


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Journal of Indian History
1932 - April - 11 - 31



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V2m, N22
N32.11.1
934.4.

Volume XI, Part I

APRIL, 1932

Serial No. 31

JOURNAL
OF
INDIAN HISTORY

(Published three times a year)

30

EDITOR

RAO BAHADUR S. KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR,
M.A., HON. PH.D., F.R. HIST. S., etc.

*Honorary Correspondent, Archaeological Survey of India
Fellow of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*


ASSOCIATE EDITOR

C. S. SRINIVASACHARYAR, M.A.,
Professor, Annamalai University.

25 JUL 1932

PRINTED BY

G. S. PRESS: LINO PRINTERS,
MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS.



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THE MANAGER,
Journal of Indian History,
'Śrīpadam,'
143, Brodies Road, Mylapore,
MADRAS, S

Journal of Indian History

Pieter Van Den Broeke at Surat

(1620-29)

By

W. H. MORELAND, C. S. I., C. I. E.

1623

January. On 6th, I despatched the pinnace *Heusden* to Admiral Dedel with all the remaining cotton goods for Batavia. On 27th, I moved into the new house, hired for four years for 1,250 mahmūdīs a year from Pahlawān Safīd.

February. On 14th, the assistant, Cornelis Arentssen, arrived with the caravan of 358 bales from Agra, in 61 days' march. On 26th, 'at night, fell from the house and broke my arm, after I had suitably entertained the English, at the instance of Anthony's and Sebolt's wives'.¹ Saw a dwarf, fully grown and well-proportioned, only 32 inches high.

March. On 12th, rain fell, to the general surprise. On 20th, despatched a caravan to Agra by way of Burhānpur. On 26th, two English ships sailed for Mocha, over-loaded with freight goods. One of them, the *Whale*, heeled over² and sank about three kos off shore, with the loss of about 38 men. The vessel contained large quantities of Persian silk, indigo and cotton goods, as well as much private trade.

June (April and May blank). On 12th, the Gujarāt ship which had sailed for Achin 20 days before, returned in consequence of bad weather. A ship arrived from Catsini in Arabia Felix, belonging to the King, who sent me a letter with a piece of cloth. On 22nd, 'I dreamed of many great pearls, and that I was fighting hand to hand with my uncle, Hans van den Burgh, with knives. God Almighty knows what this signifies; hope all well'.

1. Anthony Classen and Sebolt Wonderar were two factors on the Dutch staff in Surat.

2. See *EF.* ii. *passim*.

On 24th, 'there was a battle³ between Abdulla Khān, General of Sultān Khurram, and Safl Khān, Nāhir Khān, Abdulla Bab [?Bābū Khān] and other *umra*, Generals of the King, his father. It took place about three kos from Ahmadābād, which Abdulla Khān intended to take by force. But for the confusion caused by one of his elephants, which was wounded by a musket ball, he would certainly have won the battle, although the King's forces were quite three to one; but, owing to the elephant, he was defeated, and not more than 2,000 men out of 5,000 escaped'.

July. On 4th, Abdulla Khān entered Surat with about 700 horse. They plundered many houses, and tortured all the King's adherents.

August. [On 26th, van den Broeke again fell out of the window of his house. The passage is very obscure, but there had been a party, at which President Rastell was present, and van den Broeke got drunk. Apparently he had a very narrow escape of being killed].

September. On 16th, a royal force, about 3,000 strong, under Bahādur Khān, came from Ahmadābād to take over the fort at Surat, which was held for Prince Khurram.

October. On 1st, the *Schoonhoven*, sent out by the Amsterdam Chamber, arrived from Holland, along with the English *William*. On 3rd, senior factor Wolbrandt Gelynsen de Jongh⁴ landed. The voyage had taken eight months and 20 days; Dirck Everssen was master; the ship was of 600 tons' burden, with 20 guns, and brought a handsome capital. The pinnace *Naerden*, which had also been consigned to me, was wrecked on the voyage, but the crew, the cash, and some trifles were saved by the *Schoonhoven*. In all, six ships had left Holland,—the *Wapen van Enckhuysen*, *Leyden*, and *Mackerel* for Batavia, and the pinnace *Memelick* [Medemblick] for the Coromandel Coast. The *William* brought me a letter from our Directors, who had been on an embassy in England. On 7th, the pinnace *Heusden* arrived from Ormuz, in company with an English pinnace. On 12th, the *Vreede* and *Wesp* arrived from Batavia with a rich cargo, senior factor Claes Pieterssen Puynder being President. The voyage lasted two months and three days. On 13th, the pinnace or frigate

3. For this battle and the subsequent movements see Introduction to EF. ii p. xxviii. Safl Khān became Nawāb Safl Khān.

4. This factor subsequently wrote a long description of Gujarāt, some extracts from which were printed in this *Journal* (April, 1925); the full Dutch text was issued by the Linschoten Society in 1929.

Broach, arrived from Broach, where it had been built. On 22nd, our 80 bales of cotton goods were passed through the customhouse to everybody's astonishment; the English were very much annoyed. The same day, the four English ships reached Swally with five prizes—two belonging to Surat, one to Dabhol, one to Chaul, and one to Malabar. It was understood that the English had intimated to the Surat authorities that they were resolved to make reprisals⁵ on the ships in case their claims to compensation and better treatment were not satisfied.

On 28th, factor Francisco Pelsaert arrived from Agra with cotton goods, etc. On 31st, the fort was handed over to Khān Azam; the garrison were allowed to evacuate it with their baggage. In the afternoon the young Prince Bulāq⁶ son of the murdered Prince Khusraw, with his grandfather Khān Azam, arrived from Rānder, where he had halted for eight days with 18,000 horse and 20,000 foot. In the evening, the Governor, Safl Khān, sent for me to consult me about the English affair, and pressed me to sail next morning and rescue the King's ships from the English, so as to restore the credit of the Dutch, which had been so much injured by the depredations of the *Samson*. I excused myself on the ground that I had no commission⁷ from the Governor-General, authorising such action. This answer did not satisfy him; he said it was plain enough now that we were all one people, and he forced me to write a letter to the English.

November. On 3rd, we, like the English, were confined closely to our house by Safl Khān's servants, and guards were posted round the house. The same day he brought in five Dutch sailors and 20 Englishmen, who had gone some way inland from the ships. On 4th, I heard that our people in Broach were also closely confined, after the warehouses, chests and cases had been broken open and an inventory of the goods made. The same day the factor Hendrick Adrianssen, who arrived from Cambay

5. A connected account of these reprisals will be found in EF. ii, Introduction, pp. xxixff.

6. The family name of the Prince, who was officially styled Shāhzāda Dāwar Bakhsh.

7. From these and subsequent entries it will be realised that van den Broeke had a difficult part to play in this matter of reprisals. Naturally he was not sorry to see his commercial rivals in trouble, but on the other hand oppression of the English might form a dangerous precedent, to be applied later on to the Dutch. He was accused of duplicity by both sides; but all that need be said here is that his diplomacy resulted in a substantial improvement in the position of the Dutch in Surat.

with goods, was also arrested. On 6th I learnt from Francisco Pelsaert, who was on board the ships, that he had heard from Khoja Jalāluddīn that the English factor Bangham had said openly to the Governor, 'However aloof the Dutch may keep, we and they are at one.' The same day the English sent for All Bassa, Khoja Jalāluddīn, Khoja Nāsirī and Mīr Jān Muhammād to negotiate with them. On 16th, the *Vreede* and *Wesp* were sent to Persia with adequate capital. On 17th, the English again sent for the four Moslem merchants, but nothing important resulted. On 21st, news that factor Johan van der Dussen had died at Burhanpur. On 22nd, the English came to terms with the Surat Moslems. 'I was summoned by the Governor Saflī Khān, who gave us betel, and permission to ship our goods as we wished. He sent me a suitable meal'. On 25th, 'I was again summoned by the Nawāb, who in a friendly way told me not to take it ill that our goods had been detained for so long, and our house guarded and watched so closely; the only reason was that the English themselves had persistently given out that we were at one with them, and now he saw the difference clearly. He bestowed a *pamrī*⁸ on me, and gave us permission to trade in freedom at all places.' On 27th, Rastell, the English President, came on land; The Governor bestowed on him a horse and a gold *pamrī*, 'which afterwards came to cost him dear enough' This day our goods were put on board for all destinations.

December. On 19th, I sent everyone on board with the remaining goods; and on 21st, I followed to despatch the ship. On 24th, everything being settled, I returned to Surat. On 25th the *Schoonhoven*, with the frigate *Broach*, sailed for Batavia, fully laden with cotton goods—500 bales worth here 150,000 guilders. On 27th, the English *William* and *Reformation* sailed for Persia with freight-goods, and also much private trade (pepper, cotton goods, drugs, etc), 'by which the English Company's servants enrich themselves from the least to the greatest.'

1624

January. On 7th, returned on board the *Heusden*, which I had laden for Holland. The English pressed me to keep her back till the 10th, so that the *Dolphin* could sail in her company, because the sea is now so full of pirates. The Council sanctioned this, in

8. Light wraps, at this period usually woven in Kashmir, which were commonly given as presents

order not to give any occasion for discontent. On 11th, heard that Abraham van Uffelen, Director at Masulipatam, and nearly all the factors, had been arrested;⁹ the remainder were closely confined in the factory; and the crew of one of the *Medemblick's* boats had been seized and placed in irons. It was said that van Uffelen had been most cruelly dragged to prison head downwards through the streets. The Moslems here said this was due to our having seized their ships; the English said it was because we had seized some Portuguese craft in the roadstead, thus infringing the freedom of the port. In the afternoon visited the English President to tell him we could wait no longer, and our ship was ordered to sail tomorrow. He promised me faithfully that [*the Dolphin*] would be ready in two days. On 14th the King's ambassador visited me to ask who had really seized the ships of Gujarāt, Chaul, Dīu and Goa. I answered, to put it briefly, that he should put that question not to me but to the Moslems of Surat, who knew better than I did. On 19th, the *Heusden* and the English *Dolphin* left the anchorage, and next day they sailed. The *Heusden* had Hendrick Adrianssen as senior factor and Jan Gilbertson Boon as master; the cargo was worth 97,000 guilders here in Surat. [The printed text adds: 'This was the first Dutch ship to sail for Holland from these parts'.]

February. On 6th, the English *Globe* sailed for Batavia; sent a letter by her to the Governor-General. On 16th, our caravan started for Burhānpur. On 19th, the *Vreede* and *Wesp* returned to Swally from Persia, having left all the goods in charge of the factor Mibasse at Gombroon. There was no sign of any Portuguese shipping. Under my orders, no instructions having been received from Visnicht, the senior factor, they brought large quantities of freight, and also Dominigh, brother of Anthonny's wife.¹⁰ On 20th, I went on board to arrange for discharging the cargo. On 24th, our caravan arrived from Ahmadābād, with 860 bales of indigo, cotton goods, etc. On 28th, the factor Adam Classen arrived with the caravan from Agra, 204 camels and 408 bales of Biāna indigo, cotton goods, drugs, etc.

March. On 1st, our goods from Agra, Ahmadābād, Cambay and Broach were all sealed [at the customhouse]. The same day a *farmān* came from the King to the effect 'that all the English,

9. See *EF.* ii *passim* for this affair.

10. Presumably Anthony Classen, mentioned above.

great and small, should be put in fetters until they restored all the goods belonging to the Moslems of Surat, Chaul and other places; further that they should then be chased out of the country'. In the afternoon the English house was surrounded, the inhabitants arrested, the goods inventoried and confiscated—also in Ahmadābād, Broach, and everywhere. On 12th, the *Vreede* sailed for Holland with cargo worth 125,000 guilders here, consisting of indigo and cotton goods—master, Jan Franssen, and Steersman, Jorst Janssen.

On 22nd, the English *William* and *Blessing* arrived from Persia. Immediately on hearing that their people were prisoners, they surrounded the three Moslem vessels which were ready to sail for the Red Sea; 'but when they saw the Prince's [i.e., Dutch] flags, which, at urgent request, I had sent with two men to each vessel, merely in order that business should not be hindered further, and also to show¹¹ that the false reports given out by the English at the time they seized the Moslem ships—they said that we were at one with them, and stood together with them, but the facts were now seen to be entirely different.' The same day, I sent the senior factor Francisco Pelsert with a caravan of spice for Agra, to take charge there as Chief, in place of Wouter Heuten, deceased. On 24th, I went on board the *Wesp* to despatch her. The English sent me a protest, which I answered next day to the best of my ability. On 25th, after despatching the *Wesp* I returned to Surat, partly in order to inform the Moslems of the English plans; when I did so, they were exceedingly surprised, the more so that President Rastell had already given them passes. They asked for a further pass, which was given to them without a seal. On 29th, the *Wesp* sailed for Batavia with a cargo of cotton goods worth more than 100,000 guilders. Learned that the Moslem ships had sailed on 27th, and that the English ships had moved from the river's mouth to Swally.

April. On 1st, I sent Adam Classen Verhussen to be factor in charge of the new factory at Ahmadābad and Cambay. On 27th, a Moslem ship of Surat left for Achin with a pass from the English. On 29th, the English *William* and *Blessing* left Swally, presumably for Batavia or the Coromandel Coast. In the afternoon, heard that the English generally were taken out of fetters, but still confined to their house.

11. The text is ungrammatical; the meaning is 'to show the falsity of the reports'.

May. On 3rd, the English President, along with his Council, was released, and sent to his house, which was still closely guarded, both inside and out.

June. On 10th and 11th, heavy rain fell, for the first time this year.

July. On 14th, the English regained their freedom, and their property.

August. On 19th, proceeded to inspect the factories at Broach, Ahmadābād, Cambay and Sarkhej, because my engagement was to expire this year,¹² and I required personal knowledge in order to give a satisfactory account to the Directors.

September. On 9th, I returned to Surat. On 11th, a Surat ship, the *Bigmy* [? *Begami*] arrived richly laden from Jidda. Heard that another ship, the *Romanny* [? *Rumni*], which had sailed from Dīū on account of the Moslems of Ahmadābād, Cambay and Surat, had reached Goa,¹³ rumoured to bring more than 2,500,000 rupees (of 24 stivers) in gold, silver and goods. There was general rejoicing at the news. On 12th, a *farmān* came from Khwāja Abul Hasan, the King's Secretary, ordering that all the English should be set free. On 15th, we heard that two 'Christian' ships were at anchor off the river. On 19th, Adrian Pallinch, senior factor of the *Dordrecht*, landed without orders,—surprising conduct, because disputes sometimes arise with the people on shore. The ship brought a rich cargo. On 23rd, I went on board. On reaching the strand, I saw that the other ship was the English *Blessing*, which had wintered off Cape Ras-al-hadd. They told us they had fought with four strong Portuguese galleons, and that the *William* had sailed for Batavia. On 25th, returned to Surat.

October. On 5th, the *New Bantam*, *South Holland*, and *Wesp* arrived from Batavia in company with the English *William*, bringing a rich cargo of spices and cash. Senior factor Harman [should be Albert] Becker was President of the Council, and carried the flag on the *South Holland* pending my orders. On 6th, I went on board to decide about the flag. On 18th, the English *Thomas* and *Eagle* arrived from England; Thomas Kerridge, formerly president here, was on board as factor. They had sailed under the command of John Weddell, on the *Royal James*, but the other ships had

12. He does not mention the fact that his engagement was extended.

13. Goa is probably a slip for Goga or Gogo, the port for Cambay.

remained behind to search for the *Royal Anne*, which sailed fully laden from Batavia¹⁴ for England about a year ago, but near the Cape had been forced to make for the Comoro Islands, where she had broken from her anchors a few days before. On 24th, the two [English] pinnaces arrived; and on 27th, the *Royal James* and *Star*. The pinnacle *Eagle* was at once sent to search for the *Anne* along the coast.

November. On 6th, an Englishman was accidentally shot by the sentry over the Dutch tent at Swally. On 19th, went on board to despatch the ships for Persia. In the presence of Captain Brown [of the *William*] and the other English representative, I examined the man who had shot the Englishman; we found that no blame attached to anyone. On 14th, I appointed Harman [Albert] Becker to command the fleet on this voyage; and ordered the *South Holland* and *New Bantam* to leave the anchorage, in order that the Governor Ishāq Beg¹⁵ should come on board; he was procrastinating in the Moslem fashion, while awaiting his [?] caravan from the Deccan. On 15th, Ishāq Beg embarked with all his plunder on the *Dordrecht*, which I got ready for him. Next day this ship and the *Wesp* also left the anchorage; took a friendly leave of our people, and then of the English Commander, Weddell, who was very anxious to sail in our company, if we would wait for two days. Commander Becker asked me to see the Presidents in Surat about this, and find out if the delay was likely to be long; accordingly returned at once to Surat. On 17th I went to the English factory, and was promised an answer next day. On 18th, both the English Presidents [i.e., Rastell and Kerridge] undertook that their ships should sail on Friday. Gave orders to the fleet that, if the English did not sail on that day, they should proceed. On 22nd, all the leading merchants of the town came and besought me very earnestly to detain our ships for two days more for Ishāq Beg's goods, which would be put on board in the morning without fail; 'for very weighty reasons found it good to go on board and detain the ships'. On 23rd, I landed again, having seen that the English were preparing to sail with us, each under his own flag. On 26th, the fleet sailed for Ormuz. The Dutch ships were: *South Holland*,

14. See EF. iii, *passim*, for the misfortunes of the *Anne*.

15. Apparently this is the ex-Governor of Surat, who is mentioned frequently in EF. i, ii. The text says he was expecting his 'castle' from the Deccan; apparently the word is a slip for *Rāfla*, i.e., caravan.

William Jacopssen Coster, master, and Sebolt Wonderar, senior factor, 46 guns: *New Bantam*, Dirck Classen, master, 44 guns: *Dordrecht*, Simon Janssen Kuyn, master 26 guns: *Wesp* [? Garch] Hyde, master, 22 guns: crews and ammunition according to the usual standards for our ships in India. The English were: *Royal James*, John Weddell, Commander: *Jonas*, master, *Clevenger: Star*, master, Rowe: *Eagle*, master, Johnson: also two sloops equipped pinnacle fashion, the *Look-out* and *Teck al* [sic: the actual names were *Scout* and *Spy*]... 'May God Almighty give them a prosperous voyage, and victory over their enemies'.

December. On 1st, the entire English fleet returned, bringing no letter from our ships. They said merely that our ships had parted from them off Damān, because they had to return with the *Eagle* and two prizes she had taken. On 7th, the six English ships put to sea, with what object I could not learn. They put 20 guns on one of the prizes; the other was lost when entering the river, and nothing was saved except 35 Arab horses. On 21st, received a letter from Francisco Pelsert at Agra, telling that 'Prince Sultān Khurram had been routed by his brother Sultān Parvīz and Mahābat Khān, with the loss of about 8000 men. Khurram had brought his elder brother's army to the point of flight, but one of his elephants, wounded in the leg by a musket ball, turned back owing to the pain, and threw his master's army into disorder, so that victory fell to the side of Parvīz. Khurram and his General Abdulla Khan escaped with about 2,000 men: the rest, including a son of the Khān Khānān and the children of other nobles, were promptly beheaded, and the heads set on stakes on the battlefield for a lasting memorial'.

The same day news came that a fleet of Portuguese frigates, of 90 sail,¹⁶ from Goa, Chaul, Dīū and other places, had reached Cambay with the following goods:—

From Goa, 36 vessels, containing 130 pieces ivory, two chests *ganla*, or scented goods, 38 chests (each 5 maunds) silk, two candles wax, 10 maunds white paint, one maund China-root, 10 pots Lisbon oil. From Dabhol, two vessels, containing 8893 pieces ivory, 18 chests amber, 10 chests cloves, 5 chests vermilion.

16. The details given account for only 46 vessels, and may be incomplete; but a certain number would be fighting frigates not carrying cargo. I have not traced the word *ganla*. The number of pieces of ivory from Dabhol is suspiciously large, and possibly one of the digits is superfluous.

From *Chaul*, eight vessels, containing 189 bales ivory, 88 large pieces [? of ivory], 33 chests (each 2½ maunds) tortoiseshell, 10 maunds *nakasser*,¹⁷ 103 bahārs tin, 143 pieces tin, two chests eagle-wood, 37 chests porcelain, one chest white damask, 10 pots honey, 26 bahārs sandalwood, 35 pipes wine, 10 chests alum, two bladders civet, 88 chests other goods called *fotsi* [or *totsi*]. 'Formerly, before our coming, these ships used to come three times a year, with more than 300 vessels in each fleet; but now they come only once, with so small a total and so little merchandise'.

On 28th, the *William* and *Blessing* returned to the roadstead, having cruised until they judged that the whole of the Portuguese forces had gone to Ormuz.

1625.

January. On 23rd, there was a sharp, but short, shower of rain,—a warning against carelessly leaving the Company's goods in the open air.

February. On 25th, 'a Thursday, when through God's blessing, I reached the age of forty', the caravan of 450 camels from *Agra via Burhānpur*, in charge of junior factor Cornelis Arentssen; it left *Agra* on 14th December, so that it took two months and 11 days, because the country was 'full of war'. It brought 600 bales *Biāna* indigo, 264 bales refined saltpetre, and 36 bales cotton goods and drugs. The same day the English *Blessing* and *William* sailed for England, with Thomas Rastell, the President, on board; the cargo was *Sarkhej* indigo, *Malabar* pepper (bought here at 16½ *māhmūdīs* the maund of 30½ *Holland* pounds), cotton goods, and a large quantity of cotton at 100 and 110 *māhmūdīs* the candy of 600 *Holland* pounds.

March. Between 1st and 10th, 15 *Malabar* vessels arrived here, bringing chiefly cocoanuts, coir ropes, opium [*sic*], etc. On 10th, the King's ship *Bigmy* [? *Begami*] was burnt; she had gone from *Goga* to *Dlū* to lade for *Mocha*. On 16th, heard that the Dutch and English fleets were off the river. On 17th, went on board, 'where I learned how valiantly our and the English fleets, after three days' fighting, had routed and put to flight the Portuguese armada¹⁸ of eight powerful great galleons and 18 frigates.

17. *Nakesar*, the flowers of *Acacia Fannesiana*, from which perfume was distilled. I do not recognise *fotsi* or *totsi*.

18. See *EF.* iii, Introduction, pp. xff. The word 'volunteers' points to the Portuguese practice of increasing the war fleet by vessels provided by subscription.

The Commander, Albert Becker, was killed by a large iron ball in the first onset, and was buried at Gombroon. One powerful Portuguese galleon, that of the volunteers of Goa, and elsewhere mounted 70 brass guns, and was vice-admiral. The Admiral¹⁹ on which Dom Nunis Botelho was Admiral, mounted 64 guns; the others accordingly. They came at our ships most valiantly, just two days before our fleets intended to sail: directly we were aware of them, we weighed our anchors, and in God's name went into the midst of the enemy. There was smart firing on both sides; the Portuguese were in such a hurry that they fired many shots without ball'. Our ships brought 412 bales of Persian silk, and an Ambassador from the King to the State [*Holland*] and the Prince of Orange; the ambassador had 100 bales of silk for his expenses. 'There was much shooting when I went on board, which was not very satisfactory, seeing how small was the supply of powder'. On 22nd, I went with Persian Ambassador to *Surat*. He was received with great honour by the leading men, and saluted from the castle; most people came half way to *Swally* to receive us. He was lodged in a large and fine house on the river. On 30th, I sent senior factor Hendrick Adrianssen Vapour, with a cassowary bird from *Amboyna*, on an embassy to the Emperor *Jahāngīr* to obtain a new *farmān*; he went with the caravan by way of *Ahmadābād*, at the urgent request of the Governor *Safī Khān*. The bird was much talked about; 'everybody wanted the honour of having it, in order to obtain the King's favour'. On 31st, the factor Jan Mibasse presented me with a Persian sheep with four horns.

April. On 5th, the English sent a small pinnace to *Socotra*, and on to the *Comoros*, to warn the ships from Europe of the Portuguese force. On 19th, I went on board to despatch the ships. On 20th, the English got news from *Dlū* that the *Anne* was off *Mocha* in great distress; thereupon they sent the *Jonas* to her assistance, and a factor to visit the Pacha, with what object I could not learn. Late in the evening President Kerridge warned me that the ship would sail early next day; he said his letters made no mention whatever of our people, which was hard to believe. On 21st and 22nd, was engaged in closing the books and preparing the invoice etc. In the evening the Persian Ambassador came on

19. Here the two meanings of the word 'admiral' occur in the same sentence; originally it meant the principal ship, not the officer in command.

board. On the *Dordrecht* I sent to the Directors of the Company a goat with one horn which Muqarrab Khān, the King's Treasurer, had sent me as a curiosity from Agra. On 23rd, the *Dordrecht* and *Wesp* sailed for Home with a rich cargo, along with the English *Star*; our Persian Ambassador was on the *Dordrecht*, and the English one on the *Star*. The *South Holland* and *New Bantam* also sailed with cargo for Batavia, along with the English *James*, *Eagle* and two frigates. On the flagship, *South Holland*, Sebolt Wonderar was senior factor, and Symon Janssen Kuyn, master. I appointed senior factor Constantyn Alleman to sail for home on the *Dordrecht*, accompanied by his wife Maria Gomes; Claes Peterssen Puynder was senior factor, and William Jacopssen Coster was master. On the *Wesp* Jarch Rynnierssen was senior factor, and Dirck Classen was master. On 28th, I sent the senior factors, Adam Classen to Ahmadābād, and Wollebrandt Gelynsen to Broach, to take charge of the Company's business at those places.

May. On 12th, all the Malabar vessels which had traded here were driven back by a great storm; the wind continued to blow strongly from the south-west, so they were compelled to winter here. On 25th, two Portuguese frigates from Balsar for Cambay were wrecked here; five were lost on one, and nobody was saved from the other. On 27th, 'at night, there was a furious hurricane in Surat; the wind blew from all points, and did great damage—trees uprooted, houses destroyed or unroofed,—so that the inhabitants said nothing like it had been seen before. The great Moslem ships in the river, though strongly moored, were driven on land high and dry. About 40 were killed in Surat and 25 in Broach. It was noteworthy that the storm did not extend beyond Broach'.

June. On 10th, heard that Malik Ambar, the Deccan General, had seized Dabhol. Seven Portuguese vessels which had sailed from Goa for Chinna²⁰ were driven back by bad weather off Cape Comorin; three reached Chaul in great distress, the others had not been heard of. On 28th, I received a letter from the Persian Ambassador at Golconda, begging me to supply two ships to carry the King's goods from Chaul to Ormuz, because he was in great fear of the Portuguese; gave him a suitable reply.

20. This may mean China, but it is doubtful if Goa was in a position to send so many ships there; the reference may be to some small place on the East Coast, where 'Chinna' forms part of the name of some minor ports.

September. (July and August blank). On 16th, heard that seven Portuguese galleons from Muskat had sailed for Bombay, to watch for the Dutch and English ships; but, since it was still too early in the season, they got what they deserved. First they were separated by a storm, and then one was driven ashore and lost near Damān, while the others had not yet been heard of. The wrecked ship had 55 guns, which I hear were subsequently recovered; many of the crew were lost in the boats or on rafts. On 17th, President Kerridge and I agreed to send some native craft to sea with letters to warn our ships against the Portuguese. On 21st, a Moslem ship arrived from Mocha; they had sighted no vessels near Damān. They said the English in Mocha had difficulties with the Turks, and consequently the *Jonas* and *Anne* were still there. On 23rd, heard that another Portuguese galleon had been wrecked off Bombay. Another Moslem ship arrived in safety. 'In the evening, there was a banyan boy having intercourse with a bitch openly in front of our door, and before that with a calf. Some boys do it, one after another, in broad day light, with she-asses, while the Moslems stand round and laugh. Our servants wanted to beat the boy for his misconduct, but his mother took that exceedingly ill, and abused them'.

On 27th, the Turkish Ambassador from the Pacha of Yemen in Arabia came to visit me; he brought a letter asking us, with many compliments, to resume trade and come to Mocha. Heard that Dabhol had been recovered by the craft of the ex-Governor Āga Raza. 'His wife had remained in the town with a handsome young daughter, because she had been born and bred there. Having got some of the inhabitants on her side, she made friends with the new Governor, and offered him her daughter in marriage, there being only *sondido*²¹ to give. The brute tried to be rather mean, but such a rich girl—[sic in MS.] It was agreed that after two days he should come to a certain place, a mosque (or temple), with only one or two attendants, to be married by a priest or Mullah after their fashion. Meanwhile this loose woman had [?] armed everyone;²² and as soon as the Governor came to be married, he was attacked and beheaded. Then, the alarm being given, she made herself master of the town with the help of the inhabitants and soldiers, with whom she had arranged—noteworthy as a valiant undertaking for a woman'. On 28th, the English

21. For this word see note under June, 1621.

22. This is the apparent meaning of a very obscure clause.

Jonas and *Anne* arrived along with the small pinnace which had been sent to the Comoro Islands, but had got no further than the Arabian coast.

October. On 2nd, heard that three Dutch ships from Mocha lay off the river. On 4th, went on board. The ships were the *Golden Lion* and *Heusden* from Amsterdam, and the *Walcheren* for account of Zeeland. Pieter Pieterssen was senior factor, and Jan Gilbertssen master, on the *Golden Lion*; Anthonny Coetermans was senior factor, and Tuym Isbrantssen master, on the *Heusden*; Gerret de Jager was factor, and Sent Symonssen master (replacing Panckras deceased), on the *Walcheren*. The cargo was over 650,000 guilders, chiefly in gold and gold ducats, also rix dollars, reals-of-eight, and Holland dollars, with little merchandise. On [a blot, ? 13th,] four Portuguese galleons with some frigates and a Moslem ship arrived off the river prepared for war. I at once warned our ships, and decided to land all the money for safety. In the afternoon heard the almost incredible news that six more galleons from Goa were off Chaul; four of them were newly arrived from Portugal, the other two had been in last year's battle, and had been sent to Goa to refit. The English President sent two factors to ask for help for the *Anne*; I at once gave them an order on the ships for 25 barrels of gunpowder and 25 men. On 14th, 'when the galleons with 13 frigates were off the anchorage, Jacob Mahieussen and Jan Mibasse, bringing all the gold and ducats to Surat, met on the road nine or ten Portuguese armed with muskets. If the Portuguese had been braver, they could have got the rich booty of over 200,000 guilders in gold from our two men, who were unarmed, especially as their frigate was close by in the river, only three musket shots away—undoubtedly a great bit of luck for our Company. In the evening, I sent the factor Wollebrant with some other factors in Moslem dress, and 25 horsemen, to the waterside to guard the rest of the treasure'. On 15th, 16th and 17th, the Portuguese were trying to enter the anchorage. I sent the factors with some Moslem soldiers to the waterside in case of need. In the afternoon heard that three ships were off Navsari. The Portuguese had left anchorage, presumably to join their three other ships, which were said to have come from Goa. 'The Portuguese Admiral, Don Nunez Botelho, sent an envoy to the Governor of the Surat fort with a letter addressed to the Commanders of the English and Dutch ships, saying that if they would leave the anchorage, he would allow them to do so in safety; otherwise, he requested that the Governor would [a blot; ? drive]

us out, and allow us no provisions'. Heard that at midday President Kerridge with his Council had boarded the Dutch ships to discuss whether they should pursue the Portuguese or not; our people replied they could decide nothing without my orders.

On 19th, people from Navsari said that three ships—either Dutch or English—had fought vigorously with the four Portuguese galleons, and then put to sea. President Kerridge came with his Council to visit us: agreed to go on board at once, and send the ships to help those three vessels. On 20th, the ships started to cruise to Bombay or Sanjan. The same day news came from the Mogul Court that an Ambassador had been sent by Shāh Abbās, King of Persia; 'hearing this, the Mogul gave orders that he should halt at Kābul until summoned. The Ambassador, notwithstanding the King's prohibition, sent his cousin to the court with a few trifles that were acceptable to the Mogul, who enquired after the health of his brother Shāh Abbās. The other replied that, thank God, he was perfectly well, but he asks your Majesty for three fortresses, namely Tatta, Bakkar and Multān. On this the King was so angered that he had the ambassador's cousin beaten with shoes so terribly that he had to be dragged out for dead'.

November. On 3rd, our three ships returned with the two English ships and the *Royal James*, having heard nothing of the enemy. On 4th, I went on board to try and arrange another cruise to Bombay, where I understood the Portuguese galleons were lying, because I learned that the *New Bantam* and *Good Fortune*, with the English *Bear*, had sailed from Bantam in company with the *James*, very weak in crews, powder and water: failed to arrange this. On 6th, these three ships, under Frederick Kitssiens,²³ reached the anchorage in safety; they had sighted the galleons to leeward near Bombay, but offered the excuse [for not fighting] that they had no water. On 14th, the English beached the *Anne* because she was leaking so much; she was refloated next day with the help of our carpenters. On 17th, I went to the English factory; it was decided that the ships for Persia should sail on 25th instant. The question of making a binding agreement was postponed. On 22nd, all the Moslems of the town met regarding the capture by Kitssiens of their Malabar vessel, containing their goods from Cambay, which had been brought into the customhouse. The vessel was first captured by the English *James*,

23. Spelt Kistgens in E.A. iii.

and was then abandoned by her crew; this was the reason that Kitssiens burnt her. On 29th, despatched the ships for Persia, having taken on board all the freight-goods which were at the water-side. On 30th the English pinnace *Falcon* arrived. She had sailed with the other ships from England, but near the Comoro Islands had been driven by storms to Cape Comorin, whence she had to coast. Near Goa she took a Portuguese vessel laden with cables for the galleons—'which came exceedingly handy'.

December. On 4th, the ships sailed for Ormuz, viz, *Good Fortune*, *New Bantam*, *Golden Lion*, *Walcheren*, *Bear*, and *Heusden*, and the English *James*, *Jonas*, *Anne*, *Falcon*; in all ten ships, well furnished with men, ammunition, etc.

(To be continued).

Half a Century of the Maratha Navy

(Calcutta University Readership Lectures.)

BY

SURENDRANATH SEN, M.A., PH.D., B. LITT.

LECTURE III.

Kanhoji Angria—1698—1729.

By the treaty or convention of 1713 Angria was obliged to let all ships belonging to Bombay, Madras, Bengal and the subordinate British settlements sail freely but the Bombay authorities also undertook to prevent any improper use of their flag by alien vessels. In 1717 Kanhoji's officers seized the *Success* a boat freighted by Gobardhandas, the Company's broker at Bombay. The vessel sailed under British colours and Boone demanded restitution. Angria, however, protested that the owner of the captured ship was not a British subject and the vessel, therefore, was not entitled to any immunity under the existing treaty. Without admitting the validity of this argument Boone permitted the broker to try private persuasion and a ransom was offered for the ship and its cargo. Kanhoji at first rejected the offer but afterwards agreed to make a gift of the ship as a token of friendship in consideration of a present of ten horses and a loan of twenty thousand rupees. Accordingly the *Success* was delivered to a captain and two gallivats sent for the purpose but as Kanhoji retained the masts and guns Boone refused to make the stipulated present and Angria's agent returned disappointed. Naturally Kanhoji considered that he had been deliberately deceived and Boone protested that the agreement had not been loyally carried out by the other party. This did not ease the strained relations and matters came to a head next year.

Early in 1718 Kanhoji carried the Company's Surat boat into Kolaba and took out its cargo of timber. He was palpably in the wrong and his defence is weak and halting. He did indeed plead a previous understanding about the subject but the fact remains that he had appropriated British property without their consent. The English however decided to temporise and the council resolved that "on consideration that we are not in a very good condition, being so bare of ammunition, soldiers and seamen

to perform anything with our arms, it is agreed that the President expostulate the affair with him by letter, and endeavour by that means to bring him to reason and prevent if possible such insults for the future." It was on the 3rd of January that the Council had come to this decision, it again met nineteen days later to consider a fresh aggression on the part of Angria.

The *Robert*, a country boat, freighted by Mr. St. John Bennet was on its way from Tellichery to Bombay when it was seized by Kanhoji and carried into one of his ports. On the fifth of January the master of the ship sent intimation of his misfortune to the Bombay authorities from Vijayadurg, where apparently he and his colleagues were held prisoners. Mr. Boone and his fellow-councillors were still unprepared to strike and "it was unanimously agreed as the posture of our affairs at this juncture are so indifferent, that Santipee Sinay, a Purvoo of the Rt. Hon'ble Company's and an experienced man in the affairs of the country Government be sent down to him with the Governor's letter and that Capt. Henry Cornwall who is already at one of his ports about the ship *Success* have instructions given him to expostulate this action with Angria. Captain Cornwall's expostulations were of no avail and Kanhoji refused to deliver the ship *Robert* as it was the property of a Moor. He added "that the ships belonging to Bombay, Bengal or Madras shall not be molested by him but that if the English will freight on country shipping they must expect that he will make prize of them". Captain Cornwall informed the Council that Angria "uses the English prisoners very inhumanely by continually beating them with large bamboo to extort a confession that the said ship and goods belong to a Moor". The Council, therefore, decided to make a fresh effort to get the English prisoners released through the mediation of Ramji Kamathi, an influential Brahman trader of Bombay with whom Kanhoji had considerable financial transaction, without in any way committing the Government.

