was made from Rome containing these phrases: "In Italian responsible quarters it is believed that the situation has not yet reached a point which will permit of re-examining the disarmament problem and the problems resulting from the exit of Germany from the League of Nations. What is important—according to Italian responsible quarters—is not to aggravate the international atmosphere with investigations or manœuvres. . . ." After that announcement was made the people who thought they understood Signor Mussolini's temperament were encouraged in their belief that it was not his way to make his countenance shine upon projects which had little chance of success. But he made the confusion worse confounded on November 14th, by publicly stating that "This League of Nations started from one of those principles which, when enunciated, are very beautiful, but when considered and dissected, reveal themselves as absurd." Where did Signor Mussolini stand? No man knew.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 15th, 1933.

No. 387. *December, 1933.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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GOD AND THE ASTRONOMERS.*

The Warburton Lectures by the Dean of St. Paul's are, in a sense, the necessary supplement of what the distinguished lecturer calls "the fine Gifford Lectures of Bishop Barnes," entitled *Scientific Theory and Religion*, which was reviewed at some length in these pages in June 1933. The Warburton Lectures for 1931-1933 are, however, entirely independent of the Gifford Lectures. Dr. Inge is a philosopher and a theologian, with a mind as capable as the mind of the late Lord Balfour to estimate the significance of modern discoveries in physics; Dr. Barnes is a theologian and a mathematician, with expert knowledge of the physical problem. The two minds supplement each other, as these Warburton Lectures show. There are differences of outlook. Apparently Dr. Inge does not make the distinction between physics and the psychical realm which Dr. Barnes emphasises so emphatically.

Both Lord Balfour and Dr. Barnes assume that God is a Person, that is, a Being who has designed the physical and psychical universe. Lord Balfour, in his Bampton Lectures, says plainly to the mathematicians, "We must hold that

* *God and the Astronomers: Containing the Warburton Lectures*, 1931-1933. By William Ralph Inge. Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

reason and the works of reason have their source in God; that from Him they draw their inspiration; and that if they repudiate their origin, by this very act they proclaim their own insufficiency." Dr. Barnes apparently holds similar views and convinces the student by the entire reasonableness of his complex argument. He holds that space is finite, containing a finite cosmos which obeys the fundamental laws of Nature, including the degradation of energy which involves the ultimate destruction of this finite universe. Does God expire as well as His universe in one fearful tragedy, which we may look forward to but shall not ever record? If there is Purpose in the creation of the universe there is Purpose in its destruction. Purpose whether in God or Man is not a physical factor. The great mathematicians admit this, and say that free-will lies beyond the realm of physics. Dr. Barnes says that the things that lead to the inevitable vanishing away of the physical universe, matter, energy, radiation, are physical entities. "Mind and spirit belong to the psychical realm." Purpose and Design, with their accompanying values, therefore, seem to belong to some region where the second law of thermodynamics and the doctrine of entropy involving the eventual destruction of the physical universe by the cessation of the functioning of heat, have no place. There is a Purpose in the fashioning of this law, and because there is a Purpose the law itself is an attribute of a Purpose which must survive when the finite universe has departed. Dr. Barnes says plainly, on the evidence that the stoic doctrine of universal immanence is clearly wrong, that God is what he calls transcendent, and is only immanent "in so far as His creatures share His nature and serve His plan."

Therefore, the one thing to understand is not the technical difficulties of the mathematicians and physicists, but the nature of the personality of God and man, and the problem of the presence of evil in the heart of man. The problem of evil is partly explicable, at any rate, by the necessity of free-will. Man must be free if his personality is to be free and competent to share the nature of God. If Christ is God the problem of evil is soluble, though man can only very slowly solve the problem by discovering the only partly revealed laws of the moral being. But all this is impossible if personality does not survive physical death. The personality

is something other than the physical man, though personality is associated with him. The difficulty is to disentangle personality from the things of the flesh. But Purpose is in man as well as in God and it would be an unreasonable universe if the personality of man did not survive physical death.