The capture of the *Robert* was followed by that of a Bengal ship, the *Otter*, Captain Dixon, and on the 5th April, 1718 the Bombay Council decided to break with Kanhoji. War was not formally declared but retaliatory measures were promptly taken. An agent of Kanhoji was trying to persuade the merchants of Surat to purchase his master's pass. The English Chief of Surat was requested to thwart his efforts; a trading Shihar, Khandarav by name, belonging to one Trimbakji Meggi, a subject of Kanhoji's was seized at Mahim and it was now Kanhoji's turn to protest. Nor was this the only grievance he had against the English. In a letter, dated the 27th April, Angria made an elaborate defence of

his own conduct and complained that the English had on two occasions at least acted in direct contravention of the treaty. "And as to what relates to this matter further," wrote he, "if we discourse of differences, Ujain Tindall was a servant here and with leave went to his house and is not returned, remaining there, and Antonio D'Mell, Portuguese, went also to Bombay to marry and was entertained in Your service. About these two I wrote five or seven times, yet nothing was effected; and seeing You thus wanting in the Treaty, I left off writing. What guns and powder I want Your Excellency is obliged (by the Treaty) to furnish me with on my paying for them, and when my occasions required them. I wrote to You, but You excused Yourself till the Europe ships should arrive. I now well understand that the friendship of the English proceeds from necessity and is dissembled, which is far from being pleasing to me."

It is not possible at this distance of time to adjudicate about the justice or otherwise of these charges and counter-charges, particularly as our information is practically one sided. Kanhoji's complaint about munition must be dismissed as unfounded as the English had definitely declined any such undertaking when the treaty was concluded. About the sailors Boone retorted that one was an inhabitant of Bombay and the other a Portuguese subject and they were at liberty to give up their employment if they found it irksome. Without further details about the subject it is difficult to say whether Boone's defence was as sound as plausible, for such cases were definitely contemplated by one of the articles of the convention of 1713. It appears that Kanhoji was wrong in keeping the cargo of the *Yacht* and the *ketch* after promising to restore the goods. But the case of the *Success*, the *Robert* and the *Otter* is not so clear. Khanhoji contented that alien ships hired or laden by the English were not entitled to his protection under the treaty and if this practice was permitted no native trader need buy his pass in future. Boone however argued—"Let the bottom be whose it will, the money lent on it is worth more than the ship." But the English had undertaken to "permit no ships or vessels whatever to wear English colours, but what belong to the subjects of English nation" and the three captured ships were apparently not owned by British subjects. But the unrestored cargo and the captured vessels afforded only the immediate excuse for war. The prosperity of Bombay and the future of British commerce depended largely if not solely on British ascendancy in Indian waters and it would be an idle dream so long as Kanhoji commanded the entrance of the Bombay harbour. The conflict was bound to take place sooner or later and Boone had been preparing himself for

the coming contest since his arrival at Bombay. Had he not been engaged in petty wars with two other chiefs of the coast, the Raja of Karwar and the ruler of Sawant Wari, the war would in all probability have broken out much earlier.

Long as the preparation had been the English fleet, as the sequel proved, was no match for Angria's armada. For one thing Bombay was not very well provided with naval experts and the command was often conferred on civilians who had no experience of the sea. The crew consisted mainly of lawless elements and discipline was not easy to maintain. Kanhoji enlisted his officers from all nationalities. Several Dutchmen had entered his service and if Clement Downing is to be credited some of the most notorious European pirates of the time willingly sought his employment. The exploits of the newly organised Bombay fleet under Weekes at Rairi and under Hamilton at Karwar had not certainly improved the morale of the crew, while the sailors of Kolaba had given a very good account of themselves in the late war against the Portuguese. Boone therefore wisely sought an ally against his formidable adversary. The most obvious person to be approached was Sambhaji of Kolhapur. Whether any alliance was actually proposed we do not know but as early as the 18th June the President suggested to Mr. George Taylor, Chief of Karwar, that he should inform Sambhaji that the English had no design against His Highness and they were prepared to lay down their arms as soon as the fortresses formerly belonging to the Raja of Kolhapur were restored to him. Technically the Portuguese were still at war with the chief of Kolaba and even in 1718 Kanhoji's fleet had engaged two Portuguese pals near Anjdiva. The two European nations could therefore be expected to make a common cause against their Indian enemy and Charles Boone proposed an alliance with the Government of Goa in June of that year. Although some specific terms were suggested in October by the General of the North, it does not appear that the Viceroy treated the matter seriously. Conde de Ericeira suspected the sincerity of the English and believed that they had helped Angria with arms and ammunition in his war against the Portuguese. Moreover he did not believe that Bombay possessed sufficient force for prolonged war and the alliance did not materialise until a new Viceroy Francisco Jose de Sampaio e Castro took charge of the Portuguese affairs in India.

Meanwhile war had been formally declared on the 17th June and the inhabitants of Bombay were strictly ordered "to forbear and desist from all manner of trade or dealings with Caernojee Angria or his people whether directly or indirectly." But hostilities had actually commenced six weeks earlier. Early in April Kan-

hoji had warned the Governor of Bombay that peace was at an end and his people would no longer be permitted free access to Angria's lands. He wrote. "By the power of our friendship on both sides trade has continued free, but now that is ceased the other is (*sic*), and as your people used to come into the rivers of my country, I will not consent to the same; therefore it is convenient that you give the information that no Galevat or person of Bombay enter or come into said rivers, for in case they do and have this advice, their lives are forfeited, for I will not dissemble, neither would I issue out this order without writing to Your Excellency, that no ill might happen to the innocent people who are the servants of God; for this reason it would be proper you should give them notice, and if not, you'll find my orders and Government will be to this purpose." Kanhoji was as good as his words and on the 7th of May Bombay learnt that he had carried out his threat and seized those Bombay boats that had ventured into his rivers in quest of wood. The Bombay fleet consisting of about twenty Gallivats were immediately despatched to the place of occurrence to retake the boats if possible, "to repel force by force if they were attacked" and to plunder Kanhoji's country if practicable. Thus began the war that continued without any break for three decades and eight years.

The English began their operations with desultory raids on the enemy's coast. These made but little impression as landing could not be always effected. In May and June the English squadron had apparently achieved some success having pillaged one of Angria's towns and brought a few prisoners. But an expedition sent under Captain Jonathan Stanton in July to fortify a small island in the neighbourhood of Bombay proved unsuccessful. The Captain attributed his failure to the cowardice of his men who refused to attempt a landing after experiencing one reverse only. In September is recorded an unimportant skirmish in which the English lost their head Subedar and about sixteen men, the enemy's loss was supposed to be more considerable. In October the people from the Bombay Gallivats landed at Colgaum and fought an action near the fort. The next month Boone himself assumed the chief command and an attempt was made to dislodge Angria's men from the strategical stronghold of Khanderi. The fleet under him was fairly strong. "It consisted of the *Addison* and *Dartmouth*, East India men, the *Victoria* frigate, the *Revenge* and *Defiance* grabs, the *Fame* galley, the *Hunter* ketch, two bombketches, and fortyeight gallivats". The Governor hoisted his flag on the *Addison* on the first of November and the squadron left for its destination the next day. Shortly afterwards

it was joined by the *Morrice* and the *Stanhope*, another East India man. Formidable as the fleet looked on paper the morale of the crew was not at its best and Boone was hardly competent to command an expedition of this character. According to Clement Downing, who served on this occasion, and Captain Alexander Hamilton, Boone counted a good deal on the local knowledge of Manuel de Castro, a Portuguese deserter from Kanhoji's fleet. After ineffectually bombarding the fort it was decided to land the sepoys and mariners simultaneously at two different parts of the island but the sepoys refused to land and the soldiers and mariners were repulsed by the garrison. Promise of pension and reward procured some forty volunteers but their gallant assault met with no better success. Angria's ships kept Khanderi well supplied with provision and powder and Boone perceived the futility of persisting in his attempt. He returned to Bombay after ineffectually bombarding Kolaba. The failure of this cherished project caused no little disappointment, and as is usual, failure was attributed to treachery. Manuel de Castro was banished to St. Helena and Ramji Kamathi, an influential Brahman of Bombay, was condemned to life long imprisonment. It is doubtful whether the Portuguese was guilty of a secret understanding with his former employer but it has been definitely established that the Brahman was unjustly punished, the incriminating letter having been proved a forgery.

Foiled at Kolaba and Khanderi, Boone sent the English fleet southward with the project of burning Kanhoji's *ghurabs* in the harbour of Gheria. But Kanhoji's good luck still prevailed, and while four of Angria's prizes were captured by the English fleet, it did not return unscathed, having lost a fireship which was blown up by the fire of an Angrian *Ghurab*.

These operations hardly affected the naval supremacy of Angria, for in January, 1719, his fleet boldly appeared before Bombay and the *Morrice* had to postpone its homeward journey no less than three times in fear of Kanhoji's *Ghurabs*.

But while everything was going in his favour Kanhoji suddenly sued for peace through his overlord Shahu. His envoy visited Bombay and after several discourses with Boone agreed upon certain preliminary articles which were entirely to the satisfaction of the Bombay council. According to Colonel Biddulph "Angria contracted to restore all ships and vessels he had taken, except the *Success*, which was hopelessly decayed, for which he was to pay Rs. 10,000, or to restore goods to that amount. In lieu of captured cargoes he was to pay Rs. 50,000, or to give goods of equal value, and within two years he was to pay Rs. 10,000 more,

for which payment Sahooje undertook to be surety". Angria's envoy further promised to deliver the English prisoners as a token of sincerity. This opportunity of bringing the war to an honourable conclusion was warmly welcomed by the Bombay Council and they sent Captain John Miles to Angria's headquarters with a letter from the Governor to bring back the prisoners. Kanhoji had apparently risen in the estimation of his English neighbours since the last treaty, for it was not suggested for a moment that Captain Miles was being employed on a perilous mission. He returned from Kolaba on the 12th of February without the prisoners and brought only an answer to Boone's letter. Kanhoji wrote that the prisoners were at Vijayadurg and would be sent to Bombay as soon as they arrived in company of his envoy Sivaji Vishwanath. As for the preliminary articles, he intimated his correspondent that he had some objections, but did not explain them. He was informed that the President was prepared to discuss the terms with Shivaji Vishwanath when he comes with the English men, provided he is furnished with requisite authority. Things looked bright and Boone informed his masters that peace was in sight. Kanhoji's fleet and army had not yet met with any serious reverse but the terms were such as a victor alone could dictate to a vanquished foe. That Kanhoji suddenly backed out and negotiations were abruptly terminated need not surprise us. The question is why did he solicit peace at all? Very likely he had received some information about the proposed Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Kanhoji was no coward but he always preferred to fight one enemy at a time. It was probably on this account that he attempted an amicable settlement with the English but the terms were not to his liking. If he was to compensate the English for the captured vessels he need not have gone to war with them at all. It is also possible that by the middle of February he had received reassuring news from Goa and learnt with satisfaction that the Viceroy was not anxious to make a common cause with the English Governor. His relations with the ruler of Sawantwari were not always friendly but neither Khem Savant nor his successor Phond Savant was a match for Kanhoji.

1719 was a year of comparative peace for Kanhoji. The English fleet apparently confined itself to defensive measures alone. The Portuguese were inactive, if watchful, and the contemporary records mention no naval action or demonstration of any importance. But it was a lull in the storm which broke out with fresh fury and renewed force next year. In 1720 Kanhoji had to face three powerful enemies. It was lucky for him that they had no common plan and made no combined efforts.

Conde de Ericeira was a man of uncommon ability. He combined unflinching resolution with rare resourcefulness. Unwilling as he was to make an alliance with his neighbours of Bombay he was not blind to the dangers of Angria's aggrandisement, he therefore made two attempts to curb Kanhoji's power by destroying his fleet if possible. His first efforts were directed against Kolaba and the task of surprising that important station was entrusted to Antonio Cardim Froes who had commanded the Portuguese blockading fleet in 1713. Kanhoji might have many shortcomings but lack of vigilance was not one of them, and the Portuguese Captain-Mor had to return disappointed. The second scheme was directed against Angria's men-of-war at Gheria. It was his intention to burn or destroy them, or better still, to seize the unsuspecting vessels if possible and bring them by force to Goa. How this was to be effected we are not told, but the Viceroy complains that this well conceived plan was frustrated, though unintentionally, by the English. They appeared before Gheria without giving him any warning whatever and the enemy fleet promptly put to the sea in alarm. The fugitives were pursued for forty eight hours but without any effect.

This must have happened in the third week of September when the English squadron consisting of "the *London*, the *Victory* frigate, the *Revenge* and *Defiance* grabs, the *Hunter* Galley, two gallivats, a bombketch, and a fire ship, besides a number of fishing boats for landing troops was sent against Gheria. The fleet was later reinforced by the *Chandos*, *Pelham* and the *Phram*. The *Phram* was not an ordinary man-of-war but a flat bottomed vessel with shot proof sides designed to serve as a floating battery. It had been specially constructed for bombarding Angria's strongholds and great things were expected of it. The chief command was entrusted to Walter Brown, a civilian, with the grandiloquent designation of "Admiral of the Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of all the forces". Boone was particularly unfortunate in the choice of his commanders and Brown proved no exception. The English fleet stood before Gheria for more than a week, the fort was ineffectively bombarded at intervals, landing was on more than one occasion effected but the storming parties were invariably repulsed and at last Brown weighed anchor to repair the damages his ships had suffered. Nothing but a demonstration had in reality been made and the demonstration, judged from its results, was a very poor one. Carefully organised as the expedition had been, it was doomed to failure from the very beginning. There was no discipline in the English fleet, the sailors and their officers behaved as they pleased, some of the captains were evidently chicken

hearted, and Brown found in alcohol the sole remedy of all evils, moral and physical. "In order to make them fight well. Brown's idea was to supply them with unlimited rum: the officers kept pace with the men in their libations, and what little discipline existed soon disappeared. Orders were disobeyed, while drunkenness, violence, and insubordination reigned unchecked. When remonstrances were addressed to Brown, he refused to stop the supply of liquor, saying that the people must not be put out of humour at this juncture, and they must drink as they pleased". They drank to their heart's content and caused nothing but continual disturbances.

In October, Brown obtained an opportunity of making some amends for his failure at Gheria. Phond Savant II of Savant Wari offered to co-operate with the English against Angria and invited them to send an expedition against Devgad. The Savant had a legitimate grievance against Angria for extending his protection to the dispossessed Desais of Kudal, and Kanhoji had offered a more serious affront to the ruler of Wari when he burnt his ships and harried his lands. We learn from Hamilton that the Savant "had two Grabs apirating at sea, but in a dispute about a prize which Cannajee Angarie laid claim to they went to war, and Cannajee being much superior to him in power, first took his grabs and burnt them, and then landed at Vingurla, and burnt and destroyed the villages near the town." It was to avenge this wrong that the Savant had solicited English help but when the fleet appeared before Devgad, Brown perceived that his new ally had changed his mind and was in no hurry to aggravate his differences with his dreaded neighbour. The second venture of Admiral Brown was no more successful than the first. "The usual desultory and harmless bombardment followed; the *Phram* and the bombketch being equally inefficient. Then when Brown suggested a landing party to storm the place, the officers refused to second him, and so, with some additional loss, the attack on Deoghur came to an end".

Kanhoji could very well congratulate himself on the achievements of the year. While the English fleet under Brown failed in its main objective in September and October, his men had captured an English ship earlier in the year and carried it into his port of Gheria.

The failures of 1720 convinced the English and the Portuguese of the futility of disconcerted action against an adversary so formidable and resourceful and the two European nations were constrained to recognise the need of joint action. But they were not on the best of terms at the time being. Boone had expelled the

Portuguese priests from Bombay and nominated a Bishop of his own choice to look after the spiritual welfare of the Roman Catholic population. Luiz Gonsalves da Camara Coutinho, General of the North, considered this to be an infringement of the treaty of cession and retaliated by prohibiting all commerce with the English island. But common misfortunes had a sobering influence, and before he left India in September, Conde de Ericeira addressed a conciliatory letter to the Governor of Bombay. In December Robert Cowan was sent to Goa to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance against Angria. He found the new Viceroy Francisco Jose de Sampaio de Castro in an accommodating mood and assured him that the English would "readily enter into measures as might enable both nations to chastise the common enemy Angria who not only interrupted our commerce by sea but daily insulted the King of Portugalls subjects by land." The Viceroy on his part answered that "he noways approved of the General of the North's transactions, that he was very willing and ready to enter into any just measures, and desire nothing more than to joyn us (the English) against Angria." Thus was good feeling restored and good understanding re-established and the diplomatic efforts of Robert Cowan was rewarded with a formal treaty of alliance.

Anxious as both the parties were to come to a speedy conclusion the negotiation dragged on for eight months and the treaty was not concluded till the 20th of August. Of its fourteen articles the first provided for an immediate war against Angria and the two signatories undertook not to conclude any peace in exclusion of the other. The third article laid down that the joint force should be commanded on alternate days by the generals of the two nations. The spoils of war including munitions were to be equally shared and each nation was expected to bring to the field an army of two thousand infantry with officers and cavalry in proportion. In the sea their respective quota was to consist of five men-of-war, and as such a formidable force was expected to reduce all the forts and strongholds of Angria it was decided that Kolaba with the villages under its jurisdiction should fall to the share of the Portuguese while Gheria and the adjacent district should form the English share of the conquered lands. In recognition of his services Cowan was awarded a seat on the Bombay Council, and when the expedition set out three months later he was nominated the generalissimo of the expeditionary force.

Boone cannot be blamed for his sanguine expectations, for, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty Bombay received a fresh accession of strength. While Cowan was negotiating the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, a strong squadron consisting "of the *Lyon*, 50

guns; *Salisbury*, 40 guns; *Exeter*, 50 guns; and *Shoreham*, 20 guns" sailed for the east under Commodore Thomas Matthews. Irascible, over bearing and insolent as he was, Mathews had served under Byng and had a creditable record in the royal navy. Great things were, therefore, expected of him and Bombay was naturally jubilant.

But Kanhoji could not be caught unawares. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance was no secret to him. By some means unknown to his enemies he had got an inkling of what was going on even before the treaty had been concluded and as he preferred diplomacy to armed conflict he addressed a letter to the Captain of the Province of the North on the 7th August proposing an amicable settlement of the existing dispute. His friendly approaches were however sternly repulsed and Kanhoji made suitable provisions for the defence of his ports and further provided for his security by ensuring the support of his sovereign and liege lord and enlisting the alliance of the Malwans as the sequel proved. On the 29th November the English force left for Chaul where they joined the Portuguese army on the 1st December. But when the joint force arrived before Alibag they found Kanhoji fully prepared.

The allied army numbered more than five thousand but its strength was more apparent than real. Cowan was no soldier and the improvised Colonels and Captains did not contribute to the efficiency of the English force. Matthews was more proud than prudent and he had no previous experience of Indian warfare. His officers were hardly amenable to discipline and drinking and duels formed the order of the day. The morale of the Bombay force was not at its highest and they were not accustomed to expect any success against Angria. The Portuguese army mainly consisted of adventurers and half castes, and their commanders were as sensitive about their dignity as Mathews was insolent and overbearing. The ill assorted allies had very little chance against the veterans of Kolaba and the campaign did not last more than a month.

On the 12th, Alibag was bombarded. Two days later the allies tried to storm the fortress but the wall was too high to be escalated, no breach was effected and the assailants were repulsed. The defeated force was soon put to rout and to make matters worse Matthews 'came on shore in a violent rage, flew at the General of the North, and thrust his cane in his mouth, and treated the Viceroy not much better'. It was lucky for the demoralised party that it was not pursued by the Marathas. Kanhoji had already

received a reinforcement under Pilaji Jadhava and information now reached the allied camp that Baji Rao was in the neighbourhood with a strong force of Maratha cavalry. While the allied plans were thus upset on the land, they fared no better on the sea. Kanhoji's Captains captured a Portuguese boat from Diu and "the Malwans strove to make a diversion in Angria's favour by attacking English ships under the pretence that they were Portuguese vessels." The Viceroy decided to give up the contest and availed himself of the earliest opportunity of concluding a peace.

The Viceroy however had one small difficulty. An article of the recent alliance specifically required him not to conclude any treaty with Angria in exclusion of his English allies. But a loop hole was easily discovered. The Portuguese Government did not treat with Kanhoji but with Baji Rao, and they entered into a treaty with Shahu Chhatrapati in which his servant Angria was also included. By this treaty the ports of the two states were thrown open to the merchants of the two contracting nations, the Portuguese undertook to supply the Marathas with artillery and ammunition at a just price, both the parties undertook to set the prisoners of war at liberty. As the Kolaba fleet was still on the high sea it was stipulated that any Portuguese vessel that it might capture in the meantime would be restored with its cargo to its rightful owners on the return of the armada. And a defensive and offensive alliance was concluded between the two powers. The English were given the option of accepting similar terms within eight days.

The treaty was concluded on the 12th Januray, 1722, and the English openly accused the Portuguese of breach of faith. Kanhoji was now free to deal with the English as he pleased and a report came from Karwar of an action between two British vessels, *Victoria* and *Revenge*, and four of Angria's Ghurabs. Kanhoji's vessels suffered a defeat but safely effected their escape. Next month, however, the tables were turned. On the 27th of February Kanhoji's men engaged two English men-of-war, the *Eagle* and the *Hunter*. After five hours fighting the *Hunter* blew up and went down. The *Eagle* was badly battered but succeeded in reaching a small Portuguese port near Bassein. This apparently caused a terrible consternation for on the 12th March—"a letter was received from the Captain of the *Revenge* (at Rajapore) that he did not dare to procede without reinforcement with the merchant ships under his convoy as he was informed that Angria's Grabbs were at Colaba." The *Eagle* and the *Bombay Merchant* also deemed it prudent not to forsake their safe asylum

at Shirgaon until they were informed that the enemy fleet had gone south. The success of Kanhoji was by no means uniform, for one of his ships was captured by the English near Underi in October of the same year. It was to avenge this loss that he left Kolaba in person to assume the chief command of his fleet, his declared intention being the total annihilation of the English, if a contemporary Portuguese account is to be believed. But he achieved nothing noteworthy, and on the fifth November his fleet suffered another defeat near Versova when his chief Subedar was captured with his flag ship. Nothing daunted, the Kolaba fleet kept the sea and succeeded in causing no small injury to the commerce of Bombay. On the 20th of October 1723 twelve of Angria's Gallivats appeared before Bombay harbour and attacked two English cruisers "who went convoy to two small vessels belonging to the Island bound for Muscat and after some hours fight took them all." Thus the duel went on with varying success, and the belligerents were apparently resolved to fight to a finish. But in 1724 Kanhoji suddenly addressed a letter to William Phipps, who had succeeded Boone as Governor of Bombay two years earlier, with proposals of peace to be preceded by an exchange of prisoners. A contemporary Portuguese author suggests that this sudden predilection for peace must be attributed to Kanhoji's anxiety to procure the release of his chief Admiral, Shivaji Nayak, who had been taken prisoner by the English near Cape Ramas. But there is reason to believe that more serious reasons led the astute chief of Kolaba to secure a temporary truce with the English if permanent peace was not possible.

In 1723 the chief of Savant Wari took the opportunity of Kanhoji's absence at the court of Shahu and invaded his territories. The invasion was easily repulsed by Angria's officers. The defeated chief sought the support of his Portuguese neighbours, and although all assistance was publicly refused, secret help was promised to avert the imminent ruin with which he was threatened. The Portuguese naturally disliked the near approach of Angria to their headquarters and preferred a weaker neighbour. In 1724 Kolaba was attacked by a third European power, the Dutch. The invasion proved ineffective, but it must have added to Angria's embarrassment. In 1725 the Sidi of Rajpuri appeared before Kolaba with twelve Palls, two frigates and no less than one hundred gallivats. That Angria preferred to pay the Sidi "a good sum of Rupias", instead of opening his artillery on the hostile armada, proves beyond doubt that Kanhoji was confronted with more serious troubles than we are aware of, and he hastened to compose his differences with the English the most persistent and

powerful of his enemies. Phipps, however, did not receive his friendly approaches with a good grace and his answer was full of bitter sarcasm. In a contest of retorts Kanhoji was hard to beat and Phipps did not come out very well of the wordy conflict. Ultimately it was decided that the prisoners of war should be exchanged at a neutral place. The place selected was Karanja, which then belonged to the Portuguese, and the intermediary selected on this occasion by Kanhoji was Mr. Curgenven, a private merchant of Madras. He fell into Angria's hands when his ship *Charlottle* was captured on the 2nd of April 1720, while sailing southwards from Surat. He was kept a prisoner at Gheria till March 1724, when he was removed to Kolaba. Nine months later he was permitted to ransom himself and a few of his fellow prisoners on condition that he should convey the proposal of a mutual exchange of prisoners to the Governor and Council of Bombay, Kanhoji having promised to return his ransom when his mission was achieved. Curgenven found no difficulty in convincing Phipps and his colleagues of Kanhoji's sincerity and by the end of April, 1725, the exchange was effected. Of 12,500 rupees that Angria had received from Mr. Curgenven 10,500 were paid on this occasion and a trusty Bania of the island stood surety for the balance. The exchange of prisoners was, however, not followed by peace, and Angria's fleet remained a standing menace to the merchant men of Bombay. In November, 1726, Phipps informed the Council "that Angria since opening of the season having taken heart to cruise with his gallivats to the northward of us, which the Portuguese suffer without interruption, giving his boats the usual protection of their ports where by he has already had considerable success in taking divers vessels bound hither, as well as to the Portuguese ports that the unexpected repair the Galleys have stood in need of and the small number of gallivats in the service has put it out of our power hitherto to secure the coast from his insults." The next month, "it was decided to purchase the *Fame* which belonged to the President" "as the English fleet was not strong enough to protect the trade in the coast" and as defensive measure now demanded heavier expenses a new tax was imposed" on the boats directly employed from the island for trading". In 1727 hostilities between Angria and the Sidi broke out afresh and early in January 1728 Angria again opened negotiations for peace with the English. Phipps however would not hear of any terms except the total restitution of all captured ships and their cargoes and the peace parleys came to nought. Next year the Angria fleet took to sea with the opening of the fair season and on the 16th January Bombay perceived fifteen Gallivats proceeding northwards. On the 17th

seven of Angria's gallivats fell upon an English vessel the *Shark* almost within sight of Bombay and carried it triumphantly to Khanderi, whence it was later transferred to Kolaba. This was probably the last notable achievement of the Kolaba fleet during the life time of Kanhoji, for he passed away in the plenitude of power and prestige on the 20th June 1729.

Kanhoji can rightly claim to be the second founder of the Maratha navy. From a very small beginning he rose to be the foremost maritime leader of the Malabar coast. It is idle to condemn him as a pirate, he merely pursued the prevalent practice of his time. Nor can he be justly accused of treachery and faithlessness. His attitude towards alien ships bearing English flags was not technically incorrect. The English were specifically precluded from extending their protection to foreign ships and in February 1715 when a small ship belonging to two Muslim merchants solicited the convey of their vessels the Bombay Government concluded that such a permission would not constitute a breach of the late treaty as the ship in question had already procured a pass from Angria. The character of such a ship could not be supposed to have been materially affected when it was hired or freighted by a broker of Bombay or a merchant of Madras. In 1756 the English themselves claimed the right of enforcing their passes on native vessels already "provided with Dutch permits." It is therefore clear that the pass of one maritime power was not regarded as a legal protection against the aggression of another and exemption from this obligation could be obtained only by a convention or treaty. In 1710 when the Dutch East India Company protested against Kanhoji's appropriation of a Dutch sloop and a galley, he replied he was not aware of any friendship existing between him and the company, nor of any correspondence on the matter. He did not molest such merchants as made him presents, as for instance the English, Portuguese and Moor, and he refused to restore the prize. Since 1722 the Portuguese ships had the free use of his ports until war broke out between them and the Marathas. So long as peace prevailed between the Governments of Goa and Satara, Kanhoji loyally adhered to the provisions of the treaty concluded by the Peshwa.

About his strategy and method of enlistment we know next to nothing. As he boldly asserted in his letter to Phipps, he was an ardent believer in the policy of aggression attributed to the great Shivaji. He did not lack moderation as has been already noticed and he resorted to diplomacy as often as possible, but he failed to appreciate the real aim of Shivaji's policy. Shivaji tried his ut-

most to do away with feudalism and to strengthen the central executive as much as practicable. Kanhoji was a feudal chief first of all. He acknowledged the supremacy of Shahu but behaved, for all practical purposes, as an independent ruler. The central executive could not, therefore, treat the chief admiral as a mere servant as in Shivaji's days, and the growing power of the hereditary admiral was not always regarded as a source of strength to the State as a whole. But in justice to him it must be admitted that Kanhoji did not stand alone in his preference for feudalism or in his spirit of self aggrandisement. His shortcoming was shared by all the Maratha chiefs of his time. He was a shrewd diplomat, a great admiral, but not a far sighted statesman. It was a strong fleet, strong in number, strong in achievement and stronger in confidence that he left to his sons and successors, but with the new tradition of maritime ascendancy they inherited from him the baneful legacy of a feudal principality with all its evil implications. In the feudal conflicts of his time Kanhoji had discovered the means of his rapid promotion to power, but the forces of disruption which he had so skillfully exploited to serve his own end ultimately proved the undoing of his family.

LECTURE IV.

Sekhoji Angria: 1729-1733.

Kanhoji Angria was a much married man and he had a numerous progeny. But as the ladies of his harem were not all duly wedded to him, it is not easy to ascertain which of his many sons were born in wedlock and how many of them had the bar sinister. According to the official account of the family, Kanhoji had by his first wife two sons Sekhoji and Sambhaji, his second wife bore him two more, Manaji and Tulaji, while Yesaji, Dhondji and others were his natural sons. According to the *Epanaphora Indica*, Tulaji and Manaji were illegitimate children of their father, and of his two sons by the second wife the eldest was called Appaji. Two of his letters to Brahmendra Swami have been preserved. Of Kanhoji's wives, Mathurabai and Lakshmi-bai seem to have been the most influential and they frequently corresponded with Brahmendra and Baji Rao. As Sekhoji's succession to his father's office was uncontested and peaceful, it may be logically inferred that he was the eldest son of Kanhoji, and there is reason to believe that Sambhaji was his full brother. Grose was palpably wrong when he stated that Manaji was a son

of Sambhaji; the late Sir George Forrest was equally misinformed when he tried to perpetuate this gross error. Sekhoji was a short lived young man and followed his father to the grave four years later. It was on this account that Grose was not familiar with his name and asserted that Sambhaji was Kanhoji's immediate successor.

Kanhoji's death meant no respite for the English and the war was renewed with equal vigour and resolution by Sekhoji. The official account proudly declares that he never made any peace with the English. His father died in June. The fleet was then necessarily idle as all operations had to be suspended during the four months of the monsoon. But the opening of the fair season found it again in the scene of its former activities. In November, Sekhoji's fleet captured the *William* near Dabhol. This must have been considered an auspicious beginning for the young admiral, though the victory had been dearly purchased. The Bombay authorities now came to the conclusion that their merchant fleet would no more be safe unless Kolaba was closely watched by a squadron of invigilation and next year they wrote to the President and Council of Bengal "earnestly requesting them to dispatch to us the *Princess Caroline* and *Prince of Wales* galleys as soon as the season will permit as we shall be in great want of them to watch the motions of the enemy Angria and to protect the trade." In September 1730, the English galleys captured three of Angria's fighting gallivats near Kelve Mahim. When the crew perceived the futility of further resistance they jumped overboard and swam ashore. On the 25th of November however Sekhoji won a brilliant victory over the invigilating squadron posted off Kolaba. The squadron in question consisted of the *Victoria* frigate, *Bombay* and *Bengal* galleys. Early in the morning Sekhoji's fleet came out of Kolaba and resolutely attacked the two galleys. The frigate was then too far from the place of action and could not come to their rescue in time "there being little or no wind". "The grabs lay astern of the galleys battering them with their prow guns, the galleys having no stern chace or any other defence but their small arms which they play'd very briskly, notwithstanding which the enemy attempted severall times to lash their grabs to the galleys quarter and board and were as often repulsed and beat off with great loss, an unlucky shot from the enemy set fire to two chests of power flasks that stood on the *Bombay* galleys quarter deck which mortally wounded Captain Campbell and hurt several of his people, yet he clear'd his vessell the four times boarded, but the *Bengal* was carried the third attack the Captain and most of his men being killed and wounded, and the whole ships company

in a great consternation through the taking fire of two barrells of musket cartridges that were in the great cabin that almost blew up the quarter deck, the smallest of the grabs with the gallivats took the *Bengal* in tow and carried her to Colabbo before the *Victoria* could come to her rescue but in going in the galley struck and is hoped she is lost." After thus routing the blockading cruizers, several ships of the Kolaba fleet sailed southwards to join, as it was supposed, Sambhaji Angria's squadron at Gheria.

This disaster naturally caused a great consternation at Bombay. The garrison was weak before, and the naval action near Kolaba reduced its strength further, the English having lost about one hundred European soldiers and sailors. But to their great credit the President and his colleagues did not lose heart and resolutely set to repair the loss as best as they could. For some time past they had been trying to rally all the enemies of Angria and their efforts had not been altogether unsuccessful. On the 17th April, 1730 President Cowan had concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with Phond Savant of Wari. The fifth article of the treaty laid down that as the sons of Kanhoji Angria were professed enemies of the Hon'ble Company and the Sardesai, "the joint endeavours of both shall be exerted to destroy the said enemy." The English undertook to harass them as much as possible by the sea while the Savant was expected to attack the Angria brothers both by sea and land to the best of his ability. In May the Marathas invaded the Portuguese Province of the North and the Captain of Bassein solicited reinforcement from Bombay. The English were not anxious to go to war with the Marathas but at the same time they could not permit the neighbouring islands to be annexed by them. While offering their mediation as a common friend they did not hesitate to despatch the much needed succours to the Portuguese. Sekhoji Angria had so long kept peace with the government of Goa but now that his master was at war with them he could not possibly stand aside like a mere onlooker. His troops co-operated with the Marathas of Bhivandi. In September a Portuguese fleet consisting of a frigate and three galleys set out from Goa for Bassein with a strong reinforcement. But it was attacked by Angria's fleet in the neighbourhood of Gheria and two of the galleys were captured while the third was compelled to seek shelter in one of the Sidi's ports where it was detained by that chief in retaliation of some unfriendly act. In 1731 Sekhoji captured two merchant pals with a gallivat belonging to the Portuguese and his reputation rose so high that the Bombay Government deemed it necessary to offer special reward for the encouragement of their captains. They

were assured that such of Angria's men-of-war as they might capture shall be awarded to the captor with all their artillery and warlike appurtenances and the prizes would be supplemented by the President and the Councillors from their private purses "by an additional gratuity of two thousand rupees for each fighting Grab of Angrias." Next year, the English frigates captured one of Sekhoji's fighting gallivats but this was no more than a flea's bite to the mighty lord of Kolaba. His power was expected to suffer some decline from the defection of his brother Sambhaji two years earlier. But Sekhoji was not merely a strong leader, he was a good brother as well. Before long he managed to humour his wayward brother and gently led the erring youngman back to the path of duty. In January 1732 the English of Tellichery learnt with apprehension that the Canarees of Mangalore were contemplating an alliance with Angria and that the dreaded chief was endeavouring to get a settlement on the Billiapatam river for the reception of his vessels. In November Sekhoji sailed from Kolaba with five Ghurabs and ten gallivats and Sambhaji set out at the same time with twelve gallivats for Gheria where he was to be reinforced by four ghurabs. Bombay was naturally nervous and all the cruisers were promptly sent out to keep a strict watch over the enemy fleet. Sekhoji's squadron later entered into Suvarnadurg but Sambhaji went as far south as the Pigeon Island. Although the English records mention nothing more about the activities of the two fleets we learn from the Portuguese that on the 12th January 1733 the Viceroy ordered three galleys to sail for Honawar where a Portuguese ship was prevented from taking its cargo of pepper by Angria's fleet. On the 13th the Portuguese galleys reached their destination but found that the enemy had departed the day before. Two days later Angria returned with 14 gallivats and an action followed. Angria divided his fleet into two squadrons and safely retreated after suffering some minor loss. The Portuguese commander explains that these eight gallivats could navigate in very shallow water and this enabled them to effect their escape with such ease. It was probably Sambhaji's squadron that the Portuguese galleys had engaged. While every thing was going on in his favour Sekhoji offered to settle his differences with Bombay and on the 21st of June, 1733, his envoys waited upon the governor with proposals of peace. The same month an exchange of prisoners was effected, though we do not know the exact date of this transaction. The English had inflicted little loss on Sekhoji's fleet, their alliance with the Sawant was absolutely barren of results, the restoration of good understanding between Goa and Bombay left his maritime ascendancy entirely unshaken,

but he was prepared to leave the English alone for the time being, because his master was anxious to conquer the Sidi, and annex his territories and the Peshwa had commenced operations against the Abyssinian chief in February, 1733 in co-operation with Sekhoji.

The Sidi single handed was no match for the Marathas. But the Abyssinians still held many important ports, and Rairi, the old capital of Shivaji, was still in their possession. It was quite natural that Shahu should make a strenuous effort to recover his grandfather's forts and strongholds, but it is doubtful whether he would have shaken his lethargy so soon and set his heart so much upon the reconquest of the lost districts if the Sidis had not in the meantime offered him a fresh offence. The story of Brahmendra Swami and the elephant is too well known to be repeated here. In 1727 Sidi Sat governor of Anjanvel and Govalkot wreaked his vengeance on Brahmendra Swami by desecrating his temple and molesting the innocent Hindu villagers of Parashuram. Brahmendra was a Hindu ascetic, but from his letters it appears that he did not forget or forgive any wrong easily and though he believed in the potency of his spiritual attainments he did not omit to enlist human agencies to ensure the efficacy of his cause. Shahu and his ministers held the Swami in great esteem and the wrongs he had suffered infuriated them all. The desecration of the temple was regarded as an insult to Hinduism and Shahu was above all the leader of the Hindus in the Deccan. The practical common sense of Kanhoji Angria, however, had a sobering influence on his warlike contemporaries but the Swami went on working upon the feelings of his co-religionists until the death of Sidi Rasul, the ruler of Janjira in 1733 and the subsequent dissension among his sons and heirs offered the Marathas the suitable opportunity they had been seeking so long. A Koli convert in the Sidi's service changed sides at this crisis, and though he does not seem to have been of much use to the Marathas, their early victories were as rapid as important. The joint forces of the Peshwa and Angria reduced Rajapore and Khokri, the ochre coloured ensign of Shivaji was once again hoisted on the towers of Raigad, Sekhoji captured the fort of upper Chaul, the fort of Ravance in the Pen river and the more important town and stronghold of Thal. Thal was opposite the island of Underi and if Sekhoji's men-of-war could expel the Sidi from that station as well, the harbour and shipping of Bombay would be entirely at his mercy. The Sidis still retained their island stronghold as well as the fortresses of Anjanvel and Govalkot, but they were not in a position to offer a prolonged defence unless assistance arrived from outside. They accordingly sent distressing appeals for help to Goa and Bombay. This was

the situation with which Cowan and his Councillors had to deal when Sekhoji's envoys came with a friendly message and proposal of peace.

The fall of Rajapore had considerably augmented Sekhoji's power in the sea for the captured ships had all been added to his fleet and the English rightly apprehended that "if he should succeed in his attempt (against Underi) he is entirely master of this port when it will be impossible for any small embarkations or ships of little force bound to this port to escape his gallivats, and consequently an end put to the greatest part of our country trade, as all the Sceedys grabs and gallivats are given to Succojee Angria for his share of the plunder of Rajapore and he has carried them to Colaba to join the rest of his fleet, which now consists of eleven grabs and twentyfive gallivats besides four grabs and twenty gallivats under the directions of his brother Sambhojee at Gereah." It was no wonder that the English were in no hurry to come to terms with their ancient enemy and permit the respite which he so badly needed for reducing the remaining strongholds of the Sidi. Assistance and succour had indeed been solicited from Rajapuri and Anjanvel, but Underi demanded their attention most. As their military resources were by no means unlimited they deemed it their duty to relieve that island first. Captain Thomas Holden was ordered to proceed with his ship *Mary*, to the threatened island and to remove the non-combatants to Bombay. The expeditionary force was placed under Captain James Inchbird who was to act in consultation with Captain Robert Macneale, "whose knowledge of the language and customs of the country people renders him the fittest person to treat and transact any affair with them." The Governor told Lt. Inchbird in his instructions.—"In my letter to Sceedy Balal I have signified to him as my opinion that on the present emergency it will be for his interest and that of the Sceedy his master to hoist the English flag upon his fort, and deliver up to you the defence of it, with his assistance and that of his present garrison, with this condition, that whenever the Sceedy thinks proper to demand the restitution of it to him on his affairs taking a different turn than what they seem at present to promise, the same shall be delivered up on the Sceedy paying the Hon'ble Company the expence and charge they have been and may be at in preserving of it, with the usual lawful interest of nine per cent per annum, but in case that the Sceedy's affairs will not admit of reclaiming the said fort, that then the same shall remain to the Hon'ble Company as their sole right and property, and the garrison of Sepoys shall become the subjects of the said Hon'ble Company, and remain in their pay and service at the usual pay that is

now paid to the garrison Sepoys of Bombay." The Governor was not disappointed in his expectations. On the 16th of July the English flag was hoisted on the fort as the Commander willingly accepted Lt. Inchbird's suggestions. The fort was bombarded from the island of Khanderi as well as from a battery constructed on the mainland opposite but this distant cannonading caused little or no harm and Angria was effectively baulked of his prey.

The English were not the only friend whose help the ruler of Janjira had in his distress solicited. The Portuguese could not offer to be so unambiguous about their intention, as they were deficient in both men and money. The Goa Government had, none the less, despatched two men-of-war to aid the Abyssinians but they were not to evince any hostility to the Marathas at once. The delicate task of thwarting their efforts under the guise of a friendly mediator was entrusted to Antonio Cardim Froes, an officer of experience and credit, who was no stranger to the coast or to the belligerent powers. Sidi Masud, the Admiral of the imperial fleet, also made elaborate preparations for helping his fellow countrymen, and though Shahu had issued urgent instruction to Gaikwad and Dabhade to devise suitable means for impeding him, nothing was done by those two chiefs. Sekhoji, therefore, found him pitted against four maritime powers, the English, the Portuguese, the Sidis of Janjira and the Sidi Admiral of Surat.

Meanwhile the remaining strongholds of Sidi Sat were threatened by fresh Maratha forces, and willing as they were, the English were not in a position to send men and munitions everywhere. But this did not diminish Sekhoji's difficulties. His officers could not pull on well with the Pratinidhi who had been entrusted by Shahu with the important mission of reducing Anjanvel and Govalkot, and Sekhoji knew that, try as he might, he could not reduce the naval strongholds of his enemy so long as they were backed by the English. He correctly read the situation and rightly recognised that to reduce Khanderi he must conquer Bombay. The rest of his adversaries he could afford to ignore; with the English humiliated, they would make room for him of their own accord.

This conviction found expression in more than one epistle. Sekhoji had received reliable information about the preparation his enemies were making at Bombay, Bassein and Surat for the coming conflict. He suspected that for creating a diversion in favour of Janjira they would in all probability attack one of his strongholds in the neighbourhood of Bombay: Khanderi, Kolaba or Hira-Kot. In case this strategy failed in its objective they

would throw fresh succour in Janjira and the Sidi might be prepared to cede the island to his hatted allies in the last resort. The elaborate preparation of the allies left Sekhoji undismayed. He knew his strength, he felt no anxiety for Kolaba and he enunciated a daring plan for disconcerting his formidable forces. This was no less than an invasion of Bombay by land and sea. Powerful as the English were, the scheme of Sekhoji was by no means impracticable. He might catch the English cruisers in a carefully devised trap between the two fleets of Kolaba and Vijayadurg. The main army of the Peshwa might at the same time cross the narrow channel that separated Bombay from the mainland. Or the Kolaba fleet might fall upon the sleeping prey when its protecting fleet would be away. This was quite practicable as Kanhoji's squadron had appeared before Bombay during the absence of the English men-of-war in 1719. The bold plan was not unworthy of the great Shivaji and it is doubtful whether Kanhoji was capable of so daring a design.

But Sekhoji would concentrate his efforts against Janjira and would therefore avoid a contest with the "hatmen" if possible. He therefore suggested that Shahu should address friendly letters to them and try to persuade them to observe neutrality. Such a letter was indeed received by the English, but they had been requested by Nizam-ul-Mulk and Khan Dauran to befriend the Janjira chief and they naturally pursued the course that suited their own interests best. But in the meantime Sekhoji had suspended the bombardment of Underi lest that might prejudice the diplomatic efforts of his agents at Bombay. The English, as usual, demanded that Angria should renounce his claims on the sea and permit their merchantmen to use the high road of the sea without any bar or hindrance. Sekhoji was not prepared to make this concession as he wrote to the Peshwa, but while negotiations went on, he did not neglect to get ready for the next campaign. He kept himself constantly informed of their movements and was busily engaged in providing for the defence of his ports while the fleet was overhauled and equipped for taking to sea with the opening of the fair season. What turns events would have taken, had Sekhoji survived we do not know, but he expired after a short illness on the 28th of August. The Peshwa was anxious to have a personal interview with him and had requested Sekhoji to come to his camp. On the 25th Sekhoji wrote to Baji Rao that he had been ill for the last nine days and of late he had been bleeding through the nose on account of an unusually high temperature. The next day he wrote two letters to the Peshwa and requested him to send Pilaji Jadhav at once to Kolaba. Two days

later the Peshwa learnt from Pilaji that the gallant Sekhoji was no more. He died in harness, and the war received his personal attention till his last moment, as his recently published letters unmistakably show. With him ended the brightest period in the naval history of the Marathas.

Sekhoji survived his father for four short years only. As a naval leader, he was in no way inferior to Kanhoji, as a noble of the Maratha empire, his loyalty was unquestionable, as a territorial ruler, he was benevolent and wise. He perceived the supreme need of unity of command and it is on this account that he placed his services unreservedly at the disposal of the Peshwa. His father seldom permitted his foreign relations to be controlled from Satara or Poona, but Sekhoji took Baji Rao into his confidence while negotiating with Bombay and freely consulted the Peshwa about the proposed terms. He was by birth a feudal noble but he tried to undo the evils of that system as much as he could. He conciliated Sambhaji, and his half brothers had nothing to complain so long as Sekhoji was alive. Under him the Angrias were united at home and dreaded abroad. His relations with the head of the state and the all powerful prime minister left nothing to be desired. He knew how to control the forces of disruption without using force, he knew how to rule as a feudal chief without breaking loose from the empire, he knew how to co-operate with his fellow chiefs without surrendering his independent command. His brothers were brave sailors but their martial propensities were not moderated by kindness and a spirit of conciliation, and the pent up forces of civil war and family dissension broke out with the death of Sekhoji Angria.

The Dutch in India

By

MR. V. SRINIVASAN, M.A.

PREFATORY NOTE

THE Dutch episode in Indian history is important in that it was the Hollander and not the Englishman who succeeded to the Portuguese mastery of the Asiatic seas. Lisbon had long outshone Venice itself as a mart for oriental spices but in the seventeenth century the 'brave and indefatigable Dutch' of Mr. Marvin wrested the monopoly of Indian trade from Portugal. Dryden's lines,

"Egypt (France) and Tyrus (Holland) intercept your trade
And Jebusites your sacred laws invade'

show if anything how Dutch designs in the east affected English life of the time. For, at the crest of their power the Dutch had spotted all the East Indies with their fortifications, they held Mauritius, had six settlements in Ceylon and two in Persia and besides those in India possessed several settlements in the Cape of Good Hope. In India they settled at Sadras, Pulicat and other places. But their remoteness from either Holland or Batavia never permitted them to secure a strong foothold in the country. Their selfishness on the other hand brought them into active collision with the nationals of other European States and they had to give up the race for dominion in the peninsula. Their ideals in India were ever anything but imperial. The last settlement of Holland in India was Chinsurah which passed to British hands in 1825.

These transactions form the subject of the following pages. There appears to be no dearth of material for a study of the subject but difficulties mainly linguistic have prevented students from reading the sources and interesting themselves in the events associated with the State that had no small share in India's external trade for a good part of a Century and more.

The works laid under contribution have been stated in the foot notes. A select bibliography has been added. The account of the condition of Indo-Dutch trade is based on the excellent works of Mr. Moreland.

THE DUTCH IN INDIA.

(An episode in Indian History)

1. Oldenbarneveltd was the Stadtholder who founded the Dutch East India Company. The Republic was in its infancy and in a period of stress, but it was left to him to lay the foundation of Holland's maritime power which became in the days of Ruyter and Blake a serious menace to England.

The Dutch East
India Company.

The Spaniards were the first to enter the race for territorial expansion and the Portuguese after them. The latter appeared in the east about 1487 when Pedro de Covilham reached Malabar. The Dutch were rather late. Religious considerations made it impossible for them to acquiesce in Papal awards like those of Alexander VI. But Portugal could not continue to hold the East in perpetual fee and Papal fiats notwithstanding Holland was determined to break the monopoly.

Disorders attended several attempts but the early voyages were on the whole profitable. The expedition conducted by van Neck in 1598 is an instance in point. Earlier, William Barents in breaking a north-eastern route had visited Stalen Island and Spitzbergen. Van Linschoten who lived at Goa between 1583 and 1589 sent a report which was widely published and served for long as a guidebook to adventurers. Cornelius Hautman rounded the Cape of Good Hope for the first time, passed through Surat and reached Bantam (1596). The immense possibilities of eastern trade were well recognized early and the Dutch pursued their designs with vigour. By 1602 their nationals were known in Bantam, Achin, Ceylon, the Spice Islands and Patani in Siam.

Successes naturally brought fresh anxieties; there was a rates war and the expeditions sent up began to quarrel. The national importance of the trade however could not allow the continuance of cut throat competition and the competing companies were eventually amalgamated by the States-General into a single company with exclusive powers and a national constitution. Thus was brought into existence the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie or the United Dutch East India Company. It had a permanent capital of 6,600,600 guilders approximating to £ 550,000.

The constitution drawn up was peculiar. There was at each of the principal sea ports a district chamber which had a number of directors (*bewinthebber*). These persons were appointed in the first instance and subsequent vacancies were filled up by the

provincial governments on the nomination of existing directors. The Chambers were represented on the 'College of Seventeen' in whose hands was vested the management of the affairs of the Company. This College framed the policy which was executed by the chambers each acting for its own seaport. It determined the size and equipment of the annual fleet, ships were allotted by it and the goods brought back in them were also marketed under its orders. The members were not responsible to the shareholders and though disputes were referred to the States-General their responsibility to that body was but nominal. Thus the business of the company was entirely in the hands of an oligarchical body maintaining its continuity by nominating to vacancies.

A colonial system was organised on the basis of monopoly and slave labour which has persisted to this day in the East Indian Islands. The Company had authority to enter into agreement with foreign powers in the name of the Dutch Government.

There was as yet no idea of establishing factories in the east. The ships should simply visit ports, sell goods and return as soon as suitable cargo was procured. The change from trading voyage to factory came at a later stage.

2. One of the earlier ventures was the discovery of Mauritius by Admiral Wybrand van Warwyk (1606). High prices stimulated interest in oriental trade and other nationals had not been slow in recognising its possibilities. The English Company had been founded under a charter issued by Queen Elizabeth in December 1600. There was also the competition from the Portuguese, at this time undisputed masters of the east. But various encounters at sea had shown Portugal's weakness in this arm. Again and again her fleets were defeated by the Dutch and her supremacy broken.

Not that successes were many on land. Small forts were captured in the Spice Islands. But Mozambique, Malacca and Macao offered no small resistance to the Dutch. The commercial policy of these traders emphasized the monopolisation of Asiatic trade in cloves, mace and nutmegs. The English had secured a strong footing in Java and Sumatra and this ruled out all hopes of their being entirely excluded by the Dutch from trading in pepper. The Indian trade was at this time deemed subsidiary. Gujarat and the Coromandel were sought to be developed mainly because the cotton goods of India constituted the chief medium of their far eastern trade. A base of operations in the eastern waters was also found to be a desideratum.

Transactions in the
Indies..

Events in the early decades of the seventeenth century effected the transfer of sea power from the Portuguese to Dutch hands, and the principal objective of their policy was thus realised. Portugal's monopoly was at an end. Amboyna was captured in 1605. The same year a fleet of 15 found its way to Malacca captained by Admiral Matelieff with 1400 men under him. The city of Johore was besieged and was taken in face of fierce resistance and defence offered and organised by Don Alonzo de Castro. De Castro was defeated and several operations conducted subsequently only confirmed the verdict. The trouble was protracted and was not brought to an end till 1609 when a Convention was signed by which the Portuguese were deprived of their rights and privileges. Motley summed up the war thus: 'A commonwealth of sand banks, lagoons and meadows, less than 14,000 square miles in extent had done battle . . . with the greatest of existing powers. And this has been done with an army averaging 46,000 men, half of them foreigners hired for the job and by a seafaring population volunteering into ships of every class and denomination from a flyboat to a galleon of war'.¹

In India a fleet of thirteen arrived at the port of Calicut in 1603 and van der Hagen who captained the fleet made a peace with the king of that city against the Portuguese. And Dutch factors were rising up in the Coromandel. In 1605 a Spanish fleet was defeated off Malabar and slowly the Catholic enemy of Holland was sinking.

We may now turn to the relations between the Dutch and the English companies. The English had their headquarters at Bantam and there was a factory at Jambi on the east coast of Sumatra. The Dutch appeared to them to be dangerous, more serious than the Portuguese. Unofficial wars raged between the agents of the two Protestant companies. The Dutch attacked Pularoon which was defended by Nathaniel Courthope (1616-20). Jan Pieters-

1. 'United Netherlands'. Motley refers to Holland's struggle with Spain with which Portugal was united. Cp. also his summary of the truce:—"The Convention was signed in the spring of 1609. The ten ensuing years in Europe were comparatively tranquil but they were scarcely to be numbered among the full and fruitful sheaves of a pacific epoch. It was a pause, a breathing spell. . . . To us of a remote posterity the momentary division of epochs seems hardly discernible. So rapidly did that fight of demons which we call the Thirty Years War tread on the heels of the 40 years struggle for Dutch independence which had just been suspended, that we are accustomed to think and speak of the eighty years War as one pure, perfect, sanguinary whole." (Life of Oldenbarnevelt).

zoon Coen the able Governor effected a peace with Salisbury and the Convention provided for the settlement of disputes among the two concerns. The English were expelled from Pularoon which was however given back soon after.

Notwithstanding this treaty (which was signed in 1619) the English were attacked and in 1623 Towerson and his nine comrades together with an equal number of Japanese and Portuguese were murdered under the orders of van Speult of Amboyna. The Dutch had to pay damages to the tune of £ 3,615 and their relations with the English grew strained.

Official relations however between Holland and England in Europe did not, during these years, correspond with the hard facts of Asiatic waters. The two countries were at peace and it was not until 1652 that owing to the passing of the Navigation Acts Anglo-Dutch relations became embittered. The great wars of the period 1652-1674 have but one interest to this study viz., by the Peace of Breda (1667) Pularoon was restored to the Dutch in lieu of New Amsterdam² in America which was renamed New York after the Duke who played a prominent part in the Second Dutch War.

English power clearly declined in the Far East. In Java pepper had given way to sugarcane and the English gave up all plans of further trading in the Spice Islands. By 1640 their pepper trade was at an end and their agencies lying to the east of Macassar were closed. The factory at Bantam was closed in 1683. Unmolested, the Dutch were free to build up their island empire. They had taken Jakatra in Java and had grown powerful and influential in Achin and in the Moluccas. Pieter Both, a great Governor organised their power during the years 1609-14. The project of establishing a permanent base in the eastern waters had also materialised thanks to the genius of the great Coen already referred to. In 1619 Batavia was founded. Time and again the city had been threatened by local chiefs but the population of the Spice Islands yielded gradually to the drastic discipline of the Dutch and it has continued to this day the capital of their possessions in the East.

By a system of regular blockade the Dutch sought to destroy what remained of the Portuguese power in the Indies. They became masters of Malacca³ in 1641. The Portuguese retained

2. New Amsterdam was founded by the Dutch in 1611.

3. Malacca had remained in the hands of the Portuguese since the days of Albuquerque (1511). The garrison that had secured their rule for one hundred and thirty years now fell in the hands of the Dutch company.

Macao and Timor but they were of little use without Malacca. They were soon deprived of the commercial settlements at Macassar which event took place in 1661. From this post they had been distributing spices in some of the eastern markets. The English too maintained a factory there and the Danes from Tranquebar specialised in the trade of cloves, maces and nutmegs. Friendship was also established with the king of Macassar who expelled the Portuguese. By 1668 Dutch supremacy in the Archipelago was an established fact.

The framework of their organisation was strengthened by the establishment at Taiwan on the Formosa coast of a settlement that served as a base for the trade with China. Taiwan was one of the most hopeful possessions; we read of its extensive commerce with the mainland and its loss in 1661 was certainly a serious blow to Dutch influence in the east.

3. The Dutch had secured a footing in Japan too. Their first appearance should be dated 1609 when the 'Red Lion' and the yacht 'Griffon' arrived at Hirado. The daimyo received them well and a deputation waited on the shogun at Yedo in the Hando Isle. The Dutch received a patent in 1611 and the shogun sent a note to the king of Holland promising his subjects all help and protection. They were allowed to 'traffic and build homes serviceable and needful for their merchandise'. 'I will maintain and defend them as my own subjects'. Many of the improved notions of western medicine were introduced into Japan by the Dutch.⁴

Trade was developed on profitable lines. Their rivalry with the Portuguese settlers in the island led to the latter being banished and the Dutch establishing at Nagasaki in 1640. The small island of Deshima was also occupied.

4. Now we turn to the transactions of the Dutch in India. Though their original designs in the east were no way concerned with India, the Dutch were not slow to realise that India should be included in their scheme of operations if trade was to be profitable. The need arose from the fact that pepper and other spices they sought in the Indies were ordinarily obtained from producers by exchanging Indian made cotton cloths.

4. D. Murray, Japan. 'The Story of the Nations'. T. Fisher Unwin.

During the early years the Dutch were much helped by an Englishman William Adams by name. He was an earlier settler in Japan and was instrumental in obtaining then the patent in 1620. In his letters he speaks of the Dutch having been treated by Japanese authorities with 'great conditions'.—ibid. Chapter. xii.

The Portuguese were the earliest European nation to settle in India. The English and the French succeeded them. The Danish settlement at Tranquebar dates from 1622 but it had a shortlived existence. The English Company was destined to outlive its competitors and Dutch hostility did much to eliminate the Portuguese from the field and the fortunes of the Britisher brightened as a result of rivalry being limited to the French.

The first recorded attempt of the Dutch to enter the cloth market of India was in western India in Gujarat. Two Dutch factors took passages from Achin and were welcomed in Surat. They sent very encouraging reports and eventually an agency was established at Surat which however had but an year of existence. Van Deynson the manager met with a violent death owing to Portuguese persecution and here ended for the time being Dutch enterprise in Western India. In 1615 van Ravestyn revived trade in Surat at a time when Roe's mission at the Court of Jehangir was proving unsuccessful. Pieter van den Broecke (1621) as resident director did much to make the Surat factory a paying concern and contracted the treaty with Prince Khurram which was of much help to the Dutch in their operations in the Red Sea.

Portuguese power in India was undermined with very little difficulty. The Colony at Amboyna had fallen in 1605. Two years later their monopoly was to be rudely shaken by the French Pyrard Laval having the temerity to enter the trade of India. Goa an important settlement fell into the hands of the Dutch in 1639. It had been in Portuguese hands since 1510. Malacca was also seized two years later. Jaffnapatam the last stronghold of Portugal in Ceylon was taken in 1658.

5. On the Coromandel too the Dutch had made considerable headway. Probably their successes were phenomenal in this region. Pulicat was the site of their earliest settlement on the east Coast. The factory there was one of the earliest they erected in India. They also built a fort here which they called Castel Geldria. At an early date they executed an agreement with the King of Golkonda. At Kayal they established a factory in 1645. Two years after that another Portuguese settlement was taken. This was Negapatam which was the principal settlement of the Dutch in India. Trade was also set up at Sadras on the Palar river. In 1652 Palakollu saw their first factory near Madras.

Portuguese hegemony was certainly disappearing in the peninsula no less than in the Far East. Even their old settlements on the Malabar were no longer theirs, for, the towns on the pepper

The Dutch in the Coromandel.

coast were being transferred to Dutch control. Quilon and Cannanore were seized during the years 1661-64. The town and the fort were taken with the assistance of the Rajah of Cochin (1663).

The Portuguese were expelled from San Thome in 1669, the year of the loss of Macassar. Not only that. In 1686-90 the Dutch wrested Masulipatam and put restrictions on the English trade there 'on purpose to lay the English low in the eyes of the natives according to their usual treatment'. The Dutch also settled at Petapoli now known as Nizampatam.

Portuguese power had all but vanished. Even distant Ormuz had fallen into the hands of the Persians and the English. In the Far East they came to have only Macao and Timor and on the mainland of India itself Diu and Daman and later Goa alone remained.

Their fall was due in the first instance to their shortsighted commercial policy which was deliberately based on a vicious monopoly of trade in spices and remained from first to last destitute of sound economic principle. Their military commercial policy swallowed all their profit and Roe a shrewd observer as he was left in record his utter disgust of a system that permitted at great loss the erection in large numbers of fortifications to sustain and prop up commercial power. He spoke of the beggary of Portugal who never profited by the Indies.⁵

6. In the North, the Dutch had factories at Patna, Chinsurah, Cossimbazaar and also at Agra.⁶ In Bengal the Moghul Governors were friendly to their activities as they helped the State in the days of Shah Jahan in the suppression of the piracy widely prevalent in the Indian waters under the captainship of persons like the famous Fra Joan. Shayista Khan had particular admiration for the 'wise' Dutchmen and to placate his friends expressed the English. The affairs of the English company were far from satisfactory. What with their private trading and with Keigwin's rebellion in Bombay (1684) their affairs were not as they ought to have been. At Chinsurah and other places in Bengal the Dutch appeared to be positively dangerous rivals. And English overtures

5. Vide Appendix for Roe's views on Portuguese and Dutch trade in India.

6. Cp. Bernier writing from Delhi under date 1 July 1663: 'The Dutch have a malt factory at Agra in which they generally keep four or five persons'. Further on he mentions the Dutch establishments at Bengal, Patna, Surat or Ahmadabad'.

were always resisted by the Moghuls who had their cue from the Dutch. It was not until the famous award of Godolphin in 1702 that amity between the two nations was restored in Bengal.

7. The Dutch came into collision with the French too. Richelieu had founded the French East India Company in 1642 on the model of the English organisation. But it did not thrive as a trading concern and not infrequently its energies were frittered away in unnecessary wars that came in the wake of needless interferences in the affairs of native governments. The Frenchman Carron seized San Thome from the Dutch to whom it was returned two years later.

The Dutch forced the French to evacuate San Thome in 1693. and Pondicherry⁷ fell into their hands. They held the City for some six years and the town was restored to the French under the terms of the Peace of Ryswick (1699). While it was in their possession the Dutch constructed fortifications which long ranked as the finest in all India.

There was not much between the two people. Their relations were always strained. In 1746 some French ships returning from China and Manilla were captured by the English and the Dutch were accused of assisting them despite their professions of neutrality in Anglo-French relations. War was threatened by the French Government if adequate restitution was not made by Holland. The letter of the French King to the Government at Amsterdam is referred to in the interesting diary of Anandaranga Pillai, dubash to the great Dupleix. Here is an excerpt: 'When they basely took our ships you purchased these, together with their cargoes. In what way were you warranted in doing this? Your action shows that you are attached to the interests of the English. You must either restore to us the ships and the value of their ladings or declare war.' 'The Company (the Dutch one) has consequently written to the Governor that the money would be recovered', says the diarist.⁸ It is clear that for sometime English diplomacy had held the Dutch under its control and influence. Says Anandaranga Pillai: 'As there is no king of Holland the people of that country have put themselves under the protection of the King of England and have been assisting the English in this time of trouble

7. This city was founded by Martin in 1674.

8. The Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai: Published by the Superintendent, Government Press, Madras. Vol. II. Pp. 39-40.

with men and money. The Dutch have thus been carrying on their Government with the help of England. The new king was not countenanced by them, they retained their allegiance to the old one and took the necessary precautions to hinder the former from being installed in the throne' (Vol. II. of the Diary). The Dutch delivered the vessels seized and these became French property. But in the meantime the French Government held in occupation some of the towns on the Dutch frontier in Europe. Says the Gazette quoted in the Diary: 'As the Dutch have always inclined to the side of the English the King of France has taken three or four towns in Holland⁹ in May 1747 and has written to the States-General that if they think well and act suitably with their wisdom their dignity will be maintained but otherwise they know what to expect'.¹⁰

We read in the Diary of the remarkable exploits of one Captain M. Roussel an account of whom as given by Dupleix is reproduced in the fifth volume.¹¹ Roussel was a Dutch captain. He entered French service, took a French wife and was a commandant at Mahe for a while. He was engaged in a duel with M. Bouteville on which he was recalled and put under arrest. He returned to Holland, entered Dutch service and came back to India as captain. He participated in the siege of Pondicherry and later on served the Dutch settlements in Bengal.

Dupleix held strong views on the position of the Dutch in India. He was sceptic of their ultimate success as that of the British company and predicted the downfall of both.¹²

8. Dutch power in India began to decline with the commencement of the eighteenth century when they were stripped of their possessions. Strangely enough it was Lord Clive that gave the blow in Bengal. He sedulously guarded British interests ever since the headstrong successor of Allahvardi Khan schemed the destruction of his Company.

The central years of the century saw an unofficial war between the Dutch and the English in India. Mir Jaffir was in league with the Dutch in Chinsurah. The latter were reinforced from Batavia first by one ship and then by six, all of which were

well received by Mir Jaffir. The Dutch began to search English vessels plying in the Bay of Bengal and their effrontery reached its climax when they laid hands on one of Clive's own ships. The two nations were at peace in Europe but with calculated audacity Clive took the matter into his own hands. The Dutch having given a handle he did not hesitate and resolved on war. There were but 700 men in his settlement including Europeans and half-Europeans as against the 1,400 that the Dutch could put forth in the field. In 1759 Chinsurah was attacked by land and by sea. Clive landed all his available forces and captured the enemies' host. The Dutch were defeated and had to ignominiously capitulate. Colonel Forde just returned from the Northern Circars engaged Admiral Cornish at Biderra. The huge Dutch force was defeated (Nov. 1759). Only fifty Dutchmen escaped. The action, said to have been short and bloody is yet one of the most decisive events in Indian History, an interesting milestone besides Plassey and Buxar in the progress of British dominion in India. 'It resulted in the complete submission of the Dutch and their final withdrawal from the field of Indian politics'.¹³

That was the beginning of the end. In November 1781 soon after Sholingar, Negapatam was lost to the Dutch. In January 1782 the splendid harbour of Trincomalai fell into British hands.

The Dutch power was jeopardised on European fields during the period of the great wars at the close of the eighteenth century. In 1795, on the conquest of Holland by France, the Dutch factories in India were handed over to the East India Company. These comprised three groups:

- (i) those on the Coromandel Coast, with headquarters at Pulicat;
- (ii) those on the Madura coast as it was called, with headquarters at Tuticorin; and
- (iii) those on the Malabar coast with headquarters at Cochin.¹⁴

It is easy to summarise the closing events of Dutch relations with India and the dealings of the East India Company with the Governors-General of India in the nineteenth century. The Marquis of Wellesley (1798—1805) projected an expedition against Mauritius but Admiral Rainier would not co-operate without

9. Sluys, Sas de Gand, Hulst and Axel.

10. Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai. Vol. V. April, 15, 1748. P. 23.

11. Ibid. P. 448 sqq.

12. The relevant para in the Diary is quoted in extenso in the Appendix.

13. Vincent A. Smith, C. I. E. The Oxford History of India, P. 496.

14. Quilon had become part of the Travancore state in 1742. Dutch occupation of the town lasted for eighty years.

authorisation from home. The idea was abandoned and the Governor-General urged instead the taking of the Cape from the Dutch now in alliance with the French. An attack on Batavia was contemplated but was not carried out. Earl Minto (1807—13) attacked the Dutch possessions in the East at a time when Holland lay at the mercy of Bonaparte. The Cape of Good Hope was lost in 1806 and the Spice Islands and Amboyna as well. Sir Samuel Achmutty of the Madras army led an expedition to the Spice Islands or Moluccas which was occupied in 1810. Fort Cornelis near Batavia, the capital of the Dutch Java was ably defended by the French Jansens. It was however stormed by Gillespie (1811). Lord Minto who had accompanied the expedition effected with the assistance of Sir Stamford Raffles an admirable settlement with the Javanese and their chiefs. Java should have proved a valuable possession but Minto's successor Lord Hastings (1813—23) restored it to Holland unconditionally when with the final defeat of Napoleon she was freed from French influence. During the Governor-Generalship of Lord Almherst (1823—28) Malacca became British territory (1824). And in Bengal, Chinsurah, which had continued even after Biderra to be in Dutch hands was ceded to the British Government (1825) in exchange for some settlements in Sumatra. Thus vanished the last of the Dutch possessions in India.

9. Early in the seventeenth century both the English and the Dutch had to make their way in the teeth of Portuguese rivalry in the East not to say in India. Both coveted the Far East rather than the mainland of India as the fairer and more profitable inheritance and here the Dutch prevailed over the English and secured their end.¹⁵ Portuguese rivalry too was successfully combated in India as well as in the Indies but unlike in the case of the latter they had to give way to the Englishmen. The Dutch were never strong in India and the English, never so in the Far East. India was never the goal of Holland but England had to concentrate on the peninsula rather than on the Spice Archipelago where her star waned early. In India the Dutch pulverised Portuguese power and when their own shortlived empire came to a close they had rendered a signal service to the English company in that the latter's path was cleared. For, further rivalry was restricted to the French.

15. Cp. 'The English were reluctantly forced to develop their resources on the mainland. The Spice Islands were in reality a seductive bypath leading others astray.'—P. E. Roberts. *Historical Geography of India*.

The causes of the early Dutch successes may now be investigated.

In the first place their company was a national affair and as in the case of the French company it derived all the benefit of being a state concern. The Dutch acted in the east with the certainty that the Home Government stood by them. From the first they had a strong centralised government in the East. The direction of their resources was in the hands of a Governor-General, a powerful officer of State with freehand in matters of policy.

Their interests were certainly secure in the hands of masterful personalities like Matelieff and Coen. Matelieff gave Holland its commercial policy in the earlier stages; and as director of the factors in Java and then as Governor-General, Coen dominated Dutch affairs as an Albuquerque of their history. Coen's memorandum of instructions left to his successor in 1623 was a classic though the Company vetoed several of his ambitious projects.

Sound administration then was the principal secret of Dutch success. The Council at Batavia was an efficient body. The chain of subordination was strict, each of the chiefs at Taiwan, Amboyna, Pulicat or Surat being responsible to the Council. Occasional visits of inspection checked abuses. Theirs was a financially sound organisation and they had preceded the English. Private trading was strictly prohibited in their body. The Directors at Amsterdam reiterated in 1676 their views on the practice; 'which is nothing else than a plague and canker in the company's body and flourishes everywhere in spite of all the orders decreed and the notices issued.'

The Dutch were also a great naval power. Roe considered their strength on the sea 'as greatly superior to ours and all other Europeans joined together.' The seventeenth century saw the transfer of seapower from the Portuguese to their hands and as late as 1718 they had a reputation of being 'Europe's strongest maritime power in the East'.

Added to these was the defective organization of their rivals. Portuguese weakness on the sea as that of the Moghuls was notorious and as for the Englishmen private trading acted as a gangrene in the body politic of their company. Theirs was a private corporation and it came rather late. Efficiency was not its merit for a long time. They had at this period troubles of their own. Keigwin's Rebellion was an example. There was no unity of command and early in the XIX Century a Rainier would not co-operate with Wellesley. English trading centres suffered also from

being grouped under two co-ordinate authorities, the Councils at Bantam and Surat both of which differed acutely on matters of policy.