How does Dr. Inge deal with these many problems which form, in fact, only one problem? He argues, to quote the preface to his book, that "the law of entropy, if it holds good of the entire physical universe, points to a creation in time by some Power outside the degenerative process which science observes proceeding to an inevitable end." On the other hand, Dr. Inge avoids the free-will controversy, but he maintains that "the unseen spiritual world, the 'kingdom of values,' is . . . no mere ideal or aspiration, but a fact, an existing reality, which can only be pictured symbolically and poetically under the the forms of time and place." This "kingdom of values," and the conception of God as primarily transcendent, is common to Lord Balfour, Dr. Barnes and Dr. Inge. None of these believe, and no great thinker could believe that God will disappear with His creation. Certainly, the greatest mathematicians of our time do not believe that the physical universe contains the secret of all things. Dr. Inge says:

> We must recognise that reality is ultimately a kingdom of Values, and that the ultimate and eternal Values, which it has been agreed to classify as Goodness (or Perfection), Truth (or Wisdom), and Beauty, are *given* to us as much as the facts of what we call existence.

It is unnecessary to follow the Dean in his attack on the conception of a purely mathematical universe. No one now thinks that the God of the cosmos is a mathematician intent on destroying Himself. It seems, in fact, like a Scottish joke. But Dr. Inge is undoubtedly right in reasserting that "events in Time are relevant to eternal order is the belief of Christianity. Things of lasting moment really happen; souls are saved and lost." But for this very reason it is surprising that the author does not face the question of free-will. Souls are saved or lost by the exercise of purpose and free-will in the temporal sphere, whatever fate that sphere may have. The *results* of free-will are eternal.

The Dean of St. Paul's shows the working of "God in History," and comes to the conclusion that we cannot, with any confidence, "trace the hand of God in the development of merely material civilisation." Again, the criticism must be made that the presence of evil is necessary for the exercise of free-will and, therefore, to neglect the problem is to neglect the purpose of God in human history. "The world of values," on the other hand, is necessary to the entire argument, as was found by Lord Balfour and Dr. Barnes. In the chapter on "God and the World," Dr. Inge concludes, and rightly, that "the fate of the material universe is not a vital question for religion." He turns to "the Eternal World," and the doctrine of eternal life which "we can enter, at least in a measure, before we pass through the gate of death." Thomas à Kempis is a better guide than even Plotinus or Spinoza in that question. The following of Christ eventually eliminates evil and makes the individual personality share the nature of God. But for this purpose memory of earthly life and earthly sorrows and earthly joys are surely necessary if the purpose of man is akin to the Purpose of God. If the Purpose of God involves (as it must) a continuous picture of the scheme of things, the personality of man does not forget.

J. E. G. DE M.

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INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT.*

The growth of a world order suited to the needs of society is the most important topic of the times. The interdependence of national states is an accepted axiom of post-war politics. A form of international authority which satisfies the growing international needs of national peoples is the ultimate and necessary corollary. The most ardent form of nationalism cannot deny and cannot alter the nature of our present civilisation. The precise character of such authority has given rise to the most varied speculations. In two recent works, however, two distinguished writers have discussed the question and have reached important and, in some fundamentals, similar conclusions.

In the first edition of his work *The Bulwarks of Peace*,

* *The Bulwarks of Peace.* Methuen. 7s. 6d. net. *The Progress of International Government.* Allen and Unwin. 5s. net.

published in April 1918, Dr. Heber Hart considered the "essential conditions of an effective League of Peace," which were later largely embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. In a new and completely revised edition of this book, Dr. Heber Hart attempts "to provide a compendious statement of the material facts and guiding principles" when considering "what ought to be done by the governments and peoples of the various states of the world with the object of preventing the outbreak of wars in the future." The immediate problem is not the creation of a world-state, which is a theoretical conception wholly outside the realm of practical politics. Dr. Heber Hart, while believing in the world-state as an ultimate goal, declares that :

> meanwhile the practical reformer has to work out a different solution—a form of international organisation intermediate between the League of Nations in its present stage of development and the ideal conception of the world-state.

It may well be doubted whether the ultimate issue is between the nationalism as we understand it and the world-state. The individuality of racial culture and institutions will inevitably continue. Dr. David Mitrany, in *The Progress of International Government*, which comprised the substance of four lectures delivered before Yale University in 1932, supports this compromise as an end of political society. Our political speculations

> present us with the corresponding alternatives of a world-State or an association of State-units, still compact in their structure and authority. Most of our present difficulties are caused by that conceptual stagnation. . . . Human progress might be served best by a combination of the two lines of political organisation which hitherto have been applied rather in opposition to each other. A functional integration of technical services upon the largest possible international scale would seem to be as indispensable, as a more liberal devolution of cultural activities, which should free the individual genius of each regional or national group, would seem to be desirable as a more rational approach to the ideal ends of political society.