But the Dutch eventually failed in India. Remoteness from their headquarters in Batavia had something to do with this. They were far away from Holland also and their position was jeopardised on European fields. Theirs was after all a small country and it lay at the mercy of the French Revolution and Bonaparte. Ananda Ranga Pillai gives us an insight into their position in the middle years of the 18th century. 'The affairs of the Dutch will not run smoothly as before (Pillai wrote in 1746) and their country will gradually fall into decay. Moreover their power has been crippled, for the territory of the Emperor which borders on Holland has been occupied by the French who have also seized many of the possessions of the English. As the Dutch ships bound for Holland will necessarily have to pass the shores of Flanders along which are forts garrisoned by French soldiers, they will at once be captured. Being thus beset with dangers and difficulties on all sides, the Dutch are dispirited and feel that their power is declining.' Dupleix had no doubt of their downfall and has expressed himself to that effect, and the diarist adds: 'I concurred with the sentiments which he had expressed and related anecdotes by way of illustration, the aptitude of which he admitted.'¹⁶ A trading concern depending on the patronage of a State beset with such difficulties could not hope to thrive and limited means prevented the Dutch from coping with the vast resources of an England. The English with all their faults could bring into being a splendid machinery at least after the Regulating 'Act'. Dutch decline was not surprising.

Sir W. W. Hunter mentioned their shortsighted policy as another contributory factor.¹⁷ 'Like the Phoenicians of old they were cruel. Unlike them they failed to introduce their civilization', said Hunter. But the Portuguese had tried the experiment of 'introducing civilisation' but had failed. Hunter was perhaps nearer truth when he spoke of Dutch cruelty.

The Dutch ousted the Portuguese. But their own ideas were commercial and not imperial. They therefore dropped out of the race for empire in India. In the census of 1872 only 70 Dutchmen were enumerated in all India and in 1881 only 79.

16. P. 82. Ananda Ranga Pillai's Diary. Vol. II.
17. The Imperial Gazetteer. Vol. II. Pp. 452-3.

The passage between Ceylon and the mainland still bears the name of the Dutch Governor Palks and quaint houses in Chinsurah, Negapatam, Jaffna and other parts of Coromandel and Malabar remind the traveller of scenes in the Netherlands.

There is a Dutch cemetery at Pulicat in the Chingleput district preserved by the Madras Government.¹⁸ It contains an imposing mausoleum of one of the Dutch Governors General and also tombs elaborately carved with armorial bearings and lengthy inscriptions. One of the entrances to the cemetery has a high romanesque lichgate one holding an hour glass and the other supporting a skull on a column.

Several Dutch and Portuguese tombstones¹⁹ are found in the church at Cochin considered to be one of the oldest European churches in India.

St. Peter's Church and a cemetery with large tombs are the memorials of the Dutch occupation of Negapatam.

Just as the Portuguese struck coins with the initial G for Goa and D for Diu, so the Dutch struck coins bearing the initial letter P for Pulicat and N for Negapatam. Dutch coins called *duits* and *halfduits* or *challis* bearing on one side the monogram V.O.C. and on the other arms of Zeeland, Friseland (Frisia), Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland are met with in large quantities in the bazaars and are to some extent current on the west coast.

These are the only relics of Dutch occupation in India. The Dutch flag itself flies nowhere in India to-day.

II. DUTCH TRADE IN INDIA

1. All available evidence would justify the inference that Dutch commercial supremacy in the East was real at least in the seventeenth century.

Business was not only large but progressive from the beginning and the shareholders of the company were usually paid high dividends, the percentage for an early date like 1605-09 being 35. Though the resources of the company were devoted to combating Portuguese rivalry in the Spice Islands, there is no doubt that trade had increased in volume and the Dutch handled a larger volume of European trade than the English. 'Their commercial supremacy

Extent of Indo-
Dutch Trade.

18. Madras by E. Thurston. Cambridge University Press.

19. The oldest of these goes to the beginning of Portuguese occupation in India. It is dated 1504.

may come as a surprise to readers familiar with ordinary text-books of Indian History but it is a commonplace to those who studied . . the period and while the Dutch reports and journals are marked by frequent sneers at the poverty and inefficiency of their English competitors, the English correspondence is characterised by grudging and envious admiration of the Dutch'.²⁰ In Western India the Dutch surpassed the English and in Bengal their predominance was indisputable from the outset.

2. Strength at sea was perhaps the principal factor that contributed to this phenomenal success. The Moghul Empire itself had no navy and was glad to avail itself of Dutch help in suppressing piracy. To the Hollander however the efficiency of the mercantile marine was a primary national interest which was sedulously safeguarded by the members of the company who constituted the dominant power in the State. The Dutch were not inferior to the English on the sea and with the disappearance of the Portuguese the carrying trade in the Indian Ocean passed into their hands. Surat prospered while Goa declined; Pulicat and Madras superseded San Thome and Negapatam. Dutch boats have always been preferred for their adaptability to bad weather. Their crew had their training in the stormy seas of Northern Europe and were not infrequently employed on Indian owned vessels. The shipping industry was certainly more than a source of income; its maintenance was not only essential to the security of national existence but was a valuable asset in the keeping up of Holland's prestige as a State.

Yet another explanation of Dutch commercial prosperity could be sought in their financial strength. They started with a good capital and had large investments in India. In Gujarat alone their annual investments are said to have exceeded four million guilders (equivalent to nine and a quarter lakhs) by 1635 when that part of the country had scarcely recovered from a famine. There was no apathy against export of species from home and this relieved financial stringency.

3. The Dutch usually rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Indian exports were for sometime merely of the kind required in South America and South Africa and Brazil. But stage was soon reached when consignments available to the European markets began to be made. The calico especially

Early Commercial Policy.

20. W. H. Moreland. *India from the Death of Akbar to Aurangzeb*.

grew to be a favourite and European trade in it tended to increase in volume. The first large order was for 1600 pieces and appears to have been placed in 1634.

4. It was a slave-owning State that the Dutch had established in the Indies. Batavia was a city without population.

Slave Trade.

The Dutch were few in number and the hostility of neighbouring communities prevented any large influx from the vicinity. A supply of inhabitants had to be organised as also a steady stream of reinforcements to make good the wastage. Plenteous supplies of slaves were obtained from the Pulicat-Tanjore side. Imported slaves like the 'Bengaldar, Arakandars, Malabarais' were affected by sickness on their arrival at Batavia and the Spice Islands. The supply was obtained by ordinary commercial methods and no force or fraud was used. Slave-trading however was not universal and its practice was purely the result of the peculiar conditions in the Dutch settlements in the East. Supply was necessarily restricted. In Arakan there was for sometime a restriction but 'certainly not due to humanitarian ideas'.²¹

The imported population had to be fed and a supply of wheat and pulse was found necessary. Though Siam, Indo-China and even Japan contributed to the trade, India was the most obvious source to draw from. The trade was beneficial to India. There was an outlet for her supplies. Batavia became a brisk centre of the grain trade.

5. The Dutch did not altogether succeed in their attempt at the exclusion of the English from the Spice Islands which was a cardinal part of their commercial policy since the days of Matelieff. But Dutch influence in Achin forced the English to abandon the pepper trade.

Articles of Trade: Spices.

As pepper was not an article covered by Portuguese royal monopoly the rigorous discipline enforced on the natives by them enabled the authorities at Amsterdam to regulate production on monopolistic lines. There was a factory at Jambi in Sumatra and agents did good work in the neighbouring islands. There was a demand for spices in the great cities of Antwerp and Amsterdam and in the payment of dividends they were as much used as cash.

But spices had to be obtained in the East only by bartering Indian made cotton cloth. It was thus that cotton brought the

21. Apart from this only one instance appears to have come to us of refusal by Indian authorities. In 1643 a naik rejected a Dutch request for 1000 slaves on the ground that sale of human beings was a sin.

Cotton goods. Dutch to India. They entered the clothmarket of India in 1601 when two factors were welcomed at Surat. But till 1660 Western Europe was an undeveloped market for cotton goods. There was no great demand for muslins or prints as apparel and their import by the Dutch would only bring into jeopardy the important linen industry of the motherland. Dress, fancy goods including pintadoes (painted cloths), chintzes, handkerchiefs, sheetdyed pieces of calico and clothes with an intermixture of silk were of increased demand as years rolled by. But the Dutch had no share in opening the European trade in these things. The possibilities of the trade were realised only through the activities of their English rivals.

A small but regular export in yarn was however introduced by the Dutch from the Coromandel and to a little extent from Surat. The article was opening a new market in Western Europe and the Dutch trade was maintained at somewhere about five hundred bales a year in a period when English commerce was on the decline.

Yarn Trade. Indigo was the commodity chiefly sought and highly valued by the first European buyers in India. Ralph Fitch gave it the place of honour among possible exports while Roe thought it a 'prime commodity'. The Dutch factors at Surat considered it as the most important local product and as early as 1607 van Deynson was arranging to buy indigo. Indigo was widely grown in the Gangetic doab and the area round Biana was the home of a well-known variety called the Lohori. Sarkhej in Gujarat was another important centre of production. The Dutch were first buying in the Vengurla region and in Sind and on several occasions obtained their supplies from other parts of Asia like Siam, Formosa, and Java. But there was no monopolising the trade and competition was not absent. Merchants from distant Persia came by the landroute to handle indigo at Agra. There were also instances of official interference. The Governor of Ahmadabad appears to have demanded in 1618 a lakh of rupees from the industry before he would permit the annual manufacture of indigo.

Indigo. Saltpetre has long been recognised as an essential ingredient of gunpowder. In the seventeenth century Spain was in serious difficulties over her munitions supply and the Viceroy at Goa used to send 10 to 15 casks of saltpetre to meet the demands in the Iberian peninsula. Regular despatch became very common. But the article the Dutch were getting was nearly the dearest that India could supply.

Saltpetre.

They therefore strove best to organise their purchase on profitable lines. The region first considered was the Coromandel coast, then Gujarat and then Agra. The establishment of a factory at Patna was followed by a remarkable expansion of trade, 'facilities for supply coinciding apparently with enhanced demand in Europe'. The quantities taken by them were larger than the British—shipment for 1661 went to 1480 cwt—and before long it was 'considered to rank with indigo as a primary object of commerce'.

6. The opening of the Japanese market to Bengal silk should be reckoned as perhaps the greatest achievement of the Dutch in Asia. Once political difficulties were surmounted trade was bound to improve as it did after 1650. A consignment of 300 bales is recorded for May 1653. Skin was another object of trade. In 1644 samples forwarded to Siam were favourably reported on by a Japanese merchant trading in that country and from this year dates the regular export from India.

The Japanese Market. 7. The monopoly of the spice trade with Japan and China had enabled the Dutch to utilise their capital to the best advantage. Indian and Persian demand for cloths and mace was met and it was possible to direct streams of gold and silver from China and Japan to any port of India that offered a remunerative trade. The Dutch settlement at Taiwan in Formosa was the centre of their treasure trade and the factory in Japan was under the control of the Governor General who was responsible for the main supply of treasure both gold and silver to the Indian market. Supplies from Taiwan met the major part of the requirements of the Dutch in India, gold being taken to the Coromandel coast, and silver to Gujarat and Bengal. Thus the demand for remittances from Europe was correspondingly reduced. A wise government at Batavia under an able Governor-General with wide powers was a recognised asset to the Dutch trading in the east. Unlike the English of that date, 'neither the Hollander nor the Venetian nor the Genoese are so curious to forbid exportation of money'. And this is an important circumstance favourable to the Dutch.

Treasure transport. As for copper and iron the Dutch introduced the one and plied a good export trade in the other. They developed a steady import of Japanese copper into Gujarat. This was not a too easily available metal in India; very expensive in the north, it was not

cheap in the South. The sales were satisfactory. Sometime after, trade was hampered by restrictions in Japan which lasted for about 8 years. At that time the Dutch sold copper from Sweden. The trade revived in 1648 and inadequate supplies and a rise in prices made it possible and profitable to establish an important trade. Supplies also went to Portugal.

There was a real demand for Indian iron in Batavia. The Dutch exported first from Masulipatam and then successfully developed the industry in the Godavari delta. The artisans imported by them introduced several improvements in technique. The producers of the Golkonda country appear to have profited to some extent.

8. India moreover was a market for imported articles like lead, cloves, mace and nutmegs.

Quick silver was extensively used for conversion into vermilion. The supplies came from China and Europe. There was a fall in price in the early decades of the seventeenth century and Dutch business at Surat competed successfully with English imports. Though a period of short rise followed, private trade continued to keep prices down. The demand for quicksilver was however 'insistent though limited'.

Commerce in
other articles.

Mention should be made of the 'toy trade'. Toys were imported to be used as presents. In common with other companies the Dutch had to keep in stock articles of presentation. Van Ravestyn reported that all manner of curiosities should be sent to India 'particularly for the great Moghul': 'pictures of landscapes and personages', 'mirrors as tall as a man with frames wrought with festoon' 'fine grey hounds and some strong dogs which will tackle tigers' etc. He described the Emperor Jehangir as 'an amateur of all rarities and antiquities'.

9. It is not correct to say that conditions were ever rosy for the Dutch. Competition was always keen, rivals were not wanting at Amsterdam itself, they were also the subjects of the 'farm' system and reprisals were by no means uncommon. They were however able to successfully contend against their Portuguese and Protestant rivals. The peculiar favour they enjoyed with the Moghul administration must have stood them in good stead. For instance, in 1624 they effected an agreement with Prince Khurram and they were free from all restrictions in the trade with the Red Sea. An imperial firman issued in 1634 exempted them from all tolls and dues in Western India. When seven years

Conditions
of Trade in India.

later the vexatious duties were again levied and the firman found useless, they lost no time in conciliating the officials and a new firman was obtained that protected them ever after.

APPENDIX.

I. ROE ON THE PORTUGUESE AND THE DUTCH COMPANIES:

"It is the beggaring of the Portugal, notwithstanding his many rich residences and territories, that he keeps soldiers that spend it, yet his garrisons are mean. He never profited by the Indies since he defended them. Observe this well. It hath been also the error of the Dutch, who seek plantation here by the sword. They turn a wonderful stock, they prowl in all places, they possess some of the best; yet their dead payes consume all their gains. Let this be received as a rule that if you will profit, seek it at sea and in quiet trade; for without controversy, it is an error to affect garrisons and landwars in India."

The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe. edited by W. Foster, (Hakluyt Society) Vol. ii. p. 344.

II. DUPLEIX ON THE DUTCH AND THE ENGLISH COMPANIES:

"The English Company is bound to die out. It has long been in an impecunious condition and what it had to its credit has been lent to the king whose overthrow is certain. The loss of its capital is therefore inevitable and this must lead to collapse. Mark my words. The truth of them will be brought home to you when you ere long find that my prophecy has been realized. In like manner the Dutch company is destined to share a similar fate. Its expenses continue to be enormous, whilst its trade has considerably decreased. The Dutch are moreover in great straits, now that the towns in the countries bordering Holland have become possessions of the French as have also the cities and the provinces on both the banks of the river which debouches into the sea in their country. This circumstance is particularly disagreeable to them as the sea and the river form their chief means of communication. Further the Dutch company is robbed by the very people who are in its service and consequently the latter enrich themselves at the cost of the company—which becomes proportionately impoverished. The occupations of the Dutch are solely confined to trade and commerce and their state owns no territorial possessions. These causes must conduce to the collapse

before long of this company also. About 200 towns belonging to the Dutch were captured last year by the king of France who however influenced by certain motives afterwards restored them. But having been disappointed in its expectations, he has again commenced military operations resulting in a serious loss of life and property. If princes hurry themselves into any act without due forethought, their undertakings must be attended by consequences affecting human lives and fortunes."

Entry for 1746. The Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai. Vol. ii. p. 81.

(Cp. Ananda Ranga Pillai: 'I concurred with the sentiments which he had expressed and related certain anecdotes by way of illustration the aptitude of which he admitted.'—ibid. p. 82.).

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Early Pandyan Chronology *

BY

MR. K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI M.A.

I

UNTIL the recovery of the larger Sinnamanūr plates and the Vēlvikuḍi grant, Pāṇḍyan history before the Cōḷa conquest of Madura was a blank. Although noticed in his list of Antiquities by Sewell in the eighties of the last century, the Sinnamanūr plates became available for study only in 1907; the text was edited first in the *Śentamizh* by Mr. A. S. Ramanatha Aiyar in Vol. XXIII, 1924-5 and again by Mr. Krishna Sastri in the South Indian Inscriptions in 1929. Likewise, the Vēlvikuḍi grant was brought to the notice of Venkayya as early as 1893 by Fleet; its contents were noticed by him in 1908; the text was edited first by Mr. K. G. Sankaran in the *Journal of the Mythic Society* Vol. X and in the *Śentamizh* Vol. XX and subsequently by Mr. Krishna Sastri in *Epigraphia Indica* Vol. XVII. On a proper interpretation of the data furnished by these two sets of copper-plates depends the history of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom for a period of three centuries before Parāntaka Cōḷa attacked Rājasimha and captured Madura about A. D. 910, thus paving the way for the annexation of the Southern kingdom to the newly risen power of the Cōḷas. The contents of these two early Pāṇḍyan charters may be reproduced for easy reference.¹

From the Vēlvikuḍi grant.

Pāṇḍya: a mythical king of a past *kalpa* born in this *kalpa* as Budha, son of the Moon.

Purūravas.
In his family

* It is much to be regretted that the article above makes wide departures from the system of transliteration adopted by the Journal of Indian History. To avoid delay it has been allowed to pass and similar lapses will be avoided for the future.—Editor.

¹ S. I. I. III p. 446.

Palyāgaśālai Mudukuḍumi-Peruvazhudi: an *Adhirāja* of the Pāṇdyas.

Inter-regnum in the Pāṇḍya country.

The Kali king Kaḷabhran: drove away numberless Adhirājas before him and took possession of the Earth (i.e., usurped the Pāṇḍya country).

(1) Pāṇḍyādhirāja Kaḷlungōn: recovered the Pāṇḍya country from the enemy, i.e., the usurper Kaḷabhran.

(2) Avanicūlāmaṇi Māṇavarman.

(3) Śezhiyan Vānavan Śēndan: the over-lord of the hill chiefs.

(4) Arikēsari Asamasaman Māṇavarman: won a battle at Pāzhi; and another at Nelvēli; destroyed the Paravas; annihilated the race of the people of Kuṟu-nāḍu; gained victory at Śennilam and fought the battle of Puliyūr against the Kēraḷa king.

(5) Kōccaḍaiyan Raṇadhīra: lord of the Kongas; entitled Tennan, Vānavan, Śembiyan, Śozhan and the beautiful Karuṇā-takan; defeated Āyvēl at Marudūr; gained victories at Śengōḍu and Pudānkōḍu(?); and destroyed the Mahārathas at Mangala-pura.

(6) Māṇan Rājasimha (I): fought a battle at Neḍuvayal; defeated his enemies at Kuṟumaḷai; destroyed their power at Manni-kuṟicci and Tirumangai; defeated insubordinate chiefs at Pūvalūr; won a victory at Koḍumbālūr; crushed the Pallava at Kuzhumbūr and at Periyālūr; crossed the Kāviri (Kāvērī) and conquered Mazha-Kongam; reached Pāṇḍi-koḍumuḍi; contracted relationship

with Gangarāja; renewed Kūḍal, Vañji and Kōzhi(?); and married a daughter of the Mazhava king.

(7) Jaṭila Parāntaka Neḍunjaḍaiyan: entitled Kongarkōn, king of the Nēriyar (i.e., the Cōḷas); Paṇḍitavatsala, Kalippagai, Punappūzhiyan, Śinaccōzhan, Śrīvaran, Tennan, and Vānavan, defeated the Kāḍava king at Penṇāgaḷam on the northern bank of the Kāvērī; drove away Āyvēl and the Kuṟumbas at Nāṭṭuk-kuṟumbu; married a daughter of Gangarāja and renewed the grant of Vēlṭvikuḍi. His minister fought a battle at Veṇbai in which the opponents were the Vallabha and the Pūrvarājar (kings of the East).

From the bigger Śinnamanūr plates.

The Pāṇḍyas were descended from the Moon; had Agastya for their family priest. In this family were born (a) a king who subdued and relieved Vijaya (i.e., Arjuna) from the curse of Vasu, (b) Sundara-Pāṇḍya, a helmsman in the ocean of Śāstras, (c) a king whose surname was Pūzhiyan, (d) a king who stood firmly in the field of battle at Pāzhi and obtained the title Pañcavan, (e) the builder of Madura with its surrounding wall, (f) a king who cut off the heads of two kings in the battles at Citramuyari and Talaiyālangānam.

Arikēsari Parānkuśa: king of the Pañcavas; defeated the Cēra king at Nelvēli and the Pallava king at Śankaramangai.

Jaṭila.

Rājasimha.

Varaguṇa (I) or Varaguṇa-Mahārāja.

Śrī-Māra, Śrīvallabha, Paracakrākōlāhala: fought successful battles at Kuṇṇūr, Śingaḷam and Vizhiṇam; defeated at Kuḍamūk-

kil the Ganga, Pallava, Cōla, etc., conquered Māyā-pāṇḍya, the Kēraḷa, the Simhala, the Pallava and the Vallabha.

Varaṅga II or Varagunavarman: succeeded to throne in A. D. 862.

Parāntaka Vīranārāyaṇa Śaḍaiyan: fought battles at Kharagiri, Sennilam, Nilambēr and Kuzhumbūr; destroyed Pennāgaḍam; won battles in the Kongu country; subdued the whole of Jumbudvīpa (Nāvaltīvu) and married Vānavanmahādēvi.

Rājasimha: entitled Vikāṭa-vāḍavan, 'the banner of both the Solar and the Lunar races'; fought battles at Ulappili-mangalam, Naippūr and Koḍumbai; burnt Vāñji on the northern bank of the river Kāvērī; fought a battle at Nāval where he defeated the lord of Southern Tañjai and was the donor of Narceygai-puttūr or Mandara-gaurava-mangalam.

It is clear from the summaries that both the grants record some legendary and quasi-historical events at the outset, and then proceed to give a regular genealogy with a brief history of each reign for several generations beginning with Kaḍungōn in the one case and Arikēsari Parāṅkuśa in the other.

The question is how to combine the genealogies furnished by these two grants into one continuous scheme. The decision of this matter is beset with several difficulties. Neither of these grants is dated; the number of dated stone inscriptions of the early Pāṇḍya kings is very small; even these few dated inscriptions are not free from obscurities as they often give only the titles Māraṇ-śaḍaiyan or Śaḍaiyan-māraṇ without the personal names of the

monarch in whose reign the inscription was engraved. Venkayya who was the first to deal with this question stated: "I am not quite sure how and where the names furnished by the Vēlvikuḍi grant fit into the tentative genealogy derived from the Śinnamanūr plates", and gave the following table:²

Pāṇḍyādhirāja Paramēśvara Paśālai-Mudukuḷumi-Peruvazhudi.

Kaḷabhra interregnum.

1. Kadungōn Pāṇḍyādhirāja.

2. Adhirāja Māravarman Avaniśūlāmaṇi.

3. Śezhiyan Śēndan.

4. Māravarman Arikēsarin Asamasaman, defeated the army of Vilvēli at Nelvēli.

5. Kōccaḍaiyan Raṇadhīra; fought the battle of Marudūr; defeated Maharatha in the city of Mangalapuram.

6. Arikēsarin Parāṅkuśa Māravarman Tēr-Māraṇ; defeated the Pallava at Kuzhumbūr; conquered the Pallavas at Śanakaramangai; Rājasimha (I) defeated Pallavamalla; renewed the walls of Kūḍal, Vāñji and Kōzhi.

² A. R. E. Annual report on Epigraphy—1908, II 28.

7. Jaṭila Neḍunjaḍaiyan Parāntaka; defeated the Kāḍava at Pennāgaḍam; (donor of the Vēlvikuḍi grant,) A.D. 769-70.

8. Rājasimha (II).

9. Varaguṇa-Mahārāja; Jayantavarman (?)

10. Śrīmāra Śrīvallabha Ēkavīra Paracakra-kōlāhala; conquered Māyā-Pāṇḍya, Kēraḷa, Simhaḷa, Pallava and Vallabha; *Pallava-bhanjana*.

11. Varaguṇavarman; ascended the throne in A.D. 862-863.

12. Parāntaka Vīranārāyaṇa Śaḍaiyan; fought at Kharagiri and destroyed Pennāgaḍam; married Vānavanmahādevi, Jaṭila Neḍunjaḍaiyan (donor of the Madras Museum and smaller Sinnamanūr plates?).

13. Rājasimha (III) Mandaragaurava Abhimānamēru.

Venkayya also pointed out that this table depended for its validity on the correctness of some 'facts and surmises' the overthrow of any of which by future research may render necessary a reconsideration of the whole genealogy. There were three considerations put forward by him in support of his scheme; two of these viz., the identity of Rājasimha of the Sinnamanūr plates with the Pāṇḍyaking overthrown by Parāntaka Cōḷa, and that of Neḍunjaḍaiyan of the Vēlvikuḍi grant with Māraṇjaḍaiyan of Ānaimalai cave inscription, have stood the test of time and may be accepted as correct. But the paleographical argument of Venkayya has not turned out to be so happy. He said: "Neḍunjaḍaiyan of the Vēlvikuḍi grant cannot be identical with his namesake of the Madras Museum plates, but the former must be earlier than the

latter". It is now recognised on all hands that this view is wrong, and that there is nothing in the paleography of the Madras Museum plates which would justify a later date for them than that of the Vēlvikuḍi grant.³ Venkayya stated further: "The Madras Museum plates of Jaṭilavarman and the smaller Sinnamanūr plates are probably nearer in point of time to the larger Sinnamanūr plates than they are to the Vēlvikuḍi grant". This statement, now antiquated by the fact that the Museum plates and the Vēlvikuḍi grant are ascribed to the same ruler, is still of interest as in part accounting for Venkayya's arrangement of the genealogy of the early Pāṇḍya kings. The three generations interposed by him between the donor of the Vēlvikuḍi grant and Parāntaka Vīranārāyaṇa Śaḍaiyan, the donor, according to Venkayya, of the Museum plates are in some measure the result of his views on the relative intervals separating these plates from one another. As these views are now seen clearly to be untenable, one of the chief "surmises" supporting Venkayya's system of genealogy no longer holds good, and it is necessary to ré-examine the genealogy in the light of this and other relevant facts.

II

I ventured in my *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom* to suggest a scheme of ten generations comprising eleven rulers, 'short-circuiting' the pedigree accepted by previous writers, as Mr. F. J. Richards puts it, by two generations, and making "a very fine man of Varaguṇa".⁴ In other words, I identified Arikēsari Parāṅkuśa of the Sinnamanūr plates with Arikēsari Asamasaman (No. 4) of the Vēlvikuḍi grant instead of with Rājasimha I (No. 6) as Venkayya had done, and following him, others. This resulted in Jaṭila Parāntaka being identified with Varaguṇa Mahārāja; it also meant that two long reigns, those of Varaguṇa-mahārāja and of his son, took the place of the four shorter reigns of Varaguṇa I, Rājasimha II, Varaguṇa II and Śrī-Māra of Venkayya's scheme.

Not only has no reason been found so far for going back on the scheme put forward by me, but some more positive reasons for its being preferred to the other may now be urged, and it is my object here to do this and to consider some of the other opinions that have been offered on the subject.

³ See my *Pandyan Kingdom* pp. 42-44 for a full discussion of this point.
⁴ J. R. A. S. 1930 p. 945.

One remarkable thing may be mentioned at the outset. In 1907, discussing the stone records of Māraṇjaḍaiyan, after ascribing some of them to Varaguṇa II (acc A.D. 862), Mr. Venkayya observed:⁵ "About other inscriptions dated in the reign of Māraṇjaḍaiyan, we cannot be quite sure if they belong to Varaguṇa, or to one or more kings different from him. For instance, at Mānūr in the Tinnevely district is a record belonging to the 37th year of Māraṇjaḍaiyan (No. 423 of 1906), whose identity with any of these kings on the genealogical table cannot now be established. For the present, at any rate, those inscriptions of Māraṇjaḍaiyan, which cannot without doubt be assigned to any of the kings in the foregoing genealogical table, must be kept distinct from No. 5 Varaguṇa-Mahārāja and No. 7 Varaguṇa Varman." In the epigraphical report recently issued we read again:⁶ "One other record (No. 12), in Vaṭṭezhuttu, belonging to a Māraṇjaḍaiyan comes from Daḷapatisamudram in the Tinnevely district, and it is dated in the 6th year opposite the 35th of the reign. We cannot say who this Pāṇḍya king was; but we may note that at Mānūr in the same district there is a record (423 of 1906) of a Māraṇjaḍaiyan, similarly dated in the 35th year—469th day. Another record of a Māraṇjaḍaiyan bearing the high regnal year 43 (No. 605 of 1915) has been copied at Ēruvāḍi, a village three miles from Daḷapatisamudram. It is left to future research to settle who the Pāṇḍya king was that had such high regnal years".⁷ Now one may hesitate to accept as valid a scheme that causes so much difficulty in finding a reasonable disposal for the records that undoubtedly belong to the period with which we are concerned. It cannot be doubted that Māraṇjaḍaiyan with these high regnal years was one of the powerful Early Pāṇḍyas of the First Empire.

It should cause no surprise that, though this king held sway for such a long time and certainly over a wide stretch of country outside the bounds of the traditional Pāṇḍya Kingdom, his records are not found in any considerable number outside the southern parts of his dominions. This feature characterising the provenance of these early records is only proof of the many changes that have come over the monuments of the Cōḷa country and other tracts in the course of subsequent centuries. The numberless renovations of ancient temples undertaken in the Cōḷa period of

⁵ A. R. E. 1907 II 21.

⁶ A. R. E. 1929 II 8.

⁷ 104 of 1905 of the 39th year from Ambāsamudram; and 863 of 1917 of the 42 year from Kaḷugumalai may also be mentioned.

South Indian history must have led to the destruction * of most of the ancient records, especially where they had been originally engraved, like the inscriptions of the early Pāṇḍya kings, in Vaṭṭezhuttu characters.

Now, the Ānamalai inscription of A.D. 769-70 and Aivarmalai record which yields A.D. 862 for the accession of Varaguṇa Varman II leave barely an interval of ninety two years to be filled, in accordance with the arrangement suggested by Mr. Venkayya,⁸ by a part of the reign of Jaṭila-Parāntaka and three generations of rulers succeeding him one after another. There is little room here, therefore for a reign of over forty years, which is required by the Māraṇjaḍaiyan records under discussion. Considering the position after A.D. 862 for a moment, what we find is that the next sure date is furnished by the conquest of Madura by Parāntaka I Cōḷa, which is mentioned as early as A.D. 910. We also know that Varaguṇa II was ruling about A.D. 880, the date of the battle of Śrīpuṇḍriyam in which the Ganga Prithivīpati I, whose last known inscription is dated in A. D. 879, lost his life. The interval between this date A.D. 880, and the Cōḷa conquest of Madura, c. A.D. 910-20, is taken up by the closing years of the reign of Varaguṇa II, and the rule of Parāntaka Vīranārāyaṇa, both of them Māraṇjaḍaiyans, and by the opening years of Rājasimha, the Pāṇḍya who, according to the Udayēndiram plates of Prithivīpati II, was attacked and overthrown by Cōḷa Parāntaka I. Here again there seems to be no room for a reign of over forty years. Earlier than A.D. 770, there is only one Śaḷaiyan expressly so called, Kōccaḍaiyan Raṇadhīra; of him we do not know much, but if it is correct to identify his father, the Victor of Nelvēli with the contemporary of the Śaiva saint Tirugnānasambandhar, it is not possible for Raṇadhīra to be assigned as long a period of rule as the late Māraṇjaḍaiyan records would require. Śēndan and Kaḍungōn, also perhaps Śaḷaiyans, though not so described anywhere, are really too early in point of time for these records to be assigned to them, or indeed for any of their records to have come down

* In regard to this statement it must be borne in mind that the Cholas insisted upon the careful preservation of these records either by re-setting them or by setting copies of them where the original were too far gone. For a circular of Rajendra I and note of its having been carried out, refer to Nos. 651 and 652 of Tirumalavāḍi in the Tanjore District (p. 182 Hindu Administrative Institutions in South India, Sir William Meyer Lectures delivered by me). For a similar circular of Rāja-rāja III &c. see Epigraphist's Report: Sec. 32 of 1911 and Sec. 41 of 1913.—Editor.

⁸ A. R. E. 1908 II 28.

to us among the inscriptions we are concerned with. Considerations like these weighed greatly with me when I suggested the deletion from Mr. Venkayya's list of Rājasimha II (8)⁹ and Varaguṇa-Mahārāja (9) on the ground that they were obviously identical with Rājasimha I (6) and Jaṭila Parāntaka (7), and also assigned a long reign of about fifty years to Jaṭila Parāntaka, who was a Māraṇjaḍaiyan with the name Varaguṇa.¹⁰ We have also a Śaḍaiya-māraṇ record of the 46th year which, though a Tamil record, perhaps belongs to this period also.¹¹ As my book was passing through the press, there appeared Mr. Krishna Sastri's edition of the Śinnamanūr plates in the *South Indian Inscriptions* which sought to reinforce the position of Mr. Venkayya by some fresh arguments. These I have examined in a long note at the end of my book and I need not repeat the discussion here. I must say, however, that on further consideration I have had to conclude that 'Vilvēli' is not a proper name¹² and that consequently that part of the argument of Mr. Krishna Sastri which is based on this assumption cannot be taken to be of much value.

III

One critic of my scheme formulates his criticism in the following terms:¹³ "At the present stage, only three dates are well-known, i.e., (1) A.D. 862 the date of Varaguṇa varman's accession. (2) A.D. 770 for the donor of the Vēlvikuḍi grant, and (3) A.D. 642, the date of the destruction of Vātāpi, the Cālukya capital. Mr. Śāstri has given tentative dates allowing thirty years for Kaḍuṅgon, twenty-five years each for Avani-Śūlāmaṇi and Śēndan, forty years for Arikēsari Māra-varman or Ninra Śīr Neḍumāraṇ, thirty years for Kōccaḍaiyan Raṇadhīra, twenty-five years for Rājasimha, fifty years for the donor of the Vēlvikuḍi grant and forty seven years for Śrī Māra Śrīvallabha. In the absence of much evidence in giving unduly long periods for the last two monarchs here named, we feel too diffident to rely upon Mr. Śāstri's dates. Scholars know that Saint Appar converted Mahēndravarman who ruled from circa A.D. 600 to 625. Appar was also moving about from place to place with his friend saint

Sambandhar, who is known to have cured Ninra Śīr Neḍumāraṇ of his fever. If the Neḍumāraṇ in question ruled from 670 to 710, it is highly doubtful if Appar could have been alive, and if alive, strong enough to lift Sambandar's palanquin on his shoulders and get mixed in the crowd of Sambandar's followers, as is narrated in his life. It is almost certain, therefore, that Neḍumāraṇ, the saint, should have mounted the throne much earlier than A.D. 670. These difficulties can be conveniently avoided by accepting roughly the following dates:—Kaḍuṅgōn 562-592; Avani Śūlāmaṇi 592-622; Śēndan 622-652; Ninra Śīr Neḍumāraṇ 652-682; Raṇadhīra 682-712; Arikēsari II 712-742; Kōccaḍaiyan (donor) 742-772; Rājasimha 772-802; Varaguṇa Mahārāja 802-832; Śrī Māra Śrīvallabha 832-862; Varaguṇa Varman 862 to (?)".

There are raised two objections to my scheme in this criticism: first that there is no warrant for the long reigns assigned by me to the donor of the Vēlvikuḍi plates, and to his son and successor Śrīmāra Śrīvallabha. This objection is based, as must have become clear from the observations made earlier in this paper, on an inadequate appreciation of the epigraphical evidence relating to the period. It is the high regnal years in some of the Māraṇjaḍaiyan records, and the utter impossibility of finding out anything about the history of Rājasimha II and Varaguṇa I (on Mr. Venkayya's scheme) from the Śinnamanūr grant or from any other source, that led me to suspect some mistake in the scheme of identifications of Mr. Venkayya and ultimately to put forward the alternative actually adopted by me. So long as there are no intrinsic objections to it and a better arrangement does not come into view, I see no reason to be frightened by one long reign succeeding another. I can only draw attention once more to the analagous case of Nandi-varman Pallavamalla and Dantivarman.

The second objection is based on the difficulty of fitting into my scheme the known facts relating to the lives of the Śaiva saints. After making out an apparently strong case for dating the accession of Ninra Śīr Neḍumāraṇ much earlier than I do, the suggestion is offered that his reign may be assigned to the period 652 to 682, my own dates being 670 to 710. All these dates are approximate, and for practical purposes these two sets of dates are near enough to be treated as being substantially in agreement. No one can be quite sure for instance that Mahēndravarman's reign closed in A.D. 625; and did not, in fact, extend up to 630—the date adopted by Mr. Gopalan for the end of the reign, or even 635 A.D. Again, we should remember that Appar had by tradition—and in dealing with the lives of the Saints we are all trafficking in tradition, sometimes rather too freely—a very long life as is seen

⁹ The numbers in brackets are those of Venkayya's table.