The ultimate character, if such be possible, of international society, will be determined rather by the uncertain course of future events than by the logical perfection of a theoretical conception.

The immediate question is the strengthening of the col-

lective system as the only guarantee of permanent peace and international progress. Dr. Heber Hart advocates the creation of a Supreme Executive Force drawn from the Great Powers and controlled by the League.

> A supreme Executive Force, *ex vi termini*, would be capable of coercing any of the Powers which had been parties to its constitution. . . . A coercive power compelling obedience to the decrees of the body by which it was directly wielded and to the system of law which it applied would involve the exclusive sovereignty of this body and the operation of the law over all who were subject to its power.

Dr. Mitrany, while considering that the question of "the instruments of enforcement" is a "secondary issue" and "a matter of detail," supports the theory of the collective enforcement of the law between States by an international body. It is but

> the progressive corollary of the renunciation of individual enforcement. . . . The unchanging principle must be that when States surrender to an international authority their traditional right of using force for their own protection, that authority should take upon itself the function of protecting law-abiding States. The two aspects are inseparable and represent logical, continuous stages in the transition from anarchy to law.

It is extremely doubtful whether the creation of such an international authority is at present a practical proposition. The members of the League have refused to exercise against Japan the sanctions given them by the Covenant, though unanimously agreed as to Japanese guilt. The nations are still afraid of collective action, though agreed in principle as to its necessity. In these circumstances an international force or other sanction is less likely to be created. Towards the end of his book Dr. Mitrany asks the vital question, "how to create acceptance for international authority." The answer rests in the education of world opinion towards greater international trust and good feeling with its logical consequences of disarmament and security. An international authority will evolve very much like the British Constitution. That is to say it will grow in proportion as the peoples of the world are able to work and appreciate it. Until that time approaches, written constitutions such as the Covenant of the League will fail to be implemented by the necessary collective action.

THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS.*

It is a very hard task for one who is not a Friend, however friendly and sympathetic, to review Miss Fry's able and fair estimate of the famous Society of Friends, of which she is a notable member. Having been asked by a member of the Society to undertake the task, and having read Miss Fry's book with undiminished interest from cover to cover, the writer had to inquire what qualifications were required for such a task. A purely objective review was possible, but that is not enough, since to understand the position of the Society and its members in modern life, it is necessary to understand once and for always the subjective aspect of the Quaker's view of life. Probably the book could only be reviewed fairly by a Friend. But there is one hope. However one may disagree with certain Quaker tenets if pressed to some great emergency, still the Quaker is a mystic, and one who adopts the theory of mysticism as the only solvent in a world where materialism and objective phenomena tend to swamp psychical realities, may be able, as mystic speaking to mystic, to criticise and also to realise the Quaker attitude. From that point of view the present writer writes, keeping in mind the conclusions he had come to in a long-forgotten volume on *Thomas à Kempis: His Age and Book*.

Miss Fry sees in the history of Christian mysticism what she calls "the Background of Quakerism," and indirectly refers to Walter Hilton's famous *Ladder of Spiritual Perfection*. Hilton was an English Augustinian who died in 1395. Miss Fry writes:

> There are various types of mystic, ranging from those who have followed in its every detail the elaborate ladder of perfection leading to rapture and ecstasy, to the normal person who yet has seeing eyes for the unseen, a sensitiveness in finding God everywhere and above all in his own soul. Quakers have never been "elaborate" mystics, but have rather assumed the possibility of the inner vision, to which we shall recur, using it to inspire their work. As Rufus Jones says, Quaker humanitarian and relief work "is as much a part of the Quaker mysticism as the Meeting for Worship is."

* *Quaker Ways.* An attempt to explain Quaker beliefs and practices, and to illustrate them by the lives and activities of Friends of former days. By A. Ruth Fry. Cassell. 8s. 6d. net.