¹⁰ *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom* p. 40.

¹¹ 440 of 1907. I must note, however, that Venkayya was inclined to think it a later record of about the time of Rājendra 1 Cōla—A. R. E. 1908 p. 59.

¹² J. O. R. Vol. V. p. 73.

¹³ J. I. H. 1929 p. 279.

from the mnemonic verse that assigns to him a life of eighty-one years.¹⁴ I may mention, incidentally, that my difficulty has always been not in regard to Appar, but about the relation among Śiṟuttonḍar, Neḍumāraṇ and Gnānasambandar.¹⁵ Tradition says that Gnānasambandar did not live beyond the age of sixteen and that he was entertained once as a guest by Śiṟuttonḍar of Vātāpi fame.¹⁶ With the destruction of Vātāpi in A.D. 642, it is difficult to fit in the date provided by Śēkkizhār on the lives of the saints even with A.D. 652 as the starting date for Neḍumāraṇ's rule; with A.D. 670 for the accession of Neḍumāraṇ there is no possible method of working the data from Śaiva hagiology into the chronological scheme. If an objection is to be urged against my scheme from the standpoint of religious legends relating to the period, but narrated for the first time with great conciseness by Nambi Aṇḍār Nambi in the 10th or 11th century, and much more elaborately by Śēkkizhār in the twelfth, the difficulty of adjusting the facts of the lives of Śiṟuttonḍar and Sambandar is much more serious than that relating to the age of Appar. Appar as I have pointed out lived to a ripe old age of 81, and assuming that he converted Mahēndravarman sometime between A.D. 625 and 635 there is nothing intrinsically improbable in meetings between him and Sambandar about A.D. 670-680. And it may be noted, in passing, that we have at present no sure means of dating the conversion to Śaivism either of Mahēndravarman or of Neḍumāraṇ. To object that if Appar was alive about A.D. 670-80 he would not have been strong enough to lift Sambandar's palanquin on his shoulders is to confound Śēkkizhār's hint of a ceremonial courtesy on the part of Appar towards his fellow-apostle Sambandar with the rough work of a day-labourer.

The difficulty about Śiṟuttonḍar does indeed appear insuperable at first sight. If we must accept Śēkkizhār's statements as based on a correct tradition, if A.D. 642 is the only possible date for an expedition against Vātāpi, and if it is true that Sambandar died at the early age of sixteen, the scheme of Pāṇḍyan chronology which advocates so late a date as A.D. 670 for the accession of Neḍumāraṇ is doomed. But, very cogent reasons have been shown¹⁷ for holding that there was another and a later raid on Vātāpi towards the close of the reign of Cālukya Vikramāditya I

¹⁴ Apparukkembattonṟu, etc.

¹⁵ Pāṇḍyan Kingdom, p. 54, n. 1.

¹⁶ Periyapurāṇam, Śiṟuttonḍar VV. 23 and 24, and Sambandar 468 ff.

¹⁷ Dr. N. Venkataramanayya—The Madras Christian College Magazine 1927—pp. 236 ff.

in the years A.D. 674-80, soon after the celebrated battle of Peruvālanallūr, and that the "City of Raṇarasika" captured by Paramēśvaravarman I Pallava was no other than Vātāpi. There is nothing in the narration by Śēkkizhār of the life of Śiṟuttonḍar that precludes our connecting that warrior-saint with this second raid against the 'City of Raṇarasika,' 'Vātāpi-ttonnagaram', as Śēkkizhār more explicitly puts it. * And this, it seems to me, is the best course to adopt in reconciling all known data drawn from literary tradition and epigraphy. And this date for the raid by Śiṟuttonḍar on Vātāpi, it will be seen, fits in with my scheme of early Pāṇḍyan chronology.

IV

In editing three Tamil inscriptions from Lālguḍi in *Epigraphia Indica*,¹⁸ Mr. K. V. Subramanya Aiyar arrives at the conclusion that the Pāṇḍya king Varaguṇa Mahārāja I came to the throne in A.D. 811. If this conclusion is correct, my scheme by which I identify the donor of Vēlvikudi grant whose accession I place at about A.D. 765 with Varaguṇa Mahārāja I must be wrong and will have to give place to a more reasonable arrangement which must be sought most probably in the thirteen generations suggested by Mr. Venkayya. As the issue thus raised is very important, I must necessarily undertake a careful examination of the grounds on which Mr. Aiyar bases his conclusion regarding the accession of Varaguṇa Mahārāja I.

As I understand Mr. Aiyar's arguments put forward in the article cited above, I may sum up the leading steps in his demonstration in the following propositions:

(i) The two inscriptions 'A' and 'B' are dated in the same manner. They both 'give some year opposite to the fourth'; consequently they must both be ascribed to the same ruler, who is called Māraṇjaḍaiyan and Varaguṇa Mahārāja in 'B'.

*It is just possible that the 'City of Raṇarasika' may not be Vātāpi. Paramēśvara's invasion during the years 674-80 is a bare possibility, but the probabilities are that it is an earlier achievement if it is one distinct from the destruction of Vātāpi in 642. The association of Śiṟuttonḍar with the possible second destruction of Vātāpi lays it open to almost a similar objection to what is sought to be got over. That the carrying of the palanquin by Appar as 'the rough work of a day labourer' would seem to exhibit ignorance of the honour done to learning in what is called *Brahma-ratha*. Men of learning honouring exhibition of special ability by this act of appreciation—carrying the learned man in a palanquin. The objection to the ceremonial courtesy would be equally valid if Appar was venerably old.—Editor.

¹⁸ Vol. XX pp. 46-54.

(ii) 'A' mentions Tellärerindu-Venra Nandipōttaraiyar, and therefore he must have been a contemporary of Varaguṇa Mahārāja I in his fifth year.

(iii) From the *Mahāvamśa* we learn that Śrīmāra Śrīvalla-bha's rule covered the last three years of Dappula's reign viz., 840-843, and must have commenced about A.D. 840; as the latest regnal year known of his predecessor Varaguṇa I is the seventeenth, he must have begun to rule about A.D. 823, though "it is not impossible that it might have commenced a few years earlier."

(iv) His contemporary Nandivarman III took part together with the Raṣtrakūṭa Gōvinda III in the coronation of Śivamāra II Ganga. The last year of Gōvinda III is 814; the coronation of Śivamāra II may therefore be placed about 812 and Nandivarman III must have been ruling by this time in his own right as he is said to have been himself a crowned king at the time of Śivamāra's coronation. It is unlikely he started earlier. This again means that Varaguṇa Mahārāja I could not have begun to rule earlier than about A.D. 807.

(v) The limits of Varaguṇa's first year being thus fixed between 807 and 823, the actual date is calculated to be A.D. 811 from two records of the thirteenth year which preserve astronomical details that admit of verification.

Let us consider each of these steps in turn. First, about the classification of the early Pāṇḍyan inscriptions according to the method of dating adopted in them. Mr. Aiyar follows the rule that all records dated with two figures, of which the first is 4 must be assigned to Māraṇjaḍaiyan and he draws attention to a number of such records in his paper.¹⁹ But it is not easy to see how such an important rule of interpretation comes to be assumed as if it were self-evident and required no proof or discussion for its acceptance. After a long consideration of this question, I have had to come to the conclusion that the adoption of such a rule in interpreting the early Pāṇḍyan records of the reigns of Māraṇ-Ṣaḍaiyan and Ṣaḍaiya-Māraṇ is unwarranted in the extreme and is apt to give altogether a wrong turn to our understanding of the history of the period. It is obviously impossible to find arguments that do not beg the question from these inscriptions themselves either for or against the rule assumed by Mr. Subrahmania Aiyar. But the Pāṇḍyan kings continued the system of double dates right through history, and a study of the method as it is employed in periods in

which the identity of particular kings is established beyond doubt is bound to throw light on the method as it was employed in an earlier age. And what do we find as a result of the study of such examples? No one has ever proposed to postulate more than one Pāṇḍyan king of the name of "Vira Pāṇḍya" with the title "Śōzhan-talai-koṇḍa"; and we find that the records of this king are dated in all sorts of ways: Nos. 548, 624 and 625 of 1926 are all Vattezhuttu records of this king who belongs to the period immediately following Parāntaka's conquest of Madura, and we find these records dated respectively as 13+2, 4+5, and 5+5. There are other records of his which have a single date and do not bear a double-date. Take a later king—Māraṇvarman Sundara Pāṇḍya I, celebrated in mediaeval Pāṇḍyan history for his conquest of the Cōla kingdom and restoration of Pāṇḍyan glory; besides ordinary single dates (100 of 1907), his records exhibit all the following variations in the method of quoting regnal years: 5+1 (93 of 1907); 20+1 (96 of 1907); 20+1+1 (107 and 108 of 1907) and year 20+849th day (124 of 1907). In fact as the numbers of the records show, I have chosen these examples from a casual look into the pages of the report for 1907-8. Others, quite similar, can be quoted from the period of the decline.²⁰ The most natural inference to make is that as in the later periods, so in the earlier one, we cannot expect any adherence to any set form of quoting the regnal years in the records of any single ruler; and consequently we may well hesitate to admit that all records with the first figure 4 in a double-date necessarily belong to a single Māraṇjaḍaiyan, or that his records were not also dated in other ways, with other first figures, or with only single dates, or with a date containing some year and some days e.g., 35+469 days. Any one who contends that the Early Pāṇḍyan kings differed from all their successors in the manner of expressing their regnal years in their inscriptions will have to establish that thesis by producing evidence much stronger than a mere assumption which goes contrary to the most legitimate inference that can be made from records of the same dynasty of all the succeeding centuries. Till this is done the first of the propositions given above which concludes that both 'A' and 'B' must, from the manner of their dating, belong to the same reign must be declared 'not proven'.

The second proposition not only depends for its validity entirely on the correctness of the first, but loses force also in another way. As Mr. K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar has himself very

¹⁹ *Ibid* p. 48 n. 2.

²⁰ *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom* p. 7 and n.

clearly pointed out, the inscription is from a group of copies of earlier records "made probably when the temple where they are found was renovated or repaired. Palaeographically they may be assigned to the 10th century of the Christian era".²¹ We can hardly be too careful in dealing with such copies as they often contain the most egregious blunders imaginable. Take for instance an inscription from Cidambaram²² which combines the historical introductions of two Rājendra-cōlas, both of them Parakēsarīs, and dates itself in the twenty-fourth year of a Rājakēsari Rājendracōla-dēva. It is by no means easy to see how such a jumble can arise; and yet, there it is in a copy made undoubtedly at a time when the dynasty of the Cōlas was still ruling in the Tamil country in full splendour, possibly within a century after the time of Rājendra I. There are numerous mistakes, equally curious and puzzling, in the inscriptions from Tirupati, several of which are late copies of earlier originals. Among the copies at Lālgudi itself, there is clearly one record, professedly of the time of Nandivarman III, the king mentioned in inscription 'A' under discussion, which is beyond doubt spurious. Of this inscription,²³ we read in the Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy (1929) as follows: "There is a clear reference in the well-preserved portion of the record to a temple called Arinjigai-Iśvaram built at Parāntakapuram. As the temple and the village should have been so named after the Cōla kings Arinjaya and his father Parāntaka I who flourished in the first half of the 10th century A.D., their mention in a record which purports to be three generations earlier, stamps it as spurious. It is to be noted, however, that the inscription is not expressly stated to be a copy." It must be added here, to avoid misunderstanding, that none of the Lālgudi inscriptions is expressly stated to be a copy. But there can be no doubt that most of them are copies.²⁴ The result of this fact is, that even if we ignore the objections to proposition (i) above, it is by no means settled that we can be sure either of the date of the record 'A' or of the name of the king mentioned therein; and we must be chary of using such dubious data in extensive chronological reconstructions.

Let us now turn to the third argument which seeks light on Pāṇḍyan chronology from the Ceylonese chronicle. Mr. Subrahmanya Aiyar does not explain in the article under review how the

Mahāvamśa account implies that Śrīmāra Śrī Vallabha's reign covered the last three years of Dappula's rule A.D. 840-3. It is perhaps natural and proper to assume that the views on this subject expressed elsewhere are still held by him. In his *Historical Sketches of Ancient Dekkan*,²⁵ the learned author says: "The Singhalese chronicle *Mahāvamśa* states that Aggabōdhi IX ruled for three years from A.D. 843 to 846 and after him his younger brother Śilāmēgha Sēna I raised the canopy of dominion and reigned for twenty years from A.D. 846 to 866. Thus these two sovereigns are contemporaries of Śrīmāra. We are told in the *Mahāvamśa* that during the reign of Aggabōdhi's father Dappula, his brother's son Mahinda was not raised to the rank of a governor as was the custom. It is said that this course was adopted in order to secure the throne to Aggabōdhi and Sēna. Mahinda and his brothers then went to the opposite coast (i.e., the Pāṇḍya country) for help and returned to the island when Dappula died. Dappula's sons Aggabōdhi and Sēna killed them in a battle. This was probably the reason for the invasion of Ceylon by the Pāṇḍya king Śrī Māra." In this summary of the transactions narrated in the *Mahāvamśa*, Mr. Aiyar has not kept close to his text and has introduced assumptions that find no warrant in the text or the translations of the *Mahāvamśa*. This work, indeed, states that, apparently in defiance of the normal law of succession in Ceylon, Dappula did not appoint Mahinda, his elder brother's son, as *ādipāda*, heir-apparent, his motive being to secure the succession to his own sons Aggabōdhi and Sēna.²⁶ But when exactly in Dappula's reign this supersession of Mahinda took place is not stated, and Dappula had a reign of sixteen years ending with A.D. 843. It is therefore difficult to see why this event should be assigned to the last three years of Dappula's reign. There is also nothing whatever in the *Mahāvamśa* that can support Mr. Aiyar's statements that Mahinda returned to Ceylon after Dappula died and that he was killed in a battle by the sons of Dappula. The *Mahāvamśa* states distinctly that Sēna, the successor of Aggabōdhi IX, had Mahinda who had betaken himself to the opposite shore, slain by agents.²⁷ Mahinda therefore neither returned to Ceylon nor died in battle. It is only fair to state, however, that Wijesinha's translation is not a little misleading at this point as Geiger has shown in his recent editions of the text and translation of the *Cūlavamśa*, as the later chapters

²¹ E. I. XX p. 47.

²² 118 of 1888, S. I. I. IV No. 223.

²³ No. 144 of 1928-9. A. R. E. 1929 II 4.

²⁴ *Ibid* II 6; also E. I. XX p. 47 quoted above.

²⁵ pp. 137-8.

²⁶ Ch. 49 v. 84.

²⁷ Ch. 50, v. 4.

of the *Mahāvamsa* are called.²⁸ Lastly, there is nothing to connect the Ceylonese invasion of Śrīmāra Pāṇḍya with the fortunes of Mahinda. The story of Mahinda, the dispossessed prince of the elder line comes to an end with his assassination, and after the lapse of some years since Sēna I consolidated his position on the throne by getting rid of Mahinda and in other ways, then, "once later came the Pāṇḍu king with a great force from Jambudīpa and began to take possession of the Island."²⁹ Thus the Pāṇḍyan invasion of Ceylon in Sēna's reign stands in no sort of relation whatever to what happened to Mahinda either in Dappula's reign or at any time thereafter.

Not only is there nothing to support the assumption that Śrīmāra's reign overlapped the reign of Dappula in the last three years, but the assumption, if made, is sure to upset altogether Mr. Subrahmanya Aiyar's conclusions on early Pāṇḍyan Chronology. Since Wijesinha's time, Ceylonese chronology has been the subject of much close study and discussion, and the most authoritative summary of the results so far reached is to be found in the pages of Prof. Geiger's masterly edition of the *Cūlavamsa* already mentioned. Now, according to the scheme of this scholar, Dappula's reign ended in A.D. 828.³⁰ If Mr. Aiyar is right in his idea that Śrīmāra's rule commenced three years earlier, the beginning of his rule would fall about A.D. 825. The latest known regnal year of his predecessor Varguṇa I being the seventeenth according to Mr. Aiyar, his rule must have commenced about A.D. 808 which would be three years before the date of accession actually advocated for him by Mr. Aiyar; and if "it is not impossible" that he had a longer reign than seventeen years, the discrepancy becomes much greater. The argument from the *Mahāvamsa* summed up in the third of the five propositions given above thus breaks down at all points and proves itself utterly incapable of sustaining the conclusions sought to be deduced by Mr. Aiyar.

V

The argument of the fourth proposition rests on the fact that at the coronation of Śivamāra II Ganga, both the Rāṣṭrakūṭa Gōvinda III and the Pallava Nandivarman III were present. If this fact is established, the rest of the argument follows more or less as a necessary consequence; the last date for Gōvinda III being 814, the event in which he took part may be placed about 812 by

²⁸ See Geiger, *Cūlavamsa*—1 p. 136 n. 3 *contra* Wijesinha p. 61 vv. 84-7.
²⁹ Ch. 50 v. 12.
³⁰ *Op. cit.* II p. XII No. 51. (109).

which time Nandivarman III must have begun his rule; and as Nandi III was, according to Mr. Aiyar, the contemporary of Māraṇḍaiyan in his fifth year, the latter could not have begun his rule earlier than 807. But the trouble lies in establishing the basic fact on which this argument proceeds, and considering the weight of the argument that is made to rest on it, we cannot test its correctness too carefully.

The assurance with which Mr. Aiyar takes this fact for granted is indeed surprising. He says: "We learn from the Western Ganga grants that the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Gōvinda III and the Pallava king Nandivarman—both crowned kings themselves—fastened the fillet of royalty on the forehead of Śivamāra II, Saigōṭṭa"³¹ and the only reference he gives is to an article of Fleet in the course of which he discusses, among other things, the spurious Maṇṇe grant, dated in A.D. 797, containing the statement on which Mr. Aiyar relies so much. But Fleet's discussion of this grant must have been sufficient warning to Mr. Aiyar that he was moving on treacherous ground. For this is what Fleet says after giving a translation of the relevant portion of the Maṇṇe grant:³² "Gōvindarāja seems to be the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Gōvinda III, whose reign began about A.D. 783-4 and ended in A.D. 814-15; Śivamāra II was undoubtedly contemporaneous with him towards the end of his reign; and we shall find reasons, further on, for believing that he did assist or recognise the succession of Śivamāra II to the leadership of the Gangas. Nandivarman must be Pallavamalla-Nandivarman, son of Hiranyavarman. He cannot have had anything to do with Śivamāra II at so late a time as the date of his succession on the death of Muttarasa. And it seems that, mixed up with a real act of Gōvinda III towards the second Śivamāra, the Maṇṇe grant has preserved an anachronistic reminiscence of a real act of Pallavamalla-Nandivarman towards the first Śivamāra; viz., that, on the downfall of the Western Cālukyas, he formally recognised Śivamāra I, and crowned him as the chief, more or less feudatory, of a powerful tribe on the borders of his own outlying province of Nolamba-vāḍi." And to leave nothing uncertain, Fleet discusses in a note the claims of Nandivarman III in this matter and writes:³³ "It might, perhaps, be said that he is the later Nandivarman, also called Vijaya-Nandi-Vikramavarman, son of Dantivarman. But this does not seem at all probable.

³¹ *E. I.* XX p. 49 and n. 13.

³² *E. I.* V. p. 158.

³³ *Ibid.* n. 3.

And, if it were so, an anachronism in the other direction would be involved; for, Nandivarman, the son of Dantivarman, cannot be placed as early as A.D. 797, which is the pretended date of the Maṇṇe grant; he cannot be placed before A.D. 804, which is the date that we have for Dantivarman." Mr. Aiyar himself places the accession of Nandivarman III only in A.D. 812, and feels no call to explain how he gets over the difficulty so clearly pointed out by Fleet. His argument looks plausible simply because he has refrained from quoting, much less examining the authenticity of the Maṇṇe grant, the source of his statement about Nandi III being present with Gōvinda III at Śivamāra's coronation. And he was not unaware of the position taken up on this question by one of the foremost among the epigraphists and historians who have worked in the field Indian History.

We do not know if Mr. Aiyar has noticed, he does not state it anywhere, that the same fact is mentioned in identical terms also in the Aḷūr plates (A.D. 799), declared like the Maṇṇe grant to be 'suspicious',³⁴ and also in the undated Gaḷigakere plates of Raṇavikrama.³⁵ Except in the case of the Gaḷigakere plates which are clearly later in time than the beginning of Nandivarman III's reign, it does not seem easy to get over the anachronisms to which Fleet has drawn such pointed attention.

One other possibility suggests itself.³⁶ The Rāṣṭrakūṭa king that crowned Śivamāra II may have been, not Gōvinda III, but Gōvinda II. The relations between Gōvinda III and Śivamāra were none too friendly as may be seen from the following verse which occurs in Gōvinda III's records; and it is doubtful if Śivamāra II ever ruled independently and contemporaneously with Gōvinda III and that sufficiently long for him to have been so formally installed by two crowned kings as narrated in the Maṇṇe and other grants mentioned above. The verse from Gōvinda's plates is this:³⁷

Yen-ātyanta-dayālunā tha nigaḷa-kleśād-apāsy-āyatāt
Svan-deśam gamito'-pi darpa-visarād-yaḷ prātikūlye-sthitaḷ
Yāvan-na bhrukuṭi-lalāṭa-phalake yasy-ōnnate lakṣyate
Viksepena vijitya tāvad-acirād-baddhahs-sa Gāmgah punah

³⁴ *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, II pp. 606-7; 646.

³⁵ *Ep. Car.* iv Yd. 60.

³⁶ The argument that follows is partly based on references furnished by Mr. M. Somaśkhara Śarma with whom I had occasion to discuss this subject.

³⁷ *I. A.* XI p. 158 text II. 21-3.

During the period of Śivamāra's imprisonment, "the Rāṣṭrakūṭas appointed their own viceroys to govern the Ganga territories. In 802 Dhārāvarṣa's son Kambha or Raṇāvaloka was the viceroy and there are three inscriptions of his time. In 813 we find Chāki Raja in that office".³⁸ It seems almost certain, therefore, that between A.D. 802 and 813 there is no room for a coronation such as that mentioned in the Maṇṇe grant of Mārasimha. This fact, and the date of that grant A.D. 797, would suggest, —that is, if we put aside for the time being the doubts about the genuineness of the record—that the date of the coronation must have been much earlier than the date given by Mr. Aiyar viz., A.D. 812. The suggestion may be made that Gōvinda II and Nandivarman II Pallavamalla took part in the coronation. But if this were so, the coronation must have taken place earlier than A.D. 775 when Dhruva the successor of Gōvinda II was ruling;³⁹ and the Pallava king who took part in it could have been only Nandivarman II. But there is one difficulty in the way of accepting this account of the matter. The predecessor of Śivamāra II, Śrī Puruṣa Muttarasa was ruling till as late as A.D. 788,⁴⁰ and this at least raises a doubt if Śivamāra could have been crowned so early in the reign of his predecessor as this arrangement would require us to assume. We should not also lose sight of the facts that the Maṇṇe grant is perhaps not genuine at all, and that Fleet has suggested another and a plausible explanation of the anachronistic mention of the Pallava Nandivarman in that grant.

It thus happens that not one of the four main propositions into which Mr. Subrahmanya Aiyar's arguments may be resolved survives the slightest touch of criticism. All of them are based on an imperfect appreciation of the nature of the evidence available on the questions dealt with. That being so, we can hardly accept that the limits of the first year of Varguṇa's reign must lie between the years A.D. 807 and 823. The astronomical data in the inscriptions do not always lead to such definite results as the uninitiated may sometimes imagine; Mr. Aiyar has found no fewer than seven dates in a period of less than half a century to satisfy the requirements of the case. There are no doubt others of an earlier time which would satisfy the conditions equally. In any event, the examination of the arguments on which the date A.D.

³⁸ *Rice—Mysore Gazetteer* 1. p. 314.

³⁹ *E. I.* X p. 85.

⁴⁰ *Mysore Archaeological Report* 1918—p. 42.

811 for the accession of Varaguna is based has shown, beyond a shadow of doubt, that this conclusion rests on a series of thoroughly implausible conjectures, and is therefore hardly worthy of the serious consideration that it would otherwise merit.

VI

This long and somewhat intricate examination of the positions taken by different writers on early Pāṇḍyan chronology has, I believe, established some results more firmly than ever. Put forward by Mr. Venkayya as a tentative scheme, the genealogy of twelve generations comprising thirteen kings needs reconsideration in the light of new facts. Most important among the new facts are the position now assigned to the Madras Museum plates⁴¹ and the high regnal years in the stone inscriptions of Māraṇjaḍaiyan and Śaḍaiyanmāraṇ. The attempt to link Pāṇḍyan chronology with Pallava history, and to uphold a date in A.D. 811 for the accession of Varaguna I Pandya breaks down at every point. A revised genealogy comprising only ten generations meets all the requirements and seems best to harmonise all the known data from epigraphy and literature bearing on the period. What we know of the lives of the Śaiva saints, and of the duration of reigns of Pāṇḍyan kings from the stone inscriptions of the age is easily fitted into the scheme I put forward some-time ago and reproduce below:

- (1) Kaḍlungōn.
A.D. c 590-620.
- (2) Māraṇvarman Avaniśūlāmaṇi.
A.D. c 620-645.
- (3) Śēndan.
A.D. c 645-670.

⁴¹ I have ignored the smaller Śinnamanūr plates as of minor importance to our purpose here. They have been discussed fully in my *Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*.

- (4) Arikēsari Māraṇvarman.
A.D. c 670-710.
- (5) Kōccaḍaiyan.
A.D. c 710-740.
- (6) Māraṇvarman Rājasimha I.
A.D. c 740-765.
- (7) Jaṭila Parāntaka Neḍlunjaḍaiyan.
A.D. c 765-815.
- (8) Śrī Māra Śrī Vallabha.
A.D. c 815-862.
- (9) Varaguna Varman.
A.D. c 862-880.
- (10) Parāntaka Vīraṇārāyana.
A.D. c 880-900.
- (11) Māraṇvarman Rājasimha II
A.D. c 900-920.

History of the reign of Shāh Jahān

BY

ABDUL AZIZ, (Barrister-at-Law.)

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BOOK II: (continued)

CHAPTER III

THE IMPERIAL TREASURY

INTRODUCTORY:

THE IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD

THE Imperial Household was a great miscellany of offices, factories, departments and institutions. It was a microcosm, a complete, independent unit, where the economic processes of production, consumption, and exchange went full circle. The standard of the articles and services consumed at court was so high and the amounts required were so large that no private agency or set of agencies could be relied upon to meet the demand with a reasonable degree of satisfaction.

Some of these, indeed, were of a kind usually managed by state, such as a mint or an arms factory. But it is proof of the fastidious tastes of the aristocracy in general and the Emperor in particular that every thing consumed by court was specially produced by its various offices.

These offices constituted the mainspring of life at court—like all mainsprings invisible to outside observers, but vitally necessary. To realize the significance of court life and ceremonial one should understand the inner working of the machinery that was behind it. This machinery was to the Imperial Court what anatomy is to the art of animal sculpture—foundation of its being.

We have a wish not only to see what passed on the stage, but also to watch the processes of preparation in the green-room and to study the appliances which controlled the shifting of scenes and the rest.

'The *kārkhānājāt*', says Abū'l-Fazl, 'were more than a hundred in number, and each was like a city, in fact like a kingdom.' (Ā'in, Text, 9).

The Treasury stored valuables of all kinds: coins, gold and silver, precious stones, and useful and ornamental things made of these; as well as articles of virtu prized for rarity or workmanship.

Several departments were concerned with the royal table, such as Kitchen, *Nānbā-khāna* (Bakery), *Hawā'y-khāna* (for pot-herbs, seasonings, sweets, etc.), *Mewa-khāna* (Fruiterie), *Ābdār-khāna* (for water), *Rikāb-khāna* (Pantry), and *Āftābchī-khānā* (for ewers, etc.).

Not far removed in function were *Sharbat-khāna* (for sherbet and other beverages), and *Tambūl-khāna* (for betel-leaves).

Lighting-up was in charge of *Chirāgh-khāna* (lamps) and *Mash'al-khāna* (torches); while *Khwushbū-khāna* (Perfumery) supplied scents, *itrs*, essences and oils.

A large number of well-organized factories, where articles were manufactured and stored in proper order, also formed part of the Household. These were *Kārkhānas*, i.e., factories, properly so called:

The Mint stamped its seal on the current coin of the realm; and the *Qūr-khāna* produced arms and equipments of war. Another department engraved royal seals.

The following *kārkhānas* were concerned with the weaving of textile fabrics and the needlework connected with them:—*Farrāsh-khāna* (for tents and carpets), *Kirākyarāg-Khāna* (or *Kirākyarāq-khāna*) and *Tūshak-khāna* (for dresses and stuffs of all kinds used for wearing-apparel, etc.), and the Shawl department.

In other workshops skilful artists and artisans worked in metal, stone, ivory and other substances; and the upper reaches of art were approached in the work of goldsmiths and painters. Each department was conducted and supervised by master workers of established reputation.¹

¹ As an example, by no means isolated, may be cited Bebadal Khān, the *Dārogha* of Goldsmiths' workshop in Shāh Jahān's time, who was a celebrated lapidary, a great calligraphist, and also an author of some respectable verse. (A.S., II, 89-90).

Akbar, says Father Monserrate, who was at the Mughal Court in 1580-82, 'is so devoted to building that he sometimes quarries stone himself, along with the other workmen. Nor does he shrink from watching and even himself practising, for the sake of amusement, the craft of an ordinary artisan. For this purpose he has built a workshop near the palace, where also are studios and work-rooms for the finer and more reputable arts, such as painting, goldsmith-work, tapestry-making, carpet and curtain-making, and the manufacture of arms. Hither he very frequently comes and relaxes his mind with watching at their work those who practise these arts.' (Monserrate, *Commentary*, 201.)

Bernier, who came some eighty years later, is talking of the same factories in the following passage:—'Large halls are seen in many places, called *Kar-kanays* or workshops for the artisans. In one hall embroiderers are busily employed, superintended by a master. In another you see the goldsmiths; in a third painters; in a fourth, varnishers in lacquer-work; in a fifth, joiners, turners, tailors, and shoe makers; in a sixth, manufactures of silk, brocade, and those fine muslins of which are made turbans, girdles with golden flowers, and drawers worn by females, so delicately fine as frequently to wear out in one night. This article of dress, which lasts only a few hours, may cost ten or twelve crowns, and even more, when beautifully embroidered with needle-work.—The artisans repair every morning to their respective *Kar-kanays*, where they remain employed the whole day; and in the evening return to their homes.' (Bernier, 258-59).

Every one knows the heights of excellence essayed by the building art in this period.

Music, both as an art and as a profession, was in high esteem, and a heavy establishment consisting of musicians and singers (both male and female) and of dancing girls (of all nationalities) was maintained at considerable expense.

Where art excelled knowledge did not lag behind. And it is one of the paradoxes of history that one of the finest manuscript libraries in the world was built up, in great part, during the reign of an illiterate monarch. The Imperial Library of the Mughals is a remarkably interesting phenomenon in many ways.

A large number of animals were kept and fed in the fort-palace: Some, like elephants, horses, camels, mules and cattle, were for use, and were lodged in stables. Others, such as leopards, deer, dogs, hawks and falcons, were for hunting. Others, again, were for amusement, almost all Mughal emperors being amateur naturalists. All sorts of animals and birds that influence and patronage could bring found their way into the royal menagerie.

Then there was an office of the *Naubat-khāna* or *Naqqār-khāna* (Music Gallery) which tuned up at stated times and during the imperial audiences; and informed the capital and the camp of the time of day and night, and of the functions at the court.

There seems to have been a department in charge of the insignia of royalty. Rigid rules were observed regarding the use of these; for symbolism played a great part in Mughal administration and etiquette.

A very important department stands by itself: the Haram.

In the conspectus which has preceded, and the detailed treatment which will form the subject-matter of this and the following chapters, we have practically confined ourselves to the reigns of the greater Mughals. We are unable, therefore, to make any use of Sir Jadunath Sarkar's Classified List of *Kārkhānājāt* in his *Mughal Administration* (Second Series), (Patna University, 1925). Lecture V, where, besides the *Ā'in* and *Zawābiḥ-i-'Ālamgīrī*, he draws upon 'Afif's *Tārīkh-i-Fīrozshāhī* on the one hand, and on the Mahratta histories on the other. We are attempting a pen-picture of the Household as it was roughly from 1650 to 1700. The authorities relating to the periods anterior and posterior to this epoch are beside our purpose.

The account that follows is not meant to be exhaustive. All we can manage is a description, as material serves, of the chief offices and departments. The importance of each will naturally determine the space to be allotted to it; so that some will have a somewhat generous treatment at the expense of others, which may be crowded out.

Perhaps the reader is asking himself what would be the approximate cost of running such a gigantic establishment as the Imperial Household. Risking a guess is worse than useless. Luckily some material is available for arriving at a tolerably accurate estimate.

We may begin with Abū'l-Fazl. Writing in or before the year 1,597, he says: 'Although the majority of the officers of the Imperial Household get their salary from the army exchequer the expenditure for the year 39 *Ilāhī* [March 11, 1594—March 10, 1595] came to 30,91,86,795 *dāms*. The expenses of this Empire as well as the revenues are daily increasing.' (*Ā'in*, Text, I, 9). At 40 *dāms* to the rupee this would be equivalent to Rs. 77,29,670.

These are no doubt the office figures for Akbar's period, and we have no hesitation in accepting them. But we see that this is not at all a high figure. Both the Household and its expenses,

we must remember, expanded considerably during the last ten years of Akbar's reign and under his descendants.

Hawkins' report, which refers to the years 1609-11, is as follows:

'His daily expences for his owne person, that is to say, for feeding of his Cattell of all sorts, and amongst them some few Elephants Royall, and all other expences particularly, as Apparell, Victuals, and other petty expences for his house, amounts to fiftie thousand Rupias a day.

The expences daily for his Women by the day, is thirtie thousand Rupias.' (Purchas, III, 34.)

We understand it to mean that according to Hawkins the daily expenses of the Imperial Household, exclusive of the Haram, amounted to Rs. 50,000, and those of the Haram to Rs. 30,000 *per diem*—total, Rs. 80,000, a day. The annual expenditure would then be Rs. 1,09,50,000 for the Haram, and Rs. 1,82,50,000 for the rest of the Household—total, Rs. 2,92,00,000, or nearly three crores.

The annual budget of the Household must have gone up with rapid strides between 1595 and 1610. And these figures are neither incredible nor unlikely, seeing that Akbar's careful husbandry contrasted with Jahāngir's negligent ways, and that fifteen years of peaceful development intervened between these dates.

The historiographers of Shāh Jahān's reign give us no details on this point; and we have to fall back upon foreign travellers. Bernier had no access to the official records, and has no definite estimates to offer. Still from a man of his judgment and balance even general statements like the following are worth quoting. He is writing early in Aurangzeb's reign, and is discussing the Emperor's wealth:

'But I have not enumerated all the expenses incurred by the Great Mogol. He keeps in *Dehly* and *Agra* from two to three thousand fine horses, always at hand in case of emergency: eight or nine hundred elephants, and a large number of baggage horses, mules, and porters, intended to carry the numerous and capacious tents, with their fittings, his wives and women, furniture, kitchen apparatus, *Ganges'-water*, and all the other articles necessary for the camp, which the Mogol has always about him, as in his capital, things which are not considered necessary in our kingdoms in Europe.

Add to this, if you will, the enormous expenses of the *Seraglio*, where the consumption of fine cloths of gold, and brocades, silks, embroideries, pearls, musk, amber and sweet essences, is greater than can be conceived.

Thus, although the *Great Mogol* be in the receipt of an immense revenue, his expenditure being much in the same proportion, he cannot possess the vast surplus of wealth that most people seem to imagine. I admit that his income exceeds probably the joint revenues of the *Grand Seignior* and of the King of *Persia*; but if I were to call him a wealthy monarch, it would be in the sense that a treasurer is to be considered wealthy who pays with one hand the large sums which he receives with the other.' (P. 221-22).

It may be remarked in passing that the Princes and the greater nobles had a similar set of *Kārkhānājāt* attached to their household, of course on a descending scale of magnitude, according to the position and wealth of its owner.

TREASURIES.

The Imperial Treasury contained, as we have said, cash and precious metals, and jewels and jewelled articles. We shall take up the Cash and the Jewel Treasury separately, winding up with the miscellaneous articles of artistic and general interest—not jewels, nor forming part of Jewel treasury, yet more valuable than many gems.

Section i: Cash Treasury.

A monarch's resources in war and peace depend on wealth. Consequently the treasury which contains that wealth is a measure of his power. No wonder then that Treasury occupied the first place in the Imperial Household.

In history and tradition the Greater Mughals (from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century) have been famous for their wealth. The fame of the Golden Land of Ind had reached Milton as early as the middle of the seventeenth century. Sir Thomas Roe, a hostile and unsympathetic witness, writing to Prince Charles from Jahāngir's court at Ajmer on the 30th. of October, 1616, speaks thus of the prosperity and wealth of Mughal India: 'Plentifull in corne and cattle for mans necessitye: abundant in wealth and commodities of trade for superfluitye. His revenew far above any easteren monarch knowne: farr above the Turke: incredible if I sawe not the issues and incomes and could not give a better reason of yt then report. In jewells (which is one of his felicityes) hee is the treasury of the world, buyeing all that comes, and heaping rich stones as if hee would rather build then weare them.'¹ (Roe, 270).

¹ An unconscious prophecy, since Shāh Jahān did build (the Peacock Throne) with some of these jewels.

We have already heard Bernier's qualified praise.

Is it possible to arrive at a tolerably accurate valuation of the contents of the treasury during the various reigns?

We propose to attempt in this section a rapid survey of the Cash Treasury from Bābur to Shāh Jahān.

It is often, if somewhat vaguely, supposed that one of the causes of the immensity of the Great Mughal's wealth was the fact that unlimited treasures cumulated by the successive lines of Delhi Kings (Khaljīs, Tughlaqs, and Lodīs) fell to Bābur at Panipat, and that they went on steadily increasing in the hands of his descendants till Nādir Shāh fell on them in 1739 and carried them off at one fell swoop to his native land of Persia. Well, such sweeping statements are generally misleading. The reader is warned that whatever truth there may be in such a generalization, in the first place it can apply only to the Jewel treasury, since the Cash treasury, which Bābur inherited as the spoils of war, was completely squandered by him, as we shall see, in a short time; and while Humāyūn was mostly a fugitive, Jahāngīr's crapulous hands, it appears, were not strong enough to guard, or to spend properly, Akbar's hard-earned wealth, so that Shāh Jahān inherited, comparatively speaking, a depleted treasury. Secondly, even if we consider only the jewel treasury, the period from 1526 to 1739 was not one of steady growth and progress. Humāyūn's defeat and flight to Persia was a great set-back, and we have no means of telling how much of Ibrāhīm Lodī's jewel treasury was actually inherited by Akbar.

We can now proceed to the details:

Boundless wealth seems to have fallen into the hands of Bābur at Panipat, though no appraisalment of its value is possible from the data available. It is equally certain that heavy sums were bestowed on the princes and nobles and the rank and file of the victorious army, not omitting even the camp followers; and immense amounts were sent to princes, relations, officers and soldiers, in the Transoxiana and elsewhere, and to pious people and holy places. The story is best told by the imperial donor himself:

'On Saturday the 29th [X 30th.] of Rajab [= May 12th. 1526 A. C.?] the examination and distribution of the treasure were begun. To Humāyūn were given 70 laks from the Treasury, and, over and above this, a treasure house was bestowed on him just as it was, without ascertaining and writing down its contents. To some begs 10 laks were given, 8, 7, or 6 to others. Suitable money-gifts were bestowed from the Treasury on the whole army, to

every tribe there was, Afghān, Hazāra, 'Arab, Bīlūch etc. to each according to its position. Every trader and student, indeed every man who had come with the army, took ample portion and share of bounteous gift and largess. To those not with the army went a mass of treasure in gift and largess, as for instance, 17 laks to Kāmran, 15 laks to Muhammad-i-zamān Mīrā, while to 'Askari, Hindāl and indeed to the whole various train of relations and younger children went masses of red and white (gold and silver), of plenishing, jewels and slaves. Many gifts went to the begs and soldiery on that side (Tramontana). Valuable gifts (*saughāt*) were sent for the various relations in Samarkand, Khurāsān, Kāshghar and 'Irāq. To holy men belonging to Samarkand and Khurāsān went offerings vowed to God (*nuzūr*); so too to Makka and Madīna. We gave one *shāhrukhi* for every soul in the country of Kābul and the valley-side of Varsak, man and woman, bond and free, of age or non-age.' (B. N. E., 522-23.)

This passage incidentally illustrates the traditional wealth of India on the one hand and the munificence of the Mughal conquerors on the other—features, the combination of which was to lead to so much that is great in the art and annals of Mughal India.

The next item of news about the treasury in the Emperor's Diary is the following entry under April-May, 1527:

'Meantime news came that Humāyūn had gone into Dihlī, there opened several treasure-houses and, without permission, taken possession of their contents. I had never looked for such a thing from him; it grieved me very much; I wrote and sent off to him very severe reproaches.' (B. N. E., 583.)

Finally, by the 22nd. October, 1528, exactly 2½ years after Bābur's great victory, we learn that 'the treasure of Iskandar and Ibrāhīm in Dihlī and Agra was at an end. Royal orders were given therefore, on Thursday the 8th of Safar, that each stipendiary (*wajhdār*) should drop in to the Dīwān, 30 in every 100 of his allowance, to be used for war-material and appliances, for equipment, for powder, and for the pay of gunners and matchlockmen.' (B. N. E., 617)

So the Qalandar, after his reckless extravagance, finds himself straitened for military necessities—life-blood for a conqueror whose power and safety in a foreign land rested solely on the strength of his arms.

¹ 'Circa 10d. or 11d. Bābur left himself stripped so bare by his far-flung largess that he was nick-named Qalandar (Firishta).'
(P. 523, f. n. 2.)

Humāyūn's reign is uneventful for our present purpose. No-body can tell how much of Humāyūn's failure was due to the pecuniary resourcelessness in which Bābur's 'generosity' must have left him. Whatever money he possessed must have been exhausted in his military operations; for he was not in a position to carry with him in his flight to Persia anything more than the crown jewels, as we shall know later.¹

This brings us to the reign of the great Akbar. Thanks to his minister, Abū'l-Fazl, we possess interesting details about the administration of the treasury. It is probable that the lines here laid down were followed in the succeeding reigns.

A general treasurer with a *dārogha* and a clerk constituted the central establishment.

When a provincial treasurer had collected the sum of two lacs of *dāms* he had to send it to the Treasurer General at the Court, together with a memorandum specifying the quality of the sum. A separate treasurer was appointed for the *peshkash* receipts, another for receiving heirless property, another for *nazr* receipts, and another for the moneys expended in weighing the royal person,² and for charitable donations. These treasurers were assisted by superintendents, *dāroghas* and clerks.

The amount of the revenues was so great and the business so multifarious that twelve treasurers³ were appointed to guard the treasures, nine for different kinds of coined money, and three for gems, gold and jewelled things.

¹ Next Section.

² It should be explained that the valuables and food-stuffs against which the Emperor was weighed every solar and lunar year, were not given away at once but were stored in treasury and disbursed slowly for charitable purposes throughout the year. These included also works of public utility; for Jahāngir tells us that he once ordered five thousand rupees to be spent out of the *wazn* money on construction of a bridge at Baba Hasan Abdal and another building there. (*Tūzuk*, 76; R. & B., I, 160.)

³ Blochmann has 'treasuries' for 'treasurers', and this mistake has been copied by Sir J. N. Sarkar in *Mughal Administration*, Second Series, Chapter v.

A separate treasurer was also appointed for each of the Imperial Workshops, the number of which was nearly one hundred.

'Again, by the order of His Majesty', continues Abū'l-Fazl, 'a person of known integrity keeps in the public audience hall some gold and silver for the needy, who have their wants relieved without delay. Moreover, a crore of *dāms* is kept in readiness in the courtyard of *Daulat-khāna*, every thousand of which is kept in bags made of a coarse material. Such a bag is called *sahsa*, and many of them put up in a heap, *ganj*. Besides, His Majesty entrusts to some of the nobility a large sum of money, that it may be ready at all times; and a part is put in a *bahla*, i.e. a purse, for immediate use—hence commonly known as *kharj-i-bahla*.¹

Bābur is certainly the founder of the Mughal dynasty in India, but then Akbar is equally truly the founder of the Mughal empire in India; for the effects of Bābur's victories had worn off during the unsuccessful reign of Humāyūn, and Akbar had to rough-hew from the beginning.

Akbar inherited practically nothing, and during a strenuous but successful reign of half a century he built up a body of resource which would do credit to a monarch under any circumstances.

The following estimate of his treasure is taken from V. A. Smith's article, 'The Treasure of Akbar' in *J. R. A. S.*, 1915, p. 231-43, which is based in turn on the accounts in De Laët's *De Imperio Magni Mogolis*, and Manrique's *Itinerario*, Ch. LXXXVI (that in Mandelslo's *Voyages and Travels* being discredited as spurious). De Laët obtained his information prior to 1631, and Manrique got his about 1640. We have thought it safer to rely on Smith's collated account than on the English Translation of De Laët by Mr. Hoyland, edited by Mr. Banerjee.

¹ These paragraphs are from *Ā'in* (Text, I 10-11; Blochmann, 14-15). Blochmann's translation has several serious errors, as a comparison will show. I have freely adopted it where it is correct, and have equally freely amended it where I found it was not.

Cash Treasure left by Akbar.

Coins	Value in Rupees.
Gold coins weighing 100 tolas (or 1150 māshas), 50 tolas, and 25 tolas each: Total weight, 6,970,000 māshas. Value calculated at Rs. 14 a māsha ¹ :	97,580,000¾
Silver coins of Akbarī Rupees.	100,000,000
Bronze Paisa or Pice, numbering 230,000,000 ² (Rate, 30 takas per rupee).	766,666
Total	198,346,666¾ (or nearly 20 crores).

It must be added that the above is the total value of the cash hoard kept at Agra alone at the time of Akbar's decease. From statements by Hawkins (Purchas, III, 31 and 34) it appears that treasure was also kept (in Jahāngīr's time) in the six fortresses of Gwalior, Narwar, Ranthambhor, Asīr (Asīrgarh), Rohtas (Roh-tasgarh), and, specially, Lahore. We may presume that in Akbar's time too it was so. At a rough calculation there may be at most

¹ Māsha in the last two places is obviously a mistake for tola, since Rs. 14 a tola is an infinitely more likely quotation for gold than Rs. 168 a tola. It is strange that the error is common to all the three original authors (including "Mandelslo"), and more strange that neither V. A. Smith nor the editor of De Laët's *Empire of the Great Mogol* has noted the absurdity. We are glad to find that Mr. Hodivala has noted this point (among others) in his able and scholarly review of the *Empire of the Great Mogol* (trans. by Mr. Hoyland, edit. by Mr. Banerjee), which appeared in the *Journal of Indian History*, VII, ii, 236-46.

We may, however, pass over it, as it is no more than a careless clerical error.

² V. A. Smith notes that this should be 23 millions.

Mr. Hodivala challenges the equation of a rupee = 30 takas, and holds that De Laët here by taka means only a dām, of which 40 went to a rupee. The high price of a dām given here is, he says, due to the fact, that copper had risen in price about 1630, i.e., about the time *De Imperio Magni Mogolis* was compiled.

The exchange value of the taka, does not, however, affect the total of the treasure appreciably.

another ten crores of rupees in these provincial fortresses. V. A. Smith's estimated total of twenty crores for the *mofussil* treasure (Akbar, 347) seems to be excessive. In fact the ten crores we have conceded is an outside valuation. Thus we arrive at a total of nearly thirty crores.

De Laët's list calls for some criticism. But for the purpose of that criticism it will be convenient to take up first another list given by an earlier writer, which refers, however, to a lower date.

We give below the 'cash' part of the inventory of the Imperial Treasury, apparently obtained from some official source, by Captain Hawkins, who visited Agra in 1609-11, and who possesses the credentials—unique for a European—of having been appointed a *manṣabdār* in the Emperor's army. Although this document falls properly into Jahāngīr's reign, in time De Laët's and Hawkins' lists stand only a quinquennium apart.

'His Treasure is as followeth, The first, is his severall Coine of Gold.

Inprimis, of Seraffins Ecberi, which be ten Rupias a piece, there are sixtie Leckes. Of another sort of Coyne, of a thou- A Tole is a Rupia sand Rupias a piece, there are twentie thousand Chalany of Silver, pieces. Of another sort of halfe the value, there and ten of these are ten thousand pieces. Of another sort of Toles are the va- Gold of twenty Toles a piece, there are thirtie lue of one of gold. thousand pieces. Of another sort of tenne Toles a piece, there bee five and twenty thousand pieces. Of another sort of five Toles, which is this Kings stampe, of these there be fiftie thousand pieces.'

'Of Silver, as followeth.

Inprimis, of Rupias Ecbery, thirteene Crou (every Crou is an hundred Leckes, and every Leck an hundred thousand Ru-pias) or one thousand three hundred Leckes. Of another sort of Coine of Selim Sha this King, of an hundred Toles a piece, there are fiftie thousand pieces. Of fiftie Toles a piece, there is one Lecke. Of thirtie Toles a piece, there are fortie thousand pieces. Of twentie Toles a piece, there are thirtie thousand pieces. Of ten Toles a piece, there are twentie thousand pieces. Of five Toles a piece, there are five and twentie thousand pieces. Of a certaine Money that is called Savoy, which is a Tole ¼ of these there are two Leckes. Of Jagaries, whereof five make sixe Toles, there is one Lecke. More should have beene coyned of this stampe, but the contrary was commanded.'

(Purchas, III, 31—32.)

This matter can be put in figures thus:—
Jahangir's Cash Treasure in 1610-11.
Gold Coins.

No.	Name of Coin.	Weight in Tolas.	Value in Rs.	Number.	Total Value in lacs of Rs.
1	Akbari Ashrafi		10	60,00,000	600
2		(100)	100	20,000	200
3		(50)	500	10,000	50
4		20	(200)	30,000	60
5	Jahāngiri	10	(100)	25,000	25
6		5	(50)	50,000	25
Total ...					960

NOTE.—We have calculated the value of coins No. 4, 5 and 6 on the basis of ten rupees to a *tola*, which seems justified not only by the quaintly worded marginal note by Hawkins quoted above, but generally by the values of gold coins of Akbar's time given in *Ā'in* (Text, I, 25; Blochmann, 29-30). Calculated weights and values are given within brackets to distinguish from those given by Hawkins himself. They are approximate, not exact. All total values are calculated by us.

Silver Coins.

No.	Name of Coin	Weight in Tolas.	Number.	Total Value in lacs of Rs.
1	Akbari Rupee		13,00,00,000	1,300
2	Salim Shāhi Rupee	100	50,000	50
3		50	100,000	50
4		30	40,000	12
5		20	30,000	6
6		10	20,000	2
7		5	25,000	1½
8	'Savoy',	1½	200,000	2½
9	Jahāngiri	1-1/5	100,000	1-1/5
Total ...		Say, 1425 lacs or 14-1/4 crores		1424 - 19/20

NOTE.—In all cases except No. 1 the total values have been calculated on the rough basis of a *tola* weight being equal to a rupee. This is only a working assumption, since we know that both the Akbari rupees and the square *jalāla* weighed only 11½ *māshas*.

¹ This is *sawā'i* (one and a quarter)

Gold Coins	9,60,00,000
Silver Coins	14,25,00,000
Total	Rs. 23,85,00,000

It will be noted that no copper coins are given in this list, being presumably considered unimportant. Even if they were added the total would still be under 24 crores.

This was probably the value of the Agra treasure. Comparing this with the Agra treasure in 1605, we find that the amount of cash had increased by 4 crores during these five or six years.

With these two inventories of the Imperial Treasury before the reader, we can profitably devote a little space to their analysis and comparison.

Let us begin with the Gold Coins: Our first impression on comparing the two lists is that Hawkins' inventory dwarfs De Laët's into insignificance in every respect; in fact the latter seems to be no more than a hasty, fugitive sort of summary of the former, carelessly worded, and not without slips, and errors of a more reprehensible kind. The most serious omission seems to be the total absence of *ashrafis*, which in the other list number 60 lacs, are valued at 6 crores, and constitute the major portion of the gold treasure. Apart from Hawkins' list, a treasury without *ashrafis* would be inconceivable.

Judging from the fact that De Laët's and Hawkins' totals of the gold treasure tally very nearly, we can charitably assume that De Laët's total (and he gives only the total) represents the value of gold coins of all weights from 100 to 1 *tola*, although he mentions by name only the heaviest three.

Descending to details: We find that De Laët equates 100 *tolas* with 1150 *māshas*. This is of course not exact, since a *tola* = 12 *māshas*; but we don't consider it a serious error, as Mr. Hodivala does (*J. of I. H.*, VII, ii, 240)

We know from *Ā'in* (Text, I 23-24) that the big pieces weighed respectively 101 *tolas*, 9 *māshas*, 7 *surkhs* (value = 100 *la'l-i-jalāli*) and 91 *tolas*, 8 *māshas* (value = 100 round mohurs of 11 *māshas* each); and the smaller ones were halves of these two, and a quarter of the one first mentioned.

It appears that De Laët (or whoever copied out the list) struck a rough-and-ready sort of average between the true weights of the big pieces, and having stated the weight to be 100 *tolas*, tried to be more correct by stating it as the equivalent of 1150 *māshas*; the true weights of the two pieces being nearly 1222 and 1100 *māshas* respectively.

The next point is the rate quoted for gold, viz., Rs. 14 a *tola*. We agree with Mr. Hodivala that this is excessive. Judging from most authorities available the price of gold seems to have been about Rs. 10 a *tola* in Akbar's time and the early part of Jahāngīr's reign. We know, however, that soon after Shāh Jahān's accession gold was selling at Rs. 14 a *tola*. (B. N., I, ii, 79).

The explanation of De Laët's error lies in the fact that the compilers, instead of stating the rate which obtained in 1605 (to which date the document refers), probably quoted the rate current at the time of the compilation of the book, viz., about 1630.

If we correct Rs. 14 to Rs. 10, the obvious result will be that either we assume the weight to be correct and make the necessary alteration in the total value, or we accept the total value and work out the total weight from it. Either the weight or the value is taken from the State document—we don't know which; and the other is reckoned from it by the compilers.

Seeing that the total gold treasure in De Laët's list nearly equals the total gold treasure in Hawkins' list—assuming that no serious change took place in the short interval of five years (which is unlikely)—one would be inclined to think that the *value* given is the correct figure, and that the weight should be increased.

Now we come to the Silver Coins: De Laët's item is so brief that no detailed criticism is possible. Hawkins' total, even after deducting the *Salīm-shahī* rupees of 100 *tolas* each and the *Jahāngīrī*s 1-1½ *tolas* each (which were coined subsequent to Akbar's death), is still far in excess of De Laët's. In fact the *Akbarī* rupees alone exceed De Laët's total amount by a great deal. Possibly there was an actual increase in the store during the period 1605-1610.

Jahāngīr, in his Autobiography, speaks in some detail of gold and silver coins, the striking of which he ordered in the first year of his reign (*Tūzūk*, 5; R. and B., 10-12). But the Emperor does not mention the quantities minted, nor does Hawkins specify in his list all the coins which bore the stamp of Jahāngīr. We are, therefore, unable to make any use of the entry in, the Emperor's Diary; and a possible way of reconciling Hawkins' list with De Laët's is lost to us.

Speaking generally, one may say that Hawkins' list has all the appearance of being a careful copy of an authentic document. As regards De Laët, we agree with most of the strictures passed on him and on the editor of the English Translation of his work by Mr. Hodivala. Apart from the points noticed above, a great fault of De Laët's seems to be a lack of co-ordination in his work. De Laët's list is immediately followed by a reproduction of Haw-

kins' list (which, by the way, is not free from errors); and the least that we should have expected from De Laët is a comparison and discussion, with consequent correction and explanation. It is still more unfortunate that even the editor has not cared to collate the results or suggest corrections.

Our final opinion is that De Laët's list is a badly copied and ill-digested memorandum of what appears to be an authentic record, the exact copy of which perhaps never actually reached De Laët. But, ill supplied with reliable information as we are, we cannot afford to ignore completely even such a defective document. Even a bad record is better than no record, for it always has a corroborative value.

Further, we have also the details of the treasure left by Akbar in two Persian histories.

Both the *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa* and *M. U.* give what purports to be details of Akbar's treasure.

I confess I can make no sense of the figures and values given by Muḥammed Qāsim in *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa* (Bombay Edition, I, 517; Brigg's Translation, 1829, II, 281-2); and unless one can offer at least a working explanation, there is no point in quoting the passage.

Next comes Khāfī Khān, the author of *Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb*. We have no admiration for him as a historian, nor any respect for his sense of accuracy or responsibility. Still we give below his account of Akbar's treasure for what it is worth. His wording is so obscure that we prefer to give his text in Persian, permitting the reader freedom of opinion in the matter of its interpretation:

بعد وفات او که عرض خزانه گرفتند ده کروڑ روپیہ را اشرفی یازده ماشہ و سیزده ماشہ و چارده ماشہ
سوائے اشرفیہائے کلاں کہ از صد تولہ تا پانصد تولہ ہزار اشرفی در خزانہ موجود بود و دوصد و ہفتاد و
دو من طلائے غیر مسکوک و صد و ہفتاد من نقرہ و یک من جواہر فاضلہ کہ قیمت اُن از سہ کروڑ
روپیہ تجاوز نموده بود برآمد۔

(M. L. I, 243).

Literal translation:

'After his [Akbar's] death when stock of the treasury was taken, ten crores of rupees' worth of *ashrafīs* of 11, 13 and 14 *māshas* besides the large *ashrafīs* weighing 100 to 500 *tolas*, 1000 of which were present in the treasury, and 272 *man* uncoined gold and 370 *man* silver, and one *man* *khaṣṣa* jewels, valued at over 3 crores of rupees, were found.'

It is not clear whether 10 crores is the value of all *ashrafis* or only of those weighing 11, 13 and 14 *māshas* respectively. Assuming that it applies to all (which is by no means clear), we get the total value roughly equivalent to the total value in the tables previously discussed.

By the *ashrafis* of 11, 13, and 14 *māshas* *Khāfi Khān* means probably the following in the same order:

- (1) The 'Adl-gutka, the *Muhr-i-gird* (round mohur), and the *Mihraḥī*. Weight, 11 *māshas*; value, nine rupees.
- (2) The *Ilāhī* and the square *La'l-i-jalālī*. Weight, 12 *māshas*, $1\frac{3}{4}$ *surkhs*; value, ten rupees.
- (3) The *Aftābī* and the *Chahārgosha*. Weight of both, 1 *tola*, 2 *māshas*, $4\frac{3}{4}$ *surkhs*. Value of the former, twelve rupees; of the latter, not given.

(*A'in*, Text, I, 25)

The weight of No. 2 can hardly be described as 13 *māshas*, as *Khāfi Khān* does.

Next there is the difficulty of 1000 *ashrafis* weighing from 100 to 500 *tolas*.

In the first place we know of no coins heavier than 100 *tolas*. Thus the 500 is either a myth or a misprint. Secondly, supposing it is a mistake for 5, and that the author means *ashrafis* weighing from 100 to 5 *tolas* each (which fits in with the weights given in Hawkins' list, if we except the 5-*tola* ones, which are *Jahāngirī* coins), we have the further difficulty of their number being 1000; whereas in Hawkins the total number of these coins comes to 135,000, out of which 50,000 (the number of *Jahāngirī* coins) being deducted, we have still 85,000 left.

Again, silver and copper coins given in the other lists are not given by *Khāfi Khān*, while gold and silver bullion in *Khāfi Khān* is not found in those.

In any case, the combined value of gold and silver bullion could not have exceeded 65 lacs.

Although Hawkins' list refers to a time when *Jahāngir's* reign was well under way, we may look upon all the three documents so far discussed as practically a record of what Akbar bequeathed to *Jahāngir*.

The increase that we find in Hawkins may or may not signify a real increase in resources. Even if it does, the rate of progress seems not to have been kept up. For, according to *Mullā*

'*Abdu'l-Hamīd Lāhorī*, *Jahāngir* spent in his reign of 22 years the greater part of what Akbar had saved up during a reign of 51. (*B. N.*, II, 713).

Akbar's legacy ought to have been *Jahāngir's* opportunity; but it does not seem to have been utilized as such. Else the enormous resources inherited by the latter, if properly husbanded and developed in a fairly peaceful reign of a quarter century, would have placed the key to unimaginable power and possibilities in the hands of the Mughal emperor, already the richest monarch in the world. Our information about *Jahāngir's* reign in this respect is, it must be admitted, meagre. But all the signs point to a gradual dissipation of Akbar's hard-earned wealth.

V. A. Smith states that the treasure accumulated by Akbar was much increased during the comparatively peaceful reigns of *Jahāngir* and *Shāh Jahān* (*J. R. A. S.*, 1915, p. 240); and this seems to be the general belief to this day. Well, as regards *Jahāngir*, we have reason to doubt the validity of such a proposition.

It will add a touch of reality to our picture if we may, before taking leave of Akbar's cash treasury, watch that emperor, for once, inspecting his coins. The following quotations from the Jesuit fathers are interesting: '*Zelaldinus [Jalāl] ud-Din, i.e., Akbar* is sparing and tenacious of his wealth, and thus has become the richest Oriental king for at least 200 years. . . . With the object of exhibiting his wealth four times every year he has sacks of minted copper money publicly piled up (I think in the palace courtyard) into a heap ten feet wide and thirty feet high. By the side of this pile sit the superintendents and tellers of the treasury. They supervise the counting of the money, which is paid out to those who are entitled to receive it, after deduction of the profit which an ordinary banker would have made if it had been deposited with him. Each sack holds about four thousand copper coins.'—(*Monserate, Commentary*, 208). We must remark that from all that we know about the greater Mughal monarchs we cannot associate such vulgar ostentation with any of them. *Monserate* seems to have witnessed a periodical disbursement of cash to officers. That Akbar always or sometimes personally supervised the payments is only another proof of his frugal and careful habits with which all historians credit him.

The members of the Third Jesuit Mission, which came in 1595, relate thus the Emperor's examination of newly coined money: They saw him once 'counting a large sum of gold coins of many different values which he had ordered to mint. Behind him were some hundred and fifty plates full of them, and a good

number of bags, with others that had already been examined or were still to be seen. He examines them by himself or by others and it is his chief distraction every day, when he has retired, that is during the leisure left him after he has shown himself three times to the people; and when the money has been counted and put in bags, he has it placed among his treasures, which are very great.' (Quoted by the editor of Monserrate's *Commentary*, p. 208, f. n., from the *Examiner*, Nov. 22, 1919, pp. 469—70).

We can now proceed to deal with the reign of Shāh Jahān. It is much to be regretted that here too the material is inadequate. The official histories are generally silent or evasive. 'Abdu'l Hamīd who winds up at the end of the twentieth regnal year, instead of giving us some useful totals of the contents of the treasury, stops short with facile but useless generalizations; and Muḥammad Wārīs, who closes on the thirtieth year, has nothing to say.

Shāh Jahān was, according to Bernier, 'a great economist'. But we must remember that the expenditure had increased considerably in his reign (witness the heavy *manṣabdārī* list besides other evidence), and he had always been lavish with his gifts. Further, that emperor has left more abiding monuments of architecture than any other king in ancient or modern times, in or outside India. According to the lists in *B. N.* (II, 714; III, f. 17b) Shāh Jahān must have spent something like 3 crores on palaces and gardens, mosques and mausoleums, castles and fortifications.

As for the treasure, where the authors of *B. N.* and Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ all fail us, we can only fall back upon less well-informed writers, even if they lead us nowhere.

Khāfī Khān has the following statement about the treasure left by Shāh Jahān. His ambiguous language is placed before the reader as it is:

بیست و چهار کروڑ روپیہ و از جنس اشرفی سوائے طلا و نقرہ غیر مسکوک و ظروف طلائی و نقرئی
و جواہر کہ تخمیناً تا پانزدہ شانزدہ کروڑ اس نیز می شد مانده بود۔

(M. L. I, 758).

Rupees

24 crores.

Ashrafis (except gold and silver bullion) and gold and silver vessels and jewels.

15 to 16 crores.

The above is our interpretation of the text. The benefit of doubt is given to the author.

As we shall see in the next section, the total value of jewels and jewelled articles at the end of the second decade was 5 crores. The last decade couldn't have added appreciably to it.

The gold and silver vessels are an incalculable quantity, since we don't know what they include. Judging by the De Laët-Manrique list of gold and silver articles, which will be placed before the reader in the next section, and assuming that Khāfī Khān means all articles made of precious metals, the total value of these should be placed at about 3 crores—which is the total for Akbar's reign in the De Laët-Manrique list.

Eight crores being thus deducted, we have only 7 to 8 crores left for the ashrafis. If these figures are worth anything, the ashrafī store has ebbed since Akbar's time, while the rupee treasure has swung forward.

Bernier, however, has quite a different story to tell. '*Chah-Jehan*', he says, 'who was a great economist, and reigned more than forty years without being involved in any great wars, never amassed six *kourours* of *roupies*.' (p. 223).—If the amount is as correct as the duration of Shāh Jahān's reign given here, this quotation is worse than useless. Besides, Bernier, we know, had no access to the official registers.

Where unreliable authors succeed only in contradicting each other, we can arrive at no really stable conclusions.

SOURCES OF REVENUE

When the contents of the Cash treasury have been surveyed one feels a natural curiosity about the sources from which all these accumulations were derived.

There is no doubt that in a country like India land revenue was by far the most important item in finance; but it was not by any means the only one.

Father Monserrate has the following interesting discourse on the subject:

'The King', he says, 'exact enormous sums in tribute from the provinces of his empire, which is wonderfully rich and fertile both for cultivation and pasture, and has a great trade both in exports and imports. He also derives much revenue from the hoarded fortunes of the great nobles, which by law and custom all come to the King on their owners' death. In addition, there are the spoils of conquered kings and chieftains, whose treasure is seized, and the great levies exacted, and gifts received, from the inhabitants of newly subdued districts in every part of his dominions. These gifts and levies are apt to be so large as to ruin outright many of

his new subjects. He also engages in trading on his own account, and thus increases his wealth to no small degree; for he eagerly exploits every possible source of profit.

Moreover, he allows no bankers or money-changers in his empire except the superintendents and tellers of the royal treasuries. This enormous banking-business brings the King great profit; for at these royal treasuries alone may gold coin be changed for silver or copper, and vice versa. The government officers are paid in gold, silver or copper according to their rank. Thus it comes about that those who are paid in one type of coin need to change some of it into another type.

Such means of increasing the revenue may be thought base, but they have two distinct advantages; for the coinage cannot possibly be debased or adulterated; and the rate of internal exchange is kept constant, since it cannot be manipulated by fraudulent money-changers. Moreover, as all the money in circulation comes eventually to the royal treasuries, there can be no scarcity of money with consequent high prices'. (*The Commentary of Father Monserrate*, 207).

But the Father's list is not exhaustive; for presents received as a matter of custom from nobles and officers came to a considerable sum in the course of the year. And there must have been many miscellaneous heads of revenue.

Manucci, who has experience only of Aurangzeb's reign enumerates the sources of revenue other than land as follows. The reader should not expect precision or strict accuracy from him.

'In addition to this revenue obtained from grain, *et cetera* [he means land revenue], there are other considerable receipts. One is the tribute paid by the Hindūs, as I have stated in my Second Part (II. 182). This has no fixed total, being sometimes more and sometimes less. This variation is caused by deaths, and by travellers moving from one place to another. If carrying with them a receipt for what they have paid, the latter are allowed to pass free. But if they chance to lose this paper, or it be stolen, they are made to pay again either in the same or in another province. The officials embezzle their collections most terribly, to such an extent that the king gets more often than not less than half.

There is a second customs duty upon goods brought by Hindū merchants; it is five per cent; and though Aurangzeb had remitted it for Mahomedans, he has not failed all the same to take two and a half per cent. [from them]. He makes those whom he had exempted pay the rents and customs duty. He also draws large sums from the bathings which the Hindūs perform at various points in the empire. There is also another source of revenue, the diamond

mines in the kingdom of Gulkandah, over and above the largest and the best of the stones. Any which weigh above three-eighths of an ounce belong to the Crown. The seaports also yield him a large revenue; among them are those of Sindī, Bharoch, Sūrat, and Kambāya. Sūrat alone brings him in usually thirty lakhs, besides the eleven lakhs derived from the profit on new coin struck there.

In addition to all these items, he has the revenue from the whole coast of Choromandal, from Masulipatam (Machhlipatanam), from Narsāpur, and of the whole coast from Pundy (Pūndī), or from Ginzerly (Gingerli), as far as Ballasor (Bāleshwar); also from all the ports on the river Ganges. Over and above all these items, he seizes everything left by his generals, officers, and other officials at their death, in spite of having declared that he makes no claim on the goods of defunct persons. Nevertheless, under the pretext that they are his officers and are in debt to the Crown, he lays hold of everything. If they leave widows, he gives them a trifle every year and some land to furnish a subsistence. He also causes the goods of merchants to be seized if they die without heirs. Again, added to all that, he receives very considerable presents from the Hindū princes, *zamīndārs*, and their servants.

The rajahs, the generals of the army, and the commanders are made to contribute a certain sum, according to the number of Hindūs in their service. Usually this is taken as a deduction from the pay disbursed to them. The king's sons even are not exempted, and Shāh 'Ālam, my prince, paid in my day eighty thousand rupees a year. These revenues amount to something near the same total as the revenue from grain, of which I gave the figures above'.¹ (*Storia*, II, 415, 417-18).

I fully agree with the editor's remarks in the footnote. The land revenue was the chief revenue of the empire; so much so that the *Ā'in* has no space for the miscellaneous heads of revenue. As we shall see later, sea customs were included in the official land revenue returns.

1. 'The statement that the miscellaneous revenue equalled the land revenue can hardly be accepted; it must be a great exaggeration. In fact, many of the miscellaneous items, such as sea customs, collected by the *dīwāns* were entered as *mahāls* (heads of receipt) in the *māl* (land revenue), and not in the *sā'ir* (miscellaneous) accounts, and thus are already included in Manucci's total of £ 38,725,900. Most of the *sā'ir* items (fines, market dues, ferry tolls) were collected by the police—that is, by the *kotwāls* and *faujdārs*. (Ibid., P. 418, f.n.1).

LAND REVENUE

We now proceed to appraise the land revenue of the Mughal empire, taking each successive reign separately.

Akbar.

One may begin with Abū'l-Fazl's figures. In the 'Account of the Twelve Provinces' in *Ā'in*, he begins by telling us that in the 40th. regnal year (March, 1595—March, 1596) the *Jam'-i-dahsāla* (i.e., the annual revenue calculated on ten years' average) for the empire, which consisted at this date of 105 *sarkārs* and 2737 *qaṣbas*,² was 3,62,97,55,246 *dāms* (or over 9 crores of rupees) and 12 lacs of betel leaves.

The historian-minister further informs us that the empire was at this time divided into twelve provinces; and that when Berar, Khandesh, and Ahmadnagar were conquered, the addition of these three provinces brought the total to fifteen (*Ā'in*. I, 386).

On closer examination of the gazetteer and the statistics that follow (I, 387-596) we find that we have in fact an account not of twelve but of fourteen provinces. Khandesh and Berar are included, but not Ahmadnagar.

The *Ā'in* was completed in the first quarter of 1598; and the three provinces of Khandesh, Berar, and Ahmadnagar were organized and incorporated into the empire early in 1601, i.e., three years later. The statement about these provinces in the *Ā'in* (quoted above) is, therefore, clearly an anachronism. We can only assume that this reference to later annexations and the details about Khandesh and Berar were incorporated after the *Ā'in* had been completed; the title 'Account of Twelve *Ṣūbas*' being allowed to stand, as if by an oversight. Omission of Ahmadnagar from the gazetteer, however, remains unexplained.

The total revenue given by Abū'l-Fazl, we regret to say, does not tally with the aggregate of the totals given for the different provinces, even after eliminating those for Berar and Khandesh. Casting up the totals I arrive at 5,29,79,31,833½ *dāms* and 12 lacs of betel leaves for the fourteen provinces. This yields just under 13¼ crores of rupees. To this probably is yet to be added the revenue of the Ahmadnagar province.

2. This word seems to mean here a *mahal* or *pargana*.

The reader will remember that this is all land revenue. But there is one exception. The figure for the Gujarat province (included in this total) comprises also the income from thirteen ports, which amounted to 1,62,028¾ *mahmūdīs*, say, Rs. 67,500.³ This, however, is an insignificant amount.