Now a work which was not a manual for elaborate mysticism, but exactly answers the Quaker ideal as set forth by Miss Fry, was current in England in the mid-fifteenth century. It was called *Musica Ecclesiastica*, and was also attributed to Walter Hilton. It had for centuries a great vogue and it was only early in the eighteenth century that the work was identified with three of the books of the *De Imitatione Christi* of Thomas à Kempis. The work was in English as well as Latin (as indeed were all the works attributed to Hilton), and it is more probable that such a work, in its mystic simplicity, would have a more direct influence than the writings of the German mystic, Jacob Boehme, which were more akin to the *scala perfectionis* than to the simplicity of Thomas à Kempis. In the case of both the Quaker and Thomas Hammerlein the hypothesis of mysticism is the only true solution of the mystery of the spiritual life. I ventured to write in 1906 :

> Faith begins by an experiment which leads to an hypothesis and concludes with an experience which is a demonstration. It may be said that the demonstration is not complete, inasmuch as the following of Christ is a counsel of perfection to which no man can attain. The reply to such a criticism is that the perfect following of Christ would in fact be a complete demonstration, since experience shows that the nearer the approximation of the individual to the life of Christ the more nearly is the hypothesis confirmed. . . . Therefore the imitation of Christ throughout the darkness of the Middle Ages was the fundamental idea of the invisible and mystical Church, and therefore Thomas à Kempis, in his four books concerning the imitation of Christ, lays down the rules of human conduct and human thought that made the growth of the experience which is a demonstration, possible.

Now that, it is submitted, exactly describes the Quaker movement ever since George Fox, in the mid-seventeenth century, founded the Society of Friends. There was nothing new in the doctrine. What was new was the effort and the slow gathering together of a Society which laid down rules of human thought, human conduct which inevitably leads to an experience coincident with faith.

The Society speedily produced at the end of the seventeenth century a great statesman, William Penn, son of Admiral Penn. James, Duke of York, and his brother King Charles II, generously helped him to form the Quaker State of

Pennsylvania. Penn formed his State on the basis that "Liberty without obedience is confusion; and obedience without liberty is slavery." It was a great conception, and Penn's "Holy Experiment" was a noble and practical attempt to carry out the creed of the Society of Friends. There was no army or navy and Penn's relations with the Indians showed that there was no need for such internal defences. Indeed, the Indians, as was proved by the famous Iroquois Confederacy which was in force from the fifteenth century, were only too ready for a peace-abiding world. But Penn insisted upon education and law and order, capital punishment being reserved for wilful murder and treason, and prisons being workshops, where prisoners could be reformed and work out the debt due to their wrongdoing. There can be no doubt that Penn was a great statesman as well as a true Christian. He did not abolish slavery, but he regulated it, and entire religious freedom was accorded to every citizen. For thirty years the Holy Experiment, partly as the result of the efforts of the widow of the statesman, was an entire success. That it failed in 1756 was not the fault of the Society, but of the world as it then was. The principles of the Holy Experiment are as much alive to-day as in the time of William Penn and Hannah Penn, but in fact the Quaker, as Quaker, does not now interfere in politics, and does not directly determine, or try to determine, the policy of the State.

Mysticism and statesmanship incorporating the simpler outcomings of mysticism have justified themselves, but the Society of Friends, after the apparent failure of the Holy Experiment, have confined themselves to rules of conduct and experiments in social responsibility which work out both an experience and a demonstration of the following of Christ. They have not again aimed at the founding of a Quaker State.

J. E. G. DE M.

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A PRINCE OF THE CAPTIVITY.*

Colonel Buchan's political, social and international drama entitled *A Prince of the Captivity* is much more than a fine novel or piece of inspired fiction. It is a subjective treatise on

* John Buchan. Hodder & Stoughton. 7s. 6d. net.

the forces that are making up or tearing down the world as the Great War of 1914 left it. Most historical work on a great period—for this is a great period—is objective, written from documentary evidence and reminiscences, dealing with the period, and that is the weakness of all history since it rarely deals with the souls of men and women. Great drama, from the times of Æschylus to the times of Shakespeare, it is true, uses the subjective method, but it deals for the most part with events that cannot be identified with actual objective events with any historical accuracy. In Colonel Buchan's book we have a drama, too discursive perhaps in parts, which is based upon actual events, and deals with personages who are typical of actual personages playing current parts in actual or recent life, and the whole construction of the drama is subjective, written from within and not merely from without. In order to achieve this feat Colonel Buchan conceives and constructs an almost Christ-like character who dominates the whole book in its many phases, from the initial tragedy of the death of his little son and the second tragedy of his conviction for an offence of which he was absolutely innocent to his heroic death, a death which makes possible, after years of ceaseless social effort to construct a better world, the conversion of an enemy of terrific intellectual power to a friend who could carry on his work.

Adam Melfort, as the result of his imprisonment, never chooses to emerge into public life, though the social stain of his imaginary crime of 1912 was swept away by his miraculous conduct as a secret agent during the war. He is all through a mystic, clinging with a deathless hope to the ultimate reunion with his little son. At every turn he emanates and begets love, and never loses hope while his efforts register failure after failure. The pictures of the Labour leader and his wife, of the peer who turns Socialist, of the parson in the slums, are all pictures of men and women who were noble and who failed, while the men who ultimately answer the call were a German whom he had fought and an English financier who seemed anything but noble.

The drama (for it is a drama) is as discursive as Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*, and characters who appear and disappear have sometimes no obvious place in the plot save as figures in the world as it is to-day. The opening scene, as indeed are all the scenes, is vivid and striking, with the news

of Melfort's conviction for forgery drifting through to the smoking-room of a town club where his friends were gathered. But in any final edition of this book the scene should be rewritten, since on the facts as stated a conviction was impossible. The fact that he had admitted that his wife had forged the cheque under his orders would have put both the prosecution and the defence on the *qui vive*. It is a very common thing for a man to plead guilty to an offence that he has never committed. Adam was a rich man. After the conviction "he had settled upon her most of his income, leaving himself one thousand pounds a year" and a Scottish estate. The prosecution, with the fact before them of the admission that the wife, notoriously extravagant, forged the document, and the fact that the prisoner could have, with ease, met all her debts, would never have pressed the case. The English law, after the careful investigation of such a case (including the evidence of the lady's bankers) would never have allowed the husband to sacrifice himself. Another legal point is the alleged fact that the wife divorced him for desertion after he came out of prison in March 1914. He was convicted in June 1912. The Scotch law on the subject is that divorce can be had after malicious desertion for four years. In all the circumstances of the case it may be doubted whether, apart from the question of time, any Scottish court would have granted the worthless woman a divorce. The true facts of the case were well known in Scotland—and the husband had settled a fortune on her at the very time that malice was alleged. Scots lawyers are not fools. This criticism is made, as it is a pity to have a technical flaw in a drama which will long haunt the reader by its purity of tone, its vividness of action and its fine estimate of contemporary life.

J. E. G. DE M.

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SOCIAL THINKERS OF THE VICTORIAN AGE.*

These ten lectures which seek to put forth the leading social and political ideas held by certain pioneers in the

* *The Social and Political Ideas of some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age: A Series of Lectures Delivered at King's College, University of London, during the Session* 1931-32. Edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw. George G. Harrap. 8s. 6d. net.

Victorian Age do not limit their scope to English thinkers, though Dr. Gooch, in his searching introductory essay on the period from 1837, when the young queen succeeded to the throne, to 1901, when the old queen, " full of years and honours," died, restricted his brilliant analysis of a great epoch almost entirely to English personalities. The present writer, in dealing with " Sir Henry Maine and the Historical Jurists," had perforce to include the ideas of many continental and American thinkers. If the introduction of the subject of the theory of Law into a volume dealing with social thought could be justified, the Editor was forced to tolerate its inevitable references to foreign jurists. Perhaps the same excuse in its entirety could not be advanced in the case of some other essays. It is true that Professor Laski, in his fine essay on "Alexis de Tocqueville and Democracy," links the great French essayist with Lord Acton, traces his thought back to that aspect of Burke which owes so much to Montesquieu and declares that to understand temperamental liberalism it is necessary to know de Tocqueville. Yet he was essentially a logical French thinker, and does not seem to be representative of the Victorian Age as understood in England. Nor can Karl Marx, a German writer of Jewish stock, be called a representative thinker of that age, despite the fact that he lived in exile in England for many years. He was a German thinker basing all his thoughts and his communist ideas on a desperate perversion of the individualistic philosophy of Hegel, the perversion known as Left Hegelian.