Next comes an authority which is second in importance, though, chronologically, it ought to have preceded the *Ā'in*. Nizām'ud-Dīn Aḥmad closes his *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (finished presumably in the 38th regnal year (11 March, 1593—10 March, 1594) with the following remarks. After giving the length and breadth of the empire in *karoḥs*, he says: 'and all this land is good and cultivable. In each *karoḥ* several villages flourish. At present there are 3,200 towns (*qaṣbas*), each *qaṣba* having attached to it 100, 200, 500 or 1000 villages. The revenue of this country is to-day 640 crore *tanka-i-murādī*. Out of these towns 120 are large ones, which are to-day populous and prosperous'. (P.U.L. MS., f. 502 b.).⁴

The *tanka-i-murādī* means a copper coin of Sikandar Lodī's time, twenty of which went to an Akbarī rupee.⁵ 640 crores of these *tankas* are, therefore, equal to 32 crores of rupees.

There is nothing in the context or the wording of this passage to show that this is the revenue from all sources, as Mr. Thomas assumes. On the contrary it seems obvious that the author is talking of nothing but land revenue. Mr. Thomas is apparently trying to reconcile Nizām'ud-Dīn with other authors. Even making this unwarranted assumption, Nizām'ud-Dīn Aḥmad's figure is considerably more than double the revenue total in *Ā'in*. But this is not all. *Ā'in* was finished in 1598, and includes, as we have seen, revenues of provinces annexed subsequently; so that Abū'l-Fazl's total practically represents the land revenue for the year 1601. If the total income of the Mughal empire was 32 crores in 1593, it would be approaching 40 crores in 1601. We know that the land revenue was 13¼ crores in that year. It is incredible

3. Twelve *mahmūdīs* went to five Akbarī rupees. The results of Mr. Hodivala's inquiries (*Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics* 115—30) are confirmed by a statement in Pelsaert (p. 42).

4. The printed edition (Nawalkishor, Lucknow) is defective.

5. On this point Mr. Thomas and Prof. Hodivala (*Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics*, 51) agree.

that income from other sources amounted to double the land revenue. Edward Thomas's plea for *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* being an authoritative work fails rather badly in this particular. And of course Nizām'ud-Dīn means land revenue only. In either case his statement is wild and irresponsible.

Our old friend, De Laët, tells us that the annual revenue of the fifteen provinces (which he names) was, 'according to the roll of king Achabar', 17,45,00,000 rupees (*Empire of the Great Mogol*, 172). The date to which this statement refers is the death of Akbār. De Laët's statistics, as we have said before, cannot stand the search-light of modern criticism, V. A. Smith's undeserved panegyrics on *De Imperio Magni Mogolis* notwithstanding. His list of provinces is badly bungled; and, as usual with him, he gives only the grand total, refraining scrupulously from giving the details that go to make it up, as if on purpose to foil our efforts to check the accuracy of his results by reference to other authorities. V. A. Smith found it easier to quote his total than to do the sums in the *A'in* (Akbar, 379).

In comparison with Abū'l-Fazl's statements De Laët's have no value. We give the latter, however, for what they are worth.

We are not told by any authority for Akbar's reign how much of the total land revenue came from crown-lands (*Khālīṣa-i-sharīfa*), which went to the emperor's privy purse.

Jahāṅgīr.

Hawkins' statement that the yearly income of the *Khālīṣa* lands in this reign was 50 crores of rupees (Purchas, III, 30) is wild and unworthy of an author who is generally well informed.

In Thomas Coryat's Letters we are told that the Emperor's revenues are 40 million crowns of six shillings' value, by the year (Purchas, IV, 474). At ten rupees to the pound this yields 12 crores of rupees.

But all such statements are nebulous and elusive. We are on solid ground when we come to *Bādshāhnāma*. According to that work the total land revenue of the Mughal empire at the time of Shāh Jahān's accession was 700 crore *dāms*, which comes to 17½ crores of rupees (II, 711).

If De Laët's figure, given above, be assumed to be correct, the annual revenue of the empire seems to have remained stationary

throughout Jahāṅgīr's reign. Or, is it that De Laët took the figures pertaining to the end of Jahāṅgīr's reign, and applied them wrongly to the beginning of it? We must not forget that *De Imperio Magni Mogolis* was compiled in 1631. This hypothesis is supported by a statement in Mandelslo given below.

Shāh Jahān.

Now we come to Shāh Jahān's reign. Mullā 'Abdu'l-Ḥamīd Lāhorī, in the passage cited above, where he is summing up at the end of the twentieth regnal year, goes on to tell us that the total revenue of the older province had gone up by one crore *dāms*, amounting to 800 crores; and that the revenue of the territory conquered since Shāh Jahān's accession totalled 80 crore *dāms*, bringing the aggregate to 880 crores or 22 crores of rupees. Out of this 120 crore *dāms* or 3 crores of rupees was the income from the crown lands or *Khālīṣa*.⁶ We are further told that the *Khālīṣa* income had never reached this figure before. (B.N., II, 711-13).

This is the revenue of 23 provinces.

Mandelslo, in a carelessly worded statement, gives 17,45,00,000 rupees as the annual revenue for this reign (*Voyages and Travels*, p. 38). It is probable that this figure and De Laët's estimate are derived from the same source; and possible that they both refer to the end of Jahāṅgīr's reign, as we have already hinted.

We notice that the land revenue of the Mughal empire rose steadily from the 40th year of Akbar's reign (1595-96) to the 20th year of Shāh Jahān's (1647), due partly of course to conquests, but also, presumably, to stabler conditions and settled administration.

In the last decade of Shāh Jahān's reign Balkh, Badakhshān and Kandahar, which here account for a revenue of 19 crore *dāms* (or nearly half a crore of rupees), were lost to the Mughals. The total for the end of the reign must abate to that extent, to take no notice of other (internal) changes of which there remains no record.

Aurangzeb.

Bernier (1660-65) has a list of 20 provinces, the revenue of which totals Rs. 22,59,35,500. The editor and Mr. Thomas rightly point out that a zero has been omitted by a clerical error in the revenue for Kashmir. So counting 35,00,000 in place of 3,50,000,

⁶ This has been misunderstood by Mr. Thomas, (Edward Thomas, *Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire in India, from A.D. 1593 to A.D. 1707*, p. 29-30).

we have to add 31,50,000 to the grand total, which will then become 22,90,85,500 rupees—roughly nearly 23 crores.

Manucci gives Rs. 38,71,94,000 (which his editor corrects to Rs. 38, 72, 59, 000) as the land revenue for 24 provinces (*Storia*, II, 413-15).

Ma'lūmāt-ul-Afāq (a sober and well-informed work, written some time between the death of Aurangzeb and 1127 A.H.) gives the land revenue of 19 provinces (comprising 4440 parganas) as 9,24,17,16,082 *dāms* (=23,10,42,902 rupees and 2 *dāms*). Of this 1,72,79,81,251 *dāms* (or about 4 1 3 crores) is stated to be the income of the *Khālīṣa-i-sharīfa*, the rest going to the *Jāgīrdārs* as salary.⁷

Only about ten or fifteen years separate *Storia* and *Mā'lūmāt-ul-Afāq*, and the discrepancy between their returns is monstrous.

When we see how the revenue total gradually mounted from 17½ crores (in 1627), through a period of prosperity and annexation, to 22 crores (in 1647), and stood at 23 (in 1660), and note further that as late as 1712 this last figure was only barely exceeded, the wild exaggeration of Manucci's estimate becomes apparent. It is true that Bijapur surrendered in 1686, and Golconda fell in 1687, and that the year 1691 may be taken as marking the most distant advance of the Mogul power.⁸ Allowing for the consequent addition to the imperial revenue Manucci's return still remains fantastic.

Some of the discrepancies in the various writers are no doubt attributable to redistribution of territory.

The returns in Bernier and in *Ma'lūmāt-ul-Afāq* have every appearance of being substantially correct for the respective periods to which they refer.

We fully endorse Mr. Irvine's remarks on all these revenue statistics. 'There remains the objection', he says, 'that applies to all similar tables—those of the "Ā'in-i-Akbarī" included—that we do not know what the figures represent: whether (1) a standard assessment (*jam'a-i-kāmil*), (2) the demand of some particular year (*jam'a-i-wājib*), or (3) the actual collection (*jam'a-i-wasūlī*).' (*Storia* II, 413, fn.1.)

A single-glance summary of the results reached may be attempted in a table.

7. *Ma'lūmāt-ul-Afāq* (P.U.L. MS.), f. 227 b—229 a. The two items are given, but the total does not tally. There seems to be a slight mistake in the P.U.L. MS. available to me.

8. V. A. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 443.

Statement of Land Revenue of the Mughal Empire.

Reign	Date	Number of <i>ṣūbas</i> , <i>sarkārs</i> , <i>mahals</i> , etc., in the Empire.	Approximate amount in rupees.	Authorities
Akbar	1593-94	3200 <i>qaṣbas</i> (120 large ones)	32 crores	<i>Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī</i> (P.U.L. MS.), f. 502 b.
Do.	1595-96	12 <i>ṣūbas</i> =105 <i>sarkārs</i> =2737 <i>qaṣbas</i>	9¼ crores (and 12 lacs of betel-leaves).	<i>Ā'in</i> , I, 386
Do.	1601	14 <i>ṣūbas</i> .	13¼ crores (and 12 lacs of betel-leaves)	<i>Ā'in</i> , I, 387-596 (Calculated)
Akbar-Jahāñgīr	1605		17,45,00,000	De Laët, 172.
Jahāñgīr-Shāh	1627		12 crores	Thomas Coryat (Purchas, IV, 474).
Shāh Jahān			17½ crores	B.N. II, 711.
Do.	1647	23 provinces	17,45,00,000	Mandelslo, 38
Shāh Jahān-Aurangzeb	1658	20 provinces	22 crores (3 crores, crown lands)	B.N., II, 711-13.
Aurangzeb	1660-65	20 provinces	21½ crores	Calculated
Do.	end of 17th century	24 provinces	23 crores	Bernier
After Aurangzeb's death		19 provinces=4440 <i>mahals</i>	38¾ crores	<i>Storia</i> , II, 413-15
			23 crores (4 1 3 crores, crown lands)	<i>Ma'lūmāt-ul-Afāq</i> (P.U.L. MS.), f. 227 b—229 a

"The King of Vellore"

By

W. H. MORELAND.

[My dear Sir,

England, 10-2-32.

You may perhaps care to print this note, or else discuss it in correspondence. I should like to see the matter cleared up—especially as I am now editing another book in which the style 'King of Vellore' is applied to Venkata about 1612-14.

The main point is: Why did the inhabitants of Tegnapatam call their king 'King of Vellore' in March, 1610, and earlier? One could understand the survival of a style which had become obsolete: but, according to the Reviewer, this is the anticipation of a style which had not yet become appropriate.

yours sincerely
W. H. MORELAND.]

A friendly Reviewer in this *Journal* (August, 1931, p. 222) questioned the statement made in the Hakluyt Society's recent volume, *Relations of Golconda*, that Vellore was the capital of Venkata, the reigning sovereign of the Vijayanagar dynasty, from about A.D. 1608, the date to which the *Relations* go back; and suggested that the term 'King of Vellore' may have come into use owing to negotiations having been carried on with the King when he happened to be in camp at Vellore. It may be worth while to bring together the evidence on this point contained in European records of the period.

Portuguese envoys seem to have visited the Court of Venkata fairly often, for whenever the Dutch went there they found Portuguese representatives at work; but no contemporary Portuguese records have been traced. No English envoys visited this King, so the evidence is confined to Dutch sources. The titles of these sources are cumbrous, and I shall cite them in abbreviated form, giving a fuller description at the end of the note.

Dutch relations with Vijayanagar began in 1608, when the Company was allowed to establish a factory at Tegnapatam, but on this occasion all the negotiations were conducted with the Nāyak of Gingee, or rather with his agent, known in the Dutch records as the great Aya', (*Heeres*, 55, *De Jonge*. III. 280, *Terpstra*,

Ch. IV), and there is no reference in the records to the King. Two years later, Arend Maertssen arrived on the Coromandel Coast with orders from the Directors of the Dutch East India Company to renew the arrangement for this factory, and an agreement was made with the Nāyak on 29th March, 1610 (*Heeres*, 78, *De Jonge*, III. 345). On this occasion Maertssen visited Gingee, and the new agreement was sent for sanction to the King at Vellore (*Terpstra*, Ch. V, where the story is told at length from the records in the Rijksarchief). About the same time correspondence was opened with the King regarding the establishment of a factory at Pulicat, and the King sent envoys to draw up an agreement for this factory; the agreement was sent to Vellore for sanction, and on the 28th April, authority was received to start trade. On 15th May, when Maertssen had gone to Pulicat for that purpose, the two agreements arrived there sanctioned by the King, with an invitation to Maertssen to visit the Court in person.

Maertssen with a small party started forthwith for Vellore, and on 25th May he found the King at a village about 25 miles short of that town. He hoped to settle matters there, but this could not be done because the King "desired that they should see his magnificence and royal state, his noble castles and remarkable buildings". The King therefore returned to Vellore, where Maertssen arrived on 27th May, and three days later he was received in audience. At this point a Portuguese envoy intervened, and for some time the King hesitated between the parties, but eventually he refused the tempting Portuguese offers, and the grant for the Dutch factory at Pulicat was not disturbed.

Maertssen then left the locality, having placed Hans Marcelis in charge of the new factory, where disputes with the local officials arose almost immediately. On hearing this, the King sent for both parties to Vellore. Marcelis started on 1st August, and, after some delay, had an audience of the King on the 30th. Portuguese envoys again intervened with presents and promises, and an interval of intrigue followed, but Marcelis was able to leave Vellore on 26th September, with the grant for Pulicat confirmed in a somewhat more favourable form. From these particulars it will be seen that in 1610 the King was in Vellore continuously, or almost continuously, from March to the end of September.

The next Dutch appearance at his court was in 1612, when Wemmer van Berchem, who had become Director of the Coromandel factories, came to Vellore to complain of the sack of the Pulicat factory by the Portuguese (*Dijk*, 24-28; *Heeres*, 100-104,

Dijk's misreading of the name of Velover is corrected).
 er was a man of exceptional energy, and apparently pos-
 the art of getting things done quickly. He left Pulicat on
 cember, had an audience of the King at Vellore on 10th,
 d a formal agreement on 12th, went on to Kolār, where
 a was with the royal army, made an agreement with him,
 s back in Pulicat by 6th January, 1613.

other Dutch mission to the court is recorded during Ven-
 ifetime; and, if these facts stood alone, they would not be
 stent with the Reviewer's suggestion that the style 'King of
 ' might have arisen from the accident of the King being
 arily at Vellore from March to September, 1610, and again
 ember, 1612, though the reference to the castles and build-

Vellore is more appropriate to a capital city than to a
 ary halting place. The suggestion is, however, definitely
 ed by the fact that the style 'King of Vellore' was in use in
 atam before any Dutchman had visited the King; it was
 the Dutch letter-book at least as early as 26th March, 1610,
 months before Maertssen's mission. Under that date the
 ook shows a letter "received from the great King *Venekat*
ij, King of Velor", in which the King offered the Dutch a
 of one of the three ports "Pallicatte, Connomor, Armogon",
 ured them of his protection. This letter has not, so far as
 , been published; the quotation is made from a photostat
 d by the Rijksarchief. The style 'King of Vellore' was thus
 at Tegnapatam, one of Venkata's seaports, in March, 1610,
 ource the Dutch took it from the inhabitants of that place,
 ime their only factory in the Kingdom. If Vellore was not
 tial at that time, I must leave the Reviewer to explain how
 le in question came to be in current use, for I can think of
 r possible origin.

e Reviewer writes that "In the day of Venkata certainly,
 ital was still Penugonda, where he had to stand a siege by
 lconda army in 1612, and where he actually died in 1614, if
 al accounts could be believed". I do not know where to
 : description of that siege, but is it certain that Venkata was
 e army? As has been said above, he was at Vellore in
 er of that year, when his army was at Kolār, so he was
 rays with the army at this period of his reign. As to the
 f his death, in some parts of India it was the practice for a
 King to be taken to some particular place, commonly a for-
 pital; might not this practice explain the local accounts
 the Reviewer quotes with caution?

References.

- De Jonge*.—*De Opkomst van het Nederlandsche Gezag in Oost-Indie*, edited by J. K. J. De Jonge. The Hague, 1862-88.
Dijk.—*Zes Jaren uit het Leven van Wemmer van Berchem*, by L. C. D. van Dijk. Amsterdam, 1858.
Heeres.—*Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, compiled by J. E. Heeres. The Hague, 1907.
Terpstra.—*De Vestiging van de Nederlanders aan de Kust van Coromandel* by H. Terpstra. Groningen, 1911.

The letter and the note printed above are from Mr. Moreland, and have reference to a review of a publication by the Hakluyt Society, *Relations of Golconda*, on pages 219 to 223 of volume X of the *Journal of Indian History*. The matter has reference to the Vijayanagar ruler of the period, Venkata II, as he is sometimes called of Vijayanagar. His capital is referred to as Vēlūr, and, what is really more to the point, that he is himself described king of Vēlūr by European writers of the period, among them the Dutch correspondence published, in the *Relations of Golconda*. The points at issue therefore are whether (1) there is justification for calling Vēlūr the capital of the empire of Vijayanagar under Venkata; and (2) whether there is justification for his territory as a whole being described as kingdom of Vēlūr. Mr. Moreland's note gives full references to the Dutch correspondence, where Venkatapati is spoken of as king of Vēlūr with a variation in the spelling of the word. It would conduce to clearness if a short historical survey be taken of the rule of Venkata II.

Venkata was on the throne from 1585 to 1614. His coronation actually took place in Chandragiri, where he usually resided during the last years of the reign of his father and during the reign of his elder brother as viceroy of the south. When he was anointed, however, he was anointed as ruler of the empire of Vijayanagar, enthroned at Penugonda. His early inscriptions of dates 1585,¹ 1587,² and 1589³ state that he was seated on the throne of the Empire in Suragiri (or Penugonda). Other inscriptions at different dates also refer to him as being seated on the "Jewelled

1. Epi. Col. 71 of 1915.

2. Epi. Car. VII, S. H. 83.

3. Ibid XII, C. K. 39.

Throne" at Penugonda. These refer to year 1593,⁴ 1599⁵ 1603,⁶ 1605,⁷ 1608,⁸ 1609,⁹ 1610,¹⁰ and 1612.¹¹ We need go no further in search for authorities of this class, and may state it broadly that the proper style of the sovereign was "Ruler of Vijayanagar", whether he be called king or emperor; and he is generally said to be ruling from his throne at Penugonda, although we come occasionally upon records that refer to him as ruling from Vijayanagar itself. So far therefore as these inscriptional records go, we are concerned with the ruler of Vijayanagar, and his permanent capital is Penugonda.

We mentioned already that Venkatapati was accustomed to reside in Chandragiri as viceroy of the south, both under his brother and even under his father. During the period when the Jesuits of South India came into contact with him, he was in residence in Chandragiri, and Jesuit references regard Chandragiri as the capital. The Jesuit fathers who were sent out to reside at the court of Venkata are spoken of as the Mission to Vijayanagar, though residing in Chandragiri. The annual letter of the Jesuits for Eastern India speaks of El. Rey de Bisnaga.¹² The mission is spoken of as the mission to Vijayanagar in a letter of the previous year.¹³ A letter¹⁴ of Father Pimenta dated 1602 speaks of Venkatapati as the emperor of Vijayanagar in the capital at Chandragiri. Philip III's letter to the Portuguese viceroy refers to the ambassador from the king of Vijayanagar.¹⁵ The Dutch agreement regarding Pulicat refers to Venkṭa as king of the Carnatic.¹⁶ The traveller Floris refers to the king as "king of Narasinga".¹⁷ The same writer refers to the same king as "king of Narasinga of Vēlūr" in a letter dated 1614.¹⁸ There is a reference to the year 1606¹⁹ to the mission to

4. 377 of 1904.

5. Sewell's Lists of Antiquities, I, page 134.

6. No. 236 of 1903.

7. Sewell's Lists, I, page 101; 255 of 1903.

8. Rangachari, I, pages 622, 535.

9. 67 of 1915.

10. 184 of 1913.

11. Epi. Car. II, TN. 62. Ibid XII, S; 84. Butterworth and V. Chetty III, pages 1284-1286.

12. Appendix C, VI, Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagar by the Rev. H. Heras, S. J., M.A.

13. Ibid letter C II.

14. Ibid C. V.

15. Aravidu Dynasty B. 7.

16. Ibid, pp. 453-54.

17. Purchas, His Pilgrims III, page 320.

18. Ibid III, pages 336-27.

19. Father Quitinno's letter to Father Aquiviva, Ibid C. 13.

Bisnaga visiting both Chandragiri and Vēlūr. In 1607²⁰ there is a reference to the mission to Bisnaga in Chandragiri. Similarly a letter²¹ from the Provincial of Cochin refers to the king of Bisnaga. The annual letter dated 1607²² refers to the kingdom of Vijayanagar several times. A letter from Philip III of Spain to Venkaṭa styles him king of Vijayanagar. The letter is quoted *in extenso* on page 445 of the Aravidu Dynasty. The letter in original is found in appendix B of the work. There is again a reference²³ to the mission to Bisnaga in a letter of date 1608, but referring to the year 1606-7. In 1611²⁴ the letter from Cochin quoting one of the previous year, December 12, refers to Rey de Bisnaga. The memorial²⁵ against Jesuits some time before 1610 also makes similar references. In a letter of 1613,²⁶ Mylapore is referred to as belonging to the king of Bisnaga. This time it is the Portuguese viceroy that is writing to the king. A letter dated 1614 from the Portuguese viceroy to Philip III refers to the death of Rey de Bisnaga, and the disturbances that followed. The same year a letter from Floris speaks of 'the king of Narasinga of Vēlūr'.²⁷ There is a similar reference to him as 'king of Vēlūr' in a letter²⁸ of John Gourney dated 18th July 1614. Floris refers to his death as that of the king of Vēlūr. It will be seen from this that while the general style and description of this ruler is as the King or Emperor of Vijayanagar, he is sometimes spoken of also as king of Narasinga. References to him as king of Vēlūr are not altogether absent, even among writers other than the Dutch.

Venkaṭa was during the first few years after his coronation, about seven or eight years, in Penugonda, which then came to be spoken of as the royal capital. About 1592-93, he moved into Chandragiri, where he had been accustomed to stay for long years, as that was his vice-regal headquarters. There apparently he stayed usually. The representatives of the Jesuit missions met him there, and some of them went into residence there as representatives of the mission at his court. It was in 1604 or a little later that Lingamanāyaka son of Chinna Bomma of Vēlūr rebell-

20. Ibid C. 18.

21. Ibid C. 21.

22. Ibid C. 22.

23. Ibid C. 26.

24. Ibid C. 31.

25. Ibid C. 37.

26. Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagar B. No. 17.

27. Purchas His Pilgrims III, pages 336-7.

28. Letters Received from East India Company 2, page 83.

ed. The rebellion was put down after defeating Lingama at Minnali, as it is called, a small railway station on the Madras-Bangalore railway line, and a subsequent siege of the strong fort of Vēlūr. After the place had been taken and order was introduced Venkaṭa, went into Vellore where he was in residence for a number of years. He often moved out of the capital and stayed elsewhere. On one occasion a mission of the Jesuits went to him when he was 45 miles away in the camp. The mission was asked to meet him at Vēlūr to which he returned later. The Jesuit representatives continued to be in Chandragiri. The king himself was sometimes there, so that it would seem as though it did not matter where the king was in residence. The kingdom continued to be the kingdom of Vijayanagar, or the kingdom of the Karnāṭaka, and he was still ruling from the royal capital of Penugonda, seated on his diamond throne, in formal documents.

References to the king of Vēlūr therefore would be correct only if one understood the king of Vēlūr to mean the king at Vēlūr. The fact that he is referred to sometimes in that style by occasional travellers will not justify his being called "the King of Vēlūr." Vēlūr constituted certainly a government, but as a government it was subordinate to the Nayak at Gingee, so that Vellore did not enjoy the privilege of even being a Nayakdom of the standing of Madura, Tanjore or Gingee. Of course, it is not impossible by virtue of its position and its importance as a fortified centre, that it may have served as the capital. When inscriptions of Venkaṭa and his subjects always call him king of Vijayanagar, when even foreign travellers and the Jesuit fathers style him generally as king of Vijayanagar or king of Narasinga (this latter being a peculiar European designation more or less exclusively), and when, in formal documents by the Portuguese viceroy and even of the Spanish King Philip III, he is styled king of Vijayanagar or emperor of Vijayanagar, the justification for calling him king of Vēlūr seems small indeed. People may certainly speak of him as king of Vēlūr in the sense that the king was then in residence in Vellore, as in fact he was the king of that part of the country. It is hardly necessary to pile up more evidence.

While at the subject, we may perhaps refer to another incident to which the review made reference, the siege of Penugonda by the Muhammadans in 1612. This comes out in detail in the Ragunātha Abyudhayam, the life of the Tanjore Nayak Ragunātha. The author of the Āravīdu dynasty, my friend the Rev. H. Heras, refers to Ragunātha's assistance to Venkaṭapati to the period of the siege of Penugonda

very early in Venkaṭa's reign. This is hardly possible for the following reasons. Ragunātha at the time is spoken of as a young man, hardly fit to bear the responsibilities of rule, and his father Achyuta required to be persuaded to entrust him with the administration and abdicate, about 1614 or thereabouts as he had grown very old and rather other-worldly minded to continue in power.

As a result of the services rendered to the country and the emperor, Ragunātha is said to have obtained the release of Krishnappanayaka of Gingee who was in prison in Penugonda. Krishna was punished for his rebellion, and thrown into prison about the end of the year 1609; and it is later that he should have been pardoned and restored to his position. The siege that is referred to is a later siege, and not the earlier one, and Raghunātha's intervention must have taken place then.

Readers have now enough material to form their own opinion whether Venkaṭa or his immediate successors can be called kings of Vellore, while Vellore may be called a capital, or even the capital, during the period when the king happened to be resident there. Indian rulers certainly were accustomed to remain in various places in their territory even for considerable periods, the capital still remaining one fixed place, as the formal capital. It seems hardly necessary in this instance to regard it as any otherwise than this. Even grants²⁹ of Rama II, the successor of Venkaṭa dated A.D. 1623 refer to his being in residence in Penugonda. Later on than this in A.D. 1636, the Kondiyāta grant³⁰ of Venkaṭa III refers to him as being in Penugonda while making the grant.

S. KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR.

29. Ep. Car. III No. 62. Ibid 12th Ck. I.

30. V. R. Vol. I. N. Arcot 325 A. Copper-plate grant.

HISTORICAL AND ANTIQUARIAN STUDIES IN ASSAM.

The recent publication of the first Bulletin of the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Assam, gives us an account of the work of the Department since its inception. The *puthis* and transcripts collected by the Department have been catalogued by Professor S. K. Bhuyan of the Cotton College, Gauhati, the Honorary Assistant Director of the Department. The Department owes its origin to the efforts of Mr. J. R. Cunningham, C.I.E., Director of Public Instruction, Assam, 1912-1931, who perceived the need for and largely helped in the realisation of a Government organisation for the furtherance of research work. Professor Bhuyan has recently been engaged examining the Assam records deposited in the archives of the Local Government and also in the Imperial Record Department, Calcutta, and is the author of a book—"Early British Relations with Assam," published by the Local Government in 1928. The Department of Ethnography, started first under the Directorship of Mr. (afterwards Sir E. A.) Gait and pushed on into great usefulness by his successors in the Direction, Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. T. Gurdon, and Dr. J. H. Hutton, has been showing very fruitful work, of which the monographs brought out on the different hill-tribes, like the Lushai Kukis, the Angami Nagas, the Lhota Nagas and the Ao Nagas, have been specially useful to anthropological studies. The Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies will be thus a complement to the Ethnographic Department, and will accomplish the objects originally aimed at by Sir Charles Lyall, sometime Chief Commissioner of the Province and Sir E. A. Gait who actually began the scheme of historical research in the Province in 1894 and brought out his "History of Assam" in 1905. A systematic search for Assamese mss was begun by Mr. Hemachandra Goswami in 1912-13; and there was also some provision made for transcribing and publishing the historical mss and for compiling a descriptive catalogue of the *puthis* of Mr. Goswami's collection.

The new Department which has been in existence for a period of just over three years has, to judge from the report of its activities, more than justified its existence. It has published several books the *Kama-ratna Tantra*, including both the Assamese text and parallel English translation; a *Descriptive Catalogue of the Assamese Manuscripts*, dealing with Assamese, Ahom and Sanskrit manuscripts, collected by Mr. Goswami, and the *Ahom Buranji* coming down to 1838 containing a parallel English translation, by

Mr. Gopalchandra Barua. Besides these three publications mentioned above, Mr. Bhuyan has edited for the Department. (1) The *Assam Buranji*, being an enlarged version of the chronicle of Kasi-nath Tamuli-Phukan, and (2) *Kamarupar Buranji* (the history of Kamarupa from the earliest times down to the close of the war with the Mughals in 1682 A.D.—both being equipped with prefaces in English and Assamese. Several other *Buranjis*, also edited by the indefatigable Professor Bhuyan, are in the press and will be published in the course of this year; and one of them, the *Tung-khungia Buranji*, has also been translated by him into English. The Department has also been financing the publication of some valuable Meithi manuscripts, and other works like the *Dak-Bhamita*, *Hasti-Vidyamava* and *Vaidya-Kalpataru*. The collection of manuscripts, letters exchanged between the Ahom Court and other states like Cooch-Bihar, Jayantia, Cachar, the Nawabs of Dacca and the Emperors of Delhi, and their compilation with explanatory matter, and transcripts of historical importance, a list of which is given in this Bulletin (Part III), are among the other activities of the Department. The Department will, we trust, be able, with the labours of enthusiastic researchers like Professor Bhuyan, to produce in a short time work that will throw light upon many dark corners of Assamese history and Assamese relations with the neighbouring tribes and states. To quote an Assamese simile, taken from the report, "the nursery has been laid and considerable acreage covered with plantation. The first crops have been placed on the market, followed by satisfactory response . . . and the market thoroughly gauged . . .".

C. S. S.

Obituary

THE LATE CANON EDWARD SELL, D.D.

The late Canon Sell passed away on the 15th of February last at the ripe age of 93, having been in India for a little over 66 years. He came as a missionary, and was in charge of the Harris High School for Muhammadans in Madras. This first appointment gave the turn to his studies. He applied himself to the study of Arabic, Persian and Urdu, and became an authority in these languages. He became examiner for Higher Proficiency under Government, and occupied the position of Chairman of the Board of Studies in these languages and Chairman of various boards of examiners at the University of Madras for a series of years. During the long years of his active work, he wrote various works, but among them, we may mention the Faith of Islam, the Historical Development of the Koran, Studies in Islam and Islam in Spain. These and some others earned for him the degree of D. D. *Honoris Causa* from the Edinburgh University, and the Kaisari Hind Medal from the Government.

Apart from his activity as a scholar, he devoted himself to organising mission work and was interested primarily in the creation of an autonomous Indian Church. During the long period of forty years, he made this one of his main objects, and was directly instrumental in the appointment of an Indian to an Anglican Bishopric, the lucky recipient of this honour being Dr. Azariah, Bishop of Dornakal in the Nizam's Dominions. He was interested in educational activities, and collaborated with the late Dr. William Miller of the Christian College in bringing about a change in the constitution of the Free Church which enabled the college to go on unhampered. He took interest in the progress of other educational institutions as well, such as the Doveton College and Bishop Corrie's Grammar School. Another one of his activities was the project that he carried through successfully of publishing as many as 31 commentaries on the Old Testament and Jewish literature. These were intended to aid the Indian clergy in the results of the latest biblical scholarship to enable them to teach and preach the religion of Christ with effect.

The last piece of work in which he was deeply interested, and to which he devoted the best of his energies is the creation of a

trust fund, which goes by his name now. For thirty years he managed the press, which used to be called the S. P. C. K. press, and became the Madras Diocesan Press some years ago. He developed this business organisation which began with a capital of Rs. 40,000 into one which realised 5 lakhs of rupees for the purpose of this trust-fund the income from which is to be applied for the service of the Indian Church.

We have had the pleasure of his acquaintance during the last score of years of his life, and have enjoyed the benefits of the genuine friendship of the ripe scholar and the sympathetic man. Though he passes away full of years and achievement, we cannot but regret the removal of a familiar figure from amongst us.

Editorial

WE acknowledge with thanks receipt of the three magnificent volumes of the report of the Director-General of Archaeology on the Indus Valley Civilisation, with which Mr. Arthur Probsthain, the publisher, favoured us. We have already published a notice of the report in the last number of the Journal, and shall be publishing a more detailed review in later issues as occasion offers. This is merely to acknowledge the kindness of the enterprising publisher for this exhibition of regard for the Journal of Indian History.

Amongst a number of publications sent by the Oriental Institute, Baroda, we have received an important publication, *Jayākhyā Samhita*, a work bearing on the *Āgamas*, pertaining to the *Bhakti* cult of the Vaishnavas. This is a very important work being one of the *three jewels* of this school of *Bhakti*, the other two being the *Sāttvata*, and the *Paushkara*. A number of works belonging to this class have already been published, and have been made available in one form or another. A number of them happen to be in South Indian scripts, and therefore not really accessible to the wider body of scholars than those in South India. The best published as yet is the *Ahirbudhnya Samhita* published some years ago by Dr. Schrader with a learned introduction and other apparatus necessary for the understanding of the work. Dr. Bhattacharya, the editor of the Gaikawad's Series, publishes an introduction to the *Jayākhyā* following to a great extent the much more elaborate introduction of Dr. Schrader. While admitting the antiquity of the *Pāncharātra* as being well-known even in the time of Pānini, the grammarian, he discusses the actual date of the *Jayākhyā*, and arrives at the conclusion that this work may be referable to the fifth century A.D. He is led to this specific conclusion by a palaeographical datum, which he finds in the *Jayākhyā*, where a number of letters of the alphabet happen to be named and described. Comparing the description given with the characters current at various periods, he comes to the conclusion that the alphabetical system of the *Jayākhyā* lies between the Bilsad inscriptions of A.D. 414 and the Toramana Inscription of A.D. 500. Even on his own examination of the alphabetical characters given on the table facing page 34 of his introduction, a comparison of all the letters in their cumulative result would bring the system nearer to the Kushan. In another part of the introduction, there is a re-

ference to the Tamil texts of the classical period, which contain references to the *Āgamaic* features of Vaishnavism. We do not see, however, specific references to the four *Vyūhas* in poem 3 of the *Paripādal*, nor to stanza 44 of the *Tiruchanda-viruttam*, where this is equally under reference. The author of this latter poem Tirumaliśai Ālvar actually refers to the *Āgamic* works of the Vaishnavas. Such clear references to the *Vyūhas* indicate a stage of South Indian *Pāncharātra* referable to the earliest, according to Dr. Schrader's classification. We shall reserve for a future occasion a fuller discussion of the matter, but we content ourselves with drawing attention to the point here, as the publication of the *Jayākhyā* marks an important step in the study of this literature. We have nothing but commendation for the manner in which the text is published, and for the learned introduction both by the General Editor, and by the actual editor of the work, Pandit Krishnamachariar.