Mr. J. L. Gray, in his very interesting but too lengthy essay on Marx, says comparatively little of Friedrich Engels, and only quotes Marx's attack on Ferdinand Lassalle. Yet Engels and Lassalle, as thinkers, have the same rather confused status as Marx, and the fact that " a social revolution has been waged " in the name of Marx does not make him a thinker of the Victorian Age any more than his German and French co-perverters of Friedrich Hegel. Nor (despite his love of England and his famous *History of English Literature*) can Hippolyte Taine be regarded as a Victorian thinker, unless that term can be applied to all social and political thinkers who lived and worked between 1837 and 1901. It is probably true, as Mr. R. A. Jones says, in his very valuable essay on "Taine and the Nationalists," that Taine did much to reconstitute the French nation after the disasters of 1870,

and to lead the way, and not only for France, " to a broad nationalism, a wider and enhanced conception of patriotism." This essay on Taine is a necessary counterblast to the essay on Marx, and therefore shows skilful, judicious and judicial editing, but neither figure plays any leading part in Victorian social and political thought.

The essays on Thomas Carlyle by Mr. Robert S. Dower, and " Herbert Spencer and the Individualists " by the Editor, Professor Hearnshaw, on the other hand go to the very root of the social and political ideas that were destined to stir the thinking powers of at least two generations of social reformers and political workers. Mr. Dower defines Carlyle fairly :

> He was paradoxical in many ways—a Scottish peasant who became one of the greatest writers of English, an idealist who turned pessimist, a brilliant talker who preached silence, a hero-worshipper who despised most of his contemporaries. He founded no school of thought, and had no disciples except Ruskin and Froude, but he profoundly influenced the political and economic thought of his age. His Gospel of Work, Duty, and Self-denial is not as popular now as it was in his day, but there are elements in his teaching that are needed in our time.

Mr. Dower aptly quotes Dr. Edward Caird's estimate of Carlyle : " No English writer of the nineteenth century has done more to elevate and purify our ideals of life, and to make us conscious that the things of the spirit are real, and that in the last resort there is no other reality." That is the significance of John Ruskin's worship of Thomas Carlyle, and it is a great omission in this book that Ruskin's political and social philosophy, carrying great force to-day, is not dealt with at length. Professor Hearnshaw in his brilliant essay on Spencer contrasts the apparent differences of Carlyle and the scientific thinker and individualist thinker whom Carlyle, in a fit of indigestion, called " an immeasurable ass." Spencer was doomed to the same fate as Hegel in the appropriation of his dialectic by his chief enemies the Socialists and Communists. It is a tribute to his wide-minded outlook that Left Spencerianism has been used by enemies who are responsible for the starting of the present craze of dictatorship in Europe. The fact gives rise to one more criticism of an omission. John Austin, the apostle of the doctrine that might is the source of law, who died in 1860, has a current influence in Europe in the shape of the doctrine of dictatorships that is positively

appalling. Austin was a great thinker, as Maine admitted, and the contrast of thought between him, Carlyle and Spencer was worth bringing out, especially at the present time. That he was wrong (he never lived to appreciate the doctrine of evolution and its influence on the growth of law) and that both Carlyle and Spencer were right there can be no doubt, but the case needs arguing.

Space does not allow of comment on the learned and noteworthy article on "T. H. Green and the Idealists," by the Master of Balliol, the very brilliant essay on "Matthew Arnold and the Educationists," by Professor Dover Wilson, and Mr. C. H. Driver's lecture (with a notable Appendix) on "Walter Bagehot and the Social Psychologists." These last three essays bring out into the light of common day three men who have had, perhaps, more subjective influence on the social thinking of the present generation than any other of the great Victorians.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Captain Liddell Hart has written nothing more arresting than *The Ghost of Napoleon*.* War, as he grimly reminds us, concerns us all, for history is filled with its ravages, and no one can be sure that its day is done. The theme of this little volume, which contains so much knowledge and wisdom, is not the history but the methods of warfare. Omelettes, as the saying goes, cannot be made without breaking eggs, and battles cannot be fought and won without the shedding of blood. But it is the author's profound conviction that in many wars blood has been needlessly shed, and that this extravagance in the most precious of all commodities is directly traceable to wrong ideas. His championship of the element of mobility and surprise against the rival theory of mass attack is familiar to readers of his earlier works, and it dominates the whole argument of his latest book. His survey of military thought opens with Marshal Saxe, whose astonishing originality marks him out as a creative thinker. Napoleon owed much to his predecessors; but his earliest campaigns were best, and in later years he sacrificed surprise to costly head-on attacks. It was Clausewitz, however, "the maker of mass and mutual massacre," who dominated the practice of the nineteenth century, and, through his disciples such as Moltke and Foch, was responsible for oceans of blood.