We are glad to note that Mr. K. P. Jayaswal has taken up a discussion of Chandragupta II, Vikramaditya, of the Gupta dynasty in the Behar and Orissa Research Society's Journal. This discussion is based upon a previous one by Professor Altekar of the Benares Hindu University, who brought together the passages, which had been made available by Professor Sylvain Levi from the newly discovered drama, *Dēvichandraguptam*, to which we had drawn attention long ago in our lectures to the Madras University, and published in the Gupta Supplement of the Journal of Indian History. While the discussion therefore by Altekar brought to light a new Gupta ruler by name Rāmagupta, and the misfortune that befell him in a campaign against the Śakas, it left the position of Chandragupta in connection with the event somewhat dubious. Chandragupta there turns out to be the prince, younger brother of Rāmagupta, who volunteered service to outwit the Śaka ruler in regard to the surrender of the queen. Having done this successfully, he saved the king and the empire from the disgrace likely to result from the surrender of the queen. He is found soon after to have been the means of dispossessing Rāmagupta both of his empire and of his queen. There is an allusion to this occurrence in the Harshacharita of Bāna and that was explained in an exactly similar way by Sankarārya, the commentator, who supplied the details that Chandragupta overthrew the enemy and married his brother's wife. This was thought to be somewhat of an absurd position at the time, as we did take it upon ourselves to remark. It has since turned out to have been the case by what is stated in the drama *Dēvichandraguptam* ascribed to Viśākadatta,

the author of the drama *Mudrarākshasa*, the concluding stanza of which has a reference to the reigning king which has been read as *Avantivarma* in certain manuscripts, *Chandragupta* in others. There has been a controversy, and a discussion over the point itself. We find however that all the different manuscripts in the Tanjore Library, about twenty-five in number, and not all of them traceable to the same source, give the reading uniformly as *Chandragupta*; not one of them gives the variant *Avantivarma*. This is of value as *Dhundirāja*, the only commentator on the *Mudrarākshasa* lived at the court of *Ekoji*, the half brother of *Shivaji*, and the first *Mahratta* ruler of Tanjore, in whose reign he wrote the commentary. The datum becomes of value as the commentator must have collected the variant versions then available about the third quarter of the seventeenth century. Perhaps it makes it more probable that the *Mudrarākshasa* was written in the court of *Chandragupta*, as perhaps the *Dēvichandraguptam* itself. In the absence of the whole text, it would be difficult to discuss what the *Dēvichandraguptam* actually contained and what it did not. But the discussion of this matter actually started with us, at any rate, as the Sanskrit *śloka* quoted in the *Kāvya Mīmāṃsa* by *Rājasēkhara* on page 47. We shall discuss the verse in detail on another occasion, but we feel concerned to point out here that both Professor *Altekar* and Mr. *Jayaswal* feel that the verse is in all probability not an extract from the *Dēvichandraguptam*; and the latter even regards the verse as not referring to *Chandragupta* at all. We closed our contribution *Chandragupta Vikramāditya*, made to the Patna University Sir *Asutosh Mukerjee* Memorial volume with a question whether the stanza did not refer to the emperor *Chandragupta*, and composed in glorification of his heroic deeds. Since two subsequent investigators have taken it upon themselves to indicate clearly that they regard the stanza as having nothing to do with *Chandragupta*, we may take occasion to show here that it would be pointless absolutely, if the latter two lines of the stanza are not in reference to *Chandragupta II*, from the point of view of the rhetorician *Rājasēkhara*. Even otherwise we have sufficient indication that the *Kinnara* women folk sang the glories of *Chandragupta II*, and no other, and it is very probable that the stanza is perhaps the closing stanza of the *Dēvichandraguptam*. It is not impossible that it might occur elsewhere in the course of the drama. *Rājasēkhara*'s definition of *Kathōttha*, for which he gives the stanza as an illustration, is *Vrittē-iti vrittah*, that is an occurrence or an incident springing out of another incident; in other words, what happened is the result of something that had already happened. There would be absolutely no point unless the second

half of the *śloka* is interpreted with a view to this. Thus interpreted it can refer to no other than *Chandragupta* himself.

Advance in Indian cultural studies has in recent times given its due place to the *Mahābhārata* as at the foundation of Indian thought, religious and secular. It is not so long ago that one section of scholars, at any rate, felt it necessary to call attention to this need, particularly on the Continent. This received a stimulus when the first Indian Oriental Conference at Poona considered the question of an authoritative edition of the *Mahābhārata*, which had already been thought of and for which some little work had been done in Europe. The starting of the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* in Poona, and the formation of the Indian Oriental Conference made it possible to transfer the carrying out of the scheme to India, and work on this important scheme had been put in hand almost immediately. Work is going on on that scheme, and we have had five fascicules containing slightly more than half of the first *parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*.

In the course of the various discussions connected with this large scheme of work, was naturally one on the relative merits of the codices of texts preserved in various localities all over the vast country. Opinion was gradually crystallising that while the variations in the text are very vast, certain classes of manuscript material coming from certain localities exhibited the least corruption and certain others the most. *Kashmir* figures honourably in the first, and the South Indian texts come in for considerable notoriety in the second. This arose from the fact that there was a recent edition of the *Mahābhārata* in the south following, of course, one or two others that existed even before that. This latest edition made inclusiveness as its main characteristic and incorporated in it whatever was the text of the *Mahābhārata* on manuscript authority as well as printed texts. Examination of southern manuscripts in connection with the edition of an All-India *Mahābhārata*, and particularly the examination of manuscripts in the Palace Library at Tanjore led to the discovery that a group of Manuscripts of a particular period preserved the text much more carefully than those of the following periods. There has been besides a continuous tradition of *Mahābhārata* reading traceable in the historical records of the south, from which all the vernaculars of the south have made versions in their own languages. There were besides some commentators, at any rate, who have made references to these texts and even commented on them in various ways. It seemed desirable therefore that as an essential preparation for the critical study of the *Mahābhārata* a correct edition of the southern

text as such would be desirable in many ways. The continuity of text tradition is one feature. The vicissitudes that made for large destruction of manuscripts in the north were not so frequent, it might even be said, did not exist, in anything like the same degree, as in the north. The vernacular versions provide a landmark, and with these versions must be included the Javnese version which seems to have gone from the south. The period when Tanjore was under the Nayaks of Vijayanagar, the period extending from the reign of Achyutarāya beginning A.D. 1530 and ending with the overthrow of the dynasty by the southern viceroys by Bijapur in A.D. 1672-74 was a period when the tradition of preserving Hindu culture showed itself at its best. Manuscript corruption seems to become rampant afterwards. This may have been due to the prevalent anarchy of the time, which does not appear to have even excluded this department of scholarship. Manuscripts therefore of the period of the Vijayanagar viceroyalty, and such commentarial aid as could be got for periods previous have been utilised in the preparation of a southern recension and the well-known Madras publishers, Messrs. V. Ramaswami Sastrulu & Sons, and the present proprietor V. Venkateswara Sastrulu came forward to undertake the publication. The work has been begun, and we have three volumes out of a projected eighteen, completing the first two books. With ordinary steadiness and rapidity, the edition ought to be available to the public in another couple of years or three at the outside. In the interest of Mahābhārata scholarship and the editors and publishers as well, it is desirable that the work is brought to completion as soon as it is compatible with careful work. We wish the enterprise all success, and hope that it will have a reception sufficiently encouraging to those that have initiated the enterprise and are actually carrying it out.

While on this subject, we may refer to a new Tamil version of of the Mahābhārata, which has been going on for well over a score of years and has reached its completion during the last quarter. It is a literal Tamil translation of the Mahābhārata based on the Kumbakonam edition of the work. The first vernacular version of the Mahābhārata so far known is the Tamil version ascribable to the classical age of the Tamils, who regarded the doing of the Mahābhārata in Tamil as of importance comparable to the very establishment of the Tamil Academy itself. While this serves the needs only of the Tamil country, we welcome its completion as the completion of a vast work undertaken by a Pandit friend of ours, Pandit M. V. Ramanujachariar. The Sanskrit Academy in Madras did itself the honour of conferring upon him a title in appreciation of his labour in completing this great work.

Reviews

PICTURESQUE INDIA

By

M. HURLIMANN,

Messrs. D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., Bombay.

This is a work which attempts to give an idea of the whole of India by means of pictures, or photographic reproductions of the more remarkable features of India, primarily monumental, and to some extent even natural. The work gives 304 full page reproductions of pictures, beginning with the protecting deity of the triad Vishnu appropriately opening the book in the pronounced attitude of "Have no fear" (Abhyaya), with the letter-press Vishnu the preserver. Then we are taken on to a few scenes in the great temple at Rāmēśwaram, and then on in a particular order of a tourist's programme through a variety of scenes, coming ultimately back to a bronze statue in the Madras Museum of the dancing Śiva, Naṭeśa, in the ecstatic bliss of an almost self-forgetful dance. The illustrations themselves contain a remarkable collection. The best of the temples of South India come into view as also the most remarkable of the Islamic monuments of northern and western India; some domestic scenes, as also representations of individual and social life. There is a rapid survey of the pictures produced in an introduction, which, at any rate, begins the art history of India with Asoka and brings it in a continuous series down to practically modern times. The work ought to be of interest not merely to the tourists but also to those who wish to gain an idea of India without the labour of an elaborate study.

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

By

R. B. MOWAT,

Messrs. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., (15 shillings) net.

In this work Professor Mowat, already well-known by his handbooks on English History and European History, attempts to tackle the question of the emergence of a European concert, the nineteenth century analogue, of what has now matured into the League of Nations. As a consequence of the joint efforts of the greater monarchs of Europe who co-operated in bringing about the downfall of Napoleon, these monarchs set themselves up in a

more or less permanent conference with a view to avoiding war as a result of various matters of dispute between subjects and sovereigns in the states of Europe. Such a body naturally changed its form from time to time, and naturally exercised a varying degree of influence in the councils of Europe in connection with the particular object that it set before itself. It tried to exercise an influence in a period immediately following that of Napoleon, England being, on the whole, lukewarm. In the periods following, it had not such a recognised existence through the varying politics of the nineteenth century Europe, but had gradually emerged into a well-known body with a great deal of potentiality for good. The position of the concert came to a test at the termination of the Franco-German War, which set up a new order in Europe, and, by that fact, called for vigilance, as it was thought, on the part of some of the more powerful states directly affected by the war, particularly Germany. The concert rendered useful service, as for instance in the Berlin Congress; but on many other occasions, in which it might have proved efficient if all the connected powers took the same, or a similar view of its position in the affairs of Europe. But almost from the beginning, the new-born empire of Germany refused to bring herself into it so wholeheartedly as some of the other powers, and this introduced a factor to be reckoned with of the concert failing to take concerted action or exercise a concerted pressure whenever called for. It was gradually coming to be felt as the American President, Roosevelt, put it on one occasion, that the best way to avoid war is to be the most prepared for it. It is almost in tacit recognition of that principle that all Europe went about in a race arming themselves to the very teeth, which culminated in the world cataclysm of the Great War.

The consideration of the concert of Europe naturally and by an unobserved transition passes into the question of responsibility for the war. The responsibility, according to this work, gets more or less definitely fixed on Germany, though that position is hardly yet universally accepted as the correct position. But ever since the Berlin Congress, that Germany did not show itself ready to fall in with the views of the more pacific powers of the concert, is beyond question true. But the best criticism that has been offered so far is that the action of the other powers on these various occasions was not all of them uniform, and some of them such as France in certain cases had no more tendency to settle questions by peaceful conference. But Professor Mowat's finding may perhaps be given in his

own words; "That it failed to preserve peace in the end seems chiefly because, in the last (but not, so far as can be judged, the most difficult) crisis, Germany refused to collaborate in the concert." This general position is explained on page 8 of the book:—"Nevertheless Germany must bear the chief responsibility of the war for three reasons: firstly, because she had never really believed in the Concert of Europe and had rather encouraged than abated the "war-atmosphere" of 1871 to 1914; secondly, because in the actual crisis of July 1914, she rejected two proposals that might quite possibly have averted the actual outbreak of a general War (Grey's proposal of July 26 for a Conference, and the Tsar's proposal of July 29 for reference to the Hague Tribunal); and thirdly, because, on hearing of the Russian general mobilisation order, she decided that she could not take the risk of waiting a few more days or weeks, merely "counter-mobilising", but forthwith precipitated hostilities'. Those that wish to understand the present day problems of Europe would benefit much by a glance through this book.

SHIVAJI THE FOUNDER OF THE MAHRATTA SWARAJ

By

RAO BAHADUR C. V. VAIDYA, M.A., LL.B.,

Bharat Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala,

(Puraskrita Grantha Mala No. 26.)

Published by the Bharat Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala, Poona.

The recent celebration of the ter-centenary of the birthday of Shivaji in the year 1930 was taken advantage of by the Bharat Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala to collect together and put into a handy form the material for the early history of the Mahrattas culminating in the establishment of Shivaji as the founder of the Mahratta kingdom. There are many valuable works bearing on the life of Shivaji, and perhaps even much unnecessary controversy has been imported into a subject, which while it may lend itself to controversy in regard to particular topics, need hardly have become quite so controversial generally as it has actually become. Shivaji's life has been cast in an eventful period of Indian History, and his very existence and activity have been responsible for many a stirring event in the interesting annals of the efforts of the last great Mughal, Aurangzeb, to subdue the south and reduce it to subordination to his authority. The earlier efforts therefore at writing an account of the rise of the Mahrattas and Shivaji naturally had to be based entirely on such account as was

preserved in the writings of Musalman historians, whose primary object was the writing of the history of the times from the point of view of the Muhammadan rulers, whose history these works attempted to write, either by direct stimulation of the rulers concerned, or even by writers not so directly indebted to the Muhammadan sovereigns of the times. Among this latter class must be mentioned prominently the historian generally known by the name Khafi Khan. It does not require very great penetration to come to the conclusion that writing the history of the Mahrattas from sources like that was bound to be purely one-sided, and very often even inaccurate. The best of these, with the most honest intentions, could write only what came to his knowledge. In the great majority of cases, it could have been only knowledge at second-hand, because these great historians generally resided at court or near, and depended for their information upon various classes of people, and other sources of an indirect character. Some of them may have played a direct part, but such are very few. These sources therefore are to that extent defective, and any life of Shivaji, or even a general history of the Mahrattas, based exclusively upon these sources would certainly be defective.

There have been other sources of information with which these could be corrected. These were generally the records and correspondence of the agents of the various European Companies which had settled in the country for purposes of commerce. These settlements were generally along the coast, and these coast factories had their agents within the country. They got their reports from various of these agents, and communicated them home. Some of these agents happened to be in the locality where many of these historical events actually took place. But generally speaking, even their information was to a great extent second-hand, and to that extent imperfect. In some cases, it may be less imperfect and in other cases more. There is yet another source, the Mahratta source, pure and simple, which has been but partially exploited by even writers of the standing of Duff. Duff had unrivalled opportunities for access to original records even in Mahratti, which exist no more, so that his history must be regarded as utilising the light available from all these sources and the result of his own enquiries in the Mahratta country. But recently there has been such an accumulation of this class of material, which called imperatively for a critical examination of their value, and their fuller utilisation for the purposes of Mahratta history generally and of the life of Shivaji in particular. Any attempt at a biography of the actual founder of the kingdom of the Mahrattas would certainly

be defective, if it were based entirely upon extraneous records, such as the European correspondence, and even the accounts of Musalman historians. A biography of Shivaji therefore must be based essentially upon native sources of information if a biography is to give an account at least in some detail of the various influences that called for action and the motives that gave shape to his movements. Any account of his life based on the other sources alone is bound to be much more defective than even a history of the Mahrattas need be.

Those that formed themselves into the Shivaji-Karyalaya and set themselves up to making an exhaustive collection of material bearing upon the history of the Mahrattas did well to have collected all the sources and brought them together in a handy form for critical use by students of history. That is but doing one part of the work. It would have been a sheer waste of labour to do that alone and leave it there, unless that material were critically examined, fully digested, and actually used to write the life of Shivaji. Any effort in this direction would be better if it could make full use of the Mahratta sources with a proper appreciation of the critical value of the various other sources so far made available, and the writer ought to be a sympathetic student capable of appreciating the points of view of the subject of his biography without being too ready to cavil, or too prone to admire. Rao Bahadur C. V. Vaidya is frankly and confessedly an admirer of Shivaji, and the great work that he had done in the establishment of what is generally called Hindvi Svaraj. He might be regarded as just the kind of man to write a biography. The little book of very near 400 crown octavo pages gives a fairly succinct account of the life of Shivaji, which takes into consideration the material collected by the Shivaji-Karyalaya. The result is a hand book, which gives, more or less, an unvarnished tale of the life and doings of Shivaji. It takes away all the romantic incidents, for which usually later writers were responsible, and, basing itself upon contemporary sources mostly, presents a plain, unvarnished tale. This perhaps makes the work rather fall short of a good biography as yet, but we may say it makes a fairly real approach to what a biography ought to be.

One useful purpose that this work serves is to exhibit that the Shivabharata, a poetical account as it is, is not quite so unhistorical and the Jede chronology, which had been too much condemned as unreliable, is not quite so unworthy of credence. What really was required is a critical use of these sources, and not their condemnation because in regard to certain details, they have shown

themselves to be in error, according to our lights which may as well be wrong. While we do not subscribe to the dictum that contemporary sources are always and necessarily correct, and later sources equally generally not, we may say that this biography is based on contemporary records primarily and excludes rigorously all sources that smack of exaggeration or romance. The biography, of course, loses some of its charm, but in the present condition of criticism respecting the career of Shivaji, perhaps it is just as well that there is that exclusion. But our objection is not because we want romance in history. This rigorous exclusion removes the possibility of our understanding the character for impressionability of the hero, and the kind of influences that impressed him and stimulated him to action in various circumstances. Individuals do not always act upon a mathematical calculation of chances even in statecraft. Many another motive, honest and unworthy, might enter into the transactions of rulers, and exercise a potent influence upon the course of their public activities. While therefore congratulating the learned author upon his achievement, we may well expect him to make an effort to do fuller justice to the subject of his biography than he has yet succeeded in doing. The book is worth reading by those interested in the life of Shivaji, and copies can be had of Messrs. Higginbothams Ltd., Madras, or Bombay Book Depot, Girgaum, Bombay.

LANDLORDISM IN INDIA

By

DIVIJADAS DATTA, LATE OF THE BENGAL EDUCATION SERVICE.

(Messrs. D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., Bombay).

Landlordism in India has been a controversial subject practically through the whole of the nineteenth century. The question has been discussed elaborately by Wilks in his History of Mysore written in the early years of that century. Echo of it could be heard in the controversy between the late R. C. Dutt and the Government of India culminating in the issue of the Government communique The Land Revenue Policy of the Government of India by Lord Curzon. In this brochure of less than a 150 pages, Mr. Datta attacks the problem, and points out from quotations from various Hindu authorities and Aini Akbari that in India the land belonged to the cultivator, the so-called zemindar being a modern product and a mere farmer of revenue, the Government

itself not being a proprietor of the land. Mr. Datta contends that the change of attitude is altogether a question of the nineteenth century, the Pitt's India Act itself giving the authority, according to him, for the proprietary right of the ryot, and the unfairness of these rights being allowed to be overridden by that either of the zemindar or of the Government. The question is of a very fundamental character and requires a far more elaborate examination to prove the thesis for the country of the vastness and variety of land tenures, such as India is. There perhaps is no doubt that according to recognised Hindu law, land belongs to the community, and the Government's demand upon land, as in fact Government's demand upon other resources of the subjects, is a return for services rendered, the service of protection. There seems to be a frank recognition of this principle in Hindu law, as well as the existence of society before the state and of the creation of a Government with set objects in view. Want of sufficient recognition of this may account for much of the prevalent poverty of the agriculturist classes but it is hardly necessary to import unnecessary acerbity into the question in the discussion of a really vital and technical problem such as this.

JAINISM IN NORTH INDIA 800 B. C. A. D. 526.

BY

C. J. SHAH, M.A.,

(Published by Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1932).

The Indian Historical Research Institute, Bombay deserves to be congratulated upon the excellent work which it is turning out in the field of Indian History under the able and learned guidance of the Reverend Father H. Heras, S. J. The book under review forms the sixth of the publications under the auspices of that Institute, and is introduced to the public with a brief foreward by the Director of the Institute.

Mr. C. J. Shah, the author of the thesis on the history of Jainism, is well qualified for the task as he himself is a Jaina. The period covered is B. C. 800 to A.D. 526. He has confined himself to the history of that movement in north India and it is well he has limited himself, for adequate justice can hardly be done to the history of Jainism in South India except by a competent student of Tamil literature.

The one merit of Mr. Shah's book is the due acknowledgment of the views of previous writers on the subject whether he agrees with them or not. In this respect the thesis is up-to-date, and the

mode of treatment is historical. In a few places he simply quotes the views of scholars and takes them for granted without examining them for himself in detail. For instance we may draw attention to his view of Candragupta Maurya having died a Jaina by faith. This is a late tradition preserved in works written several centuries after Candragupta's reign. This account has its basis in an inscription at Śravana Belgola (cir A.D. 600) where any amount of careful reading does not bear testimony to the Maurya Candragupta following the *Jaina Sangha* to the far south.

It is beyond the province of a reviewer to give a full list of inaccurate statements in the book. We cannot help referring to one more wrong statement that occurs in the very first page of the Jacket on the book. It is remarked there: 'a detailed history of the non-brahmanical sect of Jainism'. But we have on P. 22 the following. Tracing from the days of Mahāvīra down to our own times we find that some of the greatest and most prominent figures of the Jaina fold were Brahmans as well. From Indrabhūti down, right to the last Ganadhara of Mahāvīra, all were Brahmans. Then in later history we have prominent *gurus* and scholars like Siddhasēna and Haribhadra who also were originally Brahmans." In the light of this it would have been better had he avoided the term non-Brahmanical, though the tendency of the teaching is to condemn Brahmanism in regard to several particulars of teaching and practice.

These blemishes, apart, the book reveals much painstaking work on the part of the author in collecting materials and collating them. It is well written, and will prove of considerable value to students of India's religious history, not to speak of her political history.

V. R. D.

THE RISE OF THE PESHWAS.

BY

PROFESSOR H. N. SINHA.

Morris College, Nagpur.

Published by The Indian Press Ltd., Allahabad, 1931—pp. VIII, XXVIII and 255.

This book is intended to be the first volume of a series which will trace the rise, decline and fall of the Peshwas down to the extinction of their rule. Several chapters of the present book had already appeared in the "Journal of Indian History" in the

years 1928-30. It traces the rise of Balaji Vishvanath, gives an estimate of his work, and, after elaborating the struggles and triumphs of Baji Rao, takes us through the regime of Nana Saheb Peishwa (Balaji Baji Rao), the death of Shahu, the coronation of Ram Raja, the failure of Tārā Bai's *coup* and the final triumph of the Peishwa, in 1752, who now-relegated the discredited Chatrapati completely to the back ground. The author has given, in the Introduction, a brief survey of Maratha vicissitudes between the death of Shivaji when the Maratha state was still invertebrate, and the stabilisation of Shahu's authority in spite of the creeping in of predatory propensities and the disappearance, for all practical purposes, of Shivaji's ideals. He points out very clearly that Balaji Vishvanath, the first of the House of the Peishwas, was the first and best servant of the House of the Bhonsles. He laid the foundation of the future Maratha confederate state, reorganised the finances and began the pursuit of an imperial policy. The concept of the *Hindu-Pat Padshahi*, which literally means nothing more than Hindu sovereignty developed, in the course of the 18th century into Hindu imperialism that however degenerated, in practical realisation, into a loose confederacy of semi-independent chiefs, lacking a centralised administrative system. Balaji Vishvanath had no idea of establishing an empire on the ruins of the Mughal Empire, by means of conquest, as sane patriotic historians of Maharashtra attribute to him. He only planned a sphere of influence which could widen with his successors and the increasing decay of Mughal authority. He might have expected the Mughal Empire to quickly fall to pieces; but this did not blur his discretion, nor raise his ambitions. But his son's policy developed and took shape out of his hazy notions, and received an impetus from the impotence of the Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Shah and from the friendliness of the Rajput powers, though the operation of the latter factor has not often been realised in its proper magnitude. It should also be remembered that the Nizam's desire to shelter himself behind the Maratha barrier set the Marathas on the road to Delhi and enabled them to strike at the trunk of the Mughal dominion. The convention of Sironje (more correctly, Durai Sarai) marked the climax of Baji Rao's activities and the fruition of his imperial policy, besides spreading his reputation all over India. The suppression of the Sidis, largely at the instigation of Brahmendra Svāmi, who was to the Marathas, in this age, what Ramdas was to Shivaji, followed by that of the Angrēs and the capture of Bassein made the Peshwa supreme in the Konkan and completed the groundwork for the foundation of an Empire.

The succession of Balaji Baji Rao is explained by Professor Sinha to have been a necessity on grounds, alike of merit, political expediency and the self-interest of Shahu himself. The question that first demanded the attention of this Peshwa was the succession of Shahu. The part played by Raghoji Bhonsle in this matter is well brought out. Mr. G. S. Sardesai, the editor of "Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar", in his latest book—*The Bhonsles of Nagpur (1717—1774)*—tells us that Raghuji precipitated an open conflict with the Peshwa in 1742, but had always the good sense to avoid an open clash and to co-operate with the latter in furthering the extension and prestige of the Maratha Raj. The Maharaja was largely instrumental in avoiding an open rupture between the two; and this should prove that Shahu was not a mere figurehead in Maratha affairs and the Peshwas were perfectly submissive to his orders. Mr. Sardesai holds that the fact that Shahu's death passed off without a bloody revolution, was mainly due to the good sense of Raghuji who was convinced that the Peshwa alone was capable of handling the critical situation of the succession, and gave his whole-hearted support to the latter, inspite of pressure to the contrary from high quarters like Tārā Bai and Damaji Gækwar. He maintains that "this phase of Raghuji's character is disclosed in unmistakable colours by the copious papers here (*Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar* No. 20) presented for the first time. The settlement between the Peshwa and Raghuji Bhonsle was brought about by the mediation of Shahu in the latter part of 1743. Thus, till the death of Shahu, the Peshwa shewed a real deference to royal authority and rendered periodical accounts to him.

Shahu's death and Rama Raja's accession were followed by the bold assumption by the Peshwa, of responsibility and initiative which laid him open to the charge of usurpation. The Peshwa threw Satara into the background and indirectly compelled both Ramaraja and Tara Bai, his guardian, to submit to his wishes. Tārā Bai's intrigues with Dabade, Damaji Gaikwar and the Nizam, were crushed by the Peshwa in 1751; and the latter, afterwards, both ruled and governed. Mr. Sinha's narrative is flowing and detailed and throws, for the non-Marathi knowing reader, light on many an intricate corner of the history of the Marathas in the first half of the 18th century. He is not as decisive, as Kincaid and Parasnis who attribute a large share of the blame for the fall of the house of Shivaji, to its new actions and bickerings.

C. S. S.

HENRY DUNDAS, FIRST VISCOUNT MELVILLE 1742-1811.

Political Manager of Scotland, Statesman, Administrator of British India.

BY

HOLDEN FURBER.

Oxford University Press, London Humphrey Milford,

1931—pp. XII and 331—16/-

Henry Dundas, the right-hand man of William Pitt, the younger, is best known to us as the Minister for India in the long period, 1784-1801, first as the Senior Member and virtual Chairman of the Board of Control, and later as its President when the office was specially created by the Charter Act of 1793. Dundas rose, at a very early age, to be the Lord Advocate of Scotland and became the acknowledged political manager of Government, even under Lord North. His influence in Scotland made him valuable to any Government, since the votes of the Scottish representatives in Parliament counted for so much. He was, by the persistent insistence of Pitt, Home Secretary, and later, Secretary for War, till the resignation of the Ministry early in 1801. His conduct of the war with Revolutionary France has been severely criticised by Sir John Footesque in his 'History of the British Army'; but Dr. Furber thinks, along with Dr. Holland Rose, that the condemnation has been too severe. His severity in enforcing anti-Jacobin laws can only be tempered by the plea that his actions were approved and abetted by such men as Burke and Pitt, and were deemed to be moderate by observers like Lord Cockburn. His impeachment for alleged misappropriation of funds during his Treasurership of the Navy ended in acquittal, and is important only as having been the last of its kind.

It is as Indian Minister that Dundas is most important to us. He suggested, even in the Ministry of Lord North, a rearrangement of the Cabinet which involved the creation of a special Secretary for India and the Plantations (1782). He had already served as Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee to inquire into the conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold, Governor of Madras and presented the Report of the Secret Committee on the War in the Carnatic (with Mysore). He brought about the passage of the first resolution, praying for the recall of Warren Hastings, and brought in a comprehensive India Bill in April 1783, during the Fox-North Coalition; the bill placed entire responsibility upon

the Governor-General and empowered him to override his council. It was shelved by Fox whose own bills were defeated and superseded by Pitt's Bill of 1784. With the latter bill, Dundas became Secretary for India in all but the name; and he Scotticised the Indian administration to a very large extent. The charge of Scotticisation was brought against him as early as 1787, on the occasion of his nomination of Sir Archibald Campbell in succession to Lord Macartney, to the Governorship of Madras. Dundas' part in the impeachment of Warren Hastings has remained obscure; and Dr. Furber tries to show that though Dundas did all he could, in the first months of his rule at the Board of Control, to bring about the dismissal of Hastings, he held that there was no need for an impeachment and that the Parliamentary Committees of 1781-82 had aimed only at his recall and not at a penal prosecution. He gave but very lukewarm support to the impeachment which greatly dissatisfied Burke. An attempt is also made by Dr. Furber to show that Dundas was not implacably jealous of Hastings, whom, the King intended on one occasion to appoint to the Chairmanship of the Board of Control. It is, however, not possible to gauge aright Dundas' personal feelings towards Hastings, for lack of decisive evidence.

Dundas was enthusiastic over Cornwallis, and was greatly troubled over the settlement of the Nawab of the Carnatic's debts, in which nothing has yet been found to implicate him directly, there being no adequate proof that he was hand-in-glove with the Macphersons and other creditors. He strove to discourage speculation and plotting, gave the authorities in India the utmost possible freedom and welcomed suggestions for the betterment of Government's Indian policy. He wished that the Board of Control should confine itself only to general supervision, and that India was to be governed in India itself and not in Downing Street or the East India House. He discouraged the London Agents of Indian Princes and insisted that all the latter's negotiations should be carried on through the Government of India. Above all, Dr. Furber shows that he wished "to discourage objectionable nepotism", though he was partial to his own relations and countrymen. He tried to create a party among the Directors, which would support the Board of Control; and he was greatly solicitous about the development of the India and China trade. He was not satisfied with the settlement of the Treaty of Seringapatam but accepted the scheme of Permanent Revenue Settlement. With Cornwallis' advice, he checked his desire for establishing greater control over the Directors when the Charter Act of 1793 came to be passed. When Lord Hobart, Governor of

Madras and Sir John Shore quarrelled, he resolved to send out Cornwallis once more, or to go himself in case of Cornwallis' refusal; but in the sequel Lord Mornington was appointed. His secret despatches to the Governor-General reveal not only his skill in foreign policy and high finance, but also his idea of starting a University at Calcutta, and the building up of a distinct and separate Civil Service.

Dundas' family allowed no one for a long time to examine his papers which were allowed to be broken up only in 1924 and sold at Sotheby's and by Francis Edwards. The former sold the Scottish correspondence to the National Library of Scotland, and the latter bought up the India correspondence and allowed it to be examined. But still scattered portions are not available. Dr. Furber pleads that his work may consequently lack finality in several points. It has used, both extensively and intensively, a large mass of *ms* material; and the book has been furnished with maps showing the growth and decline of the Dundas Interest in the Scottish Parliamentary elections of the period, which was so great that Boswell spoke of our hero, as "Harry the Ninth uncrowned King of Scotland."

C. S. S.

The Round Table

No. 86—March 1932.

The March issue of *The Round Table* covers a wide field; disarmament and reparations, the British tariff and imperial preference, India and China, the troubles of America, Europe and the great overseas Dominions. The first article continues the discussion of the international crisis. In spite of the lull in the storm, trade still remains stagnant. But the financiers themselves paralysed by want of confidence can find no way out of the depression without the assistance of the politicians, whose chief task is, in the words of the Young Plan Committee "the adjustment of all intergovernmental debts (reparations and other war debts) to the existing troubled situation of the world". After an examination of the political situation of Germany, France and the United States, *The Round Table* suggests the only method of approach which seems to it likely to lead to the solution of the problem.

The second article considers the problem of imperial preference in relation to the forthcoming conference at Ottawa, which presents a peculiar opportunity, partly because of the uprush of imperial sentiment in Great Britain, partly because the Dominions, with the acquisition of political autonomy, are questioning more doubtfully than hitherto their economic nationalism. "The purpose of an imperial economic system is to cause trade to flow not less but more freely. We want to exchange more of our products for more of the products of our fellow members of the Commonwealth". That is the keynote of the article. After analysing Great Britain's peculiar economic necessities, the writer goes on to discuss alternative methods of procedure. Should we delay negotiations with the Dominions till we have experienced the effects of a preferential tariff system? Should we enter into binding commercial treaties with the Dominions? Should we attempt to reach a single agreement with all of them, or should we differentiate between them? To these questions the article suggests the answer.

Next comes an article on "China, Japan and Manchuria" analysing the fundamental causes of the conflagration in the Far East—the colonisation policy of Japan in Manchuria, her com-

mercial interests there, the railway controversy. After discussing the situation in Manchuria, the writer explains how the struggle between Japan and China came to spread southward to Shanghai, and discusses the attitude of the League of Nations and the wider aspect of the dispute.

There follows an article describing the results of the second session of the Indian Round Table Conference, and the reasons why these results were so disappointing.

The fifth article is entitled "Reparations in Practice". The vicious economic spiral is "an escalator which must carry us downwards, even though our relative descent is checked, until the movement is definitely reversed". In the restoration of confidence, which is a condition of economic recovery, the settlement of the reparation problem holds a pre-eminent place. The article proceeds to recount by what means Germany has paid reparations, and how precarious was the economic equilibrium that she was building up. But how long can her present unstable condition be prolonged, and what would be the consequences of a German collapse? These are pertinent questions for the politicians.

The next article, "the United States in the New Year", takes up the story from the American standpoint—the disappointment of 1931, the hopes and fears for 1932. The attitude of the American people towards war debts is described, along with the budgetary problem and the plans for financial reconstruction.

A correspondent in India recounts the course of the struggle with Congress. He tells how the no-rent campaign in the United Provinces, the Red Shirt movement on the Frontier, and the outbreak of terrorism in Bengal forced the Government's hand and rendered inevitable the ordinances and arrests. But the Government while maintaining its own authority is, the writer makes clear, proceeding swiftly with the constitutional reforms.

The British article is naturally preoccupied with the tariff policy of the Government and the discussion to which it gave rise in Parliament. But space is found for an impression of the Labour party in Opposition and the other parliamentary groups, and for a brief analysis of the industrial position. The article from the Irish Free State which describes the issues and possibilities of the general election will be read with unusual interest on account of Mr. de Valera's success. The usual economic section deals

this time mainly with the problem of the Shannon scheme. From Canada comes an analysis of her difficult railway problem, which is now being considered by a Royal Commission. The Australian article records the history of the December federal elections resulting in the return of a "national" government with a large majority; it also describes the way in which interest rates have been reduced by legislative action. South Africa sends a careful discussion of the problem of the gold standard, which is now dominating politics in the Union. Finally, the New Zealand contribution describes the policy, including that of financial reform, of the new Coalition Ministry, which received a mandate from the electorate early in December. The echo of our own recent history in the distant Dominions is not the least interesting feature of this series of articles.

Select Contents from Oriental Journals

Journal Asiatique Tome CCXVIII No. 1—1931.

L. Massignon—Le Diwan d'Al-Hallāj, essai de reconstitution, édition et traduction.

J. Przyluski—Melanges: Le Bouddhisme tantrique a Bali, d'après une publication récente.

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Questions de cosmogonie et de cosmologie mazdēennes by H. S. Nyberg.

Sutrālamkarā et Kalpanāmanditikā (re partie).

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R. G. Kent—The Recently Published Old Persian Inscriptions.

J. D. Prince—Surviving Turkish Elements in Serbo-Croatian.

G. W. Briggs—The Indian Rhinoceros as a Sacred Animal.

Journal of The American Oriental Society. Vol. 51, No. 4 December 1931.

Hsuan Chuang and the Wei Shih Philosophy by Clarence H. Hamilton (a study of the essential facts concerning the basic intellectual interest of the famous Chinese Pilgrim in his journey to India in search of authentic Buddhist wisdom).

The Divinity of Kings by E. Washburn Hopkins.

Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies—London Institution. Vol. VI Part 3.

J. Przyluski and G. H. Luce—The number 'A Hundred' in Sino-Tibetan.

S. K. De—Bhagavatism and Sun-worship.

T. N. Dave—Notes on Gujarati Phonology.

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O. G. Von Wesendonk—Zuyasna 51; 20-22.

H. Lüders—Das Zeichen für 70 in den Inschriften Von Ma-thurā ans der Śaka und Kusana-Zeit.

W. Caland—A Note on the Sathapatha—Brahmana.

T. N. Ramachandran—An Inscribed Pillar-carving from Amaravati.

W. Ivanow—A Specimen of Bashgali from Kamdesh (in Ka-firistan).

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G. Ramdas—The Gadabas.

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R. Ch. Panda—Note on an Oriya copper-plate Inscription of Ramachandra Deo, Saka 1728.

A. Banerji Sastri—Two Brahmi Seals from Buxar.

U. Misra—Halayudha's Mimamsa Sastra Sarvasva.

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K. K. Datta—The Marathas in Bengal (1740-1765).

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T. N. Ramachandran—Kambakaya—Grant of the Eastern Ganga Devandra Varman.

S. R. Balasubrahmanyam—Chidambaram in Vijayanagara days.

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The Early capital of the Gurjara-Pratihāras of Mahodaya by J. C. Ghosh.

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