* Faber and Faber. 7s. 6d.

Captain Liddell Hart's message is that if wars there must be, they should be conducted with the minimum instead of with the maximum of slaughter, with the rapier, so to speak, not with the sledge-hammer.

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Nearly two years ago Mr. Hector Bolitho published *Albert the Good*, a Life of the Prince Consort which was based on letters written to his brother. They are in the archives of Coburg and had remained there unread for sixty years until Mr. Bolitho obtained access to them in connection with his book. He has now edited and published them under the title *The Prince Consort and his brother: Two hundred new letters*,* and they form a very interesting background to the life of a man who never obtained much popularity or acknowledgment for the work he did for his adopted country. Prince Albert was undemonstrative, and old for his years, both by nature and by reason of his position, with the result that he was a cautious letter-writer. Yet, in spite of that, these letters to the one person to whom he could write with full candour and frankness are full of real affection and deep concern and interest for his family's welfare. His brother's interests were as important to him as those of his own children, and with him he had no reserve, with the result that his strong character and philosophy of life stand out clearly against the background of politics and family affairs with which the letters deal.

* * * * *

Lady Stephen has written an interesting short history of *Girton College*, 1869-1932,† which in certain respects she has based on her earlier book, *Emily Davies and Girton College*. In the middle of the nineteenth century the seed for the proper education of woman was being sown very slowly but very surely. The antagonism which met the small group of its promoters and supporters strengthened their resolutions, and perhaps in the case of the women, showed the quality of their despised minds. All the would-be female emancipators were not of the militant type, outwardly at any rate, and they were not by any means the least zealous members of the feminist movement. Miss Emily Davies, one of the principal founders of Girton, hid her amazing energy and will under a conventional Victorianism, a manner most misleading wherever the question of women was concerned. She and Madame Bodichon and their friends built firm foundations and it is not only Girton College that owes them thanks, but all institutions working for the education of girls. Yet those pioneers who started the College could have made little headway without students, and perhaps Girton owes even more to those parents who allowed daughters to improve their profound ignorance for no apparent reason, and thus made plain the need for girls' schools as well as colleges. The earlier efforts of

* Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net.
† Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d. net.

Queen's College, London, and the Cheltenham Ladies' College, however counted much in the struggle for the intellectual enfranchisement of women, and Newnham at Cambridge followed close on the lead of Girton at Hitchin and Cambridge, while early efforts at Oxford must not be ignored.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Chatterbox Company Ltd. have now issued their 66th, 68th and 43rd annual volumes of *Chatterbox*, *The Prize* and *Leading Strings*.* They are books with reputations of long standing and well deserved, since they have not rested on their laurels, but have moved with the times in keeping their material up-to-date, with the best of its various kinds. Stories for young children are among the most difficult to write, but parents can still rely on the good tales of the Chatterbox company. The current volumes are well illustrated as well as being full of lively and various stories appealing to many kinds of children, but all written with simple directness.

Mr. Laurence Housman and Mr. C. H. K. Marten have collaborated with great success in their book for children,† *The Long Journey: The Tale of our Past*. It is definitely not a history text-book, but a book of stories gathered from the world's history of all times and places which will delight the child who loves stories. They are written simply and briefly; with the result that there are no wearisome descriptions, but instead immediate local colour and effect. There are tales of the ancient world, tales of mediæval and modern times from many lands; stories of soldiers, monks and prophets, kings and queens, travellers and investors, and all the types of people who have helped to make the world throughout the centuries. It is a book of both peace and war, as indeed it must be if it would show the evolution of civilisation; but as the book closes with the story of The Christ of the Andes, the reader is left with the feeling that history should teach that progress and peace must walk together. The book contains short poems as well as stories, and numerous delightful illustrations gathered from many divers sources.

* *Chatterbox*. 5s. net.; *The Prize*. 2s. 6d. net.; *Leading Strings* (The Baby's Annual). 2s. 6d. net.

† Blackwell. 7s. 6d. net.

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